OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR BY ROBERT WILDEN NEESER NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1915 COPYRIGHT, 1915. BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS Published March, 1015 PREFACE IP ever the navy of the United States needed the intelligent support of the American people, it is at the present moment. And it is fortunate that interest is now growing, and that a disposition on the part of our citizens to force action toward the meeting of the needs of the service is beginning to show itself. On one point there seems to be no difference of opinion that if we are to have a navy at all, it should be as efficient as it possibly can be made. We have to-day individual ships that are the ad- miration of foreign naval architects. We have officers and men on board of them that we believe are the equal of those in any other service. We have certain materials of war that are as good as those manufactured for other fleets. But what we have not appreciated is that efficient individual ships and efficient crews do not alone make a powerful navy. These units must be welded into an efficient whole by an organization and adminis- tration which co-ordinate their capabilities and direct their efforts toward a common end. 302358 vi PREFACE In building up our navy, the public mind has been centred too much on the power of the single ship. It has taken no account of all the various accessories essential to the maintenance of the fleet. In a recent article on the British navy, Ad- miral Lord Charles Beresford said: "We have had no naval war that threatened our existence for over a century. But if such a war had occurred any time in the last forty years preceding the creation of a war staff, our disorganization would have been complete. How in those years the navy ever carried out its duties without a war staff is a marvel; it could only have been done by the superb loyalty of those afloat, who have al- ways done their best and never allowed the word * impossible ' to exist. The Beresford committee of 1909 proved up to the hilt the unreadiness of the fleet if a sudden war had been declared. The creation of a war staff (as a result of the investi- gation) has removed this danger." In that same year, 1909, the President of the United States appointed a commission to con- sider the state of our own navy. The report of that board is strikingly similar to that of the Beres- ford committee. It revealed a condition that astounded even the service. But it accomplished nothing. For Congress refused to supply the remedy. PREFACE vii Fortunately the superb loyalty of our own officers and men, who " have always done their best and never allowed the word 'impossible' to exist," enabled our ships to carry on their work since then in a way that has, on many occasions, won the praise of foreign experts. In the face of a policy that threatened the very existence of the service, in spite of an unbalanced battle fleet, in spite of a serious shortage in its personnel, in the face of every discouragement, our officers and men have striven, and are still striving, for efficiency. But this goal will not be reached, nor even closely approached, until the doctrine is thoroughly understood that there must be an intelligent comprehension on the part of the gov- ernment of the purpose for which a navy exists. The people through their representatives that is, the government must encourage further the navy's legitimate efforts and fill its unquestioned military needs. They must develop a policy, free from any taint of partisan politics, that will se- cure the development of the navy in harmony with the purpose for which it exists. They must demand of the navy a policy, for which officers of the navy should be held to strict accountability, and must secure with equal loyalty plans in sup- port of that policy. Shall we continue to neglect our military needs and withhold that support which alone can supply viii PREFACE the dynamic force that will make of the fleet an efficient instrument capable of fulfilling the pur- pose for which it exists ? ROBERT W. NEESER. NEW YORK, March i, 1915. CONTENTS PACK PREFACE . v CHAPTER I. OUR SITUATION 3 II. OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION ... 13 III. MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION . . 32 IV. NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION ... 51 V. OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS . . 83 VI. OUR NAVAL REQUIREMENTS ... 98 VII. MILITARY POLICY 116 VIII. NAVAL POLICY 127 IX. NAVAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMIN- ISTRATION 146 X. THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE FLEET . 158 XI. THE PERSONNEL 166 XII. EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS . . . 174 ix x CONTENTS PAGE APPENDIX I THE REPORT OP THE GEN- ERAL BOARD 179 APPENDIX II THE REPORT OF BOARD ON INCREASED EFFICIENCY OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE NAVY 200 APPENDIX III THE PRICE OF UNPREPARED- NESS 204 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR "He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will. Whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits." BACON. CHAPTER I OUR SITUATION A NATION should develop its physical power for offense or defense in the same way that an individual keeps his body strong and healthy for his daily tasks. The nation is but an elaboration of the individual. Both are gov- erned by the same laws. Each is endowed with spiritual and physical attributes. The develop- ment of these is entirely in the hands of the na- tion or of the individual. A nation that develops its vital attributes but fails to develop its spiritual and physical attributes is in the class with an individual who has grown, through indolence and overfeeding, too obese to defend himself and too dull-witted to avoid his antagonist. It is strange but nevertheless true that the statesmen of our government have never been able to appreciate the true meaning of Clause- witz's philosophy that: "War is only a continu- ation, by other means, of national policy." War, by the statesman, must be considered as an in- strument of his nation's policy. If we accept the 3 4 OUR NAVT.AND THE NEXT WAR truth of this philosophy we are confronted with the conclusion that our statesmen in Washing- ton are directly responsible to the people for the preparedness of its armed forces. The na- tion's policies are in the keeping of its states- men. Such policies require, for their continu- ance, national force, both moral and physical. If the outside pressure against a just policy is strong, a greater national force must be exerted. National force is, in time of peace, diplomatic. Diplomatic notes, ententes, and understandings are the life-giving force behind a policy. When these have failed and the policy is vital to the welfare and progress of the nation, military force takes the place of diplomatic intercourse. Thus it is seen that the nation's policies become the starting-point in all calculations of war strength. The statesman must distinguish between those aims which his nation can abandon and those which are worth fighting for. The statesman must be a man of keen understanding, with a grasp of the fundamentals of history. He must study the history of those nations to which his own nation may, in the course of time, draw near in the field of competition, with danger of collision. Thus it becomes his duty to study the purpose and policy of those nations which may, in the course of their own expansion, challenge his poli- cies, and he must, therefore, understand the OUR SITUATION 5 methods that can be employed to assert his own government's purpose. Unhappily, in America, our statesmen have not reckoned with the necessity of maintaining behind our policies sufficient armed forces to per- petuate them. They seem to believe that if the nations of the world have given their tacit con- sent to our policies nothing more is necessary. They have been sustained in this method of diplomacy through the increasing acceptance of the principle of arbitration by the people of this nation, notwithstanding the fact that the causes of every one of our own great national struggles were such as to prohibit settlement by any other means than a resort to arms. But when this creation of man's credulity has failed, the nation will come face to face with a condi- tion from which there can be no turning. A policy vigorously challenged by another nation can be settled in two ways only: either by the abandonment of the policy, or else by a war to maintain it. There is no more despicable figure in history than the man who rushes his country into a war for which that nation is unprepared. A true statesman aims to harmonize the national policies with his country's readiness for war. He does not attempt to assert ideals which the armed forces of his country are incapable of defending. Under the moral code the true responsibility of a 6 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR nation is not for the preservation of peace, but for abstention from wrong, and it must be assumed among the civilized nations that each strives to be morally right in its dealings with others. Our national policies are held by the people of the United States to be morally right and necessary to the life and happiness of the people; yet, knowing this, we as a nation refuse to face the unpleasant realization that we may some day be called upon to engage in war in the defense of these policies. Those who champion the cause of arbitration and universal peace, believing that thereby they may cast off the burden of armaments, by so doing only bring the country they serve nearer to the very thing that they wish most to avoid; and when that hideous monster, War, is at hand, their country lies helpless before the nations that have prepared themselves for the fray. Can any man really believe that such policies as the Mon- roe Doctrine, the exclusion of Asiatics, and the guarantee of the neutrality of the Panama Canal can be enforced by a court of arbitration? Yet these three great policies of American di- plomacy are our policies of self-defense. They are the paper bulwarks behind which the Ameri- can nation defends its position and principles in the world of competing nations. Once this bar- rier is overthrown, the very life of the nation as OUR SITUATION 7 an independent and free people may cease to exist. Once the military nations of Europe or Asia have secured a foothold on the American continent, the United States will be forced to join the ranks of the military nations and, through a long, bloody, and exhausting war, hurl from the con- tinent those who have invaded the territories of our assumed overlordship. In all discussions over armaments in this coun- try nowhere do we hear the voice of the states- men. Their influence has been directed to the curtailment of our national defenses. How, then, can they acquit themselves before the nation when we are face to face with that final arbiter, war? These statesmen at the head of the gov- ernment cannot shirk the responsibility for the maintenance of an adequate force to insure vic- tory. A nation of 90,000,000 people, once set in motion against aggression, cannot easily be checked. That the nation is unprepared for war and that defeat is inevitable cannot be forced home after the patriotic fervor of a nation is aroused. The statesman who has forced the issue, regardless of the unpreparedness of his country, may well tremble and endeavor to avert the danger so near at hand; but his puny power is swept aside by the momentum of the outraged nation, and he can only impotently contemplate the unequal struggle for which he alone is to blame. 8 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR The only conclusion to be drawn is that the American nation to-day is sorely in need of states- men who have studied the problems of our na- tional existence and are able to apply to their solutions organized knowledge, which is the only basis of success in modern life. The nation's welfare must be intrusted to a continuing body of statesmen whom the nation can hold responsible. If we are to remain supreme in our territorial possessions, including the Panama Canal; if we are to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in spite of the cupidity of nations that are now ruthlessly sacrificing hundreds of thousands of their men on the battle-fields of Europe; if we are to exclude the Asiatic from our Pacific coast; if we are to insist upon the open door in China for our trade, then the statesmen of our nation must keep in closer touch with the preparedness for war of the two arms of our national forces. They must stand ready to go before the country and tell the people just which policies can be maintained and which policies must be abandoned. It is the statesmen, and not the military or naval men, who should be using their efforts to increase the power and efficiency of our nation for the coming struggle for the maintenance of our position in the world. In every civilized country the organization and application of its resources is the basis of success OUR SITUATION 9 in war. Resources, when stripped of all collateral elements, reduce down to men, material, and money. The organization of these is wholly within the province of the statesmen. In Section VIII of the Constitution of the United States the authority is vested in Congress to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy, and, further, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. Who else shall decide upon the size of the army and navy? If the army and navy are inadequate for the purpose of supporting the national policies, whom must the country hold responsible ? In time of war the civilian, as much as the sol- dier,' is responsible for defeat and disaster. Bat- tles are not lost on the field alone; they may be lost beneath the dome of the Capitol; they may be lost in the cabinet ; or they may be lost in the private office of the secretary of war or the secre- tary of the navy. But wherever they may be lost, it is our people who will suffer and our sol- diers patriotic citizens who will die, with a sudden, bitter knowledge that our military policy is a crime against life, a crime against property, and a crime against liberty. War affects the life, the liberty, and the prop- erty of every individual citizen. Beyond that, it imperils the life of the nation. On its issue io OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR necessarily depend the fate of governments and the happiness of human beings, present and future. The statesman should, therefore, con- sider it his duty to study peace and the causes which tend to preserve or destroy peace. History teaches us that peace ends in war. If the causes which terminate peace and produce war cannot be removed, and if the legislator does not recognize and know how to create a powerful army, he ceases to be a statesman. We thus see that we cannot divorce ourselves from the fact that national preparedness must remain in the keeping of the statesman that is, the representative of the individual and that it is the statesman whom the nation must hold re- sponsible for the development of its physical powers. It is idle, nay, useless, to base the size of armies and fleets upon local opinions. These instruments of diplomacy cannot be considered as benefits to a section of the country only. They are national instruments, to be used by the nation for the purpose of maintaining itself a free agent in the world of nations. That the Pacific coast or the Atlantic coast is not adequately prepared to repel an invader is not the care of the local politicians, but of the national statesmen. They must consider, in their demands for military force, the political situation of the entire country and its probable enemies. All decisions which a gov- OUR SITUATION n ernment is called upon to make are intimately connected, and in the relations between them is to be sought the continuity of design or unity of purpose, which are different names for a policy. The endeavors of local politicians to deter na- tional preparedness are the outcroppings of self- seeking in the nation. Their influence upon legislation is harmful, and their effect is to drag the national question of national defense into the arena of local party politics. A nation which becomes so absorbed in money- making pursuits as to neglect to take all those steps which are necessary to secure immunity from attack ceases to impose respect, and so comes to be looked upon as an easy prey. It is only by making costly sacrifices that a nation can earn peace. History shows full well that "HI fares the land, to hastening ills a prey, Where wealth accumulates and men decay." Our present lack of preparedness will force us into a slow and irregular transition to a war footing, exposing the country to the dangers of the defensive and the horrors of invasion. The real strength of a definite force depends upon the quality of its soldiers and its officers. Yet the United States has only one-tenth of one per cent of its men trained for war. It is, therefore, only one-tenth of one per cent strong. 12 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR In this agitation for naval and military pre- paredness the country should not make the mis- take of laying the blame upon the shoulders of the political party in power. We must remem- ber that the party of opposite beliefs, during a tenure in office of nearly a score of years, during which our military weaknesses were just as evi- dent as they are to-day, often did very little to remedy the defects. It is the duty of the party now in power, after it has seen the besetting dangers of the country's situation, to push reme- dial legislation. National defense should become a national issue. The party out of power, if it is unpatriotic, will grasp the opportunity of push- ing an advantage by declaring that the party in power is failing to provide for the nation's safety, saying nothing of the fact that itself, when in power, was as careless of the national needs. With national defense a party issue, those in power will try to hush things up and prevent a panic. The effect will be, as usual, to defeat the true ends of the nation. The nation should be sufficiently patriotic to agree that national defense is outside of party lines, and both parties should be willing to bring the search-light of public opinion to bear upon the country's needs and stand together to enforce the remedy. National defense is not a political issue; it is a personal issue. CHAPTER II OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION THE United States stands to-day as the great arbiter of the western hemisphere. It has expanded, by conquest and purchase, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Its northern border touches the frontier of Canada, its southern bound- ary is washed by the waters of the Rio Grande. Conquest has carried the American symbol of sovereignty into the waters of the Pacific to the very gateway of China. The Caribbean, once the spoil of European nations, now may be said to be almost Americanized by our acquisition of Puerto Rico, by our virtual political domination of these islands still under the rule of tropical races, and by our possession of the Canal route across the Isthmus of Panama, through which will soon pass the commerce of the world. We have, in our hands, the making of a great empire not an empire of kings, but an empire in whose womb lies the seed of the nation's funda- mental beliefs, recorded with such clearness in the Declaration of Independence. The power is 13 14 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR ours, if we are men enough to grasp it, to give to the great world over which our policies have flung their protecting arm those principles of social life to us now fundamental: "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights ; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights govern- ments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." The individual has no right to regard the state as a means for attaining his own ambitions. The nation owes a duty to posterity which can be per- formed only through the self-sacrifice of the na- tion to-day. The territories over which flies the American flag, and those territories over which our institutions have spread their protecting wing, are a legacy from the past. They were handed down to us, not to fritter away, but to develop and conserve. With the avowed object of safeguarding these principles of government to those over whom our nation has assumed the guardianship, we have laid down certain policies which other nations are called upon to respect. The most important of these is contained in the message which Presi- dent Monroe sent Congress in 1823, in which he said: "We owe it to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 15 those European powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." When we contemplate the great struggle of blood which is now going on in Europe, a struggle for survival, a struggle for domination, a struggle for conquest, where the wealth of entire nations is risked, can we still adhere to the belief that the mailed fist of some of those nations will not be stretched across the seas to grasp the vast resources, as yet untouched, in the countries to the south of us, from the Rio Grande to Terra del Fuego ? The limited boundaries of Europe have become too narrow to confine the people of strong and vigorous nations seeking expansion. Already those nations have peacefully penetrated into Mexico and Central and South America. Some of these nations have enunciated the principle that it is the duty of a state to make war to advance its own ideals and its own civilization. Upon the completion of this world war Europe will be even more of an armed camp. The devastation of war will have reduced the resources within their own borders. The rich countries beyond the seas, basking under the sunshine of peace, will offer them alluring inducements to sweep away that doctrine which has been so long distasteful. 16 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR Whether this happens or not will depend only upon our power to prevent it. That power will rest with our naval and military forces. If they are weak and incapable of maintaining the Mon- roe Doctrine, then that doctrine will pass into the unknown. The integrity and neutrality of the Panama Canal will, of necessity, suffer the same fate as the Monroe Doctrine, and, unless we are prepared to defend our' position in the world, we shall all see the day when the fruits of Ameri- can labor, enterprise, and ingenuity will be con- trolled and administered by a foreign nation. Our colonial possessions and our control over the weak republics of the Caribbean will pass from us because we shall have demonstrated our un- fitness to control their destinies. Our trade with the Orient, even that with South America, will be paralyzed through hostile tariffs. Our own shores may feel the iron tread of the invader, and our cities may suffer destruction. It is a misconception entirely unsupported by history that nations, at the end of a great war, are exhausted. We have only to look to the con- dition of Germany after her war with France in 1870 and to the military strength of the United States after the four long years of the Civil War. In 1865 the United States had a trained army of a million men. Those men were warriors with fighting blood in their veins. Their love of coun- OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 17 try was high above the mere lust for gold. We had great men and tried leaders men trained on the battle-field. But wherein lie our dangers, and how can they be met ? The nearest and most important danger is in the Pacific. By our own hand we freed Japan from the isolation of centuries of seclusion into a nation fully armed and equipped with that military spirit of which we, as a nation, are so lacking. The rapid assimilation of Western ideas and the successful appropriation of all the mate- rial elements of our Christian civilization by that island empire have astounded the world. Within the last decade Japan has emerged conqueror from the struggle of two modern wars. The growth of the Japanese naval power must cause us to look to the efficiency of our navy, for the interests of Japan and those of the United States are, in some quarters, diametrically op- posed. Japan, at first friendly, has suddenly changed her attitude in the tone of her diplomatic intercourse to one not as amicable. I Nations are no more mindful of past favors than are indi- viduals. Friendship between nations cannot al- ways stand the strain of a conflict of interests. A peaceful conquest of China, and the domina- tion of its markets is apparently Japan's aim peaceful if possible, but by force if necessary. During the present war Japan has seized the 1 8 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR islands that belonged to Germany, lying at the door of our own islands in the Pacific. These new possessions of Japan threaten, if they do not sever, the lines of communication to our own colonies. The occupation of Kiauchau by Japan is only another step in that domination of China which the Japanese statesmen have long in- tended. 1 An antipathy between races is not itself a cause of war. The true causes of war between nations have their roots in trade rivalry and in the necessity for an expansion of territory for the surplus population of a vigorous race; yet race antipathy in the Pacific contains germs of possi- ble danger. The exclusion of Japanese from our country might be used by Japan as a casus belli. However, the underlying cause of a war between the United States and Japan would not be for the settlement of such a trivial matter. The true reason would be to enforce the Japanese " Monroe Doctrine" and cause the United States to evacu- ate her commanding positions in the Pacific. The Japanese question may be definitely settled by liberating the Philippines and Guam and retiring from the Orient; but in the event of such an ac- 1 It is interesting to note that Japan's ultimatum to the Germans at Kiauchau was the identical one which the Germans had pre- sented to the Japanese after the latter had won Port Arthur from the Chinese. Thus does the Oriental know how to bide his time. OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 19 tion the United States must also give up its naval bases in those islands. 1 There are now only two great powers that can enter into a war for the supremacy of the Pacific; they are the United States and Japan. Japan's advantage in such a struggle is mainly due to the fact that her entire empire is not only on that ocean, but in the strategic centre of its western border. Until the day when Japan has succeeded in closing the ports of China to the commerce of all other countries by hostile tariffs, our commerce will seek to compete for its share in the trade of the Flowery Kingdom. That trade, once large, is dwindling year by year. American goods are being forced out of the Chinese market by similar articles manufactured more cheaply in Japan. To regain that trade is impossible unless greater aid is given by our government. No country can ever win the trade of the Orient that does not make it a national concern. As long as Japan is engaged in a commercial penetration of China she may not yet divert her attention to a further development of the islands lying south of her. Japan, like Germany, is dominated by the military spirit, which accepts 1 So far as the Philippines are concerned, we must either abandon them or else provide ample means for their defense. JThere is no tcrtium quid. 20 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR as fundamental the biological necessity of war and the duty of self-assertion. Such a nation of warriors will not hesitate to follow through its carefully worked-out plan of national expansion, even though it encounters a nation of double the population and treble the resources. Within the last few years the contact with Western civili- zation has had a marked effect upon the Japanese people. Their character is undergoing a change. They are losing their military spirit and becom- ing more wedded to commercialism. This fact has been deplored by their statesmen, who were born and trained under the precepts of Bushido, "the soul of Japan." Thus we see that in owning islands at her very doors there will be many points of possible con- tact with this military nation of the Pacific. It, therefore, becomes our duty to prepare our armed forces in the event that we may be called upon to use them, not for aggressive action, but to maintain our dignity in the Orient. In the Atlantic our Monroe Doctrine has ever been distasteful to Germany. For years she has been colonizing Brazil until now she has there a population of over a million Germans. Whoever is the victor in the present war in Europe, the spirit of the German nation cannot long remain subdued. Even if defeated, it will rise up stronger than ever, with its convictions as solidly implanted OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 21 as before the war. Germany is one of the world's greatest manufacturing peoples. She requires colonies to supply the raw materials and food- stuffs needed in the Vaterland and colonies wherein to open a field of activity for the im- mense intellectual labor forces now lying unpro- ductive in Germany. Furthermore, Germany requires, for the protection of her trade, a base in the Caribbean. She has already entered into negotiations with several of the minor independent governments bordering on that sea for the ac- quisition of such harbors for commercial pur- poses. Will not the occupation of such harbors, even for commercial reasons, be considered by the United States as a step toward a more general occupation later on, and would it not be resisted ? If Germany should be victorious in the struggle in Europe, which is not beyond the realms of possibility if Germany were to wrest the com- mand of the sea from England then our states- men will have to consider the question of the application and limits of the Monroe Doctrine. If we are willing to engage in a war with Germany, which would probably be a naval war, at least at first, it is doubtful whether we could protect our interests in the Caribbean and in South America. The movement of a fleet across the Atlantic would not be a difficult task for her. It is one that the German general staff has already worked 22 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR out to the minutest detail. She would have all those difficulties of long lines of communication for the transportation of supplies from her home bases to her fleet that the United States would have if it attempted to move its fleet for hostile purposes across the Pacific; but those are diffi- culties that German national efficiency, as re- flected in her army and navy, can much more easily overcome. While we should be engaged with Germany in the Atlantic, Japan, no longer under the influence of English politics, could work her will in the Pacific. All our island possessions would fall be- fore her forces. America would be driven in be- hind her own original borders. The United States has long enjoyed immunity from the interference of Europe and Asia in its political affairs. This immunity has been due largely to the policy of Great Britain. Through the powerful sentiment of the blood-tie between England and the United States the former has been able to further its purposes on the American continent without seriously alienating the friend- ship of the great republic. As long as England was able to thwart Germany in her colonization schemes she was content to tolerate the rivalry of America and willingly granted her moral sup- port to our Monroe Doctrine, while through her alliance with Japan she held the control over that OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 23 country's aspirations in the Pacific. With such a champion as England, our thoughts have naturally been turned away from the possible dangers to our interests in case the equilibrium of forces in the world should become disturbed. We have, in fact, reasoned, as a matter of course, that this equilibrium would always be maintained and that the United States would never be re- quired to exert any effort to this end. This idea, to the American nation, has become an obses- sion. But the equilibrium is now about to be disturbed. The present struggle in Europe can- not bring about any other result. Either Ger- many will emerge vanquished or England will surrender the command of the sea to Germany. Whichever happens, it matters not which, the time has now arrived for the people of the United States to awaken and realize the besetting dangers surrounding them. Let us stop and consider the characteristics and attributes of this military power in the Pacific. Japanese militarism is, perhaps, difficult to separate from patriotism. One is simply the expression of the other. The organized strength and patriotism of Japan is her defense. Every Japanese considers it a privilege rather than a mere duty to serve in the army. Under her efficient form of government the strength and efficiency of the army and navy have kept pace 24 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR with the nation's commercial and industrial prog- ress. The well-ordered organizations of her gov- ernment and of her military services are funda- mentally sound. No conflicting lines of authority or responsibility are permitted to exist. There- fore the greatest efficiency has been realized with the money appropriated. Her military and naval development has been guided by military states- men and executed by military and naval men. The size and power of her army and navy is based upon a definite national policy. In efficiency and strength both military services have thus far re- mained outside of politics. High command has gone to those who have demonstrated their abil- ity in active service in war and peace. Such well- ordered methods have given to the personnel the precious qualities so vital to successful cohesion. The Japanese nation is united. Her navy has been trained in the school of war. Her position in the Pacific and her instant preparedness give her the advantage of initiative. She owns no outlying possessions which might, if captured by us, seriously affect the issue, while we have many such possessions lying defenseless within her sphere of operations. Her large and well-organized army can be utilized to occupy as many of our possessions as she will deem advisable in order to deny them to our fleet. With all possible available bases in the hands of the Japanese, our OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 25 fleet will have no base near enough to the Japa- nese coast from which it could operate in order to control the seas in that area. Yet it is only by controlling the seas that we can hope to succeed in a war with Japan. In the event of hostilities in the far East, then, the first decision that will have to be made by our statesmen will be: How shall we bring the war to a successful conclusion ? Hawaii will be our only remaining island possession in the Pa- cific. With the fleet at Hawaii, and with Japan controlling the waters of the far East how shall we operate to bring her to terms? This is a question that would have to be decided by our naval general staff, if one existed. A study of the history of the conflicts in which great nations have engaged reveals two underlying causes of war: one is the control of commerce; the other is the possession of the sources of those two great industrial necessities metal and fuel. But the prime factor involved in the evolution of a navy is the protection of trade, for the safe- guarding of which the laws of nations should be framed so as to give every confidence to those embarking on commercial ventures across the seas. In other words, a government should protect its commerce as if it were its own enterprise. In an- cient times commerce was exposed to great risks, subject to constant pillage, and hunted down in 26 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR peace as well as in war. Nations, therefore, ap- preciated the necessity of protecting their mer- chantmen, and commerce became an armed force in the world. Even the purely commercial states became armed powers for the protection of their trade routes. But, curiously enough, the great political em- pires of the world formerly imperfectly developed their own industries and had little sympathy with any means of prosperity from without. Their sole aim was either to absorb under their own power- ful sceptre or else to destroy whatever was rich or great beyond their borders. Nothing is more marked in the early history of the world than this struggle of commerce to obtain security. The strength of Rome lay in her legions; that of Carthage in her ships. Carthage became the greatest power in the Mediterranean and inherited the trade of her Phoenician ancestors, and also the trade of Egypt, Greece, and Asia Minor. But antagonism between the great military non-com- mercial power of Rome and the great military commercial power of Carthage, whose interests crossed at so many points, caused the downfall of Carthage and her destruction. At the same time Rome accomplished the destruction of another great trade centre of which she was jealous, Corinth. Palmyra likewise fell half a century after the spoliation of Athens. And this policy OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 27 of Rome, of wiping out all the outlying centres of trade, eventually caused her own downfall, be- cause it hampered her own power to hold or turn to profitable account these valuable con- quests. Rome never became a great trade centre, al- though the city grew to great size and required immense imports of food to support its popula- tion. These imports came in the nature of taxes. For Rome neither supplied exports nor built up a carrying trade. Her contribution to civilization was her organization and her administration. Her service to humanity was, therefore, political and non-economic in character. In the arts and in diplomacy her citizens excelled, and through their skill in these they succeeded in living on the labor of subject people. The "Pax Romana" was the commodity which Rome exchanged for these con- tributions. By many the analogy between England and Rome is considered noteworthy. England is the Rome of to-day, but, unlike Rome, she herself is a great maritime nation a military one on the seas. Her geographical position was believed by her statesmen not to require a great army. Eng- land spread her civilization over the other conti- nents, as did Rome. England has organized the world's commerce and by so doing has given enormous impulses to the manufacturing indus- 28 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR tries. But a nation, having fulfilled its mission in civilization and reached the zenith of its power, will decline. This is the law of nature. Germany and the United States, and possibly Japan, are the modern Carthage, Athens, and Venice. There- fore, if England is to remain predominant these commercial powers must be controlled. Even now England employs in her industrial life many Germans and Americans, because they are more efficient, reliable, and painstaking than English- men. And for the maintenance of her enormous commerce England, to-day, is indebted to the volume of American and German trade. The rapid rise of the economic power of Ger- many has shaken England's faith in her own pre- dominance. She fears the loss of her naval su- premacy and of her control over the commerce of the world. Her policy has been to restrict Germany's colonial expansion, for she fears the rivalry of a more efficient race. Yet her fear of Germany is not half so great as her fear of America. Her statesmen see the importance of first settling with Germany before the United States waxes stronger. Once the German fleet has been annihilated, then the suppression of po- tential American ambitions will be immeasurably easier. So long as the German fleet is a force to be reckoned with, England dare not show her cloven hoof to the United States. Great Britain OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 29 must sacrifice every consideration for the main- tenance of her naval supremacy. In 1860 the United States owned 5,000,000 tons of shipping, England only 4,000,000. The United States at the outbreak of the Civil War was in a position to control the carrying trade of the world. The action of England in supporting the Con- federacy and desiring their independence was logical and necessary were she to remain the mis- tress of the sea. Much of the shipping of the United States was destroyed by war-ships fitted out by the Confederates in English ports; and when the Civil War was over, England's carrying trade totalled 6,000,000 tons, while that of the United States amounted to only 4,000,000, and was rapidly on the decline. In 1873 England owned 43 per cent of the mer- chant carrying trade of the world. The United States owned 14 per cent, and Germany 6 per cent. In 1914 England owned 53 per cent, the United States 9 per cent, and Germany 13 per cent. England's vital interest in the rebating of tolls to our coastwise shipping through the Canal is evident to all students of her commercial history. Even without rebating, the ship-build- ing industry in the United States will increase. There will, therefore, be a cut in England's carry- ing trade, for some of our trade that is now carried in English bottoms will be carried under our own 30 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR flag. With the United States and Germany cut- ting into her 53 per cent, England fears she will lose her advantage. We have seen wherein lie possible points of con- tact between the United States and the three great military nations that are each determined to secure its proportion of the world's commerce, and more than its proportion if possible. Be- tween these four nations England, Germany, Japan, and the United States the bulk of the commerce of the world is divided. Where is the power capable of limiting the share of each? There is but one power capable of accomplishing this. That is the power of diplomacy backed by force, or, in other words, the power of national efficiency. It is not too much to believe that in the struggle for commercial supremacy England will use every tool within her power to maintain her position. It is not too much to believe that England, some- time in the near future, may employ the military power of her ally Japan for the purpose of eliminating one of her competitors. We have reason to believe that, thus far, England has pro- tected us from the military aggression of Japan. There is a report that in 1907 the Japanese mili- tary party had actually ordered operations against the United States which contemplated nothing less than the occupation of the Philippine Islands. OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION 31 It has been said that troops were already on board the transports, and that these vessels were loaded and ready to sail at a moment's notice. Eng- land's veto alone stopped this movement. She was not ready to see America involved in a struggle with her ally, for America's trade was still carried in British bottoms. How will she act after our merchant flag again covers the seas ? America is too prone to confound military re- sources with military strength. Military resources comprise the wealth of the nation, the number of able-bodied men of military age, and the num- ber of ships available for war. Military strength, on the other hand, is measured by the number of trained soldiers properly organized and equipped that may be brought to a given point at a given time, and the number of war-ships fully manned and trained that can be quickly concentrated for the purpose of meeting the enemy's fleet. Let us remember that in 1900 China had a population estimated at over 400,000,000. Yet her military strength was so inadequate that she was unable to prevent 15,000 foreign troops of Europe, Asia, and America from marching ninety miles inland, capturing her capital, and dictating terms of peace humiliating to every inhabitant of the Middle Kingdom from within the very walls of her Forbidden City. CHAPTER III MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION IT is easily within the reach of every citizen to discover the failure of our military policy. Our military writers have eloquently con- demned it. General Washington, in his corres- pondence, dispassionately set forth its evils. It is unfortunately the popular impression that our people acquitted themselves creditably as a nation during the war of the Revolution, and it comes as a shock to know that such was not the case. Even with our country fanned to flame by the invasion by British troops it was difficult, almost impossible, for us to raise men to repel the enemy. Fortunately there were plenty of trained officers who volunteered their swords, and these were influential enough in their communities to enroll volunteers. In the first skirmishes of the war, notably at Bunker Hill, such veterans as Prescott, Putnam, Stark, and Knowlton were a strong factor in the behavior of the minutemen. But there were many occasions when, even when commanded by experienced leaders, our militia acquitted themselves none too well. 32 MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 33 At this time the nation was a loosely knit con- federation, an assemblage of small nations, each sufficient unto itself and jealous of all the rest. Congress called upon the colonies to furnish troops. Those that did not feel the effects of the war in some cases refused to obey; the others grudgingly sent men, but far less than the numbers needed. The necessity of a force owing allegiance to the United States exclusively, consequently became imperative, and Congress fortunately heeded the timely advice and ordered the raising of Continental troops in certain States near the points of invasion. It was a small beginning, but this handful of regularly enlisted troops formed the nucleus of the army which finally won us our independence. Washington, who had the power of appointing officers, at times was greatly discouraged at the unpatriotic attitude of those who sent in their names. Companies enlisted in one State refused to serve under officers from another State. "Many of the officers," he wrote, "sent in their names to serve in expectation of promotion; others stood aloof to see what advantage they could make for themselves, while a number who had declined have again sent in their names to serve. So great has the confusion arising from these and many other perplexing circumstances been, that I found it absolutely impossible to fix 34 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR this very interesting business exactly on the plan resolved on in the conference. The difficulty with the soldiers is as great, indeed more so, if possible, than with the officers. They will not enlist unless they know their colonel, lieutenant- colonel, major, and captain, so that it was neces- sary to fix the officers the first thing, which is, at last, in some manner done, and I have given out enlisting orders." So discouraged was Washington at the failure of his countrymen that he later added: " There must be some other stimulus besides love of coun- try, to make men fond of the service. Instead of pressing to be engaged in the cause of their coun- try, which I vainly flattered myself would be the case, I find we are likely to be deserted in a most critical time. Those that have enlisted must have a furlough. The Connecticut troops, upon whom I reckoned, are as backward, indeed, if possible, more so than the people of this (Massa- chusetts) colony. Our situation is truly alarming. ' ' Again, in a private letter to a friend he unbur- dens his heart more completely. "Such a dearth of public spirit and such want of virtue, such stock- jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another in this great change of military arrangement I never saw be- fore, and pray God's mercy that I may never be witness to again." MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 35 But there were so many desertions that it was almost impossible for Washington and his officers to hold the men. Any system of voluntary en- listment necessarily places a government in the position of a suppliant, and when patriotism and popular enthusiasm no longer suffice to fill the ranks, resort must be had to the vicious practice of giving bounties to recruits. And that system has been found necessary in almost all of our military operations. If we read the true military history of our coun- try, and not the highly colored accounts written for the school-reading of our children, we shall learn some startling facts of the disastrous effects of our past military policy. We shall find out that at no time during the Revolutionary War did we have sufficient dependable troops. After five years* experience, Washington, in a letter to Congress, expressed his opinion of our policy in these words: "Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the 36 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR ordinary guards, liable at any moment to be dis- sipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at Brandywine, with an un- equal number of raw troops, and afterward of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to the victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, desti- tute of everything, in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found our- selves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring fre- quently the mortification of seeing inviting op- portunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity from the same cause." Such were Washington's thoughts on our mill- MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 37 tary policy; on the value of raw recruits; on the value of undisciplined men ; on the value of the pa- triotism of our people. Since then has that value increased ? Has it not, on the contrary, lessened ? Even with our vast numbers, are we not worse off to-day because we shall have pitted against us a military force increased in like proportions to our great increase in population ? Our small army cannot furnish a sufficient nucleus of trained troops. The great disorganization and inex- perience so eloquently condemned by Washington will be magnified many times to-day, for the fibre of the nation has degenerated since the days of '76. A truly dispassionate investigation of our other foreign wars, and of our Civil War, will disclose almost identical defects in policy. Tracing nearly all of our sacrifices to the want of a military system in our Civil War, and the abortive strategy of the War Department, General Upton laid down the axiom: "that a nation which goes to war unpre- pared educates its statesmen at more expense than its soldiers." The strategy of the Civil War was decided by civilians who feared the power of a dictator, not realizing that, while armies are cre- ated by war, dictators are born only of disaster. Washington was not made a dictator until disaster overtook us. Yet this fear of a dictator induced us, during the Civil War, to dispense with our general-in-chief after our armies had been disci- 38 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR plined and drilled ready for battle, with the result that the conflict was prolonged for four years through defective strategy, the blame for which we must ascribe to the system of government, which, in every war since the adoption of the Constitution and during the intervals of peace, has permitted a civil officer below the President to override our military leaders and bring to naught their wisdom and counsel. Is it not time that we recognize the moral duty of the State to train as many of its citizens as possible in the use of arms ? Such training is not only in preparation for war but also in order that each individual may be benefited by a certain amount of military service which unquestionably improves his physical and moral stamina. It is far wiser yearly to spend sufficient funds for pur- poses of defense than to waste vast sums of money in futile attempts, at the last moment, to avoid a peril that has been disregarded during a generation of fundamental blunders. Military qualities are not second nature. As a nation the American people shun military service. The occupations of peace are more pleasing and less exacting than the duties of a soldier. The individual looks upon military service as one in which his individualism will be stifled. His in- tellect resists such repression. But military train- ing, on the ^contrary, has the opposite effect. MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 39 For it reveals to the recruit the true plane of the nation's welfare, which is materially higher than that of the individual himself. If this could only be recognized by our people, the American soldier's calling would be better understood and the uniform of the government's defenders would become to him a badge of honor rather than, what some consider it now, a livery of shame. Furthermore, our military system must be de- veloped. War is the means of obtaining political ends and of supporting the moral strength of a nation when those ends are contested by rival powers. Without the means of waging war the nation's moral strength rapidly degenerates. A large standing army is not essential if the citizens of the country are trained in the use of arms. All that is required is a workable military system by which we can concentrate at the point of attack a sufficiently trained force to repel an invader. Our permanent coast defenses are of no value against the attacks of a military nation unless we have sufficient trained men and modern arms to protect them. For the defense of every har- bor of importance on both our Pacific and At- lantic coasts Congress has provided land forts. These fortifications can prevent an enemy only from landing on our shores within the range of the fortifications' guns. Their guns deny to the enemy the facilities of a commodious harbor for 40 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR disembarking his troops until those guns have been silenced and captured. But recent wars have demonstrated that efficient military nations can disembark large armies even in localities where harbor facilities are not available. The United States, during the campaign of Santiago, when that harbor was denied us by Spanish guns, landed 15,000 soldiers on the open coast without a single casualty. A more military nation than ourselves can readily disembark several hundred thousand men beyond the range of our forts' guns and, if we lack a mobile army of trained men, can attack our big guns from the rear and in an incredibly short time reduce our fortifications and obtain command of our harbors for their own use. Expensive fortifications, unguarded by a mobile army are, therefore, in the light of the lessons of Liege and Maubeuge, a waste of the nation's money. A military nation such as Germany or Japan can, once our fleet has been destroyed or blockaded in port, throw a trained army upon our coast-line within two weeks of the commencement of hos- tilities. Even if it were possible to know the point of landing, and we had the time to concen- trate our entire regular force at that point, it would not be large enough or sufficiently equipped to stop the invader. The militia and State troops would be of no value to us until they had been MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 41 trained as soldiers. This would require many months. Great Britain is now suffering the pangs of remorse over her military unpreparedness. Millions of men are to-day being trained in Eng- land. If these men could have been despatched to the Continental battle-field in the first week of hostilities, the decisive battle of the war would have been fought long since, and successfully for England ! But the very men who should have been trained during peace in the use of arms ar- rived on the firing-line too late. To-day the United States is justified in devot- ing most of its energies to the increase of its naval power, for its fleet is now, as it was in 1812 and in 1898, the nation's first line of defense. But with our fleet weaker than our probable antago- nist's, should not our second line of defense be maintained at double strength? That second line comprises our land fortifications and our mobile army. We all understand the value of boundary fortifications. In following the great war in Europe, we have seen what great towers of strength they are when used legitimately to rest the flanks of an army. The incalculable value of the fortifications of Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort is apparent. Between these fortifica- tions the allied armies have been drawn up. The mobile army has saved the fortifications from de- struction, while the fortifications have supported 42 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR the most vulnerable points of attack. Forts and mobile armies are supplementary. Each is neces- sary to the other. In the same way, on our sea frontiers our armies must rest their flanks upon the fortifications which the enemy is bent upon capturing. The army protects that part of the fortifications in the rear beyond the arc of fire of the fort guns. The army drives back the enemy and holds it at such a distance that it cannot use heavy siege-guns for the reduction of the forts. If, after the close of the present European con- flict, a great military nation should emerge vic- torious and the policies of the victor conflicted with the policies of this republic, and if that nation invoked a war for the purpose of a settlement, on obtaining control of the seas, that nation could land, in the vicinity of New York, an army which, in two weeks or even less, would destroy our for- tifications and hold the city and its millions of citizens at its mercy. It is idle for us even to consider that our defense would be an insur- mountable obstacle to such a feat. Our raw re- serves, supported by the entire regular army, could not make a "war machine" hesitate a single moment in its stride. Like clockwork it would advance from its landing-place, sweeping away our puny opposition until its object was firmly within its grasp. The destruction of property entailed would amount to hundreds of millions, MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 43 and the indemnity levied would cripple the na- tion for years to come. The cost of a navy to make such a debacle impossible is a mere pittance compared to the great financial loss which would result from a catastrophe such as this. The loss to the country through indemnity, through loss by destruction, and loss by disloca- tion would amount to a figure beyond our com- prehension. In 1871 Germany exacted an in- demnity from France of $1,000,000,000 an amount sufficient to build fifty dreadnaughts. The loss by destruction from such a campaign in a populous locality like New York would amount in addition to even more than the indemnity paid by France. And the loss in trade and commerce (for from the day the invader's foot sullied our shores all business would stop) would amount to additional hundreds of millions. No military man of intelligence can refute the possibility of such a disaster. And this would be only part of the nation's losses. All of our coast cities could be as easily reduced, laid waste, or placed under tribute. Let us remember how, in 1814, the city of Washington was burned by a handful of British troops. All the patriotism of our colonial ancestors did not suffice to arrest the march of a few thousand regular British soldiers. Patriotism is a military asset only when it pro- duces trained soldiers for the nation's defense. 44 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR Knowing all this, we naturally ask ourselves what defect in our system permits us to remain so vulnerable. The answer is known already to every military student. It is the lack of sound mil- itary policy. The statesmen must hearken to the voice of the country's military experts. The statesmen must be prevented from frittering away the legacy which our ancestors have handed down to us. They must put away the confusions that waste human possibilities. Good intentions do not constitute a strong government, nor do they produce an efficient nation. The noblest senti- ments can never supply the want of soldiers. We must, each one of us, urge our statesmen to study the problems of national existence, and apply to their solution the organized knowledge of the mili- tary experts, which can be the only basis of suc- cess to the nation. The statesmen must recognize, in their diplomacy, the real strength of the mili- tary and naval arm of the nation. Universal military service in some form is the only way of saving the country from itself. In America the idea of patriotism is new, and has been shaken by the constant introduction of for- eign blood. This introduction of new blood is dangerous for countries which are not sufficiently strong to absorb it. The teaching of patriotism should be one of the fundamental points which the educators should insist upon thejnost. The MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 45 educators, especially those who teach the child, must always remember that it is patriotism that must dominate in order to inspire in the child a great admiration for his own country. We must insist that the teachers of our children do not ex- pound doctrines harmful to the nation. A teacher is free to be a peace man, an antimilitarist, or an antipatriot if he chooses, but at school he must be silent upon these subjects. If he re- fuses to be silent, he should be at once removed. The effect upon the masses of those who harp upon antimilitarism and antipatriotism is almost as disastrous to the nation as its effect upon the growing child. This Utopian dream of a world confederation and the banishment of national competition and war addresses itself to the in- stinctive reflexes of a man or woman, to the spirit of self-preservation not of the nation but of the individual. The proletariat, until it has been taught, cannot conceive of such an indefinite entity as a nation. If our teachers are allowed to instruct our children that defeat is of small in- terest to their future, and that to fight is not good for them personally, then they will no longer fight when the national safety is menaced. Those who teach the masses that the good of the indi- vidual is higher than the good of the nation teach a lesson of cowardice that introduces egotism. A nation can live only if its citizens possess ideas 46 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR in common, and the idea of patriotism is the most powerful one for cementing a people together. Militarism may be a relative evil. In its extreme it is dangerous and ruinous to resources, but there would be a still greater danger to the soul of the people if we attempted to repress patriot- ism. The police are very costly to maintain, yet no one talks of dispensing with them. Probably nothing at this moment is more dan- gerous to the future of America than the many speeches that are made by never-fight philan- thropists upon disarmament and universal peace. If we followed their advice our patriotism would be entirely destroyed. We should be left at the mercy of adversaries who have not disarmed. Let us rather wait before disarming until we know that we have no enemies in the world. Universal military training should have as its aim the development of moral qualities in the in- dividual such qualities as attention, reflection, judgment, and initiative. How seldom we find these qualities among our masses and yet how frequently they are encountered among those who, whatever their origin, have been trained as sol- diers or sailors! There are other qualities which military training can produce, the most important of which are submission to discipline, a spirit of solidarity, perseverance against difficulties, and a will to succeed. These qualities cannot be acquired MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 47 from books, but only from experience, and their development results only from their exercise. We obey the laws of the community because the strong arm of justice compels us to. As a nation we can do right only when the habit of doing right and avoiding wrong has been learned by the nation and becomes a subconscious act. By training the individual, by making him subcon- sciously choose the right, the nation composed of individuals will subconsciously act according to the principles of righteousness. Military train- ing will teach the individual to govern himself and have a respect for duty. This military training for the defense of the nation will create senti- ments in common and, above all, an ideal in com- mon. Moral rules will be appreciated and ad- mitted to be fundamental. A nation cannot build its hopes on reason. "Human reason has only served to build fragile edifices which fall in ruins before they are finished. It has built noth- ing solid, but has shaken everything. People who have trusted in reason believe no longer in their gods, in their traditions, or in their principles. They believe, to no greater extent, in their chiefs, and they overturn them as soon as they have ac- claimed them. Not possessing in any degree the direction of possibilities and realities, they live more and more in the unfeasible and the unreal, following continually delusive chimeras." How 48 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR strikingly this reminds us of our times! Popular heroes scarcely rise in prominence before they are overthrown. Of necessity, the ideal in whose defense a na- tion should exert itself is always a child of tradi- tion and never the offspring of will. An ideal cannot be created by human will, and we must accept it without argument. The idea of "coun- try" cannot be created by our wills, and we must accept it without argument. This idea of "coun- try" represents, with us, a heritage of sentiments, of traditions, of thoughts, of common interests. To cherish and defend this idea must be learned in our childhood. It is this idea in a nation that makes it strong, vigorous, progressive. Lacking this idea makes it weak, spineless, and leads to its destruction. The general indifference of our people toward national defense, the size and effectiveness of their army and navy, is the result of a blind confidence in fate, which the faulty training in the schools fosters. If the children of the nation could know that in every war in which the country has en- gaged our untrained soldiers broke and ran at almost the first shot, while our trained soldiers challenged the admiration of the world by their steadfast courage; if the children could be told that our wars have been enormously protracted by the lack of sufficient trained forces in the be- MILITARY PEACE PREPARATION 49 ginning to take the initiative; if it could be im- pressed upon them that hundreds of thousands of our women were made widows, and children or- phans, and that millions of men were crippled for life because they were sent to the battle-fields un- prepared, knowing nothing of what awaited them there, with officers as ignorant and incompetent in military duties as the soldiers themselves; if our children could be shown that $1,000,000 in preparation before any of our wars would have saved $50,000,000 later if all this could be done, then indifference to the nation's safety would immediately cease. Where is the historian who will write the real history of our past and point out to our children the lessons so bitterly forgotten by this nation? Who will tell them that the superb isolation which was once our protection is no more; that in these days of great fleets of swift merchantmen an army can be moved by sea even faster than by land, and that we owe our immunity from attack not to the enemy's fear of our latent strength but to the international jealousies and mutual dis- trust of those nations that desire to challenge our commercial supremacy and our political control over the American continent ? Who will tell our children that, despite arbitration treaties and treaties to gain time, some day, not far in the future, that challenge will come? The uni- So OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR versal law must be obeyed. Already Europe and Asia are hungry. If we are to maintain our posi- tion in the world and acquit ourselves with honor, it cannot be done by written peace doctrines or by training one-half of one per cent of our peo- ple to oppose millions of trained soldiers. Who, in the most forcible language that can be written, will tell our children to pluck from their hearts that deep-seated belief that somehow we could beat off any force that could be thrown against us? This faulty tradition held to so doggedly by the American nation will be its undoing if it be not eradicated from our national thought. CHAPTER IV NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION MODERN history has shown us the neces- sity for the instant preparedness not only of our land forces but also of our navy. How rapidly in these days of rapid transportation and of quick information a nation is hurried from the blessings of peace to the horrors of war the experience of the last few years has brought home. A nation is given no time to collect its fleet, to repair it, to dock its ships, to call in its reserves (if it has any), to fill up the complements of the personnel. 1 Time spent in placing in commission reserve ships is time lost. The opportunity for target practice and training is past. Even the time required to collect the necessary auxiliary 1 "We have no reserve and never have had one," the secretary of the navy recently wrote to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, in urging a small appropriation to perfect the organization of one. "We are turning out every year into civil life 3,000 to 4,000 highly trained men, who, if organized, would be ready on short notice to man our battleships, armored cruisers, and other naval vessels in reserve, and supplement the crews of the battleships of the fleet in case of war. No nation keeps in regular service in time of peace sufficient men to man all its fighting vessels, but there is none that Si 52 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR vessels, which our fleet now lacks, may not be given by a ready opponent. All these are peace preparations that should be attended to in ad- vance of the declaration of war. The fleet is an instrument that should always be ready. Its plans of campaign should be prepared and known to those of its officers upon whom the responsi- bility of success or failure in time of emergency rests. Its administration during peace is not, therefore, a civil concern but a military one. The disposition of the ships, their training, the times for their repairs and docking, or, more compre- hensively, the entire work of the fleet should, in consequence, be outlined and decided by the naval officers who will be called upon to fight it. From the beginning, one hundred and forty years ago, the navy has been the willing and faithful subordinate of the civil power and the indispensable instrument of the American people for carrying into effect their national policy as expressed by their chosen representatives in Con- does not provide for a trained reserve. The enlisted men of the navy have been for years urging upon Congress and the department the passage of legislation which will permit of their retirement upon graded rates of pay for certain periods of service. This measure will accomplish what they want and at the same time give the country a claim on their services as well as provide for the much-needed reserve." This recommendation, most fortunately, was favorably acted upon by Congress only a few days ago. NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 53 gress. That control of national policy lies in the hands of our statesmen. The fleet, with its ships and its bases, is the means to the end. Once the statesmen have invoked war to continue the policy of the government, they call upon the military to act. From that time forward an in- strument is called into the service of diplomacy which requires knowledge outside of the states- man's art. Its mastery requires a life study. The statesmen indicate the end to be attained that is a function of the State but the method of using that force to accomplish the end requires expert knowledge beyond the knowledge of the statesman. The statesmen continue to control the course of the war in so far as its development affects the nation's policies with the enemy or with other countries. They must stand ready to open negotiations whenever they feel that by so doing their country will be benefited. When- ever a statesman at the head of the administra- tion of our military departments assumes that his position gives him the right of making military decisions, he materially weakens the efficiency of that instrument of power which he should consider it his duty to increase. Even during the years of peace the same principles of conduct for the statesmen and civil administrators hold good. The creation of the instruments of force, their number and character, the location and 54 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR equipment of naval bases, the number of sailors required to man the fleet, the employment and training of the fleet, the military administration and up-keep of the fleet, together with all those things upon which the fleet is dependent all these are functions which the military must per- form. Untechnical civilian influence over any of these functions must, in the end, prove dis- astrous. The civilian brings to his council the idea of economy. His training in civil life, in mercantile pursuits, where the object of all business is finan- cial gain, has warped his mind to a worship of economy. To him military efficiency has no meaning. His attitude is a material one. When forced to decide between several articles of ma- terial, all of which in his unscientific eye appear equally efficient, his decision naturally will go to the one in which the least money is involved. In consequence the article accepted by him may be totally unserviceable to the military require- ment. The military man, on the other hand, takes no thought of the cost where efficiency is at stake. For him there is no second best. One gun that will reach the enemy is worth a hundred whose range is just too short. A million dollars spent where military necessity demands may save a hundred million when war is declared. All such questions are military ones, and where NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 55 these are involved the military decision alone should be considered. Naval ships are built each for its peculiar role in the service of the nation. Battleships, cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and submarines should be called upon to perform only those duties which will perfect their training as instruments of war. Their organization and service should be con- trolled solely by military minds. These ships should not be scattered or dispersed on diplo- matic service. Their power lies in unity of action and in co-ordinate training. Their func- tion is battle and the preparation for battle. They should always be kept in the pink of con- dition, fully manned and trained for the object for which they alone owe their existence. The statesman's control over this force should be only to unleash it against an enemy's fleet for the purpose of emphasizing the national will. The peace duty of representing the nation on a foreign coast belongs to gunboats, the non-military units of the fleet, which should be built for that sole purpose. Such vessels may carry few guns and small crews, but the emblem of nationality flying at their flagstaffs is, nevertheless, still the em- bodiment of the diplomatic and military power of the nation. Such a representative in a foreign port carries with it the same quantity of prestige as the entire fleet, were it there assembled. It 56 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR is a mistaken idea of our diplomacy that a pur- pose can be better accentuated with many ships of war than with one. Such a conception reveals only a glaring weakness in a diplomacy, pointing to the hope of avoiding more drastic measures by the use of a great show of force. If diplomacy has proved its strength and its determination of purpose, then the sending of one gunboat will be sufficient to announce that our diplomacy calls for certain action, which, if refused, will lead to acts of coercion that will impose the dictum. Keeping the battle fleet as a unit at its work of preparation strengthens the hands of diplomacy; scattering it, using the units on eccentric mis- sions, destroys the unity and cohesiveness of the fleet as an instrument of war. This is a point of view which the naval officer often finds it most difficult to explain to the civilian. Between him and his civilian friends there lies a great gulf which neither seems able to bridge. Each apparently thinks in a different language. Words and phrases do not convey the same meaning to each of them. It has been repeatedly asserted by some of our naval officers for many years, and with more emphasis during the last two years, that the navy was not pre- pared for war. The civilian looked at the naval list and at the types and numbers of ships, he considered our great navy-yards, and refused to NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 57 believe that the naval man was in earnest. He then went aboard a battleship, he observed the officers and men at work; he saw the marvellous organization that exists on board our ships of war; he made a cruise in a single ship or with the fleet; he noted the precision with which the ships kept position and the ease with which the ships were handled in manoeuvres, and then he came to the conclusion that the naval man is wrong and belittled the efficiency of his own instruments. But the naval man knows. He has studied and observed the work of other nations. He knows that, while we have the ships, the other nations not only have them also but use them legitimately in preparation for war. He appre- ciates that the foreign governments make appro- priations each year for mobilizations and for manoeuvres in which each type falls into the place that it would actually occupy in war. He knows that his country will spend the money to build ships, and to partially man them, but that it be- grudges the money for the training essential to make them proficient in the art of fighting an enemy's fleet. He knows that while other na- tions have created general staffs, whose sole care is the making of plans and directing of the peace administration and training of the fleet, that in his own country this most technical and neces- $8 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR sary work, when it is done at all, is usually directed by civilian control. 1 He knows that military ad- vice upon the use of the fleet, upon the prepara- tion of the fleet, upon the training of the fleet, although given, is not always accepted. What we civilians do not seem to appreciate is that the naval men have more than a personal interest in the navy. They have a personal in- terest in the welfare of their country which the navy alone can protect. The ban of secrecy has prevented them from openly expressing their full views. Occasionally, an anonymous writer dares to raise his voice against the methods of naval control. His criticisms are honest, and usually reflect the unanimous opinion of his colleagues. The mouthpiece of the navy the United States Naval Institute has published article after article condemning our naval administration as faulty 1 The General Board of the Navy has the supervision of the mak- ing of war plans, but as it has no legal status or executive power, it can neither compel action nor interest the "civilian control" to understand them and take the action necessary. The civilian secre- tary of the navy, thanks to our faulty system of administration, is left in a state of complete isolation as regards the general manage- ment of the navy at large. There exists, as Secretary Moody testi- fied before the Naval Committee of the House, on April n, 1904, "no body charged with the duty of giving responsible advice upon military matters." " It is not enough," he added, " that there should be plenty of officers ready to give him advice when he seeks it. There should be those charged expressly with the duty of studying military questions, and of giving advice for which they can be held responsible." What this "defect in a vital part" of our naval ad- ministration is, will be shown further on. NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 59 in principle, disastrous to the efficiency of the navy, and dangerous to the welfare of the nation. The civil administrators, whenever they feel that they have been personally attacked, defend them- selves by appealing to our form of government, which, according to their statements, provides for civilian control over the military. But such statements are only true in the wording and not in the intention of our form of government. Our government reflects the will of the people. Our people are civilized and scientific in their commercial dealings. If our citizens would stop and consider that one like themselves, untrained and uneducated in naval matters, was making far-reaching military decisions; that, in fact, he held in his hand the military direction of our navy, with all that goes with it, he would be aghast and doubtless tremble for the future of the nation in case it went to war. The spirit of our govern- ment requires a civilian at the head of the Navy Department to administer the financial expendi- tures allotted to the service by Congress. 1 That 1 "It has been asserted," wrote Admiral Luce a few years ago, "that a naval officer of rank and experience should be placed at the head of the navy. But naval officers are not fitted by training or habits of thought for making good ministers of state. This is well illustrated by the experience in England, where the civilian First Lord, assisted by naval men, has proved the ideal. From the ex- perience of the greatest naval power of the day, we are, therefore, led to conclude that a civilian secretary of the navy, assisted by a board of naval officers, is the main point in a naval administration that will stand the test of a great war." 60 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR civilian should bring to the Navy Department a knowledge of business methods. The business ad- ministration of the Navy Department is in his hands. He is intrusted by the nation with this great instrument of force, and the nation will ex- pect him to render an account of his stewardship. The ultimate test of his success in war will be in the exploits of the fleet. If he is truly honest with himself and big enough to acknowledge that there is a great field of effort beyond his mental capabilities, through no fault of his own, he will, as any man would upon whom has been thrust a great responsibility, surround himself with men of known integrity and ability to direct those parts of his organization to which his knowledge does not extend. These men would further sur- round themselves with men whose knowledge was more minute in the collateral branches of the naval profession. In this way in the office of the civil administrator of the navy would be formed what is termed in Europe a general staff. Our navy, in time of peace, is kept at peace strength. For the purposes of war, either in the Atlantic or in the Pacific, a great increase of our fleet would be necessary. There would have to be purchased, or chartered, merchant ships, col- liers, oilers, supply vessels, ammunition ships, tenders, mother ships, hospital ships, mine-laying ships, and trawlers for mine-sweeping. Many of NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 61 these vessels would be ready for immediate use, but some would require conversion for their new military duties. It has been found that, in order to supply these auxiliary vessels to the number and kind required for an oversea campaign, 80 per cent of the American merchant marine on the Atlantic and Pacific would have to be im- pressed on the outbreak of hostilities. The ac- quisition of all these vessels by the government would completely paralyze our coastwise traffic and decrease the efficiency of the nation in its manufacturing and commercial activities during the continuance of military operations. If the war is in the Pacific the transcontinental railroads will have to utilize their fuel-carrying facilities to the utmost to carry the navy's fuel from the great coal and oil fields of the east to the Pacific slope. Foreign merchant vessels might be bought by the government in large numbers, but their purchase would have to be completed before the declaration of war, and, besides, under our form of government no funds would be available for such purpose until actually appropriated by Con- gress. After the declaration of war no neutral country would permit its citizens to sell merchant vessels for war purposes to a belligerent. A workable scheme must, therefore, be prepared and prepared immediately to furnish the fleet with this required quota of auxiliary ships, and, 62 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR at the same time, secure the nation's coastwise trade to the purposes of the nation. This vast field requires a study by both military and com- mercial men for its successful accomplishment. The responsibility for the preparation of this necessary means of prosecuting a naval war rests, in the meantime, with the navy. It would be the duty of a naval general staff, did we have one. The broad field of naval mobilization must be scientifically investigated. Investigation by independent individuals or by the Navy Depart- ment bureaus working within themselves may accomplish a result, but it will be dearly bought and at the expense of the fleet. We must bring to this study a concentration of effort. The work already accomplished by others should be co-ordinated under a responsible military leader. The entire plan of mobilization must be understood through all its ramifications by the executive military authority in order that the machinery of mobilization may work smoothly and quickly when the order to mobilize is issued. A study of the work of a foreign general staff, such as that of Germany, Italy, France, Austria, England, Japan, and even China, must show us that we cannot afford, in these days of progress and civilization, to remain indifferent. Other departments of the government may continue their unscientific methods; there but little harm NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 63 is done. But unscientific methods, a lack of system, want of preparation, or civil interference mean more in the great military departments. Unpreparedness spells disaster to the nation, the loss of many thousand trained lives of our citizens, sailors, and soldiers. It means yet more it in- volves national dishonor. Unfortunately for the human race, half-disasters do not awaken nations; otherwise our nation would have appreciated its dearly bought lessons after the Spanish War. Prussia should have awakened after Valmy, but Jena was necessary to open the eyes of the German people. Eventu- ally, however, the revelation took place, and in the modern Germany we see what whole dis- asters accomplished for the nation. In every civil occupation we have learned to bring science to our aid in organizing, systematizing, and ad- ministering our business. Commercial men point with pride to their planning department, where every detail of the business is worked up, and each step in the process of manufacture is carefully laid out and followed. Yet, in the business of govern- ment, those fundamental truths that we apply to our private business are strangely ignored. 1 *How long would it be before a business conducted along the lines of our present naval administration went into the hands of a receiver? That was what happened to our navy from 1842 to and including the year 1889, during which there was a gradual but sure decadence. The truth of this statement is amply borne out by the annual reports of successive secretaries of the navy. 64 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR In the evolution of man from a protoplasmic cell, about the last step was the creation of intelli- gence. The Department of the Navy is following this law of evolution. But it must yet be struck with the fairy wand to be made into a thinking entity. This creation of intelligence, in order that the organization may bring system into its life, means the forming of a general staff not merely a vest-pocket encyclopaedia, where important in- formation may be instantly obtained, but an ex- ecutive body, endowed with power of execution for which it will stand responsible to the country as regards the navy's preparation for war. The creation of a general staff for the navy is im- portant when we realize that the government has no continuing body of men whose duty it is to prepare the entire nation for a conflict, to study the policies of competing nations, to discover where our policies are liable to create diplomatic friction, to study the means of averting conflicts, to decide as to the quantity of means needed for the purpose in a word, to co-ordinate the policies of the nation with the means at hand to give them effect. 1 1 At present there exists a general board and Naval War College, but neither is equipped for adequately performing the duties of a naval general staff. The demands upon the staff of the War College and the members of the general board for other questions involving the efficiency of the personnel and material of the navy are such that they have had neither the time nor the opportunity to fully prepare in detail and perfect this work. After hearing the opinions NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 65 The army and the navy are for the purposes of war. This fact is simple of comprehension, yet how many are willing to understand it ? If, then, the army and the navy are for the purposes of war, the question arises: "War with whom?" This question is not one for the army man or the navy man to answer. It is a question which the statesmen of the country must answer. Once this question is answered, and definite opponents are pointed out, then the nation should ask those responsible in the control of the army and the navy: "Are the army and the navy ready for war with this or that enemy?" Readiness is a com- parable term. The army and the navy may be ready for war with Mexico, with South America, with China, with Africa, and, maybe, with Turkey; but those countries are not our probable enemies. If the enemy pointed out by the statesmen were England, Germany, or Japan, the opinion of the army and navy would be that we were not now ready for war, and that, to wage a war, any one of those countries would tax to its limit the resources of the entire country. Vast sums of of naval officers on this subject, the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives urged the necessity for an office in the naval establishment that would fill this great and vital need of an executive and military branch for the proper employment of the vessels of our navy. The naval appropriation bill recently passed by Congress fortunately contains a provision for the creation of such a legalized chief of naval operations. 66 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR money would have to be spent hurriedly and without opportunity for proper consideration. Perhaps an outline of our naval organization would not here be amiss. The present system of administration in the Navy Department was established in 1842, to succeed the Board of Navy Commissioners, who are generally supposed to have been supplanted because they had no individual duties or respon- sibilities. 1 At its head is a civilian secretary of the navy, who is assisted in his administration by an assistant secretary of the navy. Under the secretary the civil and industrial work of the department is carried on by bureaus whose chiefs are each personally responsible to him for the per- formance of the duties assigned to them by law. These chiefs of bureaus have executive authority extending even to the fleet. 2 The Bureau of Navigation is charged with the maintenance of 1 These commissioners assisted the secretary of the navy by their counsel in the "employment of vessels of war," and "executed such orders as the secretary shall receive from the President." 2 This is a violation of the fundamental military principle, the granting to a subordinate executive powers equal to those of his superior in rank; it is a direct infringement upon the prerogatives of the secretary of the navy a fatal defect in the law. In fact, this provision of the act, in practice, creates eight secretaries of the navy, each one, in his own particular sphere, clothed with executive au- thority equal to that of the constitutional commander-in-chief. This is what has created the dire confusion, duplication of work, extravagance, and irresponsibility which, according to several secre- taries of the navy in the past, have characterized the business methods of the Navy Department for the last seventy years. NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 67 the personnel of the naval establishment and with the discipline and education of the service. The Bureau of Ordnance is charged with the de- sign and manufacture of guns, armor, torpedoes, ammunition, and explosives. The Bureau of Con- struction and Repair, composed of naval architects, is charged with all that relates to the construction and repair of the ships of the navy. The Bureau of Steam Engineering designs and builds the machinery for all our vessels of war. The Bureau of Yards and Docks, the chief of which is a civil engineer, has charge of the designing, building, and maintenance of the dry docks, wharfs, and buildings at the navy-yards. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery is charged with the health of the personnel. And, lastly, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is charged with the pur- chase of all food, clothing, supplies, and even ships, and with the disbursing of all moneys ap- propriated for the naval service. In addition to the bureaus, the organization of the Navy Department includes the judge- advocate general, whose duties are to consider and report upon all legal questions relating to the personnel; the solicitor, who attends to the other legal matters, such as contracts pertaining to the service; the general board, which considers the plans for the preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war; and the office of naval intel- 68 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR ligence, which collects information relating to foreign navies and to other subjects of interest to the naval service. The various activities essential to so complex an institution are thus accounted for. But, as Mr. Meyer pointed out in his annual report for 1909, the business of the department has entirely outgrown its original 1842 organization and its reorganization of 1862. The most serious defects he mentioned were the deplorable lack of a branch dealing directly and solely with the military use of the fleet and the lack of responsible expert advisers to aid the secretary in reaching conclu- sions in case of disagreement between the co-ordi- nate branches of the department. The business administration of the Navy De- partment seemed logically to divide itself into groups under personnel, material, and the opera- tions or management of the personnel and ma- terial. So, to provide himself with professional and responsible advisers in co-ordinating the work of the department, Mr. Meyer detailed four officers of the rank as aides to the secretary of the navy in matters of general policy. These officers have been continued by the present secretary of the navy. They act solely in an advisory ca- pacity and have no supervisory or executive power. The aide for operations advises the secretary as to strategic and tactical matters and NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 69 regarding the movements of the fleet. The aide for material advises him upon the material con- dition of the fleet. The aide for personnel advises him upon matters affecting the officers and men of the fleet. The aide for inspections, recently abolished, advised him upon the con- dition of the fleet and upon the state and manage- ment of the navy-yards. The aide for education, recently appointed, advises him upon the academic education of the fleet, not upon its education for battle. The statutes assume that if a secretary has a head for each of the activities required by the fleet, that he can decide the best way to act. This the last secretary of the navy, Mr. Meyer, realized was erroneous. The heads of the techni- cal bureaus are usually too much immersed in their own specialties to assist the secretary, a civilian and not a military man, in making cor- rect military decisions. 1 Mr. Meyer, therefore, *To quote from Secretary Moody's testimony before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, April n, 1904: "It may be said that the secretary already has the chiefs of bureaus as advisers. At the heads of those bureaus, now established by law, there are and will be competent officers with adequate technical and military information. They are abundantly able to give safe coun- sel on the important duties with which their respective bureaus are charged; but they are engrossed with the duties of the administra- tion of their bureaus. They have no responsibility for the con- sideration of these military questions to which I have referred, nor any duty to give advice upon them; and the world's experience has shown that no advice is good except that for which advisers are held 70 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR instituted the policy of having advisers to the secretary. In other words, he realized that in his short tenure of office as secretary he could not make himself into a military man; that he could not get the military training required to efficiently manage the military organization unaided. He knew that he was a good business man, and a successful one, but his business had not been that of the navy. He did not have behind him an experience of thirty odd years of sea service. He felt that the information given to him by the bureaus must be placed in such shape by his responsible. The volunteer adviser is not usually of much assis- tance. Much as I have profited by the advice of the bureau chiefs, I know by practical experience that it is impossible for them to take from their administrative duties the time which will enable them to consider these questions with such deliberation as would render them willing to accept responsibility for advice. "There is another side to the question. On the other side, I deem it of the greatest importance that no body should be created which would usurp the powers of the secretary and make him its mere mouthpiece or reduce him to a mere figurehead in naval organiza- tion. I believe that is not only of importance to the country but of equal importance to the navy itself. It is the secretary alone who can bring effective influence to bear upon the national adminis- tration or, in conference with the representatives of the legislative part of our government, carry such weight that proper measures will be enacted by Congress and proper supplies afforded. Of course, it is ultimately upon the action of Congress that all naval efficiency must depend. I do not care how efficient a general staff may be, or any body called by another name, however well that body may understand the needs of the navy: they can never, in my opinion, except in times of great emergency, wield that influence which brings into harmonious co-operation the national administration, the mili- tary power, and the authority of Congress which governs us all." NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 71 aides that he, untrained in naval matters, could handle it as a business man. In fact, his aides were for the purpose of translating the naval facts into language within his grasp and understand- ing. When once these facts were so presented to him, he, as a good business man, could render a correct decision. Then, once this decision was given, the naval aides were delegated the power of the secretary to carry out that decision. The secretary and his naval aides looked upon the questions confronting the navy from the point of naval efficiency, and each decision was made with the idea of gaining efficiency for the navy, and the execution of the idea, in consequence, steadily increased the efficiency of the fleet. One of the first acts of Congress should be logically to legalize the council of aides and to make one of the aides paramount, like first sea lord of the British navy, to whom the English people look for efficiency of their fleet. We have seen recently how a similar democ- racy, England, upon going to war, placed a mili- tary man in control of her War Office. Lord Kitchener was about to start for Egypt when the war in Europe broke out. But the English, knowing the unpreparedness of their army and appreciating that its preparation could be ac- complished in a relatively short time only by a military man of the caliber of Kitchener, at once 72 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR installed him as the first war lord of England. On the other hand, Admiral Sir John Fisher is practically in control of the admiralty; the first lord doubtless accepts his plans in all naval matters, for it is to Sir John Fisher that the English people look for naval results and not to Winston Churchill. Some years ago, in 1909, a commission was ap- pointed by the President of the United States, whose report should be known to every American. It is no more or less than a recapitulation of the fundamental principles underlying a military ad- ministration for the Navy Department. This document clears the atmosphere. Its language is so plain and so eloquent that any one upon reading it must be convinced of its soundness. The board was composed of men whose honesty of purpose cannot be questioned. They were William H. Moody, Paul Morton, Stephen B. Luce, Alfred T. Mahan, and A. G. Dayton. Unfortunately, these men are of a persuasion in politics different from those now in power, but their decisions, as can be seen, are divorced from any conception of partisan politics. The report of the commission is as follows: i. The Office of the Secretary of the Navy being execu- tive in character, nothing should be admitted into an organization of the Department which would qualify his authority or diminish his ultimate responsibility. He NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 73 has been in the past, and in the future should be, a civil- ian. He is the representative of the President, the con- stitutional Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, under whose direction his authority is exercised. 2. The duties in charge of the Secretary divide under the principal heads, closely related, but generically dis- tinct: military and civil. The civil duties embrace the provision or preparation of all material of war. This is the function of the present bureaus. The military duties concern the use of that material, whether in war or in such exercises as conduce to fitness for operations of war. For the direction of these military duties, no subordinate provision corresponding to the bureaus on the civil side exists in the present organization. 3. The discharge of both these classes of duty involves a multitude of activities, quite beyond the immediate personal knowledge and supervision of a single man. This necessitates a subdivision of the duties, by which means the supervision of the Secretary is exerted through the medium of responsible subordinates. In this sub- division the PRINCIPLE OF UNDIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY, WITHIN THE APPOINTED FIELD OF SUBORDINATE SUPER- VISION, should obtain as it does in the superior office of the Secretary. The bureau system, as now established by law for the civil activities of the department, insures for each bureau this undivided responsibility, qualified only by the au- thority of the Secretary, which, if exerted, does not divide the responsibility, but transfers it to the Secretary himself. INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY, with UNDIVIDED RE- SPONSIBILITY, though in principle proper, suffers histori- cally from intrinsic inability to co-operate, where a num- ber of such independent units are present. The Marshals 74 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR of the first Napoleon especially in Spain in the absence of the Emperor, offer a familiar illustration. The bureau system constituted by law contains no remedy for this inherent defect. 4. The co-ordinating power is in the Secretary's au- thority; but, owing to the shortness of tenure in office, and to the inevitable unfamiliarity with naval conditions with which an incumbent begins, authority, though ade- quate in principle, is not so in effect. This inadequacy consists in lack of personal familiarity with the subjects before him, not merely severally, but in their collective relations; in short, lack of specific knowledge and experi- ence. The organization should provide him with such knowledge and experience, digested formally, so as to facilitate his personal acquirement; in short, an advisory body, equipped not with advice merely, but with reasons. In order to avoid the interruption of continuity attend- ing each new administration, entailing the recurrent tem- porary unfamiliarity of each new Secretary, it is expedient that this advisory body be composed of several persons; but while this provision would insure the continuity which inheres in a corporate body, in this case continuity of knowledge and progress, the principle of undivided responsibility would dictate that ONE only of them should be responsible for the advice given to the common superior, the Secretary. 5. As regards the composition of the advisory body, the principles to be regarded are two: (4) The end dictates the means. (B) The responsibility must be individual, in advice as well as in executive action. (A) The end is efficiency in war. The agents in war are the military naval officers. Their profession qualifies them best to pronounce upon the character of the prepa- NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 75 rations of every kind for war, including not only schemes of campaign and tactical systems, but the classes, sizes, qualities, and armaments of ships of war. What the Secretary needs, specifically and above all, is a clear understanding and firm grasp of leading military considerations. Possessed of these, he may without great difficulty weigh the recommendations of his technical assistants, decide for himself and depend upon them for technical execution of that which he approves. However constituted in detail, the advisory body should be taken entirely from the class to which belongs the con- duct of war, and upon them will fall in war the responsi- bility for the use of the instruments and for the results of the measures which they recommend. (B) As regards individual responsibility for advice, it is suggested that the Secretary of the Navy nominate to the President the officer whom he deems best fitted to command the great fleet in case of war arising; and that this officer, irrespective of his seniority, should be head of the advisory body. He alone should be the responsi- ble adviser of the Secretary. The provision of a responsible adviser does not compel the Secretary to accept his advice, nor prevent his con- sulting whomsoever else he will. The provision sug- gested does not limit the authority of the Secretary; but it does provide him with the weightiest and most instructed counsel, and it lays upon the prospective Commander- in-Chief the solemn charge that in all he recommends he is sowing for a future which he himself may have to reap. An essential principle in the constitution of such an advisory body is that the majority of the members should be on the active list and should go afloat at no infrequent intervals; and, specifically, the head of the body, the 76 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR prospective Commander-in-Chief, should during the sum- mer months take command of the fleet when concentrated for manoeuvres, etc., to sustain his familiarity with ad- ministrative routine and other practical matters. 6. In the two principal classes into which the duties of the Secretary of the Navy divide, civil and military, as enunciated in Section 2 above, the word "civil" cor- responds largely to the activities known as technical; and there is no reason apparent why the same principle of undivided immediate responsibility should not be re- alized in the Navy Department in two chief subordinates, responsible, the one for military supervision, the other for technical supervision, and for all information and ad- vice given to the Secretary under these two heads. It is of course apparent that a perfectly suitable Secretary may come to his office with as little previous knowledge of the kind called technical as he has of military; nay, he may be perfectly efficient, and yet not acquire in his four years of office either the technical or the military knowl- edge presumable in men whose lives have been given to the two professions. Under the most favorable condi- tions, every superior must take decisions largely on advice; which means not accepting another's opinions blindly, but accepting statements of facts and weighing reasons. The principle of the Secretary's ultimate individual re- sponsibility dictates that he be at libery to consult as many advisers as he thinks necessary; but the principle of the individual responsibility of two chief advisers, for the advice given, tends to insure the most exhaustive consideration on the part of men selected for their special competency. Careful consideration with special com- petency give the best guarantees for advice, and a Secre- tary overruling it would do so under the weightiest sense of personal responsibility. NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 77 Can any one doubt the soundness of these prin- ciples? They apply not only to a military ser- vice, but to any great commercial organization. For instance, the president of a railroad must be ultimately responsible for the efficiency of his road, yet he will not invade the provinces of his subordinates who, in their specialties, are thor- oughly capable of giving efficient and loyal ser- vice. Each brings to his work a special knowl- edge and experience which may or may not be had by the president. The president will hold each responsible for his acts. The president and his council will decide the broad policies of the road. These policies will guide the subordinates in their work. The general manager, assistant general manager, general superintendent, etc., through their intimate knowledge of the require- ments of the railroad, will also guide the president and his council in their work. The president of a railroad would not disregard the responsibility of his traffic manager by directing against his technical advice the introduction of special trains or changing the existing schedules, for in so doing the president of a railroad knows that dangerous collisions would result and many lives would be lost. Let us look back into our history and see how the Navy Department prepared for the war with Spain. As early as the middle of March, 1898, 78 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR the government in Washington began to prepare for war. In the next six months 102 vessels of all sorts, even tugs and ferry-boats, were bought. They were inspected by boards of naval officers, but the emergency was great and thorough in- spections were impossible. There had been no inspection of vessels before the war as to their fitness for war purposes. Twenty-one million four hundred and fifty thousand dollars were spent on these vessels. During the war the active fleet was increased by 130 ships. Many of the pur- chased vessels were converted into auxiliary cruisers, the conversion of which required at least a one month's stay at the navy-yards. The navy personnel was increased from 13,000 to 25,000. Vast supplies were purchased at exorbitant prices. In many cases there had been no contract for sup- plies before the war, and the Navy Department was forced to accept the best terms it could get. In Washington all was confusion until Captain Mahan arrived, bringing with him an atmosphere of calm and sound deliberation and a compre- hensive knowledge of fundamental strategical principles. A naval war council was immediately formed. A state of war having arisen, the secre- tary of the navy at once realized the necessity of a general staff. This war board, or general staff, organized an information service which gave Admiral Sampson his only certain news among the NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 79 vast amount of rumors as to the movements of the enemy. Admiral Mahan was a typical gen- eral staff officer. He had studied for years at the Naval War College the strategical situation of the United States. In his lectures before the War College he had developed a sound strategy for the navy which, upon the outbreak of war, became the navy's plan of campaign. Whatever merits there were in the conduct of our naval war with Spain belong to him. His genius was the navy's guiding star. The war having been brought to a successful end, the naval board was dismissed. Any one who witnessed the confusion, not only in the Navy Department in Washington, but at all the navy-yards and recruiting stations in 1898, can multiply that confusion by about six and then obtain a fair picture of what would happen in case the United States went to war within the year. The size of our present navy, ships and men, is just six times its size in 1898. To plan the opening moves in our mobilization requires a general staff composed of men who have given several years to a close study of the conditions of naval war. They must prepare that plan to the most minute detail, and have it always ready for promulgation. The next war will probably not be with another Spain. It will be with a country which has worked 8o OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR out such a plan of mobilization, and who, doubt- less, knows of our unpreparedness. The enemy, therefore, will use his utmost endeavors to cut short our time of preparation, and force us to fight unprepared by striking swiftly and secretly. The United States is considered to be one of the world's most scientific nations. Methods of sci- entific management are the rule in business. The army's methods are becoming more scientific, due to the tutelage of the general staff and the Army War College, but the navy is, if anything, still deep in the mire of red tape. Our navy-yards are so congested with work, and the hand of the politician rules there so strongly that even the supreme influence of the commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet has been powerless to limit the prolonged stay of ships at navy-yards. The methods of buying material for the navy require such a length of time that repairs to ships which should be effected in a few weeks are delayed often many months. There are battleships and other vessels that have spent at the navy-yards 50 per cent of their first few years in commission, and against this disorganizing condition the com- mander-in-chief of the fleet seems powerless. One of the greatest authorities in naval matters, in discussing our naval administration, has said: It is conceded that the present organization of the Navy Department . . . has performed the business of NAVAL PEACE PREPARATION 81 the Navy Department adequately; its shortcomings have not been due to any deficiency in skill or want of business capacity in administration, but rather because the or- ganization has lacked the principle of responsible mili- tary advice to the Secretary. The object and ultimate end of the Navy Department are to build, arm, equip, and man the fleet in order to prepare it for war. It is conceivable that in a highly developed industrial community like our own the busi- ness of the Navy Department might, under its Secretary, be restricted to its military duties only, the supplies of every nature, including the vessels themselves and their entire war outfit, being obtained by purchase, as has been illustrated in certain foreign countries. The predominant character and importance of efficient military counsel will thus be appreciated. The convincing soundness of this advice upon military administration has ever since been dis- regarded. It was given six years ago. The navy-yards and the controlling bureaus of the Navy Department are merely outfitters and, if properly controlled, should work in cordial and intelligent support of each other to meet the de- mands of consumers, who, in this case, are the naval officers who use the material provided for them. To control the naval outfitters, to make them work in cordial and intelligent support of each other, is the duty of a general staff. It must always be remembered that any suc- cessful business represents an accumulation of the ideas of many men. These ideas must have 82 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR a repository where they can be sifted out, tagged, and labelled to be used for the betterment of the service. The cycle of our naval administration is not a closed one, and for that reason men untrained in the art of war are incapable of assaying profits. Congress appropriates the money wisely and un- wisely. This money is converted into raw ma- terial and labor, and this raw material and labor are in turn converted into the finished product and service. But these finished products and ser- vice are not converted back into money. They have become something intangible, a potential power a weapon ready for immediate use, but one the nation hopes it may never have to use. The steel of the blade, however, must be kept bright and sharp. Can a civilian secretary, with no experience in the art of war, tell by examining that instrument whether or not its blade is of true temper ? CHAPTER V OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AIERICA, as has been shown, has the his- torical calling of guardian over the repub- lican forms of government which have been established by the various peoples of this continent. Those traditional policies we must safeguard by preparedness, for our present posi- tion we shall not be able to maintain indefinitely without an appeal to arms. Fortunately, such an appeal does not, of necessity, mean war. Mili- tary preparation is an asset to the statesman. By the threat of an appeal to arms victories in peace can be won as lasting as those achieved on the field of battle. This, history has taught since the beginning of things. But let us also be forewarned; such a threat, given without the necessary force to back it, is futile and has al- ways led to war. Two principles that must govern the action of a nation in its preparation for possible conflict must be accepted by Americans. They are: (a) 83 84 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR that the fleet is our first line of defense, and (6) that it is the duty of every male citizen to prepare himself for the military service of his country. The naval and military armaments of the present day must be ready at all times if they are to be effective in time of need. The size of our fleet must be based upon that of its pos- sible opponents. In order that we may have a fleet capable of achieving the aim of our naval strategy, the probable theatre of war must be studied and a knowledge gained of the character of the struggle which will have to be waged to gain command of the seas. The defense of our coast is assured when our control of the seas is secured. For the protection of our coast, al- though the end is defensive, the means will not be defensive. The fleet cannot merely stand on guard. Its fighting power cannot be frittered away by being thinly spread along our entire coast-line. It must have "force" as a fleet; it must have mobility. And that fleet must have more than that mobility; it must be capable of gaining information of the enemy's movements and able to maintain its activity in whatever area of hostilities it may be drawn. Its primary duty is to find and engage the naval power of the enemy. "Force" rests on battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. ' ' Mobility ' ' indicates great individual size and steaming OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 85 radius. To gather information of the enemy, to avoid surprise, and to bring the hostile squadrons to action require fast scouts of great steaming radius. To maintain the fleet's activity in the area of probable hostilities requires well-equipped and protected naval bases, colliers, repair ships, mother ships for submarines and tenders, ammu- nition ships, mine-layers, mine-sweepers, and hos- pital ships. The study of the creation, organi- zation, administration, and management of such a fleet is a scientific one solely. The statesman, a civilian, points out the probable antagonist. This information is in the keeping of the states- man. The question of the disposition and the use of a fleet to accomplish the national purpose that is, the perpetuation of its policies cannot be intrusted to those whose sole fitness for the task lies in their capabilities as leaders in the internal politics of the country. The nation must insist that where a question arises concerning the navy as a fighting machine, that question shall be decided by those who have given a life of study to naval affairs. To permit a politician, be he ever so patriotic, to make military or naval decisions, is to court disaster. On the side of organization alone, it is well to bear in mind that a military force a fleet or an army cannot be levied en masse and led at once successfully into battle. It is first neces- 86 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR sary to train the personnel and prepare the vast material required. Military preparation we must consider in the light of a great social benefit. Such preparation raises the capabilities of the nation as a unit, which is a great national asset and a strong card in the hands of the statesman. In its more technical sense, preparation provides for the conduct of a war and supplies the means to carry it through. In our every-day walks of life, in business, in the arts and sciences, social com- petition is evident on every hand. Those hold the field who are intellectually well equipped for the contest. So it is with nations. Military ser- vice is well known to develop the intellectual and moral fibre of the individual. Through him it benefits the nation by rendering him more effi- cient for the occupations of peace. Military training gives a man the full mastery of his body; exercises and increases his initiative; develops self-reliance and decision of character. It teaches him to subordinate his will to a higher recognized authority. It develops in him those necessary qualities, self-respect and courage, both moral and physical. It is time that we realized that training in the profession of arms is a national asset which increases the wealth of the nation by increasing the efficiency of its individuals in the arts, in industries, in trade, and in commerce. A military nation will successfully embark in OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 87 enterprises which the non-military nation, fear- ing the risk involved, will refuse to undertake. It is now a well-recognized fact, that our his- tories have suppressed the military lessons which should have been forcibly brought before the people of the country. Our studied lack of pre- paredness in the military art has now been tested during more than a century. We have engaged in foreign, domestic, and Indian wars, and have in every one achieved the final success. But how many Americans have realized the price at which that success has been bought, or considered the delays and disasters that prolonged our wars till, in nearly every instance, our national resources were completely exhausted? Has not the final outcome in each case deluded the popular mind into the belief that we are, as a nation, invincible? How many Americans have any conception of the outrageous extravagance in men and money that has characterized our past wars? With a first-class power we have never yet been engaged. England, in her wars with us, has always been occupied elsewhere and never could spare more than a small part of her forces to war on us. Yet in the Revolutionary War it took 231,771 of our Continental troops and 164,000 minutemen to defeat the 150,605 soldiers that England sent to the discontented colonies. Our regulars bore the brunt of the fighting heroically, but our undisci- 88 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR plined militia tarnished the honor of our arms on more than one occasion. In the War of 1812 the navy alone saved us from national dishonor. But the successful cruises and the brilliant victories of the Constitution and of her consorts were not the entire record of those years of almost uninterrupted disasters on land. Our 56,032 regular troops and the 471,622 militia that we called into the field were shamefully routed, time and again except at Lundy's Lane and at New Orleans by less than 55,000 British and Canadians. Again, in the Mexican War of 1846 were we fortunate. Our antagonist here was racially weaker, yet no less than 30,000 reg- ular troops and 73,532 militia and volunteers were required to conquer less than 47,000 ill-fed and ill-equipped Mexicans. And in 1861 our national resources were almost completely exhausted by the delays and disasters that characterized the first few months of the conflict disasters that could have been avoided in every case by adequate preparation. It is questionable whether there ever would have been a war, had the Federal Government had the proper trained force at hand. Yet a few months before the war it was actually proposed in Con- gress to abolish the navy. 1 1 In the Civil War the United States employed 67,000 regulars, and 2,605,000 militia and volunteers to defeat 978,664 Confederates. And in the Spanish- American War of 1898 we were compelled to OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 89 Do we realize that if our fleet were defeated to-day, nothing would stand between us and the invasion of our territory? Our pitifully small army could not possibly defend our entire sea- coast, and the undisciplined hordes that would be called to the colors would be almost as useless for military purposes as would a like number of sheep or horses. The average American believes that if the danger of invasion were imminent, the na- tion would rise as one man to repel the invader; but nations cannot rise as one man unless their organization for the purpose has been carefully worked out beforehand, and they themselves have been previously trained for the task. Leaving out of consideration the possible men- ace of the European nations, let us consider the case of Japan. In the 'go's her policy clashed with the policies of China over the kingdom of Corea, which neither had a right to consider its prize. A war resulted. The subjects of the Japanese Empire had all been trained in the use of arms. Even at that date, Japan had organized a general staff, consisting of her greatest military intellects. The nation was fully prepared for the raise 58,688 regulars, and 223,235 militia and volunteers to subdue less than 200,000 Spaniards. Two hundred thousand volunteers were called for by the President in April, 1898, yet, though every State responded instantly, the work of mobilizing these troops was con- ducted in so bungling a fashion that by the beginning of June only three regiments, in addition to the regulars, had reached the rendez- vous at Tampa, Florida. 90 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR struggle which her statesmen had foreseen. China, in a manner strikingly similar to the methods of this republic, refused to believe that war was possible. In China, the military was considered of an inferior cloth to the scholar, the idealist, the civilizer, the poet. War came suddenly, but it came at the very moment when the statesmen of Japan had decided it should come. Japan won, of course, but she was deprived of the fruits of the war through the acts of a coalition of Euro- pean nations. All that was left to her was the island of Formosa, in which she now has a naval base that will prove most useful in her next war, when the probable area of naval hostilities will be in the waters of the Philippines. Russia forced Japan to give up the territory won by the sword in Manchuria, and occupied it herself. Japan, from that moment, began to prepare herself for a war with Russia. The Em- peror called his military and naval advisers to- gether at the imperial palace at Tokio. He said to them: "We must fight Russia." They an- swered: "Your Majesty, it is impossible; we cannot win. Give us ten years and we shall be ready to fight/' In nine years the statesmen and military and naval advisers of the Emperor went to him and said : "We are ready." Russia mean- while had expended money and resources in build- ing the great railroad from Saint Petersburg to OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 91 Vladivostock and Port Arthur. Her people had peacefully penetrated vast areas of Manchuria. Manchuria was becoming rapidly Russianized. The war that followed is too fresh in our minds for us to forget. The surprise of the world was great when Japan, that small island empire, began the war precipitately, and with victory after victory, finally beat the Russian giant to his knees, and won back the territory that Russia had taken from her through the power of diplo- macy, backed by the threat of a coalition of force too powerful to resist. Since this war, Japan has been able to direct all her energies toward the preparation for a war which her statesmen have foreseen to be necessary in order to carry out her purpose, which is the political control of the Pacific Ocean and its commerce. To resist the attack of such a nation as we have seen Japan to be, our preparation must be me- thodical and scientific. No longer can we afford to continue our unscientific and haphazard meth- ods of building a fleet and administering it. No longer can we afford to believe that our small army will be capable of meeting the demands which it will be called upon to meet in the event of. a war with Japan. Our fleet in the Atlantic Ocean now consists of 8 dreadnaughts, 2 semidreadnaughts, n pre- dreadnaughts, 21 destroyers, 17 submarines, 2 92 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR armored cruisers, 3 scout cruisers, and about 8 gunboats. This fleet is manned 1 and ready for service. In addition, there are in reserve 7 pre- dreadnaughts, and 13 destroyers. The reserve fleet has only a nucleus crew. In the case of the reserve battleships, only 20 men of the thousand required to man them efficiently are on board. In the event of hostilities, they would require from 600 to 800 additional men each. But we have no reserves to draw upon, and every re- cruit would, therefore, be without previous train- ing. A battleship, and, in a lesser degree, a destroyer and a submarine follow the biological law of growth. In order to develop power, the ship must become a distinct entity. When first the crew is received, the ship is an awkward recruit, incapable of military service. If, while in this condition, it is put in the fleet, it weakens that fleet instead of strengthening it. The force of a battleship has too long, in this country, been reckoned solely by the size and power of its guns. No one seems to *But not fully manned, since the 21 battleships in commission alone, according to the statement of the fleet's commander-m-chief, Admiral Fletcher, were, on January 28, 1915, 339 officers and 5,219 men short of the complements required to man them properly to efficiently fight them in battle. The dreadnaught Utah was in need of 27 commissioned officers out of 55 required; the Florida was short 26 officers out of 55 required; the South Carolina had only 21 out of 48, and the Michigan 22 out of 48. In the case of only three ships of the first battle line was the shortage under double figures ! OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 93 have thought of the psychological, the spiritual side, which is of such overwhelming importance. On paper, the Atlantic fleet is said to be com- posed of the following: 8 dreadnaughts, 2 semi- dreadnaughts, and 18 predreadnaughts, and in destroyers 34 modern vessels. Of these, 8 pre- dreadnaughts and 1 6 destroyers are immature in their development as fighting units. Naval ex- perts agree that at least one year is required for the development of a raw crew into an efficient battle unit. Recently the world was amazed at the ease with which two German armored cruisers, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, destroyed, in a battle off the Chilean coast, the British armored cruisers Good Hope and Monmouih, with but neg- ligible damage to themselves. True, the arma- ment of the German vessels was superior in caliber and in carrying power to that of their opponents, but this alone could not account for the reason why, in an hour's engagement, the British cruisers failed to damage their victorious enemy. The vaunted British marksmanship had failed signally in the hour of battle. Then a veiled statement from the British admiralty gave the full explana- tion. The crews of the Good Hope and the Mon- mouth were not regulars. They were militia reservists. The Good Hope and the Monmouth were not effective righting units of the British fleet. Their crews were greatly augmented by 94 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR recruits upon the outbreak of war. Their doom must be laid at the door of that faulty conception of naval administration which keeps, in time of peace, war-ships in reserve, or in "cold storage," and mans them hurriedly with raw and untrained crews in time of war. This naval catastrophe should not have been needed to demonstrate the unfitness of a vessel manned in such a way. Naval men, in their studies and in the council chamber, should have been able to foretell the result of such a method of organization. We cannot, therefore, consider that our 8 reserve battleships, and our 16 reserve destroyers are full units of our battle fleet, since we have no "reserves" to call upon to fill up their complements. In a war with Japan or Germany we can count on only those vessels that have been maintained in time of peace continu- ously in full commission. In those vessels a soul has been created. They are spiritually, physically, and vitally full-grown organizations, capable of us- ing to a maximum the great power of offense and defense embodied in the material, in the arma- ment of the ship. The thinking naval men of this country have endeavored, for some years, to cor- rect this grievous fault in our naval policy. They have stood for permanency in the personnel of our fighting units. They have condemned the policy of reserve fleets. But the civil administrators, dis- OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 95 regarding, if knowing, the biological law which governs the actions of organizations, have never been able to see that the ship must be something more than the armor and guns it carries. An un- wise economy has prevented an increase of per- sonnel to keep pace with the increasing number of the ships of our fleet. In order to keep the new vessels fully manned, the old vessels were retired into the reserve fleet, where they were left with only sufficient men on board to oil and paint their machinery and armament. In all our statistical comparisons with foreign navies, we have counted our reserve ships as full fighting units. The battle off the Chilean coast now forces the conclusion that we must, in our next comparison of fighting strength, scratch from the list our vessels of the reserve fleet, or else give them full crews and allow them to begin their growth to manhood. If we scan our fleet in the Pacific we shall find in the active fleet 2 armored cruisers, 7 cruisers and gunboats, 5 destroyers, and n submarines. In the reserve fleet on that coast are i battleship, 3 armored cruisers, 3 large protected cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 2 old submarines. On the Asiatic station there is an active fleet of i first-class cruiser, 2 monitors, 2 cruisers, 10 gunboats, 5 old destroyers, and 9 submarines of the oldest type. Using the same argument in marshalling our war strength, we must, therefore, subtract 96 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR from our total strength in the Pacific i battleship, 3 armored cruisers, 3 large first-class cruisers, and 4 destroyers, which are only the shells of fighting ships. Their spirit has not been created. The result of the battle off Chile had a parallel a century ago in our own history when the Chesa- peake fought the Shannon off Boston. The Shannon had been in commission for several years. Her crew was well trained, and had become a full- grown and matured organization. Her striking power was intellectually controlled. Her fighting capacity was the product of the power of guns and the capacity to use them. The Chesapeake, on the other hand, left the navy-yard, having just been fitted out. As a psychological entity she was in her incipiency. She had just begun to "grow." She was a child in swaddling-cloths; yet she went out to fight a ship with a full-grown organization, leaving the melancholy, if heroic, tradition of a battle lost against odds. This lesson of the ne- cessity for time in the evolution of a fighting unit, be it a regiment on land or a ship on the ocean, has been one difficult for the American people to grasp. A hundred years later in time of war we stand ready to commit the same military crime and would send against the Japanese and German fleets, composed entirely of fully matured units, our 9 reserve battleships, 3 reserve armored cruisers, 3 reserve first-class cruisers, and 16 re- OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 97 serve destroyers. We would actually handicap our fleet with the care of these charges, while the people of the United States firmly believed that they had increased the power of the fleet by that number of ships. Let us take this second lesson of unpreparedness and use it to advantage. Let us fully man all our ships that are capable of offense, and keep them continually in full com- mission. Those for which we have not the per- sonnel we must scratch off our lists of fighting ships and no longer consider them in the computa- tion of our naval strength. A fully organized and fully manned navy may repel an invasion, or, at least, detain it, until the army has the time to mobilize. But without such a naval force we are helpless. CHAPTER VI OUR NAVAL REQUIREMENTS A NATION'S foreign policy and the means of carrying it out must harmonize. Foreign policies, consequently, determine the size of a nation's fleet. This means that the determi- nation of the naval forces necessary for national security, the principal characteristics of the units composing such forces, and the location and re- sources of bases of operation from which the action of the fleet is to be supported require previous knowledge of what may be termed the "con- stants," the fixed factors, of the international situation. This fundamental idea is known and accepted in every civilized country except Amer- ica. We have international obligations and am- bitious policies, but a fleet inadequate both in numbers and characteristics and deficient in actual bases of operations to support these ambitions. When peace again has come to Europe no one can tell what naval forces will remain to the war- ring combatants. If Germany is successful, she will be stronger than ever, numerically and in morale. If she is defeated, many years will be 9 8 OUR NAVAL REQUIREMENTS 99 necessary before she can again compete in mil- itary and naval armaments. On July i, 1914, Germany had 17 dreadnaughts and battle cruisers in commission against 8 for the United States, while Japan holds only 4. In two years more, 1916, Germany would have had 28 dreadnaughts and battle cruisers against the United States' 12 and Japan's 10. If our policies are in conflict with those of Germany, by what course of reasoning can we dare to say that 12 dreadnaughts are sufficient to maintain our in- tegrity against 28 ? In armored-cruiser strength Germany, the United States, and Japan are about equal. In cruiser strength, the advanced cavalry of a fleet, in 1916, Germany would have had 46, the United States 14, and Japan 13. In destroyers, Germany 154, the United States 62, and Japan 52. In submarines the United States will, at that date, be on an equality with Germany and will be in ad- vance of Japan, but the German submarines are all of greater tonnage than those of the United States, and their effectiveness with the fleet will be vastly greater. We thus see that the United States has built a naval force at haphazard and without considering what is to be its ultimate use. It is not the fleet of our policy. It can neither defend the Monroe Doctrine in the Atlantic nor force the open door in the Pacific. Its weakness in scouts and destroyers for the purpose of locat- loo OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR SEA STRENGTH JULY i, 1914 VESSELS BUILT *% i 2 1 3 I 8-rt 4J 1 H rs ft J' S fi- |S 3 5 -3 .2 6 '3 ' i g,3j ll S3 Q H M pqo 5 o H & u> England . . 20 40 Q 34 74 1679 49 759 o Germany 13 2O 4 9 41 130 o 27 2 United States... 8 22 o II 14 13 30 4 France 18 2O Q . i^ e 64 Japan 2 13 2 13 13 5O 27 13 2 Russia o 7 o 6 g 14 3 2 Italy 3 8 o g 6 32 68 jg o Austria-Hungary 3 6 O 2 5 18 39 6 6 VESSELS BUILDING OR AUTHORIZED England* 16 I 17 00 2 o 22 Germany 7 7 4 5 24 o 18 United States. . . 4 II 19 France 8 o o 3 o 22 Japan 8 4 2 o 2 o 2 Russia" 7 4 8 44 19 . Italy 7 o 2 15 2 8 Austria-Hungary 4 o 5 I 24 6 1 Battleships having a main battery of all big guns (n inches or more in caliber). 1 Battleships of (about) 10,000 tons, or more displacement, and having more than one caliber in the main battery. Armored cruisers having guns of largest caliber in main battery and capable of taking their place in line of battle with the battleships. They have an increase of speed at the expense of carrying fewer guns in main battery, and a decrease in armor protection. 4 Includes all unarmored cruising vessels above 1,500 tons' displacement. Includes smaller battleships and monitors. No more vessels of this class are be- ing produced or built by the great powers. England has no continuing ship-building policy, but usually lays down each year 4 or 5 armored ships with a proportional number of smaller vessels. 1 Germany has a continuing ship-building programme, governed by a fleet law authorized by the Reichstag. For igi3 there are authorized i battleship, i battle cruiser, 2 cruisers, 12 destroyers. Eventual strength to consist of 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 cruisers, 144 destroyers, 72 submarines. '$78,837,569 authorized to be expended from 1911 to 1917 for the construction of war vessels. 9 Includes vessels of colonies. 18 Russian ship-building programme provides for the completion by 1918 of 4 battle cruisers, 8 small cruisers, 38 destroyers, and 18 submarines. OUR NAVAL REQUIREMENTS ipi ing an advancing enemy in the Atlantic and bring- ing it to action is lamentable. Its power to carry on war in the Asiatic is rendered ineffective by its lack of auxiliaries and a secure base in the far East from which to operate. This lack of preparedness, this failure to build a navy commensurate to our purpose, speaks ill of the effectiveness, in practice, of popular gov- ernment. In the continual strife between the two great rival parties in America, the navy has been the shuttlecock. The indifference of our statesmen has permitted the questions of national defense to become party issues. The difference in method between Germany and the United States in gaining their purpose is one only of degree. By Germany, force is con- sidered the proper instrument, but with us we prefer bluff ! The United States possesses a great empire and has only to preserve it, while Germany must establish her economic independence and security of national supply. Germany was forced to resort to extreme militarism in order to achieve efficiency. Without that efficiency the German Empire would long ago have been destroyed. The United States, on the other hand, is inefficient in organized endeavor of government. Our re- publicanism has developed individualism and char- acter, but has failed to provide us with unity as a nation. 102 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR It has been explained that a fleet is not only for the defense of the nation, but also is the force behind a policy believed to be essential to the growth of the nation. Therefore, those who con- trol the policies of the nation must consult with the naval and military authorities in order to ob- tain their expert advice on the military strength required by the United States to maintain its policies, by war if need be. A policy cannot be maintained through arbitration unless the nation is strong enough to enforce arbitration. 1 Arbitra- tion plus force is a fact, but arbitration without force is a dream. Now the fault lies not only in that our statesmen seldom consult with the naval and military authorities, but in that, when they do obtain their advice, they refuse to accept it and, instead, advance their own opinions as to the country's preparedness, and act upon those opinions. Since 1903 the general board of the navy, whose duty it is to study the fleets of foreign nations and recommend a naval programme to meet our international requirements, has advised the build- ing of two dreadnaughts a year as a minimum. Failing to provide this minimum number for several consecutive years, four were advised. This latter advice has been given each secretary 1 This was most emphatically proved in the case of the Alabama claims after our Civil War. OUR NAVAL REQUIREMENTS 103 of the navy since 1910, but has never been ac- cepted. 1 The result is that we have dropped from second place to third place, and this loss in rank- ing has been not only a material one, but also a moral one, for the personnel of our navy is to-day 1 The general board, in 1904, was instructed to prepare a programme of construction that would assure the United States a navy ade- quate to present requirements and future possibilities. The board submitted its report and proceeded from year to year, in accordance with its instructions, to recommend the number of ships Congress should authorize in order to keep the actual construction up to the requirements of the policy formulated by the board. The ships recommended to Congress from 1904 to 1914, inclusive, included all types from the biggest battleships to colliers. Congress put its "enlightened" civilian wisdom against the scientific knowl- edge of the highly trained members of the general board, and per- sistently cut down the number of ships asked for. How Congress has slighted the advice of the general board, and how Congress it- self has known from year to year that it has been making a travesty of our naval construction policy, are shown by placing in tabular form the recommendations of the general board and the performances of Congress. The following table, covering the period 1904-7, is illustrative of the apathy of the people's representatives: 1904 I9S IQ06 IQ07 Total 4 years Total ships, all types, recommended by general board n; 27 2* 2O 8O O5O Marines Officers 465 177 341 o o Enlisted 21 did C.7OI O QIC o o 1 70 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR This table is illuminating. It reveals an alarm- ing shortage in the personnel of our navy. It shows that the vital need of the navy to-day is men, more men, and still more men. In his hear- ings before the committee on naval affairs of the House of Representatives, last December, the assistant secretary of the navy testified that an immediate increase of 18,000 enlisted men, as a minimum, was necessary to man properly the vessels already on the navy register. And the data above tabulated show us that we are not only short of enlisted men but also in need of offi- cers to lead them. The number of petty officers and enlisted men allowed by Congress by the Act of June 30, 1914, (for the number is fixed by law, since our legis- lators are the final arbiters of all that the navy may have) is 51,500. Not one additional man may the navy enlist in excess of that number. Consequently, although there were, in the fiscal year 1913-14, over 88,900 applicants for enlist- ment in the service, but 18,948 could be accepted because only that number of men in that same period left the service at the expiration of their terms of enlistment, or for other reasons. So that, while the navy is to-day recruited up to the full strength allowed by law, it lacks, nevertheless, over 18,000 men of the full number (70,000) re- quired to properly man our ships. THE PERSONNEL 171 In officers, whose total number and number in each grade are also determined by Congress, we find a similar serious shortage. 1 Thus, for the present, Congress has determined that there shall be 1 8 rear-admirals, 70 captains, 112 commanders, 200 lieutenant-commanders, 350 lieutenants, and over 350 lieutenants junior-grade and ensigns. Since Congress limits the number 06 officers in each grade, promotions from the lower grades can proceed only as fast as vacancies occur from re- tirements on account of age (sixty-two years), or from deaths, disablements, resignations, dismissals, or from other causes. Hence, there exists a situa- tion in which officers enter the service in the lower ranks from the Naval Academy at the rate of from 150 to 200 a year, while in the higher ranks only about 40 leave in each year from the causes above enumerated. The result is that there is an ever-increasing congestion in the lower grades. An officer remains an ensign or a lieutenant junior- grade so long that by the time he is promoted to command rank he is long past his prime and, therefore, not able to do justice to himself or to the service under the more exacting duties and graver responsibilities of the higher grades. 1 Whereas in 1884 there were allowed the navy 1,114 officers (line and engineer) and 8,250 enlisted men, to-day there are authorized 51,500 enlisted men, but only 1,898 officers. In other words, while the enlisted personnel in thirty years was increased 43,250, the num- ber of officers to-day is only 784 greater than hi 1884. 172 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR The personnel question is, then, most vital at the present moment. Until it has been attended to we shall not be able to say that we have a navy ready for war. The training of the enlisted men cannot be accomplished in a few months; it takes years to educate our officers in the professional subjects, and afterward several years more to give them the practical experience essential to supplement their technical knowledge; while in the highly trained warrant officers, those men who have won promotion from the ranks by ability and merit, the navy has a strength so great that they should be encouraged in every way possible. The duty of correcting this evil devolves upon our legislators. Such a remedy has been proposed by the personnel board, appointed by the secre- tary of the navy last July. Will Congress heed the warning cry ?* In addition to the regular enlisted personnel, there should exist also a trained naval reserve such as the great naval powers of Europe have had at their disposal to call upon in time of emergency. But we have no reserves. In time of war we would not even know beforehand the name, ability, or previous training of a single man who might volunteer. For the past six years the Navy Department has asked for legislation au- thorizing the establishment of a naval reserve of 1 See the report of the personnel board, Appendix II. THE PERSONNEL 173 officers and men, but Congress, until recently, turned a deaf ear. Our naval militia is too small in numbers and too limited in its train- ing to provide that numerous and trained body of men which will be needed at the outbreak of hostilities. In such a crisis the navy will need the services of the ex-enlisted men of the service, who, after four years on shipboard, have passed back into civil life. Undoubtedly many of these men would return to the navy in time of war, but Con- gress should anticipate the emergency and provide forthwith for their legal enrollment. In the administration of its personnel, then, as well as in the administration of its material, the navy needs a continuity of policy. This involves the training of both officers and men. And this means even more. For it concerns not only their education and their efficiency, but also their con- tentment, and their pride in a service that glories in the traditions of such men as John Paul Jones, John Barry, Edward Preble, Stephen Decatur, Oliver Hazard Perry, William Barker Gushing, and David Glasgow Farragut. CHAPTER XII EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS MAN, in the development of his mechanical achievements, unconsciously follows the law of evolution. He prefers to go step by step, feeling the way, instead of advancing by leaps and bounds into lands unexplored. The speed of evolution depends, therefore, upon the activity of the times or, in other words, upon the pressure of outside influences. In times of peace the evolution of war-ships has been slow. After each war their progress has accelerated. Each type reaches its fullest devel- opment before a revolution in type occurs. But such revolution in type is made necessary only by the discovery of new or improved methods of offense, or on account of a change of material of which the existing types are built. In the last half-dozen years the evolution of the battleship has been extremely rapid, but it has not, as yet, reached its height. At the present moment, the indications are that the future development will be rather toward a combination of superior speed and gun power than toward armor protection. 174 EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS 175 The vessels with the torpedo as the sole weapon of offense, however, have periodically shaken men's convictions in first-line ships. To-day the submarine again rivets the world's attention. The theme of the small vessel, protected from gun-fire by the natural armor of the ocean, has been the central thought in many flights of the imagination. What may be termed the torpedo peril, is not, however, a new acquaintance. We have met it frequently before ; first in the days of Fulton, then in our Civil War when the spar tor- pedo was designed, and still later when the auto- mobile torpedo surprised the world and gave food to man's imagination. The advent of the automo- bile torpedo threatened the battleship's supremacy as the queen of the seas; yet the battleship did not disappear. It held its own, emerging greater and more powerful. It will be remembered that France, under the spell of this marvellous weapon, feverishly built torpedo craft for a number of years and neglected her battleship fleet. Like all such radical movements, conceived under the impulse of hysteria, the pendulum swung too far. France, believing that her logical enemy was England or Germany, thought that with countless torpedo craft she could sweep the seas. But it was soon shown by less impulsive thinkers that the mastery of the sea was impossible without those great ves- sels armed with large-caliber turret guns, and 176 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR France was obliged to again take up her interrupted battleship-construction programme. This year the torpedo peril is again with us this time cloaked in the submarine. These ves- sels are equipped with Diesel Heavy Oil engines for surface-cruising and electric motor for sub- merged work, and carry torpedoes with heavy explosive charges. These two advances in en- gineering progress have made the submarine more reliable than heretofore, and have demonstrated its usefulness as an arm of the fleet, but not as a substitute for the fleet itself. 1 With the offensive submarine now a certainty, should we continue to build battleships? The new cruising submarine, if a success, may become a serious menace to a battleship fleet, but it does not seem a sufficient menace to stop the construc- tion of those ships which have so long, and in the face of all challengers, held command of the sea. The ultimate aim of war is to command the sea. It is as certain now as always that this command will go to the nation with the most mobile and powerful fleets of all types, each to be used in its J For in the torpedo-boat destroyer there has been developed a defense against the submarine whose value is more pronounced since it is equally effective against the enemy's destroyer and submarine. In this respect, the facility with which the British destroyers have been able to evade submarine attack, and in some cases sink the submarines themselves by ramming and gun-fire, has been one of the unexpected developments of the present war. EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS 177 proper sphere of action. The submarine and the destroyer, armed with long-range torpedoes, are a natural menace to the advancing enemy. But they can be met by changes of construction in the battleship and by the provision of a sufficient number of similar types in our own fleet. In these days of marvellous mechanical and electrical devices, men's imaginations are apt to soar to illimitable heights. But a vessel designed to dive below the surface of the sea is not one upon which to place too much reliance. As long as the nations of the earth are separated by great expanses of ocean there will be a vital necessity for a strong fleet of capital ships. The capital ship may change her shape and the material and methods of her construction. The grand old wooden Victory, Nelson's line-of-battle ship, and the present dreadnaught, New York, may bear little resemblance, yet each, as the distinctive type of her day, stood for the command of the sea. The future mistress of the ocean will, like- wise, be a vessel in which there can be placed the most absolute confidence. She must, therefore, be a thoroughly trustworthy type, capable of keeping the sea in all weathers. She must be habitable for a large crew and be armed with the most powerful weapons. She must be able to take the offensive and defensive against any pos- sible opponent. She must be swift, active, and 178 OUR NAVY AND THE NEXT WAR dependable, and must be able, with the aid of her auxiliaries, to control the entire area through which she will have to operate. Nelson said that his ships of the line were the best diplomats in Europe, and the history of Eng- land proved the truth of that saying. With our own peace assured, we can labor successfully for the peace of the world. But with the will to do this, we should remember that we must have also the power to enforce it. Our proclamation of world policies has imposed upon us great obli- gations, national obligations, of making secure our influence near our own shores and in the eastern Pacific. For this purpose we have but one main defense our navy, if it is adequate, ef- ficient, and well administered. APPENDIX I THE REPORT OF THE GENERAL BOARD DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, GENERAL BOARD, WASHINGTON, November 17, 1914. To: Secretary of the Navy. Subject: Increase of the Navy; building program and personnel, 1916. Reference: Department's indorsement 8557-146 : n, September 22, 1914. Article 167, paragraph 3, United States Navy Regula- tions, 1913, reads a follows: "It (the General Board) shall consider the number and types of ships proper to constitute the fleet, the number and rank of officers, and the number and rating of enlisted men required to man them, and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy respecting the estimates therefor (including such increase as may be requisite) to be submitted an- nually to Congress." The General Board in compliance with duties thus im- posed upon it by this and similar paragraphs in preceding regulations has from year to year recommended to the department a building program and personnel legislation that would, in its opinion, produce a fleet that would be adequate to the needs of the Nation. 179 i8o APPENDIX I 2. In view of conditions now existing the General Board has given particularly careful thought to its recommenda- tions for the coming fiscal year. To make its position clear and place before the department the full meaning of its recommendations, the General Board considers it necessary to review at length all that has preceded these recommendations and led up to them. CONSISTENT POLICY OF GENERAL BOARD SINCE 1903 3. In its letter No. 420-2, of October 17, 1903, the General Board, after mature consideration of our national policies and interests, and of those of the other leading naval nations of the world, expressed its opinion of what the ultimate strength of the United States Navy should be, and recommended a program for the completion of the Navy to the strength then believed adequate by 1919. 4. The basis of the fleet recommended was 48 battle- ships; and lesser units and auxiliaries were recommended in the proportions believed to be best to complete a fighting fleet, in the light of the best information obtainable at that time. The influence of the progress made by new inventions and the discovery of new ideas in the develop- ment of the lesser units have changed the proportions and character of some of these lesser units; and have, to that extent, modified the original recommendations of the General Board. But the fundamental fact that the power of a fleet is to be measured by the number and efficiency of its heavy fighting units, or battleships, has remained unchanged. The recommendations of the General Board heretofore submitted have consistently followed a policy looking to the creation of a fleet founded on a battleship strength of 48, in accordance with its recommendation APPENDIX I 181 made in 1903, of what it considered an adequate fleet to meet the naval needs of the Nation and be an adequate insurance against aggression. 5. The General Board believes that these recommen- dations made from year to year have been both misun- derstood and misconstrued in some quarters. An im- pression prevails that the General Board has always recommended an annual continuing building program of four battleships, with accompanying lesser units and auxil- iaries. A brief analysis of the recommendations made by the General Board, beginning with the original formu- lation of its policy in 1903, to the present time, will demon- strate the error of this impression, and show that the recommendations made were consistent and contem- plated the creation of a battleship fleet of 48 vessels by 1919, but did not involve a constant and fixed program of building four battleships a year. BATTLESHIPS 6. In October, 1903, the Navy had 10 battleships com- pleted and 14 more either under construction or author- ized. The last of these 14 was to be completed by 1907. In view of this condition, and to complete a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919, the General Board in paragraph 8 of its letter of October 17, 1903, recommended: "8. To sum up, the General Board recommends that Congress be requested to authorize for the present a yearly building program, not limited by the amount ap- propriated last year, composed of the following ships: Two battleships, etc." To this letter was appended a table, quoted below, showing what the condition of the Navy would be in bat- tleships, year by year, to 1919, starting with the 10 com- 182 APPENDIX I pleted and 14 already building or authorized, if the recom- mendation of the General Board for a two-battleship per year program from 1904 were followed. YEAR BATTLESHIPS YEAS BATTLESHIPS Com- pleted Author- ized Com- pleted Author- ized IQO3 10 12 17 19 24 26 28 30 32 14 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1912 1913 1014. 34 36 38 40 42 4 i 4 6 4 8 2 2 2 2 1904 IQOS IQO6 1915 1907 1916 1908 1917 1909 I9l8 1010 I9IO I9II 7. It will be seen from the foregoing table that the General Board's recommendation provided for a two- battleship program consistently pursued from 1904 to 1915 to provide a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. In these recommendations replacements were not considered, nor had limits of age been placed on battleships. The funda- mental idea, however, was a two-battleship program to provide a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. A larger pro- gram to hasten the completion of the fleet had been con- sidered, but had been rejected because it was believed a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919 would answer all needs, in view of the known building programs of other coun- tries. 8. In pursuance of this policy the General Board, as stated above, began its yearly recommendations by ask- ing that two battleships be authorized in 1904. The fol- lowing table shows the yearly programs recommended. The reasons for an increase over two battleships annually are given in succeeding paragraphs. APPENDIX I 183 BATTL] :SHIPS BATTL. ESHIPS YEAR Recom- mended by General Board Author- ized by Congress YEAR Recom- mended by General Board Author- ized by Congress IOOA 2 I IOOO 2 IQOC 2 IOIO 2 1006 I IQII 2 IOO7 2 I IOI2 I 1008 2 IQI? I 9. The recommendation for the laying down of two ships in 1904 failed of enactment, and only one was pro- vided for, leaving the program for the creation of a 48- battleship fleet by 1919 one ship in arrears. To make this deficiency good, and maintain the general program, one additional ship, or three in all, were recommended for the 1905 program. Two were authorized, still leaving a deficiency of one for the two years, 1904 and 1905. To provide for this three were again recommended for the 1906 program. In 1906 and again in 1907 one ship only was authorized, leaving by 1908 the general program three ships in arrears. To begin making this deficiency good the General Board for the 1908 program recommended the authorization of four ships. From 1908 to 1911, in- clusive, Congress followed the original program and pro- vided for two battleships yearly. The accumulated shortage of three ships still remained, however, during these four years, and the General Board recommended year by year the laying down of four ships to begin mak- ing this good, since each succeeding year found the short- age still there. 10. In 1910 a new element entered, not considered in the original program. The fleet of 48 battleships con- templated in the program put forward in 1903, on a two- 1 84 APPENDIX I battleship per year building program, to be ready by 1919, contained all battleships then borne on the list, beginning with the Indiana. Experience had not yet in 1903 demonstrated the effective life of battleships, nor had any exhaustive study been made of it. Beginning with the program recommended for 1911 in General Board's letter No. 420-2 of May 24, 1910, this matter was se- riously taken into consideration, since experience had shown that the three older battleships, the Indiana, Massachusetts and Oregon, then 20 years old from date of authorization, were approaching the limit of their effective life. Further studies from our own experience and from that of other navies, and from practice abroad convinced the General Board that the effective life of bat- tleships is about 20 years from time of completion; and that hence, to maintain a fleet at a given strength, it is necessary to lay down a replacement ship 20 years from the time of the laying down of the original ship. Hence, replacement ships for the Indiana, Oregon and Massa- chusetts should have been laid down in 1910, for the Iowa in 1912, and new replacement ships should be begun for the Kentucky and Kearsarge in 1915. These matters, together with the shortage of three battleships already existing in 1911, were taken into consideration by the General Board in making its recommendations for a four-battleship program in both 1912 and 1913. One battleship only was authorized in each of these two years, increasing the shortage in the original program to five, without considering replacement ships for the Indiana, Oregon, Massachusetts and Iowa, already overdue for authorization. ii. The preceding analysis shows clearly the error in the prevailing impression that the General Board has heretofore advocated a navy based on a continuous build- APPENDIX I 185 ing program of four battleships a year, and proves that up to the present it has advocated continuously and con- sistently a program to produce a fleet of 48 battleships by 1919. This would have called for, considering replace- ments, a general two-battleship program with a third added every three years. The number of battleships called for by this policy, 48, and the date set for their completion, by 1919, were fixed by a calm and logical review of the policies and amis of the Nation and the known laws and prospective developments and aims of other countries; and the policy was to provide and main- tain at all times a fleet equal to or superior to that of any nation likely to challenge our policies. 12. The 1903 program given in paragraph 6 of this let- ter, as modified by the replacement policy in 1910, called for at this date, November, 1914: (a) Effective battleships completed and ready for service, less than 20 years old from completion 38 (b) Battleships under construction 7 (c) Battleships authorized in 1914 2 Total 47 13. The actual situation of the fleet as relates to battle- ships at this date, November, 1914, is as follows: (a) Effective battleships completed and ready for service, less than 20 years old from completion (since the sale of the Mississippi and Idaho) 30 (6) Battleships under construction 4 (c) Battleships authorized in 1914 2 (d) To replace Mississippi and Idaho i Total "37 14. This shows that we are now deficient 10 battleships, built, building, and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 program. 1 86 APPENDIX I 15. The General Board has made the foregoing brief analysis to set forth clearly the reasons for and meaning of all the recommendations it has made for battleship con- struction up to this time; and to show the conception under which the General Board has acted in the perform- ance of its duty, under the Regulations, as the responsible advisers of the Secretary in all matters relating to the strength of the fleet, and the number and character of the units composing it. In the matter of battleships, the final result of all recommendations, and of all action taken thereon up to this date, has been to produce a completed battle line of 8 units less than the General Board believed to be safe, and with 2 units less under construction and authorized than was needed to continue the expansion of the fleet to the strength laid down in the policy. 1 6. The General Board believes the policy it has con- sistently advocated for the production of an adequate Navy is to the best interests of the country, and that any Navy less than adequate is an expense to the Nation without being a protection. It cannot, therefore, too strongly urge the adoption by the Government of a policy looking to the making good of the deficiencies of the past, and the building up of this arm of the national defense until it becomes equal to the task that war will put upon it. That point will not be reached until the Navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the strongest prob- able adversary. 17. The wisdom of such a policy is well illustrated by recent events, and is reinforced by the teachings of all history. For a review of the history of all ages will show that no nation has ever created and maintained a great over-sea commerce without the support of sea power. It will further show that trade rivalry, which is the active expression of the most universal of all human traits APPENDIX I 187 desire for gain has been a most fruitful cause of war; and, when the clash has come, the commerce of the weaker sea power has been broken up and driven from the seas. That has been true for all time, and is true to-day; and has a particular bearing on the United States at the present time, when such strenuous efforts are being made to build up a national merchant marine and extend our foreign commerce. 18. In the matter of national defense, history teaches still another great lesson particularly applicable to our- selves. That is, that a nation, insular in character or separated by bodies of water from other nations can and must rely on its Navy when that Navy is adequate for protection and freedom from invasion and may keep its own soil free from all wars other than civil. The United States is one among the few nations of the world that occupy this happy position, being insular in so far as any nation capable of making serious war upon us is concerned, since any opponent that need be considered must come to us from across the seas. Our main defense and protection from invasion must, therefore, always rest with the Navy, which must ever remain our first and best line of defense. This defense, unless adequate, is impotent; and, as before stated, adequacy is not reached until the Navy is strong enough to meet on equal terms the Navy of the strongest probable adversary. 19. In the matter of battleships the General Board re- mains of the opinion that it has always held, that com- mand of the sea can only be gained and held by vessels that can take and keep the sea in all times and in all weathers and overcome the strongest enemy vessels that may be brought against them. Other types are valuable and have their particular uses, all of which are indispensa- ble, but limited in character. But, what has been true 1 88 APPENDIX I throughout all naval wars of the past, and what is equally true to-day, is that the backbone of any navy that can command the sea consists of the strongest sea-going, sea- keeping ships of its day, or, of its battleships. The Gen- eral Board recommends, therefore, in the light of all the information it has up to this present date that the devel- opment of the battleship fleet be continued as the primary aim in naval development, and that four (4) of them be authorized in the 1916 program. DESTROYERS 20. For the general purposes of war on the sea the Gen- eral Board has placed the destroyer as the type of warship next in importance to the battleship, and has based the programs it has recommended on that idea. After very mature consideration of all the elements involved, and a study of the results obtained from fleet maneuvers, the General Board came to the conclusion that a well-balanced fighting fleet, for all the purposes of offense and defense, called for a relative proportion of four destroyers to one battleship. Hence, for every battleship built four de- stroyers should be provided. The General Board still holds this opinion and, therefore, recommends that six- teen (16) destroyers be provided in the 1916 program. FLEET SUBMARINES 21. For several years past all leading navies have been striving to perfect a submarine of an enlarged type with habitability, radius and speed sufficient to enable it to accompany the fleet and act with it tactically, both in offense and defense. Our designers and builders have been devoting their efforts to the same end and are now ready to guarantee such a type and one such vessel was APPENDIX I 189 provided for in the appropriation act of 1914. The great difficulty in the past in the production of this type has been the lack of a reliable internal combustion engine of the requisite power to give the necessary speed. This difficulty has been overcome, and the General Board is assured that engines have been designed and fully tested that will meet the requirements; and the builders stand ready to guarantee the results. The value of such a type in war for distant work with the fleet can hardly be over- estimated, and the General Board recommends that three (3) be provided in the 1916 program. These with the one already authorized, will form a fleet submarine divi- sion of four for work with the fleet and be the beginning of a powerful arm of the fleet. COAST SUBMARINES 22. For the submarine for coast defense and for occa- sional acting with the fleet in home waters, the General Board sees no necessity for boats of as great speed and size as the later designs, made before the sea-going sub- marine was believed to be in sight. In fact, any increase of size is detrimental, in that it increases draft and debars them from shallow waters; and any increase of speed in this class of submarines is not needed, and is gained at the expense of other desirable qualities. Between the coast-defense submarine and the submarine of sufficient size, radius, habitability and surface speed to accompany and act with the fleet tactically, the General Board sees no necessity in naval warfare for an intermediate type. It is therefore recommended that the submarines for the coast work be of the general characteristics already pre- scribed in General Board letter No. 420-15, of June 10, 1914, and that sixteen (16) of these be provided for in the 1916 program. igo APPENDIX I SCOUT CRUISERS 23. In the struggle to build up the purely distinctive fighting ships of the Navy battleships, destroyers and submarines the cruising and scouting element of the fleet has been neglected in recent years, and no cruisers or scouts have been provided for since 1904, when the Mon- tana, North Carolina, Birmingham, Chester and Salem were authorized. This leaves the fleet peculiarly lacking in this element so necessary for information in a naval cam- paign, and of such great value in clearing the sea of tor- pedo and mining craft, in opening and protecting routes of trade for our own commerce, and in closing and pro- hibiting such routes to the commerce of the enemy. The General Board believes that this branch of the fleet has been too long neglected and recommends that the con- struction of this important and necessary type be resumed. For the 1916 program it is recommended that four (4) scout cruisers be provided. AIR CRAFT 24. The General Board in its endorsement No. 449 of August 30, 1913, and accompanying memorandum brought to the attention of the department the dangerous situa- tion of the country in the lack of air craft and air men in both the naval and military services. A resume was given in that endorsement with the accompanying memorandum of conditions in the leading countries abroad at that date, showing the preparations being made for air warfare and the use of air craft by both armies and navies, and con- trasting their activity with our own inactivity. Certain recommendations were made in the same endorsement looking to the beginning of the establishment of a proper air service for the Navy. APPENDIX I 191 25 The total result of that effort was the appointment of a board on aeronautics October 9, 1913. That board made further recommendations, among them the estab- lishment of an aeronautic school and station at Pensacola and the purchase of 50 aeroplanes, i fleet dirigible and 2 small dirigibles for training. At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of air craft of any kind owned by the Navy consists of 12 aeroplanes, not more than two of which are of the same type, and all re- ported to have too little speed and carrying capacity for service work. 26. In view of the advance that has been made in aero- nautics during the past year, and the demonstration now being made of the vital importance of a proper air service to both land and sea warfare, our present situation can be described as nothing less than deplorable. As now devel- oped air craft are the eyes of both armies and navies, and it is difficult to place any limit to their offensive possibilities. 27. In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind. We would be without the means of detecting the presence of submarines or mine fields or of attempting direct attack on the enemy from the air, while our own movements would be an open book to him. The General Board can not too strongly urge that] the department's most serious thought be given to this matter, and that immediate steps be taken to remedy it, and recom- mends that Congress be asked for an appropriation of at least $5,000,000, to be made available immediately, for the purpose of establishing an efficient air service. GUNBOATS 28. The Navy is very deficient in gunboats. Though the Navy list gives 30 names under "gunboats," only a 192 APPENDIX I very limited number of these 30 are in a condition to be available for general service. Some, like the Villalobos, Callao, Samar, Sandoval, etc., are old boats of little value taken over from Spain, of from 400 to 250 tons and less. Of the others, with the exception of the light-draft river gunboats Monocacy and Polos, and the Sacramento, no gunboats have been authorized since 1902. Seven are at present assigned to Naval Militia duty, and three others have been recently withdrawn from that service because of the crying need for more gunboats for general duty. Those remaining on the list serviceable and fit for general duty are so limited in number that it has been necessary in recent years to detail battleships, large cruisers and destroyers to do gunboat duty. This has been markedly demonstrated during the past year on the Mexican coast. It would seem superfluous to point out the harmful in- fluence this has on the efficiency and training of the fleet for war and the General Board advises strongly against such practice whenever it can be possibly avoided. It is therefore recommended that a beginning be made to re- place the old and worn-out gunboats, that there may be sufficient of them to do the police and general diplomatic duties required of such vessels in time of peace without disrupting the battle fleet. To this end it is recommended that four (4) be authorized in the 1916 program. With the exception of the Sacramento, authorized in 1911, no seagoing gunboat has been authorized since 1902. AUXILIARIES FUEL SHIPS 29. In the matter of auxiliaries needed for the fleet the General Board is of the opinion that the most serious situation exists in the matter of fuel-oil supply, and that APPENDIX I 193 provision for oil-fuel ships should be given first considera- tion. This is serious from the point of view of economy in time of peace, and would be disastrous in the event of hostilities arising. We have 41 oil-burning destroyers built or building, to be followed by others, 8 ships of the dreadnaught type using oil as an auxiliary fuel, and in 1915 the two first all-oil-fuel battleships will be added to the fleet, to be followed by others. To supply this oil- burning fleet with fuel the Navy possesses the Arethusa, an old tank ship of 3,629 tons capacity and not more than 10 knots speed, and seven fleet colliers fitted to carry some fuel oil in addition. The total oil capacity is 23,728 tons, 3,629 tons of which that in the Arethusa could not accompany the fleet; so that the present available 011 supply that could accompany the fleet is 20,109 tons. Logistic studies show that to maintain our present oil- burning fleet in active service across the ocean requires the delivery of about 23,000 tons of fuel oil per month. To maintain this supply we have the seven colliers men- tioned above capable of delivering an average of about 10,000 tons per month. This situation will be very much aggravated on the addition to the fleet of the two all- oil-burning battleships, Oklahoma and Nevada, and the other destroyers now under construction. Nor can com- mercial oil carriers be relied upon to remedy this deficiency, since ocean tankage both at home and abroad is not yet adequate to meet the demands of commerce and industry. 30. To partially meet this situation two oil-fuel ships of a combined cargo capacity of 15,108 tons were author- ized in August, 1912. On November i, 1914, one of these ships was only 82.4 per cent completed and the other only 57.2 per cent completed. 31. To remedy this serious defect in our preparedness for war the General Board recommended the construction 194 APPENDIX I of two (2) oil-fuel ships in the 1915 program. These were not authorized and the General Board therefore emphatic- ally repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program, and further recommends that the construction of the two ships authorized in August, 1912, more than two years ago, be hastened with all possible speed. DESTROYER TENDERS AND SUBMARINE TENDERS 32. The auxiliaries of next importance to the fleet at the present time, after the oil-fuel ships, are destroyer tenders and submarine tenders. Of the three improvised vessels used as destroyer tenders the Iris, built in 1885, is past her period of usefulness and should be replaced. The General Board recommended one (i) destroyer tender in the 1915 program. This was not authorized, and the recommendation is repeated for the 1916 program. 33. Of the six vessels used as submarine tenders, all are of the improvised variety, and none is well fitted for the service. Three of them are old monitors, two of them old gunboats, and one the old sailing ship Severn. To begin replacing these, one submarine tender was author- ized in 1911, another in 1912, and one (i) was recom- mended in 1913 for the 1915 program. This last was not authorized, and this recommendation is repeated for the 1916 program. TRANSPORTS 34. The General Board has from time to time, in nu- merous letters extending over a series of years, called the attention of the department to the inadequacy of prepa- ration in the Navy for advanced base work and to the vital importance of this work to success in war. The prerequisite for any advanced base work is the necessary APPENDIX I 195 means for transportation of the personnel and material of the advanced base outfit; and for this reason the General Board has recommended the construction of the two transports needed for the purpose ships of the size and speed necessary and especially designed for what they were intended to accomplish. Their primary use was to be for war, but secondarily they could be used in general transportation service at all times. Not one of the four improvised transports now in service in the Navy -the Hancock, Rainbow, Prairie and Buffalo is of the size, or is fitted, for the work required, nor of the character of construction needed for safety in ships carrying large bodies of men. All are old single-skin ships without proper water-tight subdivision. Of the two transports needed, one was authorized in 1913, and the other recom- mended in the 1915 program. This was not authorized, and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program. HOSPITAL SHIP 35. The General Board in making the foregoing recom- mendations has given preference to what is needed for the fighting efficiency of the fleet over all other matters. Two other types of auxiliaries, however, are required for the successful administration of the fleet hospital and supply ships. 36. The two hospital ships now borne on the Navy list the Solace and the Relief are both improvised and small, and neither adapted to the service. They have done good service in time of peace in connection with subdivisions of the fleet, but the Relief is now unseaworthy and the Solace would be of limited value in time of war. To remedy this defect, the General Board recommended the construction of one (i) hospital ship in the 1915 pro- 196 APPENDIX I gram. This was not authorized, and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program. SUPPLY SHIPS 37. Of the four ships borne on the Navy list as supply ships, all are improvised and were hurriedly bought and fitted in 1898 to meet the exigencies of the Spanish War. The Supply is already beyond her period of usefulness, and has been discarded as a supply ship. The Culgoa is approaching her limit of usefulness. The Celtic and Glacier, while old and inadequately fitted, are still good for some years service. One new ship was authorized in 1913. Another is needed, and to meet this situation the General Board recommended the construction of one (i) supply ship in the 1915 program. This was not authorized and the General Board repeats this recommendation for the 1916 program. SUMMARY 38. To summarize, the General Board recommends for the 1916 program 4 battleships. 1 6 destroyers. 3 fleet submarines. 1 6 coast submarines. 4 scouts. 4 gunboats. 2 oil-fuel ships, i destroyer tender. i submarine tender, i Navy transport, i hospital ship, i supply ship. Air service $5,000,000. APPENDIX I 197 PERSONNEL 39. The General Board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the Gen- eral Board, made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list and trained reserve, equal to the manning of the fleet for war. 40. In the opinion of the General Board this is a matter of even more serious import than that of construction, for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. The training needed for the pur- pose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities; and any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel whose existence leads only to a false sense of security. 41. The strength of fleets is measured too often in the public mind by the number and tonnage of its material units. The real strength of a fleet is a combination of its personnel with their skill and training and its material; and of these two elements the more important the per- sonnel is too often forgotten and neglected in making provision for our fleet. The General Board can not im- press this point too strongly on the department or recom- mend too earnestly that every effort be made to correct it, and that legislation be urged to provide for a personnel on the active list, supplemented by a trained reserve, sufficient to man every vessel of the fleet when the call comes. 198 APPENDIX I 42. No nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its Navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men, sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a material condition for war; and in addition a trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies, and furnish a reserve for casualties. Thus, every nation with which conflict is possible is prepared to mobilize its entire navy, by order, with officers and men trained for the service. We alone of the naval powers provide no such reserves, and an active personnel too scant, and trust to the filling of the complements of our ships by untrained men recruited after war is imminent or declared. To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war (including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary) with trained crews is impossible owing to the absence of a trained reserve. 43. In view of all that has been herein set forth, the General Board recommends: (a) That legislation be asked for providing an active personnel, officers and enlisted force, capable of keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers and all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet; and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that would be used in time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore stations. (b) That the general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the expansion of the fleet in the proportions indicated in (a). APPENDIX I 199 (c) That immediate steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and men, and that this work be pushed until this reserve in connection with the Naval Militia has reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be possible to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent ad- ditional for casualties. (d) That the Naval Militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage the continuance and im- provement of its training to the end that it may still more efficiently serve to re-inforce the regular service at need. GEORGE DEWEY. APPENDIX II THE REPORT OF BOARD ON INCREASED EFFI- CIENCY OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, WASHINGTON, January 23, 1915. From: The Personnel Board. To: The Secretary of the Navy. Subject: Report of the board. 1. The Board on Increased Efficiency of the Personnel of the Navy submits herewith the draft of a bill to pro- vide for proper distribution of officers of the Navy in the various grades in accordance with the needs of the ser- vice; to insure a uniform flow of promotion; and to give all officers equal opportunity for advancement. 2. The bill abolishes the so-called plucking board. In lieu thereof it establishes the principle of promotion by competitive methods and the selection of the most effi- cient, together with the creation of an active reserve list for those officers not chosen for promotion. Officers placed on this reserve list will continue to render active service but will not be promoted except for special meri- torious services. 3. The competitive method of promotion recognizes three factors: First, professional knowledge; second, the official record of past performances; and, third, service 200 APPENDIX II 201 opinion obtained from the recommendations of officers senior in the service. 4. The paramount problem in all matters relating to personnel is that of fairly disposing of the unavoidable surplus of officers from the lower grades as they pass to and through the upper grades. As to the existence of this surplus, it is sufficient to refer to the fact that the complement of a battleship contains one captain and from 10 to 15 ensigns. The experience of our Navy has shown that out of 150 ensigns fresh from the Naval Acad- emy there will be at the end of 34 years but 5 needed for the grade of rear admiral. The experience of other nations is in substantial agreement. Death and disability will not sufficiently reduce the original numbers; artificial means must therefore be resorted to. 5. Under the system we propose a midshipman on entering the Naval Academy becomes a member of a class varying in number from 250 to 300. After four years' work, with the consequent elimination of the least fit, about 150 should be taken into the service as ensigns at an average age of about 22. After three years' ser- vice as ensign a competitive examination will be held, establishing their order of merit. Of the original 150, then reduced by natural causes to about 135, 100 will be continued in the line of the Navy and approximately 25 others in the Pay, Construction, Civil Engineer, and Marine Corps. The remaining ensigns, approximately 10 yearly those at the bottom will be honorably dis- charged with one year's pay, as was the case for many years in the past with surplus midshipmen. 6. The 100 ensigns remaining in the line will be com- missioned lieutenants (junior grade). At the end of six years those remaining will be promoted to the grade of lieutenant subject to the usual examinations. They will 202 APPENDIX II remain in the grade of lieutenant for a similar period of six years, those remaining will become candidates for promotion. At this point will begin the process of pro- motion by selection and the transfer to the active reserve list of those not promoted. Normally two out of every three lieutenants will be promoted to the grade of lieu- tenant commander, and the length of service in this grade is also six years. At the end of that period those remain- ing will become candidates for promotion to the grade of commander. About one-half will be promoted and the other half transferred to the active reserve list. Those promoted will serve as commanders for six years. About one-half will then be promoted in the same manner to the grade of captain. Seven years is the period of service prescribed for captain, and the class originally composed of 150 ensigns will, on arriving at the top of the list of captains at the end of 34 years' service, be reduced to approximately 10 on the active list. Of this number 5 will go up to the grade of rear admiral and the remainder will be placed on the active reserve list. 7. The foregoing outline applies to the normal course after the proposed system is in full operation. Existing "humps" in the personnel of the service will take a number of years to smooth out, but it is believed that the process laid down will be carried on with the greatest possible fairness to the officers affected. For a number of years to come the transfers to the active reserve list will be less numerous than when the bill is in full operation, especially transfers from the lower grades. 8. The same general principles applied to the line of the Navy have been applied to the various staff corps. 9. In like manner provision is made for the advance- ment to the grade of master of the most efficient commis- sioned warrant officers. The board believes that the APPENDIX II 203 principle of promotion by selection after fair competition should apply to their case as recommended for all other officers. As a further step, all masters who are qualified will enter the line or the various staff corps with the rank of lieutenant (junior grade), in the line of promotion. This is in addition to the opportunities now afforded by law. 10. This board is directed by the precept creating it not to consider increases in the total number of officers now provided by law and to recommend as small increase in cost as may be practicable. After consideration of practically the entire history of personnel proposals and legislation, the board believe that it has arrived at a most economical plan to accomplish the purpose, although efficiency has been the primary consideration. 11. Special attention is invited to the fact that any in- crease or decrease in the personnel which Congress may desire to make in the future can be effected without change in the general plan. 12. To sum up: The bill provides for proper distribu- tion in grades, for uniform and fair promotion at proper ages, without material increase in cost. Detailed esti- mates of cost, etc., and a discussion of the bill by para- graphs will appear as an appendix to this report. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Senior Member. VICTOR BLUE, Chief of Bureau of Navigation, Member. D. W. TAYLOR, Chief of Bureau of Construction and Repair, Member. C. M. AUSTIN, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Recorder. APPENDIX III THE PRICE OF UNPREPAREDNESS The faulty military policy of the United States in re- fusing to keep a sufficiently large trained force of soldiers and upon the outbreak of war calling great numbers of un- trained recruits to the colors, has been the cause of vast expenditures. Thousands of men have been enlisted in even our smallest wars to serve for only a short time. The consequence has been that a great many more men have been risked in a war than really were necessary. These untried and untrained masses have been sent out to do battle, and have been slaughtered on every battle- field. Trained troops will stand until one- third have been annihilated, but untrained troops will break and run some- times at the first shot. This is the reason why great masses have been employed in our wars, and is the reason why the sum of our pensions has been so tremendous. The history of the sums expended by our government for pensions for each of our wars since 1790 spells a sad experience: The Revolutionary .War $70,000,000 The War of 1812 45,923,014 The Indian Wars 12,241,273 The War with Mexico 47,632,572 The Civil War 4,294,596,944 The War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection. 42,185,230 Regular established and sundries 44,960,800 $4,557*539,833 204 APPENDIX III 205 In 1866 there were 126,722 pensioners. In 1897, just before the war with Spain, there were 993,714 names on the pension roll. After the war with Spain, in 1902, this number had increased to 999,446, and that number is still increasing, although fifty years have passed since the Civil War was over, and the veterans of that struggle are to-day dying at the rate of 35,000 a year. It has cost the country, since 1866, $125,871,965 sim- ply to maintain the Bureau of Pensions through which the pensioners receive their money. This is the price we have already paid for non-preparation. DATE AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS OVERDUE. LD 21-95m-7,'37 r/<1* YC 03057 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY