ox HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRANSACTIONS IN INDIA. LONDON : I'RINTRT) BY S, AND K, BENTLEV, DORSET-STREUT. /T' £ice lh^ titlf paoe Vol . I " ^/// fublished bti jkuu/^iurv, J'arbiiru A^-illen..^hUu J''.' Ib'ii . HISTORY OF THE POLXTZCAXi AXfD MIIiITARV TRANSACTIONS IN INDIA DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARQUESS OF HASTINGS 1813—1823. BY HENRY T. ^RINSEP, OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE. ENLARGED FROM THE KARRATIVE PUBLISHED IN IfKO. Res poscere videtiir, — ut non modo casus eventusque reruin, qui ple- rique foituiti sunt, sed ratio etiam caiisaeque noscantur. Tacitus. IN TWO VOLUMES— VOL. I. LONDON; KINGSBURY, PARBURY, & ALLEN, LEA DEN HALL STREET. 1825. ^ .t V, / PREFACE. J "" The work published in quarto in 1820, -J QQ under the title of a Narrative of the Political 1 ^ and Military Transactions in British India, under Tt 22 the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, M has formed the basis of the present volumes. o The introduction of a particular account of the Nipal War, and the completion of the details of that with the Mahrattas to the taking of Aseergurh, together with the addition of a new and fuller summary of the political and finan- cial residt of these operations, have led to the adoption of the more ambitious title now prefixed. In other respects, the present work is only a revised edition of the Nan-ative. V In the preface to the quarto volume, the \ Author sufficiently explained the motives which had induced him to publish. A connected state- vi PREFACE. ment of the events which had then recently . occurred, seemed to him to be a desideratum, whicli, being opportunely placed for informa- tion, it was in a manner his duty, failing any one more able, to endeavour to supply. The compilation was, however, made at a time and under circumstances that obliged him to conclude it prematurely, and to give the results in anticipation from mere estimate or conjec- ture. This defect it was the Author's intention to have remedied by an early second edition, and even before the published volume reached him in India, some progress had been made in the collection of materials for this purpose. The design was, however, abandoned, partly from the pressure of official avocations, and partly because a succession of similar publications threatened to exhaust the public interest by pressing the subject too much upon attention. When, therefore, the Author came to England, in the course of the past year, he had no fixed intention of republishing; indeed, with exception to the chapters on the Nipal War, which had been compiled in the fiist instance, PREFACE. vii he brought with him no materials but a few loose notes, taken hastily in the course of bu- siness, and hence for the most part irrelative, or incomplete. Moreover, an accident which separated him from his baggage, books, and papers during the voyage home, and led to the loss of several of the latter, must further have defeated such a purpose, had the design been seriously entertained. Nevertheless, it seemed to the Author, be- fore he had been long in England, that many circumstances combined to revive the jiublic interest in Indian affairs. He found also that his work was in demand, though long- out of print ; its utility as an authentic expose of tlie events of the period not having been superseded by any of the publications which had since appeared. The time, therefore, ap- pearing favourable, the Author was encouraged to undertake the superintendence of a new edition through the press, and hence it be- came necessary for him to complete the nar- rative from such materials as he could com- mand, and more especially lo endeavour to viii I' KEY ACE- bring down the results to the latest period, according to the original design. From what has been stated, however, it will be evident that this part of the work has been executed under great comparative disadvantages. The author has no longer had the same means of ready reference to official and private corre- spondence under which it was his boast to have compiled the original narrative. He is sensible, also, that much of the favour, and still more of the credit and authenticity with which his first publication was viewed, were owing to the official situation he then filled, and the intimate rela- tion with the head of the Indian government, in which, from that circumstance, he was supposed to be placed. This certainly is an advantage he cannot claim for any thing new in the present edition ; moreover, the distance from his friends, amongst the actors and parties concerned in the events recorded, has deprived him of the power of reference to their judgment and superior in- telligences, an advantage of which he before largely availed himself. In the present instance, therefore, the public have the fruit of the Au- PKEFACE. ix thor's unaided labours ; and for any errors or imperfections, or incorrect opinions which may be found, the responsibility is entirely his own. With respect to the form of publication, it has been the author's aim to place the work as ex- tensively as possible within the reach of those connected with India here or abroad, and to make it as useful as a regard to their con- venience and its scope and design have al- lowed. To have annexed copies of the treaties, and copious notes and references in support of the text, would have had the effect of needlessly swelling the size of the volumes ; for the few who require these minute details, can have no difficulty in procuring the entire correspondence as published at the India House, while the abs- tract contained in the body of the narrative, will suffice for every purjxDse of general infor- mation. The plans and views introduced into the quarto volume, in illustration of the events of the Mahratta War, have, with exception to the general map of the seat of operations, been omitted in this edition, several of thfcm having X PREFACE. been found to be more or less incorrect, and all greatly inferior to the topographical delineations in the works of Colonel Blacker and Lieutenant Lake, to which any one needing such illustra- tions may refer. The few, however, having re- lation to the events of the Nipal War, are re- tained, as necessary to show the nature of that country, and its positions, and not to be found elsewhere ; one or two additional maps of the seat of operations against that nation, have further been Inserted for the same reasons. CONTENTS FIRST VOLUME CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. State of India on Lord Moira's arrival. Relations of the British with Native Powers. Alliances, subsidiary, protec- tive. Disposition towards British. Of States subject to their influence. Nizam. P^shwa. Other subsidiary Al- lies. Of protected Allies. Independent Powers. Holkur. Sindheea. Nature of their power and administration since 1805. Military force. How employed. Disposition to- wards British. Bhoosla. Disposition. General View. MiHtary adventurers not checked or suppressed. Pinda- rees in 1814. Their history. Settlement on Nerbudda. Mode of warfare. Successes. Rise of Kureem Khan. His power in 1806. And fall. Cheetoo. Dost Mahom- med. Kureem's redemption. Second rise. Designs, and fall. Durras in 181 4. Putans. Tiieir jiower. Locality. Relations with Mahrattas and Rajpoots. Aniecr Khan. His force in 18U. . • 1-J3 XU CONTENTS. CHAPTER 11. CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. Rise and Policy of the Goorkha Nation. Prithee Niirayun Sah. Run Buhadur. Account of the Turaee. Border disputes. Sarun frontier. Gourukpoor ditto. Bootwul case. Proceedings of Sir G. Barlow and Lord Minto. Further aggressions of the Nipalese. Occupation of 22 villages of Sarun. Appointment of Commissioners. Re- sult of investigation. Resolution of Government thereon. And of the Goorkha Court. Occupation of Bootwul by the British. Treacherous attack and murder of the Police- officers stationed there. Conduct of the Nipdlese on other parts of the frontier 54 — 80 CHAPTER HI. NIPAL WAR.— FIRST CAMPAIGN, 1814. Governor General leaves the Presidency. Plan of opera- tions. General Gillespie's division takes the field. His failure before Nalapanee. And death. Second assault. Unsuccessful. Evacuation of the fort, and pursuit of the garrison. Change of plan. General Martindell takes the command. Operations against Jythuk. Defeat of Major Ludlow's detachment. Major Richards retires with loss. General Ochterlony's division. Capture of Nalagurh. Umur Singh's position at Ramgurh. Skirmish before it. Operations to turn its flank. Affair at Deboo ka Tibia. New position of Umur Singh. General Ochterlony's movement on Belaspoor. Occupation of Maloun ridge by Umur Singh. Gourukpoor division. General J. S. CONTENTS. Xm Wood's unsuccessful attack of Bootwul. Defensive pro- ceedings. Sarun frontier. Attempt of Chunder Seeku- Opadheea to negotiate. Defeat of Pursaram Thapa by Major Bradshaw. General Marley's arrival. Posts of Captains Blackney and Sibley cut off by the Nipdlese. In- decision of the General. His departure from camp. Sik- him Raja gained by Major Latter. Repulse of the enemy at one of his outposts 81—131 CHAPTER IV. NIPAL WAR— FIRST CAMPAIGN. 1815. Reflections. Successful skirmish on Sarun frontier. Gene- ral G. Wood takes the command. His inactivity. General S.J.Wood's proceedings in Gourukpoor. Resolution of Governor-general to attack Kumaon. Levies for the pur- pose. Lieut.-colonel Gardner penetrates by the Kosila. Turns the Goorkha position. Takes post at Choumou. Major Hearsey penetrates to Chumpawut. Colonel Gard- ner again turns the Goorkha position, and arrives be- fore Almora. Colonel Nicolls sent by the Governor-ge- neral to support these operations. Defeat and capture of Major Hearsey by Husteedul. His death in an affair with Major Patton's detachment. Attack of the Goorkha po- sitions before Almora. Night sally of the Nipalese de- feated. Fall of Almora. Proceedings before Jythuk. Plans of General Martindell. Unsatisfactory results. Re- solution to cut off the enemy's supplies. Major Richards sent to occupy a post for this purpose. Dislodges the enemy with loss. Jythuk surrendered to General Ochter- lony; his further proceedings. Reduction of Ramgurh, &c. by Colonel Cooper. Final operations against Maloun. Lodgment at Ryla and Deothul. Death of Captain Showers. XIV CONTENTS. Bhiigtee Thapa leads a desperate attack or. Deotliul. His defeat and death. Goorkha chiefs desert Umur Singh. His surrender. Arrangements for disposal of the conquered territory 132—178 CHAPTER V. NIPAL.-NEGOTIATIONS SECOND CAMPAIGN, AND PEACE. 181.5-16. Disposition of the Goorkha chiefs. Overture for Peace. Go- vernor-general's terms. Cession of Turaee refused, and negotiation broken off by the Goorkhas. Preparations. Fresh overtures. Demand modified. Hesitation of the Goorkhas. Negotiations. Treaty signed. Further con- cessions meditated. Ratification refused at Katmandoo. Reflections. General Ochterlony takes the field. Plan of operations. Chooreea Ghatee pass turned. The General arrives before Mukwanpoor. Battle of Seekhurkutree. Colonel Kelly's march to Hureehurpoor. Battle there. Submission of the Nipalese. Ratification of the former Treaty. Liberality of the British Government. Sikhim- putee Raja received under protection. Objects proposed. Goorkha representations at Pekin. Arrival of a Chinese Minister at Digurchee. His proceedings there, and letter to the Governor-general. The Raja of Nipal dies of the small-pox 179—213 CHAPTER VI. OUDH.— BHOPAL. 1814-15. Financial embarrassment. Irritating discussions with Nu- wab Sadut Ulee. Set at rest by Lord Hastings. Nuvvab's CONTENTS. XV death; and succession of Ghazee-ood-Deen Hydur. Resi- dent's proceedings at Lucknou. Intrigues there. First Oudh Loan. Second ditto. Governor-general's intentions respecting Pindarees. Defensive plans. Reasons for adopt- ing Bhopal and Sagur alliance. Condition of Bhopal. Designs of Mahrattas. Chief applies for British protection. Terras offered. Consequent military arrangements. Ne- gotiations. Communication to Sindheea. How received by him. The Bhoosla and Peshwa. Preparations in the Dukhun and Hindoostan. Augmentation of Bengal army. Effect of these measures in maintaining tranquillity. Con- duct of Bhopal. Vakeel dismissed. Reflections. 214 — 260. CHAPTER VII. HYDERABAD.— POONA. 181 5-— JUNE — JULY. Rains set in. Hyderabad. Nizam's sons seize a dependent of the Residency. Guard set upon them obliged to retire. Troops called into Hyderabad. Their submission and confinement in Golkonda. Poona. Account of Bajee Rao. of the Gykwar. His relation to Peshwa. To British. Policy of Peshwa, and claims on Nizam. On Gykwar. Referred to British arbitration. Award as to Ahmedabad. Trimbukjee Dainglia. Gungadhur Sastree's negotia- tion. Intrigues at Brodera. Protest of British Resident. Renunciation of the arbitration. Gungadhur practised upon, and gained over. Pilgrimage to Nassik. Sastree gives offence. His destruction planned. Pilgrimage to Pundurpoor. Dissimulation. Sastree murdered. 261 — 295 XVI - CONTEMTS. CHAPTER VIII. POONA CONTINUED. AUGUST TO DECEMBER, 1815. Resident. Mis resolves. Returns to Poona. Obtains proof against Trimbukjee. Demands audience. Presents a me- morial. Charging Trimbukjee. Calls subsidiary force from frontier. Bajee Rao hesitates. Asks proof. Evades receiving it. Gykvvar mission threatened. Attempts to screen Trimbukjee. Hyderabad force called in. Expe- dients offered and refused. Instructions arrive. Second memorial thereon. Demand of Trimbukjee's surrender. Peshwa's irresolution. Seizure of Trimbukjee and sur- render. Reflections. Effect in Goozerat. 295 — 325 CHAPTER IX. PINDAREES.— BHOPAL.— NAGPOOR. 1815-16, MAY, TO MAY. Pindarees. Second reference to England. Array reduced. Operations of Pindarees. Party surprised. Successful expedition. Second. British provinces ravaged with im- punity. Concert of Pindarees with Mahrattas. Intrigues of 1815-16. Holkur's court. Ameer-Khan. Bhopal. Death of Wuzeer Mohummed ; and of Raghoojee Bhoos- la. Consequent deliberations. Bhopal alliance declined. Nagpoor, Pursajee. His incapacity. Apa Saheb. His pretensions. Character. Dhurmajee Bhoosla. His in- trigues. Their ill success. Both parties court the Bri- tish Resident. Who waits instructions. Their tenor. Alliance and terms offered. Transactions at Nagpoor, CONTENTS. XVll Dhurmajee confined. Apa Saheb regent. Seeks British alliance. Naroba. Negotiation. Its progress. Conclu- sion. And signature. Reflections. Subsidiary force called in. Further transactions at Nagpoor. 326—363 CHAPTER X. JYPOOR, &c. 1816, APRIL TO OCTOBER. Jypoor alliance. Orders from England. Suspended. Re- sumed. Debated. Resolved upon. Military prepara- tions. Negotiation. Protracted. Broken off. Internal condition of Jypoor. Fresh overtures, and negotiation, again broken ofF. Nagpoor affairs. Sindheea's supine- ness, and offer to Jypoor. P^shwa's conduct, and Intrigues. Trimbukjee's escape. Communication with Bajee Rao in consequence 364 — 394 CHAPTER XL PINDAREES. OCTOBER TO APRIL, 1816-17. Nagpoor subsidiary force moves to the Nerbudda. Pindarees alarmed. Their first effort. Grand expedition in three di- visions. First to Ganjam. Second to Bidur. Surprised by Major M'Dowell. Exploit of Sheikh Dulloo. Third to Ahmednugur. Surprised by Major Lushington. Ganjam penetrated. Lieut. Borthwick's pursuit. First party inter- cepted. Reflections. Resolution to extirpate the hordes. VOL. I. b XVlll CONTENTS, Motives. Sindheea. Holkur. Dya-Ram of Hutras. His fort invested and bombarded. His escape. Fort taken. 395—420 CHAPTER XII. NAGPOOR POONA. 1817, JANUARY TO JUNE. Nagpoor. Ram Chundur Wagh. Sudeek Ulee Khan. Apa Saheb goes to Chanda. Intrigues. Death of Pursajee. By violent means. Accession of Apa Saheb. Change of policy. Intrigues with Peshwa. Poona. P^shwa's du- plicity. Trimbukjee levies troops. Is covertly supported. Resident's proceedings. Discussions with the Durbar. Subsidiary force called down. Intercourse suspended. Effect. Operations against Trimbukjee. Their success. Colonel Smith called in to Poona. Terms of demand. Refused. Poona invested. Bajee Rao submits. Go- vernor-general's instructions. Conduct of Peshwa. New treaty signed. Its conditions. Reflections. Military movements 421 — 456 HISTORY, &c. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. State of India on Lord Moira's arrival — Relations of the British with Native Powers — Alliances, subsidiary protec- tive — disposition towards British — of States subject to their influence — Nizam — Peshwa — other subsidiary Allies — of protected Allies — Independent Powers — Holkur — Sindheea — Nature of their power and administration since 1805 — military force — how employed — disposition towards British — Bhoosla — Disposition — General View — Military adven- turers not checked or suppressed — Pindarees in 1814 — their history — settlement on Nerbudda-'-mode of warfare — successes — rise of Kureem Khan — his power in 1806— - and fall — Cheetoo — Dost Mahommed— -Kureem's redemp- tion—second rise— designs, and fall— Durras in 1814— Patans-— their power— locality — Relations with Mahrattas and Rajpoots---Ameer Khan — his force in 1814. The Earl of Moira, now Marquess of Hastings, arrived in India, and assumed the government- general in October 1813. The seven years of his predecessor. Lord Minto's government, had 2 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. been employed first in preparing the States of the West to resist the passage of the French, who then were thought to meditate an invasion over- land ; afterwards in composing the discontents of the Madras army ; and latterly, in wresting from the dominion of France, and the Continental Powers under her influence, their remaining in- sular possessions in the Indian Ocean and Archi- pelago. Hence this administration produced very little change in the political relations estabUshed with the several native powers, during the se- cond government of Lord Cornwallis, and that of Su' George Barlow. Some additional chiefs of Bundelkhund had indeed been admitted to the benefit of a protective alliance ; and in 1 809 the system of our relations was extended to the Sutlej, by the reception of certain Seikh chieftains also under protection, as a barrier to the rising am- bition of Runjeet Singh. Moreover, in 1812, measures of compulsion were undertaken against the Rewa principality, in consequence of this Raja's having aided an incursion of Pindarees into the rich provinces of Mirzapoor and South Buhar. These were, however, still in progress on the arrival of Lord Hastings, and the tract was only finally subjected to our influence by his Lordship. In like manner an attempt made by Lord Minto, in 1808-9, to bring about a subsi- • INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 3 diary alliance with the Bhoosla Raja, proved at the time abortive ; and though the hope of even- tually accomplishing this object was not finally extinguished, the measure was one remaining for the new Governor-General With the slight modifications above adverted to, the relations of the British with the native powers of India were precisely in the condition in which they were placed at the close of the Mahratta war, in 1805-6; but the course of events had in this interval produced many impor- tant changes, as well in the relative position of the several powers towards one another, as in their temper towards ourselves. It will be useful, by way of introduction to the proposed Narrative of the principal Political and Military Transactions of Lord Hastings's administration, to give a brief sketch of their actual condition at the time of his Lordship's arrival. The States of India, that is, of Hindoostan and the Dukhun, for external powers, as those border- ing on Persia to the west, and the Burmese and others to the east, are necessarily excluded from the review, may be classed at this period under four heads. First, those with whom the British nation had formed subsidiary alliances. Secondly, those enjoying its protection, without any subsi- diary contract, and consisting for the most part of small principalities, scarcely meriting the name B 2 4 INTRODUCTORY ]\[ATTrRS. of substantive powers. Thirdly, acknowledged princes with whom the British government was at peace, and connected by the mutual obligation of treaties ; but with whom it had no closer inter- course, or recognized means of influence, except in so far as the residence of a British representa- tive at the court was sometimes matter of stipu- lation. Fourthly, independent chieftains and asso- ciations never yet acknowledged as substantive states, and to which the British nation was bound by no engagements whatsoever. The states connected with the British by subsi- diary alliances were, the Nizam, whose court was at Hyderabad in the Dukhun ; the Peshwa, resi- ding at Poona; the Gykwar, whose capital was Brodera, or Baroda, and who held at one time the greater part of Goozerat ; and the Rajas of Mysoor and Travankoor. The Nuwab of Oudh ought, perhaps, in strictness, to be added to these ; but the cessions exacted of him by Lord Wellesley, in commutation for the stipulated subsidy, had so circumscribed his territory and contracted his means, that although independent in the manage- ment of his remaining possessions, and conse- quently far superior to the pageant courts of Deh- lee, Moorshedabad, and Arcot, (Urkat,) he was nevertheless in too great dependence on the British government, to be regarded as one of the political states of India. INTllODUCTOllY MATTERS. O All the subsidiary alliances had been formed upon the same princii^les. The British nation stipulated to furnish a specific force for the protec- tion of the country, and maintenance of the sove- reign's legitimate authority. This force was not ordinarily to be employed in the duties of civil administration, nor in the collection of the reve- nues ; and the British government generally as^reed not to interfere in such matters. A sub- sidy, equivalent to the payment of the force, was furnished by the protected state either in periodical money payments, or Ijy territorial cession ; more frequently the latter. A certain native contingent, as it was called, was also to be maintained in readiness to act with the British troops, and for the efficiency of this, the protected state was an- swerable. But the most material provision of the treaties was, that the states accepting them, en- gaged to discontinue all political negotiation with the other powers of India, except in concert with the British government ; and to submit all claims and disputes with others to its ar])itration and adjustment. This article, though an indispensable correlative of the stipidation for protection, gave to the British a controlling power in all matters of external relation ; while the obligation to main- tain the protected prince's just authority, implied the right of interfering, with advice at least, in matters of internal })olicy likely to bring it in 6 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. ({uestion. Hence all the subsidizing states were more or less in dependence, — a reference to the British government being always necessary either to prevent or punish the aggression of neighbours ; to quell insurrections, or enforce the submission of powerful vassals, and guarantee their just treat- ment ; or finally, to regulate the succession on a sovereign's demise. The engagements for the simple protection of chieftainships and principalities had the same con- trolling character, nor did they differ materially in substance from the subsidiary treaties, except in- asmuch as there was seldom any consideration exacted for the protection to be afforded, and never any obligation on the British government to maintain a specific force for the purpose. The principal members of this class were — the Rajas of Bhurtpoor, of Dholpoor Baree, of Aiwa or Macheree, and various other chiefs round Dehlee and Agra, with whom arrangements had been made on the close of the Mahratta war in 1 805-6. The Rajas of Oorcha and Tehre, of Duttea, of Punna, and others of the Bundeela race,* together with the Mahratta chiefs of Jaloun and Jhansee, and one or two more taken under protection on the conquest of Bundelkhund, or subsequently ; also the Raja of Rewa, in Boghilkhund, and the * See the nonitiiclature annexed to this edition. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 7 Seikh chieftains between the Jumna and Sutlej, to whom alhision has before been made, as added to the list in tlie time of Lord Minto. The Moosul- man Nuwabs of Rampoor and Kalpee in Hindoos- tan, of Kurnol and EUichpoor in the Dukhun, and numberless others, whom it would be tedious to recapitulate, belong also to this class. The two Rajpoot states of Jypoor and Joudhpoor had been included in this system by Lord Wellesley ; but in the settlement of 1805-6 they were left without the pale of our relations, from an appre- hension that these were already too extensive. The Raja of Jypoor was considered, by his con- duct in the war with Hoikur, to have forfeited all claim to our further protection; while the Raja of Joudhpoor had refused to ratify the treaty con- cluded with Lord Lake, hy his representative ; so that no imi3ediment arose out of any existing en- gagements with either state, to counteract tlie desire then felt by the British government to withdraw from the connexion. When mention is made of the extent of the British influence, in estimating the national power and resources in India, it is in allusion to the states and principahties whose relation with us is of one or other of the above two descriptions. These must by no means be overlooked in such an estimate, for it is one most striking feature of the connexion, generally indeed an express stipulation, 8 INTRODUCTOllY MATTERS. tliat in case of exigency the whole resources of our ally shall be at the command and under the direction of the British government. It must not, however, be supposed that of the states thus subject to our influence, all were equally well contented with their lot, or ready to afford the aid of their re- sources with the same zeal and alacrity. Their sentiment towards us was almost as various as the circumstances in which they found themselves placed. Sometimes the connexion originated in motives of ambition or interest, or present neces- sity ; and upon gaining the temporary object sought from the alliance, the restraints it imposed on all schemes of further aggi"andizement would render the pi'ince who formed it restless and dis- contented. Sometimes the British government would, from motives of policy, be compelled to pursue ulterior objects, and urge their acceptance witli an importunity very irksome and disagreeable to the ally. Sometimes the personal character of the prince or his minister, and as often that of the British representative at his court, would lead to irritating disputes and mutual alienation. But a more general source of discontent necessarily ex- isted in the checks imposed, both directly and in- directly, on the gratification of private revenge, capricious cruelty, and other bad passions. Hence it was but seldom that a prince's gratitude and sincere attachment could be depended upon, unless INTPwODUCTORY MATTERS. 9 he owed to us his elevation to i)owcr, or came to the Musnud after the estal)lishment of our influence, with moderate views and chastened ambition, satisfied with the undisturbed enjoy- ment of what he possessed, and well convinced that, but for the alliance, he would not be able to maintain himself in that. Of the subsidizing states, the Nizam was our most useful ally, and the connexion with him had, from variou^s circumstances, assumed an anomalous ciiaracter. Nizam Ulee Khan formed the alliance in his old age, not long after he had received a severe defeat from the Mahratta forces at Kurdla, and when the power and ambition of Tippoo was also a subject of constant apprehension to him. There were at the time two parties at his court ; one devoted to the French interest, and placing its reliance on the troops officered chiefly by that nation, who, since the convention of Kurdla, had been greatly strengthened; the other attached to the English, and headed by Azim ool Oomra, the prime minister. Nizam Ulee, sensible of his own weakness and increasing infirmities, desired only repose and security for the future. He was readily led to conceive a suspicion of the French party, from seeing the same interest jDredominant at the court of his rival Tippoo, as well as in most of the Mahratta durbars, and hence fell naturally into the views of his minister ; whose anxiety for a 10 1NT110I)[JCT011Y MATTERS. connexion with Uie British was not, it must be confessed, wholly disinterested. Having brought about the alliance of 1798, the same influence ef- fected the more close connexion of 1800, which secured to us the aid of the Nizam's resources in the approaching contest witli the Mahrattas ; but this latter measure was rather yielded to the para- mount influence of the minister, than adopted by Nizam Ulee from personal conviction of its benefit to his own interests ; and, indeed, during the last years of the reign of this prince, the ascendancy of Azim ool Omra was so complete as to enable him to assume the entire direction of affairs at Hyder- abad. Upon the death of Nizam Ulee, in 1803, his eldest son, Meer Ukbur Ulee, who in his father's lifetime had the title of Sekundurjali, suc- ceeded to the musnud without opposition. For this advantage, and for the subsequent acquisition of Berar on the close of the Mahratta war, this prince felt indebted to the course of measuies adopted by the ministers of his predecessor, and particularly to the connexion subsisting with the British. Being of an indolent habit, and unambi- tious character, he was well content to leave the conduct of affairs in the hands he found them. The ascendancy of Azim ool Omra therefore con- tinued till this minister's death in 1804. He was succeeded by his relation, Meer Alum, who found his advantage in drawing closer the ties subsisting INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 11 with the British government; for it was to its in- fluence mainly that he owed his appointment, and he continually needed its support against the in- trigues of his rivals. Meer Alum died in 1808, when the reigning Nizam made a feeble effort to exercise the rights of sovereignty, by the selection of a minister from amongst his personal favourites. The competit(trs for the vacant office were three: Mooneer ool Moolk, Meer Alum's son-in-law, and a connexion of the Nizam's favourite wife; Shums ool Oomra, commander of the household troops, and a large jageerdar; and Chundoo Lai, a shrewd Hindoo, long employed under the two former mi- nisters, and by far the most capable person about the court. The British government espoused the cause of the last mentioned, and assumed openly, on this occasion, the right of dictating that the minister should be a person in its confidence. After much discussion, the matter was compro- mised, by leaving to the Nizam the appointment of a nominal premier, on the condition that Chundoo Lai should be the deputy, and the i3rin- cipal never interfere with his administration. After wavering a little, the choice of Ukbur Ulee fell upon Mooneer ool Moolk, the least fit ; and in setting aside the other competitor, he is said to have been influenced principally by the discovery that of the two we should have preferred him for the station of nominal chief. The arrangement 12 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. here described took effect in 1810; since wlien, Chundoo Lai has managed all the affairs of this state, while Mooneer ool Moolk passes his time in consulting astrologers, and the Nizam, partly from ill-humour, and partly fi'om indolence and imbecility, refrains wholly from intermeddling. As the necessary result of such a system, the British influence assumed from this time forward a more confirmed character: the efficient minister was wholly dependent on its aid for the enforce- ment of his daily measures and orders; and through him the resources and means of the state took whatever direction was pointed out by our representative at the court. Chundoo Lai was naturally distrustful of the military establishment of the Nizam, and of the chiefs, who wasted the revenues of the state under the system of assign- ments for its maintenance. Hence he readily adopted a suggestion, which the inefficient state of the contingent gave us the excuse for offering, and consented, as a means of reforming this force, to raise battalions, to be officered and disciplined like British sepoy regiments. In 1814 there were two brigades of this description, whose services, when not required in the field as a contingent, were most useful in collecting the revenues, and aiding the civil administration ; and whose exist- ence gave to the Nizam's government a strength independent of the British subsidiary force, thus INTRODUCTOllY MATTERS. 13 saving our ally from the humiliating necessity of ap- plying on all occasions for its aid. But while the brigades thus effectually answered this avowed pur- pose, they were yet more useful to the minister's per- sonal views, as they enabled him to set at defiance, and ultimately to break down, all the military vas- sals and retainers of the court, whose rivalry and in- trigues had heretofore been the cause of so much distraction. Being, however, officered entirely by British subjects, and chiefly by transfer from the Company's military service, the selection being with the resident, imder the approval of the su- preme government, the system ri vetted for ever the dependence of the country. In case of dis- putes with the British, it was plain that the troops must follow the party of their officers ; but this was a contingency that Chundoo Lai needed not to provide against, for he felt himself essen- tially a British minister. While circumstances had thus reduced the state of Hyderaljad to a condition little different from that of a British province, Bajee Rao Peshwa was pursuing a very oj)posite policy in the adjoining Mahratta territory of Poona. He was a prince of considerable ability, and needed no minister to relieve him from the toils of go- vernment. "With consummate art he availed himself of his connexion with the Britisli to reco- ver and improve liis own resources ; ))ut, instead 14 INTRODUCTORY JMATTERS. of implicitly trusting to this aid, he evinced at all times the greatest jealousy of any attempt to ce- ment a closer union. It had been distinctly fore- seen by Lord Wellesley, that this prince only en- tered into the defensive alliance from conviction that " he had no other way of recovering any part of his just authority, or of maintaining tran- quillity in his empire;"* and that on "his affairs taking a favourable turn, he would, supported by the sentiments of the different branches of tlie Mahratta empire, be desirous of annulling the en- gagements he had made with the British govern- ment." Fourteen years had now passed since the conclusion of the first subsidiary alliance with the Peshwa at Bassein, and ten since the connexion was matured by the arrangements consequent on the successful issue of the first Mahratta war. If, during this period, Bajee Rao had maintained the character of a good ally, it was because the interval was necessary — first, to consolidate his own power, and then to. court the general senti- ment of the Mahratta nation, which had been so prophetically designated as the foundation of a future rupture. He was just reaching this eleva- tion when Lord Hastings assumed the govern- ment ; and the prominent part he thenceforward * Vide Pol. Despatch to the Court of Directors, Sep- tember 1804. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 15 acted in the political drama, affords the best de- velopement of his policy and actual disposition at the time. At the courts of the three remaining powers with whom subsidiary alliances had been formed, the ascendancy of the British influence was fixed even more firmly than at Hyderabad. The terri- tory and resources were, it is to be observed, in each case, much less considerable, whence the conviction felt of the greatness of our power, and of the utter hopelessness of any attempt to thwart our views caused them all to give at once into the policy of sparing no effort to secure our fa- vour, on which rested all their hopes of pros- perity. With the Gykwar, the same cause which operated at Hyderabad, viz. the prince's imbe- cility, had contributed to establish a state* of things in some respects similar ; but here the right of the British government to interfere in the in- ternal administration of the country, was matter of express stipulation by treaty. The Mysoor * Soon after the subsidiary alliance, the utter incapacity of Anund Rao, the reigning Gykwar, and the confusion intro- duced into his affairs by Arab mercenaries and bankers, to wliom the state was indebted, induced the leading men to so- licit the Bombay government to take on itself the Bhundaree, or guarantee of the public debt, and to give its support to Seeta Ram, son of Raojee Apajec, as Dewan or prime mi- nister, with full powers. This arrangement failing to re- 10 INTHODUCTOKV MATTKllS. Raja was tlie same Kisheiiraj Oodiaver ; wlio, on the fall of Seringapatam, was placed on the Guddee as an infant, by Lord Wellesley. Poor- nea, liis famous minister, died in 1810; and the young Raja was now just beginning to take an interest in jiublic affairs. His disposition gave early promise of an habitual reliance on the Bri- tish government ; and the circumstances of his elevation were a sufficient guarantee of the sin- cerity of his attachment. The Travankoor Raja was in 1814 an infant, recently born to one of the sisters of the prince who al^etted the attack on Colonel Macaulay in 1808, and who died after the subjugation of his country in 1810. The state has not, since then, been entitled to much consideration in the scale of native powers ; and for some time the country was governed, in the name of the regent Toombratee,* by Colonel John Munro, who succeeded Colonel Macaulay as resident, and on whom the office of premier, trieve the affairs of the state, from Seeta Ram's want of ability, be was deprived of power, and the administration placed in the hands of a commission, whereof the British re- sident was a member. Subsequently Anund Rao's brother, Futeh Singh Gykwar, was vested with the sole direction of affairs under the resident's advice ; and this was the state of things at Baroda on Lord Hastings' arrival. * The royal family of Travankoor are Nairs, amongst whom the sister's son has the prior claim to the inheritance. Toombratee is the title ot the royal sisterhood. Introductory matters. 17 with the title of Dewan, was conferred by the regent. The disposition of the second class, viz. of Pro- tected States, varied even more than that of the subsidizing powers ; which was owing, perhaps, to their being left more to themselves, as few were of sufficient importance to require a political agent, whose sole business it should be to watch over their actions and influence their conduct. The Raja of Bhurtpoor's object in accepting f)rotection, in 1805-6, was to recover, without other equivalent than the nominal sacrifice of un- restrained latitude of political action, the fortress of Deeg and the greater part of his territory, then in our hands. The successful defence of his capi- tal against the army of Lord Lake had raised this chief to a dangerous pre-eminence ; and in all his subsequent dealings with tjie British he displayed the most arrogant haughtiness, not exempt from suspicion, distrust, and fear. Feeling that he had become a rallying point of disaffection, he seemed rather to court than avoid the character, and took the attitude of one ready again to try his fortune against us. But while he openly thwarted and irritated us to the fuU extent of our forbearance, he betrayed his real apprehen- sions, by conceding immediately when he found he could safely risk no further provocation. The other protected chiefs on the same frontier, c 18 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. were, for t)ie most part, well contented ; and on comparing their condition with that of their neighbours beyond the pale of the British in- fluence, they had good reason to congratulate themselves on the connexion. They were all under the general superintendence of the British resident at Dehlee, who interfered with them as little as possible ; so that they experienced all the benefits, with few of the disadvantages, of the unequal alliance. An example of the conduct which occasionally called for an authoritative in- terposition may, however, be stated, as it oc- curred about the time of the arrival of Lord Hastings. The Raja of Macherree, finding him- self in the vicinity of the distracted state of Jypoor, thought the occasion a good one for ag- grandizing himself at its expense. He accord- ingly seized some forts and villages to which his family had an obsolete claim ; but the British government compelled him to make restitution, mulcting him likewise for delaying instant obe- dience to the orders for their evacuation. The eastern Seikhs,* whom the terror of the British name alone saved from the arms of Runjeet Singh ; and the Bundeelas, who felt in- * The management of the British relations with the Seikh chieftains was vested in Colonel Ochterlony, who commanded likewise a division of the army stationed at Loodheeana. The Bundeelas and Bogheelas were under the political charge INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 19 debted to it for a similar protection from Sind- heeas officer's, and the marauders of the Ner- budda, were, in every respect, well satisfied with their lot, and evinced on all occasions the most zealous attachment and obedience. But this was far from being the case with the Raja of Rewa, who yielded only on comjDulsion, and sighed again for independence. Our limit forbids a more mi- nute explanation of the views and feelings of the various individuals of this class ; nor indeed is it necessary, for in the dealings of the British go- vernment with them, advertance was seldom liad to the minuter shades of difference which marked their respective situations. All were treated on the same broad and liberal principles ; and when any one offended, it was ever the wish to find an excuse or palliative for his conduct, rather than make it a ground of serious quarrel. Indepen- dently of the circumstances attending the con- traction of the alliance in each case, great allow- ance was always made for personal character, and for the capricious views which native princes are so apt to entertain of what is best for their pre- sent interest. It would have been unreasonable indeed to expect the disposition of such various allies to be uniformly favourable. The framers of a civil superintendent, who was, at the same time, head judicial officer of the British district of Bundelkliuiid. Mr. J. Wauchope filled this donl)le situation in 1814. c 2 20 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. of the scheme of these extensive relations always contemplated that, for a long time, several of the confederates would prove disaffected, many luke- warm, and few zealous for the maintenance of the system of general regulation introduced. The greatest forbearance towards all these dif- ferent sentiments, and extreme moderation and consistency in our dealings, were essential to the successful management of the stupendous machine thus organized, particularly when a further even- tual extension of the system was not an impos- sible contingency. The states and jjowers of the third class, that is to say, those not directly under our influence, and with whom our connexion was that of mutual amity alone, were the Seikh chieftain Runjeet Singh, the Goorkha nation which ruled Nipal, and the three Mahratta governments of Central India, namely, the Sindheea, Bhoosla, and Holkur fami- lies. We shall for the present confine the review to the Mahratta courts, and exclude the two first mentioned powers as not immediately connected with the purpose in hand. British residents were established at the head-quarters of the Sindheea and Bhoosla families, but none had ever been stationed at the Holkur durbar. Indeed, since the derangement of Juswunt Rao's intellect, and more especially since his death, which occurred in 1811, the power which had been reared and main- INTKODUCTORY MATTERS. 21 tained by his personal ability, was fast falling to decay ; Avhile Ameer Khan, Mohummed Shah Khan, and others of the retainers of this family, were raising themselves to consequence and inde- pendence on the ruins of its fortune. Juswunt Rao's son and successor, Mulhar Rao, was a minor ; and the intrigues of the women and their adhe- rents, superadded to the frequent mutiny of the troops for pay, and the gradual desertion of the different commanders to seek their fortune in a life of predatory adventure, were the only occur- rences to be foimd in the reports of the news- writers* stationed at this court. Sindheea, since the peace concluded with him in 1 805, had steadily pursued the object of break- ing the force and reducing the garrisons of the chiefs between the Chumbul and the Nerbudda, so as to establish and consolidate his own power in that quarter. A person little conversant in the affairs of India, and observing on the map the uniform colouring of a given space, described as forming the dominions of a Mahratta chief, would * The news-writer is a recognised functionary of Indian diplomacy, and though possessing no representative charac- ter, is respected and made frequently a channel of intercourse by the native princes, when there is no vakeel resident at the court. Almost all the communications with Runjeet Singh were made through the news-writer, a channel this chief pre- ferred to the more formal mode of representation by letter. 22 INTKODUCTOKY JMATTEllS. be led to suppose, that his authority was peaceably established over the whole of that space, in like manner as the British authority is established within the districts marked as its immediate possessions. This, however, is quite inconsistent with the character of Mahratta conquest. Instead of commencing with the removal of the existing government, and the general assumption of the whole authority to himself, a Mahratta chieftain begins, by appearing at the season of harvest, and demanding a consideration for his forbearance in withholding the mischief he has it in his power to inflict. The visit is annually repeated, and the demand proportionally enhanced. Whatever is thus exacted is called the Choiit, and the process of exaction a Moolkgeeree (country-taking) ex- pedition. When the same chieftain has been in the habit of continuing his annual exactions from a certain district for a numljer of successive years, he considers the practice of making them a mat- ter of right and property, and resents the interfer- ence of a stranger as an invasion of his possessions. In process of time, perhaps, he has a cantonment, oi reduces a fort and establishes himself in the neighbourhood ; his exactions swell to the fidl amount of the revenue ; and, in the end, the authorities that may heretofore have retained the local administration by paying these exactions, will either be superseded and reduced to mere INTllObUCTORY iMATTERS. 23 cyphers, or be subdued and expelled by open force. The interval between the occurrence of this last act, and submission to the first exaction, will have been short or long, according as the opportunity may have been favourable for encroachment ; or as the party, upon whom it has been attempted, liap- pened to possess the sagacity to perceive, and the means to resist, the obvious tendency of such a system. At the epoch of the settlement with Sindheea and Holkur in 1 805, when the British government engaged not to interfere with the dependencies of those chieftains lying within certain Uraits ; tliat is to say, in Malwa, Mewar, and Marwar (in- cluding Kota, Joudhpoor, and Oodeepoor) ; the dominions of both families exhibited every variety of the intermediate state above described. The towns an4: villages, of wliich they had complete occupation, were comparatively few, and were moreover scattered about in different directions, disconnected and intermingled one with another : except in these few, the army of either chief was the whole machinery of his government, and was at all times kept in motion for the purpose of en- forcing contributions from reluctant tributaries, who regularly resisted, and often successfully. Under these circumstances, the effect of the peace concluded with the British was, merely to restiict the theatre of such warfare to their own assumed 24 INTUODrCTOitY .MATTERS, dominions, and to allow the employment of the wliole military power of each with greater activity against his i-espective dependents and nominal sii])jects. Thus, the confusion in that quarter of India, to which their operations were thenceforth confined, was necessarily increased, rather than diminished, by the peace ; and one cannot wonder at the rapid rise of predatory hordes to power and consequence, under favour of such a state of af- fairs. Lord Wellesley's plan for the suppression of this system was, to extend his subsidiary al- liances, which he expected would have the effect of inducing the native princes to discard their military establishments, as an useless expenditure and needless incumbrance. This plan was, how- ever, abandoned by Sir George Barlow, so far as Sindheea and Holkur were concerned ; indeed, their governments were so essentially military, that it could scarcely have succeeded with them under any circumstances, unless, in progress of time, they should assume a more regular form. In 1805, and for some years after, Dowlut Rao Sindheea apparently took but little personal in- terest in tlie administration of his affairs. Until 1 809, his government was, indeed, one of conti- nual shifts and momentary expedients; and his durbar a mere arena for the factions of a selfish aristocracy, whereon to ])ring to issue their strug- gles for wealth and pre-eminence. The natural INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 2D death of Arnbajee Inglia, the too powerful Sooba of Gwaliorj and the violent one of Surjee Rao, the father-in-law of Sindheea, both which occurred in 1809, enabled this prince to introduce a minis- try more dependent on himself. Since that year, the control of affairs had been in the hands of a banker of the name of Gokul-paruk, recommended to office by his financial ability, and held in check by the counteracting influence and rivalry of per- sonal favourites. By skilMly managing this balance, Dowlut Rao had asserted and exercised a more direct personal control over the affairs of his principality, during the latter period. Up to 1810, Sindheea generally was in motion the whole of the favourable season, with the greater part of his army, employed either in punishing his own refractory officers, or in Moolk- geeree expeditions in Malwa, Bhopal, or Rajpoo- tana. Oojein was his nominal capital ; but, after the forcible resumption of the Soobadaree of Gwa- lior from the family of his deceased vassal Amba- jee, he pitched his camp a short distance to the south-west of that city and fortress ; and as his court has never been moved from the spot, except for occasional pilgrimages, a second city has arisen on the site of his encampment, rivalling the old one in population at least, if not in the appearance and structure of its edifices. The great body of his trooi)s continued to be 26 INTllODUCTORY MATTEllS. distriljiitcd over the surface of the country, enforc- ing tribute in the usual way, and taking every opportunity, by the capture of fortresses, and the seizure or expulsion of the petty Rajas and chief- tains in actual possession, to consolidate his power, and acquire a firmer hold of what had hitherto been more nominally than really under his do- minion. The principal and most efficient of Sind- heea's commanders employed on this service was Colonel Jean Baptiste Filoze, a man of ambiguous parentage on the father's side, his mother having been a common woman of a camp bazar attached to one of the French battalions. He had, how- ever, been brought up, if not acknowledged, by the French officer whose name he bears ; and the wreck of the infantry trained by the officers of that nation was placed under his command, on their desertion in the course of the war. A con- siderable portion of Sindheea's artillery was also attached to this force i and, in the interval between the settlement of 1 805 and Lord Hastings' arrival as Governor-General, the forts and territories of Bahadur-gurh, Gurra-kota, Chanderee, Sheeopoor, with several others, had been wrested from their petty feudal lords by this commandei', Tliere were three other divisions of Sindheea's troops employed in the same manner, and commanded respectively by Bapoo Sindheea, Juswunt Rao, Bhao (successor to Juggoo Bapoo deceased), and INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 27 Ambajee Punt. A fifth coqis was stationed about his person at Gwalior, under command of one Jacob, a Portuguese half-cast, Arratoon, an Arme- nian, and some other officers. The strength of each of these corps was from seven or eight to ten thousand men of all arms ; but it fluctuated ac- cording to the personal views and interests of the respective commanders ; who were individually answerable to their troops for pay, — the greater part of Sindheea's territories being pai-ceiled out amongst them, and assigned in lots for the sub- sistence of the several divisions, by the discretion- ary levy of exactions and contributions by each within the specified limits. Under such a system, the Gwalior Durbar could not be expected to exer- cise a very active control over any of the chiefs so employed; indeed, the intercourse of each with the court was an uniform series of mutual decep- tion and jealousy. The disposition of the prince towards the British government must, on the whole, be considered to have been rather favourable than otherwise. He found us punctual paymasters of the annual stipend of seven lack of rupees, agreed in November 1 805 to be paid to him and his chiefs, in lieu of the Jageers they held in Hindoostan. Nor had we, on any one occasion, interfered with the prosecu- tion of his system of exaction upon the petty feu- datories within the circle of his influence. Even 28 INTKODUCTUllY MATTERS. when he sometimes trespassed beyond those limits, which, by the treaty of 1805, the British nation had engaged to consider as his legitimate prey, we had uniformly manifested the same indifference ; and, though free to have checked his aggressions, and to have secured the advantage for ourselves, we had never, except perhaps in the instance of the Bundeela chiefs, whom we received under protection, stepped forward to thwart his views- Thus he had felt, that so long as he abstained from the territories of our actual allies, he might fearlessly pursue his own schemes in any direction ; and as there was still abundant scope for his am- bition, as well as of employment for his military dependents, within the limits from which we had withdrawn, he had scarcely been sensible of any restraint from our neighbourhood and superior power. This disposition resulted from his expe- rience of our past conduct ; but as he could have no security for our continuing to act on the same system, and as events seemed fast verging to that state which must force on us the adoption of one that could not but interfere with his plans and in- terests, it was natural that he should entertain a jealousy of our views, proportionate to the sense of his own comparative inferiority. The disposition of Holkur's court was similar in this respect ; and its Sirdars seemed to consider it their policy to avoid giving offence to the British INTRODUCTOUY ^MATTERS. 29 government, even when they affected personal in- dependence. The resources of Ragoojee Bhoosla had been so reduced by the effects of the war of 1803, which deprived him at once of Berar and Cuttack (Kutuk), that he was scarcely strong enough to defend his own dominions from the aggression of the predatory liands, which had collected along the Nerbudda. The military establishments of this prince, with the exception of some corps of Arabs kept near the Raja's person, were undoubt- edly more defective than those of any native potentate, ^Vhile fewer European improvements had been grafted on the old Mahratta system, the latter had lost all those qualities that ever had made it formidal^le. Indeed, so despicable was the character of his troops, that, in 1809-1 0, Ameer Khan, a Patau officer in Holkar's service, and one of those who was aspiring at independence, planned an attack on Nagpoor in combination with the Pindarees, and would assuredly have annihilated the power of Ragoojee, had not the British gra- tuitously aided him in this extremity. A simul- taneous movement from Hindoostan and the Duk- hun induced Ameer Khan to abandon the design.* * It was on this occasion, that a Madras and a Bengal force first met on the north of the Nerbudda ; Colonel Sir Barry Close having advanced to Seronj, one of Ameer Khan's principal pos- sessions, where he met Colonel Martindell from Bundelkhund. 30 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. But Ragoojee's disposition towards us was far from friendly, notwithstanding the service thus rendered him : his resentment for the loss of Berar and Cuttack overpowered any feeling of gratitude for subsequent benefits. Yet fear dictated to him the necessity of keeping on the best terms with the British government : for the idea of his ability to call in its aid, was his main security, at this time, against the ambitious designs of the adven- turers in his neighbourhood. Under this con- viction, he was nevertheless jealous in the extreme of his political independence, and very averse to the formation of a specific defensive alliance of the same nature as those subsisting with the Nizam and Peshwa ; conceiving it a sacrifice of his dig- nity and reputation among the states of India, to assume the character of dependence on a British subsidiary force. Such being the feeling and disposition of the several Mahratta powers, there seemed little in their condition or motions calculated to excite any present alarm. As far as they were individual- ly concerned, the object of the settlement of 1 805-6 appeared to have been attained ; their weakness afforded a security against any one of them meditating a separate hostile enterprise ; at the same time, that the balance then established remained unaltered, and the mutual jealousies relied ui)on as the guarantee against a second INTRODUCTOIIY MATTERS 31 coalition were yet unextinguished. Nevertheless, there was an unsoundness in this system of our relations, which had been predicted by many, at the moment of their establishment on this basis. Its defects had begun to be apparent some time before 1814, and it could no longer he disguised, that the settlement of 1S05 was, after all, but an incomplete arrangement, which must ere long be entirely remodelled. It had become manifest that this settlement, or rather the state resulting from it, instead of having a tendency to wean the population of India from habits of military ad- venture, in which so large a portion of it had theretofore been bred, rather multiplied the in- ducements to engage in that course of life. The class addicted to such habits was evidently fast increasing. At the time of the settlement, though there were certainly some bands of ma- rauders and brigands associated under different leaders for purposes of general depredation, their number was not sufficient to attract notice ; and it was thought that they must soon either be dissolved through want of effectual bonds of union, or be in- corporated with the troops of the regular powers, or at any rate, that these latter, as soon as they were relieved from foreign wars and expeditions, would have the means, and see the advantage, of re- straining bodies of men, who professedly sub- sisted on the plunder of their neighbours. Instead 32 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. of this result, however, either from weakness and indifference, or from some erroneous notion of the policy of favouring the lodgment, in their neighbourhood, of a military force, available as an addition to their own strength in the hour of need, without the charge of any regular pay or establishment, Sindheea and Holkur, if not active ' abettors of the growth of these freebooters, were, at least, very lukewarm in their efforts for their suppression. Their only sohcitude was directed towards preventing aggression on themselves, and establishing a sort of nominal authority over as large a portion of the class as could be induced to acknowledge their supremacy. They even made liberal assignments of land to effect this object ; and if a leader of a durra of Pindarees, so the associations were called, happened to make him- self obnoxious, his ruin was attempted by turning against him the arms of a rival leader ; without reflecting that such a policy must, in its con- sequences, rather perpetuate than suppress the evil : the ruin of one chief serving but to consoli- date the equally dangerous power of another. It is by no means improbable, that the Mahratta states viewed the increase of the Pindarees with an eye to eventual service from their arms ; for they avowedly attributed the disasters of the operations of 1803 to their having imitated the European mode of warfare, and affected to believe* INTBODUCTOllY- MATTERS. 33 that, had they adhered to the Parthian method of their ancestors, the results of the cpntest would have been very different. The predatory hordes still pursued the old method ; and the wonderfiil impunity and success with which they engaged in the most distant expeditions, passing the most formidable barriers of nature and of military art, and baffling every attempt to intercept their return, howsoever well concerted, gave a colour of probability to this opinion; indeed, their calcula- tion was erroneous in one particular only, viz. that there were no strong-holds in India which could hope to baffle our military skill, in case we should adopt the plan of pursuing the depredators to their haunts. They were ignorant of the degree in which our means were superior to those of Aurung-Zeeb ; and recollecting that he, after having driven them into their fastnesses, could effect no more, readily gave into the belief, that the British power, now in its zenith, was only to be combated by the arms and arts with which Sevajee had foiled the Moghul in times of yore. It is immaterial, however, whether accident or design had permitted the predatory hordes to gain the strength they had attained in 1814. Their actual condition at that period entitled them to be regarded as a distinct political interest of the day, requiring an equal exertion of vigilance and circumspection, as Hyder in , D 34 TNTRODUCTOPtY MATTERS. the height of his power and inveterate animosity. The actual military force at the disposal of these associations amounted to 40,000 horse, inclusive of the Patans ; who, though more orderly and better disciplined than the Pindarees of the Nerbudda, possessed the same character, and were similarly circumstanced in every respect, supporting themselves entirely by depredation wherever they could practise it. This number would be doubled, were we to add the remainder of Holkur's troops of the irregular kind, which were daily deserting the service of a falling house, in order to engage in the more profitable career of predatory enterprise; and the loose cavalry esta- blishments of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, which were bound by no ties, but those of present en- tertainment, and were always in great arrear of pay. These materials formed the groundwork of an interest formidable at least to our repose, if not to our safety : and its centrical situation in India, nearly equi-distant from the dominions of the three presidencies, imposed the necessity of the most extensive annual precautions of defence, in spite of which the territories of our allies were continually overrun. On two occasions, once when they entered Guzerat in 1808-9, and again in 1812, when the Bengal provinces of Mirzapoor and Shahabad were devastated, they penetrated into our immediate territories, which for years before INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. , 35 had been exempt from such a calamity. The spirit of enterprise evinced on these occasions had much advanced the reputation of these associa- tions; and although they were not now united under any single head, there had grown up among them a principle of concert in prosecution of com- mon objects, such as a man of superior energy and abilities, had such an one chanced to arise among them, might model into the same descrip- tion of force that Tymoor and Chungeez Khan had directed to the devastation of v the eastern world. The rise of Sevajee and of Hyder, both rapid and both formidable, was a proof that such things could take place in India as weU as in other countries ; and the whole of the unsettled spirits of Central India were exactly in the condition to engender such another conqueror. They resem- bled the bands of Companions that swarmed all over Europe in the fourteenth century ; and wanted but a leader, whose standard they could rally round with confidence. The lawless and in- dependent character of the Pindarees, and the mode of their association, which rendered the chiefs responsible to nobody for their acts, and made it impossible to hold any of the regular powers legitimately answerable for their danger- ous existence, were the circumstances that made it necessary to watch their motions with especial €aution, in order to anticipate the effects of any D 2 36 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. sudden combination. With this view, the British power had interposed at once, when Ameer Khan had attempted to collect a large body together, in prosecution of his design upon the dominions of the Bhoosla Raja ; it being our uniform and avowed object, to preserve things on their actual footing, and to prevent any of those fluctuations of power, which generally end in erecting a vigorous and ambitious domination on the ruins of a weak superannuated government. It was evidently not for our interest that either the Pindarees or the Patans should build up such an edifice on the site of any of the regular states with which we were at that time connected ; and it was certainly incumbent on our policy to make some effort to prevent it. A short sketch of the origin of the predatory hordes, passing under the general denomination of Pindarees, and of the chiefs under whom their numbers were arrayed in 1814, will lead to a more distinct view of their actual condition at that time. The name of Pindara is coeval with the earliest invasions of Hindoostan by the Mah- rattas ; but the actual derivation of the word is unknown, notwithstanding the researches of se- veral etymologists. The designation was appUed to a sort of roving cavalry, that accompanied the Peshwa's armies in their expeditions, ren- dering them much the same service as the Cos- INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 37 sacks * perform for the armies of Russia. When the Peshwas ceased to interfere personally in the affairs of Hindoostan, leaving that part of the Mahratta empii*e to the Sindheea and the Holkiir chieftains, the Pindarees were thenceforth ranged in two parties, assuming respectively the appella- tion of Sindheea-shahee, or of Holkur-shahee, accordingly as they attached themselves to the fortunes of either family. They still preserved, however, all the peculiarities of their own mode of association ; and the several leaders went over with theii- bands to one chief or the other, as best suited their private interests, or those of their fol- lowers. In 1794, the principal leaders first obtain- ed assignments of land from Sindheea, in the val- ley of the Nerbudda, and amongst the hills which skirt it on the north. From that time till about 1800, there were two principal chiefs, the bro- thers Heeroo and Burun, whose standards were annually raised in that valley at the season of the Dussera, (an annual festival that takes place at the end of October or the beginning of Novem- ber,) as a rallying point for all loose spirits and unemployed military adventm*ers. Here they consulted upon the best means of providing for the necessities of the year, by the exercise of * Pindara seems to have the same reference to Pandour that Kuzak, "].j has to Cossack. The latter word is of Turkish origin, but is commonly used to express a mounted robbci in Hindoostan. 3b' INTRODUCTORY MATTKRS. rapine, accompanied by every enormity of fire and sword, upon tJie peaceful subjects of the re- gular governments. Until the close of the rains and the fall of the rivers, their horses were care- fully trained, to prepare them for long marches and hard M^ork. The rivers generally became fordable by the close of the Dussera, The horses were then shod, and a leader of tried courage and conduct having been chosen as Luhbureea, all that were so inclined set forth on a foray or liihbur, as it was called in the Pindaree nomen- clature. These parties latterly consisted some- times of several thousands. All were mounted, though not equally well ; out of a thousand, the proportion of good cavalry might be 400 : the favourite weapon was a bamboo spear, from twelve to eighteen feet long ; but, as fire-arms were sometimes indispensable for the attack of villages, it was a rule that every fifteenth or twentieth man of the fighting Pindarees should be armed with a matchlock. Of the remaining 600, 400 were usually common looteeas, indif- ferently mounted, and armed with every variety of weapon ; and the rest slaves, attendants, and camp followers, mounted on tattoos or wild ponies, and keeping up with the luhhur in the best manner they could. It is not sm'prising that a body so constituted, and moving without camp-equipage of any kind, should traverse the INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 39 whole of India in defiance of the most active pur- suit by regular troops along the same line of march : indeed, the rapidity with which they spread their devastations to the southern extre- mity of the Peshwa's and of the Nizam's ter- ritories, over an extent of not less than seven degrees of latitude from the Nerbudda, baffled every attempt to interrupt or overtake them. The cruelties they perpetrated were beyond belief. As it was impossible for them to remain more than a few hours on the same spot, the ut- most despatch was necessary in rifling any towns or villages into which they could force an en- trance ; every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money, was im- mediately put to the most horrid torture *, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Nothing was safe from the pursuit of Pindaree lust or avarice ; it was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away ; and, in the wantonness of barbarity, * A favourite mode of compulsion with tliem was, to put hot ashes into a bag, which they tied over the mouth and nostrils of their victim, whom they then thumped on the back till he inhaled the ashes. The effect on the lungs of the sufferer was such, that few long survived the operation. Another common mode was, to throw the victim on his back, and place a plank or beam across his chest, on which two people pressed with their whole weight. 40 INTllODUCTOUY MATTERS. to ravish and murder women and children, under the eyes of their husbands and parents. In the infancy of the estabUshment of the Pin- darees on the banks of the Nerbudda, their devas- tations were not carried to so great a distance as afterwards, when they began to feel their strength, and when the desolation of the imme- diate neighbourhood, or its submission to the levy of contributions on the condition of exemption, made it requisite to push their expeditions to a distance, in order to make them sufficiently pro- ductive. With the fruits of these expeditions, the chiefs were, from the first, enabled to keep together a large military force without much ter- ritorial revenue ; and to offer the occasional ser- vices of a part of their strength to Sindheea, Holkur, and other neighbouring chieftains, at a cheaper rate than the same amount of assistance was elsewhere procurable. By means of further assignments obtained in recompense for such ser- vices, and of conquests made by the bands thus kept together upon the Grassea (aboriginal) Rajas, in the mountains bordering the Nerbudda, w^ho had never yet submitted to the Mahrattas, the Pindaree chiefs gradually extended their in- fluence ; while, at the same time, the reputation of these successes brought additional swarms of adventurers to their standard. About the year 1800, the two chiefs Heeioo INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 41 and Biiriin died, either in the course of nature, or by violent means, the one at Nagpoor, and the other at Aseergurh. Both left sons ; the former, Dost Mohummed and Wasil Mohummed ; the latter, the two Rajuns ; but it was not till after some time that these individuals succeeded to any part of their fathers' influence : the pre-eminence devolved, in the first instance, upon other Sir- dars, according to their reputation and ability as leaders. Kureem Khan, a Holkur-shahee Pin- dara, was the first who rose to consequence after the death of the brothers ; indeed, he was not al- together fi'ee from suspicion of having procured the death of Burun at Aseergurh. Kureem was an active, bold, and ambitious adventurer, suffi- ciently devoid of principle to profit by the po- Htics of the time. He commenced his career by joining the rising fortunes of Jes^vunt Rao Holkur, with a considerable party of followers, pledged to consider their own and tlieir leader's interest as inseparable. His services proved va- luable to Holkur, and were suitably rewarded. A short tif^ after, he was bought over by Sind- heea, who gave him the title of Nuwab, and several assignments of land in the valley, and above the ghats of the Nerbudda : thenceforth he called himself a Sindheea-shahee Pindara, though he was frequently found in arms against the ad- herents of his nominal superior. He enlarged his 42 INTllOnUCTORY MATTEES. possessions by interfering in the internal affairs of Bhopal, and in the contests of this state with the Bhoosla. After worsting the latter, he ex- cited a civil war in Bhopal ; and giving his suj)- port to one party, was very near estaljlishing his authority over the whole principality ; but the state was saved by the persoHal courage and con- duct of Wuzeer Mohummed, with the assistance of Dost Mohummed, the son of Heeroo, who began about that time to rise into notice as a rival of Kureem. During the prosecution of this ambi- tious course of self-aggrandisement, there was never any intermission of the systematic pre- datory expeditions, that still formed one of the main resources by which the chieftains main- tained theii' military power. Sindheea himself, the Bhoosla Raja, and the Hindoo chiefs of Bun- delkhund, were the principal sufferers by their depredations at this period *. During the troubles of the Mahratta empire consequent upon the war with the British, Kureem Khan availed himself of the opportunity to seize on some possessions of Sindheea and of the P^sh- wa's jageerdars in Malwa ; insomuch, that after * The tolerance of this practice may, in part, be accounted for by the recollection, that a predatory inroad is not consi- dered derogatory to the dignity of a Mahratta government, which avowedly regards rapine as a legitimate resource of the state. IXTEOUUCTOUY MATTEKS, 43 the conclusion of hostilities in the year 1800, he was in the occupation of a territory of not less^ than eleven pergunnas, whereof the princijDal were Bau'sea, Ashta, Shujawulpoor, Sarungpoor, Icha- wur, and Sehoree, above the ghats of the Nerbud- da, together with Sutwas, Chipaneer, and other places within the valley. His annual land-reve- nue from this territory exceeded fifteen lack of rupees, besides compensations for immunity from plunder, which he levied on most of the neigh- bouring rajas and chiefs. He had also built himself a fort in the part of his territory acquired from Bhopal, which was called, after him, Kureem- giirh. His power was now at the height ; for though there were several Pindaree leaders who had never joined his standard, and who even affected a rivalry for the supremacy he had arro- gated ; still there were none whose means or in- fluence at all approximated to those of Kureem. Though himself independent in every respect, and even an usurper upon Sindheea on more occasions than one, he still affected to be attached to that chief's interest, and to call himself a Sindheea- shahee Pindara, for the obvious purpose of retain- ing some claim to protection in case of exigency. His power, however, excited that prince's jealousy ; and in 1806, very soon after the settlement with the English, Sindheea, by the proffer of his aid in the reduction of a fort (that, for want of artillery. 44 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. had long baffled the attacks of Kiireem), inveigled the Pindara to an interview, at which he seized his person, making a simultaneous attack on his camp, which was completely plundered.* Ku- reem's possessions were then quickly recovered ; and, for five years, he was himself detained a close prisoner in the dungeons of Gwalior. His durra, in the mean time, was not broken up, though reduced to no more than two or three thousand horse, by the defection of the gi-eater part of the sirdars of inferior note ; who had been tempted, in the fuU tide of his success, to unite their interest with his. The fall of this chief, however, strengthened the durras of other leaders, particularly of Cheetoo or Seetoo, a chief under whom the two Rajuns, sons of Burun, held a sub- ordinate rank, and who had always been the avowed rival of Kureem, though hitherto the power of the latter had greatly preponderated. The party of Dost Mohummed also acquired a great accession of strength by the ruin of Kureem, whose durra had now little else than plunder to subsist upon. The search of this, however, it prosecuted with considerable success under Ku- reem's deputies, and especially one Namdar Khan ; who made Sindheea's territories the principal thea- tre of his depredations, in revenge for the trea- * For an account of this, vide Broughton's Mahratta Camp. This officer was present, and witnessed the whole scene. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 45 cheiy employed against his leader. In 1811, Kureem purchased his release from Sindheea for six lack of rupees, which were punctually paid through Zalim Singh of Kota. Returning to the scene of his former power, he immediately raised fresh levies of infantry, and invited the Pindaree chiefs, who had before followed his fortunes, to rally again round his standard. In a very sliort time he recovered the greater part of the territory he had formerly possessed, and laid his plans to effect a general combination of all the Pindarees, preparatory to an expedition of more than ordi- nary moment. Even his rival Cheetoo was in- duced to unite with his durra ; and the Dussera of 1811 was celebrated by an assemblage of not less than 25,000 cavalry of all descriptions, besides several battalions of infantry newly raised for the purpose. Kureem proposed to lead this force im- mediately against Nagpoor, the weakness of which was notorious to all the Pindarees, whose detached parties had, a short time before, succeeded in car- rying off a considerable booty from a suburb of the city itself. The Bhoosla state had fortunately won over Cheetoo by the recent grant of consi- derable jageers on the Nerbudda. He accordingly opposed the project, and retired with his durra in discontent. This division proved the ruin of Kureem ; for having a second time awakened Sindheea's jea- 46 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. lousy, JuggooBapoo, one of Sindheea's principal offi- cers, was sent against him with as large a force as could be collected, and with a reinforcement of some battalions of Holkur. There is reason to believe that this enterprise was invited by Cheetoo, who feared the consequences of having thAvartedthe designs of Kureem in respect to Nagpoor ; at all events, he was the main instrument of its success, and the person who derived the greatest advan- tages ; the major part of his late rival's possessions being allotted by Sindheea as his share of the spoil. Kureem, expecting from Cheetoo at least neutral- ity and indifference to his fate, advanced boldly to encounter Juggoo Bapoo. His rival, however, took an active part against him, so that he was completely defeated near Munohur-Thana, and obliged to fly, with a few adherents, and seek refuge in the camp of Ameer Khan, beyond the Chumbul. The strong representations of Sindheea and Holkur obUged the Patau chief to place him in a kind of restraint, in which he remained until the end of 1816. His durra again declined to a secondary condition in comparison with that of" Cheetoo, at whose cantonment of Nemawur, on the Nerbudda, not less than 15,000 horse now annually assembled at the Dussera festival, to issue forth under a leader of his nomination, in what- ever direction he might prescribe. In 1814,. the following was supposed to be the INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 47 relative strength of the Pmdaree durras : Cheetoo 5000 good horse ; total of all descriptions about 10,000, exclusive of the Holkur-shahee Pindarees, mustering from 4 to 5000 more, who latterly- attached themselves chiefly to his standard. The remains of Kureem's durra amounted to 2000 good horse ; total of every description, at least 4000. Under Dost Mohummed 6000, with the usual pro- portion of the best quality ; this chief held consi- derable jageers above the ghats of the Nerbudda, and usually cantoned in the Bhopal territory. There were, moreover, at least 6 or 8000 horse under independent leaders of inferior note, who joined one or other of the superior chiefs, as occa- sion suited. The party that penetrated into the district of Mirzapoor through Rewa was of the durra of Dost Mohummed, who planned the expe- dition a short time before the second fall of Ku- reem. It was led by Fazil Khan ; and, turning east as soon as it reached the Mirzapoor frontier, advanced to the neighbourhood of Gya, and then disappeared up the course of the Soane, on its way back to Malwa by the Chandya Ghat, before a single soldier from any British cantonment could come up with its track. Such was the anomalous and undefinable power that had grown up into consequence out of the political arrangements of 1805-6. Its leading feature was hostility to all regidar governments, and of course most particu- 48 INTRODUCTOllY MATTERS. larly to ourselves and our allies, whose territories offered the richest booty. The existence of these hordes imposed the necessity of constant vigilance along the whole extent of the south-west frontier of the Bengal presidency ; while, for the security of the Dukhun, the subsidiary forces of the Ni- zam and Peshwa were annually obHged to move to the northern frontier of their respective terri- tories ; notwithstanding which precautions, the dominions of those states were continually pene- trated and overrun. Ameer Khan and Mohummed-shah Khan, the two Patau chiefs, who were rising into a similar and equally formidable pre-eminence, commanded forces of a very different description from those of the Pindaree chiefs, though actuated by the same predatory spirit : each of them, besides horse, had large bodies of infantry and several guns. Mo- hmnmed-shah Khan's infantry were the old batta- lions of Tukojee Holkur, undoubtedly the best in India not under the actual command of European officers. Ameer Khan's were scarcely inferior. The cavalry were besides paid by the month, in- stead of living avowedly on plunder alone, like the Pindarees. Indeed, the grand difference be- tween the two classes was, that the Patans were banded together for the purpose of preying on governments and powerful chiefs : to this end, their force moved about with the materials of re- INTRODUCTORY PJATTERS. 49 gular battles and sieges, so as to work on the fears of princes and men in power, extorting contribu- tions and other advantages from them, by such intimidation as an efficient army only could im- press. The object of the Pindarees, on the con- trary, was general rapine ; they preyed upon the population at large, without arrogating an ability to cope with the governments ; their form and constitution, therefore, were fi'amed with a view to this exclusive purpose. Rajpootana was the principal field for the exhi- bition of the species of depredation practised by the Patau leaders. The nature of the principali- ties of that tract, each of which was a petty feodal government, at war with its neighbours and with its own vassals, seemed to mark it out as their destined prey. Nor was it a new game that they were playing in that quarter ; they merely follov/- ed up what Sindheea and Hoikur had long been habitually pursuing. Indeed, although the objects of the Patan chiefs were wholly personal, and prosecuted with perfect independence of each other, still they represented the Hoikur interest in the country, and had introduced their forces under sanction of that name. The very means they pos- sessed, viz. the artillery and regular battalions, had belonged to the Hoikur family^ though now employed in supporting and cstalilishing an interest virtually distinct. E 50 INTTIODUCTORY MATTERS. Notwithstanding this virtual independence of the Patans, Sindheea did not leave them in the undisputed enjoyment of the contributions and other advantages to be extorted from Rajpootana. A division of his army, under Bapoo Sindheea lay at Ajmeer, acting precisely on the principles of the Patans, and living on the plunder it could exact from Jypoor and Joudhpoor. Another force was stationed in the Oodeepoor territory, encroach- ing on the power and possessions of the Raja there, and devastating the country. The Rajpoots, how- ever, were considerably more jealous of Sindheea's apparently consolidated power than of the Patau chiefs ; whose very loose connexion with the Hol- kur family gave them the character of mercena- ries, t)iat, for objects of private interest, might be hired and discharged at pleasure. Thus in 1 809, when Sindheea seemed to meditate an inva- sion of the Joudhpoor territory with a very consi- derable force, the Raja caUed in Mohummed-Shah Khan, and took his army into pay for the purpose of repelling the attack. This facility of transferring their services ac- cording to their personal views, gave the Patau chiefs the further advantage over Sindheea and his commanders, of a pretext and power to interfere in the passing intrigues amongst the Rajpoots hemselves, and to become partisans of the several actions, from each of which they took care to INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. 51 reap some personal advantage. So long as they had the prospect of such recompense, they were not over scrupulous of the means of earning it. Ameer Khan twice sold his services for the trea- cherous assassination of obnoxious persons, and accomplished his purpose, on both occasions, at con- ferences held under the most solemn guarantees. This chief was the acknowledged head of the Patau interest. His views of ambition were, however, not confined to Rajpootana until 1814; when, finding from the activity of our prepara- tions, whenever he seemed to be meditating an enterprize against the Bhoosla, that we were re- solved to prevent his aggrandisement in that quar- ter, he moved from Malwa across the Chumbul towards Rajpootana ; and having strengthened his interest at the durbar of Holkur (then held at Rampoora-Bhanpoora), took upon himself the supreme management of the Patau forces and in- terests. Mohummed-Shah Khan, Jumsheed Khan, and the other sirdars, agreed to act in subordina- tion to him. The former of these dying about the end of 1814, the troops he had commanded became incorporated with those under the personal command of Ameer Khan. This military adven- turer was thus placed at the head of a force of at least 30,000 horse and foot, furnished with an artillery well manned and served ; yet he had no claim to be recognised as a substantive power; E 2 52 INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. though, on the other hand, no one of the regular governments could fairly be held responsible for his acts. The field of his operations lay, it is to be observed, in a quarter where there was every likelihood of his coming ere long into contact with the British government, or with those under its protection. Against this power, as well as the Pindarees, we were obliged to be continually armed, and on the alert. The want of any determinate territory or home, or of any other stake to be hazarded by the first act of hostihty, left us entirely without security for their peaceable demeanour ; there was nothing to restrain them but mere motives of convenience, and the sense that the calculation of the chances of success was against them. This, however, was the result of continual and most expensive preparation, — the necessity of which was a part of the evil that required a remedy. Such was the state of Central India at the beginning of the year 1814. The events which led to the final catastrophe of the year 1817-18 will be traced through the intermediate period, with as much conciseness as may be foimd con- sistent with the object of exhibiting a distinct view of the origin of those occurrences, and the share which the conduct of the British govern- ment may have had in producing them. INTRODUCTOliY MATTERS. 53 Before, however, entering on this narrative, it will be necessary to detain the reader with an account of the origin and progress of the war forced upon us by the Goorkha government of Nipal, with which negotiations had been some time pending when Lord Hastings arrived in India. 64 CHAPTER II. CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. Rise and Policy of the Goorkha Nation — Prithee Nurayun Sah — Run Buhadur — Account of the Turaee — Border disputes — Sarun frontier — Gourukpoor ditto — Bootwul case — Proceedings of Sir G. Barlow and Lord Minto — Further aggressions of the Nipalese — Occupation of 22 Villages of Sarun — Appointment of Commissioners — Result of investigation — Resolution of Government thereon — and of the Goorkha Court — Occupation of Bootwul by the British — Treacherous attack and murder of the Police- officers stationed there — Conduct of the Nipalese on other parts of the frontier. The state of Nipal has purposely been reserved for separate mention, both because its situation and the circumstances which brought it into con- tact with the British government have no direct connexion with the states and powers of central India, and because the conduct of this nation, which made war inevitable, even before Lord Hastings had set foot in the country, requires more specific explanation than suited the cursory view of the condition of other powers taken in the preceding chapter. J'- CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. 55 It is foreign to our design to attempt any con- sistent relation of the means and gradations by which the Goorkhas had risen to power, in the mountainous tract stretching between the plains of Hindoostan and the high lands of Taitary and Tibet. Suffice it to say, that when Lord Hastings took charge of the supreme government, he found their dominion to extend as far as the river Teesta to the east, and westward to the Sutlej ; so that this nation was then in actual possession of the whole of the strong country which skirts the northern frontier of Hindoostan. Tliis extent of dominion had been acquired en- th'ely during the last fifty years, by the systematic prosecution of a policy likened by the Goorkhas themselves, and not inaptly so, to that Vvhich had gained for us the empire of Hindoostan. The hill Rajas, whom they had successively conquered and displaced, were mere ignorant, selfish tyrants, on bad terms with their subjects and neighbours, but mostof all, with their own relations. Thus, while there was amongst them no principle of combi- nation for mutual defence against a common enemy, not one of the petty principalities was suf- ficiently strong or united within itself to be capa- ble of substantial resistance. The Goorkha chiefs were at all times as ready to apply the influence of intrigue as open force, and could well combine both for the pro- 56 CAUSES OF THE NIPAl- WAK, ecution of their ends. They had a regular army, obedient to its officers, and the whole in proper subordination to the state. This was always available to the weaker party upon conditions, and the frequent internal dissensions of the Rajas, which successively came to form the Goorkha frontier, never failed to produce the invitation. Prithee Nurayun Sah has the merit of establish- ing the system which raised this nation to power. Taught by the example of our early victories in Bengal, he armed and disciplined a body of troops after the English fashion ; and after a struggle of more than ten years, finally subjugated the valley of Nipal by their means in 17G8. The Moorshedabad Nuwab (Kasim Ulee Khan) at- tempted to interfere in 1762-3, but sustained a signal defeat under the walls of Mukwanpoor ; and the British government was not more success- ful in an effort made some years after to succour the last of the Sooruj Bunsee dynasty, who reigned at Katmandoo.* * The expedition was undertaken at the recommendation of Mr. Golding, the commercial agent at Betia, who feared that the success of the Goorkhas would ruin the trade he before carried on witli Nipal : it had been interrupted for three or four years in consequence of the subjugation of Mukwanpoor. Major Kinloch commanded the party destined for the relief of the Nipal Raja. He was a good officer ; but advanced into the hills a month at least too early (in October 1767), and had not CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. 57 Prithee Nurayun dying in 1771, his son Singh Purtap, and, in 1775, his grandson Run Buhadur came successively to the throne ; the latter, how- ever, being an infant, Buhadur Sah, another son of Prithee Nurayun, struggled long with his brother's widow for the regency. Her death at last gave him the ascendancy, which he kept till 1795 ; when Run Buhadur came of age, and forcibly assumed the sceptre to the destruction of his uncle. Run Buhadur, proving a tyrant, was expelled in 1 800, and took refuge for a time at Bunarus. In the interval of his exile, the Bengal govern- ment estabhshed a commercial treaty with the ruUng faction ; and Captain Knox was sent re- sident to Katmandoo in 1802. Colonel Kirk- patrick had before been employed on a mission to that capital by Lord Cornwallis, but was obliged to return without effecting any thing ; and the same jealousy of the object with which the connexion was sought by us being still alive, strength enough to establish a chain of depots to secure his communication with the plains ; consequently, having pene- trated to Hureehurpoor, he was detained there by a nulla, not fordable, and the bridge and raft he constructed were carried away after a fall of rain, which swelled the torrent unnatu' rally. The delay thus experienced exhausted his supplies, and produced sickness ; so that, finally, he was obliged to return early in December, — the time when, properly, he should have set out. 58 CAUSKS OF THE NI1>AI> WAR. Captain Knox was recalled, and the connexion broken off in 1 804. Run Buhadur left Bunarus, and was received again with open arms by his siibjects<^' of Kat- mandoo, soon after Captain Knox's recall ; but his disposition proved to be incorrigibly tyrannical : his bad propensities had been exasperated rather than chastened by adversity, and by the restraints of a residence within the British frontier. The principal people of the court therefore, who found themselves the objects of a revengeful persecution, a second time formed a conspiracy against the Raja, which was brought to a desperate issue prematurely. The conspirators, having some reason to apprehend that they were betrayed, suddenly resolved to sell their lives as dearly as possible ; and one of them, the Raja's half brother, rushed forward and cut Run Buhadur down nearly to the middle by a blow of his koka,* as he sat in full durbar in 1805. A barbarous affray followed, in which the brother was himself slain with most of the chief men of the state, and the royal family was nearly extinguished. An infant son of Run Buhadur's was, however, • with diffi- culty secreted in the women's apartments, and thus saved from the massacre by Bheem Sein Thapa, v/ho proclaimed him a few days after, by * The koka is a short but heavy sword, the edge of which is on the inner side, like that of a scythe. CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. 59 the name of Kurmaii Jodh Bikrum Sah, and who, by his influence with the regent-mother, suc- ceeded in introducing himself to a large share in the government. The Raja was still in his minority when the war broke out with the British ; and the power of the state was in the hands of an aristocracy, composed of the highest military officers, with whom were associated some of the Raja's distant relations, and some Brahmins. The Panres, or Pandees, were at the head of the faction which had expelled Run Buhadur, in 1800, but on that chief's return, they were for the most part cut off or expatriated; and since then the Thapas had acquired the paramount au- thority, Bheem Sein Thapa, who assumed and still uses the English title of General, had the principal conduct of affairs at the capital. He was the son of a chief named Kajee Umur Singh Thapa, governor of Palpa on the Gourukhpoor frontier, and who died in October 1814. All the territory held by the Goorkhas west of the Gogra had been acquired within the last fifteen years, by the arms of another Umur Singh Thapa ; who, having been for many years at the head of a successful army, had clothed himself with a power, which the nationality of his troops and his own patriotism alone prevented him from making independent. The terms on which he stood to- wards those who conducted affairs at Katmandoo, 60 CAUSES OF THE NirAE WAR. and the politics of the court, generally, will Ije better understood from what we shall presently have to relate : we shall first state briefly the nature and origin of the disputes which ultimately brought on the war. The whole range of hills is skirted along its southern base by a magnificent forest, chiefly of Sal trees, (Shorea robusta). The timber is useful in ship-building, though far inferior to the teak of Malabar, and of the Burman empire. The boats, however, which navigate the upper Ganges, and the beams and rafters for building throughout Hindoostan, even down to Calcutta, are almost exclusively made of it. The forest therefore is valualile* ; it abounds in elephants, which are chiefly prized for their teeth, the animals being less fit for carriage, and in other respects greatly inferior to what are caught at Chittagong, Ceylon, and in the countries nearer the Line. Beyond the forest, towards Hindoostan, is an open plain, called the Turaee or Tereeana, which is chiefly valuable on accoimt of the fine pasture it yields during the months of April and May, when the periodical hot winds entirely destroy the herbage of the more southern regions. The bunjaree bullocks from Malwa, and even from the northern parts of the * It IS a saying of the Goorkhas, that every tree is a mine of gold. CAUSES OF THE NIPaL WAR. 61 Dukhiin, come here to gi-aze in those montlis ; and the Kahchuraee, or pasturage-rate, levied by the border Zemindars, is a very productive branch of their revenue. The soil of the Turaee is for the^ most part ex- tremely rich ; and though the nuinljer of wild elephants, rhinoceroses, and buffaloes that find shelter in the adjoining forest, makes it very un- certain whether the husbandman will reap the fruits of his tillage, cultivation has nevertheless made rapid advances there. The insalubrity of the climate during a great portion of the year, prevents the establishment of any considerable towns in the tract. The population is, indeed, for the most part migratory ; the several classes re- tiring either into the hills, or to a distance in the plains, when the unhealthy season commences. There are ruins, however, at Sumroun, and in other parts of the Turaee, which would seem to indicate that, at some former period, the capital of an extensive province was situated tliere, and that the tract therefore was not always so un- healthy as it is now deemed ; but nothing satis- factory on tliis head has yet been ascertained. From time immemorial, the coimtry with- in the hills and on the borders has been divi- ded amongst petty Hindoo Rajas, and the forest and Turaee have naturally been a perpetual bone of contention to them ; a chieftain pos- 62 CAUSES OF THE NIPAI. WAR. sessing fastnesses in the hills could always en- force contributions, by issuing thence and car- rying off booty from those who hesitated to comply. Hence every hill Raja had a sweep of the forest and low country attached to his estate, and this he was continually endeavouring to ex- tend, either by intrigue, or by violence, or by any means that presented. The superior wealth and greater number of followers at the command of some of the Rajas of the plains, enabled them occasionally to penetrate and reduce to subjection a hill neighbour ; but ordinarily, such enterprizes were beyond their skill or resources ; and the border-war was handed down from father to son, in their respective families. Neither Ukbur nor any of his descendants on the throne of Dehlee made any attempt to add the tract of hills to the Moghul empire ; its re- venue was not an object of cupidity, nor was its population sufficiently formidable to make the subjugation of the country necessary as an act of political precaution. The Rajas of the plains, on the other hand, though compelled to submit to the Moosulman yoke, retained their territories, and became tributaries of the empire ; which did not prevent their prosecuting their hereditary feuds with their neighbours in the hills, in the same manner as heretofore. The Moghul officers, not sorry to see a powerfiU vassal weakened, would CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. G3 sometimes foment these disputes, and make grants of their tributary's lands in the plains, for the aggrandizement of a hill Raja ; whose name would thus be added to the list of subjects. Or- dinarily, however, the Soobas did not interfere in the management of the affairs of this remote tract. The Rajas, therefore, were at perfect liberty to pursue their old system ; and such continued to be the state of this frontier, until the low countries fell under the British dominion, and the hills were gradually overrun by the Nipalese, and consolidated by them into one sovereignty. The British government, assimilating its con- duct to that of its predecessors, did not interfere witli the possessions of the Rajas in the plains ; but contented itself with a money-tribute, or at least with a composition for the rights asserted by the Moghuls, which becoming fixed in amount at the perpetual settlement, may be so described. The Goorkhas, on the other hand, as each Raja in the hills successively fell before them, exterminated the family ; and, becoming heir to all its possessions, took up likewise the old Raja's claims and contests with his neighbours. This brought them into contact with our Zemindars, who were, of course, unable to maintain them- selves against such an enemy, and generally therefore had to resign the object in dispute ; for, 64 CAUSES OF THK NIPAI- WAR. unless when the encroachment was gi'oss and easy of proof, it was vain to hope to interest the British government in their favour. That go- vernment was, in the first place, no loser by the usurpation, for the pubUc revenue was fully se- cured by the perpetual settlement, and by the increased value of the entire estate against any loss from a partial aggression. Moreover, it was, on principle, distrustful of the pretensions of its own subjects, which were generally exaggerated ; while it regarded the Goorkha nation as a well- disposed neighbour, whom it was desirable to con- ciliate; hence an injured Raja of the plains would seldom succeed in procuring any powerful sup- port to his cause, unless, as above observed, the case were very flagrant, when the Goorkhas would on remonstrance make reparation. It will be proper to illustrate this view by an appeal to facts ; and the disputes on the Sarun frontier, one of the main causes of the war, afford a case strongly in point. The Raja of Chumparun, who resides at Betia, was perpetually at w^ar with the Raja of Mukwan- poor mthin the hills, for different portions of the Turaee ; and amongst other sources of dispute, each of them had pretensions to sovereignty over part of a Perguna called Sumroun, the same in which the ruins before alluded to are situated. We shall endeavour to explain the circumstances CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. G.) of this dispute with some minuteness, at the risk of appearing tedious. Tlie Mukwanpoor family granted Roteehut and Puchroutee, two tuppas (sulj-divisions) of the above Perguna, in Jageer to Ubdoollah Beg, a Moo- suhnan, who had influence enough with the Moor- shedabad family to get tliere a confirmation of the tenure by the Nazim. The Betia Raja, who had claims on the tract, and was, there is reason to believe, then in possession, at first resisted ; but in the end, gave likewise to Ubdoollah a sunud* for the same lands. Thus was the Moosuhnan's te- nure secured, to whichever party the right belonged ; but as the Mukwanpoor grant was the oldest in date, and had been acknowledged at Moorsheda- bad, this Raja's title to resume eventually ac- quired a kind of preference. In 1763, Prithee Nurayun, having subdued the Mukwanpoor Raja, claimed to be feodal superior over Ubdoollah ; and resolved, as soon as he had secured his conquest, to resume the Jageer. Accordingly, after a year or two, he seized not only Ubdoollah's lands, but twenty-two villages more, which he claimed to be part of Roteehut, though not in the Jageerdar's possession. UbdooUah fled to the English authorities ; who took up his cause, and made his injuries one pre- text for the declaration of war issued prior to the * Sunud, a deed of gilt. F QQ CAUSES OF THE NIl'AL WAR. advance of Major Kinloch in 17G7. This officer, having failed in penetrating into the hills, was desired to occupy the whole Turaee, as a means of remunerating the British government for the ex- pense incurred. Ubdoollah then claimed his Jageer, and Roteehut and Puchroutee were in conse- quence given up to him. When peace was re- stored with the Nipalese, they sent an agent named Deenanath to claim the territory given up to Ubdoollah Beg as part of Mukwanpoor. This was opposed by the Betia Raja, and a long investiga- tion ensued ; when, upon the strength of the first deed of grant to Ubdoollah, which was on copper, and of a date faUing in 1743, Mr. Hastings finally decided, in 1781, that Roteehut and Puchroutee belonged to Mukwanpoor, and were not parcel of Betia or Chumparun. While this contest was undetermined, the Goorkhas courted Ubdoollah, and promised to maintain him, for without his help their title could not have been established. After it was decided, however, they resumed his Jageer, and occupied it for themselves. The twenty-two villages seized, on the first invasion of the Goorkhas, on pretence of their belonging to Roteehut, had never been given up either to Ubdoollah, or to the Nipa- lese ; and no demand was ever made for them. On the contrary, from the time of Major Kinloch's occupation, in January 1768, the revenue of them was uniformly collected as parcel of the Tuppa of CACTSES 01' THE NIPAL WAR. 67 Nunnor, or Noor ; belonging equally with Roteehiit to the Pergima of Sumroun, but falling in that por- tion of it which was annexed to Chumparun. At the perpetual settlement concluded by the British government in 1790, Nunnor formed part of the lands for which the Raja of Betia engaged : and thus the matter stood on this frontier till 1810: the twenty-two villages continuing all the while in this Raja's possession. From the above statement it will be seen that Roteehut, which appears to have originally be- longed to the Raja of the plains, was finally dis- membered from his territory, and annexed to the hills, by the effect of the intrigue of the hill Raja with UbdooUah Beg. It was even more common, however, for a hill Raja to become possessed of an estate by usurpation, and then to have his title acknowledged by being permitted to engage for the revenue. The offer of an advance in the yearly rate, or a present payment in cash, was always sufficient to effect such an arrangement with a temporary Amil : and after once procuring possession, with an acknowledged title, all future payments were of course dependent on circum- stances, and the interest of the moment. Of the confusion incident to this conduct in native Amils, more than one instance was brought to light upon our occupying the territory ceded by the Nuwab Vizeer in 1801. The most notable F 2 68 CAUSES OF THE NT PAT, ^VA^\. was that of the Raja of the independent hill ter- ritory of Palpa, who had contrived to possess him- self of Bootwul, lying for the most part in the plains; for the revenue of which he accounted to the Nuwab ^'^izeer's government. In like manner the Goorkhas themselves had usurped Sheeoraj on the same frontier ; and they further held two Talooks, called TilpoOr and Bunaeekpoor, by the same sufterance ; professing to be accountable for the revenue, though they paid or not, according to circumstances. The Bootwul case requires particular mention. On our first occupying Gourukpoor, the Raja of Palpa's family had been recently driven out of the further hills, and obliged to take refuge in Boot- wul, which is situated in the mouth of the first pass. At the settlement of the district in 1 80 1 -2, the Raja's manager engaged to us, as he had heretofore done to the Oudh government, for the lands of Bootwul, at a juma, or annual assessment, of 32,000 rupees. The Raja himself was then at Katmandoo, negotiating about his territory in the hills. He came, however, to the plains shortly after, and confirmed the engagement with the British Collector, which had been entered into by his manager. The Goorkhas subsequently induced him to re- turn to Katmandoo, where he was committed to prison, and in the end put to death. The family CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. 69 upon this, fearing the continued enmity of the Goorkhas if they resided on the frontier, obtained permission to give up Bootwul to the Company's Khas, or special management, and took up their residence at the station of Gourukpo6r, upon a pension being assigned to them in lieu of their profit from the management of the estate. The Goorkhas in 1804, on the ground of having subdued the Palpa Raja, claimed Bootwul as part of his territory. They immediately, therefore, be- gan sending people to collect the rents, instead of alloAving them to be received by the company's manager. By November 1805, they had esta- blished their influence over two-thirds of the Per- guna ; but the circumstance having been brought to Sir G. Barlow's notice, when he was at Allaha- bad in that year, he addressed a letter to the court at Katmandoo, calling upon them to eva- cuate Bootwul ; and giving them to understand that the company's right to the sovereignty of Sheeoraj also was vmdoubted, — the Talook being included by name amongst the Oudh cessions, and the Goorkhas having no title but that of usurpa- tion. Since, however, the date of the seizure of this place was anterior to our possession of Gou- rukpoor, Sir George professed a willingness to give up his claim to Sheeoraj, on the condition of the instant evacuation of Bootwul. The Goork- has answered this by an oftc'r to farm Bootwid as 70 CAUSES OF THE NirAl- WAR. a Zemindaree, on the terms agreed to by the Raja and his manager at the first settlement : this, however, was refused, and instant evacuation ordered. But Sir G. Barlow, having shortly after- wards gone as governor to Madras, and Lord Minto's attention being occupied with other things, the matter remained for some years with- out fiu'ther notice ; and, in the mean time, the Goorkhas occupied the whole of Bootwul. Emboldened by the indifference thus mani- fested, in 1810-11, they crossed the small river that forms the boundary of Bootwul, and began to occupy some villages of the adjoining Perguna of Palee. They also advanced from Sheeoraj, till at last their encroachments in this quarter again attracted the attention of government ; and in the beginning of 1812, after remonstrating against the aggressions. Lord Minto repeated Sir G. Bar- low's offer, to resign his right to Sheeoraj, on con- dition of the immediate evacuation of Bootwul and all subsequent occupations. Bheem Sein's father, Umur Singh, who was now the Goorkha governor of Palpa, answered the proposition on this occasion by asserting a distinct right to all he had taken, and even to more. This circum- stance, combined with what occurred simulta- neously on the Sarun fi'ontier, induced the Bri- tish government to nominate a Commissioner, and to invite the Goorkhas to send others to meet CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. 7 I liiin, in order to settle finally the boundary line of the respective territories. Considering that the peremptory demand made by Sir G. Barlow in 1805 for the evacuation of Bootwul, had been answered by an offer to farm it, which was a dis- tinct admission of our right, the nomination of a Commission to investigate the matter now, be- fore enforcing the evacuation, was an act of most exemplary and undeserved moderation. What had j)assed, however, on the Sanin fron- tier remains to be told. The lands forming the Jageer of Ubdoollah remained, as resigned by Mr. HastiiTgs, in the hands of the Nipalese, without aggression on the Betia territory, till the end of 1810, as has been before-mentioned. In 1811, one Luchungeer, the Goorkha Sooba (governor) of Roteehut, crossed the frontier with a party of armed men ; and having seized and stock- aded Kewya, one of the twenty-two* villages oc- cupied in Prithee Nurayun's time, began plun- * As these twenty -two villages are continually recurring, it may be useful to give their names, and to state that they all lie to the South of the ruins of Sumroun: — 1. Bijbunee ; 2. Atmoha ; 3. Gora Suhun ; 4. Sree Nugur, a Tola; 5. Kewya, or Byrajputee ; 6. Poornyhia; 7. Korya; 8. Su- munpoor ; 9. Busuntpoor ; 10. Bejaee ; 11. Bhulooa ; 12. Kudumooa ; 13. Bunkutwa ; 14. Nemya ; 15. Pukureea ; 16. Kurwa ; 17. Ambooa, a Tola ; 18. Jujhoora ; 19. Go- gawa ; 20. Simree ; 21. Khujuaree ; 22. Chynpoor, a Tola of Kurwa, No. IG. 72 CAUSES OF THE NIPAl, WAR. deling and making collections in eight others of them, stating that they l)elonged to Roteehut. The Raja of Betia's people resisted this aggres- sion, and an affray followed, in which Luchun- geer was killed. This occurred on the 19th of June, 1811. The Britisli government, on first hearing of the circumstance, directed the Assistant to the Magistrate of Sarun to proceed to the frontier, in order to inquire into the particulars of the affray ; but, before he arrived there, a reinforcement had been sent down from Katman- doo, which immediately seized on the whole of the twenty-two villages. Mr. Young's proceed- ings were, therefore, confined to the ascertain- ment of this fact, and of the circumstances of Lvichungeer's death ; both which being established, he submitted his report, and returned to Sarun. In this stage, the case was referred for the inves- tigation of the Commissioner, whom it had al- ready been resolved to send to Gourukpoor, and the instructions as to the further measures to be adopted were addressed to him. Major Paris Bradshaw, first Assistant to the Resident at Lukhnou, was the person nominated by Lord Minto to settle these frontier disputes ; and in the season 1812-13 he met the Goorkha Commissioners in the Gourukpoor part of the Turaee, and proceeded first to investigate the title they preferred to Bootwul and Sheeoraj. CAUSES OF THE Nll'AL W'All. Vo The inquiry was extended to both estates, in consequence of the court at Katmandoo not having closed with either of our offers to resign the latter conditionally. The result of the investigation established the facts above related, in regard to Bootwul, beyond the possiljility of doubt. Sheeoraj A\as proved to have been seized by the Goorkhas sixteen years be- fore the cession of Gourukpoor to us ; and great imjDortance was attached by them to some per- wanas, or written orders, addressed by British commanders to the Goorkha Sool)a, at the time of Vizeer Ulee's flight from Bunarus to the Tu- raee, after the murder of Mr. Cherry, in 1798. They argued that the demand then made of aid for that delinquent's apprehension, implied an acknowledgment of right to tlie territory within which the exertion w^as called for. The docu- ments were certainly e\ddence to the power and possession of the Goorkhas ; two points which were not denied ; but for ten of the sixteen years they had held Sheeoraj, the revenue had been accounted for to the Amils of the Nuwab Vizeer's govermiient, while the origin of the Goorkha title was clearly traced to open usurpation. The investigation having been brought to this issue. Major Bradshaw was instructed to demand tlie evacuation both of Bootwul and Sheeoraj. The Goorkha Commissioners declared 74 CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAll. themselves not satisfied, and begged to refer the matter to Katmandoo. The Major accordingly sub- mitted his proceedings for the orders of his govern- ment, while he himself went on to the Sarun frontier. Here it was in his instructions that he should insist on the restitution of the twenty-two villages occu- pied in 181 1, as a preliminary to any investigation of the claim set up by the Goorkhas. After much eva- sion, he procured this ; but when he proposed opening the inquiry, the Nipalese Commissioners, affecting to have taken some personal offence against the Major, refused to have more discussion with him, and suddenly returned to Katmandoo, leaving him alone on the frontier. This occurred in March 1814, and was evi- dently a result of the determination formed by the Goorkha government upon the Gourukpoor cases, which had previously been brought to issue. Lord Minto, being perfectly satisfied with the proceedings forwarded by Major Bradshaw, ad- dressed a letter to the Raja, in June, 1813, de- manding the immediate evacuation both of Boot- wul and Sheeoraj. The answer to this did not arrive till December : it was replete with fulsome professions of respect and attachment ; but de- <:lared the right of the Goorkhas to both Bootwul and Sheeoraj to have been clearly established by the result of the investigation. No reasons were assigned, and as far as concerned Bootwid at least, CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAJl. 75 the assertion seemed to be in the face of all the evidence. Lord Hastings, who had in the interval assumed charge of the government, as soon as he had examined the voluminous proceedings and papers, and made himself master of the case, addressed to the Raja of Nipal a peremptory requisition to evacuate the two districts ; and he sent the letter through the Magistrate of Gouruk- poor, giving that officer authority to order the advance of a body of troops to occupy the con- tested lands, in case the Raja's order for their eva- cuation should not arrive within twenty-five days from the date of his forwarding the letter. The Goorkha government was further informed that the Magistrate had these orders. It was the receipt of this letter that had pro- duced the sensation at Katmandoo, which occa- sioned the sudden recall of the Commissioners from Sarun, and ended in the resolution to abide the issue of war. In April 1814, a council was held, at which the Goorkha Commissioners from the frontier, and two and twenty others of the prin- cij)al people of the court, were present, and the question of war or peace was fairly debated, in a sitting which lasted from nine o'clock in the morn- ing till eight at night. There were some in the council who had appre- hensions of the result ; but an overweaning con- fidence in tlieir own power and resources, and tlie 76 CAUSES or the nh'al war. opinion of theii' entire invulnerability in tlic hills prevailed.* The advocates of war, indeed, argued tliat by remaining in their native fastnesses, and issuing thence on predatory excursions into the plains, a state of war could be made even more I)rofitable and advantageous, than peace would be with the loss of the power of encroaching with impunity. Tlie Goorkhas, as before stated, came to this resolution in April ; they gave, however, no inti- mation of their hostile intentions, and answered the Governor- General's letter on the subject of Bootwul and Sheeoraj, by mere common-place as- surances of respect, and of a desii'e to keep on a good understanding with the British, omitting aU mention of the specific subject in discussion. In the mean time. Sir Roger Martin, the Gou- rukpoor Magistrate, receiving no orders from Katmandoo for the evacuation of the disputed districts, addressed the commanding officer at the station ; and on the expiration of the period, three companies marched to occupy the lands. The Goorkha officers retired before them, without making the slightest opposition. For nearly a month, too, that the troops remained in the Turaee, they attempted nothing ; but suffered the * Vide in the Appendix a curious report of the opinions of some of the chiefs, as forwarded to the Palpa governor, with instructions to prepare for war. CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. 7/ magistrate to establish three police Thaiias in Bootwul, at Chitwa, Bisourea, and Sourah, and one with two subordinate outposts at Sheeoraj, without even making a remonstrance against the manner of occupation. The above arrangement was made merely with a view to the ordinary ad- ministration of the districts, upon the retirement of the troops, and wholly without anticipation of attack or hostility of any kind on the part of the Goorkhas. Early on the morning of the 29th May, 1814, before the regular troops had reached Gouruk- poor on their return, the three thanas of Bootwul were surrounded simultaneously, and the people attacked without warning. At the three stations eighteen men were killed and four wounded; the daroga, or chief officer of the thana of Chitwa, was murdered in cold blood, after he had surrendered, and in the presence of IVIunraj, the late Goorkha governor of Bootwul, who was the leader of this enterprise. As the season was too far advanced for our troops to take the field, the magistrate ordered his thanas in Sheeoraj to concentrate and retire on Bansee ; thus relinquishing for the present all he had occupied. One of the outposts was, how- ever, surprised at Rourah on the 3d of June, when four men more were killed and two wounded by the Nipalese. While hostilities were tluis couimencing in 78 CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. Gourukpoor, the disputes on the Sarun frontier M^ere fast coming to the same issue. The Marquess of Hastings, on first liearing of the conduct of the Nipalese Commissioners, ordered the joermanent annexation to the British territories of the twenty- two villages, and the other disputed tracts of that frontier ; and he sent a force of a few companies, which remained in the Turaee during the rains, to secure this quarter. The formal declaration of war was purposely delayed till the close of the rains, in order to allow time for persons engaged in trade with Nip^l to withdraw their capital, as well as to give the Nipalese the opportunity of disavowing the act of Munraj, and punishing the perpetrators, if so inclined. They showed no disposition to do so; but, on the contrary, made the most active military preparations along the whole extent of their frontier. The declaration of war was accordingly at length issued by his Lordship from Lukhnou, on the 1st November, 1814. The aggressions on the Sarun and Gourukpoor frontiers are the only ones that have been related at length, and were doubtless the most important ; ])ut there were innumerable others equally unwar- I'anted, along the whole Turaee. The magistrate of Tirhoot reported, that between 1787 and 1813 upwards of two hundred villages had been seized on one or other unjustifiable pretext. On the Purneali frontier, the Goorkha governor of Moruno; had. CAUSES OF THE NIPAL AVAR. 7i) in 1808, seized the whole Zemindaree of Bheem- nugur ; but this case being particularly flagrant, was taken up immediately, and in June 1809, a detachment under an officer was sent to the frontier, when the Nipalese, yielding to the threat of an immediate appeal to the sword, evacuated the lands in the course of 1810. Towards Rohil- khund the Goorkhas had seized five of eight Talooks, composing the Perguna of Khyreegurli : three of which were taken before and two after the cession to us in 1 80 J . They also advanced a claim to Kasheepoor, and other lands of Morada- bad ; but were deterred from seizing them. In the Seikh country, beyond the Jumna, Umur Singh, the Goorkha commander, was engaged in hostilities with Sunsar-Chund, of Kankra, and with other hill Rajas, who held likewise lands in the plains ; to which, as each successively fell before him, he advanced a claim. In 1813 he came down and seized some villages on this plea ; but on receiving a vigorous remonstrance from Major- General, then Colonel, Ochterlony, who command- ed at Loodheeana, he retired. It appeared, indeed, that both his situation and general views of policy made him averse to pushing things to extremity with the British ; and he early expressed a decided opinion against the measures adopted in Bootwul and Sheeoraj, which he declared to have origina- ted in the selfisli views of persons, wlio scrupled 80 CAUSES OF THE NIPAL WAR. not to involve the nation in war to gratify their personal avarice.* The insinuation was levelled at Bheem Sein, whose father had made the usur- pation, and whose family derived most of the advantages. The revenue of the usurped lands, it is to be observed, could not have been less than a lack of rupees a year to the Goorkhas, taken altoge- ther, in the manner they collected it : the retention of this income was therefore an object of no small importance to the ambitious views of Bheem Sein, and to the preservation of the influence he had contrived to establish for his family. * Vide Umur Singh's opinion in reply to the question sub- mitted by the Raja, Appendix A. ; also his intercepted letter, B. J Walker S uulpt . J 81 CHAPTER III. NIPAL WAR.— FIRST CAMPAIGN. 1814." Governor General leaves the Presidency — Plan of operations — General Gillespie's division takes the field — his failure before Nalapanee — and death — Second assault — unsuccess- ful — Evacuation of the fort, and pursuit of the garrison — Change of plan — GeneralMartindell takes the command — Operations against Jythuk — Defeat of Major Ludlow's de- tachment — Major Richards retires with loss — General Ochterlony's division — Capture of Nalagurh — Umur Singh's position at Ramgurh — Skirmish before it — Operations to turn its flank — Affair at Deboo ka Tibia — New position of Umur Singh — General Ochterlony's movement on Belas- poor — Occupation of Maloun ridge by Umur Singh — Gou- rukpoor division — GeneralJ. S. Wood's unsuccessful attack of Bootwul — Defensive proceedings — -Sarun frontier — At- tempt of Chundur Seekur Opadheea to negotiate — Defeat of Purseram Thapa by Major Bradshaw— General Mar- ley's arrival — Posts of Captains Blackney and Sibley cut off by the Nipalese — Indecision of the General — his de- parture from camp — Sikhim Raja gained by Major Latter — Repulse of the enemy at one of his outposts. The Marquess of Hastings, very soon after his arrival in India, determined to make a tour of inspection to the western provinces. Accordingly, G 82 NIPAL WAR. in prosecution of this intention, he embarked at Calcutta in June 1814, and reached Cawnpoor (Kan,hpoor) by the end of September, after a tedious navigation up the Ganges. The discus- sion with the Nipalese had been brought to issue by the murder of the police-officers in Gourukpoor, a short time before his Lordship left the presidency. The interval of the journey, therefore, was em- ployed in preparation for the vigorous prosecution of the war in the hills, and in defensive arrange- ments against the probabiUty of another violation of our frontier by the Pindarees. The leaders of those associations might, it was thought, be tempt- ed to seize the opportunity to annoy us that would be afforded by the employment of our troops in the opposite du-ection. The nature, however, of the defensive arrangements resolved upon will be explained hereafter. First, we shall relate the occurrences of the campaign in the hills, and it will be convenient to pursue them without interruption from their commencement in October 1814, to the close of the campaign in April of the following year. The fi'ontier which was to be the scene of war stretched a distance of about six hundred miles ; and the enemy had the command of aU the passes of the forest, as well as the hills. This, and the general suspiciousness of the Goorkha character, rendered it extremely difficult for Lord Hastings to FIRST CAMPAIGN. 83 collect intelligence for the arrangement of his plan of operations. He, nevertheless, resolved to act of- fensively against the enemy along the whole line of frontier, from the Sutlej to the Koosee ; and the following was the allotment ultimately made of this space to the several divisions that were brought into the field. It was assigned to Colonel Ochterlony,* who commanded the post established at Loodheeana in 1808-9, to operate in the hilly country lying near the Sutlej. The force under this officer's command was exclusively native infantry and artillery, and amounted to about six thousand men ; it had a train of two 1 8-pounders, ten G-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers. From Meeruth in the Dooab, Major-general Gillespie, whose conduct at Vellore and in Java had given his name a high celebrity, was to pro- ceed first against the Dehra Doon (a rich valley stretching between the Ganges and Jumna, within the first range of hills), and as soon as this should be reduced, which it was expected would not be an operation of much time or difficulty, the force was to divide; and while a detachment attacked Gurhwal and Sirinugur, under the snowy range, the main body was to proceed against Nahn, to * This officer's commission of Major-general arrived soon after the opening of the campaign ; we shall therefore hence- forth designate him as of that rank. G 2 84 NIPAI. WAU. the west of the Jumna, in aid of the operations of Major-general Ochterlony against Urnur Singh. General Gillespie's force originally consisted of his Majesty's 53d, which, with artillery and a few dismounted dragoons, made up about one thousand Europeans, and two thousand five hundred native infantry. This division, and that under General Ochterlony, were ordered to take the field towards the end of October ; the unhealthy season of the rains being generally over to the north-west by the beginning or middle of this month. Kumaon, and Almora, its capital, were to be attacked from Rohilkhund ; but, according to the original plan, this movement was to foUow the occupation of Gurhwal to the north of the province ; and the operations under- taken here in December and January were an after- thought, suggested by the peculiar cii'cumstances that attended the commencement of the war. From Bunarus and Gourukpoor a force was collected, and placed under the command of Major- general John Sullivan Wood, and his instructions w^ere to penetrate by Bootwul into Palpa. This division consisted of his Majesty's 17th foot, nine hundred and fifty strong, and about three thou- sand native infantry ; it had a train of seven 6 and 3-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers. The 15th of November was fixed upon as the day on which this force was to take the field at Gourukpoor. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 85 Further east from Patna and Moorshedabad, another force of a strength of near eight thousand men, inchiding his Majesty's 24th foot, nine hun- dred and seven strong, was collected for the main attack, which was intended to be made direct upon the capital of Katmandoo by the passes between the Gunduk and Bagmuttee. Major-ge- neral Marley was intrusted with the command of this army, and there was a train attached to it of four 1 8-pounders, ' eight 6 and 3-pounders, and fourteen mortars and howitzers. The Ganges was to be crossed by the troops from Patna on the 15th of November ; and a further brigade was formed, from troops at more distant stations, to follow the army and secure its depots and rear, as it advanced into the hiUs. Beyond the Koosee eastward, Major Latter was furnished with two thousand men, including his district battalion, for the defence of the Poornea frontier. This officer was desired to open a com- munication with the petty Raja of Sikhim, and to give him every assistance and encouragement to expel the Goorkhas from the eastern hills, short of an actual advance of troops for the pur- pose. The Raja's minister had invited the com- mon enemy, who thus had acquired a footing at Nagree and in the pass of Nagurkot ; but little advance had yet been made by the Nipalese in 86 NIPAL WAR. the subjugation of the country, and the struggle with the Raja's adherents was still actively going on when the declaration of war issued. Sikhim is tributary to Lassa and the Chinese : the fron- tier towards the plains is small, being bounded by the Teesta to the east, and by the Michee to the west ; but the territory extends northward to the snowy range, and was found to afford a more ready communication with Lassa and China than that through Bootan, by which route Messrs. Bogle and Turner penetrated in Mr. Hastings' time. Such were the dispositions made for the cam- paign. Major-general Gillespie was the first to penetrate the enemy's frontier. On the 22nd of October he seized the Keree pass leading into the Doon, and thence proceeded to Dehra, the princi- pal town in the valley, without meeting any oppo- sition. The whole of the hill country, west of the Ganges, was still under Umur Singh ; who had allotted a force of about six hundred men under the command of Captain * Bulbhudur Singh, * The use of English terms for their grades of command was general in the Goorkha array, but the powers of the dif- ferent ranks did not correspond with those of our system. The title of General was assumed by Bheem Sein, as Com- mander-in-chief, and enjoyed by himself alone ; of Colonels, there were three or four only ; all principal officers of the court, commanding more than one battalion. The title of FIRST CAMPAIGN. 87 for the defence of the Doon. About five miles from Dehra was a hill five or six hundred feet high, surmounted with a fort of no gi'eat size or strength, called Nalapanee. Here Bulbhudur re- solved to make his stand : and employed himself in strengthening and adding to the works, which were still in an unfinished state, when General Gillespie appeared in the neighboiu'hood. Misled, in some degree, by his information as to the strength of the place, which had been col- lected before Bulbhvidur had put in hand his re- cent additions, the Major-general first sent on Colonel Mawbey, with a detachment, to expel the garrison, intending to march immediately with his main body on Nahn. Colonel Mawbey, how- ever, seeing the nature of the works, was deterred from attempting any thing, and solicited fresh instructions. Upon this, the General himself ad- vanced with his whole army ; and, after a rapid reconnoissance, resolved on carrying Nalapanee by assault. On the 30th of October he seized, with a part of his force, one end of the table-land, or rather ridge, which, being more than half a mile Major was held by the adjutant of a battalion or independent company; and Captain was the next grade to colonel, im- plying the command of a corps. Luftun, or Lieutenant, was the style of the officers commanding companies under the Captain ; and then followed the subaltern ranks of Soobadar, Jemadar, and Havildar, without any Ensigns. 88 NIPAL WAR. in length, was not fully occupied by tlic Ibit- Here he formed a hasty Ijattery at six hundred yards for his light guns, intending to try the assault next day. In the course of the night he disposed his division in four parties, which, upon a given signal, were to move simultaneously from the battery and surrounding valleys, with ladders, to escalade, the walls. Unfortunately, the signal to be given was the firing of guns in a particular manner from the battery ; a method of communi- cation at all times open to accident, and particu- larly uncertain in a rugged country hke that in which Nalapanee was situated, where the columns were necessarily out of sight of the battery ; and some of them so far off, that the report could not be heard distinctly. The Major-general also gave the officers commanding each column reason to expect the signal after ten o'clock in the day ; but having early in the morning fired for some time on the walls, without producing so much effect as he expected, the impetuosity of his temper led him to give the signal an hour before the time. Hence it was only obeyed, when given, by two of the four columns, those led by Colonel Carpenter, and Major Ludlow ; the former six hundred and ele- ven strong, and the lattei', nine hundred and thirty- nine; oflficers included. Captain Bulbhudur had made the best possible preparations for defence ; besides manning the walls, he opened the wicket FIRST CAMPAIGN. 89 gate, which jutted out so as to enfilade a great part of the wall, then barring the entrance with cross beams, he planted a gun through the em- brasure thus formed, and loaded it with grape. The columns approached steadily under a heavy fire of musquetry from the walls, but igno- rant of this arrangement to take them in flank. Lieutenant Ellis led his pioneers close under the wall, where they planted the ladders. He was, however, killed immediately after, by the fire of the gun before mentioned ; and the greater part of the pioneers, and of the head of the column, were swept dbwn with him. An attempt was then made to gain the wicket, but without effect; whereupon the troops, find- ing it impossible to enter the place, fell back to the shelter of some huts, at a little distance out- side the walls. The Major-general had stayed this while in the battery ; but immediately he saw the troops retire, he hastened forward with three fresh companies of the 53d, determined to carry the fort or perish. General Gillespie attempted to lead the cokunns again to the ramparts ; but as the men saw no practicable means of sur- mounting the wall, he was not so readily followed as he wished. He pushed forward, however, with about a hundred dismounted men of the 8th dragoons ; a regiment he had once com- manded, and which was much attached to him. 90 NIPAL WAll. These he led on to within a few yards of the wicket, where, as he was waving his hat, close under the wall, he was shot through the heart, and fell dead. His aidecamp, Major O'Hara, was killed by his side ; Captain Byers, his brigade - major, was wounded ; and of the men of the 8th dragoons, four were killed, and fifty wounded. The fall of the General was the signal for retreat ; and the total loss suffered on this occasion was, besides the General, four officers, and twenty- seven men killed, and fifteen officers and two hundred and thirteen men wounded *. General Gillespie's death gave the command to Colonel Mawbey of his Majesty's 53d, the se- nior officer present. His first act was to retire * Killed. — Lieut, and Adjut. O'Hara, 6th Native Infantry ; Lieut, and Adjut. Gosling, Light Battalion ; Ensign Fother- gill, 17th Native Infantry; Ensign Ellis, Pioneers. Wounded. — Lieut. -Col. Westcnra, slightly ; Capt. Brut- ton, severely ; Lieut. Heyman, slightly ; Lieut. Taylor, se- verely ; Cornet Macdonald, severely, 8th Light Dragoons. — Lieut. Young and Lieut. Anstice, severely, his Majesty's 53d. — Ensign Davidson, slightly, 7ih Native Infantry. — Lieut. Broughton, dangerously, 19th Native Infantry. — Major Wilson, and Lieut. Thackeray, severely ; Lieut. Monteath, shghtly. Light Battalion. — Lieut. Elliott, Pio- neers, severely ; Lieut. Blane, Engineers, slightly ; Capt. Byers, Aidecamp, severely. Mr. William Eraser, of the Civil Service, the Political Agent with this division, was also wounded on this occasion, by an arrow, in his throat. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 91 to Dehra, until a train of heavy guns could arrive from Dehlee, the nearest depot. This occupied till the 24th of November ; and on the 25th, the army recommenced operations. A battery of 18- pounders was now constnicted, within three hun- dred yards ; and by noon of the 27th of Novem- ber, a large part of the wall was brought down. A sally was attempted from the fort, but the enemy were driven back by grape from the bat- tery ; and the breach appearing to be practicable, an assault was ordered the same day. On ap- proaching the breach, some few of the grenadiers of the 53d mounted it ; but, being immediately shot from within, the rest of the troops hung back, and remained at a short distance, in perfect self-possession, firing at the garrison ; but exposed, in return, to the showers of grape, musquetry, ar- rows, and even stones, which the enemy pom*ed incessantly from behind their defences. The Bri- tish officers exerted every effort to induce a se- cond attempt to mount the breach, but without effect. Lieutenant Harrington of the 53d ad- vanced personally, to prove to the men how easily it was to be ascended ; but, being unsupported, he fell a victim to his zeal and gallantry. The British commander, seeing from the battery what was passing, thought it would be of good effect to send up one of his light guns, which, 92 NIPAL WAR. being fired into the breach, might, he conceived, clear it of the enemy, and allow the men to mount in the smoke. Lieutenant Luxford, of the horse-artillery, undertook this perilous ser- vice ; but he had no sooner carried up his gun, and executed what was proposed, than he re- ceived a mortal wound. The minds of the sol- diers were impressed with so superstitious a con- viction of the impracticability of the breach, that they would not advance, even with the advantage of the smoke of the gun. The retreat was, therefore, at last sounded, after two hours had been spent by the assailants in the exposed situa- tion above described, at an immense sacrifice of valuable lives. Four officers. Captain Campbell, 6th N. I. ; and Lieutenants Harrington, his Ma- jesty's 53d, Cunningham, 13th N. I., and Lux- ford, horse-artillery, were killed, with fifteen Europeans and eigh-teen Natives ; while seven officers*, two hundred and fifteen Europeans, and two hundred and twenty-one Natives, were wounded on this occasion. Thus, including the loss incurred in the first attack, this petty fortress had already cost us considerably more than the entire number of its garrison. * Major Ingleby, Captain Stone, Lieutenants Horsely, Green, and Brodie, and Ensign Aufrere, of his Majesty's 53d; and Captain Blake of the 13th Native Infantry, FIUST CAMPAIGN. 93 It was now determined to shell the place, in the hope that from the want of bomb-proofs, or other protection from this arm, it might be made unte- nable. The efforts of the besiegers wei'e also directed against the water, which there was reason to believe was got from without the walls. After three days the wisdom of this plan was shown by the evacuation of the fort ; which was left by the remnant of its garrison on the night of the 30th of November. It is truly mortifying to reflect, that the same plan, if adopted at the commencement, must have secured the fall of the place with the same facihty ; and would thus have saved to the nation all the blood that was spilt, besides the loss of two months of the favourable season, and the disrepute of two disastrous failures. Bulbhudur carried off seventy survivors, all that remained unhurt of his garrison of near six hundred. With these he secretly passed the line of posts established round the fort, and joined a party of about three hvmdred, which had been sent from Nahn to rein- force the place. They had been seen for some days hovering about the neighbouring hills, but it had not been thought necessary to send a detachment after them. Colonel Mawbey, disappointed that the gar- rison shoidd escape after all, resolved on an effort to surprise Bulbhudur. He proposed the enter- prise to Major Ludlow, who undertook it with alacrity. Having marched the greater part of 94 NIPAL WAR. the night of the 1st of December, the Major came by surprise upon the Goorkha bivouack ; it dis- persed so quickly that only the advance party were in sight of the enemy ; but a number were cut up, and the pursuit was continued for some distance. Captain Bucke, who commanded the advance, and Ensign Richmond, his adjutant, were wounded, with about fifteen of the Sepoys. Nalapanee, when occupied by Colonel Mawbey, was found in a shocking state, full of the mangled remains of men and women killed by the shot and shells of our batteries ; a number of wounded were likewise lying about, and the stench was in- tolerable. Upwards of ninety bodies were collected and burnt ; and the wounded were sent to our hos- pitals ; after which the fort was razed, and Colonel Mawbey proceeded to execute the further opera- tions assigned to the division. Experience having shown the determined bra- very with which we must expect to be opposed, Lord Hastings so far varied his plan of operations as to forego the detachment of a part of this divi- sion to occupy Gurhwal. He accordingly in- structed Colonel Mawbey to leave a few men in a strong position for the occupation of the Doon, and to carry his undivided army against Umur Singh's son, Colonel Runjoor Singh Thapa, who was, with about two thousand three hundred elite of the Goorkha army, at Nahn . It was further intended to reinforce the division considerably ; and Colonel FIRST CAMPAIGN. 95 Mawbey was informed that the command had been conferred on Major-general Martmdell. This offi- cer was at a distance, and did not join till the 20th of December. In the mean time Colonel Mawbey had led back the division through the Keree pass, leaving Colonel Carpenter posted at Kalsee, at the north-western extremity of the Doon. This station commanded the passes of the Jmnna, on the main line of communication between the western and eastern portions of the Goorkha territory, and thus was weU chosen for procuring intelligence. The letters to and from Umur Singh and his offi- cers, which developed every secret motive of the Goorkha policy, were chiefly intercepted at this point ; and after a short time, the disaffection of the inhabitants, and want of supplies, obliged the Goorkhas to abandon Burat, an elevated and strong position north-east of Kalsee ; which, being likewise occupied by Colonel Carpenter, entirely cut off Umur Singh's communication with Ku- maon and Katmandoo, except by the very difficult routes close under the snowy range. The di\dsion left the Doon on the 5th of Decem- ber, and taking the route of the plains, entered the valley below Nahn, by the pass of Kolapanee, and encamped at Moganund on the 19th. Nahn was only seven miles distant, and though wpon a hill two thousand feet high, was not deemed by the enemy to be of sufficient strength for their main stand. Accordingly Runjoor Singh had received Umur 96 NIPAl- AVAIL Singh's orders to retire to a position north of the town, and to occupy the surrounding heights and the fort of Jythuk, situated at a point where two spurs of mountainous ridges meet, and the peak at the intersection rises to a height of three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the plains of Hindoostan . General Martindell having ascertained the eva- cuation of Nahn, caused it to be occupied by Major Ludlow on the 24th of December ; and follow- ing with his whole force on the 25th, planned an offensive movement against Jythuk, after a cur- sory examination of the position as it towered to the skies, and exhibited its several peaks to the view from Nahn. Two detachments were formed to occupy diffe- rent arms of the ridges above described. Major Richards, of the 13th N. I. was intrusted with one of a strength of seven hundred and thirty-eight men,* which was to make a detour, and estabhsh it- self on a height to the north of Jythuk, subsequent- ly called Peacock-hill. Major Ludlow, of the 6th N. I. was intrusted with the command of the other, which was to occupy the southern and nearest arm to Nahn : its strength was a thousand fighting * Major Richards : — light company of his Majesty's 53d ; three and a half light companies of Native Infantry ; the bat- talion companies of the 1st Battalion, 13th Native Infantry, and 50 Pioneers. B 1=5 O FIRST CAMPAIGN. 97 men.* Mountain -guns, on elephants, were attach- ed to each detachment, but the ground was too rugged to allow of their keeping up on the march. The roads, indeed, were mere mountain pathways, difficult of ascent for a single person, without arms, or accoutrements ; and scarcely in any part ad- mitting a march of troops otherwise than by single files. Major Richards, having farthest to go, set off an hour earUer ; but Major Ludlow, who moved at midnight, came first upon the enemy. He fell in with Runjoor Singh's outer picquet at three in the morning, at about a mile's distance from the point to be occupied. The party retired, and the Major's advance-guard pushed up the hiU in pur- suit, exposed to its irregular fire. At the top of the hill was the village and temple of Jumpta in ruins, where was a second post of the Nipalese* which similarly retired. Major Ludlow pushed on immediately with the grenadier company of the 53d, in order to seize the point assigned to him ; and on reaching it called a halt, until the rest of his detachment should come up and enable him to secure himself. There was, however, a stockade a little further on, and the grenadiers, mistaking for pusillanimity in the * Major Ludlow : grenadier company of his Majesty's 53d, three and a half light companies Native Infantry, nine compa- nies of the 1st hat. 6th Native Infantry, and fifty pioneers. H 98 NIPAL WAR. ^nemy the easy acquisition they had made of several defensible points, thought to redeem the credit that had been lost before Nalapanee, and crowding round the Major entreated to be allowed to storm the post. The impulse of the troops was in unison with the natural ardour of the com- mander, and he gave way at the sacrifice of his better judgment. He saw, indeed, that the stockade itself was of no great strength, and he thought it might be carried by a coup-de-main before the Nipalese should have time to reinforce its garrison. The occurrences at Nalapanee ought to have suggested greater caution. Juspao Thapa, Runjoor Singh's best officer, was the Goorkha commandant here; and the greater part of the force at Jythuk had, on the first alarm, been collected within or behind the stockade out of sight of the assailants. Juspao allowed the British to come close under the stockade, and then from either side, a little down the ridge, he pushed out parties round both flanks, who opened a fire on the grena- diers from all quarters at once. Not having expect- ed such a reception, the men were confounded, and di'ew back; whereupon the Goorkhas, seizing the opportunity, charged them sword in hand from the stockade, and, in the end, drove the detachment from aU the ground it had gained, in spite of three efforts of Major Ludlow to rally his men. On coming to the Jumpta temple, the Major found his FIRST CAMPAIGN. 99 main body of native infantry still unformed, and standing conftisedly, in a state to afford no support. Indeed, the Sepahees, on seeing the Europeans giving way before the enemy, were panic-struck, and could be brought to no order by the few officers that remained with them. The retreat to Nairn after this was a perfect flight, in which we suffered severely ; and so quickly did it pass, that the de- tachment had returned to camp by ten o'clock in the day ; having lost thirty-one Europeans and about one hundred and twenty natives killed and wound- ed. Lieutenant Munt, 1st N. I. was amongst the former, and there were three officers* in the latter return. Major Richards had a detour of sixteen miles to make before he could reach the post assigned to him, to the north. It was eight in the morning, therefore, before he came to the foot of the ridge on which he was to establish himself. Finding water, he halted till ten, to allow the men to refresh themselves after the march ; then continuing his advance, he came on the enemy's first picquet at about a mile from Jythuk, and, following as it retired, took possession of all the ridge to Peacock- hill, within eight hundred yards of the fort. The water of the position was three hundred yards below in a hollow to the left, which rendered a separate post * Lieutenant Scott, 5th ; Lieutenant Donnelly, 27tli ; Lieutenant Sayer, Hth N, I. H 2 100 NIPAL WAll. there necessary. The defensive arrangements were complete by noon ; but the trooi)s were astonished to hear nothing in the direction of Major Ludlow's post ; where, indeed, every thing was over some time before Major Richards arrived at his ground. While the troops were speculating on this sub- ject, Runjoor Singh's drums beat to arms; and at about one o'clock he paraded his whole force under the walls of Jythuk, preparatory to an attack. The mountaineers advanced boldly at first, but not being able to face a steady volley, they separated ; and avaiUng themselves with won- derful dexterity of every jutting rock or the like that afforded cover, kept up a continued irregular fire, charging every now and then when there was any advantage to gain. The ground was, for the most part, too rugged to allow of a charge to dis- lodge these isolated parties, consequently, during the whole day, our troops had to abide this method of attack without having any cover to shelter them. At four P. M. Major Richards, fearing that his ammunition wovild not last, for the bullocks and hiU-porters* with the spare rounds had not come up, wrote to Major-general Martindell to solicit a * These were under an escort of the rear-guard, which had separated from the column in the dark of the night, and, losing its way, was observed and cut off by a party from one of Runjoor Singh's stockades. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 101 reinforcement. At the same time, as the Goorkhas were beginning to be more bold and troublesome, he concentrated his force, and gave up the post at the watering-place. By sunset nine charges had been made by the enemy, and repulsed each time by a volley ; but as it became necessary to husband the ammunition, the pioneers were employed in collecting stones, which the position was steep enough to render an effectual weapon of defence. Thus was the post maintained till half-past seven, two hours after sunset, when a positive order arrived from the Major-general to retire. Major Richards had not by this time lost more than twenty or thirty men ; but having now no hope of a reinforcement, or of fresh ammunition, he had no choice but to obey. He made, therefore, the best dispositions for retreat that his circumstances would admit ; but as there was only a single nar- row pathway for the troops to file down, and that skirted sometimes the most tremendous precipices, so as to require careful footing, confusion and loss would have been inevitable, had it been broad day : by night it was, of course, much worse. The important duty of covering the retreat was undertaken by Lieutenant Thackeray, with his light company belonging to the 26th N. I. This officer's self-devotion contributed mainly to save the detachment from being entirely cut off; for while the troops were filing down the 102 NIPAL WAR. pathway, his company kept the whole Goorkha force in check, charging them several times in dif- ferent directions. Its situation, of course, grew every instant more desperate, still not a man of the company thought of his individual safety while the Lieutenant lived to command. After more than half of his men had^fallen, he was himself at last killed; and Ensign Wilson, who served under him, fell nearly at the same time. The covering party was then overpowered, and it was supposed at first that the company had been cut off to a man ; but it was found afterwards that Runjoor Singh had given quarter to about forty men and a soobadar, whom he treated well, and, having vainly tempted to enlist in his ranks, dismissed a few days after on parole not to serve again during the war. Every thing was in confusion in the rear after Lieutenant Thackeray's fall; but most of the troops had filed down the pathway while he was engaged, so that the loss, on the whole, after the stragglers had come in, was three officers killed,* five wounded; and of the men, seventy-eight under the former, and about two hundred and twenty under the latter return. The number of missing, whose fate was for some days uncertain, greatly swelled the first returns ; and six officers were amongst * Killed. — Lieutenant Thackeray, 2-26th Native Infan- try ; Ensign Wilson, 2-26th Native Infantry ; Ensign Stalkart, l-13th Native Infantry. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 103 these ; but the last, Lieutenant Turner, came in on the 1st January, three days after, having had several hair-breadth escapes. The disasters of this day were owing solely to tlie irretrievable error of Major LudloAv, in allow- ing himself to attempt the stockade before he had formed his men, and established the post he was ordered to occupy. Had he first secured his foot- ing on the ridge, those who were driven back would have found a point to rally upon, and the attempt at a coup-de-main, whether successful or not, would have been of no consequence. It must, at the same time, be acknowledged that had the native troops been sufficiently officered, it would have been easy to have made head at the Jumpta tem- ple; and it was natural for Major Ludlow to con- clude that he would have found his main body ready formed there to support him ; but the fault of the system, and the casualties of the war, had unfortunately so thinned the ranks of officers,* that the nine companies of the 1 st bat. 6th N. L had no more than three on duty, and this deficiency was the principal cause of the disastrous event on this side. The prudence and good conduct of Major Richards in the occupation and defence of his po- * Thirty officers had been killed and wounded in the ope- rations before Nalapanee alone. 104 NIPAL WAR- sition, produced one most advantageous result, as it fully convinced the troops of this division of their great superiority over the enemy in a fair combat. Every man of the detachment felt that had the post been reinforced, or even furnished with fresh ammunition, it might easily have been maintained. Hence the loss was attributed to its proper cause, and the effect of the day's struggle was not diminished by the subsequent retreat. Still, however, something more decisive was want- ing to restore complete confidence ; and many cir- cumstances contributed at this particular juncture to lead to an exaggerated estimate of the military character of the Goorkha nation. Thus closed the year 1814 upon this division. No active enterprize was for some time afterwards attempted by Major-general Martindell ; but, be- fore relating the operations in which the rest of the season was consumed by /him, it may he as well to show what was passing in other quarters, which had similarly become the scene of war. General Ochterlony, who took the field at the same time with Gillespie, and was opposed to Umur Singh in person, formed from the first a just estimate of the character of his enemy, and of the difficulties he would have to encounter. He re- solved, therefore, to proceed with the utmost cau- tion. On the 3 1 st of October, the day of Gillespie's fall, he readied Plaseea, situated in a valley within FIRST CAMPAIGN. 105 the hills, which he entered from the Sutlej, by a pass less difficult than most of those fm'ther east. Umur Singh was at this time at Urkee, considera- bly within the hills. They run here in broken ridges, stretching N.N.W.; and each ridge affords, of course, a series of positions. The outermost ridge was surmounted by the fort of Nalagurh, which, with an outpost at Taragurh, commanded the principal route into the hills. On the next range stood Ramgurh, Joorjooree, Chamba, and a second Taragurh ; above this again, towered the heights of Maloun ; behind which, lay Urkee on one side, and on the other the capital of Umur Singh's staunch ally the Raja of Belaspoor. Be- tween, was a comparatively fruitful valley, whence Umur Singh could draw his supplies in case of his occupying any of the above ridges. Having thrown garrisons into the forts of the Nalagurh and Ramgurh hills, and reckoning, ap- parently, that General Ochterlony would be occu- pied some time before them, Umur Singh was in no hurry to leave his position at Urkee. The British General, resolving to put nothing to hazard, made a road with great labour, and sat himself down, with his heavy guns, before Nalagurh on the 1st of November. Having breached the wall, the garrison surrendered on the 5th, capitulating also for the stockade on the same ridge, called Tara- gurh. Umur Singh came down, and took position 106 NIPAL WAR. on the Ramgurh range the same day, leaving small garrisons at Urkee and Sabathoo behind him. Having established dep6ts at the captured forts, Major-general Ochterlony proceeded, on the 13th of November, against the Ramgurh positions, send- ing on Colonel Thompson with a brigade one day's march in advance. The position of Ramgurh was so steep on the side towards the plains, that the Major-general determined to turn it if possible, and operate on its rear. These ridges, it must be observed, are all so many steps to the Heemachul ; each, therefore, as it approximates to that stupen- dous range, towers over that before it, and as you look from the plains, the steeper side is always opposed tp you. Ramgurh stood nearly in the middle of the ridge, and formed Umur Singh's right. Major- general Ochterlony, in advancing from Nalagurh, turned his left ; and in the course of November had seized a point from which he hoped to be able to batter one of the stockades of that wing. By the 26th of November, after immense labour in making roads and dragging up the guns, a battery was constructed for 6-pounders ; but when it be- gan to play, the stockade was found to be so dis- tant, and so much the higher of the two, that the shot had little effect. Lieutenant Lawtie, the en- gineer, seeing this, advanced with a small party FIRST CAMPAIGN. 107 to reconnoitre another point a little further on. The Goorkhas, however, sallied out to prevent this, and obliged him to seek the shelter of an old wall that stood near. His critical situation being observed, Lieutenant Williams was sent with two companies from the battery to support the recon- noissance; but a much stronger body came down to the Goorkhas and surrounded the whole party ; who thus found themselves under the necessity of cutting their way through the enemy, to secure their retreat*. The manoeuvre was successfully executed; but with the loss of Lieutenant Williams, who was killed, besides seventy-five Sepoys killed and wounded. This affair was of no manner of consequence, except as it afforded to the enemy an occasion of triumph. Next day the Goorkhas gave permission to remove and bury the dead, — a * The author of the Military Sketches of the Goorka War gives a different account of this affair. He says that Lieutenant Laivtie, in the course of his re- connoissance, came suddenly on a post, which he deemed it safer to attack than to retreat from. He carried it ; but the Goorkhas being reinforced turned upon him ; and his Sepoys, after firing away the upper layer of their cartridges, aban- doned the post and fled. Lieutenant Williams, who was moving to the support, was, he states, similarly abandoned by his men, who were panic-struck, and fled without exert- ing themselves. The account given in the text was prepared from official records, before the work here cited was published. The latter will be better authority. 108 NIPAL WAR. courtesy they never refused during the war, and not the only one we experienced at their hands. General Ochterlony was busily employed all this while in surveying and improving the roads, and reconnoitering Umur Singh's position on every side. By the 2d of December he was enabled to form a plan of attack, the object of which was to make a lodgment on a point within the position. The advance was to be made from the battery above mentioned, and was extremely hazardous ; inasmuch as there was but one road to the point, and that led under fire of one of Umur Singh's principal stockades, which the advancing column would have to receive on its flank, and perhaps to abide a sally from the garrison as it passed. However, seeing no other way of seriously annoy- ing the enemy, the Major-general submitted the plan to his two Brigadiers, Colonels Arnold and Thompson, in order to learn their opinion of it. The propriety of making the attack was still un- der deliberation, when news arrived of the second failure before Nalapanee ; and General Ochterlony also heard of a reinforcement being on its way to his own army, by order of Lord Hastings, which determined him to abandon the plan, and thence- forth to put nothing to hazard. The Major-gene- ral had at this time serious doubts of our ultimate success in the struggle, and he feared that our native army, with all its discipline, would be found FIRST CAMPAIGN. 109 ill adapted to warfare in a country too rugged to admit of its superior tactics being brought to play. These apprehensions were, however, expressed to none but his Commander-in-Chief; nor could his most familiar associates detect in his demeanour the slightest interruption of that cheerful flow of spirits by which Sir D. Ochterlony has been cha- racterized through life. While waiting the arrival of the promised rein- forcement, Major-general Ochterlony exerted him- self in winning over the Plaseea Raja,* and having succeeded in this object, he got him to lend ]^is exertions in making a road for artillery from Muk- ran, by Khundnee, to Nehur, three miles N.N.E. of Ramgurli, where he had for some time fixed his head- quarters. This was preparatory to an at- tempt to carry some points in Umvir Singh's rear. On the 27th of December, the 2nd bat. 7th N. I., with an additional train of light guns, having joined, Colonel Thompson was detached, with fourteen strong companies, two guns, and two howitzers, to attack two stockades which were opposed to General Ochterlony's right, and were situated on a kind of spur from the Ramgurh ridge, projecting north-eastwards in Umur Singh's rear. The stockades were, if possible, to be carried, and a third point, on which there was no stockade, was * Raja Ram Surwa Sen was at this time Raja of Hinder and Plaseea. no NIPAL WAR. then to be occupied by the detachment. Colonel Thompson set off in the night, and late in the morning came opposite the first stockade ; but on reconnoitering, thought it not safe to try a coup-de- main. He passed on, therefore, in order to seize a ridge about seven hundred yards distant from a stone redoubt belonging to the enemy, and which led to within five hundred yards of Deboo-ka Tibia, the se- cond stockade to be attacked. Here he waited for his guns, and on their arrival fired at Deboo till night, in the hope of effecting a breach. The Goorkha defences are generally proof against light artillery ; hence, no impression being made. Colonel Thomp- son was compelled to be satisfied with establishing himself on the ridge. In the course of the night the Goorkhas evacuated Deboo-ka Tibia, which Colonel Thompson discovering, sent a party to occupy. The Goorkhas further employed the night in concentrating their force, preparatory to a strong effort to dislodge the detachment. Just before daybreak they commenced a serious attack from a stockade called Mungoo-ka Dhar, which crowned the heights of the Ramgurh ridge, at the point where it was joined by that on which Deboo was situated. The detachment was well on its guard, and drove back the Goorkhas after a few vollies, with a loss of near one hundred and fifty men, whereof sixty were counted on the ground. We had twelve killed, and fifty- FIRST CAMPAIGN. Ill seven wounded, but no officer was of the num- ber. General Ochterlony, on hearing the firing, sen ^ the 2nd bat. 7th N. I. to reinforce the post ; and in the course of the 29th of December, it was stock- aded afresh, and otherwise secured. It has been mentioned that Ramgurh formed Umur Singh's right as his position fronted the plains. Colonel Thomp- son's present post was in the rear of his centre, so as entirely to intercept the supplies he received by the Urkee road, and to incommode the communi- cation with Belaspoor. Seeing this, the Goorkha General shifted his ground, deserted all his stock- ades to the left of Ramgurh, and keeping that fort still as his right, took up a reversed position on the other side of it, so as to oppose a new front to our army, which had turned his left. Umur Singh likewise strengthened Mungoo-ka Dhar, and made it his head-quarters. It was soon found that the ridge on which Colonel Thompson was lodged did not afford any means of approaching the main stockades of the enemy's new position, the inter- vening ground being particularly rugged. It hence became necessary to devise a different jjlan of operations, and on the 16th of January, General Ochterlony, still seeking the means of straiten- ing the enemy's suppHes, which, since the occupa- tion of the Urkee and Subathoo roads, had been drawn wholly from Belaspoor, put in execution the following masterly movement : — Crossing the 112 NIPAL WAK. Gumba river from Nehur, north-east of Ramgurh, he went along the Urkee road, till he turned the Maloun ridge, and thence, sending on Colonel Thompson a-head, made a long detour in the di- rection of Belaspoor. By the 18th of January a party of uTegulars, under Captain Ross, occupied the heights of Punalee, commanding Belaspoor, and the valley of the Sutlej, in which it is situated. Colonel Thompson was at the same time a kos beyond Jynugur, on the road to the same place, and General Ochterlony himself about to join him. Thus Belaspoor was open ; and the power of opera- ting against the north-east face of Maloun, from the vaUey of the Gumrora, gained. At the same time that this movement was made, Colonel Arnold was left at Deboo-ka Tibia, to watch Umur Singh ; and, as it was expected that he would not quietly wait the result, the Colonel had instructions to be on the look-out for a move ; and, if the Goorkha army hkewise took the route of Belaspoor, to occupy the stockades that would be abandoned, and follow at its heels by a road that would place the enemy between the two British divisions, each of which was more than a match for his whole force. If the Goorkhas merely retired to Maloun, leaving garrisons in the Ramgurh stockades, Mungoo was to be fii'st proceeded against, in order to maintain the direct communication with the plains and other divisions ; and as soon as that FIRST CAINIPATGN. 113 point was gained, the brigadier was to advance to Belaspoor. General Ochterlony left his heavy guns with a battalion at Nehur, to be made availa- ble in the reduction of Mungoo, and eventually of the Ramgurh forts likewise, after Colonel Arnold should have proceeded to his ulterior destination. As was expected, Uinur Singh no sooner saw the object of the detour made by the head-quarters of the British army, than he moved off with his whole force to take up the stronger position of Maloun, which he feared the British might else preoccupy. Thus Mungoo-ka Dhar was abandoned and occu- pied by Colonel Arnold on the 1 8th January ; but small Goorkha garrisons were still left in the stone redoubts of Ramgurh, Taragurh, Chamba, and Joorjooree. Against these Colonel Cooper com- menced operations, while Colonel Arnold proceeded, according to his instructions, towards Belaspoor. The latter officer marched along the Ramgurh ridge and under the walls of the remaining Goorkha forts, without experiencing any obstruc- tion from the garrisons. The movement, never- theless, took up several days, which were passed in much anxiety and hardship ; for, liesides the ex- treme ruggedness of the pathway, the progress of the division was further delayed !iy a week's heavy rain and snow. It was not, therefore, till the begimiing of February, that the brigadier reached TuLsoora, the point assigned to him, and I 1 i4 XIPAL WAR. established liimself at the extremity of the Maloun range ; subsequently he reduced Rutungurh, — a fort disjointed from the ridge, but lying directly be- tween Maloun and Belaspoor. Some time was consumed in reducing the Ramgurh forts; and, during the interval, General Ochterlony employed himself in bringing over the Raja of Belaspoor, who, after an unsuccessful at- tempt to dislodge Captain Ross from the Punalee heights, had fled across the Sutlej. This Raja, though connected with Umur Singh's family by a recent marriage, was induced at last, through fear of seeing his capital and country given over to another, to make his terms and submit. Here we shall leave this division for the present, in order to bring on the operations in the Turaeesof Gourukpoor and Buhar. Umur Singh had fully jus- tified the reputation he enjoyed as a soldier, by the manner in which he met, and sometimes defeated, the sagacious plans of the British commander. Nothing decisive, indeed, had yet been done by either army; but, considering that [the British had been rein- forced to near seven thousand men, while Umur Singh had never more than two thousand eight hundred, or at the most three thousand, this was the best possible proof of the skill with which he had availed himself of the advantage of ground, which was all he had to compensate for his nume- rical inferiority. FIRST CAMPAIGN". 115 The division assembled at Gourukpoor was ordered to take the field on the 1 5th November ; but, owing to the difficulty of collecting hill- porters for the carriage of the baggage and sup- plies in sufficient abundance in that thinly-peopled district, it was late in December before Major- general J. S. Wood proceeded into the Turaee. Having waited some time to collect information as to the best mode of penetrating to Palpa, he came at first to the determination of leaving Boot- wul to the right, and attacking Nyakot, a post which crowns the hills to the west of the town. Having ascertained, however, that the Goorkhas, under Colonel Wuzeer Singh, a nephew of Bheeni Sein's, had taken post at the mouth of the pass, within which Bootwul is situated, and had built there a stockade called Jeetgurh, it was resolved to reconnoitre the works, and carry them, if pos- sible, before proceeding further. On the 3d of January, General Wood marched from his camp at Simra, in the Turaee, with twenty-one com- panies of infantry to put this plan in execution. He acted on the information of a Brahmin, in the employ of the family of the old Palpa Raja, re- siding at Gourukpoor, and the Brahmin offered his services as guide. The road ran along the banks of the Tenavee, which here is likewise called Goonghee, and the last seven miles of the way led through the Sal forest ; but General I 2 1 IG NIPAL WAR. Wood had been told to expect an open space im- mediately al)out the stockade. He was himself, with the advanced guard, still in the thick of the forest, Avhen the road brought them suddenly in front of the stockade, at not more than fifty yards distance. A smart and destructive fire was immediately opened on the advanced party, and the General's Brigade-major, Captain Hiatt, and subsequently his engineer officer, Lieutenant Morrieson, were wounded, the latter mortally. This loss was sustained m attempting to recon- noitre the post, preparatory to the advance of the main column, which was headed by his Majesty's 1 7th regiment, under Colonel Hardyman. Imme- diately on its arrival, the colonel formed his men, and advanced against the stockade, dri\dng in the party of the enemy who had saUied out on the advance guard ; Captain Croker, who led the grenadiers, followed the enemy up the hill, and suc- ceeded in ascending with his own, and two other companies of the regiment, round the left flank of the enemy's work. Thus a position was gained that commanded it entirely, for it was merely a hollow stockade, running along the declivity. The carrying of the work was therefore certain, indeed the enemy were akeady retreating from it up the hill behind. General Wood, however, thinking it was not possible to carry the hill also, Avhile, without doing so, the stockade itself seemed to 1 IJtST CAMI'AIGN. 117 him to be untenable and of no value, ordered a retreat to be sounded, to the great disappomtment of the troops, who were flushed with the prospect of a certain and easy victory. The British loss was twenty-four kQled, and one hundred and four wounded ; besides the two staff-officers above mentioned, Captain M'Dowell, of the artillery, and Lieutenants Pointz and Pickering, of his Majesty's 17th, were severely wounded. The enemy lost a sirdar, named Sooruj Thapa, and many more men than we did ; but the retreat gave to them the triumph of a decided victory. The result of this action, and the bravery the enemy had displayed, left in the general's mind an impression of the inadequacy of his force to the objects assigned to it, which influenced all his future measures: instead of endeavouring to pene- trate the hills, he confined his operations to defen- sive precautions. At his solicitation, parties of iiTegular horse were added to the force ; and, in the end, the 8th native cavalry was sent to assist in scouring the country, and rcpelUng the enemy's incursions. Report magnified the Goorkha army to twelve thousand men ; whereas, their regular troops scarcely reached so many hundred. The major- general, however, giving credence to these exag- gerated statements, threw up works at Lotun, and put a gairison there to defend the direct road to Gourukpoor, while he himself moved with his main 118 NIPAL WAR. body to repel an incursion into Nichloul. These measures contributed to make the enemy bold, and produced a disastrous alarm in our own suljjects, which, indeed, was not altogether unfounded : for scarce a day passed without some village being plundered and burnt by the Goorkhas. The same state of things continued during the whole of January, February, and even March ; and though reinforced by another native battalion, and with further artillery, General J. S. Wood still consi- dered himself too weak to act offensively. What had passed simultaneously on the Sarun frontier, and to the eastward, unfortunately tended to confirm this impression ; and it is time now to advert to the operations in that quarter. Major Bradshaw, the negociator, remained, during the rains, in military charge of the fi-ontier, and disputed lands of Sumroun, as has before been mentioned. The posts he established were not molested, nor had he much communication of any kind with the Goorkhas until October. By that time, some alarm began to be entertained, at Kat- mandoo, at the extent of preparation witnessed ; wherefore, though determined to concede nothing, they still thought it worth while to attempt to amuse the British government with further nego- tiation, so as, if possible, to spin out the season of operations in empty discussion. In the course of November, Chundur Seekur Opadheea came down FIRST CAMPAIGN. 119 to the Turaee, and sent information to Major Bradshaw tliat he had a letter and presents for the Governor-general ; wherefore he desired a passport to enable him to carry them to Calcutta. The letter was one of congratulation, in the form usual on the arrival of a new governor-general, and was written as if there were no matters whatever in dispute between the two governments. INIajor Bradshaw sent to Chundur Seekur a copy of the proclamation of war, issued the first of the month, and refused to let any one pass, or to leceive the Opadheea himself, unless he brought full powers to treat for a pacification. The letter was forwarded to the Governor-general, who confirmed the inti- mation, and further ordered Chundur Seekur to be desired to return to Katmandoo, or remain on the frontier at his peril. Notwithstanding this intimation, Chundur See- kur lingered in the Turaee, and attempted to get a passport surreptitiously fi'om the Tirhoot Ma- gistrate, who, he thought, would not be aware of the circumstances. He was still at work on this intrigue, when Major Bradshaw, having heard of General Marley's crossing the Ganges, on his way to the Turaee, resolved to defer active operations no longer, but to attack the Goorkha post of Biu'hurwa, situated on the right bank of the Bagmuttcc, and close on the frontier, prepa- ratory to occupying the wliolc Turaee for the 120 NIPAI. WAR. Biitisli goveriiiiieiit. Accordingly he concen- trated his force on the 24th of November ; and early in the morning of the 25th, surprised and carried the post ; killing the Goorkha com- mander, Piirsm'am Thapa, and making prisoner Chundur Seekur Opadheea, with his attendants. Major Bradshaw by this means obtained po;?- session of the Opadheea's instructions, which en- tered fully into the points at issue between the two governments, and completely showed the object of the deputation to have been merely to gain time. The Goorkhas were very indignant at the seizure of Chundur Seekur, who, they thought, should have been respected as an am- bassador, since he had been deputed as such. They forgot, however, that the reception of the individual, or the sanctioning of his deputation, at least, is the thing that plights the faith of the government to whom an agent is accredited, and that this alone gives a claim to the respect of person enjoyed by the envoy of a hostile power* and distinguishes him from a spy. Lieutenant Boileau, who commanded the Major's escort, was wounded in personal conflict with Pm'suram Thapa during the affaii' ; and there were, besides, two Sepoys killed, and fourteen wounded. Of the enemy, seventy-five were killed or wounded, and ten soldiers were made prisoners, besides Chun- dur Seekur's attendants. The Turaee was imme- FIRST CAMPAIGN. 121 diately evacuated by the Goorkhas, and occupied and annexed, 'pro tempore, by proclamation, to the British possessions. Major Bradshaw then established the following posts for its defence, till General Marley should arrive. Captain Hay, vvitli the head-quarters of the Chumparun light infantry, was posted at Baragurhee ; Captain Blackney, with a wing of the 2nd battalion, 22nd native infantry, was at Sumunpoor, to the right ; while Captain Sibley was stationed, with about five hundred men, at Pursa, on the high road to Hetounda, very considerably to the left of Baragurhee. General Marley arrived in the Puchroutee Tuppa, with the main army, on the 12th of De- cember. An outpost of Captain Hay's had been driven in on the 7th ; and the Goorkhas, though they kept within the cover of the Sal forest, had shown many symptoms of an actively hostile spirit. Some attempts at poisoning the wells and pools were discovered ; and their spies were known to be busy, several having been detected in our camps. General Marley formed his army into three divisions, intending himself to attempt the Bicheeakoh and Hetounda pass, with twenty- two hundred men ; while Colonel Dick, with about fifteen hundred, took tlie route of Huree- hurpoor, to the eastward ; and Major Rougli- sedge, with one thousand two hundred and eighty 122 N3PAL WAK. men, moved by the Sukteediiree pass and Joor- jooree, which was between the other two, and in advance of Baragurhee. The remainder of the army was to be prepared to support either di\dsion that might need it, and to keep open the communications through the forest, till the arrival of the brigade allotted to this duty, which had not yet assembled. The month of December was spent in devising this plan, and in collecting information prepara- tory to its execution. In the mean time, the main army was stationary in the Puchroutee Tuppa ; and except that Major Roughsedge was at one time, sent to Janikpoor, to the extreme right, the posts above described remained as before. That of Captain Sibley was twenty miles to the left of the main army, which was encamped behind Baragurhee ; Captain Blackney was nearly as far to the right, — both without support ; and, not- withstanding the length of time that they had occupied the same ground, no substantial works had been thrown up by either officer. This state of things induced the Goorkhas to plan a simul- taneous attack on both points. The main army of the Nipalese was collected at Mukwanpoor, under Colonel Rundher Singh ; but the forest was in the possession of different parties, who were always on the alert. Rundher, having exact intelligence of the positions occupied FIRST CAMPAIGN. 123 by Captains Sibley and Blackney respectively, ordered them both to be attacked on the morning of, the 1st of January. Shmnsheer Rana com- manded the party sent against Piu'sa ; and Sm'b- jeet Thapa, that which attacked Sumunpoor : both were captains, that is, commandants of inde- pendent companies or corps in the Goorkha ser- vice, and were of high repute with their nation for bravery and conduct. Captain Blackney was taken completely by surprise by Surbjeet, who came upon him before day-break of the new year. Himself, and his second in command. Lieutenant Duncan, were killed in the first onset ; and, before the action had lasted ten minutes, the sepoys, who had but par- tially run to their arms on the alarm, broke, and fled in every direction. To increase the confti- sion, the Goorkhas set fire to the tents, having penetrated to the heart of the camp before re- sistance was offered. Lieut. Strettell, the only surviving officer, seeing things in this state, and perceiving that the day was quite irrecoverable, himself joined the fugitives, and retreated to Gora Suhun with the remnant of the detachment. The communication with Captain Hay had pre- viously been cut off, so that it was not possible to retire on Baragurhee. Captain Sibley was better on his guard at Pursa, where many circumstances had led him J 24 NIPAL WAR. to expect an attack. He had, indeed, only re- cently stated his ai)i3rehensions to General Mar- ley, who, on the 3ist of December, 1814, sent him a reinforcement under Major Greenstreet. The post was more than twenty miles distant, as before mentioned; and the detachment, having marched in the evening, unfortunately encamped on the road. On the morning of the new year, however, hearing the report of artillery in the direction of Pursa, the Major hastened his march, and got within three miles before the firing had ceased. The coming-in of the fugitives then sufficiently explained how the affair had ended. It seems that Shumsheer Rana came to the at- tack in three columns ; Captain Sibley's advance had been thrown very considerably forward, and the ground of the position lay between two nul- las, the windings of which allowed the enemy to penetrate sufficiently on either flank, to cut off the communication between the front and rear. The latter quarter, moreover, was left to the de- fence of about seventy irregular horse, and was therefore a weak point, especially in a night- affair. The attack commenced in front, where it was checked by the advance-guard, commanded by Lieutenant Smith. Finding himself pressed, however, this officer sent to ask of Captain Sibley the reinforcement of a light gun, (a one-and-a- half pounder of new construction,) which was FIRST CAMPAIGN. 125 with the detachment. The Captain brought it forward himself ; but when it came, the cartridges were found too large for it to be turned projDerly to account ; and in the mean time, the firing having begun in rear and on l)oth flanks, Cap- tain Sibley found it necessary to return imme- diately. While on his way back he was wounded, first in the leg, and soon after, mortally, by a shot through the body, from parties of the enemy who had availed themselves of the winding of the nulla, to come close in upon the line of commu- nication with the advance. Lieutenant Smith, the next in rank, was immediately summoned from the front to take the command ; and, as the firing in the rear was heavy, he judged it right to carry in his advance-guard. On reaching the line, he found that Shumsheer Rana, while he had thus kept the detachment in play in front and in both flanks, had made his chief attack from the rear ; and, having overpowered the irre- gulars, had penetrated to the officers' tents, and possessed himself of the magazine and bazar. The six-pounder, with the detachment, had been turned towards the rear by Lieutenant Matheson, the artillery-officer ; and on the junction of Lieu- tenant Smith with the advance-guard, all that could be done was to form a circle, in order to keep the enemy at a distance. They had estabhshed themselves at the magazine, where tlierc were 12G NIPAL WAR. some trees and otlier cover, from beliind which they picked off nearly all the artillery-men. Both Lieutenant Smith and Lieutenant Matheson were sensible that, unless the Goorkhas could be dislodged from this point, the day was lost. On proposing, however, to the sepoys to charge and recover it, they showed a disinclination to the undertaking; and kept on firing, nearly at random, until their ammunition was expended. A retreat was then resolved on ; and it was effected by crossing one of the nullas at a place where if was not properly fordable, and at a time when the Goorkhas were intent on the plunder. Thus many were saved ; but the two guns, the maga- zine, and stores of every kind, fell a prey to the enemy. Every European of the artillery, except Lieutenant Matheson himself, was either killed or wounded ; and our whole loss amounted to one hundred and twenty-three killed, one hundred and eighty-seven wounded, besides seventy-three missing. The detachment originally consisted of about five hundred fighting men ; and the prox- imity of Major Greenstreet, combined with the enemy's eagerness to secure the booty, was what alone saved the wounded and stragglers. The activity and enterprise shown in these at- tacks was so unexpected by General Marley, that he began to entertain some apprehension for his train of heavy artillery, which was at the time FIRST CAMPAIGN. 127 coming up from Betia, in the rear. Having therefore strengthened the post of Baragnrhee, by ordering Major Roughsedge there from Janik- poor, the general himself made a westward move- ment to cover his train ; moreover, considering his force to be insufficient, he abandoned all idea of penetrating the hills in the manner indicated in his instructions. The two brigadiers, Colonels Dick and Chamberlain, agreed with him in repre- senting the army not to be sufficiently strong for offensive measures ; and, perhaps, in this respect they were not wrong at the time. The Marquess of Hastings was seriously dis- appointed at all these untoward occurrences. Every nerve was strained to increase the strength of all the divisions, but particularly of this, fi'om which so much was expected. All the military stations of Bengal and Buhar were drained of troops, in order to furnish reinforcements ; but it was not so easy to restore confidence to the mind of the commander. Major-general Marley, notwithstanding the high state of the equipments of liis army, and the daily approach of fresh troops, continued inactive dur- ing the whole of January ; making indeed some marches in the open Turaee, but without once venturing into the forest. Repeated orders came from head-quarters, enjoining some effort at offen- sive measures. ^Vhen, however, the general began 128 NIPAI. WAU. to deliberate upon the plan he was to ado})t, he was distracted by the different opinions entertained by those he was in the habit of consulting, and came, in the end, to no resolution. In the mean time, the enemy, whose army was at Amowa, burnt sev^eral villages at no great distance from his camp, and threatened even to attack Baragurhee, where there were upwards of a thousand men in garrison. They raised a stockade at Soofee, a short distance from the post ; and were inspired with such confidence from past successes, that orders were issued, under the red seal, for the at- tack ; but the Goorkha commander, Bhugut Singh, had better information than the council at the capital, and wisely refrained. The court, however, not satisfied with his reasons, attributed his conduct to cowardice ; and summoning him to the capital, to answer for the disobedience, made hun appear at the Durbar in woman's attire, as wanting the spirit and courage of a man. They were soon afterwards undeceived ; and on the 7th February removed the post they had so impudently established. But to the mortification of the troops, and discredit of the British general, it had continued thus to insidt us for near a month with impunity. Major Roughsedge, indeed, a day or two before the evacu- ation, sent Captain Hay with a party from Bara- gurhee to reconnoitre, and, if possible, dislodge the enemy ; hut that officer, finding his approach inter- FIRST CAMPAIGN. l29 cepted by a morass, and seeing that the post was too strong for his detachment to cai^y by assault, contented himself with firing a few shrapnell shells from a couple of 6-pounders he had with him, and retired again to Baragurhee. On the 10th February, General Marley, unable longer to endure the irksomeness of his situation, and feeling strongly the impossibility of answering the expectations of his commander-in-chief, took the sudden and extraordinary resolution of leaving the camp, which was then at Bunjaree Pookureea. He set off before daylight in the morning, without pubUshing any notification of his intention to the troops, and without taking any means of providing for the conduct of the ordinary routine of com- mand during his absence. The resolution had previously been formed by Lord Hastings of providing another commander for the Sarun army ; but the unadvised step into which General Marley was thus betrayed, seemed to him to require his permanent removal from the staff. Major-general George Wood was ordered up from the presidency to succeed General Marley ; and Colonel Dick, the senior brigadier, assumed and continued to exercise the command until his arrival. We have now Ijrought up the operations of this campaign to the jieriod when the succession of K 130 NIPAL WAR. disasters had reached its crisis. General Ochterlony alone had not been foiled. He was steadily pur- suing his plan by slow and secure manoeuvres, but had yet gained no brilliant advantage over his equally cautious antagonist. General MaitindeU's division had failed three several times: twice before Nalapanee, and the third time in the at- tempt to take up positions before Jythuk. More- over, the aggregate loss sustained by this division had amounted to a third of the numbers that ori- ginally took the field from Meeruth. The army assembled at Gourukpoor had allowed itself to retire before the enemy under circumstances amounting to a repulse ; while, as we have seen, the Buhar division, which was thought strong enough to have penetrated to Katmandoo, had lost two de- tachments of five hundi'ed men each, without an equivalent success of any kind. From the fron- tier of Oudh to Rungpoor, our armies were com- pletely held in check on the outside of the forest ; while our territory was insulted with impunity, and the most extravagant alarms spread through the country. We had lost nothing, indeed, on the Morung frontier ; on the contrary, the cooperation of the Sikhim Raja had been gained, the commu- nication having been opened by an overture on his part, and a request for a few military stores. In this quarter, also, an attempt made by the Goorkha conjmander in Morung to cut off a post of ours FIRST CAMPAIGN. 131 stationed at Moodwanee, had failed ; Lieutenant Foord, of the 9th N. I. having repulsed theii" night attack, after the assailants had succeed- ed in firing his tents and iDaggage. We had several killed, and Lieutenant Thomas, of the 9th, was amongst the wounded, in this afFau', which was very creditable to the troops and officers ; but as the position was next day evacuated, there was little to boast of in the victory. Major Latter, indeed, was led by the vigorous nature of the attack to solicit the aid of some reinforcements, then on then- way to the Sarun army ; and thus, by withholding them from their destination, yielded the enemy some advantage fi'om the attack, not- withstanding its failure. The alarms of the civil authorities of Tirhoot had produced a similar di- version in that quarter ; and it was not until the end of February, or, indeed, the beginning of March, that the division destined for the main attack was augmented to the fall strength pro- posed for it. K 'J. 132 CHAPTER IV. NIPAL WAR.— FIRST CAMPAIGN. 1815. Reflections— Successful skirmish on Sarun frontier— General G. Wood takes the command — his inactivity — General J. S. Wood's proceedings in Gourukpoor — Resolution of Governor-general to attack Kumaon — Levies for the pur- pose — Lieut.-colonel Gardner penetrates by the Kosila — turns the Goorkha position — takes post at Choumou — Major Hearsey penetrates to Chumpawut — Colonel Gard- ner again turns the Goorkha position, and arrives before Almora — Colonel NicoUs sent by the Governor-general to support these operations — Defeat and capture of Major Hearsey by Husteedul — his death in an affair with Major Patton's detachment — Attack ofthe Goorkha positions be- fore Almora — Night sally of the Nipalese defeated — Fall of Almora — Proceedings before Jythuk — Plans of General Martindell — unsatisfactory results — Resolution to cut off the enemy's supplies — Major Richards sent to occupy a post for this purpose — Dislodges the enemy with loss — Jythuk surrendered to General Ochterlony — his further proceedings — Reduction of Ramgurh, &c. by Colonel Cooper — Final operations against Maloun — Lodgment at Ryla and Deothul — Death of Captain Showers — Bhugtee Thapa leads a desperate attack on Deothul — his defeat and death — Goorkha chiefs desert Umur Singh — his surrender — Arrangements for disposal of the conquered territory. The uniform success which had hitherto at- tended -the Goorkhas produced, in January 1815, FIRST CAMPAIGN. 133 an effect on the public mind in the independent portion of India which is more easily imagined than described. Although jealous, naturally, of our preponderance, and suspicious to a degree of any relinquishment of the pacific policy, the native powers had so little knowledge of the strength and resources of the Goorkhas, that the war at first excited little sensation. It was re- garded as a mere affair with a troublesome Raja of the frontier ; and, but for the greater mag- nitude of our preparations, might have been as- similated to the measures taken in 1812 against the Rewa chief. As one check, however, fol- lowed another, speculation grew more active, and the events of the campaign became matter of intenser interest ; imtil, at last, more than one of the native courts began seriously to think it was time to jjrepare to take advantage of cir- cumstances. Runjeet Singh, the Punjab Seikh, kept an army at Lahore, and seemed to menace us in the extreme north-west ; while Ameer Khan collected together his Putan battalions, and made an ambiguous offer of their services, from a point only a few marches from Agra. The tone, moreover, assumed in Sindheea's durbar and at Poona was any thing but conciliatory. It is not our business in this place to explain at length the attitude assumed by the native powers, in consequence of the altered view of our 134 NIPAL WAE. position presented by these disasters. Suffice it to say, that the intrigues which were set on foot throughout the whole independent portion of In- dia, and which led to such important results a few years afterwards, date their commencement from this period. In proportion as their exist- ence became manifest, it was of course more ne- cessary that we should persevere and conquer the subsisting difficulties in the hills ; for the name and character of the government and of the British nation were felt to be committed on the issue. The Marquess of Hastings never doubted for an instant of his ultimate success in the cam- paign ; and notwithstanding the unfavourable as- pect of things at the commencement of 1815, there were abundant sources of consolation, and of a just confidence, to those who looked beyond the surface. Every check our arms had ex- perienced was clearly traceable to a want of due precaution in those who directed the operation, and this was an error that was sure to be re- medied as soon as felt. Thus every encounter, even when vmfavourable in its result, brought more strength in the lessons of prudence it incul- cated, than was detracted in the physical loss sustained. The soldiers and sepahees of the Bri- tish army had, for some time, been unused to war ; but though somewhat open to the influence of panic from the strangeness of the scene, and riRST CAMPAIGN.^ 135 novelty of theii* situation amidst the forests and mountains of this extraordinary region, and more- over a little disheartened, at first, to find their best efforts thwarted by this Semi-barbarous ene- my, they yet showed a wonderful buoyancy of spirit in soon recovering their wonted nerve. The Goorkhas, on the other hand, were abun- dantly satisfied with repulsing an attack or cutting off an outpost. They never pushed their success beyond this; and were indeed too deficient in military science, as weU as in physical means, to assume a superiority in the campaign, or act offensively on a large scale, against any one of our divisions. Their tactics were purely defensive ; so much so, that howsoever severely their assailant might suffer from the indiscretion of his first attack, they left him ample time to collect fresh courage, and approach them again with more caution. To the officers of the Bengal army, in parti- cular, were the lessons of this war salutary ; pie- cipitancy and want of caution were qualities bred in them, by an uninterrupted course of easy vic- tory. From the days of Clive to those of Loid Lake, they had only to show themselves, and march straight against their enemy, to ensure his precipitate flight. They naturally carried into the hills the same contempt of the foe which their victories in the plains had engendered ; and J 36 NIPAL WAR. were taught only by painful experience to make sufficient allowance for the entire change of cir- cumstances in the new field of action. They had, however, to guard against another influence as prejudicial as over confidence ; and that was, too great distrust and apprehension after the ex- perience of a check. It is doubtful which ex- treme was, in its results, most injurious to the British cause : but more than one of the officers in high command afforded an example of the facility with which the mind passes from one to the other, as well as of the obstinacy with which distrust maintains its hold when once it finds admittance. It must be allowed to tlie Goorkhas that they were an experienced as well as a brave enemy : they had been continually waging war in the mountains for more than fifty years, and knew well how to turn every thing to the best advan- tage. Caution and judgment were, therefore, more required against them, tlian boldness of action or of decision ; but most of all, that power of intelUgence and discrimination which is never without a resource in circumstances the most un- expected. It will be perceived that little advance was made in the campaign until we had learnt to turn the same advantages to account against the enemy, by the help of which he foiled us so often at the FIRST CAMPAIGN- 137 commencement ; for with all the experience of Indian warfare, combined with the professional science of Europe, our officers found yet some- thing to learn from these Goorkhas. We adopted from them the plan of stockading posts, which the nature of the campaign frequently rendered it necessary to place beyond the limit of prompt support. Had this plan been adopted from the first, the detachments of Captains Sibley and Blackney would have been saved. It was, how- ever, altogether a new thing to the Bengal army ; for, from the earliest days, there had never been works thrown up for the defence of an outpost ; nor in a war of the plains, could there ev€r be oc- casion for such a precaution. Sir David Ochter- lony has the merit of having first resorted to this plan,* and of having adopted it, too, as a resource of prudence which occurred to his own mind, not taught to him by the experience of disaster, as was the case with others. Such, however, was the nature of Umur Singh's positions that they could not have been turned or surrounded, so as to cut off his communications without occupying a large circuit, and throwing out detachments for the purpose at considerable distances from one another; many of which, being necessarily much * The first stockade erected after the Goorkha fashion was at Khundnee, where a battalion was left with seme irregulars, while the division turned Umur Singh's left, by marching to Nehur. 138 Nll'AL WAI{. exposed, would have been liable to l^e overwhelmed separately, but for this simple though substantial defence. The strength of the stockades was originally greatly miscalculated: made up of rough hewn wood and stones, heaped together between an inner and outer palisade, they were in appearance so contemptible as to invite assault without even seeming to requii'e breaching. On the plains, much more formidable-looking places were con- stantly carried in that way : but appearances were deceitftil; and the Goorkhas, having a just confidence in their defences, always stood boldly to them, and made the assailants pay dearly for their temerity. The lighter artillery made little or no impression, and the difficulty of bringing up heavy guns, rendered them, in truth, most formidable de- fences. The wood and materials for raising them were every where at hand, and the celerity with which they could be prepared in any position formed a main source of the strength of the country. But this was a resource equally available to an invader, and one which placed the issue in the power of continuance, that is, in the length of the purse. By the adoption of this system, the opera- tions of the divisions which penetrated the hills were entii^ely converted into a war of posts, as will have been already sufficiently manifest from the character of General Ochtcrlony's proceedings. 55 FIRST CAMPAIGN. 139 The same plan was ultimately put in practice at Jythuk, Kumaon, and elsewhere. Its effect will presently be fully shown ; but first, it will be proper to mention the result of the efforts made against the more central possessions of the enemy. The operations of the Sarun and Gourukpoor armies may be dismissed with a very few words. Major-general George Wood was appointed Gene- ral Marley's successor, and joined the camp on the 20th of February. The very day before his ar- rival, an event occurred that struck terror into the enemy, and raised the courage of this army to the highest pitch of confidence. Lieutenant Pickersgill, an active officer of the intelligence department, dis- covered, while out reconnoitering, a party of about five hundred Goorkhas at no great distance from camp. He immediately sent intimation to Colonel Dick, the senior officer, who had assumed the com- mand on General Marley's departure, and himself re- mained with hispersonal escort to watch the enemy. Colonel Dick sent a party of irregular horse, under Cornet Hearsey, to strengthen Lieutenant Pickers- gUl, and himself followed, with all the picquets of the army, in the hope of cutting off this detach- ment. The Goorkhas, who had taken an advan- tageous position in a hollow, finding themselves unmolested by Lieutenant Pickersgill, and seeing his small numbers, came to the resolution of attacking him. Just, however, as they debouched 140 NirAL WAll. from their position for the purpose, they perceived the cavalry, and the further support that was advancing. Appalled by this, they attempted a precipitate retreat, when Lieutenant Pickersgill, waiting only to be joined by Cornet Hearsey's horse, fell upon them, and cut the whole detach- ment to pieces. A number of officers of the army had ridden out from camp immediately on its being known tliat a party of the enemy were in sight, and these joined in the charge, and were mainly instrumental to its success. The Goorkhas were so intimidated by this result, that they hastily withdrew every position they had established in the forest and Turaee ; and when Greneral G. Wood arrived next day, the passage of the forest was free to him, — not a Goorkha being to be seen below the hills. The season was doubtless very far gone for any thing now to be commenced, nevertheless, there remained a month to make some effort to redeem the consequences of his predecessor's inactivity ; and the army naturally expected to be led through the forest after the enemy, if not into the passes of the hills. The new General, however, adopt- ed an opinion that the season of the fever had arrived, and that it would be risking the health and efficiency of his fine army, which was now augmented to thirteen thousand four hundred regidar troops, were he to. attempt to FIRST CAMPAIGN. 14 1 penetrate the forest. He accordingly contented himself with sweeping its skirt, in a long march eastward to Janikpoor and l)ack again ; and thus the season closed, actually without his seeing a single enemy. In Gourukpoor, Major-general John Sullivan Wood burnt a few of the Goorkha \'iUages in re- taliation of their excesses, and marched wherever he heard the enemy were advancing. He ^vas, however, still deceived by false reports, and could not get rid of the impression that his force was too weak to effect any thing against Wuzeer Singh, whom he represented to head-quarters as command- ing an army numerically much superior to his own. On the necessity of ascertaining this point, by coming actually into contact with the enemy, being strongly urged by the Commander-in-chief, General Wood was induced at the close of the season, that is, in the month of April, to appear again before Bootwul. He accordingly, on the 17th of that month, drew up his army, and opened a desul- tory fire against the place for some hours, from his artillery and line. The manoeuvre produced no result whatever, though attended M'ith several ca- sualties. The General, however, described it as a reconnoissance calculated to create a diversion by alarming the enemy on this frontier, at the same time that it enabled himself to ascertain that he liad not miscalculated the strength of the army 142 NIPAI- WAR. opposed to him. General Wood immediatel)^ after this manoeuvre laid waste the Goorkha por- tion of the Turaee, and then retired to canton- ments at Gourukpoor. It is fortunate for the interest of this narrative that the spirit of enterprize was not every where so wanting as in the leaders of the two central divi- sions. In proceeding westward, it now becomes our duty to relate a series of operations of a very opposite character. It was ascertained by Lord Hastings, while on his tour through Rohilkhund, that the pro\dnce of Kumaon, which skirts the north of it, was nearly destitute of troops; the whole Goorkha force having been drawn off to oppose the British divisions operating to the east or west. It seemed to him that a diversion in this quarter, while it would distract the enemy by multipljdng the points of attack, would further be of use in preventing any reinforcements from proceeding westward to Jy- thuk. If successful, it might lead to very important results, even to the conquest of the province, and entire separation of the eastern from the western territory : if the contrary, the effect would be pro- duced in other quarters without much loss. It is to be observed that the Kumaonese were known to be disaffected to the Goorkhas, who held them in rigorous subjection, fi'equently seizing and seUing into servitude their women and children, in order , FIRST CAMPAIGN. ^ 143 to enforce the most arbitrary exactions. The consequent alienation of the population from their masters, was reckoned upon as likely to aid greatly the projected enterprize. There were no regular troops that could be spared at this juncture (December) ; for the threat- ening tone and position of several chiefs and associations of the south and north-west required that a warlike attitude should be maintained on both fi'ontiers ; whilst the demands for reinforce- ments to the divisions already in the hills, were so urgent as to require every disposeable man. In order, therefore, not to lose the opportunity. Lord Hastings resolved to avail himself of the warlike . population of Rohilkhund, who are Putans, of a race trained from infancy to the use of the sword and matchlock, and naturally brave and impetuous, though not easily subjected to discipline. Two officers, used to such troops, were accordingly ordered to make levies of Rohillas, to be employed against Kumaon. The persons selected wei'e Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, and Major, then Captain, Hearsey, neither of them of the regular establishment, but both Mahratta officers of great merit, who had come over under the proclamation of Lord Wellesley, on war breaking out with Sindheea in 1802-3. Lieutenant-colonel Gardner had since been retained in command of a corps of police-horse ; Major Hearsey had not !)een em- 144 NIPAL WAR. ployed in a military capacity for some years, but was the companion of Mr. Moorcroft's adventm'ous journey across the snowy range to the lake Ma- iiusararvva, and had been detained in Kumaon as a prisoner, along with Mr. Moorcroft, on their return, the very year before the war broke out. To the former officer it was assigned to pene- trate from Kasheepoor in the Moradabad district ; while the latter was to operate against Chumpawut, to the east of the province, by the jDasses near Peeleebheet and Khyreegurh, where the Deoha, or Gogra, forces its way into the plains. Both officers received their instructions late in December, and proceeded at once to organize levies. On the llthof February, 1815, Lieutenant-colo- nel Gardner commenced his march from Kashee- poor, accompanied by a civilian, his relation, the Ho- nourable Edward Gardner, to whom was assigned the function of political agent for the province. On the 15th, the force reached the foot of the first passes, and dislodged a Goorkha picquet from Deklee : from hence they could see distinctly a party of Goorkhas stockaded on the summit of Kat-kee-nao, an elevated post which overlooked the entrance of the pass, by the bed of the Kosila; while another party of the enemy occupied the Gurhee, or fort of Kotha, considerably to the right. Having reconnoitered the two positions, the Lieu- tenant-colonel determined on an attempt to pene- FIRST CAMPAIGN. 145 trate them, so as, if possible, to get between the garrisons and Ahnora. On the 16th, in order to put the above design into execution, the Lieutenant- colonel made a short march up the Kosila to Chookum, and next day halted : that the same hill porters who attended the advance, might return to bring up the rest of the baggage and supplies. Heavy rain commenced on the 18th, which soon filled the river, and otherwise impeded the advance. In the evening, however, a party was sent in the direction of Kotha, as if to threaten that post ; and at the same time two hundred Rohillas, and one hvmdred Mewatees marched up the river, to endeavour to seize a strong pass, called Thangura, where the Kosila rushes through a defile commanded by lofty and precipitous mountains on either side. This party, from some misconduct of the guide, did not secure the pass on both sides of the river ; but estabUshed itself on the hill overlooking: it to the south-east. The detachment sent in the direction of Kotha, fell in with the garrison on a hill called Ronseldeh, be- tween the Thangura pass and Kotha. Lieutenant- colonel Gardner, therefore, deeming it necessary to dislodge the enemy from this post without loss of time, moved next morning with five hundred men for the purpose. The object being effected, he turned towards Thangura, and encamped for the night at Ookul Danga, where his party had esta- L 146 NIPAL WAR. Wished themselves, as above mentioned, on the evening before. On the 20th, the Goorkhas evacuated Kat-kee-nao, and retired to Googur Gurh, on the right of the Kosila, near Thangm^a. Kat-kee-nao was immediately secured by a party of o])servation sent for the purpose the preceding day ; and in the evening, the Lieutenant-colonel in person crossed the river, and dislodged the enemy from Googur ; thus seeming both sides of the important pass of Thangura. On the 21st, seven hundred Rohilla Putans moved forward to Seethee, where they bivouacked, and were next day pushed on to a point where two roads to Almora meet, ^t a peepul-tree. The more open route, by the valley and town of Boojan, was found occupied by the Goorkha Surdar (Rungelee), with the concentrated garrisons of Kotha and Kat- kee-nao. After a short halt therefore to refresh, the Lieutenant-colonel marched with all haste to seize the Choumou hill, the first steep ascent on the other road ; which, leaving the valley, runs along the ridge to the north or left of the direct line of advance. The whole day was consumed in this arduous march ; and at the close of it, there was an ascent of three kos to the summit which it was intended to occupy. The fatigue was so great, that only about forty men of the whole number came to the ground ; and these were supplied with water from the snow, which lay there in abun- FIRST CAMPAIGN. 147 dance. Early in the morning of the 22d, the enemy were seen making for the same point : they were led by Ungut Surdar, who had just arrived with a reinforcement from Ahnora. The party at Choumou were still extremely weak ; but they had several standards, of which they made such a display as deterred Ungut from an attack which he seemed to meditate. It was the 28th of February before all the sup- plies could be brought up fi'om the rear to Chou- mou : on that day, however, a further short ad- vance was made to Kampena-ke-danda ; whence the enemy were seen in force at Koompoor, a rugged hill in front. The Lieutenant-colonel, having been obliged to form depots and establish garrisons at Kat- kee-nao, Kotha, and several other places in his rear, thought it prudent to wait here for further reinforcements ; and particularly for one thousand Putans raised at HajDur in the Meeruth district, and now on their way to join him. Little hap- pened in the interim of this halt, with the excep- tion of two skirmishes, on the 6th and 18th of March ; both of which ended in a manner highly creditable to the Rohillas. In the former, the Lieutenant-colonel's advanced-guard succeeded in driving back a party of the enemy who ven- tured to descend from their stockade into the intervening valley of Tarakot ; and in the second L 2 148 NTPAL WAR. affair, which was rather more seiious, between six and seven hundi*ed men being engaged on either side, the Putans made a resolute charge, and put to the rout a body of the enemy of equal strength, who ventured again to the same ground. The Lieutenant-colonel, while he thus ad- vanced by the Kosila, had kept a party in front of the direct route from Rohilkhund by Bu- mouree and Bheem Tal ; the commandant, how- ever, attempted nothing, and was in the end or- dered to join the main body. Major Hearsey, having completed his levies, at the same time with Colonel Gardner, ad- vanced also, in Febmary, from Peeleebheet, and penetrated by the Kalee, or western Gogra, to Chumpawut, without meeting any opposition. The population showed some disposition to de- clare in his favour ; so, posting half his force to guard the important passes of the Kalee, he began to think of co-operating with Lieutenant- colonel Gardner, by an advance to Almora from the east. In this view he moved upon Kootulgurh, a very strong fort ; but which some information received as to the state of its supplies, induced the Major to think must soon yield to a blockade. The month of March was spent in these opera- tions. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 149 111 the mean time, Colonel Gardner being joined by the men from Hapur, on the 22nd of March, again out-generaled the Goorkha commander, and established himself in his rear, and even within sight of Almora. The same night that the reinforcement joined, a strong detachment under Mohiin Singh, a na- tive commandant of known courage and steadi- ness, was sent, by a circuitous route through the valleys to the right, to seize the southeramost point of a ridge immediately facing Almora, where was a temple called Sheeo-ka Devee. On the morning of the 23d, in order to draw off the enemy's attention from this operation, a demon- stration was made of attacking Koompoor in front. The movement was thus so well con- certed, that it was not till twelve o'clock in the day that the Goorkhas made the discovery of its object, by seeing the Rohillas taking up their position at the temple behind them. The Lieu- tenant-colonel, satisfied at the success of the ope- ration, waited till the following day to see its effect on the enemy. Early in the morning he advanced with the intention of attacking, or at least turning, the left flank of the Koompoor po- sition, in order to follow to Sheeo-ka Devee. The Goorkhas, however, moved at the same time ; and setting fire to their stockade, hastened by Reonee to Kutarmul, two points on the same ridge with 150 NIP A I. WAR. Sheeo-ka Devee. The Lieutenant-colonel followed by the same route; l3Ut the want of porters pre- vented his reaching Reonee till the 25th, and a halt of a couple of days was then necessary, to bring up the guns and supplies. On the 28th he marched in two columns upon Kutarmul ; and as he approached, the Goorkha commander, find- ing himself between Mohun Singh's detachment and the main body, did not think it prudent to continue on the same ridge, but crossed the Ko- sila, and posted himself on the declivities between Almora and that river, leaving the Lieutenant- colonel free to occupy the ground on the right bank from Reonee to Sheeo-ka Devee. Thus had Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, by sheer dexterity, and without bloodshed, made an effectual opening to the heart of the province of Kumaon. His conciliatory conduct, and that of the Political Agent, had succeeded in effectually gaining the natives ; so much so, that the bazar of his camp seldom failed to be supplied from the villages in the hills ; and the intercourse opened and main- tained furnished certain intelligence of all the enemy's projects. In the end of March, Lord Hastings, seeing the state of things here, determined on sup- porting the Lieutenant-colonel ; and following up his successes, by sending a force of regular in- FIRST CAMPAIGN. 151 fantry and artillery, capable of subduing all fur- ther opposition. He selected Colonel Jasper Ni- colls, at the time Quartermaster-general of the King's troops in India, for this important service ; and on the 23rd of March, placed under his com- mand a force of two thousand and twenty-five firelocks, composed of the 1st battalion 4th N. I., under Captain FaithftU ; the 2d battalion 5th N. I. under Major Patton ; and part of a bat- talion formed of grenadier companies, and then employed in Gurhwal. Ten pieces of artillery of different kinds were added fi'om Moradabad. The state of the operations before Jythuk, combined with the assurance that the tranquillity of Central India would not be disturbed this season, were the circumstances that enabled the Governor-ge- neral to devote the troops of his regidar army to this service now ; though two months earlier he had not deemed it safe to spare them. On the 5th of April, Colonel NicoUs entered the hiUs w^ith his advance, and hastened to join Lieutenant-colonel Gardner at Kutarmul. On his way he heard of the entire defeat and capture of Major Hearsey, and of the reduction of all the posts he had estabUshed to guard the Une of the ■'Kalee or Surjoo; by which names the western branch of the Gogra is here known. It seems that the court of Katmandoo, finding all secure for the 152 NIPAL WAR. season to the eastward, determined on an effort to snccour Almora, and eventually relieve Jythuk. For this purpose they ordered a battalion to cross the Kalee into Kumaon, and gave the command of the force to Hustee-dul, the chief then go- verning the province of Dotee. Having strength- ened himself by collecting all the detachments of his province, this chief crossed the Kalee, on the 31st of March, at Khusmot Ghat. Major Hearsey had attempted the defence of a wider line along this river than his force justified, besides being still engaged on the blockade of Kootulgurh. His men were thus too much detached for his whole force to he made available in the emer- gency ; nevertheless, he hastened to meet the enemy with the few men he had at Chumpawut, and fell in with him on the first day's march. The Hohillas, being raw levies, deserted Major Hearsey after the first fire ; and he was wounded, and made prisoner. None of the positions he had garrisoned held out afterwards ; but the men hastened back again to the plains with the utmost terror and expedition. Little better was to be expected from new levies, upon the loss of their commander ; the defeat was, however, of bad effect in the impression it left on tlie inhabitants of the province ; and had not the support been on its way to Colonel Gardner, its influence on the raw troops of his force might, perhaps, have ren- FIRST CAMPAIGN. 153 dered necessary the relinquishment of all the ad- vantages gained. It may be observed here, that in every action between the Goorkha regulars and Rohilla Nujeebs, or other similar levies, the former were always victorious. Hence the merit of Colonel Gardner's plan, under which, though always advancing to his object, he avoided com- mitting his men, except in skirmishes where he had a decided superiority, or under circumstances in which the enemy did not think it prudent to attack him, is the more conspicuous. Colonel NicoUs, on being informed of the defeat and capture of Major Hearsey, hastened to effect a junction with Lieutenant-colonel Gardner, and reached him a day or two before Hustee-dul ar- rived with his prisoner at Almora. The latter event was announced by a salute which was both heard and seen from the British camp. On the 23d of April, Hustee-dul again left the town, with a considerable detachment, upon some expedition, the object of which was not immediately apparent. Colonel NicoUs, seeing the movement, despatched Major Patton, with his battalion, the 2d of the 5th N. I., in the direction of Gunnanath, a sta- tion about fifteen miles north of Almora, on which Hustee-dul appeared to be marching. The routes of the two detachments brought them in sight, and close upon one another, befoi-e they were well aware. They were both marching up the 154 NIPAL WAR. same eminence, and it was a contest which should seize it. Hiistee-dul first gained the summit ; but the British advance-guard, under Lieutenant Webster, of the 5th N. I., attacked him before he had time to make any arrangement for his de- fence. He was dislodged with considerable loss ; and in the action received a ball in his temple, which secured the victory to us. Our loss was only two killed, and twenty-five wounded, in- cluding Ensign Blair, severely. Hustee-dul was an active and brave officer, of high reputation in his nation, and his loss was severely felt in Abnora. Colonel Nicolls determined, on the return of Ma- jor Patton, to avail himself of the alarm he judged the late defeat would occasion ; and on the 25th, at one p. m., he led the 1st battalion 4th N. I. in person across the Kosiia, foUov/ed hy Lieute- nant-colonel Gardner and his irregulars, in order to effect a lodgement on the Seetolee heights, where the enemy were jDosted. Having reached the height and taken measures to secure the pos- session of it, he thought he observed symptoms of alarm in the garrison of a stone breast-work before him, and immediately in front of the town of Al- mora. He was hence tempted to try an assault, without waiting to bring up his guns to breach the walls, which would have occasioned a considera- ble loss of time. The assault was led by Captain FIllST CAMPAION. 155 Faithful in person ; and the redoubt was entered first, through an embrasure, by Lieutenant Wight, who fell immediately, severely wounded by a Goorkha chief. Captain Faithful followed at the head of some grenadiers, and saved his brother officer by cutting down the man ; w^hen the rest fled, leaving the redoubt in our possession. All the stockades of the ridge were carried or evacu- ated ; and the enemy were pursued into the town of Almora ; leaving the Colonel to make his dis- positions for the night. The Nipalese were not, however, disposed to re- sign the possession of these heights, which commu- nicated directly with the town, without a further struggle ; and accordingly, at about eleven in the night, having sent a detachment secretly round, they attacked and carried our most northerly post, though stockaded and defended by a piquet of re- gulars, under Lieutenant Costly, of the 1st batta- lion of 4th N. I. A party of the flank battalion, under Lieutenants Brown and Winfield, immedi- ately moved to the support of the post ; and with the aid of a ghole of irregulars, under Colonel Gardner in person, the place was recovered, but not without a hard struggle. The firing in this quarter was the signal for a general sortie from the fort; but for this Colonel NicoUs was prepared, and the enemy were driven back with loss ; after which tliey confined themselves to a little dc- I5G NirAi> WAii. tachcd filing. We lost in this affair an officer, Lieutenant Tapley of the 27th, attached to the grenadier battalion, besides many sepoys and ir- regulars killed and wounded.* The next day the guns were brought up, and a position taken about seventy yards only from the fort of Almora. Bumsah Chountra, the governor of the province, seeing his situation desperate, proposed in the evening of the following day a suspension of arms, preparatory to a negotiation of the terms of surrender. The armistice being granted, the Nipalese wounded officers came boldly into our camp to solicit surgical aid. They further stated, without reserve, their extreme want of supplies, and allowed us to examine the walls and defences of the place ; thus exhibiting a frankness and confidence not a little remarkable in their circumstances. In ar- ranging the terms of capitulation, their main stand was made to obtain an article permitting five hundred men, destined to the service by the go- vernment at Katmandoo, to proceed westward, to * Including the operations in the day-time, the loss in the attack and maintenance of the Seetolee position, was one officer. Lieutenant Tapley, twenty-nine sepoys, and twenty irregulars killed ; two officers (Lieutenants Wight and Purvis, of the 4th native infantry), ninety-eight sepahees, and sixty-one irregulars wounded. Making a total of two hundred and eleven killed and wounded. FIKST CA]\rPAIGN. 157 reinforce Runjoor Singh at Jythuk. This, of course, was resisted ; but tliey did not give up the point until a renewal of hostilities was threatened, if the surrender were not concluded by a given hour. At last, on the 27th of April, a formal con- vention was signed by Colonel Nicolls and the Honourable Edward Gardner, on one side, and Chountra Bumsah, Ungut Kajee, and Chamoo Bundaree, on the other. In this the surrender of the province of Ku- maon, with all its fortified places, was stipulated ; also the retirement of all troops and officers of the Goorkha government, within ten days, to the east of the Kalee ; the British engaging to furnish carriage to aid the transportation of private pro- perty. Major Hearsey's unconditional release was further stipulated. These articles were faithfully executed ; and Colonel Nicolls, having accompanied the Goorkha troops to the ghats of the Kalee, disposed his force in the best manner for the de- fence of that line, against any future attempt of the Nipalese to molest our possession of the pro- vince.* Let us now return to the events of the cam- paign further west. It has been stated that Major- * During the operations above-explained, the Goorkhas made an irruption from Dotee into Khyreegurh, in the plains; but were defeated and driven back by a detachment under Captain Buchanan, sent from Futchgurh by Lord Hastings. 158 NIPAL WAE. general Martindell, after the failures of December, was so firmly persuaded of tlie inadequacy of his force to do any thing against the position of Jythuk, that he lay long inactive at Nahn. In the interim, several reinforcements reached him; and the instructions of his Commander-in-chief continually urged the recommencement of active operations. Towards the beginning of February, Major Kelly was detached from Nahn, with a light battahon, to occupy a post on the same ridge that Major Ludlow had moved upon in December. He established himself without opposition at Nounee ; and on the 12th of the month, being supported by Major Ludlow and his battalion, he advanced to a point called the Black Hill. This post being within the range of heavy artillery, it was resolved by the Major-general to carry up 18-pounders, and batter the first of the enemy's stockades. The side of the hill was therefore prepared for the purpose, and, by great exertions, guns and stores were dragged up the precipitous part of the ascent. The ope- ration excited the astonishment of the enemy, who came out every where to see the wonder, but made no attempt to prevent it. In the mean time, Runjoor Singh's communications were left quite open ; and besides the reinforcement carried to him by Bulbhudur Singh, others were continu- ally joining. On the 17th of February, intelligence reached camp of a party being on its way to FIRST CAMPAIGN. 159 Jytlnik, from the Jumna. Lieutenant Young was accordingly detached with a body of irregulars to intercept it. Not finding the enemy at the point expected, he came back on the 19th ; but more correct intelligence being then obtained, he again marched with all the irregulars in camp, amounting to upwards of two thousand men, and found the Goorkhas in a place called Chumalgurh. Not thinking it right to trust his raw troops with an humediate attack of the position, and relying on his great superiority of number, he proceeded to post detachments where most they could annoy the enemy, and cut off the communication with Jythuk. The w^hole number of the Goorkhas did not amovmt to two hundred fighting men ; but seeing their situation desperate, they called a council, and adopted the resolution to die bravely together *. Having thus prepared themselves, they advanced, and delivering their fire, charged, sword in hand, the nearest post of the irregulars. These unfor- tunately gave way immediately, and were pur- sued, in the utmost confusion, to the next post, where the panic quickly spread ; until the whole party took to flight without attempting any re- sistance, in spite of the utmost efforts of Lieute- nant Young to induce them to face the enemy. * Ujumba Punt was the leader of this party. IGO NIPAL WAR. Tliis unlooked-for result of their intrepidity ena- bled the Goorkhas to continue their march to Jythuk, without further opposition ; and gave them so much confidence, that they never after- wards failed to attack a post of irregulars when- ever placed within their reach ; and even when stockaded, they generally succeeded. The 18-pounders, from the Black Hill, were opened against the first stockade on the 17 th of March ; and on the 20th a battery was erected in a more advanced position. The effect of one day's fire of tjiis last, was to level with the ground the whole stockade ; but the Major-general, in- stead of following up the advantage by an imme- diate attack, which all the troops were eagerly ex- pecting, came now to the conclusion that his pre- sent plan was injudicious ; for that, if carried, the post could not be maintained against the force Runjoor Singh could bring up from behind it. It would thus seem, that with an European regi- ment and a force of at least five thousand of the Company's regular army, the Major-general yet thought it dangerous to take a step that might bring on a general action with an enemy, who had never more than two thousand five hundred men at the utmost. This excess of caution was an unfortunate consequence of the early disasters above related ; but it was a feehng that none of the officers or troops of the division participated FIRST CAMPAIGN. 161 with the general, and that, under the circum- stances, was quite unwarranted. The vacillation of mind exhibited in the adoption and aban- doning of these different plans, was strongly re- marked upon by the Commander-in-chief. It seemed to him that the practicability of reducing the stockades by battering them in succession, could as well have been determined upon before bringing up the guns, and wasting so much la- bour and ammunition ; in which case, more than a month would have been saved for the prosecu- tion of any other plan. It is painful, however, to dwell upon the sources of such disappointments. Upon relinquishing the hope of gaining any use- ful end by the heavy artillery, the Major-general, on the 26th of March, came to the resolution of surrounding Runjoor by detachments, and thus reducing him by blockade and starvation. Gene- ral Ochterlony, he perceived, had effected every thing by directing his efforts against the suppUes of his antagonist ; and there could be little doubt that the same system must be efficacious at Jythuk, though the end of March was rather late in the sea- son to commence on such an operation. In execution of this new plan. Major Richards was sent, on the 1st of April, to seize a post on the eastern ridge, connected with Jythuk. He marched with two battalions, the 1st of the 13th, and 1st of the 15th N. I. and some irregulars. Having made a consi- M 162 NIPAL WAR. derable circuit, to bring his detachment to a place where the ascent could be made with artillery, and without much separation of the files, he advanced cautiously to gain the top of the ridge, which was occupied by the Goorkhas in considerable force. The enemy allowed the Major to come within forty yards before delivering his fire. The post was, however, overpowered without much loss ; and Major Richards followed up his advan- tage along the ridge to a point called Punjab-ka- Teeba, or Punchul ; where the Goorkas seemed disposed to make a more serious stand. The Ma- jor halted, to allow time for the rear companies to close up ; and then attacked this post in two columns ; and carrying it, proceeded immediately to make preparations to stockade it against an effort to recover it, that he expected Runjoor Singh would make with his whole force. The enemy were, however, deterred by the state of preparation they witnessed, and by their past ill- success ; and left Major Richards full leisure to establish himself securely. In the above affair the Goorkha commander, Ujumba Punt *, was taken prisoner ; and of thir- teen hundred men that composed his force, one hundred and seven were killed, and about two * This was the same man, who with two hundred, or one hundred and fifty Goorkhas, defeated the irregulars under Lieutenant Young ; — Fide above, page 159. t- FIRST CAMPAIGN. 163 hundred and fifty wounded. The British loss was trifling, being only seven killed and twenty-nine wounded, including two officers. On the 16th of April, Captain Wilson marched to occupy a point midway between Major Richards and the head- quarters of the Major-general : besides which, several other points had, in the interim, been seized and stockaded in execution of the plan of blockade. Notwithstanding, indeed, the late- ness of the period at which it was adopted, there can be but little doubt that the operation would have been effectual in reducing Jythuk, had not its fall been hastened by other means. The glory of receiving the surrender of Jythuk was reserved for Sir David Ochterlony, whose further successes alone remain to be recorded. We left this officer in position on the further side of the Maloun ridge, with Colonel Arnold at Rutungurh, between the enemy and Belas- poor, while Colonel Cooper was left to reduce the forts of the Ramgurh range. The first of these attacked was Ramgvu'h itself, which, after great exertions in dragging up the heavy ar- tillery, was breached at last on the 16th of February. The garrison capitulated for them- selves, and for Joorjooree, and were allowed to march out with the honours of war. The two commanders, however, on joining IJnmr Singh at Maloun, were punished with the loss of their M 2 1G4 NIPAL WAK. ears and noses ; — an act of savage discipline not perhaps wholly unmerited by the individuals ; but considering Umur Singh's circumstances, not very judicious. Each of the forts had a garrison of one hundred men ; and Joorjooree would have taken some days to reduce, even admitting that Ramgurh could have held out no longer. It was the 10th of March before Colonel Cooper could bring a battery to bear on Taragurh, the next place he attacked. The breach was practica- ble the following day, and the garrison evacuated the fort in the night. Chumba, on the same ridge, was next attacked ; and by the 16th of March, after a day's battering, the garrison hung out the white flag, and surrendered prisoners of war. The chiefs expressed alarm lest theu' families should suffer from Umur Singh's severity ; to deceive him, therefore, the Colonel ordered the guns to continue firing occasionally with blank cartridges; while some of the prisoners were released, that they might endeavour to bring away the families from Maloun. The whole of the strong forts in the rear being thus reduced and occupied. Colonel Cooper fol- lowed the main army, to take part in the last operations against Maloun. By the 14th of April all was prepared for a combined movement, the plan of which the General had for some time been maturing. I§^ ^. !?■ S ^ h ^ 5 la In, ?;'f^ "r- v; ^h'^i ^ § ^ inli- 1 ^^U 1 \ ^ ^ 1 ^ (N 5 ,, i' ? S 5 ~N. sF > ^- ^ -, s X-^ := ;^ ^ I" |: 5; -^ ^ ' \ \ a *>• -a. 1. m 1 u 5 2 pi 3 "V^. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 165 The immediate object was to effect a lodgment within the series of heights that formed Umur Singh's present position. His line stretched be- tween the stone forts of Maloim and Soorujgurh, presenting to the view a series of connected peaks more or less abrupt, and each crowned with a stockade, excepting two, which had the names of Ryla peak and Deothul. The former was conve- niently situated for operations against Soorujgurh, which it would effectually cut off from Maloun ; the latter was in the very heart of the Goorkha position, and not one thousand yards from Maloun itself. It was to be expected that the whole force of the Goorkhas would oppose the occupation of Deot- hul, which was the main object of attack. General Ochterlony reckoned, however, that even if he failed there, the possession of Ryla would still be a great advantage ; and that the movement on both points at the same time, would contribute to dis- tract the enemy. To assist the enterprize further, a diversion was planned by other detachments, which were directed to march right upon the enemy's cantonment under the waUs of Maloun. It will be proper to explain this movement more in detail. Five columns altogether were put in motion, besides detachments for the diversion, and the following was the part assigned to each. The first from Pulta, one of the posts opposed to Soorujgurh, on the enemy's extreme right, con- 166 NIPAL WAR. sisted of two light companies of the 19th N. I. under Lieutenant Fleming, who, attended by a strong party of irregulars, was to make a secret night movement on Ryla, and there show a light as a signal for the movement of the other columns. Immediately on seeing it, Captain Hamilton was to march on the same point, with his own and Lieutenant Lidlie's detachments, assembled for the purpose at Jynugur; while a grenadier batta- lion from head-quarters, under Major Innes, moved simultaneously in the same direction. This force was destined to support Lieutenant Fleming, and to occupy Ryla ; while Major Lawrie, with the 2d battaUon of the 7th N. L from his position at Kalee, to the right, and Lieutenant-colonel Thomp- son, with the 2d battahon of the 3d N. L from General Ochterlony's head-quarters, were to lead each separate columns on Deothul, and two field- pieces were attached to the latter, for the defence of the position when occupied.* Two smaller detachments, one led by Captain Bowyer, and the other by Captain Showers, and consisting each of three companies, besides irregulars, were to move from opposite sides direct upon the Goorkha can- tonment, in order to create the diversion, above alluded to, in aid of the occupation of Deothul. * These two columns were to wait for daylight in the bed of the Ciumrora, in order that their ascent of the heights miuht be simultaneous. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 167 Ryla was occupied I)y Lieutenant Fleming in the course of the night of the 1 4th ; and at sight of the signal, by which it was preconcerted that notice o this event should be communicated, Captain Hamil- ton and Major Innes marched on the same point, and in the course of the morning established them- selves, without meeting any opposition. The signal being repeated from a conspicuous station behind the General's camp, the two columns under Colonel Thompson and Major Lawrie marched immediate- ly to the Gumrora, and waiting there till daylight, moved from opposite directions on Deothul. They just met at the last ascent, and pushed on together to seize the point, at about ten in the morning; when a contest commenced as severe as any in which our native troops have ever been engaged. As the head of the first column approached the sum- mit of Deothul, a picquet of not more than twenty or thirty Goorkhas charged fearlessly on the ad- vance-guard, and occasioned a check that was near proving fatal to the success of the movement. The exertions of the officers, however, particularly of Major Lawrie, restored the men to a sense of duty, and they advanced boldly and dislodged the enemy as well from Deothul as from other posts in the immediate neighbourhood. The day was spent in desultory fighting about the position ; and every exertion was made in the evening and during the night to throw up defences about Deothul, in the 168 NIPAL WAE. conviction that the struggle for the post had yet to come. The Goorkhas had been occupied during the day in opposing and pursuing the detachments of Captains Showers and Bowyer, which had thus completely succeeded in withdrawing theii* at- tention from the main object. The former officer marched from Rutungurh, and early in the day found himself within the stockades of the enemy. He was of a peculiarly chivalrous spirit, and thinking he had instilled the same ardour and fearlessness into his men, urged them to trust only to the bayonet, and in this view he commanded them not to load. As the column approached the cantonments, a body of Goorkhas came boldly down upon them ; when Captain Showers stepped forward to lead the projected charge : the sepoys, however, not being on ground where they could form readily, proved unequal to the trial, and the Captain was left alone to stand the shock. A personal combat ensued with the Goorkha chief and he was slain by the Captain, who happened to be an excellent swordsman. This brave officer was, however, shot dead immediately after, which com- pleted the confusion. The detachment fled pre- cipitately as far as Lag Village, and were pursued by the Goorkhas ; this spot being, however, open, the men were rallied by Lieutenant Rutledge; and having had time to load, offered a successful oppo- FIRST CAMPAIGN. . 169 sition, and again assumed the offensive.* Captain Bowyer, in the mean time, had marched from Kalee at daybreak, and reached the point assigned to him as a post of observation by seven in the morn- ing ; there he was attacked, and maintained him- self tiU noon ; when perceiving the entire failure of Captain Showers, and thus seeing the impossibility of converting the feint into any thing more bene- ficial, he commenced a retreat in the face of the enemy. The retreat was executed with field-day precision, one half of the detachment retiring to position, and the other following under cover of its fire. The Goorkhas, who had anticipated confu- sion, and the destruction of the column, continued engaged in a fruitless pursuit during a great part of the day, but could effect nothing beyond occasion- ing a few casualties. They were thus effectually drawn away from the more important post at Deothul, which was in the mean time occupied and secured, as we have before mentioned. The night was one of anxiety to both parties. Bhugtee Thapa, or more properly Bukhtyar Thapa, Umur Singh's best officer, saw from Soorujgurh the serious character of the operation intended ; he accordingly left that place, with a chosen band, to * The author of the Sketches of the Goorkha War states that the flight and pursuit were continued till arrested by the artillery of Rutungurh, which opened on the pursuers. 170 NIPAL WAR. take part in the struggle which impended. The absolute necessity of dislodging the British from Deothul, was but too apparent to Umur Singh and his council. There were, however, two com- plete battalions now established there, besides irregulars ; and two pieces of field artillery had been brought up and placed in position, to say nothing of the works hastily prepared. The elite of the Goorkha army were in this emergency col- lected ; and two thousand, more than could weU operate at once on the broken ground of the ridge, were placed under the personal command of Bhugtee Thapa, for the attack of Deothid next morning.* Umur Singh himself also resolved to appear in the field with his youngest son, the only one with him, in order to encourage and support the attack. Agreeably to the arrangement thus determined upon, the British position at Deothul was attacked at once on all sides where it was accessible, just at daybreak on the morning of the 16th of April- The Goorkhas came on with furious intrepidity, so much so, that several were bayoneted or cut to pieces within our works. Umur Singh stood aU * This officer assured Umur Singh that he would return victorious, or not at all ; and he gave notice to his two wives to prepare for their sutee, as he had little hope of surviving. They both sacrificed themselves on the funeral pile on which his body was burnt the next day. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 171 the while just within musquet range, with the Goorkha colours planted beside him ; while Bhug- tee was every where exciting the men to fm-ther efforts. The Goorkhas particularly aimed at gaining possession of our guns ; and directed their fire with so much effect against the artillery men, that at one time three officers, Lieutenant Cart- wright, Lieutenant Hutchinson of the engineers, and Lieutenant Armstrong of the pioneers, were, with one artiUery man, the only persons re- maining to serve them. The British commandant at Ryla, perceiving the desperate nature of the struggle at Deothul, sent a reinforcement, with am- munition, which arrived very opportunely. After a contest of two hours' continuance without inter- mission, the Goorkhas being observed to slacken their efforts, it was resolved to assume the offensive, and drive them back. Major Lawrie led this charge, and Bhugtee Thapa being killed in it, the enemy was every where put to flight, and the victory decided. There were two hundred and thirteen killed and wounded on the side of the British* ; and the enemy left above five hundred men on the ground about the post of Deothul. In the * Lieut. Bagot died of his wounds, and Major Lawrie was slightly hurt : Lieutenant Gabb, light battalion, and Ensign Dalgairns, of the 3d N, L were the other officers wounded in this part of the operations. 172 NIPAL WAR. course of the day they sent to request permission to seek the body of Bhugtee Thapa ; and it was found, covered with wounds, close to the foot of our defences. General Ochterlony ordered it to be wrapped in shawls, and delivered toUmur Singh, in order to testify the respect his bravery had excited. The total loss incurred in the operations of the 15th and 16th of April was, two officers, three Soobadars, four Naiks, and fifty-two Sepoys killed; and five* officers, one sergeant, and two hundred and eighty-seven men wounded. Taken altogether, this approached more nearly to a general action than any event that occurred in the campaign ; and it was a proud triumph to the officers of the Indian army, to have achieved so complete a victory on ground which gave such great advantages to the enemy, and with numbers so nearly equal, — for not one half of Sir David's army was engaged. The dispositions for the operation exhibited wonderful skill, and the precision with which the movement of the different detachments was cal- culated, reflects the greatest credit on those who collected the intelligence, and furnished the ma- terials on which the plan was combined. Lieu- tenant Lawtie of the engineers was the most * The only officer not already named, is Lieutenant Spel- lessy of the 7th N. I. attached to the detachment under Capt. Showers. FIRST CAMPAIGN. 173 valuable instrument of those to whose exertions the General was indebted on the occasion. This young officer had, as field-engineer, directed the operations of the late successful sieges, under Colonel Cooper ; and there had not been a move- ment or enterprize undertaken by the division, since it took the field, that had not benefited by his professional zeal, activity, and penetration. His ardour in examining all the routes by which the Maloun position was to be approached, with a view to provide against every possible contin- gency or mishap, led him into exertions that pro- duced a fever of which he died in the beginning of May * ; but he had the satisfaction of first seeing the completion of the triumph he so essen- tially contributed to secure. General Ochterlony, who considered nothing done while any thing remained, set himself im- mediately to prepare a road for heavy artillery to Deothul ; and to straiten Maloun, by closing his positions round it. The Goorkhas likewise concentrated themselves about Maloun, with- * General Ochterlony published a general order on the occasion of the death of this officer, in which he spoke in high commendation of his services and useful talents. The officers of the division, uniting in esteem of his great merit, went into mourning for him, and further subscribed for the erection of a marble monument to his memory ; which now stands in the cathedral church of St. John's at Calcutta : — a proud record to have been earned by so young an officer. 174 NIPAI. WAR. drawing their garrisons from all the positions on the further side of Deothul ; and even fi'om Soorujgurh, though a place of some strength. The evacuation of this post gave Lieutenant Murray an opportunity of showing his activity and vigilance, by intercepting and dispersing the garrison as it retired. By the end of the first week in May, a battery was raised against Maloun ; and news of the fall of Almora having reached the Goorkha camp, all the Surdars urged Umur Singh to accept terms for himself, and his son, Runjoor, at Jythuk. The old chief was, however, obstinate in refusing ; and endeavoured, with much earnestness, to persuade his men, that if they did but hold out till the approaching rains the British army would be obliged to withdraw. Seeing the pertinacity of his refusal, the Sur- dars began to desert with their men, until at last only about two hundred remained faithful to Umur Singh. With these he retired into the fortress of Maloun until- the batteries were in readiness to open on its walls. Yielding at last to his fate, this proud chief, on the 15th of May, signed a capitulation ; in which it was agreed that the Goorkha nation shoidd retire to the east of the Kalee or Gogra ; and resign to the British all the provinces from Kumaon westward. Run- joor Singh was, of course, included in these FIRST CAMPAIGN. 175 terms ; and the father and son, after giving or- ders for the surrender of all the remaining garri- sons, were safely conducted, with all who chose to accompany them, to the other side of the Kalee, as stij^ulated. Many of the Goorkha soldiers took service with the British ; and three battalions were, at the sug- gestion of Sir David Ochterlony, formed of them, and called Nuseeree battalions, A provincial corps was likewise raised for Kumaon civil duties, in order to allow a further opening for the employment of the military classes. Thus the campaign, which in January pro- mised nothing but disaster, finished in May by leaving in the possession of the British the whole tract of hills from the Gogra to the Sutlej. A very few words will suffice to explain the nature of the arrangements made for the occupation and management of this tract. Kumaon was made a province of the British territory, and the Honourable Edward Gardner was appointed commissioner, with full power for the administration of its affairs. The Doon was likewise retained, and annexed ultimately, to the Seharunpoor district. The remainder of the hill country was restored to the several Rajas and chiefs from whom Umur Singh had conquered it ; with exception to Subathoo, Raeengurh, Nahn, and one or two other places, which were made militaiy 176 NIPAL WAR. posts for the Nusecree battalions. The principle adopted was, to place all the chiefs in precisely the same condition as they stood with respect to each other before the appearance of the Goorkhas ; and to leave them each in the free enjoyment of his own, under the general pro- tection of the British government. The fol- lowing statement exhibits the names and relative importance of the principal chiefs, whom this ar- rangement placed in a state of protected depen- dence. Mr. Fraser, the Political Agent attached to the force of General Martindell, was, in the first instance, invested with the duty of intro- ducing this system ; and for that purpose, some time before the surrender of Jythuk, he under- took a journey into Gurhwal, and afterwards made a tour of the principal places in the hiUs, where he was instrumental in confirming the Rajas and Thakoors in the assm-ance of their security, and in reconciling them to the new state of things. Ultimately, Gm'hwal being re- stored to its Raja, the superintendence of the af- fairs of all the western chiefs was vested in Sir David Ochterlony ; on whose part a military As- sistant was appointed to reside at Subathoo. 177 NAMES OF THE RAJAS AND THAKOORS, AS ESTABLISHED AND TAKEN UNDER PROTECTION IN 1815, WITH AN ESTIMATE OF THEIR REVENUE. Rupees, Per Ann. Kuhlor, or Belaspoor, extending on both sicks of the Sutlej, but the eastern part only is guaranteed. Raja Mohachund - - - - 60000 Hinder, or Plaseea. Raja Ram Surun Sein. — Hill territory 15015; in the plains 30000 rupees - - - 45000 Sirmoor. — Nahn the capital. Futteh Prokash Singh, infant son of Kurum Pro- kash ; who was set aside for profligacy and ty- ranny, and died in 1816. Jounsur and Bhawur, two Pergunnas east of the Tonse, have been re- tained by the British - - - 80000 Busahur. — Capital Rampoor. Raja Muhindur Singh, a minor son of Oogur Singh, deceased ; Teekum Das is the Vizeer or manager. The Raja pays a tribute of 15000 rupees - 80000 Keonthul. This is the largest of the Bara Thakoraees ; Suba- thoo was reserved from it as a British station; and there being no family that had any claim to resto- ration, the territory was given to the Seikh Raja of Puteeala in reward for his services - - 40000 Bagul. — Capital Urkee. Rana (name vmknown) N 23247 178 Rupees, Per Ann. Joobul. Rana Poorun Cliund, with two subordinate chiefs, Danjee Vizeer, and Prem Singh Vizeer - 19100 Besides some minor chiefs, of less than 5000 rupees per annum. Gurhwal, west of the Alknundra. Raja Sheeo Dursun Sah, to whom, with exception to the Dehra Doon, and territory east of the Alk- nundra, valued altogether at about 60000 rupees, the rest of the province was restored. - 40000 179 179 CHAPTER V. NIPAL — NEGOTIATIONS.— SECOND CAMPAIGN, AND PEACE. 1815-16, Disposition of the Goorkha chiefs — Overture for Peace — Governor-general's terms — Cession of Turaee refused, and negotiation broken off by the Goorkhas — Preparations — Fresh overtures — Demand modified — Hesitation of the Goorkhas — Negotiations — Treaty signed — Further concessions meditated — Ratification refused at Katmandoo — Reflections — General Ochterlony takes the field — Plan of operations — Chooreea Ghatee pass turned — The General arrives before Mukwanpoor — Battle of Seekhurkutree — Colonel Kelly's march to Hureehurpoor — Battle there — Submission of the Nipalese — Ratification of the former Treaty — Liberality of the British Government — Sikhim- putee Raja received under protection — Objects proposed — Goorkha representations at Pekin — Arrival of a Chinese Minister at Digurchee — his proceedings there, and letter to the Governor-general — The Raja of Niplil dies of the smallpox. ^iCr^ In hazarding a breach with the Britisli govern- ment, the Goorkhas had never s}Deculated on rousing it to such exertions as they witnessed in the N 2 180 NIPAL WAK. first campaign. Notwithstanding their early suc- cesses, therefore, they very soon repented of the rash measures by which they had brought them- selves into so hopeless a contest. Even when at the height of their prosperity, the immensity of the preparations, and the perseverance of their enemy, convinced them their cause was despe- rate ; and they would wiUingly have given up every object in dispute, could they by that means have brought the war to an honourable termina- tion. They were prepared also for some sacrifices, if such should be required. It appears from an intercepted letter,* addressed by Umur Singh to the Raja, on the 2d of March, 1815, that imme- diately on the fall of Nalapanee he was consulted as to the pohcy of giving up the Dehra Doon, and the hilly tract west of the Jumna, in addition to the contested lands on the Sarun and Gourukpoor frontiers. That chief's opinion was adverse to any cession of hill territory. Though vested, therefore, with power to negotiate on this footing, if the plan had met his approval,! he never indi- * Vide this letter Appendix A. f Some overtures were made to General Ochterlony by Umur Singh, with the view of discovering the extent of the demands of the British. When the latter, however, found that they included the cession of a considerable tract of the hill country, he proudly replied, " That from the Sutlej to the Teesta, the Goorkalees would dispute every inch of the NEGOTIATIONS. iSI cated to General Ochterlony any disposition to treat on such a basis. Upon the conquest of Kumaon, the Goorkha governor of that province, Bum Sah, a man of some consideration in the state, expressed much desire to be the means of re-establishing the former relations between the two powers; and the occasion was taken of assuring the court of Katmandoo, through him, that the British government enter- tained a reciprocal anxiety to restore the ancient good understanding. After the campaign had closed so triumphantly for us, the desire of peace seemed to have increased at the capital of Nipal. Most of the chiefs ap- peared to have become sensible that their confidence of security in the niggedness of their mountains, was a vain illusion ; and although a considerable faction still maintained their hostile disposition, all parties united in the wish to discover on what terms peace would be granted. Accordingly, in mountains ; and if driven from them, would then retire to the confines of China. This country," he added, " is not rich in men and money, like Bengaland Hindoostan ; but it contains a race, of which not a man, while the soul remains in his body, will submit to become like the Rajas of the plains, with all their wealth and luxuries." Umur Singh finally refused to hold further communication with the British gene- ral, while he allowed the vakeels of tlic hill Rajas to remain in attendance. 182 NIPAL WAR. May 1815, Gooroo Gujraj Misur, the family priest of the Raja, was sent down from Katman- doo with full powers under the red seal, and with instructions to negotiate with Major Bradshaw, the British political agent in that quarter, an entire adjustment of all diflferences. This overture was met by an unreserved dis- closure of the sacrifices which Lord Hastings con- ceived himself to be now justified in demanding. They were — 1st, The perpetual cession of all the hill country taken in the campaign, viz. from the Kalee westward; 2dly, A like cession of the entfre Turaee, from the foot of the outer hills along the whole line of the remaining territory of the Goork- has ; 3dly, The relinquishment by the Goorkhas of the footing they had gained in the temtory of the Sikhim Raja, and the surrender to that chief of the stockaded forts of Nagree and Nagurkot ; and, finally, The reception of a Resident, with the usual escort and establishment, at Katmandoo, and the customary stipulation not to receive or give service to Europeans without the special sanction of government. Major P. Bradshaw stated to the Gooroo that he could not negotiate except on this basis; and the Gooroo declaring he had no authority to treat for any cession in the Tvu'aee, excepting the dis- puted tracts, the overture was broken off, and Gujraj Misur returned to Katmandoo. NEGOTIATIONS. 183 From a hope that other negotiators iniglit be more accommodating, the Goorkha court em- powered Bum Sah to make a second overture to the Honourable E. Gardner, who was now Civil Commissioner for the management of the province of Kumaon. That officer had been instructed as to the manner in which such an overture was to be received. Accordingly, the I'eply to Bum Sah being similar in every respect to that made to the Gooroo, the negotiation in that quarter was simi- larly broken off. In the mean time, the army, which had been collected on the Sarun frontier, was cantoned to the north of the Ganges, or at Dinapoor, the can- tonment of Patna, and was kept in a state of equipment to be ready to take the field imme- diately the favourable season should return. The Marquess of Hastings, thinking that a se- cond campaign might be inevitable, determined on so conducting it as to humble the proud spirit of the Gooi'kha chiefs ; or, if that were impossiljle, to crush this ambitious and aspiring nation for ever. Prei^aration was made for penetrating with a brigade from Kumaon, where Lieutenant-colonel J. W. Adams, a most excellent and steady officer, had succeeded Colonel Nicolls ; whUe the latter was to operate against the Bootwul and Palpa frontier, with the army of Major-general J. S. ^Vood, considerably reinforced. Major-general 184 NIPAL WAR. Ochterlony was at the same time to be summoned from the north-west, to take the command of the Sarun troops, which were destined to penetrate into the valley of Nipal. Although provision was thus made for pushing the war with vigour, the efforts of the govern- ment to reestablish peace were not relaxed ; for many powerful considerations made this much the most desirable consummation at the juncture. It was with satisfaction, therefore, government learnt that the negotiation was re-opened by the Gooroo, who came again into the Turaee, in August, for the purpose. The Marquess of Hastings had, in the interim, ascertained that a main objection to the reUnquishment of the Turaee was, that most of the principal officers of the Goorkha court had Jageers there. Accordingly, to reconcile them to the cession, and to show that the British govern- ment did not desire it from any avaricious motive, his Lordship authorised his negotiator to tender the amount of the estimated revenue in stipends, to be at the distribution of the court of Katmandoo, The annual assignment thus sanctioned amounted to between two and three lacks of rupees, and his Lordship justly considered that a permanent peace was worth this sacrifice. The Gooroo was made acquainted with the li- beral disposition of the government ; but, after some consideration, he again broke off the nego- NEGOTIATIONS. 185 tiation in September ; declaring that the Goorkha chiefs would never accede to a cession of the whole Tiu'aee, which was the main som'ce of their subsistence ; the hills themselves being com- paratively unproductive. The Marquess of Hastings, having maturely weighed the matter, resolved to proceed a step further for the re-estabUshment of peace. It seemed evident, from what had passed, that no advantage offered in any other shape would com- pensate to the Goorkha government for the entire loss of the Turaee and forests under the hills. That court's repugnance to the cession was ascer- tained to be owing to the high estimate of the pecuniary value of the territory which was en- tertained by the chiefs, rather than to any feeling of pride or objection to the humiliation of the step. The reception of a resident was the article most offensive to them on this score ; but this had been insisted on as a sine qua non, and, find- ing there was no hope of procuring a change, the Goorkhas had conceded the point. The Turaee was, therefore, the only question remaining for discussion. For the last year that the British authorities had held the greater part of the tract, its management had been found very troublesome and expensive ; and the chmate was so noxious as to render the continuance in it of troops, and even of civil officers, impracticable for a large 186 NIPAL WAR. portion of the year. To us, therefore, the ac- cession of territory promised little advantage, but much trouble and difficulty in the maintenance of the rights and privileges whence the revenue was derived. The demand of the cession, it is to be observed, chiefly originated in a desire, by exclu- sion of the Nipalese from any interest in the low- lands, to take away the source of future conten- tion ; and, at the same time, to inflict an appro- priate punishment for the encroachments, and other acts of violence and insult, which had brought on the war ; — the hope of profit in the tract formed no part of the motives which in- fluenced the British government. Balancing the acquisition of the above objects, therefore, against the advantage of a restoration of peace, Lord Hastings finally determined to relax the rigour of the original terms ; and a treaty was drafted, which the British negotiator was desu'ed to pre- sent openly to the Gooroo, in case of his expected re-appear an ere, accompanied by a declaration that it contained the British ultimatum. In the draft, the Turaee, from the Kalee, or western Gogra, to the Gunduk, was all that was insisted on ; and of the rest, so much only as was in our actual pos- session. Stipends to the extent of two lacks of rupees were still offered to be placed at the distri- bution of the com't, in compensation for the re- NEGOTIATIONS. 187 tained lands, and the draft contained a stipulation to this effect. As was expected, the Raj Gooroo again souglit out Major Bradshaw; and on this occasion Chun- dur Seekur Opadheea, who, at the close of the campaign, had been allowed to return to Katman- doo, was associated with him. The drafted treaty was shown to them, when both declared that they coidd not venture to accede to the terms, even as altered, without first submitting the draft to tlie court. They engaged, however, that a definitive answer should arrive in fifteen days, and for- warded a copy of the proposed treaty to Kat- mandoo for the purpose. The term expired without their receiving any reply; and the nego- tiators, being unable to redeem their pledge, begged submissively that the negotiation might not be broken off, until they should themselves go to Katmandoo to ascertain the cause. The Gooroo, at the same time, offered to sign the treaty, if the portion of Turaee in the British occupation, viz. that lying between the Gunduk and Koosa, were substituted for the offered sti- pends. This was refused, and the negotiators took their leave on the 29th of October, pro- mising to return in twelve days, with the treaty signed. The supreme government, on hearing of the 188 NIPAL WAll. continued reluctance of the Nipfilese, called on the authorities in charge of the contiguous dis- tricts, to state their opinion as to the value of the several portions of the Turaee, and the means of obtaining a good frontier line, by the retention of part only of what had been occupied ; thus pre- paring itself to make some further gratuitous concessions, either in lieu of the stipends, or in addition to them, in order the better to gratify the Goorkha chiefs, and leave them in a dispo- sition to execute and maintain the treaty when signed. In the mean time the Raj Gooroo Gujraj Misur came down again from Katmandoo, and signed the treaty according to the original draft. This was done at Segoulee, on the 28th of November, 1815. The supreme government, on being aj)prised of the event, fired the usual sa- lutes, and ratified the treaty on the 9th of De- cember, with due solemnity. It was determined, notwithstanding, to make the further concessions contemplated ; and it was considered fortunate that the execution of the treaty without them, would yet more decidedly mark the act as a gra- tuitous bounty towards a fallen and suppliant foe. The conciliatory effect of the boon on the Sirdars would likewise, it was conceived, be enhanced by their not feeling themselves indebted for it to NEGOTIATIONS. 189 their own obstinacy eitlier in war or negotia- tion. In the confidence of its own liberal views to- wards the Nipalese, the British goveniment never doubted the sincerity of the enemy. The very earnestness of their opposition in the course of the negotiation, seemed to show that the accept- ance of the proffered terms was the deliberate act of the court ; and though their assent was unwilling and tardy in the extreme, still this seemed to be fully accounted for by being attri- buted to the reluctance with which they enter- ed into engagements they felt to be inviolable. Adopting this view, the Governor-general reckon- ed that so soon as his further intentions for the benefit of the nation should be made known, the partial discontent which existed would give place to general satisfaction ; and that all parties would be thankful for the restoration of peace. In this impression, the government hesitated not to suspend the preparations which had hitherto been actively making for a second campaign ; and the commissariat officers, in their zeal for economy, went beyond the bounds of due discre- tion, and discharged a great j^art of the establish- ments which had been entertained for tlie trans- port of stores, selling also much of the grain which had been collected in the frontier depots. Of this precipitancy there was soon reason to 190 NIPAL WAR. repent. It was a stipulation of the treaty that tlie ratification under the red seal should he de- livered to Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw in fifteen days. The period expired, and no ratification came ; moreover, it was ascertained, in the course of the month of December, that after several very animated discussions at the court of Katmandoo, the war faction had again prevailed over that which favoured the Gooroo, and his late nego- tiations. Hence a renewal of hostilities was all that could be looked for ; though it was, of course, expected to be the policy of the Goorkhas to waste as much of the season of action as possible, by amusing us with fresh offers to negotiate. In order to anticipate such an attempt, and to show the serious light in which the past conduct of the court of Katmandoo was regarded. Sir David Ochterlony was forthwith ordered into the field, and every possible exertion was made to furnish the stores and establishments requisite to give efficiency to his army. A letter was also written to the Raja of Nipal, complaining of his want of faith, and warning him of the approach of the British army. He was told, however, that the consequences might yet be averted, by send- ing the treaty, duly ratified, to meet the General in the Turaee. A word or two may be required, in order to explain the motives which seemed at this time to NEGOTIATIONS. 191 influence the Goorkha councils. The non-ratifica- tion of the treaty of Segoulee has not, ordinarily, been attributed to any settled plan of deceit prac- tised on the British government ; but it must be admitted, that the time of the Raj Gooroo's signing, which was just that at which the army would otherwise have taken the field, is a very suspicious circumstance. There seems reason, however, to believe that the Raj Gooroo was himself sincere, and that the disavowal of his act was the result of a divided sentiment amongst the chiefs; part of whom strenuously advocated the necessity of accepting the terms offered, while others as violently opposed the measure. The veteran Umur Singh, and his sons, who had recently arrived at the capital, were amongst the warmest partisans of the war. Some notion of the proud spirit which actuated this chief may be formed from the intercepted letter written by him in March 1815, when he himself was closely beset on every side by the army of General Och- terlony, against which he felt he could make no head. As the document is highly characteristic, and shows the hopes which buoyed up the war faction in their determination to persevere, rather than submit to what they deemed the first step to subjection, it may not be out of place to give it at length, though it has already been more than once before the public. The letter will be found, there- 192 NIPAL WAR. fore, in an Appendix, being too voluminous for the compass of a note. The points most dwelt upon are the following : First — That a treaty concluded after defeat could not be trusted to, as the British, knowing the terms to be conceded through fear, would pre- sume upon the weakness of the nation, and seek new causes of quarrel, until its absolute subjuga- tion was effected. Secondly — That the constitution of the Goorkha power, which held several subordinate Rajas and nations in unwilling subjection, would afford the British numberless occasions of interference; and that they would thus by intrigue, during peace, effectually weaken and undermine the dominion established. Thirdly — The danger of allowing a Resident to be permanently fixed at Katmandoo, is particu- larly dwelt upon as likely to lead to the intro- duction of a subsidiary force, and to prove a preli- minary step to absolute subjection. Fourthly — The advantage of manful resistance, as opposed to concession and submissiveness, is strongly urged, from the prosperity enjoyed by the Bhurtpoor Raja since his successful defence of that fortress, contrasted with the utter ruin by which Tippoo Sooltan was overtaken, after the conces- sions made by him to effect the peace signed by Lord Corn wallis in 1790. NEGOTIATIONS. 193 The remainder of this curious letter contains an exaggerated view of the resources of the nation : — first, in the courage of its troops, and the natural strength of the country ; and secondly, in the sup- port to be expected from the ill-affected allies of the British in Hindoostan, and eventually from the Chinese, to whom an immediate application for assistance in money is strongly recommended. Assuming this letter to contain a fair statement of the sentiment of those who advocated the con- tinuance of war, it would seem that suspicion of the ulterior views of the British was a main ingre- dient of their present disposition. It is certain, however, that independently of such a suspicion, the events of the past campaign in the Turaee, east of the Gogra, had filled many of the chiefs with the most presumptuous confidence in the strength of the barrier opposed by the forests and hills, which skirted their eastern temtories, and that the occurrences to the west had very partially removed this feeling. From the Gogra to tlie Koosee, on a line of near eight hundred miles, the British armies had been whoUv baffled ; and though superior in force to those which achieved the conquests of the west, had not even ventured to cross the forest. Hence, the Goorkhas felt assured that they might persevere in the war with impunity, so long as they kept the passes of tlie first range guarded; and, under this impression, they saw no o 194 NIPAL WAR. reason why they should assent to a permanent re- linquishment of their independence, by receiving a Resident ; or give up the ambitious hope of reco- vering some part of their lost territory in the hills. In this state of the public feeling at Katmandoo, the treaty of Segoulee was, as we have before related, finally rejected by the chiefs; and every precaution taken to fortify and render impregna- ble the passes through the first range of hills. The principal route into the vaUey of Nipal is by the Bicheea-Koh pass, which by distinction is called the Chooreea Ghatee, or main pass over the Choorea hiUs. Other minor passes have occasionally the same name applied to them, or at least to that part of the route by them which leads over the same range. The grand pass, however, is, as before stated, by Bicheea Koh ; and this the Goorkhas de- fended by three successive fortifications ; the last of which was absolutely impregnable : all the other known routes were similarly defended ; and in this manner the Goorkhas awaited the arrival of General Sir David Ochterlony, leaving him the jDassage of the forest altogether free. The British army was already in motion to the Turaee, when towards the beginning of February, it was met by Gujraj Misur, with a formal inti- mation of the determination of the Nipalese to recommence the war. Sir D. Ochterlony had a SECOND CAMPAIGN. 195 force of near twenty thousand effective men, in- cluding three European regiments, his Majesty's 24th, 66th, and 87th. He divided this force into four brigades : giving Colonel Kelly, of the 24th, one ; Lieutenant-colonel Nicol, of the 66th, another; Lieutenant-colonel Miller, of the 87th, a third ; while the fourth was commanded by Colonel Dick, who has before been mentioned. Colonel Kelly, with his brigade and regiment, were detached to the right by Bhugwanpoor, with orders to penetrate, if possible, by Hureehurpoor ; Lieutenant-colonel Nicol was similarly directed on Ramnugur, to the left ; while General Ochter- lony, with the other two brigades, moved straight through the forest, l^y Simlabassa, to the foot of the Bicheea Koh pass. On the 10th of February, 1816, the General established himself at a kind of caravanseray at the outlet of the pass, and at a short distance from the enemy's first stockade. The seray was quickly converted into a dep6t ; and the opposite works having been reconnoitered, and found unassailable, information was sought with earnestness as to the possibility of turning the pass jjy some route un- known to tlie enemy. After four days thus spent, without interruption of any kind from the Goorkha army, a route was discovered by Captain Pickersgill, of the Quarter- master-general's department; and on the 14th, at o 2 196 NIPAL WAR. nine at night, Colonel Miller's brigade was led by the General in person through a deep and narrow ravine, called Baleekola, which brought the de- tachment to a water-course, leading to a steep acclivity, by which the first formidable barrier of hills was to be scaled. The march was continued during the whole night, and by seven in the morn- ing, the Choorea heights, to the west of the enemy's positions, were occupied without resistance. In the course of the 1 5th, the brigade advanced about five miles to the Chukree Mukree Nulla, and there bivouacked for four days, waiting the arrival of its supplies and tents, for no laden animal had been able to accompany the troops. For the first two days the men suffered the gi'eatest privations, being for the most part without food. Their hardships were participated, in a great measure, by the General himself,^who had no baggage, and slept under cover of a hut, hastily constructed for him by the men of the 87th, of boughs cut from the green trees. All this, how- ever, was submitted to with cheerfulness by both men and officers, in the conviction that the object of the movement was gained. On the morning following that of the General's march. Colonel Dick moved up close to the enemy's outer stockade ; and, in the course of the following day, found the triple fortification evacuated by the Goorkhas, in SECOND CAMPAIGN. 197 consequence of the success of the operation for turnmg the position. By the 20th of February, the roads were pre- pared for a further advance; and the two brigades met again at Etounda, on the banks of the Raptee, which here runs in a valley remarka])ly pictu- resque and beautiful. After a halt to establish a second depot, the Major-general marched again on the 27th, moving up the valley to Mukwanpoor, under which place he encamped in the evening, at a village called Chougurha Mundee. Mukwanpoor is situated on a low ridge, which lay to the north of the encampment, stretching from west to east. The town and fort were to the east opposed to oui' right, and on the other extremity was a village named Seekhur Kutree, which was also occupied by the enemy on the General's first appearance under the position. For some unknown reason, the Goorkhas with- drew their men from Seekhur Kutree next morn- ing, which being observed by the British General, he immediately detached four companies and forty Europeans to seize the point. Captain Pickersgill accompanied them, and was proceeding to occupy some other points along the ridge, when he per- ceived a large force of the enemy ascending the northern side of the hill, so as to cut him off from Seekhur Kutree, which he had just left. He made good his retreat down the southern declivity 198 NIPAL WAR. into camp, while the Goorkhas advanced against the posts which had jjeen occupied. They had recovered all but the village itself, and the men there had lost their commanding officer, Lievite- nant Tirrell,* and were beginning to feel the want of ammunition, when the 25th N. I. which Gene- ral Ochterlony had kept under arms prepared for any exigency, came opportunely to their relief, accompanied by the flank companies of the 87th. 'The post was now secured, and dispositions made to maintain it ; but the Goorkhas, unwilling to relinquish the advantage, poured a force of two thousand men from the stockade near Mukwan- poor, and showed a determination to recover the village at all hazards. Sir David Ochterlony, seeing that the contest was becoming every in- stant more serious, detached the 2d battalion of the 12th N. I. with four more companies of the 87th, under the command of Colonel Miller, to support the troops at Seekhur Kutree ; and turahig out his line, he further ordered the artil- * This officer was Adjutant of the 1st battalion of the 20th, or Marine Regiment, but was at the time doing duty with the 2d battalion of the 25th, having left his staff situa- tion to seek distinction in the active service of this campaign. He had only joined by Dak a day or two before. The post was maintained after the fall of Lieutenant Tirrell, by Lieute- nant Kerr and Ensign Impey, who were publicly thanked in general orders for the service. SECOND CAMPAIGN. 199 lery to play on the different bodies of the enemy as they passed along the ridge to the attack. The Goorkhas seeing this, opened also their guns at Mukwanpoor, turning them at first against the advancing parties, and subsequently on the camp and line where Sir David and his staff were a con- spicuous object.* In the mean time, the junction of the reinforcement enabled the force at Seekhur Kutree to advance on the enemy ; and the Eu- ropeans leading, a charge was made, which drove the Goorkhas beyond a hollow separating this part of the ridge from Mukwanpoor. Detached parties of the enemy, however, stiQ cowered down in the jungul on the ridge, and kept up a very destruc- tive, though desultory fire on our posts ; they brought also some guns to the opposite side of the hollow, and thus continued to annoy us during the whole day.f Towards the afternoon, Sir David * A menial servant of the General's, who carried his pen and ink, was killed by this fire ; but, in other respects, it did remarkably little execution. t In the duty of this day many officers found great ad- vantage in the use of their double-barrelled fowling-pieces, with the skill acquired by practice in the sports of the field. The officer who commanded the light conipany of the 25th N. I. was particularly distinguished for the certainty with which he anticipated the aim of the Goorkha light troops, who ordinarily lay secure under a rock, presenting nothing except just at the moment of firing. Ensign Shipp, of his 200 NIPAL WAR. Ochterlony despatched to Colonel INIiller a fresh battaUon, the 2d of the 8th N. L, to enable him to finish the action, if possible, before sunset. The battalion, upon its .arrival, was conducted by Major Nation across the hollow ; and advancing with charged bayonets, captiued the nearest of the enemy's guns : after which, the Goorkhas retired within their fort and stockades, leaving their dead and wounded at our mercy. The Goorkhas were, in this action, led by Shumsheer Rana, the chief who commanded the attack on Captain Sibley's post at Pursa in the previous campaign. Their whole force was en- gaged in the course of the day, and the defeat was signal ; their loss in killed and wounded having, by their own acknowledgment, exceeded eight hundred men. Of the British, forty-five were killed, including eleven men of the 87th ; and one hvmdred and seventy-five wounded, in- cluding nineteen Europeans, and Lieutenant and Adjutant P. Young, of the 2d battahon 12th Majesty's 87th, was noticed for a personal encounter with a Goorkha chief, in the face of both armies. He was a capital swordsman, but his weapon broke early in the conflict, where- upon, he threw it away, and trusting to his activity, closed with the Goorkha, and wrenchinghis sword from him, laid him lifeless with a back-handed stroke. — Feats of this kind are not the proper duty of officers, but when they occur are very encouraging to the troops; for the union of personal prowess with gallantry and success will always command admiration. SECOND CAMPAIGN. 201 N. I. Lieutenant Tirrell was the only officer kiUed. Colonel Nicol, with his brigade, joined the Major-general on the day after the action ; having successfully penetrated into the valley of the Raptee, by a pass to the north of Ramnugur, and having marched thence up the valley without meeting any opposition. The Colonel left a strong detachment of two battalions in position at Ekoor, under Major Lumley, to maintain the communication by this route, and keep the valley free of the enemy. In the mean time Colonel Kelly, who had orders to penetrate by Hvu'eehurpoor, succeeded likewise in finding a route by which he entered the hiUs without opposition, and penetrated to that fortress. His march was, however, much impeded by the difficulties of the ground ; and it was the 27 th of February before he reached Rutunpoor, a village on the left bank of the Bag- mutee, a few miles to the south of the fort. He immediately made from hence a strong re- connoisance ; and finding the post to be unas- sailable from the south, he resolved on crossing the Bagmutee and advancing to Joorjoor, a vil- lage to the west of Hureehurpoor, whence the approach seemed more easy. This movement was effected on the 29th of February. The principal stockade of the enemy was about one 202 NIPAI. WAR. thousand yards to the west of Hureehurpoor, crowning the ridge in a semicircular form, and commanding the valley of the Bagmutee. On the Colonel's first arrival at Joorjoor, he observed an eminence at about eight hundred yards dis- tance from this stockade, which the enemy had left unoccupied. He, accordingly, next morning, before daybreak, detached his light companies, under Captain (Brevet-major) Hughes, of his Majesty's 24th, supported by seven battaHon- companies, under Lieutenant-colonel O'HoUoran, to seize the point. This detachment ascended, and quickly established itself, driving off a pic- quet of the enemy it found there ; no sooner, however, was it well in position, than the whole force of the Goorkhas came on to the attack ; and Colonel O'Holloran had to sustain an un- equal fight from six in the morning until half-past eleven, exposed on every side to the fire of the enemy. At length a strong reinforcement ar- rived, with two 6-pounders, and two howitzers on elephants. The enemy was then driven back with considerable loss, and the attempt on the position was not repeated *. The Goorkhas, in- * The British loss consisted of four Europeans and four Natives, killed; five officers, — Captain Lindsay, artillery; Captain (Brevet-major) Hughes, Captain Smith, and Lieute- nant O'Leary, of his Majesty's 24th ; Lieutenant De Voeux, SECOND CAMPAIGN. 203 deed, although their first attack was vigorous and obstinate, did not evince, on this occasion, quite so much bravery as was expected from the repu- tation of their commander ; who was no other than Runjoor Singh, the defender of Jythuk. He had with him also a choice band of his associates in that defence, whom he had distinguished by crescents on their turbans, and by the pompous title of ' Band of the Moon.' Runjoor was him- self one of the first to leave the field ; and his conduct in the action, and in subsequently aban- doning his post, tarnished his bright name, and brought him into permanent disgrace at the court of Katmandoo. The fort of Hureehurpoor was evacuated in the night after this affair ; and Colonel Kelly, having converted it into a depot, was preparing for a further advance, when he received the General's orders to retrace his steps. The news of the first defeat at Mukwanpoor, spread consternation at Katmandoo ; and without waiting for intelligence of the event at Huree- hurpoor, the court immediately resolved on an attempt to deprecate further vengeance by un- qualified submission. The red seal was affixed in haste to the treaty of Segoulee ; and an envoy sent to the camp of General Ochterlony, to notify Chumparun Light Infantry; twenty-three Europeans, and twenty-five Natives, wounded. 204 NIPAL WAR. that it was ready for delivery. The messenger brought a letter from Bukhtawur Singh, the Goorkha commander, requesting permission to send the instrument by Chundur Seekur Opa- dheea, who was stated to have come to Mukwan- poor for the purpose. The General returned for answer, that the Goorkhas must not expect the same terms now, as before the re-commencement of hostihties ; but that he had no objection to receive the Opadheea if he came with full powers. At the same time the approaches were pushed on to within five hundred yards of Mukwanpoor, and a battery was made ready against the place. Chundur Seekur madej his appearance in camp on the 3rd of March, and earnestly entreated the General to accept the ratified treaty. Sir David had been vested with full powers to use his own discretion, in the acceptance of the former terms, or in advancing fvuther demands, according as circumstances and the state of the season might prompt ; but he was not to conclude a treaty until the enemy were sufficiently humbled to make it safe to rely on their sincerity. This period seemed to Sir David to have now arrived ; and in order to put their humifity to the test, it was explained to Chvmdur Seekur, that the letter of the treaty would give to the British all the territory in their occupation, and would now, therefore, include the valley of the SECOND CAMPAIGN. 205 Raptee, as well as Hetounda and Hureelmrpoor. At the same time the Opadheea was assured that he must no longer expect any concession beyond the letter, and he was called upon to give a spe- cific note in writing, declaratory of his being in- fluenced by no such hopes, and further to engage that the Raja should specifically confirm the de- claration in a letter to the Governor-general. To all this the Goorkha negotiator readily as- sented ; and he agreed, moreover, to present the ratified treaty on his knees at the General's durbar, in the presence of all the Vakeels in camp. This solemnity having passed, the General con- cluded the treaty, and despatched Lieutenant Boileau of his staff to act as Resident at Katman- doo, until the Governor-general should nominate a proper officer. He prepared, also, for his own return ; but did not finally leave the hills until he received the orders for the surrender of the forts of Nagree and Nagurkot to the Raja of Sikhim, and had ascertained that they would be duly executed. Lord Hastings was much pleased with the result to which Major-general Ochterlony had thus brought the campaign in so short a space of time ; more particularly so, because the late period at which the operations had unavoidably been un- dertaken, after the interruption to the preparations. 206 NIPAL WAR. which occurred in November and December, had made him apprehensive of the arrival of the unhealthy season before there would be time effec- tually to humble the enemy. Sir David himself, too, had discovered that the capture of Mukwan- poor would be the limit of what could be effected this campaign ; for he found it would not be safe to keep the troops in that valley after the mid- dle of March ; this, therefore, was not the least powerful of the motives which influenced him in granting the terms. The articles of the treaty were all punctually executed, according to agreement.* The supreme government thought, notwithstanding what had passed, that it would be a politic act of conciliation to give up such of the Turaee as might not be re- quired to form a straight and even frontier, in lieu of the pensions stipulated in the treaty. The Marquess of Hastings, therefore, after every article had been executed, gave notice to the Raja of his intention to send the Honourable E. Gardner to Katmandoo, as Resident, and to empowerer him to conclude a new arrangement on that basis. This was subsequently effected, after a boundary had been surveyed and marked with pillars of masonry, to prevent the possibility of any future disputes between the Nipalese officers and our Zemindars. * Vide Treaty, Appendix C. SECOND CAMPAIGN. 207 The part of the Turaee which skirted the Oiidh dominions was, however, retained, and with Khy- reegurh, a perguna of Rohilkhund, lying on the Oudh side of the Gogra, was made over to the Nuwab Vizeer, in extinction of the second loan of a crore of rupees obtained from him during the war. With the Sikhimputee Raja a treaty was con- cluded by Major Latter, at Titaleea, on the 10th of Februaiy, 1817,* in which, amongst other articles, there is one guaranteeing the possessions of the Raja to himself and his family; — a small stripe of the Turaee also, lying between the Mich,hee and the Teesta, (part of what was retained under the final arrangements concluded with Nipal), was ceded to this Raja for a line of communication. The policy of this guarantee cannot be doubted. Its effect has been to shut out the Nipalese from any ambitious views of aggrandizement to the east, and to circumscribe their territory on three sides by the British power, while on the fourth, the stupendous range of the Heemalaya, and the Chinese frontier, present an effectual barrier. Thus, while the British and Chinese empires con- tinue in their present strength, the hope of extending their dominion must be extinguished, and the military spirit, which was fostered by the * See Appendix D. 208 NIPAL WAK. series of victories gained over the surrounding Rajas, must die away for want of employment. It only now remains to state the nature of the relations subsisting between the government of Nipal, and the Celestial Empire, and the result of the ai)plication made to Pekin for assistance, during the campaign of 1814-15. In the first government of Lord Cornwallis, the Goorkhas having invaded Tibet, and plundered the palace of the Teeshoo Lama, at Jigurchee or Digurchee, a Chinese army was sent to punish them. The Goorkhas retired before it, but con- trived to maintain themselves for some time with- out much loss. This produced an overture from the Chinese commander, that the British should co-operate in a simultaneous attack on Nipal. The proposition was not favourably received ; and the Chinese, having changed their General, gained an im- portant victory in the Tingree desert, and thus succeeded at last in reducing the Goorkhas to submission. From that time Nipal has been con- sidered by the Chinese as a tributary country ; and though nothing is demanded beyond some nominal offerings, still a legation proceeds every three years from Katmandoo, to renew the as- surances of allegiance and good faith. On the war breaking out with the British, the Nipalese represented to the court of Pekin that NIPAL AND CHINA. 209 the difference had arisen in consetiuence of our having demanded the passes through the Heema- chul, which they, as faithful allies, had refused to give. The Chinese attached no credit to the representation, until they received, through theu' own officers at Lassa, a long manifesto ; which the Supreme Government, knowing the relations which existed between Katmandoo and the Celes- tial Empire, thought it expedient to forward in explanation of the real cause of war. The Chinese now argued that there might pro- bably be some truth in what the Goorkhas had represented of our ambitious views, as so much pains was taken to disavow, or, as they conceived, to disguise them. Accordingly, it was determined by the Court of Pekin that a force should immedi- ately be directed to the quarter menaced ; and that one of the most confidential ministers, and a military man, should proceed to ascertain the state of things in Nipal. So slow were the Chinese in executing their de- termination, that the war was actually over before their army was heard of at Katmandoo. In Sep- tember 1816, however, the Governor-general re- ceived, through the Sikhim Raja, a letter, written in scarcely intelligible Persian, from a person styling himself Shee Cheeoon Chang, Vizeer, or Prime Minister, with whom were associated the chief authority of Lassa, and another principal P 210 NIPAI, AND CHINA. officer of the frontier. The object of the letter was, to ask distinctly what were the views of the British government in that direction,* and to state how they had been misrepresented. In the course of the same month, the Goorkhas, having heard that a Chinese force had arrived at Digurchee, or Jigurchee, in August, applied directly to the Resi- dent to know whether, in case the Chinese de- manded any further submission beyond what had already been acceded to, they might depend on the co-operation of the British in resisting them. In this state of things, the Supreme Government forbad any assurance of support being given to the Nipalese, lest it should encourage them in seeking cause of quarrel with the Chinese. The Governor-general also communicated a statement of all that had occurred, in reply to the letter which had been received through the Sikhim Raja. With this answer the Chinese authorities professed themselves satisfied, in so far as the British were concerned : they demanded, however, that some confidential agents from Nipal should wait upon them; and the following account of what * The Bengal government had furnished the Com- pany's officers at Canton with a full explanation of all that passed ; but the Chinese cautiously avoided any allusion to the Nipal war in their official communications with the select committee there. NIPAL AND CHINA. 211 passed at the interview, was obtained afterwards from a Cashmeerian of the suite. The first visit was one of pure ceremony ; but the Goorkha Vakeels, Dilbunjun Pande and Co- lonel Runbeer Singh Thapa, waited again on Cheeoon Chang on the following day, when his Excellency commenced by asking, " What had become of the Pandes and Bishnawuths ?" (leaders of the expedition into Tibet before alluded to ;) and he added, " AVho are these Thapas that I never before heard of? You Goorkhas are a mischievous race, and have caused the ruin of many Rajas. Digurchee, too, you plundered without cause or provocation ; and now you have thought to act the Digurchee scene with the English, and so murdered their police-officer, after settling the question by negotiation. You have been punished justly ; — you wrote us of war, and have since written of peace ; yet still ask our aid. — What kind of peace is this ?" The Nipalese urged that if not inclined to give as- sistance to recover what had been lost, the Chinese authorities would, at least, lend their good offices to procure the removal of the Resi- dency from Katmandoo. Cheeoon Chang replied, " You wrote that it was to establish a factory that the English liad come ; why should I re- move merchants ?" Dilbunjun, one of the Va- . keels, on tliis said, " They were not merchants, ? 2 212 NIPAL AND CHINA. but soldiers and oflicers that they desired to be rid of." Cheeoon Chang replied, " The English have written that their object is to cement peace ; and it appears you have agreed to receive the Resident. You wrote us that the English had demanded the passes into Koten China ; but we know this is false; — if they desired to come to China, it would not be by that route." Tuni- ing to Colonel Runbeer, the other Vakeel, Cheeoon Chang continued in a tone of irony, " You Goorkhas think the hills have no soldiers but yourselves : how many of you may there be ? About two lakh, I suppose ! — and what is your revenue ?" Runbeer replied, " That his Excel- lency was right in the muiiber of fighting men ; and that the revenue of the hill country v^^as very small, not exceeding five lakh of rupees." — " Truly," said Cheeoon Chang, " you are a mighty nation !" and with this he dismissed the A'akeels. The Chinese were so fully satisfied with the intelligence procured on this occasion, that they immediately withdrew their troops from Digur- chee and Lassa. They betrayed, however, a little jealousy at the establishment of a Resident at Katmandoo ; and, in reply to the letter of the Governor-general, after stating that they w^ere perfectly satisfied, the Vizier introduced a hint that they should be still better pleased were he withdrawn. It was couched in the following terms. NIPAI, AND CHINA. 213 " You mention that you have stationed a Vakeel in Nipal. This is a matter of no con- sequence ; but as the Raja, from his youth and inexperience, and from the novelty of the thing, has imbibed some suspicions, if you would, out of kindness towards us, and in consideration of the ties of friendship, withdraw your Vakeel from thence, it would be better, and we should feel very much obUged to you." These minute details are, perhaps, too puerile to be recorded at such length ; but as so little is known of the conduct pursued by the Chinese in their relations with other Asiatic powers, at the same time that there is an interest about every thing that brings us poUtically into con- tact with them, it is hoped that this full account of their proceedings at Digurchee will not prove unamusing or out of place. To the above statement of occurrences after the treaty, it only remains to add, that the young Raja of Nipal died, on the 20th of No- vember 1816, of the small-pox; and was suc- ceeded by an infant son named Raj Indur Bikrum Sah. 7'his event contributed to fix more firmly the authority of the party of Ge- neral Bheem Sein, by giving him another lease of uncontrolled dominion, pending a second long minority. •214 CHAPTER VI. OUDH.— BHOPAL. 1814-15. Financial embarrassments — Irritating discussions with Nu- wab Sadut Ulee — set at rest by Lord Hastings — -Nu- wab's death, and succession of Ghazee-ood-Deen Hydur — Resident's proceedings at Lucknou — Intrigues there — First Oudh Loan— Second ditto — Governor-general's in- tentions respecting Pindarees — Defensive plans — Reasons for adopting Bhopal and Sagur alliance — Condition of Bhopal — Designs of Mahrattas — Chief applies for British protection — Terms offered — Consequent military arrange- ments — Negotiation — Communication to Sindheea — How received by him — The Bhoosla and P^shwa — Preparations in the Dukhun and Hindoostan — Augmentation of Bengal army — Effect of these measures in maintaining tranquillity — Conduct of Bhopil — Vakeel dismissed — Reflections. In order to avoid confusion from interrupting the Narrative, the Nipal war has been related from its origin to its close without mention of the affairs of the rest of India. We shall now supply this omission ; and the completion of the war will en- able us to pursue consecutively the thread of those affairs, after first noticing one or two matters of general interest connected more or less with the events already described. FINANCIAL EMBARK ASSMENTS. 215 When Lord Hastings left, the presidency in June 1814, with the Nipj^l war upon his hands, the finances of the Bengal government were at a very low ebb. Great efforts had been made to furnish to Europe as large a cash remittance as pos- sible ; and the treasuries of the western provinces, instead of being in a condition to supply the wants of a campaign, had been drained of their resources to provide funds for this purpose, or to relieve other pressing demands at the presidency. Of these, the foremost were the necessity of supplying from Bengal a considerable deficiency in the re- sources of Java, and of meeting, besides, a heavy drain from China, where the provision of the tea investment depended on the negotiajl^on of bills on Calcutta. But a new and rather unusual source of embarrassment arose from the state of the exchange with England at this time ; for, owing to the great depreciation of the British currency, the sicca rupee, which intrinsically was worth a small fraction more than two shillings and a halfpenny, came to bear a remittance-value oftwoandeightpence, and even two and tenpence. While this was the case, all the public creditors, who had heretofore availed themselves of the option of receiving their dividends by bills on England, at two shillings and sixpence, demanded cash in India to purchase private biUs at tlie ad- vanced rate ; and as a very large proportion of 216 FINANCIAL EMBARRASSMENTS. the entire Indian debt was at this time held by retired servants, and others, resident in Europe, the sudden drain on the Indian treasuries from this cause was inconveniently heavy. The same unfavourable state of the exchanges operated, of course, to prevent the Indian governments from obtaining relief by bills on the Court of Direc- tors, had they been disposed to seek such aid. In this extremity, the natural resource would have been to open a new loan ; but several cir- cumstances precluded a resort to this stej). In the first place, the securities of the existing loans, which had then very recently been negotiated with much trouble, and at the expense of much obloquy and dissatisfaction, at six per cent, in- terest per annum, in substitution for the old debts at eight per cent., bore in the market a discount of nine and ten per cent. ; indeed, at one time, the discount was as low as sixteen. This showed the utter impossibility of raising money at the same rate of interest ; while the manner of reduc- tion rendered it as impossible, without forfeiting aU pretensions to consistency and faii'-deaUng towards the public creditors, to depart from the principle on which the preceding loans had been made, and open a new one at a higher rate. Moreover, the distress for money was, at this juncture, so great and so general at Calcutta, that the first mercantile houses were giving twelve per OITDH. 217 cent, on the security of goverament obligations. To open a public loan, therefore, at even a higher rate of interest than six per cent, would but add to the general distress, and produce, from the alarm it would occasion, a very great further de- preciation of all existing securities, Avithout being in itself productive in a degree to compensate such evils. Being thus compelled to look abroad for some extraordinary source of supply, Lord Hastings cast his eye upon the Nuwab Mzeer, whose ter- ritory had suffered equally with our own from the aggressions of the Nipalese, and who was known to have accumulated su^ immense hoard, which lay unemployed in hi^'^'treasuries. Sadut Ulee Khan, the ruler of Oudh, was a man of considera- ble ability, and, naturally, not ilUberal in disposi- tion; but from dwelling on his own and his brother Asuf ood Doida's misfortunes, all owing, as it seemed to him, to the want of ready money, he had become latterly extremely greedy and par- simonious. His administration, since the forced cessions of 1801, had been conducted systemati- cally on a principle of selfish avarice, which aimed to draw as much as possible from the country, at the smallest possible charge. Every district was, in consequence, farmed out yearly to the person who offered most for it ; and no care whatsoever was taken to protect the population 218 OUDH. either in property or person.* The farmer was the only government officer employed ; and he was absolute in power, and accountable to no au- thority but the Nuwab himself. In the treaty concluded with Sadut Ulee by Lord Wellesley, there was a loose engagement on the Nuwab's part to reform his internal adminis- tration, and the right of tendering advice to this end was specially reserved to the British govern- ment. No result, however, had yet followed from this stipulation, except an interminable and most unsatisfactory discussion between the Nuwab and the Resident. The former, of course, relished no plan of reform that trenched at all on his means of accumulating wealth ; while the latter vu-ged the necessity of providing establishments for the sup- pression of crimes which had become enormously prevalent, and for the administration of civil and criminal justice. After much fruitless negotia- tion, a plan of reform was devised, upon the prin- ciple of assimilating the administration of Oudh to that of the British provinces, and dividing the * As an example of the character of Sadut Ulees admi- nistration, it may be noticed that one of his first acts after the cession, was to resume all jageers, and rent-free tenures, by whomsoever granted, and for whatsoever purposes. Reli- gious tenures, as well Mohummedan as Hindoo, and all political grants, excepting only those protected by British interference, fell before this general and indiscriminate con- fiscation. OUDH. 2 1 territory into districts, with revenue, and judicial officers acting, as with us, under separate con- trolling authorities at the capital. This scheme was referred to government by the Resident at Lukhnou in 1810 ; and being approved, was then formally submitted to the Nuwab Vizeer, along with a letter from Lord Minto, urging strongly its adoption. The Nuwab met the proposition by declaring his readiness to adopt any scheme that might seem to him practicable ; but he denied this to be so. He dwelt upon his utter want of trust- worthy pubUc officers of the kind possessed by the British government in its civil and military ser- vants; and contended that the plan was, in other respects also, inapplicable to the state of things in his country, and to the relations which subsisted between himself and the people of his court, who must be his instruments, as well as with his sub- jects at large. The objection was plausible, and certainly not unfounded ; but the truth is, that the Nuwab saw in the scheme, besides the expense of a large establishment, a very great abridgement of his own authority, and most probably, the direct and perpetual interference of the British Resident between himself and the pubUc officers to be em- ployed *. Hence he was extremely apprehensive * Major Baillie, the Resident, went so far as to assume, in the discussions which took place, a right of seeing that pro- 220 ouDii. of the tendency of such a system ; and notwith- standing the Resident's most persevering endea- vours, backed by occasional remonstrances from the Governor-general himself, nothing could re- concile him to its introduction. Indeed, the dissa- tisfaction he showed at the manner in which the measure was pressed, threatened to end in a dis- solution of the relations of the state. Several other irritating svibjects of discussion contributed to augment the soreness produced by this negotiation. There were in Oudh some fami- lies and individuals that, from past services, claim- ed to be under the special protection of the British government. It was usual for the Resident to receive complaints from these against acts of the Nuwab or his officers affecting their interests, and also to interfere to adjust disputes between differ- ent members of the privileged families. It was impossible, in such a state of things, to avoid col- lision with the Nuwab ; but Major Baillie was, be- sides, far from discreet in his manner of advocating the cause of those to whom he gave this support, and pushed the principle much further than was intended, by including his Moonshees and per- per persons should be seljcted to execute the plan ; and fur- ther, on one occasion, in answer to the Nuvvab's objection from the want of instruments, offered to recommend him some, — an interference which threatened, at the very outset, to deprive the Nuwab of all his patronage. > OUDH. 221 sonal adherents amongst those entitled to tlie ad- vantage. Such was the state of thhigs at Lnkhnoii to- wards the commencement of 1814. It was an early determination of Lord Hastings to adopt, as far as possible, towards the native princes linked in unequal alliance with us, a course of policy di- rected to the conciliation of their personal good wiU. Seeing, therefore, the acrimony and irrita- tion apparent in the communications between the Nuwab Vizeer and Resident, and in the ajjpeals and references to which they gave rise, it was a question with him, very soon after his arrival, whe- ther it might not be expedient to make some ex- change of Residents, in order to avert the crisis which seemed to be impending. The measure would have been a strong one, and might, perhai)s, have been misinterpreted, so as to weaken our per- manent influence at the court of Oudh. For this reason it was not adopted, and his Lordship rested satisfied with enjoining Major Baillie to be more cautious in his interference in future ; and as an earnest of his desire to conciliate the Nuwab, he directed the further agitation of the question of reform to be dropped altogether. Sadut Ulee Khan was" naturally grateful for this change of policy, for which he felt himself in- debted entirely to the new Governor-general. Lord Hastings, on the other hand, reckoned on 222 ouDH. the favourable ciiange of sentiment thus produced, as likely to lead his Excellency to enter readily into his views in case his assistance should be needed for the prosecution of the Nipal war. With this predisposition to a mutual good under- standing, Lord Hastings commenced his journey to the Western Provinces ; but before he had pro- ceeded half-way, he was met by intelligence of the death of Sadut Ulee, which occurred on the 1 1 th of July, 1814. Ghazee-ood-Deen Hydur, the de- ceased Nuwab's eldest son, was at once raised to the musnud in his room, to the prejudice of the interests of the second son Shums-ood-Doula, in whose favour Sadut Ulee had created a party ; for having a mean opinion of his eldest son's abilities, he had desired to supersede him. Major BaiUie, in reporting these events, added, that the first act of the new Vizeer was to yield an immediate assent to the introduction of the plan of reform, and to give up all the points on which his predecessor had so strenuously resisted. It was impossible for Lord Hastings to approve of so injudicious an exertion of influence; and his displeasure was fur- ther excited at finding, on his arrival at Lukhnou, that all the most lucrative appointments, created under the scheme of reform, were filled by the Resident's own moonshees and dependents. It was too evident that Ghazee-ood-Deen had not been a free agent in what had been done. This the OUDH. 223 Nuwab himself did not hesitate to declare to those about him, and he even went so far as to give in a paper of complaint on the subject to Lord Hast- ings ; but his fears afterwards got the better of him, and he retracted when the matter was or- dered for investigation. There was so much in- trigue and mystery in all these proceedings, that for a considerable time little was known of their real character, and except the extreme folly and timidity of the new Vizeer, which very soon be- came apparent, all else was mere suspicion and vague rumour. Major BaiUie subsequently sent in a full statement of the whole transaction, which led to his immediate removal from the residency, It appeared from this, that the Nuwab's effort to emancipate himself from the state of thraldom in which he was held, was the effect of an intrigue instigated by the confidential advisers of the late Nuwab, aided by some English gentlemen at Lukhnou. The project was defeated by a counter intrigue, wherein the Resident's own moonshee, by holding out the example of Vizeer Ulee's de- gradation, and representing it as the consequence of his quarrel with the Resident of the time, created such an alarm in the mind of the Nuwab, as led to his recantation of his complaints, and nomination of the person of this party's selection for minister. The truth was not discovered till after Lord 224 OUDH. Hastings had left Lukhnou, consequently Major Baillie, for the time, retained his situation, but with the diminished confidence of the Governor- general, and the expression of some dissatisfaction at his past conduct. Until his removal, indeed, which occurred about a year after, he maintained also, through his moonshee and the new minister, his hold on the fears of the Nuwab ; thus, for the time, defeating the declared, wish of the Governor- general, for the Vizeer to be left unfettered in the exercise of authority within his own dominions. But after this event, and the disgrace and death of the moonshee in question, his Excellency as- sumed the reins with a more decided hand, re- lying with confidence on Lord Hastings' fi'equent assurances that he might consider himself in reality, as well as in name, independent. This confidence, however, in a timid mind like that of his Excellency, was not the growth of a day, and it was some time, therefore, before the Nuwab was convinced of the sincerity of the assurances he received. It has been necessary to say thus mucli of the passing intrigues at the court of Oudh, in order to explain the circumstances under which the two loans were obtained from the Vizeer. The subject has else no immediate connexion with the political history of India, and is far from inviting. ouDH. 225 The first loan was procured in October 1814 ; when the Resident and his party were under some apprehension lest the complaint about to be pre- ferred against him should be successfid ; and when the Nuwab was anxious to do every thing in his power to secure the fav'our of the Governor- general, as the only means of securing himself against the designs of Shuras-ood-Doula, and eventually of emancipating himself from the state of thraldom in which he was held. Lord Hastings thus found all parties eager to show zeal in pro- moting any object known to be personally inte- resting to himself; accordingly, upon the very first hint, through the Resident, that financial as- sistance was desired, his Excellency readily came forward, and offered a crore of rupees at his next interview. The sum was accepted as a subscrip- tion to the last preceding six per cent, loan, and an arrangement was at the same time made, to relieve the Nuwab from the payment of stipends equivalent to the interest payable on it. Most of these having been guaranteed by the British go- vernment, or obtained, at its instance, for indi- viduals of the priv^ileged class above described, the necessity which was constantly recurring of interposing to urge punctuality of payment had heretofore proved one of the most fruitful sources of irritation. The Nuwab was fully sensible of the advantage of ridding himself of the annoyance Q 226 ouDH, of such interpositions; so nuich so, that of his own motion he added eight lakh to the principal sum lent, in order to relieve himself from a further stipend, beyond the amount of interest on the crore of rupees originally tendered.* The aid so obtained from the Nuwab Vizeer enabled Lord Hastings to fill the western trea- suries, and send his armies into the field against Nipal, in the manner already described. A con- siderable portion was, at the same time, furnished for the relief of the presidency ; but his Lordship could not avoid feeling some disappointment at the use there made of it. There was on the register still one remaining loan, at eight per cent, amounting to about fifty-four lakh and a half (Sicca rupees, 54,56,000). In theii' anxiety to be rid of this now anomalous species of stock, the officers of finance recommended the whole debt being at once advertised for peremptory payment. Such a measure, they urged, would be of the best effect at this juncture, in restoring public credit, and relieving the mercantile community, who still suffered much distress from the want of money in the market. The step was accordingly taken, without consulting the Governor-general, upon the * Amongst the provisions thus secured, was a liberal al- lowance to his Excellency's second brother, Shums-ood-DouIa ; who, to quiet all apprehensions from his rivalry and in- trigues, was required to fix his residence at Bunarus. OUDH. 227 presumption that the Oudh loan would furnish ample means beyond the wants of the campaign ; but in this respect the calculation proved falla- cious. Extensive preparations had become indis- pensable in every quarter, and the call for in- creased exertions on the side of Nipal grew every day more urgent. The consequence was, that a deficiency of funds was again experienced before the campaign was half over. In this emergency, a second application to the Nuwab Vizeer was deemed necessary ; the financial officers being unable to devise any other remedy. The request for further aid was accordingly submitted, accom- panied with a full and candid explanation of our difficulties. So applied to, his Excellency could not, consistently with his professions of sincere and ardent attachment, refuse the soUcited assist- ance ; but he did not afford it so readily as on the former occasion. He at first offered fifty lakh, but this sum was not accepted, and the offer was assumed to be made from an imperfect acquaint- ance with the extent of the embarrassment for which we sought relief. Thus urged, his Ex- cellency was, at length, brought to consent to furnish another crore on the same terms as the preceding. It is to be observed, that the mass of treasure accumulated by Sadut Ulee Khan, and made over to Ghazee-ood-Deen on his accession, was estimated to amount, at the lowest compu- Q 2 228 CENTRAL INDIA. tation, to seven or eight crore,* so that the ac- commodation solicited was not more than the Nu- wab could well afford. Having thus explained the source whence sup- plies were drawn for the extraordinary exertions made in 1814-15, it is time to relate the measures they gave the means of undertaking in Central India, while the war, already described, was waging to the north. It had been resolved by the Supreme Govern- ment, on the eve of the Governor-general's de- parture from the presidency, in 1814, to make a strong representation of the formidable and rapidly augmenting power of the predatory associations to the home authorities ;t with the view of impressing them with the like conviction of the danger to the British interests, arising from the continu- ance and progressive increase of bodies so capable of acquiring a mischievous pre-eminence ; and of * Major Baillie stated the amount, in money and jewels, at fourteen crore. In the course of 1816, the death of the Fyzabad Begum, widow of Shooja-ood-Doula, put govern- ment in possession of fifty-six lakh more, on the condition of providing annuities equivalent to the interest, at six per cent. This also was a most seasonable relief. The Begum enjoyed our guarantee of her jageers and possessions, and made this arrangement, for the security of her proteges and dependents, some years before her death. t Vide Chap. I. CENTRAL INDIA. 229 receiving their sanction for the prosecution of a systematic combination of measures, for the sup- pression of this growing evil. It was agreed, on all hands, that the necessity of such measures would soon be forced upon us ; and it was conse- quently essential, that those intrusted with the direction in England, should thus early be ap- prised of the actual posture of affairs, and of the views respecting them entertained by those who had the means of closer observation. There seemed to be time to wait the effect of this re- presentation ; for there was no reason, at the date when it was made, to expect the occurrence of any thing to demand immediate operations in the quarter where the Pindarees and Putans had fixed themselves ; while the Indian government found ample employment in the war with the Nipalese. For the present, therefore, it was deemed advisable to dispose oiu- means in a de- fensive attitude, sufficient to prevent or repel incursions ; and neither to advance to attack the Pindarees in their haunts, nor commence that extended plan of connected movements, which, though necessary to the entire suppression of these predatory hordes, might alarm the independent states by its contrast with our recent system of general and scrupulous neutrality. The most effectual defensive measure, and the one most desirable in every point of view, seemed 230 CENTRAL INDIA. to be, the establishment of a subsidiary alliance with the Bhoosla Raja, whereby the whole of our most exposed frontier, viz. the line from Bundel- khund to Cuttack, now defended by the single po- sition of Midnapoor, where a regular battalion was stationed, would thenceforth be skirted by the dominions of a power in strict alliance ; and a force upon the Nerbudda, communicating on one hand with the southernmost position of Bundelkhund, and on the other with the troops at the northernmost point of the Nizam's dominions, would completely guard the whole line of our possessions and those of our allies, as far as it was possible to protect them against an enemy so active as the Pindarees. This was a project nowise novel. The British government had, for several years, been endea- vouring to prevail on Raghoojee Bhoosla to accede to such a proposition, but, as stated in the intro- ductory chapter, could never conquer his repug- nance and distrust. The negotiations for the purpose, which had been open since 1812, were finally closed while the Governor-general was on his progress up the river, by a decided refusal on the part of the Raja. The best alternative that presented itself on failure of the Nagpoor connexion was, to extend the chain of positions from Bundelkhund to the Nerbudda, by means of a connexion with the states of Sagur and Bhopal, and thereby draw a CENTRAL INDIA. 231 similar defensive line westward of the Nagpoor territories. The necessity of adopting this alter- native, should operations ever be undertaken without the co-operation of the Bhoosla, was fully acknowledged in the course of those discussions upon the practicability and mode of suppressing the predatory associations, which had preceded the representation to the home authorities ; but it formed part of that extended system, which it had been resolved not to commence upon for the present, in fear of alarming the independent states. AVherefore, although Lord Hastings resolved in the end to adopt this course, he would have de- ferred so doing, notwithstanding the disappoint- ment in respect to Nagpoor, had not some indi- cations appeared of a combination amongst the Mahratta powers, the danger of which required to be anticipated. At the time of rejecting our alliance, it was discovered, that the Bhoosla was actually en- gaged in negotiating one of an offensive and defensive character with Sindheea, for the sub- jugation of the Bhopal principality by their joint arms. One of the ostensible pretexts for this confederacy was, the necessity of a counter-prepa- ration against the ambitious projects of the Bri- tish government; which were inferred^ as well from the attempt to establish our influence at Nagpoor, as from the stir of our military prepa- 232 CENTRAL INDIA, ration, which denoted that active operations were meditated in some quarter or other, though the immediate direction was, at that time, involved in mystery. Sindhcea's jealousy, ever keenly attentive to all our movements, was redoubled by this show of preparation ; and it soon became evident, from his conduct towards the Pindarees, that, whatever might have been his previous in- tention, he had now no wish to suppress them. As a further consequence of this jealousy, in- trigue began to be busy at the quarters of Ameer Khan and the durbar * of Holkur, and even with Runjeet Singh, the ruler of the Punjab Seikhs. The Peshwa was suspected to have joined these intrigues thus early, if not to have been the first author and instigator of them ; a change having * At the court of Holkur, affairs were, at this time, in the hands of Myna Baee and Tanteea Aleek ur, with whom Sindheea had considerable influence. The minister Tanteea paid a visit to Gwalior early in 1815, in order to negotiate a treaty of closer union and concert between the two fa- milies, for the prosecution of common objects, under the general direction of the Peshwa, as supreme head of the Mahratta empire. The conciliation of the Pindarees by ter- ritorial grants in the respective dominions of both the fa- milies, and the concentration of the military force of both states for the prosecution of ambitious designs against the Rajpoots, were the most striking articles of this offensive and defensive alliance, api)arent on the face of the copies of this agreement, delivered in the sequel. There is reason, how- CENTRAL INDIA. 233 been observed in his conduct some time before, which will hereafter be more particularly ad- verted to. It is difficult exactly to define their immediate object or extent ; whether merely de- fensive against any sujiposed designs on our part, for the further extension of our dominion, in a manner injurious to the interests of the contracting parties ; or offensive also, in case of a favourable opportunity. The advance of Run- jeet Singh's army to a position threatening the territory of the protected Seikhs, which took place immediately after the division at Loodheeana, under Sir David Ochterlony, was moved into the hills to attack Umur Singh, and the concentra- tion of the Putans, under Ameer Khan, which oc- curred at a critical moment, and within a few marches of our Agi'a frontier, afford reason to ever, to believe that there were other secret articles, which have not even yet been divulged. Indeed, it is well known that there was one such article levelled against Ameer Khan, and more than suspected, upon many accounts, that another aimed at the diminution or subversion of the British interest. In the end, the negotiation came to nothing, from a strong surmise that Sindheea's main object was to establish his in- fluence at the court of Mulhar Rao, for the purpose of sup- planting the family in their possessions. An opposite faction was also at work, and Tanteea Aleek ur, with Myna Baee, yielded very soon after to Balavam Set and Toolsee Baee, whereof the former was favourable to Ameer Khan and the Patans, and jealous of Siudhcea. 234 BHOPAL. suspect that the object of the confederacy was not purely defensive : but this is a point it is no longer important to investigate. No sooner was Lord Hastings apprised of these intrigues, than he saw at once that their immediate result must have been the consoli- dation of the Mahratta power over the whole tract, separating the Bengal territories from those of our allies in the Dukhun, which must not only have cut oif the Bhoosla for ever from any con- nexion with us, by rivetting his dependence on Sindheea ; but have deprived us of the alternative offered in the connexion of Bhopal, by the pre- vious subjugation of that state. Urged by these considerations, he resolved no longer to hesitate in stepping forward to complete his defensive arrangements, by forming a connexion with Bho- pal and Sagur, in despite of any efforts by the regular independent powers to counteract the design. It certainly was a bold stroke of policy ; but it presented the double advantage of thwart- ing Sindheea's apparent design of estabHshing his influence over Nagpoor, and of rescmng another principahty, whose existence promised us many most essential benefits ; moreover, it served to complete those defensive measures, which the suspected disposition of the regular powers, and their present undisguised encouragement of the predatory bands, rendered more necessary than BHOPAL. 235 ever for the security of our own provinces. Perhaps the very imposing boldness of the step, which exhibited a degree of vigour and resolution proportionate to the emergency, was its best re- commendation to his Lordship's mind ; inasmuch as it was calculated to impress on the native princes a sense of the vigilance and confidence of his administration. A brief notice of the condition of Bhopal will not be here out of place. The territory of this state lies in the valley of the Nerbudda, and above the hills to the north, between the 11 '^ and 78° of east longitude. The government has been vested in a Putan family since the days of Aurung-zeeb. The reigning chief in 1814 was Wuzeer Mohummed, who had acqiured the suc- cession, rather by proving himself the fittest of the family to sustain its declining fortunes in arduous times, than as the lawful heir by the rules of hereditary descent. The family had preserved their political independence against the most active efforts of the Mahrattas in the fulness of their military preponderance ; although their position immediately between the Bhoosla and Sindheea made their territory the particular ob- ject of Mahratta jealousy, and presented, as long as it should remain inviolate, an effectual bar to the consolidation of the influence of that nation in this part of India. On a former occasion, 236 BHorAL. when General Goddard was sent by Warren Hastings with an expedition from Hindoostan, in execution of his sagacious plan of alarming the Mahratta powers, then confederated against us, into the acceptance of his own terms of peace, by penetrating through the very heart of their possessions, the existence of this independent principality was one of the principal encourage- ments to make the attempt. The family are still in possession of the strongest testimonials from General Goddard of the important services rendered him l3y the reigning Nuwab ; indeed, the ultimate success of the enterprise, and the final accomplishment of that officer's wonderful march across an enemy's, and then unknown, country all the way to Surat, were mainly to be attributed to his having found this principality, in a state of independence and hostility to the Mah- rattas, midway on the line of march. The importance of saving such a friend, when a hostile combination of the Mahrattas was to be apprehended, must be obvious enough. Already, in execution of the offensive and defensive en- gagements between Sindheea and the Bhoosla, was the best appointed force of the former, that commanded by Colonel Baptiste, on one part of the frontier ; while Sudeek Ulee Khan, with the troops of Nagpoor, approached it on the opposite side ; and another division of Sindheea's troops. BHOPAL. 237 that under Juswunt Rao Bhao, was also in the neisfhbourhood. No time was to be lost. Sind- heea had before frequently attacked this state, and even besieged its capital, but without success, owing partly to the incapacity of the commanders he employed and their general ignorance of the mode of attacking fortified places, and partly to the gallantry and skill of Wuzeer Mohummed's defence. The Maha-Raja, however, had never before entered Bhopal with so efficient an army ; and Baptiste's knowledge of European tactics, and long and successful practice in the various sieges he had hitherto conducted, seemed to leave but little hope that the Putan chief would be able to save himself and his dominions on this occa- sion. His perpetual hostility to the Mahrattas had naturally made him look to us as a resource in the hour of extremity ; and that hour was now fast aj^proaching. He was, accordingly, induced to make a very earnest solicitation for our sup- port ; and, for that purpose, despatched an agent to Dehlee, who waited on Mr. Metcalfe, the British Resident there, and submitted, on behalf of his master, a specific proposition to be admitted within the pale of our protection. The first ap- plication to this effect, reached the Govenior- general a short time before he made his determi- nation as to the course to be adopted in regard to 238 BHOPAL. the Pindarees ; but it was not until the prepara- tions and designs of the Mahratta powers were more fully developed, that it was deemed neces- sary to take any steps in consequence. The mea- sure, as above stated, was chiefly recommended as a precaution against the plots supposed to be in agitation ; and of these, the first symptoms ap- peared about the beginning of October. When his Lordship's mind was fully made up on the mat- ter, he instructed Mr. Metcalfe to entertain the proposition of the Bhopal emissary ; and, in case he should be furnished with powers sufficiently ample and explicit, to conclude with him an en- gagement on the following basis : — " The British government to afford its protection against the present designs of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, and a perpetual guarantee for the future ; the Nuwab to be left in complete independence in the ma- nagement of his internal administration ; the British troops to have free ingress and egress through the Bhopal territories, together with every facility in the provision of their supplies and necessaries ; a fortress to be delivered as a present depot, and, eventually, a spot to be al- lotted for a cantonment or permanent station ; the Nuwab to renounce all connexion with the Pindarees, and not to negotiate with other powers, except in concert with the British go- vernment, abiding by its arbitration in all dif- BHOPAL. '239 ferences with them." However, as it was thought proper to hold out the prospect of some advan- tage by way of inducement to enter into an alliance of this nature, the recovery of all the territories of the state, then in the hands of the Pindarees, was to be proposed ; and the Governor- general prepared himself to al^andon the claim to a money consideration for the expense of defend- ing the territory, though the demand of a pro- portion of the charge, if contested, was not to be hastily relinquished. The negotiation with Nana Govind Rao, the legitimate chief of Sagur, was intrusted to the po- litical agent in Bundelkhund, Mr. Wauchope, and the basis of the connexion to be offered and con- cluded was precisely the same : a large proportion of the expense, it was, however, confidently ex- pected, would be borne by the Nana, as the con- dition of our giving him possession, which he then had not.* On discovery that the agent at * The territory of Sagur was held at this time by the widow of Rughoonath Rao Bural, Rukhma Baee, whose manager was Benaeek Rao. Rughoonath Rao was the son of Balajee Govind Rao ; and, dying without children, the next heir was Nana Govind Rao of Julaon, son of Gunga- dhur Govind, Balajee's own brother. The cousin, however, was opposed by the Baee and Benaeek Rao, and had not suf- ficient influence to get possession of his inheritance without our assistance, for which reason it was thought he would listen readily to our terms. 240 BHOPAL. Dehlee had not full powers from the Nuwab of Bhopal, both negotiations were removed to Bun- delkhiind, which, from its vicinity to the two districts, seemed to be the most convenient spot for conducting them. In support of the course of policy thus resolved upon, the troops in Bundelkhund were reinforced and held in readiness ; the Nizam's subsidiary force was ordered to advance immediately from Jalna to Ellichpoor, near the northern extremity of the valley of Berar ; the Poona subsidiary force to hold itself in readiness to act in its support, by moving on Jafurabad, in the neighbourhood of J^lna; at the same time, the Bombay govern- ment was directed to draw together the whole of the Goozerat troops at some point eastward of that province. The object of these military ar- rangements was to overawe the Mahratta powers and predatory bands, in the event of their evincing an inclination to obstruct the execution of the treaties which might be concluded. Co- lonel Doveton, the commandant of the Nizam's subsidiary force, began his march from Jalna on the 3d of November, 1814; and it was intended that, vftith this army, he should penetrate into Bhopal, to execute the protective stipulations of the treaty with the Nuwab. The negotiations having been thus opened, Mr. Wauchope addressed a letter to the Nuwab SHOP A L. 241 of Bhopal, explaining at length the terms on which the Governor-general was disposed to re- ceive that state under protection, in compliance with the solicitations of the agent of his court preferred at Dehlee. He hinted, also, at the Nuwab's bearing some part of the expense. An immediate answer was received from Wuzeer Mohummed, agreeing to all the stipulations pro- posed, with the exception of the delivery of a fort for a present dejiot, and of bearing a part of the expense. For the discussion of these two points' he declared his intention of deputing an envoy, upon the return of the person he had sent to Dehlee, which was daily expected. Mr. Wauchope had been placed in communica- . tion with the Residents at the courts of Sindheea and the Bhoosla, in order that he might keep them apprised, from time to time, of the state and progress of the negotiations : and these Residents had been instructed, so soon as they should be advised of the adjustment of preliminaries, to explain fully to the respective courts the designs of the British government, with the reasons for them, in such a manner as they might deem least likely to create alarm. This being the first oc- casion of departure from the delicacy of inter- ference we had hitherto so rigidly observed, in respect to states circumstanced Uke Bhopal and Sagur, it was deemed necessary that the British 11 242 BHOPAL. representatives at the courts of the independent princes should be prepared, both to assert the right of extending the pale of our protection to any power free to contract, and to rebut any im- putation of intended injury to their interests re- sulting from such extension in the particular in- stance, by showing it to be simply a necessary precaution for the support of our own defensive system, and by no means designed or intended to thwart their respective views. The Resident at Sindheea's court (Mr. Richard Strachey) conceiving the Nuwab of Bhopal's un- qualified assent to all the fundamental articles of the Governor-general's proposition to amount to a preliminary adjustment of the terms of alliance, proceeded forthwith to make the official communi- cation to Sindheea of the intentions of the British government in respect to Bhopal, on advice of the substance of the Nuwab's reply to Mr. Wauchope. Sindheea, on receiving the communication, inveigh- ed in the strongest terms against our interference with the affairs of Bhopal, declaring the princi- pality to he one of his dependencies in Malwa, with which we were solemnly ])ledged, by treaty, to have no concern. The Resident denied that it fell within the terms of the treaty, asserting it to be a free and independent state. Gopal Rao Bhao, who took a prominent part in the discus- sion, declared the several places which had been BIIOPAL. 243 wrested from Wuzeer Mohiimmed by Sindheea at different times, to be cessions in lieu of tribute justly due, the account of which was still unset- tled ; and represented our interference to prevent the enforcement of these his just dues, as tanta- mount to a positive declaration of war. In point of fact, according to the Mahratta notions of poli- tical justice, Sindheea had a good title to what- ever he could extort from Bhopal ; and, having been in the habit of making usurpations, and levy- ing contributions on this territory as his peculiar and exclusive prey, he conceived no one else had any right to interpose. This is the meaning he attached to the word dependency. It was noto- rious, however, that Wuzeer Mohummed had long maintained a most glorious struggle for his inde- pendence; and neither had himself, nor had any of the family before him, ever by treaty, or other act of any kind, acknowledged the supremacy of any Mahratta state. The discussions on this point grew particularly warm ; Sindheea taking an ac- tive personal part in them, and using language which might have been construed into menace : and when, at the close of the interview, Mr. Stra- chey requested that Colonel Baptiste might be or- dered to refrain from active hostility against Bhopal, until the Governor-general's instructions upon the Resident's report of the conference should arrive, the request was distinctly refused. Indeed, R 2 244 BHOPAI.. considering that there was yet no actual treaty concluded with Bhopal, the demand was, perhaps, rather premature. This conference took place on the last day of November ; and the tone then as- sumed by the durbar was nowise lowered at an interview obtained by Mr. Strachey's moonshee three days after. Immediately on being apprised that this com- munication had been made to Sindheea, the Resi- dents at the other Mahratta courts resolved, very properly, no longer to defer a similar explanation. The Nagpoor Raja required time to consider of his answer ; but, on being pressed by Mr. Jen- kins, privately assured that gentleman that Su- deek Ulee Khan should be forbidden to join the army of Baptiste, or to act hostilely against Bho- pal. It was further ascertained, that this court would not oppose the advance of the subsidiary force at Ellichpoor through the portion of its ter- ritories which lay on the route from that station to Bhopal, in case events should require its move- ment in that direction. A private correspondence, however, was kept up the whole time between the Bhoosla and Sindheea ; and the intrigues, which had before been commenced in other quarters, were carried on with renewed activity. The Peshwa, on being informed of the inten- tions of the British government, in respect to Bhopal, professed to be highly satisfied, because BHOPAJL. 245 of the security that would result to the Jageers of several of his dependents in the neighbourhood. Amongst others, the Vinshorkur, in whose con- cerns he took particular interest, had large pos- sessions about Ashta and Shujawulpoor, which the Pindarees and Sindheea's commanders were continually plundering, and of the greater part of which they had ah-eady divested him. Notwithstanding the exterior appearance of amity assumed at Nagpoor and Poona, which, in the case of the former, was carried so far as to produce an offer by Raghoojee of a body of his troops to be taken into British pay, and the pres- sure of this offer with some importunity, there was still little reason to doubt that both these courts were heartily bent upon the combination, which accounts from every quarter, during the months of November, December, and January, reported to be organizing against the British power. Mahrattas, Putans, and Pindarees seem- ed, for the moment, to have forgotten all their mu- tual jealousies, under the notion that the moment was near at hand which would give the opportu- nity of a successful rise against our galling supe- riority. The discovery that we had planned an extensive war in the hills, in which their reason- ings from past history led them to anticipate our certain failure, and this anticipation was favoured by the untoward events that marked the opening 246 BHOPAL. of the campaign in that quarter, mainly contribu- ted to lead all ranks to speculate on the speedy oc- currence of such an opportunity. It was evident, however, that they were not yet prepared to act, nor had formed any consistent plan of future con- duct. The coincidence of several disasters and failures, which took place towards the end of 1814, at the precise juncture when Sindheea had assumed the decided tone which has been mentioned above, gave the Marquess of Hastings ground seriously to apprehend that the crisis was imminent. He resolved to be prepared for the worst at all points. The military arrangements which had been made in October, for the support of the Bhopal negoti- ations, were not of a magnitude to meet the extent of combination, which seemed to be organizing against us in the course of December. Instead of being overawed by them, as had been expected, Sindheea had openly declared his resolution not to desist from hostility against that principality : and as the Governor-general was determined to perse- vere in the poHcy he had entered upon, it became necessary to extend the scale of preparation in that quarter, as well as to the north, so as to pro- vide against all hazards. The whole disposable force of the Madras army was accordingly ordered into the field, under the personal command of Sir Thomas Hislop; by which means a body of BHOPAL. 247 thirteen thousand men was brought together on the northern frontier of the British possessions in the Dukhun, at a point whence it could, at any time, move forward in support of the two subsidi- ary forces in advance. Reinforcements were, at tlie same time, ordered into Goozerat from the Bombay presidency ; and it was his Lordship's in- tention, in case matters should come to an actual rupture with Sindheea, in confederacy with the Bhoosla and the predatory associations of Central India, immediately to assume the offensive on the side of the Dukhun, while he maintained such an attitude on that of Hindoostan, as he hoped would secure him from attack. This latter object however, was not of easy accomplishment, while the Nipal war continued to require such extra- ordinary exertions. There had been at one pe- riod of the season, upwards of forty-five thou- sand* fighting men engaged either in the hills or the Turaee. The military establishments of the Bengal presidency were, however, scarcely sufficient, even in ordinary times, to man a fron- tier of upwards of fifteen hundred miles, from Loodheeana to Cuttack, in such a manner as not to * According to the returns, there were at one time in the (iehl, Regulars - - - 33,059 Irregulars - . . 13,570 Making a total of - 'it],6<29 248 ' BHOPAL. expose its weakness. Indeed, the whole frontier eastward of Mirzapoor was absolutely defenceless ; and the Pindaree incursion of 1812 had completely manifested our vulnerability in that quarter. In this emergency, the following were the measures adopted. It had heretofore been the practice to leave nearly all the civil duties of the western pro- vinces to be executed by the regular army ; by which means the battalions were broken into de- tachments, and their discipline and efficiency very much impaired. From these duties they were in- stantly relieved ; and until provincial corps should be formed for the purpose, the civil officers were ordered to take into their service such tempo- rary bodies of armed men, as they might be able to procure on the spur of the occasion. An arrange- ment was at the same time effected, which con- tributed most materially to the advantageous dis- play of the inadequate means left available for the defence of the provinces : viz. the calling out of the grenadier companies of the regiments of the line, not on actual service in the field, and form- ing them into independent battalions; while their place in the corps was directed to be filled up by supplemental companies. By this measure, an addition of seven battalions was at once made to the nominal force. Besides the above temporary expedients to meet the present exigency, consi- BHOPAL. 249 derable levies of irregular horse and foot were au- thorized ; and Lord Hastings further determined to make a permanent addition of three regiments to the regular army, and to form six provincial corps, for the civil duties of the upper provinces. The irregular levies are of such a nature, as to be available the very moment they are raised ; and as the individvials, especially of the horse, gene- rally come from those ranks most likely to be op- posed to us, their enlistment is always a measure of obvious momentary expediency. The new regi- ments could not be rendered fit for duty in the current season; but the motive of this augmenta- tion was a firm conviction of the insufficiency of the military establishment, even for ordinary times ; more particularly since the Goorkha power had risen to such importance, that henceforth that frontier would require as much vigilance as the southern and western. The Burmese of Ava and Arracan had also lately assumed a tone which ren- dered it probable that it would soon become ne- cessary to have a permanent force in this direc- tion likewise ; and neither they nor the Nipalese had heretofore entered into the calculations which had regulated the extent of the Bengal establish- ments. Inclusive of all the provincial and local corps, this augmentation carried the Bengal army to no higher numerical amount than about eighty 250 IJHOPAL. thousand fighting men ; which was the whole force relied on for the preservation and protection of half a million of square miles*, with a population of forty milHons, and a revenue of 12,000,000/. sterling. Such were the provisions made by the Marquess of Hastings to meet the crisis expected to occur in the season of 1814-15. Had it happened then, instead of three years afterwards, these prepara- tions would have been no more than sufficient. The gloomy aspect of the campaign in the hills in January, induced his Lordship to ap})ly for two additional king's regiments from the Cape and Mauritius ; and it was too late to countermand them, when the favourable turn of the tide had rendered their presence unnecessary. It was, of course, some time before the above preparations could be put into a train of activity. The Madras army was not concentrated tLQ March, when Sir Thomas Hislop assumed the command. By that time, however, it had become evident, that whatever necessity might have ex- isted in December and January for military pre- parations on so large a scale, there was little chance that any part of the force assembled would be called into active service this season. The inter- ference we had already exerted in favour of Bho- * Including Oudh and the protected states, but not the other presidencies. BHOPAL. 251 pal, backed by such an appearance of precautionary vigilance, had proved sufficient to save the princi- pality from attack; and the confederates not hav- ing yet gone the length of agreeing upon a specific plan of hostilities, which nothing on our part had occurred to precipitate, matters seemed, by gene- ral consent, to be subsiding into a state of repose, which, though wakeful and feverish, yet promised to last out the season. The Bhoosla Raja, on our requisition, aiTested the advance of his troops; and Sindheea, notwithstanding his bullying refusal to abstain from hostile measures when requested by the Resident, took the first opportunity of quietly withdrawing his forces. A fair occasion for so doing was offered by the violent conduct of Jus- wunt Rao Bhao, whose differences with Colonel Baptiste proceeded to the length of obhging the Colonel to attack and drive him off. After this, Baptiste stayed some time in the neighbourhood of Bhopal, negotiating with Wuzeer Mohummed; he then turned westward, ostensibly in pursuit of Juswunt Rao, leaving Bhopal altogether unmo- lested. Sindheea had before the end of December re- ceived a letter, addressed to him by the Governor- general on the subject of the discussions which had occurred at his durbar. This letter, after ex- plaining the grounds on which Bhopal was dealt with, as a state free to negotiate and conclude alii- 252 BUOPAL. ances at will, professed a readiness to receive any statements and proofs to the contrary, that the durbar might have to exhibit ; requiring, how- ever, a suspension of all acts of hostility towards tlie Bhopal territory, until the question of its po- litical independence should have been disposed of. The court inmiediately caught at this proposition, having, as it should seem, already come to the re- solution not to hazard an open rupture, for which it was nowise prepared : after some delay, a paper of complaints was accordingly drawn up, asserting Bhopal to be one of the dependencies of Sindheea, but adducing no proof whatever ; and further, ac- cusing the British government of having interfer- ed with Sindheea's rights and possessions, by the extension of its protection to some of the Bundeela chiefs ; — a complaint now preferred for the first time, though the measure had been adopted some years before. The Raja of Nagpoor also gave in a similar paper of objections to our connexion with Bhopal ; the arguments of which w ere too trivial to be worth the recital. The object of the Marquess of Hastings in inviting these durbars to the adoption of such a course of proceeding was, to testify his adherence to that moderation, and regard to the rights of others, which had been the constant aim of the British government in its transactions with the native powers ; and by opening a door to nego- BHOPAL. 2o3 tiation, to prevent any sudden recourse to violent measures, likely to bring on a premature explo- sion. It should be recollected, that the Governor- general's principal view in proffering his protec- tion to Bhopal, had been to save that state from destruction, and thus prevent that union of inte- rests between Sindheea and the Bhoosla, which must inevitably have ended in fixing the depend- ence of the latter on the former. The advantage of the connexion as a mere defensive arrangement against the Pindarees, howsoever important, would scarcely have induced his Lordship to step forward at the particular juncture, had not the other two objects been so intimately blended with the pro- secution of the same line of policy. The salvation of the principality, however, and the obstruction of Sindheea's apparent views on Nagpoor, would as well be accomplished by a slow negotiation, which left things intermediately just as they were, as by the hasty employment of force, directed to the acquisition of the same objects. Should war be unavoidable in the end, still, in the then actual state of India, delay was necessary for the full de- velopement of our means, and for the removal of the unfavourable impression made by the early occurrences of the Goorkha campaign. In every point of view, therefore, the course adopted by the Marquess of Hastings was most judicious ; inas- mucli as, even granting that no satisfactory result 254 BHOPAI.. could ever be expected from negotiation, time at least would be gained ; and time, in fact, was every thing. This resolution was formed early in De- cember ; and in furtherance of it, Mr. ^Vauchope was directed, on the arrival of the envoy from Bhopal, to call upon him, in the first instance, to ex- hibit proofs of the independence of the principality. All these matters remained in suspense the whole of the ensuing January ; during which time, the Nuwab gave out that he was under British protection, addressing letters to the com- mandants of the two subsidiary forces in the Duk- hun, and to other British authorities, as if en- gagements had been actually signed and executed. At the end of January, he addressed a letter to Mr. Wauchope, informing him that his Dehlee agent had returned and acquainted him with all that had passed ; that his vakeel should accord- ingly set off for Banda as soon as the Mohunami * was over. No vakeel, however, was despatched before the 1 8th of March, or appeared at Banda until tlie 5th of April. It was positively ascer- tained that the Nuwab, satisfied of his security from the steps already taken by the Governor- general, imagined he might now look about for * The sacred month in which the Koran was written : the first ten days of the month are kept as a season of mourning throughout Hindoostan, in memory of the unfortunate expe- dition of Hoosein, the son of Ulee. BHOPAL, 255 Other advantages, and had employed this interval in close negotiation with Baptiste and Siideek Ulee Khan, not only while their armies were threatening his territory, when the excuse of im- minent danger might have been admissable, but even after they had retired to a distance, and there was no longer any fear of an attack being meditated by the Mahrattas. Moreover, not- withstanding that it was an express stipulation of the Governor-general, to which he had dis- tinctly declared his acquiescence, that he should not negotiate except in concert with the British government, he gave no intimation of any in- tention so to act, and carefully concealed the nature of his communications ; even denying the having sent an agent to the quarters of Baptiste after his retrograde movement, though the fact had been public, and was universally known. After such duplicity, it was not to be expected that negotiations, if opened at Banda, would be prosecuted with any cordiality on the part of the Nuvvab. The Governor-general accordingly de- termined, in order both to mark his sense of the conduct pursued by the Nu^vab, and to prevent his further trifling with the British government, to order his vakeel to be dismissed without an audience, as soon as he should appear at Banda. These orders were executed, and the negotiation thus broken off in April. Wuzeer Mohummed 25G BHOPAL. was, at the same time, assured that no ill-will was harlioured towards him ; and that it was merely because his conduct had shown that he had not a proper sense of the value of the con- nexion offered to him, or of the spirit in which it ought to have been received, that the British government, for the present, withdrew from the discussion of it. This result of the negotiation, and the insincerity of the Bhopal chief's behaviour, which had been the occasion of its abrupt termination, were com- municated in due course by the Residents at the respective independent courts. It was, however, distinctly asserted on the part of the Governor- general, in reply to the objections delivered in by Sindheea and the Bhoosla, that no proof or argu- ment whatever had been adduced, that could be construed to limit or preclude the right of the British government to take the principality imder protection on any future occasion, or to show that it had at any time been other than perfectly free and independent. No answer was made to this communication by either court ; the point may, therefore, be considered to have been virtually conceded by the Mahratta potentates. The negotiation with the legitimate chief of Sagur, which was merely an auxiliary measure to the connexion with Bhopal, was abandoned at the same time ; the delay and evasions of BHOPAL. '2o7 the Nana, Govind Rao, liaving shown tliat to hiin also, notwithstanding his original solicita- tions, the connexion had become a matter of in- difference. The season was verging towards its close, ere these events were finally concluded ; yet the ini- mical disposition which had been testified by the powers of Central India had begun visibly to subside, or at least to be more guarded and dis- guised, through the extinction of any hope that an opportunity of breaking out would be of- fered by the operations of the mountain- war of Nipal. The Governor-general felt, therefore, that it was unnecessary longer to maintain the same attitude of military preparation, which had been assumed under a different aspect of affairs. The Madras army was accordingly broken up, and the Goozerat force ordered back to its canton- ments. The two subsidiary forces of the Dukhun remained for some time longer in the advanced positions they had occupied, with a view to afford as much protection to the territories of the Nizam and Peshwa against predatory incur- sion, as the extended line to be defended would admit. Thus ended the first season of active operations. The Nipalese were soliciting peace with every ap- pearance of sincerity ; the native powers of Central India had been inspired with a degree of awe that s 258 BHOPAL. kept them quiet ; and Bhopal, though not yet linked in actual alliance with us, had been as effectually protected, as if the treaty had been signed. Moreover, the interest for its preserva- tion, evinced on this occasion, promised to afford security for the future, by leaving the Mahratta princes under the apprehension of our again step- ping forward in a similar manner to thwart a similar design. Wuzeer Mohummed seems evi- dently to have anticipated this consequence of his application to us ; indeed, his whole conduct shows that it was his intention, for his own secu- rity, to avail himself of the reputation of our power, rather than of its actual exercise ; and that he never had any serious thoughts of binding himself to us in any connexion, which would inter- fere with his political independence. This high- minded and ambitious chief was unwilling to fore- go the prospect of self-aggrandizement and ex- tension of territory, at the expense of the regular as well as irregular powers, which hemmed him in on every side. His resort to us was a mere tem- porary expedient ; and he wished to have no further intercourse, than was barely necessary to gain his purpose. The policy of the Governor-general's offer of protection to Bhopal has since been brought into question, on the ground of its tendency to give B HO PAL. 251) birth to those very intrigues, and that very dis- position to conspire against the British domination, from which he had apprehended danger to our interests. But the previous existence of these in- trigues, as e^^nced by Sindheea's connexion with the Bhoosla, and by the concurring reports of the several British Residents at the native courts, was the principal, and perhaps the sole reason that induced Lord Hastings to adopt the measure; the object of which had been to anticipate, and thereby prevent, the pernicious consequences to be expect- ed from the projects of the Mahrattas at the par- ticular juncture. Doubtless, when the outset of the Goorkha war had been vmpropitious, and when such extensive exertions were required for its prosecution, the risk of giving umbrage to the IMahratta powers and entailing fresh embarrass- ment would not, wilhngly, have been incurred, with- out a sense of most imperious exigency. But pro- bably in the opinion of some people, the best ar- gument in favour of the course taken is to be found in the result which actually followed, notwith- standing the unlooked-for disasters of the campaign. It will have been seen that the establishment of Sindheea's influence over the Bhoosla, and the destruction of Bhopal, were thereby completely prevented. And although the greater part of the force of the Bengal presidency was known s 2 2G0 BHOPAL. to be occupied in the hill country, and daily ac- counts of reverses in that quarter must have been eagerly circulated, the Mahrattas were ne- vertheless deterred, by the formidable aspect of the British preparations, from resenting in any w^ay this undisguised and direct counteraction of their views. 2GI CHAPTER VII. HYDERABAD.— POONA. 1815 — June — July. Rains set in — Hyderabad — Nizam's sons seize a dependent of the Residency — Guard set upon them obHged to retire — -Troops called into Hyderabad— Their submission and con- finement in Golkonda — Poona — Account of Bajee Rao — of the Gykvvar — his relation to Peshwa— to British — Po- licy of' Peshwa, and claims on Nizam — on Gykwar — Re- ferred to British arbitration — Award as to Ahmedabad — Trimbukjee Dainglia — Gungadhur Sastree's negotiation- Intrigues at Brodera — Protest of British Resident — Re- nunciation of the arbitration — Gungadhur practised upon* and gained over — Pilgrimage to Nassik — Sastree gives offence — his destruction planned — Pilgrimage to Pundur- poor — Dissimulation —Sastree murdered. The preceding chapter has brought down the transactions of India to the month of June 1815. The rainy season then commences, which is usually the signal for the suspension of active warfare, and drives into cantonments the few remaining troops, that the hot months of April and May have not already compelled to seek such shelter. Yet even the rainy season of this year 262 HYDERABAD. was not without anxieties. Whilst a large body of troops was cantoned in Buhar, waiting the issue of the negotiations with Nipal, which was to regulate its movements on the drying up of the waters, occurrences were passing in the Duk- hun, at the two friendly courts of the Nizam and Peshwa, which excited the most lively interest, and developed, in a manner not to be mistaken, the real disposition of those powers. The Nizam's sons and relations were allowed to live freely in Hyderabad; and, after the manner of Moosulman princes all over the world, collected about them all the dissolute vagabonds of the city, by whose agency they prosecuted a regular system of insult and extortion upon the rich and quietly disposed part of the community. The swarms of desperate characters and Putan bravoes, that habitually infest the streets of Hy- derabad, had found, in the scions of the reigning family, apt leaders for all their excesses, whose influence at the palace screened them from pu- nishment for the most flagitious crimes ; inso- much that even the ministerial authority was frequently insulted, and murders openly com- mitted with impvmity. The most profligate and debauched of the princes were the two youngest sons of the Nizam, Shumsham-ood-Doulah and Moobariz-ood-Doulah, with their cousin and bro- ther-in-law, Imteeaz-ood-Doulah. These youngmen HYDERABAD. 263 were supported in their extravagancies by Tuh- neeut-oon-Nissa Begum, the mother, and Juhan Purwur Begum, the wife of the Nizam ; and, shielded by this influence^ carried their audacity to the utmost pitch ; while the weakness and timidity of Raja Chundoo Lai, the minister, ren- dered nugatory his attempts to control them. On more than one occasion, their iniquities had been the subject of a direct representation from the British Resident to his Highness the Nizam, who had ordered them to be subjected to some restraint in consequence. Their intrigues, how- ever, baffled the minister's attempts to carry these orders into effect ; and not being prepared to go the length of securing their persons, he could produce no reformation in their conduct. In the month of August, these libertines seized an attendant of the British Resident, with a view to extort money from him. Mr. H. Russell, the Resident, immediately complained of this indig- nity to the Nizam ; who, resolving to i3lace the young men in actual confinement, sent a party of his reformed infantry, under the command of Captain Hare, with orders to plant sentries about the houses in which they resided. In execution of his orders, Captain Hare marched first to the residence of Moobariz-ood-Doidah, On approach- ing it, he was fired upon from the houses on either side, in which Putans, armed with match- 2G4 HYDEllALAD. locks, had been previously posted. Some loss was sustained on the occasion ; and, amongst others, an officer of the Resident's escort was killed. After carrying one or two of the houses, and putting the armed people found in them to the sword for the sake of example, Captain Hare pushed on to the palace of Moobariz-ood-Doulah, where he found the gates closed, and other pre- parations made for resistance. He succeeded, however, in forcing open one of the gates with some six-pounders he had with him ; but seeing the increased number of opponents, and that further perseverance in the attempt to execute his orders would probably cause the Putan po- pulation of the city to rise en masse, he retired to the house of Raja Chundoo LM, to wait for further instructions. Meantime, the Resident had called in the whole disposable force from the adjoining cantonment of Secundurabad ; but find- ing the brigade there too weak to act against the city, and fearing that the present disturbance might lead to a general insurrection, he kept the detachment at the Residency, and imme- diately despatched requisitions, as well to Colonel Doveton, to move down on Hyderabad from the northern frontier, as to the officer commanding at Bellaree, to detach a reinforcement. In the in- terim, he suffered matters to remain in complete suspense, This gave the princes time to reflect HYDERABAD. 265 on the probable consequences of their inconsi- derate conduct ; and the violence of the Putan character soon gave way to the awful apprehen- sion of what would be the result. Thus the ferment in the city subsided of itself; and the princes were easily induced to throw themselves on the mercy of the Nizam, in whose palace they took refuge. Mr. Russell urged the ne- cessity of their strict confinement, and it was de- termined that they should be sent to the fortress of Golkonda. This sentence, however, was not carried into effect, until after repeated and very earnest solicitations of the Resident, who had to encounter the arts and intrigues of the Nizam's mother and favourite wife, as well as the indif- ference of the minister. AVhen, at length, the princes were ordered off to Golkonda, the two Begums resolved to accompany them ; and both actually went into voluntary confinement, hoping by this means to induce the Nizam soon to re- store the offenders to favour. But his Highness coolly observed, on being informed of their de- parture, that they were very welcome to go, for he believed it was himself they had rather be rid of than the English ; nor did he afterwards evince much anxiety to obtain the Resident's consent to the release of the culprits. The prin- cipal fomenters of the disturbance were shortly afterwards seized and executed, when Mr. Rus- 266 POONA. sell, seeing tranquillity thus quietly restored, countermanded the march of Colonel Doveton from the frontier, but retained the reinforcements he had received from the south ; thinking it ne- cessary to maintain the force cantoned at Secun- durabad in a state of greater efficiency, as a se- curity against the evidently hostile disposition of the Putan population of the Nizam's capital. By the end of September, this affau* was completely settled, and order re-established on a firmer foot- ing than before. While Hyderabad was under the alarm of these disturbances, events and discussions of a much more serious nature were passing at Poona. It will be necessary to the due understanding of these, to enter into a somewhat detailed explana- tion of the character of Bajee Rao's policy, and the arts by which he had raised himself from the situation of a fugitive to that elevation of rank and power, which finally inspired the presump- tuous confidence of ability to cope with the Bri- tish nation. It will be in the recollection of the reader, that Bajee Rao was the son of Rughoonath * Rao, or Raghooba, the uncle and murderer of Nurayun Rao, brother and successor to the great Madhoo Rao, who was the last of the family of the * Vide Forbes' Oriental Memoirs ; also Mill's British India, and the authorities there cited. POONA. 267 P^shwas that wielded in his own person the un- divided sovereignty of the Mahratta empire. The murderer was expelled by a combination of the chiefs ; and the infant son of the murdered Nurayun was placed on the Guddee, with the name of Madhoo Rao Nurayun. During the minority, the power of the state was in the hands of a triumvirate, — Madhajee Sind- heea and Tukojee Holkur exercising independent authority in Hindoostan and Kand^s, while Nana Furnuvees managed with uncommon ability the more difficidt government of Poona and the southern territories. In 1795, the nominal Peshwa, Madhoo Rao Nurayun, threw himself from a window of his palace in a sudden fit of anger, at a hasty word from Nana Furnuvees, whose guardianship and strict control were be- coming irksome to a prince already arrived at years of maturity. He died on the spot, leaving as next heirs, the sons of Rughoonath, his father "s murderer, of whom Bajee Rao, the eldest, was proclaimed : but, as he immediately commenced intrigues to rid himself of the Nana's ascendancy, a fruitless attempt was made by the latter to set up a younger brother, Chimna Apa. Bajee Rao, though young, was an adept in intrigue and dissimulation of all kinds. By calling in the aid of Sindheea, he first ruined the Furnuvees ; and then, by availing himself of Ilolkurs rivalry with 268 POONA. that chief, set limits to the control which the latter aimed at exercising over his administration. When, after Tukojee Holkur's death in 1797, Sindheea had, by espousing the cause of one of the legitimate sons, and by circumventing and slaying the other, established his entire ascen- dancy over the concerns of this rival family, he made no scruple of straitening the Peshwa's authority at Poona. To earn his favour, Bajee Rao put to death Eithojee, the brother of Jus- wunt Rao, both of whom were bastard sons of Tukojee Holkur. This act, which was com- mitted in the firm belief that the Holkur interest was irretrievably ruined, occasioned the irrecon- cileable hatred of Juswunt Rao, and prevented a resort to the old policy of opposing the Holkur to the Sindheea party, when the fortunes of the former family were restored by the abilities and activity of the surviving bastard. Thencefor- ward, the only counterpoise to Sindheea seemed to be the British power ; and as it was an early object of Lord Wellesley's policy, to detach the Poona state from the other Mahratta chieftains, and bring it under the influence of the British government, it became Bajee Rao's study to affect to receive favourably the overtures made him on the subject ; and, by keeping' up the ap- pearance of a secret negotiation with the British Resident, to excite Sindheea's alarms, whenever POONA. 269 he had any point to carry. Thougli the mtrigues and activity of Juswimt Rao, and other chiefs in Hindoostan, fomented underhand by Bajee Rao himself, diverted Sindheea from the affairs of Poona and the Dukhim, about the year 1800, and left the Peshwa more free to pursue his own projects, still he had little authority over the powerful feudatories of the empire, but such as he derived fi'om Sindheea's countenance and su- perior means ; so that, until the victory of Jus- wunt Rao Holkur over their joint forces, and Bajee Rao's consequent flight from Poona into the Konkan, to throw himself vmder the protec- tion of the English, he could be regarded as little better than a pageant in that chieftain's hands. The British army restored him to his capital, and to independent authority within the Poona terri- tory ; but bound him, as a condition of the al- liance, in all transactions with the Nizam and with the independent Mahratta powers, such as Holkiu' and Sindheea, to square his policy to our views. Amongst other matters, it was specially provided in the treaty of Bassein, that the British government should arbitrate the claims of the Peshwa on the Gykwar state, in case it should be found impossible to settle them by amicable adjustment. As it was out of this very adjust- ment tliat the discussions and events arose, which are about to be related, we shall be excused a 270 GYKWAR. short digression, for the purpose of explaining the nature and origin of the claims in question. The rise of the Gykwar's power in Goozerat was- almost contemporaneous with that of the P^shwa's at Poona. Pillajee Gykwar, the first of the family, was Potel (managing proprietor) of a village near Poona. He entered the service of Trimbuk Rao, the Senaputtee, or general, of the Sutara dynasty, who, after the conquest of Goo- zerat, opposed in arms the ascendancy of the first P^shwa. Pillajee was a principal officer of the Senaputtee, when the latter was defeated and slain in 1731. After a struggle with the Powars, and other Mahratta families, he obtained the chief management on behalf of the SenajDuttee's descendants, and thus established his own power by the same arts the Peshwa himself had prac- tised towards the Sutara Raja. Dying in 1747, his son Damajee succeeded to his rule, and re- ceived the additional title of Shumsheer Buhadur, from the nominal head of the Senaputtee's family, which is the last act of authority that family ap- pears to have exercised. The Gykwars made good their independence in the province against the Peshwa's attempts to reduce them by force. Arms proving unavailing, negotiation was tried, in order to procure an acknowledgment of su- premacy. In the course of it, Damajee engaged in a conspiracy against the Peshwa's power, at GYKWAR. 271 the head of which was tlie Dhubareea of TuUee- gara. He marched his troops into the Dukhun, in support of the conspirators ; and, on their failure, was himself circumvented by a truce, pending which he was surprised and taken pri- soner by Balajee Peshwa. He was not released till he had agreed to resign tlie half of his pos- sessions in Goozerat, to acknowledge his holding the other half in fief of the Peshwa, and to unite his forces with those of Balajee, in a joint expe- dition for the reduction of Ahmedabad, then in the tenure of the Moghuls. This place, if con- quered, was to be similarly divided. Balajee's brother Rughoonath, father of Bajee Rao, com- manded the Peshwa's troops on this enterprise ; and Damajee, having executed the first part of the treaty, in spite of the opposition of the ministry, who had conducted affairs during his captivity, Ahmedabad was reduced by their joint arms in 1753. Since then, Damajee continued a faithful dependent of the Peshwa. He was present at the battle of Paneeput, in 17G1, and attended at Poona, in aid of Rughoonath the regent during Madhoo Rao's minority. For his services on this latter occasion he obtained the grant of Goozerat in perpetuity, together with the title of Sena Khas khel, or commander of the special band. In the subsequent differences between the uncle and nephew, he took the part of the former ; but 272 GYKWAR. Madhoo Rao, being successfiil, punished him by tlie imposition of an annual tribute of five and a quarter lakhs of rupees, and the furnishing of a contingent of five thousand horse. Damajee died five years after, in 17G8, when the succession was disputed between Govind Rao, the second son by the first wife, and Syajee, the eldest son by the second wife ; which latter was almost an idiot, set up by Futteh Singh, another son, with a view to per- sonal aggi'andizement. Pending this dispute, the Peshwa was enabled to enhance his tribute by selling his countenance to the highest bidder ; and Futteh Singh in the end carried the day, by agreeing to an annual payment of seven- teen lakh seventy-nine thousand nine hundred rupees, and to a money compensation, in lieu of the contingent, of six lakh and seventy five thousand ruj^ees. With the help of the British he expelled liis rival, and then paid his tribute or not according to his own ability, and to the Peshwa's means of enforcing it. It was, how- ever, stipulated in the treaty concluded by us with Futteh Singh, in 1782, that he should pay to the Peshwa the same tribute, and yield him the same obedience as before the treaty. Futteh Singh died in 1789; and there had since been three successions. In 1802, Anund Rao, the reigning Gykwar, received a British subsidiary force, and made several cessions to reimburse the PESHWA. 27.:} expense of an expedition, fitted out by the Bom- bay Presidency, to repel an invasion of his terri- tory by Miilhar Rao Holkur. On the last day of 1802, the treaty of Bassein was also concluded with the Peshwa. In 1803, territory, yielding a revenue of seven lakh and eighty thousand rupees, was ceded by Anund Rao in lieu of the subsidy ; and the force being increased in the course of the year, further cessions were added to the amount of two lakh and ninety thousand rupees. The British government had since taken upon itself the guarantee of the Gykwar's debts, and the management of the greater part of his territory ; and the cessions altogether amounted in 1814-15 to thirteen and a quarter lakh. While we thus gradually and peaceably esta- blished a complete ascendancy in Goozerat, the P^shwa's claims under the two engagements with Damajee and Futteh Singh were little attended to. At our suggestion, soon after the treaty of Bas- sein, Bajee Rao was induced to grant a farm of his share of Ahmedabad to the Gykwar for ten years. The fixed rent of this lease was regularly paid him ; but no steps were taken to bring the other matters in dispute to an adjust- ment, Bajee Rao having never thought proper to advance his claims. The reason of this negli- gence may be found perhaps in the policy he was pursuing nearer home. The ten years that fol- T 274 PESHWA. lowed the restoration of his authority at Poona, by the British arms, were systematically devoted by Bajee Rao to the humiliation of the old Mahratta families, who, enjoying large jageers and miUtary tenures, on every occasion of ferment chose their party according as best suited their immediate interest, without conceiving themselves under the smallest obhgations of fidelity and allegiance to the Peshwa's legitimate authority. He had con- ceived a particular enmity against this class, from a conviction that the state to which he had been reduced by Juswunt Rao Holkur, and the neces- sity he had felt of applying to the British for succour (a step most derogatory to the Mahratta name and reputation) were owing entirely to his having been deserted in the hour of need by the immediate vassals of the empire. He seems, therefore, very early to have formed the resolution of seeking every means of reducing, and, if pos- sible, of entirely dispensing with this formidable class. His plan was to entertain what troops he might need either by enlisting men singly, or in small bodies not exceeding one hundred under one commander; and as the opportunity offered, to model the large fiefs in such a manner as should leave the vassal in the most abject depend- ence on his superior lord. The British subsidiary force, which was ever prompt to enforce the Peshwa's just rights, was an engine he relied on PESHWA. 275 for the re-establishment of his authority over these jageerdars ; but, as this force was only available w^here right was on his side, he contrived to turn its name, and the apprehension created by its state of perpetual efficiency, to equal account, on many occasions, when perhaps he could not have commanded its actual service. In the coiu-se of the ten or eleven years following the treaty of Bassein, this policy had been successful in ruining by f^r the greater part of the old Mahratta fa- miUes. The superior power of the jageerdars southward of Poona, most of whom were old de- pendents of the Sutara dynasty, combined with the circumstance of their having done good service to the Duke of WelUngton, in the campaign which restored Bajee Rao to his capital, rendered it ne- cessary for him to submit to our adjustment of his relative rights over these latter. He was, however, greatly discontented at the adjustment finally made by us in IS 12, because it required him to renounce, in perpetuity, his groundless claim of sovereignty over Kolapoor and Sawunt- waree, and fixed and defined his other dues, which it is always a favourite object of the Mahratta policy to keep indefinite. Of course, having ac- cepted the arbitration of the differences, we be- came the guarantee of its execution on both sides. It was now found to be Bajee Rao's artifice to hold the jageerdars to the fulfilment of their part of the T 2 27C PESHWA. award with the utmost rigour, leaving, at the same time, such inducements to deviate from the letter of it, that some were occasionally found tripping, so as to forfeit our guarantee, and to give Bajee Rao a claim to our assistance towards their reduc- tion. The case of the Rasteeas, very powerful southern jageerdars, is a notable instance. While urging to us the necessity of chastising their con- firmed obstinacy and refusal to furnish their full quota of troops, Bajee Rao was privately assuring the family that he had no design to ruin them, and thus encouraging their resistance, until their utter destruction was finally effected by our agency. By the year 1813-14, the uniform prosecution of this crafty policy had succeeded in effecting the consolidation of the Peshwa's authority over the whole of his Poona dojninions ; it had also filled his treasuries, as well by bringing into them the large revenue before appropriated by individuals, as by the rigid exaction of fines and penalties. Until these domestic objects had been attained, foreign affairs did not seem to occupy much of Kis attention ; to them he now began to devote him- self. The Peshwa's government had indefinite claims on the Nizam ; amongst others, one for chout on the revenue of nearly his whole domi- nions, originating in concessions made in an hour PESHWA. 277 of extremity by Nizam Uiee Khan *, but neither intended nor expected to be observed, unless the same necessity should annually recur. These claims, however, the British government had en- gaged by the treaty of Basseiu to adjust and de- termine ; and Bajee Rao began about 1813-14 to be most importunate for an adjudication. After some time spent in pressing for a decision, the Su- preme Government resolved, that the senior. As- sistant to the Resident at Poona should repair to Hyderabad with the ministers of the Poona state, and a commission be there instituted, to consider and ascertain the relative rights of the parties. From this time forth nothing more was heard of the Peshwa's claims. He ceased to urge them the instant he fovmd in us a readiness to perform our part of the engagement for their settlement; either from distrust of our arbitration, or from an unwill- ingness to have his dues fixed and set at rest for ever. The claims on the Gykwar were brought for- ward at the same time, and the decennial lease of the moiety of Ahmedabad being about to expire, Bajee Rao gave notice of his intention to take the management into his own hands, and on no ac- count to renew the lease. With respect to the * The treaty which followed the defeat at Kurdla is here alluded to. 278 PESHWA. other matters at issue, it appeared, that four years before the conclusion of the treaties of Bassein and Brodera, the Gykwar had, through fear of Sindheea, agreed to pay up all arrears on Futteh Singh's engagement, besides fifty-six lakh for his own investiture. It was on this basis that Bajee Rao expected the present adjustment of his pecu- niary demands. They had been suffered to lie by so long, that, when the account came to be made up, they were found to amount to a sum consi- derably exceeding three crore of rupees, of which upwards of two crore were on account of arrears of the tribute and commutation-money agreed to by Futteh Singh, the remainder for the moiety of acquisitions made by Damajee, subsequently to the capture of Ahmedabad, besides the item of fifty-six lakh above mentioned for the investiture of Anund Rao, and upwards of thirty-nine lakh in liquidation of an old account. The Gykwar had little to set off against these claims, and was evidently in no condition to make good so heavy a balance as would ultimately have proved to be due, if the account had been settled on this basis. At the suggestion of the British government, Gungadhur Shastree, the prime minister of the Gykwar state, came, under our guarantee, from Brodera to Poona, to endeavour to make some adjustment or compromise of these claims. He hoped also to obtain a renewal of the lease of PESHWA. 279 Ahmedabad, by offering some advance of rent. This latter object was in vain attempted in every possible shape. Accordingly, in June 1814, the Resident at Poona was obliged to consent to the half of Ahmedabad being delivered to the Peshwa's officers ; and orders were issued for the purpose. The soobaship was given by Bajee Rao to Trim- bukjee Dainglia, who deputed an agent of his own to take charge of the Peshwa's interests there. This Trimbukjee had risen from the meanest ori- gin by the basest arts. He was first a menial servant ; then one of the familiar companions of Bajee Rao, whose social hours were passed in wit- nessing exhibitions of the grossest debauchery ; and had risen to favour by the conspicuous pro- fligacy with which he ministered and assisted at such entertainments. Though known to have been some time a personal favourite, it was not till after the above appointment, and his nomina- tion to command the contingent, when called out in 1814-15, that he was introduced by the Pesh- wa to Mr. Elphinstone, as a person high in con- fidence. He thenceforward regularly assisted at all conferences, assuming at them a tone of arro- gance and undisguised ambition, which seemed to advance him in his master's favour, in proportion as his tone was heightened ; a clear indication of the change of Bajee Rao's sentiments or designs, and of his beginning to feel the British connexion 280 PESHWA. rather in the restraints it imposed on his desire to restore the Mahratta empire to its pristine splen- dour, than in the security it gave to the possession of what remained under his immediate sway. Mr. Elphinstone early marked this change ; and gave a prophetic warning to his own government, that a serious rupture must inevitably ensue, if Bajee Rao persevered in giving ear to the flagiti- ous counsels of this abandoned favourite. The transactions of every day, after this man's influ- ence had been established, bore evidence of the truth of this prediction ; and it was further at- tested by the conduct of the agent whom he sent to Ahmedabad, and who there commenced a course of intrigue and aggression, from which even the subjects of the British government in the adjacent districts did not escape unmolested. Meanwhile Gungadhur Shastree, instead of meeting a reciprocal disposition to bring matters to a speedy adjustment, had to encounter syste- matic evasion and subterfuge. The Peshwa's ministers showed no inclination to accommodate matters, and would not recede an iota from their demand. He began, therefore, to be sensible that his object could not be gained without larger sa- crifices, either in satisfaction of the claims in dis- pute, or in personal gratifications to the ministers, than he felt himself authorised to consent to. This turn of the negotiation, in so far as it gave him PESHWA. 281 time, which he hoped would bring the Poona court to a right understanding of his master's means, and of the futiUty of pretensions so much exceed- ing them, was not unacceptable to the Gykwar envoy. But the objects of Bajee Rao, or rather of Trinibukjee, who seems from the first to have been intrusted with the whole conduct of this ne- gotiation, equally required time for their deve- lopement. It happened, that the Gykwar minister had a rival for his official station at Brodera, in the per- son of Seeta-Ram, the former dewan of our choice, who was still supported by a strong party in the palace of the Gykwar, notwithstanding that the Shastree had, on Futteh Singh's elevation, obtain- ed the entire control of affairs, by the direct in- terference of the British government. Since then, Seeta-Ram had been under some degree of sur- veillance, though by no means strict. Trimbuk- jee, however, availing himself of the Shastree's absence from Brodera, set on foot an intrigue, the object of which was to replace his rival in the mi- nistry, to the Shastree's exclusion, and thus to es- tablish the Peshwa's influence at the court of Bro- dera, in lieu of that of the British government. In furtherance of this plan, an agent, named Go- vind Rao Bundojee, came from Seeta-Ram, in October 1814, and was well received at Poona. A second agent, Bhugwunt Rao, came in the 282 PKSHWA. month of January following ; and on the Busunt Punchnmee festival, by the good offices of Trim- bukjee, they both obtained a favourable reception from the Peshwa himself, at the public audience of that day, which occurred in February 1815. A letter was also procured in the hand-writing of Anund Rao, the nominal Gykwar, from which it Xvould seem that he did not altogether discounte- nance these intrigues ; and they were more openly espoused by a party amongst the women of his household. It should be observed, too, that they were most active just at the time when the re- verses at the opening of the Goorkha campaign, and the state of the negotiations respecting Bho- pal, gave the Marquess of Hastings such strong reason to apprehend the worst from the disposi- tion of the Mahratta powers towards the British interests. On the first appearance of these intrigues, in October, Mr. Elphinstone protested against them; whereupon Bajee Rao's ministers did not affect to deny their existence, but, on the contrary, justified them on the ground that the Gykwar was a de- pendent of the Peshwa, who was bound to look after his vassal's interests, that, through the Shas- tree's mismanagement, had been sujffered to go to ruin. When Mr. Elphinstone argued, that his Highness's attempt to interfere was subversive of the British alliances with both states, our influence PESHWA. 2S3 liaving been instrumental in producing the exist- ing arrangements at the court of Brodera, under authority acquired by treaties with the Gykwar, which the subsequent treaty of Bassein had for- mally recognized ; the argument seemed to make little impression, and produced no relaxation in the activity with which the intrigues were carried on. In October, Mr. Elpliinstone had confined himself to the request, that Gungad- hur Shastree should be dismissed, since no good seemed likely to result from protracting an amicable negotiation with a party, whom it was endeavoured at the same time, by secret intrigue, to undermine and remove from office. However, at the Shastree's own request, he refi-ained from insisting on this point. Gungadhur, it seems, was himself unwilling to break off the negotiation, having still hopes of effecting an amicable com- promise by delay ; and he had been relieved from any fear in respect to the residt of the intrigues at Brodera, by Seeta-Ram's being subjected to fur- ther restraint, at the instance of the English Resi- dent at the court of the Gykwar. But in Febru- ary, when it became evident to Mr. Elphinstone that the negotiation must come to nothing if con- ducted in the manner it had been, and when the arrival of the second agent from Seeta-Ram show- ed the increased and alarming vigour with which the intrigues were still pursued, he (Ustinctly in- 284 PESiiWA. formed the Peshwa's government, that unless the right which had been asserted to interfere in the internal administration of the Gykwar's affairs were formally renounced, the Peshwa must not expect the British government to arbitrate, or assist in enforcing his claims upon that state. At the same time, he demanded that the two agents of Seeta-Ram should either be delivered up, or at least discountenanced and dismissed as offenders and conspirators against the established govern- ment of the Gykwar principality ; giving notice also, that unless the latter demands were compli- ed with, he would break off the negotiation alto- gether, and the Shastree must return to Brodera by the end of March. As Bajee Rao was not dis- posed to make any renunciation of his asserted right, the negotiations, as far as the British Resident was concerned, were di'opped on this ground ; which was again most fidly explained on the first day of the following month. Gungadhur was likewise recalled, and instructed to prepare for his departure ; but he was subsequently, at his own request, allowed to enter into a private nego- tiation for the settlement of the matter, without the participation of the British government, if he saw a favourable opportunity, and could effect it within a reasonable time. The bringing of matters so suddenly to this issue, completely disconcerted Bajee Rao and his PESHWA. 285 council ; for the Peshwa's government was in no condition to enforce any part of his claims, except by means of the British ; and the main-spring of his intrigues with the faction opposed to Gungad- hur was, the hope held out to them of granting in their favour better terms of settlement, than Gun- gadhur could obtain by our arbitration. The Resident having now made the Peshwa's abandon- ment of all pretension of right to interfere with the Gykwar a condition of his exerting the British influence to obtain any thing from the present ministry of Brodera, while Bajee Rao firmly per- sisted in the resolution not to renounce the pre- tension, this posture of affairs reversed the case, so as to give Gungadhur a decided advantage : for he was at liberty either to join in insisting on the renunciation as a preliminary, and thus evade pay- ment of any thing ; or, by tendering a proposition for a separate adjustment on moderate terms, to save Bajee Rao from the supposed humiliation of publicly conceding the right to interfere. Every device was put in practice to induce Mr. Elphin- stone to abandon this ground ; but having once assumed it, and being sensible that, with a view to the maintenance of our existing influence and relations with the Gykwar, the right of a third power to interfere could on no account whatever be recognised, it was of course out of the question that he should recede. The consequence was. •28G VESHWA. that Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee immediately changed their behaviour towards the envoy, and now endeavoured by every art to win him over, and to induce him to remain at the durbar, not- withstanding his official recall. In this object they were successful. They commenced by opening a negotiation with every appearance of cordiaUty, the object of which was, to compromise the whole of the Peshwa's claims past and to come, by the cession of territory yielding a revenue of seven lakh of rupees. This mode of adjustment was suggested by the Shastree himself, in order to flatter Bajee Rao's known eagerness for the ex- tension of his personal dominions ; and, certainly, it was the most favourable one for the Gykwar interests that could possibly be made; for, besides arrears, the annual tribute claimed amounted, in- cluding the commutation for military service, to upwards of twenty-four lakh. Having this ad- justment very much at heart, the Shastree resolv- ed to stay and pursue the negotiation, without the participation of the British Resident at Poona. Had there been occasion to refer to him, Mr. Elphinstone was of course prepared to resume the ground he had before made his stand upon ; but so long as the treaty could be carried on without such a reference, he saw no objection to letting it take its course, and therefore allowed the en- voy to stay and prosecute his own plans. PESHWA. 287 In this manner passed the month of March, without the dismissal of the Shastree. The nego- tiation continued open through the whole of April ; in the course of which month, no effort was spared to win him over to the interests of the Poona court. The P^shwa's daughter was offered to his son in marriage, and the chief ministry of the P^shwa's affairs, that is to say, the situation held by Suda-Sheeo-Bhao Mankeshur, was tendered to his acceptance. There can be no doubt that he was dazzled by these offers, and not only gave a favourable ear to them, but contracted a degree of intimacy with Trimbukjee, through whom they were made, which was very unusual amongst na- tives of rank, and considering the previous animo- sity on both sides, rather extraordinary. In the month of May, Bajee Rao came to a determination to commence a series of pilgrimages, whereof the first was to be to Nassik, near the source of the Godaveree. The negotiation for the marriage was at this time in a state of so much forwardness, as to induce the Peshwa to take his family with him to Nassik, and to make preparations to have the ceremony performed at that place ; and in this idea the journey was commenced in May. In the mean time, however, Gungadhur had referred the proposed compromise of the claim on the Gykwar to Futeh Singh, the representative of Anund Rao; on whose part he, rather unexpectedly, met with a 288 PESHAVA. decided repugnance to a territorial cession of any extent, howsoever [^limited. In the hope of sur- mounting this difficulty, he did not candidly ex- plain it to the Peshwa's government, but com- menced a series of evasions for the pitrpose of gaining time. He also put off the marriage on various pretexts, not wishing it to take place, un- less the adjustment was likewise effected, which he daily found it more difficult to accomplish. This conduct had the appearance of slight ; and the Shastree having refused to suffer his wife to visit the wife of Bajee Rao, on the ground of the notorious licentiousness that prevailed in the pa- lace of the Peshwa, all these circumstances, super- added to the disappointment of failing to gain over a man so eagerly courted, produced a second change of disposition towards him, and revived the hatred that before subsisted in an aggravated degree, and with the further stimulus of personal pique for a private injury. Trimbukjee began to feel that he had committed his master in the mat- ter of the marriage ; to break off which, after the families had been brought to Nassik for the pur- pose, and after all the publicity of preparation, would bring ignominy on the head of the Mahratta nation. Bajee Rao, who was naturally of a sus- picious and resentful temper, seems from this time to have vowed revenge, and found in his favou- rite a most willing instrument. A plan was ac- PESHWA. -289 cordingly laid for the assassination of the Shastree, and prosecuted with a depth of dissimulation which astonished even Mahratta duplicity. The terms of intimacy that subsisted between Trimbukjee Dainglia, and the object of this plot, had growm so extremely familiar, while matters were running smoothly on, that the former, in an unguarded moment of friendly conversation, acknowledged, that during their previous differences, he had re- solved upon the other's destruction, and had even planned his death, in case he had taken his dis- missal when Mr. Elphinstone began to press it. This had been communicated by the Shastree to Mr. Elphinstone during the journey to Nassik, and doubtless was enough to have put him on his guard, by showing the character of the man he had to deal with. Yet such was the art with which both Trimbukjee and his master continued their intercourse with him to the last, that al- though his destruction was meditated more than a month before it was put into execution, their victim never suspected any change of sentiment towards himself. When the Nassik pilgrimage was accomplished, he assented with the utmost confidence to Trimbukjee's suggestion of proceed- ing to Pundurpoor on the Bheema with a smaller equipage, and sent the greater part of his escort, and half the establishment of the mission, to wait hi? return at Poona. Particular anxiety was u 290 PESHWA. shown that Bapoo Myral, a penetrating wary Mahratta, who had been associated with the Shastree in the mission, though in a subordinate character, should not accompany the court to Pundurpoor ; but this was attributed to some per- sonal dislike, supposed to be entertained against him, rather than to fear of his prudence and fore- sight. It was a more important point to keep Mr. Elphin stone, who had attended the Peshwa as far as Nassik, from proceeding further; but the Resident needed no more, than to find that his at- tendance was not desired. While, therefore, the Peshwa continued his route to Pundurpoor, this gentleman took the opportunity of visiting the more venerable remains of EUora, to which the caprice of modern superstition did not attach an equal sanctity. About the end of June or the beginning of July, Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee set off from Nassik, taking the devoted Shastree in their train. It was given out, as upon certain information received from several quarters, particularly from Nagpoor, whence an agent had arrived, that a design had been formed against the Peshw a's life ; and that Putan assassins had been engaged at Hyderabad for the purpose, who were on their way to execute their commission. Parade was made of every possible precaution against this imaginary danger. Access to Bajee Rao became more and more PESHWA. 291 difficult ; and he travelled, quite contrary to his usual practice, surrounded by armed attendants. AVhen the coiu't arrived at Pundurpoor, these precautions were further increased ; and the Shastree ascertained that Seeta-Ram's agent, Bundojee, had been again admitted to favour, and had come to Pundui'poor escorted by one of Trimbukjee's people. He complained of this, but had yet no suspicion of the designs against himself. On the 14th of July, the Shastree had been at an entertainment given to the Peshwa. On his return at night, feehng indisposed, he gave orders that any one who should come with an invitation to go to the temple, shoidd be told that he was un- well, and unable to attend. One Luchmun Punt came with such an invitation from Trimbukjee, and returned with that answer. The message was repeated, with notice, that as the Peshwa himself was going in the morning, the crowd had retired, and he had better come immediately with a small retinue. The Shastree, stUl feeling unwell, refused a second time ; but sent two of his suite in his place. On their arrival, Trimbukjee, who was waiting at the temple, said to one of them, (Roujee Mahratta,) " I have twice sent notice to the Shastree that he had better come to prayers now, but he refuses. I wish you would again try to persuade him." Roujee accordingly return- ed; and Gungadhur Shastree, fearing he might 292 PESHWA. offend Trirabukjee by a third refusal, set off with only seven unarmed attendants. On their way inquii'ies were overheard, in a whispering tone, " Which is the Shastree ?" The answer given in the same tone, pointed him out as the person that wore the necklace. This did not attract parti- cular notice, having passed in the confusion of a crowd. Arrived at the temple, the Shastree per- formed his devotions, and continued some time in talk with Trimbukjee. On his return, he left three of his seven attendants wdth an old family priest, whom he met at the temple, and walked back, escorted by a party of Trimbukjee's sepoys. He had not gone far, when three peojjle came running up from behind, calling out to make room, and flourishing what seemed to be the twisted cloths used in clearing the way. On coming near the Shastree, one of them struck him from behind, and the blow proved to have been given with a sword ; — others closed in from the front, and in an instant despatched him, wound- ing and putting to flight his four attendants. The Gooroo*, who was following from the temple with the other three, came up while the flambeaux, which had been thrown away, were still smoking, and found the body shockingly mangled. They had met five men with drawn swords running * Family Priest. pisHWA. 293 back to the temple, where they had left Trim- biikjee, just before they drew near to the spot. Thus, there could be no doubt that Trimbukjee had contrived and supermtended the assassination. His conduct, when applied to next day by the Shastree's people, who demanded an investigation for the discovery of the murderers, confirmed his guilt. He said it was impossible to discover upon whom to fix suspicion, for the Shastree had many enemies ; as, for instance, Seeta-Ram, who was under restraint at Brodera, and Kanojee, one of the Gykwar family, confined by the English in the Carnatic ; avoiding, however, the least mention of Bundojee and Bhugwunt, though the former was known to be at Pundurpoor at the time. The Shastree's people got leave next day to return to Poona, where the rest of the mission was with Bapoo Myral ; and it was intimated to them, that there was no necessity for their again approaching either the Peshwa's or Trimbukjee's quarters. In the meantime, Bajee Rao, who heard of the murder the night of its occurrence, redoubled the precautions for his personal safety. Trimbukjee, too, never went out without a strong guard ; both evidently apprehensive of retaliation. Not only was no in- vestigation set on foot, but the matter was pro- hibited to be talked of? and spies were employed to give notice of such as offended in this respect* who were apprehended under Trimbukjee';^ au. 294 PESHWA. thority. Bundoojee and Bhugwunt came openly to Poona, where they lived without privacy or concealment. With these events, the month of July 181. 5 was brought to a close. The proceedings insti- tuted on the part of the British government, in consequence of this murderous outrage, will fur- nish the contents of a separate chapter. 295 CHAPTER VIII. POONA CONTINUED. - August to December, 1815. Resident — his resolves — Returns to Poona — Obtains proof against Trimbukjee — Demands audience — Presents a me- morial — charging Trimbukjee — Calls subsidiary force from frontier — Bajee' Rao hesitates — Asks proof — Evades re- ceiving it — Gykwar mission threatened — A ttempts to screen Trimbukjee — Hyderabad force called in — Expedients offer- ed and refused — Instructions arrive — Second memorial thereon — Demand of Trimbukjee's surrender — Pcshwa's irresolution — Seizure of Trimbukjee and surrender — Re- flections — Effect in Goozerat. Mr. Elphinstone was at Ellora, when he heard of the Shastree's violent death, and of the suspicions attaching upon Trimbukjee ; although the circumstances were as yet transmitted only by vague and indistinct report, he immediately saw the necessity of taking a decided part. The deceased was the avowed minister of an ally of the British government, who had come to a friendly court under the security of a special gua- rantee, for the purpose of assisting at an adjust- ment, which that government had undertaken 296 I'ESHWA. and }ia(l been called upon to make. Therefore, although the Britisii government was no further a party to the negotiation, in which he had latterly been concerned, than is implied in his having en- tered upon it with the knowledge and tacit con- sent of the British representative, still nothing had occurred to annul the personal guarantee, on the security of which the Gykwar minister had ventured within the precincts of the Poona court. Under this impression, Mr. Elphinstone no sooner heard of the manner of his death, than he addressed a letter to the Peshwa, ex- pressive of his concern at the event, and de- manding a rigorous investigation, with a view- to the speedy detection and punishment of the murderers. He at the same time forwarded the intelligence to the Governor-general, soHciting special instructions for his guidance in every pos- sible event ; and expressing his intention, in the interim, to hasten back to Poona ; and if his ex- amination of the Shastree's people should fix the guilt on Trimbukjee, and it should be found in- expedient to wait the anival of instructions, immediately to accuse that favourite, and demand of the Peshwa his arrest and trial, in vindication of the insult offered to the British name and authority. He did not think it necessary or advisable to travel out of his way, in order to fix upon Bajee Rao himself a charge of participa- PESHWA. 297 tion ; conceiving it more prudent, and, at the same time, quite as effectual for the sake of example, that the prince's minister and favourite, the adviser and instrument of the act, shoidd be vi- sited with the entire responsibility. Having form- ed this resolution, and called back the subsidiary force fi'om Jalna, where it was then cantoned, to Seroor, in order to be prepared for the worst, the Resident directed his assistant, who had re- mained behind at Poona, to offer his unqualified protection to the remainder of the Gykwar mis- sion ; and even, if it should be necessary, to an- nounce a rupture of the subsisting alliance with the Peshwa, as the consequence of any fiuther attempt at violation. He then set off direct for Poona, where he arrived on the 6th of August. On the route, he met groups of pilgrims return- ing from Pundurpoor, all of whom agreed in giving the same account of the transaction, and in ascribing the perpetration of it to Trimbukjee. The Shastree was a Brahmin * of the highest caste, and of great reputation for learning and sanctity of character ; the manner of his death, * For some account of the sacrilegious horror with wliich the Hindoos regard the murder of a Brahmin, the European reader is referred to the narrative of Ncrayun Rao's murder by his uncle Rughoonath, contained in Forbes' Oriental Me- moirs. Shastree was an agnomen, or rather a title acquired by proficiency in the Shastcrs. 298 PESHWA. therefore, in a holy city, in the midst of a pil- grimage, at which myriads were collected, and in the very precincts of the temple of their resort, had inflamed the superstitious minds of all who witnessed it with more than ordinary horror and detestation of the crime. Returning to their homes in every direction, they communicated their feeling wherever they went, tUl it became the general sentiment of the Mahratta nation and Hindoo sect, to a degree quite imusual in a country, where the means of diffusing informa- tion are so limited. Arrived at Poona, Mr. El- phinstone made a very particular examination of the Shastree's people, and of every one likely to afford evidence or information. The result was, the clear establishment of the facts and circum- stances above related ; and the evidence was so minute and consistent in all its parts, as not to leave a shadow of doubt in respect to Trim- bukjee's direct participation, and actual superin- ten dance of the assassination. Meantime, Trimbukjee and, his master had augured, from the Resident's demand of investi- gation, as well as from the protection afforded to the remainder of the Gykwar mission, and the whole conduct of Mr. Elphinstone, that it was his resolution to take a decided course in the matter of the Shastree's murder. Both were con- PESHWA. 299 sequently in the utmost alarm and suspense re- specting his intentions ; and began immediately to raise troops, and take every possible precaution for their personal safety. Trimbukjee hurried home to Poona, where he arrived on the 7th of August at night. One of his personal adherents, who had charge of the city in his absence, had waited on Mr. Elpliinstone in the course of the day, apparently to sound his intentions ; but on being directly questioned as to what investigation had taken place, and how it was that Bhugwunt Rao and Bundojee were living at large, he was confused, and could give no answer. The P^sh- wa himself entered Poona on the 9th by stealth, under cover of the night, in a close palanquin, without previous notice, without the troops being drawn out, or any one's going forth to meet him. This was the more extraordinary, because it was the day of the Dukshina* festival, when money is bountifully distributed among the Brahmins, thousands of whom were collected for the pur- pose ; and the P^shwa had never yet been known to fail of presiding at the largess. The whole city was in alarm at these unusual demonstrations. The rest of the Gykwar mission, under Bapoo Myral, were shunned by every one, * For an account n-f this ffslival, sec .Scott-Warin^'. 300 P^SHWA. and apparently regarded as victims already de- voted to destruction. In vain were the utmost efforts made to quiet their fears. In this state of things, Mr. Elphinstone saw the necessity of taking his measures without waiting the Go- vernor-general's orders, which, at the earliest, could scarcely arrive in a month from that date ; an interval that would have allowed Trimbukjee to complete his preparations, and to remove, in- timidate, or cut off the witnesses, and that must infallibly have driven the Peshwa to make com- mon cause with his minister ; since, while the suspense continued, they both had common fears. On the 11th of August, therefore, the Resident demanded an audience, which was refused on the ground of indisposition. The demand was re- l)eated next day, and evaded on the pretext, that an infant daughter had died, which rendered his Highness impure for three days. Unable longer to brook these subterfuges, especially as his object was to remove the cause of them, by relieving Bajee Rao fi'om his state of suspense and personal alarm, he resolved to send a written note, which he had drawn out, to be presented at the audience, in case one could have been procured. The paper was sent to Suda Sheeo Bhao, the usual channel of communication before Trimbukjee's late appointment ; but he declined to present it, as did every other minister that PESHWA. 301 was ai)plied to. At last Mr. Elphinstone resolved to send his mooiishee with it openly, but all means of getting it delivered were still unsuccess- ful. Two people came, however, on the P^shwa's part, apparently to sound the Resident as to its contents. He accordingly opened himself so far as to let it be seen that the paper only affected Trimbukjee, and that Bajee Rao was not per- sonally involved in the charge ; and Avould be so, only in the event of his continuing to counte- nance and support that favourite. After this explanation, the written paper * obtained a re- ception on the 15th of August. It began with expressing a conviction that the Peshwa must have been desirous of revenging the foul murder of a foreign minister and a Brahmin like himself, had his ministers suffered the truth to reach his ears ; but as it was evident they had not done so, * Those who would ascertain the real merits of Indian diplomacy, and would possess themselves of the secret ne- cessary to those employed in such negotiations, for baffling the arts, deceptions, and subterfuges of the treacherous Mah- ratta and wily Brahmin, should peruse Mr. Elphinstone's unassuming account of his part in these negotiations, in the record of his original correspondence with the Indian go- vernment. The whole of the account here given of the Poona affairs is but a meagre abstract of that correspondence. Mr. Elphinstone's letter of the 16th of August, on that part of the transactions now detailing, is perhaps as interesting a document as ever found its way into a record-oifice. 302 PESHWA. and, under the circumstances, conld not be ex- pected so to do, it had become necessary that it shoidd reach his Highness through an imbiassed channel, on which account the British Resident addressed him upon the matter. The memorial proceeded to charge Trimbukjee with dkect par- ticipation in the murder of Gungadhur Shastree, showing how the universal voice of the nation marked him out as the guilty person, while the circumstances of the transaction, his uniform con- duct before and after it, his suppression of all investigation, even after it had been demanded by the British Resident, and his actual encou- ragement of those, who would otherwise have been objects of suspicion, brought the charge home to him in the clearest and most undeniable manner. After recapitulating the proofs, it thus continued : — " On all these grounds, I declare my conviction of Trimbukjee Dainglia's guilt, and I call upon your Highness to apprehend him, as well as Govind Rao Bundojee and Bhugwunt Rao Gykwar, and to deposit them in such custody as may be considered safe and trustworthy. Even if your Highness is not fully convinced of the guilt of these persons, it must be admitted, that there is sufficient ground for confining them ; and I only ask of you to do so, until his Excellency the Governor-general and your Highness shall have an opportunity of consulting on the subject. PESHWA. 303 I have only to add my desire, that this apprehen- sion may be immediate. A foreign ambassador has been murdered in the midst of your Highness' court. A Brahmin has been massacred, ahnost in the temple, during one of the gi'eatest solemni- ties of your religion ; and I must not conceal from your Highness, the impunity of the perpetrators of this enormity has led to imputations not to be thought of against your Highness' government. Nobody is more convinced of the falsehood of such insinuations than I am ; but I think it my duty to state them, that your Highness may see the necessity of refuting calumnies so injurious to your reputation. I beg you also to observe, that while Trimbukjee remains at large, his situation enables him to commit further acts of rashness, which he may undertake on purpose to embroil your Highness with the British government. He is at the head of the administration at Poona, and has troops at his command. He is likewise in charge of your Highness' districts, which are con- tiguous to the possessions of the British govern- ment, the Nizam and the Gykwar ; and, even though he should raise no public distvu'bances there, I cannot but consider with uneasiness and apprehension, in what manner your Highness' af- fairs will be conducted. For these reasons, it is absolutely necessary that immediate steps should be taken ; as your Highness will be held respon- 304 PESHWA. sible by the Governor-general for any acts of vio- lence which Trini])ukjee may commit after this intimation. I therefore again call on your High- ness to adopt the course which I have pointed out to you as the only one which can restore con- fidence to the public ministers deputed to your court. They cannot otherwise enjoy the security necessary to transact business with your Highness; nor can they with safety even reside in the city : and every body will be obliged to take such steps as he may deem necessary for his own protection. One consequence of this will be, an interruption of your communication with the British govern- ment, until the measure I have recommended shall be adopted. I beg that your Highness' reply may be communicated through some person imconnected with Trimbukjee Dainglia." The memorial concluded with assuring his Highness, that the British government had no design what- ever of interfering with the freedom of his choice of a successor to Trimbukjee, or with the indepen- dence of his internal administration ; which the Peshwa might perhaps have suspected was the ulterior object of this attack on his minister. Nothing could have been better adapted to work on Bajee Rao's hopes and fears, and induce him to screen himself by sacrificing his favourite, than this memorial. The subsidiary force marched into its cantonment at Seroor, on the 17th of Au- P^SKWA. 305 gust. Mr. Elphinstone had taken the precaution of strengthenhig the brigade of this force, which was regularly cantoned at Poona, hy having ano- ther battalion marched in, as if to relieve one of those composing the brigade. But as soon as the memorial was received, he suffered the ' relieved battalion to join the main body at Seroor, think- ing such a display of confidence would have a good effect at this time. The Peshwa was evidently embarrassed and irresolute- He sent a messenger to say, that he was considering the memorial, and to propose a distant day for an interview. The Resident de- clared himself jjarticularly desirous of an audience, but intimated that he could not go to the palace, if he was to meet Trimbukjee there and at large. A day or two afterwards, a message came from the Peshwa, through Suda Sheeo Bhao, declaring that Bajee Rao believed Trimbukjee innocent; but that if Mr. Elphinstone would undertake to prove the three distinct invitations, he woidd have him arrested. That gentleman at once closed with the proposal ; but, though he did - not cease to press the execution of the Peshwa's part of this offei", it was perpetually evaded. The excuse set up by Trimbukjee for not ordering an immediate investigation on the night of the murder, was, that he was so busy sweeping the temple, that he did not hear of it in time. He thus admitted his X 300 VESHWA. having been at the si)ot, whence the assassins issued, and to which they were seen to return after the act was perpetrated. During this discussion, the situation of Bapoo Myral and the rest of the Gykwar mission became very critical. Mr. Elphinstone had, some days before, advised their coming and encamping close by the residency ; but Bundojee and Trimbukjee had l)een tampering with the escort, and had gained over the greater part, so that a strict watch was set on all their motions. On pretence of sending off the Shastree's children and family, the whole were marched a little way out of the city without disturbance ; but when it was pro- posed to move next morning to the residency, the escort broke out into open mutiny, and, under the pretext of demanding an advance of pay, surround- ed Bapoo Myral and his people in such a manner, that escape was impossible. The difficulty of their position was manifest ; but to have attempted a rescue by the British troops at Poona, would in- fallibly have produced the massacre of the whole ; — the excuse of some disturbance being all that was needed to bring matters to this extremity. The Resident contented himself, therefore, with sending his guarantee of what money Bapoo My- ral might promise ; and, with this security, the latter was enabled to win over half the mutineers, and to get quit of the other half without blood- PESHWA. 307 shed. The arrangement, however, cost a lakh and a quarter, which was advanced by the Re- sident in exchange for bills on the Gykwar treasury. On the 20th of August, hearing that the levy of troops was going on with increased acti\^ty, Mr. Elphinstone remonstrated, declaring, that if this measure were not discontinued, he should be obliged to call in the subsidiary force to Poona, and take such measures for his own security, and for the interests of his government, as must lead to a rupture. In reply, a bullying message was re- ceived, stating, that howsoever desirous the Pesh- wa might l:»e to preserve the alliance, the person accused in this case was one of the greatest conse- quence ; having ten thousand horse and five thou- sand foot at his devotion, besides fifty or sixty forts, and a territory yielding seventy-five lakhs of rupees: that therefore it was necessary to proceed with cau- tion, as there were many difficulties in the way of the course recommended by the Resident. Direct attempts were, at the same time, made to intimi- date and buy off the witnesses, whose evidence was known to constitute the proof possessed by Mr. Elphinstone. A further message was sent, declaring it not to be conformable even to English law to imprison before conviction ; and that as yet no proof had been offered, that the assassins were X 2 308 P^SHWA. in Triinbukjee's service, or otherwise connected with him. These, and other arguments verbally adduced, were answered at length in a written communication, the matter of which it would be superfhious to detail. In the mean time, the indications of an inten- tion on the part of Bajee Rao, either to make common cause with the favourite, or to abet his flight into the country, where, under the pretext of rebellion, he might place the resources of the Poona state in direct hostility to the British go- vernment, were growing daily more strong and conclusive. Mr. Elphinstone in consequence ap- plied to have the Hyderabad force marched from the vaUey of Berar to Jalna, where it might be in readiness to act according to occasion. This ap- plication was nearly simultaneous with Mr, Rus- sell's recall of that force to Hyderabad, for the settlement of the disturbance then excited by the Princes. Hoping, however, that nothing serious would arise at that court, the Resident at Poona repeated his request for a light force, at least, to take up the pursuit, in case Trimbukjee should fly before Colonel L. Smith, the commandant of the Poona subsidiary force. The Hyderabad com- motion having subsided altogether in the interim, the whole of Colonel Doveton's army moved upon Jalna at this requisition. ])uring the remainder of August, attempts were PESHWA. 309 made by the Peshwa to induce the Resident to forego his demand of Trimbukjee's arrest, by the offer of several expedients, — none of which went further, than that the accused should absent him- self from court and from Poona, pending the judi- cial investigation of his guilt or innocence, and lose his office. Of course, none of these offers could be listened to ; but Mr. Elphinstone waited with some anxiety the receipt of the first orders on the subject from the Governor-general, before taking any further step. Those orders arrived on the 1st of September. They had been made out immedi- ately on receipt of the first inteUigence of the murder, which had been despatched from Ellora about the end of July, and had reached the Mar- quess of Hastings, at Futtehgurh, in the middle of August. His LordshijD's instructions, assuming that there would be found sufficient evidence to fix the crime on Trimbukjee, provided specifically for every possible case of his surrender, or support by his master. In the event of his being deUvered up for trial and punishment at the Resident's requisition, the British representative was autho- rised to gratify the Peshwa, if necessary, with an assurance that the life of the offender was not sought by the British government, and that per- petual confinement would be tlie utmost severity exercised. But, in the event of that prince's refusing to bring his favourite to trial, or of his 310 PESHWA. affecting to consent to an investigation, and taking underhand means to render it nugatory, or of his refusing to deUver him up to punishment after the establishment of his guilt, Bajee Rao was to be held distinctly and personally responsible for the act: so, likewise, if he should abet Trimbukjee's escape from Poona, in order to raise the country ; unless the flight should be attended with such cir- cumstances as should acquit his Highness of any knowledge or participation. In the event of this responsibility being incurred, all communication was to be stopped, and preparations made to se- cure Bajee Rao's person, or at least to prevent his leaving the capital ; but extreme measures were not to be resorted to, unless it should be hazardous to delay, or absolutely necessary to anticipate his Highness' designs. A letter was addressed to the P^shwa himself by the Governor-general, in fur- ther support of the Resident's proceedings, which it was left to his discretion to present or not as he might deem expedient. Thus assured of the Governor-general's unqua- lified support in the course he had adopted upon his own judgment, Mr. Elphinstone prepared a second memorial, which he delivered on the 4th of September, together with the Marquess of Hast- ings' letter. This memorial began by setting forth the tenor of the instructions just received ; and declaring Bajee Rao to have already incurred PESHWA. 3 1 1 the responsibility adverted to in the Governor- general's letter, by systematic neglect of all inves- tigation, and by evasion of the demand for the arrest of Trimbiikjee, preparatory to his trial and punishment : it proceeded to require the imme- diate delivery of Trimbukjee to the British go- vernment, alleging his instructions to warrant the demand of caf)ital punishment ; but, out of regard for his Highness, and because he (the Resident) thought the expression of his Highness' anxiety might yet prevail with the Governor-general to spare his life, he should be contented with his delivery, until the receipt of further orders. The memorial went on to declare the alternative of a refusal of this demand to be, a suspension of all communication, and the calling in of the troops to Poona, where Mr. Elphinstone stated his inten- tion still to remain, until he should be made ac- quainted with the ulterior wishes of the Governor- general, unless an attempt on the part of his Highness to leave Poona, or the continued levy of troops by his Highness, should render active hos- tility necessary in the interim. Up to this time, Mr. Elphinstone had contented himself with demanding that the Pcshwa should himself hold Trimbukjee in restraint, until his trial should take place, as had been offered by Bajee Rao himself. The advance of this demand to that of the unqualified surrender of the accused 312 PESHWA. to the British j^ovcrnment had become absohitely necessary ; for, with the disposition evinced by the Poona court, it was evident that any investiga- tion, which might now be set on foot by its au- thority, would be the merest mockery in the world. It was most fortunate that the Governor- general's instructions, warranting such an advance of demand, arrived at the particular juncture ; for Bajee Rao was still evidently hesitating between the surrender of his favourite and the rujiture of the alliance ; and the obloquy attending the for- mer alternative seemed to have by far the most weight with him. At one time he had resolved to make common cause with Trimbukjee, and relays of horses had been placed for their joint flight from the capital ; from which course he was dissuaded only by Gokla, a southern jageer- dar, and one of the best mihtary officers in his service. The second memorial of the 4th of September, with the Governor-general's letter, found the Peshwa in this state of suspense ; and it was further communicated on the part of the Resident, that unless Trimbukjee should be seized in the course of the following day, the alternative threatened would be resorted to. His eyes seem to have been opened by this communication to the real danger of his situation. Nearly the whole of the night of the 4th of September was spent in consultation with the Bhao, Gokla, and another I'ESHWA. 313 l>erson high in confidence, viz. Balooba, dewan of the \^inshorkm* jageerdar. On the following morning the Bhao was sent with a message, that his Highness would confine Trimbukjee, on the condition that neither his life nor his surrender should be demanded. Mr. Elphinstone returned for answer, that he coidd hear nothing until the offender was seized. However, he thought it right to explain to the Bhao, that he conceived the surrender of Trimbukjee to the British go- vernment, and of Bundojee and Bhugwunt to that of the Gykwar, would satisfy all parties, and set the whole affair at rest ; that no advantage would be taken of any disclosures by Trimbukjee after his confinement, and that the investigation should be urged no further. These assurances seemed to be necessary to quiet Bajee Rao's per- sonal apprehensions. The result of the conference was reported by the Bhao, the same morning, and the whole of this day also was spent in consulta- tion. In the night, it was resolved to send Trim- bukjee to a hill fort, and the selection being left to him, he was sent off to Wusuntgurh, under an escort of two hundred Arabs, and a body of horse. The Bhao next morning waited upon the Resident, to acquaint him with what had been done, and to request that the Gykwar negotiation might be re-opened, and every thing go on as before. Mr. Elphinstone declared, that now Trimbukjee was 314 I'ESHWA. in confinement, tlic P^shwa must be answerable that he did not escape or create disturbances ; but that, before the matter could be considered as settled, he must be actually given up to the British government, according to the demand made, and the present instructions of his own court ; for that he daily expected further orders, in answer to subsequent communications, those now acted upon having been issued before the late evasive conduct of his Highness was known ; and he could not answer for what the next might contain. That, when received, he should be obliged to obey them to the letter, however injurious to his Highness' interests, unless the present demand should have been complied with in the interim ; in which case, he should of course suspend their execution, till the Governor-general was informed of the compliance with his first demand. The confinement of Trimbukjee was believed through- out Poona to be a mere device to gain time ; and the mode of it, together with the continuance in office of all his adherents, confirmed this im- pression. The Bhao returned on the 7th of September, with an endeavour, by working on Mr. Elphinstone's feelings, to induce him to forego the demand for the delivery of Trimbukjee's person. He claimed to himself the merit of having induced the Pesh- wa to confine that favourite, stating that he had TESHWA. 315 succeeded only by engaging personally that this would satisfy the British Resident. If, therefore, the further demand were still persisted in, he was himself in a dilemma, from which poison alone could .extricate him. It was hardly credible that, know- ing Mr. Elphinstone's sentiments and resolutions so fully as the Bhao must have done, he would so have pledged himself; but it was resolved, at all events, not to recede. The attempt was repeated next day with the same ill success : yet the Bhao survived his difficulties. Secret intrigues were also set on foot, through every medium likely to have influence at the British residency ; but threats, entreaties, and persuasions were alike ineffectual. Levies of horse and foot were still making every where ; and positive information was received, that it was the Peshwa's intention to fly to the fort of Wye, and there raise the standard of the Mahratta empire. Mr. Elphinstone accordingly resolved no longer to delay calling in the main body of the subsidiary force from Seroor; and gave the Peshwa notice of his havins: done so. This produced a message of remonstrance through the Bhao, which was answered in such terms as seemed most likely to fix the Peshwa's wavering resolutions for the sacrifice of Trimbukjee. His surrender, it was announced, woidd be all the satisfaction expected ; for that, except perhaps some atonement to the Gykwar for the murder of 316 PfesHWA. his minister, nothing further would Ijc demanded by tlie Britisli government ; that one word from his Highness now could accomplish this : but if he hesitated much longer, or attempted to leave Poona, an amicable settlement would be no longer possible. While this message was on its way, the Peshwa had sent for Major Ford, an officer of the Company's service, who had raised and disciplined a brigade of infantry for his Highness, as part of his contingent. On his arrival, he was left with Chimnajee, Bajee Rap's brother, and Moro Dik- shut, a minister who latterly had been gi'owing into favour. These two consulted him on the best means of re-establishing the former terms of intercourse ; and on his recommending the deli- very of Trimbukjee, as the only measure he could suggest, went with his advice into the next room, whence they brought his Highness' consent. The mode of his delivery was accordingly arranged. A party of Major Ford's brigade was to bring him from Wusuntgurh ; and the Peshwa (as the Resi- dent was told next day) had no objection to a party of the British troops accompanying, but this was decUned. At the close of the conference with the Major, Bajee Rao appeared in person, and con- firmed what the other two had agreed to, requir- ing Major Ford's engagement, that the act of surrender should replace every thing on the for- mer footing ; and that any fresh orders from the rfesHWA. 317 Governor-general should be suspended, even should they arrive before he could acquaint Mr. Elphin- stone. Gopal Punt, the manager of the brigade business at court, accompanied Major Ford to the residency, and carried back thence the assurance, that on the delivery of Trimlnikjee, every thing sliould revert to its former state ; and that, except perliaps some satisfaction to the Gykwar, which must still be left to the Governor-general's dis- cretion, no further demand or proceeding should be instituted in consequence of the Shastree's murder. On the 11th of September, eight hundred and fifty men of the brigade marched from Poona, un- der the command of Captain Hick ; and on the 19th they received charge of Trimbukjee; along with whom Bhugwunt Rao and Bundojee were delivered up at Poona, on the 25th ; and next day the three prisoners were sent down to Tanna fort in Salsette, under charge of a light battalion and a regiment of cavahy, from the subsidiary force. The main body of that force, under Colonel L. Smith, returned on the 29th to Seroor. Thus was accomplished, ])y negotiation, with- out a rupture of the alliance, and entirely througli the spirit, firmness, and diplomatic ability of the British Representative, the important object of vindicating the honour and reputation of his na- tion, which had received the grossest insult, in 3 1 8 PESHWA tlie murder of an ambassador, negotiating under its guarantee of protection. The Peshwa had sub- mitted to the humiliation of sacrificing his minis- ter and favourite, in atonement for an act which had evidently been committed with his concur- rence and participation. He had, in vain, tried every artifice and subterfuge to avert or delay the moment of submission ; and when every attempt of this description had been baffled by the firm- ness and vigilance opposed to him, there can be no doubt that his inclination was, rather to risk a rupture of the alliance, than to submit. But his own good sense, and the representation of the Sirdars, in whom he placed his principal trust, sa- tisfied him of the present insufficiency of his means to cope single-handed with the British power. It was evident, however, that henceforward we had nothing to expect but rancorous and malignant hate ; and that the same fear, which had produced the important result on this occasion, would re- quire to be constantly kept alive, in order to curb the natural bent of his mind. Mr. Elphinstone's conduct throughout the whole of this negotiation met with the Marquess of Hastings' particular ap- probation ; and his Lordship felt, that the success- ful termination of the affair was mainly attributable to the prompt and decisive tone assumed and main- tained from the outset to the close of the discussion. On the whole, perhaps, it was fortunate that rfesHWA. 319 the short-sighted violence of Trimbukjee brought matters thus prematurely to a crisis between his master and the British government. The uniform conduct of that favourite's administration, pro- ceeding from ignorance, either real or affected, of the actual relations of the Peshwa at this period, had ah-eady given rise to so many infractions of the subsisting engagements, and of the treaty of Bassein in particiUar, that it would have been im- possible to have suffered them to pass much longer without notice *. His measures must soon have * In proof of this it may be sufficient to mention, that, on the 27th of the preceding May, soon after the court arrived at Nassik, the Resident had found it necessary to present a re- monstrance against Trimbukjee's measures. The most im- portant infraction of the treaty of Bassein was, a treaty made with a Guandwana Raja, the preamble of which declared it to be offensive against both the Nizam and Bhoosla : this had been negotiated by Trimbukjec himself, after marching a hostile force into the Nizam's dominions, and occupying several of his villages. The affair took place about the prece- ding February, when Trimbukjee had been sent with some troops in pursuit of the Pindara Sheikh Duloo. The whole proceeding, however, was not only without the participation of the British government, as required by the treaty of Bas- sein, but the troops had driven away an agent sent By the British Resident at Nagpoor, to endeavour to settle a boun- dary dispute that had occurred in the neighbourhood, between the officers of the Nizam and Bhoosla ; and Ti'imbukjec had put himself in possession of the disputed lands. Many similar infractions of the subsisting engagements, which luul been pro- 320 vfesHWA. come to the pass of compelling the British govern- ment to demand the displacement of the minister, as a pledge, that the frequent acts of offence, which had occurred under his administration, were without his Highness' countenance. In diiced by the conduct of his agent at Ahmedabad, were also brought forward in this remonstrance. Mr. E. then attri- buted these acts rather to the ignorance and Mahratta habits of the favourite, than to any deliberate design of breaking with the British government. But it cannot be denied, that the tone assumed at some of the discussions of that time was such as to indicate the^most ambitious views. In one con- ference, the rights of the Peshwa coming under discussion, Trimbukjee went so far as to assert his master's right to the Chouf of Bengal, under the cession of Uleevurdee Khan, and to that of Mysoor, agreed to by Hyder Ulee : such was the temper of the man, who had been specially appointed a short time before to conduct business on behalf of the Peshwa with the British Representative at his court. The high favour he still enjoyed made it difficult not to identify the Peshwa with his minister. Had the Mahratta powers risen against the Eng- lish in the year 1814-15, there can be little doubt, that Bajee Rao would have seized the first occasion to shake off his sub- sidiary connexion with us, and take his station amongst them : but he was not yet prepared to take the lead himself, and offer an example for their imitation, in the manner he did in 1817-18. Naturally suspicious and timorous, he w^ould pro- bably have preferred to take no active part, until he had seen what success attended others. The bolder plan he ultimately adopted, he was goaded to by the continual loss and dis- appointment he incurred, in the prosecution of that course of insidious attack which he commenced from this time forward. GYKWAR. 321 such an event, Trimbukjee would have been backed by popular feeling, and have been regard- ed as the victim of our displeasure, for honestly preferring his master's interests to ours ; and, at the other native courts, the Peshwa would have made a strong case of the indignity put upon him, and represented it as a warning of the consequence of too close a connexion with a power so consti- tuted as the British. In the issue to which mat- ters were brought by the Shastree's murder, we stood forth in the character of avengers of the death of a Brahmin ambassador, and had the full advantage of the popular voice on our side, even among the Peshwa's own subjects. This favour- able impression lasted beyond the immediate oc- casion ; insomuch, that two years afterwards, when a rupture occurred with nearly all the Mahratta states, the cause of the British nation derived a vast accession of strength in public opinion, fi'om recollection of the foul murder of this Brahmin, in which the quarrel had originated ; and the indif- ference manifested upon the subsequent downfall of the Peshwa's dynasty was owing, in a great measure, to its being regarded as a judgment on the reigning head of the family for his participation in this crime, ])olluted as he was already by the yet unexpiated murder of Nurayun Rao by his father Rughoonath. The Shastree's death, as might have been ex- Y ' 322 GYKWAR. pected, excited a considerable sensation through- out Goozerat. Futteh Singh and the party of the deceased, though they lamented the loss as ir- reparable, hoped from it, at any rate, the entire exoneration from all demands of the Poona go- vernment. On the other hand, the party in communication with Trimbukjee hoped, by his means and through the Peshwa's influence and power, to bring about a revolution in the affairs of the court of Brodera. Seeta-Ram and his ad- herents were raising troops, and making prepara- tions to act according to the turn events might take at Poona ; a body of men, under a maraud- ing chief in Seeta-Ram's interest, approached from Dhar so near as Dawud ; and the two managers in Ahmedabad were acting in concert, and both levying horse and foot. Under these circum- stances, the Bombay government had thought it advisable to detain the Goozerat force, which, on its presence becoming unnecessary in Central India, had before been destined to the adjustment of affairs in Kuch, whence some of the border tribes had been latterly in the habit of making predatory incursions into Goozerat. Every thing remained in a state of the most anxious suspense, until the amicable settlement of the discussions at Poona was known. It produced a simulta- neous effect at Brodera and Ahmedabad. In the interim, Gungadhur Shastree's son was appointed GYKWAR. 323 to all his father's offices, rather in demonstration of the sense entertained of the services of the deceased, than out of regard to any superior qua- lifications the son was thought to possess. After the deUvery of Trimbukjee and the two agents of Seeta-Ram to the British authority, the two latter were transferred to the Gykwar, and con- fined in hill-forts within the dominions of that state. The Bombay government, however, re- solved to prevent the occurrence of similar in- trigues, by taking Seeta-Ram into their own custody ; an arrangement to which the court of Brodera was not induced to accede without ex- treme difliiculty. The question of the degree of compensa- tion to be afforded the Gykwar, for the murder of his minister and the representative of his court, was, in the following January, thus de- cided by the Governor-general, to whose arbi- tration it had been referred. Assuming the sur- render of Trimbukjee, the actual perpetrator, to be an entire exculpation of the Peshwa's go- vernment from any .share or participation in the act, his Highness was declared to be exone- rated from further responsibility, and, therefore, from the obligation to offer any specific atone- ment to the offended state. The Resident was, however, instructed to endeavour by persuasion to lead his Highness to make some handsome Y 2 *i24 GYKWAR. provision for the family of the Sliastree, as a spontaneous act of generosity : for the Supreme Government did not conceive itself to possess a right to make a special demand on this head. As a natural consequence of this view of the question, the negotiation for the settlement of the Peshwa's claim on the Gykwar was directed to be re-opened at the point where it had been broken off, in the same manner as if the murder had never taken place. The Peshwa occasionally revived it, but with little sincerity or interest ; his mind being apparently engrossed with the prosecution of an object nearer his heart, which, from this time, he will be found to have pursued with more consistency and determination ; viz. to bring about a general and secret combination of the Mahratta princes, directed against the British ascendancy. In the course of the nego- tiations respecting the surrender of Trimbukjee, Mr. Elphinstone was more than once assured that such a thing had been in agitation in the pre- ceding season ; but the Poona government as- sumed to itself credit for having abstained fi'om giving direct encouragement to the project. Bajee Rao certainly was not then prepared to put every thing to hazard on such a risk ; but from this time he seems to have resolved to do so, and himself to head the confederacy, as soon as it should be organized. GYKWAR. 325 While these events were passing at Poona, and, indeed, during the remainder of the year 1815, nothing of moment occun'ed at any of the courts of Southern and Central India. It was ascer- tained, however, that confidential agents, men of family and name amongst the Mahrattas, were still intriguing at each Mahratta durbar, with such secrecy, that the object of the intrigues could only be gathered from suspicion and ru- mour. Bajee Rao occupied himself in incessant endeavovu's to obtain, through Mr. Elphinstone, the release of his captive favourite ; but all his efforts directed to this end were of com'se una- vailing. In January 1816, the Governor-general addressed a letter to his Highness, in such terms as it was thought would be most effectual to extinguish all hope that the British government would ever consent either to release or give up the custody of this eminent offender. 326 CHAPTER IX. PINDAREES.— BHOPAL.-NAGPOOR. 1815-16, MAY TO MAY. Pindarees — Second reference to England — Army reduced — Operations of Pindarees — Party surprised — Successful ex- pedition — Second — British provinces ravaged v^ith impu- nity — Concert of Pindarees with Mahrattas — Intrigues of 181 5-1 6 — Holkur's court — Ameer-Khan — Bhopal — Death of Wuzeer Mohummed — and of Raghojee Bhoosla — Con- sequent deliberations — Bhopal alliance declined — Nagpoor — Pursajee — his incapacity — Apa Saheb — his pretensions — character — Dhurmajee Bhoosla — his intrigues — their ill success — Both parties court the British Resident — who waits instructions — their tenor — Alliance and terms of- fered — Transactions at Nagpoor — Dhurmajee confined — Apa Saheb regent — Seeks British alliance — Naroba — Ne- gotiation — its progress — conclusion — and signature — Re- flections — Subsidiary force called in — Further transactions at Nagpoor. The Marquess of Hastings had returned to the Presidency towards the close of the rainy season of 1815, more fully convinced than ever of the necessity of early undertaking the suppression of the predatory hordes, for which as yet no au- thority had arrived from England, Anticipating PINDAREES. 327 that the Nipal war would have closed with the first campaign, his Lordship had prepared himself to devote, if not immediately, at least in the sub- sequent year, the unreduced strength of the armies of the Bengal Presidency to the accom- plishment of the important object of securing the peace of Central India by the destruction of these lawless marauders. The assent of the home au- thorities to this undertaking could not appear doubtful to any one in Bengal : and, anticipating its arrival, he was desirous of acting while the late additions increased so much his military means, and before the extraordinary resources obtained from the Nuwab Vizeer should have been frittered away in expensive annual prepara- tions of defence. But, as the exjjected sanction of the authorities in England to the adoption of this course of poUcy had not arrived, his Lordship did not feel himself at lil^erty to undertake the proposed measures. After some discussion, it was resolved to submit a second and more ear- nest reference of the question for the conside- ration of the authorities, to whom the Supreme Government was responsible, and, in the interim* it was deemed necessary, as soon as the Goorkha war should be terminated, to make every possible reduction of the military establishments, which was done by breaking up the grenadier battahons and other temporary arrangements of the pre- ceding year. 328 VINDAUEES. Meantime, the Dussera of 1815 had been cele- brated at Cheetoo's cantonment of Nemawur by a greater concourse of Pindarees, than had ever before been assembled at one point. Preparation was evidently making for an expedition of more than ordinary interest, in which every durra was to have its share. On the 14th of October, a body of nearly eight thousand, of all descriptions, was ascertained to have crossed the Nerbudda, and to have taken a southward direction. It soon broke into two parties, one of which was heard of as it passed the valley of the Tap tee, and was beaten up in its bivoviack on the 24th of October, by a party of the Nizam's reformed in- fantry under Major Fraser, in number about three hundred, accompanied by about a hundred horse. The completeness of the surprise allowed the infantry time to fire several volleys, by which the Pindarees suffered soi^e loss before they could gallop off and disperse : but the horse would nei- ther attack nor pursue, nor even (which is yet more extraordinary) join in collecting the booty. Indeed, no efforts could get them from between the advance and rear guard of the infantry, so that the loss suffered by the freebooters was com- paratively trifling. This, and other examples of the degree of reliance to be placed on the Nizam's cavalry, induced the Supreme Government shortly afterwards to authorise the Resident at Hydera- PINDAREE&. 329 bad to exert his influence in procuring a similar reform to that ah*eady introduced by British officers into the infantry estabhshments, to be extended to the cavahy also, which were, of the two, deficient in perhaps the greater degree. A plan for the reform of the Nizam's horse was drawn up by Captain Sydenham, an officer em- ployed in a diplomatic situation at Aurungabad : and, since its introduction, these troops * have been distinguished by more courage and activity, and are now in nothing inferior to the irregular horse of other establishments. The routed party of Pindarees were not deten*ed by the sur- prise they had suffered from continuing their depredations in a southerly direction till they reached the banks of the Kishna. The other party, which had proceeded south-eastward, was heard of at Ramtikee and Choupara in the Nag- poor dominions. It thence traversed the Nizam's territories from north to south, till it also ap- peared on the northern bank of the Kishna, where no such danger was apprehended. The tcmtories of the Madras presidency lay on the * There were, from this time forward, six thousand of them continually in the field, whereof four thousand were under the command of British officers. The rest were fur- nished by Jageerdars, and fifteen Imndred of them by Sula- but Khan of EUichpoor. The reformed infantry consisted of six battalions, as mentioned in the introductory chapter. 330 riNDAREES. southern bank, and were only preserved from de- vastation by the fortuitous circumstance of the river continuing not fordable for horses so un- usually late as the 20th of November. Finding the Kishna impassable, the freebooters took a turn eastward, plundering the country for several miles along its populous and fertile banks, and committing every kind of enormity. On ap- proaching the frontier of Masulipatam, they shaped their course northward, and returned along the line of the Godavuree and Wurda, passing to the east of all Colonel Doveton's po- sitions, and making good their route to Ne- mawur, with an immense booty collected in the Nizam's dominions, and with utter impunity. The plunder obtained in this Luhbur was gi'eater than that of any previous expedition ; insomuch, that merchants were sent for from Oojein to purchase many of the valuables obtained, those of Nemawur not being sufficiently wealthy. Elated at this success, a second expedition was planned and proclaimed very soon after the return of the first. Pindarees again flocked in from every durra, to join in it ; and by the 5th of February, ten thousand, under different leaders, had again crossed from Nemawur, and were on their way S. S. E. in the route by which the former party had returned. The first that was heard of this body, after its crossing the Ner- PINDAREES. 331 budda, was its appearance on the western frontier of the district of Masulipatam, under the Madras Presidency, on the 10th of March. From this point it shaped its course southward to Dubakoo ; and next day made a march of thirty-three miles, in the course of which it plundered seventy-two villages, committing in each the most horrid cruelties upon the unarmed and inoffensive inha- bitants. The following day (12th), after a march of thirty-eight miles, and the destruction of fifty- four villages, the horde arrived at the civil station of Guntoor, where they plundered a considera- ble part of the town, and the houses of all the civil officers. The government treasure and the persons of the British Residents were protected at the Collector's office, by the exertions of a few troops and invalids kept at the station for civil duties. It being no part of the design of the Pindarees to risk the loss of time or lives, they immediately moved off with what they could get ; and before night there was not a single strange horseman in the neighbourliood. The whole had hurried off westward, making a march of fifty-two miles the next day in that direction. This body of marauders continued on the whole twelve days within the Company's frontier ; and, after leaving Guntoor, swept through part of the Kiri)a (Cudda- pa) district, and recrossed the Kishna on the 22d of Marcli. A squadron of the Madras 4th native 332 PINDAREES. cavalry, detached against them from Hyderabad, arrived on the opposite bank just after they had made good the passage. It happened that a con- siderable force was at the time in the field a little further to the west, for the settlement of a disputed succession to the Kurnol Jageer ; but, though it sent out detachments in every direction, and others were despatched from Hyderabad in their rear, the plunderers escaped from all with impu- nity. After recrossing the Kishna, the Luhbur seems by agreement to have separated into several bodies, in order the better to baffle pursuit and scour the country. The greater part moved west- ward, along the north bank of the Kishna, passing south of Hyderabad, until they approached the Peshwa's dominions ; when, turning short to the north, the whole retraced their steps to the Ner- budda in several divisions, and by various routes. The advanced guard of one body, led by Bheekoo Seyud, was heard of by Colonel Doveton, and overtaken, as it was passing the Ajunta range at Dewul Ghat, by a party of Mysoor horse, detached for the purpose. The Colonel himself had moved at the same time, under the guidance of a pri- soner, to intercept the main body; it escaped, how- ever, by a singular chance, and contrary to all expectation. The other parties, which had taken a more easterly course, met with no obstruction on their return ; and it was ascertained that nearly PINDAREES. 333 the whole of those who had passed tlie Nerljudda, in February, to engage in this expedition, had recrossed before the 17th of May, bringing a second immense harvest of booty within the year, and without having suffered any loss worthy of mention. Some idea may be formed of the extent of ravage and cruelty which marked the track of these banditti, from what was found to be the da- mage sustained by the Company's districts during the twelve days that they remained within the frontier. It was ascertained by a committee, sent to the spot for the express purpose of the in- vestigation, that three hundred and thirty-nine villages had been plundered, one hundred and eighty-two individuals * put to a cruel death, five hundred and five severely wounded, and no less than three thousand six hundred and three had been subjected to different kinds of torture. The private loss of individuals was estimated by * A great number of women destroyed themselves to escape violation. No less than twenty-five drowned them- selves for this purpose, several with infants. At Mavolee, where some resistance was attempted by the villagers, the women, seeing their protectors about to be overpowered, set fire to the house in which they had assembled to abide the residt ; and no less than ten, with six children, perished in the flames. Another woman, having fallen into the hands of the savages, and seeing no other means of destruction, tore out her tongue, and instantly expired. Many similar horrors, and some barbarities even more revolting to humanity, will be found recorded at length in the Report of the Committee. 334 riNDAREES. the committee at two lakh and a lialf of pagodas, about one hundred thousand pounds sterling. It would seem that the Pindaree leaders had this season come to a resolution to respect the territories of the Mahratta chiefs, and to direct their ravages chiefly, if not exclusively, against those of the Nizam and of the British government. This had been publicly given out in the hordes : and some of the few stragglers that were left behind and taken, stated the same thing on their examinations. Such a resolution may have been the result of the secret negotiations carried on by the Mahratta agents, particularly Balajee Koonjur, a person of high repute, and formerly a minister of the Peshwa. This man, having left Poona some years before in apparent disgrace, had latterly visited all the Mahratta courts, where he was received with marked attention, and evidently had some important business in hand. He was known to have had communication with the Pin- darees, on his way to Nagpoor from Sindheea's camp, in the early part of 1815 ; and from that city he went to Cheetoo's cantonment at Nema- wur, as if purposely to make them a party to the intrigue he was conducting. It was an insidious kind of hostihty, thus, under the mask of friend- ship and professions of attachment, to instigate the attacks of these irresponsible, unacknowledged bands ; but it is not on that account the less likely to have been suggested by the hatred and fears of PINDAIIEES. 335 the Mahratta chiefs, or recommended by their no- tions of morality. If any proof were wanting, that these enterprises of the Pindarees were under- taken in concert with the Mahratta powers, it might be found in the circumstance of the latter having afterwards chosen the particular moment of our prosecuting measures for the suppression of the predatory associations, to rise themselves against the British supremacy. ^Vithout some as- surance of such support, whenever our strength should be put forth against them, the Pindaree leaders would scarcely have commenced, at this particular juncture, a plan of systematic depreda- tion, pointedly aimed at the only power they had reason to fear. And if the plan of du^ecting the Pindarees against us originated in the councils of the Mahratta durbars, it must be traced to in- trigues anterior to those which accompanied and followed the discussions at the Poona court ; al- though these may doubtless have helped to ex- asperate the national feeling against us. A brief notice of the intrigues that passed in the season of 1815-16, will here, perhaps, be ac- ceptable. While the Peshwa was hesitating whe- ther to abandon his favourite or the British al- liance, he was naturally desirous of ascertaining how far he might reckon on the other Mahratta courts. He accordingly had taken measures to sound the Bhoosla and Sindheea ; but the answer of neither arrived until Bajee Rao had been 330 PINDAREES. forced to make his election for the surrender of his minister. It was ascertained, however, that both had given him to imderstand, that if he were v/illing fairly to commit himself and take the lead, he might depend on their co-operation ; though, until he did so, they were not disposed to trust him, or to come forward, at the hazard of taking the whole consequences on themselves. Baptist e's force was specially applied for by Trimbukjee, through Sindheea's agent at Poona, the channel used by the Peshwa to sound the disposition of that durbar. The answer was written in the form of a banker's letter to his correspondent. After assurances that Willoba Naeek (the Peshwa) might have drawn at pleasure, the letter pro- ceeded : " This banking-house is the Naeek's own ; while your house is in want of cash" (mean- ing troops) " you must submit to the importunity of creditors" (the British). "The Naeek ought, therefore, to go about for some time on pretence of pilgrimage ; l)ut let him write a bill in his own hand, and, after that, wherever money is required, thither it shall be sent without delay." The let- ter was dated 1 1 th of September, at the time the discussions were at their height ; and it is not difficult to discover both the advice, the assu- rance, and the distrust conveyed under this puerile disguise. The interest excited by these discussions, and by the state of the war and negotiations with MAHRATTAS. 337 Nipal, were the matters which engrossed the chief attention of all the Mahratta powers during the season of 1815-16. Holkur's troops were collect- ed and held in some state of preparation during the month of September ; but the pecuniary em- barrassments of that court were growing every day greater ; insomuch, that, in December, the two regent widows, Meena Baee and Toolsee Baee, were obliged to fly with their ward, JVIulhar Rao Holkur, to take refuge with Zalim Singh, the ma- nager of Kota, until the mutinous disposition of the troops, who had for some time been sitting dhurna* on the court for pay, could either be quelled, or their demands satisfied. They effected their escape on horseback after the young Holkur had been carried in procession with the Tazeea (the bier of Hoosein), during the Moohurrum, and thus got off unsuspected to Zalim Singh's fort of Gungerial. Before April 1816, the two widows, connecting themselves with different parties, came to a final rupture ; and Meena Baee, suspecting that Toolsee Baee's party had a design to seize her person, fled back for protection to a body of the * Dhurna is a kind of incessant importunity practised by creditors, when they have no other way of recovering their debt. The dun sits outside the door, under a vow not to eat till paid ; and, if a Brahmin, or of high caste, the creditor must practise similar abstinence until he pays. When troops sit Dhurna, they form a mutinous assemblage round the tent or palace of their sovereign or cliief, and not unfrequently subject him to personal indignities and violence. Z 338 AMEER KHAN. discontented troops. These, however, at the sug- gestion, it was supposed, of Toolsee Baee and Balaram Set, her adviser, placed her under re- straint, demanding their arrears from some private treasure she was suspected to possess. Ameer Khan did not seem disposed to take any further advantage of this confusion, than by the more complete establishment of his own indepen- dence. But his influence was exerted in favour of Balaram Set, and contributed materially to aid him in supplanting Tanteea Aleekur, who was very justly disliked and suspected by the Putans. In the earlier part of the season of 1815-16, Ameer Khan had been employed in settling the amount of the contribution he was to receive from Joudhpoor. The Raja, Man Singh, first employed his minister, Singhee Indraj, to negotiate this point ; and then, from jealousy of his power and influence, intrigued with Ameer Khan to have him murdered. This was effected at a conference within the citadel, where two Putans were ad- mitted to adjust with the minister the amount to be paid. The assassins were protected from the populace by the Raja, and sent back in safety to Ameer Khan, who, by agreement, held one of the gates of the city during the conference. This was the second assassination committed by the Putan chief at the suggestion of Raja Man Singh. Towards the end of the season, having adjusted matters with Joudhpoor, Ameer Khan made pre- BHOPAL. 339 parations for a serious attack on Jypoor, as will hereafter be more particularly related ; but it will be necessary first to mention some occurrences in which the British government were more imme- diately concerned, and which ended in giving us a position in Central India of no small importance, in the issue to which things were subsequently brought with the Mahrattas. While the Pindarees were engaged in the se- cond enterprise described above, two events had occurred, most propitious to the British interests in the quarter whence those marauders issued : these were the death of Wuzeer Mohummed, Nu- wab of Bhopal, on the 17th of March 1816, and that of Raghoojee Bhoosla, on the 22d of the same month. The former was succeeded by his son, Nuzur Mohummed, a very young man — too young, it was to be feared, for the perilous cir- cumstances of the principality, superadded to the troubles of a new succession. There was every reason, therefore, to apprehend that either the Mahrattas or the Pindaree chieftains in the neigh- bourhood would attempt to avail themselves of the occasion, to interfere in the concerns of Bhopal ; in either of which cases, a second and more sin- cere application for our permanent protection of its legitimate prince was to be expected as a na- tural consequence. Raghoojee's successor was his only son, Pursajee Bhoosla, known before his ac- A 2 340 BHOPAI,. cession by tlie name of Bala Saheb. The in- trigues and passing occurrences of that court like- wise promised equally to give the long- sought op- portunity of establishing a subsidiary connexion with the Nagpoor state. The question, whether or no the Supreme Government should now direct its efforts to the accomplishment of these two ob- jects, was thus forced upon the consideration of the Governor-general in council, in the month of April 1816. There was but one opinion in respect to the policy of forming the connexion with Nagpoor, which was accordingly resolved upon the mo- ment the question was brought forward. That with Bhopal had hitherto been regarded rather as an alternative, to be adopted in consequence of the impossibility of forming one with Nag- poor, or as a necessary precaution against the designs of a hostile Mahratta confederation : now, however, it presented itself in a new light ; and the point to be determined was, whether, having the means of establishing the British influ- ence at Nagpoor, the advantage of extending it in the direction of the Nerbudda, whenever the oc- casion offered, by the annexation of Bhopal, the territories of which lay opportunely contiguous, and presented advantages both of offence and de- fence against the Pindarees, did not call for its adoption yet more strongly than before. It was now recommended, not only as a measure of de- NAGPOOR. 341 fence in furtherance of the objects contemplated from the Nagpoor alliance, but also as a means of gaining a vantage ground for striking a blow at the predatory associations, whenever government might be free to adopt that course. The objec- tions urged against forming such a connexion had their foundation apparently in the apprehension of the risk of giving umbrage to the Mahratta pow- ers, which the steps taken in 1814-15 had proved to be an object of exaggerated alarm. Moreover, if the Nagpoor Raja were gained over to our side, that risk could scarcely be said to exist, or at the most, was a matter of comparative indifference to the British, after the successful close of the Ni- pal war. At the same time, having once esta- blished an alliance with Nagpoor, and obtained from it a position for a considerable force on the Nerbudda, the defence of Bhopal might be pro- vided for by an additional brigade, in communi- cation with that ])osition ; and this could be so chosen, as to form a connecting link with the force in Bundelkhund. The advantage of secur- ing the resources of this state in our own interest, and depriving the Pindarees of the means they derived from it, especially when this could be accomplished with such apparent facility, were strongly felt by the Governor-general ; who innne- diately perceived the incalculable benefit of this arrangement, both to the present interests of his government, and to the ulterior prosecution of a 342 BHOPAL, systematic plan, lor the entire sujjpression of those dangerous and rapidly increasing hordes of adven- turers and banditti. The Marquess of Hastings could not, however, consider these advantages, certain and consider- able as they were, sufficient, in the actual state of things, to warrant a departure from the policy en- joined by the authorities in England. Towards the close of the month of April, therefore, a short time after the Nagpoor connexion had been re- solved upon, his Lordship came to the resolution not to seek the Bhopal alliance, even should the negotiations, which were then opened at Nagpoor, be brought to a favourable issue. The political agent in Bundelkhund, as well as the Resident at the durbar of Sindheea, both of whom had soli- cited instructions for their guidance, in the ex- pectation of new overtures from Bhopal, or of further attempts against that principality on the part of the Mahrattas, were accordingly desired to refrain from giving to such overtures any en- couragement ; and to maintain, on behalf of the British government, the strictest neutrality and indifference in regard to what might be passing at Bhopal. They were, however, warned that there was no occasion to make public profession of this determination ; as any such declaration would in- fallibly have the effect of needlessly inviting the cupidity and ambition of the turbulent neighbours of the principality, who probably might else be NAGPOOR. 343 restrained by the fear of a second protective inter- ference. These instructions were strictly followed: and when, in the course of 1816, indirect overtures were made by the young Nuwab, they were an- swered by common-place expressions of courtesy and good-will, without meeting any further encou- ragement whatever.* Affau's were, in the mean time, hastening to a crisis at the court of Nagpoor. Raghoojee's succes- sor was nowise capable of conducting the govern- ment that had devolved upon him. He had been all his life reputed to be of a disposition flighty, and impatient of control ; but a recent sickness had deprived him of sight, and he had lost the use of one of his arms by a stroke of the palsy, that had left him, moreover, completely bedridden. His mind had also been affected by these bodily afflictions, and was frequently observed to wander, * In the beginning of 1817, an agent of the Nuwab, named Inayut Museeh, went over to Nagpoor, and there delivered a specific proposition, in writing, to Mr. Jenkins, the Resident, soliciting, on the part of Nuzur Mohummed, that the state might be admitted to the British protection, on the terms offered to Wuzeer Mohummed. This was followed up by a letter to the same effect, from the Nuwab himself to Mr. Wauchope, the political agent in Bundelkhund. On reference to the Supreme Government, it was still determined, after some deliberation, to adhere to the above resolution; but the Marquess of Hastings took the occasion to put his opinions on the question upon record, and to bring the subject to the special notice of the authorities in England. 344 NAG POOR. insomuch as scarcely to be sensible of what was passing. Several instances of this were cun-ent in the way of public conversation : for instance, during the ceremony of iDurning his father's body, he made very indecorous complaints of its length, and accused the Brahmins of having some sinister design in thus detaining him. He publicly charged Apa Saheb of attempting his life, when some consecrated water happened accidentally to be sprinkled over him ; and, on one occasion, in full durbar, expressed impatience as to what had be- come of his mustaches, forgetting that they had been shaved off, as a necessary circumstance of mourning for his father's death. There was, in- deed, but one opinion respecting his utter incom- petency to exercise the functions of his station; and all seemed to agrecLupon the necessity of an immediate resort to a provisional form of admi- nistration. The next heir to the Raja was Moodajee Bhoos- la, commonly called Apa Saheb, son of Vinkojee Bhoosla, (Nana Saheb,) the only brother of Raghoo- jee. The claims of an infant son of a daughter of Raghoojee were not held to come into competition with those of Apa Saheb, the nearest in the male line, except, indeed, in the case of his adoption by Pursajee ; marriage being considered, by most classes of Hindoos, to transfer the bride to her husband's family, and to cut off' herself and her descendants for ever from any claim on that of NAGPOOR. 345 her own parents. A pa Saheb was of an age and character to possess public consideration, and was naturally the person entitled to assume the re- gency ; but he had been on ill terms with his uncle, Raghoojee, for some time before his death, in consequence of the Raja's having attempted the resumption of a large territory which the nephew had inherited from his father. It had been pre- served to him, at last, by the aid of a remonstrance of the British Resident at Nagpoor ; and this cir- cumstance not only produced an irreconcileable difference between the two princes, but induced Raghoojee to have recourse to a series of measures, calculated to annoy and distress his nephew in every possible way. On his death-bed, however, Raghoojee, aware of his son's incapacity, sent for Apa Saheb, and placing his son's hand within that of his offended cousin, said, he made him the depo- sitary of the family honour ; endeavouring, by this tardy confidence, to secure his good offices towards Pursajee. But the ministers and favourites, who had been the instruments, if not the originators, of Raghoojee's persecution of his nephew, were not so easily reconciled to the idea of his assuming the supreme direction of affairs. A strong party accordingly formed itself, to oppose the claim of the heir-i)resumptive to the regency. It was headed by Dhurmajee Bhoosla, a chela or eltve of the deceased Raja, who had risen to such 346 NAGPOOR. favour with him, as to be intrusted with the charge of a great part of his public and private treasures, amounting, as was supposed, to about a crore of rupees. This man was an unprincipled libertine, and had been the instigator and chief actor in those measures of extortion, which had marked the close of Raghoojee's life ; and latterly rendered it dangerous for any man of wealth to reside or come within his dominions. Besides the large influence resulting from the control of the treasury, Dhurmajee had several partisans in the muhulf or women's apartment, and enjoyed a considerable share of popularity among the Arab mercenaries, who guarded the palace and person of the new Raja. The principal oflEicers of the late prince's ministry joined this party, and formed a scheme for vesting the regency in Buka Baee,* the favourite wife of the deceased ; and further, for inducing his successor to adopt the infant grandson of Raghoojee, to the perpetual exclusion of Apa Saheb from all share in the administration, and ultimately from the succession itself. The in- trigue first showed itself in an attempt to have some other than Apa Saheb nominated to officiate at the sradh of the deceased Raja, a ceremony always required to be performed by the nearest male heir, who being incompetent in the present * Not Pursajee'is mother, who was not then living. NAGPOOK. 347 case, the nephew, as next in the male line, had some sort of right to preside on his behalf. Hearing of this intrigue, Apa Saheb openly ex- pressed the highest indignation, professing his de- termination to resort to force, sooner than submit to be so superseded. His party, at the same time, talked loudly of the necessity of rescuing the go- vernment and public treasures from the hands of the worthless and designing individuals, who, under colour of the name, were usurping the au- thority of the young Raja. The popular voice was so strongly in his favour on this point, that Dhurmajee's party, not being yet prepared for extremities, disclaimed having ever meditated the supersession of the presumptive heir, or appoint- ment of another person to officiate for Pursajee at the approaching sradh. A readiness was, at the same time, expressed to admit Apa Saheb to a share in the government on certain conditions; and efforts were made to bring about a reconcilia- tion, but thwarted underhand by Dhurmajee. The sradh was quietly performed on the 1st of April, the nephew of the deceased officiating as principal actor in the ceremonies. While matters remained in this unsettled state, both parties expressed the strongest desire for the return of Sreedhur Luchmun Pundit, who was still the nominal prime minister at Nagpoor, but, having found his influence with Raghoojee on the 348 NAGPOOR. wane, had retired some niontlis before the death of that prince, on pretence of a pilgrimage to Bu- narus, where he still remained. This man was regarded as the head of the English party at Nagpoor ; and the object of these professions of intention to al)ide by what he might determine was, to prevent a more active interference on our part in their favour. Of this, both seemed ap- prehensive, though nothing was further from the Resident's thoughts. Dhurmajee had, however, an ulterior object in view : for so long as this suspense should continue, the power, as well as the treasures of the government, would remain at his disposal, in the same manner as they had been at the time of Raghoojee's decease. Thus every one seemed earnest in his protestations to Mr. Jenkins, the British Resident at Nagpoor, of a desire to maintain the best understanding with the English, Apa Saheb, in particular, made direct overtures through Juswunt Rao Ram Chundur, who was the negotiator of the treaty of Deogam, and had since been the appointed channel of communication between the Resident and this court. He proposed to accept the terms before offered to Raghoojee, and to receive a subsidiary force, on condition of support against the designs of the opposite faction. Mr. Jenkins refused to interfere in this scene of intrigue until he should receive special orders NAGPOOR. 349 from the Governor-general ; but lost no time in laying before the Supreme Government the real position of affairs at Nagpoor, asking instructions as to how far, in the actual state of the Raja's intellects, he might consider himself warranted in receiving the overtures, and listening to the pro- positions of the presumptive hen*, previously to his acquiring any direct ostensible share in the government. This was a question that depended on the degree of Pursajee's inca[)acity. If it were such as to prevent his being considered a free agent in the choice of the responsible func- tionaries of liis government, then, of course, any faction that should attempt to exclude the next heir, being of fit age, from a share in the adminis- tration, could only be regarded as usurjiers, as- suming the Raja's name as a mere cloak to their illegal proceedings. In submitting this question, Mr. Jenkins had evidently so decided an opinion of the malady of the reigning Raja, as to think it would be usurpation in Dhurmajee's party, if, representing themselves as the ministers of Pur- sajee's choice, they refused to allow Apa Saheb the exercise of a fair portion of control over their acts of administration. Wherefore, on the same principle as the latter would have been warranted in the employment of force to obtain his right, would he likewise be free to solicit foreign aid for the purpose ; and the British at liberty to con- 350 NAGPOOR. nect themselves witli his party, if solicited so to do, and to support his claims against the opposi- tion of Dhurmajee, or of the other ministers of the late Raja. By the way, it is observable, that the turn taken by these intrigues and divisions at Nagpoor had a direct and obvious tendency to introduce a foreign influence, at the invitation of either party or of both. If, therefore, we refrained from stepping forward, it was to be feared, that either Sindheea or the Peshwa, or some of the Pindaree leaders, would succeed in establishing themselves to our perpetual exclusion : at the same time, since the contention lay entirely between the factions of Apa Saheb and of Dhurmajee, the legitimate Raja having no greater interest on the one side than on the other, we seemed to have no other object of solicitude, than to connect our- selves with the rightful cause, which appeared undoubtedly to be that of the cousin and pre- sumptive heir. In the month of April, as before mentioned, the Supreme Government came to the resolution of seizing the first opportunity to form a subsidiary alliance with Nagpoor. On hearing of the state of parties at that court, as described in the des- patches of the Resident, the government further resolved, that in case Pursajee's malady should prove to be such as to render him utterly incapa- NAGPOOR. 351 ble of conducting public business, or of exercising the judgment requisite in the selection of fit per- sons for the fvmctions of government ; the next male heir, if of mature age, and possessed of the requisite qualifications, should be considered to possess an inherent right to represent the sove- reign authority of the state; and tliat the British government would consequently hold itself free to negotiate with him directly, without any inquiry whether he derived his authority fi'om the no- minal and hereditary prince, or otherwise. Whe- ther or not Pursajee was incapacitated l)y the malady under which he laboured, in the degree stated, was a point which must vinavoidably be left to the discretion of the Resident, and the general feeling of those attached to the court. But supposing this to be the case, then, if Apa Saheb should be the next male heir in legitimate succession to Pursajee, Mr. Jenkins was in- structed to negotiate with him as the rightful head of the state, and if practicable, to conclude a treaty on the basis of affording the aid of the British government in support of his just preten- sions, upon the conditions of a subsidiary alliance. The utmost caution was, however, directed to be observed, in ascertaining the precise degree of Pursajee's incapacity ; and some further inquiry was ordered into the other point, how far the he- ritable claims of the nephew were recognised by 352 NAGPOOR. the Mahratta law of succession, as preferable to those of the grandson by the daughter of Ra- ghoojee. The first instnictions on this subject were forwarded on the 1 5th of April. The divi- sion of the Hyderabad subsidiary force, then at El- lichpoor, in the valley of the Poorna, under Colonel Doveton, was placed at Mr. Jenkins's disposal, in case he should find it necessary to call for the whole or any part of it, in support of the cause of Apa Saheb, under the conditional authority con- veyed in his instructions ; or for the execution of the treaty of alliance and subsidy, in case the negotiations should be brought to this issue. The terms of alliance to be proposed to the Nagpoor prince, varied in nothing from those which it had been attempted to establish in the lifetime of the late Raja. The Bhoosla state was to be incorporated in the league for the defence of the Dukhun, already subsisting between the Bri- tish government, the Nizam, and the Peshwa ; and was to be ready, with its whole resources, when required for the purpose of promoting or securing that object. A contingent was, at all events, to be maintained in permanent efficiency, and ever ready to act with the British subsidiary force. This latter was to consist of not less than four battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavahy, and a due proportion of artillery ; and was to be posted somewhere in the neighbourhood of the NAG POOH. 353 Nerbudda, the Bhoosla bearing a proportion of the expense. His court was also to refrain from negotiation, except in concert with the British government, and to abide its arbitration of all differences with other powers. In short, the con- ditions were the same as have been explained, in the first chapter, to constitute the relations of such other states as had accepted subsidiary al- liances ; the main object being to bring the Bhoosla into this class. In subsequent instruc- tions regarding the conduct of this negotiation, the Supreme Government declared its wish, in the present instance, that whatever subsidy might be agreed on, should be stipulated in the shape of periodical money-payments ; with a proviso, how- ever, for the eventual substitution of a territorial cession in case of irregularity of payment, or of the occurrence of such a change of circumstances as should render an arrangement of this nature more desirable than at present. The reason for this unusual preference of money-payments was, that this subsidiary force must necessarily be thrown so much in advance upon the frontier, and be so continually in the field in chase of the Pindarees, as to raise a probal)ility of embarrass- ment arising, from its liaving also to protect a territory of considerable extent, specifically as- signed for its own support. Had a cession been demanded in the first instance, it could only have 354 N AC POOR. been granted somewhere in the neighbourhood of the position to be occupied by the subsidiary force, for there were no other lands belonging to the state conveniently situated for the purpose. Before Mr. Jenkins received any of tiiese in- structions, almost, indeed, before he was informed of his own government being prepared to contract the alliance, the contest had been brought to jx crisis at Nagpoor, which produced renewed over- tures of such a nature, as he did not hesitate to entertain on his own responsibiUty, from their consonance to the spirit of the orders under which he had acted upon former occasions. It has been mentioned before, that a reconciliation, which was attempted between the two rival fac- tions, miscarried in consequence of Dhurmajee's secret counteraction. He not only induced Buka Baee, the regent proposed by his party, to reject with scorn the paper of reconciliation, when sub- mitted to her for signature ; but, after first agree- ing to sign himself, next day retracted his assent, unless upon the condition, that Apa Saheb would give him the security of the Punnee Putans. This is a class of Moosuhnan assassins, whose existence would not be tolerated under any other civil institutions, than those engendered by the misrule of the Nizam and the Mahratta princes. The singularity and binding force of their con- tracts consist in this, that, if once their pledge is NAGPOOK. 355 given for any one's personal security, they are notorious for never failing to redeem it, by the secret murder of the aggressor upon the person guaranteed. The distrust of Apa Saheb, intimated in the assumption of such a pretext for rejecting the re- conciUation, joined to the known profligacy of Dhurmajee's character, made every one suspicious of his real designs. It was also discovered, that Dhurmajee had sent invitations to men of this de- scription to come over from Hyderabad and ElUch- poor, a thing which gave great disgust to the leading people of all parties at the Nagpoor court. His behaviour was moreover offensively overbear- ing to every body ; insomuch, that all but men of desperate fortunes were alienated and disgusted. Apa Saheb was encouraged by this posture of affairs to take measures for seizing him in the palace where he resided ; and having secured the concurrence of the principal people about the per- son of the Raja, as well as of Pursajee himself, who seems to have been brought to declare him- self in favour of his cousin, and consented to his acting in this, as in all other matters, as he might think best, a body of Apa Saheb's personal re- tainers was marched into the fort of Nagpoor ; and Dhurmajee secured without resistance or diffi- culty, together with his public and private trea- sures. This measure was effected on the evening 2 A 2 356 NAG POOR. of the 11th of April, 1816; having been precipi- tated by a sense of the necessity of crushing this intriguer, before his command of treasure and connexion with the Punnee Putans should have made him formidable. Pursajee showed iwore energy on this occasion than could have been ex- pected from his usual habits : for, when Apa Saheb's party was approaching the palace, there were not wanting some who represented their coming as hostile and dangerous to himself, and endeavoured to procure an order from the Raja for their being resisted, which the Arab mercena- ries were well enough incUned to obey. Pursajee, however, had no personal alarm, and forbad any resistance ; declaring that Apa Saheb had full power in all things. Three days after Dhurmajee's apprehension, the ceremony of seating the Raja on the Guddee, which is the formal act of installation, was pub- licly performed, and Apa Saheb was, on the same day, solemnly declared to be vested, by the Raja himself, with the sole and entire conduct of the public affairs, under the title of Naeeb-o-Mokhtar — Deputy with full powers. The English gentle- men at Nagpoor were present at the ceremony ; and Mr. Jenkins was the first to offer his own con- gratulations and those of the government he re- presented, upon the auspicious commencement of the new reign. NAGPOOR. 357 Though Apa Saheb had thus quietly obtained the apparent object of his wishes, in being publicly acknowledged regent with full powers, he was still by no means so certain of retaining the quiet enjoyment of the dignity, as to cease to regard a subsidiary connexion with the British as a most desirable measure of security, in the unsettled state in which he found all around him. The chief offices of the government were still held by the ministers of Raghoojee, the greater part of whom had joined in the conspiracy for his exclu- sion. There was danger in attempting their im- mediate displacement, lest they should declare Pursajee's coiyipetency to resume the reins himself; and, by alarming him with fears for his Ufe, ob- tain from him a formal revocation of the late nomination to the regency. The ministers, in- deed, though professing their ready acquiescence in the late arrangement, assumed a tone of inde- pendence by no means compatible with the Asiatic notion of the deference due from a minister to his master. Thus Naroba, the Chitnavees, or secre- tary of state, took an early opportunity to wait upon the new regent, in order to inform him, that if he wished to be served zealously by himself, it would be necessary that the course of foreign po- licy, pursued by Raghoojee in the latter part of his life, should l)c maintained ; particularly allud- ing to the com numicat ions that had for some time 358 NAGPOOR. been passing between Raghoojee, on the one hand, and the Peshwa, Sindheea, and Holkur, on the other, the object of which was to promote a spirit of concert and union amongst all the Mahrattas, directed against the British ascendancy. Naroba adverted also to another intrigue, which, it seems, had been in train some time before the death of Raghoojee, and had in view the endeavour, through the medium of English gentlemen returning to their native country, to open a direct communi- cation with the King of England, in order to pro- cure the restoration of the provinces of Cuttack and Berar, for a present consideration of thirty lakhs of rupees. Such an intrigue, it is firmly believed, never had being, except in the machi- nations of a wily Mahratta of the name of Pur- saram Rao ; who, understanding a little of the English language, had address enough to persuade the deceased Raja, that nothing was easier than to open such a channel, and had procured con- siderable sums of money, under pretence of for- warding the project. In this intrigue Naroba wished the government of Nagpoor to persevere, being himself the dupe of Pursaram's imposture. The regent was induced, by distrust of Naroba, immediately to comnmnicate what had passed to Mr. Jenkins, hoping thereby to secure his active support, in measures directed to the removal of this niauj whose office he intended for his private NAGPOOR. 359 dewan Nagoo Punt. Naroba, however, had in- duced Sudeek Ulee Khan to accompany hun, when he made this communication of his views and principles ; and, as this man was one of the principal commanders of tlie Bhoosla military, upon whose affection he knew he could place no reliance, Apa Saheb felt himself under the neces- sity of temporizing with the Chitnavees, not feel- ing sufficient confidence in his own means to take the decided part his inclinations prompted. The desire of removing this, and others of his tmcle's ministers, for the purpose of introducing men of his own choice, joined to the necessity he felt of disbanding, or at least re-organizing the military estabUshments, which caused him so much alarm, were the motives that urged him to the determi- nation of connecting himself in a subsidiary alli- ance with the British government, on the terms which had been offered to the late Raja. He was apprehensive, however, that, in the event of his forming such a connexion, an effort would be made to impose upon him a ministry made up of the party of Sreedhur Luchmun Pundit, which it was supposed that Mr. Jenkins favoured. Ac- cordingly, although the regent had resolved upon the alliance, he would not employ Juswunt Rao Ramchundur in the negotiation of it, knowing liis anxiety for Sreedhur's recall, and restoration to fa- vour and authority. This point Juswunt Rao 3G0 NAG POOR. had frequently pressed, both upon Apa Saheb and upon the Resident. Indeed, he was rather dis- appointed at the lukewarmness evinced, by the latter's refusing to make an earnest representation of the necessity of the immediate recall of his patron to settle the affairs of the court. The persons employed by Apa Saheb were his private dewan, Nagoo Punt, and Nurayun Pun- dit, a minister of the late Raja, who had early espoused his party. The negotiation was com- menced by a visit of Nurayun to the Resident, on the night of the 2 2d of April, the very same day on which Apa Saheb had consulted Mr. Jenkins about the removal of Naroba from office. Great mystery was observed upon the occasion ; and, in the course of the interview, Nurayun presented a paper, written in the regent's own hand, signify- ing " That Nagoo Punt and Nurayun Pundit en- joyed his entu'e confidence, and were commission- ed to open his (Apa Saheb's) inmost wishes to Mr. Jenkins, if he were disposed to meet them with equal cordiality." Having shown this papei", Nu- rayun invited the Resident to declare the views of his own government. Mr. Jenkins explained, that he was in daily expectation of receiving detailed instructions from the Governor-general ; but that the views of his government were sufficiently ap- parent from what had passed in the previous ne- gotiation M ith Raglioojee, and as he had no reason NAGPOOK. 361 to believe that they had undergone any alteration, he should be prepared to meet the negotiators on the part of Apa Saheb, without waiting the arrival of fresh orders. It was accordingly agreed, that both Nagoo Punt and Nurayun Pundit should have a conference with Mr. Jenkins, at the resi- dency, on the night of the 24th of April. Now that the heir-presuraptive's pretensions were backed by Pursajee's late nomination to the regency, and he had thus become the recognized head of the Bhoosla state, our Rejn-esentative had no doubts as to the propriety of receiving his over- tures ; and in the absence of any ground for sup- posing that the views of his own government in respect to Nagpoor had changed, since the mis- carriage of the negotiations in 1814, he resolved to renew them on the same basis without further delay. - He was naturally desirous of availing hmi- self of this favom'able disposition while it lasted ; a course particularly necessary, considering the wavering characters of the native princes, and the total absence of any thing like systematic policy in most of their acts and resolutions. The conference took place, according to aj)- pointment, on the night of the 24th. Nagoo Punt explained candidly his master's motives for desiring the alliance ; but after much unreserved discussion on l)oth sides, it was agreed to proceed no further, until Mr. Jenkins should have receivetl 362 NAGPOOR. his instructions. On the same evening, Apa Salieb himself sent for the Resident's mooiishee, and after mentioning his desire to contract the alliance on the terms proposed to Raghoojee, declared, that besides the four battalions and a regiment of ca- valry before proposed to be stationed on the Ner- budda, he must have another English battalion at Nagpoor, for his personal security. Mr. Jenkins received his first instructions on the 25th of April ; and a further conference was held on the 27th, when a Persian draft of the treaty proposed to Raghoojee being produced, the conditions were fairly discussed, article by article. The basis of the negotiation was at once agreed to ; and the only points remaining to be settled after the first conference were — the strength of the subsidiary force — the amount of the subsidy — and the nature and strength of the contingent to be furnished by the Bhoosla state. A further ques- tion was agitated by the Mahratta negotiators, viz. the mode in which the regent was to be as- sured of the personal support of the British go- vernment against the designs of the domestic fac- tions of Nagpoor. As both parties were equally sincere in their desire for the alliance, it was not long before all these points were satisfactorily ad- justed. The strength of the subsidiary force was fixed at six battalions and a regiment of cavalry ; the increase being made on the application of Apa NAGPOOK. 303 Saheb ; vvlio was informed that less than two bat- taUons could not safely be cantoned at Nagpoor, without support, in case he required a British force at that point. An article was further in- serted in the treaty, by which it Avas stipiUated, that two of the battalions of infantry should be stationed near the court of the Raja, one of which might be elsewhere employed on emergency; but not less than one complete battalion should ahvays remain for his Highness' personal security. Thesub- sidy demanded was an equivalent to the field charges of the force to be furnished, which was estimated at eight lakh of rupees ; and this amount had been agreed to, and a territorial cession fixed upon as the mode of payment, when Mr. Jenkins ascer- tained from his instructions, that, in the present instance, money-payments at Nagpoor were to be preferred. In order to procure this substitution, an abatement of half a lakh of rupees was made in the amount ; and it was stipulated, that the expediency of commuting this for a territorial ces- sion at a subsequent period should be considered and determined by mutual consent; but that the British government should be entitled to demand such cession, in the event of any irregularity in the payments. With respect to the contingent, five thousand horse and three thousand foot was at first mentioned; but in consideration of the poverty of the state, which was strongly repre- 364 NAGFOOfi. sented by the Mahratta negotiators, it was finally fixed at three thousand horse and two thousand foot, in the regulation of the discipline and inter- nal management of which the British Resident at the court was to have the right of offering advice. Some difficulty occurred in settling the mode in which the regent was to be assured of the support of the British government to his per- sonal interests. Some such assurance seemed to be a sine qua non with the Mahratta nego- tiators. It w^as at last agreed, that the treaty should pm-port to be concluded " With IMoodajee Bhoosla (Apa Saheb) exercising with full powers all the functions of the government on behalf of the Maha-raja Pursajee Bhoosla," thus involving a complete recognition of the authority of Mood- ajee ; in addition to which, Mr. Jenkins engaged that the Governor-general's answer to the formal letter, to be written on its ratification, should con- tain a distinct assurance of support to Apa Saheb's administration of affairs, so long as Pursajee might remain in his present state of mental incapacity. The Mahratta negotiators were very urgent to have a stipulation introduced, that cows and bul- locks should not be killed within the Nagpoor territory. But this was refused as unusual ; and they were obliged to rest satisfied with a verbal ^ assurance, that the custom wliicli prevailed at XAGPOOR. 3G0 Poona should also he observed here, and no bul- locks or cows be killed, on any account, within the city itself; but the troops, when in the field, or at a distance, were not to be restricted in this particular. All matters having been thus satis- factorily adjusted, the treaty was finally executed on the 27th of May. Apa Saheb's signature was affixed, with great secrecy, in the night, at the house of Nagoo Punt, one of the negotiators ; and it was agi'eed not to make it public, until the approach of the subsidiary force, which Mr. Jenkins promised immediately to call in from Ellichpoor, should remove every apprehension for the consequences of the expected displeasure of the adverse factions. It may be proper to mention, that early in the negotiation, and with a \'iew to expedite its con- clusion, the Resident had promised, on the part of the British government, a pension of twenty- five thousand rupees a-year to Nagoo Punt, the chief negotiator, and of fifteen thousand to his colleague, both to commence from the signature of the treaty, and subject to the approbation of their master. AVritten engagements to this effect were accordingly delivered to both in the regent's presence, immediately on receipt of the signed treaty. These were to be commuted for sunuds under the Governor-general's seal, which it was <^ngaged to procure. Apa Saheb seemed well 360 NAGPOOJi. pleased with the arrangement : indeed, a similar one had followed the treaty of Deogam, when Sreedhur Pundit and Juswunt Rao Ramchundur obtained similar pensions of thirty and fifteen thousand rupees. The treaty was ratified by the Governor-general in council on the 15th of June, and the assurance of personal support to Apa Saheb's administration, during the continued in- capacity of Pursajee, was conveyed in the letter of congratulation addressed to that prince on the 1 3th of July following. Thus was accomplished the most important ex- tension of the system of our relations with the native powers of India, that had taken place since the general settlement of them ten years before. On our part, it was hoped, that the alliance would have the effect of detaching the Bhoosla for ever from the other members of the Mahratta confederation ; at the same time that it gave us a most important vantage ground, whence to launch our operations against the Pindarees and those who might venture to support them. Judging from subsequent events, it would seem to have been regarded by the other contracting party as a mere stepping-stone to absolute authority in internal affairs, a necessary expedient at the mo- ment for breaking a formidable aristocratic fac- tion, backed by a still more formidable soldiery ; but one that might be cast away so soon as the NAGrOOR. . 3(57 object should have been securely gained. The parties obtained, each of them, much of the ad- vantage calculated upon, though the result en- tirely answered the views of neither. Immediately after the execution of the treaty, an express was sent off to summon the subsidiary force to Nagpoor. The Resident had previously acquainted Colonel Doveton with the progress of the negotiations, and prepared him to receive a summons of this nature. That officer had, ac- cordingly, held in readiness a force of the exact strength agreed upon in th^ trerty, giving the command to Colonel Walker of the 3d Madras cavalry. This force left the neighbourhood of EUichpoor on the 1st of June; and, crossing the Wurda at Amner on the 6th, arrived at the distance of one march from Nagpoor on the 8th of June. Here the main body halted ; and two battalions, brigaded under the command of Lieu- tenant-colonel Scott, marched into the Bhoosla capital on the 10th, Colonel Walker accom- panying them. The treaty, which had not till then been so much as suspected, was published in the city on the preceding day. On the l&th of June, a cantonment was fixed upon for the Nag- poor brigade, about three miles to the west of the city. It was the Resident's intention that the remainder of the subsidiary force should move innnediately to Pandoorna, there to canton during 3G8 NAGPOOR. the rains, before it took up its final position on the banks of the Nerbudda near Hoshungabad. The continuance of the intrigues at Nagpoor, however, induced our new ally to request that the departure of the main body might be post- poned. Not only Naroba and his faction, but the Baees of the Muhul, and, amongst the rest, Kashee Baee Pursajee's wife, complained loudly of the conclusion of the treaty by Apa Sahel), without previously consulting them; declaring it to have been a condition of their acquiescence in his nomination to the regency, that they should be consulted in all matters of importance. The treaty itself was not the ground of their com- plaint ; on the contrary, they avowed their readi- ness to give more advantageous terms, and made distinct overtures for the purpose to Mr. Jenkins. But the regent's breach of personal faith awaken- ed all this viriUence ; and so rancorous was the enmity, that at last, fearing assassination, and having been dissuaded from accepting a personal guard of our troops, Apa Saheb, on the 27th of June, went to live at a garden-house adjoining the newly-chosen cantonment of the brigade, as the only place where he could feel himself in security. The issue of these dissensions will be detailed in a subsequent chapter. 369 CHAPTER X. JYPOOR, &c. 1816, APRIL TO OCTOBER. Jypoor alliance — Orders from England — Suspended — re- sumed — debated — resolved upon — Military preparations — Negotiation — protracted — broken off— Internal condition of Jypoor — Fresh overtures — and negotiation — Again broken off — Nagpoor affairs — Sindheea's supineness — and offer to Jypoor — P^shvva's conduct — and intrigues — Trim- bukjee's escape — Communications with Bajee Rao in con- sequence. The Nagpoor alliance was not the only object which engaged the attention of the Supreme Go- verament during the hot season and the rains of 1816. The Goorkha war had no sooner been brought to an end, than it was resolved to en- deavour to bring the state of Jypoor within the sphere of British protection ; and the negotiations and military arrangements, commenced for this purpose, were simultaneous with the occurrences at Nagpoor, detailed in the preceding chapter. 2 B 370 JYPOOR, Tiie circumstances under which the first con- nexion of the British government with Jypoor was formed, in 1 803, and broken off in 1 806, will be familiar to those at all conversant with the political history of India. They are recorded in the work of Sir John Malcolm,* which appeared in 1811. One effect of that publication was, that it produced a revolution in the sentiments of those intrusted with the home administration of the affairs of our Indian empire, in conformity with the spirit of whose policy, the previous treaty with Jypoor had been dissolved, and the principality abandoned to the oppression and exaction of the Mahrattas and Putans. Re- gretting the policy adopted towards this state. in 1806, the secret committee issued orders from England, on the 23d of December 1813, for taking it again under protection. These arrived on the 10th of Jvme 1814, at the time when the Supreme Government had found itself forced into war with the Nipalese, and had prepared to refer the expediency of offensive measm^es against the predatory associations to the previous considera- tion of the authorities in England. When the execution of these orders came to be discussed, it was agi'eed, that the renewed connexion with Jypoor might well form part of the compre- * Political History of India. JYPOOH. 371 liensive plan proposed for the reduction of the freebooters ; that singly, it was an object of little importance, while it might involve us with the Mahrattas, and prematurely bring on the ne- cessity of the immediate prosecution of the very course it had been resolved to defer. These ar- guments prevailed ; and the home authorities afterwards admitted the propriety of this post- ponement of the execution of their orders at the particular juncture. On the Governor-general's return from the western provinces, in September 1815, conceiving the Goorkha war to be near its conclusion, his Lordship came prepared with a proposition then to carry the measure into effect. However, the suspense in regard to Nipal, and the ultimate re- newal of war in that direction, prevented the matter from being immediately taken up. After the final termination of hostilities, towards the end of March, the proposition was renewed ; indeed, the question was forced upon the Indian govern- ment, by the increasing distresses of .Typoor, and by the earnest apph cations of its Raja, Jugut Singh, the son of our former ally, Purtab Singh, to be received under the wing of ])rotection. In the course of that month it had been as- certained that Ameer Khan was collecting the whole of the Piitan forces, for the attack of Raja 2 B 2 372 JYPooR. Jugut Singli in his capital of Jyniigur ; ostensibly to force upon him a change of ministers, but evi- dently with the design of reducing the state, if possible, to complete subjection. There was no reason, therefore, to doubt the Raja's sincerity in the pressing overtures he made to Mr. Metcalfe through his agents at Dehlee, accompanied by an offer to submit to any sacrifices that might be de- manded. These were soon followed up by similar soUcitations and offers, made directly to the Su- preme Government, by the Raja's resident vakeel at the presidency. Under these circumstances, it became necessary forthwith to decide upon the course of policy to be adopted in regard to Jypoor ; and the question was fully considered and discussed. It was again urged at the Council Board that the proposed alliance ought to form a part of the general plan of operations against the predatory bands, and, therefore, should be suspended till the sanction of the home authorities should allow that plan to be commenced upon ; — that the premature adoption of this insulated measure, by immediately involving us with Ameer Khan and the Putans, and possibly also with Sindheea, who made equal advantage of exactions from Jypoor, which a connexion with the British must put an immediate stop to, would necessarily bring on that extended scale of opera- JYPOOR. 373 lions, and produce that change in the }!olitical re- lations of our eastern dominions, \\ hicli had been regarded with so much alarm ; — that the approba- tion of the postponement by- the Supreme Go- vernment of execution of the previous orders from England, was to be regarded as a virtual recall of them, or at least, as an acquiescence in the opi- nion, that the measure should only be prosecuted as part of a general system, without being desirable on its individual account. Giving to these argu- ments all the weight which they derived from the respectable quarter whence they proceeded, the Marquess of Hastings, nevertheless, considered the government to be free to take Jypoor under its protection, in obedience to the orders of 1813, whenever the measure might be deemed expe- dient ; — and that this freedom of action was not in the least affected ])y the approval of postpone- ment at a juncture, when circumstances were obviously unfavourable. His Lordship thought, also, that the measure was highly desirable in itself, abstracted from any general plan of opera- tions, inasmuch as it would cripple the resources of one of the predatory powers, and save a fine and eventually useful territory from ruin and de- vastation. At the same time he conceived, from former experience of Sindlieea's disposition, that it was not likely to involve us in extensive opera- 374 JY?ool{. tions, as it was easy to overawe both that chief- tain and the Putans, by demonstrations similar to those which had proved effectual pending the former negotiations with Bhopal. He also con- sidered the actual difficulties of Jypoor to have arrived at a crisis, that rendered the delay of a further reference quite inadmissible. In conformity with his Lordship's opinion, it was resolved to entertain the Raja's overtures ; and orders were issued to Mr. Metcalfe to that effect, on the 20th of April 1816. The terms were to correspond exactly with those offered to Bhopal in 1814-15: but Jypoor, having greater resources, though for the present in a most ex- hausted condition, was to be called upon to defray eventually the greater part of the charge to be incurred in its protection. To carry into effect the alliance, in case of its being formed, troops were to assemble in the neighbourhood of IMutra and Rewaree, sufficient for the formation of two armies of nine thousand men each. It was in- tended that Sir David Ochterlony should take g the command of one of them ; and that both should be ready to advance on the first requisition of the Resident at Dehlee, in order to drive the Putans beyond the Jypoor frontier. With a view, at the same time, to hold Sindheea and the Mah- rattas in check, the troops at Cawnpoor and in Bundelkhund were directed to be on the alert ; JYPOOR. 375 and the four subsidiary forces were ordered re- spectively to positions, whence they might over- awe the whole of Sindheea's and Holkur's domi- nions, while they covered, as far as was practicable, the territories of our own allies. The Goozerat force was to move to Brodera ; the Poona subsi- diary force to Jalna ; the Nizam's to Ellichpoor ; and the Bhoosla Raja's, immediately on its then expected establishment, to the banks of the Ner- budda. There would thus be a display of nearly forty thousand infantry and twelve thousand ca- vahy, besides artillery, and the contingents of the native powers, in readiness to put down any dis- position that might be shown, to obstruct the exe- cution of the plan determined on by government. It may be right to mention, that the Jypoor territory lay entirely to the north and west of the Chumbul ; and the principality, so far from being included amongst those Rajpoot states with which we had bound ourselves by treaty with Holkur and Sindheea not to interfere, at the time of forming those treaties, was actually under British protection, — the resolution to dissolve the alliance haxdng been subsequently formed ; where- fore, there was evidently no argument arising out of our relations with the Mahrattas, on which oiu* right to renew the alliance could l)e disputed. Before the military arrangements above speci- fied were brought to any forwardness, the negoti- 37G JYPOOR. ation had already been some time in progress. To return to it : Mr. Metcalfe, on receipt of his instructions, took an early opportunity of commu- nicating to the Jypoor vakeel, that he was ready to receive the overtures of the principality, in case an agent duly empowered to conclude engage- ments on its part should present himself. Not- withstanding the earnestness with which entreaties were made to be taken vmder protection, while it was understood to be a matter of principle with us not to extend our political relations beyond their existing limits, it became evident, after this com- munication, that there existed no corresponding desire to bring matters speedily to a point. Ameer Khan only threatened Jypoor, when Mr. Metcalfe made this offer to negotiate. He had actually invested the capital before the negotiators arrived at Dehlee, fianished with full powers. As long as the Putans continued to press the siege, the nego- tiation proceeded with apparent alacrity. Every thing, indeed, was soon agreed to, except the amount of subsidy to be paid by the Raja : this point, also, was at length settled. Mr. Metcalfe had begun with a demand of twenty-five lakh of rupees, — the amount of the total charge of the troops to be furnished for the protection of the state. He was afterwards induced to lower his demand to fifteen lakh of rupees for the permanent subsidy, with the accommodation of considerable JYPOOR. 377 remissions during the first five years, in considera- tion of the impoverished condition of the territory. Pending the siege of Jyniigur, the negotiation was kept in that state, that an hour's time would have sufficed for its completion. It seems, however, that a separate negotiation was kept up all the while with Ameer Khan ; and the threat of bringing down upon him a British force, which a mere signature could instantly effect, was held out as an inducement to his raising the siege. He withdrew early in the month of July, after having failed in several attempts to carry some strong po- sitions, necessary to cover his approaches to the city ; but not without exacting a stipulation to receive a sum of money as the ransom of the Raja's territory from plunder, and as the consider- ation for reducing Madhoorajpoor, a town in the jageer of one of the Raja's family, then in rebel- lion against him. The first stipulation was ob- served on neither side ; but Ameer Khan, with part of his troops, moved down to reduce Mad- hoorajpoor, in execution of the last article ; doubtless with the object of appropriating it to himself. Other bodies of the Putans immediately spread themselves over the surface of the country, plundering, as before, in every direction. About the time that these terms were made with Ameer Khan, every thing had been settled at Dehlee ; but the Jypoor agents were forthwith 378 JYPOOR. instructed to bring forward a new demand, viz. that our troops should reduce Tonk and Ram- poora, and reannex them to Jypoor, in addition to the other stipulations. These places had been taken by us from Holkur, and restored at the peace of 1805. They were now held on his be- half by Ameer Khan, whom we had agreed to exjDel from the Raja's own possessions ; and, as these towns had at some distant period been sub- ject to Jypoor, this was the ground of their re- duction being now demanded. The negotiation was of course broken off upon the advance of this new demand ; indeed, the Supreme Government had previously directed it to be brought to some decided issue, on first observing the insidious way in which it was conducted by the other side. The indifference manifested by the durbar of Jypoor, on this occasion, to the advantages attending a closer union with the British, is perhaps in part attributable to the general reluctance felt by the petty independent princes to make any indissoluble alliances, on terms calculated to interfere with the unrestrained latitude of poHtical action they had hitherto enjoyed. AH our alliances with states of this description have necessarily, as observed in the introductory chapter, a character of de- pendence on their part, and on that account are not very palatable. Yet a more obvious mode of accounting for the disinclination experienced on lYFOOii. 379 this occasion may be found in the actual circum- stances of the internal government of Jypoor. The whole territory was parcelled out into here- ditary tenures of the nature of the fiefs or baronies of the feudal system : over these the Raja, a weak man, had much about the same degree of influ- ence and authority, as was possessed by the weak- est of the kings of England, when the same sys- tem prevailed in that country. The continual war of factions was prosecuted with the utmost virulence. Since the preceding November, the Jypoor ministry had been twice changed. Man- jee Das's party, which was the most aristocratical and most hostile to the Putans, had ultimately gained the ascendancy ; and the strong national spirit it succeeded in exciting amongst the Raj- poots, was one of the principal instruments by which the enterprise of Ameer Khan was success- fully resisted. No member of this aristocracy, however, was disposed willingly to exchange a state of things, which left so wide an opening to his hopes and ambition, for the perpetual repose and tranquillity that must result from the intro- duction of our influence. This disposition might be expected to have prevailed, even if we had offered a settlement on the basis of leaving mat- ters as we found them ; but there was reason for the aristocracy to suspect, tliat our guarantee of maintaining the Raja's authority comprehended 380 JYPOOli. the enforcement of his just dues from themselves; and their suspicions naturally made t])em oppose the completion of the alliance. Besides, their success in baffling the Putans with theii' native means alone, had added much to the pride of their independence, and increased theii* aversion to al- low the interference of a foreign power in their concerns. It was in the beginning of August that Mr. Metcalfe broke off the negotiation, dismissing the agent, Sunkur Das, who had been sent on behalf of Jugut Singh. The Supi'eme Government had hopes, that some little longer experience of the excesses of the Putans would produce a better feeling in the leading men of this principality ; and not wishing to punish the duplicity of their past conduct, by making it a ground of perpetual exclusion from the benefits of future alliance, em- powered the Resident to receive any new over- tures that might bear the aspect of more sincerity. It was resolved, at the same time, thenceforward to make no military preparations, until a treaty should be actually signed and executed, in order to prevent the recurrence of a fruitless expense. Before the close of September, the knowledge of the final rupture of the negotiation produced a stir amongst the factions of Jynugur ; and a considerable party expressed great dissatisfaction against Manjee Das, to whom the failure was at- .lYPOOR. 381 tribiited. To qiiiet the murmurs of this party, for the event showed it was with no real design of completing the alliance, agents were again sent off to Dehlee, the minister's brother being associated with Sunkur Das in the mission. On the 1 7th of November they arrived at Dehlee, and soon after waited on the British Resident. At the first au- dience they declared, that, knowing the wishes of the British government, from what had passed at the former negotiation, they had come to conform to them, and to sign the treaty before proposed ; but that they wished first to submit a few requests to the Governor-general, leaving it to his gene- rosity to accord them or not. The reduction and delivery of Tonk and Rampoora was their first re- quest ; this Mr. Metcalfe refused to forward or listen to ; the second was for jageers or pensions to the negotiators, similar to what had been grant- ed at Nagpoor ; and the third, for a promise that they should always have a good-tempered gentle- man as Resident. The request for pensions, as a matter of stipulation, was absurd, considering that the negotiation was not on the footing of reciprocal advantage, and that there was no object to be ac- quired by the British worth a pecuniary sacrifice ; the occasion of our treating at all being the com- pliance with their solicitation for salvation by our means from impending ruin. Mr. Metcalfe, having combated these ]ioints ratlier with ridicule tlian 382 JYPOOR. argument, proceeded to state an omission in the draft of treaty before discussed, viz. the stipula- tion for ovir arbitration of all foreign disputes and claims, either for or against the principality. The greatest objections were raised to the insertion of any such article ; the chief of which appeared to arise from an apprehension, that it might extend to the adjudication of the title to the Raj of Jy- poor, to which there was more than one claimant against Jugut Singh, particularly a pretender still living, who had been supported at one time by Sindheea. The scruples of the negotiators in respect to this article could not be got over, even although this construction was disavowed. The conference accordingly broke up, with a distinct explanation to Sunkur Das and his colleague, that the insertion of this new article was insisted upon under special orders from the Supreme Govern- ment ; consequently, that the point could on no account be conceded. Two days were allowed them to consider of it : the third was fixed for a second conference, at which they would be expect- ed to sign the treaty, with this article introduced, either in the form proposed, or so modified as might be agreed upon in the interim ; or if mat- ters could not be adjusted by that time, the nego- tiation would be dropped altogether. This re- striction in point of time was necessary, to prevent the government of Jypoor from again making its JYPOOR. 383 advantage of the show of negotiation, without any intention to bring it to a point. Continued oppo- sition being manifested to the stipulation for our arbitrament, it occurred to the Resident, that the secret reason might be, the fear lest the liquida- tion of certain bonds, given at different times to Putan Sirdars, would be comprehended under its terms. To exclude this interpretation, he agreed so to word the article, as to confine it to claims of tribute or other demands on the part of Sindheea and Holkur as independent powers. In this form the negotiators waived their objections to the sti- pulation. But when the time came for the treaty to be signed, a new and extraordinary objection was started to the usual engagement to procure the ratification of Raja Jugut Singh within fifteen days. The negotiators seemed to wish our Repre- sentative to be satisfied with their signature, and to act upon their treaty, without requiring its ra- tification by their master. They were told, how- ever, in answer, that, if they objected to this article, they must take their immediate departure ; and as they made no other reply than to solicit a delay of twenty days for the discussion of the point, not for procuring the required confirmation, the treaty was a second time abruptly terminated, with no more successful issue than the former. It was now most evident, that the object of the Jypoor administration was, to keep ojien a 3S4 .TYPOOR. negotiation, not to conclude a treaty. Manjee Das, a short time after the return of the agents, declared i)iiblicly to the British newswriter at Jynugur, that he had never authorised the ne- gotiators at Dehlee to agi'ee to any stipulation for a money payment. It is difficidt to conceive what could have been the object of this extra- ordinary communication ; but it was supposed to arise from a wish to ingratiate himself with the party adverse to the British alliance. He lost nothing in their eyes by this public profession of duplicity ; and on its being made matter of re- monstrance by the Resident at Dehlee, replied only by evasion and further falsehood ; declaring, that the amount of subsidy was what he had not agreed to ; although, when the agents presented themselves the second time, it was distinctly ex- plained beforehand, that, unless they were em- powered to sign the treaty before proposed, of which the specific money stipidation formed an item, they could not 1)6 listened^ to ; and the negotiators, after this intimation, declared, at their first audience, that they had come empow- ered to sign. Immediately on the rupture of the first nego- tiation in August, the military preparations which had been made for its eventual support were sus- pended ; and the troops destined for this being now available for other service, a force >vas di- XAGPOOR. 385 rected to be formed under Lieutenant-colonel Adams, of the 1 0th B. N. I., and to hold itself in readiness to proceed to the Nerbudda at the close of the rains, in order to relieve the Madras troops there stationed, under Colonel Walker, and forming for the present the Nagpoor subsidiary force. In the mean time, Apa Saheb, who in June had taken refuge at a garden-house adjoining to the new cantonment, as mentioned in the pre- ceding chapter, became relieved from his alarms. Having seized and confined ^Naroba, the secre- tary, and established another of the Avidows of Raghoojee in the control of the interior of the pa- lace, and care of the Raja's person, in the room of Buka Baee, he returned to the city, and his authority was, in appearance, firmly established by the end of August. Goojaba Dada, who had likewise been an opponent of the Regent, but Avas in the main a moderate man, and besides a relation, was merely debarred from indiscriminate access to the Raja's person ; and Sudeek Ulee Khan, seeing the turn affairs had taken, paid as- siduous court to the Naeeb, and in a very short time acquired an influence seemingly little in- ferior to that of Nagoo Punt and Nurayun them- selves. The two last-mentioned favourites, in- deed, complained to Mr. Jenkins, that the inte- rested counsels of this ofllicer had induced Apa 2 c 386 NAGrooR. Saheb to renounce his original design of reducing and reforming his military establishments, by which means Sudeek Ulee Khan had preserved to himself the chief military authority, with all its corrupt emoluments. In October, however, the old advisers of Apa Saheb so far prevailed, as to induce him to apply for a battalion, to be raised and disciplined by British officers, on the model of the reformed infantry of the Nizam's service. The Governor-general acquiesced at once in the proposal, and nominated officers for the purpose. The object of this application was, to provide a further counterpoise to the Arabs, whose fidelity to himself he still mistrusted, on account of their known personal attachment to the son of Raghoojee, their late master. Yet this step seemed to indicate a degree of confidence and cordiality towards his new allies, little con- sistent with the treachery of his subsequent con- duct. To say the truth, there is ground to con- clude, from this and other symptoms, that Apa Saheb, while Pursajee remained alive, was not engaged in the conspiracy, which had been for some time in progress for a general rising of the whole Mahratta nation. In the beginning of October, Colonel Walker moved to take up the position assigned to him, on the banks of the Nerbudda. His operations in that quarter, and the effect of the appearance MAHRATTAS. 387 of a British force so near the immediate haunts of the Pindarees, together with their plans and ex- peditions for the season of 1816-17, will more properly form the subject of a separate chapter. But it may first be necessary to notice briefly what was passing during the rains at the other Mahratta courts. Sindheea made no effort to avail himself of the distractions at the Bhoosla court, consequent upon the death of Raghoojee : indeed, the expedi- tion with which the treaty of subsidiary alliance was negotiated by Mr. Jenkins, and the secrecy observed in the conduct of that affair, had left no time for the operation of foreign intrigue, much less for the machinations of a durbar, so slow in its deliberations as that of Gwalior. In the same manner this chieftain refrained entirely from fur- ther interference in the affairs of Bhopal ; so that the young Nuwab, having retained his father's counsellors in their offices, continued to make head against the Pindarees, and to command their respect : keeping up at the same time an active correspondence with the political agent in Bundelkhund, explaining every thing that passed between him and the freebooters, and professing his desire to become, or at least to be considered, a dependant of the British dominion. Neither did Sindheea make any effort whatever, in the course of 1816, to curb or reduce the Pindarees, 2 c 2 388 MAHTIATTAS. notwithstanding that the subject was specially brought to his notice by the British Resident, on more occasions than one. His constant reply was, that repeated orders had been issued, prohibiting their violation of the British territories ; and that time and negotiation were necessary to bring the refractory chiefs to impUcit obedience. It was explained in private to the Resident upon one occasion, that Sindheea's plan was to inveigle the chiefs to an interview, and, by seizing their per- sons, to deprive the durras of their leaders, and cause their dissolution. It was evident, from the general tenor of his conduct, that he began to be alarmed, lest he should be visited with the whole responsibility for an evil, which his weakness had suffered to grow up within his dominions. He was moreover beginning to have a more accurate notion of his relative strength than he had enter- tained before the discussions in 1814, when he thought, by the loftiness of his tone, to restrain the British government from interfering with Bhopal. In short, anxiety and alarm were fast succeeding to the jealous rivalry and contentious spirit, which the violent among his courtiers still vainly flattered him was the policy warranted and demanded by his relative position among the powers of India. To this cause, and to habitual tardiness of judg- ment, is to be attributed the supineness with which Sindheea witnessed the extension of our influence MAPI R ATT AS. 389 over the dominions of the Bhoosla ; and which, though it in the end produced the determination to temporise with both parties, and, if possible, to keep well with both, till he could see the probable issue of affairs, yet prevented any exertion to court oui" favour by a vigorous and early effort against the Pindarees, the common enemy. Another reason for his want of energy at this juncture may be found in the circumstance, that his best troops, under Baptiste, were fully employed in the siege of Raghoogurh, a fort belonging to a Rajpoot named Raja Jysingh. That active chief, while his own strong-hold was closely invested, succeeded in a sudden surprise of Baptiste's foil of Sheeopoor, ^vhere the son and part of the treasure of the Colonel had been deposited for safety. This oc- curred in the begiiming of June ; and, tliough the fort of Raghoogurh fell in the following August, Jysingh, as a partisan, gave full occupation to tlie whole of Baptiste's division, and had good success in several light skirmishes and attacks on detach- ments and convoys during the whole of the rains, and even up to the close of the cold season. At length, having lost his late conquest of Sheeopoor also by the treachery of his garrison, he went off with his followers to form a new band of Pindarees, and was not unsuccessful in his depredations on the territories of Sindheea, more particularly on Bap- tiste's assigned hinds. 390 MAIIIIATTAS. Yet notwithstanding the indifference manifested by Sindheea to the passing occurrences at Nag- poor and on the Nerbudda, the opening of the British negotiation with Jypoor seemed to waken him to the policy of a counter-exertion, for the purpose of securing some personal advantage. He accordingly opened a similar negotiation, tendering the assistance of his military means towards re- straining the Putans ; and, in furtherance of this object, sent a reinforcement to Bapoo Sindheea at Ajmeer, to add to the efficiency of his establish- ment in that quarter. The Jypoor durbar amused Sindheea for some time with the hope of accepting his protection, pretty nearly in the same manner as they amused the British government ; but the Mahratta meeting this conduct with reciprocal duplicity, opened a further negotiation with Ameer Khan, and in proportion as coolness was evinced on the part of the Raja, pretended a cordiality with the Putan, in the hope of alarming the Jypoor ministry by the apprehension, that his weight would be thrown into the opposite scale. But Jypoor had no real design of connecting itself with any one; and while it relied on the known dis- position of the British to afford it protection, as a sufficient resource against any extremity the united efforts of the Putans and Sindheea covdd reduce it to, reckoned also upon the deterring influence of this knowledge, as its best protection against any iMAHRATTAS. 391 actual design on their part to drive it to this last resort. Sindheea's plans came, therefore, to the same issue with the British negotiations ; that is to say, produced no result whatsoever. At the court of Poona nothing particular oc- curred ; but the conduct of the Pesliwa's govern- ment was an alternation of concessions, subser- vience, and conciliation, and of a spirit of recrimi- nation and litigious opposition . The prince himself assumed either character, with a versatility, that seemed to baffle every attempt to penetrate his real disposition and intentions. In this spirit, at one time, he ordered extensive levies of horse and foot, and at another reduced his establishments to the lowest possible ebb ; at one time he complained of the delays thrown in the way of the adjustment of his claims on the Nizam and Gykwar ; at other times himself created new and very childish ones. All the while, every nerve was strained to procure the release of Trimbukjee, and every advantage, personal as well as national, was offered to Mr. Elphinstone, through various channels, to engage liim to forward this gi-and object of desire. Active intrigues were at the same time carrying on in Hindoostan and Goozerat, and special agents de- puted to all the Mahratta courts, to persuade them to join the proposed coalition ; promising advan- tages to those who were not prepared for oj)en hostility, if they would but aid, by keeping up the 392 MAIilJATTAS. appearance of cvjiiceit ; for from such a course the hostile party anticipated a reduction of our tone, and a greater degree of deference to the general wish of the Mahratta nation. The British Resi- dents exerted themselves with activity to penetrate into all these intrigues, and generally with com-^ plete success. Those of the P^shwa at the court of Holkur, were made the subject of a special re- monstrance, and produceid abundance of protesta- tions, but no change of conduct. Even Futeh Singh Gykwar was a party to these designs, and gave way for some time to the dangerous counsels of low companions, and men adverse to the British connexion ; but this disposition was overcome in him without any resort to strong measures, by the opei'ation of his own good sense, and experience of the solid advantages of the alliance, and by the judicious advice and moderation of the Resident at his court. On the r2th of September, to the surprise of all, Trimbukjee Dainglia succeeded in escaping fi'om his confinement in Tannah, notwithstanding that the precaution had been taken of garrisoning the fort entirely with Europeans, of whom a guard was continually mounted to observe his personal movements. The escape was effected at eight o'clock at night, through a hole in the wall of the privy, which being detached from the place of actual confinement, communicated on the other TKIMBUKJEE. 393 side with a stable belonging to one of the officers of the garrison. By accustoming the sentries to attend him to this place at the same hour of the night, their suspicions were lulled to sleep, and he was suffered to enter alone, a\ hile the sentry with the light remained without, in a situation whence he could not see what passed within. The prepa- rations for this escape were made by a man who had, with this design, taken service as sdees, or horsekeeper, to the officer living in the adjoining premises, and who disappeared along with the prisoner. His communications with Trimbukjee are supposed to have passed while he was leading the horse under his care near the prison-door and the terrace, on which Trimbukjee was al- lowed to walk ; for at these times this sdees was generally observed to be singing Mahratta songs, which the European sentries did not understand or suspect. It was some minutes before the escape was discovered, and the night being dark and rainy, Trimbukjee had slipped off his clothes and crossed the rampart by a rope previously attached to one of the guns, before the alarm was given ; and thus gained the other side of the narrow and shallow channel separating Salsette from the Mah- ratta territories, before measures could be taken to intercept the passage. The Resident at Poona was informed of this event by express. He immediately comnuuiicated 394 "TKIMBUKJEE. tlie news to the P^shwa ; declaring that the Go- vernor-general would expect the utmost efforts to be made by his Highness for the re-apprehension of this delinquent, as a necessary proof of attadi- ment to the British government ; while to afford him protection, either overtly or underhand, would infallibly produce the mischiefs that had been avoid- ed by his surrender. Bajee Rao wished to avail him- self of the escape, to alter the terms on which his favourite had before been given up, and to make his own exertions for the re-apprehension conditional, on receiving a promise, that the prisoner should here- after remain in his own custody. This attempt was of course resisted : but the fugitive for some time eluded all efforts to discover the place of his re- treat ; and there could be no doubt that Bajee Rao abetted his concealment, notwithstanding his open professions to the contrary. Thus have the political events of India been traced to the close of the rainy season of 1816, about the middle of the month of October of that year. 395 CHAPTER XI. PINDAREES. October to April, 1816-17. Nagpoor subsidiary force moves to the Nerbudda — Pinda- rees alarmed — Their first effort — Grand expedition in three divisions — First to Ganjam — Second to Bidur — Surprised by Major M'Dowell — Exploit of Sheikh DuUoo — Third to Ahmednugur — Surprised by Major Lushington — Gan- jam penetrated — Lt.Borthvvick's pursuit — First party inter- cepted — Reflections — Resolution to extirpate the hordes — Motives — Sindheea — Holkur — Dya-Ram of Hutras — His fort invested and bombarded — His escape — Fort taken. Early in October 1816, Lieutenant-colonel Walker had moved, as above mentioned, with the main body of the Nagpoor subsidiary force, to take up the position assigned to him on the southern bank of the Nerbudda. By the 25th of the month, his defensive line was comi)leted. It extended from Choonee, or Chaonee, which lies twenty-seven miles S. S. W. of Hoshungabad, to Siriniigur, one hundred and twenty miles east of the same place. With all the advantages of favourable ground, the force, consisting ol" but live l)attalion.s of infantry, 396 riNDAREES. and one regiment of cavalry, was evidently un- equal to the defence of so extended a line ; more especially as the Raja's contingent was yet in no condition to afford effectual assistance. One of Colonel Walker's posts was no less than ninety miles distant from its nearest appui. But the first appearance of a British army in the valley of tlie Nerbudda spread consternation amongst the Pin- darees; and Cheetoo's durra, which occupied the cantonment of Nemawur, on the northern bank, a little lower down the river, prepared to retire, with their families, in the direction of the Ghats, into Malwa. In the apprehension of an imme- diate attack, the preparations which had been making for an expedition to the south, when the river should be fordable, were suspended : and some time was lost by the chiefs of durras, in for- warding entreaties to Sindlieea for an asylum for their families in some of his numerous strong- holds, while they prepared for a desultory contest with the army, whose approach they daily expect- ed. Sindheea openly rejected all such applica- tions, notwithstanding that they were accompa- nied with an intimation, that unless he helped them in this emergency, his territories should no longer enjoy immunity fro)n ravage. Some of his military commanders, however, and a party in his ministry, privately gave them hopes of ulti- mately obtaining their object, in case matters came PINDAREES. 397 Id extremity ; assuring them that all public acts and professions were merely intended to save ap- pearances with the English. Emboldened in some measure by these assu- rances, and by observing that the British troops did not cross the Nerbudda, the several durras came to the resolution of pushing small parties ' between Colonel Walker's posts, and round his flanks, and thus pursuing the same system of predatory incursion into the British territories, that had in the past year been so successful. On the 4th of November, a party crossed near Hindia, half of which proceeded on the Boorhan- poor road, and the other half towards Tamboornee. Colonel Walker immediately moved with a light force upon Hurda, to intercept their route ; and after a vain pursuit for some distance along the Boorhanpoor road, succeeded, by a sudden march eastward, in falling in with the latter party, while bivouacked in the jungle on the night of the 5th. This body suffered an inconsiderable loss, and fled precipitately back across the river. Similar at- tempts to pass were not' renewed till the 13th, when the plan which had been agreed upon by the chiefs, in the interim, was carried into execu- tion. Cheetoo's durra still continued in force to the west. At the same time, large bodies moved to the east, and upwards of five thousand passed the river in sight of the infantry post, on the ex- 398 PINDAREES. treme right of Colonel Walker's line, with a ra- pidity of movement, which baffled the efforts of the infantry to impede or harass their march, while, as the Pindarees knew, the regiment of ca- valry was on the opposite flank. In this manner the passage was effected, in sufficient numbers to form two luhburs, (expeditions), one of which con- tinued its progress due east, and, penetrating by the route of Mundela, Chuteesgurh, and the fo- rests and mountains forming the northera and eastern frontier of the Nagpoor dominions, burst suddenly into the Company's district of Ganjam, with the evident and avowed intention of turning thence north-eastward to Cuttack and Jugiu'- nath. By good fortune, the turbulent character of the Rajas and landholders of Ganjam had caused the district to be well furnished with troops, and the lulihur was driven back before it could penetrate to any distance, as will presently be mentioned more particularly. The other body of these Pindarees took a southward direction, and passed within twenty miles of Nagpoor with impunity, notwithstanding that an effort was made to intercept them, by a light detachment from the infantry brigade remaining at that city. They then crossed the Wurda into the Nizam's teiTitory, before Colonel Doveton could bring up troops for the defence of that line, from the posi- tion he occupied to shut the southern Ghats of PINDAIJEES. 399 tlie valley of the Poorna, in which quarter he was looking out for these marauders. This body, which at the lowest estimate amounted to six thousand, was on the Godavuree, at Neermul, on the 15th of December, and at Bidur on the 21st; up to which point it liad marched leisurely with- out interruption, or fatiguing its horses, plunder- ing a ])road line of country on either side of its track. The lulibur continued some time in the neighbourhood of Bidur, while the chiefs remain- ed indecisive as to the prosecution of the ulterior design of penetrating into the Company's ceded districts on the other side of the Kishna and Toomboodra. Their indecision proved the ruin of the enterprise, as it afforded time for a light force, detached from Hyderabad for this purpose, under Major M'Dowell, to give the main body a complete surprise, about thirty miles to the west of Bidur. This occurred before daylight in the morning of the 1 5th of January ; and such was the security into which the Pindarees had been lulled by their hitherto uninterrupted progress, that the infantry were close in upon the tents of the chiefs before they were discovered, and hardly a man of the party was mounted, by the time the first volley was discharged. The greater part of the horses and booty of the main division of this luhbu?' was abandoned, on the rapid advance of the infantry ; and the dispersion was so complete, that 400 I'IN'DAHEKS. nothing was afterwards thought of by those com- posing it, except their personal safety and return. One leader, however, indignant at the w^ant of energy betrayed by those vested with the chief command of the expedition, had carried away a body of from three to five hundred, a few days before this discomfiture ; and, passing rapidly across the Peshwa s territory, descended into the Konkan by the Amba Ghat in the western range, and thence shaped liis course due north, plunder- ing the western shores of India, from the seven- teenth to the twenty-first degree of north latitude, and returning by the valley of the Taptee, and the route of Boorhanpoor. The conductor of this bold enterprise was a man named Sheikh Dulloo, and the singular hardihood of the exploit, joined to the uncommon skill and rapidity with which it was conducted, saved it from the fate which over- took every other expedition of the kind this sea- son. The only loss Sheikh Dulloo sustained from British troops was, when, on his return to the Nerbudda, in the following March, he found the ford, by which he hoped to recross to Cheetoo's durra, guarded by a redoubt occupied by a havil- dar's party of our sepoys. Several of his men were shot in attempting to dash across ; but Sheikh Dulloo himself, with his main body, and best-mounted followers, retiring from the ghat, boldly swam the river lower down, though not PINDAKEES. 401 without a further loss of men and horses, several of whom were drowned in the attempt. The ill mounted and less daring of the band dispersed and fled into the jungul on the southern bank of the river, where the greater part were cut off by the wild inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Of two hundred and sixty Pindarees of the first and second classes, of which the band had consisted when it separated from the liihbur at Bidur, only one hundred and ten rejoined the durra ; but these brought a rich booty in their saddles ; and the brilliancy of the achievement added even more to their reputation than its success had done to their wealth. Besides the above two bodies of Pindarees, which had turned the right flank of Colonel Walker's line, another detachment from Cheetoo's durra had succeeded in making good its route by the Boorhanpoor road, as above mentioned. It was subsequently reinforced, and succeeded in passing the valley of the Taptee and ghats of Berar, notwithstanding the dispositions made for their defence. This body passed between Aurunga- bad and Jalna, on the 28th of November, and moved direct upon Ahmednugur. The Poona subsidiary force was not this season in ])osition for the defence of the Peshwa's frontier agahist such incursions, as a considerable part of the light troops had been called down to the south, where 2 D 402 PIXDAKEES. their presence was re(]iiired, to awe Apa Dusaee into submission. This man was a powerful south- ern jageerdar, who had subjected himself, by con- tinued contumacy, to the penalty of a forfeiture of one-third of his jageer ; and the forfeiture was en- forced by calling down a British detachment at the close of the rainy season, which did not completely effect the object until the middle of December 18ir). On the 25th of this month, while on his route to the northward with the 4th Madras native cavalry, which had formed part of the force employed to the south, Major Lushington obtained intelligence that the above-mentioned body of Pindarees was somewhere to the S. E. of Poona. He was at the time at Peepulwaree, twen- ty-five miles distant ; but as the Pindarees were ig- norant of his being in the neighbourhood, and were plundering at their leisure in fancied security, there was every hope of falling in with them : at all events, he resolved to make the effort. After an unremitting march of upwards of fifty miles, from one o'clock in the morning of the 26th, the Major succeeded in coming up with the luhhui\ at the time the Pindarees were cooking and eating after a long march. The surprise was complete ; and, as the ground was favourable for the pursuit of cavalry, a very large proportion was cut up. The loss of the freebooters was estimated to be very great, as between seven and eight lunidred PINDAREES. 403 were left on the field. The only casualty on the part of the British was the death of Captain Darke, who received a spear through the body. A man of his troop had turned from the charge of a Pindara, armed in this manner ; and, indignant at the sight, this spirited officer himself rushed forward, and fell a victim to the superiority of the weapon in skilful hands. The Pindara was im- mediately cut to pieces by Captain Darke's men. This luhbuVi like that surprised a few days after- wards by Major M'Dowell, suffered so severely, that it similarly broke up, and fled back to the Nerbudda in the utmost confusion. However, before the remnant of either could arrive on the banks of that river, the passes and ghats were so well guarded, that the gi'eater part of the fugi- tives perished, and but few reached the durras they had left in November. A small body of those surprised by Major M'Dowell, was conducted across the river with great skill by its leader, who succeeded in making his way by the Charwa road, before the party sent to intercept him by Colonel Walker arrived to occupy it. The Ganjam expedition is the only one that re- mains to be accounted for. This body ^^ as composed almost entirely of men from Wasil Mohummed's durra. It crossed the British frontier in the mid- dle of December, marching upon Kimmedy ; to which place, Lieutenant Tweedle. who was on the 2 D 2 404 PlMiAUllKS. frontier with a company of Madras native infantry, retired as the /M^Z»//r advanced. Emboldened by this, the Pindarees attacked the town, and succeeded in burning and phmdeiing part of it on the night of the 19th of December, though Major OHver was there with tln'ee companies of infantry. Having ascer- tained that their camp was but two miles distant, this officer determined to surprise it before morn- ing, and met with complete success ; occasioning considerable loss to the lnhbin\ notwithstanding the smallness of his force, and his utter want of cavalry. In the course of the following morning the whole band moved off, taking the direct road to Ganjam, before which station they appeared on the 25th. They plundered part of the town in haste, and retired through Goomsir. Lieutenant Borthwick instantly commenced a most active pursuit. On the 27th he fell in with aliout one thousand, of whom he destroyed twenty men and fifty horses ; but, not satisfied with this success, he resolved to beat up the Pindaree camj), which, in their confidence, from knowing the British troops to be infantry only, he rightly judged would not be far off. Leaving a jemadar's party to pur- sue the direct road, he himself, with fifty men of his company, took a circuitous route, so as to fall upon the enemy from the opposite quarter. His success was veiy brilliant ; and, soon after, the Pindarees disappeared from the province, aban- PINDAUKES. 405 doning the hope of being able to penetrate into Cuttaek, and disheartened by the losses ah'eady sustained. In the mean time, the advance division of the Bengal troops, destined to relieve Colonel Walker, had moved down to the Nerbudda ; and Major M'Morine, who commanded, leaving a detachment at Jubulpoor on his arrival at that })oint on the 1st of January, so disj)osed the rest of his force, under Colonel Walker's orders, as to extend the de- fensive line thence to Sirinugur, and allo\\' of the Madras troops, before stationed at the latter point, being called in to strengthen and complete the chain of posts from Sirinugur to Iloshungabad and Choonee. Wasil Mohummed, seeing these further prepaiations, became apprehensive for the safety of the luhbur he had sent out, and despatched Itur- karas in every direction to warn them against re- turning by the same route they had gone, and with positive injunctions to keep well to the north. This, however, availed them little ; for Lieutenant-colonel Adams, who was in the course of January moving down in the same direction with the main body of the Bengal troops, sent forward parties to occupy the ghats and passes from Chandya northwards to Bundelkhund, so as effectually to intercept the return of any body of marauders from the east towards the Sagur district, near which AVasil Mohummed had fixed his head-quarters. These 406 PINDAREES. arrangements completely answered the purpose. On the 24th of January, Captain Caulfield, who was furthest in advance, heard of the approach of the luhbur from Ganjam, and fell upon them in the night with a squadron of the 5th Bengal ca- valry, while attempting to retura by the Chandya road. He captured four hundred horses ; and the number of the slain was estimated at the same amount. Ramzan Khan, the leader of the party, was ascertained to be amongst these : the chief next in rank had previously fallen in one of Lieute- nant Borthwick's attacks. The fugitives, after this discomfiture, made an effort to escape by a pass yet further to the north ; where, on the 26th, they fell in with Major Clarke, and the main body of the 5th Bengal cavalry, who cut up about one hundred and fifty more. This expedition, therefore, which was the only one that penetrated the British frontier, suffered yet more severely than either of the other two. A small part of the advance, that had passed between Chandya and Jubulpoor, before Colonel Adams's detachments had taken up their positions, were all of those engaged in it who escaped unmo- lested in their return homewards.* No further attempt was made this season to pass into the Dukhun, or to get beyond the de- * This party was hotly but unsuccessfully pursued by in- fantry from .lubulpoor, under Major Popliam. PINDAKKES. 407 feiisive posts, connecting the frontier of our pos- sessions in Bundelkhund with those of the Bhoosla Raja. From January forward the Pindarees car- ried on their trade of plunder for mere subsistence, and exclusively above the ghats in Malwa ; while such was the alacrity of the troops occupying the defensive line, that, towards the end of the sea- son, a band from Wasil's durra having ventured too far to the eastward, to ravage the country between Bundelkhund and Sagur, was surprised and driven back with loss by the rapid advance of a squadron of the 4th Bengal native cavalry, under Captain Ridge, from their post at Lohar- gaon. A party that came to the bank of the Nerbudda to reconnoitre, and ascertain the prac- ticability of a passage, was in like manner stopped by the guard on the southern bank, while Major Clarke (the Bengal troops having by that time completely relieved those of Madras) crossed the river with cavalry at a different ford, and cut them up as they retired across the valley in their way to the hills that form the barrier of Malwa. Such were the proceedings of the Pindaree hordes during the season of 1816-17, and sucli the military operations against them. Their plan of depredation this year emljraced a more amj)le expanse of territory, than had ever before been attempted, extending from shore to shore of the peninsula of India, and including all the intcrme- 408 PINDAUEES. diate provinces that had been spared the ravage of the preceding year. The report of Lieutenant- general Sir Thomas Hislop to the Marquess of Hastings represented their different columns as amounting by his estimate to twenty-three thou- sand horse. This inroad had been foreseen to the full extent, and the precautionary measures of the British were consequently on a proportionate scale of magnitude. After the Bengal troops had cross- ed the Nerbudda to relieve Colonel Walker, there were no less than thirty-two thousand regulars of the King's or Company's forces between that river and the Kishna, besides the reformed infantry and cavalry of the Nizam, and the Peshwa's brigade ; troops, which, though paid by our allies, were in effect devoted to the same service with their offi- cers. In addition to the above force in advance, the utmost efforts had been made to arm the northern frontier of our immediate possessions in the Dukhun, in order to guard against a similar attempt to that of the preceding year ; so that altogether the military effort on the side of Ma- dras was nearly as great as it would have been in the event of operations of the most decisive kind. Notwithstanding all this, it was rather to good fortune on our part, and to a relaxation of vigi- lance and activity on that of the enemy, than to our own exertions, that we must attribute the overtaking of the two laiger bodies, and their PINDAREES. 409 severe chastisement by Majors Liisliingtoii and M'Dowell. So, likewise, the o])portune march of Colonel Adams to the south most materially con- tributed to afford the means of completely inter- cepting the third expedition, which had penetrated into Ganjam. Thus it was accident, not the merits of our defensive policy, that had yielded us so much more brilliant successes this year than the last ; and no argument could be di-awn from them in favour of the security of any combination of defensive arrangements. To build a system for the future, however, upon the experience of this season, as if it were sufficient to provide onlv for similar results, would involve an annual pre})ara- tion on the same enormous scale of expense ; and even by the most favourable calculation, would not secure our provinces from invasion, and our subjects from the horrors of Pindaree ravage, al- though we might, in some cases, happen to inflict signal vengeance on the marauders, on their way homeward incumbered with spoil. The insufficiency of stationary posts of defence was abundantly shown by the early success of the Pindarees in penetrating Colonel \Valker's line ; and it stands to reason, that if a light assailant of this description be allowed time to ascertain pre- cisely at what points the covering force may be expected to be found, he will always be able so to choose his line of route, and to regulate the length 410 J-iNDAllEl-.N. of his marches, as to baffle the utmost vigilance of such stationary defenders, when they are imder an interdict not to advance and meet the danger, or crush it in the embryo. The conviction of this disadvantage produced an alteration of policy be- fore the close of the season : for Colonel Adams ob- tained permission to cross the Nerbudda, and the officers in post to the south of Bundelkhund to advance w^estward even into Sagur, in case an enemy should approach : whereas antecedently, the southern bank of the Nerbudda, or more gene- rally the frontier of our own territories and that of our protected allies, had been fixed as the limit of their operations. The two successful affairs of April were attribvitable to this judicious alteration. The policy and views entertained respectively by the British government, and by the native po- tentates of India, regarding the Pindarees, in the course of this season, will now be shortly explained. The Governor-general in council had, as before mentioned, come to the resolution of w^aiting the arrival of the sanction of the home authorities to commence offensive measures for their suppression. In the interval, the Marquess of Hastings trusted, that the advantage of defence acquired by the Nagpoor alliance might, in some degree, deter, or at least enable us to repel aggression, either on ourselves or our allies. Early in the season, how- ever, he became sensible of the futility of such PINDAREES. 411 expectations; and even before the stoiin had burst upon Ganjam, the council came to the unanimous resolution to defer no longer the extirpation of these banditti. On the 21st of December IHIG, this determination was formed, and Lord Hastings gave immediate notice of his intention to proceed in person to the scene of action, and to spare no efforts to accomplish the object in spite of any ob- stacles that might be raised by open or secret foes. With respect to the time, it was resolved not to commence until the following season, unless the formation of the Jypoor alliance should require operations against Ameer Khan, in which case his Lordship proposed to enter upon immediate action. This not having taken place, his depar- ture for the upper provinces was fixed for the fol- lowing rains, that is to say, the month of June or July 1817. It was still considered doubtful, whether Sindheea would be induced to co-operate with us in this important object, or yield to the importu- nity of alternate entreaty and menace, addressed to him from the several durras. The certain op- position of Ameer Khan, or at least of his Putan mercenaries, and the probable secret counterac- tion of the Pcshwa, were confidently anticipated : but with the resources of the Nizam and of the Bhoosla, who was supposed to be equally staunch, added to our own strength in that (juarter of In- dia, there appeared little hazard of failure. But 4\2 riXDAKEI.S. his Lordship resolved to place himself abcjve that little, by calling into play the whole disposable means of the three presidencies, according to a comprehensive plan, which will hereafter be parti- cularly developed. The resolution to undertake active measures was formed not only without any assurance of support from the home authorities, but at a time when the Supreme Government had reason to believe that a contrary disposition pre- vailed at the India House. It must be observed, that there had not yet been time to learn their sentiments on receiving information of the storm having burst upon their own district of Guntoor. This intelligence arrived in England in the course of the month of Septem- ber 1816, and seems to have wrought an imme- diate change in their aversion to offensive opera- tions. WheiT the Supreme Government resolved to wait no longer for the expected sanction from home, no answer to its second reference had yet been received. The repeated violations of our own tei'ritory, and the experience of the utter futility of defen- sive arrangements, irresistibly impelled the Gover- nor-general to this course ; and his Lordship felt confident, a confidence justified by the result, if the result of a measure can ever be admitted to afford a fair test of its merit, that a knowledge of these circumstances would awaken the authorities riKDARKES. 413 in England to a sense of the magnitude of the evil, and the imperative duty and necessity of eradicating it. The reasons for postponing the commencement of operations till the close of the rains, unless prematurely brought on by the issue of the Jypoor negotiation, will be obvious, when the time requisite fully to prepare so extensive a plan of military and political movement, and the vast advantage of commencing with the whole of the fair season to look forward to, are taken into consideration. The current of events appeared also to be daily tending to produce a state of pub- lic feeling and opinion more and more favourable to our views. The successes against the Pinda- rees, the increasing alarm and anxiety of Sindheea, the prospect of further improving our connexion with N^agpoor, and of comprehending Jypoor with- in the circle of our influence, as wtU as the time thus given for the newly-formed pacific relations with Nipal to take effect, all contributed to re- commend that government should reserve the exe- cution of its resolve, until the following season. There was every prospect, that the work would then be accomplished in one campaign ; and the event has shown that the expectation was just. AVherefore, although the effort for this purpose must necessarily be on the largest and most ex- pensive scale, still the ultimate saving of charge and increase of reputation, from avoiding a w ar- 414 PINDAIIEES. fare protracted indefinitely from year to year, were objects worth any sacrifice, and only to be ensured by having an entire season to act in, after a due allowance of time for previous preparation. It will not be necessary to detain the reader, by stating at length the views of the several native princes, in respect to the Pindarees. Their ag- gressions on ourselves and our allies were more than once brought to the notice of Sindheea, by order of the Supreme Government ; and in pro- portion as we became earnest in representing the evil, this chief redoubled his protestations of hos- tility to the hordes, while his generals and minis- ters continued to give them even open encourage- ment. A commander was at last appointed to conduct an expedition, that was to extirpate the whole race of Pindarees : but, when the army was to be collected, delays and difficulties began to be started in such number, that, in the end, Balajee Inglia, the officer nominated, never stirred from Gwalior. Some anxiety was shown, when the ap- prehension of our immediately advancing to the north of the Nerbudda was most lively ; and care was taken to have troops in readiness to act ac- cording to the course of events. Beyond that point, the activity of this durbar did not reach. But we so far availed ourselves of Sindheea's pro- fessions and general policy, as to assume, that we were at perfect liberty to pursue the freebooters NATIVE POWERS. 41 beyond his frontier, though it was not thought expedient to define the matter, by desiring any formal recognition of the right. Holkur's durbar, during the season 1816-17, was agitated by a violent struggle between the party of Ameer Khan, whose agent Ghufoor Khan was at the head of the Putan interest, and had the regular battalions at his beck, and that of the native Mahrattas, who had followed the fortunes of the family, and into whose hands Toolsee Baee the regent had latterly thrown herself and her wai'd, the young Mulhar Rao. The former mi- nister, Balaram Set, having been thought to fa- voiu' the Putan faction, was arrested and put to death in prison ; and the differences between the two parties went so far, as to produce what was called a battle, though it amounted to no more than a distant cannonade. The season passed- without reconciliation or the complete reduction of either party : and Sindheea, who had at one time shown a disposition to interfere, in order to effect an accommodation, refrained in the end,, and withdrew the force he had kei)t in the neigh- bourhood for the purpose. One consequence of these disturbances was, the release of Kureem Khan, the most noted of the Pindaree leadei-s, who had hitherto been kept under the appearance of some restraint. The occurrences at the courts of Poona and 41(j NATIVE POWERS. Nagpoor, during the season 181G-17, will be given in the following chapter. The operations against tlie fort of Hutras in the Dooab, as they had con- siderable effect in calming the public mind of the native population of our own western provinces, and preparing them for the events that were to follow, will here find its proper place of notice. Soon after the Supreme Government had deter- mined on the suppression of the predatory bands, indeed before the close of the month of Decemliei', the continued contumacy of Dya Ram and Bhug- wunt Singh, two zemindars of the Dooab, was brought particularly under the notice of Lord Hastings and the council, together with some fur- ther recent acts of unprovoked aggression upon peaceable residents within the Agra district. The rank of both these chieftains was that of mere talookdars, or renters of portions of land, but they held very strong forts ; and the government, on its acquisition of the province from Sindheea, the possessions of both lying in the Uleegurh district, behaved towards them with its usual consideration, and, so long as their quota of revenue was regularly paid, a strict conformity with the equalizing laws of our system was not enforced upon them. Pre- suming upon this moderation, and upon the strength of their fortresses of Hutras and Moor- san, they both levied arbitrary duties, harboured thieves and robbers, and, disregarding the autho- HUTRAS. 4 I 7 rity of the courts of judicature, wliich they were bound to respect, sported with the persons and properties of the peaceable and well-disposed in their neighbourhood. At last, the Supreme Go- vernment felt itself called upon to resent this con- duct ; and it was particularly politic not to pass it over at this time, as a risinp; of the Putan popu- lation of Rohilkhund a few months before, to op- pose an ordinance for the regulation of the police of cities and towns, showed the minds of the peo- ple in this part of our dominions to be very unset- tled. That insurrection had, indeed, subsided on the failure of the armed mob to overpow^er a small party of but three* companies of Scpahees, which had been marched into the city of Burelee, where the green flag of Mohummed had l^een hoisted by the malcontents. Still, in the pro!)ability of ex- tensive war with the Mahrattas and Putans, ne- cessarily involving the risk of a successful inroad from beyond our frontier, the mischief would be incalculable, if the slightest idea of the internal * Tlie exemplary conduct of tliis detachment, and of Cap- tain Boscavven its commander, would desei've a much more particular notice, if the plan of this narrative would allow of such a digression. The Rohillas penetrated iHc square, into which the detachment was compelled to form itself, before the fourth side could be completed by the falling in of the pic- quets and light infantry. They were literally blown out again by the bold manoeuvre of turning one of the guns at the angles inwards, loaded with grape. ■2 F. 418 HUTRAS. instability of our power were suffered to go abroad. It was therefore important to strike a blow, that should impress all ranks with a proper estimate of our vigour and military means. Hutras was reckoned one of the strongest forts in India. Dya-Ram was a Jat, and derived no small accession of confidence and estimation, from being a relation of the Bhurtpoor Raja, with whom he claimed equality of rank. The fort was kept in the completest state of repair, and every improvement that was introduced into our neighbouring fortress of Uleegurh, such as pre- paring a covered way, raising a glacis, and le- velling the height of the ramparts, was carefuUy copied by this suspicious chief. At the close of 1816, it was resolved to reduce both Dya-Ram and Bhugwunt to the level of subjects, and to employ an overwhelming force for the purpose, as well to bear down all opposition, as to give eclat to the measure. The divisions from Cawn- poor, from Meeruth, and from Muttra, were ac- cordingly ordered to concentrate on Hutras, and place themselves under the immediate command of Major-general Marshall, the commanding offi- cer in the field. On the 1 1th of February, the place was invested on all sides. Dya-Ram was then summoned to surrender a gate of his fort and allow of its being dismantled. After some evasion on his part, and a negotiation, which HUTRAS. 419 lasted till the 1 Gtli, he finally refused ; when the siege immediately commenced. The Kutra, or fortified town, was breached and evacuated on the 23d. Approaches were then made to the fort, and l)atteries erected under a smart, tliough ineffectual fire from the ramparts. By the 1st of March the works of the besiegers were completed, and, on the following morning, forty-five mortars and three breaching batteries of heavy guns began to play on the fort. Such powerful means had never yet been employed against any forti- fied place in India. The effect was beyond mea- sure destructive and astonishing to the garrison. The batteries continued to play till the evening, when, at five o'clock*, a magazine dispropor- tionally large blew up within the place, destroy- ing half the garrison and nearly all the buildings. The effect is described to have been awful. Dya- Ram with a few horse made his escape in the dark the same night ; and, though challenged and pursued by a picquet of the 8th dragoons, got off with little damage. The rest of the garrison, in attempting to follow, were driven in and ol)liged to surrender at discretion. Bhugwunt Singh agreed to dismantle his fort on the first sum- mons ; and thus was this important object gained, * The other magazine, one of yet larger dimensions, was likewise found penetrated by a shell ; but the fuse had dropt out. 2 1-: 2 420 HUTRAS. witliout any sacrifice of lives ; the casualties * of the assailants in the siege being too insignificant to mention ; while the impression of the utter futility of resistance spread far and wide through Hindoostan, and even through the remote Duk- hun, where it materially influenced the subse- quent conduct of the Mahratta chiefs and ki- ladars. * Killed — one European, five natives. 421 CHAPTER XII. NAGPOOR.-POONA. 1817, JANUARY TO JUNE. Nagpoor — Ram Chundur Wagh— Sudeek Ulee Khan — Apa Saheb goes to Chanda — intrigues — death of Pursajee — by violent means — Accession of Apa Saheb — Change of poHcy — Intrigues with PSshwa — Poona — Pcshwa's duphcity — Trimbukjee levies troops — is covertly supported — Resi- dent's proceedings — Discussions with the Durbar — Sub- sidiary force called down — Intercourse suspended — effect — Operations against Trimbukjee — their success — Colonel Smith called in to Poona — terms of demand-— refused — Poona invested — Bajee Rao submits — Governor-general's instructions — Conduct of Poshvva -New treaty signed — its conditions — Reflections — Military movements. Events, that led to very important results, were passing at Nagpoor and Poona, while the British were engaged with the Pindarees in the manner above-described. At the former court, a party had been rapidly rising into favour, which threatened completely to undermine the influence possessed by those of the ministry, who had been instrumental in bringing about the sub- 422 ^^AGPOOR, sidiaiy alliance with the English. At the head of this party was Ramchundnr Wilgh, the com- mander of Apa Saheb's private troops, before his elevation to the regency ; a man who had the character of a daring, deep-designing Mahratta. The Naeeb was himself of a restless disposition, and a great lover of intrigue ; and it was not long before he showed a decided preference to the counsels most suited to this turn of mind. In- stead of giving his attention to the reform of his internal administration, the object which the mo- derate men endeavoured to press upon him, he greedily listened to schemes for the concentration of all power in his own hands or those of his im- mediate dependants. Nagoo Punt was of that class ; but Nurayun Pundit was one of the old advisers of Raghoojee ; and having been the im- mediate instrument, whereby the British alliance had l^een effected, he was early thought to be too much attached to that nation, and to have its objects more at heart than those of the Bhoosla family. So long, however, as Pursajee lived, and as there was a party in the state possessed of influence not derived from himself, Apa Saheb felt his dependance on his English allies, and did not venture to break finally with Nurayun, who was supposed to enjoy their fullest confidence. A plan was, therefore, laid to reheve the Naeeb from every source of apprehension on this head : NAGPOOE. 423 and, in the course of January 1817, the follow- ing expedients were practised to carry it into effect. It will be recollected, that Sudeek Ulee Khan had been received into apparent favour by Apa Saheb, instead of being degraded along with Na- roba, the late secretary. He had contrived to make his peace through Ramchundur Wagh, but was too independent in power and influence for the reconciliation to be complete. The large as- signments of territory he enjoyed were also an object of envy, as weU to the prince, as to the favourites by whom he was surrounded. Nagoo Punt and Nurayun were in the mean time, at the Resident's desire, continually urging a reform of the contingent furnished to the British under the treaty. The duty of providing and maintaining the stipulated force out of his assignments had been thrown upon Sudeek Ulee Khan ; and its notorious incompleteness and inefficiency had af- forded ground of continual remonstrance. After having for some time seemingly favoured the system as well as the individual, Apa Saheb re- solved to avail himself of these complaints for the ruin of Sudeek Ulee ; whilst, by making it appear that the measure was forced upon him hy the British, and by leaving the execution to them, he hoped himself to escape the odium that would in- foUibly attend it. 424 NA(iro()i{. On some sliglit pretence, towards the end of January 1817, the Naeeb left Nagpoor, and went to the strong fort of Chanda, situated about se- venty miles south of the capital. Immediately after his departure, Nagoo Punt waited on Mr. Jenkins, with pressing instances, that he would take the opportunity of seizing the person of Sudeek Ulee, by means of the British troops at Nagpoor. He declared that Apa Saheb's prin- cipal reason for leaving the city was, to allow of this arrest ; and showed a written authority, in the hand-writing of the regent, in proof that his sanction had been obtained. The paper, it is true, contained only an assurance, that Nagoo Punt had his entire confidence, and that a communication from hmi might be considered as authentic ; but it is very unusual for Mahratta princes to give more specific credentials to those whom they en- trust with communications of the highest import- ance. The first overture on the subject was made on the 22d of January. On the Resident's hesi- tating to afford his direct interference, the request was repeated at subsequent interviews, when both Nagoo and Nurayun were earnest in soliciting him to act. Some further credentials were shown in testimony of Apa Sahel)'s desire in the matter ; and as Sudeek, hearing that intrigues for his ruin were afoot, had begun to fortify his house, and make NAGrouK. 425 other defensive preparations, this circumstanee was urged, together M'ith sundry proofs that had been obtained of his being in correspondence with the Pindarees, to enforce the immediate necessity of strong measures. After some reflection, Mr. Jenkins finally resolved not to stir in a case of so much importance, without a written or verbal ap- plication from the prince himself, which should prevent the possibiUty of his afterwards disavow- ing the act or pretending to be dissatisfied at it. But he strongly advised the ministers to execute the arrest with their own people, assuring them of his support in case it should be necessary, and only requiring that they, as the ostensible minis- ters, should take the responsibility of the deed in the first instance on themselves. For this Nagoo Punt was not prepared ; for he knew, that though Apa Saheb would have been glad enough to have seen the ruin of Sudeek, he was far from wishing that it should appear to be his own act. Finding himself, therefore, unable to move the Resident from this judicious resolution, he immediately re- joined his master at Chanda, leaving Sudeek Ulee Khan, for the present, without further molestation. The ruin of this officer was, however, only part of the plot, with the maturation of which tlie retii'cment of Apa Saheb to Chanda was con- nected. On the morning of the 1st of February, 426 NA(;ru(n{. Pursajee Bhoosla, the reigning Raja, was found dead in his bed, without any alteration for the worse having been observed in his general health, or in the particular complaints under which he had for some time laboured. At the moment, no suspicion attached to any one ; and though it was whispered about that the Raja had met his death by violent means, Mr. Jenkins, who made private inquiries to ascertain the fact, could trace the reports to no certain source. He accordingly con- cluded them to be no more than the common ru- mours, which in India always attend the sudden death of a man in power ; and, as the previous ailings of Pursajee made it less extraordinary that he should come to such an end, he treated the reports so lightly, as not even to mention them in his despatches to the Supreme Government, an- nouncing the event. Afterwards, however, when, upon Apa Saheb's deposition, free access was ob- tained to the servants and women of the inte- I'ior of the palace, it was positively ascer- tained, that Pursajee was strangled about two o'clock in the morning ; and there was reason to believe, that an unsuccessful attempt had pre- viously been made to administer poison in an offering of prepared betel leaf,* presented to him early in the same night hj one of the Baees of the * Pursajee rejected il, iiiuling it bitter. MAC POOH. 427 palace, Ramchundur Wagh himself aj)pears to have come to the palace about midnight, and to have given directions for the perpetration of the deed. Its actual execution was entrusted to a man named Mun Bhut, who afterwards rose to great power, and was a prime mover of the treacherous attack made on the residency in the November following. Pursajee was thirty-nine years of age. His body was burnt on the 10th of February ; and his wife, Kashee Baee, ascended the funeral pile, and sacrificed herself upon it. Apa Saheb was imme- diately proclaimed successor to the Raja, by the name of Moodajee Bhoosla. The day of good omen for the new Raja's formal installation was not declared until the 21st of April following; but this did not prevent his at once assuming the titles and dignities of the head of the Bhoosla state. Upon Apa Saheb's accession and return from Chanda, Sudeek Ulee Khan was received witli marked attention ; and, as Nurayun, one of the ministers, who had pressed the Biitish Resident to complete his downfall, was treated with a cool- ness equally pointed, it was for some time mattei of doubt, whether the plot for the ruin of the former had really originated with his Highness. It was soon afterwards pretty evident, that his secret disposition was as little favourable to the 428 NAG POOR. one as to the other : but some motives still ex- isted, for practising deception towards the Moosul- man soldier ; while his elevation to the undivided honours of the Raj, under the sanction and for- jnal recognition of the British government pre- viously obtained, rendered it no longer necessary for the prince to keep on terms with the minister, whom he suspected of favouring the British in- terest. About the end of February, Nurayun Pundit was especially removed from the conduct of the department of communication with the British Resident ; and at first Pursaram Rao, the very person whose intrigues in the lifetime of Ra- ghoojee, Apa Sahelj had himself betrayed to the Resident, before his own elevation to the Regency, was appointed in his stead. Mr. Jenkins remon- strated against the causeless i-emoval of Nurayun, observing that the disgrace of this minister had the appearance of being occasioned by his having ex- erted himself to induce his Highness to execute faithfully the treaty of alliance, especially that part of it which provided for the maintenance of the contingent in a state of efficiency ; that the default in this respect, and the removal of the mi- nister who had attempted to prevent it, were cal- culated to give the British government a very unfavourable impression of his disposition towards the alliance ; which was yet further increased by the selection of such a man as Pursaram, to con- NAGPOOR. 429 duct the pu!)lic communications with the Englisli Resident. Apa Saheb was bent on the removal of Nurayun, and therefore would only listen to the remonstrance so far, as to nominate Ram- chundur Wagh to the office, instead of Pursaram, who was obnoxious on such plausible grounds. Reference being made to the Supreme Govern- ment, it was determined not to authorise any more pressing instances for the restoration of Nurayun, through fear of increasing the new^ Raja's incipient dislike of the alliance. His sa- crifice was, therefore, submitted to, notwithstand- ing that it was considered most evident, that his disgrace was owing to his exertions to procure the punctual execution of the treaty. Immedi- ately on the fall of Nurayun, Nagoo Punt combined with Ramchundur Wagh : and, in a very short time, every official station was filled by the ne^^' Raja's personal dependants. A persecution was also commenced against Goojaba Dada, who, fearing for his life, took refuge first with Nagoo Punt, and afterwards at the British Residency, whence lie ^^'as ultimately conducted in safety to Allahal)ad. In the mean time, negotiations were openly kept on foot with the resident va- keels of the Peshwa, of Sindheea, and of Holkur : and, although circumstances arose at Poona, which placed Bajee Rao for a short time on a footing of direct hostihty with the British, his 430 NAG POOR. representative at Nagpoor received daily letters and had daily audiences with the new Raja, making communications, the substance of which was withheld from the British Resident, in direct violation of the treaty concluded only twelve months before. Indeed, from the time that Apa Saheb felt himself secure in the full possession of the honours and authority of the Raj, he ceased to regard the British alliance as a necessary prop to his rule, and began to be sensible of the humi- liation of appearing to the Mahratta nation as the first of the Bhoosla dynasty who had made a vo- luntary sacrifice of political independence. It is true, there had not yet been time for the alHance to operate as a restraint on his personal direction of internal or external affairs ; but it was not dif- ficult for tlie designing men about him to convince him that it must ultimately have that effect. He, therefore, eagerly listened to the invitations of the agents of the other Mahratta powers, to unite with them for the purpose of shaking off the con- nexion : nor was his personal vanity insensible to the flattery with which his alliance was courted, and to the distinction of being thought of so much consequence to the success of the coahtion. Henceforward he lent himself wholly to the de- signs of Bajee Rao ; and, in April and May, when matters were on the eve of a rupture with the latter, it was ascertained, that assurances of POONA. 431 mutual support had passed between the two courts. But it is now time to state specifically the nature of the occurrences at Poona, to which allusion has more than once been made. Trimbukjee Dainglia's escape, in September, has been already noticed. The place of his re- treat could not be traced ; but, during the early part of the ensuing cold season, he remained in perfect quiet ; and though, as might have been expected, his master made no exertions to seize him, still it could not be discovered that he either harboured or gave him ostensible support. There was, consequently, no interruption of the good understanding maintained by his Highness with the British govornment. On the contrary, studious efforts were made by him to win Mr. Elphinstone's confidence ; and, in this view, he solicited to be made a party to the plans which were, in the course of the season, supposed to be meditated by us against the Pindarees, and made a parade of issuing orders to his agent at Sind- heea's camp, to refrain fi-om intrigues, and only to meddle in the politics of that durbar, as far as they might have relation to his claims in Hin- doostan ; and even in them to do nothing without communication with the British Resident. He also professed a disposition to be satisfied with a very moderate composition for all his demands on the Gykwar, taking six lakh of rupees a-year, and 432 I'OOXA. giving up ev^ery thing else, hut thc^ right ol" in- vestiture. The disi)lay of such an accommo- dating spirit, at a time when it was scarcely ex- pected, was not at first attrihuted to a design in Bajee Rao to deceive the British Government. It was thought rather to have its origin in the desire to keep well with us at all events, however hostile his secret inclinations might be. The Marquess of Hastings resolved to encourage this disposition : and accordingly a copy of a remon- strance, made in January to Sindheea, on the sub- ject of the late incursion of the Pindarees into Ganjam, was forwarded to Poona, together with some explanation of the grounds on which the British government proposed to take early mea- sures for the suppression of these hordes. This communication his Highness received in the course of February, with every demonstration of satisfaction at the confidence thus reposed in him. In the mean time, the plot he had contrived was drawing to maturity. In the course of the months of January and February, Mr. Elphin- stone heard of the collection of troops in the Mohadeo hills, to the south of the Neera,'and about fifty miles south-east of Poona. He early represented the circumstance to the Peshwa, who, with every appearance of alacrity, sent out a party of Gokla's troops to quell the supposed pooNA. 433 insurrection ; i)rotesting all along that he had himself heard nothing of the matter, and did not believe the existence of any thing of the kind. The detachment went to the spot, and reported that no insurgents were to be found or heard of ; though it lay for some time encamped in the neighbourhood of the Mohadeo temple, holding- daily communication with tlie armed bodies that had been there assembled. Early in March it was distinctly ascertained that Trimbukjee was himself in that part of the country, and had for some time been making extensive levies. The 18th of March was talked of as the day ap- pointed for his open appearance in arms ; and the direct participation of Bajee Rao was evident, as well from general report, and from the conduct of the detachment sent to suppress the insurrec- tion, as from positive information received of actual interviews between his Highness and that delinquent at Phoolshuhui", a village about fifteen miles from Poona, which he gave many frivolous reasons for making the place of a lengthened stay. Large remittances of money, to the parts in in- surrection, Avere also traced through several hands, in a manner that left no room to doubt their having been made from Bajee Rao to Trim- bukjee and his adherents. The Peshwa and his ministers persisted in stoutly denying the exist- ence of any insurrection, or levy of troops, in 2 F 434 POONA. the neighbourhood of Mohadeo. At the same time, all his Highness' forts were ordered to be put in a state of complete repair, and extensive levies of horse and foot were going on even at Poona and the vicinity ; liesides which, agents were sent with money into Malwa and other quarters, to invite men to the Dukhun, in order to enter his service. Up to the 24th of February, Mr. EliDhinstone had considered the insurrection as levelled equally against the Peshwa's government and the interests of the British nation, and his communications with the Dui'bar were made in that belief. On that day, however, the reply of the Peshwa's officer sent to queU it was put into his hands, which, combined with the other circumstances alluded to, satisfied him of the necessity of taking up the matter in its proper light, that is to say, as an underhand attempt of the prince himself to shake the British power. The early part of March was spent in remonstrances on one side, and on the other, in denials of the existence of any insurrec- tion or assemblage of troops, and in protestations of readiness to do any thing that might be suggest- ed, and to send troops to any place that might be named to put it down. Mr. Elphinstone declared he wanted no troops, that he should employ the British troops in dispersing the insurgents, and that the presence of those of his Highness would POONA. 435 only lead to confusion : he demanded other proofs that the insurrection was not encouraged under- hand; such as the placing Trimbukjee's known adherents and the members of his family luider restraint, instead of which they were continued in office and in favour. He demanded also, that the enlistment of troops by his Highness should be dis- continued, and the late extraordinary levies dis- banded : that the repairs of fortresses, and the measures that were taking for storing them with grain and ammunition, should cease ; adding, that while such things were going on, there could be no reliance on his Highness' sincerity, as such preparations could be meant against no other than the British. On one occasion early in ]\Iarch, Bajee Rao remonstrated against the style of the Resident's communications, declaring them to be of a threatening nature, and calculated to produce a rupture. Generally, however, he met them by an outward show of acquiescence. Thus, on the 11th of March, part of Trimbukjee's family was placed under nominal restraint, and other osten- sible measures taken of the same cast ; while the most liberal promises were continually made, to discontinue every thing which gave offence. But the preparations continued with the same activity and more secrecy, as well at Poona and its neigh- bourhood, as in Kandes and other parts ; and Trimbukjee's insurrection in the south was grow- 2 F 2 436 pooNA. ing every day into more importance. About tlie middle of March, Mr. Elphinstone resolved to call down the subsidiary force, and to employ it forth- with in the suppression of the insurrection, and eventually against Poona, in case Bajee Rao's conduct should render it necessary. On the 21st of March, he solicited special instructions for the case of a continuation of these hostile preparations, and of the covert support of Trimbukjee's rebel- lion ; stating it to be his intention to break off all communication with his Highness in the interim, and to announce the present relations of amity to be at an end, leaving it to his Lordship in council to restore them, with such demand of security for the future, as he might deem it proper to require. In communicating this to the Peshwa, he stated his intention to assure him there was no design of committing acts of direct hostility, unless his Highness' preparations should render such pro- ceeding necessary, or unless his Highness should attempt to leave Poona ; in either of which cases, hostilities against himself would be commenced, without waiting the Governor-general's orders. On the 1 st of April these intentions were carried into effect : the continued preparations of Bajee Rao, which went the length of even collecting gun- bullocks for the artillery in his arsenal at Poona, and of sending all the treasures, jewels, and wardrobe of his palace there to his strongest fort of Rygurh, PooNA. 437 having rendered it necessary no longer to defer bringing matters to this issue. Accordingly, on that day the Resident sent in a note, wherein, after reproaching his Highness with the wanton- ness of the aggression on the British goverament, which he had been abetting underhand, and after recapitulating the abundant proofs of his so doing, and of his preparing for hostiUty throughout his whole dominions, he notified the intention of im- mediately employing the subsidiary force for the suppression of the insurrection, and eventually for the support of the British interests against his Highness himself; declaring that the good under- standing between the two governments was now at an end, but that his Highness had one chance left of restoring it, that of disarming and waiting the Governor-general's determination, which if he showed a disposition to try, no act of hostility would take place against himself, though any at- tempt to leave Poona would be held a decided indication of war. The Poona brigade was ordered to hold itself in readiness, and Colonel Leighton, its commanding officer, was desired to take such precautions as he might deem necessary for the security of the residency and cantonment. Affairs were left in this posture at Poona, while the main body of the subsidiary force, which had previously been put in motion from the frontier, was formed into several divisions, whereof, one lightly equipped, 438 POONA. and vinder Colonel Smith's personal command, hastened down to the southward to operate against the insurgents. Major M'Dowell, with the de- tachment that had beat up the Pindarees on the 15th of January, being still in the neighbourhood of Bidur, was at the same time called in to Tool- japoor to co-operate ; and another force under Lieutenant-colonel Thompson, was also summoned northward from the ceded districts of the Madras presidency. Mr. Elphinstone, in placing matters on this footing with the Peshwa, acted in con- formity with the instructions he had received from Lord Hastings during the first discussion respect- ing Trimbukjee, which had provided for the case of his leaving Poona, and raising disturbances in the country under the covert support of his master, and had prescribed the particular course now adopted in that event. The circumstances were completely analogous ; the only difference being, that the dehnquent had escaped into the interior, after having been surrendered to us, instead of before. Bajee Rao was greatly alarmed when he saw matters brought to this issue. He sent his mi- nisters to assure the Resident of his disposition to do any thing that might be required, in order to restore things to their former state. It was dis- tinctly explained, that this was now become impos- sible, as it depended entirely upon the nature of the POONA. 439 instructions that might be received, in which most probably securities for the future would be made a condition precedent to the renewal of the former terms of Mendship between the governments; that his Highness had to choose between two Unes of conduct ; if he resolved to accede uncondition- ally to what the Governor-general would determine, he would disband his new levies, and place his forts in their former condition, bringing back his treasure, and showing other signs of confidence ; if he only waited the arrival Of instructions to make up his mind, whether he' would declare war or not, and wished to be understood so to do, he would leave things exactly in their present posture, but must take the consequences of the further loss of confi- dence resulting from the preference of the latter course. In the progress of the month, it was com- municated to him through Major Ford, who still continued to be consulted and treated with confi- dence, that if his Highness seized and delivered up Trimbukjee before the arrival of the Governor- general's expected instructions, as he had done before, his conduct might again warrant the Re- sident in suspending theii* immediate execution, and restore at once the former relations of amity. The month was consumed in insincere negotiation on the part of the Mahratta court, evincing alter- nate resolutions to submit and to resist. More than once preparations were made for his dcpartmc^ 440 - POONA. from Poona ; but the natural indecision and timi^^ dity of Bajee Rao's character kept him fixed to the spot to the last moment, in anxiety to know the extent of the demands that would be made upon him. Yet, instead of disarming in the in- terim, he increased the activity of his prepara- tions. During this suspense, the troops had begun to act against the insurgents. On the 7th of April, a body of one hundred newly raised troops were traced to the village of Junta, and there disarmed by Colonel Smith, and their chief confined. This was all that was done to the south of Poona ; for the Peshwa's influence had so completely set the country against us, that although that oflficer, with the light divisions, scoured all the neighbourhood in which the insurgents had been collected, no in- formation or assistance could be got at any of the villages, nor could any other party of their force be discovered. They had, indeed, decamped from that part of the country immediately on the ap- proach of the troops, with the design of removing the seat of war into Kandes. A body of fovu- thousand, chiefly horse, after having got clear off" from Colonel Smith, was heard of in its way to the north by Major Smith, who commanded one of the detachments posted to cover Poona on the east. It was instantly pursued, and after a chase of one hundred and fifty miles in four days, the rooNA. 441 Major succeeded in overtaking the party, about a march westward of Toka on the Godavurce. This body had fallen in with and cruelly murdered Lieutenant Warre, an officer of the artillery, tra- velling with a small escort. When attacked, they made little resistance, but dispersed with the loss of no more than fifty or sixty, for want of cavalry to pursue. A more brilliant affair occurred in Kandes, where Godajee Dainglia, a relative of Trimbukjee, was busily collecting partisans. Upon calling down Colonel Smith to the south, measures had been taken to put the Nizam's troops and the Hyderabad subsidiary force in motion, to counter- act the designs of the insurgents to the north. Captain Sydenham, the political agent at Aurun- gabad, being apprised of Godajee's operations, despatched Captains Davies and Pedlar with a rusala, in number about six hundred, of the re- formed horse, and a small party of the reformed infantry of the Nizam, to the frontier of that prince's dominions in that direction, giving them instructions, if they should hear of the collection of troops, and could find an opportunity of strik- ing a blow, to attack and disperse them without ceremony. Such an opportunity occurred on the 20th of April, when, after a rapid advance of fifty miles into Kandes, Captain Davies succeeded in falling in with a body of two thousand, whereof 442 pooNA. near three hundred were Arab infantry, the whole under Godajee himself. They took up a good position, and showed face ; whereupon Captain Davies resolved not to wait for the infantry, but at once to charge sword in hand with the horse he had in advance. The charge was completely suc- cessful, insomuch that the loss of the enemy was not less than four hundred left on the field. It should be noticed, that these were the same troops that two years before had refused to advance against a body of routed Pindarees. But they were now acting under the influence of the confi- dence inspired by an able commander, and were impelled by the sense of duty created by the novel assurance of regular pay. Of Captain Davies' men, seventy-four were killed and wounded. Both the officers were amongst the number of the latter, a circumstance not to be wondered at ; for the nature of the service required the example of a personal exertion on their part, which neither was of a disposition to spare. The new distinctions of modern warfare, which assign the use of the arm to the private soldier, and that of the head only to the superior, had not yet found their way amongst the class of men led by Captain Davies on this occasion. Several of the enemy fell by his own hand before he received his wound, which fortunately was not severe. Captain Pedlar's was more so, but still not dangerous. Nothing could rooNA. 443 be more creditable to the national character, than the exhibition, afforded by this conflict, of the superiority of troops similarly modelled, armed, and disciplined, and differing in no respect what- ever from the enemy, except in the circmnstance of their being led by the cool judgment and en- terprising courage of British officers. Meanwhile, affairs were coming to a crisis at Poona. On the 20th of April, Mr. Elphinstone found it necessary to increase the British force there, by calling in Colonel Smith with his light division. He gave notice to Bajee Rao that he had so done, stating the reasons, but assuring him that it would produce no alteration of his resolu- tion to commit no act of direct hostihty, unless his Highness compelled him to it, for he should still wait the receipt of his expected instructions. Discussions with the ministers and emissaries of his Highness continued as before, without produ- cing any satisfactory result. On the 25th of April, a private letter reached the residency fi'om Mr. Secretary Adam, which opened in some de- gree the views of government, by showing the unconditional svu'render of Trimbukjee, in case nothing should have been done by the Peshwa in the interval, to ]3e an indispensable preliminary to any new accommodation with him. The full in- structions, which were despatched only the day aftei', the 7th of April, were detained for a fort- 444 rooNA. night, by an insurrection which Ijroke out in Cut- tack, and at this unlucky moment interrupted the Dak* communication between Calcutta and Poona. Colonel Smith arrived at Poona on the 2Gth, and took up ground at the village of Kirkee. On the 3d of May, the Resident heard of the in- surrection in Cuttack, and of the Dak communi- cation being cut off ; he accordingly resolved to wait till the 6th for the chance of receiving the desired instructions, and, if not then arrived, to act on the imperfect intimation he had already re- ceived of the Governor-general's wishes. On that day, no further despatch having arrived, Mr. Elphinstone solicited a private audience of his Highness the Peshwa, in order to apprise him that the only terms on which the British Govern- ment could consent to any accommodation with his Highness, after what had passed, were, his engaging to surrender Trimbukjee within a defi- nite period, and his giving substantial security not to fail in this particular. Bajee Rao, who seemed prepared for the communication, distinctly refused the preliminary proposed, with the appear- ance of very unusual coolness of determination. He did not rest his case on his want of abiUty to apprehend the fugitive, for he would not even bind himself to make exertions for the purpose. * Dak — post, conducted by native carriers on foot. pooNA. 445 On the next day, a written note was sent in to the same general purport as the verbal communi- cation, but specifically requiring a covenant to surrender Trimbukjee within one month, and to deliver the three hill forts of Singurh, Poorundur, and Rygurh, as pledges for its performance. Twenty-four hours were allowed for his High- ness to come to a final determination on this projiosition ; if not in the affirmative, immediate hostility was denounced. The note was received with apparent indifference, nor were its contents noticed until the morning of the 8th, when the time had nearly expired, and the troops were marching from the cantonment of the Poona bri- gade and from the village of Kirkee, to take up positions, according to a plan previously settled, so as completely to invest the city. The fears of this irresolute prince then predominated. None of his advisers, excepting Gokla and the commandant of his artillery, recommended a re- sort to arms. About ten o'clock in the morning, he sent vakeels, promising to agree to the terms, and to surrender the forts without delay. They were accordingly taken j^ossession of in the course of that and of the following day. Rygurh was a place of peculiar strength, as indeed were both Poorundur and Singurh : but no difficulty was made in the deUvery of them under the stipula- 446 pooNA. tion. On these preliminary terms, the P<^shwa was admitted to throw himself upon the ultimate determination of the Governor-general in council, as to the conditions on which a final accommoda- tion should be made with him ; but he was given to understand, that he must not expect the treaty of Bassein to be implicitly renewed. On the 10th of May, arrived the instructions of Lord Hastings in council. They prescribed exactly the course already adopted, so far as it had gone ; but provided distinctly for the three cases: first, of the actual surrender of Trimbukjee, or sincere efforts of his master to seize him, be- fore the arrival of the instructions ; secondly, of the positive inaction of the prince up to that time; and thirdly, of his refusal or further evasion, after the Resident's receipt of the instructions, and com- munication of the enhanced demand to be made upon him in the second case. In the first case, the relations of the treaty of Bassein were to be restored, and every thing placed on the footing of the previous settlement, made on the surrender of Trimbukjee in 1815. In the second case, the de- mand of the surrender of that delinquent within a time specified, and of hostages for performance, was to be a positive preliminary to any accommo- dation ; with the further understanding, that no renewal of friendship could take place, without the delivery of greater securities for the future, rooNA. 447 than tlie treaty of Bassein afforded. In the last case, that of decided war, the person of the prince was to be seized, and a temporary arrange- ment made for the government of the country. The further securities, to be insisted on in the second case, were, cessions of territory, inchiding the fort of Ahmednugur, to the extent of twenty- nine lakh of rupees, appUcable to the raising and pay of a force of five thousand horse and three thousand foot on our own estabhshment to replace the contingent of his Highness' troops, stipulated in the treaty of Bassein*, but never furnished in full upon any one occasion : also, the surrender to the British of all claims on Goozerat, Bundel- khund, and in Hindoostan ; and, generally, a re- nunciation of the supremacy of the Mahratta em- pire. The renewal of the farm of Ahmedabad to the Gykwar, and the restoration of affairs in that quarter to the footing established by Colonel Wal- ker, were to form part of the new arrangement ; and the opportunity was to be taken of settling some points of minor importance, which had for some time been the subject of mutual irritation. The Resident prepared himself to execute these instructions, as soon as the month assigned for * The treaty of Bassein stipulated twice the quantity ; but was subsequently modified by the treaty of general concert for the defence of the Dukhun, concluded between tiie Bri- tish, the Nizam, and the P^shwa. 448 POONA. the apprehension of Trimbukjee should expire. But he informed Bajee Rao of their arrival, and of the intimation therein, that his Highness had so far lost the Governor-general's confidence, as to have incurred the demand of greater securities for the future, without acquainting him with the probable extent of this ulterior demand. In the early part of the month, no sincere efforts were made to seize Trimbukjee, notwithstanding the security given ; indeed, on the night of the 1 3th of May, every thing was ready for the prince's flight from Poona, and he was on the point of departure; even so late as the 17th, he issued pay to his troops and kept up the appearance of a resolution to break finally with the British. On the 20th, however, he made up his mind to the opposite course. The adherents and family of Trimbukjee were put in durance, and proclama- tions issued in every direction, offering two lakh rupees, and a rent free village of one thousand ru- pees a-year, guaranteed by the British government to any one, who shoidd bring in the person of the fugitive. Copies of the proclamation were given to the Resident, that he might aid in their circu- lation. This conduct satisfied every body of the Peshwa's present sincerity: indeed, it placed Trim- bukjee's apprehension, in a manner, beyond the influence of his master's caprice. Mr. Elphin- stone accordingly resolved to consider these exer- POONA. 449 lions as a sufficient atonement, and to accept his submission at the end of the month, if his conduct were not changed in the interval, whether the culprit should be seized or not, for delivery ac- cording to the letter of the covenant. On the 28th of May, Major Ford was authorised to ac- quaint the Peshwa of the general nature of tlie demands that were to be made upon him, luider the Governor-general's late instructions ; and on the 1st of June following, the Resident went in person, and explained, article by article, a draft he had prepared of the new treaty. This varied from the instructions in some few points of minor importance; and in one material item, the amount of the cessions, fixing them at thirty-four instead of twenty-nine lakh of rupees, in order to cover extraordinary expenses of staff equipment, &c. of the forces to be raised and substituted for the Peshwa's contingent, provision for which had been overlooked in the former estimate. The Peshwa and his minister endeavoured with much dexterity, to reduce the sum of these de- mands, taking the ground of intreaty, and reli- ance on the compassion and generosity of the British government. It was urged by the minis- ters, that their master's offences, whatever they might have been, did not deserve so heavy a punishment, or one so grating to his Higlmess's feelings ; that we seemed to expect a strictness of 2 (i 450 VOONA. fidelity beyond all reason, and more than a native potentate had it in his power to observe ; and that, if we enforced so rigorous a fine, the world would cry out against us, and accuse his Highness of folly, in having originally formed the connexion with us. Since proof of the wide scope of Bajee Rao's machinations against our interests was pour- ing in from every quarter, Mr. Elphinstone was inflexible in insisting on every article of his draft. On the 7th of June, the month allow^ed for the apprehension of Trimbukjee ha^^ng expired, he demanded that the treaty should immediately be signed, the only proof of submission that could now be given ; no reduction having been made in the levies of troops, and Trimbukjee not having been delivered up as agi'eed upon. Six days more were consumed in further discussion of the several items, and particularly in disputes respecting the districts to be ceded and the rates at which each should be taken. At length, on the 13th of June, the treaty was signed according to the original draft. The following is the substance. Article 1st renounces Trimbukjee Dainglia, en- gages to punish his adherents, and to surrender his family to the British government, as hostages for his never being again countenanced. Article 2d re-establishes the treaty of Bassein, except as now modified. Article 3d explains more speci- fically the former engagement not to take Euro- POONA. 451 peans or Americans into the service of the P^shwa. Article 4th engages, in further execution of the previous stipulation, respecting his Highness's con- duct to other native powers, not to receive or send vakeels or communicate in any manner, ex- cept through the British Resident : further, re- nounces the character of supreme head of the Mahratta empire. Article 5th commutes his Highness's past claims on the Gykwar for an an- nual payment of four lakh of rupees, in case Anund Rao should consent ; if he should not, arbitration to be made under the treaty of Bassein : renounces all prospective claims unconditionally. Article 6th exchanges the proviso for the Peshwa's con- tingent of five thousand horse and three thousand infantry, for an engagement to funiish to the, British government the means of maintaining an equal force. Articles 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, provide for the transfer and arromUssement of territories to be ceded for this purpose, with their forts, according to a schedule, and for the date and operation of the cessions from the 5th of June, the commencement of the Hindoo year. Article 1 1 th authorises the discretionary increase of the subsidiary force, and its employment in reducing the ceded districts. Article 12th cedes Ahmednugur, with a glacis of two thousand yards, and engages to furnish pasture lands for the sub- sidiary force. Articles 13th and 14th cede to us 2 G 2 452 POONA. all the Peshwa's rights over Bundelkhund, in Malwa, or elsewhere in Hindoostan. Article 15tli renews the farm of Ahmedabad to the Gykwar, for an annual payment of four and a half lakh of ru- pees ; exclusive, however, of the Katteewar tribute. Article 16th ratifies the settlement of Pundur- poor, made the 6th of July 1812, for the adjust- ment of the Peshwa's relative rights over the Ja- geerdars, and restores the Rasteea's forfeited Jageer. Article 17th stipulates the restitution of Melghat an usurpation of Triml)ukjee from the Nizam, in violation of the treaty of Bassein *. Article 1 8th provides for the exchange of the ratifications in the usual manner. The schedule alluded to in Article 7 specifies the following territories : 1st, the Konkan, or country between the sea and the western ghats, to the north of the high road from Poona to Bombay, rated by Mr. Elphinstone at eleven lakh of rupees, but alleged by the Peshwa's minister to yield consideralily more ; 2d, the whole of the Peshwa's possessions in Goozerat, estimated at ten lakh of rupees, exclusive, however, of Ahmedabad, Oolpar, and the Gyk war's commutation-payment for past claims ; 3d, the Katteewar tribute, taken at four lakh of rupees ; 4th, the forts of Darwar and Koosigul, with suflScient territory in the * Vide note to page 319. pooNA. 453 iicio-hbourhood and south of the Wurda to make the entire annual revenue ceded equal to thirty- four lakh of rupees. The cessions were to be immediate, except the lands in the Camatic, the extent of which would depend upon what might be found to be the value of the Konkan ; but the two forts named were to be surrendered forth- with. This treaty was ratified by the Governor- general on the 5th of July, 1817. It contains provisions for the settlement of all those points, that for a long time before had been the subject of acrimonious discussion at the Poona durbar, as well as for securing the British government, as far as seemed possible, against a continuance of his Highness's treachery and secret hostility. The engagement being avowedly compulsory, and in- volving an aggrandizement of our own territories at the expense of our late ally, the first that had been made upon any Mahratta state since the settlement of 1805-6, was undoubtedly calculated to increase the apprehension and alarm, with which our power and policy were regarded. But the measure was exacted and warranted by Bajee Rao's indisputable perfidy ; and the detection of it at the moment when we were on the point of entering on a connected plan of operations, di- rected to the extirpation of the predatory hordes, would have Justified a still further reduction of 454 POONA. the means of this prince than was actually ef- fected, nay perhaps, have warranted his entire suspension from the exercise of any kind of au- thority and influence pending those operations. Subsequent events showed the danger of restoring him to any share of power, until the projected measures had been completed. It was hardly to be expected, that his pride could ever forgive the humiliation he had been subjected to, or that the sense of comparative weakness, which had been tlie motive of present submission, could for a moment influence his speculation on those ulterior chances, held out by the enterprise in which we were about to engage. This speculation, not his present condition, was the obvious source of all his subsequent treachery, and of all his past in- trigues. Yet perhaps the risk was unavoidable ; for an attempt to remove the head of the Mah- ratta nation entirely from power and considera- tion would, at this juncture, have been productive of much confusion, and must have contributed to exasperate the hostile disposition of that nation to an earlier, and probably a more general fer- ment, at a moment too when we were less pre- pared. On the whole, there was equal mode- ration and justice in exacting, by way of safe- guard against an ally of detected perfidy, whose services to a certain extent we were entitled to pooNA. 455 expect, that in lieu of the contingent he was himself bound to furnish to the cause, he should provide the means of maintaining an equal body at our own immediate disposition. As for the appeals made to our liberality and compassion, after the final resolution to submit was taken, these were very justly allowed to have no weight in mitigating the terms imposed : such motives can have no legitimate influence, until confidence be completely re-established ; and no part of the Peshwa's conduct, from the time of our first con- nexion with him, had left an impression of his character, that entitled him to be restored to it, more particularly after what had passed so re- cently. The cessions now demanded, though extensive, were by no means a dead loss to his exchequer ; for he would henceforward be saved the expense of supporting, from his own I'e- sources, the troops they would enable us to keep up. It should be recollected, that Bajee Rao had for ten years enjoyed the benefit of the British subsidiary force, without any corresponding pecu- niary sacrifice on his part : for the cession of his Bundelkhund revenues, by way of subsidy, was a surrender of what he never had really possessed, what required an expensive military force to occupy, and what any other power would have been free to undertake the conquest of. For 456 i'ooNA. these reasons, it is fair to presume, that Bajee Rao will not be thought to have been too hardly dealt with on the present occasion. Tlie subsidiary force returned to Seroor imme- diately after the execution of the treaty, in order to prepare itself to take a part in the general operations of the ensuing season. One battalion, however, was detached to take possession of the cessions in the Konkan. The force that had moved into Kand^s, imder Colonel Doveton, suc- ceeded in keeping under that part of the country, and ultimately in expelling from it Trimbukjce and his adherents. What most contributed to this was the gallant storm of a strong hold occu- pied by them, of the name of Dorana. Colonel Scott, of the 22nd Madras N. I., appeared before it with a detachment on the 10th of July, and resolved immediately to attempt an escalade. Making ladders of his tent-poles, he forthwith attacked the Petta, and carried it in several places. The garrison retired into the fort ; which, alarmed at observing the further prepara- tions for storming that point also, they likewise surrendered. After this, Trimbukjee's adherents ceased to make head, and he himself retired to Choolee Muheshwur on the Nerbudda, where he spent the rainy months with a few followers. Colonel Doveton moved back to his cantonment of Jalna on the 1 7th of Julv. APPENDIX. Papers and Documents referred to in Vol. I. A. (Referred to in Page 76. 80.) Translation of a copy of the ivritten Opinions of the Principal Goorkha Chiefs, on the Question of Peace or War toith the British Government. Question submitted by the Raja of Nipal. Disputes exist between me and the English. The Governor-general has written to me that he has given orders to the Judge and Collector to establish their authority, (in the disputed lands on the Gourukpoor frontier,) and that he shall not think it necessary to repeat his intimation on that subject. How then is my Raj to exist.'* In my judgment, an appeal should be made to arms. Do you deliberate, and give me a de- cided and united opinion. Reply of General Bheem Sein Thapa. Through the influence of your good fortune, and that of your ancestors, no one has yet been able to cope witli 458 APPENDIX. the state of Nipal. The Chinese once made war upon us, but were reduced to seek peace. How then will the English be able to penetrate into the hills ? Under your auspices, we shall by our own exertions be able to oppose to them a force of fifty-two lakhs of men, with which we will expel them. The small fort of Bhurtpoor was the work of man, yet the English, being worsted before it, desisted from the attempt to conquer it ; our liills and fastnesses are formed by the hand of God, and are impregnable. I therefore recommend the prosecu- tion of hostilities. We can make peace afterwards on such terms as may suit our convenience. Reply of Kajee Rundoj Singh Thapa. What General Bheem Sein has stated is good. Alexander overthrew empires, but failed to establish his authority in our mountains. There is, however, one source of apprehension. The Hill Rajas have been ex- pelled from their dominions. They will disclose the secrets of the hills, and will assuredly conduct the English into those regions. When the Rajas shall unite and co-operate with the English, the latter will acquire confidence, and force their Avay into the country. I therefore recommend a temporizing policy for a time, or even to concede a portion of what is now actually in their possession, as preferable to war. By such a course, the machinations and intrigues of our enemies will best be defeated. I have thus stated what has occurred to my mind. Reply of Raj Gooroo Riingnat Pundit. I conceive that the will of the Sovereign is paramount to all other considerations, but having been asked my APPENDIX. 459 opinion, I proceed to deliver it, leaving the Sovereign to adopt it or otherwise at his pleasure. Hitherto we have contrived to effect our purpose one way or another, but for the future, it seems to me that without an adjust- ment of the boundary dispute to their satisfaction, the English will not recede. As yet we have received no injury (calhng for an appeal to arms) ; I propose, therefore, that of the territory of the Nuwab Vizeer, which has come into the possession of this state, (mean- ing of the usurpations on the Gourukpoor frontier,) half should be relinquished as the price of peace. If the English resolve on hostilities, we cannot maintain ourselves in those possessions, for we cannot cope with them in the plains or Turaee, though in the hills we have nothing to fear. I have thus stated my opinion, but am at the same time ready to yield to the better judgment of others. Reply of Kajee Dilbunjun Pande (or Panre.) The Gooroo has made himself personally acquainted with the designs and proceedings of the Enghsh, and conceives them to be decidedly inimical. It is well. But are we inferior to the English, that we should yield to them ? They cannot invade our territory : if they attempt it, they must be repulsed ; for should they once succeed in penetrating, all the concerns of this Raj will be thrown into confusion. If their efforts are directed against the Turaee of this state, and they excite distur- bances there, can we not retaliate ? and how will they be able to protect their own territories? Reply of Chonntra Bum Sah — of Kajee Umiir Singh Thapa — and of Hnstodeel. We have enough to do to manage the territory we 4G0 AITENDIX. possess. But if circumstances drive us into war with tlic English, by the influence of the auspicious fortune of this Raj, we should fight and conquer. The present time however is not favourable. The English, seeing their opportunity, have put themselves into an attitude of offence, and the conflict, if war be now undertaken, will be desperate. They will not rest satisfied without esta- blishing their own power and authority, and will unite with the Hill Rajas, whom we have dispossessed. We have hitherto but hunted deer ; if we engage in this war, we must prepare to fight tigers. If the Raja would listen to ovu' advice, we would recommend the relinquish- ment, for the present, of all lands recently occupied, so as to avoid a rupture. For if matters be pushed to ex- tremity with the English, the whole concerns of the state will be thrown into confusion. Matters in this quarter (i. e. in the western hills, of which these three chiefs were go- vernors) are already in a distracted condition, and other parts of the Goorkha territory will similarly become the scene of disorder. The advocate of war, he who proposes to fight and conquer the English (alluding to Bheem Sein,) has been bred up at court, and is a stran- ger to the toil and hardships of a military life. Even now that he proposes war, his place is about your person. By the influence of the auspicious fortune of this Raj success would crown our efforts in the event of a rup- ture : but our life has been passed in traversing forests, Avith hatchets in our hands to collect wood and leaves, and still we pursue the same occupation. War we know to be an arduous vmdertaking; it is so for veteran troops, and for raw recruits must be much more so. There is an old saying, that (hey best transact their APPENDIX. 4GI master''s business who exercise the greatest prudence and circumspection. APPENDIX A. CONTINUED. (Referred to in Page 70.) Translation of Instructions sent bi/ the Raja of Nipai to General Umur Singh Thapa, governor of Palpa, on the G our ukpoor frontier. I send you a copy of the opinions of all the principal chiefs. They differ %ridely from one another ; but the result is a determination for war. Purchase, therefore, and lay up in store,^all the grain you can procure, and send an account of the treasure and gunpowder at your com- mand. Establish a chain of posts from Sooleana to the Gunduk river, and entertain all the recruits you can. Let the property of all persons between the ages of twelve and forty, who may refuse to join in the war, be confiscated, and allow every man a seer of rice for sub- sistence while he may serve. I have issiued orders for calling out the population here, and for estabhshing a chain of posts along the frontier. You must strengthen the forts of Nonakoh. Five hundred Telingas (regular sepoys) will be despatched to reinforce the troops under your command. Send daily reports of what passes in your quarter, anil prepai'e for active hostilities. Dated, Chyt, 1871, Sumbid, corresponding with 2d April, 1814. 462 A P PENDIX. B. ^'Referred to in Pages 80, 180, 191, and passim.) From Umur Singh and his sous, Ram Das, and Uijun Thapas, to the Raja of Nipal, dated Raj-gurh, 2nd March, 1815. A copy of your letter of the 23d December, addressed to Runjoor Singh, under the Red Seal, was sent by the latter to me, who have received it with every token of respect. It was to the following pui-port. " The cap- ture of Nalapanee by the enemy has been communicated to me from Gurhwal and Kumaon, as also the intelli- gence of his having marched to Nahn: having assem- bled his force, he now occupies the whole country from Barapursa to Subturee and Muhotree. My army is also secretly posted in various places in the j unguis of the mountains. An army under a general has arrived in Gourukpoor, for Palpa, and another detachment has reached the borders of Beejypoor. I have further heard that a general-officei' has set off from Calcutta, to give us further trouble. For the sake of a few tri- fling objects, some intermediate agents have destroyed ATPENDIX. 4G3 the mutual harmony, and war is waging far and wide. All this you know. You ought to send an embassy to conciliate the English, otherwise the cause is lost. The enemy, after making immense preparations, have begun the war, and unless great concessions are made, they will not Usten to terms. To restore the relations of amity by concession is good and proper ; for this pur- pose it is fit, in the first place, to cede to the enemy the departments of Bootwul, Palpa, and Sheeoraj, and the disputed tracts already settled by the commissioners towards Barah.* If this be insufficient to re-establish harmony, we ought to abandon the whole of the Turaee, the Doon, and the low lands; and if the English are still dissatisfied on account of not obtaining possession of a portion of the mountains, you are herewith autho- rized to give up, with the Doon, the country as far as the Sutlej. Do whatever may be practicable to restore the relations of peace and amity, and be assured of my approbation and assent. If these means be unsuccessful, it will be very difficult to preserve the integrity of my do- minions from Kunka Teestta to the Sutlej. If the ene- my once obtain a footing in the centre of our territory, both extremities will be thrown into disorder. If you can retire with your army and military stores to pursue any other plan of operations that may afterwards appear eligible, it will be advisable. On this account, you ought immediately to effect a junction with all the other officers on the western service, and retire to any part of our territory which, as far as Nipal, you may think yourself capable of retaining. These are your orders." * Meaning the twenty-two villages on llie Saiun frontier. 464 APPENDIX. In the first place, after the immense preparations of the enemy, he will not be satisfied with all these conces- sions, or if he should accept of our terms, he would serve us as he did Tippoo ; from whom he first accepted of an indemnification of six crores of rupees in money and territory, and afterwards wrested from him his whole country. If we were to cede to him so much country, he would seek some fresh occasion of quarrel, and at a future opportunity, would wrest from us other provinces. Having lost so much territory, we should be vniable to maintain our army on its present footing, and our military fame being once reduced, what means should we have left to defend our eastern possessions ? While we retain Bisahur, Gurhwal is secure : if the former be abandoned, the Bhooteas of Ruwain will cer- tainly betray us. The English having thus acquired the Doon and Ruwain, it will be impossible for us to maintain Gurhwal; and being deprived of the latter, Kumaon and Dotee will be also lost to us. After the seizure of these provinces, Achain, Joomlee, and Dooloo,^ will be wrested from us in succession. You say, " that a proclamation has been issued to the inhabitants of the eastern kurats ;" if they have joined the enemy, the other kurats will do so likewise, and then the country, Dood Koosee, on the east, to Bheeree, on the west, cannot be long retained. Having lost your dominions, what is to become of your great military establishments ? When ovir power is once reduced, we shall have another Knox''s mission, under pretence of concluding a treaty of alliance and friendship, and founding commercial establishments. If we decline receiving their mission, they will insist ; and if we are APPENDIX. 4G5 ^suable to oppose force, and desire them to come unac- companied with troops, they Mall not comply. They will begin by introducing a company ; a battalion will soon after follow, and at length an army will be assem- bled for the subjection of Nipal. Yovi think that if, for the present, the low lands, the Doon, and the country to the Sutlej, were ceded to them, they would cease to entertain designs upon the other provinces of Nipal : do not trust them ! they who counselled you to receive the mission of Knox,* and permit the establishment of a commercial factory, will usurp the government of Nipal. With regard to the concessions now proposed, if you had, in the first instance, decided upon a pacific line of conduct, and agreed to restore the departments of Boot- wul and Sheeoraj, as adjusted by the commissioners, the present contest might have been avoided. But you could not suppress your desire to retain these places, and, by murdering their revenue officer, excited their indignation, and kindled a war for trifles. At Jythuk we have obtained a victory over the enemy. If I succeed against General Ochterlony, and Runjoor Singh, with Juspao Thapa and his officers, prevail at Jythuk, Runjeet Singh will rise against the enemy. In conjunction with the Seiks, my army will make a descent into the plains ; and our forces, crossing the Jumna from two different quarters, will recover posses- sion of the Doon. When we reach Hurdwar, the Nuwab of Lukhnow may be expected to take a part in the cause ; and, on his accessicm to the general coalition we * Meaning apparently that the British would restore the fallen faction of the Pandts, and by their means govern Nipal. 2 H 466 APPENDIX. may consider ourselves secure as far as Khunka. Re- lying on your fortune, I trust that Bulbhudur Koonwur, and Rewunt Kajee, will soon be able to reinforce the gar- rison of Jythuk; and I hope, ere long, to send Punt Kajee with eight companies, when the force there will be very strong. The troops sent by you are arriving every day; and when they all come up, I hope we shall succeed both here and at Jythuk. Formerly, when the English endeavoured to penetrate to Sundowlee, they continued for two years* in posses- sion of Bareh Pursa, and Muhotree; but, when you con- quered Nipal, they were either destroyed by your force, or fell victims to the climate, with the exception of a few only, who abandoned the place. Orders should now be given to all your officers to defend Choudundee, and Choudena in Bejypoor, and the two kurats, and the ridge of Mahabharut. Suffer the enemy to retain the low lands for a couple of years : measures can afterwards be taken to expel them. Lands transferred under a written agreement cannot again be resumed ; but if they have been taken by force, force may be employed to recover them. Fear nothing, even though the Seiks should not join us. Should you succeed now in bringing our differences to an amicable termi- nation by the cession of territory, the enemy, in the course of a few years, would be in possession of Nipal, as he took possession of the country of Tippoo. The present, therefore, is not the time for treaty and con- ciliation. These expedients should have been tried be- * Alluding to the expedition under Major Kinloch, when the Turaee was occupied for two years ; an event that Umur Singh was old enough to have witnessed. APPENDIX. 467 fore the murder of the revenue officer (in Gourukpoor), or must be postponed till victory shall crown our efforts. If they will then accede to the terms which I shall pro- pose, it is well ; if not, with the favour of God, and your fortune and bounty, it shall be my business to preserve the integrity of my country from Khunka to the Sut- lej. Let me intreat you, therefore, never to make peace. Formerly, when some individuals urged the adoption of a treaty of peace and commerce, I refused my assent to that measure ; I will not now suffer the honour of my prince to be sullied by concession and sub- mission. If you are determined on this step, bestow the humiliating office on him who first advised it. But for me, call me to your presence ; I am old, and only desire once more to kiss your feet. I can recollect the time when the Goorkha army did not exceed twelve thousand men. Through the favour of Heaven, and by the valour of your forefathers, your territory was extended to the confines of Khunka, on the east. Under the auspices of your father, we subjugated Kumaon ; and, through your fortune, we have pushed our conquests to the Sutlej. Four generations have been employed in the acquisi- tion of all this dignity and dominion. At Nalapanee, Bulbhudur defeated three or four thousand of the enemy. At Jythuk, Runjoor Singh, with his officers, overthrew two battalions. In this place, I am sur- rounded, and daily fighting with the enemy, and look forward with confidence to victory. All the inhabitants and chiefs of the country have joined the enemy. I must gain two or three victories before I can accomplish the object I have in view, of attaching Runjeet Singh to our cause. On his accession, and after the advance of 2h 2 468 APPENDIX. the Seiks and Goorkhas towards the Jumna, the clnefs of the Dukhun may be expected to join the coalition, as also the Nuwab of Lukhnow, and the Sallk-Ramee- Leech*. Then will be the time for us to drive out the enemy, and recover possession of the low countries of Palpa, as far as Bejypoor. If we succeed in regaining these, we can attempt further conquest in the plains. There has been no fighting in your quarter yet ; the Choudundee and Choudena of Beejypoor, as far as the ridge of Muhabharut and Sooleeana, should be well de- fended. Countries acquired in four generations, under the administration of the Thapas, should not be aban- doned for the purpose of bringing matters to an amicable adjustment, without deep and serious reflection. If we are victorious in the war, we can easily adjust our dif- ferences ; and if we are defeated, death is preferable to a reconciliation on humiliating terms. When the Chinese army invaded Nipal, we implored the mercy of Heaven by offerings to the Brahmins, and the performance of religious ceremonies; and, through the favour of one and intercession of the other, we succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Ever since you confiscated the Jageers of the Brahmins, thousands have been in distress and poverty. Promises were given that they should be restored at the capture of Kangrah ; and orders to this effect, under the red seal, were addressed to me, and Nyn Singh Thapa. We failed, however, in that object, and now there is uni- versal discontent. You ought, therefore, to assemble all the Brahmins, and promise to restore to them their lands * It is not known who Umur Singh means by the Salik-Ramee- Leech ; and some other of his names of places and persons differ from any in common use. APPENDIX. 469 and property, in the event of your conquering and ex- pelling the English. By these means, many thousand worthy Brahmins will jiut up their prayers for your pros- perity, and the enemy will be driven forth. By the practice of charity, the territory acquired in four genera- tions may be preserved, and through the favour of God, our power and dominion may be still further extended. By the extension of territory, our military establishment may be maintained on its present footing, and even in- creased : the numerous countries which you propose to cede to the enemy, yielded a revenue equal to the main- tenance of an army of four thousand men, and Kangrah might have been captured. By the cession of these pro- vinces, the reputation and splendour of your court will no longer remain. By the capture of Kangrah your name would have been rendered formidable ; and though that has not happened, a powerful impression has, ne- vertheless, been made on the people of the plains by the extension of your conquests to the Sutlej. To effect a reconciliation, by the cession of the country to the west of the Jumna, would give rise to the idea that the Goorkhas were unable to oppose the English, would lower the dignity of your name in the plains, and cause a reduction of your army to the extent of four thousand men. The enemy will moreover require the possession of Bisahur, and after that the conquest of Gurhwal will be easy ; nor will it be possible, in that case, for us to retain Kumaon, and with it we must lose Dotee, Acham, and Joonilah, whence he may be expected to penetrate even to Bheree. If the English once establish them- selves firmly in possession of a part of the hills, we shall be unable to drive, them out : the countries towards the 470 APPENDIX. Sutlcj slioukl he obstinately defended ; the abandon- ment of the disputed tracts in the plains is a lesser evil ; the possession of the former preserves to us the road to further conquest. You ought, therefore, to direct Gooroo Rungnath Pundit, and Dulbunjun Pandeh, to give up thfe^disputed lands of Bootwul, Sheeoraj, and the twenty- two villages in the vicinity of Bareh, and thus, if possi- ble, bring our differences to a termination. To this step I have no objections, and shall feel no animosity to those who may perform this service. I must, however, declare a decided hostility to such as, in bringing about a reconciliation with the English, consult only their own interest, and forget their duty to you. If they will not accept these terms, what have we to fear ? The English attempted to take Bhurtpoor by storm; but the Raja Runjeet Singh destroyed an European regiment, and a battalion of sepoys. To the present day they have not ventured to meddle with Bhurtpoor again ; whence it would seem that one fort has sufficed to check their pro- gress. In the low country of Dhurma they established their authority; but the Raja overthrew their army, and captured all their artillery and stores, and now lives and continues in quiet possession of his dominions. Our proffers of peace and reconciliation will be interpreted as the result of fear; and it would be absurd to expect that the enemy will respect a treaty concluded under such circumstances. Therefore, let us confide our fortunes to our swords ; and, by boldly opposing the enemy, compel him to remain within his own territory ; — or, if he should continue to advance, stung with shame at the idea of retreating, after his immense preparations, we can then give up the lands in dispute, and adjust our differences. APPENDIX. 471 Such, however, is the fame and terror of our swords, that Bulbhudur, with a force of six hundred men , de- feated an army of three or four thousand English. His force consisted of the old Gourukh and Kurrukh compa- nies, which were only partly composed of the inhabi- tants of our ancient kingdom, and of the people of the countries from Bheree to Gurhwal ; and with these he destroyed one battalion, and crippled and repulsed another. My army is similarly composed ; nevertheless, all descriptions are eager to meet the enemy. In your quarter you are surrounded with the veterans of our army, and cannot apprehend desertion from them: you have also an immense militia, and many Jageerdars, who will fight for their own honour and interests. As- sembling the militia of the low lands, and fighting in the plains, is impolitic; — call them into the hills, and cut the enemy up by detail, (a passage here the sense of which cannot be discovered). The enemy is proud, and flushed with success, and has reduced under his subjection all the western Zemindars, the Ranas, and Raja of Kuhlor, and the Thakooraen, and will keep peace with no one. However, my advice is nothing. I will direct Ram Doss to propose to General Ochterlony the aban- donment, on our part, of the disputed lands, and will forward to you the answer which he may receive. All the Ranas, Rajas, and Thakooraen, have joined the enemy, and I am surrounded ; nevertheless, we shall fight and conquer, and all my officers have taken the same resolu- tion. The Pundits have pronounced the month of Bysakh,* as particularly auspicious for the Goorkhas ; and, by selecting a fortunate day, we shall surely con- * Commencing about the lOlhor 12th of April. 472 APPENDIX. ([uer. I am desirous of engaging the enemy slowly and with caution, but cannot manage it, the English being always first to begin the fight. I hope, however, to be able to delay the battle till Bysakh, when I will choose a favourable opportunity to fight them. When we shall have driven the enemy from hence, either Runjoor or myself, according to your wishes, will repair to your presence. In the present crisis, it is very advisable to write to the Emperor of China, and to the Lama of Lassa, and to the other Lamas ; and for this purpose, I beg leave to submit the enclosed draft of a letter to their address ; any errors in it, I trust, will be forgiven by you ; and I earnestly recommend that you will lose no time in sending a petition to the Emperor of China^ and a letter to the Lama. 473 APPENDIX C. (See Page 206.) Treaty of peace between the Honourable East India Com- pany and Moha Raja Bickram Sah, Raja of Nipal, settled between Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw, on the part of the Honourable Company, in virtue of the full powers vested in him by his Excellency the Right Ho- nourable Francis, Earl of Moira, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, one oj' his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council^ appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indies, and by Sree Gooroo Gujraj Missiir, and Chunder Seekur Opadheea, on the part of Moharaja Kurman Jodh Bickram Sah Behaudur Shumsheer Jung, in virtue oj' the powers to that effect vested in them by the said Raja of Nipal- Whereas war has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the Raja of Nipal, and whereas the parties arc mutually disposed to restore the relations of 474 APPENDIX. peace and amity, which, previously to the occurrence of the late differences, had long subsisted between the two states, the following terms of peace have been agreed upon. Article 1st. — There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Com- pany, and the Raja of Nipal. Article 2d. — The Raja of Nipal renounces all claim to the lands which were the subject of discussion be- tween the two states before the war ; and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the sovereignty of those lands. Article 3d. — Th^ Raja of Nipal hereby cedes to the Honourable the East India Company, in perpetuity, all the undermentioned territories, namely : — First, — The whole of the low lands between the rivers Kali and Raptee. Secondly, — The whole of the low lands (with the ex- ception of Bootwul Khas) lying between the Raptee and the Gunduk. Thirdly, — The whole of the low lands between the Gunduk and Koosee, in which the authority of the British government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction. Fourthly, — All the low lands between the river Me- chee and the Teesta. Fifthly, — All the territories within the hills, eastward of the river Mechee, including the fort and lands of Nagree, and the pass of Nagarcote, leading from Mo- rung into the hills, together with the territory lying between that pass and Nagree. The aforesaid terri- APPENDIX. 476 tory shall be evacuated by the Goorkha troops within forty days from this date. Article 4th. — With a view to indemnify the chiefs and barahdars of the state of Nipal, whose interests will suffer by the alienation of the lands ceded by the fore- going article, the British government agrees to settle pensions, to the aggregate amount of two lakh of rupees per annum, on such chiefs as may be selected by the Raja of Nipal, and in the proportions which the Raja may fix. As soon as the selection is made, Sunuds shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor-general for the pensions respectively. Article 5th. — The Raja of Nipal renounces for him- self, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connexion Avith, the countries lying to the west of the river Kalee ; and engages never to have any concern with these coun- tries or the inhabitants thereof. Article 6th. — The Raja of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Raja of Sikhim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any differences shall arise between the state of Nipal and the Raja of Sikhim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be re- ferred to the arbitration of the British government, by whose award the Raja of Nipal engages to abide. Article 7th. — The Raja of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, without the consent of the British government. Article 8th. — In order to secure and improve the re- lations of amity and peace hereby established between the two states, it is agreed that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other. 476 APPENDIX. Article 9th. — This treaty, consisting of nine articles, shall be ratified by the Raja of Nipal within fifteen days from this date ; and the ratification shall be delivered to Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver to the Raja the ratification of the Gover- nor-general within twenty days, or sooner, if practica- ble. Done at Segoulee, on the 2d day of December, 1815. (L. S.) [Signed] Paris Bradshaw, Lt.-col. P. A. (L. S.) [Signed] Gujeaj Misue. (L. S.) [Signed] Chundur Seekhur Opadheea. Received this treaty from Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, agent on the part of the Raja of Nipal, in the valley of Muckwanpoor, at half-past two o'clock, p. m. on the 4th of March, 1816, and delivered to him the counterpart treaty on behalf of the British government. [Signed] D. Ochterlony, Agt. Governor-general. Translation of an engagement ( Ikrarnania) in the Ilindee language, executed at Mukwanpoor Mandee, hy Kajee Bukhtawur Singh Thapa, and Chundur Seekhur Opad- heea, Plenipotentiaries on the part of the Raja of Nipal, and forwarded by General Sir David Ochterlony along with the above treaty. At the time of delivering the treaty, Major-general Sir David Ochterlony was pleased to observe, that the Right Honourable the Governor-general had not authorised him to accept the treaty, and that he could not encou- rage any hope of those indulgences of which a prospect APPENDIX. 477 had been held out by Lieutenant-colonel Bradshaw, being- granted in addition to the treaty ; that his Lordship indeed would not grant them, and that he (the general) would not recommend him to do so ; that nothing be- yond what was stated in the treaty would be allowed. Accordingly, we, Sree Kajee Bukhtawur Singh Thapa, and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, have agreed to what Sir D. Ochterlony has required ; in testimony whereof, we have executed this liazeenama, and delivered it to the Major-general, dated 5th of Soodee Phagun, 1872, Sumbut, corresponding with Tuesday the 4th of March, 1816. A true Translation. [Signed] J. Monckton, Persn. Secretary to Government. From the Raja of Nipal, received on the 18//i March, 1816. On the 21st of Maug, 1872, Sumbut, corresponding with the 2d of February, 1816, I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter, dated 13th of January, stating that it was your hope and expecta- tion to have been able to address me in the lan- guage of friendship and congratulation, on the renewal of the former relations of amity between the British go- vernment and the state of Nipal; but that unfortunately that hope and that expectation had been defeated and frustrated by the extraordinary conduct adopted by mj' government, in refusing to ratify a solemn treaty conclud- ed by my authorized agents, stated by myself and my mi- nisters to have been vested with full powers ; intimating, however, at the same time, that there was yet time to avoid the danger to which I had exposed myself, namely, 478 APPENDIX. that the instant ratification of the treaty, and its trans- mission to Major-general Sir David Ochterlony, would avert the impending evil, and would even induce your Lordship to consider the propriety of relaxing from the rigour of some parts of the engagement, but that any delay would be fatal ; adding also, that your letter would be forwarded to me by the Major-general, who was vested with the command of the British force advancing into my territory, and with the conduct of all political affairs with my government. The relations of harmony and friendship between the Honourable English Company and this state, by the favour of the British government, had subsisted without any difference of interest for a period of fifty years ; and my ancestors were always grateful for its kindness. I also had no other wish but that of conforming to ancient rule ; and the British government likewise conducted it- self, as usual, in the spirit of kindness. Were I, indeed, to attribute the late transactions either to error on my side, or to unkindness on the part of the British govern- ment, I should be wrong ; — I ascribe all this war and tumult solely to the malignity of fortune. I neverthe- less flattered myself that your Lordship still had my welfare at heart. Accordingly, when your Lordship ad- dressed your letter of friendly admonition to me, I con- sidered the counsel and advice which it contained to be all for my own good. I wished therefore, agreeably to your Lordship's injunctions, and for my own interests, to transmit the treaty by the hands of a confidential officer to Major-general Sir David Ochterlony^; but, un- fortunately, my evil destiny led me to delay its trans- mission ; and, in the mean time, Sir David Ochterlony APPENDIX. 479 advanced with the British army to Mandee, near Muck- wanpoor. As I had no other object in view than the restoration of peace and friendship between the two states, I suc- cessively dispatched Kajee Bukhtawur Singh Thapa, and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, with the ratified treaty to Sir David Ochterlony, who knowing your Lordship's favourable disposition towards me, and being himself also kindly disposed, opened a communication with Kajee Bukhtawur Singh, for the restoration of peace and amity, and received the treaty from the hands of that officer and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea ; delivering to them at the same time, in exchange, for the purpose of being forwarded to me, the counterpart of it, under your Lordship's seal and signature, which I have since received. Sir David Ochterlony caused Kajee Bukhtawur Singh, and Chundur Seekhur Opadheea, to execute a separate engagement in the Hindee language, (Ikamama,) the contents of which will be made known to your Lordship by the Major-general's communications. I hereby con- firm that engagement. It only remains for me to express my hope that your Lordship will manifest your generosity and magnanimity in such a manner as to secure to this state the same rank and consideration which it has hitherto enjoyed : a com- pliance with this request is not inconsistent with the dictates of liberality and benevolence. I trust that your Lordship, believing me to be ever anxious for the pleasing accounts of your health, will con- tinue to gratify me by kind letters. (A true Translation,) [Signed] J. Monckton, Persn. Secretary to Government. 480 APPENDIX D. (See Page 207.) Ireaty, Covenatit^ or Agreement entered on hif Captain Barre hatter, Agent on the part of his Excellency/ the Right Honouiahle the Earl of Moira, K. G. Gover- nor-general, ^c. S^c. SiX. and by Nazir Chama Tinjen, and Macha Timbah, and Lama Duchim Longdoo, De- puties on the part of the Raja of Sickhimputee, being severally authorised and duly appointed for the above purposes. Article 1st. — The Honourable East India Company cedes, transfers, and makes over, in full sovereignty, to the Sikhimputee Raja, his heirs ot- successors, all the hilly or mountainous country situated to the eastward of the Mechee river, and to the westward of the Teesta river, formerly possessed and occupied by the Raja of Nipal, ceded to the Honourable East India Company by the treaty of peace signed at Segoulee. Article 2d. — The Sikhimputee Raja engages, for himself and successors, to abstain from any acts of ag- gression or hostility against the Goorkhas, or any other state. Article 3d. — That he will refer to the arbitration of the British government any disputes or questions that APPENDIX. 483 may arise between his subjects, and those of Nipal, ov any other neighbouring state, and abide by the decision oi the British government. Article the 4th, — He engages for himself and suc- cessors to join the Britisli troops with the whole of his military force, when employed within the hills, and in general to afford the British troops every aid and facility in his power. Article the 5th, — That he will not permit any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, to reside within his dominions without the permis- sion of the English government. Article the 6th, — That he will immediately seize and deliver up any decoits, or notorious offenders, that may take refuge within his territories. Article the 7th, — That he will not afford protection to any defaulters of revenue, or other dehnquents, when demanded by the British government through their ac- credited agents. Article the 8th, — That he will afford protection to merchants and traders from the Company's provinces ; and he engages that no duties shall be levied on the transit of merchandize beyond the established custom at the several Golahs, or marts. Article the 9th, — The Honourable East India Com- pany guarantees to the Sikhimputee Raja and his suc- cessors, the full and peaceable possession of the tract of hilly country specified in the first article of the present agreement. Article the 10th, — This treaty shall be ratified and exchanged by the 'S*khimputee Raja within one month from the present date, and the counterpart, when con- VOL. I. 2 I 484 APPENDIX. firmed by his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-general, shall be transmitted to the Raja. Done at Titalya, this lOth day of February, 1817, answering to the 9th of Phagoon, 1873, Sumbut, and to the 30th of Maugh, 1223, Bengal aera. END OF THE FIRST VOLUME. LONDON : PRINTED BY S. AND R, BENTLEY, DORSET-STREET. WORKS ON INDIA, JUST PUBLISHED BY KINGSBURY, PARBURY, and ALLEN, LEADENHALL-STREET. In one volume 8vo. price \2s. boards, OBSERVATIONS on the LAW and CONSTITUTION of INDIA — On the Nature of Landed Tenures, and on the System of Revenue and Finance, as established by the 3Ioohummuduni Law and Moghul Government; with an Enquiry into the Revenue, and Judicial Administration and Regulations of Police, at present existing in Bengal. In one volume 8vo. price 26s. boards, THE PRACTICE of COURTS MARTIAL; also, The LEGAL EXPLANATIONS of the MUTINY ACT, and ARTICLES of WAR, &c. &c. Forming a Manual of the Judicial and IVIilitary Duties of an Officer in various Situations ; and being a Complete Case Book and Book of Reference for all IMilitary I\Ien, both in the Ser\ace of his Majesty and that of the Honourable East India Company ; upon a new and improved Plan. By Capt. HOUGH, 48th Regt. Bengal Native Infantry. 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