.3 
 
 m 
 
 MC-NRLF 
 
 GOV. TAZEWELL S 
 
 REVIEW OF 
 
 RESIDENT JACKSON S 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 
 

 /!/ 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE PROCLAMATION 
 
 OF 
 
 PRKSIDKNT JACKSON 
 
 OF THE 
 
 OK DECEMBER, 1832,1 
 
 IN A 
 
 SERIES OF NUMBERS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE "NORFOLK 
 AND PORTSMOUTH HERALD," 
 
 UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF "A VIRGINIAN." 
 
 HON. LITTLETON WALLER TAZEWELL. 
 
 NORFOLK : 
 J. D. GtllS 
 
 1888. 
 

 
 PRESS OF 
 
 EDWARD O. JENKINS* 
 NEW YORK. 
 
A REVIEW OF THE PROCLAMATION OF 
 PRESIDENT JACKSON. 
 
 i. 
 
 NORFOLK, December 28, 1832. 
 
 THE recent Proclamation of the President of the United States^ 
 in denying the correctness of certain propositions that have ever 
 been held (in Virginia, at least,) as fundamental truths of consti 
 tutional law, and by affirming, in the confident language of au 
 thority, the propriety and justice of other propositions, which we, 
 of Virginia, have ever regarded as political heresies, seems to de 
 mand of some Virginian to review these, his various assertions. 
 
 I have waited ever since the Proclamation first appeared, in the 
 hope that some one more disposed and better qualified to perform 
 such a task, would undertake it ; but as none such has yet done 
 so, even I will essay its performance. In doing so, my sole object, 
 is Truth ; the sole means I shall employ for its attainment, will 
 be reason and fair argument ; the sole authorities upon which I 
 shall rely, will be the History of our country for my facts, and its 
 Constitution for my principles. 
 
 AVhen the occasion that has induced this Proclamation shall 
 have passed away (as pass away it must), the questions raised by 
 the President will still remain. 
 
 They have become the property of History. No matter how 
 these questions may be now settled or disposed of, they will still 
 arise hereafter as problems of deep interest in political philosophy^ 
 to occupy the anxious reflections of statesmen yet unborn, as they 
 have employed heretofore the solemn meditations of the wisest 
 
 250577 
 
4 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 and best amongst ns who are now no more. Seen through the 
 
 O O 
 
 long vista of Time, the meanings of the -several personal allusions 
 which darken the surface of this State paper, will not then be un 
 derstood ; the faults of its style will be then concealed by the 
 rust, or ascribed to the prevailing taste of other days ; even the 
 spirit in which it is conceived will not be discerned, nor its im 
 mediate objects regarded. Under such a light do I now wish to 
 examine it ; and, disregarding everything but it? doctrines, I pro 
 pose calmly to inquire: Are these true? I may hereafter, per 
 haps, institute another inquiry as to the authority of the Chief 
 Magistrate of such a government as that of the United States, to 
 utter ex cathedra any dogmas whatever; and as to the probable 
 effects of such a novel practice in this country, even if it is con 
 ceded that the dogmas so proclaimed may be true. 
 
 But as this is a matter of minor importance, and in its nature 
 is properly consecutive of the first inquiry, I merely announce it 
 now, to show that I have not overlooked a great question, which, 
 under a different view of this subject than that which I propose 
 to take, would present itself naturally at the very threshold. 
 
 As preliminary to the examination of the questions I have sta 
 ted (which examination may very possibly be drawn out through 
 several numbers), it will be necessary to offer a few brief and very 
 general remarks upon the nature and objects of all governments, 
 arid upon some of the peculiar characters of our own. 
 
 These will constitute the matter of this number, which is de 
 signed as merely introductory of my intended investigation. 
 
 No history records, nor any tradition even faintly preserves, the 
 commencement of that struggle between Power and Right, which 
 has continued unceasingly to this day, and must still go on while 
 man is but man. 
 
 Founded upon this long experience, is the general truth winch 
 so many particular examples illustrate, that whoever is possessed 
 of authority will probably abuse it. 
 
 But as in a world compounded of good and evil, Right can 
 never be long preserved, except by Power, the securities of Right 
 must necessarily be confided to the custody of Power, although 
 man is certain that this will be perverted, and often misemployed. 
 It is better to trust the flock to the dog, although we know that 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 5 
 
 he will, and does, worry it, than to leave it defenceless against the 
 insatiable voracity of the^evouring wolf. 
 
 In yielding to the necessity of committing the preservation of 
 Right to the care of Power, man has always endeavored so to 
 muzzle and shackle Power, as that while its strength might re 
 main unimpaired for the attainment of good, it should be impo 
 tent to accomplish any evil. 
 
 Free government is the device to attain this desirable end; and 
 the various forms under which such governments have existed 
 throughout all time, are but different inventions to accomplish the 
 same purpose. 
 
 Parental affection, the obligations of Religion, the precepts of 
 Education, and the division of authorities, all, all have been tried, 
 in past time, singly, and in every sort of combination which inge 
 nuity could suggest, as checks and limitations of Power ; but they 
 were all tried in vain. Power granted to protect Eight has al 
 ways proved unmindful of its charge. Sooner or later it has con 
 trived to rid itself of the shackles imposed upon it ; and govern 
 ors, even when but the creatures and agents of society, have be 
 lieved themselves born to command it, and have somehow or other 
 become its Lords and its Masters. 
 
 Although always disappointed and defeated, yet Patriotism lias 
 never relinquished her hope of ultimate success. 
 
 In every new state of things, she has presented some new 
 scheme, to remedy the known defects of her former plans, and to 
 prevent their recurrence. For a long time nature herself seemed 
 to oppose these devices, and to present her immutable la\vs as 
 obstacles not to be overcome by the wisdom of the most enlight 
 ened sages. That the People should govern themselves, directly 
 and immediately, was one of the experiments of Antiquity, which 
 experience soon proved to them, could never be applied, with any 
 hope of success, to any territory of wide extent, because it was 
 impossible to gather together the people of such a territory, either 
 as often, or as promptly, as their necessities required ; and even 
 if this was possible, their numbers would be too great for useful 
 deliberation. Hence, it was a maxim of one of the wisest of the 
 Greek Philosophers, that extent of territory was incompatible 
 with the existence of a Republican Government. The same Phi- 
 
6 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 losopher lived to see a small territory fall an easy prey tp the am 
 bition of a more powerful neighbor. Fme government, therefore, 
 seemed to be prohibited to mankind. 
 
 Centuries rolled by after the annunciation of this supposed po 
 litical maxim, and it still continued undenied and undoubted by 
 the learned. At length, Barbarism enveloped the better part of 
 the civilized world, and the, torch of Science was extinguished. 
 It is in these dark ages, when the light of Science had ceased to 
 shine upon a benighted world, that the historian first sees a new 
 Star appear, to shed its lustre upon humanity. 
 
 Feeble were its rays at first, but they were soon collected by 
 the watchful industry of Patriotism, and their heat then sufficed 
 to rekindle the expired vestal flame of Liberty and Right, which 
 has never since ceased to burn bright and clear. Learning may 
 continue to deplore her losses by the ravages of the Gothic con 
 querors of the Western Empire, but Freedom finds ample com 
 pensation for this loss, in their great invention of Representative 
 Government, and its necessary companion, Trial by Jury. 
 
 The present generation is not indebted to their barbarian pro-, 
 genitors for the inestimable blessing of Representative government 
 only. To our Anglo-Saxon ancestors we also owe the invention 
 of written Charters, the beet guarantees of Liberty, while those 
 who freely give, or those who bravely exact them, have the wis 
 dom to understand the nature of the grants, and the firmness to 
 preserve their provisions inviolate. Under such Charters, extorted 
 from their Kings by the clear heads and stout hearts of their 
 English ancestors, do their posterity enjoy all of Liberty now felt 
 in Great Britain. To the sensitive jealousy always manifested 
 by that people, at any attempt to violate the conditions of these 
 grants, is the world indebted for the first idea of Constitutional 
 Law, and legal Liberty. 
 
 The violation of this Liberty brought one King of Great Britain 
 to the block, to atone with his blood for the crimes he had com 
 mitted against its sacred guarantees. The attempted violation of 
 this Law, hurled another from his throne, to expiate in exile his 
 intended sins against the charters. Such is the foundation of 
 British liberty, and such the means by which it was, and is still, 
 secured. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 7 
 
 When North America was first colonized by Great Britain, our 
 forefathers settled here under the protection of written Charters, 
 in each of which were they assured the full enjoyment of all the 
 rights of free-born British subjects. These rights were trampled 
 upon by the power of the mother country ; and we were then too 
 weak to protect them. But time rolled on, and we became 
 stronger. Former submission provoked (as it always does) new 
 aggressions. We first petitioned our Sovereign for relief, but he 
 was deaf to cur prayers. We then called upon our fellow-sub 
 jects to assist us in obtaining redress and security, but they, too, 
 were heedless of our applications. 
 
 They so forced us to appeal to the God of battles, and in inde 
 pendence we wrung from our oppressors that which, had they 
 have granted at first to our just supplications, might possibly have 
 preserved much longer its richest jewel in the British Crown. 
 
 The chartered rights of British subjects were ours. Of these 
 rights we had been unjustly deprived. Like our common ances 
 tors, we demanded them in battle, and like them, by battle we 
 obtained them. 
 
 Although the acquisition was sealed with some of our best blood, 
 yet all knew it would be of little avail, if not secured by as much 
 of wisdom and of valour as had been evinced in the purchase. 
 
 Therefore, to preserve and perpetuate that Liberty which had 
 so been earned, our wisest citizens were assembled to devise a 
 form of government. To these assemblages are we indebted for 
 all our original constitutions, the peculiar characters of some of 
 which charters, it shall be the purpose of my future numbers to 
 display. 
 
 At present, I will merely say, that they were all the new in 
 ventions of most profound wisdom, designed to embody all that 
 experience had shown to be useful, in any of the institutions of 
 other times, arid to apply it to the particular condition of this 
 country then. 
 
 The Democratic form had presented the beau ideal of govern 
 ment to many of the wisest of the ancient political philoso 
 phers, because, under this form of government, the Rights of the 
 people were guarded by the Power of the people ; and it was not 
 to be believed that such Trustees could ever prove false to such a 
 
8 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 Trust. But experience had taught even these Philosophers, that 
 under such a government, a small State could not defend itself 
 with sufficient vigour against the sudden assault of a more power 
 ful neighbour ; and their own a priori reasoning had convinced 
 them, that the principles of a Democracy could not be usefully ap 
 plied to a wide, extended empire. Gothic knowledge, however, had 
 achieved what Grecian and Roman learning had in vain attempt 
 ed. In devising Representative government, it had obviated all 
 the objections to a Democracy which antiquity had felt or seen. 
 Hence, a Representative Democracy was everywhere adopted by 
 the sagacity of the American statesmen, as that form of govern 
 ment most approved by the wisdom of the past, and best suited to 
 the particular condition of our country at that time. 
 
 The origin of all former governments of this kind (if, indeed, 
 any such had ever been), was hidden by the ignorance of the bar 
 barian people with whom they had existed, or so imperfectly ex 
 hibited to modern view, as to enable us only to infer that origin, 
 from the subsequent references to its supposed ancient features. 
 
 Most conspicuous amongst these references was that to the an 
 cient positive compacts between the governors and governed, 
 whereby the rights of all were supposed to be expressly declared 
 and consecrated. 
 
 Whether such compacts had at first any other than a presumed 
 existence, was a matter which, however interesting to the Anti 
 quarian, was of little concern to the Patriot. Time had stamped 
 the presumption (if it was such) with the authenticity of Truth ; 
 and in all his references to them, the sagacious statesman of ancient 
 days regarded them as the solemn expressed assurances of the rights 
 of the governed, to be guarded by them with all vigilance, and 
 sealed anew, if necessary, with their best blood Nolumus leges 
 A.ngli(E mutari quce hucus que usitatce sunt et approbates, was the 
 language of British freemen, who, trusting to their own vigour to 
 maintain them, preferred to hold their rights under the customs 
 of a time beyond which the memory of man runneth not, rather 
 than to expose them to the cavil and artifice of insidious construc 
 tion. Hence, all the instruments of British legislation designed 
 to secure rights to the People, from the great charter of Runny- 
 jnede, to the last act of Parliament which established the House 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JAOKSON. 9 
 
 of Brunswick on the throne by the free voice of the people of 
 Great Britain, all are but declaratory Laws, not professing to give 
 what the people had not before, but merely to assure rights which 
 had been theirs in all time past. 
 
 The wisdom of this example, although duly appreciated here, 
 could not be imitated exactly in our country ; but it taught a les 
 son which American Patriots improved. The monarchy of Eng 
 land was of an origin so ancient, as to defy any search for its 
 primitive foundations. The prerogatives of the Crown and the 
 privileges of the People both rested upon the same base, imme 
 morial tisane. All the declarations of what these were and ever 
 
 o 
 
 had been, (no matter how such declarations were obtained,) pro 
 ceeded from an existing and acknowledged sovereign, seeming at 
 least to limit its own power by declaring it. But the American 
 assertion of Independence, in dissolving our connection with the 
 government of the mother country, left us no substitute for that, 
 and so imposed upon us the necessity of establishing a new gov 
 ernment for ourselves. A government thus created, could have 
 no powers derivable from custom : could have no authorities but 
 such as should be bestowed upon it in terms, by its creators. 
 While these creators, in the very fact of establishing a new gov 
 ernment for themselves, thereby asserted and manifested their 
 pre-existing Right to do so. Hence, it resulted, and from necessi 
 ty too, that while all the Powers of all our governments are deriv 
 ative and temporary, the Rights of those who created these gov 
 ernments are self-existent and eternal. 
 
 Therefore, in each of these United States, the People by whom 
 all our governments were created and established, are the only le 
 gitimate Sovereign. Governors and Magistrates of all sorts, are 
 but the agents and servants of these their creators, appointed to 
 attain the good of the People, by the exercise cf the powers and 
 authorities granted to them for that purpose by the People, and 
 responsible to the People for the manner in which all these du 
 ties have been performed or neglected. In the relations between 
 such a Sovereign and such its agents, the idea of a compact of any 
 kind, can lind no place. In governments whose powers rest upon 
 force, the victor sovereign may grant to its vanquished subjects, 
 rights and immunities, which being designed for the benefit of 
 
10 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 the grantees, constitute a limit upon the authority of the grantor 
 in being irrevocable. Such grants may well be termed compacts 
 between the granting Sovereign and his accepting subjects, 
 solemn agreements which neither party may of right alter, with 
 out the consent of the other. So too, in governments of unknown 
 antiquity, according to the theory of whose unwritten law the 
 governors are omnipotent, even if this vast power be derived not 
 from force but from consent, this very consent constitutes a sol 
 emn compact. 
 
 In this country, however, none of whose governments have 
 been established by force ; where the origin of all is the creation 
 of but yesterday, governors can filch no Power, or the governed 
 l.ose any Right in the gloomy obscurity and uncertainty of an 
 tiquity. Here everything is clear as was the light of that 
 blessed day on which was proclaimed the sacred truths, that here 
 the People are the only Sovereign of the People; that here mag 
 istrates of all sorts are but the agents and servants of this Sover 
 eign, called into being by its fiat, solely for its own benefit, de 
 riving all their authority from its grants, which grants are revoca 
 ble at the pleasure of the grantors, because intended solely for 
 their own good. But the idea of a compact, lawfully revocable at 
 the will of one of the parties, would be a legal paradox, not less 
 absurd than the moral absurdity of a compact between a creator 
 and his mere creature formed for the Creator s own use. 
 
 It results from all this, that whatever of truth there may be in 
 the theory of the political Philosophers of the old world, which 
 considers government there as a compact between the governors 
 and the governed, no such theory can be true here. 
 
 JSTone of our governments can ever be considered as such 
 contracts. 
 
 They are mere revocable procurations, simple delegations of 
 limited and temporary authority, executed by the Sovereign 
 People to their attornies, which agents are thereby authorized 
 and required by their constituents, to accomplish certain pur 
 poses, by certain defined means, the constituents thereby allowing 
 and confirming whatsoever shall be done by their attornies, under 
 this power, and in pursuance of its authorities, but nothing else. 
 Here governors can derive no power jure divino, for they are 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 11 
 
 known to be the mere creatures of man s will, and designed for 
 his use. Here they can claim no omnipotent authority, for the 
 People created them, and the creator must be superior to his 
 creature. 
 
 Here every legitimate power exercised by governors must be 
 derived from grant, and when so derived, it is of course defined 
 and limited. 
 
 Here the People gave all that is given, may take away at their 
 pleasure all that they have given, and we all unite in calling 
 down blessings upon that Sovereign People. 
 
 B 7 jt who is this mighty and blessed and Sovereign People, 
 authors and preservers of the most stupendous work of human in 
 vention for the security and perpetuation of the liberty of man ? 
 
 The answer to this enquiry shall constitute the subject of my 
 next number. 
 
12 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 II. 
 
 NORFOLK, December 31, 1832. 
 
 WHO constitute that great Corporation and body politic I have 
 called The People, which all in these now United States concur 
 in freely acknowledging as their liege Lord and only earthly sov 
 ereign by whose fiat all our governments have been created 
 and endowed, and at whose will they may at any time be 
 rightfully dissolved and annihilated ? This is the question, which 
 in my last number I promised to examine in this; and I now will 
 proceed to redeem my pledge. 
 
 ~No American is so ignorant of the history of his own country, 
 as not to know, that prior to the commencement of onr Revolu 
 tion, there did not exist anywhere on this vast continent, such a 
 body politic as The People. Then whoever dwelt in America, 
 was either a savage Indian, or the liege subject of some European 
 Sovereign. None of the various savage Tribes who wandered 
 over the surface of much of this continent, had then ever regard 
 ed themselves, or been regarded by any others as constituting a 
 fixed Society acknowledging allegiance to any Sovereign, or as 
 constituting that moral and accountable being called a State. 
 Had any civilized man or set of men presumed, at that time, to 
 assert his or their sovereignty here, the assertion would have been 
 considered by all as sedition and the attempt to maintain it by 
 force, as an overt act of treason against his European master ; for 
 all white men in America then claimed to be the loj^al subjects 
 of some such Lord. 
 
 It is true, that in British America, there existed sundry tracts 
 of country delineated upon the geographical charts as British 
 Colonies, the inhabitants of each of which regions were formed 
 into separate and fixed Societies, whose affairs were regulated by 
 long-established governments, the power of each of which gov- 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 13 
 
 ernmerits was limited by the particular boundaries of its own 
 Colony, tlieir acts having no obligation or force beyond the local 
 limits of such territory. None of these governments, however, 
 exhibited any such body politic as The People, for they all de 
 rived their powers, either mediately or immediately, from the 
 British Kings, whose mere agents they ever had been, and then 
 were. Nor were these Societies themselves known by any com 
 mon name of distinction, but only as the Colony of Virginia, the 
 Colony of Massachusetts Bay, of Canada, of Nova Scotia, and the 
 like ; for each of these communities was then separate and dis 
 tinct, in all things, from ever^ other, the Colonists being connect 
 ed by no other social or political tie, save that of the allegiance 
 which all acknowledged, not to any People, but to the Crown of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 British misrule converted some of these subjects, whose loyalty 
 had once been the highest boast, into sturdy insurgents against 
 the authority they had before delighted to acknowledge; and in 
 triumphant victory they achieved that glorious Revolution, which, 
 under different auspices, might have been branded as a traitorous 
 Rebellion. This Revolution, however, in dissolving the former 
 governments, did not dissolve the former Societies ; and years 
 before it was perfected, the Revolt had taken place. No hope 
 could be entertained of ultimate success to this Revolt, unless 
 some new government should be established in the stead of that 
 which had been dissolved, to order and direct proceedings, to 
 sanction acts, to speak and to determine for all its members. But 
 by whom, and for whom, was or could such an Institution as 
 government, be then ordained and established here ? 
 
 The general answer to this question is obvious. As all gov 
 ernment supposes the pre-existence of some established Society, 
 whose affairs it is designed to regulate, and the rules for the Civil 
 conduct of whose members it is required to prescribe, therefore, 
 by none other than some pre-existing and established Society can 
 any government be created or ordained. Even when foreign 
 force is the foundation of government (as is too often the case), 
 still as such force can only be exerted by some established Society 
 over the will of some other Society, or some part of it, when this 
 force is employed with success, the victor Society, while dissolving 
 
14 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 the former bonds of association of its vanquished antagonists, incor 
 porates them as a part of itself, tinder whatever conditions it 
 may please to prescribe, and so creates and ordains a government 
 for them. But when the foundation of government is not force, 
 but consent, it would be a paradox to suppose the consent of any 
 others than of those who had the right to consent, that is to say, 
 of the members of that particular pre-existing and established 
 Society for the regulation of whose affairs such government is 
 designed. None then but the pre-existing established Societies in 
 British America, could ordain a government for such Societies, 
 except by force; and the government ordained by any one of 
 these Societies, deriving all its powers from it, could have had no 
 authority except over that Society itself. 
 
 "When we apply this obvious general conclusion to the facts of 
 the particular case, we must all be at once convinced, that all the 
 primitive governments of the different revolted Colonies of Great 
 Britain must have been ordained and established by the several 
 Societies then existing in the revolted Colonies respectively, and 
 for their own special and particular benefit. Therefore, that none 
 of these governments could have had any other authority than to 
 regulate the affairs of their own creators, and of none others. I 
 say, that these governments must have been so established and so 
 endowed, because at that time there did not exist, nor ever had 
 existed, any such society or community as The People of America, 
 or of the British Colonies in America, or of the revolted British 
 Colonies in America, or under any other name or form, save that 
 of the Colony of Georgia, of South Carolina, etc., etc. Therefore, 
 by these several and distinct communities alone, all our primitive 
 governments must have been, and in point of fact were, ordained 
 and established ; and governments being so established, these 
 several communities, their respective authors, thereby assumed 
 to be, and so far as they were severally concerned, became, that 
 great moral and accountable being, a sovereign State, which, 
 having chosen the Democratic form for its government, was 
 known and styled the Commonwealth. 
 
 Doubtless the different revolted Colonies might, if they had 
 thought proper, have consented to amalgamate and blend them 
 selves together into one single Society, and then have established 
 
PEOCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 15 
 
 any sort of government which they chose for this new com 
 munity. Had they have done so, we should never have heard of 
 the State of Pennsylvania, or the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
 In tliat event, none of these former communities would have 
 possessed sovereignty, the essential attribute of a State, for all 
 would have sunk and dwindled into mere municipalities, bodies 
 corporate but not politic, created or permitted to exist, not by 
 their own will, but at the will and pleasure of this other more 
 august being " The Nation " by whatever name that " Nation " 
 might have been pleased to baptise itself. But the patriot Sages 
 of that day did not choose so to do. 
 
 Nor was this decision the result of any " State pride," or de 
 signed "to find advocates" in any " prejudice," although that 
 prejudice might be "honest." No, it was dictated by that pro 
 found and sagacious wisdom which can see the future in the past. 
 These patriot Sages had read, and well knew, that Communities 
 occupying different territories of wide extent, situated under dif 
 ferent climates, professing different religions, long governed by 
 different laws, having different manners, habits, customs, occupa 
 tions, and, of course, many different and conflicting interests, 
 could never be melted down into a single Society, and kept 
 together as such, but by a much stronger power than any which 
 they thought it either safe or prudent to create. Such communi 
 ties, while separate and distinct, might be well and easi\y con 
 federated, nay, even united, for many purposes useful to all and 
 essential to some, and still continue to enjoy liberty in peace. 
 But the day which should see them compressed into one Society, 
 to be governed by a single overruling consolidated government, 
 would be the eve of that on which their Freedom must be sacri 
 ficed to the power of an interested majority, in the very temple 
 dedicated to its perpetual worship, unless the victim might be 
 saved by arms. 
 
 Convinced of this, there was not one Statesman in any of these 
 different Colonies at that day, who even proposed, or who even 
 conceived, so far as we know, the wild and mad project of . 
 establishing a single Society, to be composed of all the revolted 
 Colonies, and to be regulated by a consolidated <% National " govern 
 ment, stretching itself over all. This conceptiou was the product 
 
16 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 of an after-day. How it was treated when it was first presented, I 
 will show at some other time. 
 
 Does any one doubt now, whether the first governments estab 
 lished in these now United States, were ordained by the several 
 revolted colonies, each acting as a Sovereign, for itself, and by 
 itself, without any reference to or dependence upon any other 
 colony ? Let him consult the history of that day, and he will 
 find that the Revolt was not a simultaneous movement of all these 
 Colonies, but was effected in each by several successive acts per 
 formed at different times. Nay, that independent governments 
 had actually been established in several of these colonies, and 
 were in full operation before any declaration of Independence 
 was uttered by them all when assembled in a general Congress. 
 So true is this, that even to this day, it is a matter of amicable 
 contest among several of these different communities, now States, 
 which of them is entitled to the honour of first annulling the 
 Royal Authority within its own domains, and proclaiming itself a 
 patriot Rebel. 
 
 Massachusetts claims it and points to the fields of Concord 
 and of Lexington to prove her claim. Virginia claims it, and 
 mentions prior acts of Treason in Arms which she had dared to do. 
 North Carolina claims it and shews her written declaration of 
 Independence, fearlessly promulgated to the world, while some 
 others were yet in doubt which side to take in the struggle to 
 maintain their rights. To Massachusetts and Virginia she might 
 say, your acts of Treason were but Insurrections, for when you 
 performed them you still professed to acknowledge yourselves de 
 pendants of the Authority you then resisted in arms ; but mine was 
 the first act of glorious Rebellion, for by it I renounced my former 
 allegiance and proclaimed my own Sovereignty. 
 
 Does any Virginian sceptic still doubt ? I refer him to the date 
 of our first Constitution, to prove that this form of government 
 was ordained and declared by "the Delegates arid Representatives 
 of the good People of Virginia" assembled in Convention, "before 
 even the date of the declaration of Independence, and long before 
 the signing and promulgation of that act. Referring him also 
 to the language of that Constitution and of its accompanying 
 Declaration of Rights, I ask him to tell me, to whom, after the 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 17 
 
 promulgation of these instruments, did the People of Virginia 
 owe any allegiance ? 
 
 He will not say, that their allegiance was then due to their 
 former liege Lord the King of Great Britain, for in these acts, 
 after first asserting " that all power is invested in, and conse 
 quently derived from the People that government is, or ought to 
 be; instituted for the common benefit, protection arid security of 
 the People that when any government shall be found inadequate 
 or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath 
 an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, 
 alter, or abolish it" the authors proceed to declare, "that the 
 government of this Country, as formerly exercised under the 
 Crown of Great Britain, was totally dissolved." 
 
 He will not say either, that this allegiance was due to any 
 of the other Colonies, for none of them had any stronger claims 
 to the allegiance of Virginia, than she had to theirs nor that it 
 was due to any government formed by all the revolted Colonies, 
 for there was no such government at that time nor to the People 
 of the United Colonies, for no such People had ever existed, nor 
 were these Colonies then united by any political tie whatever. 
 
 Were we then a srano; of Banditti, a wretched horde of bar- 
 
 O O 
 
 barians, a mere savage tribe, without law or any institution of 
 civil polity to bind our society together by the strong bond of a 
 common allegiance ? 
 
 Assuredly, Ave were not such, for to prevent this " deplorable 
 condition, to which this once happy country must be reduced,, 
 unless some regular adequate mode of civil polity was speedily 
 adopted," the same convention in the very act which declared the 
 total dissolution of the former government, ordained " the future 
 form of Government of Virginia." In this form of Government 
 was proclaimed the name of this new body politic or sovereign, 
 by which it was created. This Sovereign was called, " The Com 
 monwealth of Virginia," and all our people pledged themselves- 
 through their Representatives " to be faithful and trus to this 
 Commonwealth," and called upon their God to attest the solemn 
 pledge.* 
 
 * The form of the present Oath of Allegiance in Virginia, or " the assurance 
 of fidelity," as it is here called, is a curious and important instrument, to which- 1 
 2 
 
18 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 Was tliis pledge violated by any overt act of force ? The act 
 was declared to be Treason, ard the proper punishment of this 
 crime was announced. If it be true then, as the President in his 
 Proclamation says, that " Treason is an offence against sovereignty, 
 and sovereignty must reside with the power to punish it," the 
 Commonwealth of Virginia which defined this crime against 
 itself, provided for its punishment, and once at least inflicted-, it 
 must have been a sovereign.* But if ever a sovereign, she be- 
 
 hall probably refer at some other time. It runs thus : "I , do declare 
 
 myself a citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia ; I relinquish and renounce 
 the character of subject or citizen of any Prince or other State whatsoever ; 
 and abjure all allegiance which may be claimed by such Prince or other State ; 
 and I do swear to be faithful and true to the said Commonwealth of Virginia, 
 BO long as I continue a citizen thereof. So help me God " (see Revised Code of 
 1819, Vol. I., p. 72). 
 
 No person has power to act in any office, legislative, executive, or judi 
 ciary, before he shall have given this assurance ; and all who may by law 
 be required to give assurance of fidelity, must for that purpose take this oath. 
 [See the Law ut supra, which was re-enacted on the 7th day of January, 1818.] 
 
 * The law of Virginia defining and punishing Treason, is the sanction of the 
 oath of fidelity, and is not less curious and important than the form of that 
 assurance. It is in these words: " If a man do levy war against the Commonwealth 
 in the same, or be adherent to the enemies of the Commonwealth, within the same, 
 giving to them aid and comfort in the Commonwealth, or elsewhere, and thereof 
 be legally convicted of open deed, by the evidence of two sufficient and lawful 
 witnesses, or his own voluntary confession, the cases above rehearsed shall be 
 judged Treason which extendeth to the Commonwealth, and the persons so con 
 victed, and, his or her aiders, abettors and counsellors, being thereof convicted, 
 shall suffer death, by hanging by the neck without benefit of clergy. Also, 
 every person or persons, who shall erect or establish, or cause or procure to be 
 erected or established, any government separate from, or independent of the 
 government of Virginia, within the limits thereof, unless by act of the Legisla 
 ture of this Commonwealth for that purpose first obtained ; or who shall, 
 in any such usurped government, hold or execute any office, legislative, 
 executive, judiciary, or ministerial, by whatever name such office may be dis 
 tinguished or called ; or who shall swear, or otherwise solemnly profess alle 
 giance or fidelity to the same ; or who shall, under pretext of authority derived 
 from, or protection afforded by, such usurped government resist or oppose the 
 due execution of the laws of this Commonwealth, shall be adjudged guilty of 
 high Treason, and shall be proceeded against, and punished in the same man 
 ner as other Traitors may be proceeded against and punished." [See Revised 
 Code of 1819, Vol. I., p. 591.] 
 
 The scholar may read the rough English of some parts of this statute, as he 
 does the bald and confessedly bad Latin of Magna Charta, with a contemptuous 
 
PKOCLAMATICXff OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 19 
 
 came such at the moment when she " totally dissolved " the former 
 government, and in establishing a new form of government for 
 herself, thereby announcing her absolute independence. All 
 these acts were done before the fourth day of July, 1776. By 
 these acts she then became free, sovereign, and independent ; and 
 from the bottom of my heart do I unite with the President in the 
 fervent prayer, " May the great Ruler of Nations grant that tile 
 signal blessings with which he has favoured us, may not, by the 
 madness of party or personal ambition, be disregarded and lost." 
 But what is this ideal being of which every Virginian then ac 
 knowledged, and every Virginian still acknowledges, himself to be 
 a liege, and which we have called " The Commonwealth of Vir 
 ginia." It is the People of Virginia. The members of that estab 
 lished society within this " Ancient Dominion," who renouncing all 
 allegiance to a former Sovereign, incorporated themselves into a 
 body politic, chose to bestow upon themselves this new Corporate 
 name, in order to preserve and perpetuate the succession of the sov 
 ereign rights which they had then assumed. Most of these patriots 
 have sunk into the tomb, and the few who remain must follow them 
 ere long ; but long after the last of them shall be no more, that body 
 politic and corporate styled u the Commonwealth of Virginia," will, 
 by the blessing of God, still live ; and while it does live, this name 
 will denote the People of Virginia of any other day, as expressively 
 and as justly as it did those by whom the name was first assumed. 
 That Commonwealth yet lives, and remains as sovereign now as 
 then, unless it has done or suffered some act in the interim, to 
 abrogate its powers or annul its rights. 
 
 The people of Virginia, in shaking off their former allegiance, 
 establishing a new form of government for themselves, and so 
 assuming sovereignty and independence, did no more than was 
 
 sneer ; but let him remember, that it is not to learning, but to knowledge, we 
 are indebted for our Liberty. Let him also remember, that in Virginia, we do 
 not value highly that pedantry, which would amend the provisions of old instru 
 ments for the mere purpose of making their style more smooth, grammatical, 
 or classical. Those who re-enacted this statute on the 28th of January, 1819, 
 copied the rough parts of it from the old act of 1776, which was believed to be 
 an accurate paraphrase of a very old English statute, written, I believe, in the 
 Norman French, 
 
20 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 done, sooner or later, by each and every one of the thirteen 
 revolted Colonies of Great Britain. 
 
 Each of these, like Virginia, became, in virtue of such acts, 
 \j that free, sovereign, and independent body politic called a State; 
 and becoming such, it took upon itself any corporate name it 
 chose to adopt. But as all the governments then established 
 were Kepresentative Democracies, this corporate name, whether it 
 was the Commonwealth or any other, was designed to denote the 
 free people of that pre-existing and established society before 
 known by the name of some of the revolted British Colonies. 
 
 If, then, we ask, who constituted at that time that great Cor 
 poration and Sovereign body politic which I have called The 
 People, which is the Lord of all in these now United States, the 
 answer is,/not the People of all the revolted Colonies collectively, 
 but the People of each of them respectively. All individuals, be 
 ing members of any one of these separate, distinct, and independ 
 ent masses, owed faith, and truth, and allegiance to that particu 
 lar mass, which, under some selected corporate name, designed to 
 distinguish it from all others, was then proclaimed as their only 
 earthly sovereign. 
 
 Such were the People of these Colonies then. As individuals 
 they were subjects, as a body politic and corporate they were the 
 sovereign of these subjects. 
 
 Such sovereigns and such subjects these People have been ever 
 since, and still are, unless (as I have said before) they have done 
 or suffered some act, during the interval of time which has elapsed 
 since they took upon themselves these characters, to change this, 
 their moral and political condition. Have they done so ? This 
 is the question which I propose to examine in. my next Number. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 21 
 
 IIL 
 
 NORFOLK, January 2, 1833. 
 
 THE People of eacli of the several revolted Colonies of 
 Great Britain, having become free, sovereign, and independent 
 States, in the manner stated in my last number, must necessarily 
 continue to be such Sovereigns now, unless they have done or 
 suffered some act, since this their Sovereignty was assumed, 
 whereby its rights and powers have been annulled. Have they 
 done or suffered any such act ? 
 
 This is the question, which, in my last number, I proposed to 
 examine in this. But a reperusal of the Proclamation of the Pres 
 ident, since this promise was made, having shewn me, what I had 
 not before observed, that doubts are therein cast upon the truth 
 of my proposition which asserted the primitive sovereignty of the 
 several States, although this is often admitted, by necessary im 
 plication, at least, in many other parts of this very instrument it 
 self, I think it right to endeavor to remove all these doubts before 
 I proceed further in the execution of the task I have undertaken. 
 
 During the various discussions, which the agitation of the ques 
 tions as to the extent of the legitimate powers of the present gov 
 ernment of the United States called forth, in former days, this 
 asserted original sovereignty of the States was admitted and 
 claimed by both sides, and was made the very basis of all the ar 
 guments of Federalists and Democrats respectively. 
 
 To these discussions, there was then brought, by either party, 
 as much of zeal, of industry, of wisdom, and of laborious research, 
 as have ever been manifested in this country, before or since ; 
 and the discussions were conducted, on either hand, by many of 
 the Patriots of the Revolution, who were familiar with all its 
 events, because they had been actors and advisers in that great 
 scene ab initio. 
 
22 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 Nay, it used to be then contended, by either party, that the 
 jealous retainer by the States of their primitive rights of sover 
 eignty, had caused the necessity for the then new Federal Consti 
 tution. 
 
 But, like Moliere s mock doctor, " nous avons change tout cela," 
 and the new College of Politicians, having younger, and of course 
 wiser heads, have of late discovered, that all this was a mistake. 
 The fashionable doctrine of the present day seems to be, that 
 these States never were Sovereign ; that there was, from the be 
 ginning, some great Central Sovereign power, abiding somewhere 
 else than in the several States, of which they were subjects, and 
 all their people lieges. In illustration of this new doctrine, the 
 Proclamation says, that " in our colonial state, although depend 
 ent upon another power, we very early considered ourselves as 
 connected by common interest with each other. Leagues were 
 formed for common defence; and before the Declaration of Inde 
 pendence, we were known in our aggregate character as The 
 United Colonies of America. That decisive and important step 
 was taken jointly. We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, 
 not by several acts." 
 
 The exceeding caution in which this passage is penned, its in 
 tended assertions of doctrine, while seeming to narrate facts, 
 merely, and the opening it obviously and designedly leaves, for 
 escape from these doctrines, tinder the fog and smoke of verbal 
 criticism, should the doctrines be thereafter controverted, may 
 perhaps excite the admiration of minds trained or training in the 
 mazes of diplomacy. 
 
 But when found in a State paper, uttered by the Chief Magis 
 trate, and announced by him, as being intended for the edification 
 and instruction of those to whom it is addressed, it can never meet 
 the approbation of the candid and ingenuous. 
 
 Its obvious purpose is to assert, as a political dogma, that the 
 revolted Colonies became one Sovereign Nation, before they sev 
 erally assumed sovereignty upon themselves as individual States; 
 and so to prove, that the States never were sovereign. But as 
 this new doctrine was in direct conflict with all our past opinions, 
 and in seeming opposition to much of our past history, it would 
 not do to blurt it in the public face at once, as doctrine, therefore 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 23" 
 
 it is presented seemingly as a simple fact. Nay, it is not exhib 
 ited as a substantive fact, but in the modest guise of a mere infer 
 ence from other facts. These other facts, too, are asserted in se 
 lected terms of such broad and general signification, that it is 
 difficult to fix their precise meaning. If, seeing the necessary 
 tendency and effect of the doctrine designed to be put forth in thia 
 passage, any one denies its truth, such may be immediately met 
 by the assertion, that it is not stated as doctrine, but as historical 
 fact merely. If it be denied as such a fact, it may be immediately 
 said, that it is not asserted as a substantive fact, but only as one 
 inferred from others previously stated. If the correctness of this 
 inference is questioned, then commences a discussion as to the 
 true meaning of the words employed to state the facts from which 
 the inference is made; and this discussion, if it convicts the au 
 thor of error, will also furnish him with an excuse for saying, that 
 he is no scholar, not skilled in " metaphysical subtlety," and there 
 fore, may have used terms inappropriate to convey, accurately, 
 his own meaning, which, however, is precisely yours. But if the 
 true signification of the words employed in this apparent and sim 
 ple narrative, is once admitted to be that in which they are obvi 
 ously used, and if the facts themselves, so told, are conceded, then 
 no logical mind can escape from the conclusion derived from such 
 facts, and the purpose of this argument, which is to disprove the 
 original sovereign rights of the States, is fully attained. 
 
 The ingenuity of an argument thus constructed, undoubtedly 
 has merit, but it is not such merit as ingenuous candour can ever 
 claim. It imposes upon all who may deny its conclusion, the la 
 borious task of unravelling a long tissue of supposed errors, and 
 when they have done so, it exposes them to the sneer of having 
 laboured to disprove what, it will then be said, was never af 
 firmed. 
 
 On the other hand, if they pass by such things unnoticed, they 
 immediately fall into the snare laid for them, from which they 
 cannot then easily extricate themselves. For one, I greatly pre 
 fer to undertake the labour, and to subject myself to the sneer, 
 than to incur the other hazard. Therefore, I will bring the whole 
 of this narrative and argumentative passage to the test of a strict 
 analysis. Its importance justifies, its art requires this. 
 
24 A BEVIEW OF THE 
 
 The object of this argument, (confessed in its conclusion,) is to 
 prove that the People of some of these now United States, \vhile 
 in their colonial state, declared themselves to be a Nation, by the 
 Declaration of Independence made in 1776, under which they 
 became " One People." The necessary and inevitable result of 
 this would be, that the People having once resolved themselves 
 into one Nation, could not thereafter create themselves into sepa 
 rate and independent sovereignties, otherwise than by force, or 
 by common consent. 
 
 But as no one has presumed, as yet at least, to establish, or to 
 attempt to establish sovereignty here, by force ; and as there ex 
 ists not the slightest memorial of any common consent on the 
 part of this supposed Nation, to its own dismemberment, there 
 fore the sovereignty of the States never could have existed. The au 
 thor of this Proclamation, does not seem to have been aware of the 
 fact, which I stated in my last number, that before the declara 
 tion of Independence in July 1776, the People of Virginia cer 
 tainly, and of several of the other Colonies, I believe, had sever 
 ally announced their own sovereignty and independence, in 
 totally dissolving their former government, and ordaining new 
 governments for themselves respectively. But if such a fact had 
 been known to him, it would not have changed the intended effect 
 of his conclusion ; because, as this new Nation is said to have 
 been created by the People, a part of which People the creators 
 of State sovereignties wer3, their last act would of course have ab 
 rogated and annulled their first, and so put an end to the sover 
 eignty which they had created but a short time before. So that 
 the Sovereignty of all the States which had declared themselves 
 sovereign before the declaration of Independence in July 1776, is 
 as certainly annulled, as the existence of the sovereignty of those 
 States who had not then declared it, is prevented, by the mere as 
 sertion of this simple fact of our existence as one nation, if that 
 fact was true. A matter so important in its consequences ought 
 not, and would not be conceded, to the mere say-so of any man, 
 although that man might be the President; therefore, it became 
 indispensably necessary, that he should prove it. Hence the at 
 tempt to do so. Let me now examine what these proofs are. 
 
 As the object was to prove the existence of a Nation, the first 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 25 
 
 step of the process must necessarily be to prove the pre-exist en ce 
 of a community. Government being superinduced upon this 
 community, it would then become a Nation, so far at least as all 
 the members of that community were concerned. The first point 
 to be proved, then, was the existence of a community composed 
 of all the People who were afterwards to become the subjects of 
 the nation. N~ow how is this established ? 
 
 " In our colonial state," says the President, " although depend 
 ent on another power, we very early considered ourselves con 
 nected by common interest with each other." A more flimsy 
 pretext, from which to infer the existence of a single community, 
 could not easily have been selected; and yet a more ingenious 
 mode of getting up this pretext could not well have been devised. 
 Mark, no social connection of any sort, is affirmed to have actually 
 existed; it is merely said, that we very early considered ourselves 
 as connected. And by what was this imaginary connection con 
 stituted? Were we inhabitants of a common territory, the va 
 cant and unoccupied parts of which were admitted to belong to 
 all ? No. Did we profess the same religious faith ? No. Did 
 there exist any one institution, which having been created or pre 
 served by all, was therefore common to all ? N^o. By what tie 
 then did this People consider themselves to be connected, in their 
 colonial state ? Why, by the single tie of a supposed common in 
 terest. No man before President Jackson, ever thought of infer 
 ring the existence of a community from such a fact, which if be 
 lieved to be sufficient to produce that effect, would consolidate, 
 probably, one-half the People of the whole world into one com 
 munity, and by so doing, would dissolve more than the half of all 
 the societies now existing, whose members do not even consider 
 themselves connected by any such tie. 
 
 But perhaps it will be said, that I do the President wrong, in sup 
 posing that he meant the People when he says a we," that by this per 
 sonal pronoun he did not mean to denote all the Colonists, in their 
 individual, but in the social characters which they had long had, and 
 which was denoted by the term Colonies. If so, this sentence be 
 comes the simple annunciation of a well-known historical fact, 
 proved by numerous documents in our archives, that even in their 
 colonial state, the several Colonies considered themselves as connect- 
 
26 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 ed with each other, by a common interest. But as all these docu 
 ments while establishing this fact, establish also, that this belief 
 of a common interest was neither designed or ever supposed to 
 amalgamate the different Colonies, by whom it was entertained, 
 into a single community, but merely to invite to their co operation 
 confederacy and union as distinct independent communities, it is 
 not easy to discern how from such a fact, the existence of a single 
 community could be inferred. Therefore, and as the use made 
 of the assertion was afterwards manifest, I was bound to consider 
 its meaning to be such as I have stated ; especially as I found 
 this word " we," in an address of the President to his fi fellow-citi 
 zens, the People." 
 
 So much for the first proposition of this argument, which if 
 considered in one light, asserts a truth directly in contradiction 
 to its condition ; and if considered in another, asserts not only 
 an unknown fact, but one unimportant if it could be known. In 
 which of these lights it was designed to be seen, let the rules of 
 the English language, and the conclusion of the argument itself, 
 determine. 
 
 Having inferred the existence of one great community, com 
 posed of all the People of the different revolting Colonies, while 
 yet in their colonial state, the next step necessary to be taken in 
 the argument designed to prove their subsequent existence as one 
 nation, w r as to superinduce a government upon this great communi 
 ty : for a nation without a government, would indeed be a nonde 
 script, as horrible in the Political, as any of the fabled monsters 
 of the natural world. Here, as before, it would not do to affirm 
 the establishment of any such government, at the time referred 
 to, that is to say, "in our colonial state," as a positive fact, for 
 this would be in direct contradiction of the other affirmation, of 
 our dependence on another power and of such a fact too, there 
 does not exist any scintilla of proof in any of our histories or 
 State papers. Therefore, the existence of such a government, 
 like that of the community, was to be inferred. Now from what 
 is this second inference to be made ? 
 
 " Leagues were formed for common defence," says the Presi 
 dent ; and as leagues can only be formed by communities, ac 
 knowledging some government, authorized to speak and so to 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 27 
 
 contract for them, if the fact be conceded that Leagues were formed 
 by this great community, it establishes beyond doubt, not only 
 the actual existence of such a community, but of its government, 
 too. But mark the caution displayed in this assertion, also. The 
 President does not say, in terms, at least, that these Leagues were 
 so formed, but most sedulously avoids to state by whom, or with 
 whom, they were formed. The cause of this studied obscurity is 
 not difficult to be explained. If it had been asserted as an histor 
 ical fact, that in their colonial state, the Colonists being connected 
 together as one community, had, in that character, entered into 
 any League whatever, tins fact could not have been proved, sim 
 ply because it neither is, or could be, true. But if it had been 
 said, that these Leagues were formed by the different colonies 
 with each other, as separate and independent communities, in as 
 serting this well-known historical truth easily to be proved by a 
 reference to the Leagues themselves, the President would huve 
 dissolved completely his imaginary great community, and with 
 it the government to regulate the affairs of this supposed Nation. 
 
 Nay, he then would have established, beyond doubt, the sepa 
 rate and independent existence of the colonies, as acknowledged 
 by themselves, in such Leagues. 
 
 To avoid this dilemma, the author of this Proclamation most 
 cautiously suppresses the fact by whom and with whom these 
 Leagues were made. Yet, as they were certainly made for " com 
 mon defence," all those who may be disposed to believe that 
 " we" in the first sentence denoted the Colonists as individuals, 
 and not the colonies as communities, will of course conclude, that 
 these Leagues were made by the same " we," with some commu 
 nity foreign to themselves. While those who understand "we" in 
 a different sense, will arrive at a conclusion diametrically opposed 
 to this, so much for the second member of this argument, which, 
 like the first, is either true or false, according to the meaning 
 intended to be annexed by its author, to the words, " we " and 
 " our." 
 
 Having inferred the existence of a supposed community, and 
 also inferred a government for it, in the mode I have stated, the 
 next thing needful was to bestow a name upon this infant Nation. 
 But, as it would have been difficult to infer a name which could 
 
28 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 not liave had any previous existence, the President was compelled 
 to state th r s name positively. Therefore, he next says, that "be 
 fore thi; declaration of independence, we were known in our ag 
 gregate charactsr as The United Colonies of America." The 
 attempt to infer any fact, from any name, merely, would be con- 
 sidered, generally, rather as an assumption than an inference. 
 But to infer the fact of a single Nation, from the name of many 
 United Colonies, or of many Colonies United, whether in America 
 or anywhere else, is not only a groundless assumption, but a plain 
 perversion of the meaning of words, unless United means Consol 
 idated. The President seems to have been aware of this, there 
 fore, to do away, so far as he could, the effect of his own strong 
 words, United Colonies, used, apparently, to shew, that the Colo 
 nies were united, and not consolidated into one mass or Nation, 
 he tells us, that "we were known in our aggregate character " by 
 this name. Although I cannot help considering this phrase of 
 "aggregate character " as very infelicitous, especially when ap 
 plied to United Colonies, yet I freely admit that the excuse of the 
 Rhetorician may be found in the necessity the Politician felt to 
 employ it. There were two differing parties interested in the 
 matter he was examining, and he was desirous to please both ; 
 therefore, from the beginning of his argument, he had used terms 
 so general, that either might apply them to their own side : but 
 when he came to give a name to his Nation, he found that so 
 clearly indicating that it was not one consolidated mass, but many 
 distinct masses united, merely, it was necessary to weaken the 
 force of this. Hence, he tells us that, although we were united 
 by name, yet in character we were aggregated, that is to say, 
 consolidated. 
 
 From what source the President may have derived his informa 
 tion as to aggregate character, except from its name, I know not. 
 But if his information as to our character is as inaccurate as his 
 representation of our name, but little reliance should be paid to 
 it. I have before me a copy of the Journal of the first Congress, 
 which met at a the Carpenter s Hall, in the City of Philadelphia, 
 on Monday, the 5th day of September, 1774." In this first and 
 most authentic document, which any one can consult, to discover 
 either their name or character, at that day, both the one and the 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PKESIDENT JACKSON. 29 
 
 other is thus described : " We, the Delegates of the several Colo 
 nies of New Hampshire," etc., etc., (naming each), " deputed to 
 represent them in a Continental Congress." Under this name, 
 and in this character, was their first great act of Association en 
 tered into, for non-importation, non-consumption, and non export 
 ation, and recommended u to the Provincial Conventions, and to 
 the Committees in the respective Colonies," to be carried into 
 effect by them. Under the name and character of f; The Dele 
 gates appointed by the several English Colonies of New Hamp 
 shire," etc., (naming each), " to consider of their grievances in. 
 General Congress," was their next great act, the Address to the 
 People of Great Britain, uttered under the name and character 
 of " We, the delegates of the Colonies of New Hampshire," etc., 
 (naming each), " deputed by the inhabitants of the said Colonies, 
 to represent them in a general Congress, to consult together," etc., 
 was the Address to the inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, 
 put forth. Under the name and character of " We, your Majes 
 ty s faithful subjects of the Colonies of New Hampshire," etc., 
 (naming each), " in behalf of ourselves and of the inhabitants of 
 these Colonies, who have deputed us to represent them in general 
 Congress," was the Address to the King adopted, which waii the 
 last act of that enlightened and patriotic body, the first Congress. 
 In short, there cannot be found a single act of the first Congress, 
 in which that body denominated itself as "The United Colonies 
 of America," or in which its members denominated themselves 
 as delegates of or to any body of that name. So far from it, all 
 these acts shew, upon their very face, that they were the acts of 
 individuals, representing respectively, riot one, but several con 
 stituent bodies, and these individuals, as the representatives of 
 such constituent bodies, respectively, were said to be assembled 
 in a general Congress. In further proof of which it may also be 
 remarked, that the very first rule established to regulate the pro 
 ceedings of this Congress was, " that in determining questions, 
 each Colony or Province should have one vote," without any ref 
 erence to the number of its delegates present, or to its importance 
 in any sense whatever. 
 
 Upon such evidence, I think myself justified in saying, that, 
 although, at some subsequent period, it may possibly be found, 
 
30 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 that the delegates united in a general Congress, in some of their 
 ordinary proceedings, and for brevity s sake, may perhaps have 
 spoken of themselves as the delegates of the United Colonies, yet 
 in all solemn acts they are differently described. Thus, in the 
 most important paper which they could utter, the Commission to 
 Gen. Washington as Commander-in-Chief, granted on the 17th 
 June, 1775, they style themselves " The Delegates of the United 
 Colonies of New Hampshire," etc., (naming each, as before), and 
 by that name, and in that character, grant to him all the rights 
 and authorities which he then acquired. Therefore, the President 
 seems to have as little ground for bestowing this new name of the 
 United Colonies of America upon all the revolted Colonies or Col 
 onists of that day, as he has to bestow upon the Colonists any 
 such aggregate character as that under which he is supposed to 
 assert that they were then known. 
 
 Whether by the declaration of independence, uttered in 1776, 
 either in the manner in which "that decisive and important step 
 was taken," or in the language of that instrument, " we declared 
 ourselves a Nation," and so annulled or prevented all the sover 
 eign rights of the States, is a question I should have examined in 
 this number, except for the reason I have before stated. 
 
 But, Mr. Editor, I have already occupied so much of your 
 space, that I must not intrude upon it at present, further than to 
 say, that this declaration, being i\\& first act which occurs in our 
 history, that can be, or is supposed to annul any of the Sovereign 
 rights of the States, its minute examination made a part of my 
 original plan, which will be prosecuted in my next number. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 31 
 
 IV. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 4, 1833. 
 
 THE Declaration of Independence uttered in 1776, was consid 
 ered, at that day, as the most important act which had ever oc 
 curred in this Country, and subsequent time lias not weakened 
 the sentiment it was then intended to inculcate. 
 
 We still continue to commemorate it annually, on the day of its 
 date, when all the citizens of these now United States, join with 
 one accord, in humble adoration and joyful thanksgiving to that 
 Divine Providence, under whose protection, the great truths it 
 announces were afterwards maintained and established. 
 
 But if the effect of this Declaration, was to consolidate all the 
 then Colonies, by whose representatives it was made, as one na 
 tion, and to amalgamate their inhabitants into " One People," 
 the Fourth day of July, instead of being celebrated as a Jubilee, 
 would probably be spent much more appropriately in weeping 
 and in wailing. Was such the true nature and intended effect of 
 this Declaration ? This is the question I propose now to examine. 
 
 In speaking of this Declaration, the President says in his Proc 
 lamation, " that decisive and important step was taken jointly 
 we declared ourselves a Nation by a joint, not by several acts." 
 It is obvious from this passage, that its author designed to estab 
 lish the existence of a Nation, not less by the manner in which 
 this Declaration was made, than by the actual assertions of the 
 instrument itself: for not satisfied with stating that this step was 
 taken jointly , he adds, that by such a joint act we declared our 
 selves a Nation. I will examine into the truth of all these asser 
 tions, before I give my own views of the subject. 
 
 A joint act, ex m termini^ implies the co-operation of several 
 agents, by whose united and joined agencies it has been produced. 
 
82 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 Hence, it would be a very great solecism, to speak of any act 
 done by one agent only, as a joint act; and therefore, no corpo 
 rate act is ever properly described, as a joint act of a Corporation, 
 even when such a body is composed of many members: for al 
 though the members may be many, the Corporation is but one, 
 and the act, if a corporate act, must be performed by that one 
 body only. It is not every act effected by the co-operation of 
 several agents, however, that is properly termed a joint act. Be 
 cause, although considered in reference to the number of its au 
 thors, every single act accomplished by the co-operation of several 
 agents, must be their joint act, yet considered in reference to its 
 intended effects, as these may be many, and attach to all, to each, 
 or to some only of its agents, the act is regarded as either joint or 
 several, according to the nature of these intended effects. But as 
 the intent of the act, cannot possibly be inferred from the number 
 of agents co-operating to its accomplishment, while it is admitted, 
 that several as well as joint effects may and do result even from a 
 joint act, the nature of such an act can only be ascertained from 
 the intention of the agents. This intention must always be sought 
 for, and generally, is best manifested, in the declarations of the 
 agents employed to perform the act, especially when these decla 
 rations are uttered in the act itself, and of course at the time of 
 performing it. If these plain propositions, which ever^ Tyro has 
 hitherto acknowledged to be true, are still admitted to be correct, 
 it will be found difficult certainly, nay impossible probably, to rec 
 oncile them with the assertions of the President, when the effect 
 intended to be produced by these assertions is remembered. The 
 object in view in making these assertions is to prove thereby, that 
 by virtue of the Declaration of Independence w r e acknowledged 
 ourselves to be one Nation. Hence, the President says " that de 
 cisive and important step was taken jointly" Now if by this he 
 means to say, merely, that this declaration was the work of many 
 persons co-operating to produce it, no matter in what character 
 they acted, he asserts a fact so unimportant to his purpose, and so 
 familiar to every one, that it really seems almost ludicrous to ut 
 ter it with such apparent gravity, if indeed it was necessary to 
 state it at all. 
 
 But if he means to be understood, as asserting that this declara- 
 
PKOCLAMATION OF PEESIDENT JACKSON. 33 
 
 tion was the joint act of the representatives of any single body, 
 previously known as a Community or Nation, besides the histori 
 cal error committed, he states what must be unintelligible to all, 
 except to those who can comprehend how any single body can do 
 any joint act. 
 
 I should have been disposed to consider this sentence a:; a mere 
 inaccuracy, caused by the precipitate haste in which this State 
 paper was probably prepared, and therefore, to have passed it by 
 unnoticed, but that it is in exact keeping with all the previous 
 parts of this argument, and moreover, is in substance repeated 
 more impressively, in the next sentence, wherein it is said, that 
 " we declared ourselves a Nation by a joint, not by several acts." 
 Now, if we were a Nation before the Declaration of Independ 
 ence was uttered, (as it was the purpose of all the previous parts 
 of this argument to prove,) it would have been impossible for us 
 as a Nation, to proclaim this fact by any joint act : and if before 
 that event occurred, we were not a Nation, but separate commu 
 nities or individuals, it seems difficult to conceive how we 
 (whether the Colonies or Colonists) could have declared ourselves 
 as a Nation, by any other than several acts. 
 
 The reason of all this mystification and apparent absurdity, will 
 be obvious, when we come to consider the declarations actually 
 made in the Declaration of Independence itself. We shall then 
 iind, that this instrument, instead of proclaiming the Colonies to 
 be one Nation, declared the:ii to be u free and independent 
 States," in terms. Hence, as it was impossible to infer the exist 
 ence of one nation from such terms, in which this idea is so plain 
 ly and positively negatived, resort was had to the manner in 
 which this declaration was made; and we are told, "that decisive 
 and important step was taken jointly," and that "we declared 
 ourselves a Nation by a joint, not by several acts " as if the 
 plain and obvious meaning of the act itself, could be changed by 
 any such extrinsic circumstances. 
 
 I have now done with this part of the argument of the Presi 
 dent, the design of which is to show, that these States never were 
 sovereign, in showing that they constituted but parts of another 
 sovereignty called the Nation. 
 
 I will now proceed to give my account of the Declaration of 
 3 
 
34 A EEVIEW OF THE 
 
 Independence ; and therein to state ray ideas of its effects upon 
 the several Colonies, who, by their representatives, were parties 
 to that instrument. 
 
 The true nature and intended effects of the Declaration, can 
 never be understood, from a consideration of the manner in which 
 it was executed, merely. 
 
 Whether it was produced by the agency of one, only, or by the 
 joint agency of many, or by the several agencies of different per 
 sons co-operating to the same end, is of little consequence. Its 
 object and intended effects must be inferred from its language, 
 although if that is ambiguous, these may very properly be sought 
 for in extraneous circumstances of any kind, whether these cir 
 cumstances are found in the manner of the execution of the in 
 strument, or in anything else. 
 
 Let us then, turn to the act itself, and judge from its contents, 
 of its end and object, before we attempt to discover these last in 
 any other way. 
 
 When so examined, the Declaration of Independence seems to 
 be a manifesto, addressed to the world, that is to say, to the civil 
 ized world, designed to inform it of the pre-existence of a new 
 event interesting to humanity, and of the causes and circum 
 stances which had occasioned the occurrence of this new fact. 
 Like the manifesto that generally accompanies or immediately 
 follows every modern Declaration of War, which, in announcing 
 the new relations of the belligerents, and narrating how these 
 have been produced, it so contains an implied appeal to other 
 States, and to posterity, for the justification of those by whom 
 this new state of things has been made necessary. Considered in 
 this light, it asserts nothing but what had previously existed, al 
 though but recently ; and its object is confined to the justification 
 of that pre-existing state of things which it so announces. If this 
 was its purpose, it cannot be considered as creating any new com 
 munity, as ordaining any new government, or bestowing any new 
 name ; but as intended merely to announce the new condition in 
 which former societies, under existing governments and names 
 previously known, are placed. Its sole end, is to justify to others 
 that new condition which has been recently assumed by those 
 who utter the manifesto. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 35 
 
 Whether this notion of the Declaration of Independence be 
 correct, must depend, mainly, upon its own language. Let me, 
 then, examine what this is. 
 
 It commences by saying, that " when, in the course of human 
 events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the politi 
 cal bands which have connected them with another, and to as 
 sume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal sta 
 tion to which the laws of nature and of nature s God entitle them, 
 a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires, that they 
 should declare the causes which impel them to the separation." 
 Here, then, confessedly, is an appeal to mankind, induced by the 
 decent respect due to their opinions, designed to inform them of 
 the fact of the dissolution of the political bands which had previ 
 ously connected those making this appeal, with some other com 
 munity. Immediately following this introduction, comes the in 
 tended justification of this act. 
 
 Tin s consists of tA r o parts : the assertion of certain general 
 propositions, which the authors of this manifesto or appeal held 
 to be self-evident, requiring no proof to establish them ; and the 
 application of these general and self-evident truths to the partic 
 ular notorious historical facts existing in their case, which facts 
 are concisely narrated. The general truths here announced, are 
 those proclaimed in the Declaration of Rights previously promul 
 gated in Virginia, some of which I have stated in a former num 
 ber. They are, in brief, these : 
 
 That all men are created equal ; and are endowed by their 
 Creator with certain inalienable rights ; among which are the 
 rights to life, to liberty, and to the pursuit of their happiness. 
 That to secure these inalienable rights, governments are instituted 
 among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
 governed. That whenever any form of government becomes de 
 structive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to 
 abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundations 
 on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to 
 them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. 
 That, although these things are true, yet prudence dictates, that 
 governments long established should not be changed for light and 
 transient causes ; and accordingly, all experience hath shewn, that 
 
36 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, 
 than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they 
 are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, 
 pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce 
 them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, 
 to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for 
 their future security. 
 
 Having thus shewn the clear right and solemn duty to do the 
 act, the performance of which they had announced, namely, the 
 dissolution of the political bands that had formerly connected the 
 authors of this manifesto, and their respective constituents, with 
 another government ; provided, such a long train of abuses and 
 usurpations on the part of this other government, as they had 
 referred to, existed, the Declaration next proceeds to set forth 
 what were the abuses and usurpations, the previous occurrence of 
 which would give point and special application to their asserted 
 self-evident truths, and so justify that act. 
 
 The catalogue of these abuses and usurpations need not be re 
 peated here. 
 
 All men must admit, that if the facts stated therein were true, 
 as stated, and if the general propositions affirmed were correct as 
 affirmed, they made together a perfect demonstration of that 
 which they were intended to establish, that is to say, of the right 
 to throw off the government of Great Britain, by which govern 
 ment these abuses and usurpations had been practised. But not 
 content with this clear demonstration of a strict right, the authors 
 of the Declaration go on to state further : 
 
 That in every stage of these oppressions, they had petitioned 
 for redress in the most humble terms ; but that their repeated pe 
 titions had been answered only by repeated injuries. That they 
 had also appealed to the native justice and magnanimity of their 
 British brethren, conjuring them, by the ties of common kindred, 
 to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt 
 their connexions and correspondence ; but that they, too, had been 
 deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity Wherefore, they 
 were bound to acquiesce in the necessity which denounced their 
 separation, and to hold them, as they held the rest of mankind, 
 enemies in war, in peace friends. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 37 
 
 For all these reasons, the representatives of the United States of 
 America, in general Congress Assembled, appealing to the Supreme 
 Judge of the World for the rectitude of their intentions, did, in 
 the name and by the authority of the good people of these Colo 
 nies, their respective Constituents, solemnly publish and declare, 
 that these United Colonies, were, and of right ought to be, Free 
 and Independent States That they were absolved from all alle 
 giance to the British Crown ; and that all political connexion be 
 tween them and the State of Great Britain, was, and ought to be, 
 totally dissolved And that as Free and Independent States, 
 they had full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alli 
 ances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things 
 which independent States might of right do. 
 
 This is a full and faithful abstract, of everything contained in 
 the Declaration of Independence, which any man can consider as 
 important or applicable to the question now under examination. 
 For the truth of this assertion, I refer to the Declaration itself, 
 happily, now in the hands of almost every freeman in this coun 
 try I appeal then, confidently, to every candid mind, to deter 
 mine, whether there is one word uttered, or one thought ex 
 pressed, or even implied, throughout the whole of this important, 
 clear arid able State paper, to countenance the idea, that it could 
 have been designed by its Authors, to incorporate the Several 
 Communities therein for the First time Styled the United States 
 of America, into one Nation ? Whether it does not affirm, 
 in terms, that the Colonies represented in the Congress which 
 produced this act, were, and of right ought to be, Free and Inde- 
 dependent States And whether it could have had any other 
 end or aim than what I have stated, that is to say, to declare and 
 make manifest to the world, what was the condition of these 
 States ; and in tracing the causes which had produced this condi 
 tion, to justify before the world the position they had already as 
 sumed. 
 
 I ask of the Constitutional Lawyer, to tell me, whether any act, 
 professing as this does, to be declaratory of what is, and of right 
 ought to be, can properly be considered as an instrument ordain 
 ing the existence of that which it declares, merely. I ask of any 
 Politician, even of the new school, to tell me, in frankness, 
 
38 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 whether, at that time, the delegates of any Colony, assembled in 
 a general Congress, could have had any authority to extinguish 
 the rights of their Constituents, by amalgamating them with 
 y others, into one Nation, except under their credentials and in 
 structions. Should he say, as speaking in that spirit, he must say, 
 that they could not have had authority derived from any other 
 source, I then refer to these credentials and instructions, to shew, 
 that all of them contained expressed limitations upon the power 
 of these delegates, by which they were prohibited from doing any 
 such act. 
 
 It is not necessary to recite all these papers ; a part of one only 
 will suffice. The Provincial Congress of New Jersey, assembled 
 at Burlington, on the 21st of June, 1776, empowered their dele 
 gates, to join with the delegates of the other Colonies, "in declar 
 ing the United Colonies independent of Great Britain, entering into 
 a confederation for union and common defence, making Treaties 
 with foreign nations for commerce and assistance, and to take 
 such other measures as might appear to them and you necessary 
 for these great ends ; always observing that whatever plan of 
 Confederacy you enter into, the regulating the internal police of 
 this province, is to be reserved to the Colony Legislature." * 
 Words containing a more explicit prohibition, against welding 
 New Jersey with the other Colonies, or any of them, into one 
 Nation, could not well have been employed ; and yet the author 
 ity communicated to the delegates of New Jersey, by these in 
 structions, was even greater than that possessed by the Repre 
 sentatives of many of the other Colonies. If the nature and in 
 tent of the Declaration of Independence, are such, as I have 
 stated ; it is of little consequence to inquire, whether that deci 
 sive and important step was taken by its authors, jointly or sever 
 ally ; or whether it deserves the name of a joint act, or of several 
 acts ; for let the act be done as it may, it was certainly done for the 
 purposes it announces, and could not have been done for any 
 such purpose as the President ascribes to it, namely, to declare 
 the Colonies one Nation, or the Colonists one People. 
 
 In further proof of this, I will here remark, that during the very 
 
 * See Journals of the Old Congress, Vol. 2, pp. 224, 225. 
 
PKOCLAMATION OF PKESIDENT JACKSON. 39 
 
 time the Declaration of Independence was under consideration, 
 to wit, on the llth June, 1776, Congress began to take the neces 
 sary measures for preparing " the form of a confederation to be en 
 tered into between these Colonies," * which measure was perfected 
 long after the Declaration of Independence was uttered. 
 
 This of itself contradicts the assertion, that we were then one 
 Nation or one People. But I will postpone to another number, 
 any remarks upon this second great act of our political history ; 
 and will conclude the present, by saying, that it results from all 
 which has been stated, that the Sovereignty assumed by the sev 
 eral States, in the manner I have before shewn, so far from being 
 annulled, was confirmed by the Declaration of Independence, 
 which had no other object than to declare their Independence, 
 and to demonstrate to the world, that this independence was 
 their s of right. 
 
 * See Journals of the Old Congress, Vol. 2, page 297. 
 
40 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 V. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 9, 1833. 
 
 IN my preceding numbers I have attempted, and as I hope, 
 attempted successfully, to shew, that at the very commencement 
 of the Revolution, the several revolted Colonies assumed upon 
 themselves respectively, to be Free, Sovereign and Independ 
 ent States ; that this their original Sovereignty, so far from being 
 annulled, was but confirmed by the subsequent Declaration of 
 Independence, which had no other objects, than to declare this 
 their new condition to the world, and to justify that which it so 
 declared. In the pursuit of my original plan, I am brought to 
 inquire now, whether this Sovereignty of the several States, con 
 firmed as it was by the first great act recorded in our Political 
 history, the Declaration of Independence, was afterwards abro 
 gated, by the second act of this sort, the Articles of Confedera 
 tion. I could much abbreviate the labour of this examination, 
 probably, by at once opening the latter instrument and reciting its 
 contents. But as my attention has been called to this subject, by 
 the very extraordinary and new doctrines put forth in the Procla 
 mation of the President, which doctrines I have undertaken to 
 review, I shall continue to pursue the course I have already 
 adopted ; therefore, before I examine the Articles of Confedera 
 tion themselves, I will endeavor to clear away all the brushwood 
 growing out of the arguments and narratives of this Proclama 
 tion, which I think calculated to conceal the objects of this com 
 pact, or to render them obscure. 
 
 The Proclamation says, " when the terms of our Confederation 
 were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of several 
 States, by which they agreed, that they would, collectively, form 
 one nation, for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic 
 concerns, and all foreign relations/ 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 41 
 
 This passage is in the same paragraph with, and follows imme 
 diately after that, which I have formerly quoted and commented 
 upon. Nay, it is actually connected with it by the copulative con 
 junction " and," being separated from the former by a semi-colon 
 only. The leading object of the first part of the paragraph, as I 
 have already shewn, was to prove, that before the Declaration ol 
 Independence, the People of all the revolted Colonies, had formed 
 themselves into one nation, and had proclaimed the existence of 
 this nation in that instrument, which was said to have been a 
 joint act, executed by the parties jointly, and not the act of these t 
 parties severally. Scarcely did this first nation make its appear 
 ance, than as if touched by the wand of a magician, it suddenly 
 disappears, and in its stead, we have this new nation, not formed 
 by the People, but by a solemn league of the several States, who 
 by this league agreed, that they would, collectively, form one 
 nation, for some purposes. The objects to be attained by the 
 creation of the first nation, and the Authorities with which it 
 was clothed to attain these objects, were not stated in the narra 
 tive of its birth, nevertheless it was an august body, the greatest 
 of all human creations, a Nation constituted by the free will of 
 its own People ; and it belongs not to mortal man, to define 
 either the objects or legitimate authorities of such a moral being. 
 
 But when this second nation is introduced, it is seen at once as 
 a rickety monster, as an accountable being without free will, as a 
 Sovereign without supremacy, as the pigmy creature of creators 
 puny as itself ; in a word, as a nation created for certain purposes 
 only ! 
 
 I wish the President had extended his argumentative narra 
 tion of the rise and progress of the first Nation, and given at least 
 a sketch of its decline and fall. I feel great interest in the fate 
 of all nations, because, I believe that the light of not one of these 
 Stars in the Constellation of human Society can be extinguished, 
 except under direful and portentous circumstances, betokening 
 the destruction of the whole galaxy. 
 
 Therefore, I sympathize very sincerely with the unhappy 
 Greek, with the suffering and gallant Pole, and already feel anxi 
 ety for the fate of the industrious, frugal, honest, and brave 
 Dutch. But when I am told of the existence of a Nation in this 
 
42 A EEVIEW OF THE 
 
 " my own, my native land," and that it was created by the only 
 human authors who I acknowledge as having legitimate authority 
 to create a Nation, its own People, quorum pars fui, I cannot 
 but feel intense interest as to its fate. Did its authors become 
 convinced, like some Philosophers of the olden time, that a Peo 
 ple occupying a territory of vast extent, could not long exist in 
 freedom, and in peace, as one Nation ; because, unfeeling and in 
 terested majorities, would more probably oppress minorities, than 
 any single despot; and therefore, sacrificing their ideas of splen 
 did grandeur, to their love of liberty, destroy the work of their 
 own hands, leaving no memorial to tell even that " Lyons was"; 
 or did this new monster nation, raise its parricidal hand against 
 the prior work of the authors of its own being, and bring it to an 
 untimely end, to gratify its own lusts? If " History is Philoso 
 phy teaching by example," the narrative of the downfall of this 
 first nation would doubtless furnish some useful lessons to states 
 men of other times. 
 
 But it is lost, " and like the baseless fabric of a vision, has left 
 not a wreck behind." 
 
 Then, let us not deplore its unknown fate, but tarn our atten 
 tion to its successor. 
 
 The difference between the author of this Proclamation and 
 myself, is radical and irreconcilable. He contends, that the in 
 habitants of these now United States are " one People." To 
 prove this he asserts, that before the Declaration of Independ 
 ence, they had formed themselves into " a nation " the existence 
 of which was proclaimed in that act ; and that afterwards, when the 
 terms of this their first association (called now a confederation) 
 " were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of sev 
 eral States, by which they agreed, that they would collectively 
 form one nation," for certain purposes which he expresses. On 
 the other hand, I have contended, that these inhabitants are not 
 now, nor ever were, one People, but always constituted several 
 separate and distinct communities, which even in their colonial 
 state, had long existed as such, and independent of each other. 
 That before the Declaration of Independence, these communities, 
 impelled by a sense of common interest, and of common danger, 
 associated themselves, not to form one nation, but by the agency 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PKESIDENT JACKSON. 43 
 
 of certain delegates selected by them respectively, to consult to 
 gether, and to recommend to each other, the adoption of such 
 plans, as might be thought to conduce most to the advancement 
 of this common interest, and to security against this common dan 
 ger. That afterwards, accidental circumstances, beyond the con 
 trol of these several communities, having deprived them of all 
 regular government, they were severally constrained by the force 
 of these circumstances, to form a new government, each for it 
 self; and so to assume Sovereignty. That in this situation, a de 
 cent respect for the opinions of mankind, induced them all to pro 
 claim their new condition, and to justify what they had done; 
 and that this was the sole cause and object of the Declaration of 
 Independence, which so far from declaring that these communi 
 ties were then " One Nation," declared expressly, that they were 
 Free and Independent States. I contend further, that the origi 
 nal association of these several distinct and independent communi 
 ties, Having for its objects the very general purposes I have men 
 tioned, did not invest the delegates deputed to represent them in 
 the association, with sufficient authority to attain its purposes. 
 That under such circumstances, it was very soon discovered, that 
 its objects could not be advanced, happily ; therefore, it became 
 desirable, to give body and being to this association, which, like 
 the earth, "in the beginning, was without form." That to re 
 duce the association to form, by prescribing precisely its intended 
 objects, and by bestowing upon it defined powers to attain these 
 pi-escribed objects, it became necessary that the original parties 
 to the association should enter into a Covenant with each other, 
 for these ends ; and that this Covenant is to be found in the Arti 
 cles of Confederation. 
 
 It will be seen from this exposition, that I concur with the au 
 thor of this Proclamation, when he says, that " when the terms of 
 our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn 
 league of several States," except, that in order to make it accu 
 rate, I desire to amend this expression, by substituting association 
 for confederation. Previously to the formation of this solemn 
 league, the States were united by the vague and uncertain ties of 
 a common interest and a common peril only. But in what this 
 common interest consisted, or what this common danger might 
 
44 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 require, neither was or could be defined ; and therefore, the con 
 nection to promote these general ends, being necessarily as in 
 definite as were its objects, their association was an Union, merely. 
 It was this solemn league alone, which converted this general, 
 simple and undefined association, into a particular confederation. 
 And here, I must remark, that although the author of this 
 Proclamation, had announced in the former part of this very sen 
 tence, that we had proclaimed ourselves a Nation in the Declara 
 tion of Independence, yet when he comes now to give the charac 
 ter of this Nation, it turns out, and by his own acknowledgment 
 too, to have been nothing more than a Confederacy. No man be 
 fore this author, has ever considered these terms as convertible : 
 but the new theory, which denies that these States ever were sov 
 ereigns, can only be maintained by such a perversion of the well- 
 settled meanings of words. 
 
 The qnaintness and metaphysical formula, in which this annun 
 ciation is made, is well worthy of a passing remark. The Procla 
 mation says, that " when the terms of our Confederation were re 
 duced to form, it (that is to say the form) was in that of a solemn 
 league." From this some casuist might infer, that the purpose of 
 this statement, was to affirm, that in substance we had been a Na 
 tion before, but when the terms of the existence of this Nation 
 were reduced to form, this form was that of a solemn league ; so 
 that we still remained a Nation in fact, although but a Confeder 
 acy in form. As the author of this Proclamation however disdains 
 to employ "metaphysical subtlety in pursuit of an impracticable 
 theory," he surely could not have intended to draw himself, or to 
 use any language which might justify another in drawing, that 
 most subtle of all metaphysical distinctions, which seeks to distin 
 guish the substance from the form under which it exists. 
 
 The new school of politicians must not, therefore, seek to de 
 rive any support for their doctrines, from this formula. Yet un 
 less some such casuistry is employed, unless some distinction is 
 taken between a nation and the form of its existence, it is impossi 
 ble to conceive how by a solemn league of several States, said to 
 have been intended to form their Confederation, they could have 
 agreed, that they would, collectively form one Nation. 
 
 The idea too of a Nation formed for certain purposes only, con- 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 45 
 
 sisting of the same people who had previously formed themselves 
 into a Nation for other purposes, and of the co-existence of these 
 two Nations, is a conception, which as it seems to me, is truly 
 worthy of the best scholar in the new French school of Eclecti 
 cism. 1 can conceive of one Nation, having two or twenty gov 
 ernments, designed for as many different purposes, and all held in 
 due and orderly subjection, within their established spheres, by 
 the will of the Nation which created and preserved them ; but I 
 freely confess, that the idea of one People divided into two Na 
 tions, surpasses my humble comprehension. 
 
 All this, however, is of little consequence, I admit, if the fact 
 be as the President affirms it, that by their solemn league of Con 
 federation, the several States who formed it, " agreed that they 
 would form one Nation," whether collectively, or in any other 
 way, whether for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation, or 
 for any other purpose whatever, is of no moment. 
 
 This fact can only be learned from the terms of the league it 
 self, for fortunately, we are not to be again perplexed with any 
 enquiry -as to the character of the parties to this league, or as to 
 the manner in which it was executed. It is conceded that the 
 parties were several bodies politic called States, who not only did, 
 but of necessity must, have entered into it, each for itself alone. 
 
 Let us now, then, examine this league. 
 
 The Articles of Confederation constitute an act so long, con 
 taining such a number of various provisions unconnected with 
 each other, that it would be difficult to make any abstract of its 
 contents, of such brevity as would suit this occasion. Nor is this 
 necessary for my present purpose, which is merely to ascertain, 
 whether it was the object of this instrument, to divest the States 
 of their original sovereign character. 
 
 A reference to some few of these articles only, will furnish mat 
 ter so conclusive upon this point, that it would be useless to press 
 the examination further, to prove, that the President mistakes the 
 object and character of this instrument as much, as I have already 
 shewn, as he mistook the purpose and character of the Declara 
 tion of Independence. 
 
 The Act of Confederation was agreed to by the Delegates of 
 the several States assembled in a general Congress, on the 15th 
 
46 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 of November, 1777, but, as these Delegates had no authority to 
 bind their respective Constituents in this mode, Congress directed 
 that the Articles should be submitted to the Legislatures of the 
 different States, and if approved by them, they were advised, to 
 authorize their delegates in Congress, to ratify the same, which, 
 being done, the Compact should become conclusive. On the 9th 
 of July, 1778, this act was actually ratified by eight States, in the 
 mode suggested. They being a majority of the States, and Con 
 gress having information, although not such as was regarded as 
 official, that many of the other States had ratified, or would agree 
 to ratify it, in the mode pointed out, and being urged to do so by 
 the necessities of the country, promulgated it on that day. 
 
 The delegates of North Carolina and of Georgia \vere not pres 
 ent in Congress, when this promulgation was made, but arriving 
 soon after, those of North Carolina ratified the act in behalf of 
 that State, on the 21st of July, 1778, and those of Georgia three 
 days afterwards, on the 24th of the same month. 
 
 The ratification on the part of New Jersey, did not take place 
 until the 20th of the following November. Delaware .did not, 
 ratify until February, 1779 ; and Maryland refused to ratify until 
 1781. Her ratification completed the act; and on the 2d of 
 March, 1781, Congress assembled under the new powers conferred 
 upon it by this instrument. These facts of themselves are deci 
 sive to prove, that the Articles of Confederation were not designed 
 to affect, in any way, the Sovereignty of the States, for otherwise, 
 between July, 1778, and February, 1781, the Union would have 
 been composed of parties connected by different bonds, and the 
 Confederation (if it was such), would have been formed by States 
 possessing different degrees of Sovereignty. 
 
 Both of which suppositions would be manifestly absurd. 
 
 But this matter shall not be permitted to rest upon inference 
 merely, although that is a necessary inference, and is derived from 
 the very strong facts which I have stated. 
 
 I will prove it incontestably, by the language of the Articles 
 of Confederation themselves. In the Caption of this act, it is en 
 titled " Articles of Confederation and perpetual union between 
 the States of New Hampshire," etc., etc., naming each of the 
 States. The first of these Articles declares, that " the style (not 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 47 
 
 the name) of this Confederacy shall be, The United States of 
 America." The second Article is in these words, "Each State 
 retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every 
 power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation 
 expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." 
 Xow, until it can be shewn, that one may retain what he never 
 had, this Article must be conclusive, to prove, that the States 
 were free, sovereign, and independent, before this instrument 
 was agreed upon. Should it be said, that, although then sover 
 eign, the ratifying States intended to delegate a portion of their 
 original Sovereignty by this act, the answer is, that while they 
 thereby avowed an intention to delegate portions of their power, 
 jurisdiction, and right to the United States in Congress assembled ; 
 in this very sentence they retain expressly all their Sovereignty, 
 freedom, and independence. This must be very obvious, when it 
 is observed, that the delegations of power, jurisdiction, and right 
 were to be made, not to the Confederacy styled the United States 
 of America, but to the representatives of these United States in 
 Congress assembled ; which body, although a suitable assignee 
 of such subjects, could never be considered, with any propriety, 
 at least, as fit or capable to receive an assignment of the sover 
 eignty, freedom, and independence of the several States, even if 
 it could be imagined, that these States were willing to transfer 
 the sacred deposit of their freedom to any body whatever. 
 
 I will not weary the reader by numerous other extracts from this 
 instrument, which I could easily make, to prove the same thing, 
 that, by the Articles of Confederation, the States, while transfer 
 ring certain powers of government to the Congress thereby cre 
 ated, and retaining their sovereignty, freedom, and independence 
 asserted their former possession of all these attributes of a State, 
 in declaring that they would not part with them. But I will here 
 close the present number, reserving some few other remarks, 
 which I purpose to make upon that part of the Proclamation, in 
 which the powers enjoyed by the old Congress under the Articles 
 of Confederation, is treated of, and, as I think, misrepresented. 
 
48 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 VI. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 12, 1833. 
 
 ALTHOUGH in my Jast number, I have established beyond all 
 doubt, as I think, that the Articles of Confederation, so far from 
 being intended to amalgamate the People of the several States 
 into one Nation, were designed to form them into a Confederacy, 
 in which each State retained expressly its own sovereignty, free 
 dom and independence, yet there are certain remarks made in 
 the Proclamation, as to the character of the Confederacy thereby 
 created, which must not be passed unnoticed. I propose in this 
 number, therefore, briefly to examine these remarks, before I 
 prosecute my enquiries further. 
 
 It is so fashionable now, amongst those who adopt the new the 
 ory, to depreciate the old confederation, in order to infer from its 
 supposed defects, the existence of sufficient power in the present 
 government of the United States, to prevent their possible recur 
 rence, that I am not astonished at any neophyte to the new faith, 
 who follows former examples of this kind. 
 
 But when such things appear in a State paper, intended for the 
 instruction of the People in their political history, and to deduce 
 from thence their present political condition, I must confess, that 
 I expected much more of accuracy in such statements, than I 
 have yet found in this Proclamation. 
 
 The statements in themselves, are of little consequence at the 
 present day, except as they manifest a disposition, to exhibit unj 
 der false lights, facts and truths, which are supposed to have some 
 bearing upon the new doctrines. So considered, they are worthy 
 of notice. For this reason, I have already noticed many such as 
 sertions; and as my sole object is Truth, I will now proceed to 
 point out others. The author of this Proclamation says, u But 
 the defects of the Confederation need not be detailed. Under its 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 49 
 
 operation, we could scarcely be called a Nation. We bad neither 
 prosperity at home, nor consideration abroad." Yet it was under 
 the operation of the Confederation alone, that the People of the 
 United States gloriously achieved their independence, after a long 
 and bloody war, compared with which, all subsequent wars have 
 been but as the pastimes of children. It was under the operation 
 of this Confederation alone, that Treaties of Alliance, of Amity and 
 Commerce, and of Peace, were contracted with many of the princi 
 pal Powers of the World, with France, with the United Netherlands, 
 with Sweden, with Prussia, with Great Britain, and with Morocco, 
 which Treaties have served as the model of every other of the 
 like kind that has since been concluded. But the conquest of 
 Freedom and Independence at home, and the conclusion of such 
 leagues with some of the most powerful nations upon the face of 
 the earth, in the eye of this author, seem to prove only, that we 
 had neither prosperity at home, nor consideration abroad. Let us 
 not rob the dead, in order to deck the living. The old Confeder 
 ation was the wisest system of that sort, which the wisdom of 
 mankind had ever produced ; and but fora single circumstance, 
 ascribable rather to the poverty of the people than to any defect in 
 the system itself, it would probably have endured to the present 
 day, a proud monument of the sagacity of its authors. Let those 
 who prefer grandeur to liberty, decry it as they may, their ob 
 jections apply equally to all Confederacies, and strike at the 
 root of free government, wherever it may perchance spring up in 
 a territory of vmich extent. 
 
 I agree with this author, when in this paragraph, he says, that 
 under the operation of this Confederation, " we could scarcely be 
 called a nation." But I wonder why the Articles of Confedera 
 tion should have been cited by him, to prove, that by these the 
 States had agreed to form one Nation, if this formation scarcely 
 deserved such a name. The first Nation, created by the People, 
 the existence of which, he said, was announced in the Declaration 
 of Independence, vanished under the "Presto Begone" of a ma 
 gician who created a second Nation by the terms of this Confed 
 eration. By these it was then said, that the States "agreed, that 
 they would, collectively, form one Nation," for certain purposes. 
 The first nation, when its character was developed by him, turned 
 4 
 
60 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 out to be no nation at all, but was then admitted by himself, to 
 have been a mere Confederacy ; and no sooner did he create a 
 second Nation out of this confederation, to destroy the first, than 
 he now tells us, that this second we can scarcely call a nation. 
 Although consistency is not ever conclusive evidence of truth, yet 
 the want of consistency has always been regarded as an admission 
 of error, somewhere. Whether this error consists, in interring 
 the existence of the first Nation, in asserting that of the second, or 
 in announcing that this last scarcely deserved to be called a na 
 tion, I leave to him and others to determine. At the moment 
 when he is thus depreciating the old Confederation, this author 
 seems much disposed, to bestow upon it many and far greater 
 powers, than its warmest friends ever claimed for it. Thus, he 
 Bays, that it was formed for the purpose of conducting " all our 
 foreign relations." This is certainly not so. To say nothing of 
 other subjects; with the regulation of the great subject of foreign 
 Commerce, which, in modern times, involves by far the most in 
 teresting of all the foreign relations of every State, the old Con 
 federacy had nothing to do, except what might be effected by 
 Treaties. At that day, however, commercial Treaties were rare, 
 and the terms upon which such Treaties might be concluded by 
 Congress, were much restricted, by the ninth Article of the Con 
 federation, so that the whole power of regulating their own do 
 mestic Trade and Navigation, and almost all their foreign Com 
 merce, devolved upon the several States exclusively ; and this 
 power was constantly exercised by them respectively. So true is 
 this, that the manner in which this power was constantly exer 
 cised by them, was one of the great causes assigned for the 
 amendment of the old Articles of Confederation by the present 
 Federal Constitution. 
 
 Nor is this all. The Proclamation, in speaking of the Articles 
 of Confederation, proceeds to say, that in that instrument " is 
 found an Article, which declares, that every State shall abide by 
 the determination of Congress on all questions, which by that 
 Confederation should be submitted to them." And immediately 
 adds, "under the Confederation, then, no State could legally an 
 nul a decision of the Congress, or refuse to submit to its exe 
 cution." 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 51 
 
 Thus a pledge of faith on the part of the States, to abide by the 
 determination of Congress on all questions, which by that Confed 
 eration should be submitted to them, is supposed to justify the 
 author of this Proclamation in asserting, and as a consequence 
 too of this, that no State could legally refuse to submit to the exe 
 cution of any of their decisions. Vain would have been the reser 
 vation made in the second Article of the Confederation " by the 
 jealousy of the States of all their power, jurisdiction and right, 
 which was not by that confederation " expressly delegated to the 
 United States in Congress assembled, if it was true, that no State 
 could legally refuse to submit to the execution of a decision of 
 the Congress, A\ 7 hether such decision was made to settle a question 
 submitted to that body, or not. 
 
 But common sense tells every one, that when parties agree to 
 submit some matter to the arbitrament of another, such a submis 
 sion cannot authorize the arbiter to determine any thing, which 
 was not submitted to him, or bind the faith of the parties to abide 
 by any such unauthorized determination. 
 
 The President himself, has recently furnished a striking illus 
 tration of this obvious truth, in denying the obligation of the 
 award made by the King of the Netherlands, (to whom Great 
 Britain and the United States, by a compact as solemn as this our 
 league of Confederation, had submitted the question concerning 
 their common boundary,) upon the simple ground, that this arbi 
 ter had undertaken to determine what was never submitted to 
 him. 
 
 If any one will take the trouble to examine the Articles of Con 
 federation, he will h nd that there were but few questions submit 
 ted by that instrument to the determination of Congress. They 
 are all stated in the ninth article ; and are such, as to the submis 
 sion of which, no two persons would or could disagree, probably. 
 But should a question, unfortunately, have arisen, whether any 
 matter was submitted, or not, as the parties to such a question, 
 were admitted in the instrument itself, to be sovereign States, 
 it resulted from necessity, that each had retained the right of 
 deciding such a question for itself. This effect was not the con 
 sequence of any want of power in the Old Congress " to enforce" 
 their decisions, as the Proclamation supposes, for mere power 
 
52 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 can never make right ; it flowed from the very nature of the case. 
 No arbiter is ever at liberty to decide for the parties, what is the 
 subject submitted to him by them : it is his province to determine 
 only that which they agree is so submitted. If the parties and 
 their common arbiter differ, as to the extent of their submission, 
 it would be idle for him to decide this matter, because the parties 
 would at once agree to annul his decision, and to hold it for naught. 
 
 But if the common arbiter and one of the parties concur as to 
 this point, and therein differ from tl>e other party, wherever there 
 exists a tribunal superior to them all, to that forum the dissenting 
 party may appeal, to determine whether the matter decided was 
 within his submission, or not. 
 
 Where no such tribunal exists however, (as is always the case 
 where sovereigns are the parties,) it is of necessity, that each must 
 decide this question for itself. 
 
 Nor is the faith of any pledged by the submission, to abide by 
 any decision which it believes to have been unauthorized by that 
 act. There is no necessity to "annul" such a decision, because 
 if made without authority^it is already null and void of itself ; and 
 in refusing to submit to its execution, the party so refusing simply 
 affirms this fact, and denies the obligation of an act of lawless 
 power and usurped authority. 
 
 If this was not so, no prudent individual woiild, and no sov 
 ereign could agree, to submit any matter whatever, however un 
 important it might be, to the arbitrament of another. For, if the 
 submission of one matter, could ever be considered as communi 
 cating a right to determine any other matter not submitted ; or 
 what is the same thing, if the submission of one matter to the 
 arbitrament of a common arbiter, communicated to him, the right 
 to determine for the parties, the extent of their submission, and 
 bind their faith to abide by his determination, whatever that may 
 be, this arbiter, although designed to be a Judge merely, becomes 
 at once a sovereign, whose authority is without stint or limit. In 
 the case of a submission made by sovereigns, they would strip 
 themselves of sovereignty by the very act of submission ; for he 
 who holds all his rights at the will or discretion of any other, is 
 no longer a sovereign, but a mere dependent for the enjoyment of 
 such rights upon this other. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 53 
 
 I have spent more time in exhibiting the falsehood of this new 
 doctrine put forth in the Proclamation, than its native deformity 
 perhaps required. But it was necessary to do so, I thought, be 
 cause it was obviously designed, to constitute the foundation 
 of another proposition, of a like kind, which is afterwards an 
 nounced ; and it was better to crush this monster while yet in its 
 egg state, than suffer it to be hatched unnoticed, and then to come 
 upon us in all the terrors of a fiery Dragon, bearing death on its 
 wings, and pestilence in its breath. I have thus brought down 
 the political history of these now United States, from a very early 
 period, to that of which I have last spoken. I have shewn, that 
 in their colonial state, they constituted several distinct Societies, 
 whose affairs were regulated by governments absolutely independ 
 ent of each other; that the misrule of the mother courtry in 
 duced them to revolt against its authority, and to shake off these 
 governments, but that in throwing off their former governments, 
 they did not dissolve their former associations the Societies 
 remained, after the governments were no more. That the neces 
 sity for government to regulate the affairs of every Society, then 
 compelled these communities, to establish some form of govern 
 ment, each tor itself; and so to assert, each its own sovereignty 
 and independence. That a decent respect for the opinions of 
 mankind, induced them all to announce this their new condition ; 
 and to justify the step they had taken. And that this was the 
 sole object of the Declaration of Independence, which so far from 
 proclaiming that they were One People or On 3 Nation, in its own 
 terms declared them to be free and Independent States. 
 
 I have shewn further, that to secure the benefits of harmonious 
 design, and concert and promptitude of action, in this their new 
 condition it became important, to confirm their Union by a 
 league of confederacy, declaring what were the objects of this 
 Union, and by what means these objects might be attained. 
 That this was the sole purpose of the Articles of Confederation, 
 which while establishing a general government for all, expressly 
 reserved to each of the States, the sovereignty, freedom and inde 
 pendence they had before assumed respec ively, and so much of 
 their former powers, jurisdictions and rights, as were not, by that 
 act, expressly delegated to the government thereby created and 
 
54 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 that it is false, to suppose, that under these Articles, the government 
 thereby created became an absolute government without limits to 
 its authority ; for although the several States were bound to sub 
 mit to its decision in all matters referred to its determination by 
 the Articles of Confederation themselves, yet these were but few 
 in number, and the question as to the extent of the submission, 
 never was, and could not have been submitted by the States 
 reserving their sovereignty, but the determination of this ques 
 tion, so far as it might interest any une, was necessarily retained 
 by each of the States for itself. 
 
 From all this, I feel myself justified in saying, that the original 
 sovereignty of the States, assumed by them in 1776, remained 
 unimpaired, until the adoption of the present Constitution of the 
 United States in 1789. Whether by this instrument, that sover 
 eignty was then annulled, is the question which I will next examine. 
 At present, I will take leave to say, that as the existing political 
 condition of these States, is to be sought for in the Federal Con 
 stitution alone, it is to be re<m>tted that the President thought it 
 
 O <T5 
 
 right, in his late Proclamation, to ascend to a period antecedent 
 to the formation of this government, in order to teach the People, 
 what is their situation under it. There was no necessity for this 
 certainly, as he himself has proved; and if he had confined him 
 self to a construction of the present Constitution, although he 
 might have been supposed to err in this, he would at least have 
 avoided such numerous inconsistencies, and gross historical mis 
 takes, as are now exhibited every where in his work, to the great 
 mortification of many of those who wiohed to be his friends. 
 
 But the new school of which he has become a proselyte, in ex 
 acting passive obedience and non-resistance to all its precepts, 
 seems to have imposed upon him as a probationary penance for 
 all his former sins against its faith, that he should not only pub 
 licly abjure the creed whose truth he has so often and so recently 
 affirmed, but that he should also proclaim from his high place, 
 the infallibility and supremacy of the Pontiff, and that these 
 States never were his sovereigns. Less than this would not have 
 been accepted as a sufficient atonement for his former offences, or 
 as a satisfactory token to entitle him to admission to the commun 
 ion of those political Saints, the sanctity of some of whom, is at 
 least as questionable, as the truth of their new doctrines. 
 
PEOCLAMATION OF PKESIDENT JACKSON. 55 
 
 VII. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 16, 1833. 
 
 THE scene is again shifted and the Proclamation after as 
 serting, and striving in vain to maintain, the doctrines of the new 
 ultra Federal School, that these States never were Sovereign, at 
 last comes clown to the Old Federal faith, that the States, 
 although once Sovereign, are not so now, because, by the Consti 
 tution of the United States, to use the words of this Proclama 
 tion, "they surrendered many of their essential parts of sov 
 ereignty," and therefore, " were no longer Sovereign." 
 
 I freely admit the truth of this conclusion, if its premises are 
 correct. Nay, I go further even than the author of this Procla 
 mation ; for I concede, that if the States have ever surrendered the 
 smallest factional part of their sovereignty, they thereupon ceased 
 to be sovereign ; and so far from retaining " their entire sover 
 eignty," they have lost not only all this, but with it their freedom 
 and independence also. Shew me, then, the transfer by the States 
 of any portion of their Sovereignty, and I will willingly admit that 
 all of it is lost. JSTor do I regard it as worth an effort, to enquire, 
 whether they may have saved in its wreck, any vain and useless 
 bauble, to serve as a memorial of their former condition, in pre 
 senting perpetually to their view, the fact, that even this worth 
 less plaything, must now be held under the mere courtesy of an 
 other. I care not much either, who the new Sovereign of the 
 States may be, to whom their former Sovereignty has been 
 surrendered. Whether he is the Ox Apis, who they had seen 
 calved in their own fields, fatted in their own pastures, and had 
 then in their own folly consecrated as an Idol ; or whether he is 
 the great King, the majority, the necessary and legitimate Sov 
 ereign of every " Nation," which has not yet appointed some 
 other Chieftain to rule over it. The privilege of choosing a 
 
56 A EEVIEW OF THE 
 
 master, is of no value in my eyes, except that if the States must 
 Lave one, I should prefer one to many; for I have high authority 
 for the belief, that none can serve two masters at the same time. 
 
 But is it true, that these States have ever surrendered any part 
 of their sovereignty ? 
 
 To answer this question, we must first endeavour to form a 
 correct opinion of what Sovereignty is. Now, what is Sov 
 ereignty? Sovereignty is supremacy. A Sovereign, according 
 to the very derivation of the word, is one who is over all, and 
 who, therefore, can have no superior. Strictly, then, there is no 
 existing Sovereign, but He who made all, who preserves all, and 
 who by His almighty power, may at any time rightfully, annihi 
 late all. When the vanity of human Rulers, appropriated to 
 themselves a name and character, which, of right belong only to 
 their Creator, they tried to preserve all their attributes, although 
 limiting their application to a more narrow sphere. 
 
 An earthly Sovereign thus becomes, one who is over all his 
 subjects, who may of right do within his own dominions, all that 
 is physically possible, and which does not contravene the will of 
 his God. Such is human sovereignty, which alone I am now 
 considering. 
 
 Founded upon this simple truth, is that great maxim of the 
 public law, which asserts the equality of States ; for as all States 
 must have sovereignty, and as sovereignty is supremacy, there 
 fore, all States are equal. From this maxim, do all Treaties derive 
 their obligation ; for although these instruments are rarely exe 
 cuted by the Sovereign parties in person, but by their agents duly 
 appointed for that purpose, (whether mediately or immediately 
 matters not,) the acts so rat tied, are considered as the acts of the 
 Sovereigns themselves, who being equals, may properly contract, 
 which could not well be if the parties \vere not equal. Standing 
 on this well established doctrine of the equality of the States, do 
 "we the People," the. only legitimate Sovereign in this land, 
 erect our head, high as the proudest he who sits upon a throne, 
 because we too are sovereign, and like him may rightfully do 
 within our own dominions, all that mortals may. 
 
 Having thus shewn what Sovereignty is, and proved the truth 
 of my definition by exhibiting its acknowledged effects, I will 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 57 
 
 endeavor to make this more manifest by contrast, in shewing 
 what sovereignty is not. This is necessary, because, it is only by 
 confounding Sovereignty with something else, that any difference 
 has ever arisen, in the determination of the question which 
 I have first proposed. Sovereignty is not Government. If it 
 was, as all Sovereignty is Supremacy, every government under 
 the Sim of necessity, would be an absolute and unchecked Des 
 potism ; nor could free governments exist. But as Sovereignty 
 and Government are not the same, we may readily discern, how 
 it is, that although sovereignty is the same wherever it exists, 
 yet governments are infinitely diversified: Sovereignty, like 
 truth, is an indivisible unit. It may be enjoyed by one, or by 
 many, at the same time, but then all the persons make but one 
 Sovereign, as all the parceners make but one heir. Government 
 being a mere delegation or assumption of power, jurisdiction and 
 authority, each of which subjects are infinitely divisible, may 
 have as many hues as the Chamelion, as many forms as Proteus. 
 
 Although sovereignty and government are distinct, easy sepa 
 rable, and, in modern times, often found separated, yet as the 
 rights of sovereignty and the powers of government may, and for 
 a long time did, co-exist, and in the same persons, the two became 
 confounded ; and it is always difficult to remove any error con 
 firmed by long habit. Galileo suffered in a dungeon of the In 
 quisition, for presuming to demonstrate that the earth revolved 
 around the sun, and Sidney died on a scaffold as a Traitor, for 
 daring to prove, that government was not of divine origin. It 
 was reserved for American Statesmen to give a practical illustra 
 tion of the great truths which he taught, by inducing their fellow- 
 citizens, while establishing governments, to retain their own 
 sovereignty unimpaired, and so to shew, that sovereignty and 
 government were not only separable and distinct, but that they 
 ought not ever to be again united in this land, by any who wish 
 to be free. This is the true American System, which has been 
 but little understood, and therefore has been but imperfectly imi 
 tated anywhere else, as yet. 
 
 Notwithstanding sovereignty and government are not the same, 
 yet it is readily conceded, that where the rights of sovereignty 
 are admitted to be possessed by any government, there the gov- 
 
58 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 ernment becomes the sovereign, and will continue such as long as 
 it enjoys these rights, no matter by what means they may have 
 been acquired. 
 
 The first and highest of these rights of sovereignty, nay, that 
 which comprehends all the others, is the right to create a govern 
 ment to regulate the affairs of all the subjects of the sovereign, 
 and to amend, alter, or abolish this government, at its pleasure. 
 Stripped of this right, sovereignty is but a worthless name : but 
 while this right is retained, although the government created by 
 the sovereign s will may be endowed with the plenary Power of 
 a Roman perpetual Pictator, yet as it lives but by the will of its 
 Creator, it would be idle to call such a government a sovereignty. 
 
 When I speak of the right to create new, and abolish former 
 governments, as the sure index and test of sovereignty, I do not, 
 of course, refer to force. That may be, and more often has been, 
 employed to destroy, than to preserve, rights of all kinds. 
 
 What I mean to assert is simply this : wherever a power exists 
 in any Country, which power is admitted by all of that Country 
 to possess the right of creating, amending, or abolishing the gov 
 ernment of that country, this power must be superior to the gov 
 ernment created by itself, and is the true and only sovereign of 
 that country. Alterations of government made by such a power, 
 are not properly termed Revolutions. 
 
 They exhibit only a change of will on the part of an acknowl 
 edged Sovereign ; a mere peaceful repetl of some former ordi 
 nance, and the enaction of a new one, designed to attain the same 
 great objects, by different, and, as the Sovereign believes, by bet 
 ter and more appropriate means. Thus, when the King, Lords, 
 and Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled, in vir 
 tue of the omnipotence or sovereignty of that body, recently altered 
 the foundations of their government, by a mere Statute, the alter 
 ation was well termed a Reform, because those who made the 
 change, it was acknowledged on all hands, had the right to make 
 it. So, too, when the King of France, a few years since, granted 
 to his subjects a new form of .government, by a charter, wherein 
 was defined their rights and his duties, this was not Revolution, 
 but Reform of another kind only; for he who granted this char 
 ter, being an acknowledged Sovereign, had the confessed author- 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 59 
 
 ity so to do. And when these States abrogated the old Articles 
 of Confederation, and established the present Constitution of the 
 United States, this was not Revolution, but Reform of a kind still 
 different, because, it was conceded by all, that those who made, 
 might of right alter. But when the People of these Colonies 
 shook off their allegiance to their former acknowledged Sovereign, 
 and asserted their freedom and Independence, this was Revolu 
 tion, and not Reform ; for all admitted that this proceeding, how 
 ever necessary and proper it might be, was not affected in virtue 
 of any right acknowledged by both the sovereign and subjects. 
 Having thus shewn what sovereignty is, and pointed out the sure 
 test, by which its existence and abode may always be ascertained, 
 I will now endeavor, by the application of this test, to determine, 
 whether these States have lost any portion of their sovereignty by 
 their adoption of the present Constitution of the United States. 
 And first, by whom was this Constitution adopted ? To this there 
 can be but one answer : it was adopted by the People. But by 
 what People? The President, in his Proclamation, says: "The 
 People of the United States formed the Constitution, acting 
 through the State Legislatures, in making the compact to meet 
 and discuss its provisions, and acting in separate Conventions 
 when they ratified those provisions." 
 
 This statement, although correct in its terms, is yet much too 
 general to be received as a direct and positive answer to my ques 
 tion. Therefore, as I do not wish to take shelter under ambigui 
 ties of any kind, I will say, that the present Federal Constitution 
 was not made by the People of the United States, acting as one 
 mass, or " Nation," or by the will of the majority of any such 
 mass : but it was made by the People of the several States, acting 
 as several distinct and independent commonwealths, each in its 
 own separate corporate character, and each binding its own par 
 ticular minority, by the will of its own particular majority, ac 
 cording to its own established usages, and without regard to the 
 will of any other. 
 
 A single well-known historical fact will put this beyond all 
 doubt. Two of the then Thirteen States, North Carolina and 
 Rhode Island, refused to adopt this Constitution at first, nor did 
 they do so until some time after the government which was 
 
60 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 thereby created had gone into actual operation in the other eleven 
 States. Yet, although the population of each of these States con 
 stituted a ratio to the population of all the States, even less than 
 the ratio of the number of either of these States to the number of 
 all the States, no one conceived, that either of these States could 
 be bound by the will of a great majority of the People of the 
 other States, or by the will of eleven-thirteenths of the States 
 themselves. 
 
 Nor did any one ever think, that the will of that portion of the 
 citizens of either of these States who approved the Constitution, 
 and wished to adopt it, was not rightfully overruled and con 
 trolled by the will of the majority of their fellow-citizens in these 
 States respectively, although, as I have said, this majority was 
 but a small minority of all the States. 
 
 This is decisive to shew, that in adopting the Constitution, the 
 States acted as cifmm unities absolutely independent of each other, 
 each binding its own people to adopt or reject, as the constitution 
 al majority of that particular State thought best. Here then is a 
 new and conclusive piece of evidence, to prove, the sovereignty 
 of these States respectively; for none "but a Sovereign," could 
 right fully have abolished the old government formed by the Arti 
 cles of Confederation and have established this new government 
 in its stead. 
 
 Having shewn by whom this government was created, I will 
 next enquire, by whom it is preserved? The answer to this, is 
 like that given to the former question : this government is pre 
 served only by the agency of the States. Unless the States pre 
 scribe the time when, the place where, the manner in which, and 
 the persons by whom, members of the House of Representatives 
 of the United States may be elected, there could ba no such Rep 
 resentatives chosen. Unless the States elect them, there could be 
 no Senators of the United States. Unless the States prescribe the 
 mode in which Electors for choosing a President and Yice-Presi- 
 dent of the United States shall be appointed, neither of these of 
 fices could he filled. And without a President to nominate, and 
 Senate to advise, there could be no Judges appointed. 
 
 But a government without agents to perform either legislative, 
 executive or judicial functions, would be as deformed a monster, 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 61 
 
 as that of which the President Las spoken in this Proclamation, a 
 Nation for certain purposes only. 
 
 It may be said perhaps, that although some of the States might 
 refuse or omit to pass the laws necessary to give effect to those 
 provisions of the Federal Constitution, which require the appoint 
 ment of a President and Vice-President, of a Senate and House 
 of Representatives, yet so long as others do so, the government 
 would go on, heedless of the recusant States. I will not stop to 
 enquire whether this is so ; for even if it is, it does not vary my 
 argument, the object of which is to shew, that the Federal Gov 
 ernment is not preserved by its own means, but solely at the will 
 and by means of the States. Its absolute dependance upon these 
 for its existence, would not be less, if that dependance was upon 
 some, and not upon all : nor would the tenure upon which it holds 
 all its powers, be one whit less precarious, if these powers are held 
 under the will of a majority only, than if they were held under 
 the will of all the States. In either case, it is a dependant thing, 
 and its dependance for existence is upon the States. 
 
 It may be said also, that the faith, of the States is pledged, and 
 all their officers are bound by an oath, to support the Constitution 
 of the United States ; therefore, it is not fair to reason from a 
 supposition which rests upon a breach of a nation s faith, and the 
 violation of the oaths of its People. 
 
 This is all true, but it only proves that for which I am contend 
 ing, that this Federal Government is preserved solely by the 
 States, who of necessity, are, and must be, the sole judges of what 
 their faith requires; and who could absolve their own citizens 
 from the obligations of this oath, as easily as they did from the 
 obligations of that which pledged their allegiance to the British 
 Crown. And here let me beg of those who rely upon this argu 
 ment of pledged faith, to read the last clause of the thirteenth 
 Article of the Old Confederation ; and in doing so, to remember 
 the cases of North Carolina and Rhode Island, to which I have 
 before adverted. I beg every Virginian too, to think of his own 
 oath, of fidelity, and to settle w r ith his own conscience whether 
 this is abrogated by that to which. I have before referred. 
 
 Having thus shewn, that the Constitution of the United States 
 was established by the w r ill of the several States, and is preserved 
 
62 A BEVIEW OF THE 
 
 only by the agency of the several States, I will next enquire by 
 whom it may he altered ? 
 
 The fifth article of the Constitution itself, answers this question. 
 It will there he seen, that where amendments are proposed by 
 two-thirds of both branches of Congress, or by a Convention 
 called for proposing amendments, in either case, such amend 
 ments cannot be valid as parts of the Constitution, until the 
 amendments so proposed shall be "ratified by the Legislatures of 
 three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three- 
 fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may 
 be proposed by the Congress. 1 By this it is obvious, that the 
 States who established and who preserve this Constitution, can al 
 ter it ; and the only difference between the powers exerted to 
 create and to alter, is merely this, that in the creation, the assent 
 of each State was necessary to make it obligatory upon each ; but 
 it may be amended by the concurrence of three-fourths only of 
 the States, and amendments w T hen so ratified, will be obligatory 
 upon all. In this mode it has been four times amended. If, then, 
 these States have created, do preserve, and may at any time 
 (three- fourths of them consenting) alter this Constitution, and this 
 too according to its own provisions, is it not idle to say, that they 
 are not sovereign, because they have surrendered many of their 
 essential parts of sovereignty by this Instrument ? They may 
 have surrendered much of their power, much of their jurisdiction, 
 and many of their rights, by this Instrument ; but one right they 
 have not surrendered, certainly, and that is their right to alter 
 this instrument itself, and so cancel by their will, the very act 
 their will created, and by which, it is said, they have deprived 
 themselves of their Sovereignty. 
 
 This very right to make and to alter government when made, 
 is Sovereignty. It constitutes the possessor of it the earthly supe 
 rior of those who are the earthly superiors of all others, and so 
 makes Supremacy in that land where the right is admitted to 
 exist. 
 
 1 will pursue this examination further, in another number. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PEESIDENT JACKSON. 63 
 
 VIII. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 16, 1833. 
 
 ONE obvious error pervades every part of this Proclamation 
 wherein its author speaks of Sovereignty. Confounding sover 
 eignty with government, and graduating the powers of govern 
 ment according to some fanciful scale, he infers, that whoever 
 may possess what he considers the great powers of government, 
 must be Sovereign ; and that such as have not these powers, are 
 not Sovereign. Hence he concludes, that as the States, by the 
 Federal Constitution, have granted away " the right to make 
 Treaties declare war levy taxes and to exercise exclusive Ju 
 dicial and Legislative Powers " they are no longer Sovereign ; 
 but that "the allegiance of their Citizens, was transferred, in the^ 
 first instance, to the government of the United States." And he 
 asks in triumph, "How, then, can that State be said to be Sover 
 eign and independent, whose Citizens owe obedience to laws not 
 made by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those 
 laws, when they come in conflict with those passed by another? 1 
 
 This can scarcely be called sophistry, it is palpable mistake, 
 produced by ignorance of the great characteristic difference be 
 tween two subjects totally distinct from each other, by which ig 
 norance the author is frequently lead to confound them. If he 
 would but have paused a moment, to ask himself a few plain 
 questions, his own answers to them would have prevented him 
 from falling into any such errors. Is any government within 
 these States, whether general or particular, whether State or Fed 
 eral, created by its own will ? If it is, such government must cer 
 tainly be Sovereign, for none other than a Sovereign can create 
 government. But if it is not, then it is as certainly the creation 
 of the will of some other ; and its Creator must continue to be the 
 superior of its creature, unless in the act of creation, or at some 
 other time, it has transferred to the Creature, the right to pre- 
 
64 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 serve itself, in opposition to the will of the Creator ; in which 
 case also, the creature may become a Sovereign. 
 
 Now does any government, of any kind, within these States, 
 enjoy the right to preserve itself against the will of its creators? 
 There is no one to be found, as yet at least, so profligate as to af 
 firm this, although it is apparent, that there are some, who would 
 try to prove by argument what they dare not assart a? fact ; and 
 who at some time or other, will probably offer to establish such a 
 right, "ultima rationed Then, if none of our governments are 
 created by their own will, or can be preserved by their own will, 
 when that is in opposition to the will of those by whom they were 
 created, there is no semblance of truth in the position, that any of 
 them are Sovereign: because, they too, are all of them compelled 
 to acknowledge a Superior. And the argument which would in 
 fer sovereignty in one, from the want of it in another, must be 
 unsound, unless it can be shewn, that of two falsehoods one must 
 be true. 
 
 " The right to make Treaties," etc., is not a more direct emana 
 tion of sovereignty, than the right to punish crimes, to prescribe 
 the modes in which alone property may be acquired and held, to 
 create Corporations (whether for Banking or any other purpose), 
 and the like. If the exclusive possession of the former powers, prove 
 Sovereignty in the general government, the exclusive possession 
 of the latter powers, which are equally necessary and important, 
 would prove Sovereignty in the particular governments; and we 
 should then see the case of two Sovereigns of " Two Kings of 
 Brentford." But as such a conception has never been entertained, 
 except in the imagination of a humorous dramatist desirous to 
 divert by a ludicrous exhibition, I presume grave Statesmen would 
 not resort to such authority, to prove the verity of their theories. 
 Because there cannot be two Sovereigns in one Country at the 
 same time, however, it does not follow, that there is no Sovereign 
 there. In denying Polytheism, no man affirms Atheism, simply 
 because both are falsehoods. Nor in denying that all or any of 
 the governments within these States are Sovereign, does any one 
 affirm, that there is no Sovereignty here. Sovereignty must abide 
 in every State, or it cannot be a State. It abides in this country 
 as perfectly as it does in Russia, or in Turkey, not in the general 
 

 PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 65 
 
 or particular governments, however, but in the People ; and who 
 The People are, I have already shewn. 
 
 This Sovereign People might, if they pleased, have exerted di 
 rectly all the powers which, in the exercise of their Sovereign 
 will, they have seen fit to delegate to others. If they had done 
 so, we should have had a pure Democracy, where, as in a pure 
 Despotism, the Sovereignty and the government are united. 
 
 But they did not choose to do so ; and thought it wiser to es 
 tablish a Representative Democracy. It results from the very 
 nature of this form of government, that the Sovereignty remains 
 with the People, while the government is in the magistracy, their 
 Representatives, agents, and servants. Grouping all these mag 
 istrates into two great classes, of Federal and State agents, the 
 Sovereign People have said to one of these classes, we assign to 
 you the duty of making treaties for us, etc. To the other class 
 they have said, we assign to you the duty of punishing crimes 
 committed against us. 
 
 In assigning these different duties to their different agents, how 
 ever, the Sovereign People neither impair their own Sovereignty, 
 nor create one of those classes of magistrates superior to the other ; 
 because, they are all but servants, acting in virtue of the power 
 which each derives from their common master, and for his benefit. 
 Nor is it possible to institute any comparison between the powers 
 granted to these different classes of agents, in order to determine, 
 in that way, which is the higher ; because, things totally unlike 
 cannot be compared. Is the power to prescribe in what way 
 alone property may be acquired, held, or transmitted, greater cr 
 less, than the power to mak% Treaties ? Is the power to preserve 
 or take away liberty greater, or less, than the power to declare 
 war ? Is the power to forfeit life greater, or less, than the power 
 to levy duties and imposts? If we pursue this scheme a little fur 
 ther, and descending from the two groups of Federal and State 
 agents, examine the constituent parts of each of them, the subject 
 will become more plain. Thus, the Sovereign People, in their 
 different charters, or laws for the government of their representa 
 tive agents, say to their Legislative servants, in either class, you 
 shall make laws for us upon certain subjects ; to their Judicial 
 servants, you shall judge and decide for the parties before you, 
 5 
 
66 A EEV1EW OF THE 
 
 how these laws so made apply to their cases respectively; and to 
 their Executive servants, you shall execute these laws and judg 
 ments. Each constituent portion of either class is so made the 
 co-ordinate of and distinct from every other constituent portion 
 of that class, not dependant for its powers upon any of the other 
 portions, but upon the common superior of all, the Sovereign 
 People. Now, it is as easy to conceive, how two or twenty gov 
 ernments may be made co-ordinates of each other, as to conceive 
 how three or more co-ordinate departments of the same govern 
 ment may be made so. 
 
 Both cases pre-snppose a superior to all, by which alone such 
 co-ordination can be established : for if any one of the classes, or 
 of the Departments of either, should undertake to establish a co 
 ordinate of itself, the very fact of such a creation would shew 
 superiority in the one and subordination in the other. 
 
 Then, if the author of this Proclamation, wishes to prove the 
 want of Sovereignty in the State governments, by shewing that 
 they cannot exercise certain great powers of government, he 
 might save himself much trouble, for his conclusion is a truism. 
 None of these governments are now, or ever were, Sovereign. 
 But it is equally a truism, or if not, his own argument must prove 
 it, at least to himself, that neither is the government of the 
 United States Sovereign ; because that, too, wants many of the 
 most important powers of government. It is idle, however, to 
 ask in reference to the States themselves, "how can that State be 
 sovereign and independent, whose citizens owe obedience to laws 
 not made by it?" Because, in a Representative Democracy, no 
 law ever was made by the State itself, but by its Legislative 
 agents ; and if these agents exist in both of its two governments, 
 State and Federal, the law made by such agents, is as much made 
 by itself, in the one case as in the other. In either case, a ques 
 tion may arise, whether the law so made is in pursuance of the 
 authority given by the sovereign People to their Legislative 
 agents, to make laws ; and if it is once conceded, that the act is 
 not in pursuance of this authority, then no man can doubt, that 
 such an act, whether done by State or Federal Legislative agents, 
 is an act of mere usurpation, and is not law, although it may pro 
 fess to be so, and wear all the forms of law. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 67 
 
 The author of this Proclamation, labours under another strange 
 hallucination, when lie imagines, that the magistrates of the dif 
 ferent States " are sworn to disregard their laws, when they come 
 in conflict with the laws passed by another/ No such oath is, 
 and I feel very confident, ever will be required of them. It is 
 true, that they are all sworn to support the Constitution of the 
 United States, and equally true that this Constitution declares, 
 that the laws made " in pursuance thereof," shall be the supreme 
 laws of the land, anything in the Constitution or la ,vs of any 
 State, to the contrary notwithstanding. But to make the laws of 
 the United States the supreme law of the land, they must be in 
 pursuance of the Constitution : therefore, if the laws made by the 
 Federal Legislative agents, are not made in pursuance of that 
 Constitution which the State magistrates have sworn to support, 
 these magistrates not only ma}^, but must, if they regard the ob 
 ligations of this oath, declare such unauthorized acts not to be 
 law, and procaed to execute all the Constitutional laws of the 
 State, which may be found in conflict with such pretended and 
 usurped authority. 
 
 I acknowledge that I was startled by the boldness of another as 
 sertion, put forth in this Proclamation, and shocked at the moral 
 turpitude, which it wantonly imputed to me and to thousands of oth 
 ers, some of whom, while dwelling upon this earth were ever re 
 garded not only as wise, but as being what is far better, pure of 
 heart as mortals may be. It says, in speaking of the States, that 
 " the allegiance of their citizens was transferred in the first in 
 stance, to the government of the United States." 
 
 I am now so old, that it would be vain for me to attempt to 
 recollect, how often in the course of a long life, I have been re 
 quired to give assurance of my fidelity to my native State. But 
 this I know well, that I never gave this pledge of my faith reluc 
 tantly, or with any mental reservation whatever. I always meant 
 to relinquish and renounce, what in that oath, I said I would 
 "relinquish and renounce the character of subject or Citizen of 
 any Prince or other state whatever. I ahvays intended to ab 
 jure what in that oath, I did " abjure all allegiance which might 
 be claimed of me by any such prince or other state." 
 
 I always meant to be what I then swore I would be, " faithful 
 
68 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 and true to the Commonwealth of Virginia so long as I continued 
 a citizen thereof." 
 
 Is it possible, that in giving these repeated pledges, I was for 
 sworn ; and that in calling my Maker to witness the sincerity and 
 singleness of purpose of what I regarded as a sacred promise, I 
 was but invoking his wrath upon my false heart, and devoting 
 my immortal soul to everlasting perdition? Has my country 
 been so cruel and so base to one who wished to be dutiful, as to 
 transfer his allegiance to another, and then to steal from his strong 
 attachment to her, an abjuration of the very allegiance which she 
 had transferred, and a solemn assurance of the continuation of 
 that fidelity to her, which she had already relinquished and re 
 nounced ? It cannot be. The Commonwealth of Virginia could 
 never trifle thus and so meanly and wantonly too, with her faith 
 ful people. If they have been led into error by her, it is because 
 she was first deceived. 
 
 Tell me then, any of you who deceived her, you who assisted in 
 the formation and the adoption of any instrument that has trans 
 ferred your allegiance to another, and afterwards took this oath 
 of abjuration and fidelity yourselves, were you for-sworn in doing 
 so ? I answer for you all, for those who are dead, as well as for 
 those who survive, that you were not, and for you as well as for 
 myself, I throw back this foul charge upon us all, come it from 
 what quarter it may. Let the author of this Proclamation blun 
 der as he may, in reciting our past political history let him 
 involve himself in whatever absurdities and inconsistencies 
 he lists, in seeking to establish his new theory let him rea 
 son as erroneously as he pleases, as to the powers and authori 
 ties of his government all this may be pardoned. But when 
 he assails the faith of States, and seeks to falsify the truth of 
 their people, he touches subjects, upon which no man living 
 should even sportively descant, because they involve relations far 
 above his wisdom, even if that was much greater than it is. 
 
 The Commonwealth of Virginia has never transferred the alle 
 giance of her citizens, to the government of the United States, 
 either " in the first instance," or at any other time. She claims 
 it of them all now, as strongly as she did on the 29th of June, 
 1776, when she first demanded it, and at any and at every other 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. - 69 
 
 time since: nor can any man living point to the act or instru 
 ment by which she has ever surrendered it. Not one word of 
 any such transfer is seen, or ought to be expected to appear in 
 the declaration of Independence. Not one word of any such 
 transfer is found in the Articles of Confederation ; so far from it, 
 that instrument directly repudiates any such notion in the strong 
 and emphatic words which it employs. Not one word of such a 
 transfer is to be met with in the Constitution of the United States, 
 which in all its provisions, addresses itself to the People, not as 
 the people of the United States, but as the people of the several 
 States, the obedience of which people to the legitimate mandates 
 of the government thereby created, is claimed, only because such 
 obedience has been promised, in their behalf, by their respective 
 Sovereigns, the States, in their several ratifications of that Instru 
 ment. Nor have the citizens of any State ever taken, or been 
 required to take, any oath of allegiance to the United States, or to 
 their government ; for Congress could find no authority for doing 
 so, in the Constitution, and therefore have never presumed to pre 
 scribe any such oath. It is true, many swear to support the Con 
 stitution of the United States, but there is no more of incompati 
 bility between the obligations of this oath, and those of their 
 oath of allegiance to a State, than there is between the latter, and 
 the obligations of the oath administered to any witness in a 
 Court of Justice. The oaths relate to different subjects ; and in 
 swearing to support the Constitution of the United States, the 
 party taking the oath, but reaffirms his fidelity to his State, which 
 has chosen to adopt this Constitution as its supreme law, and so 
 made it a part of its own code. 
 
 But Congress may punish Treason against the United States, 
 and the Proclamation says, " Treason is an offence against Sov 
 ereignty, and Sovereignty must reside with the power to punish it." 
 Let me here remark, that the power to punish Treason, is not cited 
 to prove, the transfer by the States of the allegiance of their Citi 
 zens to the government of the United States. The author knew 
 very well, that even the acknowledged subjects of any foreign 
 power, might be punished for an act of Treason, just as properly, 
 as the subjects of the Sovereign of the country within which the 
 Treason was committed. In this respect, therefore, citizens and 
 
70 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 aliens stand upon the same footing. The power to punish Treason 
 is referred to merely to show, that the government possessing this 
 power must be Sovereign, because " Treason is an offence against 
 Sovereignty." Now with all due respect for the legal learning of 
 the author of this State paper, I will take the liberty of suggest 
 ing to him, that in this country at least Treason is no more an 
 offence against Sovereignty, than any other crime that may be 
 committed within our dominions; and certainly not more than 
 sedition, mutiny, or any other of that great class of offences, 
 which strike at the existence of subordination by manifesting a 
 contempt for the authority of government. All crimes which 
 threaten to disturb the peace and good order of society (as they 
 all do) are offences against the government of that society, and 
 against the dignity of the Sovereign by which such government 
 has been ordained, for the special purpose of preserving this 
 peace and good order. To say then, that Treason is an offence 
 against sovereignty, is only to affirm that Treason is a crime. 
 But when this author adds, that " sovereignty must reside with 
 the power to punish Treason," or any other crime, he says what no 
 constitutional lawyer can admit ; because it it was true, it would 
 prove that every government in the world is a Sovereign, since 
 one of the great objects in all government, is to punish crimes, 
 and Treason is usually put at the head of these, for in the eyes of 
 the governments which, classify offences, the greatest is that 
 which manifests contempt of themselves. 
 
 Suppose it was admitted however, that Treason is an offence 
 against sovereignty, and that sovereignty must reside with the 
 power to punish it, the learned author of this Proclamation can 
 not surely mean to assert, that the hangman who has the power 
 to execute a traitor, or the judge who pronounces the sentence of 
 death, and therein gives to the hangman his authority to execute 
 it or even the Legislature who passed the law inflicting this pun 
 ishment, and directing the Judge to apply it, are all or any of 
 them Sovereigns. He must admit that they are all, each in his 
 appropriate sphere, but the agents and delegates of that high 
 power, which by its constitution, has said to its legislative ser 
 vants, Do you declare the punishment of Treason, to its Judi 
 cial servants, do you declare upon whom this punishment must 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 71 
 
 justly fall, and to its Executive servant, the humble hangman, 
 do you execute that which in this behalf, you may be required to 
 execute, by my Judges. Now who is that great power, in whose 
 name, and by whose authority alone, all these things may be 
 done, rightfully ? Certainly not the government of the United 
 States, but the People who made that government, and by its 
 Organic law delegated to all these their respective agents, the 
 authorities 1 have stated. Then if Treason be an offence against 
 Sovereignty, it is an offence against the People who constitute 
 the Sovereignty; and the power to punish it, is their power, 
 although in the exertion of this power, they may call for the 
 action of a common hangman. We are so brought back to the 
 former question, which I have before answered, who are the 
 People ? 
 
 This number is already drawn out to a much greater length 
 than I intended, and must now be closed, but the subject is much 
 too important to be dropped at this point ; I will therefore con 
 tinue it hereafter. 
 
72 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 IX. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 19, 1833. 
 
 IF the author of this Proclamation had asserted, that the several 
 States, by the Federal Constitution, had parted with much of 
 their power, jurisdiction and authority, he would have asserted a 
 fact, that no one ever has or probably ever will deny ; because, it 
 is a truth obvious to all who read that Instrument. The only 
 question is, do the powers thereby transferred comprehend Sover 
 eignty ? If they do, then the government of the United States, 
 the assignee of these powers, is a Sovereign. But if they do not 
 that government is not a Sovereign : and as this Constitution does 
 
 o O 
 
 not profess to transfer any power, jurisdiction or authority, to any 
 other, than to the government which it creates, the former pos 
 sessors must still retain their Sovereignty, this Constitution, non 
 obstante. 
 
 This results from the very nature of this Constitution, that all 
 admit to be a grant of enumerated powers ; and which, therefore, 
 cannot convey what it does not enumerate. Even what lawyers 
 would call implied powers, that is to say, such as are not granted 
 in terms, but are necessary to give effect to others which are so 
 granted, strictly speaking do not exist under this Constitution, be 
 cause, all such powers are given expressly by the eev-ente&tfefi- par 
 agraph of the eighth section of its first article ; and of course are 
 not implied powers. Nothing could better illustrate the excessive 
 jealousy that dictated the instrument, than this simple feet: or 
 prove more conclusively, that the sovereignty, which the Procla 
 mation in this part of it, concedes, to have formerly abided in the 
 States, could not pass to the government of the United States un 
 der this Constitution. Because, Sovereignty is nowheie therein 
 granted in terms ; and it cannot be believed, that when powers 
 actually " necessary and proper for carrying into execution 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 73 
 
 other powers granted expressly, are not left to necessary implica 
 tion, but are made the subjects of a positive grant, that sovereign 
 ty, the greatest of all human powers, would be left to mere infer 
 ence, and to inference too from the grant of a few only of its 
 many incidents, and these not necessary to its existence. The 
 shadow may follow the substance by which it is caused, but that 
 substance can never follow its own shadow, except when hurried 
 on by the crazed brain of a madman. 
 
 But this is not all. Notwithstanding it was conceded on all 
 hands, that the Federal Constitution was but a errant of enurner- 
 
 O 
 
 ated powers, and of course would convey only what it enumerated, 
 yet such was the jealousy felt by the States, that while adopting 
 it, a number of the different conventions by whom it was ratified, 
 to guard against the possible misconstruction and abuse of the 
 powers therein granted, proposed various amendments to it. In 
 consequence of this, the very first Congress which assembled un 
 der this Constitution, at its very iirst session, acting under the au 
 thority given to them by the fifth article, proposed these amend 
 ments to the Legislatures of the several States, by whom ten of 
 them were, ratified, in the mode pointed out in this article. These 
 amendments thereupon became "valid to all intents and purposes, 
 as parts of this Constitution." Two of them, the Ninth and the 
 Tenth, are in the following words: Ninth The enumeration in 
 the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
 or disparage others retained by the People. 
 
 Tenth The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
 Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
 the States respectively, or to the People. 
 
 Many reflections are suggested by these amendments, which 
 have such direct bearing upon the matter I am now examining, 
 that I will briefly state them. The first is, that although these 
 amendments appear to be the joint work of Congress and of the 
 State Legislatures only, yet in truth and in fact, they proceed 
 from the People of the several States. They were suggested by 
 many of the Conventions of the People who adopted the Consti 
 tution, and in consequence of these suggestions, were proposed by 
 the first Congress, to the Legislatures of the several States, mere 
 ly to satisfy the forms of the Constitution, and to give effect to 
 
74 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 the declared will of many of the States, in the most simple and 
 expeditions mode possible. 
 
 Again, these amendments are not donations, but reservations; 
 exceptions out of a grant already made, the power of which grant, 
 if not accompanied by such exceptions, it was apprehended, 
 might, by some possibility, influence the subjects reserved. The 
 only effect, then, which such reservations can have, is to preserve 
 to the former possessors, the things reserved, and in their former 
 plight. Moreover, these reservations are exceptions out of a grant 
 of political powers:- for the object of this Constitution, is to trans 
 fer such powers only. But if so, the reservations must refer to 
 political powers also : for it would be very absurd, to save and re 
 serve any thing from the action of other powers, in a grant that 
 regards political powers alone. The reservations thus made by 
 the States, in a grant of political power only, are exceptions out 
 of such a grant, made by them to a corporate body created by 
 each State and its co-States, which body is styled in the grant it 
 self " the United States." 
 
 Even this is not all. In these two amendments, a marked dis 
 tinction is drawn between Rights and Powers. The former are 
 reserved to " the People" only ; the latter "to the States respect 
 ively, or to the People." The reason of this is plain ; in this coun 
 try the People have two characters. In the first, they are regard 
 ed as mere individuals and subjects enjoying very many private 
 rights : some of which, as men, they derive from their Creator, 
 and as citizens they derive others from the very nature of the so 
 ciety of which they claim to be members. In the second charac 
 ter, they are regarded as the sovereign of these subjects. In this 
 character they constitute a body corporate and politic, all whose 
 rights (if they may be called such) are corporate rights: and there 
 fore, are nothing else than corporate powers, which, when apper 
 taining to any body, that is not only a body corporate, but a body 
 politic too, at once become political powers. The People as in 
 dividuals, have no political power, although they have many sa 
 cred natural and civil rights. The people as a body politic, or 
 commonwealth, have no natural rights, although they have vast 
 political power which they acquire either by their own force, or 
 by their own consent. Right is eternal ; it is an emanation of 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 75 
 
 Him whose Will is Right. Political power is of human creation ; 
 it may be right or not, according to the source from and the 
 means by which it is acquired. If such power is seized by the 
 strong hand of brute force, it is confessedly, power merely. If it 
 is acquired by consent, although it is acquired of right, it is not 
 right itself; because, the withdrawal of that consent, would make 
 even such power cease to be right; and right being eternal, can 
 no more cease to be, than He whose will it is. I speak not now 
 of faith and truth, or of the obligations which they impose. I will 
 refer to these hereafter. My present purpose is, merely, to shew 
 the distinction between rights and political powers, which, al 
 though like sovereignty and governments, sometimes co-existing, 
 and frequently confounded, are nevertheless separable and distinct ; 
 and in these very amendments are plainly set in con tra-disti notion 
 of each other. Applying these several remarks to these amend 
 ments any one may see at once, the object and supposed necessi 
 ty of the first. 
 
 The People of the several States, as mere individuals, enjoyed 
 many rights, none of which had the States, who adopted this Con 
 stitution, any thoughts of subjecting, to the control of the political 
 powers granted to the government they had thereby created. But 
 as some of these rights had been specially enumerated in various 
 parts of this instrument, and then saved expressly from the action 
 of the powers thereby granted ; and as the expression of one 
 thing, is often regarded as the exclusion of all others not ex 
 pressed, therefore, to guard against such effects to the People, in 
 this case, the ninth amendment provides, that "The enumeration 
 in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
 deny or disparage others retained by the People." Among the 
 rights retained by the People, are the right to bear arms ; the 
 right peaceably to assemble and consult together ; the right to 
 petition for a redress of their grievances, whether real or imagin 
 ary only; and though last, not least, the right to instruct their 
 own Representatives, whose duty it is to observe such instruc 
 tions, notwithstanding the author of this Proclamation says, that 
 they are not accountable to their particular constituents, for any 
 act done by them, although done in their mere Representative 
 character. 
 
76 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 Nor is the object, and supposed necessity of the second amend 
 ment, less apparent, than of the first. Besides the right which 
 the People enjoyed as individuals, the same people associated 
 and hound together as members of different great bodies corpo 
 rate and politic, enjoyed in that character, many political powers, 
 of which they had as little thought of depriving themselves 
 respectively, by their several ratifications of this Constitution, in 
 this their corporate character, as they had of surrendering all 
 their private rights, to the unbridled action of the other political 
 powers thereby created and assigned to the new government. 
 
 But as the enumeration of some private rights, might possibly 
 be considered as disparaging others not enumerated, so the enu 
 meration of some political powers, might possibly be considered 
 as disparaging others not enumerated, especially as some of the 
 enumerated Political powers were of vast extent, such as the 
 power of declaring war, of making Treaties, and over all, the 
 necessary and proper means for carrying into execution these 
 granted powers. Hence the Tenth Amendment provides, that 
 " The Powers not delegated to the United States, by the Consti 
 tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
 States respectively, or to the People." 
 
 Here let me remark, that the idea of this Amendment is 
 obviously borrowed from the second of the old Articles of Confed 
 eration, (to which I have formerly referred) the form of the ex 
 pression being somewhat varied, in order to make it more ap 
 propriate to the new government of the United States. The 
 Articles of Confederation were adopted by the different Legisla 
 tures of the several States, who bj 7 this league parted with none 
 of the political powers, which the} 7 had previously possessed ; 
 therefore, their reservation was made to enure to their authors 
 only, the States. The new Constitution however, was ratified 
 by the People themselves acting by their delegates assembled in 
 Conventions called for that special purpose ; and by its provisions, 
 it transferred many of the powers that the State government had 
 formerly enjoyed exclusively. Hence a different form of exprcs 
 sion was necessary ; and in. that which I have quoted, words of 
 such broad signification are employed as are sufficient to cover 
 all political power, then existing ungranted to the United States, 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 77 
 
 whether abiding with the State governments, or with the People 
 of the several States in their high corporate character. 
 
 There existed strong necessity, too, for the employment of the 
 very words used in this reservation, supposing its object to have 
 been like that of the second article of the old Confederation, to 
 except out of the grant all powers not conveyed by it, and this 
 in favor of the respective possessors of such powers. Whoever 
 will take the trouble to read the Constitution of the United 
 States with attention, will find that it uses the term state in 
 many different senses. Sometimes it is used to signify the terri 
 tory, as when the Constitution says, u The citizens of each State, 
 shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in 
 the several States." Sometimes it is used to denote the govern 
 ments existing in such territory, as when it says. " ~No State shall 
 pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
 obligation of contracts." Sometimes it means, the People of 
 the Territory assembled by their representatives, not for the gen 
 eral purposes of government, but for some different, and special 
 purpose only ; as when it declares, that u The ratification of the 
 Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment 
 of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same." 
 And lastly, it is used to denote the unassembled People of any 
 territory called a State, in their high corporate sovereign character, 
 which they choose to assume when they agree to form, conven 
 tions, to make or to alter government, or to do any other act, sur 
 passing the legitimate powers of ordinary human institutions. 
 In this last sense it is used in the Constitution, whenever that In 
 strument speaks of " The United States," meaning thereby the 
 confederation of these distinct masses, who have mutually pledged 
 their faith to each other, that they will severally uphold and sup 
 port this Constitution, by all their means, moral and physical. 
 
 The term States being used in the Constitution itself in these 
 various senses, it was not only proper, but necessary also, that the 
 reservation should be co-extensive with the grant, and should 
 employ its own words. But lest some doubts might arise as to the 
 precise meaning of these, the amendment adds others still more 
 comprehensive in signification, and of more general use. 
 
 In this respect at least the amendments differ from the Procla- 
 
78 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 mation. Tl;ey deal in no ambiguities or double entendres. They 
 exhaust enumeration, and when they have done so, they compre 
 hend any and every possible residuum, by general words. All 
 the powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitu 
 tion, or prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
 respectively or to the People. They could not define sovereignty, 
 for none can do so. It comprehends not only all political power, 
 that ever has been granted, but all that ever can be granted. I 
 certainly mean no irreverence, when speaking of human sover 
 eignty I say it is the one "I am," which in this sublime annuncia 
 tion of its own existence, assumes to itself every possible political 
 power, and every possible political attribute, which belongs to 
 human omnipotence, whether the same has been called into 
 action or not. Yain would be all reservations, if the grant con 
 veyed any power like this, since it would authorize the grantee, to 
 annul the reservation, the moment it was adopted. No man, it is 
 believed, can suppose that the Constitution ever designed to trans 
 fer any such authority as this, to the government it creates, which 
 therefore, cannot be a sovereign. Nor can the "Nation" whose 
 existence is imagined in the Proclamation, claim any thing under 
 this grant : for it is neither made to, or by this Nation ; and if 
 it had been, provided the name of this Nation is the " United 
 States," it is from their grasp, the last Amendment expressly de 
 clares the ungranted powers to be reserved. 
 
 Then tell me ye casuists of any school, if you can, what is there 
 to which this reservation of political power can apply, but sover 
 eignty, including as that necessarily does, freedom and independ 
 ence? Tell me, likewise, if you can, in whose favor this reserva 
 tion exists, if not in favor of the People of the several States in 
 their high character of a body corporate and politic, who possessed 
 this sovereignty, when this Constitution was adopted by them in 
 that character ? You cannot say, that it applies to any enumer 
 ated right; for all these are reserved by the preceding Amend 
 ment. You cannot say, that it applies to any other political pow 
 er ungranted by this Constitution, and which had been previously 
 granted to the State governments: for all such, if not prohibited 
 to these governments by this Constitution, and so cancelled and 
 annulled, are the subjects of the former part of this reservation it- 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 79 
 
 self. And if you say, that it applies to the political powers neither 
 granted to the Federal or State governments, you describe sov 
 ereignty itself, the living source of all political power, from 
 whence it all emanates, and with which, when ungranted, it al 
 ways abides. Then, if sovereignty and sovereignty only, is the 
 subject of this reservation, in whose favor does the reservation act ? 
 It cannot act in favor of the Federal government : for it is re 
 served oat of the very grant of powers made to it. It cannot act 
 in favor of the United States as a supposed nation or body politic ; 
 for its very words declare it to be made as an exception out of 
 any powers delegated " to the United States." The State govern 
 ments never had it, and therefore it could not be reserved to 
 them. It most then abide with its former possessors the States 
 or Commonwealths themselves, unless it is in nubibus and once 
 put their Sovereignty in abeyance, and States are no more. 
 
 I have now, I trust, defended successfully the Sovereignty of 
 the States, against all the attacks made upon it by the author of 
 this Proclamation, whether his approaches were made in secret 
 mines or in open trenches.; 
 
 I have proved, at least I think I have, that the States were in 
 dependent in fact, before they declared themselves so in their 
 declaration of Independence, which instrument was intended for 
 others, and not for themselves. 
 
 That the necessities of the country after their Independence 
 was declared, which had induced their previous association and 
 union, invited, nay compelled the adoption of a general govern 
 ment of very limited powers, which was established by the Arti 
 cles of Confederation, by which Articles the States expressly re 
 tained their Sovereignty. 
 
 That the defects of this Government, (which were probably as- 
 cribable to other causes than its own inherent vice,) afterwards 
 induced the adoption of the present Constitution of the United 
 States, which so far from creating a government with the powers 
 of Sovereignty, recognized in various ways, the pre-existing and 
 continuing sovereignty of the several States, its sole creators and 
 sole preservers.- I have repelled with honest, though perhaps in 
 discreet indignation, the attempt made to tamper with the faith 
 and truth of the State and its citizens, in the rash assertion that 
 
80 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 their allegiance was transferred to another. I have denied the 
 doctrine that Representatives were not bound by the instructions 
 of their constituents, and that every government must be Sover 
 eign, which possesses the power to punish Treason. By all these 
 means, and by others, I have sought to establish the continuous 
 freedom and independence of these States, who therefore, although 
 bound by a holy bond of Union, which none ought to violate, are 
 nevertheless Sovereigns. 
 
 What may be the effects of this Sovereignty, in regard to the 
 Constitution of the United States, I will next examine. But here 
 let me warn my readers, that if any still believe, that they owe no 
 allegiance to their State, that their Representatives are not ac 
 countable to them, that every government which possesses the 
 power to punish Treason is a Sovereign, or that by these or any 
 other means the several sovereign States have become " a single 
 Nation," they will but waste time in perusing what I may here 
 after write, since it will all proceed upon the assumption of the 
 negative of all these propositions. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 81 
 
 X. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 21, 1833. 
 
 ALTHOUGH I have contended, that the several States which 
 compose this Union, are Free, Sovereign and Independent, yet let 
 no one suppose, even for an instant, that in asserting their su 
 premacy, I mean to deduce from thence, their emancipation from 
 any obligation. A State must be constituted by rational and ac 
 countable beings ; and although but an ideal creation, yet as it 
 can only think and act through its members, it must bear their 
 character. 
 
 It so becomes a moral and accountable being itself, bound by 
 every moral obligation which attaches to man as an individual; 
 and even in a higher degree. 
 
 I certainly do not concur with the learned author of this Proc 
 lamation, in the new precepts of ethics or of public law which he 
 announces therein, when he says, u a binding obligation that has 
 no sanction, may be broken with no other consequence than moral 
 guilt," or when he infers from that postulate, that as " a league 
 between independent Nations, generally, has no sanction other 
 than a moral -one ; or if it should contain a penalty, as there is no 
 common superior, it cannot be enforced." My error (if it is one) 
 proceeds probably, from my utter incapacity to comprehend what 
 is meant by moral guilt, or by a moral sanction. To my dull ap 
 prehension, moral guilt appears very like a true falsehood, and by 
 moral sanction I must believe is meant physical morality. I 
 doubt not, however, that all those who can understand what this 
 State paper means, when it speaks of " aggregate character," or 
 of "a nation for certain purposes," will as easily discover what it 
 intends by moral guilt and moral sanction. 
 
 Nay, as formerly, we have been taught to understand the pos 
 sibility of a constructive journey, and of moral Treason,, we may 
 6 
 
A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 expect to hear in some commentary upon this pandect, of con 
 structive and so unaccountable Representatives, and of the trans 
 fer of moral allegiance. 
 
 According to my old-fashioned notions of morals and of law, 
 there is no human obligation without a sanction, whether such ob 
 ligations attach to individuals or to States : nor does the existence 
 of the sanction, depend upon the existence of any common supe 
 rior to enforce it. To me it seems a solecism, to speak of obliga 
 tions that do not oblige ; and that which obliges the observance 
 of an obligation, is its sanction, be that what it may. Nor would 
 it be less a solecism, to suppose that the sanction of any human 
 obligation, was to be found in the precepts of morality only: for 
 as these precepts constitute mere obligations themselves, one obli 
 gation would so become the sanction of another. In such a case, 
 it might probably puzzle the acumen even of those who can com 
 prehend the theory of moral guilt, to decide which was the obli 
 gation and which the sanction. And if the existence of some 
 common superior, was necessary to give validity to sanctions, the 
 obligations contracted by States, could never be rightfully en 
 forced by other States, so long as the equality of States is con 
 ceded. Yet. no man before this author, has ever doubted the exist 
 ence of such a right. 
 
 It would be foreign to my present purpose, to enquire, what is 
 the sanction of national obligations, or by whom, or how, or when, 
 these may be applied and enforced. 
 
 I may, perhaps, recur to this subject hereafter. At present, it 
 will be only necessary to say that it is not morality merely, but 
 the law, that gives the sanction of all human obligations which 
 deserve that name. This law must be administered by human 
 agents, who can employ none other than human means. In the 
 case of individuals it is the municipal law of their country, which 
 gives the sanction of all their perfect obligations. This law is ad 
 ministered by magistrates only: but its sanctions, although de 
 clared by them alone, must be enforced when necessary, by the 
 power of mere men. In the case of States, it is the public law of 
 the civilized world which gives the sanction of the obligations of 
 Nations. This law is administered by States alone ; and the sanc 
 tions declared by it, must be applied and enforced, when neces- 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 83 
 
 sary, by the physical power of their subjects, who, as in the former 
 case, are mere men. Thus it occurs, that in all cases, the preser 
 vation of human Rights, must be entrusted to the hands of human 
 power. But until this guardian becomes his own ward, power 
 and right will not be confounded, any more than the obligation 
 with its sanction, or either with the physical force, that may pos- 
 sibrj 7 become necessary to apply the one or to enforce the other. 
 
 If a State as a moral being may contract an obligation, as an 
 accountable being it is obliged to keep its faith, and to observe 
 the promise it has given. Should it refuse to do so, it incurs the 
 guilt of violated faith, and renders itself amenable to the punish 
 ment of such guilt, which may then be rightfully inflicted upon it. 
 
 By whom, or when, or how, I will hereafter enquire. Whether 
 this sanction prove efficacious or not as a sanction, cannot alter 
 either the guilt or the right. The unknown or fugitive malefac 
 tor, who so escapes "unwhipt of Justice," cannot thus convert his 
 crime into what this author would perhaps call moral guilt: nor 
 must the powerful subject, who successfully resists the lawful 
 commands of his Sovereign, and so prevents their execution, nat 
 ter himself with the hope, that he is but a moral traitor. The 
 name of the State which violates its faith becomes the by-word of 
 the civilized world. The decree delenda est Carthago will be ut 
 tered by that world ; and while nations are but the Yice-gerents 
 of Him, who delights in Justice, this decree must be executed, 
 not perhaps in the first, nor yet in the second Punic War, but 
 Carthage must fall, and fall by human means too, for Carthage 
 was faithless. 
 
 With this solemn truth deeply impressed upon my heart, and 
 with this awful example full in my recollection, I will proceed 
 briefly to enquire, whether the Sovereign States who compose this 
 Union, have pledged their faith in regard to it, by the Federal 
 Constitution : to whom that pledge was given : what was the ob 
 ject and extent of the pledge : by whom and how it may be vio 
 lated : and what are the legitimate effects of such a violation. I 
 will not argue the first question. It would be an insult to every 
 American, to suppose that he ever had doubted, or could now 
 doubt, upon this subject. We all admit, that the States, by their 
 several ratifications of the Constitution of the United States, 
 
84 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 pledged their faith, and severally promised "that it should be 
 binding upon their people." 
 
 To whom was this pledge given ? It could not possibly have 
 been given to the government of the United States. This did not 
 exist when these ratifications were had : and the very object of 
 the ratifications was to create it, to preserve it, and to amend it, 
 when the Sovereign parties saw fit to do so. 
 
 The Pledge was given by each State to its co-States ; was given 
 and received to and by each mutually and reciprocally ; the 
 pledge of one being the consideration of the pledge of another. 
 These mutual and reciprocal pledges constituted a valid contract 
 between them all, which, whether it may be more properly called 
 a a league " " a compact " or " an agreement " I willingly 
 leave to the learned author of this Proclamation to decide. Nor 
 is it of the slightest importance to my present purpose, to enquire, 
 whether a Covenant made by a State, with its co-States, having 
 for its object the establishment of government, is more or less sol 
 emn, than if the object of the Covenant had been to establish an 
 Alliance, or to do any other act. If it be a Covenant at all, I ad 
 mit, that the faith of the contracting Sovereign parties is mutual 
 ly pledged to observe it ; and whatever may be the form, or 
 whatever the object of their covenant, Fides servanda est. ~No 
 one can reasonably ask more, nor am I disposed to concede 
 less than this, all for which I contend, is, that the promise 
 was made by every ratifying State, to its co-States, and by no 
 possibility could have been made to a mere potential government, 
 which, at the time of the promise made, had not, and by possibil 
 ity never might have had, any actual existence. If this is so, the 
 Constitution of the United States, is a covenant between the sev 
 eral sovereign States, by whom it was ratified, to which covenant 
 the government thereby created, is not, nor by any possibility 
 could be a party. 
 
 To ascertain what was the object and extent of the pledge, we 
 must look into the instrument itself to which the ratifications of 
 the several sovereigns refer. We shall there find, that to attain 
 certain great and enumerated objects, a government was to be or 
 dained and established, endowed with certain enumerated powers, 
 for the attainment of the enumerated objects. Therefore, the 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 85 
 
 faith of the parties was pledged, each to the other ; to create such 
 a government, endowed with such powers, to be exerted for such 
 purposes to continue and maintain this government, in the free 
 exercise of all these powers, while exerted for these objects and 
 so to support this Constitution. Further than this, it is confident 
 ly believed, that no one, at this day, can suppose the faith of the 
 sovereign parties was ever pledged. 
 
 So far the way is smooth. But when it is asked, how and by 
 whom the faith plighted by the high contracting parties, in their 
 several ratifications of this their covenant, may be violated ? The 
 answer seems, at the first view of the question, to be not so easy. 
 Yet there is no real difficulty in the way ; provided our first ap 
 proaches to it are all true and sustained ; for this answer will be 
 found but a corollary from the former conclusions. 
 
 Thus when it is asked, how this covenant may be violated 2 
 The general answer, is obviously this : It may be violated, by the 
 refusal or neglect of any of the parties, to do any of the several 
 acts, which they have respectively stipulated, in the covenant, that 
 they would do : or by their doing any of the several acts, which 
 they have respectively stipulated, in the covenant, that they 
 would not do : and it cannot be violated by them in any other 
 mode. For, while all the parties do and forbear to do, all that by 
 the covenant they have promised to do and to forbear from do 
 ing, the performance is co-extensive with the promise, the latter 
 is so fully satisfied, et Fides servata est. 
 
 So, too, when it is asked, by whom may this covenant be vio 
 lated ? The answer is, by some of the parties to it only. If all 
 agree to disregard it, this is no violation, 1:>ut a mere justifiable 
 change or avoidance of the covenant, by the parties who made it, 
 and who may at any time alter or abolish it at their will. Nor is it 
 of the slightest consequence, when the parties all concur, whether 
 the change or avoidance of the covenant is effected in the mode 
 therein prescribed or not. For, no one of its parts is more obliga 
 tory upon the faith of the parties, than any other; and they have 
 the same right (all agreeing) to abrogate the part prescribing the 
 mode in which alone it may be amended, as to change any other 
 part of the instrument. 
 
 The whole is but a promise made by each to all ; and all can 
 
86 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 as rightfully annul the promise of each, made to themselves, as 
 any individual may cancel at his pleasure, a promise made to 
 himself. Neither is it possible, for any other than a party, to vio 
 late any covenant. For if this was possible, the faith of parties 
 would not depend upon their own will and ability, but upon the 
 will of others, over whom they may have no control ; and so faith 
 never could be kept. 
 
 Strangers, not parties to a covenant, may by their acts, prevent 
 the parties from fulfilling its obligations upon them : but such 
 acts of strangers, constitute no violation of these obligations, for 
 none can violate it, but such as the obligation obliges ; and it is 
 absurd to suppose, that it can oblige any others, than the parties, 
 who voluntarily agreed that they would be bound by it. Then, 
 the covenant entered into by each of these States with its co- 
 States, can be violated by none but the sovereign parties to that 
 covenant. If this was not so, the peace of Nations and the faith 
 of States, would hang upon the will of every incendiary ruffian, 
 who lives as the disgrace of the community of winch he may be 
 an unworthy member. 
 
 Here it may be asked, may not the government of the United 
 States, or of any State, or of any Department of either of these 
 governments, nay, may not any mere individual violate the Con 
 stitution of the United States ? Doubtless, each of them may do 
 so ; and in so doing, would be guilty of a very wicked act, which, 
 generally, would draw down upon the agent or agents, the conse 
 quences of a sanction, they might then probably discover w T as not 
 a mere " moral sanction," although the act might be done, even 
 by this would-be Sovereign, the government of the United States 
 itself, which, if a Sovereign, could acknowledge no superior. But 
 a violation of the Constitution of the United States, whether per 
 petrated by their government, or by anybody else except a Sover 
 eign State, is not, of itself, any "breach of the covenant for the 
 observance of which the faith of the high contracting parties to 
 that Covenant is mutually pledged to each other; and this for the 
 reason before given, that none but the parties can violate a cove 
 nant ; and that neither the government, nor any individual, is a 
 party to that Covenant. When the Spanish Intendant at New 
 Orleans, in contravention of the 22d Article of our Treaty with 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 87 
 
 Spain, deprived the Citizens of the United States of the right of 
 deposite in the port of that City, this was no breach of the faith 
 of Spain ; because when she was informed of the act done by her 
 officer under color of her authority, she disavowed it as having 
 been done in virtue of any such authority given by her. So, too, 
 when upon a more recent occasion, a military officer of the United 
 States, acting in contravention of many of the Articles of the 
 same Treaty with Spain, entered her territory with the armed 
 force under his command, seized upon her fortresses, slaughtered 
 her subjects, and annulled her Sovereign powers ; even this act 
 constituted no breach of faith of the United States. 
 
 Because, they too, when informed of these acts, done by their 
 officer, under color of their authority, disavowed them all, as hav 
 ing been done by him in pursuance of any power given by them 
 to him for these purposes. 
 
 In either case, the misdeeds of these agents, although not 
 breaches of the plighted faith of their respective Sovereigns, be 
 cause unauthorized and disavowed by them, yet being done under 
 color of their authority, bound these Sovereigns severally, to make 
 reparation and compensation for the wrongs and injuries suffered ; 
 and in either case, such reparation and compensation was de 
 manded and given. 
 
 Although it is true, that the covenant formed between any 
 State and its co- States, cannot be violated by any other than by 
 some of the sovereign parties to that Covenant, so as to make the 
 violation of it a breach of their pledged faith, } T et while man has 
 free will, he may and often does commit wrongs, and crimes, and 
 sins, which may threaten a breach of his Sovereign s faith. 
 
 To prevent this, every person, whether natural or Corporate, in 
 every country, unless he be a bandit, or an outlaw, is forced to 
 become the subject of some Sovereign, who in exchange for the 
 protection it is bound to afford, and the responsibility it is com 
 pelled to bear for the acts of its subjects, is entitled to their obe 
 dience and allegiance. Hence, all in this country are the subjects 
 of some Sovereign State, or amenable to the authority of the gov 
 ernment of the United States, which government is itself amena 
 ble to the authority of the Sovereign States, its creators and pre 
 servers, and who whenever they may see fit, can rightfully become 
 its destroyers. 
 
A EEVIEW OF THE 
 
 If, then, that government, or these States, are notified of an act 
 done in violation of the covenant which the States have all pledged 
 their faith to support and preserve, by any of those dependent upon 
 their authority, it is their sacred and solemn duty, to disavow the 
 act done as having been done in virtue of their authority, to take ef 
 fectual steps to prevent the repetition of such an abuse, and if it 
 may be properly required, to make reparation for any injuries 
 that may have been sustained from what has been done under 
 color of their power. If any State when so notified and appealed 
 to, refuses or neglects to do these things, it thereby adopts the act 
 done as its own act, and assumes upon itself all the consequences. 
 
 In a country regulated as are the United States, the necessity 
 for such a solemn appeal from one sovereign State to its co-States, 
 must be very rare indeed. The acute moral sense of our people, 
 the vigor of our laws, the division of our powers, the accountabil 
 ity of all our magistrates, the policy of our governments, whether 
 Federal or State, all constitute so many different checks and pre 
 ventives against the occurrence of any event that could justify or 
 require any such step. It is possible, however, nay has actually 
 occurred more than once ; and therefore, while treating of the 
 mere theory of this our government, which theory, although ex 
 posed to very many practical objections (applicable not to the gov 
 ernment, but to its administration), is more perfect than anything 
 the wit of man has ever produced, I must pursue it to all its con 
 sequences. I am so led to the enquiry, what may rightfully take 
 place, should any State, after notifying its co-States of a violation of 
 the covenant perpetrated by any of those who are amenable to their 
 authority, meet from them with a refusal to redress the evil com 
 plained of, or should see this their solemn appeal treated with neglect. 
 
 The first consequence is obvious, every State so refusing or 
 neglecting, thereby adopts the act or omission complained of by 
 its co-State, as its own act. It affirms thereby, that the act or 
 omission done, or suffered by its agents, or subjects, has been 
 done either by its order, under its permission, or with its appro 
 bation ; and that it is willing to take upon itself all the legit 
 imate effects of the act or omission, be these what they may. 
 
 What then is the next consequence ? the high and solemn 
 importance of this question, is a sufficient apology for me in post 
 poning its examination to another number. 
 
PEOCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 89 
 
 XL 
 
 NORFOLK, January 23, 1833. 
 
 IN my last number, I endeavored to prove, that by their several 
 ratifications of the Constitution of the United States, the Sover 
 eign States of the Union thereby established, entered into a 
 covenant with each other, to support this Constitution that for 
 the observance of this covenant, each State pledged its faith to its 
 co-States ; and that this faith must be kept by all. I endeavored 
 to prove further, that none could violate the faith plighted by 
 this covenant, save some of the Sovereign parties to it ; but that 
 they might do so, either directly, by their own acts or omissions, 
 or indirectly, by adopting as their own the acts or omissions of 
 any others over whom they might lawfully exercise control. I 
 am tli us brought to enquire, what is the course that may be right 
 fully pursued by any State, should its co-States break their faith 
 pledged to it, by doing directly any act in violation of that 
 pledge, or by adopting as theirs, any such act done by others 
 amenable to their authority ? 
 
 I present the question in this abstract form, purposely ; be 
 cause, 1 wish to avoid, for the present, the investigation of any 
 other matter not necessarily involved in the enquiry immediately 
 before me. 
 
 Hence, instead of stopping to examine, whether any particular 
 act is or is not a violation of the Constitution or what is or is 
 not the adoption by a State of such an act, when not done directly 
 by itself or whether the agents by whom the act has been per 
 petrated are or are not under its control. 1 have assumed, that 
 the act done is a violation of the Constitution that it is done by 
 a State directly, or when done by some other, is adopted by it as 
 its own act and that the act adopted as its own act, is done 
 by such as are amenable to its authority. Thus the question 
 
90 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 of mere right comes naked before us, and so presented must have 
 a direct answer. 
 
 As to the general answer to this question, I had supposed, 
 until recently, that no man could doubt. But as opinions upon 
 this subject very different from mine, have been uttered of late, 
 and from many and high authorities too, although my former 
 confidence in my own opinions is in no degree shaken, yet I feel 
 compelled while reasserting them, to endeavor to establish them 
 by arguments, which, but a few weeks since, I should have 
 thought as unnecessary as the attempt to prove any axiomatic 
 truth, in the case of mere individuals, if a contract is made be 
 tween them, wherein the performance of one party, is the consid 
 eration for the performance of the other. No lawyer, no man, 
 can doubt, that if one of the parties does not comply with such 
 a contract, he has no shadow of right to ask or to expect the 
 observance of it by the other party. The failure to comply by 
 either, leaves to the other party, the privilege of avoiding and 
 vacating the Contract altogether, or of tendering performance on 
 his part, claiming a compliance from the other party, and if that 
 is then refused, of demanding compensation for any injury sus 
 tained by a breach of the agreement. 
 
 So too in the case of Nations absolutely independent of each 
 other, if a contract be entered into by them, the failure to comply 
 with any of the provisions of the contract, on the part of either 
 of the high contracting parties, leaves the other at liberty, to 
 vacate and annul the whole contract as to itself; or while affirm 
 ing a readiness on its part to continue its observance of the 
 obligations, to require of the other party a like compliance. 
 
 In illustration of this doctrine, I need but refer to our own 
 practice and to our own avowed principles. The act of July 7th, 
 1798, declared " That the United States are of right freed and 
 exonerated from the stipulations of the Treaties, and of the con 
 sular convention, heretofore concluded between the United States 
 and France : and that the same shall not henceforth be regarded 
 as legally obligatory upon the government or citizens of the 
 United States." The reason assigned for this declaration, in the 
 preamble of the act itself, is that " these Treaties have been 
 repeatedly violated on the part of the French government." 
 
PKOCLAMATION OF PKESIDENT JACKSON. 91 
 
 But for this fact of violation on the part of France, Congress 
 would have had no authority to enact this Statute ; because by 
 the Constitution, these Treaties had been expressly made the 
 supreme law of the land. Therefore, the Statute does not profess 
 to repeal them, by any enactment, but declares simply, that they 
 were no longer obligatory upon us " of right," because they had 
 been previously and repeatedly violated by France. So shewing, \ 
 conclusively, that the violation of a contract by one of the sover 
 eign parties to it, is sufficient to absolve the other party from all 
 its obligations, if this other party chooses to adopt that course. 
 
 Now, surely, no one will contend, that what every individual 
 does, and may of right do, in regard to his contracts; what every 
 sovereign State has done, and has" done rightfully, in regard to 
 their agreements ; is forbidden to be done by any of thesj sov 
 ereign States, in reference to their covenant with their co-States. 
 It may be denied, as the author of this Proclamation does deny, 
 that any of these States is a sovereign. It may be denied that 
 they have entered into any covenant with each other : or that 
 the Constitution of the United States is such a covenant. It may 
 be denied, that this covenant has ever been broken ; or that any 
 State is responsible to any other, for any breach of it. But if all 
 these things be granted (and in the question propounded, t\\ej are 
 all assumed,) it follows necessarily, that a violation of the cove- 
 .nant by any of the States, leaves every other State, who is a 
 party to it, the right to vacate the covenant as to itself also. 
 
 NOY can the exercise by a State, of this right of declaring N 
 a broken covenant no longer obligatory upon itself or its Citizens, 
 be ascribed, with any propriety, to the high and indefeasible 
 right of Revolution, which abides with every people. This last 
 is a mere individual right, it stands upon the great maxim, salus 
 populi est suprerna lex. It is the right of self-defence, which 
 man cannot alienate, although he may forbear to exert it. This 
 high right rides over all others whatever they may be. It claims 
 to legitimatize the dethronement of Sovereigns, the severance of 
 Empires, the dissolution of ancient Societies, the breach of alle 
 giance, and even of faith itself. But the right of declaring a 
 covenant broken by one of the parties no longer obligatory upon 
 another, is the very reverse of all this. It constitutes the founda- 
 
92 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 tion of all society, to secure it all governments of all kinds were 
 instituted, and upon its preservation depends sovereignty itself. 
 Upon it rests the efficacy even of this holy right of Revolution ; 
 for unless man can confide in his fellow, resistance of power 
 would be vain ; nor can any one confide in another, if their 
 mutual pledges may be broken by one and remain obligatory 
 upon the other, against his will. 
 
 The assertion by a State, of this right of declaring a broken 
 covenant no longer obligatory upon itself or its people, does not 
 necessarily produce any other effect, than their absolution from 
 all the obligations formerly imposed upon them by the covenant 
 while it subsisted as such. It leaves them, in the same plight as 
 to the matter of the covenant, in which they were before it was 
 enter|pl into ; in the same predicament in which they would have 
 been if it had never existed. 
 
 The covenant, as to the party making such a declaration, be 
 comes a mere nullity, without even any moral obligation upon 
 that party, who, in declaring its exemption from all the former 
 obligations of the covenant, so abandons thereafter, all shadow of 
 claim to any privilege, right or benefit, to which, it might have 
 been entitled under it. 
 
 The assertion, involves no breach of faith on the part of the 
 State declaring the covenant broken by the other parties so far 
 from it, it affirms a breach of faith by them; and, as in the case^ 
 of France, it so justifies the act declaring its absolution from obli 
 gations already violated by others. It disturbs no relations sub 
 sisting between any others independent of itself, but leaves to 
 them, the full and free exercise of all the rights and privileges 
 which the party vacating the covenant has claimed and exerted 
 for itself alone. 
 
 If they are content to abide by the broken covenant still, they 
 are free to do so, whether they think it has been violated or not. 
 
 If they choose to follow the example set, they have the same 
 right to do so, as was exercised by those who set the example. 
 
 To the Moralist, or the Jurist, or the Publicist, these wsll- 
 settled propositions need no illustration by any example. To 
 others, I will give only one, found in our own history. The thir 
 teenth of the old Articles of Confederation, declared, that " the 
 
FKOCLAMATIOX OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 93 
 
 Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by 
 every State, and the Union shall be perpetual ; nor shall any al 
 teration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless 
 such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, 
 and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislature of every State." 
 Yet did eleven only of the thirteen States, in opposition to the 
 will of the two others, alter that solemn Covenant by the present 
 Constitution of the United States ; and according to the provis 
 ions of this latter Instrument, nine States only might have done 
 so, as to themselves, as legitimately, as did the eleven. 
 
 From whence was such a power, which all concede to have 
 boen rightfully exercised, derived ? 
 
 Certainly not from the Articles of Confederation themselves, for 
 by this very article, the consent of " every State " was necessary, 
 to make any alteration whatever in that instrument, nor from the 
 fact that nine States then constituted a majority of all the States. 
 If so, seven States would have been sufficient; and moreover, the 
 old Articles of Confederation might have been put into operation 
 in the year 1778, when they were agreed to by a majority of the 
 States, three years before they went into actual operation by the 
 agreement of all the States. The power was derived in this way. 
 The old Articles of Confederation had been violated in various 
 modes, by the refusal or neglect of several of the States, to comply 
 with the requisitions and recommendations of Congress, made in 
 pursuance of that Covenant. These repeated violations of it, had 
 given every party to it, the perfect right to declare that it was no 
 longer obligatory upon them. But although this was their clear 
 right, prudence and policy dictated, that they should not exert 
 this right, until they had provided a substitute for the old Cove 
 nant ; and until this substitute should have received the concur 
 rence of at least nine cf the States. This being done, their right 
 of vacating the old instrument, which had been perfect before, 
 was then prudently exercised. So that this very Federal Consti 
 tution, grows out of the conceded right of a State, to declare the 
 obligations of a covenant no longer obligatory upon itself, when 
 that covenant has been broken by other parties to it. 
 
 It must not be said, that the Articles of Confederation were the 
 act of the State legislatures, and the new Constitution the act of 
 
94 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 the people of the several States; and that the latter abrogated the 
 former, because it proceeded from a superior power. The people 
 of the several States, by a very long acquiescence, had adopted the 
 Articles of Confederation as their own act. Under these Articles 
 many Treaties had been concluded, many other engagements had 
 been entered into, war had been carried on, and peace made, in 
 their name, and with their approbation. All these, were acts, 
 that could only have been done by acknowledged agents and Eep- 
 resentatives of the Sovereignty, which, as has been shewn, then 
 abided in the people of the several States, in their corporate char 
 acter of States, and was specially reserved to them as such in this 
 instrument. 
 
 Therefore, the change of this covenant, made in a manner di 
 rectly in opposition to one of its provisions, and against the will 
 of some of the parties, cannot be justified upon this ground, but 
 must be referred to the other. If so referred, the reason of that 
 provision of the present Constitution, which confined its operation 
 " to the States ratifying the same," even after it might be ratified 
 by nine States, is obvious. The old Covenant being annulled, the 
 States were remitted to their former condition, and could not then 
 be bound by any new covenant to which they were not parties. 
 
 This example well illustrates, what a priori reasoning had es 
 tablished, that a covenant broken by one party, may by any 
 other party be rightfully declared, no longer obligatory upon it 
 self, and so practically annulled, as to itself, by the party making 
 this declaration. If this was not so in the case of States, who can 
 foresee the consequences ? Two States agree to exchange differ 
 ent portions of their territories : may one of them retain that 
 which it has agreed to give, and rightfully demand of the other 
 the delivery of what was the equivalent ? Commercial advantages 
 are given by one, as the consideration of like advantages to be re 
 ceived by itself: Is one bound to give, and not entitled to re 
 ceive? It seems monstrous to affirm these things; but yet such 
 are the inevitable consequences of the proposition, that a broken 
 covenant is still obligatory, upon the faith of the party by whom 
 it has not been violated. It will not do to say, that a party in 
 jured by a breach of a covenant, may rightfully enforce perform 
 ance from the other. 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 95 
 
 This is true only where the innocent party is desirous to con 
 tinue the obligations of the covenant, but does not apply where 
 he is content to take the other remedy, of declaring the broken 
 covenant no longer obligatory upon him. Either mode of redress 
 may be rightfully resorted to by the injured party, and his policy 
 or discretion must decide which he will adopt : but he cannot 
 rightfully take both. If this was not so, the question of mere 
 right, Avould necessarily be converted into one of brute force, and 
 right and power would become the same. The conclusion from 
 these premises is, that when a covenant entered into between a 
 State and its co-States is violated by any of the parties to that 
 Covenant, any State may of right declare the Covenant broken, 
 and so no longer obligatory upon itself. In this view of the sub 
 ject it is of no moment, whether the government of the United 
 States be considered as a party to the covenant or not, because, 
 if the government is a party, then the principle applies in terms ; 
 and if not a party, but only the agent of the parties who approve 
 and sanction its acts, the act of violating the Constitution, becomes 
 by adoption the act of all the principals who approve, and sanc 
 tion it, and so the same consequence follows, in either case. This 
 right of a State, to declare a Covenant broken by some of the 
 other parties no longer obligatory upon itself, when one of the ob 
 jects of the broken covenant is " to form a more perfect Union," 
 is the right of Secession, neither more nor less. 
 
 He who denies this right, must contend, that a majority of the 
 States, containing a majority of the People, may break this Con 
 stitution at their will, and that the minority of the States and 
 People, is bound in good faith, and of right, still to observe it on 
 their part. For if an unconstitutional law be once passed, the Se 
 dition law for example, it can never be repealed without the con 
 currence of both Houses of Congress, that is to say, without the 
 concurrence of a majority of the States in the Senate, and of a 
 majority of the People in the House of Representatives. 
 
 Nay, this is not all, for no amendment of the Constitution can 
 be made to redress the grievance, however great that may be ; 
 for if seven only of these States refuse to ratify the amendment, 
 the other Seventeen not constituting three fourths of all the 
 States, cannot make the amendment valid. There remains then 
 
96 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 no relief, for an oppressed minority however great that may be, 
 however cruel and unrighteous and wanton maybe the oppression, 
 but to appeal to the God of battles, and to assert their rights in 
 arms. 
 
 And was it for this our forefathers fought and bled ? was it for 
 this that the wisest and best were convened, to frame and adopt a 
 Constitution stuffed with checks and limitations of power in every 
 line? Yv 7 ho ever wanted any guaranty of the right of Revolu 
 tion ? That exists always ; it is inherent in and inalienable by 
 man. Compact neither gives nor can take it away. Free gov 
 ernment, is but a device to prevent the necessity of recurring to 
 this natural right. The Constitution of the United States, in sep 
 arating the Sovereignty from the government, making govern- \ 
 ment rest upon a Covenant between the Sovereign States them 
 selves, to which covenant the government created by it, is no 
 party, but a mere agent of the parties, and in thus constituting 
 each party the judge of the observance of this covenant, with the 
 ri^ht of declaring it no longer obligatory upon itself when broken 
 directly or indirectly by any other party, was a proud monument^, 
 of human wisdom. Rob it of these qualities, and it becomes a 
 simple institution, by which all power is transferred to the major 
 ity, who may rule the minority according to the unchecked will 
 % of the majority, without accountability to any other than itself 
 the thread-bare garment of ancient days, long since cast off, be 
 cause it was always found worthless to shelter right against 
 power. Nay, so sure as effects folio w their causes, must a hard 
 military despotism speedily succeed to such a government, in such 
 a Country as this. 
 
 I will close this number with this remark. Wherever the ob- , 
 ject of the covenant is to establish union or association for any 
 purpose, between different parties, designing to preserve their 
 separate existence under the Covenant after it is made, Secession 
 is one of the remedies that may always be resorted to by any of 
 these parties, for a breach of this covenant by any other : and 
 is nothing more than a declaration of that fact. In 1788, eleven 
 States seceded from the Union, established by the old Articles of 
 Confederation, and established the present Constitution for all 
 States who might choose to ratify the same. In 1 798, the United 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 97 
 
 States seceded from the alliance established by their Treaty with 
 France. In either case, the act proceeded from the same cause. 
 In neither case, did this act produce any other consequence than 
 it was designed to produce by those who adopted it ; a mere dis 
 solution of the former bond of union, or association as to them 
 selves. JSTor in any case, can any other consequence rightfully 
 result from it, on the part of the State declaring its secession, al 
 though it is possible that other effects may flow from the course 
 of the other party. These effects shall constitute the subject of 
 my next number. 
 
98 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 XII. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 25, 1833. 
 
 WHILE seeking to establish the right of a State, to secede from 
 an Union formed by a Covenant, the terms of which have been 
 broken by other parties, I was not unaware of the objections that 
 have been urged against the existence of such a right, not only 
 by the author of this Proclamation, but by others of the School 
 of Consolidationists. But I did not choose to break the thread 
 of the argument, by replying to these objections at that time. 
 Therefore, I assumed all the facts necessary to present the naked 
 question of mere right. Having established this, I will now at 
 tend to these suggestions. Many of them have been before no 
 ticed and answered ; and I will not here repeat these answers. 
 But there is one which has not yet been presented, and to the 
 examination of this, I propose to dedicate this number. 
 
 This objection is, that no State may rightfully assume as a fact, 
 that the Covenant has been broken by any of its co-States, or act 
 upon such an assumption, without violating its own faitli : because 
 the covenant itself has provided an arbiter to decide all such 
 questions, by whose decisions the faith of all the parties must be 
 bound. This arbiter is said to be the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. To this objection, which is founded upon the 
 supposed existence of a common arbiter, authorized and capable 
 to decide all infractions of the Constitution, of which any State 
 may have cause to complain, many answers may be given, all 
 equally conclusive to shew, that no such arbiter, clothed w r ith such 
 authority, either does, or ought to be expected to exist. 
 
 The first of these answers is, that according to no legal possi 
 bility, could the case supposed to exist, ever be presented to the 
 Supreme Court for its decision, even if the sovereign parties w r ere 
 content to abide by that decision. The Judges of the Supreme 
 Court, like all other Judges, are appointed to decide " cases," and 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 99 
 
 not to amuse themselves or to edify mankind (as the President 
 seeks to do in this Proclamation), with obiter dicta, or with pub 
 lic Lectures, communicating the results of their lucubrations upon 
 mere questions of law, of politics, or of any other art or Science. 
 These cases, too, according to the very terms of the Constitution, 
 must be " cases in law and equity," and we have the authority of 
 this court itself, for saying that there cannot exist any case in law 
 or equity, but one presented to a Court by the representations of 
 parties. The law professor in every College, nay, the very under 
 graduates of his Class, may deliver theses and dissertations upon 
 questions of Sovereignty, of Politics, or of law, and may amuse 
 and improve themselves by imagining suits brought by John Doe 
 versus Richard Roe, to try these questions. But it would be a 
 high contempt of every court, to attempt to steal from it an opin 
 ion, upon any question presented in a case brought by such imag 
 inary parties ; and not a less contempt of public justice, if a judge 
 should wander out of the case before him, to prejudge some other, 
 or to determine any mere abstract proposition not necessary to 
 the decision of the matter submitted by the parties to his deter 
 mination. Now, the case supposed to exist, is the case of a Cov 
 enant of Union, believed by one of the parties to be violated by 
 the government of the United States, the agent of all the parties. 
 In such a case, the act complained of being already done by the 
 government, the United States would have no need to become 
 actors, or to go before any court to assert the power that has been 
 already exerted; and it would be difficult to find the authority 
 under which any one, as an actor, may implead the United States 
 in their own courts. 
 
 But here it may be said, perhaps, as is often said, that the gov 
 ernment of the United States can only act by Individuals, and 
 upon Individuals ; and as the courts are always open to such par 
 ties, all questions of constitutional right may so readily be brought 
 before the Supreme Court. To this commonplace assertion, I 
 oppose a flat denial. The evil complained of, may not be the 
 consequence of any act whatever, but of a wilful omission to act, 
 on the part of the government. In such a case, it cannot be pre 
 tended, that there is any individual, to whom the aggrieved suf 
 ferer may resort for redress, by a suit in court or the evil com- 
 
100 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 plained of, may be an act, which, although palpably wrong, may 
 not require the agency of any individual ; or although wantonly 
 oppressive and cruelly unjust upon all the inhabitants of a State, 
 may nevertheless, like every common nuisance, be injurious to no 
 one of them in particular, and therefore would be an act not to 
 be redressed in any private suit. Suppose for example, Congress 
 should pass a law giving a preference to the ports of one State 
 over those of another, which they are expressly forbidden to do 
 in the very terms of the. Constitution itself ; wh at Individual could 
 sue, or what Individual might he implead, for the perpetration of 
 an act so ruinous to the injured State ? 
 
 Even in cases where the Courts might take cognizance of the 
 act done, because done by some Individual to some other Indi 
 vidual, the judgement in such a case could bind none but the 
 parties to the suit. It would not repeal the unconstitutional act; 
 and might not even furnish any compensation to the Individual 
 injured. Some agent of the law-makers in execution of their 
 orders, which are in direct violation of the Constitution, does me 
 a great injury. I sue him. The court agrees with me, that the 
 act was lawless and unauthorized. 
 
 The jnry awards an amount of damages to me as a just com 
 pensation for the wrong I have sustained. The Court gives me a 
 judgement against him for that sum. But the agent is insolvent 
 or runs away, and I cannot get the intended compensation. Will 
 any one say, that the Court can compel those by whose orders 
 the wicked deed was done, and to test whose authority for direct 
 ing it to be done, the suit was brought, to pay me? Certainly 
 not. I may petition them to do so, but if they reject my peti 
 tion, the arm of the Judiciary is impotent to obtain for me the 
 relief to which the Court itself has said I was entitled even if 
 the judgement proves efficacious in my case, that judgement can 
 not prevent the perpetration of a similar outrage upon me or my 
 neighbour the next day, under the same usurped authority. 
 
 The judgement does not repeal the law, but declares simply, 
 that it constitutes no defence to the defendant in the particular 
 case brought before the Court by the parties then litigant therein. 
 So that until the Legislature will be graciously pleased to repeal 
 their law, every Individual of the State, may be compelled to go 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 101 
 
 through the same tedious and expensive proceedings, and to incur 
 the same hazards, in order to obtain relief against an act of the 
 government which has been already decided by the supposed 
 arbiter to be an unauthorized usurpation of lawless power. "Now 
 what a strange arbiter must he be, whose decision, if in favor of 
 one of the parties, is binding and obligatory, but if made against 
 that party, is of no avail to terminate the subject of difference. 
 
 The next answer to this objection is this : where a case in 
 law or equity is properly brought before the Court, by actual 
 suitors, if in the progress of this suit, it is found to involve a 
 question of the mere discreet exercise of political power con 
 fessedly granted, the Judges themselves acknowledge, that this 
 question they are incompetent to decide, but as to all such 
 matter, they are bound jurare per verba magistri / and, to say, as 
 Judges, that whatever is, is right, although as Individuals, every 
 one of them may know it is not so. While doubt exists, whether 
 the political power exercised is granted or not, the Court may 
 give an opinion upon the subject. But let it be once conceded, 
 that the power has been granted by the Constitution and the 
 Court is then compelled to say, that it has nothing to do with the 
 question of policy, nor is authorized to ask, why such power has 
 been exerted. 
 
 If Congress declare a war, although for the most unrighteous 
 purpose for which war ever was declared by the veriest tyrant 
 that ever disgraced a throne, the Judiciary must apply the sanc 
 tions of the law, to all acts done contrary to the wicked will of 
 the Legislature. 
 
 If the President and Senate make Treaties, sapping the very 
 foundations of the Constitution, the Judiciary cannot declare 
 them void, or prevent their execution by the executive. If Con 
 gress wantonly levy duties and imposts for any purpose whatever, 
 the Judicial power is helpless to afford relief. 
 
 They cannot injoin the marching of armies, the sailing of fleets, 
 the slaughter of innocent men, the levy of taxes, or the execu 
 tion of Treaties. 
 
 Yet it is precisely in such cases, that the interposition of the 
 Sovereign parties to the Covenant, will, probably, ever be neces 
 sary. 
 
102 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 It is idle, then, to say, that they may not interpose even in 
 these cases, at least for the reason given. For the very founda 
 tion of the objection to such interposition, is, that as there is a 
 common arbiter appointed to decide the case, the parties may 
 not rightfully assume to decide it, each for itself. 
 
 The next answer to this objection is, that the evil complained 
 of may be the act of the Judiciary itself, the enforcement of the 
 Sedition law for example, or the application of the common law 
 of England, as a criminal code, to the Citizens of the United 
 States. Both these cases have occurred. Here, it would be 
 monstrous, to refer to the Judiciary to decide whether the Judi 
 ciary itself had done right ; and yet the objection applies equally 
 to all cases. 
 
 Another answer is, that in this government, composed as it is 
 of co-ordinate departments, there exists no reason why more 
 respect should be paid to the acts of one of these departments, 
 than to those of any other ; and if it is admitted, that neither of 
 these departments is bound by the act of its co-ordinate, it would 
 be strange indeed to, say, that the sovereign of all was bound by 
 such an act. Now, the objection itself asserts, that the Judiciary 
 is not bound by the acts of the Legislature or of the Executive ; 
 and no one, it is believed, will contend that either of the other 
 departments is bound by the Judgements of the Judiciary, how 
 ever obligatory these may be upon the parties. 
 
 I speak not of courtesy and respect, but of obligation merely. 
 Should the Judiciary declare an act of the Legislature void, such 
 a declaration, as I have already said, cannot repeal the law, 
 although it may prevent its application to the particular case sub 
 Judice. Congress may establish other Courts or other Judges to 
 execute the law ; or the President and Senate, in execution of 
 such laws, may appoint additional Judges of the Supreme Court, 
 who may differ from their associates and over-rule the past de 
 cision in the first new case, that comes before the Court. Nay 
 the House of .Representatives may impeach and the Senate con 
 demn the Judges, for this very decision given in violation of the 
 law enacted by them. 
 
 I do not mean to say, that any of these things would be right : 
 but when reasoning upon the case of a violated Constitution, I 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 103 
 
 have a right to suppose, that all legal means would be employed 
 by the violators, to make their viojation effectual ; arid so to 
 prove, that the Judiciary cannot bind the Legislature. We 
 have the authority of the President himself for saying, that he 
 feels himself as much bound by his oath to support the Constitu 
 tion as any one else can do ; and therefore, if his agency is 
 required, whether by the Legislature or the Judiciary, to do any 
 act which he believes unconstitutional, he will not be made to 
 sin against his own conscience and to violate his oath. His new 
 partisans used to censure him bitterly for this assertion : but yet 
 he never made one more moral, legal, or constitutional than 
 it is. This is a government of concurring powers, its departments 
 are all co-ordinates, nor can any one of them move far in any 
 direction, without encountering its fellow^, by whose concurrence 
 alone, it may proceed in that way. 
 
 Of all these departments, the Judiciary is the weakest, because, 
 it cannot act until invited to do so, its sphere of action is very 
 limited, nor can it do any positive act, without the permission of 
 the Legislature, and the co-operation of the Executive. 
 
 But lastly, can the human mind conceive a more audacious 
 proposition, than that which suggests, that in a controversy 
 between the parties to a Covenant, by which covenant an agent 
 is created, where the matter in dispute between the principals, 
 regards the authority exerted by the agent, the decision of this 
 controversy must be referred to the agent himself? The very 
 exertion of the authority by the agent, is a decision that he 
 believes he may rightfully do so ; and after this, it is gravely pro 
 posed, to leave the matter to the final arbitrament of one who has 
 already decided it, and who has decided it, too, with the approba 
 tion of the very persons who proposed such a reference. In trans 
 actions between man and man, none could hesitate what name to 
 bestow upon such a proposition : but where the Sovereignty of 
 the States and the freedom of their people is concerned, a gross 
 fraud is metamorphosed into a political theory only. Nor will 
 the case be changed materially if the nominated arbiter has never 
 yet decided the question, provided that arbiter be the Supreme 
 Court ; this arbiter is not even given by lot. It is appointed by 
 the supposed wrong doer, paid by him, accountable to him, sub- 
 
104 A KEVIEW OF THE 
 
 ject at any moment to be punished and cashiered by him, and 
 this too, for giving the very.decision its conscience might prompt. 
 Thus, matters which would constitute valid and legal objections, 
 to witnesses, to Jurors, and to the Judges themselves, in the most 
 trifling controversy between man and man, are to be overlooked 
 and disregarded, in the support of a new theory, which seeks to 
 constitute the Federal government the sole Judge of its own 
 power. 
 
 I have great respect for the Judiciary of every country, but no 
 lawyer or historian can tell, in what age or in what country, 
 the Judiciary have ever been able, even where it was willing, to 
 protect the rights of the people against the usurpations of Govern 
 ment. England has long been blessed with a Judiciary, composed 
 of men, whose intelligence, whose integrity, and whose firmness, 
 would not suffer in comparison with that of any others who have 
 ever been or are now on earth. But when or who of these 
 Judges have ever been able to save the privileges of the people 
 from the prerogatives of the crown, unless the Judiciary was 
 sustained by another branch of the government? And how 
 many examples are there, of acts of Parliament made for the 
 special purpose of saving the people from the Judiciary ? For 
 the Judiciary of the United States, I entertain at least as much 
 respect as I do for any other Judiciary. I will not say more ; 
 and I cannot say less, With the individual Judges, I have 
 nothing to do. They shall all be, if any one thinks so, what 
 some of them certainly are, " like Mansfield wise, and as old 
 Foster just." But all must know that the robes of office do not 
 cover angels, but mere men, as prone to err, as any other men of 
 equal intelligence, of equal purity, and of equal constancy. We 
 all know, too, that some of the supreme Judges of the United 
 States, have not thought it unbecoming their high places, to 
 accept Foreign Missions, to present themselves as candidates for 
 other offices, and to enter into newspaper disquisitions upon party 
 topics. I do not mean to blame them for such things, but merely 
 to shew from such facts, that the rights of sovereign States, when 
 assailed by the government of the United States, could not be 
 safely confided to a forum so constituted, even if it was possible 
 that it could take cognizance of the subject. Nor can he be con- 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 105 
 
 sidered as a discreet friend to the Judiciary, I should think, who 
 desired to embark it in this fearful strife. 
 
 I have answered this first objection, founded upon the sug 
 gestion, that the Supreme Court of the United States is the com 
 mon arbiter appointed to decide all questions that may arise 
 between a State and its co-States, touching the violation of their 
 mutual covenant. My answer to the remaining objections I must 
 postpone to another number. 
 
106 A REVIEW OF THE 
 
 XIII. 
 
 NORFOLK, January 30, 1833. 
 
 A VEKY careful examination of the late Proclamation presents 
 to my view no other objection, there urged, to this right of seces 
 sion, than such as I have already noticed. 
 
 The summary of its argument, and very nearly in its own 
 words in this. Each State has expressly parted with so many 
 powers, as to constitute it jointly with the other States, a single 
 nation. In becoming parts of a nation, the States surrendered 
 many of their essential rights of sovereignty, and so were no 
 longer sovereign ; the allegiance of their citizens being trans 
 ferred to the government of the United States. But this govern 
 ment thereupon became their sovereign, because it can punish 
 Treason, which is an offence against sovereignty, and sovereignty 
 must reside with the power to punish it. Moreover, the Consti 
 tution of the United States forms a government. Every govern 
 ment has a sanction expressed or implied, therefore, a govern 
 ment has a right by the law of self-defence, to pass acts for 
 punishing offences against its authority, unless that right is modi 
 fied, restrained, or resumed by the constitutional act. In our 
 system, although the right is modified in the case of Treason, 
 yet authority is expressly given, to pass all laws necessary to 
 carry the powers of government into effect. Hence, no State of 
 this Union may secede, because such secession would destroy the 
 Unity of the Nation, any attempt to do which act, would be an 
 offence against the sovereignty of the government, and might 
 be properly punished at its own discretion. 
 
 In reply to this argument, I have already endeavoured to shew, 
 that these States do not, and never did, constitute a single nation : 
 but are, as they ever have been since they assumed to be States, 
 free and sovereign States, not consolidated into one nation, but 
 united only by a written covenant of Union, which we call the 
 Constitution of the United States. That the government formed 
 by this Constitution, so far from being a sovereign, is a mere 
 creature of the will of these States, subject to amendment, and 
 rightful destruction at their pleasure, endowed with but limited 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON 107 
 
 powers, that may be properly exerted for tlie attainment of enu 
 merated objects only. And so far from possessing this natural 
 right of self-defence, it is not even a party to the Covenant under 
 which it exists, nor may rightfully exercise any one of its granted 
 powers against any one of these States, its creators, although 
 it may properly do so against their Citizens, when they are 
 acting without the authority of their State, the only sovereign to 
 whom they owe allegiance. That the union of the States thus 
 resting upon a covenant entered into by every State with its 
 co-States, when the terms of this Covenant are supposed to be 
 broken by any of them, as there is no common arbiter to decide 
 between the parties, it is of necessity, that each State must judge 
 for itself, and act as its own judgement may dictate. 
 
 If in the honest exercise of this judgement any sovereign State 
 declares the covenant, broken by its co-States, and chooses to dis 
 solve the Union thereby established, for this cause, she has the 
 perfect right to do so ; and this makes secession from the Union, 
 as to that party only. 
 
 I will not repeat the arguments by which these several posi 
 tions have been maintained, but will follow my conclusion to all 
 its consequences. 
 
 When a sovereign State decides, that the Covenant of Union 
 which formerly bound her to her co-States, has been broken by 
 them, and is therefore annulled as to herself, it is clear, that these 
 her co-States, are not bound by her decision. They are then 
 called upon to decide several questions, of a very different charac 
 ter, each for itself also. 
 
 The first of these involves their faith. Has that been broken 
 as is averred ? Should this be so, according to the honest convic 
 tion of iiny of the co-States, such State, as a moral and account 
 able being, is bound to acquiesce in the decision made by the first 
 party, which is so acknowledged to be right. But if acting under 
 its accountability, it honestly believes, that its faith has not been 
 violated as is averred, a second question is presented. Is it better, 
 while repelling the charge of violated faith, to acquiesce in the 
 determination of the first party to annul the covenant as to itself? 
 This question also, each of the co-States must decide for them 
 selves respectively. 
 
 The subject now becomes a matter of naked policy, which like 
 
108 A EEVIEW OF THE 
 
 every other question of mere expediency, must depend upon all 
 the circumstances existing in the case. This question appertains 
 to the Statesman, the mere theorist can neither comprehend, or 
 hope to decide it, correctly ; and, therefore, it would be very for 
 eign to my present purpose. 
 
 But if after examining all the circumstances of the case, in all 
 their different relations and probable effects, the co-States, whose 
 covenant has been annulled, wrongfully as they may believe, de 
 termine nevertheless to acquiesce in the act vacating it as to the 
 other party, the difference is at an end, each party concurs, al 
 though for different reasons, in the same purpose, and no collision 
 will take place between them. 
 
 Such was the course pursued by the States in 1788, when the 
 old Articles of Confederation were annulled by the act of eleven 
 of the States, who then seceded from the Union established there 
 by. And such has been the course pursued in very many other 
 cases of Union and alliance that it would be tedious here to enu 
 merate, but to which the recollection of every reader of history 
 will at once recur. But if after a due examination of the subject 
 in all its bearings the party of which I am now speaking, thinks 
 itself unjustly aggrieved by the act of its co-State in annulling 
 their mutual covenant, and seceding from the Union thereby es 
 tablished, and that it is expedient to push this difference to war, 
 unquestionably it may wage war ; and may so impose upon the 
 other party the necessity of submitting to its dictation, or of de 
 fending itself by the same means. 
 
 Such a war, as to the party with whom alone it can commence, 
 will differ from every other that has before occurred from the be 
 ginning to that day ; because, even by the most complete success 
 its avowed object can never be attained. 
 
 Independence, conquest, reparation of wrongs, security, punish 
 ment of indignity offered, may all be achieved by successful war ; 
 but victory can never make union, or repair the breach of its 
 broken covenant. It behooves the Statesman, then, to deliberate 
 well, before he makes a war for any unattainable object. Should 
 thu seceding party prove successful in the contest, it will so 
 maintain its independence, and may then agree to enter into an 
 other Covenant of Union, " laying its foundations on such princi 
 ples, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 109 
 
 seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness," but this 
 will be a new covenant. Should the other party prove successful, 
 it may conquer the territory, exterminate its inhabitants, change 
 all the institutions of the seceding States, nay, do whatever else it 
 lists, and which is possible ; for who shall give law to conquest ? 
 
 But it cannot revive the old Covenant of Union. That is gone 
 forever, and can no more be recalled than yesterday. 
 
 If the Victor, in his clemency, chooses to spare the lives of his 
 conquered enemies, to permit them to enjoy their former religion, 
 and laws, and civil institutions, nay, to occupy the conquered 
 country still, he may win the thanks of the vanquished, and per 
 haps beget in them a sense of gratitude towards the generous 
 chief who has been thus forbearing and kind to a fallen foe. But 
 let none mistake the character of the sentiment so produced. It 
 is loyalty not patriotism ; and let those beware of the loyalty of 
 the grateful Mameluke, who may w T ish thereafter to harm his kind 
 conqueror. 
 
 A subdued people have ever been the great agents in subduing 
 others. 
 
 Extinguish any one, even the smallest of these now sovereign 
 States, and rely upon it, many others will soon share their fate. 
 A majority may subdue a minority, probably. They can only do 
 so however, by means of force, which must be guided by a man ; 
 and if their chief is prudent, the subdued minority will as certain 
 ly unite to make him a military despot, as the people of Rome 
 proclaimed the power of a Dictator to escape from the thraldom 
 of an overbearing and selfish Senate. 
 
 Will the Victors seek to avert this consequence, by proposing 
 to admit the conquered State into their Union again ? She must 
 come if they say so, but the Union thereupon becomes, to all in 
 tents and purposes, a new covenant. The rights of the conquered 
 State are then derived to her, under the gracious gift of her con 
 querors, arid not from her own free and sovereign will. 
 
 The old Covenant of Union made and sustained by equal and 
 independent States, gives place to one of a very different charac 
 ter, in which there can be no mutual confidence, because it rests 
 no longer upon mutual consent. Many generations must pass 
 away, before any subdued people ought to be trusted as a compo 
 nent part of the Union by which they have been subdued. A 
 
110 A EEYIEW OF THE 
 
 King may make conquests, and by many means may attach his 
 conquered subjects to his person, and win their loyalty to his 
 Crown ; for his people are all subjects, and in his eyes, are all en 
 titled to his protection alike. But you had as well insert some 
 deadly poison into the veins of an animal, and expect it to live in 
 health, as in a Representative Democracy, to admit immediately, 
 the Representatives of a conquered people to become parts of its 
 Union, and expect such a government to last long. 
 
 Then, the war waged to revive a broken covenant of Union, 
 however successful may be its means, can never attain its avowed 
 end. It may bring conquest, may make loyal subjects, or hollow- 
 hearted pretended allies ; but it cannot make real union. The 
 union of free States can neither be made or preserved by force. 
 
 It is a solecism so to speak. Such a fanciful Union is consoli 
 dation in its most abhorrent form, wherein the majority, while it 
 continues such, will wield not only their own powers, but those 
 assigned to their subdued allies also. 
 
 I thank God, that in His infinite wisdom and mercy He has 
 been pleased thus to ordain. The truths I have announced, ought 
 and will teach moderation and forbearance to all who value the 
 Union of these States. Each will look to the fearful consequences 
 to itself, that may attend its own acts, and will abstain from 
 pushing even admitted powers to oppression. The right of seces 
 sion is the right of all; it may be claimed by one to-day and by 
 another to-morrow, as each may find itself aggrieved. Its appre 
 hended evils may be easily guarded against, by abstaining from 
 exercising doubtful powers, or pressing legitimate powers until 
 they become doubtful. The security of the Union is to be found 
 in the common affections and common interests of the States, and 
 not in the bayonets of its soldiery. 
 
 By such feelings alone was the Union first formed, by such 
 sentiments alone has it been since maintained, and by such senti 
 ments alone can it be preserved. 
 
 Once deny this right of secession when it is claimed, and pre 
 vent or punish its exercise by military force, and surely as night 
 succeeds the day, our destiny as a free people is fulfilled. 
 
 But what may be done if a State unmindful of her faith will 
 secede from an union to support which her faith has been plight 
 ed ? If she leaves any common obligation unsatisfied, which may 
 
PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. Ill 
 
 be compensated by her, demand it, and if you can, enforce this de 
 mand. The War 5 if war shall be necessary to accomplish this 
 end, is then rightful and just. It will have an object that may 
 be attained, and when attained, it brings peace, the only legiti 
 mate end of every war. 
 
 But if she leaves no debt unpaid or any duty unfulfilled, or 
 when she has made the compensation required, let her go and let 
 her go in peace. If she is but a single State, she will soon learn 
 in her wants, the value of the Union she has abandoned, and will 
 speedily return, if the evils of its government are not intolerable. 
 If there be many States, their right of secession will never be 
 denied. 
 
 Should I pursue the subject, which this sentence suggests, I 
 should tread upon the ground which belongs to the Statesman 
 exclusively. It is the business of the theorist, to scan the nature 
 of this government, and to deduce from thence its principles and 
 its character. 
 
 It is the business of the patriot Statesman to apply these prin 
 ciples, and in their application, to adapt them to the circum 
 stances of each particular case, so as to preserve this character. 
 While he does so, he will but confirm the government in the con 
 duct of whose affairs he is called to assist. But if he seeks to 
 pervert these principles, or to change this character, he is a Revo 
 lutionist, whether his schemes are designed to be perfected by 
 the arts of persuasion, the strong hand of force, or by any other 
 means. 
 
 One remark more and I have done. The author of this Proc 
 lamation, while speaking of this right of secession, says : " To call 
 it a constitutional right, is confounding the meaning of terms : 
 and can only be done through gross error, or to deceive those who 
 are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made a 
 Revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure." 
 
 I will say nothing of the spirit which dictated these declara 
 tions; whether the assertion of this right be a gross error, not this 
 author but an enlightened world will judge ; and as to the mo 
 tives which prompt it, they, like those which produced the dec 
 larations I have quoted, can be understood by Him alone who can 
 read the human heart. To His inspection mine are willingly 
 submitted : but I utterly disclaim the authority of this self-suffi- 
 
112 PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT JACKSON. 
 
 cient personage, the President, to denounce me and all others, 
 from his throne, as stupid fools or cowardly knaves, because we 
 do not concur in his new political dogmas, but dare to think for 
 ourselves. And what in the name of common sense, has the 
 question of right to do with either his motives or mine? At last 
 it will be found to turn upon what this author means by constitu 
 tional right, probably. 
 
 According to his idea, it would seem, that there are no consti 
 tutional rights but such as are granted by the Constitution ; and, 
 therefore, that the right of bearing arms, of peaceably assembling 
 to consult about public affairs, of petitioning for a redress of 
 grievances, are none of them constitutional rights, because no one 
 of these is therein granted. 
 
 But according to my notion, every right, and every power too, 
 not disparaged by any of the grants and prohibitions contained in 
 the Constitution, are especially reserved therein, and so* become 
 constitutional rights and powers. The right of. secession thus be 
 comes a constitutional right. 
 
 I once thought, that none of the present generation would see 
 the day, when these States would become "a single nation," or 
 the government established by them u a Sovereign," claiming like 
 every other sovereign, the rights of " self-defence," " a transfer of 
 the allegiance of the citizens," and brandishing the weapons of 
 its asserted powers in their faces. 
 
 Recent events, I acknowledge, have much diminished my con 
 fidence in this belief. The same events have strengthened another 
 opinion I have long entertained, that there exists no middle 
 ground, between the Federal government established by the Con 
 stitution and that which will speedily succeed it, a simple, abso 
 lute, unmixed and hard military despotism. 
 
 So long as this Constitution can be preserved, this may be 
 averted. 
 
 Then let the sovereign States who made it, guard well this ark 
 of their political safety, which they know contains the Holy Cov 
 enant wherein is written the commandments of their law. Let 
 each constantly cry aloud to every other and to all their servants, 
 in the words of the inspired one, " nor do you prefer any other 
 constitution of government before the laws now given to you." 
 
 A VIRGINIAN. 
 
KSTURN 
 
LIBRARIES 
 
So 
 
"" LIBRARIES