cbes In 1 ouse of 
 Commons j on the ' nst 
 
 'tt'-'S 
 
 By 
 Philip
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 SPEECHES 
 
 JN THE 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 ON THE 
 
 W A 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 THE MAHRATTAS. 
 
 BY 
 
 PHILIP FRANCIS, ESQ.. 
 
 Magnopere vos et hortor et moneo, ut his provinciis, serius vos 
 quidera quam decuit, aliquand6 tamen consulatis." CICERO. 
 
 
 LONDON) 
 
 PRINTED FOR JAMES RIDGWAY, NO. 170, OPPOSITE 
 BOND STREKT, PICCADILLY. 
 
 1805. 
 Price Two Shillings and Sixpence.
 
 
 S. Gosnell, Printer, 
 Little Queen Street.
 
 4(03 
 
 TO THE 
 
 7 MY DEAR LORD, 
 
 <Q I AM much in your debt, and very desirous to 
 acknowledge it. A material service, accompa- 
 nied with constant kindness and friendship, en- 
 titles you to every proof of gratitude, which I 
 ^ can give you. In the country, where you have 
 ^ wisely resolved to fix your residence, your ex- 
 ample, I know, is eminently useful. The pur- 
 ' suits, you are engaged in, are of all others the 
 most likely to make you happy in retirement. 
 Yet knowing, as I do, how highly you are qua- 
 . lifted for greater occupations, I cannot but regret 
 ,.. that you are not called upon to act on a more 
 Y extensive scale, or in a station better suited to 
 
 M 
 
 ^^your abilities and to your rank in society. The 
 publication, which I now dedicate to you, con-
 
 IV 
 
 tains no principle or opinion, to which, as I be- 
 lieve, you would be unwilling to lend your 
 name. You seriously think, what others are con- 
 tented to profess, that justice and good faith 
 ought to be observed even to the Mahrattas, and 
 that, in the late wars in India, they were not 
 the aggressors. In these opinions I trust you will 
 find yourself confirmed by the arguments, which 
 
 I had the honour of stating to the House of :i 
 
 
 Commons, and which I now submit to the judge- . 
 
 ment of the Public. 
 
 PHILIP FRANCIS. 
 
 Nov. 1805.
 
 MAHRATTA WAR. 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 March 14, 1804. 
 
 MR. FRANCIS moved, that the 35th clause of the 
 24th of the King should be read, viz. 
 
 " Whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and 
 extension of dominion are measures repugnant to 
 the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation : 
 be it enacted," &c. 
 
 And then addressed himself to the Speaker to the 
 following effect : In moving to have this clause 
 now read, I have two objects : first, to remind the 
 House of their own unanimous resolution,on which 
 the subsequent Act of Parliament was founded ; 
 and then to shew that, in the motion, which 
 I propose to submit to the House, I am governed 
 by that resolution, and aim at nothing but to en- 
 force the execution of that law. In this purpose, 
 and on this ground, I hope for the support and 
 concurrence of the House ; because I do not be- 
 lieve it will be asserted by any man, that it is 
 very right to pass laws for the better government 
 of a distant dominion, and very wrong to inquire 
 
 k
 
 whether such laws are obeyed or not. In my 
 opinion, it would be a wiser policy, and a safer 
 practice, not to make any laws, than to suffer 
 them to be slighted with impunity. Habits of 
 disobedience are very catching; and they are the 
 more dangerous in proportion to the distance of 
 the offending parties, and to the facility, which 
 that distance gives them, to conceal or disguise 
 their transactions. I state these principles gene- 
 rally, as a rational ground of parliamentary sus- 
 picion and inquiry, whenever the governments 
 in India appear to be engaged in measures, which 
 the law prohibits ; and not at all meaning to af- 
 firm that such measures, when they are tho- 
 roughly examined, may not admit of a sufficient 
 justification. The business and duty of this day 
 does not call upon me to accuse any man, or to 
 affirm that any thing deserving the censure of 
 Parliament has been done. My object is to in- 
 quire; and then, according to the result of the 
 inquiry, to desist or to proceed. All I contend for, 
 in the first instance, is that a British Governor, 
 who commences a war in India, is prima facie, doing 
 that which the law prohibits ; that his own act of 
 itself puts him on his defence ; that he is bound 
 to justify on the case; and that, until he has so 
 justified his conduct, the presumptions are against 
 him. All the authorities of this country have 
 united with one voice to condemn and forbid the 
 carrying on war in India for any purpose but de- 
 fence, oc on any ground but necessity. I need
 
 3 
 
 not tell the House, that the practice in India has 
 been almost uniformly, or with very short ex- 
 ceptions, directly opposed to the prohibition. 
 While the Directors of the India Company had 
 any power, they certainly laid down very wise / 
 principles, and gave very proper orders on this 
 subject. When their power over their own Go- 
 vernors was found to be insufficient, the Legisla- 
 ture interposed ; but, as it appears by the facts, 
 with no more success than the Directors. Since 
 the Prohibitory Act passed in 1784, I appeal to 
 the House whether we have heard of any thing 
 from India but war and conquest ; many victories 
 and great acquisitions, with only now and then 
 a short interval of repose, to take breath and 
 begin again. There is another ground of pre- 
 sumption against the necessity and justice of these 
 wars, which seems to me as strong and conclusive 
 as any presumption can be before the contrary is 
 proved ; I mean, Sir, that almost all these wars 
 are supposed to originate in acts of provocation 
 and aggression committed by the weak against 
 the strong. The strength of any single Indian 
 state at any time, and now I believe of all of them 
 put together, is not to be compared to the mili- 
 tary power and resources of the English. I do 
 not say that these nations have no means of de- 
 fence, or that Ihe Mahrattas, for example, can 
 do us no mischief; but that, considering the great 
 disparity of force, it requires very clear evidence 
 
 B 2
 
 4 
 
 to make it credible, that whereas the disposition 
 of the British power in India is always, if pos- 
 sible, to preserve the peace, and to be satisfied 
 with what we possess, this excellent disposition 
 is never suffered to prevail, because the Indian 
 princes are so restless and unruly, that we cannot, 
 in common justice to ourselves, refrain from in- 
 vading them. The fable says the fierce, rebel- 
 lious lamb, would never suffer the mild, gentle, 
 moderate wolf to be quiet : if it was not you, it 
 was your father. These propositions may be 
 true, but they require some proof; and, when 
 ihe proof is produced, I shall desire it always to 
 be observed and remembered, that the evidence 
 which comes before us is ex farte* We hear little 
 or nothing of what the opposite, and possibly the 
 injured party, have to say for themselves. 
 
 Ever since I have known any thing of Indian 
 affairs, I hare found that the prevailing disease 
 of our governments .there has been a rage for 
 making war. The strong, though ineffectual 
 remedies, which have from time to time been ap- 
 plied to this disorder, are a sufficient proof of its 
 existence. That individuals may find their ac- 
 count in the conduct of such wars, I do not mean 
 to dispute ; but I deny that they are or can be 
 for the benefit of the India Company, or the na- 
 tion, particularly in the present circumstances of 
 tjie Company's affairs. In these circumstances, 
 and in actual possession of half the peninsula,
 
 5 
 
 you engage in a new war with the Mahrattas, the 
 success of which can give you nothing but an 
 addition of territory, which you cannot keep 
 without an intolerable increase of your military 
 establishments, and a perpetual drain of all your 
 resources, of men as well as money, and which 
 you ought not to keep if you could. Whether 
 the Mahrattas have united in defence of their 
 country, or to carry the war into the heart of our 
 best provinces, as they have done in former times, 
 or with what loss or expense our success against 
 them may have been purchased, are questions on 
 which we are utterly in the dark. By public re- * 
 port alone we are informed, that a war of great 
 extent at least, and liable to many important con- 
 sequences, is now carrying on in India, and that 
 no information of it has been communicated to 
 Parliament. Sir, 1 can safely assure this House, 
 that the Mahrattas, though not capable of meeting 
 us in the field, or at all likely to encounter us in 
 a pitched battle, are nevertheless very well able to 
 do us a great deal of mischief. In the year 1778, 
 the Presidency of Bombay received and gave their 
 protection to a Mahratta fugitive, called Ragoba, 
 and mustered all the force they could collect to 
 escort him back to Poona, and to make them- 
 selves masters of that place. If the expedition 
 had succeeded, I do not doubt that the persons, 
 who were engaged in it, would have been very 
 well paid for their trouble". The event was, that
 
 their army was surrounded, starved, and com- 
 pelled to capitulate. At some earlier periods of 
 the history of India, the Mahraltas have frequently 
 crossed the rivers, and made rapid incursions into 
 the upper provinces of Bengal and Bahar, carry- 
 ing universal desolation with them wherever they 
 went, ruining the country, and making it im- 
 possible to collect the revenues. I know no rea- 
 son, why they may not make the same attempts 
 again, and with the same success. With such 
 bodies of horse as they can collect at a very short 
 warning, from fifty to a hundred thousand in dif- 
 ferent quarters, they may pour into our provinces, 
 over-run and lay waste the country, and then make 
 their retreat with the same rapidity, without its 
 being possible for us either to meet or to overtake 
 Ihem. This is their mode of making war, and it 
 has always succeeded with them. They are the 
 Tartars of India. In these circumstances, I ask, 
 is it proper or not that Parliament should know, 
 why this war was undertaken ? for what purposes 
 it has been pursued ? and with what success it 
 has been attended ? and finally, has it the sanction 
 and approbation of the Court of Directors, and 
 of His Majesty's Ministers ? I cannot believe it 
 possible. If it should be stated, as I have some 
 reason to expect it may, that the papers, to which 
 these motions allude, have not in fact been re- 
 ceived by the Court of Directors, that answer 
 must silence me for the present ; but I must say
 
 7 
 
 that, in another point of view, it will be very 
 unsatisfactory. The orders given by Lord 
 Wellesley, in consequence of which the hostilities 
 began upon the Malabar coast, must have been 
 dated some time in June, or early in July last. I 
 beg of the House to observe the dates : we are 
 now in the middle of March ; so that eight 
 months and a half must have elapsed since the 
 orders were given, and no information received 
 at home on that subject. This is a case, which 
 the Act of Parliament has foreseen and provided 
 for : the words of the law are, that " in all cases, 
 where hostilities shall be commenced, or treaty 
 made, the Governor General and Council shall, 
 ly the most expeditious means they can devise, com- 
 municate the same to the Court of Directors, to- 
 gether with a full state of the information and 
 intelligence, upon which they shall have com- 
 menced such hostilities, or made such treaties ; 
 and their motives and reasons for the same at 
 large." Until it shall appear in evidence, that 
 this delay of information directly from Lord 
 Wellesley is not owing to any neglect or omission 
 of his, I am bound to presume that there is 
 a fault somewhere, on his side. Supposing the 
 measures in question should appear, upon in- 
 quiry, to deserve censure, that cause of censure 
 will be greatly aggravated by the neglect of send- 
 ing home timely information on the whole 
 subject.
 
 I am not able to foresee what sort of objections 
 can be stated to the motions for papers,with which 
 I mean to conclude. I rather hope for the ac- 
 quiescence of the Noble Lord on the other side. 
 At all events, I hope and expect that personal 
 character, or the personal confidence due to any 
 man, will not be alledged in bar to this inquiry* 
 At present there is no charge, and there ought to 
 be no defence. If I have laid sufficient ground 
 for inquiry, we are bound to inquire. If crimi- 
 nation should follow, it must be answered, not 
 by character, but by proof. When an inquiry 
 was moved for in this House, in the year 1791, 
 into the causes of the first war with Tippoo Sul- 
 tan, no man's reputation stood higher in the 
 estimation of the public than that of Lord Corn- 
 wallis ; but I do not remember that any opposi- 
 tion to the inquiry was set up on the score of his 
 personal character, though none was more gene- 
 rally respected. On the contrary, His Majesty's 
 Ministers met the inquiry fairly, and thought they 
 could not defend his conduct better than by giving 
 us all the information they possessed. 1 hope 
 and I expect that the Noble Lord, now at the 
 head of the Indian department, will follow that 
 example. He professes to invite and encou/age 
 a free discussion of all Indian questions. If not, 
 and if the motion, with which I am now about 
 to conclude, should be resisted, I think the House 
 will be reduced to one of these two conclusions ;
 
 9 
 
 either that there is something in the personal J 
 merits of Lord Wellesley, which entitles him to 
 greater confidence than was thought due to Lord 
 Cornwallis ; or that there has been something in 
 his conduct, to which no other defence can be ap- 
 plied but a favourable opinion of his character. 
 I move you, Sir, 
 
 " That there be laid before this House, copies 
 or extracts of all dispatches received from the 
 Governor General of Bengal, or from the Presi- 
 dencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, as far as 
 such dispatches relate to or account for hostilities, 
 now or lately subsisting between the said Govern- 
 ments and any of the Mahratta Princes or States ; 
 with the dates of the receipt of such dispatches. 
 
 " Copies or extracts of all the correspondence 
 between the said Governments and any of the 
 Mahratta Princes or States, relative to the said 
 hostilities. 
 
 et Copies or extracts of all orders or instructions 
 sent to India by the Court of Directors of the East 
 India Company on the same subject." 
 
 LORD CASTLEREAGH said, that Government 
 were not in possession of the circumstances which 
 preceded the rupture. 
 
 The motion was withdrawn.
 
 10 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 May 3, 1804. 
 
 LORD CASTLEREAGH moved, that the thank* 
 of the House be given to the Marquis of Welles- 
 Jey, and to the officers and soldiers concerned in 
 achieving our late successes in India. 
 
 Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Speaker, The motion made 
 by the Noble Lord puts me under great difficulty, 
 and, if it prevails, I think will reduce the House 
 itself to a similar difficulty in its future proceedings 
 on the subject of the war in India. I shall state it 
 fairly as it strikes me, and leave it to the candid 
 consideration and impartial judgment of the 
 House. When I attended yesterday, in conse- 
 quence of the notice given by the Noble Lord, it 
 was with an expectation, well warranted by the 
 terms in which he gave it, that nothing was in- 
 tended but a particular vote of thanks, in which I 
 should have heartily concurred, to parties and for 
 services, of which he cannot think more highly 
 than I do. I believed and I expected that the 
 motion would be confined, as I still think it ought 
 to be, to persons and to actions, concerning which 
 there could be no difference of opinion 1 mean 
 the eminent gallantry and skill, with which all the 
 . military operations against the Mahrattas appear 
 to have been conducted. The memory of the 
 brave men, who have fallen in these conflicts, is 
 entitled to every mark of honour, which this House
 
 II 
 
 has the power of conferring. The services of the 
 survivors have an equal claim to the gratitude of 
 their country. Whether so many valuable lives 
 have been unprofitably lost, in a quarrel, which 
 ought or ought not to be avowed by Parliament ; 
 or whether such great exertions have been made 
 with a sufficient consideration of the policy, the 
 justice, and the necessity of the war, are questions, 
 which it was not advisable nor in any shape ne- 
 cessary to be brought this day into debate. The 
 Noble Lord's motion forces them to a discussion 
 without necessity, and in effect decides them with- 
 out knowledge. The merits of the war itself ought 
 to have been left untouched and entire for future 
 deliberation. By this motion that question is pre- 
 judged ; or at least the use and effect of that de- 
 liberation is precluded. It is impossible for Par- 
 liament to go with a free and unbiassed mind to 
 examine the wisdom or the justice of a war, to the 
 author and director of which they have already re- 
 turned their thanks in such exalted terms, first for 
 the plan, and then for the success of it. The 
 Noble Lord has been very cautious, as he says, 
 not to confound the two questions. He has 
 drawn a line of distinction between the merits and 
 services of Lord Wellesley in his military capa- 
 city, that is, for the plan and operations of the 
 war, which cannot be too highly applauded, and 
 the justice or policy of the war itself, which, he 
 says, are still left open to the examination, and 
 
 C 2
 
 possibly to the censure of Parliament, when the 
 evidence comes before them. This I hold to be 
 
 impossible in practice. When once this House 
 
 1 * 
 
 has pronounced that the plan, the execution, and 
 the success of a great measure deserve your 
 highest approbation, you cannot tread back your 
 steps : you cannot say to the same man, under 
 another character, as if he played two parts in the 
 same performance, that the principles on which 
 he acted deserve your severest condemnation. I 
 put the case as a bare possibility in argument, and 
 not meaning to utter a word, or to breathe a 
 thought in prejudice of that part of the question, 
 which the Noble Lord says is still reserved for a, 
 free discussion. On a former occasion, when this 
 subject was first introduced, I flatter myself that 
 the manner, in which I urged an inquiry into the 
 causes of the War in India, existing then, and in- 
 deed still existing, without the knowledge of 
 Parliament, had given general satisfaction. I said 
 not one word in disparagement of Lord Welleslcy, 
 nor shall I now. No other evidence of the merit 
 of his measures is within our knowledge, but that 
 his measures have succeeded. On that principle, 
 in fair and honourable argument, if his measures 
 had been defcaled, we must have condemned 
 him on the principle of his conduct. The Noble 
 Lord, who extols the care taken, and the extra- 
 ordinary provisions made by Lord Wellesley to 
 guard against defeat and to ensure success, in one
 
 13 
 
 instance forgets himself : he says, that one of 
 General Lake's victories was obtained by a handful 
 of men against an Immense, disparity of numbers. 
 That, indeed, I allow, is saying a great deal for 
 the skill of the General, and for the valour of the 
 army ; but it is not saying much for the precau- 
 tions taken, and the means furnished by the Civil 
 Government. Whatever the event may be, no 
 Government has a right to expect, or to calculate 
 upon the probability that a handful of men will 
 succeed against a very superior force. Jn the first 
 action under General Wellcsley, on the other side 
 of India, I know with certainty that his army was 
 in the greatest danger, and that if that most gal- 
 lant charge made by our cavalry, in the front of 
 which General Maxwell fell, had not succeeded, 
 our army would in all appearance have been lost. 
 I agree with the Noble Lord, that the dissolution 
 of the French force under Monsieur du Perron, 
 which was attached to the service of Scindia, may 
 be a considerable advantage. Whatever it may 
 be, it was collateral and incidental. If I am 
 rightly informed, it was not reduced by force, but 
 came over to us by private negotiation and agree- 
 ment. The Noble Lord talks with triumph and 
 exultation of the rapid progress of our arms, and 
 the immense acquisitions of territory we have 
 made in the Guzzerat and elsewhere. He forgets 
 that the positive law of this country, founded on 
 the best-considered principles of policy and jus-
 
 ticc, and confirmed by the advice of every man in 
 this country whose authority deserves to be re- 
 garded, forbids any farther acquisition of territory 
 in India. Prima facie, a British Governor, who 
 makes war for the acquisition of territory, offends 
 against the law, and is bound to justify himself 
 on the case before he can be acquitted. On the 
 whole, Sir, it is my opinion, that this Motion of 
 Thanks to Lord Wellesley ought to be deferred. 
 I have no personal object to obtain, or even wish 
 to gratify, in the part I have taken on this subject, 
 unless it is to preserve the consistency of my own 
 character, and to adhere to the principles, with 
 which I set out in the Government of India, and 
 from which I never have departed. Thanks given 
 without knowledge or deliberation do no honour 
 to those who give, or to those who receive them. 
 They have no root, and cannot live. Let the evi- 
 dence come before us. Let the Noble Lord's 
 conduct be examined, and then if it should appear 
 that the war, in which India is involved, was not 
 voluntary on his part ; that it was founded in 
 justice and necessity, I shall be as ready as any man 
 to join in the thanks proposed by this motion. 
 The thanks of the House of Commons, founded 
 on due examination, and including all the con- 
 siderations that belong to the question, will then 
 proceed with dignity. Their impression will be 
 deep, and their effect lasting. I therefore think 
 that the motion ought to be postponed."
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 
 January ai, 1805. 
 
 Mr. FRANCIS. The motion, which I mean to 
 submit to the House, will not make it necessary for 
 me to trouble you with many reasons in support 
 of it, or for more than a few minutes ; and, in- 
 deed, it appeared to me so much a matter of 
 course, that I should not have thought it required 
 a previous notice, but for a suggestion, which I 
 am always desirous to comply with. In the course 
 of the last Session the House thought fit to order 
 a great variety of papers to be laid before them, to 
 explain the causes of the war which began in 
 1803, against two of the principal Mahratta 
 Chiefs, Scindia and Boosla. By the papers before 
 the House it appears, that those Chiefs were sub- 
 dued and reduced to submission, and that treaties 
 of peace had been signed with them about the 
 close of the same year ; and it was natural to con- 
 clude that there was an end of the war in India. 
 Nothing could be more improbable than that any 
 of the remaining Mahratta powers should take up 
 the contest where the others had left it ; and espe- 
 cially against an enemy flushed with success, and 
 which the greatest powers of the Mahratta empire 
 had not been able to resist. Nevertheless it is 
 known that another war with another Chief, called 
 Holcar, immediately, or soon alter, succeeded to
 
 the pacification with Scindia and Boosla. 1 consider 
 it as the final act of the same transaction, and that 
 the information before the House would not be 
 complete without the papers relative to these last 
 hostilities, which I propose to move for. I hold 
 it to be of importance to the good government and 
 safety of our possessions in India, that a regular com- 
 munication of all material transactionsthere should, 
 at proper intervals, be made to Parliament, and 
 that the record of them should be preserved in this 
 House. I have no doubt that Holcar has been sub- 
 dued. His force, compared with ours, is so incon- 
 siderable, that one can only wonder at his ventur- 
 ing, at such a time especially, to provoke a quarrel 
 with a power so much superior to him. Never- 
 theless he has certainly been able to make some 
 resistance, and we know that many lives have 
 been lost already in the course of this petty war. 
 In one of the provinces ceded to us, called Bun- 
 dclcund, a party of his cavalry surrounded a de- 
 tachment of ours, consisting of two complete com- 
 panies of sepoys, some cannon, and fifty European 
 artillerymen, every man of whom were cut to 
 pieces. The loss of the sepoys is to be lamented 
 that of the artillerymen is invaluable. The 
 main body, from which this little force was de- 
 tached, immediately retired, and the officer who 
 commanded it was put under arrest. I need not 
 say any more to prove that these transactions de- 
 serve the attention of the House. I am not aware
 
 17 
 
 of any reasonable objection to the motion ; but if 
 any should be made, I hope the House will permit 
 me to reply to it. I move you, Sir, " That there 
 be laid before this House copies or extracts of all 
 letters or correspondence received from India, be- 
 fore or since the close of the last Session of Par- 
 liament, relative to hostilities between the British 
 Government and the Mahralta Chief, named 
 Jesswarrt Rao Holcar, as far as may be consistent 
 with the public service, and with the good faith 
 due to persons, from whom secret intelligence may 
 have been receired." Before I sit down, I wish 
 to mention a subject connected with the Mahratta 
 war, on which the House has received no in- 
 formation. I expected to find it explained in the 
 printed papers, but in them there is no mention 
 of it. In the country of Guzzerat, to the north- 
 west of Bombay, there is a Prince called Gwico- 
 vvar : a part of his territory has been ceded to the 
 Company, partly to make good the pay of our 
 subsidiary force stationed at Poona, and for other 
 objects of indemnification. Out of that fund we 
 ought to have received a considerable revenue ; 
 but to that Prince the Government of Bombay 
 have lent a sum not much less than 360,000}. 
 The documents relative to this extraordinary 
 transaction, I think, ought to have been laid be- 
 fore the House under the orders already given, 
 which would save time and trouble ; if not, it 
 must be the subject of a particular motion.
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 
 March 28, 1805. 
 
 LORD CASTLEREAGH moved for leave to bring 
 in a Bill to enlarge and regulate the powers given 
 to the Governor General and Commander in 
 Chief in India. 
 
 Mr. FRANCIS said: Sir, I see no immediate 
 objection to the provisions of this Bill. The 
 cases stated, though I hope not likely to happen, 
 ought to be provided for. The supposition cannot 
 be made without some painful reflections, that 
 Lord Cornwallis, on his arrival in Bengal, which 
 cannot be computed at less than six months from 
 this period, will find India still involved in war, 
 and that he may be obliged to take the field in 
 person. If that be well founded, it gives us but 
 a melancholy prospect of the state of our affairs 
 in that quarter. I do not perceive that the Bill 
 gives Lord Cornwallis any new or extraordinary 
 powers ; and, if it did, I should not be inclined to 
 oppose it, for two reasons ; first, because I should 
 think it not at all unlikely that the exigency of 
 the case might require such powers ; and then, 
 because I know oi no person among those, who 
 have acted in great stations in my time, whom I 
 should be more ready to trust with great power 
 than my Lord Cornwallis. Judging of him by all 
 his public conduct, I am convinced that power
 
 may be safely trusted in his hands, and that he 
 will never use it but for the benefit of the public 
 service. If my voice could contribute to his 
 honour, he should have it without reserve, for the 
 spirit that prompts him to undertake such a task, 
 as 1 know it to be, and at such a time ; and if it 
 
 
 
 were possible to give him support in the execution 
 of it by any effort of mine, he might be sure of it. 
 I am convinced that his great object will be to 
 compose the disorders of India, and to restore 
 peace and tranquillity to the unfortunate in- 
 habitants of that country. 
 
 D 2
 
 CO 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 
 Friday, dfril 5, 1805. 
 
 MR. FRANCIS. 
 
 Mr. Shaker, 
 
 \ SHALL have too mucli occasion to solicit your 
 indulgence on a subject, which I know has no at- 
 tractions for the House, to waste your time with a 
 long preface. The magnitude of the object, which 
 I mean to bring into your view, no less than a do- 
 minion, which in one way or other embraces 
 almost the whole peninsula of India, and the im>- 
 portance of the considerations that belong to it, 
 whether as a conquest to be preserved, or as an 
 estate to be improved, are too evident to be dis- 
 puted ; but I believe it is equally notorious that, 
 in this country and even in Parliament, a general 
 indifference to this great dominion has grown with 
 its magnitude, and that a general neglect of all the 
 national interests connected with it has followed 
 and kept pace with their increasing importance. 
 It looks as if India and its Government had 
 swelled to a size too big for the capacity, or too 
 intricate and perplexed for the comprehension of 
 the House of Commons. If that be so, it is a 
 powerful argument, among many, against the 
 policy, as it is called by some, but, as I say, against
 
 21 
 
 the folly of grasping at acquisitions too extensive 
 to be governed wisely for the benefit of the people, 
 who are subject to your power, or even of being 
 managed profitably to your own advantage. In 
 a possession so remote from the inspection, and, 
 by its extent as well as its distance, so little subject 
 to the direct superintendance of Parliament, abuses 
 of all sorts are very likely to prevail. A territory 
 so circumstanced, if not well governed, that is, 
 with a watchful eye and with a strict attention to 
 the conduct of those, who are deputed to govern 
 it, will assuredly be ill governed ; and that mis- 
 government will not be confined to petty abuses ; 
 nor will the consequence of great abuses be con- 
 fined to that country. The mischiefs, that are 
 suffered to grow and prevail in India, will not 
 stop there : they will be felt here ; they are felt 
 already. There is no medium: the evils, inse- 
 parable from a ruinous system of government, 
 are progressive in their nature, and cannot be 
 stationary any where ; but least of all, where the 
 distance of itself keeps the disorder out of sight. 
 The true state of the case is never known in the 
 first instance. Prevention is never thought of, 
 nor remedy neither but in the last extremity; 
 and, when your orders arrive, the crisis is over. 
 You wait for events till the last moment. You 
 pretend to forbid war, while in fact your judge- 
 ment of the policy and justice of the measures 
 pursued abroad is always decided by a battle.
 
 22 
 
 This mode of ruling India may suit the rulers 
 .0, and the interest of individuals; but it 
 ot the way to make India, what it ought 
 |(> be, a resource and a benefit to England, 
 or to prevent its becoming more and more, 
 \vhat I know it is already, a perpetual drain of 
 men and money, which the wealth and popula- 
 tion of England are not equ.nl to ; and, even if 
 they were equal to such a burden for a few years, 
 what public purpose would it answer to hold such 
 a dominion on such terms ? If in fact these great 
 acquisitions are too distant or too unwieldy to be 
 wisely managed by the power of this country ; or, 
 if the scheme and constitution of a House of Com- 
 mons are not fitted or commensurate to the go- 
 vernment of so great an addition to the empire, 
 that consideration may furnish reasons for con- 
 tracting or relinquishing the possession, but not for 
 neglecting it. As long as the House of Commons 
 professes to retain its jurisdiction over India, it 
 cannot be improper in any individual, nor in me I 
 hope quite useless, to endeavour to recall the at- 
 tention of the House to the object of that jurisdic- 
 tion and to the duties that belong to it. In this 
 place, Sir, I beg leave to say a few words concern- 
 thc gratuitous share, which I have so long 
 taken in the affairs of India, without a personal 
 interest or advantage of any kind. Within these 
 few years the constitution of this House has been 
 so much altered, that many of the present Mem- 
 bers, not knowing in what relation I have stood
 
 to th& Government of India, might possibly think 
 mean intruder on this subject, or that I invaded 
 a department, which did no way belong to me. 
 If i hat idea should prevail in the minds of any 
 Gentlemen, a very short and a very necessary ex- 
 planation will set me right in their opinion. My 
 connexion with India began so long ago as the 
 year 1773, when I was appointed to a place in the 
 Government of Bengal by the first Parliamentary 
 appointment that was made for India. The events 
 of a few years placed me next in succession to the 
 office of Governor General, to which, with a very 
 little policy and good management, I might easily 
 have succeeded. While I continued in India, 
 every part of my public conduct was marked by 
 the approbation of the Court of Directors, in 
 whose hands the authority of this country over 
 India was exclusively vested. The honour they 
 did me was pure and unmixed with any proof of 
 their good opinion, that could be attributed to 
 personal favour. On this point, their deliberate 
 judgement with respect to me might possibly be 
 erroneous; but I have very sufficient reason to 
 say that it was perfectly impartial. On my return 
 to England, I found that two Committees of this 
 House were employed in a strict examination of 
 all the transactions in India during the period of 
 my appointment. By those Committees every 
 act, every opinion, I might almost say every 
 recorded word of mine, while I was in office, was
 
 24 
 
 minutely canvassed and reported to the House. In 
 a few years from that time, my conduct, and my 
 character too, underwent a trial of another sort, 
 but much stricter and more severe than even a 
 direct Parliamentary inquiry; I mean in the im- 
 peachment of Mr. Hastings. For no man, I think, 
 who remembers the transactions of that period, 
 and knows the disposition of those 'times, will 
 deny that, while the impeachment lasted, I was 
 in effect as much under trial as if I had heen di- 
 rectly put on my defence. Through these ordeals 
 I passed unwounded and unblemished ; and not 
 only unwounded and unblemished, but finally 
 honoured by a third Committee of this House with 
 such a testimonial under their hands, as, I believe, 
 has been rarely given to any man. So little of the 
 solid and substantial advantages of life have 
 fallen to my lot, that I trust I shall be forgiven for 
 endeavouring to avail myself of this distin- 
 guished ornament. If a name, so inconsiderable 
 as mine, should have any chance of surviving me, 
 it can only be under tlie auspices of those eminent 
 persons, to whom I have alluded, in conjunction 
 with their character, and in attendance on their 
 fame. My other titles to the barren office, in 
 which I am still engaged, consist in long posses- 
 sion, without interruption or competition. Should 
 it ever promise to be more productive, I should 
 not despair of seeing myself surrounded by many 
 competitors. In the mean time, and as long as
 
 there is no prize to be obtained, I may have the 
 race to myself. Finally, Sir, if I had no other 
 title to plead, the state of dereliction, in which the 
 discussion of India affairs has been generally left, 
 leaves it open to the first occupant, to me or to 
 any body. 
 
 The amount of what I propose to submit to 
 the consideration of the House will not be pro- 
 portioned to the mass of the printed papers on the 
 table. A large portion of these papers relates 
 to military operations, to marches, sieges, and 
 battles, with which I have no concern, and shall 
 not meddle. A great part of the remainder con- 
 sists of details of negotiations, of intelligence, and 
 of other particulars, into which it would be use- 
 less for me to enter. Among the rest, there is a 
 voluminous correspondence from the Presidency 
 of Bombay, relating to a censure of their proceed- 
 ings by the Governor General of Bengal, against 
 which my old friend Mr. Duncan, though I can- 
 not perceive that he was at all in the wrong, de- 
 fends himself with fear and trembling. My pur- ^ 
 pose is to bring before the House a summary re- 
 view of the British possessions in India from their 
 origin to the state, in which they stood at the 
 close of the last century, and for a year or two 
 after, when those measures were concerted and 
 carried into execution, which I mean to examine 
 more minutely. To understand the nature and 
 security of your present establishment in India, 
 
 E
 
 26 
 
 you must see how it began, how it advanced, 
 what root it holds by, what principles were 
 adopted by the wisdom and prescribed by the au- 
 thority of this country for the government of 
 India, what practice followed, and finally on what 
 ground we stood, when it was said to be neces- 
 sary, about two years ago, to provide for the 
 further defence and security of the British empire 
 in India by those new measures, which produced 
 the Mahratta war. This is a wide circumference ; 
 but the passage across it shall be short and rapid. 
 A bird's eye view of the subject will be sufficient. 
 The origin of our connexion with India and 
 the foundation of our establishment there was 
 commercial. Appearing in the character of mer- 
 chants, and for many years assuming no other, we 
 were received by the native Princes, not only with 
 hospitality and protection, but with extraordinary 
 favour and encouragement ; and certainly, as far 
 as the commercial interests of their subjects or 
 their own were concerned, they acted wisely. In 
 the natural course of things, it is not possible to 
 open a trade of any kind between India and Eu- 
 rope, without making it a channel of profit and 
 an influx of wealth to India. Comparatively 
 speaking, India, and especially Bengal, sells every 
 thing to foreign nations, and buys very little. In 
 this intercourse with Europe, the native Princes 
 saw and understood their immediate advantage. 
 Their commercial eye was open ; but their
 
 political eye was shut. They saw thai the ba- 
 lance of foreign trade was immensely in their fa- 
 vour ; but they did not foresee the fatal conse- 
 quence of granting to foreign merchants a sta- 
 tionary establishment in their country. The con- 
 duct of another Eastern nation, in similar circum- 
 stances, exhibits an example of sounder policy. 
 The Chinese will never suffer us to have a footing 
 in China. On this subject, their own institutions 
 are wise, and they know how we have acted in 
 India. From factories to fortifications, from for- 
 tifications to garrisons, from garrisons to armies, 
 and from armies to conquest, the gradations were 
 natural and the result inevitable. For my present 
 purpose, it is not material to look back to our 
 transactions in India before the year 1765. Up 
 to that period, our affairs were in a state of pro- 
 gression, without a solid security, and exposed to 
 many hazards. The grant of the Dewanny of Ben- 
 gal, Bahar, and Orixa, obtained by Lord Clive, gave 
 us a powerful establishment, and in effect a sove- 
 reignty in India, under the name or shadow of a 
 country government. From foreign merchants we 
 suddenly became a great territorial and political 
 power ; from adventurers, who had every thing 
 to win, we became possessors, who had every 
 thing valuable to lose. No wise man continues 
 the game, by which his fortune is once made. 
 Accordingly we changed, or professed to change, 
 
 E 2,
 
 tl 
 
 our maxims with our situation. The fundamental 
 principle immediately recommended by all the 
 authorities abroad, and acknowledged and adopted 
 by all the powers at home, was limitation of do- 
 minion. The same great man, to whom we owe 
 the acquisition, and who laid the foundation of 
 our dominion, bequeathed to us the wisest coun- 
 sels for preserving it. His words are *, " My 
 resolution and my hopes will always be to confine 
 our conquest and our possessions to Bengal, Bahar, 
 and Orixa. To go farther is, in my opinion, a 
 scheme so extravagantly ambitious and absurd, 
 that no Governor and Council in their senses can 
 ever adopt it, unless the whole system of the Com- 
 pany's interest be first entirely new-modelled." 
 On this principle, when the dominions of Suja 
 ul Dowla, when the whole country of Oude was 
 at his disposal, he restored it to that Prince. To 
 the same effect, there is another authority, par- 
 ticularly weighty in the scale with any argument 
 of mine, I mean that of Mr. Hastings, whose 
 name assuredly I should never have mentioned, 
 if I had not an opportunity of doing it with ap- 
 probation, as well as with advantage to my opi- 
 nion. No words can be stronger than those, in 
 which he gives his own. In a letter addressed to 
 the Court of Directors, the President and Council 
 
 * Sept. 30, 1765,
 
 of Fort William say *, " The security and tran- 
 quillity of these provinces shall be the ultimate 
 end of all our negotiations ; and you may trust, 
 that we are too well aware of the ruinous tend- 
 ency of all schemes of conquest, ever to adopt 
 them, or ever to depart from the absolute line of 
 self-defence, unless impelled to it by the most 
 obvious necessity, and immediate exigency of the 
 circumstances. 
 
 t( Signed, Warren Hastings and Council" 
 
 These were the principles most solemnly de- 
 clared and established by the Court of Directors, 
 in concert with His Majesty's Ministers, at that 
 time, for the future government of India. In 
 their instructions to the Governor General and 
 Council appointed by Parliament -f-, their first 
 injunction is to fix our attention to the preservation 
 of peace throughout India, and to the security of 
 the Company's possessions. Their letters are filled 
 with maxims and orders to the same effect. In 
 one of them they say J, " The treaty of Allahabad 
 compels us to assist the Vizier in defending his 
 dominions, in case they shall at any time here- 
 after be attacked. But, in regard to new con- 
 quests, or to any warlike enterprises beyond his 
 own territories, we absolutely prohibit you from 
 
 * Nov. 10, 1772. f Jan. 45, 1774. 
 
 $ March 3, 1775.
 
 3 
 
 employing our troops on such expeditions, on any 
 pretence whatsoever" 
 
 " We hereby positively restrict you from all 
 attempts of this nature in future." 
 
 In the year 1782, it appears that the House of 
 Commons found reason to conclude, from the 
 Reports of their Committees, that these principles 
 were not enforced by sufficient authority to secure 
 the obedience, or even the attention of Governors 
 abroad ; and that the lawful orders of the Di- 
 rectors on this subject were totally disregarded. 
 The House itself therefore, expecting to be better 
 obeyed, after a long and solemn deliberation, 
 unanimously resolved and declared *, " That to 
 pursue schemes of conquest and extent of domi- 
 nion in India, are measures repugnant to the 
 wish, the honour, and the policy of this nation." 
 In the year 1784, the resolution of the House 
 of Commons was found to be insufficient. The 
 principle, so declared, was adopted by the Legis- 
 lature, in the very terms of the resolution ; and 
 again, in the same specific terms, by the Act of 
 1793, when the Company's charter was renewed. 
 Where will you look for a fundamental principle 
 of government, if it is not to be found in these 
 authorities ; or what obedience do you expect to 
 any laws, which you may make now or hereafter, 
 
 * May 28, 1 782.
 
 3' 
 
 if these are disobeyed or eluded with impunity ? 
 Was the declaration of your opinion obtained by 
 surprise ? was it disputed in debate, or carried by 
 an inconsiderable majority ? or has long experi- 
 ence made us wiser than we were in 1793 ? Has 
 the resolution of this House been rescinded ? Have 
 the laws been repealed ? Are the statutes obsolete ? 
 or has the lapse of time been sufficient to make 
 us forget our principles, and to bury our insti- 
 tutions in oblivion ? I say that all these authorities 
 united in one fundamental proposition, that the 
 security of your dominion, and of all the na- 
 tional benefits to be derived from it, depended on 
 its limitation. This was the sole object of the 
 wisdom and policy of this country, from the mo- 
 ment when the sudden acquisition of a great ter- 
 ritory obliged you to consider and determine, on 
 what principles it ought to be held, and by what 
 limits it ought to be confined. It is also well 
 worth your observation, that this limitation of 
 dominion was prescribed to the Governments 
 abroad, while the French had a real establish- 
 ment, and iometimes a formidable power in India. 
 At that time, and in those circumstances, new 
 conquests were not thought necessary to counteract 
 the ambition, or to defeat the intrigues of France. 
 The necessity of providing for the security of the 
 British empire in India, by the conquest of the 
 peninsula, was never thought of until the French 
 were extirpated and their power annihilated. We
 
 3* 
 
 never pretended to be thoroughly afraid for our 
 safety, until in effect we had no enemy left, and 
 literally nothing to fear. The House, I hope, 
 will bear this observation in mind, until they see, 
 as they will do hereafter, how I mean to apply 
 it. The Legislature, as I conceive, had but one 
 object in declaring, that schemes of conquest and 
 acquisition were repugnant to the policy of this 
 country, viz. to limit our views of dominion to the 
 territory we then possessed. As to wars of direct 
 aggression, it did not require a prohibition to 
 make them criminal. Such wars were full as 
 much a crime, and that crime was just as punish- 
 able before the Acts of 1784 and 1793 as after 
 them. There was justice in this country, and 
 there were tribunals enough, to which the Go- 
 vernors of India were amenable, before those 
 statutes were enacted. Then what did they pro- 
 hibit ? Why positively nothing, if the construction, 
 now given to them, be true. The Legislature is 
 supposed to hold this sort of language to the 
 Governors abroad : " I forbid you to make unjust 
 or unnecessary wars, for the purpose of conquest 
 or extension of. dominion; but, if fortunately 
 you should find yourselves engaged in a just and 
 necessary war, there is an end of all limitation ; 
 take every thing you can get. There is no other 
 way of punishing the aggressor, but by taking 
 and keeping his country ; you cannot fine him in 
 money ; and, as to his forts and his strong holds,
 
 33 
 
 they would give you no security." On this prin- 
 ciple, it seems to me something worse than su- 
 perfluous to make parliamentary declarations 
 against schemes of conquest. The law itself pro- 
 vides the exception and furnishes the evasion. 
 All you want is a just and necessary war. The 
 Governors in India, with the evidence in theit 
 hands and nobody to contradict them, are not 
 suspected of incapacity to make out a case to 
 suit their purpose. Even in a war in Europe, 
 it is not always very easy to determine, on which 
 side the justice of the quarrel lies. But, as to a 
 war in India, how is it possible for you to decide 
 whether it be just or unjust ? What evidence is 
 there before you ? What materials have you to 
 judge by ? Why, Sir, you have precisely the evi- 
 dence and the materials, with which one of the 
 contending parties thinks fit to supply you. Now, 
 besides the natural presumption that the weaker 
 ' party, in any contest, is not likely to be the ag- 
 gressor, the want of evidence on his side ought 
 of itself to deter you from pronouncing against 
 him. In this last war, for example, with the 
 Mahrattas, do you know what Scindia and Boosla 
 had to say for themselves ? Are these Princes be- 
 fore you, by their ambassadors, or even by their 
 letters ? In former times there was a department 
 in the Council of Fort William, called the Persian 
 Correspondence, carried on between the Governor 
 General and the native Princes, with whom we 
 
 p
 
 had any business or connexion, and it usedf to 
 be extremely voluminous. That mode of inter- 
 course with the Indian states seems to be relin- 
 quished ; the printed papers at least furnish very 
 few letters from the parties engaged in the war. 
 The mode, now adopted, of negotiating with the 
 native powers, is to send British agents to reside 
 with them, in order to obtain a timely knowledge 
 of their views *. Through this channel the me- 
 rits of their cause are represented and received. 
 These agents, I dare say, are impartial ; but, at 
 best, they are counsel on both sides ; and, when 
 you come to consider their instructions, I think 
 you will not be disposed to give them credit for 
 doing more than rigorous justice to any interests 
 or pretensions, which they might possibly think 
 adverse to those of Lord Wellesley. On this 
 sort of evidence it is concluded -j~, " that the ina- 
 bility of those Chieftains to alledge any ground 
 of complaint against the British Government, or 
 its allies, affords the most unequivocal proof of 
 the justice and moderation of our proceedings !** 
 As if it were very difficult for the power, that 
 does the injury, to intercept the complaint. For- 
 tunately for our immediate instruction, all the 
 parties, concerned in these transactions on our 
 side, have a marvellous turn for writing ; but he, 
 who writes a great deal, will sometimes say more 
 
 * Pa. 8 1. f Fa. 180.
 
 35 
 
 than he intended. Sooner or later, the truth 
 escapes, and, in that form, is instant death to the 
 digested evidence. I have stated to you the prin- 
 ciples, on which the British empire in India ought 
 to have been conducted, and the authorities on 
 which those principles were founded. J shall 
 now submit to the House a view of the practice 
 which has regularly accompanied and gone hand 
 in hand with the principles, up to the end of the 
 last century. I mean to state it as a narrative 
 only, without inquiring into the justice of those 
 wars, or into the motives of those successive ac- 
 quisitions, by which your empire has been doubled, 
 since the laws of this country declared that it 
 ought not to be increased. In justice to Lord 
 Wellesley, I ought to have added the professed 
 principles and the pacific views, by which he as- 
 sures you that his conduct has been uniformly 
 regulated. To some of these principles I am 
 ready to subscribe, in the plain and obvious sense 
 of his own words. The first is fundamental, 
 and embraces all his political measures. He 
 says*, " that every principle of true policy de- 
 mands, that no effort should be omitted by the 
 British Government to establish a permanent 
 foundation of general tranquillity in India, by 
 tecuring to every state the free enjoyment of its 
 just rights and independence, and by frustrating 
 
 * Pa. 303. 
 
 F ^
 
 every project calculated to disturb the pos- 
 sessions, or to violate the rights of the esta- 
 blished powers of Hindostan and of the Deran." 
 There are many other declarations in Lord 
 Wellesley's letters to the same effect, which it is 
 needless to repeat. Almost all his predecessors 
 have used the same pacific phrases, for the real 
 purpose of interfering perpetually in the affairs 
 of their neighbours. Before you confide in such 
 equivocal professions, look at the history of India 
 from the year 1765, and then look at the map, that 
 closes the history. At that time there \vas a Na- 
 bob of Bengal, who held the Nizamut by the 
 same title., which g'ave us the Dewannee of that 
 opulent kingdom. He and his family are extin- 
 guished. There was a Raja of Benares and a rich 
 domain called Ghazipore. He is gone, and his 
 country melted into ours. There was a Nabob 
 of Oude, in my own time, Vizier of the empire, 
 and the greatest of all the Mahomcdan Princes 
 in that part of India. If any of his family sur- 
 vive, they are mere cyphers, subsisting, in disgrace 
 and obscurity, on such pensions, as our Govern- 
 ment thinks fit to allow them. His country also 
 is annexed to ours. There was a Nabob of Fer- 
 rokabad, whose name is hardly known in this 
 House ; though once an eminent person among 
 the Princes of India. He and his country have 
 shared the same fate. Beyond him, the Rohillas 
 were a considerable independent nation. They
 
 37 
 
 are extirpated, and the whole of Rohilcund 
 is ours. This last possession carried the frontier 
 and the armies of Britain to a situation consider- 
 ably to the north of the latitude of Delhi. la 
 that direction, the next step must have been into 
 Tartary. Returning to the sea, you will find the 
 whole line of coast from Bengal to Cape Co- 
 morin, with only one little interruption, which 
 has since been filled up, possessed by the English, 
 The Northern Circars have been ours for many 
 years. The lawful Nabob of the Carnatic was 
 our old and faithful ally, as long as he could pay 
 for it. He once had many friends in England, 
 and even in this House. All that we know of 
 him now is that his debts have been paid by the 
 India Company, and that his creditors are as nu-r 
 merous as ever ; that, by some mrans or other, his 
 family is dispossessed, and that their inheritance 
 is absorbed into our dominion. You have heard 
 of a Rajah of Tanjore. In former times, we gave 
 him the title of King. In whatever form he may 
 still be permitted to exist, he is your vassal, and 
 nothing more. The Rajahs of Tinnivelli, Tra-> 
 vancore, and others of that rank, are hardly worth 
 mentioning. Their names and titles are all that 
 is left of them. On the Malabar coast, we had 
 as many settlements as we wanted, or as could be 
 of any use to us. To the northward of Bombay 
 we had the city of Surat, with a rich and consi- 
 derable territory in the Guzzerat held directly or 
 
 . r
 
 38 
 
 in effect by us, under the name of a Prince 
 called the Gvvicowar. " This state," we are 
 told *, " has for its present native ruler a Chieftain 
 of avowedly weak intellects. Our support there- 
 fore must be extended to all the operations of its 
 Government ; holding as we do, the immediate 
 charge of the Gwicowar chieftain's own guard, 
 and dividing with his troops the garrison of his 
 capital." In addition to all these possessions, the 
 effective government and a great portion of the 
 revenues of the Decan were united to the British 
 dominion by a subsidiary treaty, concluded in 
 1798 with the late Nizam, who had long been 
 superannuated. We furnished him with an army 
 to be stationed in perpetuity in his capital, and 
 in return he ceded to us a tract of territory, the 
 revenues of which were to pay the army. This 
 force, in a year or two after, was augmented, and 
 of course the subsidy and a new cession of terri- 
 tory along with it. After that, it signified very 
 little what we kept, or what we left him. This 
 measure carried the British arms and power into 
 the heart of the peninsula. Tippoo Sultan was 
 the last of all the Mahomedan Princes who 
 preserved his independence. In 1799 we attacked 
 his capital, destroyed his government, and dis- 
 posed of his kingdom by the right of conquest, 
 The merit of this act consists in its being in some 
 
 * Pa. 196.
 
 39 
 
 measure provoked, and still more in its being^ 
 what it professed to be, an act of open force 
 without any mixture of fraud in it. Part of the 
 kingdom of Mysore was annexed to the Carnatic. 
 The remainder was placed under the precended 
 government of an infant Raja, descended, as it is 
 said, from princes, who had been dispossessed by 
 Hyder Ally. The whole of the country is ours. 
 The name of the Raja is a mere shadow. General 
 Wellesley says *, " The Raja, who is said to 
 be five years old, is of a delicate habit ; he seems 
 to be of a timid disposition, and to have suffered, 
 considerably from restraint." Lord Wellesley 
 says-j~," His interests and resources are absolutely 
 identified with our own. Under this arrange- 
 ment, I trust that I shall be able to command the 
 whole resources of the Raja's territory," &c. " It 
 appeared to me a more candid and liberal, as well 
 as a more wise policy, to apprize the Raja dis- 
 tinctly, at the moment of his accession, of the 
 exact nature of his depcndance on the Company, 
 than to leave any matter for future doubt or dis- 
 cussion." At this point it was natural to expect 
 that the rage for acquisition might have subsided; 
 and the rather as Lord Wellesley himself had 
 declared J, " that the lustre of this last victory over 
 Tippoo could be equalled only by the substantial 
 advantages, which it promised to establish, by 
 
 * June 25, 1799. -j. Aug. 3, 1799. 
 
 { May 1 6, 1799.
 
 46 
 
 restoring the peace and safety of the British pos- 
 sessions in India, on a durable foundation of 
 gamine security." This was our situation in the 
 first year of the present century. The security 
 \vas genuine^ and the foundation durable. The 
 map will shew you that we were then in possession 
 of at least two thirds of the peninsula. Before 
 the close of that year, however, it was discovered, 
 that the independence and safety of the British 
 empire were not quite secure ; though we had 
 contracted our frontier, and made it perfectly de- 
 fensible by increasing our possessions *. To 
 provide for our future security, the first thing to 
 be done was to find out an enemy and a danger. 
 For this purpose, the regions of possibility are 
 ransacked : you shall see with what success. The 
 formidable force of the French in India, still as 
 active as ever in the year 1801, with a long train 
 of hypothetical cases and consequences from their 
 supposed influence and intrigues, stood first among 
 the dangers, which threatened immediate or future 
 ruin, no matter which, to the British empire. 
 This French force is variously described ; some- 
 times it is a French army of fourteen thousand 
 men ; sometimes it constitutes a French state in 
 
 * " As to addition of territories, it cannot have escaped 
 observation that the events, which produced those additions, 
 have at the same time tended to increase the security of your own 
 possessions, by narrowing their frontier."' Vid. Mr. Dundas's 
 Letter to the Court of Directors, dated June 30, 1801, p. 15.
 
 the heart of Indostan : at last you find it re- 
 duced to a native army commanded and disci- 
 plined by French officers, which, with the help 
 of an enormous exaggeration of numbers, may 
 be said to have created something like the shadow r 
 of a future danger to the British power, which at 
 that time occupied two thirds of India. In fact and 
 Substance, there was none. So long ago as the 
 4th of April 1794, Lord Melville declared in this 
 House, and it was perfectly true, " that the ef- 
 fectual check, which, under the conduct of the 
 Marquis Cornwallis, has been given to the My- 
 sorean power, has since, under the same auspices, 
 been followed, by the total annihilation of that of 
 the French on the continent of India.*' These 
 were his words. I h-jard them ; but, in stating 
 them now, I do not trust merely to my memory ; 
 as soon as they were spoken, they were written ; 
 as soon as they were written, they were printed 
 and published. The Noble Lord on the other 
 side will find them in the records of the Board of 
 Control. I am far from meaning to blame that 
 practice. On the contrary, I commend it. In 
 July last, the Noble Lord *, alluding to the state 
 of India before the Mahratta war, declared in this 
 House, " that our empire had been carried to 
 an extent, which left us nothing to fear from any 
 enemy on the continent of Jndia." 
 
 * I,ord Castlereagh.
 
 4* 
 
 Now, Sir, if it be true, as it certainly is, that 
 the power of the French was totally annihilated in 
 1731, it is difficult to conceive how it revived, 
 a i.l by what means it hecameso formidable in the 
 course of five or six years after its total annihila- 
 tion. In the year 1798, Lord Wellesley says, 
 " there was a French party at Hyderabad, which 
 he thought necessary to expel. The amount of 
 the French force, disarmed on this occasion, was 
 about eleven thousand men, and the operation 
 was happily effected without bloodshed and with- 
 out contest." And well it might. A mutiny had 
 broken out in the French camp, and the sepoys 
 had imprisoned their officers. "The greatest diffi- 
 culty we had to encounter, was that of rescuing 
 the imprisoned officers from the violence of their 
 own sepoys." These officers, it appears, were 
 .soon after sent to Europe. That a corps of na- 
 tives, so disciplined and so disposed, might be a 
 distress to the Nizam, is not unlikely ; but that it 
 should be formidable to the British power is im- 
 possible/ Then what was left ? a very few French 
 officers, who entered into the service of Scindia. 
 The fact is, that there was no Freneh army in India 
 in 1801 ; I mean consisting of any number of 
 native French, great or small. The. words are 
 fallacious. They first make an impression in one 
 sense, and, when that won't do, they arc explained 
 into another. Among the European officers in 
 the service of Holcar and Scindia fliere were seve-
 
 43 
 
 ral British subjects, whom Lord Wellcsley re- 
 called by proclamation. Among the privates, 
 there were a few Portuguese and possibly a few 
 Germans. Of native French, I can find but one 
 man. Still, however, it might be supposed that 
 the number of French officers was not quite in- 
 considerable, and, some day or other, m .r!;f pos- 
 sibly be formidable, by their military skill, by 
 their political influence, and above all things by 
 keeping open a channel of intercourse and con- 
 nexion between the Mahrattas and the French 
 Government, and a door to the future introduc- 
 tion of a French army. Now, Sir. I will not 
 dispute the physical possibility of a powerful army 
 being transported from France to India and land- 
 ing there ; but it is on one condition only, that 
 the Government of England and India is asleep, 
 and suffers such a fleet to make such a voyage, 
 and to land such an army, without interruption. 
 Much less will I deny that we have thoroughly 
 disposed the minds of the natives to receive them. 
 But that these Mahrattas, if they possess common 
 sense, should naturally wish to invite a foreign 
 army even of friends into their country, or to 
 make it the seat of war between two foreign 
 
 o 
 
 powers, is a proposition in no case likely to be 
 true. In this case, 1 shall prove it to be false. 
 All that the Mahrattas desire, either of the French 
 or English, is to suffer them to be quiet, or to 
 little their internal quarrels among themselves. 
 
 G 2
 
 44 
 
 From the evidence on the table, as well as from 
 the reason of the thing, I affirm that the Mahrat- 
 tas had no such disposition as that, which is im- 
 puted to them ; that they were not inclined to 
 any European alliance, and that they were par- 
 ticularly averse from any connexion with the 
 French. Lord Wellesley himself says *, " that 
 it cannot be supposed, consistently with the cha- 
 racter of the Mahratta nations, that any of the 
 confederate States would enter into an alliance 
 with France, under any circumstances less urgent 
 than the pressure of absolute necessity and self- 
 preservation." In another place he says-}", :( that 
 it would require a most violent exercise of injus- 
 tice and oppression on our part, to dispose the 
 suspicious and cautious councils of the Court of 
 Poona to favour the progress of a French force in 
 India." I am far from objecting to the policy of 
 making it impracticable, if we can, for the French 
 to keep or to recover a territorial footing in India. 
 What I object to is our making use of the name 
 of a pretended French power, which in fact did 
 not exist, and which had no root nor hardly the 
 fibre of a root reft in India, for the real purpose 
 of destroying the very few independent States, 
 that still survived the general ruin of the penin- 
 sula. After all that has been said of the danger 
 to be apprehended from these French officers, I 
 
 * Pa. 57. f Pa. 185.
 
 45 
 
 can scarce hope for credit with the House, when 
 I affirm, from a strict and repeated examination of 
 these papers, that I cannot find the names, or an 
 allusion to the names of more than a dozen. 
 There might possibly be a very few more obscure 
 individuals, whom I have not been able to trace; 
 but I do not believe it. These were with Scindia 
 not one in the service of Holcar not one in 
 the service of the Raja of Berar, or of the Peshwa. 
 With respect to the political influence, which 
 these officers might possibly possess or obtain in 
 the councils of Scindia *, I cannot discover that 
 we had any thing to apprehend from it. Long 
 before the commencement of the war in 1803, the 
 principal person among them, M. Perron, had 
 avowed his intention of relinquishing Scindia's 
 service. In June 1803 Lord Wellesley says, 
 " It was generally believed, that Scindia had no 
 confidence in M. Perron's attachment to his 
 Government. Scindia retains no efficient con- 
 trol over M. Perron, or over his regular troops. 
 In various instances, M. Perron has either openly 
 disobeyed or systematically evaded the orders of 
 Scindia." The fact is, that M. Perron had 
 amassed a considerable fortune, with which it was 
 his anxious desire to retire to Europe ; and that 
 for this purpose " he had, some time before Au- 
 gust 1803, preferred an application to the British 
 Government for permission to enter the British 
 
 * Pa. 155.
 
 territories, in prosecution of his intention <o retire 
 from the service of Dowlat Rao Scindia ; with 
 which application the Governor Genera 1 iu. medi- 
 ately complied ;" though it was not carried into 
 effect until some time at'ter. M. Duboigne, \vho 
 preceded Perron, and who originally went, with 
 our permission, from our service into that of 
 Scindia, had taken the same course. The) knew 
 their own weakness and precarious situation ; and 
 therefore the object of all of them, or at least of as 
 many as had made a fortune, was to return with 
 it to Europe. Nothing was easier than to obtain 
 the removal of them all by pacific measures, 
 which at least ought to have been 'tried, or by 
 offering them a retreat ; and, while they re- 
 mained, they were in fact of little consequence, 
 and of none at all in a political sense. The sta- 
 tion and the force, allotted to them by Scindia, 
 were evidently intended as a barrier against our 
 aggressions. He never would have resorted to so 
 hazardous a measure, if he could have relied on 
 the good faith of the British Government. But it 
 is said that, independent of their numbers, these 
 French officers were formidable to us in another 
 point of view, viz. by introducing European 
 tactics and discipline into the Mahratta armies, 
 and teaching them possibly to encounter us in the 
 field with equal skill and with our own weapons. 
 When a purpose is to be served, it is not very dif- 
 ficult to find a principle to answer it. I entreat
 
 47 
 
 the attention of the House for a moment to the 
 consideration of this question. If it be true that 
 the French have taught the Mahrattas these tac- 
 tics and this discipline, I believe it will appear 
 that a more ruinous and unfortunate lesson could 
 not have been given to the people, who endea- 
 voured to learn it. I believe that their misfortunes 
 in this war may in a great degree be attributed to 
 iheir imperfect proficiency in those instructions, 
 and to their confidence in the skill, which they 
 thought they had acquired in that sort of disci- 
 pline. This false confidence has led them to 
 abandon their old established mode of warfare, in 
 which long use and the nature of their military 
 force, consisting chiefly of light cavalry, gave 
 them many advantages against armies much better 
 disciplined, and which they never thought of en- 
 countering in pitched battle ; I mean, in former 
 times. You know how the Roman armies were 
 harassed, distressed, and defeated by the Parthian 
 
 horse, who seldom or ever could be brought di- 
 
 . 
 
 rectly to action. They carried on the war, as the 
 Mahrattas might and ought to have done against 
 us, by the use of their cavalry only, by skirmish- 
 ing, by perpetual alarms, by interrupting the line 
 of march, by cutting off the supplies of provisions, 
 by plundering the baggage, and even by over- 
 whelming the Roman camp with clouds of dust. 
 These are great advantages against an invading 
 enemy, who have not only a hostile country, but
 
 4$ 
 
 a burning climate to contend with, and who must 
 carry their provisions with them, with an endless 
 train of draught and carriage cattle, or be supplied 
 from a great distance. See what Holcar, a mere 
 adventurer and freebooter, as he is called by Lord 
 Wellesley, but certainly, excepting his own" per- 
 sonal qualiiications, an inconsiderable Chief com- 
 pared to the others see what he has been able 
 to do single-handed, by confining himself to the 
 true Mahratta mode of war. Considering the 
 circumstances, in which he came alone and at last 
 into action, the resistance he has been able to 
 make and the mischief he has done, against a su- 
 periority of British force as well as skill, is won- 
 derful. Then judge of what the consequences 
 might have been, if the whole power of the Mah- 
 rattas had been united in defence of their country, 
 and if they had conducted the war on the true 
 Mahratta principle, on which Holcar appears to 
 have acted as for as we are informed. They re- 
 lied on the discipline of their infantry, and on the 
 use of their heavy artillery ; that is, they con- 
 fided, as we are told, in the instructions of the 
 French, and they have been every where defeated.. 
 If that be so, we have no reason to regret the in- 
 fiueace of the French over the military councils 
 of the Mahrattas. I cannot quit this subject 
 without observing that the opinions I have now 
 stated were not originally my own, and that I am 
 by no means singular in adopting them, as I have
 
 49 
 
 done long before the present question occurred. 
 Many years ago, in a conversation with Mr. 
 Hastings, I expressed to him some anxiety about 
 the progress, which, as 1 had then heard, the 
 Mahrattas were . making in the art of casting 
 cannon, in the use and practice of artillery, and in 
 the discipline of their infantry; and I perfectly 
 remember his answer, for it certainly made an im- 
 pression on rny mind, though I was not convinced 
 by it. He said : " Sir, the danger you allude to 
 is imaginary. The Mahrattas never can be for- 
 midable to us in the field, on the principles of an 
 European army. They are pursuing a scheme, 
 in which they cannot succeed ; and, by doing so, 
 they detach themselves from their own plan of 
 warfare, on which alone, if they acted wisely, they 
 would place their dependance." I hold myself 
 bound to acknowledge the sagacity of this remark, 
 because at the time, when it was made, I cer- 
 tainly did not give it so much credit as I have done 
 since. The House has now seen the full amount 
 and value of all the apprehensions said to be en- 
 tertained of the French, first of their military 
 power, and then of their political influence, and 
 of all the remote possibilities, in argument at 
 least, which might or might not be deduced from 
 the supposed existence of such power and influ- 
 ence. This sort of future danger, which might 
 eventually menace* the future security of the British 
 
 * Pa. 1 86, 
 K
 
 5 
 
 empire in India, is strongly stated ; but it is not 
 implicitly relied on. Military measures, taken 
 for security, must suppose a case of evident hazard 
 at least, if not of positive necessity. Accordingly 
 you will find that we had another set of dangers 
 ready for the service; and these to be logically 
 derived, in the form of a dilemma, from the state 
 of the Mahratta empire within itself. This new 
 set of dangers proceeds upon two principles, not 
 only distinct, but adverse to each other. We may 
 take our choice. The first event to be dreaded 
 was, " that no ultimate issue of the distractions at 
 that time existing in the Mahratta empire could 
 reasonably be supposed, which would not have 
 consolidated, under one head, a degree of power 
 and dominion dangerous to the British Govern- 
 ment." The second was, "that the effects of 
 those convulsions in the Mahratta state must 
 speedily have extended to the contiguous do- 
 minions of our ally the Nizam, and ultimately to 
 those of the Company, and would have compelled 
 the British Government to engage in the contest." 
 With respect to the first of these dangers, it appears 
 that in August 1 799 the Governor General was of 
 opinion, " that the consolidation of the power of 
 the Mahratta empire was highly improbable," 
 and, at a later period, that the contending interests 
 of the several feudatory Chieftains appeared to 
 afford a sufficient security against any dangerous 
 consolidation of the Mahratta power." With re-
 
 5 1 
 
 spect to those speedy or ultimate dangers, to 
 which the dominions of our ally the Nizam, or 
 those of the Company, might be exposed by the 
 effects of a protracted warfare in the Mahratta 
 state, it appears to me, in the first place, of all 
 things the most improbable, that any one of those 
 contending Chiefs, weakened as they all were by 
 their intestine quarrels, should have ventured to 
 provoke the British power, by an act of aggres- 
 sion, to unite with his immediate domestic enemy. 
 What consequence could he expect from it, but 
 to be crushed between them ? But, were it other- 
 wise, I ask the House, whether these remote pos- 
 sibilities are to be admitted as a solid justification 
 for invading their country, for taking an active 
 part in their quarrels ; and finally, for crushing 
 them all under the same weight. A house or a vil- 
 lage in the neighbourhood is on fire, and this fire 
 may possibly reach us some time or other. So, ta 
 put out the fire, we extinguish the people. The 
 very pretences set up are sufficient to shew that we 
 had no solid ground of hostility to these people, 
 and that, though we could not find a danger, we 
 were determined to find a quarrel. I come now, 
 Sir, to the course that was taken to furnish a 
 colour for our subsequent interference in the 
 affairs of the Mahrattas. We did not begin with 
 a direct denunciation of war against any of them, 
 because it was impossible to frame a pretence for 
 it. In the last thirty years, the Mahratta Chiefs 
 
 H 2
 
 have been often at war with one another ; but I 
 affirm, without a reserve of any kind, and I defy 
 any man to prove the contrary, that they never 
 committed an act of aggression, of injury, or even 
 of provocation, great or small, against the English, 
 at any period within the memory of the present 
 times*. In the course of the year 1801, if not 
 sooner, it appears that Lord Wellesley conceived 
 a project of establishing a system of general defen- 
 sive alliance between the British power and the 
 several Mahratta states, under the same conditions, 
 which had been established with the Nizam in 
 1798. Who were the enemy, or what was the 
 danger, against which this defence was to pro- 
 vide, is not stated ; nor am I able to conjecture. 
 There was no other power then left in India, but 
 that of the two contracting parties, namely, the 
 English on one side, and the Mahrattas on the 
 other. We were at peace and in amity with all 
 of them. We were in alliance with Scindia, and 
 the Pesh wa was our particular friend. The course 
 
 * In Lord Wellesley's letter to the Directors, dated July 13, 
 1804 (intercepted by the French), it is asserted, that " the influ- 
 ence and ascendancy of Scindia overall the Mahratta States and 
 even at Hydrabad, had been for some years uniformly directed 
 against the British power in India." An assertion, so positive 
 and so compreiiensive, ought to have been proved by some facts, 
 or supported by some evidence. The contrary is notorious, 
 In the last war against Tippoo Sultan, Scindia took no part 
 against us. With the disposition imputed to him, he would not 
 have neglected so favourable an opportunity to injure us.
 
 53 
 
 taken, to establish this general defensive alliance, 
 was to propose to each of the Mahratta Chiefs a 
 subsidiary treaty. As I date and originate the 
 war, that followed, from the attempt to carry this 
 project into execution, I am bound to explain to 
 the House, in Lord Wellesley's own terms, what 
 was meant by a subsidiary treaty ; and, to illus- 
 trate this point, I shall quote the first example 
 that occurs in the papers on the table. The Ma- 
 raja Dowlut Rao Scindia is or was a Prince at the 
 head of a great dominion, and perfectly inde- 
 pendent, of us at least. For though, to suit a 
 purpose, he and the Raja of Berar are often called 
 the servants of the Peshwa, it is not true in fact, 
 nor is it possible that Lord Wellesley could have 
 considered him in that light. The Peshwa him- 
 self is properly no more than the first executive 
 Minister of the empire. In relation to the other 
 Mahratta Chiefs, he \& primus inter pares, and some 
 of the formalities, implying an acknowledgment 
 of this superiority, are observed to him. He is 
 not their sovereign, much less is he their master^ 
 Lord Wellesley would never have levelled him- 
 self and the British Government with a pretended 
 Chief, who in fact was only the servant of a 
 higher power. Now he constantly negotiates 
 with Scindia, as with an independent state. The 
 treaty, which his Lordship proposes to him in 
 1802, is no where supposed to want the ratifica- 
 tion or even the consent of the Peshwa. It ap-
 
 54 
 
 pears also that Scindia was guarantee to the treaty 
 of Salbye between the Peshwa and the English, 
 an office and character evidently incompatible 
 with the state of a vassal. To this Prince, who 
 was in perfect amity and even in alliance with us, 
 and with whom we had never had a quarrel or 
 difference of any kind, an English gentleman is 
 deputed, in January 180.1, to propose a treaty of 
 alliance to him on the following conditions, viz. 
 " To subsidize a considerable British force to be 
 stationed within his dominions: secondly, To 
 cede, in perpetual sovereignty, to the Company 
 an extent of territory, the net produce of which 
 shall be adequate to the charges of that force : 
 thirdly, To admit the arbitration of the British 
 Government in all disputes and differences be- 
 tween Scindia and his Highness the Nizam, and 
 eventually between Scindia and the other States of 
 Hindostan : and fourthly, To dismiss all the sub- 
 jects of France now in his service, and to pledge 
 himself never to entertain in his service persons of 
 that description.*' The cession of territory, de- 
 manded in lieu of the subsidy, was that part of the 
 Duab [a kind of Mesopotamia between the Jumna 
 and the Ganges] which was in Scindia's posses- 
 sion, and the fortresses of Agra and Delhi. As 
 these countries were to be ceded to us in perpe- 
 tuity, it follows that our army was to be perpetu- 
 ally stationed in Scindia's dominions. Lord Welles- 
 ley, it is true, did not expect that Scindia would
 
 55 
 
 yield at once to the full extent of these conces- 
 sions, in return for a military force, which he did 
 not want, and never did desire, for the defence 
 and security of his possessions, which were in no 
 danger. His Lordship, adverting to the jea- 
 lousy of the Mahratta character, entertains con- 
 siderable doubt of Scindia's consent to subsidize 
 so large a force, and accordingly he authorizes the 
 Resident to agree to a limitation of the force, and 
 io other modifications of the articles proposed. 
 The essential object is to get a footing in his 
 country. The third of the proposed conditions is 
 not to be insisted on, and for a very good reason, 
 viz. " because, without any specific stipulation, 
 the arbitration of the British Government will ne- 
 cessarily be admitted to an extent proportioned to 
 the ascendancy, which that Government will ob- 
 tain over Scindia under the proposed engage- 
 ments, and to the power, which it will possess, of 
 controlling his designs." The House will now 
 judge, whether it required an extraordinary degree 
 of jealousy, supposed to belong to the Mahratta 
 character, to induce Scindia to hesitate about ac- 
 cepting the voluntary assistance of a foreign force, 
 on terms, which it was not difficult to foresee 
 would give us an ascendency over him, and a 
 power of controlling his designs. Lord Wellesley 
 appears to have placed great confidence, and \ 
 dare say very justly, in the talents and skill of 
 Colonel Collins, Yet there is a part of the task
 
 assigned to that officer, in which I doubt much, 
 whether any human ability could have succeeded. 
 The instruction I allude to is delivered in the fol- 
 lowing terms * : " Whatever proposals you may 
 offer to Scindia, under the foregoing instructions, 
 should be stated to him in the light of a concession 
 on the part of the British Government, tending to 
 the security of his interests and the stability of his 
 dominion, not as directed to objects in any degree 
 necessary to the security of the British empire in 
 India." I cannot find that Colonel Collins had 
 an opportunity of carrying his instructions into 
 effect, or that the plan of the proposed treaty was 
 formally communicated to Scindia ; but it does 
 appear that certain parts of it had come to his 
 knowledge previous to Colonel Collins's arrival 
 at his Court. Some months before this transac- 
 tion, a similar subsidiary treaty had been proposed 
 to our friend the Peshwa ; and as, at that time, he 
 really wanted assistance against Holcar, it ap- 
 pears that he was disposed to subsidize a body of 
 British troops, to be ready for his service, but by 
 no means to be stationed within his territories. 
 Colonel Palmer observes, that the suspicious motive, 
 which dictated this restriction, was too obvious; and 
 here he says his negotiation must terminate. The 
 Peshvva's Minister declared, " that he could not 
 make further cessions, without a ruinous derelic- 
 tion of power and property." Yet, of all the 
 . 
 
 * Pa. Q.
 
 57 
 
 Mahratta Chiefs, the Peshwa was the only one, to 
 whom such a treaty could be of any immediate 
 service. How unwilling he was to purchase that 
 advantage, on the terms proposed to him, cannot 
 be better expressed than in the memorable words 
 of Colonel Palmer, to which I entreat the attention 
 of the House * : "I am to have my last private 
 audience of the Peshwa this evening, when I will 
 make a final effort to convince his Highness of the 
 lasting security, power, and prosperity, which he will 
 derive from embracing your Lordship's proposals; 
 though I apprehend, that nothing short of immi- 
 nent and certain destruction will induce him to 
 make concessions, which militate with his deep- 
 rooted jealousy and prejudices, and of which he 
 thinks that he has already made extraordinary sa- 
 crifices." Colonel Close, who succeeded Colonel 
 Palmer, and who took up the negotiation where 
 he left it, says -J-, " Every day's experience tends 
 to strengthen the impression that, from the first, 
 your Lordship's amicable and liberal views, in rela- 
 tion to this state, have not only been discordant 
 with the natural disposition of the Peshwa, but 
 totally adverse to that selfish and wicked policy, 
 which in a certain degree he seems to have re- 
 alized. A slight recurrence to the history of his 
 machinations is sufficient to demonstrate that, in 
 the midst of personal peril and the lowest debase- 
 
 * Pa. 40. f Pa. 44.
 
 ment, he viewed the admission of permanent sup- 
 port from your Lordship, as well as the relinquish- 
 mcnt of his pretended demands on his Highness 
 the Nizam, with the deepest aversion." It was 
 in vain that both Palmer and Close " united in 
 presenting to his Highness's attention the great 
 liberality and favourable tendency of his Lordship's 
 views and prepositions, and the substantial bene- 
 fits, which would necessarily result to his High- 
 ness's government, from their being speedily car- 
 ried into effect.*' He was willing enough to ac- 
 cept of our assistance against Holcar, and to pay 
 for it by assigning to the Company in perpetuity a 
 territory producing twenty-five lacks of rupees 
 annual revenue ; but he never could be brought 
 to perceive the advantage and security to himself 
 of allowing to this army a permanent station in his 
 capital, or in the centre of his dominions. The 
 House will judge, whether the Peshwa's resist- 
 ance to this proposition was natural and reason- 
 able, or whether it could only be accounted for 
 by the innate craft and insincerity of his character. 
 In the course of the succeeding year, the Peshwa's 
 situation was materially altered. His forces, 
 united with those of Scindia, were totally defeated 
 by Holcar on the 25th of October 1802. He 
 retired from Poona to Bassein in the neighbour- 
 hood of Bombay, where, having no other remedy 
 or refuge left, he submitted to accept of our
 
 59 
 
 assistance on whatever equite.Ue and moderate * 
 terms we thought fit to prejcr/oe, and signed the 
 fatal treaty of Bassein -f-, by which he agreed to 
 receive a British force to be stationed in perpetuity 
 in his territories. Our array escorted him to 
 Poona, and replaced him there in a state of perfect 
 personal safety, under the guard and protection o^ 
 a British garrison ; that is, with the free agency of 
 a state prisoner, and the security of a prison. By 
 the second article of this treaty, " we are at all 
 times bound to maintain and defend his High- 
 ness's rights and territories, in the same manner as 
 the rights and territories of the India Company 
 are now maintained and defended." This en- 
 gagement, I conceive, on the face of it is equiva- 
 lent to, if not exactly the same with a formal 
 guaranty of all his remaining dominions. But, 
 in this case, the guaranty is positively forbidden. 
 The Governor General had no legal power to bind 
 the India Company by any stipulation to that V 
 effect. By the 4^d clause of the Act of 1 793, it is 
 declared that " it shall not be lawful to enter into 
 any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any 
 country Princes or States, except in the case 
 where hostilities have actually been commenced, 
 or preparations actually made for the commence- 
 ment of hostilities against the British nation or 
 their allies." The case excepted did not exist, when 
 
 * Pa 151- f December 25, 1802. 
 
 I 2
 
 6o 
 
 the treaty of Bassein was made. No hostilities 
 had commenced ; no preparations for the hostili- 
 ties, descrihed by the Act of Parliament, were ac- 
 tually made, or, as it appears, even thought of by 
 any of the surviving powers of India. The gua- 
 ranty, given to the Peshwa, was therefore an act, 
 which the Governor General took upon him to 
 execute against the positive prohibition of the 
 law. I know very well that there is no reality 
 in this transaction. I know that the pretended 
 guaranty of rights and territories to a pas- 
 sive being, who has no will" of his own, who 
 has no remedy, and who can neither deliver his 
 country, nor emancipate himself from the do- 
 minion of a foreign army, is a mere mockery of 
 his helpless condition. With respect to the 
 Legislature here, the thing, which the treaty pro- 
 fesses to do, is forbidden. On this side, the act 
 is criminal, not in itself, but because it is illegal : 
 on the other, it constitutes something worse than 
 a positive offence. The Peshwa is your prisoner. 
 You contract, or pretend to contract with a party, 
 \vho is not a free" agent, and yon profess to se- 
 cure him in his rights and possessions, while his 
 person is in your custody, and the whole of his 
 political power is at your disposal. The sub- 
 sidiary treaty with the Nizam, concluded in 
 1798, is said to have been approved of by the 
 Select Committee of the Court of Directors,
 
 6i 
 
 and on this the plan of a series of similar treaties, 
 which were to include all the remaining inde- 
 pendent Princes of India, was professedly founded. 
 Nothing can be more simple than the principle, 
 nor more effectual than the operation of a sub- 
 sidiary treaty. If once you can persuade the 
 Nizam, the Peshwa, or any other native Prince, 
 for whom you happen to have a particular friend- 
 ship, that his government is in danger, and that 
 his person is not safe without your assistance, the 
 business is done. A British army is on the fron- 
 tier ready to march" the moment the treaty is 
 signed, enters his country, takes possession of 
 his capital, and secures him in his palace. If he 
 should happen to be a short-sighted, narrow- 
 mindid person, or not sufficiently quick in ac- 
 cepting these proofs of our friendship, there are 
 various ways of convincing him. Sword in hand 
 is the shortest. Dowlut Rao Scindia and the Raja 
 of Berar might have purchased our assistance, 
 and provided a security against all their enemies, 
 if they had any, on the same friendly terms, on 
 which we had yielded it to t'he Nizam, and to 
 the Peshwa. But they, it seems, not only 
 declined our amicable offers for themselves, 
 but formed a confederacy to resist the exe- 
 cution and defeat the effect of the innocent 
 treaty of Bassein ! Supposing this to be the fact, 
 and this fact to be the origin of the war against 
 them, as I believe it was, the question is fairly
 
 62 
 
 before Parliament. In behalf of these Princes, 
 who have no advocate or representative here, I 
 am at issue with Lord Wellesley, and I appeal to 
 the judgment of this House and of the nation on 
 his own case, and on his own shewing. Were 
 they or were they not the aggressors ? I pass by 
 the opprobrious epithets and personal reproaches, 
 with which the names and characters of these 
 great persons are perpetually loaded. A language, 
 so unfit to be used, deserves no answer. The 
 Mahrattas preserve their dignity at least, and, in 
 the face of the grossest provocation, never violate 
 the forms of moderation and decorum. Whether 
 they were in the right in endeavouring to prevent 
 or defeat the establishment of a foreign military 
 power in the heart of their empire, is a question 
 to be decided by the sober wisdom and justice of 
 this House, not by the pretended passions of their 
 accusers. The Pcshwa, it 'is alledged, is an in- 
 dependent Prince ; and not only independent of 
 the other Mahratta Chiefs, but properly their so- 
 vereign and their master ; consequently he had a 
 right to make the treaty of Bassein, " and any 
 attempt to obstruct the operation of it, on their 
 part, must be deemed an act of hostile aggression 
 against thePeshwa,and the British Government*." 
 In the first place, the allegation is not true ; and, 
 if it were, I should equally deny the conclusion. 
 
 * Pa. 134.
 
 63 
 
 As far as the Mahratta empire has any regular 
 constitution, or, at least, as far as we are ac- 
 quainted with it, the Peshwa is not the sovereign ; 
 he is only the representative of the Raja at Sit- 
 tara, and chief executive officer of that Raja's 
 government. The purpose, for which these fal- 
 lacies are introduced, requires no explanation. If 
 the Peshwa be the sovereign, and if he is in our 
 hands and at our disposal, in what state are those 
 Princes, whom we call his subjects and his ser- 
 vants ? They are bound by his acts, and must 
 follow his fortune. His slavery includes theirs. 
 They can have no will of their own. Then why 
 do we send ambassadors to negotiate with such 
 persons ? Why do we endeavour to make separate 
 treaties with them, or offer them assistance to 
 maintain their independence, and to guarantee 
 their dominions ? Let it be granted nevertheless, 
 that these great Chiefs are, in point of rank, sub- 
 ordinate to the Peshwa, and more or less de^ 
 pendent on his authority. Though we do not 
 exactly know the extent of his legitimate power, 
 or the precise forms of that government, I can 
 readily believe that, in the general councils of the 
 Mahratta empire, the Peshwa's precedence is still 
 acknowledged, that he is first among his equals, 
 and that his consent is admitted to be necessary to 
 any general resolution that binds the state, espe- 
 cially in its transactions with foreign powers. In 
 the perpetual revolution of human affairs, it oftf>
 
 64 
 
 happens that the forms of power survive the fact. 
 The power of Scindia and Boosla was real, and 
 real power never submits to form, but for its own 
 accommodation. In this case however, let the 
 form or the principles of the Mahratta constitution 
 be what they may, there was nothing problema- 
 tical in the danger, with which the independence 
 and safety of every member of that community 
 was threatened by the treaty of Basscin. It is 
 said indeed that the admission of a British army 
 into Poona, into the Peshwa's residence, into the 
 capital of the empire, and its being stationed there 
 in perpetuity, was no way offensive or dangerous 
 to the other members of the Mahratta state ; being 
 intended " as a security to them for their rights, 
 possessions, and independence." As I do not 
 know that these arguments were directly made 
 use of to Scindia, or Boosla, or Holcar, I shall 
 leave them to the judgement of the Court of 
 Directors and of this House, for whose instruction 
 they appear to have been intended. Instead of 
 attempting to refute such mockeries, a 1 low me to 
 state a possible case, which, if it existed in the 
 actual situation of Europe, as it may do hereafter, 
 would be very near a parallel to this, which is 
 before us. The fact would come home to the 
 understanding of all men, and the consequence 
 require no argument to enforce it. After what 
 we have seen within these very few years, nothing, 
 that may happen hereafter, ought to be quite
 
 65 
 
 unexpected. In looking forward to future events, 
 we have no right now to limit our calculations 
 by the ordinary rules of probability. But, whether 
 the supposition I am going to state be thought 
 extravagant or not, it will serve to illustrate the 
 case in hand, and to establish the conclusion, 
 which I mean to draw from it. Suppose that, in 
 consequence of dissensions in the German em- 
 pire, or any other misfortune or misconduct of 
 his own, the present Emperor of Germany should 
 find himself compelled, or should think himself 
 obliged to quit his dominions, and to take refuge 
 with the present Emperor of France, who might 
 not only offer him an asylum, but promise to 
 reinstate him, if he would accept of the assistance 
 of a French army for that purpose. In comparing 
 the Peshwa to the Emperor of Germany, I grant 
 every thing, that can be claimed in favour of his 
 independence as a sovereign prince, and of his right 
 to contract any engagement with any foreign state. 
 I do not believe that independence, to that degree 
 or to that extent, is attributed to the office of 
 Peshwa, or that he himself pretends to it. I do 
 not think it can be maintained that the most de- 
 spotic prince, in the most enslaved nation, let his 
 supreme authority or personal power be what it 
 may, is competent to surrender the dominion of 
 his country to a foreign state, or to govern it by a 
 foreign army. Again, let it be supposed that the 
 Emperor, believing his situation to be desperate, 
 
 K
 
 66 
 
 or that he has no other remedy, submits, with 
 great reluctance and after long hesitation, to a 
 subsidiary treaty with liis new friend, by which 
 he engages to receive a French army into Vienna, 
 to be stationed there in perpetuity, to serve him 
 as a guard against his rebellious Electors, and for 
 the security of his person and government ; and 
 that in return he should make a cession of Bohe- 
 mia, or of some other great portion of his here- 
 ditary dominions, for the payment of the troops 
 so employed in his service. In that event, I ask 
 you what would be the right and duty of the 
 other great members of the Germanic body ? What 
 would the rest of Europe, and, above all, what 
 would this country say of the powerful Electors 
 of Saxony and Brandenburgh, of Hanover and 
 Bavaria, if they submitted to see the Empire in- 
 vaded and dismembered, their capital garrisoned, 
 and their Chief enslaved by a foreign army, com- 
 manded by the natural and inveterate enemy of 
 'Germany, or even by the forces of a friendly 
 power ? Would you endure to hear it asserted 
 that they had no right to interpose, that the Em- 
 peror was an independent sovereign, that he was 
 competent to make such a treaty without con- 
 sulting the Diet, and to introduce and establish 
 the force of France in the heart of Germany ? The 
 Emperor himself might possibly be pitied and 
 forgiven ; because no man would believe that, on 
 his part, such a sacrifice of himself could be vo-
 
 6? 
 
 luntary. But what should we say of the other 
 Princes of the Empire, if they yielded for a mo- 
 ment to such pretences ? My answer is, that there 
 would be but one voice and outcry in this House 
 and in this nation to reprobate the folly, the 
 treachery, and the cowardice of the Electors of 
 Germany. We should even forget our animosity 
 to Buonaparte in our abhorrence of their conduct. 
 Compare the cases. What have the Mahratta 
 Chiefs done or attempted to do, which was not 
 warranted by their duty to their country, by the 
 most obvious principles of policy, and even by 
 the necessity of self-defence ? But it is said that 
 Scindia and Boosla made no objection to the 
 treaty of Bassein when it was communicated and 
 explained to them, and that they confessed that 
 it contained no articles injurious to their rights, 
 or incompatible with their safety. Such admis- 
 sions on the face of them are incredible, not so 
 much because they must be false, as because no 
 rational being could expect that the party, to 
 whom they were made, could possibly believe 
 them to be true. So it is stated however, and so 
 we may presume it was understood by Lord 
 Welleslcy's agents. We seldom know what the 
 Indian Princes have to say for themselves, in their 
 own terms. But, be it so. They held a soft and 
 moderate language, they endeavoured to put us 
 off our guard, while they were preparing to defeat 
 our operations, and if possible to expel us from 
 
 K 2
 
 68 
 
 their country. Such a policy, for purposes much 
 less to be justified, is not uncommon in Europe, 
 and never yet was thought treacherous or criminal, 
 especially on the side of the weaker party, and 
 that party not the aggressor, but driven by the 
 insatiable ambition of a powerful invader to pro- 
 vide for its defence; as if injured weakness had 
 no right to any arms, but those, which the violent 
 aggressor thinks fit to prescribe to it, or as if there 
 was no treachery on our side, in endeavouring to 
 persuade them to receive a foreign army into their 
 capitals for the sincere and friendly purpose of 
 securing their independence. The opprobrious 
 language, in which the conduct and personal cha- 
 racter of these Princes is described, without a 
 single fact to support the charge, the duplicity, 
 falsehood, treachery, and restless spirit of avarice 
 and aggression, with which they are incessantly 
 reproached by the Ministers of our Government, 
 would lead you to conclude that the British power, 
 predominant as it is and almost irresistible in 
 India, could never be at rest for the Mahrattas ; 
 that they had carried fire and sword into the heart 
 of Bengal or the Carnatic, or at least that their 
 armies were stationed on our frontier, and always 
 ready to invade us. The map on your table is 
 an answer to all these falsehoods. Examine it, 
 and see on what ground these questions were 
 contested, and so many battles have been fought. 
 Was it in our territories, or on our frontier ? No,
 
 6 9 
 
 Sir ; if you follow the agents of Lord Wellesley, 
 and the armies of Britain, you will find them in 
 the centre, or in the remotest quarters of the pe- 
 ninsula, carrying slavery or desolation into coun- 
 tries, and exacting tribute from, people, whose 
 names are hardly known in England. And then 
 we revile the Princes of India, as if they were the 
 aggressors, as if they were the invaders, and as 
 if there could be no repose or security for the 
 British establishment, as long as any native power 
 in that immense continent was left in a state of 
 independence. We go into their country to 
 charge them with lawless ambition, and we rob 
 them of their property, in order to convict them 
 of insatiable avarice. The day of retribution, I 
 believe, will come, when you are least prepared 
 for it. It is not in the moral order, or in the na- 
 tural course of human affairs, that a handful of 
 strangers, from this side of the globe, can hold 
 such a dominion very long, on such terms, over 
 so great a portion of the world, and over so many 
 millions of people exasperated by their sufferings, 
 and instructed by their experience. To possess 
 India on Lord Wellesley 's principles, you must 
 waste and exhaust England ; that is, you must 
 weaken your empire where its vigour is most 
 wanted, and then will India be worth keeping on 
 that footing ? But I say that, even so, you cannot 
 keep it, if you do not contract your possessions 
 and concentrate your force there. I do not say
 
 7 
 
 you will immediately lose them ; but, in my opi- 
 nion, you may do worse. You may continue to 
 supply and support them until England is no 
 longer able to bear such a drain, and to carry such 
 a burden. Before that event, another case will 
 present itself, for which it will require all the 
 wisdom of His Majesty's Councils to provide. A 
 perpetual war with France is impossible. Someday 
 or other the necessity of peace will force itself 
 upon us, and be acknowledged by all men. For 
 our security in India, and even to insure the con- 
 tinuance of peace in Europe, it would undoubt- 
 edly be desirable that the French might be ex- 
 cluded from that continent, or at least that they 
 should have no other settlement there than the 
 factories necessary for their commerce ; and if 
 compensations, which they would accept of. could 
 be found in any other quarter, I should think it 
 would be our interest to give them even more 
 than an equivalent any where else, rather than 
 have such neighbours in India, where they would 
 always be our enemies, and soon be our rivals. 
 Lord Wellesley's policy establishes the necessity, 
 and supposes the possibility of totally excluding 
 the French from India. A more just, and there- 
 fore, as I believe, a wiser system of conduct to 
 the native Princes would have effectually shut 
 that door against France, that is, against the in- 
 trigues, the power, and the ambition of France. 
 But does any man believe that, in any negotia-
 
 tion for peace, let it come when it may, Buona- 
 parte will submit to relinquish his claim to a ter- 
 ritorial settlement in India, or that he will accept 
 of open commercial factories, to be held at our 
 discretion, without local resources of territory to 
 support them, without the security of fortifica- 
 tions, or garrisons to defend them ? The suppo- 
 sition is so improbable, that no rational conclu- 
 sion can be deduced from it. But if that event, 
 which 1 hold to be certain, should take place ; 
 if he should persist and succeed in demanding 
 the re-entrance and re-establishment of the French 
 in India, the fatal folly, which has opened every 
 Indian heart to receive them, will then come home 
 to you. As soon as they have got a sufficient 
 European force, in the proper quarter, ready to 
 act, and have taken their measures in concert 
 with the native powers, the battle, you will then, 
 have to fight, will be, not for the territory or the 
 property of others, but for your own existence. 
 Many victories, dearly bought, can give you no^ 
 thing more than external security, which you 
 might have had without them. But beware of a 
 defeat. A hundred thousand Romans were mas- 
 sacred in one day in Asia Minor, by the order of 
 Mithridates. In the mean time, without supposing 
 the probability of extreme disasters, admitting 
 that surface and solidity are synonymous, and 
 that present success is equivalent to future se- 
 curity, the question I ask is, what is your imme-
 
 diate profit ? where is the direct advantage you 
 derive from these hazardous enterprises, in which 
 the traud would be useless if it were not sup- 
 ported by force, and the exertion of the force costs 
 you more in one year than the success of it will 
 repay in many ? Let those, who are informed, 
 inform us, what solid benefit do you derive from 
 the destruction or slavery of so great a portion of 
 mankind ? Lord Wellesley says that he has acted 
 in obedience to the orders of the Court of Di- 
 rectors. I call upon the Court of Directors to 
 state to this House what they have positively 
 gained by these wars with the Mahrattas ; at 
 what price these victories have been purchased ; 
 and whether, on the whole, the affairs and situa- 
 tion of the India Company are materially im- 
 proved by that system of policy, on which their 
 property has been spent and their safety hazarded? 
 Of what use is the possession, if it makes no re- 
 turn ? It is not for me to answer these questions ; 
 nor do I believe they can be fairly answered in 
 the affirmative by any man. But I can tell you 
 what you have paid for your successes, and what 
 you have lost by your acquisitions ; and I shall 
 leave it to the Court of Directors to balance the 
 account. I can shew you, that you have ex- 
 changed the solid security of a very great and 
 profitable, though a limited possession, for the 
 precarious tenure of an unbounded dominion, 
 which does not pay you while you hold it. The
 
 73 
 
 solid contents bear no proportion to the superfi- 
 cial measurement. You know that your establish- 
 ments must keep pace with your acquisitions, and 
 are very likely to outrun them. You are told that 
 your territorial income increases with your ex- 
 pence. If that be true, why were you twenty 
 millions in debt in India two years ago, and even 
 before the heavy pressure of the Mahratta waron 
 your finances could have been materially felt * ? 
 The India Company are obliged to send above a 
 million a year in bullion out of England to pur- 
 chase an investment ; and it ought to be so ap- 
 plied. In fact, it goes directly to the pay of ar- 
 mies, which are said to be paid by subsidies, or 
 by the revenues of countries acquired by the war. 
 Did you ever hear of a conquest that paid its own 
 expences ? A trading Company, that trades in* 
 war, is a contradiction, and, if it traded with\ 
 success, would be a prodigy. But these, I sup- 1 
 pose, will be called narrow commercial ideas, not 
 commensurate to the dignity or suited to the po- 
 licy of a great territorial power. My humble 
 understanding, I confess, does not rise to the 
 level of those exalted notions of government, by 
 which, as I conceive, far higher faculties than 
 mine are apt to be misled. In the works of ge- 
 nius or imagination, indulgence may be allowed 
 to fancy and refinement. But the serious affairs 
 
 * Lord Castlereagh.
 
 74 
 
 of the world are to be governed by prudence ; 
 the essential interests of mankind can only be 
 provided for by sound and sober judgement ani- 
 mated by benevolence. This enlightened bene- 
 volence> I am sure, will be found, upon experi- 
 ment, the only sure and solid self-wisdom, when 
 the visions and chimeras of cruel vanity have dis- 
 appeared, and left nothing behind them but sor- 
 row, disappointment, and ruin. The Directors 
 of the India Company, I know, have no real ju- 
 risdiction over the politics, nor control over the po- 
 liticians of India ; and deeply it is to be regretted, 
 that they have only a nominal authority over 
 those groat interests, which the Legislature ac- 
 knowledges to belong to them, and professes to 
 have committed to their care. If there be no 
 Iternative, if there be no choice left but between 
 ;heir plain reason, and those vulgar mischievous 
 acuities, which are called brilliant talents, I 
 
 "-H - mm " v ~ L. 
 
 now what the option ought to be. In every 
 rational sense of success, I believe the sound 
 discretion of the India Company would be the 
 most successful, as I am sure it would be the 
 safest guide. It is a wretched and ruinous occu- 
 pation, to act only to be talked of. But, even if 
 it were otherwise ; if personal Tame were al- 
 lowed to be a laudable object of ambition, and 
 great actions to be the means of acquiring it, 
 there is one ingredient essential and indispensi- 
 ble. even in this sense, to any rational idea of
 
 75 
 
 eminence. That ingredient is difficulty. Now, 
 in fact, there is nothing so easy, or even that 
 requires so little personal resolution, as to dis- 
 turb the peace of the world, and to unsettle the 
 
 order of human affairs. Power alone, without 
 
 m 
 
 a particle of skill or a ray of genius, can do more 
 mischief in a day, than wisdom and industry can 
 repair in a century. Whereas, if we are to judge 
 by the little good that is attempted, and the still 
 less that is done, we are bound to conclude that 
 nothing is so difficult as to do good to mankind. 
 They, who look for any pursuit or object, of that 
 quality, in the late transactions in India, I think 
 will be disappointed. But perhaps it may be ex- 
 pected that some magnanimity in the conception, 
 or something frank and noble in the execution of 
 these enterprises, will furnish a consolation to 
 those, who do not suffer by them, for the misery 
 and ruin of India, and for the sacrifice of thou- 
 sands of the best and bravest of our own people. 
 Assuredly, that is not the character of our 
 proceedings against the Mahrattas. When the 
 Tartar conqueror entered India, he said, " I come 
 to conquer you. Submit to my dominion, and 1 
 promise to protect you." And so they found it, 
 at least as long as the government continued in 
 the family of Tamerlane. I am sorry to say that 
 this would not be an accurate description of a 
 modern British conquest. We proceed on other 
 principles, and make our way to success by very 
 
 i. 2,
 
 7 6 
 
 different professions. Our views are always amcablt 
 and liberal. The conduct of the British Government 
 is always regulated by justice , moderation, and/or- 
 learance! " Owr object has been at all times rather 
 to secure than to disturb the feudatory Mahratta 
 States in the possession of their separate territories 
 and distinct rights; yet their characteristic spirit 
 of habitual arid lawless ambition has inclined 
 them to view it with jealousy * /" When we offer 
 to occupy their cities and to garrison their forts, in 
 perpetuity, with British troops, " it is stated to 
 them in the light oi a concession on our part, tend- 
 ing to the security of their interests and the sta- 
 bility of their dominion, not as directed to objects 
 in any degree necessary to the security of the 
 British empire in India !" Concerning their 
 own interests, they are supposed to have no 
 judgement. When these amicable professions 
 fail, we soon resort to a different language, 
 more sincere indeed, but equally unworthy of 
 the dignity of England. You hear of nothing 
 then but -j* " the selfish and wicked policy of 
 the Peshwa, the dark complexion of his dispo- 
 sition and character, the disgustful history of his 
 domestic and public conduct, his atrocious ma- 
 chinations, his faithless and sordid policy, his 
 hatred and jealousy of the British name." The 
 House will recollect that this Peshwa is and has 
 been at all times our particular friend. Even 
 
 * Pa. 32i. f Pa. 42, 43, 34, 347.
 
 77 
 
 Scindia was not our enemy before 1803. Till 
 then, he was in alliance with us. His presump- 
 tion at last, in taking measures to defend himself, 
 is not only not to be endured, but has given him a 
 new character. * <4 The perfidy and violence of 
 that unprincipled Chief ; the corrupt and profli- 
 gate councils of that weak, arrogant, and faith- 
 less Chief, are suddenly discovered. His violence, 
 rapacity, and lawless ambition, are found to have 
 been the main causes of the war with the con- 
 federate Mahratta Chiefs." One would think 
 that Scindia and the Peshvva, supposing this to be 
 their character, were a couple of old Mahratta 
 Statesmen, bred in the school of some Asiatic 
 Machiavel, and by this time long exercised and 
 grown old in the practice of that fraud and false- 
 hood, which passes for policy with their perfidious 
 countrymen. Now the Peshwa is a very young 
 man, of whom a chief of his own family says-f^, 
 fs that he had retired from Poona owing to the 
 thoughtlessness of youth !" And Scindia, after all, 
 is % "an inexperienced youth, who as yet could 
 form no correct judgement of his own true in- 
 terests !" In another place, Colonel Collins says, 
 " he is an inexperienced youth, and, as I under- 
 stand, not at all conversant in business." I have 
 refrained from saying any thing of the war with 
 Holcar; first, because it was but just begun, I 
 mean at the date of the last advices received in- 
 
 * Pa. 35, 157, *59- t ?* 363. J Pa. 5, rj.
 
 78 
 
 directly by Bombay ; secondly, because Lord 
 Wellesley has not yet thought fit to give the Di- 
 rectors any account of the causes, commencement, 
 or progress of this war. All we know is, that, on 
 the 1 5th of December 1803, it was declared by 
 Lord Wellesley, that Holcar, * " having com- 
 mitted no act of hostility against the British Go- 
 vernment, has hitherto been considered as a 
 friend;" " that he is an adventurer, who pos- 
 sesses no other means of subsisting his troops, than 
 by plundering; and not to be considered as an 
 established power in India :" though, in another 
 place, he is stated to be -\- " a member of the 
 Mahratta empire." That, on the 24th of March 
 1804, there was every reason to expect an amica- 
 ble termination of the negotiations with him ; and 
 that, on the i6th of April, Lord Wellesley in- 
 forms the Governor of Bombay of " his determi- 
 nation to commence hostilities against Holcar, 
 from Indostan and the Decan, at the earliest prac- 
 ticable period of time." Of the event or progress 
 of this war, at this day, a full year after its com- 
 mencement, we know nothing ; but, after the re- 
 duction of Scindia and Boosla, it certainly is not 
 to be presumed that an inferior Chief can hold 
 out very .long against us. In all these voluntary 
 wars, without entering into questions of justice or 
 necessity, it appears to me, that even the final 
 
 * Pa. 258. f Pa. 100.
 
 79 
 
 profit, if any, I mean to the Public, is very remote 
 and uncertain ; whereas the losses and inconve- 
 niences, which attend them, are immediate and 
 unquestionable. I shall not now enter into the 
 state of the Company's finances, which in effect 
 are the revenues of the Government of India, or 
 into their debts abroad, or their difficulties at 
 home. For that discussion, a better opportunity 
 will offer, when the Noble Lord brings forward 
 the India Budget of this year *. I shall therefore 
 confine myself to some other considerations, sug- 
 gested by the subject, and not less important than 
 that of the revenues. In the year 1801, the mili- 
 tary establishment of Europeans recommended by 
 His Majesty's Ministers and adopted by Par- 
 liament, for the service of India, amounted to 
 twenty-one thousand men, in addition to those of 
 the Company, which now I believe are not re- 
 cruited, but which it would be very advisable to 
 keep up, if it were only as a nursery of non-com- 
 missioned officers for the Sepoy corps : he whole 
 may be reckoned at about 25,000 men. If that 
 force was necessary some years before the late ad- 
 dition to your territories and extension of your 
 frontier were thought of in England, I suppose it 
 ought to be augmented now, or at least that it 
 cannot safely be diminished. For to say, .as it has 
 been said, that your frontier is contracted by the 
 
 * The India Budget, annually laid before Parliament, was 
 omitted for this year 1805.
 
 8o 
 
 increase of your possessions, or, in other words, 
 that, the more you conquer, the less you have to 
 defend, seems to me very like a contradiction. 
 If such a proposition could be true, you ought to 
 reduce your army and lessen your expence. I 
 know very well the purpose, which these phrases 
 are intended to answer. Even nonsense has some 
 meaning, at least in its application. On the 
 principle so assumed, economy and conquest go 
 hand in hand, and keep an equal pace. A just 
 and necessary war not only furnishes a supply, but 
 creates a saving. For my part, Sir, I have no 
 idea of a thrifty conquest, or that they, who make 
 it, will not begin with helping themselves. The 
 profit in reversion will be cheerfully bequeathed 
 to the Public. The establishment of Europeans 
 is the fundamental security of your India posses- 
 sions, and the main stay of your empire. A well- 
 disciplined army of Sepoys may be depended on 
 for ordinary services and, to a certain degree, 
 against native enemies. But, in a situation of real 
 hazard, and much more in the case of a reverse, I 
 am of opinion that neither their courage nor their 
 fidelity ought to be relied on, unless they are at 
 once encouraged and kept in awe by a powerful 
 reserve of European troops. These last, in my 
 judgement, ought to be spared and saved as much 
 as possible, not harassed by unnecessary marches, 
 not placed in the front of every battle, or com- 
 manded to storm every breach. It is natural
 
 Si 
 
 . 
 enough for a commanding officer to resort, in the 
 
 first instance, to the instrument that cuts best. 
 The Europeans of course are most employed and 
 most exposed, and suffer accordingly. The his- 
 tory of India furnishes no example of such a 
 slaughter of British troops, as has happened in 
 the last two years. I do not know to what num- 
 ber the effectives fit for service are actually re- 
 duced ; nor would I state it, if I did. But this 
 part of your military force is invaluable ; because 
 it* is extremely difficult to recruit them, and be- 
 cause it requires a long time to prepare them for 
 the service, and to inure them to the climate. The 
 numbers, who die by the sword, fall short, as I 
 believe, of those who perish by other means, and 
 whom you never hear of. Now, Sir, if this [ 
 establishment of the King's troops be not kept up, 
 it is a mere deceit, which deceives nobody but : 
 yourselves, and leaves your possessions without , 
 any solid security. But, supposing it to be com- 
 pleted by constant supplies from England, it is 
 not easy to conceive how such numbers of picked 
 men can be spared at any time from the. popula- 
 tion of this country, and especially in the present 
 state of Europe. Then consider what the conse- 
 quence of maintaining such an establishment, 
 sooner or later, must be in India. When the renewal 
 of the Company's charter in 1 793 was debated in 
 this House, you heard some strong opinions, ve- 
 hemently expressed by Lord Melville, of the dan- 
 
 M
 
 8* 
 
 
 
 gerof colonization in that country, and the ruinous 
 effects, with which such a perpetual drain upon 
 the population of Britain must be attended. On 
 that subject, his fears were not to be quieted. So 
 he renewed the charter, and laid the foundation 
 of such a military establishment of Europeans, as 
 never had been thought of before. Now, Sir, I 
 believe it will not be disputed that twenty-five 
 thousand armed men are very likely to have a pro- 
 portionate number of women and children, and 
 that sooner or later they will take what land they 
 please, and make their own settlement. Whether 
 colonization, in any other form, be good or evil, a 
 military colony, I presume, is of all the most liable 
 to objection. They may possibly keep the con- 
 quered couiftry against the natives, but they will 
 keep it for themselves. They, who profess to 
 dread colonization in India more than I do, ought 
 not to leave this view of the question out of their 
 contemplation. The event, to which I have al- 
 luded, may be remote or improbable, not in its 
 own nature, but because other events are more 
 likely to occur at an earlier period. On the pre- 
 sent plan of holding all India by subsidiary trea- 
 ties, which, in plainer English, means nothing but 
 to place garrisons in all the principal cities, your 
 military force, whatever it is, must be thinly dis- 
 tributed in detachments too distant from each 
 other to be capable of giving mutual assistance if 
 they were separately attacked, or to be readily
 
 83 
 
 united if the occasion should require it. Look at 
 the map, and see how your army is and must be 
 divided, from Delhi to Agra, from Agra toUgein, 
 to Indore, to Nagpour, to Poona, to Hyderabad, 
 to Seringapatam, and to Cape Comorin. In the 
 mean time, your settlements on the two coasts 
 
 
 
 must be stripped of a considerable part of their 
 defence. I put the case, against which I suppose 
 you mean to be guarded, of a future combination 
 among the natives, assisted by the French : for 
 otherwise, if that case were impossible, your pre- 
 sent precautions would be superfluous. To drive 
 the native Princes into such a combination, I can- 
 not conceive a measure more effectual than this of 
 placing garrisons in their capital cities. It is the 
 most offensive to their pride, and the most galling 
 to their feelings. It not only robs them of their 
 personal and even domestic freedom, but of all 
 appearance of dignity in the eyes of their subjects. 
 It is not so much the pay or the burthen, it is the 
 presence of these troops that degrades and afflicts 
 them. They would much rather pay a greater 
 subsidy to support them at a distance, where I 
 should think they might be stationed with greater 
 security and advantage ; I mean upon our own 
 frontier, in large bodies, in regular cantonments 
 connected by posts, and within reach of one 
 another. On that principle, the main body of 
 your military power would be at all times ready to 
 assemble and act together. 1 leave it to officers 
 
 M 2
 
 8 4 
 
 of experience in the Company's service, to inform 
 you, on which of the two plans the discipline of 
 your armies is most likely to be preserved. On 
 that point many serious considerations occur, 
 which I shall not enlarge on. At great distances 
 from the Commander in Chief, there may be a 
 gradual relaxation of discipline, of which he can- 
 not be apprized. The Sepoy corps may not be kept 
 complete. Wherever they are stationed, the 
 serrice their officers like best is the collection of 
 the revenues. Your Hindoo Sepoys may be ex- 
 posed to seduction in the cities, which are the 
 residence of Princes of their own religion, and 
 your Mussulmans in those of the Mahornedans. 
 These separate commands are a sure road to for- 
 tune, and will be perpetually solicited at the seat 
 of government, and always given to those who 
 have mo? f interest, or who know the shortest 
 way to preferment. The unavoidable tendency 
 of this system, if I am not greatly mistaken, is to 
 weaken and corrupt your whole military establish- 
 ment. 
 
 The substancdof what I have now submitted to 
 
 yout consideration, amounts, as I think, to a 
 
 " 
 
 serious charge against the system and practice of 
 Lord Wellesley's government, or the greater 
 parf of it. I have no personal interest to 
 serve, or animosity to gratify in stating these 
 opinions. My intention and my endeavour ha s 
 beeri to do a public service by suggesting to the
 
 House, and particularly to His Majesty's Minis- 
 ters, what 1 think right notions, on a subject, on 
 which my attention has been fixed, without a va- 
 riation of view or principle, during thirty years, 
 and not to give useless pain or offence to any 
 individual. 1 know how Lord Wellesley is sup- 
 ported ; and for that reason, as well as from my 
 own sense of justice, should be as ready to ap- 
 prove as to condemn his conduct, if an opportu- 
 nity offered. There is one of his public acts/ >] 
 which I can mention with pleasure and approba-, I 
 tion, because it is honourable to the British cha- 
 racter, and right in itself, on a higher principle^ 
 than mere policy, I mean the attention and re- 
 spect, which Lord Wellesley has paid to the most 
 unfortunate representative of the race of Tamer- 
 lane, the Mogul, Sha dllum. I am not aware of 
 any u important benefits *, which can now be^rft 
 derived from a renewed connexion between His 
 Majesty and the British power in India :" nor 
 would I mix any consideration of that kind 
 with the just and generous office of relieving so 
 great a person from the accumulated calamities, 
 which have descended upon him. Except the 
 fall of the House of Bourbon, completed by 
 the murder of the last, and, as I believe, the 
 most innocent of its Princes, 1 know of nothing 
 so awful as that state of inconceivable misery and 
 
 *Pa.*o 3 . MllPj
 
 86 
 
 degradation, in which the last of the House of 
 Timour still survives the destruction of his em- 
 pire, and the utter ruin of his family. In reliev- 
 ing such a person from such unparalleled afflic- 
 tions, Lord Wellesley has acted well : and I 
 should equally concur with him in the liberality 
 of that act, considering who is the object of it, if 
 we were not, as we are, in possession of his in- 
 heritance. Having said so much of Lord Welles- 
 ley's administration, to say nothing of himself, 
 I mean always in his public character, would look 
 like affectation. As far as I can judge from his 
 voluminous writings and incessant occupations, 
 he appears to me to be a person of no incon- 
 siderable ability, of uncommon industry, and 
 everlasting activity. They, who read his cor- 
 respondence, will be at a loss to conceive, how 
 the pen could erer be out of his hand, or when 
 he could allow himself a day's relaxation, or a 
 night's rest. That so determined an enemy to 
 his own repose should not be a steady friend to 
 the tranquillity of others, is not very wonderful. 
 
 As to the general merits and final result of his 
 
 . 
 government, the choice of his successor says 
 
 every thing that I could say of it, and practically 
 perhaps in stronger terms, than I should make 
 use of, because his removal is the act and con- 
 fession of his friends. The remedy indicates the 
 disorder. With respect to my Lord Cornwallis,
 
 I have already taken an opportunity to declare 
 my confidence in his principles and in his pru- 
 dence. We want those principles and that pru- 
 dence more than ever ; and I do not believe that 
 the Noble Lord has a relation or a friend, who 
 wishes him success more heartily than I do. 
 The motion, with which I shall conclude, is not 
 directed to personal accusation or to parlia- 
 mentary censure. My purpose is to do a public 
 service; not to criminate, but to correct; by 
 engaging the House of Commons to revert to 
 their principles, to avow them once more, and to 
 adhere to them hereafter. The vote and declara- 
 tion I am going to propose, will be a weapon 
 in Lord Cornwallis's hand, with which we ought 
 to arm him. It is not easy for the wisest man to 
 do perfectly right, after infinite wrong has been 
 done. Many steps must be trodden back, before 
 the right road can be recovered. They, who are 
 able to estimate the difficulty of the task, which 
 Lord Cornwallis has undertaken, will not think 
 it superfluous to encourage and support him, in 
 the execution of it, by all the authority of Par- 
 liament. I therefore move you, Sir, that it may 
 be declared, " That this House adheres to the 
 principles established by its unanimous resolu- 
 tion of the 28th of May 1782, adopted by the 
 Legislature, and made law by two successive
 
 Xtt's of His -present .Majesty, in" 1 784 and i 793 ; 
 namely, that to pursue schemes of conquest and 
 extent of dominion in India are measures repug- 
 nant to tho wish', the honour, and the policy of 
 this nation " noi '^ 3<1 fi 8B[ ^ ' 
 .oh 1 iii;d) \(iiJn;'jiI ytoir us mifl aadehv 
 
 Jon i'J Ilfida I ibidVf d)i// t noi)orn orfT 
 
 -jwheq ot 10 noitisaijDDB IjsnoeTO] oi bot'i'jiib 
 oilduq n ob oJ er o^oqinq -(M .oinsrm ^ii- 
 yd ?ajifnirj ot Jon 
 
 ot hvvoi oJ e;;- ) lo oeuoH orit 
 
 ol brie , jfio morit WOVB ot ,8o[qioniiq ibd) 
 
 -jii. . 3)07 odT .TOilfirnail modi ot 'ji^ribs 
 
 noqeaw & od Iliw ,o8oqoiq ot $niog m I noil 
 Jiigoo 3W doiri-// diiw ( bnfid I'ailUwmoO bio. : 
 ot nrrn Igo^iw odt io\ \BB3 ton HI )I .mid rrrm ot 
 .1 noi uir loftc jiioq oh 
 
 sic'; . --JOT acp:- ' .onoh 
 
 : HBO bfiOl Jdh Sfit 
 
 > bt olds 
 
 ^nidt ton ' . liuv/moO bioJ 
 
 .xnns oi euoufhdqija ti 
 dt Us ^d t 1i lo nol1uD3X3 odt 
 vcf! ->vom a7o^oi*>i!) i .In-;; 
 
 joll aid! ''JdT y ad 
 
 ; LodiWr,^o eofqianiiq 
 
 M *io d)8 odt 'io noit 
 
 ,.I tbrn bns
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from the Marquis Wtllesley to 
 the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 
 dated i$th July 1804. 
 
 " To every person acquainted with the real na- 
 ture of the British interest and power in India, 
 the north west frontier of Indostan must have 
 appeared to be the most feeble part of our vast 
 empire. 
 
 " The power of the Seiks, as well as of the 
 Mahrattas, and the Rajpouts, and other petty 
 states, affords a considerable advantage to the 
 invasion of an enemy coming from the most distant 
 parts of the north-west of Asia, or the banks of 
 the Indus; and it will be superfluous to remark, 
 that the enterpising spirit of France, or the am- 
 bition of Ruffia, or even the violence and ra- 
 pacity of the Afghan tribes or other Asiatic na- 
 tions, which inhabit the northern and western 
 countries of Asia, may have conceived plans of 
 invasion in that part ; an invasion, which 
 
 N
 
 9 o 
 
 have extremely embarassed the British power in 
 India. 
 
 '* However formidable the power of Scindia 
 would be, in case of an increase of his forces by 
 the junction of another enemy, a more pressing 
 and immediate danger in all its consequences has 
 just arisen from the decline of the local authority 
 of Scindia in Indostan ; and that danger has 
 recently assumed a more alarming aspect in pro- 
 portion to the accumulated embarassments of 
 Scindia in the Decan, and to the decrease and 
 general decay of his resources and his power. 
 
 " Scindia has no direct authority over M. Per- 
 ron and his regular troops. Several examples 
 must be known to you, in which M. Perron has 
 openly disobeyed or systematically evaded the 
 orders of Scindia, particularly in the last crisis of 
 that chiefs affairs. 
 
 " M. Perron is supposed to possess a consider- 
 able fortune, and you perfectly well know how 
 strong his desire is to return to Europe. 
 
 "In addition to these remarks, it is proper to 
 inform you, that the vicinity of the regular army 
 of M. Perron constantly diminishes the population 
 of the Company's provinces, and dries up the 
 sources of our agriculture, our manufactures, 
 our commerce, and our revenues; as well as 
 1hc means of recruiting for the army in that 
 country.
 
 9* 
 
 " Among the principal advantages, which the 
 late peace gives us, we must reckon the mainte- 
 nance of the national character in India, by the 
 moderation, the clemency, and the justice, which 
 the British Government have manifested in the 
 conditions of peace granted to our enemies. 
 
 " Your Hon. Committee will remark with sa* 
 tisfaction, that the total amount of the subsidiary 
 troops in the Decan, constituting a force of 22,000 
 men, may be employed against Jeshwunt Row 
 Holkar, or any other disturber of the tranquillity 
 of India, without requiring extraordinary succours, 
 or without occasioning any extraordinary addition 
 to the expences of our military establishment. 
 Your Hon. Committee will not fail to see, and 
 duly to appreciate the advantages of an arrange- 
 ment, by means of which the expences of so 
 great a proportion of the war in India are defrayed 
 ly foreign subsidies. Whilst we mention this, we 
 cannot overlook the constant state of preparation 
 and equipment imposed upon subsidiary troops. 
 
 " During the course of these marches, the 
 troops suffered severely from excessive heat and 
 want of provisions and forage. A number of 
 excellent officers and soldiers fell victims to the 
 effects of the climate and fatigue. 
 
 " We have taken a considerable sqm of money, 
 twenty-four lacks of rupees in the fort of Agra, 
 five Jacks at Delhi, besides a number of other 
 
 N 2
 
 9* 
 
 sums taken from Aleghour and other places, 
 which were immediately distributed to the 
 soldiers." 
 
 " i<)th July 1804. 
 
 " The diminution, which the provision of 
 goods for the present year mur,t suffer, cannot be 
 determined at present. 
 
 " It is to be hoped that the speedy arrival of a 
 fresh remittance of money from Europe will re- 
 move the momentary embarassment, that has 
 been experienced in the administration of your 
 finances in this Presidency." 
 
 Extracts from private Letters from India, intercepted 
 by the French. 
 
 i 
 " IF Colonel Fawce't had at first joined Smith, 
 
 instead of keeping his men underarms, he would 
 at least have prevented the country from being 
 ravaged by the enemy ; the troops would not have 
 been so harassed ; and he would not have lost 
 ten or twelve Europeans a day. 
 
 ** This rapid march cost us dear; we lost each 
 day twenty or thirty Europeans, and ten times as 
 many natives of every class. The heat was so 
 excessive, that I was myself a witness that out of
 
 93 
 
 seven soldiers, who went to a well to quench 
 their thirst, five fell dead. 
 
 " The thermometer was, during several days, 
 no, and upwards. 
 
 " How we shall be able to preserve and defend 
 this vast extent of country, I cannot conceive. 
 I think that Lord Wellesley himself will be soon 
 alarmed at the greatness of his conquests; none 
 of which, according to rny opinion, will produce 
 revenues enough to defray the expences they oc- 
 
 casion," 
 
 Extract of a Letter from the Chairman of the Court 
 of Directors (David Scott, Esq.) to Mr. Ad- 
 ding I on, dated 1 4-th August 1801. 
 
 " To the harmony, which has hitherto sub- 
 sisted between these two Boards, may be ascribed 
 in a great degree the PROSPERITY, which has at- 
 tended the affairs of the East India Company. 
 
 " Situated, Sir, as you know the Company to 
 have been for some years, with an immense in- 
 creasing debt abroad, owing to an expenditure far 
 beyond their revenue ; and if even (as is the fact) 
 since the destruction of our most formidable 
 enemy in India, and our acquirement of such 
 rich and extensive possessions, the increased re-
 
 94 
 
 venue fells short of our disbursements, you may 
 believe that the united efforts of the Court must 
 be necessary to find out and apply a proper re- 
 medy. In consequence of the above alarming 
 situation, and seeing the prospect of an actual 
 failure of resources for furnishing the usual iu- 
 testments, &c." 
 
 THE END. 
 
 S. GOSNELL, Printer, 
 tittle Queen Sweet, Holbwn.
 
 I* fit 
 
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