1 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Receh-ed 
 
 , 288 J'. 
 
 Accessions No. -^ %$ #3 S/itlf No. 
 

 

STRATEGY AND TACTICS: 
 
 BY 
 
 GENERAL G. H. DUFOUR, 
 
 LATELY AN OFFICER OF TIIK FRENCH ENGINEER CORPS, GRADUATE OF THE POLY- 
 TECHNIC SCHOOL, AND COMMANDER OF THE LEGION OF HONOR J 
 CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE SWISS ARMY. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE LATEST FRENCH EDITION, 
 
 BY 
 
 WM. P. CRATGHILL, 
 
 OAPT. IT. 8. KNGINEKR8, LATELY A88T. PROF. OF CIVIL AND MILITARY ENfllNKEKlXQ 
 AND SCIENCE OF WAB AT THE U. 8. MILITARY ACADEMY. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 D. VAN NOSTRAND, 192 BROADWAY. 
 
 1864 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1SC3, 
 BY D. YAN NOSTRAND, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
 Southern District of New York. 
 
 0. A. ALVORD, STEREOTYPES AND PRINTEB, 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 GENERAL DUFOUR, the Chief of the General Staff 
 of the Army of Switzerland, is a graduate of the 
 Polytechnic School of France, the institution styled 
 by the great Napoleon, " The lien which lays me 
 golden eggs" General Dufour is a distinguished 
 Civil and Military Engineer, besides being a prac- 
 tical soldier. In all military matters he is recog- 
 nized as one of the first authorities in Europe. 
 
 The work on Strategy, Guard Tactics, &c., of 
 which a translation is now offered to the public, 
 was prepared for the instruction of the officers of 
 the Swiss army. It is written in a plain and sim- 
 ple style. The author does not deal in vague gener- 
 alities, but gives simple, practical directions, which 
 are illustrated by actual examples left by Napoleon 
 and other great generals of ancient and modern 
 times. It will be observed that the work contains 
 numerous excellent plates embodying principles in 
 themselves. 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 That portion of the original which had a special 
 application to the Swiss army has been omitted in 
 the translation. Some modifications and slight ad- 
 ditions have been ventured upon, with a view of 
 making the book more acceptable to American 
 readers. 
 
 U. S. MILITARY ACADEMY, 
 West Point, N. T. 
 
PISTES. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 FIG. 1. Relation of distances and times of two armies from a 
 
 common point 9 
 
 1 2. Advantage of oblique base of operations 13 
 
 " 3. Concave base of operations 14 
 
 " 4. Double lines of operations 18 
 
 " 5. Line of operations towards flank of enemy's front 24 
 
 " 6. Advanced guard, flankers, Ac Ill 
 
 " 7. Preparatory order for battle of a division 140 
 
 " 8. A flank march 142 
 
 " 9. A flank march of a large body of troops 145 
 
 " 10. Method of marching of Frederick the Great 147 
 
 " 11. March of an army containing five corps 157 
 
 " 12. March of Russian army to Austerlitz 161 
 
 *' 13. Napoleon's march upon Ulm in 1805 163 
 
 " 14. Echelon order 181 
 
 " 15. Order of battle, with artillery in front of the infantry . . . 189 
 " 16. Example, showing relative influence of strategical and 
 
 tactical considerations in choosing point of attack. . . . 195 
 
 " 17. Second example 197 
 
 " 18. Point of attack, when a wing of each army is on the 
 
 same range of high ground 199 
 
 " 19. Case in which an extensive turning movement ig proper . 202 
 " 20. A method of making an unexpected attack upon a 
 
 flank 203 
 
 " 21. An attack upon the centre 205 
 
 " 22. Attack by a corps of four divisions 212 
 
 " 23. Defence by a corps of four divisions 228 
 
 " 24. Defensive position on high ground 235 
 
 "25. Dispositions of an army in line, surprised on the left 
 
 flank 2 40 
 
 " 26. Defence of a position in a mountainous country 271 
 
 " 27. Topographical sketch 348 
 
 " 28. Itinerary 3GO 
 
 " 29. Profile of field-work for defence of a camp guard 385 
 
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 Art. I. Definitions. 
 
 IF by the aid of the histories, often very incomplete, 
 of the armies of ancient times, we examine their 
 operations, we shall find some of them more or less 
 similar to those of modern armies, and others essen- 
 tially different. The first class, which relate to 
 grand movements, are within the domain of Strategy. 
 The second class belong to Tactics: such are the 
 dispositions for marches, for battles, of camps, &c. 
 For example, the famous expeditions of Hannibal 
 and Napoleon across the Alps presented more than 
 one point of resemblance in their general outline, 
 but the subsequent combats and battles were entirely 
 dissimilar. The general arrangements of campaigns 
 depend upon the topography of the theatre of the 
 war, which is almost unchanging; but special arrange- 
 ments, evolutions, or, in a word, Tactics, vary with 
 the arms in use at different periods. Much valuable 
 
8 PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 instruction in strategy may therefore be derived from 
 the study of history : but very grave errors would 
 result if we attempt to apply in the armies of the 
 present day the tactics of the ancients. This fault 
 has been committed by more than one man of merit, 
 for want of reflection upon the great differences be- 
 tween our missile- weapons and those of the ancients, 
 and upon the resulting differences in the arrangement 
 of troops for combat. 
 
 It is evident from the preceding remarks, that strat- 
 egy is in a special manner the science of generals; but 
 in tactics in its various ramifications, from the school 
 of the platoon to the orders of battle, from the bivouac 
 of an outpost to the camping of an army, officers of 
 all grades are concerned. It would, however, be ped- 
 antry to desire to fix invariable limits for these two 
 branches of the military art, for there are many cases 
 where these separating limits disappear. 
 
 Tactics, if we designate by that term simply the 
 evolutions of the battle-field, may, so to speak, be 
 taught by mathematical figures, because for each of 
 these movements there is a rule ; and this remark is 
 the more applicable as we descend the scale of mili- 
 tary knowledge. But the case is not the same with 
 strategy, because in its calculations account must be 
 taken of time, of the nature of roads, of obstacles of 
 every kind, of the quality of troops, of the mobility of 
 the enemy, and many other things which cannot bo 
 measured by mathematical instruments. For example, 
 
DEFINITIONS. 9 
 
 any one would be greatly deceived who should be- 
 lieve the point A (fig. 1) sufficiently protected by the 
 army M against an en- 
 emy placed at N, a lit- A^ ?- 
 
 tie outside the circle de- 
 scribed with A as a cen- 
 tre and A M as a radius. 
 Athough, upon the sup- 
 position that the ground 
 is perfectly level, the ar- Fi &- * 
 
 my M may reach A before the army N, which is at a 
 greater distance ; still the point A is insecure, because 
 the enemy, taking the initiative before the army M is 
 informed of its movement, may have so much the 
 start as to reach some point, as P, before M is ready 
 to march ; the distance P A being then less than M A, 
 IS" could arrive at A before M. It is quite evident 
 from this illustration, that other things besides dis- 
 tances are to be taken into account in calculating the 
 relative advantages of the positions of two armies 
 having a common object in view : the time must be 
 considered which is necessary for one army to be in- 
 formed of the movement of the other ; and this ele- 
 ment of time- is the one which in war gives so many 
 advantages to the general who takes the initiative, 
 and moves with activity. If, moreover, the quality 
 of the roads is variable; if rivers are to be crossed and 
 defiles to be passed as the two armies will seldom be 
 upon equal terms in these particulars the problem 
 1* 
 
10 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 of the relative advantages of positions becomes still 
 more complicated, and less capable of solution by the 
 use of geometrical figures ; genius alone can grasp 
 and solve it. 
 
 Having now explained what is to be understood by 
 the terms strategy and tactics, to the definition of 
 which too much importance has perhaps been lately 
 given, we shall proceed with our subject. 
 
 In every operation in war there are three principal 
 things to be considered : the point of departure, the 
 point to be attained, and the direction to be followed 
 in reaching it. The line upon which an army rests, 
 and from which it proceeds to act against the enemy, 
 is called the ~base of operations. Thus, the Rhine, 
 with its fortified cities, is the base of operations for 
 the French in waging a war in Germany. The Alps 
 and Pyrenees, with their forts and defiles, are the 
 bases for operations in Italy and Spain. 
 
 If the army remains upon its base of operations, 
 and limits itself to disputing its possession with the 
 enemy, it takes the name of line of defence. In fol- 
 lowing the course of the Danube, we find in succes- 
 sion the lines of defence of the Black Forest ; of the 
 Iller, which has Ulm on the right ; of the Lech, pass- 
 ing by Augsburg ; of the Iser, having Munich and 
 Landshut near it ; of the Inn, which empties into the 
 Danube at Passau, &c. A hundred combats have 
 taken place on these different lines. 
 
 The points which it is desirable to attain, whose 
 
BASES OF OPERATIONS. H 
 
 capture is important for the success of a campaign, 
 are called objective points, or objectives of operations. 
 
 The route pursued by an army in reaching an ob- 
 jective is the line of operations, which takes the name 
 of line of retreat when passed over by an army reti- 
 ring before a victorious enemy, in order to gain some 
 line of defence where a stand may be made. 
 
 Art. II. Bases of Operations. 
 
 The base of operations should be formed of secure 
 points, where every thing is collected that is necessary 
 for the wants of the army, and from which proceed 
 roads suitable for purposes of transportation. If these 
 points are joined by a natural obstacle, such as a river, 
 a chain of mountains, a great marsh, extensive forests, 
 the line is so much the better, on account of the diffi- 
 culties presented to an enemy who attempts to break 
 through it. 
 
 A base of operations which has some extent is bet- 
 ter than a contracted one, because there is more room 
 for manoeuvres, and there is less danger of being cut 
 off from it. If, for example, a single city forms the 
 base, and an enemy gets possession of the principal 
 road leading to it, the army may be greatly embar- 
 rassed, as it will be cut off from all supplies and re- 
 enforcements. 
 
 The form of the base is not a matter of indiffer- 
 ence : if it is concave to the front, or has its extremi- 
 ties resting upon the sea, a great lake, or some other 
 
12 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 prominent obstacle, the army lias its wings much 
 more secure than if the base be convex, or presents a 
 point towards the enemy. 
 
 "When an army moves forward a long distance, it i8 
 obliged to assume a new base in advance of the first, 
 in order to have depots at hand from which its sup- 
 plies may be drawn. This new line is called the 
 secondary base of operations / it is usually a river 
 crossing the line of operations, and the towns upon it 
 are fortified, if they are not already so, in order to the 
 security of the military supplies, &c., collected in them. 
 
 If it is prudent to occupy successive bases of opera- 
 tions as the army advances into an enemy's country, 
 still, it is not to be understood to be necessary for it to 
 halt in the midst of a series of successes for the pur- 
 pose of making these establishments. Troops are left 
 behind, or others are brought up, to occupy and fortify 
 the points to be held, and establish depots of supplies, 
 while the army continues to advance and profit by 
 the successes already gained. 
 
 When the secondary base is not parallel to the 
 original base, the more distant extremity must be 
 specially strengthened by art, because it is more ex- 
 posed to the attacks of the enemy. The other ex- 
 tremity, from its retired position, is more secure, but 
 affords less protection to the army. 
 
 An oblique base gives an army the opportunity of 
 threatening the enemy's communications and base, 
 without exposing its own. Thus the army M (fig. 2), 
 
BASES OF OPERATIONS. 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 Fig. 2. 
 
 whose original base was 
 K S, parallel to P Q, the 
 base of the enemy, and 
 which has as its natural 
 line of operations A B, 
 perpendicular to these 
 two lines, could not make 
 an attempt upon the left 
 flank of the army N with- 
 out running the risk of 
 having its own communi- R 
 cations intercepted, unless it had taken a secondary 
 base, X Y, oblique to A B ; for the positions would be 
 reciprocal. If you cut the line of communications of 
 the enemy, he may take possession of yours, which is 
 left open to him. But with the new base, the lateral 
 movement is not imprudent, because M always has a 
 direct and safe retreat upon the point Y, which is 
 near enough to give support.* 
 
 Attention has already been called to the advantages 
 of a base of operations which is concave towards the 
 enemy, and embraces with its wings the theatre of the 
 war. When it is decidedly of this form, it gives 
 an opportunity of changing the line of operations, if 
 necessary, without the loss of the support of a secure 
 base. Suppose, for example, that the base of opera- 
 tions has the form E S T (fig. 3) ; the army M, basing 
 
 * Points like the one in question, which are marked in the figures 
 by sm;tll circles, are fortified cities or posts. 
 
14: PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 itself on R S, may at 
 first adopt the line A B 
 in its operations against 
 the army N, whose base 
 is P Q, and afterwards, 
 if circumstances render 
 it necessary or advanta- 
 geous, the line B C may 
 be taken up, which has 
 S T for a base. In this 
 rig. s. s way the King of Prussia, 
 
 before the battle of Prague, passed from the left to the 
 right bank of the Moldau. The passage having taken 
 place, he had a new base upon the frontier of Silesia, 
 and abandoned the one he had at first in the defiles 
 separating Bohemia from Saxony. His first line of 
 operations was from Dresden to Prague by the left 
 bank of the Moldau ; the second was directed towards 
 Neiss, a strong position in Silesia ; the two bases 
 made an angle with its opening towards the enemy. 
 In the same way, in 1809, Napoleon had the Danube 
 for his base, and a line of operations directed towards 
 Ingolstadt, but found it prudent to change both, pre- 
 vious to the combat of Landshut and the celebrated 
 battle of Eckmuhl : he wrote to his generals that he 
 was no longer concerned about the Danube; that he had 
 chosen a new base on the Lech, and that they should 
 fall back to Augsburg in the event of a failure. (See 
 fig. 12, p. 161.) 
 
LINES OF OPERATIONS. 15 
 
 When the change in the line of operations is made 
 just before a battle, great advantages may be gained, 
 because it deranges all the plans of the enemy. None 
 but great generals, however, know when to make such 
 a change. 
 
 The army !N" (fig. 3), which has but a single base, 
 P Q, must remain upon the line B D, as it otherwise 
 runs the risk of having its retreat cut off, in the event 
 of a reverse. It is laid down as a principle, that in 
 such a case, even if the forces were superior, the 
 abandonment of the line B D, which is virtually the 
 abandonment of the base P Q, would be wrong. 
 
 When one party controls the sea, a portion of the 
 coast, where a* good harbor may be held and furnished 
 with supplies, is a sufficient base for an invasion. 
 The English on different occasions have taken Co- 
 runna, Lisbon, and Dunkirk, as bases of operations ; 
 they used every possible exertion to retain the last- 
 named place as a foothold upon the coast of France ; 
 they still hold Gibraltar, whence they are ready to 
 penetrate into Spain whenever it is necessary or 
 politic.* 
 
 Art. III. L.ine of Operations. 
 
 All routes are not equally good for moving against 
 an enemy. Some lead more directly and safely than 
 others to the object aimed at ; some are more or less 
 
 * Yera Cruz was the base for the operation of General Scott's 
 campaign in Mexico, in 1847, as also for that of the French, in 
 1862-'63. 
 
16 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 favorable, according to the relative inferiority in cav- 
 alry or infantry ; some abound more in resources, are 
 more convenient for turning the enemy's positions ; 
 some are more completely protected by the base of 
 operations, &c. One of the most valuable talents of 
 a general is that which enables him to estimate pro- 
 perly the relative advantages of lines of operations, 
 and to choose the best. 
 
 The line of operations is simple when the army pro- 
 ceeds in a single direction and remains united ; or, at 
 any rate, the corps composing it are not so distant 
 from each other that they cannot afford mutual sup- 
 port. It is, therefore, the case of roads being used 
 nearly parallel, not distant from each other, and 
 separated by no great obstacles. 
 
 The line of operations is doiible when the army is 
 divided, and, although proceeding from a single base, 
 the different corps move along lines so distant from 
 each other that they could not be concentrated the 
 same day upon a common field of battle. "When 
 .Marshal Wurmser, issuing from the passes of the 
 Tyrol to succor Mantua, which was besieged by 
 Bonaparte, divided his army into two parts, with a 
 view of advancing simultaneously along the valleys 
 of the Adige and Chiese, on both sides of Lake Garda, 
 he had a double line of operations. In the same year 
 1796, Jourdan and Moreau, basing themselves on the 
 Rhine, between Basle and Mayence, manoeuvred upon 
 the Main and Danube separately : they had a double 
 
LINES OF OPERATIC 
 
 line of operations ; or, what is nearly the 
 each had his own line. 
 
 Except in the case of being as strong as the enemy, 
 both morally and physically, or stronger upon each 
 line, it is disadvantageous to use a double line of 
 operations, especially if it is divergent ; because the 
 enemy may take a position between the fractions of 
 the army, beat each separately, and find himself 
 favorably situated for cutting their communications. 
 
 The greater the progress made upon divergent lines 
 of operations, the greater does the disadvantage be- 
 come ; because the two armies are constantly increas- 
 ing their distance from each other, as well as the dif- 
 ficulty of affording mutual assistance. The enemy 
 between them may suddenly move against one of the 
 two corps and beat it before the other can come up ; 
 he may then return to the latter, with a fair prospect 
 of overwhelming it in the same way. In the first of 
 the two examples cited above, Marshal Wurmser was 
 beaten by his young opponent, who took a position 
 between his two corps and destroyed them in succes- 
 sion. In the second example, the French generals 
 were forced to retreat by the Archduke Charles, who 
 manoeuvred upon a single interior line, and had the 
 skill to profit by his position. It is evident from this 
 explanation, that although there is danger of being 
 enveloped on a battle-field, the case changes when 
 the distances increase, and the enveloping corps are 
 too far separated to be able to combine their attacks. 
 
18 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Then the central position is the best, provided there 
 is a display of the energy requisite in such circum- 
 stances. Thus, the rules of strategy may differ essen- 
 tially from those of tactics ; they may even be di- 
 rectly in opposition ; and this is one of the causes 
 which often render the application of these rules so 
 difficult. 
 
 The only case in which, even with forces nearly 
 equal, and when powerful motives urge to such a 
 course, it is proper to take a double line in presence 
 of a respectable enemy, is that where he moves upon 
 two diverging or widely separated lines. But then 
 the lines should be interior, in order that the two 
 
 J> % corps M and M' (fig. 4) 
 
 / \ m ay, if necessary, keep 
 
 / \ up an inter-communi- 
 
 / \ cation, give mutual as- 
 
 sistance in case of at- 
 tack, or concentrate sud- 
 denly against one of the 
 \ hostile corps N N', which 
 
 A \ are manoeuvring upon 
 
 Fig. 4. exterior lines, and can- 
 
 not possibly take part in the same action. The prin- 
 ciple of interior lines, especially when they are con- 
 verging, is really nothing but a modification of that 
 of the simple line of operations. This principle con- 
 sists in always keeping your corps between those of 
 the enemy, more nearly together than his, and better 
 
LINES OF OPERATIONS. 19 
 
 prepared to afford mutual support. It is, however, al- 
 ways safer to manoeuvre upon a single line than upon 
 two, even if they are interior ; especially so when 
 the country is entirely open, and there is no obstacle 
 between you and the enemy which would permit him 
 to attack one of your corps by surprise, before the 
 other could rejoin it. 
 
 We must not confound with double or multiple lines 
 of operations the different roads taken by the corps 
 composing a single army, for the purpose of reaching 
 a common place of concentration ; in this case there 
 is a common object to be attained, and the corps are 
 separated only temporarily, to enable them to move 
 more rapidly, to gain a thorough knowledge of the 
 country, and to subsist more easily. This separation 
 is, indeed, the perfection of art, when it is arranged in 
 such a manner as to cease at the moment the decisive 
 struggle begins. It is one of the best means of keep- 
 ing the enemy a long time uncertain as to the point 
 where he will be attacked. To know how alternately 
 to separate the corps, in order to embrace a great ex- 
 tent of country when circumstances permit or require 
 it, and to concentrate them rapidly to strike decisive 
 blows, is one of the most evident marks of mili- 
 tary genius. ISTo general of modern times has given 
 stronger proofs of possessing this faculty than Na- 
 poleon. 
 
 When a commander is forced by the events of the 
 war to change the original line of operations, and to 
 
20 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 take a new one, the latter is called an accidental line 
 of operations. But it would be improper to apply 
 this term to a line taken voluntarily, for the purpose 
 of marching upon a point that the enemy may have 
 left unprotected, because he imagines himself threat- 
 ened in another direction. The change of the line, 
 far from being an accident in this case, is the result 
 of a wise combination, and the probable cause of im- 
 portant successes. The primitive line would then be, 
 to some extent, a pretended one, and the secondary 
 line, the real one ; it should not, therefore, be called 
 accidental : it would be simply a new line of opera- 
 tions.* 
 
 It is sometimes proper, in a retrograde movement, 
 to abandon the natural line of retreat and adopt a new 
 one, for the purpose of drawing the enemy into a part 
 of the country where his superiority may be diminished 
 and himself removed from his principal object. The 
 retreat is then made parallel to the frontier instead of 
 along the original line, which is usually perpendicular 
 to it. This line of retreat cannot be styled accidental, 
 because it is made through choice and has an advan- 
 tage over the natural line. It has received the name 
 of parallel retreat, which is very appropriate. Fred- 
 erick of Prussia, having been obliged, by the loss of 
 
 * "Washington made a change in his line of operations after the ac- 
 tion of Princeton, in New Jersey, which is one of the finest in military 
 history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line of operations, in 
 case he lost the battle of Austerlitz, but victory rendered its execution 
 unnecessary. Hcdkctis Military Art and Science. 
 
LINES OF OPERATIONS. 21 
 
 a large convoy, to raise the siege of Olmutz, adopted 
 a line of retreat through Bohemia in preference to 
 re-entering Silesia by his natural line, from Olmutz 
 to Neiss: by pursuing this course he continued, 
 though retreating, to wage the war on his enemy's 
 soil, and to relieve his own provinces from its burdens. 
 The line was really accidental only for his adversary. 
 Success, in such a case, requires, in the first place, 
 that the force be not too much interior to that of the 
 pursuing enemy ; and, secondly, that the retiring army 
 be not so far from its owii territory as to run the risk 
 of being entirely cut off. The nature of the surround- 
 ing country must be considered in coming to a con- 
 clusion in this matter; if it is difficult, the movement 
 will be the less dangerous ; if the country is, on the 
 contrary, free from obstacles, the safest road will 
 usually be the shortest. 
 
 If the retreat is effected behind a line of defence 
 which the enemy has forced, it may still be parallel 
 rather than perpendicular to that line, because he is 
 thus withdrawn from his object of penetrating into 
 the interior and marching on the capital ; there is 
 thus a gain of time, and although the country is not 
 relieved by it of the burdens of the war, it has all the 
 other advantages of the parallel retreat. The retreat 
 of Marshal Soult, in 1814, before the English army, 
 may be classed under this head. Wellington's main 
 object was to cross the Garonne and march upon Paris; 
 Soult moved along the Pyrenees, forcing Wellington 
 
22 PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 to follow him as far as Toulouse, where he detained 
 the English general several days. 
 
 When a choice is to be made between several lines 
 of operations, that should be preferred which offers 
 the greatest facilities for subsistence where the army 
 will be safest and have the greatest advantages. If 
 it is superior in cavalry, the level country will be 
 better for its operations ; in the contrary case, broken 
 or mountainous country will probably be more suitable. 
 A line of operations parallel and near to a water- 
 course is very favorable, because the army has at once 
 a support for one of its wings, and great additional 
 facilities for transportation. The position of the ene- 
 my has also a great influence upon the choice of a line 
 of operations. If he is spread out in cantonments 
 over a large extent of country, that route will be the 
 best which leads into the midst of his isolated corps, 
 and gives an assailant the opportunity of separating 
 them still more. If, in these circumstances, the line 
 of operations were directed towards one of the extremi- 
 ties of the hostile army, its corps would be pressed 
 back towards each other, and their concentration 
 would be rather expedited than hindered. If, how- 
 ever, the enemy is concentrated, a direction should be 
 chosen by which one of his flanks may be threatened, 
 provided your own line runs no risk of being cut ; 
 the first principle is never to uncover the base or the 
 line of operations. The plan to be adopted depends 
 also upon the character and capacity of the opposing 
 
LINES OF OPERATIONS. 23 
 
 generals, the quality of the troops, their state of dis- 
 cipline, &c. Turenne, when he had to contend 
 against the great Conde, by no means undertook what 
 would have been simple and easy in presence of infe- 
 rior men. Upon one occasion, in the campaign of 
 1654, he lost several men by passing before the Span- 
 ish lines within range, which gave rise to some re- 
 marks from several officers who were with him ; he 
 replied : u It is true, this movement would be impru- 
 dent if made in presence of Conde ; but I desire to 
 examine this position closely, and I know the customs 
 of the Spanish service are such, that before the arch- 
 duke is informed of our proceedings, has given notice 
 of them to Prince de Conde and received his advice, 
 I shall be back to my camp." There spoke a man 
 who was capable of judging in those matters which 
 belong to the divine part of the art. It is in these 
 delicate distinctions that is manifested a true genius 
 fur war. 
 
 It has been stated that the line of operations should 
 be directed upon the flank of the enemy when he 
 keeps united, if it can be done without exposing your 
 own. It almost always happens that the turner is 
 turned ; and this is strictly true in a country free 
 from obstacles, when the bases of the two armies are 
 nearly parallel and equal. In fact, the army M 
 (fig. 5) cannot make an attempt upon the commu- 
 nications of the army N, except by following a line 
 of operations, S B, which is oblique to the base, R S, 
 
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 ?- 5 - 
 
 and supported by it at 
 its extremity ; but then 
 the central line A B 
 and the communication 
 on the left are uncovered, 
 and the advantages of 
 the extended base are lost, 
 since the only line of re- 
 \ treat left is upon the 
 \ point S. It is then only 
 "f in the case where natural 
 obstacles enable a few 
 troops to defend the communications, B R and B A, 
 against attack from the enemy, that the principal line 
 of operations may probably be directed towards the 
 flank of the enemy, because by throwing forward the 
 small corps, m and m\ upon the other lines, the base, R S, 
 is covered, while at the same time the enemy is threat- 
 ened upon several points. It may be stated generally, 
 that it is only when favored by natural obstacles in 
 this manner, movements may, without very great risk, 
 be made against the flanks of an enemy. The influence 
 of the features of ground is always manifested in the 
 resolutions arrived at in war ; the study of topography 
 is, therefore, of the highest importance for officers of 
 all grades, but especially for those who are intrusted 
 with important commands. 
 
 A line of operations which is too extended, rela* 
 tively to its base, loses a portion of the advantages it 
 
STRATEGIC POINTS. 25 
 
 may possess, on account of the opportunity afforded 
 an enemy of cutting it. It is this consideration which 
 induces a general, as he advances from his primitive 
 base, to adopt secondary ones. To desire to establish 
 a fixed relation between the length of a line of opera- 
 tions and the extent of a base would be ridiculous 
 pedantry. The triangle formed by connecting the po- 
 sition of the army with the extremities of the base may 
 vary infinitely. Its form and dimensions generally 
 do not depend upon our will. It is sufficient to say, 
 that the greater the extent of the base, the more dis- 
 tant may be the operations of the army without having 
 its communications endangered ; nearly in the same 
 way that a pyramid may, with equal stability, have 
 a greater height as its base is broader. 
 
 Art. IV. Strategic Points. 
 
 Objective points are also called strategic points ; and 
 we include under this denomination not only those 
 which may be considered as the principal objects to 
 be attained, but also those whose occupation is of 
 manifest advantage to the army. 
 
 A capital city is a strategic point of great impor- 
 tance, because it regulates or greatly influences the 
 public opinion of the nation, contains abundant re- 
 sources of every kind, the loss of which may greatly 
 paralyze the enemy ; and to the minds of a large por- 
 tion of the people all hope of successful defence is 
 

 26 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 lost when an invading army has reached the heart of 
 the state. If by seizing the capital no other than the 
 moral eifect is produced of discouraging the people, 
 it is still a worthy object of the efforts of an invading 
 army.* 
 
 A point is strategic when it is the key of several 
 important communications, when it controls the navi- 
 gation of a river or defends some important passage. 
 For instance, Ratisbon, on the Danube, w T hich is the 
 centre of important communications on both banks 
 of the river, has always been shown, in the wars in 
 Germany, to be a strategic point for the possession 
 of which the belligerents have made great efforts. 
 Smolensk on the Borysthenes is another ; this city is 
 in the interval between the Borysthenes and the Meja, 
 the key of the Russian empire on the side of Moscow. 
 Hence, in 1812, the Russians were as anxious to hold 
 this point as the French to seize it. The city of Lan- 
 gres, situated near the sources of several of the 
 
 * The possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, 
 both from their political and military importance, had a decided influ- 
 ence upon the results of the war in these several states. In the same 
 way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 179Y; Vienna, in 1805 and 1809. 
 Berlin, in 1806; Madrid, in 1808; andParis, in 1814 and 1815. IfHanni- 
 bal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of Cannte, the 
 Roman power would have been destroyed. The taking of Washing- 
 ton, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the place was 
 then of no importance in itself and was a merely nominal capital. It, 
 however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and required many 
 brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national escutcheon. 
 The possession of the capital is of prime importance in a civil war, as 
 recent evonts in America have proved. HALLEOK. 
 
STRATEGIC POINTS. 27 
 
 streams which water France, is another strategic point. 
 Alexandria, in Piedmont, as a fortress beyond the Alps, 
 is equally so ; its possession is indispensable for holding 
 the plains of the Po. Soria, upon the plateau of Old 
 Castile, is a,lso a strategic point, although that city 
 has nothing in itself to make its conquest desirable ; 
 it is rather the position which is important, because, 
 like Langres, it is near the source of several rivers.* 
 In level countries there are few points that are strate- 
 gic from their positions ; they become so on account 
 of the fortifications which surround them, as well as 
 the supplies and resources they furnish. Many of 
 these points are found in wooded, undulating coun- 
 tries, cut up by rivers and lakes. Such countries are 
 usually thickly settled. 
 
 In mountainous regions, like the Alps and the 
 Pyrenees, the number of strategic points is some- 
 what limited, but they are very distinctly marked: 
 they are found at the entrances of defiles, at the 
 points whence several valleys branch out, at the junc- 
 tions of roads. The high ground at the point where 
 several ridges meet is also strategic, for the troops oc- 
 cupying it may select the route by which to descend : 
 their movements are from a central point outwards, 
 while those of the enemy can only be accomplished 
 
 * Cairo, at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, is a 
 strategic point of great importance. Paducah, at the mouth of the 
 Tennessee, is also important. New York, New Orleans, Fortress Mon- 
 roe, St. Louis, and Chattanooga are strategic points. 
 
28 PRINCIPLES OF STEATEGY. 
 
 by long circuits made to pass around the mountains 
 which it may be impossible to cross. If he has once 
 fairly started in a valley, he is in a measure forced to 
 remain in it, as it is extremely difficult for him to 
 pass from one to another ; but the troops stationed at 
 the head of the valleys may use them at pleasure and 
 in turn if necessary. 
 
 Art. V. Plan of a Campaign. 
 
 Before undertaking a war or any operation, a cer- 
 tain object to be attained must be decided upon ; the 
 direction of the necessary movement must be fixed 
 in advance and as accurately as possible ; there must 
 be a thorough understanding of the real object aimed 
 at, in order that every thing may be prearranged and 
 nothing left to chance. This is called making the 
 plan of the campaign : the definition itself implies 
 that the war is to be offensive. 
 
 It is evident that this plan should be limited to the 
 grand strategic operations and be only an outline of 
 them, leaving as much latitude as possible for choice 
 of movements of detail and execution. It would be 
 absurd to pretend to dictate to a general what he 
 ought to do from day to day, for, after the first 
 marches, and he has reached the theatre of the ene- 
 my's operations, he no longer does what he likes but 
 what he can : marches, manoeuvres, combats depend 
 upon imperious circumstances ; the determinations to 
 make them are usually sudden and result from the posi- 
 
PLAN OF A CAMPAIGN. 29 
 
 tion, resources, forces, and condition of the enemy. The 
 general should be perfectly untrammelled in carrying 
 out a plan of campaign, even if it has been marked 
 out for him by higher authority ; but it is still better, 
 after selecting a competent man, to let him make his 
 own plan and attend also to its execution, as he, be- 
 ing more interested in its success than any one else, 
 will strive to make it succeed. 
 
 In making a plan of campaign, maps are necessary, 
 and for this purpose those upon a small scale are the 
 best, as they show a whole country together. It is 
 enough for them to indicate exactly the position of 
 fortified places, water-courses, the main roads, moun- 
 tain ranges, frontiers. Those maps are best which 
 are most distinctly marked, because they are more 
 easily consulted. Maps on a large scale, or topo- 
 graphical maps, are useful in determining questions 
 of detail, but the number of sheets such maps usual- 
 ly consist of renders them inconvenient for use in 
 making the general arrangements of a plan of a cam- 
 paign. The topographical maps will be consulted 
 when a camp is to be established, a position taken 
 up, an order of battle agreed upon. 
 
 The plan of the campaign indicates the places of 
 concentration of troops, the base and line of opera- 
 tions, the strategic points to be attained. 
 
 The choice of the points of concentration of troops 
 is regulated not only by the consideration of subsist- 
 ence, although this is always very important, but by 
 
30 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 the desire to occupy such positions as will keep the 
 enemy uncertain where he is to be attacked, and 
 which permit the initiative to be taken promptly and 
 in strong force. The distance of the different points 
 of assembly should be so calculated that all the corps 
 may arrive at the same time at the general rendez- 
 vous in order to pass the frontier together. Thus, in 
 1815, Napoleon having determined to attack the al- 
 lied armies, directed his forces towards Belgium, which 
 was occupied by the English and Prussians. They 
 were covering all the space between Liege, Mons, 
 and Brussels, for a distance of sixty or seventy miles 
 along the Sambre and the Meuse, being "principally 
 established between Mons and Namur. Napoleon 
 assembled his forces at Maubeuge, Beaumont, and 
 Philippeville, thus threatening Mons, Brussels, and 
 Namur, and forcing the enemy to remain separated. 
 He resolved to pass the frontier at Charleroi, with a 
 view of assailing the centre of the hostile canton- 
 ments. Calculating the distance, he caused the sev- 
 eral corps to set out at hours which enabled them to 
 arrive simultaneously at Charleroi. The place was 
 readily taken. They passed the Sambre, and on the 
 same day, June 15th, camped in the enemy's coun- 
 try. This is an interesting example : it demonstrates 
 the influence of a good choice of places of assembly 
 upon the first successes, the moral effect of which is 
 so great. The saine general, two years previously, 
 operating upon a vastly greater scale, obtained the 
 
PLAN OF A CAMPAIGN. 31 
 
 same precision in the results of his arrangements. 
 He had assembled his corps on the Niemen; he sent 
 them by different roads and at different times to- 
 wards Ostrowno, where they arrived, after long march- 
 es, at the moment when the two armies were about to 
 come to blows. General Barclay, with Fabian pru- 
 dence, avoided the effect of this formidable concen- 
 tration, by abandoning the position to his adversary. 
 In a plan of campaign, the base of operations can 
 only be a subject of discussion when there is a choice 
 between two frontiers, and there is a hesitation which to 
 take. For example, if a war were impending between 
 France and Austria, and France, as she usually does, 
 wished to take the offensive, there would be occasion 
 for discussing the relative advantages of the Rhine 
 frontier or that of the Alps. This is the time when 
 the general form of the base must be considered, and 
 its influence upon the object in view. If it is concave, 
 the army after advancing will have a secure support 
 for its wings and rear. If it forms a salient angle, as 
 does Silesia in the Austrian States, there is the advan- 
 tage of being enabled, with a single body of troops, to 
 keep the enemy uncertain as to the quarter to be at- 
 tacked; and he is thus obliged to spread his forces 
 along the whole circuit to be guarded, which is very 
 unfortunate for him. But even if he remains united, 
 there is every facility for attracting his attention in 
 one direction, suddenly striking a blow in the other by 
 the shortest route 3 and taking him unawares. This 
 
32 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 salient form is therefore advantageous for opening a 
 campaign ; but the army runs the risk, in case of a 
 defeat, of being separated from its base. The case is 
 reversed with a concave base. 
 
 The importance of the base of operations increases 
 with its extent, its defensive properties, its resources 
 of every kind, its vicinity to depots, the facilities for 
 reaching it from the interior, &c. If it is perpendicu- 
 lar to the proposed line of operations, and extends be- 
 yond it on both sides, it is better than if it were oblique, 
 and only supported the line on one side. 
 
 When, therefore, in a plan of campaign, there is an 
 opportunity to compare the relative advantages of two 
 bases of operations, not only should the character of 
 the base be considered, as a more or less solid support 
 for the army, a greater or less obstacle to the enemy, 
 but also its form and relative position. 
 
 Of two frontiers, one necessarily has preponderating 
 advantages ; it should therefore be selected as the base 
 of operations, and all the disposable means of attack 
 should be collected upon it. A fault is committed in 
 proceeding from two bases at the same time. It is 
 much better to stand on the defensive on one frontier, 
 in order to collect more troops on the other, and secure 
 more chances of success. Success seldom follows a 
 division of forces ; and the same reasons which make 
 double lines of operations dangerous, are equally power- 
 ful against attempts to act offensively from two distinct 
 bases. There should, on the contrary, always be the 
 
PLAN OF A CAMPAIGN. 33 
 
 greatest possible concentration of effort, in order that 
 successes which are gained may be decisive; and 
 they will always be more so upon the important fron- 
 tier than upon the other; all proper means of strength- 
 ening the one, without too much weakening the power 
 of defence of the other, should be adopted ; in the 
 same manner upon a battle-field, troops are withdrawn 
 from the wing that is less threatened, in order to re-en- 
 force that one which is to decide the fate of the conflict. 
 The discussion of the different lines of operations 
 that may be followed, is an essential part of the plan 
 of a campaign. In fact, it is not with these lines as 
 with the base, which oftentimes gives no ground for 
 discussion, for the reason that it is determined before- 
 hand by the geographical position of the country where 
 the war is to be waged. Lines of operations, on the 
 contrary, may be very different, because there are al- 
 most always several routes leading to the same object. 
 There are so many things to be considered, that the 
 choice of the best line is always a very delicate matter. 
 In this, the general shows his true conception of the 
 principles of the art. It is scarcely possible to lay 
 down other rules on this subject than those stated in 
 Article III. It may be added that, in discussing these 
 lines, effective distances are to be calculated, that is to 
 say, the times actually necessary for passing over 
 them, and not the distances on the map ; all things 
 else being equal, the shortest route should be adopted ; 
 the best road will be used when there are no strong 
 
34: PKIXCIPLES OF STEATEGY. 
 
 reasons for leaving it, for troops march much more 
 rapidly along a broad and convenient road, than 
 through narrow and difficult paths. The character of 
 the cities to be passed, defiles, obstacles, may oblige 
 the use of indirect and bad roads ; for the mere diffi- 
 culties of a march are not usually so great as those of 
 capturing cities and forcing denies. When the army, 
 in advancing, is enabled to rest one of its wings upon 
 a natural obstacle, the best line of operations will be 
 the one which is nearest to that obstacle, because 
 during the march it will be better covered by the 
 army, whose front is almost always several miles in 
 extent ; at any rate, while a battle is not imminent. 
 When the two wings of the army are unsupported, the 
 line of operations should proceed from the middle of the 
 front, in order to be, as far as possible in this unfavor- 
 able case, equally covered on both sides. As a gene- 
 ral rule, in a march as in a battle, the line of opera- 
 tions must not be uncovered; all the arrangements 
 should, on the contrary, tend to cover and defend it 
 as much as possible. 
 
 The choice of objective points also requires much 
 sagacity, as the possession of one may give great mili- 
 tary advantages, such as the control of the navigation 
 of a river or the passage across it, or the control of 
 several roads or valleys having a common point, or an 
 essential line of retreat, &c. ; another may have ad- 
 vantages of a different kind, but no less important, such 
 as provisions, munitions, arms, clothing, equipments, 
 
PLAN OF DEFENCE. 35 
 
 tools, money, all indispensable articles, which must be 
 carried with the army, if they cannot be obtained 
 along the way. The capital, large cities abounding 
 in resources of every kind, are the principal points to 
 be occupied, and are those which, in a plan of cam- 
 paign, should figure as objective points of the first im- 
 portance. But this subject has been already treated 
 to some extent in the preceding article. 
 
 Art. VI. Plan of Defence. 
 
 The plan of a defensive campaign may be better 
 termed plan of defence. It consists, in the first place, 
 in determining the character of the war to be under- 
 taken, which depends on national character, the re- 
 sources of the country, its topography, and climate. 
 The French defend themselves by attacking; the Ger- 
 mans patiently wage a methodical war behind their 
 frontiers ; the Spaniards strive to exterminate their 
 adversaries in detail ; the Russians, in 1812, were seen 
 to devastate their country and burn their capital, to 
 deprive the invader of necessary resources. People 
 who are courageous, but unaccustomed to privations, 
 will not protract a war, but strive to end it by bril- 
 liant actions ; they will strike heavy blows, preferring 
 a single great battle, where defeat even will be glori- 
 ous, to a series of partial engagements, which exhaust 
 the country and lead to no decisive result. 
 
 To carry the war into the territory of the invader or 
 of his allies, is a sure means of throwing part of the 
 
36 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 burden upon their shoulders and thwarting their 
 plans. The morale of troops is raised by a proceeding 
 of this kind, and the chances of success are increased. 
 But to reap success from such a plan, the forces must 
 not be too inferior, and the conformation of the fron- 
 tiers must be favorable. The army must not go too 
 far from its own territory, in order to avoid being com- 
 promised. The zone of country .between the army 
 and its frontiers will supply its wants, and should be 
 defended to the last extremity, by bold attacks, with 
 the entire disposable force, upon that corps of the 
 enemy which is most conveniently situated for the 
 purpose. If the stroke is successful, the army may 
 pass to the offensive, giving an entirely new phase to 
 the war. If it is unsuccessful, there should be still 
 greater concentration, strong positions for camps 
 should be selected, or the army should retire under 
 shelter of some fortified city, or cover itself by means 
 of a river, &c. You thus oblige the enemy to follow 
 you, and to move in a zone of which the devastation 
 is entirely at his expense. Montecuculi, in his Me- 
 moirs, strongly recommends this kind of a war for the 
 defensive. He says : " On the territory of an adver- 
 sary, malcontents are enlisted in your favor ; there is 
 no need for concern about supplies of men, money, 
 and other necessaries, as these only become exhausted 
 in the theatre of war, which is upon your adversary's 
 soil." 
 
 An army fighting upon its own territory causes, 
 
PLAN OF DEFENCE. 37 
 
 necessarily, much injury to the people, but there are 
 less risks to be run ; the population is favorable, and 
 gives assistance of every kind; every individual is a 
 spy upon the enemy, and gives information of his 
 operations ; the battles are fought on positions ex- 
 amined, and sometimes prepared, in advance, where 
 the enemy is obliged to come after the army ; it may 
 move in any direction, because every space not occu- 
 pied by the enemy may serve for a base of operations ; 
 there is every facility for threatening his communica- 
 tions ; he is forced to make detachments for the 
 purpose of guarding the cities he has taken, and to 
 secure his subsequent movements. These detachments 
 are fair game they may be separately attacked and 
 beaten, or surrounded. When fortune crowns with 
 success the efforts of the defenders, their victories are 
 much more decisive if obtained within their own 
 territories than beyond them, because the vanquished 
 enemy has defiles to repass, and a retreat to effect, 
 in the midst of a population which is hostile and ready 
 to fall upon him. But, in order that such a method 
 of acting defensively be successful, there must be 
 unity of intention and effort in the nation, no civil 
 discords to divide it into two hostile parties, and the 
 dread of foreign domination must exist in every heart. 
 What can a divided people do in presence of an 
 enterprising enemy ? What can the army do, even 
 when most faithful to its flag, its own honor, and 
 organized in the most perfect manner, if it is not 
 
38 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 seconded by the population, if it meets nothing but 
 inertness and lukewarmness, or hostility, where it 
 should receive assistance, support, co-operation ? This 
 essential condition, without which defence is impos- 
 sible, should, therefore, be assumed as satisfied in 
 treating a question of this kind. 
 
 A frontier which has its convexity turned to the 
 enemy is favorable for a defence made within its limits 
 at the opening of the campaign, and may lead to the 
 adoption of that method. In fact, from a central 
 point which is strongly held, the w T hole circuit of 
 vulnerable frontier may be observed, and the army 
 may stand ready to move by the shortest route to the 
 point threatened. Thus, the Piedrnontese, by occupy- 
 ing a position near Turin, may reply to any attack 
 made upon them from the surrounding Alps. 
 
 The character of the war being decided upon, the 
 details are next to be considered, and these properly 
 compose the plan of defence. The determination of 
 the places where a suitable resistance may be made ; 
 of those to which the forces shall retreat in case of 
 reverse, and the routes to be pursued ; the disposition 
 of the troops while expecting the enemy's approach ; 
 the manner of anticipating him, wherever he may 
 come ; the indication of points for concentration 
 behind the frontier, as soon as his projects are 
 developed ; the method of supporting the advanced 
 corps, and those in observation, by central reserves ; 
 finally, the designation of points to be fortified by the 
 
PLAN OF DEFENCE. 39 
 
 appliances of art, bridges to be destroyed, roads to be 
 mended, &c. : these are the objects to be attended to 
 in making a plan of defence. 
 
 The local topography will indicate the appropriate 
 military dispositions to be adopted. It is scarcely 
 possible to lay down rules on this point ; all that can 
 be said is, that a too great scattering of the troops 
 is always dangerous ; consequently, far from thinking 
 of guarding all the passages, some must be abandoned, 
 that others, the most important and the most 
 threatened, may be better defended. If the enemy 
 leaves these to go to the former, his projects must be 
 counteracted by similar means, an effort being always 
 made to oppose to his advance, by whatever route he 
 may come, as many troops as possible. Hence we 
 see how greatly the defence of a State is influenced by 
 the form of the frontiers, the direction and character 
 of the roads. If you are enabled to follow, by straight 
 interior lines, the movements of the enemy manoeu- 
 vring on the circumference of the circle, you have all 
 the advantages of position, and may always anticipate 
 him at any threatened point. Even in the contrary 
 case,- you cannot possibly close all the avenues ; that 
 would oblige you to form a long cordon of troops, very 
 weak at every point, through which an enemy may 
 penetrate wherever he pleases. You should rather 
 place the main body of the troops behind the frontier, 
 in a well-selected position for the promptest movement 
 upon the several roads open to the enemy. In advance 
 
40 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 1 
 
 of this corps, and upon its flanks, you should send out 
 simple detachments to occupy the passes temporarily, 
 and give notice of an attack. They will dispute the 
 ground while falling back, thus retarding the march 
 of the enemy, and giving time for troops to approach 
 and meet him. In this way all the surrounding 
 country will be efficiently watched to avoid surprises, 
 and the troops are, also, readily concentrated to fight. 
 Such are the general arrangements to be adopted in 
 a plan of defence ; evidently great latitude is given 
 them, and they should conform to the requirements of 
 localities. If, however, they are based upon the 
 principle of concentration, they will be always prefer- 
 able to an insecure cordon, whose detached bodies 
 afford no reciprocal support, are withdrawn from the 
 immediate command of the general, who cannot be 
 omnipresent, and, on account of their distance apart, 
 they cannot be concentrated when the line is broken 
 anywhere. Feuquieres blames Marshal Catinat for 
 neglecting these principles : " Catinat being intrusted 
 with the defence of the passes of the Alps against 
 Monsieur de Savoy, adopted a cordon system, 
 scattering his forces along the whole circuit of the 
 mountains, and thus gave the enemy an opportu- 
 nity of taking the offensive, although much inferior 
 in infantry, which is the important arm for moun- 
 tain warfare. De Savoy, by concentrating his 
 forces, was superior to Catinat wherever he chose 
 to attack, especially as he occupied the centre of the 
 
PLAN OF DEFENCE. 41 
 
 circle and could threaten several points at once, 
 and choose for the real attack that which seemed 
 best." 
 
 To give prompt notice of the enemy's movements 
 a system of signals must be used, or the magnetic 
 telegraph. 
 
 It is not always by taking position in the direct 
 path of an enemy that his advance is opposed, but 
 sometimes points may be occupied on the flank with 
 much advantage, so as to threaten his line of opera- 
 tions if he ventures to pass. If these flank positions 
 can be held in force, the enemy must leave his direct 
 route to attack them, for, unless he carries them, he 
 runs the risk of being cut off from his base. He 
 is thus compelled to fight on ground selected by his 
 adversary, and prepared for his reception by fortifica- 
 tion and any other means circumstances may permit. 
 In this way the Turks, by concentrating at Shumla, 
 completely arrested the Russian invasion of 1810, and 
 by pursuing the same course in the war of ISiJS, they 
 prolonged their defence during a whole campaign. 
 If, in 1812, Kutosow, instead of covering Moscow 
 and taking position upon the plateau of Mojaisch, had 
 retired towards Kiow, he would, as Napoleon himself 
 admits, have drawn the French army in that direction, 
 and the immense sacrifice of Moscow would have been 
 avoided. 
 
 Next come the successive lines of defence presented 
 by a country, which are naturally indicated by the 
 
4:2 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 water-courses and the chains of mountains or hills. 
 The advantages and disadvantages of these are to be 
 carefully discussed. The best lines are those whose 
 wings are supported by natural obstacles, such as the 
 sea, a great lake, a broad and rapid river; which 
 have a controlling influence over the surrounding 
 country ; are only passable by a small number of 
 roads easily guarded ; whose general form is convex 
 to the front, and behind are good roads facilitating 
 rapid movements, and by short marches, to any point 
 attacked. The famous lines of Torres Yedras, con- 
 structed by Wellington, in 1809, to cover Lisbon, 
 satisfied the most of these conditions ; they formed a 
 great curve, several leagues long, one of its extremi- 
 ties resting on the Tagus and the other on the sea ; 
 there was a chain of hills, most of them crowned by 
 fortifications, behind which the English army could 
 manoeuvre unseen, and move to diiferent points of 
 the curve by roads which had been put in good con- 
 dition, and some newly constructed. The French 
 co'Ld not force these lines, although they were not 
 covered by a river in front of them. Continuous arti- 
 ficial lines, erected by the labor of men, deserve but 
 little confidence, on account of the difficulty, not to say 
 impossibility, of defending these inert masses when 
 unprotected,' or but feebly defended by natural ob- 
 stacles. The lines of Wissembourg, although covered 
 by the Lauter, did not prevent the French from being 
 driven out of them by the Austrians, under Marshal 
 
PLAN OF DEFENCE. 43 
 
 "Wurmser. Resting at the left upon the Yosges moun- 
 tains, and at the right upon the Rhine, they were ten 
 or twelve miles long ; it was impossible for an army 
 of less than 20,000 men to make an energetic resist- 
 ance in them. But a few hours were necessary to see 
 them entered at several points, and the defenders 
 driven off. The most celebrated artificial lines are 
 the Chinese walls, and these never arrested the inva- 
 sions of the Tartars. 
 
 The advantages to be drawn from fortified cities 
 should be considered, either for protecting against the 
 attempts of the enemy all the supplies that must be 
 collected for the troops, or for the defence of certain 
 points which should be held as long as possible. A 
 city surrounded by a simple wall and ditch, which 
 secures it from danger of being taken by surprise or 
 open assault, may, if favorably located, be of the 
 greatest value. A city which will withstand attack 
 but twenty-four hours, may be very useful, as in this 
 space of time events may transpire that will entirely 
 change the appearance of affairs, and save a State 
 from the greatest of all misfortunes the loss of its 
 independence. If, in 1814, the city of Soissons had 
 closed its gates and made but a semblance of resist- 
 ance, Blucher could not have escaped Napoleon's ac- 
 tive pursuit, and perhaps France might have been 
 saved. In 1809, the Austrian Government rebuilt 
 the walls of Comorn, which had been destroyed thirty 
 years before, through Joseph's want of foresight. 
 
4A PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 In a special manner cities upon rivers may be very 
 valuable to the defence, although they may not be in 
 a condition to repel an attack in force,. By giving 
 possession of the bridges, they facilitate manoeuvres 
 from one bank to another, enable an army to cover it- 
 self by the river or to pass it, in the event either of its 
 being too weak to march against the enemy, or of a 
 good opportunity being presented to take advantage 
 of some false movement upon his part. If the army 
 passes the river, these cities are so many tetes-de-pont 
 securing its retreat and covering its operations after 
 repassing ; they are so many points by which the 
 army may debouche at any instant, and the enemy is 
 thus kept on the watch and obliged to divide his 
 forces. In a word, fortified cities give much value to 
 the lines of defence formed by rivers ; they may even 
 make a river, which is perpendicular to the frontier, 
 a dangerous object for an invading army, by the 
 facilities afforded the defenders for occupying the 
 side opposite the enemy and threatening his com- 
 munications. He must then halt and gain possession 
 of the cities which control the river. But this is a 
 very difficult operation in presence of an adversary 
 who is determined to make a vigorous defence. If 
 the attacking party advance along both banks, his 
 army is divided. The defensive party, holding the 
 bridges, may assemble in force and operate against 
 either subdivision of the hostile army. His success 
 is altogether probable. The invader must therefore 
 
PLAJS OB DEFENCE. 45 
 
 remain united and turn his attention to the river whose 
 tetes-de-pont are so threatening to him, just as would 
 be necessary for any flank position strongly occupied, 
 that could not be passed by without great danger. If 
 such a river had upon it no fortified places, it might, 
 instead of being an obstacle, form a support for one of 
 the wings of the invading army, and facilitate its 
 transportation. 
 
 It is therefore true that cities commanding the 
 water-courses are of great importance, and deserve 
 careful attention upon the part of those engaged in 
 preparing a plan of defence ; even when they are 
 imperfectly fortified, their advantages should not be 
 neglected, but, on the contrary, efforts should be made 
 to increase their powers of defence. 
 
 Positions, properly so called, that is, the places 
 where an army may advantageously fight, should be 
 indicated in a plan of defence. The relative advan- 
 tages and disadvantages of the several positions should 
 be carefully examined, in order that the former may 
 be profited by, and the latter avoided as far as the 
 circumstances permit. Calculation should be made 
 of the efforts necessary to augment the defensive 
 power of the several positions by the means presented 
 by the engineer's art, and to remove the obstacles of- 
 fered to the free movement of troops; an enumera- 
 tion should be made of the troops of each arm of the 
 service necessary or useful in the defence, and the 
 places for them to be camped or quartered should be 
 
46 PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 indicated, as also the resources in the neighborhood 
 of each. As a measure of prudence, in anticipation 
 of a reverse, the question of the best line of retreat 
 for the army should be discussed ; what are the best 
 places for rallying ; what parts of the line are to be 
 disputed foot by foot, and what parts are to be 
 rapidly passed over, &c. The conditions of a good 
 military position will be mentioned under the subject 
 of battles. 
 
 The roads are to be designated that should be 
 broken up to make them impassable by the enemy ; 
 also those to be improved, in order to facilitate the 
 defence. Too much attention cannot be bestowed 
 upon these objects, which at first sight seem of sec- 
 ondary importance, but have so much influence upon 
 the rate of movement of the two parties, and conse- 
 quently upon the execution of any project. A well- 
 organized government will always take care, in the 
 establishment of canals and roads, that the advan- 
 tages procured by them to commerce are not very 
 dearly paid for in war. The best road may be se- 
 cured from danger by constructing a work for its 
 defence at the most suitable point. Roads may 
 undoubtedly, and especially in mountains, be cut and 
 rendered temporarily impassable, by the destruction 
 of bridges, &c. ; but, independently of the greater or 
 less facility with which an enemy may repair these 
 injuries, there is always a feeling of repugnance to 
 taking steps for the destruction of the communica- 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 47 
 
 tions of the country ; it is delayed to the last mo- 
 ment, and often until too late. The safest plan is to 
 build the forts, of which mention has been made, and 
 for this reason a plan of defence should indicate the 
 positions for them. While marking the points where 
 a defence may be made, the method of obstructing 
 the roads in front should be indicated, as well as the 
 means of improving the parts to the rear, with the 
 double view of retarding the approach of the enemy, 
 and facilitating the arrival of succor. 
 
 All the roads connecting two positions, or which, 
 being behind a line of defence, run parallel to it, 
 should be repaired ; for these roads are the routes to 
 be passed over to succor threatened points, or to fall 
 in force upon detachments of the enemy. The plan 
 of defence should treat these operations in detail. 
 
 These are the essential objects to be mentioned in 
 a plan of defence. There are others, no less im- 
 portant, which relate to the administrative depart- 
 ment, such as hospitals, equipment, accommodating 
 troops at the points of concentration, their subsist- 
 ence, foraging, the postal service and other means of 
 correspondence, &c. These objects should all be con- 
 sidered in a plan of defence, but it is impossible to go 
 into all their details here. 
 
 Art. Til. Strategical Operations. 
 
 Preparatory movements, marches skilfully made, 
 with a view of taking position upon vulnerable points 
 of the enemy's line ; in a word, strategical operations, 
 
48 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 procure those immense results which sometimes fol- 
 low a single victory. A battle gained is an excellent 
 thing, but its consequences will vary according as the 
 victor is so situated as to be able to profit by it, and 
 cut the enemy's communications, separate him from 
 his base, disperse his army, &c., or is unable to inter- 
 nipt his retreat. In the first case, the victory is deci- 
 sive, if the pursuit of the defeated enemy is vigorous- 
 ly prosecuted ; in the second, he may be expected 
 soon to make another stand, and fight again. When 
 Napoleon moved his army from Boulogne, in 1805, by 
 forced marches, to attack the Austrian army, that had 
 already invaded Bavaria, and was advancing between 
 the Danube and Lake Constance, he directed the dif- 
 ferent corps upon the flank and rear of the enemy, 
 assuming as a base the Rhine below Strasbourg and 
 the Main, of which he was master ; he turned the 
 mountains of the Black Forest, in whose defiles he 
 showed several heads of columns, to cause Mack to 
 think he was going to meet him by the way of the 
 valley of the Danube. When Mack perceived his 
 error, it was too late ; the blow had been struck. He 
 was cut off from his communications, beaten in seve- 
 ral encounters, and obliged to take shelter in Ulm, 
 where he capitulated with his whole army. The wise 
 and rapid marches which preceded the combats of 
 Gunzbourg, Elchingen, &c., were the causes of the 
 successes of Napoleon, much more than those com- 
 bats, brilliant as they were. The Austrians were 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 49 
 
 completely cut off from retreat ; they were enveloped, 
 and forced to lay down their arms before the arrival 
 of the succor they expected.* Marshal Saxe was con- 
 vinced that marches contributed to the successful 
 issue of a campaign more than battles, and he laid 
 down the axiom, that " success in war is due to the 
 legs of the soldiers." History justifies his assertion. 
 
 We shall now lay down the principles relating to 
 marches, or rather to strategic movements. 
 
 Forward Movements. A numerous army is always 
 divided into several corps, which move along different 
 roads, either to procure subsistence more easily, or to 
 facilitate their deployments and preparations for bat- 
 tle. These columns should be the nearer to each other, 
 as the enemy's enterprises are the more to be ap- 
 prehended. If he may attack, the columns should be 
 near enough to afford mutual support ; there should 
 be no obstacle between them, which will prevent their 
 junction and concentration on the field of battle. But 
 there is no necessity for the columns to move exactly 
 side by side, and along parallel roads which have 
 been opened with the axe and the pick. Such a 
 course would make rapid movements impossible, and 
 would give all the advantages to the antagonist who 
 was not so precise. Since the time of Turenne, Lux- 
 embourg, and Villars, rapid marches had been forgot- 
 ten ; a weak army was divided up into numerous 
 columns, which, with great labor, made roads through 
 
 * For the details of these marches, see Chapter III., Article IIL 
 3 
 
50 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 forests and across ravines, without losing sight of each 
 other, so to speak. The result was great confusion, 
 and inconceivable slowness. The French Revolution 
 put an end to that folly, and a return was made to 
 the free, rapid, bold marches of the Romans. So 
 long as the manoeuvre is out of range of the enemy's 
 cannon, the intervals between the columns executing 
 preparatory movements may be greater or less, accord- 
 ing to circumstances ; the only limit to be laid down 
 is to keep the intervals such that the .corps may be 
 able to concentrate the same day upon the same field 
 of battle. 
 
 Each column should take proper precautions to 
 prevent being surprised, and its march should be pre- 
 ceded by an advanced guard. Negligence in this 
 particular may lead to disaster, as history proves con- 
 clusively. The defeat of Flaminius at Thrasymene 
 (now Perugia), is a celebrated example in point. 
 This general imprudently ventured into the defile 
 between the lake and the mountains without sending 
 out an advanced guard, and without examination of 
 the heights. He was hurrying to attack Hannibal, 
 who was laying the country under contribution ; his 
 haste was so great that he would not wait for his col- 
 league, who was coining up from Rimini with an 
 army. In the midst of the defile the wily Carthagin- 
 ian had taken a stand to bar the way. The action 
 begins, and the Romans see descending from the sur- 
 rounding heights numerous troops, to take them in 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 51 
 
 flank ; at the same time the cavalry, which they had 
 passed by unseen, attacks them in the rear. The Ko 
 mans, being obliged to fight on all sides, are obliged 
 to yield, and the Carthaginians made terrible slaugh- 
 ter among them. 
 
 To make a march safe against the attacks of the 
 enemy, it should, as far as possible, and in the man- 
 ner previously explained, be along a river which will 
 cover the flank of the column ; but, even in this case, 
 the avenues must always be occupied by which the 
 enemy might approach. For this purpose troops are 
 detached to take position and cover the march until 
 the column has passed so far that there is no longer 
 danger. The detachment will then rejoin the army 
 as soon as practicable. 
 
 Those marches which are concealed from the ene- 
 my lead to the most important results. By such 
 marches a general succeeds in placing his army upon 
 the flank of his adversary, threatens his base, or sur- 
 prises him in his cantonments. The most difficult 
 countries are the most favorable for concealed 
 marches, as there are greater facilities for hiding 
 them ; and the enemy, trusting to the natural obsta- 
 cles, neglects ordinary precautions, and omits to seek 
 for information. With patience, labor, and preseve- 
 rance, material obstacles may be always overcome by 
 an arrny that is not disturbed by the presence of an 
 enemy. It may be stated that in this particular noth- 
 ing is impossible. As an example, take the extraor- 
 
52 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 dinary march of Hannibal across the marsh of Clu- 
 sium. He had two roads by which to advance on 
 Rome ; one through the defiles of the Apennines, easy 
 but long, and held by the Roman army ; the other 
 shorter, but across vast marshes, supposed to be im- 
 passable. Having ascertained the depth of the 
 marshes, and being convinced that the difficulties 
 they presented, though great, were not insurmounta- 
 ble, Hannibal chose that road. Knowing he was not 
 expected in that direction, he saw that he would have 
 to overcome only local difficulties, and he was sure of 
 success as far as they were concerned. By taking 
 that road he avoided the defiles, where his cavalry, 
 which was superior to that of the Romans, would 
 have been useless, and where the individual valor of 
 the Roman soldiers would have compensated for 
 the incapacity of their consul. He had, moreover, 
 good grounds for hoping that, having once effected 
 the passage, he could inveigle the imprudent Flami- 
 nius into a battle before the arrival of his colleague, 
 as in fact happened. The success of that bold move- 
 ment was perfect, because it was so secret and prompt 
 that the Romans had no time to offer any opposition. 
 Rapidity is one of the first conditions of success in 
 marches, of strategical movements, as of simple ma- 
 noeuvres. By celerity of movement a general pre- 
 serves the advantages gained by a fortunate initiative, 
 and he follows up and completes the success a vic- 
 tory has begun. It is only by rapid marching that 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 53 
 
 war can ~be made to support war. By remaining but 
 a short time in one place, an army does not exhaust 
 the provinces through which it passes ; their resources, 
 uncertain as they may be, will always be sufficient 
 for the temporary wants of armies. By adopting such 
 a system, there is no longer a need of the immense 
 wagon-trains used to transport provisions ; nothing is 
 carried but what is indispensably necessary ; the sol- 
 diers may be required to take a few rations of bread, 
 and are followed by droves of animals to furnish meat. 
 The troops, being thus unencumbered, can undertake 
 and execute the grandest projects. It is impossible 
 to gain any success in war without rapid marches. 
 Proceed at a snail's pace, and you will accomplish 
 nothing ; misfortune will attend you continually, and 
 the elements will seem to conspire against you. 
 
 If the enemy approaches, spreading out his corps 
 over a large space, with the intention of enveloping 
 you, move at once against him, and strike at the centre 
 of his line. Endeavor to attack one of the isolated 
 parts of his army, and defeat it before the others can 
 arrive ; move rapidly against another, and treat it in 
 the same way : you will thus oblige them all to re- 
 treat, to take divergent roads, and to encounter a 
 thousand difficulties in effecting a junction, if indeed 
 it be possible for them to do so at all. 
 
 In this way ISTapoleon, in the beginning of his 
 career, rushed from the maritime Alps, and fell like a 
 mountain torrent upon the Austro-Sardinian army, 
 
54: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 commanded by Beaulieu and Colli, who had commit- 
 ted the fault of spreading out their forces in a long 
 line, with the expectation of enveloping their young 
 adversary. Colli was first beaten at several points ; 
 Beaulieu's turn came next, and from that time the two 
 armies were so entirely separated, that one of the gen- 
 erals, desiring to cover Turin, retreated towards that 
 city, whilst the other fell back upon Milan without 
 attempting to rejoin his colleague. Colli was forced 
 to accept such terms as the victor chose to give ; Beau- 
 lieu could only stop his retrograde movement under 
 the walls of Mantua. 
 
 But if the hostile army is concentrated, an attempt 
 may be made to advance upon him along two lines 
 towards his flanks, which will induce him to divide 
 his forces in order to meet this double attack. Then 
 the two corps, which have been separated only tem- 
 porarily, with a view of immediately effecting a re- 
 union, will move towards each other, and make a com- 
 bined attack against the nearest of the two portions 
 of the opposing army. It readily appears that such 
 movements may be attempted only when the topogra- 
 phy of the country favors, and to some extent suggests 
 them. For example: a general, having his army 
 covered by a river, need have no alarm at seeing his 
 adversary appear opposite in the interval between his 
 two corps, when he can make a rapid flank movement 
 by means of roads along the river. In this case he 
 may, with no great danger, pass to the right and left, 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 55 
 
 in order to cause uneasiness to the enemy at two dis- 
 tant points. If the enemy weakens his centre to re-en- 
 force the wings, the general may make a rapid and 
 concealed night march, hurry back and pass the river, 
 using temporary bridges for the purpose, for which 
 the materials should all have been prepared in ad- 
 vance, and as secretly as possible. The river once 
 crossed, he has the interior position ; activity and 
 bravery must accomplish what remains to prevent the 
 separated corps of the enemy from effecting a junction, 
 and they are thus forced to operate on exterior lines. 
 Here we see the importance of making a good use of 
 time, in order to concentrate, pass the river, and beat 
 in succession the fractions of the army between which 
 we have fortunately succeeded in interposing our own. 
 Time is all-important in war ; often an hour lost can- 
 not be regained ; in one hour we may be anticipated 
 upon the decisive point; in one hour we may be over- 
 whelmed by superior forces suddenly assembled, or we 
 may let slip advantages which fortune grants only to 
 activity and boldness. 
 
 The preceding remarks prove that if a frontier is 
 attacked on several points, the defensive army should 
 not be divided into the same number of equal corps, 
 because the resistance will be feeble at every point ; 
 but the different attacks should be met by small corps, 
 placed in observation chiefly, while the principal mass 
 is kept at some convenient point, in order to fall upon 
 a single one of the attacking armies when separated 
 
56 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 from the others. Suppose we take the case of 80,000 
 men being called upon to resist 120,000, divided into 
 three equal masses of 40,000 each ; if the defensive 
 army is divided into three equal corps, each will con- 
 tain about 26,000 men, and consequently there will be 
 an inferiority of force at every point. If, instead of 
 that arrangement, each of the advancing armies is met 
 by a simple corps of observation of 12,000 to 15,000 
 men, they will be able to delay the enemy's march, 
 and there will remain a central mass of 35,00.0 to 40,000 
 men, which, b eing united to one of the corps of observa- 
 tion, will form an army of about 50,000 men, and this 
 may defeat the enemy, all other things being equal. 
 
 When the disparity of force is still greater, every 
 effort must be exerted to be superior in numbers upon 
 some point ; but if that cannot be done, and it is some- 
 times impracticable, the rule must still be followed of 
 concentrating as large a force as possible to meet the 
 enemy. Then the struggle is to be prolonged by the 
 development of the greatest attainable vigor and ac- 
 tivity, and by skilfully using all the topographical 
 advantages of the country. Napoleon, in the war in 
 France, gave a striking example of the effectiveness 
 of central manoeuvres ; he fought triple his forces for 
 four months. He moved his reserves from point to 
 point with marvellous rapidity. One day he fought a 
 battle in one place, and the next he was twenty-five 
 or thirty miles distant, marching to attack another 
 enemy, whom he astonished by the exhibition of so 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 57 
 
 much resolution and celerity of movement. Csesar, 
 when surrounded in the middle of Gaul by nations in 
 insurrection, extricated himself from his critical posi- 
 tion by similar movements. He was at every point 
 where danger called ; he gave the Gauls neither time 
 nor means of uniting ; he fought them successively, 
 and beat them in detail. A few weeks sufficed to 
 finish that remarkable campaign. 
 
 The study of the Commentaries of this great cap- 
 tain is one of the most instructive that can be recom- 
 mended to young officers. Almost every page exem- 
 plifies the application of strategical principles, which, 
 as has been remarked, are the same at all times and 
 in all places. 
 
 Retreats. In retrograde, as in forward movements, 
 the simple line is the best, as by using it the mass of 
 the force is always in hand to oppose the enemy. 
 What are called divergent or eccentric retreats, which 
 are effected at the same time by several routes, with 
 the view of misleading the victor, and making him 
 uncertain as to the course to pursue, are extremely 
 dangerous. A force which is divided up to follow 
 these different directions is weak at every point ; the 
 isolated corps, affording no mutual support, are ex- 
 posed to the risk of being enveloped, thrust upon ob- 
 stacles, dispersed, destroyed, as was the case with the 
 Prussians after the battle of Jena. The victor, not 
 allowing his attention to be diverted, should follow 
 closely one of these corps and overwhelm it ; he need 
 
58 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 give himself no present concern about the others, well 
 knowing that he will have no difficulty in attending 
 to them separately at a convenient time. 
 
 An army should never be divided up except just 
 after a brilliant victory ; it is then in presence of a 
 disorganized enemy, who has lost his communications 
 and is in a state of demoralization. It may rush into 
 the midst of the scattered corps ; it need only show 
 itself and the enemy flies. In such a case no attempt 
 is too rash ; any thing is good except what is too slow 
 and methodical. But this is an exceptional case, pro- 
 duced by the circumstances of the defeat of the enemy. 
 
 Remain united, therefore, in a retreat, still more 
 than in an offensive movement, even if your motions 
 are thereby retarded, for the first consideration is 
 safety. March in as good order as circumstances per- 
 mit, or at least keep together ; still present an impos- 
 ing front to the enemy, and, if he pursues too rashly, 
 make him pay the penalty for so doing ; have the 
 boldness to turn upon him if he gives a fair opportu- 
 nity or marches negligently. More honor is some- 
 times derived from a well-conducted retreat than in a 
 battle gained, where chance often enters so largely. 
 
 Marshal Massena's retreat, in Portugal, in 1809, is 
 an excellent model for imitation. He knew how to 
 take advantage of all the accidents of the ground to 
 retard the pursuit of the English. He never gave up 
 a position until it was just about being turned, and 
 then he fell back to another at some distance further 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 59 
 
 on. His columns retired slowly, afforded mutual sup- 
 port, and kept out of each other's way, deploying and 
 righting whenever the enemy pressed them too closely, 
 or where the ground was favorable for defence. 
 Again they fell back, moving towards a common 
 point in the rear, keeping always near enough for mu- 
 tual assistance. Nothing, said an eye-witness, could 
 exceed the skill there displayed by Massena. 
 
 It is very advantageous to retreat in a direction 
 parallel to the frontier, if possible, because then an. 
 enemy gains nothing by his pursuit. This subject 
 was touched upon at the same time with accidental 
 lines of operations. If the parallel retreat is executed 
 in an enemy's country, the army lives at his expense ; 
 the. burdens of the war weigh upon him ; he is almost 
 as badly off as if he were the beaten party. If the 
 retreat is made behind the frontier, the victorious 
 army is drawn along after the other ; it is forced to 
 pass over much ground without advancing an inch 
 towards the interior ; only the borders of the country 
 are given up to the pursuing enemy, which is also in 
 a position where the flank is exposed to forces coming 
 from the interior. But the retiring army should 
 take care not to expose itself by undertaking such a 
 movement in a country where there are no obstacles, 
 for the enemy would then be able to cut it off from 
 its base. The parallel retreat should therefore not be 
 undertaken unless some respectable obstacle, as a 
 river or mountain range, favors it. 
 
60 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 If the parallel retreat is covered by a river, all the 
 bridges should be broken, for security against attack 
 on the flank. For the same reason, if it is made under 
 cover of a chain of mountains, the lateral passes should 
 be occupied until the army has gone by, and such dis- 
 position should be adopted as will permit an attack 
 in force upon those hostile bodies which, notwith- 
 standing the precaution taken, may succeed in break- 
 ing through or turning the passages, and may attempt 
 to stop the progress of the retreating army. A weak 
 corps presenting itself in this way should occasion no 
 alarm, for the danger is really on its side. 
 
 Evidently a parallel retreat can only be effectively 
 carried out on a frontier of considerable extent. If 
 such a frontier is guarded with difficulty, on account 
 of its length, it presents the advantage which has just 
 been indicated, and this is not the only one, if the 
 general knows how to adopt the active defensive sys- 
 tem. For what cannot be undertaken in the defence 
 of a narrow frontier without risk of being cut off from 
 it, or being thrown back upon the obstacles which 
 contract it while giving support to the wings, may be 
 attempted with success upon an extensive frontier 
 that presents long bases of operations. Those offen- 
 sive returns may then be made which fortune often 
 crowns with success, and those a brilliant enterprises 
 undertaken that are inspired by courage and daring. 
 
 Diversions. Combined marches. What has been 
 thus far said to demonstrate the necessity of concen- 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 61 
 
 tration of forces and of keeping united, proves also 
 that diversions, combined movements, detachments, 
 are operations that generally cannot be approved. 
 
 A diversion is effected when a corps is sent to a 
 distance to operate independently of the army. A 
 combined march is made when the movements of this 
 corps and of the army have a mutual relation, and the 
 same general object in view. In each case the sepa- 
 rate corps forms a detachment. 
 
 Diversions are dangerous, because the army is weak- 
 ened by just so many men as are employed that way ; 
 they withdraw the attention of the commander-in- 
 chief from the main object ; they increase the chances 
 of accidents ; they complicate events, multiply juris- 
 dictions which may lead to clashing of orders, and 
 they are almost always a source of disaster. The 
 army, if victorious, can only gain a partial success, 
 and can with difficulty profit by it; if, on the con- 
 trary, it is defeated, it is exposed to the danger of total 
 ruin, since it can receive no support from the corps so 
 unfortunately detached. However, there is nothing 
 absolutely fixed in the difficult science of war ; there 
 is 110 rule without numerous exceptions. Cases arise, 
 therefore, in which diversions are not only justifiable, 
 but necessary. For example, a formidable position is 
 to be carried by force, and it can only be done by at- 
 tracting the enemy's attention in another direction ; 
 it then becomes necessary to detach a body of troops, 
 more or less numerous, according to circumstances, 
 
62 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 who may make a circuit for the purpose of occupying 
 commanding heights, or threatening the enemy's line 
 of retreat. These cases frequently occur in moun- 
 tainous countries ; a detachment then becomes a ne- 
 cessity, the only alternative being the failure to accom- 
 plish the object in view ; but it should be so regulated 
 that its absence should be as short as possible, and, as 
 soon as circumstances permit, there must be a return 
 to the observance of the principle which requires unity 
 of action and concentration of forces. Combined 
 marches and diversions are much less dangerous in 
 mountainous countries than elsewhere, because it is 
 difficult for the enemy to interpose himself between 
 the columns. The separate corps find in every valley 
 contracted spaces where their wings are supported, 
 and they are in no danger of being enveloped ; and 
 sometimes it would be even more dangerous than use- 
 ful for large bodies to be held together. In such a 
 case, each of the separate corps should be strong 
 enough to defend the valley in which it is operating, 
 and to keep open its communications to the rear. The 
 rule is here violated only in form and not in reality, 
 since there is no more subdivision than the ground 
 requires; the different corps are not exposed to be 
 forced from their positions, and there is ample oppor- 
 tunity for reunion by the roads in rear. General Le- 
 cointe gave a fine example of such marches when he 
 attacked the Saint Gothard, in 1799. Upon that oc- 
 casion, in all the valleys occupied by the French, they 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 63 
 
 were in sufficient force to defend them even against 
 a sudden attack of very superior numbers. That is 
 the whole secret. 
 
 A diversion is allowable when the forces in hand 
 are greatly superior to the enemy's, and there is diffi- 
 culty experienced in subsisting them together. Skill 
 is then shown in making such a division of the 
 troops as will permit a corps to be moved against the 
 flanks or the communications of the enemy while a 
 force equal to his is presented in front; diversions 
 may then be made in the provinces which are poorly 
 guarded, or lukewarm in their allegiance, or where 
 insurrection may be excited ; troops may be unex- 
 pectedly sent to the capital or the richest cities, to 
 levy contributions, &c. The detached corps should 
 then act vigorously, make forced marches in order to 
 multiply itself in the eyes of the enemy, cause him 
 very great uneasiness or inflict a real blow. Indeci- 
 sion or vacillation on the part of the commander of 
 the hostile army may induce a diversion. Except in 
 these cases, it is much better to resist the temptation 
 of diversions ; it is always safest. 
 
 When diversions are condemned, it is to be under- 
 stood that those are not referred to which may change 
 the whole face of the war, or consist in an army's 
 abandonment of its own country to the enemy in 
 order to carry the war into his. They are altogether 
 different from other diversions; the army remains 
 united, and moves as a whole to the attainment of a 
 
64 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 single well-determined object. Such resolutions bear 
 the true impress of genius, and, far from being blama- 
 ble, are worthy of praise, no matter how they may 
 result ; for a man of spirit can attempt nothing more 
 honorable for the salvation of his country after hav- 
 ing tried in vain all ordinary means. Agathocles, 
 king of Syracuse, was besieged by the Carthagin- 
 ians ; after exhausting all his resources in the defence 
 of the place, being upon the point of surrendering, 
 he determines boldly to pass over into Africa. He 
 leaves in Syracuse only the garrison strictly necessary 
 for its defence, takes with him his best troops, burns 
 his fleet on the coast of Africa, so as to make victory 
 a necessity, and advances towards Carthage. He 
 overwhelms the opposing army, succeeds in contract- 
 ing certain alliances, and brings the capital to the 
 brink of ruin. Syracuse was saved. Certainly this 
 was a diversion which produced a very great result ; 
 it would be a misuse of words to condemn an operation 
 having the same name, though differing so essentially 
 in character from those already referred to. 
 
 Diversions of this kind, although on a small scale, 
 may be successful when they are well conducted and 
 localities favor. It is always advantageous to do 
 what the enemy is not prepared to expect, because in 
 this way his combinations are thwarted, and he is 
 obliged to stand on the defensive instead of taking 
 the offensive. Turenne, in his last campaign, gives a 
 fine example of such a course. He was not intimi- 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 65 
 
 dated by the attack of his adversary, the celebrated 
 Montecuculi, who had crossed the Rhine ; but, tak- 
 ing no notice of his initiative, he crossed the river at 
 another point, and obliged his opponent to leave the 
 French territory in order to follow him and defend 
 his own. 
 
 We. ordinarily understand combined marches to be 
 those arranged with the intention of arriving from 
 two or more directions upon a position occupied by 
 the enemy; or taking in front and rear an army 
 which is to be attacked ; or placing it, to use the ordi- 
 nary expression, between two iires. But there is 
 nothing more influenced by chance than these eccen- 
 tric movements ; independently of the temporary 
 weakening they occasion, the smallest accident is suf- 
 ficient to lead to their failure, and upset plans appa- 
 rently perfect : a body of troops is led astray by the 
 guide, bad roads retard the march, a storm arises, a 
 swollen stream stops the column, the enemy is en- 
 countered where he was not expected ; finally, a 
 thousand accidents happen which cause the operation 
 to be unsuccessful. On the other hand, the army 
 may in the mean time have been attacked or forced to 
 retreat; it may not be at the place of rendezvous; 
 then the isolated corps is very much compromised ; it 
 is in danger of being enveloped and obliged to lay 
 down its arms. The greater the extent of these 
 eccentric movements, the more they are exposed to 
 chance, and consequently the more care is to be taken 
 
66 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 to avoid them. Thus, on a field of battle, it is a fault 
 to send a corps to the rear of an enemy to attack him 
 there, or to cut his communications, because the army 
 may be defeated while this corps is making its de- 
 tour ; but the fault is still greater when the detached 
 corps is to make a march of several days, in order to 
 reach a point of rendezvous already occupied by the 
 enemy, for success then depends on circumstances 
 that cannot be controlled. 
 
 Detachments made to effect a diversion or a com- 
 bined march, or for any other motive, are condemned 
 by all writers on the art of war. Many examples 
 may be cited to prove their danger. The Great Fred- 
 eric, usually so wise and skilful, had to repent having 
 made, near Dresden, a large detachment of 18,000 
 men, with the intention of cutting the communica- 
 tions of the Austrian army with Bohemia. The de- 
 tachment was surrounded, and fell into the enemy's 
 hands after having fought bravely against triple its 
 numbers, constantly ho Ding that the army would come 
 up to its delivery. This affair took place at Maxen, 
 in the month of October, 1759 ; it shows at once both 
 the danger of detachments and that of wishing to 
 cut the line of retreat of an army, which, although 
 beaten, is still not entirely disorganized. The detach- 
 ment, commanded by General Fink, succeeded, it is 
 true, in taking a position in rear of the Austrian ar- 
 my and closing the way, but it was not strong enough 
 to hold it. This general was certainly deserving 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 67 
 
 blame for having permitted himself to be enveloped, 
 for a force of that magnitude ought always to be able 
 to penetrate through the enveloping circle at some 
 point. Fink should have made the attempt, and he 
 would have saved a part or the whole of his detach- 
 ment. 
 
 Nearly upon the same ground, the corps of Yan- 
 damme, debouching from Pirna after the battle of 
 Dresden, in 1813, had advanced to Toplitz in Bo- 
 hemia, while the mass of the French army was still 
 in the vicinity of Dresden. This detachment experi- 
 enced at Culm the same fate as that of Frederic. 
 However, Yandamme attempted to break th rough 
 the enemy's line, and a part of his corps escaped in 
 that way. Napoleon, in sending out this detachment, 
 deprived himself of a part of his troops for the bat- 
 tle, or at least for the operations subsequent to the 
 victory and having the object of completing it ; he lost 
 10,000 or 12,000 excellent troops; and, what was worse, 
 the morale of the army was sensibly affected by this 
 check. If all the detachments referred to in history 
 were as disastrous as these, the temptation to make 
 them in presence of an enemy, unless he is entirely 
 defeated, would be overcome; but others which are 
 mentioned were entirely successful, and hence arises 
 an attraction for them which it is difficult to resist. In 
 fact, there is no more brilliant operation than cutting 
 the line of retreat of the enemy. If, however, this can 
 only be done by a division of force, it ought to bo 
 
68 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 enough for a general of prudence to know the dan- 
 ger to which he exposes himself, to cause him to re- 
 ject the idea of a diversion or of any separation of 
 the different parts of his army. 
 
 Pursuit. After a victory, the beaten corps, which 
 are separated and disorganized by defeat, should be 
 vigorously followed up ; every effort should be put 
 forth to prevent their rallying, and to take advantage 
 of their temporary weakness and discouragement. 
 There is no danger in dividing the army in order to 
 give greater mobility to the columns intrusted with 
 the pursuit, provided, however, they keep on interior 
 lines and push the enemy on diverging lines. Care 
 must be taken not to drive towards a common point 
 corps already separated, because this would be play- 
 ing directly into their hands and facilitating their ral- 
 lying. A fault of this kind lost the battle of Water- 
 loo to the French. Marshal Grouchy, who had been 
 directed to pursue the Prussians after their defeat at 
 Ligny, should have gained their right, in order to 
 separate them from the bridges of the Dyle, which 
 were their communications with the English army ; 
 instead of that, he pushed them towards Wavre, 
 where they crossed the river, and came up at the de- 
 cisive moment to the aid of their allies on the field 
 of "Waterloo. Grouchy, who should at all hazards 
 have barred the way to them, or at least have reached 
 the field of battle simultaneously with them, only 
 followed them up, and did not make his appearance 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 69 
 
 until the battle was over. Moreover, the terrible 
 cannonade said in tones of thunder that the great 
 question at issue was being decided at Waterloo, and 
 that he should hasten there with his whole corps. In 
 this memorable instance Grouchy exhibited a want 
 of skill or of resolution ; he did not know how to 
 keep the Prussians at a distance, and, after permitting 
 them to pass, he took no steps to neutralize the mate- 
 rial and moral effect necessarily produced by their 
 arrival upon the French army, which had been fight- 
 ing since noon against superior forces. 
 
 When the enemy retires in tolerable order, his corps 
 remaining united, and not presenting their flanks to 
 partial attacks, the pursuit is made by the army en 
 masse. It is necessary, however, to do something 
 more than simply follow him along the same road, be- 
 cause, as soon as he finds a defile or other favorable 
 position, he will check the pursuer, and compel the 
 use of means to dislodge him ; precious time will thus 
 be consumed, which may enable his re-enforcements to 
 arrive. It is, therefore, judicious to manoeuvre to gain 
 the flank of the enemy, while a part of the army 
 presses closely in rear. In this way he is unable to 
 take any position that cannot be turned at once, and 
 he will be forced to fall back immediately after estab- 
 lishing himself. The march of the pursuing army will 
 thus be not perceptibly retarded, and the beaten party 
 will experience the greatest difficulty in effecting a 
 reorganization of his force. General Kutusof, in the 
 
70 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 disastrous campaign of 1812, took advantage of this 
 method, called the parallel pursuit. Instead of fol- 
 lowing the same road as the French army, where he 
 would have suffered much from want of provisions, 
 and would have had continued combats with strong 
 rearguards, he moved alongside the long column of the 
 enemy, attacking whenever he could, throwing his for- 
 ces into the gaps occasioned by the length of the road, 
 by the cold, and by the sufferings of the French. This 
 wise conduct on the part of the Russian general greatly 
 increased the losses and demoralization of his enemy. 
 When the pursuing army has outstripped the en- 
 emy, there are two courses which may be taken ; either 
 to close the way, if it is sufficiently strong to brave his 
 despair, or to take a position on the flank, leaving 
 the road open. The latter is the better course, be- 
 cause it is always dangerous to impose upon any body 
 of men, weak as it may be, the necessity of conquer- 
 ing or dying. Under such circumstances, men of 
 spirit surpass themselves, and sell their lives or liber- 
 ties very dearly ; nothing is to be gained by placing 
 them in such a situation. It is then better to attack 
 such a body of troops by the flank than to bar their 
 retreat ; for they will seek rather to escape than to 
 fight ; a determination, however, which will cost them 
 dearly. A general, expecting to occupy with impu- 
 nity the path of an army or a strong detachment, 
 must have forces considerably superior, to prevent its 
 breaking through ; otherwise, he should make a bridge 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 71 
 
 of gold rather than expose himself to great loss, or 
 even to entire defeat, as was the lot of the Bavarians 
 at Hanau, when in 1813 they attempted to close the 
 way to France to Napoleon's army, which was retiring 
 after the disaster of Leipsic. 
 
 The passage of a river is always a delicate operation 
 for an army which is retiring ; the general engaged in 
 the pursuit should know how to profit by this circum- 
 stance, to make an opportune attack. The advantages 
 are evidently on his side ; he attacks with his united 
 forces an army divided by the river into two portions, 
 which cannot assist each other ; he surrounds the por- 
 tion on the same side of the river with himself, and 
 presses it upon an obstacle which should cause its de- 
 struction. Now or never he should act with the great- 
 est promptness to take possession of the bridge, the 
 only means of escape. Any hesitation under such 
 circumstances would be a fault. 
 
 Guarding a conquered country. It is not sufficient 
 to overcome the enemy at every point, but arrange- 
 ments should be made for holding the conquered 
 country. For this purpose, detachments are made of 
 sufficient strength to occupy the fortified places and 
 other military posts, to collect the taxes imposed, and 
 to keep the people in subjection. These detachments 
 weaken the army in proportion as it penetrates fur- 
 ther into the country ; whilst the defenders, concen- 
 trating in the interior, are getting stronger. A point 
 must therefore be reached where an equality will again 
 
72 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 exist, and there the struggle will recommence, the in- 
 vaders having against them all the chances which may 
 result from a defeat at a distance from the base of ope- 
 rations, and in the midst of a population ready to rise 
 in arms at the reverse of their enemies, as was done in 
 the Spanish war of Napoleon. 
 
 These inconveniences may be avoided by having the 
 active army followed up by corps, whose only duty it is 
 to guard the country. They will form an army of 
 reserve, which will remain at the distance of several 
 days' march, and will act according to special princi- 
 ples. Instead of remaining concentrated, it will ex- 
 tend itself as much as possible, in order to enlarge the 
 base of operations, to procure abundant supplies, and 
 to keep the country in subjection. The army of re- 
 serve, being weaker than the active army, and formed 
 chiefly of new soldiers, will be entirely secondary to 
 the latter, and will receive orders from the same chief; 
 properly speaking, it is but a portion of the main 
 army, which will be added to it when circumstances 
 require. 
 
 The army of reserve will follow the active army in 
 all its movements, keeping at a certain distance from 
 it ; will secure its rear, will guard the depots, and pre- 
 serve free communications with the sources of supply ; 
 will besiege or blockade the fortified places, which the 
 active army may thus neglect and pass by ; it will 
 guard and secure the line of retreat in case of disaster ; 
 will construct necessary works of fortification to im- 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. T3 
 
 prove the lines of defence, to cover the bridges and 
 secure the depots ; in a word, will do every thing the 
 active army could not do, without scattering too much 
 and delaying its march. 
 
 It is evident that such arrangements can only be 
 made when there is great superiority on the part of 
 the invaders in material and moral force. In the re- 
 verse case, far from thinking of forming an army or 
 corps of reserve in rear of the active army, all the 
 available forces should be assembled for battles ; for 
 the essential thing is to have decisive victories. When 
 these are obtained, the country is held in subjection, 
 either by re-enforcements passing through it to the 
 main army, or by detachments of the strictly minimum 
 strength consistent with safety, which, under the name 
 of movable columns, pass through the country, and 
 multiply themselves in the eyes of the inhabitants, by 
 continual marches and counter- marches. 
 
 When an army, after long fatigues, should take 
 some rest, it should be spread out for accommodation 
 in the villages, and with a view to embrace such an 
 extent of country as will furnish subsistence for men 
 and horses. This is called going into cantonments. 
 Evidently this step is only taken when the enemy is so 
 distant that there is no danger of attack from him. 
 However, the contingency of his advancing against 
 the cantonments should always be provided for, by 
 making arrangements for meeting him with a suffi- 
 cient force. A point of assembly is designated for the 
 
74: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 troops in the event of an attack, and care is taken to 
 have it so far to the rear, that the enemy may not be 
 able to reach it before them. The more advanced 
 corps retires on this point, those on the right and left 
 move towards it by flank inarches, and those in rear 
 come up like re-enforcements by forward movements. 
 Thus the concentration is effected by the shortest 
 routes. To facilitate the movements, and when the 
 cantonments are to be occupied some time, the roads 
 are repaired, new ones even are made through forests 
 and marshes, bridges are thrown over intervening 
 streams, dikes are formed across ravines, &e. : no 
 trouble or labor should be spared which contributes to 
 the safety of the army. 
 
 The cantonments occupied during winter are called 
 winter quarters. They differ from those just referred 
 to only in being of greater extent. Natural obstacles 
 should be taken advantage of to cover and secure them 
 from incursions of the enemy. They are ordinarily 
 established behind a river, which may serve as a line 
 of defence. 
 
 We here conclude what we have to say on the sub- 
 ject of strategy with the remark, that if the principles 
 of this elevated branch of the art of war are so simple 
 that any one may not only understand, but discuss 
 them, their application in practice is very difficult, 
 and requires much sagacity and tact. The problem 
 to be solved is an indeterminate one, admitting of 
 many solutions ; a thousand circumstances complicate 
 
STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS. 75 
 
 it ; the data are often, indeed always, more or less 
 uncertain ; and in many cases action must be taken 
 upon no other basis than conjecture. There are many 
 exceptions to the guiding rules. Events succeeding 
 each other rapidly ; unforeseen occurrences ; difficulties 
 in procuring information ; motives unperceived by the 
 mass of people, but imperiously influencing a com- 
 mander, oblige him to modify plans perfectly arranged. 
 If we add that time, a most essential element, almost 
 always fails, it will be understood that none but 
 superior men are capable of putting in practice this 
 science, whose principles are contained in so small a 
 compass. Let us, therefore, abstain from judging 
 unfortunate generals with too much severity. Let us 
 recollect that at the moment when they were obliged 
 to act, they were not accurately informed, either of 
 the force or the position of the enemy ; that, having 
 no certain information on this subject, they were 
 necessarily reduced to a weighing of probabilities; 
 that of many things which became perfectly well 
 known after the event, they were entirely and neces- 
 sarily ignorant ; that, if they had known them, they 
 would, doubtless, have seen as well as we what was 
 best to be done ; that, perhaps, again, the force of 
 circumstances, which is irresistible in war, has 
 obliged them to act otherwise. Let us, therefore, be 
 moderate in judging others. Let us be indulgent, or 
 rather just, towards those who are, in all probability, 
 competent to be our teachers ; let us not forget that 
 
76 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 circumstances beyond their control may have induced 
 those acts which seem to us faults, and that good 
 fortune is often at the bottom of the most glorious 
 results. 
 
COMPOSITION OF A!* AKMY. 77 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ORGANIZATION, ETC. 
 
 Art. I. Composition of an Army. 
 
 To form an army, something more is requisite than 
 a mere assemblage of men with arms in their hands ; 
 those men must be obedient to the orders of a com- 
 mander, who directs their movements, and causes them 
 all to act for the attainment of a common object. 
 Without this, an army is little more than a tumultuous 
 mob, where confusion and disorder reign supreme. 
 If the numerous individuals composing it do not obey 
 a single will, and do not act for a common object, no 
 plan can be certainly undertaken or carried out. 
 Discipline is, therefore, of prime importance to an 
 army ; an essential, indispensable condition for its 
 existence. Thus those troops which have been brought 
 to the highest state of discipline have at all periods, 
 and among all races, had the undoubted superiority. 
 By their admirable discipline, the Romans triumphed 
 over all nations, and gained the mastery of the world. 
 
 Honor is the most certain promoter of discipline, 
 especially in the militia. Punishments which are too 
 severe irritate the soldier without reforming ; they 
 should be reserved for rare cases, where, to arrest 
 mutinous disorder, it becomes necessary to use the 
 
7S PRINCIPLES OF STJKATEGY. 
 
 most powerful repressive measures. It is by using 
 persuasive means with soldiers inclined to be regard- 
 less of duty ; by treating them humanely, even when 
 punishing ; by carefully avoiding humiliating them, by 
 contemptuous and offensive language ; by seeking, on 
 the contrary, to inspire them with sentiments of patriot- 
 ism and honor, that a chief can expect to form cohorts 
 which will be magnanimous in victory and unshaken 
 in the midst of reverses. These are the only means 
 which can be relied upon to produce soldiers who may 
 be trusted in critical moments. If they are insufficient 
 to make heroes ; if enthusiasm alone is the mainspring 
 of prodigies of valor, like that at Thermopylae, we 
 may be at least sure of obtaining every thing that 
 can be expected from veteran and well-organized 
 troops. 
 
 A commander should, therefore, never use harsh 
 and contemptuous language; he should particularly 
 avoid violent reproofs of those subordinates who have 
 failed in their duties ; he is not excusable for giving 
 way to passionate expressions ; he will always congrat- 
 ulate himself for restraining his tongue ; the soldiers, 
 who are perfectly able to appreciate the offence, will 
 give him credit for his moderation, and will pass 
 their own judgment on the guilty parties, and will 
 be themselves more disposed to obedience. 
 
 But there is another extreme into which officers of 
 militia easily fall, and it must be carefully avoided. 
 It is that excessive familiarity which lowers and 
 
COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 79 
 
 throws discredit upon the individual who resorts to it, 
 and renders him contemptible in the eyes of the very 
 persons whose favor he seeks to gain. It is this 
 culpable weakness which is the means of filling the 
 ears of commanders with the talk of bad soldiers, who 
 are always indulging in grievances and complaints. 
 It is destructive of all discipline, as it seals the eyes of 
 the officers to the faults and disorders which should 
 be rigidly punished or repressed. A commander who 
 is too familiar with his soldiers, loses all control over 
 them ; he is exposed to vulgarities and want of respect 
 from those whom he has accustomed to regard him aa 
 an ordinary companion, and to speak to him as such. 
 
 The man to whom the charge of a body of soldiers 
 is intrusted, should avoid two extremes : the severity 
 which alienates, and the excessive familiarity which 
 breeds contempt. He will preserve a proper mean, 
 if he knows how to be just while not severe, and to 
 be kind to individuals while requiring rigid perform- 
 ance of duty. If no fault goes unpunished ; if general 
 good conduct and gallant deeds receive praise and 
 worthy rewards, the chief will be at once feared and 
 loved by his subordinates ; his order will be punctually 
 executed, and every effort will be, made to merit his 
 approbation. Finally, discipline will be perfect. 
 
 If it were possible to select the men of whom to 
 make up an army, great stature should not be the 
 only thing to be sought after. The Komans were not 
 a tall race, and yet what nation has equalled them in 
 
80 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 military exploits? They accomplished such great 
 results by joining to military qualities the civil virtues. 
 Strength of body, great height, courage, are doubtless 
 valuable things ; but, to make the real soldier, these 
 should be accompanied by other qualities no less 
 precious, such as sobriety, patience under privations, 
 honor, and, above all, a pure and ardent spirit of 
 patriotism. Those virtues alone are sufficient to 
 ennoble the military profession, which is too often 
 disgraced by excesses of every kind, as hurtful to the 
 nation it should protect as to the enemy who is the 
 cause or the pretext of them. Therefore, the republics 
 of ancient times exercised the greatest precautions in 
 the selection of the soldiers to whom their destinies 
 were committed. No one was admitted to the honor 
 of bearing arms in the service of the country who was 
 not directly interested in its defence. Our modern 
 institutions do not permit us to hope for so excellent 
 a composition of our armies, but something similar 
 might be attempted in the service of militia ; and, in 
 the regular army, the custom of recruiting its ranks 
 from the scum of cities might be abandoned, and 
 replaced by a military conscription, against which, it 
 is true, there has always been a great outcry ; but 
 still it presents the only means of having an army 
 filled with men whose interests are the same as those 
 of other classes of citizens. 
 
 After these preliminary remarks, which, it is 
 hoped, may not be useless, I enter upon my subject. 
 
COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 81 
 
 A great army, under the orders of a general-in- 
 chief, is composed of corps commanded by subordi- 
 nate generals, each corps containing all arms of the 
 service, that is to say, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, 
 in the proportions determined by experience. It will 
 be evident that the division of a large army into seve- 
 ral corps is absolutely necessary, in order to render 
 that huge machine capable of obedience to the various 
 impulsions it is to receive, and of assuming the various 
 forms circumstances require. 
 
 An army corps rarely contains more than 30,000 
 men, and often lower, even among nations who have 
 the greatest numbers of troops. Such a command is 
 a great burden, and few men are capable of managing 
 it creditably. 
 
 An army corps is divided into a certain number of 
 divisions of infantry and cavalry, each of which is 
 usually, in France, commanded by a general of divis- 
 ion, the army corps itself being under the orders of 
 a marshal of the empire. In the United States army 
 a division is the command of a major-general. The 
 number of divisions in an army corps is variable, de- 
 pending on the strength of the divisions and the corps. 
 The other arms, engineers and artillery, enter usually 
 by companies in the composition of an army corps. 
 If, however, there are several companies of the same 
 arms, as is usually the case for artillery, they may be 
 joined under the orders of one commander. 
 
 A division is composed of several brigades, usually 
 4* 
 
82 PRINCIPLES OF STEATEGY. 
 
 from two to four ; in the United States service each 
 is commanded by a brigadier-general. 
 
 Brigades are divided into regiments, each contain- 
 ing two or more ; regiments into two or more batta- 
 lions or squadrons, according as they are composed 
 of infantry or cavalry. We hence see that for these 
 two arms the denominations are the same, except the 
 last subdivision, which may therefore be regarded as 
 the unit in the composition of armies, and is often 
 used in expressing the strength of a corps, the num- 
 ber of battalions and squadrons it contains being 
 stated. In the United States army the artillery has 
 a nominal regimental organization. 
 
 One man could not attend to all the duties imposed 
 by the command of an army. He has, as assistants, 
 a certain number of officers who compose his staff. 
 They transmit his orders verbally or in writing ; they 
 arrange marches and encampments ; they make ex- 
 aminations of ground, and collect all possible infor- 
 mation with reference to the position and movements 
 of the enemy; they receive and communicate with 
 flags of truce, and attend to procuring spies, &c. ; 
 they make condensed reports of the state of the com- 
 mand, from the reports of its several subdivisions ; 
 they make detailed inspections of troops, quarters, 
 hospitals, &c., to be certain that every thing is in 
 good order ; they preserve the correspondence and 
 records; they give descriptions of the parts of the 
 campaign, make maps of fields of battle, supervise the 
 
COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY. 83 
 
 different services, and see to the execution of regula- 
 tions and orders ; in a word, they are the intermedia- 
 ries the general makes use of in setting in motion the 
 huge machine called an army, and causing its various 
 movements to be made in an orderly and suitable 
 manner, without interference between the several 
 parts. The great variety of details composing the 
 duties of the staff makes it necessary to divide them 
 into bureaus, and to assign special duties to each 
 bureau. The superior officer placed at their head 
 should possess the confidence of the commander ; he 
 must be made acquainted with his plans, in order to 
 co-operate fully in carrying them out ; it is his duty 
 to give his opinions freely on the plans proposed, 
 even to offer new ones if he thinks fit to do so ; but it 
 is equally incumbent upon him to throw aside his 
 own ideas when they have not been adopted, in order 
 that he may imbibe, so to speak, those of the general, 
 as the least misunderstanding between these two men 
 may lead to the gravest mishaps. Unity of ideas 
 and action is the best requisite for success. 
 
 Each army corps, division, brigade, and regiment 
 has its own staff, whose duties are similar to those of 
 the staff of an army, although, of course, more con- 
 tracted, and less important, proportionally to the body 
 of troops in question. The artillery and engineers, 
 when found in sufficient numbers, are assimilated to 
 the divisions of infantry and cavalry. They have 
 their special staffs for directing their troops, and 
 
84r PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 every thing relating to their special and appropriate 
 duties. 
 
 The administrative service of an army is usually 
 divided into several distinct departments, as : 
 
 Pay department. 
 
 Subsistence department. 
 
 Medical [These two in United States 
 
 Hospital " ) service united. 
 
 Recruiting 
 
 Clothing " ") 
 
 Barrack " I Tnese four in United States 
 
 V army combined in one, called 
 
 ^ ue * I quartermaster's department. 
 
 Transportation " j 
 
 Military justice. 
 
 These all have their employes, who swell the num- 
 bers of an army, although they do not enter the line 
 of battle. 
 
 Thus, to recapitulate, a grand army is composed of 
 several corps, which are sometimes designated as the 
 wings, the centre, the general advanced guard, the 
 general rear-guard, reserve corps, &c. Each army 
 corps is formed of several divisions, each division of 
 several brigades, each brigade of several regiments 5 
 and each regiment of several battalions or squadrons. 
 The artillery attached to different corps, is usually 
 formed into companies which serve batteries. They 
 are kept together as much as possible. Sappers, 
 miners, and pontoniers serve in companies. 
 
 An army is accompanied by a great number of car- 
 
COMPOSITION OF AN AEMY. 85 
 
 riages, for the transportation of munitions and war- 
 like equipments, provisions, money, hospital stores, 
 &c., tools, pontoons, &c., baggage, and a variety of 
 other things. All these accompaniments were aptly 
 styled by the Romans impedimenta, for m>thing em- 
 barrasses the movements of an army so much as the 
 long trains of wagons it is forced to carry with it; in 
 order to supply its various wants. It is almost super- 
 fluous to say that these should be kept down to the 
 smallest possible number, and the strictest care should 
 be taken to prevent officers and employes from carry- 
 ing with them carriages unauthorized by regulations. 
 
 The three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, 
 enter in different proportions in armies, according to 
 the nature of the country where the war is to be car- 
 ried on. In a mountainous country less cavalry is 
 necessary, for there is but little ground suitable for its 
 action ; less artillery is admissible, especially of heavy 
 calibres, because of the difficulty of transporting it. 
 In countries full of plains, the artillery and cavalry 
 should be considerably increased. The usual propor- 
 tion, in the great armies of Europe, is for the cavalry 
 to be one-fifth, and three pieces of artillery to every 
 1,000 men. Thus, an army of 100,000 men would 
 contain 20,000 horses for cavalry, and 300 cannon. 
 
 The three arms are still usually distinguished as 
 troops of the line and light troops : the first are 
 specially designed to fight in order, with closed ranks 
 the others to scour the country, harass the enemy, 
 
86 PRINCIPLES OF STBATEGY. 
 
 pursue him after victory, make prisoners, &c. It 
 would, however, be an error to suppose that these 
 light troops are never drawn up in any kind of order, 
 and never fight except as skirmishers. Such troops 
 would be a great embarrassment. It seems still ques- 
 tionable whether two distinct classes of infantry, doing 
 different duties, are necessary ; an infantry of the line 
 to fight in the ranks, and light infantry to act indi- 
 vidually. "Will it not be better to instruct all in- 
 fantry soldiers in these double duties ? A great sim- 
 plicity would be the result ; every body of troops 
 would then be able to do its own scouting and sim- 
 ilar duties ; to spread out in broken ground, and to act 
 in mass on level ground. The troops of the line would 
 no longer be heard complaining of the absence of the 
 light troops, nor the latter sometimes giving way on 
 account of their separation from the infantry of the 
 line. There would no longer be a pretext for the dif- 
 ferent corps accusing each other of want of success. 
 The infantry would then, under all circumstances, be 
 self-sustaining ; being composed of similar elements, 
 it would be able to form line of battle at pleasure, or 
 to act in dispersed order. 
 
 "When the duties are divided, one class of infantry 
 cannot dispense with the services of the other ; and if 
 by accident they are temporarily separated, there is 
 danger of loss of confidence ; because the one is un- 
 able to disperse among woods and rocks, or the other, 
 being in a level position, is unaccustomed to fighting 
 
COMPOSITION OF AN AEMY. 87 
 
 in line. It has, moreover, been observed that troops 
 of the line deteriorate in a long campaign, whilst the 
 contrary is the case with light troops ; all the infantry 
 should therefore be required to perform in turn duties 
 as light troops, and in the line of battle. Detached 
 troops engage in what is called "la petite guerre" an 
 excellent school for officers, who, in such expeditions, 
 must make use of all their faculties. Light infantry, 
 seeming more suited to these duties, are preferred for 
 them ; so that the officers of the line, perpetually at- 
 tached to their battalions, can learn nothing except 
 the less elevating part of their profession. This is a 
 very grave inconvenience, that would be avoided by 
 giving all the infantry the same instruction. And 
 certainly this would not be exacting too much of 
 soldiers, who commonly pass a life of idleness in 
 garrison, much more calculated to ruin their health 
 than excite military virtues. 
 
 Certain military officers of great merit insist, not- 
 withstanding these considerations, upon the propriety 
 of having two kinds of infantry, in order that each 
 may perform more perfectly the duty required of it, 
 and have more confidence in itself. The principal 
 strength of soldiers consisting in their own opinion of 
 themselves, the soldier of the line will behave better 
 in the closed ranks of a battalion, and the light in- 
 fantry man in an open order which allows him full 
 freedom of movement, where he can profit by his 
 skill, and take advantage of the least obstacle offering 
 
88 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 a shelter. In fact, this question cannot be treated 
 in a rigorous manner, as its solution depends upon 
 national characteristics and varying circumstances. 
 
 As to the cavalry, it is best to have several kinds, 
 in order to use profitably horses of all sizes, and to 
 take advantage of their different degrees of strength 
 and speed. Cavalry of the line, or heavy cavalry, are 
 usually mounted on the strongest horses ; light cav- 
 alry, composed of hussars, chasseurs, and lancers, 
 make use of the smallest and most active horses ; the 
 dragoons are a kind of intermediate cavalry, ma- 
 noeuvring in line with the first, or skirmishing with 
 the second. 
 
 The artillery of the line is served by men on foot, 
 and the gait, usually, is the walk or the trot of the 
 horses, in order that the men may follow. But the 
 system is now adopted of mounting the gunners 
 upon the limbers and caissons, which permits much 
 more rapid movements. Light artillery is served by 
 mounted gunners, the usual gait being the gallop ; it 
 manoeuvres with the cavalry, being able to move 
 with equal rapidity, and be supported by it. The 
 artillery of the line regulates its movements by those 
 of the infantry, and should be always supported by it. 
 Besides, there is the heavy or siege artillery, w r hich is 
 necessary for the attack and defence of fortified 
 places : it only follows the armies at a distance, or 
 remains in the parks ; it is only brought on the 
 ground when needed. 
 
FORMATION OF TROOPS. 
 
 Art. II. Formation of Troops. 
 
 Since the introduction of the musket, to the exclu- 
 sion of the rifle, in all the armies of the civilized 
 world, infantry is formed in not more than three 
 ranks, and often in two. With this formation, all 
 three ranks can use their arms at once ; with four 
 ranks it would be impracticable, because the arm is 
 too short. The men of the fourth rank would kill or 
 wound those of the first. Even in the three-rank for- 
 mation there is danger of this, especially with new 
 troops. Opinion in Europe is divided as to the rela- 
 tive advantage of the formation in two or three ranks, 
 and practice in European armies is also variable. The 
 English and Swiss adopt the former. Among some of 
 the people who use the three-rank formation, the 
 third is specially intended for duty as skirmishers, so 
 that there are really but two ranks firing in line. 
 
 The advantages and disadvantages of the two 
 methods balance each other ; examples of success at- 
 tending the use of both may be cited. The English 
 are certainly firm, notwithstanding their shallow 
 order ; the French deemed it expedient to form in 
 two ranks at the battle of Leipsic, where they were 
 obliged to occupy a very great extent of ground in 
 order to fight against vastly superior numbers. Na- 
 poleon, in his Memoirs, seems to favor this formation, 
 but proposes to increase greatly the number of file- 
 
90 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 closers, really making a third rank, whose duty it is 
 not to use their arms, but to preserve order in the ranks. 
 To use the third rank in firing, the first must kneel, 
 and this movement requires a command for its execu- 
 tion. Firing at the word of command is rarely prac- 
 ticable when the action is in progress, for the voices 
 of the commanders are drowned in the noise of can- 
 non, drums, cries of the wounded, &c. ; the excite- 
 ment of the combat makes it impossible for soldiers 
 to give that cool and continued attention, without 
 which a large number cannot discharge and reload 
 their pieces together. The firing necessarily becomes 
 " by file" which can only be executed by the first two 
 ranks. The third rank thus becomes useless in firing, 
 while one more man in each file is exposed to each bullet 
 of the enemy. An attempt has been made, in the 
 French service, to make the men of the third rank load 
 their muskets and pass them to those in the second, who 
 may thus fire twice in rapid succession, and the firing 
 is in theory more actively kept up than in the two- 
 rank formation. Experience has demonstrated the 
 fallacy of this expectation, as confusion is produced in 
 exchanging arms between the second and third ranks, 
 loss of time takes place, and there is, moreover, a re- 
 pugnance on the part of the soldier to part with his own 
 and to use the musket of another. This repugnance is 
 praiseworthy, for the soldier should cling to his mus- 
 ket, as did the Spartan to his shield. He should 
 never be permitted to lose it ; and if he cannot bring 
 
FORMATION OF TROOPS. 91 
 
 the whole of it from the field of battle, he should be 
 obliged to exhibit pieces of it. 
 
 The losses of troops drawn up in two ranks, whether 
 in line or column, are less when exposed to artillery ; 
 they occupy with equal numbers a greater extent of 
 ground, which is very advantageous for outflanking 
 the wings of the enemy, or for resting their own on 
 obstacles which would necessarily be beyond the line 
 if formed in three ranks. The first being able to occu- 
 py the same ground with fewer men than the second, 
 stronger reserves may be held in hand, in order to act 
 at the decisive point and gain the victory. Finally, 
 troops formed in two ranks march with greater ease, 
 and, for the same reason, are more quickly instructed 
 and formed. 
 
 If there is a shock to be received, a charge of cav- 
 alry to be repelled, the formation of three ranks has 
 undoubted advantage, because the third rank supports 
 the other two and gives them confidence ; its fire may 
 be very effective against the horsemen in the later 
 moments of the charge, when the men of the first two 
 ranks, having come to the position of " charge lay- 
 onets" are bracing themselves to receive the shock. 
 At this movement they naturally lower the head and 
 lean forward a little, which diminishes their height 
 somewhat, so that those who are behind are able to 
 discharge their pieces without injury to those in front, 
 particularly as it is necessary to aim high in order to 
 strike men on horseback. 
 
92 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Cavalry, all other things being equal, have a much 
 better chance of success against a battalion which is 
 very shallow and extended greatly, than against one 
 drawn up with a narrow front and with deep files. 
 For this reason a small square is much safer than a 
 large one : a little body of a few infantry often re- 
 sists all the efforts of a numerous cavalry, because 
 combined attacks are impossible against so small an 
 object, which can be only assailed by a few horsemen 
 at once, and these may be always driven off, if the 
 infantry are cool and manage their lire skilfully. 
 
 When an action is prolonged and losses occur, gaps 
 are formed in the line of battle, which, being con- 
 stantly increased, may eventually compromise the 
 safety of the troops, unless measures are taken to fill 
 them ; this effect is specially to be apprehended in 
 two-rank squares, on account of the diminution of fire. 
 The third rank may be very usefully employed in 
 closing these gaps. It is really the first reserve of the 
 combatants, and, viewing it in this light, a commander 
 would be wise who, when the fight is not at close 
 quarters, should place his third rank behind an undu- 
 lation of ground, either standing, or sitting, or lying 
 down, to prevent useless exposure. The third rank 
 may be used in carrying off the wounded, whose suf- 
 ferings and cries produce a demoralizing effect, which 
 should be avoided if possible. Finally, if, during the 
 contest, it is necessary to re-enforce the skirmishers, or 
 to send suddenly a detachment upon the flank of the 
 
FORMATION OF TROOPS. 93 
 
 enemy, or to some point important to be occupied, it 
 may be done, without disarranging the plan of battle, 
 by employing the men of the third rank. Marshal 
 Saxe condemned battalions too much extended, on 
 the ground that they were not firm, and were good 
 for nothing but firing, which, he said, was never de- 
 cisive. 
 
 If the battalion is considered by itself, it is evident 
 that where it exceeds certain limits it marches and . 
 manoeuvres badly, either on account of the difficulty 
 of moving its parts together, or of the impossibility of 
 hearing the voice of its chief from one end to the other. 
 A long line always wavers, and is more or less dis- 
 jointed when inarching in line of battle, which, of all 
 the methods of gaining ground towards the enemy, is 
 the most natural and simple. A battalion of moderate 
 extent can march more easily and for a longer time 
 in good order. The same number of officers is 
 necessary for a weak battalion as a strong one, and 
 they are more expensive for the state than soldiers. 
 Two armies, one of 90,000 men, formed in three ranks, 
 and the other of 60,000 men, in two ranks, would re- 
 quire the same number of commissioned and non-com- 
 missioned officers. Grade would be more valuable, 
 and the subordinate officers would have greater im- 
 portance, in the first case than in the second, because 
 they would be proportion ably less numerous. Any 
 thing depreciates in value as it becomes common. 
 
 In a very mountainous country, like Switzerland, 
 
94: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 for example, there are special reasons for preferring 
 the formation in three ranks, which are drawn from 
 the nature of the country itself. This country, even 
 in the most open portions, is cut up by woods, hills, 
 rivulets ; there is seldom found sufficient space for 
 deploying several battalions ; there is no level ground 
 not flanked by woods or other natural obstacles. 
 Hence it is better for the battalions to have less extent 
 and more solidity, in order to be less disordered in a 
 broken country, and to close the open spaces better. 
 These are in fact the only places where the enemy 
 can penetrate the only points where attacks of 
 cavalry are to be met. The w^oods and broken ground 
 may always be sufficiently defended by riflemen and 
 skirmishers. Firing should not be the only depend- 
 ence of the battalion ; every thing else should not be 
 sacrificed to facility of firing; care should also be 
 taken to have the lines firm, and to provide means of 
 giving the men that self-reliance without which they 
 cannot be expected to offer a prolonged resistance to 
 the attacks of troops that may be better disciplined 
 and more numerous. 
 
 It has been proposed to retain all the advantages 
 of the battalion formation in two ranks, for firing and 
 executing certain movements with convenience, and 
 to give also, in part at least, and under certain cir- 
 cumstances, the advantages of three ranks. This is 
 to be effected by keeping two or more companies of 
 a battalion specially for skirmishers, and when not 
 
FORMATION OF TEOOPS. 95 
 
 thus engaged to place them in rear of the flank com- 
 panies, in order to strengthen these points of the line, 
 and protect them from attack by the rear or flank. 
 If the battalion has a powerful attack to resist, these 
 companies may form a third rank. In a simple square, 
 they may also furnish a third rank to the four fronts, 
 or form a reserve, to be moved to any point the enemy 
 may threaten. In moving against the enemy in 
 columns of companies or divisions, these companies 
 may form small columns on the flanks of the main 
 column, keeping abreast with the last division or a 
 little in rear of it ; they will thus serve to enlarge the 
 breach which may have been made. These auxiliary 
 columns may then turn to the right and left, taking 
 in flank the adjacent parts of the enemy's line, if it 
 still remains firm next the breach ; finally, they may 
 pursue in open order. 
 
 A formation in an even number of divisions is 
 advantageous, as it permits a battalion to be divided 
 into two equal half battalions, and each part to be 
 manoauvred separately, if necessary. The proper 
 extent of front to give a battalion in line is deter- 
 mined by the condition that the voice of its chief 
 at one end may be easily heard at the other. This 
 will fix the proper number of men for a battalion. A 
 suitable front is found to be about one hundred and 
 fifty yards, and, if in two ranks, the battalion will 
 contain about six hundred men. It is an excellent 
 plan to have each division formed of a single com- 
 
96 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 pany, because, in actual engagements, the battalion is 
 manoeuvred in column of divisions much oftener 
 than in company, and at such times it is very advan- 
 tageous to have the men under the immediate orders 
 of their own captains. When a division is formed of 
 two companies, one captain is in the ranks, and a whole 
 company under the orders of a man with whose voice 
 the men are not familiar. This is a frequent cause of 
 confusion at moments when it is most to be avoided. 
 Cavalry is drawn up in two ranks, which are quite 
 as many as are necessary, and even then the men of 
 the rear rank cannot use their arms effectively. Con- 
 sidering this point alone, it would seem that cavalry 
 should be drawn up in but one rank ; but the men of 
 the second rank are by no means useless ; for they 
 support, press forward, and excite to greater effort 
 those of the front rank. Gaps in a line of cavalry are 
 even more dangerous than in a line of infantry, and 
 the men of the rear rank are at hand to fill such open- 
 ings. If we could expect to determine the effect of 
 the shock of a body of cavalry, as in a problem of me- 
 chanics, by multiplying the mass by the velocity, we 
 would conclude that the formation of cavalry ought 
 to be deeper than it is actually, since the mass would 
 be increased by making the number of ranks greater, 
 the front remaining unchanged. But such a hope 
 would not be realized ; for no cavalry, however well 
 it may be drilled, will form a compact mass at the end 
 of a charge. The boldest men and the faster horses 
 
FORMATION OF TROOPS. 97 
 
 get in advance, and the wounded, timid, and badly 
 mounted men fall behind, so that the shock, if a col- 
 lision takes place, is rather that of successive and sepa- 
 rate individuals than of the whole body. It appears, 
 therefore, that two ranks are enough. The squadron 
 cannot have so great a front as a battalion, because it 
 would be less easily managed, and the voice of its 
 commander would be drowned by the rattling of arms 
 and the noise of horses. Experience has shown that 
 it should have about half the length of the battalion, 
 or about seventy-five yards. Allowing, as is usual, a 
 yard to a man, the squadron will consist of one hun- 
 dred and fifty men and horses ; and if the roll contains 
 more men, it will be with a view of keeping the ranks 
 filled to the proper number, and making allowance 
 for absentees, who are generally numerous, since a 
 horseman is a compound animal, consisting of horse 
 and rider, and rendered unserviceable by accident to 
 either of its parts ; moreover, horsemen are more used 
 for duties out of their ranks than infantry. 
 
 For artillery the unit is the battery, consisting usually 
 of four or six pieces. It is best to have the pieces in 
 each battery of the same kind and calibre, as there is 
 always liability to confusion and delay from mixing 
 different sorts of ammunition. As a general rule, it is 
 best to have the corresponding parts alike in any mili- 
 tary body, and this applies to the personnel as well as 
 to the materiel. Eeplacements of disabled parts is 
 thus facilitated. In line of battle each piece of artil- 
 5 
 
98 
 
 PKINCIILES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 lery of large calibre should be allowed about fifteen 
 yards, and twelve for smaller. These distances are 
 necessary for the free passage of limbers and caissons. 
 Each piece should have its own caisson. The line of 
 caissons is about fifty yards behind the pieces. This 
 distance may be varied, and advantage should be taken 
 of inequalities of the ground to cover the caissons. 
 
ETJLES TO BE OBSERVED IN MARCHES. 99 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MARCHES AND MANCEUVRES. 
 
 THE business of an army is to march and to fight. 
 By rapid and wisely directed marches a skilful gene- 
 ral prepares the way for a successful campaign, reaps 
 the fruits of victory, or escapes from pursuing and 
 superior forces. The subject of marches forms, there- 
 fore, a very important part of the art of war. 
 
 Article I. Rules to be observed in Ufareliei. 
 
 Marches are of two classes those made near an 
 enemy, and those made at a distance from him. In 
 the latter, convenience and comfort are greatly con- 
 sidered ; each man may have ample room, so as not to 
 be crowded by his neighbors ; the road may be given 
 up to the carriages of different kinds, so as to allow 
 free passage ; and the soldiers may march on the sides. 
 Care should be taken not to move very large bodies 
 together, in order that the troops arriving in a town 
 may be more easily lodged and fed. When too many 
 men are accumulated in a town, it is sometimes very 
 difficult to provide promptly for their wants ; those 
 who. are obliged to wait have just cause for complaint, 
 
100 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 and disturbances may take place. It is sometimes irn 
 possible to avoid these delays and discomforts, and 
 soldiers should therefore learn to bear them patiently 
 This is the touchstone which proves the good soldier. 
 There is more merit in patiently enduring the incon- 
 veniences necessarily attending the painful trade of 
 war than in braving death in battle. 
 
 When the body of troops to be moved to any point 
 is very large, it should be divided up into detach- 
 ments, and these started successively at intervals of a 
 day or more, that they may be distributed along the 
 road. If two roads lead to the same point, part of the 
 troops will be sent by each, the time being so regu- 
 lated that they will arrive successively at the point of 
 junction. The columns should never cross each other, 
 because a tiresome delay will always be caused to that 
 one which must wait for the other to pass. Dangerous 
 contests may even result from such meetings, if the 
 staff officers who regulate the march are not very 
 careful to arrange the manner in which the columns 
 shall pass each other. Unless specially ordered to do 
 so, no column will halt to allow another to pass it. 
 
 Soldiers cannot make an entire march without halt- 
 ing, especially when the distance is considerable. A 
 halt at mid-day is necessary, and should be long 
 enough to give men time to rest themselves and take 
 some food. It is, moreover, right to halt a few min- 
 utes in each hour, and to allow no leaving of ranks at 
 other times. A few trusty men should always be in 
 
RULES TO BE OBSERVED 
 
 rear, to gather up stragglers and prevent marauding. 
 An early hour in the morning should be taken for 
 starting, especially in summer ; but men should not 
 be deprived of necessary sleep ; that between midnight 
 and three or four o'clock is found to be best and most 
 refreshing. Night marches are bad for the health of 
 troops, as has been ascertained by direct experiment ; 
 they are very fatiguing to mind and body, and there 
 is more straggling than in daylight. 
 
 For inarches made in an enemy's country other ar- 
 rangements are necessary. In such cases comfort and 
 convenience must be sacrificed to security ; necessary 
 restrictions and labors must be borne in order to avoid 
 all danger of surprise, and to be always ready to 
 receive an attack. Negligence in this respect is inex- 
 cusable ; for the enemy may at any time make his 
 appearance when least expected. 
 
 The first rule is to march in column, and with as 
 wide a front as possible, in order to have the column 
 as short as possible, so that in case of attack it may 
 be most speedily concentrated. If the object of the 
 movement is a simple change of position, to effect an 
 assemblage or concentration of troops before coming 
 to blows ; if, in a word, the march is not within the 
 limits of the enemy's operations, some freedom may 
 be allowed in the ranks, and the column may march 
 at full distance. It should, however, be closed to 
 half distance when the march is a manoeuvre, that is 
 to say, one of those movements which precede a battle, 
 
102 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 and are intended to concentrate the troops upon the 
 important point, to secure the communications, to 
 cover weak points, to deceive the enemy, to distract 
 his attention, to divide his forces, to threaten his line 
 of retreat, to make him uneasy about his depots, &o. 
 These manoeuvre-marches are so called because they 
 are manoeuvres made on a large scale, out of range of 
 cannon, and have not for their object a simple gain 
 of ground, as is the case with an ordinary march, but 
 to reach a suitable position on the field where a battle 
 may follow. They are executed in the immediate 
 neighborhood of the enemy, and really under his ob- 
 servation. They should therefore be characterized by 
 perfect order and great celerity. 
 
 "When the battle is imminent, the troops should bo 
 prepared for rapid deployment, and formed in close 
 column, by divisions, on the road, or at the side of it. 
 This may be called the order preparatory to battle. 
 There is but a single case where full distances should 
 be kept in a manoeuvre-march, and this is when the 
 flank is exposed to the enemy. A column at full 
 distance may form line of battle by a simple wheel of 
 its subdivisions. These flank movements are always 
 dangerous, and should be avoided as much as possible. 
 Generally, the head of the column reaches the battle- 
 field first, and the propriety of closing it up is mani- 
 fest, with a view of facilitating and hastening the 
 deployments. 
 
 A column on the march will always be preceded by 
 
RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MARCHES. 103 
 
 an advanced guard, which searches and explores the 
 ground, opens or repairs the roads, if necessary, defeats 
 the attempts of the enemy to surprise the column, or 
 draw it into ambuscades, &c. It gives warning of 
 the approach of the enemy, receives the first attack, 
 and thus secures the main body time to prepare for 
 battle. The advanced guard is preceded by small 
 detachments. Other small bodies, called flankers, are 
 sent off to the right and left, to pass around villages 
 and clumps of trees where the enemy might be con- 
 cealed, around hills bordering the road, behind hedges, 
 through ravines, fields of grain, &c. The column has, 
 in addition, its own flankers, especially when it is 
 isolated, for something may escape the advanced party. 
 It is far better to take too many precautions, than too 
 few. 
 
 The Duke of Yendome was more fortunate than 
 prudent, when, at Luzara, in 1702, he came near 
 pitching his camp in presence of Prince Eugene's 
 whole army, which was in battle array, concealed 
 behind a dike. His presence was not at all suspected, 
 BO that the advanced guard, having reached the 
 ground, did not move further to examine the neigh- 
 borhood, and the pitching of the tents, with its at- 
 tending confusion, was about to begin, when an 
 accident saved Vendome's army. An aide-de-camp, 
 whose duty it was to establish the camp-guard, 
 thought it advisable to place a sentinel on the dike, 
 which was very near. Reaching that point, he dis- 
 
104: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 covered the infantry of Eugene lying concealed behind 
 the dike, waiting the signal for the attack ; while the 
 cavalry was in line of battle at a greater distance. 
 He immediately gave the alarm, and the troops, 
 who had not broken their ranks, were able to repulse 
 the attack. Ten minutes later, Yendome would have 
 lost his army and his reputation. 
 
 In the wars of the French Revolution, an inex- 
 perienced republican general had under his command 
 a long column of infantry, which was moving on a 
 road bordered by hedges. There were no advanced 
 guard, no flankers, and much negligence in the 
 column, which was much elongated. Suddenly the 
 Vendean chief, Charette, fell upon the flank of the 
 column, cut it through, and dispersed it in a moment. 
 Bravery was of no avail in such circumstances, and 
 there was nothing to be done but to escape by flight. 
 Such was the result of ignorance or imprudence upon 
 the part of a commanding officer. A rear-guard is 
 also necessary to close the march, prevent the dis- 
 orderly conduct of stragglers, and guard against 
 unexpected attack in the rear. The main body is thus 
 surrounded by detachments which look to its security. 
 
 Wagons should not be mixed with the troops, 
 because, in an accidental engagement, they would 
 seriously interfere with the prompt assembling of the 
 different corps ; and, in all cases, they make the 
 column unnecessarily long. The vehicles, therefore, 
 should move in a compact and orderly manner, behind 
 
RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MARCHES. 105 
 
 the troops, in two files, if the roads are sufficiently 
 wide, in order to reduce, by half, the space they 
 occupy, which is always considerable. The baggage 
 should have an escort, to protect it from the partisans 
 who may slip in upon the rear of an army. 
 
 Working-men should be distributed at the head of 
 every column, to level obstacles, fill up ditches and 
 ruts, repair bridges, or strengthen them when they are 
 weak, &c. By pursuing this course the march of a 
 column may sometimes be made less rapid, but never 
 entirely stopped. These workmen should have with 
 them several wagons loaded with tools, timbers, ropes, 
 and other necessary articles. 
 
 Another thing, seemingly of little, but really of 
 great importance, which demands attention, is the 
 regulation of the pace at the head of the column, to 
 avoid its becoming elongated too much. The poorest 
 marchers, or the heaviest troops, may be placed 
 in front, and, for the same reason, ox-teams may be 
 put before the other vehicles. When the enemy is 
 still distant, an interval may be left between the 
 various corps of which the column is composed ; by 
 this means the fluctuations of one are not transmitted 
 to the others, and each moves with almost as much 
 comfort as if alone. Otherwise, every man in rear is 
 obliged to halt when, for any cause, those in front of 
 him do so, and then he must quicken his pace to re- 
 gain his proper distance. This irregularity of pace is 
 found to be very fatiguing. It may be greatly avoided 
 
106 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 by adopting the plan indicated, but in manoeuvre- 
 marches, and whenever there is danger of an attack, 
 distances must be carefully preserved. 
 
 Ordinary marches are from fifteen to twenty miles. 
 The latter distance is a long inarch, but sometimes 
 circumstances require a column to get over twenty- 
 five miles, and even more, at the risk of leaving many 
 men and animals behind. 
 
 Several days' rest should always follow forced 
 marches, else the army will melt away in a little while, 
 for the human body is not made of iron. At a deci- 
 sive moment, and to obtain important results, a 
 general may, and should, demand of his troops an 
 extraordinary effort ; but it should be of short du- 
 ration. Two or three forced marches in succession 
 are all that should be expected from troops inured 
 to fatigue; but raw troops cannot stand even so much. 
 
 Infantry inarches about two and a half miles an 
 hour, not counting halts ; so that, taking every thing 
 into consideration, ten hours are necessary for passing 
 over twenty miles, the march being in column. 
 Cavalry makes about three miles an hour at a walk, 
 and five miles at a moderate trot ; as this gait 
 may be held for several hours, it may, if necessary, 
 pass over the space of an ordinary day's march in 
 three or four hours ; but forced marches are even 
 more hurtful to cavalry than to infantry. 
 
 In marches near the enemy, the halt at mid-day is 
 taken advantage of to cook. When men and horses 
 
KULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MARCHES. 107 
 
 have eaten something, they can with more ease get 
 over the remaining part of the march, and have suffi- 
 cient strength to fight, if an engagement occurs in the 
 afternoon. Unless there are orders to the contrary, 
 or special circumstances interfere, this halt should be 
 long enough to give time for cooking. 
 
 The commissaries should be careful to have provi- 
 sions ready at the end of each march, and, with this 
 end in view, should have the column followed by 
 animals and wagons loaded with provisions, procured 
 by purchase, and by requisitions on the inhabitants, if 
 necessary. These resources may sometimes fail, and 
 it is a good plan to require each soldier to carry pro- 
 visions sufficient to last him several days, prohibiting 
 them, as far as possible, from eating unless when it is 
 really necessary. In the Russian campaign, Marshal 
 Davoust had arranged the knapsacks of his men so 
 that they could carry in them four biscuits of a pound 
 weight, and under each a little bag of flour weighing 
 ten pounds, besides a cloth bag suspended from the 
 shoulder, and containing two loaves, of three pounds 
 weight. The entire load was nearly sixty pounds 
 but little less than that habitually carried by the 
 Bom an soldier. Whether the troops are in quarters 
 or bivouacs, they should never break ranks until the 
 detachments, whose duty it is, have examined the 
 neighborhood, and the outposts are established around 
 the quarters or bivouacs. Security is the fruit of 
 vigilance. Every body of troops, however numerous 
 
108 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 it may be, should take these precautionary measures, 
 not only at night, but at all halts. 
 
 Scouting Parties. No march should be made in 
 an enemy's country without a careful examination of 
 the ground. In an unobstructed country this duty 
 will be performed generally by mounted soldiers, but 
 in a broken country by footmen. The scouting par- 
 ties move in front and on the flanks. It is useless to 
 have them composed of many persons, as their duty 
 is not to fight, but to learn every thing they can. The 
 duty is, moreover, a very fatiguing one, and should 
 not recur too frequently. 
 
 The scouting parties precede the advanced guard. 
 The parties on the flanks are called flankers. They 
 move at two or three hundred paces from the ad- 
 vanced guard, of which and of each other they never 
 lose sight. For this purpose the leading detachment 
 sends out three small groups, one in front on the road, 
 and two others on the right and left. Each group 
 keeps together, or at least the members of it should 
 always be in sight and hearing of each other. The 
 flankers are sometimes obliged to move at a consider- 
 able distance from the road, in order to examine the 
 country w r ell. Each detachment would, in such a 
 case, surround itself with small groups, one in front, 
 and the others towards the enemy. When the coun- 
 try is much covered by forests, &c., the number of 
 scouting parties must be increased. 
 
 Three men are enough for a group, the senior com- 
 
RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MARCHES. 109 
 
 manding the remaining two. They do not use their 
 arms unless they fall into an ambuscade, or they are 
 on the point of being taken, and then they must give 
 notice of the enemy's presence in the only way which 
 remains. We may here call to mind the noble devo- 
 tion of the Chevalier d'Assas, who, having fallen into 
 the hands of a hostile patrol, and being threatened 
 with death if he uttered a sound, cried out at the top 
 of his voice, " This way, Auvergne ; here are the ene- 
 my !" He fell, covered with wounds, but he gave 
 the alarm arid saved his comrades. 
 
 The scouting parties endeavor to cover themselves 
 under hedges, woods, thickets, or heights along the 
 road, to see as much as possible without being seen. 
 As soon as they discover a body of the enemy, they 
 halt and conceal themselves, while one of the number 
 gives the information to the commanding officer of 
 the detachment to which they belong. They will 
 keep him informed of every thing more they learn, 
 and all without noise. 
 
 The scouting parties explore ravines and woods with 
 great care, and will never pass a dike, a hedge, a 
 wall, or a field of tall grain, without seeing whether 
 there is any thing concealed. They should visit 
 houses in which the enemy might be concealed, one 
 of the scouts entering alone, while the others remain 
 outside to give the alarm, if necessary. In like man- 
 ner every spot should be examined where an enemy 
 might be hid. 
 
110 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Before entering a village the advanced guard halts, 
 to give the scouts time to examine it, and procure 
 information about parties of the enemy that may be 
 near. The scouts pass through the streets, enter yards 
 and gardens enclosed by walls, cause several houses 
 to be opened to their inspection, and visit the church- 
 es and other public buildings. To take as little time 
 as possible, the business of examination should be 
 divided up, and ought to take but a few minutes. If 
 the enemy is quite near, and there is any thing suspi- 
 cious about the village, the scouts should take a 
 longer time, and make a more thorough inspection. 
 Moreover, however small the number of the advanced 
 guard may be, it should be also preceded by an ad- 
 vanced guard, so that only the advanced detachment 
 shall be delayed ; and this body will retake its place 
 by a rapid movement, after passing the village. In 
 this case the advanced guard of the advanced guard 
 would furnish the scouts, and the flankers would 
 come from the advanced guard itself. 
 
 As the flankers are sometimes out of sight, connec- 
 tion is kept up with them by patrols or small detach- 
 ments. The leading group on the road should consist 
 of about five men, of whom two are sent in front of 
 the remaining three. 
 
 Figure 6 gives the idea of these arrangements. 
 A represents the advanced guard. B, the detachment 
 that furnishes the three groups of scouts which pre- 
 cede it. C and C, the detachments which move 
 
RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MARCHES. Ill 
 
 parallel to the road, oo 
 
 and furnish flankers, a & > o 
 
 who are supposed 
 also to be in three 
 groups, the one in S 
 
 front of the detach- 
 ment communicating 
 with the scouts, and 
 the other two groups 
 
 on the outer flank. o<> i 11 
 
 D and D are patrols, |] 
 to keep up communi- 
 cation with the flank- 
 ers, and affording 
 them prompt aid if attacked. 
 
 In a night march all these detachments should be 
 drawn in much nearer to the advanced guard, and 
 generally the flankers must be dispensed with. Si- 
 lence must be kept, and every ear ready to catch the 
 least sound. Xenophon says that at night ears must 
 do the duty of eyes. 
 
 Advanced Guard. If the only duties of an ad- 
 vanced guard were those of examination and skirmish- 
 ing, none but light troops should be employed ; but 
 it has sometimes to seize and hold important points 
 against a superior force until the main body can come 
 up. It has to force defiles, take possession of villages, 
 and is at every moment exposed to serious attacks. 
 The advanced guard of a corps of considerable im- 
 
112 PKINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 portance ought therefore to have, in addition to the 
 light troops, some infantry of the line, heavy cavalry, 
 and some artillery, in such proportions that the differ- 
 ent arms may afford each other mutual assistance. 
 
 The battalions and squadrons of the army should 
 all be detailed in turn for advanced guard duty, since 
 this is the best school for soldiers of all grades to 
 learn their trade, and all should receive its instruc- 
 tions. To form the advanced guard of detachments 
 taken from the several corps is a bad plan, as it com- 
 plicates the details of that service, and destroys the 
 spirit of honorable rivalry which should subsist be- 
 tween the corps. Discipline suffers also, because the 
 men do not serve under the chief to w T hom they are 
 accustomed. For these reasons it should be laid down 
 as a rule, that the battalions and squadrons should 
 serve in succession on advanced guard duty. If the 
 advanced guard does not contain a battalion or a 
 squadron, whole companies should be detailed, and 
 never fractions. 
 
 The commander of the advanced guard ought to 
 have the best maps that can be obtained, and to be 
 attended by several of the inhabitants of the country, 
 to serve as guides, and give him such information as 
 he may need. At each station he takes new guides, 
 who are carried along under a strong escort, to prevent 
 their escape. Knowledge of the language of the 
 country is of great importance, and, if the commander 
 himself does not possess it, he should have on his staff 
 
KULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MARCHES. 113 
 
 some officers who do, preferring those who have 
 travelled through the country before. 
 
 Travellers, deserters, and prisoners, should be sepa- 
 rately questioned as to the position and forces of the 
 enemy, and with reference to what is known or pre- 
 sumed about his plans, the morale of his troops, the 
 character of the commanders, &c. From each indi- 
 vidual some information will be obtained, often indeed 
 very incomplete and unsatisfactory, but by comparing 
 all their statements a quite accurate idea may be 
 formed of the composition of the hostile forces, their 
 numbers, positions, prior movements, &c. All an- 
 swers should be exactly written out and transmitted 
 to the commanding general, whenever they furnish 
 any interesting information as to the plans of the 
 enemy. 
 
 As soon as the commander of the advanced guard 
 arrives at the place where he is to halt, he questions 
 the magistrates and other intelligent persons, in order 
 to obtain all the information they possess about the 
 roads, bridges, fords, forests, defiles, marshes, &c. If 
 they know any thing of the position and designs of the 
 enemy, they can generally be prevailed upon, by polite 
 management rather than by threats, to communi- 
 cate it. What they say with regard to the resources 
 of the country is to be received with caution, for it is 
 generally their interest to depreciate them. This, 
 however, is a point about which reliable information 
 should be required. While the commander is attend 
 
114 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 ing to these details, which demand much activity and 
 tact, he sends some of his subordinates to examine the 
 neighborhood, and specially in the direction of the 
 road to be passed over the next day. The country 
 should be explored to a considerable distance by 
 patrols, which will move along all the roads, and 
 inspect every spot where an enemy might be con- 
 cealed. The troops should not lay down their arms, 
 nor enter quarters, nor bivouac, until the patrols re- 
 turn and the guards are established, and there is no 
 longer any thing like attack to be apprehended. 
 
 A very important duty of the commander of an 
 advanced guard is to obtain provisions, in order to 
 prevent his men from wandering off in search of 
 them. As the advanced guard is generally not very 
 strong in numbers, and may have to engage very su- 
 perior forces, it is the more important for it to keep 
 united. As provisions are needed to-day, so they will 
 be to-morrow, and they should be loaded into some 
 of the vehicles of the country. Such foresight is 
 never hurtful. Montluc says : " Always have a good 
 stock of provisions, and especially bread and wine, in 
 order to afford the soldier some refreshment, for the 
 human body is not made of iron." 
 
 When the advanced guard comes to a village on 
 the road, it passes round it, if possible, rather than 
 through it, especially if it is quite long, because de- 
 files, where an attack may be made, are generally to 
 be avoided. Sometimes, moreover, it may happen 
 
KULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MA.RCHES. 115 
 
 that the scouts have not made a sufficiently close 
 examination of a village; the enemy may be con- 
 cealed in the houses, and, under their cover, may do 
 much mischief before they can be dislodged. Although 
 this event is not very probable, yet it is possible, and 
 the precaution is therefore justifiable and prudent. 
 
 At crossings of roads the advanced guard marks 
 out with branches of trees or with straw the one it 
 has taken, so that the main body, which is at some 
 distance in rear, and generally out of sight, may not 
 mistake the road. A few horsemen may be left at 
 Biich a place to show the way, but that will depend 
 upon the time required for the main body to come up. 
 If a bridge is found broken or unsafe, or ditches dug 
 across the road, or there are miry places or other obsta- 
 cles which might stop the march of the column, the 
 workmen immediately commence the necessary repair 
 with all possible diligence, and rejoin the advanced 
 guard at the first halt. 
 
 When the country is much covered with forests, 
 the advanced guard sends out some scouts who keep 
 up communication with the leading detachment and 
 the flankers. This is to provide for the case of the lead- 
 ing scouts having left some portion of the ground with- 
 out sufficient exploration, and the enemy, not having 
 been discovered, might unexpectedly fall upon the 
 advanced guard. The second set of scouts will see 
 him approach and give warning of it. The same pre- 
 caution may be used for the main body, especially 
 
116 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 when it is considerably distant from the advanced 
 guard. We repeat, that in war it is impossible to 
 take too many precautions to prevent surprise, as 
 well on the march as in quarters. 
 
 In passing defiles that cannot be avoided, the lead- 
 ing detachment of the advanced guard should, after 
 passing through, examine with minute care the neigh- 
 boring ground, because it is in such positions that an 
 enemy would secrete himself, with a view of attack- 
 ing the column before it had time to deploy. The 
 leading detachment should therefore halt after pass- 
 ing the defile, form line of battle, and send flankers 
 out as far as possible, at the same time that the scouts 
 examine all the ground in the front. Its march will 
 only be resumed when the head of the advanced 
 guard is at hand, and then its proper distance will be 
 regained by increasing the pace. It is evident that 
 this duty is very fatiguing, and consequently all the 
 light troops of the advanced guard should take their 
 turns, they alone being employed to form the leading 
 detachment of the advanced guard. 
 
 There is no good reason for dispensing with any of 
 these precautions in an open country, for however 
 level it may appear, there are always undulations 
 under whose cover troops may lie hid in considerable 
 numbers, and an ambuscade in such a country would 
 probably be the more effectual because the less ex- 
 pected. The only advantage presented by a level 
 and open country is, that a few horsemen may gallop 
 
RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MARCHES. 117" 
 
 over it rapidly, giving it a sufficient examination, and 
 thus the column be not long delayed. 
 
 If the advanced guard meets the enemy, it forms 
 line of battle and tries to hold its position ; if this 
 cannot be done, it falls back upon the main body, 
 taking advantage of all favorable points for delaying 
 the enemy, and giving time to the main body to make 
 such preparations as may suit the occasion. The 
 commander should lose no time in sending an express 
 messenger to the main body. If it is night, the ad- 
 vanced guard should charge with impetuosity, what- 
 ever may be its force, in order to throw the enemy 
 into confusion or to intimidate him ; at all events, to 
 check him. In such a case the darkness is favorable 
 to the attacking party, because the enemy, being 
 unable to see what force he is engaging, must be 
 careful. The main body can thus have time to come 
 to the support of the advanced guard. But, as has 
 been already observed, night marches are to be avoid- 
 ed, since they are very fatiguing, give rise to disor- 
 derly conduct which the officers cannot repress, and 
 during the darkness most unfortunate mistakes often 
 occur. One example will be given of the many that 
 have occurred of friendly troops firing into each other 
 at night. A French army in two columns was march- 
 ing at night towards Landau, when a partisan chief 
 with fifty men slipped between the two columns, 
 which were separated by a ravine. He fired from his 
 central position upon both columns at the same time. 
 
118 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Each, supposing itself suddenly attacked, returned the 
 fire, and so they continued butchering each other 
 until daylight revealed the fatal error. 
 
 The advanced guard should choose some favorable 
 spot for the principal halt of the march one con- 
 cealed as much as practicable from observation, as, 
 for instance, the reverse slope of a hill. Sentinels 
 should be placed at the top to have an extended view, 
 and upon the roads by which an enemy might ap- 
 proach. If there are roads near, they should be ex- 
 amined by scouting parties and a few men left there, 
 who may conceal themselves in the undergrowth, and 
 be enabled to see the exterior ground without being 
 seen. If an attack is imminent, one-half of the 
 troops will remain in line of battle, ready to fight 
 until the remaining half take their meal. The halves 
 will then change places. 
 
 When a wood of considerable extent is to be crossed, 
 the advanced guard should be halted before entering 
 it, and the leading detachment strengthened, in order 
 that the number of scouts may be increased. 
 
 The drums of the advanced guard should not be beat, 
 as they give warning of its approach ; and generally 
 the drum should be little used on the march, except 
 in passing through a town, in coming into camp, or 
 entering the field of battle. 
 
 "What should be the strength of the advanced 
 guard, and at what distance should it march from the 
 main body? These questions cannot be answered 
 
EULES TO BE OBSERVED IN MAECHES. 119 
 
 with precision. The strength of the advanced guard 
 and its composition vary with circumstances, and de- 
 pend upon the means at the disposal of the corn- 
 mander-in-ehief. The advanced guard may be tem- 
 porarily re-enforced when it may have to receive an 
 attack, or carry and hold a position ; but in general 
 its strength will not exceed one-fifth of the main 
 body, and oftener will be less. The advanced guard 
 will contain, in the majority of cases, between one- 
 tenth and one-fifth of the main body. To make it 
 stronger would be to fatigue the men by a severe 
 duty recurring too frequently ; on the other hand, to 
 make it too weak would be to expose it to capture or 
 destruction. A consciousness of weakness might pre- 
 vent risking a vigorous effort when imperatively re- 
 quired, and such a failure might be highly disastrous 
 to the army. 
 
 The distance of the advanced guard from the main 
 body may evidently be greater for a large than a small 
 body of troops, and it depends also very much on the 
 length of the column. As it is the duty of the ad- 
 vanced guard to give notice of the approach of the 
 enemy and to delay his march, it should be at such a 
 distance that the main body may have time enough to 
 prepare for an attack. For example, if the column is 
 three miles long, more than an hour is needed for the 
 rear to come up to a line with the head, and the ad- 
 vanced guard should, therefore, be at least the same 
 distance in front ; for if it is true that it delays the 
 
120 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 enemy's arrival, it is equally true that some time is 
 consumed in ascertaining the real state of affairs and 
 sending a messenger to the rear. It would seem then 
 a good rule, that the advanced guard should precede 
 the main column by a distance at least equal to the 
 length of the latter. Frequently the distance is much 
 increased. 
 
 The rear-guard is arranged nearly in the same way 
 as the advanced guard, but is naturally made weaker, 
 as there is less danger of attack in rear than in front. 
 It is the escort for the baggage when the march is 
 in advance. The rear-guard proper has its own rear 
 detachment and flankers. These detachments send 
 out groups of two or three men, who should fre- 
 quently turn back to see whether the enemy is fol- 
 lowing the column. They will arrest deserters and 
 marauders and drive along stragglers. A rear-guard 
 should have a detachment of cavalry to move about 
 rapidly in every direction when necessary, and to 
 keep up communication with the main body. 
 
 In a retreat, the rear-guard becomes the most im- 
 portant body, and should be composed of the best 
 troops, or those which have suffered least. There can 
 be but little rotation in such duties. Necessity gen- 
 erally requires the same body to act some time as the 
 rear-guard, often for several successive weeks. No 
 other service can give more fame to a body of troops 
 than in such a case as this, where it exposes itself 
 to danger, privation, and toil, less for itself than for 
 
BULES TO BE OBSERVED IX MARCHES. 121 
 
 the remainder of the army. More than one com- 
 mander of a rear-guard has made his name celebrated. 
 
 In a retreat, the baggage wagons are not placed be- 
 tween the main body and the rear-guard, but are 
 moved as far towards the head of the column as pos- 
 sible, to secure them against attack, and not to em- 
 barrass the defensive arrangements. 
 
 Strength of a column on the march. It has been 
 stated, in a preceding chapter, that an army of con- 
 siderable size is always divided up into several corps, 
 which, on a march, form separate columns, and move 
 along parallel roads. The army has thus not only 
 more mobility, but also threatens the enemy sim- 
 ultaneously in several directions, keeps him in a 
 state of uncertainty as to the real point to be at- 
 tacked, outflanks him if he makes a stand at any par- 
 ticular one, and can be subsisted with much greater 
 ease. The number of columns will depend on the 
 magnitude of the army and the character of the coun- 
 try. Generally the number will be increased near 
 the battle-field, to facilitate the necessary deploy- 
 ments. There is, however, a limit, below which it is 
 best to keep the strength of a marching column. 
 
 Suppose, for example, a large corps marching along 
 a single road. It will be composed of troops of all 
 arms, in the proper proportion. There will be an 
 advanced guard from seven to ten miles, or a half 
 march, in front of the main body. Couriers will take 
 about an hour to pass over this distance, and the 
 6 
 
122 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 commander of the main body will hence have about 
 two hours in which to give his orders and to deploy 
 his columns, upon the supposition that the enemy is 
 greatly superior to the advanced guard, and drives it 
 back upon the main body. Hence, the total length 
 of the column should not be more than six or seven 
 miles, in order that the rear battalions may have time 
 to arrive at the head of the column to participate in 
 the engagement. Experience and calculation demon- 
 strate that an army of 30,000 men, including artillery 
 and cavalry, and with infantry in three ranks, is about 
 as large as can be properly marched along a single 
 road. This fixes the magnitude of the army corps^ as 
 it is termed. If the infantry is in two ranks, the 
 corps should not contain more than 20,000 men. 
 
 Art. II. Forward Movements, and the Combats 
 they lead to. 
 
 Order of march of a Division. In order to apply 
 the rules laid down, and to have definite ideas as to 
 the details of a forward movement, we will take an 
 example of a division of four brigades, subdivided as 
 follows : 
 
 16 battalions of infantry of 700 men each 11,200 men. 
 
 10 companies of sharpshooters 1,000 " 
 
 2 " " cavalry 150 " 
 
 24 pieces of artillery, in 4 batteries TOO " 
 
 1 company of sappers 100 " 
 
 1 " " pontoniers 100 " 
 
 Total 13,25D " 
 
ETC. 123 
 
 This total does not comprise the division and 
 brigade staffs, or persons employed in the medical, 
 quartermaster, and commissary departments. These 
 troops in line of battle will occupy about two and a 
 half miles if deployed in a single line, and the in- 
 fantry is in two ranks. The column, if the infantry 
 march by sections, and each piece of artillery be fol- 
 lowed by its caisson, will be also about two and a 
 half miles in length, notwithstanding the absence of 
 the advanced guard and flankers. The advanced 
 guard will be two and a half or three miles in ad- 
 vance of the column. 
 
 The rear-guard, which escorts the baggage, will be 
 about one mile and a half to the rear. If the division 
 carries four days' provisions in wagons, as is usual 
 when concentrating before the enemy, 400 wagons 
 will be required, and the train will be more than a 
 mile long. 
 
 The infantry is divided into four brigades, each of 
 four battalions ; and as the marksmen are to be spread 
 along the front in case "of an engagement, two com- 
 panies will be attached to each brigade and two to the 
 artillery. The infantry brigades will march in turn 
 at the head of the column, and that one which is in 
 front will furnish the battalions and sharpshooters of 
 the advanced guard. In like manner, each battery 
 marches in turn with the advanced guard, unless 
 there are special reasons to the contrary. 
 
 The advanced guard will consist of the company 
 
124 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 of sappers, one company of cavalry, two of sharp- 
 shooters, one battery, and two "battalions of infantry. 
 The proportion will thus be one-eighth for the in- 
 fantry, one-fifth for the sharpshooters, one-fourth for 
 the artillery, and one -half for the cavalry. It is too 
 large for the artillery and cavalry, but the entire ad- 
 vanced guard will be about in the proper proportion 
 to the whole command. Some cavalry soldiers are 
 necessary with an advanced guard, even in a very 
 broken country, to serve as couriers between it and 
 the main body. Not less than one company should 
 be with the advanced guard in this case. One plat- 
 oon will pass to the front, and furnish scouts for the 
 main and parallel roads, while the other will remain 
 at the head of the advanced guard, forming the 
 escort of its commander. The sappers will follow 
 the cavalry, having with them wagons of tools, and 
 other things necessary for the repair of roads and 
 bridges. The battalions will throw out flank detach- 
 ments, who will also keep up a communication with 
 the cavalry scouting parties. 
 
 The remainder of the troops will march along the 
 road, as well closed up as possible, and in such order 
 that the column may readily form line of battle to 
 the front. Generally the artillery should be in the 
 centre, so as to be better protected by the infantry, 
 and the sharpshooters will be on the flanks. The 
 order of march of the advanced guard will therefore 
 be the following : 
 
FOKWARD MOVEMENTS, ETO. 125 
 
 1st. A platoon of cavalry in front of the advanced 
 guard proper, and furnishing the scouts ; 
 
 2d. Another platoon of cavalry at the head of the 
 advanced guard ; 
 
 3d. The company of sappers with their wagons ; 
 
 4th. A company of sharpshooters ; 
 
 5th. A battalion of infantry, sending out one com- 
 pany as flankers on the right ; 
 
 6th. A battery of artillery ; 
 
 Yth. A battalion of infantry, sending out one com- 
 pany as flankers on the left ; 
 
 8th. A company of sharpshooters. 
 
 If this column deploys to receive the enemy, the 
 two platoons of cavalry and the company of sappers 
 will fall to the rear, to be employed as may be neces- 
 sary, and the flankers will gather in upon the wings 
 to support the sharpshooters. 
 
 The main body will march (two or three miles in 
 rear) in the following order : 
 
 1st. Two remaining battalions of the brigade which 
 has furnished the advanced guard. A company of the 
 leading battalion will march three or four hundred 
 paces in advance, like a second advanced guard, which 
 will throw to the several groups front and flanks ; 
 
 2d. The entire second brigade, with sharpshooters 
 leading ; 
 
 3d. Three batteries of artillery together, each piece 
 followed immediately by its caisson, and the whole 
 preceded by their two companies of sharpshooters ; 
 
126 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 4th. The third brigade, with sharpshooters lead- 
 ing; 
 
 5th. The fourth brigade, preceded by its sharp- 
 shooters, having detached one battalion to the rear as 
 rear-guard ; 
 
 6th. All the baggage, reserve ammunition, forges, 
 ambulances, bridge train ; 
 
 7th. The battalion which forms at once the baggage 
 escort and the rear-guard, the company of pontoniers 
 and the remaining company of cavalry closing the 
 column. 
 
 It w r ould seem at first glance that the pontoniers 
 ought to be in front, to prepare for passing rivers 
 whose bridges may be broken ; but their train would 
 clog the advanced guard, whose movements should be 
 prompt and unembarrassed. At the first reverse the 
 train would be lost, and the army deprived of a most 
 important accessory to successful operations. The 
 pontoniers will only be employed in passing rivers of 
 some importance, and in such cases their train is 
 easily moved to the front while the army is halting, 
 as it must do. The sappers of the advanced guard can 
 make all necessary arrangements for crossing brooks 
 and small streams. 
 
 The division will march as indicated, in advancing 
 towards the enemy. There will be denies to pass, 
 bridges to force, rivers to cross, and, at last, prepara- 
 tions made for battle, when the enemy takes up a 
 position to hold it. These cases will be treated in a 
 
ETC. 127 
 
 general way, without particular reference to the divi- 
 sion, whose order of march has been described. 
 
 Passage of Defiles. A grave disaster may result 
 from rashly entering a long defile when the enemy is 
 near, even if he is retreating after a defeat. It is 
 much wiser to attempt to turn a defile held by the 
 enemy, than to trust to the chances of forcing it by 
 direct attack at the expense of much blood. How- 
 ever, there are cases when the necessity is urgent, and, 
 cost what it may, the passage must be forced. Under 
 such circumstances, the first thing to do is to take 
 possession of the lateral heights, a necessary prelimi- 
 nary to success. The heights must be assailed with 
 infantry columns, whose strength will be proportional 
 to the resistance and difficulties to be met and over- 
 come. The enemy will be driven from the heights, 
 and his position in the defile turned. The army will 
 not attempt to penetrate the defile until the columns 
 on the flanks have taken possession of the heights. If 
 the defile is very narrow, there will be a single 
 column in it ; and in such a case there should be con- 
 siderable intervals between the several parts of the 
 column, in order that if the leading portion is driven 
 back, the confusion will not be transmitted to those 
 behind. "When the valley is broad, and its sides 
 gently sloping, other columns may move parallel to 
 the main one, at levels between the bottom and top. 
 These side columns should keep somewhat in advance 
 of the main column on the lowest ground. This 
 
128 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 arrangement is based upon the supposition that the 
 stream of water usually found in such locations may 
 be readily crossed, so that the communication between 
 the several columns may be easily kept up. It is 
 always unsafe to separate the parts of an army by im- 
 passable obstacles, in presence of an enemy, who may 
 attack and crush one while the other is little else 
 than an idle spectator. If the stream in the defile is 
 not easily crossed, bridges must be thrown over it at 
 several points, or the whole force must remain on one 
 side. 
 
 If the defile is short and not occupied in force, the 
 advanced guard should take possession of it, the light 
 infantry clearing the heights, and the heavy infantry 
 passing through the defile with the artillery and 
 cavalry. The artillery takes the lead, that it may 
 *not be masked if it becomes necessary to open fire. 
 The cavalry falls to the rear, as it can be of little use 
 in such a situation. The sharpshooters, if there are 
 any, form small columns on the flanks of the artillery, 
 or they may be replaced by companies of regular 
 infantry. 
 
 When the defile is quite long, and strongly held, 
 the advanced guard halts at the entrance and waits 
 for the main body. When all the troops have come 
 up, arrangements will be made as previously indi- 
 cated. 
 
 The rules to be followed are the same for a large 
 or small body of troops. The heights must first be 
 
FORWARD MOVEMENTS, ETC. 129 
 
 carried, and the enemy driven from them, before a 
 movement is made into the defile. This principle 
 cannot be violated with impunity, as more than one 
 example has demonstrated. 
 
 In high mountains, defiles are so easily defended 
 against direct attack, that it is preferable to turn 
 them, which is generally possible, as paths more or 
 less circuitous almost always exist by which a force 
 may be thrown upon the flank or rear of the assailed. 
 The sense of security on account of the strength of a 
 position sometimes puts vigilance to sleep, and the 
 place is taken. 
 
 Sometimes the enemy occupies but one side of the 
 valley. If the heights cannot be carried in such a 
 case, the attempt may be made to slip along the other 
 side some skirmishers, and even artillery, so as to take 
 the enemy in flank, while the remainder of the troops 
 attack in front. It was thus the French forced the 
 defile of Galliano. 
 
 The defence is not always made in the defile itself. 
 Sometimes an attempt is made to envelope and over- 
 whelm the column as it debouches. The commander- 
 in-chief, having been informed of such a state of 
 affairs, hastens to join the advanced guard, and, as- 
 cending some eminence whence he can see the ene- 
 my's position, he makes his arrangements and sends 
 his orders to the troops in rear. 
 
 Generally, the only course is to scatter the troops 
 just in front of the defile by a fire of artillery, and 
 6* 
 
130 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 immediately to throw forward and deploy a portion 
 of the troops on the ground thus cleared. These 
 troops, under cover of the artillery crossing its fire in 
 front of them, endeavor to gain ground to the front to 
 make room for those behind them. The skirmishers, 
 and especially the sharpshooters, push forward on the 
 right and left along the heights, with a view of an- 
 noying the batteries of the enemy, whose converging 
 fire on the debouching columns may be very destruc- 
 tive. In the mean time, new battalions, closed in 
 mass in the defile, but at some distance from each 
 other, debouch and deploy rapidly to the right and 
 left. Several squadrons gallop up and deploy on the 
 wings. When troops enough are on the ground, they 
 attack with the bayonet and drive the enemy off. 
 
 In the deployments subsequent to passing defiles, 
 and in other cases which might be mentioned, much 
 time is often gained in manoeuvring by inversion. 
 Many instances have occurred of troops being repulsed 
 because they did not know how to manoeuvre in this 
 way. 
 
 "Whatever be the circumstances of the passage of a 
 defile, and whatever plan be adopted, the baggage 
 should never be permitted to enter until the outer ex- 
 tremity is clear of the enemy, and there is ample 
 space for the troops to manoeuvre. It is not difficult 
 to conceive of the horrible confusion of a column 
 driven back from the front, harassed in flank, and 
 finding the defile filled with wagons, whose drivers 
 
FORWARD MOVEMENTS, ETC. 131 
 
 have cut their harness and escaped on the horses. 
 The baggage should therefore never be permitted to 
 enter the defile until it is perfectly safe. 
 
 The passage of a defile of some importance requires, 
 on the part of the advanced guard, redoubled vigi- 
 lance and precaution, even when the enemy is sup- 
 posed to be absent, for he may return by a cross-road 
 and attack unexpectedly. The defile should, there- 
 fore, be examined by a detachment of cavalry some 
 distance in front of the advanced guard, and the 
 woods on the right and left carefully explored by 
 flankers. The advanced guard should pass through 
 by detachments, so that if any accident happen to the 
 leading one, the remainder may escape the same fate, 
 and may render it assistance. All the detachments 
 should unite at the debouche, and remain there until 
 scouting parties have thoroughly examined the neigh- 
 boring ground, so that they may feel secure against 
 all danger of attack. . 
 
 Passage, of Bridges. Bridges are short defiles, but 
 their passage requires some precautions to be taken 
 by any body of troops. They present serious difficul- 
 ties when they are defended, and the passage must be 
 forced. When there is no enemy visible, the same 
 precautions are necessary as for any other short defile. 
 The leading detachment of the advanced guard stops 
 at the river-bank, taking advantage of all cover afford- 
 ed by the locality, until the scouts have made an 
 examination of the ground on the other side. The 
 
132 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 horsemen, who perform this duty, cross the bridge at 
 a rapid trot, and then divide into three groups ; one 
 of which moves carefully along the road, making the 
 circuit of houses, gardens, and clumps of trees, while 
 the other two groups go to the right and left, explor- 
 ing as they go. When, after a few minutes, no enemy 
 is discovered, the leading detachment crosses the 
 bridge, and rapidly rejoins the groups which belong to 
 it. In the mean time, the advanced guard has halted 
 at some distance from the bridge ; the flankers, having 
 reached the river-bank, move down towards the 
 bridge, examining as they go. They cross the bridge 
 and move to the right and left, resuming their duties 
 as flankers. The advanced guard then crosses the 
 bridge, but always at a rapid pace, and in close order. 
 It is a good plan to leave an interval between the 
 artillery and the troops before and after, and to pass 
 that over at a trot. 
 
 As soon as the advanced guard is safely over, the 
 commander makes a report of the facts of the case 
 to the commander-in-chief. When the main body 
 comes up, it may pass without delay, only giving a 
 little time for its flankers and scouts to pass before, 
 and take their appropriate places on the other side. 
 If the communication established by the bridge is 
 an important one, the advanced guard should not 
 move forward until the main body has come up, 
 because the enemy might permit the passage by the 
 advanced guard, and dispute that of the main body. 
 
FORWARD MOVEMENTS, ETC. 133 
 
 In such a case, it should prepare to resist any attack 
 the enemy might make before the arrival of the main 
 body, taking advantage of the features of the ground 
 to strengthen its position. 
 
 When the enemy holds the bridge, it is very diffi- 
 cult to dislodge them, especially if the bridge is long, 
 and the opposite bank the highest, and the enemy 
 provided with artillery. The famous passage of the 
 bridge of Lodi, by Napoleon, in the presence of 
 10,000 Austrians, is well known. 
 
 Artillery plays an important part in the attack of a 
 bridge, because it is necessary to drive the enemy from 
 the other side before sending troops upon the bridge. 
 If the direct attack fails, the enemy's attention must 
 be engaged while the main body passes at another 
 point. 
 
 If the bridge is short, and is held by a small force, 
 the advanced guard may be able to carry it. If 
 not it will halt, the staff officers will examine the 
 ground, look for fords, &c., while the main body is 
 coming up. 
 
 The artillery will be put in position to cross their 
 fire on the ground near the other end of the bridge, 
 and marksmen may do excellent service also in killing 
 the men and horses, if the river is not too wide. 
 While this firing is in progress, the infantry who are 
 to force the passage are making the necessary pre- 
 parations, covering themselves as well as possible 
 behind inequalities of the ground, houses woods, 
 
134 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 or thickets near the bank. Each battalion will form 
 a closed column, with as wide a front as the bridge 
 will permit. The first battalion advances past the 
 line of marksmen, rushes upon the bridge, and 
 crosses it at a run ; drives away the few men remain- 
 ing at the other end, and deploys near the bridge. 
 If this is successful, a second battalion crosses in like 
 manner, deploys alongside the first, and the two gain 
 ground to the front. A third battalion is thrown 
 over, and finally the whole army is gotten across. 
 But it may happen that the first battalion is repulsed. 
 If so, the officers rally it, and again rush upon the 
 enemy. If there is any hesitation in the movement, 
 it is a fit time for a personal effort. The chief seizes 
 a flag, takes his place in front ; the men are inspired 
 with fresh courage ; the bravest rally around their 
 leader ; the rest follow, and the passage is forced. 
 Evidently there must be some powerful motive to 
 justify so dangerous and bloody an operation, else it 
 would be preferable to take more time, and secure an 
 easier passage at some other point. 
 
 As soon as the infantry has taken up a position on the 
 opposite side, the artillery continues its fire as long as 
 it can without endangering the infantry which has 
 crossed. It then ceases fire, forms column, passes the 
 bridge as rapidly as possible, and takes position on 
 the other side, at some suitable point where it may 
 continue to fire upon the retiring enemy. The cavalry 
 will have crossed as soon as the infantry was in suffi- 
 
FORWARD MOVEMENTS, ETC. 135 
 
 cient force to give it support, and is threatening the 
 flanks of the enemy. Or else, taking advantage of 
 some ford, it may have turned the position while the 
 infantry were attacking in front. The remaining 
 troops, who, during the engagement, have kept out of 
 fire, and made such dispositions as would be advanta- 
 geous in case of a repulse, now form column and cross 
 the bridge. 
 
 Passage of Woods. When a column is to pass 
 through a large forest, the attempt should not be 
 made until it has been thoroughly explored, both in 
 front and on the sides, to such a distance as to remove 
 all apprehension of unexpected attack by a large force 
 of the enemy. In this case, the infantry must do the 
 scouting, as the cavalry can make but little progress 
 in a dense forest. The flankers should be supported 
 by several patrols, which will keep up their connec- 
 tion with the column. If the wood is of small extent, 
 the advanced guard does not pass through until the 
 scouts have reached the other side ; but if of consider- 
 able extent, the delay would be too great, and, in this 
 case, a halt of half or quarter of an hour is made, 
 while detachments follow each other to the front, and 
 serve as successive re-enforcements to the leading 
 detachment, if it is obliged to fall back. 
 
 If the wood is occupied by the enemy, skirmishers 
 are sent forward, who gradually creep up on the 
 flanks, under such cover as they can find, to the out- 
 skirts. The artillery follows at a suitable distance, 
 
136 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 takes a central position, fires obliquely, and forces the 
 defenders to take refuge in the denser parts. Thus, 
 the skirmishers are enabled to get cover behind the 
 outer fringe of trees. When this is accomplished, and 
 the advanced guard is in possession of the skirts of 
 the wood, the enemy can not hold his position long, 
 unless abatis have been made. This species of 
 obstacle cannot be of very great extent, and may be 
 the more easily turned, as the wood itself conceals the 
 movement. The enemy, once set in motion, should be 
 vigorously pressed by the skirmishers, supported, if 
 practicable, by small columns. If the entire wood 
 can be turned, the cavalry, which can be of no use in 
 the interior, may make a circuit to threaten the com- 
 munications of the enemy, and hasten his retreat. 
 When the forest has been well swept by the fire, 
 several squadrons may be sent along the road at a 
 gallop, to dash upon the retiring enemy as he debouches 
 into the open ground, and thus change his retreat 
 into a rout. 
 
 Passage of Rivers. The most serious obstacle that 
 can be encountered on marches is an unfordable 
 river, with its bridges broken down, and the enemy in, 
 possession of the opposite bank. To pass such an 
 obstacle always occasions loss of time, which will be 
 proportional to the difficulties attending the attempt. 
 If the column has a bridge train, it will answer for 
 the passage of streams of moderate size ; but when the 
 river is very broad, it may become necessary to collect 
 
FORWARD MOVEMENTS, ETC. 137 
 
 the boats of the country and other materials for build- 
 ing the bridge. 
 
 A passage is made either by a stratagem or by 
 force, or often er still by both together. The attempt 
 should not be made until the staff officers have made 
 an examination of the river, to discover the most 
 favorable point. This point will usually be one where 
 the bank is higher than on the other side, and at the 
 same time envelopes it, on account of a bend in the 
 river. The neighborhood of an affluent is convenient, 
 as it offers facilities for collecting in safety and float- 
 ing down the bridge materials. A thickly wooded 
 bank and a wooded island enable the preparations for 
 passage to be made out of sight of the enemy. 
 
 Efforts are made to keep the plans secret, and to 
 deceive the enemy. Preparations are sometimes made 
 at a place where no passage is intended, and, when 
 every thing is ready, a sudden move is made to the 
 real point. At dawn, batteries, advantageously posted 
 upon commanding points, on the right and left, cross 
 their fire on the opposite shore, and drive off or under 
 cover all who may be there. Marksmen may also be 
 very useful in assisting the artillery, if the stream is 
 not too wide. At the same time, the boats descend 
 the affluent where they have been concealed. They 
 are filled with soldiers, and rapidly moved across the 
 river, where the men disembark as fast as possible, 
 and secure the best cover they can, to enable them to 
 hold their ground. The artillery gives all the aid it 
 
138 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 can render while the boats are carrying over other 
 loads of infantry. There is a double advantage in 
 these successive trips of the boats, the first soldiers 
 thrown over being incited to strenuous efforts by 
 having their retreat temporarily cut off, and still 
 having the hope of speedy re-enforcement. The posi- 
 tion of the attacking force gets constantly better until 
 they feel strong enough to charge upon the enemy, 
 and drive him from the river. 
 
 The artillery is silenced as soon as its fire might be 
 dangerous to the troops on the other side, and will 
 shift its position to another, where it may still be 
 effective. 
 
 "When things are in this condition the bridge may 
 be commenced, but troops should continue to cross in 
 the boats. Field-works are at once begun, to cover 
 the bridge and secure its possession in case a retreat 
 becomes necessary subsequently. This is a pruden- 
 tial measure which should never be omitted. 
 
 The bridge should be built above the affluent, so as 
 not to be exposed to dangerous shocks from boats 
 which might get loose and float down the current. 
 "When the bridge is finished, the artillery, the cavalry, 
 and the remainder of the infantry pass over. 
 
 Arrival of the column in presence of the enemy. 
 As soon as the general receives notice of the presence 
 of the enemy, he hastens to join the advanced guard, 
 in order to examine his forces and position, as well as 
 the ground upon which he must himself manoeuvre 
 
FORWARD MOVEMENTS, ETC. 139 
 
 and fight. He takes with him the chief of artillery, 
 and at least one of the higher officers of each of the 
 corps in the column, so that, after the reconnoissance, 
 when his plans are arranged he may give to these 
 officers, in person, instructions for their respective 
 corps. 
 
 In the mean time, the troops composing the column 
 halt in the road, after sending forward several battal- 
 ions to re-enforce the advanced guard, if necessary ; 
 and, while waiting orders, they close in mass, to oc- 
 cupy as little depth of ground as possible. The bag- 
 gage, under guard of a few men, remains in rear, and 
 the- cavalry, which had formed its escort, files past 
 along the road and takes position behind the infantry. 
 The field artillery is in the centre of the column, and 
 the reserve caissons draw near, to be at hand in case 
 of need. 
 
 In this order the column will advance, either along 
 the road, or moving off obliquely, if required. If the 
 engagement is not to take place the same day, the 
 army, upon reaching the position selected, will deploy, 
 light its fires, and wait for the next day. When the 
 general sends word to prepare at once for battle, the 
 column will halt and break up into several smaller 
 columns, which will move to the right and left at dis- 
 tances suitable for deployment, opening roads, if ne- 
 cessary, with the aid of the axe and shovel. 
 
 To have definite ideas on this matter, let us recur 
 to the example of the division on the march, men- 
 
140 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 tioned above in this chapter. The two remaining bat- 
 talions of the leading brigade of the column will be 
 rapidly moved forward to support the advanced guard. 
 There will remain three brigades on the road in close 
 column, the sharpshooters and eighteen pieces of ar- 
 tillery being between the second and third brigades. 
 The order assumed preparatory for battle will be that 
 
 <ti 
 
 Fig. T. 
 
 shown in Fig. 7, where A, B, and C are the brigades, 
 D the artillery, and C the cavalry, and the division 
 will move forward in this order. When it has arrived 
 on the field, the necessary deployments can be made 
 in twenty minutes. The subject of battles will be 
 treated in another chapter. 
 
FLA^E. MARCHES. 14.1 
 
 Art. III. Flank Marches. 
 
 As a rule, a flank should not be exposed to tho 
 enemy ; but there are cases where a flank march can- 
 not be avoided, or where it is the best thing to be 
 done, and the risk should be run for a short, time, in 
 order to gain some great advantage. Take the case, 
 for example, of a corps which could effect a junction 
 with the main body, by executing a flank march along 
 the position of the enemy, or by making a wide detour 
 at a distance from him. If it was essential that the 
 junction should be effected in the least possible time, 
 the risk should be taken, and the flank inarch made. 
 In war there is no rule without exceptions. These flank 
 marches are exceptional cases, which sometimes occur, 
 and it is proper to mention the precautionary measures 
 to be adopted to avoid disaster on such occasions. 
 
 As the greatest danger to which the column is ex- 
 posed is that of being attacked in flank during the 
 march, a strong detachment should be thrown out on 
 the side next the enemy, to move along in a direction 
 parallel with the column, and sufficiently near to keep 
 up a constant communication with it, and avoid being 
 itself compromised. A mile would be about a proper 
 distance between the column and the flank detach- 
 ment, but this must depend upon the ground and 
 other circumstances. 
 
 The advanced guard usually becomes the flank de- 
 
142 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 tachment on a flank march, but it will be well to in- 
 crease its strength, as the chances of attack are greater, 
 and it should be able to hold its ground against a serious 
 effort of the enemy. The flanking detachment should 
 have its advanced guard, rear-guard, and flankers, each 
 of these sending out groups and single men in every 
 direction, to avoid surprise. The main body will need 
 but a small advanced guard to march a few hundred 
 yards in its front, the ordinary rear-guard following 
 also, but nearer than usual. 
 
 The baggage becomes, in a case like this, more of an 
 encumbrance than usual. It may be sent to join the 
 army by a circuitous route, at a distance from the 
 enemy, or may move on that flank of its own column 
 which is safest against attack. 
 
 Such are the principal arrangements necessary in a 
 flank march. See Fig. 8, where M indicates the en- 
 
 o T}"I O 
 
 o BE3J o 
 
 V 
 
 CL 
 
 Fig. 8. 
 
FLANK MARCHES. 143 
 
 emy in position ; A the principal column, with it8 
 advanced guard #, and rear-guard a' ; B the flank 
 detachment, with its advanced guard 5, rear-guard 
 ', and detachment ft", on its flank. The scouts are 
 only placed on the side next the enemy. The baggage, 
 D, moves on a road parallel to that occupied by the 
 principal column. 
 
 The principal column and the flanking detachment 
 should each march with full distance between their sub- 
 divisions, so that, by simply wheeling to the right or 
 left, as the case may be, line of battle is at once formed. 
 Perfect order should be kept. If the flank detachment 
 discovers a lateral defile, through which the enemy 
 might debouch, such as a ridge, or a road through a 
 marsh or village, that would not need a strong guard, 
 a detachment should be left until the column has 
 passed, and it will then join or replace the rear-guard. 
 This would be a useless precaution in an open country, 
 as small detachments would not then answer for such 
 purposes, and, moreover, there is not the same liability 
 to surprise as in a broken country. 
 
 It is obviously wise to conceal a flank march, if 
 possible, under cover of a fog or the darkness of night, 
 or any feature of the ground which would screen the 
 movement from the enemy. Under no circumstances 
 should the use of the flank detachment be omitted. 
 If it encounters hostile patrols, a bold appearance 
 must be put on, so as to lead to the belief that the 
 whole army is at hand. In the mean time, the column 
 
14:4: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 moves steadily forward, and, when it has passed suffi- 
 ciently far, the detachment leaves the position it had 
 held, and retires rapidly, taking, if necessary, a direc- 
 tion different from that of the main column, and 
 subsequently rejoining it by a detour. The enemy will 
 not follow it very far, as he exposes his own flank to 
 the troops which have already passed. 
 
 In flank marches, it is particularly necessary to have 
 accurate information as to the character of the road, 
 and the obstacles to be surmounted, for the least delay 
 might prove fatal, if unexpected. If a defile is to be 
 passed, troops should be sent forward to hold it. 
 
 If the flank march is to be executed by a large 
 body of troops, several columns should be formed, if 
 the ground is of a nature to allow them to move 
 freely. The column at the greatest distance from the 
 enemy should be also farthest to the front, the others 
 being thrown back in echelon so as to afford mutual 
 support. If the enemy attacks the first column, he is 
 liable to a flank attack from the others ; if he attacks 
 the last column, those in front are in close supporting 
 distance for it. 
 
 In Figure 9, M M represents the enemy in posi- 
 tion ; A is the flanking detachment ; B, C, and D the 
 three columns into which the mass to be moved is divi- 
 ded. The columns are moving left in front, so that by 
 simply wheeling to the right, line of battle is formed 
 in echelon towards the enemy. The baggage E may 
 follow the same road as D, or a still more distant one, 
 
FLANK MARCHES. 
 
 145 
 
 *i 
 8, 
 
 H- 
 
 tt 
 t* 
 
 I 
 
 if there is such. The columns may be a thousand 
 paces from each other. The first column might be too 
 seriously compromised if the others were more distant. 
 When several columns are to march in this way by 
 the flank, it may be necessary to make roads to enable 
 them to preserve the proper distances. It was for- 
 merly a very common thing to make roads for the 
 numerous columns of an army as they approached 
 
146 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 the field of battle ; but in later years, when armies 
 are moved with so much more rapidity and ease, it is 
 seldom done. However, Napoleon had several roads 
 cut out of the rocky banks of the Saale, in the night 
 preceding the famous battle of Jena. It might be 
 done again when necessary.* 
 
 It was the habit of Frederick the Great, when his 
 enemy was incapable of rapid manoeuvres, to fall 
 upon him by a flank march. He formed his own army 
 on such occasions in two columns of companies, so 
 that by wheeling to the right or left he at once formed 
 line of battle facing the enemy. For this pur- 
 pose, he changed the direction of his march when 
 near the enemy, under cover of some inequality of 
 ground and protected by the advanced guard. These 
 long columns ran the risk of being attacked in front, 
 and often would have been if the enemy had been 
 more prompt, but Frederick knew with whom he had 
 to do. Sometimes, to remedy this grave objection, he 
 moved forward in four columns, and upon changing 
 direction formed two which could wheel at once into 
 a double line, constituting his line of battle. See Fig- 
 ure 10. The two central columns A and A are com- 
 posed entirely of infantry ; one-half of each goes in- 
 to the front line, and the other half into the second 
 line. The columns B and C, of cavalry, are also 
 each divided equally between the front and second 
 
 * Roads were cut at Cerro Gordo by the Americans under General 
 Scott. 
 
! 
 
 FLANK MAKCHES. 
 
 147 
 
 It 
 
 V 
 
 
 iV_ T> ^_ \x 
 
 \ ^""- ;u " L ' JU , b A " o!uiJ - aitJi: 
 
 Fig. 10. 
 
 lines of the line of battle, of which they form the 
 wings. An advanced guard D covers the heads of 
 the columns arid masks their movements. The rear- 
 guard E of the columns, becomes the reserve of the 
 line of battle. 
 
 Art. IV. Marches in Retreat. 
 
 A retreat may be simply a retrograde movement 
 of one army before another, without an engagement 
 between them, which demands nothing more than the 
 ordinary precautions for a march ; or it may be after 
 a defeat, and the general who conducts such an oper- 
 ation will need all the firmness and experience of the 
 finished soldier. The essential thing in a retreat is to 
 get the start of the pursuing enemy and shake him 
 
148 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 off. Forced marches become necessary, and they must 
 often be made at night. Night marches are not ob- 
 jectionable in such circumstances, as there is little or 
 no danger of the retreating army falling into an am- 
 buscade. On the other hand, the pursuing army has 
 that danger to apprehend, and must be proportionally 
 circumspect. The necessary inconveniences and fa- 
 tigue accompanying night marches must be expected 
 and endured, for safety has become the paramount 
 consideration. Marshal Turenne, after his defeat at 
 Marienthal, held his ground until night, and then 
 took advantage of the darkness to move off, com- 
 pletely distancing the Imperial troops, who dreaded 
 an ambuscade and preferred to wait for daylight. 
 Sometimes a movement to the rear may be concealed 
 from the enemy by lighting the camp fires as if to 
 spend the night, and leaving a few men to keep them 
 burning, while the army passes off quietly. The de- 
 tachments thus left behind may set off just before 
 daylight and readily rejoin the main body. 
 
 When a start is gained in this way, it is important 
 to keep it, even at the sacrifice of some of the wagons 
 that move too slowly. In such times the safety of the 
 troops is the important thing. Every thing, however, 
 should be carried off that can be, and especially the 
 artillery should be saved. 
 
 As soon as the commander has determined to re- 
 treat, he should order the officer having charge of the 
 train of wagons to move off at once on the route in- 
 
MARCHES IN KETKEA.T. 149 
 
 dicated to him, and to push along as rapidly as pos- 
 sible. The road may thus be cleared to some distance 
 to the rear. 
 
 It is a very difficult thing for an army to commence 
 a retreat in presence of the enemy, especially after a 
 severe battle. It should hold its own as well as it 
 can, repulsing the attacks of the victorious army, and 
 yielding ground only foot by foot, until some position 
 is reached where a stand may be made during the 
 remainder of the day. The general should take advan- 
 tage of the first opportunity to collect his scattered 
 troops, cause them to take some food and rest, while 
 he arranges the order of march and organizes a rear- 
 guard. Notwithstanding the darkness, each corps 
 must take the place assigned it, after procuring the 
 means for transporting the wounded. It will thus 
 usually be midnight before the retreat really begins. 
 If it is absolutely necessary to abandon the wounded, 
 they should be collected in such houses as may be at 
 hand, with physicians and other attendants, and left 
 to the generosity of the victors. 
 
 The rear-guard should be formed of the best 
 troops, or of those which have suffered least. It 
 should be well provided with artillery, as this will 
 keep the enemy at a distance, and force him to fre- 
 quent deployments which delay his movement for- 
 ward, and give the retiring army time to get a good 
 start, and occupy some advantageous position for 
 checking the pursuit. The rear-guard is expected 
 
150 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 to make a bold front wherever the ground is favora- 
 ble ; and as the main body continues its marches, the 
 interval between them must often be considerable. 
 The composition of the rear-guard should, therefore, 
 be such that it may take care of itself on all kinds of 
 ground. It is impossible to say exactly what should 
 be its strength ; but, as a general rule, a rear-guard in 
 retreat should be stronger than an advanced guard in 
 an advance. Less than one-fifth the whole force 
 would be too little, and sometimes one-quarter would 
 cot be too much for the rear-guard, for, independently 
 of its daily combats, its duties are extremely fatiguing, 
 since the same troops, on account of the difficulty of 
 changing them, are often obliged to constitute the 
 rear-guard during the whole of a retreat. 
 
 On the march, the rear-guard is divided into three 
 parts : its main body, which keeps together as much 
 as possible ; the rear detachment, which sends word of 
 the approach of the enemy, and gives time to make 
 arrangements to receive him ; and an intermediate de- 
 tachment, to keep up communication with the army, 
 and occupy defiles which are to be passed. In addi- 
 tion, there are small detachments of flankers. 
 
 Perfect order should be preserved in the rear-guard. 
 That detachment which is in the immediate presence 
 of the enemy should march l>y the rear rank, so as to 
 be with its proper front rank to the enemy, if obliged 
 to halt and engage him. 
 
 In an open country, the rear-guard should inarch 
 
MARCHES IN KETREAT. 151 
 
 in several columns. In a defile, on the contrary, the 
 whole must be in a single column, except the flankers, 
 who try to move along the heights. Squares are 
 formed in open ground, if the cavalry of the enemy is 
 annoying. These squares should afford mutual pro- 
 tection, by flanking each other with their fire. The 
 rear detachment should be of light artillery, and the 
 best cavalry in the command. If it becomes engaged 
 with overwhelming forces, it must retire at a gallop, 
 and take shelter with the columns of infantry, or in 
 the intervals of the squares. 
 
 In a very broken country, infantry will form the 
 rear detachment, as neither cavalry nor artillery could 
 manoeuvre freely. The cavalry and artillery would 
 then be mostly with the leading portions of the rear- 
 guard. 
 
 The commander of the rear-guard should be con- 
 stantly on the qui-vive, to avoid being surprised. On 
 the march, he will not only keep out his flankers, but 
 will send out detachments, to occupy any points where 
 the enemy might debouch upon the flank of his line of 
 march. These detachments will remain in position 
 until the whole rear-guard has passed, and will then 
 join the rear detachment. At halts, the troops should 
 be in order of battle, all approaches being carefully 
 guarded. The men will not be all allowed to eat at 
 once. The march will only be resumed when all the 
 detachments have come in. 
 
 Passing a Bridge in Retreat U there is a bridge on 
 
152 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 the road, the main body, after passing it, will leave 
 a sufficient force to hold it until the arrival of the in- 
 termediate detachment, of which mention has been 
 made. When the rear-guard is informed of the facts, 
 it halts at some distance from the bridge and deploys, 
 in order to check the pursuit of the enemy. When 
 the resistance has been sufficiently prolonged, the rear- 
 guard retires in echelon or in the checker order, and 
 passes the bridge by the wings, taking position on the 
 other bank, where a part of the artillery has already 
 been advantageously placed. The rear detachment 
 of the rear-guard makes a final effort to defend the 
 entrance to the bridge, while the sappers make prepa- 
 rations for burning or otherwise destroying it. Several 
 pieces of artillery will be placed in position to enfilade 
 the bridge, and others will cross their fire in front of 
 the entrance. The sharpshooters on the bank endeavor 
 to retard the establishment of the enemy's batteries, 
 and the battalions take advantage of all cover aiforded 
 by the ground, to protect themselves from the artillery 
 fire. 
 
 The difficulties of the passage are much increased, 
 if the bridge, from peculiarities of the ground, is 
 opposite one of the extremities of the line of battle 
 instead of the centre, as the rear-guard must then ma- 
 noeuvre by but one wing, and the other is necessarily 
 fixed in front of the bridge until the remainder of the 
 force has passed. 
 
 If the bridge is destroyed, the enemy is necessarily 
 
MARCHES IN RETREAT. 153 
 
 checked for a greater or less time. If it cannot be de- 
 stroyed, the rear-guard, after holding its position as 
 long as possible without compromising its safety, will 
 resume its march to the rear. The commander will 
 first send to the rear those battalions that are farthest 
 from the bridge; then a part of the artillery will take 
 up some position where it may sweep the road and 
 the neighboring ground, and the cavalry will be on 
 the flanks, to charge the first troops engaging in the 
 pursuit. Skirmishers will cover the retreat, taking 
 advantage of ditches, hedges, and other like obstacles. 
 They thus form a screen which protects and masks 
 the columns. 
 
 It may be sometimes advisable to cross the bridge 
 at a run, but care should be taken to avoid confusion 
 in crossing, and there should be prompt return to the 
 ranks, and order on the other side of the stream. 
 
 Passing other Defiles. The hints given above will 
 suggest the precautions to be taken in passing other 
 defiles than bridges, such as a road through a marsh, 
 a long, narrow mountain pass, a village with narrow 
 streets, thickly built. In such cases, care must be 
 taken to get well the start of the pursuing enemy, to 
 look for, seize, and hold, until all have passed, any 
 lateral roads by which he might attempt to attack in 
 flank, and cut off a portion of the column. Narrow 
 defiles may be obstructed by the use of various simple 
 devices, and the enemy forced to great delay. It must 
 not be forgotten that a defile is a favorable situation to 
 7* 
 
154 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 form an ambuscade for part of the enemy's force. An 
 attempt of this sort may often be carried out with 
 ease, and produce the effect of entirely stopping the 
 pursuit. 
 
 The commander of a rear-guard is often placed in 
 the most trying positions. To acquit himself with 
 credit, he should possess much firmness and activity, 
 and be acquainted with all the resources of the tacti- 
 cian. He should possess the confidence of his men 
 and the respect of his enemies. If there is no post 
 more dangerous than that of commanding the rear- 
 guard, there is certainly none more honorable. Mar- 
 shal JS~ey acquired an imperishable fame by his con- 
 duct as chief of the rear-guard of the French army, in 
 its sad and terrible retreat from Moscow. For several 
 weeks successively he was fighting the enemy every 
 day, and more than once engaged in hand to hand 
 conflicts, like a simple grenadier. Soldiers will never 
 forget the glorious deeds of that heroic spirit, who was 
 the last to leave the hostile soil, after enduring, with 
 a few brave comrades, all the dangers and privations 
 poured by cruel fortune upon the heads of that fam- 
 ished and shattered army, which entered Kussia in 
 such imposing array but a short time before. 
 
SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENTS, ETC. 155 
 
 Art. V. The simultaneous movement of several 
 Columns. 
 
 Thus far we have considered but a single' column or 
 army corps, marching along one road. It remains to 
 say something with reference to the movement of a 
 great army of several corps, upon the supposition that 
 the enemy is near. 
 
 As each of these columns is liable to attack sepa- 
 rately, and may have to take care of itself for a time, 
 until supported, the same precautions for its safety 
 should be taken as if it^were isolated and alone._ Thus 
 every thing contained in the preceding articles is ap- 
 plicable to each of these columns. Each should have 
 its advanced guard, rear-guard and flankers; and 
 should break into as many smaller columns as circum- 
 stances may require, and the locality permit. Each 
 should select its positions, encampments, or bivouacs, 
 of course within the limits properly falling to it. But 
 each should deport itself as a part of the great mass, 
 and all manoeuvre towards the common end. 
 
 Independently of the special advanced guards of the 
 several columns, one of the corps should precede the 
 others, and form a general advanced guard for the 
 army, and another will form a general rear-guard or 
 reserve. The arrangement of a great army of five 
 
156 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 corps, marching on three roads, is shown in fig. 11. 
 The central road is occupied by three corps, A, B, and 
 C, the first forming the general advanced guard, the 
 second the centre of the army, and the third the gene- 
 ral rear-guard, more properly in such a case called the 
 reserve. The other two roads are followed by the 
 corps D and E respectively, which serve as flankers to 
 the principal column. 
 
 The lateral extent of ground, as D E, embraced by 
 the columns, is called the front of the inarch. It is 
 usually a distance of several leagues, so that all kinds 
 of ground may be found within its limits. There is 
 one rule never to be disregarded : to avoid leaving 
 between any two columns obstacles such as rivers, 
 lakes, extensive marshes, impassable ranges of hills, 
 which would prevent the corps from communicating 
 with each other, and rendering aid in case of need. 
 If such an obstacle occur, either the whole army 
 should make a detour to avoid it, or the column which 
 would be separated from the others, if not moved in 
 the original direction, should turn to the right or left 
 and fall behind the nearest corps, where it would remain 
 until enabled to regain its proper place. The corps 
 on the flanks should occupy any defiles through which 
 their communication is kept up with the main column. 
 
 The distance between two of the parallel columns 
 should not be more than from five to six miles. The 
 general advanced guard, being on the principal road, 
 along which it may fall back, if necessary, should be 
 
SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENTS, ETC. 157 
 
 44 
 44 
 44 
 
 44- 
 + + 
 4 + 
 
158 PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 at a greater distance ; in fact, it should be as far to 
 the front as possible, consistently with safety. Twenty 
 or twenty-five miles would often be not too great a 
 distance, although a precise limit cannot be laid down 
 for it. The general reserve may be from six to ten 
 miles in rear of the main body. 
 
 The reserve artillery, the great train, and the most 
 cumbrous baggage- wagons are collected, as well as 
 possible, in the safest place, as at F in the figure. Each 
 column, however, is accompanied by whatever is 
 indispensable in the way of baggage, &c., which follows 
 in its rear, under charge of a guard. The fewer the 
 wagons, &c., attached to a column, the better for it ; 
 but there are always too many. 
 
 The commander-in-chief generally stays with the 
 central corps, because he is then in the most con- 
 venient position for transmitting his orders to the 
 other corps, and receiving reports from them. He 
 may join the advanced guard when it is necessary to 
 examine the ground before the army reaches it, or to 
 see the disposition of the troops of the enemy. 
 
 In order that the march may be executed in the 
 best manner, the chief of each corps ought to know 
 its general object ; to be told what corps are respect- 
 ively before and behind him, and on his flanks ; from 
 what quarter he is to expect support in case of need ; 
 in what direction he mast move if assailed by very 
 superior forces. There should, moreover, be a con- 
 stant interchange of couriers, orderly officers, or aides, 
 
SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENTS, ETC. 159 
 
 between the general head-quarters and the several 
 corps, in order that, on the one hand, the chief of the 
 staff, who prepares the orders of march, may be con- 
 stantly informed how they are carried out, and may 
 communicate to the commanding general the real 
 condition of affairs at any moment ; and, on the other 
 hand, that the commanders of corps may be kept 
 acquainted with passing events, and instructed as to 
 the necessary modification of details in carrying out 
 the main plan. The orders sent to the different corps 
 of the French army, by Berthier, during the inarches 
 which preceded Napoleon's great battles, are worthy 
 of careful study. 
 
 If an enemy is met in front by an army marching, 
 as in fig. 11, the advanced guard A falls back 
 nearer to the main body, at least until it reaches a 
 position that may be held, when it makes an effort to 
 maintain it. The corps D and E oblique towards 
 the central column, still gaining ground towards the 
 front. The central corps B hastens up to the support 
 of A. D and E unite and form a second line. The 
 reserve C will come up and be employed as the com- 
 mander-in-chief may think fit. 
 
 These are the most natural dispositions, but they 
 may be modified in many ways ; for example, D and 
 E may join A, and form a first line, the other joining 
 B, and forming a second line. Three corps may be 
 put in the first line, and two in the second ; or, two 
 in the first and three in the second, &c. This will 
 
160 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 depend on the ulterior designs of the general, and the 
 relative facilities offered by distances and the ground 
 of bringing up one or the other corps to the support 
 of the advanced guard ; or he may be influenced by 
 some other of the many circumstances which are con- 
 stantly arising to interfere with what would be 
 invariable rules in war. There is one great advan- 
 tage in this, for the enemy cannot know, until the last 
 moment, the disposition of the troops he is to contend 
 against. 
 
 If the enemy shows himself in force in such a posi- 
 tion as to threaten the flank of the army, all the corps 
 change direction towards that side, and it will be seen 
 that the general arrangement remains unchanged. 
 There is still an advanced corps, a reserve, a central 
 corps, and one on each flank. Suppose, for example 
 (fig. 11), the army to have changed direction to the 
 right : D forms the advanced guard, B remains in the 
 centre, A and C are on the flanks, and E is the 
 reserve. In retreat, or to attack an enemy who is in 
 the rear, the arrangement is the same. 
 
 No general ever understood better this mechanical 
 part of the art, or applied it more skilfully, than 
 Napoleon. The history of this wonderful man offers 
 to every student of military affairs the most instructive 
 lessons. It is necessary to go back in history as far 
 as Julius Caesar to find a general at all to be compared 
 with him. 
 
 The inarch of the Russian army before the battle of 
 
SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENTS, ETC. 161 
 
 Austerlitz was made in a manner entirely similar to 
 that shown above. This army, under the orders of 
 Kutosof, was moving along the road from Olmutz to 
 Brnnn (see fig. 12), in order to engage the French 
 army, whose advanced guard was at Wichau. The 
 French main body was between Brunn and Austerlitz. 
 Kutosof divided his army of 95,000 men into five 
 columns, leaving between them only space enough 
 for deployment. The columns on the Hanks were but 
 subdivisions of the corps E and 
 D, being under the same com- 
 mander. Three corps were 
 
 . AU8TERLITZ 
 
 marching on the main road ; A, 
 commanded by Bagration, being 
 the advanced guard ; B, under 
 the immediate eye of Kutosof, 
 but having its own commander, 
 a lieutenant-general,forming the 
 centre ; 0, commanded by the 
 Grand Duke Con stan tine, as 
 the reserve. The two columns 
 on the right, D, composed a 
 corps under General Buxhow- 
 den, and the two left columns,E, ^OLMUTZ 
 
 also a single corps, directed by Fig. 12. 
 
 Prince Li chten stein. So far, all was well. The 
 Russians were defeated, but it was because they com- 
 mitted the fault of making a long circular movement 
 around Austerlitz with a portion of the army, in order 
 
162 PRINCIPLES OF STEATEGY. 
 
 to turn the right of the French army, M. The centre 
 was too much weakened: Napoleon fell in force upon 
 that point, and the Russians were completely beaten. 
 
 After laying down the general rule, it must be 
 stated that circumstances may, and often do, render 
 modifications of it necessary. The essential thing is 
 to conform to the principle, that the different corps, 
 into which an army is necessarily divided, ought 
 always to have such relative positions that their con- 
 centration may be easily effected, before the enemy 
 can unite his forces against one of the corps. In an 
 open country the rule must be strictly adhered to ; 
 but whenever any natural obstacle delays the march of 
 the enemy, and renders a concentrated attack upon his 
 part difficult, while, at the same time, protecting the 
 movements of the other army, there may be greater 
 space between the columns of the latter, and a more 
 extended field may be embraced in the manoeuvre, if 
 some important result may thereby be gained, or 
 the object of the campaign be more perfectly attained. 
 
 In 1805, when Napoleon had concentrated his army 
 in the neighborhood of Stuttgard and Ludwigsburg, 
 intending to cross the Danube and take in the rear 
 the Austrian army, which was established near Ulm 
 (see fig. 13), he divided his army into four columns, 
 of which the first, on the right, commanded by 
 Marshal Ney, was to move upon Giinzburg, near Ulm, 
 to attract the attention of the Austrians in that direc- 
 tion. The second column, composed of the corps 
 
SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENTS, ETC. 
 
 163 
 
 of Soult, Murat, and 
 Lannes, on the same 
 road, and at a half day's 
 march from each other, 
 was to be directed upon 
 Donauwerth, twenty- 
 five miles lower down 
 the Danube than Giinz- 
 burg. The third col- 
 umn, containing the 
 corps of Davoust and 
 Marmont, passed the 
 Danube at Newburg, 
 ten or twelve miles be- 
 low Donauwerth. Fi- 
 nally, the fourth column, under Bernadotte, was direct- 
 ed towards Ingolstadt, eight or ten miles lower still. 
 There were bridges at all the towns named in the fig- 
 ure. In this manoeuvre-march there was a distance of 
 forty-five miles between the right and left columns, 
 but the fact of a great river like the Danube being be- 
 tween the two armies, the certainty that the enemy 
 had not collected his entire forces, made the probability 
 of attack very small. If the right corps had been at- 
 tacked, it would have fallen back upon the central col- 
 umn moving along the Danube, which would have 
 been a protection to one of its flanks. The enemy, hav- 
 ing his attention drawn to this retrograde movement, 
 would have abandoned the right bank of the river, 
 
 Fig. 13. 
 
164 PKINCTPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 where was his line of operations, and the general ma- 
 noeuvre would have equally succeeded. There was, 
 therefore, no real disadvantage in thus separating this 
 column from the others. If, on the contrary, the enemy 
 should make a flank movement towards Donauwerth, 
 with all his disposable force, he would find there Na- 
 poleon himself and the principal French column, 
 while he was all the time outflanked by the other two 
 columns, the nearest of which might be brought np 
 in a day. The distances were so calculated that the 
 strongest column, the one by Donauwerth, was to arrive 
 in advance of the others, and they were echeloned in 
 such a manner, that the first having passed the Dan- 
 ube during the 6th and 7th of October, the second 
 would arrive at Newburg on the 8th, and the last at 
 Ingolstadt on the 10th. So that really only the Donau- 
 werth column was attackable, and as it was composed 
 of three corps near together, it could dispute the 
 ground until the arrival of the others ; or else, if 
 forced to retire, it might move down the right bank 
 of the Danube, protected in flank by the river, until 
 reinforced the next day by the column from ISTew- 
 burg, and still later by the column from Ingolstadt, 
 while, in the mean time, the Giinzburg column was 
 threatening the flank and rear of the enemy. The 
 more study is given to this manoeuvre-march, the wiser 
 does it seem. There is no supposition to which it 
 does not adjust itself, and still the front of the march 
 was more than fifty miles. This is another proof that 
 
ETC. 165 
 
 in war every thing depends on the skill with which 
 the arrangements are made to suit the topography of 
 the field of action. 
 
 After crossing the river, all the corps changed 
 direction to the right, in order, by a movement of 
 considerable extent, to envelope the position of Uhn, 
 and take possession of the bridges of the Lech, by 
 which the Anstrians might attempt to escape. The 
 whole army described a circle around Giinzburg while 
 Key held that point, his corps becoming the pivot of 
 that grand movement. Soult's corps, which at first 
 formed the advanced guard, became the left flank ; 
 Murat and Lannes, who were in the centre, became 
 the general advanced guard ; Davoust and Marmont 
 now formed the centre. *N"ey was on the right, and 
 Bernadotte was the reserve. In this way the army, 
 which had arrived upon the Danube, presenting the 
 right flank to the enemy, advanced upon him by a 
 front march, after passing the river. The results of 
 this skilful plan are well known. Ulm capitulated ; 
 nearly a whole army was captured ; only a small part 
 of it escaped along the left bank of the Danube, while 
 the French were passing to the right. 
 
 Fig. 13 exhibits the features of this combination. 
 M M represents that part of the Austrian army which 
 was assembled at Ulm and Giinzburg ; A is the corps 
 of Key flanking the other columns, and moving upon 
 Giinzburg, where he was to hold the bridges. B, C, and 
 D, the corps of Soult, Murat, and Lannes, forming 
 
166 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 the principal column, are represented as arriving at 
 Donauwerth ; the first of these, having crossed the river 
 the previous day, is marching towards Augsburg, to 
 secure the bridge over the Lech at that point ; 
 the other two, after passing through Donauwerth 
 and seizing Rain, turn to the right and form the 
 new general advanced guard. E and F, commanded 
 by Davoust and Victor, will reach Newburg the next 
 day, and, having crossed the Danube at that point, 
 will turn to the right and move towards the bridge of 
 Rain, to form the centre of the army. Bernadotte's 
 corps, G, making the fourth column, is directed upon 
 Ingolstadt and Munich, being intended to be the gene- 
 ral reserve for the army. 
 
 Enough has been said to explain the merely me- 
 chanical part of manoeuvre-marches made by several 
 columns, and to show the spirit of such combinations. 
 If the country is open, and the enemy near, the 
 columns keep together, and march so as to be ready 
 to give prompt m'utual support. If, on the contrary, 
 the troops of the enemy are scattered or at a distance, 
 or if large rivers intersect the country and give secu- 
 rity against sudden attack, the columns may be sepa- 
 rated by greater distances, and may even present them- 
 selves obliquely, provided their relative positions are 
 preserved, so as to permit concentration in case of 
 need. "When shall the rule be strictly observed? 
 When and how far may a deviation from it be permit- 
 ted ? These questions admit of no answers. Circum- 
 
SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENTS, ETC. 167 
 
 stances, which are always different, must decide in 
 each particular case that arises. Here is the place for 
 the general to show his ability. The military art 
 would not be so difficult in practice, and those who 
 have become so distinguished in it would not have 
 acquired their renown, had it been a thing of invaria- 
 ble rules. To be really a general, a man must have 
 great tact and discernment, in order to adopt the best 
 plan in each case as it presents itself; he must have a 
 ready coup d'ceil, so as to do the right thing at the 
 right time and place, for what is excellent one day 
 may be very injudicious the next. The plans of a 
 great captain seem like inspirations, so rapid are the 
 operations of the mind from which they proceed ; not- 
 withstanding this, every thing is taken into account 
 and weighed ; each circumstance is appreciated and 
 properly estimated ; objects which escape entirely the 
 observation of ordinary minds r may to him seem so 
 important as to become the principal means of indu- 
 cing him to pursue a particular course. As a necessary 
 consequence, a deliberative council is a poor director 
 of the operations of a campaign. As another conse- 
 quence, no mere theorizer can be a great general. 
 
168 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 CHAPTER IY. 
 
 BATTLES. 
 
 BATTLTSS are the most conspicuous features of a cam- 
 paign. A general may often put off a battle if he 
 is not willing to fight; but a prolonged delay may 
 become more damaging than a battle, on account of 
 the many small combats and daily skirmishes which 
 lead to no decisive result, and in the end occasion 
 considerable losses ; besides, the country around, from 
 which the armies draw their supplies, may become 
 exhausted. It is sometimes impossible to pursue a 
 temporizing policy, because the country may not be 
 of a suitable character, or the enemy may press so 
 vigorously as to compel either a battle or a retreat. 
 Again, a commander may fight a battle, when im- 
 pelled thereto not by any necessity, but by the hope 
 of great results from a victory. This he may do, if 
 decidedly superior in the numbers and quality of his 
 troops, when the enemy is expecting considerable re- 
 enforcements, or his different corps are too distant and 
 disunited for mutual support, or his generals are on 
 bad terms, or give evidence of irresolution and inca- 
 pacity, &c. Although success is always doubtful, as 
 fortune has quite as much to do in deciding battles as 
 
BATTLES. 169 
 
 the talents and foresight of the commander-in-chief, 
 there are other motives than those already mentioned 
 which may induce him to fight a decisive engage- 
 ment ; such as the wish to relieve a besieged city ; to 
 extricate himself from a position where supplies are 
 failing ; to open a campaign by a brilliant stroke, 
 which will demoralize the opposing army and animate 
 his own. If it were possible to avoid battles and ruin 
 the enemy by other means less influenced by fortune, 
 the most ordinary prudence should lead to the adop- 
 tion of the latter. But a battle is generally the only 
 means of putting an end to the many other ills of a 
 protracted war, and gives the wisest and speediest path 
 to lasting peace ; for, after a great victory, the con- 
 queror may dictate terms ; and even the defeated party 
 goes from a severely contested field without disgrace, 
 and may reasonably expect the consideration always 
 due to courage and devotion to duty. 
 
 No general should determine to bring about so 
 solemn and momentous a transaction as a great battle 
 without having upon his side as many elements of 
 success as possible. Therefore, all troops within a 
 reasonable distance of his army, which are not abso- 
 lutely necessary to guard other important points,, 
 should be called to him, for one battalion more or less 
 may decide the fate of the day. If he has a great 
 number of troops, only enough to engage the enemy 
 thoroughly should be at first brought into action, the 
 remainder being manoeuvred against the flanks, or 
 8 
 
170 PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 held in reserve, for use as occasion may require. The 
 army should, if possible, be placed in such a position 
 before the battle is begun, as to make the victory, if 
 gained, lead to great results; as, for example, to the 
 separation of the enemy from his depots and re-en- 
 forcements ; to his being forced back, after defeat, upon 
 some obstacle, like a lake, or river, or defile, where 
 his forces may be wholly or in part captured or dis- 
 persed. "When the features of the country are unfa- 
 vorable to either army, it should fight with so much 
 the greater order and obstinacy, that it may wrest 
 from the enemy the advantages he has. When vic- 
 tory is essential for the preservation of life or liberty, 
 men will perform prodigies of valor. A skilful com- 
 mander knows how to bring success out of what in- 
 spires ordinary minds with despair. Cortez, after 
 landing on the sea-shore the small force which was to 
 conquer Mexico, burned his ships, and thus compelled 
 his men to rely entirely on their swords, as there was 
 no way left for retreat. 
 
 Art. I. Definitions. Orders of Battle. 
 
 If an army were always drawn up in the same 
 manner, it would be certainly beaten by another 
 w'hose dispositions were changed to suit varying cir- 
 cumstances. There is no invariable order of battle. 
 It will always depend upon the locality. In a con- 
 tracted space, an army will be drawn up in several 
 successive lines ; if, on the contrary, the front to be 
 
DEFINITIONS. OTtDEJRS OF BATTLE. 171 
 
 occupied is great, but a single line may be used. 
 This use of one or more lines will depend on the topo- 
 graphy of the battle-field, the circumstances of the 
 moment, the forces and position of the enemy, the 
 kind of troops forming the mass of his army, the char- 
 acter of his commanders, &c. 
 
 As a rule, troops in battle should be drawn up in 
 several lines, as far as possible, to prevent the whole 
 from being exposed to the first shock, and to enable 
 one portion to be used to relieve or support another 
 when necessary. 
 
 Usually, an army is formed in two lines, affording 
 mutual support. The infantry and cavalry are dis- 
 tributed in these two lines, as the commander may 
 deem expedient ; but the artillery is always in the 
 first line, and even in front of it, in order to have a 
 wide field of view, and to take the masses of the enemy 
 obliquely as they advance to the attack. The line of 
 caissons is in rear of their pieces, but near enough to 
 supply them readily. The first line of the order of 
 battle is disposed in such a way as to be able to come 
 into action as soon as the contending forces are within 
 range of the small arms. Up to that moment the 
 time is occupied in manoeuvres, the formation of lines 
 and columns, movements to the front and rear, &c. 
 The second line keeps out of fire, taking advantage of 
 undulations of ground, until its support becomes neces- 
 sary. 
 
 Besides these two lines, a reserve is organized of all 
 
172 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 arms of the service, which is held at some suitable 
 point in rear, until called upon to move to some point 
 where it is needed. This reserve, composed chiefly of 
 cavalry and artillery, is under the immediate orders 
 of the commander-in-chief, who uses it at opportune 
 moments. "With this reserve, and especially with the 
 artillery, he re-enforces certain parts of his order of 
 battle during the action ; with the reserve cavalry, 
 enveloping movements of the enemy are repelled by 
 counter-attacks in flank ; with the entire force of the 
 reserve he strikes the blow which will decide the vic- 
 tory, or else repairs a disaster and re-establishes his 
 line. This is of great importance, for there is danger 
 in these movements of the original lines, which are 
 made under fire, and, being not understood by the 
 men, give them unnecessary alarm. More than one 
 battle has been lost by an attempt to make a change 
 in the order of battle during the actual progress of the 
 engagement. As the movement of any part of the 
 original line is, therefore, to be avoided, and a change 
 of front is sometimes necessary, for this purpose, if for 
 no other, a reserve is indispensable. The Romans 
 adopted the rule of multiplying reserve corps behind 
 the main army rather than prolong the wings, even if 
 their force was much superior. This is a good rule 
 still. In case of decided inferiority of numbers, the 
 reserve must, of necessity, be small comparatively, 
 because an army must not allow itself to be outflanked ; 
 but there must be a reserve. Upon the proper use of 
 
DEFINITIONS. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 173 
 
 this reserve success is dependent, no less than upon 
 preliminary arrangements and the courage of the 
 troops. Generally, that army whose reserve comes 
 last into action will be successful. A general shows 
 his skill in compelling his adversary to employ his 
 whole force while there is still unused, on his own 
 side, the weight which is at last to turn the scales in 
 his favor. 
 
 The battalions of the first line should be deployed, 
 in order that the artillery may injure them as little as 
 possible, and that they may deliver their own fire if 
 opportunity offers ; those of the second line are held 
 in compact columns, so as to be readily moved to the 
 front through the intervals of the first line, and against 
 the enemy, or to execute any other necessary move- 
 ment ; or, finally, to leave openings through which 
 the battalions of the first line may pass if driven back. 
 The battalions of the second line will, therefore, be 
 drawn up in close columns, as a rule; but this sup- 
 poses.the ground to be of such a character as to afford 
 cover to these masses, otherwise the artillery would 
 be very destructive, unless the line were held so far 
 to the rear as to be beyond good supporting distance 
 of the first. In that case, the second line would be 
 deployed like the first, and at a distance of 300 yards 
 or more. If the ground favors, it should be brought 
 up nearer. The topography of the field has, there- 
 fore, a very decided influence upon this first element 
 of the order of battle. 
 
174 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 The troops of an army corps should be divided be- 
 tween the two lines. For example, a corps of four 
 divisions would usually have two in each line. The 
 two lines, being under the orders of the same chief, 
 have a common interest, and will afford mutual sup- 
 port and assistance. If, on the contrary, entire 
 corps are formed in each line, it sometimes happens 
 that the commanders are jealous of each other, and 
 do not act in concert ; or the troops of the second line 
 may give a cold support to the first ; and the latter, 
 expecting such a state of affairs, lose confidence and 
 fight feebly. This arrangement is, however, quite 
 frequently resorted to, and really has its advantages, 
 for the commander has not his attention divided be- 
 tween two lines; and the second, being not so inti- 
 mately connected with the first, is more disposable 
 for such movements as may be necessary. In a 
 broken country, the first is undoubtedly the best ar- 
 rangement, inasmuch as it reduces the front by half, 
 and lends itself better to varying ground. 
 
 The reserve should be composed of independent 
 and entire bodies, in order to have independence and 
 capability of rapid movement wherever its presence 
 may be required. 
 
 A corps of sixteen battalions, divided into four 
 brigades, two in the first line and two in the second, 
 and with twenty-four pieces of artillery, would re- 
 quire about 1,500 or 2,000 yards front, or about one 
 mile. This would be increased or diminished, accord- 
 
DEFINITIONS. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 175 
 
 ing to the character of the ground. If in one line, 
 the extent of front required would be about two miles, 
 a greater space than one man can readily keep well 
 under his eye, especially in a wooded or rolling 
 country. 
 
 Tacticians give different names to the order of bat- 
 tle, according to the manner of arranging it. It may 
 be the continuous order or the order with intervals. 
 "With respect to the hostile army, it may be parallel 
 or oblique. These different varieties are usually all 
 found in the same army when engaged, some parts of 
 the line being continuous and others with intervals, 
 some parts parallel and others oblique, in some places 
 single and in others double. But each of these 
 dispositions must be examined separately in order to 
 appreciate its properties. 
 
 The parallel order, as its name imports, is that in 
 which the two armies are drawn in front of each 
 other, so as to become engaged simultaneously along 
 the whole line. Such must have been the style of the 
 earliest battles, where no science was required, and 
 success depended upon little else than individual 
 strength, and upon the courage and obstinacy of the 
 combatants. In this order, an equal effort is made 
 along the whole front. If a victory is obtained, it is 
 doubtless a complete success ; but, on the other hand, 
 a defeat is alike decisive. With equal bravery on 
 each side, the victory belongs in advance to the 
 more numerous party. 
 
176 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 The oblique order, on the contrary, is a disposition 
 by which a portion of the troops are carried against 
 the enemy's line, while the remainder are kept disen- 
 gaged. To use the technical terms, one wing is 
 thrown forward, while the other is refused. The first 
 is strengthened in every possible way, while the other 
 is reduced as much as it can be, without compromi- 
 sing its safety. An attempt is thus made to outflank 
 a wing of the opposing army, to crush the line at one 
 point, while attention is drawn to others. If the 
 enemy can be kept in a state of uncertainty, up to 
 the last moment, by false attacks, and by a skilful 
 direction given to the columns of attack ; if they are 
 promptly deployed, and only at the moment when 
 the action is about to begin, the enemy will have no 
 tune for counter-manoeuvres, or sending sufficient sup- 
 ports to the wing attacked, and will probably be de- 
 feated. Art may thus supply the want of numbers ; 
 and a small army, well commanded, may defeat a 
 large one, whose chief has not known how, or has not 
 been able, to mass his forces at the decisive point. 
 This art is in our day much more important than 
 with the ancients, because our lines are much more 
 extended. The troops drawn from parts not attacked, 
 to support those that are, sometimes cannot come up 
 soon enough to check the confusion; and the bat- 
 talions are overthrown one after another by the at- 
 tacking wing of the army adopting the oblique order, 
 which becomes more threatening by each successive 
 
DEFINITIONS. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 177 
 
 step and by the deployment of its whole strength. At 
 Leuthen this was the result, where Frederick, after 
 threatening for some time the right wing of the Aus- 
 trians, in order to induce them to draw a large part of 
 their forces to that point, attacked their left with his 
 best troops, took it in flank, drove it back upon the 
 centre, and followed up so closely that the different 
 corps, which came up from the opposite extremity to 
 arrest his progress, ware beaten in succession. 
 
 Among the generals of antiquity, Epaminondas 
 seems to have specially apprehended the advantages 
 of the oblique order, and to it he owed the famous 
 victories of Levetia and Mantinea. 
 
 By refusing one wing, not only is the advantage 
 secured of strengthening the other for the attack, but 
 at the same time means are held in hand for recover- 
 ing from the effect of a check, if one occurs, or for 
 protecting the retreat, if necessary. In fact, the fur- 
 ther the repulsed wing falls back, the more strongly 
 it is sustained by the troops left to the rear, which 
 come now successively into action. The front in- 
 creases and becomes more formidable ; a fresh attempt 
 may be made, or, if the battle is certainly lost, a re- 
 treat may be commenced under the protection of the 
 troops that have been but slightly engaged, and have 
 not suffered. "When the oblique order is properly 
 employed, it gives many chances of success, as has 
 been explained, and provides, as far as possible, against 
 mishaps. 
 8* 
 
178 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 When a wing is refused, artillery of the heaviest 
 calibre should be placed upon it, in order to keep the 
 opposite wing of the enemy at a respectful distance, 
 arid to prevent the order from becoming parallel. 
 The retired wing should also, as far as practicable, be 
 in a good position for defence, which may, in case of 
 need, be a set-off to its want of numbers. All natural 
 features should be taken advantage of, such as woods, 
 ravines, hills, &c., to afford support or cover to this 
 wing. 
 
 The oblique order, properly so called, is undoubt- 
 edly preferable to the parallel order ; but the latter 
 has also its advantages, especially when it is re-enforced 
 on one of its wings. It is very suitable for an army 
 having a numerical superiority, that can present equal 
 forces to the enemy's along the whole front, while at 
 the same time it doubles its lines and effects a con- 
 centration of strength on one wing. In thus attack- 
 ing the enemy in front, the victory will be more de- 
 cisive, because the battle will have raged seriously at 
 every point. This method, called the parallel order 
 re-enforced, conforms to principles, because a princi- 
 pal mass is brought against one point of the hostile 
 line, while at other points the opposing forces are 
 equal. Thus, in fact, the parallel order re-enforced is 
 analogous to the oblique order, and possesses the same 
 properties, though not in so great a degree. In both 
 there is a decisive effort at one wing, and simple dem- 
 onstrations, or a less serious engagement, at the other. 
 
DEFINITIONS. ORDEJiS OF BATTLE. 179 
 
 If, now, we compare the continued order with that 
 having intervals, either oblique or parallel, we will 
 see that the first can only be used in large plains free 
 from obstacles, where cavalry may always be placed 
 on the wings. The other may be used in all cases of 
 ground, and permits the use of the cavalry wherever 
 it can act, whether at the centre or on the wings. If, 
 in the continued order, the cavalry is put in the 
 centre, it loses all its advantages ; being kept down 
 to the pace of the infantry with which it is in line, it 
 loses its mobility, its chief, or, more accurately, its sole 
 source of success ; exposed, without possibility of re- 
 ply, to the fire of the artillery, it must either stand 
 still and be cut to pieces, or retire to a place of safety 
 and leave a large gap in the line of battle. The chief 
 of the cavalry would doubtless prefer to move forward, 
 being supposed to be a man of spirit ; but in charging 
 infantry, which is in good order, his force will be 
 overwhelmed by the fire, and probably dispersed; 
 either way, the gap still remains in the line of battle. 
 
 This took place at the battle of Hockstaedt, which 
 was gained, in 1704, by Eugene and Marlborough. 
 At the battle of Minden, Duke Ferdinand, seeing 
 Marshal de Contades place his cavalry in the centre, 
 where the ground was favorable to its action, directed 
 a portion of his infantry against it, giving orders that 
 when the infantry had dispersed the cavalry, it should 
 turn to the right and left and fall upon the flanks of 
 the enemy's line, while an attack was made in front by 
 
180 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 the remainder of the army. This manoeuvre, imitated 
 from that at Hockstaedt, was equally successful. In the 
 continued order, the cavalry must always be placed on 
 the wings, that it may have independence and mo- 
 bility ; and if the ground there is unfavorable for its 
 action, it is nearly useless. Such are the grave incon- 
 veniences of the continued order. 
 
 If, on the contrary, the different bodies of infantry 
 leave intervals between them, the cavalry and artil- 
 lery may easily act at opportune moments and wher- 
 ever necessary. But in order that these intervals may 
 not have the disadvantage, pointed out above, of leav- 
 ing gaps through which the enemy may penetrate, 
 the line should be formed in echelons, as shown in 
 fig. 14. By this arrangement the cavalry may be 
 held behind the echelons, ready to charge through the 
 intervals, as shown by the direction of the dotted line 
 A B. But this is not the sole advantage. The differ- 
 ent bodies, not being attached to each other, can be 
 more readily placed to suit the ground ; have greater 
 mobility in following up a success or withdrawing in 
 case of reverse ; the defeat of one does not necessa- 
 rily involve those adjacent ; one may rally under the 
 protection of another. Notwithstanding the inter- 
 vals, the entire line occupies the same front parallel 
 to the enemy as if drawn up in the continued order, 
 while permitting a still greater extension if circum- 
 stances require it. Each echelon flanks and supports 
 the preceding one, so that if the enemy attempts to 
 
DEFINITIONS. ORDEKS OF BATTLE. 
 
 181 
 
 pass through an interval, he is taken in flank by the 
 next echelon to the rear, while at the same time he ia 
 charged in front by the cavalry. Thus the order in 
 echelons facilitates the application of the principle, 
 that the different arms should be made to act on the 
 ground best suited to their manoeuvres ; but at the 
 same time the danger is avoided of leaving gaps in 
 the line of battle. 
 
 The first echelon, C D, may 
 be called the point. The second 
 line and the reserves support the 
 echelons of the first line, by 
 adopting a similar formation or 
 by accumulating near the point, 
 or in any other way circumstan- 
 ces may demand or the general 
 commanding may desire. 
 
 The checker order is the par- 
 allel order with intervals, the 
 several subdivisions being drawn 
 np in two lines, so that those of 
 the second line are opposite the 
 intervals of the first. This or- 
 der is wanting in solidity, be- 
 cause the subdivisions of the front 
 line are too far apart ; on the same front it gives but 
 half as much fire as a full line; with equal forces, it oc- 
 cupies double as much ground, which is almost always 
 an inconvenience rather than an advantage, especially 
 
 Fig. 14. 
 
182 PRINCIPLES OF STKATEGY. 
 
 if producing diminished solidity. The artillery cannot 
 be placed in the intervals of the first line, because it 
 would attract towards the battalions of the second 
 all the missiles of the enemy ; for it is an established 
 fact that artillery replies to artillery ; this being the 
 case, troops should not be in position behind batter- 
 ies, as thereby a double mark is offered to the enemy. 
 The intervals in the checker order or the quincunx 
 order are the more dangerous in proportion to the 
 proximity of the enemy, for he may, through such 
 openings, penetrate in mass, overthrow the simple line 
 which resists him, and drive it back upon the second 
 line, where the same confusion may be produced. 
 Generally, there should be no other intervals in a line 
 of battle than those strictly necessary for the move- 
 ments of the bodies of troops composing it. 
 
 This order, however, will be less vicious if the sec- 
 ond line is formed of cavalry, because these troops 
 may then charge through the openings before them. 
 Thus the checker order, somewhat modified, might be 
 partially adopted in an order of battle ; for example, 
 in a retired wing that must be extended to make a 
 greater show. In a retreat, this order is employed, 
 but rather as a manoeuvre than an order of battle ; it 
 is then used to withdraw successively the different 
 bodies of troops engaged with the enemy. When in 
 a line of battle several of the subdivisions are drawn 
 back in order to guard against flank attack, there is 
 formed what is called a crochet to the rear, If the 
 
DEFINITIONS. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 183 
 
 same subdivisions are thrown forward in advance of 
 the line of battle, but so that they are attached to it, 
 making an angle> there is formed the crochet to the 
 front. The former may become the wedge and the 
 latter the inverted wedge, when the two branches of 
 the line are about of equal length. The wedge is es- 
 sentially offensive, as an army would only adopt this 
 formation with the intention of making an attack to 
 pierce the opposing line, whilst the crochet to the rear 
 would be adopted as a defence against an enveloping 
 attack. The same may be said of the crochet to the 
 front and the inverted wedge, but in a contrary sense; 
 as the inverted wedge would be used when the object 
 was to yield in the centre to the enemy advancing on 
 that point, while enveloping his wings, it is a defen- 
 sive formation, the crochet to the front being offen- 
 sive. History describes a famous example where two 
 armies were formed, one like the wedge and the other 
 like the inverted wedge. It was the battle of Casilin, 
 fought in 533 between the Franks and Romans, near 
 Capua. The Franks were drawn up between two 
 woods; they re-enforced their centre, forming a real 
 wedge. The Romans were less numerous, and adopt- 
 ed an order having less depth but more extent, form- 
 ing an inverted wedge. They gave ground in the 
 centre and made their principal efforts against the 
 wings of the Franks, the cavalry, in the mean time, at- 
 tacking them in the rear after passing around one of 
 the woods, The front of the Frank wedge, continu- 
 
184: PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 ing to press forward, reached the Roman camp, the 
 confusion of the pillage leading to their own defeat. 
 The victory of the Romans was complete. 
 
 Art. II. Employment of the Different Arms. 
 
 When the columns have reached the field of battle, 
 and each is in the place marked out for it, the com- 
 manding general gives the signal for the action to be- 
 gin, arid each of his subordinate commanders prepares 
 to execute the general instructions he has received, 
 retaining a great latitude in the means of carrying 
 them out. They know, for example, that the right is 
 to make the great eifort ; that the left will be but 
 feebly engaged, and in a manner only to give the 
 enemy uneasiness and to retain him in his position ; 
 they regulate themselves accordingly, directing all 
 their movements and manoeuvres towards the com- 
 mon end. It is a sacred duty for each of them to 
 give any support his colleagues may require. As the 
 general-in-chief cannot be everywhere, it is for them 
 to supply his absence, and make every arrangement 
 that critical circumstances may require. They will 
 do well if in nothing they act in opposition to his 
 general plan. The greater their responsibility, the 
 greater will be their part of the glory if success 
 crowns their efforts, or even if deserted by fortune 
 they fail, provided they have borne themselves brave- 
 ly and honorably. 
 
 The battle is begun by skirmishers, who are thrown 
 
EMPLOYMENT OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 185 
 
 ont to the front, sometimes a thousand or fifteen hun- 
 dred paces. Supported at suitable intervals by more 
 compact bodies of troops and* by light batteries, they 
 attempt to check the enemy until the columns have 
 had time to deploy; or else, when an attack is to 
 be made, they cover the advancing columns, mask the 
 dispositions for the offensive, repel the opposing skir- 
 mishers, observe the latest positions of the enemy, 
 discover the vulnerable parts of his line, at the same 
 time keeping him uncertain of the real point of at- 
 tack, which should not be disclosed until the complete 
 deployment of the columns and the onset is just about 
 to be made. 
 
 Now the skirmishers should retire, either to permit 
 the columns to become engaged, or because they can 
 no longer resist the enemy and are obliged to give 
 way, disputing the ground foot by foot. When with- 
 in a short distance of the line of battle deployed be- 
 hind them, they fall back rapidly through the inter- 
 vals of the battalions and join their respective corps 
 or rally in rear. 
 
 As soon as the front of the army is unmasked, the 
 firing of the first line begins, the artillery first, and 
 then the infantry, when the armies are sufficiently near 
 for small arms to be effective. The firing is continued 
 until some disorder is observed in the opposing ranks. 
 This is the moment for forming columns of attack and 
 charging. If the enemy retires before this offensive 
 movement, the pursuit must not be headlong or disor- 
 
186 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 derly, but the columns should be halted, perfect order 
 restored as rapidly as possible, and then the onward 
 movement resumed against the second line, which is 
 usually disordered by the confusion of the first ; care 
 must also be taken that no part of the line of battle 
 be advanced far beyond the remainder. It is only 
 when the victory is certain, that the enemy may be 
 rapidly followed up, and then with the object of 
 making his retreat a rout. 
 
 When, on the other hand, it becomes necessary to 
 fall back, the ground should be disputed foot by foot, or- 
 der being preserved in the ranks as far as possible, that 
 advantage may be taken of the least fault committed by 
 the enemy. In every case, the second line will move up 
 to support the first, and take its place, making, if possi- 
 ble, a counter-attack upon the advancing enemy. This 
 will restore confidence to the troops, and prevent their 
 thoughts dwelling upon retreat ; and will, moreover, 
 arrest the enemy or drive him back. The same ground 
 is thus often taken and retaken several times by brave 
 troops. 
 
 The cavalry may charge at any favorable time, and 
 should never let slip any opportunity of rushing upon 
 disordered infantry, or an exposed flank, or a badly 
 supported battery, or of making a counter-movement 
 against cavalry in motion. For this reason it is neces- 
 sary to have convenient intervals, which will permit 
 the cavalry to pass through, and to seize proper mo- 
 ments for falling with lightning speed upon the ranks 
 
EMPLOYMENT OF THE DIFFERENT AKMS. 1ST 
 
 of the enemy. Generally it is advantageous not to 
 employ cavalry until a late period in the battle, as its 
 effect is better then, and it is also in better condition 
 to pursue the enemy in case of success, or to check 
 his advance in case of reverse. 
 
 The artillery continues firing during the whole en- 
 gagement. The cannon are often heard during the 
 first skirmishing, and also give the enemy a parting 
 salute when the victory is gained. The caissons should, 
 therefore, be abundantly supplied with ammunition. 
 The artillery is distributed in strong batteries, so as to 
 produce large gaps at certain points of the line in front, 
 into which the cavalry may rush. Without, perhaps, 
 doing more absolute injury in this way than if dis- 
 tributed uniformly along the front, the moral effect is 
 much greater. The soldier is filled with horror when 
 he sees his comrades fall rapidly around him, and 
 whole battalions swept away in an instant ; he loses 
 his presence of mind, he recoils ; and if the cavalry 
 presents itself at this moment, he is not in a condition 
 for resistance. All the artillery should not be accu- 
 mulated at one point, even if it were possible. It is 
 easier to cover, by undulations of the ground, several 
 separate batteries than a single one, containing all the 
 pieces. The fire should, as far as possible, be conver- 
 gent upon the important points of the line of the 
 enemy, as, for example, a wing that is to be crushed, 
 a salient angle that is to be enveloped, or a battery 
 that is to be dismounted, &c. 
 
188 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 The light artillery moves to the front to begin the 
 action, following oblique directions, as far as practica- 
 ble, both to unmask the other troops and to get slant- 
 ing fires upon the enemy's lines. This kind of artil- 
 lery should be bold, as its lightness enables it to escape 
 with ease. Usually accompanied by supports of cav- 
 alry, it falls suddenly upon the flank of the enemy, 
 advances, retires, halts, in order to avoid the attempts 
 made against it, takes advantage of every favorable 
 position to fire a few rounds. As soon as the victory 
 is gained, the light artillery moves rapidly to the front 
 with the cavalry, in order to break up the arrange- 
 ments for retreat, following closely upon the heels of 
 the enemy, giving him no rest, and in every way in- 
 creasing the confusion in his ranks. It is of the first 
 importance that light-artillery horses be of the best for 
 strength and swiftness, and the cannoneers should be 
 picked men. 
 
 The heavy artillery is collected in several strong 
 batteries, either in the line in advance of the intervals 
 between the divisions, or upon the wings ; anywhere, 
 in fact, where it interferes least with the infantry, and 
 where the ground suits it. The smallest undulations 
 are taken advantage of, to cover the pieces and give 
 them elevation. A hill thirty or forty feet high gives 
 an excellent position for artillery, as the fire is grazing 
 and not too plunging, and the infantry supports can 
 be kept near at hand and out of sight and fire. 
 
 Salient points of the order of battle are good posi- 
 
EMPLOYMENT OF THE DIFFEKLNT ARMS. 
 
 189 
 
 tions for the artillery. Batteries thus placed give a 
 concave formation to the first line, which is very fa- 
 vorable, as the enemy is enveloped and liable to a 
 converging fire. In order, however, that a battery 
 may be established on a salient point in this manner, 
 it should be protected by some obsta- SW^fl 
 cle, either natural or artificial, from 
 the flank fire it might otherwise be 
 exposed to. Take, for example, the 
 case shown in figure 15, where, in 
 the centre, two batteries are pro- 
 tected from enfilading fire by the 
 hill between them ; on the left, an- 
 other battery is masked by a village ; 
 and on the right, still another by a 
 wood. The infantry is formed in line 
 of battle between the batteries, and 
 the light troops occupy the village, 
 wood and hill. If no obstacle exists 
 to cover the artillery and permit it 
 to fire obliquely, as in the example 
 shown, it is placed in the line, or, 
 more exactly, a little in front of it, 
 fires directly to the front, and ordi- 
 narily in reply to the artillery of the 
 enemy. If the artillery is silenced, 
 it fires upon the infantry, to break 
 the ranks, cut up the columns, pre- 
 vent their deployments and to keep 
 
190 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 them at a distance ; shells are thrown among the 
 cavalry, which cause both destruction and alarm. 
 
 Firing at too long range should be avoided, for 
 it wastes ammunition. The small effect it produ- 
 ces is discouraging to one party, and tends to em- 
 bolden the other. The ravages of artillery are 
 greatest within the range of grape. It would, how- 
 ever, be foolish to permit an enemy to approach so 
 near undisturbed, because the effects of artillery are 
 very considerable at fifteen hundred paces or more. 
 The guns of smallest calibre are most advanced, while 
 the pieces of heavy metal are placed at greater dis- 
 tances, as with a retired wing, upon heights, &c. 
 
 Art. III. Offeiiive Battles. 
 
 The Reconnaissance. The general arrangements for 
 an attack can only be made after an examination of 
 the position and force of the enemy. This examina- 
 tion is made by the commander-in-chief himself, and 
 if the battle is put off to the next day, he must then, 
 before giving his final orders, be certain that no change 
 has been made by the enemy in his position. With- 
 out this precaution, the measures adopted might prove 
 very unsuitable to the new state of affairs. Whilst 
 he is on some elevated point, glass in hand, glancing 
 rapidly over the field and the position of the enemy, 
 the commanders of corps will be around him ; he com- 
 municates his intentions, arid gives notice of any modi- 
 fications of previous orders, or reiterates them. 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 191 
 
 But if the battle is to be fought the same day, the 
 skirmishers of the enemy must be driven in before the 
 general can approach near enough to get a good idea 
 of the advantages and inconveniences of the ground, 
 on which the two armies are about to engage. He 
 must at any cost reach some high point, where he can 
 see, at least to a considerable extent, the surrounding 
 ground, as well as the forces and dispositions of the 
 enemy. "While he is making his examination, and set- 
 tling his plan of attack in accordance with what he 
 has seen, he transmits to the different columns the 
 orders relating to them ; he sends the officers of his 
 staff to guide them, and goes in person to that corps 
 which will be first engaged, or is to take the principal 
 part in the action ; he ascertains from a brief conver- 
 sation with the commander of this column whether 
 his orders have been understood ; he gives whatever 
 explanations may be necessary, and hastens to other 
 points. It is evident, from what has been said, that 
 if the general is not with the advanced guard when 
 the enemy is reported in presence, he should join it as 
 rapidly as possible, in order to have time for the re- 
 connoissance, and to make his dispositions for battle. 
 
 It is from this rapid examination that he determines 
 the point upon which the strongest attack should be 
 made, and whose possession will decide the fate of the 
 battle. 
 
 Determination of the point of attack. If the topo- 
 graphy of the field is alone considered, it may be said, 
 
192 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 that generally, a height, a village, a wood occupied 
 by the enemy, are so many points to be taken from 
 him. In fact, a height is often the key of the battle- 
 field, and should be the point upon which the first 
 and great attack should be made, because such a point 
 may give a commanding view and fire over all the 
 surrounding ground. At the same time it serves as a 
 screen, behind which new dispositions for attack may 
 be arranged, and from the high ground a rush may 
 at any moment be made upon the enemy below. 
 Frederick said: "Always attack the mountain or 
 highest ground occupied by the enemy, for if you 
 force that position, all other points will fall into your 
 possession ; troops are always more vigorous and 
 orderly in the first stages of an engagement. Do not, 
 therefore, waste time and blood upon points of minor 
 importance, and afterwards proceed with disordered 
 and decimated battalions to attack the principal points 
 of the enemy's position, where the greater part of his 
 force will by this time be massed by the course of 
 events if not by design." 
 
 The possession of a large village, with store-houses, 
 is always a great advantage on the field of battle, be- 
 cause it may be very easily put in a defensive state, 
 and is a kind of fortification. Such a village often 
 becomes the scene of the most severe fighting, as, for 
 example, Gross-Aspern and Essling, at the battle of 
 Essling and Castel Ceriolo, at Marengo. 
 
 A wood presents similar advantages. It covers and 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 193 
 
 masks the artillery ; it is easily held by skirmishers ; 
 cavalry cannot approach it. A wood protects the 
 flank of a line which rests on it, and the position of 
 the latter cannot be held until the former is carried. 
 
 But the topography of the field of battle is by no 
 means the only thing to be taken into account in de- 
 termining the point of attack. There are considera- 
 tions of another kind, much more extensive in their 
 relations. The commander must first observe the dis- 
 tances separating the various hostile corps, for it will 
 be proper to direct his principal efforts against the 
 centre or one extremity, according as they are too 
 much spread out, or are well connected with each 
 other. He ought then to examine what is the posi- 
 tion of the opposing army with reference to its line 
 of operations, or any obstacles the country may pre- 
 sent, in order to try to throw it back upon those obsta- 
 cles or to cut its line of communications. The various 
 reasons influencing to a movement in one or the other 
 direction are often quite in opposition, and make the 
 determination of the point of attack a problem of 
 great difficulty, frequently admitting of a correct so- 
 lution only from considerations of a character likely 
 to escape common minds, and appreciated solely by 
 those of vast powers. 
 
 It is impossible to lay down rules upon a subject 
 like this, which is a matter of inspiration and genius ; 
 but we may group under three heads the considera- 
 tions to be taken into account in determining the 
 9 
 
194 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 point of attack : first, those of a strategical character, 
 relating to combinations of the highest order ; second, 
 the grand tactical, determining the principal manoeu- 
 vre of the battle ; third, the tactical, which, resulting 
 from the nature of the ground where the troops are to 
 act, may influence the details and execution of the 
 general movements. It will be profitable to develop 
 these ideas a little, and to cite some examples to ex- 
 plain more definitely what is meant. 
 
 If, for example, the opposing army has its right nearer 
 the frontier of its own country than the left, and the line 
 of operations is exposed, the attack should be made on 
 the right, because there is a prospect in this way of 
 cutting its communications, and separating it from its 
 base ; if a victory is obtained, the results may be very 
 great. This is the strategical consideration. If the 
 enemy is near a lake, a river, a great marsh, a thick 
 forest, or a difficult defile, the grand tactical considera- 
 tion, which is dependent upon the locality and the 
 configuration of the battle-field and its environs, would 
 lead to an attack on the side from the obstacle, in 
 order to drive the enemy back upon it. If there is a 
 height on the field of battle, attack that first, be- 
 cause success there will lead to decisive results. If a 
 salient point is presented in the order of battle of the 
 enemy, direct the first efforts upon this, because it 
 may be enveloped and crushed. If his line is too dis- 
 jointed and extended, strike at the centre, pierce it, 
 and then beat in detail the separated wings. There 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 
 
 195 
 
 are other grand tactical considerations. Finally, when 
 the country is more open and practicable on one wing 
 than the other, the desire to have unity and prompti- 
 tude of movement, which is the tactical consideration, 
 invites to an attack upon that wing. This last is the 
 least important consideration, because vigorous efforts 
 will enable troops to surmount almost any difficulties 
 the ground may present, and often these obstacles once 
 passed are a guarantee of further success, because the 
 enemy supposed himself secure in that direction and 
 was less on his guard. The tactical consideration 
 should yield to the other two when there is antagonism 
 among them in fixing upon the point of attack. When 
 they are all in accord, there can be no doubt about 
 the true point of attack, and none but the most un- 
 skilful commander would fail to detect it. Suppose 
 an army, A B (fig. 16), drawn up in such a line as to 
 
 ng. la, 
 
196 PEItfCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 make an obtuse angle with its line of operations, A C, 
 which is towards its right and rear ; let the left of the 
 army rest on a river, and the right be established on 
 the high ground, A ; let the ground in front of the 
 left wing be a marshy wood, and that on the right 
 open and unobstructed. Every consideration then 
 leads to making the principal attack at A, for that is 
 undoubtedly the key of the battle-field, and must be 
 attacked, whatever may be the enemy's means of re- 
 sistance there. If this height is carried, the line of 
 operations, A C, is cut, and the enemy driven back 
 upon the river. The army, A B, instead of taking 
 the position supposed, should have formed the line 
 A D, re-enforced on the wing D. In this position the 
 assailant is very much embarrassed as to the choice 
 of a point of attack. In the first place, he cannot 
 attack the left, which is on the strong ground, and 
 threaten the line of communications of the other army, 
 without running the risk of being taken in flank, or 
 turned by the re-enforced wing D, which may force 
 him back upon the river. Or else, to avoid such 
 a mishap, he will attack the right, D, at the same 
 time holding the left in check ; but then, even a 
 success can have no decisive result, inasmuch as it 
 does not lead to the possession of the commanding 
 ground. 
 
 Suppose, in the next place,that the army, A B (figure 
 17"), rests upon a lake in an open country, and that its 
 line of operations, C D, is directed towards the banks, 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 
 
 197 
 
 Fig. 17. 
 
 and to the rear of the 
 lake. The strategical 
 considerations would 
 lead to an attack upon 
 the left wing, B, with a 
 view of cutting the line 
 C D, but the grand tacti- 
 cal considerations would 
 induce to attack the right wing, with the intention of 
 driving the whole army back upon the lake. Here 
 strategy and grand tactics advise opposite plans, and, 
 in such a case, a battle should only be fought when the 
 victory is, from other causes, almost certain. It would 
 be much better to attempt by manoeuvres to prevail 
 upon the army, A B, to leave its position. In fact, 
 an indecisive success on the right wing, A, does not 
 drive the enemy upon the lake, nor cut his line of 
 communications. On the other hand, it will not do to 
 violate the law of grand tactics and attack at B, for, 
 if the attempt failed, the enemy might take the initia- 
 tive and drive the attacking army into the lake. If 
 a battle must be fought, the strategical considerations 
 would, in this case, be deemed less important than the 
 tactical, although the general rule is otherwise. In 
 fighting a battle, we must always take into account 
 the contingency of a defeat, and not place an 
 army in such a position that defeat would be destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 If an army is posted between two rivers, covering 
 
198 PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 its flanks, and the line of operations is perpendicular 
 to the line it occupies at. the middle point, there is 
 nothing special to be gained by attacking on one side 
 rather than the other it is entirely a tactical question. 
 
 When the point of attack is once chosen, it should 
 be pressed vigorously, all the arms of the service co- 
 operating, and as many troops being employed there 
 as can be without confusion. The enemy should be 
 kept in a state of uncertainty up to the last moment. 
 If the first attempt fails, renew it again and again, if 
 necessary. Such pertinacity often leads to victory. 
 If the first effort is successful, the enemy should be 
 vigorously followed up, and no time or opportunity 
 afforded him. to recover himself. 
 
 Attack of heights. Although it is a rule to attack 
 heights in opening an engagement, it should only be 
 done when they are attainable, and the troops, upon 
 reaching the high ground, will have room to extend 
 themselves ; for. if such positions can only be ap- 
 proached through narrow defiles and under fire, and 
 the troops must advance with a very small front, there 
 is little prospect of success. Such a position must be 
 turned. But it must be recollected that, in seeking 
 to turn a position, the turning party runs the risk of 
 being taken in flank and seeing his own communica- 
 tions cut. Such a movement should, therefore, only 
 be attempted when there is no opportunity for the 
 enemy to debouch on the flank. 
 
 High ground may not always present its front, but 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 199 
 
 may be a chain of hills, perpendicular to the general 
 
 line of the two armies, both resting one wing upon 
 
 them. In such a case, the attack should proceed from 
 
 the higher to the lower portions. Thus, the two 
 
 armies, A B and C D (figure 18), having each one wing 
 
 in the plain and the 
 
 other on the high 
 
 ground, the general 
 
 direction of which is 
 
 perpendicular to their 
 
 front, the army A B 
 
 should attack by its 
 
 right, in order to dis- rig. is. 
 
 lodge the left of the enemy, D, before bringing B 
 
 into action. The centre, E, follows the right, and 
 
 serves as a connection between the wings. The attack 
 
 is thus progressive from right to left, and becomes 
 
 general only when the right and centre have repulsed 
 
 the left and centre of the enemy. The order of battle, 
 
 from being at first parallel, becomes oblique and in 
 
 echelon. 
 
 The enveloping attack. If the attacking army is 
 sufficiently numerous, the enemy may be enveloped 
 upon a single wing, or upon both. If the attempt is 
 successful, victory is nearly certain, as the long shallow 
 lines of a modern army are almost defenceless against 
 such an attack on the flank. A too extended move- 
 ment must, however, be guarded against in such an 
 operation, for a line with great development becomes 
 
200 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 proportionately weaker, and may easily be pierced, as 
 the Russians discovered at Austerlitz. It is better to 
 keep the army concentrated and to fight in front, than 
 to attack a flank in the manner referred to. The 
 enveloping attack requires, therefore, superior num- 
 bers, and precautions should be taken to keep the 
 enemy occupied throughout his front while the 
 enveloping mass assails the flank, but by no very 
 extended movement. For still stronger reasons are 
 those very great circuits to be avoided, by which a 
 body of troops is sent to attack the enemy in rear. 
 They are in opposition to a fundamental rule in war, 
 which requires the concentration of all the disposable 
 forces when an engagement is to take place. 
 
 The flank attack, properly so called, differs from 
 that just referred to, since, in this case, the flank of 
 the enemy is assailed not only by a single corps while 
 the others hold him in check along the front, but the 
 whole army is drawn up in a line crossing that of the 
 enemy, at a greater or less angle. It is certainly to 
 have gained an important advantage to have been 
 enabled to take up such a position, since only a part 
 of the troops of the enemy can be brought into action, 
 and as the other portions come up they may be suc- 
 cessively overthrown. The advantages of the oblique 
 order are here seen in all their force. But is it prob- 
 able the enemy will stand still and suffer himself to 
 be thus taken in flank, if his attention is not drawn in 
 some other direction? Is it not easy for him, by a 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 201 
 
 similar operation, to counteract a circular movement 
 such as must precede an attack of this kind ? May 
 he not even attack at some favorable moment, while the 
 army is filing before him and in taking position prepar- 
 atory to battle ? All this may happen, and hence the 
 flank attack is extremely hazardous. If the great 
 Frederick owed most of his victories to this kind of 
 an attack, it was because the opposing army manoeu- 
 vred with excessive slowness and heaviness, and because 
 he knew how to conceal his preparatory march by a 
 demonstration in another direction. As a rule, the 
 turning party is also turned ; if he threatens the line 
 of communications of the enemy, he exposes his own 
 at the same time, so that a manoeuvre-march, made 
 with the view of massing the army on the flank or 
 rear of the enemy, can only be justified by a favorable 
 locality, and the possibility of its accomplishment 
 without exposing the line of operations. For example, 
 fig. 19, the army M may, without much risk, and with 
 considerable prospect of success, manoeuvre against 
 the flank of the army N, if the line of operations, P Q, 
 which it is obliged to leave temporarily, is protected 
 by a river and by difficult ground on its flanks. A 
 weak corps, m', stationed on this line, behind a stream 
 with a deep bed, making a strong defensive point, 
 may hold the enemy in check long enough to allow 
 the main body, M, to move around along the dotted 
 line from m' to M. Even in this case, a body of 
 troops, m, should be placed in such a position as to 
 9* 
 
202 
 
 PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Fig. 19. 
 
 have a commanding view of the enemy, and give 
 warning of any attempt on his part to strike at M in 
 flank while on the march. Although the corps M, m, 
 and m' are somewhat separated from each other, the 
 connection is sufficient, as the intervals cannot be 
 penetrated by the enemy. Napoleon practised a 
 manoeuvre almost identical with this, during which 
 the famous battle of Arcola was fought. 
 
 It seems, therefore, evident, that if an attack in 
 mass by the flank is sometimes practicable, it is only 
 so under the cover of natural obstacles, and with cer- 
 tain precautions ; such as concealing the movement, 
 occupying in sufficient force all points which, if in 
 possession of the enemy, would enable him to fall on 
 the flank of the moving mass. Generally, on the 
 battle-field, the enemy must be fairly attacked, without 
 consuming time in movements to turn him, which 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 
 
 203 
 
 often prove dangerous, and frequently useless, because 
 easily avoided. 
 
 A body of troops may sometimes, by a simple de- 
 ployment to the right or left, gain ground in that 
 direction so as to outflank one wing of the enemy. 
 Suppose, for example, it is desired to attack, with five 
 battalions, an enemy in equal force, and to take him 
 in flank. Two columns, A and B (fig. 20), will be 
 
 Fig. 20. 
 
 moved forward towards the centre of the hostile line. 
 The first, A, will consist of two battalions at half-dis- 
 tance by divisions ; the second, B, of three battalions 
 closed in mass, and with one color concealed. The 
 columns will seem to the enemy to be of equal size, 
 and he will not know where the principal attack is to 
 be made. He will think it is to be in front and 
 
204r PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 parallel, until the deployments, under cover of the 
 skirmishers, show him a fifth battalion on the extrem- 
 ity of his left wing. The skirmishers that should be 
 displayed against his right will contribute to the suc- 
 cess of this manoeuvre. If the attack is vigorously 
 made before the enemy has recovered from his aston- 
 ishment, it will be almost certain of success. What a 
 small corps of five battalions has done in this case, a 
 large army with numerous columns may repeat. Every 
 head of a column shown to the enemy increases his 
 uncertainty, and this is a reason for pushing them 
 forward equally, as if the intention was to adopt the 
 parallel order of battle. Being in this state of uncer- 
 tainty until the last moment, he cannot prepare well 
 for the blow which is to fall upon him. 
 
 If the ground on one of the wings presents any fea- 
 ture, under cover of which a body of troops may slip 
 along unperceived, advantage should be taken of it. 
 Even a small body, appearing at an unexpected place 
 and time, will astonish the enemy, and if the attack 
 is pressed at this moment it will certainly succeed. 
 
 Attack upon the Centre. Although the centre is 
 the strongest part of an order of battle, there may be 
 circumstances making it advisable to direct the main 
 attack against that point. Suppose, for example, that 
 a height, the key of the field, is in the centre of the 
 line. In such a case the bull must be taken by the 
 horns if a decisive result is desired, and consequently 
 the most vigorous efforts should be made to carry the 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 
 
 205 
 
 Fig. 21. 
 
 high ground, the possession of which is equivalent to 
 a control of the field. An advantage obtained on one 
 wing would amount to nothing so long as the enemy 
 held the high ground, and it would be always neces- 
 sary to drive him away from that part at last, or else 
 retire from the contest. Therefore, however perilous 
 this attack may be, there is no time for hesitation ; the 
 
206 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 attempt must be made as the only possible chance for 
 success, unless, indeed, the position can be turned, in 
 which case it would be better to manoeuvre than to 
 fight. If the attack is made, the best troops should 
 be selected for that purpose, and every possible pains 
 taken to insure success. The natural order in such a 
 case is the oblique order in echelon by both wings, 
 presenting a figure somewhat similar to the wedge of 
 the ancients. The point, A B, of this wedge (fig. 
 21), intended to pierce the centre of the army, M, is 
 re-enforced by doubling its line and by drawing nearer 
 the reserve C. On the other hand, the echelons, A' and 
 B', of the two wings are formed in a single line, as 
 they are to be but slightly engaged, only, indeed, to a 
 sufficient extent to hold the opposing wings in check. 
 The artillery, being non-effective against the high 
 ground, is put in position to fire obliquely on those 
 parts of the line adjacent to the centre, and thus in a 
 measure to separate the centre and wings. In short, 
 every effort must be made to have this attack success- 
 ful. If not, the battle is lost, and it is time to think 
 of retreating. The figure, showing the army M sup- 
 ported on the flanks by natural obstacles that cannot 
 be turned, explains sufficiently why it has been neces- 
 sary to attempt to carry the centre. 
 
 There is still another case when it is proper to attack 
 the centre, even when the opposing army is well con- 
 centrated. It is when the latter is in front of a defile, 
 which offers but few advantages for a retreat ; because 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 207 
 
 if the centre is pierced, and the mouth of the defile 
 seized, the enemy is lost, being obliged to fly in con- 
 fusion, abandon his baggage, and lose many prisoners. 
 The entrance of the defile is in such a case the key of 
 the field of battle. At Waterloo, Napoleon directed 
 his main attack against the centre of the English 
 army, because the latter had the great forest of 
 Soignes behind it, and the only line of retreat for the 
 cavalry and the baggage was along the road to Brus- 
 sels. This attack failed only because the defenders of 
 the position were as brave as the assailants, were more 
 numerous, and towards the end of the battle received 
 considerable re -enforcements, which decided the vic- 
 tory in their favor. 
 
 The attack on the centre, which is but an excep- 
 tional case when the opposing army is well concen- 
 trated, becomes the rule when the army is much 
 spread out, and the different corps in it are too far 
 apart. By making simple demonstrations upon the 
 extremities of this long line, and pressing vigorously 
 upon the centre, it will almost surely be pierced, and 
 the two wings will never succeed in reuniting. It 
 will be practicable under such circumstances, if time 
 is used to good advantage, to envelope and destroy 
 the wings in succession, or else oblige them to retreat 
 upon divergent lines. In 1808, the Spanish army of 
 45,000 men took up a position in front of Tudela ; 
 but the general, Castaiios, instead of assembling them 
 on a front of two miles, as he should have done, 
 
208 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 extended them over three and a half. Marshal 
 Lannes, who commanded the French army, perceived 
 the weakness of such a disposition of troops, and 
 attacked in the centre. One division of infantry 
 promptly broke the line, and the cavalry, passing 
 through the gap, and turning to the left, enveloped the 
 Spanish right wing, and completely routed it. The 
 left wing could make no further resistance, although 
 composed of the best troops, and retired with precipi- 
 tation. 
 
 Concentration. In whatever direction the attack be 
 made, whether upon one of the wings or the centre, 
 whether the order of battle be parallel or oblique, the 
 mass intended for the attack should be composed of 
 all arms, and should contain as many battalions, 
 squadrons, and batteries as can be brought together 
 and can act without confusion. No eifort should be 
 Spared to make the blow a decisive one. The lines 
 should be doubled and the reserves brought near. 
 Success depends upon the simultaneous, cordial, and 
 vigorous action of all the individual parts. 
 
 To give an idea of the method of effecting such a 
 concentration of force and action as is necessary, we 
 will take the case of an army of four divisions, re- 
 quired to act in an open field, with the intention of 
 making a powerful attack from its right, after engag- 
 ing the centre. The army may consist of the follow- 
 ing troops : 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 209 
 
 40 battalions 30,000 
 
 30 companies of riflemen or sharpshooters . 3,000 
 
 12 squadrons 2,096 
 
 16 batteries, each of 6 pieces 2,800 
 
 4 companies of engineers 400 
 
 Total 38,296 men. 
 
 It will be observed that the proportion of cavalry 
 and artillery in this army is small.* It is supposed 
 that the advanced guard has rejoined the main army 
 and that all the troops are with their respective divi- 
 sions. The entire force of cavalry is joined to the 
 division which is to form the reserve. All the dispo- 
 sable artillery and riflemen are also held with the 
 reserve. 
 
 The principal attack is to be made by the right, and 
 the right division is consequently strengthened by the 
 addition of five companies of riflemen, giving it ten, 
 each of the two other divisions five, and the reserve 
 ten. Three divisions are to form the line of battle, 
 each presenting a front of four battalions, and the re- 
 maining six to be disposed of in the best manner to 
 carry out the plan of battle. 
 
 This arrangement is agreed upon the evening pre- 
 ceding the battle, but is only definitely settled the next 
 
 * Jomini says : "Asa general rule, it may be stated that an army in 
 an open country should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth ita 
 whole strength ; in mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice." 
 
 Of artillery, the same authority says: " The proportions of artillery 
 have varied in different wars. Usually three pieces to a thousand 
 combatants are allowed, but this allowance will depend on circum- 
 stances." TRANSLATOR. 
 
210 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 morning, when an examination of the field has shown 
 that the enemy has made no changes in his disposi- 
 tions. The following order is then sent to the division 
 commanders : 
 
 " The principal attack will be from the right, the 
 left being retired. 
 
 " The army will advance in three columns, at suffi- 
 cient intervals for deployment. They will regulate 
 their motions by the right, and neither will get in ad- 
 vance. The reserve will follow the central column. 
 Each column will be preceded by an advanced guard, 
 composed of its riflemen, the flank companies of the 
 leading brigade, and a battery. 
 
 " The deployment will be effected in the usual 
 order, each brigade forming one line, the artillery on 
 the right, the riflemen in the intervals of the battalions, 
 and the flank companies on the wings. If at any time 
 during the battle the artillery moves to the front at 
 any point, the battalions will form columns, to make 
 room for its passage." 
 
 Under this order the divisions are moved to the 
 front, preserving their proper intervals, and preceded 
 by their advanced guards some 1200 or 1500 paces. 
 They commence to deploy at a signal of three guns 
 fired by the reserve. When the advanced guards are 
 sufficiently near the enemy, the riflemen are deployed 
 as skirmishers to engage the skirmishers of the enemy. 
 The flank companies, already referred to, form their 
 supports, each keeping near the battalion to which it 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. ' 211 
 
 belongs. The artillery will, in the mean time, have 
 opened upon the enemy whenever his masses have 
 been discovered. 
 
 The combat of the skirmishers is continued until 
 they are driven in or called in nearer to the line of 
 battle, which is formed by this time. The batteries 
 move up at a trot, to join the troops already in posi- 
 tion. The supports relieve the riflemen, who rally 
 behind them. One-half forms the line of skirmishers 
 and the other the supports, and in this order they fall 
 back gradually towards the intervals of the battalions. 
 The batteries are first unmasked and immediately 
 commence firing. The riflemen take position in the 
 intervals of the battalions and the flank companies, 
 which have formed their supports, doubling on the 
 wings. 
 
 The two right divisions now become engaged, open- 
 ing fire if the enemy is in good range, or charging with 
 the bayonet. The left division cannonades the right 
 of the enemy and makes a display of troops ; the 
 only object there being to hold that part of the op- 
 posing line in position. 
 
 Figure 22 shows these arrangements, and the man- 
 ner in which the generals of division have conformed 
 to the spirit of their instructions. The general of the 
 right division has withdrawn one battalion from each 
 
 O 
 
 line to form a small reserve, which he has placed be- 
 hind the centre. He will engage in the parallel order. 
 The general of the central division has formed his 
 
212 
 
 PEINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 first line in two echelons, but has doubled the right 
 battalion and placed all the riflemen with the first 
 line. The second line has nothing peculiar about it, 
 except that the three right battalions are nearer to- 
 gether than the two on the left. This is in conformity 
 with the primary idea of making the main attack 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 213 
 
 towards the right and refusing the left. The general 
 of the left division, in order to retire the left, has 
 formed his first line in echelons by battalions deployed 
 at 100 yards distance from each other. One of his 
 batteries has been thrown to the left and front, in order 
 to cover his echelons and lead the enemy to expect an 
 attack on that side. The five companies of riflemen 
 form a support for that battery, and the flank compa- 
 nies of the battalion form the line of skirmishers. 
 The second brigade remains in column to the rear. 
 
 The general-in-chief, having placed his reserve be- 
 hind the centre of the right division and seeing the 
 engagement commenced, judges that the moment has 
 arrived for the development of his plan. He detaches 
 one brigade of the reserve, with four companies of 
 riflemen, six batteries, and half the cavalry. He sends 
 verbally the following orders : " The artillery to move 
 up to the right and left of the batteries of the right 
 division, and to take the line of the enemy by as slant 
 a fire as possible ; the infantry to be massed on the 
 right of the artillery, as supports, guarding against at- 
 tacks of cavalry (the smoke of the cannon will facili- 
 tate this movement); the cavalry to follow the in- 
 fantry, keeping to the right and rear, and being pre- 
 pared to take in flank the cavalry of the enemy, should 
 it attempt to attack." Two of the reserve batteries 
 are also sent to re-enforce those of the central division. 
 The figure (22) shows these movements executed. 
 
 The right and left battalions of the right division 
 
214: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 form column, to make room for the artillery; and those 
 of the second line close in towards the centre, to avoid 
 being behind the batteries. The infantry brigade 
 gains ground to the right, preceded by the riflemen, 
 who are ready for deployment as skirmishers. This 
 brigade may either charge in mass, deploy the leading 
 battalions, or form squares to close the front line. The 
 cavalry is deployed, to appear more numerous, two 
 squadrons being always kept in column. 
 
 The order of battle, at first parallel, thus becomes 
 oblique, and the enemy will be turned if he does not 
 hasten to withdraw his left wing. In the figure (22) 
 the two armies are four hundred or four hundred and 
 fifty yards apart, which supposes that the enemy has 
 brought into action as yet only skirmishers and artil- 
 lery, or has already fallen back to avoid the flank at- 
 tack with which he is threatened. But that has noth- 
 ing to do with the movements just described, which 
 are so much the more decisive if the armies are in 
 close musket range. 
 
 The reserve being weakened by these movements, 
 the general sends orders to the second brigade of the 
 third division to draw near the centre, to act as a sec- 
 ond reserve in case of need. When the first division 
 is about to move to the front, its two deployed bat- 
 talions will first advance, in order to give a good volume 
 of fire within effective range ; when the time for 
 charging has arrived, these battalions form column, 
 those of the second line take their places in the inter- 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 215 
 
 vals, and all advance together. The muskets will not 
 be brought to the position of "charge bayonets" until 
 the columns are within ten or twenty paces of the 
 enemy. It is a bad plan to bring them down sooner, 
 as the marching is more awkward and the align- 
 ment lost. The enemy seldom waits to receive such 
 an onset. If a second deployment is necessary, it will 
 be done by the battalions of the second line, those of 
 the first taking the places of the latter. During these 
 manoeuvres, the riflemen and flank companies, placed 
 in the intervals of the columns, will have opportuni- 
 ties of using their fire-arms effectively. 
 
 In the general movement, the centre will be regu- 
 lated by the right, constantly endeavoring to gain 
 ground. If any gap occurs in the line on account of 
 the manosuvres, it should be filled by the battalions 
 of the second line. The officers should use every ex- 
 ertion to have the engagement progress from right to 
 left, all disconnected movements being carefully 
 avoided. Finally, the left, which has been retired in 
 the beginning, becomes engaged, and the .action is 
 general. The troops along the entire line are engaged 
 with the enemy, who, being outflanked on his left and 
 assailed in front by doubled battalions, ought to be 
 defeated, unless he is very superior in artillery, for this 
 arm, in its present state of improvement, has very 
 much to do in the decision of battles, especially in 
 open ground. 
 
 Enough has been said to give an idea of the method 
 
216 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 of concentrating upon a given point a large mass of 
 troops, and of handling them in action. It will be 
 observed that upon the right, now become really the 
 centre by reason of the offensive movement which has 
 been explained, the troops are really drawn up in 
 three lines. This arrangement might have been made 
 still stronger by forming a greater number of battal- 
 ions in column and closing them more, but they would 
 thus have afforded a better mark for the artillery of 
 the enemy, and there would have been the additional 
 inconvenience of having a portion of the troops re- 
 duced to a state of inaction. "With modern weapons, 
 the problem to be resolved is to cover as much front 
 and to obtain as long a line of troops firing as possi- 
 ble, without having too much weakness in the line of 
 battle. 
 
 In the example selected, the ground is supposed to 
 be level and open, so that the artillery would be the 
 most important arm. That is by no means the gen- 
 eral case. The dispositions must always be made to 
 conform to the ground. Where it is more broken, the 
 troops will remain more in columns, which will move 
 over the practicable parts of the field ; the combat of 
 skirmishers will be continued longer, and, as the artil- 
 lery of the enemy is less effective, they may advance 
 nearer; the bayonet will be more frequently used ; the 
 artillery will regulate its movements by those of the 
 infantry, and will not be so much massed, on account 
 of the want of suitable ground ; finally, the cavalry 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 217 
 
 will be little else than spectators until the pursuit 
 begins. 
 
 Even in an open country, manoeuvres cannot be 
 conducted with such methodical regularity and exact 
 distances as have been seen in the example given, if 
 the enemy is met on the march and a battle ensues 
 the same day. It may begin when but two divisions 
 are at hand. Sometimes a single division, with the 
 advanced guard, will be obliged to receive the first at- 
 tack of the enemy, while the other divisions are com- 
 ing up in succession into line. An oblique line in 
 echelons will necessarily result under such circum- 
 stances, and the commanding general, having made 
 provision for first emergencies, should give suitable 
 orders to the different corps as they successively ar- 
 rive on the field. Upon such occasions a skilful 
 commander demonstrates his ability ; he has no time 
 for protracted reflection ; his arrangements must be 
 made upon the spur of the moment. His combina- 
 tions should be simple, his orders brief, and he must 
 be cool when every one around him is in motion and 
 excitement. Any man of ordinary capacity and some 
 experience in moving troops may, after reflection, 
 make suitable dispositions of an army for battle, but 
 he must be born a general who can improvise them 
 under fire. 
 
 Pursuits. It may happen that while a decisive 
 attack is made on one wing, the enemy may be doing 
 the same thing on the other, and the two armies may 
 10 
 
218 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 each be victorious on one wing and defeated at the 
 other. It is, therefore, important to modify the ardor 
 of the troops, and instead of indulging in a headlong 
 pursuit, to keep them well in hand, and move them 
 all or in part upon the flank or rear of the other wing 
 of the enemy. It will be sufficient to follow up fugi- 
 tives with the light cavalry, supported by light artillery 
 and a few battalions of infantry. In the mean time, 
 the wing of the enemy which has been victorious 
 may be enveloped, and its defeat made so much the 
 more complete as it had advanced beyond its original 
 line. At the battle of Naseby, fought in 1645, be- 
 tween Charles I. and the parliamentary forces, Prince 
 Rupert defeated the troops in his front and pursued 
 them vigorously. But Cromwell, who had defeated 
 the royalists immediately in his front, did not pursue, 
 but turned on those that were still fighting, took them 
 in flank, and entirely routed them. If Prince Rupert 
 had pursued this course, he would probably have 
 saved Charles his crown. 
 
 After a first success, therefore, the pursuit of the 
 enemy should be made with circumspection ; the ranks 
 should be reformed, and order preserved in anticipa- 
 tion of further attacks. When it appears safe to 
 move forward, the pursuit may be recommenced in 
 such direction as to separate the corps of the enemy 
 and prevent their reunion. While the battalions are 
 preparing for this pursuit, the light troops will har- 
 ass the retiring enemy; the artillery will follow up 
 
OFFENSIVE BATTLES. 219 
 
 and give him no rest; the cavalry will charge vigor- 
 ously those corps which seem to be recovering their 
 order, and will cut them to pieces or oblige them to 
 lay down their arms. 
 
 In following out the rule of reforming the ranks be- 
 fore pursuing actively the enemy when he is thrown 
 into confusion at any point, care must be taken not to 
 lose too much time in making the necessary rectifica- 
 tions of alignments. Perfect alignment is not so im- 
 portant to the preservation of order as the touch of 
 man to man. Keep the troops well closed and push 
 forward ; nothing more is necessary, to overthrow 
 completely an enemy who has once yielded ground. 
 If, on the contrary, time is lost in aligning the ranks 
 as upon a drill-ground, the enemy will be enabled to 
 reform and offer battle a second time. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that two extremes are to be 
 avoided when the enemy is falling back. Too much 
 circumspection may prevent a first success from lead- 
 ing to decisive results, and too much rashness may 
 cause total ruin. A union of prudence and boldness 
 is necessary. A commander must look not only be- 
 fore him, but often to the sides and sometimes behind. 
 He must know what is passing in the neighboring 
 corps ; must observe whether he is supported ; if the 
 line of which he forms a part is maintaining its posi- 
 tion ; if the reserves are engaged ; if he must depend 
 upon his own means, &c. 
 
 The commander-in-chief will direct the movements 
 
220 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 of the whole army in such a way as to render his vic- 
 tory decisive, by gaining as much ground as possible in 
 the direction of the line of retreat of the enemy, in or- 
 der to cut him off; the last reserves will be disposed in 
 such a manner as to overthrow any remaining resist- 
 ance. While the different corps are pressing the defeat- 
 ed enemy, turning them, driving them upon obstacles, 
 making prisoners and capturing material, the general 
 should take some rest, dictate orders for a bivouac of 
 the army, and for moving the next day ; he should 
 give attention to the wounded, and should signify his 
 satisfaction to the troops in an order of the day, in 
 which he will recount what each corps did in gaining 
 the victory. Finally, he should take measures to re- 
 place expended munitions, fill up the ranks of his 
 army, and draw from the country such supplies as he 
 needs and it can furnish. 
 
 Art. IV Defensive Battles. 
 
 The weaker army is usually obliged to receive an 
 attack from the stronger. It chooses as favorable a 
 site as possible and awaits the enemy there, endeavor- 
 ing thus to supply its numerical inferiority by superi- 
 ority of position. 
 
 Positions. A good position is one which, not too 
 high, still overlooks the surrounding ground and af- 
 fords space enough for deploying the troops. The 
 ground should be sufficiently smooth and unbroken 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 221 
 
 to facilitate the manoeuvres of all the arms of the ser- 
 vice, but especially the artillery and cavalry. Its ex- 
 tent should be proportioned to the strength of the 
 army ; and it may here be remarked, that in a good 
 position the same troops may occupy a greater front 
 than in a plain, as there is not the same necessity for 
 doubling the line throughout. It will be sufficient if 
 two lines are drawn up on the most easily accessible 
 parts of the field ; one line will answer at other points, 
 and moreover considerable spaces may be left be- 
 tween different corps, which will be occupied by skir- 
 mishers. Some localities permit such deviation from 
 general rules. All salient points being held by the 
 artillery, or even by sharpshooters and infantry, the 
 enemy cannot, with a prudent regard for his own 
 safety, expose his flanks by penetrating between them 
 and finding the reserves in his front at the same time. 
 A division of sixteen battalions, four batteries, a bat- 
 talion of sharpshooters, and four squadrons may con- 
 veniently occupy a front of two thousand yards. 
 
 The wings of the position should rest upon strong 
 natural obstacles, such as large marshes, a lake, a 
 deep river, a wood, impassable rocks, which secure 
 the array against attack in flank, or oblige the enemy 
 to make wide detours to turn the flank. In front the 
 ground should fall away gently, so that it may be 
 thoroughly swept by the artillery ; and it also permits 
 forward movements against the enemy when advisa- 
 ble. There should also be at intervals along the front 
 
222 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 clumps of trees, villages, farm-houses, or enclosures, 
 which, being occupied in a proper manner, become 
 formidable salient points, that furnish cross-fires and 
 must be carried by the enemy before attacking the 
 real line. 
 
 A position whose front is covered by a river, or by 
 very steep and difficult ground, is only suitable for 
 an army which is too weak to venture a forward move- 
 ment against the enemy, but must be content to 
 remain strictly on the defensive. Even in such cases 
 there should always be efforts made to facilitate offen- 
 sive returns upon the enemy at opportune moments, 
 as these have a powerful effect in arresting an attack. 
 
 In rear the roads should be good, in order to facili- 
 tate a retreat in case of reverse. A single road is not 
 enough for the easy and prompt evacuation of a battle- 
 field. Moreover, if the enemy should seize that sin- 
 gle road to the rear, the army is lost ; this is especially 
 dangerous if the road leads from one of the wings, 
 and not from the centre. The most favorable case is 
 that where there are several good roads through a 
 wooded and broken country, where the army may 
 find good positions for checking the enemy. An open 
 country is dangerous, as nothing is more to be dreaded 
 than charges of cavalry upon a retreating army which 
 is in more or less confusion. 
 
 Besides the roads leading to the rear, whose gen- 
 eral direction is perpendicular to the line of battle, it 
 is well to have in rear of the line a cross-road from 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 223 
 
 right to left, so that the artillery may move freely 
 from point to point. The best place for this road is 
 behind the second line. Besides the foregoing advan- 
 tages which the position should offer to the defending 
 army, the low ground that is left to the enemy should 
 be cut up and obstructed by ditches, ponds, hedges, 
 walls, &c. obstacles that are not impassable, but 
 greatly tend to delay and confuse the advancing 
 troops, especially if under fire. 
 
 The general form of the position should be concave 
 towards the front, if its extent is limited, but convex 
 if there is considerable development. In the first case 
 the army occupies the entire extent of the position, 
 and has its wings strongly posted, so as to be in no 
 danger of being enveloped ; it has only to stand and 
 deliver a close, converging fire upon the enemy. In 
 the second case, however, as it will generally be 
 necessary to move troops from one part of the field to 
 another, to repel the various attacks of the enemy 
 upon the extended front, it is best to have the position 
 convex towards the front, as the troops may then 
 move on the chords of the arcs passed over by the 
 enemy. But, properly speaking, such a position as 
 the last is not a good field for a defensive battle, 
 which should always be in strict proportion to the 
 army holding it ; it should rather be deemed a piece 
 of ground offering facilities for manoeuvre-marches, 
 and giving opportunities for prompt movements upon 
 threatened points, or for effecting a concentration of 
 
224: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 troops at vulnerable parts of the enemy's position. 
 The advantages of such ground are rather strategical 
 than tactical. 
 
 Positions actually occupied, seldom possess all the 
 advantageous conditions that have been mentioned, 
 and the best are those in which the most of them are 
 found. The general shows his skill in making the 
 best use of every advantage presented by his position, 
 and in supplying what is wanting by field-works, or a 
 good disposition of his troops, or both. 
 
 In order that a village may form a strong point 
 upon the front or flank of a position, it should be of 
 solid construction. Wooden houses, far from being 
 favorable in the defence, may become very hurtful, 
 because they may be so readily fired. Tillages may 
 be occupied by several battalions, by sharpshooters 
 and by artillery, according to their importance ; the 
 walls of the outer enclosures, by being loopholed, 
 greatly assist in the defence, and guns may be con- 
 cealed behind the houses in favorable positions for 
 procuring a flank or slant fire upon the troops of the 
 enemy. The line, of which the villages are the salient 
 points, should be near enough to support them read- 
 ily, and prevent their being turned and surrounded. 
 
 However excellent the features of a position may 
 be an army should seldom be satisfied with a purely 
 passive defence. On the contrary, it should always 
 take the offensive whenever a favorable opportunity 
 offers for striking an effective blow. By moving out 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 225 
 
 to attack, instead of waiting to be attacked, the weaker 
 party, by seeming boldness, may conceal real weak- 
 ness ; by unexpected offensive movements a detached 
 or venturesome corps of the enemy may be cut off; at 
 any rate, he will be made more circumspect in his 
 proceedings, and the morale of the defensive army 
 will be elevated. 
 
 Disposition for the Defensive. Since strong posi- 
 tions are not always to be found, and obstacles 
 are not always at the proper distances apart to 
 form good points for the flanks to rest upon, it is 
 necessary for a general, while knowing how to take 
 advantage of any favoring features of the ground, to 
 be able also to supply the want of these, as far as 
 practicable, by a judicious arrangement of the troops 
 at his disposal. The essential thing is to make the 
 wings secure against a flank attack. To guard these 
 weak points against charges of cavalry, it is sufficient 
 to place there several battalions, which may be drawn 
 up in squares. At the battle of Molwitz, gained by 
 Frederick in 1741, the cavalry of his right wing had 
 been routed, and the infantry were about to be taken 
 in flank, but the victorious cavalry of the enemy was 
 checked by three battalions, which for want of space, 
 could not be deployed, as was expected, in the line of 
 battle, and were drawn up behind the wing. This 
 infantry, although repeatedly charged, stood firm 
 until Marshal Schwerin brought up the left wing, 
 hitherto retired, and gained the victory. Had not 
 
226 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 these three battalions been accidentally in the position 
 they occupied, Frederick would probably have been 
 defeated. It is seldom an evil when want of space 
 compels some of the battalions to remain in column 
 behind the line, or several companies behind a bat- 
 talion. 
 
 The wings may also be strengthened by forming 
 behind them in echelon several squadrons of cavalry, 
 to make counter-charges, in case the enemy should 
 attack in flank. In the orders for the battle of Hohen- 
 friedberg, Frederick directed a regiment of hussars to 
 form a third line behind each of the wings of the 
 army, " either to cover the flanks or to be used in the 
 pursuit." If no cavalry can be formed for such a 
 purpose, battalion squares, in echelon on the wings, 
 will secure them against enveloping attack from the 
 cavalry of the enemy. 
 
 The more serious efforts of infantry against the 
 flanks during a battle, while the front is strongly en- 
 gaged, may be paralyzed by causing the second line 
 to outflank the first, and the third to outflank the 
 second, so that the enemy is 'himself turned when he 
 attempts to assail the flank, or he is obliged to make 
 an extended and hazardous circular movement, should 
 he endeavor to turn all the lines at once. In this 
 way, during the first attack of the enemy, and until 
 his real designs are displayed, as few troops as possible 
 are exposed. One of the wings may thus be kept 
 disengaged, or the whole disposable force brought 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 227 
 
 into action, as occasion requires, by successive por- 
 tions, without interference or confusion. 
 
 In order to give a clearer understanding of the pre- 
 ceding remarks, the same army of four divisions, al- 
 ready described as fighting an offensive battle, will now 
 be supposed placed upon the defensive. A plain will 
 be taken as the field of battle, entirely bare of obsta- 
 cles, that we may examine simply the arrangement of 
 the troops, and strip the example of every thing extra- 
 neous. 
 
 The commanding general, wishing to retain a strong 
 reserve, withdraws two battalions of each division 
 in order to form a supplementary brigade, which he 
 attaches to the reserve division. The divisions of the 
 line of battle have each eight battalions, two batteries, 
 and four companies of sharpshooters. The cavalry 
 and the remainder of the sharpshooters are joined to 
 the reserve, which is thus composed of sixteen bat- 
 talions, twelve squadrons, ten batteries, fifteen compa- 
 nies of sharpshooters, and four companies of engi- 
 neers. 
 
 The first two divisions will be deployed in two lines, 
 with their artillery on the right, as shown in figure 23 ; 
 the second line outflanking the first by the length of 
 two battalions on the right of the first division, and 
 on the left of the second. The two battalions on the 
 right and on the left of the second line will be de- 
 ployed, the others remaining in column as usual. The 
 intervals between the ends of the two lines will be 
 
228 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Fig. 28. 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 229 
 
 occupied by three companies of sharpshooters, in 
 column, at the extremities of the first line; the two 
 other companies of sharpshooters, in each division, 
 will form a part of the second line, in the vacant space 
 in the centre, occasioned by the second line outflank- 
 ing the first. These companies, however, will only 
 take up these positions after they have opened the 
 engagement in the capacity of skirmishers. 
 
 The third division forms in echelon on the left, 
 farther in rear than the second line, but will deploy 
 only two battalions of its first brigade ; the remaining 
 two battalions of this brigade will remain in column 
 behind the left wing, and the whole of the second bri- 
 gade will be massed ready for movement. The artil- 
 lery of this division will be placed in battery, on the 
 prolongation of the second line, and two companies 
 of sharpshooters will be placed as a link between the 
 battery and the first battalion. 
 
 The reserve will approach the right, which seems 
 to be threatened ; the supplementary brigade of in- 
 fantry will support the right wing, adopting the same 
 formation as the brigade of the left wing. Of the five 
 companies of sharpshooters accompanying this bri- 
 gade, two will take position on the left, in advance 
 of the brigade, and near the adjacent battery ; the 
 other three companies will remain with the column, 
 and may be extended to the right as skirmishers. 
 Half of the cavalry will form in echelon on the extreme 
 right, which will complete the defensive arrangements. 
 
230 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Such dispositions as have been indicated, will only 
 last until the moment when the enemy displays his 
 designs, and will then be modified to suit circum- 
 stances. An attack upon the right is supposed, but 
 the left is not left without resources. The latter is 
 sufficiently strong to resist a serious attack until the 
 reserve can be brought up ; the second brigade of the 
 third division is disposable for a flank attack upon 
 any bodies of the enemy attempting to outflank the 
 army on this side, or it may form squares, if circum- 
 stances require. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the real attack is made on 
 the right, every thing is in readiness to receive it; the 
 enemy finds four echelons before him, which compels 
 him to extend his line very much, unless he prefers 
 to attack one of the echelons, and then he is himself 
 exposed to attack. If it becomes necessary to call the 
 reserve into action, the disposable brigade of the left 
 wing may replace it. 
 
 Although this order of battle makes sufficient pro- 
 vision for the security of the flanks, still it occupies a 
 third more space than if the first three divisions were 
 simply deployed in two lines, in the usual way. The 
 army may thus resist four divisions of the same 
 strength ; and in order that the enemy may attempt to 
 envelope it, with any chance of success, he must be 
 in decidedly superior numbers. In the places where 
 there is but one line of infantry, and a consequent ap- 
 pearance of weakness, the infantry is covered by a 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 231 
 
 good line of sharpshooters, who restore the equilib- 
 rium. It may be observed that the defensive dispo- 
 sition, adopted by the army while in a state of expec- 
 tation, presents a convex line to the front in its general 
 outline. This form, to which the reasoning has led 
 us, is the one which offers the greatest facilities for 
 moving the reserves to threatened points, by following 
 chords or radii, which are the shortest lines; the army 
 on the defensive has thus the advantage of greater 
 mobility. This fundamental principle is discovered 
 in fortifications: every work, whose extremities do 
 not rest on natural obstacles, should have an outline 
 convex towards the front. But if this form is advan- 
 tageous for providing against the preparatory move- 
 ments made by the enemy for carrying out his plans, 
 it is so no longer when the lines are actually engaged 
 and fighting has taken the place of manoeuvring; 
 then the concave form is the best, because it is natu- 
 rally enveloping, and delivers a converging fire. The 
 skill of a general is shown in passing from one to the 
 other form during the battle, by taking advantage of 
 successes gained by one of the wings. When the 
 ground presents firm points of support, it becomes 
 possible to adopt the right line or the concave line in 
 defence, as there is then no danger of being enveloped. 
 The ground will always have a great influence upon 
 the arrangements adopted, as well in the offensive as 
 the defensive. 
 
 It is very important, whenever the field of battle is 
 
232 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 obstructed and cut up, to make wide openings through 
 hedges, &c., and to provide ample communications 
 across ravines and small streams lying between differ- 
 ent corps of the army. The existing roads should be 
 repaired and widened. 
 
 Squares. In the case now under consideration, 
 squares are formed by divisions or brigades. Bat- 
 talion squares are too small to serve as a basis for an 
 order of battle, but they are excellent when a part of 
 the line is strongly pressed. These small squares are 
 rapidly formed, especially when the battalions are 
 already in close columns, as usually happens ; it is 
 easy to place them in echelon or quincunx order, to 
 flank each other. These battalion squares may be 
 considered as a good manoeuvre in certain cases ; but 
 when squares are the basis of the order of battle 
 against an enemy whose principal strength is in cav- 
 alry, they should be formed of at least four battalions, 
 that they may double their ranks without diminishing 
 too much the interior space. This space is necessary 
 for the reception of the staffs, and sometimes to con- 
 tain even the cavalry when it is too weak to act. 
 
 This doubling ranks, when forming squares, is par- 
 ticularly applicable to those troops whose usual forma- 
 tion is in two ranks. It should not be done, however, 
 by doubling companies or platoons, as there would be 
 an improper mixture of subdivisions, and confusion 
 would result at critical moments, a thing to be spe- 
 cially avoided. The doubling should be effected by 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 233 
 
 placing the left half of each battalion behind the 
 right half, or by placing even divisions behind the 
 odd. 
 
 When the troops are thus formed in a doubled 
 square, the front ranks of one or more faces may be 
 detached without breaking the square. The angles 
 are the weak points, and it is well to put the sharp- 
 shooters there in small solid squares, flanking the 
 larger. The artillery is also placed at the angles, the 
 pieces outside and the caissons inside ; or, it may be 
 in the middle of a face, or on the diagonal line, join- 
 ing two adjacent squares. Several companies, dis- 
 tributed as reserves in the interior, will be very useful 
 in re-enforcing points that are attacked, and giving 
 support wherever necessary. 
 
 The cavalry is placed between the squares, so as to 
 be flanked by them. From these positions it may 
 fall upon the cavalry of the enemy, when disordered 
 by the fire of the infantry ; but when too weak to act, 
 it takes refuge inside the squares. 
 
 Defensive Properties of Ground. When the ground 
 is not precisely what is called a position , but still pre- 
 sents some favorable features, they must be taken 
 advantage of, no matter how insignificant they may 
 appear, for whatever is not for us, in such cases, is 
 against us. Thus, in 1690, Waldec lost the first bat- 
 tle of Fleurus, because he did not take possession of a 
 plateau which had a very slight command of the field 
 of battle. Marshal Luxembourg saw the fault, and 
 
234: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 at once took advantage of it, and, in consequence, 
 gained a victory. 
 
 A simple wood, in which a few companies of skir- 
 mishers may be thrown, permits the line of battle to 
 .be extended, and a strong front to be presented, equal 
 in extent to the enemy's. A piece of high ground 
 gives advantages of another kind : if isolated, and of 
 limited extent, forming a little eminence in the midst 
 of a plain, it is proper, if there is no other reason to 
 the contrary, to place the centre of the line upon it, 
 as the enemy will generally be obliged to attack there, 
 which will usually be unfavorable for him. 
 
 When, for any cause whatever, as, for example, to 
 cover the line of retreat, it becomes necessary to have 
 the high ground on the flank instead of in the centre, 
 it should be held by one of the wings as strongly as 
 possible. As it is advantageous to you, if held dur- 
 ing a battle, so will it be of importance to the enemy 
 to seize it. If the rising ground is of varying eleva- 
 tion, the highest is the most important point. Much 
 will be gained if, in such a case, a block-house or re- 
 doubt can be erected. 
 
 The heights may form a line of hills whose direc- 
 tion is either parallel to the line of retreat or cuts it. 
 What has been said above is applicable to the first 
 case, and in the second the heights present in a 
 greater or less degree the advantages of a good posi-. 
 tion. The first line will then be placed at the crest 
 of the slopes ; the second line and the reserves on the 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 
 
 235 
 
 plateau or the reverse slopes, so as to be greatly or 
 entirely out of view of the enemy. The line of battle 
 thus follows the general direction of the chain of 
 hills, and will be more advantageous, as it cuts the 
 line of retreat more nearly at right angles. On the 
 other hand, the more oblique the line of retreat, the 
 less favorable is the position. The army A B (fig- 
 
 rig. 24. 
 
 ure 24), occupying the heights whose general direction 
 forms with its line of retreat, X Y, an obtuse angle, 
 has its left flank very much exposed ; for the enemy 
 may envelop this extremity with superior forces by 
 taking a position E F perpendicular to its line of 
 operations ; that is to say, by a natural deployment, 
 and without an eccentric movement, it is ready to 
 make a flank attack, which can only be counteracted 
 successfully by changing the position of A B. This 
 
236 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 can only be made when the high ground presents a 
 plateau of sufficient extent to permit a change of 
 front, which is contrary to the supposition. In such 
 a case it becomes necessary either to receive the flank 
 attack or to abandon the high ground. It appears, 
 therefore, that whon there is high ground upon the 
 line of retreat, it will not necessarily be proper for 
 the army to occupy it and await the attack of the 
 enemy, but the ground should have a suitable position 
 and direction with reference to the line of retreat. 
 The two lines should form nearly a right angle. 
 
 The danger just pointed out is not the only one. 
 The enemy may take the position C I D, preferring 
 the strategical to the tactical consideration. On his 
 right, I will suffice to guard his own line of retreat, 
 while the main eifort is made on the left. If this 
 attack succeeds, it is evident the army A B is in great 
 danger of being cut off from its line of retreat. 
 
 Use of Fortifications. It is sometimes necessary to 
 take positions where there is no natural support for 
 the wings. Artificial ones must be created under 
 such circumstances, if time permits. Yery slight 
 works of this kind, if judiciously constructed, may 
 have a great value. 
 
 The engineer has sometimes also the important 
 duty of fortifying a position selected and prepared for 
 one of those mighty battles which decide the fate of 
 empires. Time, that precious element in war, is then 
 allowed him ; he may then be extremely useful, if he 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 237 
 
 has that eye for ground which enables him to make 
 the best dispositions of his works, and that activity 
 and devotion which ensures their execution. He 
 should give ample opportunity for offensive move- 
 ments, as a mere passive defence of intreuchments is 
 injudicious. The works, whatever may be their char- 
 acter, should be separated from each other, leaving 
 wide openings through which troops may debouch 
 with considerable front. Each work should be well 
 arranged, fraised, palisaded, and closed at the gorge, 
 in order to offer a strong resistance. It is better to 
 have a few works with a considerable relief and large 
 ditches, than a number of insignificant affairs which 
 would not check good troops for five minutes. Under 
 protection of these works, and in a favorable position, 
 an active defence may be made, which is so well 
 suited to men of spirit, and tends so much to increase 
 the morale of soldiers. This method is the best, 
 because the impetuosity of attack is necessary for 
 victory. A man feels inspirited when he is moving 
 forward. To adopt a continuous system of intrench- 
 ments is to confess our own weakness, to render our- 
 selves incapable of getting at the enemy, and to chill 
 the ardor of the troops. The influence of fortifica- 
 tions in deciding battles is too well known to make it 
 necessary to cite any examples of the fact. 
 
 Defensive Manoeuvres. We have hitherto supposed 
 an army, obliged to act on the defensive, to have 
 chosen a good position, with flanks well supported by 
 
238 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 obstacles, or by troops suitably posted. It may hap- 
 pen to be attacked in flank before its arrangements 
 are completed. What shall be done then ? It may 
 either change front, pivoting on the least exposed 
 wing, or a crotchet to the rear may be formed, or the 
 second line disposed in echelon to outflank the first 
 at the menaced end, or the reserve thrown upon the 
 flank of the enemy making the attack. The last is 
 the best course, as there is a boldness about it which 
 is inspiring. It does not derange the positions of the 
 several corps, that may then act to suit circumstances, 
 under the protection of the attack of the reserve, 
 which will surprise the enemy and check his move- 
 ment. 
 
 The other plans are dangerous. The crotchet has 
 the disadvantage of being easily enveloped, and hav- 
 ing two long branches exposed to enfilade fire from 
 artillery, which may prove very destructive. The faces 
 are in such relative positions to each other that the 
 troops cannot move forward without separating them 
 at the angle and making an opening through which 
 the enemy may advance, nor can they fall back with- 
 out crowding. If the crotchet is formed under the 
 lire of the enemy, confusion is the almost certain re- 
 suit. For a still stronger reason should a change 
 of front of the entire army be avoided under such 
 circumstances. 
 
 To move the second line by the flank towards the 
 point attacked is scarcely better. The troops of the 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 239 
 
 first line, seeing themselves unsupported, lose their 
 confidence and do not hold their ground well. The 
 two lines should be kept together as well as possible. 
 Moreover, the second line may be outflanked as well 
 as the first, and the movement referred to becomes 
 impossible. It is only by arrangements made previ- 
 ous to the battle that the second line can be made to 
 outflank the first by echelon. But at present we are 
 speaking of movements made at the instant of fight- 
 ing. It is prudent, then, to make no change in the 
 primitive order of battle, and to leave the lines sup- 
 porting each other. 
 
 The reserves alone are disposable for use every- 
 where. The reserves must now be thrown against 
 the wing of the enemy. In the mean time, what are 
 the other troops to do ? They should effect a change 
 of front, not in a methodical manner, as upon a drill- 
 ground, where each corps must preserve its distance 
 and alignments with the utmost rigor, but each will 
 move by the shortest path to the point where it may 
 soonest enter effectively into action. To explain by 
 an example : take the line M, figure 25, surprised on 
 its left flank by the army K, which prepares to attack. 
 As soon as the enemy is discovered, the line M, which 
 is supposed to be composed of four brigades, is broken 
 to the left by divisions and formed in close column in 
 each brigade. While these preparatory movements 
 are going on, the reserve R moves to the position S, 
 where it deploys so as to threaten the right flank of 
 
240 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 jr 
 
 Fig. 25. 
 
 the enemy. The fourth brigade will be deployed 
 upon its left division and the following brigade upon 
 its right division in such a way that when the deploy- 
 ment is ended, which will require but a short time, 
 these two brigades will be in echelon in front of the 
 line of the enemy, and having a connection with the 
 reserve. The second brigade moves off diagonally 
 and takes position in echelon to the right of the fourth. 
 The first brigade remains in column behind the cen- 
 tre, to act as a reserve. In this way there is very 
 rapidly brought into line in the new direction a force 
 equal to that in the former line, if we suppose the 
 reserve to have been one-fifth of the whole. 
 
 If the army, K, extended towards its right still 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 241 
 
 more than shown in the figure, the reserve should not 
 attempt to take K in flank, as this would separate it 
 too far from the third brigade. It would then be 
 proper for the reserve simply to deploy in front of IS". 
 but the second brigade would threaten the left flank 
 of the enemy, and the general result would be the 
 same in character. 
 
 For the sake of simplicity, we have supposed but 
 one line. If there were two, the second would follow 
 the movements of the first. The manoeuvres we have 
 just indicated are equally applicable to the case of a 
 column suddenly arrested, while on the march, by an 
 enemy in position. They are equally suitable for 
 weak corps and for large armies. Thus, a battalion 
 would first deploy two companies to receive the first 
 shock of the enemy, while the remaining companies 
 would be manoeuvred into position. An inversion 
 may be necessary, and hence the propriety of practis- 
 ing inversions at drill. 
 
 Retreat. Whatever precautions may have been 
 taken, or whatever courage displayed, it often becomes 
 necessary to yield to mere numbers, or to the caprices 
 of fortune. Happy, then, is the general who succeeds, 
 after a battle long and severely contested, in with- 
 drawing his army from the field in comparatively 
 good order. 
 
 The movement to the rear is begun unnoticed, in a 
 measure, the troops insensibly falling back as the 
 enemy gains ground, on account of his superiority, 
 11 
 
242 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 which becomes more and more evident. Then comes 
 the moment when longer resistance appears useless, 
 and the general gives orders for the retreat. 
 
 Taking for granted that the army is drawn up in two 
 lines, the retreat is begun by the first, which retires 
 checkerwise ; that is to say, the even-numbered batta- 
 lions fall back to the rear some sixty or a hundred 
 paces, while the odd-numbered battalions hold their 
 ground. When the former have halted and taken 
 position, and are ready to receive the enemy, the others 
 retire in the same way, and so on. 
 
 In the mean time, the reserve, infantry and artillery, 
 or part of the reserve, goes to the rear, to occupy the 
 defiles the army has to pass in retreat. The second 
 line regulates its movements by those of the first, 
 sometimes hastening them, in order to gain some 
 advantageous position where it may check the enemy 
 temporarily. If the first line has suffered greatly, 
 the second should replace it, a passage of lines being 
 executed. It is better for the second line to pass 
 offensively through the intervals of the first, than for 
 the first to fall back through those of the second. 
 Each battalion, being formed in a close column, is 
 moved a few paces to the front of the second line, and 
 rapidly deployed, or, better still, charges with the 
 bayonet. The enemy is thus, in a measure, thrown 
 upon the defensive, and becomes much more circum- 
 spect in his onward movement. The second method 
 is dangerous, because the first line, coming back in a 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 243 
 
 state of some confusion upon the second, may produce 
 disorder in the ranks of the latter. The moral effect 
 upon the troops of both lines is also bad. 
 
 In general, troops who are falling back should do 
 so slowly and calmly, keeping their ranks well closed 
 and in good order. They should frequently halt and 
 turn to deliver their fire upon the enemy if he presses 
 too closely. They may thus succeed, without very 
 great disorder, in reaching some advantageotfs posi- 
 tion, or being covered by the shades of night. 
 Cavalry alone may retire rapidly ; it is even its duty 
 to do so, because in its rapidity of movement consists 
 its safety. It should, however, return as rapidly to 
 the charge, when rallied, in order to disengage the 
 infantry. 
 
 When a regiment or a battalion is entirely broken, 
 and the men absolutely running, the commander 
 should seize a flag and plant it in some conspicuous 
 place, at the same time causing the drummers to beat. 
 The men, ashamed to abandon the flag they have 
 vowed to defend with life even, will gradualy rally, 
 and if the officers of all grades are active in reforming 
 the ranks, order may be restored and confidence re- 
 gained. Upon such occasions, the value of good 
 officers is displayed, as well as the excellent effect of 
 the example of old soldiers. 
 
 While the two lines are retiring the reserve does 
 not remain inactive, but the infantry will occupy 
 points where a firm stand may be made, or will form 
 
244 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 into squares, between which the army may fall back. 
 Thus, at Marengo, the Consular Guard formed that 
 famous square against which all the .charges of the 
 Austrian cavalry failed, and which gained from the 
 army the name of the granite square. At the same 
 time, the cavalry should make every effort to protect 
 the retreat, by daring and repeated charges. It 
 should never stop to count the numbers of the enemy, 
 but should rush upon him, wherever he may be and 
 however strong, in order to oblige him to deploy, and 
 thus delay his movement forward. It is absolutely 
 essential to s*afety to gain time, and nothing is more 
 likely to effect this than dashing, furious attacks of 
 cavalry, no matter what may be the result to itself. Th e 
 artillery should cross its fire upon all points to be 
 passed over by the enemy in pursuit, selecting favor- 
 able positions for this purpose. It must run some 
 risks, even to the loss of a few pieces, as without its 
 effective support the retreat of the infantry under the 
 close murderous fire of the enemy must become a rout. 
 
 In the mean time, the baggage train should move off 
 rapidly, under the escort of some troops. It has been 
 kept at a considerable distance during the battle, and 
 is set in motion as soon as the order is given to retreat. 
 Its movement should be hastened as much as possible, 
 in order to clear the way for the army. 
 
 Night at last comes on. The enemy, tired of 
 fighting and exhausted by his losses, is forced to halt. 
 This is the time for rallying and reorganizing the 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 245 
 
 retreating army, and giving the men some food ; but 
 sleep is out of the question, as this opportunity must 
 be used for getting the start of the enemy. A strong 
 rear-guard, commanded by a bold and experienced 
 officer, remains in position to cover the retreat. This 
 rear-guard, when forced to retire, will do so slowly, 
 and forcing the enemy to be cautious, by disputing 
 the ground foot by foot. 
 
 The worst consequence of a defeat is not the number 
 of men killed, and cannon captured, but the demorali- 
 zation of the troops. Every means should, therefore, 
 be used to remove their sad depression of spirits. The 
 officers should wear cheerful countenances and speak 
 encouraging words. The commander-in-chief, far 
 from appearing disheartened, should seem entirely 
 calm and collected ; should visit the different bivouacs, 
 and give his orders as if no reverse had occurred. He 
 will thus impart to the men confidence in his firmness 
 and courage. The troops will recover their spirits, 
 and be ready to meet the enemy again. The victor 
 of the preceding day may find, to his cost, that he 
 did not know how to use his success, if he has per- 
 mitted his army to sleep and his adversary to recover 
 from his defeat. He will verify again the adage, that 
 " in war nothing is done so long as there remains any 
 thing to do." 
 
 Frederick the Great recommended that a beaten 
 army should not retreat far, but halt at the first favor- 
 able position, to restore spirit and order to the ranks. 
 
246 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 The Dukes of Weimar and Rohan, the two greatest 
 generals of their day, after "losing the battle of Rhin- 
 feld, halted about fifteen miles from the field, and there 
 rallied the remains of their army. By a night march, 
 they presented themselves suddenly before the camp 
 of the Bavarians, who did not expect such an attack, 
 and were keeping a very poor lookout. They were 
 surprised and routed completely, losing all their 
 cannon and baggage. Here the Bavarians were 
 accessory to their own ruin by sleeping on the field 
 of battle, and giving themselves up to idle joy, instead 
 of vigorously pursuing their beaten enemy. The rule 
 laid down by Frederick, which he put in practice 
 after the battle of Hohenkirch, accords with what has 
 just been stated ; but it is not always practicable for a 
 defeated general to halt his army when and where he 
 pleases. The more faithfully the army has performed 
 its duty on the battle-field, the more difficult it is for 
 him to do so ; for the greater the obstinacy it has dis- 
 played, and the more determined the resistance, the 
 less the probability of its withdrawing in order. It 
 then becomes necessary to retreat to a considerable 
 distance, to collect its scattered fragments and to 
 receive re-enforcements. 
 
 We often see an army with one wing defeated, while 
 the other still holds its ground and serves as a rally- 
 ing point for the scattered battalions of the former, 
 the whole then moving impetuously upon the enemy. 
 Such conduct is often followed by complete success. 
 
DEFENSIVE BATTLES. 247 
 
 If, instead of that, the general orders a retreat, he may 
 succeed in retiring without serious losses, but he is 
 not the less certainly beaten. Indeed, victory is a 
 prize sufficiently great to be renounced only after 
 strenuous efforts to secure it. The first of duties is to 
 fight well, and then to do whatever else is possible. 
 A victory which is the result of a battle faithfully 
 fought, may be equivalent to the destruction of the 
 opposing army and the conclusion of the war. On 
 the contrary, even in defeat, under such circumstances, 
 honor is safe, and the vigor displayed in the fight 
 and the losses incurred may dissuade even a successful 
 enemy from engaging in similar contests. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 DEFENCE OF RIVERS AND MOUNTAINS - COVERING A 
 SIEGE. 
 
 Art. I. Defence of River. 
 
 Disposition of the Troops. In order to defend a 
 river, the army should be divided into several corps 
 of observation, placed in front of the points most threat- 
 ened by the enemy, and not so near the banks as to be 
 exposed to artillery fire. Each corps remains concen- 
 trated, only sending out small detachments to observe 
 what is going on upon the opposite bank. Communi- 
 cation between the corps is constantly kept up by 
 patrols. The detachments should be as few as can per- 
 form the duty thoroughly. They should be posted in 
 clumps of trees and behind rising ground ; in fact, 
 wherever they can best observe the opposite bank 
 without being seen themselves. The distance between 
 the corps of observation will depend upon the breadth 
 of the river and the time required for constructing 
 bridges across it. The corps should be so near together, 
 that either may receive the support of those next it in 
 time to prevent the enemy from passing the river in 
 its vicinity. If two or three hours are required for 
 
DEFENCE OF EIVEIiS. 24:9 
 
 building the bridges, the corps may be from six to ten 
 miles apart. Three corps of observation would thus 
 watch twenty or twenty-five miles of the river, as the 
 enemy could not attempt a passage above or below all 
 three, or between any two of the corps, without resist- 
 ance, first from one, and soon from two or three. 
 
 A strong reserve or principal corps should be kept 
 to the rear, at a distance depending upon the front 
 occupied by the corps of observation, and such that it 
 can arrive at the point where the attempt is made to 
 cross, before the enemy can carry out his object. If 
 the part of the river to be watched is very long, two 
 reserves should be formed instead of one. 
 
 To enable the corps to move readily from point to 
 point, there should be a good road parallel to the 
 river, and cross-roads connecting it with the position 
 of the reserve. When the parallel road is very near 
 the river, and under fire from the opposite bank, it 
 loses its advantages, and a new one must be cut, far- 
 ther to the rear. 
 
 Besides the general dispositions already mentioned, 
 there are many details to be attended to. There 
 should be a good system of signals, both for night and 
 day-; boats should be brought to the bank which is 
 held by the af my, and those that cannot be brought 
 over should be sunk ; the largest of them should be 
 carried up stream, to be filled with stones and floated 
 down to break the bridges of the enemy. If the river 
 is fordable in some places, pits and trenches should be 
 11* 
 
250 PKINCirLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 dug in the bottom, if possible ; if not, the end of the 
 ford should be obstructed by an abatis, or a field for- 
 tification of suitable character. If between two fords 
 or two points favorable for passing the river, a narrow 
 defile exists, it should be fortified and held, in order 
 to control the road, and prevent the bodies of the 
 enemy which may have passed, from effecting a junc- 
 tion without being attacked. When the bridges are 
 of such a character as to be defended with difficulty, 
 they should be cut, notwithstanding the opposition of 
 the inhabitants of the country. In such cases, private 
 interests must yield to the general welfare. As far as 
 possible, however, such demolitions should be avoided. 
 If a partial destruction will stop the enemy's progress, 
 more than that is unjustifiable. 
 
 Bridge-heads. If the bridge is to be preserved, it 
 should be covered by strong field fortifications, while 
 all proper precautions are taken upon the bridge 
 itself, and behind it. A bridge thus held gives to the 
 possessors the power of passing the river, whenever it 
 is desirable. The fortifications erected to control a 
 bridge constitute what is called a bridge-head, and 
 should be arranged to suit the circumstances of the 
 case, in accordance with the principles laid down in 
 treatises on the subject of Field Fortifications. 
 
 The river, instead of crossing the line of operations 
 of the enemy, may be parallel to it. In this case, a 
 bridge that is to be held must be defended by fortifi- 
 cations on both sides, as it is impossible to say on 
 
 ' 
 
DEFENCE OF RIVEKS. 251 
 
 which side the attack may be made. There is thus 
 formed a double bridge-head. Such a work gives 
 great advantages to the party on the defensive, if it 
 manoeuvres rapidly, for there is always a safe passage 
 from one bank to the other, and the bridge-head may 
 be occupied by only a sufficient garrison to hold it 
 against the enemy ; this garrison may be relieved or 
 re-enforced at pleasure, so as to make a very efficient 
 defence. The enemy cannot safely pass by, leaving 
 such a point upon his line of operations. He must 
 therefore attack the fortifications, and may thus be 
 forced to a considerable loss of time, men, and mate- 
 rial. If he divides his forces to surround the work, 
 and attack both sides at once, the army on the defen- 
 sive may concentrate in force against a fraction of the 
 enemy and destroy it. In order to operate success- 
 fully, therefore, against such a work, the enemy must 
 have a very great superiority of force. 
 
 The Archduke Charles remarks : " There is no 
 better defensive position than one which keeps the 
 enemy constantly apprehensive of being attacked. 
 An army behind a river, with strong bridge-heads, is 
 in precisely such a position. Almost any other may 
 be turned, but a bridge-head, well built, secure from 
 capture by assault, and perfectly covering a passage 
 of the river, need never suffer from an insufficiency of 
 numbers in the garrison, or from want of provisions 
 and munitions of war. The enemy is forced to 
 watch carefully such a communication, by which 
 
252 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 superior forces may be at any moment thrown upon 
 him." 
 
 When a simply passive defence of a river can alone 
 be made, which is an unfortunate state of affairs, 
 special attention must be given to those points that 
 offer the enemy advantages for building bridges. 
 Such are those where the river makes an elbow convex 
 towards the enemy, as batteries may be constructed to 
 cross their fire in front of the ground where his lead- 
 ing troops would be landed. Other favorable points 
 for him are those where the river is divided into seve- 
 ral arms by islands, that may conceal the preparations 
 made for passing ; also the mouths of tributary streams, 
 by means of which the enemy may bring up from the 
 interior boats and other materials for bridges. Bat- 
 teries should be constructed at such places, so as to 
 sweep with their fire the opposite banks, and the 
 ground adjacent. When there is no time to finish in 
 a complete manner such works of fortification as may 
 be suitable, simple trenches and rifle-pits should be 
 rapidly built, so as to envelope the space upon which 
 the enemy must place the foremost of his troops, and 
 expose them to a close converging fire. Upon one 
 occasion Eugene had gained a inarch upon Yendome, 
 and was attempting to throw a bridge across the Adda 
 at a very favorable spot. Yendome came up as soon 
 as he could, and arrived before the bridge was com- 
 pleted. He tried to arrest the work of the pontoniers, 
 but in vain. The ground was so well swept by the 
 
DEFENCE OF RIVERS. 253 
 
 artillery of Eugene, that he could not get near enough 
 to injure the workmen. Still, the passage of the river 
 must be prevented. Vendome put his army to work 
 upon a trench and parapet, surrounding the ground 
 which the Imperialists must occupy after crossing. 
 They were finished nearly as soon as the bridges; 
 Eugene deemed the passage of the river impracticable, 
 and ordered a retreat. 
 
 When the attacking party is thus caught in the act 
 of constructing his bridges, he is taken at great disad- 
 vantage, because the main body of his army is not 
 across, while the few troops who have passed in boats 
 are not in sufficient numbers to force their way for- 
 ward, and make room for the army to debouch from 
 the bridges and deploy in line of battle, even if it be 
 practicable for it to do so under the converging lire 
 of the artillery and infantry of the defenders. 
 
 The enemy is also in a perilous condition, if a por- 
 tion of his forces have crossed, and the defenders suc- 
 ceed in breaking the bridges, and thus cutting his 
 army in two. Every effort should therefore be made 
 to do this. If large boats, filled with stones, and 
 heavy rafts, constructed of trunks of trees, be sent 
 down the stream, there is great probability, if the cur- 
 rent is rapid, that some, or all of them, will strike the 
 bridges and break them. In 1809, the Austrians suc- 
 ceeded in cutting the French army in two, by throw- 
 ing into the stream several wooden mills which were 
 upon the banks of the Danube. The corps which had 
 
254: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 passed the river, and taken possession of Gros-Aspern 
 and Essling on the left bank, were surrounded by the 
 whole army of the Archduke Charles, and obliged, 
 after a heroic but ineffectual resistance, to retire to 
 the large island of Lobau, that here divides the Danube 
 into two channels. After this check, two months 
 were consumed by the French in immense and per- 
 severing labor, in building several strong bridges, and 
 preventing them from rupture by stockades above 
 them. 
 
 Secondary Means. It is very important for an army 
 engaged in defending a river not to be deceived by 
 false demonstrations, and to have timely warning of a 
 real attempt at a passage. Officers of experience 
 should be sent to the posts of observation, who are 
 not easily deceived by feints. Signals must be agreed 
 upon, by which timely notice may be given of suspi- 
 cious movements of the enemy. 
 
 There is, moreover, a military law, a law which 
 can never be violated without dishonor, that requires 
 a commander to go in the direction of a cannonade 
 when it is so near and so prolonged that there can be 
 no reasonable doubt in his mind of a serious engage- 
 ment being in progress. No excuse can justify him 
 for remaining unmoved in his position when the thun- 
 der of the cannon tells him that a battle is going on 
 at no great distance. He cannot even plead the orders 
 of a senior, for contrary orders may have been sent 
 but intercepted, or their bearers may have been killed. 
 
DEFENCE OF KTVEES. 255 
 
 He must decide as to the urgency of the case, and 
 take the responsibility of moving where honor and 
 danger call. If the soldier and subordinate officer 
 should render implicit obedience to the orders of their 
 superiors, the case is different with a chief of long ex- 
 perience in war ; he must necessarily exercise a cer- 
 tain degree of discretion in the performance of his 
 duty, especially when an unforeseen case arises. Unity 
 of effort towards a common end is a fundamental 
 principle in the operations of war, and this requires 
 movement towards the sound of the cannon, when 
 there is doubt in the mind of the commander. 
 
 Movements of Troops. As soon as the alarm is 
 given, the posts of observation nearest the point of 
 passage hasten up and charge the troops already over, 
 whatever may be their numbers, to drive them into 
 the river, if possible, before others can cross to their 
 assistance, or at least hold them in check until re-en- 
 forcements arrive from the rear. If the enemy com' 
 mits the fault of commencing the construction of his 
 bridges before he has possession of both banks, the 
 sharpshooters may draw near and pick off the pon- 
 toniers with ease. 
 
 The artillery and cavalry ought to be the first to 
 arrive to the support of the advanced posts. If the 
 ground favors, the cavalry charges vigorously, while 
 the artillery takes position to reply to that of the 
 enemy, or to crush the troops already over. The 
 horse artillery may be very useful on such occasions, 
 
256 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 from the rapidity with which it may be brought upon 
 the ground and placed in position. The corps of ob- 
 servation, on the right and left, are put in motion im- 
 mediately, and lose no time in coming up and taking 
 part in the action, which becomes continually warmer. 
 The position of the enemy becomes more critical, as 
 he can scarcely use his artillery for fear of firing upon 
 his own troops. He will be unable to hold his ground, 
 pressed and surrounded as he is, if he has not suc- 
 ceeded in completing his bridges by the time the re- 
 serve cornes up. The troops that have crossed must 
 lay down their arms. 
 
 It often happens that the defenders are taken by 
 surprise, notwithstanding all their precautions, be- 
 cause the enemy may deceive them in a thousand 
 ways. The troops will then reach the ground too 
 late, or, coming up in successive portions, may be de- 
 stroyed. The passage is forced, and, as the assailant 
 is usually the stronger in such cases, the other army 
 must fall back to some other position in rear. 
 
 Whatever may be the danger of the passage of the 
 river by the enemy, there is no reason for occupying 
 a great extent of the river to prevent it, and thus 
 spreading out the troops in a long weak line. The 
 enemy must do one of two things. He must either 
 keep his forces united, or divide them. If he concen- 
 trates, the army on the defensive should pursue the 
 same course, remaining opposite to him and gaining 
 all possible information of his movements. It will be 
 
DEFENCE OF RIVERS. 257 
 
 difficult for the enemy, in such a case, to effect a pas- 
 sage by surprise, unless the locality is very favorable 
 to him, and information of his movements cannot 
 be obtained, either through spies or the inhabitants 
 of the country. If he occupies a great extent of 
 country by separate corps, he need not be feared 
 at any point. The army on the defensive should 
 be kept together opposite the centre of his line, 
 thrown upon any corps that might succeed in crossing, 
 and crush it before the arrival of other detachments, 
 which, in the case supposed, are quite distant. By 
 concentration, is not meant crowding the whole army 
 in a single camp. It would then be impossible to 
 watch the banks of the stream. The troops are suffi- 
 ciently concentrated when the corps are near enough 
 to afford mutual support ; and it is quite certain that 
 when this is the case, the enemy cannot effect a pas- 
 sage between two of the corps before they can resist 
 him with effect. The word concentration must, there- 
 fore, be not understood in an absolute sense, but re- 
 ceive a liberal interpretation, as, indeed, is the case 
 with all military terms. 
 
 A very effectual method of disconcerting the enemy, 
 and neutralizing the moral effect of the successful 
 passage of a river by him, is to cross at some other 
 point and begin offensive operations upon his terri- 
 tory. Such a determination upon the part of a general 
 would show him to be a man of spirit. The imagi- 
 nation of the troops is excited, their hopes aroused, 
 
258 PEINCIPLES OF STEATEGT. 
 
 and their courage renewed, while, at the same time, 
 the enemy is astonished and demoralized at the very 
 natural supposition that the opposing army is in 
 greater force and better supplied than was believed. 
 The enemy will speedily repass the river, to protect 
 his own territory. In 1674, Montecuculi crossed the 
 Rhine. Turenne at once crossed in the other direc- 
 tion, instead of seeking to defend the frontiers of 
 France by the usual means. The initiative that Mon- 
 tecuculi had so skilfully taken was of no avail, as he 
 was obliged, by the still more skilful manoeuvre of 
 Turenne, to return to the right bank of the river. 
 
 Sometimes the defenders withdraw designedly from 
 the river, in order to entice the enemy across, and 
 then return upon him before his whole army is over 
 and in position. The general who retires in this way 
 is only justified in so doing by the character of the 
 ground, which permits him, upon his return, to have 
 a good position, while the enemy is crowded and 
 unable to deploy his forces. Unless these are the cir- 
 cumstances of the case, he runs the risk of a defeat 
 if the enemy succeeds in throwing over troops enough. 
 Such a mistake has been actually made. Marshal. 
 Crequi, at Consarbruck, suffered the enemy to cross, 
 deferring his attack with the expectation of envelop- 
 ing and routing a greater number. To those who 
 were surprised at his course, and expostulated with 
 him, he replied, that the greater the number who 
 passed, the more decisive would be their defeat. 
 
DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 259 
 
 However, so many passed that lie could not resist 
 them, and the marshal was completely beaten and 
 covered with shame. This mistake made a fine gen- 
 eral for France, as Crequi was cured of his rashness, 
 but still retained ardor enough for great undertakings. 
 We may learn, also, from the life of CrequiJ that a 
 man who is truly great, and worthy to command 
 others, knows how to profit even by his own faults. 
 
 Art. If. Defence of Mountains 
 
 Such a country is best defended by rapid manoeu- 
 vring and energetic attacks upon the enemy. His 
 plans are thus thwarted, and he is obliged to think 
 about his own safety. He has not the same freedom 
 of movement as the defenders, because he is obliged 
 to protect and keep open his line of operations, whilst 
 they are at home and find a line of retreat in any di- 
 rection. The inhabitants of the country are also gen- 
 erally ready to aid the defenders, and fall upon the 
 assailants at all favorable opportunities. They will at 
 least render important services by watching the move- 
 ments of the enemy and giving notice of them. Some 
 of them will always act as partisans, and do much 
 valuable service. 
 
 The first rule to be observed in defending a moun- 
 tainous region is not to try to close all the passes, as 
 an attempt to do this would lead to injudicious scat- 
 tering of the troops, and a very weak front is offered 
 
260 TKINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 to the enemy at every point. The plan of concentra- 
 tion should be followed, as far as the country will 
 permit. Those positions should be strongly held, 
 from which troops may be rapidly moved to any 
 point threatened by the enemy. It is possible to as- 
 semble several battalions only in the valleys ; these, 
 then, will usually be the places where the defence will 
 be mainly made ; but the advantages given by the 
 higher ground in arresting the movements of the 
 assailants must not be lost sight of. 
 
 In the next place, there are two things to be done 
 in a warfare of this kind : to manoeuvre offensively, in 
 order to dislodge the enemy, take his columns in 
 flank, separate his detached corps, seize his convoys, 
 &c. ; and to fight defensively, that is to say, to take 
 position in the most advantageous way possible when- 
 ever it is necessary to engage seriously. Although 
 these two precepts may seem contradictory, a skilful 
 officer will know how to apply them together ; he 
 manoeuvres to get upon the flank or rear of the enemy, 
 and having succeeded in doing so, he takes a position, 
 or, at any rate, does not attack unless he has the de- 
 cided advantage over the enemy. The latter, being 
 unable to move farther without danger of having his 
 line of retreat cut, is obliged to turn upon the corps 
 which is in position and attack it. Until that is done, 
 he is in constant danger of being separated from his 
 re-enforcements and means of subsistence. He must, 
 therefore, be the cost what it may, march upon this 
 
I 
 DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 261 
 
 position and attack it before advancing to other ope- 
 rations. To oblige him to do this was the object of 
 the manoeuvre ; if his attack succeeds, he will at any 
 rate suffer greatly; and if he fails, his position is 
 critical. 
 
 Artificial Obstacles. Besides manoeuvres of the 
 troops, whose importance is undoubted, there are other 
 means, not to be neglected in a good defensive sys- 
 tem ; these art provides, for the purpose of delaying 
 or completely arresting the movements of the enemy 
 in certain localities, and for strengthening positions for 
 engagements. Thus, preparations should be made in 
 advance for obstructing roads. Mines will be placed 
 in the piers of stone bridges, and combustible mate- 
 rials got in readiness for burning those of wood. 
 Parts of the roads that are narrow and cannot be 
 turned will be blown out with powder, and temporary 
 bridges made, which can be readily destroyed. At 
 other places mines will be prepared to throw down 
 masses of rock in the roads, either in anticipation of 
 the approach of the enemy or when he is passing, and 
 thus be the occasion of much damage to him. Aba- 
 tis may be formed across narrow roads, or barricades 
 constructed of earth, timber, or rocks. These meas- 
 ures suppose some haste in their execution ; but, when 
 time is abundant, the better plan is to build block- 
 houses or larger earthen works in those parts of the 
 valleys which are commanding from their position, 
 and yet so contracted as not to require works of great 
 
262 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 extent. A strong redoubt, well fraised and having a 
 considerable command, is a difficult obstacle for an 
 enemy to pass in such a locality as is here spoken of. 
 
 Positions. Good positions, well defended, will 
 always give the enemy much trouble in mountainous 
 warfare. He can take them by assault only, at great 
 loss to himself, and much time will be consumed if 
 he attempts to turn them. 
 
 Positions will be found upon the high ground or in 
 the valleys. The first, although ordinarily strong 
 against attack in front, are often easily turned. It is, 
 moreover, generally difficult to furnish food and water 
 to the troops holding them, and they should, there- 
 fore, be held by only sufficient forces to repulse the 
 enemy with loss if he attacks in front. Small bod- 
 ies will retire with facility and without fear of being 
 overtaken ; they will take every advantage of the 
 ground to check the enemy, and will give themselves 
 up more to fighting than to getting out of the way. 
 Finally, if a small body is unfortunately captured, 
 the moral effect is not near so great as would be pro- 
 duced by the loss of a large detachment. 
 
 The detachments that defend the heights, usually 
 belong to more numerous corps encamped in the 
 lower ground. The troops should not be scattered 
 around, holding every little by-path, as this will pre- 
 vent a strong resistance being made at any point. 
 The detachments will be grouped near the main pass, 
 which they should hold long enough to give time 
 
DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 263 
 
 to the troops below to come to their support. By 
 placing reserves in rear and on the flanks, at points 
 where the lateral roads come in, they will guard 
 against being cut off. The natives may be very 
 useful in giving warning by signals of the approach 
 of the enemy, and a few of them, with arms in their 
 hands, will guard the by-paths as well as the best 
 soldiers, and with more confidence, on account of 
 their being perfectly acquainted with the country, 
 and certain of their ability to escape at the last mo- 
 ment. 
 
 The best positions are usually in the valleys, be- 
 cause they are generally better supported, being occu- 
 pied in force, and with the high ground on the flanks 
 guarded. The enemy cannot turn them so easily as 
 those upon the hills; if he wishes to do so, he is 
 obliged to make wide detours through other valleys. 
 Positions, properly so called, are comparatively few. 
 They are either across or along a valley. 
 
 When the defence is made while ascending a val- 
 ley, the enemy attacking from below, the ground, 
 without presenting what are called positions, is never- 
 theless favorable almost everywhere. But when the 
 top of the ascent is passed, and the defenders are de- 
 scending while the enemy is higher, he has the deci- 
 ded advantage. It is only at considerable intervals 
 that such elevations in the valley occur as to form 
 defensible positions; but these are generally very good, 
 because contracted in extent, and having the flanks 
 
264: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 upon the precipitous sides of the mountains. These 
 positions often have the disadvantage of being cut 
 in two by the stream which flows at the foot of the 
 valley, and, if it is not fordable, the wings cannot 
 support each other. Thus the enemy may attack one 
 wing with superior numbers, and, when it is driven 
 back, threaten the other in flank and oblige it to re- 
 tire also. Such positions, therefore, to be available to 
 the defence, should offer free communications between 
 the different corps of the army, while those of the 
 enemy are difficult or impossible. With this view, the 
 bridges above the position should be cut, while those 
 upon it and below should be retained and even new 
 ones constructed. Such is the position across a valley. 
 A position is taken up along a valley, w r hen it is 
 desired to arrest the progress of an enemy wishing to 
 emerge from a cross valley. The ground will usually 
 rise like an amphitheatre in front of the mouth of the 
 transversal valley, so that the heads of the columns 
 of the enemy, in debouching, will be exposed to a cross 
 and enfilading fire, and it will be extremely difficult 
 for him under these disadvantages to advance to the 
 attack. But, in order that the position be thus favor- 
 able to the defence, and that the general may expect 
 to force the assailant to retire, the valley must be so 
 narrow as to enable troops on the opposite slope to 
 reach with their fire the enemy emerging from the 
 transversal valley. If the main valley is too wide 
 for this plan to be pursued, the army on the defensive 
 
DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 265 
 
 must be on the side next the secondary valley, and 
 must act offensively, enveloping the enemy as he 
 debouches. There will not be the same advantage or 
 position as before, but the defenders are enabled to 
 bring fresh masses of troops against those of the 
 enemy, who are necessarily much strung out, and 
 perhaps fatigued by painful marching. When an 
 attack is thus made upon an enemy seeking to debouch 
 from a secondary into the main valley, the artillery 
 ought to be placed in front of the infantry ; this is in 
 violation of the ordinary rule, but it is permissible, 
 because the enemy, in such a case, will usually have 
 little or no artillery in action ; and it is necessary, be- 
 cause the space required for the ordinary dispositions 
 is wanting, and the artillery must be in front to attain 
 the enemy at the greatest possible distance. 
 
 Intrenchments. There are some examples of valleys 
 defended by intrenched lines. These are, undoubtedly, 
 good when the valley is narrow, and the mountains on 
 the flanks very steep and only turned with great diffi- 
 culty ; when the intrenchments have masonry revet- 
 ments, and the ground on which they are built has such 
 a command over the valley that the artillery can sweep 
 it to a great distance. These conditions are not so 
 often satisfied as is supposed, and hence the proper 
 use of this kind of defences is not frequent. Refer- 
 ence is not now intended to small redoubts for detached 
 posts, nor to the larger earthworks often advantage- 
 ously used in mountain warfare, but to those extensive 
 12 
 
266 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 lines intended to close up an entire valley ; such lines, 
 to have any real value, must fulfil the conditions laid 
 down above. 
 
 Movements of Troops. When all hope of a success- 
 ful defence of a valley is lost, the commander may 
 attempt an offensive movement through a lateral 
 valley, rather than retire immediately into the interior. 
 Nothing can be more honorable and brilliant than 
 such an effort, and it is often crowned with the success 
 Fortune loves to bestow upon daring actions. A timid 
 chief, who thinks only of defending positions, and who 
 falls back constantly as the enemy advances, deserves 
 and receives none of her favors. In warfare in a 
 mountainous country some risk must be run in 
 making eccentric movements upon the flanks and rear 
 of the enemy, because the character of the topography 
 favors ; the body of troops making the movement is 
 not likely to be enveloped, even when very inferior in 
 numbers, because the enemy, usually spread out in 
 the valleys over a great length, can with difficulty 
 assemble his troops, and, even when that is practicable, 
 he requires some time to reach the high ground and 
 rid himself of the restraint imposed upon his actions 
 by want of space. A small body, well posted, will 
 perhaps fight all day before the enemy can reach its 
 flanks, so difficult will he find it to make combined 
 movements when attacked thus unexpectedly. The 
 paucity of communications is unfavorable to the 
 prompt transmission of his orders, and when, at last, 
 
DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 267 
 
 they reach their destination, the time for their execu- 
 tion may have passed. The attacking party has, 
 therefore, many chances of gaining some signal success, 
 and the fame of it, increasing as it goes, will make 
 the enemy uneasy and encourage the defenders. The 
 worst thing that can happen in such a case is to be 
 obliged to fall back after an unsuccessful attack ; but 
 retreat is easy and not very dangerous, as the troops 
 that retire are getting constantly nearer their supports, 
 while the enemy is leaving his behind. Here is 
 another example of the modifying influence of lo- 
 calities upon general rules. 
 
 When a defensive corps has succeeded in regaining 
 some important pass or high ground, by which means 
 the communications of the enemy are interrupted, it 
 may either take the offensive or remain in position. 
 The first course will be pursued if the enemy is not 
 in great force and the ground is favorable ; in the 
 other case, the defenders will simply hold on to what 
 has been gained, and make preparations to receive an 
 attack, by occupying woods and commanding ground 
 with sharpshooters, by making abatis across the roads, 
 and collecting large rocks and trunks of trees to roll 
 down upon the assailants. The enemy will make a 
 powerful effort to reopen his line of communications ; 
 if it is unsuccessful, the assailed should not give them- 
 selves up to an imprudent pursuit, but should reoccupy 
 their position, and prepare for the^.eiieu}y a similar 
 reception whenever he 
 
2 08 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 A great advantage is gained in an attack in such 
 country by occupying a height which had been deemed 
 inaccessible, and planting a piece or two of artillery 
 upon it, even if of small calibre. The enemy is dis- 
 concerted and alarmed, and inclined to abandon his 
 position at once, especially if attacked in front. Thus, 
 at the combat of Val Carlos, General Nogues had a 
 piece of artillery carried by main strength up very 
 steep slopes to the heights which commanded the 
 camp of the Spaniards. The latter were astonished, 
 as they had supposed the heights inaccessible, and 
 they rapidly retired from their position before an 
 enemy greatly inferior in forces. 
 
 It has been already seen how the character of the 
 ground will modify general rules. Still another 
 example in point may be mentioned. The combined 
 movement of several detachments to envelop the 
 enemy in an open country is very properly con- 
 demned ; but, among mountains, such a manoeuvre 
 may be safe and very successful. The enemy is unable 
 to interpose between the detachments and beat them 
 separately ; each should be strong enough to defend 
 the valley it occupies, and it is then in no danger of 
 being surrounded; moreover, all the detachments can 
 retire safely if they fail in their attempt. They should 
 have, at least, mountain artillery with them, not only 
 for the effect to be produced upon the enemy, but to 
 make signals. This is often the sole means of communi- 
 cating between the detachments. 
 
DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 269 
 
 If a detachment of tlie enemy is met in one of the 
 valleys, it should be attacked in front, while infantry, 
 in dispersed order, attempt to gain the high ground 
 on the flanks and rear. This precaution should be 
 taken in all movements along valleys. 
 
 "With the precautions that have been mentioned, 
 boldness may be displayed, even to rashness, and will 
 generally lead to success. The Archduke Charles 
 says : " Nowhere are such wonders accomplished by 
 boldness as in broken countries, and especially among 
 high mountains ; where the warfare is necessarily one 
 of posts, the engagements are generally unexpected, 
 and the enemy, surprised by unusual daring, is 
 paralyzed at the critical moment." In combined 
 movements, rivers and lakes may furnish a very 
 excellent means of communication. The transports 
 should be propelled by steam, and armed, or escorted 
 by gunboats. 
 
 If, after disputing the upper valleys foot by foot, 
 by taking successive positions in them, or by manoeu- 
 vring to separate the columns of the enemy and divert 
 them from their object, it becomes necessary to 
 abandon them, the lower valleys still remain to be 
 defended, where larger bodies of troops can be con- 
 centrated, and the ground offers many positions where 
 a good general may use his tactical ability most 
 effectively. A point will be selected, for example, at 
 the junction of several valleys, or at the mouth of a 
 single one. The defensive army will have great fa- 
 
270 PRINCIPLES OF STEATEGY. 
 
 cilities for moving rapidly from one outlet to another 
 by the shortest lines, while the enemy can only ope- 
 rate in a single valley, or cannot communicate between 
 adjacent valleys except by great labor or wide detours. 
 The plan then will be to retard him simply in the 
 narrow valleys, which can be done by small detach- 
 ments, while the main body attacks where a greater 
 display of force is practicable. After beating the 
 enemy here, a rapid movement may be made to the 
 outlet of the nearest valley, where it is more than 
 probable a similar success may be gained. 
 
 Suppose, for example, that an army of 30,000 men 
 is advancing by three valleys towards an objective 
 point, M, figure 26, which is probably the principal 
 city on the outskirts of the mountains. The roads 
 through these valleys converge towards M, but the 
 two on the right unite before reaching M. The 
 invading army, in order to occupy these three valleys, 
 is obliged to send an equal force of 10,000 men into 
 each. Suppose the defensive army to contain about* 
 19,000 men. They may or not have been also divided 
 into three equal parts, but the moment has now 
 arrived for a decisive concentration ; 3,000 men can 
 check 10,000 in each valley, or at least delay them 
 sufficiently by cutting bridges, closing defiles, taking 
 flank positions, &c. The general will, therefore, 
 leave three detachments, a, 6, <?, each of 3,000 men, 
 in these valleys, and with 10,000 men will take up 
 a position d, near m, where two of the roads meet. 
 
272 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 If the valley on the right is most accessible, he will 
 strike his first blow there. He will inform the com- 
 mander of ~b of his intentions, ordering him to main- 
 tain his position firmly, while he joins a and fights a 
 battle. He will have 13,000 against 10,000 of the 
 enemy's forces, and the result cannot be very doubt- 
 ful, especially if the ground favors his operations. If 
 the enemy retires without a battle, the news must be 
 proclaimed far and wide, but the general should not 
 engage in a pursuit by which he would be removed 
 too far from m, which is now the essential point ; he 
 will, on the contrary, after a show of pursuit, return 
 to his former position, to manoeuvre from it as circum- 
 stances may justify or require. 
 
 If the enemy fights and is beaten, the corps a 
 should be sent in pursuit, while the main body hastens 
 to J, to fight again with a similar superiority of forces. 
 Immediately afterwards the main body d moves by 
 the cross-road m n to the third detachment <?, & having 
 been sent in pursuit of the enemy in the middle val- 
 ley, or ordered to hold him in check. Upon this last 
 occasion the victorious army will follow up its advan- 
 tage, pressing the third corps of the enemy vigorously, 
 and gaining the flank of the other two, which will 
 thus be forced to retreat. 
 
 If, on the contrary, the enemy does not advance 
 along several valleys, as has been supposed in the ex- 
 ample above, but by a single road, with a view of pene- 
 trating into the interior of the country, his forces will 
 
DEFENCE OF MOUNTAINS. 273 
 
 be concentrated, it is true, but he will want room to 
 use them efficiently. The defenders should not be 
 alarmed at this concentration, but bravely prepare to 
 meet the enemy at the mouth of the valley. Such a 
 position and order of battle will be selected that the 
 enemy will be enveloped as he debouches, and exposed 
 to powerful cross-fires. Courage and firmness are espe- 
 cially necessary now, for if the defensive army is beaten 
 in this position, with the ground favoring it so much, 
 it will not probably be successful elsewhere. 
 
 Communications. The preceding remarks demon- 
 strate the necessity of good roads for the defence of a 
 mountainous country, as without them it would be im- 
 possible to move rapidly to threatened points, to effect 
 the speedy concentration of troops when desirable, and 
 to make those offensive returns which have so excel- 
 lent an effect in raising the morale of the army and 
 disconcerting the enemy. If possible, therefore, a sys- 
 tem of roads should be prepared in advance for the 
 defence of a mountainous country. At ten or twelve 
 miles to the rear of the principal crests of the chain, 
 a road should be built parallel to it, passing over the 
 spurs and crossing the perpendicular roads, thus giving 
 an opportunity to move freely from right to left in case 
 of need. Each of the perpendicular roads should be 
 closed by a strong fort, well located between the crest 
 of the chain and the parallel road. Still farther to 
 the rear, at the foot of the mountain, a second parallel 
 road should be built, crossing the outlets of the val- 
 12* 
 
274 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 ley. By means of such a network of cross and longi- 
 tudinal roads, the defence might be made as active 
 as possible. If such an arrangement is impossible, 
 on account of topographical difficulties, the spirit 
 of it, at least, may be attained. 
 
 Summary. From what has been said on the subject 
 of conducting a defensive war in a mountainous coun- 
 try, it appears it should be characterized by peculiar 
 boldness and activity. Every thing depends upon 
 rapidity of movement and the art of acting offensively, 
 even if upon the defensive. The enemy cannot be 
 driven out by attacking him in his chosen positions, 
 but by manoeuvres to turn his flank and get in his 
 rear ; by obliging him to fight offensively and upon un- 
 favorable ground ; in a word, the course to be pursued 
 is, as before stated, to mano&uvre offensively and fight 
 defensively. 
 
 Art. III. Covering a Siege. 
 
 While a portion of the army is besieging a fortified 
 place, the remainder repels the enemy, if he attempts 
 to succor it. The besieging army performs all the ac- 
 tual labor of the siege ; the covering army is called 
 sometimes an army of observation. The former is 
 established in camps, near the besieged place, and 
 beyond the range of its cannon ; the camps are 
 fortified both against sorties from within and at- 
 tack from a succoring army. The details of siege 
 operations are described in treatises especially devoted 
 
COVERING A SIEGE. 275 
 
 to such subjects. "We will simply state some rules for 
 the government of the covering army. 
 
 It should not be too distant from the besieging army, 
 in order that, in case of need, re-enforcements may be 
 drawn from the latter, who will return to their camps 
 after the necessity for their assistance has passed away. 
 Such re-enforcements, arriving at an opportune mo- 
 ment when an engagment is imminent or in progress, 
 will be of great value, and will have a powerful effect 
 in defeating or repulsing the enemy. "When Bona- 
 parte was besieging Mantua, he did not limit himself 
 to drawing several battalions from the besieging army 
 when about to engage the numerous forces that seemed 
 to surround him, but he brought up the whole be- 
 sieging army, and, uniting it to the army of observa- 
 tion, he gained the battles of Lonato and Castiglione. 
 But it is disadvantageous to be obliged thus to with- 
 draw the whole besieging army, because the siege- 
 works must then be suspended and the siege artillery 
 abandoned ; the latter can be only recovered by de- 
 feating the succoring army and capturing the besieged 
 place. If the covering army is too distant, the enemy 
 may, by a rapid movement, come unexpectedly upon 
 the besieging army, which is often, indeed generally, 
 in no condition to fight a battle. The consequence 
 of such an occurrence would be the raising of the 
 siege and the abandonment of all the siege materials. 
 In such a case the covering army should rapidly fol- 
 low upon the heels of the enemy and attack him in 
 
276 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 rear, while the besieging army should concentrate and 
 attempt to hold its ground by the aid of the fortifica- 
 tions already erected around the camps. There is no 
 other way of recovering from the injury caused by the 
 rapid march of the enemy. 
 
 The covering army will remain in a fortified posi- 
 tion only when it is accessible in a single direction. 
 If the enemy can pass along some other route, or can 
 come up by several roads, they should be all watched 
 by detachments, while the central mass, far from being 
 tied down in intrenchments, should be as easily moved 
 as possible ; with this object the commander should 
 send to the camps of the besieging army all unneces- 
 sary baggage and all the sick and wounded ; his artil- 
 lery should be in perfect marching order, the roads 
 should be repaired, (fee. But if the main body, in the 
 case supposed, should not make use of intrenchments, 
 the detachments of observation should by all means 
 do so, when the ground favors ; defiles should be forti- 
 fied and bridge-heads constructed, to enable these 
 detachments to resist superior forces, and for a time 
 even to check the entire succoring army. 
 
 Scouting parties should be sent cut to a distance, 
 and frequent reconnoisances made, to ascertain what 
 the enemy is doing or going to do. If he is concen- 
 trating his forces an attack may be expected, and pre- 
 parations must be made accordingly ; if he is collect- 
 ing wagons and provisions, he is about to attempt to 
 throw supplies into the besieged place ; the besieging 
 
COVERING A SIEGE. 277 
 
 army should be informed of this design, and arrange- 
 ments made to capture the train, or at least prevent its 
 passing in. 
 
 If several roads lead from the enemy's positions to 
 the city under siege, the covering army occupies the 
 central one, defending the others indirectly, by the 
 fear occasioned the enemy of being taken in flank or 
 rear, should he attempt to pass along one of the lateral 
 roads. Here, as in every other case of defence, disper- 
 sion of the forces, that inevitably leads to partial re- 
 verses or total ruin, must be carefully guarded against. 
 
 When the enemy has developed his designs, the 
 covering army should march to meet him and attack 
 resolutely, whatever may be the relative forces ; this 
 is no time for counting numbers. In the mean time, 
 the noise of the cannon, staff officers, and couriers will 
 have given notice to the besieging army of what is 
 passing. Its commander will call out his whole dis- 
 posable force, after making sufficient provision for 
 guarding the trenches, and taking proper precautions 
 for repelling sorties from the place, which are more to 
 be apprehended at this than at any other time. The 
 troops intended to participate in the engagement 
 should lose ,no time in leaving, and when they arrive 
 upon the field of battle, they take their places in the 
 line, or form a reserve, or fall upon the flank or rear 
 of the enemy, according to circumstances. Nothing 
 can have a more powerful effect in procuring a vic- 
 tory than the appearance of such re-enforcements upon 
 
278 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 the field of battle at a critical moment in the contest. 
 Desaix's division, suddenly debouching upon the field 
 of Marengo, regained the day for the French. If, not- 
 withstanding the assistance rendered by the besieging 
 to the covering army, the latter is obliged to fall back, 
 it should endeavor to do so in good order, and take 
 position at a little distance from the field of battle, in 
 order to keep the enemy in a state of uneasiness, and 
 to prevent him from falling with all his force upon 
 the siege-works. The covering army will be put in as 
 good condition as possible, calling in all detachments at 
 some distance, and if it is then sufficiently strong an- 
 other attack may be made upon the succoring army, 
 which will have been during this time arrested by the 
 intrenchments of the besieging army. Then, if both 
 parties are equally determined, will be witnessed the 
 singular spectacle of two armies at once besieging and 
 besieged. 
 
 If the covering army has been unable to resist -the 
 succoring army, and the latter has immediately 
 attacked the lines of the besiegers and forced them, 
 aifairs are certainly in a bad state, and the siege must 
 be raised ; but all is not yet lost. The remains of the 
 two armies must be rallied and a new one formed, 
 which will soon be in condition to fight again. 
 
 If the enemy is fearful of compromising himself, 
 and remains closely within the walls of the fortifica- 
 tions, no attack can be made upon him ; but many 
 mouths to be filled soon exhaust the supplies, and the 
 
COVERING A SIEGE. 279 
 
 place will capitulate for want of provisions. Every 
 tiling that had been previously lost will now be re- 
 covered, and at the same time the result is obtained 
 without loss of life a most pleasing thing to a chief 
 who loves his men and is averse to shedding their 
 blood. 
 
 If, on the contrary, the enemy has more confidence, 
 and remains in the open field rather than shut him- 
 self up in the fortifications, new combats will follow, 
 and the effort must be made, by partial successes, or 
 by the gain of a battle when the enemy will fight 
 one, to force him into such a position that he may be 
 blockaded. If, finally, the enemy divide his forces, 
 leaving a part in the place for its defence, and with 
 the remainder takes the field, so much the better for 
 the other party, as there is an opportunity offered for 
 cutting off from the garrison the portion in the field. 
 The attempt should be made to slip in between the 
 two by a night march, such precautions having been 
 taken that the corps in the field may be attacked, 
 thoroughly beaten and dispersed, or captured, before 
 assistance can arrive from the place. Thus, Marshal 
 Soult, at the siege of Badajoz, having to deal with an 
 army stronger than his own, skilfully took advantage 
 of an opportunity that offered of restoring the equilib- 
 rium. Ten thousand Spaniards, to avoid being too 
 much crowded, passed out of Badajoz and encamped 
 upon some high ground, which was separated from the 
 French army by the Guadiana and covered by the 
 
280 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Gebora. Fire was opened upon the Spanish camp 
 from the French camp, with long-range howitzers, 
 with a view of obliging it to be pitched as far as pos- 
 sible from the outworks of the place. An hour before 
 dawn, a passage of the Guadiana was effected in boats, 
 the Gebora was forded, and, while Marshal Mortier 
 made an attack in front upon the high ground, and 
 sent his cavalry to turn the right, two or three thou- 
 sand infantry were posted in the valley between the 
 fortress and the camp. The Spaniards were thus 
 completely cut off. Eight thousand prisoners were 
 taken, five or six hundred killed, and the rest escaped. 
 This was the brilliant combat of Gebora, fought Feb- 
 ruary 19, 1811. 
 
COMBATS AND AFFAIRS. 281 
 
 CHAPTEK YI. 
 
 COMBATS AND AFFAIES. 
 
 THE term combat is applied to a partial engage- 
 ment to a conflict of parts of two opposing armies. 
 Generally, the losses in combats are proportionally 
 greater than in battle ; often, when the forces en- 
 gaged are numerous, the action is called a battle, al- 
 though more strictly a simple combat. But too much 
 importance must not be ascribed to mere definitions, 
 for the name has really no influence upon the thing ; 
 a combat is a small battle, and a battle is a great 
 combat. 
 
 A combat may occur between two bodies of in- 
 fantry, between two bodies of cavalry, or between a 
 body of infantry and one of cavalry, between troops 
 with artillery and troops without artillery. It may 
 occur in the open field or in intrenchments, &c. It 
 is well to examine these different cases separately, 
 although it generally happens that they all may be 
 discovered in a single engagement. 
 
 Art. I. Combat of Infantry with Infantry. 
 
 A combat of infantry against infantry presents 
 much the same appearance as a battle; skirmishers 
 in front to open the engagement, the first line de- 
 
282 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 ployed to deliver its fire, the second line covered by 
 accidents of the ground, and out of range of fire-arms, 
 several masses upon the wings and in reserve, to 
 guard against turning movements. If the troops are 
 few, they will form a single line with a reserve. In 
 such an engagement, the best armed men and the 
 best marksmen have a great advantage, for the op- 
 posing lines are not very distant, and the firing is 
 kept up a long time, as there is neither cavalry nor 
 artillery to be feared. 
 
 "When several battalions are engaged, some of the 
 manoeuvres prescribed in the works on tactics may be 
 applied, and may lead to important results for the 
 party that knows how to perform them with prompti- 
 tude and precision ; these are changes of front of a 
 whole line, &c. ; the study of minor tactics is there- 
 fore principally important as a preparation for partial 
 engagements, for combats. In more extensive affairs 
 the movements are more simple, and are little else 
 than deployments and formations in column, the pas- 
 sages of lines, the formations of squares, of echelons, 
 &c., which are in common use. But our object now 
 is not to discuss or explain tactical manoeuvres which 
 are prescribed by regulations ; it is taken for granted 
 that these are well known. 
 
 A commander who expects an engagement should 
 cause his troops to take some food, for the reason 
 that it can no longer be done after the action begins, 
 and men who are fasting cannot be expected to dis- 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTE Y WITH INFANTRY. 283 
 
 play much vigor. If the weather is cold, they should 
 not be marched across a ford to meet the enemy, be- 
 cause half-frozen limbs are not active, and a soldier 
 who is thoroughly chilled is already half beaten. An 
 exception may be made to this rule in case of passing 
 through the water to use the bayonet, because the 
 blood is then kept warm by the excitement of the mo- 
 ment, and such a movement will generally succeed 
 on account of its daring. 
 
 Before engaging, an inspection of the arms should 
 be made, to see that all are in good condition, that 
 nothing is wanting, the cartridge-boxes full, &c. The 
 general should assemble the principal subordinates 
 and inform them of his intentions and expectations, 
 a* well as all he knows of the plans of the enemy. 
 He encourages them by the confidence thus mani- 
 fested, and a proper spirit of emulation is excited. 
 He especially recommends them to lend mutual assist- 
 ance, to avoid partial efforts, to act impetuously and 
 together, to show a fine example to the soldiers, and 
 to do nothing but what is perfectly honorable. Points 
 of assembly in case of reverse are agreed upon, and 
 they are then sent back to their respective commands. 
 
 If the combat is foreseen the troops should fight in 
 full uniform. This mark of politeness is due to a re- 
 spectable enemy, and troops who are trying to appear 
 to the best advantage will usually do their duty best 
 in the engagement. 
 
 In a Plain. The action is begun by the skirmish- 
 
284 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 ers, who are spread out to the front sufficiently far to 
 cover the deployments ; and when, after a longer or 
 shorter time, according to circumstances, the skir- 
 mishers have unmasked the front and rallied to the 
 rear, the firing of the real line will begin. The firing 
 should not be commenced at too great a distance, for, 
 in that case, some of the shots are lost ; neither, from 
 an excess of confidence, which has sometimes proved 
 fatal, should the firing be delayed until the enemy 
 gets too near, because the ranks, having to receive 
 several discharges, become somewhat thinned, espe- 
 cially as the first shots are always better aimed than 
 the subsequent ones. Firing by file is almost exclu- 
 sively used, because that by platoons can seldom be 
 maintained, on account of the noise and confusion ; and, 
 moreover, the soldier fires more accurately when he 
 takes his own time. Volley firing, by battalion or 
 half battalion, sometimes has a good effect, as, for ex- 
 ample, when poured into a body of troops boldly ad- 
 vancing to the charge. In such a case as this, bold- 
 ness should be met by boldness, the fire reserved until 
 the enemy is within thirty or forty paces, a volley de- 
 livered in his face, and then a rush made upon him 
 with the bayonet. A body of troops advancing find 
 themselves but little injured by distant firing, their 
 courage is really increased, and they become irresist- 
 ible. If, on the contrary, the fire is reserved, the 
 men are disconcerted at their unexpected reception, 
 and when at last the volley cornes, they are ready to 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTRY WITH INFANTRY. 285 
 
 take to their heels. If this murderous discharge is 
 
 O 
 
 followed up by a rapid charge, it will almost certainly 
 prove successful. 
 
 While a fusilade is going on from both sides, one 
 or the other will insensibly gain ground, by that in- 
 stinct of the soldier which urges him to press upon an 
 adversary he deems his inferior. Thus, without an 
 apparent movement, without any command being 
 given, a wing will be gradually advanced. Then a 
 reserve force should be brought up and deployed 
 against the yielding enemy, or thrown upon him in 
 column. If this attack is successful, the whole line 
 advances and attacks the enemy with the bayonet, 
 marching in line of battle, or forming columns of 
 attack with skirmishers in the intervals. 
 
 This last course is preferable in ordinary cases ; the 
 commanders encourage their columns, and correct the 
 disorder which is almost inevitable in those which 
 have suffered most. As soon as a battalion has broken 
 the line of the enemy, it should prepare to attack in 
 flank the nearest troops which are still in good order. 
 For that purpose, each column should be so organized 
 that it may readily be divided in two parts, and moved 
 by both flanks ; the column of attack permits this. 
 If the enemy's line is broken in this way at two or 
 three places, it cannot stand much longer at any 
 point. 
 
 But when the opposing bodies are very near, it is 
 sometimes better to charge in line than to take time 
 
286 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 to form the columns of attack. If the battalions are 
 well drilled, this last method is very effectual in break- 
 ing the line of the enemy when he seems to be waver- 
 ing, or has suffered greatly. By attacking thus along 
 the whole front, the enemy is unable to practise the 
 stratagem of making an opening in his line, with the 
 purpose of drawing on the assailants, and then envel- 
 oping and destroying them. 
 
 Sometimes the line will advance upon the enemy 
 with some battalions deployed, and others in columns, 
 the latter being formed under cover of the skirmish- 
 ers, and the deployed battalions continuing their fire. 
 The whole line then moves forward, the deployed bat- 
 talions halt at short range, and pour in their fire, while 
 the columns rush upon the enemy, break through his 
 line and threaten the flanks. The deployed battalions 
 advance again and sweep the ground with their fire. 
 Mutual assistance and support are thus rendered by 
 the deployed battalions and those in column. This 
 order is sometimes adopted at the outset of the en- 
 gagement, to give more solidity to the line, while pre- 
 serving the advantage of a good front for firing. It 
 will be used when it is desired to act offensively upon 
 a particular part of the enemy's line, to seize the key- 
 point of the field, &c. At the battle of Fuentes de 
 Onore, in 1811, a brigade, composed of five battalions, 
 had three formed in close columns by division, and 
 the two intervening deployed. In his admirable Italian 
 campaign, in passing a ford of the Tagliamento, JBo- 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTRY WITH INFANTRY. 287 
 
 naparte had in each regiment one battalion deployed, 
 and the other two in close columns on the wings of 
 the iirst. Oftener still this order of attack results 
 from the fact that, at the moment of advancing, some 
 battalions are formed in column, while others, being 
 better situated for delivering their fire, remain in line. 
 The openings thus formed in the line should be filled 
 by skirmishers. 
 
 The rule for charges is, to persist in them when once 
 begun, not to fire a shot, but to press upon the enemy 
 as rapidly as possible, both to avoid the effect of his 
 fire and to overthrow him by the shock. The bayo- 
 net should not be brought down until within ten paces 
 of the enemy, as order in the ranks is much better 
 preserved in this way. There is nothing more im- 
 posing than a column advancing in this way at the 
 u double quick ;" the ground trembles under the tread 
 of many feet. 
 
 When the line of the enemy is routed, a few compa- 
 nies should be detached in pursuit, and the ranks are 
 reformed for a renewal of the contest, if necessary, with 
 the second line or the reserve. Ko longer halt, how- 
 ever, should, be permitted than is necessary to rally 
 the troops ; an advance should at once be made upon 
 the second line, which, being discouraged by the de- 
 feat of the first, and perhaps thrown into confusion by 
 its disordered and flying battalions, will probably 
 make but a faint resistance. 
 
 If the combat is obstinate, and his first line has suf- 
 
288 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 fered severely, the general should bring up his second, 
 and move it through the intervals of the first. This 
 offensive movement, made under cover of the skirmish- 
 ers, will shake the enemy's line ; he will with diffi- 
 culty be able to stand the fire of these new battalions, 
 that have just deployed their fresh troops in front of 
 his, who are wearied and harassed. Here it should 
 be observed, that if the passage of the lines were ef- 
 fected, by the battalions of the first line falling back 
 through the intervals of the second, the result would 
 have been much more doubtful. Every retrograde 
 movement is dangerous, because of its bad effect upon 
 the morale of the troops. To fall back is, with most 
 men, to acknowledge themselves worsted. It is par- 
 ticularly important to avoid movements to the rear 
 with raw troops, who easily lose their equanimity. 
 
 In the mean time, the first line becomes the second, 
 reforms, sends off its wounded men, takes some rest, 
 and makes preparations for new efforts, in order to 
 bring the contest to a close. 
 
 But fortune may be adverse, and the general will 
 then observe his troops begin to give ground, and to 
 waver and fall into confusion. A portion of the re- 
 serve should then be brought up, and if these fresh 
 troops do not succeed in regaining the lost ground, it 
 is time to prepare for retreat. The first line will 
 already, and in spite of its efforts, have fallen back 
 towards the second line, and may be so near, that, 
 to avoid producing disorder in the latter, it may be 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTRY WITH INFANTRY. 289 
 
 necessary to effect a passage of the first to the rear of 
 the second. If the first line falls back in good order, it 
 should halt at three or four hundred paces to the rear, 
 and face about ; but if some of the battalions are 
 scattered, their chiefs should plant their colors in some 
 conspicuous places, and cause the drums to beat at the 
 same time. The soldiers will have rallying points in 
 this way. 
 
 In the mean time, the second line cannot hold its 
 ground long against the victorious troops of the en- 
 emy ; it must therefore commence to retire in an 
 orderly way, either falling back in line, occasionally 
 halting, turning upon the enemy and giving him seve- 
 ral volleys ; or adopting the checker formation, either 
 by battalions or half battalions, or moving in echelon, 
 if one wing is less pressed than the other. At the 
 same time, skirmishers should, if practicable, be thrown 
 out upon the flanks of the enemy, to check his pur- 
 suit. This is the moment for engaging the troops 
 which have thus far been held in reserve. These will 
 pass to the front, and rush impetuously upon the enemy 
 with the bayonet ; by vigorous conduct of this sort 
 they may check his advance, or oblige him at least 
 to move with more slowness and circumspection. In 
 this way efforts will be made to dispute the field, inch 
 by inch, until night. The baggage and the wounded 
 are sent to the rear, to be out of the way of the re- 
 treating troops. If there is a defile, such as a bridge, 
 or causeway through a marsh, &c., to be passed, the 
 13 
 
290 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 troops must form line of battle in front of it, and per- 
 form the manoeuvres prescribed for passing defiles in 
 retreat. If the defile is short, the troops will reform 
 on the other side ; if it is of considerable length, and 
 the enemy presses on in pursuit, a defence must be 
 made from point to point, advantage being taken of 
 the ground. Sometimes an ambuscade may be pre- 
 pared for an incautious enemy. This is a resource 
 upon which too much reliance should not be placed. 
 Still it should not be forgotten or neglected. 
 
 It may happen, and, unfortunately, often does 
 happen, that a vigorous defence of a position against 
 superior numbers may result in the defenders being 
 surrounded. Such a state of affairs is certainly very 
 critical, but it need not necessarily end in a surrender. 
 On the contrary, the commander should gather all 
 his forces, before he is too closely pressed, and rush 
 headlong upon the enemy at the point where his line 
 seems weakest, or in the direction where the chances 
 of escape are greatest. Fortune usually smiles upon 
 such efforts ; the enveloping line is weakened by its 
 extent, is pierced, and all or part of the troops escape. 
 In 1795, the Piedmontese general, Roccaviva, being 
 surrounded at Loano by a French division, refused to 
 surrender, fell in mass upon the enveloping line, 
 broke through it, and succeeded in joining the Austrian 
 army. Even if such an attempt fails, the captured 
 soldiers will at least have done every thing required by 
 the most exalted honor. 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTRY 
 
 Upon Heights. Combats do not always occur in 
 level ground; on the contrary, undulations of the 
 ground are often advantageous to the defence, and 
 lead to its occupation. It then becomes necessary to 
 attack the enemy in position, if he cannot be turned. 
 
 A height may be attacked either in front or on the 
 side. Most frequently both attacks are used together, 
 because it is necessary to divide the attention of the 
 enemy. Without that, he might have too much the 
 advantage. If the defenders are uncovered, occupy- 
 ing the slopes and not the crest, the attack may be 
 opened by firing upon him, to thin his ranks. But 
 this will not be kept up long, as the advancing columns 
 will soon put an end to it ; they will slowly ascend 
 the slopes, stopping occasionally to take breath. 
 When they have nearly reached the enemy, they 
 should increase the pace, and charge with the bayonet. 
 The columns should be rather numerous than long ; 
 too great length makes them heavy, and they present 
 too good a mark for the fire of the enemy. They 
 should all advance equally, otherwise those leading 
 may be seriously checked, and the effect produced is 
 bad. 
 
 If the enemy is entirely on the summit, it will be 
 useless to fire, as the crest hides him, unless he has 
 some troops on the slopes for the purpose of firing. 
 The columns, being in readiness to attack after 
 ascending the slopes, halt to take breath and reform, 
 especially if, from the form of the ground and the 
 
292 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 retired position of the enemy, both parties are con- 
 cealed from each other. A warm reception and a 
 murderous fire must be expected, for the defenders, 
 being three-quarters covered by the ground, have a 
 very great advantage over the assailants when they 
 first show themselves. Moreover, the defenders are 
 fresh and in line, whereas the assailants are more or 
 less fatigued and in column. Therefore, when the 
 movement is begun, it should be made with great 
 impetuosity and rapidity, to prevent the defenders 
 from firing even a single volley, if possible. A ruse 
 may sometimes be resorted to, to draw their fire, by 
 sending forward a few skirmishers in open order, and, 
 under their protection, the main body may advance, 
 the men stooping down and raising their caps on the 
 end of their bayonets, so as to make the fire pass over 
 their heads; if the enemy fires, an immediate rush 
 must be made upon him. 
 
 The columns should always be accompanied by 
 numerous skirmishers, closing the intervals between 
 them and covering the flanks. These skirmishers, 
 forming a closer line than usual, fire rapidly ; they 
 act like a deployed line, preparing the way by its 
 fire for the advance of the columns of attack. 
 
 The course to be pursued in defending heights is 
 indicated by what has already been said. The troops 
 who first show themselves having been received by a 
 well-aimed fire, a rush should be made upon them 
 without reloading; when they are repulsed, the 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTRY WITH INFANTRY. 293 
 
 defenders may return to their former covered position. 
 This method was more than once successfully practised 
 by the English against the attacks of the French 
 columns, and particularly at Pampeluna, in 1813. 
 If the defenders do not halt and fall back to their 
 position, after repelling the enemy, they run the risk 
 of being drawn on by a pretended flight to the bottom 
 of the hill, where the assailants turn upon them and 
 defeat them. It is never safe to indulge in a headlong 
 pursuit, even of a disordered enemy. Certain pre- 
 cautions should always be taken, which have been 
 more than once pointed out. 
 
 If there are fortifications on the high ground, care 
 should be taken not to mask their fire, as otherwise 
 their whole advantage may be neutralized. General 
 Taupin committed a fault of this kind at the battle 
 of Toulouse, where he placed his troops in front of a 
 redoubt, which was really the strong point of his 
 position. He made another mistake which it may be 
 well to point out, as it relates to the subject now 
 under consideration. He formed his whole division 
 into a single column, which was enveloped by the 
 fire of the enemy, and could only reply from the head 
 of the leading battalion ; it lost its momentum, was 
 repulsed, and driven in disorder off the ground. This 
 kind of attack was proper against an enemy with 
 a stream behind him, and climbing a hill with diffi- 
 culty, but there should have been several columns, 
 and not a single one. If the French had been less 
 
294 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 impetuous, and had been deployed upon the top of 
 the high ground, imitating the method used by their 
 adversaries, the presumption is a reasonable one that 
 they might have driven them back to the stream and 
 into it. 
 
 Hence it appears that, if the defenders are deployed, 
 and the enemy advance in a single column, there is 
 no cause for apprehension. The line should be formed 
 in a circle, or like the letter V, in order to envelop 
 the column, which can only fire from its head. 
 Coolness and good aiming are all that are requisite, 
 and this formidable column will almost surely be 
 checked in disorder ; if it continues to move on, resist- 
 ance to it in front is useless ; the line should yield and 
 the attack be made upon the flanks ; not a single shot 
 will be lost, and the overthrow of the enemy is certain. 
 
 It is more difficult to resist the attack of several 
 columns. However, if it is foreseen, if the troops 
 on the defensive are in good order, a steady fire should 
 be opened at good range. The flank companies will 
 deliver their fire upon the flanks of the advancing 
 columns, and the enemy, seeing his losses increase, 
 will either halt in order to deploy and return the fire, 
 or his impetuosity will at least be much diminished. 
 
 In Woods. If the enemy is holding a wood, skir- 
 mishers must be principally used to dislodge him, as 
 great loss would be caused the assailants were they to 
 attack at the outset either in line or in column. The 
 skirmishers should envelop the salient portions of the 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTRY WITH INFANTRY. 295 
 
 wood, for they will in this way be enabled to take 
 in flank those men who are trying to conceal them- 
 selves behind trees. If there is any part of the wood 
 commanded by neighboring heights, or that may be 
 approached unobserved, the skirmishers should select 
 these points, as they are evidently weak. 
 
 In order to get near the point of attack, the assail- 
 ants should take advantage of all local features, 
 creeping along hedges and ditches, and covering them- 
 selves by every little elevation of ground, by clumps 
 of trees, &c. The enemy should be fired upon from 
 every point that is gained, in order to harass him as 
 much as possible ; and even when he is really not much 
 injured, the accuracy of his fire will be affected. While 
 efforts are made to advance in front by quite open 
 lines of skirmishers, the attention of the enemy should 
 be diverted by false attacks at distant points. 
 
 As soon as the skirmishers have taken possession of 
 the outskirts of the wood and are covered by the trees, 
 detachments should be brought up to their support, 
 and as they penetrate into the forest, the main body 
 advances, divided into several small columns that 
 move forward to the sound of drums and trumpets ; 
 they should always be at some distance behind the 
 skirmishers, but ready to support them if necessary. 
 If an open space is found, the troops must be rallied 
 before crossing it, and new measures taken to attack 
 the other part of the forest ; the same course should be 
 pursued whenever any obstacle is encountered ; no 
 
296 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 individuals or detached bodies should alone cross a 
 ditch or a ravine or a strong hedge, for there is always 
 danger of meeting the enemy in force on the other 
 side, and it may be impossible to assemble men enough 
 to resist him. 
 
 When the forest is of small extent, it is better to try 
 to turn it ; in this case, the assailants will keep out of 
 range of fire-arms. 
 
 In the defence, an effort should be made to occupy 
 the skirts by skirmishers ; if time permits, the adjoin- 
 ing ground should be cleared up, ditches filled, &c., 
 in order to afford a better view of the assailants and 
 to remove every thing which might cover his advance ; 
 abatis should be constructed in the most accessible 
 places, and especially by cutting down the trees at the 
 most salient positions ; salients may also be flanked 
 by small field-works, in order to prevent the assailant 
 from enveloping them ; trunks of trees, laid one upon 
 the other, and held in place by stakes, are excellent 
 for this purpose. 
 
 Behind the line of skirmishers, supports are placed, 
 either to secure their retreat or to re- enforce them ; 
 they are also on the wings, to prevent them from being 
 turned. Still farther to the rear, and at a point equally 
 distant from the threatened points, is placed the reserve, 
 to act according to circumstances. Thus, for exam- 
 ple, if the attack is disconnected and the defence of 
 the outskirts is successful, the reserve may take the 
 offensive by debouching from the wood or by passing 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTRY WITH INFANTRY. 297 
 
 around it. Such an operation may succeed, because 
 the troops that execute it are concealed during the 
 movement and the assailant may be surprised. 
 
 In Inhabited Places. The attack of a body of in- 
 fantry, posted in a town or village which is favorable 
 to defence, is a very difficult operation without the aid 
 of artillery. In such affairs the artillery is the most 
 important arm. However, if the enemy has not had 
 time to fortify himself, the attempt may be made with 
 infantry alone, if the assailant is in superior numbers. 
 "We will suppose that infantry alone is used. Gener- 
 ally the attack will be made in columns ; skirmishers 
 should envelop the village, to drive the defenders from 
 hedges and garden walls, to fire into windows, and at- 
 tempt to take possession of several detached houses, 
 where they may take post and fight the enemy on 
 equal terms. 
 
 The columns will not advance until the fire of the 
 skirmishers has produced its effect, which will be in- 
 ferred from the slackening of the fire of the defenders. 
 Until this time the columns should keep out of range or 
 covered by some accident of the ground. While one 
 column attacks in front and attempts to penetrate the 
 principal street of the village, others should be at its 
 sides to look for other entrances, or to turn the place, 
 if possible. The columns will be preceded by sappers 
 or workmen, provided with axes and crowbars, shov- 
 els and picks, who throw down walls, cut hedges and 
 palisades, fill up ditches ; in a word, remove all obsta- 
 13* 
 
298 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 cles that might impede the movements of the troops. 
 If a house offers a particularly obstinate resistance, it 
 should be surrounded and attacked on all sides; and, 
 if the defenders obstinately refuse to lay down their 
 arms, they should be threatened with having the house 
 burned over their heads. For that purpose straw and 
 piles of brush will be brought up, but lire should not 
 be set to it until the defenders have again been sum- 
 moned to surrender, as no unnecessary cruelty should 
 be practised even in war. 
 
 If the enemy defends the village from house to 
 house, the same course must be pursued by the assail- 
 ants, that is to say, fire will be poured from the win- 
 dows and roofs of those which are in possession of the 
 latter. It will readily be perceived that this kind of 
 a contest can only take place in large villages or towns 
 where the streets are, like those of cities, lined with 
 continuous rows of houses solidly constructed. In 
 such places one precaution must be taken : it consists 
 in advancing singly along a street that is to be seized ; 
 men slipping along the walls are covered by very small 
 projections, and may succeed at last in reaching im- 
 portant points without too much exposure. Generally, 
 when troops are making an assault in a defile, they 
 should not be crowded, as a repulse of those in front 
 may lead to terrible slaughter and confusion. The 
 advance should, in such cases, be made by successive 
 companies at considerable intervals, those not actually 
 engaged being kept under cover. In proceeding along 
 
COMBAT OF INFANTRY WITH INFANTRY. 299 
 
 a street an entrance may be effected in one house, and 
 the assailants may then sometimes pass from house to 
 house under cover, breaking down division walls. 
 
 In order to defend a village, the infantry should be 
 distributed in the gardens, behind walls and hedges, 
 and at the windows of houses. A single rank is suffi- 
 
 O 
 
 cient for such purposes, and, consequently, a quite ex- 
 tended line may be occupied ; however, it should not 
 be more so than necessary. This is a fine opportunity 
 for riflemen and sharpshooters to show their skill, be- 
 cause they are out of sight of the enemy and can 
 quietly take perfect aim. Platoons or companies 
 should be placed in the streets or avenues, to support 
 the line of sharpshooters, and a reserve at the centre 
 of the village or a little to the rear, in readiness to 
 move in any direction to meet the enemy. If time 
 permits, openings should be pierced in the walls to 
 serve as loopholes ; the principal streets should be bar- 
 ricaded, &c. 
 
 When the village is surrounded or preceded by a 
 ravine or a little stream, or any other obstacle, the de- 
 fence should commence there ; if necessary, a retreat 
 will be made upon the village, which will have been 
 previously occupied by a portion of the troops and put 
 rapidly in a defensible condition. The resistance that 
 may be made under cover of the houses, walls, and other 
 enclosures, will be the more energetic and prolonged, 
 as the enemy will be less likely to turn the position, 
 either on account of its natural features or the disposi- 
 
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 tion of the troops. In this case, vigorous sorties will 
 succeed well, if made at suitable places and not pushed 
 too far, for fear of the parties being cut off; the ave- 
 nues by which they will return should be suitably oc- 
 cupied, so that the enemy may not re-enter pellmell 
 with them. Offensive returns of this sort always pro- 
 duce a good effect, and they should be frequently re- 
 peated ; they elevate the morale of the defenders and 
 disconcert the assailants. 
 
 In order to avoid confusion, each detachment should 
 be charged with the defence of a particular part of the 
 village, and instructed in the manner of doing this, and 
 of effecting a retreat, in case such an operation becomes 
 necessary. This precept is applicable not only to the 
 defence of a village, but to any military operation. 
 
 After all that has been said, it must be remembered 
 that wooden villages are rather dangerous than useful 
 to occupy, because they are readily set on fire. A 
 village which can be surrounded on all sides cannot 
 be well defended. To make a good defence, it is 
 therefore necessary : 1st, that the village be built of 
 masonry ; 2d, that it rest upon some obstacle which 
 prevents its being turned, or else it mast be supported 
 in rear by good troops. 
 
 Art. II Cavalry against Cavalry. 
 
 The fundamental rule for cavalry is, not to wait to 
 receive an attack, but to act always offensively, and to 
 be galloping at the moment of meeting the enemy. 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST CAVALRY. 301 
 
 Otherwise it will be thrown into confusion and dis- 
 persed, for it has been clearly demonstrated by expe- 
 rience that a squadron, even of heavy cavalry, cannot 
 withstand, at a halt, the attack of another squadron of 
 which the horses are very small, provided the latter 
 is at the gallop. This is not because the shock of a 
 body of cavalry is proportional to the mass and the 
 velocity with which it moves, but because the gallop 
 gives impetuosity, excites the horses, and timid riders 
 are drawn along with the others. 
 
 When two bodies of cavalry are advancing towards 
 each other to engage in front, that one will have the 
 advantage which has several squadrons in a position to 
 charge at the same time upon the flank of the other. 
 The result of such a movement is even more decisive 
 than in combats of infantry, both on account of the 
 rapidity with which it is executed, and the difficulty 
 the assailed line has in opposing it. There should, 
 therefore, be placed in rear of the wings of a line of 
 cavalry, columns composed of several squadrons or 
 platoons, according to the strength of the force in 
 line. These columns, formed at full distance, while 
 they enable an attack to be made upon the enemy's 
 flank, are the surest means of guarding against a sim- 
 ilar attack from him, since a column at full distance 
 may in a moment deploy and be ready to meet an at- 
 tempt to envelop the extremity of the line. In an 
 attack made by heavy cavalry, the columns on the 
 wings may be formed of light horse, which, in addi- 
 
302 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 tion to the duty already assigned them, may pursue 
 the enemy after the charge, while the line of battle is 
 reforming. As the enemy may adopt the same meas- 
 ures, the precaution should be taken of holding a 
 small reserve, if only a platoon, in echelon with the 
 columns on the wings. To avoid inversions in de- 
 ploying these columns, that on the right wing should 
 have its left in front, and that on the left its right in 
 front. But, as has already been explained, cavalry 
 should be perfectly accustomed to inversions, in order 
 to be always ready to deploy in either direction. 
 
 When cavalry can rest its wings on any natural 
 obstacle which prevents the enemy from mano3uvring 
 on the flank, the columns on the wings are no longer 
 necessary, but, as a general rule, their presence can- 
 not be too strongly insisted on. It appears," therefore, 
 that a body of cavalry moving to the attack, is partly 
 deployed and partly in column. While satisfying 
 these conditions, it should occupy as large a front as 
 possible, because it is important to have as many en- 
 gaged at once as possible. If a body of cavalry should 
 advance in column, it would be almost certainly 
 beaten, as none but the men in front could use their 
 weapons ; enveloped and attacked on the flanks, the 
 column could only extricate itself by a speedy flight. 
 
 If cavalry advances in a single unbroken line, with 
 but small intervals between the squadrons, it is said 
 to charge en muraitte, or as a wall. This method of 
 attack is very imposing, but is only practicable for a 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST CAVALRY. 303 
 
 few squadrons, because, on account of the irregulari- 
 ties of the ground and other obstacles, and the inevi- 
 table crowding that takes place in a line of consider- 
 able length, the shock is not a single one, but com- 
 posed of partial shocks, whose effect is by no means so 
 great; if the line is thrown into confusion at any 
 point, and especially if it is pierced by the enemy, 
 the disorder may become general throughout the line ; 
 mistakes are corrected with difficulty ; finally, one of 
 the principal advantages of this arm its mobility is 
 lost. The charge in a continued line of great extent 
 is hardly practicable, when the design is to sweep 
 over a field of battle covered with broken battalions, 
 of which some are making a show of resistance. 
 
 The attack in echelons is much used by cavalry 
 commanders, and oifers the advantages of not enga- 
 ging the whole force at once, and of giving better op- 
 portunities of retrieving chance reverses during the 
 action. The most retired echelons are last engaged, 
 and, up to the moment of being so, are disposable for 
 the support of the others, or to attack the enemy 
 in flank. This formation is especially advantageous 
 when the cavalry, in order to attack, passes from 
 column into line, as would happen, for example, in 
 issuing from a defile : under such circumstances it is 
 
 O ' 
 
 not necessary to wait until all the echelons are in 
 line before making the charge, as it is sufficient for 
 the first to be formed, and the others will come up in 
 succession. So long as the deployment is unfinished, 
 
304 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 the enemy is uncertain where the attack is to be 
 made, and this is an advantage for the assailant. 
 Two or three echelons may be placed in position to 
 threaten his left; he will re-enforce that part. The 
 remaining echelons may then be launched against his 
 weakened right, which will very probably give way, 
 as there is not time enough for a counter-manoeuvre 
 on his part. If the leading echelon is successful, it 
 may take the line in flank while the others attack in 
 front. The echelons must have considerable strength 
 in themselves, that their successive shocks may pro- 
 duce the expected effect. They should, therefore, be 
 formed of regiments, or, at least, of squadrons ; eche- 
 lons of platoons are of little value. We repeat, cav- 
 alry in attacking cavalry should always form a front 
 of considerable extent, without, however, dispensing 
 with the columns on the wino-s or other means of at- 
 
 O 
 
 tacking the enemy in flank at the same time as in 
 front. 
 
 Whatever dispositions are adopted, the rules for the 
 charge are invariable. The troops move off at a walk, 
 then taking the trot, which becomes gradually more 
 rapid until they fall into the gallop at some distance 
 from the enemy, and at last into the full run when at 
 about a hundred paces, uttering at the same time loud 
 cries. Without these precautions, if the gallop is 
 taken too soon, the horses are blown and the ranks 
 disunited before the enemy is reached, the imposing 
 effect of the onset of one great mass is lost, the shocks 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST CAVALRY. 305 
 
 are partial and of no avail. The shouts inspire the 
 men and excite the horses. At the moment of the 
 shock and in the ensuing melee, it is better generally 
 to use the point rather than the edge of the sabre. 
 
 If light cavalry finds itself in presence of heavy cav- 
 alry it should not receive attack, but should scatter 
 and charge in dispersed order upon the flanks, some- 
 times cantering around the line, flying before it, and 
 eluding it by superior speed and agility, sometimes 
 pouring in a fire from musketoons or pistols. This is 
 almost the only case where fire-arms can be employed 
 in combats of cavalry, for the musketoon is placed in 
 the hands of the horsemen, not for use in line of battle, 
 but simply for skirmishing, for getting out of a diffi- 
 cult position when dismounted, and for other excep- 
 tional cases. To stop during a charge and fire would 
 be a great mistake, as the momentum would be lost, 
 and the attack almost certainly repelled. It would 
 be equally an error to receive an attack in this way 5 
 for the line would be routed before the musketoons 
 could be put away and the sabres be drawn. 
 
 When the cavalry is numerous, it is formed in two 
 lines, like infantry. The first is always deployed. 
 The second, which is often inferior in numbers, is 
 either deployed in part and outflanking the wings of 
 the first, so as to prevent its being turned, or formed 
 in as many columns of platoons at full distance as 
 there are squadrons. All these columns are ready to 
 form line of battle by a very rapid movement to the 
 
306 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 front, and they also leave wide intervals between 
 them, through which the squadrons of the first line 
 may readily pass to the rear after being routed or 
 thrown into confusion by an unsuccessful charge. 
 "Without this precaution, the second line would run 
 the risk of being pressed back by the first. The 
 second line remains at several hundred paces from 
 the first, whose movements it follows, whether in 
 advance or retreat. If the first line is repulsed, the 
 second sends its flank squadrons to take the enemy in 
 flank, and disengage the first. In the mean time, the 
 columns move to the front at a trot, in order to de- 
 ploy as soon as they are unmasked, and to rush upon 
 the enemy's line, which must be also more or less in 
 confusion. Thus, in combats of cavalry, a body, at 
 first victorious, is checked by other squadrons taking 
 the places of those that have been beaten, and the 
 whole face of affairs is changed in a moment. 
 
 To avoid accidents, it is well always to rally, even 
 after the most brilliant success. But it is not neces- 
 sary that all should halt : several platoons in dispersed 
 order should harass the enemy, while the standards 
 are moved forward at a walk. The soldiers, obedient 
 to the call of the trumpet, will regain their places in 
 ranks, and the squadrons, all the time advancing, are 
 soon reformed and ready to charge again. 
 
 The close column is best for the manoeuvres of in- 
 fantry on the field of battle ; but, for cavalry, the usual 
 formation is at full distance, because the subdivisions 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 307 
 
 may thus with greater facility and rapidity form line 
 in whatever direction the enemy may appear. How- 
 ever, when cavalry has nothing to fear upon its flanks, 
 it may manoeuvre at half distance, in order to have 
 less depth of column. The enemy may be deceived 
 as to the number of cavalry, if some columns move at 
 half and others at full distance. 
 
 Art. III. Cavalry against Infantry. 
 
 Charges against infantry are principally made in 
 columns of squadrons at double distance, so that, if one 
 squadron is repulsed, the men may turn to the right 
 and left and rally behind the column. The second 
 squadron charges and performs the same manoeuvre as 
 the iirst ; the third comes in turn, and then the fourth. 
 If the infantry is not very firm, and does not manage 
 its fire well, it will undoubtedly be broken. 
 
 Attacks in* columns at double distance are chiefly 
 directed against the angles of squares which are not 
 well defended. Against deployed lines, that cannot 
 be turned, charges are usually made in echelon. How- 
 ever, charges in column would answer well in such a 
 case, if made simultaneously at several points. Both 
 are better than a charge in a continuous line against 
 infantry, because the loss of a squadron does not check 
 the whole, and there is sufficient freedom of movement 
 to allow attack upon weak spots, or those temporarily 
 deprived of fire ; finally, renewed or successive shocks 
 
308 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 are more exhausting to infantry, and produce more 
 real effect than a single charge, however grand and 
 imposing the latter may be. A charge in an unbroken 
 line against infantry can only succeed when the latter 
 has been much cut up and disorganized by artillery, 
 or when bad weather prevents them from firing. At 
 the battle of Dresden, Murat took advantage of such 
 a state of affairs, broke a line of Austrian infantry, 
 and sabred many of the men. 
 
 Cavalry should avoid passing near woods and thick- 
 ets, unless certain they do not conceal infantry skir- 
 mishers, as much injury might be caused them by the 
 fire of the infantry, to which no reply could be made. 
 
 When a charge is successful, and the enemy's line 
 broken, the important thing is not to sabre the fugi- 
 tives, but to turn upon those who still stand their 
 ground. For this purpose, the cavalry is rallied, and 
 manoeuvred to envelop the flank of the portions of the 
 line yet fighting. The infantry will be almost cer- 
 tainly swept away. 
 
 When, on the contrary, a charge is repulsed, the 
 horsemen should gallop back to the place for rallying. 
 If there is a second line, it should be promptly un- 
 masked, to give it an opportunity of coming into ac- 
 tion. The ranks are reformed, preparations are made 
 for a new charge, as the failure of the first attempt 
 should be no cause for discouragement. Good cavalry 
 will charge again and again. 
 
 When infantry is formed in square it should dis- 
 
CAVALKY AGAINST INFANTRY. 309 
 
 miss all apprehensions, and pour into the cavalry a well- 
 aimed fire, that should not be begun too soon ; volleys, 
 commenced when the cavalry is at about one hundred 
 yards, will have a good effect. The fire by ranks is the 
 best to use. In this way, four well-aimed volleys may be 
 delivered, and without precipitation, while the cavalry 
 is passing over the one hundred yards which separates 
 it from the infantry when the firing begins. This sup- 
 poses the front of the square to consist of four ranks. 
 First, the two rearmost ranks fire successively, while 
 the men of the two foremost ranks stoop. These then 
 rise and fire at the word of command, the front rank 
 last, and in the very faces of the cavalry. In the mean 
 time, the two rear ranks have reloaded their arms, and 
 may again use them against those horsemen who may 
 have succeeded in reaching the line. This firing by 
 ranks, when there are four, is only practicable when 
 each rank fires but once, for a renewal of it would be 
 dangerous to the men of the front ranks, in the midst 
 of the smoke and confusion of the combat. Four suc- 
 cessive volleys, well aimed, are enough to check the 
 best cavalry. Four ranks are absolutely necessary, 
 unless artillery is at hand to keep the cavalry at a 
 distance. Infantry, formed in two ranks, is too weak 
 for such combats; at least three are necessary, and 
 four are better. 
 
 The bayonet is the last resource against cavalry 
 that has not been checked by fire. It has been pro- 
 posed to stretch ropes, and place chevaux-de-frise in 
 
310 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 front of the infantry, but these devices, which answer 
 very well on a drill-ground, are of no practical value 
 in presence of an enemy ; they simply embarrass the 
 infantry, and clog its movements. The foot-soldier 
 may and should expect to repel cavalry by the use of 
 his ordinary weapon ; he should be cool, and convinced 
 that horses can never pass through a line of infantry 
 well closed up and bristling with bayonets ; timidity, 
 confusion, and the ravages of artillery are the only 
 things that can compromise him. Let alarm be felt 
 neither at the approach of the horses, nor the cries of 
 the horsemen ; let the ranks be well closed up ; let the 
 fire be carefully husbanded, and there need be no 
 doubt as to the result of a charge. 
 
 It is not to be expected that this confidence in their 
 weapons will be felt by other than veterans, who have 
 had occasion to test their value, and know, from expe- 
 rience, what they are worth. It is for such as these 
 to ask, as was done in Egypt and at Marengo, that 
 the cavalry be permitted to come within fifty paces, 
 and even less, when a most destructive fire may be 
 poured into their ranks. It would be dangerous to 
 try this with raw troops, who may experience a not 
 unreasonable feeling of apprehension at the approach 
 of cavalry upon them for the first time. For such 
 soldiers, one hundred paces is about the distance at 
 which they should begin to fire. 
 
 The resistance of infantry to cavalry is chiefly due 
 to the order of battle adopted for that purpose. Its 
 
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY. 311 
 
 power of resistance is greatly increased by forming 
 several squares, which protect each other by their fire ; 
 and the flank and reverse fire, procured in this way, is 
 much more feared by the cavalry than that coming in 
 front. Mention has been made in another place of 
 large squares, formed by divisions or brigades. We 
 have now reference to battalion squares, because we 
 are considering a simple combat between a body of 
 infantry and one of cavalry ; in this case, the small- 
 ness of the squares is not only not disadvantageous, as 
 interior space is not required, but several small squares 
 are better than a single large one, because, if the latter 
 is broken through on one front, all is lost ; but, one or 
 more of a combination of small squares may be de- 
 stroyed, and the remainder hold firm ; besides, they 
 give mutual support by cross and flank fires, and the 
 enemy's attention is, moreover, divided. 
 
 The formation of these battalion squares is very 
 simple, and is explained in detail in the authorized 
 works on tactics. There may be either a line of ob- 
 lique squares, or in echelon, with a view of flanking 
 each other. Squares, if small, may be moved consid- 
 erable distances without material inconvenience. 
 
 The infantry should carefully avoid throwing away 
 its fire upon skirmishers sent forward by the cavalry, 
 often for the very purpose of drawing it, or raising a 
 dust, under cover of which some movement may be 
 concealed. If the infantry imprudently delivers its 
 fire upon these skirmishers, the squadrons should 
 
312 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 immediately charge, before the arms can be re- 
 loaded. The skirmishers should be kept at a distance, 
 by sending out a few good marksmen in front of the 
 squares. 
 
 The only manoeuvres and formations infantry may 
 safely adopt in presence of cavalry, are those of squares 
 and close columns. 
 
 Art. IV. Combats of Artillery. 
 
 Artillery should never be brought into action, unless 
 well supported by other troops. The supports take 
 positions to the right and left of the batteries, covering 
 themselves, by any features of the ground, from the 
 fire of the enemy, only emerging to resist attacks 
 upon the battery or upon themselves. Positions are 
 selected for artillery where it may act with greatest 
 effect. A firm soil is requisite to prevent the wheels 
 from sinking too much. A rocky site would be unfa- 
 vorable, from the many dangerous fragments produced 
 by the shot of the enemy. The space should be suffi- 
 ciently extensive to afford room for all the pieces of 
 the battery, and high enough to give a good command 
 over the surrounding ground within range, but not so 
 high that the fire would be too plunging. Slopes 
 of about one-hundredth are the best. If the object 
 aimed at is near, the elevation of the site of the bat- 
 tery should be small, but this may be greater as the 
 range increases. 
 
COMBATS OF ARTILLERY. 313 
 
 Artillery duels rarely lead to decisive results, and 
 are usually avoided. Sometimes they are inevita- 
 ble. In such a case, other things being equal, that 
 party will evidently have the advantage which has the 
 best view of the enemy, and has at the same time the 
 best cover. Artillery cannot endure a flank or very 
 oblique fire, and, when such a fire is received, an im- 
 mediate change of position becomes necessary. This 
 may sometimes be accomplished under cover of the 
 smoke, or some undulation of the ground. At the 
 battle of lena, Colonel Seruzier was in command of a 
 battery of twenty pieces, which was opposed by a very 
 superior one, and his was on the point of being de- 
 stroyed. He immediately withdrew the alternate 
 pieces, keeping up the fire with the others, until, by a 
 rapid movement under cover of the smoke, he reached 
 a position where he had a very slant fire upon the 
 enemy ; his remaining pieces were soon disengaged. 
 
 A battery, in taking position to get an enfilading 
 or slant fire upon an opposing battery, runs the risk 
 of exposing its own flank to attack. A battery may 
 present a poor mark to the enemy by having wide 
 intervals between its pieces, while, at the same time, 
 some of them must obtain a slant fire upon him ; the 
 fire of all the pieces is convergent. The effect of such 
 a fire is very powerful. A battery of eight pieces 
 united would scarcely be able to contend successfully 
 with one of six pieces divided into two or three 
 parts, at some distance from each other, but all con- 
 U 
 
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 verging their fire on the larger battery. It should 
 be observed that in this we do not find a violation 
 of the principle which sanctions the employment of 
 as many pieces as possible in a battery. Concentra- 
 tion of fire is the object to be attained in both cases, 
 and there is no contradiction between the two. 
 
 The caissons should be covered as much as possible 
 from fire, and even from sight. It is better to aim 
 low than high, to use the ricochet when it is practi- 
 cable, to fire slowly at distances greater than 700 
 yards, and rapidly inside of that, and every shot 
 should be well aimed. The use of shells is recom- 
 mended for broken ground ; solid shot against columns 
 of attack, although, at close range, grape and canister 
 are better, as also against cavalry and infantry in line. 
 A strict defensive should not be observed, for if it is 
 well to select a strong position, and to profit by every 
 accidental cover presented by the ground, it is equally 
 so to inspire the enemy with an apprehension of 
 attack, and to advance upon his position when pru- 
 dence permits, as the moral and real effect of such a 
 course is great. 
 
 The cavalry is the best arm for supporting that 
 portion of the artillery which should move rapidly from 
 point to point, but the supports of batteries of position 
 should be of infantry, and, indeed, that arm is the best 
 in all cases when the simple protection of the artillery 
 is considered. If both arms are united as supports, 
 infantry skirmishers will be to the right and left to en- 
 
COMBATS OF ARTILLERY. 315 
 
 gage the opposing skirmishers ; the main body of the 
 infantry will be somewhat to the rear, as well cover- 
 ed as possible, and the cavalry in echelon on the flanks, 
 
 A battery, whose supports are very weak or do not 
 contain cavalry to meet that of the enemy, may be in 
 danger of being captured, and should select a posi- 
 tion unfavorable to the action of cavalry. Colonel 
 Foy, seeing a body of Russian cavalry issuing from 
 the bridge near Schaffhause, rapidly withdrew his ar- 
 tillery into a clump of pines which was fortunately 
 at hand ; he there formed his battery into a square, 
 and was enabled to keep the cavalry off until two 
 regiments of infantry came up to his assistance. 
 
 When a battery is very destructive in its effects, 
 it may become necessary to attempt its capture. 
 Skirmishers will precede the assaulting party, the 
 intervals of the line being as great as possible, to offer 
 a poor mark to the enemy, and to enable the men to 
 shelter themselves behind any little accidental covers. 
 These skirmishers will be specially useful, if they are 
 good marksmen, in killing the' gunners and horses. 
 While skirmishers advance on the front of the battery, 
 small columns will threaten the flanks. If the fire is 
 directed upon the columns, the skirmishers will 
 advance rapidly upon the front ; if, on the contrary, 
 the skirmishers attract the fire, the columns may 
 advance without much loss. When these are near the 
 supports, they will charge vigorously, and if the 
 supports are driven off, the battery is attacked in rear. 
 
316 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 As cavalry moves very rapidly, it is a good arrange- 
 ment to have the assaulting party contain both infantry 
 and cavalry, the former to act as skirmishers and 
 occupy the battery in front, while the latter form the 
 columns on the flanks. 
 
 If the pieces are captured, and the horses are still 
 at hand for use, they should be rapidly carried off; 
 if this is impracticable, they should be spiked, and the 
 elevating screws and rammers carried off. 
 
 Art. V. Attack and Defence of a Redoubt. 
 
 A redoubt may be armed with cannon, or defended 
 by infantry alone. In the first case, the cannon must 
 be silenced by other cannon ; but in the second case, 
 the attack may be made without any such prelimina- 
 ries. 
 
 Marksmen envelop a part of the redoubt, aiming 
 at the crest of the parapet to prevent the defenders 
 from showing themselves, or, at least, to cause them 
 to fire rapidly and inaccurately. The circle of skir- 
 mishers is gradually contracted, an active fire being 
 all the time kept up. When sufficiently near the 
 ditch, they advance at a run and jump into it, unless 
 they are checked by some such obstacle as abatis, 
 palisades, trous-de-loup, &c. ; if these are encountered, 
 a way must be opened through them before farther 
 progress is made. While some descend into the 
 ditch, others remain upon the counterscarp to fire 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF A KEDOUBT. 317 
 
 upon the defenders who show themselves. "When the 
 troops in the ditch have rested somewhat, they make 
 the assault. The soldiers assist each other in ascend- 
 ing the scarp and getting upon the berme, from which 
 point they rush over the parapet in a body, and com- 
 pel the defenders to lay down their arms. 
 
 If the redoubt is armed with cannon, and of greater 
 strength than is supposed above, it would be neces- 
 sary to use artillery, to break down palisades, dismount 
 the pieces, and breach the parapets. The best positions 
 for the artillery are those from which a plunging or 
 enfilading fire can be obtained. If the redoubt has 
 embrasures, one or two pieces should be directed 
 against each of them, as there is an opportunity, not 
 only of dismounting the pieces, but also of firing 
 through the embrasures into the interior of the work. 
 
 o 
 
 A few good marksmen may also be detailed to pick 
 off the gunners, whenever they show themselves at 
 the embrasures. 
 
 When the artillery has produced its full effect, the 
 skirmishers will be advanced, as above described. The 
 skirmishers will generally be followed by supporting 
 columns, that will advance upon the salients of the 
 work. Each column should be preceded by workmen 
 provided with axes, and ladders should be carried by 
 men detailed for the purpose. It is a good plan to 
 give each of the leading men a fascine, with which he 
 may shield his body greatly, and he may use it for 
 partly filling up the ditch. The skirmishers open out 
 
318 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 and permit the columns to pass through their line, 
 keeping up a rapid fire until the ascent of the parapet 
 by the storming party begins. The important thing, 
 at this decisive moment, is unity of movement 
 and action, an entrance being made on all sides at 
 once. The troops should, therefore, pause a moment 
 on the berme, until a signal is given, and then all will 
 rush forward together. Such an attack as this is 
 almost certain of success. 
 
 The commander of a redoubt should use every effort 
 to increase the confidence of his men, especially by 
 his own demeanor ; still every thing should be kept in 
 the best possible order. If the attack is not to take 
 place at once, the redoubt should be surrounded with 
 an abatis; large stones should be obtained to roll 
 down into the ditches ; sand-bags and sods should be 
 prepared for making loopholes along the parapet. As 
 soon as the batteries of the enemy are seen, fire should 
 be at once opened upon them ; but when their guns are 
 fairly in position and partly covered by the ground, 
 the contest becomes an unequal one. Only those 
 pieces will be kept in position which are covered from 
 the enemy's fire by traverses or otherwise. A few 
 other pieces may sometimes be temporarily run into 
 battery and fired with grape upon the infantry. The 
 effect will be good. 
 
 A few marksmen will at first shelter themselves 
 wherever they can along the parapet ; but when the 
 fire of the assailants ceases, for fear of injuring their 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF A REDOUBT. 319 
 
 own men, the defenders will line the parapets and 
 open a warm fire of musketry and artillery upon the 
 columns of attack, and upon the skirmishers who are 
 attempting to pass the obstacles in front of the ditch. 
 This is the time to explode any mines that may 
 have been prepared in the ground over which the 
 assailants must pass. If the enemy succeed in getting 
 into the ditch, and collecting their forces to make the 
 assault, shells should be rolled down upon them, as 
 well as trunks of trees, large rocks, beehives any 
 thing that may cause confusion. The defenders must 
 then mount the parapet to receive the enemy at the 
 point of the bayonet. More than one attack has been 
 repelled at this stage of it. At Iluningue, in 1796, 
 Captain Foy of the artillery, observing that the enemy 
 had planted scaling ladders to ascend into a demilune 
 he was holding, had shells rolled down upon them, by 
 which considerable injury was done them, crowded as 
 as they were in the ditcl;. The gunners seized their 
 rammers and handspikes, and, mounting the parapet, 
 knocked on the head and back into the ditch the 
 first men who showed themselves. The enemy 
 abandoned the attack. "When we reflect upon the 
 disordered condition of the assailants at such a 
 moment, and the difficulty they must experience in 
 using their weapons, as well as upon the physical and 
 moral advantages in favor of the defenders, who have 
 a firm foothold upon the parapet and nothing to clog 
 their freedom of motion, it will be manifest that, not 
 
320 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 only have the defenders many chances of success, but 
 it seems impossible that such an attack can result in 
 any thing but failure. 
 
 Art. T I. Attack, and Defence of a strong Dwell- 
 ing-house, with out-buildings and enclosures, 
 all of masonry. 
 
 A careful examination of the locality should be 
 made before the attack, and this may be attempted 
 with least danger just before dawn. Nothing is sup- 
 posed to be known of the arrangement of the inte- 
 rior. All that meets the eye are several walls pierced 
 with loopholes, and several ways of approach along 
 which an attack may be made. By the time the out- 
 skirts are seized, there will be light enough to see how 
 to advance farther. Much danger will be incurred in 
 the onward movements, and it might well be desired to 
 have them made under cover of the darkness, but this 
 always leads to confusion and gives those who are so 
 inclined an opportunity to skulk. In night attacks 
 there is generally a want of concert, mistakes occur, 
 panics take place, by all of which means the best plans 
 miscarry. Therefore it is better to make every prepa- 
 ration for the attack in the night and execute it 
 just at dawn. Darkness is only favorable in case of 
 a surprise. 
 
 Every preparation should be made for forcing locks 
 and hinges and breaking through doors. If none of the 
 soldiers have the skill necessary for using tools, native 
 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF HOUSES, ETC. 321 
 
 mechanics must be pressed into the service, and made 
 to act, if they are unwilling. Ladders should be col- 
 lected, in order to facilitate entrance by the windows, 
 or, at least, to enable grenades to be thrown in. The 
 attack is supposed to be made by infantry alone, for 
 artillery can soon destroy such structures as we are 
 now considering. 
 
 The approach should be made in silence, until the 
 sentinels challenge and the enemy begins to fire ; a 
 rush must then be ma'de upon several points at once, 
 in order to divide his attention. A loopholed wall is 
 supposed to be the first obstacle, but by inserting the 
 muskets of several men into each hole, the enemy may 
 soon be forced to leave it. The gate of the enclosure 
 must then<be broken down, or a portion of the wall. 
 The foot of the wall of the house is reached ; the first 
 thing is to stop up the lower loopholes with bags of 
 earth or with timbers ; efforts must be made to break 
 down the door with axes, or by battering, or to burst 
 off the hinges ; this will soon be accomplished, unless 
 the doors are strongly braced from behind ; in the 
 mean time, sharpshooters should watch the windows 
 and fire whenever a man shows himself. The men 
 should keep dispersed as much as possible. When- 
 ever a window seems abandoned, attempts should be 
 made to enter it. To increase the number of openings 
 into the interior, the wall may be battered down with 
 any heavy timbers that are at hand. Finally, an en- 
 trance is effected into the lower story, and the defend- 
 U* 
 
322 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 ers driven above. They may now be summoned to sur- 
 render. If they accept, all is over, and the captives 
 should receive the treatment due to brave 'men. If 
 they decline to surrender, a large fire lighted below 
 will soon bring them to terms. 
 
 In the defence, doors will be barricaded and loop- 
 holes made in all the stories, taking care to have them 
 as small as possible and those of the lower story so 
 high that the enemy cannot close them nor fire 
 through them. Banquettes, to stand upon, may be 
 made of plank placed on barrels, boxes, &c. The 
 angles are weak points, and an effort must be made to 
 pierce loopholes there. If the roof will burn, it must 
 be taken off and the upper floor covered with earth. 
 The principal beams of the frame of the hc^use should 
 be propped, so as not to fall if the wall is breached ; 
 to close the breach, various household articles may be 
 used. Books are quite impenetrable to musket-balls. 
 Bedsacks and pillow-cases filled with earth, also car- 
 pets rolled up, resist bullets well. Balconies may be 
 fitted up as machicoulis, &c. 
 
 Art. Til Attack and Defence of a Tillage. 
 
 In Art. I. of this chapter some observations were 
 made with reference to combats of infantry in towns 
 and villages, but they were supposed to be of an open 
 character. What follows is to be understood as relat- 
 ing to an intrenched village. 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE. 323 
 
 Here the artillery plays the principal part, because 
 it would be otherwise impossible to prostrate the ob- 
 stacles prepared by the defence to aid in holding a post 
 which may be of great importance, either as a bridge- 
 head, or a strong point of a line of battle, or a pivot 
 for manoeuvres. The most favorable positions should 
 therefore be selected that are offered by the surround- 
 ings of the village, either commanding points, or others 
 from which the principal street may be enfiladed, or 
 the walls' breached that give shelter to the enemy. 
 If a redoubt defends the approaches, it should be first 
 attacked, for success at other points will lead to no de- 
 cisive result so long as that holds out. Several pieces 
 of artillery may be directed against a single embrasure, 
 and their fire directed to others in succession, as fast as 
 the guns are dismounted or withdrawn. Other pieces 
 should enfilade the terre-plein, break down palisades, 
 &c. All this maybe done openly, if time presses and 
 the ground favors, but it is more prudent to make a 
 careful examination of the locality in the first place, 
 and, during the night, throw up epaulements of earth to 
 cover the guns in the position selected for them. It is 
 also the part of a wise man, before attempting a deci- 
 sive movement, to procure ladders and tools of every 
 kind necessary for throwing down walls and parapets. 
 
 These arrangements having been made, fire will be 
 opened at dawn. The artillery will make vigorous ef- 
 forts to produce the effect expected. There will be the 
 greater probability of this as the pieces are of heavier 
 
224: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 metal. When the breaches begin to open, and some of 
 the artillery of the work is silenced, the skirmishers 
 may be advanced to envelop with their fire as much of 
 the village as they can. The skirmishers should not 
 mask the artillery, which continues its fire, but they 
 will aim at windows, loopholes, at every man who shows 
 himself. They will be followed by workmen, provided 
 with tools for levelling hedges and palisades, filling up 
 ditches, breaking down gates, enlarging breaches, &c. 
 In the mean time, the skirmishers close in upon the 
 village. The artillery is now silent, except it may 
 throw shells into the town. The skirmishers still ad- 
 vance, the boldest even approaching the breaches and 
 attempting to enter, while the workmen are busy with 
 their tools, preparing the way for the advance of the 
 columns over the outer obstacles : until now they have 
 been out of range, or concealed by the ground, trees, 
 &c. They move out at a given signal towards the 
 breaches and other points indicated ; they destroy any 
 barriers which may still exist, leap into the ditches and 
 scale the parapets, break down palisading, burst open 
 gates by means of powder-bags or levers. During the 
 same time the skirmishers between the columns en- 
 ter by any available openings, leaping over hedges, 
 climbing walls, wherever they do not meet a too formida- 
 ble resistance. Finally, the exterior defences are car- 
 ried ; the troops, before penetrating farther, ought to 
 rally and make new dispositions for driving the enemy 
 from any houses still in their possession. 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF A VILLAGE. 325 
 
 If the defence is obstinate, much caution is requisite 
 in pushing forward into the interior. The outer houses 
 should be seized, as they might be occupied by parties of 
 the defenders, who could take the troops in the streets 
 at great disadvantage. If the houses are detached, they 
 will be captured by surrounding them ; if contiguous 
 and vigorously defended, a passage may be effected 
 from one to another in succession by breaking through 
 the separating walls. The defenders having thus been 
 driven from point to point, an effort will be made to 
 cut them off from the line of retreat, which is usually 
 through a defile, such as a bridge or narrow street ; 
 this manoeuvre will generally hasten the evacuation 
 of the village. 
 
 A village is seldom without support from troops on 
 the exterior ; it would, therefore, be impossible -to at- 
 tempt an attack, without having force enough to hold 
 these supports in check or to engage them. To obtain 
 success a marked superiority of forces is requisite, as 
 well as in the number and calibre of cannon. It 
 would be very rash to attack an intrenched village, 
 which formed part of a line of battle, without this su- 
 periority. An isolated village should be turned, rather 
 than attacked. 
 
 Some time is necessary to prepare for the defence 
 of a village, for there is much to be done if a vigorous 
 resistance is to be made. A continuous enclosure 
 must be arranged, advantage being taken of hedges 
 and walls which will answer the purpose, and all 
 
326 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 others being thrown down, in order to give no covers 
 for the enemy. Those may be left standing which 
 are completely under fire, and will be hindrances to 
 their movements. The same course will be pursued 
 with ditches. Behind the enclosure, every facility for 
 circulation of troops should be found. The enclosure 
 should be a broken line in order that its parts may 
 flank each other and give cross-fires. If it is inter- 
 rupted at any point, the break should be supplied by 
 abatis, palisades, barricades, or earthworks ; batteries 
 are constructed for the cannon, and sometimes re- 
 doubts built. 
 
 Behind the standing hedges, trenches may be dug 
 and the earth thrown to the front, as shelter from the 
 fire of infantry is thus obtained. A wall that is over 
 six feet high is more valuable ; loopholes may be 
 made in it, and they should be small and beyond the 
 reach of the enemy. A banquette for them, of boards, 
 may be supported on barrels or any thing of that kind. 
 It is not always easy to make these loopholes of suit- 
 able dimensions, as the stones in the wall may be too 
 large ; this defect may be cured by using stiff mortar 
 or sods. 
 
 Finally, a keep should be arranged in the interior 
 of the village, to secure the retreat of the defenders, 
 and to give them more confidence in resistance. This 
 may be a church and cemetery, or a large dwelling- 
 house and enclosure. 
 
 A fortified village is a strong point of support for 
 
OBSERVATIONS UPON MANOEUVRES. 327 
 
 an army on a field of battle, as frequent examples 
 have proved. 
 
 Art. VIII. Observations upon the Subject of 
 Manoeuvres. 
 
 After what has been said with reference to various 
 operations in war, in which the manoeuvres and evo- 
 lutions prescribed in the tactics find applications, it 
 will not be out of place to close this chapter by some 
 remarks with reference to these movements, in order 
 that their spirit may be appreciated. Their charac- 
 teristics should be as follows : 
 
 1st. Promptness / for, while a manoeuvre is in pro- 
 gress, the troops are comparatively helpless as a mass, 
 and it should be consummated as speedily as possible. 
 
 2d. Simplicity r , in order that officers and soldiers 
 may execute the manoeuvre mechanically, so to speak, 
 and without thinking of it. A complicated move- 
 ment produces confusion, and this may lead to defeat. 
 Simplicity, in this case, means facility of execution. 
 
 3d. Security ; that is to say, if the enemy appears 
 unexpectedly while the movement is being executed, 
 the troops should be in the best order to resist him. 
 
 4th. Precision, in order that every movement may 
 have well-defined limits, which regulate its progress 
 and direction. 
 
 5th. A brief and clear command / for upon the na- 
 ture of the command often depends the success of a 
 
328 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 manoeuvre. If the command is such, that a man 
 hearing it cannot doubt as to the meaning, the ma- 
 noeuvre will succeed. If, on the contrary, the language 
 is ambiguous in sense, or the words improperly ar- 
 ranged, there can be neither certainty of conception 
 nor promptness of execution. 
 
 A manoeuvre, to be good, should, as far as possible, 
 be offensive ; that is to say, it is better in its execution 
 for the troops to move forward than to the rear, be- 
 cause a retrograde movement has a disheartening ef- 
 fect, and may bring on a shameful flight ; on the con- 
 trary, the courage of the troops is better sustained 
 when they advance, as it were, to meet the enemy. 
 Manoeuvres should be not only well arranged, but 
 properly executed. Skill can only be gained and re- 
 tained by constant practice, and therefore the drill is 
 necessary for veterans as well as for recruits. While 
 keeping soldiers in good drill, it is necessary to avoid 
 insisting too much upon things really of little import- 
 ance. Insist upon what is necessary, and reject what 
 is superfluous. Soldiers should be accustomed to re- 
 main together and in good order, but it is sufficient, 
 with this view, to require the touch of the elbows ; 
 that is to say, that each man feel his neighbor 
 lightly, and that the whole battalion, facing in the 
 same direction, be on a line nearly straight. No com- 
 mander should be so foolish as to bring his " guides on 
 the line" in a shower of grape or musket balls, or 
 should listen to the remonstrances of a major or an 
 
OBSERVATIONS UPON MANOEUVRES. 329 
 
 adjutant who would think all was lost if the battalion 
 were not in a perfectly straight line. And as to those 
 wonderful firings of a whole battalion as one man, 
 that are sometimes esteemed so highly, is any thing 
 like them ever heard in a great battle ? Amid the 
 thundering of the artillery, the beating of drums, the 
 cries of the wounded and dying, the excitement of the 
 combatants, are they able to give that close attention 
 to the word of command which alone makes such fir- 
 ing possible? If possible, what value has it? Are 
 more of the enemy killed and wounded than by a roll- 
 ing fire ? Every operation in war is accompanied by 
 more or less disorder, but this, to the eye of the real 
 soldier, is grand and beautiful when it is the result of a 
 noble daring and enthusiasm, and is infinitely prefer- 
 able to the frigid regularity of indifference or luke- 
 warmness. It is an excellent thing to drill soldiers 
 upon irregular ground, such as they find upon the 
 field of battle. 
 
 Good marching is the important thing. A body of 
 troops that marches well is always imposing, and by 
 this alone victory is often attracted, independently of 
 all the advantages procured by that good order which 
 results from fine marching. It is not out of place to 
 repeat again the maxim of Marshal Saxe, that victory 
 resides in the legs of the soldiers. Marching should, 
 therefore, be deemed of great importance, and much 
 time and pains should be devoted to it, first in level 
 drill grounds, then along roads, and finally over ir- 
 
330 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 regular ground of all kinds. The cadenced step, light- 
 ness of carriage, and the touch of the elbow are the 
 things for each man to learn ; and for the whole body, 
 the preservation of distances and direction. 
 
 By keeping tlie step, wavering is avoided, and a 
 whole battalion moves like a single man. If a body 
 of troops is charging another, it is only by all keeping 
 the same step of uniform length that*the enemy's line 
 is attacked along the whole front at once. By the 
 touch of the elbow^ soldiers remain together and pre- 
 serve the alignment necessary for an engagement. 
 Any pressure, coming from the direction of the guide, 
 should be yielded to gradually, and without crowd- 
 ing. At the same time, the touch towards the guide 
 shall always be lightly kept up. The preservation of 
 distances on the march is of the greatest importance. 
 It is a less evil for the distance to be diminished than 
 increased, because it is much worse to have gaps in a 
 line than to have some men crowded to the rear, who 
 may be usefully employed in replacing or caring for 
 the wounded. The preservation of distances is in the 
 hands of the officers and non-commissioned officers, 
 who, taken together, form what is called the frame- 
 work (cadre) of the battalions. It is of very great im- 
 portance that the cadre be well composed. Young 
 soldiers, directed upon the field of battle by good offi- 
 cers and non-commissioned officers, will rival veterans 
 upon the field of battle, as Lutzen and Bautzen 
 testify. 
 
OBSERVATIONS UPOX MANCEUVRES. 331 
 
 The preservation of direction is quite as important 
 as distance, in order that crowding and confusion in 
 ranks be avoided, and that there be any certainty in 
 the execution of manoeuvres. It is important to prac- 
 tise battalions in running, as it is sometimes neces- 
 sary in order to achieve success, to get over ground 
 very rapidly, and it is frequently advantageous. It 
 usually produces more or less confusion, and the men 
 should learn to avoid that evil as much as they can. 
 There is a thing rarely seen at drills, which is, how- 
 ever, very important ; that is, rallying to the colors, on 
 the supposition that a battalion may be dispersed and 
 rally again to re-enter the engagement. Soldiers 
 should be taught how obligatory it is upon them to 
 rally to the flag as long as it floats, and to sacrifice 
 their lives to save it from capture. Honors paid to 
 the flag are not mere empty ceremony ; they are in. 
 tended to inspire the respect due from every soldier 
 to this symbol of valor and devotion. See the veteran 
 uncover himself in presence of the ensign that he has 
 often followed to victory ; he is proud, as of his own 
 wounds, of the marks of the enemy's bullets upon it ; 
 he venerates those folds which have survived twent}^ 
 battles. The names inscribed upon it are his titles of 
 nobility ; they bring to mind grand and glorious 
 memories ; he values more those brilliant and de- 
 served mementoes of his services than every thing else 
 which men usually so much desire. 
 
332 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 CHAPTEE Y1L 
 
 RECONNOISSANCES. 
 
 RECONNOISSANCES are either armed or topographical. 
 Both kinds will be treated briefly, although the last 
 have little to do with our general subject. 
 
 Art. I. Armed Reconnoisaiices. 
 
 Armed reconnoissances are made to procure infor- 
 mation with reference to the position and force of the 
 enemy. So long as a commander is ignorant upon 
 these points, he can have no confidence in his mea- 
 sures, either for attack or defence ; if he is on the 
 march, he must feel his way with great caution ; he 
 is in danger of falling into an ambuscade, or of making 
 a blundering offensive movement, or of being suddenly 
 attacked. It is, therefore, necessary to endeavor not 
 only to learn exactly the composition, strength, arid 
 position of the different corps in the opposing army, 
 but to be informed of their movements and simple 
 changes of position, in order to divine the intentions 
 of their commanding general and take precautions to 
 thwart his projects. As much information as practic- 
 able should be gathered from intercepted communica- 
 tions, spies, deserters, and travellers. This should be 
 
AKMED KECONNOISSANCES. 333 
 
 classified under various heads, and always kept com- 
 plete and ready for reference. With these notes and 
 a good map, upon which are indicated the positions of 
 the several corps, by means of numbers or conven- 
 tional colors or colored pins, a very good idea may be 
 formed of the force and the location of the hostile 
 forces. When the enemy is very near, it is necessary 
 to ascertain every day what changes of position have 
 been made for the purpose either of concentration or 
 withdrawal. Hence arises the necessity for armed 
 reconnoissances, which are often very bloody aifairs. 
 
 The custom, usually prevailing, of covering camps 
 with chains of posts and sentinels, makes it impossible 
 generally to see them and the arrangements of the 
 enemy for, attack or defence. To remove this uncer- 
 tainty, a reconnoissance becomes necessary, which must 
 be pushed on past the screen of post and sentinels, 
 to a point where the officer in charge may see plainly 
 the hostile army, appreciate the advantages or incon- 
 veniences of its position, count its battalions, judge of 
 its means of resistance, whether it is intrenched and 
 is strong in artillery, whether the ground is favorable 
 for the action of cavalry, &c. These different objects 
 should be seized with the promptness of a practised eye, 
 for such an operation will usually call to arms the 
 whole of the enemy's force, which may be very supe- 
 rior in numbers, and it may be necessary to leave the 
 ground speedily But the object has been attained, 
 since the enemy has displayed his forces. 
 
334: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Such reconnoissances usually precede battles. By 
 means of them the general ascertains the true condi- 
 tion of affairs, before giving his final orders ; he sees 
 whether the corps of the enemy have the positions 
 they have been reported to occupy ; are in supporting 
 distance of each other ; are too much spread out ; 
 have their wings supported, &c. On the march, the 
 advanced guard reconnoitres the enemy. Sometimes 
 the reconnoissance is made in order to discover if a 
 single point is strongly occupied ; if a bridge has been 
 broken ; if a defile is fortified ; if the enemy has cannon, 
 in a particular place ; if he holds a certain village ; if 
 he is moving along such and such a road after a 
 defeat, &c. In some cases the reconnoitring party is 
 less numerous, and composed of cavalry alone, in order 
 that its march may be more rapid. But when the 
 party is expected to have an engagement, it should be 
 composed of all arms and commanded by an officer 
 of experience. 
 
 The commander usually receives written instruc- 
 tions. These he should understand perfectly before 
 setting out. He should have a map, a glass, and all 
 necessary materials for writing and sketching. He 
 should procure two or three of the residents of the 
 country to act as guides, and answer his questions rela- 
 tive to the names and sizes of villages, the character 
 of the roads, the extent of woods, the features of streams 
 and the country generally, &c. He should take with 
 him an officer who speaks the language of the country ; 
 
ARMED KECONNOISSANCES. 335 
 
 it is better still if he knows the language himself. 
 Finally, he should carefully inspect every man, animal 
 and vehicle of the command, to be certain that all are 
 in good condition and provided with provisions and 
 munitions. 
 
 A detachment, intrusted with such a duty, should 
 take all the precautions of advanced guard, flankers, 
 &c. ; scouts should examine hollow roads, woods, 
 villages, every place where the enemy might be con- 
 cealed. Every one who is met should be questioned 
 as to the road, &c. When a detachment passes 
 through a village, the commander should halt some 
 minutes to obtain news of the position of the enemy. 
 If he suspects deceit, he should take hostages, and re- 
 lease them only when he is certain that correct informa- 
 tion has been given him. His inquiries should not be 
 too prolonged, lest the enemy might learn his where- 
 abouts, and take measures to thwart him in his 
 object. 
 
 The commander should note particularly the features 
 of the country he passes through, in order to deter- 
 mine in advance points upon which he might fall 
 back and make a stand, if necessary. At cross-roads 
 he should question the guides, to ascertain their direc- 
 tion and termination. He will test and correct his 
 map. To get an accurate notion of the country, he 
 should turn back frequently and examine it in its 
 various aspects from different points of view. 
 
 The detachment remains united as well as possible 
 
336 1 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 during the march, in order to be always in condition 
 to sustain an attack or drive in an advanced post. 
 The main body should, therefore, not lose sight of the 
 advanced guard, nor that of its scouts. At night the 
 scouts may be called in, as useless, or, at least, they 
 may be drawn in within hearing distance. In such 
 cases, frequent halts must be made in order to listen. 
 Tillages should not be entered if any thing suspicious 
 is discovered, and until the return of two or three 
 men sent out to examine them. 
 
 When the length of the march requires a halt, it 
 should be made behind a wood, or some feature of 
 the ground which will conceal the troops. Sentinels, 
 placed in the woods or upon high points, so as to see 
 the country without being seen, will give notice of 
 every thing that goes on. Cavalry sentinels, in pairs, 
 will be posted at a still greater distance on the roads 
 towards the enemy, in order that one may leave their 
 post and bring any information the commander should 
 have, while the other remains on the lookout. If it 
 is necessary to halt near a village to take food, the 
 troops should pass through and take position on the 
 side next, the enemy, in order that he may not seize it. 
 The commander will oblige the inhabitants to supply 
 provisions, which he will distribute, neither officers nor 
 men being permitted to occupy houses. A guard will be 
 stationed in the village to enforce this regulation, and 
 to see that the requisition for provisions is complied 
 with. It is the better plan to pay for these, if possible. 
 
ARMED KBCONNOIS8ANCK8. 337 
 
 So long as the object of the reconnoissance is not 
 attained, the detachment should press forward, with- 
 out fear of being compromised, as it is here supposed 
 to be strong enough to overthrow easily any body of 
 troops it may probably encounter. There are other 
 reconnoissances, made by small detachments, where 
 stratagem is employed, rather than force, to discover 
 what is desired, and in such cases, of course, an en- 
 gagement is to be avoided. In a strong reconnoissance, 
 on the contrary, where the object is to penetrate as far 
 as the positions of the enemy, the detachment should 
 not permit itself to be checked by any body of troops 
 it may chance to meet, but rather regard it as a piece 
 of good fortune, as prisoners may be captured who can 
 give valuable information, and a running fight may 
 be kept up to the outposts of the enemy, where the 
 flying party will give the alarm. The line is soon 
 pierced, and a good opportunity is given of seeing the 
 troops of the enemy as they deploy to repel the attack. 
 They are thus forced to show their strength. The 
 commander should, at this moment, look for a high 
 point whence he may examine the ground and get an 
 idea of the position itself, and the manner in which it 
 is occupied, as well as the force and composition of 
 the troops. He makes, or causes to be made, a rapid 
 sketch of the ground and the position of the enemy. 
 
 He should not, in the heat of a first success, permit 
 an inconsiderate pursuit of the fugitives, and, losing 
 eight of the object of his expedition, become engaged 
 15 
 
338 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 so deeply as to be unable to withdraw. On the con- 
 trary, he must know how to stop and order a retreat, 
 even in the midst of a successful engagement, when 
 he has seen what he wishes. Prudence must here 
 control courage, and coolness regulate the whole 
 operation. 
 
 The commander of a reconnoitring party should 
 avoid an engagement that would draw him off from 
 his object, for his mission is not to damage the enemy, 
 but to discover his plans and acquire an accurate idea 
 of his position. When it comes in his way, he may 
 attack, defeat detachments of the enemy, make 
 prisoners, capture or spike cannon ; but he would be 
 reprehensible for turning out of his route and losing 
 time to attempt to surprise a park, or carry off a con- 
 voy, or disperse a careless body of troops, even if suc- 
 cessful. Such operations are not allowable, unless it 
 would be too dangerous to advance without driving 
 off troops who might be at the sides of his route. 
 
 Secret reconnoissances are conducted upon princi- 
 ples entirely different. Few men are taken, in order to 
 elude better the observation of the enemy or his pur- 
 suit. The effort is made to approach by night the 
 point that is to be reached. The detachment moves 
 stealthily through ravines and hollow roads, making 
 long detours to avoid meeting the patrols of the enemy, 
 and returning by some other way, so as to escape any 
 trap he may have laid. 
 
 A party of this sort is usually composed of but one 
 
ARMED KECONNOISSANCE3. 339 
 
 kind of troops, cavalry in a flat open, country, and in- 
 fantry in a rugged or obstructed country. It may be 
 commanded by an officer of low rank, if he is intelli- 
 gent and brave. From such services young officers 
 acquire reputation and receive advancement. The 
 detachment moves cautiously ; it is not of sufficient 
 numbers to have an advanced guard, but is preceded 
 by a group of scouts, and one of these is in front of 
 the others. Two or three flankers are necessary on 
 each side. The commander has with him a guide or 
 two, a special necessity for him, as he must often leave 
 the main roads. If the scouts report the presence of a 
 body of the enemy, he turns to one side and tries to 
 avoid it, by riding behind a clump of trees, a rise in 
 the ground, or in any other way. If he cannot escape 
 observation, he will fight or retreat, according to the 
 numbers of the enemy. If it is a strong column of 
 the enemy, and he has been able to remain concealed, 
 he scans it closely and endeavors to form an accurate 
 idea of its strength, before giving notice of its presence. 
 He then sends one of the fleetest soldiers by a detour, 
 with a brief note to the general. In the mean time, 
 if the column is about to reach the advanced posts, he 
 should attack, in order to stop it and give the alarm, 
 but he should be careful not to engage the main body ; 
 indeed, to avoid every thing but the leading detach- 
 ment of the advanced guard, if the enemy is in force. 
 His object is thus accomplished. The enemy, being 
 uncertain what force is before him, is compelled to halt 
 
3iO PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 aiid prepare for defence. Time is thus gained. The 
 commander of the reconnoitring party will take care 
 to send several orderlies to the commander of the ad- 
 vanced posts ; but, as they might be captured, and the 
 firing might not be heard, several bundles of straw 
 should be set on fire. 
 
 When the party has reached its destination, the 
 commander conceals it behind a screen of some kind, 
 as a clump of trees, a hill, an old wall, in a ravine or 
 hollow, and, taking a few men whom he places along 
 at intervals, he ascends to some place where he can see 
 the enemy, being accompanied to that point only by 
 the guide and two or three men. lie makes notes of 
 what he sees, along with the explanations given him 
 by the guide. If the positions of the enemy are in 
 plain sight, he makes a sketch, which it is well to do, 
 even if the drawing is very rough. He must not per- 
 mit himself to be satisfied with a mere glance, but ex- 
 amine every thing with coolness, and endeavor to gain 
 exact information, even at considerable personal risk ; 
 false reports are worse than total ignorance in such 
 matters. It requires experience to perform a duty of 
 this kind satisfactorily. Many examples might be 
 cited where incorrect information, made so either by 
 inexperience or fear, has led to grave mistakes or seri- 
 ous disasters. If the officer is discovered while making 
 his observations, and sees a body of troops approach- 
 ing that he cannot resist with the few men near him, 
 he hastens to rejoin the detachment at the foot of the 
 
AHMED RECONNOIS3AXCES. 
 
 hill, in order to fall back upon the reserve, which will 
 advance to his support, as concealment can no longer 
 be practised. When his whole force is united, he may 
 attempt to repulse the enemy, if his task is not com- 
 pleted ; but if it is, he should retire, even if sure of 
 success. When the object of liis mission is once at- 
 tained, it is to his credit to bring back his whole com- 
 mand rather than be seeking trophies from the enemy. 
 In this connection may be mentioned a remarkable 
 instance of presence of mind. At the siege of Luxem- 
 bourg, Vauban, wishing to ascertain, by personal ob- 
 servation, the real condition of affairs, as was his cus- 
 tom, advanced under the escort of a few grenadiers, 
 who were left in rear lying upon the ground. He was 
 crossing the glacis alone, under cover of the twilight 
 darkness, when he was discovered. He beckoned 
 with his hand to the sentinels not to fire, and con- 
 tinued to advance instead of retiring. The enemy 
 took him for one of themselves, and Yauban, having 
 seen what he wished, retired slowly and was saved by 
 his admirable coolness. 
 
 We will indicate some of the precautions that should 
 be taken to assure the success of a secret reconnois- 
 sance. In the first place, the detachment should con- 
 sist of trusty men, arid of non-commissioned officers 
 who, in case of need, might take the place of officers. 
 If they know the language of the enemy, it will help 
 them greatly in attempting those ruses, by which a 
 quick wit extricates its possessor from critical situa- 
 
342 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 tions. In every case it is necessary for some of the 
 party to speak the language. Two guides should be 
 obtained, who are mounted, if the detachment is of 
 cavalry, and always watched by men detailed for that 
 purpose. They should not be permitted to communi- 
 cate with each other, as they might concert some plan 
 for the destruction or injury of the party. Silence 
 should be observed, but especially at night, when 
 every man should be all ears. When there is danger 
 of discovery, main roads should be avoided and cross- 
 roads used, efforts being made by the party to find 
 concealment behind woods, hedges, rising ground ; 
 with this object, fields may be crossed ; it is not safe 
 to pass by a hill without ascertaining whether any one 
 is behind it, a duty performed by the scouts, who make 
 signs if all is safe. The same precaution is necessary 
 in passing near woods, ravines, farm-houses, &c., where 
 the enemy might be concealed. Tillages are avoided 
 as much as possible, in order not to give the alarm, 
 especially in going out upon the expedition ; if it is 
 necessary to pass through a village, it should be pre- 
 viously examined with care ; some of the principal 
 persons should be questioned as to the position and 
 plans of the enemy ; at the same time, incorrect infor- 
 mation will be given as to the destination of the de- 
 tachment. Food and other necessaries will be pro- 
 cured for the troops, if they were not brought along. 
 The best plan is to carry every thing that is necessary, 
 but sometimes it is impossible to do this, for want of 
 
ARMED RECONNOISSANCES. 343 
 
 time ; the first opportunity should then be taken to 
 procure what is wanting. 
 
 At night the men are not permitted to smoke. 
 When the party arrives, at daybreak, near the advanced 
 posts of the enemy, it should be carefully put under 
 cover, because it is the time when patrols are moving 
 about ; sentinels are placed upon^ all the avenues, so 
 that notice may be given of the approach of patrols, 
 or measures may be taken to capture them. If pris- 
 oners are taken, useful information is obtained. This 
 is also an excellent time for ascertaining the strength 
 of the enemy, for the troops are usually under arms 
 until the return of the patrols. The commander will 
 look for a high point, from which he may, by using 
 his glass and without being seen, discover what is 
 passing at the outposts. The fires, smoking in the dis- 
 ance, indicate, in a general manner, the force and lo- 
 cation of the corps covered by the advanced posts. 
 If it is necessary to penetrate so far, it can only be 
 done by a night march, and by making a wide detour, 
 in order to reach, by the rear, the villages occupied 
 by the enemy ; for there would be no probability of 
 success in attempting to pass through the line of posts 
 covering the front. At this time the men who speak 
 the language are useful ; they approach the villages 
 carefully, replying to the challenges of the sentinels, 
 and gaining access to some farm-house in order to 
 question the inhabitants. The sentinels in the rear 
 are generally neither numerous nor vigilant, and it is 
 
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 possible to capture them and learn every thing that 
 may be desired. To accomplish such an object, the 
 French company, which gained such renown at the 
 siege of Dantzic, under the orders of Chambure, made 
 use of the following stratagem : several soldiers ob- 
 tained bells and, mingling with the cattle, crept up to 
 the sentinels and killed them ; they then attacked the 
 p~,st by assault, and the remainder of the company, 
 which had been concealed, ran up, and the village was 
 soon in their possession. In order to avoid recogni- 
 tion by their accent, Chambure's men replied in Rus- 
 sian to the Prussians, when they crossed the posts, and 
 in German to the Russians. There will be many op- 
 portunities for imitating this ruse, when the hostile 
 army is composed of troops of two or more nations. 
 
 When the reconnoissance is finished, the officer who 
 has had charge of it gives the general a written re- 
 port, when a verbal report would be insufficient. 
 This should be clear, simple, and as brief as possible. 
 The object of the report is the important thing, and 
 not the more or less elegant manner in which it is 
 written. The officer should mention only those things 
 of which he is certain ; his conjectures should be pre- 
 sented with caution ; he should carefully avoid draw- 
 ing upon his imagination for facts. Finally, he should 
 not spea'k much of himself; for if there i^ ground for 
 pride on account of the manner in which the duty has 
 been performed, the troops should receive all the 
 praise, from him at least. 
 
AKMED RECONNOI'SSANCES. 345 
 
 The small reconnoissaiices every morning at the 
 advanced posts, to ascertain that the enemy has not 
 come nearer during the night, are made by patrols, 
 who advance a short distance beyond the line of posts. 
 This is a special duty for which all the officers should 
 be detailed in turn. They seldom remain out more 
 than an hour, and in the mean time the grand guards 
 and pickets are kept under arms. All the precau- 
 tions prescribed for secret reconnoissances are appli- 
 cable to these. The commander should move with* 
 much circumspection, sending out scouts, advancing 
 in silence, and under such covers as the country may 
 aiford, stopping often to listen and examine, giving 
 the alarm if the enemy is met, and avoiding engage- 
 ments with him. If the reconnoissance has a special 
 object, at some distance, and it is necessary to know 
 the result speedily, mounted men should be distri- 
 buted along the route passed over, to form a continu- 
 ous connection between the detachment and the out- 
 post. 
 
 Among the means of obtaining news of the enemy, 
 spies should be mentioned. It is, unfortunately, too 
 true that men are found everywhere who are ready to 
 sell their honor and to betray their country for a 
 greater or less sum, according to the position they oc- 
 cupy in society. This means, costly as it is, should 
 not be neglected, for news opportunely received often 
 decides the result of an enterprise. Large sums may 
 therefore be paid for such services, however contemp- 
 15* 
 
346 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 tible the agents are. They are often in the pay of 
 both parties, and spying for both. A treacherous spy 
 should receive no pity if his guilt is clearly proved. 
 
 Art. II. Topographical Recoiuioisaiices. 
 
 Such reconnoissances are no less important than 
 those treated above, as a general cannot arrange a 
 plan of attack, or make the least movement of his 
 forces, unless he has an accurate knowledge of the 
 ground. He should know the distances between 
 places and the obstacles to be encountered, in order 
 to arrange a combined march of several columns. 
 This information can only be obtained by special re- 
 connoissances, for the most finished maps are incom- 
 plete for his uses ; they never show the nature of the 
 soil, the quality of the roads, the state of rivers and 
 bridges, the thickness of woods, nor the exact slopes 
 of mountains and hills, which are all things that must 
 be known before any plan can be carried out. 
 
 It is difficult to give a perfect representation of 
 ground upon paper ; at any rate, it can only be done 
 by those who have bestowed upon the subject much 
 study and practice. Moreover, to make an accurate 
 map requires time. I propose, therefore, several sim- 
 plifications. Slopes may be indicated by two lines, 
 one at the top and the other at the bottom, marking 
 simply the contour. These are not level lines, but 
 are readily seized by the eye, and indeed present 
 
TOPOGRAPHICAL RECONNOISSANCES. 347 
 
 themselves when it is desired to give but an outline of 
 a plateau, a hill, a ridge, &c. The space between 
 these lines gives room enough to write a few descrip- 
 tive words. It will be noted whether the slope is 
 gentle or steep, accessible or not for cavalry, what is 
 its approximate height. In order that the circum- 
 scribing lines of heights be not confounded with those 
 which give other indications, they are made broken, 
 as shown in Figure 27. At the top of the sketch the 
 two circumscribing lines point out plainly a plateau 
 which, is connected with the plain by a gentle slope. 
 Lower, and near the river, there are two other lines 
 representing an elongated hill, and what is written be- 
 tween the curves gives an idea of the nature of the 
 slopes, or, at least, all that is necessary in a military 
 point of view. On the right of the sketch is a spur 
 shown by the circumscribing lines, terminated at the 
 river by steep rocky slopes ; a small hill, rising at its 
 extremity, is also indicated by its circumscribing lines. 
 The numbers in brackets give the heights of the points 
 of the upper curve above those directly below in the 
 lower curve, it being understood that these heights 
 are only estimated. We see, therefore, that the pla- 
 teau is on the right, 100 feet above the plain, in the 
 centre 90, and on the left 75 ; the isolated hill is 10 
 feet high at one end, and 12 feet at the other, &c. 
 It is not easy to judge of heights by the eye, and they 
 are rarely placed upon a mere sketch. I have only 
 desired to show how it is possible to put such informa- 
 
348 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 tion on a sketch without causing confusion, Every 
 officer should be able, by using such simple means as 
 those indicated, to represent, with considerable accu- 
 racy, the features of a piece of ground he has passed 
 over attentively. 
 
 Having now shown how a military sketch may be 
 
TOPOGRAPHICAL RECONNOISSANCES. 349 
 
 made in a simple manner, it remains to settle upon 
 some conventional signs to represent the different ob- 
 jects found in a country. These are streams, ponds, 
 marshes, roads, rocks, woods, vineyards, towns, vil- 
 lages, large isolated houses, which may play an im- 
 portant part in a combat, dikes, boats, fords, bridges 
 of stone or wood. All of these are shown in Figure 
 27. We will examine them separately. 
 
 Water-courses. These are represented either by 
 two lines, one larger than the other, or by a succession 
 of parallel lines between the first two. A blue tint 
 might well replace the interior lines. The arrow in- 
 dicates the direction of the current. On the lower 
 part of the stream is a water-mill. The affluent, on 
 the right is a brook whose banks are steep, which is 
 indicated by two irregular lines traced along the 
 bunks. 
 
 Means of Passing. On the left is a ferry-boat, in 
 the centre a stone bridge, which is distinguished from 
 the wooden bridge constructed over the affluent by 
 the narrowness of the latter and its having no abut- 
 ments on the banks. Higher up is a ford, indicated 
 by a finely dotted line across the stream. 
 
 Stagnant Water. Ponds and lakes are represented 
 in the same way as rivers, the only difference being in 
 the shape. Marshes are shown by an outline and 
 several lines drawn parallel to the bottom of the 
 paper with a few tufts of grass scattered. It may be 
 noted whether the marsh is impracticable or not. 
 
350 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 Woods and Vineyards. It takes much time to 
 draw these in the usual way. We have simplified it 
 by tracing the . outline, and making on the inside 
 straight parallel marks for woods, and a small imitation 
 of a vine for vineyards. A tint of Indian-ink or yellow- 
 ish green may replace the marks for woods, if colors are 
 used, as well as a purple tint for vineyards. Besides 
 the marks, the character of the woods should be written. 
 
 IZocks. The most difficult thing is the representa- 
 tion of rocks, on account of their great variety of 
 form. A single sign is not sufficient to distinguish 
 all the cases. An attempt must be made to imitate 
 them to a certain degree. When they have long 
 walls, it will be sufficient, as shown in the sketch, to 
 draw the top and bottom line with a few crossings to 
 give an idea of the object. This method is shown on 
 the right of the drawing. 
 
 Habitations. If it were necessary to draw all the 
 houses in towns and villages, as in a regular topo- 
 graphical map, it would require considerable time, 
 and discourage most officers. If a simple sign is used 
 to mark the place, the thing becomes very easy. A 
 village will, therefore, be represented by a circle 
 crossed closely, and the town- by changing the circle 
 into a square. A is a town on our sketch ; B, C, D, 
 and E are villages. If it is important to have the 
 form of one of those villages, a special sheet will be 
 necessary on a large scale. A red tint may replace 
 the cross lines. 
 
TOPOGRAPHICAL RECONNOISSANCES. 351 
 
 Isolated houses, such as farm-houses, large enclo- 
 sures, post-houses, inns, &c., are shown in their real 
 form, and without regard to the scale. A small bugle 
 or horn may indicate a post-house; a cup, an inn. On 
 the left of the plateau is the usual sign for wind- 
 mills. 
 
 Communications. What has been said of isolated 
 buildings applies also to roads, that is to say, it is 
 necessary to exaggerate their width, in order to make 
 them more visible. A main road, such as that from 
 A to B, is represented by two parallel lines ; in the 
 same way the wagon road from C to D, with the 
 single difference that the lines are made somewhat 
 nearer together. Roads practicable only for small 
 vehicles, such as that from C to B, are indicated by a 
 single full line and a dotted line ; paths for pack ani- 
 mals, by a single line ; three of these meet near the 
 ferry. Distances being very important in a drawing, 
 such as we are considering, they should be written 
 along the roads between striking objects. The num- 
 bers indicate the times required by a foot soldier to 
 pass over the corresponding spaces, at the rate of three 
 miles to the hour. If these distances were taken from 
 the walk of a horse, a note should be appended, tell- 
 ing the rate of movement of the horse. When roads 
 lie partly on the sheet, there should be written on 
 each the name of the place towards which it leads, 
 with an indication of the distance, if it is known. 
 
 Levees and Dikes. It is important to represent 
 
352 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 these objects, because troops may be sheltered by them. 
 If the parallel lines were used, they might be taken to 
 mean a road ; to avoid this uncertainty, the space be- 
 tween the lines is filled by cross marks. This is shown 
 upon the left bank of the stream near the bridge. 
 
 These are the different conventional signs, by means 
 of which an officer may promptly and easily trace 
 upon paper the result of his observations in a recon- 
 noissanee. He will not produce a fine map, but he 
 will have a military sketch, which maybe very useful, 
 if the forms of objects and relative distances are only 
 approximately obtained. To complete the sketch, a 
 meridian line should be added, and a scale of yards, to 
 determine distances not written. This scale is de- 
 duced from the space a man on foot can pass over in 
 an hour, about three miles. Also, as distances along 
 the roads are expressed in the time required to pass 
 over them, it will be well to add a second scale agree- 
 ing with the first, giving distances passed in a minute. 
 Officers will find it convenient to have these scales 
 marked upon a little rule, in order to save them the 
 trouble of re-marking them continually. 
 
 An officer who expects to make a reconnoissance, 
 should prepare his paper, if he has time, by attaching 
 it to pasteboard, to keep the wind from blowing it 
 about, and by marking upon it the scales and, approx- 
 imately, the positions of known objects within the 
 limits of his work, but so lightly that they can be 
 effaced and corrected, if necessary. 
 
TOPOGRAPHICAL EECOXNOISSANCES. 353 
 
 We will suppose that the patrols of the enemy 
 have shown themselves in the country, and that the 
 officer has been put on his guard against them. He 
 lias arrived the evening before in the town A, with 
 his detachment ; he has slept there, and gathered all 
 the information he can with respect to the surround- 
 ing country. He knows already the population of B, 
 C, D, and E, their distances apart, and also from the 
 places to which roads lead from them ; he learns that, 
 in addition to the bridge on the main road, he can 
 pass the river in the ferry-boat at D, and that there 
 should be, higher up, a ford practicable for cavalry. 
 He has embodied this information in his note-book, 
 and has secured a good guide before seeking any rest. 
 It is scarcely necessary to say that the usual military 
 precautions for safety should be taken, as he is in- 
 formed of the presence of the enemy upon the heights 
 across the river. 
 
 The next day he should be on his way before the 
 rising of the sun, his detachment having been assem- 
 bled at dawn. A small party is sent out in charge of 
 an officer, to examine the villages D and E, and ascer- 
 tain whether any one is there ; another party is sent 
 out to the right to visit the country house., and to scout 
 the ravine and the banks of the stream. These par- 
 ties are ordered to rejoin him at the -bridge. He pro- 
 ceeds along the main road with the principal body of 
 the troops, but stops a half hour at the inn, to give 
 time for the two detachments to make their circuits, 
 
354: PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 and collect precise information about the ford which, 
 has been spoken of to him, some one being sent to 
 sound it. He then moves on, marking distances by 
 his watch, and commencing to trace the direction 
 upon his paper. Having reached the bridge, he waits 
 until his detachments rejoin him. A third of the 
 troops are then left to guard the bridge, and he con- 
 tinues with the remainder to move on towards B, pre- 
 ceded by scouts and accompanied by flankers, who 
 never should be out of sight ; he sketches in the road 
 as he advances, laying down distances by the times 
 required to pass over them. He marks the branching 
 of roads and paths, the feet and tops of slopes, post- 
 house's, &c. On the subject of slopes, it should be ob- 
 served that the lengths given by the scale of minutes 
 should be diminished in proportion to the steepness 
 of the slope, because the horizontal distances, which 
 are alone put upon the sketch, are less in slopes ; and 
 also, in such ground less space is passed over in a 
 given time. A reduction of one-tenth for gentle 
 slopes is sufficient, and one-fifth for steeper. The eye, 
 when it is practised in the estimation of distances, 
 is a great help in such cases. Every .soldier should 
 endeavor to acquire this faculty. 
 
 Arrived at the village B, the officer leaves a third 
 of his detachment, and with the remaining portion 
 pushes on a mile or two, to ascertain whether any one 
 is approaching in that direction. He may then have 
 an engagement with the enemy. If he meets a force 
 
TOPOGRAPHICAL RECONXOISSANCES. 355 
 
 inferior to his own, or comes on a small post, lie at- 
 tacks and endeavors to capture several prisoners, who 
 may inform him of the position of the corps further 
 on. After pushing to the front in this way, he retires 
 rapidly to B, and then his topographical labor really 
 begins. He is preceded by a few scouts, and is ac- 
 companied only by a good non-commissioned officer 
 and two or three soldiers ; the main body of his 
 detachment remains at B, where it is established in 
 a military manner on the side towards the enemy. 
 
 The officer goes, in the first place, to the left of the 
 plateau, towards the windmills, in order to see the 
 slopes and country on that side. He passes around 
 the plateau, and returns to the village by way of the 
 post-house. Thence he goes to the village C, with 
 half of the troops he has with him ; the other half 
 is ordered to leave the village in an hour, and take 
 position at the foot of the slopes. The officer, pre- 
 ceded by scouts, advances along the road B C, stop- 
 ping a moment at the top and bottom of the slopes to 
 mark their direction on his sketch. In the village C 
 he learns where the two roads go from that point, 
 and what are. the distances of the nearest villages; 
 these will be written upon the plan. He proceeds as 
 far as the stream by the path, and crosses the wood 
 and returns to the village. In this way the principal 
 bend of the river is marked upon the sketch. From 
 the village two men should attempt to cross the marsh 
 and arrive at the ford ; it will only be after receiving 
 
356 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 their report that the officer will write the word im- 
 practicable, and it would be better still, if he has the 
 time, to ascertain the fact for himself, for subordinates 
 are apt to be deterred by small difficulties. From 0, 
 the detachment returns to the bridge by the road. In 
 passing, the officer detaches two men to go around 
 the marsh, cross the ford, and return to A. He then 
 estimates the distance to the foot of the hill, and puts 
 in the curve on his plan. 
 
 He next passes around the little hill, following out 
 the foot of the slopes and the paths ; he ascends the 
 hill, whence he discovers plainly the form of the 
 river ; he sketches both in, and proceeds as far as the 
 farm-house, always measuring the distances. The 
 farm-house is marked down, and he returns a second 
 time to the bridge by the path, after taking note of 
 the ferry and the mill. The whole force is now col- 
 lected between the bridge and the hills, where it will 
 remain an hour, while the commander, accompanied 
 by the guide and four or five horsemen, passes around 
 the villages I) and E ; the troops will then proceed to 
 A and wait for their commander. The latter, in pass- 
 ing over this part of the ground, marks upon his 
 sketch the woods, pond, and stream, as well as infor- 
 mation concerning the roads from D and E. 
 
 By the time the officer reaches A, the daylight may 
 be past, or a portion of it still left. In the latter case, 
 he will let his troops rest, and, if he is certain of not 
 meeting the enemy, he will take two or three of the 
 
TOPOGRAPHICAL RECONNOI83ANCES. 357 
 
 best men and go to the heights on the right, passing 
 by the stone country-house. From the old chateau, 
 on the sugar-loaf at the end of the spur, he can see 
 distinctly the course of the stream, and correct his 
 sketch, if necessary. He will endeavor to represent 
 this broken ground as well as he can. In returning, 
 he will go down the little brook, down the river to 
 the bridge, measuring the length of the dike. His 
 work is done, and he should then return to his quar- 
 ters to complete his sketch and notes. 
 
 This sketch will be undoubtedly insufficient, if an 
 accurate map is required, for it is not to be expected 
 that a work so rapidly done will not contain con- 
 siderable errors ; but what is essential is shown in a 
 clear and simple manner, and the general can, by its 
 aid, discover what it is important for him to know. 
 A sketch, made with the pencil, should be gone over 
 with pen and ink. 
 
 When the duty can be divided between several offi- 
 cers, a reconnoissance, even of greater extent, may be 
 made more rapidly. One officer examines the roads ; 
 a second the streams, noting their breadth, depth, 
 velocity, height of banks, &c. ; a third goes through 
 woods, examines villages as to their defensive proper- 
 ties and resources, &c. Each officer has his sheet, on 
 which he makes his sketch and adds his notes. An 
 officer of higher rank superintends the whole. He 
 takes precautionary measures for the safety of his 
 parties, and studies the general outline of the country. 
 
358 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY". 
 
 Provided with his glass, lie seeks elevated places, 
 whence he can better see the ground to be examined. 
 
 However rapidly this may all be done, it is some- 
 times necessary to reconnoitre much more so, almost 
 at a gallop even. All that can then be done is to take 
 a few rough notes and put down a few hasty lines ; 
 the sketch must then be made from memory. 
 
 Itineraries. Reconnoissances are much simplified 
 when they have no other object than to indicate the 
 features of a road ; they are then termed itineraries. 
 They are made in two ways ; either by means of con- 
 ventional signs, or by notes written in a -table, with 
 columns prepared in advance. 
 
 No march should be made without an officer being 
 selected to make an itinerary. He notes the special 
 features of the road, what is remarkable on the right 
 and left, the breadths of defiles, the declivities of slopes, 
 the repairs needed, c. Distances from point to point 
 are expressed in hours of march. 
 
 Itineraries of the first kind are made upon sheets 
 prepared as in Figure 28.* The sheets are then united 
 to represent the whole road, and mounted upon linen 
 for preservation. The top of each sheet must be 
 attached to the bottom of the next. The notes are 
 commenced at the bottom of the sheet and carried on 
 to the top. A straight line in the middle marks the 
 road ; squares or circles indicating inhabited places. 
 Other lines to the right and left represent side roads, 
 * See also Regulations for U. S. Army, page 100 
 
TOPO&RArHICAL KECONNOISSANCES. 359 
 
 near which are written the names of the nearest 
 places. Crooked lines mark streams crossing the 
 road, &c. Every one ma} 7 adopt such signs as he 
 prefers. 
 
 If the sheet is too small to receive all the notes 
 that are proper, a special note-book may be kept in 
 addition. 
 
360 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 Fig. 28. 
 
 &C. 
 
 
 
 &C. 
 
 Woods at 300 yards from 
 the road. 
 
 
 gsTAVERN 
 
 Many scattered houses in 
 the neighborhood. 
 
 Distance from A to D. 
 4h. fry. The road is good 
 be f A r een these points, ex- 
 ex pt near the river, where 
 are deep ruts, which 
 must be filled for the 
 passage of artillery. 
 
 .,_ - . -s 
 
 ! 
 
 Surrounded by old walls ; 
 accommodates 3,000 men. 
 
 Kiver fordable. Stone 
 bridge ; admits 10 abreast. 
 
 
 HIGHEST 
 
 b 
 
 M 
 POINT 
 
 From the bridge to the 
 highest point, double 
 teams are needed. 
 
 
 *\. 
 
 Q 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 VILLAGE^ 
 
 )B. 
 
 Accommodates 1,200 men. 
 
 
 i^^B^ 
 
 ^MIIJU'** 
 
 Marshy stream. 
 
 The plateau offers a good 
 position for defence. The 
 front is covered by the 
 marshy stream, the flanks 
 rest on woods, leaving 
 an interval of 4,000 yards. 
 
 FARMHOUSE 
 
 1*1 
 K 
 
 Q 
 ^ 
 
 "> <S 
 
 Koad toY. in 4h. SO 7 . 
 Practicable for wagons. 
 
 
 0. 
 
 "*$ 
 
 Not capable of defence. 
 Accommodates 10,000 
 men. 
 
 CITY H Hj A. 
 
 
 General Remarks . ICONVENTIONALSIGNS! Particular Remarks . 
 
CHAPTER Till. 
 
 SPECIAL MISSIONS, AND GIVING BEST TO TROOPS. 
 
 Art. I. Convoy. 
 
 IF convoys move elsewhere than on ground con- 
 trolled by the army, and, consequently, at a distance 
 from the principal force of the enemy, they will cer- 
 tainly be captured, for there is no task more difficult 
 than to defend a convoy of considerable extent against 
 a serious attack. Frederick lost a large convoy on its 
 way to Olmutz, because it was obliged to follow roads 
 in the possession of the enemy. Neither the bravery 
 of the escort nor the nearness of the army could save 
 it from falling into the hands of the Austrians, and 
 Frederick was obliged to raise the siege of Olmutz in 
 consequence of its loss. 
 
 Usually these convoys are only exposed to the at- 
 tacks of partisans or light troops, who have succeeded, 
 on account of the smallness of their forces, in passing 
 unperceived to the rear of the army. Against such 
 attacks precautions are taken in giving escorts to con- 
 voys. These escorts are principally composed of 
 infantry, because troops of this kind can fight on all 
 kinds of ground, and may, in case of need, take posi- 
 16 
 
362 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 tion behind the wagons, or even in them, in order to 
 drive off an enemy. Cavalry is also necessary, both 
 to scout the country to a great distance from the con- 
 voy, and give prompt notice of the approach of the 
 enemy, and also to take part in the defence against an 
 attack of cavalry. The latter, being able to move 
 very rapidly from one end to the other of the convoy, 
 would soon discover some unprotected point, if the 
 escort were composed only of foot soldiers. 
 
 It will be taken for granted, therefore, that the es- 
 cort of a convoy of importance ought to be composed 
 of infantry and cavalry, the former being the more 
 numerous. They should march in the following 
 order : A leading advanced guard, composed of cav- 
 alry, will precede the convoy from two to five miles, 
 in order to examine the road in front and the ground 
 on the flanks. But, as the enemy might escape the 
 observation of the leading detachment, and place him- 
 self in ambush in the interval between it and the 
 head of the convoy, a second detachment is necessary 
 immediately in front, from which scouts will be sent 
 out in advance and flankers on the sides. The longer 
 is the string of carriages or pack-animals, the greater is 
 the danger of surprise, and, consequently, the greater 
 the necessity for precautions to avoid it. A convoy 
 is exposed to attack in rear nearly as much as in 
 front ; it is therefore necessary to form a rear-guard, 
 a part of which will be cavalry, to give speedy notice 
 of what is passing in rear. The troops forming 
 
CONVOYS. 303 
 
 the mass of the escort, principally infantry, will be 
 divided into three bodies, one of which will inarch at 
 the head of the convoy, accompanied by workmen, 
 carrying with them several wagons filled with tools 
 of all kinds, ropes, timbers indeed, every thing neces- 
 sary for repairing bridges and roads. The second de- 
 tachment will be placed in the middle of the column, 
 and the third at the tail. 
 
 The troops should be by no means scattered along 
 the whole length of the convoy, because, in case of 
 surprise, every part would be equally weak to resist 
 attack. There should, however, be a few men de- 
 tailed from the detachments of the main body to 
 march along the sides of the road, and compel the 
 drivers to keep their places and distances. Order on 
 the march is one of the most important things. The 
 drivers are generally ready to cut loose their horses 
 and take to flight at the first appearance of danger, 
 and at all times to be very negligent. They should, 
 therefore, be kept in a rigid state of discipline, arid 
 carefully watched. 
 
 The head of the convoy should move slowly and 
 regularly, in order to avoid breaks in the column. 
 The drivers should be forbidden to water their horses 
 except by permission. If there is powder in the con- 
 voy, no smoking should be allowed. If a wagon 
 breaks down, its load should be speedily divided 
 among the others that can receive it most conveni- 
 ently. There should be a signal agreed upon for the 
 
364 PKINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 halting of the whole column when such an accident 
 
 o 
 
 happens. If only some slight repairs are necessary, 
 the convoy moves on, while the disabled wagon falls 
 to one side and takes its place in rear of the column, 
 to return to its proper place at the first general halt, 
 unless the commander decides otherwise. The sol- 
 diers should never be permitted to put their knap- 
 sacks, &c., in the wagons ; still less should they ride 
 themselves. 
 
 Whenever the road is wide enough, the carriages 
 should be formed in double file. The length of the 
 column is thus diminished one-half; and, if circum- 
 stances require, the defensive park may be rapidly 
 formed, which is done by the carriages wheeling to the 
 right and left, so as to form in two compact lines, with 
 the horses' heads towards each other and quite near. 
 In this way the horses are better covered, the drivers 
 cannot get off with them, and the whole space oc- 
 cupied is much less than when in column. This for- 
 mation evidently requires some time, and should only 
 be adopted when necessity requires. 
 
 A halt of a few minutes should be made every 
 hour, to give the horses time to breathe, to adjust the 
 harness, &c. In the middle of the day a longer halt 
 is made, to feed and water the animals, but without 
 unhitching. The necessary food for this purpose 
 should be carried both by men and beasts. The con- 
 voy usually halts at night near a village, as provi- 
 sions are to be found there for man and beast, as well 
 
CONVOYS. 365 
 
 as shops for repairs of harness and wagons, and for 
 shoeing horses. Unless it is absolutely, necessary to 
 do otherwise, the park should be formed beyond the 
 village, because it is better to have a defile of that 
 sort in rear than in front, if it should during the 
 night fall into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 A good place for the park is a spot enclosed by 
 walls or thick hedges, as it is most secure. In the 
 interior of the park the most valuable objects are put, 
 such as despatches or other valuable papers, money, or 
 munitions ; a guard should always be placed to pre- 
 vent the drivers making a fire near the wagons con- 
 taining powder. The horses are tied up inside the 
 enclosure, each team near its own wagon. The troops, 
 except the guard of the park, bivouac at a little dis- 
 tance, occupying the ground, with the usual precau- 
 tions of outposts, &c. No one should be permitted 
 to leave the park without the consent of the com- 
 mander. Those who are to go for provisions and 
 forage should be designated. Neither officer, soldiers, 
 nor drivers should be suffered to go to the inns and 
 shops of the village. The commander should take all 
 necessary measures for providing food for the whole 
 command, as well as straw to sleep on ; for this pur- 
 pose, as well as to select a place for the park, officers 
 and a few men should be sent in advance. 
 
 The park is commonly a hollow square, but the 
 locality will always determine its form, which should 
 make an enclosure, either to contain the horses and 
 
366 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 drivers, or as a kind of defensive work in case of 
 attack. The carnages may be in file or side by side, 
 according to the front of the square they form ; the 
 rule being that all the poles be turned in the same 
 direction and towards the place of destination. It is 
 proper to double the carriages in file, so that in case 
 of need the intervals of one row may be rapidly 
 covered by pushing forward the carriages of the 
 other. When the space occupied is contracted, and 
 the number of carriages large, they are placed in 
 several lines, with sufficient intervals between them 
 to receive the teams. 
 
 When the convoy sets out the next day, each car- 
 riage retakes its own place in the column, and, to en- 
 able it to do so, each has its own number, which pre- 
 vents all quarrels on the subject of precedence among 
 the drivers. The officers should also see that each 
 enters the column in its turn and without delay. 
 These precautions may appear very minute, but they 
 are quite necessary. There are others that should bo 
 taken by the commander of the convoy ; for example, 
 he should satisfy himself that all the carriages and 
 animals are in good order before setting out. He 
 should see whether the loads are not too heavy, and 
 remedy the difficulty if they are, either by employing 
 more wagons or lengthening the teams. He prepares 
 a list of all the wagons, with their contents and the 
 names of the drivers. He requires the officers to assist 
 in his duties of supervision, and gives them instruc- 
 
CONVOYS. 367 
 
 tions what they should do in different circumstances 
 that he may foresee. He should cause a defensive 
 park to be formed several times, that the drivers may 
 know how to perform their part without confusion. 
 
 The passages of defiles are dangerous for a con- 
 voy which is surrounded by numerous parties of the 
 enemy. A defile should therefore never be entered 
 until the outlet from it is secured, and it should be 
 passed with all practicable speed. In passing bridges, 
 precautions should be taken against attacks on both 
 banks. It is manifestly the duty of a commander of 
 a convoy to obtain all the information he can of the 
 route he is to follow, and even to make a personal 
 examination of it in advance, if he has time enough. 
 
 o 
 
 When the enemy is reported in front by the leading 
 detachment, which falls back rapidly upon the escort, 
 the carriages close up as much as possible and halt, 
 or, better still, form in double file, if the road is wide 
 enough. The advanced guard and the head detachment 
 of the escort take a position to receive the enemy ; the 
 centre detachment forms alongside of the first, or in 
 echelon, as the ground may permit, and as one or 
 other flank is more exposed. The third detachment, 
 joined by the rear-guard, remains in reserve, ready to 
 charge the enemy when he has turned the wing of the 
 troops in front, and is attempting to fall upon the 
 flank of the convoy, to cut it in two, or throw it into 
 confusion. This reserve should be immediately in 
 front of the carriages, that it may pass readily from 
 
308 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 right to left. In this position it has the advantage of 
 replying by small detachments to the circling move- 
 ments of the attacking party. All the cavalry of the 
 escort should be in the reserve. If the main body is 
 too near the head of the convoy, the reserve may be 
 obliged to take position somewhere on the flank ; in 
 this case an opening should be made in the column, to 
 allow passage through from side to side. It is very 
 necessary for the reserve to have much mobility, be- 
 cause it is called upon to look out for the feints of the 
 enemy, and repel all the lateral attacks, which the 
 main body cannot attend to. The soldiers placed 
 along the convoy, to watch the drivers, must now give 
 special attention to their duties, and should at once 
 shoot down any who attempt to cut loose their horses 
 in order to escape. 
 
 If the attack is repulsed, the commander of the es- 
 cort must be very careful how he indulges in a pursuit, 
 for the flight may be a feint, to draw him into an am- 
 buscade, or away from the train, while another body 
 of the enemy attacks it. His object is to arrive safely 
 at his destination with his charge. This, however, 
 should not prevent him from attacking the enemy if 
 suitable opportunities offer. If necessity requires, he 
 should take shelter in and behind the wagons. In a des- 
 perate case like this, a protracted resistance may be 
 useless, on account of the great superiority of the ene- 
 my ; the commander may then endeavor to save a 
 portion of the train by abandoning the remainder, or 
 
CONVOYS. 300 
 
 else to destroy the whole by killing or maiming the 
 horses, breaking the wheels, overturning the wagons, 
 and even setting on fire those easily burned. 
 
 The defence against an attack from the rear is con- 
 ducted on the same principles: the centre detach- 
 ment is united to the rear detachment and the rear- 
 guard, to form a main body to resist the enemy ; the 
 head detachment falls back to form a reserve. The 
 convoy should continue its march while the troops 
 fight. The latter will retire gradually, keeping at no 
 great distance from the tail of the column, but pre- 
 senting a bold front in defiles, and wherever the ground 
 permits. In the mean time, the advanced guard re- 
 ceives information of the attack, and joins the reserve. 
 
 The most dangerous attack is that in flank, because 
 the convoy is more exposed in that direction. In this 
 case, the three detachments unite on the side attacked, 
 and move out so far that the enemy will be obliged to 
 make a wide detour in attacking and expose his own 
 flank. The best arrangement is to throw the centre 
 detachment well out, and form in echelon the other 
 two, strengthened respectively by the advanced and rear 
 guard. The convoy doubles its files and moves on, 
 regulating its movements by those of the troops. If 
 they halt, it must halt, unless the enemy has only in- 
 fantry, in which case the convoy will take the trot and 
 escape. But the attacking party usually contains cav- 
 alry, and the convoy must regulate its movements by 
 those of the escort. However, it may sometimes gain 
 16* 
 
370 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 ground in a defile, or in some place where cavalry is 
 unable to act. At any rate, the director of the train 
 must obey exactly the orders of the commander of the 
 escort. If the latter thinks it necessary to form a 
 defensive park, the former executes the movement at 
 the first suitable place. 
 
 It is sometimes impossible to adopt the above dis- 
 positions. There may not be men enough to form 
 three detachments, and in this case two are used, one 
 at the head of the convoy, and the other at the tail ; 
 perhaps, even, after furnishing the advanced and rear 
 guards, the main body may be too small for subdivi- 
 sion, and then it should all march together on the 
 most dangerous side. The rule is never to scatter the 
 escort along the convoy, but to assemble it in one or 
 more groups capable of effectual resistance. A con- 
 voy of importance should never be risked on the road 
 without a previous sweeping of the country by mova- 
 ble columns. If the convoy is put in motion immedi- 
 ately after the return of the columns, there are many 
 chances in its favor, and the escort may be considera- 
 bly diminished. 
 
 It is evident, from what precedes, that the attack of 
 a convoy is a very safe operation, even for a body of 
 troops inferior to the escort, for, if the enemy is taken 
 unawares, the convoy may be destroyed, or a part of 
 it captured ; if the attack fails, the party may retire 
 safely. It should be partly infantry and partly cav- 
 alry. It is evident that if, by hiding behind a wood, 
 
CONVOYS. 371 
 
 a bill, a field of grain, &c., the bead or tail of tlie con- 
 voy can be surprised and enveloped before assistance 
 can arrive, the success is complete. This plan should 
 be attempted before resorting to an open attack. But 
 it is not right to expect such negligence upon the part 
 of the commander of the escort ; but, on the contrary, 
 that the escort will be prepared for the attack. Hence, 
 his attention must be divided by sending against him 
 several small columns and many skirmishers, who seek 
 to get near the wagons, to shoot the horses and obstruct 
 the road. The cavalry, circling around, moves rapidly 
 upon exposed points. If several carriages are reached, 
 it is sufficient to frighten off the drivers and cut the 
 traces, because in this way the rear part of the convoy 
 is brought to a halt. 
 
 If the time and place of the attack can be chosen, 
 it evidently should be made when the convoy is partly 
 in a defile, and the head or the tail may be enveloped. 
 Success is then certain, the inevitable crowding and 
 confusion in the defile preventing one part of the 
 troops from coming to the assistance of the other. 
 But such a piece of good fortune is rare, and there 
 are chances enough of success to justify attacking a 
 convoy wherever it is found. 
 
 When the whole or part of a convoy has been seized, 
 the prize should be rapidly carried off to a secure 
 place, before the enemy can come up in superior force 
 and recapture it. Rather than permit this, the carriages 
 should be destroyed, and only the most valuable part 
 
372 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 of their contents preserved arid carried off on the backs 
 of the horses. Fighting is to be avoided ; that is not 
 the object of the expedition. 
 
 Art. II. AmS>ucades. 
 
 As war is now waged, and with the great number 
 of detachments with which armies are surrounded in 
 the present day, ambuscades are scarcely possible, 
 except for small bodies of troops. Very broken coun- 
 try is particularly suited to them, from the ease with 
 which troops may be concealed in it. This method 
 of attacking by surprise can only succeed when the 
 enemy is very negligent in his marches, taking none 
 of the usual precautions ; for, as soon as notice is 
 given of an ambuscade, it has failed. In an ambus- 
 cade, the effort should be made not only to surprise 
 the enemy, but to envelop him and cut off his re- 
 treat ; for this purpose, the troops in ambush should 
 be divided into several bodies, in order to attack on 
 all sides at once. 
 
 When moving to a position of ambush, the body 
 of troops should be preceded by a small advanced 
 guard and by scouts, in the usual manner, to avoid 
 falling into a similar trap laid by the enemy, and to 
 seize all persons who might carry him word of the 
 operation. This is a rule, in fact, which should never 
 be disregarded. 
 
 Woods, hills, rocks, tall hedges, &c., are, it is true, 
 
AMBUSCADES. 373 
 
 the most advantageous places for ambuscades, but 
 there are others by no means useless for such pur- 
 poses, such as dikes, fields of grain, or meadows of tall 
 grass, or plains crossed by gentle undulations, partic- 
 ularly as the enemy is lulled into security by not sus- 
 pecting any probability of an attempt at surprise on 
 such ground. An inventive genius can make the 
 most of circumstances of this kind, when he sees his 
 adversary inclined to negligence and presumption. 
 In this way Hannibal deceived Minutius. Polybius 
 says, that between the two camps was a hill whence 
 either could greatly annoy the other. Hannibal de- 
 termined to seize it first, but suspecting that Minu- 
 tius, proud of a former success, would not fail to pre- 
 sent himself, he had recourse to a stratagem. Al- 
 though the plain commanded by the hill was gener- 
 ally level and open, Hannibal had observed several 
 undulations and hollows, where some men might be 
 hid. He accordingly distributed among them, in 
 small bodies, 500 horse and 5,000 foot. Minutius 
 marched up to defend the hill, without perceiving the 
 troops in ambush, who took him in flank and rear ; 
 he was completely defeated. 
 
 In preparing an ambuscade, those places are also 
 to be sought where the enemy cannot deploy easily ; 
 where he is obliged to move in a long, narrow 
 column ; where, on account of local difficulties, dis- 
 order may be expected to occur ; where the troops are 
 separated by obstacles, &c. 
 
374 piimciPLEs OF STRATEGY. 
 
 At what distance from the road, followed by the 
 enemy, should an ambuscade be established ? This 
 question can only be solved by considering the local- 
 ity, and the kind of troops to be attacked. In general, 
 it may be said, that if the place of concealment is too 
 near, the flankers of the enemy will discover the trap ; 
 and if it is too far off, the enemy will have time to 
 escape. Cavalry should station itself at a greater 
 distance than infantry, because it can get over ground 
 more rapidly, and the noise of the horses cannot be 
 repressed. For this reason, and because cavalry can- 
 not act in all kinds of ground, infantry is better suited 
 for ambuscades. However, cavalry may be used in 
 small bodies. 
 
 The place of ambush should be entered from the 
 sides and rear, in order to leave no tracks on the road 
 by which the enemy might be led to suspect some- 
 thing. K-ight is the best time for moving, in order 
 to arrive before day at the place. It is a good plan 
 to take, at first, another road, in order to mislead the 
 inhabitants of the country, who may be in the interest 
 of the enemy. 
 
 A body of troops in ambush should light no fires ; 
 each soldier should remain in the place assigned to 
 him, whether standing, sitting, or lying ; he should 
 not move, nor hold his arms in such a position as to 
 reflect the rays of the sun. In the daytime, a portion 
 of the troops may sleep, if they have long to wait, be- 
 cause the enemy is visible at a distance, and there is 
 
AMBUSCADES. 375 
 
 ample time for preparation ; but at night, every man 
 must be on the alert, to seize the favorable moment 
 for rushing upon the enemy, when the preconcerted 
 signal is given. 
 
 The troops being divided, as has been stated, into 
 several bodies, with special duties to perform, each 
 should be informed precisely what it has to do, in 
 order to avoid confusion and to have concert in the 
 attack. The infantry, placed as near the road as 
 possible, fire a single volley and then rush upon the 
 enemy, uttering loud cries at the same time. The 
 cavalry, posted at a greater distance, make a circuit, 
 in order to close the way both in front and rear. The 
 party in ambush should only rise up at a given signal ; 
 it should not stir on account of a few shots, that may 
 be accidental. The commander is the sole judge of 
 the moment for action, and it is for him to give the 
 signal. Too much impatience may cause the opera- 
 tion to miscarry. 
 
 After an engagement, the enemy may often be 
 drawn into an ambuscade by a feigned retreat. This 
 ruse is well known, but still it succeeds, because an 
 enemy who believes himself victorious, and wishes to 
 profit by his first success, does not always take all the 
 precautions usual in an ordinary march, and, more- 
 over, people are made presumptuous by good fortune. 
 In 1622, Tilly was pressing Heidelberg closely. The 
 King of Bohemia and Mansfeld passed the Rhine to suc- 
 cor that city. At the news of the march of the Kin? 
 
376 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 of Bohemia, Tilly encamped near Wisloch, in a very 
 advantageous position. To draw him from it, Mans- 
 feld attacked, and during the engagement caused his 
 troops to fall back, as if worsted. Tilly pursued 
 warmly, and advanced as far as Mingelheim, where 
 Mansfeld had placed in ambush a part of his army, 
 and much artillery. The Bavarians, taken unawares 
 in this way, were at once defeated ; they had 2,000 
 men killed, and lost their baggage, cannon, and many 
 prisoners. Heidelberg was relieved. 
 
 When information has been received of an attempt 
 upon the part of the enemy to prepare an ambuscade, 
 an excellent opportunity is offered to make a counter- 
 plot, for he will be surprised at the moment when he 
 expected to cause surprise, his troops will be demor- 
 alized, and fear will give the finishing stroke. "With 
 this object, the counter-ambuscade should be arranged 
 as near as possible to that of the enemy. Paulin, in- 
 formed by deserters that Cecinna had prepared an am- 
 buscade for him,, sent a portion of his troops to station 
 themselves in ambush near those of the enemy, while 
 he moved up as if he knew nothing of their design. 
 The party of Cecinna was cut to pieces, because his 
 men lost confidence as soon as they saw Paulin's 
 troops show themselves. 
 
 This proves that even in arranging an ambuscade, 
 that is to say, when a commander deems himself suffi- 
 ciently in control of the country to effect a surprise of 
 his enemy, it is necessary to be on his guard, to post 
 
AMBUSCADES. 377 
 
 sentinels, and to examine the neighborhood of the 
 position he is going to occupy. The sentinels are not 
 only necessary for the security of the party in am- 
 bush, but also to give notice of the arrival of the 
 enemy who is to be surprised, and to communicate 
 any information that may be interesting to the com- 
 mander. This duty should be committed to men of 
 intelligence and experience in war ; it is well even to 
 place an officer or non-commissioned officer on the 
 look out, with two or three men to transmit his 
 reports. 
 
 If the patrols or sentinels see any of the scouts of 
 the enemy, they should not challenge, but hide, or 
 retire without noise ; the least indiscretion may cause 
 such an enterprise to fail. If the enemy discover the 
 ambushed party, all that remains is to rush out and 
 seize the most exposed men. 
 
 It is well to have, on the two flanks of the ambus- 
 cade, small detachments of cavalry to ride after peas- 
 ants, who might see the trap, and endeavor to give 
 notice of its existence to the enemy. The neighing 
 of the horses is, however, dangerous, as it may lead 
 to discovery. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to say that, if the troops are 
 to remain a long time concealed, the commander, be- 
 fore setting out upon the expedition, should see that a 
 supply of provisions is laid in for men and horses. 
 Having once entered the place of concealment, none 
 should be permitted to leave it, even in disguise, for 
 
378 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 fear of arousing the suspicions of the inhabitants, and 
 also those of the enemy. 
 
 Art. III. Advanced Pots. 
 
 When the circumstances of the war permit the 
 troops to remain quietly resting, they are either in camp 
 or cantonments. Some remarks were made in a pre- 
 vious chapter on the subject of cantonments. It is 
 proposed now to enter into more detail, and to treat 
 of castrametation, or the art of choosing and laying 
 out camps. But first, a few words will be said as to 
 advanced posts, applicable alike to the case of troops 
 long in a position of repose, or simply making a tem- 
 porary stay at some place. 
 
 The advanced posts of a stationary body of troops 
 perform the same duties as the scouting parties and 
 flankers on a march. Their office is to prevent the 
 enemy from falling upon the main body without being 
 perceived and the alarm given. Every body of troops 
 which is established in camp, bivouac, or cantonments, 
 for a long time, or for a single day, or even for a few 
 hours, should be covered by detachments whose num- 
 ber and strength should be proportioned to the entire 
 force, arid the extent of ground to be occupied. These 
 detachments form the advanced posts. If they are 
 well posted, and keep a good look out, the enemy can- 
 not present himself in any direction without being 
 
ADVANCED POSTS. 379 
 
 seen at a considerable distance, and time is thus given 
 for preparations for defence. If, on the contrary, they 
 are badly placed, are too much separated, and perform 
 their duties negligently, one of the detachments may 
 be captured without the knowledge of its neighbors, 
 and the danger for the main body is so much the 
 greater because it is reposing in a false security. Out- 
 post service deserves, therefore, the careful attention of 
 all officers connected with it. 
 
 The nature of the ground determines the kind of 
 troops to be used for this purpose. In an open coun- 
 try cavalry will be employed, but infantry chiefly in 
 a broken country. A few horsemen should always be 
 with the detachments, for duty as orderlies and mes- 
 Fengers. Mounted soldiers are also necessary as ve- 
 dettes on the principal roads, to give timely notice of 
 the approach of the enemy. 
 
 The distance at which the advanced posts should be 
 placed cannot be fixed absolutely, because it depends 
 upon their number, the ground, and the strength of the 
 main body. It is plain that a large body of troops, 
 requiring some time to assemble, should have its out- 
 posts more distant than a small body, which can get 
 under arms in a moment. Moreover, a large force 
 can safely extend its line of outposts, because they 
 may be made stronger and well supported. 
 
 Advanced posts are divided into outposts and grand 
 guards. The first, as their name implies, are outside 
 of all, the grand guards serving as centres and rallying 
 
380 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 points for them. The grand guards furnish the out- 
 posts, each sending out as many as may be necessary 
 for a good view of the surrounding ground. In addi- 
 tion to these, and intermediate between them and the 
 main body, small reserves are placed in suitable posi- 
 tions; they are called supports or pickets. 
 
 The grand guards are placed, as much as possible, 
 in covered positions, such as low ground, behind vil- 
 lages or woods, on the reverse of a hill, &c. The 
 essential thing is to keep them out of sight of the 
 enemy, who might attempt to attack them suddenly 
 or capture them. The outposts are still more to the 
 front, say about 100 paces, observing the same rule of 
 keeping out of view of the enemy. These posts, 
 drawn from the grand guards, furnish an extensive 
 chain of sentinels or vedettes, who are intended to see 
 every thing that goes on. Each picket furnishes three 
 or four grand guards, each grand guard as many out- 
 posts, and each outpost several sentinels. The 
 strength of the outposts cannot be always and every- 
 where the same, being dependent on the number of 
 sentinels to be furnished. In each outpost there 
 should be three times as many men as it furnishes 
 sentinels, besides the officers and non-commissioned 
 officers. 
 
 In a wooded country, the sentinels occupy the outer 
 skirts, the outposts the first clear places, the grand 
 guards those more to the rear. The pickets are placed 
 behind the forest, and always far enough so that the 
 
ADVANCED POSTS. 381 
 
 enemy cannot fall upon them suddenly, under cover 
 of the trees, even if he should have succeeded in pene- 
 trating the wood. In general, woods and other covers 
 should be viewed with suspicion. If the forest is too 
 extensive to be left in front, large open places should 
 be sought out for the pickets, or else abatis made to 
 cover them. The grand guards and outposts should 
 take similar precautions. 
 
 Communication between the posts should be kept 
 up by frequent patrols, either to watch the sentinels, 
 to discover any of the enemy who may slip past in 
 the dark, to prevent desertions, to seize spies, &c. 
 The outposts should never be separated from the 
 grand guards by obstacles which would prevent their 
 prompt assembling, if the enemy should attack. The 
 same rule should as far as possible be observed be- 
 tween the grand guards and pickets, but sometimes 
 cannot, on account of the greater distance. In this 
 latter case, the obstacle should be held by an inter- 
 mediate post, to keep the enemy in check and protect 
 the retreat of the advanced troops. 
 
 The pickets may be composed of troops of all arms, 
 but the grand guards are either cavalry or infantry. 
 If of infantry, there should be still a few mounted 
 men, for purposes already mentioned. The pickets, in 
 addition to the outposts and grand guards, should have 
 their own small posts, or, at least, their own sentinels. 
 Generally, too many precautions cannot be taken to 
 guard against surprises. The officer who permits him- 
 
S82 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 self to be surprised is entirely inexcusable ; lie should 
 always take it for granted that the posts in front of 
 him are negligent, or may be captured bj the enemy, 
 and his arrangements should be made accordingly. 
 
 When the sentinels give notice of the approach of 
 the enemy and see him coming, they fall back upon 
 their respective posts, then upon the grand guards ; 
 and the latter, after ascertaining the exact state of af- 
 fairs, and that a serious attack is made, retire towards 
 the pickets, skirmishing as they go. The pickets send 
 supports to the grand guards ; receive them when 
 they come in ; fight, if it is necessary to hold their 
 positions ; or fall back slowly upon the main body. 
 
 At night, the outposts are strengthened, in order to 
 increase the number of sentinels. If the country is 
 wooded and favors surprises, the sentinels are drawn 
 in nearer their outposts at nightfall, in order to avoid 
 risk of being carried off. By taking their places at 
 the bottom of the hills, whose tops they may have 
 occupied during the day, they have a better chance 
 of seeing an approaching enemy. 
 
 When the same points are occupied for several 
 days, it is a good plan to fortify them, either by throw- 
 ing up earthworks or by using abatis. 
 
 No one should leave the outposts. Houses should 
 be occupied neither by officers nor men. The men 
 should never take off their clothes or accoutrements. 
 Not more than half the men should sit down or rest 
 at the same time, the remainder being on the lookout. 
 
ADVANCED POSTS. 383 
 
 The outposts receive deserters, stop travellers and 
 inhabitants coming in, and question them. Their 
 reports are to be received with caution, as they are 
 often false and generally inaccurate. 
 
 Frequent patrols move about among the outposts, 
 called defensive patrols, to distinguish them from those 
 which are sent to the exterior, to greater 
 tances, to make some discovery. Defei 
 only intended to see that the sentiiij 
 and that the enemy does not slip inwiM^thi between 
 the posts : to perform this duty, a coi 
 or four men are sufficient. When a noise* 
 patrol is sent to discover the cause, as every little 
 thing may be an indication of the approach of the 
 enemy. A man is sent forward to reconnoitre, who 
 fires his piece if he sees the enemy. The corporal 
 causes his patrol to discharge their pieces, and they 
 all fall back towards the nearest sentinel. If the 
 ground is very obstructed or covered, the men of the 
 patrol are separated, in order to examine the ground 
 more thoroughly ; but usually they keep together. 
 The patrol should follow the direction marked out for 
 it, be perfectly silent, march slowly, halt often and 
 listen, avoid rattling the arms, must not smoke. If a 
 sentinel is found neglectful of his duty, the patrol 
 halts and a man is sent to give notice at the outpost; 
 it will only move forward when the sentinel has been 
 replaced. 
 
 Near dawn, patrols should be sent out more fre- 
 
384 PRINCIPLES OF STEATEGY. 
 
 quently, because this is the time to expect the enemy. 
 A patrol is sometimes replaced by an intelligent 
 soldier, who makes the rounds of the sentinels, to 
 keep them on the alert. 
 
 Art. IT. Laying out Camps. 
 
 In establishing a camp, either tents, barracks, or 
 branches of trees may be employed in giving shelter, 
 depending upon the means at hand and the duration 
 of the encampment. A camp should always be 
 located upon military considerations, regard being 
 also had to the health of men arid animals. It should 
 be near wood and water, but far from swamps, which 
 breed fatal fevers. In a military point of view, a 
 camp should overlook the surrounding country, or at 
 least not be overlooked, and the wings should be 
 rested upon natural obstacles. If a river flows in 
 front, at such a distance as to permit the army to 
 be assembled and manoeuvred, so much the better. 
 The rear should be open, and present one or more 
 good woods, by which a retreat may be effected if 
 necessary. 
 
 The position of a camp seems to be therefore essen- 
 tially defensive. Hence come the measures for its 
 safety; all the avenues to the camp from the front, 
 flanks, and rear should be held by detachments ; the 
 bridges should be particularly guarded and covered 
 by mtrenchinents, fords watched and defiles occupied. 
 
LAYING OUT CAMPS. 385 
 
 Besides these detachments, which may sometimes be 
 at a considerable distance, the camp should be imme- 
 diately surrounded by guards occupying lines parallel 
 to the front, flanks, and rear, at a distance of one or 
 two hundred yards. To avoid surprise, the guards 
 may construct small defensive works, which will 
 enable them to repel a charge of cavalry, or even to 
 resist for some time the attack of superior forces of 
 infantry. These works may be very rapidly con- 
 structed (See Figure 29), in which the unit of measure 
 is the yard. If the exact form shown cannot be 
 given, at any rate a mound of earth can be thrown 
 up, three or four feet high. 
 
 The work may be in the form of a redan or lunette, 
 only large enough to contain the guard when under 
 arms. A yard along the parapet is the allowance 
 for each man. The work is closed at the gorge 
 by a small trench and bank of earth. Sometime? 
 abatis may be substituted for the earthwork. 
 
 f 
 
 $. 5o 
 
 Fig. 29. 
 
 The front of the camp should be as great as that 
 of the troops in line of battle, not only for the whole 
 mass, but for each battalion, &c. The artillery camps 
 17 
 
386 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 are usually in rear of the infantry. As far as possible, 
 the camp of the infantry and cavalry should form a 
 single line, the cavalry being on the wings. The 
 lines of the carnp of an army should be regulated by 
 the ground, in the same way as an order of battle. 
 When the army is formed in two lines, there are two 
 camps, one before the other. The reserve has its 
 own. The same rules are observed in each camp, as 
 if it were alone. 
 
 If a camp is to be occupied a long time, and may 
 be attacked, it should be fortified. It is better to 
 have the works that are built for its protection few 
 and strong, than many and weak. In an open and 
 level country, the cavalry should camp upon the 
 wings of the infantry, because that is their place in 
 line of battle ; but in a broken country, they would 
 form a second line behind the infantry ; they should 
 always take precautions to avoid sudden attack, as 
 some time is required to saddle the horses, &c. The 
 artillery park should also be in rear, as nothing is 
 more to be feared than a surprise of a park. When 
 there are no natural obstacles to cover the flanks of 
 the camp, brigades or divisions may be placed in 
 camps on the flanks, perpendicular to the general line. 
 Sometimes, when attack may be also expected in 
 rear, the second line may turn its color fronts to the 
 rear, and thus a large square or rectangle be formed. 
 
 It is better, for several reasons, to put soldiers in 
 huts than in tents : 1st, no transportation is required 
 
BIVOUACS. 387 
 
 for them; 2d, the huts are more healthy; 3d, the 
 construction of the huts gives occupation to the sol- 
 diers and develops their intelligence. The general 
 arrangement of a camp of huts should be the same 
 as for tents. 
 
 Art. V. Bivouacg. 
 
 When the troops cannot be regularly established in 
 camp, but still must be kept together, they are placed 
 m bivouac. In bivouac, as in camp, each body of 
 troops should be placed as in the order of battle. 
 
 A regiment of cavalry being in order of battle, in 
 rear of the ground to be occupied, is broken by 
 platoons to the right. The horses of each platoon 
 are placed in a single row, and fastened to pickets 
 planted firmly in the ground ; near the enemy, they 
 remain saddled all night, with girths slackened. The 
 arms are at first stacked in rear of each row of 
 horses; the sabres, with the bridles hung on them, 
 are placed against the stacks. The forage is placed 
 on the right of each row of horses. Two stable- 
 guards for each platoon watch the horses. 
 
 A fire for each platoon is made near the color line, 
 twenty paces to the left of the row of horses. A 
 shelter is made for the men around the fire, if possi- 
 ble, and each man then places his arras and bridle 
 against the shelter. The fires and shelter for the 
 officers are placed in rear of the line of those for the 
 
3S8 nilNCII'LES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 men. The interval between the shelters should be 
 such that the platoons can take up a line of battle 
 freely to the front or rear. 
 
 The interval between the squadrons must be with- 
 out obstruction throughout the whole depth of the 
 bivouac. The distance from the enemy decides the 
 manner in which the horses are fed and led to water. 
 "When it is permitted to unsaddle, the saddles are 
 placed in the rear of the horses. 
 
 For infantry, the h'res are made in rear of the 
 color line, on the ground that would be occupied by 
 the tents in camp. The companies are placed around 
 them, and, if possible, construct shelters. When 
 liable to surprise, the infantry should stand to arms at 
 daybreak, and the cavalry mount, until the return of 
 the reconnoitring parties. If the arms are to be 
 taken apart to clean, it must be done by detach- 
 ments, successively. 
 
 The artillery can have no fixed rule for its bivouacs, 
 being obliged to suit itself to localities ; but, in every 
 case, the fires should not be near the park. The fol- 
 lowing is a good arrangement : 1st, a single row of 
 fires for cannoneers and drivers ; 2d, the horses in 
 four ranks ; 3d, the forage ; 4th, the pieces, caissons, 
 and wagons, parked in rear, in two ranks. The officers 
 have a fire to the front. 
 
CANTONMENTS. 389 
 
 Art. VI. Cantonments 
 
 In order to put troops in cantonments, they are 
 distributed in the villages of the country occupied by 
 them. "When an army is moving, it must be can- 
 toned, if at all, in the order in which it happens to 
 be, each corps using to the best advantage the villages, 
 hamlets, and farm-houses it occupies, all under the 
 direction and superintendence of the officers, in order 
 to avoid fighting among the men for the best quar- 
 ters. 
 
 If the army is to remain in the same position some 
 time, it may be more extended, in order to burden 
 the country less and make the soldiers more comforta- 
 ble. They are generally much crowded in cantoning 
 on a march. This distribution of the troops among 
 the villages and hamlets of a country demands much 
 care and attention from the staff officers, who have 
 the duty to perform, in order that the men may be 
 securely and conveniently lodged, and that they may 
 be uniformly distributed among the people in propor- 
 tion to their ability to receive them. 
 
 Cantonments should, if possible, be established 
 behind a river, for the sake of greater security against 
 attack. This is particularly necessary for winter 
 quarters, which are generally more extended. The 
 different corps should be near enough for mutual sup- 
 
390 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 port. A place of assembly should be designated, in 
 view of the contingency of an attack. This point 
 should not be too near the enemy. 
 
 The different arms of the service should be so 
 cantoned as to afford mutual support. The artillery 
 is placed near the roads, so as to be able to move 
 rapidly wherever needed ; it should be, covered Lj 
 the infantry. The cavalry may be placed wherever 
 forage and water are most convenient, as the rapidity 
 of its motions enables it to reach the place of assem- 
 bly in time from any part of the cantonment. Care 
 must betaken, however, not to station it where it may 
 be easily surprised, as it is not so able to repel a sud- 
 den attack as infantry. 
 
 In each partial cantonment, there should be a place 
 for the troops to assemble at a given signal, and all 
 the usual precautions for safety should be taken. 
 Each battalion should have its place of assembly in 
 case of alarm, each brigade, each division, each army 
 corp, and finally the whole army. This final position 
 should be known to the commanders of divisions arid 
 even of brigades, to provide for the case of acciden- 
 tal separation from the divisions to which they belong. 
 
 The communication between the different places of 
 assembly should be free ; with this object, bridges 
 should be repaired, roads improved and newly 
 opened, if necessary. If a river passes through the 
 cantonment, it must be bridged ; and if there are 
 deep ravines, difficult of passage, roads must be made 
 
CANTONMENTS. 391 
 
 across them for artillery. When the cantonments 
 are not covered by an nnfordable river, it is well to 
 break up the roads by which the enemy can arrive, 
 and to construct abatis and field-works in the most 
 accessible places. A still better safeguard is great 
 vigilance upon the part of the advanced posts. Both 
 means should be used. 
 
 Generals should never leave their troops, but re- 
 main in their midst, in the most convenient place for 
 giving their orders. In 1094, Count Tilly was cap- 
 tured in a house where he was lodging, because a 
 marsh separated him from his troops. Such disgrace 
 is reserved for officers who prefer their comfort to 
 their safety. When troops bivouac, the generals 
 should bivouac with them ; their tents, if they have 
 them, should be kept for maps and papers which must 
 be used, and might be ruined by rain or dew ; but 
 they should sleep out with the men. The latter 
 should have no ground for complaining that they are 
 exposed to hardships and privations which are not 
 shared by their officers. This is especially necessary 
 with volunteers and militia. 
 
 The commanding general fixes the limits to be oc- 
 cupied by each corps, the commanders of corps dis- 
 tribute their own divisions, the generals of divisions 
 their brigades, &c. To make these distributions, 
 maps are required, and the more they are in detail the 
 better. After the first assignments are made, it 
 must be expected that many rectifications will be 
 
392 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 necessary. "When they are made, tables will be pre- 
 pared, showing in detail the positions of the different 
 bodies of troops. At the head-quarters of a division, 
 for example, there will be a table, embracing the fol- 
 lowing heads : Head-quarters of the division ; Head- 
 quarters of the brigades, battalions, isolated compa- 
 nies ; Places of assembly of brigades ; Place of assem- 
 bly of the division ; Remarks. So for other bodies, 
 whether larger or smaller. 
 
 There is often no time for the preparation of such 
 tables, w r here the distribution of the troops must be 
 made very rapidly, as, for example, in cantonments on 
 a march. In such a case, each brigade quartermas- 
 ter, accompanied by the battalion quartermasters and 
 an officer of each company, should precede the bri- 
 gade several hours, to prepare lodgings, the division 
 quartermaster having given general instructions to 
 the brigade quartermasters. To complete the subject, 
 there are given below some extracts from a circular 
 addressed to commanders of divisions, in anticipation 
 of a grand concentration of troops. It may be 
 modified to suit varying circumstances : 
 
 1st. The companies of the same battalion must be 
 always kept together, and, as far as practicable, the 
 battalions and regiments of the same brigade. 
 
 2d. The soldiers of the same company must be 
 lodged together by sections, or at least by half sec- 
 tions ; which will not prevent putting several sections 
 in a single house, if it affords room enough. 
 
CANTONMENTS. 393 
 
 3d. The commander of a battalion and his staff 
 should be placed as nearly as possible in the centre 
 of his battalion. 
 
 4th. The company officers should be lodged in the 
 same house with their men, or very near them. 
 
 5th. The drummers must be near head-quarters. 
 
 6th. Near the rallying place, there should always 
 be the police-guard. 
 
 7th. Barns are to be prepared as lodgings, and the 
 first floors of dwellings, the upper being left to the 
 inhabitants, unless there is great scarcity of room. 
 
 8th. The company officers in advance will mark 
 with chalk, upon the doors of barns and houses, the 
 letters of companies, and the number of men to be 
 received in them. 
 
 9th. When a room is six paces in width," soldiers 
 may be made to sleep in two rows ; but if the width 
 is less, in but one row. Each man is allowed the 
 breadth of a pace. Thus, a room twenty paces long 
 would accommodate forty men, if six paces or more 
 in width ; but only twenty men, if less than six paces in 
 width. 
 
 10th. The distribution of lodgings should com- 
 mence on the right of the village, looking towards 
 the enemy ; that is to say, the first company should 
 be placed on the right, and so on. 
 
 llth. The same rule should be followed if several 
 battalions are in the same village ; that is, the first 
 battalion should be on the right. 
 17* 
 
394 PKINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 12th. The non-commissioned officers will see that 
 arms and accoutrements are placed in order in the 
 several rooms, so that each man may easily lay his 
 hands upon his own, &c., &c. 
 
 During cantonments of some duration, efforts are 
 made to re-establish that perfect discipline and order 
 which are often much disturbed by a long and painful 
 campaign. During the same period, the cavalry is 
 remounted, the ranks filled up, the troops paid, 
 clothed, shod, and fully equipped in every way. In 
 marches in their own country, the troops live on what 
 they carry with them, and what may be procured for 
 distribution to them by the proper officers. In an 
 enemy's country, they may live on the product of 
 requisitions made upon the inhabitants. Those requi- 
 sitions should be regulated in amount by the ability 
 of the people to meet them and by the wants of the 
 troops, both present and prospective ; for it is always 
 well to have a supply of provisions for several days, 
 in order that the troops may not want the neces- 
 saries of life. These requisitions are renewed as the 
 army advances. But it is one of the most difficult 
 things to prevent the soldiers from wasting their 
 rations, when they have a supply issued for several 
 days at once. 
 
 Depots of supplies are also formed, from which the 
 troops may be subsisted during the operations of the 
 campaign, if the country through which they pass 
 cannot support them. If extended requisitions upon 
 
CANTONMENTS. 395 
 
 the country do not furnish sufficient supplies, more 
 must be purchased elsewhere, for money must be 
 expended to feed the men, who have, at best, to 
 undergo many privations and sufferings. 
 
 If the war is conducted upon proper principles, the 
 soldiers should never be permitted to seize food or 
 clothing for themselves. Every thing should come to 
 them through authorized officers, otherwise the war 
 will soon degenerate into wholesale pillaging. Un- 
 doubtedly, the men must not be permitted to starve 
 nor to suffer in an abundant country. The enemy 
 should be always made to bear, as far as possible, the 
 burden of the war. But, on the other hand, leav- 
 ing out of consideration the calls of humanity, 
 self-interest requires that the non-combatant inhabit- 
 ants of any country be treated in person and prop- 
 erty with as much consideration as possible. By 
 requiring an invaded country to furnish whatever sup- 
 plies it can, without causing starvation to innocent 
 non-combatants ; by exhibiting all the kindness and 
 humanity possible, consistently with firmness arid 
 justice, provision is made for the future, and especially 
 for the eventuality of a retrograde movement through 
 the same country. By treating the inhabitants with 
 justice and humanity, and giving them an equivalent 
 for their property, many friends are gained, or, at least, 
 their hostility diminished ; they will not fly at your 
 approach ; they will give you bread for money, and 
 give you shelter in their habitations. Act otherwise ; 
 
396 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 pillage, ravage the country ; force the timid non-com- 
 batants to flee for their lives ; march with the sword 
 in one hand and the fire-brand in the other; surround 
 yourself with ruins, make the country a desert, and in 
 a little while you may be yourself reduced to the direst 
 extremities. To-day you may be swimming in plenty, 
 and to-morrow enduring the pangs of want. I repeat 
 it ; require the inhabitants of a country to supply 
 your necessities, for this is the right of war; but use 
 this right with wise discretion. In this light must 
 we interpret the maxim of Cato War supports war. 
 
 THE END. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 ART. 1. Definitions 7 
 
 2. Bases of operations 11 
 
 3. Lines of operations 15 
 
 4. Strategic points 25 
 
 5. Plan of campaign 28 
 
 6. Plan of defence 35 
 
 7. Strategical operations 47 
 
 Forward movements. 49 
 
 Retreats 57 
 
 Diversions Combined marches Detachments 60 
 
 Pursuit 68 
 
 Holding a conquered country 71 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF ARMIES 
 
 ART. 1. Composition of an army 77 
 
 " 2. Formations of troops 89 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MARCHES AND MANfEUVRES. 
 
 ART. 1. Rules to be observed in marches 99 
 
 Scouting parties 108 
 
 Advanced guard Ill 
 
 Rear guard 120 
 
 Strength of a column on the march 121 
 
 u 2. Forward movements and the combats they lead to 122 
 
 Order of march of a division 122 
 
398 CONTENTS. 
 
 VAGB. 
 
 Art. 2. Forward movements and the combats they lead to 122 
 
 of bridges 131 
 
 of woods 135 
 
 Passage of rivers. 136 
 
 Arrival of the column in presence of the enemy . . . 138 
 
 3. Flank marches 141 
 
 4. Marches in retreat 147 
 
 Eear guard 149 
 
 Passing a bridge in retreat 151 
 
 5. The simultaneous movement of several columns 155 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 BATTLES. 
 
 Preliminary remarks 168 
 
 ART. 1. Definitions Orders of battle 170 
 
 Number of lines in order of battle 171 
 
 Reserve 172 
 
 Lines to be deployed or in columns 173 
 
 Divisions of a corps, how distributed 174 
 
 . Parallel order 175 
 
 Oblique order 176 
 
 Parallel order re-enforced 178 
 
 Continued order and order with intervals 179 
 
 Checker order 181 
 
 Crotchet to the rear 182 
 
 Crotchet to the front 183 
 
 " 2. Employment of the different arms 184 
 
 " 3. Offensive battles 190 
 
 The reconnoissance 190 
 
 Determination of the point of attack 191 
 
 Attack of heights 198 
 
 The enveloping attack 199 
 
 The flank attack 200 
 
 Attack upon the centre 204 
 
 Concentration 208 
 
 Example of attacking with a corps of four divisions. 208 
 
 Pursuits . 217 
 
CONTENTS. 390 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Art. 4. Defensive battles 220 
 
 Positions 220 
 
 Dispositions for the defensive 225 
 
 Squares 232 
 
 Defensive properties of ground 2,33 
 
 Use of fortifications 23G 
 
 Defensive manoeuvres 237 
 
 Retreat.. . 241 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 DEFENCE OF EIVERS AND MOUNTAINS COVERING A SIEGE. 
 
 ART. 1. Defence of rivers 248 
 
 Bridge-heads 250 
 
 Secondary means 254 
 
 Movements of troops 255 
 
 " 2. Defence of mountains 259 
 
 Artificial obstacles 201 
 
 Positions 262 
 
 Intrenchments 265 
 
 Movements of troops 266 
 
 Example 270 
 
 Communications 273 
 
 Summary 274 
 
 " 3. Covering a siege 274 
 
 CHAPTER YI. 
 
 COMBATS AND AFFAIRS. 
 
 ART. 1. Combats of infantry against infantry 281 
 
 In a plain 283 
 
 Upon heights 291 
 
 In woods 294 
 
 In inhabited places 297 
 
 -" 2. Cavalry against cavalry 3 ' 
 
 " 3. Cavalry against infantry 307 
 
 " 4. Combats of artillery 312 
 
400 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Art. 5. Attack and defence of a redoubt 316 
 
 " 6. Attack and defence of a strong dwelling-house with out- 
 buildings and enclosures, all of masonry 320 
 
 " 7. Attack and defence of a village 322 
 
 " 8. Observations upon manoeuvres 327 
 
 CHAPTER YII. 
 
 RECONNOISSANCES. 
 
 AET. 1. Armed reconnoissances 332 
 
 Secret " 338 
 
 Spies 345 
 
 " 2. Topographical reconnoissances 346 
 
 Itineraries . 358 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 SPECIAL MISSIONS, AND GIVING REST TO TROOPS. 
 
 ART. 1. Convoys 361 
 
 " 2. Ambuscades 372 
 
 " 3. Advanced posts 378 
 
 " 4. Laying out camps 384 
 
 " 5. Bivouacs 3B7 
 
 " 6. Cantonments . . .389 
 
 
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