UC-NRLF SB THE Mercantile License Tax AN INQUIRY Is It Constitutional ? Who are Liable and How? The Seven Remedies o! the Citizen LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Cltus V THE MERCANTILE LICENSE TAX. The Mercantile License Tax An Inquiry. Is It Constitutional ? Who Are Liable, and How ? The Seven Remedies of the Citizen. BY RAY W. JONES A Member of the Philadelphia Bar, ion Chestnut Street Philadelphia " By goode disputing the law shall be well knowne." YEAR BOOK PHILADELPHIA : J. L. H. BAYNE PUBLISHER 23 North Juniper St. IQOO COPYRIGHT, 1900, BY RAY W. JONES. INTRODUCTION. If some favorite child of manifest destiny in his native Philippine swamp should be told that today in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania a particular officer of the government and he not a legislative officer may prescribe at his sole discretion a series of ques- tions to be answered by every merchant or shop- keeper concerning the merchant's private affairs and compel the merchant to expose everything to certain agents of the law, as they are called, who may invade his store and counting-house, he might perhaps be puzzled to discern wherein lies the difference between the inquisitorial Spanish and the free American systems. Were this special charge of Christian humanity told that another officer of the government not a judicial officer may require the merchant to appear before him with his private books and accounts, may make such inquiries and examinations as he sees fit and become the inquisitor and judge of all, he might be pardoned if he did not cry out for American freedom. And were it known to our yellow fellow citizen that a merchant who declines to submit to these exactions and infringements of his natural rights is subjected to 117476 a penalty of one thousand dollars, it might be better understood why he has preferred the latter of the alternatives that a great American patriot proposed to himself why he has chosen death rather than Amer- ican liberty. Yet this is the system attempted to be set up by the Mercantile License Tax Law of May 2, 1899. Unequal, Local, Inquisitorial, Tyrannical, Infringing upon natural rights, Interfering with the inviolability of private affairs, Open to fraud and evasion, Discriminating against the honest, Productive of dishonesty, Fostering the spirit of petty favoritisms and petty tyrannies of petty officials, Arraying class against class. If it be urged, in the language of European econ- omists and statesmen, that these are practical questions for the economist and statesman to decide and not for the courts ; and that when the finances of a state are in a bad way and require money relief, the end justifies the means ; it may be answered that with us, under the American system, no power of government is untram- meled or unrestrained, and that there are principles dearer to the American heart and more jealously guarded by the American judiciary to their honor be it said than the mere question of money-getting for a municipality or for a state. This book is devoted (i) To an inquiry whether the Legislature can con- stitutionally set up the odious and un-American system attempted to be set up by the Act of 1899. 2) To a short inquiry as to some of the features of the Mercantile Tax Law of the State without regard to the question of unconstitutionality. (3) To an inquiry as to the remedies. Under the first head will be considered : I. Whether the taxation attempted to be imposed is uniform taxation. II. Whether the Act is not a local or special Act. III. Whether the Act is not a forbidden violation of private rights and a forbidden delegation of legis- lative functions. IV. The question of the emoluments of officers under the Act. V. Whether the Act does not contain more than one subject not clearly expressed in the title. Under the second head will be considered : I. Who is a vender or dealer. II. Who is not a vender or dealer. III. The law in regard to manufacturers or mechanics. Under the third head will be considered : The seven remedies of the citizen. CONTENTS. The Act of May 2, 1899 PART I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT OF MAY 2, 1899. I. Is It Uniform Taxation ? 21 II. Is the Act Local or Special? 33 III. Is the Act not a Forbidden Violation of Private Rights and a Forbidden Delegation of Legislative Functions ? . . . . 43 IV. Emoluments of Officers under the Act 55 V. Does the Act Contain More than One Subject not Clearly Expressed in the Title ?. 61 PART II. SOME FEATURES OF THE MERCANTILE TAX LAW OF THE STATE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY. VI. Who is a Vender or Dealer 67 VII. Who is Not a Vender or Dealer 71 VIII. The Law as to Manufacturers or Mechanics 81 PART III. REMEDIES. IX. The Seven Remedies of the Citizen 93 (9) AN ACT To provide revenue by imposing a mercantile license tax on venders of or dealers in goods, wares, and merchandise, and providing for the col- lection of said tax. Section i. Be it enacted, &c., That from and after the pas- sage of this act, each retail vender of or retail dealer in goods, wares and merchandise shall pay an annual mercantile license tax of two dollars, and all persons so engaged shall pay one mill additional on each dollar of the whole volume, gross, of business transacted annually. Each wholesale vender of or wholesale dealer in goods, wares and merchandise shall pay an annual mercantile license tax of three dollars, and all per- sons so engaged shall pay one-half mill additional on each dollar of the whole volume, gross, of business transacted annually. Each dealer in or vender of goods, wares or mer- chandise at any exchange or board of trade -shall pay a mer- cantile license tax of twenty-five cents on each thousand dollars worth, gross, of goods so sold. Section 2. And it is provided that all persons who shall sell to dealers in or venders of goods, wares and merchandise, and to no other person or persons, shall be taken under the pro- visions of this act to be wholesalers ; and all other venders of or dealers in goods, wares and merchandise shall be retailers, and shall pay an annual license tax as provided in this act for retailers. Section 3. For the purpose of carrying into effect the pro- visions of this act, the appointment of mercantile appraisers shall be made annually, on or before the thirtieth day of December of each year, by the county commissioners, except 12 in cities of the first class, when the Auditor General and the treasurer of the city are authorized and required to appoint five suitable, qualified citizens, all of whom shall not be of the same political party, and the term of office of said appraisers shall be for three years. Section 4. The Auditor General shall be authorized and required to prepare and have printed proper blanks, to be distributed by the mercantile appraisers in the several coun- ties to each vender of or dealer in goods, wares and merchan- dise. These blanks shall be in the form prescribed by the Auditor General, and shall contain a request for such infor- mation as may be necessary in arriving at the actual amount of business transacted by the vender of or dealer in goods, wares and merchandise, during the calendar year preceding that for which a license is required. The blanks thus prepared shall contain an affidavit ; and every dealer subject to the provisions of this act shall be required to make an affidavit, by oath or affirmation, as to the correctness of the return made. The whole volume of business, including cash receipts and merchandise sold on credit, which is thus ascertained has been transacted during the preceding calendar year, shall be the basis upon which the license is to be rated. Section 5. It shall be the duty of each vender of or dealer in goods, wares and merchandise to fill up the blank prepared, as before said, by the Auditor General, and return the same to the mercantile appraiser of the proper county within ten days from the date of the receipt thereof, with an affidavit certifying to the correctness of the return so made. If any vender of or dealer in goods, wares and merchandise refuses to make a return, as required by this act, to the mercantile appraiser, when requested so to do, it shall be the duty of the mercantile appraiser to report the same immediately to the 13 county treasurer, whereupon it shall be the duty of the county treasurer to require the owner or business manager to appear before him in person, with the books and accounts of his mer- cantile establishment, for interrogation and examination ; and the county treasurer shall have power to issue subpoenas and attachments, to be served by any constable or sheriff, and to compel the attendance of the owner, or any clerk, book- keeper or officer connected with said business, to produce such books and papers as he may deem expedient to secure the information necessary to ascertain and fix the amount of business transacted during the calendar year preceding that for which a mercantile license tax is to be paid. After the county treasurer has ascertained, from the best evidence that can be secured, the amount or volume of business transacted during the calendar year preceding that to which the license is to be issued, he shall settle an account, in the usual mode, against the owner or owners of such establishments, for the amount of mercantile tax due under the classification herein- before provided. If the owner, proprietor, or any other person connected with the business, who is subpoenaed, refuses to produce the books and papers and appear before the county treasurer, for the purpose of giving the information required by this act of Assembly, he shall be liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars, to be collected in the manner provided by law. The county treasurer shall settle an account against the owner or owners, so neglecting or refusing to make the report as aforesaid, and a certified copy of said settlement shall be forwarded to the vender of or dealer in goods, wares or merchandise, which settlement, when so made, shall be subject to appeal for thirty days from the date thereof, and, if not appealed from within that time, it shall be final and con- clusive. If an appeal is not taken as hereinbefore provided, within the period authorized by law, it shall be the duty of the county treasurer of the proper county to proceed to col- lect the amount due, as mercantile taxes are in other cases collected. Section 6. It shall be the duty of each mercantile ap- praiser, appointed under the provisions of this act, to forward by mail, at least ten days prior to the date when he makes a personal visit to the place of business of every person whom he is required by law to ascertain and assess, a blank prepared for distribution by the Auditor General as hereinbefore pro- vided. It shall be the further duty of the mercantile ap- praisers, after mailing the blank as hereinbefore provided, in the several cities and counties of this State, personally to visit the store, or other place of business, of every vender of or dealer in goods, wares and merchandise, and, at the time of such visit, to require each vender or dealer to make a return, under oath or affirmation, of the goods sold for the preceding calendar year, on the blank forwarded, and he is hereby em- powered to administer an oath or affirmation for that purpose. If the mercantile appraiser is dissatisfied with the return, so made by the vender or dealer, he shall ascertain and assess the mercantile license tax according to the classification so made. He shall also leave a written or printed notice, to be prepared and furnished by the Auditor General, specifying the classification and amount of license money to be paid by such person to this State, and also the time and place, when and where, an appeal will be held as required by law. The appeal shall be held by the county treasurer, acting in con- junction with the mercantile appraiser, at such date as shall conform with law in all counties, except where there is a board of mercantile appraisers, in which case the board shall hear all appeals. Any vender or dealer, subject to the pro- visions of this act, who is dissatisfied with the rating so made by the mercantile appraiser, shall have the right of appeal to the mercantile appraiser and county treasurer, who are re- quired to hear him on the day so fixed for the appeal ; if the vender or dealer is still dissatisfied with the finding of the county treasurer and mercantile appraiser, or board of ap- praisers, in reference to the proper classification of said ven- der or dealer, he shall have the right of appeal to the court of common pleas of the proper county, which appeal the said court is required to hear and determine within twenty days after such appeal shall be taken, or at the next sitting thereof. If any person fails to attend the appeal before the county treasurer and mercantile appraiser, board of appraisers, or the court, he shall not thereafter be permitted, in a suit for the recovery of said mercantile license tax, to set up as a de- fence, either that he is not a vender of or dealer in goods, wares or merchandise, or any other ground of defence, which might have been heard and determined either by said county treasurer and mercantile appraiser, board of appraisers or the court of common pleas, on appeal, as aforesaid. Section 7. It shall be the duty of every city arid county treasurer to sue for the recovery of all licenses, duly returned to him by the mercantile appraiser, if not paid on or before the first day of July in each and every year, within ten days after that date : Provided however, That if the county treas- urer is satisfied that the mercantile license tax, for any good and sufficient reason, cannot be collected, he shall make a report to the Auditor General of all the facts connected with the case, and the Auditor General, upon investigation, may exonerate him from the payment of said tax, and in all such cases suit shall not be brought. The county treasurer shall at the expiration of each month, forward to the State Treas- urer the amount of mercantile tax received by him. i6 Section 8. Any mercantile appraiser who shall neglect or refuse to visit the store, or other place of business, of any person ascertained and assessed by him for license, and to furnish such person with a written or printed notice of his classification, amount of license, and time and place of hold- ing appeal, as required by the fifth section of this act, shall pay a penalty of one hundred dollars, for the use of the Com- monwealth, to be recovered as debts of a like amount are recoverable, on due proof of such neglect or refusal being made according to law. Section 9. It shall be the duty of every mercantile ap- praiser, appointed under this act, on or before the first day of May, in each year, to certify to the county treasurer a correct list of all venders or dealers in goods, wares and merchandise, assessed or to be assessed with a mercantile tax in the county for which he is appointed, giving the names and postoffice addresses of the venders or dealers so returned, the classifi- cation, and amount of license due by each. The list fur- nished by the mercantile appraiser to the county treasurer shall not contain the name or names of venders or dealers who are not subject to the payment of the mercantile license tax. This list shall be kept by the county treasurer, for his guid- ance in hearing appeals and collecting said license taxes. After appeals have been heard and exonerations made, the corrected list shall then be certified by the county treasurer to the Auditor General, on or before the first day of July, of each year. Section 10. The rate of commission allowed county or city treasurers, the fees collected for the county or city treasurers and mercantile appraisers, also the rate per mile paid mercantile appraisers, and all provisions of law with ref- erence to the advertising of said lists, shall be and remain 17 the same as now fixed by existing law ; and after such publi- cation of advertisement shall have been properly made, it shall be the duty of the constable of his respective ward, dis- trict or township to compare the list, and report to the county or city treasurer all omissions found, and for such service the constable shall receive a fee of fifty cents for each and every omission so reported. Section n. Each dealer who comes under the provisions of this act shall cause to be placed, permanently, at the entrance of his or their place of business, a sign describing the busi- ness in which the party is engaged, with his or their name or names upon the same, such sign ; and a violation of the pro- visions of this section shall be punishable with a fine of ten dollars, said fine to be collected as fines of like amount are now by the law collected, and to be paid into the county treasury. Section 12. All acts or parts of acts, general, special or local, inconsistent herewith be and the same are hereby repealed. Approved The 2d day of May, A. D. 1899. WILLIAM A. STONE. Pamphlet Laws, page 184. PART I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT OF MAY 2, 1899. I. Is IT UNIFORM TAXATION? SECTIONS i AND 2. I. While courts cannot review the wisdom or expe- diency of legislative enactments or the motives of their framers, they can pronounce enactments void which violate prohibitions, expressly declared or clearly implied, of the Constitution. Does the Act of 1 899 offend in this respect ? Is it unconstitutional ? Will the courts declare it or any part of it void ? When the city of Williamsport attempted to impose an occupation tax based upon the amount earned by each individual in his occupation, the Supreme Court said in 1885 : The assessment upon occupations is hopelessly, incurably vicious. The plain mandate of the Consti- tution has been wholly ignored. It is in direct viola- tion of Article IX, Section i, which provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of sub- jects." The organic law requires not merely that there shall be no exemption of persons or classes, but that upon persons and classes the tax shall be uniform. Thus, in levying a tax upon occupations, a tax of $100 upon every person having a known occupation would be uniform. But what uniformity is there in laying an occupation tax of $100 upon A and a like levy of $200 (23) 24 upon B, the occupation of each being similar? The answer, and the only one that can be urged, is that B earns double the amount that A does. This brings us at once to the vice underlying the whole case. Under the guise of an occupation tax the city of Wil- liamsport has levied and is seeking to collect an income tax. Of all forms of taxation this is the most odious to the American people. It was submitted to during the war from a feeling of patriotism in view of the great financial strain to which the country was sub- jected. But when no such cause exists there is little excuse for imposing such an obnoxious burden. Bangor's Appeal, 109 Pennsylvania State Reports, 79 (1885). Accordingly, when the city of Allentown imposed a license tax upon dealers, graduated by the estimated amount of their gross annual sales, a dealer, relying upon the decision in Bangor's Appeal, appealed to the courts, contending that the grading of the license tax according to the amount of the annual gross sales was illegal because not uniform. But the Court held that such a tax was NOT A TAXING OF THE SELLER, but A TAXING OF HIS PROPERTY, and that Being a taxation of a thing, and not of a person, the classification makes uniformity the same as in the case of money at interest or real estate. 25 Allentown vs. Gross, 132 Pennsylvania State Re- ports, 319 (1890), followed in Williamsport vs. Wenner, 172 Pennsylvania State Reports, 173 (1896). The first two clauses of the first section of the Act of 1899 are : "Each retail vender of or retail dealer in goods, wares and merchandise shall pay an annual mercantile license tax of two dollars, and all persons so engaged shall pay one mill additional on each dollar of the whole volume gross of business transacted annually. Each wholesale vender of or wholesale dealer in goods, wares and merchandise, shall pay an annual mercantile license tax of three dollars, and all persons so engaged shall pay one half mill additional on each dollar of the whole volume gross of business transacted annually." This is a tax graduated by the estimated amount of gross annual sales. It is therefore NOT A TAXING OF THE SELLER, but A TAXING OF HIS PROPERTY. As such it must stand or fall. There is no doubt of the right of the Legislature to classify property as the subjects of taxation. But all the members of each class must be treated alike. 26 Pittsburg vs. Coyle, 165 Pennsylvania State Reports, 61 (1894). So, the Legislature may legally tax the property of merchants and shopkeepers and exempt the property of all other citizens, however unfair and unequal, and however dangerous to the political lives of the legis- lators such taxation may be. But whether the Legislature may discriminate be- tween the property of the wholesale and retail dealer in the same commodity and tax the property of the retailer twice what it taxes the property of the whole- saler, is a far different and, to say the least, a most doubtful question, especially in this day of the great department stores, whose volume gross of business transacted annually exceeds many times over that of the largest wholesale houses. But this is not the question which arises in the con- struction of the Act of 1899, f r tne Legislature, dis- carding the ordinary use of language, declares in the second section the meaning of the first to be " that all persons who shall sell to dealers in or venders of goods, wares and merchandise, and to no other person or persons, shall be taken under the provisions of this act (to) be wholesalers, and all other venders of or dealers in goods, wares and merchandise shall be retailers and shall pay an annual license tax as pro- vided in this act for retailers." The distinction thus set up between the "wholesaler" and the " retailer" 27 of the Act depends, not upon the size or the quantity of the individual sales, but solely upon the persons to whom the sales are made. A great yarn house, there- fore, which makes a sale of tens of thousands of dol- lars of warps or filling to a great carpet manufacturer by that sale becomes a "retailer" and liable to pay twice as much on the whole volume gross of its busi- ness as its competitor, which confines itself to sales to dealers ; a dealer in plumbers' supplies who sells to a plumber must pay twice as much as his competitor who does not ; a paper house which sells to a paper- hanger must pay twice as much as one which sells only to paper dealers. Two mercantile houses each carry on a business of one million dollars a year in the same commodity. One makes a sale, large or small, to a manufacturer or a consumer ; the other confines its sales to dealers. The latter will pay a mercantile license tax of five hundred dollars, while the former will have to pay one thousand dollars, simply and solely because it has made a sale to a manufacturer or a consumer, and this without regard to the size or amount of the sale. Let us now re-read the clauses of the first section, in the light of the second section, and the ruling of the Supreme Court that the taxation is the taxation of the property of the dealer. They will read: "All dealers who shall sell to manufacturers or any other person or persons than dealers shall pay a tax of one 28 mill on each dollar of their property. Each dealer who shall sell to dealers and to no other person or per- sons, shall pay a tax of one-half mill on each dollar of his property." And bearing in mind that the Supreme Court has said, in Allen town vs. Gross (above), that this taxation is the same as in the case of money at inter- est, or real estate, the re-read clauses are the same as if they read: "All dealers who shall sell to manufac- turers or any other person or persons than dealers, shall pay a tax of one mill on each dollar of their real estate. Each dealer who shall sell to dealers and to no other person or persons shall pay a tax of one half mill on each dollar of his real estate." Surely, it cannot be seriously said that this does not conflict with Article IX, Sections i and 2 of the Con- stitution, which declare that "all taxes shall be uni- form upon the same classes of subjects," and "all laws exempting property from taxation . . . shall be void." If it does conflict, the Act of 1899 must fall, no matter what inconvenience may result to the State. This portion of the Constitution is too important and valuable to be overridden by the Legislature or frit- tered away by judicial construction. It was intended to and does sweep away forever the power of the Legislature to impose unequal burdens upon the people under the form of taxation. The evils which led up to its incorporation into the organic law are well known. The burden of maintaining the State 2 9 has been in repeated instances lifted from the shoul- ders of favored classes and thrown upon the remainder of the community. This was done by means of favor- itism and class legislation. Article IX of the Constitu- tion was intended to cut up this system by the roots, and we shall have no more of it if the legislative and judicial departments of the Government perform their full duty in giving effect to that instrument. The taxing power of the State is great and searching. Within the limits of the Constitution it is bounded only by the necessities of the State. This must be so or the State might be without the means to sustain itself; to repel aggression from without or to suppress disorder within. So long as it lays the burden upon all alike there is hardly a limit to this power. It may take from the people what its necessities demand. The power of the State is conceded to select its sub- jects of taxation. It may tax mortgages or it may omit to tax them. It may tax horses or it may omit to tax them. But the tax, upon whatever laid, must be uniform. Thus it must be laid upon all tax- payers alike. It cannot tax A on his mortgages or his horses and exempt B from a like tax ; or tax B half as much as A. Each must bear his equal share of the public burdens. This is because the Constitu- tion provides that all taxes shall be uniform. Fox's Appeal, 112 Pennsylvania State Reports, 337 (1886). 30 The question is not whether the Legislature can select particular classes of property for taxation, whether .it can tax one article at one rate and another article at a different rate, but whether it can prescribe rules of taxation upon like property which shall vary as it is sold to one person or to another person. It may be difficult, if not impracticable to obtain ab- solute equality between all classes of property. That is recognized ; but there must be absolute equality between persons or owners of the same kind of prop- erty. The taxing power may select land and omit personal property, or select any particular kind of personal property and omit land, and the courts can- not interfere ; but on whatever subject the tax is imposed, it must apply equally and uniformly to all owning similar property. As Mr. Edmunds said in his argument in the income tax cases: "A tax on polls does not distinguish be- tween tall and short men ; or their wealth or health. Congress has passed a law that people coming by ves- sel shall pay a tax ; but suppose Congress had said that in the port of New York the people coming by one line, the Cunard Line, should pay ten dollars ; and that the people coming by the International Line (the Paris and New York) into the same port should pay fifteen dollars a head. What do you think would have been the decision in that case ? Would my brother Carter say that was uniform ? I take it not. 31 You would say Congress had no power to do anything of the kind. ... It is true that the attainment of per- fect equality in taxation is a baseless dream, as has been said. But it does not follow that the legislative power can lawfully and purposely go to the other extreme and impose taxes broadly designed to be unequal, and by false and arbitrary classification set one great body of citizens in conflict with another." For if the Legislature can tax its so-called " retailer " twice as much as its so-called "wholesaler" it can tax him fifty times as much. The unconstitutionality of the Act becomes even more obvious when we examine the third and last clause of the first section : " Each dealer in or vender of goods, wares or merchandise, at any exchange or board of trade, shall pay a mercantile license tax of twenty-five cents on each thousand dollars' worth gross of goods so sold." Adding this clause the first section might be read as a whole : " All dealers who shall sell to manufac- turers or any other person or persons than dealers shall pay a tax of one mill on each dollar of their property. Each dealer who shall sell to dealers and to no other person or persons shall pay a tax of one- half mill on each dollar of his property. Provided, that if the first mentioned dealer shall sell at an exchange or board of trade he shall be exempt from three-fourths of the tax on his property, while if the 32 second mentioned dealer do the same thing he shall be exempt from one-half of the tax on his property." An unconstitutional act is not a law ; it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection, it creates no office ; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Poindexter vs. Greenhow, 114 United States Re- ports, 270. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Chapter 7. It would be no answer to say, even if it were true, that the whole volume gross of business transacted annually by a wholesaler is greater than that by a retailer. It is the dealer's property, be it small or great ; be he rich or poor. But it is notorious that the contrary is to-day the truth, and well known to every casual observer of the Senatorial contest in our State that a great motive for the preparation of the cunningly devised Act of 1899 was to injure and retard the progress and success of our great retail enterprises. Such an attempt was never before perpetrated in the history of the State. It cannot hide itself under this flimsy disguise of pretence of classification. The true rule is laid down by Justice Miller of the United States Supreme Court in his Lectures on the Constitution (New York, 1891) : " The tax must be uniform on the particular article ; and it is uniform within the constitutional requirement if it is made to bear the same percentage." II. Is THE ACT LOCAL OR SPECIAL? SECTION 3. II. The third section declares : "For the purpose of carrying into effect the pro- visions of this Act, the appointment of mercantile appraisers shall be made annually on or before the thirtieth day of December of each year, by the county commissioners, except in cities of the first class, where the Auditor General and the treasurer of the city are authorized and required to appoint five suitable, quali- fied citizens, all of whom shall not be of the same political party, and the term of office of said appraisers shall be for three years." It provides for the appointment of the mercantile appraisers annually by the county commissioners. It then in express words excepts from its operation cities of the first class where the auditor general and the treasurer of the city are authorized and required to appoint five suitable, qualified citizens for three years. Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution declares : "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law .... regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs or school districts .... creating offices or prescribing the powers and duties of officers in counties, cities, boroughs, town- ships, election or school districts." (35) 36 Notwithstanding the prohibition of the Constitution it has been determined by the Supreme Court ex necessitate rei that the Legislature may classify cities for certain purposes of legislation. But the purposes for which legislation according to such classification can be upheld have been defined as comprising only those relating to the organization or administration of their municipal governments. In other words, while the ap- proved classification of cities authorizes all necessary legislation for them as cities in the management of their municipal affairs ; on the other hand, they are under the Constitution and must remain part of the State of Pennsylvania for all purposes not municipal, and subject only to general laws on all subjects not of municipal concern. Many efforts have been made to make the classifi- cation of cities for municipal purposes serve as a warrant for local legislation on subjects having no possible relation to municipal government, but the courts have uniformlly refused to sanction them. Mercantile appraisers are not municipal officers. They are not invested with any municipal powers. They are not charged with the performance of any municipal function. They are not under the control of the municipal legislature. They are not under the control of the municipal executive. 37 They have nothing to do with municipal taxation. They are not paid by the municipality. They are the paid officers of the Commonwealth, engaged in the collection for the Commonwealth of a tax by the Commonwealth assessed, as the Common- wealth's servants. In 1878 an attempt was made by the Legislature to classify counties for the purpose of regulating fees of officers. It was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court eight years afterward. Referring to the section of the Constitution under discussion, Chief Justice Paxson said: "It was a wise provision and will be sternly enforced. It is our purpose to adhere rigidly to that instrument that the people may not be deprived of its benefits. It ought not to be necessary for this Court to make this judicial declaration, but it is proper to do so in view of the amount of legislation which is periodically placed upon the statute books in entire disregard of the fundamental law. Much of this legislation may remain unchallenged for years, only to be overturned when it reaches this Court. In the meantime parties may have acted upon it, rights may have grown up, and the inconvenience and loss entailed thereby may not be inconsiderable. As we view it, this note of warning at this time is needed. . . . If it can exclude Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, it can exclude every other county in the State, but the one county seeking such special or local legislation. . . . 38 It is special legislation under the attempted disguise of a general law. Of all forms of special legislation this is the most vicious." Morrison vs. Bachert, 112 Pennsylvania State Re- ports, 322 (1886). In 1888 an Act relating to street railways in cities of the third class was held to be local, and therefore unconstitutional, not relating to municipal affairs of cities of the third class, but to certain corporations that happened to be located within them. Weinman vs. Railway Co., 118 Pennsylvania State Reports, 192 (1888). The cities in this State are divided into classes by the Act of May 23, 1874, Pamphlet Laws 230. The object of the classification is stated in the body of the act in these words : " For the exercise of certain cor- porate powers, and having respect to the number, character, powers and duties of certain officers thereof." The first class embraced cities having a population of 300,000 and upwards ; the second, those whose population exceeded 100,000 and did not exceed 300,000 ; the third, those whose popula- tion was less than 100,000. The object of classification being thus clearly stated in the body of the act which ordains it, we are not left to conjecture. The Legislature has declared its object in providing a system of classification to be to facilitate the convenient exercise of certain corporate powers V 39 necessary for the proper regulation of municipal affairs. It does not authorize legislation on subjects not relating to municipal affairs. As was said by the late Justice Williams, in In re Ruan Street, 132 Pennsylvania State Reports, 257 (1890), declaring the Act of May 6, 1887, Pamphlet Laws, page 87, which provided a pro- cedure in road cases for cities of the first class, unlike that in use in the rest of the State, unconsti- tutional : " These are the only purposes contemplated by the Legislature. They are the only purposes for which classification seems desirable, they are the only purposes for which it has been upheld. . . . All legislation not relating to the exercise of corporate powers or to corporate officers and their powers, as cities, is unauthorized by classification." The collection of mercantile taxes is certainly not one of the corporate powers of cities of the first class, and mercantile appraisers are certainly not corporate officers thereof. To the same effect are the cases of Van Loon vs. Eagle, 171 Pennsylvania State Reports 157, decided in 1895, an d Chalfant vs. Edwards, 173 Pennsylvania State Reports, 246, decided in 1896, in both of which the same learned Justice Williams affirmed and vindi- cated the reasoning of the earlier cases. The only conceivable reason for the exception of Philadelphia would be its greater population. But is there any necessity for classification springing from this peculiarity? Why does difference in population 40 make it necessary to have a different law for Phila- delphia? Why may not a general law be framed adapted to the needs of all ? It is difficult to discover an answer to this question. If the law for the rest of the State is inadequate for a city like Philadelphia, how is it adequate for Pittsburgh, with its 295,000 inhabi- tants ? And even if it is inadequate it does not follow that a general law could not be framed which would meet the needs of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and still not be inadapted to the wants of the smaller cities. It is certainly not impracticable to form a general law, and the very purpose of Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution was, not to limit legislation, but merely to prohibit the doing by local or special laws that which can be accomplished by general laws. It relates not to the substance, but to the method of legislation and imperatively demands the enactment of general instead of local or special laws whenever the former are at all practicable. Avars' Appeal, 122 Pennsylvania State Reports, 266 (1889). We are not called upon, however, to show the ne- cessity or vindicate the wisdom of the constitutional requirement. It is enough for us to know that it is an express mandate of the organic law which the Legislature ought to obey and courts are bound to enforce. But even conceding for a moment for the sake of argument that the Act of 1899 does not conflict with 41 Article III, Section 7, it can scarcely be denied that the mercantile license tax is a tax and levied by the authority of the State, as the Act itself as well as the Supreme Court has declared. Now Article IX, Section i, of the Constitution declares that all taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws : " All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be levied and collected under general laws." "Thus," said Chief Justice Sterrett, in Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pennsylvania State Reports, 266 (1889), speaking of this clause, " by express mandate . . . all taxes must be levied and collected under general and not special or local laws." And again he said : "It is expressly required, as we have seen, that * all taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws' ; and it is impossible to suggest any valid reason why they should not be thus levied and collected. When the present Constitution was adopted local and special laws relating to . . . assessment and collection of taxes were in force in some of the cities and remained unaffected by that instrument ; but that fact will not justify the substitution of other local or special laws in their stead. When new legislation is resorted to, it must conform to the requirements of the Consti- tution." The only fair conclusion from these premises seems to be that the Act of 1899 is unconstitutional and void. III. Is THE ACT NOT A FORBIDDEN VIOLATION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS AND A FORBIDDEN DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS. SECTIONS 4 AND 5. III. The Constitution of the United States declares that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. The Constitution of Pennsylvania declares that all. men have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of acquiring, possessing and protecting property ; and that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and posses- sions from unreasonable searches and seizures. While the fifth section of the Act of 1899 declares that in Pennsylvania each dealer shall fill up and swear to certain undescribed blanks to be prepared after the Act goes into effect by the auditor general for such information as to the dealers' private business as the auditor general may then prescribe ; and that upon the dealer's refusal to do so the county treasurer shall " require the owner or business manager to appear before him with the books and accounts of the mercantile establishment for interrogation and exam- ination . . . and compel the attendance of the owner or any clerk, bookkeeper or officer connected with said business to produce such books and papers as he may deem expedient . and further (45) 4 6 declares that if the owner, proprietor or any other person connected with the business refuses he shall be liable to a penalty of one thousand dollars. If the constitutions of our Country and our State have really created any barrier to protect citizens against tyrannical invasions of private rights, the Leg- islature possessed no such power. The protection of our constitutions does extend to a citizen's books and papers wherever they may be. It is justly assumed that every man may have secrets pertaining to his business or his family or his social relations, to which his books, papers, letters or journals may bear testi- mony, but with which the public, or any individual of the public, who may have controversies with him, can have no legitimate concern ; and even if they happen to be disgraceful to him, they are nevertheless his secrets, and are not to be exposed. Even a search warrant to seize private papers is wholly unwarranted, except, possibly, in cases of frauds upon the revenue, where the papers to be searched for have been the agencies or instruments by means of which the frauds have been accomplished. Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law, page 220. The Legislature, itself, possessed no such power, we have seen ; and we shall see from a reading of the fourth section that it nevertheless attempted to dele- gate the legislative function of prescribing what was to be required of the dealer to escape the threatened 47 illegal invasion of his private rights to the auditor general : " Section 4. The Auditor General shall be authorized and required to prepare and have printed proper blanks, to be distributed by the mercantile appraisers in the several counties to each vender of or dealer in goods, wares or merchandise. These blanks shall be in the form prescribed by the Auditor General, and shall contain a request for such information as may be necessary in arriving at the actual amount of business transacted by the vender of or dealer in goods, wares and merchandise, during the calendar year preceding that for which a license is required. The blanks thus prepared shall contain an affidavit ; and every dealer subject to the provisions of this Act shall be required to make an affidavit, by oath or affirmation, as to the correctness of the return made." Under a well-balanced constitution the Legislature can no more delegate its proper function than can the judiciary. The fourth section is a delegation of legislative power, because : 1. It does not fix the terms and conditions of the blank. 2. It delegates to a single individual the power to prescribe the form of the blank, and the conditions and restrictions to be added to, and made part of it, and to decide what questions may be necessary. 4 8 3. The appointee clothed with the power is not named, but is designated only by his official title. He is the person who may happen to be auditor general when the time comes to prepare the form of the blank. 4. The legislative appointee is not required to report his work to the body appointing him, but simply to dis- tribute the forms of blanks he has devised. The form does not become part of the statute, in fact, is not recorded in the statute-book, and no trace of it can be found among the records of either branch of the Legislature. 5. The Act was approved May 2, 1899. The legis- lative appointee had until the first of the next January to prepare the form, over which when prepared, the Legislature had no control whatever. The legislators did not consider, they had no knowledge of the ques- tions they required each dealer to answer under oath, within ten days, under penalty of the seizure of his private books and papers by the county treasurer, and a penalty of one thousand dollars. The Legislature says, in effect, to its appointee, "Prepare just such orders as you please. We do not care to know what they are. The Governor shall have no opportunity to veto them. Distribute them, and we will compel every dealer to obey and answer under oath by the punish- ment of every man who hesitates." It is not to be supposed that a blank, so mischievous 49 as the one prepared after the adjournment of the Leg- islature by the auditor general, a copy of which is given below, could have passed both houses of the Legislature. If, by reason of any complication of cir- cumstances, this should have happened, still the people would have had a remaining safeguard in the veto power possessed by the Governor. The Act of 1899 steered past both legislative discussion and executive veto, and vested in the legislative appointee the power to prepare and distribute the blank, without even the knowledge of the Legislature or the Governor of its provisions, which were to be bound under penalties of invasions of private books and papers, and of heavy fines upon thousands of citizens all over this Common- wealth. It will not do to say that the preparation of this form was an unimportant matter of detail, or an act partak- ing of an executive or administrative character. It was the sole purpose of the fourth and fifth sections. Its enforcement was the object of the penalties of the fifth section. Take out the form prepared by the auditor general and to be found in some pigeon-hole in his office, and the fourth and fifth sections are without meaning or effect. They are completely eviscerated. O'Neill vs. Insurance Co., 166 Pennsylvania State Re- ports, 72 (1895). The following form prescribed by the auditor gen- eral is inserted for the purpose of showing the impolicy 5 of such delegation of legislative power as might make it possible to fasten upon the people of this Common- wealth such an inquisitorial, misleading, unjust and oppressive burden. H - , s . ^ ^ % ^ v o g | k * 2 | ^* ^ s *2 ^v ^ Q "*^ frk fn g 5 * ^^ v * X G ^ S> J"^ ' *^j MONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA. .N FOR MERCANTILE LICENSE T. RETAIL VENDER A. D. 1900. r; \ irm ; Y transacting business at f corporation. ' ( ff d\ accor ding to law, does declare or Effects of whatsoever kind or nature (ex calendar year of twelve months ending Dei sales for which payment has not been ma g 12 months ending December 3ist, 1899 . .ales for same year for which payment has n iding December 3ist, 1899 , des all Retail Sales made in any part ofsai c the calendar year above described. \ (f-Hsrn name here\ \ K ] ', - ] M 1 i i i a J, O < ^ 5 I ^ I >, I 1 * i)**- 1 O ' ^ 5 C "' o .s o v 8^j k f .> ^ ^ "H "S "^ *Q "O **" ^ 5 -S "** J M ^ <<_ "5 % u i ^ st in *v "g "5 s 3 M I ^ | | |^J g %. J 8: ' * '> " ^ \ "Q C "^ 'Q ^ "a (S " 5H ^ ^ T ? '3 $ s - "3 S <2, -M a? S ^ ? J i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ? ^ a o CO g * 3 * ^|^^ '53 E - | 1 B| 2 u -rt ii| V > j ^^ ") "> Q 1 _ I ti *> < i :il|] ^1 rt 'l ^ 1 | 1 1 1 stl- 3! bX c 1^ ^ ^ k s ^> ?f ^ rj Q ^i i^ "3 "rt C g ^ ^J O O ^ k ^ V. ^ 1 \ *Q 's ^ \ - f^Si^ ^ s SI 1 d ^ 8! | i iv^l "^^2 Z^ 3 & R Q "the defendants here did not avail them- selves of the mode of redress which the law gave them. By their acquiescence they have waived any defence which they miglv have made, and, therefore, have now no defence." The Act of 1899 has not attempted to change the law in this respect. The sixth section provides : " He (the appraiser) shall also leave a written or printed notice, to be prepared and furnished by the Auditor General, specifying the classification and amount of license money to be paid by such person to this State, and also the time and place, when and where an appeal will be held as required by law. The appeal shall be held by the county treasurer, acting in conjunction with the mercantile appraiser, at such date as shall conform with law in all counties, except where there is a board of mercantile appraisers, in which case the board shall hear all appeals. Any vender or dealer, subject to the provisions of this act, who is dissatisfied with the rating so made by the mercantile appraiser, shall have the right of appeal to the mercantile ap- praiser and county treasurer, who are required to hear him on the day so fixed for the appeal ; if the vender or dealer is still dissatisfied with the finding of the county treasurer and mercantile appraiser, or 102 board of appraisers, in reference to the proper classi- fication of said vender or dealer, he shall have the right of appeal to the court of common pleas of the proper county, which appeal the said court is required to hear and determine within twenty days after such appeal shall be taken, or at the next sitting thereof. If any person fails to attend the appeal before the county treasurer and mercantile appraiser, board of appraisers, or the court, he shall not thereafter be per- mitted, in a suit for the recovery of said mercantile license tax, to set up as a defence, either that he is not a vender or dealer in goods, wares or merchandise, or any other ground of defence, which might have been heard and determined either by said county treasurer and mercantile appraiser, board of apprais- ers, or the court of common pleas, on appeal, as aforesaid." The safe method, therefore, to present a defence, or to raise any question, always is to appear before the mercantile appraiser and county treasurer, or be- fore the board of mercantile appraisers, as the case may be, at the time set for appeal ; and, if dissatisfied with the finding at such appeal, to appeal from the finding to the court of common pleas. This method is also a reasonable and convenient one. The following form of an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas has been in use in the county of Philadelphia. No. TERM, 190 C. P. No. APPEAL FROM THE APPRAISERS OF MERCANTILE LICENSES. Attorney for Appellant, Defendant. IO4 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. FOR THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, TERM, NO. APPEAL of from the decision, of the Appraisers of Mercantile Licenses, rating .him having been rated for the license year commencing May i, 190 , by the Appraisers of Mercantile Licenses, and having attended the appeal to the Appraisers, and being dis- satisfied with the decision of the Appraisers upon such appeal rating him , hereby ap- peals from the said decision of the Appraisers to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, ss. : being duly says that he is the Appellant in the above appeal, and that the said appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay, but because he verily believes injustice has been done the Appellant. and subscribed before me "j this day of > A.D. 190 . J Notary Public. IDS It can be readily adapted for use in any other county. The practice has been for the Commonwealth to pre- pare, file, and serve its statement of demand under the Act of May 25, 1887, Pamphlet Laws, page 271, set- ting forth the acts of Assembly upon which its demand is based. The appellant, defendant, replies by affi- davit of defence. The matter can then be heard by the Judges upon a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence. Where it is necessary, the Commonwealth, if it desires, may take a rule to plead. The defendant then pleads " non assiimpsit" and the case is at issue and ready for jury trial. At the trial the Commonwealth must first prove its case. If it does, the defendant then presents his defence. The Court must hear the appeal within twenty days, or at its next sitting. There is the usual appeal to the Superior Court, or to the Supreme Court, as in other cases. No penalty is incurred by the appellant for delay until after the appeal is finally disposed of. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. Potter, 159 Pennsylvania State Reports, 583 (1894). Sixth. Defence in Subsequent Suit by the Commonwealth . In the preceding section upon the subject of appeal, we saw that the provision of the sixth section that " if any person fails to attend the appeal before the county io6 treasurer and mercantile appraiser, board of apprais- ers or the court, he shall not thereafter be permitted in a suit for the recovery of said mercantile license tax to set up as a defence, either that he is not a vender of or dealer in goods, wares or merchandise, or any other ground of defence which might have been heard and determined either by said county treasurer and mercantile appraiser, board of appraisers or in the court of common pleas on appeal as aforesaid," as contained in the older act of Assembly, had been strictly adhered to by the courts in many instances. And it was shown that when applied to questions of the amount of the assessment, of classification, of irregularities, of technicalities, etc., it is consistent with public interests. Nevertheless there are cases where a person asses- sed has a right to treat the assessment, with the sub- sequent proceedings under it, as a nullity and to disre- gard it ; and, afterwards, to present his defence by an affidavit of defence, should an action be brought by the Commonwealth for the amount of the assessment after the time for the statutory appeal has expired, notwithstanding he has not appealed. Such a case was the case of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. The American Tobacco Company, 173 Pennsylvania State Reports, 531 (1896). There a corporation of another State, having no factory, store, office or other place of business in the State of Pennsylvania, but selling goods in this State, was assessed with a mercantile tax as a dealer doing business in this State. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County gave judgment against the company, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence ; but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, the late Justice Williams saying : " The learned judge did not put the reasons that influenced his action upon the record and we are left to conjecture as to what they were. It may be that he regarded the assessment of the license tax as wholly unauthorized, but regarded the failure of the defendant to appeal from it as preclud- ing the company from setting up any defence whatever to this action. If the defendant had been a local dealer within the County of Philadelphia, regularly assessed and served with notice, the remedy for any error in the assessment would have been by appeal. If this had been neglected, the defendant would have been precluded by such neglect from defending in this action, for any error or irregularity that could have been reached on an appeal. But the defendant was not subject to assessment by the mercantile appraiser. That officer was without any authority in the premises, and his unauthorized act imposed no liability and no duty on the defendant." It is always safer and better not to sleep upon one's rights. Vigilantibus non dormientibus lex subvenit. Still, as an unconstitutional act is not a law, as it con- io8 fers no rights and imposes no duties, as it affords no protection and creates no office, as it is in legal con- templation as inoperative as though it had never been passed, it is conceived that citizens have a right to treat proceedings under the Act of May 2, 1899, as nullities and to disregard them. Whether men, wrongfully claiming to be created agents of the law under that act and wrongfully assuming to act as such agents of the law, can be so treated is probably a more doubtful question, as they may be said to be de facto, although not de jure, officers. The question of the authority of such men can be better and more safely raised by quo war- ran to, or by refusal to pay them. Seventh. Removal and Habeas Corpus. The merchant may prepare to leave the State in search of a land of saner statutes, and, if the county treasurer issues an attachment for him, as the Act of 1899 provides that official may, the merchant may speedily have his body within the care and disposition of the courts ; for even the upholders of this legisla- tion can scarcely hope successfully to maintain that the mercantile appraisers or the ward constable could declare war, that the county treasurer might suspend the writ of habeas corpus. And it must be borne in mind, in connection with 109 this subject of removal, that dealers from other States or our own merchants driven out of the State, and so depriving our community of their enterprises, and our people of needed employment, are perfectly free to sell their goods here, in competition with those who can remain, and pay no mercantile tax whatever. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. The Ameri- can Tobacco Company, 173 Pennsylvania State Re- ports, 531 (1896). Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States reserves to Congress the right to regu- late commerce among the several States. INDEX. A. Advertising, 57, 58, 99 Affidavit by dealer, 47, 51 Affidavit by manufacturer or me- chanic, 97, 98 Apothecaries, 78, 83 Appeal, 98-105 Assessment by Mercantile Ap- praiser, 99 Attachment by County Treasurer, 1 08 Auditor General, 35, 45-51, 57 B. Bakers, 78, 83 Bill in Equity, 95, 96 Blanks prepared by Auditor Gen- eral, 47-5 1 Board of Trade, 31, 32 Books of Dealers, 45, 46, 49 Bookbinders, 78, 83 Butchers, 75, 78, 83 C. Canners, 78, 83 Caterers, 78, 83 Chemists, 78, 83 Cities, Classification of, 35-41 City fee for license, 88 Class legislation, 29 Classification, 25, 31, 32, 35-41 Clothing Makers, 78, 83 Coffee Roasters, 78,83 Confectioners, 77, 78, 83 Constable, 57-59, 108 Consumer, 27, 28 County Treasurer, 35, 45, 57, 108 D. Dealers, 27,28, 31,32,69, 70 Dealers from other States, 109 Defence in subsequent suit by Com- monwealth, 105-108 Delegation of Legislative Func- tions, 45-53 Dress Makers, 78, 83 E. Emoluments of Officers, 57-59 Equality of Taxation, 30, 31 Exchange, 31, 32 Exemption, 52, 57, 89 F. Farmers, 75, 77, 78, 83 Fees of Officers, 57-59 Florists, 78, 83 Foreign Dealers, 109 Furriers, 78, 83 G. Governor's veto, 49 H. Habeas Corpus, 108, 109 Hatters, 78, 83 I. Ice-cream Makers, 78, 83 J- Jewelers, 78, 83 L. Local legislation, 35-41 Locomotive Makers, 69, 70, 74, 78, 83 I 12 M. Manufacturers, 27, 28, 31, 32, 73-90 Mechanics, 73-90 Mercantile Appraisers, 35-37,51-53, 57, 89, 96-100, 108 Millers, 75, 78, 83 Milliners, 78, 83 N. Notice of Classification by Mer- cantile Appraiser, 89, 90 O. Occupation tax, 23 Opticians, 78, 83 P. Paperhangers, 77, 78, 84 Papers, 45, 46, 49 Penalty of $i, coo, 46, 49, 52 Photographers, 78, 84 Plumbers, 75, 76, 78, 84 Practice on Appeal to Court of Common Pleas, 102-105 Private Rights, 45~53 Property, Taxing of, 24, 25, 28, 30 Publishers, 78, 84 Q- Quo Warranto, 96 R. Refusal to pay men claiming to be Mercantile Appraisers, 96 Remedies, 95-109 Removal from State, 108, 109 Repeal, Acts concerning manu- facturers and mechanics not re- pealed, 73 Retailer, 26, 27, 31, 32 S. Searches and seizures, 45, 46, 48, 49 Seller, Taxing of, 24, 25 Shirtmakers, 79, 84 Shoemakers, 79, 84 Signs to be placed on places of business, 63 Special Legislation, 35-41 Stationers, 79, 84 Summons, Pretended, 52, 53 T. Tailors, 76, 78, 83 Tanners, 69, 70, 75, 79, 84 Taxes must be levied and collected under general laws, 41 Taxing power of State, 29, 30 Title of Act, 58, 59, 63 Tyrannical invasions of private rights, 46 U. Unconstitutional act, 32 Undertakers, 77, 79, 84 Uniformity, 23-32 Upholsterers, 79, 84 V. Venders, 27, 28, 31, 32, 69, 70 Veto of Governor, 49 W. Ward Constable, 57-59, 108 Watchmakers, 79, 84 Wholesalers, 26, 27, 31, 32 Women, Exemption of, 89 YC 23122