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ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
DESIGNED ESPECIALLY FOR YOUNG TEACHERS
EDWIN C. HEWETT, LL.D.
President of the Illinois State Normal University
XLbc Bclectfc ipress
VAN ANTWERP, BRAGG, AND COMPANY
CINCINNATI AND NEW YORK
n5
Copyright, 1889, by Van Antwerp, Bragg, & Co.
EDUCATION DEPF«
The author's aim in this little book is to set before the
reader, in a simple and compact form, some of the lead-
ing facts of the human mind, — its power and capabilities,
the laws that govern its working and growth, — and some
truths concerning ways of strengthening and cultivating
its powers.
He has not been ambitious to make a large book. On
the contrary, it has been his constant purpose to use the
fewest words that would enable him to make his thought
clear. He has tried to say just enough to set forth the
leading points of his subject, and to pave the way for a
more extended pursuit of the study. In short, the aim
has been to make a text-book, that is, a book of texts.
The book is written, not for philosophers, learned men,
or controversialists, but for young people of moderate ac-
quirements, who are likely to need the facts of Psy-
chology as a guide to the practical work of the teacher.
It is hoped, moreover, that they will be induced to read
deeper and more pretentious books on the subject, as well
as to continue the study by means of their own observa-
tion and introspection. And the author hopes that this
book may assist in preparing them for future study.
One of the reasons why many books on Psychology
are hard to understand, is the lack of sharp, formal defi-
544365 w
VI PREFACE
nitions. It has been a purpose of the author to supply
this lack. He does not expect that all his definitions will
be accepted ; but he believes they are tolerably clear, and
he hopes that where they are defective, they may start
inquiries which will result in something better.
He holds that Pyschology is an inductive science ; but
in this book he has not made the least attempt to develop
it inductively. Yet he most earnestly urges all who study
the book to test its statements for themselves. In a
science that is derived by induction from the study of
facts, no one can speak with any authority other than the
authority of a witness. The author has put his state-
ments in a dogmatic form for the sake of clearness and
brevity, and because he believes them to be true. But
he cheerfully invites his readers to test their truth.
He lays claim to no originality in the book. In the
course of many years of teaching he has given much
attention to the study of mind ; he has also read some of
the many books that have been written on the subject.
In this book he has stated as well as he could, some of the
most important facts of mind just as they now appear to
him. He has not hesitated to take from any author any
statement that commended itself to his judgment. When
the form of the statement has been retained, he has used
quotation marks; but it has not seemed worth the while
to give the name of the author in every case, for, as was
said before, nothing in Psychology rests upon authority.
Such as the book is, it is submitted to the public with
the fond hope that it may be found of some use, especi-
ally to young teachers.
Edwin C. Hewett.
Illinois State Normal University,
Normal, June 4, 1889.
I. Definitions, and General Statements - - 9
II. The Nature of Mind - ■ - 19
III. General Powers, — Consciousness - - 29
IV. General Powers, — Attention and Conception - 36
V. The Intellect, — Definitions and First Principles 47
VI. The Presentative Powers, or the Senses - 54
VII. The Presentative Powers, Concluded - - 63
VIII. The Representative Powers, — Memory - 75
IX. Memory, Concluded - - 86
X. Imagination, and Constructive Conception - 96
XL The Reflective Power, — Concepts and Terms 108
XII. Judgment, Proposition, and Reasoning - 118
XIII. Reasoning, Concluded - - - - 126
XIV. The Sensibility,— General Statements - - 137
XV. Specific Feelings ... - 146
XVI. Conscience and Morality - - - 157
XVII. The Will 165
XVIII. Conclusion .... - - 176
(vii)
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
CHAPTER I
DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS
HAT is Mental Philosophy? — Philos-
ophy literally means love of wisdom.
But, as the term is commonly used, it
means the explanation of things, or
giving the reasons for them ; for in-
stance, to give the philosophy of a pump is to show
in what way it produces its results.
By Mental Philosophy, we mean an explanation
of the action and growth of the human mind ; it in-
cludes a knowledge of the facts of the mind, — that
is, of its powers of knowing, feeling, and willing, —
and a statement of the laws according to which it
acts and grows.
A text-book on Mental Philosophy should state
these facts and laws exactly, clearly, and concisely.
Psychology. — This word is derived from two Greek
words, one of which means the soul, or mind, and the
other means a discourse, or science. Hence, Psy-
chology, the science of the soul, is a good name for
Mental Philosophy.
(9)
''' IO ' ' ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY ,
' ' *' Several' bther words are sometimes used to designate this
science; among them are Anthropology and Metaphysics.*
But Anthropology includes much more than the philosophy
of the mind; "and Metaphysics is used in several senses, some-
times meaning more than Psychology, and sometimes less.
What is a Science? — A Science is the body of
knowledge concerning some subject, systematically-
arranged in accordance with general principles or laws.
Two Kinds of Science. — In some cases, the gen-
eral principles, or laws, are first laid down, and then
the science is derived from them; such a science is
termed a deductive science.
Geometry is a good example of a deductive science; a few
general principles, viz., the definitions and axioms, are given,
and the science is built up from them.
Other sciences are formed by first collecting a
large number of facts, and then deriving the laws and
general principles from a study of these facts. Such
a science is termed an inductive science.
Botany is a good example.
How Developed? — In developing an inductive sci-
ence, we may recognize four steps:
First, The collection of a large number of facts.
Second, A comparison of the facts, noting resem-
blances and differences, and an arrangement of them
in classes accordingly.
Third, A discovery of laws, or uniformities.
Fourth, Careful, formal statements concerning these
facts and laws, or uniformities.
*Let the student consult the Unabridged Dictionary, and study carefully
the etymological meaning of these words, and difficult or scientific terms.
DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS I I
By the word "law," in Science, is meant simply A uniformity.
It is a law of plant-life that every plant must have root, stem,
and leaf. But to write this law, is only another way of saying
that every plant does have root, stem, and leaf.
Psychology, an Inductive Science. — We class
Psychology among the Inductive Sciences, because
its facts are gathered by observation, and its laws
are discovered by a careful study of the facts after
they have been scanned and classified. Thus, Psy-
chology conforms to our definition of an Inductive
Science ; and it is built up in the same way as other
inductive sciences are.
It may be claimed that there are some facts and
laws in Psychology which may be reached by deduc-
tion ; but the same thing is true of the other induct-
ive sciences. And these exceptions do not invalidate
the statement that the general truths of the science
are established mainly by induction.
For the reasons given above, we claim that Psychology is
an Inductive Science. And, unless we deny that Mind is a
part of Nature, we must allow that it is an Inductive Natural
Science. But, in general, the term Natural is confined to
those sciences which treat chiefly or entirely of matter.
How are Facts in Science Obtained? — Facts in
science are learned by observation ; but this observa-
tion is of two kinds. Every careful student of sci-
ence knows some facts of his science from personal
observation ; some he learns from the observation of
others, reported to him orally, or by writing or print-
ing. Hence, it may be said that his knowledge rests
upon two foundations, viz., observation and testimony —
the term observation being confined usually to per-
sonal observation or experience.
12 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Facts in Psychology are learned in both these
ways ; careful observation of the gestures and actions
of others will reveal much respecting the operations
of their minds, while their words, written or spoken,
will reveal much that is additional.
A Striking Peculiarity. — The field of observa-
tion in all the sciences excepting those that relate to
sentient man, is wholly external to the observer him-
self. But, in Psychology, by far the most important
field of observation for any student, is his own mind.
The mental phenomena shown by his own mind, re-
vealed to him by his own consciousness, claim his
most careful attention. Here is a field of observation
quite different from any found in most of the other
sciences; and knowledge gained in this field rests
upon experience alone. No other than the observer
himself can aid him here, save only as he may be di-
rected in making his observations.
A student of Psychology- should test every statement made
in a text-book, or by a teacher, comparing it with what he
knows of his own mental operations. If he finds that his own
experience does not attest the truth of the statement, he may
conclude that the statement is false entirely, or that it is true
of some minds only, and not of mind in general — provided he
is qualified to exercise sound judgment in the case.
In fact, a little reflection will convince us that we can know
absolutely nothing of other minds, except through what we
know of our own minds. All expressions of countenance, all
gestures, all words, in so far as they reveal to us anything of
the operations of other minds, reach this result through the
interpretation which we give to them in the tight of our own
mental experiences. Let no student of Psychology lose sight
of the truth here stated.
Psychology, a Noble Science. — One way of de-
DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS 13
termining the rank of a science is found by determin-
ing the rank of the subject to which it relates. Min-
eralogy has to do with dead matter; Botany deals
with plant life ; Zoology has for its subject, animal
life; Physiology treats of physical man. Here we
have an ascending series of subjects of scientific
study. But Psychology has to do with man as an
intellectual, rational, and moral being. Judged on
this basis, then, Psychology must be regarded as a
very noble science.
Again, mind is the organizer of all the sciences;
and of some of the deductive sciences, like geometry,
it may be said to be the creator. Surely, we must
accord a very high rank to that science which has
mind itself for its subject.
Sciences differ greatly in rank, according to their
value in aiding to make human life successful and
happy. From this practical point of view, we think
it can be shown that Psychology should be given a
very high place.
Relation to Personal Interests. — The success
and happiness of every one depend largely upon the
wisdom of his thinking, the right control of his ap-
petites, impulses, and emotions, and the character of
his purposes and actions. The better he understands
his mind, its powers, capabilities, limitations, and the
laws which govern its action, the more able he is to
control himself rightly in all the respects just named.
Some sciences, like Astronomy, are very interesting, but they
have little to do with the affairs of one's every-day life. We
may watch the movements of the heavenly bodies with an in-
terest similar to that with which a spectator, standing on the
14 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
shore, would watch the movement of ships far out on the ocean.
But, if he were a passenger on one of those ships, — moreover,
if he were responsible for the safe navigation of the ship on
which he was sailing, — his interest would be of quite another
kind. It would be an interest similar to that which we should
have in Psychology, when its practical relation to our life and
destiny is duly appreciated.
SPECIAL VALUE TO DIFFERENT PROFESSIONS
The Clergyman. — One's Theology, his ideas and
beliefs respecting God, are largely determined by his
system of Psychology. The qualities of the Divine
Mind, as we conceive them, are qualities of human
minds refined and enlarged in our conception. This
aspect of Theology is sometimes criticised ; but there
seems to be no alternative, unless we boldly assume
that we can know nothing about God. Further-
more, if we accept the ideas of God which the Bible
gives us, this view of God is the correct one.
But the clergyman must have a theory of human
duty and human responsibility. This theory will be
determined by his theory concerning human thought,
and the relation of the human will to life and con-
duct. For instance, if man has no power to direct his
thoughts and feelings, if he has no liberty of choice
and action, has he any duty or responsibility at all in
respect to his life and character? These questions
clearly belong to Psychology.
Again, it is an important part of the clergyman's
business to influence the thinking and action of men.
His success will depend largely upon his knowledge
of the laws of human thought, and of the use of ar-
guments and motives.
DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS 15
The Teacher. — It is the teacher's special work to
lead his pupils to know, and to train them into right
habits of thought and action. How can he do this,
unless he understands the processes by which the
mind comes to know, and the processes by which
growth in right habits is secured ?
To suppose that one will be a good teacher simply because
he knows well the subjects which he is to teach, is very shal-
low, and it is the cause of a great deal of poor work in the
school-room. Some one has compared such a teacher to a per-
son who should attempt to play a piano, knowing only the tunes
he is to play, but entirely unacquainted with the instrument.
The illustration is good as far as it goes, but it is very inade-
quate. To reach the case of such a teacher in an ordinary
school, we must suppose the musician to attempt to play on
thirty or forty instruments at the same time. Nay, we must
suppose that these thirty or forty instruments, no two of which
are quite alike at the start, are daily growing, each into some-
thing a little different from what it was the day before.
The Physician. — The relation between mind and
body is such that a physician can hardly hope to deal
successfully with bodily weakness and disease, if he is
ignorant of mental phenomena, and of the influence
of the mind on the body.
The Lawyer. — No man needs to know more clearly
than the lawyer, the movements of the human mind,
and the way in which men are led to different opin-
ions and courses of action. How, otherwise, can he
unravel his "cases," or how can he bring judge or
jury to decide in his favor?
The Orator. — The orator's success in arousing, con-
vincing, and persuading those who hear him, must be
determined by his ability to play on that most won-
derful of all instruments, the human soul.
1 6 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
To Men, in General. — The success of any man in
dealing with his fellows will depend largely upon his
"knowledge of human nature." But three fourths
of one's knowledge of human nature is a knowledge
of the capabilities and modes of activity of the hu-
man mind.
A Mental Discipline. — Few studies are better
calculated to give good mental discipline than Psy-
chology. This study demands: (i) Close observa-
tion; (2) Careful reflection; (3) The making of fine
and critical distinctions; (4) Precision, and exactness
in the use of terms and in the making of statements.
These are the exercises that are especially calculated
to sharpen and strengthen the intellectual powers.
Common and Scientific Knowledge. — It must
not be inferred from what has been said, that no one
but those who have studied formal Psychology in
school or college can possess any of the advantages
that we have claimed for this study. Here, as in
Botany, Zoology, and every other science, one may
have a great deal of knowledge "picked up" in a
hap-hazard way, crude and unorganized, but which
may be very useful so far as it goes.
In every field of human thought, the difference
between scientific knowledge and common knowledge
is not a difference of kind, but of precision, order,
and efficiency.
Neglect of Psychology. — Notwithstanding all
that is claimed for Psychology, it must be confessed
that, as a general thing, it is not a very popular
study in the schools, nor among studious men who
conduct their studies in private. Nor does it offer
DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL STATEMENTS 17
much that is attractive to the great multitude who
are not students. It may be said that one reason
for this is that the subject is usually presented in a
dry and unattractive way. While this may explain
the fact in part, there seem to be several other rea-
sons.
Why Neglected. — First, The practical value of
Psychology, its relation to the common affairs of life,
is not seen so readily as in the case of some other
studies. Arithmetic teaches how to compute inter-
est, Geography aids in trade and travel, Chemistry
teaches how to deal with soils, medicines, and ex-
plosives, Physics has to do with the making and us-
ing of machinery, etc. But the value of Psychology
does not so readily show itself in the outward and
visible.
Second, This science can make no show of speci-
mens and apparatus, like some of those mentioned,
and others that might be mentioned. An appeal to
the senses has a wonderfully attractive power to most
minds.
Third, Psychology is a very old science; much
that is most valuable in it has come down from the
old Greeks, or from remoter sources. This science
has little of the charm of novelty — nor is there much
hope of making any new discoveries here. In Geol-
ogy, Botany, Chemistry, Electricity, etc., astonishing
discoveries and inventions are often made, and men's
names are sent down to posterity in connection with
them. But who expects to discover a new mental
power, or to invent a new process of thinking?
Fourth, In a new country like ours, the pursuits
Psy — 2.
18
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
that have to do with taming and controlling nature,
with furnishing food, clothing, and shelter, may al-
ways be expected to receive the largest share of at-
tention. But, as better provision is made for sup-
plying the most urgent needs of our bodily existence,
it is to be expected that men who are willing to think
at all, will turn their thoughts more and more to those
subjects which are more intimately connected with
man's inner life and well-being, although they appeal
less strikingly to the senses.
Among those who are teaching and guiding in the
work of our schools, there is an increasing interest
in questions of Psychology. This is one of the most
cheering facts in the whole field of public education.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF MIND
IND and Matter. — Man is curiously
made up of mind and matter, so won-
derfully blended that no one can tell
exactly how they live and work to-
gether. Of the real nature of both
mind and matter, we are profoundly ignorant. No
one can tell what either is; we can study their phe-
nomena only. Man has a body, and he has a mind;
he has, also, powers that belong to the body, and
others that belong to the mind.
Power is the ability to do something.
For distinction, we may call the powers that pertain
especially to the body, as the muscular powers, phys-
ical; and we may call those powers that pertain es-
pecially to the mind, as the power to remember, the
power to love, etc., psychical powers. To be sure,
the mind's powers do not show themselves wholly
independent of the body; all mental activity is prob-
ably attended by movements among the molecules
of the brain. The truth seems to be that, in some
way not fully understood, the mind uses the brain as
its instrument.
(*9)
20 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Our best philosophers teach us that the mind itself is one
indivisible thing; it does not possess organs, as the body does,
nor is it a bundle of powers; but it has many powers, which it
can exercise in various ways. When we love, it is the entire
mind that loves, and not part of it, although it may work with
more or less force in the act. The same is true when we re-
member, when we will, etc.
Grand Divisions of Mental Power. — The pow-
ers of the mind are numerous, but they may all be
arranged in three classes ; viz. , intellect, sensibility, will.
Writers on Psychology differ greatly on many
questions ; and their discussions about some of them
are very fierce. But, on the division of mental pow-
ers into three groups, as here given, there is almost
complete unanimity among all modern writers.
Definitions. — The Intellect comprises those pow-
ers by which we are able to know.
The Sensibility, or the Emotions, is that group of
powers by which we feel.
The Will is the power to choose and execute.
In speaking of the psychical powers of man and their phenom-
ena, we are obliged to borrow our terms from the body and its
phenomena. This is somewhat unfortunate, as the terms thus
borrowed are likely to be misunderstood. The word feel, which
we have just used, is an example of such a term. When one
speaks of feeling sorrow, he means something very different
from that which he means when he speaks of feeling the table
with his finger. In the latter case, he means an affection of
the mind through the nerves of the body. This is perception,
or an exercise of one of the knowing powers. In the former
case, he means an affection of the mind independent of the
nerves, as when he feels sorrow for the loss of a friend. This
is an exercise of sensibility.
Illustration. — The action of the three grand classes
THE NATURE OF MIND 21
of mental powers may be illustrated in the following
way : You take up a newspaper and read of the floods
in the lower Mississippi valley. You are able to un-
derstand what the writer says — to think his thoughts
after him — and his thoughts awaken new thoughts of
your own. Thus, you see that you have the power
to know, to think, — or, you have Intellect. As you
read of the sufferings the floods cause the people,
you begin to pity them, and to desire to relieve their
suffering. You thus see that you have the power to
feel, — or, you possess Sensibility. You learn that
others are sending money to aid these poor people;
moved by your feelings, you determine to join in the
contribution; and you do contribute. Thus, you see
that you have the power to choose, to determine, and
to execute, — or, you have Will.
Order of Action. — These are the three grand
classes of mental powers; nor is there any mental
faculty that can not be properly grouped under one
of the three classes. Moreover, these classes of men-
tal powers always act in the order here given. It is
inconceivable that we should have feeling in regard
to any matter until we know something about it, or
think we do. Nor do we ever put forth any activity
of the will till We are prompted to it by some feeling.
This is illustrated in the case of the "prodigal son." He
"came to himself," and thought; he felt, in respect to his
wretched condition, and the plenty at his father's house ; he
then resolved to arise and go to his father.
A wise writer, or orator, or teacher, who wants to
lead men up to a resolution, always observes this order.
He strives first to awaken thought, — to make people
22 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY'
know something about the matter in hand. He then
seeks to arouse their feelings in view of what they
know and think. It is only after both these results
are reached that he hopes to bring them to any res-
olution, or choice, or action, respecting the matter.
Division of the Powers. — By the earlier philos-
ophers, the mind's powers were divided into two
classes instead of three. They were termed the con-
templative and active, or the cognitive and motive ; that
is, powers exercised in knozving, or the Intellect, as
we now say, and powers concerned in action or in
motives to action, including what we now call both
the Emotions and the Will.
Observations. — We give a few general observations con-
cerning the three Grand Classes of mental powers.
The Intellect. — A writer says: "The infant soul contains
implicitly all the faculties of developed intelligence ; reason is
there with all its essential characteristics, but it is there only in
its intuitive form."
He says again: "Each faculty has a primitive state corre-
sponding to its spontaneous development. Primitive judgments
form the basis of all our knowledge." A " primitive judgment"
is denned by another as the "judgment of a relation between
the conscious subject and the immediate object of conscious-
ness." An act of sense-perception is such a judgment; a child
can make it long before he can make the formal judgment
called a thought, — that is, a judgment of agreement or non-
agreement between two concepts.
Again, it is well said, "That our intellectual faculties may
exist in two distinct states of development, seems to have been
overlooked by teachers, as well as by educational writers. We
have no hesitation in saying that the higher faculties, in their
first or simpler forms, may be healthfully exercised at an early
age. A child of seven years readily forms simple abstractions,
and reasons clearly about concrete things."
THE NATURE OF MIND 23
The Emotions. — Another able writer says: "We demand
that we feel towards objects in proportion to their rank and
worth. To be interested solely in physical goods, is the mark
of an animal life. To be enthusiastic over the insignificant, is a
form of folly that finds its perfection in the fool. To be cold
and indifferent towards the highest, indicates either an atrophy,
or a distortion, of the emotional nature. The indifferent must
be treated with indifference ; the commonplace must not be ex-
alted; enthusiasm and devotion belong only to noble objects ;
and wrath must be reserved for injustice, baseness, and degra-
dation."
The Will. — Of the will, another keen writer says: "When
exercised only in the gratification of animal appetites, it is
brute-will ; when fulfilling the ends of free, spontaneous (vol-
untary) thinking, it is the scientific will ; and when executing
the imperatives of the reason, it is the spiritual will in liberty."
Nature of Mind. — Although we claim to know
nothing of the real nature of mind, or of matter, still
it is important that we have certain clear, fundamental
conceptions regarding each, and regarding their rela-
tions to each other.
Mind, a Unit. — We should think of the mind as
one indivisible thing, neither made up of parts, nor
an aggregate of powers or capabilities. And yet it
has the power of acting in various ways ; and to these
several ways of acting, we find it necessary to give
names. Hence, we speak of the mind's Powers or
Faculties ; but we must not think of these powers as
things in themselves, nor as being parts of the mind.
For instance, the mind has the power to remember,
which we call Memory. But Memory is not a part
of the mind ; it is the ability of the mind to do a spe-
cific act. An act of memory is an act of the whole
mind, in accomplishing a certain result.
24 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Mind, an Entity. — We believe that the mind is a
real thing, and that it will live after the body is dead.
Although we know nothing of human minds discon-
nected from bodies, we see no reason to doubt that a
soul may be thus disconnected without any essential
change in its nature or function. Even Mr. Bain says :
"For anything we can see, the body might have its
bodily functions without the soul, and the soul might
have its psychical functions in some other connection
than our present bodies."
Differences of Mind and Matter. — There are good
reasons for denying that mind and matter are the
same thing viewed from two different stand-points, or
that mind is a product of matter.
(i.) Matter manifests itself only by its qualities;
mind manifests itself only by its acts.
(2.) The characteristic quality of matter is its occu-
pation of space; it is impossible, perhaps, even to
conceive of mind as occupying space.
(3.) The law of matter is Inertia, — it never moves
unless some force moves it; we are sure that mind
has the power to originate its own activity.
(4.) The characteristic of mind is consciousness;
wherever there is consciousness there is mental activ-
ity, or mind. But there is no evidence that con-
sciousness is ever found in dead matter.
(5.) Mind has the power to know its own acts;
only mind knows the qualities of matter.
Mind, a Product of Matter? — There are philoso-
phers who teach that mind is the product of molec-
ular movements in the brain, — that a "little agitation
of the brain" is thought, — that the "brain secretes
THE NATURE OF MIND 2 5
thought as the liver secretes bile." But to suppose
that matter in any way produces mind involves the
absurdity of supposing that something totally inert
and unconscious can produce that which is both con-
scious and self-active. Can anything be greater than
its maker? Can any effect exceed its cause?
Mind and Body Closely Related. — But, while
we believe that mind and body are not the same
thing, nor one the product of the other, yet in the
living human being they are very closely related. A
keen writer says : ' ' Body and mind are so closely
connected that it may be doubted whether anything
ever takes place in the one without being registered
in the other."
We all know how intense thought shows itself in
the bowed head, the contracted brow, or the clenched
hand ; it may even make one unconscious of physical
discomfort. Strong emotion, as anger, joy, or fear,
will not only show itself by involuntary movements
of the muscles, but will seriously interfere with the
vital functions of the stomach, the heart, etc.; nay,
will sometimes even cause death. The action of a
strong will shows itself in the whole bodily attitude
and movement. Almost every form of mental activ-
ity has its appropriate outward bodily manifestation;
in this fact lies the significance of gestures.
On the other hand, causes that belong in the body
alone, have much influence on mental states and activ-
ities. Who can think well, or be perfectly calm and
serene, when suffering from toothache? Whose mind
is clear when his stomach is struggling with an over-
load of indigestible food? And a mental state, or
Psy.-3.
26 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
form of mental activity, may often be induced by the
performance of the appropriate bodily act.
Mind and Brain. — While there is a close connec-
tion between the mind and the whole body, the con-
nection is most intimate between the mind, and the
brain and nervous system. The brain seems to be
the mind's instrument; probably there is never any
mental activity that is not accompanied by move-
ments and changes in the brain.
A description of the brain and nervous system be-
longs to physiology. But all teachers should feel the
importance of having the brain nourished with good
blood ; this is impossible without good food, good air,
and exercise. Nor should they forget that the brain
always demands rest after labor. Especially is this
true of the brains of children, for the child's brain,
like his muscle, has not the power of endurance that
belongs to the adult. The best rest for the brain is
sound sleep.
It is well-known that the muscles of children can not, with-
out damage, be put to the hard work which the muscles of a
man can safely perform. But physiologists tell us that the
child's brain grows more rapidly, proportionately, than his mus-
cles ; is there not, therefore, much greater danger of overtaxing
the child's brain than of overtaxing his muscles ?
Culture of the Mind's Powers. — The specific
work of the teacher is the cultivation of the minds
of his pupils, — not simply giving them knowledge to
be memorized. And even the knowledge acquired,
useful as it may be, should confer a greater benefit
upon the pupil by the mental culture it gives than by
the practical ends it may serve.
THE NATURE OF MIND 2J
TEN PRECEPTS OF MENTAL CULTURE *
1. The object of mental culture is the fullest de-
velopment and highest right activity of the faculties
of the mind.
2. One of the primary conditions of mental culture
is a well organized and healthy brain.
3. The mind is cultivated by the right activity of
its faculties.
4. The mind requires objective realities for it to
act upon.
5. Each faculty of the mind requires a culture
adapted to itself.
6. The culture of the mind should be adapted to
the order of the development of its faculties.
7. The culture of the mind should aim at a har-
monious development of all the faculties.
8. The culture of the mind should be modified to
suit the different tastes and talents of the pupils.
9. The culture of the mind is not creative in its
character; its object is to develop existing possibili-
ties into realities.
10. The ultimate end of mental culture is the at-
tainment of the threefold result — learning, develop-
ment, and efficiency.
-These ten precepts of Mental Culture have been taken from Dr. Ed-
ward Brooks, and slightly changed in phraseology.
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Consciousness.
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NOTE. — In this Scheme, we have included only such of the sensibilities
as have special importance for the teacher.
(28)
CHAPTER III
GENERAL POWERS, — CONSCIOUSNESS
N order to bring before the mind of the
reader clearly and distinctly, the psychic-
al powers and their relation to each
other, we give the foregoing scheme.
General Powers. — We have already
defined a Power as the ability to do something; but
some philosophers make a distinction between a mental
Power and a mental Faculty.
A Faculty is a power under the control of the will,
having a specific work of its own to do.
According to this definition, we must class Seeing,
Memory, Judgment, Love, etc., as mental faculties.
But the mind has three very important powers that
do not answer to the definition of faculties ; these are,
Consciousness, Attention, and Conception.
The powers of Consciousness, Attention, and Conception
never act separately from each other, nor from some one or
more of the mind's faculties. These powers are not co-ordi-
nate with the faculties, but are connected with them all. Hence,
in the Scheme, their names are written across, opposite a brace
that includes the faculties in all the three Grand Divisions.
(29)
30 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Definition. — Consciousness is the power the mind
has to know its own actions and states, and to know them
as belonging to the Ego.
This is not a faculty ; it is not under the control of
the will, nor does it perform any specific act of itself;
it gives cognizance of the acts performed by the fac-
ulties, and of the Ego as their subject.
Dr. Hopkins says: "We would define consciousness to be
the knowledge by the mind of itself as the permanent and in-
divisible subject of its own operations. Consciousness holds
the whole in unity by a constant reference of the different acts
and states of the mind to the indivisible self or Ego." Thus,
consciousness is the ground of the idea of personal identity.
We think this is true ; but we believe consciousness includes
both the state, or act, and the Ego.
Necessary to Mental Activity. — Consciousness
is necessary to any mental activity; it is the charac-
teristic of mind. Two persons direct their eyes to the
same landscape or picture; the same image is upon
the retina of the eye in both. But both do not see
the same things; each sees what he is conscious of
seeing, — no more. In fact, he may be so absorbed
in thought, or so overpowered by emotion, as to see
absolutely nothing. A burst of harmony from several
instruments or several voices may fall on the ear; the
hearer may be conscious of the harmony as a whole,
or he may be conscious of the individual tone of one
voice or one instrument. He hears just what he is
conscious of hearing. So of all other mental acts, —
there is no unconscious mental activity; not to be
conscious that you remember, is not to remember.
Consciousness has sometimes been compared to a light, show-
ing to one's self what is in his mind. It puts nothing into the
GENERAL POWERS,— CONSCIOUSNESS 3 1
mind ; it simply shows what is already there. We can not will
to be more or less conscious ; we shall be more conscious when
we have more in the mind to be conscious of, — in no other way.
Objects of Consciousness. — In other words, of
what can we be conscious?
1 . The Ego. — We may be conscious of the Ego,
as thinking, feeling, or willing.
2. Acts and States. — We may be conscious of the
activity, or state of the mind, in perceiving, remem-
bering, loving, choosing, etc.
3. Products. — We may be conscious of the prod-
ucts of these actions, — our concepts, our thoughts,
our feelings, our choices, etc.
4. The Non-Ego tn Contact? — Some hold that we
may be conscious of the Non-Ego, as in the case of
something resisting our muscular effort; Sir William
Hamilton thinks so, if we understand him.
All these objects of consciousness, except the last, belong
strictly to the Ego. Nor can we be conscious of anything ex-
cept that which is before the mind at the present instant ; con-
sciousness can not deal with the past nor the future. In re-
membering, we are not conscious of that which we remember ;
we are conscious only of the concept of it which is now before
the mind. You may be conscious that you were conscious
yesterday, — that is, you are conscious of your present concept
of the former consciousness. You may be conscious of a pres-
ent concept of that which is future.
Testimony of Consciousness. — We know most
thoroughly that of which we are conscious. You
know that you are hearing when you are conscious
that you hear; and, if you are asked how you know
you are conscious, there is no further answer to be
given, — consciousness is the " bottom fact." When
one forms a judgment, he is conscious of the result;
32 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
that is, he knows what decision he has made. The
decision may be false or true, consciousness can tell
him nothing as to that; but consciousness can not
mistake as to what the decision is.
Mental Activity without Consciousness? — We
have said that consciousness is the characteristic of
mind. If this be true, there is no exhibition of mind
apart from consciousness, — there can be no uncon-
scious mental activity. "Unconscious knowing and
unconscious willing are phrases which defy all inter-
pretation." But cases are often cited where there
seems to be mental activity without any conscious-
ness; at least, there is no remembrance of any con-
sciousness. It is said that a reporter in the House of
Lords became very weary, and fell into a state of un-
consciousness; but that he made a correct report of
all that was said during the time he was unconscious.
The explanation, doubtless, is either that he was not
entirely unconscious, but was simply unable to re-
member the slight degree of consciousness that he
had, or that his action in reporting was purely auto-
matic, — that his fingers, through long habit, responded
correctly to the impressions that fell upon his ear,
without any mental action whatever.
"Unconscious knowledge" seems to be contradictory in
terms. Yet much of our knowledge, doubtless, has not been
consciously forinulated ; a child or a savage knows that a part
can not equal the whole, and still he may not be able to state
his knowledge to another. Perhaps his mind has never con-
ceived such a statement.
Unconscious Cerebration. — Such action as the
supposition about the reporter implies, would be a
case of "unconscious cerebration ",— that is, brain
GENERAL POWERS— CONSCIOUSNESS 33
activity unaccompanied by mental activity. All mus-
cular activity is prompted by an impulse from the
nervous system ; but often this is attended by no
mental activity. An involuntary kick when the foot
is tickled, is a movement of this kind. It is called
" natural reflex action," which is an involuntary re-
sponse of the motor nerve to an excitement of the sensory
nerve. The limbs of a dead man may be made to
move in this way, by an electric shock.
Habit. — But it is found that movements which
were at first guided by the mind may become so fa-
miliar that they become reflex, and require no more
thought, or mental activity, than natural reflex action
does. It is so in walking; and, with an expert mu-
sician, the playing on an instrument may be of the
same kind. Muscular habit is induced reflex action ;
that is, it is prompted by unconscious cerebration. In
this consists the value of such habits: they enable
us to do things correctly and rapidly without any out-
lay of mental power.
And it is very important to notice that mental hab-
its may be formed, which tend to become similarly
automatic, perhaps because, by long continuance, the
action of the brain becomes reflex, like the action of
the muscles. This shows how a result of the multi-
plication of two small numbers appears without effort
in the mind of one familiar with the multiplication
table. Thus, you think "twelve" whenever you hear
''four times three." Anything in which one is thor-
oughly educated has taken on the form of habit ; and
it is the true business and aim of education to form
right habits, — physical, intellectual, and moral.
34 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Some very curious phenomena, aside from those that result
from known habit, may be explained, perhaps, by unconscious
cerebration. You grapple with a difficult problem in the even-
ing ; it baffles you, and you give it up, retire, and sleep. In the
morning, the solution is perfectly easy and clear. You try to
recall the name of a person ; you fail, and give it up. An hour
after, when all desire or use for the name has passed, it sud-
denly comes before your mind with provoking clearness. In
these and many similar cases, it may be that movements in the
brain, having been started in a certain direction, have continued
until they have wrought out the result, simply by unconscious
cerebration, — without any mental activity until we become con-
scious of the result itself.
What we Know. — In the strictest sense, we know
nothing except what is before consciousness at this
moment. In a looser sense, — which is the common
one, — we know all that we can recall into conscious-
ness. When the child truthfully says, "I know, but
I can't think," he means that it is possible for him to
bring the thing in question into his consciousness, but
that he can not do it at this moment.
Our knowledge now in consciousness is like our money in
hand; all our other knowledge is like our money in the bank.
And the one who can not recall what he knows, at the moment,
is like a depositor after the bank is shut.
The Ego in Consciousness. — Our definition of
consciousness implies that each act of consciousness
has two sides; one relates to the thing known, the
other relates to the Ego as knowing. But attention
may be directed more fully to the one or to the other.
The expression " I am conscious that I see," may in-
dicate to which side the attention is directed, by the
word on which the emphasis is placed. Place the
emphasis on the last word, and note the meaning;
GENERAL POWERS,— CONSCIOUSNESS
35
now place it on next to the last word, and note the
striking difference in meaning.
All consciousness is of necessity self-consciousness,
but, when undue attention is given to the Ego, we
have what is commonly called self-consciousness, or
abnormal consciousness. Every thoughtful person
knows how much such consciousness of self interferes
with our best performances, and how ridiculous and
contemptible it sometimes makes one appear. For-
get self, if you would do your best before your fellows.
Such unfortunate and mischievous consciousness of
self may be due: —
1. To morbid "sensitiveness", — the result of he-
redity or of bad education.
2. To a real, or supposed, feeble or morbid condi-
tion of the body.
3. To undue pride, vanity, or self-love.
4. To a knowledge of personal defect, ignorance,
or unworthiness.
Can Consciousness be Cultivated? — Conscious-
ness is not under control of the will, — it can "pro-
duce" nothing. Hence, to speak of its products or
its cultivation, seems to be an abuse of language.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL POWERS, ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION
EFINITION. — Attention is the power the
mind has to bring all its fo7-ce to bear on
one thing.
Important as this power is, it pro-
duces no result alone, and of itself.
Hence, it is not to be considered a faculty, although
it is under the control of the will.
When we say that attention is under the control of the will,
we do not mean that it never acts except in obedience to a
mandate of the will, but simply that the will can cause it to
act. The same is true of other voluntary powers ; we often re-
member without willing to do so, but memory can be moved
by the will.
Mode of Action. — If it be asked how the mind
turns its force to one thing in an act of attention,
the answer seems to be that it is done by not allow-
ing the mental force to move towards anything else.
This restraining, or limiting, of the mental force is
the act of attention.
Illustration. — The mental current maybe compared
to a stream of water — it flows constantly. In revery
and absence of attention, it is like that stream flow-
ing down the mountain side, and spreading, unre-
(36)
ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 37
stricted, over the meadows ; it may be pleasant
enough, but it does no work. When one wishes to
put the stream to work, he puts a dam across it, and
allows no place of escape, except at the point where
he puts his wheel. So we put the mind to work by
confining the mental force to one point of escape.
If we can do this completely, the attention is per-
fect, — no force is lost; if not, the power in part es-
capes, like lost water through a leaky dam.
Meanings of the Word. — When we speak of At-
tention, we always have reference to the direction in
which the force and activity of the mind are turned.
It may be spontaneous, — it is always so in the case
of the child, — as when something attracts us power-
fully ; or as in the case of revery or day-dreaming,
although the latter is often called lack of attention.
Or the attention may be voluntary, as when one reso-
lutely sets himself to the performance of a task. We
properly mean, however, by attention, either the
power of the mind to direct its course by the force
of the will, or the act which this power thus performs.
There is a close connection between interest and at-
tention ; it is very easy to attend to anything that in-
terests us deeply. Interest may even compel us to
attend against our will. But, on the other hand, if,
through a sense of duty we oblige ourselves to at-
tend to that which does not interest us at present,
interest is very sure to follow. Attention is always
due to interest or will, or to both.
The word " attention" is often used to signify the mind's force
itself, rather than the power of the will over it ; as when one
says, "Give your whole attention to this subject."
3$ elements of psychology
Power of the Will over the Mind's Action. —
In what respects has the will power over the mind's
activities? First, it may arouse and incite the mind
to activity; or, in other words, the mind may arouse
itself through the action of the will. Secondly, the
mind may direct the course of its activity, by will-
power; this is properly the power of attention.
And one who has complete control of himself in
this respect, can call off his mental forces from any
object with the same readiness that he can direct
them towards any object.
The true conception of the operation of the will in an act of
attention seems to be, not that the will seizes the mind's powers
and turns them towards a certain object as the hand uses a
crow-bar, but that the will prevents the mental force from
moving in any but the desired direction, as in the illustration
just given. And, in consequence, the mental force, by virtue
of its own essential activity, goes in the way desired. This
" liquid theory," if we may so call it, seems to be preferable to
the " crow-bar theory."
Mental Activity without Attention? — There
can be no mental activity without some expenditure
of the mind's force in a certain direction ; hence, there
must be some degree of attention. Some of our ac-
tivities are thoroughly habitual; in such cases, there
is no attention, for there is no mental activity, — the
movements are purely automatic. For instance, take
the case of a mechanic at familiar work, of a person
walking and reading, or of a musician playing a tune
and talking with a friend at the same time.
Can we Attend to More than one Thing at a
Time? — Much has been said on this question; many
learned men have declared in the negative. They as-
ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 39
sert that, in cases where the mind seems to attend to
more than one thing, the fact is that the mind vibrates
rapidly from one to the other ; and they tell us that,
in the comparing of two objects, we can detect this
vibratory movement. They seem to be clearly wrong.
In a case of perfect attention, the mind's forces are all
brought to bear on one thing, but experience shows
that in imperfect attention the mental force is divided ;
in the case of comparing, no conclusion could ever be
reached, if, in the vibration, only one of the objects
was the point of attention. The mind must have
both before it, in order to decide.
Every one must have observed that in reading or conversa-
tion there is often an under-current of thought passing in his
mind, of which he is vividly conscious.
Objects of Attention. — As attention has refer-
ence to all the mind's activities or force, and as the
word often means the mental force itself, of course the
objects of attention will include everything on which
mental force can be made to bear.
Can be Cultivated. — As the will has the power
to direct the attention, attention can be cultivated;
and the success of a student will be almost propor-
tioned to the degree of that cultivation. This is
equally true of the pupil in school, and of the pro-
found scholar. How shall it be done? By a com-
plete, continued, persistent exercise of sheer will-power
over the mind's movements.
In order that a teacher may be of any service to
his pupils, he must have the power to secure their
attention. For securing attention in recitation, we
offer the following rules: —
40 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Rules. — I. Look the pupils squarely in the eye.
2. Say nothing till you have the attention of your
class; stop, if you lose it.
3. Talk slowly and clearly.
4. Say a thing but once.
5. Hold the pupils strictly responsible for what you
have said.
6. Do not put questions to your class in a fixed
order; propound the question, then name a pupil to
answer it. Do this habitually.
7. When the class need such discipline, stop the
one who is reading or reciting, in the middle of a sen-
tence, and require another to begin exactly where he
left off.
Attention of little children must accompany every successful
mental effort. There are two ways in which the man may be
led to give attention : one is by attracting it, so that he attends
without effort ; the other, by inducing him to attend through
sheer force of his will-power. The attention of the child can
be gained in the first way only. It can be attracted and held
for a short time ; but his will is not strong enough to enable
him to attend against his inclination, nor after he has become
weary. And yet he must attend, if he is to do anything to any
purpose. Nor can his attention be secured by frequent calls
for attention, nor even by authority. It must be attracted at
first, and its object must be changed frequently. It is a grad-
ual process, by which he gets the power to command his atten-
tion, and this power must be gained by a judicious course of
training.
To the teacher there is no subject more important than this
of attention. Dr. Rosenkranz says: "To education, the con-
ception of attention is the most important of all those derived
from Psychology."
Conception. — It is not easy to frame a short sat-
isfactory definition for Conception, but there is little
ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 4 1
difficulty in naming the particular things that it does.
It is the power by which we see with the "mind's
eye" absent objects; by which we perceive the ab-
stract relations of things ; by which we get clear no-
tions through discourse or thinking; by which we
understand why and how things may be, etc.
When a teacher, after explaining a problem in algebra, asks
the pupil if he " sees it," he means to ask if it is clear to his
conception ; of course, he has no reference to the act of sight.
Perhaps the best short statement for Conception, is
to say that it is the power by which zue see with the
"mind's eye." When we conceive of a thing fully,
we see all around it, as it were ; we become acquainted
with all its limitations; we "take it in"; we compre-
hend it. But we often appreJiend things that we can
not comprehend; just as one may see something of a
mountain when much of it is hidden in clouds.
We must not limit the possibility of things by our power to
comprehend them. Many possible things are inconceivable ;
for instance, the matter of this earth must have been created
out of nothing, or it must always have existed in some form,
without any beginning ; both these things are utterly inconceiv-
able, and yet not only is one of them possible, but it is certain.
On the other hand, some impossible things are perfectly con-
ceivable, as the passage of a flying ship to the moon.
Not a Faculty. — Conception is largely under the
control of the will, but it accompanies all the other
mental powers, and produces no specific results alone.
Hence, it is not a faculty.
There is a special use of the Conceptive power in forming
abstract, general concepts ; for instance, when the ideas of sur-
face limited by three lines, are combined, we have the abstract,
general concept signified by the word ' ' triangle." This combina-
Psy.- 4 .
4 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
tion is made by Conception acting with the Reflective Power ;
such a use of the Conceptive Power may be called Logical Con-
ception. More will be said of this hereafter.
Meanings of the Word. — Dr. Haven says, "This
term (Conception) has been employed in various senses
by different writers. I conceive of a thing when I
make it a distinct object of thought, when I appre-
hend it, when I construe it to myself as a possible
thing, and as being thus and thus. This form of
mental activity enters more or less into all our mental
operations; it is involved in perception, memory,
imagination, abstraction, judgment, reasoning, etc.
For this reason, it is not to be ranked as one of, and
correlate with, these several specific faculties."
It seems to us that these statements are eminently
just, and that we must reckon conception as a general
mental power; but it is not a faculty, for the reason
given by Dr. Haven.
We think common language shows that in the minds of men
in general there is such a conception of this mental power as
is expressed above. Take such expressions as " I have a dis-
tinct conception of his personal appearance," — " I have no con-
ception how that can be," — " This is my conception of the mean-
ing of the statement," etc. Common language is the expres-
sion of common knowledge, and of common modes of thought ;
and it often deserves great weight in considering a thing in its
scientific aspect. Note what is said on page 16, about common
knowledge and scientific knowledge.
What is Conception? — From Dr. Haven's state-
ment of the several uses of conception, it is readily
seen that a short and comprehensive definition for this
power is not easily found. We venture to propose
the following, as a tentative definition : Conception is
the mind's power to represent tilings to itself.
ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 43
What is a Concept? — A concept is a product of
the conceptive power; it is the elementary unit of the
mind's operations. Or, A Concept is a mental product
whose expression is a single term.
The concept may be simple, as that expressed by the word
"redness"; or it may be complex, as that expressed by the
words, "A man in uniform, riding rapidly, on a spirited black
horse "; but the expression makes but a single term in language.
A concept of an object of sight is perhaps the most
readily recognized, as the concept of an absent friend's
face, or of some familiar scene. But we certainly
have concepts of sounds, odors, tastes, sensations.
Nor are our concepts by any means confined to prod-
ucts of the senses ; we have concepts of all our mental
activities and states. We also have concepts of the
abstract qualities of things, as well as of relations of
all kinds, — for instances, the relation of eight to
twelve, or of crime to ill- desert.
Many writers use the words "idea," "picture," "image,"
etc., where we would use the word " concept.'' These words all
refer to the sense of sight. " Idea" comes from a Greek word
which means a form ; hence, these words may do very well for
concepts of objects of sight, but they are not strictly appropriate
when applied to other concepts. "A picture of an odor" is a
strange use of words, to say the least.
The Concept, an Intellection. — We may readily
form a concept of an emotion or a volition, but the
concept itself is a pure intellection. Your present
concept of a sorrow felt a year ago is not sorrow, is
not an emotion. It may give rise to a new feeling of
sorrow, or you may have learned that the sorrow was
causeless, and so have no present feeling in regard to
it; or, again, it may have been caused by something
44 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
which turned out to be ludicrous, and so it now may
give rise to a feeling of mirth.
Truth of Concepts. — Our concepts in themselves
are neither true nor false ; we can predicate nothing
of truth or falsity concerning them till we have some
judgment or belief respecting them. I may conceive
of a horse with wings of silk ; this concept is neither
true nor false. But if I judge, or believe, that such
a horse really exists, it is quite probable that my
judgment concerning that concept, is false.
Logical, or General, Concepts. — Many writers
attempt to confine the word " conception," exclusive-
ly to that use of the power by which we form general,
or logical, concepts. But very few of them, so far as
we have observed, fail to use the word repeatedly in
their writings, as though it meant what we have ex-
plained above ; we think they show in this way their
mistake in attempting to restrict its meaning to only
one of its uses.
A logical concept, such as is expressed by the word
"man " or the word "triangle," is not a concept of an
object, but of a bundle of attributes that belongs to
every one of the class to which the term may properly
be applied. The term itself serves as a cord or strap
to hold the bundle together.
If one uses, in speaking to you, the phrase " a man," he asks
you to respond with the concept, or "image," of an individual
man; but if he says "man," he asks you to respond with a
concept of a bundle of qualities common to all men. Rarely
are all the elements of such a concept distinct and perfectly
clear in the mind of the one who uses the term, or of the one who
hears it ; and still it serves very well for ordinary purposes.
Were it not so, our language would become very meager and
ATTENTION AND CONCEPTION 45
very barren. Even a child, who could do little or nothing to-
wards analyzing and denning the general concept expressed
by the word " cow," must have that concept in his mind with
some fair degree of distinctness. How, else, could he place an
animal in the class " cow," so readily, on seeing an individual
specimen of the class?
Cultivation of Conception. — The will has great
control over our conceptions; hence, the power can
be highly cultivated, both in its common use, and
in its use to form and analyze general and logical con-
cepts. And the work of the wise and earnest teacher
will show no more profitable results in the culture of
any other mental power of his pupils. A bright mind
is one whose conceptive power is clear and strong.
Dullness is due to lack of this power. "Parrot" reci-
tations are of words without their accompanying con-
cepts. Mechanical reading is calling over words, in
this way, from a book. Mechanical, meaningless
mathematical work is the blind following of rules
while the conceptive power is asleep. Much of our
school work, we are sorry to say, is performed in such
a way as to put this power to sleep; and the more
we work with tongue, or pen, or hand while concep-
tion sleeps, the more soundly it will sleep while we
thus work. This is the process by which many little
children, who entered school bright, keen, and inquis-
itive, are made dull and stupid after attending the
school for a few months.
A really "lively" school exercise of any kind is
not to be measured by the noise made, nor by the
amount of manual activity; but by the fullness and
clearness of the conceptive power used. No reading
by older or younger pupils will be correct, — except,
46 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
perhaps, with the correctness of mechanical imita-
tion, — until conception gives life to the words spoken.
No Geography lesson is worth anything that does not
fill the mind with correct and lively pictures. No
mathematical work is anything but a mechanical
"grind" till the pupil "sees" the relation of the
parts with his "mind's eye."
Our concepts of sensible things must be based on our sense-
perception of them; hence the importance of careful and cor-
rect perceptions, in order that our concepts derived from them
may be correct. These concepts are to be the material with
which the mind must work, in all its thought and reflection
concerning objects of sense.
CHAPTER V
THE INTELLECT, — DEFINITIONS AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
HE Intellect. — The group of knowing
powers, or the Intellect, is subdivided
into four groups; viz., the Presentative
Powers, the Representative Powers, the
Reflective Powers, and the Intuitive
Power. This division is exhaustive.
The Presentative Powers give us knoivledge of the out-
side world through the senses.
The Representative Powers give us concepts of absent
objects.
The Reflective Powers show us the relations and con-
nections of objects ■, or of their concepts.
The Intuitive Power is the power by which we know
certain fundamental tilings without being taught.
The word "object" must not be confined to material things.
When we say that these powers do these acts, we must remem-
ber that the powers themselves are not entities. It is the mind,
— the one indivisible mind, — that performs all these acts ; but
its power to do one thing is called by one name, and its power
to do another thing is called by another name. It is the mind
that perceives through the senses, that represents, that reflects,
that has certain ideas and thoughts without teaching.
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4-8 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
The Intuitive Power. — Because of its funda-
mental character and the intimate relation of its action
and products to the other intellectual powers, it seems
best to say something about this power and its prod-
ucts, before we proceed to speak of the other divis-
ions of the Intellect.
It is said that the Intuitive Power acts in only one
way, but that its products are of two kinds. By this
power, we have certain fundamental notions, ideas, or
concepts ; and also certain necessary, self-evident truths.
Some assert that we get all our knowledge, of every sort,
through experience and reflection ; they claim that this is as
true in regard to what we have called the ideas and truths of
intuition, as it is of our knowledge of the qualities of objects.
We hold, however, that observation and experience merely
furnish an occasion for this kind of knowledge; they do not
cause us to have it.
Truths. — Thus, we know that a part can not equal
the whole ; we know that the same thing can not be
in two places at the same time ; we know that a state-
ment can not be both true and not true at the same
time and in the same sense. All such truths every
sane and sound mind knows at once, as soon as it is
capable of comprehending clearly what is said. We
can not disbelieve them, if we try. No attempt at
proof can make us believe them any more firmly.
In fact, no proof of them is possible ; we may illustrate
such truths by individual instances, but we can not
demonstrate them. Many of these truths are included
in the axioms of mathematics; but there are axioms
which do not belong to mathematics.
All necessary, self-evident truths have these three
characteristics: 1st, They are true everywhere, and
THE INTELLECT 49
at all times ; 2d, They can not be demonstrated ; 3d,
The contradictory of any one of them is manifestly
absurd. To illustrate, take the axiom that a whole is
equal to the sum of all its parts. This must be true
everywhere, and it must be true at all times. We
may illustrate it, — that is, we may show it to be true
in any given case; but we can not prove that it will
always be true in every case. The contradictory, viz. ,
that the whole is not equal to the sum of all its parts,
is seen to be absurd at once by any one capable of
understanding the statement.
Ideas. — Philosophers do not agree as to the num-
ber of fundamental ideas given us by Intuition. We
may safely say that there are seven of them, at least;
viz., Being, Time, Space, Beauty, Cause, Right, and
Personal Identity.
Being. — By the intuitive idea of Being, we mean
that all men naturally and always believe in the ex-
istence of themselves and of other things. None
but crazy men and some philosophers ever think or
talk as if there could be any doubt about this.
Time. — The intuitive idea of Time is the nec-
essary notion of time as passing whenever we think
of the occurrence of events. We can not rid our-
selves of this idea; in thought we may empty time
of every event, but we can not think the time away.
In respect to definite amounts of time, we exercise
our judgment and experience ; but the idea that there
must be some amount of time, is intuitive.
Space. — The intuitive idea of Space is very similar;
when we think of bodies, we are compelled to think
of them as existing in space. We judge of the amount
Psy -5.
50 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
of space in any particular instance, but we can not
get rid of the idea that space is, and must be ; we can
empty it in thought, but we can not think it away,
nor think of it as finite.
Beauty. — The intuitive idea of Beauty is that there
is, and must be, such a thing as beauty ; or, in other
words, that some things are beautiful and some are
not. The child shows that he has this idea very early ;
"pretty" is one of his first words. The judgment
decides as to the beauty of any particular thing, and
the decisions differ very widely.
Cause. — We believe intuitively that every effect
must have a cause; the child shows that this idea is
inherent by his questions "Why?" "What makes
it?" etc. A cause that is not itself caused is incon-
ceivable to him ; is it not beyond the comprehension
of any one? Judgment pronounces as to what the
cause is, in a particular case.
It is highly important that we do not confound the occasion
of a thing with its cause. The occasion of a thing allows it to
be or to be done ; the cause makes it to be or to be done. To
illustrate : The expansive force of steam is the cause of motion
in the locomotive; the opening of the valve, or throttle, is the
occasion of the motion.
Right. — The idea that there is such a thing as
Right, — that some things are right, and others are
wrong, — seems to be intuitive. "Is it right?" is a
question that has a meaning to a very young child;
parents and teachers would do better to ask it more
frequently. Judgment decides whether a specific
thing is right or not. As in the other cases named,
these decisions vary greatly.
THE INTELLECT 51
Personal Identity. — No sane person can divest him-
self of the idea that he is himself, — the same person-
ality that he always has been. It is intuitive; he is
conscious that it is so, and that is the end of all
question. Nor would the testimony of a thousand
strengthen his conviction.
We may say that a knowledge of these fundamental,
intuitive truths and ideas, is innate ; that is, we are so
constituted at birth that, as soon as the occasion arises
for this knowledge, we have it, and that without any
instruction or study. And we take it for granted that
every one else has this knowledge the same as we
have; we pronounce one an idiot, or insane, if he is
lacking in this respect. For, a recognition of these
products of Intuition constitutes what we call natural
reason. Reason, as we here use it, must not be con-
founded with the Power of reasoning; some insane
people can reason most logically, but they have lost
their reason, as they show in various ways.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE INTELLECT
The Mind knows by its own Activity. — A writer
truly says, ' ' Every concept or idea is formed in the
mind that possesses it, by the mind's own activity. It
is not received; it is produced." A skillful teacher
will cause a pupil to know what he did not know be-
fore. But he does this, not by transferring his own
concepts and thoughts to the learner, but by causing
the learner to produce in his own mind the same con-
cepts and thoughts that are in the teacher's mind.
Hence, knowledge can not be imparted, in the strict
sense of the word; it can only be induced, or awak-
52 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
ened. It is sometimes said that knowledge differs
wonderfully from money or material goods, in that the
one who imparts it has no less than he had before.
The wonder disappears when we see that knowledge
is never imparted at all. The mind that gets knowl-
edge must produce it for itself, under proper condi-
tions and with proper helps. This is a fundamental
principle of mental acquisition that no teacher can
ignore without disastrous consequences; some of the
greatest evils in our schools are due to the false no-
tion that words convey knowledge.
What the human Mind is Like. — On the one hand,
the human mind is, in some of its aspects, like the
minds of intelligent animals. There seems to be the
clearest evidence that the mind of a horse or a dog per-
ceives through the senses much as a human mind does;
and some of the acts of animals in remembering seem
to be exactly like similar acts of memory in man. But
there is no evidence that the animal can perform the
higher acts of abstraction and reasoning, nor that he
has an intuition of right, nor any sense of obligation,
nor any conscience, nor any religious capacity.
On the other hand, the fact that man can under-
stand the laws of nature, that he can in some cases
demonstrate their necessity by mathematical formulae,
seems to show very clearly that man's mind is akin
to the Mind that made and governs the Universe.
Who. can doubt that the old astronomer was right,
when he said, "Oh, my God, I think thy thoughts
after Thee!" Any student of natural science who
clearly comprehends one of its laws, thinks the
thoughts of God after him, — in some degree, at least.
THE INTELLECT 53
Three Steps in the Intellectual Process. — The mind
gathers the crude material of its knowledge by the
use of the perceptive powers. The exercise of sense-
perception is also the occasion of the development
of those fundamental ideas and truths which the mind
has through the intuitive power. Conception after-
wards brings before the mind the concepts of that
knowledge which has been gathered by the use of
the perceptive powers. Then, by the reflective
power, or the ' ' Elaborative Faculty," the significa-
tion, the relation, and the use of what has been gath-
ered, are discovered. The three steps, then, are Per-
ception, Conception, and Reflection, or Thinking,
as that word is used by philosophers. It is an old
saying that, "There is nothing in the Intellect that
was not first in the Sense." This is very true, if we
except the products of intuition, or the "Natural
Reason." All the highest thoughts of the philoso-
pher or the poet have been elaborated from the crude
material obtained through sense-perception. A failure
to recognize these three necessary steps in their order
is the reason why so many teachers are vainly striv-
ing to build up conceptions or to induce reasoning in
the minds of their pupils, by the use of mere words
which have never been filled with meaning through
a proper use of the perceptive powers.
Mr. Tate says, "All our knowledge is derived from three
sources; viz., sensation, reflection , and the primitive laws in-
volved in our mental operations." By the last, he means the
ideas and truths given to us by Intuition ; that is, by the very
nature of the mind itself.
CHAPTER VI
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES
HE Presentative Powers. — The Pre-
servative Powers, often called the Per-
ceptives, seem to get their name in this
way: Since the days of the old Greeks,
men have divided the Universe for every
man, into the Ego and the Non-Ego; the Ego is the
man himself, and the Non-Ego includes everything
except himself. The Presentative Powers, or the
senses, present, as it were, the things of the Non-Ego
to the Ego, shut up, as he seems to be, somewhere
in this bodily tenement. They are a kind of ' ' intro-
duction committee."
The Senses. — The senses are commonly said to be
five in number : — Feeling, or the sense of touch, See-
ing, Hearing, Tasting, and Smelling. To these, some
philosophers add a sixth sense, which they call the
Sense of Resistance to Muscular Effort.
Feeling is the most general of all the senses, as it
extends over the whole body, wherever the nerves
are found. There is some propriety in saying that
the other senses are modifications of feeling, because
they all require special nerves for their action. All
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THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES 55
these special nerves are located in the head. Two of
the senses, seeing and hearing, in addition to the spe-
cial nerves, also require curiously constructed organs.
Most of the words used to designate the powers of the mind,
may also signify the acts which the powers perform, and often
the products of the acts ; thus, Feeling may mean the power to
feel, or the act of feeling. The same is true of Memory,
Judgment, etc. Whenever we use one of these words, we do
well to think carefully whether we mean by it the power, or
the act which that power is able to perform.
The sense of feeling makes us acquainted with such
objects only as are close to us. It also acts slowly,
from the parts to the whole ; this is illustrated by the
actions of a blind man as he studies objects that he
handles. We all act in a similar way when we grope
in the dark ; hence, feeling has two limitations.
Seeing is very different; it shows us objects that
are near or very distant, and it acts rapidly; it gives
us notions of things as wholes at first, and afterwards
studies their parts. The special nerves of sight are
called the optic nerves. But sight can not act when
light is absent, nor when the rays are obstructed by
opaque objects; hence, sight has two limitations.
Hearing. — The medium through which we hear
must always be present where life is possible, for it is
the air we breathe ; nor do intervening objects wholly
prevent our hearing. No other sense affects the emo-
tions so quickly or so deeply as hearing; this is seen
in the effects of music, and of the tones of the voice.
The auditoiy nerve is the special nerve of hearing.
The senses we have considered make us acquainted with the
size, shape, position, resonance, etc., of bodies; in other words
with such qualities of bodies as have relation to space.
5^ ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Tasting and Smelling. — But tasting and smelling,
by means of the gustatory and olfactory nerves, enable
us to learn much of the composition and condition of
bodies. We judge by the use of these senses whether
substances are fit to be taken into our organism or
not. Hence, the special nerves for these senses are
found in the mouth and nose, the gateways to the
stomach and lungs.
Sense of Resistance. — When you allow an object
merely to touch your hand, you simply feel it; but
when you let it rest upon your hand, and put forth
muscular effort to sustain it, your sense seems to give
you something besides simple feeling; you have a
sense of something resisting your muscular effort.
This is why some philosophers say that there is a
sixth sense; and they say that no other sense makes
us know so soon and so certainly that there are ob-
jects outside of our own organism.
Teachers can teach young children a great many truths about
the "five senses," but they had better say nothing to them
about the sixth sense. Children should understand that it is
the mind that acts through these nerves and organs of the
senses. The eye does not see; but the mind sees by means of
the eye, using it as an instrument.
Because the Sense of Resistance to Muscular Effort is not re-
garded by all as a separate sense, distinct from mere feeling,
we have placed an interrogation mark after it in the Scheme.
More about the Senses. — Having briefly defined
each of the senses, it is now proper that we study them
more closely, to ascertain their mode of action, and
to see exactly what we derive from their use.
Sense- Perception. — This is the foundation of all
our knowledge, or mental activity, (i) Because men-
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES 57
tal activity begins with sense-perception ; (2) Because
sense-perception furnishes the crude material for all
our mental activity, as has just been said. A study
of a baby will soon convince one that the first signs
of mental activity appear in the use of his senses.
Probably the first step, beyond the mere cognizing of
impressions on the nerves, is an act of discrimina-
tion, — a cognizing of differences.
Were an infant entirely deprived of the use of all
his senses, there is no reason to suppose that he would
ever show any indication that he possesses a mind.
We have said that his first mental act is a cognizing
of impressions on the nerves ; that is, the first thing
he knows is a sensation.
A sensation is a cognized affection of the nerves.
Conditions of Pe?reption. — (1) There must be a
perceiving mind. (2) This mind must be connected
with a nervous organism, that can be affected by the
external world. (3) There must be an external world
— the Non-Ego — to affect the sentient organism.
(4) The external world must affect the nervous or-
ganism. (5) The affection must be cognized and in-
terpreted by the mind. If any one of these five con-
ditions be wanting, no perception is possible.
What Each Sense Gives. — The acquisition which
the mind gains through each of the senses is distinct
and separate from anything acquired by the use of
any other sense.
Touch gives us tactual sensation, or feeling, with
all its varieties.
Sight gives us a knowledge of color, with all its va-
rieties.
58 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Hearing gives us sound, with all its varieties.
Taste gives us savor ', with all its varieties.
Smell gives us odor, with all its varieties.
All the knowledge that the mind gets directly
through the "five senses" is included in these five
short statements.
Is It Much or Little f — From the above bald
statement of the case, it might seem at first as though
we get but little through the senses ; but, if we will
reflect upon' the vast amount that is implied in the
phrase, "all its varieties," we shall see that our ac-
quisitions through sense are not small. At any rate,
they are all we have; and they are enough.
But Dr. Hopkins maintains that, if we had only
what these senses would receive, were we deprived
of motion, and the senses were passively acted upon
by the outer world, we could never know that there
is an outer world, — a Non-Ego; we could not deter-
mine that our knowledge relates to anything objective.
But when we exercise our power of motion in con-
nection with sense-perception, we begin to be aware
of the Non-Ego as affecting us. This knowledge of
the Non-Ego comes first and most powerfully through
the sense of resistance to muscular effort, — a sense
which would be impossible without the power to
move. Motion also reveals the Non-Ego by the sense
of feeling, as when we put one finger on some part
of the body, and another finger on a stone ; in one
case the sensation is double, in the other it is single.
Motion, also, enables us to decide that colors, sounds,
odors, and savors belong to the external world, and
are not merely subjective affections of our organism.
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES 59
That is, the outer world is revealed to us when the
mind begins to act upon it, but not so long as we
passively receive impressions from without.
Probably, the infant's first impressions are not dis-
tinguished as having any connection with anything
outside of his organism ; but he soon begins to act
upon the external world, and gradually to discover
the sources of his sensations. In the adult, his senses
have so long acted together, and in connection with
his power to move, that it is a little difficult to dis-
tinguish what each sense gives alone, or to realize
how much he would be limited, were he deprived of
the power to move.
Direct and Acquired Perceptions. — So true is
this that, in common language, we are accustomed
to say that we perceive directly, through one sense,
all that we are enabled to know from what that sense
gives us when interpreted by all the light of former
experience, aided by other senses. We say that we
perceive a rose by the smell, or ''We smell a rose."
All that we smell is the odor; the rest we know
through experience. One may say, "I hear Mr.
Brown's wagon, driving rapidly towards the south,
and it is empty." Does he perceive all this through
his hearing? All that he hears is a peculiar sound;
the rest he knows from experience.
Sense of Touch. — It is usually said that four
things are involved in a perception through the sense
of touch. These are: (i) Simple sensation ; (2) Cog-
nition of its character; (3) Reference to the part of
the body affected ; (4) Cognition of the object touched.
These do not differ psychologically; that is, we do
60 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
not have one of them without the others, excepting
that the fourth is sometimes wanting. But, logically,
they are different steps in the complex process ; that
is, each may be a subject of separate thought.
It is commonly said, too, that these steps do not differ chron-
ologically, — that they are synchronous. But, in a case where
the perception is violently painful, it would seem that there is
a slight difference in the time of these four steps. Suppose one
to step with the bare foot on a hot iron; he exclaims, "Oh, I
burned my foot on the iron." Is there not a perceptible differ^
ence in the time of the four steps, as expressed by the order in
which his words are pronounced ? First, there is a violent
sensation of pain, expressed by "Oh"; next, the sensation is
cognized as a burn; then it is referred to iYitfoot; lastly, the
cause of the trouble is referred to.
Sensation and Cognition. — In every perception, —
by touch or by any other sense, — there are involved
an affection of the nerves, — a sensation, — and a cog-
nition and interpretation of that affection.
It has been said that these two bear an inverse ra-
tio to each other, and the remark is doubtless true,
to a certain extent. An overpowering light, sound,
odor, or taste has a mastery over us to such a degree
that the intellectual element in the perception be-
comes very small. On the other hand, we may sup-
pose a philosopher so intent in studying a painful ex-
periment upon himself, as to become almost uncon-
scious of the pain. For instance, he might allow a
bee to sting him, and be so much interested in com-
paring the sensation he feels with some other remem-
bered sensation, as hardly to feel the pain of the sting.
This seems to be merely an example of the general
truth that intense feeling and intense thought can not
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS, OR THE SENSES 6 1
co exist. One partially or completely neutralizes the
other; and this is equally true whether the feeling be
a sensation of the nerves or pure emotion — a man
violently agitated by any feeling can not think well.
Is the Body Ego or Non-Ego? — We have seen
that every act of perception has two sides, the side of
sensation and the side of cognition or interpretation.
In sensation we involuntarily regard the body as Ego ;
but, so far as cognition is concerned, the body appears
as objective, — Non-Ego.
Questions as to Sight. — Does sight give direct
knowledge of surface ? As sight gives color, and as
color can not be confined to a point, it would seem
that sight necessarily involves the notion of surface.
Practiced sight, re-enforced as it has been time and again
by the testimony of the other senses, not only gives
notions of surface, but of solidity. Hence, we know
or infer from sight alone, that a body is a sphere
or a cube. That this inference is due simply to our
perception of colors, is proved by the deceptive ap-
pearance of frescoes and other paintings which have a
well-managed blending of shades and perspective.
Does Sight Give Distance? — This question is
ambiguous. If it means to ask if sight gives an imme-
diate knowledge of the amount of distance, the an-
swer is clearly in the negative ; only after long expe-
rience can we judge accurately of distance. But, if
the question inquires whether we see objects as apart
from us, the answer is just as clearly in the affirmative.
The infant does not think that his rattle touches his
eye, nor has the chicken any doubt that the corn
must be reached after.
62
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Other Questions. — The image upon the retina of
the eye is inverted; and it is asked why objects are
not seen inverted. This is an idle question ; until we
can tell how we become cognizant at all of what is
pictured on the retina, it is not worth while to discuss
the peculiarities of that cognizance.
Having two eyes, why do we not see double ? We
may, if we hold the object very near the eyes, or if
we press one of the eye-balls and throw the axis of
the eye out of its usual position. Ordinarily, nature
has arranged the axes so that the images appear to
coincide.
Some books on Psychology give many pages to the
discussion of these questions; but we think we have
said all about them that needs to be said in a book
on mental science.
CHAPTER VII
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS CONCLUDED
BOUT Hearing. — It has been said that
hearing is the most internal sense. This
is literally true, in that the organ of
hearing is more internal than the organs
or nerves of the other senses. But it
is also true that no other sense has such power to
arouse emotions. A groan will awaken pity in one
who hears, more quickly and more deeply than the
signs of suffering that appeal to the sight.
Sounds have a close connection with emotions not
only in awakening them, but in expressing them, as
well. The language of emotion through sounds is a
natural language ; and it is largely shared by man and
animals in common. It is easy to tell from the cry
of a dog whether he is in pain, or is earnest in the
pursuit of game. The horse knows from the tone of
his driver's voice whether he is frightened, or is calm,
resolute, and self-confident.
Varieties of Sounds. — Sounds differ in pitch and
in power; and the range of difference is very great.
It has been estimated that a trained ear can distin-
guish five hundred variations in pitch, and also five
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64 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
hundred variations in power. If this is so, then two
hundred and fifty thousand different sounds can be
distinguished, taking account only of pitch and power.
But sounds also differ in quality, or timbre. The
sounds of two instruments, — violins, for instance, —
playing the same tune with the same power,. are read-
ily distinguished by their quality. In the same way
we distinguish the voices of different persons, without
regard to pitch or power. From this it will appear
that the " varieties" of sound are almost unlimited.
What is Sound? — Sound is the cognized vibrations
from a sonorous body, conveyed by the air to the auditory
nerve. From this, it will follow that vibrations which
do not affect the auditory nerve and become cog-
nized, do not produce sound. In other words, there
is no sound without a hearing ear.
Sounds Express Emotion and Thought. —We have
seen that natural sounds express emotion; but the
sounds which express thought are artificial, or con-
ventional. Such are the words and sentences of a
human language. But most of our language is in-
tended to express both thought and feeling. Thought
is expressed by the right use of the right words ; but
the feeling is expressed by the tone, pitch, quality, and
inflection of the voice. This is a matter of great im-
portance to the public speaker and the oral reader ;
neither thought nor feeling should be lost.
Do We Hear Direction and Distance ? — Probably
we can judge nothing primarily of direction and dis-
tance, by hearing. But, through long experience, we
learn to judge in these respects, with much accuracy.
This, however, is acquired perception.
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 6$
Taste and Smell. — The varieties of savors and of
odors are very numerous. The odor of the apple
differs much from that of the orange ; and each dif-
fers from that of any other odorous body. Nor
do all apples smell alike, by any means, although all
have the peculiar odor of the apple. The same is
true of savors ; all teas have a common taste, and so
have all wines. But the varieties of these common
tastes are so numerous, and are so closely related to
the quality of the articles, that the great merchants
employ professional tea-tasters and wine-tasters.
Organic and Vital Sensations. — There are sen-
sations which are purely subjective, and have no direct
connection with our perception of the external world.
The organic sensations pertain to the nutritive, cir-
culatory, and other organs of the body. In health,
they are hardly cognizable, except as we have a gen-
eral feeling of comfort ; but, in disease, they are some-
times the source of most acute torment. The vital
sensations, like those of health or sickness, rest or
fatigue, etc. , have much to do with our comfort or dis-
comfort. But, as they afford no means of knowledge
concerning the external world, and as they have little
connection with the mind's operations, except incident-
ally, it does not seem necessary to spend many words
upon them, in a book on mental science.
Some call the power to feel these sensations a sev-
enth sense. Some also regard the power to perceive
heat or cold, as a separate sense ; but it seems hardly
worth while to spend much time on these distinctions.
What is it to Perceive through Sense? — It is
to get direct and immediate knowledge of the external
Psy.— 6.
66 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
world. What we get directly through each sense is
rudimentary and elemental ; but, by combining these
several elements, and by testing what our senses give
us through our power of motion, by acting upon the
external world, we build up our whole fabric of knowl-
edge of the Non-Ego, — so vast, and varied, and useful.
The word " percept " is used with some lack of defi-
niteness. An elemental percept is just that item of
knowledge that one sense gives during its exercise, —
an odor, a sound, etc. But a percept of an object
is the notion we get of that object by our senses, at
the time when we are exercising our senses upon it.
When our senses have ceased to act upon it, the no-
tion that persists or returns is a concept of the object.
Our Perceptions, Intuitive. — Sense-perception
acts intuitively ; that is, it acts immediately, and by
no roundabout method. This is the case with all
direct perception ; of course, the case is different with
what we have called the acquired perceptions.
Let us distinguish three uses of the word " intuitive." Our per-
ceptions are intuitive, as just explained. Our consciousness is
intuitive. Our knowledge of the ideas and truths given us by
the Intuitive Power, is intuitive.
THE QUALITIES OF BODIES
Two Divisions. — Through sense-perception, we
become acquainted with the qualities of bodies. But
there are some differences in those qualities which a
book on mental science must notice. The qualities
of bodies are broadly divisible into two classes, called
Primary and Secondary. The first are necessary to our
conception of matter; the second are not.
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 67
Their distinctive characteristics may be given in
three corresponding statements, as follows:
The Primary qualities are: (i) Necessary to our
conception of the existence of matter; (2) They are
known without experience ; (3) We may conceive of
them as belonging to empty space, — as existing, even
if no body should exhibit them.
The Secondary qualities are: (1) Not necessary to
our conception of the existence of matter; (2) They
are known by experience only ; (3) They can not be
conceived as existing apart from some body to exhibit
them ; that is, we can not think that they do or can
exist with no body to exhibit them: but we can in
thought draw them away from that body; this we
do in the process of abstraction.
Examples of Primary qualities are extension and
divisibility ; examples of Secondary qualities are hard-
ness, odor, color, etc. If we are told that a body
exists in the moon, we know it must have extension
and divisibility, but we know nothing of its Second-
ary qualities.
Primary Qualities. — The Primary qualities are
extension, impenetrability, size, divisibility, incom-
pressibility, shape, situation, mobility. Some writers
add others. We can not think of matter as not pos-
sessing these qualities, because our ideas of these
qualities grow out of two necessary conditions of our
conception of matter.
Two Conditions. — These conditions are: (1) Every
body must occupy space; (2) No body occupies all
space. If matter, or body, must occupy space, then
it must have extension, for that is the property by
68
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
virtue of which it occupies space. If a body occupy
space, no other body can occupy the same space;
hence, impenetrability.
Observe that the word " occupy," means to Jill Xo the exclu-
sion of everything else.
If a body occupy space, — that is, if it is not a mere
point, — it must have size. If it have size, half of it,
will have half the size, and so on; that is, it can be
divided, or is divisible. If it must occupy space, it
can not be compressed so as to occupy no space, —
it is incompressible. If a body occupy space, but
does not occupy all space, then it must have limits;
hence, figure, or shape. If a body occupy space, but
does not occupy all space, then it must have a place
in space, or situation. If it does not occupy all space,
then it may be moved into the space it does not oc-
cupy ; hence, it has mobility.
A Further Division. — The Secondary qualities
may be divided into two classes, called Mechanical
and Physiological. Weight, hardness, toughness, etc. ,
are examples of the mechanical qualities; and odor,
color, savor, etc., are examples of the physiological
qualities. The first have a real existence as stick, in
the body, whether any one shall deal with them through
sense or not. The second have no existence as such in
the body, — they belong only to our subjective expe-
rience. For instance, what we call sourness in an ap-
ple, is the name of a peculiar affection of the gustatory
nerve when we taste it, the name of an effect pro-
duced on our physiological system. Hence, the qual-
ity is called a physiological quality. We may make a
similar remark about odor, color, sound, heat, etc.
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 69
It is usually difficult for the young learner to realize that the
physiological qualities have no existence as such outside of our
organism. But a little careful attention will make the matter
clear, so that it will not seem strange for one to say that, strictly
speaking, bodies have no color, nor odor, nor taste, nor sound,
nor heat.
An Unknown Something. — Of course, there is
some quality in the body which produces that effect
on one's nervous system that we call color, taste, etc. ;
but that something is not known to us : at least, we do
not conceive it to be the same thing as the subjective
effect that we call taste, color, etc. The name we
use is properly the name of the effect of an unknown
quality on ourselves, and not the name of the quality
itself. But, as the quality is unknown, and as its effect
on us is constant, we usually give the same name to
the quality and to its subjective effect. Hence, we
say, "The apple is sour," instead of saying, "The
apple possesses that unknown quality which produces
the effect on us that we call sourness."
Another Division. — Sir William Hamilton divides the qual-
ities of bodies into Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary.
His Primary is the same as ours ; his Secundo-primary and
Secondary correspond respectively to our mechanical and
physiological. We prefer the division we have given.
Can we Trust our Senses? — There have been
philosophers who taught that all which sense gives
us is purely subjective, and that we have no ground
for believing that there is anything in the outer world
that corresponds to these affections of sense ; in fact,
that we have no sure ground for believing that there
is any outside world to be known.
In answer to this, it may be said that we have no
70 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
other guides but our senses, that if we use them wisely
we get on very well, and that these very philosophers,
in all the common affairs of life, use and trust their
senses just like other folk.
Apparent Deceptions. — But certain cases are often
cited, in which our senses are said to deceive us.
1. An oar partly in the water appears to be broken,,
an object viewed in the mirror seems to be behind
the mirror, a sound seems to come from a direction
the opposite of the real one, the mirage in the desert
misleads the traveler, etc.
2. Again, it is said that in disease we experience
sensations that are known to have no real outward
cause. We hear ringings in the ears, we feel prick-
ings in the flesh, we see strange forms and colors that
belong to nothing outward, etc. One suffering from
delirium tremens sees snakes and demons; one in a
fever sees ghosts and apparitions, etc.
3. Again, we are told that men differ in their judg-
ment as to some qualities; what one calls sour, an-
other calls sweet. One will assert that a color is blue
while another pronounces it green, etc.
Explanation. — Now, all apparent deceptions of
the senses can be thrown into three classes, as those
cited above are grouped in the numbered paragraphs.
It may be said of the first group that there is no false
report of the senses, — they report just as they would
if things were as they seem to be. The rays come to
the eye as they would if the stick were broken, if the
object were behind the glass, etc. The reason for
these misleading movements which the senses report,
is to be sought in Natural Philosophy. Moreover, we
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 7 1
can correct the apparent deception by further use of
the senses themselves; we can remove the oar from
the water, or remove the water from the oar, and
sight will correct itself.
All the trouble in the cases in the second group
arises from a disordered organism. And, surely, we
must not hold the healthy sense responsible for the
errors and weaknesses arising from a diseased organ.
The differences indicated in the third group are all
in respect to physiological qualities of bodies. As
all that we know about such qualities is the effect
they produce on the nervous organism, and as nerv-
ous organisms are not all alike, it is not strange that
men should differ as to tastes, sounds, colors, etc.
Still it will be noticed that the great mass agree in
respect to these qualities; hence, we must suppose
that, when one differs from the generality, his organ-
ism is in some way peculiar.
There are some so-called deceptions of sense that are pure
hallucinations ; the trouble is wholly in the mind, and not at
all in the senses. For instance, the moon near the horizon
seems broader than when on the meridian; but it is easily-
shown by actual measurement that the eye really shows it
broader when on the meridian, — the trouble is wholly in our
interpretation of what the eye gives us.
Theories of Perception. — There is an inscrutable
mystery in the relations of mind and matter. We
may study the nervous system, we may observe how
objects affect or stimulate the nerves, we may trace
this affection from the extremities to the organ of the
sense, or to the brain, we may even determine the
time that elapses from the application of the stimulus
till the effect appears in consciousness ; but when we
7 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
ask how the effect appears in consciousness, we ask a
question that no one can answer, — we have reached
a bridgeless chasm.
When men begin to speculate about that of which
they know nothing, they sometimes reach very queer
conclusions ; and they are likely to be the more dog-
matic the less they know. So men have put forth
very varying theories as to the process of perception.
The principal theories may be shown in a Scheme, as
follows :
—. . ( i. The Natural Realists.*
lneones J
( 2. The Idealists \ ' V» _\„«..-..„ f I. Egoistic.
2. Representative. i VT ° ^ ' . .
^ { 2. Non-Egoistic.
The doctrine of each class of theorists may be
briefly stated as follows :
The Realists believe that there is an outside world,
that we take direct cognizance of it through the
senses, and that it is essentially as the senses report
it to be. They make no attempt to show how we
perceive, — that is, to explain the process.
The Idealists assert that the mind can have no cog-
nizance of anything outside of itself. They divide
into two classes :
The Absolute Idealists assert that we have no evi-
dence that there is an outside world ; and even if we
suppose that there is one, we have no reason to be-
lieve that it really is as it seems to be.
The Representative Idealists assert that there is an
outside world, and that it is truthfully represented in
*The words Idealist and Realist are sometimes used in different senses
from those here defined. But philosophers have taught all the doctrines
here outlined, and some writers have given them the names that we have
found it convenient to use as we have done.
THE PRESENTATIVE POWERS— CONCLUDED 73
the mind ; but that we are cognizant of the represen-
tation only, not of the world itself. But they divide
into two classes, as to the mode of representation.
The Egoistics say that the representation is a mod-
ification of the mind itself.
The Non-Egoistics say that the outside world is
represented by little images, or ' 'ideas," which are
not exactly mind or matter, but which are real, ob-
jective existences; and which, as a sort of go-be-
tween, enter the mind and there represent the objects
of the outside world. This system was probably sug-
gested by Plato's doctrine of Ideas.
Historically, it is probable that the last class arose
first. Attempting to speculate upon something that
no one can understand, and assuming that mind can
take knowledge of nothing outside of itself, they in-
vented the doctrine of the go-betweens, or ideas.
Hence, the name Idealist came to be applied to all
who deny that the mind can know anything about
what is outside of itself.
It is easy to see, however, that, beginning with
this assumption, there is no logical stopping short of
Absolute Idealism, or complete skepticism.
It is said that Dr. Reid of Scotland showed this
inevitable tendency of Idealism towards the absolute
form, and that he answered the assumption of the
Non-Egoistics briefly as follows:
1st. He showed that the doctrine of the little im-
ages or ideas was pure assumption, without a par-
ticle of proof of their existence.
2d. He showed that if it were fully established it
would explain nothing, for it is inconceivable that the
Psy.- 7 .
74 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
images could be neither mind nor matter ; and if they
are mind they can not represent matter; and if they
are matter it is as difficult for the mind to cognize
them as to cognize the matter that they represent.
Many modern philosophers take the ground of the Natural
Realists — do not attempt to explain the process by which mind
knows about matter. Certainly, the facts are more important
for practical purposes than any theories to explain the facts.
Cultivation of the Senses. — There are very few
people whose senses are cultivated as they should be.
The special time for cultivating sense-perception is in
early youth ; most of the work of our Primary Schools
should be in this direction.
Mrs. Barbauld's story, " Eyes and No-eyes," shows very viv-
idly how differently people may use their senses.
What the Teacher Can Do. — As perception is
an immediate, an intuitive, process, the teacher's work
is not direct, but incidental. He can
1st, Arouse an interest in observing objects, among
his pupils ;
2d, He can direct them as to what they should
perceive, can point out the objects to be observed ;
3d, He can explain the meaning of what is per-
ceived, and so deepen the interest, and lead to greater
attention and accuracy.
It is generally urged by all the best writers on Edu-
cation, that the training of the pupil's senses should
be the principal work during the first years of his
education. This training will consist in putting him
to using his senses, and to interpreting properly what
the senses give him.
CHAPTER VIII
THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS MEMORY
HE Representative Powers give us con-
cepts of absent objects, but give them
in two ways ; that is, as they are or
were, and as they might be. When the
concept of the object is as that object is
or was, the mental act is called reproduction. If
you also know that the thing reproduced is a con-
cept of some former mental possession, you recognize
it ; that is, you know it again. These two mental
acts, — Reproduction and Recognition, — make a com-
pleted act called Memory.
Definition. — Memory is that Representative Pozuer
which brings before the mind concepts of absent objects
as they are or were, and recognizes them.
Concepts of anything the mind has ever possessed,
— sights, sounds, tastes, thoughts, feelings, former
concepts, etc., — may thus come before the mind and
be recognized, for memory can bring before us all
these things.
It is probable that a very large share of the concepts that are
really reproductions, are not recognized ; they may seem to us
to be original; often we question when a thing "comes into
(75)
7& ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
the mind," whether it is something that we remember, or is
really a new thing. Not long since, a certain eminent preacher
was accused of plagiarism. It seemed to be clear that he had
used in his sermon whole sentences just as they are to be
found in a book, which he admitted he had read. His de-
fense was that his mind had great tenacity in retaining words,
and that these words were not recognized when they were re-
produced. Whatever the fact may have been, his defense was,
psychologically, a plausible one.
The Word ' ■ Memory. " — We use the word ' 'mem-
ory" in three distinct senses: — First, meaning the power
to remember, as when we say, " He has a good mem-
ory"; second, signifying an act of that power, as
when one says, "My memory of the affair is clear";
third, signifying the product of that power, as when
one says, ■ ' My memories of the occasion are pleasant. "
Remembrance and Recollection. — For the sec-
ond sense here given, remembrance or recollection is
a better word than memory. Remembrance is prop-
erly a generic term, meaning any act of memory ; rec-
ollection is properly specific, meaning an intentional
act of memory. It may be denned as voluntary re-
membrance. The distinction is worth observing.
Conditions of Remembrance. — In order that
there may be an act of memory, there must be first,
a mind capable of remembering; second, that mind
must have had an experience in the past ; third, there
must be a present concept of that past experience ;
fourth, the present concept must be recognized as a
correct representation of that past experience.
The word " experience" is here used with reference to any act
or state of the mind. Of course, we can remember nothing of
which the mind has never had any experience.
THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS— MEMORY 77
Two Elements in Memory. — According to our
definition, an act of memory is twofold. It includes
reproduction and recognition. When a concept of
some former mental possession is before any mind,
the mind may recognize it, or it may not; that is,
it may or may not know it as a concept of a former
mental possession. In the first case, there is a com-
plete act of memory ; in the second, there is only re-
production. It is probable that a large portion of
our reproductions are not recognized. This is often
true, even when we give attention to the matter. We
sometimes say to ourselves or to others, "Is this
thing now in my mind something that I remember,
or is it something new ? "
Time, Place, and Circumstance. — In such a case,
the doubt may be resolved, if we can recall the at-
tendant circumstances of place, time, etc. But it
should be clearly seen that a recognition of time, place,
etc. , is not essential to a recognition of the thing in
question, although it may be helpful to such recogni-
tion in some cases. If we clearly know that the thing
now before the mind is a concept of something that
has been there before, we remember that thing,
whether we also remember the attending circumstances
or not.
Other Opinions. — Some writers regard memory as
including more elements than the two we have named.
One very eminent writer names four elements, as fol-
lows : \ ' Retention, recollection, representation, and
recognition." If we understand him, he uses the
word recognition to mean exactly what it means in
the definition that we have given. And we think
7$ ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
that his two words, recollection and representation, to-
gether, cover no more ground than our single word,
reproductio?i. We might ask, How can a thing be
recollected, how can it be before the mind at all, un-
less it is represented ? The distinction seems to be
founded on no tangible difference.
Meaning of "Retain." — Retention we should re-
gard as a condition of memory, rather than an element
in memory. But, we may ask, What is the exact
meaning of retention ? What do we mean by the
mind's power to retain? Has the mind anything to
do at present with that which is retained but is not
now before consciousness ? It would seem that we
can give no precise meaning to the mind's power to
retain, further than to say that the mind has the power
to bring into consciousness again that which has been
there before, but has now passed out of consciousness.
The mind is said to retain that which it can so re-
call, but it is not easy to see that the mind performs
any action in retaining. We can not understand how
there can be any mental action of which one is un-
conscious ; we are not conscious of what we retain.
A Puzzle. — There is an apparent puzzle in an at-
tempt to recall a thing to mind, which may be pre-
sented in this way. We want to recall a name, for
instance; but, it may be said, "You either know
what you want or you do not ; if you know, it is re-
called already ; if you do not know it, how do you
know what to try to recall?" The puzzle is in the
use of the word ' ' know " ; you do not know the name
at this moment, but you do know enough about it to
know what you want to recall. But what can you do
THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS— MEMORY 79
to recall anything into your mind? Briefly, you can
hold your attention to it, you can seize upon every
available thing connected with it; and, usually, per-
sistent effort in this way will bring the desired result.
Importance of Memory. — A moment's reflection
will convince us that no power of mind is of more
value than memory. Conceive of a mind deprived
of this power — a mind to which that which is past
is lost forever — a mind having power to deal with
nothing but the immediate present. In fact, such a
mind could not deal with the present, properly speak-
ing, for there is something of the past necessary to
all our present thinking. In short, such a mind would
not be at all like the mind we have now, if, indeed,
it could be a mind in any sense.
Belief in What We Remember. — How firmly
may we trust our memories? How confident may
we be in what we remember ? The true answer is
that we may trust our memories in the same way, and
to the same extent, that we may trust our senses.
When we know that our senses are working clearly
and correctly, we trust them, as we may do with safe-
ty ; and in the same way we ought to trust mem-
ory when it works clearly. In fact, this is the way
men do in actual life; cases, even of life and death,
are daily decided in our courts, upon testimony whose
value rests solely upon the trustworthiness of the
memories of the witnesses.
Two Uses of Memory. — It is worthy of note, that
in practical life we have occasion to use memory in
two widely different ways. In one case, we desire to
have it serve us for all time, as when we commit to
80 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
it the multiplication table, the meaning of words, etc.
In the other case, it is our desire that it should serve
only a temporary purpose, as with a lawyer defending
a case in court. While the case is pending, it is im-
portant that he should have all the facts subject to a
ready recall ; but as soon as the case is decided, he
wishes to dismiss it from memory completely, to make
room for the next. A similar use for memory will
often appear in common affairs, as when we wish to
retain the items of an errand till the errand is done,
etc. The trouble with the careless student — the stu-
dent who "crams" — is that he uses his memory for a
temporary purpose, when he should have aimed at a
permanent purpose.
Strong Memory and a Weak Mind. — Because
some people of feeble intellect in general, like "Blind
Tom," for instance, have shown extraordinary powers
of memory, some have been inclined to jump to the
very foolish conclusion, that a mind having a strong
power to remember is likely to be weak in its other
intellectual powers. This is basing a rule on excep-
tions. It would be difficult, we think impossible, to
find in all history a person of strong intellect in gen-
eral, who was markedly deficient in the power of mem-
ory. But it is often remarked of some of the ablest
men the world has known, that they were especially
strong in the power to remember. Many of the
books on mental science give a list of men who pos-
sessed remarkable memories, among the most noted
of whom are Cyrus the Great, Themistocles, the
blind Euler, Napoleon, and others, all men of remark
ably strong intellectual powers.
THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS— MEMORY 8 I
A Panorama of Concepts. — A little reflection will
show us that, in every conscious moment, from the
beginning of intelligent activity till its close, there is
passing "before" the mind, or "through" the mind,
an endless procession of concepts. This is equally
true whether one is day-dreaming or studying, whether
he is in joy or in sorrow, whether he is using his
senses or is reflecting ; it is equally true of the old and
the young, the learned and the ignorant, the good and
the bad. In every mind the endless panorama un-
rolls, the ceaseless procession marches. Stop it we
can not, if we would ; only in profound sleep and un-
consciousness do we retire from our position as spec-
tator, as it were ; but, when we awake, or ' 'come to
ourselves," the tireless movement of varying concepts
is resumed. We may change the order of the march
accidentally or intentionally, we may give more or
less earnest heed to it ; but the march goes on, one
concept follows another in a ceaseless round.
Laws of Suggestion. — Now, do these concepts
succeed each other in a haphazard way; does any
one of them ever get into the procession by chance ?
Or is the order of movement regulated by law; is
there always a cause for one thing being before the
mind rather than another? We believe the answer
clearly is, that there is nothing of chance or hap-haz-
ard about it. If a certain concept is before the mind
at this moment, there is a reason why it is there. It
has followed in the train of some concept that pre-
ceded it, or it has been suggested by some sensation,
percept, emotion, or volition. We may not be able
in every case to determine why any given thing is be-
82 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
fore the mind at any given time; but some good
reason exists, nevertheless. There are no interlopers
in the mental procession ; every concept in the line
is there in obedience to some one or more of the laws
of mental suggestion.
Writers on Psychology have given lists of these
laws of suggestion. They have sometimes called
them "laws of memory," sometimes "laws of asso-
ciation," etc. The better term is "laws of sugges-
tion," inasmuch as they account for the ways in which
concepts are suggested to the mind in general. The
operation of these laws is not confined to things that
have been previously associated, nor to the mind's
working in the act of memory alone. They are gen-
eral laws of mental activity ; they are laws of memory,
but they are more than that.
Primary Laws. — As commonly given, these laws
are four in number :
i . Similarity or resemblance . — Any percept, concept,
emotion, sensation, etc., tends to suggest the concept
of something like it.
2. Contrast. — The sight of a palace may suggest a
hovel ; the snow of winter, a hot day of summer, etc.
3. Contiguity of Time or Place. — Things associated in
time or place are likely to suggest, the one the other.
4. Cause and Effect. — A wound will remind one of
the instrument which caused it, or the sight of a
pistol suggests a thought of the effect it is intended
to produce, etc.
From Aristotle. — Two precepts worth remem-
bering have come down to us from Aristotle. The
first is given in the following words: "Thoughts
THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS—MEMORY 83
which have at any time, recent or remote, stood to
each other in the relation of co-existence or immedi-
ate consecution, do, when severally reproduced, tend
to reproduce each other." The other precept sug-
gests that a less important, or less interesting, thing
is more likely to suggest one more important, or more
interesting, than the reverse. For instance, a knob
will suggest a door sooner than a door the knob ; a
name will suggest its owner sooner than the sight of
a person will suggest his name.
Let the student present numerous examples from his own ex-
perience, illustrating these laws ; and other examples illus-
trating Aristotle's precepts, also.
One Comprehensive Law. — Some writers have
maintained that the four primary laws may be reduced
to one general principle, which may be expressed by
the word "contiguity." Of course, this requires
that we give the word contiguity a very broad mean-
ing, but not broader than its etymology may imply.
Things that touch each other in any way, in fact or in
thought, may suggest each other. Contiguity may
denote all such relations as likeness, contrast, cause
and effect, relative position in time or place, things
and their names, quantity and quality, wholes and
their parts, etc.
Secondary Laws. — Of these there are eight, at
least ; some give more :
1. Continuance of Attention. — The longer and more
earnestly we attend to a matter, the more likely it is
to be suggested to the mind afterwards.
2. Vividness of Feeli?ig. — The more our feelings are
aroused when a matter is before the mind, the more
84 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
readily we recall it. This is true whether the feeling
be one of interest in the thing itself, or simply an ex-
altation of feeling in general.
3. Fi'equency of Repetition. — The more frequently
a thing is called to mind, the more ready it is to come
when called. Every school-boy recognizes this when
he " says his lesson " over and over.
4. Lapse of Time. — Other things being equal, that
which the mind has recently attended to is more easily
recalled than those things which were attended to
long ago.
5. Exchisiveness of Association. — When two things
have always been associated together, one is more
likely to suggest the other than in case each had been
associated with several other things. For instance,
if a certain kind of hat has always been seen on one
person, the sight of that hat, or one like it, will sug-
gest that person sooner than it would if many wore a
hat of the same kind.
6. Original Mental Differences. — Minds differ much
naturally in the readiness with which they observe
suggestions. Besides, some find it comparatively easy
to recall one class of things, and some to recall other
things. One can remember numbers readily ; another,
faces; another, animals, as horses, etc.
7. State of Mind. — Every one knows that the mind
sometimes is much more responsive, both in commit-
ting and in recalling, than at other times. Often this
is due to the condition of the body ; but, frequently,
the cause seems to be wholly mental.
8. Professional Habits. — It is comparatively easy
for any one to remember what belongs to his trade
THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS— MEMORY
85
or profession ; and anything that he observes is very
likely to suggest something pertaining to his daily
business. One can easily guess the business of the
man who exclaimed, on first seeing Niagara, " What a
place to wash sheep!"
Recall numerous illustrations of each of these laws, from
your own experience or observation.
Objective and Subjective. — It will be noticed that
the Primary Laws pertain to the things to be re-
membered, or suggested ; hence, they may be termed
objective: while the Secondary Laws pertain to the
person remembering, or receiving the suggestion;
hence, they are subjective. The law of exclusive as-
sociation seems at first to be an exception ; but if
we reflect that the association is in the mind of the
observer, we shall see that the exception is only
apparent, not real.
CHAPTER IX
MEMORY CONCLUDED
EMORY in the Aged. — It is often said
that memory is one of the first of the
mental powers to fail, especially in recall-
ing names, etc. And yet it is noticeable
that many old people, who can not re-
member the transactions of the last half-hour, can tell
with perfect clearness and fullness of particulars, what
occurred fifty or seventy years before. This seems
to be contradictory of one of the secondary laws of
suggestion ; viz. , that the lapse of time weakens the
power of suggestion. The truth is, however, that this
law is simply outweighed by a combination of two or
three other laws. The old person's senses are dulled ;
they report recent things less clearly. For this and
other reasons, there is less vividness of feeling respect-
ing recent events. Besides, silently, and often orally,
the things of the long past have been frequently re-
viewed, until they have become firmly fixed.
Effects of Disease on Memory. — Usually, dis-
ease weakens memory, as it usually weakens all the
powers of both mind and body. But there are many
instances on record where disease has had the effect
(86)
MEMORY— CONCLUDED 87
of quickening the memory. Stories are told of per-
sons who, after long sickness, when near their deaths,
have spoken and prayed in the language of childhood,
although they had spoken exclusively another language
for many years.
Do We Completely Forget? — Such facts as those
just given suggest the question whether the mind ever
completely loses anything it has once possessed ; and
there are numerous other facts which point in the same
direction. Persons who have come near death, from
drowning and otherwise, have often told that, in what
seemed their last moment, the whole past of their
lives appeared to come before their minds as in a flash.
Every one, probably, has at some time been startled
by the sudden recurrence to memory of something
not thought of for years. These facts have led some
to conclude that nothing is ever completely forgotten ;
but that the "book of remembrance," out of which
man shall finally be judged, is neither more nor less
than the tablets of his own memory. This conclusion
seems to be plausible.
But, whatever may be true as to the possibility that
nothing is forgotten, it is certain that one who lives to
old age will find his life largely sweetened or embit-
tered by the things memory will surely bring before
him ; he is daily making his future self.
Beneficent Law of Memory. — Another curious
fact about memory is worthy of notice. When we re-
call things that were both pleasant and innocent, we
experience a new pleasure, sometimes but little in-
ferior to that of first experience; but when we remem-
ber unpleasant or sorrowful things, if no guilt is con-
88 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
nected with them, they have lost much of their bit-
terness. We sometimes laugh at the remembrance
of that which was anything but laughable in the ex-
perience. Time assuages even our sorrow for dearest
friends. This beneficent law of memory seems to in-
dicate that our Creator intended that this power should
be a source of happiness, and not of pain.
Memory Neglected. — It is often charged that the
cultivation of memory is neglected in modern times.
This is probably true ; in fact, the multiplicity of books
has rendered it less necessary to commit many things
to memory than it once was. Memory serves us now,
if we can remember where a thing may be found in
books, instead of remembering the thing itself. But
we think that in many of our schools, at the present
time, there is a very harmful neglect, even a partial
contempt, of memory. It is probably the reaction
from the abuse which formerly prevailed, when mem-
ory seemed to be almost the only faculty that was used.
The present neglect has gone so far, in many cases,
that pupils of good natural abilities find it next to
impossible to recall anything that they have studied,
readily and exactly. In this matter we think there
should be a reform, and that more should be done
to cultivate memory in our schools.
Cultivating the Memory. — But, how shall we
cultivate memory? Just as we cultivate any other
power, that is, by wise use. If we would cultivate
memory, we must lay demands upon it, and make it
do its work promptly and accurately. This is not dif-
ficult, if it be undertaken at the right time of life.
The child remembers with ease what the man can re-
MEMORY— CONCLUDED 89
member only with the greatest labor. Not only so,
but things learned early in life are held more tena-
ciously. The author remembers with perfect ease
many poems and other compositions which he learned
in childhood, while others committed with much labor
later in life, seem to have disappeared entirely. It is
not very difficult for a child to learn the spelling of
words, the paradigms in grammar, etc., but such work
is drudgery of the hardest sort to the man. Child-
hood, then, is the time for "storing the mind" with
things that will be needed in after life. The work is
then comparatively easy, and it is more lasting.
In order to train the child's memory, he must be
made responsible for its use. He must be held to
remember what he is told in the way of command
and direction, — to remember it exactly y and to ob-
serve it accordingly. He must be held to remember
the instruction given to him, in oral form, as well
as that gained from the book. So tenacious is mem-
ory at this period that it easily seizes and holds mere
words, although they make no appeal to the under-
standing. Here is the root of one of the most glar-
ing evils in our schools, especially with careless and
ill-trained teachers. Mere words are caught and re-
peated by the pupils; and they are glibly recited,
giving an appearance of knowledge when none exists.
Of course, this evil should be avoided ; but the oppo-
site extreme of requiring nothing to be committed in
exact form, is still worse.
Because of the facility with which mere words are
retained at this time, it is not unphilosophical to re-
quire the pupil to commit to memory some useful
Psy.— 8.
gO ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
things which he does not fully understand. The recent
movement in favor of memorizing literary "gems"
is worthy of all commendation. Nor need they be
fully understood at present. Who can not recall some-
thing of this kind, dropped into his memory in his
childhood, that afterwards became a most profitable
subject of rumination?
It is a curious fact that certain defects sometimes become
objects of personal vanity, such as a pale skin, defective eye-
sight requiring spectacles, etc. It is thought by silly young
people to be fashionable, and an evidence of "high-tone," to
have these defects. On this ground we account for the readi-
ness with which many people declare that they are deficient in
the power of memory. Certain it is that no one possesses a
really good mind if his memory is very defective. When stu-
dents have come to the author pleading complacently this de-
fect as a reason for failing to retain their lessons, he has some-
times effectually cut off a repetition of the excuse by fully ac-
cepting it, suggesting, perhaps, that he had long suspected that
their minds were not quite sound !
There is no need to commit unnecessary or useless
things, simply for the sake of exercising the memory.
There is enough that will be of lasting pleasure and
value, for this. Nor is it necessary that the child fully
understand all that he commits to memory. Who does
fully understand?
The mind will ruminate and feed upon that which
it remembers, be it good or bad, wheat or chaff; but
if the memory be well filled with wheat, there is little
room for chaff. And the value of what is good in
the memory will appear more and more, the more
the mind reflects upon it.
Rules for Committing. — In order to commit to
memory successfully, certain rules may be given: —
MEMORY— CONCLUDED 9 1
ist, Lay rigid demands on the memory; make it
do its work, and do it well.
2d, Give close attention to what you wish to re-
member, and examine it carefully.
3d, Thus get a clear conception of the exact thing,
" not something like it nor something about it" — be-
fore any attempt to commit at all is made.
4th, Endeavor to arouse the greatest possible in-
terest in it.
5 th, Observe the ' ' Laws of Suggestion " already
given, on pages 81-85.
6th, Review, Review, Review.
Attention, Interest, Repetition form the key to
ready and exact remembrance.
It may be well for the student who has a lesson to
learn from a text-book, to go over it first, simply to
see that he understands it, making no attempt to com-
mit it. Then let him go over it again, fixing it, slowly
and with all the links of association he can find ; after-
wards, by repetition and reviewing, he will find him-
self master of it, both in sense and in form. He can
recite it clearly, readily, exactly.
Systems of Mnemonics. — Many attempts have
been made to invent artificial systems of memory,
usually called systems of "Mnemonics." Some of
these systems are very ingenious, but all are utterly
zvorthless. Any system that attempts to aid memory
by forced and artificial association only, may be termed
a system of "Mnemonics," such as we have declared
to be worthless ; and they are worthless, from the sim-
ple fact that, by their artificial association, they add a
new element of labor to those necessarily existing.
9 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Devices to Aid Memory. — There are, however,
many devices that can frequently be used, which are
not open to the same objections as the systems of
"Mnemonics." We will mention:
1st, The use of the senses or the muscles. A class
will remember the order of the bodies in the solar
system better if one child stands for the sun, and
others revolve around him at the proper distances, to
represent Mercury, Venus, and the rest. A child will
remember the number three better by taking three
steps, making three jumps, bringing three books, etc.
This is helping memory through the muscles. On
the use of the senses, also, depends the value of charts,
tables, diagrams, genealogical trees, etc.
2d, The use of rhyme and meter. Who has not
recognized the value of
" Thirty days hath September," etc. ?
No doubt many have helped to fix the multiplication
table by singing it. The conjugations of the Latin
verbs are more easily held on account of the jingle,
"bam, has, bat," etc.
3d, The use of short, pithy, comprehensive forms
of speech, such as proverbs and formulae.
4th, Seizing upon any fact of natural association,
however accidental it may be ; as the association of
Bacon's Rebellion in 1676, with the Revolution in
1776, and the Centennial in 1876.
It may be noted, also, that the ' ' Laws of Sugges-
tion," especially the Primary Laws, will furnish many
forms of natural association.
Observations on Memory. — There are, doubtless,
great differences in minds as to their power to remem-
MEMORY— CONCLUDED 93
ber. And yet the absolute amount retained by each,
probably, does not vary so greatly as appears at first
sight. The eminent linguist, historian, or man of
science, carries in his memory a vast amount of matter
pertaining to his specialty; but his mind is likely to
be free from the mass of gossip and triviality which
is retained by his illiterate neighbor. Those who are
wont to complain of their "poor memories," often
show that their memories are fairly well-stored when
exercised upon matters that interest them.
Without doubt, the power to retain can be im-
proved, by thorough practice, both as to the amount
retained and the accuracy and readiness with which
it may be recalled. But, as Mr. Bain suggests, there
is probably in every individual a definite limit to the
power, beyond which no training or effort can carry
him. Mr. Bain also holds that "committing" to
memory consumes more mental force than any other
form of mental activity.
Verbal Memory. — Some minds have great facility
in recalling and reproducing words without any re-
gard to their meaning; this is a characteristic of the
memory of a child, in most cases. The man of
thought and of culture finds such a use of memory
difficult, sometimes almost impossible. He needs to
see the meaning and the logical relations of what he
commits, in order to retain it well. Education should
lead from the childish form of verbal memory to that
of memory by reference to significance and relation.
Committing and Remembering. — Committing is
not remembering, but it is closely related to it. The
success of memory depends very largely upon care
94 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
in committing; hence, the rules for remembering, or
for improving the memory, must include rules for com-
mitting. In general, probably, the mind that commits
with great ease does not retain so well as the mind
that finds more difficulty in committing. Such a mind
is easily "crammed," but does not hold things so well
permanently. ' ' Lightly come, lightly go, " describes
the action.
Nor is that always the best memory that is most
ready in recalling. In general, the memory that holds
mere words is more ready in recalling them than the
memory that retains by an observance of significance
and of logical relations.
Instances of Remarkable Memory. — As a mat-
ter of some interest, we add an account of some per-
sons who are said to have shown remarkable memo-
ries. Some of these stories have been given by many
authors ; we quote from Dr. Brooks :
" Historians, and writers on mental philosophy men-
tion some remarkable examples of the power of mem-
ory. Cyrus, it is said, knew the names of all his of-
ficers, — Pliny says, of all his soldiers. Themistocles
could name every one of the twenty thousand citizens
of Athens. Hortensius, after sitting all day at an auc-
tion, could at night recall every article sold, the pur-
chaser, and the price. Dr. Wallis, while in bed in
the dark, extracted the square root of a number of
fifty-three places to twenty-seven terms, and repeated
the result twenty days afterwards. Euler, blind from
early life, carried in his memory a table of the first six
powers of the series of natural numbers up to one
hundred. Two of his pupils, in calculating a con-
MEMORY— CONCLUDED 95
verging series, found, on reaching the seventeenth
term, that their results differed by a unit at the fiftieth
figure; and to decide the question he made the calcu-
lation mentally, and his result was found to be correct.
"Hamilton tells us that Muretus saw at Padua a
young Corsican, who could repeat thirty-six thousand
names, in the order in which they were given to him,
or repeat them in the reverse order, or begin at any
point in the list and repeat both ways. The cele-
brated Magliabecchi, Librarian of the Grand Duke of
Tuscany, it is said, could name all the authors who
had written upon any subject, giving the name of the
book, the words, and often the page. A gentleman
of Florence, to test his memory, lent him a manu-
script to read, and afterward, pretending to have lost
it, requested him to endeavor to recall it, which he
did with great exactness. It is also stated that upon
being asked by the Grand Duke if he could procure
for him a copy of a certain book, he replied, ' No,
sir, it is impossible ; there is but one in the world :
that is in the Grand Seignior's library at Constanti-
nople, and is the seventh book, on the seventh shelf,
on the right hand as you go in. ' "
CHAPTER X
IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION
EFINITION. Imagination is that Repre-
sentative Power which gives us concepts
of absent objects, not as they are or were,
but as they might be.
Illustrations. — You turn your face towards
a church and notice carefully how it looks ; you are now per-
ceiving it by sight. You turn away, and before your "mind's
eye " stands the same form as clearly as before; the Represent
tative Power has reproduced a concept of what was perceived.
You know that your concept is of the church as it was. So you
recognize the concept, — you remember the building.
You now begin to play with this concept; you replace the
brick with stone; you give it extra towers; you elevate the
spire to twice its present height, etc. You are now conceiving
of the absent object as it might be. Imagination is at work.
The Word "Imagination." — We would remark
that the word "imagination" may be used like the
word ' ' memory, " to signify a power of the mind, or it
may signify an act or a product of that power. The
grand difference between imagination and memory is,
that the latter gives us concepts as wholes which are
true to previous experience, while the former gives
us wholes that correspond, not to fact, but to our
subjective fancy.
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IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 97
The Occupation of Children. — Every one who
is at all familiar with the ways of children, knows
that imagination begins to be active at a very early
age, and that its action, or "play," makes up a large
part of the intellectual activity of a child's life. It is
for the mother and the teacher to accept this fact,
and to be guided by it, instead of foolishly trying to
counteract nature in this respect. There is no end to
the ways in which the imagination of the child may
be used to aid in all his school tasks, as well as in the
training of his will, and in the building of his char-
acter. On this point we know of no more helpful
book than Dr. Jacob Abbott's " Gentle Measures in
Training the Young " ; and yet there is room for other
good books on the same theme.
Will Training. — A word about the use of imagi-
nation as a means of developing the child's freedom
of will. The child is under authority as to his be-
havior ; he is equally under authority in his acquisi-
tion of a knowledge of facts. But in his "play" in
his imaginings, he is his own master, — he is a law unto
himself. In this lies a large part of the charm of all
his play. Let some superior power undertake to dic-
tate how he shall play, and the fun is over. This
consideration shows us why the battered rag baby is
dearer to the little girl than her fine china doll, — she
can do what she pleases with it. When we remem-
ber what a free will is to an adult, it will be seen that
its first unfolding and proper exercise is a thing of no
mean importance.
In What Sense, Creative? — Imagination is often
called a creative faculty, but it is creative in a very
P S y.- 9 .
9^ ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
limited sense only. Sense-perception, through mem-
ory, gives all the original material with which imagi-
nation builds. This material may be used without
modification, or it may be modified and then used ;
but, in either case, the whole that is constructed from
it must differ from any whole that memory gives — it
may be a kind of creation, but only in respect to the
ideal which that whole bodies forth.
Four Forms of Product. — Imagination may be
used in four different ways, to which different names
have been given. It may combine the elements it
uses, in such a way as to give a result that is weird,
unearthly, monstrous, or grotesque ; it is then called
phantasy. It may combine them so as to give a whole
that is light, playful, pleasing, but still showing noth-
ing of high purpose or of noble and cultivated taste ;
it is then called fancy. Again, it may combine them
so as to give a whole that meets the demands of a
high purpose or a noble taste ; this is artistic imagi-
nation. Or, finally, it may combine according to
principles of fact, of science, so that the conception,
when realized in material forms, gives us the steam
engine, the telegraph, the sewing machine, etc. ; this
is inventive imagination. Find illustrations.
What is a Fine Art? — Imagination lies at the
basis of the whole realm of fine art. This is equally
true in poetry, fiction, music, architecture, painting,
sculpture, or any other fine art, if there be another.
There is one aspect — an essential one — in which all
these arts are alike ; viz. , in the completed work, an
ideal of its author is so bodied forth, or symbolized,
that the symbol — poem, novel, anthem, temple, pict-
IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 99
ure, or statue — awakens in the mind of another an
ideal, kindred to that from which it sprung in the
mind of the author.
Let us remark, in passing, that the true work of the teacher
belongs among the fine arts, because it conforms to the essen-
tial of all fine art, in that it attempts to realize an ideal as its
result. But how little of the work done by teachers is thus ar-
tistic or true work !
Uses of Imagination. — All admit that imagination
is important in the realm of art, but some seem to sup-
pose that, outside of art, it serves little or no good
purpose. Some seem even to doubt whether we should
not be better without this power ; but let us name
six very important uses of this power :
i. Pure enjoyment. — To child and man the play of
imagination, both in building its castles and day-dreams
and in responding to the magic touch of others, often
gives great enjoyment ; and when nothing impure or
malicious enters, such enjoyment may be entirely in-
nocent if indulged moderately.
2. Imagination may lighten life's burdens. — A little
boy, walking with his grandfather, complained of being
tired, and asked his grandfather to carry him. ' ' No, "
said the grandfather, ' ' take my gold-headed cane and
make a horse of it." He bestrode the cane, and gal-
loped away happy. Many a weary man at his daily
toil finds his task less heavy when imagination points
to the comforts which that toil may bring to wife or
child. Many a poor, tired mother, as, late at night
she repairs the tattered clothing of her little ones, may
find the task sweetened as she pictures the possible
future of those objects of her care and toil. The teacher
IOO ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
may well imagine what her troublesome little ones
may become. Almost every cloud has its " silver
lining," but imagination must find it.
3. Imagination gives vividness and force to language.
— Without the touch of fancy, and poetry, and illus-
tration — all dependent upon imagination — what a dull
and fruitless thing were language, written or spoken !
On this point, Dr. Haven happily illustrates, by the
language he uses, the very thing he is describing. He
says : ' ' Imagination gives vividness to our concep-
tions, it raises the tone of our entire mental activity,
it adds force to our reasoning, casts the light of fancy
over the somber, plodding steps of judgment, gilds
the recollections of the past and the anticipations of
the future, with a coloring not their own. It lights
up the horizon of thought, as the sunrise flashes along
the mountain tops and lights up the world."
Wit, humor, and illustration would be impossible in
speech or literature without an appeal to Imagination.
4. Imagination is essential to success in some of the
most practical affairs of life. — Without it, the lawyer
could not construct his "theory," the inventor could
not make his discovery, nor the pushing man of busi-
ness plan those "ventures" which result in foreign
commerce, transcontinental railways, and great manu-
factories. In fact, it is not easy to see what enter-
prise, even the simplest, could be conceived or carried
forward without the help of this power.
5 . Imagination makes possible all that Art gives us, both
of enjoyment and of culture, — We have already said
something bearing on this point. As the creation of
works of Art is impossible without imagination, so it
IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CO^NGERTION 1.Q1;
is impossible that they should produce any effect ex-
cept through the imagination of the beholder.
6. Imagination gives the idea of personal excellence
towards which we strive. — This is its highest and no-
blest use. Without such ideals, no progress is pos-
sible. Like the rainbow, ever moving before us as
we follow, they lead on in every path of progress.
When one no longer has before his mind an ideal of
personal excellence towards which he is striving, he
would better die; life is not "worth living" to him.
It is clear, we think, that imagination is not an enemy to its
possessor ; it is not a power to be " crushed out." It is to be
cultivated and put to a good use. In this respect, it is much
like all the other powers of the mind, but hardly any other is
more useful, on the one hand, or more dangerous on the other.
Abuses of Imagination. — For, on the other hand,
there is no mental power whose abuse can work more
mischief. And the abuses lie alongside of the uses.
1. Too great indulgence in the "play" of imagina-
tion wastes time and weakens the mind, even when
nothing impure is indulged in. — This is the danger of
the day-dreamer and the too-ardent lover of fiction.
2. Imagination may add to life's burdens, as it docs
in the case of those zv/io habitually * ' look on the dark
side." — No one works happily when he looks only for
failure or disaster in his work.
3. Imagination leads one astray, if he mistakes the
ideal for the real. — This is the trouble with the wild
dreamer or the "visionary"; his imagination seizes
on the ideal, and he thinks it real. It is, also, the
temptation of the reckless speculator, of the gambler,
and of the "sharper's" dupe.
fCV2
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
4. Vile art and vile imaginings are both the parent
and the product of debased characters. — Nothing is
more harmful, especially to the young. And one of
the saddest things is that, when a mind has been once
polluted in this way, the evil remains even against the
will. Such a person may reform, and come to hate
the vile thing and to shrink from it, and yet be utterly
unable to free his mind wholly from it. If the wound
be healed, the scar and disfigurement remain. Hence,
it is doubly important that the minds of youth should
be protected against corrupting art, literature, and
companionship.
5. As Imagination gives high and holy ideals of char-
acter arid achiwement, so, on the other hand, it may give
those that debase and destivy. — Here is the danger to
boys, of all highly "sensational" literature, — the
"dime novel," the accounts of the exploits of the
"James boys" and of other criminals. Here is the
danger to girls, of the overwrought, sensational novel.
One grows to be like those whom he chooses for his
models, — and he is likely to choose for a model some
one whose character and career he admires.
Special Use to the Teacher.— To the teacher,
imagination may be of special use in three ways, at
least : First, It may help him in imparting knowledge.
How a dull, abstract problem in arithmetic may glow
with interest when imagination has illustrated the dry
relations by a story! What a tone and power are
given to reading, when imagination has prepared the
way ! Second, Imagination may assist greatly in govern-
ing, especially in the case of small children. Let us
refer again to Dr. Abbott's little book, for excellent
IMAGINATION,AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION IO3
illustrations. Third, Successful building of good charac-
ter is not possible without appeal to the imagination.
This follows from what was said of its sixth use.
Culture of Imagination. — The same means, —
viz. , wise use, — serve for the culture of Imagination,
as for the culture of all the other faculties. But the
sort of use must be determined by the constitution
of the individual; here, as everywhere, the teacher
must take account of the individuality of his pupil.
With some, the power needs first to be aroused,
with others, it needs to be repressed ; in all cases
something must be done to refine and chasten it.
For definiteness, we may say that this power may
be cultivated: (i) by observations of nature, (2) by
study of imaginative literature, (3) by exercise in
writing, (4) by study of works of art.
The child's imagination readily enough sees in nat-
ure more than the natural, as in the case of the little
one who wanted to sit on the summer cloud. It is
easy for the loving and skillful mother or teacher to
cultivate this tendency until the common aspects of
nature shall speak to the soul as clearly as to the
sense. The one of whom the poet said,
"A primrose by a river's brim
A yellow primrose was to him;
And it was nothing more,"
had never received such training, we are sure.
A good exercise for boys and girls ' ' in their teens "
is to take some highly imaginative passage in litera-
ture, and attempt to rewrite it, in statements devoid
of all imagination. For this purpose, Dr. Haven
chooses the following lines from Mrs. Welby:
104 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
" The twilight hours like birds flew by,
As lightly and as free ;
Ten thousand stars were in the sky,
Ten thousand in the sea ;
For every wave with dimpled cheek,
That leaped upon the air,
Had caught a star in its embrace,
And held it, trembling, there."
Had the poet said: "It was a quiet, pleasant even-
ing ; there were many stars visible, and each one was
reflected in the sea, which was slightly agitated," it
would seem that all the ideas would have been ex-
pressed in plain prose.
Find other examples in your own reading ; show in what ways
there is an expression of imagination ; then rewrite without
any imaginative expression.
Space will not permit us to take up the study of art ; but
every earnest student, in these times, can find some opportunity
for such study, and some books that will aid him.
CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION
What is It? — It diners from simple memory in
that it strives to give its possessor a whole which is
7ieiv to him, while memory strives to recall his former
possessions only. When one, by means of maps,
models, pictures, and words, seeks to give another a
correct notion of some object in nature that he has
not seen — Niagara, for instance — the appeal is made
to his constructive conception. And if the work is
successfully done, there grows up in his mind a pict-
ure that would be realized were he to go and see the
object for himself.
IMAGINATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION IO5
Mr. Bain says : " It passes above memory, as being an ex-
ercise of constructiveness, and falls below imagination proper,
as containing no originality or invention."
Not Imagination. — This is often spoken of, im-
properly, as the work of imagination ; but, unlike im-
agination, it aims to produce a result which corre-
sponds to fact, and not to fancy. Like imagination,
it builds with material that memory must furnish from
the stores given to it by sense-perception. No de-
scription could ever lead one born blind to conceive
of the colors of a painting or a landscape — he has
never gained a knowledge of them through sense.
Nor would description be any more successful with
one who knew colors in his youth, if he has since be-
come blind, and has lost his memory of colors.
Its Use. — A moment's reflection shows that this
power plays a large part in our intellectual activity ;
by it alone are we able to form just notions, through
description of any kind, of anything beyond our ex-
perience. Our schools should carefully train this
power wisely and systematically.
Unless this power be active, reading becomes dull
and mechanical, geography is a collection of words
without meaning, history is lifeless, mathematics a
mere form, and astronomy, beyond the bare aspect
of the heavens, is impossible. Illustrative apparatus
of any kind has a value just in proportion to the aid
it furnishes to the constructive conception, and no
whit further. By this power only can illustrations il-
lustrate, for it is the nature of an illustration to de-
mand that conception should give the meaning to it;
that is the very purpose for which it is used.
106 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Use, in Relation to Words. — All words that
have any meaning are at first symbols of the concepts
of the one using them ; but, in order that they may
serve any good purpose, they must awaken similar
concepts in him who hears or reads them.
Often the chief difficulty with the student in arith-
metic is that he has not properly construed — conceived
of — the words in which his problem was stated. The
unprofitable work in geography, — - so often and so
justly criticized, by saying that the pupils have learned
mere words, — is due simply to the fact that the pu-
pil's maps and text have failed to awaken the proper
concepts in his mind. The successful student of his-
tory sees, in his " mind's eye," the movement of the
army, as he reads the description in his text. A
large part of the unskillful teacher's effort is wasted in
the fruitless attempt to deal with concepts in the pu-
pil's mind, which have not been correctly built up
from the percepts derived through sense-perception.
Gaining Concepts. — These statements will show
what should be the first aim of the teacher in these
and in other school studies ; viz. , helping the pupil to
gain correct concepts, first from sense-perception, and
then through language. The main purpose of all
"language lessons," as the phrase has come to be
used, should be the just fitting of words to the concepts
for which they stand. The foundation of all right
concepts is laid in sense-perception ; hence, the first
work with the child, — the first work with any one
who takes up a subject in natural science, — should
be the getting of the concepts for future thinking,
through a right use of the senses.
IMAGINATION,AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTION 107
Value of Right Concepts. — It is apparent that
the facts of nature, the words of a speaker or writer,
and all works of art, mean much more to some minds
than they do to others. The difference is due to the
mental preparation of the observer or hearer. An
active mind well furnished with the proper concepts,
which arise in it readily on occasion, will carry away
proportionally more from any speech, book, or ob-
servation of nature.
No flower, book, sermon, or statue can have any'
meaning to one beyond what he is able to put into
it. What we carry to the field or the forest, the
church, library, or picture-gallery, must determine
very largely what we shall bring away.
CHAPTER XI
THE REFLECTIVE POWER, CONCEPTS AND TERMS
TS Forms. — The Reflective Power acts
in several ways ; writers do not agree
fully in respect to their number. We
may safely indicate five of these ways
of acting; viz., Comparing, Abstracting,
Judging, Generalizing, and Reasoning.
By some, the Reflective Power is called the Understanding ;
by others, it is called the Elaborative Faculty.
Because writers on Psychology do not agree as to the exact
number of forms in which the Reflective Power acts, we have
placed the abbreviation " etc." after our list, in the Scheme.
Comparing. — As the Reflective Power deals with
the relations of things, or of the concepts of things,
rather than with the things themselves, it will be ob-
vious that much of its action must be in the form of
comparison. It notes the relations of size, length,
position, density, value, purpose, cause and effect,
agreement, and a multitude of others.
Comparison is clearly involved in abstracting, judging, gen-
eralizing, reasoning, etc. ; hence, some writers regard compari-
son as including all the various forms of the Reflective Power.
Its Products. — The products of the Reflective
Power are concepts and thoughts. A thought is a
(108)
THE REFLECTIVE POWER —CONCEPTS, ETC IOQ
logical judgment. Not all concepts are the product
of the Reflective Power, nor are all judgments. This
power gives us only such concepts as are abstract or
general, and such judgments as are logical. A con-
cept of an object of sense, or of a quality in connec-
tion with its object, is not a product of the Reflective
Power, nor is a primitive judgment, such as is nec-
essary to the cognition of any sensation or perception.
See page 22.
Analysis and Synthesis. — Comparison is the first
step in an act of this power. From comparison, we
may proceed to find the elements of any object of
thought, — this is analysis. Or, we may proceed to
combine certain elements which we judge to belong
together, — this is synthesis. Frequently, both proc-
esses are combined in one operation.
Abstraction. — A concept of a quality is abstract
when that quality is not associated in thought with
any other quality nor with any object to which it be-
longs. Some writers consider the process one of ab-
straction when the attention is directed to one of the
qualities which an object possesses, as when looking
at a rose I fasten my mental activity solely on its
form. But this is not abstraction, — the quality is
not "drawn away" from the object; this is simply
analytic attention.
It is. seen that the process of abstraction is a very
common one, when we observe the large number of
abstract terms which are used even by children and
uncultivated people. This process has sometimes been
illustrated in this way : You look at several objects
having a common color, as a red ribbon, a red book,
HO ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
a red necktie, etc. You note their color in connection
with the other qualities of those objects. You now
perceive the color in the concrete. You turn away or
shut your eyes, and think of what you have just seen ;
you now conceive the color in the concrete. Again,
you drop out of thought all the other qualities of the
several objects, but still think of the color in connec-
tion with each object ; you are now conceiving of the
color in the discrete. Once more all thought of the
object disappears, and you think of the color only,
apart from every object and from all other qualities.
You are now conceiving of redness i?i the abstract, —
that is, drawn away from everything else. It is proba-
ble that some such process as this is often gone through
with by those who have no thought of the peculiar
form of mental activity they are exercising.
Logical Concepts. — These are concepts not of ob-
jects, nor of single abstract qualities, but of a group
or collection of qualities which belong to several objects
in common ; all the objects possessing these common
qualities constitute a class. The expression for any con-
cept is a term. The term for a logical concept is said
to be both abstract and general; it is abstract because
it is not applied to any individual of a class, and it is
general because it may be applied to any individual of
the class. Recall what was said about the terms
"man" and "a man," on page 44.
Steps in Forming Logical Concepts. — One per-
ceives a large number of animals, including horses,
dogs, etc. ; he compares them, noting their resem-
blances and differences. He perceives, for instance,
the particulars in which horses differ from the other
THE REFLECTIVE POWER,— CONCEPTS, ETC I I I
animals ; dropping out the points in which the indi-
vidual horses differ from one another, he selects the
particulars in which they are all alike ; these particu-
lars he withdraws from the individual horses and com-
bines them into a whole, which is a logical concept
expressed by the term "horse." Here we note four
distinct mental operations. The first is attentive per-
ception ; this is no part of the forming of a logical
concept, but is preparatory for it. The next step is
comparison, resulting in a discrimination of resem-
blances and differences. The third step is the process
of abstracting, from the concepts of the individual ob-
jects, — those qualities which they possess in common.
The last, the characteristic, step, is the synthesizing
of these common qualities into one complex concept,
— the logical concept.
Rarely, if ever, does the mind proceed to take these
steps with the logical distinctness which we have sup-
posed ; the operations are more or less involved one
with another. But we need to separate them thus, in
thought, in order that we may see what is really done.
We must distinguish, with much care, the concepts from the
terms which express them, or we fail to mark the distinction
between things and their symbols. The result always is lack
of clearness, or confusion.
Characteristics of Concepts. — An abstract, gen-
eral concept may embrace few elementary concepts ;
in that case, it is said to be " broad," and it may be
individualized in a large number of objects. And
the class to which such a concept may be applied is a
"high" class. Thus, the concept expressed by the
word ' ' man " is broader than the concept expressed by
112 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
the word "Caucasian"; and the class to which it may
be applied is a higher class, and includes more indi-
viduals. So Caucasian is higher than European.
Higher and Lower Classes. — Thus, we see that
broader concepts may be formed from narrower, by
dropping out some of the elementary concepts, or
"marks," which they contain. And the class to
which the broader concept is applied is the higher
class. Thus polygon signifies a broader concept and
a higher class than quadrilateral ; and this is broader
than parallelogram, etc.
Genus and Species. — The higher class is a genus,
of which the next lower class is a species ; and a
class which was species to a genus may become a
genus to a lower species. Thus polygon is a genus
of which quadrilateral is a species ; but quadrilateral
is a genus of which parallelogram is a species.
Clear and Obscure. — A concept is clear when it
is sharply distinguished from every other concept ;
when it is not so distinguished, it is obscure.
Distinct and Confused. — A concept is distinct
when its marks are clearly seen ; thus, A quadrilateral
is a polygon bounded by four straight lines. The
concept denoted by quadrilateral is distinct when we
clearly comprehend the two parts of the above defini-
tion. But the concept is still inadequate, unless we
see clearly all the "marks" denoted by the terms
"polygon" and "four straight lines." Thus, it will
be seen that a concept may be clear, and still be in-
distinct; and it may be both clear and distinct, and
yet be very inadequate.
It should here be noted, that our concepts become
THE REFLECTIVE POWER.—CONCEPTS, ETC I 13
more and more adequate, the more faithfully we study
what is involved in them ; complete knowledge is nec-
essary to a perfectly adequate concept.
Comprehension and Extension of Terms. — The
comprehension of a term relates to the number of ele-
mentary concepts, or "marks," embraced in the con-
cept to which it applies ; thus, the term quadrilateral
has a greater comprehension than the term polygon,
the term European than the term Caucasian, etc.
The extension of a term relates to the number of ob-
jects to which it may be applied, that is, to the
number of individuals belonging to its class ; thus poly-
gon has greater extension than quadrilateral, etc.
The comprehension and extension of a term always
bear an inverse ratio to each other, — the greater the
comprehension, the less the extension, and vice versa.
This distinction between comprehension and extension is
very important, and it should be fully comprehended by the
student. Let him name terms of great comprehension and
little extension, also terms of little comprehension and great
extension. See if you can find a term which has less exten-
sion and greater comprehension than any other, or the reverse.
Notative and Symbolic Terms. — A notative term
signifies, by its form, the marks of the concept to
which it applies; such terms are polygon, quadru-
ped, etc. By a careful study of the literal and exact
meaning of words, many terms which are merely sym-
bolic at first, will become notative.
Absolute and Relative. — A term is relative when
it implies another term to which it is related ; thus,
debtor implies creditor; master implies servant, etc.
An absolute term suggests no other as corresponding
to it ; such terms are sun, corn, etc.
Psy.— 10.
IH ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Positive, Contrary, and Contradictory. — A posi-
tive term may be opposed by a contrary term, or by
a contradictory one. It is very important that these
distinctions be understood. A contradictory denies
the positive merely, but a contrary asserts the oppo-
site of the positive. Thus, the contrary of good is
bad ; but its contradictory is not-good. Often, terms
are used as contrary in sense, when they are merely
contradictory in form. Thus, the term unkind is only
contradictory in form, to kind ; but it is often used to
signify its contrary, cruel. So, unlearned is used to
mean ignorant, unwise, foolish, etc.
It is important to notice that two contradictory
terms always include the universe between them ;
thus, everything is either good or not-good, either
man or not-man, either Ego or Non-Ego, etc. There
is nothing in the world of things or of thought that
can not be put into one or the other of the two classes
denoted by any two contradictories.
Logical Analysis. — This is analyzing a term with
respect to its comprehension, as when we find that
surface is a necessary element of the concept expressed
by the term "polygon."
Logical Division. — This is analyzing a term with
respect to its extension, as when we find that the
quadrilateral is included in the class of figures de-
noted by the term "polygon."
Distribution of a Term. — A term is "distrib-
uted " when it is used in its widest extension ; thus,
"all men," or "every man," is a term distributed, be-
cause it includes every one of the class to which it
may be applied.
THE REFLECTIVE POWER —CONCEPTS, ETC H5
Logical Definition. — In defining a thing logically,
we put it into a class, and then point out the differ-
ence between it and other objects in the same class.
Thus, a quadrilateral is a polygon having four sides.
Here quadrilateral is put into the class "polygon "; it
is then distinguished from other polygons by its hav-
ing four sides. Every such definition, therefore, con-
sists of the generic part, which puts the object into a
class ; and of the specific, which marks it off from oth-
ers of the class. In the given definition, " polygon " is
the generic part, and "having four sides," the specific.
The specific part is called the differentia.
Importance of General Concepts. — Without gen-
eral, or logical, concepts, language would be impos-
sible. Most substantives are general terms, and the
same is true of verbs, adjectives, and adverbs.
Nor would anything like science be possible with-
out the power to classify ; and classification depends
upon the power to form logical concepts, according
to which objects can be arranged in classes.
Progress of Scientific Classification. — In all
the natural sciences there is a marked progress from
a classification that is more or less loose, towards that
which is more truly scientific. This progress results
from a knowledge of deeper and more important char-
acteristics, which are discovered by closer study. In
Zoology, no importance is now attached to such a
class as quadrupeds, for it is found that the fact of
having four feet is not very significant. So, in other
sciences, progress in knowledge often leads to new
classifications on a more scientific basis, — that is, on
distinctions that have a more profound meaning.
IJ 6 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Thus, thought in its progress comes more and more
into harmony with things ; if man shall ever attain
complete knowledge, the harmony will be perfect.
It must be remembered that classes, as such, do
not exist in nature; there are found only individ-
ual objects, with their peculiarities and qualities,
some of which are obvious, but unimportant, while
others may be profoundly significant, but their sig-
nificance appears only after careful study. It is held
by some that these significant peculiarities express the
profound thought of the Creator ; and that classifica-
tion is the more scientific, the more nearly it harmon-
izes with this creative thought.
Generalizing. — According to some writers, the word "gener-
alize" means the forming of logical concepts. Others use the
term to signify scientific classification. It is in the latter sense
that we have used it as designating one form of the Reflect-
ive Power.
Significance of General Terms. — Some have
maintained that there is no such thing as a logical
concept, such as we have defined it; some declare
that general terms, such as "man," are empty of
meaning, — mere names. Those who take this posi-
tion are, therefore, called Nominalists. One branch
of the Nominalists, however, claims that, when the
term is not a mere name, the corresponding concept
is a concept of some individual of the class, which is
a type, or representative, of the class. On the other
hand, some have held that classes have a real, object-
ive existence as such, — that is, that there is a real
thing, not merely a product of thinking, that corre-
sponds to such terms as "man," "horse," etc. Fierce
discussions have been waged over these questions.
THE REFLECTIVE POWER, CONCEPTS, ETC WJ
Answers. — Doubtless, abstract, general terms are
often used as mere words, and sometimes it may be
that a concept of an individual of the class does re-
spond to the term. But many know, from their own
consciousness, that such words do awaken in their
minds concepts that are real, and that are clear, but
which are not concepts of any individual, — which are
not images at all. The Nominalists seem to assume
that there can be no concepts that are not images.
Further, how can an individual represent a class, if
the mind can not conceive of a class for it to repre-
sent? The concept of the class, however, is purely
subjective, — it is a product of the mind; classes, as
such, have no objective existence. Only individuals
exist; no horse can be found that is not "a horse."
The notion of an objective existence that corresponds
to a general term, is kindred to that notion of "ob-
jective ideas," out of which grew the "little images"
of the Non-Egoist (page 73).
■ .-
CHAPTER XII
JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING
UDGING. — In forming a logical judg-
ment, or thought, the mind holds be-
fore itself two concepts, or a concept
and a percept, and decides that these
do, or do not, agree ; the concepts may
be simple or very complex. You bring before your
mind a concept of the thing called snozv, and a con-
cept of the quality whiteness ; you decide that they
agree, and you say, "Snow is white." You bring
before your mind a concept of the act called murder,
and a concept of the quality tightness; you decide
that they do not agree, and you say, " Murder is not
right. " Every judgment, then, involves two concepts,
and the decision respecting them.
Proposition. — The expression of a judgment is a
proposition.
This definition is often expressed in a false form by
saying, "A proposition is a judgment expressed. " We
deny that a- proposition is a judgment expressed or
unexpressed ; the judgment is the thing, the propo-
sition is its symbol. Here, as everywhere, the teacher
can not afford to confound a thing and its symbol.
(.18)
JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION , AN D REASONING I 1 Q
As a judgment involves three things, so a proposi-
tion must have three parts; these we call subject, at-
tribute, and copula. The subject is the word or words
denoting the principal concept; the attribute is the
word or words denoting the related concept ; and the
copula is the word or words expressing the decision.
Both copula and attribute may be expressed by a single
word, as in the proposition, Water flows. The sub-
ject and the attribute are the terms of the proposition.
In this relation of judgment and proposition is the
foundation of all grammar. All complete language is
in the form of propositions; hence, every kind of
mental activity results in a kind of judgment ; if it
were not so, all language would not take this form.
Sense-perception is a form of judgment called a prim-
itive judgment (page 22). Only such a judgment as
we have defined above results from reflection.
Kinds of Propositions. — Every proposition must
contain two terms, a subject and an attribute. With
the same two terms, four different propositions may
be made.
By the quantity of a proposition, we mean its char-
acter as universal or particular ; if its subject is dis-
tributed, it is universal, otherwise it is particular.
By the quality of a proposition, we mean its char-
acter as affirmative or negative ; this is determined by
its copula.
With the same two terms, then, we may make a
universal affirmative proposition, as, All A is B. This
proposition is symbolized by the letter A.
We may also make a universal negative, as, No A
is B ; this is represented by the letter E.
120 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
We may make a particular affirmative proposition,
as, Some A is B ; this is represented by I.
Finally, we may make a particular negative, as, Some
A is not B ; this is represented by O.
Distribution of Terms. — In a universal proposi-
tion, the subject is distributed, for this is what marks
it as universal ; the subject is not distributed in a par-
ticular proposition. Every negative proposition dis-
tributes the attribute, for every part of the attribute
must be denied of the subject.
Opposition. — Any two of the four propositions made
with the same terms are in opposition ; but different
names are applied, according as the propositions differ
in quantity or quality, or both.
The different forms of opposition are clearly shown
and named in the accompanying fig-
A CONTRARIES E
-SUB-CONTRARIES —
I, the particular, corresponding to
A, is called its subaltern ; O is the
subaltern of E.
Laws of Opposition. — Universal and Particular. —
If the universal is true, its subaltern is true. If the
particular is false, its universal is false.
Contraries. — Two contraries can not both be true;
both may be false.
Sub- Contraries. — Two sub-contraries can not both
be false ; both may be true.
Contradictories. — Of two contradictories, one is al-
ways true, and one is false.
Let the student be prepared to give the reasons for these
laws. Let him take two terms, make the four propositions,
A E I O, with them, and illustrate the Laws.
JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING I 2 I
Conversion of Propositions. — A proposition is
said to be converted when its terms are exchanged.
The original proposition is then called the convertend ;
the new proposition is called the converse. The con-
version is improper unless the converse is a logical
inference from the convertend. This is the rule of
conversion : No term must be distributed in the converse
that was not distributed in the convertend.
There are three kinds of conversion ; viz., Simple,
by Limitation, by Negation. In simple conversion,
the terms are exchanged without modifying them. In
conversion by limitation, the quantity of the proposi-
tion is changed from universal to particular. In con-
version by negation, the quality is first changed from
negative to affirmative, by removing the negative par-
ticle from the copula and joining it to the attribute:
then the terms are exchanged by simple conversion.
How Converted. — A is converted by limitation.
The attribute of A is not distributed ; hence, it can
not become the subject of a universal, therefore A
must be converted into I. Example: All birds have
wings; converted, it becomes, Some (creatures) hav-
ing wings are birds.
E is converted simply, into E. For, as it is uni-
versal and negative, both its terms are distributed.
Example: No men are dogs; converted, it becomes,
No dogs are men.
A substitutive proposition may be converted simply,
also; for both of its terms. have the same comprehen-
sion and extension ; any logical definition is an example
of a substitutive proposition.
I is converted simply, into I. For, as it is particu-
Psy.— ii.
122 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
lar and affirmative, neither of its terms is distributed.
Example: Some sheep are black; converted, it be-
comes, Some black (creatures) are sheep.
O is converted by negation; it is first changed to
its equivalent I, and then that is converted, simply.
Example: Some trees are not oaks, is first changed to
the equivalent I as follows : Some trees are not-oalcs ;
then, by simple conversion, it becomes, Some (things)
not-oaks are trees. If you recall what was said about
contradictory terms, such as oaks and not-oaks, you
will readily understand how O may be thus changed
to its equivalent I (see page 1 14, second paragraph).
Every tree must be oak or not-oak.
If the student will carefully reflect upon these Laws of Oppo-
sition and Laws of Conversion, he will soon see that he can not
make the simplest assertion of any kind without, at the same
time, saying several other things by logical inference. For in-
stance, if one asserts A, he asserts its subaltern, and denies E
and O in the same breath ; if he asserts O, and in so doing
speaks falsely, then A and I must be true, and E must be
false. Every proposition asserts its converse.
REASONING
Inference and Reasoning. — One truth may be
drawn from another by inference ; as, when the truth
of one proposition is seen, the falsity of its contradict-
ory may be known by inference ; or when an animal
is found having no eyes, it may be inferred that such
an animal can not see.
But true reasoning establishes a relation between two
concepts, through a comparison of each with a third ;
thus, A equals B, and B equals C ; hence, A equals C.
JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING I 23
The Syllogism. — When a process of reasoning is
reduced to a systematic form, it appears as a syllogism,
or a chain of syllogisms.
Not that all reasoning is put into the syllogistic
form ; in fact, it is not generally in this form. But
all reasoning may be put into the form of a syllogism ;
and this it is well to do, when we would test its va-
lidity. A syllogism consists of three propositions so
related that one necessarily follows from the other two.
Of course, as a syllogism contains three proposi-
tions, it must contain six terms. But, as each term
appears twice in the syllogism, only three separate
terms are used ; they are known as major, minor, and
middle terms.
The major term is the attribute of the conclusion;
the minor term is the subject of the conclusion; the
middle term is the one with which the other two terms
are compared, — it does not appear in the conclusion.
The major premise compares the major term with
the middle ; the minor premise compares the minor
term with the middle.
The order of the propositions in a syllogism is im-
material ; any one of them may occupy the first, sec-
ond, or third place. For instance:
Socrates is a man ;
Therefore he is mortal,
For all men are mortal;
Or, All men are mortal ;
Therefore, Socrates is mortal,
Because he is a man, etc.
Two Kinds of Syllogisms. — By one process of
reasoning, we derive a particular truth from a general
124 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
truth ; this process is called deduction. It is based upon
the principle that what is true of a whole, is also true
of its constituent parts.
The formula for a deductive syllogism is this : a is
b y c is a; therefore c is b.
By another process of reasoning, we derive a general
truth from several particular truths; this process is
called induction. It is based upon the principle that
what is true of the constituent parts, is true of the whole.
The formula for induction is this: a, b, c, etc., are
x ; a, b, c, etc., represent y; therefore y is x.
These abstract formulas should be thoroughly learned; and
then, in any given case, the student should fix the value of
each term, and then fill the syllogism.
The Deductive Syllogism. — Taking the M stock"
example to illustrate the deductive syllogism, let a
equal man ; let b equal mortality or certainty of death ;
let c equal Socrates. Our abstract syllogism now be-
comes,
All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man ;
Hence, Socrates is mortal.
Such a syllogism is made in this way : We take the
logical concept denoted by the term ' ' man, "and we find
by logical analysis that mortality is one of the ' ' marks "
or elements of that concept ; hence, we make the first
statement. By logical division, we find that Socrates
is one of the class to whom the term " man " applies ;
hence, we make the second statement. From these
two statements, we derive the conclusion, on the prin-
ciple already stated, that what is true of the whole is
true of each constituent part.
JUDGMENT, PROPOSITION, AND REASONING 125
When a Conclusion May Be Trusted. — Before
a conclusion can be trusted, we must be sure of two
things : First, we must be certain that our premises
are true ; Second, we must be sure that the conclusion
necessarily follows from the premises. The syllogism
itself gives us no power to test the truth of the prem-
ises ; this must be done in some other way. But the
validity or conclusiveness of the syllogism must be
determined by observing whether it conforms to all
the " Laws of the Syllogism."
Not all syllogisms are sound or valid, as we shall
see by a study of the Laws of the Syllogism. Every
conclusive syllogism is sound; that is, the soundness
or validity of a syllogism depends solely on its conclu-
siveness. But, if the premises are one or both false,
the conclusion from a sound syllogism is untrustworthy ;
it may be true or false ; our reasoning gives us no ground
of knowledge as to its truth, although we may be sure
that our syllogism is valid. For instance, take this:
Every tyrant is a good man ;
Washington was a tyrant ;
Therefore, Washington was a good man.
Here we know, from other sources, that the conclusion
is true ; we also know that the syllogism is valid. But,
as the premises are false, the truth of the conclusion
does not follow from our reasoning at all.
CHAPTER XIII
REASONING, CONCLUDED
2p3F£jAWS of the Syllogism. — In order that
we may determine the validity of a syl-
logism, the following laws are given :
i. The Middle Teiin Distributed. — The
middle term must be distributed, in one
of the premises, at least. Otherwise, the major term
may be compared with one part of the middle, and
the minor with another part, and so no conclusion
follows. Example :
Oaks are trees ;
Maples are trees ;
Therefore, oaks are maples.
2. The Middle Term Unequivocal. — If the middle
term is equivocal, it may have one meaning in one
premise and another meaning in the other, in which
case it would be no true middle, but such in appear-
ance only. Example:
All light bodies are easily lifted ;
The sun is a light body ;
Hence, the sun is easily lifted.
3. Distribution in the Conclusion. — No term must be
distributed in the conclusion that was not distributed
(126)
REASONING— CONCLUDED 127
in the premise. Otherwise, the conclusion would as-
sert more than the premises would warrant. Example :
All birds breathe air ;
No dog is a bird ;
Hence, no dog breathes air.
4. Affirmative Premises. — If both premises are af-
firmative, only an affirmative conclusion can be drawn.
For the premises have asserted agreement of minor
and major terms with the middle ; hence, the conclu-
sion must assert agreement between major and minor
terms, if it assert anything.
5. Negative Premises. — If both premises are nega-
tive, there is no conclusion. For the premises having
asserted, merely, that both the minor and the major
terms do not agree with the middle, of course we
know nothing about their agreement with each other,
from such assertion.
6. Negative Conclusion. — A negative conclusion re-
quires one negative premise. For the agreement of
one term of the conclusion with the middle term must
have been asserted, and the non-agreement of the
other, in order that we may assert their non-agree-
ment with each other in the conclusion.
7. Particular Prentises. — If both premises are par-
ticular, there is no conclusion. If both are 7, there
is no conclusion, by Law I, If both are 0, there is
no conclusion, by Law 5. If one is I and the other
0, then the conclusion, if any, must be negative, by
Law 6. But this negative conclusion would distrib-
ute at least one term ; by Law 3, this term must be
distributed in the premise; and by Law 1, the mid-
128 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
die term must be distributed ; this would require the
distribution of two terms in the premises, which is
impossible if the premises are / and 0.
8. Universal Conclusion. — In order that the conclu-
sion may be universal, both premises must be universal.
If the conclusion be A, both premises must be affirma-
tive, by Law 4 ; the conclusion A distributes one
term; hence, two terms must be distributed in the
premises ; these affirmative premises must both be A,
in order to distribute the terms.
If the conclusion be E, both of its terms are distrib-
uted ; hence, three terms must be distributed in the
premises ; but, as one premise must be affirmative, by
Law 5, no premises but A and E will distribute three
terms. Therefore both premises must be universal,
in order to have any universal conclusion.
The Inductive Syllogism. — Returning to the ab-
stract inductive syllogism, let us give value to its
terms, and then fill the syllogism.
Let a, b, c, etc., stand for all bodies whose ex-
pansibility we have tested ; let x stand for the quality
of expansibility by heat ; let y stand for all bodies,
including a, b, c, etc. Then the syllogism will read :
All bodies, as iron, lead, etc., that I have tried as
to their expansibility by heat, are expanded by heat.
But these bodies represent all bodies; hence, all
bodies are expanded by heat.
The word " represent" here must be taken to mean
just like, in respect to the tJii?ig in question.
It will be noticed that the first premise states the
result of observations ; the second premise states an
assumption. Hence, the first premise may be false,
REASONING— CONCLUDED I 2Q
if our observations have not been carefully made ; and
we can never be absolutely sure that the assumption in
the second premise is not false. The only possibility
of absolute certainty in the second premise would be
to make a, b, c, etc., equal to y, that is, to try the
experiment with every one of the class. But in
that case there would be no induction at all; the
conclusion would be identical with the first premise,
and both would merely state a truth discovered by
observation.
We do Trust the Assumption. — Although we
can never be absolutely certain that the several cases
examined do represent the class, in the sense in which
we have defined the word " represent " as used in an
induction, yet the human mind is so constituted that
we do constantly trust this assumption, and make our
inductions. And, in many cases, we find it perfectly
safe to do so. Most of the laws of Natural Science
are established by induction.
For instance, the law that all horned and cloven-footed ani-
mals ruminate, that all metals are expanded by heat, that all
magnets attract iron, etc. Let the student see if he can take
the abstract formula for induction, and so fill the terms as to
make these inductions.
The conclusion of an induction may become the
major premise for a deduction. For instance :
All horned and cloven-footed animals ruminate ;
The cow is a horned and cloven-footed animal ;
Hence, the cow ruminates.
The major premise of a deduction is usually the result
of an induction; or it is a necessaiy truth, to be de-
fined hereafter.
13° ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Not Always Safe to Do So. — But some induc-
tions are found to be false, because the assumption of
the meaning of "represent" is unwarranted. Some-
times the reason is that not enough cases are exam-
ined before the assumption is made ; then the induc-
tion is said to be too narrow. Sometimes circum-
stances prevent us from examining such cases as would
show the falsity of the assumption. It is said that a
traveler from a cold country once told the King of
Siam some very strange and improbable stories about
things in his own country. However, the King be-
lieved all that he said until the traveler told him that
sometimes in his country water became hard like a
rock. This was too much for the King's credence.
Why did he reject it? Because he had made an in-
duction with which it was in conflict.
Many superstitions, as that Friday is an unlucky
day, Thirteen is an unlucky number, etc. , and many
of the so-called "signs," as that a certain position of
the horns of the new moon indicates a wet month,
are the result of careless or false inductions.
Let the student see if he can put the King of Siam's induction,
or any of the others, into the formula.
The Enthymeme. — An argument in which one of
the premises is suppressed, is called an enthymeme.
This is often done in the deductive argument; and
usually the suppressed premise is the major, — it may
be supposed to be so well understood as to need no
statement. Four pencils cost twelve cents because one
pencil costs three cents, is an enthymeme of this kind,
the suppressed premise being that four pencils cost
four times as many cents as one pencil.
REASONING— CONCLUDED I 3 I
Often an enthymeme which seems plausible will be
seen to be faulty if the suppressed premise is supplied.
For instance, some one shows you that a certain habit
or opinion is working great evil among men, therefore
he urges that it is your duty to give your whole time
and energy to the overthrow of this habit or opin-
ion. His argument is an enthymeme, the suppressed
premise being that it is your duty to give your whole
time and energy to the overthrow of bad habits and
opinions among your fellows. A sophistical advocate
will sometimes put his argument in the form of an
enthymeme purposely, because the statement of the
suppressed premise would show the misleading nature
of his argument.
Hypothetical Reasoning. — This is'of two forms,
conditional and disjunctive, represented as follows :
If A is B, C is D; but A can be shown to be B;
hence, C is D; or, Either A is B, or C is D; but it
can be shown that A is not B; hence, C is D. These
are not, properly, forms of reasoning at all, because
there is no middle term ; they are, rather, forms for
drawing an immediate inference.
Let the student be careful that he does not assume that, in
the first of these cases, Cis not D, when it can be shown that
A is noti?/ the condition gives no ground for this conclusion.
Nor does it follow, in the hypothetical form, that C is not D,
when A is found to be B.
Two Kinds of Truth. — There are two kinds of
truth; viz. , necessary and contingent. Necessary truth
is independent of time and place ; and its contradict-
ory is unthinkable or absurd. Such truths belong
mostly to Mathematics and Logic (page 48).
I3 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Contingent truth is no less truth than the other, but
it is dependent on time, place, and circumstance ; nor
is its contradictory unthinkable. Napoleon was Em-
peror of France, is a contingent truth ; so is the truth
that The Nile flows northward. " The sum of the three
angles of a triangle equals tzvo right angles, is a neces-
sary truth.
Two Kinds of Reasoning. — Reasoning upon nec-
essary truth is, demonstrative reasoning ; reasoning upon
contingent truth is probable reasoning. It is not meant,
however, that probable reasoning may not lead to re-
sults that are just as certain as those reached by de-
monstrative reasoning. But the results of demonstra-
tive reasoning are always certain, or they are worth-
less ; while the results of probable reasoning may range
from certainty down to the barest possibility.
Demonstrative Argument, Peculiar. — Demon-
strative arguments have two peculiar characteristics:
First, every argument is perfect, or it is worthless ;
Second, one conclusive argument is as good as an-
other, and one is as good as a thousand. It is not meant
that all arguments are equally neat, or concise, or in-
genious ; but an argument is conclusive, or it has
no force ; and all conclusive arguments are equally
strong, and one is sufficient.
Direct and Indirect Demonstration. — In demonstra-
tive reasoning, there are two modes of procedure ;
one shows the truth of a proposition directly, and
the other shows its truth by proving that no in-
consistent proposition can be true. For instance,
if a geometer wants to prove that the line a is equal
to the line b, he may be able to show that each is
REASONING— CONCLUDED 133
equal to the line c y and hence they are equal to each
other ; this is direct reasoning. Or, he may show
that if he supposes a to be either longer or shorter
than b, such a supposition will lead to an absurdity.
If, therefore, a can not be longer nor shorter than b,
they must be equal in length ; this reasoning is indi-
rect. Both are equally conclusive.
Probable Reasoning. — Reasoning concerning con-
tingent truth is probable reasoning. In this kind of
reasoning, different arguments may carry different de-
grees of weight, and the more arguments tending to
the same conclusion, the stronger becomes our confi-
dence in the truth of that conclusion. Sometimes
we may trust the conclusion as implicitly as we trust
the result of a mathematical demonstration. From
this certainty, the degree of probability established by
this kind of reasoning may diminish to a conclusion
that is simply possible.
The sources of evidence in probable reasoning are
three ; viz. , Testimony, Observation or Experience, and
Analogy.
Testimony. — It is natural for men to put confidence
in the testimony of others ; and it is reasonable to do
so. For men tell the truth much oftener than they
tell falsehoods ; if it were not so, society could not
be held together. Even the worst liars speak the
truth more than they lie.
Weighing Testimony. — Nevertheless, men do often
tell untruths, sometimes by mistake, and sometimes
from purpose; hence, it becomes us to weigh testi-
mony. The value of testimony is determined by the
following considerations : The number of the witnesses,
134 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
their competence, and their honesty, the independence
of their statements, the degree in which their state-
ments concur, and the question whether the witnesses
have any motive to falsify. All these points must
be taken into account in deciding how fully we are to
receive what is told us. Nor must the one who weighs
testimony forget that if he has any bias in his own
mind, any leaning towards one side rather than the
other, he is likely to be misled; he is in danger of
receiving too readily that testimony which accords
with his bias, and of unreasonably rejecting the testi-
mony opposed to it.
Degree of Probability. — We must believe, if we
are reasonable, what rests upon the testimony of a
sufficient number of competent, honest, independent,
concurrent witnesses. It is said that an eminent math-
ematician has demonstrated that a sufficient amount
of such testimony should cause us to believe any story,
no matter how improbable it may be ; in other words,
it is mathematically more improbable that a certain
amount of such testimony should be false than any
possible improbability in the story told.
Fact and Inference. — A careful distinction, how-
ever, must be made between the testimony of a wit-
ness as to fact,s.nd the statement of his inferences from
that fact. If a sufficient number of witnesses say that
they have seen a ghost in a grave-yard, we are bound
to believe that they have seen something; but that
does not bind us to receive their inference that it was
a ghost. Witnesses in court are often cautioned to state
only facts, and not their opinions concerning those facts,
— to tell what they know, not what they think.
REASONING— CONCLUDED I 3 5
A few years ago, a story was started that a farmer in eastern
Illinois, being in his field one day, cursed the Almighty, be-
cause of the drought or something else; and that he was struck
dead, and his body stood there for days after, with a constant
stream of fire issuing from his mouth and nostrils. It was said
that many different persons had seen the body standing thus.
Now, should we be justified in believing such a story? Un-
doubtedly we should believe the story as to the body, if it was
supported by sufficient evidence ; but that would not oblige us
to believe the inference that the man's death was a judgment
inflicted by the Almighty, for his blasphemy.
Observation or Experience. — The evidence of
our own senses is observation, and it may be trusted
under fair conditions. But we are guided in respect
to the present and the future, largely by knowledge
derived from past experience. This knowledge is al-
most entirely in the form of inductions which we have
made from that experience ; and often they have al-
most the force of intuitions.
Analogy. — By analogy we mean the inference that,
because two things are alike in certain particulars,
therefore they are alike in some other particular. Of
course, the more known points of resemblance, the
stronger the analogy. But analogy is very untrust-
worthy as an argument when taken alone ; joined to
other arguments, it strengthens the case more or less.
For instance, our observation that some of the other
planets are flattened at the poles, adds to the force
of other arguments for believing that the earth is
flattened at the poles.
Analogy as a Defense. — But, while analogy weighs
but little in support of a proposition, it may be a most
powerful instrument in destroying the argument of an
36
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
opponent. For instance, if the opponent has built up
a plausible argument in support of a certain position,
and we can make another argument just like it, but
which leads to a palpably false conclusion, we have
destroyed the force of his argument. The original
question remains as it was before.
Example. — Some years ago, a skeptical writer con-
structed a famous argument to show that the miracles
of the New Testament are incredible. He was an-
swered by an argument precisely similar, showing that
it is incredible that such a man as Napoleon Bona-
parte ever lived.
Much of what we have said here concerning the Reflective
Power, strictly belongs to Logic ; but it claims a place in Psy-
chology because it has to do with the necessary action of the
human mind.
ifl'*?r*5Tl<x}'\2 < £
CHAPTER XIV
THE SENSIBILITY, GENERAL STATEMENTS
NTER ACTION of Powers. — The hu-
man being is a unit. We may divide
Man's powers into physical and psychic-
al ; again, we may divide the latter in-
to Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, — we
may subdivide still further. In thought, we may dis-
tinguish these different activities and states ; some-
times, in fact, one or more of them may be especially
prominent, while the others are comparatively quiet or
unnoticed. But after all, it is the one Ego, the one
indivisible human being, that knows and feels and
acts, — body and mind both concerned in it all. And
each of the powers and susceptibilities interacts with
all the rest, and influences them all.
Studying, in different chapters and under different
heads, the several powers, susceptibilities, and activi-
ties of man, there is danger that we shall forget or
overlook his unity, and the interdependence and in-
teraction of all with each, and of each with all. So,
as we take up the study of the Sensibility, we must
remember that we have not passed over into a foreign
realm, independent of the one we have left, and un-
Psy.— 12. (137)
138 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
connected with it. We have simply brought under
consideration another part of the same mind's activi-
ties and susceptibilities, blended in actual life with all
the rest, — acting upon them all and modified by their
action in return. ' ' The action of the soul in feeling
depends more or less upon its action in knowing and
willing ; its action in knowing depends on its action
in feeling and willing ; and its action in willing de-
pends on its action in feeling and knowing."
The teacher, especially the young and inexperienced teacher,
is in great danger of forgetting the essential unity of the child,
— unity in all his bodily powers and capacities, together with
all the distinct but dependent capacities and activities of his
mind. Only as all are duly regarded in their relation to one
another and to the sum total which makes the individual pupil,
can education be truly symmetrical.
Not Definable. — We can not define Sensibility,
or Feeling in general. Professor Bowne says: "We
can only identify and name it." It is one of the
primary things in human experience, — easily distin-
guished from all others by its subject, readily ex-
pressed by tone, sign, or word. But, as in the case
of all first things, we have nothing simpler on which
we can frame a definition. We know when we feel,
we distinguish the peculiarities of the experience ; but
that is the end of it, — we can not define it.
Nor is there any certain test by which we can be
absolutely sure that the experience is the same to
others that it is to ourselves, although there are many
reasons for inferring that it is so. Least of all, is
there any sure measure of the relative intensity of our
feelings as compared with those of others. Nothing
THE SENSIBILITY,— GENERAL STATEMENTS 139
seems more certain than that many who are the most
vehement in expressing their feelings, are most shallow
in their experience of them.
Sensibility Begins Where? — The lowest form of
Sensibility is found in what we have known as a sen-
sation, that is, a cognized affection of the nerves ;
but it must be kept in mind that the nerves do not
feel, the mind feels through the nerves. No matter
how great the stimulus to the nerves, if the mind is
not affected by it, there is no sensation. Hence,
what is sometimes called physical feeling is really a
psychical affection. And it is quite certain that the
first movements of mental activity in the babe begin
in the cognition of these nervous affections. From
this lowest form of Sensibility, its range extends to
the highest flights of sublimity, duty, and adoration.
We have noted that all our terms in Psychology are borrowed
from sense ; notice such terms as tasteful, loathsome, disgust-
ing, sweet, fragrant, insipid, etc. All have a secondary mean-
ing which has no reference to sense, although all are borrowed
from sense. Again, conscience is said to prick us, or to buffet
us ; joy elates us ; grief depresses us ; love warms us, etc. We
use the term "warmth" to apply to fullness of feeling in general;
and coldness signifies lack of feeling. From the lower forms
of Sensibility, then, we borrow terms for the higher.
Two Classes. — In a very true sense, any move-
ment or form of Sensibility is psychical ; but it is
easy to draw a distinction between two well-marked
forms. The first is the feeling that arises solely from
the condition or functions of the nerves of the body,
as in the sensations. This we may call physical feel-
ing ; and it* is the ground of a large part of our com-
fort or discomfort.
14° ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
The feelings which have a purely mental source are
much more numerous and important. These do not
arise from the organic functions, but from some ' 'con-
ception or mental state." Such are psychical feelings
proper ; but it may be observed that physical sensa-
tions may be their remote cause, as when the hearing
of a noble piece of music gives rise to exalted emo-
tions. We must note, however, that in proper
psychical feeling some act of the intellect is the immedi-
ate cause. We feel sorrow, or joy, or anger, or pity,
because of something we know, or think we know. The
feeling of the ludicrous arises from the juxtaposition
of incongruous concepts ; take away the concepts, and
the feeling passes. If one insult us never so grossly,
we feel no anger if he speak in an unknown tongue,
— there is no act of the intellect to give rise to anger.
All Feeling, Pleasurable or Painful. — Dr.
Haven says : ' ' One general distinction lies at the out-
set, patent and obvious, running through all the forms
and modes of Sensibility; namely, the difference of
agreeable and disagreeable." The quality of pleasure
or pain may exist in almost infinite degrees ; some
feelings may even partake of both characteristics.
But perhaps we can not conceive of any feeling that
should be strictly indifferent ; as Dr. Haven says :
* ' The state of indifference is not an exercise of Sen-
sibility, but a simple want of it, as the very name de-
notes by which we most appropriately express this
state of mind, i. e., apathy" Professor Bowne says:
1 * We might define feeling as the state of consciousness
which consists in some form of pleasure or pain, like
or dislike, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Of course
THE SENSIBILITY— GENERAL STATEMENTS H 1
this is not a definition, but only an identification.
What the terms mean can be known only in experi-
ence."
We may notice that painful feelings — fear, dread, suffering,
are always costly ; they diminish the vigor and efficiency of the
mind. Hence, such feelings should be used, or appealed to,
as motives only when nothing better can be done. This fact
has an important'bearing in reference to a government by force
and punishment.
Source of all Joy and Sorrow. — It is not in
knowing or willing that we find our happiness or un-
happiness, our pleasure or our pain ; these belong to
our feelings alone, or rather, they are our feelings.
For, as has been said, all feeling has one or the other
of these characteristics, which are not found any-
where else. To be sure, the feeling may arise in con-
sequence of knowing or willing in a certain way ; but
the joy or sorrow, the pleasure or the pain, is not in
the knowing or the willing. For this reason, it may
even be said that feeling is more vital to us, concerns
us more, as it were, than any other form of mental
state or movement. So far as our personal interest is
involved, it may perhaps be said that the chief reason
why we should know rightly, and choose and act
rightly, is because in that way alone we shall secure
to ourselves a feeling of happiness. Neither know-
ing nor willing has come to fruition as to its subject
till it has been followed by the appropriate feeling.
Motives to Action. — Not only are our feelings the
source, or seat, of all our happiness or unhappiness,
but they furnish the motives in view of which we choose
and act. "The springs of human action lie here.
Here we find the motives which set the busy world
H 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
in action, the causes which go to make men what they
are in the busy and everchanging scene of life's great
drama." It seems possible that knowledge alone
might lead us to will and to act ; but it seems certain
that it never does. It is only when desire or aversion
has arisen in consequence of what we know, that there
is anything affecting the will, soliciting it to act.
Many know well enough in respect to right behavior,
whose feelings in respect to the right are too slug-
gish to urge the will effectually.
Professor Bowne says: "The desires and their opposites
form the transition from knowing to willing. In knowing and
feeling, we have the conditions of desire ; and in desire we
have the condition of proper volition. Our feelings and inter-
ests are the deepest things in us. Will and understanding
have no significance except as instruments of this throbbing
and aspiring sensitive life."
In common language, "the heart" is the term to express the
sum total of our feelings ; hence, we see the philosophic cor-
rectness of the Wise Man when he says, " Keep thy heart with
all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life."
Close Relation to the Body. — The relation of
the Sensibility to the body, if we may say so, is more
intimate than that of the intellect or the will. Its lowest
form arises simply from the affections of the nerves.
In their reaction, our feelings have an astonishing ef-
fect on the vital functions of the organism. Shame
reddens the cheek, joy quickens the pulse, fear some-
times paralyzes the muscles. Not unfrequently ex-
cessive feeling has been fatal in its results.
We have noted before, that nearly or quite all
forms of mental activity have an appropriate bodily
expression ; but, while this is true, it will be found
THE SENSIBILITY— GENERAL STATEMENTS 143
that the bodily expression of the feelings is far more
striking than any expression of the intellect or the
will. Many of the bodily expressions of feeling are
common to man and brute.
Expression and Repression. — A feeling is often
induced, or at least intensified, by indulging in its ex-
pression. Hence the wisdom of restraining the ex-
pression of unlovely feelings. One may not be able
to overcome his anger at once; but it will help him
to do so, if he refrains from showing the feeling. De-
sirable feelings, on the other hand, may be induced
or strengthened by their free expression.
However, sad and depressing feelings are sometimes
prolonged if their expression is repressed; while a full
expression is found to be a relief. This is seen in the
benefit sometimes found in a " good cry." The tend-
ency to deepen a feeling by restraining its expression
is also seen in the case of one moved to mirth in a
place where laughter would be unseemly. In such a
case, that is sometimes found to be irresistibly funny,
which in other circumstances would be only slightly
diverting. Teachers will generally do better to let
pupils indulge in a reasonable laugh when there is any
cause for it, instead of trying wholly to suppress it.
Sensibility and Intellect. — We have seen that
cognition is necessary to the lowest form of physical
feeling ; also, we have seen that knowledge, or a move-
ment of the intellect, is a necessary condition for the
higher forms of psychical feeling. On the other hand,
the intellect does its best work only when it is favored
by helpful feeling. Conditions of bodily comfort, in-
terest in what is attempted, a buoyant and hopeful
144 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
frame of mind, are necessary to the best accomplish-
ment of any intellectual task. Such work is greatly
aided, also, by love for one whom it will please, or
by the hope of applause or reward. All these and
similar facts have great significance for the teacher.
In order, however, that feeling should be helpful to
intellect, it must be moderate in degree ; a mind per-
turbed by feeling of any kind can not think well. In
such a case, Intellect and Sensibility may be said to
be opposed to each other, or to ' ' exist in an inverse
ratio." It is sometimes said that the highest intel-
lectual power is not found in persons susceptible to
the most intense feeling. Probably, however, the
opposite is generally true ; the great intellect and the
keen sensibility usually go together, but such persons
are rarely the most demonstrative of their feelings.
Temperaments. — Much has been written, both in
ancient and in modern times, about the so-called tem-
peraments. Not a little of what has been said is
purely fanciful ; but marked differences do exist among
men in those respects which the word has been used
to designate. The word itself seems to refer to the
tempering of the man by the proportionate blending
of the several parts which go to make up his nature
or disposition. These differences of temperament are
seen conspicuously in the feelings.
Many names have been applied to the different tem-
peraments ; but perhaps the most common are : First,
the bilious or choleric ; Second, the sanguine or nerv-
ous ; Third, the melancholic ; and Fourth, the phleg-
matic or lymphatic. There are certain physical char-
acteristics which are said to indicate these different
THE SENSIBILITY— GENERAL STATEMENTS H5
temperaments ; and these are accompanied by cor-
responding mental characteristics. It is said that com-
paratively few pure and unmixed types of tempera-
ment exist; but that in most people two or more
types are blended.
We have not space to dwell on this topic, concerning which
there is much confusion ; but it appears to be worth mention,
because it is clear to every observer that differences do exist in
human constitutions, corresponding more or less fully to what
these names of the temperaments have been held to express.
And any one who has to attempt the management of human
beings would do well to remember that different temperaments
require different treatment. Hence, this is a matter worthy of
the careful attention of the teacher.
Moods. — Every one who has observed much of
his own mental states, or those of others, knows that
they are not uniform. At one time he feels a special
tendency to be joyful, at another to be sad. No ap-
parent reason may be known; like Antonio, he may
have to say, "I know not why I am so sad. " He may
be in a jubilant frame of mind, or in a peaceful, se-
rene state, with just as little knowledge of the cause.
Doubtless, in many cases the mood depends upon the
physical condition ; but often no complete reason can
be found here.
Some people are much more subject to varying
moods than others; but probably no one is wholly
free from their influence. A teacher should recognize
this fact, and watch with great care both his own
moods and those of his pupils. In this way, very
much friction may be avoided, and fewer causes for
subsequent regret will arise.
Psy.— 13.
CHAPTER XV
SPECIFIC FEELINGS
NALYSIS, Not Exhaustive. — A recent
writer says : ' ' The doctrine of the feel-
ings is the most confused part of Psy-
chology, and has been least developed."
One reason is that the subject itself is
very complex ; the feelings are many and of many
kinds, and they are intermingled almost inextricably.
It would be difficult to make a complete list of them,
and much more difficult to make a complete classifi-
cation, if the list were made.
One attempt to classify the feelings results as fol-
lows : First, the Ego-feelings ; Second, the social feel-
ings ; Third, the impersonal feelings, — embracing the
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The ground
of this classification is clear enough ; but it would be
very difficult to arrange all the feelings properly under
these heads. We shall not attempt an exhaustive
analysis nor a complete list, still less, a perfect classi-
fication. We shall speak only of such of the feelings
as it concerns the teacher especially to regard.
The Usual Classification. — The feelings are com-
monly divided into three classes ; viz. , Emotions, Af-
(i 4 6)
SPECIFIC FEELINGS 147
fectionSy and Desires. The emotions are simple feel-
ings, as comfort, joy, etc. The affections are feelings
that go out towards an object, as love, etc. The de-
sires go out towards an object with the wish of pos-
session, as a desire for food, money, etc.
Each of these classes has its two poles, as they may
be called; the emotions range from bliss, joy, happi-
ness, down to sadness, sorrow, misery. The affec-
tions extend from profound love to the deepest hate ;
and the desires, from a passionate wish to possess, to
a mortal aversion or dread.
In each class, too, there is the feeling that results
immediately from sense, and the higher feelings based
on ideality, knowledge, or thought. We experience
the satisfaction that attends the simple gratification of
any of the senses, and the delight that follows the
contemplation of beauty, truth, and goodness. Love
reaches from the low plane of a mere liking for some
object of bodily appetite, to the most absorbing love
for the Highest. Desire may have for its object some-
thing that will gratify a bodily craving, — perhaps a
base one, — or it may earnestly seek the best good of
others, or the perfection of one's own personal char-
acter in its noblest form.
Affections and Desires. — The affections are often
classified as benevolent or malevolent ; but this seems
to be a bad use of terms. We have noticed the two
poles of the affections, which may be named, compre-
hensively, love and hate ; but love does not necessa-
rily and always imply good will, or goodness in any
form : so there may be a hate which is entirely proper,
and has no mixture of ill-will.
14^ ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
There is a logical order in this arrangement of the
three classes of feelings; enjoyment, preference, de-
sire, — these words express the natural order of the
movement of the feelings. That which gives us pleas-
ure, we come to like ; and we desire to possess it
more fully. Hence, desire is a secondary feeling, in
that it is preceded by another feeling, enjoyment,
or liking re-enforced by the knowledge of previous
experience. One would not be expected to desire
anything which he has never experienced as a gratifi-
cation, or source of enjoyment ; but often imagination
may be found in place of actual experience, as leading
to desire. In this way we can explain why desire,
not seldom, turns to its opposite, aversion, after the
object of desire has been gained.
Passions. — When the affections or the desires be-
come violent, taking possession of the mind, as it
were, spurning the control of reason and conscience,
they are called passions. The exhibition of passion
does not betoken strength, as it is sometimes supposed ;
the passionate man is not the strong man, but the suf-
fering man, as the word ''passion" clearly implies.
Motives. — In the form of affection or desire, the
Sensibility furnishes the motives, soliciting the will to
act in conformity with the feeling. In this fact lies
the great importance of a knowledge and control of
the feelings, both in one who wishes to shape his own
conduct aright, and in one who wishes to influence or
guide the conduct of others.
Work of the Teacher. — The teacher's success
or failure in the most valuable part of his work will
be largely determined by his power or weakness in
SPECIFIC FEELINGS 149
dealing with the sensibility of his pupils, — not solely,
nor chiefly, in dealing with their intellect, as many
seem to think. The Sensibility, as we have seen, is
the seat of happiness or its opposite ; here, also, mo-
tives to action are found, and from motives and actions,
character results. Intellectual success, too, is impos-
sible unless the Sensibility is enlisted in behalf of the
work attempted. No child is likely to make much
progress in a study which he thoroughly dislikes, es-
pecially if he dislike his teacher at the same time.
Even the mature man finds his intellect will work with
redoubled power and success when the glow of emo-
tion accompanies its action.
We will now note some of the forms of Sensibility
that demand the teacher's careful attention. (See
Scheme, page 28).
Love of Self. — This is a feeling altogether natural
and proper. St. Paul says: "No man ever yet hated
his own flesh" ; nor is it his duty to do so, notwith-
standing all that is truly said in decrying selfishness.
For true self-love is not selfishness. Selfishness is
either a regard for self to the injury of the rights or
the feelings of others, or it is the purblind wish to
gratify some present personal desire at the expense
of personal good in the future. In either case, it is
opposed to the truest self-love. We hear much of
the virtue of self-denial ; it is a virtue of a noble kind,
when some present demand for self is denied, in order
for a higher good, either for self or for others. But,
in itself alone, self-denial is no virtue ; there is no
merit in mere self-tormenting. An appeal to self-love,
then, is entirely proper, whether the purpose be phi-
15° ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
lanthropic, or the acquisition of some worthy good for
one's self. Self-love, rightly viewed and directed, is
a powerful aid in building a desirable character.
Love of Others. — Genuine love for others, — even
unworthy persons, or animals, — is one of the noblest
virtues ; and it is significant that the M Golden Rule "
makes self-love the measure of love for others.
Love of Country. — In a greater or less degree,
a love of country seems to be natural to every nor-
mally constituted human being ; and, strangely enough,
it is often exceptionally strong in those whose native
land would have few attractions for a stranger. There
are abundant reasons why this feeling should be es-
pecially strong in the people of our country; and
there are special reasons why our young people should
be carefully taught to do well their part in promoting
the well-being of our country, for under our institu-
tions the well-being of the country depends upon the
right actions of its citizens.
Love of Beauty, Truth, and Right. — The first
of these lies at the foundation of all aesthetic culture ;
the second, at the foundation of all right thinking ; and
the third, at the foundation of all right behavior.
Hence, to the teachers of the young, all these feelings
appeal for development and guidance ; nor can teachers
do more important work.
Training the Pupil's Love. — The child's love for
good things, for his fellows, and for his teacher, must
be carefully trained and strengthened. Here is a
worthy field for the power of the teacher with the
wisest head and the noblest heart. But it is no place
for pretense or sham ; all work here must be genuine.
SPECIFIC FEELINGS 15 I
If you wish to arouse a child's love for anything, or
for any person, your efforts will be successful only as
you show a genuine love in the same direction. If
you wish to awaken the child's love for yourself, ex-
pect it only in return for genuine love for him. Stage
smiles and honeyed words, with no heart back of
them, will not serve. It is easier to deceive a grown
person than a child in this respect. In the old poem,
the child says :
" I do not love thee, Doctor Fell ;
The reason why, I can not tell."
No doubt, there was a good reason which the child
fclt y although she could not tell it. And we think
that an equally good reason generally exists for the
child's personal likes and dislikes.
But perhaps some teacher is ready to say : ' ' Well,
it is of no use; I never did love children, and I can
not; at least, I can not love uninteresting and dis-
agreeable children." Then, we say, you ought to do
one of two things: either set about acquiring this
power at once, or forever forego any attempt to teach
children. One of the surest ways to develop a love
for any person or thing is to make that person or
thing the object of your special care, interest, and ef-
fort. If persistence in such a course will not beget a
love for its object, we think the case is hopeless.
The Feeling of Hate. — But the child's capacity
to hate or dislike needs attention, as well as its oppo-
site. We remember with what earnestness and effect
an old associate of ours used to say to his pupils,
" Boys, hate mean tilings." That they have not been
trained to hate mean things is the trouble of to-day
IS 2 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
with too many of our boys, and girls as well. But
the child should be carefully shown that the hatred
of mean things must not be allowed to pass over into
a hatred of the persons who do them. He should be
taught that hatred towards persons is never right.
The Appetites. — Such desires as are bodily crav-
ings, we commonly call appetites. Little ever needs to
be done to strengthen them ; but young people need
careful training as to their regulation and control. We
believe these appetites are given us, not only for the
purpose of sustaining life and propagating the race,
but that they are intended to be a source of inno-
cent enjoyment, — as they are always found to be when-
ever they are not abused.
Desire of Society. — This is a very strong pro-
pensity; it is often called an instinctive feeling, and
this seems reasonable when we reflect that most ani-
mals share it with man. But it is more than an in-
stinct, for the more a person grows in knowledge,
the more he realizes both the necessity and the pleas-
ure of companionship. But, because of the moment-
ous interests and influences that inevitably pertain to
society, pupils need special care and instruction that
they may both receive and impart nothing but good in
their social relations.
Desire of Power. — This desire seems to be uni-
versal. And, when properly guarded and controlled,
it is most fruitful in usefulness and happiness, although
its abuse may lead to the gravest evils.
Desire of Approbation. — Much the same may be
said of the desire of approbation that was said of the
desire of power; and, because both its use and its
SPECIFIC FEELINGS 153
danger are so great, the teacher needs to use all his
wisdom and tact in dealing with it.
Curiosity. — This feeling is a compound of a desire
for novelty and a desire for knowledge. Both these
desires are proper to a well-constituted mind, and
both are combined in what we call curiosity, although
their relative proportions vary in different cases. Not
unfrequently, the pupil's curiosity is the teacher's
greatest annoyance ; but it should be his greatest friend
and helper. Woe to the unwise teacher who attempts
to crush it, instead of stimulating and directing it. In
every true sense, such a teacher is a complete and
predestined failure, whatever literary or scholarly qual-
ifications he may possess.
Hope and Dread. — Hope is compounded of de-
sire and some degree of expectation ; while its oppo-
site, dread, is a compound of aversion and expecta-
tion. Hope and dread maintain a kind of warfare,
perhaps in nearly all minds; but, in some minds, hope
seems to be generally in the ascendant, while dread
is quite as predominant in others. The result is a
radical difference as to the happiness or unhappiness
of the individuals; and at the same time it is a cause
of great difference in their power and usefulness. Both
these feelings are powerful motives to action ; but one
is buoyant and helpful in its influence, while the other
has a depressing effect. Remember that dread or
fear is a painful feeling, and that all pain is costly.
Interest. — This word is not easy to define, but it
is seldom misunderstood. It always involves a more
or less conscious recognition of some relation to self.
Interest is essential to the best success of any mental
154 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
effort ; and, other things being equal, that is always
the best teacher who can best arouse, hold, and direct
the interest of his pupils.
Admiration. — The word "admiration" was formerly
nearly synonymous with wonder. It retains some-
thing of the same meaning still, but there is added to
wonder a feeling of approbation, as well. As we now
use the word, we admire that which seems to us won-
derful and pleasing at the same time.
The child's power of admiration, and his tendency
to admire, demand careful attention. Owing to the
activity of imagination in children, the persons that
seem to them admirable are thought to be perfect.
Children are born hero-worshipers. And the things
that they admire are likely to be thought ' ' altogether
lovely." There is a psychological reason why, in the
vocabulary of young persons, " splendid " and " hor-
rid " exhaust the list of descriptive adjectives so often.
Now, because admiration always contains the element
of approval, it is easy to see that one's character is
indicated by the persons and things he admires ; not
only is his present character indicated in this way, but
his future character is largely determined as well. In
the admiration that boys conceive for the characters
depicted in the robbers and Indian killers of the
wretched "dime" literature of the day, lies the chief
danger of the poisonous stuff. And the young girl's
admiration of the vain, vapid character of the heroine
in the trashy novel she reads, is likely to work lasting
injury to her, for the same reason. There is little
danger threatening the character of any young per-
son whose admiration is thoroughly fixed only on
SPECIFIC FEELINGS 155
such people as are noble, and such things as are
"pure, honest, lovely, and of good report."
Reverence. — By reverence, we mean a profound
regard for what is great or good, or both. When the
feeling becomes intense, we call it veneration.
There is special need in this country, and in this
age, that the reverence of children should be culti-
vated and thoroughly trained. In the abounding life
and freedom of this new country, we seem to forget,
to a great extent, that there is anything to be treated
with reverence and respect. And it is a serious ques-
tion whether this tendency is not on the increase.
Much of the flippant nonsense in our newspapers that
passes for wit, would lose all its point if the irreverence
were taken out of it. And the children and youth are
not slow to imitate the example of their elders. The
"old man," or M the governor," is the boy's frequent
appellation for his father, nor does the "old woman"
signify the mother much less frequently. Similar dis-
respectful terms are ready to apply to men and women
who, by age, or character, or position, should be
treated with special respect.
The reverent attitude of mind or speech, towards
God or man, seems to be very unpopular just now.
This fact does not augur well for the future of our
people ; and the best efforts of our schools should be
turned to its correction.
Sympathy. — This word literally means fellow-feel-
ing, or feeling with another. It is often mistakenly
used as synonymous with pity; nor is commiseration
much nearer to its meaning. For, by sympathy, we
may enter into any feeling which another has.
156 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Like the desire for society, sympathy is both in-
stinctive and rational ; in its lower forms, it is possessed
by the brutes. Young children are especially suscept-
ible to sympathy; and it is an element so essential to
successful dealing with them that one who wholly lacks
it may as well make no attempt to teach or to guide
them. Nor does it cease to be very important to any
one who attempts to teach or to guide, no matter what
age or class he may work with. One with quick sym-
pathies can readily "put himself in another's place,"
— a thing that must always be done before the most
efficient help can be given.
The heart that will not respond to real sympathy
in any of its exhibitions, is rarely found ; its possessor
lacks an almost essential element of humanity. Through
the magic power of sympathy, the show of any feel-
ing is likely to be met by a similar feeling in the be-
holder. No teacher should fail to recognize, at all
times, this grand principle of human nature : That the
exhibition of any feeling is likely to awaken the same
feeling in another.
CHAPTER XVI
CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY
OT Well Defined. — Few topics have
been discussed more than conscience, and
its relation to life and conduct ; but the
discussions are rarely or never clear and
consistent. The difficulty seems to be
the want of a clear and consistent definition of con-
science,— a definition in which all will agree, and to
which all will adhere.
Mr. Bain would make conscience only the recogni-
tion of the claims of custom and law ; he says : ' ' Duty
is the line chalked out by public authority or law,
and indicated by penalty or punishment." Others
seem to regard conscience as the everpresent and in-
fallible voice of God in every human soul, both in-
structing and urging in regard to duty. However,
such a conception is usually intimated in a vague and
loose way, rather than clearly stated. In fact, we have
observed that vague and loose statements about con-
science seem to be the rule, even with writers of ability.
An Instance. — A celebrated writer on education
says : " Conscience, that inherent, instinctive sense of
right and wrong." What does he mean? Does he
(157)
158 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
mean the intuitive notion that there is such a distinc-
tion as right and wrong? But is that conscience?
Does he mean an inherent, instinctive sense which
knows right from wrong in every case? Is there such
a sense ? If so, why do conscientious men differ re-
specting right and wrong? Does he mean a feeling
of personal obligation, or oi/ghtness, in regard to the
choice between right and wrong ? Or, does he mean
two or more of these, or something different from
any one of them? In fine, is there evidence that he
had any clear meaning to express?
A Feeling. — Amid all the clashing opinions of psy-
chologists, there is almost universal agreement in teach-
ing that mental activity has the three distinct forms
of knowing, feeling, and willing; and that these are
all. Now, in which class shall we put that form of
activity called conscience ? We unhesitatingly put it
among the feelings, and restrict it to the feelings. It
is certain that in every act of conscience as treated by
any writer, a feeling is involved. We believe that
feeling to be all that should receive the name of con-
science. If, however, one chooses to make the term
cover the intellectual action that goes with the feeling,
the question is simply one of terminology. But we
think obscurity is the consequence.
Definition. — We offer the following definition:
Conscience is that feeling which prompts us to do what
zve believe to be right, and to shun what zve believe to be
wrong; which commends us when we obey it, and con-
demns us when we disobey it.
This definition contains all that we think should be
covered by the term ''conscience"; and, if it were gen-
CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 159
erally accepted and adhered to, it would settle many-
disputes, and simplify others.
The definition indicates a double act of conscience,
— an act of prompting before a choice is made, or a
volition is put forth ; and an act of commendation or
condemnation following the choice or volition. Does
not every rational human being recognize in his own
consciousness a feeling that acts thus ? This feeling we
mean by the term " conscience," and we mean noth-
ing more nor less by the word.
Relation to Judgment. — Like every other rational
feeling, conscience requires an intellectual basis; a ra-
tional feeling arises in consequence of something we
know, or think we know ; that is, a judgment always
precedes a rational feeling and forms its basis. The
judgment that gives rise to the feeling of conscience
is a judgment that a certain thing is right or wrong,
and that we have a duty in regard to it. As soon as
this judgment is pronounced, conscience responds with
its imperious " You ought."
Judgments Differ. — In respect to judgments of
this kind, men differ widely ; not seldom they are dia-
metrically opposed to each other. Education, habit,
and custom have much to do in determining such
judgments ; bias arising from desire or inclination, often
clouds one's view in relation to the ethical character
of a choice or course of action. In such a case, too
often " the wish is father to the thought."
Yet, in respect to the right or wrong of many things,
the judgments of men almost universally agree ; this
is true in respect to truth, honesty, kindness, good-
will, oppression, injustice, cruelty, murder, etc.
l60 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Universal and Identical. — We believe conscience
to be a universal feeling among men ; otherwise, we
can not account for the feeling of guilt or ill-desert,
which we suppose every one has felt, at some time in
his life, at least. And history intimates very clearly
that this feeling has always been common to human-
ity, in every age and every stage of culture. The
strength of conscientious feeling varies greatly with
different men, and at different periods in the lives of
the same men. With some, it is a ruling power ha-
bitually ; others seem to regard it as little more than
an impertinence more or less troublesome.
Moreover, it is very important to notice that the
action of conscience is always the same, in all men
and at all times. This imperious and imperial feeling,
which is within us and yet hardly seems to be of us,
which assumes supreme authority to guide and then
to reward or to punish, never changes the nature nor
the direction of its action.
We often hear that the Hindoo woman conscien-
tiously throws her babe into the Ganges, while the
Christian woman as conscientiously preserves and cher-
ishes her offspring. This is the ' ' stock " illustration to
show that conscience acts differently in different peo-
ple. Looked at carefully, it illustrates exactly the
opposite. Both women do what they believe to be
right ; they differ in their judgments, but agree per-
fectly in their consciences.
A Safe Guide? — If conscience rests upon judg-
ment, and judgment is fallible, is conscience a safe
and sufficient guide ? Will it always lead us aright ?
Of course not ; if the judgment is wrong, conscience
CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY l6l
must necessarily urge us towards the wrong. Many
men have been wrong-headed and exceedingly con-
scientious; and such men are among the most mis-
chievous and the most intractable. No amount of
sincerity can make that right which is inherently wrong.
But is a person who conscientiously does wrong, to
be blamed? Or, to put the question in another way,
ought one to follow his conscience at all times? It is
inconceivable that it should be one's duty to violate
his conscience ; nor, strictly speaking, can we believe
that one is ever to be blamed for obeying his con-
science. But, if his judgment is wrong through any
neglect or perverseness of his own, he is to be blamed
for his wrong judgment with all its consequences.
What is Morality? — With some, morality seems
to be only some form of refined self-interest, — pru-
dence, for example. With others, like Mr. Bain, it
seems to be nothing more than conformity to custom
or law. It is restricted to its literal signification, as
derived from the Latin mores, or manners. We be-
lieve that morality in the full meaning of the term
signifies a supreme regard for the right ; hence, it rests
upon a habitual conformity to conscience. In order
to train one, then, in ways of morality, it is necessary
to cultivate his judgment and conscience.
How Cultivated? — But how shall conscience be
cultivated and made stronger? In the same way that
every other power is cultivated and strengthened, —
by wise use. Every time that the voice of conscience
is heard and heeded, it gains strength to speak with
more clearness next time. Every time it is disre-
garded, it is shorn of some of its power ; this may be
Psy. — 14.
1 62 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
continued until conscience will sleep quietly while one
does things that would once have caused the keenest
anguish. Thus, conscience becomes ' ■ seared as with
a hot iron", — it withers and decays like an unused
muscle. And yet, sometimes, it wakes after a long
slumber, with a fearful power, and stings like a scor-
pion. This is remorse. An educated conscience,
then, is a conscience that is habitually obeyed ; but it
must follow a judgment rightly educated, if the result
is to be a high type of morality.
Four Elements. — The psychological elements of
morality are four in number, and four only. These
are : First, the intuitive idea that there is such a dis-
tinction as that of right and wrong ; Second, the
judgment that decides whether any particular thing is
right or wrong ; Third, the conscience which moves us
towards the right and away from the wrong ; and
Fourth, the will that chooses or refuses the right.
All true moral training must regard all these; it must
recognize the underlying idea; it must develop and
train the judgment ; it must appeal to the conscience ;
and it must lead the will to a proper choice.
With Young Children. — With quite young chil-
dren frequent appeal to conscience is the proper way
to awaken and strengthen it. Let the parent and
teacher assume that the child has a conscience; —
press upon him the word ought in all the fullness of
its meaning. If there is any doubt as to whether one
ought, or ought not, to do a certain thing, the only
safe way is to give conscience ' ' the benefit of the
doubt." A very young child understands such an
appeal, for conscience begins its work almost as soon
CONSCIENCE AND MORALITY 163
as the earliest perceptive powers. "Is it right?"
"Then ought you to do it?" These are questions
that he will appreciate ; and it is sad that such ques-
tions so often give place to mere appeals to expedi-
ency, or self-interest, or pride, or custom. In view of
this fact, it is not strange that so few grown persons
are able to stand boldly for what they believe to
be right, even if they have to stand alone. How
can the moral fiber be otherwise than flabby if it has
never been strengthened?
With Older People. — The same method should
continue with older persons. But little good will
follow lessons on morals, or the learning of moral
precepts, or the reading of books on the subject, un-
less some course is taken to lead the student to in-
dividual action in conscientious behavior, or into the
formation of moral habits. Every act has its moral
significance when viewed rightly, for we are so bound
together that every act of ours has an influence to
benefit or to harm others directly, or through its in-
fluence upon ourselves. There is an ethical value in
the smallest and most trivial actions ; for instance,
the cleaning of one's shoes on the scraper and mat.
If one neglects this small thing, he defiles the house ;
and some one must perform additional and need-
less labor on his account. So of other matters which
we commonly regard as insignificant ; some of them
are right or wrong in themselves, and some have
this quality by virtue of their relation to other things
or to other persons. As we learn to put conscience in-
to every tiling we say or do, we shall make real advance-
ment in a true morality.
164
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Force of Habit. — Here we see the pedagogical
value of habit ; for, by constant attention to the eth-
ical quality of all our words and actions, — even
those commonly thought insignificant, — we form the
habit of obeying conscience in all things. Nothing
more is wanting to a perfect morality, except that
judgment shall be trained to decide correctly as to the
ethical quality.
Every student will notice the resemblance of the words con-
science and consciousness ; this is due to the fact that they are
derived from the same roots. By some old writers, one is some-
times used for the other ; but modern writers make a distinc-
tion which should never be disregarded.
We have insisted thus strongly on the supremacy of con-
science, because, unless its promptings are obeyed, correct
behavior will not follow, however clear the judgment may be.
But, as is intimated in the first paragraph on page 162, judg-
ment must decide rightly and conscience must be obeyed, in
order that the man may be right.
CHAPTER XVII
THE WILL
EFINITION.— The will is the power by
wJiich ive choose and execute.
Or, we may perhaps better say, The
will is the mind, or soul, or Ego, choos-
ing and putting forth effort, or force, to
execute its choices. A completed act of the will in-
cludes both the choice of an aim or object and the
putting-forth of energy to accomplish that aim, or to
attain that object. To expend energy in executing
without any choice would show will no more than a
machine shows will. But if we choose without mak-
ing any effort in the line of that choice, that is no act
of the will ; it is a mere preference, or wish. Dr.
Samuel Harris says: "A choice is not a mere prefer-
ence of one thing to another, but it is the choice of
an object to which the activity is to be directed."
That which makes the human animal a man, is his
power to select an object of choice, in view of delib-
erate judgment and in the presence of motives, and
then to exert force in the line of the choice thus made.
In these acts, or in the power to do these acts, re-
side man's personality and his responsibility.
(165)
J 66 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
In the process of knowing, man has no choice.
True, he may elect to put himself in the proper rela-
tions in order that he may know, or he may deliber-
ately refuse to do so. But this election is not an act
of knowing ; if he puts himself into the proper rela-
tions, knowing follows in accordance with unchange-
able laws. So the feelings come and go in obedience
to fixed laws, although it is not always possible to
trace these laws perfectly ; the will has even less power
in respect to feeling than in respect to knowing, be-
cause we have less power to control our relations here.
But, in the act of willing, man becomes a law unto
himself. Hence, in this act alone, man shows himself
a personal, responsible agent.
Man, A Cause. — In exercising his power to choose
and to execute, man shows himself to be a cause.
Whatever may be his intellectual judgments, or his
desires and motives, in view of which he makes his
choices and puts forth his volitions, these judgments
and desires do not cause his will to act as it does. In
thus acting, he is himself a cause, and the results
which follow, he causes to be different from what they
would have been had his will acted otherwise.
' ' The will (or the Ego willing) is the cause of its
own determinations." "The will is the source of
its own actions, and thus the cause of its own ac-
tions." "In knowing himself as possessed of will,
man must know himself as a cause ; and whenever
he sees causation exerted in connection with evi-
dence of intelligence, he naturally attributes it to
mind." '* Here is a being capable of interposing his
own free choice and his power of volition, and thus
THE WILL 167
purposely causing that to be which, but for him, would
not have been." "A free act has a cause as much
as any other. Its cause is the free spirit."
Spontaneity, Not Will. — It is important to dis-
tinguish will from some things which have been con-
founded with it, even by eminent writers.
Many of our acts are performed spontaneously, as
the foot kicks when it is tickled, or the thirsty man
rushes instinctively to the water. Perhaps all the acts
of brutes which seem to be the result of will, are of
this nature. But human will — rational will — always
acts from judgment and motive. The judgment reaches
certain conclusions, motives are present in the form
of desires, and then the mind freely chooses, in the
presence of these judgments and motives. Will stands
above spontaneity, and watches over and controls it.
The thirsty man may believe that drinking water at
this time would injure his health; and so, however
much he may desire it, prompted by a regard for his
health, he wills to refrain from drinking.
Desire itself has sometimes been confounded with
will. But this is a mistake ; one never wills a thing
until he chooses it, no matter how much he may de-
sire it. Doubtless he may be led to a final choice of
the thing itself by first choosing to harbor the desire
for it; this is the danger of one who permits himself
to dally with temptation. Otherwise than in choos-
ing to entertain or to reject his desires, one has little
or no control over them directly. But, through sheer
force of his will, he may deny himself that which he
desires most ardently; his will is his own, — it is the
exhibition of his deepest selfhood.
1 68
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Free Will. — The discussions about freedom of the
will are endless; nor need we wonder at it, for no
question is more fundamental as respects human ac-
tion, character, and destiny. We hold that the hu-
man will is free ; but it is very important that we con-
ceive clearly just what we mean by freedom of the
will. When we say that man's will is free, we mean
that, having in his consciousness certain decisions of
the intelligence and certain motives in the form of de-
sires, he is able to select for himself his own course
of action and to put forth force or effort for the exe-
cution of the course he has chosen. For illustration :
One may be conscious of some desire of sense prompt-
ing him to act for its gratification ; at the same time
he may t be moved to some different act by the known
preference of a friend and by his desire to please that
friend ; furthermore, his reason and conscience may,
at the same time, urge him to do something still dif-
ferent. In this state of things, because his will is
free, he is able to choose any one of the three courses.
Or he may arbitrarily refuse them all, and decide to
do something quite different from any one of them.
Evidences of Freedom. — We have evidence of
this freedom in that most trustworthy of all witnesses,
our own consciousness. Every man is conscious that
he makes a free choice and acts accordingly, scores
of times, every day of his life. For this reason he
holds himself responsible for his actions, and blames
or praises himself accordingly. If one believes that
there was no alternative for his action, that he could
not have done otherwise than he did, no power can
awaken in him any feeling of responsibility for the act.
THE WILL 169
Furthermore, the universal consciousness testifies to
the same fact. We hold others responsible for their
acts, and we praise or blame them accordingly, be-
cause we believe their acts are the results of their own
free choices. On this ground rest all law, all notion
of desert of any kind, and all punishment. Here,
too, is the ground for the reasonableness of any ex-
hortation, or argument, or appeal designed to influ-
ence another's conduct.
To blame a machine, or a stick, or any inanimate
object for an undesirable result, is well regarded as an
act of supreme childishness, or folly. Xerxes has been
held up to the ridicule of the ages for chastising the
sea because it wrecked his fleet ; but every magistrate
who punishes a criminal is equally ridiculous, and far
more blameworthy, if that criminal has no free will.
If man is a machine, his responsibility is at an end,
or never existed. But the fact that men everywhere,
and in all ages and in all states of society, hold them-
selves and others responsible, is proof positive that man
has free will ; because it is a fact sustained by the uni-
versal consciousness of the race. In truth, there is
little doubt that any philosopher whose system denies
free will to man, would blame the thief who should
steal his purse.
Two Sides. — Our definition recognizes two parts,
or two sides, in every completed act of the will; viz.,
the choice and the volition, — which is the putting-
forth of force or energy in the line of that choice.
Both choice and volition are self-determinations.
But, as has been well said, " Choice is self-direction;
volition is self-exertion or self-restraint."
Psy.— 15.
17° ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
In the element of choice man has perfect freedom,
nor can such freedom be destroyed and the man re-
main. But in volition, or the outward act, he is only
partially or relatively free. To accomplish our choices
we must work in accordance with the fixed laws of
nature. For instance, one may choose to have the
force of gravitation grind his corn. But, in order to
make his choice effective, he must select a stream of
water which has a suitable fall, he must construct his
dam properly, he must put his wheel in the right place,
he must arrange his machinery according to the laws
of physics, and he must turn on the power at the
proper time. If he fail in any of these respects, he
will fail to realize his choice, however ardently he
may desire to do so. Or he may be prevented from
executing his volitions by human interference, by the
conflict of some stronger will opposing his own. But,
so far as the choice extends, he is subject to no limi-
tations, — here he is autocrat.
Dr. Hopkins well says of choice and volition : ' ' The
one is absolute, and so belongs to us, that to be de-
prived of it we must be destroyed. The other is con-
tingent, and we can be deprived of it by accident, or
disease, or by the will of others. The one is the es-
sential element of freedom manifesting itself in the
spiritual realm, and is the immediate object of the
divine government; the other is simply instrumental
and executive, and is that of which human govern-
ments chiefly take cognizance."
When a man proves to be what we commonly term "a fail-
ure in life," the reason for his failure can generally be found
in lack or misdirection of his will-power. Not many fail solely
THE WILL I7 1
because circumstances are against them; fewer succeed by-
sheer good fortune, or a combination of fortuitous circumstances.
"Good luck" is largely a myth. Often the trouble is a want of a
well-considered, fixed choice or dominant purpose in life. Such
a person labors in one direction to-day and in another to-mor-
row. We say he has no aim in life ; often the reason he has
no aim worthy of the name, is that he has too many aims.
"Unstable as water, he shall not excel."
But some fail who have a worthy choice firmly adhered to,
because they lack will-power on the volition side. They are
feeble, or wavering, or unreasonable in their attempts to ac-
complish their choices ; opposing circumstances appal and de-
feat them, where a stronger will would readily have overcome
these very opposing circumstances, or would have changed
them into helpers. No man ever accomplished much in this
world who had not a strong will on both sides of its manifesta-
tion. We should add, also, that this strong will needs the aid
of a sound judgment in all cases.
Motives. — The will, especially in its choices, is
perfectly free ; but it never acts without some motive
to prompt its action. These motives are always in
the form of desires of some sort, soliciting the will to
act. No conclusion of the judgment or reason, noth-
ing purely intellectual, is a motive till it has been fol-
lowed by a feeling of desire. Nothing from without
can prompt to a choice or an act of the will, till it has
awakened a desire within.
The will is often solicited by opposing desires, in
various degrees of conflict. But these desires do not
move the will one way or the other, as the heavier
weights draw down their arm of the scales. The will
is no such inert thing as that implies ; the process of
willing is not a mechanical obedience to the strongest
force. The motives simply solicit or influence the
will, which, in its regal capacity, freely determines for
172 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
itself to which of the opposing motives it will yield,
with which it will put itself in accord. There are
philosophers who deny this freedom of the will, and
declare that it obeys the strongest motives.
"The determinations of will are always made under
the influence of motives"; but the motives do not
determine, the will does not obey. But, under the
influence of motives, the will freely chooses ; and it
often chooses in defiance of what seem to be the
strongest impulses. Here is, probably, the difference
between the human will and the will of the brute ;
the brute always yields to the strongest impulse, and
the only way to change his action is to induce in him
a stronger impulse than the one he now obeys. But
\ man, endowed with reason and conscience, has the
j power to put any impulse or desire under his feet,
#nd to choose freely.
We think that any one who will examine the move-
ments of his own mind, in the light of consciousness,
ought to see the truth of what has been said. He is
conscious of the actions and judgments of the intel-
lect, he is conscious of the awakening of desires seek-
ing gratification, he is conscious of the appeals of con-
science, and he is conscious of a free choice; and,
furthermore, he is conscious that every one of these
differs from all the others.
\ Choices Give Character. — Because man is per-
fectly free as to his choices, it is his choices that deter-
mine the moral quality of all his actions. Without
this freedom our actions could have no moral quality
whatever ; and to this fact of our constitution alone, is
due all responsibility, and all character so far as it re-
THE WILL 173
spects morality. Yet choice alone, — that is, as indi-
cating mere preference, — is far from working out a
character in harmony with itself. It must be a choice
followed by volition, making a complete act of the
will. To be moved again and again towards a worthy
choice, to choose so far as simply to approve, but noth-
ing more, is a weakening and a deadening process as
regards the forming of a worthy character. For this
is the very thing we mean by that properly contempt-
uous word, sentimentalism.
It is by his choices and volitions that man builds his
^character as a moral being. A supreme choice is fol-
lowed by a multitude of subordinate choices in line
with itself. And, out of these repeated and continued
acts of the will, grow habits. So our subsequent
choices are influenced by those we have already made.
Furthermore, these choices bias our judgments, and
largely give rise to motives that influence our wills to
future choices. Hence, by the very freedom of his
will, man comes to limit it. "The outcome of voli-
tional action is habit, fixed disposition, settled char-
acter. Freedom may choose the seed, but it can
neither determine nor escape the harvest."
True Freedom. — We have used the word ' 'freedom"
to mean man's ability to choose freely, even though
his choice should be a choice of wrong, or should be
purely arbitrary. But, as we have just seen, the wrong
exercise of this freedom may result in bitter bondage.
One has attained to true freedom only when his free
choices are habitually in accord with the right, or the
highest reason. ' ' Real freedom exists only in the
complete harmony of the rational and natural motives
174 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
with one another and with reason." This is a will
acting in " self-conscious freedom"; its outcome is a
righteous character, in which the soul is in peace. In
so far as a man reaches this stage, in so far he is really
free. He is no longer under the law, for he has be-
come a law unto himself; and this law is no bond, for
he is in harmony with it. He has realized the divine
words, "The truth shall make you free."
Training the Will. — Like all the rest of our pow-
ers, the will is rightly trained by right use. Nothing
is more desirable than a strong will, if only it is rightly-
used. A man with a weak will is a pitiable object.
It is the will which gives one his moving force ; that
makes him a power rather than a mere helpless thing.
One who lacks will-power is like a log floating at the
mercy of the current ; while one with a strong will
is like a steamboat, that can not only stem the cur-
rent, but can make headway against it. There is no
danger that one will have too much will, if only it is
joined with right motives and sound judgment. The
man of strong will is not necessarily willful in the bad
use of that word. A man of strong will need not be
mulish.
There has been much discussion of the question
whether a child's "will should be broken ? " The an-
swer turns wholly upon what is meant by "breaking"
the will. If by this is meant simply that the child
must be taught to bend his will to rightful authority,
then it is one of the first lessons to be learned ; it is
an act of the greatest kindness to the child to break
his will in this sense. But if, by breaking the will,
we mean to destroy its power, or to diminish it, then
THE WILL 175
it is a heinous crime to do it. For, one with his will
broken, in this sense, is like a watch with the main-
spring broken. Instead of this, special effort should
be made to strengthen the child's will-power. Use
all reasonable means to lead him to cease saying ' ' I
can't," and to cultivate the habit of saying " I can"
and ' ' I will. " Of course he should be taught to judge
rightly as to whether a thing ought to be done, before
he says "I will do it." Even kindly ridicule or gen-
tle sarcasm may be used with good effect here, and
sometimes resort may well be had to something a little
more vigorous.
Give the child the opportunity to exercise his will
within all reasonable limits, and then hold him to the
responsibility that belongs to a free will. Above all
things, never thwart or cross a child's will unless there
is a very good reason for it. Many a well-disposed
child has had his will wantonly denied, or needlessly
thwarted, by a thoughtless or tyrannical parent or
teacher until the result has been deplorable weakness
or a settled perversity.
CHAPTER XVIII
CONCLUSION
«.
^Jl ^ Jg.
OR Young Teachers. — As it is stated
on the title-page, this book is designed
for young teachers. It has grown out
of the author's efforts to prepare young
persons for the teacher's work. In the
course of nearly forty years in the school-room, he
has been led to give much attention to the phenom-
ena of mind. He has also read many books treating
of the human mind more or less directly. From these
years of observation, reading, and reflection, he has
come to certain conclusions respecting the facts of the
mind, — its powers, its laws of working, and of growth.
These facts, especially such as relate to the work of
teaching, he has endeavored to state in the fewest and
plainest words he could command. He has stated
these facts as they appear to him ; of course, he will
not be surprised to find that, in some respects, they
may appear differently to others. It is urged again,
upon all who read the book, that they test the truth
of its statements by their own observation, and es-
pecially by referring to the testimony of their own
consciousness.
(i 7 6)
CONCLUSION 177
Writers on Psychology often give much time and
space to theories and speculations ; but the author has
aimed, as far as possible, to avoid all discussion of
theories, and to confine himself to what, in his view,
are the facts of the science. Again, in many books,
much space is given to controversy, to the stating
and refuting of the opinions of other writers. In
this book we have aimed to write nothing controver-
sially excepting in cases that we deemed essentially
vital to truth. Nor have we given space to the his-
tory of the science or to the history of the opinions
that different men have held concerning its facts.
In brief, we have endeavored to put the facts of the
science before young people in such a way that, by
study and thinking, they may understand them ; hop-
ing that they will be able to apply them in the work
of teaching. We have tried to make a text-book, —
that is, a book of texts, — striving to give what may
be of immediate value, at the same time that it will
awaken a desire for further investigation, and will aid
in making that investigation profitable, both by guid-
ing personal observation and by aiding to understand
other books upon the same subject.
Sources of Information. — A student of mind has
three sources of information, three fields in which he
may glean. The first and most important is found in
his own mind, studied in the light of his own con-
sciousness. As we said in a former part of the book,
Psychology differs from almost every other study in
this respect. But it must be remembered that one's
own mind is an important object of study, not only
because here is found an original source of informa-
I78 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
tion, but also because it furnishes a test for all the in-
formation gained from every other source : such in-
formation has a value for us only as it is interpreted
and tested in the light of our own conscious experi-
ence. We know about other minds only in the light
of what we know of our own minds.
But the teacher, who has to deal with minds that
are in the process of development, not only needs to
study carefully his own mind as its activities are re-
vealed in present consciousness, but he needs to call
to his aid all that memory can give him, of his mental
experiences when he was in the stages of transforma-
tion or growth. If a person has forgotten his own
childhood, he is not fit for a teacher of children.
Another very important field for study is found in
observing the mental operations of others, as they are
revealed by gestures, words, and the different forms
of behavior. The teacher has extraordinary oppor-
tunities for this kind of study, especially as it relates
to juvenile and growing minds. His pupils are con-
stantly before him as specimens ; he is in most inti-
mate relations with them, and these relations are most
largely in the sphere of their mental activity. If he
will observe carefully, he will not only discover the
characteristics in which all minds are alike, but he
will be strongly impressed with the fact that no two
minds are exactly alike; — each is marked by individ-
uality, peculiarities, and idiosyncrasies. These differ-
ences call for special care and attention. Probably
Garfield was thinking particularly of them when he
said that a teacher should study the boy more than
he studies the book.
CONCLUSION 179
Thirdly, the student of mind can find access to won-
derfully rich stores of literature relating to the sub-
ject. Many of the ablest men in all the ages have
given profound attention to this study, and they have
left in books abundant records of the result of their
labors. And, dry as such books often are to the be-
ginner, they become strangely fascinating to one who
has already made some progress in the study, and
who is thus able to comprehend their contents and
to enter into their meaning.
Unity and Diversity. — As was just said, no two
minds are exactly alike ; then the question may arise,
whether there can be any science of mind in general.
Science deals with classes and uniformities. Psychol-
ogy, however, is not singular in this respect ; no two
horses are just alike, nor are any two oaks ; and the
same may be said of two objects in any class in nat-
ure. But it is found that, notwithstanding all the
differences, there are certain well-marked and invari-
able likenesses, which are the ground of scientific
classifications and laws. The same thing is true of
human minds ; it is found that all sane and sound
minds are alike in all those grand general character-
istics which form the subject-matter of Psychology.
These general truths must be recognized as such, and
they must be carefully distinguished, especially by
the teacher, from such mental facts as are individual
and peculiar.
Are All Powers Good ? — If one may judge from
statements he sometimes meets in books, or hears in
conversation, it would seem that some people, im-
pressed with the evil results following the abuse of
l80 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
some of the mental powers, are inclined to believe
that some of our powers are better than others, that
some even are bad in themselves, and that it might
be better for us if we lacked them. Such persons
make a great mistake; all our powers are evidently
designed to serve a good and useful purpose, but ah
may be abused. Let us ask, however, in what sense
a mental power can be called good or bad. Evi-
dently not in any moral sense ; morality relates only
to the use that is made of the powers, — it has noth-
ing to do with their nature. Our powers are all good,
in one sense, if they are certain and efficient in pro-
ducing their results, just in the same sense that a knife
is good when it is made of good steel. But good
powers may be put to a bad use, just as the good
knife may be.
Education should aim to render all the mental pow-
ers efficient ; but, more than that, it should endeavor
to lead to such a use of them as shall promote right
thinking, right living, a harmonious subjection of the
lower appetites and impulses to reason and conscience,
and to such a use of the will as shall lead its subject
into true freedom, as its meaning has been explained.
Body, Soul, and Spirit. — We have divided man's
powers into two classes only ; viz. , physical and psy-
chical. But we often hear it said that man has a
threefold nature : body, soul, and spirit. We accept
this division, using the word "soul" to mean such of the
lower psychical powers as the nobler brutes possess, in
some degree, in common with man. These will not
include reason, conscience, and a free will. In the
possession and exercise of these higher powers, man
CONCLUSION I O I
shows his real spiritual nature, — a nature that in-
cludes personality, morality, and responsibility.
Dreams, Insanity, Etc. — In many books on men-
tal science, much space is given to the discussion of
questions respecting the action of the mind in dream-
ing, insanity, and abnormal manifestations. Many of
these questions are very fascinating, perhaps, because
of the veil of mystery that hangs about them. But we
have purposely ignored all such questions. We are
writing a book especially for teachers, who have to do
with minds only in their waking activities, and in their
sane and normal manifestations.
Man, a Unit. — Once more, we desire to impress
on our readers, as we leave them, that man is a unit ;
he is not a sum of powers and activities ; he has many
powers and activities, but these do not constitute the
man. Nor are these powers and activities entities in
themselves. If our language sometimes seems to im-
ply actual existence of the powers as things, it must
be remembered that such language is used simply for
convenience, and it must not be taken literally with all
its apparent implications. These powers are simply
different manifestations of the man, — a complex unit, —
acting in various ways. Furthermore, in these actions
the powers are blended ; rarely or never is the man
showing himself in one of these forms of activity alone.
In thought, the powers are distinct and separate, but
in fact, they are inextricably blended and interwoven,
in their action.
Precepts. — We conclude by giving twenty-four
short precepts, for the consideration and guidance of
teachers especially. With respect to most of them,
1 82 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
it will be easy to see that they are deductions from
what has been said in the previous pages. They are
given here in this compact form, in order that they
may be remembered and applied the more easily :
EIGHT PRINCIPLES OF MIND-ACTIVITY AND MIND-GROWTH
1. Health. — The mind can not do its best work un-
less the body and brain are in good condition.
2. Attention. — No mental activity is of any value
without careful attention to the thing in hand.
Corollary : One thing at a time.
3. Self- Activity. — There is no way in which a mind
can increase in knowledge or power except by its own
activity.
4. Growth. — Mental acquisition, and mental power
or skill, are forms of growth ; and all growth requires
time.
5. Origin of Ideas. — Ideas and thoughts are never
conveyed from one mind to another ; they are formed,
or awakened, in that mind where they exist.
6. The Senses. — The mind gains the crude material
for all it knows or thinks, through the use of the senses.
7. Habit. — Neither knowledge nor skill is fully ours
till it has taken the form of habit ; frequent repetition
tends to produce a habit.
8. Expression. — One can express intelligibly what
he understands clearly ; one can not express clearly
anything that is not clear in his own mind; the at-
tempt to make a clear statement helps towards clear-
ness of thought.
CONCLUSION 183
EIGHT GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUNG CHILDREN
i. Attention. — The attention of children is intense,
but volatile ; they have little or no power of voluntary
attention.
2. The Senses. — The mental activity of children is
chiefly shown in the use of their senses.
3. Muscular Activity. — Children delight to use their
muscles, when they can use them according to their
own will or fancy.
4. Imitation. — Children have a strong propensity to
imitate, especially in things that please them.
5. Faith. — Children instinctively believe what is
told them, especially when told by one whom they
esteem.
6. Curiosity. — The curiosity of children is very act-
ive; but, for the time being, it is easily satisfied on
any one point.
7. Memory. — Children remember well what they
understand clearly, and what they have an interest in.
8. Imagination. — Children delight in the play of
imagination, — a fact which the teacher may make good
use of, both in teaching and in governing.
EIGHT PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING
1 . Teaching '? — Teaching is causing another to know
what he did not know before.
2. Begin Where ? — Begin where the pupil now is ;
use the pupil's present knowledge for a foundation.
3. Attention.— Make no attempt to teach till you
have the pupil's attention ; stop, if you lose it.
1 84
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
4. Interest. — Aim first to arouse the pupil's inter-
est in what you propose to teach, and to awaken his
curiosity in respect to it.
5. Symbols. — Do not allow meaningless symbols to
be used ; do not confound the symbol with what it
represents ; be sure that all symbols mean the same
to teacher and to pupil.
6. Fixing. — Fix exactly in the pupil's memory what
ought to be there; but never load the memory un-
necessarily.
7. Responsibility. — Hold the pupil strictly responsi-
ble for all that he ought to know or do.
Corollary: Do nothing for him that he can do for
himself.
8. Individuality. — In teaching, always have regard
to general principles, but respect the pupil's individ-
uality in their application.
INDEX
INDEX.
PAGE
Abnormal Consciousness, 35
Abstraction 109
Abuses of Imagination .... 101
Acquired perception 59
Admiration 1 54
Affections, the 147
Analogy 135
Analysis and Synthesis. .. . 109
Appetites, the 152
Artistic Imagination 98
Arts, fine 98
Assumption in inductive syl-
logism 129
Attention, cultivation of. . 39
defined 36
illustrated 36
objects of 39
to several things 38
Bodies, their qualities 66
Body, soul, and spirit 180
Cause, man is a 166
Cerebration, unconscious. . 32
Children, characteristics of, 183
Choice 169
is perfectly free 170
PAGE
Choices give character. . . . 172
Classification 1 15
Classes, higher and lower.. 112
not found in nature 116
Committing, to Memory,
rules for 90
and remembering 93
Comprehension of terms.. 113
Concept, defined 43
logical 44, 1 10
the, an intellection 43
Conception, cultivation of. 45
constructive, defined. . . . 104
" not imagination. 105
" uses of. 105
defined 40
Concepts, a panorama of. . 81
clear and obscure 112
distinct and confused. . . 112
how formed 1 10
how gained 106
importance of 115
logical, characteristics
of in
Conclusion, when trust-
worthy 125
Conscience, always the same. 160
<i8 7 )
i88
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
PAGE
Conscience, defined 158
not always safe 160
not well defined 157
relation to judgment 159
universal 160
Consciousness, abnormal.. 35
as a test 178
defined 30
necessary to mind 30, 32
objects of. 31
testimony of 31
Contiguity, law of 83
Contrary and contradictory
terms 1 14
Conversion of propositions. 121
" Cramming " 80
Cultivation, of attention. .. 39
of conception 45
of imagination 103
of memory 88
of morality 161
of the senses 74
of the will 174
Culture, mental, ten pre-
cepts 27
Curiosity 153
Deceptions of sense, ap-
parent 7°
Deductive syllogism 124
Definition, logical 1 15
Demonstration, direct and
indirect 132
Demonstrative reasoning.. 132
Desire, of approbation 152
of power 152
of society 15 2
relation to will 167,171
Desires, the 147
PAGE
Devices to aid memory. .. . 92
Distribution of terms 114
Dreams, etc 181
Education of the mind. . . 180
Ego, and Non-Ego. 54
and the body 61
Emotion, expressed by
sound 64
Emotions, the 147
Enthymeme, the 130
Extension of terms 113
Faculty, a, defined 29
Failure in life, causes of . . 170
Fancy, defined 98
Fear 153
Feeling, the sense of 55
Feelings, physical and psy-
chical 139
Fine art 98
Forgetting, impossible, per-
haps 87
Free will 168, 173
Generalizing, defined 116
General terms 116
Genus and species 112
Habit 33
and morality 164
and will 173
Hate, its use 151
Hearing, and emotion 63
sense of. 55
the most internal sense. . 63
Hope 153
INDEX
189
PAGE
Ideas c intuitive... 49
Imagination, abuses of 101
artistic 98
cultivation of 103
defined 96
four forms of product. . . 98
in childhood 97
in relation to free will.. 97
inventive 98
in what sense creative. . . 97
uses of 99
uses of to teachers espec-
ially 102
Inductions, false 130
Inductive syllogism 124, 128
Insanity, etc 181
Instances of remarkable
memory 94
Intellect, defined 47
observations on 51
Intellectual process, three
steps in 53
Interest 153
" Intuitive," how used 66
Intuitive power, defined,. 47
Judgment, defined 118
Judgments, primitive 22
Knowing, what is it ? 34
Knowledge, can not be im-
parted 52
common and scientific. 16
primitive and developed. 53
Law, in science, defined.. 11
of contiguity 83
Laws, of opposition 120
PAGE
Laws, of suggestion 81
of suggestion, primary.. 82
of suggestion, secondary. 83
of the syllogism 126
Logical, concepts 44, 1 10
definition 115
Love, of beauty, truth, and
right 150
of country 150
of self. 149
of pupils, how trained.. 150
Man, a cause 166
a unit 19, 137, 181
Mechanical qualities of bod-
ies 68
Memory, belief in 79
beneficent law of 87
defined 75
devices to aid 92
effects of disease on 86
elements in 77
how cultivated 88
importance of 79
laws of 81
neglected 88
observations on 92
of the aged 86
remarkable cases of 94
strong, with weak mind. 80
three meanings of word. 76
two uses of 79
Mental activity, and atten-
tion 38
power of will over 38
Mental, habit S3
philosophy, defined 9
Mind, and body related. . . 25
and brain 26
190
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Mind, and matter, differ-
ences of 24
a unit 23
human, is like what?.. 52
knows by its own activity. 5 1
nature of 23
Minds, unity and diversity
of 178
Mnemonics, worthless 91
Moods 145
Morality 161
four elements in 162
habit of. 164
how cultivated 162
Motion, an aid to sense... 58
Motives, and will 171
found in sensibility. .. 141, 148
Necessary truth 48, 132
Nominalists 116
Objects, of attention
of consciousness
Observations, on the intel-
lect
on the memory
Opposition, of propositions.
laws of
Passions, the
Patriotism
Percept, defined
Perception, direct and ac-
quired
intuitive
theories of
through the senses
Perceptives, defined
39
31
5i
92
120
120
148
150
66
59
66
7i
65
47
PAGE
Phantasy, defined 98
Philosophy, means what ?. 9
Physiological qualities of
bodies 68
Power, defined 19
intuitive, defined 47
intuitive, products of. . .. 48
Powers, mental, are they
all good? 179
grand divisions of 20
observations on 22
order of their action 21
scheme of. 28
two stages of 22
Powers, presentative, de-
fined 47
presentative, described. . 51
reflective, defined. 47
representative, defined.. 47
Precepts of mind-activity.. 182
Premises, defined 123
Primary qualities of bodies. 67
Principles of teaching 183
Probability, degrees of 134
Probable reasoning 133
Probable truth 131
Proposition, defined 118
Propositions, conversion of. 121
kinds of. "9
opposition of 120
quality and quantity of. 119
Psychology, aim of this
book 176
a mental discipline 16
an inductive science 1 1
a noble science 12
defined 9
peculiarity in 12, 177
personal value of 13
INDEX
I 9 I
TAGE
Psychology, relation to edu-
cation 180
study of other minds.. 178
tests in 12
value to different profes-
sions 14
why neglected 16
Qualities of bodies 66
Hamilton's division... 69
how divided 66, 68
mechanical 68
physiological 68
primary 67
Reasoning, defined 122
demonstrative 132
hypothetical 131
probable 133
Reason, natural 51
Recognition 77
Recollection, defined 76
Reflective powers, defined. 47
forms of 108
products of 108
Reflex action, natural 5^
Reid's answer to idealists. 73
Remembrance, conditions of 76
defined 76
Representative powers, de-
fined 47
discussed 75
" Represent," in inductive
syllogism 128
Reproduction 75> 77
Resistance, sense of 56
" Retention," meaning of. 78
Reverence 155
Scheme
Science, deductive,
defined
inductive
... 28
10
10
10
facts in, how gained. ... II
how developed 10
Seeing, sense of 55
Self-consciousness 35
Selfishness 149
Sensation, and cognition.. 60
defined 57
Sensations, organic and vi-
tal 65
Sense-perception, defined.. 56, 65
Senses 54
cultivation of 74
deceptions of 70
to be trusted 69
Sense, what each gives.... 57
Sensibilities, analysis not
complete 146
classification of 146
motives to action 141
related to the body.... 142
Sensibility, begins how?.. 139
expressing and repressing. 143
importance of, to teacher. 148
its relation to intellect. . 143
not definable 138
of two kinds 139
painful or pleasant 140
source of joy or sorrow. . 141
Sentimentalism 173
Sight, questions about.... 61
Smelling, sense of 56, 65
Soul, the 180
Sound, defined 64
Sounds, natural and arti-
ficial 64
192
ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY
PAGE
Sounds, varieties of. 63
Spontaneity, is not will... 167
Suggestion, laws of 81
Syllogism, deductive 124
defined 1 23
inductive 124, 128
laws of 126
two kinds 123
Sympathy 155
Synthesis 109
Tasting, sense of 56, 65
Teaching, a fine art .. 99
principles of 183
Temperaments 144
Terms,absolute and relative 1 13
comprehension and ex-
tension of. 113
distribution of. 114
division of. 114
logical analysis of 114
notative 1 13
relation of. 1 14
Testimony, as to fact and
inference 134
value of 133
Theories of sense-percep-
tion 71
PAGE
Thought, expressed by
sounds 64
Touch, sense of 55, 59
Truth, kinds of 131
Truths, necessary, self-evi-
dent 48
Unconscious cerebration.. 32
Unit, man is a 19, 137^ 181
Unity and diversity in
minds 178
Uses of imagination 99
Varieties of sounds 63
Volition 169
What each sense gives.. 57
What we know 34
Will, cultivation of 174
defined 165
free 168, 173
its power over mental
action 38
relation to habit 173
relation to motives 171
two elements 169
makes responsible 166
not desire 167
not spontaneity 167
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