a MEMOIRS OP A MINISTER OP STATE J. PETER MAYtR LIBRARY 3 MEMOIRS OF A MINISTER OF STATE FROM THE YEAK 1840. P. GUIZOT, AUTHOB OB ' IHB LIFE OF OLlVKll CKOilWKLL. LONDON : KICHAIID BENTLEY, NEW BUELIXGTOX STREET, ^ublis|)cr in ©riinarg to %\tx iflajcstg. 1864. printbd by john ebwahd tatlob, little qttebit 8tbebt, Lincoln's inn fields. iJmvi.JiMii oi ( A.'. IFOR? SAM A iJAUiJAltA CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. THE OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEOX.— THE FOETIFICA- TIONS OF PARIS. Page My Personal Situation and Relations in the Cabinet of the 29tli of October, 1840. — Political Friends. — Different principles and movin<2; causes of Foreii^n Policy. — The Foreign Policy in har- mony with the existing state and true tendencies of Civiliza tion. — Cliaracter of tlie isolation of France after the Treaty of the loth of July, 1810. — Debates on the Address in the two Chambers on the opening of the Session of 1810-1811. — Ar- rival of the Prince de Joinville at Cherbourg, bringing from St. Helena, in the frigate ' Pelle Poule,' the remains of Napo- leon. — Journey of the colllii from Havre to Paris. — State of minds on the route. — Ceremony of the Obsequies at the In- valides. — Conduct of the (iovenmunit of July towards tlie ^le- mory of the Emjjeror Xa])olcon. — Fortifications of Paris. — Vauban and Napoleon. — Preparatory Studies. — Various Sys- tems of Fortification. — How the Final Eesolulion was taken. — Introduction, Debate, and Adoption of the Bill. — Opinion of Europe on this Measure ........ 1 CHAPTER II. AFFAIRS OF THE EAST.— CONVENTION OF JULY THE 13Tn, IStl. Situation of France after the Treaty of the 15th of July, 18-40. — Character of her isolation and Annanients. — Dispositions of the European Cabinct.s. — Lord Palnicrston's Dispatch of the 2nd of November, 1810. — Its Efl'cct in France. — Capture of St. John d'Acre by the English. — Mehemet Ali is threatened in VI C(1XTKNTS. Page Egypt. — Mission of Baron iMounier to London. — Words of Prince Metternicli. — Commodore Napier anives before Alex- andria, induces Mehemet Ali to treat, and concludes a Conven- tion Mith bim, wbicb promises tbe Eigbt of Inberitance in Egypt. — Anger of tbe Sultan and of Lord Ponsonby on receiv- ing tiiis intelligence. — Tbe Napier Convention is disavowed at Constantinople, altbougb approved in London. — Conference of tbe European Plenipotentiaries at Constantinople witb Kedscbid Pacba. — Hatti SberifF of tbe 13tb February, 1841, wbich only grants to Mebemet Ali an incomplete and precarious inberitance of Egypt. — Interview of Lord Palmerston witb Cbekib Efiendi. — Our expectant Attitude and Precautions. — Project of a Pro- tocol and of a new Convention for tlie Ee-entrance of France into tbe European Coalition. — Conditions wbicb we attacb to it. — I autborize Baron de Bourqueney to sign tbe two pro- jected Acts provisionally, but not definitively. — Effort of Prince Metternicli at Constantinople. — Cbange of Turkisb Ministry. — New Hesitations of tbe Porte. — It finally gives way, and awards tbe bereditary rule in Egypt to Mebemet Ali by a New Firman of tbe 25tb of May, 1841. — Fresb delay in Lon- don as to tbe Signature of ibe Protocol and Convention. — Tbe Fall of tbe Wbig Ministry appears imminent. — Mebemet Ali accepts tbe Firman of tbe 25tb of May, 1841. — I autborize Baron de Bourqueney to sign tbe Convention. — It is signed on tbe 13tb of July, 1841. — Summary of tbe Negotiation and its Kesults " 37 CHAPTER 111. THE EIGHT OF SEAECH. Lord Palmerston asks me to sign tbe New Treaty prepared in 184I), for tbe Suppression of tbe Slave Trade. — My Eefusal and its Causes. — Accession of tbe Cabinet of Sir Eobert Peel and Lord Aberdeen. — I consent tben (on tlie 20tb of December, 1841) to sign tbe New Treaty.— First Debate in tbe Cbamber of De])utie8 on tins subject. — Amendment of M. Jacques Le- febvrc on tlie Address. — True Cause of tbe state of minds. — I adjourn tbe Eatiilcation of tbe New Treaty.— Attitude of tbe Englisb Cabinet. — Eatifications are c.xclianged in London, be- tween tbe otlier Powers, and tbe Protocol is left open for France. — Fresh Deljates in tbe two Cbambcrs against tbe Eigbt of Search, and tbe Conventions of 1831 and 1833.— We defini- tively refuse to ratify tbe Treaty of tbe 20tb of December, 1811.— MoiU'i-ation and goodwill of Lord Aberdeen. — The Pro- tocol of the lUtli of February is closed, and tbe Treaty of the 2otii of December, 1841, annulled for France.— At tbe Opening of tbe Session of 1813-1841, a ])aragrapb inserted in the Ad- dre.ss of the Chamber of Deputies e.\i)resses a wish for the Abo- lition of tbe Eight of Search. — Why I do not immediately enter CoXTKNTS. Ml Page into Negotiation with tli;' English Government on this Subject. — Visit of Queen Victoria to tiie Chateau d'Ku. — Its Effect in France and Europe. — I prepare the ^Negotiation for tlie Aboli- tion of the Eight of Search. — Dispositions of Lord Aberdeen and Sir llobert Peel. — Fresh Debates on this Subject in the Chambers at the Opening of the Session of 184.4. — Visit of the Emperor Nicholas to England. — Visit of King Louis Philippe to Windsor. — I accompany him. — Negotiation entered upon for the Abolition of the Right of Search. — How can this Uight be replaced for the Suppression of the Trade? — The Duke de Broglie and Dr. Lusiiington are appointed to examine this Question. — Their meeting in London. — New Plan Proposed. — It is adopted and replaces the Eight of Search in \ irtue of a Treaty concluded on the 25th of May, 1845. — Presentation, Adoption, and Promulgation of a Bill for the Execution of this Treaty 130 CHAPTER IV. VAEIOrS FOREIGN AFFAIES. (184i)-181.2.) State of S\ria after the E\])ulsion of Mehemet Ali. — War between the Druses and ^laronites. — Powerlessness and Connivance of the Turkisli Authorities. — My Steps in favour of the Maronite Ciiristians. — Dispositions of Prince Metternich ; — of Lord Aber- deen. — Baron do Bourqueney and Sir Stratford Canning at Con- stantinople. — Obstinate Eesistance of the Porte to our Demands for the Christians. — Sarim Efl'cndi. — Plan of Prince Metternich for the Government of the Lil>anus. — We adopt it, in the ab- sence of a better. — The Porte ends by yielding. — -My opinion on the Turks and their Future. — State of Greece in 181L — ^Mission of M. Piscatory to Greece ; its()l)ject. — What I convej' on this Subject to Lord Al)erdeen. — He gives Analogous Instructions to Sir E. Jjyons. — Our Anxiety and Attitude towards the Bey of Tunis.— Suspicions of the iMiglish Cabinet on this Subject. — My Instructions to Prince de Joinville. — .Mission of M. Piichou. — Atliiirs of Algeria. — Situation of tlie Foreign Consuls in Alge- ria. — \ ic\^s on the Future of France in Africa. — Factories esta- blished on (lie Western Coast of Africa. — The Eastern Coast of Africa and Madagascar. — Possi'ssion taken of the .Jsles of Ma- yottaaiul Nosibe — Treaty with the Inian of Muscat. — Question of the Custom House Union between Franceand Belgium. — Ne- gotiations on this Sul)ject. — My oj)inion on the (Question. — The Commercial Treaty of the lOth of .luly, 1SI3, and the 13th of December, 1815, with Bcliiiuni.— Affairs of Spain. — Eivab'y and Obstinate Suspicion of Enghiiul towards France in Spain. — Queen Christina in Paris.— Eegency of Espartero. — Insurrec- tion and Defeat of the Christinos. — Our General Policy in Spain. — -M. ile Sahandy is appointed Ambassador in Spain. — Vlll CONTENTS. Page Reception given to him on his Journey. — Question of the Pre- sentation of his Credentials. — Espartero refuses to allow him to present them to the Queen Isabella. — Attitude of Mr. Aston, the English Minister at Madrid. — M. de Salvandy returns to France. — Instructions from Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Aston. — Incident be- tween France and Russia. — Count de Pahlen quits Paris on leave. — From what motive. — My Instructions to M. Casimir Perier, French Charge d'Affaires in Russia. — Anger of the Em- peror Nicholas. — Vain Attempts at Reconciliation. — Perseve- rance of King Louis Philippe. — The Ambassadors of France and Russia do not return to their Posts, and are replaced by Charges d'Affaires 241 CHAPTER V. VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1810-1842.) Internal Position of the Cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840. — Philosophical and Political Ideas recognized and powerful as Means of Opposition. — Summary Analysis of those Ideas. — In what they are False, and from what Cause. — How they ought to have been combated. — Insufficiency of our Arms for that Strug- gle. — Outrage committed against the Duke of Aumale and the Princes his Brothers, on the 13th of September, 1841. — Entry of the Duke of Aumale and of the 17th Regiment of Light In- fantry to the Court of the Tuileries. — Plot connected with the Outrage. — M. Hebert is appointed Attorney-General to the Royal Court of Paris. — Trial of Quenisset and his Accomplices before the Court of Peers. — Legislative Debates. — Laws on the Labour of Children in Manufactures ; — On Expropriation on Account of Public Utility ; — On Great Public Works ; — On the General Network of Railways. — Propositions of M. Ganneron on Parliamentary Incompatibilities, and of M. Ducos on Elec- toral Reform. — Discussion and Kcjection of these Propositions. — Operation of the Census for Personal and House Tax, and also tor the Tax on Windows. — Disturbances on this Question. • — Uneasiness of M. Ilumann. — He is lirmly supported. — His sudden death — He is replaced by M . Lacave-Jja])lagne. — General Rugeaud is appointed Governor-General of Algeria. — His Re- lations and Corros]iondence with me. — His First Campaigns. — Closing of the Session of 1841-1842 341 M E M 1 11 S OF A MINISTER OF STATE. CHAPTER I. TilE OBSEQUIES OF NArOLEOX.— THE FOETIFICATIONS OF PARIS. MY rKRSONAL SITUATION AND DELATIONS IN THE CABINET OF THE 29th of uctobek, ISiO. — political fkiends. — diffebent pkin- CIl'LES AND MOVING CAUSES OF FOEEIGN POLICY. — THE FOREIGN POLICY IN HARMONY "WITH THE EXISTING STATE AND TKUE TEN- DENCIES OF CIVILIZATION. — CHAEACTEIt OF THE ISOLATION OF FEANCE AFTER THE TREATY OF THE loTH OF JULY, 1810. — DEBATES ON THE ADDRESS IN THE TWO CHAMBERS ON THE OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1810-1811. — ARRIVAL OF THE PRINCE DE JOINVILLE AT CHEK- BOURO, BRINGING FROM ST. HELENA, IN THE FRIGATE ' BELLE POULE,' THE REMAINS OF NAPOLEON. — JOURNEY OF THE COFFIN FROM HAVRE TO PARIS. — STATE OF MINDS ON THE ROUTE. — CEREMONY OF THE OBSEQUIES AT THE INVALIDES. — CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JULY TOWARDS TIIK MEMORY OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. — FORTIFI- CATIONS OF PARIS. — VAUBAN AND NAPOLEON. — PREPARATORY STUDIES. — VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF FORTIFICATION. — HOW THE FINAL RESOLU- TION WAS TAKEN. — INTRODUCTION, DEBATE, AND ADOPTION OF THE BILL. — OPINION OF EUROPE ON THIS MEASURK. When the ministry of the 29th of October, 1840, formed itself, I fell into no illusion as to the diffi- culties, dangers, and vexations of the position I / B 2 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON accepted. As in 1831, we undertook to resist, on a question of peace or war, the national inclination. We began to admit that we had engaged too far in the cause of the Pacha of Egypt, that we had relied too much on his power of self-defence, and that the question had neither interest nor basis of sufficient importance to induce France to brave a European war. But although serious and sincere, this tardy return to sound judgment, in face of the abrupt apparition of the truth, was partial and painful. Those even who were most eager to adopt it, felt some uneasiness at their recent ardour, and a con- siderable portion of the public remained much moved by the reverses of Mehemet Ali, by the check which French policy had received, and irritated beyond measure, although not without cause, against the treaty of the 15th of July, and the proceedings which had accompanied its conclusion. The light which enlightens minds fails to appease passions, and an acknowledged error affords no consolation for a mor- tifying position. The adversaries of pacific reaction re])udiated it the more vehemently, as they were no longer in a condition to indulge their warlike aspira- tions, and to answer for the results. I felt confident tliat in the coming struggle, the support of the true, h'gitimate, and leading interests of the country, would not be witldu'ld from me ; but once more I saw myself at issue witli ])opular sentiments and prejudices, the force of wliicli I acknowledged, while I opposed and considered them ill-founded. AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 6 There was, moreover, something of embarrassment in my personal position at the moment when I re- sumed the burden of power. I succeeded a cabinet- with wliicli I liad been associated for eight months by remaining, according to its wish and under its direction, ambassador in London. For myself, and in my own most rigorous scruples, this embarrassment had no existence ; I had clearly explained from the first day, upon what conditions and within what limits, whether in foreign or domestic affairs, I gave my adhesion to the ministry presided over by M. Thiers. As long as we confined ourselves within those bounds, I had loyally seconded and sustained his policy ; but as soon as I saw the cabinet pre- paring to exceed the paths in wliich I had promised my concurrence, I apprised him that I could not follow in that direction, and after communicating my full opinion on the state of affairs, external and in- ternal, I requested and received permission to repair to Paris at the opening of the Chambers, that I might be in a position to declare my views. In " My Embassy to England," I inserted in detail, with their proper dates, these reservations and their proofs. I had therefore punctiliously fulfilled my engagements, and was, when the new cabinet instalknl itself, in free possession of my liberty. But the public, within and without the Chambers, knew nothing of this private understanding between the ])receding ministry and myself, nor of its vicissitudes ; and as it had not been openly ap})arent, astonishment might readily arise, at B 2 4 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON seeing me succeed, with a clifFerent policy, the govern- ment I had served. Appearances thus existed which nothing but a public statement of facts and situations could effectually dissipate. Another circumstance, more closely personal still, affected me deeply. I foresaw that my acceptance of power, and the policy I intended to pursue, would lead to the loss of friends who were dear to me. We must have lived in the midst of the passions and con- tests of a free government to estimate the value and charm of political attachments. In that fiery arena wliere men hazard and engage, under the eyes of the world, their self-respect and reputation, as well as their fortunes, life is severe and painful ; the combat is unsparing and incessant; successes are ever dispu- ted and precarious, failures are signal and galling. In no position are the union of minds and the constancy of ])ersonal reUitions more necessary; in nothing do we more require the support of warm and faithful adhe- rents, and the confidence that a vast measure of true sympathy mingles with the bitternesses and chances of that pitiless war. And when we have possessed tliese advantages, when we have long marched side by side witli generous companions, great indeed is the vexation to see them separate and diverge into paths wli(>re the alienation becomes wider from day to day. In 1S40, I liad to endure this sorrow. The group of ])oliti(;d friends, in the midst of whom I had lived until then, broke up permanently: MM. Uuchatel, Dunion, A'illemain, Altet, Ilebcrt, Jouffroy, llenouard, AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 5 remained under the same flag with myself; hut !MM. de Remusat and Jauhert, who had hoth sat in the cahinet of M. Thiers, MM. Piscatory and Duvergier de Ilauranne. who liad approved of and supported his measures to the end, entered, through very difl'erent impulses, and at very unequal depths, into the ranks of tlie opposition that awaited me. Bossuet goes too far when he describes and fulmi- nates with j)ious disdain against " tlie changing wills and deceitful words of politicians, the evasions of promises, the illusions of worldly friendships, which vanish with years and interests, and the profound obscurity of the heart of man, which never knows what it may desire, whicli often is only imperfectly aware of what it actually wants, and which is no less deceitful and concealed from itself than from others." This sublime painter of human weaknesses and of the eiTors of life, is too rigorous : all is not fluctuation in the wills of politicians, nor deceit in their words, nor evasion in their promises, nor illusion in their friendsliips. In tlie hearts and minds of men devoted to ]mblic life, then^ is more of seriousness, sincerity, and constancy than moralists allow ; and not more with tliem than in tli(> ranks of privacy do friend- ships entirely fade away witli years and interests. In the ardour of ])oliti(al struggles, we demand from men mor(^ than we can or ouglit to expect. Because Ave r(H|uin> and tliirst aftcn* strong sympathy, efl'ectual attachment, and enduring luiion, we feel astonished and irritated when these supports break down. 'Jliis 6 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON is to want freedom of mind and equitable judgment ; for thus we forget the inevitable diversity of ideas and situations in proportion as events develop them- selves and change, the irremediable insufficiency of realities to satisfy our desires, and all that there is of incomplete, imperfect, and fickle in our best and sin- cerest relations. These calamities of our nature are neither more common nor more controlling with poli- ticians than with other men ; and when they display themselves, the pangs they inflict neither efface the merits which produced sympathy, nor justify their oblivion, I felt poignantly the grief of the separations I am now referring to ; but that sentiment was speedily checked and surmounted by the urgency of the cause and the part I had to sustain. It forms the charm and peril of public life that the interests involved are so great and pressing that every other feeling bows down and disappears before their empire. To decide on peace or war, to give laws to nations, to secure or compromise their prosperity or their glory, — these noble labours absorb the entire soul, and carry thouglit to such an elevation tliat all which passes below ap[)ears insignificant or indifferent compared with the superior work in hand. I do not hesitate to say that the hauglity coldness with which politicians are so often reproaclied, never infected me, and that ni}' h(>avt was {>vt'r open to tlie ordinary sympathies and r(\^i-ets, tlie common joys and sorrows of life. I)Ut in tlie heat of action, in presence of the lead- AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 7 ing questions I had to solve, and under the influence of the ideas which occupied my mind, every other consideration and prepossession became secondary, and my personal regrets never reached the point of shaking or overthrowing my constancy. Moreover, I always carried into public life the disposition of an optimist, ever ready or determined to hope for success. This tendency, at the outset, covers difficulties with a veil, and at a later period renders trials more easy of endurance. Independently of these indirect considerations, I had superior and more decisive reasons for accepting and feeling gratified with the position into which I was about to enter. In the diplomatic complication which agitated Europe, I saw a brilliant opportunity of exercising and loudly proclaiming a foreign policy, extremely new and bold in fact, though moderate in appearance ; the only foreign policy which in 18-10 suited the peculiar position of France and her govern- ment, as also the only course in harmony witli the guiding principles and permanent wants of the great scheme of civilization to which the world of to-day aspires and tends. The spirit of conquest, of propagandism, and of system, have hitherto been the moving causes and masters of the foreign policy of States. Tlie ambi- tion of princes or peoples has sought its gratification in territorial aggrandisement. Keligious or political faith has endeavoured to expand by imposing itself. Great heads of government liave attempted to regulate 8 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON the destinies of nations according to profound combina- tions, the offspring rather of their own thought than the natural result of facts. Let us cast a glance over the history of international European relations. We shall see the spirit of conquest, or of armed propagand- ism, or of some systematic design upon the territorial organization of Europe, inspire and determine the foreign policy of governments. Let one or other of these impulses prevail, and governments have disposed arbitrarily of the fate of nations ; war has ever been their indispensable mode of action. I know that this course of things has been the ftital result of men's passions, and that in spite of those passions and the evils they have inflicted on nations, European civilization has continued to increase and prosper, and may increase and prosper still more. It is to the honour of the Christian world that evil does not stifle good. I know that the progress of civiliza- tion and public reason will not abolish human pas- sions, and that, under their impulse, the spirit of con- (juest, of armed propagandism, and of system will ever maintain, in the foreign policy of States, their place and ])()rtion. lint at tlie same time I hold for certain tliat these various incentives are no longer in harmony with tlie existing state of manners, ideas, interests, and social instincts, and that it is quite possible to-day to combat and restrain materially their empire. The extent and activity of industry and commerce, the ne- cessity of consulting the general good, the liabit of frequent, easy, prompt, and regular intercourse between AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 9 peoples, the invincible bias for free association, inquiry, discussion, and publicity, — these characteristic features of great modern society, already exercise, and will con- tinue to exercise more and more, against the warlike or diplomatic fancies of foreign policy, a prepondera- ting influence. People smile, not without reason, at tlie language and puerile confidence of the Friends of Peace, and of the Peace Societies ; all the leading ten- dencies, all the most elevated liopcs of humanity have their dreams, and their idle gaping advocates, as they have also their days of decline and defeat ; but they no less pursuetheir course, and through all the chimeras of some, the doubts and mockeries of others, society becomes transformcHl, and policy, foreign and domestic, is compelled to transform itself with society. AVe have witnessed the most dazzling exploits of the spirit of conquest, the most impassioned efforts of the spirit of armed propagandism ; we have seen territories and States moulded and re-moulded, unmade, remade, and unmade again at the pleasure of combinations more or less specious. AMuit survives of all these violent and arbitrary works I They have fallen, like plants without roots, or edifices without foundation. And now, wlien analogous enterprises are attem])ted, scarcely luiv(> tliey mad(> a few steps in advance, when tliey |)ause and liesitat<\ as if embarrassed by and doui)tf"ul of tlu>mselv(^s. So little are tlu^y in accord with the real wants, the profound instincts of existing so- ciety, and with the persevering, though frequently dis- puted tendencies of modern civilizati(jn. 10 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON I say " the persevering though disputed tendencies." We are, in fact, in a singular crisis. At the same time that general ideas, public manners, social inter- ests, and the combined harmony of our civilization, invoke internally, progress by peace and liberty ; and externally, patient influence through respect for rights and examples of sound policy, instead of the improvident intervention of force ; — at the same time, I repeat, our history since 1789, our endless succes- sion of shocks, revolutions, and wars, have left us in a state of feverish agitation w^hich renders peace in- sipid, and teaches us to find a blind gratification in the unexpected strokes of a hazardous policy. We are in prey to two opposing currents ; one deep and regular, which carries us towards the definitive goal of our social state ; the other superficial and dis- turbed, which throws us here and there in search of new adventures and unknown lands. Thus we float and alternate, between these two opposing directions, called towards the one by our sound sense and moral conviction, and enticed towards the other by our ha- bits of routine, and freaks of imagination. Tt was the merit and glory of the government of 1830, that from its first days, it did not hesitate, in I)resencc of this alternative, to comprehend the true and superior spirit of modern civilization, and to adopt it as the nde of its conduct, despite the temp- tations and inenuc(>s of the spirit of armed propagan- dism and conqu(\st. From 1830 to 1832 this sound and elevated policy triumphed in the struggle. In AND FOirriFICATICiNS OF PARIS. 11 1840, when the cabinet of the 29th of October was formed, it was again subjected to a new experiment. Our entire constitutional system, King, Chambers, and Country, were once more called upon to decide wliether they would go to ^^•ar without sufficient and legitimate motives, from routine and enthusiasm, and not for the public interest or necessity. Notwithstanding the weight of the burden, I es- teemed myself happy and honoured in becoming, under tliis contingency, the interpreter and defender of the policy which had my entii*e and inmost ad- hesion. I enjoy enterprises at once rational and diffi- cult, and 1 know no greater pleasure in public life than that of struggling for a great truth still new and little understood. Nothing, in my eyes, was more important to my country tlian to escape from the ruts of a dangerous and sliortsighted foreign policy, to enter upon paths more dignified and also more secure. During my residence in London, I liad convinced my- self that with tlie greater portion of the powers who liad sign(>d tlie treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, the act was not influenced by any premeditated ill-will towards France and her govei'nment, and that despite the pr()ce(>ding of which we complained, the English cabinet liad never ceased to attach high value to its good understanding with Fiance. Austria and Prus- sia had closely at li(\art the maintenance of peace. The Emperor Nicholas himself was not at all anxious that his unfiiendly disposition should be compelled to assume a bolder aspect. Far therefore from ap- 12 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON prehencling, in Europe, an attempt to aggravate and encourage, against us, the isolation in which we found ourselves, I had grounds for hoping that eiforts would be made to end it, and that my presence in office might prove serviceable to this result. The firm and sincere support of King Louis Philippe was assured to me. Disposed, on the first impulse, not to combat, and sometimes even to adopt popular impres- sions, he speedily recognized their want of foresight and danger, and then resisted them with persevering courage. He had believed that Mehemet Ali could make a stronger defence, and that the English cabi- net would not act without the co-operation of France. But even before he recovered from the double delu- sion, he foresaw that in this afi"air, the peace of Eu- rope, the basis of his general policy, might, in the end, become compromised, and I satisfied myself that he was resolved not to drift upon that rock. lie, at once, treated me with marked confidence and kind- ness that no one about him could misconstrue, and all refrained from exhibiting towards me the frivolous coldnesses and petty veiled hostilities, which constitute the imp(M-tinent pleasure of the hangers-on of a court. He imparted to me tlic sliglitest incidents, as they occurred, as also his own proceedings, wishing to do nothing without my knowledge and advice : " I have just received," lie wrote to me on the 31st of October, ] 840, " a l('tt(n- of yesterday's date from King Leopold, wlio has ytnt some questions to me which I want to answer by this day's post. Before doing so, however. AJsD FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 13 I should like to have a moment's conversation with you, and I pray you to come to me, if you can." And again, two daj s later, on the 2nd of November : " the articles in the ' Morning Chronicle,' the ' Times,' and 'Globe,' which I have just read, appear to me impor- tant, and I wish }-ou would give me an opportunity of speaking with you without delay. I shall remain within until you arrive, that they may not have to look for me, and to occupy as little of your time as possi- ble." He apprised me of the seeds of discord, of the jealousies or embarrassments which seemed to peep forth in the interior of the cabinet, and employed his utmost care to extinguish them. At the com- mencement, he had little to do, in this respect. My particular friends, MM. Duchatel, Ilumann, and Ville- main, filled the principal posts in the administration ; Marslial Soult was content with his position, and urged no importunate pretensions; MM. Cunin-Cari- daine and Martin (du Nord), represented faithfully that centre of the Chamber of Deputies, whicli had not followed me, in 1831), in tlie coalition against M. Mole, but which, in 1840, rallied frankly on my side, pressed by its anxiety for order and ])eace. I could reckon upon the harmony and common action of the cabinet, as on the sup])<)rt of the King. At the opening of the sessicm, in the debate on the addresses of both Chambers, in reply to the speech from the throne, tlie question was plainly stated : "Why has the cabinet of the 29th of October re- placed that of the 1st of March T' asked M. Thiers; 14 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON " because the cabinet of the 1st of March thought that, under particular conditions, it might be neces- sary to declare war. What does the cabinet of the 1st of March bring with it ] It brings certain peace." I replied on the instant : " The honourable M. Thiers has just said, 'under the ministry of the 29th of Oc- tober, the question is settled, peace is certain.' The honourable member has only declared half the truth : under the ministry of the 1st of March war was cer- tain. We were both in the right. The two poli- cies confronting each other after the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, led, in fact, one to war, the other to peace." But after thus accepting for both, their true name, I hastened to add : " And now let us not mutually retort these words : — war at any price, peace at any price. — Let us do justice to each other. No, you were not the cabinet of war at any price, neither are we the cabinet of peace at any price. You were a cabinet of intelligent and bold spirits, who thought that the dignity, the interest, and the intiiience of France called for war in the existing position, and tliat France should prepare for it now, to be ready by the spring. AVell ; I thought, and I still think that you deceived yourselves ; 1 believe that in the a(-tual state of things, the interest and honour of France do not call for war ; that the treaty of the 15th of July contains no ])lea for war. Herein lies th(> true and honest question between us, and the question we have to discuss to-day." This was, in fact, tlie object of the debate. An- AND FOKTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 15 Other point, entirely personal to myself, was attached to it. Had I sufficiently foreseen the chances of the negotiation with which I was charged] Had I fully represented them to the cabinet of the 1st of March? Had I communicated my difference of opinion as soon as events, and tlie attitude assumed by the ministry, had excited it ? Had I discharged all the duties of an am- bassador while maintaining my independence as a de- puty 1 In the preceding volume of these memoirs, when relating the details of my embassy, I have al- ready named what I had to say in reply tc^ these in- terrogatories. In both Chambers the debate turned essentially on my diplomatic correspondence ; of this I have already published all that was important and characteristic ; I have no occasion to repeat it here ; I have openly recorded my opinion on the causes, as on the bearing of the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, and my personal conduct in the negotiation. My reasons, explanations, and quotations satisfied both Chambers. At the same time they felt and admitted that I neither could nor ought yet to speak of the events which were following their course in the East, and of the fresh negotiations to which tliey had given rise. On the 18th of November, and the 5th of December, 1840, a considerable and determined ma- jority declared, in both Chambers, their sanction of the policy I was pursuing ; and after tlie formal de- bate on the two addresses, the cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840, felt itself firmly established. While the policy of peace thus achieved a \ictory 16 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON through public and free discussion, the policy of war also obtained its triumph. On the 30th of Novem- ber, 1840, at five in the morning, the frigate ' Belle Poule,' commanded by the Prince de Joinville, cast anchor before Cherbourg, bearing from St. Helena the remains of the Emperor Napoleon ; and on the 3rd of December, in the midst of an ardent population crowding round the Prince de Joinville, who had disembarked the preceding evening, an unbeneficed priest, the Abbe Pauline, a chaplain in the navy, said to him, with an emotion participated in by all present, " Will your Royal Highness permit the son of a labouring man, now a naval chaplain, to ofi'er his respectful homage to the son of his king? Perhaps you will pardon me for uniting my feeble voice to the great national cry of France, and for anticipating the judgment of posterity w^hich will assign to you the full credit due for your expedition to St. Helena, and will engra\e your name by the side of that of the King, your august father, on the glorious cofiin of the great Emperor. Honour to you. Prince ! Ho- nour to the monarch of whom you are the worthy son ! The cry is not mine alone ; I bring it to you freslily uttered by the mouths of two hundred brave invalids, confined, by the toils of service, within the naval h()S])ital of ('herbourg. Tliis is the vivat with which they yesterday greeted, in conjunction with the national cannon, your entry into our harbour." The invalids of Clierbourg, and their chajdain, thus truly refiected the ])ublic sentiment. At the first moment, AXD FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 17 in presence of this generous sympathy on the part of the King, his sons, and his government, for great national reminiscences, all party hatred and personal rivalry were hushed ; nothing was seen or heard but the justice rendered by all to all, to the living and the dead, to the victors and the vanquished, to Louis Philippe and Napoleon, to war and to peace. The 'Belle Poule' remained eight days in the port of Cherbourg, while on the road from ^a^re to Paris, and in Paris itself, preparations were making for the passage and reception of the coffin. "We had deter- mined, with the full sanction of the King, to invest this ceremony with the greatest possible solemnity, and to afford unfettered freedom to popular manifes- tations. On the 8th of December, in presence of all the authorities, the military and naval forces, the na- tional guard of Cherbourg, and a numerous popula- tion, the coffin was transferred from the ' Belle Poule' to the steamer ' Xormandie,' which immediately de- part(xl for Havre, escorted by two other men-of-war. A minor incident, little remembered at present, al- though mentioned by the journals of tlie time, at- tested, in tliis particular case, the universal concur- rence of all gcMierous sentiments. The French flag, which floated from the summit of the mainmast of the ' Xormandie,' had becMi embroid(>r(Hl by English hands; it was the work of the ladies of St. Helena, presented by them to the Prince de Joinville, who promised that if sliould wa^ e over the coffin of the illustrious prisoner given up by England to France, until Paris c 18 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON was reached. Between Havre and Rouen, at Val de la Haye, the 'Normandie' was unable to proceed higher up the Seine ; a flotilla of six small steamboats waited her arrival, and a second transfer took place. The vessel appointed to receive the coffin (' La Do- rado,' No. 8) was pompously decorated. The Prince de Joinville, with appropriate tact, directed all orna- ments to be withdrawn, and funeral appendages only to be substituted. His order was thus expressed : " The boat will be painted black ; the imperial flag will be hoisted at the masthead ; the coffin will be placed on the fore part of the deck, covered with the funeral- pall brought from St. Helena ; incense will be burnt ; the cross will be placed at the head ; the priest will stand before the altar ; myself and my staff behind ; the sailors will be armed ; a cannon fired astern, will announce the vessel bearing the mortal remains of the Emperor. There will be no other decoration." Thus arranged, tlie funeral procession ascended lei- surely up the Seine, finding everywhere, in the fields as in the towns, the population flocking on both sides of the river. It was received in all places with grat(^ful, curious, and respectful admiration, entirely divested of all party feeling. On the 14th of De- cemb(!r, as it reached the waters of Xeuilly, they re- marked, on board the ' Horade,' a group of four or five ladies assembled on tlie bank, who waved their handkercliiefs witli animation. " It is my mother !" exclaimed tlie Prince de Joinville. It was, in fact, Queen Marie Amclie, the first to greet, with maternal AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 19 joy, her son on his entry mto Paris, bearing from St. Helena the mortal remains of Napoleon. On Tuesday, tlie loth of December, before noon, the King, the Queen, the royal family, the Chambers, the ministers, with a serious and silent crowd, were assembled in the Churcli of the Invalid es, under the dome and round the canopy, waiting the arrival of the funeral procession which had started at ten from the shore at Courbevoie, and advanced slowly between ranks of regular troops and national guards, preceded, surrounded, followed, and jostled, indescribably, by a whole people, eager to look upon and approach it. The cold was intense, the atmosphere frozen, the wind piercing ; yet nothing checked or discouraged the vast concourse. Upon the wliole, that human ocean was calm, divested of all political excitement, and intent upon the spectacle alone. Occasionally, from point to point, and at distinct intervals, in the midst of little groups, dispersed amongst the national guards and the crowd, some factious s])irits had met designedly, and declared themselves by shouts of — Down with Guizof ! Down with the niinisfo:^ ! Down with the Enf/l{,-ih ! ])own u itli tlw dctaclieil forts ! These cries were not takiMi up, and no one troubled himself to re- jU'ess thein ; they burst forth freely and were lost in the air, witliout contagion or resistance ; a symptom at the same time serious and vain of the contests to which France and her government were still reserved. At two o'clock tlie procession arrived before the iron gates of the Invalides ; the clergy received it under c i 20 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON the portico ; a mingled funeral and triumphal march announced its approach ; the cannon boomed from without ; the national guard presented arms ; the pen- sioners closed ranks and drew sabres ; the coffin en- tered, borne by soldiers and sailors ; the Prince de Joinville headed the procession, sword in hand ; the King advanced to meet him. " Sire," said the Prince, lowering the point of his weapon to the ground, " I present to you the body of the Emperor Napoleon." " I receive it in the name of France," replied the King ; and taking from the hands of Marshal Soult the Em- peror's sword, he delivered it to General Bertrand, with these words : — " General Bertrand, I desire you to place the Emperor's sword on his coffin." Then turning to General Gourgaud, he said, " General Gourgaud, place on the coffin the Emperor's hat." These duties performed, the King resumed his place, and the funeral service commenced. It lasted two hours, in the midst of a profound and universal silence which covered the many conflicting emotions excited by this grand spectacle in the souls of the spectators. At five o'clock the ceremony terminated ; the King returned to the Tuileries, and the crowd dispersed trancjuilly. That evening, the most perfect calm reigned throughout Paris. I do not wish to speak of the past solely with the experience 1 have since acquired, and the convictions I at i)resent entertain. I find, in a letter I addressed three days after, on tlie 18th of December, to one of my friends, Baron Mounier, at that time absent from AND FOIITIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 21 Paris, the faithful expression of the effect produced upon me at the moment when this incident occurred, and the judgment I then formed: — " Behokl us, my dear friend," I wrote to him, " safely cleared from our second deiile. Napoleon and a million of French people have found themselves in contact, under the fire of a conspiring press, and not a spark has been elicited. We are more in the right than we think. In spite of many evil appearances and actual weaknesses, this country desires order, peace, and good govern- ment. Our revolutionary squalls are factitious and transient. They would sweep all before them, were tliey not resisted ; but when opposed, they stop, like those huge fires of straw kindled by children in the streets, but to which no one brings solid aliment. The spectacle of Tuesday was beautiful. It was purely a spectacle. Our adversaries had promised themselves two things — a riot against me, and a de- monstration of warlike feeling. Both expectations failed. All was confined to a few cries evidently pre- concerted, and not at all contagious. The disappoint- ment is great, for tlie labour had been active. On Tuesday evening no one could have suspected what liad occurred in tlu^ morning. Already it has ceased to be talked of The general difficulties of the go- vernment subsist still, ever the same, and immense. The menacing incidents are dissipated ; ^lehemet Ali remains in Egypt, and Napoleon reposes at the In- valides." My first impulse, on re-perusing this letter to-day, 22 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON is to smile mournfully at my confidence. The soul and the life of nations have infinite depths, into which day cannot penetrate, except by unforeseen ex- plosions, and nothing is more deceptive as to what is concealed and in preparation there, than a superficial and momentary success. In December, 1840, on the arrival of the remains of Napoleon, things passed as I have just described them; a great memory and a grand spectacle ; nothing more appeared, and the friends of liberty and peace were justified in believing that the imperial system was buried definitively in the coffin of the Emperor. I do not regret our mistake. It did not create the events which have revealed it. It is not because King Louis Philippe and his advi- sers re-erected the statue of Napoleon, and brought his remains from St. Helena, that the imperial name was found to be powerful in the midst of the social ])erturbation of 1848. The monarchy of 1830 would not have gained a day by showing itself jealous, fear- ful, and anxious to stifle the reminiscences of the Empire. And in this subordinate attempt, it would have lost tlic glory of the liberty it respected, and of the generosity it displayed towards its enemies. A glory which attaches to it after its reverses, and is also a power tliat death cannot assail. Simultaneously with our brilliant accomplishment of the obsecpiies of Napoleon, we brought before the clianibers another question, more political and less popular, raised also by tlie preceding cabinet, and left for our solution ; — the question of tlie fortifications of AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 23 Paris. More than two centuries earlier, in the midst of the great wars of Louis XIV., Vauban had sug- gested it. Napoleon took it into consideration, even before he was compelled to defend the capital of France after having invaded nearly all those of con- tinental Europe. Tlie fear of rendering the inhabi- tants uneasy, and the incredible rapidity of events, prevented him, as he tells us himself in his ' Memoirs,' from carrying out this great idea. Under tlie Kestora- tion, in 1818, Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr, after having re-modelled the army, instructed a grand commission, called " Committee of Defence," to examine the condi- tion of the fortresses, and to point out all that was required for the safety of tlie kingdom. After study- ing tlie subject for three years and a half, that com- mission delivered to the minister of war a report in which it insisted strongly on the necessity of fortifying Iaous and Paris. After the revolution of July, from I80O to 18o4, the idea was resumed; King Louis Philippe enten^d warmly into it ; Marshal Soult put his hand to the work; operations commenced and funds were asked for from the Chambers, at first on a small scale and without display. Put when, in 18.">o, by the demand of a special credit of thirty- five millions, the enterprise revealed itself in its full extent, economical objections and popular discpiiet, manifested thcnisclves ; financiers bowed their heads des])ondingly ; the citizens of Paris fluctuated between their patriotic zeal and the terrors of a siege. In the Chambers and in the daily pa})ers, the opposition 24 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON took advantage of these various apprehensions and fomented them with ardour. The men of war, declared partisans of the measure, furnished the arms them- selves ; they were divided in opinion ; some demanded for the defence of Paris, a strong enclosing wall con- tinuous and bastioned ; others, a certain number of detached forts, established at a distance from the city, according to the configuration of the ground, and which, they held, would be sufficient to cover the approaches. Both systems were supported by soldiers of high reputation. General Ilaxo and Marshal Clauzel were for the continuous enclosure ; Generals llogniat and Bernard, and Marshal Soult himself, re- commended the detached forts. The opposition furi- ously attacked the last project, imputing to power the design of using the forts to overawe Paris, rather than to repulse a foreign foe. In the midst of this contest between theories and parties, the works remained sus- pended. In 1830, and to put an end to this agitated paralysis. Marshal Maison, at that time minister of war, instituted a second committee of defence, with instructions to examine thoroughly the two systems, and to propose a final decision. After another three years of deliberation and discussion, this commission pronounced both plans imperfect and inadequate, and tluit to malvi) them efficacious they ought to be com- bined and rendered mutually available in a fixed pro- ])orti()n, according to the duties assigned to each. The treatise in wliicli this new scheme, with the lead- ing reasons for its ad()])tion, was explained, reached AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 25 the hands of King Louis Philippe in May, 1840 ; and two months had scarcely elapsed before the treaty of the 15th of July induced its prompt execution. The veiy day on which the signature of this treaty at London, w^as announced in the ' Moniteur ' at Paris (the 2Tth of July, 1840), the Duke of Orleans sum- moned to St. Cloud one of his aides-de-camp, M. de C'habaud Latour, at that time a lieutenant-colonel in the engineers, whose character and ability he held in equal estimation : " Well," said he, " we have often talked of fortifying Paris ; we are now at the foot of the wall ; how do you think we ought to settle this question ?" " Your Royal Highness," replied M. de Chabaud, " knows my opinion. To fortify Paris, we require a continuous enclosure with detached forts ; an enclosure to prevent the enemy from penetrating through the large gaps of two or three thousand metres between each fort ; and forts to save the po- pulation from the horrors of a siege, and to render the circle of investment so extensive that it would become almost impossible, even to the most numerous armies." — "This is entirely my own view," replied the Prince; here are a map and a pencil ; trace the enclosure." The young officer, who, since his return from Algeria in 1S->'I, had been employed in the works commenced for tlie defence of Paris, and had made that subject his principal study, immediately traced the circuit wliich the ench^sure ought approximately to follow. " Good," said tlie Duke ; "now place the forts." M, de Chabaud marked fifteen positions on both banks 26 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON of the Seine, which appeared to him indispensable. " And now," added the Duke of Orleans, " bring this plan with you, and let us go to M. Thiers." Both repaired instantly to Auteuil, where M. Thiers then resided. M. de Chabaud then explained in detail to the president of the council the plan he had traced upon the chart, and which had been selected in 1836 by the committee of defence instituted by Marshal Maison, as the only complete and effective system. The three interlocutors discussed the sum total of ex- pense, the permanency of the works, the number of hands they would require, and the employment of troops in their construction. " Can you draw up for me," said M. Thiers to the young officer, " a detailed plan, and what time will it require ?" — " Six days, I think, will suffice." — " Take them ; we have many preliminary questions to settle between this and then, touching this great affair ; as soon as your plan is ready, we will lay it before the council." Aided by all the ministerial documents collected from Vauban down to General ])ode de la Brunerie, reporter of the Commission of 1836, M. de Chabaud Latour, at the expiration of six days, completed his task, traced the entire plan of the fortifications, en- closure, and forts, discussed tlie modes of execution, and cakndated minutely the (^xpense, whicli, according to him, ouglit not to exceed one hundred and forty millions, I'x^fore taking this statement to the Duke of Orleans, lu> requested liis permission to submit it to jNIurshal Vaillant, at that date a brigadier-general, AND FOKTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 27 commandant of the Polytechnic School, for a long time aide-de-camp to General Ilaxo, and already looked upon in the engineers as one of the most eminent officers of that arm. After minutely scrutinizing the work of the younjr lieutenant-colonel, " I am ready," said General A^aillant to him, " to sign this project with both hands ; tell the Duke of Orleans so, and add, that I request, as a favour, for which I shall be profoundly grateful, to be called to co-operate, in any post he may select, in the execution of this thoroughly national undertaking, which has my entire conviction." Strong in this support, the Prince and his aide-de- camp returned to ^I. Thiers, ^^ho, without hesitation, approved of a work conformable with the ideas he had liimself conceived and already expressed on the sub- ject. The King's consent was the next step to accom- ])lish. lie was not yet convinced of the necessity of the continuous enclosure, and inclined to believe that tlie forts would suffice for the defence of Paris, to wliich opinion he ardently adliered. Tlie subject was several timers discussed in liis presence, in cabinet councils and at special conferences. During this in- terval, tlie o])p()siti()n journals, aware of the King's prcdiU'ction for the system of forts, attacked it every morning, and veliemently advocated the continuous enclosure. At last, one day at St. Cloud, after a long conversation between the King, the Duke of Or- leans, M. Thiers, General Oubieres, at that time mi- nister of war. and the young framer of the proposed plan, the King exclaimed, with the familiar gaiety 28 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON which often accompanied his resolutions : " Come, Chartres, we adopt your project. I know well, that to enable us to carry the point of the fortifications of Paris, they must cry in the streets, Down with Louis Philippe ! The continuous enclosure for ever !" The resolution once adopted, the speedy results are well known. Extraordinary credits were opened ; many workmen and vast supplies were collected. General Dode de la Brunerie, the senior lieutenant- general of engineers, and president of the committee of fortifications, was appointed to superintend the un- dertaking. A scientific and experienced officer, as conscientious as able, and extremely careful of his personal dignity, while at the same time devoted to his duties as soldier and citizen, he only accepted this great mission after a severe examination of the scheme, its conditions and means, and a prudent selection of his co-operators. All applied themselves to the task without delay. When the cabinet of the 29th of Oc- tober, 1840, entered on office, the question of the for- tifications of Paris was decided, the plan adopted, the works everywhere commenced, and carrying on with energy. We accepted this inheritance without hesitation. I did not deceive myself as to its obligations. On very opposite grounds, the fortifications of Paris and the system adopted, displeased many of my own poli- tical friends, and of the most ardent folloAvers of the op])ositi()n. The former saw therein a relic of the po- licy of the [)receding cabinet, a chance of war through AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 29 the confidence which the partisans of war would thence derive, and all the dangers of a siege for Paris, should w'ar break out. The latter became alarmed at the strength which power would thus acquire against po- pular movements in the capital. In the opinion of the first, a sort of challenge was offered to Europe ; wliile the last considered that a great obstacle was raised to freedom of revolutions. In time of war, the continuous enclosure made Paris a prison ; in time of peace, the detached forts were so many Bastilles by which the city was surrounded. Advocates for finan- cial order were terrified at the enormous expense, impossible, as they said, to estimate or limit with ex- actness. Tliese objections and obstacles found, even in the bosom of the cabinet, a dangerous support. M. liumann openly evinced his discontent, and Mar- shal Soult, when presenting the bill, expressly declared his persistent disapproval of the continuous enclosure. '• I have never abandoned," he said, " tlie opinion I was called on to declare on this same question in 1831, 1832, and 1833; but I considered that the moment liad not yet arrived for repeating it. Tlius I have studiously laid it aside until tlie entire subject came before the Chamber. But I owe to it and to myself the declaration tliat I still reserve that early opinion wliich neither time nor circumstances have weakened." To surmount tliese difficulties, two conditions were indispensable. Externally, and in our relations with Europe, it was necessary that the fortifications of Paris 30 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON should evidently bear the character of a defensive step, intended to prevent, much rather than to provoke war ; and in harmony with the pacific policy we were main- taining. Internally, and in the Chambers, a complete concert on this point was essential, between the recent and the existing cabinet, and that they should mutu- ally defend the measure against its different adver- saries. On these terms alone could a majority be formed and the passing of the bill secured. The case involved a diplomatic and a parliamentary question, equally pressing and delicate. To solve the first, I did not content myself with seizing, in the course of the debate, every opportunity that offered of thoroughly establishing the political bearing of the bill, and the moral effect which the fortification of Paris, once established, could not fail to produce in the interest of European peace. As soon as the law was voted in the Chamber of De- puties, I wrote to the representatives of France in Europe, especially to Count Bresson, the King's mi- nister at Berlin, whom I knew to be zealous and skil- ful in disseminating through Grcrmany our views and words : " Paris is half fortified. I have considered it highly important to attach to the bill its true and fundamental cliaracter, as a pledge of peace and an evidence of strength. This was necessary for our ex- ternal relations, and also for the Chamber itself. If I had not convinced three-fourths of the conservative party that the measure harmonized with their policy as well as with ours, it would infallibly have fallen AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 31 through. Endeavour constantly in your language to maintain the physiognomy I am anxious to impress on it. Neither menace nor fear ; neither agitating nor agitated ; extremely pacific and extremely watch- ful. Let no act or word on your part derogate from this double character of our policy. This is our only metliod of recovering at the same time security and influence." The parliamentary question caused us more embar- rassment than the diplomatic one. This was not pro- duced by any difficulty of concord, in the debate and vote, between the old and the new cabinet. M. Thiers and his colleagues were the original parties interested. Their resolutions and acts were what we required the Chambers to sanction. In adopting these resolutions and acts, and in the introduction of the bill which embodied them, we accepted the responsibility for ourselves, but witliout releasing its first proposers, and they were called upon, equally with us, to desire that the bill and its double system of fortifications should pass into law. This reciprocal position was perfectly luiderstood and loyally accepted on both sides. ]\I. Thiers and his colleagues resolutely supported the bill we as resolutely introchiced. It was within the cabinet and from the attitude of its president that the embarrassnunit emanated. As we have seen. Marshal Soult, when presenting the bill, formally reserved his personal opinion against the continous enclosure and in favour of the detaclied forts alone. Participating in the Marshal's convictions, and perhaps also in com- 32 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON pliance with his secret desire, one of his intimate friends, General Schneider, his minister of war in the cabinet of the 12th of May, 1839, made this idea the object of a formal amendment, and proposed in the bill, the suppression of the continuous enclosure. The adversaries of that system eagerly seized this chance of ejecting the clause. A long discussion ensued, Marshal Soult entered into it to explain his position, while maintaining, on this point, his opinion against the bill he had himself presented. His explanations aggravated instead of dissipating the confusion of the debate. It might have been thought from what he said, — and the adversaries of the continuous enclosure laboured to impress the belief — that the President of the Council abandoned the bill to attack and would willingly see it mutilated. Suspicion pervaded the partisans of the continuous enclosure ; the loyalty of the cabinet seemed questionable, and the fate of the bill became extremely doubtful. I rose and spoke on the instant ; " I hold much more," I exclaimed, " to the clearness of situations than to that of ideas, and to consequences rather than to arguments in conduct. Let the Cliamber permit me to declare, and let no one feel offended at my words, my full opinion on the sub- ject now under consideration. The question is so se- rious that I must endeavour to place it, in its nudity, before the eyes of the Chamber. This is the only mode of bringing it to issue. The President of the Council, several years since, expressed on the means of fortifying Paris, an opinion entitled to the respect of AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PARIS. 33 the Chamber and of France, for no one can, on such a question, define his ideas with so much authority. What has he recently done I He has yiehled, in the cabinet, to the opinion of his colleagues ; he has pre- sented in the name of the King's government, the bill which, in the actual state of affairs, his colleagues have considered the best, and at the same time he has re- served the free expression of his old views, and respect for his personal antecedents. A debate springs up here on this subject. The President of the Council will, I am sure, allow me to say plainly, it is not sur- prising that he should fail to bring to this tribune the same tactical skill he has so often exhibited elsewhere; it is not to be wondered at that he should be less prac- tised here than elsewhere in delivering and winning battles. It has happened to men more accustomed to the tribune than the President of the Council, to find themselves in the position in which he now finds himself Mr. Pitt and Mr. Canning have often spoken against measures proposed by the ministry to which they belonged ; they \m\c not only reserved their opinions, but have formally combated the propositions of their cabinet. INEr. Pitt and Mr. Canning were ex- clusively parliamentary men, practised in extricating themselves from the difficulties of such positions. 1 he President of the Council has souglit and found his glory in other fields. His conduct to-day is per- fectly simple. In maintaining his former opinion, he has merely exercised a right consecrated by the insti- tutions and habits of free countries. But the bill D 34 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON which he has presented in the name of the govern- ment remains entire. It is always the government bill. The cabinet supports it, the President of the Council himself supports it, as the thought, the act, the permanent intention of the cabinet. He has just now read it again. 1 support it in my turn. I persist in saying that, in the conviction of the King's govern- ment the entire bill is the best mode, technically the most effective, and politically the only effective mode, of settling the great question now in debate." On returning to my bench, I said to M. Duchatel, who sat beside me : " I think the bill is safe." — " Yes," he whispered in my ear, " you have saved the bill, but you may have killed the cabinet." — " Make yourself easy," I replied; " the Marshal is somewhat susceptible, but he cares more for the duration of the cabinet than for the rejection of the continuous enclosure." General Schneider's amendment was thrown out, and all doubt disappeared as to the passing of the bill. I called on the Marshal the same evening, and found him alone with tlie duchess, playing at Patience. " My dear President," I said, " I feel convinced that you un- derstood and approved what I said this morning ; if General Schneider's amendment had passed, our bill was lost and the cabinet along with it." He replied with sly gravity, " You manoeuvred excellently ; you have delivered tlie government from a great embarrass- ment. On leaving the chamber, I went to the King, and complimented liim on the result. I repeat the same to you." 1 found, in fact, when I returned home, AND FORTIFICATIONS OF PAKIS. 35 a note from the King couched thus : — " My clear minister, I am impatient to congratulate you on the brilliant success you obtained to-day, and to thank you, in addition, for the great service you have rendered to France and to myself I am happy to add tliat the Marshal, who brought me the details, participates in my satisfaction." Either from nature, or habits of command. Marshal Soult in government affairs, and as respected his own position, had great instincts which supplied the place of what he sometimes wanted in elevation of mind and sustained dignity. Abroad, the adoption of the fortifications of Paris produced the full effect, and precisely the quality of effect we desired. Count Bresson Mrote to me from Berlin on the 5th of February, 1841 ; "You will be gratified by hearing what they say of you in all quar- ters, and the good wishes formed for the success of the administration to which you belong. That these wishes will not prove barren, your triumph in the de- bate on the bill for the fortifications of Paris is a pledge. You have indeed made the triumph ijour own, and, unless I deceive myself radically, you have rendcnul an incalculable service to our country. I have less riglit tlian any one to constitute myself a judge of systems ; but I see clearly that the course we liave adopted overthrows many calculations and baffles many lio])es. The worst-intentioned go so far as to say, 'Wliy allow them to turn to advantage the five years necessary for the accomplishment of their D 2 36 OBSEQUIES OF NAPOLEON. work ] We must prevent them.' But these impetuous suggestions find no access to the men who direct the cabinet here. Your words, moreover, have calmed a portion of their uneasiness ; the only desire is that you may remain long in a position to reduce them personally to practice," And on the 14th of February following, at the moment when the bill introduced on the 1st of February to the Chamber of Peers seemed likely to encounter serious resistance there ; " I do not believe," M. Bresson wrote again, " that the Chamber of Peers can refuse to France a guarantee of feace and strength, so materially oAving to you. 1 shall continue to repeat until my voice fails me, that the fortifications, more than anything else, are calcu- lated to produce an effect abroad, to restrain foreign aggression, and to give freedom and ease to the exer- cise of our just influence." In 1844, during the visit in which I accompanied King Louis Philippe to Windsor Castle, the Duke of Wellington said to me one day : " Your fortifications of Paris have closed that era of wars of invasion and rapid marches on capitals which Napoleon opened. They have almost effected for you what the Ocean has done for us. If the sovereigns of Europe believed me on this point, they would all do the same. I know not whether wars would, in consequence, be less long or deadly, but beyond doubt they would be less re- volutionary. By this example you have rendered a great service to the security of States and to Euro- pean order." CHAPTEE II. AFFAUiS OF THE EAST.— COXVE^^^TIOX OF JULY THE 13th, 1841. SITUATION OF FKAXCE AFTEB THE TREATY OF THE loTH OF JULY, 1840. — CIIAEAGTEB OF HEE ISOLATION AND AEMAMENTS. — DISPOSITIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CABINETS. — LOUD PALMEESTON's DISPATCH OF THE 2nd of NOTEMBEE, 18 W. — ITS EFFECT IN FEANCE. — CAPTUBB OF ST. JOHN d'aCBE BY THE ENGLISH. — MEHEMET ALl IS THEEAT- ENED IN EOVPT. — MISSION OF BAEON MOUNIEE TO LONDON. — WOBDS OF PRINCE METTEBNICII. — COMMODOEE NAPIEE AKBIVES BEFOEB ALEXANimiA, INDUCES MEHEMET ALI TO TBEAT, AND CONCLUDES A CONVENTION WITH HIM, WHICH PEOMISES THE BIGHT OF INHEEIT- ANCE IN EGYPT. — ANGEE OF THE SULTAN AND OF LORD PONSONBY ON RECEIVING THIS INTELLIGENCE. — THE NAPIEE CONVENTION IS DIS- AVOWED AT CONSTANTINOPLE, ALTHOUGH APPBOVED IN LONDON. CONFEBENCE OF THE EUBOPEAN PLENIPOTENTIABIE3 AT CONSTANTI- NOPLE WITH EEDSCHID PACHA. — HATTI SIIEBIFF OF THE 13tH FEB- EUAEY, 1841, WHICH ONLY GBANTS TO MEHEMET ALI AN INCOMPLETE AND PRECARIOUS INHERITANCE OF EGYPT. — INTEEVIEW OF LOED PALMEBSTON WITH CIIEKIB EFFENDI. — OUR EXPECTANT ATTITCDB AND PRIXAUTIONS. — PROJECT OF A PROTOCOL AND OF A NEW CONVEN- TION FOR THE RE-ENTRANCE OF FRANCE INTO THE EUROPEAN COALI- TION. — CONDITIONS WHICH WE ATTACH TO IT. — I AUTHORIZE BARON DB BOURiiUENEV TO SIGN THE TWO PROJECTED ACTS PROVISIONALLY, BUT NOT DEFINITIVELY. — EFFORT OF PRINCE METTEKNICH AT CONSTANTI- NOPLE. — CHANGE OF TURKISH MINISTRY. — NEW HESITATIONS OF THE PORTE. — IT FINALLY GIVES WAY, AND AWARDS THE HEEEDITABY EULE IN EGYPT TO MEHEMET ALI BY A NEW FIEMAN OF THE 25tH OF MAY, 1841. — FEE3II DELAY IN LONDON AS TO THE SIGNATUBE OF THE PROTOCOL AND CONVENTION. — THE FALL OF THE WHIG MINIS- 38 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, TEY APPEAES IMMINENT. — MEHEMET ALI ACCEPTS THE FIRMAN OF THE 25th of MAY, 1841. — I AUTHORIZE BARON DE BOUEQUENEY TO SIGN THE CONVENTION. — IT IS SIGNED ON THE 13tH OF JULY, 1841. — SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATION AND ITS RESULTS. While we were discussing the addresses in the Cham- bers, and receiving at the Invalides the cofRn of Na- poleon, the execution of the treaty of the 13th of July pursued its course in the East, and we assumed in Europe the position which that treaty had assigned to us. I lost no time in my correspondence with our foreign agents in clearly laying down that position, and the attitude it prescribed to them. I wrote thus on the lOtli of December, 1840, to Count de Sainte- Aulaire, the King's ambassador at Vienna : — " Of all that has passed, two facts remain for us — our isolation and our armaments. By the isolation frankly ac- cepted, we gain some dignity and much liberty. That liberty is advantageous to us, and will become more so every day ; for, as regards the other Powers, success will be followed by embarrassments, disagreements, and jealousies; and in proportion as all these arrive they Avill bring to all a desire for reconciliation with us. We shall see this desire manifest itself Isola- tion is not a state to be deliberately selected, or in whicli to continue for ever ; but when we are there, let us remain tranquil until we can emerge from it with advantage. " We have no intention of separating ourselves from tlic general affairs of Europe. We are con- vinced that it is to our interest to mingle witli them, AND CONVENTION OF THE 13tII JULY, 1841. 39 and for the benefit of all that we should do so. They have done without us; we must let them feel and say that we are wanted again. In the state of Europe, I believe that great affairs of necessity require the concurrence of all leading governments. Neither isolation, nor the fractional division and formation of separate camps is good policy for any. There are superior interests which for a long time will demand Euro2:)ean concert and unity ; and there can be neither concert nor unity in Europe while France is excluded. " I have just fought for peace. In my idea, be- yond the maintenance of peace I liave always had in perspective the re-establishment of European concert. l>ut we shall wait for it ; and to wait with security and convenience we have completed our armaments. "They were necesssary. Our material, our cavalry, artillery, arsenals, and fortresses were not in a satis- factory condition. They will be so henceforth, and will continue such as we may deem suitable. The permanent part of our military establishment, that wliich is not formed suddenly, will emerge from this crisis (\ssentially improved. " As to our strength in men, we shall keep it up to tlie present mark as long as the actual situation con- tinues. "The more T reflect, tlie more I satisfy myself, my dear fritMid, that tliis is the only course and attitude that becomes us. The King is thoroughly convinced of it. Act so tliat it nr.iy be well understood in Menna. This, for the moment, is the only instruc- 40 AITAIKS OF THE EAST, tion I send also to Berlin, London, and St. Peters- burgh." We had not to wait long without seeing how much these two facts, the isolation and armaments of France, disturbed and weighed on Europe. The new cabinet was scarcely formed, when in Vienna, in Berlin, and even in London, politicians began to seek some me- thod of promptly terminating the position. The ces- sation of intimate relations between France and Eng- land suited Prince Metternich, provided that it did not go so far as to menace the peace of Europe ; and although determined not to separate himself from the English cabinet, he was far more desirous to check than to follow Lord Palmerston. He directed the Austrian ambassador, Prince Esterhazy, to return to London, charging him to adhere strictly to the treaty of the 15th of July, and at the same time to soften its consequences. These were dreaded even more at Berlin than at Vienna, and Baron de Biilow, who had left London on leave, returned suddenly with instruc- tions aided by his own personal desire, to use his ut- most activity and ability for the speedy return of Franc(; to European concert. Amongst the members of tlie English cabinet, who, from the commencement of the affair, had exhibited a more sincere than effec- tual disposition for the French alliance, there were some, Lord Clarendon in particular, who were eager and anxious in seconding the pacific efforts of the (iernian diplomatists. "The cabinet recently formed in Paris," tliey said, "• cannot last but by a sacrifice on AND CONVENTION OF THE 13tII JULY, 1841. 41 the part of the powers who have signed the treaty of the 15th of July." — "Yes," replied Baron de Boiir- queney, to whom 1 had entrusted in London this deli- cate negotiation, " France requires a concession un- connected with this treaty." But what concession could be made to the Pacha of Egypt, to give satis- faction to France "? Various expedients were sug- gested. Such, for instance, as the island of Candia left to Mehemet Ali, the pachalic of Tripoli given to one of his sons, the suspension of hostilities, and the territorial status quo in Syria until the issue of new negotiations. While the debates in the French Cham- bers were in progress, the diplomatists assembled in London employed themselves with more solicitude than hope in their attempts at reconciliation. M. de Bourqueney supplied me with a highly intelligent ac- count of their goings and comings, their interviews and overtures. 1 replied : " Two sentiments are in- volved here, the desire of peace and the national honour. The feeling of France, I say of France and not of the turbulent and factious, is, that she has been treated lightly ; that her alliance, her friend- ship, and her co-operation have been inconsiderately sacritictnl, ^^ith()ut sufficient motive, for a secondary interest. Herein lies the leading mischief produced by the treaty of the 15th of July, and tlie great ob- stacle to the policy of i)eace. To cure this evil, to remove tliis obstacle, it must be proved to France that she has decei\ed herself; that nuich value is at- tached to her alliance, friendship, and co-o})eration, 42 ATFAIKS OF THE EAST, and that a sacrifice will be made in evidence of this. It is not the amount, but the fact of the sacrifice, that signifies. " Let something be offered, distinct from the con- vention of the 15th of July, with the desire of restor- ing a good understanding with France, and with the wish of seeing her, once more, in concert : peace may then be preserved, and general harmony re-established in Europe. If this is represented to you as practic- able, 1 am ready to take the necessary steps to ac- complish the object, and to incur the responsibility; but I wish to make no movement without knowing that such an end is within scope of attainment. The policy of agreement is preferable to the policy of iso- lation, if agreement really exists : but should it mean only abandonment on our part, isolation is to be pre- ferred. At all events, tliese are, in my opinion, your two rules of conduct : to treat really with liOrd Pal- mcrston and not against him ; to neglect nothing that may influence the atmosphere in which Lord Palmer- ston lives to act upon him in accordance with our views. The result depends on him." At this precise juncture, a new incident, emanating from Lord Palmerston, rendered reconciliation more difficult. It is well known that on the 8th of Octo- ber, 1840, M. Thiers, in liis last communication to the English cabinet, had declared that " France, disposed to take part in any admissible arrangement that should be based on the double guarantee of the existence of tlie Sultan and tlu^ Viceroy of Egypt, could not con- AXD COXVENTIOX OF THE 13tII JULY, 1841. 43 sent to the execution of the decree of forfeiture pro- nounced against Mehemet Ali on the 14th of Sep- tember at Constantinople." It is also known that, on the 15 th of October, prompted by the impression which this declaration on the part of tlie French government had made on his colleagues and himself. Lord Palmerston instructed Lord Ponsonby to arrange uith the representatives of Austria, Prussia and Russia, at Constantinople, that they should conjointly and strenuously recommend the Sultan, not only to rein- state Mehemet Ali as Pacha of Egypt, but to give him also the hereditary investiture of that pachalic, in conformity with the conditions specified in the treaty of the 15th of July, provided he signified his submission to the Sultan, and pledged himself to restore the Turkish fleet, as also to withdraw his troops from all S\'ria, from Adana, and the Holy Cities. After this step of the English government, I felt myself fully authorized when assuming, on the 29th of October, the direction of foreign affairs, to consider the hereditary establishment of Mehemet Ali in Egypt as settled, provided he complied with tlie prescribed conditions. Put, cm the 5th of Novem- ber, liOrd (iranville communicated to me a dispatch from Lord Palmerston, dated on the 2nd, wliicli seemed to have for its object the removal of that conviction. Lord ]\almerston reverted to ]\I. Thiers's dispatcli of tlie preceding Stli of October, discussed its arguments, and laid down '' tliat the Sultan, as sove- reign of the Turkisli empire, had the sole right of 44 AFFAIKS OF THE EAST, deciding to which of his subjects he would confide the government of any specific portion of his states ; that the foreign powers, whatever might be their ideas on this subject, could only ofi"er the Sultan ad- vice, and that none of them had any right to fetter him in the discretionary exercise of one of the in- herent and essential attributes of independent sove- reignty." This, in principle, was to annul the counsel which Lord Palmerston had given to the Porte, and to provoke the Sultan to maintain the absolute for- feiture of Mehemet Ali, which fifteen days before he had been urged to recall. Lord Palmerston did not confine himself to the simple communication of his dispatch to me ; it was published on the 10th of November in the 'Morning Chronicle.' The efi'ect in France was lamentable. I wrote thus to Baron de Bourqueney, on the 14th of November: — "This document is looked upon here as a veiled retractation of the step taken, less than a month since, with the Porte, to engage it not to persist in the deposition of Mehemet Ali. I resist this idea ; I maintain that Lord Palmerston has only meant, as he says in conclusion, to consider a question of principles, and to declare explicitly his own. But the efi'ect is still not the less produced. Our adver- saries take advantage of it, and our friends are dis- turbed. This is the first communication Lord Pal- merston lias addressed to the new cabinet. How does it differ from what he would have written to our predecessors ? Why has this dispatch been pub- AXD CONVENTION OF THE 13tII JULY, 1841. 45 lished in the ' Morning Chronicle,' and with so much eagerness? Signify, my dear Baron, both to the English cabinet and to our friends in London the sentiment I now express, and the mischief that has been done to us." ^r. de Bourqueney felt no embarrassment in sharply communicating my complaint. Lord Palmerston's dispatch had excited amongst the friends of peace in London nearly as much surprise and blame as in Paris. People asked themselves whether it did not exhibit the mere mania of controversy, and whether that mania concealed the desire of consummating tlie ruin of Mehemet Ali, and of breaking down every species of accommodation. " I have just left Lord Palmerston," M. de Bourqueney replied to me on the IStli of November; ''he began by apologizing for the date of his dispatch of the 2nd. ' I regret ex- tremely,' he said, ' tliat my answer to M. Thiers's dispatch of the Sth of October should have been, of necessity, addressed to his successor ; but you know how my time is occupied. Days passed by, the cabinet of M. Thiers retired, and my reply reached the hands of M. Guizot. I assure you my intention in writing it was good ; I thouglit it necessary, even in the interest of the policy of conciliation, to refute some of tlie arguments in the disi)atch of the Sth of October, because those arguments, passing as accepted by us, would encourage the ])rolongation of the strife we anxiously desire to terminate. But, believe me, my preceding declarations subsist still ; I retract none 46 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, of them ; Mehemet Ali is yet free to preseiTe here- ditary rule in Egypt. If a different conclusion has been drawn from my dispatch of the 2nd of Novem- ber, I disavow it.' " I was then, and still remain, convinced that this disavowal was sincere. Nothing is more rare in politics than simple resolutions, and the exclusive pursuit of a single end, without deduction or com- plaisance for secret desires which exceed the real and avowed purpose. Lord Palmerston did not premedi- tate the utter ruin of Mehemet Ali ; his serious intention amounted only to confirming and strength- ening at Constantinople and in the East, the position of England, by weakening a rival subject of the Sultan, and a favourite client of France. But when a chance of the entire destruction of Mehemet Ali presented itself to his mind, he did not reject it frankly, and thus gave himself the air of encouraging it. Moreover, he could not resolve to pass by the arguments of an adversary, without opposing his own, and he voluntarily accepted a political embarrassment to obtain a logical success. lie wrote his dispatch of tlie 2nd of November without caring to sustain or harm me, to support, in general thesis, against M. Thiers, who had fallen, the Sultan's rights of sove- reignty, and also to incline Mehemet Ali to submis- sion, by giving him a glimpse of the extreme peril which might reach him if he remained contumacious. lie might have spared himself this appearance of ill feeling, and reserved intentions. The events he had AND CONVENTION OF THE loTII JULY, 1841. 47 foreseen, served him better than the arguments he took pleasure in displaying. While the diplomatists in London wearied themselves in hunting out some combination which, terminating the isolation of France, might equally end their inquietudes, the insur- rection in Syria, fomented by Lord Palmerston, burst out against Mehemet Ali. The Emir Beschir, recently Governor of the Libanus in the pacha's name, aban- doned the Egyptian cause without saving himself by his defection. Saida, Tyre, and Tripoli surrendered at sight of the English squadron, and the Turkish troops disembarked. Ibrahim Pacha and his de- moralized army fell back into the interior. Finally, on the 3rd of Xovember, after resisting for a few hours, St. John d'Acre fell into the power of Admiral Stopford ; and on receipt of this news Prince Metter- nich wrote as follows to Baron de Neumann, still accredited' in London, on the Egyptian question : — " Let France no longer retain her delusion as to Syria ; it is irrevocably and entirely gone ; we must think of Eg}pt ; mischief increases on that side ; not a mo- ment should be lost in persuading Mehemet Ali to submission." The only effect this intelligence produced in London was to increase Lord Palmerston's confidence in himself, his ascendancy over his colleagues, and to end the petty labour undertaken to bring about some concessions extraneous to the treaty of the 15th of July. " ]NL de Billow is thrown from his saddle," M. de Bourqueney wrote on the 8th of November ; 48 APFAIRS OF THE EAST, "he told me this morning that he expects from Berlin, within a few days, a dispatch analogous to that of M. de Metternich. You may judge by this that he considers his mission at an end." The Lord Mayor of London gave a grand dinner on the 9th of November, to which the ministers and foreign diplo- matists were invited. Sir Robert Peel, who was present, leaned over to Baron de Bourqueney and said, in a low tone, " Events move on rapidly in Syria. They say Egypt is to be attacked. This makes me very anxious on the European question." In Paris, the surprise equalled and aggravated the uneasiness. The weakness of Mehemet Ali in Syria was an unex- pected revelation, presaging a similar result in Egypt. A clever man who had resided some time in the East, M. Aphonse Royer, wrote as follows to me on No- vember 16, from Constantinople: — "It is impossible not to ask oneself, with heart-breaking anguish, how it has happened that the French government, which employs so many agents, at such an enormous expense, in all these countries, should not have known, before acting, tlie physical and moral state of Egypt and Syria. Has it believed in an Arabian empire, en- throned by a Turkish pacha, and in the affection of the Arabs for a government constructed upon the old Turkish system, under which the natives cannot obtain the most insignificant command, or the meanest em- ployment? Has it thought that to work a country like a colonial farm was the way to civilize it? Has it never been presented with a picture of the suffer- AND CUNVENTIUX OF THE 13X11 JULY, 1841. 49 ings of tliis wretched people, amongst whom mothers deprive their children of one eye, to exonerate them from statute labour? And when the Christians of the Libanus, who had risen against their oppressors, implored mercy after their defeat, and were only answered by monstrous executions, how has it hap- pened that their groans and their anguish have been transformed into a concert of praises in the official reports transmitted to the French ministry^ This would be conceivable if the King's government drew its information from the same sources with the French journals, which are directly supplied from Alexan- dria, by express order of Mehemet Ali. The vice- rov has the talent of conciliating', bv his anxious, deli- cate attentions and amiable manners, every one from whom he can expect a verbal or written eulogium. All travellers of any note who have passed through Egypt, have submitted to this influence. The most clear-siglited and conscientious suppress their judg- ment. When we speak of the prodigies effected by the genius of Mehemet Ali, this is apparently not the least." In presence of these errors, and under the fear of seeing more proclaimed, several of my friends in the C'lianibers, amongst others the Chancellor Pasquier, tlie Duke l)(>cazes, Count (iasparin, M. Barthe, and M. La})lagne-lkuris asked tliemselves and me whether it would not be well for one amongst them, witliout official mission or diplomatic character, to pass some weeks in London, to observe the disposition of minds, E 50 AFFATRS OF THE EAST, to converse freely with men of influence, and thus to estimate, without prejudice or routine, the chances of the future. I did not imagine that such a visit could in any manner alter the information I had received from Baron de Bourqueney, or the ideas I had formed of the actual state of things ; but I had no reason, on my own account, for refusing to accede to it, and I knew M. de Bourqueney sufficiently well to feel quite sure that the trifling annoyance it might give him, w^ould neither afl'ect his judgment nor his zeal. I therefore entertained the proposition, and requested Baron Mounier, one of my most judicious and inde- pendent political supporters, to undertake this mis- sion of free observation. He consented, with friendly readiness, and left Paris for London on the 21st of November, to verify my information and presenti- ments. Far from dissipating, his obserA-ations confirmed them. In the Englisli cabinet, and amongst its adherents, he found the sincerest partisans of peace convinced that it could only be secured by the sub- mission of ]\[ehcmct Ali to tlic terms of the treaty of the 15tli of July. "How can you expect," said Mr. Macaulay, at that time Secretary of War, " that we sliould not follow up wliat we have commenced 1 By cfmtinuing liostilities, Melicmet Ali would have on liis side the cliancc of reconquering Syria. If we had not on ours, tliat of wresting Egypt from liim, there would be neitlier ('(piality, justice, nor policy. Tlie paclia cannot be permitted to suspend or commence war at AXD COXVEXTIOX OF THE IFjTR JULY, 1841. 51 his clioicc. lie must give up the Turkish fleet, and confine liis pretensions solely to Egypt." The anxieties of the continental di})lomatists confirmed the language of the English ministers. " Prince Esterhazy is much impressed by the necessity of opposing an obstacle to the controlling influence of events," M. Mounier wrote to me on the 29th of November. "lie assured me, yesterday e\ening that he was going to make strong efforts to obtain a positive declaration that no attempt would be directed against Egypt unless its necessity and suitableness were previously recognized by all the cabinets who had signed the treaty of the 15tli of July." Ih'ince Metternich wrote in this sense to the ambassador, and in the clearest manner. " We must anticipate the case," said his dispatch, " in which Syria being delivered, Mehemet Ali might still refuse to submit. The (piid faciendum then is still to be sought for." "While this question was under debate in London, Prince ^Metternich said to Count de Sainte Aulaire at Menna, " Assure M. Guizot that we shall endeavour to confine all to Syria. Of the consent of England I feel c(>rtain ; but explaining uiyself at this date, on accoiuit of Austria only, 1 declare to you that she will abstain from any attack on Egy])t, and entirely out of res])ect for France. If M. (iuizot considers that any advantage would be gained by making tliis fact known in i\\v Chambers, he may announce it with the cer- tainty of not being contradicted by me." The English admirals had already saved the diplo- E 2 52 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, matists from the embarrassment which prepossessed Prince Metternich. On the 25th of November, Com- modore Napier, with a part of Admiral Stopford's squadron, suddenly appeared before Alexandria, and addressed the following letter to Boghos Bey, Mehe- met All's chief adviser : — ■" The pacha knows certainly that the European powers are anxious to secure to him the hereditary government of Egypt. Will his Highness permit an old sailor to suggest to him an easy method of reconciliation with the Sultan 1 Let him promptly and freely, without imposing any con- ditions, send back the Ottoman fleet and withdraw his troops from Syria ; the miseries of war will then cease ; his Highness will find ample employment and satisfaction, during the last years of his life, in culti- vating the arts, and probably in laying a base for the rc-establishmcnt of the throne of the Ptolemies. After what has passed in Syria, his Highness ought readily to foresee how little he can do where the people are dissatisfied with his government. Within a month, 6000 Turks and a handful of sailors have taken Bey- rout and Sai'da, beaten the Egyptians in three actions, secured 10,000 prisoners or deserters, and occasioned the forced evacuation of the ports and of the passes of the Taurus and Tibanus ; and all this in face of an army of 30,000 men. Three weeks after. Acre, the key of Syria, submitted to tlie allied fleets ; should his lliglnioss resolve to continue hostilities, allow me to ask if he f(>els sure of retaining Egypt? I am a great admirer of his Highness, and would much ra- AND CONVENTION OF THE loTII JULY, 1841. 53 ther be his friend than his enemy. I take the liberty of representint^; to him, that if he refuses to reconcile himself witli the Sultan, he can only hope to pre- serve E<>:ypt for a very short time. ... A general discontent prevails liere amongst the inhabitants and the sailors ; his Ilighness's vice-admiral and se- veral of his officers have already abandoned him, and are on board my fleet. The Syrian soldiers in Egypt are anxious to return home. The pay of the Egyp- tian troops is greatly in arrear, and they are without bread to support their families. Let his Highness reflect on the danger he will incur, if his soldiers are promised, on his fall, to be delivered from his ser- ^ice. AMio can say tliat Egypt would be invulner- able I Alexandria may be taken as Acre was, and his Highness, who may now become the founder of a d} nasty, would be reduced to the rank of an ordinary pacha." After a correspondence of some Iiours, all the pro- positions of Commodore Xapier were acceded to. Mehemet Ali pledged liimself to send back the Turk- ish fleet to Constantinople, as soon as tlie powers assur(>d to him the hereditary government of Egypt. An l^gyptian envoy was instantly dis})atched in an I'jiglish man-of-war, witli orders to Ibrahim Pacha to evacuate Svria witli liis whole armv. A formal con- vention ratified these arrangements. Tlie submission of Meliemet Ali was complete, and the treaty of the 15th of July received its full execution. This intelligence readied l^ondon on the 8th of 54 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, December, and produced all the effect that could be expected. It was the accomplishment of Lord Pal- merston's predictions, and the triumph of his policy. The diplomatists, his allies, exchanged congratula- tions, not without surprise ; they asked themselves, what cause could have determined this action at once menacing and pacific of the English fleet, and thus anticipated the issue "? Had Commodore Napier acted hi compliance with the orders of his cabinet, or in concert with Admiral Stopford, or solely on his own spontaneous impulse 1 "I cannot think," I wrote to M. de Bourqueney, " that Napier had instructions to engage the pacha to re-establish the throne of the Pto- lemies^ or to threaten the bombardment of Alexandria. If a French agent had used the first phrase. Lord Pal- merston would have exclaimed against this contempt of the Sultan's rights ; and if Napier had executed his tlireat, I should have been justified in saying that Lord Palmerston had broken faith with me, for he had plainly pledged his word that no act or com- mencement of an act should take place against I'^gypt witliout a fresh deliberation of the powers who had signed the treaty of the 15th of July. 1 attach no importance to these petty complaints, or to recrimina- tions against accomplished facts ; but I take notice of all irregularities, and of all inconsistent and ill-con- sidered proceedings ; and it is well to let it be known that we pay attention to them." I foresaw tliat tlie result thus obtained would be speedily represented to us as definitive, and calling for AND CONVENTION OF THE 13tII JULY, 1841. 55 the cessation of our armed isolation, and that vre should be asked to recognize it. I at once took pre- cautions to ward off these advances, and to establish plainly the position we intended to maintain. On the 18th of December I wrote to Baron de Bourqueney ; '• ^^'e liave remained strangers to the treaty of the loth of July, that is to say, to the settlement of re- lations between the Sultan and the pacha, through the intervention of Europe. Xeither the territorial basis, nor the coercive mode of that settlement, ac- corded with our views. There is no reason why they should be more suitable to us after than before. AVe are not materially opposed to the fact ; but we cannot associate ourselves with it, to accord our homage and guarantee. We sliall still remain, therefore, uncon- nected with the treaty of the 15tli of July, and the coalition which signed it, in all that touches the rela- tions of the Sultan and the pacha. This is a duty we owe to ourselves as a stringent consequence and an act of simple dignity. *' But su])posing the treaty of the 15th of July to be carried out, and settled, the leading point remains of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and I'uropc. The relative position of the Sultan and the })aciia of I'gypt forms, in respect to tlie Ottoman P^m- ])ire, an internal (pu^stion on which w(> thought dif- ferently from our allies and se])arate(l from them. The relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe consti- tute an external, general, and p(>rmanent question, with which we are always iiiclined to co operate, and 56 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, which cannot be effectually or definitively settled with- out our concurrence. " By the side of this great external and European consideration, may be still placed an internal and Otto- man question, that of the guarantees to be given to Syria on returning under the Sultan's dominion, especially to the Christian population of the Libanus : and on this question we are also ready to resume our position. " Far, therefore, from wishing to persist in our iso- lation, we have ever in view the re-establishment of European concert, and we know through what portals, wide or narrow, we are able to rejoin it. " We know also that our re-entry is desired, and that the desire is judicious. Our isolation is of no value to any one. It compels us, for our own safety, and to satisfy public feeling in Franco, to keep up our present armaments. We have arrested them at the limit they had reached when the present cabinet was formed. The preceding ministry wished to increase them ; we have declared that we shall not do so ; but to enable us to reduce our existing armaments, our po- sition must be changed so as equally to change and calm down the public mind. I speak here of the well- disposed of the conservative party, wlio while the pre- sent state of things last, would not agree to the reduc- tion of the existing pacific armaments, more readily tlian they would liave sanctioned the excessive and war- like armaments called for by the preceding cabinet. " T rep(\it tliat our present armaments arc purely ])rccautioiiary and pacific. The very existence of this AND CONVENTION OF THE 1 OTII JULY, 1841. 57 cabinet is an evident and permanent proof that they are so. But tlie scjde proves it also. It gives us only what we had in 1831, 1832, and 1833,— from 400 to 450,000 men. And tlien we had not 70,000 men in Africa. '• Tliere is notliing, therefore, either in the idea or amount of those armaments to excite uneasiness, and we lia\e no intention of prolonging indefinitely, and without necessity, a state of things so onerous. But while the situation which has produced it continues, we accept tlie consequences. Let a suitable door be opened to us by which to emerge from this state, and wc sliall evince no obstinate desire of remaining in it." Facts soon afforded evidence that I was right in considering the Egyptian question as not definitively settled, and in still pausing before I abandoned the ])osition we had assumed. As soon as the conven- tion concluded on the 27th of November between Sir Charles Napier and the pacha became known at Constantinople, througli the envoy dispatched by the commodore to Lord Ponscmby, and a letter from ]Me- luMnet Ali himself to the Cirand Vizier, much anger displayed itself in the divan; participated in and sup- ported by Lord Ponsonby, wlio wrote immediately to l^ord Palmerstoii. on the 8tli of December. "Your Lordslii]) lias received the commodore's report. All tliat I have to tell you is, that the Porte has ex- pressly declared the convention null and void, and that my colleau:u(^s and myself liave accorded with tliis declaration. I need not add that no government 58 ATFAIKS OF THE EAST, in the position of the Ottoman Porte could for a single moment allow an individual to treat on their account, with a power considered, either in right or fact, as a rebel. Her Majesty's ambassador has no au- thority whatever to recognize the act of one who has received no power from her Majesty's government; and the ministers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, are in precisely the same position with myself" On the same day, Redschid Pacha announced to the Turkish ambassador in London, and to the envoys of the four powers at Constantinople, the determination of the Porte : " How," said he, " can we, after all that has passed, confide authority again to such a man as Mehemet Ali '? Nevertheless, and although the Sultan has no intention of granting anything, of his own wdll, to Mehemet Ali, in case of a request on the part of the allied powers, perhaps, in deference to them, some temporary favour miglit be extended to him. But would it be possible to-day to return to the important question of hereditary rule, that great concession of the treaty of alliance, already rejected by him "? And how could the great powers reconcile that concession, lienceforward, with the maintenance of tlie integrity of the Ottoman Empire, wliicli forms the principal object of their solicitude ] Consequently, the Sublime Porte protests, in the most formal man- nei-, by this declaration, against the convention con- cluded on tlie 27t]i of November by Commodore Na- pier ; — a convention which it is called upon to regard, and does regard as null, and as not having taken place." AND C(.>^'VI•:^'TIuN of the K^tii july, 1841. 59 A few days later, the French dragoman at Constan- tinople, M. Cor, a man of experience and credit, being in conversation with lledschid Pacha on this conven- tion, recommended him not to confound the form and substantial bearing of the act : " You have a right," he said, " to protest against the form ; but in its bear- ing, the act is generally approved ; it may lead to a reconciliation between France and the contracting powers to the treaty of the loth of July ; the Porte might have to re})ent of its conduct towards France, its most ancient ally ; the self-respect of France is engaged in the question, and some means must be found of inducing her to re-entertain it." "The Sub- lime Porte," replied Pedschid Pacha, " finds the sub- stance of the convention quite as contrary to the in- terest of liis Iligluiess tlie Sultan, as the form is ob- jectionable. You say that we must frame an act in which France may participate ; we have only two things to suggest, both diametrically opposed to the policy France has adopted — the entire and absolute submission of Mehemet Ali, as a subject, not as a Aussal, or his destruction. How can you pretend to be anxious ior tlie integrity and independence of tlie Ottoman l'ni])ire wlien you seek its dismemberment? If you arc so bent on ])reserving Mehemet Ali, ap- point him governor of one of your own provinces." The Turkisli anger, and, above all, the haughty discontent of Lord Ponsonby, embarrassed Lord Pal- merston not a little, but without controlling his reso- lutions. As soon as he was made ac([uainted with 60 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, the conduct of Sir Charles Napier, he signified his approval, declaring, however, that Sir Charles had acted without instructions, and adding this reserve, that the powers who had signed the treaty of the 15th of July, could not pledge themselves to secure the hereditary rule in Egypt to Mehemet Ali, which they recommended the Porte to concede to him. At the same time he communicated his approval of the convention of the 27th of November, and the re- serve he attached to it, to Lord Ponsonby. On the 15th of December, speaking with M. de Bourqueney on the obstinacy of the Porte in insisting on the de- position of Mehemet Ali : "The Porte," he said, "must now listen to us ; we have done enough for it." The dispatches he received from Vienna confirmed this disposition. On the 3rd of January, 1841, Lord Beauvalc wrote : " Prince Metternich has instructed me to tell your Lordsliip, that if the Porte hesitates to accept the recommendation of the powers en- gaging it to confer on Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, the Austrian court cannot con- sent tliat the allies should suffer themselves to be compromised by this hesitation. Prince Metternich feels convinced that the Porte will yield to the advice of its allies if they urge it firmly and conjointly." And again, some days later, on the 17th of January: " Tlie dispatclies of the internuncio, M. de Stiirmer, announce that the commissioners to Alexandria are not empowered to give any pledge for the liereditary succession in the family of Mehemet Ali, and that AND CONVENTION OF THE 13tII JULY, 1841. Gl they will delay as much as possible their arrival in that port, to afford time for the military opera- tions against Ibrahim Pacha and the insurrection in Egypt to take effect. On receiving this intelligence, Prince Metternich has acquainted Prince Esterhazy with the firm resolution of Austria to obtain the hereditary succession for Mehemet Ali, adding that the refusal of the Porte would determine Austria to withdraw her moral and material support from the Sultan. Copies of these dispatches will be forwarded to-day to tlie internuncio at Constantinople, that he may regulate his conduct accordingly." Great perplexity existed at Constantinople. Un- able to act alone, and for himself, the Sultan saw his allies divided and uncertain. Lord Ponsonby was evidently more hostile to Mehemet Ali than his chief, Eord Palmerston ; wlio in turn,'was less disposed than Prince Metternich to support the vanquished pacha. Prussia followed Austria step by step ; Pussia fluc- tuated between the Germanic powers and England ; and absent France Aveighed upon the minds of all, as much as by lier presence sh(^ miglit have influ- enced tlieir deliberations. In the hope of escaping from this embarrassment, PiMlschid Pacha, on the 2<>th of December, 1840, assembled in congress, at his own palac(\ the representatives of the four powers who had signed tlie treaty of the 15th of July; and after repeating the memorandum by which, on the 14tli of November preceding, tlieir governments had counselled th(> Porte to grant to Mehemet Ali the 62 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, hereditary investiture of the pachalic of Egypt, pro- vided he submitted without delay to the required conditions, he said : " The Sultan has commanded me to ask you whether Mehemet Ali, by his letter of the 11th of December to the Grand Vizier, has con- formed to the spirit of this memorandum, and whether his submission ought to be received as real." On this positive question, Lord Ponsonby refused as positively to explain himself. " I think," he said, " it rests with the Sultan alone to decide this point. I see nothing, at present, that authorizes me to deliver an opinion." The Austrian internuncio. Baron Stiirmer, who had received precise instructions from Vienna, was less brief and more decided, though not without circum- locution : " To relieve myself," he said, " from all per- sonal responsibility, and to explain clearly the views of my government on this important question, I have thought fit to commit what I have to say to writing, and I shall now read it to the conference : — I have perused more than once, with tlie most scrupulous attention, the letter addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier. I find nothing there to object to. The tone which reigns throughout seems to me to meet all reasonable considerations. It would have been desirable that the convention witli Commodore Napier should not have been named ; but we all agree tliat it would have been still better if that convention liad never been concluded. And Mehemet Ali, by refer- ring to it, lias done no more than profit by an advan- tage gratuitously ofFercnl to him. In liis letter, tlie AND COXYENTION OF THE loTII JI'LY, 1841. Go pacha declares liis readiness to do all that is required of him, and in this sense his submission appears to me complete. I therefore recommend that this sub- mission be accepted. I should reject, in every respect, any liesitation of tlie Porte to conform to the wishes of its allies. The most brilliant successes have crowned their efforts in Syria ; these successes have not ex- ceeded our calculations, anticipations, and hopes. Sy- ria has been restored to the sceptre of liis Highness, and the principal object of the alliance is thus accom- plished. To go further enters not within the views of the allied powers ; the conference of Tondon has explicitly declared itself on this point. The Sublime Porte may undoubtedly have good reasons for desiring the complete overthrow of Mehemet Ali ; but not be- ing able to effect tliis alone, the burden of execution must fall upon its allies. Now, can the Porte desire, as tlie reward of tlieir services, to plunge them into an enterprise which might imperil the general peace so ardently desired by all nations, and u]) to this period so fortunately maintained ? Towards France, above all. the attention of our governments is at this moment directed ; that power has a right to our re- s])ect and interest ; and if the menacing and war- like attitude of M. Thiers's cabinet could not arrest us in our march towards the end we proposed and liave attained, we an* henceforward inclined to em- ])loy all our efforts in conciliating the ministry which has succeeded it. and whose language announces a wise, moderate, and })eaceful policy. "We ought, con- 64 AFFAIKS OF THE EAST, sequently, to enter into its position, to take our share in the difficulties by which it is surrounded, and not expose it to the danger of being carried away, in spite of itself, into a false track. In the present state of minds in France, any unforeseen incident might over- throw everything ; is it not, therefore, the interest of all, as it is just to all, to unite frankly with those who govern France, for the prevention of such a misfor- tune?' The ministers of Prussia and Russia adopted, with some shades of difference, the opinion of the Austrian internuncio. The English ambassador repeated that he must wait the decision of the Sultan on the value of Mehemet All's submission, before giving the advice prescribed by the orders of his government. E-edschid Pachai made vain efforts to lead the four plenipoten- tiaries to a more formal and unanimous declaration ; and the conference broke up with nothing more con- clusive than the last words of the Austrian internuncio, who once more repeated " how much it would have to be regretted if the Porte did not promptly conform to the wish expressed by the allied courts in the memo- randum of the 14th of November." Nearly three weeks after this conference, on the 7th of January, 1841, Baron Stiirmer wrote to Lord Pon- sonby : " If we could still liave retained any doubts as to the real intentions of our governments, thedispatches I received yesterday from Prince Metternich are cal- culated to destroy them entirely. The Prince is im- patient to know the sequel of his preceding instruc- AND CONVENTION OF THE 13tII JULY, 1841. G5 tions ; he again repeats, in the most peremptory man- ner, that the four courts have decided that heirship in the functions of tlie government of Egypt shall be granted to the family of Mehemet Ali. I am going, therefore, to ad(hess a formal letter to Redschid Pacha, which 1 shall deliver to him myself, that I may ver- bally enforce all the necessary explanations. The ideas of your cabinet being absolutely identical with those of mine, I feel convinced you will explain yourself in the same sense to the Porte. I confess to you, it is not without some regret that 1 thus see evaporate the hope we entertained of beholding the power of Mehe- met Ali destroyed, root and branch ; but my part is finished, and I have now only to wait in silence the orders transmitted to me by my government, and to execute them scrupulously." M. de 8t firmer immediately took the step with Red- schid Pacha that he had announced. The. Russian minister, M. de Titow, declared that he should follow the example of the Austrian internuncio, and an- nounced his intention to Lord Ponsouby. The Eng- lish ambassador replied with ironical scorn : " Nothing can be more indifferent than the private opinion of any one of us on this ([uestion ; it is the affair of our go- vernments, for which we are not responsible. But it is (piite another tiling to act without orders, and this responsibility I shall not risk. 1 decline, therefore, to act in concert with you until 1 am authorized, by formal instructions, to adopt the course you propose. It has been said to me several times, by the best au- F 66 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND thorities, by yourself, unless I mistake, that your go- vernment had not determmed to insist on hereditary rule for Mehemet Ali, and at our conference, it did not appear that you were authorized to speak on this point. But that was not of recent date, and it is by no means impossible that more than one change may have since taken place in the opinion of your cabinet. What is error now, may have been truth formerly, and may become truth again, for in this matter there has been a continual fluctuation of circumstances. That my government has not yet sent me instructions can scarcely be for want of time, for such might have reached me, as soon as yours from Vienna. Three days later, on the 10th of January, 1841, Lord Ponsonby wrote to Mr. Frederic Pisani, English dragoman at Constantinople : " You will inform his Excellency, the minister for foreign affairs, that I am ordered, in the name of the British government to recommend the Sublime Porte to accord hereditary rule in Egypt to Mehemet Ali." At the same time, in terms equally laconic, he announced to MM. de Stiirmer and de Titow his instructions and proceeding. In the face of all these hesitations, contradictions, and procrastinations of European diplomacy, it was quite natural that the Sultan and his advisers should hesitate also, and seek, either through vague words or repeated delays, to reject the cup so often presented to and withdrawn from their lips. After protesting against Sir Charles Napier's convention as null and of no effect, the divan had nevertheless resumed ne- CONVENTION OF THE loTII OF JULY, 1841. 67 gotiations with Mehcmet AH, and the Grand Vizier, when sending Maslouim Bey, one of the chief officers of tlie Porte, to receive his submission, had written to him to say, that as soon as this was completed, " the Sultan would deign to reinstate him in the go- vernment of Egypt," but without mentioning right of inheritance. "When Lord Ponsonby announced to the Porte that the British government advised that con- cession, the Sultan (on the 13th of February, 1841) issued the following hatti-sheriff : " In deference to the recommendation of the high allied powers, and with the expectation that my consent to the heredi- tary rule in question may settle tlie affair and contri- bute to the maintenance of general peace, I have re- solved to confer again the government of Egypt on ]\Iehemet Ali, with right of heirship, as soon as he actually makes submission in the manner that the council requires. . . . There is however this to be said ; the experience of the past has rendered it necessary that our Sublime Porte sliould be })laced in ])erfect security, on the part of Egypt, both for the present and the future ; and this end can scarcely be attained unless by attacliing to tlie succession strong condi- tions and necessary obligations. Feeling convinced tliat the same friendly solicitude of which the high allied powers have already given proofs will be exer- cised for this object also, 1 hasten to adopt their ad- vice and to put it in execution. Let all zeal be em- ])loyed in the necessai-y arrangements." Tlie hatti-sheriff was forwarded on the same day to F 2 68 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND Mehemet Ali : but the promised zeal was wanting as before in its execution. The Porte still flattered itself it would escape, in the end, from exigencies which it considered not altogether inevitable. Satisfied with having obeyed their instructions, neither Lord Ponson- by nor Baron Stiirmer pressed the Porte to hurry itself. With more adroitness, Mehemet Ali placed good faith and honest appearance on his side by immediately issuing the necessary orders for the return of the Turkish fleet and the evacuation of Syria. In London, Prince Esterhazy, Baron de Biilow, and even M. de Briinnow urged the final settlement of the Egyptian affair ; and in the English cabinet, as well as with the public, the friends of peace expressed their uneasiness at seeing a weighty and precarious European question prolonged from no other motive than frivolous indeci- sion or delays. Lord Palmerston felt the necessity of a conclusion. On the 28th of January, Chekib Eff'endi asked what he was to write to Iledschid Pasha touch- ing the hereditary establishment of Mehemet Ali in the pachalic of Egypt. " I have told him," Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Ponsonby on the following day, " that I could not but admit the force of the ob- jections raised against that concession. Certainly it would be much better for the Sultan and his Egyptian subjects, if he could preserve, in choosing the future rulers of Egypt, the liberty he possesses in selecting tlie governors of the other provinces of liis empire. But in all afl'airs we must be contented with what is practicable, and not compromise an advantage gained CONVENTION OF THE 13X11 OF JULY, 1841. 69 by running after sometliing we cannot reach. It is clear that Mehemet Ali lias submitted in the hope tliat he would obtain hereditary rule in Egypt. If this is now refused to him, what will be his course 1 A fresli revolt, or at least, an attitude of passive re- sistance. Wliat will be the remedy ? Such a state of things could not be suffered to continue indefi- nitely, for, if it continued, it would be equivalent to tlie se])arati()n of Egypt from tlie Turkish Empire. But the Sultan lias not, at present, either maritime or military means sufficient to re-establish his authority in Egypt. lie would therefore be obliged to ripply to his allies. Now, the measures hitherto agreed u])on between the four ])()wers, in virtue of the treaty of .July, are confined to the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria, Arabia, and C'andia, and to driving back the troops of Mehemet Ali within the limits of Egypt. If, therefore, the Sultan were to ask the four powers to lend liiin tlu^ir aid, in an attack on Mehemet Ali in Egypt itself, a new delib(>rati()n of the conference would become necessary. 'AN'ell tli(>n,' I said to C'hekib, 'if the Sultan seeks the aid of the four powers as a consequence of his refusal to grant, according to their a(lvic(\ the hereditary ])achalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, 1 can tell you beforehand what tlu^ r(>sult of that deliberation ^^ill be. 1 know well that the four ])owers will r(>fiis(^ to aid the Sultan. A\'hat will liap- ])en next ? For want of sufficient strength of his own, and aftcn- a ^aiii attempt, the Sultan will be compelled to yield to Mehemet Ali with a bad grace what to- 70 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND day he may have the merit of conferring on him vo- luntarily ; and thus, instead of performing, on the suggestion of the allies, an act of sovereign power, he will, in the eyes of the whole world, have the air of submitting to a concession, wTested from him by a subject.' " 'I shall not attempt,' I added, 'to represent as with- out importance or value what is incontestably a great sacrifice ; I should fail to convince the Sultan. But I ask you to consider the immense amount of moral and physical force which your government has gained by the incidents of the last few months, and to re- member that all the Sultan has won, Mehemet Ali has lost. Their relative positions are changed ; if the Sultan knows how to profit by the stipulations of the treaty of July, if he understands thoroughly how to organize his army, his marine, and his finances, and to place them on a respectable footing, Mehemet Ali can never more be to him a source of danger or even of uneasiness. The Sultan has recovered, under his di- rect sovereignty, all Syria, Arabia, and Candia, terri- tories which in military, financial, and religious points of view, are of the greatest importance, and for the possession of which, last year at this date, he would have made great sacrifices. Finally, remember that, faithfully carried out, the stipulation of the treaty of July which says that all the laws and treaties of the Empire arc applicable to Egypt as to any other pro- vince, is a most essential guarantee for the sovereign authority of the Sultan.' I then requested Chekib CONVENTION OF THE IStII OF JULY, 1841. 71 EfFendi to urge his government strongly to end this affair without delay, for it is of extreme importance to all parties interested that it should be definitively settled as soon as possible. "Chekib Effendi promised me that he would write in this sense to Kedschid Pacha, and that he felt con- vinced the Sultan would yield to the advice of his allies." Two days after this interview, the representatives of the four powers in London, addressed a detailed note to Chekib EfFendi (forwarded by Lord Palmers- ton to Lord Ponsonby), in which they recommended the Sultan " to grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, requesting the Turkish envoy to submit the note and its considerations without de- lay, to his court, and calling upon the government of His lliglmess to devote to it their most serious atten- tion." Three days after the arrival of this note at Constantinople, on the 13rh of February, 1841, the Sultan definitively signed the firman which conferred on Meliemet Ali and his descendants the heirship of the pachalic of Egypt, S])(>cifying tlie conditions. During the course of this negotiation and through all its fiuctuations, we kept entirely aloof, resolved not to issue from our isolation as long as the treaty of the L')th of .July was in action and the Egyptian question not finally closed. But since tlie act of Commodore Napier before Alexandria, and the approbation be- stowed on it by Lord I\ilmerston, I felt satisfied that the heirs]ii[) of Lgyj)twould be granted toMehemetAli 72 AFFAIES OF THE EAST, AND It had reached me through London that the passion of Lord Ponsonby against the pacha was scarcely displeasing to Lord Palmerston, and that the latter, while admitting his engagements with respect to the hereditary succession, allowed some glimpses to appear of an inclination to escape from them if opportunities offered. I attached no value to those rumours, and judging that the moment had arrived for signifying clearly the conduct we should hold when in course of time they would duly subside before facts, I wrote on the 13th of January, 1841, to Count de Sainte-Au- laire : " I cannot believe that the fantastic animosity of Lord Ponsonby can carry the day against Prince Metternich's prudence and Lord Palmerston's word. I am satisfied that the Porte will award to the pacha the heirship promised to him when his submission was obtained. Do not then on this point admit a doubt that I myself cannot entertain, and persist in looking upon "the concession of the hereditary rule in Egypt as a settled point. " When it is so declared, how shall we be situated, and what will remain to be done that Europe may derive, in the East, some profit from this shock, and resume her normal condition "? " On this point, we have nothing to do, no initiative to take. We are alone, we are at peace, and we wait. But you know also that while taking no part, after as before, in the treaty of the 15th of July, that is to say in the settlement of relations between the Sultan and the pacha, France is disposed to resume, in such East- CONVENTION OF THE loTII OF JULY, 1841. 73 ern affairs as have a general interest for Europe, the place belonging to her, and also, on suitable overtures, to rejoin European concert. " I stand alone in my cabinet, and in full liberty of mind, I trouble myself about no one. I look only at tilings as they are, to understand them clearly, and to judge what they advise or require. Unless I deceive myself, the following are the points of importance to regulate, as regards the East, and to regulate in common. " 1. The closing of both straits. " 2. The consecration of the principle admitted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in their notes of the 23rd, 2-tth, 2Gth of July, and IGth of August, 1839, in reply to the note of Erance of the 17th of July preceding ; tliat is to say, the recognition of the status qvo of the Ottoman Empire in its independence and integrity. This is what the five powers an- nounced eighteen months ago at the commencement of the affair. They could and ought to establish, to- day, in common, what they declared from the first, and end as tlu'y began. " 3. Tlie guarantees to be required from the Porte for the Christian po])ulations of Syria, not only in its own, but in the general interest, Ottoman and Euro- pean ; for, if Syria falls back into anarchy, the Porto and Europe may in their turn be involved in the em- barrassment. " 4. Certain stipulations in favour of Jerusalem, This idea has sprung uj), and begins seriously to 74 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND occupy Christian minds. I know not exactly what may be possible, or under what forms and limitations European intervention is prepared to obtain for Jeru- salem a degree of security and dignity ; but the go- vernments which lament, with reason, the enfeeble- ment of national faiths, ought of themselves, when occasion offers, to afford those faiths some palpable token of adhesion and interest. Let Europe and European policy resume a Christian aspect. No one estimates, at this epoch, all that order and power have to gain thereby. "5. Finally, there are, with reference to commer- cial routes, whether between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, by the Isthmus of Suez, or between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, by Syria and the Euphrates, stipulations required of general liberty, and perhaps positive neutrality, of great interest to all Europe, and establishing, for the rapidly increasing intercourse between Europe and Asia, excellent principles, for which such a favourable opportunity may never again present itself. " This is what occurs to me, my dear friend, when I leave my mind to its free scope. Take all this as I give it to you ; show it, and speak of it as you may think proper. But, if I judge correctly, there is matter here to employ the five powers, and to ter- minate the affairs of the East, in common, by a ge- neral act deficient neither in greatness nor utility." I made the first move by liolding this language. The plenipotentiaries assembled in London expressed CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 75 their views less clearly. " I firmly believe," M. de Bourqueney wrote to me, " that they will come to us on tlie general question ; but will they open ground as widely as we desire ? Up to this time they are rather vague with me. I cannot, therefore, at present, specify to you profitably, thoughts w^hich perhaps are not yet sufficiently defined themselves." I resolved not to suficr this obscurity as to the inten- tions and words of the allies to prepossess my mind. When we have formed no decision, it is best to wait and preserve in silence full liberty of action accord- ing to circumstances ; but w'hen we see distinctly the practicable and desirable course, it is wise to examine and explain it to ourselves ; we thus escape difficul- ties and tendencies which, when suff"ered to approach, often lead to serious errors and dangers. Under the pressure of tlie intelligence from the East, they, however, became anxious in London to draw the questions closer, and to seek their definite solution. I determined to send Count de Rohan Cliabot to Alexandria to convey categorically to the pacha our intentions and advice. He had been at- tached to my embassy in England as second secretary; had acquitted liimself well of his mission to St. Helena with Prince de Joinville, and his character and capacity liad won my entire confidence. Before leaving for Egy})t he made a liasty jouniey to Lond(m, where lie was equally well known and esteemed, and after conferring with M. de Bourqueney, he reported to me in detail their common information and conjee- 76 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND tures on the approaching position there preparing for us. " In an interview of considerable length, Lord Palmerston," he said, " confined himself to the defence of his policy towards France, and to the dis- cussion of that of the cabinet of the 1st of March ; evidently resolved not to admit that anything on his part had justified the French uneasiness and irritation, and not to enter into the question which, neverthe- less, appeared at every instant in his inmost thought, — the nature of the overture to be made to France. It is not, therefore, from what I was able to gather from him that I have formed my impression. It emanates rather from my conversations with MM. de Biilow, Esterhazy and Briinnow, and especially from what M. de Bourqueney has confided to me as the result of his own observations. " All the members of the conference, M. de Briinnow alone excepted, arc anxious that a courteous advance should shortly be made to France to induce her to resume her place in European concert, and that this advance should be followed by a general act concluded in conjunction with France, on the afi"airs of the East. " When the internal question of the relations between the Sultan and the Pacha are considered by the divan as settled, the Porte sliould announce to the plenipotentiaries of the four powers at Constan- tinople that the object of the treaty of the 15th of July is accomplished. On this declaration reaching London, the conference would be convoked ; it would CONVENTION OF THE loTII OF JULY, 1841. 77 record the fact, and the secondary questions, to which France was no party, would be thus completely closed. It would tlien be determined to make an advance to the French government inviting it to consult, in concert with the allies, on the final solu- tion of the general question. A protocol might be drawn up of this decision, and the natural organ of the conference. Lord Palmerston, would be instructed to communicate it to the French government. " France being thus invited to resume her place in the conference, the following would be the nature and substance of the general act to be con- cluded. " In the preamble would be repeated the expres- sion of the integrity and independence of the Otto- man Empire, as the basis of the policy adopted by the powers. A first article would establish the prin- ciple of the closing of the straits. In a second, tlie Sultan would pledge himself not to grant fir- mans of admission to more than one man-of-war of each ])ower at a time. A third article might con- tain some sti[)ulations in favour of the Christian po- pulations of Syria. Until now, Lord Palmerston has opposed this idea, saying tliat religious protections prepare political dismemberments ; and the otlier members (jf the conference appear to incline to this opinion. " On the question of the routes of communication with India, notliing lias yet been said in London ; but there would be no embarrassment in its introduction. 78 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND always taking care to avoid any suspicion of English policy, or of an attempt to succeed against it. " Care also would be taken to abstain from any allu- sion that might recall the question in which France had refused to participate, and the success obtained without her co-operation. " Nothing at present authorizes the hope of seeing the principle of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire recognized in a specific article. Lord Palmerston, satisfied with the part which Russia has acted in these last events, does not seem to insist, strongly on the point. Prince Esterhazy and M. de Biilow will not urge it too far, feeling persuaded, for the moment, that the resistance of M. de Briinnow would be insurmountable. In his attitude and lan- guage, M. de Briinnow is far behind his court ; he op- poses the suggested advance to France, and the un- derstanding with her. Nevertheless, they profess to believe in London that the cabinet of St. Petersburgh has not only said but written that it would associate itself witli the common measure and general act, on condition that no special stipulation should appear touching the principle of the independence and inte- grity of the Ottoman Empire. It is expected, finally, that with this limitation, M. de Briinnow will range with liOrd Palmerston's opinion as soon as he sees tliat it is fixed." From tliis picture of the dispositions of the pleni- jK)teiitiarics in London, I had little difficulty in con- cluding that no effective solution of the general ques- CONVENTION OF THE IStH OF JULY, 1841. 79 tions would issue from their deliberations, no great act of truly European policy. Evidently the courts of Vienna and Berlin, anxious for the peace of the continent, thought only of closing, well or ill, the Egyptian affair, and of concluding the perilous en- gagements, which, by the treaty of the 15th of July, they had been led to contract. The Emperor Nicholas found that he had done enough in abandoning his pre- tensions of exclusive preponderance at Constantinople, and by allowing the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi to fall to the ground to break up the close friendship between England and France. He had no desire to go further, or to re-animate, at the expense of his own policy in the East, the influence of France once more added to European concert. I>ord Palmerston wished to re- sume amicable intercourse with France, always pro- vided that this reconciliation in no way reduced the complaisance lately testified by Russia towards Eng- land, and the sacrifices she had made. Before this re- crudescence of pcn-sonal passions and interests amongst the different powers, the general interest of Europe turned pale ; the great questions of European future retired ; neither the real independence of the Turks, nor the fate of the Christians in the East, nor the security and facility of commercial relations between Europe and Asia stood forward as objects of serious solicitude. Elevated and far-seeing policy no longer held its place. Tliere was no eagerness but to be de- livered fnnn recent embarrassments without being compromised in any new design ; and such was the im- 80 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND patience that M. de Bourqueney wrote thus on the 12 th February ; " Here is the danger in presence of which we stand. I do not believe, on the part of the confer- ence, in an equal sincerity and ardour to obtain the jive signatures on paper. If some find us cold, and others suspicious or exacting, they will content them- selves with four. They will issue a protocol of closure, declaring that the conference has reached the term of its labours by the final accomplishment of the treaty of July ; and all will then reduce itself to diplomatic action. They will not the less afiirm that France has no longer a right to call herself isolated, and that her isolations ceased with the expiration of the treaty of July and the breaking up of the conference. The question of armed peace will follow. Remem- ber the situation of June, 1840 ; there was also a mo- ment when you felt that you were on the point of being outflanked by an agreement oi four. I see the same danger beginning to peep out under another form. There was then a treaty to inaugurate ; the question is now to bury one, but in such a manner as to render any other impossible !" I did not conceal from myself the peril of this position, and the necessity of forestalling it. I re- plied to M. de Bourqueney. "We are not hastening eagerly towards the conclusion, which seems to be in progress, but if it is really at hand, I think with you, that it would certainly be puerile and might be in- jurious to keep it waiting. " First of all, is the Turco-Egyptian question really CONVENTION OF THE 13tH OF JULY, 1841. 81 and completely terminated ? The heirship is accorded, the Turkish fleet restored, and Syria evacuated. Is all settled also as to the mode of the pacha's administra- tion in Egypt ? Is no new regulation proposed beyond the general conditions announced in the note of the 30th of January last ? Tliis matter must not be pro- longed after we have been told that all is over, and when we have ourselves acted in virtue of that declara- tion. Look well to this. " If all is really at an end, as regards the Turco- Egyptian question, I am of opinion that the four powers should declare this by a protocol before inviting us to regulate together what may still require to be settled in the general relations of Europe with the Porte. This will have more weight than a declaration and direct invitation from the Porte to the European powers, including France. \Ve thus remain more evi- dently unconnected with the treaty of the 15tli of July ; they do not address us until after proclaiming that the special object of that treaty is fulfilled. The four powers then come to us and their courteous step towards France has its full value. " Now for the form. In substance and in general thesis, it is desirable that the act should be as con- sistent and plenary as possible ; its true worth will con- sist in putting an end to the present state of universal tension, and in re-establishing European concert. But the importance of the special stipulations which the act will contain, must respond in a certain degree, to the political value of the act itself G 82 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND " Its first and incontestable merit, therefore, ought to be the annulment and replacing of preceding and particular acts or treaties relative to the Ottoman Em- pire, henceforward without object, — the treaty'of Un- kiar Skelessi, as also that of the 15th of July, 1840. " It would unquestionably be desirable that the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be the object of a special article and positive engagement. But I agree with you that, on this point, we must insist only on what we absolutely require and shall certainly obtain. If the common intention of the five powers is to be ex- pressed in the preamble to the act, the drawing up of the preamble is of great importance. Take care to ascertain beforehand what may have been prepared. " With respect to the Christian populations of Syria, I have lately written on that subject to M. de Sainte-Aulaire. M. de Metternich has also entered warmly into this idea, but considers it more imme- diately interesting to the two Catholic powers, France and Austria, and more likely to succeed by their united action at Constantinople than by a formal deliberation of the five powers in London. He lias therefore sig- nified to me his desire that this matter should be ne- gotiated between Vienna and Paris, rather than at the conference. lie may very possibly be in the right. I therefore do not think we should strongly urge this point. At the same time, it is desirable to mention it, and to ask wliether, in case special stipulations sliould appear to be impracticable, the five powers ought not CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 83 to pledge themselves mutually to use- their influence with the Porte to induce it to grant to these Christian populations pledges of justice and fair administra- tion. " The routes of communication between Europe and Asia, whether by the Isthmus of Suez and the Red Sea, or by Syria, the Euphrates, and the Persian Gulf, might well form the object of a formal stipulation which should guarantee their free use to all European nations, without special favour or privilege to any. The scope of this stipulation, and the nature of the guarantees, are matters for discussion, but in no case should they contain anything inconvenient or offensive to the contracting powers. " I say nothing on the closing of the Straits, and the restrictions to be imposed on ships of war. There can be no contest on that point. " You have here, my dear Baron, bases on which to regulate your conduct and language in the confiden- tial preliminaries of this negotiation. Continue to show no eagerness or wish to anticipate, and also no hesitation or desire to retard." Thus relieved from impediments, tlie negotiations advanced rapidly. As tlie pleni])otentiaries of Austria and Prussia appeared to be the most anxious, M. de Bourqueney communicated first with tliem, and dis- cussed confidentially the bases of the protocol destined to close the Egyptian questi(m, and of the new treaty for the restoration of European concert. B(>ing in- formed by his allies of the dispositions of Erance, G 2 84 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND Lord Palmerston said one evening to the Baron : " I am told we can now talk together." — " I am quite ready," replied M. de Bourqueney. — "To-morrow, then," rejoined Lord Palmerston; and the next day, February the 21st, 1841, the French envoy held a long conversation with the English minister, which he reported to me the same evening. " It was I," he wrote, " who spoke first. I said that my government being apprised from all quarters that the four powers considered the time arrived for proposing to it to enter in common upon some European act, had thought fit, in turn, to weigh the bearing and form of the act that might thus be carried out in concert. I gave your ideas as to the form, and passing to the substance, I pointed out the five points upon which I was instructed to insist, as comprising the essential elements of an act suitable to the importance of the object. " Lord Palmerston replied at first by some general phrases on the sincere disposition of his cabinet, a disposition common to all the powers, to resume its normal relation with France. He accepted warmly the form of a step by the conference to announce to me the drawing up of a protocol, signifying that the Turco-Egyptian question was closed. He then ad- verted to the five i:>oints, which I had touclied upon, as the bases of the prospective act. " 1. The guarantee of the independence and inte- grity of the Ottoman Empire would be, he said, a stipulation at variance with the political doctrines of cc)N\i:ntion of the LStii of july, 1841. 85 England. Unless under exceptional and flagrant cir- cumstances, it is our rule here not to enter into engagements at unlimited date, which save nothing, and only tend to encumber the future, ^^'ith a special end, defined in object and duration, England has been led into an arrangement of this kind ; but in a general and undefined treaty she could not con- sent to pledge herself to an abstract principle. We have thought of supplying a special arrangement by a phrase in the preamble of the projected act; for instance, by expressing the union of the powers in the (Je.sire of securing the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But here again a serious difficulty presents itself. In its note of the Stli of October, 1840, the French ministry of that epoch gave to tlie principle of tlie integrity and inde- pendence of tlie Ottoman Empire an interpretation which the other powers decline to admit. This princi})le became (by the avowal of the then existing cabinet) a position taken against one of the contract- ing powers to the treaty of the 15th of July. In an act of general reconciliation, could we insist on the insertion of a clause offensive to a particular power'? And even if the four others urged it strongly, could it be possible to induce the consent of tlie fifth? This is not all. The note of the 8th of October goes even to maintain that the independ(Mice and integrity of the Ottoman Em])ire demand the consideration of a sort oi partial and internal independence, that of the pacha of l42:yi)t. Here are, unquestionably, discord- 86 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND ant ideas, which we cannot submit to the trial of ^a new contradictory discussion. Nevertheless, without inserting in the treaty under consideration the exact words which have furnished a text for these bitter differences, we may find equivalents to lead all the powers towards the end they propose, by an act of general reconciliation. " 2. The closing of the two straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, is a principle equally acceptable to all the powers who desire, in good faith, to re- spect the independence of the Ottoman Empire. It is to the advantage of Europe to sanction it anew by a solemn act. " 3. The free enjoyment, by all the powers, of the great avenues of communication between Europe and Asia, would be looked upon (draw up the formula as you may) as an advantage specially and exclusively acquired by England. One of the heaviest reproaches hurled against her policy since ihe 15th of July, 1840, is that of having sought, through the Egyptian ques- tion, the monopoly of these communications. AVhat end would it answer to extend this monopoly in prin- ciple to all the other powers 1 Which amongst them possesses an empire in India? People will say, and above all in France, that England had deceived her allies under a false semblance of disinterestedness. They will assert that she has pleaded for the insertion of an article profitable only to herself, and that she has made this the condition of her reconciliation with France. We possess no exclusive privilege. We CONVENTION OF THE loTII OF JULY, 1841. 87 desire it not. I-et all the world be free to ask and obtain what the spirit of enterprise of a simple indi- vidual has created. But there is no matter here for stipulation in a treaty. " 4. Advice to the Porte to secure to the Chiistian populations of Syria conditions of justice and fair administration, reflects honour on the power proposing it, and finds an echo from the others ; but a treaty comports badly with the form of advice. We might conveniently with the drawing up of the general act, address a note to the Ottoman plenipotentiary from the five powers, suggesting to the Sultan the exercise of tolerance, and the protection of Christian rites. "5. The treaty of tlie 18th of July, 1840, expires with tlu> ])rotocol of closure. The treaty of Unkiar- Skelessi falls with the clause relative to the closing of the Straits. Russia, moreover, is solemnly pledged not to rcvi^e it, and this year it dies a natural death." " You have here. Sir," added M. de Bourqueney, " a summary of Lord Palmerston's arguments on the five points submitted to our discussion. I shall not now repeat my replies. He ended a conference of two hours and a half with these words: 'I did not wish to employ my hand in drawing up of the final act, until after a conversation with you. I shall now com- mence it, and submit to you the draft.' " 1 entered into no controversy on Lord Palmerston's reasonings; it would have been vain and futile. Evi- dently, the grand object 1 had shadowed out for the effectual settlement of the affairs of the East, Turkish 88 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND and Christian, and for the general policy of Europe, had no chance of success. The powers were solely preoccupied with their personal interest in the situ- ation of the moment. Within these bounds, they offered France the satisfaction she required on her own account. They made the first overtures. They asked nothing which implicated, directly or indirectly, our sanction or concurrence in the treaty of the 15th of July. They came to us declaring that it was ex- tinct. Finally, no allusion was made to disarmament. I wrote to Baron de Bourqueney : " These three points being opened, and they are so in the plan you transmit to me, our honour is quite safe, and the advantage of presuming our place in the councils of Europe is of far more consequence than the objection of a treaty somewhat meagre. This is the opinion of the King and the Council. Let the draft you men- tion be prepared and forwarded to us as a confidential communication, and I trust 1 shall return it to you with a favourable reply. To break up all coalition, apparent or real, unconnected with us ; to check be- tween England and Russia habits of intimacy rather too much prolonged ; to bring back all tlic powers to their individual positions and natural interests ; to emerge fi-om a state of isolation, and to take the attitude of independence ; — these are, in a diplomatic sense alone, results of considerable value, when purchased at the price of some irksome debates in the Cham- bers." Five days after his long conversation witli Lord CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 89 Palmerston, Baron tie Bourqueney again wrote to me : " AVe have had fresh conferences. The protocol of closure and the final act have nearly received their last revision. The two documents can only be judfjed fairly, together; the first I consider good. To-morrow both will be communicated to me. I shall immediately dispatch a courier to bear them to you."' Instead of sending the documents as he promised, M. de Bourqueney, two days after, wrote thus : — A se- rious incident occurred yesterday, in the afternoon. Chekib EfFendi refuses to make the declaration neces- sary to head the protocol of closure. Lord Palmer- ston has yielded to the reasons alleged by the Turk- ish plenipotentiary, and maintains that the protocol must wait for official advices that the firman for the hereditary investiture of Egypt, granted by the Sultan, has been accepted by tlie pacha. But he adds, that this formality does not peremptorily suspend our pass- ing on to the signature of the general treaty, under reserve that the protocol shall be signed in the interval between the signature of tlie treaty and tlie exchange of ratifications. Tlie ])leiiipotentiaries of Prussia and Austria, on the other hand, maintain that we may dispense with tlie assent of Chekib Effendi and pro- ceed at once to sign the protocol. The Pussian pleni- potentiary hesitates between the two camps. Things being in this position, I cannot consent to transmit to you the draft of the treaty without the document which serves as its complement and ])reface. We 90 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND have exhibited no eagerness in the negotiation ; we ought not to do so for the issue. The incident will be disposed of to-morrow. I ask therefore a respite of twenty-four hours." The incident neither was nor could be disposed of so rapidly as M. de Bourqueney expected. Two of the powers engaged in the negotiation, Austria and Prussia, ardently desired that the Egyptian question should be looked upon as closed, the treaty of the 15th of July as extinct, and that the conference of London, by making this official declaration, should restore them to their liberty. But the Porte desired not to release its allies from their engagements, until Mehemet Ali accepted with the concession of the heirship, the accompanying conditions, and un- til it felt thoroughly assured that it would no longer require the aid of Europe to coerce him. Lord Palmerston Avas determined to continue this aid as long as it might be necessary, and not to with- draw his patronage until, in consequence of the ac- corded succession, the pacha submitted to the Sul- tan. The llussian plenipotentiary was in no hurry that the question should reach its definitive solution, and that harmony should be re-established between France and the powers signing the treaty of the 15th of July. In the midst of these contrarieties, it was quite in order, before proclaiming that the object of the treaty of the 15th of July was achieved, to wait certain in- telligence that the solution given at Constantinople CONVENTION OF THE loTlI OF JULY, 1841. 91 was accepted at Alexandria, and that harmony was effectually restored between the paclia and his so- vereign. To satisfy the Austrian and Russian pleni- potentiaries, efforts were made in London, during eight days, to dispense with this official delay. The form of protocol intended to close the Egyptian ques- tion, and whicli Chekib Effendi had refused to sign, was altered, and divided into two distinct articles, — one, authorizing the return of the European consuls to Alexandria, implied that the treaty of the 15tli of July had reached its term and object ; the other, as a natural consec|uence, invited the French Government to sign the general treaty destined to regulate the relations of Turkey with Europe. With some diffi- culty, Chekib Effendi was persuaded to sign the first of these, and when both had received the commentaries of Prince Esterhazy, Baron de Biilow, and Lord Pal- merston, on their bearing and value, Baron de Bour- queney considering them himself as satisfactory, for- warded them to me, saying: "The last tedious inter- ruptions have been, this morning, definitively removed, Chekib Effendi has signed the protocol under a modi- fication of no im])()rtance. 1 was immediately sum- moned to Lord Palmerston. I transmit lierewith the documents. I assure you that our attitude here, du- ring tlie last fortnight, has been highly dignified. There was a moment when it vei-g(^d on rupture. Let me persist in asking from you the stage-effect of rapid acceptance. You have s])oken tlie great word; we exchange isolation for independence." 92 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND After carefully examining the documents for- warded by M. de Bourqueney, 1 differed from his opinion, and resolved not to sign them without seve- ral alterations, two of which appeared to me indis- pensable. The King and the cabinet agreed with my view. I forthwith returned the three papers to M. de Bourqueney, indicating minutely the changes we de- sired. " I comprehend," I said to him, " the merit of what you call the stage-effect of immediate acceptance, and should have been pleased to have afforded you that gratification ; but it was impossible. The strength of our position here consists in the unswerving main- tenance of the three reserves I have constantly recom- mended. The second, which separates us absolutely from the treaty of the 15th of July, would be seriously compromised, if we accepted, in the protocol inviting us to re-enter European concert, the phrase which cuts that treaty into two parts, one temporary, the other per- manent, presenting thus the new general convention we shall have to sign as a consequence of the second part of the preceding treaty ; this Avould connect us with a shred of the first, to which, in its entirety, we mean to continue strangers. I am aware that we do not ourselves sign this protocol, and therefore we are no direct party to it. But it is presented to us ; it is the act by which we are invited to re-enter European con- cert, and we accept the invitation ; they owe it to us, to em})loy the form we consider suitable, when that form takes nothing from the position of others, nor from the ])ermaiient principle sought to be established. CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 93 If these alterations in llie proposed act are admitted, as I hope they will be, I sliall immediately forward our adliesion and your full powers. We have dis- played no anxiety to negotiate ; we have waited to be asked. It becomes us to be equally calm and digni- fied when matters approach conclusion, and since the drafts of these acts are confidentially transmitted to us, this evidently means that we are to make such ob- servations on them as we may deem essential, and that these amendments will be admitted if in fact they are consistent. In forwarding this letter, I added, with reference to vague intelligence from Alexandria : " You probably know already that the arrangement between the Sul- tan and the pacha is not so completely settled as was supposed. The unexp{^cted restriction attached by tlie Porte to the principle of liereditary succession by reserving to itself the right of selecting amongst the sons of the pacha, and its pretension of substituting for the fixed tribute a share of the gross revenue of Egypt, may lead to many embarrassments. The pacha demurs, and calls for negotiation at Constantinople on these new conditions, wliicli aj)pear to him to ex- ceed tlie meaning of the separate act annexed by the powers to the treaty of the loth of July. I do not yet know what turn tliis incident may take." Two days later, these rumours received full con- firmation. On tli(> liOth of February, 1841, Said Muhib Eftendi, charged by the Sultan to bear to tlie pacha the firman of liereditary investiture, arrived 94 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND at Alexandria. He was received there with distin- guished honours. The pacha's chief officers, in grand costume, waited his disembarkation. A regiment was under arms. The batteries of the ports and fleet saluted him. The men-of-war dressed with flags, the consulates displayed their national colours. The French and English corvettes in the harbour fired salutes of twenty-one guns. General satisfaction spread throughout the city. Mehemet Ali sent one of his dignitaries to receive Said Muhib Eflendi at the foot of the great marble staircase of the seraglio, and awaited his entrance standing, in his grand au- dience-chamber. " After some indiff'erent conversa- tion," the Turkish envoy wrote to the Porte, " his Highness asked for the firman of which I was the bearer. I handed it to him respectfully. He then made me read, first the letter of the grand vizier, and then the firman relative to the heirship. After which, he said, ' The publication of the conditions named in the firman would, in a country like this, cause disorders.' I replied, that so far from the pub- lication of the firman leading to disorders, it was in itself a brilliant favour, of which the whole people, and those who heard it, would have reason to feel proud ; and in conformity with my instructions, I used tlie utmost efi'orts of my tongue and judgment to bring him to better feelings, by the use of encoura- ging arguments and necessary threats. I represented that the nature of this afi"air required that the firman should be read in a solemn assembly, and conveyed CONVENTION OF THE 13X11 OF JULY, 1841. 95 to the knowledge of the public. The pacha replied, ' May God preseiTe our Padisha and benefactor ! I am the Sultan's slave. I am unable to evince to him sufficient gratitude for the favour of which I am the object, and it is my duty to execute promptly all his orders ; but as the public reading of the firman at this moment offers some objections, we will speak of it later, and see what is to be done.' I then told him that the conditions in question were settled in con- currence with the high allied courts ; that the will of his Highness the Sultan was positive on this point, and that the hereditary investiture depended on his, the pacha's compliance. But as his Highness had said we should see to all this later, Sami Bey, who was also present, interposed, saying, ' Tlie Effendi is fatigued with his voyage, will your Highness allow him to repose V At these words the audience broke up, and I repaired to tlie house of Sami Bey, which had been prepared to receive me." In the evening a report spread through Alex- andria tliat ]\Ieliemet Ali refused to accept the con- ditions attached by the firman to the lieirsliip, and tliat Commodore Napier, wlio had dined witli him, said they were inadmissible. '• I repaired to the seraglio." M. Cochelet, our consul-general, wrote to me, " to satisfy myself of the facts. ^lehemet Ali had dined in company witli Commodore Napier, who left him as I anived. The paclia received me with his usual kindness, but seemed moody. At first he preserved perfect silence. He then asked me if any 96 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND letters had reached me from Constantinople. I showed him one from M. de Pontois. ' You know nothing,' he said ; ' the Porte grants me hereditary rule in Egypt under the condition of choosing itself my suc- cessor in my own family. What then becomes of my will ] ' I made no reply, and Mehemet Ali continued ; ' All the children of Egypt have now returned ; not one remains in Syria (he had that morning been ap- prised of the arrival of Ibrahim Pacha at Damietta) : it is for them to see whether they are willing to lose the fruits of all I have done for them. Selim Pacha, general of artillery, charged with the defence of Alex- andria, was present at this audience. Mehemet Ali turned to him, saying, ' Thou art still young ; thou knowest how to wield the sabre ; thou shalt yet see me give thee lessons.' My countenance betrayed my embarrassment ; I saw that Mehemet Ali looked at me, seeking to divine my thoughts, and I said to him, with gravity and sadness: — ' lieflect well before rush- ing into a new struggle; I see that your Highness is engaged with Selim Pacha ; I leave you to your af- fairs.' I went out witli the first interpreter, Artim Bey, who told me that independently of the condi- tion relative to the lieirship, the Porte intended to take from Mcliemet Ali the right of appointing the superior officers of the Egyptian army, from the rank of Jiiiiihaslii, or lieutenant-colonel. This is what has most enraged tlie paclia, next to taking from him the faculty of naming his successor. He knows that, in Turkey es})ecially, the masses act only on the impulse CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 97 of their leaders, and the Porte, by naming all the bimbashis, kaimakans, beys, and pachas, will entirely control the Egyptian army, and can employ it, equally with their own, to depose him at pleasure. lie fore- sees the entire overthrow of his career, and of the fortunes of all the men he has seen spring up around him, educated at his expense, appointed by him to all the higher commands in the army, and looked upon, as he says, in the light of children. Now that they are all near him, under his eyes, and that the fear of losing their posts will reanimate their courage, he hopes to obtain from them what he expected in Syria from their devotedncss. He wishes to pre- serve the right of establisliing the order of succession in his family, to prevent ambition or jealousy from arming his sons against each other." The firman decreed also that " whatever might be the annual amount of customs, tithes, taxes, and other revenues of Egypt, one quarter should be set aside, and paid over as tribute to the Porte, without deduct- ing any expenses." Mehcmet Ali, always with the most reverential forms, declared tliese three condi- tions unacceptable. '• I endeavoured to persuade him," Said Muhib wrote, in his letters to Constanti- no])le, " that it was most desirable for liim to submit to the engagements proposed, but far from listening to me, he reiterated tlie same objecticms. I said once more, I liave ventured to importune your Highness with many arguments for your own advantage, and the interests of your family, but all to no purpose. II 98 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND You must now state precisely your intentions and desires to the Sublime Porte ; we shall see the answer that will arrive. — I am the servant and slave of our master the Sultan. I will write the plain truth, ac- companied by my prayer. Their Excellencies the mi- nisters of the Sublime Porte know what justice is." I wrote immediately to M. de Bourqueney : " I was right in telling you yesterday to look well to the ground of the position. Let us thoroughly assure our- selves that the difficulties are really smoothed, that the Egyptian question is, in effect, terminated, and let us take care not to pledge ourselves prematurely by ac- cepting as accomplished, facts which are still in sus- pense. — I send you a copy of the dispatches I have just received from Constantinople and Alexandria. They require no comments. If I am correctly informed. Lord Ponsonby is at the bottom of all this ; his direct and personal action in London itself is the key to the obstinacy of Chekib Effendi in refusing to sign the protocol of closing. I am assured that one of the German diplomatists has seen with his own eyes the written proof, and has transmitted it to his court. Whatever may be the result of this incident, more singular than improbable, it is certain that all is not settled between the Sultan and the pacha, and that new difficulties in which the hand of Lord Ponsonby can scarcely be mistaken, arc about to spring up. K(>st, therefore, on your oars. The effect of this in- telligenc(> is great here, — great with the })ublic, greater s-till perhaps in the diplonuxtic world. The displeasure CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 99 of the Germans is excessive at seeing a question re\ive which they believed settled, and at the precise moment when they hoped to put a term to the general tension caused by this question in Europe. They sj)eak al- most openly of the bad faith of the interpretation given by tlie Turkish firman to tlie principle of heir- sliip in Egypt ; no one understood it in that sense, and tlie pacha is justified in Siiying that he should have been apprised of it before being called upon to restore the fleet and evacuate Syria, If there is bad faith as to the heirship, there is absurdity in imposing on tlie pacha, with respect to the army and the tribute, con- ditions which would give rise to perpetual conflicts between the Porte and him, and would incessantly threaten Europe with complications similar to those the weiglit of which we feel at this moment. The entire policy is equally void of honesty and prudence. I see but two issues to the situation it has ])roduced. Either, the conference of Eondon, unanimously em- barrassed by this incident, will cause a serious effort to be made at Constantinople to destroy Eord Ponsonby's work and to incline tlie Sultan to grant better terms to the ]iaclia ; — or, disunion will pervade the conference, and the two (ierman powers will withdraw from tlie affair, declaring that in their eyes it is terminated, and that they will mix themselves up with it no longer. I trust rather to tli(> first result, and 1 think, at the same time, that if a determined effort is ma(l(> at Con- stantinople to render the Sultan more rational and loyal, success will follow without difficulty. Be this 11 -2 100 AFFAIES OF THE EAST, AND as it may, our position is invariable ; in conduct, tran- quil expectation ; in language, careful but positive disapprobation. We meditate no interference in favour of the pacha. We make no attempt to bring on a settlement between him and the Sultan. Let the em- barrassments of this position weigh upon those by whom they have been created. We shall continue strangers to them. Our action confines itself to sug- gesting, at Constantinople and Alexandria, moderate counsels, and in pointing out the dangers to which fresh complications might lead. At Vienna, at Berlin, and in London itself, the Turkish firman and the new difficulties it caused to spring up between the Porte and the paclia excited surprise oveiilowing with dis- pleasure. The German plenipotentiaries gave full vent to their anger. Prince Metternich went quietly to w^ork at Constantinople to compel the Porte to modify the dispositions against which the pacha remonstrated. Lord Palmerston, at first, seemed less disposed to se- cond these remonstrances. In replying to the grand vizier, Mehemet Ali had extended liis objections be- yond the leading points, and manifested for the in- ternal administration of Egypt, pretensions of inde- ])endence which furnished at the outset, fresh arms to the ])()lemics of Lord Palmerston and the hatred of liord Ponsonby. Baron de Briinnow seized every opportunity of throwing into the negotiation wliich tended to restore cordiality betAveen England and Erauce, impediments and delays. But the desire of Europe to put an end to a tightened and perilous CONVENTIOX OF THE IStH OF JUT.Y, 1841. 101 position was stronii^er than personal passions and tlie petty dilatory efforts of some of the nep^otiators. On the Gth of April, M. de IJourqneney wrote: " Prince Esterhazy has received a courier from Vienna this morninii^. I have read his dispatches. Prince Met- ternich has no doubt that the hatti-sheriff will be modified, as regards the heirship, the tribute, and the appointment of ranks in the army. He sends to M. de Stiirmer extremely reasonable instructions on these tliree points." Lord Palmerston, on his part, wrote tlius on the 10th of April to Lord Ponsonby : "It is most important that the points in dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet should be settled as soon as possible. Tier ^Majesty's p^overnment think that the objection raised by your Excellency in your dispatch of the 17th of ^larch last, against all communication from the Sultan to Mehemet Ali, considering that such would have the air of negotiation, ought not to prevail over the extreme urgency of coming to a final settle- nunit, — a settlement which cannot take place without such direct communications. On some of the points in (question between the two ])arties, Mehemet Ali is in the right ; on others he is evidently and decidedly wrong. Tlie Sultan sliould modify, without delay, such portions of liis firman as give rise to reasonable objections, and (>xplain thorougldy why he cannot cliange the rest without deviating from the terms of tlie treaty of tin* l.")t]i of July, and the opinion of the four powers, ^'our liXcellency will urge the Porte to do this witliout loss of time." 102 AFFAIKS OF THE EAST, AND Even at St. Petersburgh, the animosity of the Em- peror Nicholas against King Louis Philippe did not stifle his pacific prudence. He had no desire that we should believe in active malevolence on his part, and although ever hostile at the bottom, he took pains when the situation pressed, to appear easy and con- ciliatory. Baron de Bourqueney kept me fully informed of all these internal agitations amongst the allied pleni- potentiaries, and I noticed them without inquietude. Their attitude towards us left me no doubt as to their real and definitive dispositions. They hastened to in- sert the alterations I had required in their drafts of the protocol of closure and the new general treaty, and invited me to sign this last, modified with the first, according to our desire. I refused peremptorily, until the new difiiculties between the Sultan and the pacha were removed, and the Egyptian question really settled. They then proposed that at least the two acts should be provisionally initialled, to record that we approved them, while waiting the moment for final signature. I authorized Baron de Bourqueney to con- sent to this, and Lord Palmerston, when told of it, evinced warm satisfaction. " I feel confident," he said, '^ that the afiair has arranged itself at Constantinople, and that the Porte has given the exj^lanations and granted the modifications required by the pacha; but the really important fact is the sanction given to-day by your g()V(3rnment to the acts which will constitute the r(3turn of France to the councils of Europe. In a CONVENTION OF THE loTII OF JULY, 1841. 103 matter so serious, we must not lose a day. I shall call you all together at seven o'clock." The conference met that same evening, and the two modified acts were provisionally signed, one by the five plenipoten- tiaries without France, the other including that of the French plenipotentiary with theirs. At a later hour in the evening, the Duke of Wellington, happen- ing to meet Baron de Bourqueney, observed, with the satisfaction of a realized prophecy, " 1 always said, and I was the first to say it, that nothing solid could be done without France." The German plenipotentiaries were so convinced of this that the conditional signatures failed to tran- quillize them as to the future ; they wished our defi- nitive signature to end all debate on tlie matter. Fearing tliat tlie solution expected from Constantino- ple might be doubtful or tardy, they endeavoured to conclude all in London by exchanging with Chekib Effendi (who consented with much reluctance) notes declaring that the Egyptian question was closed, and that nothing remained in dispute between tlie Sultan and tli(> piicha but a (lom(>stic point with which the powers had no wish to interfere further. Prince Es- terhazy and Baron de Neumann tlien conjured ]\[. de BounpuMiey to obtain our consent to the final signa- ture of the acts : '' Take care in ]^^ris," they said, " that you are not, by your delays, serving the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, which d(\sir(^s no general treaty of jive^ and that of I^ord l^dnun-ston also, which witli extreme ri'luctance gives u]) the guardiansliip of Tur- 104 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND key hy four, for it is in fact their own." M. de Bour- queney was a little shaken by these anxieties and re- monstrances. I persisted peremptorily in my refusal. " The latest news from Constantinople," I wrote to him, " indicate no change in the situation. I wait, and I shall most certainly continue to wait until a change occurs. We shall not be slow to acknowledge that the Turco-Egyptian question is closed, but that has not yet taken place. The last instructions from Prince Metternich to M. de Stiirmer, and from Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby will, I think, decide the final resolutions of the Porte ; and as, at Alexandria, they are in a tranquil and conciliatory mood, they will probably receive concessions very moderately rea- sonable. But what you tell me yourself of a petty splenetic recrudescence of Lord Palmerston, proves that we have done well in taking our securities. It is not Austria and Prussia only that are to be relieved from embarrassment ; it is we ourselves, and all the w^orld with us. And that we may really escape from difficulty here, we must not run the risk of again falling into it in the East. Between Kedschid Pacha, Lord Ponsonby, M. de Stiirmer, the divan, the se- raglio, written instructions and spoken words, con- cc^alcMl and opposing influences, there has been, of late, so much complication and confusion, that we are called upon to see very clearly before we declare that all is at an end." The clear light we wanted appeared almost at the moment of our demanding it. The Marquis Louis con^t;xtion of tiiij 18tii of july, 1841. 105 de Sainte-Aulairc, charge d'affaires at Vienna, during the absence of liis fatlier on leave, ^yrote to me on the 30th of March, that, the evening before, the Turkish minister for foreign affairs had been dis- missed by the Sultan, and replaced by Rifat Pacha, formerly ambassador from the Porte in Austria. Lord Ponsonby transmitted the same news the same day to Lord Palmerston. For some time M. de Pon- tois had informed me that this change was in prepa- ration. Mr. Bulwer, charge d'affaires for England, in Paris, during the illness of Lord Granville, ac- quainted Lord Palmerston on the 23rd of April that " the immediate cause was an insignificant quarrel between the grand vizier and the minister of com- merce, Ahmed Fetlii Pacha, who has also been dis- missed ; but the success of the action is attributed to the enemies of the new Turkish reforms, and also to tlie resistance opposed by lledschid to the modifica- tions desired by the great powers in the hatti-sheriff relating to Egypt; — modifications necessary to a reconciliation between the Sultan and the pacha." The influence of Prince M(>tternicli in this change was apparent. It prevailed more and more at Con- stantinople over that of TiOrd Ponsonby. "The lat- ter has oversliot his mark," said Prince Esterhazy to Paron dc Bourqueney ; " even Lord Palmerston begins to find it out, and to feel the necessity of disengaging himself, with us, from the local intrigues of Constantinople." As soon as he learnt the fall of Pedscliid Paclia, Prince Metternich forwarded to 106 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND . Baron de Stiirmer instructions somewhat pedantic and verbose, according to his habit, but, withal, extremely judicious, and concluding with this formal order : — " You will invite your colleagues of Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, to a meeting, and you will make known to them: 1. That the Emperor, our august master, being determined on his part to restrain himself within the limits of the resolutions passed in common by the plenipotentiaries of the four powers assembled in London, directs you to insist, with the divan, on the admission of the modi- fications which these same courts desire to see intro- duced, in the interest of the Porte itself, into certain articles of the firman of investiture of the pacha of Egypt. 2. That, in virtue of this decision, you are instructed to invite your colleagues to join with you in a common measure to be adopted, in this sense, with the Porte ; that in case this union cannot be obtained, you are charged to take the step in ques- tion, with the divan, either alcme, or with such of your colleagues as may join you. 3. That having acquitted yourself, towards the divan, of counsels conformable with the resolutions taken in the central locality of London, and in case of refusal on the part of his Highness the Sultan to acquiesce in the Avishcs of his allies, you have also to declare that his Highness being master of his decisions, his Imperial INIajcsty, on his part, should look upon as accom- plished the task lie had undertaken by the engage- ments contracted on the 15th of July, 1840, and that CONVENTION OF THE 13X11 OF JULY, 1841. 107 he should henceforward consider himself restored to entire liberty of position and action." The Porte had no disposition to reject such a peremptory notice. The new reis-effendi, Rifat Paclia, immediately dispatched orders to Chekib Eft'endi to refer to the conference in London on the modifications demanded in the firman of investiture of Mehemet Ali, and gave him at the same time powers sufficiently extensive to bind his outi govern- ment according to the advice he miglit receive from the four powers. " Baron de Biilow," M. de Bour- queney wrote on the 27th of April, " has read a letter to me this morning which says that, on the 17th, they received at Vienna, intelligence from Constanti- nople dated on the Gth. Lord Ponsonby at last understands that it was desired in London that the Turco-Egyjitian question should end at Constanti- nople, and he is now labouring to produce its conclu- sion. Better late than never, wrote M. de AVerther to ^1. de Billow ; but we have reached the denoue- ment." We are not yet so close to it as M. de Werther flat- tered liimseir. Cliekib Kflendi called for the opinion of the plenipotentiaries in London on tlie modifica- tions demanded by the pacha in the firman of investi- ture. The conference replied that the succession ouglit to be fixed in the family of Mehemet Ali, according to the Oriental principle of seniority, which ri'gulates that power passes in the direct line, through tlu' male issue from elder to elder, amongst 108 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND the sons and grandsons. As to the tribute, it declared itself incompetent to name a figure, but expressed a wish that the amount should be fixed and regulated once for all, so as not to load the pacha with charges too heavy for his government. With respect to the appointment of ranks in the army, the conference thought that it behoved the Sultan to delegate to the ruler of Egypt the powers he might deem necessary, reserving to himself the right of extending or re- straining those powers, according to experience and the requirements of the service. The questions seemed thus determined, but Chekib EfFendi doubted whether he was sufficiently authorized to accept these solutions, by finally binding his government. The Porte wished to obtain from Europe, as the price of its concessions, an official guarantee of the indepen- dence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The English cabinet was warmly attacked in Parliament by the Tories, and approached a crisis which threat- ened its existence. On the verge of the end the negotiation lagged and languished still, either from the will or position of the negotiators. But while they hesitated in London, a peremptory decision took place at Constantinople. The Marquis de Sainte-Aulaire wrote to me from Vienna on the Gth of May : " A courier who arrived last night from Con- stantinople has brought to Prince Metternich the in- telligence he impatiently expected of the modifications made by the Porte, in conformity with the demands of the allies, in the hatti-sheriff for the investiture of CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 109 ^lehemet Ali. The heirship in the government of Egypt, with transmission in the order of pronogeni- tnre from mule to male, and the appointment of officers to the rank of full colonel inclusive, are granted to the pacha. The quota of tribute will be subsequently fixed (not on the casual revenue of the province) at a sum to be determined in common accord. This de- cision of the Sublime Porte has been recorded in a memorandum handed to the envoys of the powers at Constantinople, bearing date the 19th of April. M. de Metternich forwards it this evening to Paris and London. " The joy displayed by the Prince at this news, which he considers the pledge of a bond jide conclusion, seems to me lively and sincere. lie congratulates him- self on having at last terminated this long and difficult affair. After receiving his instructions of the 2Gth of March (the prince informed me), M. de Stiirmer ad- dressed the most urgent remonstrances to the Porte, in wliich he was warmly supported by his colleagues of Russia and Prussia. Hut all their efforts were annulled by the contrary advice incessantly given to the divan by Pord Ponsonby. The instructions in virtue of wliich you act, said the Pnglisli ambassador to his colleagues, are anterior to our last dis[)atches ; they are framed under the exclusively Egyptian influence of Commo- dore Napier. AVlio knows whether the a})peal ad- dressed since by the Sultan to the exalted wisdom of the central conference in Pondon may not cause them to be modified \ Thus Lord Ponsonby paralysed the 110 AFFAIES OF THE EAST, AND effect of all the measures attempted by his associates. When the internuncio became more pressing, Eifat Pacha replied that he could do nothing, and that his influence in the divan was not great enough to obtain new concessions, as long as it was possible to entertain the hopes encouraged by the English ambassador. Finally, my instructions of the 2nd of April arrived. M. de Stiirmer sought his colleagues, and informed them that he had received orders to proceed with three, or two, or alone. The envoys of Prussia and Russia expressed their determination to join him. An exact copy of the orders sent by Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby, communicated here by Lord Beauvale, was, moreover, forwarded to M. de Stiirmer, who used it, not to persuade, for that was impossible, but at least to silence his refractory colleague, who not wishing to be defeated, held aloof until the last moment. Never- theless, the quasi collective step of the other envoys sufficed to determine the submission of the Porte, and thank God all is settled. " Now then," added M. de Metternich, " the moment has arrived for France to convert the provisional sig- nature into a definitive one. I have written to M. d'Appony to make this formal demand of M. Guizot, and 1 beg you also to write in the same sense. There is henceforth utility, and opportunity for all. But, besides the general interest, I avow that I consider myself, from to-day, as personally engnged in this (piestion. I took upon myself to arrest tlie efforts (inopportune some weeks ago) addressed to your CONVENTION OF THE loTII OF JULY, 1841. Ill minister to induce him to sign ; 1 had the courage to bhime the premature demand of our envoys fixing beforeliand and spontaneously, the moment when the signature could be equitably called for and profitably accorded. Now that the time has arrived, if the sig- nature is still refused, 1 shall be seriously compromised in all eyes by the moral responsibility I have assumed. I venture to say that I ought not to receive so bad a return, and that it must be admitted that nothing now opposes a definitive signature. There is no occasion to ask or wait what Mehemet Ali may say to the new concessions of the Porte. They are those he has asked for. The answer he will return to the Sultan- may be dilatory, but must be good. In no case can it be bad, or amount to a refusal ; tliis is not supposable. But he will show less eagerness in acceptance, if he is still permitted to think that he may gain by delay. It is highly important not to let him receive or retain this idea. Let us hasten to draw a line of separation between the past and the future. New difficulties must of course spring up every day ; we do not build for eternity; but new difficulties, if they come, ought not to conii)li(ate tliemsclves with the past of an old affair. AN'lien they ])resent tliemselves we shall concert measures; each will see the course he ouglit to take ; each will be free in his movements; we sliall liave to deal with a new transaction and not with the con- tinuation of one we have already settled. I attach great value to tliis view of the question. Moreover, 1 feel confident that M. Guizot will participate in my 112 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND sentiment, and not hesitate to declare that what is finished is finished." M. de Metternich estimated my disposition correctly I wrote to M. de Bourqueney without delay : " I have sent you the last intelligence from Vienna and Con- stantinople. I presume the conference will assemble immediately to take note of the modifications appended by the Sultan to his hatti-sheriff' of the 13th of Fe- bruary, and that we shall now be asked to transform our provisional signature into a final one. We have no longer any grounds for refusal. The modifications granted are, for the most part, what Mehemet Ali de- mands ; what still remains in debate is evidently of an internal nature, and ought to be settled between the Sultan and the pacha alone. We have therefore de- termined to sign when required. Your full powers are ready and will be forwarded without delay." " But while I tell you we are ready to sign, I add that in the extremely close prospect of the retirement of the English cabinet, we should be as mucli, and more disposed to sign with its successors. This would have a better efi'ect both in Paris and London. I need not tell you the reasons. Without therefore eluding in any manner the fulfilment of our promise, when claimed, do nothing to hasten this demand, and gain rather twenty-four hours if you can conveniently do so, and if the cliange from one cabinet to another, takes })lace, as I think probable, within that interval." Two days later, on the 1 8th of May, M. de Bour- queney replied : " In expectation of your orders, I CONVENTION OF TIIK loTII OF JULY, 1841. 113 had already taken the attitude you recommend, show- ing myself ready to keep our enfj^a^i^ements with re- spect to tlie final si<;nature, and avoiding all appearance of a disposition to elude either the substance or the form. Chekib Effendi has requested an appointment with Lord Palmerston. I doubt whether he can be received to-day. If he is, Lord Palmerston will not have time to open the conference ; this meeting can- not take place before to-morrow ; they must either write or speak to me. This brings us, at least, to Thursday. I may, without affectation, gain twenty- four hours more. It is therefore not probable that my demand for powers can reach you before Sunday the 23rd. I had already understood, and 1 compre- hend still better to-day, the difficulties which this ministerial crisis in England adds to the exact appre- ciation of the moment we ought to select for exchan- ging our provisional consent to a final signature, and it is not without some degree of dread that I feel weighing on me so great a share of responsibility in such an im])ortant decision. Although I believe the existing cabinet is in agony, nothing ])r()ves that its convulsi(ms may not last long enough to interdict the system of prolonged delays. I can undertake to gain days without risk ; but I could not promise weeks without exciting suspicions to be reckoned with here- after." M. de Bounpiencn' was spared the trouble of gaining either days or weeks of delay. Called to Lord Pal- merston on the 2 1th of May, he wrote thus on leaving 1 114 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND him : " I have only time for two lines. The moment has not arrived for final signature. The conversation with Lord Palmerston leaves me no doubt on this point. The jpast is not sufficiently closed. My courier will bring you explanations to-morrow." The following day brought this intelligence : " The conference met the day before yesterday, the 23rd. Chekib EfFendi, when communicating the memorandum by which the Porte has modified, according to the principal desires of the pacha, the firman of investi- ture, announced that he had received the necessary poAvers for proceeding to the final signature of the two acts remaining in suspense from the 15th of March last. It had been settled that Lord Palmerston should invite me to call upon him on Monday, the 24th, should acquaint me with what had passed at the con- ference on the preceding evening, ask me if I was furnished with the necessary powers to sign the new general convention, and in case they had not yet arrived, request me to demand them from the King's government. I went yesterday to Lord Palmerston, who made his communication, and put his question. I replied that the King's government had not deviated from the ground it had taken on the day of the provi- sional signatures, which it had made subordinate to the accomplished fact of the closing of tlie Turco- Egyptian question. If the last events at Constanti- no])le, I said, seem to you to establisli this closing peremptorily, I do not doubt for a moment that my government will furnish me with tlie necessary powers CONVENTION OF THE 1 3tII OF JULY, 1841. 115 to sign the convention definitively. You remember, my lord, our conversation from the first day, in this same place ; we shall do nothing as jive^ I told you, without a ]KM-fect assurance that either diplomatically or materially, nothing further was possible by foiu\ as a sequel to the treaty of July. I remember those words, Lord Palmerston replied. I approved of them then, and 1 agree witli them now. At the instance of some allied courts, I made the sacrifice of suppressing my personal opinion on tlie motives which seemed to me still to contend in favour of an adjournment of the final signature ; but to-day when I am instructed to ask if you are ready to sign, you have a right to pro- pose again tlie question you put to me at the begin- ning; you have a right to ask mo if the treaty of the 15th of July is extinct in all its possible consequences ; and although I believe it to be so in fact, as 1 expect daily to receive news that the last concessions of the divan have been accepted by the pacha, I feel bound to declare to you, as a man of honour, that a refusal on the part of Mehemet Ali would seem to me to place the powers who signed tlie treaty of July under the necessity of doing something to compel the acce})tance, l)y tlie paclia, of the reasonable conditions which tlieir action at Constantinople has contributed to secure for him. I beli(>ve, I am almost convinced that this will not ha])peii ; but a possibility suffices to prevent me, as a duty to myself, from engaging the responsibility of your government to its chambers, or yours to your government, by a signature prematurely founded on a I 2 11G AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND certainty which is not yet complete. You have, for two months, placed yourselves with us on ground perfectly loyal. I owed you in exchange the sincerity with which I now speak. " All this was said in an amicable tone, to which I felt called upon to reply with the same confidence. ' Well, my lord,' I said, ' I expected to return home to ask the King's government to furnish me with the necessary powers for the signature of the new conven- tion. I must now write that the moment for that proceeding has not yet arrived. My instructions have always been peremptory on this point, — the closure, the definitive closure of the past. The past is not closed while the shadow of a possibility remains to the con- trary, as far as you are concerned. " I was unwilling to accept without reserve Lord Palmerston's insinuation as to the possibility of a new intervention by four in the disputes between the Porte and the pacha. I expressed that I utterly re- jected the idea of bringing back the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to a question so completely ex- hausted for them. ' The error of tlie cabinets of Vienna and Berlin,' replied Lord Palmerston, ' has consisted, for two months, in persuading themselves that they could terminate a question by declaring it terminatcnl. Hence those diplomatic documents which have followed eacli other, and each of wliich was an- nounced as the last. I believe, in fact, that we have reached the end ; but I am not so completely certain as to lead you to participate my conviction, in honour, CONVENTION OF THE loTII OF JULV, 1841. 117 when that cortaiiity is tlic condition chosen by you and admitted by us, of your return to the councils of Europe. A few weeks, days, or j)erliaps hours, may dissipate tliese lingering clouds which still envelop the ([uestion. A little patience, and it will be com- pletely disposed of. The affair thus settled, will be better settled for you and for us.' " The anger of the German plenipotentiaries was extreme. "They rave," said ^I. de 15ourqueney, " against Lord Palmerston, who, they affirm, wishes to leave the question open in London, to prevent its being closed at Constantinople or Alexandria, They add, that he disposes of their cabinets too lightly ; that they will never lend themselves to any act what- ever \)\ f'oii}\ from the day wlien we sign h\ Jive ; and supposing Lord Palmerston should invite them to do so, his attempt would fail completely." Their col- leagues at Paris held the same language to me; they could ncjt comprehend Lord Palmerston's conduct ; they souglit its cause and objecl:. Count Appony saw in it a fit of jealousy against Prince Metternich ; Baron Arnim suspected some secret design of still keeping tlie East in trouble, and liUrope in alarm. I thanked tlieni for tlnnr sentiments, without relying on their efficacw •'Tlie (iermans," liaron de Pour([ueney wrote, "talk mucli, but act little. M. de Ihilow has sent a uu itKn's by placing himself in 120 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND our point of view. It rested with me then to sustain the contest with advantage, upon the facts ; but to what would such a controversy tend? Let us cast aside petty recriminations. Lord Palmerston must reply to Mr. Bulwer, to release, he says, his personal responsibility." This incident led to long and subtle explanations on Lord Palmerston's part, which I gladly allowed to drop. I now carried my solicitude to another quarter. I wrote to Count de Rohan Chabot, then on a mission extraordinary at Alexandria : " It is not without un- easiness that I see the Viceroy deviate from the tone of submission he had adopted towards the Porte, and assume a language which in some degree presents the air of equal treating with equal. This is precisely the appearance wdiich, for his own interest, he ought most carefully to avoid. It was the cause or pretext of the alliance formed against him on the 15th of July, — an alliance which appeared to have reached the mo- ment of dissolution when he declared his submission to tlie orders of the Sultan. If there is a means of reviving it, or rather of prolonging its existence, (for it still exists at this moment, although several states wlio were parties to it are evidently most desirous to disengage themselves,) it is unquestionably through the attempt of Mehemet Ali to set up fresh preten- sions of inde])endence with regard to his sovereign. Nothing could more effectually aid the views of the governments, which, less favourably disposed towards him or France, work secretlv to retard the moment CONV'ENTION OF THE 13t11 OF JULY, 1841. 121 when tlie return of tlie King's government to the councils of Europe will loudly i)roclaim that the treaty of the 15th of July exists no longer. The signature of the act intended to replace the relations of the powers on the footing on which they stood a year ago, is still adjourned, and the motive for this adjournment is precisely the dread of the resistance of Mehemet Ali to the wishes of the Porte, and of the complica- tions which may result therefrom. The Viceroy, in his own pressing interest, must remove all cause or pretext for these real or pretended fears ; and the only mode of effecting this, is by declaring himself fully satisfied with the meniorandniii of the Porte. This memorandmii grants his most important and only es- sential demands. lie obtains the substantial right of succession, the a])pointment to ranks in the Egyptian army, and the substitution of a fixed for a proportional tribute. It is true the amount of this tribute is not yet named ; Mehemet Ali fears that it may be on a scale that he considers inadmissible, but nothing is decided on the subject. This is a point between the Sultan and the paclia, and the latter has himself in- dicated to you a mode of arrangement which is pro- bably not the only one. The path of representations is open to him ; he may reckon on the aid of circum- stances, and on the necessity the Porte may be under of conciliating liis siij)port. AN'liat he must avoid is de- claring beforehand an absolute refusal, which, ])lacing him again in a state of revolt, would transform this ])urely donu^stic question into one of general policy. 122 AFFAIKS OF THE EAST, AND would restore strength to the treaty of July at the moment of its expiration, and would compel the al- lied powers to interfere in details which they have acknowledged themselves incapable of regulating. It is of more consequence to Mehemet Ali than to any one else, that the exceptional situation created by this treaty should not be prolonged, and that each of the States who have signed it should resume its individual position and liberty of action. He ought therefore to be very careful of all that could oppose this result, and I cannot too strongly recom- mend you to give him, in this sense, the most urgent advice." Mehemet Ali was one of those aspiring ambitionists alternately chimerical and rational, obstinate and fa- talistic, who push their fortune beyond all bounds, but who, on the eve of ruin, submit suddenly to the necessities they were unable to foresee. The Count de Chabot wrote on the 12th of June : " The Russian steamer ' Saleck ' arrived at Alexandria on the evening of the 7th, having on board an envoy from the Porte, Kiamil Effendi, instructed to deliver to Said Muhib Eff(Midi, the new hatti-sheriff of investiture, a letter from the grand vizier to Mehemet Ali, and the spe- cial firman which fixes the tribute at 80,000 purses, to date from the commencement of the year. On tlic 8th, Said Muhib Effendi and the new envoy waited upon tlie \'iceroy to communicate these documents, and remained in conference with him the whole day. Melicmet Ali declared, at this interview, tliat the re- CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 123 sources of Egypt would not permit him to place at the Sultan's disposition so large a sum as 80,000 purses, and induced Said ^luhib Eftendi to receive again the firman which regulates the tribute ; but he said that he no less considered tlie general question as termi- nated, and that tlie hatti-sherifF of investiture would be solemnly read with all the customary ceremonial. On the morning of tlic 10th, in fact, the Viceroy, sur- rounded by the cliief dignitaries of Egypt, receiAcd the two Ottoman envoys in the great hall of his palace. Said Muhib EfFendi liaving presented to him the hat- ti-sheriff, Mehemet Ali ])ressed it to his lips and fore- head, and Sami Bey read it with a loud voice. The pacha was then invested with tlie decoration sent by the Sultan. Salvos of artillery from the forts and squadron, a general display of flags, and other public demonstrations, announced to the city the solemn promulgation of the imperial decree." I immetliately forwarded this intelligence by tele- grapli to Baron de Bounpieney. It readied T^ondon in the midst of a flagrant uni- versal crisis. On the 5th of June, on a motion of Sir KobcMt Beel, the House of Commons had declared tliat the AN'liig cabiiu^t no longer retained its confl- dence. On the '2-\r(\, Parliament was dissolved. The elections, nearly all over, secured to the Tories a strong majority. On the 29th, ^T. de Bounpieney wrote tlius: '•You are aware that I have been extremely reserved in m\ predictions ; 1 dreaded even the re- sponsibility of my own impressions when I feared 124 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND their influence on our great diplomatic affairs ; to-day I think I can without rashness pronounce the fate of the present cabinet as decided in the new house. But will it retire before Parliament meets'? I hear the Tories say that Sir Robert Peel will not consent to form the new ministry before that epoch. I require to know as soon as possible whether this internal situation ought to influence my diplomatic conduct. I do not conceal from myself the difficulty of adjourn- ing all decision on our part for the seven or eight weeks during which the present cabinet may live. Prussia and Austria are not likely to assist us in this plan, and some mode must be thought of to induce them to accede to it. You wrote to me, six weeks ago, that you did not wish to sign with dying men. I replied then that their malady might last long enough to cause us much embarrassment. We now know its term. Decide." I immediately replied by telegraph : " Do nothing to adjourn the final signature of the acts initialled, and sign the new general convention as soon as you are asked to do so, after the signing of the protocol of closure, as regards the Egyptian question." " Your telegraphic dispatch of yesterday," M. de Bourqueney answered, " removes all uncertainty. I shall create no delay, nor allow any to be created that I can prevent. To-day I had occasion to see liOrd Palmerston on another affair. I took advantage of my visit to show him the dispatch from Alexandria. lie knows now that all is finished ; but if it were C0N^^-:NTI()^• of tiik Iotii ok jilv, 1841. 125 merely to justify liis last delays, he will wait until complete and regular information is forwarded to him- self. In other respects luMvas disposed to he amiable this morninLi:, for without statin that Mehemet Ali has accepted the firman. Nevertheless, 1 think it right to send, enclosed in tliis, the dispatch 1 have just received from Kgvpt announcing the satisfactory news." Five days before, on the l(Jth of Jun(>, Lord Pon- sonby had written to Lord Palmerston : " The French boat, which arrived on the 14th, brought letters say- ing that Mehemet Ali intends to refuse the new fir- 126 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND man. One of them is from a person well known as having the best information in Alexandria, When these letters were written, Mehemet Ali had not yet received the firman, but he was aware of its contents. He may modify his views before replying, and perhaps has reasons for expressing his intention of refusal. He will probably do something to gain time. I think, as I have always thought, that he will only execute the measures ordered by the Sultan, in compliance with the advice of the great powers." Lord Ponsonby's opinion was of little importance this time ; Lord Palmerston immediately dispatched to London the order to complete all the official for- malities necessary for the full signature of the acts conditionally signed on the 15th of May preced- ing; and, on the loth of July, M. de Bourqueney wrote to me: "The plenipotentiaries of the six courts were convoked yesterday at the Foreign OfRce. The plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prus- sia, Russia, and the Ottoman Porte, first affixed their signatures to the protocol of closure touching the Egyptian question, wliich was dated the lOtli of July, the day on which intelligence arrived, through Con- stantinople, that Mehemet Ali had accepted the Sul- tan's new firman. The general convention for closing tlic straits was then signed by all of us, in the official order of the powers, bearing date tlie loth of July, 1841. The delay for exchange of ratifications is fixed at two montlis." Tlie Egyptian question was settled. A question CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 127 raised, in 1840, much above its real importance, and in whicli, imperfectly informed as to facts, we had engaged ourselves much furtlier than comported with the strength of the pacha, and the interest of France. 1 recapituhite the results of the solution it received in 1841, by the negotiation 1 have here related, and the convention by which it was wound up. European ])eace was maintained ; and in the bo- som of peace, the precautionary armaments, levied by France in 1840, were maintained also; the fortifi- cations of Paris were erected ; the French govern- ment established itself in the isolation made for it by an insufficient estimate of its presence and opinion. Europe felt the weight of the void whicli absent France left in its councils, and evinced an anxiety for her recall. France declined returning until Europe advanced to invite her, after compelling the Porte to the concessions demanded by the pacha, and declaring that the treaty of the 15tli of July, 1840, was com- pletely and for ever extinct. Mehemet AH, driven from Syria, and threatened in Egypt itself, was hereditarily established there, on e([uitable conditions ; not by his own strength, but tlirough consideration ibr France, and because the ])()wers signing the treaty of the 15th of July, were disinclined to run the risk either of disunion or of giving birth to new complications. r)y the convention of the lotli of July, 1841, the Porte was withdrawn from the exclusive protector- ate of lUissia, and placed within the sphere of the 128 AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, AND general interests and common deliberations of Eu- rope. By these results, the check France had received, the fruit of her own error in the question, was limited and stayed ; she resumed her position in Europe, and secured that of her client in Egypt. We had done and obtained, in the end, what we ought to have done and might have obtained in the beginning. This was all the success that the situation bequeathed to me in 1840 admitted. I did not conceal from myself that it was inadequate to satisfy the national sentiment carried away beyond truth and sound judgment. I foresaw that the convention of the loth of July, 1841, and the negotiation which had led to it, would be the object of animated attacks. But, after what I had seen and learned during my embassy in England, I resumed office, fully determined never to subject the foreign policy of France to the chimeras and mis- takes of the day. Some weeks after the closure of the Egyptian question, and with reference to vague overtures which had been made to us on the affairs of the East- in general, I wrote to Count de Sainte-Au- laire, who, at my suggestion, had been appointed by the King his ambassador in London : " Let us neither elude nor seek anything. It is our habit to be con- fident, presuming, liasty. We intoxicate ourselves witli our desires, as if they were always our right and in our power. We love appearance almost more than reality. 1 am convinced that, to re-establisli and ex- tend our influence in Europe, we ought to follow an CONVENTION OF THE 13tII OF JULY, 1841. 121) opposite mode. Everywhere, and on all occasions, I am determined to sacrifice the report to the fact, the appearance to the reality, the first moment to the last. We shall tlins risk less, and j^^ain more ; and, finally, there is no dignity in any other course." 130 CHAPTER III. THE EIGHT OF SEARCH. LORD PALMERSTON ASKS ME TO SIGN THE NEW TREATY PREPARED IN 1840, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SLAVE TRADE. — MY REFUSAL AND ITS CAUSES. — ACCESSION OF THE CABINET OF SIR BOBEET PEEL AND LORD ABERDEEN. — I CONSENT THEN (ON THE 20tH OF DECEMBER, 1841) TO SIGN THE NEW TREATY. — FIRST DEBATE IN THE CHAMBER OF DE- PUTIES ON THIS SUBJECT. — AMENDMENT OF M. JACQUES LEFEBVRE ON THE ADDRESS. — TRUE CAUSE OF THE STATE OF MINDS. — I ADJOURN THE RATIFICATION OF THE NEW TREATY. ATTITUDE OF THE ENGLISH CABINET. — RATIFICATIONS ARE EXCHANGED IN LONDON, BETWEEN THE OTHER POWERS, AND THE PROTOCOL IS LEFT OPEN FOR FRANCE. FRESH DEBATES IN THE TWO CHAMBERS AGAINST THE EIGHT OP SEARCH, AND THE CONVENTIONS OF 1831 AND 1833. — WE DEFINITIVELY EEFUSE TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF THE 20X11 OF DECEMBER, 1841. MODERATION AND GOODWILL OF LOUD ABERDEEN. — THE PROTOCOL OF THE 19tH of FEBRUARY IS CLOSED, AND THE TREATY OF THE 20th OF DECEMBER, 1841, ANNULLED FOR FRANCE. — AT THE OPENING OP THE SESSION OF 1843-1814, A PARAGRAPH INSERTED IN THE ADDRESS OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES EXPRESSES A WISH FOR THE ABOLI- TION OF THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. — WHY I DO NOT IMMEDIATELY ENTER INTO NEGOTIATION WITH THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. — VISIT OF QUEEN VICTORIA TO THE CHATEAU d'eU. ITS EFFECT IN FRANCE AND EUROPE — I PREPARE THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. — DISPOSITIONS OF LORD AHERDEEN AND SIR EOBEET PEEL. — FRESH DEBATES ON THIS SUHJECT IN THE CHAMBERS AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION OF 1814. — VISIT OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS TO ENGLAND. — VISIT OK KINO LOUIS PfllLIPPE TO WINDSOR. — I ACCOMPANY HIM. — NEGO- TIATION ENTERED UPON FOB THE ABOLITION OF THE EIGHT OF THE RIGHT OF SKAUCTT. 131 SEARCH. — now CAN THIS BIOIIT BE BEPLACED FOB THE SUPPRES- SION OF THE TRADE? — THE DUKE DE BBOOLIK AND DR. LUSHING- TON ARE APPOINTED TO EXAMINE THIS QUESTION. — THEIR MEETING IN LONDON. NEW PLAN PROPOSED. — IT IS ADOPTED AND REPLACES THE lilfillT OK SEAItCH IN VIRTUE OF A TREATY CONCLUDED ON THE 25th oe may, is 15. — presentation, adoptu)N, and promulga- tion OF A UILL FOR THE EXECUTION OF THIS TREATY. 0\ the day of signing the convention of the 13th of Jnly, 1841, the signatures were scarcely affixed, when T.ord Pabncrston spoke again to M. de Bour- queney of the treaty prepared, three years before, between the Hxe great powers, to secure the more effectual re])ression of the slave trade, and which had remained in abeyance since 1840. lie asked him to remind me of it, and to invite me to con- clude tliat affair also. On the 20th of July, I replied to M. de Bourqueney ; " I wish to t(41 you on tliis subject my real feeling and intention. For nine montlis I have carefully avoided, with T^ord Bal- merston, all petty debates. There have been no complaints, no recriminations, no trivial j(\ilousies. In no instance have I exhibited temper or ill-will. I have transacted business sinqily, tran([uilly, without yielding anything sul)stantial, but keeping to main points, and throwing aside incidents and impediments. The ])olitical position r{>quired tliis. My o])inion of liOrd I'almerston justifi(>d it. 1 tliiidv liighly of his understanding. I have confidence in his word. Ilis manner of treating, thougli a little narrow and per- verse, suits me. He is clear, prompt, and firm. I neitlnn* believe in his liatred to France or to the K -2 132 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. King, nor in his imputed perfidies ; and as to diffi- culties, I may say of the misunderstandings occasioned by his passionate love of argument, his disposition to shut himslf up in his own constructions, and to push them to extremes without seeing anything above, be- yond, or on either side, — I am neither oiFended by, nor do I complain of them. This is the natural con- struction of his mind ; we must accept it, and with a good grace when we treat with him. I therefore find within myself at the close of this long negotiation, nothing which indisposes me to terminate as soon as possible the pending affairs. "But, while subordinating little things to great, I do not close my eyes to the small ones, neither do I forget the grievances which at the moment, I thought it unseasonable to notice. I have three of these against Lord Palmcrston ; — "1. His dispatch of the 2nd of November, 1840. A bad proceeding towards the new cabinet and my- self. A proceeding which T attribute to want of fore- sight and carelessness of the effect that dispatch might produce, and not to evil intentions ; but the miscliief was not the less real, and I felt it keenly, as every one remarked. " 2. On the 2Gth of April last, I instructed you to speak to TiOrd Palmcrston on the state of South Ame- rica, and of the propriety of France and England act- ing in concert to restore peace between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video. You informed me on the 11th of May, that he had received the idea very favourably ; THE KIGIIT OF SEARCH. 133 that you were confident, instructions in that sense would be speedily addressed to Mr. Mandeville, and you even asked the name of our cliarge d'affaires at Buenos Ay res, to enable Mr. Mandeville to put him- self in friendly and confidential relations with him, tending to give this double action, unity and efficacy. And yet, when called a sliort time after to this sub- ject in the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston re- jected all idea of concert with France, and spoke of the action of England between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video as entirely separated from, and foreign to ours. " 3. The speech he lately delivered, during the electoral contest, on the hustiiifis at Tiverton. AVhat would have been said in England, if, at Lisieux, speaking to the world at large, [)ersonified by my con- stituents, I had held similar language with respect to England, her government, and her armies '? In this speech, Lord Palmerston compared the conduct of the English in India, and of the French in Algeria, in the following terms:* — " ' We brought within Bi'itish iiillueuce, in one campaign, a vast extent of country largei- tlian France, ahnost as big as half Europe; and llie way in which this was done and the results which have followed are well deserving of the atten- tion of the people of England. 'J'here is a contrast of which \vc may have reason to ])e proud, between tlu> progress of our arms in the East, and the (operations which a neigh- * Tlie entire sjx'ocli [\-ow\ \vliich I ii;ive tliis extract, was published ill the ' MorniuL; Cliroiiirle ' ul' llie oOtli trlJune, ISll. 134 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. bouring power, France, is now carrying on in Africa. Tlie progress of tlie British arms in Asia has been marked by a scrupulous reference to justice, an inviolable respect for property, an abstinence from anything which could tend to wound the feelings and prejudices of the people ; and the result is this, that I saw, not many weeks ago, a distin- guished military officer who had just returned from the centre of Affghanistan, from a place called Candahar, which many of you perhaps never heard of, and he told me that he, accompanied by half-a-dozen attendants, but without any military escort, had ridden on horseback many hundreds of miles, through a country inhabited by wild and semi-bar- barous tribes who, but two years ago, were arrayed in fierce hostility against the approach of the British arms ; but that he had ridden through them all with as much safety as he could have ridden from Tiverton to John o' Groat^s House ; his name as a British officer being a passport through them all, because the English had respected their rights, and afibrded them protection, and treated them with justice. Thence it is that an unarmed Englishman was safe in the midst of their wilds. The diffi3rent system pursued in Africa by the French had been productive of very different results ; there the French army, I am sorry to say, is tarnished by the character of their operations. They sally forth unawares on the villagers of the countiy ; they put to death every man who cannot escape by flight, and they carry off into capti- vity the women and children. (Sliame ! shame !) They carry away every head of cattle, every sheep, and every horse, and they burn what tliey caunot cairy off. The croji on the ground and the corn in the gi-anaries are consumed by the fire of the invaders. (Shame!) AMiat is the consequence ? While in India our ofiicers ride about unarmed and alone amidst tlie wildest tribes of the wilderness, there is not a THE KIGUT UF SEAUCII. 135 Frenchman in Africa wlio shows his face above a given spot, from the sentry at his post, Avho docs not foil a victim to the wild and justifiable retaliation uf the Arabs (hear, hear). They professed to colonize Algeria, but they are only en- camped in military posts ; and while we in India have the feelings of the people with us, in Africa every native is opposed to the French, and every heart burns with the desire of vengeance (hear, hear). I mention these things because it is right you should know them. They are an additional proof that, even in this world. Providence has decreed that injustice and violence shall meet with their appropriate punishment, and that justice and mercy shall also have their reward,^ etc., etc. " Upon all this, my dear Baron, I have no wish to build any ground of remonstrance, or to take any step. Xothing here would prevent me from conclu- ding with Lord Palmerston the affairs in suspense, if the interest of our country required that I should do so. But all this exonerates me from anxiousness, from any act of supererogatory goodwill ; it even demands a certain degree of coldness. I wish to do nothiug unpleasant, nothing disagreeable. I shall adopt no unfriendly ]n-oceediiig ; I neither desire, uor am called upon to be particularly gracious. I wish to mark that 1 have observed wliat I have not acted on, and that I have felt, though I have not comjdained. AVith one who shows little amiability, complaint is not digni- fied ; neitluu- is carelessnc^ss mori> so. 1 ask only what is due to nu' ; but I give nothing beyond what I receive. •• Von see here, my d(>ar Baron, tlie motives which 136 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. regulate my present conduct, and I ask you, in the relations you may yet have with Lord Palmerston, to modify upon what I now tell you, your own attitude and language, without rigidity, without affectation, but at the same time, in a manner that must command notice. The shading is delicate, but you are fully capable of handling and of making it felt." I required from M. de Bourqueney an attitude which accorded well with the judicious acuteness of his understanding, and something less with the natu- rally courteous and gentle features of his character. He replied, " I comprehend perfectly the reasons which prevent you from seconding Lord Palmerston in his liquidation of the Foreign Office. I am pre- paring for a very anxious question on the slave trade. My answer will be vague, indicating neither concur- rence, nor opposition. I shall confine myself within the limits you have so delicately fixed." And some days later, he added : " Lord Palmerston has asked me whether I have received an answer from your Ex- cellency relative to the general convention for the suppression of the slave traffic. I answered that I had not yet received instructions on that head ; but I avoided all allusion to the causes which retarded their transmission. ' I am compelled to be in rule,' liord Palmerston said, 'and I am going to address an official note to you. The representatives of the three other courts liold tlieir powers. It is France, wlio, in concert with us, lias invited Austria, Prussia, and Pussia to sign in common a general convention. The THE KIGIIT OF SKARCII. 137 three powers have replied to our invitation. Delay is no longer justifiable on your part or ours.' I then threw out some general remarks on the careful ex- amination which the details of the convention would require, and on the delays that must be produced by the division of functions, in this matter, between the minister for foreign affairs, and the minister of ma- rine. Lord Palmerston listened to me, but I failed to convince him. Mr, Bulwer will receive instructions analogous to the spirit and text of the note to be ad- dressed to me, and the forwarding of which I should have vainly endeavoured to forestall." I received both through M. dc Bourqueney and Mr. Bulwer, a formal demand from Lord Palmerston for the signature of the new convention. I replied officially, by tlie following dispatch which 1 instructed M. (le Bourqueney to communicate to him : " I have received, with your letter of tlie 14th of this month, a copy of the note addressed to you by liOrd Palmer- ston expressing his desire that the King's government should authorize you to sign immediately, with the pleni])()tentiaries of the other great powers, the plan of a general treaty drawn up in liondon, three years ago, fertile more effectual su})pression of the traffic in negroes. I iuhmI not tell you tliat in the object of this convention and in tlie sum total of its provisions, tlu're neither does nor can exist any difference of opinion between llie King's government and that of \\CY Britannic Majesty. But some of the sectmdary clauses a])i)(>ar to re(|nii(' eertain (>xj)lanations whicli 138 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. will, I trust, anticipate the difficulties their execution might encounter. Public opinion is not less decided in France than in England against the infamous trade, the last traces of which it is now sought to obliterate. But it is not equally so unanimous on the fitness of some of the measures to be taken for the attainment of the object in question ; and on this point there are still doubts and suspicions which call for removal. These difficulties are not insurmountable, and if more press- ing questions had not recently absorbed our exclu- sive activity, if it had been possible to fix on this point the public attention distracted from it by other considerations, it is probable that we might have al- ready triumphed over the obstacles to which I now allude. Be that as it may, Lord Palmerston will un- derstand that it would be improvident on our part not to consider them, and that we cannot pledge our- selves to throw them aside so promptly as to be pre- pared to sign, without contingent delay, the conven- tion to which, with reason, he attaches so much im- portance." Lord Palmerston did not confine himself to his official request. lie instructed his charge d'affaires in Paris, to make a fresh application. " Mr. Bulwer," I wrote to M. de Bourqucney, "has been with me on the ])art of Lord Palmerston to repeat what his Lord- slii]) said to you, and also to press for our signature. As 1 perceive, from your last letters, that you have not thought it necessary to acquaint Lord Palmerston with my true motive, and that you have, as you tell THE lilGUT OF SEARCH. 131) me, evaded the situation, I have now taken upon myself tliis trifling difficulty I told Mr. Buhver can- didly, that the immediate signature of the convention would not be thoroughly understood or well received here by everybody ; that the minister of marine liad objections to this extension of the right of search ; that our public, on this point, entertained prejudices and jealousies ; that the papers would cry out; that, as regarded myself, there was an obstacle to surmount, an incidental misunderstanding to arrange ; and that to speak plainly. Lord Palmerston, on the 2nd of November last, had not been so courteous to me, and recently at Tiverton so complimentary to my country, that I should embarrass myself in Paris to procure for him a triumph in London. — And as I wish, I added, that you sliould see tliis matter precisely as it is, as I am ^('ry glad to show } ou the exact measure of my feelings and intentions towards Lord Palmerston, here is what I wrote to M. de Bourqucney three weeks ago. — 1 then read to him, nearly the whole of my private letter to you of the 20th of July. Mr. Bulwer took all this as a man of sense, and I feel satisfied tluit he lias related our conversation to Lord Palmers- ton in such manner as to convey to him a just, and as I think, a useful impression. 1 have not done this, vou know, fioin personal exigency or susce])til)ility, but because, iu my opinion, the dignity of our nda- tions commands it ; and also becaus(\ alter some time, and a very little time, I am convinced, they will gain not onlv in diuinitv but in securitv. When we know 140 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. well that we risk something by not being careful, we take care ; and transactions of business become easier when we give them more thought and less fancy." I did not deceive myself as to Mr. Bulwer's report of our interview, and its effect. A few days after I received from him this note : — " My dear Monsieur Guizot, '' The enclosed from Lord Palmerston has just reached me. This is all he says on the subject of my letters. You will see that you are understood. At all events, I should esteem myself too happy if I could contribute in the least, in placing on tlie most amicable footing the relations between two men so well calculated to direct the affairs of the great nations to which they belong." I here insert the letter from Lord Palmerston thus communicated to me. " Carlton Terrace, 17th August, 1841. " My dear Bulwer, " I am very sorry to find, from your letter of last week, tliat you observed, in your conversation with M. Guizot, that there is an impression in his mind that, upon certain occasions which you mention, I appear not to have felt sufficient con- sideration for his ministerial position ; and you would much oblige mc, if you should have an opportunity of doing so, by endeavouring to assure him that nothing has been further from my intention than so to act. I have a great regard and esteem for M. Guizot ; I admire his talents and I respect his character, and I have found him one of the most agreeable men in ])ublic affairs, because he takes large and philosophi- cal views of things, discusses questions with clearness, and sifts tliem to the bottom, and seems always anxious to arrive THE KIGIIT OF SEARCH. 141 at tlic truth. It is very unlikely that I should have inten- tionally clone anything that could be personally disagreeable to him. " You say he mentioned three circumstances with regard to which he seemed to think I had taken a course unnecessa- rily embarrassing to him, and I wall try to explain to you my course upon each occasion. " First, he adverted to my note of the 2nd November last in reply to M. Thicrs's note of the 8th of the preceding Oc- tober. I certainly wish that I had been able to answer M. Thiers's note sooner, so that the reply would have been given to him instead of his successor ; but I could not ; I was over- whelmed with business of every sort and kind, and had no command of my time ; I did not think however that the fact of ^I. Thiers having gone out of office was a reason for with- holding my reply ; the note of October contained important doctrines of public law which it was impossible for the British government to acciuiesce in ; and silence would have been construed as acquiescence. I considered it to be my indispens- able duty, as minister of the crown, to place my answer upon record ; and I will fairly own that, though I felt that ^I. Thiers nn'glit complain of my delay, and might have said tliat, by postponing my answer till he was out of office, I prevented him from making a reply, it did not occur to me at the time that .M. (lui/.ot would feel at all embarrassed by receiving my answer to his predecessor. " When ]\I. Guizot, as ambassador here, read me M. Thiers's note of the 8tli Octo])er, he said, if I mistake not, that he was not gr. 1 had anticipated his reasons witliont considering them sonnd, and 1 confess that after read- ing his letter twice, I cannot ])ron()nnce them better. But I am mnch touched by the sentiments lie e\- 144 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. presses towards me, and I hope he will preserve them. What I said to you the other day, I should not hesi- tate to repeat to liimself, as I hold too high an opi- nion of his understanding and loyalty to think that he could be wounded by them." In London, on the same day, the 19th of August, Baron de Bourqueney handed to Lord Palmerston our official refusal to sign, without delay, the new treaty. After assuming for a moment, and for the sake of de- corum, the air of discussing the apparent motives of this refusal. Lord Palmerston said : " M. Guizot does not like the slave trade more than I do myself ; I know his principles; they are mine also. It must be painful to him to retard the conclusion of an act, more effectu- ally suppressive than any we have yet adopted. As to myself, it would certainly have been personally gra- tifying to me to crown, by the signature of a general treaty, ten years of labour and devotion to so good a cause ; but I have only to produce the documents and lay the diplomatic notes on the table of the House, to prove to the whole world that, in all that depends on myself, I have brought the work as near as possi- ble to its execution. I have nothing to reproach my- self with, and no one else will have reason to reproach me." In giving me an account of this interview, M. de Bourqueney added, " All this was spoken without acrimony. I allowed the subject to drop. Mr. Bul- wer will receive a dispatch in reply to the one I com- municated ; all will then be said." THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 145 All was, in fact, said, from that day between Lord Palmerston and me ; but after his fall, and when the Tory cabinet came into office, the situation was changed. " I am going to consult on the affair of the slave-trade," M. Thiers replied to me in 18-40, wh^n I informed him of the new project of convention ; " I dread treaty upon treaty with people who have evinced so much ill- feeling towards us." This just motive for hesitation had disappeared. Unconnected with the proceedings which had wounded us, the new English ministers evinced the most friendly dispositions. Although I had not, at that time, established the ties of close friendship with Lord Aberdeen which were subse- quently formed between us, I knew him to be ani- mated with the best feelings towards me. " M. Guizot has all my good wishes," he wrote shortly after the accession of our cabinet, " and 1 shall be anxious to prove my esteem for him, should it ever be in my power to do so usefully and effectually." Between the two ministries there were motives of sympathy more profound than personal predilections. Sir Kobert Peel and liis colleagues were conservatives, become liberal ; we were liberals become conservative. Wliat- ever might be the difference of origin and position between the two cabinets, we held strongly similar ideas on the duties and conditions of government in the present state of European society ; and starting from separate ])oints, we marched towards the same goal by following similar t(>ndencies. In these natural analogies of thought and inclination, there is a secret I. 14G THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. power which acts upon men and draws them together, often without design and unknown to themselves. At the commencement of October, 1841, Lord Aberdeen asked me, through M. de Sainte Aulaire, what were my intentions on the two treaties, one for the suppression of the slave trade, the other for the commercial relations of the two countries, which had been prepared under the preceding cabinet. He at- tached much value to the conclusion of both. I re- plied to M. de Sainte Aulaire: " As regards the negroes — presently. For the commercial treaty, — I wish to inform myself better, I am disposed to conclude it also ; nevertheless you have done well to indicate ad- ditional reserve." The commercial negotiation was in fact adjourned ; but towards the end of November, M. de Sainte Aulaire received his powers to sign the convention intended to render the suppression of ne- gro traffic more general and effective. For myself, I had warmly at heart this suppression undertaken at once in the spirit of philosophy and Christianity, and one of their most brilliant common glories. The two conventions negotiated in 1831 and 1833, with this object, between France and England, one by General Sebastiani, the other by the Duke de Broglie, had excited, at their origin, no remark ; the opposition equally with the ministry, accepted them readily at that epocli, as necessary to the triumj)]! of the liberal cause throughout the world. Tlicy had been in course of execution for ten years, during which time the reciprocal riglit of searcli they established, THE KICHT OF SKAKCII. 147 Imd not given rise to numerous or serious complaints. I was not, as has been seen, witliout a presentiment of tlie difficulties that might spring up on this point; but I felt confident tliat liberal and humane feeling would surmount them. With the approbation of the King and council, I authorized without hesitation, the signature of the new treaty. It was affixed on the 20th of December, 1841, and the exchange of ratifi- cati(ms limited to the 19th of February following. But as soon as the Chambers met, I saw that the contest would be more serious than we had imagined, and on the eve of the opening of the session I wrote tluis to Count de Sainte Aulaire : " Understand clearly that the right of search for the suppression of the slave traffic is, in the Chamber of Deputies, a most im- portant affair. I shall j)robably debate it to-morrow, and without yielding a point ; I am perfectly decided ; but the cpiestion has fallen in unluckily in the midst of our national susceptibilities, and I shall have occa- sion to support it with my whole weight, and to ma- nage that weight judiciously. I cannot say whether it will be ])ossible to ratify as soon as Lord Aberdeen desires. There are no nutans of totally excluding personal considerations from the general situation, and though l>ord Palmerston has fallen, matters are not yet betN\eeu the two countries as easy and gracious as during the time of our intimacy." The debate proved to be even more serious than I anticipated when writing this letter. M. IMllault took the initia- tive, skilful in scrutinizing all tlu^ bearings of a subject, L -2 148 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. in discovering the points of attack, and in introducing without labour, but somewhat lengthily, and in an in- cisive though not violent manner, a multitude of argu- ments, specious even when not powerful. He pro- posed, to the address of the Chamber, an amendment which attacked not only the new treaty still unratified, but the conventions in vigour since 1831 and 1833. M. Dupin followed him, with his clear, animated rea- soning, his familiar eloquence and natural art of pre- senting his convictions under the flag of popular feel- ing and sound common sense. M. Thiers, a little embarrassed by the convention of 1833, concluded while he was minister of commerce, and without ob- jection on his part, removed the question to another ground, and opposed the exercise of the right of search for the suppression of the slave traffie in the name of the maritime policy of France for the defence of neutral rights. M. Berryer and M. Odilon Barrot entered the arena in turn; the one with his rich, brilliant, and seductive eloquence, the other with gravity somewhat vague, and an anxious eflbrt to main- tain his aversion to the trade, in conjunction with his opposition to the means hitherto regarded as the most eff'ectual for its suppression. Admiral Lalande, a con- summate sailor, as much esteemed in the English service as in his own, expressed, witli dexterous mo- deration, the natural antipathy of the French navy for the right of search accorded to the English ships, even in cases exclusively special and on the ground of retaliation. All these shades of the opposition, each THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 149 according to its rank and measure, united in a general assault on the conventions of 1831 and 1833, the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, and the cabinet in place. M. de Tracy, alone in his camp, had the courage to defend the conventions of 1831 and 1833 as indispensable to the suppression of the traffic, and to repulse the amendment of M. Billault in the name of the convictions and hopes which the liberal party had hitherto nourished. But even more serious than this concurrence of the 'whole opposition, was the agitation it produced and the support it found in the conservative ranks. Our friends were in a majority in the committee on the address, and fell into no mistake as to the bearing of M. Billault's amendment, equally directed against the cabinet and the riglit of search ; but in repelling it, they undertook to separate the two points of attack, and one amongst them, M. Jacques Lefebvre, proposed a second amendment which, while signifying tlieir ad- hesion to the government and their approbation of its co-operating in the suppression of a criminal traf- fic, " expressed also tlieir confidence that it would take care to ])reserve from all encroacliment, the inter- ests of our commerce and tlie independence of our fiag." Strongly im})ressed by this complication, and deter- mined, on tlie one hand, not to abandon our principles and acts in regard to the suppression of the trade, and on the other, not to sacrifice to an hicidental difi^iculty the maintenance of the general policy represented and 150 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. supported by the cabinet, I took part in the debate at renewed intervals ; 1 replied to the attacks of M. Billault, M. Thiers, and M. Berryer, and the last day having arrived, I summed up the question and situa- tion in these terms : " A case has been added to those which all civilized nations have placed without the li- berty of the seas ; this is all. Do not say there are no similar cases ; you have yourselves proclaimed them from this tribune. You have spoken of piracy and con- traband of war ; you have admitted that according to the principles avowed by the nations most jealous in claiming the full liberty of the seas, according to the principles professed by France herself, contraband of war was interdicted, and that the right of searching neutrals was permitted, to arrest contraband of war. What the conventions of 1831 and 1833 did, was to consider human flesh as a contraband of war. They have done this, neither more nor less ; they have as- similated the crime of the traffic in negroes to the accidental offence of carrying contraband of war. God forbid that the liberty of the seas should be compro- mised so lightly. The question no more concerns the liberty of the seas than the liberty of the United States ; the seas remain free as before ; there is only an additional crime registered in the code of nations, and there are nations who pledge themselves to sup- press in common this crime denounced by all. On the day when all nations contract this same engage- ment, the crime of the traffic will disappear. And on that day the men who have followed up this noble THE RIGHT OF sp:akch. 151 object through the storms of conteiidinn^ politics and the contests of parties, tlirough ministerial jealousies and personal rivalries, — the men, I say, who shall have persevered in their design without allowing themselves to be shaken by accidents and obstacles, — these men will be honoured in the world, and I hope that my name may be enrolled with theirs. " I have another duty to fulfil. I have defended, for the negroes, the cause of liberty and humanity. I have also to defend the cause of the prerogatives of the crown. When I name the prerogatives of the crown, I speak modestly, gentlemen, for 1 might well say, 1 de- fend the lionour of my country. It belongs to the ho- noiu- of a country to keep its word, and not to be led into a step it may perliaps disavow two or three years later. In 1838, in tlie mcmth of December (1 was not tlien in office), France and England together, and certainly after sound deliberation — for great govern- ments and c()untri(>s think before they act — France and England together, I say, proposed to Austria, Prussia and Russia, not to adhere simply to the con- ventions of 18ol and 183o, l)ut to make a new treaty, the text of which they framed in conformity with the treaty now under discussion. After two or three y(^ars of negotiation and debate, tlie tliree powers have accepted tlie pro])()sal. and tlie treaty is con- cluded. It is not yet ratified, 1 admit; and 1 am not amongst th()S(» wlio look upon ratification as a mere formalitv. to wliicli no objection can be raised when a signature lias once been given. Ratification is an 152 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. important and a free act ; let me be the first to pro- claim it so. The Chamber, therefore, can apply to this matter a new incident ; it can, by the expression of its opinion, attach a serious embarrassment — no more, I affirm, — a serious embarrassment to the rati- fication. But in this difficulty, the liberty of the crown and its advisers remains entire ; the liberty of ratifying or not ratifying the new treaty, whatever may have been the expression of the opinion of the Chamber. Without doubt, that opinion is a serious consideration which ought to weigh in the balance ; but it is neither decisive, nor the only one we have to take into account. By the side of this consideration there are others, equally serious, for few things are more so than for a government to say to other powers, with whom it is in regular and amicable intercourse, — what we proposed to you three years ago, we decline to ratify to-day. You have accepted our ofi'er ; you have raised certain objections ; you have required certain alterations ; these objections have been admitted, these alterations have been made ; — no matter, we refuse to ratify. " I say, gentlemen, there is something in this which deeply affects the authority of our country's govern- ment, and the honour of our country itself. The authority of government, the honour of the country, the interest of the great cause now in debate before you, — surely these are powerful and controlling reasons which a minister would be highly culpable to forget. I repeat, in conclusion, that, let the vote THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 153 of the Chamber be what it may, the liberty of the King's government in the ratification of the new treaty remains entire. When it has to decide defi- nitively, it will weigh all the considerations I have retailed to you, and act on its own responsibility. You will find us ready to accept the position." The Chamber loudly approved my reservation of the privilege of the crown in the act of ratification ; but, at the same time, it maintained the official ex- pression of its wishes as opposed to the new treaty. The amendment of M. Jacques Lefebvre was carried almost unanimously. It was evident that the general feeling for the suppression of the slave trade no longer retained the intensity which, in 1831 and 1833, had led to the existing act without objection to the measures intended to accomplish it. No one disputed the principle; all were eager to denounce the traffic in the harshest terms as cu1i)ah1e, criminal and infamous ; the most moderate in the reaction made it a point of duty to admit that the conventions of 1831 and 1833, while th(^y were in force, had been loyally carried out; but no one would resign liimself longer to the inconveniences they might lead to, and the effects thev (>xact('d. Their abuses were dreaded much more than theii- efficacy was desired. The passicm of na- tional jealousy had superseded the public impulse for the trium])li of justice and humanity. "What, during eleven years, had been these abuses, at first so little heard of and so patiently borne'? Had England exceeded the limits fixed by Article 3 of the 154 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. Convention of 1831, which prescribed that "in all cases, the cruisers of either of the two nations should not more than double those of the other" ? Had the num- ber of vessels visited been so numerous that commerce had materially suffered in consequence ] Had the outcries against the exercise of the right of search been multiplied to excess'? I ordered investigations on this subject, which produced the following re- sults. The number of English cruisers commissioned to exercise the right of search, between 1833 and 1842, had not exceeded 152 ; that of the French amounted to 120. On the western coast of Africa, the theatre of the most active surveillance and traffic, the French cruisers had searched, in 1832, seven ves- sels, of which two were French and five English ; in 1833, five; in 1835, two; in 1838, twenty-four, eight of which were English. The reports of the years 1834, 1836, ]8:]7, 1839, and 1840, gave no spe- cification of the number of searches within the French stations. As to the English cruisers, the years 1838 and 1839 were the only periods respecting which anything like correct details could be collected. In 1838, on the western coast of Africa, five French ships had been visited by the English cruisers, while eiglit English had been visited by the French ; and in 1839, the English cruisers had searched eleven French vessels. Finally, as regarded the complaints of French commerce, excited by abuses of the right of search, an inspcctitm of the archives of the ministries of foreign affairs and of the marine during the course of THE RIGHT OF SExVHCH. 155 these eleven years, detected only seventeen cases, five or six of whicli had obtained satisfaction ; the others had been rej(H;ted as witliont fonndation, or aban- doned by tlie claimants tliemselves. These were un- doubtedly facts to be regretted, but neither tlieir number nor importance sufficed to explain such a cla- morous outcry, or to justify the change of conduct required from the King's government. The true cause of the state of minds lay elsewhere, and threatened dangers far more serious than any that could result from the right of search. The treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, and our check in tlie Egyp- tian question, had revived in France the old feelings of suspicion and liostility towards England. On this point, as on many otliers, we are in a labour of tran- sition and transformation singularly difficult for go- vernments, and critical for peo])les. Ages roll on, but the facts which have occupied them do not disap- pear entirely, and the traces survive long after the extinction of their real causes and legitimate range. Frencli history, ancient and modern, tecMued witli our contests witli l^iUghmd ; the issue of tlie last was unfavourable to us, and left in the liearts of })eo])le and army a l)urning and bitter reminiscence. iSever- tlieless, times liad changed. Botli nations wanted ])eace. For both, ])eace was fertile in tlie ])rogress of ])rosperity and happiness. To harmony of interests was added similarity of institutions. The spirit of liberty displayed itself on both sides of the Channel. The Eimlish nation and government had tjiveii to 156 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. France and the monarchy of July, brilliant evidences and solid proofs of sympathy. The two countries marched side by side in the great paths of liberal and pacific civilization. Ought we then to deviate from these, and compromise the glories and benefits of the new era, to resume our old conflicts, and obey the call of those national enmities so felicitously subdued for twenty-five years'? This was the question which re- appeared in 1842, in connection with the right of search, after having been so recently raised and deter- mined with regard to the affairs of Egypt. The sup- pression of the slave trade was not the only point at issue ; the general policy which the cabinet of the 29th of October, 1840, had mission to defend and practise, was included in the dispute. Notwithstanding the difiiculties and vexations I foresaw, I did not hesitate for a moment on the line of conduct to be held. I placed the maintenance of our general policy, foreign and domestic, far above any personal or private consideration. I saw the con- servative party in the Chambers well determined to support me, on the whole, although it had deserted in the matter of the right of search. I knew that in the existing state of things, I was better adapted than any other person to preserve friendly relations with England, and to extricate my own country from the new false step in which it had entangled itself. I de- termined to adjourn the ratification of the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, and to propose modifi- cations which should either annul or render it accept- THE RIGHT OF SEAHCII. 157 able to the Chambers. The King and council coin- cided with my opinion. The debate in the Cliamber having terminated, I wrote to ^I, de Sainte Aulaire : " I regret the annoy- ance this will occasion to Lord Aberdeen. I can readily sympathize with difficulties of this sort, for I am used to them. I have often combated popular impressions, but never one more general and animated than this which has manifested itself against the right of search, unthought-of during the ten years of its exercise. All the bitterness that Lord Palmerston has sown amongst us, has seized this opportunity for display. Be well assured that, in tlie present state of minds, we could not proceed to the pure and simple ratification without exposing ourselves to the most imminent dangers. 1 have established the full liberty of our right to ratify. I have stated tlie reasons for ratifying. I maintain all that I have said. But at w'hat moment can we ratify without compromising interests highly important in another sense ? This is what I am luiable to determine to-day." While writing this letter, I received one from M. de Sainte Aulaire, giving me an account of liis first conversation with Lord Aberdeen, after the know- ledge of our debate had reached London. " I should fail in my dut) ," he said, " if I held back from you the entire truth. On entering his lordsliip's study, I at once recognized a premeditated intention of making me listen to the harshest words. He laid down that he had nothing to do with what liad passed in the 158 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH, Chambers ; he held the treaty as ratified, since neither delay nor refusal were supposable, and that the Queen would speak in this sense at the opening of her Par- liament." I replied that, "with the exception of the last words, M. de Metternich would, under similar circumstances, use the same terms, and that I should be much more embarrassed by this language in his mouth, than in that of a Secretary of State to the Queen of England. The chancellor of Austria does not trouble himself much with the necessities of the parliamentary government he detests. In London, all its advantages are too well appreciated not to secure respect for its difficulties." M. de Sainte Aulaire's answer was judicious. I added a postscript to what I was writing to him. " I change nothing in my letter after having read yours, for it makes no change in the situation. Lord Aberdeen deceives himself if he thinks to act upon me by the words he has used in his interview with you. I will not say they are more likely to confirm than alter my opinion ; this would be childishness on my part. They leave me exactly in the same mind as before. I re- gret the obstacle which the immediate ratification of the treaty has encountered. I have done all in my power to remove it. But I know how to measure things by their relative importance. Six weeks ago, I supported in principle and by the most disinter- ested action, the right of the King of the Nether- lands to rel'nsc a ratification he rejected without ex- ternal necessity, and of his own will. I know equally Tin: KiGHT (»F SKAuni. 150 well, if compelled, how to maintain the same right on our own account, when it is evident that tlie delay, far from emanating from our wislies, lias arisen in spite of tliem, and after a fierce struggle to avoid it." The powers transmitted to M. de Sainte Auhiire on tlie 20th of Xovemher, 1841, instructing him to sign the new treaty, contained expressly, loith reacrce of our rafijicafiun. We were, therefore, not only in general principle, but by special and direct right, authorized to give or withhold the ratification, thus reserved beforehand, I recalled this text to M. de Sainte Aulaire, and sent also the modifications we required in the treaty, and which alone could place us in a condition to conclude it. The English cabinet refused to admit them, less on account of their im- portance, than to avoid the air of yielding to the feel- ings of distrust and hostility towards England exhibited in France. "The symptoms in society here," the am- bassador replied to me, " are serious. The opinion that a violent hatred of England prevails in France, gains ground, and provokes retaliation," I did not regret the rejection of the modifications proposed, and wrote inimethatcly to M. de Sainte^ Aulaire: '"At pre- sent neither ask nor urge anything. Time is what we want most. A\'e recjuire all the time we can gain. Steer by this (•()mi)ass." ^^'e were verging on a critical moment ; the 20th of February, 1S42, the day nanu'd for exchanging rati- fications, was close at hand. On that day we were bound to declare openly and explain our refusal. On 160 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. the 17th, I forwarded to M. de Sainte Aulaire our fixed points: — " 1. We cannot give our ratification at present. 2. We cannot name the precise date when we shall be able to do so. Certain modifications, re- serves, and additional clauses are indispensable to enable us to give it. These points admitted, what can then be done ? Ratification may be postponed in- definitely, or to a fixed term. I have nothing to say against indefinite postponement. It is clear that this would suit our policy. As to postponement to a fixed term, we cannot oppose it, neither could we engage to ratify purely and simply when that time arrives. Evidently, the circumstances which impede our rati- fication are not created by us, and it is beyond our power to make them disappear by a given day. Post- ponement to a fixed term allows, it is true, time for possible change of circumstances, and mutual under- standing on the indispensable modifications ; but it has the objection of holding the question in suspense, in sight and knowledge of all the world, without afford- ing a certainty of settlement when the term arrives. " The actual change of ratifications between the other powers, and the protocol left open for France until we reciprocally understand each other on the required modifications, appears to me, at present, the most convenient solution for all. It accomplishes, for the other powers, the treaty of 1841, and leaves France on the ground of the treaties of 1831 and 1833, giving us as regards the treaty of 1841, the chances of time and fresh negotiation. THE UIGIIT OF SEAHCH. IGl " But talk over this, my dour friend, with liOrd Aber- deen, before attending the conference. Concert with him the mode of proceeding and the forms he consi- ders most suitable. I have indicated to you our fixed ])oints. "\\'e shall do all we can, within these limits, to diminish the embarrassments of position and de- bate which this afiair may throw on the English ca- binet, relying, on its part, for the same disposition." Tlie meeting for the exchange of ratifications took place on the 1 9th of February, and M. de Sainte Au- laire found, not only Lord Aberdeen, but the Aus- trian, Prussian, and Ivussian plenipotentiaries in a most conciliating temperament. " I have just left the conference," he wrote ; " at noon we met at the Fo- reign Office. It rested with me to bell tlie cat. I said, tliat 1 had not received my ratifications, etc. etc. You will find my text in the accompanying not(\ Lord Aberdeen replied, that 1 was entirely changing the position assumed by you ; that you had declared in fact that you could not ratify at this moment witli- out reserves, but that with reserves you would have ratified at once, wliicli left it to be su])p()sed, tliat, witli an undetermined ])ostp()n(Mnent, you would give pure and simple ratifications. I answered that not only could I giv(> neither engagement nor hope, in tliis \w\v, but tlmt. on the contrary, 1 was compelled to insist on a (hawing up of the protocol which should leave us the most complete independence. Lord Al)erdeen admitted this independence, and simply re- (piired that I should not impress on you the necessity 162 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. of holding to reserves destitute of serious value, and which he felt convinced you would voluntarily re- nounce, if opinion, ever fickle in France, permitted you to do so, at a later period. M. de Briinnow, who is commissioned to draw up the protocols, suggested an opinion that this particular one should be as brief as possible, and state simply that the French plenipoten- tiary not having produced the ratifications of his court, the exchange had taken place between the other powers, the protocol remaing open for France." After some explanatory remai'ks on the modifications we had demanded, and on the necessity of Avaiting, on this point, for the instructions of the courts which as yet had no precise knowledge of them, the opinion of M. de Briinnow was adopted, and the protocol drawn up in terms which suited us. Now then," M. de Salute Aulaire said to me, " move at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburgh ; the reports forwarded from hence, even to the last court, will be, I feel certain, of a conci- liatory nature." I replied to him on the 27th of February : " You have spoken and acted well. The drawing up of the ],)rotocol is good, and the situation as favourable as the embarrassments made for us permit. I had al- ready informed them at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Peters- burgh of what was taking place. I shall follow up the nuitter. I rely on time, and the spirit of concili- ation. AVc liave ample reason to be pleased with the language! held in the English Parliament. It was full of consideration and tact. 1 dreaded a debate which THE UIGIIT OF SEARCH. 1G3 might aggravatf the irritation here and add to my difficulties. I can, on the contrary, take advantage of a good exampk\ I am delighted at this." The diplomatic embarrassment was thus adjourned ; but from day to day, on the other hand, the parlia- mentary difficulty went on increasing. At evtM-y op- portunity, on the slightest pretext, in both Chambers, the debate recommenced on the treaty still in sus- pense, on the conventions of 1831 and 1833, on the particular complaints and claims to which tlieir exe- cution had given and was still giving rise. Our ad- versaries incessantly mounted and remounted this ever open breacli, and our adherents, while reuiaining faith- ful to us on the foundation and entire edifice of the policy, yielded readily to the desire of raising, on this ])oint, a slight popular opposition. The general elec- tions wliicli took ])lace in July, 1842, for the Cham- ber of IJeputies, revealed a similar disposition in the public; it was clear to us that the new Chamber would be as strongly decided against the right of searcli as that which liad just terminated. It was indispensable tluit before the ()])eniiig of tlie session of ISl.'), thr (pu^stion sliould make a ste]). I wrote to the Count de Flahault, the King's ambassa- dor at A'i(Mina, on the 2"Jnd of SeptcMuber, 1842: ''I need not ivW you th;it we could not and do not tliink of e^ er ratifying, un(U'r any modification it miglit un- dergo, tlie treaty of the 20tli of December, 1841. At the first moment, wh(>n the (U'bate sprang u]), if the modifications 1 })ointed out luul been at once accepted, M -2 1G4 THE RIGHT OF SEAllCH. perhaps the ratification might not have been impossi- ble. But the modifications have been rejected. The question has become what you know it to be. At present it is no longer practicable. For us, the treaty of the 20tli of December, 1841. is dead, and all the world here, in the diplomatic body as well as with the public, is as thoroughly convinced of this as I am. " Meanwhile, the protocol left open in London in- duces a belief that the ratification of France is still possible. The ill-disposed say so to the idlers. It would be said much more, and would be credited a little in the approaching session. It is therefore necessary that the closure of the protocol should close a situation wiiich can no longer have any other issue. "We require this on another ground. In the next session, the conventions of 1831 and 1833 will be at- tacked. We ought and wish to defend them. We sliould do this under great disadvantage if the proto- col still remained open, and the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, suspended over us. To enable us to entrench ourselves in the old treaties, the Chambers and the country ought no longer to be disturbed by the new one. Tliis inquietude would draw them into a state of susceptibility and irritation which would not fail to be worked upon, as has already been done with so much efi"ect. "All that I repeat to you here, I luive said to Lord Cowley and to Mr. I5ulwer, who has gone to pass some weeks iu London. 1 know that they have written and TiiK uig;it of search. 165 spoken in this sense to Lord Aberdeen and to Sir Robert Peel, and that the two ministers comprehend the sitnation, and will offer no objection to the closure of the protocol. But they do not think they can take the initiative in this step. They fear the saints in l^arliamcnt. and are unwillinj^ to have it said that they themselves proposed to renounce the ratification of France. They are ready, if I am correctl}' informed, to accept the closure of the protocol, provided that the proposition is made by a third power. " I have mentioned this to Count D'Appony. I have told him that M. de Sainte Aulaire was goiupj back to T.ond(m, that he would state the situation to Lord Aberdeen, and would tell him that we could not (h'eam of ratifying the treaty, and that, in consequence, as far as we are concerned, it is quite useless to keep the protocol longer open. 1 signified a desire to Count D'Appony, that on this declaration by France, the Austrian plenipotentiary would at once demand the pure and sim})le closure of the protocol, without any observation unpleasant or embarrassing to us. Tic wrote on the subject to Prince Metternicli, and bus just read a dispatch to me which promises to render us this good office. M. de Xeumaan is sum- moned to -lohannisberg, where lie will receive suitable instructions, ^'ou see, my dear Count, that tlie affair is very nearly settled ; but I wish you to understand it thoroughly, to s])eak of it to Prince ^letternich on his return to Menna, and to tliank him for the favour- able course lie has adopted. It is deliglitful to treat 166 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH, with a just and elevated mind which simplifies every- thing." At the same time 1 forwarded to M. de Sainte Aulaire positive instructions for the closure of the protocol. At the first moment they found him a little uneasy. Lord Aberdeen said to him that he under- stood the ratification of the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, w^as considered by us henceforward as impossible, that he should never ask for it, and that on the meeting of Parliament he would announce un- equivocally not only that we had entered into no en- gagement to ratify, but that he entertained no hope on this point. This, according to him, would suffice to set the question aside as closed. " I confess," added M. de Sainte Aulaire, " that I am much of his opinion ; explicit declarations from the tribune seem to me to supply the place of a formal closure of the protocol, and I dread lest by employing the pen in this unto- ward afi"air some new embarrassment might arise. But the intentions here are positively conciliating: tell me which course you prefer, and I shall endeavour to carry it through." I replied without delay : " With us, and in the temper of our public, the declaration which Lord Aberdeen has named to you, would produce nothing like the effect of tlie closure of the protocol. More than this ; in the then state of the affair, I should be unable to comprehend it. In tlic course of the present montli you will be instructed to announce to Lord Aberdeen and to the conference that after mature THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 167 reflection and in consequence of all that has passed within the last year and a half, the King's goveiTi- ment feels that it ought not to ratify the treat}-, and decidedly will not ratify it ; and that therefore, as far as regards us, there no longer exists a motive for keeping tlie protocol open. When you have made this declaration, no reason can remain for saying that we have not entered into an engagement to ratify, that no hope is entertained on this point, and that we shall never be asked for our ratification. These words would imply the continuance of a situation which has ceased to exist. Why has the protocol been left open ? In the ])rospect of a possible ratification by France and to maintain that possibility. Tliis is not f)nly what has been done, but officially announced. AMien France has finally declared that she cannot ratify, kee[)ing the protocol open would be absolutely objectless. " ^^'ha^, then, would it imply, and to what suppo- sitions would it give rise ? "It would be supposed, either that the present cabinet may recall its declaration that it will not ratify, or that at some future day, another cabinet can and will ratify. Evidently tlie protocol could only remain open for one of these two clnnces, and all tlie world would believe or think itself entitled to believe so. " I do not lu^sitate to affirm that neither of these chances exists, and that by keeping them on tlie horizon, serious embarrassments would be created be- 168 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. tween the two countries, and particularly for us in our Chambers. " And at what moment, in fact, would this prospect be left partially disclosed ! " At the exact moment when the conventions of 1831 and 1833 are and will be violently attacked, and when their execution may, does, and will furnish pre- texts for untoward conflicts and incessant complaints. "To defend the conventions of 1831 and 1833, to execute them without compromising, at every instant, the amicable relations between the two countries, I require, no additional burden on my shoulders. This is, of itself, weighty enough. " Now, the mere prospective of a possible resurrec- tion of the treaty of the 20th of December, 1841, however distant and doubtful it might be, and in spite of any denials in both Parliaments, I should feel as an enormous burden which would weaken me ex- tremely in the task, already difficult, I shall have to fulfil. This prospective always in existence, would also keep alive with us, every shade of irritation, jealousy, and mistrust. The opposition would seize on these eagerly. The slightest incident, in the exe- cution of the treaties, and such wc may surely foresee, would become the source of bitter complaints and violent debates. " I'lie pure and simple closure of the protocol after our declaration that we shall not ratify, can alone cut short tliese difficulties, or as I may even call them, dangers. Notliing else accords with the true state of THE KIGIIT OF SEARCH. 1G9 things and with the interest of friendly relations be- tween the two countries. Nothing else will allow us to open an entirely new account, and to settle tlie dif- ferent affairs between us with no other difficulty than that of tlie affairs themselves." liOrd Aberdeen, finally, came over to this opinion. 1 never knew a man less fettered within his own ideas, more disposed to comprehend the views and position of others, and to allow them their full share. There was in him, with a prudence which disguised none of the difficulties of an affair, and made no at- tempt to surmount them but step by step, a freedom and equity of mind which led him, in all matters, to seek for the solution most just to all concerned. But, on this question of the right of search, lie had to deal, in his own cabinet, with opposing and intract- able dispositions. The English Admiralty, its presi- dent, Tord Haddington, and several otlier ministers were opposed to all concession. The head of the cabinet, Sir Kobert Peel, althougli extremely judi- cious and jiacifically inclined, was, in regiird to foreign policy, sus])i(ious, susceptible, pr()m])t to adopt ])opu- lar impressions, and al)ove all, pre})ossessed by the fear of being or of seemini;: to be deceived or weak. When it became known in London that all attempt to obtain our ratification of the treaty of the 20tli of December, 1841, was of necessity renounced, and that we were on the point of issuing a positive decla- ration on tlie subject, violent differences sprang up in tlie cabinet as to the bearing of this declaration, and 170 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. the manner in which it should be received. " Some," M. de Sainte Aulaire wrote to me, — " are strongly exasperated against our proceeding; they wish an answer to be sent to our declaration, and for that reason prefer that it should be specifically detailed. Others are anxious that the matter should be con- ducted as gently as possible, that no reply should be made to our declaration, and to afford less hold for an answer would prefer no justification. From what I see and hear, the mode selected by Lord Aberdeen would be the declaration without arguments. To this Sir E-obcrt objects that a dry, abrupt declaration has something of a dictatorial air, and would natu- rally call for the question. Why is this ? It seemed preferable to him that we should enter into explana- tion, and say that since the signature of the treaty, the Chambers having investigated it, have manifested an opinion to which a constitutional monarchy is bound to defer, and which opposes an absolute obstacle to the ulterior ratification. Sir Robert Peel adds, that if you see difficulties in the way of a posi- tive avowal of the dependence in which the preroga- tive of the crown finds itself before the Chambers, you might simply say, that between the signature of the treaty and the epoch fixed for the ratification, facts had occurred in France which the government was compelled to consider, and which rendered the ratification from this moment impossible. Lord Aberdeen thinks Sir Robert Peel is right in his ob- jections to a decisive refusal to ratify witliout argu- TIIK RIGHT OF SEAIJCII. 171 ment. We separated without coming to a decision. He has requested me to try several forms of drawing up in accordance with Sir Kobert Peel's ideas and his own. I have promised to give my attention to this, but before submitting anything to him, I am anxious lo receive your instructions. They may reach me by Friday next, the 28th. I hope the business will then advance rapidly." My instructions were forwarded without delay. I gave M. de Sainte Aulaire all tlie flicilities they could desire in London, and sent two forms of drawing up for the definitive closure of the protocol. One contained, without reasons, our declaration that we had resolved not to ratify the treaty of the 20th of December ; the other, explaining our refusal, " in consequence of important and well-known events connected with this subject, which have occurred in France since the signature of the treaty, and which the King's government considers it a part of its duty to take into serious consideration." — " AMtli this choice," I added, " it seems to me easy to arrive at a speedy conclusion." Nevertheless, obstacles and doubts were still pro- longed. Nothing is more difficult even amongst those who, in the main, agree in intention and object, than to satisfy all the susceptibilities and a})pearances which different situations require. '■ Observe well," said Lord Aberdeen to M. de Sainte Aulaire, " that in tliis wliole affair you yield to motives wliicli pos- sess a conclusive value for you, but whicli you ought 172 THE RIGHT OF SEAECH. not to call upon us to appreciate, for we find them extremely injurious, and we cannot, with dignity, see them introduce themselves without questioning them severely. They have arrived at a persuasion in France that we are abominable hypocrites, that we conceal Machiavelian combinations under the cloak of an interest for humanity. You find yourselves under the necessity of yielding to these calumnies, and we give ample proof of good temper in showing that we are not off'ended by them. But if you come, in the face of Europe, to present them as the deciding rule of your conduct, we are compelled to repulse them, for our silence would imply a kind of adhesion." In my private correspondence with M. de Sainte Aulaire, I replied to all these humours and suspicions of the English cabinet and public ; I endeavoured to throw light on the legitimacy in principle, as on the neces- sity in fact, of our conduct. When I authorized him to do so, he showed my letters to Lord Aberdeen, who said to him one day, on returning one he had communicated to Sir llobert Peel : " M. Guizot's let- ters are all perfectly beautiful ; but, on reading them, one would readily believe that he is entirely right and we wrong, that we have ever to praise his pro- ceedings, and he to condemn ours ; finally that, in all tliis, it is he and not us who is the aggrieved party." " I replied," said M. de Sainte Aulaire to me, " that u]) to this you had made no complaint against the iMiglish cabinet, but that if you saw susceptibiliti(\s and suspicious, it could not be surprising that you THE RKHIT OF SEAKCH, 173 sliould feel wounded by them. ' What is, in reality,' I added, ' the position of M. Guizot in Fiance ? Upon what ground do his enemies attack him 1 They reproach him with his partiality to England, with his preference for tlie Englisli alliance, with the esteem he professes for your nation and government. If, while he is pursued at home for these reasons, he lias also to defend himself against you, a little liu- mour on his part is surely legitimate.' Lord Aber- deen admitted that there was truth in my remark, but lie retorted a portion of it against me. 'If ^I. Guizot is attacked on account of England,' said he, ' England also is attacked on account of him. The odious accusations charged, the passions excited, are not in reality directed at us; they are machines of war against M. Guizot : it is to oppose him that the ratification of the treaty of 1841 has been prevented; it is to embarrass him that those of 1831 and 1833 are going to be assailed.' I cautioned Lord Aberdeen to beware of the practical conse(piences that might be drawn from these premises. Unquestionably, the stiategv of parties has its share in what is now passing in I'rance ; but parties trade only on exist- ing dispositions, and if a man less iiitre[)id than you were in power, he would, beyond all doubt, be car- ried away by the teuipest against Avhich you are struggling. To this Lord Aberdeen replied by very explicit, and 1 doubt not sincere, protestations of his confidence in your loyalty and his esteem for your ability and couragi*. Now, my dear friend, it is my 174 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. duty to apprise you, that at the bottom of all this lies the prevision that we shall return to the trea- ties of 1831 and 1833, that a resolution is formed to yield nothing on this point, and that any attempt to modify those treaties would lead, as a necessary and immediate consequence, to a diplomatic rupture." The difficulties and hesitations were finally sur- mounted by the mutual good will and good sense of the negotiators. Lord Aberdeen resolved to disregard the wishes of some of his colleagues. " They want a reply to your refusal to ratify," he said to M. de Sainto Aulaire, " and if I trusted to them it would be sharp ; but, in fact, it is I and not they who would be respon- sible for the consequences. I shall not allow my- self to be driven." — " I presume," added M. de Sainte Aulaire, " that he and Sir Robert Peel are agreed." Some days later, on the 8th of November, 1842, he wrote thus : " Although 1 have deviated slightly from the line you traced out, you will not, I hope, be dis- satisfied with the result. You required, — 1. An imqualified declaration that you would not ratify, eitlier now or later, the treaty of the 20th of Decem- ber, 1841. 2. That this declaration should be admit- ted, and the protocol closed, without phrases. I have carried both points, not, 1 assure you, without a strug- gle. I conceded that our declaration of non-ratifying should be made by a note to Lord Aberdeen, who will convoke tlie conference to-morrow, and communicate to it tlie said announcement. He has pledged himself not to allow the introduction of a single word in the TIIK RIGHT OF SEAUCII. 175 protocol uncourteous towards us ; the closure is to be without phrases. It was Prince Metternich who sug- gested this mode of proceeding. Lord Aberdeen did not relish it at first yesterday evening ; however, after a long and animated discussion between us, he pro- duced this expedient as extenuating the tartness of our style. He seemed quite satisfied when 1 gave my consent, and left me precipitately to tell Sir llobert Peel, who was waiting for him in an adjoining cham- ber. On resuming our interview this morning, I was surprised to find Lord Aberdeen almost indifferent upon the expedient to which he attached, the pre- ceding eve, so much value. I then asked to return to the course more conformable with my instructions, from which I had departed with much regret. " For Heaven's sake," said Lord Aberdeen, "do not go back upon that. For my own part, I care little ; but yes- terday, when I told Sir Pobert Peel that you and I had agreed on this point, he expressed the utmost joy, and would be greatly annoyed at any misunderstand- ing. Neither M. Guizot nor you will ever know tlie tenth part of the trouble whicli this unhappy affair has giv(>n me." Trouble signifies little when the end is gained. It was completely so on tliis occasion. The knot was untied, and tli(> treaty of the 20th of ])(>cember, 1841, as far as it regai'ded us, annulled, A\ithout any re- crimination from the otlier powers between Mhom it continued in vigour, and without producing the slight- est change in the friendly relations between France 176 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. and England. I wrote to Count de Sainte Aulaire : "You have reason to be satisfied, and so have I. Your form of declaration, by a note written and com- municated, is almost as clear, perhaps more correct, and certainly less open to controversy than a face-to- face announcement in the conference. The drawing up of the protocol is good. All is therefore well, and here is a great embarrassment shaken off. But I wish that not the slightest cloud should exist between Lord Aberdeen and me, in consequence of this non-ratified treaty. This would be a great reciprocal injustice, for we have both, I venture to say, conducted and wound up this untoward affair with irreproachable prudence and loyalty. For my part, I struggled with it as long as I could. I proposed modifications in the treaty. I waited more than a year. Could I go further? Ought 1 to have risked, on this question, our position and entire policy '? Evidently not. Neither the interest of France nor of Europe, nor the interest of the relations between France and Eng- land would have gained anything thereby. I have adopted the only rational and suitable course. In the form, I was desirous that our resolution, once taken, should be frank and concise. I liave admitted nothing wliich could wound either the dignity of my country OY of its government. This was my duty. But at the same time, I have neither said nor received anything in a manner of which England coidd complain. Lord Aberdeen, on his side, has thrown into the affair much good will and persevering moderation. We were both THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 177 in a difficult position. We have both exercised sound policy, and should both remember it with satisfac- tion, " So much for the past. Let us now look to the future, for we have one before us which will also briuf^ its embarrassments. '• Evidently, in the ai)proaching session, the con- ventions of 1831 and 1833 will be attacked: by the o})})osition, by tlie intriguers, and by some ill-disposed or blind conservatives. More or less openly, two things will be demanded of me. One, to elude, by indirect means, the execution of these conventions ; the other, to open a negotiation to excite their abo- lition. I shall reject the first in the name of loyalty, the second in that of policy. 1 am not an attorney, a Inmter after (piibbles. I shall carry out honestly what has been ]:)romised in the name of my country. As to a negotiation for the abolition of the treaties, England would not lend herself to it. Her refusal would bring on ill feelings, perhaps the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Such a fault shall not be connnitted by my hands. I said recently to Eord Palmerstou, that lie sacrificed great ])oli(y to small, tliat the friendsliip of France was wortli more than Syria taken from Mehemet Ali. I shall not incur the same re])r()acli. Good intelligence with England is of more value than the abolition of the treaties of 1831 and 18.]3. Here is a command- ing reason which relieves me from tlie S(>arch of oth(>rs. 178 THE RIGHT OF SEAECH. " Such, my dear friend, is my plan of conduct. I shall encounter in it many combats, many obstacles, for prejudices are general, passions highly excited, and all the pretenders to power will club together, openly or secretly, to profit by them. Still, I shall persevere, and I think with success ; but that I may reckon on this issue, I require three things : — " 1. The complete execution, in the conventions of 1831 and 1833, of all the clauses which can be consi- dered, in France, as guarantees : particularly of arti- cle 3 in the Convention of 1831, which requires that the number of cruising vessels should be fixed annu- ally by a special agreement. " 2. Much prudence and moderation in the exer- , cise of the right of search. This depends on the se- lection of cruising officers and on the instructions they receive. It does not belong to me in any man- ner to interfere in the choice of the officers employed by the English cabinet in this service, especially on tlie west coast of Africa. Nevertheless, we may fear, from ascertained facts, that some of them have not always been as moderate, calm, and civil, as could have been desired. Our own people are proud and susceptible ; it is by coolness and politeness that jea- lousy is forestalled. I cannot refrain from remarking tliat no complaint has ever arisen on the part of the Englisli vessels visited by our cruisers, and these visits liave ()ft(Mi occurred. I therefore take the liberty of calling the entire attention, or rather the scrupulous delicacy of the English cabinet to the choice of their THE HIGIIT OF SEARCH. 179 officers. Thus, above all, we shall spare each other serious and continual embarrassments. " As to the instructions, I am charmed at hearing that Lord Aberdeen examines and causes them to be examined very minutely. He certainly cannot forget that according to tlie terms of article 5 of the Con- vention of 1831, tliere are instructions, drawn up and settled in common hij the two governments. If it be tliose tliat Lord Aberdeen has under revision at this moment, that revision ought to be made in common, and no modification can be introduced except by con- cert. Undoubtedly there may and ought to be, be- yond the general instructions settled in common, spe- cial instructions personally given by each government to its officers. L^pon these also it might be useful to understand each other officially. Neither you, nor any one attached to your embassy, is, I feel sui'e, ac- quainted with the executive details of this service, and prepared to discuss them with professional men. Should you consider it desirable I would send to you to London an officer to supply information, and to communicate with tlu> English Admiralty, specially selected by our minister of marine, and placed at your disposal for tliis purpose. "I now come to my third essential point. Satis- faction and just re])aration promptly rendered for past and future grievances. In matters of tliis nature I shall be compelled to sliow mysdf exact and in- sisting. I understand fully tliat the Englisli cabinet may, (m tliis point, be placed in some embarrassment; N 2 180 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. facts are often doubtful, disputed, difficult and slow of proof. There are also some that are certain. A few examples of firm impartiality would produce an excellent effect here with the public, and on the dif- ferent stations, with the cruisers themselves. I shall do my entire duty, but I shall claim my full right. " I have gone into length, my dear friend, and yet, on this subject I could say much more. I have named the essential points ; the rest will follow in due time. The case stands thus : here is between Paris and London a delicate, prolonged situation, and concerted, prudent action difficult but necessary. I hope we shall succeed as we have hitherto succeeded, but, in truth, I must be allowed to say, my sfiare is the weightiest." 1 did not deceive myself on this point. As soon as the session of 1843 opened, the Chamber of Deputies hastened to express its sentiments on the right of search. Although the speech from the throne made no allusion to the question, the conservatives, in a decided majority in the committee on the address, and selecting for their reporter one of my most inti- mate friends, M. Dumon, inserted in the draft of their reply, a paragraph thus worded : " Uniting in a feel, iiig of humanity, the powers apply themselves to the su])pr(^ssion of the infamous traffic in negroes. We have s(H>n with satisfaction, that while lending to this just enterprise the concurrence of France, your Ma- jesty's government has not given its consent to the extension of the existing conventions. For the strict THE KIGHT OF SEAKCII. 181 and loyal execution of these conventions, without in- fringement, we rely on the vigilance and firmness of your government. But impressed by the objections which experience reveals, and also in the interest of the good intelligence so essential to the accomplish- ment of the common work, we call, with our most ardent wishes, for the moment when our commerce shall be replaced under the exclusive superintendence of our own flag." Here, beyond doubt, was an urgent insistence that the government should undertake the abolition of the conventions of 1831 and 1833. But the opposition did not content itself with this. It used the attack on the right of search as an onset against the cabinet and its whole policy. It demanded, for the abolition of the conventions of 1831 and 1833, a categorical and immediate negotiation. The debate lasted for six days, and it was not without a slight degree of mournful surprise that I reckoned M. de Tocqueville amongst my adversaries. He seemed to me called, by the elevation of his cliaracter and ideas, to place him- self, on this occasion, beyond the ranks and routines of op])osition. In recjuital, a young deputy, new in the Chamber, M. Ag<''n()r de Ciasparin, defended with undaunted courage the almost abandoned cause of the conventions of 1831 and 1833 which he persisted in considering as necessary for the effectual repression of tlie traffic, and little dangerous, in reality, to the se- curity of commerce and the liberty of the seas. Several amendments were proposed to aggraNate tlie [)aragraj)h 182 THE RIGHT OF SExVRCH. in the draft of the address, and to turn it into a weapon of war against the cabinet. I spoke towards the end of the debate, and after fully explaining the attitude of the cabinet in its refusal to ratify the treaty of the 20th December, 1841, 1 added, "As to the treaties of 1831 and 1833, they have been for ten years concluded, ratified, and in execution. I believed that it concerned the honour of my country as well as my own to carry them on loyally, not to furnish an example of extreme irregularity and of positive bad faith in international relations. I have therefore advised the crown and have continued their execution. The Chamber knows that in the course of this execution negligence has oc- curred, and that the carelessness of all classes, Cham- bers, public, and government, on this question, during so many years, has caused several guarantees, import- ant to us, to fall into disuse. I have recapitulated and claimed them all. They are three in number ; the drawing up of an annual convention to debate and settle, according to the circumstances of the year, the number of cruisers ; the declaration that the cruisers sliall be attached to a special station, and shall not, without a fresh order, pass from one to the other ; finally, equality, as nearly as possible in the number of cruisers belonging to the two countries. None of these guarantees wfu'e in force for ten years. I have claimed them, and they are now in vigour. At this moment, England and France, as regards the execu- tion of the treaties of 1831 and 1833, are in the exercise of strict, complete, and loyal rights. THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 183 " Beyond this, is it necessary to provoke the actual abolition of these treaties? I cannot dispense with recalling this maxim, that treaties concluded, ratified and carried into execution can only be loosened by agreement or cut by tlie sword. Tliere is no third me- tliod. Is this a moment to demand mutual consent and accordance for the abolition of the treaties of 1831 and ISSo? Is there any actual cliance of obtain- ing it? The cabinet thinks not, and has not consi- dered it a duty, at present, to enter into negotiation on this subject. I know no one who negotiates except for the purpose of success. " It has been asked whether the cabinet will really take the public sentiment and the wisli of the Cham- ber seriously. 1 might be tempted to consider this question as an insult ; I shall not do so. Gentlemen, if I did not take the sentiment of the country and the wish of the Chamber in this question seriously, shall I tell you wliat I would do ? I would open a negotia- tion, I woidd open it on tlie instant without caring for the probable consequences. My opinion, my fore- thought tell me that it would not succeed. After it had failed, I should come to you and say, I have de- ferred to the wish of the Chamber ; I have done all that dep(>nded on the cabinet ; I should then ask the CHiamber, now what do you nnpiire ? AVill you pause ? V\'i\\ you I'etreat ? ^^'ill you advance? I should thus remove the burdtMi from the shoulders of the cabinet to rc^place it on the Chamber and on the country. "Such conduct would be an indignity and an act 184 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. of cowardice. The cabinet will keep the burden to itself. The cabinet will not reduce the Chamber and the country to an alternative which I cannot qua- lify but by these words, a madness or a folly. It takes too seriously the public sentiment, the state of minds, and the wish of the Chamber. When the cabinet be- lieves, with perfect sincerity, with profound convic- tions, that such a negotiation might succeed, that the treaties of 1831 and 1833 can be loosened by mutual accord, the cabinet will undertake the work. Before, no; then, certainly." The Chamber loudly applauded this attitude and language. The amendments were rejected, and the adoption of the pure and simple paragraph proposed by the committee on the address proved at once the persistence of the majority in its wish, and its steady adhesion to the cabinet. An analogous debate took place in the Chamber of Peers. Faithful to its traditions, its committee maintained, on this question, in its draft of address, tlie same silence witli the speech from the throne. Several peers demanded, by way of amendment, the formal and prompt abolition of the riglit of search. The l^ukc de ]3roglie combated them in the name of the committee, of which he was reporter ; and taking up, on liis own account, the question from the source, he discussed it liistorically and politically, in prin- ciple and in fact, in a manner so lucid and complete, that the Clianiber of Peers, rejecting all the amend- ments, maiutaiucd the reserve adopted by its com- mittee. THE KIGIIT OF SEARCH. 185 At this precise moment, the issue of these debates was fortunate for the cabinet. The Chambers had shown their full confidence, and had sustained it against its enemies, although they had themselves entered on the paths which those enemies had opened. But evidently the desire for the abolition of the right of search was general, and could not fail to become daily more imperative. I wrote to Count de Fla- hault at Vienna : " The question of the right of search remains open, and will weigh on the future. I have saved honour and gained time. But it must come to a solution. Before I touch on that, I shall wait till the necessity is understood in all quarters. Speak of it, I pray you, with M. de Metternich. He knows how to foresee and prepare things. I hope, when the moment arrixes, that he will aid me in modify- ing a situation wliich cannot perpetuate itself inde- finitely, for it would bring every year, on the re-as- sembling of the Chambers, and in the course of the the session, at any maritime incident, a dangerous fit of fever." In London, tlic Count de Sainte Aulaire had no occasion to be thus warned. His uneasiness on the subject of the riglit of search was ever alive. '' "^'ou tell me," he wrote, '• to feel ([uite tranquil, for the present, on tliis ([uestion. ^ ou are perfectly right ; if anytliiiig should become possible at some future time, it is only on condition of compromising nothing now. I liave no wisli to exaggerate. While declaring witliout the slightest hesitaticm that any ()V(Mture made at this moment to the En-^lish cabinet 186 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. would lead to a rupture, or a retreat with a very ill grace on our part, I do not assume that such a card would always lose, or that at another epoch, under the predominance of different circumstances, we might not attempt with success what is impossible to-day." Other circumstances soon presented themselves, ex- tremely unlooked for, and well calculated to furnish us, in this embarrassing affair, with opportunities and means of acting. Towards the end of August, 1843, the session of the Chambers having terminated, the royal family and the cabinet left the capital. The King was enjoying his summer vacation at the Chateau d'Eu ; the Prince of Joinville, and the Duke of Au- male, went to pass some days at London and Windsor ; the Duke of Nemours held a camp of ten thousand men at Plclan in Brittany ; I reposed at Val Richer from the fatigues of the session. Returning to Paris on the 23rd of August, I received a call from Lord Cowley to inform me that Queen Victoria was on the point of paying a visit to the King at the Cha- teau d'Eu, and tliat liord Aberdeen would accompany her. He had only as yet received the information by a letter from Mr. Henry Greville, but he considered the fact as certain. I instantly dispatched a courier to the King, who replied on the following day, the 20 th of August: "Yes, my dear minister (I begin like Racine's Agamemnon), I have every reason to believe that we are about to receive at Eu a royal visit from (iueen Victoria and Prince Albert. She lias entrusted my sons, who arrived this morning. THE KIGIIT OF SEARCH. 187 with all her messages. She only requires us to keep till the 30th of August a secret which is no longer one ; because, she says, the execution of this project might be impeded by publicity. I therefore think it important, and I have just written to this effect to Duchatel, that our official or ministerial gazettes should not take the initiative of the news, that they should express doubt in publishing it, and that they should speak always of the unsettled state of the weather and the sea, particularly in September. The Queen intends to be at Brighton on Monday, to em- bark there to visit some Englisli ports in the Channel, and thence to proceed to Treport, taking perhaps a French pilot at Cherbourg. 13e so kind as to name tliis to Admiral Mackau. I conclude that the autho- rities by land and sea will attend to their duty for the salutes from all the forts, batteries, and men-of- war, in case the royal flag of England should appear at Cherbourg. However, we shall have full intelli- gence, 1 hope. Here, I am badly supplied with four invalids to s(n-ve six guns, although the marshal or- dercnl thirty last year, I have told (general Teste to send them by post from Dcmai. This to facilitate the secret. Then, we must have plate and china. All liere liave lost tlieir heads. The rooms are an- other embarrassment. Fortunately Feckham has a dozen wooden huts intended for Algiers, wliich T shall S{^t up in tlie garden of the churcli, and furnish them as well as we can. I have ordered sixty beds from Neuilly, and lunc sent to Dieppe for sailcloth. 188 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. which they can pay with tar, to cover the roofs. This will be a sort of smahla^ in which the Duke of iVumale will set the example of sleeping, as he did of charging the smahla of Abd-el-Kader. I have or- dered a play for Monday, for the Queen expects to arrive on Saturday, the 2nd. It is settled that Lord Aberdeen comes with her. This seems to indicate to us the invitation of Lord Cowley. Have the good- ness to tender it on my part to Lord and Lady CoAvley, and Miss Wellesley. As to yourself, my dear minister, you will come when you please, but I advise you not to let it be later than Thursday, that we may have time to understand each other thoroughly, and to talk matters well over before the broadside is poured in. I shall also be delighted to see Admiral Mackau here ; hut you tvill have to excuse the accommodation, which will he very indifferent. Never mind -/^ all will go on excellently well. Good night, my dear minister." At Paris, and wherever the news spread, a great effect was produced. Satisfaction for some, discon- tent for others, surprise for all. Amongst some mem- bers of tlie diplomatic body ill-humour vented itself in thoughtless and unworthy expressions: " the freak of a little girl ; a king would not have acted so." And when tliey were answered, " a freak accepted by mi- nisters who are not little girls," the ill-temper re- doubled, " Tier ministers think only of pleasing her, tlicy tremble in her presence." Very soon, however, * The words in italics were thus written in iMiglisli in the Kinj^'s letter. THE KIGIIT OF SEARCH. 189 tlicse ebullitions restrained themselves before tlie im- portance of the fact and the public sentiment. Im- pressions of the moment, and on the spot, are more trutliful tlian the most tenacious reminiscences. I insert here textually a letter, in which, on the same evening, writing to Paris, I related the arrival and disembarkation of the Queen. " At a quarter past five, cannon announced that the (^ueen was in sight. In another half-hour, we em- barked in the ro} al barge, the King, the Princes, Lord Cowley, Admiral Mackau and myself, to anticipate her arrival. We proceeded about half a mile, in the calmest sea, under a beautiful sky, and the land teeming with the entire popuhition of the neighbourhood. Our six sliips under sail, dr(\ssed with French and I^iglish flags, saluted loudly and joyfully. The report of the can- non scarcely drowned the shouts of the sailors. We drc>w up alongside the yacht ' Victoria and Albert.'' VsQ mounted the deck. The King and Queen were mutually affected, lie embraced her. She said to me, ' 1 am delighted to see you again here.' She de- scended with Prince Albert into the King's barge. As we a])proached the sbore, the salutes of the can- non and crews of the men-of-war grew louder and mon^ animated. The land batteries repeated them. '[\\v (^ueen, as she placcnl lu^- foot on shore, had the tlu> brightest expression of countenance 1 have ever looked upon : a mixture- of emoti(ms, a degree of sur- ])rise, and above all the most animated pleasure in this reception. There was nmcli shaking of hands in 190 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. the royal tent. Then the carriages and the journey. God save the Queen was loudly played, and there were as many shouts of Long live the Queen ! Long live the Queen of England, as of Long live the King ! Let us put faith in the power of just and simple ideas. This district loves not the English. It is Norman and maritime. In our wars with England, Treport was three times burnt, and pillaged I know not how often. Nothing would be more easy than to excite a po- pular passion which might embarrass us seriously; but it has been said and repeated, 'The Queen of England does an act of courtesy to our King, and we must be extremely polite to her.' This idea pos- sesses the people, and has surmounted all recollec- tions, passions, temptations, and parties ; they have shouted and they will continue to shout Long live the Queen ! and they applaud God save the Queen with enthusiasm. We must take care only not to ask it from them for too long a time. " I add, however, that another simple and more durable idea, peace, the advantage of peace, has be- come, and becomes daily more powerful. It prevails amongst the citizens and also with the reflecting and well-disposed sections of the people. It serves us greatly at this moment. They say often amongst themselves, ' When we want peace, we must not ex- change abuse and make faces at each other.' This was understood to-day by all the world on this side of the Cliannel." As soon as we were alone. Lord Aberdeen said to THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 191 me, " Take this, I beg of you, as a certain indication of our policy, on the Sj)anish and on all other questions ; we shall talk thoroughly on all." It was not easy to talk. The days were passed in general parties, in pre- sentations, in snatches of conversation in the draw- ing-rooms, in promenades. On Sunday, the 3rd of Sep- tember, after Queen Victoria had been present at the English service in a hall of the Chateau arranged for that purpose, the King took her in a large char a banc entirely filled by the royal family, to the sum- mit of a table-land which afforded an admirable view of sea and forest. The weather was beautiful, but the road bad, narrow, and full of stones and ruts. The Queen of England laughed and amused herself at the idea of being thus jolted along in Royal French com- j)any, in a sort of carriage quite new to her, and drawn by six splendid, dapple-grey Xorman horses, driven gaily by two postilions, with their sounding bells and brilliant uniform. Eord Aberdeen and I followed, with Lord Liverpool and M. de Saintc Aulaire in another carriage. Lord Aberdeen liad just had with the King a long fcfe-a-tcte, by which he was satisfied and impressed. Satisfied with tlie political views and intentions wliicli tlie King liad opened to him, especi- ally on tlie (piestion of Spain ; struck by the fertility of his ideas and recollections, by the rectitude and liberty of his judgment, by the natural and cheerful animation of his language, " The King has spoken to me without reser^e and very seriously," he said to me. Lord Aberdeen and I talked as we drove along. 192 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. a little of all things. He told me that for two months the Queen had projected this voyage, and had spoken of it to Sir Robert Peel and himself; that they had strongly approved of it, requesting her to say nothing on the subject until the rising of Parliament, to avoid the questions, remarks, and perhaps censures of the opposition. " The Queen," added Lord Aberdeen, " would not go to Paris : she wished to pay a visit to the King and royal family, not to divert herself." In this conversation, 1 expressed a disposition to concert wdth him liberal modifications in our mutual tariffs, separately arranged by the two governments in perfect independence, rather than to conclude a solemn and permanent treaty. He seemed to accept my argu- ments, and I afterwards ascertained that he had said to Sir Robert Peel, " 1 incline to think that this would be better than a commercial treaty, the importance of wliich is greatly exaggerated, and never fails to excite, on both sides, much dissatisfaction and com- plaint." On returning from the drive, the King liad no sooner left his carriage than he asked me what effect their interview had produced upon Lord Aberdeen : " Good, Sire," I replied, " I am certain ; but Lord Aberdeen has not given me any details, whicli I must wait for." lliis delay greatly disconcerted the King. He was patient in tlie end and for general results, but the most eager and anxious of men at the mo- ment and in any particular case. Never did he ap- pear moYv friendly, T might evcm say more affectionate THE RIGHT OK SEARCH. 193 to myself, •'^^'e are," lie said to me on that day, " very necessary to each other. Without you I can arrest bad policy, but it is only with you that I can carry out re a great efiect. I will not say that the joy I feel is ])articipated ; far from it. You ^^•ill readily under- stand that this is not made apparent to me ; but I can easily see that Prince Metternich, (the quarter most favourable^ to us), is auything but satisfied. It is not that he wishes for unfriendly intelligence be- * Oil the 11 til and 30tli of September, 1843. THE RIGHT OF SKARCH. 197 twcen the governments of France and England ; he is too mncli an advocate of peace for that ; but he lias no desire to see cstablislied too close a friendsliip, and the idea of an alliance between France and Eng- land, he holds in antipathy. Nothing would tend more to negative the influence he is accustomed to c'xercise as the grand moderator and mediator of Eu- rope/' AMiile I received from without these testi- monies of the favourable effect of a visit as unex- pected by Europe as by oursehes, I caught a glimpse of a chance of sohing, in accordance with the desire of the Chambers and of the country, the question of the right of search which weighed so heavily upon us. I returned to Paris satisfied and confident, waiting the session of 1844 and its debates. I set myself to work to prepare a favourable issue. Three weeks before the meeting of the Chambers, I M rote to Count Sainte de Aulaire :* " Ilesume witli Lord Aberdeen the conversation I had with him at the Chateau d'Eu on the conventions of 1831 and I800 and the right of s(^arch. Tlie question is a little cooled. '14ie public seems less preoccupied with it. The journals no longer dedicate to it all their columns. TJH ])rudence of the instructions given to the cruisers has ])revented the multiplication of comjdaints. I acknowl(M]g(> this improvement of the situation and it delights me. But we must not snffer it to deceive us. At tlie bottom, the disposition of minds is the same; no one forgets tlie (piestion, neither those who enter * ( >n the (Uh of DirembiT, 1813. 198 THE RIGHT or SEARCH. into it from sincere conviction, nor others who use it as a weapon against the cabinet. If they supposed we have forgotten it, and that we think no more of a matter which has so generally and warmly excited the country, they would remind us of it with an increase of ardour, real or calculated, which would instantly re- inflame public passion and bring back the former or perhaps augmented embarrassments. Lord Aberdeen knows, as I do, the pride and jealousy of public as- semblies. The Chamber of Deputies has pledged it- self by its addresses ; the Chamber of Peers has not spoken expressly, but it has clearly manifested the same sentiments and desires. While resolutely refus- ing what was required of me, while struggling against the evil policy they wished to impose, I said myself that, as soon as the effervescence had tamed down, and when negotiation might become possible without compro- mising our loyalty in our engagements, and the friendly relations between the two countries, I should hasten to open it. I cannot longer delay. What has passed and wliat is likely to pass render it impossible. " Tiord Aberdeen, I hope, knows me well enough to feel convinced that there are two things, or rather, I may say, duties, which I shall never deny or aban- don. One, to pursue constantly the end we proposed in 1831, and for which the conventions of that epoch are only a means, — the abolition of the traflic ; the oth(M% to observe the treaties faitlifully until they are clianged or abrogated by common accord. I have maintained tliese two principles in the most critical THE KIGIIT OF SEAKCII. 199 moments; I sliall always be faitliful to them. The honour of my comitry, of its government, and my own word are thereto engaged. I hit I have studied the ([uestion with care. There are, I think, not only in the disposition of minds, but also in other circum- stances which have arisen since 1831, decisive reasons, and at the same time effectual means of modifying, in certain respects, the existing state of things, and of giving it a new form. At present, I only wish to re- mind Lord Aberdeen of the necessity that presses on us, and of which I spoke with him three months ago. He has too much judgment and equity not to acknow- ledge it." ]M. de Sainte Aulaire replied on the 12th of Decem- ber : " I forwarded to Lord Aberdeen your letter relative to the treaties of 1831 and 1833. We spoke of it this morning. I had no occasion to enlarge on tlie considerations therein developed. Lord Aberdeen had thoroughly comprehended them, and retained the spirit of your conversation with liim at the Chateau d'Eu. I therefore confined mys(4f to asking him in what precise terms I sliould transmit his answer: 'You ran write to M. (luizot,' he said, 'that fully confident in the sincerity of liis resolution to labour for th(^ sup])ression of the trade, 1 shall receive any proposition coming fnmi him with nuich consideration^ and sliall examine it with th(^ greatest care.' I had nothing mon*, as it a])])eared to me, to urge at pre- sent. We spoke of other matters ; and on separating, 1 repeated his phrase, saying I should write to you. 200 THE RIGHT or SEARCH. ' Quite light,' said Lord Aberdeen ; ' but be careful to add nothing which implies adhesion on my part to any specific measure. It was settled at Eu, between M. Guizot and me, to commence a negotiation, but not to prejudge the issue. I understand the position of your ministry with its Chambers; he must also understand mine.' " Lord Aberdeen's position, not only with his parlia- ment but with his cabinet, was far from easy, and re- quired, on his part, as much moderation as persevering firmness ; on ours, great circumspection. When he communicated to Sir Eobert Peel my letter, and the proposal of a fresh negotiation, the first minister ex- hibited equal uneasiness and displeasure. "Why bring on," he said, " a parliamentary debate on this subject ? We have already shown ourselves extremely yielding to the desires of France. M. Guizot lays down principles well suited for partial application hereafter: he speaks of the pride and jealousy of public assemblies ; he knows well that England also is not a country of absolute power, and that her govern- ment is compelled to take into account, national prejudices and passions. The House of Commons will never consent to make concessions to the exigen- ces of the Chamber of Deputies." — " There is no ques- tion of concessions or exigences," replied Lord Aber- deen ; " M. Guizot attaches importance to a necessity of situation, as we also should do, did tlie case occur. He {muouuces propositions which we have no right to reject a priori, for this is not exclusively an Eng- THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 201 lish question. The suppression of the slave trade is a common interest in which France, equally with England, has a right to originate an opinion. I know not what measures M. Guizot can substitute for reci- procal search, and certainly I shall not accept them, unless they are effectual for the suppression of the traffic. But to entitle us to reject, we must first know and discuss them." Sir Robert Peel had too just a mind, and too much confidence in his colleague not to yield to such honest and equitable language. It was settled between the two ministers that nego- tiation should not be rejected. AVhen our session opened, on the 27th of December, lS4o, the speech from the throne, — while stating, '• the sincere friendship whicli unites me, as the King said, to the (^ueen of Great Britain, and the amicable und(>rstanding existing between my government and hers," — maintained, of course, complete silence on tlie negotiation entered upon with regard to the riglit of searcli ; but the committee appointed, in tlie Chamber of l)e})uties, to prepare the address in reply to the speech, knew and perfectly understood the new posi- tion ; and in congratulating itself on the good intelli- gence which prevailed betwe(Mi tlie two countries, a(hled in a special paragrapli ; '• This perfect under- standing Avill, without doubt, aid the success of the negotiations, wliich, while guarantcHMug the repres- sion of an infamous traffic, must tend to re})lace our commerce under tli(> exclusive protection of our own fiag." The Chamber persisted tlius in its desire for 202 THE RIGHT. OF SEARCH. the abolition of the right of search, and at the same time signified its confidence in the cabinet charged to prosecute its accomplishment. This was distasteful to the opposition. M. Billault proposed an amend- ment which omitted all testimony of confidence in the cabinet, and declared that the good understanding between France and England, " had no chance of being durable, until the day when negotiations con- ducted with perseverance, should, while continuing to prosecute the suppression of an infamous traffic, re- place French navigation under the exclusive superin- tendence of its own flag." I opposed this amendment formally. " I have taken the desire of the Chambers seriously," I said, " and at this moment, I give proof of it, for I accept fully the paragraph of your commit- tee. That paragraph repeats textually the desire that French commerce should be replaced under the ex- clusive protection of our own flag. Since I accept this without objection, it is evident that this is the object I have in view. " At the same time that I am thus formal in the expression of my conduct, I affirm that I should fail in my duties Avere I to produce here documents and details on the actual state of the negotiation, for I should create difficulties in its w^ay, instead of aiding it to advance. " Allusion lias been made to the many reasons that mi^ht ))e given for reaching the accomplishment of the desire ex])ressed in the address. Permit me to keep tliose reasons to myself, and to give tlieni where THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 203 it is profitable tlmt I should give them. I am not called ii]ion to produce them -svithin these walls ; else- where 1 must make them valid, and I shall know how to do so. "■ The amendment of the honourable M. Billault creates a difficulty in tlie negotiation, instead of giv- ing me strength. What do I say] It creates two difficulties, one bearing on me, and one which ad- dresses itself to London. The difhculty bearing on me is, that in this amendment, there is no confidence in the negotiator ; there is a contrary sentiment. Do you believe that you would give me strength in London by acting thus ? To act in London, I must present myself there with the confidence, as well as witli the desire of the Chamber. This is what your address of the last year did, and what the address of your committc^e does now. The amendment of M. l>illault takes strength from me in a negotiation it imposes. "Here is the second difficulty it creates for me: "This amendment is denunciatory. It has the fea- tures of menace, (ientlemen, tlien^ are two national sentiments, two national self-lo^es in presence here. A\ hat is the duty of the negotiation? To ])revent these two sentiments from clasliing. 'i'lie honourable M. IJillault does th(> contrary; lie compels them to clasli. 'fills, at any cost, is wliat I seek to avoid. " liCavc^ tlie question to debate its(>lf between the two governments ; between two governments seri- ously and harmoniously disposed, who know, on 204 THE IlIGHT OF SEAIICII. both sides, the difficulties with which they have to deal. The object is indicated by the French Cham- bers to the French government, by the French go- vernment to the English government, with which it negotiates. Give strength, then, to the negotiators, instead of clogging them with embarrassments." The Chamber was convinced. M. Billault withdrew his amendment. The paragraph proposed by the committee was unanimously adopted. And in 1844, as in 1842 and 1843, the Chamber of Peers main- tained silence on this question in its address. Henceforward I found myself in a suitable position for entering on negotiation in London with authority and some chances of success. In demanding the abo- lition of the right of search, I was the interpreter of a national desire, not of the vote of a party ; I made no concession to my adversaries ; I spoke in the name of my own friends, in the name of the conservative party which supported me firmly in our general policy and in our amicable understanding with the English government. I began to perceive means of continuing, without right of search, the effectual pro- secution of the repression of the slave trade. The mi- nister of marine, M. de Mackau, and the heads of his (h^partment, amongst others, M. Galos, director of the colonies, studied the (piestion with zeal. A young and ck>ver naval officer, M. Bouet-^^'illaumez, then only ca])tain of a corvette and provisional governor of Senegal, had communicated information and views to the Dnke (U> Hroglie and myself, which we considered THE KIOIIT or SRAUCII. 205 valuable. And by a sin<>;ular coincidence, at the same moment, analogous ideas were suggested to me by Tjord Brougham, one of the firmest supporters of the good intelligence between France and England, who had just given me, in the House of I^ords, eloquent tokens of amicable sympathy. I wrote to Count de Sainte Aulaire, on the 24th of February, 1844: '• An idea has occurred to Ford Brougham for re- placing the right of search without injury to the sup- pression of the slave traffic, which we have had under consideration here for six weeks ; a system of com- bined squadrons, placed alternately under a comman- dant from each nation. I do not yet see this very clearly; but I think something may be drawn from it, — j)erhaps a definitive solution of the question. I am delighted that this idea should have sprung up in liOndon as well as in Faris, and I encourage Ford Brougham to cultivate it. Do not speak of it but to him. I am preparing a complete memoir on this subject, which I shall send to you later." Several montlis elapsed before these preparatory studies were terminated, and in that interval two inci- dents occurred which furnished me with an opportu- nity of making some ])rogres.s in the negotiati(m scarcely opened. On the 1st of June, 1S44, the Em- peror Nieholas arrived in I'higland, and remained eight days there, betweiMi Fondon and Windsor. On the Sth of October following, King Fouis Philippe re- turned tlie visit of Queen Victoria to the Chateau d'Eu, and passed six days at Windsor, whither I accom- panied him. 206 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. The journey of the Emperor Nicholas occasioned us no surprise. On the 16th of February, M. de Sainte Aulaire had written to me : " I forgot an im- portant fact, which I beg you to keep secret. The Emperor has announced himself for this summer in England. On the return of the Grand-duke Michael, who gave great accounts of his journey, the Emperor manifested, in presence of Mr. Bloomfield, secretary to the English embassy, a desire of judging for him- self of the exactness of these recitals. I heard this from Lord Aberdeen. He did not add that a formal invitation had been sent." Two months later, on the 16th of April, I, in turn, gave warning to our am- bassador; "I have reasons for believing," I wrote, " that towards the end of May, the Emperor Nicholas will appear in London suddenly, like an unexpected and unceremonious traveller. He says, and causes it to be repeated, that to his great regret, he cannot go this year. All, nevertheless, indicates that he will go. He is fond of surprises and effects of this nature." The surprise was merely apparent. Without having been suggested in London, the journey was eagerly accepted by the English court, by the cabinet more than by the Queen herself As soon as the emperor liad arrived, I wrote to M. de Sainte Aulaire : " On this subject, I have no private directions to give you. Be reserved with a shade of coldness. The unfriendly here, or the malicious only, would rejoice if we took umbrage at this journey, or evinced at least ill temper. There will be nothing of the kind. We see things TIIK KIGIIT OF SEARCH. 207 as they are, and reject perverse conclusions. The Emperor goes to London because the Queen of Eng- land went to Eu. We find no difficulty in looking on this as a retaliation. We are quite sure that he will accomplish no policy with the English cabinet beyond wliat we know. Ear from regretting that he should pay court to England, and that England should ex- ercise influence over him, we are glad that it is so ; it is advantageous to the European world. So much for the reality of things. As to external forms, you know as well as I do, the proprieties of our situation. Do what they prescribe to you, neither more nor less. Wait for the Imperial civilities, and receive them with the respect which is their due, and as being due to you also." During his whole visit, the Emperor Nicholas con- ducted himself like a royal courtier come to display his graceful manners with his greatness, anxious to please Queen Victoria, her ministers and ladies, the aristocracy, the people and all the world in England ; always preserving in his eagerness much personal dignity, but deficient sometimes in tact and restraint. Being ]n-esont one day, with the (JuecMi, at a review, and com])limenting her on the splendid appearance of li(M- troops, he added, witli a ])r()found bow, " I beg your ^lajesty to consider all mine as belonging to you;" and he took care to repeat wliathe liad said to s(>veral officers of tlu' Queen's staff. At Ascot races he affected the most extravagant admiration, and to assist the expenses of this national amusement in 208 THE RIGHT or search. England, he conferred the annual gift of a gold cup, valued at five hundred guineas, forgetting that at that precise moment the lovers of the turf were a little displeased with Prince Albert, to whom they attributed some of the police restrictions recently enforced against the incidental games. A subscription ball was to take place on the 10th of June, for the benefit of the Polish refugees. Attempts were made, without suc- cess, to adjourn it. Baron de Briinnow wrote to the Duchess of Somerset, the first of the lady patronesses, to say that the Emperor viewed this act of benevo- lence with much interest, and would willingly associ- ate himself with it, should the receipts not answer the hopes of the committee. While the committee, with much difference of opinion, deliberated on the question whether they should accept the Emperor's money or tliank him for his offer, he observed with ill-suppressed humour to Horace Vernet, " They cry in my ears even here, Lo7ig live the Poles." Success, however, attended him at the court ; and in London, with the crowd, the singular circumstances of his journey, his splendid person, his lofty, open deport- ment and haughty simplicity excited curiosity without kindly feeling, bat not without admiration. Altoge- ther lie was more run after than appreciated by the English public, and he left on shrewd observers the idea of a man who drapes himself majestically in a brilliant part, the weight of which disturbs him, and wlio dreads the trial of action, although he wishes to api)ear always prepared for it. THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 209 The day after his departure, Lord Aberdeen chat- ting familiarl) with M.de Sainte Aulaire complimented him on the reception, particularly gracious in fact, with wliich the Emperor had distinguished him. " I do not accept the compliment," said the Count ; " exclusively personal civilities on the part of a sove- reign to an ambassador are actual embarrassments. The Emperor ought to have spoken to me of the King; he did not do so ; I set no value on his attentions." Eord Aberdeen then said that with Queen Victoria the Emperor Xicliolas had been equally reserved and refrained from mentioning the King's name. Once, the tenor of the conversation having introduced it, the Emperor checked himself in the midst of his speech and changed the subject abruptly. M. de Sainte .Vulaire liaving asked Lord Aberdeen whether with him the Emperor preserved the same restraint. Lord Aberdeen, while endea\ouring to soften rather than aggravate, gave the ambassador reason to believe that the sentiments of the Emperor Nicholas were always the same and that he liad manifested them freely. "lie has not," said Lord Aberdeen, "any personal ani- mosity against your king ; he acknowledges that for fourteen years Europe owes nnicli to his ability and wisdom ; but tlie principle of the government of July is revolutionary, and that principle is essentially op- posed to his sentinu^nts and policy. 1 have nothing more to reproach myself with, he added ; in I80O, I was induced to recognize the government of France, and since, 1 liave done nothing to injure it. I have not p 210 THE EIGHT OF SEARCH. given the slightest support to its enemies. I see with- out the least regret your amicable relations. Con- tinue them while you can. To tell you the truth, I do not think they will last long ; the first squall in the Chambers will sweep them away. Louis Philippe will try to resist, and if he does not feel strong enough he will place himself at the head of the movement to save his popularity." The sagacity of the Emperor Nicholas was at fault here, and he much miscalculated events and men. The trial of the worst as of the best days has shown how far the perseverance of King Louis Philippe could go, rather than sacrifice his policy to the main- tenance of his popularity. " This exclusively French subject being exhausted," M. de Sainte Aulaire wrote, " I asked Lord Aberdeen what he wished me to say to you on the political object of the Emperor's visit. — ' 1 understand your curiosity, he replied ; a voyage to England from the Chateau d'Eu, or from the Chateau d'Eu to England, may be explained as a party of pleasure ; but to arrive in eight days from the extremity of Europe to return eight days after, appears less simple ; and yet in spite of all probability, it is positive that the Emperor has neither transacted nor attempted any public business here ; the only subject on which we spoke in detail is tlie Turkish Empire. The Emperor much desires its i)rcservation and is very uneasy at its weakness. Vmt he ])r()])osed no plan and suggested no project applicable to tlie difi"erent eventualities we may anti- THE RIGHT OF SKARCII. 211 cipatc.'— I remarked, however,'' M. de Sainte Aulaire added, " in the course of our conversation, that the Emperor Xicliolas had declared that under any cir- cumstances lie wanted nothing for himself. He evinced equal confidence in the disinterestedness of Entj^land, with which country he is confident of a friendly understanding, ha])pen what may. But the embarrassments will, he thhiks, come from the side of France, who will throw herself impulsively into a question, which, the case occurring, ought to be treated with much restraint and wisdom. Lord Aber- deen sincerely believes that these generalities com- prise the full scope of the Emperor's thoughts. If he had arranged a plan, if he had come to England to propose its execution, he would assuredly have made some overtures, and lie has made none." The Emperor Nicholas in 1844 took care not to propose to L(n-d Aberdeen the plan for the conquest and ])artition of the Ottoman Empire, to the entire exclusion of France, which nine years later he some- what thoughtlessly revealed to Sir Cieorge Hamilton Seymour, and whicli cost Kussia Sebastoj^ol and the dominion of the Black S(,>;i. Ijut wluitcver may have been his confidence or re- serve, this visit of tlie Empm'or of Russia was, for the Englisli cabinet, a signal triumph of ])olicy and self- congiatulation, and Ford Al)erdeen did not dissemble his satisfaction. But far from cliilling or impeding his good dispositions towards l-'rance and her govern- ment, tliis incident encouraged and ])laced him more p ■> 212 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. at his ease. He could no longer be accused of an exclusive preference, prejudicial to the relations of England with her other allies. A short time after the departure of the Emperor Nicholas, he spoke to Count de Jarnac of the King's visit to Windsor as of a set- tled affair, which Queen Victoria mentioned to him as often as he saw her, and which gratified him as much as it did the Queen herself. The report soon spread in England, and was received in all quarters with that satisfaction, alternately silent and eager for public and formal manifestation, which forms the characteristic of English enjoyments. The Mayor of Liverpool wrote as early as the 12th of September to Lord Aberdeen, expressing a desire that King Louis Philippe would honour with a visit the second com- mercial city of the kingdom, offering to defray the entire expenses of the reception cither at his own private residence, or in the Guildliall. Being informed of this desire before he embarked for England, the King requested Lord Aberdeen to thank the Mayor on liis part, and to express at the same time his regret that he could not avail liimself of it. " I am aware," lie said, " that 1 must deny myself these gratifications ; T shall and ouglit to be exclusively the Queois guest., and I shall be too happy to devote entirely to her the little time tliat I am permitted to remain." At that moment I was myself in poor condition for travelling, having scarcely emerged from an indisposi- tion caused by the fatigues of tlie session, and which still left me suffering so much that the King, on the THE RIGHT OF SEAKCn. 213 2Tth of September, addressed me thus: — "My dear minister, no one ean take a more lively interest in your liealth than I do. You are surrounded by skilful physicians who ought to know your temperament better than any one else; but I, who am naturally bilious, have ])ersevered in the system of Tronchin, who superintended my early years, and I have found the advantage of it. Now he said ; — few remedies, diluents, and caution in the abuse of tonics. For- give me if I say too much. The interest I feel for you, and my long experience of seventy-one years, dictate my remarks ; but I know I am not a doctor, and ought to hold my tongue. What succeeds with one might be injurious to another." Although 1 felt weak, 1 determined to take my part in this visit, a brilliant evidence of the success of the policy for which 1 had so strenuously fought. On the morning of the Ttli of October, I joined the King at the Chateau d'Eu, and on the same evening we embarked at Treport, in the Gamer, a fine steam frigate, in which we expected to reacli Portsmouth the follow- ing day. 'J'his was not the only occasion on which I haw felt tlie ])ower of grand scenes of nature and imposing actions of life in suddenly reviving physical strength, and enabling the body to bear the impulsive movements of the soul. During the day the weather had been dull and rainy ; towards evening, the sun rea])peared. a bi-eeze sprang up. At half-past six, the King, the Duke de Montpensier, Admiral de Mackau, and I, entered the barge of Admiral de la Susse, 214 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. which immediately cleared the bar of Treport, and rowed towards the Gomer, at anchor in the roadstead, with two other steamers, the Caiman and Elan, in- tended for our convoy. Night had already fallen, the air was fresh, the rowers vigorous and animated ; the barge advanced rapidly ; sometimes we looked astern towards the shore, where the Queen, Madame Ade- laide, the Princesses and their suite were still stand- ing, endeavouring to follow us with their eyes across the sea, through the approaching darkness, and still continuing to wave their adieux. At other times we looked ahead towards the ships that expected us, and whence the shouts of the sailors mounted on the yards already reached our ears. As we approached the Gomer, the three vessels in the road illuminated sud- denly ; the port-holes were lighted up ; Bengal fires shone on the nettings, and their bluish flames were reflected in the slightly agitated waves. We reached the bottom of the ladder ; the King placed his foot on it ; a cry of Long live the King ! re-echoed above and around us. We ascended ; a company of ma- rines drawn up on deck presented arms ; the scattered sailors redoubled tlieir acclamations. AVe were moved and gratified. The last arrangements then took place ; every one went to his assigned post ; the fires fell, the lights disappeared, the boats were hoisted in, all resumed silence and obscurity. The anchor was raised, and when the three vessels began their voy- age, I was already in bed in my cabin, where I slept almost immediately, with a feeling of repose and TIIK RIGHT OF SExVHCII. 215 comfort to whicli I liad been a stranger for many clays. The following morning, by seven o'clock, we were in sight of Portsmouth. There was no mist; the sky was bright, the sea calm ; the rising clay showed us the three towns surrounding the harbour, Portsmouth, Portsea, and Gosport, which seemed to form one only. Eight small steamers, dispatched before our depar- ture to form lines on our route, and salute us alter- nately as we approached, had ranged behind us, and followed in our wake. Others, anchored in the road, had joined them spontaneously. As we advanced, our convoy increased ; the sea was now covered with vessels of every kind, under sail or steam, large ships, yachts, barges, and boats.so eager and numerous,thatthe Gomer was compelled to slacken her speed, to avoid running foul of tlu^m. All WQYC dressed with flags ; the French and English colours floated together ; the crews were on the yard arms or on deck ; the crowd assembled on tlie shore mixed their liuzzas with the salutes of the batteries, forts, and ships of the line. It was an immense movement and uproar in testimony of national and pacific joy. Having entered and an- cliored in the harbour, we waited, before disembark- ing, the arrival of the train by which Prince Albert was coming to (iosport to receive the King. Put the delay proved to b(> no gap. Animated by the same sentiments wliicli t]ire(> w(>eks before the Mayor of Ei\erpool liad ex})rcssed to Lord Aberdeen, the Mayor and Municipal Corporation of Portsmouth had re- 216 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. quested and obtained authority to signalize, on their own account, the arrival of the King of the French in England, by presenting him with an address. They delivered this on board the Gomer, and retired de- lighted with the answer they received, and at having thus taken part in such a meeting between two sove- reigns and two nations. This municipal manifestation of national feeling occurred four times during the King's visit; at Portsmouth, when he arrived, at Windsor, at Dover, when he re-embarked, and on the 12th of October, the Corporation of the City of Lon- don, regretting strongly that they coidd not entertain the King in London, dispatched to Windsor Castle the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, Sheriffs, Common Coun- cilmen and officers, instructed to present to him in a formal address their congratulations, homages, and good washes. It was a solemn and affecting ceremony. I wrote the same day to Paris : " I have just come from the reception of the City address by the King. His answer was admirably received. I wrote it this morning, and gave it to M. de Jarnac to translate. By the advice of Sir Pobcrt Peel and I^ord Aberdeen, it was necessary that it should be written, read, and im- mediately handed by the King to the Lord Mayor. The Queen and Prince Albert passed half an hour in the King's cabinet looking over and correcting the translation. This is a true family intimacy. Accord- ing to universal opinion here, this address, voted unanimously in the Common Council, is an unexampled and highly significant event. Sir Robert Peel says he is deeply im])ressed by it. THE KIGIIT V¥ SEARCH. 217 At the court, filled with Tories, some expressed con- siderable surprise at seeing around them and amongst tliemsehes, such marked courtesy to France, and to a King of France, sprung from a revolution. But these remnants of the passions and routines of party vanish or remain silent before the evident friendship of the Queen for King Louis Pliilippe and his family, the amicable understanding proclaimed by the Tory ca- binet, the adhesion given to this policy by the old and illustrious cliiefsof the party, tlie Duke of Wellington at their head, and the satisfaction which the Whigs could not avoid exhibiting. It was with the general approbation, Wliig and Tory, aristocratic and popular, that tlie Queen conferred on Louis Pliilippe the Order of the Ciarter ; and on the evening of the day on which the city of London presented its address, the ceremony of knightly iuAestiture took place at Windsor, b}' the hands of Queen Victoria herself, surrounded by the full splendour of her court. Lord Aberdeen ever thoughtful and just t(nvards his adversaries, took care that. l)y special fa^ oui', the cliief of the AMiig leaders. Lord John Kussell should be invited to dine at Windsor on tlie eve of the King's departure, and he engaged me to talk freely with him on the relations between the two countries, and on the right of search. This (piestion ever (){cu{)i{>(l his mind ; \w endeavoured to place it beyond party dis])ut(^s. and he had some hope that Lord John liusscU might render assistance. Lord Palmerstou, on the contrary, in the preceding session of Parliament, had tried to excite on this question a 218 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. passionate debate. He gave notice of a formal motion against any attack upon the right of search and the treaties which established it. The slight favour which his project received, even from the Whigs themselves, led to its repeated adjournment. Mr. Monckton Milnes declared that to that motion he would propose an amendment to the effect that the conventions re- lative to the right of search for the abolition of the slave trade ought to be regarded as a temporary es- say, ever open to the examination of both countries ; and on the day when Lord Palmerston proposed to develop his proposition, the House of Commons was counted out. The right of search was evidently shaken in the opinion of the Parliament and the country; but no one dared to say so openly, or to perceive as yet any other mode of action against the traffic, by which it miglit be replaced. I conversed on the subject with all the members of the cabinet who were at Windsor; with Lord Aber- deen, Sir llobert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Stanley (now Earl of Derby), and Sir James Graham. 1 held the same language to all: "It may be," I said to tliem, " that the right of search is, as they think in England, the most effectual method of repressing the trade ; but to become effectual, it must be rendered practicable. Now, in the present state of minds in France, Chambers and country, it is no longer so ; for if seriously exercised, it will infallibly lead to incidents tending to a rupture between the two countries. Ought we to sacrifice to this particular question our Till; RIGHT OF SEARCH. 219 general policy, and peace to the suppression of the trade by the ri<^ht of search ^ Therein lies the ques- tion. We believe, in France, that there arc, for the suppression of tlie traffic, other modes than the right of search, and such as in the actual position will prove more effective. Vs e shall propose them to you. AVill you refuse to examine them with us, and to adopt them, if, after examination, they really appear more effecti\e than the right of search which no longer possesses that (piality ?" Lord Aberdeen accepted fully the question thus stated, and laid it before his colleagues in the same form, with reserve, however, and subordinating the issue of the negotiation to the practical value of the new methods we should propose. It was his nature to ap})(\ir always less decided than he was in reality, and to wait patiently until time and reflection should bring round wavei"ing and refractory spirits to his opinion. Sir Kobert Peel entered into no explanation with me on the question itself. He was evidently ])erpl('\ed and mo>ed by the ojjposition wliich the abandonment of this right would encounter in Parlia- ment, and by the impression it would convey to the public. I'ut lieevinced towards me much c )nfi(lence,re- peat(Hl twice tliat on all points he and 1/n'd Aberdeen perfectly agreed, and at the end of one interview, ex- tended Iiis liand with more cordiality than 1 expect- ed, inviting my unreserved friendship. The Duke of AVellington Nisi ted m(> in my own room, and ])assed half an hour with me, listeiiinjj with the attention 220 THE BIGHT OF SE.VECH. which his deafness rendered necessary, astonished that a right, exercised for ten years with so little stir, should suddenly excite so much clamour, half disposed to consider these clamours less serious than I reported them, but admitting that the good intelligence between the two governments was of more value than the right of search, and ready to accept what his colleagues decided. Lord Stanley, after a tolerably long con- versation in a corner of the grand drawing-room, said to me in a frank and firm tone : " I promise you I will remember all you have said ; " and Sir James Graham seemed to me, of all, the most intimate with Lord xlberdeen, and the most decided to march with him at the same pace towards the same end. I left Windsor convinced that the moment had arrived for entering on the negotiation, and for following it up vigorously. On the 27th of November, I forwarded a memoir to Count de Sainte Aulaire, instructing him to com- municate it confidentially to Lord Aberdeen, — in which I pointed out the new means which appeared to me suited to replace, for the suppression of the slave traffic, the right of search. In this, I suggested that the commissioners selected by the two governments sliould meet without delay in London, either to ex- amine my suggestions, or to seek others themselves if these appeared ineligible. I announced the dispatch of this memoir to Lord Aberdeen, myself, saying; " You and we are in a false position. Entirely occu- pied with the riglit of search, we lose sight of the TIIK RIGHT OF SEA1{CH. 221 actual suppression of the trade ; we sacrifice the end to the means. The conventions of 1831 and 1833, the pledge and symbol of the union of France and Eng- land to suppress the trade, have lost almost all their practical efficacy, and ha\ e become little better than empty appearances, and official falsehoods. Is this a serious policy worthy of us ? Is it not a thousand times more convenient and useful to adopt, for the suppression of the trade, other means that we might mutually exercise with the same zeal and confidence, so tliat the union of France and England, in this great object, may become once more real and efiec- tive r' The call for special commissioners appointed to examine the question freely, and to seek new modes of common action for the two governments, con- vinced Lord Aberdeen. '• lie lias adopted this idea eagerly," M. de Saintc Aulaire wrote to me ; " his re- sponsibility will be thus relieved, and he might name such a commissioner, Lord Brougham for instance, as would be to us, a guarantee of success. " But, on the substance of the affair. Lord Aberdeen exhibited much more hesitation. *■' 1 understood at Windsor," he said to M. de Sainte Aulaire, "that M. Guizot ])r()])()S('d. not to abandon entirely the system of the treaties of 1831 and 1S3', but to try a new system with a view of returning to the old one, in case of non-success. — the treaties not ceasing thus to be in virtual existence. '' I re])lied," said M. de Sainte Aulaire, " that, for my i)art, I had not heard you say 222 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. anything to that effect, and that I considered it im- possible to satisfy our Chambers on such terms. I should not be surprised if Lord Aberdeen found it much more difficult to change the treaties of 1831 and 1833, than to let them fall into disuse by refusing to deliver to the cruisei's, warrants of search. Such a refusal, coming from us, would be, at the most, re- ferred to the crown lawyers, who, in their Judaical system of interpretation, would not fail to declare that we are within the letter of the treaties in not asking or giving more than one warrant for one cruiser. Assuredly I do not propose this expedient to you, which I could not consider either worthy or advantageous ; but how am I to receive it in case the su2:2:estion should come from Lord Aberdeen 1" Lord Aberdeen was far from entertaining any such idea, for M. de Sainte i\.ulaire, having allowed it to escape him: "That would be an insult," he said; *•' and all negotiation would become impossible. But before I add a word, I must communicate, at least officially, IM. Guizot's memoir to my colleagues, and above all must come to an understanding with Sir Robert Peel, l^erhaps it would be best, when your official communication arrives that it should merely develop your objections to the treaties of 1831 and 1833, on account of their inconvenient conditions, and their want of effect for tlie suppression of the traffic. Then, witliout entering into a detail of the nutans to be substitutcnl in place of tlie reci})r()cal right of sc^irch, you miglit indicate them vaguely, and THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 223 propose the appointment of a mixed commission to examine tliem. I think it woukl be mnch easier to obtain the adhesion of the cabinet in this way, than by callin abolition of the shive trade. My (Hspatch thoroughly satisfied Loi-d Aberdeen, wlio for- warded it iniiiiediatcly to Sir Robert Peel, and on the .']()th of Sc})teinber M. de Sainte Aulaire wrote as fol- lows: •• The I'rc iiu'rr dovs not (Hspute in princi})le the mixed cominissioii : he argu(\s even under the hypo- tlu^sis of its admission, whicli is, in fact, admitting it implicitly ; but he calls for two points : 1. the nomina- 224 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. tion of the commissioners; 2. concerted instructions. He requires that you should not name the matter in the Chambers until it is settled. Even vague words, ut- tered by you, might prepare serious difficulties. In con- clusion, he strongly urges his colleague to persevere still in great reserve." While listening to this letter, I did not feel quite at ease ; I dreaded scruples and delays ; I was most agreeably surprised by the com- mentary which followed the text. " I^ord Aberdeen, who understands better than we can the value of Sir Robert Peel's emendations, sees nothing in his letter which prevents him from advancing. He proposes therefore to send your dispatch in communication to all the members, at present dispersed, of the cabi- net, and has little doubt except as to the date more or less early at which you will receive his answer," While expecting this answer, we each selected our commissioner. Lord Aberdeen informed me that he should appoint Doctor Lushington, a member of the Privy Council and Judge of the High Court of Ad- miralty, a grave and learned man, honoured equally for his character and knowledge, and one of the most ardent enemies of the slave trade. I, in turn, in- structed M. de Sainte Aulairc to tell Lord Aberdeen that I should ask the Uuke de Broglie to undertake this delicate mission. " If M. de Broglie accepts," rc^plicd l>()rd Aberdeen, " M. Guizot must still ex- press liimself with great reserve before the Cham- bers ; l)ut he may from that day regard the success of his proposition as secured." Sir llobert Peel, in THE lUGIIT OF SEAUCir. 225 fact, when informed of this choice, wrote to Lord Aberdeen that he laid aside every objection. " If, however," lie said, " M. Guizot should leave the ministry, and if, in that case, the Duke de Broglie were to retire from the commission, the choice of his substitute might be luifiwourable, and we should have reason to regret our concession." In transmitting these details to me, M. de Sainte Aulaire added, " At Windsor, Prince Albert spoke to me equally of the good effect which the appointment of the Duke de Broglie as commissioner, would produce here. This is the first time the Prince has touched on politics with me; I found him very judicious, well informed, and most friendly to Lord Aberdeen. As to ourselves, it is impossible to be better disposed than are the Queen and Prince ; the remembrances of the King's visit to AVindsor are as lively as on the day after his departure. ' Nearly at the same moment, when M. de Sainte Aulaire gave me these assurances, I wrote to him thus: "The Duke de Broglie consents willingly to be our commissioner, on two conditions only. The first is, that you approve of it ; the second, that it must be well understood that he only undertakes tliis mission for, and with the cabinet in ofhce ; and that, in case it should retire, he retires also. I accept this new mark of his friendship without regret, for 1 feel confident he will have no occasion to put it in practice. The bureaux of the Chamber of Deputies have just named the committee on the address, and we have 226 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. eight votes against two, and eight of the most de- cided character. The debate will be animated, but success appears to me certain. The opposition has raised and taken alarm. The abstract of votes in the bureau gives us a majority of fifty-five." The debate on the address was, in fact, warm, less on the right of search than on newer questions, which offered better chances to the opposition ; amongst others, the war with Morocco, and the affairs of Otaheite. It was difficult to press the ministry strongly on the right of search at the moment when it had induced the English cabinet to accept a serious negotiation to satisfy the desire of the Chamber in demanding its abolition. Enlightened by information which reached him from London, M. Thiers himself engaged his friends not to pronounce too decidedly impossible a success which the cabinet might perhaps obtain, and which would be increased by denying it beforeliand. When I was called upon in both Cham- bers to give explanations on this point, I confined my- self to saying, " The question is very difficult in itself, and certainly, nothing has been done for three or four years to render it more easy of solution. I do not say that at present it is entirely settled ; do not be- lieve that I extend my words beyond the reality of facts : I should prefer remaining within them. If I said more to-day than actually exists, I should impede ratlier tlian advance the solution of the question. This is wliat has taken place. The English govern- ment is engaged with a national feeling with which THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 227 it must treat, as we treat with that oi' France. You know with wliat passion, what honourable passion the abolition of the slave trade is prosecuted in England. Now, it is the general opinion there that the right of search is, with this object, the most, perhaps the only effectual course. That the English government may be able to change what exists, it must first recognize, and through itself cause the Parliament to recognize, and through the Parliament the country, — that to suppress this trade there are other means than the right of search ; means as ef- fective, more effective ; for in the existing state of facts and minds, the right of search has lost much of its efficacy. The first, perhaps the greatest step to take, is to induce the English government to decide with us on these new means of repressing the trade. This step has been already made. Not to adjourn the difficulty and beguile ourselves with false appear- ances, but to undertake seriously the investigation and settlement of the question. And the names of the persons who co- operate in this act will furnish the best proof of tlie serious considerati(m that the two governments bring to the incpiiry. It is said tliat we pursue an impossible end. I firmly hope that those wlio say so are mistaken, and that two great govern- ments, filbnl with reci])rocal {\steem, and firndy re- solved to persevere in the great work they have com- menced in common, will, under any circumstances, succeed in its accomjdishment.'' Before the cpiestion thus laid down, all the amend- Q 2 228 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. ments moved against the cabinet in the Chamber of Deputies were rejected, and the Chamber of Peers, breaking the silence it had hitherto preserved, inserted this paragraph in its address: "Your Majesty assures us that the relations between France and England have not been altered by discussions which might have compromised them. We congratulate ourselves on this with you, Sire, well convinced that your Majesty's government perseveres in its efforts to smooth, in a manner conformable with the dignity and interests of France, the difficulties which might menace the peace of the future. A good accord between the two states is important to the repose of the world ; the interests of civilization and humanity are engaged in it ; the high degree of prosperity which two great peoples enjoy, and which have equal rights to reci- procal esteem, depends on it. May a mutual spirit of equity preside over their relations and hasten the success of the negotiation, which, while guaranteeing the repression of an odious traffic, must tend to the re- placement of our commerce under the exclusive pro- tection of the national flag !" Far from causing any embarrassment by this language, it was a support which the Chamber of Peers thus afforded to us. Having arrived in London on the 15th of March, the Duke de Broglie was received by the court, the cabinet, and in general society, with distinguished favour. On the day next but one after, the Queen asked him to dinner. Lord Aberdeen and M. de Sainte Aulaire were the only guests invited to meet him. THE RIGHT OF SKAHCH. 229 " Xotwithstaiuling tlie Holy Week," the Queen said, "I did not wish to delay your reception." She spoke miicli to liim of the King and the royal family, and slightly alluded to the affair which had brought him to England, merely observing, " It will be very diffi- cult." The evening before, he had passed an hour with Lord Aberdeen. '• He anticipated," he wrote to nie, •' our propositions, entering successively on all tlie general points of the matter ; the appointment of a new squadron better adapted to the service of the suppression of the traffic and the pursuit of the slave shii)S, the destruction of the slave markets, the diffi- culty and dangers of the undertaking, and the possi- bility of a future association of the Americans in the new system. Finding him so well informed on the subject, I did not decline conversation, but restricted myself to general terms, and professed the greatest doubt on the result of all these speculations until based on the accordance and approbation of profes- sional men. I therefore suggested that, above all, we sliould h( ar the commandants on the French and Fiiiglisli stations on tlu* coast of Africa, which was eagerly admitted. 1 added only, tliat T was autho- rized to say my government would not shrink from any expens(> wliich miglit be considered necessary to effect th(> ol)ject we liave in \'wv>-. Lord Aberdeen n^turned to the charge on several of the })oints he had touched U])on, and, as far as 1 suffered myself to go, we entenul into tlie substance of the discussicm. If I had to deal with him only, [)erliaps 1 might have 230 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. yielded to his desire of knowing and saying every- thing ; but as it is Dr. Lushington who must be con- vinced first of all, I entrenched myself behind a dis- trust of our own ideas, giving him at the same time to understand that we are perhaps prepared to answer the objections he foresees. In short, we parted in a perfectly good understanding." Amongst the mem- bers of the English cabinet, Sir James Graham and Lord Haddington were particularly well disposed. " I wish you," said the latter to the Duke de Broglie, " all possible success in your enterprise, and I place my entire department — the Admiralty — at your disposal." Sir Robert Peel was absent ; but, on his return he gave his opinion more frankly than was expected, and formally approved of the substitution of an increased number of cruisers of the two nations, in place of re- ciprocal right of search. The Whig leaders, nearly all friends of the Duke de Broglie, received him M'ith their former sentiments, but with much reserve, and were silent on the object of his mission. " They are much divided," he wrote to me, on this point : " the reasonable section considers itself beaten, or even wishes that we should succeed ; liOrd Clarendon said this to me yesterday. Lord Palmerston stands alone in attaching great importance to the treaties of 1831 and 1833 ; but when he speaks, he imposes his opinion on many persons otherwise well disposed." A cir- cumstance occurred, calculated to act upon the Whig party. The Anti-Slavery Association^ composed of the warmest and most approved saints, transmitted a me- THE RIGHT OF SKAUCH. 231 morial to the Duke de Broglie, which the year before had been presented to Sir Kobert Peel. " This me- morial," he wrote to me, " lays down through a long series of quotations and arguments that the right of searcli is utterly useless ; that the only way to extin- guish the traffic, is to abolish shiNcry, and concludes tliat France ought to be answered thus : — Put an end to slavery, and there will no longer be a question of the right of searcli. If you require, to effect this, five, ten, or fifteen years, take them ; the right of search will last as long as slavery does, and will end with it. — The conclusion is absurd, but the argument against the right of search has its value, and I shall use it in the discussion. Lord Prougham has under- taken to speak to the committee of the Association against the conclusions in the memorial, and to send the members to me, one by one, that I also may reason with them to the best of my ability." liOrd Prougham seconded us with indefatigable zeal ; and appearances looked so favourable that the Duke de Proglie did not think he went too far in saying to Lord Aberdeen, '• 1 hope, my Lord, it will ha])pen to you on this oc- casion, as on many others, to reply to your adversa- ries, as tlie Lacedemonian said to the Athenian, W/iat fliou ,sj)f'((^e,sf, I do. It is you wlio will definitively abolisli the traffic in negroes." And Lord Aberdeen (lid not refuse the compliment. Hut, wlietiier in liope or fear, we ought not, in public affairs to trust too much to favourable ap- pearances and easy beginnings. While evincing his 232 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. friendly disposition, Lord Aberdeen, as soon as the questions were closely pressed, retreated behind Dr. Lushington. "I give him no instructions," he said to the Duke de Broglie : " I leave to him the care of finding expedients, and I shall accept all he agrees to with confidence." The first time that the Duke de Broglie met Lord Aberdeen and Dr. Lushington to- gether, he found the minister more reseiTed in pre- sence of the commissioner than he had been when they were tete-a-tete. It was therefore Dr. Lushing- ton above all who was to be persuaded and decided. It was admitted on all hands that he was a man of perfect integrity, honourable and scientific, devoted to just causes, open to sound reasoning, but somewhat opinionative and punctilious, pre-occupied with his own judgment and personal success. The Duke de Broglie, whose pride is absolutely divested of self-love and of all inclination for display, abstained from bring- ing on the controversy abruptly, evinced a stronger desire to hear Dr. Lushington's ideas than to expose his own, and sought, in the first instance, to establish with him a confiding intimacy. This he was enabled to cfiect without affectation or loss of time. The ne- gotiation commenced by a long inquiry into the cir- cumstances of tlie traffic on the coasts of Africa, and on tlie means of suppressing it, otherwise than by the riglit of search. Six naval officers, three French and three English, were heard in succession. Dr. Lush- ington had ])reviously expressed great confidence in Captain 'J'rotter ; and the Duke de Broglie found in THE UlflllT OF SEARCJI. 233 Captain Bouct-Willaiimcz, now a vice-admiral and ma- ritime prefect at Toulon, a sailor of equal genius and experience, full of ardour, of invention and ready re- source, and remarkable for his tact in living on good terms with the English officers, even when a little too eager to forestall at the risk of eclipsing them. His deposition agreed entirely with that of the English Ca})tain Denman, a distinguished officer, who, like himself, had long commanded on the Western coast of Africa. After a week entirely devoted to this in- vestigation, the Duke de Broglie and Dr. Lushington entered into conference on their mutual views and plans. That wliich the Duke communicated to Dr. Lush- ington, as in conformity with the instructions of his government and liis personal conviction after a miunte study of the facts, was simple and sliort. It consisted in declaring, at first, the impossibility of maintaining " under any form and within any possible limits " the right of reciprocal search establislied by the conven- tions of 1881 and 1833, and in substituting in their ])lace ; 1. On tlie Western coast of Africa, the princi- j)al tlieatre of the traffic, two squadrons, Frencli and English, each composed of a considerable and fixed number of cruistM-s, steamers and sailing vessels, with orders to pursu(\ each under its own flag, all ships sus- ])e(t('(l of being engagcMl in the slave trade : 2. Treaties concluded with the native chiefs on those parts of the coast at which the slave markets were usually held, to obtain from them engagements to interdict the 234 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. trade within their territories, with authority to inter- fere on land and by force, should occasion require, to compel respect for their interdiction, and to destroy the harracoons^ or places and instruments of traffic. Dr. Lushington's plan was longer and more com- plicated. It contained two clauses unacceptable by us : — 1. Instead of abolishing the conventions of 1831 and 1833, it confined itself to their suspension for five years, to replacing them by the new system proposed for the suppression of the trade, and to declaring that at the expiration of five years they should resume vigour i'pso facto ^ unless expressly abrogated by consent of the two governments ; 2. It established in principle, and in the name of the law of nations, the doctrine supported by the English government in its relations with the United States of America, upon the right of verifying the nationality of the ships suspected of hoisting a flag, not their own, for the concealment of acts essentially illegitimate. This maintained indi- rectly and under a general denomination, the right of search specially instituted against the traffic. On the first point, the question was simple, and from the opening of the negotiation our object had been positively determined. On the second, a serious objection presented itself It was impossible to esta- blish, in principle, that, to escape all examination, it would be sufficient for a vessel engaged in an act essentially illegitimate, piracy, or slave traffic, to hoist a flag not its own ; neither could it be formally recognized tluit men-of-war should be privilegt^d, in THE IJIGHT OF SEx\.RCU. 235 time of peace, to stop and search merchant ships under pretext of verifying their nationality. As soon as the Duke de Broglie informed me precisely of the difficulty, I replied : " I much fear that it ■will be impossible to make the mass of our public here comprehend tlie difference between a search for the sup})ression of the trade, and a visit to verify na- tionality. And even when we have made it clear to them, it will suffice for the Americans to reject, on principle, the second visit as well as the first, to bring it into equal disrepute with us. Unless I deceive myself greatly, if our negotiation leads to no other result than the substitution of one search for another, instead of producing any good effect, it A\dll rather aggravate the position." A long and subtle controversy ensued on this point between the Duke de Broglie, Dr. Lushington, and Lord Aberdeen. I am wrong in saying controversy, for there was, on both sides, so much good faith and sound sense that they had tlie air of seeking truth and justice toge- ther, rather than that of each maintaining his own interest and opinion. Long practice in business, and experience of tlie artificial egotisms mixed up with it. leave on the minds of upright men a natural dis- position to mistrust and suspicious precautions; but when they meet and mutually recognize each other, they joyfully emerge from that depressing routine, and gratify themselves in surmounting, by frankness and rectitude of mind, the difficulties which spring up in their way. Tiiis happened on the present 236 TEE EIGHT OF SEARCH. occasion with the three negotiators. After a month of research and conversation, equally sincere on the part of all, they agreed in the articles which, while taking into account every situation, solved equitably, and in the main point according to our desire, the two embarrassing questions. With regard to the conven- tions of 1831 and 1833, it was stipulated that they should be suspended for ten years, the term assigned to the duration of the new treaty, and that at the end of that period, they should be looked upon as defi- nitively abrogated, unless, by common accord, they were restored to vigour. On the right of verifying the nationality of vessels, no general and absolute maxim was established ; but it was agreed " that in- structions founded on the principles of the right of nations and the habitual practice of maritime coun- tries should be addressed to the commandants of the French and English squadrons and stations on the coast of Africa, and that the two governments should communicate to each other their respective instruc- tions, the text of which would be annexed to the now convention." Thus drawn up, the treaty was signed on the 29th of May, 1845, and the right of search abolished. Towards the close of the negotiation I had suf- fered from hepatic and nephritic attacks which com- pelled me, for a month, to almost absolute repose. When I returned to business, we presented a bill to the Chamber of Deputies, asking for an extraor- dinary credit of 9,760,000 francs to meet the expenses TIIK UIGIIT OF SEARCH. 237 which, in the naval department, the execution of the new treaty woukl entail. The debate on the bill opened on the 27th of June, and no one asking to be heard, we expected to carry it without objection. Nevertheless, Messieurs Denis, Mauguin, and Dupin broke the general silence, and made some remarks on the right of verifying the nationality of vessels, to which I liastened to reply. The Chamber would hear no more, and tlie bill was carried by 243 voices against 1. The greater part of the members of the opposition, not wishing either to approve or condemn, abstained from voting. The debate was equally short in the Chamber of Peers. Tlie Duke de Broglie ended it by a few explanations, and 103 votes against 8 adopted the bill, which was promulgated on the 19th of July, 1845. The year following, in the ses- sion of 1846, the two Chambers expressed, in the clearest manner, their approbation of the new treaty and of the negotiation which had effected it. The ad- dress in the Chamber of Peers ran thus : " A conven- tion recently concluded between France and England, with the object of putting an end to an odious traffic, replaces our commerce under the protection and superintendence of our own flag. We loudly a])plau(l the success of a negotiation skilfully con- ducted and pr()m])tly terminated. The execution of the treaty, entrusted to the loyal co-operation of the navy of the two states, assures us that the right and dignity of both nations will be equally respected, and tliat effectual repression will henceforth reach Zdb THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. every violation of the sacred laws of humanity." The Chamber of Deputies was not less explicit : — "The repeated testimonies of the friendship which unites you to the Queen of Great Britain," it said to the King in its address, " and the mutual confidence of both governments have happily secured amicable relations between the two States. Your Majesty an- nounces to us that the convention recently concluded, to put an end to an infamous traffic, is at this moment in the act of execution. This realizes the desire constantly expressed by the Chamber. The laws of humanity will be effectually protected, and our com- merce replaced under the exclusive superintendence of our own flag." In both Chambers, however, the opposition broke from the silence it had preserved the preceding year. The treaty of the 29th of May, 1845, was criticized. In the Chamber of Deputies Messieurs Dupin and Billault proposed amendments to expunge from the address the approbation be- stowed on it ; but, after the debate, M. Dupin with- drew his, and M. Billault's was rejected. The Chamber retained fully its testimony of satisfaction and adhesion to the cabinet. I know no affair in which the salutary efficacy of free government, discreetly and honestly exercised, demonstrated itself more powerfully than in this. Tlie question of the right of search was not natu- rally raised by the facts ; in its application to the suppression of the trade, this right had not given ri§e to alarms sufficiently grave and numerous to strike a THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. 239 blow against the safety of legitimate commerce and the liberty of the seas. The conventions of 1831 and 1833, in virtue of which it was exercised, had been as loyally executed as conceived. Their effect had not exceeded their object. They had only acted, in reality, against the trade, and had they been accepted and prac- tised by all the maritime powers, they would probably have furnished the surest method of repressing that detestable traffic. But after the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, and the check of France in the Egyptian question, these conventions and that of the 20th of December, 1841, which merely formed their comple- ment, became, suddenly, in France, a subject of alarm and national anger. The opposition seized this sen- timent to work upon ; but it was general and sincere, and the conservatives were not less ardent than their adversaries in their manifestation. Immediately two serious dangers sprang up. Abroad, good relations, even peace, between France and England,— at home, the general policy of the French government, — were compromised. In England, also, the naticmal sentiment was wounded, and might have rendered all settlement impossible. In France, the union of the majority of tlie opposition, on this question, miglit have led to the fall of the cabinet. Nothing of this occurred. In both countries, facts ended by being considered in their true light, and reduced to their just value. In Eng- land, they arrived nt an understanding tliat the conven- tions of 1831, 1833, and 1841, were not worth the rupture of friendly relations with France, and that 240 THE RIGHT OF SEARCH. the trade might be suppressed by other means than the right of search. In France, the conservative party refused to be hurried beyond its general policy, be- cause it found itself on a special point in agreement with the opposition. In both countries, free discus- sion and time came in aid of judicious diplomacy, and the national feeling was satisfied without sacrificing the public interest. 241 CIIAPTEU IV. VAEIOUS FOEEIGN AFFAIRS. (1810—1812.) STATE OF STRIA AFTER THE EXPULSION OF MEREMET ALT. — WAR BETWEEN THE DRUSES AND MARONITES. — -POWERLESSNESS AND CONNIVANCE OF THE TURKISH AUTHORITIES. — MV STEPS IN FAVOUR OF THE MARON- ITE CHRISTIANS. — DISPOSITIONS OF PRINCE METTERNICH; — OF LORD ABERDEEN. — HAUON DE liOURQUENEY AND SIR STRATFORD CANNING AT CONSTANTINOPLE. — OBSTINATE RESISTANCE OF THE PORTE TO OUB DEMANDS FOR THE CHRISTIANS. — SARIM EFFENDI. — PLAN OF PRINCE METTERNICH FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THELIHANUS. — AVE ADOPT IT, IN THE ABSENCE OF A BETTER. — THE PORTE ENDS BY YIELDING. MY OPINION ON THE TURKS AND THEIR FUTURE. — STATE OF GREECE IN 1811. — MISSION OF M. PISCATORY TO GREECE ; ITS OBJECT. — WHAT I CONVEY ON THIS SUBJECT TO LORD ABERDEEN. — HE GIVES ANALOGOUS INSTRUCTIONS TO SIR E. LYONS. — OUR ANXIETY' AND AT- TITUDE TOWARDS THE BEY OF TUNIS. — SUSPICIONS OF THE ENGLISH CABINET ON THIS SUBJECT. — MV INSTRUCTIONS TO PRINCE DE JOIN- VILLK. MISSION OF M. PLICHOX. — Al KAIUS OK ALGERIA. — SITUATION OK THE KOKEUiN CONSULS IN A LG EUI A. ^VIENVS ON THE FUTURE OF FKANCK IN AFRICA. FAfTOKIKS KSTAIil.IS H KD ON TH E WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA. — THE EASTERN COAST OF AFRICA AND MADAGASCAR. — POS- SESSION TAKEN OF THE ISLES OF MAYOTTA AND NOSUIE. — TREATY WITH THE IMAN OF MUSCAT. QUESTION OF THE CUSTOM HOUSE UNION BETWKEN FRANCE AND BELGIUM. — N E(iOTI ATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. — MV OPINION ON THE iJlKSTloN. — THK t'oMMERCIAL TREATY OF THE I'VlH OK Jt LV, lSl:i, AM) THE I.ItH OK DECEMBER, 181-5, WITH BELGIUM. — AKKAIRS OF SPAIN. — RIVALRY AND OBSTINATE SUSPICION OF ENGLAND TOWARDS FRANCE IN .SPAIN. — l^UEEN CHRISTINA IN PARIS. — REGENCY OF ESPARTERO.- INSURRECTION AND DEFEAT OF K 242 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSiO-lS42.) THE CHRISTINOS. — OTJE GENERAL POLICY IN SPAIN. — M. DE SALVANDY IS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR IN SPAIN. — RECEPTION GIVEN TO HIM ON HIS JOURNEY. — QUESTION QF THE PRESENTATION OF HIS CRE- DENTIALS. — ESPARTEEO REFUSES TO ALLOW HIM TO PRESENT THEM TO THE QUEEN ISABELLA. — ATTITUDE OF MR. ASTON, THE ENGLISH MINISTER AT MADRID. — M. DE SALVANDY RETURNS TO FRANCE. — IN- STRUCTIONS FROM LORD ABERDEEN TO ME. ASTON. — INCIDENT BE- TWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA. — COUNT DE PAHLEN QUITS PARIS ON LEAVE. — FROM WHAT MOTIVE. — MY INSTRUCTIONS TO M. CASIMIE PERIER, FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN RUSSIA. ANGER OF THE EM- PEROR NICHOLAS. — VAIN ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION. — PERSEVE- RANCE OF KING LOUIS PHILIPPE. — THE AMBASSADORS OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA DO NOT RETURN TO THEIR POSTS, AND ARE REPLACED BY CHARGES D'AFFAIRES. Absolute governments, whether absolute in the name of a revolution or a dictatorship, are inclined and al- most condemned to practise a foreign policy full of arbitrary resolutions and enterprises, unexpected, and excited by their own will, not by the natural course of facts and necessity. They require to occupy the imagination of their millions abroad, to distract them from what is withheld at home, and then give them the chances of adventures and wars in exchange for the rights which they refuse to liberty. Free govern- ments do not resort to such means. Their mission is to conduct well the natural affairs of peoples, and the spontaneous activity of national life relieves them from the necessity of seeking foctitious and unwholesome gratifications for idle spirits. After the crisis of 1840 and when the cabinet of the 29th of October had established itself, we found abundance" of business on liand, .and took care not to excite new questions, gratuitously. Natural affairs VAKIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lS10-18t2.) 243 and questions sprang up before us in all quarters. To accept them ■without hesitation when they presented themselves, to conduct and solve them in accordance with the particular interest of France and our own general policy, and to obtain by constant discussion, the adhesion of the Cliambers and the country to our resolutions and acts ;— in those points our whole am- bition was comprised ; and this constitutes the only legitimate, and in my judgment, the most exalted am- bition wliich men called to the honour of government can conceive. I do not undertake to repeat here in detail, as I have done in the affairs of the East and the right of search, all the questions and negotiations with which I had then to occupy myself: some only belong to history ; for the rest, I merely propose to mark their date and place, and to indicate, with ex- actness, the character of the presiding policy. It is with events as with men ; the greater number are destined to oblivion, even after making much stir in their time. The Egyptian question had scarcely terminated, when tliat of Syria rose up. No longer tlie question of deciding who should govern Syri;i, but the much more difficult one of how Sjria sliould be governed, ^lehemet Ali oppressed and drained that country, but to a c(Mtain extent witli impartiality and order. Anarchy and fanaticism returned there with tlie go- vernment of tlie Sultan. Civil war recommenced, in the libanus, between the Druses and Maronites ; an old war of race, religion, influence and pillage. Far R 2 244 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l8iO-1842.) from repressing it, the Turkish authorities, scarcely re-established and at once malevolent and powerless, alternately fomented it secretly, and looked on with cynical indifference. Rumours soon spread over Eu- rope of the devastations and massacres to which the Libanus was in prey. Reports, declarations, accusa- tions and petitions from Constantinople and Beyrout, reached us by every courier ; the Maronite Christians invoked our treaties and traditions, our common faith, and the name of France. I did not wait, before act- ing, until their cries and entreaties resounded in our Chambers, It would have been a great mistake to have wished to act alone. In all times, the rivalries of the European powers had been, in Syria, an addi- tional excitement for local disputes, and a source of mutual helplessness ; and in a greater degree even after what had recently passed and was yet passing in the East, we should have been suspected and speedily baffled by our rivals still coalesced against us. To act effectually, it was necessary to move Europe, b} taking ourselves the initiative of the movement. On the 13th of December, 1841, I wrote to Count de Flahault: " I send you a copy of the last reports from our con- sul at Beyrout. I beg you to make use of them, in calling the serious attention of Prince Metternich to the present condition of Syria, and particularly of the mountain districts. Europe cannot remain an indif- ferent and passive spectator of the massacre of Christian l){)pidation8 abandoned to the fury of their enemies by the apathy and perhaps the detestable policy of the VAKIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSiO-1842.) 245 Turkish authorities. M. de Metternich will think, without doubt, that such a state of things, if suffered to be prolonged, would produce on the public mind an impression which sooner or later might engender seri- ous complications and dangers for the general peace. In the interest of that peace and also on the ground of humanity, M. de Metternich will acknowledge the urgency of pressing and energetic steps at Constanti- nople, that tlie Porte, solemnly warned, may prevent, by vigorous and effective interposition, such fatal con- sequences. I intend sending instructions to M. de Bourqueney conceived in the sense of these considera- tions, and I have already directed M. de Sainte Aulaire to communicate them to Lord Aberdeen. I shall also write to Berlin and St. Petersburgh." M. de Flahault replied on the 20th of December : " I have read your dispatch to Prince Metternich re- lative to the troubles which still desolate and stain Syria with blood. I added that you felt convinced he would feel the pressing necessity of enforcing ad- vice at Constantinople in the interests of peace and humanity. ' You may rely on it,' he replied ; ' M. de Stiirmer has received orders to that effect : but 1 shall repeat them, and direct him to act in conjunction with } our agent. M. Guizot's reflections on the fatal effects which the conduct of tlie Turkish authorities may pr()(lu((>, are ])erfectly just, and on this point I parti- cipate in all his ideas. The authorities must be closely watched and denoiuiced at Constantinople as often as they neglect their duty. With this object I have de- 246 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) cided to send a consul-general to Damascus, which is the true central point, to observe what passes. He has orders to transmit to Constantinople all legitimate complaints which may be preferred against the agents of the Porte. You and we are, in quality of co-reli- gionists, the natural protectors of all the Latin Chris- tians established in the East, and we can only have one and the same end, namely, to protect them from every kind of persecution and oppression. There is only one point which could offer a difficulty, or .which, at least, some persons might consider as a possible source of jealousy between us ; — the exercise of your old right of protection. In my eyes, this cannot be, for reason that we never dispute an acquired right. As we are essentially conservative, a right acquired, is, with us, a right w^hich must and ought to be re- spected. The King of the French holds this by treaties, usage and tradition. Be assured that we shall not contest this with you. We know perfectly that all disputes on this subject could only profit a third party, and would be injurious to those we desire to protect. We must not introduce politics where there sliould be no question exce})t that of humanity and religion." The Emperor Nicholas was less rational than Prince Metternich. ]M. de Barante wrote thus from St. Pe- tersburgh : " The dispositions relative to the Chris- tians of the East, and to the guarantees that may be given to them, are not luifavourable. I should think, however, tliat the best course would be to effect a previous accord with the other powers, well assured, VAKIOUS FOKEIGN AFFAIRS. (lSiO-1842.) 247 ill that caso, of obtaining without difficulty the subse- quent consent of Ilussia. In addressing ourselves directly here, we should be met by indecision, slow- ness, dilatory answers, and an inclination to rely on any opinion opposite to ours." M. de Sainte Aulaire found T.,ord Aberdeen some- what embarrassed : " I asked him whether he would not write to Constantinople on the subject of the events in Syria. lie objected at first that the too frequent intervention of the powers in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire might tend to evil consequences. ' We cannot hope,' he said, ' that the Turkish government sliould ever be legal or pater- nal. A\'e should vainly endeavour to lead it to exact ideas of order and justice. The powers who assume this task and act too vigorously in its accomplish- ment, will compromise themselves uselessly, and per- haps not without risking their reciprocal good intel- ligence.' In these words I recognized a policy, not Lord Aberdeen's, but to which, they say, he is dis- posed to make great concessions. I answered that, if he feared the too active intervention of the European ])owers in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the only metliod of preventing that was to put a prompt end to horrors, tlie ])rolonge(l spectacle of which would assuredly excite public opinion in all civilized coun- tries. Lord Aberdeen readily returned to more ge- nerous inspirations. He agreed with me in detesting the Turkisli Macliiavelism which he believes to be aware of tlie events in Syria. He assured me that 248 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) his letters to Constantinople explicitly urged the ne- cessity of sending disciplined troops to Syria, and of placing them under the command of men determined to re-establish order. He accuses the apathy or base- ness of some pachas, and positively demands the dis- missal of the Pacha of Damascus, who has assisted the Druses in their attack upon the Christians : ' the Druses are nevertheless the English party,' he added; 'judge after this step of the importance I attach to these miserable questions of local contention.' " I felt no inquietude on the first hesitations of Lord Aberdeen; I was sure that they would yield to his sense of justice and the interests of sound general policy. He sent, moreover, an ambassador to Con- stantinople, Sir Stratford Canning, an envoy very friendly to the Ottoman Empire, but at the same time fully alive to moral considerations and the rights of humanity, and capable of restraining the Turks with the same energy he employed in their support. At the same moment I appointed Baron de Bourque- ney the King's minister at Constantinople ; I knew him to be faithful and able in the prudent execu- tion of his instructions, and I felt confident that he would agree with Sir Stratford Canning, who was said to be somcwlmt haughty and suspicious. I re- solved to urge on ^igorously our action with the Porte in favour of the Christians of Syria, and to exercise all the riglits of the traditional French pro- tectorate, while calling to tlieir aid the European concert wliich could scarcelv be refused to us. VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lS40-lSi-2.) 249 The Porte resisted our remonstrances with a degree of obstinacy and artifice which seemed to challenge the employment of our whole force. The tumults and massacres in Syria embarrassed it in its relations with Christian Europe, but, in reality, were not un- welcome. What the Porte desired was to re-establish in 8\ria, no matter at what price, the Turkish autho- rity, the government of Turkish pachas. The popu- lations who were exterminating each other in the Libanus were the ancient and natural adversaries of that authority ; it expected to control them by their discords, and to raise itself on their ruins. The Sul- tan's ministers began by disputing the fact we pointed out to them. When our remonstrances became too urgent, tliey sent, one after another, extraordinary commissioners to Syria, instructed, as they said, to verify them and stop the anarchy. The anarchy went on ; they promised us that the Turkish agents against W'hom complaints were made should be recalled, and, meanwhile, they declared for ever deposed from the government of the Libanus. the family of the Cheabs, an indigenous and Christian race, in\ested for more than a century with traditional power in those moun- tains. Baron d(^ Boun^ueney sent the dragoman of France, M. Cor, to complain of this forfeiture, and to apprise the minister for foreign affairs of the impres- sion it would produce in Europe. " Talk not to me of Euro[)e." replied Sarim Effendi ; " we are tired of it. If we are not statesmen such as there are in Euro])e, wc^ are not madmen. The Ottoman Empire 250 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ( 1840-1842.) is a house which the proprietor desires to keep quiet at home ; it is his interest that his neighbours should have no cause to complain of him. If he were mad or drunk, or acted so as to kindle a fire which threatened the neighbourhood, then indeed it would be necessary to call his household to order ; but until then, is it not exorbitant to ask me whether the Porte is or is not exercising a right 1 Sir Stratford Canning recently questioned me on what had happened ; 1 gave explanations which apparently satisfied him, for he has said nothing more in reply." Sir Stratford Canning, not in the least satisfied, united strenuously with Baron de Bourqueney ; the other ministers fol- lowed his example ; even the Eussian envoy, M. Titow, though hesitatingly and with qualification. The grand vizier, Mehemet Izzet Pacha, to whom they equally preferred their complaint, was more circumspect than Sarim Effendi, but not more efficacious. Fresh com- missioners w^^re disj^atched to Syria ; but they were always Turks, instructed, in reality, to dissipate the ancient privileges of the Christian population, and to maintain solely the Turkish power. The men changed, but the facts continued the same. Prince Metternich, fertile in expedients, suggested a new idea. He proposed, if the Porte refused absolutely to re-establish in the Libanus the old Cliristian administration personified in the family of the Cheabs, that at least the Turkisli pacha should be witlidrawn, and that the two populations, Maro- nite and Druse, sliould each be ruled by a chief of VAIROUS FORKIGN AFFAIRS. (lS10-lS12.) 251 its own race and religion, both subject to the Go- vernor-General of Syria. After long negotiations and repeated conferences, the Porte also rejected this idea, and offered to place the Maronites and Druses under the authority of two Caimacans, each distinct from and independent of the other, but both Mo- hammedans. The European plenipotentiaries una- nimously refused this proposition and persisted in their own. Fresh instructions from their courts approved their persistence. New disorders burst fortli in the Libanus. The Porte began to be alarmed. " If Europe neither divides nor grows weary," ^1. de 13our(pieney w^'ote, " everything in- duces me to believe tliat we shall carry the last and only point in dispute." From Berlin, Count Bresson apprised me that Sir Stratford Canning, tired of the Turkish subterfuges, had urged his government to the prompt employment of coercive means on the coasts of Syria. Lord Aberdeen still waited ; but on the 24th of November, 1842, C()n^■ersing with M. de Sainte Aulair(% he said: " M. de Neumann has just sliown me a letter in whicli Prince ^letternich lays down in princi})le tliat we can only act by coun- cil in tlie afiairs of Syria. This would be an ex- tremely false and dangerous idea to give to the Porte. England will not confine h(>rs(>lf indefinitely to councils. Sh{> has waited long enough already, per- liaj)s too long, in an affair in which her word, and conse(piently her honour, is engaged towards the Christian pc^oph^ of Syrie. I have explained myself 252 VAKIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l8i0-1842.) clearly on this point with M. de Briinnow ; ' Pay at- tention to this,' I said to him ; ' France and England had lately men-of-war on the coasts of Syria, whose presence gave efficacy to their demands with the divan; those men-of-war have been removed with great prudence ; but they could readily return, for France undoubtedly is not more indifferent than England to the fate of the Christians of Syria.' " Informed of these words, I wrote immediately to M. de Sainte Aulaire : " This disposition on the part of Lord Aberdeen is excellent ; cultivate it without pressing the result. After the treaty of the 15th of July and the events of 1840, it would be, you must admit, an amusing spectacle to see the French and English fleets acting in concert on the coasts of Syria to intimidate the Turks for the advantage of the mountaineers of the Libanus. There is a great mixture of comedy in the tragedy of this world. I have communicated your conversation to M. de Bour- queney. I think Lord Aberdeen must have written in the same sense to Sir Stratford Canning." Thus stimulated by their governments, the five re- presentatives of the great European powers at Con- stantinople resolved to take a fresh step with the Porte, and to demand a conference with Sarim Ef- fendi, in which they strongly insisted on the adoption of the plan they had proposed. Apprised by Baron de Briinnow of the menacing disposition of Lord Aberdeen, the new minister of lliissia at Constanti- nople, M. do Boutineff, evinced as much eagerness as VAKIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSlO-lS42.) 253 his colleagues, and the conference was officially re- quired. Having suddenly decided on yielding, the Porte was anxious to spare itself at least the discus- sion, and instead of fixing a day for an interview, Sarim EfFendi, on the 7tli of December, 1842, ad- dressed a dispatch to the five plenipotentiaries, to the following purport : " The Ottoman ministry feels the most lively regret at seeing that the point of this question has given rise to so many conferences and debates for an entire year, and that desjiite the good administration it has been enabled to re-establish in the mountain, and the convincing proofs it has in its power to produce in support of this assertion, the high powers have never changed their views on this su))ject. The Sublime Porte, moved nevertheless by the sentiments of respect it has never ceased for an instant to entertain for the five great powers, its dearest friends and allies, has preferred, in order to settle a question so delicate, and which is at the same time a domestic affair, to conform to their wishes rather than to oppose them by a refusal. ... If the re-establishment of good order in the mountain can be attained by the aid of the system proposed, the wish of the Sublime Porte will be accomplished, and its gratitude secured. But if, as there is reason to apprehend, from information successively received up to tliis date, tranquillity could not tliereby be re- stored in Syria, in that case the justice of the objec- tions hitherto made by the Porte would be evidently recognized, and his llighness's government would 254 VARIOUS rOEEIGN AFFAIES. (l840-1842.) find itself, by the avowal of the whole world, to have been in the right." On receiving news of this concession, I wrote im- mediately to Baron de Bourqueney ; " The King's go- vernment cannot but approve of the act whereby the Porte, deferring to the representations of its allies, has formally adopted the system of indigenous admi- nistration for the mountain of Libanus, and has de- creed the appointment of a Christian chief for the Ma- ronites, and of a Druse for the Druses. Such a reso- lution is conformable, in principle, with the object the great powers had in view, and I gladly acknow- ledge the active part which the influence of your counsels and proceedings have a just title to claim in the result. However, I do not conceal from myself what this measure of the Porte comprehends of in- complete and precarious, especially by the exclusion of the Cheab family from the government of the moun- tain, contrary to the rights it derives from the past, and perhaps also in opposition to the desire of the inhabitants, I have therefore remarked with satis- faction, that, while judging that it would be, at least, inopportune to mix up a question of individual names with the leading object, you have avoided, in reply to the communication of Sarim Efiendi, the appearance of accepting such a conclusion. But what the deci- sion of the Porte leaves to be desired under certain bearings, only demonstrates more strongly the neces- sity of securing the results obtained, and of taking care that they are carried out loyally and in a spirit VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lS40-lS4S?.) 255 of durability. To this you must apply your utmost attention. It is idle for the Porte to attempt to re- pudiate, on its own account, the disorders which may still disturb the tranquillity of the Libanus, and to throw this back beforehand on the cabinets to whose counsels it has yielded. Europe would not follow it on such ground, for Europe expects that the Porte will now realize in good fiiith, seriously, and without reseiTcd intentions, what it has consented to adopt in principle, in the interest of its own repose. We were only too well justified in taking precau- tions beforehand against the ill-dissembled obstinacy of the Porte. vScarcely had the new system adopted for the libanus begun to be put in execution, when tlie European plenipotentaries at Constantinople as- certained that one of the principal districts of that province, the Djebal, which contained 30,000 Maro- nite Christians, had been withdrawn from the juris- diction of the Maronite chief, and placed under Turkish administration. They remonstrated on the instant and in common accord against this serious in- fringement of the (engagements of the Porte. "Take care," said M. Cor to Sarim Effendi, when handing to him the French com})laint: "in deferring to our con- sels, you almost declared that our system was an at- tempt that would not succeed ; we neglected this announcement ; we took it for a mere defence of the past ; but from the moment when you yourselves in- troduce into the measure dissolvents calculated to produce failure, the parts change, and I tremble sin- 256 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) cerely for you when I think of all that Europe will in that case have to demand at your hands. " Well," replied Sarim Effendi, angrily, " let Europe resort to force; let her govern the Libanus herself; these are continual attacks on our independence, our rights of sovereignty :" and he attempted to show that the Sul- tan had a right to retain the district of Djebal under his direct and exclusive jurisdiction. But ill- temper soon yielded to fear, and the Djebal was replaced under the authority of the Christian chief Events have not ceased to prove the insufficiency of this sys- tem for the establishment of order and justice in Syria; but since 1813, nothing has been tried with better success. We had grounds of complaint against Sarim Ef- fendi, and Sarim Effendi was not destitute of them against us. In the relations of Christian Europe with the Ottoman empire there exists an incurable vice. We cannot but demand of tlie Turks what we require from them for their Christian subjects, and they are unable, even when called upon to make the promise, to do what we ask. European intervention in Turkey is at once inevitable and vain. To enable governments and peoples to act with efficacy upon each other, by coun- sels, and examples, by diplomatic relations and engage- ments, there must be between them a certain degree of analogy and sympathy in manners, ideas, and senti- ments, in the leading features and currents of civiliza- tion and social life. There is nothing similar between the Christians of Europe and the Turks ; they can, VAKIOUS FOKEIGN AFFAIRS. (1810-1812.) 257 through necessity or policy, live in peace, side by side, but they are always strangers to each other ; while ceasing to combat they have not achieved mu- tual understanding. The Turks have been nothing in Europe beyond destructive and sterile conquerors, unable to associate themselves with the races that have fallen under their yoke, and equally incapable of being impressed or transformed by them or their neighbours. How much longer will the spectacle of this radical incompatibility endure, which ruins and depopulates many fine countries and condemns mil- lions of men to such accumulated misery 1 No one can foresee. But the scene will never change while it continues to be occupied by the same actors. We are attempting at present a difficult enterprise in Al- geria. As Christians, we are labouring to make xVrab Mussulmen understand and accept regular and just government. I trust we shall succeed ; but Europe will never compel the Turks to govern according to justice the Christians of their empire, or induce the Christians to believe in and trust Turkisli government as a legitimate })0wer. AVliile we were endeavouring to obtain from the Turks, for the Christians of Syria, a sliglit infusion of order and cMpiity, we also liad to exert our influence for the ad\ antage of other Christians, recently deli- vered fi-oni tlie yoke of the Turks, and inheritors of the fairest name of j)agan anti([nity. Greece, in 1840, was far from being well governed. King Otho, an ho- nest man, attached to what he conceived his duty and s 258 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) his right, was tainted with the maxims of the Bava- rian court, obstinate without vigour, and plunged in continual hesitation and permanent sloth, which para- lysed his government and allowed financial disorder and political agitation to increase from day to day in his little state. The people grew impatient ; the foreign envoys openly blamed the king; the English minister, above all, Sir Edmund Lyons, a rough and imperious sailor, imputed all the mischief to him, and urged the prompt establishment of a constitutional system as the only eff'ectual remedy. The evil was not so great as the appearance and the complaints. Despite the errors and weaknesses of power, the na- tural intelligence and activity of the Greeks displayed themselves with more freedom in fact than in prin- ciple, and with more success than security. Agri- culture revived, commerce prospered, population in- creased, the love of study and science once more sprang to life in Athens. There was evidently in this resuscitated nation impulse and a future. For some time, the French government, absorbed in the East by more dangerous and pressing questions, had bestowed little attention on Greece. The English and Russian party almost entirely disputed preponderance there, and the English had recently conquered. M. Mauro- cordato, its leader, had just been called to the head of affairs. I thought the moment had arrived for France also to resLitne her place. I entered into correspon- dence with the King's representatives at London, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Berlin, on tlie state of VAKIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lS40-lS42.) 259 Greece, of the evils of wliich she complained, on her progress in spite of those evils, and of the ideas which, in my judgment, ought to preside in the con- duct and councils of the allies. I had at hand, in the Chamber of Deputies, a man extremely well fitted to be the living proof and interpreter of my dispatches. M. Piscatory had evinced towards Greece tokens of ardent and intelligent devotion. Still young, in 1824, he had (juitted the enjoyments of his paternal home, and the pleasures of worldly life, to engage in the war of independence. He had fought by the side of the bravest palicari ; in Greece he was known and lo^ed by all, leadei's and people. I resolved to send him there on au extraordinary mission, so that in seeing liiin, the attention of the Greeks should be drawn back towards France ; that he might explain to them cordially our counsels, and put me in possession of the true state of facts, disfigured in the recitals of inter- ested rivals or desponding friends. But while thus resuming at Athens an active posi- tion, I was most anxious that my intention and pro- ceeding should be everywhere well understood, aboAO all in London, and by Lord Aberdeen, a perfect intel- lig(>nce with whom app(>ared to me, from day to day, more necessary and more practicable. After some months of ministry, M. Maurocordato had fallen, lie was replaced by M. Christides, one of the chiefs of the French party, and the friend of M. C'olettis, at that time (ireek envoy in France. I wrote to M. de Sainte Aulaire, on the Sth of December, 1841 : 2G0 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) " Since my assumption of office, I have been forcibly impressed by the bad state of the Greek govern- ment, by the serious, perhaps mortal dangers which threatened it, and by the heavy embarrassments they might produce in Europe. This evil I have traced to two causes : the obstinate inertion of King Otho ; the discord between the foreign ministers at Athens and their struggles for influence. Lord Palmerston pro- posed for remedy, the establishment of a representa- tive constitution in Greece. In the existing state of things, this remedy appeared to me more calculated to aggravate than to cure the evil. A regular, active administration, in harmony with the country, capable of managing its affairs and progressively ameliorating its institutions, I consider the only cure at present practicable and effectual. I also believe that such an administration can only maintain itself in Greece by the concert and u.nitcd support of the great Euro- pean cabinets. My dispatcli of tlie 11th of last March was written to recommend this plan of conduct, and to prepare its execution. Since M. Maurocordato was called to power, I liave put my dispatch in practice. 1 did it the more readily because the elevation of i\I. INIaurocordato could not be attributed to Erencli in- fluence. I do not pretend tliat the policy of Erance towards Greece is disinterested, if by this term is im- plied a policy exclusively occupied with Greek objects. I)ut 1 ft>cl satisfied that the only great and true in- t(M-{'st wliich Erance has in (ireece, lies in tlie perma- nence and consolidation of that state within its present VARIOUS FOREIGN ^VFFAlllS. (lSiO-lS12.) 261 limits and under the monarchical form. With this conviction, I declared myself ready to asssist M. Mau- rocordato witliout troublin^: myself as to his origin and party. "What I announced I did. When M. Mau- rocordato came to Paris I gave him the same assu- rance, and I do not hesitate to say, convinced him that he miglit rely on our sincere support. I endeavoured to smooth his path by reconciling him to M. Colettis, a long time his rival, and used my utmost efforts to per- suade tliem to aid each other mutually. I directed M. de Lagrene, at that time Frencli minister at Athens, to second M. Maurocordato with all his power, both in and after the construction of his cabinet. I acted for him so vigorously, myself, that the minister of Austria at Atliens having blamed him for his conduct to King Otho and tlie severity of the conditions he wislied to impose on him, 1 wrote to Vienna, to Ber- lin, and to St. Petersburgh, to exculpate him from that reproach and to urge the necessity of sustaining him. Finally, even at the moment when M. Maurocor- dato quarrelled with King Otho, 1 forwarded to all quarters a fresh dis[)atch, to give liim aid. In this sense, I sent ntnv instructions to M. de I.agrene. AVhen tlicy readied Athens, M. Maurocordato had already retired. " I do not enter into the cause of his fall. Even now, 1 scarc(^ly understand it. But it is certain that I sup])ort(Ml him loyally and energetically, before he formed his cabinet, while he was struggling to com- plete it, and after his resignation. 262 VARIOUS FOEEIGN AFFAIRS. (l810-18i2.) " From M. Maurocordato I pass to M. Piscatory. I sent him to Greece ; — " To obtain the report of a new, non-official, and intelligent observer on its administration, prosperity, and resources. I required it at the moment when we were called upon to complete the issue of the third series of the Greek loan : " To assure and persuade King Otho and our friends in Greece that the support promised and given, on our part, to M. Maurocordato was thoroughly real and sincere ; that no reticence was to be sought for in our words, no reserved thoughts in our acts ; " To turn the Greeks from all rash or irregular de- monstration, at home or abroad, tending to change either their territorial limits or the political constitu- tion of their country. " It Avas highly necessary to act in this sense, for, on the question of territory, in Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus, insurrection had broken out or was on the point of explosion ; and on that of internal organiza- tion, dispositions were manifesting themselves, of the most animated and compromising character in regard to King Otho. " Such were the instructions I gave to M. Piscatory ; such was the true object of his mission. Und(mbtedly, in sending him, I expected that his name, his ante- cedents, his presence, and his speeches would con- tribute to place France in good credit and position in Gre(>ce. But that credit and position I neither used nor wished to use except to maintain Greece in VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1S40-1S42.) 263 a sound course, for her own advantage as also for ours and tliat of Europe at large. " On the 28th of last July, in a private and confi- dential letter I wrote thus to M. Piscatory : ' 1 have no new instructions to give you. You went to Greece to tell and convince the Greeks that our wishes to- wards them are really what we declare, — a good ad- ministration at home, tranquil expectation abroad. Herein lies our whole policy: Greece has reached this point ; — to rise, she has only to live. To live, re- quires, I admit, a certain amount of wisdom. By general consent, this was recently found wanting in the Greek government. I hope that ^I. ^laiirocordato may exercise it. In this hope we have supported and shall continue to support him, without pausing to con- sider any incidental occurrence or proposing to our- selves any other object. Some complaints reach me against the new cabinet ; they say it does not contain enough of our friends, and that our friends are not in the posts best suited to them. J^et us sustain our friends, but without urging their [)retensi()ns beyond wliat is necessary for the success of the Greek govern- ment itself, wlietlier presided over by Maurocordato or Colettis.' '• Eepeat all tliis carefully to Lord Aberdeen, my dear friend, and sliow liim my letter. Let liim do as much on liis side, let him be for M. Christides what I lia\e bcH'u for ^L Maurocordato, and I hope we shall succeed in securing for Greece some degree of sta- bility. 15ut it is most essential that, on the spot, we 2G4 VARIOUS FOREIGN AJFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) should put an end to those blind jealousies, those puerile rivalries, those contests on the most trifling points, and all that tumult below which falsifies and paralyses sound policy above. I have nothing to say of Sir Edmund Lyons ; I cannot endure giddy accu- sations and unguarded assertions. He seems to me credulous, imprudent, and rash. I trust he may not compromise and embarrass his cabinet. I shall again recommend to M. de Lagrene to neglect no effort to live on good terms with him, and to prevent quarrel or offence. In truth, as our views with respect to Greece are similar, it would be unfortunate if Lord Aberdeen and I could not compel our agents to second and promote their accomplishment." As I instructed him, M. de Sainte Aulaire commu- nicated my letter to Lord Aberdeen, and I feel con- vinced it moved him, for he addressed the same instruc- tions to Sir Edmund Lyons which I had given to M. de Lagrene and M. Piscatory. He desired him to live on friendly terms with the representatives of the other powers. He apprised him that his recall had been formally demanded from Vienna and Berlin, and that at St. Petersburgh and Paris it had been signified that it would be acceptable ; and while assuring him that his own government had determined to refuse com- pliance, lie strongly recommended him not to meddle, at any moment, with all sorts of trifles, or to lend himself to the exaggeration of the short-comings of the Greek government, ^^•hich might be as great as he, Sir Edmund Lyons, represented them, but which VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSlO-1842.) 265 should always be considered with leniency. It "was impossible to impart more loyalty to the common action and concert of England and France at Athens ; but it is much more difficult to establish and maintain active harmony between secondary agents, on the spot, than from a distance and at the summit of the hier- archy. Neither did the affairs of Greece occupy in the general policy of Europe, nor in the relations be- tween France and England, a position sufficiently pro- minent to call, in London and Paris, for all the efforts and sacrifices necessary to the continued success of the policy anxiously desired by the two cabinets. Small affairs are often as difficult and require as much man- agement as great ones ; but they weigh too little in the destinies of the states which handle them, to com- mand all the attention they require ; and the most judicious governments apply their full strength and wisdom only in presence of imperious necessities and important dangers. Notmthstanding the importance, in my eyes, of a good intelligence between France and England, and the value I attached to tlie daily increasing confi- dence between Eord Aberdeen and myself, I was fully det(n-mined, in all places and at all times when the serious interests of niy country and its govern- ment re(piired, never to elude the diplomatic embar- rassments to which they might gi\ e rise. By land and sea, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, in the Mediterranean and in the ocean, frecpient occasitms occurred wliich excited sucli difficulties ; for at all 266 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) those points the two nations found themselves inces- santly in contact, either from local causes or habits of rivalship. Our establishment in Algiers was parti- cularly an object of continual prepossession with the English government. The Porte had for a long time nourished the desire of effecting, in Tunis, a revolu- tion analogous to that recently accomplished in Tri- poli ; that is to say, of taking from the regency of Tunis all it had conquered of hereditary indepen- dence, and of reducing the Bey of Tunis to a simple pacha. A Turkish squadron issued nearly every year from the Sea of Marmora to make a demonstration more or less meancing on the Tunisian coast. It was highly important to us that such a design should not succeed. Instead of a weak neighbour, like the Bey of Tunis, interested in living on friendly terms with us, we should have had, on our eastern frontier in Africa, the Ottoman Empire itself wdth its perse- vering pretensions against our conquest, and its alli- ances in Europe. The slightest incident, the enmity of wandering tribes, an unpremeditated violation of territory might have raised the fundamental question of our establishment in Algeria and bring on Euro- pean complications. We Avcre firmly resolved not to suffer such an arrangement. We had not the slight- est wish to conquer tlie regency of Tunis, or to break tlie feeble traditional ties which still united it to the Porte ; but we desired tlie complete maintenance of the sfatifs quo ; and as often as a Turkish squa- di"on threatened to approach Tunis, our ships steered VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSiO-lSi2.) 267 towards that coast, with orders to protect the Bey against any enterprise of the Turks. At different in- tervals, I gave my private instructions on this subject, to tlie commandant of our naval forces in the Medi- terranean, particularly to the Prince of Joinville, in 1840. I did not confine myself to these precautions by sea ; I wished to ascertain whether, as report said, it was possible that the Porte might send troops, by land, from Tripoli to Tunis, and attempt a surprise against the Bey by that route. In June, 1843, I in- structed a young man, not invested with any official character, M. Ignatius Plichon, to repair without de- lay to Tripoli, to collect there all the information he could obtain, to ascertain the means of passage that were available, and to traverse himself the vast space, nearly a desert throughout, which separates Tripoli from Tunis, to ascertain whether, in fact, the Turkish expedition spoken of was practicable. M. Plichon accjuitted himself of this perilous mission with equal intelligence and courage, and reported to me the cer- tainty that, on that side, we had nothing to fear for the Tunisiiin .sff/fi/.s (juo. At every movement of this kind the Englisli cabinet showed disquietude ; its agents, even some of the acutest amongst them, with little clear-sightedness and governed by habitual ap- ])reheiisi()n, talked incessantly of the restless spirit and ambition of France. Observations and questions w(Me addressed to us, enhancing the riglits of sove- reignty of the Porte over Tunis. A\'e declared our intention of respi^cting them and of recommending 268 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) the same conduct to the Bey, provided that the Porte made no attempt to change an ancient state of things at Tunis, the maintenance of which imported much to our tranquillity in Algeria. Lord Aberdeen thoroughly understood our position; but he found it difficult, and his colleagues more difficult still, to believe in our persevering moderation. The English govern- ment accepted our conquest of Algeria, in fact, and de- clared its determination of refraining from any fur- ther opposition ; but it evaded recognizing it, in right, until the Porte made the same admission. An embarrassing circumstance presented itself. Before our conquest, England had a consul at Algiers, and consular agents at several points of the regency. The consuls were commercial, not political agents ; it was almost the general custom in Europe to consider them as strangers to the question of sovereignty, and not to require, when the sovereign changed, that they should receive, from the new ruler, a new title to their mission. In Algeria, we had conformed to this custom, and after our conquest, the consul-general of England at Algiers had, without fresh authority, con- tinued his functions. But, in 1840, the Duke de Broglie, and after him, M. Thiers, determined that every new consular agent in Algeria should demand and receive our exefjvafur. Not only did T maintain this principle in debate in the Chambers, but I rigidly practised it, with the English consular agents, as well as with those of every other nation. In July, 1844, out of thirty-nine consuls and consular ngents of all VARIOrS FDHEIGX AFFAIKS. (lSiO-lSi2.) 2G9 nations and ranks, in Algeria, twche had received their ej-ef/Nafur from the King ; fourteen of inferior grade hekl theirs from the minister for foreign affairs, and eiglit from the governor of the province. Five only still acted in virtue of titles anterior to 1830. Algeria was not the only point in Africa where great French interests appeared to me engaged. That quarter of the world, still so unknown, oifered an immense field to the activity and future greatness of France. It was at our gates ; to reach it, we had not to incur the risks of a long and perilous naviga- tion. Our establishment on the northern coast gave us an extended and solid base. On the western side, our colony of Senegal secured to us the same advan- tage. In the interior of the country, we encountered no formidable competitorship ; none of the great European powers had established themselves strongly there in the road to conquest. The colony of the Cape, though inq)ortant in the eyes of England, was not ])r()gressing, and its situation, moreover, did not interfere with ours on that vast continent. Struck by these facts, and by the future they disclosed, I not only seized but sought opportunities of extending the ])ower and presence of Fran((\ The merchants of Marseilles, Nantes, and Bordeaux, already car- ried on. on the Western coast, a considerable trade in })alm oil, i\-ory, gum, earth-nuts [aracliidcs)^ and other African produce. A\'e resolved to erect at the [)rincipal centres of this traffic fortified factories, to aive them securitv and facilitate extension. The 270 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) mouths of the rivers, Great Bassam, Assinia, and Gabon, in the Gulf of Guinea, were the localities selected with this object. From 1842 to 1844, trea- ties concluded with the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes gave us the full possession and external so- vereignty of a certain extent of territory on the sea-coast and on the banks of those rivers. Small forts were built there ; suitable garrisons were pro- vided; the Governor of Senegal was ordered to in- spect and protect them. The English merchants who prosecuted on that line the same commerce with ours took alarm ; some difficulties arose on the spot. The English cabinet demanded explanations; our replies were peremptory ; we established our right of acquiring territories and of founding new fac- tories. We had anticipated objections. We had pro- claimed entire franchise for all flags, and the main- tenance of all the commercial usages in vigour on that coast. Lord Aberdeen, with his accustomed loyalty, acknowledged our right, and put an end to the discussion. France obtained, on the Western coast of Africa, for lier commerce, her marine, and lier future prospects, the resting points of which she stood in need. \\'hen our attention turned to the Eastern coast, we found ourselves confronted by difficulties of an- other kind. Tlie hirge island of Madagascar of- fend a great temptation for conquest, and for a vast colonial establishment, with indeflnite persj)cctives. 'i'lie King's gov(M-nnient was pressed to undertake the VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSiO-1842.) 271 enterprise ; the natural riches of the island were described, the excellence of its ports and roads, the maritime and commercial advantages it promised us, the facilities afforded by the discords of the two races who inhabited it, the Ilovas and the Sakalanes. Traditional claims were not wanting in support of desires. From the commencement of the seven- teenth century, at first, under the auspices of Car- dinal Richelieu, and subsequently under Louis the Fourteenth, French companies had sought to take possession of Madagascar. They had formed rela- tions there, built factories, and erected forts. Tliey had obtained from the native chiefs vast concessions, and a sort of admission of French sovereignty. Through frequent alternations of success and reverse, Louis XIV., Louis XV., and Louis XVI. had ac- knowledged and maintained their establishments. At one time the name of Ide Uauphine, at another tliat of Eastern France, had been given to the whole island. Saving the exceptions formally stipulated, the treaty of the oOth of May, 1814, restored to France all her ])ossessioiis beyond Europe in 1792, and Madagascar was not amongst the excluded number. Since tliat epocli, diplomatic and maritime acts had, at least reserved, if not exercised our rights. Quite recently, skilful naval officers had visited the island, examined its coasts, communicate d with the inhabit- ants, and re^ ived old memories. The colonial council of lsU> Bourbon represented with details, in an ad- dress to the King, all the reascms which, in their 272 VAllIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) idea, " called upon the government to undertake the general conquest and colonization of Madagascar." The Governor of Bourbon, Admiral de Hell, vigo- rously supported the opinion of the colonial council. Finally, the empire of these traditions and hopes perpetuated itself even in the ' Royal Almanack,' in which, since 1815, the Governor of Isle Bourbon was st} led Governor of Bourhon and Madagascar. I was opposed to any enterprise of this nature. To enable a nation to found with success, far from its centre, great territorial and colonial establish- ments, it must have, in the world, a widely extended, active, powerful, and enterprising commerce, and its population must be disposed to transport its force and destiny far from its native soil ; — to swarm, like the bees. Neither of these conditions existed in France in 1840, nor do they exist there now. We had enough on hand in an Algeria to conquer and colonize. Nothing is more injurious to tlie power of nations than the miscarriage of great enterprises, and it is amongst the misfortunes of France to have more tlian once signally failed in such attempts, in Asia and America, in India, liOuisiana and Canada, and to have abandoned her conquests to the hands of her ri\als. Th(^ Khig, the cabinet, and the Chambers (•oncun-('d fully in my opinion. AA'e therefore re- jected all pr()j(>cts for tlie conquest of Madagascar; and we shonhl luive abandoned them equally, even though l^ngland liad not exhibited jealousy and un- easiness. 15ut while I refused to seek, for my VAKlors FCIJKIGN AlTAiRS. (l^iO-lSl^.) 273 conntr}', gn^at and distant tcM-ritorial establishments, I was far from thinking that slie oiiglit to continue apart and inactive on different points of the globe. Our small land belongs to European and Christian civilization, and wherever European and Christian civilization establishes and devel()])s itself, there also France is bound to assume her place and exercise her p(Huliar genius. It is both suitable and indispensable for her to possess, at all the great centres of com- mercial and international activity, secure and strong maritime posts, which do not, of necessity, create for us aggressive and undefined relations, but act as resting-points for our commerce, where we can refit and re victual ; stations where French sailors may find everywhere, in the great seas and on extended coasts, the forecasting ])r()tection of France, without impli- cating her be} ond her general and superior interests. It was to attain this end on the Eastern, as on the AVestern coast of Africa, that between 1841 and 1813 we took possession, at the north entry of the channel of Mozambique, of the islets of Mayotta and Nosibf', and that in 1811 we concluded a treaty with tlie I man of Muscat, wliich gave us, on the long extent of his coasts, important securities and liberties for our colony of Isle IJourbon, and for our relations witli the great East. About the same time, and under the dominion of a similar idea, we took possession, in th(^ Pacific Ocean, of the Man(U(\sas Islands. I shall speak later of this act and of the incidents it excited, whidi occasioned T 274 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ( 1840-18 12.) more stir than they deserved. In 1841, we were engaged, at our very doors, in two questions infi- nitely more important, and well calculated to compli- cate seriously our relations with England. The first of these was the unity of custom-house duties between France and Belgium. A country of immense produce and extremely limited consumption, Belgium was choking within her narrow limits, and ardently aspired to a more extended market than her own. From her emanated the formal proposition for a union of customs, which, since 1831, had been a subject of continual publication, conversation, and discussion between the two countries. In 1840, under the ministry of M. Thiers, the question had been introduced, and a negotiation opened. It was resumed in 1841. Four conferences took place in Paris, in the month of September, between some of the ministers and several commissioners of the two States. I presided at them. On both sides, dis- positions were guarded ; we had no wisli to make our trade and finances pay too highly for the political advantages the union of customs might produce, and the lielgians were anxious to obtain at the smallest possible political sacrifice the industrial profits they looked for. They proposed, however, the total abolition of all scale of customs between the two countries, and the establishment of a single and iden- tical tariif on their other frontiers. This was a real and complete custom-house union. But they attached to it tbe express condition that the Belgian frontiers VAKloUS FOIJEIGX AIFAIKS. (lSiO-lS12.) 275 should bo guarded solely by Belgian officials. " The admission of some thousands of French soldiers on Belgian territory, in the uniform of custom-house officers, would be," said one of their commissioners, " a mortal blow against the independence and neutra- lity of Belgium." AVe declared, in turn, that France could not entrust to Belgian officers the care of her industrial and financial interests. " 1 see," King Leopold wrote to King Louis Philippe, "that your ministers incline towards a treaty of differential tariffs. I could ask nothing better. I understand the uneasiness whicli our custom-house inspires as guardian of a part of French revenue and industry. "\^'e could not, however, consent to have French offi- cers. Europe would pretc^id to see therein an actual incorporation ; and even tliose amongst us who do not live by commerce and trade, Avould oppose the measure. I still liope something acceptable may spring up from the I'd fie tvldclt is hoiUng. The matter is extremely important, and the consequences of failure might be liiglily injurious. Evidently, some politicians in France believe tliat, if the nego- tiation broke down, no inconvenience would arise, and all might remain as it is. Tlun-e are positions in wliich av(^ cannot remain, and, wIumi ])assions min- gle with them, the chances of their endurance arc diminislied. In tliis country, men of importance of all ])artic\s are opj)osed to a commercial association witli France. It is with great re})ngnance tliat they have finally consented to it, seeing tlie standstill to 'J' -2 276 VARIOUS FOliEIGN AFFATKR. (lSlO-1842.) which Belgian industry would be inevitably exposed by the sort of blockade which weighs upon us at pre- sent. Having, according to their idea, made a great sacrifice, almost equal to the abandonment of their political existence, they have persuaded themselves that a proposition for association with France could not be rejected by her. You may therefore readily form an idea of the political embarrassments which would result from the non-success of the treaty. The labour of our internal enemies is also to this end; to demand association with France, — and, if she re- pulses Belgium, to base itself on the impossible posi- tion of the country, for a change of government and re-union wdth Holland." We were quite as determined as King Leopold him- self, to combat, at any cost, this last hypothesis. We had, moreover, some fear lest Belgium, rejected by France, might turn towards Germany, and seek to enter the Prussian Zollvcrein. We were not ignorant that Belgian and German statesmen were favourable to this combination, and endeavouring to prepare it. 'Jlie negotiation dragged slowly on in the midst of these solicitudes, wlien an incident intervened to postpone the sjstem of a great custom-house union, and to drive us into the path of differential tariffs concerted between the two countries. For two or three years, threads aud tissues of English flax had ra])idly encroached upon tlie French market. From ISH) to IS 12. tlieir importation had doubled. Our spinning iiictories were seriously menaced. On the VAUIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lS10-lS12.) 277 20th of June, 1842, a decree, declared as urgent, raised our duties on foreign threads and tissues of flax. The measure was general. Belgium remon- strated energetically. We had no intention of stri- king her, and our trade in flax could bear the com- ])etition of hers. AVe entered into negotiations, and on the IGth of July, 1842, a commercial convention ^vas concluded, which exempted threads and tissues of Belgian flax from the increased duty. Belgium, in turn, adopted, on her frontiers not adjoining France, our new tariff on threads and tissues of foreign flax, and made, in addition, some slight concessions in favour of our commerce. The duration of the treaty was fixed at four years. Wlien the bill for executing tlu^se articles was debated in tlie Chamber of Deputies, the treaty met with various adversaries. Some reproaclied me with not liaving accomplislied the union of customs, and under tliis form, the incorporation of Belgium with France. Otliers, with having too much sacrificed French trade, and with exacting too little from Belgium in return for the exceptional favour we had accorded her. Independently of the special reasons which 1 wished to establish in their full value on this point. I seized the ()p])ortunity of expressing the ge- neral idea wliich had guided me in the negotiation, and to which, under any circumstances, I proposed to remain faithful. '" I am not amongst those," I said, '• wlio think that in affairs of trade and commerce, existing- interests and establishments are to be easilv 278 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) given over to all the risks and changes of external and unlimited competition. I believe, on the contrary, that the conservative principle ought to be applied to these as to other social interests, and that they should be effectually protected. It is however indispensable that industrial interests should, in certain cases and to a certain extent, be called upon to assist in what serves the security, strength, and greatness of France, in her foreign relations. The State must have a right to demand sometimes from these interests a pro- portionate elasticity and sacrifices, with this object in view. These industrial interests also must lend themselves, in some degree, to the general and easy extension of the common good; that is to say, they must hold themselves bound to accept progressively a competition which excites and compels them to work better and cheaper for the advantage of all. These are the two conditions imposed on, and which legiti- mize the protective system. We are bound to apply the policy of conservatism to industrial interests, and to protect them, in the name of tliat policy, from the dangers by which they may be assailed ; but, at the same time, those interests must accommodate them- S('lv(>s to the necessities of foreign policy, and to the progress oi internal improvement. On these terms only can protection be justified and maintained. Tlie Chamber acce])ted these maxims, and sanc- tioned tlie treaty. Ihit the fundamental question still subsisted, and the danger Belgium had lately enc()unt(M-e(l for one of her trndes, rendered her more VAKInUS FOKKIGN AFFAIRS. (lSl(J-lSi2.) 279 eager in her desire for unity of customs. The negotia- tion was resumed. A plan of treaty, which contained, on the })art of Belgium, the adoption of the prin- cipal arrangements of the French system in custom- house duties and indirect assessments, was pre- pared and discussed under three successive forms of drawing up; the last was read on the 1st of Novem- ber, 1842, in a council held at St. Cloud; the Belgian commissioneis still demanded certain changes. The nearer we approached the term, the difficulties of this great international measure became more appa- rent. The principal French trades strongly testified their alarm. Abroad, the interested powers became uneasy, at first silently, and without diplomatic stir. '• You ask me," Count de Sainte Aulaire wrote on the 20tli of October, 1842, "what they think here of the Franco-Belgian customs union. I can only guess by induction, for they ])reserve with me as absolute a silence as with you. Even the papers, with an admi- rable intelligence of the interests of their country, approach the subject with great reserve. Each understands that pcnverful French interests will luidertake the opposition, and that England would diminisli tlieir force by prematurely taking the initi- ative." At this very moment, however, on the 24th of October, Lord Aberdeen wrote a pressing, though at tlie same time a conciliatory letter to King ]AH)pold to detach him from a measure " full of danger, it may be affii'med, for the interests of your Majesty, and the tran(pnllity of Europe." Some weeks after, (m thr 280 VARIOUS rOKElGN AFFAIRS. (lSiO-18i2.) 19th of November, talking with M. cle Sainte Aulaire ; " It seems," he said, " that the Belgian question is still pending." " 1 replied," the ambassador wrote to me, " that I knew nothing of it, except through the newspapers ; that, in my opinion, a speedy and defini- tive solution was scarcely probable, and that I was glad to notice the indifference of the English press, whence I concluded that, in any case, I should not have to quarrel with him on this subject." He replied, " that all commercial treaties were popular in England, and that English capitalists would be the less disposed to complain of a Franco-Belgian treaty of commerce, as they would hasten to embark their capital in Belgian manufactures, and would promise themselves enormous profits from those speculations. But, on the hypothesis of the union of customs, his language was altogether different. " You can under- stand," he said, " that England could not see with a favourable eye, French custom-house officers at Ant- werp. You will also encounter opposition on the side of Germany, and tliis time you would find us more united tlian on tlie right of searcli." The F.nglisli cabinet liad, in fact, as-.ured itself of this union. On the 28tli of October, Lord Aberdeen ad(h-essed a dispatch to tlie representatives of England at IJcrlin, Yienna, and St. Petersburgh, with orders to connnunicate it to those three courts, in which, without fully adiiering to the principles which Lord Falinerstoii had manifested from the earliest reports of the iiiteiidcd I"Vanco-l>elgiaii union, lie maintained VARIOUS FoUKIC.N ATFAIRS. (lS10-lSi2.) 281 in tlic name of the neutrality of Belgium, and in virtue of the protocol of the 20tli of January, 1831, ^vhich had established it, that the other cabinets were authorized to o])pose themselves to a combination whicli would present a real danger to the balance of European power. On the 29th of November, he expressed himself still more strongly on the subject, with the Belgian minister in liOndon, M. Van de A^'eyer, who hastened to inform King Leopold ; and on the Gth of December, having requested the Count de Sainte Aulaire to call upon him ; " I am informed," he said, " that a former minister* has had an inter- view with King Louis Philippe, and that they held a long conversation on the Franco-Belgian union of customs. The ex-minister said that the project would encounter unanimous opposition in Europe. The King rei)lied, ' I have no reason to expect this oi)p()si- tion, and 1 do not believe in it, since none of the powers have caused a word to be said to me on the subject.' In consetpience of this s})eech of your king, and to aAoid all misunderstanding on a matter so serious, 1 have thought it my duty to write to liOrd Cowley, and also to tell you that the customs union between France and Belgium would appear to us an attack on Belgian indej)endence, and consequently on the treaties by which it is established." — " I declined," ]M. de Sainte Aulaire said to me, ''any discussion on tlie words or personal opinion of the King; but I affirmed that my government had, for a considerable * It was Count Mult' to whom lie alhukd. 282 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1S40-1S42.) time, been informed by me, and through other channels also, of the intentions of the English cabi- net ; it was therefore in full knowledge of the case that you had entered on the examination of the ques- tion, determined to solve it in consideration with the national interests, and without pausing at the expres- sion of a discontent founded neither in justice nor reason." — " I have abstained until now from speaking to you in any detail on this subject," resumed Lord Aberdeen, " and I am glad of it, as your government can defer to the complaints of French commerce without the appearance of its resolutions being influ- enced by diplomatic considerations ; but to-day, 1 felt bound to name it to you to prevent any false interpre- tations arising from my silence. I have, moreover, taken care that the step adopted with you shall not be in any manner collective." Without announcing to me, on the part of Prussia, any positive movement. Count Bresson forwarded to me from Ijerlin, on the 7th of November, 1842, analo- gous information, and after treating the question him- s(.'lf under difl'erent points of view, he concluded by sa} ing that in his opinion, the union of customs with ]k>lgium possessed only a very secondary importance for France and her government, and that we sliould derive from it but little advantage to counterbalance the inevitable (embarrassments and mistakes. In face of tliese re})orts, and of the secret labours and oflicial dechuations to whicli this question gave rise ill Kurojic, 1 resolved to (>xplain myself fully on the VAIIIOUS FOIJEIUN AIFAIKS. (lSK)-lS12.) 283 subject with the representatives of France abroad, and to reguhite carefully their attitude, while determining our own with precision. I wrote therefore, on the oOth of November, 1842, first to Count Bresson, for the cabinc^t of Berlin was the most seriously disturbed, and the most eager to seek, in the English anxieties, a resting-point for their own. '" I wish you to know, from this time forward, our views on the main point of this affair and on the arguments of Lord Aberdeen, as also the moti\es which regulate our conduct. "The treaties which established Belgium, also sti- pulated that she should form an independent and neutral state. Could this independence and neutrality be, as is assumed, destroyed or encroached upon by the simple fact of a union of custom-house duties with France? " Yes ; if the clauses of that union in any manner touched the political sovereignty of the King of the Belgians ; if he did not preserve in his state the full exercise of the rights essential to that sovereignty. No ; if the political sovereignty of Belgium re- mained entire, and if the Belgian government retained always the faculty of breaking tlie union within a ti\(Hl period, as soon as it should find it ()})posed to its indeptnidence. '' It would be a strange indc'pendence accorded to Ijelgium wliich should at tlu^ same time interdict to her absolutely and as a condition of her existence, the right of contracting tlu* relations, and of ado[)ting the mi'asures sugg(^sted by her interest, and which might possibly l)e necessary to her very existence itself 284 VARIOUS rOKEIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) " Independence is not a mere word ; it ought to be a flict. A state is not independent because it has been so written down in a treaty, but on the condition that it can really act according to its interest, neces- sity, and will. " Supposing the political sovereignty of Belgium to be respected, and we are the first to say that no other hypothesis is admissible, the union of customs between France and Belgium would be no more than a parti- cular form of a commercial treaty, — a form Avhich would, without doubt, lead to certain changes in the internal administration of the two states, freely con- sented to on both sides, but which, far from encroach- ing on the independence of one of the two, would be, on its part, an act and evidence of independence. " Lord Aberdeen admits the right of France and Belgium to interchange commercial treaties, even though sucli treaties should prove injurious, economi- cally speaking, to the interests of third states. What would lie say if France and Belgium should each, on their common frontier abolish all custom-house duties, and if, at the same time, Belgium by an act of its own government slioidd establish on her other frontiers, th(^ tariffs and existing system of the French customs, without any other change in the relaticms and inter- nal administration of the two States ? I do not say that such a system would be practicable ; but as- suredly it would be one of those commercial treaties against which Lord Aberdeen himself acknowledges that no foreign <^()\ cinment would have a right to VARIOUS FOREIGN AI-TAIRS, (lStO-lSI2.) 285 protest. And yet, the union of customs would be complete. It is not therefore necessarily, and in itself, opposed to tlie independence of Belgium, and to pub- lic European law. " But the neutrality ? This is a special condition of existence of wliich Bel<^ium reaps the advan- tages, and which imposes on her certain obligations, certain inconveniences which the five great powers accepted with her, and are equally bound, with her, to respect. " Assuredly, it is not France that will ever strike or suffer the slightest blow to be struck against the neutrality of Belgium. This neutrality, is, since 1830, the only advantage we have acquired abroad. In 1814, the kingdom of the Netherlands was erected against us. It fell ; in its place a state arose wliich lias been declared neutral, and which, by its origin, instituticms, political and material interests, and by the marriage of its King, has, while still re- taining its neutrality, become to us a friendly state. We have here a material guarantee of security on our own frontier, and a political ])ledge of peace and of the ])alance of power in Europe. Europe has ac- cej)ted this situation. Above all other states we com- prehend and esteem its advantages. Much less than others are we disposed to the slightest change. " IIow could the political neutrality of Belgium ])erish l)y her union of customs with France ? This is Lord Aberdeen's assum})tion and liis leading argu- ment. I shall not say, although it might be true. 286 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l810-lS42.) that this argument is insulting to us ; as it implies that we could only desire a commercial union with Belgium to destroy her neutrality, and to find there- in a hidden road to conquest. Neither shall I say that it is treating public European law very slightly, and holding it as utterly vain to suppose that it would lend no strength to states that might appeal to it if it were disowned. I go straight to Lord Aberdeen's fundamental idea, and weigh exactly its value. " A unity of custom-house duties and of a finan- cial system cannot, it is said, take place between two states of very unequal force, for one would be politically absorbed by the other, and the European balance thereby endangered. The example of Ger- man unity of customs, it is added, is not applicable, for tliis last rests on a political union long admitted by public European law, which it has never dis- turbed. " These are mere assertions and appearances by which we cannot be satisfied. Let us look to the fact. Is it true tliat the German unity of customs lias subsisted between states of equal force capable of b'alancing each other reciprocally 1 Is it true that the internal equilibrium of Germany, which weiglis something in the general balance of Europe, has not been tliereby sensibly affected ? Ask the (juestion of Austria'? Ask it of tlie small German ])ow(M-s engaged in the association ? It is evident, that by this now fart, Prussia has greatly advanced. VAUIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ( 1810-1812.) 287 that her weight in Germany, and consequently in Europe, has much increased, that the German powers of the second and third chiss ha^e no longer the same importance or even liberty in their foreign com- binations. Assuredly, these are serious facts, pro- found changes in the state of Germany and Europe ; and if they occupy little attention in London, I feel convinced tliat they are deeply considered at Vienna, at Hanover, and even Stuttgardt and Dresden. " AVhy have not the powers, Austria for example, to whom this new fact is distasteful, openly opposed it ? Because they understood that they had no right to do so. When a change in the division and scale of European influence operates in virtue of powerful and legitimate interests, by regular and pacific means, and when the state or states engaged confine them- selves within their habitual limits of action, we may feel discontent and uneasiness ; we may labour to shackle, to restrain, or to overthrow this change ; but we liave no right to oppose it by violence or official protest. Tlie history of Europe offers more tlian (me example of such changes in tlie division of influences wliich, beyond doubt, have given rise to disguised struggles and diplomatic efi'orts, but they ha"V"e ncnther ended in hostile declarations nor wars. And, in our days, a war excited on such grounds would l)(> more opposed than ever to the notions of justice entertained by the public of Europe, and to its sentinunits on the rights and relations of states. '' Ihidoubtedly, the Eranco-Belgic unity of customs 288 VAllIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l8i0-1842.) would give France an increase of weight and in- fluence in Europe. But why should not France and Belgium exercise equally with Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, the right of regulating under this form their common interests ? Why should whatever takes place on the right bank of the Rhine, for the profit of Prussia, be denied on the left bank, to the ad- vantage of France, without any infringement on the peace of Europe, in the one case more than in the others ? " So much, my dear Count, for the question of right. These are, in my opinion, and searching to the heart of things, the true principles. I now turn to what has been, and will continue to be, our practi- cal rule of conduct in this affair. " We have not taken any initiative. We have not hastened, and have no intention of hastening the Franco-Belgian unity of customs. Without doubt, it offers us advantages ; but, at the same time, it creates great difficulties with some of our most im- portant interests. The union of customs is not nc- c(>ssary to France. Tn this relati(m, France has no- thing to ask from Belgium. The existing state of things is suitable to, and sufficient for France, who, of her free choice and movement, will do nothing to change it. " Tt is u])on Ijclgium that this position weighs. It is Belgium wlio tells us she cannot remain in it, and tliat for her internal security, exen for her national government and existence, the danger is so great, that VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRt^. (1S10-1S42.) 289 she must risk all to escape from it. She comes to us. If we reject her, slie will look elsewhere. Were she to remain as she is, everything with her, would be compromised. " Now, tlie security of Belgium, the existence of the Belgic kingdom, as at present constituted, forms the peace of Europe. You know, my dear Count, that tlie constitution of this kingdom has not been a result readily obtained. It was not easy to restrain and baffle all the passions and ambitions that desired another state of things ; and you also know that, tliat other state of things would have been war and the confla- gration of Europe. Ix't us not deceive ourselves. The same })assions and ambitions which in 1830 and 1831 desired other results than those whicli were effected, are still in active existence. And if an opportunity, a great internal commotion in Belgium, for instance, presented itself to them, tliey would explode. To- day, as in 1830, their explosion would infallibly brhig on war, the overthrow of European order, and all those fatal, undeveloped chances, which for twelve years we all labour to charm away. This, in our eyes, con- stitutes the seriousness of the question. These are the dangers to whicli th(> Eraneo-Belgic union of customs may furnish a remedy. Let tliese dangers be dissi- pated ; let l)elgium no longer believe herself seriously menaced l)y them ; let her not appeal to us formally for extrication ; let her be contented with the actual sfafu.s quo ; it is not we who sliall urge her to escape from it. AN'e are not devoured by that thirst of inno- u 290 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) vation and extension so incessantly attributed to us. We believe to-day, that for the greatness as well as for the happiness of France, her first want is stability. This conviction governs and will continue to govern our conduct in this affair, as it has already done in so many others. But what we cannot and will not suffer is, that the stability of a kingdom founded at our very doors should be impaired at our expense or compro- mised by I know not what absurd jealousy of the progress of our influence. Truly, those who see, in this Franco-Belgic unity of customs, a question of political rivalry, uphold a very narrow and false idea ; the matter here is widely different from that for com- petitorship in influence ; it concerns the maintenance of European peace and order. This is what we de- fend. " From all these facts and ideas, I now give you, my dear Count, the conclusions I have formed on the line of conduct that becomes us, and by which you will regulate your own. " 1. Remain perfectly tranquil ; avoid rather than court discussion on the Franco-Belgian unity of cus- toms, and convey strongly the impression that we do not seek the fact. I'hat unity must seek us, and Belgium must impose it upon us, in some degree, as a necessity of her actual existence ; " 2. Maintain on the pith of the affair, our com- plete^ independence ; acknowledge no right on any part to ()])p()se it, in the terms of the treaties and on the princi])les of public law. VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (iS 10-1842.) 291 "■ 3. ^^'atc•h carefully the dispositions of the different powers on this subject. Are they all prepossessed with the same view and in a similar de<^rce 1 AVhat differ- ences exist between them ? llow far would they go in their opposition] What objections and concealed efforts would be made to prevent a public protest or war? AMiat are the various steps possible in this course, and at what point would any specific power think proper to pause? " 4. ¥oY the present, beyond this work of observa- tion and expectation, one thing alone is important to us; to prevent all collective or official step or de- monstration which might compromise or embarrass us. T.ook well to this." I addressed the same letter, mutatis mutandis, to tlie King's ]-epresentatives at London, Vienna, St. I'etersburgli, Brussels, and the Hague. I am quite aware that the different powers did not all attach to this question the importance besto^^ ed on it by Eng- land or Prussia, or enter into it with the same ardour. I know especially that Prince Metternich had written thus to Count d'Appony : '• As to the effort of King Leopold with the French cabinet to accomplish a unity of customs between the two countries, I think lightly of it, and I consider- the cabinet of Berlin quite mistaken in evincing so nuich inquietude. France would not desire better than to swallow up Belgium, and Belgium would be delighted to fatten commer- cially at the table of France. This is perfectly clear and sim])le. Nevertheless, no government or country r 2 292 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) voluntarily allows itself to be devoured by another ; and in such transactions the weakest is generally that which stands most upon its guard. If it does not escape well, this is also quite simple, and exclusively its own affair. I repeat to you that I attach little im- portance to this project." In his relations with the courts of London and Berlin, as also in his official communications with me on the subject. Prince Metternich thought only of calming down uneasiness and of preventing any active, collective, or diplomatic step. He assumed this amicable and impartial part the more willingly as he felt convinced that the plan of Franco-Belgic unity of customs would never be realized : " AVhen I consider," he said one day to Count Flahault, all the varieties of danger to which King Leopold ex- poses himself in pursuing this object, when I reflect that a reciprocal modification of tariffs would secure to both countries (quite as well as the custom-house union) all tlie commercial advantages they can desire, I ask myself whether King Leopold ever seriously in- tended to conclude such a treaty, and if it is not much more probable that he puts forward this project, wliich lie must know to be impracticable, to arrive at notliing, while appearing disposed to do everything to please the King, his father-in-law, the French na- tion, the French party in Belgium, and the national sentiment which seeks an outlet for the excess of Bel- gian produce." I am strongly tempted to believe that M. de Metternich was in the right, and that King VAliKJUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSiO-lSi2.) 293 Leopold never seriously pursued the plan of custom- house unity, nor reckoned on its success. Whatever may have been the intention of the King of the Bel- gians, the ultimate fact accorded with the foresight of the chancellor of Austria. The negotiations, confer- ences, and royal and ministerial conversiitions ended in nothing. The idea of the union of customs between France and Belgium was gradually and silently aban- doned ; and on the 13th of December, 1845, after se- veral more months of restricted and effective negotia- tion, a new treaty of commerce, lowering the mutual tariff on many commodities, regulated for six years, in a more extensive and liberal manner than that con- tracted on the IGth of July, 1842, the industrial rela- tions of the two countries. I felt little regret at tins result. The more deejdy T studied the question, the more I convinced myself, tliat the Franco-Belgic unity of customs would have entaih^l on France inconveniences,not counterbalanced by the political advantages in prospect. The advan- tages were more apparent than real, and would have been purcliased beyond their value. "\A'e sliould have found in this fact a gratification to vanity rather than a solid increase of strength and power. A\'hat- ever the partisans of the measure might say, Belgium would not liave been completely assimilated to and melted into France. The spirit of independence and nationality, which prevailed in 1830, wouhl still have maintained itself there, and would have intermingled, witli the relations of the two states, doubts, difficul- 294 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (i8iO-lS42.) ties, and continual perturbations. 1 am convinced that the four great powers would have immediately opposed, to the Franco-Belgic unity of customs, a formal resistance, and that they would have officially demanded the neutrality of Belgium by declaring it compromised by such an act. England and Prussia had already united in this eventual design ; Kussia was eager to support them, and Austria would have had no inclination to stand aloof. But under the most favourable hypothesis, and admitting that the four powers might not at once have assumed an active attitude, they would not have been less pro- foundly wounded and disturbed ; they would have lost all confidence in our political wisdom, and in the stability of the general system which after 1830, and in concert with us, they had founded in Europe. They would have once more entered into concert against us ; that is to say, they would have returned to the paths of anti-French coalition. And at the precise moment when we accepted this injurious European position, we should have inflicted a serious discontent and much confusion on the principal Fi-(>ncli manufacturers ; we should have strongly agi- tated the country within, while placing it without, und(>r tlie lee of the suspicious and hostile alliances of Till rope. The anxieties and demands of natitmal industry had, witli us, much greater weight than diplomatic considerations, in the abandonment of the project for a union of customs; but in allowing it to fall through VARIOUS FOKEIGN AFFAIRS. (1810-1812.) 295 and ill re})lucing it by a reciprocal reduction of tariffs, we executed an act of foresight without, and of equity and prudence witliin. At that epoch, in our relations with England, we liad an affair, or rather affairs on hand, far more serious and permanent than the Franco-Belgian cus- tom-house union ; — the affairs of Spain. I have not encountered in the experience of my life, nor do I recognize in history any example of a policy so obstinately retrospective as that of England towards Spain. The war of the Spanish succes- sion under Louis XIV., the treaty of Utrecht, the royal house of France reigning in Spain, the family compact under Eouis XV., Spain concurring with France under liouis XVI. to aid the independence of the United States of America, the invasion of Spain by the Emperor Napoleon, — all these facts were in 1840, and probably are still, as constantly present to the thoughts of the English government, and as decisive in regulating its conduct, as if they were still active and flagrant. A dread of the ambi- tious views and preponderance of France in Spain is ever a permanent and ruling prepossession in the mind of I'^iUgland. 1 am not surprised at this empire of tradition in the policy of a well-governed State. Memory is the mother of forcsiglit, and tlie past always occupies a leading j)lace in tlie present. Facts change, never- tlieless. Situations become modified, and sound ])olicy consists in acknowledging these clianges. and 296 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) in estimating their value correctly, as also in not forgetting old incidents and their share of influence. Since 1830, and more particularly since 1840, the re- lative positions of France and England, with respect to Spain, were profoundly altered, and their respec- tive policies had no longer the same reasons for being opposed or even different. When, in 1833, we ac- knowledged Queen Isabella and the constitutional system in Spain, we held ourselves utterly separated from the absolute Spanish party which the Restora- tion had protected, by reconciling ourselves with the liberal section, which since 1808 had accepted Eng- land for its patron. When in 1835, we refused armed intervention in Spain, despite the solicitations of England herself, we had given the most decisive proof that we sought in that country no exclusive preponderance. Finally, since the month of Septem- ber, 1840, Queen Christina and the chiefs of the mo- derate constitutional party, called the French party, had lost power in Spain, which had passed into the hands of the extreme liberals, recognized as the Englisli party. The new regent of the kingdom, Espartcro, declared openly, that "his inclinations and ()]:)inions were and ever had been in favour of an intimate alliance with Great Britain, and that in that quarter lay the friendship on which he de- pended." The English government had reason to be satisfied with its position in Spain, and little cause to api)reh(Mi(l our [)retensions to preponderate in that country. VAUIOUS FOllEIGN AFFAIUS. ( ISlO-lSl'i.) 297 Nevertheless its disquietude was ever the same. The necessity of combating in Spain the ambition and influence of France continued to preoccupy it passion- ately. The accession of the Tory cabinet did not seem to liave made any important change in this feeling; Lord Aberdeen evinced on this point, as on all others, more freedom of mind and impartiality ; but the anti- French suspicions of Sir Eobert Peel were so deeply rooted that he declared himself inclined to seek, in Spanish affiiirs, the amicable understanding and con- certed action of Engand, with Austria, Prussia, and Eussia, neither of which three powers had acknow- ledged Queen Isabella or the Spanish constitutional system, rather than a friendly accord with France. '• Our position and interests," he said, '* agree better with the positicm and interests of these powers than witli tliose of France ; they are in community with us in the design of preventing Spain from beconi ing a mere instrument in the hands of France. Ee- sistance to the establishment of French influence in Spain ought to be our principal and constant ef- fort." The Fnglisli minister at Madrid, Mr. Aston, a man of talent and integrity, but specially selected by Lord Palnierston, was imbued with the same pre- judices and passion. There was at one moment a (question of replacing liim, but he was retained at his post, and the j)olicy of rivalry and struggle against France continued to })revail, in fact, at Madrid, while in London, tlie prime minister su[)ported it, in prin- ciple, in the council. 298 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSlO-1842.) While I encountered at every step this disposition of the English government, I learned from Spain, even be- fore the fall of Lord Palmerston and the Whig cabi- net, that the regent Espartero was daily losing ground, and that the moderate party, particularly the military chiefs, were preparing an insurrection against him, •through which they promised themselves the return to power of Queen Christina and her friends. Espartero and his partisans did not conceal their alarm ; they went so far as to say that foreseeing the success of this rising, they meditated quitting Spain and retiring to Cuba, carrying with them the young Queen Isabella, and her sister the Infanta Donna Fernanda, and thus retaining possession of the royalty and legal power. I attached no faith to this report, almost as impro- able to conceive as impossible to execute ; but I was much impressed by the state of parties it revealed and the events it prognosticated. On the Cth of August, 1841, I wrote as follows to the King, then at the Cha- teau d'Eu : "It is greatly to be desired that the friends of (iueen Christina should remain quiet and leave the government of the actual Ilegent to follow the course of its own errors and the destinies they will produce. It goes down visibly. If they try to over- tlirow it, tliey may perhaps raise it up again ; and if tlicy succeed in the attempt, their victory will be full of dangers. On the otlier hand, if they wait with folded ;inns until victory comes, it will be sure. A natural d(>ath is the only true (Mid for governments, tlif only chaiiiiel which really o])ens their iidieritance. VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lStO-lS12.) 299 M, Z('a* seems to iiic strongly penetrated by these ideas, and Queen Christina is, I believe, well disposed to adopt them." And some days later, on the 17th of xViigust, considering the affairs of Spain under another aspect, I again addressed the King : " \n idea dis- turbs me ; I fear lest we should assume the air of abandoning without protection or succour, this poor little Queen, who has near her neither mother nor gouvernante, nor guardian nor any faithful and devoted servant. Would not this be an extremely suitable, praiseworthy, and well-selected moment, to send an ambassador to Spain, specially accredited to her in case of revolutionary movements ? Tlie government of Madrid would lia^'e no right to complain of this. The King would ])erf()rm an act of ])olitical foresight and family prot(>ction. Xo one could misunderstand it, and I cannot see, under any possible hypothesis, how evil consequences could result. I entreat tlic^ King to think well of this, and to communicate to me his im- pression." The King rejdied to my first letter on tlie 7th of August, 1(S41: "(iuecn Cliristina came to Saint Cloud tlie day of my departure. I spoke to her in the sense you d(>velop in your hotter of yesterday, and she entirely concurs in the o])ini()n." And to my second, on tlie IStli of August: 'T agree with you as to the favour- able ()j)j)()rtuiiity of placing an ambassador near Qirmmi lsul)(>lla II., and of thus covering her with all the i)ro- * M. Zt'u BiTimuK'z, receiilly (^uccmi Cliristiim's minister, still cuii- timu'd to 1)0, ill oxilc, iu-r inliiiiato and faitlifnl aihisor. 300 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) tection we can at this moment afford. 1 even much prefer that in tliis matter, we should take the initia- tive, before England. At the same time, I fear lest they should attach to this step an interpretation which, while falsifying its character and object, might lead to a result entirely opposed to what we seek to obtain. This interpretation would consist in making it ap- pear that the dispatch of an ambassador was an over- ture to Espartero and a homage to his regency. I think all will depend on the mode in which Queen Christina and her political friends may receive and qualify this step. Consequently, I wish you could see M. Zca early to-morrow morning, sufficiently so to enable you to have an interview afterwards vvith Queen Christina herself before you set out for Li- sieux. When you are assured of the manner in which the Queen and Zea will regard this act, should it be taken by them as I hope, then the measure is safe and we can immediately go forward. But if, on the con- trary, they see in it only an advantage to Espartero, then, I think, it will be better to give it up for the moment, and keep to the line we have hitherto fol- lowed ; that is to say, wait before we act, to see what the new English ministry does, and probably what it may wish to do in concert with us." The next day T wrote to the King in reply : " I have just seen M. Zea. lie is convinced that the iinin(M]iat(^ a})p()intment of an ambassador to Madrid would turn to tlie advantage of Espartero, and be icgardcd by tlie moderate! Jiarty as a serious clieck. VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSiO-1812.) 301 He much prefers that the King should wait the for- mation of the new English cabinet, which, he says, will be well disposed and even eager to act in con- cert with France. I find M. Zea's conviction so firm and sound that I have not considered it necessary to see Queen Christina on the same subject. I think, with your Majesty, that the measure could only be a good one, wlieu producing on all parties in Spain, whether moderate or extreme, an effect analogous to the intention with which it would be adopted. As this is not the case, we must wait." We did not wait long. As soon as the Tory ca- binet was formed, M. Zea withdrew his objection to the appointment of our ambassador at Madrid, and urged me to accomplish it. He had been long ac- quainted with Lord Aberdecni, by whom he was well known and esteemed. He felt confident that the new English cabinet, essentially monarchical and con- servative, would be the same in S[)ain, and would act in understanding with us. For my part, 1 considered it highly important that our ambassador sliould be appointed before the explosion of the troubles which all the world anticipated beyond the Pyrenees. If those troubles terminated in favour of the regent Espartero, tlie unexpected dispatch of an ambassador from France to Madrid became a platitude ; if, on the other hand. Queen Christina and lier partisans triumplied, our ambassador would only arrive in their suite, and as their instrument. Neitlier of these positions suited us. In the eyes of England, as of 302 VAEIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) Spain, we wished to be the friends of Queen Isa- bella and of the constitutional Spanish monarchy, not auxiliaries in the service of one of the parties which, under that system, violently contended for power. We had no confidence in the regent Espar- tero, neither had we any intention of entering the arena against him or of assisting his overthrow. We did not conceal our opinions and wishes as to the internal government of Spain, but we remained faithful to our policy of non-intervention. I re- quested the King to appoint this embassy without delay, and to confide it to M. de Salvandy; a man of elevated and enterprising mind, monarchical and liberal, with earnest though somewhat ostentatious sincerity, filled with sound political views, even when inclining to be exuberant and imperfectly balanced ; not invariably circumspect in the incidents and out- ward appearances of public life, but judicious in the main, capable of errors, but also of acknowledging them, and of loyally combating the consequences and sustaining the burden. Pie had been minister of public instruction in the cabinet of M. Mole, and I found a real advantage in detaching him from the o])positi()n and enrolling him in the ministry. He kiK>w and loved Spain, and willingly accepted the adventurous mission, to which he was appointed on tlio Otli of Sei)tember, 1841. Queen Christina re- ceived liim courteously, tliough with some dissatis- i'actioii ; she found that in sending an ambassador to Madrid tliiriiig the regency of Espartero, against VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ( 1810-1849.) 303 wliich slic had protested, that the King, her uncle, Mas less Cliristino than slie wished ; hut she was one of those wlio know how to yield without renouncing their opinions. M. de Salvandy was preparing for his departure wlien the news of General O'Donnell's insurrection in Xavarrc against Espartero reached Paris, in tlie early part of October, 1841, but still confus(>(l and witliout ascertained result. I felt, on receiving this intelligence, that the ne- cessity and at the same time the opportunity had ar- rived for communicating fully to the new Englisli cabinet our attitude, intention, and views, in our relations with Spain, I wrote immediately to M. de Sainte Aulaire, on the 11th of October: "I feel sure tliat in London, as elsewhere, they attribute to us what is now passing in Spain ; they believe that we are working to restore Queen Christina. I am not surprised at this ; it is a natural idea, conform- able to probability and appearances. Here follows the trutli as to what we have thouglit and done, with regard to Spain, for some years, and as to what we think and do to-day. •■• Our general disposition towards Queen Cln'istina is kind, from family feeling, as also from personal consickn'ation, as we think she merits and naturally insj)ires interest. '• Political motives liave co-operated witli our per- sonal good win. When, in 183'), in spite of an- cient traditions and important French interests wx^ acknowledged the regency of Queen Christina, it 304 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l8i0-1842.) was because we thought that she only was capable of governing Spain, of maintaining in that country some degree of royalty and order, in opposition to unintelligent absolutism and revolutionary radical- ism." "If all Europe had thus thought with France and England, if the five great powers had at once ac- knowledged the sovereignty of Isabella, the regency of Christina, and had exercised their combined in- fluence at Madrid, in all probability that influence would have diverted events into a difl'erent course, would have spared Spain many disasters, and Europe a host of embarrassments. " Despite her faults and misfortunes, we think that, in a general view. Queen Christina was not unequal to her situation. As long as she governed, she employed, to the profit of the good cause, for the advantage of the principles of order and justice, all the power and influence she possessed. She was often led astray, frequently vanquished, but she never ceased to struggle, and her defeat was the triumph of the spirit of anarchy. " Tliis, without concealment or exaggeration, has been the extent of our good feeling towards Queen Christina, her political capability and her motives. Facts have already demonstrated its limits. " After Queen Christina's fall, we accepted without licsitation or interruption, political relations with the regeiic y. at first provisional, and subsequently defini- tive, of l^s])artero. There has never been between VAKIOL'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSlO-1842.) 305 the two governments any rupture, even momentary, — any sliock, e^en concealed. I have openly declared in both Chambers that we should not interfere in the internal affiiirs of Spain ; that we should do nothing to prejudice her new government. '• Our conduct has been conformable with our lan- guage. For the advantage of the regent Espartero, as also for that of Queen Christina, we have retained Don Carlos in France, and as far as in us lay, have preserved Spain from civil war. Xeither against the regent Espartero nor against Queen Christina have we prosecuted the execution of engagements relative to the forty or fifty millions whicli Spain owes us, and wliich would liave reduced her to public bank- ruptcy. " Fresli opportunities for quarrel were not wanting to us. 'I'he proceedings of the new Spanish govern- ment towards France and her king have often been extremely unbecoming. A conflict was on the point of breaking out on our frontitu- on account of territories and rights of pasturage in dispute between the two countries. At Mahon, they decided on and almost commanded tlie evacuation of tlie islet Del Bey with- out even giving us notice. I passed by these oppor- tunities for embroilment. 1 was conciliatory in tlie midst of cold and sometimes critical relations ; I evinced neitlu^' susceptibility nor suspicion. Between the cabinet of ^ladrid and us tliere was no intimacy; but 1 never suffered ill-feeling to glide in for a moment. 306 VARIOUS FOKEIGN AFFAIRS. (1S40-1842.) " The residence of Queen Christina in France, and the friendly reception she has met with, are, I know, what have excited and still continue to excite the greatest suspicions. " How could this have been otherwise 1 If we had not received Queen Christina kindly, we should have failed in the first duties of relationship and honour, in the examples of mutual respect which sovereigns owe to each other. We should have equally dis- regarded the simplest counsels of prudence. Let us not dissemble facts. We have never thought well of the Spanish revolution of September, 1840, nor of the future of Espartero. W^e have ever dreaded, beyond the Pyrenees, fresh revolutionary explosions. We have looked upon Queen Christina as able to become, one day, an anchor of safety for Spain, — the only ])ossible channel of transaction and government. On this ground, also, I do not hesitate to say, we were bound to receive her, and treat her position with respect. " We have advised her to remain totally dis- connected with all plots against the new government of Madrid, We have told her that if she can ever be useful to Spain, it will be on condition of not being r(^pr()duced on the scene except by evident necessity, after the exhaustion and fall of opposing parties, not by th(> intrigues of her own party. In our own course, w(^ have stood absolutely aloof, not only from all action (>.\(Mcise(l in Spain by the partisans of Queen Christina, but even from all communication with VAKIoUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1S40-1S42.) 307 them. Wc have rejected every insinuation of this nature, and have scrupulously observed, towards the Spanish government, the suggestions of prudence and the dictates of integrity. I affirm that we are com- pletely strangers to what has lately burst forth in Spain, — we have in no manner connived at it, — we had no previous information ; we have neither ren- dered nor intend to render it the slightest assistance. We do not ignore the difficulties of our position with the government of Madrid, and Ave cannot escape from this, for we are unable to change the position itself. Neitlier shall we change anything in our con- duct. It will continue to be, as it has been for a year, perfectly loyal and pacific. We have just now given a proof of this, by decreeing, in compliance with the desire of M. Olozaga,* tliat tlie Carlists mIio had assembled on the frontier to return to Spain in virtue of the amnesty, should be removed from thence and sent back to our departments of the interior. '" This, my dear friend, is what actually exists, and what I liave to say, with reference to passing events. But, evidently, and whatever may be the result of the movement now exploding, we must think of the future of Spain. " Of the three parties in action there, the absolu- tists and Don Carlos, the moderates and Queen Chris- tina, the extreme liberals and the Regent Es])artero or tutor Arguelles, neither is sufficiently strong nor * Envoy llxtraordinary and Minister Plonipotontiar}' of Spain in FraTu'o, since the roi,'CMU'y of Espartero. X 2 308 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) wise to conquer its adversaries ; to restrain them and re-establish order and regular government in the country. Spain will not reach this result but by an understanding between the three. " On the other hand, this understanding can never be effected unless France and England labour to that end in concert. The rivalry of France and England in Spain — their struggles for influence — the opposi- tion of their patronages, — these causes alone suffice to feed the war of Spanish parties and to strike them all with impotence when they reach government. " A good intelligence and common action between France and England are indispensable to the pacifi- cation of Spain. " And as Lord Aberdeen most truly said to you, in order that France and England may understand each other and act in concert in Spain, it is essential that they should not be the only actors on that stage, and that the other great powers should appear there with them. With two, it is to be apprehended that rivalry miglit continue. With five, we may hope that a more general and elevated interest would ultimately pre- vail. " Undoubtedly, interests of a secondary class will not cease to exist. Undoubtedly, there will always be, between France and England, as regards Spain, questions of national self-love and traditional jealousy, questions of alliance and marriage. I do not miscon- ceive the iin])()rtance and (Hfficulty of these questions 1 do not hesitate to say, that on all, we shall be found VAIilOUS FOREIGN AIFAIUS. (lS40-lSi2.) 309 moderate and conciliatory, without reserved thoughts or exclusive pretensions. — I have nothing more to add at present. We earnestly desire the pacification of Spain ; it is essential to our repose and prosperity. We cannot suffer a hostile influence to be established there at the expense of our own. But I affirm that, on the theatre of Spain pacified and regularly go- verned, as soon as we no longer see cause to fear for our just interests and rights, we shall be disposed to live in harmony with all the world, and neither to desire nor do anything to inspire reasonable uneasi- ness for the proper balance of strength and influence in Europe." When forwarding this letter to M. de Sainte Aulaire I added : " Read it to Lord Aberdeen, and although strictly private and confidential, offer him a copy. It is the true expression of our position and views. I \\ish it to remain under the eyes of Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel. It is impossible to predict the issue of the insurrection of the Clinsfinos. At pre- sent, I can scarcely augur anything from it but a new cause of anarchy in the country and impotence in the government. I tremble for those two little girls. It is a situation of the middle ages and of Shake- speare." When the reports of the insurrection of the 67/ W6f/>/05 reached London. Lord Aberdeen at first evinced little emotion. He s])()ke of it coldly to M. de Sainte Aulaire, adding, as if incidentally, " 1 would not give too much utterance to this idea ; but, in reality, I see no safety 310 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) for Spain except in a union of the parties of Queen Christina and Don Carlos by means of a marriage." Two days after, he was more animated, as M. de Sainte Aulaire assured him that we had taken no part in what was passing in Navarre. " Here again," he said, " are things that I am bound to believe in the face of all probability; but assuredly you will find many incredulous. Is not Queen Christina in Paris 1 Is she not going to place herself at the head of the insurrection ?" "When M. de Sainte Aulaire read and delivered to him on the 15th of October my letter of the 11th, he was much struck by it ; he kept it a few days, and on returning it, said, that he had shown it to Sir Robert Peel and also to the Queen, " whom it had greatly interested." " I believe," he added, " all that M. Guizot affirms, but it will be difficult to convince Madrid. However, the prejudices I entertained against Espartero, on entering office, are now diminished. I find him moderate, without great talents, but ani- mated by good intentions and disposed to hear reason. But I have written to Mr. Aston, directing him, in his intercourse with the regent, to confine himself within the reserve which the principles of public right re- quire towards a recognized government, without exag- geration, and without compromising himself by too eager manifestations." It was not only at Madrid that it was difficult to impress the belief that we had no part in the insur- rection of tlie Clirisfinos^ and that we had no designs in Spain Ix^yond wliat I had explained to M. de Sainte VARIOUS FOl^EIGN AFFAIRS, (l SiO-lS42.) 311 Aulairc. i'hoy wrote from Paris to London, tliat, in all probability, I was, individnally, a stran<2^cr to the insurrection ; but that the same could not be believed of the King or of ^larshal Soult. They related the frequent intervie^^s of the King with Queen Chris- tina, the joy wliich he was said to have evinced on learning the rising of O'Donnell ; they spoke of audi- ences given by Marshal Soult to some Chrhfino of- ficers setting out for Spain. King T.ouis Philippe sometimes allowed too mucli scope to his first impres- sions, and Marshal Soult cared little for unity and co- herence in his proceedings. But whatever might be the King's sudden ebullitions, he held firmly to his general ])olicy, and the marshal served it without em- barrassment in the midst of the deviations and contra- dictions which for a moment he found useful or con- venient. ]3oth were well determined not to impli- cate France and themselves in the affairs of S})ain, and the error of the diplomatists was to attach to trifling facts, meanings and consequences beyond what they possessed. Tlie sus])ici()us know not the extent of their own credulity, nor how lightly, in their eager- ness to believe what is possible, they mistake what is true. The failure ot the insurrection speedily put an end to these reports and doubts thus rendered unimpor- tant. At Madrid, as in the provinces, the regent Es- ])arter() trinmplied ra])idly. Tlie most brilliant and devoted of Queen Christina's partisans, (ieneral Diego Leon, was taken ])risoner and shot. At Paris, the re- 312 VARIOUS FOKEIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-18i2.) suit of the regent's victory was a visit from M. Olozaga, who came to inform me that he had received orders to demand the expulsion of Queen Christina from France; in case of refusal, he added, he was instructed to de- mand his passports. I did not wait to consult the King and the cabinet to tell him that in answer he would receive nothing but a refusal, and at the same time 1 directed M. de Salvandy to delay his depar- ture. The King, whom I informed immediately, replied : "As to the departure of M. de Salvandy, it seems to be impossible to let him go without know- ing how this impertinent demand of Olozaga will terminate. You think it has been suggested to him here. I think with you; but judging from Spanish arrogance and their fear of compromising themselves witli the tribune or the journals, it is probable that whoever may be the inventors, the government ot Espartero will support him. We shall see. I hope the answer will be rather lofty. If Olozaga takes it quietly and gives in, we shall say, ' Good ; take your departure, Salvandy,' should he not be retained by other reasons. But it is clear that we should be much entangled by the departure of Salvandy, if Olo- zaga, confining himself within the circle of Popilius, sliould tell us to drive away Queen Christina or give liiin his passports. In that case it would be to him we sliould have to say 'Good;' and, 'go, Olozaga.' I think in tliat case tliere would not be amonsst us a The cabinet was unanimous, and the refusal peremp- VARIOLS FOKKIGX AFFAIRS. (lSKJ-lmonstrated toAvards us moderate and conciliatory dispositions. Instead of addressing to us inopportune and haughty demands, or complaints, M. Olozaga consulted Mr. Bulwer, first secretary of tlie English embassy, as to the method he should adopt to obtain from us the answers or demonstra- tions they desired at Madrid. I then wrote to M. dv Sainte Aulaire, on the 22nd of November, 1841 ; 314 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) " The cord slackens between us and Spain. The atti- tude taken by the regent Espartero against the anar- chists, permits us to modify ours towards him. The ships we had sent to Barcelona have returned. With- out removing from our frontier of the Pyrenees the troops already arrived there, we retard the move- ment of those who were in march for that quarter. Very probably M. de Salvandy will soon set out for Madrid." M. de Sainte Aulaire replied on the 24th : " I believe that the moment has arrived for the depar- ture of M. de Salvandy. I think he would do well at Madrid, and I am sure that the effect would be advantageous in London. I strongly approve the attitude we have taken, and I see no reason to remove our troops from the frontier ; but the absence of the ambassador leaves the field free to our rivals, and while it gives them advantages over us, it keeps them in a humour daily increasing in bitterness, and which will shortly become clironic. I have given M. de Salvandy credit with Lord Aberdeen for his favour- able dispositions towards Espartero ; I have said they were known to you, and that this selection for Ma- diid gave the lie to the malevolence imputed to us against the regent. Lord Aberdeen listened to me with evident satisfaction, and the departure of our ambassa- dor would dissipate suspicions -which may embarrass our ])()licy without advantage." M. do Salvandy left Paris for Madrid on the 29th of November, and his instrnctions clearly determined t\w ])afitic and impartial character of his mission. VARIOUS FOKKKiX AFFAIRS. (l'^iO-18i2.) 315 Entering Spain on the 8th of December, liis journey from Irun to Madrid, was a species of triumph. " The kin^^^'s embassy," he wrote to me on his ar- rival, on the 22nd of December, 1841, "lias received on the I'oad, from the Spanish government, repeated tokens of respect and solicitude. The alcaldes of all the towns and villages, without exception, came wdth compliments and offers of their services. Meanwhile, on the frontier, it was not received with the customary salutes ; but the harangues addressed to it by all mili- tary, ecclesiastical, and ciAil authorities at Irun, and the salvos at St. Sebastian do not permit the suppo- sition that this neglect was either concerted or preme- ditated. I shall, however, make an observation with respect to this, in the interest of the future. At Irun, the speeches were full of respect and attachment to France ; the alliance of the two nations, the special need of this alliance for the Spanish people, the ap- peal to French action to assure the union of all par- ties, were the texts most frequently and energetically develo])ed. In the Bas(pi{> ])rovinces, the eageiTiess of the ])eoph' united itself visibly to tlie official proceed- ings of th(> authorities. At A'ittoria, the captain- general, notwithstanding the advanced hour of the night, remained up to receive me. At Burgos, Lieu- tenant-General de Iloyos, captain-general, visited me imnKHliately on my arrival. I did not think it neces- sary to present myself to the Infants. In this last town, the political chief and the alcaldes vehemently urged on me the error into which the French govern- 316 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l8iO-1842.) ment would fall, if it believed the Spaniards inclined towards revolutionary ideas or English influence ; the cause of order, they said, the consolidation of the monarchy, and aff"ection for France, are in the hearts of all Spaniards. In many cantons of the Basque provinces, I found still animated traces of the devas- tations of the civil war. In the Castilles, the ravages of the war of independence are not yet effaced. After twenty-one years, I have observed few changes ; the principal ones I remarked are more regular and fre- quent communications, cultivation advanced, and the appearance of the troops improved. These latter are very dilapidated in French eyes, but less so than in 1820." Three days later, M. de Salvandy again wrote : " A serious incident has presented itself. The Spanish cabinet refuses to acknowledge the ambassador accre- dited to Queen Isabella II. It assumes that the cre- dentials should be handed and the ambassador pre- sented to the Regent, as the constitutional depositary of tlie regal authority. I have peremptorily declined these unexpected pretensions, and wait the King's orders." In the first phrase there was a little exaggeration and confusion. The Spanish cabinet did not refuse to acknowledge the ambassador accredited to Queen Isabella 11. ; it expressed neither surprise nor com- ])laint tliat the credentials were addressed to the young Queen herself; it assumed that they ought to be de- livered to tlie Regent, the constitutional depositary of VAHIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIUS. (iSlO-lStg.) 317 the rci^al authority. M. de Salvandy maintained that in his quality of ambassador, representing personally the King of the French near the Queen of Spain, it was to the Queen personally, although a minor, that he ought to hand his letters of credence, without hindrance to the transaction of all affairs with the Re- gent only and his ministers. lie founded this privi- lege on monarchical principles, on the constant usage of the European courts, and especially on what had passed between France and Spain themselves in 1715, when the Count de Cellamare, Spanish ambassador in France, had presented his credentials to I^ouis XV., a minor, and not to the regent, the ]3uke of Orleans. The Spanisli cabinet replied, through the organ of M. Antonio Gonzales, minister for foreign affairs, that the Hegent exercising in terms of Article 59 of the Spanisli constitution, the full authority of king, it was to him tliat tlie credentials of the foreign representatives should be delivered. A long discus- sion ensued between the ambassador and minister ; several notes were exchanged ; various modes of ac- commodation were attempted. M. de Salvandy de- clared himself ready to present his credentials to the Queen in presence of the Regent, who might receive them immediately from her Majesty's hand and open them in her presence. It was proposed to M. de Salvandy to give all the eclat he could desire to his reception by tlie Regent in the Queen's palace, adding that as soon as he had handed his letters of credence to the Regent, he would be authorized to deliver to 318 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) the young Queen the private letters of Queen Chris- tina her mother, or of King Louis Philippe her uncle, of which he might be the bearer. The discussion only confirmed the two diplomatists in the position they had assumed and the thesis they maintained, while every attempt at accommodation failed under the im- perious pretensions of the two principles in contest. It was truly an active struggle between two princi- ples. In giving me an account of the difficulty that had arisen, M. de Salvandy added : " I feel convinced that the hand of an ally has directed all. In a con- ference with Mr. Aston, — and I mentioned this to M. Pageot before this incident intervened, — I saw the obstinate Whig, the determined and impassioned con- tinuator of Lord Palmerston's policy, who finds, in the part he plays here, a double gratification, that of re- venging himself on France, as also on the very cabinet that employs him. My careful and cordial expressions on the alliance of the two nations, and the relations of tlie two governments, extracted from him no reply. Neither could I obtain any to my assurances of sin- cere and sustained efforts to establish a perfect under- standing with him. His features and tone alone re- sponded. His external politeness had not concealed from me his vexation at being no longer alone on this theatre, and at seeing liis influence disputed. Let me repeat tliatl fully adopted this impression and formed this judgincut previous to the incident which has oc- curred." M. de Salvandy's impressions were just, but (^xtrcme, and he attached to them, as was his frequent VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (lSt()-lSi2.) 319 practice, consequences too important. Mr. Aston's dispositions were not more favourable tlian he inter- preted them ; accustomed to represent and practise the policy of suspicion and hostility between France and England in Spain, the minister of Lord Palmer- ston had more taste for the inspirations of his old chief than for those of Lord Aberdeen, and in all pro- babilit}', he troubled himself very little as to the dis- agreement that sprang up between the new French ambassador and the Spanish government ; but his at- titude was embarrassed and weak rather than clear and active ; he did not guide the regent Espartero and his counsellors in the quarrel in which they engaged ; he merely followed them, writing to London, that, according to his idea, they were in the riglit, and even striving to hold his ground in Madrid by not opposing them. He might have employed a favourable in- fluence which he did not seek, and that which he ex- ercised was bad though feeble. The instincts and passions of the extreme party, at that time dominant in Spain and with the Kegent, were the true springs of the movement. That party felt shocked at the secon- dary position to which the denuuid of the French am- bassador reduced their chief; sliocked that, during the legal inaction of hereditary power, elective autho- rity sliould not count for everything under all cir- cumstances of govennnent. The party did not con- temj)late the abolition of monarchy, but it held mon- archical considerations in little value, and was ruled by radical sentiments. It believed the judgment and 320 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l8 10-1842.) honour of the constitution to be engaged in the quar- rel. It was neither the action of the English minister, nor the plots of intriguers who sought their personal fortune in hostility to France, but the general and deeply rooted disposition of the party then in powder that decided the obstinacy with which the Regent and his advisers persisted in their refusal to accede to the demand of our ambassador.^ Whatever might have been the causes and authors of the event, we entirely approved the conduct of M. de Salvandy, to whom I wrote thus, on the 22nd of December, 1841: "The King's government has not learnt without lively astonishment the unexpected obstacle which has retarded the delivery of your cre- dentials. The pretence set up by the Spanish minis- ter is totally inadmissible, and contrary to all known precedents. Excepting the very few cases in which the regency has been exercised by a royal personage, the father or mother of the monarch, letters of cre- dence have always been delivered to the sovereign to whom they were addressed. You have quoted an apt instance in what occurred in France during the minority of Louis XV., and on the presentation of tlie Spanish ambassador himself. This example car- ries irresistible weight in the present case. Another instance, by its recent date and circumstances, applies even more specially to the difficulty wliich has so unexpectedly sprung up ; I allude to what took ])lace in Brazil, a few years since, wlien M. Feijo was elevated to the regency. lie also demanded that VARIOUS F.)Ri:iGN AFFAIRS. (lS10-l>5i>.) 821 letters of credence should be delivered to him ; but the King's govemment refused to consent, and M. Feijo ultimately gave in. In Greece, during the mi- nority of King Otho, the question was not even raised. The usage of which we claim the mainten- ance has been uniformly adopted until now, and is founded on motives so powerful that it would be super- fluous to detail them. Evidently, when the sovereign is incapacited by non-age from exercising the active functions of monarchy, it is most important, in the interest of the monarchical principle, to leave him the external appurtenances, and thus to preserve in the mind of peoples those habits of respect which a complete eclipse of royalty might impair. AVe can- not even catch a glimpse (*f the arguments that might be opposed to considerations of so much weight. It is, therefore, I repeat, impossible for us to admit the pretensions of the S})anis]i government. Inasmuch as we have no idea of modifying to its prejudice the established practice of the law of nations, so are we equally called upon not to fail in a sacred duty by sacrificing, to gratify it in a matter in which it has not thoroughly calculated its situation and interests, those tutelary forms, tlie abandonment of whicli might entail serious consequences. We incline to think that mature reflection will lead to a more just estimate of tlie question, and that reducing its demands to the literal sense of the letter of M. (jonzales, the Spanish government will confine itself to recpiiring what we find perfectly natural, — the Y 322 VARIOUS FOKEIGN AFFAIKS. (l840-1842.) presence of the Regent at the delivery of the creden- tials, which would immediately pass from the Queen's hands into his. If we are deceived in our hopes, if, notwithstanding the observations I now forward to you, the Spanish government persists in its preten- sions, the King desires you to quit Madrid at once ; and M. Pageot, who has never lost his character as charge d'affaires, as you have had no opportunity of assuming that of ambassador, will, in due course, re- sume his functions." Before my dispatch reached Madrid, the contro- versy there had continued with increased irritation. The Cortes were opened without the presence of the French ambassador or any member of his suite. In the embarrassment caused by the non-delivery of his credentials, he had been invited to attend in an awk- ward and unbecoming manner, by merely sending him a simple note in his personal name, which he immediately returned with this brief formula: "The ambassador of France returns, to the official intro- ducer of ambassadors, the enclosed letter, which is not suitably addressed to him." On both sides, feel- ings of wounded dignity and personal jealousy min- gled themselves with the interchange of arguments. Sustained by the formal approbation of the two Spanish Chambers, by the Senate as well as by the Cortes, the Regent and his advisers entrenched them- si'lvos fjom day to day more strongly behind their constitutional scruples. Under the shadow of these scruples, the faction hostile to France vigorously VAHIOUS FOUEIGN AFFAIHS. (iSlO-lSii?.) 323 prosecuted its iutngiies against us. The English minister lent a cold and embarrassed concurrence to insignificant attempts at conciliation. My dis- ])atcli of the 22nd of ]3ecember reaching M. de Sal- vnndy in the midst of this tightened and warm posi- tion, scarcely satisfied him. In the effervescence of his imagination, ever inclined to exaggerate all mat- ters, he had dreamt of eveiything as a consequence of the incident in which he was involved, except his recall. He wrote to me without delay, on the 29th of December, 1841 ; " If I do not obtain the result I seek for, and which your dispatches, once more, urge me to prosecute more vigorously, I see only two measures for adopti(m ;— to wait, or strike. " To wait ; relations with Spain being suspended, and tlie interests of France, in which I include those of the Spanish royalty, placed under the safeguard of certain vetoes so ch^arly expressed as to command the attention of all the world, and so legitimate as to arm no one in opposition. This is a policy which com])romisos nothing, and, in tlie end, assures all. The Spanish governnunit, wliich you see, with knees on the ground, soliciting the recognition of distant monarchies, will understand the value of amicable relations \\ ith ours, when it feels, as it instantly will, the conse([uences of tlu-ir interruption. Tlie mo- narchical party resuming its conse(iuence and arms, tlu^ nnolutionists their exactions and firebrands; an importunate protectorate menacing all the vital in- terests of tlie coun<^ry, and, above all, wounding its V -2 324 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1810-1842.) pride ; the established power everywhere encounter- ing resistance and speedily competition ; that of the theoretical republic imagined by Arguelles, or quite another matter, the armed republic represented by Eodil ; concession and violence becoming the two resources in which that power would rapidly engulf itself Such would be the consequences, if France, opening her hand to civil war to allow it a free pas- sage, and reducing Spain to bankruptcy by enforcing her lawful claims, as I have heard you so often say, docs not take upon herself to hasten the period of an inevitable reaction. " This reaction would so rapidly make itself felt, that to avoid the consequences I enumerate, and which would appear from the commencement, I feel it to be beyond dispute that an admissible and be- coming return would on the instant be offered to French action. " England would be the first to desire and second tliis. " The other plan would be more prompt and clear. There was a time when, to put an end to the dangei's to which the revolutionary state of this country ex- ])()ses our ])eace and monarchy, the King's policy ^^()uld have accepted the legitimate opportunities wliich the folly and audacity of this government ()fl["er(>(l to it. At that period I should have felt un- easy at such a ])()licy. Your Excellency remembers this. 1 should have wished that, with all tlie com- j)U(ati()iis of events and the accusations emanating VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l8iO-lS42.) 325 therefrom, the lawfubiess of the opportunities had been less evident, so as to induce us to leave Spain, offensive through parties and revolutionary govern- ment, to her own strength. It is my duty to add, that, from a distance, I believed in that strength ; I spoke of a second Africa on our frontiers. To-day, with firm and prompt decision, I believe neither in an Africa nor a Europe. I persist in my opinion that the present Spanish government may be made to last, with laborious care, with good counsels if they are listened to, witli good intentions if they are appre- ciated, and with favourable chances, if God sends them. This is the difficulty. The facility lies in beat- ing down the scaffolding of a revolution which does not rest on a people, of a usurpation which does not depend on a man. ... I know not the future in re- serve for the King's policy, nor the weight that may be attached to my words ; but right or wrong, at tlie risk of deceiving myself, knowing all that an error might produce, and owing to tlu* government of my country what appears to me tlie truth, I declare, that to put an end to all this, in my opinion, we re- quire scarcely twenty thousand men, twenty days, and a ])rete.\t. The pretext }()u are already furnished with. "1 paus(» here. Sir and Minister; I came with the ambition, since sucli was the King's d(>sire, of recon- (piering this kingdom for France by policy ; others have rendered tliis work impossible of accomplisli- ment, by rendering it impracticable for me to make 326 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) the attempt. I think I see other means of reconquer- ing Spain to our alliance, maxims, and civilization, to our constitutional liberty, to the blood and policy of Louis the Fourteenth. I have indicated to you two, to wait or march on. I do this safely^ for the King will decide the question, and you are his minister." I adopted neither of M. de Salvandy's propositions. I found them both violent and chimerical, exceeding the exigencies of the position, and calculated to bring on consequences totally opposite to those he foresaw. The King and the council thought with me, and on the 5th of January, 1842, I replied to the ambas- sador : " The King's will, which I have already an- nounced to you by telegraph, is, that if the misun- derstanding in which you are engaged with relation to the delivery of your credentials has not terminated in conformity with our just requirements, you will, on the moment of receiving this dispatch, demand your passports, and leave Madrid immediately for France. " You express to me your opinion that for the dig- nity of France, as also in the interest of Spain, your recall should be followed by one of these two mea- sures — the dispatcli of a French army beyond the Pyrenees, or at least the absolute rupture of diplo- matic relations between tlie States. The King's go- vernment, after Inning maturely weighed the consi- derations you urg(^ in support of tliese alternatives, ronsid(Ms it impossible to accept either. On the one liand, in what relates to the dispatch of a French VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1S40-1812.) 327 army to Spain, it seem to it that the incident which causes your recall, would not sufficiently justify, in j)ublic opinion, such an extreme measure, the con- sequences of which, near or possible, appear more serious than the inciting causes. On the other hand, it is evident that between two contiguous countries which have continually to discuss so many essential interests, entirely unconnected with politics, the total interruption of all diplomatic relations could not as- sume a permanent state, nor even a position of any considerable duration ; and that we could not reason- ably assume such an attitude, except, so to speak, on the eve and in the form of a declaration of war already certain. " The King and his council have therefore not thought it practicable to adopt either of the deter- minations you suggest. Meanwhile, we have equally recognized that after the notoriety which has taken place, matters could not be replaced purely and simply on the footing they occupied formerly, and that the King's government is bound to signify, in an nne(jui- voeal manner, its just displeasure. Tliey refused at Madrid to allow the Queen to receive tlie ambas- sador accredited to lier by the King of the French. Tlie King will not receiv(> near himself any Spanish agent accredited to Paris with a title superior to tliat of chargo d'affaires. M. Pageot will remain as our charg(> d'affaires to the Spanisli ministry, and I re- (piest you to deliver to liim tlie accompanying dis- ])at(h, whicli instructs liim to make this declaration to M. (ion/.ales." 328 V7\RI0US FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) When this final dispatch reached him, M. de Sal- vandy was still in Spain, but had left Madrid ; he de- parted from that city on the 6th of January, leaving as charge d'affaires, not the first secretary to the em- bassy, M. Pageot, himself deeply engaged in the quar- rel, but the second secretary, the Duke de Gliicksberg, " whose precocious maturity, sound judgment, self- restraint, and reserve," he wrote to me, " give me the fullest confidence as to all that the situation may em- brace of delicacy and difficulty." I shared the confi- dence of the ambassador in his young official, and con- firmed the arrangement. He had not yet quitted the Spanish soil, when Lord Cowley came on the 9th Janu- ary, to communicate to me a letter from Lord Aber- deen to Mr. Aston, dated the 7th, and forvvarded to Madrid by a courier, who, he said, had not stopped in passing. 1 had duly informed our ambassador in Lon- don of all the incidents of our dispute with the Span- ish cabinet, instructing him at the same time to com- municate fully to Lord Aberdeen the facts and docu- ments. From the first moment, Lord Aberdeen said to liim, " that in such a matter precedents had great autliority and ought to be carefully verified ; that a jn'iori he was disposed to agree with us and to con- sider- tlie demand of Spain as highly impolitic; that if Mr. Aston liad encouraged it he was much to blame, but that nothing justificMl such a supposition." "1 asked I A)V(\ AbenhuMi," added M. de Sainte Aulaire, "whether he wouhl not make known at Madrid his opinion on this incident ; li(> r(>])lied that a dispatch from hini VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ( 18 10-1 842.) 329 would probably arrive too late to exercise any influ- ence on the solution ; that nevertheless he was dis- ])()sed to write it after conferring with Sir Robert l^eel, and witli this object he requested me to leave with him the documents I had just read." I cannot deny myself the pleasure of inserting here this letter to Mr. Aston, which at the request of M. de Sainte Aulaire, Lord Aberdeen instructed Lord Cowley to communicate to me ; a brilliant testi- mony of the steady equity and perfect loyalty, which in spite of prejudices, suspicions, and national rou- tines, and while maintaining the English policy, he evinced from that moment in the relations of En- gland with France in regard to Spain. "It is neces- sary," he wrote to Mr. Aston, " that I should speak to you with the most perfect frankness on the subject of tlie (piarrel between the Spanish government and the French ambassador. You know without doubt that it is imputed exclusively to your influence. This is not alone the conviction of M. de Salvandy and of the Fr(>nch government. I have seen letters from Madrid, wiitten by persons wlio have no relations with them, but filled with the same ])ersuasion. I need not tell you that 1 attach no credit to these reports, and that 1 believe you liuv(> endeavourcnl, by conciliatory mea- sures, to accommodate tliis misunderstanding. But at the same time, as you liave acted under the idea that tlie Spanisli government was well founded in its pre- tensions, it is clear that your advice, in whatever mode you mav Ikinc given it, and you have not explained this 330 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) to me in detail, was not calculated to produce much effect. " No one can be more disposed than I am to sup- port the Spanish government when in the right, es- pecially against France. But in this case I think it decidedly wrong, and I much regret that your judg- ment, usually so sound, should have arrived at any other conclusion. The justification that the Spanish government pretends to find in Article 59 of the con- stitution, is a mere cavil, and such a sophism suffices to inspire serious doubts of its sincerity. Consider it certain that if the present course is persevered in, it must bid adieu to all hope of the recognition of Queen Isabella by the Northern powers. They would see in it, and very naturally, only an adroit attempt by the revolutionary party to lower the monarchy, an attempt supported by English jealousy at the aspect of French iiifluence. " I am not surprised that the Spaniards regard with suspicion every step of France, and that they see in all some intention of slighting the Regent and his au- thority. In the present case, I believe this suspicion to be inifoundcd, and that the French mission has been undertaken in an amicable spirit and urged by our desire. The natural proceeding, simple and quite obvious, was, without any doubt, that the ambassador sliould ])rosent liis letters of credence to the Queen, to whom they wer(> ad(lress(>d ; and tliough I attri- bute tlie difhculty which has arisen to an ill-founded suspicion of the Spauisli government, otliers see in it VAKIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1SI0-1S12.) 331 a premeditated abasement of royalty and a determi- nation to quarrel, at any risk, witli France. "I do not hear tliat M. de Salvandy set forth any pretension as a family ambassador, or that he attempted to revive ancient privileges of communication with the Queen of Spain, beyond the rules which the Spanish government might consider it necessary or convenient to establish. Any attempt of this kind would call for firm resistance. As the family compact has ceased to exist, the French ambassador ought to be on the same footing with all the others. '' I need not tell you that this affair has been the source of much embarrassment and displeasure. If M. de Sahandy has not yet left Madrid, I do not de- si)air of your being able to bring about an accommo- dation. There will be violent harangues in the Cortes ; tlie two governments will be more and more compro- mised, and each day will aggravate the difficulty. It is not improbable that within a short time from tlie prc'sent, very serious consequences may manifest them- selves. At present, we look upon the Spauisli govern- ment as entirely in tlie wrong ; but this incident will be cMiergetically rt^sented in France, and the course of things may perhaps lead the French to aggression. Our ])()siti()n then will be extremely difficult and com- plicated. I'iVen though in the end the Spanish go- vernment iniLi^lit be riglit, tlie origin of the quarrel would be always wrong. •' In recommending to you prompt and energetic efforts to bring the Spanish authorities to more tract- 332 VAEIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1810-1842.) able dispositions in this unfortunate question, I leave you the choice of means to be adopted with this view ; you must know, better than any one else, how success may be obtained, and I affirm that you could not render a greater service to Spain and to the public interest." As Lord Aberdeen anticipated, his letter reached Madrid too late to exercise any influence on the ques- tion in agitation there ; but for me, it furnished a leading and valuable evidence of the elevation and equity of mind he carried into the relations of the two governments. I communicated it to M. de Salvandy, who had halted at Bayonne ; he returned immediately to Paris, reassured and even satisfied with himself as Lord Aberdeen had approved of his conduct. I ad- dressed on the 5th of February, 1842, to the various representatives of France in Europe, a circular in- tended to explain thoroughly in all quarters the atti- tude we had assumed with the Spanish government, the principles which had governed us, and the adhe- sion we had received from all the great cabinets ; and the incident concluded without detriment to our posi- tion in Spain, and without producing any embarrass- ment in Europe. Amongst the cabinets which testified their complete a])])r()bation of our principles and attitude in this oc- currence, I abstain(>d in my circular from naming St. Fctersburgli. "\\'e had, at this precise moment, en- tered witli tlie court of liussia into a personal and straitciHMl position. It is well known that the Em- ])eror Nicliolas liad never in liis correspondence given VARIOUS F()l{i:iGN AFFAIUS. (lSiO-lSl2.) 333 to King Louis Pliilippc, as he was accustomed to do with other sovereigns, the title of Sir, my Brother; and that the King had appeared to hold no account of this tacit offence between the two sovereigns, in the bosom of peace between the two States. It was the custom every year, on the 1st of January and also on the 1st of May, the fete-day of King Louis Philippe, for the diplomatic corps, with the various national authorities, to offer to the King its homage, and he amongst the foreign ambassadors who found himself, at that epoch, the oldest of the body, spoke in the general name. Several times this mission had fallen to the liussian ambassador, who acquitted himself of it without embarrassment, as any of his colleagues would have done. On the 1st of May, 1834, amongst other periods, and also on the 1st of January, 1835, Count Pozzo di Borgo, at that time the senior ambas- sador in Paris, had been, with the King, and in strict propriety, the interpreter of their sentiments. In the autumn of 1841, Count d'Appony, at that time senior of the diplomatic body, was absent from Paris, and his return was not to take place until after the 1st of January, 1842. Count de Pahlen, Russian am- bassador, and next to Count d'Appony the oldest of the ambassadors, was invited to re])lace liim in the ceremony of the 1st of January, On tlie 31st of Oc- tober, he called upon me and read a dispatch, dated the 12tli, wliich lie liad just received from Count de Nesselrode, expressing the regret of the Emperor Nicholas at not having been able to invite his ambas- 334 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) saclor from Carlsbad to Warsaw, and his desire to converse with him. As no important affair required his presence in Paris, at that moment, the Emperor ordered him to repair to St. Petersburgh, without otherwise fixing precisely the moment of his depar- ture. Count de Pahlen neither gave me nor did I ask any explanation, and he set out accordingly on the 11th of November following. On that same day, the 11th of November, I for- warded the following instructions to M. Casimir Pe- rier, who happened to be charge d'affaires at St. Petersburgh during the absence on leave of our am- bassador M. de Barante : " The Count de Pahlen has received a very unexpected order to repair to St. Petersburgh, and left Paris this day. The motive alleged in Count de Nesselrode's dispatch, which he read to me, is that the Emperor, not having been able to see him at Warsaw, desires to converse with him. The real cause, whicli is a mystery to no one, is, that in consequence of the absence of the Count d'Appony, the Pussian ambassador, as the eldest of the diplomatic corps, found himself called upon to compliment the tlie King, on New Year's day, in the name of the wliole body. When he waited on the King to an- nounce his departure, his Majesty said to him, ' I al- ways see Count de Pahlen near me with pleasure, and I regret his removal ; beyond this, I have nothing to sa} .' To the ambassador lie addressed not a word." '' Altlioiigh we are accustomed to the strange pro- ceedings of tlie Emperor Nicholas, this last step has VARIOUS FOHKIGN AFFAIRS. (lSlO-lS12.) 335 caused some sensation. More astonishment is ex- pressed by the diplomatic corps than by the public, at this puerile obstinacy in the exhibition of useless ill- temper, and if we could liave been hurt by it, the sentiment it inspires would have amply satisfied us. One answer alone suits us. On St. Nicholas's day,* the French leo^ation at St. Petersburg!! will confine itself to its hotel. You will assign no serious motive to explain this unusual retirement. You will simply name indisposition in reply to the invitation which according to custom you will undoubtedly receive from M. de Xesselrode." On the 21st of December, M. Casimir Perier re- plied as follows: — "On the 18th of this month, I conformed exactly to the orders your Excellency had delivered to me, carefully avoiding at tlie same time all that might increase irritation. The day following, the 19th, on the occasion of the ball at the palace to celebrate his Imperial Majesty's y<:V^, and at which I considered that my absence from the circle cm the preceding eve, prevented me from appearing, and during these forty-eight hours, I confined myself within the hotel of the embassy. This year, there was no dinner at the Vice-Chancellor's. Up to this moment, the official relations of the embassy with the Imperial cabinet or court have experienced no altera- tion. 1 have ascertained, however, that the absence of the French legation was much remarked, and j)ro- * Tlu> IStli of l)ei'i'mI)or, in the Kiissiau caleiidar ; tiie 0th, acoord- iiiir to ours. 336 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) ducecl a great sensation. No one entertained any doubt as to the cause. The Emperor exhibited much excitement. He has declared that he looks upon this demonstration as personally directed against him- self, and, as might be expected, his own intimate circle have not failed to exceed the imperial disposi- tion. I could not avoid thinking, and have already been given to understand, that my relations with society would undergo visible modifications." Three days later, on the 24th of December, M. Casimir Perier added: "The French Embassy has been interdicted and placed under ban in society at St. Petersburgh. I am thoroughly convinced that this order proceeds from the Emperor. All doors are closed against us. No Russian will appear here. Evening parties and dinners to which I had been invited with Madame Perier have been postponed; persons whose houses were open to us and who had fixed days of reception, have requested us, tlirough intermediaries, to spare them the embarrassment of our presence, and allege, under a promise of secrecy, the orders they have received." On the 4th of Janu- ary, 1842, I replied to M. Casimir Perier: "I have received the dispatch in which you tell me that you conformed implicitly to my instructions. You will perhaps know before tliis reaches you that M. de KisselefF and his legation absented themselves from the 'I'uileries on the 1st of January. A few hours before^ the reception of tlie diplomatic body, M. de Kissek'ft" wrote to the introducer of ambassadors, to VARIOUS FOUEIGX AFFAIRS. (lSiO-lSl2.) 337 say he was ill. Ilis absence did not snrprise us. Our intention was to si<^nify that we warmly respect the dignity of our august sovereign, and that unbecoming proct^edings towards his person find us neither blind nor indifferent. We have fulfilled this duty. We see now, as far as you are concerned, no obstacle to the resumption of the usual course of consideration and politeness. In this idea, I authorized you, as far back as the 1 8th of November last, to wait upon the Emjx'ror and pay your duty to him, according to cus- tom, on the first day of tlie year. You seem to think that the cabinet of St. Petersburgh may wish to sig- nify other tokens of its discontent. As hmg as this dissatisfaction does not extend so far as to withhold wliat is officially due to you as head of the French mission, you have no occasion to perceive it ; but if they sliould affect to disavow the rights of your posi- tion and rank, you will remain witliin your hotel, confine yourself to the dispatch of current business, and wait my instructions." Nothing of this kind occurred. The official rela- tions of the French legation with tlie cal)inet of St. Fetersburgli continued perf( ctly regular and becom- ing. As often as pul)lic affairs called ^I. C'asimir I'rrier to the Count de Nessolro(U'. he ev(M' found tlie same ])()lit('ness, — the sam(> moderate and rational dis- positions. At tlu' court, M. and Madame Casimir Frriei. invited on the ordinary occasious, were re- ceived by tlie Fm])eror witliout any affectation of cold- ness, and even with a shade of friendly feeling. " How z 338 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) have you been since we last saw each others' said the Emperor to M. Perier when passing him at the first ball where they met ; " better, have you not '? " The Empress asked him with some earnestness when M. de Barante would come back, and if he knew any- thing of his return. But the interdict proclaimed in Russian society against the French envoy was main- tained and practised ; and when, either in the Impe- rial family or on the part of his most confidential advisers, some conciliatory insinuations were suggested to the Emperor, he repulsed them, saying, " I shall make no advance ; let M. de Barante return, and my ambassador will set out for Paris." On our side, we were fully decided not to lend ourselves to this return, until the relations between the two sovereigns became what they ought to be. At the end of seven months and at liis own request, I gave M. Casimir Perier a leave of absence which the health of Madame Pe- rier required. M. d' Andre, second secretary of the embassy, replaced him at St. Petersburgh. In July, 1843, M. de Kisseleff" came to communicate to me a dispatch from Count de Nesselrode, particularly cour- teous as regarded myself. I took the opportunity of entering into explanations, without subterfuge or re- serve, as to our attitude, its original cause and inci- dental motive, and on our intention of continuing it, while that cause subsisted. " We do not see, in general," 1 said to M. de Kisselefl^, "as regards the respective interests of France and llussia, anything but reasons for good intelligence between the two VARIOUS FOREIOX AFFAIRS. (l810-18l2.) 339 countries ; and if, during the last twelve years, their proceedings have not always presented that character, it is that the relations between the two sovereigns and courts are not in perfect harmony with this essential fact. The regularity of these relations, and M. de Nesselrode may remember that we have often fore- warned him of this, is of itself an important question, seriously implicating the policy of the two States. The King's government has accepted the opportunity offered to it of a frank explanation. According to my opinion, what 1 have done and said ouglit to liave been done and said twelve years ago. In questions where dignity is concerned, we cannot explain our- selves too clearly or too soon ; they ought never to be left to doubtful chances or placed at the mercy of any one. Without the re-establishment of good and remdar relations between the two sovereiijns and courts, the return of the ambassadors would want truth and consistency. The King prefers confining himself to cliarges d'affaires." Neither of the ambassadors returned to their posts. Cliarges d'affaires only, continued to reside at Paris and St. Petersburgh. To judge by appearances, tlie relative position of the two sovereigns remained un- changed ; but, in reality, it wiis materially altered. Tlu' l''mper()r Xicliolas app(^ared to be embarrassed in his obstinacy, and King Louis Philii)pe tirm in his moderation. Instead of enduring in silence an unbe- coming attitude, we openly declared our sentiment, and determined the form and measure of relations be- 7. 2 340 VARIOUS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) tween the two monarchs. The mutual affairs of both countries suffered nothing; dignity was maintained without any compromise of policy. This was the ob- ject 1 seized the opportunity of pursuing, and which I congratulated myself on having accomplished. 341 CHAPTER V. VAEIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1810—42.) INTERNAL POSITION OF THE CABINET OF THE 29tH OF OCTOBEIi, 1840. — PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS KECOGNIZED AND POWERFUL AS MEANS OF OPPOSITION. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THOSE IDEAS. IN WHAT THEY ARE FALSE, AND FROM WHAT CAUSE. HOW THEY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN COMBATED. — INSUFFICIENCY OF OUR ARMS FOR THAT STRUGGLE. — OUTRAGE COMMITTED AGAINST THE DUKE OF AUMALE AND THE PRINCES HIS BROTHERS, ON THE 13tH OF SEP- TEMIiEK. 1811. — ENTRY OF THE DUKE OF AUMALE AND OF THE 17tH REiUMENT OF LIGHT INFANTRY TO THE COURT OF THE TUILERIES. — PLOT CONNECTED WITH THE OUTRAGE. — M. HEBERT IS APPOINTED ATTORNEY-GENERAL TO THE ROYAL COURT OF PARIS. TKIAL OF QIKNISSET AND HIS ACCOMPLICES BEFORE THE COUET OF PEERS. LEGISLATIVE DEIiATES. — LAWS ON THE LABOUR OF CHILDREN IN MANUFACTUKES ; — ON EXPROPRIATION ON ACCOUNT OF PUBLIC UTI- LITY ; — ON GREAT PUBLIC WORKS ; — ON THE GENERAL NETWORK OF RAILWAYS. — PROPOSITIONS OF M. GANNERON ON PARLIAMENTARY IN- COMPATIBILITIES, AND OF M. DUCOS ON ELECTORAL KEFOKM. — DIS- CUSSION AND REJECTION OF THESE PROPOSITIONS. OPERATION OF THE CENSUS FOK PERSONAL AND HOUSE TAX, AND ALSO FOR THE TAX ON WINDOWS. — DISTUKHANCES ON THIS QUESTION. — UNEASINESS OF M. HUMANN. — HE IS FIRMLY SUPPORTED. — HIS SUDDEN IiEATH. — HE IS REPLACED BY M. LACAVE-LAPLAGNE. — GENERAL BUOEAUD IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF ALGERIA. HIS RELATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH ME. — HIS FIRST CAMPAIGNS. — CLOSING OF THE SESSION OF 1S41-1S12. TiiK Cabinet was formed on a (jnestion of foreign po- licy, and throngliout the m hole conrso of its duration, 842 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) from 1840 to 1848, matters of foreign policy filled and animated the scene : the Egyptian affair, the right of search, the occupation of Otaheite, the war in Morocco, the fate of the Christians in Syria, the esta- blishment of the constitutional system in Greece, the Spanish marriages, the Jesuits in France and Rome, political reforms in Italy, the Sundeibund, and the civil war in Switzerland. Entrusted with the direc- tion of this portion of the affairs of France, I enter- tained a profound conviction and a constant sentiment that the power and success of the State depended, above all things, upon good internal government. In a perfect harmony of the great constitutional powers, in public order, and prosperity, in a judicious admi- nistration of the finances, in authority controlled by liberty, and in liberty restrained by law ; — on these conditions only is sound foreign policy practicable. It is at home that we must seek for the just and de- cisive causes which produce influence abroad and es- tablish the solid greatness of peoples. The position of our internal government in 1840, was at the same time extremely similar to and diffe- rent from that whicli had prevailed from 1830 to 1835; better on the surface, but at the bottom ever difficult and dangerous. Insurrections, seditions, and conspiracies with a defined and approaching object, liad ceased ; order reigned in Paris and throughout tlie country ; power exercised itself without obstacle ; but tli(> hostility of the republican and legitimate parties remained without change; they had neither VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1810-1842.) 343 renounced their hopes nor their designs; we were constantly in presence of an active and continued at- tempt at subversion, which pursued its work by means of the press, the elections, the tribune, and all the arms of liberty. Tranquil on the surface and for the moment, the government was ardently attacked by the opposition of minds and ideas, and with refer- ence to tlie future. It would be indeed an unintelligent and frivolous authority which contented itself with actual and material order, without also aspiring to govern minds and to control the future. No one is more convinced tlian I am of the important part acted in the life of peoples by tlie ideas wliich ferment in their bosoms, and of the necessity of impressing on them faith in the duration as also in the right of the power which rules them. It implicates the dignity and lionour of men not to attach themselves to their government until tlieir thoughts are satisfied, while their interests are seciu'cd, and to be necessitated to believe that that government will last when they themselves have departed. But free governments, in this respect, are very differently situated from absolute power ; and wlien the cpiestion arises, either to give a new idea its place and part in the conduct of public affairs, or to imj)ress (m men's minds confidence in the fu- ture, tliey have very opposite difficulties to surmount, and very com])licated duties to fulfil. We lived and acted from 1840 to 1848 in presence and under the fire of several ideas which 1 am anxious 344 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) to recapitulate and characterize to-day, by the light of the trials they have undergone, and of my own personal experience in the arena in which I encoun- tered them. The universal right of men to political power ; — their common claim to social prosperity ; — democratic unity and sovereignty substituted for monarchical unity and sovereignty ; — rivalry between the people and the citizens, succeeding to rivalry between the citizens and the nobility ; — the science of nature and the worship of humanity assuming the place of re- ligious faith and the worship of God : — such were the ideas which, under different names, republicans, democrats, socialists, communists, positivists, political partisans, philosophic communities, secret associa- tions, and isolated writers, all enemies to the esta- blished government, assumed as fundamental maxims, and ardently struggled to proj^agate. I do not propose here to enter on a theoretical examination of these ideas ; I merely wish to mark tlieir common character and the essential cause of tlieir fatal influence on our society and times. They have all this radical vice, that, containing a small quantity of truth, they isolate, inflame, and exag- g(u-ate it to such a point as to elicit from thence a huge and abominable mass of error. Without any doubt, the end and the result of sound socinl institutions ought to be to elevate progressively a greater number of men to the degree of intelli- gence ujid independence wliich renders them capable VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lS10-lSl2.) 345 and worthy of participating in the exercise of politi- cal power ; but between this principle of free govern- ment and the universal suffrage asserted as the first and fundamental law of human society, what an ab} ss exists ! What an oblivion of an infinite num- ber of facts, rights, and truths, which demand on just grounds their place and part in social organiza- tion ! Nothing can be more evident or more sacred than the duty of government to aid the classes least fa- voured by fortune, to solace them in their privations, and to second them in their ascending effort towards the advantages of civilization. But to establish that the misery of so many human beings flows from the vices of social organization, and to impose on govern- ment the charge of rescuing them therefrom, and of distributing prosperity equitably, is to ignore abso- lutely the condition of humanity, to abolish the respon- sibility inherent in human liberty, and to excite evil passions by false hopes. M. Iloyer-Collard said, in 1822: "I admit that de- mocracv flows with full banks in France, such as aires and events have made it. It is true that, for a lonvati^ the middle classes, they hav(> thrust tliemselv(\s into public affairs; they find themsehcs neither guilty of curiosity nor of rash- ness in this action ; they know tliat these affairs are theirs. This is our democracy, such as I see and conceive it ; yes, it flows with full banks in our 346 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) beautiful France, more than ever favoured by Heaven. Let others afflict or irritate themselves at this ; for myself, I return thanks to Providence for calling so great a number of its creatures to the benefits of civilization." Truth flows with full banks in these noble words ; but to conclude, from the great fact thus summed up, that democracy is now the sole element, the only master of society, that no power is legitimate or salutary unless it emanates from that source, and that it alone is authorized to unmake and make governments, is to disavow frivolously the di- versity of situations and rights which co-exist natu- rally, though in very unequal degrees, in all society ; it is to substitute the insolence and tyranny of num- bers for the insolence and tyranny of privilege ; to enthrone, under the name and mantle of democracy, to-day, anarchy, — to-morrow, despotism. In common with all associations of men which si- milarity of position brings together, the middle classes have their faults, errors, want of foresight, obstinacy, and egotism ; and it is easy to distinguish them ; but it is a calumnious eff"ort to attribute to these imperfec- tions a bearing they possess not, and to exaggerate them beyond measure, to produce from thence, be- tween the citizens and the people, a rivalry, an active and deeply seated liostility, analogous to that which for so long a time existed between the citizens and the nobility. Modern citizenship does not contradict its history ; it is in the name and for the advantage of all that it has conquered the rights it possesses and V^VKIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lSiO-lS42.) 347 the principles wliich prevail in our social order; it neither exercises nor demands any domination of class, and exclusive privilege ; in the vast space which it occupies in the bosom of society, the doors are al- ways open, and places are ever ready for those who desire and know how to enter. It is often said, and truly, that the English aristocracy has had the merit of learning how to extend and renew itself by recruit- ing largely from the other classes, in proportion as the latter increase around it. This merit belongs more completely and infallibly to the middle class in France ; it forms its very essence and public right ; sprung from the people, it feeds and nourishes itself continually at tlie same source which flows and rises without cessation. Diversity of situation and aspira- tions of passion subsist and will continue to endure for ever ; they are the natural fruit of the social move- ment and of liberty ; but it is a gross error to take advantage of these moral observations on nature and human society to induce from thence, between the citizens and the jx'ople a political war which has neither serious nor legitimate motives. "The infantry is tlie nation of camps," said General Foy : but he did not therefore conclude that it was in natural and per- manent hostility against the cavalry, artillery, engi- neers, and staff". AVhat shall 1 say of anotlun* idea still obscure and almost imperceptible in 181(1, but now active on the scene, and in course of becoming expanded and noto- rious I It is true, by the side of the advantage and 348 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) honour they have conferred on human society, reli- gious faith and ecclesiastical influence have often been a source of error and oppression. They have alter- nately misled and fettered man's liberty and thought ; now, a liberal and scientific spirit has emancipated it- self from their yoke, and in its turn renders immense services to humanity, but will be equally mingled with error and mischief. What do M. Auguste Comte and his disciples conclude from this social evolution ■? * That faiths and religious influences have had their day ; that they are no more than a worn-out relic, an uninhabitable ruin, a sterile fragment. In place of the fantastic and impenetrable world of theology and me- taphysics, the real world, they say, is opened and de- livered to man ; the knowledge of nature has killed the supernatural ; science wdll henceforth occupy the throne of religion ; God makes man will be replaced by man makes God. Is it possible to falsify and mu- tilate humanity and history more strangely? Can we descend into and enclose ourselves in a horizon more narrow and more stripped of all great light upon the grand ])rol)lcms and facts wliich invincibly preoccupy the human mind ? I touch sliglitly and in the name of simple common * I here consider it a duty to correct an error wliich has crept into a former statement. I said that before my ministry of public instruction (lS;52-ls;}r)), I was unacquainted with M. Auguste Comte. This was, on my jjart, a ford it faithfully. To deny it would have been an insult to the sense and intelligence of the jury ; it would have been on our part an unworthy false- liood." Tlio same day I wrote to the King, then at the Castle of Compiegne : "The ^ Nafioiiar was ac- quitted yesterday. Tiie article in which it boasts this VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1S40-1812.) 351 morning of its acquittal seems to me more guilty than that which had been tlie object of the prosecution. ^IM. Duchatel, Martin du Nord, and ViUemain, en- tertain the same opinion. Mq liave therefore seized it agtiin, and it will be cited with little delay. The attorney-general will conduct the prosecution himself. I liave made him feel and I think he thoroughly un- derstands the necessity of acting and speaking, in this and in the analogous trials, with sustained energy, lie is a man of talent who understands his duty, and intends to engage personally in this affair. We shall see the impression he makes upon the minds of the jury. In any case, I persist in thinking that as often as tliere is crime and danger, the govemmcnt ought to prosecute, and place the jurymen in a condition to do their duty, by doing its own." Prosecuted a second time on account of this new article, even more scandalously aggressive than the preceding one, the 'Xatioiar was again acquitted. At this same epoch, on the loth of September, 1841, the Duke (jf Aumale, returning from Algeria with tlie 17th regiment of light infantry, of which he was colonel, and accom])anied by his brothers the Dukes of Orleans and Nemours, who went to meet him, en- tered Paris at the head of the regiment which had serxed in Africa with distinction for seven years. In the street of St. Antoine, tlu' group of ])rinces and es])e(ially tlie Duke of Aumale were aimed at by an assassin almost within reach of the muzzle of the irun. At the moment when the shot was fired, the horse of 352 VAEIOUS HOME AFFAIKS. (1840-1842.) the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, M. Lavaillant, who rode by the Duke of Aumale's side, threw up its head, received the ball intended for the colonel, and fell dead before him. The concourse of people was great and joyously eager to hail this brave regiment, whose number and deeds of arms had, for seven years, resounded in the journals. From Marseilles to Paris, throughout the entire march, it had received tokens of popular satisfaction and goodwill ; the attempt at assassination furnished a revolting contrast to the public sentiment. It was with difficulty that the mur- derer was rescued from the indignation of the crowd. I was at the Tuileries when, about two o'clock, the ITth light infantry entered the court of the Chateau, its young colonel at its head, under the shouts and acclamations of an entire people who filled the square of the Carrousel and the adjacent streets. Officers and soldiers had the aspect at once grave and animated of veteran troops who return to their hearths after having long fought, suffered and conquered. Their clothes were worn, their countenances sunburnt, their looks calmly content, with some expression of fatigue. The regimental standard waved to and fro, blackened and torn. I have seldom witnessed a more animated movement than that which displayed itself round the Tuik^ries wlien King Touis Philippe presented him- self in fnmt of his son and embraced him in the centre of tlie court, while the regiment formed in two lines by a ra])i(l and silent evolution. Overflowing with miUtai'y sympathy, ^ith family emotions, and honest VAHIOUS HOME AFFAIUS. ( ISM»-1S4:J.) ^53 anger, the entire population seemed bent on loudly giving the lie to factious attempts. The first inquiries for the prosecution indicated clearly that the assassin was not isolated, and that a plot had prepared the attempt. The matter was referred to the Court of Peers. We Avished to make no change in the legislation of the press. We re- spected the independence of jurors, and we could do nothing to give them more intelligence and firmness ; but we were able and bound to secure to the legal action of the magistrates its full efficacy. It is the first condition of a free government that all who con- cur in it, ministers, magistrates, administrators, and military chiefs, all within their proper limits, should be suited to and fully suffice for the special functions confided to them ; for on the harmony and energy of these difierent actions the general success depends, I felt c(mvinced that in political trials, the public magistracy of Paris had often been deficient in skill and viyour. I recommended that ]\I. Prank Carre, who filled his post more honourably than effectively, should be called to tlie first presidency, then vacant, of the Court of Rouen, and that M. Ilc'lx'rt should re})lace him as attorney-general in the poyal Court of Paris. A member of the Chamber of Deputies, M. llebert had won notice and distinction there by the frankness and firmness of his ideas and conduct; as attorney-general in the Court of Ap])eal, he had ])romptly acquired the reputation of a skilful lawyer, precise and powerful in debate ; both as politician and ■2 A 354 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIKS. (l 840-1842.) magistrate he inspired serious confidence. The King and council approved this choice ; he was appointed on the 12th of October, 1841, and commissioned to conduct in the Court of Peers the trial of the assassin of the Duke of Aumale, Qucnisset called Pappart, and his accomplices. On the day after this appointment, I had, on this subject, a moment of anxious solicitude. At seven in the morning I saw Madame Hebert enter my cabinet, sad and agitated. Her husband, she told me, was so impressed and disturbed by the weight of his new functions and the responsibility they imposed on him that, despite his official and public accept- ance, he could not resolve to undertake the burden, and requested to be relieved from it. I went to his house immediately, and found him, in fact, a prey to extreme perplexity, excited by the scruples of an exacting conscience and the uneasiness of an im- ])assioned pride unable to endure the prospect of a check in a great position and a lofty duty. We talked together for a long time ; I combated his pre- sentiments of failure ; I urged the motives which li;id h'd to his being selected. lie reassumed confi- dence in himself, promised me to proceed at once to his task, and though a little surprised at his fit of hesitation, I left him witli increased esteem, and satis- fied tliat in him we shouhl find the energetic and (>ff'ecti\e attorney-general of whom we stood so much in need. My ex])ectation was not falsified. Called at the VAKIUUS IIoMK AFFAIRS. (ihiU-lSl^.) 355 outset of his new functions to })rosecute in the Court of Peers the authors and accom])lices of the attempt and ph)t directed on the loth of September against tlie Duke of Aumale and his brotliers, M. Ilebert disphiyed tliroughout this important process a vijjjour of mind and cliaracter equal to the most difficult trials, and wortliy of the most eminent magistrate. Not suffering himself to be disturbed, embarrassed, or irritated by the violence and subtleties of the debate, and only arming himself against the accused with the ordinary law, the penal code, as reformed in 1832, and the liberal legislation of 1819 in affairs of the press, he placed in brilliant light the })lot as well as the attempt ; not by alleging a simple moral complicity, as the friends of tlie accused pretended, but by demonstrating a real and legal participa- tion of the inciters to the act and conspiracy, what- e\er miglit be the mode and instrument of aggres- sion. ^^'hile his attitude was firm and conscientiously animated, his reasoning was simple, precise, adapted to i)lace the true character of the facts in face of the true sense of tlie laws, and e([ually exempt from ex- aggerated emphasis or false circumspection. The Court of Peers, witli leniency in the a])plication of penalties, returned a sentence in conformity with the conclusions of the attorney-general, and the King's clemency extenuated still further, in the cases of se- veral of the condennied, the decisions of the court. No one, not more the journalists than the affiliated sections of the secret societies, succeeded in elud- •,' A ■! 356 VAKIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l8l0-1842.) ing the responsibility of their acts and the justice of the laws. On the occasion of several political prosecutions instituted during the course of 1842, before the Court of Assizes in Paris, M. Hebert gave proofs of the same talent and courage, and in various instances with similar success. But these partial triumphs of judicial resistance supplied a very insufficient remedy for the evil by which we were assailed. You punish and intimi- date assassins and conspirators, for a moment, by sen- tences ; but such means fail to change the state of minds and the course of ideas : it is in the intellec- tual region itself that you must combat the mis- chievous currents that spring up there ; it is truth that you must oppose to error ; sound spirits must be brought into collision wdth diseased ones. Carried away and overwhelmed by the affairs of every day, the depositaries of power often lose sight of this por- tion of their task, and content with victory in the political arena, they think too little of the moral sphere in which they have also so many and such arduous struggles to encounter. We were not all exempt from this fault ; we neither took sufficient care nor made adequate efforts to sustain in the press, in the journals, and in public instruction, by all avail- able means, a vigorous struggle against the false ideas 1 luue recently enumerated, and which attacked without intermission tlie government confided to our care. A fact explains, and in some degree, excuses VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lStO-lSi-2.) 357 * this gap in our action. We wanted champions for such an encounter. Contemporaneous with our great revohition, born in its cradle or nourished by its breath, the ideas to be combated were still, in the greater number of minds, implicitly admitted into and attached to that cause. Some regarded them as necessary to the s(^curity of its conquests ; others as the natural consequences and pledge of its future progress ; others again, clung to them without re- flection, from routine and prejudice. We know not to what point have extended, or to what depths have penetrated, the roots of the mischievous philosophi- cal and political theories which, in our present day, so deplorably shackle the regular progress of free go\ernments and of a sound social condition. But amongst the men who, from 1830 to 1848, perceived both the end and the danger, and who, in the prac- tice of every day, while contesting with us the con- sequences, the greater part, and some of the most eminent, failed to trace the evil to its source, and paused before reaching it, either from hesitation of thought or througli fear of aiding a reaction towards the old system and absolute power. The young ge- neration also, educated in the ruts or seduccnl by the new prosj)C'cts of the revolution, was little disposed to enter on the more laborious and slower paths of liberty restrained by law. Pliilosophers, equally with politicians, surrendered themselves to the same doubts and perturbations; tlie spiritual school, which had so brilliantl} and ])rofitably dis])uted the errors of 358 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) the last age, honourably sustained its flag, but without rallying the masses under it, and unable to prevent many distinguished minds from falling into a pre- tended scientific materialism, at one moment openly declared, at another disguised under the name of pantheism. In such a position of facts, how could we find, in adequate number, spirits sufiiciently con- firmed in their own tlioughts, and resolute enough to proclaim and develop, every day and on every point, the true, rational, and moral principles of the free government, which, in the political field, we were labouring to establish 1 In this scarcity of the necessary arms for philoso- phic and moral combat, the political tribune was our principal and constant organ of action. This cha- racteristic fact of our position and entire government from 1830 to 1848, has been and still continues to be strangely misrepresented. People alternately magnify or calumniate speech, or as they express it, when they wish to add compliment to insult, eloquence. Ihider the parliamentary system, they say, eloquence is the ruler, and power belongs to the ablest speakers, wlio, to lower their pride, they style rhetoricians. They pay too mucli honour to eloquence. Even in times of i'vco discussion, w^hen it becomes somewliat neces- sary, it is far from bcniin^ sufficient ; and neither in fact nor in riglit, does powc^r incline to or endure with elofinenco alone. Eloquence may, at a given moment, luider special circumstances, decide a passing success ; it is not, in the bosom of political liberty, the first VARIOUS IIO.Mr: AtTAIUS. (lSlO-1812.) 359 condition of the art of government. The value of thought and action is much superior to that of speecli, and in the parliamentary system as under every other, sound judgment, good conduct and courage are much more indispensable and efficacious than the gift of words. It is to the honour of iree government that she requires tlie same qualities, and a mucli greater union of them, than any otlier form of legis- lation ; and it is precisely this powerful exigency wliich guarantees the good management of ])ublic affairs and the enlightened satisfaction of the public sentiment. During our first session, from the 5th of November 1840, to the 25th of June, 1841, the position of the cabinet in the Chambers was extremely animated and laborious, bnt in reality little dangerous. Impor- tant allies joined us from different ranks, and our ad- versaries themselves, not eager to fill our places, made no serious attempt at our overthrow. Between peaci> or war, the crisis was urgent, and the res])onsibi- lity heavy ; eitlier from conviction or prudence they voluntarily resii^ned to us the burden. In the great questions of foreign ])olicy, MM. de Lamartine, I)u- f nir(\ and Passy lent us their support ; embarrass- ing subjects of internal legislation were not raised. A\'e took advantage of tliese tolerant dispositions to entertain and settle other (pu'stions more social tlian ])oliti(al. and extienudy difficult tliough not stormy. During the short existence of tlie cabinet of tlie 12th f)f Mav, IS.'jO. two of its members. "Messrs. Cunin- 360 VAKIOUS HOME AiTAIKS. (1840-1842.) Gridaine and Dufaure, had presented to the Cham- bers two bills indisputably opportune, one on the labour of children in the manufactures, and the other on the expropriation of property for the public ser- vice. The cabinet of M. Thiers, accepted the inheri- tance of these ; but, being still more transient than its predecessor, left both questions at the point where it found them. On an understanding with us, MM. Eenard and Dufaure demanded from the Chamber of Deputies, on the 16th of November, 1840, and the 4th of January, 1841, the reintroduction of the two bills ; we fully sanctioned the idea and took an active part in the debate. It w^as long and scrutinizing. All the objections of the manufacturers in the first case, all the difficulties raised by the lawyers in the second, were set forward and discussed ; the questions were considered under their different aspects without any complication of political dissent, with the sole view of social benefit, and the debate ended in two laws essentially practical, promulgated, one on the 22nd of March, the other on the 5th of May, 1841. The question of the labour of children in the factories has been rc^sumed, and will again be argued more than once ; there are implicated in it moral and material interests, rights of liberty and authority difficult to reconcile, and the conciliation of which must vary according to the diversity and mobility of industrial facts. But the ])rinciples laid down in the law of the 22nd of Marcli, 1840, are not and never will be aban- doned. The paths into which it lias introduced pub- VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lStO-lS12.) 361 lie power eannot be deserted. The problem of poli- tical economy and morality laid down by the condition of children in the factories, has been frankly accepted and decided according to sound judgment and hu- manity. As to the law for the expropriation of pro- perty for the public advantage, it has vanished. We know the system which succeeded it. I do not hesi- tate to affirm that it will reappear. In administration as in policy, dictatorship has but its day, and property will endure the absence of guarantees even less than privatiQn of liberty. AVe did not confine ourselves to this settlement of the question bequeathed to us by preceding cabinets ; we introduced, at the same time, to the Chambers new subjects which excited public interest. ^I. Hu- mann, wlio liad not resicrned liimself without recrret to the undertaking of tlie fortifications of Paris and its charges, was not the less eager to propose, on the 18th of January, 1841, to the Chamber of Deputies, in accordance with the wish of the King and tlie cabinet, u great combination of extraordinary public works for the (liftei'cnt services of the bridg(^s and roads, and of tlie army and navy. "For ten years," he said, on presenting tlie bill, " the government has advanced daily in this career of useful enterprises. From 1830 to lSo2, in the midst of the greatest embarrassments, nearly twenty millions were annually assigned to ex- traordinary works. From 183o to 18o(), this class of expense was carried, on the average, to thirty millions a vear. BetwcHMi 1887 and 1840, the same service 362 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) obtained a medium dotation of fifty millions. It will exceed sixty millions for 1840, and the bill we now propose will elevate the sum to seventy-five millions for six consecutive years beginning with 1842." M. Humann assigned for this service a sum of 450 mil- lions, to be raised by way of loan ; and soon after the promulgation of the bill adopted in both Chambers by strong majorities, a first instalment of this loan, amounting to 150 millions, with interest at three per cent., was subscribed at the rate of 78 francs 52 cen- times, 1/2. The administrative measure and its finan- cial operation were at the same time extensive and comprised within prudent limits, thus seconding pub- lic prosperity without weighing heavily and precipi- tately on the treasury. In the following session, from the 27th of Decem- ber, 1841, to the 11th of June, 1842, the cabinet un- dertook and accomplished a much more important and more difficult work. For several years the ques- tion of the railways had strongly prepossessed the government and the public. Both sides hesitated and lingered as to the lines to be carried out and the system to be adopted in their construction. Of the two opposing scliemes, construction by the State and nt tli(> public expense, or by commercial companies to whom concession of the lines would be granted, the cabinet of iNI. Mole had, in 1837 and 1838, adopted tlie first, and ])roposed th(^ execution, by the State, of four great lines ; but his bills and the principle on whicli tliey rested >Aere rejected by a numerous majo- VAUloUS HOME AFFAIRS. (IS10-1S42.) 363 rity. A step was made in 1840, under the ministry of M. Thiers ; some raih'oads, and amongst the num- ber two important ones, that from Paris to Rouen, and anotlier from Paris to Orleans, were voted. But the general question, the question of the great lines to be eoustructed, with their mode of construc- tion, tliroughout France, was still unsettled. On these two fundamental points minds and measures were still in susj)cnse. We resolved to end this uncertainty, and on the 7th of February, 1842, presented a bill to the Chamber of Deputies which authorized the con- structicm of a general network of railways formed by the six great lines from Paris to the frontiers of Bel- gium, from Paris to the coast of the British Channel, from Paris to Strasbourg, from Paris to Marseilles and Cette,from Paris to Xantes, and from Paris to Bordeaux. The execution of these lines was to take place by a co-operation between the State, the departments and townships interested, and private si)eculators, in the proportions determined by the bill, whicli placed two- thirds of tlie ind(Mnniti(^s for land at the cliarge of the departments and townsliips ; tli(> rcMuaining third of these indemnities, tlie embankment and artificial works, to tlie account of the State ; the iron rails, tlie materials and exp(>ns(^s of working and maintaining tliem, at th(^ cost of tlu^ companies to which the con cession would be granted. In the midst of many diffi- culties and special objections, this bill and its general ])nnciples wer(^ r(^ceiv(>d with signal approbation ; and after two months em])loyed in its investigation, M. 364 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIES. (l840-1842.) Dufaure, reporter of the committee, when proposing the adoption with certain amendments, concluded his report by saying: "Your committee owed you a faith- ful account of its researches and labours ; it has ex- posed even the disagreements which sprang up on some portions of the bill, and it has authorized its re- porter to tell you that on many important points it formed part of the minority. But it declares in con- clusion that it has been ardently and constantly una- nimous in desiring that the bill should have a useful result ; that all opinions of detail, after having sought to obtain a legitimate triumph by discussion, should be submitted to the sovereign judgment of the Cham- ber; that the creation of a network of railways is considered by us all as a great national undertaking ; and that at the moment of delivering our definitive vote on the bill now presented, each of has been go- verned by the general ideas and convictions of public advantage which elevate our debates and make them profitable, instead of yielding to local considerations whicli would degrade and render them barren." The debate continued for fifteen days, and the two fundamental principles of the bill, — the establishment of a general network of railways, and the division of the expenses between the State, the departments in- terested, and ])rivate speculators, — triumphed over all local jealousies and systematic objections. But when we caiiK* to consider tlie actual execution of the net- work, a (piestion arose, not of principle, but of con- duct. Several members, M. 'J'lii(>rs at their head, de- VARIOUS HOMK AFFAIRS. (lSlO-lS42.) 305 mandcd that instead of dividing, from the commence- ment of the works, the co-operation and funds of the State between the different lines of whicli the network was to be formed, they should be concentrated on a single line, the most important of all, as they said, the line from Paris to the Belgian frontier on the one side, and to the Mediterranean on the other. This was almost to destroy the vote already given in favour of a general network, for it amounted to postponing for a long time the application of the equitable prin- ciple which had determined the government to make the different districts of France participate simultane- ously in the fertilizing advantage of the railways. It seriously compromised, moreover, the fate of the bill, whicli r(Hpiired to collect, on many points of the ground, the elements of the majority. The reporter, M. Dufaure, had, in tlie course of the general debate, foreseen and combated tliis amendment in advance, by saying : " If you confine yourselves to a single line, you continue the incomplete and incoherent work you have commenced during the last years ; you do not determine beforehand the employment of the re- sources whicli the government may be able, in five, t(MK or fifteen years, to apply to the great work of the railroads. This is what we ought to do, and what uigi'iitly presses on us. It is not only a theoretical satisfaction we shall give to the country ; it is the end we shall assign to our efforts; it is a destination we shall give to our resources. This classification has difficulties; we cannot effect it without animated dis- 360 VAKIOUS HOME AFFAIIJS. (1840-1812.) cussions ; we ought to prepare for them ; it will cause great emotions in the country ; nevertheless, we are bound to carry it through if we wish to accomplish anything great or complete in the enterprise of the railways." A lively debate sprang up on this subject. M. Thiers on one side, and M. Duchatel on the other, were the principal actors. It was pre-eminently on financial considerations that M. Thiers supported the amendment in favour of a single line. M. Duchatel opposed it in the name and state of our finances, of the great future of the railroads, and of the distribu- tive justice which formed at once the rational prin- ciple of the bill and the practical condition of its success. M. Billault and M. de Lamartine seconded M. Duchatel ; the Chamber agreed with them ; the amendment was rejected by a powerful majority; the Chamber of Peers united its vote to that of the Chamber of Deputies ; and experience, in due course, fully justified this conduct of the government and the Chambers. From 1842 to 1848, the simultaneous execution of the general network was carried on with- out any confusion of the public finances ; and since tliat epoch, in the midst of all our political and ad- ministrative revolutions, the act of the 11th of June, 1^42, lias continued to be the base on which the ge- neral edifice of railroads in France is erected; it did that which has accomplished the rest. lu matters of political legislation, the cabinet saw spring up, in the session of 1842, questions more deli- cate and more strongly in opposition than those it had VARIOrs llnMK AFKAIKS. (lsK;-lSi2.) 367 encountenHl during the preceding year. The serious disquietudes of 1840 had vanished ; peace was secured ; the puhlic ceased to occupy itself exclusively with foreign affairs ; the allies, which for the moment those affairs had rallied round us in the C'liambers, no longer considered it their duty to give us the same support, and resumed by degrees their distinct and middle posititm between tlie government and the op- position. The two questions which in 1840 the ca- binet of M. Tliiers had studied to elude, that of par- liamentary incompatibilities and of electoral reform, presented themselves anew. Two members of the third party. ^lessrs. Ganneron and Ducos. made them, on the lOth and 14th of February, 1S42, the object of formal propositions. M. Ganneron, interdicted to a great number of public functionaries, entry into the Chamber of Deputies, and demanded that, with some exceptions as to the superior duties of political order, no member of that Chamber who was not a salaried public officer on the day of his election should become one wliile lie retained his seat, and for a year after the expiration of his summons. M. Ducos proposed that all the citizens inscribed, in each department, in the jury lists, should be electors. 1 had no ol)j(>ction of princi})le, or of any permanent nature, to either of these propositicms. Several parlia- nu'utary incompatibilities were already established by law ; and in virtue of the act passed in 1840 on my own motion as minister of the interior, every member j)r()nioti>d to public otHee was subjected to re-election. 368 VAIUOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) Neither did I think that the introduction of the en- tire jury list of a department into the electoral body menaced the safety of the state, nor that the privilege of voting should not be extended progressively to a greater number of persons. But, under the circum- stances of the time, I looked upon the two proposi- tions as totally inopportune, not in the slightest de- gree called for by serious or pressing facts, and much more injurious than profitable to the consolidation of free government, the first of national interests. In fact, on the 1st of February, 1842, out of 459 members of which the Chamber of Deputies was com- posed, there were 149 salaried functionaries. Of this number, 16 were ministers or great political officers, which the proposition of M. Ganneron for the exten- sion of parliamentary incompatibilities would still leave eligible. Of the remaining 133, 53 were ma- gistrates for life. The Chamber therefore contained only 80 removable functioned members placed, on this groimd, in dependence on power. With respect to the deputies promoted, since their entry into the C'hamber, to salaried public ofl'.ccs, a table was drawn up of the appointments of this nature made by the different cabinets from the 1st of November, 1830, to the 1st of February, 1842; their number amounted to 211, and in the list were 72 ministers or great po- litical officers, whom no one wished to exclude from the Cliamber. Out of 1400 members elected within the space of these twelve years, there were thus only \-\() who luid been called to functions, to whom the VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1840-1812.) 3G9 required incompatibilities could be rendered appli- cable. On tliis first view, and looking only at the figures, there was nothing strange in the number of official deputies, nothing calculated to inspire legitimate doubt as to the independence of the resolutions of tlie Chamber, none of those startling abuses which de- manded indispensable and prompt reform. Messrs. Villemain, Duchatel, and liamartine, while pointing out these facts, brought other considerations of more weight to bear against the proposition of M. Ganne- ron ; they described the actual state of French society in which the public functionaries liold such an im- portant position, that when that society calls for repre- sentation, it naturally demands that its representa- tives should also fill a prominent place ; they insisted on the necessity of not reducing by law the number, already so restricted in all democratic associations, of men practically and experimentally enlightened, and ready to comprehend, in the bosom of political liberty, the conditions of government. But just and profound as th(>y were, tliese considerations would not have suf- ficed to surmount the old prejudices and ardent pas- sions which had provoked and supported the proposi- tion ; it was not, to speak truly, a question of principle and organization that was in debate ; tlie attack was directed more against tlie prevailing policy of the Chamber tlian against the functioned deputies, and it was, above all, to change the majority by mutilating it that they demanded the reform of an abuse the 2 R 370 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) extent and gravity of which was greatly exaggerated. M. Duchatel adroitly confined the discussion to these points; the Chamber understood the true meaning of the assault, and the proposition was rejected, though by a weak majority. On the motion of M, Ducos for electoral reform, the debate was at the same time more easy and more extended. The law of elections, a change in which was demanded, had only been in existence eleven years. When it passed in 1831, the opposi- tion itself proclaimed that it fully satisfied the re- quirements of liberty. Through the lowering of the electoral rate from 300 to 200 francs, and by the natural progress of free institutions as of public pro- sperity, the number of electors had rapidly increased. Starting at 99,000 in 1830, it had, by 1842, reached 224,000. When, under the ministry of the 1st of March, 1840, the Chamber of Deputies had to de- liberate on petitions the greater number of whicli de- manded universal suffrage, and some only required modifications analogous to the proposition of M. Du- cos, M. Thiers, in the name of the cabinet, and also in his own, formally declared against electoral re- form, and on all the petitions, moved the order of the day, which the Cha nber had in fact pronounced. Such a reform was assuredly not more urgent or sea- sonable on th(» 15th of February, 1842, than on the IGth of May, 1840. But I did not confine myself to rejecting it on these previous and accessorial conside- rations. T penetrated the lieart of the question, and VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lSiO-lSi2.) 371 entered into an examination of the motives in the name of which electoral reform was demanded. It required no great sagacity to perceive that universal sufi'rage was in the essence as at the end of the move- ment, and that its partisans were the true instiga- tors, and constituted the real force of the attack di- rected against the electoral system in operation. I have no prejudice against universal suffrage, syste- matic and absolute ; I acknowledge that in certain conditions and within specific limits of society it may be practicable and useful ; I admit that under ex- traordinary and transient circumstances it may serve sometimes to accomplish great social changes, at others to rescue the State from anarchy, and to beget a government. But in a great community, for the regular course of social life, and for continued dura- tion, I regard it as a miscliievous engine of legisla- tion, as alternately a dangerous implement either for prince or people, for order or liberty. I did not dis- cuss directly or fully tlie theory of universal suffrage whicli we liad only before us in pers])ective ; but I attacked, as false and worn-out, the ])rincii)al idea on wliich it rests, the necessity of a great number of voters at political elections. " Society," I said, '' was, in former times, divided into ditterent classes, vary- ing in civil conditions, interests, and infiuences. And not only (Hff'erent but opposed, in contest with each other, tlie nobility with tlie citizens, the proprietors of land with the labourers, the inliabitants of the towns witli those of the country. There were amongst ■2 B ■:> 372 VAKIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) them profound distinctions, conflicting interests, and continued struggles. What then became of the divi- sion of public rights ? The classes who had none, suffered much from this privation ; the class which possessed them used them against the others ; this was their great weapon of force in their combats. Nothing of the kind exists with us in these days ; much is said, and with reason, of the unity of French society ; but it is not only a geographical unity ; it is also a moral and internal unity. There are no more struggles between classes, for there are no longer in- terests profoundly divided or opposed. Who now se- parates electors at 300 francs from those at 200, 100, or 50 '? They are in the same civil condition, they all live under the dominion of the same laws. The elector at 300 francs represents perfectly the elector at 200 or 100 ; he protects, he covers him; he speaks and acts naturally for him, for he partakes and de- fends the same interests. What never before hap- pened in the world, similarity of interests, at the pre- sent day, with us, allies itself to diversity of profes- sion and inequality of condition. Herein lies the great fact, the new fact of our society. Another great fact results from the first : those who look upon a great number of electors as indispensable to truth of representative government deceive themselves. A great number of electors was important formerly, when chisses were profoundly separated and placed under tlie empire of opposing interests and influences, wlien each demanded a considerable share. Nothing VAHIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lStO-lSi2.) 373 of the kind, I repeat, exists at present with us ; parity of interests, the support they naturally lend each other, permit the number of electors to be limited, without any detriment to those who do not possess the right of suffrage. In an aristocratic society, in face of an ancient and powerful aristocracy, demo- cracy defends itself by numbers ; numbers constitute its principal strength : to the influence of great, power- ful, and accredited lords, it must oppose its number and even its noise. We are not now called upon to provide for such a necessity ; democracy, with us, has no longer to defend itself against an old and influ- ential aristocracy. Remember, gentlemen, that in- novation is only improvement when it applies an ef- fective remedy to a real want. In my opinion the electoral reform pi'oposed to you is not at present an actual necessity. Do you know what you would do by adopting iti Instead of applying a remedy to a real evil, instead of satisfying an actual necessity, you would only allay (I do not wish to use too coarse a word) tlie itcliing for innovation which irritates us. You would compromise, you would weaken our so cial system, so sound and tranquil, to please for a moment tlie small, sickly section which agitates it- self and us. Turn your thoughts, I entreat you, to- Avards tlie practical side of our affairs and the totality of our position, ^^'e liave a liard task to fulfil, harder than any tliat lias been imjiosed at other epochs; we have three great points to establish : a new society, tlie great modern democracy, until now unknown in 374 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) the history of the world ; new institutions, represen- tative government hitherto a stranger in our country ; finally, a new dynasty. Never did it happen to a generation to have such a work assigned to it. Never- theless, we closely approach our object. The new society is to-day victorious, preponderant ; no one contests it ; it has had hard trial and experience ; it has gained for itself civil laws, political institutions and the dynasty which suit and serve it. All the great conquests are accomplished, all the great in- terests are satisfied. Our actual, predominant object should be to secure the steady enjoyment of what we have won. To succeed in this, we only require two things, stability in our institutions, and judicious con- duct in the daily and naturally incidental affairs of the country. This is at present the task, the great task of the government, the responsibility which weighs equally on you and on us. Let us make it a point of honour to be found equal to it ; we shall find it diffi- cult. Be cautious in adopting all questions which may be placed before you, in entering into all affairs to which you may be invited. Do not consider your- selves obliged to do this to-day, and that to-morrow. Do not encumber yourselves too eagerly with the bur- dens which the first stranger may have a fancy to place on your shoulders, when the loads we are necessarily compelled to bear are already so heavy. Settle obli- gatory questions ; transact indispensable affairs which the time naturally brings forward, and reject those which arc hurled at your heads lightly and without necessity." VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lS10-lSi2.) 375 The Chamber was convinced and rejected the elec- toral reform of M. Ducos by a stronger majority than that which threw out the parliamentary incompati- bilities of M. Ganneron. I succeeded in impressing on the minds of that majority the idea which governed my own, the necessity of applying our- selves, above all and before all, to the consolidation of the free and regular government which was still a novelty with us. This policy has been called the policy of resistance, and the name has been employed to represent it as hostile to the social movement and the progress of liberty. An accusation singularly unintelligent ; for, beyond doubt, it is the mission and duty of government to second the progress of the public strength and destiny ; and all policy would be blameable which tended to render society sterile and stationary. But what is more important to the pro- gress of liberty, is the practice of liberty. It is by exercising itself at the present that it prepares and secures its conquests for the future. As in 1830, under the ministry of ^I. Casimir Perier, resistance to material disorder was the first condition of liberty, so in 1 842, it was from the mobility of laws and po- litical fantasies that we had to preserve the newly- born system of liberty. Wliat there was of resistance in our policy had no other object and could produce no other effect. Let the roots of the tree be firmly j)lanted, and the branches will not fail to extend ; if, at the moment of planting, the tree too frequently shaken, instead of growing, it falls. The duration 376 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) of a free government guarantees to a people much more liberty and progress than they can derive from revolutions. Once only, between 1840 and 1842, we had to re- sist material disorder. The financial law of the 14th of July, 1838, had decreed that " in the session of 1842, and every succeeding ten years, there should be submitted to the Chambers a new plan of as- sessment between the departments, equally of the personal and house tax, and of the tax on windows. With this object, the collectors of taxes on property and persons will continue to supply the information necessary to ascertain the number of individuals liable to the personal tax, the amount of renters of houses, and the number of rateable windows." In 1841, to execute this provision of the law of 1838, and to put himself in a position to submit to the Chambers in 1842, the new assessment announced. M. Humann ordered a census throughout France, of all taxable persons and matters. Perhaps he expected, at some future time, to obtain by this measure, a notable augmentation of the public revenue by trans- forming the house and window taxes, until then as- sessed imposts of which the sum total was annually by the Chamber, to contingent duties susceptible of indefinite increase. A report spread abroad that such was in fact the object of the census, which ren- dered it, from the first moment, suspicious and unpopu- lar. M. Humann contradicted the report and declared tliat he had no other design than that of arriving at VAIUOUS Ilo.ME AITAIKS. ( 1810-1812.) 377 a more equal assessment of these taxes without in any degree augmenting the amount. But the effect was produced ; and, moreover, independently of all augmentation of the sum total of the two taxes, the result of the measure would impose payment on per- sons who had hitherto evaded it. Amongst other points, it was ascertained, on the 15th of June, 1841, that 129,480 houses had not hitherto been rated. M. Hu- mann, whose general ideas on government and finance were extremely sound, did not always thoroughly foresee the political effect of administrative measures, thought too lightly of them beforehand, and was not sufficiently careful to have a clear understanding with his colleagues. He communicated with them seldom and acted alone. The census, ordered by him as a simple and easy operation, encountered at several points of the country, amongst others in some great towns, Toulouse, Lisle, and Clermont-Ferrand, resist- ances, which either through the weakness of the authorities, or the ready complicity of factions, be- came actual rebellions, requiring armed force for their suppression. This was everywhere effective, but tlie ferment continued, and ]\I. Ilumann was shaken by it. On the 14th of August, 1841, tlie King wrote as follows to me from tlie Chateau d'Eu : " M, Ilumann draws a gloomy picture of our position, and he adds (I quote his own words) : — ' My convictions with re- gard to the census are that it concerns my honour not to draw ba( k. The measure, meanwhile, excites extreme difHculties ; these difficulties mav become in- 378 VAKIOUS HOME AFFAIKS. (l840-1842.) surmountable, and there is reason to inquire whether it is prudent to incur the risk. To-day, my retirement, induced by the state of my health, would pacify minds and entail no inconvenience ; if, on the con- trary, it should be compelled at a later period by cir- cumstances, the moral authority of the King's govern- ment would be compromised. I submit this reflection to your Majesty ; 1 entreat you to consider whether your consent to my retirement would not be, under the actual circumstances, an act of good policy.' " I shall not reply to M. Humann until this evening," the King added ; " I shall explain to him how highly I value his services, and how anxious I am to avoid anything that might shake the present ministry, I so ardently wish to retain ; but I shall add that the cir- cumstance is so important that I must transmit to the president of the council the communication he had made to mo, that he and his colleagues may de- liberate, and assist me with their advice." I replied to the King immediately : " I have just seen the Marshal, M. Duchatel and M. Humann. 'I'hc marshal, who is still unwell, will, however, I be- lieve, carry to the King in the course of the evening the result of our deliberation. That result is not doubtful. M. Humann has placed his retirement at tlie disposal of the King and council to acquit -his conscience. lie has no wish to retire ; he feels that his honour is engaged in the operation of the census ; h(^ wislies to remain and carry it out to the end. If liis offer were accepted, he would consider himself as VAKIOUS IIOMK AITAIRS. (lSW-]S12.) 379 a victim sacriiicod, and sacrificed tliroiigh weakness. In my opinion, he would be ri<^lit. The difficulties of the position are real, but neither insurmountable nor threatening ; we have not yet been called upon to fire a shot. The resistances, even when they exhibit them- selves with animation, fall rapidly and easily. The chief part of the great municipal councils declare for the legality of the act. We have not reached the term of embarrassments, but I see no danger in any quarter. Tlu^ abandonment of the census would be the abandonment of the government. There would be no longer law, administration, or cabinet, and power would voluntarily court its own ruin ; for, in truth, there is nothing in what is passing of sufficient weight to inspire serious uneasines'^. M. Ilumann under- stands that in carrying out the act, it is necessary to temper and soften it, to show oursehes easy as to the forms, and to arrive promptly at the end. He has for several days given, and will continue to give, orders in consequence. I do not therefore hesitate to tell the King that the advice of the council will b(^ to reject all idea of tlu^ retirement of ^I. Ilumann, and to fol- low u]) the census, while rendering the law as flexible and indulgent as possible, but at the same time by securing obedience to the law." The King felt more obliged by our firmness than it deserved. " Your letter," he wrote in reply, " has given me the most lively j)l(^asure. You have assu- redly said and written many beautiful and good things in tlu^ course^ of your life ; you have honourably ])ro- 380 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. ( 1810-1842.) claimed great truths, and defended those precious principles which can alone preserve the morality and secure the prosperity of human associations ; but you have never said or written anything better than the letter I have just received from you, and it is, on all points, the expression of my own thought and desires. As soon as I have seen the Marshal, or heard from him, I shall write to M. Humann, and, while repeat- ing how anxiously I wish him to remain, I shall signify how entirely I approve the course he is pur- suing. With this perfect understanding the clouds of the moment will dissipate, and our political sun will shine with more brilliancy than before. I have had no other anxiety than that of the consequences which the retirement of M. Humann might have entailed in the midst of this crisis. Once re-assured on this point, I am also easy as to the issue ; and you may tell him, before I write, how much I am gratified by the resolution you announce to me on his part." M. Humann being thus fortified, the operation of tlie census terminated without fresh troubles, and ceased to be a check for him. But, eight months after, on the 25th of April, 1842, at the moment wlien lie was preparing to take part in the debate on the bill for the general network of railroads, M. Humann, stricken by an aneurism of the heart, died suddenly, seated in his cabinet, before his desk, with his liand on liis paper. His death, if he felt himself die, surprised him less than it did his friends; ten days before, talking with one of his clerks, he said : VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lS10-lSl2.) 381 " I feel that 1 am going ; the life 1 lead wears me out; I shall not be here long-," He was a man of elevated mind and serious habits, a great financial authority, laborious, suspicious, susceptible, silently anxious, extremely solicitous as to his personal con- sideration, carrying into public lile more dignity than force, and more prudence than tact; a conservative by taste as well as by position, too enlightened not to be liberal as far as was consistent with the interests of order, and holding his general position well with- out giving himself up entirely to any particular point. I had no intimate ties with him, but I regretted his loss sincerely ; it was at my request and from confi- dence in me, that, on the 29th of October, 1840, he entered the cabinet ; he proved to be a real strength there and in the Chambers, and was held in consider- able estimation by the public. The void his death occasioned amongst us was immediately filled up. On the following day, we offered the ministry of finance to M. lIippol}te Passy, who refused it with- out hostility ; a man of mind and acquirement rather than of action, having more self-love and dignity than ambition, fearing failure more than he desired success, pleasing himself ^ith criticism, and preferring inde- pendence to responsibility. The finances were given on the same day to M. Lacave-I.aplagne, who liad filled tlie department witli ca})acity under the presi- dency of M. Mole, and was eager to acce])t it. Thus were successively rallied round tlie cabinet all the fractions of the conservative })arty divided in 1839 by the coalition. 382 VAEIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l810-1842.) By the side of these external and internal affairs we had still another of considerable importance, which, W'ithout being foreign, was not altogether domestic, and in which, a few days after the forma- tion of the cabinet, we took a great step ; — I allude to Algeria. I had always given serious attention to this point ; I had taken part in all the debates of which it had been the subject; I had expressed, at the same time, a firm resolution that France should preserve her new possession, and the intention of not hurrying on our establishment, except step by step, according to the exigencies and chances of each suc- ceeding day, without premeditation of war, and Avith- out impatience of aggrandizement. This, in my opinion, was the judicious course, and the disposition of the Chambers made it our law. Not only in the bosom of the conservative party, but also of the op- position, many persons had little faith in the utility of this conquest, feared its extension, and resisted the accompanying expenses ; others even went so far as to propose formally its relinquishment. We found in 1840 the affairs of Algeria in a state at once of crisis and languor. The peace concluded, in 1837, at the Tafna, with Abd-el-Kadcr, had been broken ; after employing the interval of leisure in rallying the scattered tribes, in organizing his regular battalions, and in })rocuring supplies, the Arabian hero had re- commenced war in all quarters. Marshal Valee, Governor-General since tlie taking of Constantino, sustained it worthily, but without decisive results; VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lSiO-lSi2.) 383 partial expeditions succeeded ; princes, officers, and soldiers acquired much honour: our journals re- sounded with the defence of Mazagran, the taking of Cherchell, the passage of the Atlas, the occupation of Medeah and Milianah ; but tlie general situation remained the same, and Abd-el-Kader, always beaten, still maintained or rekindled the insurrection. There was a general feeling amongst those who took most interest in the affairs of Algeria, that, of all our offi- cers, General Bugeaud was the fittest to superintend effectually this difficult warfare. lie explained his ideas on this subject, on all occasions, with abundant and powerful eloquence, and with confidence in him- self, which had much more the appearance than the reality of presumption ; for, while he expected suc- cess, he fell into no error as to the difficulties, and neglected no means of surmounting them. Already employed more than once in Africa, he had given rapid proofs of ability and influence. The army looked on him with reliance and partiality ; the Arabs dreaded him. The cabinet of M. Tliiers, if I am rightly informed, intended to make him (jiover- nor-General ; but, from liis rougli ardour in the })olicy of resistance, his attitude in the Chambers, and his various antecedents. General Bugeaud was lield in antipatliy by the ])arty of the Left, and M. Tliiers abandoned the a])p()intment. ^^'e had not the same motives for hesitation ; I had faith in the military talent of General Bugeaud, and in his political firm ness ; the King, Marshal Soult, and all the council 384 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l840-1842.) seconded my opinion. On the 29th of December, 1840, he was named Governor-General of Algeria, and after having undergone, with complete success, in his arrondissement, the trial of re-election, he en- tered, towards the end of February, 1841, on the ac- tive duties of his government. From his opening, in the two campaigns of spring and autumn in 1841, he fully justified our expecta- tion. Abd-el-Kader was not destroyed ; a great man at the head of his nation is not destroyed until he is killed or taken prisoner ; but he was everywhere beaten, followed up, and reduced to the defensive. Several amongst the leading Arab tribes sent in their submission. Some of the most important points of the regency were taken and strongly occupied. Our dominion resumed its course of consolidation and steady progress. General Bugeaud, on leaving Paris, explained to me his plan of conduct ; since he had been in Algeria he supplied me with regular intel- ligence of his operations, complaining a little that he had received no letter from me in return, — a re- serve I practised to avoid offending the susceptibi- lity of ^Marshal Soult, to whom the affairs of Algeria were officially entrusted. On the 21st of September, 1841, 1 wrote to the (jovernor-General : "If I were to enumerate all my reasons for not writing to you before, 1 am sure that, amongst the number, you would find some quite satisfactory, and that you would forgive my silence. I break it now without wasting time in explanation, I should feel bitter re- VARIOUS HOME AFFAIHS. (iS K)-lSi3.) 385 grct if I could think it had given you a moment's doubt as to my sentiments towards you. Be assured, my dear General, that no one entertains for you higher esteem or more sincere friendship. We have seen and proved each otlier in moments never to be forgotten. "You have met with real success. You will meet with still more. Your impending campaign will se- cure and develop the results of the first. It is e\ident that above and before all other considerations, we must re-establish our moral ascendency in Africa, and impress a deep and permanent conviction of it on the Arabs ; and if we cannot hope for tlieir complete and lasting submission, we must throw amongst them, at least, disorganization and despondency. " This is the question of the moment. You are in the course of settling it. I admit that it is not finished, that you have yet efforts to make, that for these efforts you rerpiire means, and that wo must furnish them. For my own part, in the council and in the tribune, I sliall support you witli my utmost power. Even strongly uplield, your burden is still extremely heavy. A\'e owe it to you to sustain our due share. "But T suppose the question of the monuMit settled, tlie Arabs intimidated, the confederacy which sur- rounds Abd-el-Kader disunited. The grand point still remains, — our establislinKMit in Africa, and the con- duct to be lu'ld to render it solid. If solid, it will become useful. '•In my opinion, tlie first consideration is the settle- 2 r 386 VAKIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) ment of a clear and rigorous frontier between the ter- ritories ; one directly occupied by France and given over to European colonists, the other indirectly go- verned in the French name and left to the Arabs. " The separation of the two races appears to me the fundamental rule of the establishment, the condition of its success. "What ought to be, in the different provinces of the regency, the territory reserved for our direct sove- reignty and for European colonization'? You alone can furnish the information necessary to determine this question. Collect it, I entreat you, with care. Ar- rive at distinct propositions. We shall do nothing rational or durable on this point, until a course is well determined on and thoroughly investigated, in Africa and at home. " In the selection and limitation of the European territory, we ought to be governed by the idea that it must be found sufficient, at some future time, to support our establishment, whether of the population that cultivates, or of the army that defends it. This will be a result very slowly ascertained; but from this moment we ought to have it in view, and regulate, in consequence, the extent of our direct occupation. "Tliis boundary being fixed, we must next determine, within the European territory, the portions to be first delivered over to colonization, and procure positive se- cuiity for the colonists, whatever they may be, military or civil, companies or individuals. By what means is this security to be acquired? To wliat extent of ter- VAKIOUS HO.MK AFFAIKS. (iSiO-lS 1:2.) U87 ritory should it be, in the first instance, applicable ? Of these details I am ijjfnovant. AMiat I know is, that we require a European tenitory; that in that territory we must liave colonists, and that the colonists must have protection. "All the other questions springing from colonization are secondary, and need not be touched upon vmtil the previous ones are solved. "As to the Arabian territory, while interdicting it absolutely to European colonists, we ought evidently to occupy in it certain military points, where our rule may be visible, and whence we may exercise it in case of need. The more I consider, tlie more 1 feel con- vinced that these points ought to be few and strongly garrisoned. "Beyond these points, the farming and administra- tion of the country ought to be left to the Arabs, their chiefs, laws, and customs, under the sole condition of tribute. Our action there should confine itself to constant efforts of sound judgment and diplomacy, so as to live on good terms witli the scattered tribes, to prev(>nt tliem from coalescing against us, to attach some to our interests specially, to have a fa\"ourable understanding with all, and to maintain amongst them the c(mviction of our strength without meddling with their affairs. "Here, as with the Euroi)ean territory, I pass over secondary ([uestions. You alone can propose and solve them. "1 ecpially lay aside otlun' important but specific ■2 V 2 388 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) matters, such as maritime works to be executed at cer- tain points of the coast, the assessment of public pro- perty, and the administrative organization. At pre- sent, my dear General, I only write to make clearly known to you the state of my mind on the general view and conditions of our establishment, to ask you W'hether your ideas accord with mine, and thus to lay down the bases of the understanding which should exist between us, that I may be able to aid you ef- fectually when I have to discuss at the Palais Bour- bon and at the Luxembourg, your proceedings in Africa." In the plan I thus submitted to General Bugeaud, there was, as experience has taught me, a slight in- fusion of a preconceived and Utopian system. I be- lieved too much in the possibility of regulating, accor- ding to justice and by peaceful means, the relations be- tween Frenchmen and Arabs, Christians and Moham- medans, colonists and natives. I did not sufficiently estimate the difficulties and propensities which would inevitably spring up from the juxtaposition of races, religions, territories, authority, and property. Previous reflection does not always see things exactly as they are, and reason caniiot divine all that experience may re- veal. But it is precisely the mission and honour of the human mind to take, in worldly affixirs, a salutary initiative, despite the errors that may be mingled with it ; and practical policy would sink into a d(>plorable prostration and torpor, if fancy did not summon it from time to time to participate in her generous ex- VAKIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lS10-lS42.) 3S9 pectations. I aspired to introduce into the govern- ment of conquered Algeria, a large measure* of equity, humanity, and respect for rights, and I pointed out to General Bugeaud, according to my views, the means and conditions. He replied to me from Mostaganem, on the Gth of November, 1841 : "I find here your admirable letter. It requires a serious answer, well considered, which I have not time to forward at this moment, but which you shall have as soon as I am disembarrassed from the accumulated arrear of business occasioned by hft}- ihree days of a campaign just concluded. I feel tlic im})ortance of satisfying your ([uestions. " You ask in what you can assist me ; this is my reply. The greatest service you can render me at this moment, is to reward my army reasonably. After ha\ing been ])rodigal to Marshal Valee, who obtained all lie asked, u])on the most trifling claims, they have become extri^mely avaricious towards me. I ha^-e becMi unable to get anything for a great number of \\ ell- deserving officers, despite my reiterated dc^mands. Tlic army of Afiica, from ^vhicll 1 have recpiired much tliis year, compares its servicers and is not satisficnl. It compares (>])()clis also, and the com])aris()n is not in my favour, since I exact more fatigu(> and obtain much few(M- rewards. 1 thouglit it my duty to bring- back tlie bulletins to tlu' truth and nuxk^sty tliey ought to contain witli an army wliicli, to render it ca])abl(> of grc^at achievements, ouglit not to be glori- fied foi- small ones. 1 am ti'mi)ted to believe that tliis 390 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIKS. (1840-1842.) has been turned against us. People think that we have done little because we have not drawn up pompous re- ports of trifling engagements. But they ought to know that we cannot have battles of Austerlitz in Africa, and that the great merit of this war consists not in gaining victories, but in sustaining with pa- tience and firmness fatigue, inclemency of climate, and privations. In this respect, I think we have surpassed all that has hitherto taken place here. The war has been urged on with unheard-of activity, while sparing the troops as much as circumstances permitted, which they fully acknowledge. The care I take of them and the vigour of our operations console them in some de- gree for the scarcity of rewards : but if that parsimony continues, the present feeling may change. It con- cerns the interest of the country that my moral au- thority should not be weakened. " I fully comprehend the delicacy, on your part, of touching this chord in the council. Nevertheless a favourable and natural opportunity may present itself of saying your word. You might, moreover, have a private conversation with the King. I hope his Ma- jesty bears m(^ no illwill for having had some trifling ebullitions with the Duke of Nemours, whom, in other respects, I have treated extremely well. I wish to Heaven that all the servants of the monarchy were as devoted to it as T am, and possessed the same ar- dour," I accomplished, with the King, what General Bu- •i^eaud wished ; s{'V(>ral of his officers obtained the dis- VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lS10-lS12.) 391 tinctions he liad asked for them, and no one rendered him, m various conversations, more justice than the Duke of Nemours, sensible above all others to simple merit and well-performed duty. On his return to Algiers, General Bugeaud wrote to me on the 27th of November, 1841 : " Having nearly worked off my arrear of two months and impressed fresh activity on all branches of the service, and on all labours, I read again your letter of the 21st of September, which I did not receive until the 5tli of November, and to which I promised you an answer. " I might confine myself to sending you, as I do, a copy of a memoir, in form of a letter, which 1 addressed to the minister of Avar in reply to a series of questions proposed to me at the beginning of September. You will find there the greater portion of what you ask. But certain passages in your letter call for something more, whicli I sliall endeavour to satisfy. '• First, I remarked with nuicli pleasure tliat you thoroughly understand the position, for which reason your questions are generally well put. You admit that, ' above all, we must re-establish our moral as- ctMulencv in Africa, and impi'ess a dee]) and jx-rina- nent conviction of it on the Arabs.' Then you add, ' and if we cannot hope for their complete and lasting submission, we must throw amongst them, at least, disorganization and despondency.' " In the first ])art of this paragraph we are })erfectly agreed ; my system of war has had this object, and, I believe, to a great extent this effect. On the st'coml 392 VARIOUS HOME AFEAIRS. (l840-1842.) point AYe differ, inasmuch as you seem to doubt com- plete subjugation, and I feel assured of it, provided we know how to persevere in our impolitic enterprise. " If we are in the road, as I feel convinced, to a complete disorganization and despondency, — with tenacity we shall infallibly accomplish the conquest and control of the Arabs. What should we profit by disorganization and despondency if we abandon the game ? Discouragement would soon give place to the confidence and arrogance which cliaracterize this peo- ple. They would think, and with reason, that if we have not completed our work it was because we were unable to do so, and before six months, we should have to re-commence war. " But I am wrong in dwelling on your doubt ; it is evident that you only suggest it should things be at the worst, as you add immediately, ' You are in the course of settling the question ; I admit that it is not finished, that you have yet efforts to make, that for these efforts you require means, and that we must furni.sli them, etc. etc' " Xo, all is not finished, and there is yet much to do ; but tlie most difficult work is accomplished ; the first stones of this Arabian edifice, much more solid than was supposed, are torn away ; a few more, and tlie demolition will go on quickly. We have de- stroyed nearly all tlie depots of war. We have over- run the finest districts. We have amply supplied the places we possess in the interior. We have pro- foundly studied tlie country in many directions, and VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l8iO-lSi2.) 393 we know the manoeuvres and retreats of the tribes to escape us, so that at the approaching campaign we shall be in a condition to inflict much mischief on them. But what is still more important, we have singularly weakened the prestige which Abd-el-Kader exercised over his people. He had persuaded them that we coidd not leave the coast ; ' they resemble fishes,' he said ; ' they can only live by the sea ; their war has a short range and they pass like clouds. You have retreats and they cannot reach you.' We have this year penetrated to their most remote haunts, which has stricken the populations with consterna- tion. We are also beginning to find allies and auxili- aries ; we have reason to believe that the defection of the South will spread ; tlie submission of that por- tion of the Douars and Smelas which had always re- mained faithful to the Emir, and was composed of the most fanatical families, is an important event, since in addition to four liundred horsemen which we have gained, it is an excellent symptom of the enfeeblement of the Arab chief. This example must be contagious, and as soon as we win over a certain number of tribes, the ball of snow will augment rapidly, if we pusli it on with energy, and keep it rolling until we have gathered and subdued all. Half-measures obtain only half-resulls ; the work lias always to be done again. Our policy and war in Africa ought to be what yours should have been at home. You have been three times attacked witli arms in hand, and three times you have con(piered ; but tliree times also you have paused 894 VAKIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (1840-1842.) as if in fear of being too victorious. Look at the con- clusion at which the factions have arrived ; see them to-day more audacious and eager than ever; do they give you any credit for moderation and clemency"? No ; they have declared that you were afraid of them, and you have only discouraged your friends. And this is why you are now obliged to say, 'We shall have no rest, we are condemned to be indefatigable.' (Expressions in your letter.) " Let us not do the same in Africa ; let us not con- tent ourselves with half-submission, with a light tri- bute, which would infallibly be precarious. Since we have been mad enough to engage in the struggle, let us triumph completely and quell the Arabs. Let us meddle with their affairs^ and demand a heavy tribute, for this is, according to their habits, the most signal proof of power on the one side and submission on the other. All the diplomacy you name to me is not worth this, and this does not prevent skill elsewhere. " I do not mean to say that we ought to give to the Arabs in every quarter French commanders and legislators, although several tribes of the province of Constantino have demanded both ; no, we should go- vern them for a long time by natives ; but these chiefs of our selection should be vigorously restrained and rule only in our name. General Ncgrier* ma- nages them excellently ; he has thus considerably augmented the revenues and ^^ ill continue to increase tliem every year. * Comniauduut in Uio proviiice of Constautine. VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (lSlO-lSi2.) 395 " You wish to know my opinion on the mode of es- tablishing ourselves in this country and of maintain- ing our power here so that the conquest may not be a perpetual charge on the metropolis: I shall now communicate it to you. " You will see, in my letter to the minister of war, that I agree with you that there should be an Ara- bian and a French territory ; that is to say, that we ought not to interfere with the rural farming of loca- lities, and that fusion is not possible except in a cer- tain number of towns ; but I think, at the same time, that we should not be divided by great geographical masses, for such a division would not permit us to ex- ercise the governmental action, the necessity of which I have endeavoured to demonstrate, to render our es- tablishment durable. " In the election of our stations, we should always have revolt in view, the war which accompanies it, and militarv strcnG^th before ai2:ricultural and com- mcrcial conveniences. AVe must therefore occupy the military positions, the centres of action, and you deliver a sound maxim in war when you say that tliese points should be few in number but strongly garrisoned. When points of occupation are nume- rous, we cannot fail to be weak in some, and hence arises paralysis of all strength. Points of occupation have in general no otlier power tlian that of the faci- lity of moving the troops stationed there. When they are only sufficient to keep the post, they are conunanded bv it ; but wlu'U thev can move out in 396 VARIOUS HOME AFFAIRS. (l810-1842.) strength they command a radius of from tliirty to forty leagues. These self-evident truths appear to have been ig- nored, and the scattering of posts still paralyses, at this moment, more than a third of the army of Africa. In this point of view, I would place civil coloniza- tion by the side of military occupation in the interior, at well-selected stations, and on our most important lines of communications. Thus, civil colonization round Oran, Arzew, Mostaganem, Cherchell, Algiers, Phi- lippcville and Bona : military colonization at Tlem- cen, Mascara, Milianah, Medeah, Setif and Constan- tino ; and from post to post on the communications from these points with the coast. On some points of the coast and of the military colony there should be placed small reserves of regular troojis to be furnished and relieved from home, but the expense to be reim- bursed at a fixed time from the budget of the colony. Civil colonization should be militarized as much as possible. " This system would enclose the country, once sub- dued, so effectually, that serious revolts would become almost impossible. Policy and enervating civiliza- tion would complete the work. The European race, more favoured, better constitutc^d, and more indus- trious than th(^ native Arabs, would increase, I think more rapidly, and form, in the course of time, the great mass of ihc population. An iinj)()rtant (piestion still remains, which, though VAUTOrS nOME AFFAIRS. (lSK)-lSl2.) 397 late, demands solution: what advantages will the mother-country derive from its conquest 1 "It would be vain to look for advantages propor- tioned to the sacrifices already mentioned and still to be made, to the dangers and embarrassments whicli this conquest has caused. But we may find many sources of consolation. In this respect my ideas are more favourable tlian they were before I traversed Algeria, as I have done tliis year. Judging of tlie whole from certain portions, I believed that Algeria was far from meriting its ancient reputation for fertility. I think now that it is productive in corn ; that it may become so in fruit, oil, and silk, and I have acquired a certain knowledge that it nourishes, without labour, a vast stock of cattle and horses. It also possesses much more fuel than was supposed ; only this fuel is badly distributed. " Our colonists and the Arabs, when no longer at war, may therefore live in abundance, and have an excess of produce for commercial ])iirposes. Under actual circumstances, in spite of tlieir bad administra- tion, tlieir incessant wars, and tlie barbarism of tlieir agriculture, the Arabs rear more corn and cattle than tlicy require for tlieir consumption. '• T judge of the fertility, not only fioni the products I have seen on the Clielif, the Miiia, the TUel, the Ilabra, the Sig, etc., but still more by tlu^ ]>opulation, and of that by the great number of liorseuKMi, I am certain that the province of Oran has 2o,()00 men, mounted on horses belon