SEP 1 1974
 
 Sfimmcmi tatcmen 
 
 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD 
 
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 THORNTON KIRKLAND LOTHROP. 
 
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 48601 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 
 <$be UrtjEmDe prc$a Cambridge 
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 Copyright, 1896, 
 
 SIRKLAND. 
 
 All rights reserved. 
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 CONTENTS. 
 
 ^ CHAPTER I. 
 
 ^ YOUTH. ADMISSION TO THE BAR. FIRST STEPS IN 
 
 POLITICS ........... 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK ...... 23 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 fc\ PROFESSIONAL LIFE. Six YEARS A PRIVATE CITIZEN . 43 
 
 N - ' ; '.- /. :.-.. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. ." - 
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS ..... 62 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES : SEWARD'S SPEECH 86 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION ..... 106 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 THE REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE . . 122 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 THE FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY . . 142 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS ...... 162 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE DRED SCOTT CASE. THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR 
 KANSAS 181
 
 vi CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1860 .... 209 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61 220 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 THE CABINET. FORT SUMTER 246 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 JUSTICE CAMPBELL AND THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS . 258 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 LETTER OF APRIL IBT TO THE PRESIDENT. THE 
 BLOCKADE 276 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 ENGLAND'S RECOGNITION OF THE CONFEDERATES AS 
 BELLIGERENTS 292 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS AS TO THE TREATY OF PARIS. SUSPEN- 
 SION OF THE HABEAS CORPUS 311 
 
 CHAPTER XVIH. 
 THE TRENT 320 
 
 CHAPTER XlX. 
 
 INTERVENTION. CABINET DIFFICULTIES. EMANCI- 
 PATION 348 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR .... 368 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. RETIREMENT 
 
 FROM PUBLIC LIFE 39G
 
 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 YOUTH. ADMISSION TO THE BAE. FIRST 
 STEPS IN POLITICS. 
 
 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD was born on the 
 16th of May, 1801, in Florida, a village in the 
 town of Warwick, in the county of Orange, and 
 state of New York. His father, Dr. Samuel S. 
 Seward, was a physician of good standing, and 
 the first vice-president of the county medical 
 society. Dr. Seward was a farmer as well as 
 physician, and also the magistrate, storekeeper, 
 banker, and money-lender of the little place. 
 He lived to a good old age, dying after his son's 
 election to the senate of the United States, in 
 1849. 
 
 The family was of New Jersey origin. John 
 Seward, the grandfather of William Henry, 
 served in the Revolution, beginning as captain, 
 and ending his campaigns as colonel of the First 
 Sussex Regiment. Sussex is the northernmost
 
 2 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 county of New Jersey, and Orange county lies 
 on the southern border of New York, so that the 
 migration of Dr. Seward did not carry him far 
 from his original home. He married a Miss 
 Jennings from the neighborhood of Florida, and 
 Seward speaks of his mother as a " person of 
 excellent sense, gentleness, truthfulness and can- 
 dor." William Henry was the fourth of six 
 children, and, after the fashion of those days, 
 was selected, as the least physically robust, to 
 receive a college education. The village school, 
 the academy at Goshen, and a term or two in 
 a short-lived academy in Florida, gave him his 
 preparatory training, and at the age of fifteen 
 he passed the examination for the junior class 
 atJJnion College, Schenectady ; though the rules 
 as to age at that institution compelled him to 
 enter as sophomore./ 
 
 Before going to college, Seward at home had 
 taken his share of the household duties and 
 labors. His father had three domestic servants 
 (slaves, some of whom lived to a good old age 
 and were Seward's pensioners to the end of their 
 days) ; but William Henry drove the cows to 
 pasture in the early morning and back again at 
 night ; he had the wood to chop and bring in, 
 and other daily chores to do. He began his 
 labors at dawn, and finished them at bed-time, 
 about nine o'clock. At school he was a bright
 
 YOUTH. 3 
 
 and studious boy, perhaps a bit of a prig. His 
 first composition, an essay on Virtue, began: 
 "Virtue is the best of all the vices." He re- 
 fused, when at the academy, to join in a lock- 
 out ; at college he sought his tutor's aid that he 
 might really get hold of his Latin, and was 
 evidently desirous to make the most of his oppor- 
 tunities. He was not wanting, however, in the 
 hasty temper or the audacity of youth, and when 
 an instructor had, as Seward thought, treated 
 him unfairly, he remonstrated, refused to recite, 
 marched out of the class-room, left the college 
 buildings and established himself in a hotel, de- 
 clining to return until he had received an apol- 
 ogy. The judicious intervention of Dr. Nott, 
 then and for nearly half a century president of 
 Union College, quickly settled the matter, and 
 Seward went back to his work. This seems to 
 have been his only collision with the authorities ; 
 but a little later in his college career troubles 
 of another sort came upon him. 
 
 On his arrival in Schenectady he had been 
 dissatisfied with the work of the traveling tailor 
 who had furnished his wardrobe ; and, that he 
 might be dressed in a less rustic fashion, he had 
 gone to the shops patronized by the students. 
 His scanty allowance did not enable him to pay 
 for this extravagance, his father would not help 
 him, and his creditors became clamorous ; so with-
 
 4 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 out consulting or even informing his family, he 
 resolved to abandon his college career, and begin 
 at once to make his own way in the world. He 
 quietly left Schenectady, joined a friend who 
 was engaged to teach at the South, and sailed 
 with him for Savannah. His father, learning 
 of his departure, started in pursuit, and endeav- 
 ored unsuccessfully to intercept him in New 
 York. Seward arrived safely in Georgia, and 
 obtained a position there as the teacher of a 
 newly established academy. His father learned 
 his whereabouts and wrote in a rage to the 
 trustees, threatening them with all the terrors 
 of the law if they continued to harbor the delin- 
 quent, whom he described as " a much-indulged 
 son, who, without any just provocation, had ab- 
 sconded from Union College, thereby disgracing 
 a well - acquired position, and plunging his pa- 
 rents into profound shame and grief." Seward, 
 however, remained at his post as teacher until 
 the appointment and arrival of his successor, 
 and then returned home to pass six months 
 studying law in an attorney's office at Goshen. 
 At the end of this time he rejoined the senior 
 class at Union College, graduating with honor 
 in 1820: His father upon his return was far 
 from killing the fatted calf for this wandering 
 son ; he still declined to assist him in paying the 
 tailor's bills, and they were finally discharged
 
 ADMISSION TO THE BAR. 3 
 
 by installments from Seward's own hard earn- 
 ings. Writing of this after the lapse of half a 
 century, Seward says : " I would by no means 
 imply a present conviction that the fault was al- 
 together with my father. On the other hand, I 
 think now the fault was not altogether mine." 
 As, before his own exodus, two of his brothers 
 had already left home on account of money dif- 
 ficulties with their father, there was probably 
 some justification for these conclusions. 
 
 On leaving college, Seward resumed the study 
 of the law, and occupied himself also with office 
 work and such other professional employment as 
 he could obtain in the inferior courts. He was 
 admitted to the bar at Utica in October, 1822. 
 His earnings while a student had not only ena- 
 bled him to cancel his college debts and to pay 
 his way, but left him sixty dollars with which to 
 begin life. He started at once for western New 
 York, and at Auburn accepted an offer of a 
 partnership with Elijah Miller, a leading lawyer 
 of that town. How far Mr. Miller was induced 
 to make this proposal by his good opinion of 
 Seward's abilities, and how much he was influ- 
 enced by his knowledge of the mutual interest 
 in each other of his daughter Frances and the 
 young lawyer, one cannot tell, but the legal part- 
 nership was speedily followed by a closer rela- 
 tion between them, Seward marrying Frances
 
 8 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Miller on the 20th of October, 1824. His 
 marriage was a satisfaction, and his professional 
 success was an agreeable disappointment to his 
 father, who had dismissed him, when he left 
 home to begin his practice, with a present of fifty 
 dollars, and " the assurance of his constant ex- 
 pectation that he would come back too soon." 
 
 Seward's first appearance in court, after his 
 admission to the bar, was in defense of a con- 
 vict just discharged from the State prison at 
 Auburn, who had been warned to leave town at 
 once. The temptation of an open house-door 
 was too much for him. He went in and began 
 to steal, but was disturbed in his operations and 
 got only a few trifles. He was indicted for 
 the larceny of a quilted holder and a piece of 
 calico. Seward proved that the holder was 
 sewed, not quilted, and that the bit of cloth 
 was jean, not calico. The variance caused his 
 client's acquitta/, and his success in this case 
 was followed by a considerable amount of crimi- 
 nal business. Seward was a careful draughts- 
 man, taking pains, not merely with the sub- 
 stance but with the clerkly appearance of every 
 instrument that left his office, so that he was 
 much employed in this way also, and in his first 
 year his professional income exceeded the five 
 hundred dollars guaranteed him by Mr. Miller. 
 
 In 1828, he was nominated by Governor Clin-
 
 ADMISSION TO THE BAR. 1 
 
 ton for surrogate of Cayuga county ; but while 
 he was in Albany, awaiting the confirmation of 
 his appointment by the senate, a meeting in 
 favor of the renomination of President John 
 Quincy Adams was held there. Clinton had just 
 come out for Jackson, and a decided majority 
 of the New York senators were Jackson men. 
 Seward was for Adams. He went to the Adams 
 meeting, and in consequence of this his nomina- 
 tion was rejected. His name was never again 
 submitted to a senate for its action until more 
 than thirty years afterward, when Lincoln nom- 
 inated him as secretary of state. 
 
 In these early years of his professional life, 
 he took a lively interest in the militia of the 
 state of New York. He was the adjutant of 
 the troop which met Lafayette on his arrival at 
 Auburn in 1825, and accompanied him on his 
 night journey eastward to Syracuse. A few 
 years later he organized a company of artillery, 
 contributed largely to its equipment, and was 
 chosen its captain. By successive promotions 
 he attained the rank of brigadier-general, but 
 declined the major-general's commission which 
 was subsequently offered him. 
 
 Seward's family were Jeffersonian Republi- 
 cans, and in the divisions which rent that party 
 in the state of New York into personal factions, 
 on the one side the Tammany men, or " Buck-
 
 8 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 tails," as they were called, supporting Vice-Pres- 
 ident Tompkins ; and on the other the followers 
 of Governor Clinton, " the Clintonians,'" Sew- 
 ard at first remained with his father on the side 
 of Tammany. When Vice-President Tompkins 
 visited Schenectady, Seward, then in the senior 
 class, delivered an address of welcome on behalf 
 of the students who were of the vice-president's 
 party; and in his last college term he wrote an 
 essay to prove that the Erie canal, then in 
 process of construction under Clinton's auspices, 
 was an impossibility ; and that, even if it could 
 be completed, it would be the financial ruin of 
 the state. But he was never quite satisfied with 
 his father's explanation of Washington's dissent 
 from, and Hamilton's opposition to, the Repub- 
 lican party, which Dr. Seward accounted for 
 by Washington's alleged failure in intellectual 
 power and independence, and Hamilton's desire 
 
 . for a monarchy. Moreover, his original journey 
 to Auburn had opened his eyes to the impor- 
 tance as well as to the practicability of the Erie 
 Canal ; and so it happened by a gradual process 
 of change and development, that in 1824, he cast 
 his vote for De Witt Clinton as governor, and 
 definitively abandoned the party he had been 
 educated to support. \ 
 
 v In the summer of 1824, before his marriage, 
 Seward, with his father and mother and Mr.
 
 FIRST STEPS IN POLITICS. 9 
 
 Miller's family, made a journey to Niagara. As 
 they were driving through Rochester on their 
 way home, a wheel came off the coach, and most 
 of the party were thrown out. Among the pas- 
 sers-by attracted by the accident was Thurlow 
 Weed, then a resident of Rochester, " the editor 
 of a dingy weekly Clintonian newspaper, called 
 the * Monroe Telegram,' one of the poorest 
 and worst dressed men in the town, living in a 
 cheap house in an obscure part of the village ; " 
 but even then in western New York wielding 
 in politics a very decisive power. Weed was 
 helpful to them in their misfortune ; and this 
 was Seward's first meeting with the man whose 
 friendship and influence played so important a 
 part in his whole political career. x 
 
 Not long after his return from this journey, 
 Seward wrote his first published political paper, 
 an Address of the county convention at Au- 
 burn, in October, 1824. This address was a 
 bold onslaught on the " Albany Regency," a 
 combination of a dozen politicians, who, under 
 the direction of Martin Van Buren, dictated for 
 many years the nominations and policy of the 
 Democratic party of the state of New York. 
 On the fourth of July, 1825, he spoke at Auburn, 
 and something of what he said is interesting as 
 a summary of his own convictions at that time 
 and his forecast of the political future :
 
 10 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 " The Missouri question is settled and almost 
 forgotten ; the tariff bill has become a law ; the 
 sceptre has passed from the Ancient Dominion, 
 and the union of these states is still unshaken. 
 Believe me, fellow-citizens, those men's wishes 
 for confusion far outrun their wisdom, who 
 believe, or profess to believe, that parties upon 
 cardinal principles will again arise. The time 
 and the occasion for these parties have alike 
 gone by, and the attempt to rouse the vindic- 
 tive feelings which once existed is as idle as the 
 hope to call spirits from the vasty deep. New 
 parties are yearly formed and as often dis- 
 solved, because they arise upon questions of 
 limited extent, or out of regard to men of dif- 
 ferently estimated merit. And such parties will 
 succeed each other, as in rolling seas wave suc- 
 ceeds wave ; but there will at times be a calm, 
 and such light and transitory excitement will 
 only serve to keep the political waters in health- 
 ful motion. 
 
 " Those, too, misapprehend the true interests 
 of the people of these states, or their intelligence, 
 who believe, or profess to believe, that a sepa- 
 ration will ever take place between the North 
 and South. The people of the North have been 
 seldom suspected of a want of attachment to the 
 Union, and those of the South have been much 
 misrepresented by a few politicians of a stormy
 
 FIRST STEPS IN POLITICS. 11 
 
 character, who have ever been unsupported by 
 the people there. The North will not willingly 
 give up the power they now have in the national 
 councils, of gradually completing a work in 
 which, whether united or separate, from prox- 
 imity of territory, we shall ever be interested 
 the emancipation of slaves. And the South will 
 never, even in a moment of resentment, expose 
 themselves to a war with the North, while they 
 have such a great domestic population of slaves, 
 ready to embrace any opportunity to assert their 
 freedom and inflict their revenge. ... If , indeed, 
 these states were to be divided by a geographical 
 line, that line would be drawn along the Alle- 
 ghany Mountains or the Mississippi River." 
 v The sphere of Se ward's political activity for 
 the next few years did not extend beyond the 
 limits of his town and county, and it is not till 
 1828 that we find him appearing on a larger 
 field of public affairs. In August of that year 
 he presided over a convention of the young men 
 of the state favorable to the reelection of John 
 Quincy Adams to the presidency. The conven- 
 tion numbered more than three hundred and 
 fifty members, a body of earnest, active workers 
 with strong political convictions. It was one of 
 the last of the state assemblages of the National 
 Republican party, which was utterly routed and 
 dispersed by the Democrats under Jackson in
 
 12 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the presidential election of that year. Upon 
 its disappearance Seward joined, and soon be- 
 came active in, the anti-Masonic party in west- 
 ern New York, of which Thurlow Weed was a 
 moving spirit. The rise and progress of this 
 party is one of the most curious episodes in our 
 state and national politics. / 
 
 In 1826 there lived in Batavia in the state of 
 New York, one William Morgan, a most humble 
 and insignificant person, a Freemason, whose 
 extreme poverty tempted him to publish a book, 
 announced as a revelation of the secrets of the 
 order, and by the sale of which he expected to 
 make a good deal of money. Some over-zealous 
 and misguided fanatics among the Masons, learn- 
 ing of his proposed publication, arrested him on 
 a frivolous pretext, hurried him from place to 
 place, and at last procured his confinement in a 
 deserted fort at Niagara. Here he utterly dis- 
 appeared, having been, if one may trust the evi- 
 dence, taken off in a boat and drowned in the 
 waters of Lake Ontario. All attempts to detect 
 and convict the authors of this crime were 
 baffled by the powerful association of which 
 they were members ; but there was no anti- 
 Masonic party in any locality until, in the sum- 
 mer of 1827, a gentleman who had been the 
 treasurer of the town of Rochester, ever since 
 its incorporation, and to whose reelection there
 
 FIRST STEPS IN POLITICS. 13 
 
 was no open opposition, was beaten at the polls 
 by a candidate whose nomination even had 
 been previously unknown. For this political 
 overturn the Freemasons claimed the credit. 
 The defeated officer was not a Mason ; he had 
 by chance been an eye-witness of something 
 subsequently shown to have been connected with 
 Morgan's disappearance ; and he had also taken 
 a prominent part in the investigations set 011 
 foot to discover the criminals. The result of 
 this petty local election, and the consequent ex- 
 ultation of the Masons, angered the people of 
 the village and county, and in the autumn anti- 
 Masonic candidates were nominated and elected 
 to the state assembly. The next year (1828) 
 the anti-Masons extended and perfected their 
 political organization ; they obtained control of 
 the western counties of New York ; they cap- 
 tured some isolated towns elsewhere, and at- 
 tracted the attention of the public throughout 
 the state. They held a convention, nominated a 
 candidate for governor, and succeeded in choos- 
 ing five out of the thirty -two state senators 
 and seventeen members of the assembly. The 
 " Anti-Masonic Enquirer," Thurlow Weed's 
 paper, had a circulation not merely in the 
 western, middle and northern counties of New 
 York, but in some parts of Pennsylvania and 
 Ohio. There was no general state election in
 
 14 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 1829. In March, 1830, the " Albany Evening 
 Journal " was established as an anti-Masonic 
 paper under Weed's editorship ; and a national 
 convention of the party, which Seward attended, 
 was held at Philadelphia in September. 
 
 In the following year Seward came to New 
 England for the first time in his life. Arriving 
 in Boston on the anniversary of Morgan's ab- 
 duction, he went to the anti-Masonic committee 
 room, where he was called upon to speak, and 
 found himself to his surprise " preaching pol- 
 itics " in that city. He visited John Quincy 
 Adams at Quincy, and the acquaintance thus 
 begun ripened into a warm and enduring friend- 
 ship. He found Mr. Adams an anti-Masonic 
 candidate for Congress, "intensely engaged in 
 Writing a bitter polemic against Freemasonry." 
 A little later there was a second national anti- 
 Masonic convention at Baltimore, to which 
 Seward was also a delegate. Here chief justice 
 Marshall occupied a seat on the platform, and 
 William Wirt (who had been Monroe's attor- 
 ney-general) was nominated as a candidate for 
 president. It was known, when this was done, 
 that Henry Clay intended to be a presidential 
 candidate ; but he had already expressed him- 
 self so strongly against the anti- Masons, that 
 his nomination by them was impossible. It was 
 certain, therefore, that the opposition in New
 
 FIRST STEPS IN POLITICS. 15 
 
 York to General Jackson's reelection would be 
 divided, and it was feared that it would be im- 
 possible under the circumstances to carry the 
 state against him. The result justified this 
 apprehension. Jackson had in New York a 
 decisive majority; and both in the electoral col- 
 lege and in the country made considerable gains 
 over his vote of four years before. Clay sus- 
 tained an overwhelming defeat. Wirt received 
 only the four electoral votes of Vermont. The 
 two parties representing the opposition were 
 utterly crushed, and Jackson's removal of the 
 government deposits from the United States 
 Bank in the following year failed to reanimate 
 either of them in New York. The anti-Masons 
 sent only nine members to the assembly, as 
 against thirty-five the year before, and at a con- 
 ference of the leaders in December, 1833, it 
 was unanimously agreed that the party was at 
 an end. 
 
 The anti-Masonic party owed its origin and 
 its strength to the conviction of the leading 
 young men of western New York that the ex- 
 istence of a secret society, whose members were 
 bound to one another by an obligation which had 
 been able to paralyze the exertions of counsel, 
 to shut the mouths of witnesses or compel them 
 to perjure themselves, to unnerve the arm of 
 justice and to override and corrupt all depart-
 
 16 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ments of the government, was inconsistent with 
 the safety, and even threatened the existence, of 
 a popular government. Many men of distinc- 
 tion, ability, and experience shared these views, 
 and supported the party ; among them were 
 Chief Justice Marshall and Judge Story, John 
 Quincy Adams, Calhoun, William Henry Harri- 
 son, Richard Rush, and Edward Everett. The 
 extent of their feeling about the matter may be 
 judged from the fact that ex-President Adams 
 and Judge Story seriously considered whether 
 such secrecy as there is about the college Greek- 
 letter societies ought not, on public grounds, to 
 be prohibited. 
 
 A national party, however, could not be built 
 up on a solitary instance either of the open 
 defiance or secret evasion of the law in one 
 section of a single state. Though the popular 
 excitement in New York and the neighboring 
 states caused by the Morgan affair was natural, 
 yet in their attacks upon the Masonic orders 
 the anti-Masons overlooked for the time the be- 
 nevolent purposes of the organization, and ap- 
 plied to it a general proposition, that, 'l_Secret 
 societies, composed of members bound together 
 by unlawful oaths, and extended over the whole 
 land, are opposed to the genius of our govern- 
 ment, subversive of the laws, and inconsistent 
 with private rights and the public welfare."
 
 FIRST STEPS IN POLITICS. 17 
 
 x Seward joined the anti-Masons, as he himself 
 says, because he thought them the only political 
 organization, having any life, which was opposed 
 to Jackson, Calhoun, and Van Buren, three 
 political leaders whose policy seemed to him to 
 involve " not only the loss of our national sys- 
 tem of revenue, and of enterprises of state and 
 national improvement, but also the future dis- 
 union of the states, and ultimately the universal 
 prevalence of slavery." It was as the represen- 
 tative of this short-lived but vigorous party that 
 he made his entrance into public office, being 
 elected in the autumn of 1830 to the senate of 
 the state. 
 
 The New York senate at that time consisted 
 of only thirty-two members, each chosen for four 
 years, their terms expiring in rotation, so that 
 neither the whole senate nor more than one 
 member from a district was changed in any one 
 year. Se ward, when he took his seat there in 
 January, 1831, was only twenty-nine years old, 
 small and slender, with blue eyes, light sandy 
 hair, a smooth face, and a youthful air and ex- 
 pression which made him appear even younger 
 than he was. He was one of a very small minor- 
 ity, the majority being all members of, or de- 
 pendent on, the Albany Regency, the all-powerful 
 central force of the New York Democracy. J3.& 
 had had no previous experience in public affairs,
 
 18 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 while nearly all his fellow - senators were not 
 only older and more mature, but were familiar 
 with their position and its labors ; and he was 
 for a time diffident, embarrassed and silent. His 
 first set speech was an argument for a reform 
 in the militia system ; the changes he then ad- 
 vocated were afterwards substantially adopted, 
 and their value was shown in the prompt re- 
 sponse of New York to President Lincoln's call 
 for troops in April, 1861. The closing passage 
 of this maiden speech of Se ward's, though it 
 may have been a mere rhetorical flight, has 
 about it, in view of later events, a curious, pro- 
 phetic ring, when he speaks of " the military 
 spirit which brought the nation into existence, 
 and will be able to carry us through the dark 
 and perilous ways of national calamity yet un- 
 known to us, but which must at some time be 
 trodden by all nations." 
 
 During his term in the senate, he was an 
 earnest supporter of the first law passed in New 
 York abolishing imprisonment for debt except 
 in cases of fraud; and an early" ancTstrenuous 
 advocate for the enactment of general laws, 
 such as are now found in the statute books of 
 most states, giving to all citizens the right to 
 form business corporations, instead of creating 
 them as a favor by special charter. 
 
 At this time, and down to the adoption of the
 
 FIRST STEPS IN POLITICS. 19 
 
 constitution of 1846, the senate of New York 
 was not merely a branch of the legislative de- 
 partment, it had also judicial functions, and like 
 the English House of Lords was the court of 
 last resort ; and a considerable portion of Sew- 
 ard's time was taken up by his judicial labors. 
 The work was excellent professional training; 
 he was interested in it, and discharged its duties 
 conscientiously. 
 
 In the summer of 1833, Seward, at his father's 
 invitation, accompanied him to Europe. The 
 account of his travels has no novelty or especial 
 interest to-day, aside from a little visit which 
 he made to Lafayette at La Grange. He re- 
 turned in season for his last winter's work as 
 senator. 
 
 The presidential election of 1824 had been 
 purely a personal contest. No one of the series 
 of resolutions recommending the various candi- 
 dates suggested any difference in their political 
 opinions ; and though in the campaign of 1828 
 the friends of Jackson attacked President Ad- 
 ams's position on the tariff, and on questions of 
 internal improvements, no distinction could be 
 drawn between Jackson and the President on 
 these points, since Jackson had voted for all the 
 measures of the kind that Adams supported. 
 Jackson's first term was characterized by discus- 
 sions and divisions as to the tariff and internal
 
 20 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 improvements, and by the opening of his attack 
 on the United States Bank. Before his second 
 election a convention of the young men of the 
 National Republican party adopted a series of res- 
 olutions, declaring adequate protection to Amer- 
 ican industry to be indispensable to the pros- 
 perity of the country, and a uniform system of 
 internal improvements, sustained and supported 
 by the general government, to be an important 
 security for the harmony, strength and perma- 
 nency of the republic. Yet it might fairly be 
 said, taking the whole country together, that the 
 question of personal loyalty to Jackson entered 
 into the campaign of 1832 at least as largely 
 as any matter of public policy. The union of 
 the opposition, which was divided into National 
 Republicans and anti- Masons, would not have 
 changed the result. Jackson's majority author- 
 ized him, as he thought, to carry on a personal 
 government for the next four years and to make 
 war in such a way as seemed to him effectual, 
 without regard to constitutional or legal limita- 
 tions, upon any policy or institution which he 
 disbelieved in, or which was supported by men 
 who withstood his imperious will. The opposi- 
 tion, demoralized and disheartened by its over- 
 whelming defeat in 1832, so far rallied two 
 years later as to unite in the formation of the 
 Whig party, the fundamental articles of whose
 
 FIRST STEPS IN PC! T^ICS. 21 
 
 political creed were the sr fa policy of 
 
 internal improvements, r- rican 
 
 industry and a national iu \nk. 
 
 Of this new party Sewaru 
 
 for jjovernor in 1834. He faileu 
 and returning to Auburn resumed u 
 of the law. His four years in the state 
 had strengthened him in every way ; the life *. 
 enlarged his horizon ; the constant intercourse 
 with other and older men of more experience 
 than himself, and discussions in public and pri- 
 vate, had developed him ; his position as a judge 
 not merely gave him the opportunity to hear, but 
 required him to listen to and to weigh the argu- 
 ments of all the leading lawyers of the state ; 
 and this legal work was on a higher plane than 
 his previous practice at the bar. His absence 
 had rather improved than injured his standing 
 as a lawyer, and he was at once full of business, 
 and soon overworked. The summer of 1835 
 he spent in traveling for the benefit of his wife's 
 health. 
 
 In June, 1836, he became the agent of some 
 gentlemen who had purchased of the Holland 
 Company its lands in Chautauqua county, in the 
 extreme southwest of the state of New York. 
 The settlers on these lands were to pay for them 
 by installments, and only received their deeds 
 when the final payments were made. The gen-
 
 22 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 tlemen for whom Seward was acting bought the 
 rights of the Holland Company in these lands, 
 and then got into difficulties with the settlers, 
 who were refusing to pay and were fast becoming 
 disorderly a,ud dangerous. To deal with them re- 
 quire&i both firmness and forbearance, good sense, 
 tact, kindness of heart and manner, and an evi- 
 dent disposition to do exact justice. The work 
 necessitated a more or less prolonged residence 
 in the county, and was Seward's most engross- 
 ing occupation until his nomination and election 
 as governor by the Whigs of New York, in the 
 autumn of 1838.
 
 CHAPTER H. 
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 
 
 THE Chautauqua affairs had been so far settled 
 in the previous year that the financial crisis of 
 1837 did not affect them, and Seward thought 
 himself free from all personal and business anx- 
 ieties when he entered upon his duties as gov- 
 ernor. His election meant a revolution in New 
 York politics. For forty years there had been 
 no governor who was not a Democrat ; but 
 though the Whigs had now carried the state, the 
 senate was still Democratic, and could control 
 both the legislation and appointments to office. 
 It was not till 1840 that Se ward's own party 
 had command, and in the last year of his second 
 term he was again confronted by a hostile, not 
 to say vindictive, majority in both branches of 
 the legislature. 
 
 During his four years as governor, the state 
 spent many millions in public improvements. 
 The Erie canal was enlarged, new canals were 
 built, and state aid was given to railways and 
 other similar enterprises. For only a small part 
 of this legislation were the Whigs really respons-
 
 24 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ible. Most of it they received as an inheritance 
 from their Democratic predecessors. 1 
 
 The Erie canal was De Witt Clinton's scheme, 
 and its success, from the outset, was so over- 
 whelming that it is not strange that it gave rise 
 to all sorts of similar schemes, of varying merit 
 and demerit. Seward was an ardent, perhaps 
 an indiscriminate advocate of all these. He be- 
 lieved in internal improvements, in constructing 
 either by the state itself, or with the aid of the 
 state, all manner of ways of communication by 
 land and by water, railways and canals, from 
 north to south, from east to west, between tide- 
 water and the lakes, through the great valleys 
 
 1 Seward says, That of the state debt of $30,000,000, in 
 1844, all but about $4,000,000 originated under Democratic ad- 
 ministrations ( Works, iii. p. 365) ; and Hammond, the historian 
 of New York, and a Democrat, admits that most of the debt 
 was contracted and sanctioned by Democratic legislatures and 
 governors ; though he explains that they were forced to do this 
 in order to keep their power, as the people were so eager for 
 public works that they would have brought in the Whigs, had 
 the Democracy shown any faltering in promoting them. In a 
 letter of January 30, 1844, Seward writes: "With unimpor- 
 tant exceptions every one of these contracts was made by the 
 statesmen who now disavow and disown them. . . . The same 
 statesmen who now denounce these works (the enlargement 
 of the Erie Canal and the New York and Erie Railroad) are 
 the same persons who called the latter enterprise into exist- 
 ence by a loan of $3,000,000. An intervening administration 
 [his own] added no new enterprise, and only executed the con- 
 tracts which it found in existence." Works, iii. pp. 392, 393.
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 25 
 
 of central New York, to the coal and iron fields 
 within and on her borders. Some of the works 
 which he favored may have been premature ; he 
 may have crowded and hurried them more than 
 the finances of the state would warrant; some 
 may not have been in themselves good paying 
 investments ; but the policy which inaugurated 
 and fostered them was broad and far-sighted, 
 and they one and all have enabled the state to 
 reap the full benefit of its admirable geographi- 
 cal situation, and have helped to make the city 
 of New York the seaboard metropolis of the 
 New "World. 
 
 v The necessity of public education in a com- 
 munity governed by universal suffrage was a 
 cardinal article of Seward's political faith, and 
 he was earnest in season and out of season in 
 his endeavors to extend and develop the school 
 system of New York. He saw the reluctance 
 of the Roman Catholics to send their children 
 to public schools not under their own control 
 and where the peculiar tenets of their faith were 
 not taught. For this and other reasons, he ad- 
 vocated the substitution of new school boards in 
 the city of New York in the place of the close 
 corporation, the " Committee of Public Instruc- 
 tion," a body exclusively Protestant, which had 
 the entire control of its schools and school funds. 
 He also earnestly recommended that sectarian
 
 26 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 or parochial schools should receive a share of the 
 public money devoted to educational purposes. 
 His support of the first of these measures drew 
 upon him the hostility of many of his party in 
 New York city ; while his repeated recommen- 
 dations of the latter policy alienated large bodies 
 of Protestant voters. His suggestions of changes 
 in legal procedure and practice, to lessen the 
 delays and diminish the expense of litigation, 
 were not favorably received by the bench or 
 bar; and the opposition to him upon these vari- 
 ous grounds, to say nothing of the hostility of 
 the disappointed office-holders and their friends, 
 caused the reduction of his personal majority in 
 1840, and contributed, with other national and 
 more general causes, to the total overthrow of the 
 Whig party in New York in the autumn of 1842. 
 During his public service as governor, the 
 
 charities of the state found in him a warm 
 
 - 
 
 friend ; and its lunatic asylum almost owed to 
 him its existence. The records of his pardon 
 papers, so far as they have been printed, are a 
 most honorable testimony, not merely to the 
 humanity and good sense which he brought to 
 bear on each particular case, but to the sound 
 principles which governed him in the exercise of 
 this high prerogative, and which are so often 
 neglected for the less creditable reasons of im- 
 portunity and influence.
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 27 
 
 In the distribution of offices he simply followed 
 the then well-established New York custom. 
 For at least a quarter of a century before Seward 
 was governor, "the cohesive power of public 
 plunder " had been the strongest bond of union 
 among the members of the different factions 
 who had followed the banner of one or the other 
 of the political leaders ; and it was a well-settled 
 rule of practice, long before it was formulated 
 by a New York senator as a political axiom, 
 that " to the victors belong the spoils." Fifty 
 years of added experience may enable us to 
 criticise and repudiate this doctrine, from whose 
 disastrous consequences we suffer daily in nearly 
 every department of our administration, from 
 that of the humblest messenger in our smallest 
 municipalities to the most important posts in our 
 national government. But a half century ago 
 " civil service reform " would have been an in- 
 comprehensible phrase, not merely to politicians 
 but to the people, and Seward was in this respect 
 no wiser than his generation. He expected from 
 those whom he appointed to office absolute and 
 unquestioning support. When a lawyer, whom 
 he had nominated as judge, appeared before a 
 legislative committee to oppose a change in the 
 management of the public schools, recommended 
 by the state superintendent of education, Sew- 
 ard withdrew the nomination. The unsatisfac'
 
 28 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 tory nature of the spoils system did not fail, 
 however, to impress itself upon him. He says 
 in a letter : " The list of appointments made 
 this "winter is fourteen hundred, for all of which 
 I am of course responsible, while in many, if not 
 most, instances the circumstances under which 
 the nominations were made left me without 
 freedom of election. ... I am not surprised 
 by any manifestation of disappointment or dis- 
 satisfaction. This only I claim, that 110 interest, 
 passion, prejudice or partiality of my own has 
 controlled any decision that I have made." 
 
 His courage and good temper in the trying 
 years when he was confronted with a legislature 
 where his political opponents were in a majority 
 in either one or both branches were admirable. 
 He never flinched or lost his self-control before 
 their petty insults or their grosser provocations, 
 but bore them with perfect apparent equanimity, 
 repelling with vigor, when necessary, the attacks 
 made on him, but never forgetting his personal 
 self-respect or the dignity of his position. " 
 
 His official action in two matters, which came 
 before him as governor, excited a good deal of 
 public feeling and discussion. The first of these 
 had its origin in the Canadian rebellion of 1837. 
 There was in that year an insurrection in Upper 
 Canada, in which the Canadian ringleaders were 
 largely assisted by reckless adventurers from
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 29 
 
 northern New York, a party of whom seized 
 Navy Island, in the Niagara River, entrenched 
 themselves there, and manned their works with 
 cannon stolen from the New York state arsenals. 
 A little steambpat, the Caroline, had been en- 
 gaged to bring them supplies. At the end of 
 her first day's employment she was made fast to 
 a wharf on the American side of the river, and 
 within the limits of the state of New York. 
 Here about midnight she was boarded by a 
 band of loyal Canadians, set on fire, cut loose 
 and left to drift over the falls. There was no 
 resistance. The men on the steamer were asleep 
 and unarmed. Some of them, awakened by the 
 attack, jumped ashore ; others were drowned. 
 One of the crew, Durfee, an American, was shot 
 and killed as he was running away. 
 
 When the news of this affair reached Wash- 
 ington, the secretary of state, Mr. Forsyth, 
 wrote to the British minister, complaining of 
 the violation of our territory, and saying that it 
 would form the subject of a demand for redress. 
 In his reply the British minister offered as an 
 excuse for the attack the "piratical character 
 of the Caroline, and the necessity of self-defense 
 and self-preservation under which Her Majesty's 
 subjects acted in destroying her ; the temporary 
 overthrow of the ordinary laws by piratical vio- 
 lence, on the New York frontier ; and the fact
 
 30 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 that Her Majesty's subjects in Upper Canada, 
 having already severely suffered from this cause 
 and being threatened with still farther injury, 
 . . . were necessarily impelled to consult their 
 own security by pursuing and destroying the 
 vessel wherever they might find her." 
 
 After this despatch, which treated the matter 
 as an act of private violence with extenuating 
 circumstances, nothing more was heard on the 
 subject from the British government for three 
 years, except the acknowledgment of our formal 
 demand for an apology and redress. " British 
 interests," says an English historian, " had 
 apparently been secured by the burning of the 
 Caroline, and the natural susceptibilities of the 
 inhabitants of the United States seemed hardly 
 worth consideration." 
 
 In November, 1840, Alexander McLeod, a 
 Canadian, while at Lockport in New York, 
 boasted that he had been one of the party at- 
 tacking the Caroline, and had himself shot 
 Durfee. He was thereupon arrested on a charge 
 of murder and arson. 
 
 On learning of his arrest, the British minister, 
 Mr. Fox, who had previously treated the affair 
 as the unauthorized act of private individuals, 
 and rested his justification of it upon the neces- 
 sity of self-preservation, which had impelled the 
 Canadians for their own security to pursue and
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 31 
 
 destroy the steamer wherever she might be, at 
 once took the opposite ground, and demanded 
 McLeod's immediate release ; because the " de- 
 struction of this steamboat was a public act of 
 persons in Her Majesty's service, obeying the 
 orders of their superior authorities." This was 
 the first official suggestion that the attack on 
 the steamer was the act of the government ; and 
 in making it, Mr. Fox was speaking without 
 authority. Forsyth replied that the matter was 
 now in the hands of the judiciary of New York, 
 and beyond the President's control. In Febru- 
 ary, 1841, Lord Palmerston, then secretary of 
 state for foreign affairs, wrote to Mr. Fox, 
 approving his course, and saying : " There was 
 never a matter upon which all parties, Tory, 
 Whig, and Radical, more entirely agreed. If 
 any harm should be done to McLeod, the in- 
 dignation and resentment of all England will be 
 extreme ; the British nation will never permit a 
 British subject to be dealt with as the people of 
 New York propose to deal with McLeod, with- 
 out taking signal revenge upon the offenders; 
 McLeod's execution would produce war, war 
 immediate and frightful in its character, because 
 it would be a war of retaliation and vengeance." 
 In this dispatch Lord Palmerston assumed on 
 behalf of Great Britain full responsibility for 
 the original attack. On the 12th of March,
 
 32 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 1841, the British minister communicated the 
 substance of this letter to Mr. Webster, who, 
 on the change of administration, had become 
 secretary of state under President Harrison ; 
 and our government then had for the first time 
 an authoritative declaration that the violation 
 of our territory, the killing of Durfee, and the 
 destruction of the steamer, with the incidental 
 loss of life, were acts done under orders of the 
 Canadian authorities, which England justified 
 and assumed as her own. In the opinion of the 
 administration this declaration entirely changed 
 the situation, and the transaction became a 
 national affair. Webster's reply to Fox was 
 delayed in consequence of Harrison's death. 1 
 Before sending it he had learned from Cass, 
 who was in Paris, that while McLeod's execu- 
 tion would be considered a casus belli, any sen- 
 tence short of this would not have that effect. 
 This information, however, did not diminish his 
 eagerness to dispose of the matter at once, and 
 he advised the President to send the attorney- 
 general to confer with Governor Seward upon 
 the new aspect given to the affair by this letter, 
 and to urge him to direct the prosecution to be 
 discontinued, and McLeod discharged. Seward 
 doubted his authority to interfere with the case 
 as suggested; and in view of the popular ex 
 
 1 He died April 4, 1841, after ten days' illness.
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 33 
 
 citement thought that such interference, if law- 
 ful, would be extremely injudicious. He was 
 confident that the people would acquiesce in 
 McLeod's acquittal, or in his pardon, if con- 
 victed, but would be very much stirred up if he 
 were released in the exceptional manner pro- 
 posed. For these reasons he declined to accede 
 to the President's suggestions ; though he as- 
 sured the attorney-general that he would pardon 
 McLeod if he were convicted, and that there 
 should be no execution and no war. This did 
 not satisfy Mr. Webster, and in reply to Pal- 
 merston's dispatch he suggested that McLeod 
 should apply to the court for a discharge on 
 habeas corpus. This was done. The federal 
 administration, against Seward's earnest remon- 
 strances, permitted the United States attorney, 
 who before his appointment had been McLeod's 
 counsel, to continue to act for him ; the attorney- 
 general of New York appeared officially on the 
 other side, and the proceedings in court assumed 
 in this way the aspect of a controversy between 
 the federal government on one side, and the 
 state government on the other, and were gen- 
 erally so regarded. 
 
 As McLeod's application for his discharge 
 was to be heard in the city of New York, he 
 was taken there in custody. The legislature 
 was in session when he passed through Albany.
 
 34 WILLIAM HENRY 8EWARD. 
 
 There was much excitement, and an outcry 
 that, by collusion between the governor and 
 the United States authorities, McLeod was to 
 be discharged without a trial. A resolve was 
 passed calling for all the documents and corre- 
 spondence relating to the case- The production 
 of the papers and Seward's accompanying mes- 
 sage showed the charge of collusion to be abso- 
 lutely groundless. The discharge was refused 
 by the court. McLeod was tried in October, 
 and acquitted on proof of an alibi. 1 
 
 Seward in this matter was upholding, as was 
 his official duty, the sovereignty of the State 
 of New York. Webster's contention was that, 
 
 1 The comments of the newspaper press on the court's 
 refusal to discharge McLeod disclosed a distinct difference 
 between the Whigs of the city of New York and those beyond 
 the Harlem River. Out of the city opinion was unanimously 
 with the court ; but in New York itself nearly as unanimously 
 against it. The question was treated as an issue between the 
 state of New York, her courts and governor on the one side, 
 and on the other the federal administration, represented by 
 Mr. Webster with his dominating personality, and supported 
 by the whole weight and authority of the United States. 
 
 The public questions raised in this case were novel ; and 
 though later writers on international law have supported Mr. 
 Webster's positions, yet at the time so eminent a jurist as 
 Lord Lyndhurst was of opinion that " it was very questionable 
 if the Americans had not right on their side," and that " in 
 a similar case in England they would be obliged to try the 
 man, and, if convicted, nothing but a pardon could save him." 
 Dana's Wheaton, p. 371 ; Greville's Journal, Part II. vol. i. 
 p. 383.
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 35 
 
 after Great Britain's admission of her responsi- 
 bility, the case should be at once ended and 
 McLeod released, either by an order of the 
 executive discontinuing the prosecution, or by a 
 judgment of the court, discharging him. 
 
 The New York court decided that, as peace 
 existed between Great Britain and the United 
 States, at the time of the burning of the Caro- 
 line, and McLeod was merely a private citizen, 
 holding no commission and acting under no pre- 
 vious authority, and as no responsibility for his 
 act was assumed by his government until after 
 he had been arrested and the court had acquired 
 jurisdiction of the case, its jurisdiction was not 
 ousted by the subsequent admission of his gov- 
 ernment, and the case should proceed in the 
 regular way. 
 
 What had been done in New York after Mc- 
 Leod's arrest had been originally approved by 
 Van Buren's administration, and Seward felt 
 keenly the treatment he had received at the 
 hands of its successors, the representatives of 
 his own party. Writing to a friend before the 
 trial, he says : " Nothing could have been more 
 unkind or unwise than the course pursued to- 
 wards me by the general government in the 
 McLeod affair. It was not merely unkind, it 
 was ungenerous. They enjoyed my full confi' 
 dence, they showed me none. I was left to learn
 
 36 WILLIAM HENRY SE^TARD. 
 
 the ground taken by the administration from 
 the published documents accompanying the 
 President's message. ... It has been somewhat 
 oppressive upon me personally to have Mr. 
 Webster roll over upon us the weight of his 
 great name and fame to smother me." 
 
 The matter created a good deal of feeling 
 on both sides. If Seward was offended at his 
 treatment by the administration, the President 
 and Mr. Webster were personally irritated both 
 by his refusal to intervene, and by the failure of 
 the attempt to obtain McLeod's immediate dis- 
 charge by the court. There were public grounds 
 also on which Mr. Webster wished to dispose 
 of the affair of the Caroline as speedily and 
 quietly as possible, and it annoyed him that the 
 governor of New York would not yield to his 
 judgment and cooperate in carrying out his 
 wishes. 
 
 Before the case was finally disposed of, there 
 was a change of government in England, and 
 shortly afterwards a special envoy was dispatched 
 to this country to settle various matters in dis- 
 pute. Among these was the affair of the Caro- 
 line. But with the discharge of McLeod, Great 
 Britain relapsed into the same indifference as 
 before his arrest, and it was with difficulty that 
 Mr. Webster obtained from the minister a state- 
 ment that " it was perhaps most to be regretted
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 37 
 
 that some explanation and apology for this 
 occurrence was not immediately made." This 
 doubtful expression of regret, and careful avoid- 
 ance of an apology, our government accepted as 
 sufficient amends for the invasion of our terri- 
 tory and the killing of our citizens. It was not 
 a triumph of American diplomacy, and the re- 
 sult quite justified Lord Palmerston's boast, that 
 "there was no apology for the Caroline and 
 should be none." 
 
 Whether Seward had at any time any expec- 
 tation of going into Harrison's cabinet, or any 
 reason for such expectation, cannot be stated. 
 A letter from Harrison to Webster, printed in 
 " Webster's Life and Correspondence," perhaps 
 indicates that Webster had dissuaded Harrison 
 from considering Seward for any cabinet ap- 
 pointment, and that Harrison had listened to his 
 advice. After thanking him for suggestions 
 upon this matter, Harrison writes : " I tell you, 
 however, in confidence, that I have positively 
 determined against S. There is no considera- 
 tion which would induce me to bring him into 
 the cabinet. We should have no peace with 
 his intriguing, restless disposition." It would 
 have been more useful, as well as more inter- 
 esting if Mr. Webster's biographer had either 
 suppressed both letters, or published the one to 
 which this is a reply. It is difficult to see who 
 
 48601
 
 38 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the mysterious " S " could have been except 
 Seward. If he were the person named, it is 
 evident that Webster had, before he went into 
 Harrison's cabinet, an opinion of Seward by no 
 means favorable, which may partly account for 
 the tone assumed by him in the matter of Mc- 
 Leod. If one considers also that the McLeod 
 matter came up after a controversy with Vir- 
 ginia, to be spoken of presently, had been going 
 on for two years, that President Tyler was first 
 and always a Virginian, and that his personal 
 animosity to Seward at that time and down to 
 the day of his death appears everywhere in his 
 biography, it is possible that there is to be 
 found here an additional explanation of the 
 arrogant and offensive treatment which Seward 
 received at this time at the hands of the admin- 
 istration, and how it happened that, while he 
 gave them his entire confidence, he was left to 
 learn their plans and policy from the newspapers 
 and public documents. 
 
 A controversy with Virginia, growing out of 
 a demand for the surrender of persons charged 
 with aiding in the escape of a fugitive slave, 
 involved Seward in a long and unpleasant cor- 
 respondence with the governor of that state, 
 gained him notoriety and odium in the South, a 
 prominent position among the advanced anti- 
 slavery Whigs at the North, and induced the
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 39 
 
 Abolitionists to endeavor to persuade him to 
 join their ranks and accept their nomination for 
 president. He preferred, however, to remain 
 ^Whig, believing, as he always insisted, that 
 there could be only two great parties in the 
 country, and that a third party could never ac- 
 complish, except indirectly, any important end. 
 The facts of the case were simple enough, 
 and the statement of them all that was needed 
 for Seward's justification. As he was leaving 
 Albany for a few days' absence an agent of 
 Virginia appeared with a requisition for two 
 colored men, charged with stealing a slave. 
 They had been already arrested and were in jail 
 in New York. Seward examined the affidavit 
 on which the application was founded, pointed 
 out what seemed to him its fatal defects, said 
 that he should hear the men before answering 
 the requisition, and would attend to the matter 
 on his return. Nothing more was heard from 
 the agent ; but a month later, on receiving a 
 letter on the subject from the acting governor 
 of Virginia, Seward ascertained by an official 
 report that the men had been discharged on 
 habeas corpus, because the judge before whom 
 they were brought was satisfied upon the evi- 
 dence that "neither of them had committed 
 an offense against the laws of Virginia." A 
 courteous note enclosing this report would seem
 
 40 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 to have been the dignified and proper reply to 
 the letter from Virginia ; but instead of confin- 
 ing himself to this, Seward voluntarily embarked 
 in a discussion of the proper construction of the 
 constitutional provision for the surrender of 
 fugitives from justice, insisting that it applied 
 only to offenses recognized as crimes by the 
 jurisprudence of all civilized nations, or to acts 
 made criminal by the laws both of the state 
 demanding and of that assenting to the sur- 
 render, and did not apply to acts which any one 
 state chose to make highly penal, but which 
 had no criminal significance in another, such 
 as assisting in the escape of a slave, an act 
 inspired by the spirit of humanity and of the 
 Christian religion. 
 
 This letter gave great offense to the authori- 
 ties and people of Virginia ; it was considered 
 an insult to the state, a wanton attack on the 
 peculiar institution upon which its whole social 
 fabric rested. The correspondence was continued 
 through more than two years, Seward's letters 
 alone covering seventy printed octavo pages. 
 Virginia sent copies of the letters to the other 
 slave states and asked their support ; the matter 
 was laid before her legislature, and a committee 
 of that body made an elaborate report upon it. 
 Her governor refused to surrender to New York 
 a fugitive charged with forgery ; and when the
 
 GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 41 
 
 legislature disapproved his action, he resigned. 
 The lieutenant-governor returned the alleged 
 forger ; but the Virginia legislature, by way of 
 retaliation for Seward's conduct, passed a law 
 imposing special burdens upon vessels coming 
 from, or bound to New York ; authorizing the 
 governor, however, to suspend its operation, 
 whenever New York should repeal its statute 
 giving alleged fugitive slaves the right of trial 
 by jury, and should either return the colored 
 seamen originally demanded, or show a proper 
 penitence and recant its constitutional heresies. 
 
 The friends of each governor approved his 
 course, and praised his superior skill in the dis- 
 cussion. All Virginians, of whatever party, 
 thought the "attitude, conduct and ability of 
 Governor Gilmer was in every way a match for 
 the wily arts of Seward." But New York was 
 by no means so unanimous in its support of 
 its chief magistrate. " The controversy has 
 hitherto been much more ably managed by 
 Seward than by the Virginians," writes John 
 Quincy Adams, in his diary, " but there have 
 been symptoms of the basest defection to the 
 cause of freedom among the New York Whigs, 
 and a disposition to sacrifice Seward to the 
 South." There is no question that, at the time, 
 this correspondence injured Seward with his 
 own party. The Democratic opinion of his po-
 
 42 WILL 1 AM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 sition was expressed in a joint resolution of the 
 New York legislature, declaring that " stealing 
 a slave, contrary to the laws of Virginia, is a 
 crime, within the meaning of the constitution," 
 and requesting the governor to transmit to the 
 executive of Virginia a copy of this resolve. 
 Seward returned the resolution with a message 
 in which he said : 
 
 " I could not transmit the resolution in the 
 present case, without silently acquiescing therein, 
 and thus waiving a decision to which I adhere, 
 or accompanying the communication to Virginia 
 with a protest of my dissent. The senate and 
 assembly will, therefore, excuse me from assum- 
 ing the duty which an assent to their request 
 would impose, and will, if it be proper, select 
 some other organ of communication with the 
 executive authorities of our sister common- 
 wealth." 
 
 This message was his last important commu- 
 nication to the legislature, his official career in 
 New York ending with the year.
 
 o 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. SIX YEARS A PRIVATE 
 CITIZEN. 
 
 WHEN Seward returned to Auburn in Jan- 
 uary, 1843, he had some reason for thinking, as 
 he said, that his public career was closed. The 
 Whigs in the country were as badly off as 
 a political party well could be. They had 
 elected their president and vice-president, but 
 the former had died, and the latter vetoed every 
 measure intended to carry out their policy. In 
 New York the Democrats had again obtained 
 entire control of the state government, and for 
 this many Whigs held Seward's administration 
 responsible. He was blamed for the state 4ebt, 
 though Democratic legislation had created it; 
 his Virginia correspondence had alienated con- 
 servatives ; his course in the McLeod matter had 
 incurred the hostility of Webster's friends ; and 
 his views about the distribution of the school 
 funds had given much dissatisfaction to Protest- 
 ants. It seemed, therefore, not only that there 
 was no prospect of success for his party, but that, 
 even should they unexpectedly carry an election,
 
 44 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 there was no probability that any public service 
 would be required of him. It was perhaps best 
 for him that he felt that his public career was 
 closed, for the condition of his affairs was such 
 as to require all his attention, and he was glad 
 to think that he was still young enough to 
 " repair all the waste of his private fortune." 
 During his term as governor he had entirely 
 neglected his own business matters, and had spent 
 more than his income ; his moderate personal 
 estate had been nearly consumed, and he now 
 found himself so embarrassed that he was advised 
 to seek the benefit of the bankrupt act. But this 
 he refused even to consider, and opening his old 
 office set himself to work to earn his living and 
 pay his debts. 
 
 Kesuming his practice with a local action of the 
 most trifling character, the circle of his clients 
 continually widened and his cases increased both 
 in number and importance ; he became counsel 
 for the owners of several valuable patents, and 
 in a few years was able to write to his wife: 
 "Every day since my retreat from public life, 
 the profession which I once so ungratefully 
 despised has been increasing its rewards, until 
 we are no longer pressed by fear of disaster or 
 sickness, although I have been diverted so often 
 and so long from lucrative engagements. Our 
 boys are pleasantly obtaining an education which
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 45 
 
 is a better patrimony than riches. If our com. 
 forts do not decrease, and our children have no 
 reason to complain of neglect, we shall have 
 passed through life happier, and I hope die 
 better, than we should, if my earliest schemes of 
 wealth had been accomplished." 
 
 One trial in which he took part at this time 
 should certainly be mentioned, as Seward's con- 
 duct in it exhibited some of the best qualities of 
 his character, the courage and tenacity with 
 which he pursued, in spite of threats and obloquy, 
 a course which his conviction of right and his 
 sense of humanity dictated. A demented negro 
 named Freeman, just out of the state prison at 
 Auburn, killed, without the slightest provoca- 
 tion and with revolting brutality, a whole family 
 of the neighborhood. He was arrested. The 
 people, roused to a pitch of frenzy, were with 
 difficulty restrained from lynching him. Seward 
 was away at the time. He had recently been 
 counsel in another case where the then novel 
 and unpopular defense of insanity had been set 
 up and maintained by him with some success ; 
 and it was feared he might be induced to act 
 for Freeman. Every effort was made to pre- 
 vent this. To quiet the popular apprehensions 
 on this point, one of the county judges publicly 
 declared that no Governor Seward would inter- 
 fere to defend Freeman ; and Seward's own
 
 46 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 law partners were persuaded to confirm this 
 assurance, while threats of personal violence, 
 should he appear for the defense, were freely 
 made. Seward, on his return, was present in 
 sourt when the poor lunatic was brought in to 
 be arraigned ; he had no counsel ; and thereupon, 
 finding no other lawyer willing to defend him, 
 Seward, though he had full knowledge of the 
 popular feeling and of all that had been said 
 and done as to his appearance in this case, the 
 threats as well as the promises, volunteered to 
 act for him. It is not necessary to repeat the 
 story of the trial. It was a most painful mockery 
 of justice, equally discreditable to the judge, the 
 prosecuting counsel and the jury. Seward was 
 uniformly treated by them all during its progress 
 as a person who was prostituting his great talents 
 in a wicked attempt to save by unlawful means 
 the worst of criminals. But he was apparently 
 unmoved by all this. He bore with seeming 
 composure the taunts and abuse of the prosecut- 
 ing attorney, the ill manners and injustice of the 
 court, and the gibes and insults of the people. 
 The arduous and painful professional duty he 
 had undertaken was most faithfully discharged. 
 His closing argument was exhaustive and con- 
 vincing. The insanity of Freeman was proved 
 beyond a doubt. But conviction was a foregone 
 conclusion. The public excitement had made
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 47 
 
 a fair trial and verdict a matter of difficulty. 
 The presiding judge did not hesitate to show 
 that he shared the feelings of the people, and 
 his obvious leaning against the prisoner and his 
 defense made any unbiased consideration of the 
 case by a jury altogether impossible. A higher 
 court, less subject to local pressure and the tem- 
 porary popular frenzy, set aside the verdict on 
 Seward's application, and ordered a new trial; 
 but before that could take place the poor fellow's 
 mania had so developed that it was impossible 
 to try him again. He lived only a short time, 
 and the examination which followed his death 
 disclosed an organic disease of the brain, from 
 which he had long been suffering. 
 
 For his conduct in this case, Seward was at 
 the time to some extent proscribed. " I rise 
 from these fruitless labors," he wrote, " ex- 
 hausted in mind and in body, covered with pub- 
 lic reproach, stunned with protests." Freeman's 
 death, however, and the clear proof of his in- 
 sanity, caused a revulsion of popular feeling; 
 and in the end, and perhaps especially with 
 those who had been loudest in their denuncia- 
 tions of him, his defense of Freeman brought 
 him far more gain, than loss, of reputation. 
 
 Though he was not again a candidate foi 
 office until his election to the United States 
 Senate in 1849, declining in the interval every
 
 48 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 suggestion of a nomination, yet he was never so 
 absorbed by his professional labors as to cease 
 to take an interest in politics. Either from his 
 own choice, or because he was out of favor with 
 his party, he gave little time to public affairs in 
 the year 1843. But in the presidential cam- 
 paign of 1844 he did his utmost to insure the 
 success of the Whigs. He began on the 22d of 
 February with a speech at Auburn in favor of 
 Clay, who was then recognized as the Whig 
 candidate, though it was not till May that the 
 convention ratified, by a formal vote, the nomi- 
 nation already made by the people. 
 
 In this election there was but one real issue, 
 the annexation of Texas. Though this had been 
 vaguely threatening for some time, no scheme 
 for effecting it had taken any definite shape 
 until that which Tyler had sprung upon the 
 country, only a few weeks before the nominating 
 conventions of the different parties were to be 
 held. Adventurers from the southern states 
 had wrested Texas from Mexico, not to make it 
 an independent republic, but to secure its an- 
 nexation to the United States and extend the 
 area of slavery. There were many intrigues and 
 secret negotiations during the earlier years of 
 Tyler's administration, and even before that; 
 but iio decisive step was taken until Calhoun 
 became secretary of state in March, 1844,
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 49 
 
 when he at once negotiated a treaty of annexa- 
 tion, which the Senate rejected by a considerable 
 majority. While it was under consideration, 
 both the great parties held their conventions. 
 The platform of the Whigs was silent as to 
 Texas and slavery, though Clay had declared 
 himself opposed to annexation. The Democrats 
 threw over Van Buren, who had been their most 
 prominent candidate, because he was known to 
 be against annexation ; they nominated James 
 K. Polk of Tennessee, and declared " the re-an- 
 nexation of Texas a great American measure 
 reccnnmended to the cordial support of the 
 Deriocracy of the Union." The Liberty party 
 had met the year before and nominated James 
 G. Birney, with a platform of twenty-one resolu- 
 tions all aimed at the slave system of the South. 
 During the summer, as the canvass went on, it 
 became evident that the election was to depend 
 on the vote of New York. Whichever of the 
 great parties could carry that state would elect 
 its candidate. The Whigs might reasonably 
 hope to do this, if they could hold the radical 
 anti-slavery members of their party, and induce 
 them to support the regular nominations in- 
 stead of throwing away their votes on Birney. 
 Seward's advanced anti-slavery opinions, and his 
 unhesitating adherence to the Whig party and 
 its candidates, made him a most efficient worker
 
 50 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 with men of this description, who were opposed 
 to the admission of Texas, who meant to re- 
 sist it by their votes, and wished to do so in 
 the most effectual manner ; and he spent three 
 months in campaign labors in the strongholds 
 of anti-slavery opinion in northern and western 
 New York. His speeches and letters were of 
 necessity much alike in substance, however they 
 might differ in form. The following passages 
 give an outline of his principal arguments for 
 the support of the Whig candidates : 
 
 " The annexation of Texas is identical with 
 the perpetuation of slavery. Our opponents are 
 for it. The Whig party are against it. If 
 there is a friend of human freedom willing to 
 follow my lead in this sacred cause, I appeal to 
 him to give his suffrage to the Whig candidates, 
 not for the sake of Henry Clay, nor even for 
 the sake of the Whig party, but for our coun- 
 try, for liberty's sake, and for the sake of hu- 
 manity." 
 
 " What will Texas cost ? It will cost a war 
 with Mexico, an unjust war a war to extend 
 the slave trade. You will not go to war for hu- 
 man slavery, will you ? You say Henry Clay is 
 a slaveholder. So he is. I regret it as deeply 
 as you do ; I wish it were otherwise. But our 
 conflict is not with one slaveholder, or with 
 many, but with slavery. You are opposed to
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 51 
 
 the admission of Texas. Will you resist it by 
 voting for James G. Birney ? Your votes would 
 be just as effectual if cast upon the waters of 
 the placid lake." 
 
 " Henry Clay is opposed to the coming in of 
 Texas. He is the candidate of the Whig party. 
 They are opposed to the coming in of Texas. 
 The security, the duration, the extension of 
 slavery, all depend on the annexation of Texas. 
 How, then, can any friend of emancipation vote 
 for the Texas candidate, or withhold his vote 
 from the Whig candidate ? " 
 
 " The integrity of the Union depends on the 
 result. To increase the slaveholding power is 
 to subvert the constitution, to give [this power] 
 a fearful preponderance, which probably will be 
 speedily followed by demands to which the 
 Democratic free-labor states cannot yield, and 
 which will be made the ground for secession, 
 nullification, and disunion." 
 
 Before the convention met in May, Mr. Clay 
 had written a letter deprecating either urging or 
 opposing annexation on sectional grounds, de- 
 claring an acquisition of territory for the purpose 
 of strengthening one portion of the country 
 against the other to be a scheme pregnant with 
 evil, insisting that annexation and a war with 
 Mexico were identical, and that such a measure 
 at that time would be dangerous to the integrity
 
 52 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 of the Union. It was npon this letter that he 
 was nominated and that the Northern Whigs 
 were asked to accept his position on the Texas 
 question as satisfactory. But in August, yield- 
 ing to the pressure of Southern Whigs in states 
 which he could not possibly carry, he wrote 
 again: " So far from having any personal objec- 
 tion to the annexation of Texas, I should be 
 glad to see it, without dishonor, without war, 
 with the common consent of the Union, and 
 upon just and fair terms." The news of this 
 last letter reached Seward while he was can- 
 vassing New York on Clay's behalf ; its effect 
 was immediately apparent : " I met that letter 
 at Geneva," he writes, " and thence here, and 
 until now, everybody droops, despairs. It jeop- 
 ards, perhaps loses the state. Is there any other 
 way but to go through to the end more devot- 
 edly than ever ? " 
 
 He followed the course he here suggests, 
 finishing his campaign labors with no apparent 
 lack of zeal or courage, but with an inward 
 conviction of the coming defeat. His exer- 
 tions, however, brought him one satisfaction, 
 the restoration to some extent of the former 
 harmonious relations between the conservative 
 Whigs of the city of New York and himself; 
 it was pleasant to him to recognize this. The 
 causes of it were twofold. The mass of the
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 53 
 
 Whigs had moved forward to where Seward 
 stood, and even the laggards had advanced 
 much nearer his position ; while the more intelli- 
 gent of his opponents in his own party were 
 becoming aware of the fact, that whatever were 
 his hopes or beliefs as to the perfect republic, 
 he endeavored to consider and deal with actual 
 public affairs as a practical statesman rather 
 than a Utopian doctrinaire, and would not know- 
 ingly sacrifice a possible present gain to a remote 
 and uncertain ideal. 
 
 At the close of the campaign he resumed his 
 professional labors, and remained until the next 
 presidential election a simple looker-on in pol- 
 itics, even declining a nomination to the consti- 
 tutional convention of his own state. 
 
 Detained by professional business at Wash- 
 ington during several weeks in the next three 
 winters, he heard there much talk as to the 
 political questions of the day, the matter of 
 the Oregon boundary, which was in dispute be- 
 tween this country and Great Britain, the Mexi- 
 can war and the Wilmot proviso. But he lis- 
 tened, perhaps, to more speculations ay to the 
 possible and probable candidates for the next 
 election, and by March, 1847, he felt that Gen- 
 eral Taylor's nomination and election scarcely 
 admitted of a doubt. "I am not prepared to 
 speculate," he writes, "upon the consequences
 
 54 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 of events so great and unlocked for as these. 
 What will be their effect upon the ' Great 
 Question of Questions,' which underlies all pres- 
 ent political movements ? " 
 
 When the nomination was actually made, he 
 accepted it as a "result inevitable, if not the 
 best left within our power to attain," and took 
 comfort in thinking that, " if the Barnburners 
 continued the conflict, they would be able to 
 save the state for the Whigs." 
 
 Before the convention took place, Seward's 
 name had been suggested for the vice -presi- 
 dency ; but it was immediately stated that he 
 was not a candidate. Fillmore, who received 
 the nomination, was not the choice of Taylor's 
 supporters, but was a concession to his opponents ; 
 and Seward at once predicted that, if Fillmore 
 were elected, that portion of the Whig party of 
 the state, to which he himself belonged, " would 
 be in the position of a faction apparently op- 
 posed to the New York leader in the general 
 council of the Whigs of the Union," a pro- 
 phecy partially realized during Taylor's life, and 
 thoroughly fulfilled after his death. 
 
 Before the Whig convention met, General 
 Cass had been nominated by the Democrats; 
 and when the new Free Soil party had selected 
 Van Buren and Adams as their candidates, the 
 political campaign began.
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 55 
 
 In 1848 the Whigs repeated the experiment 
 made eight years before. They nominated a 
 military hero, admittedly without political ex- 
 perience, and having at the best but a scanty 
 equipment of political knowledge or opinions. 
 Their convention had no committee on resolu- 
 tions, and made no declaration of principles. 
 The Democrats proclaimed the war with Mexico 
 "just and necessary; " and the Free Soilers de- 
 clared for " no more slave states and no more 
 slave territory ; " but for " Free Soil, Free 
 Speech, Free Labor and Free Men." 
 
 It was soon evident that for a second time the 
 election was to depend upon the fortunes of this 
 new third party in the pivotal state of New 
 York. Would it catch enough anti- slavery 
 Whig votes to give the election there to the 
 Democrats ; or could Van Buren, by the magic 
 of his name, his personal popularity and his 
 political skill, seduce from their allegiance so 
 many Democrats as to compass the defeat of 
 his old political rival and enemy, Cass ? Again, 
 the conduct, the position, the presence and the 
 labors of Seward, a pronounced anti-slavery 
 man, but an equally emphatic Whig, were all- 
 important to his party. He yielded to the nu- 
 merous demands made upon him, and for six 
 weeks or more spoke constantly in New York, 
 New England, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Dela-
 
 . 
 56 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ware and Ohio. In Boston he and Abraham 
 Lincoln were heard together, and at the close of 
 the evening Lincoln said to him : " I have been 
 thinking about what you said in your speech. 
 I reckon you 're right. We have got to deal 
 with this slavery question, and got to give much 
 more attention to it hereafter than we have been 
 doing." i 
 
 Seward wound up the campaign among the 
 anti-slavery men of the Western Reserve in 
 Ohio, striving to persuade them to cast their 
 votes for Taylor rather than throw them away 
 on Van Buren, thereby assuring the election of 
 Cass, and the opening to slavery of the territories 
 just wrung from Mexico. His friends thought 
 his speech at Cleveland the most bold and terse 
 he had made, while his opponents characterized 
 it as the most perverse and dogmatic. He re- 
 vised this speech for publication, thinking " it 
 would commend itself to consideration." A short 
 summary of it will show his views of the issues 
 between the parties, and of the duty of all oppo- 
 nents of the extension of slavery. 
 
 He saw two antagonistical elements of society 
 in America freedom and slavery. These ele- 
 ments divided and classified the American peo- 
 ple into two parties. One of these, the party 
 of slavery, regarded "disunion as among the 
 
 1 Seward, Life, ii. p. 60.
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 57 
 
 means of defense, and not always the last to be 
 employed." The other maintained that the pres- 
 ervation of the union of the states, one and in- 
 separable, now and forever, was the highest duty 
 of the American people to themselves, to pos- 
 terity and to mankind. " The party of slavery 
 declares that institution necessary, beneficent, 
 approved of God, and therefore inviolable. The 
 party of freedom seeks complete and universal 
 emancipation. These two great elements exist 
 and are developed in the two great national par- 
 ties of the land." Seward did not contend that 
 the evil spirit had always possessed one of these 
 parties without exception or mitigation, and that 
 the beneficent one had on all occasions fully 
 directed the actions of the other ; but he insisted 
 that the beneficent spirit had worked chiefly in 
 the Whig party, and its antagonist in the other 
 party ; and that the Whig party had been as true 
 and faithful to human freedom as the inert con- 
 science of the American people would permit it to 
 be ; that inert as that conscience was, much could 
 be done, everything could be done, for freedom. 
 " Slavery," he said, " can be limited to its 
 present bounds, it can be ameliorated, it can and 
 must be abolished, and you and I can and must 
 do it. The task is as simple and easy as its 
 consummation will be beneficent and its rewards 
 glorious. It requires only to follow this simple
 
 C8 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 rule of action, namely, to do everywhere and on 
 every occasion what we can, and not to neglect 
 or refuse to do what we can at any time, because 
 at that precise time and on that particular occa- 
 sion we cannot do more. Circumstances deter- 
 mine possibilities. When we have done our 
 best to shape them and make them propitious, 
 we may rest satisfied that superior wisdom has 
 determined their form as they exist, and will be 
 satisfied with us if we then do all the good that 
 circumstances leave in our power. But we must 
 begin deeper arid lower than in the composi- 
 tion and combinations of factions and parties. 
 Wherein do the strength and security of slavery 
 lie? You answer that they lie in the consti- 
 tution of the United States, and the constitu- 
 tions and laws of all slaveholding states. Not at 
 all. They lie in the erroneous sentiment of the 
 American people. Constitutions and laws can 
 no more rise above the virtue of the people than 
 the limpid stream can climb above its native 
 spring. Inculcate, then, the love of freedom and 
 the equal rights of man under the paternal roof ; 
 see to it that they are taught in the schools and 
 in the churches ; extend a cordial welcome to the 
 fugitive who lays his weary limbs at your door, 
 and defend him as you would your paternal gods ; 
 correct your own error, that slavery has any con- 
 stitutional guaranty which may not be released
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 59 
 
 and ought not to be relinquished. Say to slavery, 
 when it shows its bond and demands the pound 
 of flesh, that if it draws one drop of blood its 
 life shall pay the forfeit. Inculcate that free 
 states can maintain the rights of hospitality and 
 humanity ; that executive authority can forbear 
 to favor slavery ; that Congress can debate, that 
 Congress can at least mediate with the slave- 
 holding states ; that at least future generations 
 might he bought and given up to freedom. . . . 
 Do all this, and inculcate all this in the spirit of 
 moderation and benevolence, and not of retalia- 
 tion and fanaticism, and you will soon bring the 
 parties of the country into an effective aggres- 
 sion on slavery. Whenever the public mind shall 
 will the abolition of slavery, the way will open 
 for it. I know that you will tell me that all this 
 is too slow. Well, then, go faster if you can, 
 and I will go with you ; but . . . remember 
 that no human work is done without prepara- 
 tion, that God works out his sublimest purposes 
 among men with preparation." 
 
 If the closing passages of this speech, which 
 have just been quoted, did not indicate a new 
 departure in what Seward considered the politi- 
 cal aims of the Whig party, they certainly stated 
 these aims with clearness and emphasis, and are 
 in marked contrast with the absolute silence of 
 its platform on the subject of slavery. The mass
 
 60 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 of the anti-slavery Whigs at the North, though 
 opposed to the extension of slavery, were not 
 emancipationists, and had by no means reached 
 Seward's position as declared in this speech. 
 The large majority of them who were not poli- 
 ticians voted for Taylor, slaveholder though he 
 was, on the grounds upon which Seward advised 
 it, that the Whig party was, after all, the 
 party of freedom, and the personal question a 
 subordinate one, and that it would be almost 
 impossible to regain for freedom what would be 
 lost by a Democratic victory. 
 
 Seward had no special gifts of voice or pres- 
 ence. He was below the average height, with 
 nothing commanding in his appearance, and his 
 voice was harsh and shrill; but there was a 
 courage, an earnestness about his campaign 
 speeches of this year, which made them most 
 effective at the time, and a tone of conviction, 
 which still vibrates as one reads them after the 
 lapse of nearly half a century. 
 
 He returned home the night before the elec^ 
 tion. The next morning it seemed probable 
 that the Whigs had carried New York; in a 
 week's time Taylor's election was ascertained 
 beyond a doubt. 
 
 The campaign over, Seward turned again to 
 the law, and was busily engaged with his cases. 
 But though he wrote on the 16th of November :
 
 PROFESSIONAL LIFE. 61 
 
 " Now that I have got into the law again pretty 
 deep, I care nothing for these [political] in- 
 trigues," yet it cannot be doubted that he took 
 a lively interest in the canvass for the United 
 States Senate, which his friends were making 
 on his behalf, and which his opponents in his 
 own party were fighting by the publication of 
 anonymous pamphlets, forged letters, and the 
 manufacture of fictitious interviews. As often 
 happens in such cases, these inventions returned 
 only to plague the inventors, and on the 6th of 
 February, 1849, Seward was chosen Senator 
 from New York.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 
 
 IN the four and a half years between Folk's 
 election and Taylor's inauguration, the policy 
 of the slave states had become distinctly devel- 
 oped, and the political dogmas of their lead- 
 ing statesmen clearly formulated. In 1845 they 
 refused to admit Iowa, which had a sufficient 
 population, unless Florida, deficient in numbers, 
 should be brought in as a state under the same 
 bill. In 1848 Wisconsin came in as a counter- 
 poise to Texas and the great acquisitions of the 
 Mexican war, which were then expected to 
 inure to the benefit of the South and slavery. 
 
 In the closing days of Tyler's administration, 
 a joint resolution for the annexation of Texas 
 had been passed by the expiring Congress, and 
 received the President's signature. Before the 
 middle of January, 1846, Polk ordered Taylor 
 to advance into Mexico, and our war of inva- 
 sion began. In the following winter, while the 
 war was still in progress (February 19, 1847), 
 Calhoun offered in the Senate, and supported 
 by an elaborate speech, resolutions declaring in
 
 TEE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 63 
 
 substance that slavery was national, freedom 
 sectional ; that the 'Constitution authorized and 
 protected slavery in all the national domain, 
 and that neither Congress nor any territorial 
 legislature could legally prevent a citizen of a 
 slave state from migrating with his slaves to any 
 territory and there holding them in servitude. 
 
 During the Mexican war the territory which 
 was ceded to us by treaty at its close had been 
 occupied by our troops and governed by the 
 officers in command of them, who treated the 
 laws of Mexico as still in force, so far as the 
 civil rights and obligations of the people were 
 concerned. With the peace, the military author- 
 ity properly ceased ; and President Polk ear- 
 nestly recommended Congress to provide some 
 government as a substitute. For California 
 this was an imperative need, for directly the 
 discovery of gold was known, hordes of adven- 
 turers of every description had rushed in, and 
 it was absolutely necessary that there should 
 be some authority to repress and punish with 
 a strong hand the disorderly and vicious, and 
 protect the honest and industrious immigrants. 
 
 Congress was so divided on the question of 
 free soil or slave labor in these new possessions 
 ttract^it legislation was impossible. The House 
 would pass no bill organizing them without a 
 proviso prohibiting slavery, while the Senate
 
 64 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 would assent to no bill containing any such pro- 
 viso ; and Congress adjourned six months after 
 the peace, leaving them without a legal govern- 
 ment or any provision for forming one. Under 
 these circumstances, the military governors con- 
 tinued, though reluctantly, to exercise the same 
 authority as before, relying for their justification 
 quite as much upon the necessity of the case 
 and the tacit acquiescence of the people, as upon 
 the orders of the President. The acquiescence 
 of the people was an unwilling one ; they were 
 much disappointed that no permanent govern- 
 ment had been provided for them ; but they fol- 
 lowed the President's advice, and submitted to 
 the existing condition of things in the expecta- 
 tion that, as he assured them, Congress would 
 give them a proper government before the 4th 
 of March, 1849. As, however, from the inac- 
 tion of Congress during the winter, these hopes 
 gradually faded away, while the necessity for a 
 strong and permanent government became con- 
 tinually more manifest, the people of California 
 grew more and more restless, and in various 
 localities, San Francisco, Sacramento, and else- 
 where, the inhabitants made abortive attempts 
 to establish local legislatures and governments. 
 General Riley succeeded in inducing the lead- 
 ers of these tentative governments to forbear 
 and delay, though he had only persuasion and
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 65 
 
 argument to rely on, the attractions of the mines 
 making it impossible to hold in the ranks on 
 land either soldiers, sailors, or marines. 
 
 Biley was conscious, however, that he had ex- 
 hausted his influence ; and when he learned that 
 Congress had dissolved, and California was left 
 without legislature or government, he at once 
 (June 3, 1849), issued a proclamation, calling 
 upon the people to choose delegates to a conven- 
 tion to adopt a frame of government, state or 
 territorial, as they might think best. 
 
 The insurmountable obstacle to any territorial 
 legislation in the second session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, which expired March 4, 1849, had 
 been, as before, the matter of slavery ; the Sen- 
 ate again rejecting any bill restricting slavery 
 in the territories, and the House insisting on 
 its absolute prohibition there. The presidential 
 election of the previous summer had been fought 
 by the Whigs with no platform ; Northern vot- 
 ers had been urged to support Taylor as the 
 candidate of the party most firm and persist- 
 ent in its opposition to slavery ; while on the 
 other hand it had been contended at the South 
 that absolute confidence could be placed in him 
 as a Southern planter and the owner of three 
 hundred slaves. The Democratic party had 
 enunciated its doctrines on the subject of slavery 
 in the platform of the convention ; and the plat-
 
 66 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 form had been supplemented by a letter from 
 General Cass, insisting on the right of the people 
 of a territory to settle the question of slavery for 
 themselves. This letter, however, was suscep- 
 tible of a double construction, at the North it 
 was declared to mean that the people of a ter- 
 ritory could at any time determine for themselves 
 the question of freedom or slavery there ; while 
 at the South it was relied on as containing the 
 true Southern doctrine that the people of a ter- 
 ritory were powerless to take any action in re- 
 gard to slavery while in their territorial con- 
 dition, and could only do so when framing a 
 state government. 
 
 Among the solutions of the California ques- 
 tion proposed during the winter of 1848-49, the 
 one which had found most favor in the eyes of 
 the South, though it failed to be adopted, was 
 that of authorizing the inhabitants to form a 
 state constitution and apply for admission to the 
 Union. The Southerners thought that, if a con- 
 vention for this purpose were to be called under 
 an act of Congress, and with sufficient notice to 
 them, they could flood California with their own 
 people prepared to vote for a pro-slavery con- 
 stitution, before the more distant Northerners 
 could reach there. In the meantime, however, 
 they hesitated to carry their slaves thither, partly 
 because they feared that the Mexican laws abol-
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 67 
 
 ishing slavery were still in force, and their slaves 
 might therefore be free in California ; partly 
 because they were afraid of the passage of a 
 bill prohibiting slavery there ; partly also, be- 
 cause, until the discovery of gold, it was very 
 doubtful how far slave labor could be made 
 profitable in California ; and for another reason, 
 perhaps of greater weight than all these, that 
 the labor and expense of moving slaves ren- 
 dered it practically impossible for any Southern 
 planter to compete in the ordinary processes of 
 emigration with the enterprise of the pioneers 
 of the North and West. 
 
 When General Taylor arrived in Washington, 
 just before his inauguration, he was greatly dis- 
 appointed to find that Congress was likely to 
 expire without any provision for the government 
 of California, and he used his best exertions, 
 Seward acting as his representative and adviser, 
 to secure the passage of a bill which should give 
 the territories some form of legal government. 
 Having failed in this attempt, he then, with the 
 approval of all the members of his cabinet, the 
 majority of whom were Southerners, and with 
 the assent of Seward, dispatched to California 
 T. Butler King of Georgia, " to encourage the 
 people there to form a state constitution and ask 
 for admission to the Union, assuring them of 
 his support should they do so ; " and he took a
 
 68 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 similar course as to New Mexico. There is no 
 reason to suppose that he had any special pur- 
 pose, either to introduce or prohibit slavery in 
 either territory. His plan was that which had 
 already been proposed, to look to the territories 
 themselves for the settlement of the territorial 
 difficulties, letting the people organize their own 
 governments, since Congress would not do so for 
 them. 1 
 
 As it turned out, neither General Taylor nor 
 his messenger had any hand in calling the Cali- 
 fornia convention. General Riley, the military 
 governor, had published his proclamation before 
 he had any communication with either of them. 
 The proclamation stated that the course he was 
 taking was advised by the President and by the 
 secretaries of state and of war ; but it is clear 
 from a comparison of dates that the President 
 and public officers to whom he referred were 
 Polk and his secretaries. King never saw Riley 
 till the middle of June ; when the convention 
 met he was dangerously ill and unable to be 
 present, and the only advice he is known to have 
 given was to recommend that the boundaries of 
 the state be made as large as possible. This 
 was doubtless in accordance with Taylor's view 
 of sweeping into two new states all the territory 
 acquired from Mexico ; and this was the course 
 1 Letter of John Tyler, March 5, 1849.
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 69 
 
 advocated in the convention by the Southern 
 delegates, who may have hoped either to prevent 
 the admission of California with such extensive 
 boundaries, or at a later date to procure her 
 division into two states, one of which would be 
 slave though the other were free. At all events 
 the boundary question was really the only mat- 
 ter in dispute in the convention. There was 
 a due proportion of men from the South among 
 the delegates, but the clause prohibiting slavery 
 was unanimously adopted. 
 
 When Congress assembled in December, 1849, 
 it was known that California, with a constitu- 
 tion prohibiting slavery, would at once apply 
 for admission as a state. The Mexican war had 
 been a Southern war, brought about by Southern 
 policy, largely fought by Southern officers and 
 men, with the determination that its final result 
 should be " to adjust the whole balance of power 
 in the Confederacy so as to give the South the 
 control over the operations of the government in 
 all time to come," and with the expectation that 
 the territory acquired by the war would create a 
 new demand for slave labor and a great advance 
 in the price of slaves. The admission of Cali- 
 fornia as a free state would not merely rob the 
 Southerners of what they considered the just 
 political and pecuniary fruits of this war, but 
 also, unless accompanied by that of a slave state
 
 70 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 at the same time, would destroy that equilibrium 
 of sectional power in the Senate which had been 
 successfully maintained ever since slavery had 
 become a political question. 
 
 Party ties were to a certain extent dropped 
 when Congress assembled. The Southern 
 
 O 
 
 Whigs and Democrats stood together on every 
 question which appeared to them to have any 
 sectional bearing. They were supported by 
 some Northern Democrats, and were also aided 
 by the small knot of Free Soilers in the House, 
 whose violence of language, half justified by the 
 personal attacks on themselves, hindered the 
 cause they professed to have at heart, and helped 
 that party which they said they were seeking 
 to destroy. For a whole month the House of 
 Representatives attempted to elect a speaker, 1 
 and during this time the talk of the Secessionists 
 was defiant and treasonable. 
 
 When at last the House was organized and 
 the President's message read, the vital strug- 
 gle began. There were several burning ques- 
 tions connected with the war : the admission of 
 California, the question of the true limits of 
 
 1 The Free Soilers were not averse to any speaker who would 
 pledge himself to give the Wilmot Proviso members control of 
 the Committee on Territories, and nearly succeeded in electing 
 a Democrat who had promised in writing to do this. Seward 
 urged the Whigs of the House to stand firmly by Mr. Win- 
 throp, the regular Whig candidate.
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 71 
 
 Texas, those which the United States were 
 bound to recognize, the proper governments 
 for New Mexico and Utah. The President 
 thought California should be admitted, because 
 she had the population and all the other condi- 
 tions requisite to form a state. He hoped that 
 New Mexico might also come in as a state with 
 a proper frame of government, and that the 
 Texas boundary question might be settled as a 
 judicial matter before the Supreme Court. He 
 doubtless had some feeling and a very decided 
 opinion upon this latter question, as he knew 
 from his own personal experience during the 
 war, that, whatever might have been claimed 
 on paper, Texas had never actually governed a 
 single inch of the land in dispute. 1 The only 
 importance of the matter arose from the fact 
 that if the lands in dispute were a part of Texas 
 they were already slave territory ; if they be- 
 longed to Mexico and became ours by the treaty, 
 slavery had been abolished there before we 
 
 1 Texas had advanced claims to a large portion of New 
 Mexico, cutting off many thousand square miles where there 
 was no slavery, and insisting that it was included within her 
 own limits where there was slavery. Polk, at the very end of 
 his administration, issued orders to the officer in command at 
 New Mexico to fall back before any inroad of the Texans, and 
 surrender possession of the disputed territory. These orders 
 Taylor at once revoked, and directed him to maintain the 
 boundary line as the United States found it, and as ceded to 
 them by the treaty.
 
 72 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 acquired them. It was not, therefore, merely 
 a Texas question, but a slavery question, and so 
 a sectional one. 
 
 There were other matters, the discussion of 
 which served to excite still more the hostile feel- 
 ing already existing between North and South. 
 These were, the abolition of slavery in the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia, the prohibition of the slave 
 trade between the states (neither of which had 
 any such support as to make it of political im- 
 portance), the inefficiency of the law for the 
 surrender of fugitive slaves, and the reluctance 
 of the North to comply with the constitutional 
 requirements on this point ; and the prevention 
 of the use of the District of Columbia as the 
 common slave mart and exchange for the entire 
 South. Though this last was hardly a sectional 
 issue, and received the support of senators and 
 representatives from all parts of the country, yet 
 it lay dangerously near the burning brand of 
 slavery agitation, and debate upon it was liable 
 to become passionate and personal. 
 
 Upon the question of slavery in the territo- 
 ries, the Southern view was : That the Constitu- 
 tion is a compact of union for limited purposes 
 between several sovereign states, the citizens of 
 each of which have in all the territories a com- 
 mon property and equal rights with the citizens 
 of every other state, any citizen having the right
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 73 
 
 to carry there all property of every species 
 recognized as such by the laws of his own state, 
 and therefore slaves, if slaves were property in 
 the state from which they were taken. Some 
 Southerners went even farther than this, and 
 insisted that under the provisions of the Consti- 
 tution for the return of fugitive slaves to their 
 masters, and for slave representation in Con- 
 gress, slaves were a kind of property entitled 
 to special and peculiar favor, singled out by 
 the Constitution from the mass of other prop- 
 erty, invested with higher dignity and guarded 
 with greater security, too precious to be en- 
 trusted solely to state law, and especially under 
 the protecting aegis of the Constitution; or, as 
 it was forcibly put by one of the ablest expo- 
 nents of the Southern doctrine : " This is a pro- 
 slavery government; slavery is stamped upon 
 its heart, the Constitution. No matter where 
 you place the power to legislate on the territory, 
 the power to legislate on questions of slavery 
 is a legitimate instrument of it. Slaves are 
 property our property. If it is said slavery 
 is a peculiar institution against the common 
 law of mankind, then I reply, our government 
 is a peculiar government, our Constitution is 
 a peculiar Constitution, for they are both im- 
 pregnated with this peculiarity." In short, it 
 was insisted that, without any legal enactments,
 
 74 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 slavery existed by force of the Constitution in 
 all the territories of the United States, and that 
 neither foreign laws before conquest, nor domes- 
 tic legislation afterwards, could prohibit or abol- 
 ish it there. 
 
 The original opposition of the North to the 
 extension of slavery to the new territories was 
 not founded upon political considerations. The 
 Northerners had submitted, without reluctance, 
 to the supremacy of the South for two thirds, or 
 more, of the whole period of the history of the 
 government, and were practically indifferent 
 about the matter. The men of the North were 
 engaged in all sorts of industrial and commercial 
 enterprises, their interest in politics was limited, 
 and their opposition to slavery and its exten- 
 sion was in most cases an objection upon moral 
 grounds. The Southerners, on the contrary, 
 had practically no occupations except politics 
 and the ordinary pursuits of a country life, 
 and they had controlled the government almost 
 from its foundation, either directly through one 
 of their own number, or indirectly through some 
 Northerner designated by them for President. 
 They saw the possibility, and feared the prob- 
 ability, of this political supremacy slipping from 
 them, and believed the admission of California 
 as a free state to be the first fatal step in a path 
 which would ultimately leave them in a position
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 75 
 
 of inferiority and subjection to the North in the 
 government and administration. To them the 
 contest was not merely for a theoretic principle, 
 but for a positive, actual, valuable right. 
 
 General Taylor having been nominated with 
 no platform or declaration of principles, any 
 policy which he advocated as to the settlement 
 of the slavery question might fairly be called 
 the President's policy, and no Whig need feel 
 that, if he failed to support it, he was break- 
 ing loose from his party. There was, indeed, 
 no Whig party, in that sense in which party 
 means a combination of persons agreeing upon 
 certain political principles, and united to carry 
 out a certain political policy. The questions 
 which had united the Whigs were either dead 
 or dormant, and on the only living political 
 issue they had, as a national party, no princi- 
 ples and no policy. Those members of Con- 
 gress, therefore, who had been always classed 
 as Whigs and were elected as Whigs, felt at 
 liberty to vote as they pleased upon all the 
 questions relating to the territory. 
 
 Taylor was unfortunate also in the fact that 
 he had not the support of the two great leaders 
 of the Whig party, Clay and Webster. Clay 
 thought himself ill-treated by Taylor in regard 
 to the nomination, and never forgave it. He 
 had declined to advocate or support him during
 
 76 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the campaign. He was not present at the inaur 
 guration, and when he took his seat in the Senate 
 in the middle of December, he announced his 
 purpose of taking " the lead of no subject and 
 no party ; " while a few weeks later he made a 
 speech which drew from one of his opponents 
 the observation, that he well knew " the sena- 
 tor from Kentucky formally declined exercising 
 on behalf of the administration a parliamentary 
 leadership, but had no suspicion, until he lis- 
 tened to his speech, that he meditated a regular 
 course of hostilities against those in power." 
 Clay's opposition to the administration became 
 more decided as the session went on. 
 
 Webster, the other great leader of the Whig 
 party, had sulked in his tent by the sea the 
 whole summer long; and when he was at last 
 induced to leave his solitude to speak at a politi- 
 cal meeting, he would only say that, though Tay- 
 lor's nomination was one not fit to be made, 
 yet, as he was the Whig candidate, he should 
 support him. He was in Washington when 
 Taylor arrived there, and called upon him at 
 once ; but his real feeling towards the incom- 
 ing President is to be seen in an extract from 
 a letter, in which he says: "Although I would 
 not yield myself to any undue feelings of self- 
 respect, yet it is certain that I am senior in 
 years to General Taylor, that I have been
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 77 
 
 thirty years in public life, . . . have had . . . 
 friends, who have thought that for the admin- 
 istration of civil and political affairs my own 
 qualifications entitle me to be considered a can- 
 didate to the office for which General Taylor 
 has been chosen. I feel [therefore] that I shall 
 best consult my own dignity by declining to fill 
 a subordinate position in the executive govern- 
 ment." 1 
 
 Even before Congress met, Taylor's course as 
 to California had alienated the leading Southern 
 Whigs, upon whom he might have thought he 
 could depend ; and either from inclination or 
 necessity he consulted Seward, the only Whig 
 senator from the most important state in the 
 Union, and his active supporter in the election 
 campaign. Before the inauguration Taylor's re- 
 lations with him had been friendly and confi- 
 dential, and very soon afterwards the existence 
 of such relations was called to the attention of 
 the public by a published letter from Seward, 
 written to exonerate Taylor from the charge of 
 using his personal influence for legislation which 
 would practically extend slavery to the territo- 
 ries. The letter was well intentioned but un- 
 
 1 Webster's Life, ii. p. 357. Webster was born January, 
 1782, Taylor in September, 1784. A year later Webster 
 accepted a subordinate position, and became Secretary of 
 State to Fillmore, who was born in January, 1800, and so was 
 sixteen years younger than Taylor.
 
 78 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 fortunate. There was no real occasion for its 
 publication. It injured the President, not only 
 with Clay and the Southern Whigs, but also 
 with Webster and his friends, to have public 
 proclamation made that he was taking for one 
 of his chief counselors a radical anti- slavery 
 wan like Seward, and one so inexperienced in 
 national politics. The necessity for printing the 
 letter was so little apparent, that Seward was 
 taunted with having done this that he might 
 make a display of his confidential relations with 
 the administration ; while its publication made 
 him a ready nxark for the attacks of all the 
 senators, of whatever party, who were either 
 publicly or privately hostile to the administra- 
 tion. 
 
 From the moment of the assembling of Con- 
 gress the air of the Capitol was heavy with the 
 coming storm, and gusts of political passion 
 swept over it almost every day. There seemed 
 to be no question, the discussion of which was 
 harmless. A resolution to extend the courtesies 
 of the Senate to Father Mathew, the Irish 
 apostle of temperance, brought on a discussion 
 as to slavery. A debate upon our diplomatic 
 relations with Austria soon drifted into the same 
 channel. 
 
 In talking about the subjects to be embraced 
 in the census, abolition and the abolitionists were
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 79 
 
 among the topics treated of, and the discussion 
 was made the occasion for bitter personalities. 
 Threats of disunion were frequent. These were 
 partly in earnest, and were partly intended to 
 excite the fears of the people of the North, that 
 they might yield more readily to the demands 
 of the slaveholders and assent to the legislation 
 they desired. In many of these debates Seward 
 took part, and was, when the occasion required, 
 vigorous and outspoken in declaring his hostil- 
 ity to slavery and his hopes of ultimate emanci- 
 pation. He made no personal attacks on any 
 one, and replied once for all to those made on 
 him : "I am here for public measures, not for 
 private ends, and no imputations shall ever put 
 me on a defense of myself against aspersions or 
 complaints of this kind." 
 
 Taylor, though inexperienced in political af- 
 fairs or civil administration, was a man of good 
 sense, single-minded, honest, direct, averse to 
 anything in the nature of political intrigue or 
 bargain, of sterling integrity, of undoubted 
 loyalty and unhesitating courage, perfectly able 
 and determined to discharge his duty as he 
 understood it, and impatient at the Southern 
 bluster and threats of disunion, which he con- 
 sidered treasonable, and in the face of which 
 what was called compromise seemed to him a 
 cowardly surrender to disloyalty. There was to
 
 80 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 his mind no connection between a bill admitting 
 California as a free state and acts organizing 
 the other territories, or establishing the true 
 boundaries of Texas ; and a combination to se- 
 cure the passage of any one bill by arrangement 
 with the friends of the others seemed to him a 
 base business. He might have assented to all 
 the measures contemplated by Clay's compromise 
 resolutions, each on its own merits, but never 
 as a bargain between contending sections. 1 On 
 the 21st of January, 1850, he sent to Congress 
 a message recommending the admission of Cali- 
 fornia with the constitution it had formed pro- 
 hibiting slavery, confining his message to this 
 subject alone. 
 
 I Clay, Calhoun, and Webster werejbhis year 
 together in the Senate for the last time^ Clay 
 was the man of compromise. He had been 
 the father of the Missouri Compromise in 1821, 
 had quieted the threatened nullification outbreak 
 of South Carolina a dozen years later by an- 
 another compromise, and now came forward for 
 the last time, offering a series of resolutions to 
 
 1 " I would rather have California wait than bring in all 
 the ' territories on her back.' " Taylor to Webster, Curtis's 
 Webster, ii. 473. Southern Whigs in Congress said the Southern 
 officers would refuse to obey, if ordered to maintain the line 
 of New Mexico against Texas. "Then." said Taylor, "I 
 will command the army in person, and hang any man taken in 
 treason." Schooler, v. p. 185.
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 81 
 
 be afterwards embodied in appropriate legisla- 
 tion. They were intended to cover all the mat- 
 ters in dispute, and to be a full and final 
 adjustment of all questions relating to slavery. 
 California was to be admitted as a free state ; 
 the other territory conquered from Mexico was 
 to have a proper territorial government, with 
 no provision either introducing or excluding 
 slavery ; the western boundary of Texas was to 
 be established, and that state to be paid from 
 the public treasury for the relinquishment of 
 its claims to any part of New Mexico. The 
 resolves further declared that, so long as slavery 
 existed in Maryland and Delaware, it was inex- 
 pedient to abolish it in the District of Columbia 
 without the assent of those states ; but that it 
 was expedient to prohibit there the trade in 
 slaves brought from without the District ; that 
 Congress had no power to interfere with the 
 slave trade between the different slave states, 
 and that more effectual provision ought to be 
 made for the restitution of fugitive slaves. 
 
 Clay had been for some time deliberating on 
 the matter of these resolutions. On the 2d 
 of January he wrote his son James : " I have 
 been thinking much of proposing some compre- 
 hensive scheme of settling amicably the whole 
 question in all its bearings, but have not yet 
 positively determined to do so." Before offer-
 
 82 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ing his resolves, he went, on a stormy evening, 
 to Webster's house and secured his approval. 
 He introduced them in the Senate at the end of 
 the month, and a little later the great debate 
 began. For two days, to a chamber crowded 
 with an eager and excited audience, Clay spoke 
 eloquently and persuasively in support of his 
 resolves, appealing to the North for concession, 
 and to the South for peace. A month later 
 Calhoun, tall, gaunt, and haggard, with the 
 shadow of coining death on his face, sat in the 
 Senate, while a friend read for him his carefully 
 prepared argument. He opposed Clay's reso- 
 lutions, and insisted that the South required 
 further legislation for the protection of her 
 peculiar institution and for the security and 
 maintenance of that equilibrium between the 
 slave and free states, which he asserted was a 
 fundamental condition originally insisted on by 
 the South in joining the Union. On the 7th 
 of March Webster followed. His speech was 
 not a discussion of the subjects considered in 
 Clay's resolutions ; it was an appeal " for the 
 preservation of the Union " and the restoration 
 to the country of quiet and harmony. Pene- 
 trated with a deep sense of what the Union had 
 accomplished during the seventy years of its 
 existence, and of the future it promised, if it 
 remained unbroken, he compared slavery to a
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 83 
 
 spot on the face of the sun, and the persons who 
 would break up the government on account of 
 it to those who would strike the light from the 
 heavens, if there were any imperfection in it, 
 and prefer the chance of utter darkness. He 
 endeavored to make the proposed compromises 
 acceptable to the free states, he minimized the 
 concessions required of them and either wholly 
 omitted or touched but lightly on their com- 
 plaints ; while he dwelt at length on the wrongs 
 done the South by the general hostility to slav- 
 ery, by the violent language of the abolitionists, 
 and by the evasion of the constitutional provi- 
 sion for the surrender of fugitive slaves. He 
 would, therefore, he said, vote for a more strin- 
 gent law on the last subject ; while he should 
 vote against the insertion of a proviso prohibit- 
 ing slavery in any bills organizing governments 
 for the territory acquired from Mexico, because 
 slavery was excluded from those regions by a 
 law of nature, and he would not " reenact the 
 will of God," or wound to no purpose the pride 
 of the South. Upon the other subjects of the 
 resolves he was silent. 
 
 This speech was a great disappointment to 
 many Northern Whigs, including some of Web- 
 ster's warmest supporters. It cannot be denied 
 that it has a very different ring from that in 
 which he claimed the Wilmot proviso as his own
 
 84 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 thunder, or from his political utterances of the 
 September previous, when he said : " There has 
 for a long time been no North; I think the 
 North star is at last discovered. I think there 
 will be a North, but up to the recent session of 
 Congress there has been no North, no section of 
 the country in which there has been found a 
 strong, conscientious, united opposition to slav- 
 ery ; no such North has existed." Yet, though 
 there was much bitterness of feeling and criti- 
 cism, and imputation of base motives at the time, 
 it is only just to Mr. Webster to admit that the 
 speech may have been inspired by his profound 
 love for the Union and his conviction that it 
 was in great peril; that his honest apprehen- 
 sions of its imminent destruction affected the 
 whole tone as well as the conclusions of the 
 argument by which he attempted to undo at 
 once with the Northern voters his own work of 
 many years. The success he met with at the 
 time is a striking tribute to his personal power. 
 In the cities the merchants, manufacturers and 
 business people generally, many scholars and 
 thoughtful persons acting with them, held large 
 and enthusiastic Union meetings, and resolved 
 their approval of Webster's speech and Clay's 
 compromises. But the country folks the rural 
 districts, held off, and Webster never regained 
 his hold on them. The Whig party at the
 
 THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 85 
 
 North split into two factions, the " Con- 
 science " and the " Cotton " Whigs. There 
 were in the next Congress an increased num- 
 ber of senators and representatives distinctly 
 opposed to the doctrine of the 7th of March 
 speech and to the measures of compromise. 
 These members made the nucleus for the forma- 
 tion of the Republican party.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES : SEWARD's 
 SPEECH. 
 
 SEWARD, during the winter, was the object 
 of many attacks and a great deal of personal 
 abuse from Southern senators, who seemed to 
 go out of their way to insult him. To these 
 he replied, as has been said, that he had come 
 to the Senate for public, not for private ends ; 
 that he should pass by in silence, as he had 
 before done, all such personal attacks ; that he 
 admitted the purity and patriotism of the mo- 
 tives of all other senators, and expected the same 
 justice to be done to himself. He was not on 
 any committee during this session. He asked 
 to be excused from the committee on patents, to 
 which he had been assigned, upon the ground 
 that his previous employment as counsel in patent 
 suits might be embarrassing to him; and no 
 other place could be found for him except by a 
 re-arrangement of all the committees, which he 
 thought not worth while. 
 
 When Clay and Webster spoke, the silver 
 tongue and personal charm of the one, the
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES. 87 
 
 majestic eloquence and noble presence of the 
 other, and the national reputation of both, filled 
 the Senate chamber with their admirers, women 
 as well as men ; and their speeches found a sym- 
 pathetic response in the breasts of the people 
 of Washington, Southerners and slaveholders as 
 they were. Seward had no such presence, no 
 such eloquence, no such reputation, and when a 
 few days later he rose to speak, the Senate was 
 substantially empty. The President's message 
 transmitting the constitution of California was 
 the special order of the day, and it was to the 
 question of the admission of that state that he 
 particularly addressed himself. It is difficult to 
 give within moderate limits an analysis of this 
 great speech. An intelligent listener said of it, 
 at the time, that it " was marked by more breadth 
 of view, more vigor of thought, and a more pro- 
 found and masterly treatment of the subject, 
 than was displayed by either Clay or Webster." 
 On the other hand, Clay wrote to his son a few 
 days after its delivery, " Mr. Seward's late abo- 
 lition speech . . . has eradicated the respect 'of 
 almost all men for him." These different state- 
 ments represent the extreme divergence of public 
 opinion at the North and South. The speech 
 marked an epoch in discussions on slavery in the 
 Senate of the United States. It was the first 
 time that any senator, regularly elected by one
 
 88 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 of the great^parties of the country, had made in 
 the Senate not merely a statement of his own 
 position, but what was felt to be an authentic 
 declaration of the attitude as to slavery of a 
 formidable and growing minority, if not a ma- 
 jority, of the people of the North. It was the 
 first time that the senators had been called on 
 to recognize the fact, which many of them were 
 striving to ignore, that " a moral question, tran- 
 scending the too narrow creeds of parties, had 
 arisen, that the public conscience was expanding 
 with it, and the green withes of party associa- 
 tions giving way and falling off." 
 
 Seward began by brushing aside the formal 
 and trifling objections brought forward by the 
 opponents of the immediate admission of Cali- 
 fornia, all of which were to be waived if the 
 admission of this free state should be accompa- 
 nied by sundry irrelevant concessions to slavery, 
 a new fugitive slave law, a guaranty of the 
 perpetuity of slavery in the District of Columbia, 
 acquiescence in its existence in the territories 
 of Utah and New Mexico. Passing from these 
 objections, he proceeded to state the reasons, 
 which to his mind rendered the immediate ad- 
 mission of California imperative. The substance 
 of these was, that California was in fact already 
 a state, and could never be a territory, colony, 
 or military dependence ; that remote as she was
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES, 89 
 
 on the Pacific coast, with the population that 
 had suddenly filled her borders, she needed a 
 constitution, sovereignty, independence and pro- 
 tection, either a share of ours, which she had 
 asked for, or her own, which she could assume 
 without our consent, if we rejected her appeal ; 
 and that if we wished to retain her, and Oregon 
 with her, we could not afford to trifle or delay. 
 He then considered the position of those persons 
 who insisted that to the admission of California 
 should be joined fresh compromises on questions 
 connected with slavery. It was to what he had 
 to say on this point that the especial interest and 
 importance of his speech attached. The admis- 
 sion of California was almost conceded. The real 
 struggle was on what should be yielded in re- 
 turn. Declaring himself, for various reasons, 
 opposed to all legislative compromises not ab- 
 solutely necessary, he took up in turn each of 
 the particular measures proposed, commenting 
 briefly on the incongruity of the subjects tacked 
 together in the resolves. He next examined Cal- 
 houn's statement, that nothing would satisfy the 
 South except such legislation as would secure a 
 permanent equilibrium between the free and slave 
 states ; this he pronounced absolutely impossible, 
 as it must involve a veto by the minority of the 
 majority, which meant nothing less than a return 
 to the rope of sand of the old Confederacy ; and
 
 90 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 a subjection of the people of the growing states 
 of the North and West to the more stationary 
 population of the slave states. 
 
 Speaking of the proposed fugitive slave law, 
 he took the ground not merely that a more 
 stringent law would be useless, as it was opposed 
 to the moral convictions of the people of the 
 North, denied all the recognized safeguards of 
 personal liberty, and converted into a crime that 
 hospitality to the outcast and refugee which all 
 mankind save the slaveholder considered an act 
 of common humanity ; but he also insisted, that 
 to have the constitutional provision as to the 
 return of fugitive slaves honestly carried out, 
 the rigors of the law must be alleviated, not in- 
 creased. Referring to the proposal that, as part 
 of the compromises, Congress should deprive it- 
 self of the power of emancipation in the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia, he declared that he would at 
 any time vote for the abolition of slavery there, 
 with a proper compensation to the slave-owners, 
 and was willing to appropriate any sum neces- 
 sary for this purpose. 
 
 It was, however, what he said in treating of 
 the public domain, and of the power and duty 
 of Congress in regard to it, that so greatly 
 stirred the people of both sections at the time, 
 and has since been often quoted and misinter- 
 preted by both friends and enemies.
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES. 91 
 
 "The national domain is ours. ... It was 
 acquired by the valor and with the wealth of 
 the whole nation. We hold, nevertheless, no 
 arbitrary power over it. ... The Constitution 
 regulates our stewardship ; the Constitution 
 devotes the domain to union, to justice, to de- 
 fense, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a 
 higher law than the Constitution, which regu- 
 lates our authority over the domain, and devotes 
 it to the same noble purposes. The territory 
 is a part of the common heritage of mankind, 
 bestowed upon them by the Creator. We are 
 His stewards, and must so discharge our trust 
 as to secure in the highest attainable degree 
 their happiness. . . . Whether, therefore, I re- 
 gard the welfare of the future inhabitants of 
 these new territories, or the security and welfare 
 of the whole people of the United States, I 
 cannot consent to introduce slavery into any 
 part of this continent, which is now exempt from 
 what seems to me so great an evil, ... or to 
 compromise the questions relating to slavery, as 
 a condition of the admission of California." 
 
 To the argument that the prohibition of 
 slavery was unnecessary, he answered : 
 
 " There is no climate uncongenial to slavery. 
 . . . Labor is in quick demand in all new coun- 
 tries. Slave labor is cheaper than free labor, 
 and it would go first into new regions, and
 
 92 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 wherever it goes it brings labor into dishonor. 
 . . . Was the ordinance of 1787 necessary or 
 not? Necessary, we all agree; and yet that 
 ordinance extended the inhibition of slavery 
 from the thirty-seventh to the fortieth parallel 
 of latitude. . . . We are told that we may rely 
 on the laws of God, which prohibit slave labor 
 in this new territory, and that it is absurd to 
 re-enact the laws of God. The Constitution of 
 the United States and the constitutions of all 
 the states are full of such re-enactments. Wher- 
 ever I find a law of God or a law of nature 
 disregarded, or in danger of being disregarded, 
 there I shall vote to re-affirm it with all the 
 sanction of civil authority." 
 
 In all this there is nothing startling, revo- 
 lutionary or treasonable, nothing even that is 
 novel or original. The same thought had been 
 expressed more than once by English philoso- 
 phers and writers upon jurisprudence. Two 
 hundred and fifty years before, Bishop Hooker 
 had written those noble and familiar words : 
 " Of law, there can be no less acknowledged 
 than that her seat is in the bosom of God." 
 Already in this very speech Seward had quoted 
 from another political philosopher, " There is 
 but one law for all, namely, that law which 
 governs all law, the law of our Creator." In 
 any point of view the passage was harmless, for
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES. 93 
 
 far from antagonizing or contrasting the Consti- 
 tution and the laws of God, Seward was insist- 
 ing that they were both in harmony and working 
 to the same noble ends. 
 
 Nor was he responsible for introducing into the 
 debate both the " higher law " and the Consti- 
 tution as conclusive authorities as to slavery and 
 the rights of the slaveholders. Southern sena- 
 tors had already appealed to them. On the day 
 on which Clay introduced his resolutions, Mason, 
 of Virginia, and Davis, of Mississippi, had both 
 insisted that the Constitution carried slavery 
 into all the territories, and protected it there. 
 A fortnight later, Davis declared slavery to be 
 "a blessing, established by God's decree, and 
 sanctioned by the Bible, from Genesis to Reve- 
 lations." A few days before Seward spoke, 
 Davis had again rested the Southern case upon 
 the same authorities, saying : " It is the Bible 
 and the Constitution on which we rely, and we 
 are not to be answered by the dicta of earthly 
 wisdom or more earthly arrogance, when we 
 have those high authorities to teach and to con- 
 strue the decrees of God." It was natural, there- 
 fore, it was fit, and it was necessary, that some 
 senator holding the opposite opinions should also 
 appeal to the "higher law" which the South- 
 erners had already invoked, and should say that 
 he did not so read the Bible and the Constitu-
 
 94 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 tion, though he also found them both in accord, 
 the one a gospel of freedom, not a decree of 
 bondage, and the other a charter of liberty, not 
 a law of servitude. 
 
 The rest of Seward's speech was devoted to 
 considering the argument that the Union was 
 in danger, and could only be saved by compro- 
 mise. He was but little moved by the threats and 
 passionate talk of dissolving the Union, unless 
 satisfactory concessions were made to slavery. 
 He attached, or professed to attach, but little 
 importance to them ; but the Southern leaders 
 and many of their followers were in deadly ear- 
 nest and meant all that they said. The South- 
 ern heart, however, had not yet been thoroughly 
 fired, the slave states had made no preparations 
 for secession, there had been no single act or 
 even fancied aggression of which they could 
 complain ; and they knew that, while Taylor 
 lived, there could be no peaceable separation, 
 that he considered secession to be treason and 
 would not hesitate to treat it accordingly. Ten 
 years' delay, and the complaisance of a Presi- 
 dent as feeble and vacillating as Taylor was 
 prompt and resolute, were needed to complete 
 their preparations and put them in readiness 
 for action. That Seward saw any part of this 
 is more than doubtful. He thought the Union 
 practically indissoluble, because the centripetal
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES. 95 
 
 and conservative forces seemed to him much 
 stronger than the centrifugal. It seemed to him 
 that the South, on reflection, would realize that, 
 if there were to be a dissolution, the probable 
 line of cleavage would run north and south, fol- 
 lowing the great river. He could not believe 
 that the people of the South, when it came to 
 the point, would be willing to say to the civilized 
 world that they had seceded from the Union, 
 in order to establish a government of which 
 African slavery should be the corner-stone, and 
 its maintenance and perpetuity the final cause. 
 Animated as he personally was by the convic- 
 tion that slavery, which he had abhorred since 
 the youthful days of his teaching in Georgia, 
 must give way before the light of modern civili- 
 zation, he felt confident that the Southerners, 
 looking at the question calmly, would at last 
 prefer that the Union should stand, and slavery 
 " disappear gradually, voluntarily, and with com- 
 pensation," rather than that the Union should 
 be dissolved, and, as he foresaw, " civil war and 
 violent, complete, and immediate emancipation 
 follow." The day, he trusted, was far off, when 
 the fountains of popular content should be 
 broken up ; but should it ever come, he felt cer- 
 tain that it would show " how calmly, how firmly, 
 how nobly a great people can act in preserving 
 their Constitution."
 
 96 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 At this time, Clay, Calhoun, Webster, and 
 Seward practically represented all the shades 
 of public opinion in the different sections of 
 the country on the subject of slavery, except 
 the views of the radical abolitionists. Clay, 
 recognizing the existing antagonism between 
 the North and South arising from the various 
 questions connected with slavery, thought that, 
 if some arrangement could be made by which 
 the pending issues could be compromised, no fur- 
 ther differences would arise, and this disturbing 
 and dangerous element would be removed from 
 our politics. Calhoun considered any such com- 
 promise as a mere palliative. In his opinion the 
 Union was only a compact between two classes 
 of equal, sovereign states, one class having slaves 
 and the other not ; and there must be an exact 
 equilibrium of political power between these two 
 classes, or the compact could not be permanent. 
 Webster believed that the gain to mankind by 
 the maintenance and perpetuation of the Union 
 would far outweigh any loss or injury from 
 concessions to, or compromises with, slavery 
 and the slave states. Seward thought that the 
 slave states and slaveholders were entitled to the 
 exact rights and privileges which the Consti- 
 tution gave them, but to nothing more; that 
 slavery was a moral and political wrong, and 
 that under no compulsion and by no persuasion
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES. 97 
 
 would he ever consent to give it one hair's 
 breadth of advantage not distinctly secured to 
 it by the compromises of the Constitution. 
 
 After a debate, protracted more than two 
 months, Clay's resolutions, with the amend- 
 ments and the substitutes proposed by other 
 senators, were referred to a committee of thir- 
 teen, of which he was chairman. A month 
 later this committee reported three bills. The 
 first of these made two amendments to the fugi- 
 tive slave bill then pending before the Senate ; 
 the second put an end to the use of the District 
 of Columbia as a public slave mart for the 
 states. The third was a bill of thirty-nine sec- 
 tions, the first four of which provided for the 
 admission of California, the next seventeen gave 
 Utah a territorial government, and prohibited 
 the territorial legislature from passing any law 
 as to African slavery. Seventeen more sections 
 provided a similar government for New Mexico. 
 The last section contained a proposition to Texas 
 as to the settlement of her boundaries. This 
 third bill soon became known as " the Omnibus 
 bill." 
 
 Those Southerners who had always opposed 
 Clay's resolutions at once attacked this " Omni- 
 bus bill," and all through the hot and sultry 
 summer the debate went on, personal, acrimoni- 
 ous, eager, passionate. The Southern senators
 
 98 WILLIAM HENRY SEWAED. 
 
 were unwearied in their efforts to gain here or 
 there something more than the bill gave them. 
 They endeavored to limit the southern boundary 
 of California to the line of the Missouri Com- 
 promise, and to provide for a slave state out of 
 the territory thus cut off, to obtain a distinct 
 recognition of what they claimed to be their con- 
 stitutional right to carry slaves into New Mexico 
 and hold them there, though the laws of that 
 country abolishing slavery had never been re- 
 pealed, and also to secure an admission of the 
 power of the territorial legislatures to pass laws 
 for the protection of slavery, but not for its pro- 
 hibition. Clay, in spite of his years and feeble- 
 ness, was indefatigable in defense of the com- 
 mittee, and in his endeavors to pass the bill ; 
 but all was in vain. By successive amendments 
 it was gradually reduced to a simple act to pro- 
 vide a territorial government for Utah ; and so 
 mutilated, it passed the Senate on the last day 
 of July. 
 
 Before this happened, Taylor, after a short 
 illness, had died. So long as he lived, Clay 
 had against him, not so much Taylor's active 
 opposition, as the knowledge of every senator 
 that this plan was not the President's or ap- 
 proved by him, and that he had said to a 
 senator who was opposed to the compromise 
 measures: "Stand firm, don't yield." But
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES. 99 
 
 when Fillmore succeeded Taylor, he called to 
 his cabinet Webster and Corwin, the leading 
 compromisers from the free states, and exerted 
 all the influence of his administration to secure 
 the passage of the Omnibus Bill. Contrary, 
 however, to the expectation of its advocates, it 
 turned out that the tacking together of so many 
 incongruous matters was a source of weakness, 
 that it served to combine the opponents rather 
 than to unite the friends of the separate meas- 
 ures, and so brought about the defeat of the 
 entire bill. All the measures recommended 
 by the committee were, however, carried later, 
 each in a separate act. It is the fashion to talk 
 of these as compromise measures, but it is in 
 a certain sense a misnomer ; they did not as a 
 whole receive the support of a majority of the 
 committee of thirteen, less than one third of its 
 members voting for all the bills. The separate 
 acts were carried by different combinations of 
 senators, only eighteen senators voting for all 
 the bills as passed ; of these, twelve were North- 
 ern Democrats, one a Northern Whig from 
 Pennsylvania ; four were Southern Whigs, and 
 one, Houston, of Texas, a Southern Democrat. 
 The analysis shows that it was not to be ex- 
 pected that measures, which taken as a whole 
 found so little general support, could be a final 
 settlement of all questions as to slavery.
 
 100 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Had Taylor lived, the compromise measures 
 wonld probably have failed to pass in any form. 
 The threats of disunion had steeled him against 
 concessions to the demands of the South. "I 
 am pained to learn," said he, " that we have dis- 
 union men to deal with. Disunion is treason." 
 It seems the very irony of fate that this South- 
 ern President, for whom so many Northern 
 Whigs hesitated or refused to vote, because he 
 was a slaveholder and the representative of 
 slaveholding interests, should have been aban- 
 doned by the great leaders of the party upon 
 such a question, and should have stood without 
 their support, an immovable bulwark against the 
 slaveholders, in spite of Southern pressure and 
 Northern weakness. Webster thought Taylor's 
 death delivered the country at that time from 
 the horrors of civil war ; and later writers have 
 said that "the slaveholding states would have 
 been more able to hold their own in 1850 than 
 they proved to be in 1861." But secession, had 
 it been then attempted, would have lost the ten 
 years of organization and preparation secured 
 by delay, and would have encountered the iron 
 will and firm resolve of a Southern soldier, 
 who would have acted while others talked, and 
 whose well known character would have made 
 the stoutest secessionist hesitate before he took 
 the fatal step which separates declamation from
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES, 101 
 
 action. The South did not secede in 1850 be- 
 cause the masses were not ready to do so, and 
 because the leaders knew well what they might 
 expect from the President. Had any state com- 
 mitted a single overt act of rebellion, there would 
 have been at once a resort to force. The offend- 
 ers would have been quickly reduced to obedi- 
 ence, but slavery would have been untouched, 
 and the whole battle would have remained to 
 be fought out at a later day. 
 
 The death of Taylor made a great difference 
 in Seward's political weight in the Senate ; he 
 had been recognized as the advocate, if not the 
 official representative of the President's policy, 
 and this position lent additional importance to 
 his words. But he had no such relations with 
 Fillmore. On the contrary, though in their 
 early political days both Fillmore and Seward 
 had been anti-Masons, and both were original 
 members of the Whig party, yet each of them 
 had his own friends and followers, who looked 
 to him when in office or power for crumbs from 
 the political feast ; and there was early estab- 
 lished between them or their partisans a rivalry 
 in the prosecution of claims for spoils. When 
 questions as to slavery first became prominent, 
 their opinions seemed substantially the same; 
 but later, while Seward grew more outspoken 
 against slavery, Fillmore became more conserv-
 
 102 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ative and cautious. When Fillmore was nom- 
 inated for vice-president, he was understood 
 to represent the anti-Seward wing of the Whig 
 party; and the probability of difficulties from 
 the counter-claims "to office of their respective 
 supporters was so fully recognized, that an at- 
 tempt was made to effect an amicable arrange- 
 ment between them as to the division of places ; 
 but it did not succeed. Some of Fillmore's 
 friends were first served ; but the fact that the 
 governor and state authorities of New York be- 
 longed to the Seward wing of the party, which 
 was far more numerous than Fillmore's, and 
 that to this wing Taylor was principally indebted 
 for the vote of the state, made it essential that 
 this wing should be chiefly recognized in the 
 distribution of offices. 
 
 The change in the attitude of the administra- 
 tion towards the compromise measures, which 
 occurred on Fillmore's accession to office, did not 
 affect Seward's position regarding them, or that 
 of the Whigs who were his followers. The 
 Whig papers in the state of New York which 
 had hitherto opposed them continued to do so, 
 and President Fillmore became prescriptive. He 
 removed the Albany postmaster, a friend of the 
 editor of the Albany " Evening Journal," a paper 
 outspoken in its hostility to the compromises; 
 and the whole influence of his administration
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES. 103 
 
 was exerted, in vain, to prevent the Whig state 
 convention of New York, in the autumn of 
 1850, from passing any resolution approving 
 Seward's course. The president of the conven- 
 tion was one of the conservative Whigs, or, as 
 they were afterwards called, Silver G^eys ; he 
 appointed a committee on resolutions, so se- 
 lected as to make it sure that they would let 
 Seward severely alone. But when they made 
 their report, a resolve indorsing Seward's course 
 was moved as an amendment and carried by a 
 handsome majority. The administration mem- 
 bers of the convention thereupon withdrew to 
 another hall and indorsed the President and 
 the compromises. In the Senate, within three 
 weeks after Taylor's death, a Southern senator 
 threatened to move Seward's expulsion ; and as 
 he himself wrote : " By the advent of Mr. Fill- 
 more " he " was buried below low-water mark." 
 The compromise measures, passed as separate 
 bills before the adjournment of Congress in Sep- 
 tember, 1850, and which were practically all the 
 work of the session, conceded to the North the 
 admission of California as a free state, and the 
 abolition of the slave trade in the District of 
 Columbia ; to the South, territorial governments 
 for New Mexico and Utah, with no exclusion 
 of slavery, the adjustment of the boundary line 
 between New Mexico and Texas, so as to give
 
 104 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Texas a large area which she had never occupied 
 or governed while an independent republic, the 
 payment to her of ten million dollars for relin- 
 quishing a purely paper and nominal claim to 
 still more of New Mexico, and the enactment of 
 a new and more stringent law for the recovery 
 of fugitive slaves. These measures were pro- 
 claimed to be a final settlement of the whole 
 slavery question, which had thus become a dead 
 issue. 
 
 Perhaps the compromises would have allayed 
 the excitement, and have been accepted at the 
 North with practical unanimity, but for the fugi- 
 tive slave law. But this law was odious to the 
 communities in which it was to be enforced. It 
 contained no statute of limitations ; it permitted 
 the recapture of runaways, who had been for 
 years residents in, and had become citizens of, 
 the different free states. The proceedings were 
 assumed to be analogous to those by which a 
 person charged with a crime in a state from 
 which he has fled is surrendered to take his trial 
 there ; and the statute was so drawn that colored 
 persons alleged to be fugitive slaves could be 
 arrested upon ex parte affidavits and hurried 
 into slavery upon the production of mere formal 
 proofs, with no opportunity to try the question 
 of their freedom in the States where they were 
 living and where all the testimony tending to
 
 CALIFORNIA AND THE COMPROMISES. 105 
 
 establish this was naturally to be found. While, 
 as if to make the statute still more offensive 
 to the North, it was provided that the commis- 
 sioners who were to administer the law should 
 receive a fee, when the alleged fugitive was 
 returned, twice as large as that to which they 
 would be entitled if the captive were discharged. 
 Had the law been less arbitrary and brutal, had 
 it provided some safeguards for freedom, some 
 remedies for mistakes of identity, had it made 
 any concessions to Northern sentiment and to 
 the civilization of the nineteenth century, the 
 people of the free states might have permanently 
 acquiesced in it as a legitimate mode of fulfill- 
 ing an obligation which the Constitution im- 
 posed on them, repugnant to their conscience 
 and feelings as that obligation was. But the 
 actual statute was a mere firebrand flung among 
 the opponents of slavery at the North, and every 
 case that arose added fuel to the spreading 
 flames of the popular excitement against it.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 AFTER the passage of the compromise meas- 
 ures, there was a lull in the great contest 
 between freedom and slavery, as often after a 
 battle both combatants seek repose, and time to 
 recruit their strength before renewing the con- 
 flict ; and this truce lasted, with no signs of any 
 new struggle, until the close of Fillmore's admin- 
 istration in 1853. 
 
 The congressional session of 1850-51 was 
 politically unimportant. It was yet too soon 
 for either the North or the South to declare that 
 the compromise measures were not a finality ; 
 although in the free states many meetings, with 
 resolutions indorsing the fugitive slave law and 
 declaring an unfaltering determination to ex- 
 ecute it, and a deluge of pamphlets and sermons 
 by its supporters, lay and clerical, were found 
 necessary to offset the meetings, speeches, and 
 sermons of its opponents, and to endeavor to 
 overcome the hostility of the North to its en- 
 forcement. In November, 1850, Mr. Webster 
 wrote to the President from Boston : " There is
 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION. 107 
 
 now no probability of any resistance if a fugi- 
 tive should be arrested." Yet only three months 
 afterwards a negro, arrested as a fugitive slave, 
 was rescued from the court house there at high 
 noon and successfully carried to Canada ; and in 
 spite of the utmost exertions on the part of the 
 government, no one was ever convicted of tak- 
 ing part in his escape. Quite as significant of 
 the public opinion of the North, though in a 
 different way, was the election to the Senate 
 from New York, Fillmore's own state, of Ham- 
 ilton Fish, an opponent of the compromises, as 
 Seward's colleague ; while Ohio sent Benjamin 
 Wade, a most outspoken Free Soiler ; and in 
 Massachusetts, though only by a bargain for 
 offices between Democrats and Free Soilers, 
 Charles Sumner, an exponent of the extreme 
 anti-slavery opinion, though not a political abo- 
 litionist, succeeded Webster in the Senate. 
 
 Though "political ends, and not real evils 
 resulting from the escape of slaves, constituted 
 the prevailing motives for the enactment of the 
 fugitive slave law," yet, in fact, during the first 
 year after its passage, more persons were seized 
 as fugitive slaves than in the preceding sixty 
 years. This statement, however, does not imply 
 so much as it seems to. From many of the 
 New England states no slave had ever been 
 taken back, and, except from Massachusetts, not
 
 108 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 one from any of them for at least a quarter of a 
 century. There was, even so early as February, 
 1851, some foundation for the complaint that 
 bad faith threw all kinds of difficulties in the 
 way of the recovery of fugitives, often increas- 
 ing the cost to the full value of the slave. 
 Charges of this kind became doubtless more 
 and more true as time went on, and the con- 
 stantly growing hostility to the law continually 
 invented new and fresh obstacles to its speedy 
 and peaceful execution. There were other res- 
 cues, and an occasional murder either of pur- 
 suers or pursued, or the killing by a mother of 
 her children that they might not be sent back to 
 slavery. These, with some kidnappings, and the 
 not infrequent return to slavery, under the sum- 
 mary processes of the law, of free colored per- 
 sons, kept alive the public feeling, and tended 
 slowly to consolidate into a new party the plain 
 people of the Northern states, who did not live 
 by commerce or manufactures, and had no direct 
 dealings or intercourse with the South. 
 
 Even in Congress there was a certain recog- 
 nition of the fact that the finality of the com- 
 promises might be questioned. Before the end 
 of January, 1851, forty-four senators and repre- 
 sentatives of different political parties, with Clay 
 himself at their head, thought it advisable to 
 publish a manifesto, declaring that they would
 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION. 109 
 
 support no man for office who did not condemn 
 any disturbance of the compromises, or agita- 
 tion of the slavery question. Yet congressional 
 action on this subject was not always consistent 
 with what this declaration implied. A bill to 
 construe the fugitive slave law so as to increase 
 its rigor was introduced into the Senate a few 
 days later, and at once referred to a committee, 
 while petitions for its repeal were refused such 
 reference, and immediately laid on the table. 
 Yet even as to these the rule was not uniform, 
 such a petition presented by Seward being sum- 
 marily disposed of, while similar petitions pre- 
 sented by senators from Maine and Pennsylvania 
 were appropriately referred. 
 
 In a short speech on this matter, Seward, 
 alluding to the charge of being an agitator, 
 said : " I am one of the members of this body 
 who have been content with the debates which 
 were had when this subject came legitimately 
 before us in the form of bills requiring debate. 
 I have never spoken on the subject since those 
 bills became laws. I have been content to leave 
 those measures to the scrutiny of the people, and 
 the test of time and truth. I have added no 
 codicils and have none to add, to vary, enforce or 
 explain what -I had occasion to say during the 
 debates." 
 
 This declaration was true, and his conduct in
 
 110 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 this matter eminently characteristic. He was 
 no agitator for agitation's sake. He recognized 
 the fact that the country was for the moment 
 worn out with discussion, that it was hopeless 
 to attempt to rouse the people by declamation, 
 and that only concrete facts of wrong and out- 
 rage, which he felt sure would not fail to occur, 
 could do this. 
 
 There were other subjects besides slavery dis- 
 cussed in the session of 1850-51, a French 
 Spoliation Bill, which Seward supported in an 
 elaborate speech, the improvement of rivers and 
 harbors, the disposition of the public lands, and 
 changes in our postal system. In his views on 
 this last subject, Seward was distinctly a re- 
 former, and in advance of the times. He could 
 not secure cheap postage ; but it was to his exer- 
 tions at this session that we owe our street letter 
 boxes and the first attempt at delivery by letter- 
 carriers in the cities and towns. 
 
 The summer of 1851 saw the opening of the 
 Erie Railway to the lakes ; the President and 
 many of his cabinet and Seward with them 
 made an excursion over the whole length of the 
 road, and there were banquets and speeches and 
 fireworks and all the other festivities common 
 to such occasions. To the " Silver Greys," the 
 Whigs who had indorsed the administration 
 and the compromises, the chief of the " Woolly
 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION. Ill 
 
 Heads " must have seemed au undesirable ad- 
 dition to the presidential party on this pro- 
 longed excursion ; and Sevvard himself felt that 
 there might be some embarrassment from his 
 presence. But the construction of this railway 
 had been one of his early and constantly cher- 
 ished projects, and he would have been reluctant 
 to miss " the wedding of the lakes to the salt 
 sea with the ring of well wrought iron." This 
 was his holiday for the year; he spent the rest 
 of his summer in the trial of an important and 
 fatiguing criminal case. 
 
 Both sessions of the thirty-second Congress 
 (December, 1851, to March 4, 1853), were in 
 striking contrast to those of the previous one. 
 Instead of stormy discussion, hard feelings, bit- 
 ter words, and unbecoming personalities, there 
 was courtesy, fair debate, and general kindliness 
 and good feeling. In the opening days of the 
 first session, resolutions were introduced in the 
 Senate affirming the finality of the compromise 
 measures ; but the discussion of these, except in 
 a single instance, was carried on between the 
 Southern senators, and the resolutions them- 
 selves were never pressed to a vote. In Missis- 
 sippi, where Jbhe issue had been distinctly raised 
 between secession or the Union with compro- 
 mises, Foote, the compromise Union candidate, 
 was elected governor over Jefferson Davis, the
 
 112 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 nominee of the pronounced Secessionists. A 
 South Carolina convention, called to promote the 
 cause of disunion, collapsed ; and, so far as the 
 South was concerned, it was evident that no 
 further concessions to the slaveholding interests 
 were to be asked for at present. At the North 
 the number of cases under the fugitive slave law 
 seemed to diminish. There was consequently 
 less general excitement about it, though there 
 were occasional bursts of indignation, when the 
 popular passions in some locality broke out in 
 a flame ; but the flame never spread into a con- 
 flagration, and the elections in 1852 showed 
 that, on the whole, public opinion was inclined 
 to abide by the compromise measures and not 
 to disturb them. 
 
 The event of the winter (1851-52) which prin- 
 cipally excited Congress and the country was the 
 visit of KoSSuth and his companions, who had 
 been leaders in the Hungarian insurrection of 
 1848. The efforts of the Hungarians to estab- 
 lish a republic had seemed on the point of success, 
 when the forces which Russia sent the Austrian 
 emperor at his request, joined to his own army, 
 enabled him to crush the rebellion. The Czar, 
 who had refused to aid Austria so long as the 
 Hungarians were merely seeking reforms, justi- 
 fied his interference when they had undertaken 
 to form a republic, upon the ground that " the
 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION. 113 
 
 internal security of his empire was menaced by 
 what was passing and preparing in Hungary." 
 Upon their final defeat, Kossuth and other 
 Hungarians escaped to Turkey. The Sultan, 
 supported by England, refused to surrender 
 them ; and the Congress of the United States, 
 acting on the belief that these refugees wished 
 to leave Europe forever, and to seek new homes 
 here, gave them passage to this country in a 
 national vessel. Kossuth, however, leaving the 
 ship at Gibraltar, went directly to England, 
 where he was received with an enthusiasm which 
 grew day by day. During his visit there he put 
 before the people in public addresses of marvel- 
 ous eloquence, tinged with oriental thought and 
 fancy, and clothed in the language of Shake- 
 speare, the only English he knew, vivid pictures 
 of the wrongs and oppression of his country. He 
 made it evident that it was his purpose to in- 
 duce both Great Britain and the United States 
 to acknowledge that it was their duty to protest 
 against the action of any state which should 
 assist another to put down an insurrection ; 
 and although he did not expressly say so, he 
 evidently expected them to be prepared, if ne- 
 cessary, to support their protests by force. As 
 an earnest of their assent to this principle, he 
 wished Great Britain and the United States each 
 to put on record its official and public con-
 
 114 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 deinnation of the recent intervention of Rus- 
 sia in the affairs of Hungary, and his hope was, 
 under cover of this declaration, to start a fresh 
 insurrection there with a better prospect of suc- 
 cess. 
 
 After a short stay in England, he sailed for 
 New York, where he was to arrive early in 
 December. On the very day that Congress as- 
 sembled in that mouth, a resolution was intro- 
 duced in the Senate, at the instance, it was said, 
 of the secretary of state, providing for the wel- 
 come and reception of the Hungarian patriots. 
 It was expected to pass at once and unanimously, 
 but it was opposed, and was therefore not pressed. 
 A substitute offered by Seward, simply giving 
 Kossuth " a cordial welcome to the capital and 
 and the country," was adopted by both houses 
 after some debate. The small minority against 
 it consisted, with a single exception, of South- 
 erners, whose opposition to the resolve, as one 
 of them declared, "had been guided solely by 
 sensitiveness on the subject of slavery." Some 
 Southerners, whose sympathies had been excited 
 for the defeated leaders of an unsuccessful rising 
 in a remote land, and who had been quite ready 
 to invite them here as " exiles broken in heart 
 and fortune," desirous only " to spend their re- 
 maining clays in obscure industry," were quick 
 to take alarm when they found Kossuth preach-
 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION. 115 
 
 ing a crusade in favor of freedom and the rights 
 of men, and when they witnessed the effect of 
 his fervid appeals upon all classes of persons at 
 the North. For it was not merely the more 
 impressionable and uncritical masses who were 
 carried away by his eloquence ; but grave profes- 
 sors, scholars, and men of letters, the intelligent, 
 refined, and fastidious people of the land were 
 equally moved by him ; and the slaveholders not 
 unreasonably apprehended that the quickened 
 sense of the wrongs of a people suffering under 
 the yoke of a despotism, might intensify and 
 deepen the growing conviction at the North of 
 the greater wrongs and sufferings of a people 
 borne down by the still heavier yoke of slav- 
 ery. The fact that the most earnest anti-slavery 
 leaders were among the most ardent of Kos- 
 suth's admirers naturally tended to increase 
 these apprehensions. Kossuth made a tour of 
 the South ; but though trerpfeserved a discreet 
 silence on the subject of slavery, his speeches 
 failed to awaken there any interest for Hungary. 
 Some of the men in public life undoubtedly 
 used the Hungarian question for political pur- 
 poses. Seward took it up in dead earnest. He 
 offered in the Senate a resolution which de- 
 nounced the conduct of Russia in invading Hun- 
 gary without just right, in subverting there the 
 constitution established by the people, and re-
 
 116 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ducing the country to the condition of a province 
 ruled by a foreign power; and which further 
 declared that the United States, in defense of 
 their own interests and of the common interests 
 of mankind, protested against this conduct of 
 Russia, as a wanton and tyrannical infraction 
 of the law of nations, and would not in future 
 be indifferent to any similar acts of national in- 
 justice, oppression, or usurpation, wherever they 
 might occur. In a very earnest and elaborate 
 speech he urged the passage of this resolve. He 
 admitted that it would have been better had we 
 made our protest before the final defeat and sur- 
 render of the Hungarians ; but thought this of 
 the less consequence, as the surrender was quite 
 recent, and there was some prospect of a new 
 rising in Hungary, which made the protest im- 
 portant and seasonable. 1 We had an interest in 
 making this protest, he said, as one of the family 
 of nations, and so deeply concerned in their 
 general welfare that it was not merely our right 
 but our duty to do this. 
 
 Nor did he see any real objection to it. A 
 
 1 The final defeat and surrender of the Hungarians was 
 August 10-13, 1849. This speech was delivered March 9, 
 1852. As neither this country nor England gave Hungary 
 official encouragement there was never any later outbreak. 
 The ninety thousand dollars ($90,000) raised in this country 
 by subscription, for the Hungarian cause, was all spent for 
 the benefit of those who came over here.
 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION. 117 
 
 protest was "not a declaration, nor a menace, 
 nor even a pledge of war in any contingency." 
 It was only " a remonstrance addressed to the 
 conscience of Russia, and an appeal to the reason 
 and justice of mankind. By the law of nations," 
 he argued, "no remonstrance justifies a war." 
 If war should come, the protest would be not a 
 cause, but a " pretext," and " in a defensive war 
 levied against us on such a pretext we should be 
 unconquerable." If Hungary should never rise, 
 there would be no casus belli, and if she should 
 do so, we should have the right to choose our 
 own time for recognizing her. He found in our 
 civil reply to Louis XVI.'s announcement of the 
 formation of the French constitution of 1791, an 
 inferential protest against the foreign interven- 
 tion then organized beyond the Rhine, although 
 the reply was absolutely silent on this point; 
 and he discovered further protests of the same 
 kind in the friendly official messages sent to the 
 Committee of Safety of the first French republic. 
 Washington's policy of avoiding entangling 
 alliances with European countries Seward ad- 
 mitted to have been wise and necessary in its 
 day ; but he argued that this policy was not in- 
 tended or adapted for all time ; that Monroe's 
 course as to the Holy Alliance and the South 
 American republics was a departure from it ; and 
 that his later expression of sympathy with Greece
 
 118 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 towards the close of her long struggle for inde- 
 pendence was inconsistent with it. He spoke 
 with pride of the instant, though unauthorized, 
 recognition by our own minister of the French 
 republic of 1848, as showing the trend of our 
 political relations and influence with the countries 
 of Europe ; and he insisted that the resolve he 
 offered was no greater intervention (if it were 
 intervention at all), than what we had done " in 
 every contest for freedom and humanity through- 
 out the world since we became a nation." 
 
 Seward had, in fact, found no precedent for 
 any such protest, in any act of our foreign policy 
 as to the domestic difficulties of any European 
 state. The diplomatic history of the country 
 afforded no such precedent. The speech was one 
 in which his sympathies got the better of his 
 reason. It advocated a meddlesome foreign 
 policy, inconsistent with the position, the inter- 
 ests, and the prosperity of the United States. 
 Had his resolution been adopted, it would have 
 been a new departure, at variance with the estab- 
 lished practice and traditions of this country, 
 and ten years later might have been relied on 
 by the countries of Europe to justify a more 
 tive interference with our course in crushing the 
 Southern rebellion. The sober sense of Con- 
 gress saved us from the possible consequences of 
 Seward's rash and quixotic proposal.
 
 FILLMOR&S ADMINISTRATION. 119 
 
 In forming the standing committees of the 
 Senate, in the Congress which met in December, 
 1851, Seward was made a member of that on 
 commerce. This brought him into more familiar 
 relations with other senators, and gave him 
 plenty of congenial work. He was always a 
 believer in the development of the country, upon 
 the lines of the policy of the Whig party, and 
 his place on this committee made more effective 
 his endeavors to foster by legislation our domes- 
 tic and foreign commerce. He advocated gov- 
 ernment aid to two lines of Atlantic steamers, 
 to the ship canal round the Sault Saint Marie, 
 and to railroads in various parts of the country, 
 declared himself " out and out " in favor of a 
 railway across the continent, while for the bene- 
 fit of our whalers and trade in the Pacific he 
 strenuously urged a government survey of that 
 ocean. 
 
 In the second session of this Congress there 
 were no political debates. When the presidential 
 conventions met, both parties inserted in their 
 platforms an indorsement of the finality of the 
 compromises. That of the Democrats was ex- 
 plicit, and adopted unanimously; that of the 
 Whigs, though more qualified, was opposed by 
 one fourth of the delegates. 
 
 In the Democratic convention the struggle for 
 the nomination was long : the party leaders, Cass,
 
 120 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Marcy and Buchanan, were all at last abandoned, 
 and Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, who 
 had seen some public service both in the House 
 and Senate and been a general in the Mexican 
 war, secured the nomination. 
 
 Among the Whigs, Scott was the candidate 
 of the opponents of the compromises of 1850 ; 
 Fillmore and Webster, of those who supported 
 these compromises. In the convention, Webster 
 received only twenty-nine votes, while Fillmore 
 had a hundred and thirty -one, enough with 
 Webster's twenty-nine to have given him the 
 nomination. The conservative Northern and 
 the Southern Whigs had together a majority of 
 the convention", and the indorsement of the 
 finality of the compromise measures, including 
 the fugitive slave law, was not unexpected. 
 Indeed, the outcome of the convention was 
 but another compromise, a last attempt of the 
 Whigs to preserve their character as a national 
 party. The anti-slavery Whigs of the North 
 secured the nomination, the South the platform. 
 Seward was disheartened. " The North, the free 
 states," he wrote, "are divided as usual, the 
 South united. Intimidation, usual in that quar- 
 ter, has been met, as usual, by concession, and so 
 the platform adopted is one that deprives Scott 
 of the vantage of position he enjoyed. ... I 
 anticipate defeat and desertion." He was so
 
 FILLMORE'S ADMINISTRATION. 121 
 
 discouraged as to feel weary of his position 
 and that he should be glad to get out of it. 
 This feeling continued throughout the summer. 
 " When will there be a North ? " he asks ; and 
 says again : "I still remain strongly inclined to 
 give up this place and public life. If the state 
 Whig convention adopt the platform, I think I 
 shall be justified in resigning at once." 
 
 The result of the election confirmed his fore- 
 cast. Pierce received two hundred and fifty- 
 four electoral votes from twenty-seven States, 
 while General Scott had only the votes of Ver- 
 mont, Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 
 forty-two in all. Pierce's plurality over Scott 
 on the popular vote was more than two hundred 
 thousand, and his majority over all candidates 
 nearly sixty thousand. So far as the election 
 had any political significance, it showed that the 
 Southerners believed the Democrats more sub- 
 servient to the slaveholding interests than the 
 Whigs ; while it also indicated that the majority 
 of the Northern voters were weary of anti-slavery 
 agitation, and had accepted the compromise 
 measures as a solution of all difficulties, and as 
 the finality which the platforms of both parties 
 asserted them to be.
 
 CHAPTER VH. 
 THE REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 
 
 PRESIDENT PIERCE'S first message, delivered 
 on the 5th of December, 1853, called attention to 
 the " sense of repose and security in the public 
 mind," and gave assurance that this repose 
 should suffer no shock if he had power to avert 
 it. There can be no doubt that, at the time he 
 said this, the President had not the slightest 
 foreboding of the rude shock which this repose 
 was at once, with his own assent and support, 
 to receive at the hands of his own party. 
 
 The Louisiana purchase, the territory acquired 
 from France by the Treaty of 1803, extending 
 west from the Mississippi to the Rocky Moun- 
 tains, first brought into our politics the disturb- 
 ing factor of the extension of slavery ; all our 
 previous holdings being free under the Ordi- 
 nance of 1787. After a sharp contest the ques- 
 tion of freedom or slavery in this territory was 
 settled by a compromise, by which Missouri was 
 admitted as a slave state ; and in all the rest of 
 the territory slavery was to be allowed south of 
 36 30', while north of this latitude it was for- 
 ever prohibited. 
 
 \
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 123 
 
 By this bargain between the sections, the 
 South secured all the rich and fertile lands from 
 the mouth of the Mississippi to the northern 
 border of Missouri, and left to the North the un- 
 inhabited regions beyond, stretching westward 
 to the Rocky Mountains, which were abandoned 
 to the hunter and trapper, or gradually given 
 over to Indian reservations. In 1836, Missouri 
 obtained leave of Congress to extend her bound- 
 aries westward to the Missouri River, and thus 
 more than three thousand square miles, which 
 the Compromise had made free, became slave ter- 
 ritory. Aside from this, however, the Missouri 
 Compromise remained practically unquestioned 
 from its passage in March, 1820, until the year 
 1853, and had been regarded as hardly less sa- 
 cred and binding than the Constitution itself. 
 But the South had now reaped the full benefit 
 of all it had secured by the bargain ; and the 
 inhabitants of the southwestern counties of Mis- 
 souri, with their twenty -five thousand slaves, 
 were looking with covetous eyes upon the fair 
 lands of Kansas, lying just beyond their own 
 borders. 
 
 Several attempts had been made to secure 
 from Congress an act for the organization of a 
 territorial government, in conformity with the 
 provisions of the Missouri Compromise ; but they 
 had all been defeated by Southern votes, osten-
 
 124 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 sibly upon the ground that this territory could 
 not be opened to settlement without interfer- 
 ence with Indian reservations secured by solemn 
 treaties. Within ten days after the delivery 
 of the President's message, with its promise of 
 repose, a similar bill was introduced into the 
 Senate and referred to the committee on territo- 
 ries, of which Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois was 
 chairman. TfiTee weeks later the committee 
 returned it with amendments, accompanied by 
 an elaborate report, in which it was said that it 
 was a disputed point whether the Compromise 
 prohibiting slavery in this territory was a valid 
 enactment ; eminent statesmen holding that Con- 
 gress had no authority to legislate as to slavery 
 in the territories, that the Constitution secured 
 to every citizen an inalienable right to move into 
 any territory with any property, including slaves, 
 and to have the same protected by law, and that 
 any legislation interfering with or restricting 
 this right was null and void. The committee 
 added that they did not recommend any legis- 
 lation either affirming or repealing the Missouri 
 Compromise, or declaring the meaning of the 
 Constitution upon this disputed question ; but 
 then went on to say that the compromise meas- 
 ures of 1850 rested upon the proposition that all 
 questions pertaining to slavery in the territories, 
 or in the states to be formed therefrom, should
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 125 
 
 be left to the decision of the people residing 
 therein. 
 
 The purpose and effect of this report did not 
 escape the notice of the vigilant anti- slavery 
 press of the North. 1 Nor was the hint at its 
 close wholly lost on the South. On the 16th 
 of January, a Southern senator gave notice of 
 an amendment repealing so much of the Mis- 
 souri Compromise as prohibited slavery in this 
 territory, and providing that slaves might be 
 taken there as if that act had never been passed. 
 A week later, after a Sunday's conference with 
 the President, in which Pierce at last yielded 
 to the arguments and persuasion of Jefferson 
 Davis and Douglas, Douglas again reported the 
 bill from his committee, and now there was no 
 uncertainty as to its meaning. It created two 
 territories, Kansas the southern one, and north 
 of this Nebraska. It provided that slavery in 
 these territories should be left to the decision 
 
 ^^^^^^^^^" 
 
 of the people there, and declared the Missouri 
 Compromise inconsistent with the principle of 
 the Acts of 1850 and therefore inoperative and 
 void. The bill in this shape passed the Senate 
 by a vote of thirty-seven yeas to fourteen nays, 
 all the Southerners, of whatever party, ex- 
 cept Bell of Tennessee and Houston of Texas, 
 
 1 New York Evening Post, Jannary 7, 1854 ; Tribune, Janu- 
 ary 11, Independent, January 7.
 
 126 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 voting for it, and only four Northern Democrats 
 against it. 1 
 
 When Douglas reported his bill, he readily 
 granted its opponents a week's delay before it 
 should be brought up for discussion. In this 
 interval there was published the address of the 
 " Independent Democrats," in which the whole 
 history of the growth and development of the 
 bill was exposed, the report attacked, and a 
 strenuous effort made to rouse the people of the 
 North to a sense of the wrong attempted to be 
 done them, and of the threatened danger to free- 
 dom. This address was signed by Chase and 
 Sumner of the Senate and three members of the 
 House. Seward did not sign it, and it is obvi- 
 ous thair-iKTcouM~irot have done so. He was 
 not an Independent Democrat ; he was a Whig, 
 and there was no reason for his signing it which 
 did not apply equally to the other anti-slavery 
 Whigs in the Senate, Fessenden, Foote, Fish, 
 Smith, and Wade, none of whom put their 
 names to it. 
 
 When the day for the debate arrived, Doug- 
 las, assuming that the delay had been Usked to 
 gain time to stir up sectional agitation at the 
 North, made a savage attack on Chase and 
 
 1 Seven Whigs including Bell, five Democrats including 
 Houston, with Chase and Sumner, Independents, made up th 
 minority.
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 127 
 
 Suraner, the senators responsible for this mani- 
 festo, and on them, for the time, came the brunt 
 of the battle against the bill. Before its final 
 passage Seward made two speeches upon it. 
 It was a case, however, where discussion was 
 useless. Douglas had brought the bill to its 
 final shape, providing for the organization of 
 two territories with no restriction as to slavery, 
 because (if we are to take his own explanation) 
 he thought some organization of these territories 
 a pressing necessity, and was satisfied that the 
 South would assent to no other plan. 
 
 The Southerners were perfectly well aware of 
 what they were doing. They knew that they 
 were breaking a bargain of which they had 
 reaped the advantage, and they were at bottom 
 quite indifferent to the charges of bad faith and 
 to all the reproaches heaped upon them. They 
 expected to gain an immediate substantial ad- 
 vantage for slavery, and did not mind the ex- 
 posure of the flimsy and shifting pretexts which 
 they offered in justification of their conduct. 
 They had the united Southern vote, which 
 was pro-slavery and "knew no Whiggery and 
 no Democracy where slavery was concerned ; " 
 and they could rely on a sufficient number of 
 Northern Democrats to carry any measure on 
 which they had determined. To the Senate, 
 therefore, argument was vain, and invectives
 
 128 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 and personalities were useful only to relieve 
 the niiud of the speaker. Whatever was said 
 was a mere protest, unavailing where it was 
 spoken. "We were only a few here," said 
 Seward, " engaged in the cause of freedom in 
 the beginning of this contest. All that we 
 could hope to do was to organize and prepare 
 the issue for the House of Representatives, and 
 awaken the country." 
 
 Seward's first speech was a simple but ex- 
 haustive statement of the whole question in all 
 its bearings, entirely free from personalities, and 
 with little rhetorical adornment. Its tone was 
 one of great calmness, and its calmness made it 
 all the more effective. It has been described 
 as a lawyer's argument. If it was so, the jury 
 to whom it was addressed was the people of the 
 United States, and its effect upon them was all 
 that Seward himself could have desired. 
 
 "His words were listened to not only by his 
 followers in New York, but they had a marked 
 influence on all the anti-slavery Whigs in the 
 country. The speech was translated into Ger- 
 man, and extensively circulated among the Ger- 
 mans of western Texas. It probably affected 
 the minds of more men than any speech de- 
 livered on that side of this question in Con- 
 gress." 1 Having stated the history of the ac- 
 * Rhodes's Hist. U. S. i. pp. 453, 454.
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 129 
 
 quisition of the territory and of the passage of 
 the Compromise bill, which had secured it to 
 freedom, the " universal acceptance of this meas- 
 ure by both parties for more than thirty years, 
 as a conclusive arrangement, its confirmation 
 over and over again by many acts of successive 
 congresses, and the fact that the slaveholding 
 states had received the full benefit of what the 
 Compromise secured them, while the non-slave- 
 holding states had practically enjoyed nothing 
 under it," Seward went on to consider the 
 nature of the question and the momentous con- 
 sequences depending upon its decision. " It 
 was no abstraction that had brought the Com- 
 promise into being. Slavery and freedom were 
 then active antagonists, seeking for ascendency 
 in the Union ; and the contest between them 
 had since that day been merely protracted 
 not decided. By holding fast to the Compro- 
 mise, the occupation of the land by freemen, with 
 free labor, would be secured forever; by abro- 
 gating it, this vast region was to be abandoned 
 to the chances of slavery, which no one could 
 foretell." He announced his conviction that 
 if ever the slaveholding states should " multiply 
 themselves and extend their sphere, so that they 
 could, without association with the non-slave- 
 holding states, constitute of themselves a com- 
 mercial republic, from that day their rule would
 
 130 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 be such as would be hard for the non-slavehold- 
 ing states to bear; and their pride and ambition 
 would consent to no union in which they should 
 not so rule." 
 
 Notwithstanding the compromise measures 
 of 1850, Seward's observation and his natural 
 optimism had made him hopeful that anti-slav- 
 ery opinion was gaining ground, and the coun- 
 try making slow progress, with occasional draw- 
 backs, towards the gradual and peaceful emanci- 
 pation which he ardently desired. The intro- 
 duction of Douglas's original bill at this session 
 of Congress, and the support which it at once 
 received from Northern Democrats, was a rude 
 shock to this hope ; and Seward's letters at this 
 time are full of gloomy forebodings. He wrote 
 home : 
 
 " Douglas has introduced a bill for organizing 
 the Nebraska territory, going as far as the Dem- 
 ocrats dare towards abolishing that provision of 
 the Missouri Compromise which devoted all the 
 new regions north of 36 30' to freedom. 
 
 " I am heart-sick of being here. I look around 
 me in the Senate, and find all demoralized. 
 Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode 
 Island, Vermont ! ! ! All, all in the hands of 
 the slaveholders ; and even New York ready to 
 howl at my heels, if I were only to name the 
 name of freedom, which once they loved so
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 131 
 
 much." l To an invitation to a meeting in New 
 York to protest against the bill, he replied: 
 " Nebraska is not all that is to be saved or lost ; 
 we who thought, only so lately as 1849, of secur- 
 ing some portion at least of the Gulf of Mexico 
 and all the Pacific coast to the institutions of 
 freedom, shall be, before 1857, brought to a 
 doubtful struggle to prevent the extension of 
 slavery to the shores of the Great Lakes and 
 Puget Sound." 2 And as the vote was about to 
 be taken in the Senate, before sending the bill 
 to the House, he wrote again : " Heaven be 
 thanked that since this cup of humiliation cannot 
 be passed, the struggle of draining it is nearly 
 over. . . . This triumph of slavery, the greatest 
 and the worst, is the consummation of thirty-four 
 years of compromise." 3 
 
 In Mr. Welles's " Lincoln and Seward," which 
 was written rather from a controversial than a 
 historical point of view, he prints a letter from 
 Mr. Montgomery Blair, in which Mr. Blair says : 
 "I shall never forget how shocked I was at 
 Seward's telling me that he was the man who put 
 Archie Dixon, the Whig senator from Kentucky 
 in 1854, up to moving the repeal of the Missouri 
 Compromise as an amendment to Douglas's first 
 Kansas bill ; and had himself forced the repeal 
 by that movement, and had thus brought to life 
 1 January 4, 1854. 2 January 28, 1854. 3 March 3, 1854
 
 132 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the Republican party. Dixon was to out-Herod 
 Herod at the South, and he would out-Herod 
 Herod at the North. He did not contemplate 
 what followed. He did not believe in the reality 
 of the passions he excited, because he felt none 
 himself. He thought it all a harmless game for 
 power." This statement of Mr. Blair's, though 
 apparently relied on by some careful writers, 
 seems to show so great f orgetf ulness or ignorance 
 of historical facts, or such a reckless disregard 
 of them, as greatly to impair, if not wholly to 
 destroy its claim to serious consideration; but 
 as a malignant posthumous attack on Seward, 
 it justifies, if it does not require, even at the 
 risk of repetition, some notice here. 
 
 The principal historical facts, which dispose 
 of Mr. Blair's charge that Seward forced the 
 repeal of the Missouri Compromise by putting 
 up Dixon of Kentucky to move it, are as fol- 
 lows : early in December, 1853, Dodge of Wis- 
 consin introduced into the Senate a bill for organ- 
 izing into one territory, to be called Nebraska, 
 the whole country stretching west from Mis r 
 souri to Oregon and Utah. All this region 
 had been declared free by the Missouri Com- 
 promise, and Dodge's bill assumed this to be 
 constitutional and still in force, unaffected by 
 any subsequent legislation. His bill was re- 
 ferred to the committee on territories, of which
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 133 
 
 Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois was chairman, 
 and that committee, on the 4th of January, 
 1854, reported the bill in a new draft, or, to 
 speak accurately, substituted for Dodge's bill 
 one of their own. They also submitted an elab- 
 orate report, in which they said that " it was 
 disputed whether the law prohibiting slavery in 
 Nebraska was valid ; that there was involved 
 in it the question whether Congress had the 
 constitutional power to regulate the domestic 
 institutions of the territories, the same issue 
 which produced the struggle of 1850, that 
 they thought it wise not to depart from the 
 course pursued at that time, and would not 
 recommend either affirming or repealing the 
 Missouri Compromise, or the passage of any act 
 declaratory of the meaning of the Constitution 
 on this point." Nevertheless their bill, when it 
 first appeared in print as an act of twenty sec- 
 tions, on the 7th of January, 1854, contained 
 provisions borrowed from the laws organizing 
 Utah and New Mexico, by which, whenever this 
 or any part of this new territory should be ad- 
 mitted as a state, its admission should take 
 place without regard to the fact that its consti- 
 tution permitted or prohibited slavery. This 
 provision was a violation of the spirit, if not also 
 of the letter, of the Missouri Compromise, and 
 an application to this territory of the doctrine
 
 134 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 of squatter sovereignty as established by the 
 compromise measures of 1850. 
 
 Three days later (January 10, 1854), there 
 was printed an additional section (the twenty- 
 first) said to have been omitted by a mistake of 
 the copyist in the original draft of the bill. This 
 section contained several paragraphs. It declared 
 that it was the intent of the act, so far as slavery 
 was concerned, to carry into effect the principles 
 established by the compromise measures of 1850 ; 
 and specified as the first of these principles that 
 " all questions pertaining to slavery in the terri- 
 tories, and in the new states to be formed there- 
 from, are to be left to the decision of the people 
 residing therein, through their appropriate 
 representatives." If there had previously been 
 any doubt as to the purpose and effect of 
 Douglas's bill, this new section made its scope 
 and object perfectly clear; and Douglas was 
 quite right when he said at a later date that 
 " the bill, in the shape in which it was at first 
 reported, as effectually repealed the Missouri 
 restriction, as it did when the repeal was put 
 in express terms." The country understood the 
 bill in this way, and leading newspapers at once 
 exposed its character. 
 
 Seward so understood it, and before the 10th 
 of January (the day when the additional section 
 first appeared) had written of it as " this infa-
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 135 
 
 mous Nebraska bill, an administration move ; " 
 and called attention to its clause protecting 
 Indians in their rights of property, which he 
 declared to be " an equivoque to cover the slaves 
 the Indians own, and so sanction slavery by 
 implication." He had also written as to meet- 
 ings and legislative resolutions to remonstrate 
 against it, and expressed a hope that Clayton 
 might be induced "to lead an opposition to the 
 repeal of the Missouri Compromise" l 
 
 On the sixteenth of January, eight days after 
 the date of this letter, Archibald Dixon of Ken- 
 tucky, who had been elected to the Senate as a 
 Whig, but who openly declared that upon the 
 question of slavery he knew no Whiggery and 
 no Democracy, that he was a pro-slavery man, 
 was from a slaveholding constituency, and was 
 there to maintain their rights, gave notice of an 
 amendment which he proposed to offer, expressly 
 repealing so much of the Missouri Compro- 
 mise as prohibited slavery in this new territory. 
 Sumner on the next day proposed an amendment 
 of an exactly opposite character. The bill was 
 recommitted; the following week Douglas re- 
 ported it substantially as it was finally passed ; 
 and we find Seward writing to his wife : " The 
 great news of the day I suppose you have antici- 
 pated. The ' Hards,' finding fault with Doug- 
 1 Letters, January 8, 1854.
 
 136 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 las's equivocations in his first bill, insisted on 
 the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Doug- 
 las conferred last Sunday with the cabinet ; and 
 the matter resulted in a unanimous agreement 
 to concede the demand, and to put the bill right 
 through, before the country could be aroused, 
 and so silence agitation of freedom by leaving 
 no more for slavery to demand. I shall not 
 speculate yet on the consequences." 
 
 The course of events in the Senate and the 
 accounts contained in these letters correspond 
 with one another. Douglas meant to repeal the 
 prohibition of slavery contained in the Missouri 
 Compromise, but hoped to do it indirectly, in 
 such a way as to satisfy the South without 
 rousing the attention or exciting the opposition 
 of the North. He made two attempts for this 
 purpose, the second (by the restoration of the 
 suppressed twenty-first section) more explicit 
 than the first. But the friends of freedom had 
 seen his object from the beginning ; they be- 
 lieved, as he did, that he had accomplished it in 
 his original bill, and at once began to endeavor to 
 rouse public opinion at the North. The South- 
 ern slaveholders and the Northern pro-slavery 
 Democrats (the Hards) would not, however, be 
 satisfied with anything less than a direct repeal 
 
 J O 
 
 in clear language. They persuaded the President 
 to assent to this course, and Douglas reported
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 137 
 
 his final bill. Dixon's motion was an incident of 
 no special importance. Before it was made the 
 committee had determined that their bill should 
 open the territory to slavery, and believed that 
 it had done so in the way to attract least atten- 
 tion. The South insisted on more explicit 
 language on this point, and the committee 
 yielded to their persistence. The final shape of 
 the bill, proposing the organization of two terri- 
 tories instead of one, may have been expected to 
 facilitate its passage, as it left room for the argu- 
 ment that there was to be a division between 
 the North and South, as often before, and that 
 though Kansas, which was next Missouri, would 
 be a slave state, yet Nebraska was not likely 
 to be so. Nebraska it was then quite safe to 
 talk about, as its only denizens were Indians on 
 their reservations, and our hunters and the game 
 they were pursuing ; and there was no immedi- 
 ate prospect of any more stable population. 
 
 What Seward actually said to Mr. Blair, which 
 enabled him to make the statement he has printed, 
 can never be known, since Mr. Blair, however 
 shocked he was, never mentioned the matter 
 during Seward's lifetime, when Seward might 
 have explained or denied it, but reserved it for an 
 attack on him after his death. To any one who 
 has studied Seward's life, the suggestion that in 
 his opposition to the extension of slavery he was
 
 138 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 playing a part in " a harmless game for power," 
 is simply absurd. Slavery was abhorrent to 
 him from his early experience in Georgia. Later 
 in life he abandoned a journey in Virginia 
 because the daily contact with slavery was so 
 repulsive to him. He believed it a moral wrong 
 and a political mistake, and his whole course in 
 politics rested upon this conviction. The sub- 
 stance and the tone of the letters we have quoted, 
 his whole correspondence at the time, and his 
 speech on the Kansas-Nebraska bill are abso- 
 lutely inconsistent with his having " put up 
 Dixon " to moving the repeal of the Missouri 
 Compromise. There were no confidential rela- 
 tions between Seward and Mr. Blair which 
 would have naturally led Seward to make him 
 the sole depositary of this secret ; Blair himself 
 had no such tender regard for Seward's repu- 
 tation as would have caused him to hesitate 
 for an instant to speak of this, if, at the time, 
 he really understood what he at last brought 
 himself to state in this letter. There were in 
 Congress, when the Kansas-Nebraska bill was 
 under discussion, many of its opponents who 
 did not like, or always agree with, Seward, and 
 who did not shrink from criticising him, or say- 
 ing sharp and unpleasant things about him. If 
 there were any background of facts to warrant 
 Mr. Blair's charges, we may be quite sure that
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 139 
 
 some rumor of them would have been then cir- 
 culating in Washington, and that we should not 
 have waited till twenty years after the events 
 happened, when all the actors were dead, before 
 hearing this story for the first time. Nor, if 
 there were any foundation for Mr. Blair's charge 
 against him, if he had any share in Dixon's 
 motion, could Seward himself, when the facts 
 were fresh, and when the evidence to convict 
 him of falsehood, if what he was stating were 
 untrue, was right at hand, have written as he 
 did in the letters we have quoted, or have pub- 
 licly said in a speech on this very bill : " The 
 shifting sands of compromise are passing from 
 under my feet, and they are now, without agency 
 of my own, taking hold again on the rock of the 
 Constitution." 
 
 In the House of Representatives there was 
 more opposition to the bill ; there seemed a 
 possibility of its defeat, and more than a possi- 
 bility of some amendments unacceptable to the 
 slaveholders. But it was at last forced through, 
 without material changes, by the parliamentary 
 skill and the unhesitating audacity of Alexander 
 H. Stephens of Georgia, who succeeded most in- 
 geniously in cutting off all possible amendments 
 and stopping all debate. 
 
 A change, which the Southerners were pre- 
 pared to accept, made it necessary to return the
 
 140 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 bill to the Senate, that it might be put on its 
 final passage there. It was on the night before 
 this final vote was taken that Seward made his 
 second speech ; and the despondency betrayed 
 in his correspondence is even more manifest 
 here. 
 
 " The sun has set," he began, " for the last 
 time on the guaranteed and certain liberties of 
 all the unsettled and unorganized portions of 
 the United States. To-morrow's sun will rise in 
 dim eclipse over them. How long that obstruc- 
 tion shall last is known only to the Power that 
 directs and controls all human events. For my- 
 self, I know only this, that no human power will 
 prevent its coming on, and that its passing off 
 will be hastened and secured by others than 
 those now here, and perhaps only by those be- 
 longing to future generations. . . . By the pas- 
 sage of this bill, freedom will endure a severe, 
 though, I hope, not an irretrievable loss. . . . 
 The slave states are in earnest in seeking for 
 and securing an object, and an important one. 
 I do not know how long the advantage gained 
 will last, nor how great and comprehensive it 
 will be. ... There is suspended on the issue 
 of this contest the political equilibrium between 
 the free and the slave states. It is no idle ques- 
 tion, whether slavery shall go on increasing its 
 influence over the central power here, or whether
 
 REPEAL OF MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 141 
 
 freedom shall gain the ascendency. ... I be- 
 lieve that, if ever the greater ascendency of the 
 slave power shall come, the voice of freedom 
 will cease to be heard in these halls, whatever 
 may be the evils and dangers which slavery shall 
 produce. . . . When freedom of speech on a 
 subject of such vital interest shall have ceased 
 to exist in Congress, then I shall expect to see 
 slavery not only luxuriating in all new territo- 
 ries, but stealthily creeping into the free states 
 themselves. Believing this, ... I am sure that 
 this will be no longer a land of freedom and 
 constitutional liberty, when slavery shall have 
 thus become paramount." It was, therefore, 
 rather with the courage of despair than with the 
 confidence of hope that he said : " Come on, 
 then, gentlemen of the slave states. Since there 
 is no escaping your challenge, I accept it in be- 
 half of the cause of freedom. We will engage 
 in competition for the virgin soil of Kansas, 
 and God give the victory to the side which is 
 stronger in numbers as it is in right." 
 
 The only gleam of satisfaction that he could 
 see came from his conviction that the so-called 
 final arrangements with the South, made only to 
 be broken, were forever at an end.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 
 
 THE vote on the Nebraska bill again demon- 
 strated that all questions touching the interests 
 of slavery lay outside of the creeds of parties, 
 and the ties of party associations. The disin- 
 tegration of the Whig party seemed inevitable. 
 Every Northern Whig, in either House or Sen- 
 ate, voted against the bill ; while of the South- 
 ern Whigs, twenty-one voted for it and only 
 eight against it. Among the Democrats the sec- 
 tional lines were not so sharply drawn ; fifty-eight 
 Northern Democrats voted for the bill, and forty- 
 eight against it ; while from the South but three 
 voted against it, fifty-eight for it. 
 
 From the Northern Democracy, as an anti- 
 slavery party, there was nothing to be hoped, 
 and the people as well as the politicians were 
 discussing whether it was more advisable to make 
 a fight against slavery under the Whig name 
 and organization at the North, or to form a new 
 party. Already, before the passage of the bill, 
 there had been meetings in Wisconsin to con- 
 sider a fusion of the Whigs, Free Soilers, and
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 143 
 
 an ti- slavery Democrats into a new party, for 
 which the name " Republican " had been sug- 
 gested. The day after the passage of the bill 
 some thirty members of Congress agreed to- 
 gether upon the necessity for a new party, and 
 adopted the same name ; and in the summer 
 there were in several states, under varying 
 forms, fusions between the anti-Nebraska mem- 
 bers of the different parties, and elections to 
 local offices of candidates who represented the 
 various organizations which had united to form 
 a common opposition to the constant demands 
 of slavery. In Michigan the new organization 
 was complete. It held a- regular convention, 
 called itself the " Republican jsajity," nomi- 
 nated its candidates and elected them. 
 
 Something had been said, even before the 
 passage of the bill, as to calling a convention of 
 all the free states ; and Seward in reply to this 
 suggestion had given his opinion that " we were 
 not yet ready for a great national convention ; " 
 that the states were the places for activity. 
 " Let us make our power respected, as we can, 
 through our elections in the states, and then 
 bring the states into general council." 
 
 The difficulties in the way of any fusion of the 
 old parties were much greater in the East than 
 in the West ; for at the East the animosities 
 were much stronger between the various politi-
 
 144 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 cal elements from which the opponents to the 
 Nebraska bill were drawn. 
 
 There were several distinct bodies. The 
 Northern Whigs, who on this question were a 
 unit, were divided into at least two groups, 
 those who had opposed the compromises of 
 1850, the Seward Whigs we may call them, 
 and those who had favored those compromises, 
 the Webster Whigs. The former were the 
 more numerous, and had been recruited by the 
 addition of most of the young Whigs ; the 
 strength of the latter was in the cities and with 
 the older, richer, and more influential classes. 
 Of the former Seward was the leader ; but by 
 the latter he was looked upon with distrust and 
 dislike. If the houses of some of the conserva- 
 tives in New York were again opening to him, 
 the Webster Whigs of Boston ignored his exist- 
 ence even at a later period ; and when he came 
 to Massachusetts in December of the following 
 year (1855) to deliver an oration at Plymouth, 
 though his arrival had been announced in the 
 newspapers, no one of them called upon him, 
 and he passed a day in Boston, alone in a hotel 
 parlor, reading Lewes's " Life of Goethe." For 
 the Whigs of this class he had gone too fast 
 and too far. To the Free Soilers who had been 
 Democrats, and to those Democrats who had 
 opposed the Nebraska bill, he was objection-
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 145 
 
 able, as having been always, upon all the eco- 
 nomic questions which had divided the two 
 great parties, a pronounced Whig. For the suc- 
 cessful formation of a new national party ^ it 
 was essential that Seward should lend to the 
 movement his active assistance, if he must not 
 indeed lead in it ; yet the politicians were too 
 much afraid of the opposition to him from va- 
 rious quarters to put him at its head, and, as 
 he thought, would have liked him to do the 
 work and decline the honors. He wrote to his 
 wife : " I have letters of all sorts ; . . . the 
 amount of which is that, insomuch as I am too 
 much of an anti-slavery man to be proscribed by 
 anti-slavery men, and yet too much of a Whig 
 to be allowed to lead, that I am in the way of 
 great movements to make a Democratic anti- 
 slavery party . . . which would revolutionize the 
 government at once. 
 
 " Then again, I am so important to the Whig 
 party that it cannot move without me ; but that 
 party (the Webster part of it) is so jaundiced 
 toward me, that I am expected to decline being 
 a candidate right off, and go in for some other 
 Whig candidate, and so carry the election for 
 the Whig party. 
 
 " The Free Soilers are engaged in schemes for 
 nominating Colonel Benton and dissolving the 
 Whig party ; . . . and there are not less than
 
 146 WILL 1 AM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 half a dozen parties coming to negotiate with me 
 as if I were a vendor of votes." 
 
 All that he saw and learned increased his 
 doubts whether the various opponents of the 
 Nebraska bill were yet prepared so to subordi- 
 nate their differences as to work together har- 
 moniously and earnestly for a common end, and 
 confirmed his opinion that the time was not ripe 
 for a national experiment, but for separate efforts 
 in the states, where success would be more prob- 
 able and more encouraging, and where failure 
 would be less disastrous and demoralizing. This 
 course seemed all the more judicious, as there 
 was no national contest this year, and separate 
 congressional districts could arrange, each in 
 its own way, for the election of anti-Nebraska 
 congressmen, more effectually than if they were 
 in any degree under the control of a new party 
 organization. 
 
 It presently appeared also that there was a 
 new element to be taken into account in any 
 political calculation : the mysterious appari- 
 tion of a new party, the " Dark Lantern," the 
 u Know-nothing " or " Native American " party, 
 which was both a political organization and a 
 secret order, whose ostensible purpose was to 
 check the power and restrict the numbers of 
 foreign-born citizens by a rigorous enforcement 
 and the ultimate modification of the existing
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 147 
 
 naturalization laws, to purify the ballot, and to 
 resist all attempts to exclude the Bible from the 
 public schools ; in other words it seemed to be 
 a union of American Protestants against Irish 
 Roman Catholics. It originated in New York 
 in 1853, and its avowed objects appealed to 
 many people in that and other large cities of 
 the East, where the influx of illiterate foreigners 
 was the greatest, and abuses of the naturaliza- 
 tion laws most frequent. Conservative men all 
 over the country who had been Whigs, and who 
 realized that this party, as a national organiza- 
 tion, was dead, joined the order in the hope that 
 questions as to slavery might be put aside by 
 these new issues, which had nothing sectional 
 about them. It was the only refuge for a South- 
 ern Whig ; and Northern Whigs, who could not 
 bring themselves to strike hands with Seward 
 and the advance guard of their old party, found 
 here an escape from so doing. It became dis- 
 tinctly a Union-saving party in November, 1854, 
 when it introduced into its ritual a third, or 
 Union, degree, and conferred it on the initiates 
 with an imposing ceremonial. Before this time, 
 however, there were not wanting zealous anti- 
 slavery men who had seen that the Know-no- 
 thing organization might be used as an instru- 
 ment in breaking up the old parties and aiding 
 the formation of a new one, and who joined it for
 
 148 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 this purpose. They were sufficiently numerous 
 in many states to influence the nominations, and 
 to take care that the candidates for Congress 
 should be in harmony with their views. 
 
 The Know-nothings were badly defeated in 
 Virginia in the spring of 1855, and their national 
 council, in June of that year, was hopelessly 
 divided by sectional strife, yet in the elections 
 of 1854 they had been formidable opponents, 
 all the more so because nothing was known of 
 them, of their methods, their power or their 
 numbers. In Philadelphia, where they were 
 supposed to be very numerous, Douglas de- 
 nounced them bitterly in a campaign speech, 
 hoping in this way to deter Democrats from 
 joining the organization, and to secure for his 
 party the full Irish vote. 
 
 Seward, whose hostility to any political pro- 
 scription on account of birth, race or religion, 
 was of long date and had often been stated by 
 him in public addresses and letters, took no 
 part in the campaign. His silence has been 
 criticised. But whether considered with refer- 
 ence to his own personal interest in his reelection 
 to the Senate or to the success of the party, 
 it seems to have been judicious. It may be 
 doubted whether, when the largest national 
 issue to which he could address himself was 
 practically that of his own reelection, he
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 149 
 
 would have thought it becoming the dignity of 
 his position to enter the lists as a campaign 
 speaker on his own behalf. It was well under- 
 stood too, that many Whigs, who looked on him 
 with jaundiced eyes, had joined the new, myste- 
 rious company with its secret affiliations. The 
 Whig party of New York had declined all alli- 
 ances whatsoever, adhered to its old organization, 
 and placed itself squarely on anti-Nebraska 
 ground ; nothing that Seward could have said 
 would have detached a single "Silver Grey" 
 neophyte from his allegiance to the new order, 
 though it might have lost him the vote of some 
 Know-nothing, who had a more vivid interest in 
 the struggle against a manifest and growing evil 
 at home, than in a crusade to secure the freedom 
 of a region so remote as Kansas. In the state 
 of New York the Whigs carried their ticket 
 by a plurality of only three hundred in a vote of 
 nearly half a million. A change of one hundred 
 and fifty-five votes would have elected the Dem- 
 ocratic candidates. 
 
 Early in February of the following year, Sew- 
 ard was reflected senator ; and this reelection, 
 considering his antecedents, was as severe a blow 
 as could have been dealt the Know-nothings 
 at that time. The earnest members of that 
 party had set their hearts on his defeat ; but the 
 result showed that, when an issue was raised
 
 150 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 between Anti-slavery and Americanism, there 
 were members of that party, at least in the 
 legislature of Seward's own state, who were 
 opponents of slavery before they were Know- 
 nothings. 
 
 This campaign, and election, which seemed to 
 Seward a victory for himself as well as his 
 party, was to bear for him most bitter fruit. 
 Horace Greeley, who was generally considered 
 at that time an unselfish patriot, but had at 
 bottom an unsatisfied desire for a nomination, 
 as a recognition from his party, had set his 
 heart on being the Whig candidate for gov- 
 ernor; and had, as both he and his friends 
 thought, every reason to expect this. In spite 
 of Greeley's ability, his advocacy of various 
 hobbies and crotchets of his own had led so 
 many sensible people to doubt his judgment, 
 that it was feared that his name on the ticket, 
 when success was at the best so uncertain, 
 would insure its defeat, and he did not receive 
 the nomination; while to make matters worse 
 a rival editor Henry J. Raymond, of the 
 " New York Times " was nominated and 
 elected as lieutenant - governor. For all this 
 Greeley chose to consider Seward responsible, 
 and he wrote him a letter, which Seward took 
 for a momentary ebullition of temper, but which 
 was in truth a declaration of undying hostility.
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 151 
 
 Greeley bided his time ; and in 1860 went from 
 New York to Chicago as a " delegate from Ore- 
 gon" to the Republican Convention, that he 
 might do all in his power to get even with 
 Seward and defeat his nomination. 
 
 The defeat of the Know-nothings in Virginia, 
 and their domestic disorders in Philadelphia, 
 were unmistakable signs of waning strength. 
 The auspicious moment for the formation of 
 a new party in those states which had clung 
 to their old organizations, appeared to have 
 arrived. In Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, 
 and New York, Republican conventions were 
 called and candidates nominated. To this move- 
 ment in New York Seward gave his hearty 
 adhesion and a strong impulse. In a speech 
 at Albany he summed up the case for the 
 Northern opponents of the extension of slavery, 
 by a most graphic sketch of the changes of atti- 
 tude in the slaveholders, from their assent to the 
 dedication to freedom of all our public lands 
 by the ordinance of 1787, to their steady en- 
 croachments and constantly increasing demands 
 as to our newly acquired territory from the time 
 of the Louisiana purchase to the repeal of the 
 Missouri Compromise ; and he showed the ne- 
 cessity of a 'new party organization to resist the 
 future exactions of this privileged and persist- 
 ent class.
 
 152 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 The result of the autumn elections, however, 
 indicated that the Northern seceders from the 
 Know-nothing party had under - estimated its 
 strength, and justified the boast of the New 
 York leader of its pro - slavery faction : that, 
 though they had expelled thirty thousand mem- 
 bers for supporting Seward's reelection, they 
 could still muster votes enough to carry the 
 state. The outcome of these elections, as a 
 whole, was somewhat disheartening for the Re- 
 publicans ; the Democracy recovered New Jer- 
 sey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois ; and 
 the pro-slavery American party, with the " Sil- 
 ver Grey " Whigs, who voted for its candidates, 
 carried New York, California, and Massachu- 
 setts. If any conclusion is to be drawn from 
 the result in New York, it would seem to be 
 that, had Seward surrendered his own judgment 
 to the opinions of those who advocated the for- 
 mation of a new national party the year before, 
 and had he abandoned the Whig organization 
 at that time, the Know-nothings or the Demo- 
 cracy would have carried the state, he would 
 have returned to private life, and the country 
 would have lost his great services during the 
 trying six years to come. 
 
 The Republican party having been organized 
 in the various Northern States, the next step 
 was to give it a national character and prepare
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 153 
 
 for the presidential campaign of the following 
 year. A preliminary matter, to which much 
 consideration was given by some of the leading 
 men, was the question of the recognition of the 
 Know-nothings, either in the call for the con- 
 vention, the platform, or the candidates, and an 
 alliance, if not a fusion, of the two parties. 
 
 Just at the close of the year, at a conference 
 to which Seward was invited, but which he de- 
 clined to attend, it was proposed to have a 
 convention, half Republican, and half Know-no- 
 thing, and he was told that all the free states 
 except New York either had acquiesced in it or 
 would do so. Seward declined to assume any 
 responsibility as to the action of his state ; but 
 for himself protested- against any such combina- 
 tion, saying that if it were carried out, he should 
 disavow all connection or sympathy with it. 
 The prospect of some such understanding he 
 thought increasing as time went on, and re- 
 gretted that the tone of anti-slavery sentiment 
 was becoming daily more and more modified 
 under the pressure of Know-nothing influence, 
 feeling as if he himself were half demoralized 
 by it. The question had a personal bearing 
 with him from the outset. He would have liked 
 the presidential nomination, if the new party 
 were to put itself squarely on a ground of prin- 
 ciple and not of expediency; but he could not
 
 154 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 accept it if there should be any taint of Knovr- 
 nothingism, either about the convention or the 
 platform. At the conference which has been 
 spoken of, it was stated that Fremont and 
 Chase were both candidates; and it was also 
 said on Weed's authority that Seward was not 
 so. This Seward confirmed, so far as it related 
 to a nomination by the joint convention then 
 proposed; but he by no means abandoned 
 either the hope or the desire for the nomination, 
 though he put himself as to that in Weed's 
 hands, trusting to his political sagacity to de- 
 cide what was best. The trend of opinion in 
 favor of Fremont was so strong that early in 
 April Seward wrote that it had ripened into the 
 general impression that it would be expedient 
 to nominate the California candidate ; but his 
 apprehensions of some arrangement with the 
 Know-nothings were by no means relieved. " I 
 am content and quiet on the personal question," 
 he wrote to Weed, " and when the array of the 
 battle shall be set and fixed, I shall decide upon 
 my own line of duty, so as to save my independ- 
 ence without the exhibition of personal suscep- 
 tibilities." 
 
 A preliminary convention, on the 22d of Feb- 
 ruary, had announced the organization of the 
 Republicans as a national party ; its nominating 
 convention was to be held at Philadelphia on the
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 155 
 
 17th of June. As this time drew near Seward's 
 uneasiness increased ; he thought the indications 
 decisive of a compromise which would be embar- 
 rassing to him, and " even more injurious to the 
 great cause in whose name it was to be made." 
 He had not, however, nor had the people gen- 
 erally abandoned all expectation of his being 
 the nominee of the convention ; and though he 
 learned, and with apparent surprise, tracing 
 no connection between Greeley's conduct and his 
 letter, that Greeley had struck hands with his 
 enemies, and sacrificed him for the good of the 
 cause, and that Weed had concurred in this; 
 yet it was not till the day the convention met 
 that he absolutely declined the nomination, upon 
 the ground that the convention was not pre- 
 pared to adopt all his principles, and that he 
 would not modify them to secure the presi- 
 dency. Chase's name was also withdrawn, and 
 the only candidates practically before the con- 
 vention were Fremont and McLean. The latter 
 was the choice of Pennsylvania, the only man, it 
 was said, who could carry that state, where the 
 Republican party contained a large admixture of 
 Know-nothings, to whom Seward was impossible 
 and Fremont unacceptable. But on the first 
 ballot Fremont 'received a decisive majority, and 
 his nomination was at once made unanimous. 
 The platform, contrary to Seward's expectation,
 
 156 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 contained nothing to which he could not cor- 
 dially assent. The result of the convention was, 
 as he himself expressed it, " a complete Seward 
 platform with new representative men upon it." 
 It is certainly very doubtful whether, if Sew- 
 ard himself had personally urged his claims for 
 the nomination at this time, and his friends had 
 done all in their power to procure it for him, he 
 could have carried the convention. He was not 
 then so strong in the country as he was four 
 years later ; in the Republican party, especially 
 in Pennsylvania and Indiana, there were many 
 seceders from the Know-nothings to whom he 
 was particularly objectionable ; the opposition of 
 the delegates from these states in the conven- 
 tion four years later had a powerful, if not a 
 conclusive, effect against him at that time, and 
 their influence would have been greater in 1856 
 than it was in 1860. Moreover, his anti-slavery 
 views were more advanced than those of a large 
 number of Republicans, who were opposed to 
 the extension of slavery, but by no means be- 
 lievers in emancipation in the District of Co- 
 lumbia, or in taking any steps towards ulti- 
 mate emancipation in the slave states, even with 
 their consent and with compensation. He was 
 really in 1856 the candidate of the original 
 anti-slavery men, the pioneers of the army of 
 freedom.
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 157 
 
 Two years earlier Seward had objected to a 
 national convention, on the ground "that it 
 would bring together only the old veterans." 
 Now the ranks of the anti-Nebraska party were 
 filled with new recruits, young men ; they were 
 the bone and sinew of the party in the country, 
 and the delegates at Philadelphia represented 
 them. Fremont was their choice. All that was 
 known of him, his pluck, energy, persistent en- 
 durance, and skill as an explorer, justified their 
 attributing to him the qualities which the times 
 and the triumph of the Republicans would re- 
 quire. His career appealed to them ; his adven- 
 tures roused their interest and excited their ad- 
 miration ; there was a romance about his mar- 
 riage which touched their sympathies, and there 
 had been an element of martyrdom in his treat- 
 ment by the government which enlisted in his 
 behalf the lovers of justice. He was person- 
 ally handsome and attractive ; a Southerner by 
 birth, and a son-in-law of Benton, who, as an 
 opponent though on grounds peculiar to him- 
 self of the repeal of the Missouri Compro- 
 mise, had more or less close relations with the 
 Republican leaders. Everything told in his 
 favor. To those delegates who were looking 
 only to the promotion of the principles of their 
 party, as well as to those who were eager for 
 success, and to the mass of the people, Fremont
 
 158 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 appeared an ideal candidate. He was invested 
 by them with the qualities of a hero ; and of all 
 the names presented to the convention, or sug- 
 gested elsewhere, his was doubtless the most 
 potent to conjure with. 
 
 The nomination of Buchanan was the strong- 
 est that the Democrats could have made, and 
 was discouraging to the Republicans. " The tem- 
 per of the politicians " (i. e. the Republican), 
 wrote Seward, " is subdued by Buchanan's nomi- 
 nation, and indicates retreat, confusion, rout in 
 the election." Early in August he found that 
 " there was no Republican organization or life 
 in eastern Pennsylvania or New Jersey," and 
 that " the well-informed despaired of both these 
 states, and so of the election itself." There 
 was a pressure on him to take the field ; never- 
 theless, he did not make any campaign speech 
 till October. Congress was late in adjourning. 
 The two houses disagreed as to the army ap- 
 propriations, the Representatives passed the 
 bill with a proviso, prohibiting the employment 
 of troops to enforce the laws of the fraudulent 
 legislature of Kansas ; the Senate refused to 
 concur ; and so the session ended. The Presi' 
 dent immediately called an extra session, and, 
 after laboring ten days with the recalcitrant 
 Democrats, succeeded in forcing through the 
 House, by the narrow majority of three, the bill
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 159 
 
 without the proviso. Seward took a month's 
 needed rest, then spoke at Detroit, and de- 
 voted the time till the election to the work of 
 the campaign at various and widely separated 
 places in his own state. Of these speeches only 
 two have been preserved in any permanent 
 form. In that at Detroit he drew a vivid pic- 
 ture, hardly exaggerated, of the slaveholders' 
 entire possession of the government in all its 
 branches : the executive, from the President 
 and the heads of the various departments to the 
 humblest tide-waiter in the Customs, the most 
 unimportant consul in our foreign service, and 
 the merest scrivener in the army of clerks ; the 
 legislative, through their control of the Senate, 
 with the aid of their Northern Democratic allies ; 
 and the judicial, by having a majority of the 
 justices of the Supreme Court from the slave- 
 holding states. He also showed how fidelity to 
 the slaveholders' policy was the test required of 
 all Northern Democrats who wished to share 
 even the crumbs that fell from the government's 
 table. 
 
 His speech at Auburn repeated his opinion 
 that the conflict was not merely for " toleration, 
 but for absolute political sway in the Republic, 
 between the system of free labor with equal and 
 universal suffrage, free speech, free thought, and 
 free action, and the system of slave labor with
 
 160 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 unequal franchises, secured by arbitrary, oppres- 
 sive, and tyrannical laws ; " and emphasized again 
 his conviction that " the state, the nation and the 
 earth were to be, in the fullness of time, the 
 abode of freemen, and its hills and valleys to be 
 fields of free labor, free thought and free suf- 
 frage." 
 
 New York responded handsomely to Seward'g 
 arguments and appeals ; though Fremont carried 
 the state only by a plurality, he had eighty 
 thousand votes more than Buchanan, and his 
 majority over Fillmore was greater than Fill- 
 more's entire vote. Of the sixteen free states, 
 eleven voted for Fremont. He received only 
 twelve hundred votes in the slave states, and 
 these came from Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
 and Kentucky. Buchanan was elected by the 
 solid South, with the aid of five free states 
 (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, 
 and California). In the free states Buchanan 
 had a hundred and twenty thousand less votes 
 than Fremont, and by the popular vote of the 
 country was in a minority of nearly three hun- 
 dred thousand. There were votes for Fillmore 
 in all the states where the people chose the 
 electors; 1 but they were so distributed that 
 though he was the choice of nearly nine hundred 
 
 1 la South Carolina they were chosen by the Legislature.
 
 FORMATION OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 161 
 
 thousand voters, he received only the eight elec- 
 toral votes of the state of Maryland. 
 
 The elections of the year had an ominous 
 aspect. In the House of Representatives the 
 speaker was chosen for the first time by a purely 
 sectional majority, no Southern man voting for 
 the successful candidate, and no Northerner for 
 his opponent. The issue in the presidential 
 campaign had been solely sectional, the surren- 
 der of the territories to slavery or its exclusion 
 from them. Buchanan, though a Pennsylvanian, 
 was the nominee of the South, and the repre- 
 sentative of the slaveholders' policy. The new 
 party had carried nearly three fourths of the 
 free states, had given to Douglas, as a colleague, 
 an anti-Nebraska senator, and substituted for 
 General Cass a radical Republican from Michi- 
 gan. If the South had won the victory, it was 
 one that boded ill for their future control of 
 the country.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOB KANSAS. 
 
 AFTER the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska 
 bill, the political struggle during the remainder 
 of Pierce's term and for a large part of Bu- 
 chanan's was as to slavery or freedom in Kansas. 
 On the one side were arrayed the administration 
 with its patronage and appointments, the solid 
 South, with its members of Congress, its Demo- 
 cratic supporters in the North and the border 
 ruffians from Missouri ; on the other were the 
 free state settlers in Kansas, who were largely 
 in the majority there, and the Republican party 
 in Congress and in the country. The battle was 
 fought in the territory between the settlers and 
 immigrants from the North, and the invaders 
 from Missouri and the South ; in "Washington, 
 by the President and his advisers at the White 
 House, by senators and representatives at the 
 Capitol. But as the members of the lower house 
 are more numerous and more frequently elected, 
 the change in the public opinion of the North 
 caused by the passage of the bill was more 
 quickly shown there, the opposition to the ad-
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 163 
 
 ministration was stronger in the House, and the 
 part played by the representatives during the 
 struggle was in some respects more prominent 
 and important than that of the Senate, with 
 which Seward was directly concerned. The 
 story of the struggle cannot, however, be omit- 
 ted here, nor can any one part of it be told with- 
 out the other. 
 
 The repeal of the Missouri Compromise had 
 thoroughly roused all the Northern people except 
 the Hunker Democrats. Angry at the South's 
 breach of faith in accepting the benefits of a bar- 
 gain and then repudiating its obligations, the 
 North determined to save for freedom, if possi- 
 ble, the territory secured by the Compromise. 
 The South recognized the struggle as a vital one. 
 " If Kansas is abolitionized," wrote Atchison, 
 " Missouri ceases to be a slave state, New Mexico 
 becomes a free state, California remains a free 
 state. But if we secure Kansas as a slave state, 
 Missouri is secure, New Mexico, and southern 
 California, if not all of it, becomes a slave state ; 
 in a word, the prosperity or ruin of the whole 
 South depends on the Kansas struggle." 
 
 One or more emigrant aid societies had been 
 organized at the North before the passage of the 
 bill, and others followed afterwards. Among 
 the earliest was the New England Emigrant Aid 
 Society, a Massachusetts company, which assisted
 
 164 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARB 
 
 five hundred free state men to emigrate and 
 settle in Kansas within a year, and about three 
 thousand during the entire struggle. The ad- 
 ministration was prompt in opening the territory 
 to settlement, and had purchased, while the bill 
 was still pending, several Reservations lying 
 nearest Missouri, from the Indian tribes to 
 whom they had been secured by treaty. These 
 purchases were known to the people of Missouri 
 before the rest of the country had learned of 
 them ; and, within a few days after the bill be- 
 came a law, hundreds of Missourians entered 
 the territory in small bodies at various points, 
 staked out, each man for himself, his quarter 
 section or more, and marked it. The different 
 companies then held meetings, at which they 
 resolved that slavery already existed in the terri- 
 tory, and urged slaveholders to bring in their 
 property at once ; while they also voted to afford 
 no protection to abolitionist settlers. To offset 
 the emigrant aid societies of the North, associ- 
 ations called "Blue Lodges," "Sons of the 
 South," and other similar names, were organized 
 in western Missouri, to take possession of Kan- 
 sas in behalf of slavery, and to assist in removing 
 any emigrant who might go there under the 
 auspices of the Northern societies. 
 
 The first territorial governor appointed by 
 President Pierce was Andrew H. Reeder, of
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 165 
 
 Pennsylvania, whose loyalty as an administra- 
 tion Democrat was unquestioned. An election 
 for a delegate to Congress was had by his orders 
 at the end of November, 1854, and of the twenty- 
 eight hundred ballots then cast, more than seven- 
 teen hundred were the illegal votes of invading 
 Missourians. In one polling precinct six hun- 
 dred and four votes were thrown, of which only 
 twenty were legal. There was no concealment 
 about the matter; what was done was done 
 openly, and was encouraged and approved. 
 " When you reside within one day's journey of 
 the territory," said Senator Atchison in a public 
 speech before this election, "and when your 
 peace, your quiet and your property depend 
 upon your action, you can, without any exertion, 
 send five hundred of your young men who will 
 vote in favor of your institutions. Should each 
 county in Missouri only do its duty, the question 
 will be decided quietly and peaceably at the 
 ballot box." 
 
 After ascertaining by a census the number of 
 legal voters in the territory, Governor Reeder 
 appointed a day for the election of a territorial 
 legislature. The evening before, about a thou- 
 sand Missourians, armed with rifles, pistols, and 
 bowie-knives, and supported by two pieces of 
 artillery, arrived at Lawrence, a free state town. 
 They distributed their men among the different
 
 166 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 election precincts, overawed the judges of elec- 
 tion, and, reenforced by other men of Missouri, 
 chose their candidates in all but two of the dis- 
 tricts. The census had shown twenty-nine hun- 
 dred voters ; but more than six thousand ballots 
 were cast, only eight hundred of which were legal. 
 In some of the districts, where protests were sea- 
 sonably made, the governor declined to issue 
 certificates of election, and ordered a new poll ; 
 but the legislature refused to admit the free 
 state men chosen on this second ballot, and gave 
 the seats to the persons to whom the governor 
 had refused certificates. The legislature thus 
 chosen adopted by a single act all the Missouri 
 statutes (to save time), and then proceeded to 
 pass, notwithstanding the governor's veto, a 
 criminal code, by which nearly all offenses con- 
 nected with slavery, including that of aiding a 
 fugitive to escape, were made punishable with 
 death. 
 
 Reeder's course as to the election and his 
 vetoes made it clear that he was not a sufficiently 
 pliant tool ; the President, yielding to the pres- 
 sure from the South, removed him, and ap- 
 pointed in his place Wilson Shannon of Ohio, 
 who signalized his arrival in the territory by 
 declaring in a public speech that he was " for 
 slavery in Kansas." Isolated acts of violence 
 had taken place from time to time, before and
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 167 
 
 during Reeder's administration ; a free state 
 settler had been occasionally murdered ; the 
 pro-slavery newspapers had given warning that 
 they "would continue to lynch and hang, tar, 
 feather, and drown every white-livered abolition- 
 ist who dared to pollute the soil ; " and Law- 
 rence had been threatened by a party of more 
 than two hundred Missourians. Under Shan- 
 non's misgovernment such outrages became the 
 rule ; Lawrence was plundered ; its printing 
 offices and hotels were burned by a troop of 
 about eight hundred men, partly from the South 
 and partly from Missouri, armed with weapons 
 from the United States arsenal, and commanded 
 by General Atchison, United States senator from 
 Missouri ; whilst later the town of Osawatomie 
 was sacked and burned by a similar force headed 
 by Whitfield, the territorial delegate to Con- 
 gress. 
 
 Meantime, the free state settlers, seeking re- 
 lief by a thoroughly American process, had 
 called a convention, which framed a constitution 
 prohibiting slavery. This was ratified by the 
 actual settlers, a governor and legislature were 
 chosen, and a memorial was forwarded to Con- 
 gress praying for the admission of Kansas as a 
 free state under this constitution. The Presi- 
 dent's annual message, sent in on the last day of 
 the year (1855), dismissed the subject of Kansas
 
 168 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 with a word ; but less than a mouth later, when 
 he had determined to give a thorough-going 
 support to the Southerners, although nothing 
 new had happened in the interval, he sent a 
 special message in which he characterized the 
 proceedings of the free state settlers as revolu- 
 tionary and treasonable, 1 and announced his 
 purpose of upholding the fraudulent legislature 
 and enforcing its laws by Federal authority; 
 and, in accordance with the policy thus declared, 
 the legislature at Topeka was dispersed by 
 United States regulars in the following July. 
 
 A guerrilla war was carried on during the sum- 
 mer of the year 1856 between bands of free 
 state and pro-slavery men. In August the ad- 
 ministration, unable longer to endure the scan- 
 dals of Shannon's misgovernment, and fearing 
 lest these should lose them the presidential 
 election, removed him, and appointed John W. 
 Geary of Pennsylvania in his place. Geary 
 endeavored to restore order and to do exact 
 justice, leaning neither to one side nor the 
 
 1 It was nothing revolutionary or even unprecedented for 
 the people of a territory, without any previous authority from 
 Congress, to form a state constitution and ask for admission 
 to the Union. Michigan did this and was admitted ; Califor- 
 nia had done it and heen admitted ; and the reasons for the 
 action of the people of Kansas, though of a different nature, 
 were quite as strong as those which existed in either Cali- 
 fornia or Michigan.
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 169 
 
 other ; but, finding that this impartiality was not 
 what the administration required, he resigned 
 in the following March. 
 
 Whatever may have been President Pierce' s 
 ideas, when he assented to Douglas's bill and 
 accepted the doctrine of popular sovereignty, in 
 his actual treatment of Kansas he had been not 
 the honest exponent of that policy, but the active 
 and unhesitating agent of those Southerners 
 who were determined, by fair means or foul, to 
 make that territory a slave state. He finds his 
 severest condemnation in the course of the 
 governors appointed by him. The two who 
 were men of character, and who were not willing 
 to use their power to defeat the wishes of the 
 actual settlers and to drive the free state men 
 from the territory, were forced out of office, and 
 became most active opponents of his policy, un- 
 sparing in their exposures and denunciations of 
 the frauds and violence which he was seeking to 
 hide ; while the third, who had been at first 
 the ready tool of the border ruffians of Missouri, 
 and acceptable to the whole South, was at last 
 unable to satisfy their demands, was distrusted 
 by them, despised by the other party, and re- 
 moved in disgrace by the administration that had 
 appointed him'. 
 
 In the Congress which met in December, 
 1855, the House had a majority hostile to the
 
 170 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 administration, but composed of heterogeneous 
 elements. There were Democrats and pro- 
 slavery Whigs, both pro-slavery and anti-slavery 
 Americans, and Republicans. No one party 
 had the control, and it was not until the 3d of 
 February, 1856, that its organization was per- 
 fected by the choice of a speaker. Meantime, 
 both houses had taken action on the Kansas 
 question, the Senate by resolutions of inquiry, 
 calling on the President for information as to 
 the troubles there ; and the House by the pass- 
 age of a resolve demanding the restoration of 
 the Missouri Compromise. In the Senate, the 
 President's special message concerning Kansas, 
 and his answer to the resolutions of inquiry, 
 were referred to the committee on Territories, of 
 which Douglas was chairman. The committee 
 presented two reports ; that of the majority, pre- 
 pared by Douglas, was very severe upon the 
 settlers from the free states and upon the 
 Emigrant Aid Society, who were made respon- 
 sible for all that was wrong in Kansas ; while the 
 fraudulent legislature, he insisted, was a proper 
 law-making body, whose acts were legal statutes 
 binding upon the people. The minority report 
 was signed only by Senator Collainer of Ver- 
 mont, who justified the Topeka convention and 
 the proceedings under it as a peaceful and con- 
 stitutional effort for the redress of grievances.
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 171 
 
 The Emigrant Aid Society was vindicated from 
 Douglas's attack, as soon as the reading of the 
 reports was finished, by Sumner's spirited pro- 
 test that it had not offended, either in letter or 
 spirit, the Constitution and laws of the land. 
 It had sent men to Kansas, " and it had a right 
 to do so. Its agents loved freedom and hated 
 slavery, and they had a right to do so." " This, 
 and no more, was its offense." 
 
 In the House Governor Reeder, who had 
 been elected by the legal voters of Kansas as 
 territorial delegate, presented a petition claim- 
 ing the seat held by Whitfield, the delegate 
 fraudulently chosen by the Missourians; and 
 this petition, after some debate, was referred to 
 a committee empowered to investigate generally 
 the Kansas troubles. The exhaustive report 
 of this committee, with the accompanying evi- 
 dence, is a storehouse of information as to the 
 history of the times. On the same day that 
 this committee was appointed in the House, 
 Douglas addressed the Senate in support of his 
 report and of the bill in which its conclusions 
 were embodied, which authorized the people of 
 Kansas to form a state constitution, when they 
 should have sufficient population to entitle them 
 to one representative in Congress. For this 
 bill Seward proposed, as a substitute, the im- 
 mediate admission of Kansas under the Topeka
 
 172 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 constitution. Of his speech in support of this 
 substitute, one hundred and sixty-two thousand 
 copies were sent out on the day it was published. 
 Such defense as could be made for the invad- 
 ers of Kansas, for the rule they had established 
 there, and for the government's support of it, 
 had already been set forth in the President's 
 message and in Douglas's report ; and a large 
 part of Seward's speech was devoted to a scath- 
 ing criticism of the President's message, and an 
 unsparing exposure of his misrepresentations 
 and concealment of facts, of his unjust asper- 
 sions on the North, and of the flimsy pretexts 
 and hardly specious arguments by which he at- 
 tempted to justify his course. It might almost 
 be called, in this aspect, an arraignment, trial 
 and conviction of the President, upon the charge 
 of prostituting his official power to sustain in 
 Kansas a government which he knew, from his 
 own representatives, had been forced upon the 
 territory by the frauds and violence of the 
 people of Missouri. Seward proved to a demon- 
 stration, by the declarations of the leaders of 
 the border ruffians, by the statements of inde- 
 pendent observers, as well as by those of the 
 free settlers of Kansas, and the public avowals 
 of the territorial governor, whom the President 
 himself had appointed, that " Kansas had been 
 invaded, conquered, subjugated by an armed
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 173 
 
 force from beyond her borders, trampling under 
 foot the principles of the Kansas bill and the 
 rights of suffrage ; " and that the President of 
 the United States was aiding and abetting this 
 wrong, upholding with all the resources of the 
 administration and all the powers of the Fed- 
 eral authority the perpetrators of this outrage 
 upon republican government, and maintaining 
 by force of arms the tyranny they had estab- 
 lished. Seward then turned to the question of 
 how these wrongs were to be redressed. His 
 contention was unanswerable, that the only sure 
 remedy was the immediate admission of Kansas 
 as a state, under the constitution presented by 
 the actual settlers. The objections urged to 
 this course were practically only formal, and 
 might be waived by Congress in this case, as 
 they had been in others. Touching the very 
 heart of the controversy, he said : " Congress 
 can refuse admission to Kansas only on the 
 ground that it will not relinquish the hope of 
 carrying African slavery into that territory," 
 . . . and asked : " Have we come to that stage 
 of demoralization and degeneracy so soon ? " 
 
 The speech was the masterly argument of a 
 statesman. If he sometimes showed a fondness 
 for philosophical generalization and theorizing, 
 there was nothing of that here ; it was an emi- 
 nently practical speech. Any remedy, other
 
 174 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 than that which he urged, was at the best doubt- 
 ful. Any plan authorizing the calling of a new 
 convention, and the formation of a new consti- 
 tution, because of defects or uncertainties about 
 the one adopted at Topeka, must be carried out 
 by the authorities actually in power in Kansas, 
 the creatures and tools of the border ruffians 
 who elected them, and under the supervision of 
 an administration whose partisan character and 
 absolute disregard of justice and of the pledges 
 of the organic law of the territory had already 
 been abundantly manifested. But the truth 
 was, as Seward suggested, that neither the ad- 
 ministration nor the South was prepared to 
 relinquish one inch of the advantage which 
 slavery had already gained in the territory, 
 whether acquired by force or fraud ; both were 
 still confidently expecting to make it a slave 
 state ; and the majority of the Senate were sup- 
 porters of the South and of the administra- 
 tion. 
 
 The debate on Kansas continued till the close 
 of the session in August ; it resulted in no 
 legislation ; but the speeches of the opposition, 
 circulated by hundreds of thousands all over the 
 North, had an immense effect in forming and 
 stimulating public opinion, and produced a re- 
 action even in Congress. This was increased by 
 the assault upon Sunaner in the Senate chamber
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 175 
 
 itself, by the burning of Lawrence, and by the 
 publication of the report of the committee of 
 the House, charged to investigate the Kansas 
 troubles. 
 
 For two whole days Sumner addressed the 
 Senate in denunciation of the crime against 
 Kansas. His speech was not merely an unspar- 
 ing philippic against slavery, but most bitter in 
 its personalities. He spoke of Atchison, stalk- 
 ing like Catiline into the Senate, reeking with 
 conspiracy, and then like Catiline skulking away 
 to join and provoke the conspirators, " murder- 
 ous robbers from Missouri, hirelings, picked 
 from the drunken spew and vomit of an uneasy 
 civilization;" of Butler of South Carolina, 
 " with incoherent phrases, discharging the loose 
 expectoration of his speech ; " and of Douglas, 
 as " switching out from his tongue the perpetual 
 stench of offensive personality." It was a 
 speech in this aspect to make the judicious 
 grieve, and feel a keen regret that Sumner 
 should have descended to such a level. It would 
 hardly have gained converts to the Republican 
 party but for the assault by which it was fol- 
 lowed. 
 
 Two days later, while he was writing at his 
 desk in the Senate chamber, just after the 
 adjournment, he was attacked in a most brutal 
 and cowardly manner by Preston S. Brooks, a
 
 176 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 member of the House from South Carolina, who 
 inflicted on him injuries from which he never 
 wholly recovered. The Senate, when Seward 
 moved for a committee to investigate this assault, 
 so far forgot the common parliamentary courte- 
 sies, the requirements of decency and the gravity 
 of the occasion, as to choose a committee com- 
 posed wholly of Sumner's personal and political 
 enemies, who performed the service expected of 
 them, and reported that there was nothing for 
 the Senate to do. The subservient judiciary of 
 Washington disgraced itself by inflicting on 
 Brooks a paltry fine, and even in the House of 
 Representatives there were not to be found the 
 necessary two thirds to secure his expulsion. 
 Any difference of opinion there may have been 
 at the North as to the wisdom or good taste of 
 Sumner's speech- disappeared at once, swallowed 
 up in the universal outburst of sympathy for him 
 and indignation at the assault ; the recollection 
 of which, even to-day, heightens Sumner's fame, 
 by investing him with somewhat of the glory of 
 martyrdom. 
 
 " The blows that fell on the head of the sen- 
 ator from Massachusetts," said Seward, "have 
 done more for the cause of human freedom in 
 Kansas and in the territories of the United 
 States, than all the eloquence which has re- 
 sounded in these halls, from the days when
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 177 
 
 Rufus King asserted that cause in this chamber 
 until the present hour." It was not regarded 
 merely as an attack upon an individual, it was an 
 assault on the freedom of debate, a violation of 
 the privileges and dignity of the Senate, an 
 insult to the state that Sumner represented, 
 and through that to all the other states of the 
 Union. 
 
 The same day that Sumner was speaking in 
 the Senate, the free settlers' town of Lawrence 
 in Kansas was attacked and burned. A little 
 later came the report of the House committee, 
 accompanied by evidence which proved, beyond 
 question, that the territorial elections were car- 
 ried by fraud, the legislature unlawfully consti- 
 tuted, and its acts without a color of legality. 
 Under these circumstances it was felt by some 
 Southern senators that there must be further 
 concessions to the public opinion of the North, 
 some fresh attempt at a settlement of the Kansas 
 question. Various amendments to Douglas's 
 original bill were proposed, and other measures 
 introduced ; these were all referred to the com- 
 mittee on Territories, who reported a bill which 
 was, in substance, one that had been offered a 
 few days before by Senator Toornbs of Georgia. 
 Upon its face it was a fair proposition. There 
 was to be a new census in Kansas, only actual 
 male inhabitants of full age were to be registered
 
 178 WILLIAM EENRY SEWARD. 
 
 as voters, and they were to elect delegates to a 
 constitutional convention. Commissioners were 
 to supervise the census and the registration ; and 
 frauds and irregularities at the election were to 
 be prevented. Had the measure been proposed 
 in January instead of July, its details might 
 have been modified, where they were open to 
 criticism, and the bill have become a law ; but 
 it was brought in too late. The presidential 
 election was approaching, and Seward thought, 
 and doubtless others with him, that the change 
 from denunciation to compromise proceeded only 
 from the alarm of the Democrats. 
 
 The Republicans objected to the bill as a snare 
 and a delusion. It did not directly annul the 
 enactments of the usurping legislature. On the 
 contrary it recognized that body as a regularly 
 chosen law-making assemblage, and left it un- 
 certain whether any of its so-called laws were 
 abrogated, remitting the determination of this 
 question to the territorial judges, whose partisan 
 character had been already abundantly demon- 
 strated. The proposed bill continued the exist- 
 ing regime in Kansas, until a new census should 
 be had, delegates elected, a convention held, a 
 constitution formed, and Kansas admitted as a 
 state, thus perpetuating the tyranny established 
 by fraud and violence, and only maintained in 
 power by the arms of the United States. It
 
 THE STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 179 
 
 provided that a census should be taken and an 
 election held under the direction of commission- 
 ers to be appointed by a president, who had 
 already shown by the appointments he had made, 
 by the officers he had retained, and by those he 
 had removed, how unevenly he held the scales 
 of justice in the territory, how little freedom of 
 action he was allowed by his masters, and how 
 he lacked courage to assert himself against the 
 hot-headed Southerners who prescribed his policy 
 and his conduct. All this and more, which made 
 it " a sham, evasive Kansas bill," Seward showed 
 in his speech on an amendment, offered by Wil- 
 son, proposing the immediate repeal of all the 
 spurious laws of the so-called legislature, an 
 amendment which the Southern and Democratic 
 majority of the Senate at once rejected. 
 
 The proofs of the wrongs done in Kansas 
 were quite different now from what they had 
 been when Seward spoke in March. There was 
 no more need of argument or inference, and no 
 room for denial or doubt. The evidence taken by 
 the House committee established conclusively 
 not only the public wrong committed by the 
 invaders from Missouri and ratified and sus- 
 tained by the President of the United States 
 and his territorial officers, but also the private 
 violence and crime by which settlers from the 
 free states had been robbed of their property,
 
 180 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 their houses burned, their cattle destroyed and 
 they themselves either murdered or compelled 
 to flee for their lives; and it was not to be 
 expected that the Republicans would accept as 
 satisfactory a bill which converted the illegal 
 oppressors of the territory into its rightful gov- 
 ernors, and substituted for the election guaran- 
 teed by its organic law a ballot to be taken 
 after the settlers from the free states had been 
 driven from Kansas, and under conditions which 
 would permit the people from Missouri to come 
 into the territory, according to their avowed 
 plan, " in time to acquire the right to become 
 legal voters for the purpose of determining the 
 domestic institutions of the new state." 
 
 The bill passed the Senate, but not the House. 
 The House bill, admitting Kansas as a state, 
 under the Topeka constitution, was rejected in 
 the Senate, and Congress adjourned without 
 giving any relief to the people.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE DEED SCOTT CASE. THE FINAL STRUG- 
 GLE FOR KANSAS. 
 
 THE closing session of the Congress which 
 expired with Pierce's administration was, like 
 most of the short sessions ending with a presi- 
 dential term, absolutely colorless and unimpor- 
 tant ; and Buchanan was inaugurated with the 
 hopes of many Northern Whigs and Democrats, 
 who had voted for him with hesitation, that he 
 would have a just and tranquil administration, 
 a reign of law and order in Kansas, and no 
 further slavery agitation. But two days had 
 not elapsed before the country was shaken to its 
 centre by the extraordinary intervention of the 
 Supreme Court in the slavery discussion. The 
 statement in Buchanan's inaugural, that "the 
 point of time when the people of a territory can 
 decide the question of slavery for themselves " 
 would be "speedily and finally settled by that 
 court," had not at all prepared the public for 
 what was to follow. It was known that a case 
 was pending before the Supreme Court, in which 
 one Dred Scott, a person of African descent,
 
 182 WILLIAM HENRY 8EWARD. 
 
 and once a slave, was claiming his freedom, on 
 the ground of a residence with his master in 
 Minnesota, a territory made free by the Mis- 
 souri Compromise, and of a shorter stay in Illi- 
 nois, where slavery had been prohibited by the 
 ordinance of 1787. To maintain his action it 
 was necessary that the plaintiff should be a citi- 
 zen of the United States ; if he were not so, the 
 federal courts would have no jurisdiction of 
 the case. The first objection raised by the 
 master was to Scott's citizenship, upon the 
 ground that this was a white man's govern- 
 ment, and that no person of African blood could 
 be a citizen. This objection was not sustained 
 by the court in which the suit was originally 
 brought, and the trial went on ; but the court 
 finally decided that Dred Scott was not entitled 
 to his freedom. The case was then taken up to 
 the Supreme Court and had been twice argued 
 there. A few days after the inauguration that 
 court announced its decision. The majority of 
 the judges held that Dred Scott was not a citi- 
 zen, because he was of African blood, and that 
 the courts of the United States had, therefore, 
 no jurisdiction of his suit. This was the end of 
 the matter, so far as Dred Scott was concerned. 
 From this judgment there was no appeal. Two 
 judges, however, dissented from the judgment. 
 In their opinion Dred Scott, though of African
 
 THE DEED SCOTT CASE. 183 
 
 descent, was a citizen of the United States, and 
 the court had jurisdiction of his suit. Having 
 reached this conclusion, it became necessary for 
 them to examine all the facts of the case, and to 
 consider the constitutionality of the Missouri 
 Compromise and of the ordinance of 1787, and 
 the effect of the plaintiff's living in Minnesota 
 and Illinois ; this they did in a most exhaustive 
 manner, and, affirming the constitutionality of 
 both these enactments, decided in favor of the 
 plaintiff's claim to his freedom. 
 
 The Southern and pro-slavery members of the 
 court were unwilling to let the statements and 
 reasoning of these dissenting opinions go out to 
 the country without some reply on their part, 
 and induced the chief justice to violate the re- 
 cognized and established judicial proprieties, by 
 adding to his opinion a statement of his political 
 views upon the relations between the Constitu- 
 tion and slavery, as if this were a part of the 
 judgment of the court. It was a flagrant 
 abuse of a judicial position, and drew from one 
 of the dissenting justices, in no way a sympa- 
 thizer with the Kepublican party or the anti- 
 slavery agitators, this emphatic rebuke : " I dis- 
 sent from the assumption of authority by the 
 majority of the court to examine the constitu- 
 tionality of the act called the Missouri Compro- 
 mise. Having decided that this is a case to
 
 184 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 which the judicial power of the United States 
 does not extend, they have gone on to examine 
 the merits, and so have reached the question of 
 the power of Congress to pass this act. On so 
 grave a subject as this, I feel obliged to say that, 
 in my opinion, such an extension of judicial 
 power transcends the limits of the authority of 
 the court." 
 
 The political declaration of the chief justice 
 was in substance a repetition of Calhoun's doc- 
 trine, that the territories were the common do- 
 main of the several states, in which each had 
 equal rights ; that therefore the people of every 
 state could legally carry into any territory and 
 lawfully hold there any property recognized as 
 lawful in any state ; and that all legislation, 
 congressional or territorial, limiting or interfer- 
 ing with the full and perfect enjoyment of this 
 right, was unconstitutional and void. If this 
 statement had been necessary to the judgment 
 of the court in the case, it would have been 
 a hard blow to the Republican party, whose 
 avowed object was the exclusion of slavery from 
 the territories ; but it was so obviously a pure 
 piece of politics, that, stigmatized as it had been 
 by Mr. Justice Curtis, it only impressed the 
 people of the North as a fresh and most convin- 
 cing proof of the demoralizing influence of the 
 slave power, roused them to more strenuous
 
 THE DEED SCOTT CASE. 185 
 
 efforts to make Kansas free, and envenomed 
 still more the bitterness already existing be- 
 tween the two sections of the country. 
 
 Judge Curtis had shown the Republicans that 
 the chief justice's politics were no part of the 
 judgment of the court ; that they were only the 
 political views of a judge upon questions not 
 at the time judicially before him, and of no 
 binding force whatever. Lincoln and Seward 
 made another suggestion. The judgment set- 
 tled the case of Dred Scott ; but it might be re- 
 versed in some other suit, as other judgments 
 had been, and one mission of the Republican 
 party should be to hasten this result. 
 
 It was evident from the President's inaugural 
 that he had been privately informed of what the 
 court was to do, and it was believed and asserted 
 by Republican leaders that the decision had been 
 withheld until after the election, lest it should 
 injure or destroy the chances of Democratic 
 success ; and that nothing would have been 
 heard of the monstrous doctrines of the chief 
 justice had Fremont been chosen President. 
 Lincoln, in a public speech in Illinois, attacked 
 the court for its attempt to render nugatory the 
 right of choosing between freedom and slavery, 
 which the Kansas-Nebraska act assumed the 
 people of the territory to possess. Seward 
 charged the court with forgetting, " in this ill-
 
 186 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 omened act, its own dignity, which had always 
 before been maintained with just judicial jeal- 
 ousy," and both the court and the President with 
 failing to remember " that judicial usurpation 
 was more odious and intolerable than any 
 other among the manifold practices of tyranny." 
 The resignation of Governor Geary, President 
 Pierce's last appointee in Kansas, took effect at 
 the close of the presidential term, leaving Bu- 
 chanan free to make his own appointment. After 
 much persuasion, he induced Robert J. Walker, 
 of Mississippi, to accept the post. Walker was 
 a Pennsylvanian by birth, who had removed to 
 Mississippi shortly after he began the practice 
 of the law. He had been in Congress, was 
 Polk's secretary of the treasury, had exercised 
 a large influence with several Democratic ad- 
 ministrations and with the Democratic party, 
 had advocated the annexation of Texas and coun- 
 seled a vigorous prosecution of the Mexican 
 war, and was a man of much more prominence, 
 of larger experience in public affairs, and of 
 greater ability than is usually to be found in the 
 office of governor of a territory. In his inaugu- 
 ral address, Buchanan had given the assurance 
 that any constitution, framed by a convention 
 in Kansas, should be submitted to the people ; 
 and before Walker left for the West, he under- 
 stood that the President agreed with him that
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 187 
 
 the territorial act required this to be done. 
 The fraudulent legislature had called a conven- 
 tion, and appointed a time for the choice of 
 delegates. Walker arrived in the territory 
 before the day fixed for the election, and en- 
 deavored to induce the free-state men to vote. 
 They were afraid to trust him, and suffered the 
 election to go by default ; a little more than one- 
 fifth of the registered voters chose the delegates. 1 
 The convention met at Lecompton, but immedi- 
 ately adjourned until after the regular election 
 of a new territorial legislature. Meantime, the 
 governor, having satisfied himself that Kansas 
 was lost to slavery, though he still hoped she 
 might be honestly saved to the Democracy, if 
 the two wings of the Democratic party, the free- 
 state and pro-slavery Democrats, would unite, 
 bent his energies to accomplishing this, and to 
 inducing the free-state men to vote at the regu- 
 lar territorial election. With some difficulty 
 they were persuaded to do so. The election was, 
 on the whole, a fair one. In one precinct, where 
 there were about a hundred voters, the returns 
 showed sixteen hundred votes for the pro-slavery 
 
 1 Had there been no frauds and had the free-state men 
 voted, as the governor urged them to, they would have elected 
 their own candidates as delegates, notwithstanding that about 
 seventeen counties, settled principally from the North, had 
 been practically disfranchised by omitting them from the
 
 188 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 candidate ; in another more than twelve hundred 
 similar votes represented about twenty settlers 
 entitled to the ballot. Walker courageous!}' 
 threw out these returns, and the result gave the 
 free-state party the control of both branches of 
 the territorial legislature. 
 
 The Lecompton convention met, pursuant to 
 its adjournment, and framed a constitution, 
 which, by its terms, could not be amended till 
 1864, and its provisions as to ownership in slaves 
 not even then. The article entitled " Slavery " 
 declared : " The right of property is before and 
 higher than any constitutional sanction, and the 
 right of the owner of a slave to such slave and 
 its increase is the same, and as inviolable, as the 
 right of the owner of any property whatever." 
 
 As the great majority of the people of Kansas 
 considered the members of this convention as 
 malignants, and its whole proceedings as an in- 
 sult, it was evident that to submit its constitution 
 to a popular vote would be merely to insure its 
 rejection. To avoid this, the convention deter- 
 mined that the vote should be only upon the 
 question whether the constitution should be 
 adopted with slavery or without it. If the ma- 
 jority should be for the constitution with slavery, 
 the article quoted was to remain ; if for the 
 constitution without slavery, then that article 
 was to be stricken out ; slavery was no longer
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 189 
 
 " to exist in the state, except that the property 
 in slaves already in the territory should not be 
 interfered with." This was not such a submis- 
 sion of the constitution to a vote of the people 
 as Walker had promised. No pressure from 
 Washington could induce him to accept it as a 
 fulfillment of the requirements of the law and of 
 the assurances he had made with the President's 
 sanction and approval. He left the territory, 
 and, on arriving at Washington, finding himself 
 at issue with the President on this vital point, 
 resigned, rather than be a party to what he did 
 not hesitate to pronounce a vile fraud. 
 
 At the election ordered by the convention, 
 the total vote was less than seven thousand. 
 For the constitution without slavery there were 
 five hundred and sixty-nine votes ; for the con- 
 stitution with slavery, sixty-one hundred and 
 forty-three, of which three thousand and twelve 
 were fraudulent. 1 
 
 When Walker left the territory, the secre- 
 tary, Frederic P. Stanton, of Tennessee, also a 
 Southerner antt"a perfectly fair and upright 
 man, became acting governor. At the instance 
 of the people of Kansas he summoned the newly- 
 elected legislature to meet in December. One 
 of its first acts provided for a direct vote on the 
 Lecompton constitution, and at the election 
 1 Wilder, Annals of Kansas, p. 156.
 
 190 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 held for this purpose it was almost unanimously 
 rejected, receiving only one hundred and sixty- 
 two votes, out of ten thousand four hundred. 
 On learning of Stanton's action, Buchanan at 
 once removed him. 
 
 In defense of his course as to Kansas the 
 President insisted that, as the vital question, 
 whether they would have the constitution with 
 or without slavery, had been submitted to the 
 people, it was the same thing as if they had 
 been allowed to vote directly on its adoption or 
 rejection. He persisted in this statement in 
 spite of his knowledge that the election ordered 
 by the convention was not open to all qualified 
 voters, but that every citizen, before he could 
 deposit his ballot, was obliged to take an oath 
 to support the Lecompton constitution. 1 He 
 also knew that it had been proved that the set- 
 tlers there were opposed to this constitution, by 
 its rejection by an almost unanimous vote at an 
 untrainmeled election. 
 
 When Congress met in December, it was 
 quite understood that any Democrat who did 
 not favor the admission of Kansas with the 
 Lecompton constitution would come under the 
 ban of the administration ; and Washington was 
 full of speculations as to what Douglas would 
 do. The numbers and position of the Republi- 
 1 Lecompton Coast. Schedule, Sect. 7.
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 191 
 
 cans in both branches of Congress had been con- 
 stantly improving. "It did look well," wrote 
 Seward, " to see the array of twenty solid men " 
 on the floor of the Senate. There was no longer 
 any attempt at the ostracism, of which they had 
 heretofore been the victims. "All personal 
 antipathies and prejudices against the party and 
 its members seemed to have disappeared." The 
 Southern and Democratic opposition in social 
 circles had given way, and society of all classes 
 was profuse in its courtesies. As an illustra- 
 tion of the changed conditions, we find Seward, 
 before the session is over, acting as peacemaker 
 between Jefferson Davis and Senator Chandler 
 of Michigan ; and, in connection with Critten- 
 den and Jefferson Davis, settling a difficulty, 
 in which Wilson of Massachusetts and Gwin of 
 California were the opposing parties. The 
 thorny, solitary path which the Republicans 
 had heretofore pursued was now abandoned to 
 Douglas. The Southern Democrats transferred 
 to him their former hatred of the Black Republi- 
 cans, and their courtesies to the old anti-slavery 
 men served to emphasize their treatment of the 
 deserter. 
 
 Arriving in Washington before the meeting 
 of Congress, Douglas called on the President to 
 discuss the Kansas question. Buchanan said 
 that he should recommend the admission of
 
 192 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Kansas under the Lecompton constitution ; 
 Douglas answered that he should denounce it 
 in the Senate ; and on the 9th of January he 
 did so. " What can equal the caprices of poli- 
 tics I " wrote Seward. " The triumph of slavery 
 [in 1850] would have been incomplete, indeed 
 it could not have occurred, had it not been for 
 the accession to it of Stephen A. Douglas. . . . 
 By that defection he became soon, and has, 
 until just now, continued (under the favor or 
 fear of successive administrations) legislative 
 dictator here, intolerant, yet irresistible. . . . 
 That was his position yesterday morning. . . . 
 Yesterday he broke loose from all that strong 
 host he had led so long, and although he did 
 not at the first bound reach my position, as an 
 ally, yet leaped so far towards it as to gain 
 a position of neutrality altogether unsafe and 
 indefensible." 
 
 Seward welcomed all accessions from the Dem- 
 ocrats to the anti-Lecompton forces. " Since 
 Walker, Douglas, and Stanton," he wrote, " have 
 been converted, at least in part, we are sure to 
 hear the gospel preached (though with adultera- 
 tion) to the Gentiles." And, while many of the 
 Republican leaders were distrustful of Douglas, 
 he took the opposite view, saying : " God forbid 
 that I should consent to see freedom wounded, 
 because my own lead, or even my own agency
 
 TEE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 193 
 
 in serving it, should be rejected. I will cheer- 
 fully cooperate with these new defenders of 
 this sacred cause in Kansas, and I will award 
 them all due praise for their large share of merit 
 in its deliverance." 
 
 The administration had staked its all upon 
 sustaining the Leconipton constitution. Bu- 
 chanan's message, transmitting it to Congress, 
 showed his entire surrender to the extreme 
 Southern opinion. " Kansas," he said, " is at 
 this moment as much a slave state as Georgia 
 or South Carolina." Before his message was 
 sent in, Denver, who had succeeded Walker as 
 governor of Kansas, had endeavored to dissuade 
 him from sending to Congress the Lecompton 
 constitution, advising him strongly against his 
 proposed policy. Buchanan answered that he 
 had already shown his message and that the ad- 
 vice came too late. 
 
 It was hardly to be expected that the debate 
 on this question should add anything to what 
 had already been said. The Southerners fell 
 back on the doctrines of Chief Justice Taney, 
 insisted that all the anti-slavery agitation had 
 been aimed at the constitutional rights of the 
 South, and that both the Missouri Compromise 
 and the WilnaotjVoviso were unconstitutional. 
 
 In a speech, made early in March, Seward 
 gave a highly colored sketch of a coalition be*
 
 194 WILLIAM HENRY 8EWARD. 
 
 tween the executive and judicial departments of 
 the government, to undermine the legislature 
 and the liberties of the people, and of whispered 
 conferences between the chief justice and the 
 incoming President before the delivery of the 
 inaugural, which heralded, not the decision of 
 the Dred Scott case, but the extra-judicial ex- 
 position of the Constitution, which the chief jus- 
 tice was about to promulgate. This drew from 
 Judge Taney the declaration that, if Seward were 
 elected President, he should decline to administer 
 to him the oath of office, and from both Taney 
 and Buchanan indignant denials of any such con- 
 ferences. But these denials did not meet the sub- 
 stance of the charges then made, not by Seward 
 alone, but by many Republican leaders. These 
 charges were, that the political passages were 
 added by the chief justice after the result of 
 the presidential election was known, and that 
 their substance was communicated to Buchanan 
 just before the 4th of March, to enable him to 
 make the announcement which he did in his 
 inaugural address. Known facts justified the 
 accusation, even though they did not conclu- 
 sively prove it. It was understood that a ma- 
 jority of the judges, having reached the conclu- 
 sion that Dred Scott, being of African descent, 
 was not a citizen, and had therefore no standing 
 in the courts of the United States, an opinion
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 195 
 
 stating this conclusion and the reasons for it, 
 and nothing more, had been prepared, to be 
 read as the judgment of the court; that the 
 chief justice afterwards, and not long before 
 the delivery of the judgment, added to his 
 opinion the statement of his political conclu- 
 sions, which if they had been in any sense 
 a decision of the court would have fastened 
 slavery irrevocably upon every foot of the terri- 
 tory of the United States. Buchanan's inaugu- 
 ral address substantially foreshadowed these con- 
 clusions as the result of the case, and it was 
 known that the passage in which he did this 
 was added after his arrival in Washington. It 
 was insisted that it was quite incredible that he 
 should have written this at that time unless he 
 had received authentic information of what the 
 chief justice was to say. 
 
 His long and unblemished judicial career and 
 his patriotic motives have been urged as an ex- 
 cuse or apology for the chief justice's course in 
 this case, and it is perhaps only fair to him to 
 suppose that he may have thought his political 
 statement would be quietly accepted by the 
 North as an authoritative and binding construc- 
 tion of the Constitution, and would put an end 
 to all anti-slavery agitation there ; while, as it 
 conceded to the South all that they could gain 
 by separation, the motives for secession would
 
 196 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 no longer exist, and the Union would continue 
 undisturbed. 
 
 Other persons disapproved of Seward's speech 
 for reasons of an opposite character. The aim 
 of the Republicans was to secure Kansas to free- 
 dom ; and in the struggle of the moment the 
 question of its admission under the Lecompton 
 constitution they had the support of several 
 Democrats, among whom was Douglas, the 
 author of the repeal of the Missouri Compro- 
 mise, and for that reason, as well as for his 
 qualities as a debater, a most powerful auxiliary. 
 Seward had already publicly welcomed the acces- 
 sion of these new allies, and announced his 
 cordial cooperation with them ; and in this 
 speech, after declaring his opinion that "it 
 would be wise to restore the Missouri prohibition 
 of slavery in Kansas and Nebraska," he went on 
 to say : " But I shall not insist now on so radi- 
 cal a measure as the restoration of the Missouri 
 prohibition. I know how difficult it is for power 
 to relinquish even a pernicious and suicidal 
 policy all at once. We may obtain the same 
 result, in this particular case of Kansas, without 
 going back so far. Go back only to the ground 
 assumed in 1854, the ground of popular sover- 
 eignty. Happily for the authors of that measure, 
 the zealous and energetic resistance of abuses 
 practiced under it has so far been effective, that
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 197 
 
 popular sovereignty in Kansas may now be made 
 a fact, and liberty there may be rescued from 
 danger through its free exercise." It is difficult 
 to see in this passage anything more than a 
 recognition of the facts as they actually existed ; 
 but it gave offense to some persons, who thought 
 it implied a readiness to condone the repeal 
 of the Missouri Compromise, and to welcome 
 the cooperation of Douglas, who, they considered, 
 should have been received with reluctance, hesi- 
 tation, and distrust. 
 
 His speech on the Lecompton constitution 
 and convention is not one of Seward's best. It 
 drags here and there ; but the wrongs of Kansas, 
 as material for a speech, had already been worn 
 threadbare. There are certain passages, how- 
 ever, to which the South might well have given 
 heed : 
 
 "The nation has reached the point where 
 intervention by the government for slavery and 
 slave states will no longer be tolerated. Free 
 labor has at last apprehended its rights, its 
 interests, its power and its destiny, and is organ- 
 izing itself to assume the government of the 
 republic. It will henceforth meet you boldly 
 and resolutely here; it will meet you every- 
 where, in the territories or out of them, wherever 
 you may go to extend slavery. . . . The inter, 
 ests of the white races demand the ultimate
 
 198 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 emancipation of all men. Whether that con. 
 summation shall be allowed to take effect, with 
 needful and wise precautions against sudden 
 change and disaster, or be hurried on by violence, 
 is all that remains for you to decide. ... It is 
 for yourselves, not for us, to decide how long 
 the contest shall be protracted before freedom 
 shall enjoy her already assured triumph. I 
 would have it ended now. . . . But this can be 
 done only in one way, by the direct admission 
 of the three new states [Kansas, Minnesota, and 
 Oregon] as free states, . . . and by the aban- 
 donment of all further attempts to extend slavery 
 under the federal constitution." 
 
 The Kansas question, however, was not to be 
 decided by argument, or by any sense of justice. 
 The best men of the South did not venture to 
 defend the Lecompton constitution, or the pro- 
 ceedings by which it came before Congress, or 
 the course of the administration. The necessity 
 of making Kansas a slave state was the govern- 
 ing motive with those who supported the bill. 
 A few Southerners, notably Bell and Crittenden, 
 opposed it. But the administration controlled 
 the Senate, and its patronage and proscription 
 were freely employed to enable it to carry the 
 House. The outcome of the whole matter for 
 this session (1857-58) was the passage of a bill, 
 a new compromise, by which the Lecomp-
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 199 
 
 ton constitution was to be again submitted to 
 the people of Kansas for adoption or rejection. 
 If it should be adopted, the territory would 
 receive large grants of public lands, and be 
 admitted at once as a state. If it should be re- 
 jected, Kansas was to remain a territory for 
 an indefinite period. The people spurned the 
 bribe ; the constitution was a second time re- 
 jected by an overwhelming majority. Yet it 
 was only when some Southern senators had 
 already vacated their seats that the struggle 
 was ended in January, 1861, by the admission 
 of Kansas as a free state. 
 
 There was another matter before the Senate 
 this winter, in which Seward's course was most 
 severely condemned by some of his own party. 
 The Mormons of Utah were in a state of open, 
 if not of avowed rebellion. Troops were needed 
 to compel their obedience and to maintain the 
 authority of the government. The administra- 
 tion wished to raise two additional regiments for 
 this purpose. The Republicans, distrusting the 
 President and remembering the use to which 
 the army had been put in Kansas, were opposed 
 to giving him any such power. Seward thought 
 the troops necessary for the purpose for which 
 they were asked, and that the President should 
 have the authority he desired. " It is," he said, 
 "with a view to save life, to save the public
 
 200 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 peace, to bring the territory of Utah into sub- 
 mission to the authorities of the land without 
 bloodshed, that I favor the increase of force 
 which is to be sent there." A letter from Senator 
 Fessenden shows us how the Republicans of the 
 Senate looked at the matter. " Some of our 
 people," he wrote, " are frightened by the idea 
 of refusing supplies in time of war. Seward, I 
 understand, is to make a speech for the bill. 
 He is perfectly bedeviled. He will vote alone, 
 so far as the Republicans are concerned ; but 
 he thinks himself wiser than all of us." Hale 
 spoke of him as the Judas Iscariot of the little 
 company of Republicans in the Senate. Never- 
 theless he persisted in his opinion, and spoke 
 and voted in favor of the bill, carrying out in 
 his conduct the policy which he had insisted was 
 correct at the beginning of the Mexican war a 
 dozen years before, when he was still a private 
 citizen. The bill, however, after being amended, 
 was at last defeated by a vote which had no 
 party significance or character, Toombs voting 
 with Seward, and Mason and Slidell with Fessen- 
 den and Hale. Coercion of the Mormons became 
 for the time unnecessary, as a truce was patched 
 up between them and the government. 
 
 Subsequent events, however, showed that 
 Seward was right in his views of the necessity 
 of reducing to strict obedience the Latter Day
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 201 
 
 Saints ; and had this been done earlier there 
 would have been fewer or no unpunished out- 
 rages upon Christians, no Danite bands, no 
 cowardly midnight murders in Utah. Seward 
 himself must have felt amply rewarded for his 
 speech and action in the matter, when three 
 years later he learned from more than one War 
 Democrat that this speech had taught him to 
 disregard unpatriotic party counsels, and to stand 
 by the government and the Union. 
 
 The historical interest of the political cam- 
 paign of the summer and autumn of 1858 is 
 practically confined to the debates between Lin- 
 coln and Douglas ; but Seward in his speech at 
 Rochester struck the keynote of the contest 
 when he spoke of " the irrepressible conflict 
 between Freedom and Slavery." The idea was 
 not a new one on his part, though the expres- 
 sion was. If we read his speeches we shall 
 find him often before struggling with a similar 
 thought, but never till now finding the apt words 
 which would best convey his meaning, and coin- 
 ing a phrase which became at once a part of our 
 popular speech. 
 
 The substance of the Rochester address was 
 an indictment of the Democratic party as sec- 
 tional and local, with its principal seat in the 
 slave states and its constituency almost exclu- 
 sively there, but having in the free states a
 
 202 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 number of supporters sufficient to modify its 
 sectional appearance without altering its sec- 
 tional character, committed therefore to the 
 policy of slavery, and which had carried that 
 policy to its then alarming culmination. The 
 accusation was followed by a statement of the 
 historical facts justifying it, and the speech had 
 great weight in the autumn elections. In the 
 year before the Republican party had suffered a 
 grievous setback ; but the course of the Presi- 
 dent in endeavoring, by all the means at his 
 command, to crowd through Congress and force 
 upon Kansas a constitution odious to its inhabi- 
 tants and so tainted with fraud that even his 
 own officers there, Southerners and slaveholders 
 as they were, refused to sustain him, had done 
 for the opponents of the administration what 
 they could not have done for themselves. The 
 Congress chosen in the autumn of 1858 elected, 
 though only after a prolonged struggle, a Re- 
 publican speaker. To the Senate no Northern 
 Democrat was returned except Douglas, and the 
 Republicans there now numbered twenty-four. 
 
 Nothing was done in the short session ending 
 on the 4th of March, 1859. The endeavors of 
 the South to obtain a vote to put thirty mil- 
 lions of money into the hands of the President, 
 in order to pave the way for a favorable negotia- 
 tion as to the purchase of Cuba, signally failed;
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 203 
 
 and a homestead bill, granting moderate quan- 
 tities of public lands to actual settlers, and 
 warmly pressed by the Republicans, shared the 
 same fate. The antagonism between the North 
 and South was never more conspicuous than in 
 the discussion of these measures. The House, 
 it was known, would not pass the Cuba bill, if 
 sent down to them, but they had already passed 
 the homestead bill, which was before the Senate, 
 and Seward urged laying aside Cuba to take up 
 the homestead bill, saying : " The Senate may 
 as well meet face to face the issue. . . . The 
 homestead bill is a question of homes for the 
 landless freemen of the United States. The 
 Cuba bill is the question of slaves for the slave- 
 holders of the United States." Toombs retorted, 
 that, much as he despised senators who were dem- 
 agogues, he despised still more those who were 
 driven by demagogues, and who met a great 
 question of national policy by the cry of land for 
 the landless ; on which Wade cried out : " Shall 
 we give niggers to the niggerless or land to the 
 landless ? When you come to niggers for the 
 niggerless all other questions sink into perfect 
 insignificance." 
 
 The summer and autumn of 1859 Seward 
 passed in Europe. When he retHmecrpthe John 
 Brown raid in Virginia had ended in the exe- 
 cution of its leader; Congress had assembled,
 
 204 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 and the two months' contest for the election 
 of speaker was well under way. The several 
 parties were already beginning to take their 
 positions for the coming presidential campaign. 
 The Senate was practically under the control of 
 the extreme pro-slavery leaders, who were deter- 
 mined to drive Douglas out of the Democratic 
 party as a punishment for his opposition to the 
 admission of Kansas under the Lecompton con- 
 stitution. For this purpose, Jefferson Davis of- 
 fered a series of resolutions embodying the 
 political doctrines enunciated by Judge Taney 
 in the Dred Scott case, and the most extreme 
 deductions to be made from them. These re- 
 solves were meant to be a complete statement of 
 the true creed of the Democratic party on the 
 subject of slavery, as revised by the chief justice. 
 The fundamental article was this : 
 
 " Resolved, That neither Congress nor a ter- 
 ritorial legislature, whether by direct legislation, 
 or legislation of an indirect and unfriendly 
 character, possesses power to annul or impair 
 the constitutional right of any citizen of the 
 United States to take his slave property into the 
 common territories, and there hold and enjoy 
 the same while the territorial condition re- 
 mains." 
 
 Special interest attaches to this resolution, 
 from the fact that in the Democratic national
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 205 
 
 convention of 1848 a resolve, offered by Mr. 
 Yancey of Alabama, declaring, " That the doc- 
 trine of non-interference with the right of prop- 
 erty of any portion of the people of this con- 
 federacy, be it in the states or territories 
 thereof, by any other than the parties interested 
 in them, is the true republican doctrine recog- 
 nized by this body," was rejected by a vote 
 of two hundred and sixteen to thirty-six ; while 
 against this resolution of Jefferson Davis, intro- 
 duced in the Senate eleven years later, there was 
 only one Democratic vote, that of Mr. Pugh of 
 Ohio. 1 The attitude of the Democracy as re- 
 gards slavery was clearly not stationary. If the 
 Republicans were advancing in the path of 
 modern civilization, the Democrats were even 
 more rapidly retrograding towards a govern- 
 ment which should rest on slavery as its base. 
 The Republicans stood aloof, and left Davis's 
 resolutions to be discussed by the Democrats. 
 They were adopted by a strict party vote. 
 
 Seward's most important speech during the 
 session was on the bill for the admission of Kan- 
 sas under a new constitution framed by a con- 
 vention held at Wyandot, and composed of dele- 
 gates from the actual settlers of the territory. 
 In this speech he discussed the general state of 
 the country ; and in a sketch of the difference 
 
 1 Douglas was absent throughout, from illness.
 
 206 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 between the slave and free states, defined the 
 former as states where the slave was regarded 
 and protected, not as a man, but as the capital 
 of another man, a special kind of capital entitled 
 to be politically represented by its owners, and 
 which, with the increase in slaves, had become a 
 great political force ; while in the free states 
 the laborer, invigorated and developed by the 
 rights of citizenship, was himself the dominating 
 political power. He therefore classified the 
 slave states as capital states, and the free 
 states as labor states. Running a historical 
 parallel between these two classes, he showed by 
 the debates on the Missouri Compromise, the 
 first great struggle between them, how easy it 
 was to combine the capital states in defense 
 even of their external interests, and how difficult 
 to unite the labor states in any common policy ; 
 that the labor states were naturally loyal to the 
 Union, while the capital states were quick to 
 alarm that loyalty by threats of disunion, and 
 either could not or would not distinguish be- 
 tween legitimate, constitutional opposition to the 
 creation of new capital states out of the common 
 territory, and unconstitutional attacks upon 
 slavery in the states where it already existed. 
 The history of the two parties proved, he con- 
 tended, that the Democratic party was generally 
 found sustaining the policy of the capital states ;
 
 THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR KANSAS. 207 
 
 while the Whigs, being usually an opposition 
 party, had practiced some forbearance towards 
 the interests of labor, until, in an evil hour, the 
 Whig representatives of the capital states con- 
 curred in the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska 
 act, and the Whig party instantly went down, 
 never to rise again. 
 
 To the charge that the Republican party was 
 a sectional one, and that its success would there- 
 fore justify secession, he answered : " Is the 
 Democratic party less sectional? Is it easier 
 for us to bear your sectional sway than for you 
 to bear ours ? Is it unreasonable that for once 
 we should alternate? But is the Republican 
 party sectional? Not unless the Democratic 
 party is. The Republican party prevails in the 
 House of Representatives sometimes, the Demo- 
 cratic party in the Senate always. Which of 
 the two is most prescriptive? Come, if you 
 will, into the free states anywhere, address the 
 people, submit to them fully all your complaints 
 of Northern disloyalty, oppression, prejudice, 
 speaking just as freely and loudly as you do 
 here ; you will have hospitable welcomes and 
 ballot-boxes for all the votes you can win. . . . 
 Extend to us the same privileges and I will en- 
 gage that you will have very soon in the South 
 as many Republicans as we have Democrats in 
 the North. . . . Our policy of labor in the terri-
 
 208 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 tories was not sectional during the first forty 
 years of the republic ; it will be national again 
 during the third forty years, and forever after- 
 wards." He minimized the dangers of dis- 
 union, not because he underrated the earnest- 
 ness of the leaders of secession, but because he 
 believed that, refine as one might about the na- 
 ture of the Constitution, calling it a compact 
 between states, a breach of any article of which 
 by one state would absolve all the others from 
 their allegiance, yet it would be found, on any 
 attempt to subvert it, to be a government of the 
 whole people, in which every member was con- 
 scious of his interest and power, and which was 
 indestructible from the millions of fibres by 
 which it was interwoven with the affections, the 
 ambitions, and the hopes of all citizens of all 
 classes.
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1860. 
 
 THE Democratic national convention of 1856 
 had determined to hold that of 1860 at Charles- 
 ton, South Carolina ; it accordingly met there 
 towards the end of April. The irreconcilable 
 difference between the supporters of the admin- 
 istration and the followers of Douglas made 
 any agreement as to a platform impossible ; and, 
 on the failure of the resolutions proposed by the 
 South, forty-five of the one hundred and twenty 
 Southern delegates withdrew. The convention 
 adjourned to Baltimore and there nominated 
 Douglas for the presidency ; Herschel V. John- 
 ston, of Georgia, being afterwards added as the 
 nominee for vice-president. The seceding dele- 
 gates held a separate convention, and chose as 
 their candidates John C. Breckenridge of Ken- 
 tucky, and Joseph Lane of Oregon. The Con- 
 stitutional Union party, the survivors of the 
 Native American organization, put John Bell, 
 of Tennessee, at the head of their ticket, and 
 gave the second place to Edward Everett, of 
 Massachusetts.
 
 210 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 The Republican convention assembled at 
 Chicago on the 16th of May. The organiza- 
 tion, preparation, and adoption of the platform 
 occupied the first two days, and it was the 
 general expectation both of his friends and op- 
 ponents that Seward would be nominated on the 
 following morning. It was known that there 
 was opposition to him, yet it was thought that 
 the different elements composing it would not be 
 able to unite on any candidate. But on the 
 third ballot Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, was 
 nominated, a change of four votes of the Ohio 
 delegation from Chase to Lincoln giving him the 
 requisite majority. There is no question that to 
 the Republican party, as a whole, this nomina- 
 tion was at the time a bitter disappointment. 
 Lincoln was a man comparatively unknown. He 
 had served in one Congress without distinction, 
 and would gladly when his term was over have 
 jiccepted a subordinate office. Four years ear- 
 lier he had received a respectable vote on an 
 informal ballot as a candidate for vice-president 
 on the ticket with Fremont ; but this was hardly 
 remembered at the time of his nomination in 
 1860. His campaign with Douglas had brought 
 him into more prominence, had shown him to be 
 a clear thinker, and very ready and formidable 
 in debate ; but the interest in that discussion 
 was comparatively limited ; and he was best
 
 THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF I860. 211 
 
 known at the East by his address at the Cooper 
 Institute in New York, on February 27, I860. 
 He was a very popular local politician, but was 
 hardly recognized elsewhere as a rising man 
 with anything that could be called a national 
 reputation. The opposition to Seward, adopt- 
 ing the policy pursued in previous conventions 
 by the opponents of the great men of the respec- 
 tive parties, united on Lincoln as a more or less 
 colorless candidate. 
 
 So far as the Republican party in 1860 was 
 not the inevitable outcome of the constantly 
 increasing demands and pressure of the South, 
 and the consequent resistance of the North, it 
 was the work of William H. Seward more than 
 of any other single individual. He had labored 
 to this end for many years ; his speeches had 
 been printed in different languages, and circu- 
 lated by millions, and had produced the deepest 
 and widest effect on public opinion. At the 
 South he was fully recognized as the leader of 
 his party, the price set on his head there being 
 fifty thousand dollars, while only twenty-five hun- 
 dred was offered for that of any other prominent 
 Republican. 
 
 A Southern newspaper did no more than jus- 
 tice to his position, when its editor wrote :/" Mr. 
 Seward is a great political leader. Unlike others 
 who are willing to follow in the wake of popular
 
 212 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 sentiment, Seward leads. He stands Lead and 
 shoulders above them all. He marshals his 
 forces and directs the way. The Abolition host 
 follow. However we may differ from William 
 H. Seward, we concede to him honesty of pur- 
 pose, and the highest order of talent. He takes 
 no halfway grounds, he does nothing by halves. 
 . . . He is at once the greatest and most danger- 
 ous man in the government. . . . For eighteen 
 years he has stood forth in the Senate of the 
 United States, the great champion of freedom, 
 and the stern opposer of slavery.'/ If one 
 turns from the estimate of opponents to the 
 judgment of his political friends, the words of 
 Governor Andrew of Massachusetts, in indorsing 
 the nomination of Lincoln, do not exaggerate 
 the appreciation of Seward at that time in the 
 Republican party : 
 
 /"The affection of our hearts and the judg- 
 ment of our intellects bound our political for- 
 tunes to v William H. Seward, to him, who is 
 the highest and most shining light of this politi- 
 cal generation, to him who, by the unanimous 
 selection of the foes of our cause, and our own, 
 has for years been the determined standard- 
 bearer of liberty r A Democratic newspaper 
 announced the result of the convention in an 
 article entitled " Actseon devoured by his own 
 Dogs ; " and this heading had quite enough
 
 THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1860. 213 
 
 truth in it to give it point, and to require no 
 explanation for even the dullest and most obtuse. 
 Seward's failure to obtain the nomination at 
 Chicago was due to a variety of causes. The 
 influence to be attributed to the defection of 
 Horace Greeley was probably exaggerated at the 
 time ; and the episode is mostly interesting for 
 the light it throws upon the characters of the 
 two men. Greeley was commonly thought to 
 be an unselfish patriot, but he had at bottom a 
 hunger for office, and, as his conduct to Seward 
 shows, a strong appetite for revenge. As has 
 been already stated, he was very much disap- 
 pointed at not receiving the nomination for 
 governor of New York in 1854, and still more 
 chagrined that his old associate and subsequent 
 rival, Henry J. Raymond, was nominated for 
 lieutenant-governor by the very convention in 
 which he himself had been defeated. There is 
 nothing to show that Seward personally had any. 
 thing to do with this result, though Weed, be- 
 lieving it essential to success, had undoubtedly 
 done what he could to bring it about ; there 
 were, however, so many objections to nominating 
 Greeley, that it may be doubted whether Sew- 
 ard's active intervention in his behalf would 
 have been of any avail. The election was ex- 
 tremely close. A change of less than two hun- 
 dred votes would have altered the result ; and
 
 214 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the party was evidently wise, in so close a con- 
 test, in declining to handicap themselves with 
 a candidate of such pronounced opinions, the 
 eager advocate of so many visionary schemes as 
 Greeley was considered to be. Greeley himself 
 subsequently admitted that he could not have 
 been chosen. Just after the election, when he 
 was still extremely sore, he wrote Seward a letter, 
 complaining of the treatment he had received, 
 notifying him that he could no longer rely on 
 his support, and that the so-called partnership 
 of Seward, Weed, and Greeley was at an end. 
 So far was Seward, however, from penetrating 
 Greeley's real meaning, that he shortly afterwards 
 wrote to Weed : " I have a long letter from 
 Greeley, full of sharp, pinching thorns. I judge, 
 as we might indeed well know, from his, at the 
 bottom, nobleness of disposition, that he has no 
 idea of saying or doing anything wrong or un- 
 kind ; but it is sad to see him so unhappy. Will 
 there be a vacancy in the board of regents of 
 the University of New York this winter ? Could 
 one be made at the close of the session, could he 
 have it ? Raymond's nomination and election is 
 hard for him to bear. ... I think this a good 
 letter to burn. I wish I could do Greeley so 
 great a favor as to burn his." 
 
 Seward did not suffer this letter to interfere 
 with the personal relations between himself and
 
 THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1860. 215 
 
 Greeley ; and though Greeley opposed Seward's 
 nomination in 1856, yet, if his opposition was 
 based on personal grounds, he carefully con- 
 cealed them. Ten days after the convention of 
 that year he called on Seward in Washington, 
 and wished to be congratulated on having done 
 the very best thing in the very best way. In the 
 spring of 1859 he succeeded in satisfying a poli- 
 tician so astute as Weed that he was all right 
 politically and " seeking to be useful " in Cali- 
 fornia, whither he was going ; and he dined with 
 Seward on the eve of his departure. 
 
 He was not a delegate from New York to the 
 Republican convention of 1860 ; but he procured 
 an appointment as substitute from Oregon, and 
 going to Chicago in this capacity, devoted his 
 time and energy to defeating Seward. He 
 nominally advocated the candidacy of Edward 
 Bates of Missouri, but was ready to support 
 anybody to beat Seward ; and it has been said 
 that, when Seward was actually defeated, he 
 openly gave thanks that he was even with him 
 at last. 
 
 Seward had shown Greeley's letter of 1854 to 
 no one ; but after the convention there began to 
 be rumors of its existence, and Greeley himself 
 finally printed it in the " Tribune." Its publi- 
 cation drew from Weed an article in which he 
 said : " Having remained for six years in bliss-
 
 216 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ful ignorance of its contents, we should have 
 much preferred to have ever remained so. It 
 jars harshly upon cherished memories. It de- 
 stroys ideals of disinterestedness and generosity 
 which relieved political life from so much that 
 is selfish, sordid, and rapacious." The impar- 
 tial reader, who wishes to think well of Greeley, 
 will probably agree with Weed. 
 
 Greeley's unaided exertions would hardly have 
 resulted in Seward's defeat. There were other 
 more powerful elements at work for that end. 
 The body of the Republican party was composed 
 of old Whigs ; but even among these there were 
 not wanting some conservatives who had joined 
 the party late and half reluctantly, and who still 
 thought Seward almost dangerously radical. To 
 those who had supported Fillmore in 1856, his 
 nomination would not have been acceptable ; and 
 the Democratic Free Soilers of '48, who had voted 
 for Van Buren, and were now in full Republican 
 communion, were at heart strongly opposed to 
 him. They might put their opposition nomi- 
 nally on various grounds ; but the fundamental 
 reason was that he had always been a Whig, 
 till that party perished, and never a Democrat. 
 Those members of the convention who had been 
 members of the Know-nothing party remem- 
 bered Seward's steady and uniform opposition 
 to and denunciation of that party and its pro-
 
 THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1860. 217 
 
 scriptive doctrines. Many Republicans in Penn- 
 sylvania and Indiana were still Know-nothings, 
 slightly covered with a thin varnish of Republi- 
 canism ; and the respective candidates for gov- 
 ernor in these two states professed to think it 
 impossible to succeed at their state elections in 
 October, if Seward were the national candi- 
 date, and were therefore earnest to defeat his 
 nomination ; Cameron of Pennsylvania, who was 
 thought to favor Seward, did not appear at the 
 convention and took no steps in his behalf, and 
 Ohio had a favorite son, Chase, whom she pre- 
 ferred to him. Some Republicans of more or 
 less prominence nominally placed their opposi- 
 tion to Seward on the ground of their distrust 
 of a New York politician ; they objected to his 
 connection with Weed ; they admitted him to 
 be personally honest, but thought him not suffi- 
 ciently averse to jobs for his friends. These 
 objections came mainly from persons who, had 
 they fully expressed their minds, would have 
 given other reasons why they wished he should 
 not be nominated. If they had any effect upon 
 the action of the convention, it was so trifling 
 that it need not be taken into account. The 
 nomination was determined by other and quite 
 different influences. 
 
 Lincoln was most ambitious for the nomina- 
 tion, and had been working eagerly for it for
 
 218 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 months. He was personally a much more adroit 
 politician than Seward, who practically, during 
 his whole public life, relied on Thurlow Weed 
 to manage for him. Lincoln's forces were well 
 organized ; he had an earnest committee, deter- 
 mined to succeed, and not over-scrupulous as to 
 the means ; and as the convention was at Chi- 
 cago, they were on their own ground and sup- 
 ported by all the local influences. The ques- 
 tion was how to consolidate upon Lincoln all the 
 elements of the opposition to Seward. This dif- 
 ficulty was solved on the night preceding the 
 nomination, by the chairman of Lincoln's com- 
 mittee promising to Caleb Smith, of Indiana, 
 a place in Lincoln's cabinet in return for the 
 vote of that delegation, and giving a similar 
 pledge in favor of Simon Cameron to the dele- 
 gation from Pennsylvania, on the assurance of 
 its support ; the votes of these two delegations, 
 with a change of votes by a few wavering mem- 
 bers from Ohio, secured Lincoln's nomination. 
 Lincoln had telegraphed his committee to make 
 no bargains for him ; nevertheless he did not 
 afterwards repudiate their promises, and Caleb 
 Smith and Cameron were both in his first cab- 
 inet. 
 
 When the news arrived at Auburn, and no one 
 else there had the heart to prepare for the " Daily 
 Republican " newspaper a paragraph approving
 
 TEE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1860. 219 
 
 the nomination, Seward himself wrote : " No 
 truer or firmer defenders of the Republican 
 faith could have been found . . . than the dis- 
 tinguished . . . citizens on whom the honors of 
 the nomination have fallen." None the less 
 keenly, however, did he feel himself to be "a 
 leader deposed by his own party in the hour of 
 organization for decisive battle." Yet instead 
 of merely acquiescing in the result of the con- 
 vention, and remaining quietly at home, as he 
 might fairly enough have done, he put forth all 
 his energies to insure the success of his party, 
 and devoted five weeks to a political campaign 
 in New York and the northwest, especially in 
 those states which had been his ardent sup- 
 porters in the convention.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 
 
 THE narrative of the events of the winter suc- 
 ceeding the election of Lincoln forms one of 
 the most mortifying and melancholy chapters 
 in our national history. The withdrawal of the 
 Southern Democratic leaders from their party 
 convention, and their nomination of a separate 
 candidate in the summer of 1860, was a mere 
 prelude to the secession of the states they rep- 
 resented. It rendered the election of Lincoln 
 certain, and thus furnished the pretext they 
 wanted for carrying out their long cherished 
 scheme of breaking up the Union and forming 
 a new Southern confederacy of which slavery 
 should be the corner-stone and cotton the king. 
 They were not alarmed at the prospect of any 
 injury to their property in slaves in consequence 
 of the Republican victory, or of any diminution 
 of their material prosperity. The Democratic 
 control in Congress not only made them abso- 
 lutely secure from attack, but left the incoming 
 Republican president powerless to appoint a 
 single public officer, from the members of his
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 221 
 
 cabinet down, who would not be satisfactory to 
 the South, or to carry any measure, or pursue 
 any policy which did not have its approval. 
 Moreover, there were practically no open issues, 
 by the de6ision of which the interests of the 
 South could be materially affected. The Dred 
 Scott case, it was claimed, had settled the 
 right to hold slaves in all the territories of the 
 United States ; it could not be modified until 
 the political complexion of the Supreme Court 
 should be changed, and this would be, of neces- 
 sity, a process requiring many years and a succes- 
 sion of presidents of the same political opinions. 
 The excitement, both North and South, about the 
 fugitive slave law had practically died out ; and 
 the secession movement had no strength in the 
 border states, the only ones having a material in- 
 terest in the observance of this law, or suffering 
 from its evasion. 
 
 The real grievance was one which could not 
 well be formulated or put forward as a ground 
 for breaking up the Union. For half a century 
 the cotton states and Virginia had governed the 
 country; they had controlled its policy, made 
 its wars, annexed new territory, nominated pres- 
 idents, and filled the government bureaus and 
 departments. They foreboded from this election 
 the end of their political domination, and deter- 
 mined to go off by themselves, having faith that
 
 222 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the world's need of their great staple would 
 bring them, should the United States use force 
 to prevent their carrying out their plans, the 
 recognition of their independence by the leading 
 countries of Europe, if not more material sup- 
 port. " Our leaders and public men, who have 
 taken hold of this question," wrote Alexander 
 H. Stephens, " do not desire to continue the 
 Union on any terms. They do not wish any 
 redress of wrongs ; they are disunionists per se, 
 and avail themselves of present circumstances to 
 press their objects." l 
 
 South Carolina was in the van of the move- 
 ment. Preliminary conferences had been held 
 in Charleston as early as September, 1860, and 
 at a private meeting of the leading men on the 
 25th of October it was unanimously resolved 
 that South Carolina should secede in the event 
 of Lincoln being chosen president. To the legis- 
 lature which assembled on the 5th of Novem- 
 ber, the day before the presidential election, the 
 governor in his message declared his opinion 
 that, should the Republican party carry that 
 election, the only course for South Carolina 
 would be secession from the Federal Union ; 
 that political indications justified the conclusion 
 that other states would immediately follow, and 
 that the long desired cooperation for which 
 1 November 30, 1860.
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 223 
 
 so many citizens had been waiting would soon 
 be realized. From this time South Carolina 
 marched forward in her revolutionary course 
 with steady steps, and, as the governor had fore- 
 seen, the other cotton states were not slow to 
 follow. Before the end of November the pre- 
 liminary steps had been taken in eight South- 
 ern states ; within two months afterwards, six 
 of them, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
 Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, had 
 passed ordinances of secession ; by the middle 
 of February Texas had united with them to 
 form a Southern Confederacy, which had chosen 
 a complete set of officers to administer its gov- 
 ernment. They had also seized for their own 
 use all the forts, arsenals, and other public prop- 
 erty and moneys of the United States in the 
 South, unfortunately left without guard or pro- 
 tection, except Fort Sumter, off Charleston, 
 which Major Anderson was holding with a hand- 
 ful of men, and Fort Pickens, at Pensacola, into 
 which a gallant subaltern, Lieutenant Sleminer, 
 had thrown himself with his company. 
 
 The moment selected for the outbreak of the 
 secession conspiracy was most auspicious. The 
 administration at Washington had no sympa- 
 thy whatever with the Republican party or the 
 dominant sentiment of the North. Four of 
 Buchanan's cabinet were from the South, and
 
 224 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 three of these were either open or ill-disguised 
 secessionists, while every one of the Northern 
 members was a pro-slavery Democrat, untainted 
 by any of the heresies which had split the party 
 in 1848, and either indifferent to, or else a sup- 
 porter of the violence and fraud by which the 
 South had undertaken to gain Kansas for slavery, 
 as well as of the administration's policy toward 
 that territory. All the departments swarmed 
 with Southern rebels. Washington society was a 
 hot-bed of treason and secession, wholly Southern 
 in its sympathies ; and the extremists from the 
 South in Congress were the closest companions 
 and friends of the President. His term was 
 nearly over, and the secession leaders relied on 
 his political and personal proclivities and inti- 
 macies, and on his general reluctance to take 
 responsibility, increased, as they knew it would 
 be, by the fact that he was merely holding over 
 until the inauguration of his successor, as suf- 
 ficient to prevent any aggressive action on his 
 part. 
 
 The President's annual message, sent to Con- 
 gress on the 3d of December, did not disappoint 
 these anticipations. It took the Northern states 
 and people severely to task for the existing con- 
 dition of things, for which, it said, they were 
 wholly to blame. Secession was unlawful; of 
 that there could be no question ; but the coercion
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 225 
 
 of a state was equally unlawful, and in the 
 political dilemma, which he had thus reached, 
 the President left the subject to Congress and 
 the country. It was generally known that these 
 views had not merely the support of the cab- 
 inet, but were the conclusions of the attorney- 
 general, submitted to the President in a labored 
 opinion. Thus encouraged, the Southern lead- 
 ers had little hesitation in following their in- 
 clinations, and crossing, one by one, the narrow 
 Rubicon which divides idle declamation, vapor- 
 ing threats and empty braggadocio from actual 
 rebellion and treason. Within a month mat- 
 ters had gone so far that South Carolina, hav- 
 ing removed the buoys and extinguished the 
 lights in her harbors, and occupied by hostile 
 troops all the forts except Suinter, was sending 
 commissioners to Washington to treat with the 
 government as a foreign power. She insisted, 
 as a preliminary to all negotiations, upon the im- 
 mediate evacuation of Sumter, on the ground 
 that the presence of the United States troops 
 there was a standing menace to her sovereignty. 
 Under these circumstances the attorney-general 
 revised his opinion ; and approaching the ques- 
 tions presented him from a different point of 
 view, reached the conclusion that it was the 
 President's clear constitutional right and duty 
 to defend the public property, to resist by force
 
 226 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 any attempt to drive the troops of the United 
 States from any of its fortifications, and to use 
 both the army and navy, if necessary, for the 
 purpose of aiding the proper officers in the exe- 
 cution of the laws. 
 
 Had he been convinced of this a month ear- 
 lier, and satisfied the President's mind then, it 
 is possible that the rebellion might have been 
 nipped in the bud ; though it is extremely doubt- 
 ful if the small force disposable for this purpose 
 would have been sufficient to effect much, unless 
 the message and the proceedings of the govern- 
 ment had evinced such a resolute purpose that 
 the Southern leaders would have hesitated about 
 precipitating a conflict. By the end of the year 
 they had gone too far, and kindled their own 
 and their people's passions to such an extent that 
 retreat was no longer possible. 
 
 The attorney-general succeeded, however, after 
 a severe struggle, in bringing the President to 
 his own standpoint. The cabinet was purged 
 of the secessionists (Cobb of Georgia, Thomas 
 of Maryland, who succeeded him, Floyd of Vir- 
 ginia, and Thompson of Mississippi), and their 
 places were filled by Dix, Stanton and Holt; 
 the White House ceased to be the rendezvous of 
 Benjamin, Mason, Slidell, and Jefferson Davis, 
 the conspirators of the Senate ; and the efforts 
 of the administration were loyally and vigor.
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 227 
 
 ously bent towards keeping the government in- 
 tact for delivery to its regularly elected suc- 
 cessors. 
 
 Meantime, the bold and defiant attitude of the 
 cotton states and their hasty and rapid strides 
 towards secession had caused much alarm and 
 a good deal of vacillation of opinion and feel- 
 ing at the North, even among the supporters of 
 Lincoln. Leading Republican newspapers were 
 suggesting that our erring brethren should be 
 allowed to go in peace. There were meetings 
 in the large cities recommending concessions 
 to save the Union, the concessions suggested 
 amounting in some cases to an abandonment of 
 everything for which the Republican party had 
 contended ; and in the press and elsewhere there 
 were from time to time hints, that, should there 
 be any attempt at coercion, the men from the 
 North might find from their homes a fire in 
 their rear. 
 
 When Congress assembled, the aspect of affairs 
 inspired the loyal members of both Houses with 
 profound gloom and anxiety. They knew that 
 Washington was the centre of innumerable plots 
 and intrigues, all having for their object the 
 destruction of the Union. They felt themselves 
 absolutely powerless, and the administration, 
 which was then controlled by its Southern lead- 
 ers, they considered worse than powerless, be-
 
 228 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 lieving it to be the mere tool of the enemies of 
 the country. In this great crisis no man dis- 
 tinguished himself as a leader. Many men of 
 experience in public affairs, of character, reso- 
 lution, and intelligence, seemed hopelessly bewil- 
 dered ; they made speeches, proposed and voted 
 for measures, and took positions, which are only 
 to be explained by their desire to postpone any 
 violent outbreak until after the 4th of March, 
 lest on that day Washington should be in the 
 hands of the rebels, and Lincoln trying to find 
 some safe retreat where he might take the oath 
 of office as President of the United States. 
 This fear was by no means a groundless panic, 
 but a well justified apprehension. From early 
 in January, 1861, the senators from seven South- 
 ern states were sitting in a room at the Capitol, 
 as a revolutionary council, directing every move- 
 ment toward secession, and preparing the pro- 
 gramme to be carried out in the formation of the 
 Confederacy. There were several months when 
 the capture of Washington by surprise would 
 have been perfectly feasible ; but so long as 
 Buchanan, the President whom the South had 
 elected, and who had faithfully done its bidding, 
 was in office, it was not easy to find a pretext for 
 seizing the capital. To do so would have been, 
 not the assertion of independence, but an act of 
 offensive warfare, for which the seceding states
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 229 
 
 were not yet prepared; and so they delayed; 
 the chances for the success of a sudden attack 
 were constantly diminishing, yet it was never 
 certain until some time after Lincoln's inaugura- 
 tion that such an attack would not be made, and 
 Washington be captured. 
 
 It needs but little reflection to convince one 
 that the plan of letting our erring brethren de- 
 part in peace was impracticable and visionary ; 
 that it would have merely postponed till after 
 the recognition of their secession and independ- 
 ence the settlement of difficulties, which would 
 then surely have given rise to war. An inde- 
 pendent North would never have consented to 
 return a fugitive slave to the seceded South ; yet 
 the Southern Confederacy must have insisted at 
 all hazards on some provision for this purpose, 
 in any treaty of separation, or they would have 
 lost rather than gained by secession. The policy 
 of conciliation, however, acquired new strength 
 from its advocacy in various New York papers, 
 and especially from an editorial by Thurlow 
 Weed, which was supposed to have been inspired 
 by Seward, and to represent his views. Seward 
 had in fact no knowledge of the article before 
 its publication, and Weed was alone responsible 
 for it. But the personal and political relations 
 between Seward and Weed naturally gave rise 
 to suspicions of his connection with it, and these
 
 230 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 were confirmed by the positive statement at the 
 office of the " New York Tribune " that Seward 
 not only wrote the article, but was meditating a 
 great compromise after the fashion of Clay and 
 Webster. This whole statement, whether mali- 
 cious or not, was absolutely false, and it annoyed 
 Seward extremely. He had nothing in view, 
 no plan but to wait, drifting like the rest. " I 
 am thus far silent," he writes to his wife, 1 " not 
 because I am thinking of proposing compro- 
 mises, but because I wish to avoid, myself, and 
 restrain other Republicans from intermeddling 
 just now, when concession, or solicitation, or 
 solicitude would encourage, and demonstrations 
 of firmness of purpose would exasperate;" 
 and again, a day or two later, he says: "An- 
 other day in the Senate. Vaporing by Southern 
 senators ; setting forth the grievances of their 
 section, and requiring Northern senators to an- 
 swer, excuse and offer terms which they are told 
 in the same breath will not be accepted." 2 
 
 He was desirous, if possible, to find some solu- 
 tion of the " difficult task of trying to reconcile 
 the factious men bent on disunion, reckless of 
 civil war, to the ascendency of an administration 
 based on the principles of justice and human- 
 ity." But he had no faith that any constitu- 
 tional amendment that might be proposed would 
 1 December 8, 1860. 2 December 11, 1860.
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 231 
 
 be of any avail. He had written earlier : " No 
 amendment that can be proposed, and would be 
 satisfactory, can get two thirds of both Houses, 
 although just such amendments might pass 
 three fourths of the states in convention." 
 
 Besides his conviction that the Fabian policy 
 was the best, Seward had another reason for 
 silence. He must have shared the general ex- 
 pectation that he would be offered a seat in 
 Lincoln's cabinet, and was therefore unwilling 
 to make or assent to any proposals which might 
 not meet the approval of the incoming President, 
 or be in accord with the policy of his administra- 
 tion. Ten days after the meeting of Congress a 
 letter from Mr. Lincoln invited him to become 
 secretary of state ; and he left Washington that 
 he might consult his wife and Weed before com- 
 ing to a decision. 
 
 He was by no means certain what he had 
 better do, and wished for some more definite 
 knowledge as to who were likely to be his asso- 
 ciates in the cabinet, and as to Mr. Lincoln's 
 general policy. Weed had already been asked 
 to come to Springfield for a conference with the 
 President-elect, and at Seward's suggestion he 
 decided to go at once. While he was there Mr. 
 Lincoln talked to him with entire frankness, and 
 Weed in return stated his own opinions with ab- 
 solute freedom. Weed came away, satisfied that
 
 232 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Chase was to be secretary of the treasury, and 
 Bates attorney-general, that Indiana was to have 
 a place in the cabinet, and that Pennsylvania 
 would probably be represented there by Cam- 
 eron, that Gideon Welles was to be secretary 
 of the navy, and that the only remaining post 
 was likely to be offered to Montgomery Blair. 
 Against these last two nominations Weed pro- 
 tested strongly. Many men might be named, he 
 said with perfect truth, any one of whom would 
 be more satisfactory to New England, and better 
 qualified to be secretary of the navy, than Mr. 
 Welles. He was satisfied, however, that what 
 he said did not affect Mr. Lincoln's previous 
 decision, though he did not learn till much later 
 that this appointment was made at the vice- 
 president's special request. To Blair he ob- 
 jected, because he represented nobody and had 
 no following ; because his appointment would be 
 obnoxious to the Union men of Maryland, who 
 were old Whigs, while he had been always- a 
 Democrat, and till 1858 an office-holder under 
 Buchanan; and also because, though he was 
 now called a citizen of Maryland, he actually 
 lived in the District of Columbia. To appoint 
 both Welles and Blair would, Weed urged, give 
 an undue prominence in the administration to 
 the Democratic element among the Republicans, 
 as it would leave the Whigs, who were a major-
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 233 
 
 ity in the party, in a minority in the cabinet. 
 It was evident to him, however, u that the selec- 
 tion of Montgomery Blair was a fixed fact," 
 unless some Union man from one of the more 
 southern states, who was of undoubted loyalty 
 and acceptable to Lincoln, could be prevailed 
 on to take the place. At Weed's instance, Mr. 
 Lincoln made the attempt to induce a gentle- 
 man of this description to come into the cabinet, 
 but the hopelessness of keeping these states in 
 the Union made all efforts in this direction 
 fruitless. 
 
 On his journey home Weed saw Seward, told 
 him all he had learned as to the plans for the 
 cabinet, and also the concessions which Lincoln 
 was willing to make for peace and harmony. 
 Seward returned at once to Washington, and 
 after thinking over the matter for two or three 
 days, in the light of the information he had re- 
 ceived from Weed, whose conclusions as to the 
 composition of the cabinet were subsequently 
 shown to be absolutely correct, he wrote to Mr. 
 Lincoln that, after due reflection and with much 
 self -distrust, he had concluded that, should he be 
 nominated and confirmed as secretary of state, it 
 would be his v duty to accept the appointment. 
 
 During Seward's absence at Auburn, Critten- 
 den had offered in the Senate a series of reso- 
 lutions proposing various constitutional amend-
 
 234 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ments. The Missouri Compromise was to be 
 restored, and extended to the Pacific ; the fugi- 
 tive slave law was to be amended, so that the 
 government should pay for a rescued slave; 
 there were to be constitutional provisions, pro- 
 hibiting Congress from abolishing slavery in 
 any place under its exclusive jurisdiction in a 
 slaveholding state, or in the District of Co- 
 lumbia (so long as slavery existed in Maryland 
 or Virginia) ; and from interfering with the 
 transportation of slaves by land or water from 
 any one slave state or territory to any other 
 slave state or territory. 
 
 The resolutions were referred to a select 
 committee of thirteen, of whom Seward was one, 
 who were "to consider the grievances between 
 the slaveholding and non-slaveholding states, 
 and to suggest if possible a remedy." At the 
 close of the first day's session of this committee, 
 he wrote to his wife : " We came to no compro- 
 mise, and we shall not." Toombs makes Sew- 
 ard responsible for this result. " I supported 
 Crittenden's compromise," he says, "heartily 
 and sincerely, although the sullen obstinacy of 
 Seward made it almost impossible to do any- 
 thing. . . . At length I saw that the compromise 
 must fail. With a persistent obstinacy that I 
 have never yet seen surpassed, Seward and his 
 backers refused every overture. I then tele-
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 235 
 
 graphed to Atlanta : ' All is at an end. North 
 determined ; Seward will not budge an inch. 
 Am in favor of secession.' " 
 
 On his first meeting with the committee 
 Seward offered, with the unanimous consent of 
 the other Republican members, three proposi- 
 tions embodying the concessions which they 
 understood Mr. Lincoln would sanction. These 
 were : First, A constitutional amendment pro- 
 viding that the Constitution should never be 
 altered so as to authorize Congress to abolish or 
 interfere with slavery in the states. Second: 
 A modification of the fugitive slave act so as to 
 secure to any alleged fugitive from service a 
 trial by jury in the state where he was arrested. 
 Third: A recommendation to all the states to 
 revise their legislation concerning persons re- 
 cently resident in other states, and to repeal all 
 such laws as were in contravention of the Con- 
 stitution of the United States or of any law of 
 Congress in pursuance thereof. 1 And later, with 
 the concurrence of the other Republicans, he of- 
 fered a fourth resolution : That Congress should 
 pass a law to punish all persons engaged in the 
 armed invasion of one state from another or in 
 complicity with such invasions. 
 
 1 This was aimed at the personal liberty bills of the North, 
 the laws of South Carolina as to colored seamen and the similai 
 statutes of other states.
 
 236 WILL 1 AM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Nothing, however, came of Crittenden's reso 
 lutions, or of Seward's propositions. Neither 
 the Senate committee of thirteen, nor a more 
 numerous committee appointed by the House for 
 a similar purpose, nor a Peace Convention assem- 
 bled in Washington later in the winter at the 
 invitation of Virginia, were able to make any 
 suggestions which would be acceptable to the 
 North, and would also induce the South to 
 abandon its scheme of secession. The only ef- 
 fect of all the conferences and discussions was 
 to postpone any further overt acts by the South 
 and to enable Buchanan to see his successor 
 inaugurated as the nominal President of the 
 whole United States. The Republicans expected 
 nothing more, and were only fearful lest this 
 should not be safely accomplished. The seceding 
 South meant to break up the Union, and could 
 only have been diverted from its purpose by 
 the acquiescence of the North in the substance 
 of the demands set forth in the resolutions 
 offered by Jefferson Davis in the Senate's select 
 committee, which proposed : " That it should be 
 declared by an amendment of the Constitution, 
 that property in slaves, recognized as such by the 
 local law of any of the states of the Union, shall 
 stand on the same footing in all constitutional 
 and Federal relations as any other species of 
 property so recognized ; and like other property
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 237 
 
 shall not be subject to be divested or impaired 
 by the local law of any other state, either in 
 escape thereto, or by the transit or sojourn of 
 the owner therein. And in no case whatever 
 shall such property be subject to be divested or 
 impaired by any legislative act of the United 
 States or any of the territories thereof." 
 
 " The people of the South, all of the Southern 
 states," wrote Seward, " are in the lead of reck- 
 less politicians. They are bent on coercing the 
 free states into a recognition of slavery, and fail- 
 ing that, into a civil war and disunion." To 
 this recognition, whether by amendments to the 
 Constitution or otherwise, no Republican could 
 assent. 
 
 The debates of the winter, the wide-spread 
 publicity given to the pretensions of the South, 
 the peremptoriness and arrogance with which 
 its claims were insisted on, and the rejection 
 of every scheme of compromise or adjustment 
 proposed by any Northern senator or represent- 
 ative brought home to the people of the free 
 states a realizing sense of the impossibility of 
 preventing the South from attempting to break 
 up the Union, unless they were prepared to con- 
 cede that this was a government in every part of 
 which negroes might be lawfully held in bond- 
 age, and which had for the object of its exist- 
 ence the maintenance and perpetuation of Afri- 
 can slavery.
 
 238 WILLIAM HENRY 8EWARD. 
 
 In this winter of talk Sevvard made a speech, 
 on the 12th of January, in which he endeavored 
 to set before the country a picture drawn 
 in colors as glowing as possible of the ad- 
 vantages of the Union ; to describe what it 
 had done for us, how under it we had grown 
 from feeble colonists to a great nation, happy 
 and prosperous at home, respected and feared 
 abroad; and to contrast with this the result 
 which would follow the dissolution of the gov- 
 ernment into several confederacies, each of 
 which would be unimportant and disregarded ; 
 each would have its own policy, and would 
 endeavor to stipulate with other countries for 
 arrangements advantageous to itself, though in- 
 jurious to its neighbors. Their mutual jeal- 
 ousies would encourage civil wars, which must 
 ultimately result in the loss of their liberties 
 and the destruction of their independent repub- 
 lican governments. Neither North nor South 
 would suffer the other section to possess our 
 entire national domain, nor would any peace- 
 able division of this be possible. The resources 
 of the slave states might be called on to put 
 down risings of the slaves, or possibly to meet 
 invasions of their territory more extensive and 
 formidable than John Brown's attack upon 
 Harper's Ferry. Dissolution would arrest the 
 growth of the country, paralyze its industries
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 239 
 
 and commerce, and substitute for the brilliant 
 constellation of our United States, the feeble 
 light of small groups, or the uncertain glimmer 
 of solitary stars. 
 
 While not even for peace and the mainte- 
 nance of the Union would he make concessions 
 that involved " any compromise of principle or 
 any advantage of freedom," yet he would " meet 
 prejudice with conciliation, exaction with con- 
 cession which surrenders no principle, and vio- 
 lence with the right hand of peace." He sug- 
 gested in the Senate the propositions he had 
 already offered in the committee of thirteen, and 
 urged the immediate admission of Kansas, as 
 settling all that was vital or even important as 
 to the question of slavery in the territories. 
 
 In a second speech a few weeks later he fur- 
 ther explained his position upon this question. 
 The territories of the United States, he said, 
 contained more than a million square miles, over 
 which a slave code had been in force for twelve 
 years; but though during this time the courts, 
 the legislature, and the administration had main- 
 tained and guaranteed slavery there, yet only 
 twenty-four African slaves were to be found in 
 that whole region, one slave for every forty-four 
 thousand square miles. He had, therefore, no 
 further fears as to this great public domain. 
 Slavery there had ceased to be a practical ques- 
 tion.
 
 240 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Afterwards, during this same session, when 
 Colorado, Dakota, and Nevada were carved out 
 of this vast country, the acts organizing them 
 as territories, which were reported by a senator 
 from Missouri, a strong supporter of the Breck- 
 enridge Democracy, and which contained no pro- 
 hibition of slavery, received the votes of such 
 stalwart anti-slavery men as Sumner, Wade, and 
 Chandler of the Senate, and Thaddeus Stevens, 
 Owen Lovejoy, and the radical Republicans in 
 the House ; no one of whom thought it worth 
 while to explain or justify the omission of the 
 proviso prohibiting slavery, which they had so 
 long and hotly contended was of vital impor- 
 tance. 
 
 It was said on the one hand that Seward in 
 these speeches had " surrendered his principles 
 and those of his party to avert civil war and 
 the dissolution of the Union ; " on the other 
 hand he was denounced because he would " give 
 up nothing at all, not even his prejudices or 
 caprices, to save peace and the Union, the most 
 inestimable of all blessings ; " whilst there were 
 others who thanked him for his attempt to save 
 the Union, " without damage to the sacred cause 
 of freedom, and the safeguard of its laws." 
 
 He himself considered the "concessions" in 
 his speech "not compromises but explanations." 
 And as they were substantially only assurances
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 241 
 
 that he was prepared to abide by the Constitu- 
 tion as it was and would not seek to amend or 
 alter it except by a convention duly called for 
 that purpose, his own conclusion may be fairly 
 accepted as correct. 
 
 /To the charge that he had made a Union 
 speech and not an anti-slavery one, Seward re- 
 plied : " Twelve years ago freedom was in dan- 
 ger, and the Union was not. I spoke then so 
 singly for freedom, that short-sighted men in- 
 ferred that I was disloyal to the Union. . . . 
 To-day, practically, freedom is not in danger; 
 and Union is. With the loss of Union all would 
 be lost. Now, therefore, I speak singly for Union, 
 striving if possible to save it peaceably ; if not 
 possible, then to cast the responsibility upon the 
 party of slavery./ For this singleness of speech 
 I am now suspected of infidelity to freedom. In 
 this case, as in the other, I refer myself not to 
 the men of my time, but to the judgment of his- 
 tory." 
 
 Perhaps the clearest insight into Seward's 
 hopes and expectations at this time is to be 
 gained from a letter of Lord Lyons, the British 
 minister at Washington, to Lord John Russell, 
 then secretary' of state for foreign affairs. " Mr. 
 Seward's real view of the state of the country," 
 he writes, " appears to be, that if bloodshed can 
 be avoided until the new government is installed,
 
 242 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the seceding states will in no long time return to 
 the confederation. He seems to think that in 
 a few months the evils and hardships produced 
 by secession will become intolerably grievous to 
 the Southern states ; that they will become 
 completely reassured as to the intentions of the 
 administration, and the conservative element 
 which is now kept under the surface by the 
 violent pressure of the secessionists will emerge 
 with irresistible force. From all these causes he 
 confidently expects that, when elections for the 
 state legislatures are held in November next, 
 the Union party will have a clear majority, and 
 will bring the seceding states back into the 
 confederation. He then hopes to place himself 
 at the head of a strong Union party having 
 extensive ramifications both North and South, 
 and to make ' Union or Disunion,' not * Freedom 
 or Slavery,' the watchword of political parties." 
 
 Seward himself had expressed something of 
 the same thought in the closing passages of his 
 speech at the dinner of the New England So- 
 ciety in New York on the 22d of December, 
 just after he had learned from Weed Mr. Lin- 
 coln's views, the concessions he was willing to 
 make, and his tone toward the South. He 
 said : " The necessities which created this Union 
 are stronger to-day than they were when the 
 Union was cemented; these necessities are as
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 243 
 
 enduring as the passions of men are short lived 
 and effervescent. The cause of secession was as 
 strong on the night of November 6th, when a 
 President and Vice-President were elected who 
 were unacceptable to the slave states, as it has 
 been at any time. Fifty days have passed ; 
 and I believe that every day the sun has set 
 since that time, it has set upon mollified pas- 
 sions and prejudices; and if you will only 
 await the time, sixty more suns will shed a 
 light and illuminate a more cheerful atmos- 
 phere" 
 
 Taken in its connection, the meaning of the 
 passage in italics is obvious. Sixty days more 
 will see the inauguration of a new President, 
 whose administration will dispel doubts, clear 
 the air, purge the government of secessionists 
 and conspirators, and cheer the heart of every 
 loyal lover of the Union. But, wrested from 
 their context, these words were tortured into a 
 prophecy that the war of secession would be at 
 an end in sixty days, and were constantly quoted 
 to show how false a prophet, how blind to the 
 signs of the times, and how untrustworthy a 
 guide Seward was. Even if this had been their 
 real meaning,' he would not have been alone 
 at that time in his opinion that the war, if it 
 came, would be a short one. An observer 
 equally intelligent, with equal, if not superior,
 
 244 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 opportunities of seeing and knowing the actual 
 condition of the South and Southern opinion, 
 General Grant himself, has left on record a 
 statement that during the winter of 1860-61, 
 and indeed until after the battle of Shiloh, he 
 believed that the war would be over in ninety 
 days. 1 
 
 It was not Seward's natural optimism which 
 led him and many others with him to the be- 
 lief that the advent of Lincoln's administration 
 would bring a brighter outlook for the Union. 
 Secession was as yet confined to the cotton and 
 gulf states. It was believed that, unless joined 
 by others, these states alone had not power to 
 break up the Union. In the other slave states 
 there were marked indications of a strong Union 
 feeling; in several, a distinct Union majority. 
 At the North the hope was very generally enter- 
 tained that Lincoln's inaugural and the whole 
 tone of his administration would allay the pas- 
 sions and calm the fears of the people of those 
 slave states that had not passed secession ordi- 
 nances, and that they would remain loyal. But 
 those who had this hope did not reckon upon 
 the strength of the family affections and the 
 wide ramifications of family ties among the dom- 
 inant class in the slaveholding states. They 
 overlooked the natural effect of the slavehold- 
 
 1 Grant's Autobiography, i. p. 222.
 
 THE WINTER OF 1860-61. 245 
 
 ers' loyalty to one another, of their strong sec- 
 tional sympathies and of their fidelity to their 
 supposed common interest in slavery. They for- 
 got the Southerners' dislike to the North, the 
 feeling they had that they were looked down 
 upon as slaveholders, were treated as inferior 
 in civilization and humanity, and the belief, 
 common in the slave states, that Northern in- 
 termeddling with their domestic institutions was 
 the cause of ell their difficulties. Nor did those 
 people who were still hopeful of the Union in 
 any way anticipate the expedients to which the 
 secessionist leaders would resort to drag any 
 doubting state into disunion, or to stifle the 
 voice of the majority when they feared it was 
 against them.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 f 
 
 THE CABINET. FORT SUMTER. 
 
 j 
 
 DURING the winter Mr. Lincoln had endeav 
 ored without success to select some Southern man 
 as a member of his cabinet. When he reached 
 Washington on the 23d of February, there was 
 still one place which was supposed to be open ; 
 and, in the scramble and intriguing for this, 
 there was a moment when it seemed as if Sew- 
 ard would withdraw. The President's decision 
 to nominate Montgomery Blair for this post 
 was no surprise to Seward. The statements of 
 Weed on returning from Springfield in Decem- 
 ber had quite prepared him for this as well 
 as for all the other cabinet appointments. He 
 had no personal objections to Mr. Blair, and 
 no reluctance to serve with him as a colleague. 
 The selection, however, gave great offense not 
 only to the leading Whigs, the most numerous 
 body of Lincoln's supporters, since it left them 
 a minority of the cabinet ministers ; but also 
 to many Republicans of Democratic antecedents, 
 who, while recognizing the ability of the Blairs, 
 both disliked and distrusted them. It was also
 
 THE CABINET. 247 
 
 especially objectionable, for the reasons already 
 given, to the Union men of Maryland, by whom 
 Mr. Blair was not recognized as a Marylander, 
 and of whom, as they were substantially of old 
 Whig stock and descent, Mr. Blair, as a Demo- 
 crat and a stranger, was in no sense a repre- 
 sentative. Under these circumstances, Blair's 
 friends were naturally uneasy, lest the President 
 should for some reason change his mind before 
 the nomination was actually made; and, when 
 rumors of such a change were flying about Wash- 
 ington three or four days before the inaugura- 
 tion, one of these gentlemen, a personal friend 
 of the President, asked him if they were true. 
 Mr. Lincoln answered, " No, if that slate is 
 broken again, it will be at the top." This was 
 where Seward's name stood. 
 
 There can be but little doubt that this speech 
 of the President was at once reported to Sew- 
 ard, and that it had much to do with the abrupt 
 manner in which on the 2d of March he wrote 
 to Mr. Lincoln, thanking him for his kindness 
 and confidence, but declining the office of secre- 
 tary of state. The other considerations inducing 
 him to this course, and of which he speaks in 
 his letter of March 8th, presently to be quoted, 
 may have been in his mind for some time ; but 
 they had not moved him to any definite action. 
 Something of a different nature must have sud-
 
 248 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 denly come to his knowledge, which caused him 
 within forty-eight hours before the inauguration 
 to write to Mr. Lincoln, withdrawing his pre- 
 vious acceptance of the first place in the cabinet. 
 His short note bears quite as strong marks of 
 wounded feelings as of changed convictions. 
 The coldness of its tone is in marked contrast 
 with that of his other letters to the President. 
 
 WASHINGTON, March 2, 1861. 
 
 My DEAR SIR : Circumstances which have 
 occurred since I expressed to you in December 
 last my willingness to accept the office of secre- 
 tary of state seem to me to render it my duty 
 to ask leave to withdraw that consent. 
 
 Tendering to you my best wishes for the suc- 
 cess of your administration, with my sincere and 
 grateful acknowledgments of all your acts of 
 kindness and confidence towards me, I remain 
 very respectfully and sincerely, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 
 
 The Hon. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President-elect. 
 
 Lincoln got this note on Saturday, and on 
 Monday, inauguration day, handed his answer 
 to his secretary, saying that he "could not 
 afford to let Seward take the first trick." This 
 mode of speech, with which the country after-
 
 THE CABINET. 249 
 
 wards became familiar, seemed at the time more 
 undignified and offensive than pithy and ex- 
 pressive ; and many persons found it, in the 
 President of the United States, as unpleasant 
 as it was novel. As Seward did not persist in 
 his refusal, one may be quite sure that the dis- 
 creet secretary did not repeat to him the remark 
 with which the President accompanied the de- 
 livery of the note. Seward was not considering 
 the administration as a game in which he was 
 trying to take the first or any other trick ; nor 
 did he wish his name on a slate which the Presi- 
 dent had any inclination to break ; he was not 
 so hungry for place that he would submit to any 
 indignities, if he might thereby enjoy either the 
 honors or emoluments of office ; he was under 
 no obligations to Lincoln to accept any appoint- 
 ment. The obligation, if there were any, was 
 the other way : Lincoln had taken from Seward 
 the first trick at Chicago, and Seward had done 
 his best to enable him to win the game in the 
 country. He went into the cabinet from no mo- 
 tive less noble than the desire to perform for his 
 country the best public service he could. He 
 might not unreasonably have hesitated about 
 becoming a member of an administration com- 
 posed of such discordant and heterogeneous ma- 
 terials as Mr. Lincoln had got together, a 
 cabinet which the caustic tongue of a veteran
 
 250 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Republican described as " an assortment of rivals 
 whom he had appointed out of courtesy [Seward, 
 Chase, and Cameron], one stump speaker from 
 Indiana [Caleb Smith] , and two representatives 
 of the Blair family [Mr. Bates, for whom Gen- 
 eral Frank Blair was said to be responsible, and 
 Montgomery Blair]." 
 
 After the inauguration Lincoln had a long 
 talk with Seward, who at last agreed to take 
 office, and on the following day was nominated 
 and confirmed as secretary of state. 
 
 In writing home at this time (March 8, 1861), 
 Seward says : " The President is determined that 
 he will have a compound cabinet; and that it 
 shall be peaceful, and even permanent. I was 
 at one time on the point of refusing nay, I did 
 refuse to hazard myself in the experiment. 
 But a distracted country appeared before me, 
 and I withdrew from that position." 
 
 The cabinet, as finally constituted, consisted 
 of Chase, Welles, Cameron, and Blair, Dem- 
 ocrats; Seward, Bates, and Smith, Whigs. 
 Some of these have already been spoken of, and 
 of others there is no occasion to speak. The 
 attorney - general, Edward Bates of Missouri, 
 was known as a gentleman of spotless reputa- 
 tion, as an old conservative Whig of distinct 
 anti-slavery opinions in a state where the hold- 
 ing of such views was as courageous as it was
 
 THE CABINET. 251 
 
 rare, as a man who avoided rather than sought 
 office, and as a respectable rather than an emi- 
 nent lawyer. Mr. Welles was a Democrat from 
 Connecticut. If he had any position or promi- 
 nence in his party, it was practically confined to 
 his own state ; he was not known throughout 
 New England, of which section he was the repre- 
 sentative in the cabinet. He had been a news- 
 paper editor, and held a facile pen, had been 
 in one of the departments at Washington, and 
 postmaster at Hartford ; but he brought to the 
 cabinet neither increased strength within, nor 
 additional support from without. The vigorous 
 and successful administration of the navy dur- 
 ing the war was substantially due to the energy 
 and executive ability of Captain G. V. Fox, the 
 assistant secretary in that department. 
 
 Lincoln, in entering upon the duties of his 
 office, was confronted by problems as appalling 
 and perplexing as any government was ever 
 called upon to face. The seven states which 
 had undertaken to secede and break up the 
 Union had formed their new Confederacy. In 
 the month before Lincoln's inauguration they 
 had elected a President, and adopted a consti- 
 tution, whose fundamental difference from that 
 of the United States was in its provision for 
 the most " ample and avowed protection to prop- 
 erty in slaves." Their government was com-
 
 252 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 plete on paper ; the machinery of their state 
 governments was the same as before the seces- 
 sion ordinances were passed, was in the hands 
 of the same officers, and running on without 
 change. They had banished the sovereignty of 
 the United States from all places within their 
 jurisdiction, except the two forts already spoken 
 of ; the safety of which, insufficiently garrisoned 
 and provisioned as they were, must be at once 
 provided for by the administration, unless they 
 were to be abandoned. 
 
 On the morning after the inauguration, be- 
 fore any member of the cabinet had assumed 
 the duties of office, the War Department com- 
 municated to the President information just re- 
 ceived from Major Anderson at Sumter, stat- 
 ing that he had only a month's provisions, that 
 newly erected hostile batteries commanded his 
 position, that the channels and harbor had been 
 obstructed, that patrol boats and other Con- 
 federate vessels guarded the approaches to his 
 post and watched his every movement ; and 
 that it would take twenty thousand men to re- 
 lieve and hold the fort. General Scott and 
 the other army officers confirmed this opinion. 
 The relief of Fort Pickens was a much simpler 
 affair, if it were only done promptly. But an 
 expedition for Sumter on the scale which these 
 officers thought requisite to insure success was
 
 FORT SUMTER. 253 
 
 simply impossible. The President had at his 
 disposal no forces adequate for such an under- 
 taking. A vague direction to General Scott by 
 word of mouth, that he was " to exercise all pos- 
 sible vigilance for the maintenance of all mili- 
 tary posts, and to call upon the departments for 
 the means necessary for this purpose," and a 
 request to him to reconsider carefully the mat- 
 ter of the relief of Sumter, were all that could 
 be done for the moment. Four days later the 
 whole matter was laid before the cabinet, and 
 on several days following there were consulta- 
 tions with officers of the navy as well as of the 
 army. The latter adhered to their opinion as 
 to the force required to succor and hold Sum- 
 ter ; the former thought that a small expedition 
 of light-draft steamers might successfully carry 
 supplies. The President hesitated. He took 
 from General Scott an order for the evacuation 
 of the fort, but did not sign it ; and on the 
 15th of March he called upon the members of 
 his cabinet to give him in writing their opin- 
 ions, whether, if it were possible to provision 
 Sumter, it would be wise to attempt to do so. 
 The form of the question showed that it was the 
 political rather than the military problem which 
 the President submitted to their consideration. 
 
 Only two members of the cabinet, Chase and 
 Blair, favored the attempt to provision the
 
 254 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 fort, assuming it to be possible to do so. The 
 other five, Seward, Bates, Cameron, Welles, 
 and Smith, were opposed to it. Seward in his 
 answer assumed that " the government was to 
 maintain, preserve, and defend the Union, peace- 
 fully, if it could, forcibly, if it must, to every 
 extremity." It was by our standing on the de- 
 fensive, he thought, that the border states had so 
 far been kept loyal, and a perseverance in this 
 policy was in his opinion the only means of assur- 
 ing their continuing so. He expressed his fear 
 that with a daily press, daily mails, and incessant 
 telegraph, the design to supply the fort would 
 become known in Charleston as soon as prepa- 
 rations should begin, and the garrison fall by as- 
 sault before the expedition could reach the harbor. 
 To obtain more certain and definite informa- 
 tion both as to the condition of Sumter and the 
 existence of any Union feeling in South Caro- 
 lina, the President dispatched to Charleston 
 Captain Eox, the author of the relief plan pro- 
 posed by the navy, and two other gentlemen. 
 Returning before the end of the month they 
 reported that there was but one Union man in 
 Charleston ; and while Captain Fox was more 
 confident than ever of the success of his plan, 
 he had been unable to convince either his com- 
 panion, who visited the fort, or Major Ander- 
 son, that it was in any way a feasible one.
 
 FORT SUMTER. 255 
 
 Just after their return Lincoln received from 
 General Scott a memorandum, advising the 
 abandonment of Fort Pickens, as a measure of 
 conciliation which would soothe the eight re- 
 maining slave states, and render perpetual their 
 cordial adherence to the Union. A cabinet 
 meeting was called, and with this memorandum 
 and all the other information before them, the 
 members of the cabinet gave the President their 
 written opinions as to both forts. Of the seven 
 members of the cabinet who, a fortnight before, 
 had answered his question as to Sumter, Blair 
 had been then the only advocate of the plan for 
 its relief, of which his brother-in-law, Captain 
 Fox, was the author ; though Chase had doubt- 
 fully answered that the fort should be relieved 
 if possible. But now, when the situation of both 
 forts was considered (only six members of the 
 cabinet being present), Chase and Welles joined 
 with Blair; Bates thought Sumter should be 
 " either provisioned or evacuated," and they all, 
 except Blair, were of opinion that Pickens should 
 be reinforced. Having heard the views of his 
 constitutional advisers, the President determined 
 to attempt the relief of Sumter ; and, as he was 
 uneasy at the want of news from Fort Pickens, 
 to which he had previously dispatched a steamer, 
 he resolved to send other vessels there also. The 
 preparations for the Sumter expedition, which
 
 256 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 were made through the Navy Department and 
 followed its usual routine, were more or less 
 guessed at by the public and disclosed in the 
 newspapers. Notice of this expedition was offi- 
 cially communicated to the governor of South 
 Carolina in accordance with an assurance the 
 President had previously authorized to be given, 
 that he would give such information, if it should 
 be decided to provision the fort. But before 
 this notice reached Charleston, two telegrams 
 had already made the plan known ; its precise 
 details had been ascertained by the treacherous 
 rifling of Major Anderson's mail bags. The 
 bombardment began before the first vessel of 
 the relief expedition had reached the rendezvous 
 off Charleston harbor ; a violent storm prevented 
 the arrival of the tugs which were essential to 
 success, and the expedition was a failure. 
 
 Seward has been criticised for detaching and 
 sending to Fort Pickens the Powhatan, which 
 the secretary of the navy had ordered 011 the 
 Sumter expedition. But Seward's responsibil- 
 ity in the matter, if any at all, is very slight. 
 Captain Fox asked for the Pocahontas for 
 Sumter, and the President ordered her to be 
 given him. Mr. Welles substituted the Pow- 
 hatan. The President, knowing nothing of 
 this change, gave to the officer in charge of 
 the Pickens expedition a direct order for the
 
 FORT SUMTER. 257 
 
 Powhatan, and he carried her off. The loss of 
 this vessel did not in fact have anything to do 
 with the failure of the Sumter expedition, the 
 causes of which have been already stated. 
 
 The Fort Pickens expedition succeeded, and 
 gave us during the war the control of that fort, 
 of Key West, and of the Dry Tortugas. This 
 expedition was fitted out under the direct orders 
 of the President without the knowledge of the 
 Navy Department, and the secret was kept so 
 perfectly that the first actual knowledge of it 
 was derived from the report of the commander 
 on his return. This mode of proceeding was, of 
 course, all wrong and irregular, but secrecy was 
 vital to success, and it may well be doubted 
 whether in the then existing condition of affairs 
 secrecy would have been possible had the Navy 
 Department directed or even been cognizant of 
 the preparations. 
 
 The Sumter expedition failed of its ostensible 
 object, but it brought about the Southern attack 
 on that fort. The first gun fired there effectually 
 cleared the air, put an end to discussions and 
 differences of opinion, and placed Lincoln at the 
 head of a united people, resolved, at whatever 
 cost, to maintain the integrity of their country. 
 There were no more doubts or hesitations. The 
 border states chose their sides. The struggle 
 had begun. 

 
 XIV. 
 
 JUSTICE CAMPBELL AND THE REBEL COMMIS- 
 SIONERS. 
 
 AT the time of Lincoln's inauguration there 
 were in Washington commissioners accredited 
 by the " Confederate States of America " to the 
 government of the United States as a foreign 
 power, and instructed to open negotiations " with 
 a view to the recognition of the independence of 
 the Confederacy and the concluding of treaties 
 of amity and good will between the two na- 
 tions." So far as its avowed objects were con- 
 cerned their mission was wholly fruitless. They 
 never saw or had any communication with the 
 President or any member of his cabinet. They 
 lingered in Washington for their own purposes, 
 until on the 8th of April they took from the 
 State Department a copy of a memorandum 
 which Seward, unwilling to give them even such 
 recognition as is implied by the writing of a 
 letter, had filed there on the 15th of March, and 
 which they knew had been waiting for them 
 since that time. In this memorandum he dis- 
 tinctly but civilly declined to receive them, and
 
 THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 259 
 
 gave some reasons for so doing. As they assumed 
 to be foreign ambassadors, they should have 
 addressed themselves in the first instance to the 
 secretary of state; but, feeling doubts as to 
 their reception, they induced a senator from a 
 border state that had not yet seceded, to ask if 
 the secretary would see them informally ; when 
 Seward declined to do this, they sent a formal 
 application, with the final result that has just 
 been stated. This is the whole story of these 
 commissioners, so far as the nominal and de- 
 clared object of their appointment is concerned ; 
 but Southern historians have accused the govern- 
 ment of having adopted " a policy of perfidy " 
 toward them, and Judge John A. Campbell, of 
 Alabama, who still retained his place on the 
 Supreme Court, although he was in fact the in- 
 termediary of the Southern commissioners and 
 Confederate authorities, has devoted much 
 labor to an attempt to prove that Mr. Seward 
 in his intercourse with him was guilty of du- 
 plicity and equivocation. 
 
 Judge Campbell's intervention began in this 
 way. When Seward had written the memoran- 
 dum which has been spoken of, declining to 
 receive the commissioners, he directed a copy 
 of it to be prepared and given them; but be- 
 fore this had been done two justices of the 
 Supreme Court, Nelson of New York, an old ac-
 
 260 WILL I AM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 quaintance and almost neighbor of Seward, and 
 Campbell of Alabama called upon him together. 
 Campbell, it is said, had his resignation already 
 prepared and was to have sent it in on that very 
 day (March 15, 1861). 1 Instead of doing this, 
 however, he had determined to withhold it for 
 a time, that, as he wrote Jefferson Davis, he 
 might avail himself of his position to give him 
 access to the administration, which he could 
 not otherwise have. 2 He probably thought the 
 breaking up of the Union a mistake, and was 
 therefore not a disunionist ; but he was a states- 
 rights Southern Democrat, who believed that his 
 state had a claim on him paramount to any obli- 
 gation which he owed to the United States gov- 
 ernment, whose sworn officer he was. Alabama 
 had seceded, and he meant to follow her. He 
 also believed, however, that if the United States 
 were to abandon Sumter and Pickens and let 
 the Confederacy go its way unmolested, war 
 might be avoided, and a more satisfactory con- 
 clusion of the questions between the two " gov- 
 ernments " be speedily reached. Seward knew 
 nothing of this. He only knew that Campbell 
 was a judge of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States; and if he had harbored any suspicions 
 as to his loyalty, or had felt the need of any 
 
 1 Stanton to Buchanan, March 10, 1861. 
 
 2 April 3, 1861.
 
 THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 261 
 
 assurance of this beyond the guaranty of his 
 official position, any such doubts would have 
 been dispelled, and every requisite assurance 
 given, by his coming as the companion of Judge 
 Nelson, whose support of the government was 
 absolutely unquestioned. 
 
 Seward, Nelson, and Campbell each wished 
 to preserve the existing condition of things, and 
 to postpone as long as possible any outbreak, in 
 the hope that a resort to force might be at last 
 avoided. Their reasons for wishing so and the 
 objects they had in view were, however, quite 
 different. Seward's position and hopes were 
 well known. He thought that if any clash of 
 arms could be postponed until the border states 
 should realize the scrupulous care with which 
 Lincoln would respect and maintain the just 
 rights of the South, they woidd remain loyal, 
 and that secession, confined to the seaboard 
 and gulf states, would fail from its own weak- 
 ness. Nelson dreaded a war, was more doubt- 
 ful as to the legality of some coercive measures 
 which it was rumored that the government might 
 adopt, and feared that, should there be a resort 
 to arms, our constitutional government might 
 perish in the struggle. As to Campbell's posi- 
 tion, perhaps enough has been already said. 
 He considered the Confederacy an established 
 fact ; but he knew that peace was very important
 
 262 WILL 1 AM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 for the new government, and he was willing to 
 work for it in the interests and as the inter- 
 mediary of Jefferson Davis and his cabinet. 1 
 Whether Campbell had seen the commissioners 
 before calling on Seward seems uncertain. His 
 visit with Judge Nelson was made for the pur- 
 pose of inducing Seward to reconsider the mat- 
 ter, and to write to the commissioners, stating 
 the desire of the government for a friendly ad- 
 justment, and saying that " every effort would 
 be made and every forbearance exercised before 
 resorting to extreme measures." This Seward 
 declined to do, and told the judges that the cab- 
 inet would never assent to it. On Seward's 
 part the conversation was frank and friendly; 
 but, considering that Judge Campbell was a 
 Southerner from a seceded state, it was unwise 
 and indiscreet. That there was any difference 
 between Campbell's relations and feeling towards 
 the government and those of Judge Nelson, 
 seems not to have occurred to Seward at the 
 time; certainly no suspicion ever crossed his 
 mind that Campbell was in fact a secessionist 
 going out with his state, but lingering in Wash- 
 ington and keeping his place, that he might 
 better serve the interests of the rebel authorities. 
 It had already been announced half officially 
 in the newspapers that Sumter was to be evacu 
 1 Davis's Message, May 8, 1861.
 
 THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 263 
 
 ated ; 1 and Campbell asked Seward point-blank 
 if this was so. Campbell says that Seward re- 
 plied that Sumter would be evacuated within 
 five days. Leaving Seward, Campbell went at 
 once to the rebel commissioners and reported to 
 them the result of his conversation. He urged 
 them to give a reasonable delay before demand- 
 ing an answer to their request for an interview, 
 telling them that, if they pressed for it at once, 
 they would receive a civil but firm refusal. As 
 to Fort Sumter, he said he felt perfectly con- 
 fident it would be evacuated within five days. 
 The commissioners were not quite open with 
 Campbell ; he found them apparently impatient 
 of delay; they seemed to yield to his wishes 
 reluctantly, and only after they had satisfied 
 themselves that all his information had come 
 from Seward; they required him to put his 
 statement as to Sumter in writing and to sign 
 it. Their reluctance, however, was more appar- 
 ent than real. Their secret instructions were to 
 "play with Seward and gain time," until the 
 South was ready. They meant to make a per* 
 emptory demand for their reception or rejection 
 on the very first day that Jefferson Davis and 
 his cabinet were ready to meet the consequences ; 
 but not till then, if they could avoid it. Camp- 
 
 1 New York Herald, March 10. National Republican, March 
 12, 1861.
 
 264 WILL I AM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 bell's intervention gave them just the excuse they 
 desired. It enabled them to stay in Washing- 
 ton and pick up such crumbs of information 
 and gossip as could be found in the corridors 
 of the hotels or in other places accessible to 
 them, and to secure time for the Confederacy to 
 make the necessary arrangements for the public 
 defense. Their course was approved, and they 
 were instructed to make no formal demand for 
 an answer so long as the United States contin- 
 ued its hesitating, uncertain, and vacillating 
 policy. 
 
 After seeing the commissioners, Campbell 
 the same evening (March 15) wrote to Jefferson 
 Davis : " Before this reaches you Sumter will 
 have been evacuated, or orders will have been 
 issued for the purpose." This he says that 
 Seward authorized him to do ; he also says that 
 he sent to Seward the same evening the substance 
 of the memorandum which he had given to the 
 commissioners. The memorandum and his state- 
 ment as to that are to be found in his letter to 
 Seward of April 13, 1861. The statement that 
 Seward authorized what he wrote to Davis was 
 never made public until after Seward's death. 
 
 The conversation, memorandum, and letter to 
 Davis are all to be referred to the same day 
 (March 15), the very day of the decisive vote in 
 the cabinet (five to two) against holding Sum-
 
 THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 265 
 
 ter ; when Lincoln had already in his possession 
 the order for its evacuation, which only needed 
 his signature. Seward, therefore, had not the 
 slightest doubt that the matter was settled. He 
 communicated to his visitors the confidence he 
 himself felt. It was an unguarded statement on 
 his part, yet not fairly subject to any severe 
 criticism. What Judge Campbell stated, on the 
 faith of what he heard from Seward, he might 
 almost equally well have said upon the faith of 
 what is admitted to have been the almost official 
 utterance of the government organ ; his attempt 
 to torture Seward's statement into a promise 
 and to charge him with duplicity in not carrying 
 it out wrests the words from their natural mean- 
 ing and from the sense in which the judge un- 
 derstood them at the time. He knew perfectly 
 well that it was not in Mr. Seward's power to 
 carry out any policy or to control the situation 
 in any way ; that all that he could do, and all 
 that he was doing, was to communicate to him 
 a conclusion, which he understood to have been 
 reached at the time, but which at any moment 
 before it was acted upon might be reversed, 
 against his own judgment and contrary to his 
 expectation, as in this case it actually was. 
 Moreover, Judge Campbell seems to forget, 
 when he speaks of this statement as a promise, 
 and charges Seward with bad faith in not fui-
 
 266 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 filling it, that a promise necessarily implies 
 two parties who are on opposite sides, and that 
 in charging the secretary with bad faith he as- 
 sumes not merely that he himself was, as after- 
 wards appeared, a rebel emissary, but that he 
 was then known as such to Mr. Seward ; whereas 
 just the reverse is true. It had never occurred 
 to the secretary that he might find under the 
 robes of a United States judge an emissary of 
 Jefferson Davis. The two judges who were 
 present at this interview on the 15th of March 
 seemed to have come on the same errand and 
 were presumed to be in the same position. 
 Mr. Seward's conversation was with both alike ; 
 whatever he said was said to both ; whatever as- 
 surances or promises he made were given to one 
 just as much as to the other ; if he was guilty 
 of any bad faith, he was equally so to both 
 judges. Judge Nelson approved Judge Camp- 
 bell's memorandum which has been quoted, but 
 we have yet to learn that he ever gave to Camp- 
 bell's charges against Seward any countenance 
 or endorsement. 
 
 When five days had gone by, Campbell, whose 
 true relations, if there was still any shadow of 
 doubt about them, were thus made absolutely 
 clear, requested the rebel commissioners to tele- 
 graph Beauregard at Charleston and ascertain 
 what had been done as to vacating Sumter.
 
 THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 267 
 
 Beauregard answered that there had been no 
 change ; and thereupon Judge Campbell, taking 
 Judge Nelson with him, went twice to see Mr. 
 Seward (March 21 and 22) and on the same 
 days wrote for the commissioners two memo- 
 randa giving the results of these interviews. In 
 the first he says that his confidence in the evacu- 
 ation of Sumter is unabated ; in the last, that 
 of March 22d, he repeats this statement, and 
 adds, " I shall have knowledge of any change 
 in the existing status." l At this point Judge 
 Nelson withdrew from further connection with 
 the matter ; he had probably begun to suspect 
 Campbell's real relation to the Confederate au- 
 thorities, and was afraid of being drawn into 
 a false position by continuing to follow him 
 further. Here it becomes important as well 
 as interesting to note the difference in Judge 
 Campbell's language when he speaks of a 
 promise actually made him, and that which he 
 had used in stating his own conclusions from 
 what had been said in conversation. He does 
 not say now that he is convinced he shall have 
 knowledge of any change ; he asserts positively, 
 
 1 In his letter of April 13 to Mr. Seward Judge Campbell 
 attempts to paraphrase this sentence so as to restrict it, and 
 make it mean that as regards Fort Pickens he was to " have 
 notice of any design to alter the existing status there." This 
 is not so in the original memorandum, and this construction 
 is not warranted by the context there.
 
 268 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 " I shall have knowledge of any change in the 
 existing status." This new mode of expression 
 was not accidental ; it corresponded to the new 
 situation. He now for the first time had a 
 promise, which Seward had been authorized by 
 the President to make, and the difference in 
 his phraseology only repeated the difference in 
 Seward's. The President had been informed 
 by Seward of his conversation with Nelson and 
 Campbell on the 15th of March. He had 
 weighed the matter deliberately, and Seward's 
 statement to Campbell on the 22d, that he 
 should " have knowledge of any change in the 
 existing status," embodied, as Mr. Lincoln's 
 biographers tell us, the conclusion which the 
 President himself had reached and which he 
 had authorized Mr. Seward to communicate to 
 Judge Campbell. 
 
 The President was at this time deeply consid- 
 ering his duty with reference to the whole situ- 
 ation and especially as to Sumter. He had said 
 in his inaugural address : " The power confided 
 to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess 
 the property and places belonging to the govern- 
 ment." It might be true that it would require 
 a force greater than he could command to hold 
 Sumter against a hostile attack; and that to 
 send any reinforcements thither might provoke 
 an attack ; the garrison already there was quite
 
 THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 269 
 
 sufficient for a time of peace ; but its provisions 
 were nearly exhausted. Should he undertake to 
 throw in fresh supplies by sea, following a plan 
 which naval officers assured him was practica- 
 ble ; or should he, notwithstanding his public 
 declarations, withdraw the troops, and evacuate 
 the fort without making a single effort to supply 
 the needed provisions? 
 
 To determine this matter to his own satisfac- 
 tion, the President felt that he must have fur- 
 ther and more accurate information, and to ob- 
 tain this he sent to Charleston, as has already 
 appeared, three gentlemen on whose judgment 
 he thought he could rely. One of them, Mar- 
 shal Lamon, besides visiting the fort and see- 
 ing Major Anderson, had an interview with 
 Governor Pickens, in which he made such in- 
 quiries as to the best mode of removing the 
 garrison, and whether they would be permitted 
 to depart in peace, that the governor fancied 
 the evacuation definitely determined on, and was 
 constantly expecting to see signs of preparation 
 for it. Becoming impatient after a few days, 
 he wrote to Beauregard, whom the Confederate 
 authorities had sent to command at Charleston : 
 " If Lamon was authorized to arrange matters, 
 Anderson ought now to say so." Failing to 
 learn anything through Beauregard's inquiries, 
 the governor, on the 30th of March, telegraphed
 
 270 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 to the Confederate commissioners at Washing, 
 ton. They sent at once for their intermediary, 
 who carried the dispatch to Seward on Saturday 
 afternoon and left it, saying that he would 
 return on Monday. When they met on that 
 day, Campbell, after some unimportant talk, 
 asked Seward what he might say to Governdr 
 Pickens on the subject of Sumter. Seward 
 wrote : " The President may desire to supply 
 Fort Sumter, but will not undertake to do so 
 without first giving notice to Governor Pickens," 
 and handed this to Campbell. According to a 
 more detailed narrative of this interview given 
 by Campbell (from whom, it should be ob- 
 served, our only accounts of all these interviews 
 come), Seward, in reply to a further question, 
 stated that he did not believe the attempt to 
 throw in supplies would be made, and that there 
 was no design to reinforce the fort. To which 
 Campbell answered that he had that assurance 
 previously, and added, that it was difficult to 
 restrain South Carolina already, and that he 
 " would not recommend an answer that did not 
 express the purpose of the government." There- 
 upon Seward went out, saying he must see the 
 President ; and returning presently, modified the 
 memorandum so that it read, " I am satisfied 
 the government will not undertake to supply 
 Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor
 
 THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 271 
 
 Pickens." 1 With this, as the definitive reply 
 to his inquiry as to what he "might say to 
 Governor Pickens," Campbell departed ; and 
 the interviews between him and Seward were 
 brought to an end. If there is any substan- 
 tial difference between the two papers written 
 by Seward at this time, it is, that the probabil- 
 ity of an attempt to provision the fort is more 
 strongly suggested by the second, which Camp- 
 bell carried off, than by the first. A person 
 comparing the two, and considering the change 
 of phraseology, might naturally find the expla- 
 nation of it in a more than half-formed, though 
 not fully ripe purpose in the President, by whom 
 the alteration had evidently been made, to en- 
 deavor to supply the garrison of Sumter. 
 
 The day before Campbell went to Seward with 
 the telegram from Governor Pickens the cabi- 
 net had held its second meeting as to Sumter. 
 At this meeting Chase, Welles, and Blair had 
 given their opinions in favor of relieving the 
 fort, by force if necessary, and Bates had stated 
 his conclusion that the time had come either to 
 evacuate or to relieve it, while Seward and Smith 
 thought that it should be abandoned. The Pres- 
 ident had given no definite orders for an expe- 
 dition to Sumter, though he had issued some 
 preparatory directions, which were probably 
 
 1 Campbell to Seward, AprU 13, 1861. Reb. Rec. L Doc. 
 p. 426.
 
 272 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 known only to the secretaries of war and of 
 the navy, who were each necessarily cognizant 
 of them. It is clear from his letter of April 
 1st to the President, which is presently to be 
 spoken of, that Seward either did not know 
 them, or had no belief that they would lead to 
 any consequences. If there was any rumor of 
 these preparations in Washington, it was not 
 sufficient to excite serious uneasiness in the Con- 
 federate commissioners before the 6th of April, 
 the day on which the President gave to Captain 
 Fox his final orders for the Sumter expedition, 
 and sent to Charleston a confidential messenger 
 with the promised notice to Governor Pickens of 
 his intention to provision the fort. 
 
 By the morning of Sunday, April 7th, however, 
 the commissioners had become so disturbed that 
 they again invoked Campbell's assistance ; he at 
 once wrote to Seward and received from him this 
 brief reply: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept; 
 wait and see." This of course meant that notice 
 had been given to the governor, as agreed, of 
 the attempt to provision the fort, and that 
 Campbell, if he would only wait, would see this. 
 It is evident that Campbell at the time so under- 
 stood it, for on the same day, after receiving this 
 line from Seward, he wrote the commissioners, 
 " I believe that my assurances to you that the 
 government will not undertake to supply Sumter
 
 TEE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 273 
 
 without notice to Governor Pickens will be fully 
 sustained by the event." A further extract 
 from the draft of a letter written by him on the 
 same day will show that, while he knew and 
 shared the common opinion in Washington as to 
 the uncertainties and vacillations of the admin- 
 istration, he also anticipated what was to be its 
 ultimate decision as to Sumter. He says : " Such 
 government by blindman's-buff, stumbling along 
 too far, will end by the general overturn. Fort 
 Sumter, I. fear, is a case past arrangement." 
 
 The same Sunday evening at nine o'clock 
 the commissioners' secretary called at Seward's 
 house to ask that the answer to their request for 
 an interview, which they knew had been waiting 
 their pleasure at the State Department for more 
 than three weeks, might be delivered to them at 
 two o'clock the next day. This was done. On 
 the 9th of April, they sent to Mr. Seward a reply, 
 which had previously been submitted to Judge 
 Campbell and modified at his request, and on 
 the llth they left Washington. They had 
 gained the delay which they were instructed to 
 obtain. If their hopes of a peaceful solution of 
 their difficulties by the administration's aban- 
 donment of Sumter and Pickens seem to have 
 been at times somewhat too sanguine, and their 
 communications to the Confederate authorities 
 too rose-colored, yet their telegram of March
 
 274 WILLIAM HENRY Si: WARD. 
 
 22d " And, what is of infinite importance 
 to us, notice will be given of any change in 
 the existing status " shows that they them- 
 selves were not over-confident of the fulfillment 
 of their own prophecies of evacuation and of 
 peace. Jefferson Davis and his cabinet never 
 put any faith in these. On the 1st of March the 
 Confederate secretary of war wrote to Beaure- 
 gard at Charleston : " Give but little credit to 
 the rumors of an amicable adjustment. Do not 
 slacken for a moment your energies ; " and this 
 represents the attitude and action of the author- 
 ities at Montgomery from that time forward. 
 
 The news of the bombardment of Sumter 
 reached Washington on the 12th of April ; the 
 next day Campbell addressed to Seward a let- 
 ter complaining that the equivocating conduct 
 of the administration was the proximate cause 
 of this great calamity. To this letter Seward 
 properly made no reply. A week later Campbell 
 inclosed a copy of it in another communication, 
 in which he said that he insisted upon an expla- 
 nation, adding that in case of refusal he should 
 not hold himself debarred from placing these 
 letters before such persons as were entitled to an 
 explanation from him. This letter also remained 
 unanswered. Shortly afterwards Campbell gave 
 his own version of the whole matter to Stanton, 
 who was by no means inclined at this period to
 
 THE REBEL COMMISSIONERS. 275 
 
 a favorable opinion of the administration or of 
 Seward ; but who, after hearing Campbell's whole 
 story, wrote to Buchanan that he did not believe 
 any deceit or double dealing could be justly 
 imputed to Seward, that he had no doubt that 
 Seward believed that Sumter would be evacu- 
 ated, as he stated it would be ; but that the war 
 party overruled him. With Judge Campbell's 
 later statements, founded upon his recollections 
 after the lapse of ten years, there is no need to 
 concern ourselves ; so far as they conform to the 
 contemporary records they are unimportant, so 
 far as they modify them they are less trust- 
 worthy. Nor is this the place to discuss what 
 must be regarded by many people, whatever 
 may have been his motives, as Judge Campbell's 
 equivocal and unfortunate position in the whole 
 affair. As a historical episode, the incidents have 
 but little importance, though they are not devoid 
 of interest as the story of a single Southern in- 
 trigue, as the basis of a serious accusation against 
 Seward they seem to justify this somewhat full 
 statement of them. It is difficult to understand 
 how, fairly considered, they could ever have 
 been thought inconsistent with perfectly simple 
 and straightforward dealing on his part in the 
 whole matter, or why he should not be fully 
 exonerated from any suspicion of bad faith at 
 any point in the transactions.
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 LETTER OP APRIL 1ST TO THE PRESIDENT.- 
 THE BLOCKADE. 
 
 SEWARD'S first month as secretary of state 
 svas not to close without another incident, of no 
 great importance except as it throws light on 
 the state of the times, the characters of both 
 the President and secretary, and their relations 
 to each other. 
 
 On the 1st of April he submitted to Mr. Lin- 
 coln a paper entitled " Some Thoughts for the 
 President's Consideration," in which he stated, 
 that at the end of a month's administration we 
 were " without a policy, either domestic or for- 
 eign." But, though he admitted this condition 
 to have been unavoidable, the presence of the 
 Senate and the pressure of the office-seekers 
 having prevented attention to graver matters, 
 any further delay to adopt and prosecute our 
 policies for both domestic and foreign affairs, 
 would, he said, not only bring scandal upon the 
 administration, but danger upon the country. 
 
 As to domestic policy, he suggested that " we 
 must change the question before the public from
 
 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. 277 
 
 one upon slavery, or about slavery, for a ques- 
 tion upon union or disunion." The occupation 
 or evacuation of Fort Sumter being regarded as 
 a slavery or party question, although it was not 
 so in fact, he " would terminate it, as a safe 
 means of changing the issue ; " and he deemed it 
 " fortunate that the last administration created 
 the necessity." He would reinforce and defend 
 all the forts in the gulf, have the navy recalled 
 from foreign stations to be prepared for a block- 
 ade, and put Key West under martial law. 
 
 As to foreign nations, he " would demand 
 explanations from Spain and France categori- 
 cally, at once ; " and would convene Congress 
 and declare war against them, if the explana- 
 tions were unsatisfactory ; he would also " seek 
 explanations from Great Britain and Russia, 
 and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Cen- 
 tral America to rouse a vigorous continental 
 spirit of independence on this continent against 
 European intervention." " But," he added, 
 "whatever policy we adopt, there must be an 
 energetic prosecution of it. It must be some- 
 body's business to pursue and direct it inces- 
 santly. Either the President must do it him- 
 self, and be all the while active in it, or devolve 
 it on some member of his cabinet. It is not 
 in my especial province, but I neither seek to 
 evade nor assume responsibility."
 
 278 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 This paper was evidently written before Sew- 
 ard knew that the President had definitely de- 
 termined on the expeditions to either fort. 1 It 
 is an extraordinary document in any point of 
 view. Its suggestions as to foreign policy would 
 have been wild at any time. In a period of 
 domestic peace and prosperity, to invite the ill 
 will of all the European powers at once, and 
 to encourage the other countries of America to 
 do the same, would have been a mad scheme. 
 But that any cabinet minister, when his coun- 
 try was distracted by domestic difficulties which 
 threatened its destruction, when its treasury was 
 bankrupt, its navy scattered, its army a mere 
 handful of men, and the majority of its offi- 
 cers, both naval and military, of doubtful fidelity 
 or confessed disloyalty, and when an absolute 
 peace and a friendly understanding with all 
 other countries was essential to its safety, should 
 propose to throw down the gauntlet to the 
 most powerful of the civilized nations, is in- 
 comprehensible. It is obvious that the sugges- 
 tions as to foreign policy came from the be- 
 lief that a foreign war, or the prospect of one, 
 would unite all our people, divert the attention 
 of the South, give a new direction to the ex- 
 
 1 The first orders as to the Pickens expedition were issued 
 on the afternoon of April 1. The decisive ones as to Sumter, 
 April 4.
 
 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. 279 
 
 citement there, and put an end for the moment 
 to all schemes of secession. But that Seward 
 should have entertained this idea only shows 
 how blind he was to the signs of the times ; 
 how his very nearness to the troubles prevented 
 his seeing what was clear to more distant ob- 
 servers, that, while the politicians at Wash- 
 ington were "vacillating between compromise 
 and resistance, in the South there had been one 
 steady, uninterrupted progress toward secession 
 and war." 
 
 As a statement of the extreme need of a 
 domestic policy, and yet of its entire absence, 
 Seward's paper only repeated the common talk 
 of the time, the language of the newspaper 
 press and the opinions contained in the pri- 
 vate letters not merely of ordinary observers, but 
 of well-informed and sensible persons. Gen- 
 eral Dix wrote about this time : " When I left 
 Washington Saturday last (March 23), I do 
 not think the administration had any settled pol- 
 icy. It was merely drifting with the current, 
 at a loss to know whether it were better to come 
 to anchor or set sail ; " and a month later one 
 of the most distinguished of Lincoln's cabinet, 
 Mr. Chase, thought that the President, in lieu 
 of any policy, had " merely the general notion 
 of drifting, the Micawber policy of waiting for 
 something to turn up."
 
 280 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Seward had already made the suggestion that 
 the issue before the country should be put as a 
 question of union or disunion, rather than as 
 a dispute about slavery. It was of the first 
 importance that this should be done, if people 
 at the North of all shades of political opinion, 
 from the Breckenridge Democrats and those 
 Whigs who in the last election had voted for 
 Bell of Tennessee, to the most radical Republi- 
 cans, were to be united in support of the govern- 
 ment. The difficulty was how to effect this; 
 but we had not long to wait for a solution of 
 the problem ; the seceding states determined it 
 for us. To the great mass of the Northern 
 people the situation was wholly changed by 
 the attack on Sumter. To their minds it was 
 no longer a question whether we should coerce 
 the South; but whether we should see the na- 
 tional flag insulted, national troops fired on, a 
 national fort besieged and captured, and tamely 
 submit to it. To this question there could be 
 but one answer. 
 
 Lincoln's reply to Seward's memorandum 
 was eminently characteristic, tactful, and. judi- 
 cious. It dealt with the several points of the 
 paper, but as a rule did not combat them di- 
 rectly. To use one of the President's favorite 
 illustrations, he ploughed round the log rather 
 than attempted to go through it. To the clos-
 
 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. 281 
 
 ing suggestion that some one must devote him- 
 self to pursuing the policy determined on, he 
 replied that, if any one were to do this, the 
 President must be the person. Having sent his 
 answer, he put the paper away and never spoke 
 of it; its existence was wholly unknown until 
 after his death and its publication by his biogra- 
 phers. 
 
 That Seward should have made suggestions 
 to Mr. Lincoln is not extraordinary : his doing 
 so could hardly be called an impropriety, even if 
 it were not within the strict line of his duty as 
 a cabinet minister. Mr. Chase did exactly the 
 same thing ; and other people, not merely men 
 in public stations, but private citizens, were at 
 this period profuse of their advice to the Presi- 
 dent. The state of the times and their patriotic 
 motives were their justification or excuse. The 
 unpleasant tone of Seward's suggestions is to be 
 regretted ; they have an impatient sound ; the 
 whole memorandum seems censorious rather than 
 advisory; it bears evidence of the extremely 
 high pressure under which he had been living 
 for months, and the state of nervous tension 
 produced by the anxiety and suspense of the 
 winter. This must be the explanation of itr 
 closing paragraph. Its suggestion that Lincoln 
 ought either personally to discharge the duties 
 of his office, or devolve them on some one else,
 
 282 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 would have quite justified the President in ask- 
 ing for his resignation. He did nothing of the 
 sort ; so far as is known the matter was never 
 alluded to by either of them ; it never chilled 
 their relations to each other. Seward gave to 
 Lincoln his tireless industry and his undivided 
 influence, with a sincere and devoted personal 
 attachment ; and Lincoln recognized his strength 
 and his services, and repaid them with a perfect 
 and unwavering trust. 1 
 
 Something has already been said of the con- 
 dition of our public service at the beginning of 
 Lincoln's administration. But it is quite im- 
 possible for any one not at that time in active 
 life to realize the extent of the disintegration 
 and demoralization which then prevailed in 
 every department. The civil service contained 
 many men who thought the betrayal of their 
 trusts no shame. The South found its most dis- 
 tinguished officers in deserters from our army 
 and navy. Before the close of Buchanan's ad- 
 ministration one of our generals had not only 
 treacherously surrendered to the secessionists the 
 public property of the United States confided 
 to his charge, but had attempted to carry with 
 him into the rebel service the troops under his 
 command. Another officer, whose loyalty was 
 not put to the test till later, received and trans- 
 i N. & H. iii. p. 449.
 
 THE BLOCKADE. 283 
 
 mitted the orders for the disposition of the 
 troops when there were apprehensions of a night 
 attack on Washington, and the same evening fled 
 and joined the hostile forces. In the diplomatic 
 and consular services there were men who, while 
 holding the commission of the United States, 
 negotiated purchases of arms for the rebels, and 
 others who assisted their cause by more indi- 
 rect and less conspicuous means. Four, certainly, 
 of Buchanan's foreign ministers returned home 
 only to accept commissions in the Southern 
 army, and one of these had not even the com- 
 mon excuse of going with his state, for his state 
 never seceded. In his instructions to Mr. 
 Adams, written a day or two before the attack 
 on Sumter, Seward gives a vivid and forcible 
 picture of the situation : 
 
 " The party which was dominant in the fed- 
 eral government during the period of the last 
 administration embraced practically and held in 
 universal communion all disunionists and sympa- 
 thizers. It held the executive administration. 
 The secretaries of the treasury, war, and the 
 interior were disunionists. The same party held 
 a large majority in the Senate, and nearly equally 
 divided the House of Representatives. Disaf- 
 fection lurked, if it did not openly avow itself, 
 in every department and in every bureau, in 
 every regiment and in every ship of war, in the
 
 284 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 post office and in the custom house, and in 
 every legation and consulate from London to 
 Calcutta. Of four thousand four hundred and 
 seventy officers in the public service, civil and 
 military, two thousand one hundred and fifty- 
 four were representatives of states where the 
 revolutionary movement was openly advocated 
 and urged, even if not actually organized." . . . 
 The new administration " found the disunionists 
 perseveringly engaged in raising armies and lay- 
 ing sieges around national fortifications situate 
 within the territory of the disaffected states. 
 The federal marine seemed to have been scat- 
 tered everywhere except where its presence was 
 necessary, and such of the military forces as 
 were not in the remote states and territories 
 were held back from activity by vague and mys- 
 terious armistices, which had been informally 
 contracted by the late President or under his 
 authority, with a view to postpone conflict . . . 
 at least until the waning term of his adminis- 
 tration should reach its appointed end. Com- 
 missioners . . . sent by the new Confederacy 
 were already at the capital demanding recogni- 
 tion of its sovereignty, and a partition of the 
 national property and domain. The treasury, 
 depleted by robbery and peculation, was ex- 
 hausted, and the public credit was prostrate. 
 " The period of four months, which inter-
 
 THE BLOCKADE. 285 
 
 vened between the election which designated the 
 head of the new administration and its advent, 
 . . . assumed the character of an interregnum, 
 in which not only were the powers of the govern- 
 ment paralyzed, but even its resources seemed 
 to disappear and be forgotten." 
 
 From the time when his secretary of state 
 transmitted to our ministers abroad Buchanan's 
 message of December, 1860, which contained 
 the statement that in his opinion secession was 
 a revolutionary, not a constitutional right ; but 
 that the federal government had no power to 
 interfere with, restrain or coerce any state at- 
 tempting to carry out this revolution, until the 
 28th of February, 1861, less than a week before 
 Lincoln's inauguration, no general instructions 
 as to their duties in the grave crisis through 
 which we were passing were issued to our for- 
 eign ministers. During this whole period the 
 pernicious doctrines of this message, which gave 
 to secession all the countenance and encourage- 
 ment its friends could expect, were permitted 
 to make their way unchecked throughout the 
 various countries of Europe, encouraging their 
 rulers in the belief that the ill contrived govern- 
 mental machine, the United States, which its 
 own President declared to be held together only 
 by the mutual consent of its several parts, was 
 fast falling to pieces, if indeed it were not
 
 286 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 already broken up. At length, after this long 
 silence, but not until the very close of his official 
 term, the Democratic secretary of state wrote to 
 our representatives abroad a circular, in which, 
 after reiterating Buchanan's declaration that 
 there was no constitutional right of secession, 
 and stating again the sectional character of the 
 election and the consequent apprehensions of the 
 defeated party, he instructed our ministers that 
 the President expected them to use such means 
 as might in their judgment be necessary and 
 proper to prevent the success of any attempts 
 to secure from the European powers the recog- 
 nition of the new Confederation, declaring that 
 such an acknowledgment by any European gov- 
 ernment would tend to disturb the friendly re- 
 lations existing between that country and our 
 own. 
 
 One of Seward's first acts on entering upon 
 the duties of his office was to endeavor to re- 
 inforce the somewhat formal and perfunctory 
 directions of this dispatch, and to counteract its 
 statement of the issues and results of the elec- 
 tion, a statement which seemed to half apolo- 
 gize for the conduct of the seceding states. For 
 this purpose he wrote a circular dispatch more 
 bold and vigorous in tone, in which he inclosed 
 Lincoln's inaugural address. In this circular 
 he expressed his entire confidence in the main-
 
 TEE BLOCKADE. 287 
 
 tenance of the Union, and strove to impress 
 foreign powers with the conviction that its per- 
 petuity was more for their advantage than its 
 division into several distinct nationalities would 
 be ; while he also counseled our ministers that 
 they must exercise the greatest possible dili- 
 gence to prevent the designs of those who would 
 invoke foreign intervention to embarrass or over- 
 throw the republic. 
 
 To purge our diplomatic and consular ser- 
 vice of all persons whose loyalty was uncertain 
 was, however, his most urgent duty; in many 
 cases it was not enough that our representatives 
 abroad should " speak only the language of truth 
 and loyalty, and of confidence in our institutions 
 and destiny," but it was of the utmost conse- 
 quence that they should be persons selected with 
 especial regard to their ability and fitness for 
 the posts assigned them. It could hardly be 
 expected that Lincoln, who not unnaturally 
 considered our difficulties as a domestic quarrel 
 with which foreign nations had no concern, 
 should be so keenly alive to the importance of 
 these nominations as was Seward ; but he soon 
 brought himself to attach more weight to fitness 
 than to pressure in his selection from the candi- 
 dates proposed, and was willing to accept the 
 responsibility for several of them being "hud- 
 dled up and coming from a small section of the
 
 288 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 country." There may have been differences of 
 opinion between the President and secretary as 
 to who would best fill some of the vacant places ; 
 but the appointments were as a rule exception- 
 ally good, and the one which we know from the 
 President's own statement to have been made at 
 Seward's pressing instance and on his responsi- 
 bility, that of Mr. Adams to England, as it was 
 the most important, proved the wisest possible. 
 
 With the actual outbreak of the rebellion, the 
 mode of dealing with our Southern ports be- 
 came a matter of the first importance, requiring 
 an immediate decision. To leave them open to 
 commerce, as they were, was out of the question. 
 It would enable the seceding states, by the export 
 and sale of their cotton, to raise money to sustain 
 the insurrection, and would allow the unrestricted 
 importation of all sorts of arms, equipments and 
 munitions of war, as well as of such articles of 
 daily use as those states did not themselves man- 
 ufacture. Two ways of closing these ports were 
 suggested. One was their discontinuance as 
 ports of entry, so that any vessel landing her 
 cargo there would violate the laws of the United 
 States. This course had the advantage of ease 
 and simplicity. It required only a notice from 
 the Executive that Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, 
 New Orleans, and the other Southern cities where 
 there had been United States custom houses,
 
 THE BLOCKADE. 289 
 
 were no longer ports of entry. It had this dis- 
 advantage, that if any vessel paid no heed to 
 the notice, and ran in with her cargo, she had 
 simply violated a revenue law, and could only 
 be punished by proceedings in a federal court 
 of the state and district where the offense was 
 committed; and all these courts were in the 
 hands of the insurgents. There were also well 
 grounded apprehensions that other nations would 
 consider the closing of the ports by proclama- 
 tion an evasive attempt to establish a paper 
 blockade, would certainly remonstrate against 
 it, and would probably disregard it; and that 
 it would therefore be wholly ineffectual. 1 The 
 other method was an actual blockade. The ad- 
 vantages of this were, that, as it closed the ports 
 by physical force, it must necessarily break up 
 foreign commerce, and that any vessel violating 
 it could be captured and condemned as prize 
 in any Admiralty Court of the United States, 
 or in that of any foreign country, with the assent 
 of its government. The objections urged against 
 it were, that a blockade was strictly an act of 
 war, and that to proclaim it would either con- 
 
 1 These apprehensions were subsequently shown to be well 
 founded. When Congress in the summer of 186 1 passed a law 
 authorizing the President to close the Southern ports by pro- 
 clamation, it was at once made a subject of remonstrance by 
 both England and France, though nothing whatsoever had been 
 done under it.
 
 290 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 vert the insurgents into enemies and the domes- 
 tic insurrection into a war ; or that the blockade 
 would be declared unlawful by the courts, and 
 vessels violating it could not therefore be con- 
 demned ; that no nation had ever attempted to 
 establish so extensive a blockade, and that we 
 had no naval force at all adequate for the pur- 
 pose. 
 
 Seward was earnest in advocating a blockade, 
 and it has been said by one of his associates in 
 the cabinet that he was principally responsible 
 for the adoption of this alternative. The wisdom 
 of this course was amply justified by the result. 
 The legal objection turned out to be unsound, 
 the supreme court deciding that a blockade of 
 their coast was a legitimate mode of dealing with 
 insurgents. The practical difficulties proved to 
 have been exaggerated ; the coast was extensive, 
 but the important harbors were few. The validity 
 of the blockade was never seriously questioned ; 
 and as it became continually more effective, it 
 more and more crippled, and in the end prac- 
 tically destroyed all foreign commerce at the 
 South, cutting off both their resources and sup- 
 plies for carrying on the military operations of 
 the rebellion. Of the two million four hundred 
 thousand bales of cotton, the crop of 1861, the 
 largest part of which should have found its way 
 across the Atlantic by the summer of 1862, only
 
 THE BLOCKADE. 291 
 
 about fifty thousand bales ever reached Europe, 
 of which England received the lion's share. In 
 December of that year (1862) one of the Con- 
 federate cabinet ministers spoke of " the almost 
 total cessation of foreign commerce for the last 
 two years " as producing a " complete exhaustion 
 of the supply of all articles of foreign growth 
 and manufacture ; " and this statement was con- 
 firmed by Lord Russell's almost simultaneous 
 declaration, that " the United States were ena- 
 bled by the blockade to intercept and capture 
 a great part of the warlike supplies which were 
 destined to the Confederate States from Great 
 Britain."
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 ENGLAND'S RECOGNITION OF THE CONFEDER- 
 ATE8 AS BELLIGERENTS. 
 
 BEFORE the breaking out of the rebellion the 
 question of the probable attitude of the great 
 European powers, in case of the government's 
 resort to force to maintain the Union, had occa- 
 sioned no uneasiness at the North. If there was 
 any public opinion there on the matter, it was 
 hardly more than a vague notion that we should 
 be left to settle our own quarrel in our own way, 
 the North, as representing the cause of free- 
 dom and of legitimate government, having the 
 sympathy of civilized Europe, while the South 
 would labor under the odium of having stirred up 
 a rebellion solely for the purpose of perpetuating 
 and extending African slavery. The tone of the 
 foreign newspapers warranted this belief. In 
 leading articles which showed their writers to 
 be familiar with our Constitution and the rela- 
 tions between the federal and state governments, 
 any attempt to destroy the Union, whether by 
 individuals or by states, was declared to be 
 treason.
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 293 
 
 The South was at the same time warned that 
 a proposal to intervene in their behalf in a 
 struggle against the Union would be scouted 
 nowhere with more scorn and indignation than 
 in those districts of England which would most 
 benefit by free trade with the United States ; 
 that the dissolution of the Union, so far from 
 being hailed as a profitable transaction, would 
 be lamented ; and that any policy would mis- 
 carry, which assumed that England could be 
 coaxed or bribed into a connivance at the exten- 
 sion of slavery. The English government was in 
 the hands of the Liberals, the party of reform, 
 the authors and advocates of an extended suf- 
 frage, and of the emancipation of the slaves in 
 the British West Indies. No important ques- 
 tions were open between this country and Great 
 Britain, and the North assumed that, as it would 
 in any event remain the United States of Amer- 
 ica, the friendly relations then existing would 
 not be interrupted. The French emperor had 
 been, it was thought, especially cordial in his 
 expressions of good will to the United States at 
 his New Year's diplomatic reception (January 
 1, 1861), and the French press had expressed 
 its hopes for the safety of the great American 
 Republic and the gradual diminution of slavery. 
 There was a prevailing notion that the French 
 would feel a decided sentiment of regret at the
 
 294 WILLIAM HENRY SEWASD. 
 
 disintegration of that Union, which France had 
 so largely aided to establish, and that the seced- 
 ing states would meet at her hands nothing but 
 discouragement. 
 
 At the South, on the contrary, the confidence 
 of the leaders in their speedy recognition as an 
 independent nation inspired them with a con- 
 viction of success, and encouraged them to has- 
 ten the work of secession. They argued that 
 Cotton was King, and that the loss of their 
 great staple would cause such distress and dis- 
 affection in the manufacturing districts of both 
 England and France that the two governments 
 would be forced to insist that any war which 
 interfered with its production and free expor- 
 tation should cease. They also relied on the 
 cupidity of the European commercial world, to 
 which they proposed to offer the bribe of free 
 trade, while they would exclude the North from 
 their markets as a punishment, if their peace- 
 able secession should be opposed. 
 
 The course of events in the winter and early 
 spring of 1861 had a marked effect on Euro- 
 pean opinion. First came Buchanan's declara- 
 tion that there was nowhere any power to 
 prevent the withdrawal of any state from the 
 Union. This was followed, during the re- 
 mainder of his administration, by an inaction 
 which was broken only by an abortive attempt
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 295 
 
 to reinforce Sumter, when the steamer carry- 
 ing the troops was fired on by South Caro- 
 lina militia. The federal government tamely 
 submitted to the insult and made no further 
 attempt to strengthen the garrison, while the 
 people seemed to accept the situation with 
 tranquillity. In Congress nothing was done 
 to prepare for the emergency of a forcible re- 
 sistance to the federal authority, and Northern 
 statesmen and newspapers were earnestly 'ad- 
 vocating concessions and peace. During the 
 month after Lincoln's inauguration there were 
 no signs of any more vigorous policy ; the gov- 
 ernment was apparently still hesitating and 
 drifting. On the other hand, the secessionists 
 had been making steady and regular advances. 
 The Southern states had formed a new Con- 
 federacy, organized its government and elected 
 its officers, had ousted the United States from 
 all jurisdiction over its territory, and by the 
 seizure of forts, arsenals, custom houses and 
 mints, had turned against the federal govern- 
 ment its own strongholds, arms, and resources. 
 The Confederate soldiers were being drilled, 
 instructed, and commanded by officers who had 
 abandoned the government that had trained 
 and educated them; and the work of organ- 
 izing and administering the civil affairs of 
 the Confederacy was in the hands of experi-
 
 296 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 enced public men, who had hardly ceased to 
 hold office under the United States. 
 
 The South was an oligarchy; the people were 
 accustomed to follow their leaders, and were 
 not so sluggish and reluctant to move as the 
 masses of the free states. The South was 
 roused and in earnest, the North still apathetic 
 and inert. When Suniter was attacked, it was 
 generally believed in Europe that the Union 
 was at an end, that the South had practically 
 secured its independence, and that the North 
 would soon admit this. With most of the 
 European governments the result was a matter 
 of comparative indifference ; but with England 
 and France this was not so ; the prospect that 
 this great republic might break in pieces was 
 soon followed by a wish that it would do so. 
 The vast majority of the great governing classes 
 in England thought that the division of the 
 United States would be a fresh proof of the 
 inability of a republican government to weather 
 a storm, and would therefore give additional 
 strength and stability to their own institutions. 
 Some of them, who had condemned African slav- 
 ery as a foul blot upon this country, excused 
 their support of the slaveholders' rebellion by 
 insisting that the South was fighting for inde- 
 pendence, the North for supremacy. The mill 
 owners and manufacturers of both countries
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 29? 
 
 were anxious lest a war between the sections 
 should bring on a cotton famine and the dis- 
 tress which would accompany it ; and the appre- 
 hension of this probably had the greatest effect 
 in determining the attitude of France at the 
 outset of the struggle. Perhaps the feeling 
 prevalent among the average Englishmen, that 
 the Americans were a boastful and conceited 
 people, and that it would do them no harm to 
 have their pride taken down though it may 
 not have shaped the government's policy had 
 more effect than any other cause upon the tone 
 and attitude of most of the English press, which 
 changed from that of friendliness towards the 
 North to bitter hostility and brutal and con- 
 temptuous sneers. 
 
 Seward possessed a certain knowledge of 
 Europe; he had traveled there and met some 
 of the leading statesmen ; he had served on the 
 Senate's committee on foreign affairs, and knew 
 the diplomatic relations between this country 
 and the great European powers; he was from 
 the state of New York, had long been interested 
 in the development of the commercial connec- 
 tions of its metropolis with foreign countries, 
 and knew the extent and closeness of these con- 
 nections with both England and France, and 
 especially with the former. What complications 
 might arise abroad, growing out of our difficul-
 
 298 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ties at home, he could not foresee ; but it was 
 evident that the seceding states would make all 
 possible efforts to obtain recognition as a nation, 
 and were entirely confident of their speedy suc- 
 cess. He thoroughly realized the necessity of 
 our being represented abroad by our ablest and 
 fittest men, especially in England, where he 
 expected the Confederacy would make its first 
 and most strenuous appeal, and would not cease 
 to renew its efforts so long as a possibility of 
 hope remained. 
 
 Early in the spring Jefferson Davis had sent 
 abroad commissioners to negotiate for the recog- 
 nition of the Confederacy; but their presence 
 in England seemed to furnish no cause for 
 anxiety, as we were still confident of the good 
 will of both its government and people, and had 
 moreover the assurance of Lord John Russell, 
 the secretary of state for foreign affairs, that 
 " the coming of Mr. Adams would doubtless be 
 regarded as the appropriate occasion for finally 
 discussing and determining the question" of 
 the attitude to be taken by Great Britain to- 
 wards the rebellion. The Confederate agents 
 baited their hooks judiciously, and had the au- 
 dacity to tell Lord John that it was not any 
 apprehensions as to slavery, but the protective 
 tariff on which the North insisted, that had 
 made it necessary for the Southern states to
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 299 
 
 secede, since free trade was essential to their 
 prosperity. It was not believed at the time in 
 this country that this assertion could impose 
 upon any one, or have any effect, unless its 
 flagrant disregard of truth should excite a smile. 
 No importance was attached to it, for neither 
 our government nor people were at all prepared 
 to believe that Great Britain's policy towards us 
 was to be that of a nation of shop-keepers, who 
 would justify their course by saying that, though 
 they objected to slavery, they wanted cotton, and 
 they disliked the Morrill tariff. 
 
 Seward's first serious anxiety as to our foreign 
 relations was caused by learning through Russia, 
 that the French Emperor had proposed to Eng- 
 land that they should act in concert in their 
 course towards this country, and that England 
 had assented ; that Russia had been invited to 
 join this league, and had declined; but that 
 it was confidently expected that the smaller 
 European powers, and those having less interest 
 in the matter, would follow the lead of France 
 and England. This intelligence showed him 
 that our quarrel was not considered only our 
 own affair ; that we were not to be permitted to 
 settle it in our own way ; but were possibly to 
 be threatened with a combined pressure from 
 the European powers, which we could not resist, 
 and which might ultimately force us to acquiesce
 
 300 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 in the breaking up of the Union. Upon learning 
 this arrangement, Seward immediately took the 
 only means in his power of averting the difficulty, 
 by notifying our ministers that this government 
 would not recognize any such understanding be- 
 tween France and England, and would decline 
 to receive any communications as joint proposals 
 from these two, or any two or more countries. 
 He adhered to this resolve when, later in the 
 year 1861, the British and French ministers 
 called upon him together to present a joint offer 
 of mediation ; he insisted on receiving them in 
 separate interviews at different times, and dis- 
 cussing each proposition as if it were a distinct 
 matter, wholly unconnected with the other. 
 
 The knowledge of the agreement between 
 these two great powers had not at all prepared 
 Seward for the first decided step taken by them 
 together; or it is perhaps more exact to say, 
 that the statement of Lord John Russell already 
 quoted had given him absolute confidence that 
 nothing would be done until Mr. Adams had 
 arrived and had the opportunity of laying before 
 the ministry the views of the new administration, 
 with which he was fully in accord. The recog- 
 nition of the rebels as belligerents, made after 
 Mr. Adams was known to have sailed for Eng- 
 land, and the publication, on the very day of 
 his landing, of the Queen's proclamation enjoin-
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 301 
 
 ing her subjects to observe a strict neutrality in 
 the civil war then existing between the Northern 
 and Southern states, seemed to Seward, in the 
 moment selected for this action, when a few 
 days' delay could have done no possible harm, 
 a breach of good faith, an act of national dis- 
 courtesy and of personal disrespect to our minis- 
 ter. In substance, too, he thought the proceed- 
 ing of the British government unprecedented 
 and unjustifiable, and under the influence of 
 these feelings he wrote a fiery despatch, which 
 might have produced a rupture between the two 
 countries, had the paper been treated, according 
 to the usages of diplomatic correspondence, as 
 a message from one government to the other, 
 and read in full to the British secretary of state. 
 But when it was submitted to the President, 
 Mr. Lincoln, besides suggesting various modifi- 
 cations softening its tone, advised its being sent 
 to Mr. Adams for his own guidance, not as a 
 dispatch to be read, and that this should be dis- 
 tinctly stated in the letter itself. The wisdom 
 of this was apparent ; it was done, and Seward's 
 original draft with these changes made by the 
 President and a few other unimportant verbal 
 alterations, conveyed to Mr. Adams, in language 
 which did not admit of a doubt, the views of our 
 government as to the course of the English 
 ministry.
 
 302 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Without undertaking to discuss elaborately 
 how far the United States had just cause for a 
 serious complaint against Great Britain on ac- 
 count of her recognition, on the 6th of May, 
 1861, of the Confederacy as a belligerent, it 
 may fairly be said that the action of that gov- 
 ernment was unprecedented and precipitate, and 
 could only be regarded by us as ungracious, if 
 not intentionally offensive. As has already been 
 stated, early in April Lord John Russell had 
 suggested to Mr. Dallas, who was then our 
 minister in London, that the coming of his suc- 
 cessor, Mr. Adams, would be the suitable time 
 for discussing any question between the two 
 countries connected with the rebellion ; and 
 again, on the 1st of May, referring to the rumors 
 of a proposed blockade, he agreed that the time 
 for discussion would be on the arrival of Mr. 
 Adams, who was to sail on that day. Under 
 these circumstances the publication, on the very 
 day of Mr. Adams's landing, of the Queen's pro- 
 clamation notifying her subjects of their duties 
 and obligations as neutrals in the civil war 
 then raging in this country, whether it arose 
 from an accidental forgetfulness, or an inten- 
 tional disregard by Lord John of his conversa- 
 tions with Mr. Dallas, and his assurances then 
 given, was alike ungracious and offensive both 
 to Mr. Adams and to the country he repre-
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 303 
 
 sented. It shut the door in his face, and pre- 
 cluded the discussions which Lord John had 
 suggested ; and it was obviously intended to 
 do this. 
 
 That Great Britain's recognition of the Con- 
 federates as belligerents was unprecedented is 
 not to be denied. One of the principal grounds 
 on which it was attempted to justify this re- 
 cognition was, that an insurrection of so many 
 provinces, with organized governments, and a 
 central Confederate administration and army in 
 existence at the outset, had been hitherto un- 
 known. Mr. Adams, replying to this contention, 
 reminded Lord Russell that there had been 
 within a century a revolt of thirteen provinces 
 corresponding in every particular, except that of 
 the numbers involved, to Lord Russell's descrip- 
 tion ; but that, notwithstanding all these points 
 of identity, Great Britain had not been met at 
 the outset in 1774 with the announcement by 
 any foreign power of a necessity for the im- 
 mediate recognition as belligerents of her in- 
 surgent American colonies ; and he added, that 
 there was not the smallest ground for believing 
 that Great Britain would have tolerated for one 
 moment any such proceeding, if it had been 
 attempted. The only historical precedent, to 
 which Lord Russell ever referred as a vindica- 
 tion of his course, was that of the recognition
 
 304 WILL I AM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 of the Greeks as belligerents in 1825, after they 
 had maintained during four years the struggle 
 for independence ; yet, when, after this lapse 
 of time, such recognition was granted them, the 
 Turkish Government complained of it, but 
 Great Britain answered that a people, who in a 
 contest of arms had already covered the sea with 
 their cruisers, must either be acknowledged as 
 belligerents or treated as pirates, and that this 
 latter character England disclaimed for Greece. 
 It is obvious that this so-called precedent bears 
 no analogy to the case of the Southerners in 
 May, 1861. The cruisers of Greece had scoured 
 the Mediterranean and forced the English Gov- 
 ernment to take a decided stand for the protec- 
 tion of Great Britain's commerce and merchant- 
 men. The Confederates in May, 1861, had done 
 no harm at sea, were then utterly incapable of 
 doing any such harm, and, if left to themselves, 
 without the aid of British intervention and 
 British ships, would have remained, until the 
 insurrection was crushed, as powerless at sea 
 as when Great Britain first created them mart 
 time belligerents. 
 
 It is equally clear that the action of the 
 British Government was precipitate. Though 
 France and England had determined to act in 
 concert, France took no similar step till a month 
 later. It is hardly credible that Lord John
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 305 
 
 Russell, when he was agreeing with Mr. Dallas 
 on Wednesday, that the arrival of Mr. Adams 
 a fortnight later would be the appropriate time 
 to discuss the questions of policy as to the 
 Southern Confederates, should have been at the 
 same moment seriously considering the propri- 
 ety of at once recognizing them as belligerents. 
 Yet he did so recognize them publicly and offi- 
 cially, on the following Monday, in a speech in 
 Parliament, and in despatches to the British 
 Minister at Paris, as well as to Lord Lyons, in 
 both of which he speaks of the late Union. The 
 only reason he assigned in his speech or in 
 either of his letters for this recognition was, 
 that the Southern insurgents had established a 
 government which was carrying on in regular 
 form the administration of civil affairs. But 
 this is an explanation which does not explain 
 the British ministry's haste. The organization 
 of the Confederacy took place before the end 
 of February. It was no new fact ; it had been 
 known in England for weeks. It was not, how- 
 ever, even in May absolutely true that the 
 Southern Confederacy was performing all the 
 functions of the federal government ; for one of 
 the most important of them, the carrying of the 
 mails, was done by the United States through- 
 out the entire South until the 1st of June. 
 Between "Wednesday, the 1st, and Monday the
 
 306 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 6th of May, nothing had happened, no new intel- 
 ligence had been received, which could either jus- 
 tify or account for the ministry's sudden change 
 of front. Yet on that day the Southerners, who 
 up to that time had been insurgents, became bel- 
 ligerents, and the fact of their recognition as such 
 was announced in Parliament. The Queen's 
 proclamation, a week later, was merely a do- 
 mestic publication, cautioning British citizens to 
 govern themselves accordingly. The ministry 
 had, on the 1st of May, all the knowledge as to 
 the proposed blockade of the Southern ports by 
 the United States, and the issuing of letters of 
 marque by Jefferson Davis, which they possessed 
 on the 6th. 1 They had not at either date any 
 official or authentic information as to these mat- 
 ters, and they did not at the time refer to either 
 of them as a reason for their conduct. Both 
 proclamations were mere declarations of inten- 
 tions, which might never be carried into effect, 
 and official notice of them would not therefore 
 have justified any such hasty action. It is a sig- 
 nificant fact that the blockade was first officially 
 mentioned as a reason for this sudden announce- 
 ment of the existence of a civil war in America 
 in the letters of Lord Russell to Mr. Adams at 
 and after the close of the rebellion in 1865. 
 
 1 See Lord John Russell's letter of May 1st to the Commis- 
 sioners of the Admiralty. Correspondence concerning Claim* 
 against Great Britain, i, p. 33.
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 307 
 
 In its haste to recognize the Southerners as 
 belligerents the English ministry almost anti- 
 cipated the Confederate Congress, whose Act 
 declaring the existence of a war between the 
 United States and the Confederacy was first 
 published on the same day on which Lord John 
 Russell announced in the House of Commons 
 that Great Britain considered the Southern in- 
 surgents a belligerent power. 
 
 In the four days between Lord John's inter- 
 view with Mr. Dallas, which left our minister 
 with the understanding that nothing was to be 
 done until Mr. Adams arrived, and the govern- 
 ment's declaration in Parliament, there was only 
 one significant incident, the unofficial meet- 
 ing of Mr. Yancey and the other Southern com- 
 missioners with Lord John, at which they assured 
 him that it was the heavy duties which the North 
 had forced the South to pay, and not the attacks 
 upon slavery, that had driven their States to se- 
 cession ; that the new Confederacy had abolished 
 the slave trade, was opposed to a high tariff and 
 wished only to sell its cotton to Europe and 
 make its purchases there. This interview took 
 place on Saturday ; on Monday the letters to 
 Lord Cowley and Lord Lyons were written, and 
 it was announced in Parliament that the govern- 
 ment had come to the conclusion that the South- 
 ern Confederacy must be treated as a belligerent.
 
 308 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 The real motives for this hasty action can only 
 be conjectured. So far as the debates in Parlia- 
 ment at this time throw any light on the matter, 
 they indicate, that, foreseeing that Englishmen 
 would be likely to avail themselves of Jefferson 
 Davis's offer of letters of marque, the British 
 government determined to settle by anticipation 
 the question of the character of such adventurers, 
 and after consulting the law officers of the Crown 
 decided to recognize at once the Confederates as 
 belligerents, in order to prevent any privateers- 
 men who were British subjects being treated as 
 pirates. This consideration, together with the 
 prevailing idea, probably strengthened to a 
 conviction by the efforts of the rebel commis- 
 sioners at their interview with Lord John Rus- 
 sell, that the schism was complete, the South- 
 ern seceders already a perfect Confederacy, and 
 cotton sure to come more quickly, if there should 
 be some act on the part of England which could 
 be interpreted as the expression of a wish for, 
 and a belief in, the speedy success of the South, 
 may perhaps be fairly assumed as the leading 
 motives for the sudden and decisive action which 
 followed so closely the representations of the 
 Southern agents. 
 
 Seward's strong feeling as to, the matter was 
 not uncalled for nor unnatural. He realized 
 what British recognition meant, what courage
 
 RECOGNITION AS BELLIGERENTS. 309 
 
 and confidence it would give the seceders, how 
 great an increase to their strength and resources ; 
 while he also knew that it would add incalculably 
 to our difficulties and indefinitely prolong the 
 struggle. His repeated remonstrances and un- 
 ceasing endeavors to have this hasty step re- 
 called were therefore no more than his duty, 
 and, if ineffectual, were in no way unreasonable. 
 Mr. Motley, who was on the spot and in a 
 position to form an opinion about it, thought 
 that, had this recognition been delayed only " a 
 few weeks or even days," it would never have 
 been made. Possibly he was right ; but at all 
 events we may moderate our natural resentment 
 at this early unfriendliness of England by con- 
 sidering that our actual blockade a few weeks 
 later would have justified, in point of law, though 
 it would not have required, her declaration that 
 the secessionists were belligerents. In judging 
 of her conduct at this time we should also bear 
 in mind the natural inclination of the citizens 
 and government of a free country to sympathize 
 with any people in rebellion, to assume that they 
 have good reason for their insurrection, and are 
 really striving to secure some right which is 
 wrongfully withheld from them. Our own polit- 
 ical history furnishes more than one instance of 
 such sympathy on our part. And it is only fair 
 to Great Britain to make some allowance for
 
 310 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the influence which this feeling had in bringing 
 about the hasty and impulsive step of her gov- 
 ernment on the 6th of May. Its action can be 
 called fortunate for us only in one aspect. It 
 prolonged the struggle, and so brought about 
 emancipation. Had the rebellion been crushed 
 quickly, slavery, the cause of all our trouble, 
 would have remained, and sooner or later the 
 battle would have had to be fought over again.
 
 CHAPTER XVH. 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS AS TO THE TREATY OF PARIS. 
 SUSPENSION OF THE HABEAS CORPUS. 
 
 BY the articles of the treaty of Paris, which 
 was made at the close of the Crimean War in 
 1856, the leading powers in Europe agreed, 
 in order to mitigate the severities of maritime 
 warfare and assimilate its usages more nearly to 
 those of war on land, that privateering should 
 be abolished, and that both enemy's property, 
 not contraband of war, on board a neutral vessel, 
 and neutral property, not contraband of war, on 
 an enemy's vessel, should be exempt from capture 
 and condemnation as prize. They invited other 
 countries to subscribe to these articles, with the 
 hope of making them in this way rules which 
 should govern naval warfare for the whole civil- 
 ized world, stipulating, however, that every na- 
 tion's assent must be given to them as a whole, 
 or not at all. The United States, whose position 
 was usually that of a neutral, wished to extend 
 the exemptions from condemnation to all private 
 property not contraband of war, and, postponing 
 its assent to the treaty as it stood, opened uego-
 
 312 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 tiations for this purpose, which, though appar- 
 ently fruitless, had not been abandoned at the 
 close of Mr. Buchanan's administration. On 
 the 24th of April, 1861, Seward instructed our 
 ministers to England and France, as well as to 
 other countries which had assented to these arti- 
 cles, to ascertain whether the governments to 
 which they were severally accredited were dis- 
 posed to negotiate for the accession of the United 
 States to this treaty, adding that the assent of 
 these governments was to be expected, as we 
 should accept the articles precisely in the form 
 in which they had been proposed to us. These 
 instructions were given before the British recog- 
 nition of belligerency, and when there was no 
 anticipation of any such action. France had 
 not yet proposed to England the adoption of 
 a common line of conduct towards this coun- 
 try in its difficulties ; and though a week before 
 (April 17, 1861) Jefferson Davis had published 
 his offer of letters of marque to any one wish- 
 ing to engage in privateering on behalf of the 
 Confederate States, no such letters had been 
 issued or applied for. 
 
 Our negotiations seemed to open prosperously. 
 They were delayed on various grounds ; but by 
 the middle of July Mr. Adams was officially in- 
 formed that the English ministry would advise 
 the Queen to conclude the necessary convention,
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS. 313 
 
 so soon as they should be informed that a similar 
 convention had been agreed on with the French 
 Emperor, so that both might be signed on the 
 same day. Ten days later, however (when he 
 notified them that our minister to France had 
 returned to Paris to propose there the same 
 arrangements), Lord Russell wrote him: "On 
 the part of Great Britain the agreement will 
 be prospective, and will not invalidate any- 
 thing already done." The meaning of this some- 
 what enigmatical sentence was made clear a few 
 weeks later, by the announcement that Great 
 Britain proposed to add to the convention al- 
 ready agreed on a declaration, " that by exe- 
 cuting that convention Her Majesty did not in- 
 tend to undertake any engagement which should 
 have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the inter- 
 nal difficulties prevailing in the United States." 
 Seward approved Mr. Adams's course in declin- 
 ing to sign the paper with this addition, which 
 there seemed reason to believe an afterthought ; 
 and this ended the negotiations, the French gov- 
 ernment desiring to attach a similar condition to 
 its assent. 
 
 Seward's objects in proposing our assent to 
 this treaty were, probably, to declare our pur- 
 pose of conducting our contest with the South 
 under the humane rules agreed on by the lead- 
 ing nations of the world, and also to preclude
 
 314 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 the recognition of privateers under Jefferson 
 Davis's letters of marque as vessels having any 
 legal status. Before the declaration of May 
 6th this result might have followed the unquali- 
 fied acceptance of our assent to this treaty ; but 
 after recognizing the Confederacy as a belligerent 
 both Great Britain and France were in honor 
 bound to take no step which might impose on 
 them obligations inconsistent with this position. 
 Seward was equally right in declining to accept 
 the arrangement proposed. It would not have 
 been the Treaty of Paris to which we should 
 thus have become parties, but a different and 
 special convention with England and France, 
 implying an acquiescence in the assumption of 
 these governments that we were no longer the 
 sovereign of the states in insurrection, and had 
 no power to treat for them, an admission which 
 would have been irreconcilable with our position, 
 that the integrity of the Republic was unbroken 
 and the government of the United States su- 
 preme, so far as foreign nations were concerned, 
 as well for war as for peace, over all the states, 
 all sections, and all citizens, the loyal not more 
 than the disloyal, the patriots and insurgents 
 alike. 1 Seward was of opinion, however, that 
 the real objection of the English government to 
 giving an unqualified assent to our adherence to 
 1 Seward to Adams, July 25, 1861.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS. 315 
 
 the Treaty of Paris was, that by the middle of 
 August it was well understood that any vessels 
 cruising as Confederate privateers would be 
 English ships, and that Great Britain, while op- 
 posed to this mode of warfare in the abstract 
 and on principle, was perfectly willing to become 
 the patron of privateering when aimed at our 
 devastation. 
 
 Though they knew that Jefferson Davis, after 
 his call for privateers, would not assent to the 
 provisions of this Treaty as a whole, the only 
 way in which there was any provision in the 
 Treaty itself for its acceptance, the British 
 ministry thought it sufficiently important to se- 
 cure his adherence to the other articles (those 
 relating to neutral and enemy property and to 
 blockade) to open negotiations with him, for the 
 purpose of obtaining this. They selected as 
 their agent in this matter an Englishman, 
 their own consul at Charleston, accredited to the 
 United States, whose exequatur was unrevoked. 
 To voluntarily open direct negotiations with the 
 insurgents was a proceeding sufficiently con- 
 temptuous of the United States, and encoura- 
 gingly near to complete recognition ; and so Mr. 
 Bunch, the consul, an active sympathizer with 
 secession, considered it. He successfully per- 
 formed the mission intrusted to him, and ob- 
 tained the adhesion of the Confederacy to these
 
 316 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 articles ; but was indiscreet enough to claim 
 much more. The bearer of his letters to his 
 government, having crossed the Union lines 
 without permission, was arrested, his papers were 
 taken from him, and among them was found a 
 letter saying, " Mr. B. on oath of secrecy com- 
 municated to me also that \h& first step to recog- 
 nition was taken. . . . This is the first step to 
 direct treating with our government, so pre- 
 pare for active business by 1st January." The 
 whole matter having in this way come to Sew- 
 ard's knowledge, he remonstrated, protesting 
 against Great Britain's employing one of their 
 public officers accredited to and recognized by 
 the United States, and still, in the legal view 
 of both governments, exercising his functions 
 there, to conduct a negotiation with insurgents 
 in arms against this government, whether the 
 insurgents were to be considered as simple 
 rebels, as we viewed them, or to be treated as 
 belligerents, as Great Britain had acknowledged 
 them. The English government expressed nei- 
 ther regret nor apology. They maintained the 
 supercilious tone which characterized much of 
 their correspondence during the war, until 
 Gettysburg and Vicksburg demonstrated that 
 the suppression of the rebellion was merely a 
 question of time. The whole proceeding shows 
 how illogical and inconsistent was the attitude
 
 SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS. 317 
 
 of England and France during our domestic 
 difficulties. The rebels were parties to a war ; 
 they were amenable to, and to be governed by, 
 the laws of war, they were sufficiently a nation 
 to be asked to become parties to a treaty, yet 
 not so far a nation as to permit negotiations for 
 this purpose to be conducted in any regular 
 manner. 
 
 Not long after the attack on Sumter, the 
 President, acting upon the opinion of the attor- 
 ney-general that he had the power to do so,, 
 suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus without 
 any special legislation authorizing it. Chief Jus- 
 tice Taney held this suspension illegal; there- 
 upon, when a British citizen residing here, ar- 
 rested and held without regular process, was 
 unable to obtain relief by applying for this writ, 
 Lord Russell undertook to open a diplomatic 
 discussion as to the constitutionality of the Pres- 
 ident's action. Seward courteously but peremp- 
 torily declined to enter upon any such discus- 
 sion, or to permit the constitutionality of any 
 act of the administration to be called in ques- 
 tion by any foreign power, and the attempt was 
 not renewed. Nevertheless every foreigner ar- 
 rested by arbitrary process naturally appealed 
 to his minister, in the hope that diplomatic in- 
 fluence might procure his discharge. Most of
 
 318 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 these foreigners were Englishmen ; their cases 
 occupied a great deal of time, and were a constant 
 source of worry and anxiety to Seward during 
 the greater part of the war. At first, and until 
 Mr. Stanton became secretary of war, all these 
 arrests, as well of our own citizens as of foreign- 
 ers, were under the direction of the State De- 
 partment, and during this period Seward was 
 earning with the disloyal and their friends the 
 name of a tyrant with his hands full of despotic 
 orders of arrest and imprisonment, a reputa- 
 tion which clung to him long after he had 
 ceased to have any charge of these matters. 
 
 The accusation of officious intermeddling, 
 which has been to some extent taken up as a 
 popular cry against him, has its origin in these 
 and other acts of his during the first year of the 
 rebellion, when the War Department was much 
 disorganized by the desertion of Southern offi- 
 cers and clerks, and was also excessively over- 
 worked. There were many things which needed 
 to be done, some of them disagreeable, 
 which did not properly belong to the secretary 
 of state, but which no one else seemed able to 
 find time or inclination to do. At the Presi- 
 dent's request and to the entire satisfaction of 
 all loyal citizens, Seward undertook the responsi- 
 bility and burden of some of these matters. In 
 doing so, he was no more guilty of officious
 
 SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS. 319 
 
 intermeddling than were the " great war Gov- 
 ernors," whose zealous loyalty induced them to 
 overstep the strict line of official duty and en- 
 deavor to relieve the War Department of some 
 of the burdens of the equipment and transpor- 
 tation of troops, which properly belonged to the 
 general government. There is no reason to be- 
 lieve that Seward had any motives for what he 
 did other than patriotic ones ; he had in a high 
 degree the fervor and lofty spirit which then 
 animated and dignified the country. The time 
 had arrived of which he had spoken, when we 
 were to see " how nobly, how firmly a great peo- 
 ple could act in preserving their Constitution."
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE TRENT. 
 
 THE summer of 1861 wore away without 
 further serious diplomatic trouble. The defeat 
 at Bull Run, and the later repulse at Ball's 
 Bluff, confirmed the general European opinion 
 of the ultimate success of the seceding states. 
 It had severely taxed Seward's optimism and 
 ability, to minimize in his dispatches to our 
 ministers the character and effect of these fail- 
 ures. Our successes in the West were too re- 
 mote to offset them with the public ; and the 
 importance of the capture of the forts and garri- 
 sons at Hatteras Inlet, Port Royal, and Hilton 
 Head, and of the occupation of these points by 
 the Union forces, was too little understood to 
 check the tide of European opinion, which was 
 running strongly against us. There was a time 
 in the autumn when Seward, fairly disheart- 
 ened, wrote home : " I have had two weeks of 
 intense anxiety and severe labor. The pressure 
 . . . which disunionists have procured to operate 
 on the cabinets of London and Paris has made 
 it doubtful whether we can escape the yet deeper
 
 THE TRENT. 321 
 
 and darker abyss of foreign war. ... I have 
 worried through and finished my despatches. 
 They must go for good or evil. I have done 
 my best." 
 
 The moment which Seward thought so gloomy 
 seemed to Jefferson Davis auspicious for a vigor- 
 ous and determined effort to obtain from Eng- 
 land and France the full recognition of the South- 
 ern Confederacy as an independent nation ; and 
 early in the autumn he sent James M. Mason, 
 of Virginia, to England, and John Slidell, of 
 Louisiana, to France, as commissioners to open 
 negotiations for this purpose. Slidell was a 
 Northerner by birth, who had made his for- 
 tune in Louisiana, and who, while still United 
 States senator from that state, had been, during 
 Buchanan's administration, a most zealous and 
 efficient worker in the cause of secession, using 
 his official position to break up the govern- 
 ment of which he was a member. Mason, if 
 less conspicuous, had been no less earnest, and 
 had done all in his power to prevent a free, 
 honest, and independent vote in Virginia on 
 the question of the secession of that state. If 
 the United States were a government and not 
 a mere voluntary association, both were traitors, 
 and both were especially odious and infamous 
 in the eyes of the loyal people of the country. 
 On a dark night in October these envoys with
 
 322 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 their families and secretaries ran the blockade 
 at Charleston in the little steamer Theodora, 
 and arrived safely at Havana, where, after re- 
 ceiving much attention from the authorities, 
 they embarked on the British mail steamer 
 Trent for St. Thomas, proposing to sail thence 
 for England. The United States frigate San 
 Jacinto, commanded by Captain Charles Wilkes, 
 boarded the Trent between Havana and St. 
 Thomas ; but instead of putting on board a 
 prize crew and sending the steamer to a port 
 of the United States, that the question of her 
 liability to condemnation, as a neutral carrying 
 contraband of war, might be settled in a Prize 
 Court, Captain Wilkes, out of consideration for 
 the convenience of the other passengers and for 
 the regular business of the steamer, contented 
 himself with taking on board his own ship the 
 commissioners and their secretaries, leaving the 
 Trent to continue her voyage with her other 
 passengers and her mails. 
 
 When the news of this reached England the 
 excitement was intense, public opinion was 
 unanimous, and the public passion at fever heat. 
 The British flag had been insulted ; the prison- 
 ers must be given up and a suitable apology 
 made. Troops were at once ordered to Canada 
 and ships of war were made ready for sea ; in 
 the arsenals and dockyards the business of pre-
 
 THE TRENT. 323 
 
 paration was pushed forward daj and night and 
 even on Sunday; and the first transport left 
 the Mersey with the regimental band playing 
 " I wish I was in Dixie." The British minis- 
 try had some time before received information 
 from a source which they professed to think 
 worthy of belief, that the government of the 
 United States was expecting Mason and Slidell 
 to embark on the Trent, and had given express 
 orders for their capture. On the receipt of 
 this information the law officers of the crown 
 had been consulted, and had advised the minis- 
 try that a United States man-of-war overhaul- 
 ing the Trent, capturing her and carrying her 
 into port, would be exercising a recognized bel- 
 ligerent right ; but that if she merely took 
 the Confederate commissioners and their des- 
 patches and let the steamer go, she would be 
 clearly wrong; or, as has been said, "if the 
 British flag were more grossly insulted there 
 would be less or no cause of complaint." After 
 exact information of what had been done was 
 received in England, the Queen's legal advisers, 
 being again consulted, reiterated their opinion ; 
 so that upon the actual facts the British case 
 appeared quite perfect. The English ministers 
 had been told by Miss Slidell that the officer who 
 boarded the Trent stated that the commander of 
 the San Jacinto had no instructions, but was
 
 324 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 acting solely or. his own responsibility. They, 
 however, permitted the receipt of this informa- 
 tion and even an authentic confirmation of the 
 officer's statement to be denied by the party press, 
 though they communicated it to the Queen when 
 the despatch, as originally drafted, was shown 
 her. The Queen was distressed at the peremp- 
 tory tone of this paper ; at her request Prince 
 Albert prepared a memorandum embodying her 
 views, and the despatch was modified to conform 
 to them. A pathetic interest attaches to this 
 incident from the fact that Prince Albert was at 
 the time suffering from the illness which shortly 
 afterwards proved fatal, and that this memoran- 
 dum was the last thing he ever wrote. 
 
 The officer who boarded the Trent had stated 
 the simple truth, Wilkes was acting solely 
 on his own judgment and responsibility. The 
 first knowledge that either our government or 
 people had of the matter was by a telegram 
 from Fortress Monroe, where the San Jacinto 
 touched for coal (November 15, 16, 1861) and 
 proceeding thence directly to New York was 
 met in the harbor there by orders to carry the 
 prisoners to Boston, and deliver them to the 
 commandant at Fort Warren. By universal 
 consent Wilkes became at once a hero ; the 
 newspapers and the people praised him as if 
 he had won a great naval victory ; he was
 
 THE TRENT. 325 
 
 feasted in Boston, and honored in New York. 
 The secretary of the navy on receiving his 
 report wrote him : " Especially do I congratu- 
 late you on the great public service you have 
 rendered in the capture of the rebel commis- 
 sioners. . . . Your conduct in seizing these 
 public enemies was marked by intelligence, 
 ability, decision, and firmness, and has the em- 
 phatic approval of this department." The an- 
 nual report of the Navy Department repeated 
 and indorsed this approval, and when Congress 
 met, the House of Representatives voted Cap- 
 tain Wilkes a gold medal for his good conduct 
 in promptly arresting the rebel ambassadors. 
 
 Except the letter from the secretary of the 
 navy and the passage in his report, which may 
 be fairly taken as representing his own opinion 
 at the time, there is little if any contemporary 
 evidence as to what the President or any mem- 
 ber of his cabinet thought about the matter 
 when the news of the capture of the commis- 
 sioners first reached them. In writing from his 
 recollection ten years later, Mr. Welles, whose 
 object at that time was to depreciate Seward as 
 much as possible, said " that no man was more 
 elated or jubilant than Seward at the capture of 
 the emissaries, and that for a time he made no 
 attempt to conceal his gratification and approval 
 of the act of Wilkes." Without actually indors-
 
 326 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ing this statement of Mr. Welles, or bringing 
 forward a single fact in support of their view, 
 Mr. Lincoln's biographers say : " Mr. Seward 
 was doubtless elated by the first news that the 
 rebel envoys were captured." So far as can be 
 ascertained, there is not a solitary fact tending 
 to support either statement. 
 
 Dr. Russell, the correspondent of the " Lon- 
 don Times," who was in Washington when the 
 news of the capture reached there, says that 
 " at the State Department there was a judicious 
 reticence observed about it." Mr. Sumner, 
 arriving there for the opening of Congress, 
 writes : " I learned from the President and from 
 Mr. Seward that neither had committed him- 
 self on the Trent affair, and that it was an 
 absolutely unauthorized act. Mr. Seward told 
 me that he was reserving himself in order to 
 see what view England would take." Even to 
 his family Seward said nothing. The only 
 allusion to the affair that appears in any domes- 
 tic letter prior to the settlement of the case is 
 contained in a single line, "The Mason and 
 Slidell affair will try the British temper." 
 
 His son, then the assistant secretary of 
 state, and in daily confidential relations with 
 him, and who was also his biographer, whose 
 narrative of the whole transaction is founded 
 not upon his recollection but upon notes made
 
 THE TRENT. 327 
 
 at the time, 1 speaks of his abstaining from all 
 conversation on the subject. Seward did see 
 McClellan on the 17th of November. 2 There 
 seems to be no reason, however, to suppose that 
 McClellan was volunteering his advice, as he 
 has been charged with doing ; on the contrary 
 it has been said on trustworthy authority that 
 Seward sent for McClellan when he first learned 
 of the capture, and asked him what we could 
 do if Great Britain made a peremptory demand 
 for Mason and Slidell, and the alternative was 
 either their surrender or war ; that he was told 
 in reply that if we went to war with England 
 we must at once abandon all hope of keeping 
 the South in the Union ; and that he thereupon 
 said that, " if the matter took that turn, they 
 must be at once given up." 3 It is further to 
 be observed that the subject was not alluded 
 to in the President's message, and Mr. Sumner 
 tells us was not touched upon in the cabinet or 
 in conversation. 
 
 The first thing which Seward is known to 
 have said or written about this affair is his con- 
 fidential letter to Mr. Adams, on November 27, 
 in which he cautiously refrains from expressing 
 any opinion, and says : " I forbear from speak- 
 
 1 Letter of F. W. Seward, February, 1896. 
 
 2 McClelland Own Story, pp. 175, 176. 
 
 3 R. H. Dana, Jr., to the writer, January, 1862.
 
 328 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ing of the capture of Messrs. Mason and Sli- 
 dell. The act was done by Commodore Wilkes, 
 without instructions, and even without the know- 
 ledge of the government. Lord Lyons has judi- 
 ciously refrained from all communication with 
 me on the subject, and I thought it equally wise 
 to reserve ourselves until we hear what the Brit- 
 ish government may have to say." Seward 
 repeated this in an official despatch of Novem- 
 ber 30th, which was communicated to the Brit- 
 ish government, but which, as has already been 
 said, was not suffered to find its way to the 
 public, while its statements were denied by the 
 ministerial press. From the day when the cap- 
 ture was first known Mr. Seward and the Brit- 
 ish minister did not meet, until on the 20th of 
 December Lord Lyons came to the State De- 
 partment, bringing with him his government's 
 despatch, submitted it informally to Mr. Seward, 
 and gave him a copy. 
 
 The reserve of Seward and Lord Lyons, 
 and their avoidance of each other during this 
 month of waiting, show how strongly both felt 
 the gravity of the situation, and their apprehen- 
 sion of mtost serious consequences. If Seward 
 hoped that the British demand might leave some 
 loophole for negotiation, he had evidently fore- 
 seen the possibility that the English might take 
 a tone which left us only the alternative of the
 
 THE TRENT. 329 
 
 surrender of our prisoners or war, and had de- 
 cided upon his course if this should be the 
 case. 
 
 It was insisted in Lord Russell's despatch that 
 the forcible taking of the commissioners from 
 a neutral ship pursuing a lawful and innocent 
 voyage was an affront to the British flag, and 
 a violation of international law ; and a confident 
 hope was expressed that, when the matter was 
 brought under the consideration of our govern- 
 ment, it would voluntarily offer the only redress 
 that could satisfy the British nation, the re- 
 storation of the captured persons to British pro- 
 tection, and an apology for the aggression com- 
 mitted. The demand for an apology was not 
 pressed and no apology was ever made. That 
 for the return of the prisoners, if not uncourte- 
 ous in tone, was absolute and peremptory. Two 
 sets of private instructions to Lord Lyons ac- 
 companied the despatch. Both these, how- 
 ever, were at the time unknown to our gov- 
 ernment and to Seward. The first of them 
 gave to the demand the character of a threat. 
 It directed Lord Lyons, if it should not be com- 
 plied with in seven days, to close the legation, 
 remove the archives, notify the admiral of the 
 British Atlantic fleet and the governors of the 
 North American and West Indian colonies, and 
 return home ; but the second private note, writ-
 
 330 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ten later, and apparently intended to soften the 
 public despatch as well as the earlier instruc- 
 tions, gave him a discretion which would tend 
 to avoid a war, and expressed the wish that he 
 would not formally deliver the despatch at once, 
 but prepare the way, and ask Mr. Seward be- 
 fore its delivery to settle with the President and 
 cabinet the course they would propose. Acting 
 upon these suggestions, Lord Lyons left with 
 Seward on Friday a copy, and on the Monday 
 following (December 23d) made a formal deliv- 
 ery of his despatch. In this interval the sec- 
 retary had not been idle. The manner in which 
 he employed the time leaves no room for doubt 
 that he had already carefully considered the 
 situation and studied the law of the case, and 
 had determined not only what he should an- 
 swer if the British demand were for an absolute 
 surrender of the men, but also the grounds on 
 which he would rest his compliance. Shutting 
 Himself in his room, and barring his door against 
 all interruption, he began at once the draft of 
 his reply. 
 
 The cabinet met on Christmas day (Wednes- 
 day), and Seward read them his proposed an- 
 swer. He writes : " It (the case) was consid- 
 ered on my presentation of it on the 25th and 
 26th of December. The government, when it 
 took the subject up, had no idea of the grounds
 
 THE TRENT. 331 
 
 upon which it would explain its action, nor did 
 it believe it would concede the case. Yet it was 
 heartily unanimous in the actual result after two 
 days' examination, and in favor of the release." 1 
 Two other members of the cabinet have given 
 us accounts of these meetings which are en- 
 tirely in accord with this statement. Mr. Bates, 
 the attorney-general, in his diary says : " Sew- 
 ard read his proposed despatch; it was exam- 
 ined and criticised by us with apparently per- 
 fect candor and frankness. All of us were im- 
 pressed with the magnitude of the subject. . . . 
 I urged the necessity of the case, that to go 
 to war with England is to abandon all hope of 
 suppressing the rebellion. . . . The maritime 
 superiority of Britain would sweep us from all 
 the Southern waters. Our trade would be ut- 
 terly ruined and our treasury bankrupt. There 
 was great reluctance on the part of some of the 
 members of the cabinet and even the Presi- 
 dent himself to acknowledge these obvious 
 truths ; but all yielded to, and unanimously con- 
 curred in, Mr. Seward's letter, . . . after some 
 verbal and formal amendments." 2 Mr. Chase 
 wrote in his journal : " I give my adhesion, 
 therefore, to the conclusion at which the sec- 
 
 1 Letter to Weed, January 2, 1862. Memoirs of Thwloio 
 Weed, ii. p. 409. 
 N. & H. v. p. 35.
 
 332 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 retary of state has arrived. It is gall and 
 wormwood to me. But I am consoled by the 
 reflection that . . . the surrender under exist- 
 ing circumstances is ... simply giving the 
 most signal proof that the American nation will 
 not, under any circumstances, . . . commit even 
 a technical wrong against neutrals." 1 
 
 Mr. Lincoln's biographers and other writers 
 have assumed or claimed that the settlement of 
 the Trent case was substantially his work, that 
 his judgment favored the surrender of the pris- 
 oners, and that he intimated to Seward the need 
 of finding good diplomatic reasons for so doing. 
 Whatever Mr. Lincoln said, thought, or did 
 about this matter can neither greatly add to nor 
 detract from his fame, which rests upon other 
 and wholly distinct grounds ; but justice to 
 Seward demands that he should receive in this 
 matter the credit to which he is fairly entitled. 
 It is only so far as they are consistent with what 
 we know from contemporary evidence that Mr. 
 Lincoln actually said or did at the time, that 
 credit should be given to the personal recollec- 
 tions of the popular writer, who tells us that on 
 the day when the news of the capture of the 
 commissioners reached Washington he went to 
 the White House in company with a Treasury 
 official and saw the President, who said to him : 
 1 Warden's Life of Chase, p. 394. .
 
 THE TRENT. 333 
 
 "We must stick to American principles con- 
 cerning the rights of neutrals. We fought Great 
 Britain for insisting by theory and practice on 
 the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes 
 has done. If Great Britain shall now protest 
 against the act, and demand their release, we 
 must give them up, apologize for the act as a 
 violation of their doctrines, and thus forever 
 bind her over to keep the peace in relation to 
 neutrals, and so acknowledge she has been wrong 
 for sixty years." 1 
 
 This story was first published more than seven 
 years after the transaction took place, and nearly 
 three years after Lincoln's death. It has never 
 been confirmed ; though it has been quoted again 
 and again by writers of history and biography, 
 who sometimes give credit to Mr. Lossing and 
 sometimes do not. Whatever one may think as 
 to the substance of the alleged conversation, it 
 is evident that the language as reported is Mr. 
 Lossing's own, and not that of Mr. Lincoln ; 
 and it will be quite as apparent, when we come 
 to examine what we do really know about Mr. 
 Lincoln's conduct in this matter, that, if he said 
 anything which justified Mr. Lossing's statement, 
 it was a mere passing thought, not the expression 
 of any fixed conviction. The anecdote related 
 by Mr. Welles was so often told at the time 
 
 1 Lossing's Pictorial History of the Civil War, ii. 156, 157.
 
 834 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 that it may fairly be considered as supported by 
 contemporaneous proof. " The President," says 
 Mr. Welles, " was from the first impressed with 
 the gravity of the situation, and thought the 
 capture embarrassing. His chief anxiety was as 
 to the disposition of the prisoners, who, to use 
 his own expression, would be elephants on our 
 hands that we could not easily dispose of. Pub- 
 lic indignation was so overwhelming against the 
 chief conspirators that he feared it would be 
 difficult to prevent severe and exemplary pun- 
 ishment, which he always deprecated." This 
 opinion is quite different from what Mr. Lossing 
 reports to have been the President's views ex- 
 pressed to him on the same day, even if the two 
 accounts are not absolutely inconsistent with one 
 another. 
 
 Of the President's subsequent reticence we 
 have already spoken. Sumner, after his arrival 
 in Washington, writes that he has "seen him 
 almost daily and most intimately ever since the 
 Trent question has been under discussion, 1 and 
 that he has pressed upon him arbitration." But, 
 though he speaks of the President as being 
 "essentially honest and pacific in disposition, 
 with a natural slowness," he does not give us in 
 his published letters the slightest hint that he 
 had heard him express any opinion as to the 
 affair of the Trent. 
 
 1 Life, iv. p. 60.
 
 THE TRENT. 335 
 
 After Lincoln's death there was found among 
 his papers the draft of a letter proposing arbi- 
 tration as a solution of the difficulty. This was 
 probably written under the influence of the in- 
 terviews in which Sumner urged this course. It 
 was never submitted to the cabinet, but it is an 
 authentic piece of evidence in his own hand- 
 writing, that he was seriously considering this 
 aspect of the matter. 
 
 The intimation that there were confidential 
 interviews between the President and Seward as 
 to this case, of which no record has been kept, 
 and the further suggestion, that the President 
 intimated to Seward, while he himself was con- 
 sidering the desirableness of arbitration, that, as 
 only a few days of the grace allowed by the 
 British Government for our ultimate decision of 
 the matter remained, he should find good diplo- 
 matic grounds for the surrender of our pris- 
 oners, are both gratuitous. There is no foun- 
 dation for either of them. The latter falls to 
 the ground, as neither the President nor the 
 secretary had any knowledge at the time that 
 Lord Lyons was instructed to absolutely require 
 his answer within a limited period, much less 
 that that period had nearly expired. The former 
 is inconsistent not only with Seward's own state- 
 ment in his letter to Weed already quoted, but 
 also with the President's reluctance, as shown
 
 336 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 by Mr. Bates, to acquiesce in the conclusion of 
 Seward's dispatch and the surrender of the 
 prisoners ; and it is further practically contra- 
 dicted by Seward's biographer, who tells us 
 from his memorandum made at the time that 
 when the cabinet separated on Christmas day 
 after discussing Seward's despatch, the Presi- 
 dent said to him : " Your answer states the 
 reasons why they ought to be given up; now 
 I 've a mind to try my hand at stating the rea- 
 sons why they ought not to be given up ; but 
 told him the next day that he could not make 
 an argument that satisfied his own mind, and 
 that this proved to him that Seward's ground 
 was the right one.** 
 
 The contemporary evidence all points one 
 way, it shows that Lincoln took no lead in 
 the decision of the matter, but acquiesced, as 
 the members of the cabinet did, in the reason- 
 ing and conclusions of Seward's despatch, con- 
 vinced, though against his will, that the result 
 that Seward had reached could not be avoided. 
 
 Seward's despatch, whatever be its merits or 
 defects, is distinctly a technical document. It 
 has been called an attorney's plea. The ques- 
 tion was one of law, and he properly treated it 
 as such. His paper bears evidence of a most 
 careful and exhaustive study of the adjudicated 
 cases, and of the discussions in the text-books
 
 TEE TRENT. 337 
 
 and elsewhere having any bearing on the ques- 
 tion at issue ; the internal evidence as well as 
 the historical facts show that, both in its gen- 
 eral scope and in its details, it was the work of 
 one mind, and that Seward's alone. The cabi- 
 net, as we know, adopted it after discussion, 
 making only some verbal and formal amend- 
 ments, and on the same day it was delivered 
 to Lord Lyons. 
 
 Before considering the argument of the des- 
 patch, a few words on international law and 
 the political situation of the country at that 
 time may not be amiss. The sources of pub- 
 lic international law are to be found in those 
 practices universally admitted and recognized 
 as legitimate by the usage of civilized nations, 
 in historical precedents, and in the decisions of 
 the prize courts. In every war there are two 
 or more belligerents. Other countries, not 
 engaged in the war, are known as neutrals. 
 Neutral nations naturally desire, if they are 
 commercial people, to have their merchantmen 
 free from liability to capture and condemnation, 
 and their trade with any belligerent as secure 
 and untrammeled as possible. They constantly 
 endeavor to procure such mitigations of the 
 established rules of international law, and such 
 liberal interpretations of these rules as will en- 
 able them to extend in every way the uniformly
 
 338 WILLIAM HENRY 8EWAED. 
 
 profitable commerce of neutrals in war time 
 Belligerents, on the other hand, if maritime 
 powers, contend for a strict construction and 
 rigorous enforcement of these rules, in order 
 that neutral trading with the enemy may be 
 reduced within the narrowest limits. 
 
 From the time of the formation of our gov- 
 ernment we had uniformly contended for the 
 largest extension of the rights of neutrals, for 
 in all the European wars we had been a neutral 
 nation. But now the positions were reversed. 
 We were engaged in a contest for the suppres- 
 sion of a formidable rebellion ; and were em- 
 ploying for that purpose ah 1 the recognized 
 methods of modern warfare, both on land and 
 at sea. Other nations had declared the in- 
 surrection a war, had recognized the insurgents 
 as belligerents and proclaimed their own neu- 
 trality. Commercial intercourse with the insur- 
 gents was of immense profit to these nations, 
 especially to Great Britain, and was of vital 
 importance to the states in rebellion. We had 
 established a blockade to put a stop to this 
 commerce. Whatever claims we might have 
 previously put forth as neutrals, we could not 
 now afford to make concessions impairing any 
 right heretofore claimed by belligerents, much 
 less any undisputed right. If Mason and Sli- 
 dell were to be surrendered, care must be taken
 
 THE TRENT. 339 
 
 in stating the grounds for their release that no 
 admission was made and no position taken which 
 in any future contingency could be turned 
 against us. 
 
 The successful enforcement of our blockade 
 depended on the energy, vigilance, and prompt 
 and courageous action of the officers of our 
 navy. It had been charged that these officers 
 were not sufficiently alert and watchful. If the 
 zeal of Captain Wilkes should meet with any- 
 thing like a rebuff or rebuke, it would certainly 
 tend to discourage other commanders, and in- 
 duce them to slacken their exertions, which it 
 was important to quicken. The secretary of 
 the navy and one branch of Congress had al- 
 ready thanked Wilkes for what he had done ; 
 it was most undesirable that anything should be 
 said which could be interpreted as a reflection 
 upon their action. The whole country had lav- 
 ished on him unstinted praise ; men of emi- 
 nence and intelligence, with hardly a dissenting 
 voice, had maintained the legality of his capture 
 and conduct; this universal outburst of patri- 
 otic feeling and concord of public opinion were 
 not to be rudely checked or wholly disregarded. 
 The people did not understand the military 
 exigencies of the situation, and they were en- 
 tirely unprepared for the surrender of our pris- 
 oners, the reasons for giving up the rebel
 
 340 WILLIAM HENRY 8EWARD. 
 
 envoys must be so put, that they would, at the 
 same time, both satisfy the judgment and save 
 the pride of the nation. To do this was not an 
 easy task ; but Seward's despatch met these vari- 
 ous requirements so far as possible. 
 
 Lord Russell had assumed that in what had 
 been done we claimed to be exercising a right, 
 similar to that on which Great Britain had 
 relied to justify her taking from our vessels 
 persons alleged to be her seamen, a sort of 
 ocean police for municipal purposes over vessels 
 of a foreign country, which would authorize any 
 belligerent to take from a neutral vessel rebels, 
 criminals, deserters, or even the citizens of a hos- 
 tile country. 
 
 This Seward at once disclaimed. After re- 
 citing the facts as stated by Lord Russell 
 and adding what seemed necessary to the cor- 
 rect understanding of the matter, he went on 
 to say that, instead of being a flagrant act 
 of violence on the part of Captain Wilkes, 
 what he did was undertaken as a simple, legal, 
 and customary belligerent proceeding, the ar- 
 rest of a neutral vessel engaged in carrying 
 contraband of war for the use and benefit of 
 the insurgents. He then proceeded to enumer- 
 ate and discuss the questions involved. These 
 were, as he stated them: Were the commis- 
 sioners and their secretaries with their des-
 
 THE TRENT. 341 
 
 patches contraband of war ? Could Captain 
 Wilkes lawfully stop and search the vessel 
 for those persons and their despatches ? Did 
 he exercise that right in a legal and proper 
 manner? Having found the contraband per- 
 sons on board and in presumed possession of 
 the contraband despatches, had he a right to 
 capture the persons ? If so, did he exercise this 
 right in the manner allowed and recognized by 
 the law of nations ? 
 
 It was not denied that persons in the military 
 or naval service of the enemy are contraband. 
 The question was, whether ambassadors, their 
 suites and their despatches fall within the same 
 category. Mr. Seward maintained the affirma- 
 tive, relying principally on the opinion of an 
 eminent expounder of Prize Law, Sir William 
 Scott, judge of the British Admiralty Court, 
 that: "You may stop the ambassador of your 
 enemy on his passage. Despatches are not less 
 clearly contraband, and their bearers fall under 
 the same condemnation; . . . when it is of 
 sufficient importance to the enemy that persons 
 shall be sent on the public service at the public 
 expense, it is only reasonable that it should af- 
 ford equal ground of forfeiture against a vessel 
 that it has been let out for a purpose so inti- 
 mately connected with hostile operations." It 
 was contended by Mr. Sunmer, in his speech
 
 342 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 on the Trent case delivered in the Senate a few 
 weeks later, that neither Mason nor Slidell, 
 not being persons in the military service, nor 
 their despatches, were contraband of war. But 
 it may be questioned whether, though neutrals 
 might take this ground, Sir William Scott's 
 doctrine may not be defended, if not as a uni- 
 versal rule, at least as one of limited applica- 
 tion. While all despatches may not be contra- 
 band, there are some despatches which it would 
 be an insult to common sense not to declare 
 contraband. It would have been a great mis- 
 take for Seward to have conceded, while we 
 were in the midst of a war, that under no cir- 
 cumstances could the ambassador of a belliger- 
 ent and his despatches be contraband, even 
 though their successful transit in a neutral ves- 
 sel might give more aid and comfort to an en- 
 emy than many thousand stands of arms. The 
 right of Captain Wilkes to detain and search 
 the Trent, though she was proceeding from one 
 neutral port to another, Mr. Seward justified by 
 the maritime law as expounded by British ma- 
 gistrates and uniformly maintained by the Brit- 
 ish Government. 
 
 That the right of search, if it existed, was 
 exercised in a lawful and proper manner was 
 hardly disputable, nor, if it were once ad- 
 mitted that the envoys and their despatches
 
 THE TRENT. 343 
 
 were contraband, was there any question of the 
 Trent's liability to capture. 
 
 There remained only the inquiry whether 
 Captain Wilkes had exercised his right of 
 capture in conformity with the law. The law 
 requires that the captor should bring the cap- 
 tured vessel into a convenient port, and there 
 subject the validity of her capture and con- 
 demnation to the adjudication and decision of 
 the proper admiralty court. If an overwhelm- 
 ing necessity prevents his doing this, the cap- 
 tor is excused, but not otherwise. In this 
 case, upon the captain's own admission, a con- 
 sideration of the derangement and disappoint- 
 ment it would cause innocent passengers had 
 operated, perhaps more powerfully than any 
 other motive, in inducing him to remove to 
 his own ship the persons claimed to be con- 
 traband, and to suffer the Trent to proceed on 
 her voyage. Though in so doing he followed 
 exactly the practice of the British officers in 
 carrying off from our merchant vessels sailors 
 whom they claimed to be British subjects, against 
 which we had so often protested in vain ; yet 
 by converting his quarter deck into a court of 
 law, and constituting himself a judge in his own 
 case, he violated the established rule that ques- 
 tions of prize are not to be decided on the spot 
 by the captor, but are to be determined upon
 
 344 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 a full and impartial investigation before a com* 
 petent and regularly organized judicial tribunal. 
 The United States had always insisted upon 
 this course, and had so uniformly protested 
 against just such proceedings as took place in 
 this case, that it was impossible for us to admit 
 their sufficiency and regularity ; the prisoners 
 must, therefore, be returned. 
 
 It was upon this narrow ground that the sur- 
 render of Mason and Slidell was determined. 
 The merits of this mode of dealing with the 
 case were : that it yielded no point of interna- 
 tional law on which we might at any time de- 
 sire to rest a claim as belligerents, but made 
 the decision depend on a doctrine and practice 
 universally recognized in modern civilized war- 
 fare as the only lawful mode of treating a 
 prize; that it gave due credit to Wilkes for 
 all the qualities which we wished our naval 
 officers to cultivate and exhibit, and only indi- 
 rectly criticised and lamented his courtesy and 
 leniency ; that it appeared to follow to their 
 legitimate conclusion the doubts suggested by 
 the secretary of the navy as to the possible con- 
 sequences of Wilkes's failure to bring in the 
 Trent; that it showed, therefore, that the gov- 
 ernment had from the outset been conscious of 
 the weak point of the case, and that its first 
 official utterance in Secretary Welles's letter to
 
 THE TRENT. 345 
 
 Captain Wilkes was not inconsistent with the 
 final conclusion of the secretary of state. 
 
 As the despatch followed precisely the argu- 
 ment, and reached precisely the conclusions of 
 the British crown lawyers, on exactly the 
 grounds on which they relied, though this was 
 not then known to us, it weakened any criti- 
 cism on the part of the British government. 
 From the whole transaction we gained this ad- 
 vantage that the surrendering of these men 
 so promptly and with so little discussion made 
 both the ministry and the people of Eng- 
 land ashamed of their violence and haste ; and 
 Messrs. Mason and Slidell instead of being 
 England's heroes became her, and not our, 
 "white elephants." They were quietly taken 
 early one winter morning from Fort Warren 
 to Provincetown, where they were delivered 
 on board the British frigate Rinaldo. They 
 arrived in England, January 29, 1862. For 
 seven weeks they had been heroes ; but the 
 tide was already running against them, and the 
 English did not require the encouragement of 
 the " Times " to " let the fellows alone." 
 
 When exactly what Captain Wilkes had done 
 was known in England, the law officers of the 
 crown were again consulted. Somewhat modi- 
 fying their former opinions, they then advised 
 the ministry, that enemy's despatches and their
 
 346 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 bearers were contraband ; but that if the des- 
 patches were so successfully concealed as to es- 
 cape discovery and seizure, the bearer, whether 
 an ambassador or any other person, could no 
 longer be taken. 
 
 In his original demand Lord Russell had made 
 no allusion to the supposed diplomatic charac- 
 ter of Mason and Slidell. The complaint of the 
 British government was simply that one of our 
 cruisers had forcibly stopped a neutral vessel 
 on an innocent voyage, and taken from her two 
 persons. In his reply to Mr. Seward, written 
 after the surrender of the prisoners, Lord Rus- 
 sell denied that ambassadors were contraband 
 of war subjecting the vessel to seizure. Mr. 
 Seward, as has been stated, had maintained the 
 contrary. The case therefore leaves that ques- 
 tion exactly as it was before. 
 
 The surrender of our prisoners being placed 
 upon the well settled rule, that a captor cannot 
 take out of a prize either persons or property 
 as contraband without bringing in the vessel for 
 adjudication, unless he is necessarily prevented 
 from so doing, the decision settled in this re- 
 spect no new principle of international law. But 
 Lord Russell persisted in his original conten- 
 tion, that a belligerent cannot on any pretense 
 take persons out of a neutral vessel, thus not
 
 THE TRENT. 347 
 
 merely admitting but insisting on what we, as 
 a nation, had claimed for years ; this doctrine, 
 therefore, for which we had so long contended 
 in vain, must now be considered an established 
 rule of international law. 1 
 
 1 Dana's Wheaton, p. 648, note.
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 INTERVENTION. CABINET DIFFICULTIES. 
 EMANCIPATION. 
 
 FROM the time that Seward learned that 
 France had invited both England and Russia to 
 act in concept with her as to our affairs, and 
 that, though Russia had declined, England had 
 agreed to do so, he was very uneasy as to the 
 possible consequences. He feared that this ar- 
 rangement might lead to offers of mediation, 
 and, if these were not accepted by our govern- 
 ment, to a recognition of the independence of the 
 South, if not to more positive intervention on its 
 behalf. He was not aware that M. Mercier, the 
 French minister to this country, had already in 
 March (1861) advised the Emperor to recognize 
 the Confederacy, and two months later had re- 
 commended the raising of the blockade ; nor did 
 he know that in October of that year, when our 
 summer's campaign had ended in disaster, there 
 had been a correspondence between the British 
 secretary of state for foreign affairs and the 
 prime minister, in which Earl Russell had writ- 
 ten to Lord Palrnerston, that while it would not
 
 INTERVENTION. 349 
 
 do for England and France to break a blockade 
 for the sake of getting cotton, yet he felt sure 
 that France would join England in saying to 
 both North and South, as had often been said 
 to European belligerents, " Make up your quar- 
 rels ; we propose fair terms of pacification ; if 
 your adversary accepts them, and you do not, 
 you must expect to see us your enemies." To 
 which Palmerston had answered that the best 
 policy for Great Britain was to go on as she had 
 begun, and keep quite clear of the conflict. Sew- 
 ard had at the time no knowledge of these occur- 
 rences, but the discussions in Parliament, the gen- 
 eral tone of the foreign press, his information as 
 to the activity and persistent efforts of Jefferson 
 Davis's emissaries both in France and England, 
 and the letters of our ministers, made him keenly 
 alive to the constantly increasing danger of some 
 such movement on the part of these countries as 
 had now been proposed. 
 
 To correct the representations of the Southern 
 agents and counteract their influence, he deter- 
 mined to send abroad some gentlemen without 
 official position, who, through the press, and by 
 social intercourse with as many different circles 
 and classes of people as possible, as well as with 
 the leaders of public opinion, might produce 
 more favorable impressions of our situation and 
 prospects. Accordingly, in October of this year,
 
 I 
 
 350 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 before the incident of the Trent, he dispatched 
 for this purpose, with the President's sanction, 
 Archbishop Hughes, the distinguished Roman 
 Catholic prelate of New York, whose posi- 
 tion especially fitted him for such a mission in 
 France, Bishop Mcllvaine of the Protestant 
 Episcopal Church, and with them his own inti- 
 mate friend, the veteran politician and editor, 
 Thurlow Weed. Their presence in Europe was 
 an advantage to us in the storm that arose on 
 the news of the capture of Mason and Slidell ; 
 for though they had no knowledge of this matter 
 that was not possessed by everybody, they were 
 able, and especially Mr. Weed from his intimacy 
 with Seward, to contradict the stories which were 
 widely circulated and eagerly believed, that the 
 secretary had the utmost animosity to Great 
 Britain, and a serious purpose of bringing on a 
 war between the two countries. 
 
 The affair of the Trent absorbed for a time 
 the entire attention of the British ministry and 
 public. After our surrender of the rebel com- 
 missioners no further demands upon us from 
 England were expected for the moment. But a 
 despatch from the French minister for foreign 
 affairs, received at the beginning of the new 
 year, showed conclusively the extent of the 
 arrangement between the two countries, and 
 that, though neither the honor nor the interests
 
 INTERVENTION. 351 
 
 of France were in any way affected by Captain 
 Wilkes's conduct, yet the Emperor was prepared 
 to make the quarrel his own, and that we should 
 have had both countries to contend with had 
 there been a rupture between us and England. 
 
 When the case of the Trent was disposed of, 
 our foreign ministers, while expressing their 
 satisfaction at the temporary relief which this 
 gave them, wrote Seward that nothing but very 
 marked evidence of progress toward success 
 would restrain for any length of time the hos- 
 tile tendencies of England, which this affair had 
 developed. Fortunately for us, the New Year 
 opened with a series of successful movements. 
 Important points on the Southern coast were 
 one after another taken and occupied by United 
 States troops, and New Orleans was captured. 
 In the West and Southwest a succession of 
 victories restored to the government's control 
 large portions of several of the states which 
 the Confederacy had claimed as its own. It 
 needed only the capture of Vicksburg, which 
 then seemed close at hand, to open the free 
 navigation of the Mississippi and cut the Con- 
 federacy in two. 
 
 During 1 the whole war Seward had the habit 
 
 -*"* 
 
 of writing from time to time to our foreign 
 ministers accounts of the military situation, as 
 well of our losses as of our gains : and these
 
 352 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 accounts, though colored by his natural optimism, 
 and strenuously cheerful when our prospects 
 seemed gloomiest, give excellent general descrip- 
 tions of the important military movements and 
 situations. He had protested strongly against 
 the recognition of the South as belligerents, and 
 now, encouraged by our achievements and pros- 
 pects, he exerted all his powers of argument and 
 persuasion to induce the European governments 
 to withdraw this concession. But France de- 
 clined to retract, upon the ground that it would 
 be shabby to deprive the South, when it seemed 
 weak, of the assurance that had been given when 
 it appeared strong ; and England also refused, 
 giving as her reason that, although our immediate 
 success then seemed probable, it would be better 
 to wait until the victory had been actually won. 
 The Northern gains in the early months of 
 1862 were followed by a series of reverses. The 
 advance on Richmond, for which such enormous 
 preparations had been made, terminated in the 
 withdrawal of the Union troops, after a series of 
 bloody and destructive battles. The Confeder- 
 ates moved forward both in the East and West, 
 not merely with the purpose of repossessing 
 themselves of the places they had heretofore 
 occupied but of actually invading the North. 
 They were at first successful. At the West 
 the Northern troops retreated in Kentucky and
 
 INTERVENTION. 353 
 
 Tennessee, the Confederates advanced, and Ohio 
 was seriously threatened ; in the East the South- 
 ern forces fought their way through Virginia, 
 and actually invaded Maryland. They were 
 driven back at Antietam, and compelled to re- 
 treat. Their forward movement in the West 
 was checked, and there also they were obliged 
 to withdraw. Before this was known in Eng- 
 land, when only the news of the Confederate 
 successes had reached there, it was agreed by 
 Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell in the early 
 autumn of 1862, that the proper moment for in- 
 tervention had arrived, and that, if the United 
 States declined the proposed mediation, the 
 Southern Confederacy should be recognized as 
 an independent nation. A little later, a min- 
 isterial circular was prepared, describing the 
 result of the summer's campaign, and setting 
 forth these views ; but before the whole cabinet 
 met, towards the end of October, it was evident 
 that the scheme for recognition had failed ; the 
 tide was setting against mediation ; the Southern 
 victories were seen to be barren of results, and 
 the opinion was gradually gaining ground that 
 the superior resources and population of the 
 United States would enable it eventually to sub- 
 due the rebellion. 
 
 In November of the same year the French 
 Emperor proposed to both England and Russia
 
 354 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 to join with him in offering to arrange terms 
 of peace. Both countries declined to do so and 
 he made the proposition alone. It was com- 
 municated to Mr. Seward early in February, 
 1863, at a moment of great discouragement ; to 
 the failure of our summer campaign had been 
 added the disaster of Fredericksburg and the 
 political defeat of the administration in the No- 
 vember elections ; and under these disheartening 
 circumstances Seward wrote his reply, refusing 
 the offered mediation. His letter is remarka- 
 ble for its dignity and courage, for its forcible 
 presentation of the situation in which the insur- 
 rection found us, and of what had been done 
 to insure success, and for the absolute reliance 
 which it shows on the patriotism of the people 
 and their determination, at whatever cost, to 
 maintain the Union in its integrity. 
 
 " This government," he wrote, " has not the 
 least thought of relinquishing the trust which 
 has been confided to it by the nation under 
 the most solemn of all political sanctions ; and 
 if it had any such thought, it would still have 
 abundant reason to know that peace proposed 
 at the cost of dissolution would be immediately, 
 unreservedly and indignantly rejected by the 
 American people. It is a great mistake that 
 European statesmen make, if they suppose this 
 people are demoralized. Whatever, in the case
 
 INTERVENTION. 355 
 
 of an insurrection, the people of France would 
 do to save their national existence, no matter 
 how the strife might be regarded by, or might 
 affect, foreign nations, just so much, and cer- 
 tainly no less, the people of the United States 
 will do. If those now exercising their power 
 should, through fear or faction, fall below this 
 height of the national virtue, they would be 
 speedily, yet constitutionally, replaced by others 
 of sterner character and patriotism." 
 
 No further suggestion of mediation was ever 
 made. But apprehensions of some form of for- 
 eign interference, especially from Great Britain, 
 were felt from time to time till nearly the close 
 of the war. It was only on the 24th of March, 
 1865, ten days before our troops entered Rich- 
 mond, that Mr. Adams was able to state with 
 confidence that " no further apprehension need 
 be felt by us of any aggressive policy " on the 
 other side of the Atlantic ocean. 
 
 Aside from the grave questions connected 
 with the war, the diplomatic events of the 
 eighteen months after the surrender of Mason 
 and Slidell, in which Seward found the greatest 
 satisfaction, were a treaty with Great Britain for 
 the " extirpation of the African slave trade at 
 once and forever," l and the opening of diplo- 
 matic intercourse with Hayti and Liberia. 
 
 i April 8, 1862.
 
 356 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 In the summer of 1862, when the army before 
 Richmond seemed too reduced for any effective 
 movement, Seward left Washington, carrying 
 with him a letter from the President, intended 
 to supplement his own personal efforts with the 
 loyal governors and leading men at the North, 
 to induce them to urge the administration to 
 issue a fresh call for troops. The President could 
 have made such a call without being asked ; but 
 the military situation was critical, our prospects 
 were gloomy, and he feared that if he did so 
 " a general panic and stampede would follow." 
 Seward did his work successfully. Soon after 
 his return to Washington, he was called upon by 
 Mr. Seaton, the editor of the "National Intel- 
 ligencer," who began the conversation in this 
 way : " Now really, governor, this is a time to 
 say something." Seward began to speak of the 
 need of reinforcements, and the promptness with 
 which they were arriving ; but, either induced 
 by what Mr. Seaton said, or guessing the object 
 of his visit, he turned to personal matters, and 
 added that " Every rumor of a division of coun- 
 sels, and of a conflict about generals, tended to 
 defeat this (the arrival of reinforcements) ; that 
 he therefore felt at liberty to state that he had 
 never exercised a power or duty in the progress 
 of the war with which he was not specially 
 charged by the President, and in the perform-
 
 CABINET DIFFICULTIES. 357 
 
 ance of which he was not always in free com- 
 munication with him. That to no one had he 
 ever expressed distrust of the President, or of 
 any of his associates in the government; but 
 on the contrary had uniformly supported them. 
 That he had not been quick or willing to enter- 
 tain complaints against any general, but had 
 exerted his best endeavors to sustain them all. 
 That he had never introduced or encouraged in 
 the cabinet any test question concerning men or 
 measures ; had never seen any intemperance of 
 debate there ; nor had one word of unkindness 
 or distrust ever passed between the President or 
 any of his official advisers and himself." 
 
 This interview shows not only that the charges 
 against Seward, which came_to a head in Decem- 
 ^TJO -thia aama_ y-ear. in the action of a caucus 
 of senators . requesting^is jremjoyal, were in July 
 the gossip of Washington, but also that they 
 were perfectlj^wejl known to him at that time, 
 and that he understood their object ; for he went 
 on to say that he was " content to. remain where 
 he was so long as the war continued and the 
 President required it; but would not prolong 
 his stay one hour beyond the time when the 
 President should think it wise to relieve " him. 
 
 It waajto Seward a summer of intense anxiety. 
 Continued defeats were likely to bring on a 
 recognition of the independence of the Southern
 
 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 , -< xConfederacy, which must be either acquiesced in 
 or met by war. To avert the defeats, " what 
 could we do but to push recruiting, and, that 
 failing, to provide for a draft ? " "I go to Con- 
 gress and implore and conjure them," he writes 
 to his wife. " They give me debates upon the 
 errors of the past, and quarrels about who is to 
 blame. These disputes involve policies about 
 dealing with slaves, upon which Congress angers 
 itself and the country ; and the Governors of the 
 states write, 'You can get no recruits.' I ask 
 Congress to authorize a draft. They fall into 
 altercation about letting slaves fight and work. 
 Every day is a day lost, and every day lost is a 
 hazard to the country." The letter shows that 
 /nis relations with Congress were at this time not 
 altogether harmonious. V'A. despatch of the same 
 month to Mr. Adams gives us a further insight 
 into his state of mind : 
 
 " It seems as if the extreme advocates of 
 African slavery and its most vehement oppo- 
 nents were acting in concert together to precipi- 
 tate a servile war, the former by making the 
 most desperate attempt to overthrow the Federal 
 Union, the latter by demanding an edict of uni- 
 versal emancipation as a lawful and necessary, 
 if not, as they say, the only legitimate way of 
 saving the Union." 
 
 an official despatch, this communication
 
 CABINET DIFFICULTIES. 359 
 
 was unwise, if not unjustifiable, and was not 
 helped by the word " confidential " at the top. 
 It was really no despatch, but a private, per- 
 sonal letter, expressing strongly a feeling then 
 quite prevalent in parts of the country, which 
 Seward might fairly enough have held, and 
 which he had a perfect right to communicate 
 in private correspondence to a friend. His own 
 object at this time was to secure, as soon as 
 possible, a victory which should be to Europe 
 a demonstration of the certainty of our ultimate 
 success. For this troops were needed, and every 
 day occupied by Congress in discussing political 
 problems, instead of taking measures to fill up 
 our armies, was, to his mind, a day lost to us. 
 He knew that each day so lost increased the 
 chances of foreign intervention. He thought 
 that the questions as to slavery might wait, but 
 that our successes could not do so ; and he was 
 impatient of anything which might endanger or 
 delay them. Before the meeting of Congress 
 this despatch had become public. Mr. Lincoln 
 said that it had not been submitted to him. It 
 made no reference whatever to either the House 
 or Senate, and no allusion to Congress. Seward 
 spoke of " the extreme advocates of slavery " 
 and of " its most vehement opponents." These 
 terms described classes, not Congressmen ; nev- 
 ertheless the radical anti-slavery senators and
 
 360 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 representatives were indignant at what they chose 
 to consider an affront offered them by a cabinet 
 minister in an official document written without 
 the knowledge of the President. 
 
 When the session began in December, every 
 one was blue about the military situation, and 
 the Republicans very sore at the results of the 
 November elections. The administration had 
 lost everywhere. New York, Seward's own state, 
 had elected as governor a peace Democrat ; and 
 had the new Congress met at once, some peace 
 would probably have been patched up, either with 
 or without foreign intervention. The change 
 in the popular vote was to be attributed largely 
 to the failure of our military operations at the 
 East. There was a general feeling that the ad- 
 ministration was mainly responsible for this, by 
 its interference with, and mismanagement of, 
 the conduct of the war. Some people thought 
 our misfortunes were owing to the fact that the 
 government had intrusted important commands 
 to officers who had not decided anti-slavery opin- 
 ions, and were not, therefore, it was charged, 
 thoroughly in earnest in their work. It was evi- 
 dent that the emancipation proclamation, which 
 is presently to be spoken of, had further divided, 
 instead of uniting the people. The nation had 
 given a distinct vote of want of confidence ; and 
 the Republican senators wished to regain the
 
 CABINET DIFFICULTIES. 361 
 
 popular favor. They assumed that Seward had 
 been the controlling mind in the administration, 
 the Premier, in the talk of the day ; that he was 
 practically responsible for its domestic as well 
 as its foreign policy, for all its mistakes and 
 misfortunes, civil, political, and military, and 
 had dominated, in a heterogeneous and discord- 
 ant cabinet, even the President himself. 
 
 It is idle to speculate upon the origin or 
 causes of this opinion. It is enough that it ex- 
 isted at the time, and was not confined to Con- 
 gress. It is not easy to find any foundation for 
 it. From the time that supplies were ordered 
 to Sumter to the close of his life, Lincoln was 
 the head of his own government, and Seward 
 recognized it. " There is but one vote in the 
 cabinet," he said, " and that is cast by the Pres- 
 ident." " The President is the best of us all," 
 he wrote to his wife in June, 1861. Lincoln 
 listened to Seward's opinions, as he did to those 
 of the other members of his cabinet, but the 
 decision was always his own ; if anybody inter- 
 fered with the military operations and the dis- 
 position of the troops, it was the President and 
 secretary of war, not Seward. 
 
 It was thought, however, that some change 
 must be made ; and acting on their preconceived 
 notions, a caucus of Republican senators voted 
 by a small majority to request the President
 
 362 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 " to dispense with the services of the secretary 
 of state." Believing that their object might be 
 equally well attained by a resolve less personal, 
 supported by a larger majority, the caucus on 
 the following day adopted, with only one dissent- 
 ing voice, a substitute, recommending the Presi- 
 dent to partially remodel his cabinet, and ap- 
 \/ pointed a committee of nine, six radicals and 
 three conservatives, to wait on him and pre- 
 sent this resolution. That there might be no 
 doubt as to the object of the resolve, eight of 
 these nine committeemen were known to think 
 " Seward a serious obstacle to the prosecution 
 of the war." Seward, learning of the doings of 
 the caucus, anticipated the action of the com 
 mittee by sending in his resignation. Chase dis-- 
 approved the action of the caucus ; he was unwil 
 ling to be a party to an attack upon Seward* 
 and finding the reason given by the senators for 
 their action broad enough to extend to all the 
 members of the cabinet, he also sent in his resig- 
 nation. The whole thing disturbed Lincoln ; he 
 was displeased with the attempt at congressional 
 dictation, and greatly annoyed at the inability 
 to grasp the situation which the proceeding dis- 
 played. Seward and Chase represented the op- 
 posite extremes of the Republican party, and it 
 was necessary that he should have in his cab- 
 inet the support of both. He was relieved from
 
 EMANCIPATION. 363 
 
 all embarrassment on that score when he re- 
 ceived Chase's resignation, and, one might almost 
 say, ordered them both to go back at once to 
 their posts, because the public good required it. 
 Speaking of the matter a year later, he said : 
 " If I had yielded to that storm and dismissed 
 Seward, the thing would have slumped over one 
 way, and we should have been left to a scanty 
 handful of supporters." 
 
 As our armies advanced into the seceding 
 states, the questions of the effect of the war 
 upon the slaves found within our lines, as well as 
 upon slavery itself, became of constantly increas- 
 ing interest and importance. General Butler's 
 ingenious application of the term " contraband " 
 to the slaves coming within our lines, was of 
 great service in solving the former : but the lat- 
 ter, the vital question of slavery or emancipa- 
 tion, still remained, and upon this there were 
 great differences of opinion. There were many 
 persons, not necessarily radicals, who, looking 
 at the matter only from a moral point of view, 
 considered constitutional scruples wholly idle, 
 that if slavery were not abolished the war would 
 be not merely a crime but a blunder, and that 
 public proclamation of immediate emancipation 
 should be made at once, without regard to con- 
 sequences, and however ineffectual it might in 
 fact be. Our foreign ministers while they
 
 364 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 thought military successes essential, if we would 
 prevent the recognition of the South by the 
 governments of Europe admitted that a pro- 
 clamation of emancipation, which should give 
 to the war the aspect of a crusade against slav- 
 ery, might be of advantage to us ; and some of 
 them were urgent that this proclamation should 
 be made at once. 
 
 At home those persons who believed in the 
 supremacy of the Constitution, and that the 
 maintenance of the Union was the object of the 
 war and its only justification, were in a state of 
 great doubt both as to the duty and the powers 
 of the Federal government. Many of them, as 
 the war went on, had come gradually to the con- 
 viction that it must end in the abolition of slav- 
 ery, and that the struggle would be futile or 
 worse, if in the result this cause for sectional 
 strife should not disappear forever; yet they 
 saw no ground for the government's interference 
 with slavery in any state, except as a military 
 necessity for the purpose of more quickly and 
 successfully putting down the rebellion. They 
 were very doubtful whether an emancipation pro- 
 clamation would have this effect, whether it 
 would not more strongly unite and give fresh 
 courage to the South, while it would bring into 
 opposition to the government all those elements 
 at the North, which, united in their support of
 
 EMANCIPATION. 365 
 
 a war for the Constitution, were more or less in- 
 different to slavery ; and whether it would not, 
 by thus dividing the Northern people, make the 
 successful prosecution of the war no longer pos- 
 sible ; or in other words, whether it would not 
 add an enemy in the rear to those already in 
 the field. 
 
 His own doubts upon this point, and his con- 
 viction that he had no right to convert the war 
 into a crusade against slavery, had made the 
 President hesitate long. As he declared in 
 words often quoted : " My paramount object in 
 this struggle is to save the Union, and is not 
 either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could 
 save the Union without freeing any slave, I 
 would do it ; and if I could save it by freeing 
 all the slaves, I would do it ; and if I could save 
 it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I 
 would also do that. What I do about slavery 
 and the colored race, I do because I believe it 
 helps to save the Union ; and what I forbear, I 
 forbear because I do not believe it would help 
 to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I 
 shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, 
 and I shall do more whenever I shall believe 
 doing more will help the cause." 
 
 More than a month, however, before he wrote 
 this letter, he had submitted to his cabinet the 
 draft of an emancipation proclamation. The
 
 366 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 discussion which followed showed that there 
 was between the secretaries the same difference 
 of opinion that existed among the people. The 
 attorney-general and Stanton favored the im- 
 mediate issuing of this proclamation ; the secre- 
 tary of the navy was silent ; Mr. Chase said it 
 was a measure of great danger, would lead to 
 universal emancipation, and went far beyond 
 anything he had recommended ; and Mr. Blair 
 prophesied that it would cost the administra- 
 tion the next elections. Nothing was said, how- 
 ever, that affected the President's decision, until 
 Seward suggested : That the depression of the 
 public mind, in consequence of our repeated 
 reverses, was so great that this might be consid- 
 ered the last resource of an exhausted govern- 
 ment, a cry for help, the government stretching 
 forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia 
 stretching forth her hands to the government ; 
 and that the proclamation had better be post- 
 poned until it could be supported by military 
 successes, instead of coming upon the heel of 
 great disasters. The wisdom of this struck Mr. 
 Lincoln so forcibly, that he put the paper away, 
 and waited till our partial victory at Antietam 
 had, to some extent, redeemed the failures of the 
 summer. The proclamation was then issued; 
 and when the days of grace which it gave to the 
 seceding slaveholders had expired, its assurances
 
 EMANCIPATION. 367 
 
 were fulfilled. As our armies advanced, the 
 government in all its branches recognized and 
 maintained the freedom which the proclamation 
 promised, and the interests of humanity became 
 identified with the cause of the country.
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 
 
 WHEN Lincoln entered upon the duties of his 
 office the troops at his command were too few 
 to permit him to even consider the question of 
 properly reinforcing and holding Fort Sumter. 
 Our navy consisted of forty-two ships fit for 
 immediate service, thirty of which were dispersed 
 in different parts of the world, leaving only 
 twelve for use at home. To suppress the rebel- 
 lion took us four years. At its close we had 
 an army of a million men, and a navy of nearly 
 six hundred ships, seventy-five of which were 
 ironclads. It was, of course, impossible that a 
 contest of this magnitude, as to which the great 
 European powers had proclaimed their neutrality 
 almost before it began, could be carried on by 
 sea and land for so long a period without giving 
 rise to an infinite number and variety of diplo- 
 matic questions and complaints. The published 
 correspondence of the State Department for this 
 period fills thirteen volumes ; the mere enumer- 
 ation of the matters treated of would be ex- 
 tremely tedious. It may be said in general, that
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 369 
 
 Seward claimed for us as belligerents the fullest 
 exercise of all the rights upon which Great 
 Britain had insisted when at war ; but that, 
 without waiving these, he at times made conces- 
 sions for the purpose of relieving the tension 
 between this country and the leading European 
 powers, and of diminishing if possible the hostile 
 feelings of their citizens. His mode of dealing 
 with the mails found on captured blockade run- 
 ners is an illustration of this. 
 
 These vessels often had mails on board ; the 
 question of the disposition to be made of these 
 was important and troublesome, and involved a 
 good deal of feeling. Should we open them 
 and examine their contents ? They might con- 
 tain official despatches or private letters having 
 important information ; but, to ascertain this, it 
 would be necessary to pry into domestic letters 
 of a strictly personal character. Was this per- 
 mitted by the laws of war ? The governments 
 under whose flags these vessels sailed, insisted 
 that the mail bags should be forwarded un- 
 opened to their destination ; our navy depart- 
 ment contended that they were liable like the 
 cargo to examination for contraband. Seward, 
 after some consideration, agreed that the public 
 mails of any friendly or neutral power should 
 be forwarded unopened. The secretary of the 
 navy thought this a weak yielding to an unrea-
 
 370 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 sonable demand. Seward made the concession 
 not as a matter of right, but of expediency, and 
 was unquestionably wise in so doing. In any 
 event the advantages to us would have been 
 slight and rare ; the irritation of other govern- 
 ments and of their citizens, whose private cor- 
 respondence might have been tampered with, 
 would have been constant and extreme, and 
 might have led to most serious consequences. 
 
 The permission granted, at the request of their 
 government, to the French, who wished to do so, 
 to leave New Orleans by passing through the 
 blockade is another instance of the same policy. 
 The abuse of a similar privilege by a British 
 consul and the commander of an English man- 
 of-war, which had been authorized for a special 
 purpose to enter a blockaded port, shows the 
 extent to which their sympathy with the South 
 could carry two British public servants. They 
 permitted the Confederate government to ship 
 and send to England by this vessel gold for the 
 payment of its obligations there, that it might 
 in this way escape any risk of capture. When 
 Seward remonstrated, the consul was dismissed 
 from the service ; but the mischief had been 
 already done. 
 
 The blockade gave rise to many complaints, 
 most of them depending on questions of fact, as 
 to which it was not always easy to ascertain the
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 371 
 
 truth. Though the investigation of these cases 
 occupied a great deal of time, they hardly fur- 
 nished any cause for serious anxiety; but our 
 attempt in the autumn of 1861 to obstruct some 
 of the channels of Charleston Harbor by sinking 
 old hulks loaded with stones the stone block- 
 ade, as it was called seemed at one moment 
 to threaten difficulties of a graver character. 
 Similar modes of closing the entrance to a har- 
 bor, by quasi-permanent obstructions, were not 
 wholly unknown. The British in the war of the 
 Revolution had done something of the sort at 
 Savannah ; the Confederates during their four- 
 years struggle placed such obstructions in many 
 harbors. But on learning of our stone block- 
 ade Earl Russell's temper seems to have got 
 the better of his courtesy. He instructed Lord 
 Lyons to remonstrate with Mr. Seward against 
 this as a "cruel plan, which could only be 
 adopted as a measure of revenge and of irre- 
 mediable injury against an enemy ; " and to say 
 further that " even as a scheme of bitterest and 
 sanguinary war, such a measure would not be 
 justifiable ; that it would be a plot against the 
 commerce of all maritime nations and against 
 the free intercourse of the Southern states of 
 America with the civilized world." How far 
 Lord Lyons in his interview with Mr. Seward 
 softened the offensive phraseology of this letter
 
 372 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 cannot be known. Mr. Seward's position in the 
 matter, according to Lord Lyons's report to his 
 government, is exactly what he himself stated it 
 to be in a despatch of February 17, 1861, to 
 Mr. Adams, in which he said : " I am not pre- 
 pared to recognize the right of other nations to 
 object to the manner of placing artificial ob- 
 structions in the channels of rivers leading to 
 ports which have been seized by insurgents in 
 their attempts to overthrow this government. I 
 am nevertheless desirous that the exaggerations 
 on that subject which have been indulged abroad 
 may be corrected." He adds that he has applied 
 to the navy department for information, and 
 has learned that there are two ship channels 
 in which no artificial obstructions have been or 
 are to be placed, and which are guarded only by 
 the blockading squadron. Nothing further was 
 heard from Great Britain on the subject. The 
 sunken hulks were gradually washed away by 
 storms, and the necessity for the discussion dis- 
 appeared with the obstructions. 
 
 The personal questions as to foreigners were 
 not confined to matters having their origin in 
 our blockade. There were numerous com- 
 plaints of unjust imprisonment or of hard 
 usage as to their persons or property by resi- 
 dent foreigners of various nationalities. Care 
 and patience were requisite for the examination
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 373 
 
 of these, and tact and good sense for deciding 
 them; but they were all disposed of without 
 hard feeling, except those arising out of Gen- 
 eral Butler's government at New Orleans. The 
 foreign population there, a majority of which 
 was French, had strong secession sympathies, 
 and was not disposed to submit quietly to But- 
 ler's arbitrary proceedings. Complaints from 
 the foreign ministers came thick and fast ; some 
 were of a very serious nature, involving claims 
 for large amounts of property confiscated, of 
 money seized, without apparent justification, 
 together with demands for indemnity for per- 
 sonal insults and injuries. They engrossed half 
 Seward's time, and were seriously endangering 
 our friendly relations with the great powers 
 of Europe, until, " to relieve their uneasiness," 
 Banks was sent to succeed Butler. Butler's pro- 
 ceedings were gratifying to the vindictive feel- 
 ings of the North towards the secessionists, and 
 at the time were much approved. They may 
 have been necessary for the maintenance of pub- 
 lic order ; if they were not so, it was certainly 
 injudicious to run such risks of a rupture with 
 France, which would probably have involved 
 one with England also. It is not impossible 
 that the action of the state department on some 
 of these complaints of the foreigners at New 
 Orleans may have been the alleged " interfer-
 
 374 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ence with our generals," which was urged as one 
 of the reasons for asking Seward's removal. 
 
 There is a wide difference between a procla- 
 mation of neutrality in the case of a war between 
 two states already recognized as belonging to 
 the family of nations, and a similar proclama- 
 tion in a case where bands of insurgents, or 
 provinces in revolt, are seeking to wrest their 
 independence from their government. In the 
 former case the proclamation makes no change 
 in the existing status, it is a mere cautionary 
 notice of undisputed facts, which are thus called 
 to the attention of the subjects of the govern- 
 ment issuing it, to remind them of their rights 
 and duties. In the latter it alters the previous 
 conditions, and, so far as the citizens of the 
 country issuing it are concerned, actually creates 
 what it only professes to recognize, either calling 
 into being as a full-grown nation (if it acknow- 
 ledges their independence), a body of people who 
 had previously no political existence whatever, 
 or turning a rebellion into a war, if it only calls 
 them belligerents. It is really not a declaration 
 of neutrality, but a mild form of intervention on 
 behalf of an incipient revolution, and when made 
 jointly by several powerful nations at the same 
 time, is a pretty efficacious one ; it is also dis- 
 tinctly an act injurious to the government en- 
 deavoring to put down its rebellious citizens.
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 375 
 
 The only way for any foreign government to 
 maintain a real neutrality in such a struggle is 
 to leave the rebels alone to gain their independ- 
 ence if they can, and the government undis- 
 turbed to crush the insurrection if it is able. 
 It was not this absolute neutrality which Eng- 
 land and France assumed to maintain towards us 
 during the rebellion. Their proclamations at 
 the outset gave countenance to the South, and 
 the hope of something more. 
 
 Our complaints of these proclamations at 
 the time they were issued have already been 
 spoken of. It soon appeared, that, so far as Eng- 
 land was concerned, the immediate and princi- 
 pal effect of her course was to stimulate all her 
 industries and manufactures, and to encourage 
 her people to do their utmost to supply the needs 
 of our states in rebellion, whose only resources 
 were agricultural, whose main dependence for 
 everything essential to carrying on their strug- 
 gle was the workshops and factories of Great 
 Britain, and who, without the supplies received 
 in this way, would have been quickly subdued. 
 The perception of these facts quickened and 
 intensified our sense of the wrong done us by 
 England at the outset ; it gave rise to a general 
 conviction that the British government was not 
 reluctant to gain advantages for its own citizens 
 at our expense, and was the source of a wide*
 
 376 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 spread belief that to secure this result had been 
 the purpose of its original action. 
 
 We also complained that England persistently 
 violated in various ways the duties and obliga- 
 tions of the neutrality she had declared. We 
 charged her with doing so by permitting the 
 Confederates to use, at first Nassau in the Brit- 
 ish Bahamas, and later Bermuda, as military 
 bases, and depots for their arms, ammunition, 
 stores and equipments. Against this use of these 
 ports Seward protested strenuously ; but his re- 
 monstrances produced no effect. If England 
 had made no proclamation of neutrality, such 
 assistance to unrecognized rebels would not have 
 been tolerated ; but under the circumstances it 
 is doubtful if it was a technical breach of neu- 
 trality, though if it had clearly been so, it could 
 not have done us more grievous harm. 
 
 Our complaints against England's violations 
 of neutrality, however, went far beyond this. 
 We charged her with gross breaches of it in 
 permitting rebel cruisers, intended to prey upon 
 our commerce, to be built in her ship-yards, 
 equipped and armed from her workshops, provis- 
 ioned and manned by her sailors and subjects. 
 Early in 1862, complaint was made to the Brit- 
 ish government as to the construction of a ves- 
 sel for this purpose. She was finished, regis- 
 tered as an English ship and cleared as such for
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 377 
 
 Palermo. She never went there, but appeared 
 at Bermuda, eventually ran the blockade intc 
 Mobile, where she was armed, successfully e* 
 caped from there, and cruised as the Florida. 
 She made many prizes in the Atlantic, and hav- 
 ing burnt one of our ships off the Irish coast, 
 went in to Brest to land its crew and make 
 some repairs, and, in spite of our remonstrances, 
 was there allowed to ship a fresh crew for her- 
 self and start again. She ended her career in 
 October, 1864, at Bahia. She was cut out from 
 under the guns of a Brazilian battery and the 
 broadside of a guard-ship, by the United States 
 steamer Wachusett, and brought into Hampton 
 Roads, where she fortunately solved a diplo- 
 matic difficulty by springing a leak and sinking. 
 Brazil accepted our apology for the violation of 
 her sovereignty in the attack on the rebel ship, 
 and the removal of our consul who had advised 
 it, with the sending of the commander of the 
 Wachusett before a court-martial, as sufficient 
 amends for the offense. 
 
 Towards the end of June in the same year 
 (1862), Mr. Adams informed Lord Russell that 
 a new and more powerful steamer was nearly 
 ready to leave Liverpool on the same errand 
 as the Florida. She did not in fact sail until 
 the 29th of July, but the British government 
 was not able during this whole month to satisfy
 
 378 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 itself, until it was too late, that there was any evi 
 dence which would justify her detention. This 
 vessel was the Alabama. She slipped out of 
 port and waited off the coast until she had re- 
 ceived a crew of forty men sent her in a tug 
 from Liverpool; off the Azores she was met 
 by two vessels, which had sailed directly from 
 England, bringing all her armament, clothing 
 for her crew, a supply of coal, and her captain 
 and officers. As British ships are British terri- 
 tory, it seems that in this case the vessel was 
 built, equipped, armed and manned under the 
 British flag and protection ; and that the breach 
 of neutrality and the violation of the spirit, if 
 not of the letter, of the municipal law of Eng- 
 land were complete in every particular before 
 she hoisted the Confederate colors. It has been 
 admitted by a British jurist that, " had the whole 
 series of transactions which finally placed her on 
 the ocean armed, manned, provisioned and com- 
 missioned for war, been within the knowledge of 
 the British government, and within its power of 
 control, she would never have left the Mersey ; " 
 and, if it be conceded that the display of the 
 Confederate flag and the exhibition of a Confed- 
 erate commission, under the circumstances stated, 
 so changed her character that she could no longer 
 be proceeded against and condemned in any 
 British port, it may fairly be claimed that a due
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 379 
 
 regard to the neutrality they professed, to the 
 dignity of the crown and to the spirit of their 
 laws would have more than justified the Brit- 
 ish ministry in refusing to this vessel, English 
 in everything but the name, an asylum in any 
 harbor under their jurisdiction. Instead of this 
 she was received at every British port she chose 
 to visit, and met there a liberal hospitality quite 
 different from the bare toleration which was 
 grudgingly given to our men-of-war. She began 
 her predatory cruising in August, 1862, and fin- 
 ished it twenty-two months later in June, 1864 
 when she was sunk off Cherbourg by the United 
 States steamer Kearsarge after an hour's action. 
 During her cruises she captured and destroyed 
 about sixty American vessels, most of which 
 were merchantmen employed in foreign voyages. 
 Applications to the ministry having proved 
 ineffectual to prevent the sailing of the rebel 
 cruisers, Seward wrote to Mr. Adams : " As one 
 more resource, it is deemed advisable that an 
 effort be made to secure the enforcement of the 
 enlistment laws through the action of the courts " 
 (April 2, 1863). In pursuance of these instruc- 
 tions Mr. Adams furnished the British govern- 
 ment with such evidence that proceedings were 
 begun against the owners of the steamer Alex- 
 andra. At the trial there was no dispute about 
 the facts. The vessel was built under a contract
 
 380 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 with the agent of the Confederate government 
 and was intended for use as a man-of-war. She 
 was not finished at the time the proceedings were 
 begun ; and the jury were instructed that to bring 
 the case within the provisions of the foreign en- 
 listment act her equipment must have been so 
 far completed in British territory that she was 
 capable of hostile operations, or that if it were 
 not already so complete, it must be proved that 
 it was intended it should be completed in British 
 territory. They were also told that, although 
 the vessel had been built and was to be used 
 as a cruiser, if it was intended to put the arms 
 on board at a place beyond British jurisdiction 
 there would be no violation of the foreign en- 
 listment act. Upon these instructions the jury 
 found for the defendants. The subsequent ac- 
 tion of the judge who presided at the trial was 
 such as, under the English forms of procedure, 
 precluded any final, authoritative decision as to 
 the construction of the statute. The case left 
 the Confederates at liberty to violate without 
 substantial inconvenience the spirit of interna- 
 tional law, and to evade both the letter and 
 spirit of the municipal statutes. 
 
 The gravity of the situation was at once ap- 
 preciated here, and Seward wrote to Mr. Adams 
 that, if the law of this case was to regulate 
 the action of her Majesty's government, the
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 381 
 
 United States would be without any guarantee 
 against the unlimited employment of capital by 
 British subjects in building and sending forth 
 ships of war from British ports to make war 
 against the United States, and that this would 
 be, in effect, " a war waged against this country 
 by a portion at least of the British nation, and 
 tolerated, though not declared, by the British 
 government." He suggested to the English min- 
 istry, whether Parliament would "not consider 
 it just and expedient to amend the existing stat- 
 ute in such a way as to effect what the two gov- 
 ernments actually believed it ought to accom- 
 plish ; " and he added, that if her Majesty's gov- 
 ernment should desire such a proceeding, the 
 President would not hesitate to apply to Con- 
 gress for an equivalent amendment of the laws 
 of the United States. Mr. Adams made the 
 suggestion, and Earl Russell expressed his will- 
 ingness to propose amendments, on condition 
 that they should also be adopted in the Ameri- 
 can act; but when Mr. Adams informed him 
 later of the assent of our government to this 
 proposal, he was told that her Majesty's gov- 
 ernment had reconsidered the matter and de- 
 clined to suggest any amendments. This closed 
 the negotiations ; the act remained unchanged 
 till the end of the rebellion. 
 
 The English government, however, became
 
 382 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 more ready to exert themselves to prevent the 
 construction and sailing of Confederate cruis- 
 ers. Two rams that were building in Liverpool, 
 under the supervision of the officer in charge 
 of the Confederate naval bureau of construction 
 there, were seized and detained, and were finally 
 bought by the Crown. The only vessel of im- 
 portance which subsequently got away was the 
 Shenandoah, whose depredations were continued 
 long after the Southern armies had surrendered 
 and peace had been restored. In October, 
 1864, when Sherman had already taken Atlanta, 
 Farragut had captured Mobile, and the fall of 
 the Confederacy was evidently a mere question 
 of months, she left London as the Sea King. 
 Off a little island near Madeira she met by ap- 
 pointment another steamer direct from Liver- 
 pool, from which she received her arms, ammuni- 
 tion and stores ; she raised the Confederate flag 
 and started on her cruise as the Shenandoah. 
 In January, 1865, she put in at Melbourne, 
 filled up her crew, and proceeded to the Arctic 
 Ocean, where she destroyed the American whal- 
 ing fleet, continuing her depredations until she 
 learned in August from an English ship that 
 the Confederacy had ceased to exist. Returning 
 to Liverpool, she was taken possession of by the 
 Crown, and was subsequently delivered to the 
 government of the United States.
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 383 
 
 All these vessels, not only those that have 
 been mentioned, but others that have not been 
 named, though called Confederate cruisers, were 
 built to overhaul, plunder, and destroy unarmed 
 merchantmen, but, as the captain of one of them 
 frankly admitted, not to fight, " unless in a 
 very urgent case." Their operations occasioned 
 an enormous amount of diplomatic correspond- 
 ence and negotiation, which lasted after Seward 
 ceased to be secretary of state. So long as Mr. 
 Adams remained in England it was conducted 
 by him, upon general lines laid down by Sew- 
 ard, but with the largest discretion given to Mr. 
 Adams. For a time each new vessel destroyed 
 was made the subject of a fresh complaint, 
 until this constant repetition of similar demands 
 drew from Lord Russell the impatient declara- 
 tion, " that he wished to say once for all, that 
 her Majesty's government disclaimed any re- 
 sponsibility for these losses, and hoped they had 
 made their position perfectly clear." Neverthe- 
 less a subsequent ministry expressed her Ma- 
 jesty's regret for the escape of these vessels from 
 British ports and for the depredations commit- 
 ted by them, agreed to submit to arbitration the 
 question of Great Britain's liability for these, 
 and consented that the arbitrators should ac- 
 cept as the law which should govern their deci- 
 sion, the rules, That a neutral power is bound
 
 384 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, 
 arming or equipping within its jurisdiction of 
 any vessel which it has reasonable grounds to 
 believe is intended to cruise or carry on war 
 against any power with which it is at peace : 
 That it is bound in the same way to prevent the 
 departure from its jurisdiction of any such ves- 
 sel which has been either wholly or partly fitted 
 there for such warlike use : That it cannot per- 
 mit a belligerent to use its ports or waters as a 
 base of naval operations against his enemy, or 
 for the purpose of renewing or increasing his 
 arms or other military supplies, or of enlisting 
 men ; and lastly, that it must exercise due dili- 
 gence as to all persons and places within its 
 jurisdiction to prevent the violation of these 
 obligations. By the award of the arbitrators 
 to whom was submitted the question of Great 
 Britain's liability under these rules for the acts 
 of the Confederate cruisers, she was compelled 
 to pay fifteen million five hundred thousand 
 dollars ($15,500,000) for property actually de- 
 stroyed by them. This sum was intended as a 
 compensation to American shipowners and citi- 
 zens for the loss of their property ; but for the 
 heaviest loss to the country, and one from which 
 it has never recovered, that of its share in the 
 carrying trade of the world, no compensation 
 was made. It was this trade to which Mr.
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 385 
 
 Adams referred when he wrote to Mr. Seward 
 early in the war, that "the English people 
 would be gratified at anything which would in- 
 flict an injury on American commerce, of which 
 they are very jealous." 
 
 The building and depredations of the Ala- 
 bama and her sister ships were not, however, 
 the only matters of diplomatic correspondence 
 and complaint as to these cruisers. Their re- 
 ception in foreign ports, the right of coaling, and 
 other privileges accorded them there, and the 
 courtesies alleged to have been shown to their 
 officers but refused to ours were the subject of 
 constant remonstrances from the state depart- 
 ment ; and though some of these matters might 
 seem trifling, and the complaints unavailing, 
 they served to make the colonial governors of 
 the various European powers more cautious 
 about overstepping the bounds of neutrality, and 
 to lessen the instances in which they actually 
 did so. On the other hand, it was charged that 
 our naval officers pursued blockade runners into 
 neutral waters, lay in wait for Confederate 
 cruisers in foreign harbors, and often failed to 
 observe the courtesies expected from ships of war 
 in friendly ports ; and every such complaint re- 
 quired to be investigated, and explained or an- 
 swered, or an apology made whenever there was 
 shown to be just ground of offense.
 
 386 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 There were other matters as to which we con- 
 sidered that Great Britain gave us good cause 
 of complaint. 
 
 Towards the close of the war, in October, 
 1864, a few men, coming as ordinary travelers 
 from Canada to St. Albans, Vermont, were met 
 there by others arriving from Chicago ; the two 
 bands, having joined forces, attempted unsuc- 
 cessfully to set the town on fire ; they robbed 
 the banks of their specie and then crossed the 
 frontier into Canada, where several of them were 
 arrested. Seward endeavored in vain to obtain 
 their extradition as criminals. British writers 
 have admitted that, had they been caught in 
 Vermont, they would have had no claim to be 
 treated as military prisoners ; but the Canadian 
 court refused to surrender them, on the ground 
 that what they had done was not a crime but an 
 act of war. Somewhat similar occurrences took 
 place on board steamers on the lakes or on coast- 
 wise voyages on the Atlantic. When parties 
 of apparently innocent passengers threw off their 
 disguise and seized and plundered the steamers 
 on which they had embarked, their surrender 
 Was refused on similar grounds, the court say- 
 ing : Either this is an act of piracy on the high 
 seas, in which case the men can be tried here ; 
 or of war, in which case they cannot be tried 
 anywhere.
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 387 
 
 It is certainly not for the interests of civili- 
 zation that acts of this character, done by bands 
 of desperadoes for their private gain and without 
 authority, should be treated as acts of war by a 
 neutral. It is doubtful whether any one con- 
 nected with any of these expeditions held any 
 regular commission from the Confederate author- 
 ities ; it is quite certain that no one of the men 
 was at the time a soldier in the Confederate 
 service, and there was no evidence that any of 
 the expeditions were in pursuance of the orders 
 of the Confederate government or of any of its 
 agents. They were the work of marauders. 
 The Canadian government was so ashamed of 
 the conduct of its judiciary that it refunded the 
 gold value of the paper money stolen at St. 
 Albans, which by order of court had been given 
 back to the thieves, from whose possession it had 
 been taken by the police. 
 
 Aside from the diplomatic difficulties directly 
 connected with the rebellion, the condition of 
 affairs in Mexico was a source of great anxiety 
 during Lincoln's administration. We were not 
 only uneasy as to the temporary effect which 
 the troubles there might have upon our foreign 
 relations, but we were also apprehensive lest they 
 should have a serious influence upon the future 
 of our country. 
 
 Mexico in 1861 was indebted to citizens of
 
 388 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 France, England, and Spain, who complained 
 that they could not obtain payment of the money 
 due them. The governments of these three 
 countries, realizing that our domestic difficulties 
 were their opportunity, made an alliance in the 
 autumn of that year, the purpose of which was, 
 not merely to enforce the payment of these debts, 
 but also to secure a better protection for for- 
 eigners resident in Mexico. A month after the 
 treaty was executed we were invited to join it. 
 Seward declined the invitation. He suggested 
 that we might guarantee the Mexican debt, and 
 that in this way the necessity for foreign inter- 
 vention would be avoided. This suggestion was 
 not accepted ; it was said that it would leave 
 untouched one of the objects of the alliance, 
 security for the future good treatment of foreign- 
 ers living in Mexico. The original scheme of 
 the three powers evidently contemplated a tem- 
 porary and limited occupation of the territory, if 
 nothing more. In declining to become a party 
 to the treaty, Seward stated our strong interest 
 that no foreign power should acquire territory 
 in Mexico, or gain any peculiar advantage there, 
 or exercise any influence to interfere with the 
 free choice by the Mexicans of their own form 
 of government. 
 
 It soon became evident that Louis Napoleon 
 had aims quite different from those of the other
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 389 
 
 powers, and early in April, 1862, the Spanish and 
 English commissioners, finding that the French 
 were giving military aid to the monarchical party, 
 withdrew from cooperation with them, and the 
 alliance was dissolved. Mexico at this time> 
 was divided between the Church party, which 
 was monarchist and conservative, and the liberal 
 party, which was republican. The actual govern- 
 ment was republican and liberal, but it was weak 
 and unstable. Napoleon's plan was to use his 
 power and influence in favor of the monarchists, 
 and to obtain, at an election to be held under 
 the auspices and the control of the French 
 troops, a plebiscite creating a monarchy and 
 calling a foreign prince to the throne. He knew 
 that it was the settled policy of this country not 
 to permit the establishment by a European power 
 of any monarchy in America, and that, if our 
 condition permitted it, we should interfere, by 
 force if need be, to prevent it. But our hands 
 were tied, and he took advantage of our necessi- 
 ties to attempt to carry out his project. Before 
 the departure of the first expedition for Mexico, 
 rumors that this was the Emperor's scheme were 
 rife in Europe, but the French ministers in con- 
 versations, apparently frank, with our represen- 
 tatives, and in their diplomatic correspondence, 
 not only at that time but during the whole 
 French occupation of Mexico, persistently denied
 
 390 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 that there was any foundation for these reports, 
 or that the Emperor had any purpose of forcing 
 a government upon that country. Though it 
 was difficult to reconcile these statements with 
 the reports of the English and Spanish commis- 
 sioners, Seward in his correspondence accepted 
 them as true, and instructed our minister to say 
 that we relied on them as such ; and that while 
 we recognized the right of France to make war 
 against Mexico, and to determine for herself the 
 cause, we had " a right and interest to insist that 
 she should not improve the war to raise up in 
 Mexico an anti-republican or an anti- American 
 government, or to maintain such a government 
 there." 
 
 An assembly of notables, convened July 10, 
 1863, by direction of the French general, voted 
 to establish an imperial government and elected 
 the Arch-Duke Maximilian of Austria to the 
 throne. In a despatch of September 26, 1863, 
 Seward stated with great distinctness the views 
 of our government upon this matter. He said 
 that the United States had neither a right nor a 
 disposition to intervene by force in the internal 
 affairs of Mexico, either to maintain a republic 
 or to overthrow an imperial government, if Mex- 
 ico chose to establish the one or the other; but 
 that our government knew that the inherent 
 normal opinion of Mexico favored a republican
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 391 
 
 and domestic government in preference to any 
 monarchy imposed from abroad, and that if 
 France should determine to adopt in Mexico a 
 policy adverse to these views, it would probably 
 scatter seeds which might ultimately " ripen into 
 collision between France and the United States 
 and other American republics." It was intimated 
 to Seward that the early acknowledgment of 
 Maximilian's government by this country would 
 tend to shorten, or perhaps to end, the French 
 occupation of Mexico. To this intimation he 
 replied that the French government had been al- 
 ready informed that in the opinion of the United 
 States the permanent establishment of a foreign 
 and monarchical government in Mexico would 
 be found neither easy nor desirable; that this 
 opinion remained unchanged ; and that, so long 
 as the United States continued to regard Mexico 
 as the theatre of a war, which had not yet ended 
 in the subversion of the existing republican gov- 
 ernment with which this country remained in re- 
 lations of peace and friendship, we were not at 
 liberty to consider the question of recognizing a 
 government which, in the further chances of war, 
 might come into its place. 
 
 In all his diplomatic correspondence since the 
 recognition of the Confederates as belligerents 
 by Great Britain, Seward had been hampered 
 by a sense of the possibility of a combination
 
 392 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 between one or more of the great maritime 
 powers with the insurgents, and an apprehen- 
 sion of the probable effect of such a combina- 
 tion upon our contest for the preservation of the 
 Union ; and his efforts were directed to preserv- 
 ing peace with all other nations without impair- 
 ing the dignity of his own country. He had 
 stated with entire frankness, and with unmistak- 
 able distinctness, though in courteous language, 
 our position as to the French intervention in 
 Mexico, yet had been careful to avoid using 
 any expressions which could be construed into a 
 threat, or give France an opportunity for break- 
 ing with us. The members of the legislative 
 department of the government were not so wise. 
 Resolutions upon this subject were introduced 
 into both the House and Senate in the winter 
 of 1864. In the Senate they were laid on the 
 table on the motion of Sumner, who said that 
 if they meant anything, if they were not mere 
 words, they meant war. The House, however, 
 voted that they were unwilling by silence to 
 " leave the world under the impression that they 
 were indifferent spectators of the deplorable 
 events transpiring in the republic of Mexico, 
 and thought fit to declare that it did not accord 
 with the policy of the United States to acknow- 
 ledge any monarchy erected in America upon 
 the ruins of any republic, under the auspices of 
 any European power."
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 393 
 
 This action naturally excited the French gov- 
 ernment, and brought from it the direct inquiry 
 to our minister, " Do you mean peace or war?" 
 When this question was put to him he had heard 
 nothing from home, and could only answer that 
 the terms of the resolution were opposed to 
 the instructions contained in his despatches. 
 The French government, however, considered 
 the resolves as a serious matter, and the seces- 
 sionists in Paris were jubilant until some days 
 later a despatch was received, in which Seward 
 said, that the question of the recognition of a 
 monarchy in Mexico was a purely executive 
 one, the decision of which constitutionally be- 
 longed "not to the House of Representatives, 
 or even to Congress, but to the President of 
 the United States," and that while the President 
 received a declaration from the House of Rep- 
 resentatives with the respect to which it was 
 entitled, he did not contemplate any departure 
 from the policy he had hitherto pursued as to 
 France and Mexico, and that the French govern- 
 ment would be seasonably apprised of any change 
 which he might at any future time think proper 
 to adopt. Fortunately this declaration calmed 
 the French government, and the new war, which 
 Congress seemed to court, without considering 
 that in all probability it might have been fatal 
 to our success in the struggle we had already
 
 394 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 on hand, was averted by the good sense of the 
 President and Seward. 
 
 Maximilian never obtained the popular vote 
 calling 1 him to the throne, upon which he had 
 at first insisted as a condition precedent to his 
 acceptance of the crown. He went to Mexico 
 in the summer of 1864. Negotiations were had 
 from time to time between this government and 
 France to induce the Emperor to withdraw his 
 troops. After the collapse of the Confederacy, 
 attempts were made to persuade the adminis- 
 tration to force France to withdraw her troops 
 at once ; but Seward thought it wiser to give 
 her the opportunity to act in the matter, in ap- 
 pearance at least, upon her own judgment, and 
 not under compulsion. He succeeded in doing 
 this. The French troops were gradually with- 
 drawn during the year 1867, without our having 
 assumed any position which could wound the 
 pride of our old Revolutionary ally. When they 
 left, Maximilian declined to desert his Mexican 
 supporters. He was captured by the Republican 
 army. Seward interfered in vain to procure his 
 release and liberty to return to Europe ; the 
 soldiers insisted on his execution, and the Mexi- 
 can President did not dare to refuse their de- 
 mand. 
 
 If among Seward's despatches during the 
 course of the war there are some that deal with
 
 DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS OF THE WAR. 395 
 
 generalities, and seem prolix and dull, yet his 
 discussions of the actual questions submitted to 
 hirn are open to no such criticism. They are 
 vigorous, simple, direct and to the point, and 
 always manly and dignified. Lord Russell said 
 no more than the truth, when he spoke of the 
 singular and varied ability exhibited in them. 
 They are a credit to American diplomacy, a 
 monument to Se ward's unwearied powers of 
 work, and to his intellectual capacity and re- 
 sources. 
 
 Tried by its results, the success of his diplo- 
 macy during the four years of Lincoln's admin- 
 istration is entitled to the highest praise. We 
 were engaged in a domestic struggle which was 
 taxing our resources to the utmost, and in which 
 we had not the cordial good will of a single one 
 of the great nations of the world, unless it were 
 Russia. The opportunities for differences with 
 these countries were numerous, the dangers of 
 the interference or intervention of one or more 
 of them, or of the outbreak of a war between us 
 and any one of them, were almost constant. 
 Seward conducted us safely through all these 
 perils, with no breach of the peace and no sacri- 
 fice of the honor or dignity of the country.
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHN8OW.- - 
 RETIREMENT FROM PUBLIC LIFE. 
 
 THE Union troops entered Richmond on ;ht 
 3d of April, 1865. Two days later Seward 
 was thrown from his carriage, and so badly in- 
 jured that his life was despaired of for a time. 
 His right shoulder was dislocated, and his jaw 
 broken on both sides. Nine days afterwards, 
 late at night, when only his nurse and daughter 
 were with him, an unknown man succeeded in 
 entering the house, burst open the door of his 
 chamber, rushed to his bedside, and with a bowie- 
 knife slashed and stabbed him in the face and 
 throat, till, alarmed by the wakening household, 
 the would-be assassin hastened to escape, fled 
 through the open door, mounted his horse and 
 rode away. This assault was one act in the con- 
 spiracy whose supreme tragedy was the murder 
 of Lincoln in the theatre. 
 
 Seward survived ; but for more than a year 
 he was compelled to wear mechanical appliances 
 to retain the broken jaw in its place. Before 
 he could leave his bed he insisted on trying to
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 397 
 
 work, and scrawled on scraps of paper directions 
 for his letters ; so soon as he could be moved he 
 was carried daily to his chair in the State De- 
 partment, where he sat, the shrunk, maimed and 
 disfigured semblance of his former self. The 
 injuries which he survived brought on him the 
 great sorrows of his life. Mrs. Seward, who had 
 been for some time an invalid, hastened from 
 Auburn to Washington on learning of his acci- 
 dent. On the night of the assault she was 
 roused by the screams of her daughter, and 
 rushing from her room found her husband in 
 the state we have described. The shock was too 
 much for her ; she survived it only two months, 
 dying on the 21st of June. The tributes of 
 praise to her knew no exception. Se ward's 
 friends and foes alike recognized her charm and 
 her worth, and knew that for him the loss was 
 irreparable. But this was not the only life that 
 was sacrificed to the assault upon him. His 
 only daughter, who, next to her mother, was the 
 person dearest and most important to him, was 
 in his room, saw the attack, his struggles and 
 attempts, in spite of his feebleness, to shield her 
 from any blows, and the scenes of that night 
 killed her. She lived little more than a year ; 
 and her death left Seward very desolate. 
 
 Though for some days after his injuries 
 Seward's life was in great danger, yet thanks to
 
 398 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 his vigorous constitution, his unfailing courage, 
 his excellent physical condition, and his equable 
 temperament, his recovery was rapid, and less 
 than four weeks after the attack on him he was 
 able to receive the President and cabinet at his 
 house. In this short time there had been a 
 revolution in our political world. The Southern 
 Confederacy had ceased to exist, its government 
 had collapsed, its officials were dispersed, its sol- 
 diers had been paroled and sent home by our 
 victorious generals. The questions of the true 
 relation of all the seceding states to the Union, 
 and of the proper treatment of the states which 
 had seceded had therefore to be dealt with at 
 once, whilst their secession had been more 
 gradual, some of them having been the ring- 
 leaders in rebellion, and others having followed 
 with more or less reluctance and hesitation. It 
 had been Mr. Lincoln's idea that no uniform 
 rule should be established, to be applied indis- 
 criminately to the rehabilitation of all these 
 states ; but that each one should be treated as 
 seemed wisest with reference to its own people 
 and condition, without regard to the others, al- 
 ways bearing in mind the declared object of the 
 contest on our part, " the maintenance and 
 preservation of the Union," and troubling our- 
 selves as little as possible with theories as to the 
 effect of their attempted secession upon the reh>
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 399 
 
 tions of these states to the Federal government. 
 He also believed that it was for him, as Presi- 
 dent, to determine when the rebellion had been 
 so far crushed that military rule could come to 
 an end, the troops be withdrawn, the ordinary 
 machinery of civil government put in motion, 
 and the state left to itself ; each House of Con- 
 gress having, as to any of the states in rebellion, 
 the same constitutional right that it has as to 
 all the states, to be " the judge of the elections, 
 returns and qualifications of its own members." 
 He had already put in practice in Louisiana a 
 scheme which seemed to him satisfactory for 
 that state, and two representatives chosen there 
 in the autumn of 1862 had been admitted as 
 members of Congress in February of the follow- 
 ing year. A similar experiment was tried in 
 Arkansas about the same time. 
 
 In his annual message in December, 1863, the 
 President made a full statement of what he had 
 done to bring about the resumption of the na- 
 tional authority in the states where it had been 
 suspended, and transmitted with the message a 
 copy of an amnesty proclamation, granting a 
 pardon to those persons concerned in the rebel- 
 lion, who would take an oath to support the 
 Constitution of the United States, the Union of 
 the states thereunder, and all acts of Congress 
 with reference to slaves passed during the rebel-
 
 400 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 lion, " so long and so far as not repealed, mod- 
 ified or held void by Congress, or by decision 
 of the Supreme Court." Six classes of per- 
 sons were excepted from the promised pardon. 
 Whenever in any of the states in rebellion a 
 number of voters, not belonging to any of the 
 excepted classes, and equal to ten per cent, of 
 those voting for President in 1860, should have 
 taken the required oath, he was willing to trust 
 them to form a state government, and, if it were 
 such a republican government as the Constitu- 
 tion provides that the United States shall guar- 
 antee to every state in the Union, to recognize 
 it as the true government of the state. He 
 was careful to say that he did not intend this to 
 be a Procrustean bed to which exact conformity 
 was indispensable, and that he would by no 
 means exclude the consideration and adoption 
 of other plans. 
 
 The message and proclamation were not well 
 received by Congress. There was a general 
 feeling of irritation that the President should 
 have assumed upon his own responsibility the 
 initiative and power of decision in a matter, 
 which, it was said, was either exclusively a sub- 
 ject for legislation, or one about which Congress 
 should, at least, have been consulted. In the 
 Senate Sumner offered a resolution declaring 
 that a state pretending to secede from the Union,
 
 9KCRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 401 
 
 and "battling against the general government 
 to maintain that position, must be regarded as a 
 rebel state, subject to military occupation, and 
 without representation .. . . until it has been 
 re-admitted by both Houses of Congress." The 
 Senate was not yet ready for so strong a state- 
 ment, and a resolve that " the rebellion was not 
 so far suppressed in Arkansas as to entitle that 
 state to representation in Congress " was substi- 
 tuted and passed. The definitive action, however, 
 in reply to the President, was a bill, the first 
 reconstruction act, passed on the last day of 
 the session, July 4, 1864. This act required 
 the President to appoint a provisional governor 
 for each of the states which had been declared in 
 rebellion, who, when military resistance ceased, 
 should make an enrollment of the white male 
 citizens. If a majority of them should take an 
 oath to support the Constitution, the governor 
 was to order an election of delegates for a con- 
 stitutional convention. This convention was to 
 declare on behalf of the people of the state their 
 submission to the Constitution of the United 
 States, and also to insert in the constitution to 
 be framed for the state, articles providing that 
 no office-holder under the Confederate govern- 
 ment, except civil officers merely ministerial and 
 military officers of inferior grades, should ever 
 vote for, or be, either governor or a member of
 
 402 WILLIAM HENRY 8EWARD. 
 
 the state legislature; that no rebel war debt, 
 state or Confederate, should ever be paid, and 
 that slavery was forever prohibited. When a 
 constitution containing these provisions should 
 have been adopted by a majority of the popular 
 vote, the governor was to certify the fact to the 
 President, and the President, after receiving the 
 assent of Congress, was to recognize the state 
 government so established. 
 
 This act was not signed by Mr. Lincoln, and 
 a few days after the adjournment of Congress, 
 he made public his reasons for this, which were, 
 that he was not willing to commit himself to 
 one inflexible plan of restoration ; or to discour- 
 age and repel the loyal citizens of Louisiana and 
 Arkansas, and set aside their free state l govern- 
 ments ; or to declare Congress constitutionally 
 competent to abolish slavery in the states. He 
 said, however, that if any states chose to adopt 
 the plan proposed in the bill, he would render 
 them all possible executive assistance and would 
 appoint military governors to act according to 
 its provisions. Wade of the Senate, and Henry 
 Winter Davis of the House, replied to the Pres- 
 ident in a paper personally vituperative, and 
 reflecting on his motives, which the country 
 knew to be above suspicion. Lincoln was re- 
 
 1 Slavery had already been abolished in both these states by 
 constitutional amendments.
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 403 
 
 elected. Congress at its next session (Febru- 
 ary 4, 1865) passed a joint resolve declaring 
 certain states not entitled to representation in 
 the electoral college. This resolve excluded 
 Arkansas and Louisiana, and was intended as a 
 rebuke to the President. It was sent to him for 
 his signature. He returned it, signed, but with 
 a message stating that he signed it " in deference 
 to the views implied in its passage and presen- 
 tation," though he thought Congress had com- 
 plete power to exclude all electoral votes which 
 it deemed illegal, and that the president could 
 not by his veto obstruct or defeat the exercise 
 of this power. He disclaimed all right of inter- 
 ference, and said that by his signature he ex- 
 pressed no opinion on the recital of the pream- 
 ble, and no judgment upon the subject of the 
 resolve. 
 
 This short statement shows the substance of 
 what had been done in the way of reconstruction 
 before Lincoln's death, and makes sufficiently 
 clear the radical difference already existing be- 
 tween the President and Congress, and the 
 measures adopted by Congress to assert and 
 maintain its right of control in the matter of 
 reconstruction. Lincoln was very desirous to 
 avoid a personal issue, and willing to make any 
 concessions which did not involve a sacrifice of 
 his convictions, or of what he believed to be the
 
 404 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 prerogatives and duties of his office. In his last 
 public utterance, only a few days before his 
 death, he reaffirmed his faith in the wisdom and 
 justice of his course, and his conviction that 
 any inflexible plan of reconstruction would be a 
 mistake. He had originally called for troops to 
 suppress a resistance to the execution of the laws, 
 too powerful to be overcome by the ordinary 
 judicial processes. There is no question that it 
 is for the President alone to determine when the 
 emergency has arisen which authorizes him to 
 require the aid of the soldiery for this purpose ; 
 and in the absence of any express provision of 
 law, it seemed to Lincoln a legitimate conclu- 
 sion, that it was also for him to decide when the 
 exigency had ceased and the enforcement of the 
 laws could safely be left to the civil authorities, 
 and that it was his duty therefore to ascertain, 
 by whatever means seemed to him best adapted 
 for the purpose, the facts necessary for his de- 
 cision upon this point. 
 
 All that Lincoln did as to reconstruction may 
 be explained and justified, as being the means he 
 adopted to satisfy himself as to the public opin- 
 ion and temper of the South, and to determine 
 whether the troops could be withdrawn, and the 
 execution of the laws of the United States safely 
 intrusted to the ordinary civil government. To 
 secure this it was necessary that the leading men
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 405 
 
 of the South should accept without reservation 
 all the results of the failure of their attempted 
 revolution, should honestly endeavor to make 
 the best of the situation, should be ready to take 
 the hand that Lincoln was holding out to them, 
 and to cooperate heartily with him to bring about 
 the harmonious restoration of the Union. If 
 they would not do this, either they must be dis- 
 franchised and the work intrusted to less com- 
 petent hands, or the military rule must be pro- 
 longed until there should be some satisfactory 
 security that the rebel states had not merely laid 
 down their arms, but that they would not try to 
 evade the new conditions imposed upon them by 
 the emancipation of their slaves and the aboli- 
 tion of slavery. Possibly, if Lincoln had lived, 
 their confidence in his candor, his integrity, his 
 magnanimity and kindliness, aided by his own 
 rare tact and knowledge of men, might have 
 caused his plan to be honestly accepted by the 
 Southern leaders. If he had succeeded in this, 
 it is more than probable that he would have 
 had the support of a majority in the thirty-ninth 
 Congress (March 4, 1865, to March 4, 1867) 
 which, as we shall see, was at first induced with 
 some difficulty to overrule Johnson's vetoes ; if 
 his plan had not worked satisfactorily, he would 
 have been open-minded enough to recognize its 
 failure, and wise enough to modify or even to
 
 406 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 abandon it, as the case might require. Whethet 
 he would ever have assented to imposing upon 
 the South the emancipated slaves as voters is 
 more doubtful. He would not have excluded 
 any one from the ballot on account of his color ; 
 but he never went farther than to suggest that 
 it was worthy of consideration whether the fran- 
 chise might not be conferred as a special privi- 
 lege on some of the more capable and deserving 
 of the colored citizens. He would have been 
 extremely reluctant to subject the white popula- 
 tion of the South to what he would have realized 
 they must feel as so gross a wrong and humilia- 
 tion, or to impose on them as voters an ignorant 
 proletariat of a different race, the mass of whom 
 were totally unfit for the ballot, whose number 
 in all the seceding states taken together was 
 only one-fifth less than that of the whites, while 
 in three of these states it actually exceeded it. 
 In the end Congress gave the colored people the 
 ballot, as essential to their protection ; but the 
 race problem at the South, even though the out- 
 look should be thought hopeful, is by no means 
 yet settled. 
 
 There were persons both in Congress and in 
 the country who thought that the accession of 
 Johnson to the presidency would save us from 
 the consequences of what seemed to them Lin- 
 coln's ill-advised leniency and trust. A caucus
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 407 
 
 of politicians holding these views was held on 
 the very day of Lincoln's death, to consider the 
 questions of a new cabinet and of a less con- 
 ciliatory policy ; and on the next morning the 
 chairman of the reconstruction committee said 
 to the new President : " Johnson, we have faith 
 in you. By the gods, there will be no trouble 
 now in running the government." 
 
 Both before and after his inauguration, John- 
 son had talked of treason as a crime to be pun- 
 ished, and this and similar sayings of his had 
 created an impression that he would make 
 harder terms with the states in rebellion, before 
 permitting them to get back into their " proper 
 practical relations with the Union," than Lin- 
 coln would have done. But no such inference is 
 fairly to be drawn from what he had said. He 
 was speaking, not of harshness to communities, 
 but of the punishment of individuals, and hoped 
 for convictions for treason just as he desired the 
 condemnation of Mr. Lincoln's assassins. The 
 legal and practical difficulties in the way of ob- 
 taining such convictions he realized later. 
 
 The thirty-eighth Congress had expired with 
 the close of Lincoln's first administration ; and 
 unless the President should call an extra session, 
 it would be nearly nine months before the new 
 Congress met. Johnson did not call it together 
 sooner; in this he followed the plan of Mr.
 
 408 WILL 1 AM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 Lincoln, who had thought it fortunate that 
 there was to be so long an interval between the 
 end of the rebellion and the coming together 
 of Congress. Johnson's constitutional opinions 
 were well known. He believed the Union in- 
 tact, and that it included as well the states which 
 had undertaken to secede as those which had re- 
 mained loyal. " It is the doctrine of the Con- 
 stitution," he had said, "that no state can go 
 out of this Union, and morever Congress cannot 
 eject a state from this Union." He had resigned 
 his seat in the Senate of the United States, and 
 gone to Tennessee at Mr. Lincoln's solicitation, 
 as military governor, to facilitate the resumption 
 by that State of her proper relations to the Fed- 
 eral government; he had initiated the measures 
 necessary for this purpose, accepting and acting 
 upon the policy which Lincoln had employed 
 in Louisiana, that civil government should be 
 substituted for military rule whenever armed re- 
 sistance had ceased, and the President, as Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, was satisfied that the people 
 of a state were prepared loyally to accept and 
 abide by the results of the struggle, however 
 bitter they might feel them to be. It would 
 have been impossible for Johnson to hold any 
 other opinion upon the constitutional questions 
 involved in the rebellion. Only upon the theory 
 that Tennessee, in spite of the ordinance of se-
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 409 
 
 cession, was still an integral part of the Union 
 could he properly have retained his seat as sen- 
 ator from that state, or been nominated and 
 elected as vice-president, or be now discharg- 
 ing the duties of President of the United States. 
 This opinion was not the outcome of his con- 
 troversy with Congress ; it was his settled con- 
 viction before any controversy arose, and it 
 governed all his official action on the different 
 reconstruction measures that came before him. 
 
 Early in May, 1865, he issued a proclamation 
 announcing that hostilities had ceased. Three 
 weeks later he published a proclamation of am- 
 nesty, the terms of which were identical with 
 those granted by Lincoln, except that he added 
 seven more to the classes of persons excluded 
 from the benefits of the former proclamation. 
 No criticisms were made as to any of these ad- 
 ditions, unless it be as to the last, which shut 
 out from the right to a pardon " all voluntary 
 participants in the rebellion having more than 
 twenty thousand dollars worth of taxable pro- 
 perty." He has been charged with having 
 inserted this for the purpose of striking at a 
 class of men " whom he personally hated ; " but 
 the accusation seems unjust. This exception 
 would not strike the aristocratic slaveholders, 
 who had lost everything by the extinction of 
 slavery, and of whom Johnson might personally
 
 410 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 complain, but the prosperous business men and 
 traders, earnest Southern sympathizers, active 
 and influential in promoting the rebellion, of 
 whom Johnson had just had experience in Ten- 
 nessee, who were not included in any of the 
 previously excepted classes, but who were in his 
 opinion equally undeserving of pardon. 
 
 There was also added to this proclamation 
 a clause that " special applications for pardon 
 might be made by any one belonging to the ex- 
 cepted classes, and that such clemency would be 
 extended him as might be consistent with the 
 facts of the case and the peace and dignity of 
 the United States." It has been said that this 
 clause was inserted at Seward's instance, and 
 that he favored it for various petty reasons, as 
 it is also asserted that he resisted as long as 
 he could the previous clause excepting men of 
 property. What foundation there may be for 
 these assertions it is difficult to ascertain, but the 
 imputation of low motives is a purely gratui- 
 tous aspersion. The final clause is an extremely 
 proper one, and should not have been omitted. 
 It was substantially copied by Congress when it 
 had succeeded in obtaining control of the whole 
 subject of reconstruction ; 1 and the reasons for 
 its insertion were in each case the same. That 
 the clemency sanctioned by this clause was 
 1 XI V th Amendment to Constitution, Sec. iii.
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 411 
 
 abused is unquestionable ; but this is no reason 
 for altogether omitting the clause. The par- 
 doning power is often improperly exercised, but 
 the necessity for its existence is universally ad- 
 mitted. There can be no doubt that Congress 
 made mistakes as to some of the persons whom it 
 rehabilitated under the provisions of the recon- 
 struction acts. 
 
 On the day that this proclamation was issued, 
 Johnson appointed a provisional governor for 
 North Carolina, and before the middle of July 
 had made similar appointments for the other 
 rebel states for whose government there were no 
 existing provisions. These officers were directed 
 to take measures to call conventions to be com- 
 posed of delegates chosen by the loyal voters of 
 the respective states. These voters were defined 
 to be those persons, possessing the qualifications 
 required by the laws of the state before its 
 secession, who were entitled to the benefits of 
 the amnesty proclamation, and who had taken 
 the prescribed oath. These requirements fol- 
 lowed the precedents established by Lincoln in 
 Louisiana, Arkansas, and Tennessee, and re- 
 stricted the suffrage to white men. The object 
 of each convention was declared to be to secure 
 to its state that republican form of government 
 guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
 States ; the insurrection having deprived the
 
 412 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 states in rebellion of all recognized civil gov- 
 ernments. The convention, or the subsequent 
 legislature in each state, was to prescribe, it was 
 said by the President, " the qualifications of 
 electors, and the eligibility of persons to hold 
 office under the constitution and laws of the 
 state, 1 a power the people of the several states 
 composing the Federal Union have rightfully 
 exercised from the origin of the government 
 until the present time" 
 
 This last sentence emphasizes one point in 
 the differences between Congress and himself. 
 The bill of the previous July had insisted that 
 the state constitutions to be adopted must pro- 
 vide that no Confederate officer of rank or im- 
 portance, civil or military, should ever vote for, 
 or be, governor, or a member of the legislature ; 
 and the President now declared that in his 
 opinion these were matters to be determined not 
 by Congressional dictation, but, as they always 
 had been, by the several states, each for itself, 
 and that the Southern states had not by the 
 rebellion lost the right to do this. Both the 
 President and Congress, however, were agreed 
 that something was required, as proof that the 
 rebellion was really over, before the troops could 
 be properly withdrawn and the people of any 
 
 1 Lincoln took a similar view as to the work of the Louisi- 
 ana convention. N. & H. viii. p. 434.
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 413 
 
 seceding state be permitted to organize a civil 
 government and resume their old relations to 
 the Union ; they were also agreed that some oath 
 should be required of these people. The Presi- 
 dent during this summer had further insisted 
 with each of these states upon its abolition of 
 slavery, its ratification of the thirteenth consti- 
 tutional amendment, which forever prohibited 
 slavery, and its absolute repudiation of all rebel 
 war debts, declaring that he could " not recog- 
 nize the people of any state as having resumed 
 the relations of loyalty to the Union, who ad- 
 mitted the legality of obligations contracted or 
 debts created in their name to promote the war 
 of the rebellion." 
 
 In all that he was doing the President as- 
 sumed to act in the exercise of the war power, 
 and by virtue of his authority as Commander-in- 
 Chief. For any legislation by Congress author- 
 ity must be found either in the Constitution 
 itself, where the only clause which seemed to 
 have any bearing on the matter was that which 
 makes each House the judge of the elections, 
 returns and qualifications of its own members, 
 or in the assumption that the seceding states 
 had forfeited all their constitutional rights, were 
 to be treated like any conquered people, and 
 that therefore Congress had absolute authority 
 over them. This assumption is the ground upon
 
 414 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 which the constitutionality of the reconstruo 
 tion act of March 2, 1867, is to be defended ; 
 yet in this very act Congress showed its want 
 of confidence in the soundness of this theory. 
 It recognized these states as constituent mem- 
 bers of the Union for the purpose of voting on 
 the fourteenth constitutional amendment, while 
 with a palpable inconsistency it denied them 
 their right of representation, unless they voted 
 in a particular way. This theory was origi- 
 nally propounded by Thaddeus Stevens in the 
 House and by Sumner in the Senate, in the 
 resolve already quoted. It was never thoroughly 
 accepted even in Congress, was not sustained 
 by the Supreme Court, was never believed in 
 by Lincoln, and was denied by many leading 
 statesmen and jurists. 1 
 
 It has been asserted that Johnson, 2 after he 
 
 1 To get the votes of those who could not accept Stevens' 
 theory, the reconstruction acts were declared to he an exercise 
 of authority under that clause of the Constitution by which 
 the United States is to guarantee to every state in the Union a 
 republican form of government. This declaration afterward 
 found support in the opinion of Chief Justice Chase in Texas 
 . White (7 Wallace, 700). To maintain this view, however, 
 Teems to oblige one to do violence to the natural and obvious 
 Meaning of this clause, and to give it an effect certainly never 
 Contemplated by the makers of the Constitution. 
 
 2 This is the view of Mr. Elaine ; but General Grant, whose 
 delations with the President entitle his conclusions to much 
 more weight, " thought the plan the child of Johnson's own 
 brain."
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 415 
 
 became President, changed his whole opinion 
 of the proper policy to be pursued towards the 
 seceding states, and that this change was owing 
 to Seward's persuasive powers and the immense 
 influence he had thereby acquired over the Pres- 
 ident. The two statements depend on each 
 other ; if there was no such change in the Presi- 
 dent, then it was certainly not caused by Sew- 
 ard's influence. The real difficulty with John- 
 son was exactly the opposite one, the obstinacy 
 with which he adhered to his policy towards 
 the South, after it became evident that it was a 
 mistake and a failure. The persons who charge 
 the President with reversing his entire policy 
 towards the South have confounded two things 
 which Johnson himself kept quite distinct, the 
 proper treatment of individual wrongdoers, the 
 leaders in rebellion, for whom he thought no pun- 
 ishment too severe, and the leniency to be shown 
 to the communities who had followed their guid- 
 ance, whom he was always disposed to treat with 
 the utmost consideration. His opinions upon 
 constitutional questions were those he had main- 
 tained before his election as Vice-President. Pie 
 believed that the Union was indissoluble ; that 
 the Constitution secured certain rights to the 
 states as well as to the Federal government; 
 that though the exercise of these rights on the 
 one side or the other might be for a time sus-
 
 416 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 pended or prevented, the rights themselves could 
 not be forfeited or lost ; and his course as Pres- 
 ident and all his vetoes were not merely consist- 
 ent with this view, they depended upon it and 
 were its logical outcome. In appointing provis- 
 ional governors of the several rebel states, and 
 in all that he did towards bringing them back 
 to their true position as an integral part of the 
 Union, he believed himself to be carefully fol- 
 lowing in Lincoln's footsteps. He undoubtedly 
 hoped and expected in this way to convert re- 
 pentant rebels into loyal Unionists ; yet before 
 Congress met, he had ample evidence, if he had 
 chosen to heed it, that the Southerners were 
 neither loyal nor submissive, but absolutely un- 
 regenerate and untrustworthy. Had he been a 
 man of a different nature he would have seen 
 this, and would have modified his treatment of 
 them when he found that it was resulting in the 
 restoration of authority to insurgents, who, while 
 laying down their arms, retained their hostil- 
 ity to the government that had compelled their 
 submission. But he had neither the perception, 
 nor the flexibility nor the breadth of mind ne- 
 cessary for this. He was a person essentially 
 narrow, obstinate, and conceited, was coarse and 
 vulgar and possessed of a very bad temper which 
 caused him to lose his head when it got the 
 mastery. He was like many common men, con-
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 417 
 
 scious of his defects, very sensitive to ridicule or 
 to any mark of disrespect, and easily affected by 
 attentions or even gross flattery. He had made 
 an unfortunate exhibition of himself on inau^u- 
 
 O 
 
 ration day, and never forgot that Sumner had 
 urged that, in consequence of this, he should be 
 requested to resign. His first message in De- 
 cember, 1865, shows, however, that he had then 
 no wish or expectation of quarreling with Con- 
 gress. But in little more than a month after 
 the beginning of the session, a resolution offered 
 by a Republican, expressing confidence in the 
 President and in his cooperation with Congress 
 in restoring to their equal position and rights 
 the states lately in insurrection, was buried by 
 sending it to the committee on reconstruction ; 
 and Johnson felt most keenly the indignity thus 
 offered him by his own party. 
 
 In his message in December the President 
 had stated correctly the alternative modes of 
 dealing with the Southern states. They must 
 either be retained under military subjection for a 
 period longer or shorter as circumstances might 
 require, or they must be brought back into 
 practical relations with the Union, as quickly 
 as possible, by methods which necessarily im- 
 plied a trust in the loyalty of the people. The 
 objections to the former scheme were, that it 
 was opposed to all our ideas as to the right
 
 418 WILLIAM HENRY BE WARD. 
 
 of self-government, and that it assumed that 
 the seceding states were practically out of the 
 Union, and that the South was a conquered 
 country over which we had full power. The ob- 
 jections to the latter course were, that it seemed 
 to impose no penalty on rebellion, and that its 
 success depended upon the existence at the 
 South of a sufficient body of people loyal to the 
 United States, and prepared to accept the re- 
 sults of the war. Lincoln and Johnson both 
 believed in the existence of such a body, large 
 enough to form and organize state governments 
 and to serve as a nucleus round which the mass 
 of the citizens would crystallize. In this belief 
 time showed that they were mistaken, and that 
 the four years of war had substantially extin- 
 guished for the time the Union sentiment in the 
 seceding states, as it had destroyed the peace 
 Democracy at the North. The Congressional 
 plan of reconstruction, which was finally adopted, 
 assumed that the North had prevailed in a war 
 of conquest, and had the conquerors' right to 
 deal with the Southerners as a subjugated peo- 
 ple. Johnson opposed this plan by all the 
 means in his power. The contest between him 
 and Congress was most bitter ; it was carried on 
 by vetoes on the one side, and by the passage of 
 bills over these vetoes on the other, by attacks 
 of the President on Congress in various public
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 419 
 
 addresses, while in Congress there were attacks 
 upon him, equally bitter and unjustifiable, which 
 resulted in an impeachment and a trial, upon 
 which no man not a partisan can reflect without 
 a sense of shame. 
 
 Before Lincoln's death an act of Congress had 
 established the freedmen's bureau. Early in 
 1866 a bill was passed enlarging the powers of 
 this bureau, and extending the period of its 
 existence. This bill the President vetoed on 
 constitutional and other grounds, and his veto 
 was sustained. A second bill was then intro- 
 duced, drawn not with a view to overcoming the 
 President's objections and obtaining his approval, 
 but with regard to the ability to pass it over his 
 veto, which was done on the same day that the 
 veto message was received (July 16, 1866). 
 "It required, however, potent persuasion rein- 
 forced by the severest party discipline to prevent 
 a serious break in both houses against the bill," 
 and to carry it over the veto. 
 
 In April, before the passage of this act, a civil 
 rights bill, giving to the colored people in every 
 state equal civil rights with the whites, had also 
 been passed over the President's veto ; but to 
 secure the majority required to do this, it had 
 been found necessary to unseat by a strict party 
 vote a Democrat, who would otherwise have 
 retained his place in the Senate, and to insist
 
 420 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 upon a vote, when one of the Republicans who 
 sided with the President was ill and unable to 
 be in his seat. In December, 1865, Congress 
 had passed the thirteenth amendment to the 
 Constitution. This prohibited slavery every- 
 where. In June (1866) they passed the four- 
 teenth amendment which declared all persons 
 born or naturalized here to be citizens, prohibited 
 any state from abridging their privileges or 
 immunities, and proportionally reduced the re- 
 presentation in Congress and in the electoral 
 college of any state which denied to any of its 
 male citizens the right of suffrage. This amend- 
 ment also prohibited any person, who, having 
 taken an oath to support the Constitution of the 
 United States, had engaged in insurrection, from 
 holding any office under the United States or in 
 any state, unless this disability should have been 
 removed by a two-thirds vote of both houses of 
 Congress. The proposed amendment was no 
 affair of the President's, but he very unwisely 
 sent to Congress a message expressing his disap- 
 proval of it. 
 
 By a series of offensive speeches, beginning 
 on Washington's birthday and culminating in 
 those which he delivered at various places during 
 a summer tour in 1866, Johnson had succeeded 
 in utterly disgusting the people, and had wholly 
 lost the confidence of the country. The autumn
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 421 
 
 elections went decidedly against him, and gave 
 to Congress a free hand. In the following 
 year they passed the military reconstruction bill, 
 which laid down the conditions required of any 
 state to obtain the admission of its senators and 
 representatives to Congress, and the counting 
 of its votes in the electoral college. These con- 
 ditions were : the adoption of a constitution 
 which granted universal suffrage, which abol- 
 ished slavery forever, which prohibited the pay- 
 ment of any rebel war debt, which secured ab- 
 solute equality between all classes of citizens ; 
 and the ratification by the state of both the 
 thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the 
 constitution. To these was added one further 
 condition. No state in insurrection was to be 
 admitted to representation in Congress or in the 
 electoral college until the thirteenth and four- 
 teenth amendments had become part of the 
 Constitution by the ratification of two thirds of 
 the states. Meantime the Southern states were 
 divided into various military districts, several 
 states being united for this purpose, and placed 
 under a single command. This bill was vetoed 
 by the President, but was passed over the veto. 
 This was the plan of reconstruction which was 
 finally carried out. Whether it would have 
 worked satisfactorily had the President and 
 Congress been cordially at one in endeavoring
 
 422 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 to promote its success, is uncertain. Before it 
 was adopted the President's plan had failed. 
 Unrepentant rebels had got control of state gov- 
 ernments which he had recognized ; there were 
 outrages and riots, and though slavery had been 
 technically abolished, vagrant and apprentice 
 laws had been passed in several of the Southern 
 states, the purpose and effect of which was to 
 reduce the colored people to a condition anal- 
 ogous to that from which they were supposed 
 to have been freed. The seceding states at last 
 accepted the terms which Congress had pre- 
 scribed, but only because they found there was 
 no escape from doing so, if they wished to be 
 represented in the House and Senate ; in 1868 
 they all, with the exception of Virginia, Missis- 
 sippi, and Texas, were readmitted to the Union. 
 The three states last named were brought back 
 in 1870. Although the states had accepted these 
 conditions for the purpose of obtaining their old 
 rights, they felt that they were not bound to 
 observe in good faith the requirements which 
 had been forced upon them, and for several years 
 they resorted to all sorts of expedients to deprive 
 the freedmen of the free and fair exercise of 
 the suffrage to which they were legally entitled. 
 The success of the congressional reconstruction 
 scheme was therefore by no means an unquali- 
 fied one. It was disapproved of at the time
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 423 
 
 by some of the leaders and by a number of the 
 members of the Republican party, and it had a 
 considerable influence in inducing many of the 
 most conservative of them to join at last the 
 ranks of the Democracy. 
 
 Though the President's reconstruction policy 
 was not inspired by Seward, but had its origin 
 in Johnson's own convictions as to the proper 
 construction of the Constitution and the true 
 position of the seceding states, and was in har- 
 mony with that which he had with Lincoln's 
 approval pursued in Tennessee, yet it was the 
 logical sequel of the doctrines reiterated by 
 Seward again and again in his despatches as 
 secretary of state. 1 
 
 It would have been obviously impossible for 
 Seward, after having labored for four years to 
 satisfy the governments of Europe that the 
 Union was intact, that we were engaged in 
 quelling an insurrection and were not embarked 
 in a war of conquest, to deny his own instruc- 
 tions and assent to the new congressional theo- 
 
 1 In Senator Sherman's Recollections, published since thig 
 chapter was written, he says : " After this long lapse of time 
 I am convinced that Mr. Johnson's scheme of reconstruction 
 was wise and judicious." [Vol. i. p. 361.] Was it not the hos- 
 tility between Congress and the President, rather than John- 
 son's policy, that encouraged the subdued secessionists to try 
 to evade the legislation of four years and escape the conse- 
 quences of their unsuccessful rebellion ?
 
 424 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ries and to the legislation which followed them. 
 He thought the course of Congress unwise as 
 well as unconstitutional ; he believed in the 
 President's honesty of purpose, the soundness 
 of his constitutional views and the correctness 
 of his vetoes, and holding these opinions saw no 
 reason why he should leave the cabinet. He 
 regretted extremely the dissensions which had 
 arisen from the differences of opinion as to the 
 best mode of' reconstruction ; but did not con- 
 sider these differences or dissensions as of pri- 
 mary importance. He had no doubt that the 
 states which had ceased their resistance in the 
 field would in some way, after no long delay, 
 come again into the full enjoyment of their 
 privileges as members of the Union ; and that 
 time would not merely heal the wounds of the 
 war, but would also efface any bitterness which 
 might follow the harsh measures of Congress; 
 and so believing, he was not a violent partisan 
 of either party. Speaking at the Cooper Insti- 
 tute on Washington's birthday, he said : " I am 
 not here as an alarmist ; I am not here to say 
 that the nation is in peril or danger in peril 
 if you adopt the opinions of the President ; in 
 peril if you reject them ; in peril if you adopt 
 the views of the apparent or real majority of 
 Congress, or if you reject them. Nor do I think 
 the cause of liberty and human freedom, the
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 425 
 
 cause of progress or civilization, the cause of 
 national aggrandizement present or future, mate- 
 rial or moral, is in danger of being long arrested, 
 whether you adopt one set of political opinions 
 or another. The Union has been rescued from 
 all its perils. The noble ship has passed from 
 tempest and billows within the verge of a safe 
 harbor, without a broken spar or a leak, star- 
 board or larboard, fore or aft. There are some 
 small reefs yet to pass as she approaches her 
 moorings. One pilot says that she may safely 
 enter directly through them. The other says 
 that she must back, and, lowering sail, take time 
 to go around them. That is all the difference 
 of opinion between the pilots. I should not 
 practice my habitual charity if I did not admit 
 that I think them both sincere and honest. But 
 the vessel will go in safely, one way or the other. 
 The worst that need happen will be that, by 
 taking the wrong instead of the right passage, 
 or even taking the right passage and avoiding 
 the wrong one, the vessel may roll a little, and 
 some honest, capable, and even deserving politi- 
 cians, statesmen, president, or congressmen may 
 get washed overboard. I should be sorry for 
 this, but if it cannot be helped, it can be borne. 
 If I am one of the unfortunates, let no friend 
 be concerned on that account." 
 
 Seward had remained in the cabinet, how-
 
 426 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 ever, not so much to take part in the process 
 of reconstruction as because he wished to dis- 
 pose of the diplomatic questions which the war 
 had left unsettled, and thus to finish his work. 
 These, the proper duties of his office, he found 
 much less onerous than during the war, and 
 more fruitful and agreeable in their results. 
 With the various states of Central and South 
 America he made treaties for the settlement of 
 all outstanding claims ; and with Nicaragua, 
 one containing stipulations for a transit between 
 the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Nicaragua 
 Canal. As has already been stated, the French 
 were induced by negotiations, and without a 
 resort to war on our part, to withdraw their 
 troops from Mexico, and the republican govern- 
 ment was reestablished there, though its advent 
 to power was stained by the execution of Maxi- 
 milian, whose life Seward's exertions were un- 
 able to save. 
 
 The European governments had always denied 
 the right of any native-born subject to cast off 
 his allegiance to his own country and to become 
 a citizen of an adopted one. Our naturalization 
 laws permitted a foreigner to do this, and per- 
 sonal complications were constantly arising on 
 account of this difference. Seward succeeded, 
 at first with Prussia and afterwards with various 
 other countries of Europe, in arranging this
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 427 
 
 matter on a satisfactory basis. He also made 
 a treaty with the Island of Madagascar which 
 opened to us trade and commerce there, and un- 
 der which this country absorbed about two thirds 
 of the entire foreign business of that island, and 
 retained it until the recent conquest and annex- 
 ation of Madagascar by France. 
 
 Any practical discussion of the Alabama 
 claims was negatived by Lord Russell's emphatic 
 refusal to admit England's liability on this ac- 
 count ; this matter therefore remained in abey- 
 ance until the change of ministry in 1868. Mr. 
 Adams had resigned at the close of the previous 
 year, and Eeverdy Johnson had been sent to 
 England in his place. He negotiated with Lord 
 Clarendon a treaty for the settlement of these 
 claims, which was known as the Johnson-Claren- 
 don treaty. It gave to the United States, in 
 substance, all that it got by the treaty of Wash- 
 ington ; but it was rejected by the Senate, upon 
 the ground that it belittled, by its form, the 
 work to be done, ignored the greater national 
 grievances, and contained no word of regret for 
 the fact that American commerce had been swept 
 from the sea by the rebel cruisers, and for the 
 enormous loss thus inflicted on the country. 
 
 Though the actual treaty failed to be ratified, 
 Seward had secured by it the essential conces- 
 sion, an admission of the principle of arbi-
 
 428 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 tration for the settlement of our claims against 
 Great Britain for the losses occasioned by these 
 cruisers ; and, this concession once made, a satis- 
 factory treaty was sure sooner or later to follow. 
 
 The most important and successful treaty with 
 which Seward's name will always remain as- 
 sociated, was that for the purchase of Alaska. 
 To many people it seemed a wild and visionary 
 scheme to annex, at the cost of more than seven 
 millions of dollars, this frozen region of the 
 North ; but Mr. Sumner was induced to see both 
 its political and pecuniary value, and he made 
 these so clear to the Senate that the treaty was 
 easily ratified. Subsequent events have justified 
 its wisdom ; Alaska has returned to the treasury 
 of the United States many fold the original pur- 
 chase money. 
 
 Another treaty to which Seward attached 
 great importance, that for the purchase from 
 Denmark of the island of St. Thomas in the 
 West Indies, failed in the Senate, partly, one 
 cannot but think, because of the bitter enmity 
 of that body and its leaders to the President. 
 We had suffered exceedingly during the whole 
 civil war from the want of a foothold and a har- 
 bor of our own in the West Indies, which might 
 serve as a coaling and naval station ; and the 
 great importance of a possession of this sort to 
 us, in any war in which we might be either neu-
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE UNDER JOHNSON. 429 
 
 trals or belligerents, had been recognized by our 
 military and naval commanders. St. Thomas 
 fulfilled exactly the desired conditions. A small 
 island, with a limited population, its purchase 
 would give rise to no embarrassing questions as 
 to how its people should be governed, or as to 
 their participation in the public affairs of this 
 country. It is poor in agricultural products 
 and resources, but has a magnificent land-locked 
 harbor ; it was at that time the great commer- 
 cial entrepot for trade with Venezuela, Porto 
 Rico, San Domingo and Hayti, and the princi- 
 pal rendezvous for the steam packets of various 
 important West India lines ; it had a population 
 two-thirds Protestant, with a language almost 
 exclusively English. The fact that its agricultu- 
 ral products were few, and that it suffered from 
 time to time, like other tropical islands, from 
 the violent disturbances of the elements, ren- 
 dered it no less valuable or important to us for 
 the purposes for which we required it. 
 
 This treaty had been much valued by Seward, 
 and was vigorously championed by him, though 
 it was not finally disposed of until after his term 
 of office had expired. " It became a part of 
 the great controversy between the Executive 
 and Congress. The President and the State De- 
 partment had negotiated this treaty, and there- 
 fore, if for no other reason, the Senate would
 
 430 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 not consent to it.' 5 1 There were questions as 
 to the price to be paid, and other financial con- 
 siderations, which might have led to its rejec- 
 tion ; but the judgment of practical experts like 
 Secretary Fox and Admiral Porter, that the 
 island would be of the greatest value and im- 
 portance to us for naval purposes, is certainly 
 entitled to far more weight than the opinions, 
 however emphatic and decided, of those persons 
 who had no such special knowledge or qualifica- 
 tions. The admiral and the secretary were both 
 strenuous advocates of this treaty. 
 
 At the close of President Johnson's admin- 
 istration Seward resigned his office and left 
 Washington. " I never saw him," wrote a 
 friend at this time, " more happy than he is 
 now ; so different (without his stilts) from what 
 he has been the last ten years." 
 
 With short intervals of rest at home, the next 
 two years and a half were spent by him in 
 travel. He visited the western coast of America 
 from Alaska to Lower California, crossed Mex- 
 ico and returned by the West Indies, and later 
 made a journey round the world, of which an 
 account has been published, taken from his jour- 
 nals and dictation. After his return he passed 
 the remainder of his days, either in his home- 
 stead at Auburn, or in his son's cottage on 
 1 Dawes's Summer, 282.
 
 >' 
 
 FE\ 
 
 RETIREMENT FROM PUBLIC LIFE\ 431 
 
 Owasco Lake. Here, with his strength gradu- 
 ally failing, his temper always serene and cheer- 
 ful, his mind clear and untouched, he waited the 
 slow approach of Death. At work in the morn- 
 ing with his adopted daughter on his notes of 
 travel, he lay down to rest, and the end came. 
 He died on the 10th of October, 1872. 
 
 It may not be entirely amiss here to say a 
 word of Seward as a man. In all the relations 
 of private life he was most admirable : a devoted 
 husband, a kind and sympathetic father, a firm 
 and loyal friend, an excellent neighbor and cit- 
 izen. The bitter disappointment of the people 
 of Auburn at his failure to receive the presi- 
 dential nomination in 1860 shows the love they 
 bore him. His optimism in politics and in life 
 generally was not merely the result of a disposi- 
 tion naturally cheerful and buoyant, but of a 
 firm faith in an overruling Providence. His in- 
 dustry was tireless, his capacity for work enor- 
 mous. He often wrote far into the night, and 
 during the years of his active practice as a 
 lawyer the young men in his office would fre- 
 quently find in the morning the floor of hi? 
 room strewn with papers which he had written 
 while they were asleep. 
 
 His political life stretched over a period of 
 nearly forty years, occupied with the discussion 
 and settlement of the most vital and exciting
 
 432 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 questions both by legislation and war. He has 
 been charged with having no political convic- 
 tions, but an examination of his public career 
 seems to prove exactly the contrary. From 
 first to last he was a consistent Whig. He be- 
 lieved in and advocated a protective tariff, in- 
 ternal improvements, and all the doctrines which 
 formed the policy of that party. His hostility 
 to slavery began with his life in Georgia, and 
 what he saw there, while he was yet a mere lad. 
 His opposition to it never ceased so long as 
 slavery in any form was a political question : 
 and he had the satisfaction, as secretary of 
 state, of signing his name not merely to the 
 Proclamation of Emancipation, but to both the 
 Constitutional amendments which secured to 
 the colored people of this country complete civil 
 equality with the whites. He was never, how- 
 ever, an abolitionist. He was a steady and per- 
 sistent advocate of gradual and compensated 
 emancipation. From his short life at the South 
 he realized more fully perhaps than any North- 
 ern statesman the enormous difficulties and em- 
 barrassments which the sudden and violent free- 
 ing of the slaves would bring about at the 
 South the destruction of property and the 
 temporary ruin of all industries which such an 
 emancipation would be likely to cause ; and he 
 had therefore a compassion for the people of
 
 RETIREMENT FROM PUBLIC LIFE. 433 
 
 that region, rebels though they had been, which 
 people at the North could hardly understand. 
 
 He not only had convictions, but he had the 
 courage of his convictions, and did not hesi- 
 tate to separate himself from his friends, to 
 oppose his party or to risk his own popularity 
 in support of these convictions. His defense of 
 the poor negro Freeman is a striking example 
 of this. His political life is full of illustrations 
 of the same quality. His persistent support of 
 what he regarded as the rights of the Roman 
 Catholics in the public schools, and his opposi- 
 tion to the Know-nothing party, which cost him 
 his nomination at Chicago, are marked instances 
 of it. His political controversies never degen- 
 erated into personalities. He gave to his oppo- 
 nents the same credit for honesty of conviction 
 which he expected them to accord to him, and 
 numbered among his friends many of those who 
 in public life were his political opponents. He 
 was not a shrewd political manager ; he trusted 
 to others to manage for him. Perfectly clean- 
 handed himself, by the admission of those who 
 had the least confidence in him, he may have 
 permitted his political managers and friends to 
 do what they thought was for his interest ; but 
 he knew very little about this ; he surrendered 
 himself entirely into their hands, and had to 
 bear the consequences of their mistakes, as well
 
 434 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 as receive the benefit of their successes. The 
 severest judgments on him came from members 
 of his own party, from whom he happened to 
 differ as to a particular measure or policy, who 
 were not clear sighted enough to see, as he did, 
 that " one half the effort of the anti-slavery men 
 was lost, because it consisted of the incrimimv 
 tion of other anti-slavery men for shades of dif- 
 erence of opinion ; and that the field was broad 
 enough for all." 
 
 He was most severely attacked, however, by 
 the leaders of his own party for remaining in 
 Johnson's cabinet ; and they spoke of him and 
 treated him as a traitor. It would have been 
 easier and pleasanter for him to have resigned, 
 but to abandon Johnson under the actual cir- 
 cumstances would have seemed to Seward like 
 desertion, and he had to bring himself to bear, 
 with such equanimity as he was master of, his 
 old friends' avoidance of him. The cordial wel- 
 come he received, and the honors paid him in all 
 parts of the world during the next two years 
 must have served to efface the recollection of 
 this coldness and neglect. Though he never 
 recovered his vigor of body after his injuries in 
 1865, the activity of his mind was inexhaustible. 
 He planned his travels, lest " rest should mean 
 rust," and with the thought that the study of 
 mankind would be the most interesting and least
 
 RETIREMENT FROM PUBLIC LIFE. 435 
 
 fatiguing pursuit for him. He might have ex- 
 pected a kindly welcome in California, for whose 
 admission as a free state he had labored in the 
 Senate, and in Alaska, which he had made a 
 part of our country. He might have looked for 
 a friendly reception from the republican presi- 
 dent of Mexico, who was largely indebted to 
 him as secretary of state ; but he could hardly 
 have thought that from the day of his arrival 
 until the day of his departure from that coun- 
 try he was to be, at every stage of his journey 
 and at every resting place, not merely the gov- 
 ernment's, but the people's guest. There was 
 apparently no hamlet so small that his name 
 and fame had not preceded him there. Not the 
 least grateful token of recognition that he re- 
 ceived was in a village of cane huts, where the 
 tall, swarthy headman handed into the carriage, 
 with a profound bow, a scroll on which was writ- 
 ten, " To the great statesman of the great Re- 
 public of the North. Techaluta is poor, but she 
 is not ungrateful." 
 
 In the East he was everywhere received with 
 the highest honors. The Mikado of Japan un- 
 veiled his face to him in a friendly audience, an 
 honor said to have been never before bestowed 
 on a foreigner ; he also desired his ministers to 
 converse with him on affairs of state, and it 
 must have been gratifying to Seward to have
 
 436 WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD. 
 
 been asked by them to observe that, in dealing 
 with the vanquished party in a late rebellion, 
 "the government of Japan had copied the ex- 
 ample of toleration given them by the United 
 States." 
 
 Throughout the entire East his reception was 
 the same. His reputation had everywhere pre- 
 ceded him. The prince-regent of China rose 
 from a sick-bed to visit him. The ministers of 
 the various countries were eager to see and to 
 talk with the distinguished statesman of the 
 West, of whom they had heard so much ; the 
 European governors and native princes of India 
 vied with each other in their attentions to him. 
 
 Seward's observation was quick and his per- 
 ceptions acute, and he returned home with his 
 mind stored with the results and experience of 
 travel, and with new and healthful interests and 
 occupations for the remainder of his days. In 
 spite of his great sorrows and of his increas- 
 ing infirmities, his last years were happy ones. 
 Even in the busiest period of his life his own 
 hearthstone had been always the place dearest 
 to him, and now the companionship and affec- 
 tion of his children and grandchildren and the 
 society of his lifelong friends and neighbors 
 were the solace and enjoyment of his serene 
 old age.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ADAMS, Charles Francis, Free Soil 
 candidate for vice-president, 54 ; 
 minister to England, 288, 298, 301 ; 
 argues with Lord Russell on rec- 
 ognition of belligerency, 803, 304 ; 
 announces end of foreign hostility, 
 355 ; informs Lord Russell of pur- 
 pose of the Alabama, 377 ; and of 
 the Alexandra, 379 ; negotiates 
 with him regarding enlistment 
 laws, 381 ; makes claim for 
 damage done by Confederate 
 cruisers, 383 ; his opinion of Eng- 
 lish view of this damage, 384 ; re- 
 signs, 427. 
 
 Adams, John Quiucy, friend of 
 Seward, 14 ; as anti-Mason, 14, 
 16; versus Jackson in 1828, 19. 
 
 Alabama, the, leaves port, 377 ; 
 England's virtual breach of neu- 
 trality, 378, 379; depredations 
 and destruction of, 379; claims. 
 427. 
 
 Alaska, purchase of, 428. 
 
 Albany Regency, the, 9. 
 
 Alexandra, the, 379 ; questions pro- 
 voked as to enlistment laws, 380, 
 381. 
 
 Anderson, Major Robert, command- 
 ant of Fort Sumter, 223, 252, 254, 
 25G, 2G9. 
 
 Andrew, John A., governor of 
 Massachusetts, his opinion of 
 Seward, 212. 
 
 Anti-Masons, the, political activity 
 of, 12-17 ; origin and extinction 
 of, 15. 
 
 Arkansas, right of representation 
 denied under Reconstruction Act, 
 401, 403. 
 
 Atchison, David R., senator from 
 Missouri, 163, 165, 166, 167, 175. 
 
 Banks, General X. P., in command 
 at New Orleans, 373. 
 
 Bates, Edward, attorney - general, 
 232, 250; his action in the re- 
 lief of Sumter and Pickeus, 254, 
 255. 
 
 Beauregard, General P. G. T., in 
 command at Charleston, 266, 267, 
 269. 
 
 Bell, John, 198 ; opposes Lecompton 
 Constitution, 209. 
 
 Birney, James G., 49, 51. 
 
 Blair, Montgomery, his allegation 
 against Seward re Dixou, 131, 137, 
 138, 139 ; suggested for the cabi- 
 net, 232, 233; objections against 
 him, 246, 247 ; is chosen, however, 
 250 ; his action in the relief of 
 Sumter and Pickens, 253, 255, 271. 
 
 Brooks, Preston 8., his assault on 
 Sumner, 175, 176. 
 
 Buchanan, James, 120 ; nominated 
 for the presidency, 158 ; disposi- 
 tion of votes at his election. ICO ; 
 represents slave-holders, 161 ; in- 
 augurated, 181 ; deposes Stanton, 
 190 ; defends his course as to 
 Kansas, 190 ; calls Kansas a slave 
 state, 193 ; said to have conferred 
 with Taney prior to inaugural ad- 
 dress, 194, 195 ; his cabinet, 223, 
 224; influenced by the South, 
 224 ; and by the attorney-general, 
 225, 226 ; no pretext for the seiz- 
 ure of Washington during his ad- 
 ministration, 228 ; his message to 
 ministers abroad as to secession, 
 2S5 ; further instructions to them, 
 286. 
 
 Bunch, British consul at Charles- 
 ton, negotiates with Jefferson 
 Davis regarding Treaty of Paris, 
 315, 316. 
 
 Butler, General B. F., declares 
 slaves to be contraband of war, 
 303 ; treats foreigners arbitrarily, 
 373.
 
 438 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Calhoun, John C., and the anti- 
 Masons, 1C, 17 ; negotiates for the 
 annexation of Texas, 49 ; his view 
 of slavery, 03 ; opposes Clay on 
 territorial government and slav- 
 ery questions, 82 ; how he regards 
 compromise, 96 ; his doctrine of 
 property of States in tiie territo- 
 ries, 184. 
 
 California, need of government for, 
 C3, 04 ; tentative government, G4 ; 
 Southern designs respecting, CC, 
 G7, 69 ; asked to seek admission 
 to the Union, 67 ; admission dis- 
 cussed at Washington, 88, 89. 
 (See, also, under "Territories.") 
 
 Cameron, Simon, 217, 218, 232; 
 member of Lincoln's cabinet, 250 ; 
 opposed to relief of Sumter, 254. 
 
 Campbell, John A., Judge of Su- 
 preme Court, agent at Washing- 
 ton for the Rebel commissioners, 
 259 ; his policy and plans, 2GO, 
 2G1, 262 ; reports coming evacua- 
 tion of Sumter, 263; writes to 
 Jefferson Davis about it, 264 ; 
 misrepresents Seward's state- 
 ment, 2C5 ; declares himself well 
 informed, 267, 268 ; gets Seward's 
 answer re Sumter, 270; writes 
 to Seward, 272 ; foresees decision 
 as to Sumter, 273 ; writes to 
 Seward again, 274 ; comment on 
 these transactions, 275. 
 
 Canadian rebellion, 28. 
 
 Caroline, affair of the, 28-38. 
 
 Cass, General Lewis, nominee of 
 the Democrats, 54, 55, 56 ; on 
 slavery in a territory, 66 ; loses 
 nomination for the presidency, 
 119. 
 
 Charleston harbor, stone blockade 
 of, 371,372. 
 
 Chase, Salmon P., 126 ; stated to be 
 presidential candidate, 154 ; with- 
 draws, 155 ; in the field again, 
 210, 217 ; talked of for the cabi- 
 net, 232 ; member of it, 250 ; ac- 
 tion in the relief of Sumter and 
 Pickeus, 253, 255, 271 ; his opin- 
 ion of Lincoln's policy, 279 ; gives 
 him advice, 281 ; his view of the 
 Trent affair, 331, 332 ; resijmation 
 from office refused, 362, 363. 
 
 Clay, Henry, defeated as presiden- 
 tial nominee, 14, 15 ; candidacy 
 in 1844, 48 ; how he viewed an- 
 nexation of Texas, 49, 50, 51, 52 ; 
 
 nominated, 52 ; hostile to Taylor. 
 75, 76 ; offers Compromise Reso- 
 lutions, 80-82; secures Web- 
 ster's approval, 82 ; admired as 
 an orator, 86, 87 ; his opinion of 
 Seward's abolition speech, 87 ; 
 his views on compromise, 96; the 
 Compromise Resolutions, 97, 98 ; 
 the Omnibus Bill, 97 ; its fate, 98 ; 
 carriage of compromise measures, 
 99 ; insists on holding to them, 
 109. 
 
 Clinton, De Witt, governor of New 
 York, nominates Seward for sur- 
 rogate of Cayuga County, 6, 7 ; 
 father of the Erie Canal scheme, 
 24. 
 
 Confederate cruisers, built and 
 equipped in England, 376 ; their 
 sailing at first not prevented, 379 ; 
 then often stopped, 382 ; Eng- 
 land's liability for their depreda- 
 tions, 383 ; indemnity paid, 384 ; 
 their harm to trade, 384, 385; 
 their reception in foreign ports, 
 385. 
 
 Confederate successes in 1862, 352, 
 353; checked, 353 ; consequences 
 on British opinion, 353. 
 
 Corwin, Thomas, a leading Com- 
 promiser, 99. 
 
 Cowley, Lord, British envoy to 
 France, 305, 307. 
 
 Crittendeu, John J., 191 ; opposes 
 Lecompton Constitution, 198 ; 
 brings forward constitutional 
 amendments, 233 ; which are not 
 accepted, 234, 236. 
 
 Cuba Bill, the, 202, 203. 
 
 Curtis, Judge B. R., on the Dred 
 Scott case, 184, 185. 
 
 Dallas, George N., U. S. minister 
 to England, 302, 305, 307. 
 
 Davis, Henry Winter, attacks 
 Lincoln in connection with Re- 
 construction, 403. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, declares slavery 
 sanctioned by the Bible, 93 ; loses 
 election for governor of Missis- 
 sippi, 111 ; helps to upset the 
 Missouri Compromise, 125 ; offers 
 pro-slavery resolutions in the 
 Senate, 204 ; his intrigues inter- 
 fered with, 226 ; proposes an 
 amendment to the Constitution, 
 236 ; tries to get the Confederacy 
 recognized abroad, 298; issues
 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 439 
 
 letters of marque, 306, 312 ; ne- 
 gotiates with Bunch regarding 
 Treaty of Paris, 315 ; sends Mason 
 and Slidell to Europe, 321. 
 
 Denver, John W., governor of Kan- 
 sas, 193. 
 
 District of Columbia, questions as 
 to slavery there, 81, 88, 90, 103, 
 234. 
 
 Dix, General John A., pronounces 
 on Lincoln's want of policy. 279. 
 
 Dixon, Archibald, his connection 
 with the repeal of the Missouri 
 Compromise, 131, 135, 139. 
 
 Dodge, Henry, senator from Wis- 
 consin, introduces bill for organi- 
 zation of Nebraska, 132. 
 
 Douglas, Stephen A., 124 ; helps to 
 upset Missouri Compromise, 125, 
 126, 127 ; tne Nebraska Bill, 133, 
 134, 136, 137; object of his de- 
 nunciation of the Know-nothings, 
 148; his report on Kansas 
 troubles, 170 ; addresses the Sen- 
 ate on tht subject, 171 ; de- 
 nounces admission of Kansas, 
 192 ; his po.ver, 192 ; sides with 
 Republicans on Kansas question, 
 196 ; debates with Lincoln, 201 ; 
 nominated for presidency, 209. 
 
 Dred Scott case, the, judgment of 
 Supreme Court, 181, 182, 183, 
 194 ; opinion of the dissenting 
 judges, 182, 183, 184 ; additional 
 pronouncement of the chief jus- 
 tice, 183, 184, 195; opinions of 
 Curtis, Lincoln, Seward, 185; de- 
 cision claimed to allow slavery in 
 all states, 221. 
 
 Emancipation, questions relating 
 to, 358. 363, 364 ; Lincoln on the 
 subject, 365; and Seward, 366; 
 proclamation postponed, 366 ; de- 
 clared, 366, 367. 
 
 Emigrant Aid Societies, their action 
 in Kansas, 164, 170, 171. 
 
 England, good feeling there towards 
 the Union, 293; probable effect 
 of war on her industries, 294, 296, 
 297 ; hostility towards the North, 
 297 ; proposal of concerted action 
 with France, 299, 300; negotia- 
 tions with U. 8. concerning Treaty 
 of Paris, 312, 313; her attitude 
 towards privateering, 314-317 ; 
 prepares for war in consequence 
 Of the Trent affair, 322, 323 ; how 
 
 insulted, 323 ; refuses to retract 
 recognition of belligerency, 352 ; 
 abandons mediation, 353 ; treaty 
 with U. S. for extirpation of slave 
 trade, 355 ; supplies the rebels, 
 375 ; her violations of neutrality, 
 375, 376 ; more active in stopping 
 Confederate cruisers from sailing, 
 382 ; her liability for damage done 
 by them, 383, 384 ; in the alliance 
 against Mexico, 388 ; withdraws 
 from it, 389. 
 
 Enlistment laws, 380, 381. 
 
 Erie Canal, Seward against its con- 
 struction, 8 ; enlarged by him, 23. 
 
 Erie Railway, opening of, 110. 
 
 Everett, Edward, 16, 209. 
 
 European opinion as to the war, 292, 
 296, 320. 
 
 Fessenden, William P., 126; on 
 Mormon question, 200. 
 
 Fillmore, Millard, nominated for 
 the vice-presidency, 54 ; succeeds 
 Taylor, 99 ; position with regard 
 to Seward and Compromise, 101, 
 102 ; Compromise candidate in 
 1853, 120 ; defeated for the presi- 
 dency, 160. 
 
 Fish, Hamilton, elected to the Sen- 
 ate, 107. 
 
 Florida, the, 376, 377. 
 
 Foote. Henry S., governor of Missis- 
 sippi, 111, 126. 
 
 Forsyth, John, secretary of state, 
 29. 
 
 Fort Pickens, 223 ; the relief expe- 
 dition, 252, 255, 256, 270, 271, 
 273 ; success of the expedition, 
 257. 
 
 Fort Sumter, 223, 225 ; completely 
 blockaded, 252 ; relief considered, 
 252-254, 255; failure of relief 
 expedition, 256 ; historical im- 
 portance of first shot fired there, 
 257 ; reported evacuation, 262, 
 263, 266, 267. 
 
 Fox, Captain G. V., assistant secre- 
 tary of the navy, 251 ; his part 
 in the relief of Sumter, 254, 255, 
 256 ; his opinion of the value of 
 St. Thomas to the I'. S., 430. 
 
 Fox, Henry Stephen, British minis- 
 ter at Washington, his action in 
 the Caroline affair, 30, 31. 
 
 France, favors maintenance of the 
 Union, 293 ; probable effect of 
 war on her industries, 294, 296,
 
 440 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 297 ; proposal of concerted action 
 with England, 299, 300, 304 ; ne- 
 gotiations with U. 8. as to Treaty 
 of Paris, 313 ; her intended ac- 
 tion in the Trent case, 350, 351 ; 
 refuses to retract recognition of 
 belligerency, 352 ; proposes medi- 
 ation, 353, 354 ; in the alliance 
 against Mexico, 388; her aims 
 there, 389 ; warlike sentiment 
 against U. S., 393 ; withdraws 
 from Mexico, 394. 
 
 Freeman, negro murderer, 45 ; de- 
 fended by Seward, 46 ; convicted 
 though proved insane, 46; dies 
 naturally, 47. 
 
 Fremont, John C., California can- 
 didate for the presidency, 154, 
 155 ; personal qualities and popu- 
 larity as candidate, 157, 158; 
 numerical details of his defeat, 
 160. 
 
 Free Sellers, the, declaration of 
 policy, 55 ; their position at the 
 beginning of Taylor's administra- 
 tion, 70 ; merged into the Repub- 
 lican party, 143 ; opposed to Sew- 
 ard, 216. 
 
 Fugitive Slave Law, 104, 105 ; ob- 
 jected to by the North, 105, 106 ; 
 partly inoperative, 107 ; growing 
 sentiment against it, 108 ; petitions 
 for its repeal, 109 ; decreased 
 excitement about it, 112 ; pro- 
 posed amendment, 234. 
 
 Geary, John W., governor of Kan- 
 sas, 168, 169. 186. 
 
 Gilmer, Thomas W., governor of 
 Virginia, 40, 41. 
 
 Grant, General U. 8., believes in 
 short duration of the war, 244. 
 
 Greeley, Horace, seeks nomination 
 for governor of New York, 150 ; 
 attributes his defeat to Seward, 
 150 ; plans retaliation, 151 ; for 
 which Seward's nomination gives 
 him opportunity, 213-216. 
 
 Harrison, William Henry, 16, 32; 
 
 his opinion of Seward, 37. 
 Hayti, diplomatic relations opened 
 
 with U. S., 355. 
 Homestead Bill, the, 203. 
 Hughes, Archbishop, unofficial 
 
 agent of U. 8. in Europe, 350. 
 
 Jackson, Andrew, defeats the Na- 
 
 tional Republican party, 11 ; re- 
 elected presiden , 15 ; attacks the 
 U. S. Bank, 15, 20 ; Sewavd's op- 
 position to him, 17 ; in the cam- 
 paign of 1828, 17, 19 ; his strength 
 and policy in 1832, 19, 20. 
 
 Jennings, maiden name of Seward's 
 mother, 2. 
 
 John Brown Raid, the, 203. 
 
 Johnson, Andrew, on punishment 
 of treason, 407 ; believes rebel 
 states belong inalienably to the 
 Union, 408, 409 ; issues proclama- 
 tion of cessation of hostilities, and 
 of amnesty, 409 ; criticism of his 
 additional clauses to the latter, 
 409, 410, 411 ; appoints governors 
 for some of the rebel states, 411 ; 
 takes steps as to franchise, hold- 
 ing office, slavery, war debts in 
 rebel states, 412, 413 ; constitu- 
 tionality of hismeasures discussed, 
 413, 414 ; his Reconstruction pol- 
 icy attributed to Seward, 415 ; 
 the statement examined, 415, 416, 
 423 ; his personality and char- 
 acter, 416, 417 ; snubbed by his 
 party, 417 ; fights congressional 
 plan of Reconstruction, 418, 419, 
 420, 421 ; counter attacks result 
 in his impeachment, 419 ; loses 
 popular confidence, 420. 
 
 Johnson-Clarendon Treaty, 427. 
 
 Kansas, question as to legality of 
 slavery there, 124 ; formation of 
 Nebraska, 125; future of the 
 South dependent on the fate of, 
 163 ; invaded by Missourians, 164 ; 
 who carry elections by fraud and 
 force, 165, 166 ; and continue 
 their rule of terror, 167 ; seeks 
 admission as a free state, 167 ; 
 legislature dispersed, 168 ; fur- 
 ther scenes of violence, 168 ; 
 speech by Seward on, 172, 174 ; 
 further propositions at Washing- 
 ton for administration of this 
 state, 177 ; whose wrongs are 
 conclusively proved, 179 ; petition 
 for admission rejected by the 
 Senate, 180 ; admitted as a free 
 state, 199. (See, also, under " Ter- 
 ritories.") 
 
 Kearsarge, the, sinks the Alabama, 
 379. 
 
 King, T. Butler, Taylor's emissary 
 to California, 67, 68.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 441 
 
 Know-nothings, the, their purpose, 
 146, 147 ; figure as a Unionist 
 party, 147 ; their power, 148 ; 
 antagonistic to Seward, 216. 
 
 Kossuth, Louis, and the Hungarian 
 question, 112 ; in England, 113 ; 
 comes to America, 114. 
 
 Lafayette, Marquis de, at Auburn in 
 1825, 7. 
 
 Lamon, Marshal, sent to Charleston, 
 269. 
 
 Lawrence, town of Kansas, raids 
 there, 165, 167, 177. 
 
 Lecomptou Constitution, 188, 190, 
 192, 193, 196, 198, 199. 
 
 Liberia, diplomatic relations opened 
 with U. S., 355. 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, with Seward at 
 Boston, 56; on the Dred Scott 
 case, 185 ; debates with Douglas, 
 201 ; nominee for the presidency, 
 210 ; his career till then,210, 211 ; 
 particulars of his nomination, 218 ; 
 how his election was made certain, 
 220 ; in danger at Washington, 
 228 j confers with Weed about 
 make-up of a cabinet, 231, 233 ; 
 expected to check spread of se- 
 cession, 244, 245 ; forms his cabi- 
 net, 240, 247 ; comments on Sew- 
 ard's withdrawal, 248 ; persuades 
 Seward to join the cabinet, 250; 
 its composition, 249, 250 ; gravity 
 of problems to be faced, 251, 252 ; 
 considers relief of Sumter and 
 Pickeus, 253-255, 268, 269 ; de- 
 cides on Sumter expedition, 271 ; 
 orders it, 272 ; his want of a pol- 
 icy, 279 ; answers Seward's mem- 
 orandum, " Some Thoughts," etc., 
 280 ; suspends Habeas Corpus, 
 317 ; supposed views on and ac- 
 tion in the Trent affair, 332-386 ; 
 refuses resignation of Seward and 
 Ch;ise, 362, 363 ; on emancipation, 
 365 ; believes in separate treat- 
 ment of rebel states, 398, 399: 
 his message to that effect, and 
 amnesty proclamation, 399 ; which 
 are disliked by Congress, 400; 
 disapproves of congressional idea 
 of reconstruction, 402, 403 ; com- 
 ment on his own idea of it, 404, 
 406. 
 
 Lousing, B. J., historian, on Lin- 
 coln and the Trent affair, 333. 
 
 Louisiana, purchase ci, extension of 
 
 slavery and its consequence, 122 ; 
 denied the right of representation 
 under the Reconstruction Act, 
 402, 403. 
 
 Lyons, Lord, British minister to 
 the U. S., 241, 305, 307 ; avoids 
 Seward after the Trent affair, 
 328 ; gives him Lord Russell's des- 
 patch, 338 ; concerning blockade 
 of Charleston, 371, 372. 
 
 Marshall, Chief Justice, an anti- 
 Mason, 14, 1G. 
 
 Mason, James M., 93, 200, 226; 
 Southern envoy to England, 821 ; 
 captured on board the Trent, 322 ; 
 surrendered, 345. 
 
 Mathew, Father, 78. 
 
 Maximilian, Arch-Duke of Austria, 
 Emperor of Mexico, 390; exe- 
 cuted, 394. 
 
 McClellan, General G. B., advises 
 Seward on the Trent affair, 327. 
 
 Mcllvaine, Bishop, unofficial agent 
 of the U. S. in Europe, 350. 
 
 McLean, John, candidate for presi- 
 dential nomination, 155. 
 
 McLeod, Alexander, and the Caro- 
 line affair, 30-38.< 
 
 Mrcier, French minister to U. 8., 
 348. 
 
 Mexico, alliance against, 338 ; French 
 plans there, 389 ; monarchy estab- 
 lished in, 390 ; which is not recog- 
 nized by U. 8., 392 ; war between 
 France and U. 8. averted, 393. 
 (See, also, under "Territories.") 
 
 Miller, Elijah, Seward's father-in- 
 law, 5. 
 
 Miller, Frances, married to Seward, 
 5. 
 
 Missouri Compromise, fathered by 
 Clay, 80 ; particulars of, 103, 104 ; 
 its meaning, 122, 123 ; area of 
 slavery increased by it, 123; va- 
 lidity as to Kansas disputed, 124 ; 
 repealed by the Senate, 125 ; final 
 passage of repeal, 139, 140 ; its 
 constitutionality questioned, 193 ; 
 proposition for its restoration and 
 extension, 234. 
 
 Morgan, William, his alleged expos- 
 ure of Masonic secrets and con- 
 sequent murder, 12. 
 
 Mormons, the, 199, 200, 201. 
 
 Motley, John Lothrop, historian, his 
 opinion of British recognition of 
 belligerency, 309.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Nebraska, how organized, 125, 132. 
 (See, also, under " Territories.") 
 
 Nelson, Samuel, Judge of Supreme 
 Court, calls on Seward, 260 ; his 
 policy, 261 ; no endorsement from 
 him of Campbell's charges against 
 Seward, 266 ; severs his connec- 
 tion with Campbell, 267. 
 
 New York Senate, constitution of, 
 17, 19. 
 
 Nott, Eliphalet, president of Union 
 College, 3. 
 
 Omnibus Bill, 97, 98, 99. 
 Osawotomie, town of Kansas, burnt, 
 167. 
 
 Palmerston, Henry John Temple, 
 Viscount, attitude of in the Caro- 
 line affair, 31, 32 ; corresponds 
 with Russell on mediation, 348, 
 349,353. 
 
 Pickens, Governor Francis W., asks 
 for information respecting Sum- 
 ter, 269 ; gets message from Lin- 
 coln, 272. 
 
 Pierce, Franklin, nominated for the 
 presidency, 120 ; elected, 121; 
 first message, 122 ; persuaded to 
 repeal of Missouri Compromise, 
 125 ; breaks up Kansas legislature, 
 168 ; tries to make Kansas a slave 
 state, 169 ; arraigned for this by 
 Seward, 172, 173. 
 
 Pocahontas, the, 256. 
 
 Polk, James K., nominated for the 
 presidency, 49 ; makes war upon 
 Mexico, 62 ; recommends regular 
 government for Mexico and Cali- 
 fornia, 63, 68. 
 
 Porter, Admiral David, his opinion 
 of the value of St. Thomas to the 
 U. S.,430. 
 
 Powhatan, the, 256, 257. 
 
 Public service, the, condition of in 
 1861, 281-285. 
 
 Raymond, Henry J., lieutenant-gov- 
 ernor of New York, 150, 213, 214. 
 
 Rebel commissioners to Washington, 
 refused recognition, 258 ; claim 
 diplomatic rank, 259 ; their in- 
 structions to Campbell, 203 ; their 
 own course, 264 ; leave Washing- 
 ton, 273. 
 
 Reconstruction, provisions of first 
 act, 401, 402; respective positions 
 of Congress and President in the 
 
 matter, 403, 404 ; constitutionality 
 of the act considered, 413, 414 ; 
 the plan as finally carried out, 
 421, 422. 
 
 eeder, Andrew H., governor of 
 Kansas, 164, 165, 169 ; as territo- 
 rial delegate, 171. 
 
 Republican party, the, formation of, 
 85, 143, 153; its improved posi- 
 tion, 191. 
 
 Riley, General Bennett, his part in 
 the formation of government in 
 California, 64, 65, 68. 
 
 Rinaldo, the, 345. 
 
 Rush, Richard, in the anti-Mason 
 party, 16. 
 
 Russell, Lord John, English secre- 
 tary of state for foreign affairs, 
 241 ; on blockade of Southern 
 ports, 291 ; delays giving opinion 
 on belligerency, 299,302; declares 
 neutrality of England, 300, 302 ; 
 this act shown to be unfriendly, 
 303, 304 ; and also premature, 304- 
 307 ; interviews Southern com- 
 missioners, 307 ; probable motives 
 in recognizing Confederacy, 308 ; 
 criticises suspension of Habeas 
 Corpus, 317 ; notes to Lord Lyons 
 on Trent affair, 329, 330 ; his ori- 
 ginal contention in the matter, 
 346 ; corresponds with Lord Pal- 
 merston as to mediation, 348, 349, 
 353 ; protests against stone block- 
 ade, 371 ; action with regard to 
 enlistment laws, 381 ; testifies to 
 Seward's ability, 395. 
 
 Russia, invited to join England and 
 France regarding Confederacy, 
 299. 
 
 San Jacinto, the, boards the Trent, 
 322. 
 
 Scott, Sir WilKam, his doctrine of 
 contraband of war applied to the 
 Trent case, 341,342. 
 
 Scott, General Winfleld, 120, 121, 
 252,253. 
 
 Seward, John, 1. 
 
 Seward, Dr. Samuel S., 1, 7. 
 
 Seward, Mrs. Samuel S. (nee Jen- 
 nings), 2; death of, 397. 
 
 Seward, William Henry, family con- 
 nections, 1,2; school days, 2 ; at 
 Union College, 2, 3; teaches school 
 in Georgia, 4 ; returns to Goshen 
 and studies law, 4 ; admitted to 
 the bar at Utica, 5 ; established at
 
 INDEX. 
 
 443 
 
 Auburn, 5 ; marries, 5 ; first ap- 
 pearance and success in court, 6 ; 
 conscientious in professional de- 
 tails, G ; nominated for surrogate 
 of Cayuga County, 7 ; and for sec- 
 retary of state, 7 ; as a militiaman, 
 7 ; sides with Tammany, but 
 eventually supports Clinton, 8 ; 
 meets Weed, 9 ; attacks the Al- 
 bany Regency, 9 ; enunciation of 
 his political views in 1825, 10, 11 ; 
 works for reelection of John Qutn- 
 cy Adams, 11 ; joins anti-Masons, 
 12 ; visits John Quincy Adams, 14 ; 
 speaks from anti-Masonic plat- 
 forms, 14 ; reasons for joining the 
 anti-Masons, 17 ; elected by them 
 to the New York Senate, 17 ; phy- 
 sical disadvantages and want of 
 experience, 17, 18 ; makes maiden 
 speech on military reform, 18 ; 
 further activity as senator, 18, 19 ; 
 visits Europe, 19 ; defeated for 
 governor and resumes legal prac- 
 tice, 21 ; dealings with the Hol- 
 land Company, 21, 22 ; elected 
 governor of New York, 22 ; ex- 
 tends public works, 23 ; and inter- 
 nal communications, 24; efforts 
 in the cause of popular education, 
 25, 26 ; and in t lie simplification 
 of legal procedure, 26 ; his human- 
 itarianism while in office, 26 ; how 
 he regarded the spoils system, 27, 
 28 ; good-tempered towards the 
 opposition, 28 ; affair of the Caro- 
 line, 28 et seq. ; complains of un- 
 just treatment, 35, 36 ; Virginia 
 controversy, 38-41 ; opinions of 
 Adams and of the Democrats 
 thereupon, 40, 41 ; his message in 
 answer, 42 ; retires, 43 ; aspersions 
 upon his official career, 43; be- 
 lieves to have done with public 
 life, 44 ; and resumes local prac- 
 tice, 44 ; characteristic behavior 
 in the defense of Freeman, 45, 46 ; 
 popular opinion of it, 47 ; declines 
 repeated offers of nomination, 47 ; 
 speaks in support of Clay, 48; 
 his arguments against annexation 
 of Texas and against slavery, 50, | 
 
 51 ; continues this agitation in 
 spite of Clay's change of front, 
 
 52 ; relations with the Whigs, 52, 
 53; declines to reenter politics. 
 53; opinion of Taylor's nomina- 
 tion and of Filluiore's, 53 ; sug- 
 
 gested for vice-president, 54 ; po- 
 sition and activity in Taylor's 
 election campaign, 55, 56 ; senti- 
 ments on slavery question and in- 
 terpretation of Whig policy, 5(1- 
 60 ; earnestness as a speaker, 60 ; 
 returns to his profession after this 
 campaign, 60; elected senator 
 from New York, 61 ; wishes legal 
 government for the territories, 67 ; 
 declares Taylor's intentions as to 
 slavery in the territories, 77 ; an- 
 swers personal attacks, 79, 80; 
 marks an epoch by his abolition 
 speech, 87, 88 ; general sketch of 
 this speech, 88-90 ; arguments 
 therein on constitutional author- 
 ity over the national domain, 91 ; 
 and over the prohibition of slav- 
 ery, 91, 92; and on the preserva- 
 tion of the Union, 94, 95 ; com- 
 ment on these arguments, 92, 93, 
 94, 95 ; to what extent willing to 
 compromise, 96, 97 ; relations with 
 Fillmore, 101 ; whose accession 
 does not change his compromise 
 policy, 102 ; agitates against Fugi- 
 tive Slave Law, 109, 110 ; as a re- 
 former of postal service, 110 ; at 
 the lake opening of the Erie Rail- 
 way, 110; moves a protest against 
 Russian interference in Hungary, 
 115, 116; his justification of such 
 a protest, 117 ; this resolution de- 
 feated, 118 ; on the commerce 
 committee, 119 ; discouraged at 
 weakness of the North, 120 ; does 
 not sign address of Independent 
 Democrats, 126 ; first speech 
 against repeal of Missouri Com- 
 promise, 128-130 ; despondent 
 about it, 130 ; accused of originat- 
 ing repeal, 131 ; this case dis- 
 cussed, 132-139 ; second speech 
 on repeal of Missouri Compromise, 
 140, 141 ; his importance in the or- 
 ganization of a new national party, 
 145 ; wishes to hold back informa- 
 tion, 146 ; takes no part in the 
 Know-nothing campaign, 148; re- 
 elected senator, 149 ; this election 
 damaging to the Know-nothine, 
 149; Greeley 's hostility to him,150; 
 speaks at Albany for the forma- 
 tion of the new party, 151 ; presi- 
 dential aspirations, 153, 154 ; de- 
 clines nomination, 155 ; pould not 
 hare carried the convention, 166 ;
 
 444 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 his opinion of Buchanan's nomi- 
 nation, 158 ; Detroit and Auburn 
 speeches, 159 ; proposes admission 
 of Kansas, 171 ; comment on this 
 speech, 173, 174 ; on effects of the 
 assault on Sunnier, 176 ; again 
 champions the cause of Kansas, 
 178 ; on the Dred Scott case, 185, 
 186 ; grows in prestige, and so does 
 Republican party, 191 ; on the 
 policy and power of Douglas, 192 ; 
 further declarations in support of 
 Kansas, 192, 193 ; makes charges 
 against Taney and Buchanan, 194 ; 
 speech on Lecompton Constitu- 
 tion, 197, 198 ; indicts Democratic 
 party at Rochester, 201, 202 ; urges 
 adoption of Homestead Bill in lieu 
 of Cuba Bill, 203 ; trip to Europe, 
 203 ; speech on Wyandot Constitu- 
 tion, 205, 208 ; thought to be sure 
 of nomination for the presidency, 
 210 ; mainstay of the Republican 
 party, 211 ; how estimated at the 
 South, 211, 212 ; and by his friends, 
 212 ; failure to obtain nomination 
 due partly to Greeley, 213-216; 
 and partly to other causes, 216, 
 218 ; though defeated, continues 
 his part in the campaign, 219 ; 
 said to favor conciliation of the 
 South, 229, 230 ; but has no defi- 
 nite plan, 230, 231 ; offered secre- 
 taryship of state, 231 ; which he 
 decides to accept, 233 ; opposes 
 Crittenden's resolutions, 234 ; 
 making counter propositions, 235 ; 
 which come to nought, 236 ; 
 speaks on advantages of the 
 Union, 238 ; and on concessions, 
 239 ; urges admission of Kan- 
 sas, 239 ; charges against him in 
 this connection, 240 ; his views 
 explained, 241-243 ; his meaning 
 distorted, 243 ; hopes Lincoln's 
 accession will prove salutary to 
 the Union, 244 ; such expectations 
 mistaken, 244, 245 ; refuses to 
 enter Lincoln's cabinet, 247, 248 ; 
 comment thereon, 249 ; finally ac- 
 cepts portfolio, 250 ; opposes re- 
 lief of Sumter, 254 ; criticised as 
 to relief of Pickens, 256 ; declines 
 to receive rebel commissioners, 
 258 ; accused by Campbell of per- 
 fidy, 259 ; ignorant of Campbell's 
 real position, 260, 262, 266; de- 
 sires postponement of armed hos- 
 
 tilities, 261 ; tells Campbell Sum- 
 ter will be evacuated, 263; his 
 statement unguarded, 265 ; again 
 answers Campbell re Sumter, 270 ; 
 ignorant of Lincoln's decision re 
 Sumter, 273; does not reply to 
 letters from Campbell, 274 ; no 
 reason to suspect his good faith 
 in these dealings, 275 ; writes 
 " Some Thoughts for the Presi- 
 dent's Consideration," 276, 277 ; 
 rashness of his foreign policy, 278 ; 
 as to domestic policy, thinks is- 
 sue should be union instead of 
 slavery, 280 ; doubtful propriety 
 of " Some Thoughts,'' 281 ; his ' 
 devotion to Lincoln, 282 ; on the? 
 condition of the public service, 
 283-285 ; circular on secession to 
 ministers abroad, 286, 287 ; selec- 
 tion of representatives of the U. 
 S., 288, 289; advocates blockade 
 of Southern ports, 290; under- 
 stands foreign trade relations, 297; 
 believes in strong representation 
 abroad, 298; anxious about for- 
 eign relations, 299 ; refuses to re- 
 ceive British and French minis- 
 ters together, 300 ; despatch to 
 Adams on recognition of belliger- 
 ency, 301 ; how he regarded the 
 recognition, 308, 309 ; opens ne- 
 gotiations concerning Treaty of 
 Paris, 312; from which he with- 
 draws, 313 : his opinions, 313, 314 ; 
 resents Bunch's negotiations with 
 Jefferson Davis, 316 ; and Lord 
 Russell's criticism of suspension 
 of Habeas Corpus, 317 ; alleged to 
 have intermeddled in War Depart- 
 ment, 318 ; th allegation exam- 
 ined, 318, 319 ; fears possibility of 
 foreign war, 320, 321 ; various re- 
 ports as to his view of the Trent 
 affair, 325, 327 ; letter to Adams 
 on the Trent affair, 327, 328 ; 
 avoids Lord Lyons at this time, 
 328 ; answers Lord Russell's de- 
 spatch, 330. 331 ; supposed inter- 
 views with Lincoln as to the Trent 
 affair, 335 ; nature of despatch in 
 reply to Lord Russell, 336 ; which 
 is entirely his own work, 337 ; 
 juotifles detention and search of 
 the Trent, 340-342; but admits 
 irregularity of the proceedings, 
 343, 344 ; merits of his decision. 
 344 ; fears European intervention.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 445 
 
 348 ; sends over unofficial agents, 
 350; correspondence with minis- 
 ters abroad, 351 ; protests against 
 recognition of belligerency, 352 ; 
 refuses French offer of mediation, 
 354, 355 ; treats with England for 
 extirpation of slave trade, 355 ; 
 advocates reinforcement of troops, 
 356-359 ; writes to Adains about 
 this, 358 ; gives offense thereby, 
 359 ; his removal desired, 357, 
 360, 361 ; and suggested, 361, 362 ; 
 his resignation refused, 362, 363 ; 
 advises postponement of emanci- 
 pation proclamation, 366 ; treat- 
 ment of mails on blockade - run- 
 ners, 369, 370 ; despatch to Adams 
 on blockade of Charleston, 372 ; 
 correspondence relating to Con- 
 federate cruisers, 383 ; declines 
 to join alliance against Mexico, 
 388 ; correspondence with France 
 regarding form of government in 
 Mexico, 390-393 ; general remarks 
 on his diplomacy and despatches 
 during the war, 394, 395 ; carriage 
 accident and attempted assas- 
 sination, 396 ; death of his wife 
 and daughter, 397 ; rapid recov- 
 ery, 398 ; reported action in addi- 
 tional clauses to Johnson's am- 
 nesty proclamation, 410 ; did not 
 inspire Johnson's Reconstruction 
 policy, 423 ; upholds him on the 
 question of Reconstruction, 424 ; 
 speaks at Cooper Union on the 
 subject, 424 ; believes the Union 
 to be safe, 425; reasons for re- 
 maining in the cabinet, 425, 426 ; 
 negotiates for construction of Nic- 
 aragua Canal, 426 ; naturalization 
 treaties, 426; effects commercial 
 treaty with Madagascar, 427 ; pur- 
 chase of Alaska, 428 ; wants to 
 purchase St. Thomas, 428 ; is 
 balked by the Senate, 429; resigns, 
 430 ; travels, 430 ; his death, 431 ; 
 private, professional, political 
 character, 431^134 ; how received 
 in Mexico and Japan, 435 ; and in 
 other Eastern countries, 436 ; 
 his old age, 436. 
 
 Shannon, Wilson, governor of Kan- 
 sas, 166, 168, 169. 
 
 Shenandoah, cruise of the, 382. 
 
 Silver Greys, the, 103, 110, 149, 152. 
 
 Slidell, John, 200, 226 ; Southern 
 envoy to France, 321 ; captured 
 
 on board the Trent, 322 ; surren- 
 dered, 345. 
 
 Slidell, Miss, statement of to Brit- 
 ish ministry, 323. 
 
 Smith, Caleb B., 218 ; secretary of 
 the interior, 250 ; opposed to re- 
 lief of Suinter, 254, 271. 
 
 South Carolina, threatens to secede, 
 222 ; sets up as a hostile power, 
 225. 
 
 Southern ports, blockade of, 288, 
 291,371, 372; mails entering on 
 blockade-runners, 369, 370. 
 
 Spain, in the alliance against 
 Mexico, 388 ; withdraws from it, 
 389. 
 
 Stunt on, Edwin M , in Buchanan's 
 cabinet, 226 ; secretary of war un- 
 der Lincoln, 318. 
 
 Stan ton, Frederic P., governor of 
 Kansas, 189, 190. 
 
 Stephens, Alexander H., on the 
 Union, 222. 
 
 Stevens, Thaddeus, 240 ; his theory 
 of reconstruction, 414. 
 
 Story, Judge, as anti-Mason, 16. 
 
 St. Albaus, town of Vermont, raid 
 on, 386, 387. 
 
 St. Thomas, treaty suggested for its 
 purchase, 428 ; its value to U. S., 
 
 428, 429; the treaty rejected, 
 
 429, 430. 
 
 Sutnner, Charles, elected to Senate, 
 107 ; position with regard to re- 
 peal of Missouri Compromise, 126, 
 127 ; and Nebraska Bill, 135 ; de- 
 fends Emigrant Aid Society, 171 ; 
 assault upon him, 175 ; political 
 import and effects thereof, 176, 
 177 ; his violent speech on Kan- 
 sas, 175 ; votes for acts organizing 
 new territories, 240; on Seward 
 and tin- Trent affair, 326 ; on 
 Lincoln and the Trent affair, 334 ; 
 his own opinion of it, 342 ; resolu- 
 tion opposing monarchical govern- 
 ment in Mexico, 392 ; on the posi- 
 tion of rebel states after the war, 
 401 ; recommends purchase of 
 Alaska, 4'JS. 
 
 Tinimany, or " Bucktails," 7. 
 Taylor, General Zachary, nominated 
 
 for the presidency, 53, 55, 56 ; 
 
 elected, 60 ; invades Mexico, 62 ; 
 
 encourages California and New 
 
 Mexico to seek admission, 67, G8 ; 
 
 desires permanent government
 
 446 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 for them, 67, 68 ; not pledged 
 to special principles, 75 ; how 
 thought of by Clay and Webster, 
 75, 76, 78 ; relations with Seward, 
 67, 77 ; effects of letters from 
 Seward considered, 77, 78 ; char- 
 acter and opinions, 79, 80 ; recom- 
 mends admission of California, 
 80 ; dies, 98 ; opposed to Compro- 
 mise, 98, 100 ; a staunch Union- 
 ist, 100 ; effect of his death on 
 Seward's position, 101. 
 
 Taney, Chief Justice Roger B., gives 
 political opinion on slavery in the 
 Dred Scott case, 183, 184 ; said to 
 have conferred with Buchanan 
 about this, 194, 195; excuses on 
 his behalf, 195 ; objects to suspen- 
 sion of Habeas Corpus, 317. 
 
 Tennessee, application of Recon- 
 struction doctrines to, 408, 411, 
 423. 
 
 Territories, the, questions of govern- 
 ment and of slavery, 63-71, 72, 
 73, 74, 81, 83, 97, 98, 103, 104, 124, 
 125, 133, 234, 236, 237, 239, 240. 
 
 Texas Boundary question, 71, 97, 
 103, 104. 
 
 Toombs, Robert, senator from 
 Georgia, on the Cuba Bill, 203 ; 
 on Crittenden's resolutions, 234. 
 
 Topeka Constitution, 1C7, 168, 170, 
 171, 174, 180. 
 
 Treaty of Paris, 311, 314, 315. 
 
 Trent, the, boarding of, 322. 
 
 United States Bank, attacked by 
 Jackson, 15, 20. 
 
 Van Buren, Martin, 9, 16, 17 ; op- 
 posed to Texan annexation, 49 ; 
 Free Soil candidate for the presi- 
 dency, 54, 55, 56. 
 
 Wade, Benjamin, 107, 126, 203, 240 ; 
 attacks Lincoln in connection 
 with Reconstruction, 402. 
 
 Walker, Robert J., governor of 
 Kansas, qualifications of, 186 ; 
 throws out election returns, 188 ; 
 resigns, 189. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, action in the Caro- 
 line affair, 32, 33 ; his opinion 
 upon it, 34, 36 ; correspondence 
 
 with Harrison re Seward, 37, 38; 
 resentment towards Taylor, 76, 
 77 ; speaks for preservation of tli 
 Union, 82, 83 ; far-reaching effect! 
 of this speech, 83, 84, 85; ad- 
 mired as an orator, 86, 87 ; his 
 views on Compromise, 96 ; iu Fill- 
 more's cabinet as a Compromiser, 
 99 ; on Fugitive Slave Law, 106 ; 
 Compromise candidate, 120. 
 
 Weed, Thurlow, meets Seward, 9 ; 
 anti-Mason, 12, 13, 14; works 
 against Seward, 155 ; his part in 
 the Greeley-SewarU antagonism, 
 213, 214, 215 ; advocates concilia- 
 tion witii the South, 229 ; confers 
 with Lincoln on make-up of a 
 cabinet, 231, 233 ; reports result 
 of conference to Seward, 233 ; 
 sent to Europe as unofficial agent 
 of U. S., 350. 
 
 Welles, Gideon, 232 ; secretary of 
 the navy, 250 ; of little conse- 
 quence as cabinet officer, 251 ; 
 action in the relief of Sumter and 
 Pickens, 215, 254, 255, 256, 271 ; 
 on Seward's view of the Trent 
 affair, 325 ; and on Lincoln's, 
 334. 
 
 Whig party, formation of, 20 ; par- 
 tial causes of its overthrow, 26 ; 
 condition after Seward's retire- 
 ment, 43 ; policy regarding Texan 
 annexation, 49-53 ; its nominee 
 in 1848, 55 ; its aims as declared 
 by Seward, 56-60 ; political atti- 
 tude in 1850-51, 75; merged into 
 Republican party, 143. 
 
 Whitfield, J. W., delegate to Con- 
 gress from Kansas, 167, 171. 
 
 Wilkes, Captain Charles, seizes 
 Mason and Slidell, 322; acting 
 in this on his own responsibility, 
 324 ; popular hero, 324 ; officially 
 praised, 325 ; criticism of his ac 
 tion, 342, 343, 344. 
 
 Wilmot Proviso, the, 53, 193. 
 
 Wirt, William, 14, 15. 
 
 Wachusett, the, captures the 
 Florida, 377. 
 
 Wyandot Constitution, 205, 208. 
 
 Yancey, William L., of Alabama, 
 on slave property, 205. 
 
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