The 
 PHILIPPINES 
 
 To theEnd of the Miliiary Regime 
 
 CHARLES B.ELLIOTT 
 
 4J^»^:
 
 THE PHILIPPINES
 
 COPYRIGHT, CLINEDINST
 
 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 To the End of the Military Regime 
 
 AMERICA OVERSEAS 
 
 By 
 CHARLES BURKE ELLIOTT, Ph.D.,LL.D. 
 
 Author of 
 
 THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
 
 Former Member United States Philippine Commission, 
 Secretary of Commerce and Police in the Gov- 
 ernment of the Philippines, Associate Jus- 
 tice of the Supreme Court of the 
 Philippines, Associate Justice 
 Supreme Court of 
 Minnesota 
 
 PREFATORY NOTE BY ELIHU ROOT 
 
 Ptrtraits In Photogravure 
 
 INDIANAPOLIS 
 
 THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY 
 
 PUBLISHERS 
 
 IC^^^vfm'^ 
 
 \AJUb^
 
 Copyright 1916 
 BY Charles Burke Elliott 
 
 PR(88 OF 
 
 BRAUNWORTH Jr CO. 
 
 ■OOK MANUFACTUREM 
 
 BROOKLYN, N. V.
 
 
 By acknowledging and accepting the Sovereignty 
 of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, 
 as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I be- 
 lieve I am serving thee, my beloved Country, 
 
 — Emuio Aguinaldo. 
 
 How weary a step do those take who endeavor to 
 make out of a great mass a true political personality. 
 
 ^Edmund Burke.
 
 To my friend 
 
 SIR FREDERICK DEALTRY LUGARD 
 
 G.C.M G.. D.S.O., D.C.L. 
 
 GoverncMT-General of Nigeria, 
 Soldier and Colonial Administrator
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 Other matters of critical importance have engrossed the inter- 
 est of the people of the United States in recent years to such a 
 degree that we have been losing rather than gaining in our knowl- 
 edge of affairs in the Philippine Islands. When the dramatic 
 incidents of war had ceased to furnish material for striking news 
 items and new issues had superseded the political and Anti-Im- 
 perialist controversies of our early occupation we ceased to 
 hear or to think very much about what was going on in that 
 distant part of the world. That is not strange in view of the 
 preoccupation of our domestic politics, of Mexican affairs, and 
 of the great war in the Old World; but it is a condition which 
 ought not to continue. 
 
 The question whether it was wise or unwise for the United 
 States to take title to the Philippines and assume the burden of 
 government there no longer calls for consideration. We did take 
 the Philippines. We acquired the rights and undertook the du- 
 ties of sovereignty. We declared a trust for the benefit of the 
 people of the Islands. We are committed to the undertaking. 
 Self-respect requires that we should discharge the obligations 
 that we have assumed. We can not relieve ourselves from them 
 except in one way, and that is by carrying our performance to 
 such a point that our cestuis que trustent will be competent to 
 take care of themselves. When that point is reached we can 
 resign the trust with credit; but not until then. This is not a 
 new view. It is the view with which we began. We took a po- 
 sition at the very outset removed as far as possible from the old 
 ideas of colonial exploitation of which Java has been the most 
 long continued and conspicuous illustration. We declared our 
 adherence to the most advanced modem view of colonial rela- 
 tions — the view that the good of the colony is to be the primary 
 consideration in all administration. We did what is rather a 
 remarkable thing for any people to do. We took the same view
 
 Prefatory Note 
 
 of rights and duties when we became sovereign and the Filipinos 
 colonists that we did in the time of the American Revolution 
 when we were colonists and Great Britain was sovereign. We 
 did not stop there. We undertook to go a little farther than 
 other countries had gone and to make the first consideration in 
 our government of the Islands the training of the inhabitants in 
 the difficult art of self-government so that they would as soon 
 as possible become competent to govern themselves instead of 
 being governed by us. Accordingly one of the first things that 
 we did was to send over teachers by the shipload — thousands of 
 them — and to establish schools all over the Islands. And then 
 we provided a form of government under which the Philippines 
 should receive what may be called clinical instruction in admin- 
 istration and in the application of the principles which we con- 
 sider vital to free self-government, and we provided that, step 
 by step, just as rapidly as they became familiar with the institu- 
 tions of free government and capable of continuing them, the 
 powers of government should be placed in their hands. I am 
 sure that this view of suitable treatment of the Philippines so 
 long as we are to be in the Islands at all commends itself to the 
 best intelligence and the practical idealism of the American peo- 
 ple. If we carry it through successfully it will result in great 
 credit to our country throughout the world ; but we can not fail 
 in it, whether by our own misconduct or by weak abandonment 
 of the duty we have undertaken, without being greatly discred- 
 ited throughout the world. One peculiarity of having colonial 
 affairs to deal with in these times is that the country which ex- 
 ercises control over a colony is always itself on trial in the public 
 opinion of mankind. The people of a country can make a thou- 
 sand mistakes about their own internal affairs and recover from 
 them as best they may, and very few people outside the country 
 know or think anything about it. The treatment of a colony, 
 however; success or failure in establishing good government 
 there; in producing peace and prosperity and human progress 
 there — ^all the multitude of facts involved in this success or fail-
 
 Prefatory Note 
 
 ure constitute a simple, concrete whole of which the world takes 
 notice and upon which the ruling country is judged. More im- 
 portant still probably is the effect upon national self-respect and 
 patriotism of doing such a piece of work well or making a dis- 
 creditable failure in it. 
 
 As I look back over American administration in the Philip- 
 pines from the Treaty of Washington in the spring of 1899 down 
 to the close of the Taft Administration in the spring of 1913, 
 I think the American people are entitled to say to themselves 
 that their work was well done. We maintained in the Islands 
 a very able and honest government which constantly and effect- 
 ively kept in view the very high standard of purpose with which 
 we began. By limiting this statement to the end of the Taft 
 Administration I do not mean to imply that I think any differ- 
 ently of our administration since that time. I simply do not 
 know enough about it since then to make an assertion one way 
 or the other. The time during which I knew about the Philippine 
 government covers the first fourteen years, and as to that time 
 I say that the people of the United States ought to be proud of 
 their government in the Philippines and grateful to the men and 
 women who reflected credit on their country by giving their 
 strength and lives to that public service. 
 
 It is idle, however, to expect that kind of service to continue 
 indefinitely if nobody at home cares or knows anything about it. 
 The service will inevitably deteriorate and become a source of 
 painful discredit if the people of the United States do not keep 
 themselves sufficiently informed about what is being done in the 
 Philippines and sufficiently interested in it to make service there 
 the basis of reputation here. The standard of service will in- 
 evitably be lowered and the best men will refuse it if the people 
 in the United States become so ignorant and indifferent that 
 there is no way of discriminating between just criticism upon a 
 bad officer and that detraction to which faithful service is always 
 subject, or between just condemnation and the fulsome praise 
 which is dictated by policy and a desire to curry favor. Comip-
 
 Prei^atory Note 
 
 tion and abuse will creep into any official service that is not sub- 
 ject to be inspected and called to account. If the people of the 
 United States wish to have good government carried on in the 
 Philippines and to have their duties there discharged in a cred- 
 itable way they must take an interest in that government and 
 watch it. 
 
 Moreover, there are serious questions about the Philippines 
 to be determined, not by the Filipinos or the local government, 
 but by the people of the United States. The question to what 
 extent the natives are showing themselves competent to carry 
 on government; when we ought to consider that our task has 
 been so far performed that we are at liberty to turn the Islands 
 over to the control of the natives ; what measure of protection 
 we shall accord to them thereafter, if any; what reservations, if 
 any, will be necessary to make any such protection to them con- 
 sistent with our own safety, such, for instance, as the provisions 
 of the Piatt Amendment regarding Cuba. All these questions 
 are of great importance to the people of the United States as 
 yjeW as to the people of the Philippine Islands. We ought not 
 to decide them without knowledge — ^and that knowledge to be 
 really useful must be acquired not at the moment when the ques- 
 tions have to be decided, but through keeping up a familiarity 
 with the government of the Islands as we go along from year 
 to year. The American people have had some very serious les- 
 sons to teach them the truth that self-government is an art to 
 be acquired and that it is a terrible evil for a people to have im- 
 posed on them a form of government which it is beyond their 
 capacity to carry on. We gave the ballot to the Blacks of the 
 South at the close of the Civil War upon the theory that if they 
 had an opportunity to vote they would be self-governing; and 
 we made a ghastly failure of the experiment and inflicted great 
 injury upon the Blacks themselves because our theory was wrong. 
 We have now a distressing illustration in Mexico of the evils 
 which can befall the people who are relieved from the restrictions 
 of one form of government before they have become competent
 
 Prefatory Note 
 
 to establish another. In the Caribbean we have been proceeding 
 upon an entirely different theory as illustrated by the Piatt 
 Amendment with Cuba and the San Domingo treaty. This the- 
 ory is that the best service we can render to the peoples whom 
 we wish to benefit is to help them to acquire the art of self-gov- 
 ernment. This is the theory upon which we are proceeding in 
 the Philippines, but the application of such a theory requires 
 knowledge and genuine interest and S3nnpathy, and these quali- 
 ties ought to characterize the relations of the people of this coun- 
 try to the people of the Philippine Islands. 
 
 I think that the book by Judge Elliott to which this is a prefa- 
 tory note will be very useful in making the people of the United 
 States better acquainted with the Filipinos and with our govern- 
 ment there. The Judge's long service upon the Bench of the 
 Supreme Court of the Islands and as a member of the Philippine 
 Commission and Secretary of the Department of Commerce and 
 Police gave him special facilities for observation and sound judg- 
 ment regarding men and affairs in the Islands, and it seems to 
 me that he has availed himself of that opportunity with the im- 
 partiality and thought fulness which have characterized his pre- 
 vious valuable work. 
 
 EuHU Root. 
 
 August 8th, 1916,
 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
 Throughout the preparation of these pages I have been very 
 fortunate in securing the cheerful cooperation and generous as- 
 sistance of many of my friends and former colleagues in the 
 Philippine government, as well as of others who are familiar 
 with the subject treated. To acknowledge my indebtedness in 
 detail would consume far more space than is available. It is 
 possible to mention only a few of those who, with counsel and 
 labor, have rendered me invaluable aid during the years which 
 the writing has consumed. 
 
 I am indebted to Honorable Elihu Root for many courtesies 
 and particularly for the prefatory note. 
 
 Admiral of the Navy George Dewey was kind enough to sup- 
 ply me with certain valuable information which I could have 
 obtained from no other source. 
 
 Brigadier-General Frank Mclntyre, U. S. A., Chief of the 
 Bureau of Insular Affairs at the War Department, and his as- 
 sistants have invariably responded with unfailing kindness to my 
 many calls upon them for information. 
 
 To my son. Lieutenant Charles Winslow Elliott, Thirty-Sixth 
 United States Infantry, I owe much of the material embodied 
 in the chapter on the Moros. The proofs of that chapter were 
 very kindly read by Lieutenant-Colonel John P. Finley, Fourth 
 United States Infantry, who was for many years Governor of 
 the District of Zamboanga in the Moro Province. A recognized 
 authority on Moro life and customs, he made many valuable 
 suggestions and important corrections. 
 
 To my wife, without whose constant encouragement and active 
 assistance the work would never have been completed, I acknowl- 
 edge my deepest obligations. 
 
 Mackinac Island, C. B. E. 
 
 August 25th, 1916.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Theory and Practise of Colonization 1 
 
 Problems of Modern Colonization — Changing Theories — Develop- 
 ment of Backward Races — American Theories — Political and Eco- 
 nomic Growth — Ancient Colonization — Nature of Greek and Roman 
 Colonies — The Middle Ages — Spanish, Portuguese and French Colo- 
 nization — English Methods and Theories — The New Era — Develop- 
 ment of the Tropics — New French, Italian and German Colonization 
 — Modern Native Policies — Recognition of Obligations — Queen Vic- 
 toria's Proclamation of 1858 — ^The Self-government Principle in 
 India and Egypt — Moral Justification for Western Rule — The 
 United States in the Tropics — Recognition of Duty to the Natives — 
 Their Political Development — European Criticism — Controlling 
 Principles — Education of the Natives — Attitude Toward Native 
 Aspirations — Policy Not Repressive. 
 
 PART I 
 The Land and the People 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 The Phiuppine Archipelago 63 
 
 Location — Number and Extent of the Islands — Configuration- 
 Character of the Coasts — Rivers — ^Underground River — Mountain 
 Streams — The Rainfall — Location of Cities — Mountains and Forests 
 — Volcanoes — Earthquakes — Coast Line — Ocean Currents — Faima 
 and Flora — Minerals — Fish and Fishing — Climate. 
 
 CHAPTER in 
 The Native Peoples . 80 
 
 Non-Christians and Filipinos 
 Varieties of People — "East is East and West is West" — Extent to 
 Which This Statement Is True — Classification of the Inhabitants- 
 Aborigines and Malays and Subdivisions of Each — The Negritos 
 ^Various Tribes of Wild Men — Head-Hunting— The Beginnings of 
 Civilization — The Filipinos — The Seven Groups — ^Various Opinions 
 as to Their Characteristics.
 
 CO'tiTENTS— Continued 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 The Native Peoples 114 
 
 The Moros 
 A Special Problem — The Designation More— The Different Tribes 
 — Their Warlike Character — Running Amok — Weapons — Moro 
 Forts — The Language and Books — Varying Habits — Physical Char- 
 acteristics — Dress and Ornaments — Temperate — The Betel Nut 
 Habit — Houses — Polygamy — Tribal Government — Slavery — Schools 
 — Their Religion — Burial Customs — Their Industries — Power of 
 Datus — The Moro Laws and Courts — Penalties — Old Customs 
 Slowly Being Abandoned. 
 
 PART II 
 The Historical Background 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 Discovery and Conquest 137 
 
 A Half-Century of Accomplishment 
 Route to the East — Struggle Between Spain and Portugal — Appeal 
 to the Pope — The Demarcation Bulls — Treaty of Tordesillas — Ferdi- 
 nand Magellan — Extension of Demarcation Line around the 
 Globe — The Circumnavigation of the Globe — Discovery of the Phil- 
 ippine Islands — The Junta of Bandajos and the Treaty of Saragossa 
 — Voyage of Villalabos and Naming of the Islands — Andreas de 
 Urdaneta — Expedition Under Legaspi — Mohammedism in the Phil- 
 ippines — Conquest of Luzon and Founding of Manila — Death of 
 Legaspi — Expedition of Salcedo — Limahong's Expedition against 
 Manila — Expedition to Borneo — The Conquest Completed and Gov- 
 ernment Established — Missionary Character of the Enterprise — Pro- 
 prietary Government — Salazar and the Appeal for Reform — San- 
 chez Sent to Spain — Reorganization of Affairs — Salazar the First 
 Archbishop — ^The End of the Constructive Era. 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Two AND One-Half Centuries of Stagnation 160 
 
 Loss of Energy-^Quarrels of Officials — Character of Governors — 
 Financial Difficulties — Governor Corcuera and Archbishop Guerrero 
 — Salcedo and Pobleta — ^Vargas and Pardo — Difficulties of Reform- 
 ers — Ferdinand de Bustamente — Capture of Manila by British — 
 Archbishop Roja and Simon de Anda — The Indemnity and the Dis- 
 honored Drafts — A Friar's Opinion of Governor Torre — Chinese 
 Uprisings and Massacres — Moro Raids — ^The Obras Pias — An En- 
 terprising Governor — The Liberal Movement in Spain — Representa- 
 tion in the Cortes — Discontent — Description of Conditions by Mas 
 and Matta.
 
 CONTENTS— Continued 
 
 PAGB 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 The Awakening and Revolt 182 
 
 A New Era — Changing Conditions — Attack on Monastic Orders — 
 Revolts and Insurrections — The Cavite Revolt — Execution of Native 
 Priests — The Movement for Reforms — The Propaganda Abroad — 
 Jose Rizal — The Idea of Independence — Insurrection of 1896 — The 
 Katipunan — Execution of Rizal — ^The Pact of Biak-na-bato — De- 
 parture of the Leaders. 
 
 PART III 
 The Spanish Colonial System 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 The Governmental Organization 211 
 
 Literary Theories of Government — Theory and Practise — The Min- 
 ister of Ultramar and the Conscja de Filipinas — The Chief Execu- 
 tive — The Board of Authorities and the Council of Administration 
 — The Audiencia — The Residencia — The Ecclesiastical System — The 
 Monastic Orders — Powers of the Friars — Conflicting Opinions of 
 Their Work — The Inquisition — ^The Provincial Governments — Prov- 
 inces and Pueblos — Organization of Municipalities Under Maura 
 Law. 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 Legislation, Codes and Courts 232 
 
 Sources of the Law — The Laws of the Indias — Extension of Penin- 
 sular Laws to Philippines — The Ancient Spanish Codes — The Fuera 
 Jusgo — Siete Partidas — La Nueva Recopilacion — The Prelation of 
 Laws — The Modem Codes — The Judicial Tribunals — The Audiencia 
 — Its Organization and Powers — The Provincial Courts — The Courts 
 of First Instance — Justice Courts — Ecclesiastical, Military, Treasury 
 and Contentious Courts — The Judicial Personnel — Unsatisfactory 
 Procedure — Popular Dissatisfaction with the Courts. 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 Taxation and Revenue 249. 
 
 The Tax System— Direct Taxes— The Tribune— Abolished in 1884 
 — The Cedula Personal — Special Provisions for Chinese — The In- 
 come Tax — Indirect Taxes — Customs Duties — Classification of 
 Goods — Rates Levied — Certain Special Charges — Monopolies — 
 Stamps, Cockpits, Lotteries, etc. — The Tobacco Monopoly — Govern- 
 ment Receipts and Disbursements.
 
 CONTENTS— Co«fmuei 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 Personal Status and Trade Restrictions ......... 270 
 
 Classification of Residents — Restrictions — Status of Natives — Slav- 
 ery Forbidden by Law — The Tribute and Its Collection — The En- 
 comiendas — A Sort of Slavery — Restrictions on Commerce — The 
 Galleons — Japanese and Chinese — Segregation and Regulation of 
 Chinese — Massacres — Effect of the Restrictive System on Character 
 of the Natives. 
 
 PART IV 
 American Occupation and Change of Sovereignty 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 The Capture of Manila 28S> 
 
 Conditions in 1898 — Means of Defense — Opinions as to Relative 
 Power — Dewey at Hong Kong — And Mirs Bay — Localizing a War 
 — Spanish Preparations at Manila — Destruction of the Spanish Fleet 
 —At Anchor on the Battle-field— New Problems for the Govern- 
 ment — Attitude of Foreign Naval Officers — The Germans — The 
 Filipinos Disloyal to Spain — Arrival of American Troops — Camp 
 Dewey — The Military Situation — Delaying the Attack — Plan for 
 Painless Extraction of Spaniards — Night Attacks — Demands for 
 Surrender — Capture of the City — Terms of Capitulation — The In- 
 surgents and Their Claims — Conflict Avoided — ^The Materiel Cap- 
 tured. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 The Peace Protocol and the Treaty of Paris 319 
 
 Spain Sues for Peace — Negotiations Through French Ambassador 
 — The Protocol — Status of Spain in Philippines — Effect of the 
 Capitulation — The Peace Commissioners — Opening of Conference — 
 Uneasiness about Philippines — Spanish Preliminary Demands — Pro- 
 posals for Treaty — Assumption of Sovereignty over Cuba — The 
 Colonial Debts — Refusal of United States to Assume Debts — Orig- 
 inal Instructions as to Philippines — Growth of Sentiment in United 
 States — Investigations by Commission — Conflicting Opinions — Final 
 Instructions — Claim of Conquest — The Philippine Public Debt — 
 Continental Sentiment Favors Spain — British Attitude — Offer of 
 $20,000,000 — Spain Accepts America's Terms — Certain Minor Issues 
 — The Treaty — Purchase of Additional Islands — ^The End of a Colo- 
 nial Empire.
 
 CONTENTS— Conh'»«<ri 
 
 FAGi 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 The Policy of Expansion and the Anti-Imperialists ..... 359 
 
 Some Generalities — First Impressions — McKinley's Original Views 
 — Publicists and Literary Men — Their Arguments Ineflfective — A 
 Question of National Policy — Instincts of the People — Natural De- 
 sire for Growth — Decision Rested with McKinley — The Anti- 
 Imperialists — Nature of Their Opposition — Sentiment in Continental 
 Europe — British Feeling — Kipling's Appeal — Opposition at First 
 Negative — The Policy of "Walk Alone" — Senator Hoar's Sugges- 
 tion for a Convention of Nations — The World Power Idea, Altru- 
 ism and Commercialism — Not Originally a Party Issue — Mr. Bryan's 
 Responsibility — Ratification of the Treaty — Future Policy Left Un- 
 determined. 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 The Diplomacy of the Consulates 380 
 
 Early Relations With the Insurgents 
 
 Charges of Bad Faith — Consular Activities — Wildman's Relations 
 With Hong Kong Junta — Forbidden to Discuss Policies — Aguinaldo 
 at Singapore — The Pratt-Dewey Cables — No Reference to Independ- 
 ence — Aguinaldo at Hong Kong — Minutes of Meeting of Junta — 
 Aguinaldo Meets Dewey — Is Assisted with Arms — Organizes Army 
 and Government — Dewey^s Statement — Proclaims Independence — 
 Origin of the Promise Myth — Filipino Claims — Bray and St. Clair — 
 Aguinaldo's Report to the Junta — Summary — Filipino Plans and 
 Policies — American Policy Unknown — No Promise Made and No 
 Bad Faith. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 The Period of Military Occupation — Suspended Sovereignty . . . 422 
 
 Military Occupation — Powers of a Military Occupant — Merritt's In- 
 structions — The Proclamation — Organization of Civil AflFairs — 
 The Peace Protocol — Spanish Claims Thereunder — Relations with 
 Insurgents — No Joint Occupation — Aguinaldo Required to With- 
 draw His Troops — Consolidation of Civil Officers — The Courts — 
 Trade and Commerce — Prisons — Ownership of Bonds and Money in 
 the Treasury — Spanish Prisoners — Spanish Priests and Nuns as 
 Prisoners — The Chinese — Closing up Spanish Affairs — Difficulties at 
 Iloilo — The "Benevolent Assimilation" Proclamation — Aguinaldo's 
 Response — Conferences with Insurgents — The Schurman Commis- 
 sion — The Attack on Manila.
 
 CONTENTS— Con/in«fd 
 
 pAcat 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 The Fiupino Rebellion and the Days of the Empire 4SS 
 
 Nature of the War — Filipinos Misjudged — Aguinaldo at Zenith of 
 Power — The Malolos Congress His Creature — Character of Leaders 
 — Encouraged and Misled by Americans — Democrats Vote Supplies 
 for War — Bitter Opposition by Anti-Imperialists — Military Situa- 
 tion at Manila — State Volunteers Remain — New United States Vol- 
 unteers — Campaign to the North — Capture of Malolos, Calumpit and 
 San Fernando — Minor Movements near Manila — Lawton's Cam- 
 paign toward San Maguil de Mayiima — Fight at Zapote River — 
 Situation in the Vasayas and to the South — The Occupation of Jolo 
 — Spanish Relation with Moros — The Bates Agreement — The Re- 
 public of Negros — Special Military Government — Arrival of Schur- 
 man Commission — Negotiations with Insurgents — Statement of 
 American Intentions — Efforts at Conciliation — The Insurgents Con- 
 fident of Foreign Intervention — Aguinaldo Inclined to Peace — Influ- 
 ence of Mabini and Agoncillo — The Congress Votes for Peace — 
 Pacification in Sight — Reversal of Policy by Luna — The End of 
 Filipino Government — Negotiations for Peace End in Failure — 
 Military Despotism — Final Campaign in the North — Searching for 
 the Enemy — Escape of Aguinaldo — Death of General Lawton — 
 End of Organized Warface — General MacArthur Succeeds General 
 Otis — Character and Work of General Otis — New Phase of the 
 Insurrection — Guerrilla Warfare — Attitude of Municipalities — Peo- 
 ple of Luzon Support Guerrillas — Beginning of Educational Work. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 The End of the Military Regime 487 
 
 Building a Government 
 Policy of the Administration — Civil Government in Occupied Terri- 
 tory — Unpopularity of the Policy — Elihu Root, Secretary of War — 
 War Department in Charge — War Powers of President — Civil Gov- 
 ernment by Civilian Agents — Constitutional Questions — Theories of 
 National Power — Power to Acquire and Hold Territory — The Po- 
 litical Precedents — Secretary Root's Theory — The Insular Cases — 
 The United States Philippine Commission — The President's Instruc- 
 tions — Principles of Government Adopted — Questions for Consid- 
 eration — Legislative Power of Commission — Reception in Manila — 
 Local Conditions — Building a Government — Further Efforts at Rec- 
 onciliation — Presidential Elections in the United States — Final Blow 
 at the Insurrection — Deportations — Organization of Federal Party 
 — Early Legislation — Civil Service Law — Reorganization of the 
 Judicial System — Municipal Code — Provincial Government Law — 
 The Beginnings of Baguio — Tour of the Islands — Organization of 
 Provincial Governments — The Spooner Law — Capture of Aguinaldo. 
 
 Index 531
 
 THE PHILIPPINES
 
 INTRODUCTORY
 
 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 The Theory and Practise of Colonization 
 
 Problems of Modern Colonization — Changing Theories — Development of 
 Backward Races — American Theories — Political and Economic Growth — An- 
 cient Colonization — Nature of Greek and Roman Colonies — The Middle Ages 
 — Spanish, Portuguese and French Colonization — English Methods and Theo- 
 ries — The New Era — Development of the Tropics — New French, Italian and 
 German Colonization — Modern Native Policies — Recognition of Obligations 
 — Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 — The Self-government Principle in 
 India and Egypt — Moral Justification for Western Rule — The United States 
 in the Tropics — Recognition of Duty to the Natives — Their Political Develop- 
 ment — European Criticism — Controlling Principles — Education of the Natives 
 — Attitude Toward Native Aspirations — Policy Not Repressive. 
 
 It is only within recent years that colonizing states have found 
 it necessary to adopt a systematic policy for controlling and 
 developing the native population of their tropical possessions. 
 Prior to the opening of the present era colonies were supposed to 
 exist for the sole benefit of the metropolitan state; the natives 
 were regarded as obstructions to be as rapidly as possible elim- 
 inated or assimilated. 
 
 In the tropics industry, although directed by white men, has 
 always been dependent upon native labor. After slavery ceased 
 to exist and forced labor could no longer be exacted, some 
 method had to be devised to induce the people of their own free 
 will, to furnish the labor which was essential for the develop- 
 ment of industrial and agricultural enterprises. In addition 
 thereto in colonies where the natives have made some progress, 
 affairs have to be so managed as to induce the subject people to 
 
 1
 
 2 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 accept and be satisfied with the supremacy of a. foreign, 
 power. 
 
 Two problems, one economic and the other poHtical, are thus 
 present in every modern colonial situation and the predominant 
 element at any time or place is determined by the stage of de- 
 velopment of the colony and the aims and conceptions of the 
 colonizing state. Thus, when the present European war com- 
 menced, German colonization, which was still in the plantation 
 stage, was concerned primarily with the economic problem ; Great 
 Britain was groping for a native policy which would prevent the 
 overthrow of her political supremacy, and the United States was 
 placing the stress on the development of the natives. 
 
 All advanced nations now agree that the management and de- 
 velopment instead of the destruction of backward races is an 
 essential part of the raison d'etre of colonization. But this is 
 a modern conception. Two generations ago Sir George Come- 
 wall Lewis, then the leading English authority, defined a colony* 
 
 ^The French classify colonies as Colonies de commerce, Colonies d'ex- 
 ploitation, and Colonies de Peuplement. Francois et Rouget, Manual de legis- 
 lation coloniale, p. 11. Leroy-Beaulieu, De la Colonisation chez les Peuples 
 Modernes (Sixieme edition, 1908), Chaps, V, XL As used in Eng- 
 land, the word colony has no exact meaning. For various definitions, see 
 Lewis, Government of Dependencies (Lucas ed.), p. 168; Lucas, Introduction 
 to a Historical Geography of the British Colonies, Chap. 1 (1899) ; Snow, 
 Administration of Dependencies, Chap. 6; Keller, Colonization, Chap. \. 
 
 The British Colonial Office makes an arbitrary classification of British 
 possessions into Dominions, India and the Crown Colonies. For a classifica- 
 tion of the colonies with reference to the forms of government, see Bruce, 
 The Broad Stone of Empire, 1, p. 226. 
 
 An approach to accuracy is reached if we describe an English colony as 
 a dependent political community the majority or dominant portion of whose 
 members belong by birth or origin to the metropolitan country to which they 
 have no intention of returning. They are communities in which people from 
 the home country have established their permanent homes. See Egerton, 
 Short History of English Colonies, p. 9. 
 
 This fairly well describes all the British possessions other than depend- 
 encies, protectorates, and India, which is a class by itself. The essential ele- 
 ments are the origin and permanency of residence of the dominant element of 
 the population. The original American settlements, Canada, Australia and 
 South Africa, were thus properly called colonies. Purely military settlements 
 such as Malta, Gibraltar, and semi-commercial and military stations such as 
 Hong Kong and Wei-Hai-Wei are not colonies. Ceylon, Jamaica and Mau- 
 ritius have a fair number of English settlers but are governed very much as 
 Hong Kong and are designated as Crown colonies. India, Egypt, and the 
 tropical settlements of France and Holland are properly called dependencies, 
 (juam is a military station and the Philippines a dependency. In all communi- 
 ties of this class the animus revertendi is always present in the minds of the 
 greater portion of the dominant race who reside in the country. They are
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 3 
 
 as a body of persons belonging to one country and political com- 
 munity, who having abandoned that country and community, 
 form a new and separate system, independent or separate, in 
 some district which is wholly or nearly uninhabited *^and from 
 which they expel the ancient inhabitants." 
 
 A few years later Charles Dickens amused the public with his 
 satirical portrait of Mrs. Jelleby, who was "devoted to the subject 
 of Africa, with a view to the general cultivation of coffee — and 
 the natives." But the sense of obligation for the growth of the 
 natives as well as the coffee gradually developed until at present 
 no statesman, trader or colonial business man dares ignore it. 
 Recently Lord Milner, speaking at a meeting of the Royal Colo- 
 nial Institute, said* that in the rivalry between the nations that 
 one "will be most successful which exhibits the greatest wisdom 
 in its efforts to promote the welfare and progress and content- 
 ment of its subject people." 
 
 Colonization has thus come to signify the extension by annexa- 
 tion or some form of protectorate, of the authority and activities 
 of an established power over lands vacant or inhabited to some 
 extent by a people of a lower order of civilization with the ob- 
 ject of developing the resources of the country and ameliorating 
 the physical and moral conditions of the natives. It thus in- 
 volves moral, political and economic considerations' but not nec- 
 essarily the training of the natives for self-government, or even 
 for participation in the government. 
 
 In fact, European states generally affect to ignore the question 
 
 there for purposes of government, or of trade, with the ever-present intention 
 of returning to the homeland. Egerton, supra. The great body of the people 
 who are born, live and die in such countries are of a different race and of a 
 lower order of civilization. Colonies, as distinguished from dependencies, 
 and from Crown colonies, in British nomenclature, belong almost entirely to 
 the temperate zone. Dependencies and most Crown colonies are in the 
 tropics. 
 
 2 United Empire (N. S.), II, p. 136. On the same occasion Mr. George 
 E. Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce of Canada, said that the solution 
 of the whole problem largely depends upon "the view we take as colonizing 
 people of the trust which is imposed upon us by the assumption of dominion 
 over the countries and peoples who inhabit those countries." 
 
 •Francois et Rouget, Legislation Coloniale. p. 3 (1909). See Girault, 
 Principes de Colonisation et Legislation Coloniale (1895).
 
 4 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 of the political development of the native people because it in- 
 volves tlie question of the permanency of their tenure. The 
 United States has frankly put it in the forefront of the pro- 
 gram. Her experiment in tropical colonization in the Philippines 
 has therefore certain features which deserve special attention. 
 She accepts as axiomatic the principle that the good of the native 
 people is the primary object of the metropolitan state. Her 
 policy is distinctive in that it places stress upon the political as 
 well as the economic development of the natives and on educa- 
 tion as the primary means by which such development is to be 
 effected.* It is almost unique in that its complete success requires 
 the elimination of the metropolitan state from the situation." 
 
 The modern theory of colonization leads logically to this con- 
 clusion, but the United States only has announced that complete 
 self-government and ultimately an Independent state is not only 
 the incidental and possible result of its Philippine policy, but the 
 direct object of its activities. America hopes that a prosperous 
 tropical dependency will in the course of time grow into a free 
 state through the development of the capacity of the people for 
 self-government. If this most generous and altruistic of co- 
 lonial projects fails, it will be because the Filipinos prove un- 
 equal to the responsibility which has been laid upon them. In 
 that event America must be content with having given the dis- 
 tracted country order, peace, justice, and a high degree of ma- 
 terial prosperity. 
 
 The work of the United States in the Philippines has therefore 
 an important place in the history of colonization. It recognizes 
 the naturalness and propriety of the aspiration of the natives 
 for nationality and also the certain efTect of Western education 
 on Eastern people. It sees what is written across the heavens 
 
 * The difference is one of priority and degree. Great Britain places order 
 and material prosperity first and education second. The United States would 
 use education as a means to secure these necessary objects. 
 
 * This is also true of England in Egypt, In India the concession of 
 greater powers of self-government and larger participation in the work of 
 gorernment implies the permanence of British rule. Logically, however, it 
 leads to the ultimate elimination of Great Britain, should the Indians ever 
 grow into a nation and prove themselves capable of self-government
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 5 
 
 and frankly attempts to aid and direct instead of obstruct what 
 is a perfectly natural growth.* 
 
 A rapid glance over the history of colonization will enable one 
 to understand and appreciate the dynamic force of the idea of 
 nationality which is now so powerfully influencing the minds of 
 Eastern peoples. 
 
 Colonization is as old as history. It has been going on since 
 men first founded families, communities, cities, states and na- 
 tions. Few things in nature have been less permanent than na- 
 tional boundaries and the territorial possessions of nations. States 
 have been born, struggled for life, expanded, absorbed their 
 neighbors, established colonies, decayed, been absorbed and dis- 
 appeared from the map. Europe has been overrun, repeopled, 
 divided and subdivided, and Asia is one vast burial place of dead 
 states. 
 
 All primitive peoples engaged in some form of colonization. 
 The Chinese from motives of safety or trade gradually extended 
 their boundaries until they embraced the great plains to the 
 north and west, which have so recently been lost to a more ag- 
 gressive race. They spread throughout the world but they 
 establish no colonies; they remain strangers in the lands of 
 their adoption. 
 
 The Phoenicians were the first colonizing people of whom we 
 possess a record, and their influence has extended even to mod- 
 em times. Forced out of their diminutive home country and 
 impelled by the instinct of the trader, they established trading 
 posts along the shores of the Mediterranean and even to the north 
 as far as the coasts of Britain and Germany. They were not 
 idealistic — they cared nothing for empire — and the political 
 bonds between their colonies were weak or non-existent. Their 
 motives were commercial or religious, not political. Absorbed 
 in the struggle for wealth they were unable to consolidate and 
 preserve a colonial empire and in time gave way for the Greeks. 
 
 « It may be well to state that few if any writers on colonial subjects show 
 much confidence in the success of popular or representative government in 
 the tropics. See Reinsch, Colonial Governtnrnt, Chap. XI. 
 
 Lewis, Government of Dependencies, p. 307.
 
 6 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The Greek state occasionally established subordinate govern- 
 ments outside of its boundaries, but Greek colonization generally 
 was conducted upon other theories. The Greek word for colony 
 signifies a separation of dwelling, a departure from home, a 
 going out of the house. It suggests a derivative but politically 
 independent community.'^ "An ancient Greek colony," says 
 Archbishop Whately,* "was like what gardeners call a layer, a 
 portion of the parent tree, with some twigs and leaves embedded 
 in fresh soil, till it has taken root and then severed." It was of 
 such colonies that Turgot was thinking when he wrote that 
 "colonies are like fruits which only cling until they ripen." When 
 this final condition was reached separation according to the 
 Greek conception of a political community as a mere city, was 
 inevitable. According to Aristotle,* the state must be of moderate 
 population because otherwise "who could command in war if the 
 population were excessive, or what herald short of a Senator 
 could speak to them?" As each Greek city increased in popula- 
 tion it was necessary to replant another shoot because no city 
 should be so large that any part of it was beyond the reach of a 
 herald's voice. Such colonization has been compared to the 
 swarming of bees or the migration of married children to their 
 own homes. 
 
 As the city state increased in population it was therefore nec- 
 essary that some should emigrate and we may assume that it was 
 the adventurous, the unsuccessful, and the needy who, under the 
 lead of a few bold spirits, became the founders of new states. 
 
 That assisted emigration was not unknown even In those early 
 days appears from the institution ver sacrum which flourished 
 among the Greco-Italian branch of the Aryan family during the 
 time when Italy was being occupied. All the children bom in 
 one spring were dedicated to a certain deity which, being a rea- 
 sonable deity, was willing to accept emigration in lieu of sacrifice. 
 Its votaries were accumulated and when they reached a proper 
 
 ' See Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chap. 7. 
 8 Note to Bacon's Essay on Plantations. 
 ^Politics, Book VII, Chap. 4.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 7 
 
 age were driven across the frontier and left to found a city for 
 themselves.*" 
 
 The Greek colonies -were often founded without the express 
 authority of the state, and were not designed to increase its 
 power and dominion. They were usually established in some un- 
 occupied or partially occupied territory and were practically in- 
 dependent from the first. Their relation to the parent state 
 resembled somewhat that of the American colonies to England 
 after the War of Independence. 
 
 Roman colonization was conducted under different conditions 
 and upon entirely different theories. Rome dealt with subject 
 people and was satisfied if she gave them peace, order and jus- 
 tice under Roman domination. Her vast and complicated system 
 of dependencies can only be glanced at. Those in Italy were 
 either city communities known as municipia or colonia. The 
 former were cities formerly independent, which after being con- 
 quered, retained their local civil laws. The latter were generally 
 established in existing towns after the citizens had been ejected. 
 They were strictly dependent on the home state. 
 
 The colonists were sent out by Rome for the purpose of con- 
 firming and extending her influence and were paid for their 
 services by grants of land. The old military colonies — the col- 
 onice civium Romanorum — were simply garrisons of Roman sol- 
 diers placed in the conquered towns of Italy. As the incoming 
 Romans amalgamated with the native community they formed 
 a colony which in time became a part of the Roman state. In 
 the time of the Gracchi, colonies were founded beyond seas for 
 the purpose of drawing off the surplus population and thus re- 
 lieving the agrarian situation. Later, generals like Marius, Pom- 
 pey and Caesar established military colonies for the purpose of 
 aiding their veteran soldiers. 
 
 Beyond Italy, conquered states after being "reduced under the 
 formula of a province" became Roman dependencies. A province 
 was under the immediate supervision of a resident provincial 
 Roman governor styled at various periods, praetor, propraetor, 
 
 ^'^ Seeley, Expansion of England, p. 47.
 
 8 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 or proconsul. Augustus divided the provinces into two classes — ' 
 senatorian and imperatorial. Whether a province belonged to 
 one or the other of these classes was determined by the lex prO' 
 vincia under which it was organized. In the former class a gov- 
 ernor appointed by the Roman Senate controlled civil affairs, 
 while military functions were reserved to an officer appointed by 
 the Emperor. Civil and military authority were thus separated. 
 In the imperatorial province a lieutenant of the Emperor directed 
 both civil and military affairs.^ ^ 
 
 The laws regulating the appointment, powers and rank of Ro- 
 man governors were uniform throughout the provinces. In all 
 other respects the greatest diversity prevailed. The policy of 
 the conquering Romans was to make only such changes in local 
 laws and customs as were necessary to reduce the place to sub- 
 jection. Civil laws, rehgion and local customs usually remained 
 untouched. The Romans seem indeed to have concerned them- 
 selves as little as possible with local affairs. Like some modern 
 colonial powers, they were satisfied with military rule and the 
 prompt payment of the tribute. ^^ 
 
 The laws of a Roman province consisted of the formula which 
 prescribed the terms upon which it was annexed, the acts of the 
 supreme Roman legislature, the edicts of the provincial governor, 
 and the native laws as they existed before the country became a 
 Roman dependency. The revenues were collected by Roman offi- 
 cers who remitted to Rome what was left after paying the ex- 
 penses of the provincial government. A province sometimes paid 
 its tribute in a gross sum. Taxation was not ordinarily excessive 
 but the people suffered from the rapacity and extortions of gov- 
 ernors such as Verras, made famous by Cicero's denunciation. 
 Roman rule was maintained by a military system of marvelous 
 
 ^1 See Lewis, Government of Dependence, p. 118, note. 
 
 12 When Paul was brought before the judgment seat, Gallic, the deputy of 
 Achaia said: "If it be a question of words and names, and of your law, look 
 ye to it; for I will be no judge of such matters. And he drave them from the 
 judgment seat. Then all the Greeks took Sosthenes, the chief ruler of the 
 synagogue, and beat him before the judgment seat. Ahd Gallic cared for 
 none of those things." Acts xviii, 15-17.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COtONIZATION 9 
 
 efficiency. Magnificent roads and bridges connected the towns 
 and fortified camps. 
 
 In the course of time the distinction between the different 
 classes of dependencies in Italy and the provinces disappeared. 
 The privileges of Roman citizenship were extended to the whole 
 of Italy and finally to the distant provinces. During the reign of 
 Constantine the provincial government system was completely 
 revised. Financial and judicial functions were separated from 
 the military power. A system of inspectors was established for 
 the purpose of a more efficient control of the provincial gov- 
 ernors. The Roman military, administrative and judicial sys- 
 tems, and Roman law, language and institutions, because of 
 their value and efficiency, gradually superseded those of the na- 
 tives. The vast superiority of the Roman law and particularly 
 its scientific codification led to its universal adoption. In Jus- 
 tinian's time the provincial governors were required to receive a 
 regular education in the Roman law schools. The provinces 
 always retained subordinate governments.^^ 
 
 It has been generally asserted that Rome ruled the provinces 
 for the good of her subjects and not for selfish gain;^* but Fer- 
 rere says^' that "we must abandon one of the most general and 
 most widespread misconceptions which teaches that Rome admin- 
 istered her provinces in a broad-minded spirit, consulting the gen- 
 eral interest and adopting wide and beneficial principles of gov- 
 ernment for the good of the subjects." Lord Cromar also says^" 
 that the colonial policy of Rome, when judged by modem stand- 
 ards, stands condemned. 
 
 The feudal kingdoms which arose upon the ruins of the Ro- 
 man Empire were in some respects aggregations of dependencies. 
 In the sixteenth century Spain ruled the kingdoms of Naples 
 and Sicily, the Netherlands, and the Duchy of Milan, as prov- 
 
 ^3 See Lewis* Government of Dependencies, Chap. 2, pp. 112-134; Keller, 
 Colonization, Chap, 11 ; Broderick. Political Studies, Roman Colonies (1879) ; 
 Arnold, Roman System of Provincial Administration (1879). 
 
 1* Gwatkins, "Early Church History to A. D. 313," p. 52. 
 
 "^^ Greatness and Decline of Rome, V, p. 3. 
 
 '^^ Ancient and Modern Imperialism, p. SO.
 
 10 THE PHILIPPINES3 
 
 inces under a system which resembled that of the Romans. Na- 
 poleon created a system of dependent states in Europe of which 
 nothing vital remains. 
 
 During the early Middle Ages the maritime republics of Italy 
 instituted the system of commercial posts or "factories" in the 
 Levant, which later played so great a part in the development 
 of the Far East. These factories were ordinarily parts or sep- 
 arate walled sections of certain cities within which the foreign 
 merchants lived with their families. They were similar to the 
 sections assigned to the Jews in European cities and centuries 
 later to the Dutch and English on the coast of China. They 
 were often fortified and not infrequently became the basis for 
 territorial as well as commercial conquest. 
 
 During the period of the Latin Empire of the East, the Vene- 
 tians, Genoese and Pisans maintained factories in Constantino- 
 ple. The Venetians established colonies on the Black Sea, the 
 Propontis, the Archipelago, the Morea, the coast of Syria, 
 Cypress, and along the Adriatic Sea. These colonies were pat- 
 terned after the mother city. When taxation was too heavy the 
 people, subject to their government, occasionally revolted. In 
 1361 the population of Candia, which had been acquired by 
 Venice, refused to pay a tax for public works and demanded 
 representation in the Great Council of the home city. Venice 
 considered her colonies in the Levant as an integral part of the 
 state, but as existing for purely commercial purposes. She en- 
 couraged the members of her noble families to migrate to the 
 colonies for the purpose of enriching themselves and upon their 
 return to Venice with their ill-gotten wealth, raised them to the 
 highest order of nobles. Necessarily under such a system the 
 native people within her colonies were subjected to all kinds of 
 oppression. 
 
 It is a remarkable fact that modern colonization was begun by 
 the people who probably, judged by modern standards, had the 
 fewest qualifications for such work/'^ 
 
 *^ Leroy-Beaulieu, De la colonisation ches les Peu/yles Modernes, I, p. 3. 
 Keller, Colonisation, p. 81, takes a contrary view. See generally, Roscher, 
 The Spanish Colonial System, Translation by Bourne (1904).
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 11 
 
 Spain at that time was neither rich, prosperous, nor overpop- 
 ulated. Her long struggle with the Moors had cultivated the mili- 
 tary spirit and induced a contempt for labor and agricultural life 
 which was reflected in all her laws and colonial administration. 
 Church and state, engaged in a common struggle for life with 
 the infidel, had been welded into a unit. Enthusiasm for ex- 
 tending the Empire of the Cross glowed with an intensity else- 
 where unknown. To Spain, whose monarchs had financed Co- 
 lumbus, fell the lion's share of the new Western world and she 
 entered upon its exploration and exploitation with great energy. 
 The kingdoms were full of needy nobles and soldiers recently 
 released from the wars and eager for adventure. They were 
 sent by shiploads to Mexico and South America to search for 
 gold and silver and the loot of conquered native states, some- 
 thing which could be carried back to Spain to be enjoyed and to 
 enrich the royal treasury. Spain established few colonies in the 
 temperate zone. In America and in the Philippines she con- 
 quered countries already inhabited by natives who had reached 
 some degree of civilization. Her conquests were easy, and there- 
 after she ruled a native population, for the benefit of Spain. No 
 effort was made to populate the new colonies with Spaniards. 
 Her possessions were dependencies and not colonies as the term 
 is ordinarily understood by English-speaking people. 
 
 The ancient civilizations of Mexico and Peru were swept 
 away ; the natives were killed in battle or reduced to slavery and 
 forced to toil for their masters. The governments were admin- 
 istered entirely by Peninsula-bom Spaniards. Viceroys in 
 Mexico and Lima represented the person and the authority 
 of the king and governed under the discretion of the Council 
 of India after it was established in 1514.*' 
 
 The rights of the native people were ignored by the civil offi- 
 cials. Good and benevolent laws enacted for their protection 
 were ordinarily disregarded.*' The work of developing the ag- 
 
 1' This was the first attempt to exercise control over colonics by means of 
 a separate public department in the home country. 
 
 "See Lea, "The Indian Policy of Spain," Yale Review, August 1899;
 
 12 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ricultural resources of the new country was considered as beneatK 
 the dignity of the adventurous soldiers and needy and rapacious 
 nobles who constituted the bulk of the Spanish residents. At one 
 time forty-five marquises and counts with their families resided 
 in Lima. Rare material indeed for colonists ! 
 
 The church was all-powerful. With earthly ambitions went 
 the spirit of proselytism. The passion of the adventurers for 
 gold was no stronger than that of the monks and priests for the 
 saving of souls. Notwithstanding the glow of religious enthusi- 
 asm in which it was enveloped, Spanish colonization was con- 
 trolled by a spirit as sordid as that of the ancient Phoenicians 
 and the Venetians of the Middle Ages. Spain adopted their 
 system of trade monopoly and passed it on to the Dutch, French 
 and English. To the end of her career as a colonial power she 
 retained all the worse principles of the original system. Never- 
 theless there was something vital in her system. The native 
 races under her rule never entirely disappeared as they did in 
 the French and English colonies in the West Indies, to be sup- 
 planted by negro slaves brought from Africa. While often cruel 
 and oppiessive she managed in some degree to assimilate the 
 natives and to impress upon them her religion and civilization, as 
 no other country has been able to do. In the course of time all 
 her colonies revolted, but to-day the people of the Philippine 
 Archipelago and of most of the great AVestern continent south 
 of the United States are the children of Spanish civilization.^*^ 
 
 While Spain was establishing dependencies in the west the 
 Portuguese were scattering their outposts of trade about the Med- 
 iterranean and along the route of the East. Considering the 
 insignificance of Portugal in Europe, the part she played in early 
 expansion and trade is little less than marvelous. Her enter- 
 
 Bourne, Spain in America, Chap. 18; Chejmey, European Background of 
 American History, Chaps. 5, 6. 
 
 20 Leroy-Beaulieu. De la colonisation ches Peuples Modernes, I, Chap. 1. 
 _ "From the beginning the Spanish establishments in the Philippines were 
 missions and not in the proper sense of the term a colony. They were 
 founded and administered in the interests of religion rather than of commerce 
 and industry." Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, I, Introduction. 
 Hereafter this work will be cited as B. & R.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 13 
 
 prises, however, were almost purely commercial. She established 
 factories and trading posts but founded few states or permanent 
 colonies,^^ and in the course of time her conquests in the East 
 fell to the Dutch and the English. 
 
 For many years the Dutch were satisfied to secure Eastern 
 products at the port of Lisbon, where they were granted special 
 commercial privileges, and distribute them throughout Europe. 
 It was a profitable trade. The Portuguese handled the situation 
 very skilfully. They not only withdrew entirely from the Euro- 
 pean coastwise trade, but even forbade the exportation of India 
 goods from Portugal in Portuguese ships. By leaving this trade 
 to the Dutch they hoped to satisfy them and prevent them from 
 interfering with their monopolies in the Far East. A great mys- 
 tery was made of the voyages. The difficulties and dangers of 
 navigation were greatly exaggerated. The sailing routes were 
 kept secret. All information with reference to the Indies which 
 was disseminated was designed to play upon the credulity of the 
 age. 
 
 Although the Dutch had been feeling their way into the East- 
 ern trade, they would probably for many years have remained sat- 
 isfied with the profitable role of intermediaries had not the ac- 
 quisition of Portugal by Spain threatened the destruction of the 
 Lisbon trade.^^ In 1595 Philip II seized two-fifths of the entire 
 Dutch merchant fleet in Spanish and Portuguese harbors. 
 
 Houtman's voyage by way of the Cape, to Java, led to the 
 organization of various companies to trade with the East. In 
 1602 these companies were consolidated into the East India 
 Company which for two centuries thereafter controlled Dutch 
 commerce and colonization. The powers conferred on this 
 famous company gave it not only a monopoly of trade but made 
 it practically sovereign in the territory. It was authorized to 
 
 21 Brazil is all that is left. It has been said that during two centuries of 
 colonization the Portuguese taught the natives nothing more important than 
 how to distil a poor quahty of rum by the use of an old gun barrel. 
 
 For an account of the pioneer work of the Portuguese, see Cheyncy, 
 European Background of American History, Chap. 4; Cambridge Modern 
 History, I, Chap. 1. 
 
 *' Cunningham, Western Civilisation, II, pp. 183 et seq.
 
 14 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 make treaties with native rulers in the name of the States Gen- 
 eral, to build forts, appoint military governors and judges, and 
 to take any and all measures necessary for the establishment and 
 maintenance of government. The directors were given full 
 authority to do anything they chose except establish a govern- 
 ment independent of the Netherlands. Designed to act as a sub- 
 stitute for the state it soon, by the simple process of absorbing 
 the statesmen, assumed the powers and functions of the state. 
 Another company known as the West India Company, organized 
 in 1621, operated in Brazil and elsewhere. For many genera- 
 tions these two companies controlled Dutch commercial and co- 
 lonial enterprises.^^ 
 
 The Dutch East India Company was organized for trading 
 purposes solely, but political control was soon found necessary 
 for the protection of the trade. From the creation of this com- 
 pany until the middle of the nineteenth century Dutch coloniza- 
 tion pursued one definite object. It had no theoretical or hu- 
 manitarian aims. It was not in the least interested in the heathen 
 or in posterity. It was after dividends and for general unscru- 
 pulousness and cupidity it stands unrivaled in the history of com- 
 merce and government. It finally came to an inglorious end and 
 its rights, property and obligations were assumed by the govern- 
 ment. The judgment of history upon this famous monopoly is 
 stated by the Dutch publicist, DeLouter :^* 
 
 "To the day of its downfall the Company remained faithful 
 to its origin. It was a company of brisk and energetic tradesmen, 
 who, with profit as their lode-star, and greed as their compass, 
 obtained, through the chance of events, absolute control of one 
 of the most beautiful and fertile regions of the earth and unhesi- 
 tatingly sacrificed it to their low ideals." 
 
 With the exception of the invigorating five years of English 
 
 23 Many of these commercial companies were organized about the begin- 
 ning of the seventeenth century. England, Holland, France, Sweden, Den- 
 mark and other countries had their East India companies. See Cheyney's 
 European Background of American History, Chap. 7. 
 
 '* Quoted with approval in Ireland's The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 173.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 15 
 
 control under Sir Stamford Raffles,^' Holland has ruled Java 
 for more than three hundred years, but she can teach modem col- 
 onizing states only the things to be avoided. She made the 
 beautiful island of Java a fruitful plantation and worked it by 
 natives who were as truly slaves as were the negroes of Jamaica. 
 An early effort to settle the country with white men failed mis- 
 erably through the narrow and monopolistic policy of the com- 
 pany, and thereafter, until within very recent times, the country 
 was exploited for the financial benefit of the Netherlands govern- 
 ment and Dutch traders in utter disregard of the rights of the 
 Javanese. The East India Company took vast sums of money 
 out of the country, but almost from the beginning of its history 
 the great trading concern was a fraud and a swindle. It paid 
 huge dividends, which were often little more than bribes, out of 
 its capital, or with borrowed money, and in the end it fell into 
 discreditable bankruptcy. The Netherlands government for many 
 years after it took charge made no real change of policy. The 
 colony continued to exist for the benefit of the Netherlands. 
 It must be made to pay, and to pay in money. The government 
 was merely a trader dealing in the products of the island. It 
 forced the natives to raise the quantity of coffee and sugar re- 
 quired and fixed the price at which such products must be sold 
 to it. The natives were not permitted to share in the prosperity, 
 such as it was. 
 
 The Dutch found an old and well developed civilization in 
 Java. The native governments were harsh and tyrannical but 
 well adapted for the trade purposes of the newcomers. Instead 
 of attempting to organize a new system which would protect the 
 natives from the rapacity of their rulers, the Dutch retained the 
 ancient system and adapted it to their own purposes. They dealt 
 only with the local rulers who in time were made Dutch officials 
 and charged with the duty of collecting the designated products 
 from the natives under their local jurisdiction. No attempt was 
 made to train or educate the people, and no responsibility for 
 
 25 For an account of the remarkable work of this young Englishman, see 
 Boulger, The Life of Sir Stamford Raffles (London, 1899).
 
 16 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 their well being was assumed by the government. This system 
 without substantial change was continued until the humanitarian 
 spirit of the present age forced the abandonment of the old 
 iniquitous methods. 
 
 The so-called "culture" system which for a time brought so 
 much credit to the Dutch now appears to have been the greatest 
 instrument of injustice ever devised by a civilized power. Until 
 recently it was pointed to as the conclusive evidence of Dutch ca- 
 pacity for governing a tropical colony. When in 1830 Van den 
 Bosch became governor-general, the finances of the colony were 
 in a desperate condition. The India government owed more 
 than thirty million gulden and was becoming more deeply in- 
 volved with each passing year. Under the system which he 
 devised the natives, instead of paying the government a certain 
 proportion of their crops, were required to place at its disposal 
 one-fifth of their land and of their labor time. The government 
 was thus enabled to determine the products which should be 
 grown under its direction. Theoretically the natives were re- 
 quired to contribute this one-fifth of their time in lieu of the two- 
 fifths of the crops demanded under the old system. The loss 
 from failure of crops, when not due to the fault of the cultivators, 
 was in theory to fall upon the government. The labor would be 
 directed to the cultivation of the products which had the greatest 
 value in the markets of the world.^^ The system was heralded 
 as the solution of all the difficulties of colonization. Van den 
 Bosch, who had been a leader in charitable enterprises in Hol- 
 land, introduced it to the world as a measure of philanthropy 
 designed to elevate and educate the natives. He constantly urged 
 the necessity for protecting the natives. 
 
 "So long," he wrote in 1834, "as we do not regard and treat 
 the Javanese as our children, and do not honestly fulfil to them all 
 the duties which rest upon us as their leaders and protectors, our 
 arrangements will constantly be subject to shocks, and the aim 
 
 28 Day, The Dutch in Java, p. 249.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 17 
 
 that we propose will not be attained but will lead constantly to 
 disappointments."^' 
 
 The sincerity of such statements may be doubted. 
 
 "Only one strong motive," says Day,^* "underlay the founda- 
 tion and the maintenance of the culture system, the desire to ob- 
 tain revenue for the Dutch treasury. Pious hopes of benefiting the 
 natives which may have been at first sincere could be only hypo- 
 critical after a few years' experience with the workings of the 
 system, and at any rate never interfered materially with its de- 
 velopment." 
 
 The author of a recent comprehensive work on Java says '?* 
 
 "In 1833 the colony was in debt and the coffers of Holland 
 were absolutely empty at the end of the war of secession with 
 Belgium. General Count Van den Bosch presented himself with 
 an offer to relieve the budget and fill the coffers. He was given 
 a free hand, and installed in the East Indies the system of forced 
 cultures, which at one moment was the glory of his name, and 
 afterward became his disgrace. ... It has deprived Java of 
 enormous sums of money and of precious lives. By condemning 
 the population for more than fourteen years to hard labor, which 
 was also for them unjust and fruitless labor, it led to their intel- 
 lectual retrogression ; it was therefore from the etliical standpoint 
 absolutely unpardonable. Yet we can not forget that by this 
 realistic sacrifice of a whole generation it transformed the island 
 into one of the richest and most fruitful of agricultural coun- 
 tries. . . . Once more the truth of the famous adage is exem- 
 plified, *Woe to them that make revolutions ; happy are they who 
 inherit after them.' " 
 
 The culture system was in full force from 1830 to 1850, and 
 during that time Java was made to pay two hundred milHon dol- 
 lars into the Netherlands treasury. 
 
 '"Ihid, p. 255. 
 
 28 Day, The Dutch in Java, p. 257. 
 
 2»A. Cabaton, Java and the Dutch East Indies (London, 1911), pp. 207, 
 210. The attempt of the Spaniards to apply the system of forced culture in 
 the Philippines resulted unfortunately for the country. Day, The Dutch in 
 Java, p. 637.
 
 18 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Speaking of the system Professor Keller says :'* 
 
 "It looks philanthropic, but was in reality mercenary; in its 
 application all the features which interfered with revenue speed- 
 ily dropped away. For example, the fifth of the people's working 
 time which was put under requisition lengthened out indefinitely, 
 and they often bore the land tax besides, from which the system 
 was supposed to free them. Moreover the government evaded 
 shouldering the losses, both by a specious use of the proviso at- 
 tached and otherwise; and paid the natives, if at all, in the 
 scantiest and stingiest manner. The system was unworkable in 
 any way profitable to all parties/' 
 
 Gradually information as to the treatment of the Javanese 
 found its way to Europe, and the publication of a popular novel 
 dealing with the abuses of the culture system, prepared the public 
 mind for the legislation which followed the introduction of con- 
 stitutional government after the revolution of 1848.^* 
 
 The enforcement of the provisions of the Colonial Constitu- 
 tion of 1854 for the protection of the natives meant the end of 
 the culture system. In 1870 it was formally superseded by the 
 system of "free labor" which, as usual, soon degenerated into 
 credit bondage. In 1903 the States General enacted a law under 
 which all the income of the Indian government was required to 
 be expended in the islands, and from that time until the present 
 Holland has governed her dependencies under a system which is 
 worthy of the modern age.^^ 
 
 30 Keller, Colonisation, p. 475. 
 
 31 This story, entitled Max Havelaar, or The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch 
 Trading Company, was published in 1860, and its influence upon the culture 
 system may be compared to that of Uncle Tom's Cabin upon the slavery 
 question. 
 
 The repute which the culture system formerly enjoyed in England and 
 America was due largely to a book by Mr. J. W. B. Money entitled, Java, or 
 How to Manage a Colony (London, 1861). Doctor Day (p. 254), calls atten- 
 tion to the influence this book had on the opinion of such writers as Ireland 
 (Tropical Colonization) and Wallace (Malay Archipelago) and says, "No one 
 at all conversant with the actual conditions in Java, as they are known to us 
 on unimpeachable evidence, can retain the slightest respect for Money's au- 
 thority after reading his book." Ibid., p. 253. 
 
 32 See Cabaton, Java and the Dutch East Indies, p. 152. 
 
 Until recently the Dutch denied the Indians Western education. Consider- 
 able attention is now being devoted to the education of the natives. Generally 
 separate schools are maintained for the natives and white children, but ia
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 19 
 
 For almost two centuries France contended for territory and 
 colonies on equal terms with England. The opening days of the 
 nineteenth century found her in possession of only a few scat- 
 tered islands. Her old colonial empire was never real; it was 
 all appearance. She had few real colonists. Her people were 
 facile and could accommodate themselves to all conditions. They 
 were sympathetic with natives but they rarely took root in the 
 land. France furnished audacious and intrepid adventurers but 
 few colonists. Leroy-Beaulieu attributes her failure to defects 
 in the national character as well as in her political system. Her 
 people were too ready to assimilate with the natives.'* Her 
 trading companies induced monopoly and trade restrictions. In 
 the East, Dupleix, Labourdonnais, and other brilliant leaders 
 sought glory instead of commercial advantages. The extrava- 
 gant spirit of adventure and desire for immediate results on a 
 large scale led to a scattering of energy. Empires are neither 
 built nor consolidated by voyageurs or gentleman adventurers. 
 The stolid Englishman or the phlegmatic Dutchman stays. 
 
 In the beginning England was distanced by Spain, Portugal 
 and Holland. Each of these countries had secured the control 
 of vast territories while England possessed not a foot of land 
 beyond the British Isles. It requires an effort to realize that in 
 those days England was in fact a very small and rather insig- 
 nificant country. Not until the time of Elizabeth did English- 
 men wake to the fact that empires were to be won beyond the 
 narrow seas which swept her shores. Then came those wonder- 
 ful years during which Drake and his like won for England the 
 control of the seas,'* when — 
 
 Ternati in 1911 I saw Dutch and Javanese children sitting on the same 
 tenches in schools where the text-books and the instruction were in the Dutch 
 language. 
 
 83 Leroy-Beaulieu. De la colonisation chec les Pcuplcs Modcmes (Sixieme 
 edition), Chap. 5. 
 
 8* In the hall of Buckland Abbey there is preserved an old drum said to 
 have been used on Drake's ship. 
 
 Newbolt's stirring ballad makes the old hero say : 
 
 "Take my drum to England, hang it by the shore, 
 
 Strike it when your powder's runnin' low, 
 
 If the Dons sight Devon, — I'll quit the port of Heaven, 
 
 And drum them up the Channel, as we drummed them long ago."
 
 20 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 "They diced with Death. Their big sea boots 
 Were greased with blood. They swept the seas 
 For England; and — we reap the fruits 
 Of their heroic deviltries." 
 
 Her first colonies were planted in temperate climes where 
 Englishmen could live and establish permanent homes. They 
 were settlement colonies. By the middle of the seventeenth cen- 
 tury they had passed the experimental stages and become per- 
 manencies. The enactment in 1651 of the first of the Navigation 
 Laws^® opened a century of trade expansion^^ during which it 
 was held that the colonies existed solely for the benefit of the so- 
 called mother country — a period dominated by "that baleful spirit 
 of commerce that wished to govern great nations on the maxims 
 of the counter." It was the same theory which controlled the 
 Dutch in the management of their colonies down almost to the 
 present time. In a paper written in 1726 by Sir W. Keith^'^ it 
 was said, "All advantageous projects or commercial gain in any 
 colony which are truly prejudicial to and inconsistent with the 
 interests of the mother country, must be understood to be illegal, 
 and the practise of them unwarrantable, because they contradict 
 the end for which the colonies had a being/* 
 
 This system led to the loss of the American colonies. It "in- 
 volved the theory," says Egerton,^^ "that the colony was to be 
 always the producer of the raw material which the industries of 
 the mother country should work up. By implication it denied the 
 equality of colonial Englishmen with Englishmen at home and 
 by this means poisoned the wells of common patriotism." 
 
 But India was under the control of the East India Company, 
 and there Clive and Hastings had laid the foundations of the 
 Empire. During the Napoleonic wars England, to some extent, 
 
 35 The navigation laws were not passed in any spirit of hostility to the 
 colonies. They were directed at the naval supremacy of Holland and their 
 effect on the colonies was incidental. Egerton, History of British Colonial 
 Policy, p. 62. 
 
 ^^ For the mercantile system, see Egerton, Origin and Growth of English 
 Colonies, Chap. 6 ; Day, History of Commerce, pp. 167-172. 
 
 27 Cited by Egerton, History of British Colonial Policy, p. 72, 
 
 88 Origin and Growth of English Colonies, p. 118.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 21 
 
 made good her losses in America by the capture of French and 
 Dutch colonies. 
 
 In the readjustment which after 1815 took place England re- 
 turned much of the most valuable territory which she had con- 
 quered, including the great island of Java, retaining only Tobago 
 and San Lucia in the Antilles and Mauritius in the East. The 
 settlement of Australasia was then commenced and pushed with 
 considerable vigor. 
 
 The growing humanitarian spirit of the age led to the aboli- 
 tion of the slave trade and finally to the emancipation of the 
 slaves in the colonies. During the years of exhaustion and 
 stagnation which followed the war many economic and social 
 evils developed and the disposition of the unemployed be- 
 came a serious question. In 1826 a committee of the House 
 of Commons recommended that the local authorities provide 
 means for assisting unemployed laborers to emigrate and locate 
 on the Crown lands, and in 1830 the famous Colonization So- 
 ciety was founded for the purpose of directing and systematizing 
 the work.*" 
 
 Then, for the first time in English history, a systematic plan 
 for colonization was worked out and applied, and during the 
 succeeding thirty years so much progress was made in develop- 
 ing the settlement colonies that they began to resent the interfer- 
 ence which the system involved and to aspire to self-government. 
 
 English colonial history has passed through three clearly de- 
 fined periods. During the first the colonies were regarded as 
 political and commercial necessities. Every unoccupied island 
 was appropriated and promptly organized into a colony. The 
 policy was satirized by Disraeli in his novel Popanilla. Accord- 
 ing to the story a tiny speck upon the sea originally thought to 
 be a porpoise proved, upon closer investigation, to be a rock and 
 it was immediately provided with all the paraphernalia of a civ- 
 
 8»The credit for this policy belongs to Gibbon Wakefield and Lord 
 Ilowick, afterward Lord Grey. Its central idea was tlie sale of the Crown 
 lands and the use of the money thus obtained to assist the emifirrants. Eger- 
 ton, History of British Colonial Policy, p. 281 et j^g.- Wakefield, Vinv of 
 the Art of Colonisation (1849) ; New Edition (1914) ; Pari Com., Pari Pap. 
 1836.
 
 22 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ilized government. *'Upon what system," asked Popanilla, "does 
 your government surround a small rock in the middle of the sea 
 with fortifications and cram it full of clerks, soldiers, lawyers 
 and priests ?" **Well, your Excellency," was the reply, *'I believe 
 it is called the Colonial System." 
 
 During the second period, which came in with the Victorian 
 era, there was a disposition to regard all colonies as politically 
 mischievous and commercially useless. England's attitude dur- 
 ing that time resembled that of the mother of a numerous family 
 of maturing daughters, all dear to her heart but horribly ex- 
 pensive. To them she was inclined to say : 
 
 "Keep to yourselves. 
 So loyal is too costly, friends, your love 
 Is but a burden ; loose the bond and go." 
 
 In plain prose, set up your own establishment as soon as possi- 
 ble and relieve me from the burden of your support. 
 
 The Whig statesmen were inclined to accept Turgot's theory 
 of the inevitable falling of ripe fruit. Many of them as- 
 sumed that the tropical colonies particularly were a positive 
 detriment to England and that the sooner the settlement colonies 
 such as Canada and Australia were able to establish themselves 
 as independent states, the better it would be for all concerned. 
 Therefore, "all that could be done was to insure that the eutha- 
 nasia of the empire should be as mild and as dignified as pos- 
 sible." "We must," says Sir Charles Bruce,*° "bear in mind that 
 for decades our colonial policy had for its aim to supply the 
 colonies with a constitutional apparatus, to educate them in politi- 
 cal methods, and to provide them with an equipment of political 
 leaders and departmental officials with a view to their ultimate 
 separation as independent states."*^ 
 
 It would be easy to fill many pages with quotations from the 
 speeches and letters of leading Englishmen which tend to con- 
 
 « The Broad Stone of Empire, I, p. 170. 
 
 ^'^This, of course, applied to Englishmen in the settlement colonies, not to 
 the backward native people. We, in the Philippines, include the natives.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 23 
 
 firm this statement/^ The Liberahsm of the period was wilHng 
 to concede a very large measure of self-government to the settle- 
 ment colonies and experience seemed to show that self-govern- 
 ment meant ultimate independence. 
 
 Lord John Russell in introducing his bill to provide autono- 
 mous governments for the Australian colonies declared that its 
 object was "to train the colonies into a capacity to govern them- 
 selves." In his speech to the House of Commons*' on February 
 8, 1858, he said : "It is important that you should know on what 
 it is that you will have to deliberate ; i f your public spirit should 
 induce you to preserve your colonies; or if your wisdom should 
 induce you to amend your policy, or finally, if an unhappy judg- 
 ment should induce you to abandon your colonies, it is essential 
 to know what you would preserve, or amend, or abandon." 
 
 In 1861 Sir George Cornewall Lewis, who twenty years earlier 
 had published his well-known book on the government of de- 
 pendencies, said in Parliament : "I for one can only say that I 
 look forward without apprehension, and I may add, without 
 regret, to the time when Canada might become an independent 
 state." John Stuart Mill wrote: "England is sufficient to her 
 own protection without the colonies and would be in a much 
 
 42 The historian Froude, writing in Fraser's Magasine for January, 1870, 
 said : "It is even argued that our colonies are a burden to us and that the 
 sooner they are cut adrift from us the better. They are, or have been, de- 
 monstrably loyal. They are proud of their origin, conscious of the value to 
 themselves of being a part of the Empire and willing and eager to find a home 
 for every industrious family that we can spare. . . . Whether the colonies 
 themselves rernain under our flag or proclaim their independence, or attach 
 themselves to some other power, is a matter which concerns themselves, and 
 to us of profound indifference." See also Froude's article in Fraser's for 
 August, 1870; "How Not to Retain Colonies," by Lord Chancellor Norton, 
 Nineteenth Century, July, 1879; Robinson, The Colonies and the Century, 
 Appendix (1871). As to the methods of the Colonial Office, see Leshe 
 Stephen's Life of F. J. Stephen, p. 443 ; Bruce's The Broad Stone of Empire, 
 I, Chaps. VI, VII. 
 
 " Spencer Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, II, p. 103. Vide Stan- 
 hope's History of England, VI, p. 143. On February 7, 1850, John Bright 
 made the following entry in his diary: "Colonial policy explained by Lord 
 John Russell in a long speech. Very important. Colonies at the Cape and in 
 Australia to have legislative chambers and to have liberal self-government 
 Great agreement in the House on the subject Marvelous absence of preju- 
 dice when the objects are ten thousand miles away. Should like to move that 
 the Bill be extended to Great Britain and Ireland." Trevelyan, Life of John 
 Bright, p. 176.
 
 24 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 stronger as well as more dignified position if separated front 
 them than when reduced to be a single member of an American, 
 African or Australian Confederation. Over and above the com- 
 merce which she might equally enjoy after separation, England 
 derives little advantage, except in prestige, from her depend- 
 encies, and the little she does derive is quite outweighed by the 
 expense they cost her and the dissemination they necessitate of 
 her naval and military forces, which, in case of war, or any real 
 apprehension of it, requires to be double or treble what would 
 be needed for the defense of the country alone."^* 
 
 Lord Morley^' says that in his views of colonial policy Mr. 
 Gladstone "was in substantial accord with the radicals of the 
 school of Cobden, Hume and Moles worth. He does not seem to 
 have joined a reforming association founded by these eminent 
 men among others in 1850, but its principles coincided v/Ith his 
 own — local independence, an end of rule from Downing Street, 
 -the relief of the mother country from the whole expense of the 
 local government of the colonies, save for defense from aggres- 
 sion from a foreign power." 
 
 In a speech at Chester in 1855 Gladstone said: "Govern them 
 upon a principle of freedom. Defend them against aggression 
 from without. Regulate their foreign relations. These things 
 belong to the colonial connection. But of the duration of that 
 connection let them be the judges, and I predict that if you leave 
 them the freedom of judgment it is hard to say when the day 
 will come when they will wish to separate from the great name 
 of England.""" 
 
 Statesmen were greatly impressed by the dangers of war orig- 
 inating in connection with colonial questions. It was generally 
 believed that the United States had designs on Canada and that 
 the Trent affair in 1861 was a deliberate attempt to involve the 
 
 **To the contrary, the Great War has shown that England's reserve 
 strength is in her great colonies. 
 
 *5 Morley, Life of Gladstone, I, p. 361. "He had from his earliest parlia- 
 mentary days regarded our colonial connection as one of duty rather than 
 one of advantage." Ibid., p. 359. 
 
 «/&tU, p. 363.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 25 
 
 country in war. About this time the Duke of Newcastle, the 
 colonial secretary, wrote that "he should see a dissolution of the 
 bond between the mother country and Canada with the greatest 
 pleasure." Sir Henry Taylor, who for many years was an offi- 
 cial in the Colonial Office, in an official Minute addressed to the 
 duke, said:*'^ "As to the American provinces, I have long held, 
 and have often expressed the opinion that they are a sort of 
 damnosa hereditas, and when your Grace and the Prince of 
 Wales were employing yourselves so successfully in conciliating 
 the colonists, I thought that you were drawing closer ties which 
 might better be slackened if there were any chance of their slip- 
 ping away altogether. I think that a policy which has regard to 
 a not very farnDff future should prepare facilities and propensi- 
 ties for separation ; . . . I should desire to throw the current 
 military expenditure upon the colonists, as tending, hy connect' 
 ing self-protection with self-government, to detach the colonies 
 and promote their independence and segregation at an earlier day, 
 and thereby to withdraw this country in time from great con- 
 tingent dangers. If there be any motives which should plead 
 for a prolonged connection, it appears to me that they are of a 
 cosmopolitan and philanthropic nature, and not such as grow; 
 out of the interests of this country, though there may be no 
 doubt some minor English interests which are the better for the 
 connection. There are national obligations also to be regarded, 
 and some self-sacrifice is required of this country for a time. 
 All that I would advocate is a preparatory policy, loosening ob- 
 ligations, and treating the repudiation by the colonists of legisla- 
 tive and executive dependence as naturally carrying with it some 
 modification of the absolute right to be protected. As to prestige, 
 I think it belongs to real power, and not to a merely apparent 
 dominion by which real power is impaired." 
 
 In fact nearly every responsible statesman of the period at some 
 time used language which, standing alone, would mark him as an 
 advocate of what is now known as an anti-imperialistic policy, 
 
 *'' See Bruce, The Broad Stone of Empire, I, pp. 109-111.
 
 26 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 but as Sir Charles Bruce says :*^ "There was not one of these 
 statemen of the first rank, including Cobden, who did not, either 
 by immediate reservation or subsequent profession, at some time 
 or other express himself in terms consistent with what we should 
 at the present day consider sound imperial judgment. The truth 
 is that there was a good deal of justification at the time for the 
 policy now condemned, and for the utterances it is the present 
 fashion to treat with contemptuous ridicule." 
 
 Of course the men who advocated the policy of training the 
 olonies for independence were thinking only of the settlement 
 colonies inhabited by Englishmen, not of India and the Crown 
 colonies. 
 
 It is a remarkable fact that the idea of abandoning the col- 
 onies was strongest among the aristocratic Whig statesmen who 
 then governed England and that it never seems to have been pop- 
 ular with the general public. The transition from the laisser faire 
 policy to that which created Greater Britain was coincident 
 with the rise of democracy in England. By that time the col- 
 onies had become great democratic communities and their forms 
 of government and ideals appealed more to the English working 
 men and the middle class generally than to their aristocratic 
 rulers. 
 
 There were also economic and political reasons for a change of 
 policy. Great military powers were being built up on the con- 
 tinent. England's free trade policy had not brought the expected 
 millennium. Other countries were erecting tariff walls against 
 her. France, Italy and Germany were adopting an aggressive 
 colonial policy. The pressure from without thus tended to bring 
 England and her colonies into closer relationship. About this 
 time Sir John Seeley in his brilliant book. The Expansion of 
 •England, developed the attractive idea that the colonies were 
 merely England beyond the seas.** The American Captain Ma- 
 
 han's early writings on the influence of sea power also made a 
 t. - 
 
 *8 The Broad Stone of Empire, T, p. 94. 
 
 ■*9 "Probably no single book has ever exerted a more powerful influence in 
 the direction of the appreciation of English colonial enterprise than Professor 
 .Seeley's Expansion of England." Ireland, Tropical Colonization, p. 24.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 27 
 
 great impression upon Englishmen. The feeling of loyalty on 
 the part of the colonies toward the mother country which, during 
 the preceding generation, had been almost non-existent, was 
 suddenly revived. The new movement was represented by the 
 Conservative party under the leadership of Disraeli. Speaking 
 at Crystal Palace in 1872, Disraeli said: "Well, what has been 
 the result of this attempt during the reign of Liberalism for the 
 disintegration of the Empire? It has entirely failed. But how 
 has it failed? Through the sympathy of the Colonies with the 
 Mother Country. They have decided that the Empire shall not be 
 destroyed ; and in my opinion no Minister in this country will do 
 his duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing as much 
 as possible our colonial empire and of responding to those dis- 
 tant sympathies which may become a source of incalculable 
 strength and happiness to this land." 
 
 The creed of the new policy was to be "the maintenance of our 
 institutions, the preservation of the Empire, and the improvement 
 of the condition of the people."^" 
 
 Slowly the attitude of England toward her colonies changed. 
 Under the threat of a common danger the parts of the far-flung 
 empire were wedded together. Conflicting interests were ad- 
 justed, and the Great War of 1914 found Greater Britain fight- 
 ing as a unit for the empire and that for which it sjtands. 
 
 When in 1898 the United States acquired the Philippines the 
 world had entered upon a new era in the history of colonization. 
 Colonies in the ordinary English sense of the word had almost 
 ceased to exist — they had all become independent states or do- 
 minions. The dependencies were all in the tropics. Coloniza- 
 tion, with its medley of objects, motives, desires, ambitions — 
 noble, ignoble, personal, disinterested, material, spiritual — after 
 
 60 Bruce, The Broad Stone of Empire, I, p. 166. Disraeli, while in oppo- 
 sition, often spoke slightingly of the colonies, hut his statements were gen- 
 erally directed at the policy of his political opponents. In Lord Malmes- 
 bury's Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, II, p. 57, there is a letter of August 13, 
 1852, in which Disraeli, writing about the Newfoundland fisheries, said: 
 "These wretched colonies will all be independent, loo. in a few years and are 
 a millstone around our necks. If I were you I would push matters with 
 Fillmore, who has no interest to pander to the populace like Webster, and 
 make an honorable and speedy settlement."
 
 28 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 passing through various epochs had been reduced very largely 
 to the problem of developing the tropics and governing depend- 
 ent people. 
 
 Only the people of temperate countries are colonizers, and 
 the land within the temperate zones had all been occupied. It 
 was generally recognized that the time for establishing settlement 
 colonies had passed, although some enthusiasts still hoped to 
 plant white men upon the table-lands of Africa. The future of 
 colonization was therefore in tropic lands already inhabited by 
 savages or by people of a comparatively low order of civilization. 
 The demand for tropical products had increased enormously. 
 In 1898, the year of Manila, the combined trade of Great Britain 
 and the United States with the tropics was about forty-four per 
 cent, of their combined trade with all the rest of the world.^^ 
 What had been luxuries had become necessities. It was evident 
 that the rivalry of the future would be for the trade of the tropics 
 and the control of the channels along which it would flow. The 
 people whose capacity and energy had made the modem world 
 were not willing that vast areas of productive lands should 
 longer lie fallow. The world demanded their products, and the 
 feeling prevailed that the natives must, under pressure if neces- 
 sary, be forced to join the onward march of the world and do 
 their part of its work. It was evident that this would be done 
 only on the initiative and under the direction of men from tem- 
 perate climates. 
 
 Political and social conditions in Europe also impelled the 
 Continental states toward a policy of territorial expansion and 
 schemes of colonization. The pressure of population had been 
 partially relieved by the flow of emigration to America. Social 
 dissatisfaction prevailed very generally and the ambition of the 
 working classes for better things was probably stronger than 
 ever before in the history of the world. The protective policy 
 of the United States and the British dominions had narrowed 
 the markets for manufactured articles. It was felt that the loss 
 
 61 It amounted to £208,000,000— more than a billion dollars. For further 
 (details, see Kidd, The Control of the Tropics, p. 6 et seq.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 29 
 
 of so many of the people who were emigrating to foreign coun- 
 tries was a disgrace to their native lands. 
 
 With German and Italian unity came the ambition which 
 seems only satisfied by the possession of colonies. France had 
 acquired control of Algiers and was engaged in a system of colo- 
 nization and development under conditions resembling in many 
 respects those now existing in the Philippines. She was also in 
 possession of Tonkin in the Orient and was slowly regaining 
 some of her lost prestige as a colonizing power. Germany, a 
 late entry in the race, found practically all desirable territory in 
 tropic climes occupied. As epigrammatically stated by Bismarck 
 at that time, England had colonies and colonists, Germany had 
 colonists but no colonies, France had colonies but no colonists. 
 Nearly all the states of Europe were contemplating colonial 
 schemes in Africa and were represented at the Berlin Confer- 
 ence in 1884. 
 
 French statesmen had accepted the theory that without colo- 
 nies France would cease to be a great power. The distinguished 
 publicist. Monsieur Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, urged upon French- 
 men the necessity for developing their colonies. "From now 
 on," he wrote, "our colonial expansion must occupy first place 
 in our national consciousness. . . . We must found a great 
 French empire in Africa and in Asia; else of the great role 
 which France has played in the past there will remain nothing 
 but the memory, and that dying out as the days pass. . . . 
 Colonization is for France a question of life or death. Either 
 France must found a great African Empire, or in a century she 
 will be but a secondary European power; she will count in the 
 world scarcely more than Greece or Roumania counts in Europe." 
 
 Then followed the scramble which resulted in the carving up 
 of Africa and the apportionment of a share to each claimant. 
 From that time until the beginning of the war in 1914 the Euro- 
 pean nations pushed the work of colonization in the Dark Conti- 
 nent with energy and a fair but unequal degree of success. The 
 objects and methods of each colonizing state were clearly under- 
 stood and for my present purposes it is not material whether
 
 30 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Great Britain, Germany, France or Belgium shall in the future 
 control any particular territory. The colonial policy of each 
 nation had been clearly defined long before the eventful third day 
 of August, 1914. 
 
 France has created a new colonial empire.^^ She controls forty- 
 five per cent, of the land and twenty-four per cent, of the popu- 
 lation of Africa. Her policy has been pacific and reasonably 
 effective. She has built public works, improved the means of 
 communication, introduced modem agricultural methods, mutual 
 benefit societies, and many other institutions designed to improve 
 the material condition of the native people. "In all these mat- 
 ters," says Lord Cromer,®^ "the French have certainly nothing 
 to learn from us. Possibly, indeed, we may have something to 
 learn from them." 
 
 In fact, French colonial policy more nearly resembles that of 
 America than of England, Germany or Italy, as it attaches more 
 importance to education and seems more sympathetic toward 
 native aspirations. But too much must not be claimed for it in 
 this respect. Apparently none of her subjects is at present 
 aspiring to separate nationality, and the problem therefore dif- 
 fers from that of England or the United States. All they de- 
 mand is equal rights and privileges with white colonists, and 
 this France has denied, but seems now preparing to concede to 
 them. In Algiers important political reforms are in contempla- 
 tion, which wil^ grant the natives greater numerical strength in 
 the Conseil Superior, the Delegations Financier es, and in the lo- 
 cal provincial and municipal bodies.^* France seems to be mak- 
 
 ^2 Certain English writers depreciate French colonial work because it has 
 not been financially profitable. See France in the Twentieth Century, by 
 W. L. George. But more competent critics commend her work in Algiers. 
 Lord Cromer, Pol. and Lit. Essays, p. 256 (1813). As to French equatorial 
 Africa, see an article by A. G. Leonard, United Empire, V. (N. S.) No. 3, 
 p. 237 (1914). 
 
 See generally, "French Colonization in North Africa," by T. R. Balch, 
 American Pol. Sci. Rev., Nov., 1909; "French Colonial Expansion in West 
 Africa, the Soudan and the Sahara," by N. D. Harris. Ibid., Nov., 1911. 
 
 ^^ Pol. and Lit. Essays, p. 256. 
 
 ^* As to present conditions, see Roy, Aspects of Algeria (London, 1913) ; 
 an article by Philippe Millet, "France and Her Algerian Problem," The Nine'
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 31 
 
 ing a success of her colonial work because she is controlled by 
 liberal ideas, does not exploit the natives and recognizes that "to 
 attempt to govern a country without those, or against those to 
 whom it belongs, is a blunder."'* 
 
 Italy was without experience in such work and it is still uncer- 
 tain whether her people possess at present the qualities which are 
 essential for it. Colonies it was urged would increase her impor- 
 tance politically, build up her trade, provide a place for her dis- 
 satisfied contadini and thus stop the draining away of her man- 
 hood. But she entered the field hesitatingly. Soon after the 
 opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 she purchased Assab on the 
 coast of the Red Sea. For a time thereafter the agitation for 
 colonies seems to have subsided.^' In 1882 Italy refused to co- 
 operate with Great Britain in Egypt. The occupation of the 
 Port of Massowah in 1885, in consequence of the massacre of 
 a party of scientists, resulted in one of those outbursts of public 
 feeling to which the people of all races seemed to be subject. 
 "Were not the Romans the first of colonizers? Could the Ital- 
 ians acknowledge themselves degenerate sons of these hardy 
 Venetians, Genoese and Pisans who were medieval lords of trade 
 and of commercial factories?" Between 1885 and 1895 Italy 
 acquired by conquest approximately one hundred thousand square 
 miles of territory along the western shores of the Red Sea and 
 a protectorate over some of the surrounding country. But in 
 
 teenth Century, Vol. LXXIII, p. 728 (April, 1913), and tr feview of Mrs. 
 Roy's book by Lord Cromer in The Spectator for May 31, 1913. 
 
 M. Millet says : "The new conception . . . implies that France has to 
 grant definite rights to her citizens. The Algerian Moslems are to enjoy 
 fiscal equality, justice and sufficient power to defend their own interests and 
 to take part in the administration of the colony." 
 
 *55 Powell (The Last Frontier, p. 6) says: "The most casual traveler can 
 not but be impressed by the thoroughness with which France has gone into 
 the schoolmaster business in her African domains. She believes that the best 
 way to civilize native races is by training their minds, and she does not leave 
 so important a work to the missionaries either. ... In Tunisia alone 
 there are something over 1,500 educational institutions; all down the fever- 
 stricken West Coast, under the palm-thatched roofs of Madagascar and the 
 crackling tin ones of Equatoria, millions of dusky youngsters are being taught 
 by Gallic schoolmasters that p-a-t-r-i-e spells 'France'." 
 
 soBrunialti, Le colonic degli Italiani (Torino, 1897), p. 323; cited in 
 Keller, Colonisation, p. 519.
 
 32 THE PHILIPPINES ' 
 
 1896 she^ met with a disaster which for a time dampened the 
 enthusiasm for a colonial policy. At the battle of Abba Garima 
 an Italian force of twelve thousand men was annihilated by the 
 Abyssinians. 
 
 During the succeeding years the Italian possessions were or- 
 ganized under the name of Eritrea. No more territory was to 
 be acquired and Eritrea was to be governed on the most advanced 
 and liberal principles. The Italians intended, so they announced, 
 to avoid Spanish formalism, Dutch egoism, French concentra- 
 tion and the too diverse conditions of English colonization. 
 They intended to give the people simple justice and economic and 
 commercial prosperity. So much for the theory. In reality, 
 says Professor Keller, they "always proceeded toward Abyssinia 
 as toward a people ignorant and barbarous, whom they thought 
 it not only allowable, but' easy to deceive."^'^ 
 
 Nevertheless considerable progress was made toward develop- 
 ing the country. Roads were constructed, artesian wells dug, and 
 lighthouses built, all by native labor. Schools were established 
 in which the boys and girls were taught Italian, Arabic, arith- 
 metic, hygiene and gymnastics. Although the administration 
 was not phenomenally successful, it was creditable to the Ital- 
 ians.^^ 
 
 In 1912 the revival of the expansion fever led to the war with 
 Turkey and the annexation of Tripoli, which is now being ad- 
 ministered render the name of Libia. The work is as yet in the 
 experimental stage. There is in Italy, as in the United States, 
 a strong party which is violently opposed to expansion,^^ but 
 its supporters assert that the colonial policy has already been 
 justified by results.^** It is not yet time to pass judgment upon 
 modern Italy as a colonizing power. Her initial efforts were 
 failures, but she seems to have learned something from her mis- 
 fortunes. Her statesmen and administrators are studying the 
 
 ^^ Keller, Colonisation, pp. 525, 526. 
 58 See "Italy in Africa," The Nation, LX, p. 179. 
 5^ "Italian Imperialism," Fortnightly Review, February, 1914. 
 ^° "Italy a Year After the Libian War," by Luigi Villari, Fortnightly Re- 
 view, November, 1913.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 33 
 
 problems of colonization in a scientific spirit,"* and there seems 
 to be no reason why she may not ultimately be successful. 
 
 During the thirty years immediately preceding the war, Ger- 
 many was the most active and aggressive of the colonial 
 powers. Having determined to claim her "place in the sun" 
 she acted with characteristic promptness and precision.** Her 
 theory of colonization was definite and understandable. Each 
 colony was to be a little Prussia, and there was to be no non- 
 sense about native rights and privileges. 
 
 Soon after the Franco-Prussian War the Germans began to 
 look about for new territory.*' Bismarck, who was not much 
 of a Kolonialmensch, waited patiently until the new empire had 
 been firmly cemented and the foundation of a navy laid and 
 then yielded to the growing demand.** In 1884 Germany had 
 no territory beyond the seas. One year later she was in posses- 
 sion of an external empire of more than one million square miles 
 with a population of ten million. Of this all but ninety-six thou- 
 sand square miles was in Africa. With the exception of the Bis- 
 marck Archipelago, the so-called New Philippines, a few small 
 islands such as in the Samoan group, and Kaiou Chau, which 
 was Germany's gateway to China, her colonial possessions at the 
 
 *i For a list of recent Italian books and monographs on colonization, see 
 United Empire (N. S.) IV, p. 284. 
 
 82 "German Colonial Policy," an address by Prof. M. Bonn, of Munich, 
 before the Royal Colonial Institute, January 13, 1914, United Empire, V. (N. 
 S.), No. 2, pp. 126. This is an authoritative and very valuabU statement of 
 the condition of the German colonies and of the national colonial policy just 
 before the beginning of the war. See also "The German Colonies, 1010-11," 
 by L. Hamilton, United Empire, III, (N. S.). No. 12; "German Colonial 
 Policy," by the same writer, United Empire, IV (N. S.), No. 2 (1913), p. 150; 
 "German Colonies in 1912-13, United Empire, V, No. 6, p. 493, 
 
 63 Mr. E. A. Powell (The Last Frontier), p. 166 (1912), gives the follow- 
 ing graphic description of German methods : 
 
 "Germany has deliberately embarked on a systematic campaigrn of world 
 expansion and exploitation. Finding that she needs a colonial empire in her 
 business, she set out to build one just as she would build a fleet of dread- 
 naughts or a ship canal. The fact that she has nothing, or next to nothing to 
 start with, does not worry her at all. What she can not obtain by purchase 
 or treaty and what she can not obtain by threats she stands ready to obtain 
 by going to war. Having once made up her mind that the realization of her 
 political, commercial and economic ambition requires her to have colonial 
 dominion, she is not going to permit anjrthing to stand in the way of her 
 getting it." 
 
 6* Lowe, Prince Bismarck, p. 172 ; Keltie, The Partition of Africa, p. 17a
 
 34 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 beginning of the war in August, 1914, were divided into four 
 groups — Togo, the Cameroons, German East Africa and Ger- 
 man Southwest Africa. 
 
 The Cameroons and Togo are tropical coimtries consisting of 
 malarial lowlands with high inland plateaus inhabited by about 
 three and one-half million natives. In 1913 there was a small 
 German population of about sixteen hundred, of which five hun- 
 dred were merchants. 
 
 German East Africa is also a tropical country with an enor- 
 mous table-land about thirty-five hundred feet above the sea 
 level, where Europeans may live with reasonable comfort. The 
 population consists of seven and one-half million natives and five 
 thousand Europeans. 
 
 German Southwest Africa is mainly an elevated table-land 
 divided from the sea by a broad, slowly rising, uninhabited desert 
 and interspersed with mountain ranges. The climate resembles 
 that of the Orange River country and Rhodesia. It has a sparse 
 native population. It is not suitable for close settlement and the 
 Germans divided the country into big farms ranging from six to 
 forty thousand acres each. There are only about eighty-five 
 thousand natives. In 1914 the white population was consider- 
 able and was slowly increasing. It Is the most European of 
 Germany's colonies. It can fairly be said to be a white man's 
 country, but all manual labor is done by natives. "The real 
 problem of .Southwest Africa," said Professor Bonn,^^ "has al- 
 ways been not only how to find the white men to settle the coun- 
 try, but quite as much how to find colored laborers to support 
 them when settled." 
 
 This statement suggests a remarkable fact in the recent eco- 
 nomic history of Germany. She entered upon her career as a 
 colonial power during a period of commercial depression, and 
 it v/as assumed that the emigration which marked the preceding 
 period would continue. The Germans were asking themselves, 
 "Are we going on contributing to build up foreign states with 
 
 65 German Colonial Policy, supra.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 35 
 
 our best bone and brain? If not, what is the remedy?" The an- 
 swer was, acquire territory where they can settle and remain 
 Germans. But after the territory was acquired Germans almost 
 ceased to emigrate.^" The yearly loss of one hundred thirty thou- 
 sand between 1881 and 1890 fell to twenty-two thousand during 
 the years 1901-10 and to eighteen thousand five hundred in 1913. 
 For several years before the war about seven hundred thousand 
 migratory foreign laborers entered Germany each year to engage 
 in agricultural work. While developing colonies the Germans 
 were developing Germany as well. In 1882 German industry 
 employed six million four hundred thousand men; in 1907, 
 eleven million three hundred thousand men. Nor was Germany 
 overpopulated, having but 310.4 persons to the square mile, as 
 against 618 in England. 
 
 Even if the establishment of settlement colonies in Africa 
 was practicable, it had become evident that no German material 
 would be available until industrial depression or social discon- 
 tent again moved the Germans to leave their Fatherland. 
 
 Germany was thus in the possession of a great territory in the 
 tropics which she was developing with money out of the Imperial 
 Treasury by the use of native labor. While a few enthusiasts 
 still hoped to establish settlement colonies, the German govern- 
 ment, according to Professor Bonn, had "shown plainly enough 
 that their idea of colonisation is not a policy of settlement, but 
 one of commercial exploitation/' That is, Germany was still in 
 the plantation era of colonial development. She wanted land 
 where she could grow raw material and develop open markets 
 for her manufactured articles. Her real and only immediate 
 problem was the old one of securing and handling native labor 
 in the tropics. The question, said Professor Bonn, was: "What 
 are we going to do with the natives when we have the power to 
 shape their fate? We want them to be as numerous as possible 
 and as skilful and as intelligent as we can make them. For only 
 
 *8 Many German emigrants preferred to live and do business in British 
 colonies. Powell, The Last Frontier, pp. 2, 185.
 
 36 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 their numbers and their industry can make our colonial empire 
 as useful and as necessary as it ought to be to us."^'^ 
 
 Japan also, under the impulse of her ambition to secure the 
 mastery in the East and provide for her surplus population, has 
 been pushing colonial projects with feverish activity. Formosa, 
 as fast as it is pacified by the use of the army, is being devel- 
 oped.^' The Japanese deal ruthlessly with the natives."^ They 
 have so far shown no great capacity for handling and developing 
 backward people or even for colonizing their own people.'^*' 
 
 The question of a native policy which has now become of vital 
 importance to colonizing powers, was almost unknown before 
 the great discoveries of the sixteenth century. In ancient times 
 the colonists seldom settled outside the zone of their accustomed 
 climate. There were no great ethnological differences, no im- 
 possible chasms between the colonists and the natives, due to 
 race characteristics. There was nothing to prevent them from 
 mingling freely on a footing of substantial equality. The for- 
 mer found no call to make over the latter, politically or morally. 
 They were not engaged in crusades. Their objects were purely 
 commercial and the conditions were not such as to incite to the 
 cruelties which later became common. The more prosperous the 
 natives the more profitable the commerce. There were no rea- 
 
 ^"^ "In the Cameroons and in Togo, we are ruling native states and native 
 tribes by a bureaucracy somewbat on the lines of the Indian Bureaucracy. 
 In East Africa we are creating a mixed colony, planting fragments of a white 
 society among dense African masses. In Southwest Africa we have created 
 a kind of manorial system with a European lord of the manor and an African 
 serf. Each type has its advantages and each has its drawbacks." Bonn, 
 United Empire, supra. Powell (Tne Last Frontier, p. 182) charges the Ger- 
 mans with treating the natives harshly. 
 
 ^s The natives of Formosa resemble the mountain people of the northern 
 Philippines, who are now reconciled to American control. The Japanese seem 
 to have made no serious efforts to placate the natives, and the result is con- 
 stant war. 
 
 For a semi-official account of the administration of Formosa see Count 
 Okuma's Fifty Years of New Japan, II, Chapter XVIII, (1909). 
 
 ^^ L'ImperialismJapanais, par Henri Labronc (Paris, 1910). 
 
 '■" Belgium was just beginning to recognize the Congo when the Great War 
 opened. At his New Year's reception in 1914 King Albert said: "It is my 
 duty to tell the Chamber that modifications in the charter of the Congo 
 Colony are necessary. ... A responsible autonomy must be able to assert 
 itself under the direction, control and sovereignity of the motherland." 
 London Times, January 2, 1914. See the chapter on "The Transition of the 
 Belgian Congo," in Harris' Intervention and Colonization of Africa (1914).
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 37 
 
 sons for oppressing and exploiting the people among whom the 
 settlements were made. Only that degree of submission was 
 required which was necessary for trading purposes. Diversity of 
 customs and morals were regarded of no consequence. Such 
 changes in the social organizations as took place were the result 
 of imitation and not of intimidation or imposition.'^ 
 
 In the newly discovered countries colonization was carried on 
 under different conditions. The natives were of another type 
 from the invaders. The stages of culture were so different as to 
 render sympathetic relations almost impossible. Hence wars of 
 extermination were common and those natives who could not 
 be reduced to abject submission or slavery were ruthlessly de- 
 stroyed. 
 
 The desire to convert the Indians to Christianity burned 
 fiercely in the breasts of many of the earlier explorers, but the 
 religious motive for colonization soon spent its force. Hugue- 
 nots and Puritans established colonies in order to secure religious 
 and political liberty for themselves, not to carry the Gospel to 
 the Indians. 
 
 The Spanish monarchs were very careful to see that just laws 
 were provided for the protection of the natives and that priests 
 be given the opportunity to teach them religion. Nevertheless 
 the conquistadors murdered them and the encomendadors made 
 slaves of them. The English and Dutch treated the natives 
 little if any better than the Spaniards. For more than two cen- 
 turies these conditions continued without much change. 
 
 Then a new spirit began to pervade the world, a spirit which 
 recognized the kinship of all mankind. Improved means of com- 
 munication and a public press made visible the dark comers of 
 the world. Enlightened selfishness also played a part in the 
 amelioration of the hard lot of the natives of tropical colonies. 
 After the slave trade was destroyed the native laborers had to be 
 conserved, and the planters finally learned the lesson that their 
 efficiency and value increased in proportion as they were main- 
 tained in health and contentment. With the growth of the hu- 
 
 Ti Keller, Colonisation, pp. S, 76.
 
 38 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 manitarian spirit came also a sense of duty and obligation toward 
 subject people. At first a vague sentiment which found expres- 
 sion in protest, it became in course of time an effective and con- 
 trolling force. The impeachment of Warren Hastings did much 
 to strengthen it and direct it particularly toward India. By the 
 sacrifice of an individual an iniquitous system was destroyed and 
 a principle established. Burke's speeches left an indelible im- 
 pression upon the public mind. "The great lesson of the impeach- 
 ment," says Lord Morley/^ was "that Asiatics have rights and 
 that Europeans have obligations ; that a superior race is bound to 
 observe the highest current morality of the time in all its deal- 
 ings with the subject race. Burke is entitled to our lasting rev- 
 erence as the first apostle and great upholder of integrity, mercy, 
 and honor in the relation between his countrymen and their 
 humble dependents." 
 
 But for several generations thereafter the principle meant 
 little more than that natives should not be ruthlessly killed, 
 robbed or otherwise mistreated. In fact, their exploitation was 
 involved in the theory that colonies existed for the exclusive 
 benefit of the colonizing state. Benevolently inclined colonists 
 adopted the theory that if the languid denizens of the tropics 
 were forced to labor hard enough and long enough they would 
 form the habit and thereafter all would be well for the country. 
 
 The people of India are, and during the entire period of British 
 rule have been, very different from those of any of the other 
 colonies or dependencies. They are the product of an ancient 
 and highly developed as well as distinctive civilization. In blood, 
 religion and philosophy they differ from the English. The great 
 mass of the people of India are ignorant, but there has always 
 been a small proportion of highly cultivated and educated native 
 people. England's responsibility for the good government of 
 the natives was recognized long before the administration of the 
 country was formally taken over by the Crown. To Lord Will- 
 iam Bentinck, says Sir Charles Trevelyan,'^ "belongs the great 
 
 ''^ Life of Edmund Burke, p. 133. 
 
 '3 Rulers of India, III, p. 137. "The foundation of British greatness upon
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 39 
 
 praise of having placed our dominion in India on the proper 
 foundation in the recognition of the great principle that India 
 is to be governed for the benefit of the Indian and that the ad- 
 vantages which we derive from it should be such as are incidental 
 to and inferable from that course of proceeding." 
 
 This doctrine was accepted without reservation by the Crown. 
 In the famous proclamation of November 1, 1858, Queen Vic- 
 toria announced that 
 
 "We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian terri- 
 tories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our 
 other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty 
 God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil. 
 
 "It is our further will that so far as may be, our subjects, of 
 whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to 
 offices in our service the duties of which they be qualified by their 
 education, ability and integrity duly to discharge. 
 
 "We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which 
 natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their 
 ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected 
 therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we 
 will that generally, in framing and administering the law, due 
 regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages and customs of 
 India." 
 
 For many years the specific promises of this proclamation were 
 not fully performed. The Indian people were being slowly edu- 
 cated and the country developed. But the higher English educa- 
 tion given a few; of the natives and the comparative material pros- 
 perity resulted in dissatisfaction with the government. Had 
 England deliberately planned an educational system designed to 
 destroy the type of government which she established in India 
 it is doubtful whether she could have improved on the one ac- 
 tually adopted. It commenced at the top and has never reached 
 very far downward. It was inevitable that a generation of Indi- 
 ans brought up on the philosophy of English Liberalism, and 
 nourished on the writings of Burke and Mill, would demand that 
 
 Indian happiness was to be Lord William Bentinck's own special work.* 
 Ibid., p. 133.
 
 40 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 their principles be applied to India. Why, they asked, did not 
 the arguments of Burke's speech on Conciliation with America 
 hold good in India? There was no answer other than that India 
 was not America and Indians not Americans or Englishmen. 
 That answer, which implied inferiority, was not satisfactory to 
 the Indians. 
 
 It seems difficult for an Englishman to understand why any 
 person, white, black or yellow, should not wish to live under the 
 British flag. Does it not, he asks, mean the blessings of law, 
 order, peace and justice, and what more should any reasonable 
 and well disposed person desire? In fact, these very desirable 
 things, as understood by Europeans, are what the majority of 
 Orientals do not want and object to having imposed upon them. 
 
 If the English government desired to perpetuate British 
 rule In India it should in 1836 have rejected instead of approved 
 Macaulay's plan for reorganizing the educational system.^* 
 
 It decided that Indian youth should be educated on English 
 instead of Oriental lines and proceeded to give an Oxford train- 
 ing to excitable young men who were destined to be clerks and 
 subordinate officials. The history and literature of England are 
 instinct with the spirit of personal liberty and political freedom, 
 and it was to be expected that an India educated on such lines 
 would demand control of her own affairs. 
 
 The movement took the form of an agitation for greater par- 
 ticipation In the government — that Is, for more offices for natives. 
 The so-called National Congress which met annually after 1885 
 enabled the agitators to reach the ear of the world.''' Being 
 without vision the government attempted at first to ignore and 
 then to suppress aspirations which under the circumstances were 
 as natural as the sequence of the seasons. The concessions made 
 were made grudgingly and therefore were not appreciated. Brit- 
 ish policy Is generally just but seldom generous. It Is never 
 Idealistic. 
 
 ]* Vide Chailley, Problems of British India, Book II, Chap. 6 (1910), for a 
 review of the Indian educational problem. 
 
 '^^ For a fair estimate of the work of the Congress, see Sir Charles Dilke's 
 Problems of Greater Britain, p. 432.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 41 
 
 The United States pursued a different policy in the Philippines. 
 She skilfully adopted as her own the cry which the Filipinos had 
 raised of "the Philippines for the Filipinos," and has been able in 
 a measure to direct a movement which could not be suppressed. 
 Writing of the situation in India M.Joseph Chailley says : "If the 
 English were an idep.^Istic people their rule would be easy and 
 splendid; in their turn they would seize on the motto, 'India for 
 the Indians.' " 
 
 The modest concessions produced no great moral effect. In 
 1870 Lord Mayo inaugurated a restricted system of local govern- 
 ment which was somewhat extended by his successor. Lord 
 Lytton. By 1878 the native press had become so violent that it 
 was necessary to establish a censorship. The first serious effort 
 at reform on principles favorable to native participation in the 
 government was made by Lord Ripon — "the first Viceroy to dis- 
 cover the new India, the India not of expanding boundaries, but 
 of expanding souls." During his term of office municipal and 
 urban boards based on the elective principle were established. 
 For the first time "the natives became of some account in the 
 management of their own affairs." The Press Act was repealed, 
 but an attempt to authorize the trial of Europeans by native 
 judges raised such a storm of indignation that it had to be mate- 
 rially modified.'* 
 
 In 1892, under Lord Lansdowne, a large non-official element 
 was introduced into the Provincial Legislative Councils. Some 
 very substantial concessions were thus made, but nevertheless the 
 Indians remained politically strangers in their own land. 
 
 Thus matters rested for sixteen years. During that time there 
 was a general movement throughout Asia which boded ill for 
 European control. The success of the Japanese in the war 
 against a European power greatly stimulated the activities of 
 those who were working to develop the idea of nationality and 
 to consolidate the Asiatic races. Lord Curzon, who ruled India 
 from 1899 to 1905, sympathized with the aspirations of the In- 
 
 '8 For the history of the famous "Ilbert Bill." see Lord Cromer's article 
 on Sir Alfred Lyall, in The Quarterly Review for July, 1913.
 
 42 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 dians for greater national unity and with their ambition to play 
 a part in the life of the country, but he believed that India then 
 needed administrative reforms more than political concessions. 
 The keynote of his remarkable administration was "efficiency," a 
 word which he believed to be a "synonym for the contentment of 
 the governed." 
 
 The experience of the British in India and of the Americans 
 in the Philippines shows that this, like many other perfectly 
 sound and valid principles, will not always work with Orientals. 
 The fact is that they care very little for efficiency in administra- 
 tion. In a community of politically half developed and excitable 
 Eastern people who are living under the imposed dominion of 
 an alien race, it is a waste of breath to advise them to eschew 
 politics and devote themselves solely to the developing of the 
 material resources of the country. Probably it is exactly what 
 they should do, but certainly it is what they will not do. 
 
 Soon after Lord Morley became secretary of state for India 
 in 1905 it was decided to make further substantial concessions 
 to the natives of India. The jubilee of the Queen's Proclama- 
 tion of 1858 furnished an occasion for stating this intention in 
 an impressive way. In the Proclamation of the King-Emperor, 
 November 2, 1908, it was announced that: 
 
 "Steps are being continually taken toward obliterating distinc- 
 tions of race as the test for access to posts of public authority 
 and power. In this path I confidently expect and intend the 
 progress henceforward to be steadfast and sure, as education 
 spreads, experience ripens, and the lessons of responsibility are 
 well learned by the keen intelligence and apt capabilities of 
 India. 
 
 "From the first the principle of representative institutions be- 
 gan to be gradually introduced, and the time has come when in 
 the judgment of my Viceroy and Governor-General, and others 
 of my Counsellors, that principle may be prudently extended. 
 Important classes among you, representing ideas that have been 
 fostered and encouraged by British rule, claim equality of citi- 
 zenship and a greater share in legislation and government. The 
 politic satisfaction of such a claim will strengthen, not impair,
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 43 
 
 existing authority and power. Administration will be all the 
 more efficient if the officers who conduct it have greater oppor- 
 tunities of regular contact with those who influence and reflect 
 common opinion about it."^'^ 
 
 Just at this inopportune time the irreconcilable and criminal 
 element among the agitators began throwing bombs and murder- 
 ing officials. The Liberal government met the situation with 
 firmness, but refused to abandon its plans at the instigation of 
 the extremists of either violence or conservatism. The regula- 
 tions of 1818 relating to the deportation of seditious characters 
 were revived and in recognition of the fact that "you may put 
 picric acid in a pen and ink just as much as in any steel bomb," 
 a Press Act and an Explosives Act were passed. 
 
 In a speech replete with the greatest magnanimity. Lord Mor- 
 ley appealed for support to the best class of Indians: 
 
 "Time has gone on with me," he said,'® "experience has wi- 
 dened. I have never lost my invincible faith that there is a bet- 
 ter mind in all civilized communities — and that this better mind, 
 if you can reach it, if statesmen in time to come can reach 
 that better mind, can awaken it, can evoke it, can induce it to 
 apply itself to practical purposes for the improvement of the 
 conditions of such a community — they will earn the crown of 
 beneficent fame indeed. Nothing strikes me much more than 
 this, when I talk of the better mind of India — there are subtle 
 elements, religious, spiritual, mystical, traditional, historical in 
 what we may call for the moment the Indian mind, which are 
 very hard for the most candid and patient to grasp or to realize 
 in their full force. But our duty, and it is a splendid duty, is 
 to try." 
 
 In 1907 two Indians were appointed members of the Council 
 of India in London, and soon thereafter another was made the 
 legal member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. The legisla- 
 tion of 1909 resulted in the enlargement of the Imperial and 
 Provincial Legislative Councils. The size of the former was 
 trebled, the number of non-official members increased, and greater 
 
 '■'The Proclamations of 1858 and 1908 are printed in the Appendix to 
 Morley's Indian Speeches, 1907-1909. 
 
 w Speech at Arbroath, October 21, 1907, Indian Speeches, p. 42.
 
 44 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 scope was given to the elective principle. As increased, the Im- 
 perial Council consists of sixty-eight members, of whom thirty- 
 six are official and must vote with the government. Of the re- 
 maining thirty-two non-official members, four are nominated by 
 the viceroy, two elected by Chambers of Commerce, one by the 
 Indian trading communities, seven by the landed interests of 
 seven provinces, six by the Mohammedans and twelve by the 
 non-official members of the Provincial Councils or by rural and 
 urban boards in the Central Provinces where no councils exist. 
 The control thus remains with the government. In the Provin- 
 cial Councils, however, the non-official members have a majority 
 and may outvote the government on legislative matters. In the 
 Provincial Council of Bengal the elected non-official members 
 outnumber the nominated members, both official and non-official. 
 
 It is not easy to overestimate the importance and significance 
 of these concessions. They are especially interesting in view 
 of the charges of rashness which were so generally made against 
 the United States when similar powers were conceded to the 
 Filipinos. 
 
 As to the general effect of this reform legislation. Sir Bamp- 
 fylde Fuller says 'J^ 
 
 "For the educated and well-to-do the State is then no longer 
 to be regarded as an esoteric institution, with whose behests their 
 only concern is to obey. Encouraging results can already be ob- 
 served, although so far they are mainly indirect fruits of the con- 
 cession. At the Council board Indians meet British officials upon 
 equal terms; this equality is advantageous to both parties; the 
 one gains in invigorating self-esteem, the other loses an aggra- 
 vating air of superiority. Non-official opinion is bridled by re- 
 sponsibility, and elected members, who make their entry in decla- 
 mation, soon settle down to dispassionate discussion. The offer 
 of an authorized opportunity to public criticism lessens its incli- 
 nation for tempestuous attacks, whether in the press or in such 
 informal gatherings as the National Congress — a convention in 
 which representatives of the educated classes have annually met 
 to discuss and ventilate their grievances. These gains are indi- 
 te TAe Empire of India (1913), p. 284.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 45 
 
 rect, but they are very substantial. In the direct exercise of their 
 legislative functions non-official members have not as yet made 
 any great mark upon state policy; they generally find that their 
 earnestness is discharged by their eloquence; having spoken with 
 credit they feel relieved of concern with practical issues. But 
 in this they do not differ from many Western orators." 
 
 He then calls attention to a fact which is noticeable in all East- 
 ern countries which are subject to Western control — the disposi- 
 tion of the politically favored to represent their class only and 
 ignore the common man. 
 
 "There is," he says, " a real danger that, under the new regime, 
 the States will find it so troublesome to interfere on behalf of the 
 working classes (who have in Council no spokesman of their 
 own) that it will treat their interests with the indifference which 
 they have suffered under the middle class Cabinets of the West." 
 
 Lord Morley said that the government in passing this reform 
 legislation had no intention to pave the way for parliamentary 
 government in India. It is hard to believe, however, that he and 
 the other responsible Liberal statesmen could have been unaware 
 of the fact that they were entering upon a road along which 
 their successors must continue to travel until the goal is reached 
 — and that is the government of India by the Indians, subject 
 possibly to sufficient control to maintain its connection with the 
 British Empire.'" 
 
 At a meeting of the National Congress at Madras in 1908, one 
 of the leading Indians, Mr. Surendra Nath Banerjee, thus ex- 
 pressed the understandings and aspirations of his people. *'I 
 will not say that we have got all that we want. We want abso- 
 lute control of our own finances and executive administration. 
 We have got neither ; but I believe that these reforms and prO' 
 
 ®° "Some Englishmen appear to think that our duty lies in the direction of 
 developing self-governing principles all along the line, and that we must 
 accept the consequences of their development whatever they may be — even, I 
 conclude, to the extent of paving the way for our own withdrawal from the 
 country.^ ... I do not conceal from myself that the consequences may be 
 serious in so far that they may materially increase the difficulty of governing 
 the country; but I altogether reject the extreme consequence of possible 
 "withdrawal" Lord Cromer, Ancient and Modern Imperialism, p. 125.
 
 46 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 posals in their moral development and in their ultimate evolution 
 will give them both." 
 
 Under these circumstances there is no reason to believe that 
 the agitation for further concessions will cease, and the most 
 disinterested observers think that the natives will win. "It is 
 certain," says M. Chailley,^^ "that this struggle must, in the long 
 run, end in the victory of the natives, and that the English must 
 one day be reduced to the occupation of a very small number of 
 high appointments — a mere symbol of their rule. Stendhal has 
 said that as the prisoner thinks more often of escape than the 
 jailor of keeping him there . . . the prisoner must in the end 
 succeed. The Indian, too, will succeed — ^that is certain ; hut it is 
 good for him and for India that he should not triumph pre- 
 maturely" 
 
 Great Britain's real problem is the maintenance of her su- 
 premacy over a land as large as Europe west of the Vistula and 
 with thirty million more people, full of ancient nations, of great 
 cities, of varieties of civilization, of armies, nobilities, priest- 
 hoods, organizations for every conceivable purpose from the 
 spreading of great religions down to systematic murder. It is a 
 vast territory in which there are more Hindustanees than there 
 are white men in the United States, more Bengalees than there 
 are Frenchmen in Europe, more Maharattas than there are Span- 
 iards in Spain; in which the number of fighting men under a 
 military system such as is in force in Germany would place two 
 and one-half million soldiers in barracks, add eight hundred 
 thousand recruits thereto annually, and leave the reserves un- 
 touched.*^ 
 
 The difficulties presented by the government of such a coun- 
 try are almost inconceivable, and yet for more than a century 
 India has been governed by a few thousand resolute detached 
 Englishmen supported by a white army smaller than the regular 
 army of Belgium. Of course British rule has rested on the pres- 
 tige of moral and political superiority, and the people have acqui- 
 
 ^'^ Problems of British India, p. 526. 
 *2Townsend, Asia and Europe (1910), p. 84.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 47 
 
 esced in that rule because they reahzed that under existing condi- 
 tions it was for the good of India. It has given them peace, 
 order and justice. Its withdrawal would probably mean an in- 
 ternecine struggle and invasion by some other great power. 
 
 The moral justification of Western rule over Eastern people 
 rests on race superiority and the possession of a higher civiliza- 
 tion — a civilization so superior as to justify its imposition upon 
 the ancient system by force. Like the American rule in the Phil- 
 ippines, English rule in India is justified by the moral and politi- 
 cal superiority of the rulers. It follows that when those condi- 
 tions no longer exist the moral justification for the rule will be at 
 an end. As Mr. Meredith Townsend says,^^ "If the Englishman 
 by virtue of the superior morale of his race has not a moral right 
 to govern and administer India irrespective of the opinion of her 
 people, then he has no right to remain there when she bids him 
 go, no right of any kind to office if an Indian can beat him at 
 the tests set up." 
 
 Whatever the final destiny of India, the work which England 
 has done is permanent and will endure. As Lord Curzon so elo- 
 quently said, "The message is carved in granite, it is hewn out 
 of the rock of doom — that our work is righteous and that it shall 
 endure." It is for England to say when her work is finished. It 
 is for her to determine when and to what extent the people of 
 India are prepared to manage their own affairs. In the mean- 
 time she must resist the demands of the impracticable enthusiasts 
 and grant concessions only as a reasonable proportion of the 
 people are prepared for self-government. But the rapidly devel- 
 oping feeling of nationality should not and can not be suppressed. 
 It should be cultivated and directed. Its worst features are the 
 results of discontent and dissatisfaction; its best form will de- 
 velop from the prosperity and well-being of the people. Agita- 
 tion, a free press, Western literature and education all make for 
 the same end. It is doubtful whether any Asiatic race will in the 
 future willingly submit to the permanent rule of a white race. 
 The white and yellow people may for a time occupy the same 
 
 M/fctU, p. 116.
 
 48 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 territory, cooperate in the same government, fight for the same 
 cause and labor for the development of the same country, but if 
 the white man is successful in his efforts to raise the yellow race 
 to his own standards of efficiency and culture, he will have com- 
 pleted his political work. That time has already come in Japan, 
 and it will come in China, in Java and in the Philippines. The 
 recognition of the fact does not in the least detract from the use- 
 fulness or the dignity of the white man's work in the tropics. 
 The master is responsible for those under his tutelage, and his 
 honor and glory are in the success achieved by his pupils after 
 they grow to manhood. The world's work must be done, and the 
 East and the tropics must do their fair proportion. For the 
 present it must be done under the direction of the white races. 
 There is little in the history of the past to encourage the belief 
 that the period of tutelage will be short. The issue rests with the 
 natives themselves. If they have not the will or the capacity to 
 develop on modern lines, the white man's control will be perma- 
 nent. 
 
 The demand for some degree of self-government by the na- 
 tives of tropical countries is general.®* Even the Javanese are 
 feeling its impulse.*' Great Britain's constructive work in Egypt 
 
 8* "Self-government after the model of our self-governing colonies seems 
 to be at present the ideal of every administrative unit of the Empire. Let it 
 be so; but let us also bear in mind that the justification of that type of 
 government depends on conditions that it may take generations, perhaps cen- 
 turies, to realize.^ Ohne Hast ohne^ Rast (unhasting, unresting) must be our 
 maxim ; our spirit a spirit of caution in every procedure which has a tend- 
 ency to bring into collision the usages and prejudices of communities, a spirit 
 giving time for the slow and silent operation of desired improvements, with 
 a constant conviction that every attempt to accelerate the end will be attended 
 with the danger of defeat." Bruce, The Broad Stone of Empire, I, p. 35. 
 
 85 The nationalist movement there is not at present of much importance, 
 There are, however, indications of an attempt at organization for the purpose 
 of agitation. 
 
 Mr. Bernard Miall, in a preface to Cabaton's Java and the Dutch East 
 Indies, p. 23, says : "The nationalist cry is only dangerous when it is a demand 
 that a helpless and ignorant people shall be handed over to a horde of semi- 
 westernized lawyers, agitators, bureaucrats and contractors. It is to be hoped 
 that the Indies have once and for all passed the period of spoliation ; and 
 there is every indication that the wise and paternal rule of the Dutch, and the 
 lack of enormous urban populations will forever be a safeguard against the 
 poisonous growth of a spurious nationalism. But we can not be surprised if 
 the Dutch, with India and Egypt before their eyes, prefer to proceed with the 
 utmost caution."
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 49 
 
 is greatly to her credit. She has rescued the country from bank- 
 ruptcy, converted its deserts into cotton-fields, protected the com- 
 mon people from oppression by their native rulers and encour- 
 aged the people to expect self-government.** She entered Egypt 
 for financial purposes ; she remained as a schoolmaster. Until the 
 exigencies of a European war made the establishment of a pro- 
 tectorate necessary she exercised but denied sovereignty over the 
 country. She promised that her occupation would be temporary, 
 but conditions made it permanent. For twenty years she con- 
 trolled the country through a strong skilful diplomat and admin- 
 istrator who masqueraded under the ostentatiously simple title 
 of British agent. Lord Cromer, who ruled with a wise and firm 
 hand, was succeeded by Sir Elden Gorst, who soon after his ar- 
 rival in Cairo informed a gathering of British officials that "they 
 were not there to govern Egypt indefinitely, but to teach the 
 Egyptians to govern themselves." He weakened his government 
 by too much talking, just as we have done in the Philippines. 
 
 Gorst's well-meant efforts at conciliation were interpreted by 
 the nationalists as evidence of weakness,*'^ and for a time British 
 prestige suffered. "When," says Lord Cromer,®* "a very well 
 intentioned but rather rash attempt was made to advance too 
 rapidly in a liberal direction, the inevitable reaction, which was 
 to have been foreseen, took place. Not merely Europeans, but 
 also Egyptians called loudly for a halt, and, with the appoint- 
 ment of Lord Kitchener, they got what they wanted." 
 
 The movement for nationality has probably been stronger and 
 more aggressive in Egypt than in any other Eastern country. It 
 
 8* "Nothing that England has done in Asia, and Germany or France in 
 Africa, has been so swift, so certain, so unquestionably beneficial to the 
 world at large and to the populations immediately concerned." Low, Egypt in 
 Transition (1914), p. 253. 
 
 87 Fyfe, The New Spirit in Egypt (1911), Chap. 16. This is an interesting 
 but one-sided book. The author prefaces his chapter on "The Fruits of Sen- 
 timental Anarchism" with Ex-President Roosevelt's wise statement that: 
 "There are foolish empiricists who believe that the granting of a paper con- 
 stitution, especially if prefaced by some high-sounding declaration, can of 
 itself confer the power of self-government upon a people. This is never so. 
 Nobody can give a people self-government any more than it is possible to give 
 an individual self-help." 
 
 ^^ Political and Literary Essays, p. 255. See also Cromer's Abbas II, 
 Preface (1915).
 
 50 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 will nevertheless be many years before any real nationality can 
 be developed from the congeries of races which inhabit that an- 
 cient land. Egypt presents scarcely a problem other than that 
 of religion which is not duplicated in kind in the Philippines. 
 Even the declared objects of the two governments were the same 
 and there is a remarkable resemblance in the methods which have 
 been adopted. The origin of British power in Egypt and Ameri- 
 can power in the Philippines and the original objects were very 
 different. But in each country the primary purposes of the gov- 
 ernment were declared to be the education of the people and the 
 material developm.ent of the country for the benefit of the na- 
 tives with the hope and reasonable expectation that indirect and 
 incidental benefits would accrue therefrom to the metropolitan 
 power. In a recent book on Egypt, Mr. Henry Cunningham®^ 
 says: "It may be argued that the Philippine Islands are a col- 
 ony whereas Egypt is an indefinable something which certain 
 British politicians even hesitate to pronounce a protectorate, but 
 the fact remains that the work of both powers is identical in 
 principle — each has promised self-government when the people 
 are considered to be fitted by education and training to re- 
 ceive it." 
 
 Nothing illustrates better the force of the general movement 
 toward self-government than that, notwithstanding the fact that 
 Lord Kitchener was sent to Egypt to "put a stop to the non- 
 sense" which was being encouraged by Sir Elden Gorst, he found 
 it advisable to grant the natives further participation in the legis- 
 lative department of the government.^" 
 
 Lord Dufferin, who, after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, was sent 
 to report on the situation in Egypt, recommended the institution 
 of certain representative institutions which would give the edu- 
 cated natives some part in the government.^* The Organic Act 
 
 ^^ Cunningham, To-day in Egypt (1913), p. 48. 
 
 90 Lord Kitchener's Rept., Egypt, No. 1 (1913). 
 
 81 Sir Auckland Colvin (The Making of Modern Egypt, p. 31) says with 
 reference to Lord Dufferin's recommendation of local government: "There 
 was a feeling in England that as the Egyptian revolt had raised the cry of 
 self-government, some measure of self-government should be accorded. A 
 Liberal government looked with unction on such an issue ; the British public,
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 51 
 
 of 1883, provided for a Legislative Council of thirty members, 
 of whom fourteen were nominated by the government, with 
 authority to examine the budgets and proposed laws and com- 
 municate its opinions with reference thereto to the government. 
 There was also a General Assembly composed of the Legislative 
 Council, the six ministers, and forty-six elective members. No 
 new tax could be imposed or public loan contracted without the 
 consent of this General Assembly.®* 
 
 By the law enacted in 1913, after Kitchener became British 
 Agent, the General Assembly was merged into the Legislative 
 Council, which became the Legislative Assembly. This body has 
 eighty-nine members of whom sixty-six are elected by elector 
 delegates, each of whom represents fifty inhabitants and must be 
 elected by an absolute majority of votes. The cabinet ministers 
 are ex officio members of the Assembly and the government 
 nominates seventeen members to represent certain elements of the 
 population, such as the Copts, Bedouins, and certain occupations 
 and professions, such as merchants, doctors and engineers. The 
 powers of the new Assembly are, however, little more than con- 
 sultative and advisory. The government is still absolute, and 
 legislation and administration are executive functions. Never- 
 theless the reorganized Assembly will, if its members are wise, 
 exercise considerable influence upon legislation. It may initiate 
 a pro jet of a law and send it to the Council of Ministers for con- 
 
 profoundly ignorant in Egyptian matters, but pleased to see its most char- 
 acteristic features reflected in all waters, acquiesced. Too great stress has 
 sometimes been laid on Lord Dufferin's generous recognition that the meta- 
 morphic spirit of the age was working even in Egypt; as on his brilliant 
 metaphor that, like her own Memnon, she had not remained irresponsive to 
 the beams of the new dawn ; that the lips of Egypt had trembled, if they had 
 not articulated. This was only to recall to his countrymen, with character- 
 istic felicity of language, that so far from her being capable of self-govern- 
 ment the breath of a free spirit had but now for the first time touched 
 Egypt." 
 
 See also Cromer. Modern Egypt, T, Chap. 18 ; Lyall's Life of the Marqms 
 of Dufferin, II, p. 260. For an account of the development of self-govern- 
 ment in Egypt, see Lord Cromer's Report of 1906 (Egypt, No. 1, of 1907, 
 p. 29). Lord Cromer says that the leading idea of Lord Dufferin's law was 
 "to give the Egyptian people an opportunity of making their voices heard, 
 but at the same time not to bind the Executive Government by Parliamentary 
 fetters." Modern Egypt, 11, p. 274. 
 
 82 Milner, England in Egypt, p. 308.
 
 52 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 sideration. The Council is required to consult with the Assembly 
 and will doubtless be greatly influenced by its advice. The "peo- 
 ple" are thus consulted and advised with and to that extent prog- 
 ress has been made along the road which all governments are 
 traveling. 
 
 England in the Soudan, like Germany and France in their 
 African colonies, is dealing with primitive conditions and unde- 
 veloped people. Politically the Soudan is Anglo-Egyptian, flying 
 both flags, a sort of hybrid state, "of a nature eminently calcu- 
 lated to shock the susceptibilities of international jurists." The 
 country is quiet and orderly, and great progress is being made 
 in material development and the preparation of the people for 
 civilization. It is in the Soudan, United Nigeria and British 
 East Africa, where native political aspirations have not yet de- 
 veloped, that British genius for colonial work at present finds its 
 greatest opportunities.®' 
 
 In the British Crown colonies the agitation for participation 
 in the government by the natives is in the incipient stage. In 
 India, Egypt and the Philippines it has become not merely a 
 question of native participation but of native control. France 
 in her colonies has avoided the question to some extent by a pol- 
 icy of assimilation. The Englishman keeps himself and his 
 government as much aloof as possible from the natives and 
 grants concessions as a favor from above. The Frenchman takes 
 the natives of Algiers, Tonkin and the other colonies into the 
 political family and invites them to send representatives to the 
 National House of Deputies in Paris. La ou est le drapeau, la* 
 
 93 For present conditions in the Soudan, see Sydney Low, Egypt in Tran- 
 sition (1914), Chaps. 2-13, with introduction by Lord Cromer; and Yacoub 
 Pasha Artin's England in the Sudan (1911). For an account of Sir 
 Frederick Lugard's work in Nigeria, see Harris' Intervention and Coloniza- 
 tion in Africa, Chap, 7. In South Africa the British have constructed a self- 
 governing dominion out of the various colonies, which came to her as the 
 result of the Boer War. The loyalty of the Boers during the present war is 
 a_ tribute to British skill as state builders. It is interesting to note the great 
 similarity of British methods and those of the Americans in the Philip- 
 pines. For a detailed account of the methods pursued, see Worsford, 
 Reconstruction of the New Colonies Under Lord Milner, 2 Vols. (1913).
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 53 
 
 est France.^* The Germans were busy teaching their natives to 
 labor. The Americans are serving as schoolmasters training the 
 natives in state-building, agriculture, sanitation, road-making, 
 and how to live like self-respecting members of a self-governing 
 community. 
 
 Previous to the war with Spain the United States had taken 
 no part in the work of colonizing and developing the tropics. 
 Her territorial growth had been rapid but, with one exception, 
 her acquisitions had been of contiguous territory. Her entry 
 into the field of modem colonization was perhaps fortuitous. 
 What Sir John Seeley said of England may, in one sense, be 
 said of the United States — she seems to have acquired an em- 
 pire "in a fit of absence of mind." 
 
 The first decade of the twentieth century found her definitely 
 committed to a policy of colonization according to the modern un- 
 derstanding of that word. Under forms of governments, adapted 
 to the special conditions of each, she was governing Alaska, Ha- 
 waii, the Philippines, Porto Rico, Guam and the Panama Canal 
 Zone, all distant non-contiguous territory. Cuba was an American 
 protectorate ; San Domingo a sort of protege. Her control over 
 the petty states of Central America, although less tangible was 
 no less real. It was already apparent that for political purposes 
 the Panama Canal should be considered as the southern boundary 
 of the United States. 
 
 With the exception of Alaska, which wfvS almost uninhabited, 
 all these possessions were situated in the tropics and inhabited 
 by alien peoples with a lower order of civilization. The matter 
 of contiguousness, which had seemed so important to earlier 
 generations, was important only in so far as it involved diffi- 
 culties of communication. But distances had so shrunk that a 
 few thousand miles of intervening ocean had become less for- 
 midable than the weary miles our forefathers traveled in cross- 
 ing New England. The steamship, the cable and the wireless 
 telegraph had annihilated distances. 
 
 **Reinscli, Colonial Government, p. 190; Lewis, Government of Depend- 
 encies, Cliap. X.
 
 54 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The acquisition of territory in the Orient was neither an un- 
 natural nor an abnormal fact in the history of the United States. 
 It did not even, to use the language of the geologists, constitute 
 a fault in the structural development of the nation. It is a 
 curious fact that more than fifty years before Dewey sailed Into 
 Manila Bay the German scientist and traveler, Jagor, predicted 
 that: *'In proportion as the navigation of the west coast of 
 America extends the influence of the American element over the 
 South Sea, the captivating, magic power which the great Re- 
 public exercises over the Spanish Colonies, will not fail to make 
 itself felt also in the Philippines. The Americans are evidently 
 destined to bring to a full development the germs originated by 
 the Spaniards.^^ 
 
 The entry of the United States into the field of tropical col- 
 onization came as a surprise to a world which had assumed that 
 her policy of isolation was necessarily a permanent policy and 
 that it would forever limit her activities to the Western Hemis- 
 phere. Nor did the manner in which she proposed to manage her 
 new dependencies meet with the enthusiastic approval of Euro- 
 pean experts in colonization. It was to be expected that she 
 would accept the generally approved theory that the welfare of 
 the people under her control should be her first consideration. A 
 republic with her traditions might be excused even for overstating 
 the formula, but it was felt that there could be no excuse ex- 
 cept Ignorance for statesmen who deliberately and seriously an- 
 nounced to the world and to the natives that the country would 
 be managed solely in the interest of the natives with the delib- 
 erate purpose of preparing them for the management of their 
 own affairs. To British colonial statesmen of even the modern 
 liberal school the announcement of such a policy seemed like 
 flying in the face of nature which had intended certain races to 
 remain in a perpetual condition of subordination. 
 
 It was conceded that the welfare of the natives should be the 
 
 *5 Jagor, Travels in the Philippines (London, 1875), p. 369. In an article 
 published in La Solidaridad, September 30, 1891, Rizal discussed the possibil- 
 ity that the United States would acquire the Philippines.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 55 
 
 primary object of the government, but back of all such statements 
 was the implication that what was for the welfare of the natives 
 should always be determined by the Europeans.®^ Now came the 
 impracticable and theoretical Americans and announced that the 
 natives themselves should not only have a large share of the 
 offices but a constantly increasing influence in determining their 
 own affairs, and ultimately, when they had been educated and 
 trained, if they so desired the entire government should be turned 
 over to them. 
 
 It involves the assumption that an Oriental people of Malayan 
 origin with three centuries of Spanish training are capable of 
 being educated and trained to govern themselves on modem 
 lines. 
 
 Much of the criticism of this policy was captious and founded 
 on complete ignorance not only of the policy but also of the 
 tendencies of modem colonization. Thus it was alleged some- 
 what superciliously that the Americans were disregarding all 
 precedents and assuming inherent capacity for solving problems 
 which the Dutch, English and French experts had not been able 
 to solve to their entire satisfaction by the most scientific meth- 
 ods.®^ In fact the United States in adopting a policy and or- 
 ganizing a government for the Philippines followed the most 
 approved British theories and precedents. Every principle which 
 she applied had been approved by British statesmen or was the 
 
 *^The same conservative doctrine is thus stated by Lord Cromer: "In 
 dealing with Indians, Egyptians, Shilluks, or Zulus, the first question is to 
 consider what course is most conducive to Indian, Egyptian, Shilluk or Zulu 
 interests. We need not always inquire too closely what these people, who are 
 all, nationally speaking, more or less in statu pupillari, themselves think is 
 best in their own interests, although this is a point which deserves serious 
 consideration. But it is essential that each special issue should be decided 
 mainly with reference to what, by the light of Western knowledge and ex- 
 perience tempered by local considerations, we conscientiously think is best for 
 tlie subject race, without reference to any real or supposed advantage which 
 may accrue to England as a nation." Political and Literary Essays (1913), 
 p. 12. 
 
 It may be doubted whether in the administration of her colonies England 
 always subordinates her interests to that of her native subjects. Her leading 
 statesmen, however, certainly recognize her obligation to do so. It needs 
 hardly be said that in practise America reserves the power to determine 
 what is best for the natives of her dependencies. 
 
 97 We have seen to what extent scientific methods had been applied to 
 British colonization.
 
 56 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 logical conclusion of British practises. She followed the way 
 the Zeitgeist pointed. There was nothing novel in her methods 
 of procedure unless it was in the stress laid on education as a 
 means of elevating and developing the native people. 
 
 The instructions of President McKinley to the Philippine 
 Commission followed the lines laid down in the Queen's Procla- 
 mation of 1858. Compare the following with the language 
 which I have already quoted from that proclamation. The 
 commissioners jvere directed to : 
 
 "devote their attention in the first instance to the establish- 
 ment of municipal governments, in which the natives of the 
 islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall 
 be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to 
 the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the 
 least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of 
 their capacities, and observation of the workings of native con- 
 trol show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and 
 loyalty." 
 
 As different degrees of civilization and varieties of customs 
 and capacity among the people precluded specific instructions as 
 to the part which the people should take in the selection of their 
 officers, the following general rules were to be observed : 
 
 *Tn all cases the municipal officers who administer the local 
 affairs of the people are to be selected by the people, and that 
 wherever officers of more extended jurisdiction are to be se- 
 lected in any wzy, natives of the islands are to be preferred, and 
 if they can be found competent and willing to perform the duties, 
 they are to receive the offices in preference to any others. It 
 will be necessary to fill some offices for the present with Ameri- 
 cans which after a time may well be filled by natives of the 
 islands." 
 
 In all the forms of government and administrative provisions, 
 the Commission should bear in mind that : 
 
 **The government which they are establishing is designed not
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 57 
 
 for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical 
 views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people 
 of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be 
 made to conform to their customs, their habits and even their 
 prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplish- 
 ment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective gov- 
 ernment." 
 
 But the Commission was instructed that the people of the 
 islands should be made plainly to understand that : 
 
 "there are certain great principles of government which have 
 been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem 
 essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual 
 freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied 
 the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain prac- 
 tical rules of government which we have found to be essential 
 to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, 
 and that these principles and these rules of government must be 
 established and maintained in their Islands for the sake of their 
 liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the 
 customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar." 
 
 Then follows an enumeration of all the provisions of the Bill 
 of Rights of the Constitution of the United States, except those 
 relating to trial by jury and the right to bear arms. 
 
 Quoting the pledge contained in the capitulation of the City 
 of Manila, the president closed the instructions with the follow- 
 ing words : 
 
 "As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the Government 
 of the United States to give protection for property and life, civil 
 and religious freedom, and firm, wise, and unselfish guidance in 
 the paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philip- 
 pine Islands." 
 
 There was, after all, nothing very radical in this statement of 
 controlling principles. The government was to be for the benefit 
 primarily of the people of the islands; In their local affairs they 
 jvere to have every opportunity, subject to proper supervision, to
 
 58 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 manage their own affairs, through officers elected by themselves, 
 to the fullest extent to which they were capable ; in filling offices, 
 natives, when competent, were to have the preference; their cus- 
 toms, habits and even prejudices were to be respected, and their 
 civil and political rights protected; all subject to certain great 
 principles which the United States deemed essential for the rule 
 of law and the maintenance of individual freedom. 
 
 But the United States was charged with placing undue con- 
 fidence in the governmental value of education. All colonizing 
 states now provide a certain amount of education for their native 
 subjects. Great Britain makes order and material prosperity the 
 primary objects of her governments and applies what money is 
 left toward education, regarding it as a necessity but nevertheless 
 the generator of difficulties innumerable. "In the long course of 
 our history," says Lord Cromer,^^ "many mistakes have been 
 made in dealing with subject races, and the line of conduct pur- 
 sued at various times has often been very erratic. Nevertheless, 
 it would be true to say that, broadly speaking, British policy has 
 been persistently directed toward an endeavor to strengthen po- 
 litical bonds through the medium of attention to material in- 
 terest." 
 
 It seems unnecessary to say that the Americans also recognize 
 that order is the first essential of every government. But the work 
 of education was commenced in the Philippines at once upon 
 the restoration of comparative order. In speaking of English 
 and Dutch colonization. Governor Ta ft said: "The chief differ- 
 ence between their policy and ours in the treatment of tropical 
 people arises from the fact that we are seeking to prepare the 
 people under our guidance for popular self-government. We are 
 
 98 Cromer, "The French in Algeria," The Spectator, May 31, 1913. See Ire- 
 land, The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 240. 
 
 In reference to Lord Cromer's policy in Egypt, Sir Auckland Colvin {The 
 Making of Modern Egpyt, p. 406) says : 
 
 "Moral and intellectual progress have not been lost sight of, but they have 
 been deliberately relegated to a subordinate place. The economic base of the 
 Agents' policy has been the desire to leave an appreciable margin in the hands 
 of the taxpayer," And yet Lord Cromer says : 
 
 "They [certain Pashas] recognized that the acquisition of knowledge was 
 the sole instrument by the use of which Egypt might perhaps eventually be 
 free from foreign control." Modern Egypt, II, p. 528.
 
 THEORY AND PRACTISE OF COLONIZATION 59 
 
 attempting to do this first by primary and secondary education 
 oflFered freely to the FiHpino people. . . . Our chief object 
 is to develop the people into a self-governing people, and in 
 doing that popular education is in our judgment the first and 
 most important means." 
 
 Time tends to show the wisdom of this policy. No British, 
 Dutch, German or French colony has made more progress ma- 
 terially than have the Philippines, during the last ten years, or 
 enjoyed a higher degree of order and justice. Considering the 
 educational work which has been done in Egypt, Mr. Cunning- 
 ham says:*' "A larger measure of education might conceivably 
 have made the task of government easier and facilitated the prog- 
 ress of civilization. A similar view was taken by the United 
 States when the responsibility for the government of the Philip- 
 pines was thrust upon her, a responsibility which, as in the case 
 of England and Egypt, was unpremeditated and undesired. 
 America came promptly to the conclusion that the first step to be 
 taken was the education of the people and they set about it in 
 their characteristic fashion. Instead of sending a score or two, 
 as we have done in Egypt, they sent teachers out in battalions 
 . . , starting schools everywhere and improving the many 
 scholastic institutions already in existence." 
 
 Without much exaggeration it may be said that the American 
 common school was carried to the East as a part of the materiel 
 of the army. Probably nothing exactly like it was ever before 
 witnessed. Soldiers left to guard the towns, opened extemporized 
 schools for the instruction of the children while their com- 
 rades were in the fields fighting the parents. It may have been 
 foolish, but it was a powerful agency in convincing the Filipinos 
 of the good will of the Americans. 
 
 "Behold, they clap the slave on the back, and behold he ariseth 
 a man! 
 
 They terribly carpet the earth with dead, and before their can- 
 non cool, 
 
 They walk unarmed by twos and threes to call the living to school." 
 
 »' To-day in Egypt (London, 1912), p. 48.
 
 60 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 It has been said that the EngHshman's sense of justice and the 
 Frenchman's sense of humor are their chief assets as successful 
 colonizers and rulers of alien people, and that the German, pos- 
 sessing neither of these invaluable attributes, is heavily handi- 
 capped. Americans possess the sense of justice and of humor 
 and possibly something more. 
 
 America has controlled the Philippines for seventeen years, 
 nearly a third of which were years of war and organization. In 
 that short time she has demonstrated not only that her people 
 possess the Englishman's capacity for governing dependencies 
 but that they have a certain quality of enthusiasm for high ideals 
 which British colonial history has not always disclosed and to 
 the lack of which friendly foreign critics attribute her present 
 difficulties in India and Egypt. Law, order and justice prevail 
 in the Philippines as in all British colonies. The Filipinos have 
 their national aspirations, their agitators, sedition mongers, irre- 
 sponsible politic OS and objectionable newspapers. They are as 
 eager for self-government as the Indians and Egyptians, but it 
 is a noticeable fact that these conquered, irritable and excitable 
 people have not thrown a bomb or attempted to murder an 
 American official. America's policy has not been repressive; it 
 has not presented a stone wall of opposition to native aspirations, 
 and it gives every indication of being successful. Never in the 
 whole course of history has there been a better illustration of the 
 profound truth of Edmund Burke's statement that "magnanimity 
 in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom."
 
 PART I 
 The Land and the People 
 
 "From the cape of California, being the uttermost part of 
 Neuva Espanna, I navigated to the Islands of the Philippinas 
 hard upon the coast of China; of which countrey I have brought 
 such intelligence as hath not bene heard of in these parts. The 
 statelinesse and riches of which countrey I feare to make re- 
 port of, least I should not be credited; for if I had not knowen 
 sufficiently the incomparable wealth of the countrey, I should 
 have bene as incredulous thereof, as others will be that have 
 not had the like experience." Thomas Candish to Lord Huns- 
 don (1588), Hakluyt's Principle Navigations, XI, p. Z76.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 The Philippine Archipelago 
 
 Location — Number and Extent of the Islands — Configuration — Character of 
 the Coasts — Rivers — Underground River — Mountain Streams — The Rainfall — 
 Location of Cities — Mountains and Forests — Volcanoes — Earthquakes — Coast 
 Line — Ocean Currents — Fauna and Flora — Minerals — Fish and Fishing — 
 Climate. 
 
 At some remote time while continents were in the making, the 
 long eastern coast of Asia which looked out upon the Pacific 
 Ocean was crushed, wrenched, torn and flung about by the gi- 
 gantic forces of nature. After the cataclysm, when things had 
 settled down, turbulent new seas were washing the shores of the 
 continent and the ocean was held at bay by a line of islands which 
 extended from the far north southward until they spread fanlike 
 toward the continent of Australia. A far-flung line of defense 
 had been created along the entire eastern front of Asia. But 
 it was not all above the surface of the sea. There were depres- 
 sions, and elevations, high mountains and deep channels. Ever 
 since the upheaval, the forces of nature have been at work mold- 
 ing and shaping the crushed and broken mass. 
 
 The islands thus formed are clustered together in well-defined 
 groups. The northern and central have become the home of an 
 Asiatic people who aspire to rival the Anglo-Saxons, who from 
 their seagirt home rule over one-fifth of the earth and its peo- 
 ple. From the southernmost point of the Japanese island of For- 
 mosa can be seen, on a clear day, the northernmost of that Phil- 
 ippine group of islands which extends far to the southward 
 where they cluster about the northern shores of Borneo and the 
 
 63
 
 64 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Celebes, which with Java and its satellites form yet another ag- 
 gregation. 
 
 The Philippine Archipelago thus lies north of the Dutch and 
 British island of Borneo and the Dutch island of Celebes, south of 
 the Japanese island of Formosa, and east of French Indo-China, 
 the British colony of Hong Kong, and the southern provinces of 
 the quondam Celestial Republic of China. It extends from five 
 degrees north latitude to twenty-two degrees north latitude, and is 
 thus entirely within the tropics. An isosceles triangle approxi- 
 mately five hundred miles on its base and a thousand miles on the 
 sides would enclose all except the Sulu Group of coral islands, 
 which would be left south of the base line and almost within sight 
 of the fringes of Borneo. Within this figure there are about 
 3,141 islands, in sizes from the tiny islet inhabited only by strange 
 tropical birds, to Luzon, with its millions of inhabitants and area 
 greater than the state of Pennsylvania. The total land area of 
 the Philippine Archipelago is 115,026 square miles, thus exceed- 
 ing the combined area of the states of New York, New Jersey, 
 Pennsylvania and Delaware and being seven thousand square 
 miles larger than Great Britain. Two of the islands combined 
 are greater than all of New England with the states of New York 
 and New Jersey added. Luzon in the north contains 40,969 
 square miles. Mindanao is reported to contain 36,292 square 
 miles, although recent surveys suggest the possibility that it is 
 larger than Luzon. Nine islands, Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, 
 Negros, Cebu, Panay, Leyte, Bohol, Mindoro, and Masbate, each 
 contains more than ten thousand square miles, or six million four 
 hundred thousand acres. Twenty of the islands each contains 
 between one hundred and one thousand square miles. Seventy- 
 three islands each contains between ten and one hundred square 
 miles, 262 islands between one and ten square miles, and 2,775 
 islands, or seven-eighths of all, contain less than one square mile 
 each. That is, seven-eighths of all the islands are so small that 
 each one contains less than 640 acres of land. When the 1905 
 Philippine census was published 1,668 of the islands had received 
 names, while 1,473 had not yet attained to that dignity.
 
 THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO 65 
 
 Jhree partially submerged isthmuses join the Philippine Archi- 
 pelago to Borneo and Celebes. On the west the connection is 
 between the northwest coast of Borneo and the southernmost 
 point of the long narrow island of Palawan. The strait of Bal- 
 abac which lies between Palawan and Borneo is full of reefs and 
 islands. The central connection runs from the northern coast 
 of Borneo through the Tawi-Tawi, Jolo and Basilan groups to 
 the southwestern point of Mindanao near Zamboanga. Between 
 these connections lies the Sulu Sea with an average depth of 
 six thousand feet. Farther east, a third isthmus extends from 
 Celebes through the SanguU group to the southeast point of Min- 
 danao near the gulf of Davao, thence northward in a great curve 
 through Leyte, Samar, and southern Luzon. Between the east- 
 ern and western connections lies the deep Celebes Sea. On these 
 submerged connections there are many coral reefs which often 
 lie dangerously near the surface of the warm shallow waters. 
 
 The Philippines face the setting stm and the shore of Asia 
 from which they were torn. During the greater part of the year 
 equatorial currents and trade winds pile the waters of the Pa- 
 cific on the bold and inhospitable eastern coast, rendering the 
 few harbors dangerous and useless. The western coast is broken 
 by inlets, bays and harbors. Between the coast line and the 
 verdure covered mountains in the hazy distance, lie long stretches 
 of fertile level country shaded by cocoanut palm and banana 
 trees, beneath which are many villages teeming with brown peo- 
 ple. White convent buildings and church steeples rise above the 
 verdure and suggest life and civilization to the voyager whose 
 ship day after day skirts the island shores. 
 
 Numerous rivers find their sources in the mountains, and after 
 rushing through narrow gorges, meander slowly across the plains 
 and fall sluggishly into the sea. These short streams form in- 
 valuable highways for the transportation in small boats of the 
 produce of the country. The Cagayan River in northern Luzon, 
 the Father Nile of the Philippines, flows into the Pacific at Apirri 
 and is navigable for large steamers to the upper reaches where 
 grows most of the tobacco for which the island is famous. Sixty
 
 66 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 miles from its mouth this river is as wide as the Mississippi at 
 St. Louis, but it is comparatively shallow and requires the con- 
 stant attention of a large and expensive dredge boat. 
 
 The Rio Grande de Mindanao or Cotabatu, in southern and the 
 Agusan in northern Mindanao are large rivers each more than two 
 hundred miles in length. The Pampanga in Luzon carries much 
 commerce. The Agno and Abra find their sources in the moun- 
 tains of Benguet and wander through various and changing 
 channels, across the plains of Pangasinan to the sea. During the 
 dry season these rivers seem insignificant, but the engineer who 
 is attempting to dam and confine them within their proper chan- 
 nels and the official who is required to find the money for such 
 conservation proceedings never cross their dry beds without a 
 feeling of exasperated respect for a worthy but troublesome 
 opponent. When the torrential rains come, these modest rivers 
 are suddenly transformed into rushing torrents. Inconceivable 
 volumes of water come roaring, pitching and tossing down the 
 mountain gorges, and spread wooden bridges and structural iron 
 work all over the valleys. In such times the rivers disdain to 
 follow their recognized and legitimate courses to the sea and 
 treat with contempt the carefully executed engineering works 
 designed to prevent the wearing away of banks and the destruc- 
 tion of villages and haciendas. They often cut new channels and 
 occasionally leave concrete bridges standing in lonesome dignity 
 miles from any water. They make of old highways in the rear 
 of the towns new channels through which they thereafter for a 
 time placidly flow while the carefully constructed and expensive 
 docks, ripraps and warehouses face sadly out upon dry sandy 
 wastes^ 
 
 The Bued River rises in the mountains near Baguio and travels 
 about twenty miles through deep and picturesque gorges, which 
 in places are not more than one thousand feet wide, before it 
 reaches the plains. In that distance it falls about five thousand 
 feet. 
 
 Soon after the United States Commission took charge of 
 Philippine affairs it was decided to build a sanatorium in the
 
 THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO 67 
 
 mountains in order that overheated, weary, workwom civil gov- 
 ernors, commissioners and other pubhc officials might find rest 
 and health. The beautiful plateau where the Igorots had built 
 a village which they called Baguio, which translated means ty- 
 phoon, was selected. But it was five thousand feet up to Baguio, 
 and a road had to be constructed. The place was near the head 
 waters of the Bued River, and for reasons which neither gods nor 
 men have been able to fathom the road was located along the 
 river bank in the bottom of the long gorge. The first location 
 was elsewhere. The construction was commenced at Baguio, 
 and the work continued for several miles along the ridge on a 
 good level grade. Then suddenly it became necessary to drop 
 over a cliff to the valley about two thousand feet below. Appar- 
 ently no one had previously observed this cliff, so the work and 
 the route were abandoned and work commenced anew at the 
 other end of the river. As completed the road follows the river 
 bed until within a short distance of Baguio when it rises some 
 two thousand feet by a series of zigzags and lands among the 
 pine trees and cool breezes of a glorious new climate. It is 
 one of the most picturesque mountain roads outside of Switzer- 
 land. One can hardly believe that engineers advised the con- 
 struction of the Benguet road in a tropical country along the 
 bottom of a long mountain gorge where it was absolutely certain 
 to be seriously damaged or destroyed every rainy season. But 
 it was commenced and in time completed, and no one in power has 
 ever found a good opportunity or possessed sufficient moral 
 courage to abandon it. Every rainy season has left it badly dam- 
 aged, and the expenses of maintenance and repair have been so 
 great that the road is popularly supposed to have been surfaced 
 with gold dust. 
 
 In the autumn of 1911 forty inches of water fell at Baguio 
 in twenty-four hours. The mountains slid into the gorge. The 
 Bued River rose sixty feet and when order had been restored 
 the lower reaches had been scoured clean of road, concrete walls 
 and bridges. Emerging from the gorge, the torrent met the
 
 68 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 railroad, and so great was the propulsive power that the wits 
 said that for weeks thereafter the structural iron belonging to 
 the Benguet Road and the Manila Railroad Company was being 
 picked up by thrifty Celestials across the sea on the coast of 
 China. Nor did it sound entirely improbable to those who were 
 familiar with the effectiveness of mountain rivers under the in- 
 fluence of torrential tropical rain-storms. 
 
 On the western coast of the island of Palawan there flows into 
 the sea from what looks like the entrance to an abandoned coal 
 mine in the hills of Ohio or Pennsylvania, an underground river 
 which is one of the physical wonders of the world. From whence 
 it comes no one as yet knows. To the few natives of the remote 
 and desolate coast the cave has an evil reputation. Ghosts and 
 such like evil and undesirable things have made it their abiding 
 place for ages past, and Moro pirates who disappeared through 
 its jagged entrance were seen no more. Until recently nothing 
 was known of this remarkable natural phenomenon. The first 
 partial exploration was made by Lieutenant Miller while acting 
 as governor of Palawan. In the spring of 1912 the river was 
 further explored and surveyed by a party under my direction. 
 After passing up the river for a distance of three miles, the 
 boats were stopped by a huge mass of rock which an earthquake 
 had shaken from overhead. The boulders filled the channel to 
 the height of probably sixty feet. The climb over the slimy rocks 
 into the unknown cavity was difficult and rather awe-inspiring for 
 amateur explorers. Beyond the rocks there was a bowl-shaped 
 depression the bottom of which seemed to be on a level with the 
 lower river bed. The roof overhead was like an inverted bowl, 
 thus creating almost a round cave. 
 
 After passing through a kind of tunnel for several hundred 
 feet the river was again located. The cavern or tube through 
 which it came was about the same size as that below the cave-in 
 and there appeared to be nothing to prevent an exploring party 
 from continuing if a boat could be carried over the rock pile. 
 But as neither canoes nor canvas boats were available further 
 progress was impossible;
 
 THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO 69 
 
 The river throughout its entire course averages about thirty- 
 feet in width and probably fifteen feet in depth. In places the 
 ceiling of the cave is so low that it is necessary to lower the 
 head in passing, while elsewhere it expands into a good-sized 
 chamber, from one hundred to one hundred fifty feet in height. 
 There is very little variation in the size of the stream 
 until the obstruction is reached. The water is fresh, clear and 
 cool and flows with a steady but not rapid current. The air is 
 fresh and pure. The scenery is picturesque and extraordinarily- 
 interesting. 
 
 Having ascertained that the river continued above the cave-in 
 and not having the necessary equipment for proceeding farther, 
 we began the return journey toward daylight. The party had 
 been under the mountain for about five hours. The Stygian 
 darkness was but slightly affected by the insufficient lights. The 
 return to the sea was a memorable journey. The soft gliding 
 water made no sound. There were no waterfalls. Only the oc- 
 casional flutter of the wings of a bat, the dip of an oar and the 
 awed ejaculations of surprise and appreciation broke a silence 
 which was that of the ages. The novelty of the situation had 
 somewhat worn away and the details of the rock formations 
 could be more closely observed. Nothing but an artist's pencil 
 could tell the story. Photographs give but the outlines, and con- 
 vey no adequate conception of the marvelous detail of line and 
 color. Nature's sculpture is everywhere. There a stain like a 
 splotch of paint from the brush of a drunken painter suddenly 
 assumed the form of a huge black cat, squat upon his haunches, 
 and you gazed fascinated, expecting momentarily to hear the 
 cavern echo with an angry yowl. But the boat glided silently by, 
 leaving the fantastic feline to his darkness. Looking over your 
 shoulder for one last glance, you found him metamorphosed into 
 some sprawling, floundering monster without a name. Another 
 dark splotch on the high wall had become a warrior bold, with 
 drawn sword, in the dress of past centuries. The illusion was 
 complete. As the angle of light changed the sword came slowly 
 down in salute to the passing procession. The warrior, too, was
 
 70 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 left to meditate upon the strange scene of ghostly boats gliding 
 slowly by, amid the uncertain light of flickering torches, filled 
 with mystic figures, bound seaward. 
 
 Again the scene changes. Here the note is of ancient Egypt. 
 Carved by Time itself, unaided by the hand of man there reposes 
 a complete and finished griffin, or is it a sphinx resting solitary 
 as amid the sands of the desert? Between stately stone pillars 
 rise a series of steps leading from the water to some temple 
 within. It all belongs on the banks of the Nile. Stalactites in 
 myriad numbers, carved into forms of fruit, flowers and vegeta- 
 bles, are everywhere. Along the roof extends the perfect keel 
 of a yacht. Then the cavern stretches away, an almost perfect 
 rectangle, with walls and ceiling decorated with many colors — 
 surely the deft work of an artistic, designing hand. A sharp 
 turn of the way and a huge stalactite hangs glittering like a chan- 
 delier from the ceiling of some great ballroom. Another has 
 been cut by silent creeping waters into the form of a huge bunch 
 of banana leaves. Here hang dark brown leaves of curing to- 
 bacco while there the rocks are folded and convolved into a great 
 artichoke. 
 
 Suddenly the boats glided into a great chamber, resplendent 
 with color and decorations, like a stage set for a scene in some 
 grand opera or spectacular drama. The chiseled stones catch 
 and break the light into myriad glistening particles. All these 
 and a thousand more wonderful things are there three miles in- 
 ward from the sea and four thousand feet beneath the roots of 
 the great forest trees which cover the mountains above. 
 
 As the boat neared the exit a certain eagerness to reach day- 
 light became apparent which evidenced the strain inevitable to 
 such a journey. The air, although comparatively pure, lacked 
 vitalizing power. We turned suddenly to the left, and the en- 
 trance flashed into view. The brilliant yellow sunlight seemed to 
 be crowding and surging against the jagged saw teeth cavities 
 like the surf of the sea beating upon a rocky shore. The op- 
 pressive silence gave place to the sound of life and being. So
 
 THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO 71 
 
 sudden the change that we seemed to hear "the roar of sap in 
 bough impregnated and the deafening rumor of tlie grass." 
 
 Manila is situated at the mouth of the Pasig River which flows 
 into a great bay twenty-five miles in diameter, over the narrow 
 entrance of which the great fortress of Corregidor stands guard. 
 The traveler in the Philippines is impressed by the fact that the 
 towns and cities are badly located. They are seldom on the 
 coast. Even Manila is twenty-five miles from tlie entrance to 
 Manila Bay. It would have been better for the modems if Le- 
 gaspi had located the city at or near Maravales at the entrance to 
 the bay, where there is a good protected natural harbor lying 
 under the guns of Corregidor. Such a location would have had 
 many advantages over the present one. Nature there has fur- 
 nished good water, and perfect drainage. From their residences 
 on the mountainsides, the inhabitants would have enjoyed the 
 cool invigorating breezes, and a view such as poets seldom 
 imagine and painters never dare paint. 
 
 But the cities and towns of the Philippines are centuries old 
 and their original locations were determined largely by reasons 
 of defense. From the very earliest times the coasts were har- 
 ried by sea rovers. First came the Dutch and the Portuguese, 
 then the Malay pirates from Borneo, and ever after the Moros 
 from the southern islands. The towns and villages shrank back 
 from the shore in order to find protection from tliese ocean raid- 
 ers. From the north of Luzon to the far south the coasts bear 
 the marks of the long contest with the Moros. On many stra- 
 tegic points the Spaniards and Filipinos constructed the stone 
 watch towers which still stand gray and picturesque amid the 
 green foliage and entangled vines. For two and one-half cen- 
 turies a substantial stone fort, built by the natives under the 
 direction of a Spanish friar, on a cliff jutting into the sea, has 
 guarded the entrance to the beautiful little harbor of Romblon. 
 It was built of the white stone found on the island and stands to- 
 day an interesting and picturesque memorial of the time when 
 pirates' craft and sea marauders were as common as now are 
 merchant vessels and tourists.
 
 72 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The entire Archipelago is mountainous, with broad valleys be- 
 tween the ranges and along the shores, and occasional high table- 
 lands in the interior. The general trend of the mountains is north 
 and south. Ordinarily the height Is not great enough to be very 
 imposing, but what is lacking in grandeur and impressiveness 
 is supplied by beauty of form and coloring. The tropical forests 
 mass about the foothills and roll up the mountainsides like green 
 waves on a sloping beach until they crown the summits with 
 verdure. There is little of the ruggedness of the mountains of 
 temperate climes. The soft warm mists hang about them. 
 Strange animals live in their shadowy depths, and stranger men. 
 Primitive, timid little people build their habitations in the 
 branches of the great trees, hidden amid the entanglement of 
 vines and parasitic growths. Unseen waterfalls splash and tin- 
 kle amid the silence. To climb the slopes of one of these 
 mountain ranges beneath the great trees through whose inter- 
 lacing tops the sun never penetrates, is to realize the meaning of 
 the forest primeval. 
 
 In the interior the mountains rise often to grandeur. Mount 
 Apo in Mindanao is more than ten thousand feet in height, while 
 many others run from five to eight thousand feet. The scenery 
 in the Benguet mountains is very beautiful and impressive. From 
 the observatory on Mount Mirador the plains of Pangasanan 
 unroll toward the great Gulf of Lingayan and the China sea. 
 From the rest house on the summit of Santa Tomas on a clear 
 night, the lights of Manila, one hundred fifty miles away, glow 
 dully against the sky. About twenty of the mountains are vol- 
 canic and many others bear the marks of early activity. About 
 a dozen have been in active eruption within historic times, while 
 scores of others are quiescent or extinct. 
 
 Mount Mayon in Albay is one of the most beautiful moun- 
 tains in all the world. A perfect cone, with a base eighty miles 
 in circumference, it rises in the midst of a rich cultivated plain 
 to the height of eight thousand feet. Smoke and steam float 
 about the summit in lazy grandeur. Amid the memories of 
 many beautiful tropical scenes, none stands out more distinctly
 
 THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO 73 
 
 in my mind than a ride over the splendid road which runs en- 
 tirely around the base of the mountain. A few miles from the 
 base are the ruins of the old city of Daraga. The top of the 
 church and convent only show above the ground to tell the story 
 of the eruption in the early years of the last century. 
 
 Taal volcano, forty miles from Manila, rises from the center 
 of a lake to a height of a few hundred feet. It is the most active 
 volcano in the Archipelago. The eruption of 1873 did much 
 damage. That of 1903 was not so bad, but in 1910 Taal 
 eclipsed all previous records. More than a thousand people who, 
 despite warnings, continued to live in a village at its base, 
 lost their lives. Much damage was done to the neighboring 
 country. The initial explosion brought half the people of Manila, 
 forty miles away, out of their beds to see one of the most won- 
 derful and impressive spectacles which the world has to offer. 
 
 Coral animals have aided volcanic action in building the 
 islands. Volcanism has raised the land through the warm waters 
 and formed thousands of islands fringed about with coral reefs. 
 
 Serious damage has often been done by earthquakes. In 1645 
 many churches, monasteries and public buildings in Manila 
 were destroyed. The governor-general had to be extricated from 
 the ruins of his palace. In 1865 Manila was again badly dam- 
 aged. During certain months of the year slight quakes and 
 tremors are so common that the people become accustomed to 
 them and pay them little attention. 
 
 Although the islands are of volcanic origin, there are large 
 areas of northern Luzon which are underlaid with granite, chists 
 and the like, and several islands like Cebu and Bohol are covered 
 with a thin layer of limestone. The elevated lakes, marshes, 
 waterfalls and beach lines which are so common show that many 
 changes of level have occurred within times which are, geolog- 
 ically speaking, recent. 
 
 The coast line is more than double that of the United States 
 proper. The coasts are sinuous and intricate; the currents un- 
 certain and unaccountable; the channels dangerous and tides 
 variable. The navigator who strays from the beaten paths, un-
 
 74 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 less very familiar with the waters, takes serious chances of land- 
 ing his craft upon some submerged coral reef. Even the most 
 experienced navigators may go astray. 
 
 One evening when traveling from Sandakan, in British North 
 Borneo, across the dangerous Sulu Sea to Siassi, my attention 
 was called to a statement in the official sailing directions of the 
 experience of an English ship, which had laid a course for two 
 miles south of a small island, and in the morning found itself 
 ten miles to the north of its objective point. It had been car- 
 ried twelve miles sidewise as it were by the current. We laid 
 the exact course of the English ship, making allowance for the 
 current. The night was perfect and the sea quiet. At daylight 
 our ship was several miles south of the island in a nest of reefs, 
 the current having run from exactly the opposite point from 
 which it was expected. A few months later the same navigator, 
 going to the same island, laid a course which he considered a fair 
 average, and struck the low island at full speed. Such are the 
 uncertainties of navigation in the Sulu Sea. At times the cur- 
 rents seem to flow without law or reason as the wind blows 
 where it listeth. 
 
 The animal life in the Archipelago resembles that of the sur- 
 rounding regions, but shows nevertheless remarkable differences. 
 There are fewer mammalia than in the neighboring islands of 
 Borneo and Java. There are but two species of monkey, three 
 of the carnivora, and but six of the deer tribe — the most interest- 
 ing being the tiny mouse deer, which is no larger than a little rat 
 terrier. Small rodents are very scarce, but there are not less 
 than thirty species of bat. The great fruit bat, which is found 
 in many of the southern islands, has a body as large as that of a 
 good sized cat, with a spread of wings measuring as much as 
 five feet. The carabao and timarau are the only large mammalia. 
 The latter lives in Mindora, where it is the ambition and the 
 terror of all hunters. The mountains and foothills abound in 
 wild boar and deer. Monkeys are quite common, and travelers 
 in the remote districts soon become familiar with them.^ 
 
 1 In a Historia de Mindanao y Jolo (1667), by Francisca Combes, a work
 
 THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO 75 
 
 Certain animals are found on certain islands and not else- 
 where. Thus the timarau lives in Mindora, the porcupine in 
 Palawan and the Calamianes Islands, and numerous other ani- 
 mals live within very restricted districts. 
 
 Some unpleasant animals inhabit the waters. Crocodiles are 
 often to be seen basking in the sun along the banks of the large 
 rivers, and furnish rare target practise from passing steamers. 
 But they are not always in evidence. I once spent a night and 
 part of two days in a Moro vinfa traveling through marshes and 
 rivers to reach Lake Buluan under the shadow of Mount Apo, 
 where crocodiles were popularly supposed to feed only on ambi- 
 tious hunters, but the day's hunt revealed not one crocodile. 
 However, on the return journey through the marshes, four guns 
 brought down from above more than five hundred fine ducks of 
 various species. 
 
 Lizards are common and in sizes to suit all tastes. The little 
 chirping house lizard is a sort of cricket who lives on the ceiling 
 instead of the hearth, and earns the friendship and gratitude of 
 his hosts by eating an astonishing quantity of flies, and other 
 such pests. Of snakes there must be a reasonable number, al- 
 though in my travels about the islands I was never so fortunate as 
 to see even a little one. However, I was not looking for snakes. 
 Pythons must exist because they can be seen in the museums, 
 and many narrations of desperate encounters with them have 
 been written. But they seem to belong generally to the prehis- 
 toric or the late Empire period, after the war had become un- 
 interesting and while the home-land appetite for stories of adven- 
 ture remained unsatiated. House snakes are also traditional, 
 but few moderns have seen them. Formerly it is said that they 
 were sold on the streets like parrots and canaries, for pets.^ 
 
 which Blumentritt says has "always been considered one of the most valuable 
 pearls of Philippine literature," it is said that wild elephants were then found 
 on the islands. 
 
 * "In view of the number of species known, it is a matter of some surprise 
 that snakes are so seldom encountered by those whose business leads them 
 into the forests or through the high grass; in fact the majority of people 
 seem to believe that very few snakes exist here." E. L Griffin, "Poisonous 
 Snakes in the Philippines." Phil. Jour, of Sci., January, 1909, sec. B.
 
 76 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Insects are too numerous for the comfort of other than nat- 
 uralists, but fewer than one is led to expect. The number of 
 species is said to be great, but the amount of insect Hfe is sur- 
 prisingly small. Common house flies are comparatively few and 
 mosquitoes, while always present, are scarcely anywhere such 
 pests as in certain sections of the United States. In the large 
 cities they have been almost exterminated by the modern crusade 
 against the carriers of fever bacilli. Ants of various kinds and 
 locusts are numerous, the former eating everything but the cor- 
 rugated iron roofs of the wooden houses and the latter often 
 desolating the fields. 
 
 Cockroaches furnish material for some hysteria among the 
 ladies and not a little profanity from the men. They are of stu- 
 pendous size according to the ordinary home standard for cock- 
 roaches. Three inches In length with an expanse of wing suffi- 
 cient to suggest a bat is about the average. They are a very great 
 nuisance, as they eat everything from boots to bookbinding. 
 
 The general features of the flora are Malayan, resembling that 
 of Java, Borneo and the Celebes. In northern Luzon the plants 
 resemble those of China. But the differences are such as to give 
 the flora of the Philippines marked individuality. In 769 in- 
 stances there are differences sufficient to make distinct species. 
 
 On Mount Apo In Mindanao there are birds which are said to 
 be found nowhere else In the world. The number of species is 
 about the same as In the United States, but birds are not so 
 common. Of 286 species found in Luzon fifty-one do not exist 
 on any other island. The avifauna of Samar and Leyte contain 
 twenty-two species not found elsewhere, and seventeen are pe- 
 culiar to Mindora and Palawan. Cebu, a near neighbor of 
 Negros, on one side and Bohol on the other, contains nine species 
 of land birds not found elsewhere. The islands contain three 
 hundred species of land birds, more than are found in Java. 
 Snipe, plover, pigeons, ducks and geese abound. But there are 
 many important genera found In other Malay Islands which are 
 not found in the Philippines. Flocks of white parrots give a 
 touch of color to the somber forests of Mindanao.
 
 THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO 77 
 
 Flowers are common, although not as a rule very striking. 
 The Philippines have been described as a land where the birds 
 have no song and the flowers are without perfume, but this is a 
 libel on both birds and flowers. The night air is heavy with the 
 fragrance of the dama de nocJie and the flower of the famous 
 ilang-ilang. Orchids in great variety are common. At certain 
 seasons the entire foliage of large trees turns to flaming red, 
 purple or violet. Long avenues in Manila are lined with the 
 so-called fire trees which during the month of July blaze with 
 their gorgeous foliage. 
 
 The mountains are shot with minerals, but for reasons mainly 
 economic mining has never been very profitable. Gold has al- 
 ways been produced and marketed. The mountain people bring 
 gold dust to the towns for exchange and sale. Coal is found in 
 good quantities, but the quality is poor, as the islands are not yet 
 old enough to produce a very good grade. The operator who 
 holds on to his claim until the proper geological period arrives 
 will undoubtedly gain great wealth. There is also copper on the 
 upper waters of the River Abra which has been crudely mined by 
 Spaniards and natives in the past. Marble exists on the island 
 of Romblon, but inconsiderate earthquakes have wrenched and 
 twisted the deposits and made it difficult to find large unbroken 
 slabs. There is also some iron, and the prospects for petroleum 
 are said to be good. 
 
 The coast waters teem with fish, which form an important 
 element in the food of the Filipino people. Trout and bass do 
 well in the mountain streams, although the torrential rains are 
 liable to wash them down into the valleys, where they perish 
 in the warm waters. After the streams near Baguio were 
 stocked with bass, the Igorots developed remarkable skill in catch- 
 ing them with their hands. The warm waters of the tropical sea 
 are filled with curiously shaped and vividly colored fish. I have 
 seen Moros frying goldfish for supper. I am not an ichthyologist 
 and can not speak with authority, but venture the assertion that 
 there is not a fish in the Naples, Honolulu or other aquaria which 
 is not found in Philippine waters. The aquarium at Manila is
 
 78 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 a unique structure built into the ancient city walls and can easily 
 be made the most complete in the world. 
 
 Until very recently it was asserted that no game fish lives in 
 Philippine waters. But the difficulty was in the absence of game 
 fishermen. It is commonly said that the fish are too lazy to bite, 
 but this, like similar statements with reference to the people, is 
 a perverted, exaggerated statement of the facts. It is the fish- 
 ermen who are generally too languid to undergo the necessary 
 exertion. There are no finer fishing grounds in the world. Bar- 
 racuda, tanguingui (Spanish mackerel), pompano, bonito, lapu- 
 lapM (groupers), snappers, Sargent fish, tuna, tarpon (probably) 
 and many others abound and furnish satisfactory sport for the 
 most seasoned and experienced sportsman. 
 
 The various characterizations of the climate of the Philippines, 
 ranging from "delightful" to "deadly" are all correct when 
 proper consideration is given time, place and personality. It 
 varies in different islands and localities, depending upon latitude, 
 altitude, the relative distribution of land and water, the size and 
 configuration of the island, the proximity of mountain ranges, 
 the composition of the soil, the vegetation, the ocean currents and 
 various other matters.^ 
 
 According to the thermometer the heat is seldom excessive, but 
 individuals measure by other standards. So great is the humid- 
 ity that a reasonable degree of heat is trying to the temper and 
 the linen. But while a "wet heat" is uncomfortable it is seldom 
 deadly. The situation is saved by the fact that the extremes of 
 heat and humidity never coincide. During May the thermom- 
 eter will often register ninety degrees Fahrenheit, but the humid- 
 ity is low and the nights, with few exceptions, cool and re- 
 freshing. 
 
 The highest recorded temperature at Manila is 103 degrees 
 Fahrenheit in May, 1871, and 101 degrees Fahrenheit in May, 
 1912. The average temperature during the years from 1885 to 
 1912 was: January, 76.8; February, 77.5; March, 79.9; April, 
 
 3 "Climate," by Rev. Jose Algue, Censtu of the Phil. (1906), p. 87 et seq^
 
 THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO 79 
 
 82.8; May, 83.3; June, 82.2; July, 80.8; August, 80.8; Sep- 
 tember, 80.4; October, 80.2 ; November, 78.6; December, 77.4. 
 
 April and May are the hottest, August and September the most 
 humid months. On the west coast the rains begin in June and 
 continue through November. From December to June there is 
 little rain, and by March the country is dry and parched. On the 
 west coast these conditions are reversed and in the southern 
 islands it rains at all times of the year. 
 
 By ascending the mountains one can always find relief from 
 the heat of the plains. Pine trees grow at Baguio and a fire 
 is always comfortable in the evenings. But it never freezes al- 
 though the thermometer occasionally drops to the line of a gentle 
 frost. Personality and temperament play an important part in 
 the health and comfort of individuals. There is truth in the 
 statement that "it is your human environment that makes cli- 
 mate." Irritable, fidgety persons who insist that things should 
 be exactly as they were at home, are seldom happy in the tropics. 
 The well-balanced, equable and reasonable adjust their habits to 
 the conditions, learn from the natives, recognize the limitations 
 in their activities and live happily and comfortably ever after, 
 or at least until time for the long vacation in some land of frost 
 and snow. When that energetic uplift worker, Mrs. Jellyby, was 
 asked about the climate of Borrioboola Gha, she replied: 
 
 "The finest in the world." 
 
 "Indeed, ma'am?" 
 
 "Certainly. With precautions/* 
 
 Science, sanitation, and knowledge of the laws of health have 
 rendered life almost, if not quite, as safe and comfortable in 
 the tropics as elsewhere — Tjuith precautions.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 The Native Peoples 
 
 I 
 
 NON-CHRISTIANS AND FILIPINOS 
 
 Varieties of Peoples — "East Is East and West Is West" — Extent to Which 
 This Statement Is True — Classification of the Inhabitants — Aborigines and 
 Malays and Subdivisions of Each — The Negritos — Various Tribes of Wild 
 Men — Head-Hunting — The Beginnings of Civilization — The Filipinos — ^The 
 Seven Groups — ^Various Opinions as to Their Characteristics. 
 
 The great variety of peoples, with their different languages, 
 customs, habits, religions and degrees of culture, have made the 
 Philippine Archipelago a sort of happy hunting-ground for stu- 
 dents of ethnology. It has now become almost as interesting 
 to students of social and political conditions. 
 
 It has been assumed very generally that the people of the East 
 are incompetent racially to develop on Western lines or to acquire 
 Western civilization; that there are inherent differences, mental 
 and physical, which require the white man and yellow man to be 
 educated and governed on different principles and to develop 
 on distinct lines. 
 
 The colonial policy of the United States is based on the as- 
 sumption that the Filipinos, so far as desires and inherent capac- 
 ities are concerned, do not differ materially from white men and 
 that they are capable of being educated and trained to govern 
 themselves. It assumes that the principles of good government 
 will be recognized and accepted by all men and that an Eastern 
 people with a fair degree of development may successfully con- 
 duct a popular form of government and that such a government 
 is the best for them. 
 
 The fact that the attempt is being made to apply this theory 
 
 80
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 81 
 
 in the Philippines adds greatly to the general interest in the char- 
 acter of the native people. Although the Philippines are in the 
 East, they are not entirely of the East as the word is commonly 
 used. The Filipinos are Malays, who for more than three cen- 
 turies were governed by Europeans and subjected to the in- 
 fluence of the Roman Catholic Church. During that period the 
 great majority of them became Christians, many sincere and de- 
 vout, others mere technical adherents. The nature of their 
 contact with Europeans has differed from that of any other 
 Oriental people. It was not until comparatively recent times 
 that they were brought under the influence of Western theories 
 of life. The Christian civilization under which they and their 
 ancestors were trained was that of Spain in the days of the relig- 
 ious revival, which is known as the Catholic Reaction. The 
 spirit of modernism which in Europe and America influenced 
 the Catholic Church like all other institutions, never reached the 
 Philippines, and, of course, the independent spirit of Protest- 
 antism was never known there. 
 
 With few exceptions writers who philosophize about Eastern 
 matters assert that East and West are antithetic terms, connoting 
 moral and intellectual conditions separated by an almost impassa- 
 ble gulf. This view is accepted by almost all European residents 
 in the Orient and by most of those who have come in close con- 
 tact with the people.^ It is crystallized in Kipling's oft quoted 
 lines : 
 
 "Oh, East is East and West is West and never the twain 
 shall meet, 
 
 Till Earth and Sky stand presently by God's great judg- 
 ment seat." 
 
 1 See Townsend, Asia and Europe, Qiap. 23 ; Cromer, Modem Egypt, 
 I, Introduction. 
 
 ''Those who have been in the East and have tried to mingle with the 
 native population know well how utterly impossible it is for the European to 
 look at the world with the same eyes as the Oriental. For a while, indeed, 
 the European may fancy that he and the Oriental understand one another, but 
 sooner or later a time comes when he is suddenly awakened from his dream, 
 and finds himself in the presence of a mind which is as strange to him as 
 would be the mind of an inhabitant of Saturn." Sayce, The Higher Criticism 
 and the Monuments, p. 558.
 
 82 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 This alleged inherent social and racial difference is supposed 
 to be so great and of so permanent a nature as to render impos- 
 sible any real comprehension of the people of one part of the 
 world by those who have developed under a different environ- 
 ment. 
 
 In philosophizing about the East, people think of India and 
 China; the Malay race, with the exception of the Japanese is 
 included by implication only. It seems, however, that even the 
 Chinese are not such mysterious and incomprehensible beings as 
 we have been led to believe.^ 
 
 There is a growing disposition to question the common theory 
 of an inherent difference between the people of East and West 
 and to treat what is called the literary interpretation of the Orient 
 with scant respect. According to Doctor Reinsch, "The conven- 
 tional and vulgar antithesis of the Orient to the West with its 
 short delineation of contrasts has been altogether misleading." 
 He believes that there is no evidence of any distinct racial differ- 
 erences which render the people permanently antagonistic, but 
 that by profoundly influencing each other they will both con- 
 tribute their share in developing the ideal of an "all human civil- 
 ization of the future." 
 
 In a recent book, Professor E. H. Ross says that "to the 
 traveler who appreciates how different is the mental horizon 
 that goes with another stage of culture or another type of social 
 organization than his own, the Chinese do not seem very puz- 
 zling. Allowing for differences in outfit of knowledge and 
 
 2 Our conceptions of these strange people have really not been much more 
 just and accurate than were theirs of the Westerners. We have been taught 
 that China is a "sort of fantastic, topsy turvy land ; a land of pagodas and 
 pigtails and porcelain ; where the people ate birds* nests, and chow dogs ; 
 where merchants and missionaries struggle eternally with illusive man- 
 darins against a background of willow pattern, serenity chequered by periodic 
 cataclasms" Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in China (1913), p. 4. 
 
 This is not much more accurate than the old Chinese idea of the people of 
 the outer world. 
 
 "The barbarians [all other than Chinese] are like beasts and are not to be 
 ruled by the same principles as natives [Chinese]. Were any one to attempt 
 controlling them by the great maxims of reason, it would tend to nothing but 
 confusion. The ancient Kings well understood this and accordingly ruled 
 barbarians by misrule." Quoted in Foster, American Diplomacy in the 
 Orient, p. 44.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 83 
 
 fundamental ideas, they act much as we should act under the 
 same circumstances. The theory, dear to literary interpreters of 
 the Orient, that owing to diversity of mental constitution, the 
 yellow man and the white man can never comprehend or sympa- 
 thize with one another, will appeal little to those who from their 
 comparative study of societies have gleaned some notion of what 
 naturally follows from isolation, the acute struggle for existence, 
 ancestor worship, patriarchal authority, the subjection of women 
 and the ascendency of scholars." 
 
 It is very certain that recent events in the East have forced 
 the Western world to adrpit that all things being equal, the 
 Oriental will act very much like other people.' The move- 
 ment is the answer of the yellow race to the questions put 
 by the Jew. Have we not "hands, organs, dimensions, senses, 
 affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the 
 same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same 
 means, warmed and cooled by the same summer and winter as a 
 Christian is? If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle 
 us do we not laugh? If 3^ou poison us do we not die? If you 
 wrong us shall we not revenge?" 
 
 A belief in the essential unity of the human race and the ca- 
 pacity of all men for progress and development, does not require 
 one to believe that the people of the East and West are at pres- 
 ent so alike that they should be required to live under the same 
 form of government and be subject to the same kind of laws. 
 Ages of racial life in different environments have developed dif- [ 
 ferences which for all practical purposes may be regarded as f 
 inherent traits of character. The Western people have great con- | 
 fidence in the curative and regenerating force of Western meth- 
 ods, education and ideas. But neither, nor all combined, have 
 been able so far to show substantial results in proportion to the 
 amount of effort put forth. 
 
 The attempt to infect these ancient civilizations with the germs 
 
 ' There may be something in Mr. Bland's suggestion that the appearance 
 in China of dynamiters, suffragists, and other evidences of mankind's com- 
 mon instincts and common destiny has helped to modify our views.
 
 84 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 of Western life has not been very successful; at most it is but 
 encouraging. To continue the biological simile, the "cultures" 
 generated in that strange compound of Christian ethics, Pagan 
 philosophy and commercial dishonesty which is called Western 
 civilization, have not been able to destroy those already in pos- 
 session of the Eastern body politic. The bacilli resident in the 
 ancient organization have generally been able to repel the in- 
 vaders. There is evidence, however, that although the battle is 
 still on, the newcomers have at last got the upper hand. 
 
 The truth as to the nature and character of the people lies as 
 usual, about midway between the extreme views. The Oriental 
 is unlike the Westerner but not at all so unlike as we have been 
 taught to believe. The difference is mostly in his outlook on life, 
 and in his estimate of values. It is psychological rather than 
 biological. The point of view is different, and also the mental 
 processes.* As said by Sir Bamplylde Fuller in an interesting ad- 
 dress at the Royal Colonial Institute,' the phrase, East is 
 East and West is West has something real behind it. It ex- 
 presses a vital distinction between the view which Eastern and 
 Western people take of the purpose of life. In both East and 
 West the object is to obtain satisfaction. The East endeavors to 
 satisfy itself simply and directly by appealing to the emotions, 
 by developing such feelings as affection, loyalty, devotion and 
 self-esteem. The West aims at satisfaction less directly. It is 
 concerned rather with its environment than with itself, and in- 
 fluences its feelings largely by changing and complicating the cir- 
 
 *"No casual visitor," says Lord Cromer, "can hope to obtain much real 
 insight into the true state of native opinion. Divergence of rehgion and 
 habits of thought; in my own case, ignorance of the vernacular language. The 
 reticence of Orientals when speaking to any one in authority; their tendency 
 to agree with any one to whom they may be talking ; the want of mental sym- 
 metry and precision, which is the chief distinguishing feature between the 
 illogical and picturesque East and the logical West, and which lends such 
 peculiar interest to the study of Eastern life and politics; the fact that re- 
 ligion enters to a greater extent than in Europe into the social life and laws 
 and customs of the people; and the further fact that the European and the 
 Oriental, reasoning from the same premises, will often arrive at diametrically 
 opposite conclusions — all these circumstances place the European at a great 
 disadvantage, when he attempts to guage Eastern opinion." Modern Egypt, 
 I, p. 7. 
 
 5 United Empire, IV (N. S.), No. 1, p. 19.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 85 
 
 cumstances of life. In the West life is a cinematographic enter- 
 tainment that results from the variety of the material objects 
 around us; and since these objects admit of endless changes and 
 each change modifies our conceptions, there is a constant change 
 and development of ideas. In the East change is limited by the 
 simplicity and directness of the outlook; man searches for his in- 
 terests in himself 
 
 As Hazlitt obser\^es : "Man is the only animal that laughs and 
 weeps, for he is the only animal that is struck with the difference 
 between what things are and what they ought to be." The man of 
 the East, says Sir Bamplylde Fuller, not only observes this but 
 accepts it as a finality. He accepts his environment as he ac- 
 cepts death itself; as a thing over which he has little control. 
 According to his theory of life, nature should be propitiated, not 
 controlled. His attitude toward his physical environment is 
 thus passive, while in the West, the conflict with nature is re- 
 garded as the most interesting if not the noblest in which man can 
 engage. 
 
 The Oriental regards evil as being indissolubly connected with 
 the world. He is content that his growth shall be cramped by 
 his physical surroundings; he never attempts to adapt his sur- 
 roundings to his desires. The passive acceptance of environ- 
 ment means crystallization into immobility; the struggle for 
 change means constant development. 
 
 In fact, the extent to which the people of the East are dis- 
 satisfied with their physical surroundings and conscious of a 
 will to change the same is the measure of their progress toward 
 modernism. And here is where the Filipino has advanced be- 
 yond the Chinese, or any other Oriental people but the Japanese. 
 The great physical changes which have taken place in India, 
 Egypt and China, have been affected very largely, if not en- 
 tirely, on the initiative of Europeans. In the Philippines, more 
 rapid progress in this respect has been made than in any other 
 part of the East, and in the work the Filipinos have not only 
 willingly furnished the necessary money, but also a share of the 
 initiative and active direction of the work.
 
 86 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Before the coming of the Americans two attempts at systematic 
 classification of the natives of the Archipelago had been made; 
 one by Blumentritt in 1890, and the other by the Jesuits.® The 
 former was published in the Zertschrift der Gesellschaff fur 
 Erdkunde zu Berlin, and in a translation by the Smithsonian In- 
 stitution in 1899. The work of the Jesuit Fathers formed the 
 basis of the elaborate Atlas of the Philippines prepared by 
 Father Jose Algue and published by the United States Coast and 
 Geodetic Survey. More recent investigations under the direction 
 of the government of the Philippines have greatly reduced the 
 number of tribes. In this way the eighty-two tribes of Blumen- 
 tritt and the sixty-seven tribes of the Jesuits have been reduced 
 to twenty-seven, including the seven groups of Christianized 
 people. 
 
 Who are the people of the Philippines? Numerous theories, 
 many of them very fanciful, have been advanced as to their origin, 
 but the authorities now very generally agree that with the ex- 
 ception of the Negritos, they are all of Malayan stock. 
 
 For administrative purposes the Spaniards divided the na- 
 tives into Christians, non-Christians and Moros, and this classi- 
 fication has been retained by the American government. It is 
 needless to say that the classification is not determined entirely 
 by theological considerations. The Christians include the seven 
 groups of people who are properly known as Filipinos, who in- 
 habit the Christian provinces and are subject to the legislative 
 power of the Philippine legislature. The Moros are the Moham- 
 medans who make up the mass of the population of the southern 
 islands. 
 
 The non-Christians, including the wild men and the Moros, 
 constitute approximately one-eighth of the population of about 
 nine million and are scattered over about one-half of the territory. 
 
 According to race and origin, the people fall into two groups, 
 the Malays and the aboriglnes.'^ The former include the Filipinos, 
 
 6 See Rept. (Schurman) Phil. Com. (1900), III, p. 330. 
 
 "^ Certain people who are found in the vicinity of the Gulf of Davao and 
 Mount Apo in eastern Mindanao have been classified by Montano and others 
 as Indonesians. For a time this designation was generally accepted. See
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 87 
 
 Moros and wild men, distinguished by religion and different 
 stages of development ; the latter are the few Negritos who still 
 linger superfluous on the stage. We find then ( 1 ) the Negritos ; 
 (2) the wild men;^ the Atas, Bagohos, Bilancs, Biikidnons, Bu- 
 langancs, Guiangas, Ifngaos, Igorots of Benguet, Lepanto and 
 Amburayan, Igorots of Bontoc, Kalingas, Ilongots, Katabaganes, 
 Mandayas, Manguaguans, Mangy ans, Manobos, Montcscs (wild 
 people other than Negritos who inhabit the mountain regions of 
 Panay and Negros), Tingians; (3) the Moros, and (4) the Fili- 
 pinos, who include Visayans, Bicols; Tagalogs, Pampangos, Pan- 
 gasines, Ilocanos and Ibangs. 
 
 The Negritos, known in different parts of the islands as Abun- 
 lon, Aetas, Balugas, Buquiles, Dumagats and Bataks, are gen- 
 erally considered as the aborigines of the Philippines. They 
 "are racially distinct from all the other people inhabiting the 
 Archipelago which have not intermarried with them." "The 
 number of problems presented to the ethnologist by these little 
 people," says Professor Jenks,* "is almost bewildering. Wliat 
 place have they in the evolution of man? Their identity with 
 the Sakais of the Malay Peninsula and the Mincopie of the 
 Andaman Islands is almost certain ; but what is their relation to 
 those other pygmies — the long-headed dwarfs of Central Africa? 
 And further, what may be their connection with the true negro 
 race of Melanesia, almost contiguous to them? The geographic 
 distribution of the Negrito is such that it must be concluded that 
 at one time they were the sole possessors of the Philippine Archi- 
 pelago." 
 
 Rept. (Schurman) Phil. Com. (1900), III, p. 352. German writers, including 
 Blumentritt, ignore it, and Jenks believes that it will disappear. Keane, a, 
 recent English writer, not only accepts it, but includes therein the mountain 
 tribes of northern Luzon. 
 
 The people who have been included under this name are probably physically 
 superior to all other races in the Philippines. Some of them are quite tall, 
 are well developed, have high foreheads, narrow aquiline noses, wavy hair, 
 and often abundant beards. They are much lighter in color than any other 
 natives of the islands. Many are clever and intelligent, and all are pagans. 
 
 8 See Worcester, "Head-Hunters of Northern Luzon," Nat. Geog. Mag., 
 Sept, 1912 ; "The Non-Christian People of the Philippine Islands," Nat. Geog. 
 Mag., Nov., 1913 ; Ann. Rept. Gov. Moro Province, 1913, p. 76. 
 
 " Native Races, Official Handbook, p. 156.
 
 88 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Recent investigations by the Ethnological Survey have shown 
 their presence in several hitherto unrecorded regions. "It is 
 probable," says Mr. D. C. Worcester/** "that they originally occu- 
 pied every island of any size in the group; but at present they 
 occur only in northeast Mindanao, Samar, central Negros, cen- 
 tral Panay, north central Palawan, a few isolated points in 
 southern Luzon, the mountains of Bataan, and Zambales, where 
 they are relatively numerous; Abra, where there remain but a 
 few individuals of mixed descent; Apayao, Cagayan, Isabela and 
 Tayabas. The great forested and almost unexplored area ex- 
 tending from the northernmost point of Luzon to the vicinity of 
 Casiguran and Baler is to-day the one remaining Negrito strong- 
 hold and in many parts of this region it is quite impossible to get 
 into touch with them for they flee at the approach of strangers." 
 
 The Negritos are among the smallest people of the group. Al- 
 though their color and hair are negroid, they have neither the 
 small facial angle and large cranio- facial angle, nor the long head 
 of the African and Malanesian. They are true savages. They 
 have no villages, no permanent houses. About A. D. 1250, Chao 
 Ju-Kuo, a Chinese geographer,^^ wrote of them: "They build 
 their nests in the tree tops and in each nest lives a family, which 
 only consists of from three to five persons. They travel about 
 in the densest thickets, of the forests, and without being seen 
 themselves, shoot their arrows at the passer-by. For this rea- 
 son they are much feared. If the trader throws them a small 
 porcelain bowl they will stoop down to catch it and then run 
 away with it, shouting joyfully." 
 
 Their characteristics have not greatly changed since that time. 
 They still wander through the mountains in small groups of a few 
 families each. They are fleet of foot and travel with great 
 speed. Fish, roots, fruit, rice, and the products of the chase con- 
 stitute their principal food. Their usual weapons are a lance of 
 
 i<>*The Non-Christian People of the Philippines," Nat. Geog. Mag., Nov., 
 1913. See Meyer, Distribution of Negritos (1899), Reed, Negritos of Zam- 
 bates (1904), Chap. 1, and particularly p. 14, note 2, where the authorities 
 are collected; Wallaston, Pigmies and Papuans (1912), Appendix B, p. 303. 
 " B. & R., XXXIV, p. 183.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 89 
 
 bamboo and a quiver of poisoned arrows which are used with 
 deadly effect. They have some knowledge of agriculture, but it 
 does not extend much beyond scratching the earth with a stick, 
 throwing in the seed, and trusting nature for the result. They 
 use as ornaments, bamboo combs, feather head-dresses, rings, 
 and bracelets of brass or copper, and braided leg bands of hog 
 bristles. They scarify the body, and the scars are their most 
 highly prized adornments. For household utensils they use 
 cocoanut cups or seashells. Their trade consists in exchanging 
 certain forest products for rice, tobacco and trinkets with the 
 inhabitants of neighboring places. There are probably twenty- 
 five thousand of these people left. The best opinion is that they 
 are incapable of civilization, and that they will disappear. 
 
 "The paths are rough, the trails are blind. 
 
 The Jungle People tread ; 
 The yams are scarce and hard to find 
 
 With which our folks are fed. 
 
 We suffer yet a little space 
 
 Until we pass away. 
 The relics of an ancient race 
 
 That ne'er has had its day."^^ 
 
 It is now generally conceded that the various tribes and people 
 of the Archipelago other than the Negritos are of Malayan 
 ancestry. But Malay as a descriptive term is not very definite. 
 "We are not wise enough," says Le Roy, "to say just who 
 or what the Malay is. He is the typical brown man of the 
 Asiatic Seas and their confines, and the name brings to mind, 
 because of the faithful labor of English descriptive and scien- 
 tific writers, dealing with the regions lying southwestward of 
 the Philippines, a water man par-excellence; a pirate through 
 a mixture of enterprise and of an indisposition for effective po- 
 litical organization in law and order on any general scale, and 
 more commonly a Mohammedan on whom the tenets of that re- 
 
 ** The Song of the Last Semangs, by Hugh CliflFord. 
 
 In the Malay Peninsula the Negritos are called Semangs. 
 
 i
 
 90 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ligion lie much more lightly than they do further westward to- 
 ward the spiritual center of that faith."*' 
 
 These people are supposed to have come to the Archipelago 
 in three waves. Long before the arrival of the Portuguese, in 
 the Southwest, in their little sharp-prowed and out-rigged water 
 craft, they pushed their way from island to island until they 
 reached the Philippines. The earliest wave probably extended 
 even to the north of Luzon, Formosa and Japan. These early 
 comers have been called pre-Malays. They were no doubt 
 followed by others of the same kind, who, having been for 
 a long period subjected to certain influences, were more advanced 
 in civilization than their predecessors. There is a Sanscrit ele- 
 ment in their language which suggests the time when their an- 
 cestors were subjected to the influence of the Buddhists, who 
 came from India, and for generations ruled Java and the neigh- 
 boring islands. When the Spaniards arrived, the Malays who 
 represented this second wave were considerably more advanced 
 than the people of the hills and forests. 
 
 A last wave carried the Mohammedan Malays, who became 
 known as Moros. Being warlike and virile, they soon proselyted 
 their predecessors in the southern islands and even succeeded in 
 making a Mohammedan city of Manila. 
 
 Properly to describe and distinguish the various tribes of wild 
 men who are supposed to represent the first arrivals would re- 
 quire a volume and the expert knowledge of the specialist. A 
 brief reference to a few of the leading tribes and their character- 
 istics must suffice. 
 
 In the south the Bagobos, Manobos, Mandayas and the Bukid- 
 nons invite special attention.** The Bagobos, of whom there are 
 at least twenty-five thousand, are a fairly strong and good sized 
 people who live in the Davao hinterland, near Mount Apo. Their 
 dress is made of a cloth woven of dyed hemp fiber, elaborately 
 
 13 Le Roy, The Philippine People, p. 19. 
 
 i*The last report of the governor of the Moro Province (1913) gives the 
 number of pagans in the province as 103,358, distributed as follows : Suba- 
 nons, 35,000; Mandayas, 16,500; Bilanes, 8,114; Manobos, 10,545; Bagobos, 
 25,500; Tirurays, 4,435; Atas, 3,264.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 91 
 
 ornamented with bead and mother-of-pearl work. Their war- 
 knives are carried in curious double-pointed sheaths ornamented 
 with bead work and horsehair plumes. They live in small vil- 
 lages ruled over by chiefs called datus. They occasionally in- 
 dulge in human sacrifice.*' 
 
 The Manobos occupy the lower Aguson Valley and a few other 
 parts of Mindanao. Many of them, like the Negritos, live in 
 houses built in the treetops. Like the Bagobos, they are fond of 
 music and dancing. The passion is still strong for what they 
 call mangayaos — killing expeditions. The Mandayas live about 
 the upper waters of the Aguson River and along the east coast 
 of Mindanao. The Jesuits described their complexion as "ashy 
 gray." Men and women wear their hair long. They are skilled 
 metal workers, good fighters and experienced slavers. 
 
 The Bukidnons, of whom there are about thirty thousand, are 
 a very promising people who inhabit the subprovince of the same 
 name in northern Mindanao. They "are naturally a peaceful 
 and very industrious agricultural people, but in self-defense have 
 been compelled to stand off the neighboring more warlike tribes 
 of the interior and their Christian Filipino neighbors as well."" 
 They are making considerable progress in the ways of civilized 
 life. Nearly all the Bukidnon villages have "well attended schools 
 and are connected with telephone lines which are freely used. The 
 people are converting their beautiful and naturally fertile coun- 
 try into a checkerboard, with roads and trails for dividing lines. 
 They are giving up their picturesque native costumes so rapidly 
 that typical native garments are even now hard to obtain."*'^ 
 
 In the north the most important are the Igorots, Ifugaos, 
 Ilongots, Kalingas and Tingians. The Ifugaos to the number of 
 one hundred twenty-five thousand live in the central part of 
 northern Luzon. They are warlike and in times past were fa- 
 mous head-hunters. They seem to be natural stonemasons and 
 
 18 See The Wild Tribes of the Davao District, by Fay-Cooper Cole, Pub. 
 Field Museum, 1913. 
 
 18 Worcester, "Non-Christian People of the Philippines," Nat. Ceog. Mag., 
 Nov., 1913. p. 1160. 
 
 "/6fd., p. 1193.
 
 92 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 have constructed marvelous terraces with walls of dry stone on 
 the steep mountainsides on which the growing rice is irrigated 
 by water brought in ditches/® They are very good farmers, 
 raising rice, beans, onions, gabi and some cotton on their ter- 
 races. They have pigs and chickens, but no cattle. Their table 
 manners are said to be superior to those of their neighbors, as 
 each person, be he ever so poor, carries a wooden spoon. They 
 are now very friendly to the Americans and under their direction 
 are building roads, trails and substantial buildings. They have 
 furnished recruits for a company of constabulary, who are ex- 
 cellent soldiers and expert marksmen. 
 
 • The Ilongots, who occupy a part of the province of Nueva 
 Viscaya, number about six thousand. They are of a rather low 
 order and have not made much progress. 
 
 The Kalingas, to the number of about seventy thousand, live in 
 north central Luzon. They are a good-sized, well-developed, 
 cleanly people and famous for the gaudiness of their dress. They 
 have been inveterate head-hunters, but their crimes of violence are 
 now comparatively rare. They are kindly disposed toward the 
 Americans, who travel with safety through all parts of their 
 country. 
 
 The Tingians may be divided into civilized and uncivilized. 
 The former, in number about fourteen thousand, live mostly in 
 the province of Abra. Naturally pacific, they are industrious 
 farmers. They "are a kindly gentle people, and the immaculate 
 cleanliness of their persons and of their homes promptly com- 
 mend them to the average American." 
 
 The wild Tingians, numbering probably fifty thousand, live in 
 the subprovince of Apayao. They are inveterate head-hunters 
 and, like the Igorot, are very fond of dog as an article of diet. 
 They have been only partially brought under government control. 
 
 The Igorots are the best known of all the wild men, as they 
 live in the vicinity of the summer capital. They fall into two 
 groups, one living in Bontoc and the other in the provinces of 
 Benguet, Lepanto and Amburayan. There are about eighty-nine 
 
 18 See the pictures in Nat. Geog. Mag., Sept., 1912.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 93 
 
 thousand of the latter and seventy-six thousand of the for- 
 mer. They are a vigorous people addicted very generally to la- 
 bor and truth telling, A few of them have accumulated con- 
 siderable wealth. They are peaceful industrious agriculturists 
 who generally have a hard time to make extremes meet. From 
 miles about they come to the Baguio market, marching in single 
 file with huge baskets on their heads, laden with camotes and 
 other products of their poor farms. Like the Bontoc Igorots 
 and Ifugaos, they terrace the mountainside for rice fields. The 
 men wear no superfluous clothing but the women ordinarily keep 
 their bodies fully clothed. The Benguet Igorots alone keep 
 horses. The types of house run all the way from grass huts to 
 good modern structures with galvanized iron roofs and Ameri- 
 can furniture. The Benguet and Lepanto Igorots are the only 
 native miners in the islands. They have never been head-hunters. 
 Many of the children are now attending school and some of the 
 young men are able to serve as town treasurers and secretaries. 
 
 The Bontoc Igorots are a strong warlike tribe of head-hunters 
 who have shown much capacity for development.^^ They live in 
 large villages, and depend on their fighting men for protection. 
 The villages are divided into wards, in each of which there are 
 club-houses in which live apart the unmarried of each sex. They 
 have an interesting system of trial marriages. In building rice 
 terraces they are excelled by the Ifugaos only. They manufac- 
 ture head axes, earthen ware, salt, cotton blankets, and other arti- 
 cles. The Igorots, like the Ifugaos, are spirit worshipers. 
 
 The patient and tactful work of the American administrators 
 with the non-Christian tribes is beginning to produce appreciable 
 results. They have succeeded in getting into sympathetic rela- 
 tions with them and satisfying them of their desire to deal justly 
 and improve their hard conditions. The Spaniards never to any 
 great extent pacified or conquered the mountain people. To the 
 Filipinos of the low lands the mountains were ever the abiding 
 
 i» For a special study of these people, see "The Bontoc Igorot," by Dr. A. 
 E. Jenks, Phil. Ethog. Survey Pubs., Vol. I.
 
 94 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 place of mystery and death ; the unsafe refuge of the man who for 
 crime or misconduct had been driven out of the community. 
 
 Along the foothills there was of course some mingling of the 
 people. Occasionally the wild man ventured down in search 
 of work to earn a few pesos with which to eke out the products 
 of his rocky abiding place. Occasionally he ventured plain- 
 ward to the market, where he was carefully and skilfully cheated 
 out of his property. In return the Filipino, who with misplaced 
 confidence fled to the mountains to escape the Guardia Civil, the 
 taskmaster, or simply from the almost equally dreaded neces- 
 sity for labor, was very fortunate if he did not lose his head. 
 
 The ancient custom of head-hunting has been generally aban- 
 doned, and the number of heads now taken within a year is 
 probably less than the number of murders committed among the 
 same number of people in many civilized communities. If head- 
 hunting were as effective, as a means to desirable ends, as it was 
 supposed to be, these people might almost have been justified in 
 their practises. Marriage, abundant harvests, bravery and man- 
 liness, exultation in the minds of descendants, increased wealth, 
 abundance of game and fish, general health and activity, favor at 
 the hands of women, slaves In the future life, and many other de- 
 sirable things were supposed to come to the successful taker of 
 heads.^" To some extent head-hunting was looked on as a 
 game in which the young men satisfied their sportsmanlike in- 
 stincts and won a reputation for skill and courage. In the au- 
 tumn after the crops were gathered, the lusty young men required 
 amusement and an opportunity to display their prowess. The 
 maidens turned their eyes away from the brave who had no 
 trophy to his credit. The specimens which ornamented the door- 
 way or front yard of the elders as do the antlered trophies the 
 civilized hunter's hallway, shamed them. A head ax was sent 
 to a neighboring village, and if the challenge was accepted the 
 game was on. And the game was to take and carry away the 
 
 20 See Worcester, "Head-Hunters of Northern Luzon," Nat. Geog. Mag., 
 Sept., 1912 ; Roth. Natives of Sarawak and North Borneo, Vol. I, p. 163 ; 
 Goames, The Diaks of Borneo; Jenks, The Bontoc Igorot, Chap. 6.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 99 
 
 heads of their competitors. There was no mahce, or at feast, no 
 more than between two rival American colleges. When a rea- 
 sonable number of heads had been taken, the game was called 
 off until another season. 
 
 The individual who needed a head to qualify for some situa- 
 tion was sometimes forced to resort to methods which were not 
 approved by the community. A young woman scorned the hand 
 of a suitor who was trophy less, and in desperation he left the 
 home village vowing not to return without a head taken under 
 circumstances which would establish his prowess. The next 
 morning he returned with a trophy and was received with favor. 
 He told a hairlifting story of how in the dead of night he had 
 crawled into a village and from the midst of his sleeping enemies 
 brought away a head — of a woman to be sure, but in the game 
 a head is a head. And so they were married. But alas! the 
 truth came out. The hero was no hero. He had not gone bravely 
 into danger; he had merely met his own grandmother near the 
 home village and taken the old lady's head. 
 
 The village turned against him. His wife could not forgive 
 the deception. The young man was driven forth. The natural 
 inference would be that he was censured for killing his grand- 
 parent, but that would be an error. That circumstance was re- 
 garded as a mere incident. It was recognized as bad form, but 
 the head and front of his offending was in lying about the risks 
 he had encountered. Neither was taking the head of his grand- 
 mother considered as involving sufficient danger to justify the 
 reputation for heroism upon which he had won a bride. 
 
 Thus it all depends upon the point of view. The Igorot has 
 his own code of morals. He attaches little importance to human 
 life, but his pledged word is sacred. A few years ago, four 
 Igorots, Laoyan, Guay, Dalocdoc and Udcusan, ventured into 
 the valley and solicited work from a Filipino planter named 
 Rufino Ancheta and were informed that there was no work 
 available. But, said Ancheta, just beyond the river lies my 
 cousin Tiburcio, who is in possession of a farm which by right 
 should be mine. He has a carabao and in his house are forty
 
 96 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 pesos in silver. Go and kill my cousin, and you shall divide the 
 pesos and the carabao, and I shall secure the farm. "Beside all 
 that," testified Laoyan, "Rufino Ancheta said that Tiburcio was 
 the son of one hundred fathers; and then he gave us five chick- 
 ens and we found out from the galls that it was all right; that 
 it was a good time to kill a man." And so the contract was made. 
 
 The following day the Igorots returned and explained that they 
 had visited Tiburcio but found him sitting with his back to the 
 wall within easy reach of an effective-looking bolo. The occa- 
 sion not being propitious, they came away and asked to be re- 
 leased from the agreement. "Why did you eat my chickens if 
 you are not going to do what I told you to do ?" asked the indig- 
 nant employer, and he ordered them to return and kill Tiburcio, 
 which they did and received their reward. In time the Igorots 
 were convicted of murder. The story told by them in court 
 reads like a chapter from some ancient chronicle, and is ex- 
 tremely interesting as an illustration of the wild man's code of 
 morals. Being asked why they returned and killed the man, 
 Udcusan replied that it was because they had agreed to do so. 
 The prosecuting attorney asked, "Suppose you had been told to 
 kill me, would you do so?" "Certainly, if we had agreed to do 
 so. We would have to keep our word."^^ 
 
 But the old customs are beginning to disappear. The wild men 
 have learned that civilization has material advantages which 
 appeal to them. Life has been hard with them. The mountain- 
 sides are not very productive. The white man pays good wages, 
 and the Igorots live in a temperate climate and are willing work- 
 ers. Many now work on the streets and other public works in 
 Baguio and carry their scanty products and manufactures over 
 weary miles to the city market. During one year nearly two 
 thousand of them, worked for good wages on a railway which 
 was being constructed into their country. 
 
 Remarkable work is being accomplished by the health authori- 
 ties through the hospitals that are being established in the moun- 
 tains as rapidly as money for the purpose is available. At first it 
 
 21 U. S. vs. Ancheta, 15 Ph. Rep. 470.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 97 
 
 was difficult to induce the people to submit to medical treatment. 
 In the old school-book we used to read of the poor dog who, after 
 having his broken leg repaired by the kind-hearted surgeon, re- 
 turned the next day bringing with him a canine friend who had 
 met with a similar accident. When a hospital was first established 
 among the wild people, the doctor induced an Igorot who was 
 suffering from a very serious disease to submit himself for treat- 
 ment. The man rapidly improved, but one night he disappeared, 
 and the doctor mourned the loss of the patient, whom he had 
 hoped to use as an example. But after about a week the lost pa- 
 tient returned, bringing with him a startling collection of lame, 
 blind and halt specimens of humanity which he had picked up 
 among the mountains. 
 
 Among the things which contact with civilization is elim- 
 inating is the Igorot's appetite for dog; not nice fat dog, but lean 
 curs of the commonest back-yard variety. Once a week that part 
 of the Baguio market assigned to natives is crowded with yelp- 
 ing curs brought from the lowlands to sell to the Igorots. Dur- 
 ing the night preceding market day the roads diverging on 
 Baguio are alive with packs of dogs so tied together as to pre- 
 vent them from biting their drivers. To one who, in a less lit- 
 eral sense, is fond of dogs, it is rather a pitiful sight to see them 
 on the way to the sacrifice. But after all, it is merely a matter 
 of taste and training. If you have a taste for dog, there seems 
 to be no reason in the nature of things why you should not eat 
 dog, and a dog has no more inherent right to be immune from 
 being eaten than a lamb or any other animal. But it is said that 
 the Igorots who visit Baguio are beginning to sense the fact that 
 among white people it is considered not quite the proper thing 
 to use dogs for food. 
 
 Many of the Igorot boys are attending school, and some of 
 them do good work in the trade schools. They make good serv- 
 ants and readily adapt themselves to the habits of civilized Fili- 
 pinos. But the Igorot has one very strong prejudice. He will 
 wear a coat, a high collar, a silk hat, and a red necktie even, but 
 only force or moral intimidation can induce him to wear the
 
 98 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 trousers of civilization. My first sight of a Christian Igorot 
 boy, with sack-coat, breech-clout, standing collar, brilliant neck- 
 tie and smoothly combed hair, but without the rest of the apparel 
 usually considered proper for a complete gentleman, passing the 
 plate in Bishop Brent's church at Baguio, will long be remem- 
 bered. The constabulary soldiers recruited from the wild people 
 wear all the uniform except the trousers, in lieu of which they 
 wear the gee-string and a heavy copper bracelet just above the 
 ankles. 
 
 This disinclination to wear clothes led to an amusing incident 
 at the Exposition in Manila. * It was arranged that each province 
 should have a certain section In which to exhibit its manufac- 
 turing processes. Some of the wild people manufacture very 
 useful and attractive articles, and it was decided that a number 
 of these workmen should be brought to the fair. The Filipinos 
 are very sensitive about the appearance of the wild people in 
 public, as they believe they are a reflection upon the "culture" of 
 the population generally. When it became known that the 
 tribesmen were to be at the Exposition, a protest was filed against 
 what they feared would be a shocking exhibition of wild men 
 w'ithout modern clothing. The governor-general was induced 
 to issue an order that all the strangers should wear pajamas, and 
 these useful articles were duly supplied at public expense. It was 
 like clothing the statuary in an art museum. The stalwart 
 bronzed men accustomed to go clad only in a breech-clout, known 
 locally as a gee-string, were each furnished with a pair of striped 
 trousers. In the mountains, they always travel in single file, and 
 on their first appearance in public at the Exhibition, about fifty 
 of them started to walk solemnly along, each observing the 
 proprieties by carrying his trousers carefully folded over his 
 left arm. 
 
 The wild people of the mountains and the Mohammedans of 
 the south are extremely picturesque and much more interesting to 
 travelers than the ordinary so-called Christian Filipinos. The 
 average person feels about as did the English traveler who on 
 seeking official assistance in traveling about the islands said, "I 
 want particularly to meet your interesting wild tribes. The
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 99 
 
 Christians I care little about." This perfectly natural feeling 
 has been catered to by writers, lecturers and showmen. An or- 
 dinary citizen of Manila, Dagupan, or Loag, clothed like an 
 American or Englishman, spending his days in merchandising, 
 practising a profession, superintending the operation of a farm, 
 editing a newspaper, or running for the Legislature, is far less 
 interesting than an Igorot statue in bronze, enveloped in the 
 restricted folds of a highly-colored gee-string, with an ambig- 
 uous reputation for eating dog and gathering sporting trophies 
 from among the heads of his neighbors. A game of baseball in 
 which this kind of native dives skilfully to base between the legs 
 of an athletically inclined governor-general amply justifies a 
 magazine article. But there is no such inspiring publicity for 
 patient Juan de la Cruz, who toils in the rice paddy or sugar field. 
 He and his kind are very prosaic, and as material for a lantern 
 slide it must be conceded that the wild man is much his superior. 
 The Igorots have been so frequently exhibited at world's fairs 
 and other such places that many people in the United States and 
 Europe understand that they are fair samples of the Filipinos 
 who are so vociferously asserting their capacity for self-govern- 
 ment, and crying for independence. 
 
 The Moros, because of their religion and peculiar character- 
 istics, and the Igorots and other wild men, because of their pic- 
 turesqueness, have thus possibly absorbed more than their share 
 of public attention. 
 
 The picturesque eighth of the Inhabitants, who are known col- 
 lectively as non-Christians, have not advanced much beyond the 
 condition of savagery. They represent a very low stage of cul- 
 ture and have shown little, if any, capacity for development from 
 within. What Impulse for improvement they have felt has come 
 from without and a few of them have responded in a way which 
 is very encouraging. The government of the wild people, with 
 the exception of the Moros, Is a comparatively simple matter, as 
 they are entirely free from the ambitions and aspirations which 
 complicate conditions In the Christianized provinces. The real 
 difficulty has been to gain their confidence, and this has been
 
 100 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 accomplished by a policy of nicely adjusted firmness and gentle- 
 ness. The simplest forms of government only have been intro- 
 duced among them for the purpose of establishing order and 
 opening the country by the construction of roads and trails. 
 The beginning of an educational system has been made and the 
 conditions under which the people live have been greatly im- 
 proved. 
 
 The other seven-eighths of the inhabitants of the Archipelago, 
 who are known as Filipinos, occupy substantially all the culti- 
 vated parts of the country north of Mindanao. They now num- 
 ber about eight milHons and represent nearly every stage of 
 race culture. They are divided into seven groups, commonly 
 called tribes, the Tagalogs, Visayans, Bicols, Ilocanos, Pam- 
 pangos, Pangaslnes and Ibangs. They are, however, developed 
 far beyond the stage to which the word tribe applies. Indeed, 
 the use of the word in this connection suggests the character in 
 one of Anthony Trollop's novels of English clerical life who 
 divided all people into "Methodists, Baptists and other savage 
 tribes." 
 
 The Tagalogs and Visayans constitute the majority of the 
 civilized Filipinos. The former occupy the central part of Luzon ; 
 the latter, Cebu, Panay, Negros, and the other islands of the 
 central group. The Ilocanos live along the northwest coast of 
 Luzon; the Pampangos and Pangaslnes on the great plains be- 
 tween Manila and the Gulf of LIngayan; the Bicols in the ex- 
 treme south of Luzon ; and the Ibangs in the Cagayan Valley in 
 the northeast of Luzon. 
 
 These people speak different dialects and have many differ- 
 ent habits, customs and characteristics, but their lack of homo- 
 geneity has been greatly exaggerated. The things in which they 
 are alike are much more vital and important than those in which 
 they differ. The former are racial characteristics, and the latter 
 the result of Isolation and environment. They are all Malays 
 with typical Malayan traits. When the Spaniards arrived, they 
 found them occupying the coast line plains and valleys, having
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 101 
 
 driven their predecessors into the mountains. At that time they 
 numbered about six hundred fifty thousand and have thus multi- 
 plied about fourteen times in three centuries. 
 
 Recent investigations have reduced the dialects which are 
 spoken by the Filipinos from sixty to sixteen, and these contain 
 so many common words as to suggest their development from 
 a common ancestral language. While differing widely in their 
 vocabularies, they have a common Malayan origin and a uniform 
 structural basis. Early contact with the Hindu civilization 
 which once flourished in Java and built the marvelous temples 
 which may yet be seen in the midst of the tropical jungles, left a 
 mark upon the language. It is probable that it was from this 
 source that the people who came with the last wave of emigration 
 acquired their knowledge, such as it was, of writing and the 
 other arts which elevated them above the people of their own race 
 that they drove into the mountains. 
 
 Once established in the Philippines, the Malays seem to have 
 lost their roving habits and acquired the strong attachment for 
 place which is such a noted characteristic of the present people. 
 Pocketed in particular localities with water or mountain boun- 
 daries, they soon became strangers and the enemies of their neigh- 
 bors. The natural order of development was inverted. Local 
 life was petty, intensive and ingrown. No large political life 
 was developed. Neither the Tagalogs nor Visayans were ever 
 organized as a political unit. Each represented merely a certain 
 number of people who spoke a common dialect, occupied contig- 
 uous territory and had a sort of community feeling of superiority 
 over their neighbors. The barangay was the most important 
 political body which the Filipinos were ever able to develop. 
 Each cell of what normally should have united into a body 
 politic continued to live its own insignificant life. Nothing was 
 united, nothing coordinated. Living thus in almost complete 
 isolation, each little community developed local peculiarities and 
 added local words to its dialect. 
 
 This inability to form political combinations and thus influence 
 and control large masses of men seems to be an inherent weakness
 
 102 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 of thie Malay character. The people of the Malay Peninsula, 
 Sumatra, Java, Borneo and the islands to the west have never 
 united in any great numbers for the pursuit of a common politi- 
 cal aim and never at all, except when dominated by a religious 
 motive such as is supplied by Islamism. In the Philippines only 
 the Moros ever recognized allegiance to a chief of more than 
 local importance. In 1565 the royal officers at Cebu wrote to 
 Philip II that the natives "recognize no ruler, therefore if their 
 chiefs try to force them they will do nothing else than go to 
 another island." According to Andres de Mirandaola they were 
 "a race who lived without any respect for rulers." In 1569 Mar- 
 tin de Rada wrote to the viceroy of Nueva Espana that the peo- 
 ple of the Philippines had no king or sovereign and were a race 
 "the most arrogant that was ever seen and the slaves were the 
 freest that can be imagined for they do only what they wish."^'* 
 Such a people without organization could offer no effective re- 
 sistance to the Spaniards. 
 
 A great deal has been written about the customs, manners, 
 superstitions and characteristics of the Filipinos, i Scientists, 
 travelers, officials civil and military, churchmen, old residents 
 and casual tourists have published the results of their observa- 
 tions. Since the American occupation many such books and arti- 
 cles have appeared, written by travelers, soldiers, sailors and 
 newspaper men — a few carefully and conscientiously prepared, 
 but the greater number apparently the work of the impressionist 
 or cubist schools. 
 
 Notwithstanding the influence of the Spaniards and the Chris- 
 tian religion, it is remarkable how little the Filipinos have 
 changed during the time from the arrival of the Spaniards in 
 1560 until their departure in 1898. The ordinary Filipino of 
 pure blood seems to have retained nearly all of his racial charac- 
 teristics. The old savage customs have been abandoned, but the 
 writings of the early narrators, such as Pigafetta and Morga, 
 describe very accurately the provincial people of to-day. It is 
 
 22~B & R., XXXIV, pp. 201. 214.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 103 
 
 only during the last decade that any radical changes have become 
 apparent. 
 
 The conflicting opinions expressed by travelers ian'd residents as 
 to the merits and demerits of the Filipinos are remarkable. The 
 value of the narratives are determined not so much by the date 
 of publication as by the relation in which the writers stood to 
 the country and its people. The Spanish officials were almost 
 always contemptuous, patronizing and depreciatory of the In- 
 dians. Disinterested travelers generally extolled their good qual- 
 ities. The friars, while not indiscriminate in their praise, were 
 generally kindly and appreciative until they became the objects 
 of political attack. Thereafter they were bitter and denuncia- 
 tory. The value of modern estimates depends almost entirely 
 upon the personal equation and the political predilections of the 
 writers. The party in the United States that has constantly op- 
 posed the Philippine policy of the government has drawn the 
 picture of the Filipinos in very high colors, and some of the 
 books published have not been entirely honest. The Filipinos 
 painted by these writers are not recognized by Americans or 
 Europeans who have dealt with and worked among the real 
 people. The estimates of foreigners like Blumentritt, whose 
 personal observations were confined to a few choice specimens 
 of the race like Rizal and the Lunas, are often grotesquely 
 erroneous. Nor are the statements of those who have systemati- 
 cally written the people down for political effect or because of 
 race prejudice entitled to any greater respect. 
 
 In the midst of it all the Filipinos, who are really pretty fair 
 ordinary specimens of mankind, have fared rather badly. From 
 authentic writings it is easy to prove that they are totally incom- 
 prehensible people who will fit any description whatever, be- 
 tween ignorance and enlightenment, intellectual capacity or inca- 
 pacity, virtue and vice, treachery and fidelity, cowardice and 
 courage, lying and truthfulness, the thief and the honest man. 
 
 It must be conceded that the Filipinos are not easy to under- 
 stand, and it is not surprising that even honest observers have
 
 104 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 reached different conclusions as to their character. "Dealing 
 3^rith such an enigma/' says Foreman/^ "the most eminent physi- 
 ognomists would surely differ in their speculations regarding the 
 Philippine native of the present day. That Catonian figure, with 
 placid countenance and solemn gravity of feature, would readily 
 •deceive any one as to the true mental organism within." 
 
 The first description of the Filipinos is found in a narrative 
 written by the Chinese geographer, Chao Ju-Kuo, about the year 
 1250. He gives a very favorable account of the inhabitants of 
 Ma-yi [the Chinese name for Luzon], particularly of their hon- 
 esty. The Chinese traders he wrote deliver their goods to the 
 Indians "and although the bearers are often unknown, none of 
 the goods are ever lost or stolen. The savage traders carry these 
 goods to other islands, and then nine or ten months pass until 
 they have obtained other goods of value equivalent to those that 
 have been received."^* 
 
 For three hundred years thereafter we have no record of what 
 occurred in the Philippines. The Venetian Pigafetta, in his nar- 
 rative of Magellan's expedition, described the habits, customs 
 and modes of living of the people of the central islands with 
 considerable minuteness. His description of the native houses 
 is as applicable to-day as it was in 1560. From the way the In- 
 dians handled their rude instruments Pigafetta was convinced 
 that they possessed musical ability. He also found that they 
 loved ease and quiet and to live In accordance with justice. The 
 custom of cockfighting was already well established. 
 
 An invader and conqueror seldom has a good opinion of a 
 conquered people who fail to show gratitude and consideration 
 for their conqueror. Legaspl, after having been In the Philip- 
 pines four years, reached the conclusion that the natives were 
 "a crafty and treacherous race and understand everything 
 . . . They are naturally of a cowardly disposition and dis- 
 trustful, and if one has treated them ill they will never come 
 hack. . . . They are a people extremely vicious, untruthful, 
 
 23 The Philippine Islands, p. 167. 
 
 24 B. & R., XXXIV, p. 183.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 105 
 
 and full of other superstitions. No law binds relative to relative, 
 parent to children, or brother to brother. No person favors an- 
 other unless it is to his own interest. On the other hand, if a 
 man in some time of need shelters a relative or a brother in his 
 house, supports him and provides him with food for a few days, 
 he will consider that relative as his slave from that time on, and 
 is served by him." 
 
 Martin de Roda, who was a companion of Legaspi, was of the 
 opinion that the natives other than Moros could easily be 
 converted, because they were "rather like monkeys, very desir- 
 ous of imitating our dress, speech and other peculiarities." 
 
 Francisco de Sande, who was governor from 1575 to 1580, 
 wrote to Philip IV that the natives "were greatly addicted to 
 licentiousness atid drunkenness. They are all usurers, lending 
 money for interest, and go even to the point of making slaves of 
 their debtors, which is the usual way of obtaining slaves. . . . 
 They do not understand any kind of work unless it be to do some- 
 thing actually necessary, such as to build their houses, which are 
 made of stakes after their fashion, to fish according to their meth- 
 ods, to row and perform the duties of sailors, and to cultivate the 
 land. . . . The natives are all very idle. . . . Nevertheless, 
 all know how to raise cotton and silk, and everywhere they know 
 how to spin and weave for clothing. They are," he adds, "af- 
 flicted by no poverty and only seek to kill one another, consider- 
 ing it a great triumph to cut off one another's heads and take 
 captives."" 
 
 In Antonio de Morga's book on the Philippine Islands, pub- 
 lished in 1609, the inhabitants of the southern part of Luzon 
 were said to be "of a clever disposition for anything they under- 
 take, sharp and choleric, and resolute." 
 
 The Augustinian friar, Caspar de San Augustin, whp wrote 
 one hundred years after Morga, had a very poor opinion of 
 the natives. He regarded them as generally Inconstant, dis- 
 trustful, malicious, sleepy, idle, timid, envious, ill-bred and im- 
 pertinent. As servants "in convents and houses, they break 
 
 *' This evidently refers to the motintain people.
 
 106 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 enougli plates to ruin their masters." They were bold and inso- 
 lent even to the extent of demanding one hundred dollars for 
 four eggs. It mattered little, however, as "they are just as well 
 pleased when they fail as when they succeed." They showed great 
 indifference to danger and would not "move out of the way of 
 a restive horse, nor if in a small boat give place to a large one. 
 In the river if they see crocodiles approaching they take no no- 
 tice and adopt no precautions." Worst of all, they did "not 
 object to rob Spaniards, not even the ministers of religion." 
 
 Exactly a century later another Augustinian friar, Joaquin 
 Martinez de Zuiiiga, wrote that the Indians the Spaniards found 
 in the islands "all possessed some description of government, 
 better or worse, and each nation was distinguished by a different 
 name; but a similarity of their dress and manners proves that 
 the origin of all of them is the same." 
 
 Writing in 1820, Tomas de Comyn expressed the opinion that 
 the natives were credulous, superstitious, cunning, of weak ca- 
 pacities, addicted to robbery, piracy, acts of private and public 
 revenge, fond of external show and pomp, and of a very litigious 
 spirit. He attributed these social defects largely to their igno- 
 rance, want of civilization, the bad administration of justice and 
 the defective system of government under which they lived. 
 
 Dr. Paul de la Gironiere, a French surgeon who lived in the 
 Philippines for twenty years, wrote a very discriminating account 
 of the people, particularly of the Tagalogs. In his opinion they 
 could be ruled only by strict justice and judicious severity. They 
 are great children and should be trained as such. The Indian's 
 hospitality is unselfish and disinterested. The stranger who en- 
 ters his cabin at mealtime is sure of an invitation to a seat at the 
 board. When an old man who can no longer work finds him- 
 self destitute he takes up his quarters in a neighbor's house, 
 where he is free to remain until his death. The Tagal, as de- 
 scribed in 1854, "is gay and pleasant. He is very fond of music 
 and dancing; he is ardent in love, cruel with his enemies, and 
 revenges himself with the poniard, which, like the kris with the 
 Malays, is his favorite weapon. He keeps his word, is passion-
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 107 
 
 ately fond of gambling, is a good husband and father, jealous 
 of the honor of his wife, but careless of that of his daughters, 
 whose youthful errors in no way prevent their finding husbands. 
 His sobriety is admirable. Water, a little rice, and salt fish, sat- 
 isfy him. He venerates old age. In a family, at all periods of 
 life, the younger obey the older." Elsewhere the same writer 
 says : "The moral portrait of these natives of the Philippines is 
 curious to sketch, still more curious to read. The Indian keeps 
 his word, and is yet a liar; anger he holds in horror, comparing 
 it to madness and deeming it worse than drunkenness, which he 
 nevertheless despises. To avenge an injury he scruples not to 
 use his dagger; what he will least support is abuse, even when 
 deserved. You may flog him when he has committed a fault 
 and he will not complain, but at hard words he is indignant. He 
 is brave, generous, a fatalist. The life of a robber pleases him 
 by reason of its liberty and excitement, not on account of the 
 wealth he may acquire by leading it. . . . They dislike cow- 
 ards and readily attach themselves to the man who is brave 
 enough to court danger. Their ruling passion is play. They are 
 fond of fights between animals, especially cockfights." ' 
 
 An English merchant named Robert MacMicking wrote in 
 1851 that "the native Indians appear to have a good ear for 
 music and execute many of the finest operas with spirit and 
 taste. . . . They appear to possess a superior degree of vigor 
 or freshness of mind to those bom in Europe or in old and thickly 
 inhabited countries." He found in the character of the natives 
 many good points, the most noticeable being "their hospitality, 
 good nature and bonhommie." They "never appeared as ag- 
 gressors; and it has only been when the white men, despising 
 their dark skins, have ventured on unjustifiable conduct, that I 
 have heard of their hands being raised to avenge it. When 
 they know that they are in the wrong, however, should the 
 harshest measures be used toward them, I have never known or 
 heard of their having had recourse to the knife, and I have fre- 
 quently seen them suffer very severe bodily chastisement for very 
 slight causes of offense. They are easily kept in order by gen-
 
 108 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 tleness, but have spirit enough to resent ill treatment if unde- 
 served. Their general character is that of a good-natured and 
 merry people, strongly disposed to enjoy the present and caring 
 little for the future." 
 
 Jagor wrote that, "They imitate everything that passes before 
 their eyes without possessing the intelligence to appreciate it. 
 It is this which makes both themselves and their artistic produc- 
 tions wearisome, devoid of character and, I may add, unnatural, 
 in spite of the skill and patience they devote to them. These two 
 peculiarities, moreover, are invariably to be found amongst na- 
 tions whose civilization is but little developed." 
 
 Sir John Bowring, who visited the Philippines in 1858, 
 found that the natives were very credulous, showed much def- 
 erence to everything aristocratic among them, and were not 
 much distinguished for intellectual superiority. They had some 
 knowledge of mechanical arts, appreciated music, had little am- 
 bition, few wants, concerned themselves little with the affairs of 
 their neighbors, were strongly imitative, sober, economical and 
 much given to display when desirous of honoring a guest. But 
 the Filipino was idle, fond of gambling, and his affection for his 
 gamecock resembled that of an Arab for his horse. 
 
 William Gifford Palgrave, who was British consul at Manila 
 from 1876 to 1878, found the natives distinguished for an "in- 
 bred courtesy, equally diffused through all classes high or low, 
 unfailing decorum, prudence, caution, quiet, cheerfulness, ready 
 hospitality, a correct though not an inventive tact, and a marked 
 tendency to ancestral worship." 
 
 In his Social History of the Races of Mankind, Mr. Feather- 
 man says that, "The Tagalogs of the higher classes of the interior 
 have preserved many noble traits of character. They are kind 
 and even generous in their social intercourse. They are grateful 
 for benefits received, and are faithful, calm and considerate. 
 They are very hospitable and consider it a high honor to receive 
 a stranger, and they make every possible sacrifice to manifest 
 their high regard for their guest." 
 
 Mr. John Foreman, Mr. Dean C. Worcester and Mr. Frederic
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 109 
 
 H. Sawyer, in books published about the time of the departure 
 of the Spaniards, give very full and detailed descriptions of the 
 natives. According to Mr. Foreman, the Filipino "is fond of 
 gambling, profligate, lavish in his promises, but Idche in the ex- 
 treme as to their fulfilment. He will never come frankly for- 
 ward to make a clean breast of his fault committed, or even 
 a pardonable accident, but will hide it until it is found out. In 
 common with many other non-European races, an act of gen- 
 erosity or a voluntary concession of justice is regarded as a sign 
 of weakness."^^ 
 
 It is no more possible to praise than to indict a whole people. 
 Generalizations deal with masses, not individuals; with con- 
 stants, not variants. The exceptional Filipino, whether because 
 of excellence or inferiority, is not the type of the race. In fact, 
 he may be neglected, almost, in estimating the value of the race 
 for the purpose of development along modern lines. It is what 
 we may call the upper average which counts. The extremes may 
 serve as an inspiration or a horrible example, but not as material 
 from which to draw working conclusions as to the characteristics 
 and qualities of the whole people. 
 
 The Filipinos are anxious to own land and much of the coun- 
 try is divided into small farms, but they are a gregarious people 
 who dislike the isolation of a country life and prefer to live in 
 the towns to which they return after the day's work on the farm. 
 The result is that a country which is highly cultivated often looks 
 unoccupied. Much of the work is done by laborers who sleep 
 during the hot hours of the day. Highways which are deserted 
 during the day are often crowded during the night by vehicles 
 carrying produce to the market towns. • 
 
 Village life is gay and joyous. The people are good-natured 
 and kindly, and welcome the stranger with hospitality which is 
 sometimes oppressive. The banqucte and the baile play a large 
 part in their lives. They delight in music and dancing and every 
 village has its gorgeously uniformed band, which turns out on 
 
 28 The foregoing and many other estimates of the Filipinos are collected in 
 Census of the Philippine Islands I, pp. 493-531.
 
 110 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the slightest provocation. Fiestas and hoHdays are so numerous 
 as seriously to affect the labor problem. In the rural communi- 
 ties the cockpit is still the center of social life although it is being 
 crowded from its preeminence by the baseball field. 
 
 Family affection is strong and relatives of remote degree find 
 a home with the moderately prosperous. It is almost impossible 
 to induce laborers to remain long away from their homes and 
 during railway construction times it was found necessary to build 
 temporary villages where the laborers might be joined by their 
 families. An American householder must exercise eternal vigi- 
 lance to avoid supporting all the parientes of his house servants. 
 Periodical inspection of servant quarters is necessary to clear out 
 these distant relatives who fasten themselves on the working 
 representatives of the group. It is not unusual for a clerk in a 
 government bureau, on a salary of thirty dollars a month, to sup- 
 port father, mother and innumerable brothers and sisters, in idle- 
 ness, and it is done with perfect willingness and evident uncon- 
 sciousness of the imposition. 
 
 The women are In all respects the social equals of the men and 
 they are much more ambitious. As a rule they control the family 
 purse. Most boys of twenty are married and when employed as 
 house servants the wife generally calls and collects the wages. 
 The women are employed as laundresses and seamstresses only. 
 
 The Chinese attempt to monopolize the business of cooking, 
 although a trained Filipino cook is the equal of a Chinaman. 
 The Chinese cooks are thoroughly organized and as they learned 
 how to cook during the Ming dynasty, or some other remote 
 period, and have no intention of changing their methods, the 
 American mistress soon throws up her hands in despair. When 
 given his instructions the cook blandly says, "Yes, missie," and 
 proceeds as usual. But the Filipino is anxious to learn new ways 
 and in time makes as good a cook as the Chinaman. Servants 
 are inclined to be shiftless, but they are easily trained, and, for 
 a judicious mistress who remembers the servant problem at home, 
 housekeeping in Manila Is one long period of solemn joy. 
 
 For the average servant a falsehood is an ever-present help in
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 111 
 
 time of trouble, and, when necessary or convenient, he will pre- 
 varicate freely and fluently without apparent consciousness of 
 wrong-doing. In this respect he is like a normal child ; he simply 
 moves along the line of least resistance. The desire to please, to 
 avoid offense, to give the answer he thinks you wish, leads to 
 many departures from strict truth. The political class and the 
 journalists pay little regard to the truth when dealing with their 
 opponents and are greatly surprised when called on to prove their 
 charges in court. The Anglo-Saxon theory of the sacredness of 
 abstract truth is made workable by liberal mental reservations. 
 The Oriental claims more individual liberty in determining when 
 a lie is justifiable, and it must be conceded that he is less of a 
 hypocrite than his Anglo-Saxon brother. He frankly recognizes 
 exceptions to the general rule. Thus in the Mahabharata it is 
 said : "There is nothing higher than to tell the truth, yet it is bet- 
 ter to speak what is beneficial than to speak the truth." Also that 
 it is permissible to lie "on an occasion of marriage, or of love, or 
 when life is In danger, or when one's entire property is about to 
 be taken away, or for the sake of a Brahman." 
 
 In theory the Westerner makes no exceptions to the rule; in 
 practise he is often quite liberal. The Filipino is an Oriental 
 who professes the theory taught him by the Church while prac- 
 tising that of the Mahabharata with stress on the five exceptions, 
 modifying the fourth by striking out the superfluous word 
 entire.^'^ 
 
 Competent observers agree that testimony offered in the Phil- 
 ippine courts must be carefully scrutinized. In parts of Burma 
 there are said to be licensed practitioners of the gentle art of 
 perjury, and in the Philippines, as In America, there are many 
 experts who practise the art without a license.^' 
 
 27 Lord Curzon brought the hornets about his ears by telling the students 
 of the University of Calcutta that "the highest ideal of truth is to a large 
 extent Western." The statement was true enough, but all over India the cry 
 went up that the Anglo-Saxon is a hypocrite who pays lip service only to a 
 general principle. Speeches of Lord Curson, I, p. 126. 
 
 28 The naivete with which a Filipino witness sometimes testifies is very 
 amusing. In one instance a witness, after describing an accident in great 
 detail, and standing successfully a severe cross-examination, volunteered the 
 information that he was not present When asked for an explanation be
 
 112 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Dissimulation, deceit and servility in people, as in children, are 
 founded in fear and hope. They are seldom inherent or per- 
 manent traits of character of any people and when they have been 
 acquired they ordinarily disappear with the removal of the in- 
 ducing causes. 
 
 It has often been said that the Filipinos are lazy, treacherous 
 and cruel, as well as ignorant of the meaning of the word truth. 
 The charge is grossly untrue. It must be remembered, however, 
 that Anglo-Saxon-Puritan standards are not accepted by all the 
 world as laws of nature and that the Filipinos are not of English 
 or New England origin. As business men the Filipinos are 
 probably less reliable than the Chinese, but more honest than the 
 Japanese. The common people arei like those of similar social 
 and economic station in other countries, — simple-minded, good- 
 hearted, and generally honest, with a sufficient number of excep- 
 tions to necessitate the maintenance of a police system. 
 
 Like all people who live in the tropics, the Filipinos are natu- 
 rally indolent. Activity for its own sake has no charm for them. 
 The restless energy of the Americans seems to them mere fool- 
 ishness, — ^like jumping up and down for the sake of doing some- 
 thing. Their necessities are the exact measure of their energies, 
 and the necessities of life in the tropics are few and easily sup- 
 plied. With banana and papaia trees growing in the back yard, a 
 Filipino who can borrow" a ladder need not worry about the sup- 
 port of his family. The people subscribe cheerfully to the biblical 
 doctrine that labor is a curse, to be avoided when possible. En- 
 ergy and activity are unnatural In such a climate. The tendency 
 Is downward to the standard which nature has fixed for the 
 tropics, and even American and European born residents can 
 avoid the inevitable languor only by constant vigilance and active 
 exercise. 
 
 Personal dignity, reserve and pride are common to all Fil- 
 ipinos as to all members of the Malay race. They are sensitive, 
 courteous, hospitable and quick to take offense at any discourtesy, 
 
 replied : "I was not there. My friend saw the accident, but he had to work 
 in the rice-fields to-day so, as an accommodation, I came to do the testifying 
 for him."
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 113 
 
 slight, or lack of consideration. They are offended by the brusk 
 directness of a certain type of American who regards courtesy 
 as undemocratic. Their sense of what is due to an individual 
 is shocked by disregard of the requirements of formal courtesy. 
 They have little sense of humor and detest boisterousness and all 
 sorts of horse play. 
 
 In speaking of the characteristics and habits of the Filipinos 
 the reader must constantly bear in mind that no characterization 
 applies to all individuals or even to all classes. It is possible to 
 generalize only with reference to the great body of the common 
 people. As we have seen, there is great diversity of opinion as 
 to their merits and demerits.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 The Native Peoples 
 
 II 
 
 THE MOROS 
 
 A Special Problem — The Designation Moro — The Different Tribes — Their 
 Warlike Character — Running Amok — Weapons — Moro Forts — The Lan- 
 guage and Books — Varying Habits — Physical Characteristics — Dress and 
 Ornaments — Temperate — The Betel Nut Habit — Houses — Polygamy — Tribal 
 Government — Slavery — Schools — Their Religion — Burial Customs — Their In- 
 dustries — Power of Datus — The Moro Laws and Courts — Penalties — Old 
 Customs Slowly Being Abandoned. 
 
 The tribes which inhabit the island of Mindanao and the 
 Sulu and lesser groups at the extreme southwest extremities 
 of the Archipelago have attracted much attention because 
 of their warlike character and their distinction as the only Mo- 
 hammedan wards of the United States. As a governmental fac- 
 tor they are most embarrassing. The wild men are good raw 
 material, and the Filipinos are easily influenced in favor of good 
 government, but the Moros, encased in the armor of Islamism, 
 present a much more difficult problem. After a decade of Amer- 
 ican control, although intertribal wars and the worse vices of 
 slavery have disappeared, they remain in character substantially 
 as the Spaniards left them. Nevertheless those most familiar 
 with the situation, while not enthusiastic, are hopeful of the fu- 
 ture. Their regeneration will be a matter of generations, not of 
 decades. General John J. Pershing, who has had much experience 
 with the Moros, in his last annual report as governor of the prov- 
 ince, says : "Relatively there has been great progress, but in reality 
 
 114
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 115 
 
 the people are yet in dense darkness and only the merest begin- 
 ning has been made toward their enlightenment. The main thing 
 to record is that we have a solid foundation for the future, in 
 that the wild people and the Moros have come to look upon the 
 Americans as their true friends. They have learned that they 
 dare ask and that they will receive protection. They have found 
 Americans just and unselfish, and they regard us as their de- 
 fenders against their own countrymen who would keep them in 
 ignorance for exploitation or seize upon them and sell them into 
 slavery." However, unless "he can be induced to relinquish some 
 of his most vicious customs, and unless he can be protected from 
 exploitation at the hands of his datu, the Moro faces the future 
 with very little of promise. He can not progress far while he is 
 bound down by the chains of polygamy and female slavery. A 
 code which recognizes plurality of wives and authorizes concubi- 
 nage can not prevail against civilized standards of morality. Its 
 baneful influence encourages sensuality and lust with all their 
 degrading effect upon Moro character. Neither can the Moro 
 advance under datu rule, the very foundation of which is laid 
 in ignorance and strengthened by superstition. The moral sense 
 is generally lacking in these datu leaders, and as a consequence 
 even to a greater degree is the conscience of the common Moro 
 befogged."* 
 
 The Moro is not a subject for ordinary missionary work, but 
 the medical missionary can reach him, and it is safe to predict 
 that the work along that line recently commenced under the di- 
 rections of Bishop Brent will be more effective than anything 
 heretofore attempted. 
 
 The religion of Mohammed regulates the lives, government 
 and customs as well as the beliefs of its followers. Hence a 
 change of government, to some extent, necessarily interferes 
 with their religion. With this in mind the difficulties in the way 
 of imposing a new system of government will be appreciated. 
 
 To the Spaniards all the followers of Islamism were known as 
 Moors or Moros, and the name has been perpetuated in the 
 
 ^Annual Report of Governor of the Moro Province, 1913.
 
 116 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 islands as descriptive of all the Mohammedan tribes.^ There are 
 six separate and distinct tribes of Moros, and five or six groups 
 which hardly rise to the dignity of tribal entities, so nearly do 
 they resemble one or another of the greater divisions or merge 
 their identity with that of some one of the wholly pagan peoples. 
 While possibly not the most numerous, the Jolo Moros, because 
 of their fierce and intractable natures, their continuous successful 
 defiance of Spanish and American control, and their fanatical 
 religious traits, are the most important and widely known of the 
 Mohammedan peoples. The most of them live on the island of 
 Jolo, a few miles southwest of Mindanao, where they have for 
 centuries fought their fierce and sanguinary battles. They are 
 found also throughout the Jolo group on the Siassi and Tawi- 
 Tawi Islands, which stretch away to the coast of Borneo, and on 
 the Cagayan de Sulu Islands to the north. Many of them have 
 emigrated to Zarnboanga, where they now form no inconsider- 
 able element in the population. 
 
 The Sultan of Jolo has always been regarded as the head of 
 the Moslem church in the Archipelago. The island of Jolo is 
 the political and commercial center of the Philippine Moros. 
 The Joloanos, in striking contrast with all the other Moros, pre- 
 sent a type very closely approaching the original Malay, from 
 whom they sprang, having mingled their blood with none of the 
 other peoples of the Philippines and only to a slight extent with 
 the Arab traders and missionaries who first brought them into 
 the fold of Islam. These latter, though never present among 
 them in any considerable numbers, invariably held high political 
 rank and, practising the polygamy permitted by the Koran, left 
 traces of their blood among the Moros of rank and wealth which 
 are still easily discernible. 
 
 From the boundaries of the Cotabatu district west along the 
 coast and for thirty or forty miles inland, to the Zamboanga dis- 
 trict line, live the Maguindanao tribesmen, approximately fifty 
 
 2 The Moros call themselves Tau sa Islam or The People of Islam as dis- 
 tinguished in their tongue from the Tau sa Pilipino or Christian Filipinos.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 117 
 
 thousand in number, less warlike than any of their neighbors, an 
 agricultural and pastoral people, firmly attached to their Moham- 
 medan faith, but more or less completely reconciled to the pres- 
 ent stable and peaceful government. 
 
 The Lanao Moros, or more properly, and as they call them- 
 selves, the Maranao, or lake people, occupy the great plateau ly- 
 ing about Lake Lanao in north central Mindanao, the entire coun- 
 try surrounding Iligan Bay and the fertile valleys and grassy 
 plains which extend to the southeast of the lake. Originally 
 savage and warlike, they are fast losing these traits and becom- 
 ing successful tillers of the soil, valued and dependable laborers 
 on roads and public improvements throughout the province and, 
 in a crude and uneconomic manner, rather remarkable workers 
 in brass, copper and silver. 
 
 The Yakan Moros inhabit almost alone the island of Basilan, 
 across the straits from Zamboanga. They are probably the best 
 farmers in Mindanao, but have suffered much from contact with 
 the Joloano trouble makers. 
 
 The latest comers of the Mohammedans are probably the Sa- 
 mal Moros — the "Sea Gipsies of the East" — whose migration 
 from Johore was of relatively recent date. They are found in 
 Mindanao, invariably close to the water's edge. Great numbers 
 of them live their entire lives aboard their boats. They were 
 formerly pirates and slave catchers, who in many regions domi- 
 nated their less energetic co-religionists. But American rule has 
 put an end to their lawless activities and they are to-day occupied 
 almost wholly in fishing, leaving their boats only to obtain sup- 
 plies ashore in exchange for their sea produce. Considerable 
 numbers of these people now live in Jolo and on Basilan, but the 
 most of them still build their rude houses on poles over the water 
 and close to the shore, or wander from place to place along the 
 coast of the Zamboanga Peninsula in their vintas.^ 
 
 Of the less important Moro tribes may be mentioned the Kali- 
 
 8 The real Samals are confined to the Samals group of islands. They are 
 not wanderers of the Jolanese type.
 
 118 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 bugan, a mixed people of Moro and Subano blood, and the Bajau 
 and llanos.* 
 
 By instinct, tradition and training the Moro is fierce and war- 
 like, exhibiting all the cruelty toward his enemies which is cus- 
 tomary with savages. Ready and eager to shed blood, inde- 
 pendent and jealous by nature, he goes to war on the slightest 
 provocation. Formerly every man when outside his house or 
 away from home was armed either with a kris or a barong, the 
 two weapons of warfare.^ He is not open and fair in fight, and 
 frequently resorts to what white men regard as improper meth- 
 ods of attack. Being by birth and tradition a fighter he makes 
 an excellent soldier and has been largely employed in that 
 capacity by the government. Two companies of the Philippine 
 Scouts and a dozen or more of the Philippine Constabulary are 
 enlisted from the Moros, and very gallant and valuable soldiers 
 they have proved to be. They take readily to a strict discipline, 
 show great powers of endurance and fight cheerfully and bravely 
 against their own people under the leadership of white officers. 
 
 Occasionally they carry spears and a species of war-club shaped 
 like a boomerang. The barong is a cutting weapon, with a 
 blade twelve, fifteen or eighteen inches long, with front and back 
 oval shaped, meeting at an acute angle at the point. Krises are 
 of two varieties, wavy and straight, and are used for both cut- 
 ting and thrusting. They are often prized for their service in 
 having killed a great number of persons, and the selling price is 
 established accordingly. Individuals have an uncomfortable 
 habit of getting into a religious frenzy and running amok among 
 Christians. A Moro who goes juramentado and runs amok often 
 finds many victims before he is killed. 
 
 The kampilan, another favorite weapon, is a long two-handed 
 
 * According to the most recent estimate there are 325,000 Moros divided 
 among the leading tribes, as follows : 
 
 Magindanaos 90,000 Sulus 65,000 
 
 Malanaos 78,000 Yakans 17,000 
 
 Samals 75,000 
 
 Kept. Gov. Moro Province, 1913, p. 52. 
 
 5 They have now been generally disarmed. The Lanao, Magindanao and 
 Samal Moros make the best soldiers. The Yakans are the pacifists.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 
 
 sword, widening toward the point and sharp on one side. Dag- 
 gers and knives of many shapes and sizes are commonly used. 
 
 The Moros fortify their homes and villages, surrounding 
 them with thick stone or earthen walls and conceal these forts, or 
 cotas, by planting bamboo on or just outside the parapets. 
 The cotas are usually deeply ditched, and entrance is effected by 
 means of a narrow bamboo bridge consisting of a single pole and 
 hand rail leading to a narrow gateway in the wall. From these 
 cotas, in which they often make desperate and stubborn resist- 
 ance to their foes, there are always secret means of ultimate 
 escape, usually underground. 
 
 The Moro languages are of Malayan origin, with a large ad- 
 mixture of Arabic. Although derived from a common source, 
 the dialects differ so as to make intercourse between the tribes 
 impossible without an interpreter. They have some written 
 books, other than the Koran and the Codes, but they are mostly 
 genealogical and do not rise very high in the scale of literature. 
 Considerable has been done by American army officers in the 
 way of formulating the grammars of the different dialects. The 
 Moro languages, however, remain quite rudimentary and unde- 
 veloped.' 
 
 The various tribes, having reached different stages of civiliza- 
 tion, differ to some extent In their habits, customs, modes of life 
 and belief, and no description of habits and customs is applicable 
 to all the tribes. A few who live near the coast are quiet and 
 peaceful and carry on a little farming and primitive manufacture, 
 in connection with the universal fishing. They are generally 
 quite prosperous, but, living as they do in a land of great fertility, 
 where the climate offers but slight encouragement to either energy 
 or ambition, they make no effort to better the conditions into 
 which they were bom. They are not thrifty, are fond of gam- 
 
 « A Grammar of the Maguindanao Tongue, by Father J. Juanmarti, trans- 
 lated by Captain C. C Smith, U. S. A. (1906). 
 
 A Phrase Book and Vocabularx of the Lanao Moro Dialect, by Lieut 
 Charles Winslow Elliott, U. S. A. (1913). 
 
 The Moros now publish a small newspaper at Jolo, and several school 
 text-books are issued in the Moro script by the Department of Education.
 
 120 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 bling, and, as a rule, squander their substance without much 
 thought of the future. 
 
 The men are assisted in the outside work by the women and 
 boys, who plow the fields, go on various expeditions and engage 
 in fishing. Those who are particularly skilled in the things inci- 
 dent to their daily life acquire a reputation among their neigh- 
 bors. Thus one man becomes noted for sailing the fastest boat, 
 another for making the best barong and kris handles and scab- 
 bards, a third as an expert catcher of crabs and crayfish, another 
 as a diver, and so on through all the various native occupations. 
 
 The Moros of pure blood have the usual characteristics of the 
 Malay race. The complexion is olive brown, the hair straight 
 and black. They are somewhat taller than the average Filipino, 
 straight and well formed, and often strong and stockily built. 
 The feet are particularly broad at the toes, which are generally 
 widely separated, due to the habit of going barefooted. In many 
 of their daily occupations they use their toes as other people 
 use their fingers. Thus, in climbing a tree a Moro will grasp the 
 climbing rope with his toes, and in sailing a boat he will wind the 
 sheet around the great toe, and in riding the stirrup strap is 
 passed between the toes. 
 
 The different tribes are easily distinguished by their dress. 
 Generally that of both the men and women is quite simple. For 
 the former it often consists of nothing except a sarong, a long 
 piece of cloth joined at the ends and folded around the waist. 
 A breech-clout is sometimes worn, and upon special occasions 
 a costume consisting of a tight jacket and close-fitting trousers, 
 buttoned to the ankle and full in the seat. These garments are 
 often made in brilliant colors and ornamented with bright but- 
 tons. In the folds of the sarong the wearer usually carries a 
 short dagger, or if a man of high rank, a kris. 
 
 Woman's ordinary clothing is limited to the sarong, a strip of 
 brightly-colored cotton cloth about four feet wide and ten feet 
 long, while her more elaborate dress is usually a close-fitting 
 jacket and loose trousers. Shoes or sandals are unknown to the 
 common people of either sex. The favorite head-dress is a
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 121 
 
 brightly-colored scarf, which the men twist into a turban. Occa- 
 sionally straw or wooden hats of domestic manufacture and 
 enormous size, adorned with tin or silver spikes, are worn by 
 the men. But the turban is more popular. 
 
 Children wear little or no clothing in their homes, but fre- 
 quently appear in public adorned with a sarong. It is not un- 
 usual to see Moro women ornamented with rings and bracelets, 
 the work of native smiths, who are skilful in molding brass and 
 precious metals. The hair is usually worn long by the men, while 
 the women grease it with cocoanut oil and knot it upon the head 
 in more or less fantastic fashion. The umbrella is universally 
 popular and is carried by the well-to-do on all occasions. 
 
 The Moros bathe frequently, spending a gjeat deal of time in 
 the water, but as the use of soap is unknown they can not truth- 
 fully be said to be a cleanly race. Their houses and surround- 
 ings are often in a very filthy condition. They fall very short 
 of the standard of Mohammed, with whom cleanliness was said 
 to be the foundation of religion. The teeth are filed and black- 
 ened and the edges so shaped as to give them an outward curve. 
 This process, which is very painful, is begun by both men and 
 women in their youth and continued for several years. The 
 front teeth are sometimes filled with copper, not for the purpose 
 of preventing decay, but for ornament. Artificial teeth of horn 
 are sometimes inserted, but they are entirely useless. The dye 
 for the teeth is compounded from lemon juice, charcoal, rusty 
 iron, or a certain vegetable sap. 
 
 Tobacco is used for chewing in connection w^ith the betel nut 
 and generally for smoking. Like all Mohammedans, the 
 Moros are temperate in the use of alcoholic liquors. They 
 use opium, however, to a certain extent. The habit of chewing 
 the betel nut has a firm hold on all the people, men, women, and 
 even children. It is supposed to aid digestion, preserve the teeth 
 and act as a stimulant on the body. A betel nut outfit consists 
 of a small brass box, a knife, a mixing pestle, a small package of 
 shell lime, a few betel nuts from the areca palm, tobacco and a 
 roll of buyo leaves.
 
 122 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The people of all stations in life build their houses very mudi 
 alike. They are raised on poles from three to ten feet above the 
 ground and are often built near or over the water. The timbers 
 are lashed together and held in place with bejuco or rattan. The 
 roofs are usually thatched with cogon grass, sometimes with nipa, 
 or some other variety of palm, and the walls made of salaga, a 
 species of palm leaf sewed together. The floors are made of strips 
 of bamboo. These structures are practically waterproof and af- 
 ford shelter from the sun, and also withstand the frequent earth- 
 quake shocks. The houses of the better class are often large, well 
 built, and the outside joists elaborately carved and colored. The 
 Bajaus, or sea gipsies, live in boats. Those who do not spend all 
 their time at sea build huts on the shore over the water. Samal 
 settlements are compactly built along the coasts, while those of 
 the Yakans are scattered, the people living in small rancherias 
 with houses far removed from one another. Generally the Moros 
 proper live farther inland than do the Samal Laut. 
 
 The house furnishings are not elaborate, but sufficient for the 
 needs of the occupants. Chairs and tables are not required, as 
 the people sit on the floor. A few shelves, perhaps, are used for 
 pottery and the kitchen utensils, all of which are primitive, con- 
 sisting of brass bowls and jars, dried gourds, cocoanut shells, 
 banana leaves and crude baskets. Mats are used for sleeping, 
 except in the homes of datus, where bedsteads, curtained with 
 colored cloth hangings and provided with pillows and mattresses, 
 may be found. Among the wealthier people the walls are deco- 
 rated with krises and lances, while tom-toms, called agongs, and 
 other alleged musical instruments are among the prized family 
 possessions. Artificial light, when needed, is obtained from a 
 slender torch-like bundle of resin, wrapped in a green leaf, or 
 from a dish of cocoanut oil in which floats a wick. The tiny 
 kerosene lamps sold by the Chinese traders are much used.'' 
 
 ^ But civilization is getting its grasp on the Moro. Once on a visit of 
 inspection, I was shown through the establishment of a wealthy datu. In 
 the large living-room were two cheap but gaudy "Morris chairs," which it 
 was easy to see were regarded by tlie proprietor as the conclusive evidence 
 of his "culture." But this was not all. As a special favor, I was shown the 
 women's apartment and the chair which conjugal affection had provided for 
 the favorite wife. It was a second-hand dental chair.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 123 
 
 Polygamy is common among the Moros and is sanctioned by 
 their religion, a man having as many wives as he cares to support 
 The Koran permits four legal wives, but frequently all except 
 one are slaves, whose children do not inherit land and titles. 
 Wives are practically bought, the suitor paying an agreed amount 
 to the family of the bride. Marriage ceremonies are performed 
 by the priests and are often quite elaborate, followed by feast- 
 ing, music and dancing. The Moros have many children, and the 
 family ties are close. The women carry the children on their 
 hips, as is customary among Filipinos. The proportion of ille- 
 gitimate births is small. The marriageable age for women is 
 thirteen years. Among Malanao Moros divorce is easy. Hus- 
 band and wife separate on mutual agreement, the woman return- 
 ing to her people, taking with her all presents received from her 
 husband during wedded life. If a man finds himself too poor 
 to support all his wives he may send one or more back to their 
 former homes. The position of women among the Moros is 
 rather high, in that they receive kindly treatment and often affec- 
 tion from their husbands, and are consulted in matters pertain- 
 ing to the family and property. Parents are fond of their chil- 
 dren, and the punishment of the latter by whipping is rare. 
 
 The tribal government is patriarchal, the most prominent mem- 
 ber of the order being a chief, generally called a datu, although 
 sometimes known as sultan, rajah, or by some other title. But 
 whatever his title, his authority is always recognized by the mem- 
 bers of his clan, and he has extensive power over his followers. 
 The office is usually hereditary, descending to the oldest, or some- 
 times to the most capable son. The number of a chief's follow- 
 ers varies, running from half a dozen to perhaps ten thousand, 
 but the importance of a chief is not determined entirely by the 
 size of his following; other considerations, such as noble blood 
 or great riches are frequently taken into account. There seems 
 to be a tendency toward acknowledging the social importance of 
 the merely rich man, which, if increased, will necessitate consid- 
 erable changes in the social stattts. At present this idea has not 
 sufficiently developed to threaten the position of the datu, who
 
 124 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 generally rules by right of blood and exercises supreme au- 
 thority.® 
 
 A form of slavery still very generally prevails. Moro slavery 
 differs materially from the institution of negro slavery as it for- 
 merly existed in the United States, and in many cases the bond- 
 age is almost nominal. Sometimes the slave is from an alien 
 tribe or is a captured man of the woods; but oftener of pure 
 Moro blood. Master and slaves often live in the same house, 
 eat the same food and exist upon the same plane. Their simple 
 wants are provided for, and undoubtedly many bond servants 
 prefer the secure and easy life they lead In the household of a 
 well-to-do master, who always has enough fish and rice, to the 
 struggle for existence that would follow their liberation. The 
 female slave often occupies a position of considerable impor- 
 tance. 
 
 The slaves are obtained as captives in war, as punishment for 
 crime, as security for debts, or by the despotic decree of some 
 chief. They may be bought or sold. A man desiring to borrow 
 money turns over as security some relative or other dependent, 
 who is bound to servitude until the debt is paid. Persons fail- 
 ing to pay their debts are liable to bondage, and because of high 
 rates of interest and the cost of their maintenance they not Infre- 
 quently remain In servitude for the rest of their lives. Often, 
 however, the slavery Is temporary. 
 
 The Samal Laut, in the days of piracy, obtained an abundance 
 of slaves as the' result of their expeditions. Among them were 
 Filipino Christians, pagans and Mohammedans. Among the 
 Bajaus slavery Is general and each man is required to work one 
 or two days each week for his chief. On account of the extreme 
 difficulty of obtaining reliable information upon the subject, no 
 estimate can be made of the number of slaves. 
 
 Slavery has, of course, been sternly interdicted under Ameri- 
 can rule, but It has been impossible suddenly to terminate so 
 deeply and firmly implanted a custom. The one great source of 
 supply has been cut off since the raiding expeditions Into the 
 
 8 The title of datu may be won by personal influence or by conspicuous 
 acts.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 125 
 
 interior and constant intertribal warfare have ceased, and in 
 time the system will die a natural death.* 
 
 Until recently, with few exceptions, the Mores have been un- 
 provided with schools. The teachers among them have always 
 been the priests, or panditas, who have trained a sufficient num- 
 ber of the young people to read and write to insure the perpetua- 
 tion of their own class. Books, being made laboriously by 
 hand, are scarce and confined to the Koran, the Luwaran or 
 Book of Laws, and a few genealogical works. Some of the latter 
 are very old and beautifully written in many colored inks. Among 
 the children of the datus and sultans, reading and writing are 
 commonly taught, but as few except the priests have any use for 
 these arts they are quickly forgotten. Boys are raised for the 
 priesthood by being taken directly into the families of the pan- 
 ditas, where they remain for several years in the capacity of 
 servants and pupils. 
 
 Many of the Moros have made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and 
 on their return are treated with great respect and veneration. 
 These pilgrimages are organized perennially by the Arabic had- 
 jis, who wander about the country and make all the arrangements 
 with steamship companies through their agents in Jolo and Zam- 
 boanga. 
 
 Nearly all the heads of families and men of consequence 
 among the Lanao Moros are able with more or less difficulty to 
 write and read their own dialect, using the Arabic characters, 
 and in most families of any means a boy or two, and occasionally 
 a girl, will be found who are proficient in these simple accom- 
 plishments. The books used by the panditas in teaching their 
 pupils are written on old sheets of printed paper and sometimes 
 on thin boards of soft wood. 
 
 In recent years education among the Moros has received seri- 
 
 ® General Pershing says, "Slavery has always been a part and parcel of 
 Mohammedanism, and prior to American occupation was practised openly by 
 Moros, pagans, and even Filipinos. Since the enactment by the Legislative 
 Council of the law of 1903, prohibiting slavery in the Moro Province, its 
 existence has been generally denied, although to some extent it has been car- 
 ried on under the pretense of retainer, follower, sacope, or concubine." Report 
 Gov. Moro Province^ 1913,
 
 126 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ous consideration by the provincial authorities. Pandlta schools 
 were first established. These schools are organized in the Moro 
 settlements under the patronage of some influential datu and 
 conducted by the local pandita or priest. The building and 
 teacher are provided by the Moros themselves, while the prov- 
 ince furnishes books, paper, blackboards and other necessary sup- 
 plies. The instruction given is necessarily limited almost en- 
 tirely to reading and writing the native dialect. Primary and 
 Industrial schools are being established under American direc- 
 tion, and the work is making some progress. When in 1913 
 the Moro Province was reorganized as the Department of Min- 
 danao and Sulu, the administration of the schools was taken 
 over by the Bureau of Education.^** 
 
 The Moros are, according to Christian standards, unprogres- 
 sive. The Koran is everywhere regarded with great reverence, 
 but the people are as a rule ignorant of its teachings and are not 
 steadfast in the practises of the Mohammedan faith. Aside from 
 a few rites and abstention from the use of pork and liquor, the 
 Moros can scarcely be said to abide by the laws of Mohammed- 
 anism. They pay their priests a nominal respect, but are not 
 particularly prompt In paying the tithes expected of them. Very 
 few observe the five daily hours of prayer. There are but few 
 houses of worship, and these are modest mosques, or chapels 
 (generally, nipa shacks), where services are held on Friday, the 
 Sabbath of the Mohammedan.^^ The priests read selections 
 from the Koran, in Arabic or Malay, which are not understood 
 by the average listener. In many villages there are no places of 
 worship. The religion, however, permits of home worship, and 
 doubtless many Moros are devout and loyal to their faith. In 
 
 ^^ Rept. Dir. of Ed., 1914, p, 54. The Moros asked for teachers competent 
 to instruct their children in the tenets of their religion. 
 
 11 At Sagiaran, near Lake Lanao, the powerful and influential datu Amai- 
 Kerut has built a large mosque of sawed lumber, and adorned it with a cor- 
 rugated iron roof. The best mosque is at Jalukoaugan. Of course there are 
 many sincere Mohammedans among the Moros, and it is easy to underesti- 
 mate the attachment of the people to their religion. See "The Mohammedan 
 Problem in the Philippines," by Lt, Col. John P. Finley, in The Journal of 
 Race Development, V, No. 4, April, 1915.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 127 
 
 cases of sickness a priest is often called in to repeat a formula 
 over a glass of water, which is then drunk by the patient. 
 
 *The Moro religion in many of its aspects is largely a govern- 
 mental affair, a sort of state church, and acts committed in its 
 name are respected. The Spanish converted to Christianity a 
 few Moros, who are scattered along the coast in the vicinity of 
 Zamboanga. 
 
 Respect for the dead is general among the Moros, and they 
 provide a suitable burial, attended by more or less religious cere- 
 mony. The Malanao tribe celebrates the death of a datu or other 
 important person with considerable pomp. The body is kneaded 
 to remove all impurities and is then wrapped in cloth, a process 
 which is repeated imtil it becomes heavily encased. It is then 
 buried with prayers by the panditas. Graves are covered with 
 heaps of stone and often marked with a long pole from which 
 are suspended colored banners and painted figures of grotesque 
 birds or animals. At the conclusion a feast is spread, to which 
 all friends of the deceased are invited. The burial ceremony is 
 followed by a period of mourning. 
 
 Among the Samal Laut, at the approach of death a priest is 
 called in to read from the Koran or to intone prayers. The 
 corpse is carefully washed and wrapped in white cloth; or, if the 
 family is poor, cloth of some other color, or even matting, may be 
 used. The body is then placed in a wooden coffin and is buried 
 with the eyes open and the face toward Mecca. A simple cere- 
 mony consisting of prayers and selections from the Koran is held 
 at the grave, which is sometimes sprinkled with sandalwood wa- 
 ter. The place is usually marked by a modest canopy of cloth 
 supported by low posts. Returning home, the family of the de- 
 ceased is expected to devote several nights to mourning for the 
 dead and to reading the Koran. 
 
 Although they live almost entirely in boats and wander from 
 place to place, the Bajaus never bury their dead at sea, but al- 
 ways on a particular island, regardless of the distance they may 
 have to travel to reach the burying-ground. Everything belong-
 
 128 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ing to a Bajau, including money, is buried with him. Even his 
 boat is cut up and buried. 
 
 The aggregate of Moro industry is not large, although it has 
 been considerably increased during recent years. The tools, by 
 the aid of which everything else is produced, are largely home- 
 made. Here, however, as elsewhere in the Moro economy, much 
 ingenuity is often wasted in trying to fit one tool to many uses 
 instead of devising implements suitable for the work at hand. 
 Even with the Moros there has been some little specialization of 
 function; thus not all men are smiths or woodworkers. There 
 has also been some recognition of the necessity for trades and 
 craftsmen in even the small division of labor which their social 
 organization affords. But this tendency is not marked. 
 
 Although the Moros are primarily farmers or fishermen, some 
 of them acquire mechanical trades. The ironworkers or smiths 
 are the most skilful among these semi-tradesmen. Their equip- 
 ment is primitive, but shows considerable ingenuity, and their 
 workmanship is often excellent. They obtain iron and steel 
 from Chinamen by barter, and forge the numerous krises, bolos, 
 knives, daggers and spears in which the people take great delight. 
 The occupation of smith is held in high honor among them. 
 
 Another important home industry is the building of boats. 
 The Moros are semi-amphibious, and when they are not actually 
 immersed in water are frequently to be found upon its surface 
 in small canoes. Practically every family possesses at least one 
 boat and often several. Although the demand is consequently 
 large, it has not developed a special class of boat builders. Each 
 man is competent to construct some kind of a craft for his per- 
 sonal use. It requires about three weeks' time for a man to make 
 an ordinary canoe twenty feet in length, as the tools employed are 
 crude and unsatisfactory. Many a huge vinta has been labori- 
 ously hollowed from an immense tree trunk with no other tool 
 than a mallet and a rough chisel. 
 
 The making of pottery is common but not general. A pot- 
 ter's wheel of a rude pattern is used. The material is a black
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 129 
 
 volcanic mud obtained from the sediment of streams. It is not 
 apparently rich in clay, but holds together quite well after bak- 
 ing. The pottery is fired by being put directly into an ordinary 
 fire, where a good deal of it is ruined, but the rest emerges hard- 
 ened and toughened sufficiently for household use. The firing 
 kiln is unknown. 
 
 Some of the more ingenious artisans, -particularly among the 
 Lanao people, work in brass, hammering or molding a variety 
 of ornamental articles. The ability to do this work is confined 
 to a few localities and families. Few articles are made except 
 "chow pots," betel boxes, ornaments and handles for krises. 
 Some brass workers are able to work in silver, but their skill 
 does not equal that of the Navajo and other American Indians. 
 
 The women weave cloth of good quality, the usual articles 
 made being the sarong and large handkerchief, which constitute 
 the ordinary dress of both sexes. This work is executed upon 
 primitive looms and is often artistic in addition to being skilfully 
 woven. But little use is made of twills, diagonals and other fancy 
 weaves. Considerable diversity in appearance is obtained by the 
 manipulation of many-colored threads. The thread is obtained 
 from the Chinese, the women having small knowledge of spin- 
 ning. The dyeing is done at home with colors that are generally 
 lasting, extracted from barks, roots and flowers. 
 
 A small-eared, low-growing corn is raised, principally because 
 it IS immune from the attacks of locusts. It receives little care 
 other than numerous weedings, and the quality of the seed is so 
 poor that the resulting crop is far from satisfactory. Sweet po- 
 tatoes form a never-failing crop, growing apparently from year 
 to year without replanting, but the quality could be improved by 
 the introduction of fresh stock and the employment of modem 
 agricultural methods. The banana is prolific, but can scarcely be 
 classed as a cultivated product. Although great groves are to 
 be seen everywhere, they receive no attention. Cocoanut trees 
 abound near the coast, and the natives find them of use in many 
 .ways, the oil being an important article of food. Tobacco is
 
 130 ^^ fTHE PHILIPPINES 
 
 raised for family consumption, also a small quantity of sugar 
 cane, from jvhidi brown sugar is manufactured in a crude 
 fashion. 
 
 The Moros in the vicinity of Lake Lanao raise excellent coffee, 
 and all who live on the island of Mindanao collect large quanti- 
 ties of gutta-percha, rubber and hemp. 
 
 The establishment throughout the province, by the American 
 government, of the Moro Exchanges has proved a great stimu- 
 lant to trade among them, as well as a. civilizing influence. 
 Through these exchanges the Moros have been brought into 
 peaceful commercial relations with one another and with the wild 
 pagan peoples of the interior.^^ 
 
 All datus, and especially those of importance, strive to keep iii 
 immediate attendance upon their persons a number of armed 
 fighting men, who not only act as a body-guard, but also exer- 
 cise functions of a governmental nature. The personal power 
 of the datu is greatly increased by the existence of this class of 
 retainers, for they derive their authority from him and are re- 
 sponsible to him alone for the way in which it is exercised. The 
 personal despotism of the datu is tempered in practise by the 
 great deference paid by all members of the community, himself 
 included, to custom. Not only is there a written code of law 
 governing the people, but there are Moro customs, the reputed 
 usages of their ancestors, in the observance of which they are 
 quite strict and of which they are very tenacious. Precedent is 
 the great law giver and court of last resoriE. It would not occur 
 to a datu to institute new laws in the governing of his people, 
 and progress that would have to be based upon such action would 
 meet with general disapproval. The Moros have no comprehen- 
 sion of the word government. They recognize only a personal 
 central power. When the census of 1903 was being taken they 
 frequently asked by whom It had been ordered, and when told 
 by the government, were at a loss to understand what the work 
 
 *2At one time tlie Moro Exchanges in the districts of Zamboanga, Jolo 
 and Cotabatu did a business of one million pesos annually.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 131 
 
 meant. .When told, however, that the governor nad decreed it, 
 they were satisfied. 
 
 All real authority is vested in the datu, who presumably acts 
 in the interests of his subjects. By him war is declared and car- 
 ried on and peace made. As he is not always competent to lead 
 in war, it frequently becomes necessary to select a war chief. 
 The office of war chief is comparatively unimportant imder the 
 peaceful conditions of the last few years. 
 
 The administration of justice is a guarded prerogative of the 
 datu, who either holds court in person, or determines all ques- 
 tions on appeal. If the case presents unusual difficulties, he may 
 confer with his panditas, who are presumed to know the written 
 law — the Koran and the Luwaran — and the elders among his per- 
 sonal following. 
 
 The title to all land occupied by the tribe is vested in the datu. 
 The occupancy of it by the people is either with his permission 
 or by his sufferance, but in practise tenants enjoy all the advan- 
 tages of ownership, including, in a majority of cases, perma- 
 nency of tenure. 
 
 Among the Malanao Moros, sultans and datus are often 
 elected. In matters of importance a sultan usually acts with the 
 advice and consent of his subordinate officials. The title sultan 
 is commonly applied to a leader having several datus under his 
 authority. He may, however, have none, and a datu at times 
 may have more wealth and influence than his sultan. A datu 
 does not necessarily obey the sultan, although he is liable to pun- 
 ishment if the chief ruler is powerful enough to wage war against 
 him. 
 
 The Moros, under American rule, are governed largely by 
 their ancient laws, which are administered through the tribal 
 and ward courts. An effort is being made to deprive the datus 
 of their personal jurisdiction, but no great results have been so 
 far accomplished. The laws of the Maguindanao and Sulu 
 Moros were long ago collected into a Code written in Arabic, 
 known as the Luwaran. The authority of this Code is universally 
 accepted by the people of this tribe, although the datus use con-
 
 132 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 siderable discretion in applying its provisions. As customary 
 law prevails very generally, there is much variety throughout the 
 Moro country in the methods of administering native justice and 
 in the laws applied." 
 
 Among the Samal Laut of Zamboanga, a dispute between two 
 persons of the same village is disposed of by the local headman 
 in conference with all interested parties. If the accused and 
 the leader do not agree, the case is carried to the next in rank, 
 such as a secondary datu, and again discussed. If the results 
 are still unsatisfactory, it goes by appeal to the ranking datu of 
 the region, whose decision is final. 
 
 If the difficulty involves people of different villages, the re- 
 spective headmen take it under consideration, and the case is 
 subject to appeal in a similar manner as stated above. The su- 
 preme authority or over-lord has power to reverse any previous 
 decision. Minor matters are usually settled without appeal. 
 
 Adultery in women must be proved by at least two witnesses, 
 and the punishment inflicted is a heavy fine to be paid by herself 
 or her family to her husband, which amount he shares with the 
 datiis or headmen who conduct the trial. If unable to pay, the 
 woman becomes a slave and her husband is at liberty to sell her. 
 A woman can not secure divorce on the ground of her husband's 
 adultery. A man convicted of adultery is subject to a fine twice 
 as heavy as that exacted from a woman. This money goes to 
 the injured husband, who divides with the headmen. If unpaid, 
 the offender becomes a slave and is sold.^* 
 
 A convicted thief must pay the victim twice the amount of the 
 theft, in addition to a fine, which goes to the headmen. If the 
 case comes before a datu, he receives the entire fine, but is ex- 
 pected to divide with the headmen assisting in its conduct. Fail- 
 ure to pay means enslavement of the condemned, who, however, 
 
 13 Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion (1905), pp. 64 
 et seq. 
 
 i*The different tribes have different punishments for adultery. The 
 Yakans tie the parties together and throw them into the sea. The Maguin- 
 danaos give the injured husband the right to kill the man and w^oman if he 
 acts within a reasonable time.
 
 THE NATIVE PEOPLES 133 
 
 often substitutes one of his children, who in this manner sinks 
 into slavery for life. 
 
 Murder is usually punished by a heavy fine divided between the 
 family of the victim and the men who try the case, a datu receiv- 
 ing an extra share. If a man commits a crime when intoxicated, 
 the case is investigated to see whether he was in that condition 
 voluntarily or whether others were partly to blame, and this fact 
 is taken into consideration in the infliction of punishment. 
 
 The customary laws of these people thus allow money to be 
 paid in settlement for almost all crimes. In fact, this was the 
 usual practise among the Malays of the Philippine Islands. With 
 the Samal Laut particularly this method is the natural one, in view 
 of the fact that not only the somewhat unsettled and roving life 
 of the tribe is unfavorable to devising means for guarding pris- 
 oners, but especially because the system of fines is a source of 
 income to the headmen. 
 
 The Maguindanao Moros have but few criminals and generally 
 deal summarily with them. Ordinarily a fine is imposed, but in 
 rare cases offenders are sentenced to confinement, and, in the 
 absence of jails or other strong buildings, are secured by attach- 
 ing a huge block of wood to the ankle. 
 
 Among the Sulu tribes, the sultan appoints a judge before 
 whom all cases are tried. The fine for murder is two hundred 
 ten pesos for each person killed.. In default of payment for a 
 crime, the culprit is sentenced to slavery. According to the rules 
 of evidence, the accused can not testify in his own behalf. He 
 may be convicted upon the testimony of a single witness, which 
 fact, together with the custom of giving half the fine to the com- 
 plaining witness, often makes the prisoner the victim of revenge. 
 What has been written refers generally to the conditions exist- 
 ing at the time of the American occupation. 
 
 Many of these customs and laws are slowly giving way before 
 the system of government inaugurated and maintained in the 
 Moro country by the Americans. The tribesmen, particularly 
 the Malanaos and Maguindanaos, are realizing more and more 
 the value of a stable government, of just courts and of the
 
 134 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 sympathetic and unprejudiced attitude of their American gov- 
 ernors. Hundreds of cases, disputes which formerly were settled 
 solely by the datus themselves, are now regularly brought to the 
 district capitals and submitted to the white governors and judges 
 for adjudication. The old warlike and predatory tendencies are 
 slowly but surely dying out, as the Moro begins to appreciate 
 the meaning of a peaceful and quiet agricultural existence with 
 a swift and relentless justice ever at hand to punish the evildoer. 
 This does not apply to the datus, who naturally object to being 
 deprived of their ancient authority. Practically all the non-reli- 
 able and outlaw chiefs, who until about 1913 made necessary the 
 presence of considerable bodies of American and native troops in 
 the Moro Province, have now been hunted down and disposed of, 
 and the balance of the datus and sultans, with that fatalism char- 
 acteristic of Islam, show a disposition to accept the new order 
 and to turn from war to agriculture and peace. 
 
 The Moros have never been on good terms with the Filipinos. 
 The attempt to bring them into closer relations by establishing 
 agricultural colonies composed of members of both races is still 
 in the experimental stage.
 
 PART II 
 The Historical Background 
 
 "In the light, then, of impartial history raised above race prej- 
 udice and religions prepossessions, after a comparison of the 
 early years of the Spanish Conquest in America as with the first 
 generation or two of the English settlements, the conversion and 
 civilisation of the Philippines in the forty years following Le- 
 gaspi's arrival must he pronounced an achievement without par- 
 allel in history." Edward G. Bourne.
 
 I 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 Discovery and Conquest 
 
 A HALF-CENTURY OF ACCOMPLISHMENT 
 
 Route to the East — Struggle Between Spain and Portugal — Appeal to the 
 Pope — The Demarcation Bulls — Treaty of Tordesillas — Ferdinand Magellan 
 — Extension of Demarcation Line around the Globe — The Circumnavigation 
 of the Globe — Discovery of tht Philippine Islands — The Junta of Bandajos 
 and the Treaty of Saragossa — Voyage of Villalabos and the Naming of the 
 Islands — Andreas de Urdaneta — Expedition under Legaspi — Mohammedism 
 in the Philippines — Conquest of Luzon and Founding of Manila — Death of 
 Legaspi — Expedition of Salcedo — Limahong's Expedition Against Manila — 
 Expedition to Borneo — The Conquest Completed and Government Established 
 — Missionary Character of the Enterprise — Proprietary Government — Salazar 
 and the Appeal for Reform — Sanchez Sent to Spain — Reorganization of 
 Affairs — Salazar the First Archbishop — The End of the Constructive Era. 
 
 The discovery of the Philippine Archipelago by Ferdinand 
 Magellan was one of the immediate results of the attempt of 
 Pope Alexander VI to reconcile the conflicting claims of Por- 
 tugal and Spain in the newly discovered and to be discovered 
 parts of the world. 
 
 The overland road to the Far East was obstructed by the Egyp- 
 tians and Turks. Somewhere in that half mythical region were 
 the famed islands where grew the prized nutmegs, cloves, cin- 
 namon, ginger, pepper and other spices. 
 
 "Here see o'er Oriental seas bespread 
 
 Infinite island groups, and alwhere strewed; 
 
 Tidore, Ternate view, whose burning head 
 Lanceth the wary flame and fiery flood ; 
 
 There see the groves the biting clove bud shed. 
 Bought with the price of Portuguese blood. 
 
 Here dwell the golden fowls, whose home is air ' 
 
 And never earthward save in death may fare."* 
 
 iCamoens' The Lusiads, Canto XII, p. 407 (Burton). 
 
 137
 
 138 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Could an all-sea route to these islands be discovered then would 
 the fabled wealth of India and far Cathay fall into the lap of 
 Europe without tribute paid to the robber Turks. 
 
 The struggle for the discovery and conquest of new lands was 
 then between Spain and Portugal. England, the mother to be 
 of empires, had not yet awakened to the possibilities of the fu- 
 ture. The seas that washed her island home still formed her 
 boundaries. For the spacious times of great Elizabeth, with its 
 bold buccaneer leaders, she was yet to wait for half a century. 
 
 In the meatime Prince Henry the Navigator was devoting 
 his energies to the extension of geographical knowledge and the 
 development of the commerce of Portugal.* The navigators 
 ,who were soon to sail to the East and West Indies and lay the 
 foundations of a great colonial system were being trained and 
 developed in the trade on the coast of Africa. 
 
 Jhe discoveries of Columbus placed a new world in the pos- 
 session of the Spaniards. Before the end of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury the people of two small countries on the Iberian Peninsula, 
 .through whose veins flowed the vigorous blood of youth, had 
 extended their sway over all the newly- found lands of the globe. 
 Conflict between them had become inevitable. Portugal was 
 watchful of her monopoly of the African trade, and Spain was 
 dreaming of a world-wide colonial empire. 
 
 Both appealed to the accepted arbitrator, and Pope Alexander 
 VI generously divided the waters and new lands of the universe 
 between the two ambitious claimants. The famous demarcation 
 bulls drew a line from pole to pole through the Atlantic Ocean. 
 The existing rights of Portugal to the east of the line were con- 
 firmed, while Spain was authorized to take possession of all 
 unknown, unoccupied heathen lands to the west thereof. 
 
 The future of the Philippines was determined by these papal 
 bulls and the subsequent Treaty of Tordesillas. Had not the bulls 
 been issued the islands would inevitably have fallen into the 
 
 2 See the life of this remarkable prince by C. Raymond Beasley (London 
 and New York, 1895) ; and an article by Prof. Bourne, entitled, "Prince Henry 
 the Navigator," in Annual Rept. Am. Hist. Ass'n (1893), p. 112.
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 139 
 
 hands of the energetic Dutch. The voyage of Magellan and the 
 discovery of the new islands were the logical results of the estab- 
 lishment of the demarcation lines. 
 
 Several bulls were issued during the year following the dis- 
 covery of America by Columbus, the apparent purpose being to 
 secure to Spain the new lands which her enterprise had found, 
 while reserving to Portugal the rewards of her enterprise in the 
 East. The world of waters, islands and lands were to be di- 
 vided between the faithful sons of the Church, Ferdinand of 
 Castile and John of Portugal. 
 
 By the first of three bulls' the Pope granted to Spain the coun- 
 tries which Columbus had recently discovered and such as her 
 navigators hoped to discover in the West. And this was 
 done "because of all works the most agreeable to divine Majesty 
 is that the Christian religion should be exalted and spread every- 
 where; that the salvation of the human soul should be secured 
 in all countries, and that barbarous nations should be subjugated 
 and converted to the Catholic faith." 
 
 On the same day there was issued a sort of abridgment of this 
 bull which recited the same matter more clearly and concisely. 
 The previously granted rights of Portugal in her discoveries were 
 carefully protected and the rights of Spain in her new lands were 
 defined in the same terms. It has been suggested, Harrisse thinks 
 with good reason, that something thereupon happened in diplo- 
 matic circles, as on the following day another bull was issued 
 which determined the Spanish and Portuguese rights by drawing 
 a line north and south through the Atlantic Ocean one hundred 
 leagues west and south of the Azores and of Cape Verde. All 
 new unoccupied lands to the west and south of this line were to 
 belong to Spain.* 
 
 But as it was possible that while voyaging toward the west 
 or south the Spanish captains might land or touch in eastern 
 waters and there discover islands or mainlands that belonged 
 
 « Dated May 3, 1493. 
 
 * These bulls and the Treaty of Tordesillas are printed in full in B. & R., 
 I, pp. 97 et seq. See also Harrisse's Dip. Hist, of America, and Bourne's 
 Essays in Historical Criticism, p. 13.
 
 140 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 to India, the Pope, as further evidence of his good will, by a 
 bull dated September 25, 1493, extended the Spanish grant so 
 that it included "all islands and mainlands whatsoever that are 
 found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered, that are 
 or were, or seem to be in the route by sea or land to the west 
 or south but are now recognized as being in the waters of the 
 west or south and east and India." 
 
 King John of Portugal was much dissatisfied with the arrange- 
 ment effected by the various papal bulls. According to his inter- 
 pretation of the existing treaty between Spain and Portugal, the 
 former had resigned to Portugal the entire field of oceanic dis- 
 covery, excepting only the Canary Islands. A boundary line only 
 one hundred leagues west of the Azores did not seem to him to 
 allow sufficient sea room for the Portuguese sailors who were 
 engaged in African voyages. 
 
 The Pope declined to make any further changes and war 
 seemed imminent. But Spain was disposed to make reasonable 
 concessions, particularly as Columbus had estimated the distance 
 from the Canary Islands to the new islands as nine hundred 
 leagues. The principle of the papal bull was accepted by the 
 rivals, but it was thought that a line drawn half-way between 
 the Cape Verde Islands and the islands newly discovered by 
 Columbus would effect a fair division of the waters and lands 
 which were to be exploited and Christianized. The result was 
 the Treaty of Tordesillas, whereby the line of demarcation was by 
 agreement drawn three hundred and seventy leagues west of the 
 Cape Verde Islands, and this was duly ratified and confirmed by 
 Pope Julius II in a bull promulgated July 24, 1506. 
 
 In neither the papal bulls nor the Treaty of Tordesillas is there 
 anything to suggest that the demarcation line was intended to 
 extend around the globe. The line was drawn north and south 
 through the Atlantic Ocean, and Spain was given a free field 
 to the west and Portugal to the east thereof. Should they meet 
 on the other side of the globe it was evidently the intention that 
 the usual rule of priority of discovery should detemine owner-
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 141 
 
 ship.* The idea that the Pope when he estabhshed the demarca- 
 tion line intended to divide the world like an orange does not 
 seem to have prevailed until a generation later. 
 
 The Portuguese reached India in 1498 and thirteen years later 
 Malacca, in the Golden Chersonese, the great entrepot of the 
 spice trade, was occupied. The Moluccas Islands from whence the 
 spices came were not discovered until 1512. It has been claimed 
 that Magellan visited these islands with a Portuguese expedi- 
 tion, but it is more than probable that he obtained his informa- 
 tion about them and the inspiration for his voyage from a certain 
 Captain Serrao, who wrote enthusiastically to Magellan of a 
 "world larger and richer than that discovered by Vasco da 
 Gama." It is possible that Serrao by exaggerating the distance 
 from Malacca to the Spice Islands suggested to Magellan the 
 idea that these islands must be beyond the line of demarcation 
 and hence within the Spanish portion of the globe. They could 
 be reached therefore by sailing westward according to the origi- 
 nal idea of Columbus. 
 
 Ferdinand Magellan had been badly treated by his sovereign. 
 He is said, on doubtful authority, to have joined the Portuguese 
 fleet which sailed for India in 1505, to have been present at the 
 siege of Malacca and to have accompanied an expedition which 
 discovered 
 
 "... the Isles 
 
 Of Ternate and Tidore, whence merchants bring 
 
 Their spicy drugs."" 
 
 It is more than probable that he secured his information with 
 reference to the Moluccas from his friendly correspondent. He 
 had served in the wars in Africa and received a wound that ren- 
 dered him permanently lame. Unfriendly persons secured the 
 ear of the king and made him believe that Magellan was sham- 
 ming lameness. Having lost the royal favor and seeing no pros- 
 pect for employment, Magellan formally renounced his allegi- 
 ance to Portugal and became a naturalized Spaniard. He now 
 
 ' Harrisse, Diplomatic History, p. 64. Bourne, B. & R., I, p. 24. 
 ^Paradise Lost, Book II.
 
 142 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 appealed to Charles for aid in the enterprise which was to "force 
 a passage such as fancy ne'er conceived."^ 
 
 The importance of the idea that the demarcation line extended 
 around the globe, and that the Moluccas were within the Spanish 
 limitations, was perfectly clear to Magellan and also to Haro, 
 who was his financial backer. Transylvanus says that, "They 
 showed Caesar that though it was not yet quite sure whether 
 Malacca was within the confines of the Spaniards or the Portu- 
 guese, because as yet nothing of the longitude had been clearly 
 proved, it was quite plain that the great gulf and the people of 
 SInae lay within the Spanish boundary. This was held to be 
 most certain — ^that the islands which they called the Moluccas, 
 from which all spices are produced and are exported to Malacca, 
 lay within the Spanish western division, and that it was possible 
 to sail there ; and that spices could be brought then to Spain more 
 easily and at less expense than they came direct from their na- 
 tive place." 
 
 Las Casas, who was about the court when Magellan presented 
 his plan to the king, gives a graphic account of what occurred. 
 Magellan, he says,® "had a well-painted globe on which the whole 
 world was depicted, and on it he indicated the route he proposed 
 to take, saving that the strait was left purposely blank so that 
 none should anticipate him. And on that day and at that hour 
 I was in the office of the High Chancellor when the Bishop 
 brought it and showed the High Chancellor the voyage which 
 was proposed; and speaking with Magellan, I asked him what 
 way he planned to take, and he answered that he intended to go 
 by Cape Saint Marry, which we call the Rio de la Platte, and 
 from thence to follow the coast up until he hit upon the Strait. 
 But suppose you do not find any strait by which you can go into 
 the sea? He replied that if he did not find any strait he would 
 go the way the Portuguese took." Las Casas adds^ "This Ferda- 
 
 '^"A Luslan . . . 
 Who being greatly by his King agrieved 
 Shall force a passage fancy ne'er conceived." 
 
 Camoens' The Lusiads, Canto X. 
 8 B. & R., I, p. 28.
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 143 
 
 nando de Magalhaes must have been a man of courage and val- 
 iant in his thoughts and for undertaking great things, although he 
 was not of imposing presence, because he was small in stature 
 and did not appear in himself to be much." 
 
 The contract with the king provided for the distribution of 
 the profits of the voyage and required Magellan to limit his 
 operations to "the dominions which belong to us and are ours 
 in the Ocean Sea, within the limits of our demarcation." He was 
 directed "not to discover or do anything within the demarcations 
 and limits of the most serene King of Portugal." Magellan was 
 given the title of cavalier, invested with the habit of St. James, 
 and granted the hereditary government of all the islands he 
 might conquer. 
 
 The expedition which was to bring the Philippines to the atten- 
 tion of the world sailed from Seville, September 20, 1519.* 
 While still on the eastern coast of South America the terrors and 
 hardships already encountered led to a mutiny of the crew, but 
 Magellan's courage and tact, together with the swift punishment 
 of the leaders, finally gained him control.^ ° The strait which now 
 bears the name of the intrepid navigator was discovered a year 
 later. Jhirty-eight days were consumed in threading its sinuosi- 
 ties and ninety-eight days more in crossing the lonely Pacific. 
 
 After stopping at an island where the natives were such skilful 
 thieves that they stole the nails out of the side of one ship and 
 the rudder from another, thus winning for the group the name 
 of the Ladrones, the fleet reached the great Archipelago, which 
 Magellan, in honor of the saint on whose day he arrived, called 
 the Islands of Saint Lazarus, but which later were to be known 
 as the Philippines. During the same month he visited the island 
 of Homonlion, near Surigao, and the island of Limasagua. After 
 
 »B. & R., I, p. 250. 
 
 10 "Magellan, who could only hound his crew 
 Onward by threats of death, until they turned 
 In horror from the Threat that lay before. 
 Preferring to be hanged as mutineers 
 Rather tlian venture farther." 
 
 Alfred Noyes. Drake, An English Epic.
 
 144 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 stopping at Leyte and a few small islands he finally reached the 
 large island of Cebu. 
 
 The people were suspicious and assembled to oppose the land- 
 ing of the strangers, but good relations were soon established 
 and a treaty of friendship was ratified under the forms of the 
 blood covenant. A chapel was constructed on the shore and mass 
 was there duly celebrated for the first time in the Archipelago, 
 which for so many generations thereafter was to remain loyal 
 to the Church of Rome. We are told "that the royal family of 
 Cebu," anxious to observe the manners and customs of the visit- 
 ors, attended the celebration and were so much impressed by the 
 sight that they sought baptism, became Christians and took the 
 oath of allegiance to the king of Spain, and that their good ex- 
 ample was followed "to a great extent by the nobles and people 
 of Cebu." Thus was the Christian form of faith and the sym- 
 bolic cross planted by the Spaniards in the Antipodes. 
 
 But Magellan, after accomplishing so much, was destined to 
 lose his life in a petty skirmish with the enemies of his Cebuan 
 friends. The great navigator, as a modem poet with excusable 
 license says, 
 
 "... with Hell all around him, in the clutch 
 Of devils, died upon some savage isle. 
 By poisonous black inchantment." 
 
 It was on the small island of Mactan, which lies near by across 
 the Cebu Strait, that he met his death. There visitors from the 
 far-away land which now holds sovereignty over the Archipelago, 
 and which then had but recently been discovered, may see a small 
 monument*^ which marks the spot where the great navigator is 
 supposed to have fallen. A more imposing memorial to his mem- 
 ory stands on the south bank of the Pasig River within the city 
 of Manila. 
 
 After the death of Magellan the natives began to be trouble- 
 some. His successor, Barbosa, and twenty-six of his men were 
 murdered while attending a banquet given by their native hosts, 
 
 ^^ Also near by, an extensive manufacturing plant.
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 145 
 
 and the others, hearing the disturbance, sailed away, treacher- 
 ously leaving a number of their comrades to a miserable fate. 
 Only Captain El Cano succeeded in taking his ship, the Victoria, 
 to the port from which three years before he had sailed. 
 
 El Cafio was thus the first navigator actually to circumnavigate 
 the globe, although the project was that of Magellan to whom 
 the world has given credit. But El Cafio was rewarded by knight- 
 hood, a life pension and the right to use on his escutcheon a globe 
 bearing the motto, primus circumdedit me. A second expedi- 
 tion under the command of Loaisa and El Cafio sailed in 1525 
 and visited Mindanao and the Moluccas, where it went to pieces, 
 Loaisa and El Caiio losing their lives. 
 
 Magellan's theory was justified by the facts. A western route 
 to the Spice Islands had been discovered, and if the line of demar- 
 cation was to be extended around the globe they were clearly on 
 the Spanish side. 
 
 Portugal showed no disposition to relinquish any of her claims 
 in the East, and Charles V was in greater need of ready money 
 than of new islands. An attempt to settle the controversy by 
 diplomacy was unsuccessful. Plenipotentiaries, accompanied by 
 a full complement of astrologers, scientific experts and lawyers, 
 met on a bridge over the River Caya, which formed the boundary 
 line between Spain and Portugal. But nothing was accom- 
 plished. Neither the lawyers nor the experts could agree upon 
 even a starting point for negotiations. The Junta of Badojis 
 was a failure. A street boy jeered at the great men who were 
 engaged in dividing the world. And, says Hakluyt, "what wise 
 men seeth not that God by that childe laughed them to scorne 
 and made them ridiculous and their partition in the eyes of the 
 world."" 
 
 12 That the demarcation bulls were a reasonable and proper exercise of 
 conceded power, see Harrisse's Dip. Hist, of Am., Chap. 5, p. 40. 
 
 "Men now smile when they read or hear of the attempt of Alexander the 
 Sixth to divide the undiscovered world between Spain and Portugal, but what 
 single act of any Pope in the history of the Church has exercised directly and 
 indirectly a more momentous influence on human affairs than this last re- 
 minder of the by-gone world sovereignty of the Holy See?" Bourne, Essays 
 in Hist. Criticism, p. 217.
 
 146 * THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The Portuguese and Spaniards were already fighting, but both, 
 monarchs desired peace, as their houses had recently been united 
 by marriage, and in the end Spain, in consideration of the pay- 
 ment of three hundred and fifty thousand ducats, relinquished 
 her claim to the Moluccas. This arrangement was assumed 
 to be in the nature of a compromise, and it was provided that 
 should the contemplated scientific determination of the line show 
 that the disputed territory belonged to Portugal the money should 
 be returned. It is needless to say that Portugal never saw the 
 ducats again. 
 
 As long as Spain held her possessions on the western conti- 
 nent she regarded the Philippines as a part thereof. They, to 
 her, were the Western Islands, and not until 1844 were they 
 transferred to the Eastern Hemisphere and a day dropped from 
 the calendar at Manlla.^^ 
 
 The new Archipelago of St. Lazarus was not mentioned in the 
 treaty, but as it lay well to the west of the Moluccas it was clearly 
 renounced to Portugal. Nevertheless, Spain in 1542 — against 
 the protest of the Portuguese, who asserted, without any justifi- 
 cation, that they were introducing Christianity into Mindanao — 
 despatched another expedition from Mexico under the command 
 of Lopez de Villalabos. This fleet was wrecked on the coast of 
 Samar, and the Spanish returned to Spain by way of the Moluc- 
 cas. Villalabos is remembered principally because he gave the 
 name Filipinas to the islands in honor of the Prince of Asturias, 
 known to history as the somber Philip II of Spain. 
 
 After this potent monarch came to the throne a new and 
 better equipped expedition was prepared for the conquest and 
 colonization of the Archipelago. Philip did not question the 
 right of Portugal to the Moluccas under the treaty of Saragossa, 
 but he determined to ignore the fact that the treaty applied also 
 to the new islands which were to bear his name. 
 
 There was then at the court an Augustinlan friar named 
 Andres de Urdaneta, who was destined to win fame by his part 
 in the early history of the Philippines. While yet a layman and 
 
 ^3 See Guillemard, Magellan, p. 227.
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 147 
 
 a sailor he visited the Moluccas as captain of one of the ships of 
 the ill-fated expedition of Loaisa and acquired considerable gen- 
 eral and scientific knowledge of the country. He had earnestly 
 and persistently urged Charles to send another expedition to the 
 Far West, but the emperor had grown weary of the world and 
 was contemplating his abdication. Urdaneta, discouraged also, 
 retired to Mexico and became an Augustinian monk. Philip 
 placed him in charge of the missionaries who were to accompany 
 the new expedition, but Urdaneta believed that the Philippines 
 belonged to Portugal and protested against going there unless, as 
 he told the king, *'some legitimate and pious reason for the expe- 
 dition shoidd he assigned, such as the rescue of the sailors who 
 had been lost on the islands on previous expeditions and the de- 
 termination of the longitude of the demarcation line." 
 
 But Philip took the bolder course, and in the first despatch 
 sent by him to Mexico relative to the expedition announced that 
 it should not go to the Moluccas but "to the other islands which 
 are in the same region as are the Philippines and others that were 
 outside the said contract but within our demarcation, that are 
 said to produce spices." With characteristic caution he wrote 
 to the viceroy of New Spain^* directing him to provide "what 
 seems best for the service of God, our Lord and ourselves, and 
 with the least possible cost to our estate, for the recovery of the 
 Western Islands toward the Moluccas." 
 
 The expedition was placed under the command of Miguel Lo- 
 pez de Legaspi, who, with the title of Adelantado, was appointed 
 governor and captain-general for life over all the islands that 
 he might discover, occupy and colonize. Urdaneta, who believed 
 that the king had been impressed by his pious representations 
 and that the expedition was destined for New Guinea, accom- 
 panied the fleet as spiritual guide and general adviser. When on 
 the high seas Legaspi opened the instructions which had been 
 given him by the royal audiencia of Mexico he discovered that 
 the objective point was the Philippines and not New Guinea. 
 Urdaneta and the unhappy friars complained bitterly that they 
 
 " September 24, 1559.
 
 148 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 had been deceived by the king, but as he could not conveniently 
 abandon the voyage at that stage, Urdaneta consented to guide 
 the fleet to the Philippines by the most expeditious route. 
 
 "The religious in the fleet were very sorry at this, giving out 
 that they had been deceived; and had they known while yet 
 ashore that such a route was to be pursued, that they would not 
 have accompanied the expedition." But "they expressed their 
 willingness to make the expedition now for the service of God, 
 the Holy Catholic faith, and the increase of the kingdom and 
 the general good of the fleet."" 
 
 Legaspi was instructed to avoid the Moluccas, and as soon as 
 the fleet reached the Philippines to send Urdaneta to establish a 
 route to Mexico and report to the king. After stopping at Guam 
 and other islands, the fleet reached the island of Cebu on April 
 27, 1565." Here houses and a fort were constructed, and a ship 
 in command of Urdaneta was despatched on the return trip to 
 Mexico. 
 
 At Cebu, Legaspi found the people who had destroyed Magel- 
 lan, and the task of establishing friendly relations with them was 
 difficult. To add to his troubles a Portuguese fleet appeared and 
 served notice that the Spaniards were trespassing on Portuguese 
 territory, but as Portugal had never taken actual possession of the 
 islands, and was now at peace with Spain, no serious attempt, 
 other ,than such as was involved in a lengthy correspondence, 
 was made to prevent the Spaniards from establishing their col- 
 ony.^'' 
 
 The missionaries entered enthusiastically upon the work of 
 converting the natives. For eight strenuous centuries, without 
 a year of peace, the people of the Iberian Peninsula had been 
 engaged in a desperate struggle with the Moors. During that 
 period there was developed a virile race which, when its energies 
 were released, created the Spanish monarchy which for genera- 
 tions dominated Europe and the greater part of America. The 
 
 « B. & R., Vol. II, p. 105. 
 i« Relation of Legaspi, B. & R., II, p. 212. 
 
 1^ For the negotiations between Legaspi and Pereira, the commander of 
 the Portuguese fleet, see B. & R., II, pp. 245 et seq.
 
 DISCOVERY and: CONQUEST 149 
 
 ifierceness of the religious war with the Moors burned the Chris- 
 tian faith into the very natures^* of the Spaniards and made them 
 so loyal to the Church that they and the State itself became its 
 slaves and failed to catch steps with the onward marching world. 
 The last battle with the Moors was won at Granada the year 
 Columbus discovered America. The long struggle was over. 
 The Crescent recrossed into Africa never again to appear in 
 Spain. Turning now to the west, Spain half-way around the 
 world discovered new islands, and strange to relate there found 
 herself again facing her old antagonist, the Mohammedans. 
 
 As early as 1276 Mohammedan missionaries had reached Ma- 
 lacca, and in 1415 their converts were found in the Spice Islands. 
 The inhabitants of the Sulu group of islands, and of Mindanao, 
 the largest of the southern islands of the Philippine group, had 
 been converted, and many Moros, as they were called, were 
 already in Luzon, far north of Manila, which itself was a Mo- 
 hammedan city. 
 
 A contemporary Augustinian chronicler** says that "so well 
 rooted was the cancer that had the arrival of the Spaniards been 
 delayed all the people would have become Moors, as are all the 
 islanders who have not come under the government of the Phil- 
 ippines." The sons of the men who fought at Granada may 
 have fought at Manila. Thus within the span of one human life 
 Spain broke the power of Islamism in the peninsula and checked 
 its advance on the other side of the world. 
 
 One of the first natives to be baptized was the niece of Tupas, 
 
 18 "La catholique Espagne, qui venait d'achever sa longue croisade centre 
 les Maures, dans I'exaltation de I'esprit religieux, avail appris a confondre en 
 un sentiment unique le zele pour la foi et Tamour de la patrie. Toute 
 conquete pour la couronne devait etre aussi une conquete pour la chretiente. 
 La propagande religieuse fut des I'origine I'un des motifs principaux des 
 establissements d'outre-mer. Dans I'esprit mystique de Colomb, dans I'ame 
 picuse d'Isabelle, comme dans les imaginations plus rudes et plus incultes des 
 Cortez et des Pizarre, I'idee de proselytisme 'catholique ne cessa de s'allier a 
 Tambition terrestre. Ca ete I'un des principaux merites de la grande et belle 
 histoire de Prescott de mettre en lumiere I'influence que le sentiment religieux 
 exerqa sur la fondation et I'administration des colonies espagfnoles en 
 Amerique." Leroy-Beaulieu De La Colonisation, etc., I, p. 3. 
 
 1^ Grigolva, quoted by Bourne, B. & R., I, Int., p. 34, and citing to the 
 same effect Retana's Zuiiiga, II, p. 222, Montero y Videl, Historia de Fili~ 
 pinas, I, p. 60.
 
 150 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the petty ruler of Cebu, and the new convert was soon thereafter 
 married to a Greek who was one of Legaspi's crew. Later Tupas 
 himself was baptized and given the name of Felipe, after his 
 "cousin of Spain," and the prospect for amicable relations be- 
 tween the natives of Cebu and the Spaniards and the extension 
 of the true faith looked very bright indeed.^** 
 
 But the great island of Luzon had not yet been explored, 
 and Martin de Goite and Juan de Salcedo, the grandson of 
 Legaspi, with a small force of arquebusiers and sailors, sailed 
 for the north. At the mouth of the Pasig River, in the village 
 of "Maynila," on the spot where now stands Fort Santiago, the 
 headquarters of American military power in the Orient, they 
 found the natives strongly entrenched behind breastworks upon 
 which were mounted brass cannon such as the Moros call Lan- 
 takos. The defense was brave and vigorous, but the natives 
 were finally routed and the Spaniards took possession of the 
 town. 
 
 Legaspi, being much impressed by Salcedo's account of the 
 location and advantages of the place which he had conquered, 
 organized a government for Cebu and with a considerable force 
 proceeded to Manila. 
 
 The Spaniards after capturing the fort at Manila had re- 
 turned to the island of Panay. When the natives saw another 
 army approaching they set fire to their houses and fled. With- 
 out opposition Legaspi took possession of the place, and on 
 June 24, 1572, formally founded and established what Philip 
 later designated as the "Distinguished and ever-loyal city" of 
 Manila in the "New Kingdom of Castilla."^^ 
 
 The land was immediately divided among the religious persons 
 and other Spaniards in order that each person could build a 
 house within the city. The adventurers exercised great tact and 
 much good judgment, and in a short time the local rulers of 
 the neighborhood were won over. The Raja Solimon, who ruled 
 
 20 See Legaspi's Relation, B. & R., 11, pp. 140-1. 
 
 21 See the document in B. & R., Ill, p. 250. For an account of the con- 
 quest of Luzon, see B. & R., Ill, p. 141.
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 151 
 
 in Manila, when approached by Legaspi with a tender of friend- 
 ship, had replied, "Not until the sun is cut in two, not until I 
 seek the hatred instead of the love of women, will I be the friend 
 of a Spaniard." But he soon saw the light and was baptized, 
 and, like the head of the "royal family" of Cebu, was honored 
 with the patronymic of his new sovereign. 
 
 The missionaries began immediately to teach the catechism to 
 the natives, who accepted the new religion passively if not enthu- 
 siastically. Great care was taken to avoid antagonizing the peo- 
 ple, and the laws and proclamations were carefully framed for 
 that purpose. Thus the Laws of the Indias, in contemplation of 
 such conditions, had provided for the use of the word pacification 
 instead of conquest o when referring to the possession or occu- 
 pancy of such new countries. 
 
 Legaspi died in 1572. His figure stands in high relief in the 
 history of the Philippines. He was of noble birth, and after 
 practising as a notary became the mayor of the city of Mexico. 
 His reputation for justice and loyalty secured for him the favor 
 of the king and the command of the expedition which was to 
 establish Spain in the East.^^ Legaspi was succeeded by the 
 treasurer, Guido de Lavezares, who ruled for three years. 
 
 The youthful Juan de Salcedo, the Cortez of the Philippines, 
 continued the conquest of the country. With but forty-five men 
 he overran and conquered the most of northern Luzon and in- 
 duced the people to submit to the Spanish rule. In fact, he 
 appears to have taken possession of all the reasonably accessible 
 parts of the island — all that the Spanish ever actually controlled. 
 
 Salcedo had the honor also of saving the city of Manila from 
 destruction by the Chinese, who in 1574, under the command of 
 the famous Limahong, made a descent upon Manila and came 
 near destroying the Spaniards. This leader of the Chinese cor- 
 sairs, who out of deference to the customs of the Western world 
 should probably be described as a sea-faring man out of favor 
 with the home government, was a bold and daring adventurer, a 
 
 22 J. A. Robertson, Legaspi and Philippine Colonisation (1909), also in 
 Rept. Am. Hist. Assft. 1907, I, p. 145. 
 
 I
 
 152 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 sort of Celestial Sir Francis Drake, who saw visions of easy- 
 wealth, glory and empire in a country which had surrendered 
 with so little effort to a handful of Spaniards. 
 
 Limahong organized a formidable force of four thousand men 
 and, accompanied by women and artisans, with supplies of all 
 kinds, crossed the turbulent China Sea with the intention of 
 founding an empire in the Philippines. Fortunately Salcedo, 
 who was then at Vigan, learned of the expedition and hastened 
 southward with his troops. The Chinese force landed where all 
 invaders have landed, near Paraiiaque, and under the command 
 of a Japanese adventurer, marched upon the city over the exact 
 road through the suburb of Malate which was followed three 
 hundred years later by the American troops. They succeeded 
 in entering the city, but were finally forced to retire. While the 
 Chinese were preparing for another attack, Salcedo arrived with 
 fresh troops and took command. In the second attack the inva- 
 ders penetrated into the fort and only after a most desperate 
 hand to hand fight were they finally routed and forced to take 
 refuge on their boats. 
 
 Of Salcedo it was said that he was "unlucky because fate had 
 placed him where oblivion must needs bury the most valiant 
 deeds that a knight ever wrought." 
 
 Limahong now abandoned all hope of taking Manila, but he 
 had no intention of returning to China, where he was very much 
 persona non grata with the authorities. Sailing northward he 
 landed in the province of Pangasiman and established what he 
 intended should be his capital city, near the mouth of the River 
 Agno. There he built a small fort, dwellings for his people, and 
 a pagoda. But the Chinese authorities sent a war-ship after him, 
 and in cooperation with the Spaniards such a formidable force 
 was raised that resistance was impossible. 
 
 The wily Celestial sent a part of his soldiers to make a feigned 
 attack on the approaching Spaniards while he, with the main 
 body, passed out through one of the many mouths of the river and 
 sailed away out of Philippine history, leaving the attacking de-
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 153 
 
 tachment to make its escape to the mountains of Benguet, where 
 they affiliated with and were ultimately absorbed by the Igorots.*^ 
 
 Having conquered the island of Luzon, Governor Sande sent 
 an expedition to Borneo, where he hoped to enter into an alli- 
 ance with one of the various local sultans. On account of sick- 
 ness and the lack of supplies the expedition was obliged to return, 
 having accomplished nothing more important than the destruc- 
 tion of a fleet of Malay praus. Sande organized the first of the 
 many expeditions against the Moros, which roused the Moham- 
 medan pirates to fury and led to the many retaliatory expeditions 
 that during succeeding years harried the coasts from Zamboanga 
 to Apairi. 
 
 Within twenty-five years after the landing of Legaspi the 
 Spaniards were in complete possession of the Philippines. The 
 native people had been unable to make any serious resistance to 
 the enterprise. Without unity, political organization or ade- 
 quate leadership they had been easily conquered and were soon 
 gathered within the fold by the Spanish missionaries. 
 
 The work of the first period of Spanish occupation was sub- 
 stantially accomplished by the end of the sixteenth century. 
 Legaspi carried with him the system of colonial government 
 which had been carefully worked out and introduced in the Span- 
 ish American colonies. The Laws of the Indias were simply 
 extended to the new possessions in what was then called the 
 Western Islands. As fast as the country was conquered the or- 
 ganization was extended over it and the missionaries took up 
 the work of gathering the people within the sound of the bells. 
 
 The energy and enthusiasm displayed during this constructive 
 period of Spanish rule were remarkable. A complete executive 
 government was instituted, a Royal audiencia erected in Manila, 
 the land and the people thereon granted in encomiendas, the eccle- 
 siastical system and the monastic orders thoroughly organized 
 and a complete body of laws for the government of the country 
 
 2' For Limahong's attack, see Govenor Sande's Relation (June 2, 1576)' 
 
 in B. & R., IV, p. 24.
 
 154 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 and the protection of the natives instituted. Substantial progress 
 was made in the work of estabHshing schools for the education 
 of the Spaniards, and a surprising amount was done toward the 
 establishment of hospitals and other protective institutions. 
 
 Most of the problems and difficulties about which Philippine 
 history centered during the three hundred years of Spanish rule 
 originated and were clearly defined during this early period. 
 The ecclesiastical and secular authorities were already quarrel- 
 ing, the people were protesting against the restrictions placed 
 upon their trade, the missionaries were charging the secular 
 authorities with maladministration, cruelty to the natives, ig- 
 noring the laws designed for their protection, and the nest of 
 stinging Mohammedans to the south was injudiciously stirred up. 
 
 The key to the early history of the Philippines is found in the 
 missionary character of the enterprise. The country was never 
 really a colony; it was a mission. The main object of the con- 
 quest was declared to be the extension of the true faith. The 
 king and the missionaries at least took these statements literally 
 and insisted that all other matters should be subordinated and 
 when necessary sacrificed to the conversion of the Indians. It 
 was for that purpose that the king paid the expenses of the en- 
 terprise and the annual deficits of the government. The laws 
 were designed to protect the natives from oppression, and with- 
 out exception, apparently, the king sustained the ecclesiastics 
 in their frequent appeals on behalf of the natives against the 
 secular officials. The number of missionaries was increased as 
 rapidly as possible. The Jesuits arrived in 1581. The Augustin- 
 ians, Franciscans, Dominicans and Recollectos followed in con- 
 siderable numbers. Not content with the spiritual conquest of 
 the Philippines these zealous workers soon began to seek other 
 fields for their activities. For them the islands were to be merely 
 outposts from which to carry the Gospel to the entire East. 
 China, Japan, Formosa and Cambodia seemed to offer boundless 
 fields for missionary work. 
 
 Soon after the arrival of Governor Sande in 1575 the agents
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 155 
 
 •who had been sent to China returned and reported that while the 
 Chinese were willing to take goods, wares and merchandise from 
 the Europeans they were satisfied with their own religion. Nev- 
 ertheless missionaries soon reached both China and Japan, where 
 they were persecuted and often put to death for attempting to 
 proselyte the people in violation of the local laws and customs. 
 Their labors resulted in nothing more than the exasperation of 
 the Asiatics against the Europeans, and finally the king prohib- 
 ited all but the Jesuits from sending missionaries from the Phil- 
 ippines to any other Asiatic country. 
 
 The religious character of the conquest and the support given 
 the ecclesiastics by the king induced the latter to magnify their 
 own importance at the expense of the secular authorities. The 
 powers vested in the governor were always subject to the impli- 
 cation that they should be exercised in aid of the primary purpose 
 of the enterprise — the conversion of the Indians. In this work 
 the ecclesiastics were the immediate agencies, and as they, 
 through their own intermediaries, had the ear of the king, they 
 were from the first in practical control of the colony. It was 
 only natural, under the circumstances, that they should attempt 
 to dictate in secular affairs. 
 
 The policy of appointing proprietary governors, which was 
 soon adopted, also tended to cause friction between the secular 
 and ecclesiastical officials by cultivating a sense of importance in 
 the governors while not in the least increasing their power. In 
 1584 Ronquilla proposed to the king that if appointed governor 
 of the Philippines for life and given the concessions then usual 
 for the discoverers and colonizers of new lands, he would go 
 out at his own expense and take with him six hundred colonists. 
 Philip, who was already weary of the financial burden imposed 
 upon the royal treasury by his various colonial enterprises, gladly 
 accepted the offer. The governors were thereafter interested 
 primarily as proprietors rather than as officers of the king and 
 were unable to see eye to eye with the missionaries, who as yet 
 were free from the influence of mercenary considerations.
 
 156 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The Spanish kings must be given credit for entire sincerity 
 in their efforts to secure the well-being of the natives. They 
 prohibited their enslavement, much to the disgust of the officials. 
 The laws, ordinances and decrees commanded the utmost consid- 
 eration for their physical as well as spiritual welfare.^* All 
 sorts of checks and restraints were imposed; but they did not, it 
 is to be feared, seriously restrain the high-handed and arbitrary 
 officials who had interests to serve which were in no way con- 
 nected with the saving of souls. 
 
 This farming out of the colony meant the exploitation of the 
 natives, who were required to supply the wealth. The lands and 
 the natives thereon were granted in encomiendas as rewards for 
 services, real or imaginary, to persons who were charged with 
 the collection of the tribute and the care of the people. The 
 tributes were of course collected, but the natives were neglected 
 and often cruelly oppressed. 
 
 All the proteges and parasites of the governors had to be pro- 
 vided with places which would enable them to live and prosper. 
 Before the arrival of Ronquilla, Manila had managed to struggle 
 along with four magistrates ; but as the new governor had seven- 
 teen deserving friends to provide for the magistracies were in- 
 creased to seventeen. As Bishop Salazar wrote, these people 
 came out poor and were granted scant salaries so "they deprive 
 the natives of the rice from the fields and of all the other har- 
 vesting products that they can get." 
 
 Salazar, who was the first Bishop of the Islands, has been 
 called "the Las Casas of the Philippines." He was an authorita- 
 tive and rather arbitrary person, who made himself the advocate 
 of reforms and the special champion of the natives. Many 
 abuses had already grown up in the local administration. Sala- 
 zar wrote long letters to the King denouncing the cruelties of the 
 encomenderos and the secular authorities, and praying for the 
 reform of the administration. The dissatisfaction with condi- 
 tions was so general that in 1586 a junta, in which all the 
 estates were represented, met in Manila and prepared a memorial 
 
 2* Lea, "The Indian Policy of Spain," Yale Review, August, 1899.
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 157 
 
 setting forth the requirements of the colony, which was carried 
 to the king by a priest named Sanchez.*'' 
 
 The envoy, who really represented Bishop Salazar, arrived at 
 Seville in 1587, and while waiting for his audience with the king 
 took an active part in the controversy which was raging between 
 the factions over the proper way to conduct missionary work. 
 One party was contending that the propaganda of the faith ought 
 to be purely apostolic; that the doctrines of poverty and humility 
 should prevail ; that violence should never be resorted to, and that 
 those who rejected the true religion should be left to their folly. 
 The other regarded such methods as useless and held that the 
 true religion should be forced upon the unwilling and recalcitrant 
 by persuasion if possible, by force of arms if necessary. Father 
 Sanchez cast his lot with the belligerent faction. 
 
 Finally the king, after careful consideration of the memorial, 
 determined to reorganize the Philippine service. The decree 
 which was issued determined the amount of tribute which should 
 be paid by the natives and its apportionment among the Church, 
 treasury and army; the amount of customs duties to, be charged 
 and the number of troops to be maintained. It made provision 
 for the prompt payment of salaries; the payment of the balance 
 of the debt incurred at the time of the original occupation of the 
 islands; the fortification of Manila, the construction of peniten- 
 tiaries and the foundation of separate hospitals for Spaniards 
 and Indians. The governor and bishop were recommended to 
 consider the matter of establishing refuges for young women 
 and dowries for native women who married Spaniards. The 
 offices of secretary and notary were no longer to be sold, and the 
 governor was thereafter to make grants of land to those only 
 who had been three years in the islands and- would actually im- 
 prove the lands granted. All previous grants which had been 
 
 25 For the Memorial, see B, & R., VI, p. 157. After Sanchez had sailed the 
 cabildo of Manila caused another document to be prepared and ordered it sent 
 to him. It was lost when the Santa Ana was captured by Thomas Candish 
 oflf the California coast. A copy was furnished Bishop Salazar and incorpo- 
 rated in his description of conditions in the Philippines. See B. & R., VII, 
 pp. 32-51.
 
 158 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 made to their relatives by governors and magistrates were di- 
 rected to be canceled. 
 
 More Augustinian friars were to be sent to the islands, and 
 they were to be followed by missionaries from the other orders. 
 Of the expenses of the outgoing friars one-half of the passage 
 money was to be paid by the king and one-half by the clergy 
 out of the funds accruing from their share of the tribute. Slaves 
 held by Spaniards were to be immediately set free, and natives 
 thereafter bom were declared free. Provision was also made 
 for the ultimate freedom of all natives then held in bondage. 
 The audiencia, which had been established in 1583, and which had 
 not proved satisfactory to the ecclesiastical authorities, was abol- 
 ished and a sort of advisory council provided for the governor. 
 
 Apparently at the instance of Sanchez, Gomez Perez Desma- 
 rifias was sent out as governor, with authority to name his son 
 as his successor, and the changes and reforms were included in 
 his instructions. In the meantime Governor Ronquillo had died 
 and the senior magistrate of the audiencia was acting as governor. 
 
 Desmarifias proved to be a strong and energetic man ; but as he 
 would admit no ecclesiastical partnership in the administration 
 of the secular government he was soon at cross purposes with 
 Bishop Salazar. He sailed in personal command of an expedi- 
 tion against the Dutch in the Moluccas and was murdered by his 
 Chinese crew, who mutinied and took possession of the fleet, thus 
 bringing the enterprise to a disastrous end. According to one 
 of the contemporary chroniclers, Desmarifias was *'the only Gov- 
 ernor who held office during the first quarter of the seventeenth 
 century who was fitted for his position, and did more for the hap- 
 piness of the natives in three years than all his predecessors and 
 successors." 
 
 Bishop Salazar, after quarreling with the new governor, as he 
 had done with his predecessor, began to long for the days when 
 the audiencia had been there to share his troubles. Notwith- 
 standing his extreme old age, the bishop determined to journey 
 to far-away Spain and lay his claims and grievances before the 
 king in person. His influence was very great and the visit re-
 
 DISCOVERY AND CONQUEST 159 
 
 suited in the reestablishment of the audiencia and the raising of 
 the See of Manila to an Archbishopric. Salazar was appointed 
 as the first Archbishop of Manila, but died before his investiture 
 was officially authorized by the Pope, leaving in Philippine his- 
 tory the reputation of a sincere friend of the native people. 
 
 In the year 1606 Doctor Antonio de Morga, who had been the 
 senior magistrate of the audiencia, published an elaborate de- 
 scription of conditions, from which it appears that the Spaniards 
 had by that time substantially completed their constructive work 
 in the Philippines. The situation changed but little thereafter 
 until near the middle of the nineteenth century.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 Two and One-Half Centuries of Stagnation 
 
 Loss of Energy — Quarrels of Officials — Character of Governors — Financial 
 Difficulties — Governor Corcuera and Archbishop Guerrero — Salcedo and Po- 
 bleta — Vargas and Pardo — Difficulties of Reformers — Ferdinand de Busta- 
 mente — Capture of Manila by British — ^Archbishop Roja and Simon de Anda 
 — The Indemnity and the Dishonored Drafts — ^A Friar's Opinion of Governor 
 Torre — Chinese Uprisings and Massacres — Moro Raids — The Obras Pias — 
 An Enterprising Governor — ^The Liberal Movement in Spain — Representation 
 -a the Cortes — Discontent — Description of Conditions by Mas and Matta. 
 
 There is little of general interest in the history of the Phil- 
 ippines during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It 
 was a long dreary period filled with the eternal quarrels of gov- 
 ernors, audiencias and ecclesiastics, enlivened by occasional Moro 
 raids and massacres of Chinese. The spirit seemed to have gone 
 out of Spanish rule. The State felt that its work was done, and 
 the people were left for the Church to educate and civilize. Iso- 
 lated and its activities restricted by a narrow commercial policy, 
 the beautiful land simply marked time while the world moved on 
 its way. Once, for a few months, it was drawn within the influ- 
 ence of world forces. The unexpected appearance of a British 
 fleet in the bay for a while galvanized the community into un- 
 wonted activity; but Manila was only a pawn in the European 
 game and, unfortunately for the country, the conquerors sailed 
 away, leaving it to take up anew its droning life. 
 
 It would be an unprofitable task even to name all the men who, 
 each for a few years, ruled over the colony.^ Many of them were 
 corrupt, seeking only ways and means to repair their own broken 
 fortunes. 
 
 ^ A complete list of Spanish governors with a brief summary of the events 
 of each administration is printed in B. & R., XVII, p. 285 et seq. 
 
 160
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 161 
 
 "O que triste el alma mia 
 Hasta que la parte vea*'* 
 
 A few very honest gentlemen tried to do their duty under 
 evil conditions. Occasionally an energetic governor like Enrile 
 attempted to rouse the land from its lethargy. Fortunate indeed 
 were the ones who escaped unscathed from the mob, the Holy 
 Inquisition, or the residencia. Those who were sufficiently tact- 
 ful to avoid friction with the ecclesiastical authorities earned 
 thereby consideration for piety. 
 
 The ordinary Spanish civil official was there to accumulate a 
 fortune, and from this he did not propose to be diverted by any 
 religious or fanciful scruples with reference to the rights of the 
 natives. Under such conditions more than royal mandates were 
 necessary to secure good government in a far-away colony where 
 public opinion did not exist, and that of the home land was inef- 
 fective. The public revenues were of course mismanaged. They 
 seemed to dissolve on the way from the taxpayer to the treasury, 
 and even what reached the treasury was too often misappropri- 
 ated or wasted on dishonest projects. Hence, the financial condi- 
 tion of the colony was always deplorable. During the early years 
 it was natural that the expenses of the government should be 
 greater than any income which could be raised without exploiting 
 the natives, but as time passed and the government became more 
 settled it seemed reasonable to the authorities in Spain that the 
 colony should become self-supporting. 
 
 About thirty years after the death of Legaspi we find the 
 Manila procurator soliciting financial aid from Spain to meet the 
 deficits created by official misconduct. A Royal Commission, 
 after a full investigation of the conditions in the Philippines, 
 reported that owing to the constant disputes, ill feeling and gen- 
 eral bad government the islands were and would continue to be 
 unproductive and unprofitable, and recommended that they should 
 be abandoned. But for the opportune presence of a missionary 
 named Morga it is probable that the king would have approved 
 
 * **A!as, how sad a soul I bear 
 Until I see what is my share."
 
 162 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 this report. Morga protested energetically against the abandon- 
 ment of the work of the Church and induced the king to an-i 
 nounce that "even though the maintenance of the colony should 
 exhaust the Mexican treasury his conscience would not allow him 
 to consent to the perdition of souls which had been saved and the 
 hope of rescuing far more in the distant region." 
 
 Brief reference to a few of the bitter controversies, some of 
 them tragic and bloody, will give an idea of the difficulties and 
 obstacles which obstructed the growth and progress of the coun- 
 try. Governor Corcuera,^ who ruled with a high hand, quarreled 
 with Archbishop Guerrero. The friars, he declared, "were law- 
 less people ;" he "would rather fight the Dutch in Flanders than 
 them." After a stormy period, during which the churches were 
 closed, the archbishop was overcome, imprisoned, fined and ban- 
 ished to Corregidor. But the governor's triumph was only tem- 
 porary, as his successor, after inquiring into his conduct, caused 
 him to be imprisoned for five years.* 
 
 Diego de Salcedo, who was governor from 1663 to 1668, car- 
 ried on a constant quarrel with Archbishop Pobleta, who by the 
 ill-advised courtesy of the preceding governor had been conceded 
 the privilege of vetoing all his official acts. Archbishop Pobleta 
 refused to obey certain decrees of Governor Salcedo and was 
 finally banished to Marivales. Ultimately the archbishop was 
 compelled to pay a heavy fine, and when he died the governor 
 prohibited the de profundis mass on the groimd that its observ- 
 ance would interfere with the feasts by which he proposed to 
 celebrate the archbishop's demise. But Salcedo's triumph was 
 also temporary. He was soon in the hands of the Inquisition, 
 
 * 1635 to 1644. Corcuera was an energetic governor who reorganized all 
 the departments of the government and quarreled indiscriminately with friars, 
 bishops and civilians. His reports to the king are interesting. See Reot. for 
 1636, B. & R., XXVI, p. 60 et scq. For his account of the trouble with the 
 ecclesiastical authorities, B. & R., XXVI, p, 60. 
 
 * Lea, The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies, p. 309. After Corcuero 
 was out of office the Augustinians prosecuted him for removing one of their 
 buildings while constructing the defensive city walls. They secured a judg- 
 ment against him for $2,500, which he was unable to pay — a very good evi- 
 dence of his honesty while in office. On his liberation Philip IV appointed 
 him governor of the Canary Islands.
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 163 
 
 and after years of imprisonment died while on his way to Mex- 
 ico for trial. 
 
 During the reign of Governor Vargas, Archbishop Pardo was 
 banished from Manila." When restored to his See after the re- 
 tirement of Vargas, he proceeded to equalize matters by imposing 
 the severest penalties possible upon all of his enemies. He or- 
 dered the governor to adjure his past acts, to "wear a penitent's 
 garb, to place a rope about his neck, and to carry a lighted candle 
 to the doors of the Cathedral and churches of Parion, San Ga- 
 briel, and San Binondo on every feast day during the four 
 months." 
 
 Vargas claimed privilege on the ground that he was a Cavalier 
 of the Military Order of St. James, but the archbishop refused 
 to recognize the privilege and desisted only when the new gov- 
 ernor threatened to send him again into banishment. Many 
 other such instances might be cited. * 
 
 After a corrupt system of government has been thoroughly 
 established the way of the reformer is difficult and dangerous. 
 The beneficiaries of the system feel that they have vested rights. 
 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, financial abuses in 
 all parts of the government of the Philippines had become so 
 general as to make the work of reform extremely difficult. IMost 
 of the prominent officials were involved. To the interested the 
 mass of corruption was sacrosanct, and woe to him who assumed 
 to touch it with irreverent hands. 
 
 Ferdinand de Bustamente' was the victim of an attempt to 
 protect the public treasury. While neither tactful nor consid- 
 erate, nor always right, he seems in a large way to have had the 
 good of the colony at heart. Having discovered irregularities 
 in the management of the public funds, he caused the delinquents, 
 some of them of high degree, to be imprisoned and prosecuted. 
 The monastic orders furnished refuge in the churches to the 
 
 "^For an account of Pardo's controversy with the audiencia, see B. & R., 
 XXXIX, p. 149. 
 
 ^ 1717 to 1719. For an account of his government and death, see B. & R- 
 XLIV, p. 148.
 
 164 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 enemies of the governor. Certain influential men, including 
 many advocates, signed a statement which denied the right of 
 the governor to arrest a certain notary who had taken refuge 
 in the Cathedral. Bustamente thereupon lost his head and inju- 
 diciously threw the archbishop and the lawyers into jail. The 
 feelings of the people were outraged by the imprisonment of 
 the archbishop. The refugees came out of the churches and 
 joined a mob which marched against the palace. The soldiers, 
 when ordered to fire on the rioters, lowered their arms before 
 the crucifixes and images of the saints w^hich were carried by 
 the friars before the advancing- mob. The ill-fated governor 
 and his son met the attack almost alone on the stairway of the 
 palace, and both fell mortally wounded. 
 
 After his death every effort was made to blacken the character 
 of Bustamente. So many charges were filed during the period 
 of his residencia that the commission was overwhelmed and 
 never made a report. 
 
 The capture of Manila by the British during the Seven Years' 
 War was but an incident of that memorable struggle, but it 
 might well have changed the course of history in the Orient. 
 Had England retained possession of the Archipelago the new 
 era would have opened at least a century earlier than it did.'' 
 The orders as originally issued directed General William Draper 
 to capture Manila and then establish a permanent settlement in 
 the island of Mindanao "which could be kept after peace." The 
 news of the capture did not reach Europe until after the signing 
 of the definitive treaty, Manila was therefore not mentioned 
 in that instrument, and was returned to the Spaniards without 
 any compensation. The king of Spain dishonored the drafts 
 drawn by the authorities at Manila to cover part of the indem- 
 nity. It is probable that had the news of the capture reached 
 
 '^ In a manifesto issued by the Filipino junta at Hong Kong about the 
 time the American fleet sailed for Manila, the iollowing appears in their list 
 of grievances : "We were compelled to spill our blood by Simon de Anda 
 against the English, who in any case would have made better rulers than the 
 Spaniards."
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION^ 165 
 
 Europe at an earlier date, Mindanao, at least, would have re- 
 mained British territory. 
 
 There is a striking resemblance between the methods followed 
 by the British in the seventeenth century and by the Americans 
 more than one hundred years later. Had the latter withdrawn 
 their troops after suppressing the native revolt, the resemblance, 
 barring the sacking of the city by the British, would have been 
 even greater. In both instances events followed almost the 
 same course. 
 
 On September 23, 1762, just a week after the fall of Habana, 
 thirteen ships with about two thousand troops under the com- 
 mand of General William Draper entered Manila Bay and de- 
 manded the surrender of the city. The Spaniards had not yet 
 learned of the existence of war between England and Spain and 
 were, as usual, unprepared for defense. The governor was 
 absent and Archbishop Rojo was in charge. - After the sur- 
 render of the city the usual controversy arose as to who was 
 responsible for its unprepared condition. One of the ecclesi- 
 astics wrote to Madrid that "Manila well deserved it, not indeed 
 because of its total lack of Christian procedure, but singularly 
 because of its cursed neglect of politics, as if the whole world 
 had to respect and fear us because of our boasting that we are 
 Spaniards."' 
 
 Archibishop Rojo should not be blamed for the situation 
 which the British found in Manila. The city was not properly 
 fortified or manned for defense against an attack by an European 
 power. It was a short-sighted policy, but it was the policy of 
 Spain and not of the individual who was so unfortunate as to 
 hold power at the time of the invasion. La Gentil says that the 
 garrison was composed of Mexicans whom he described as good 
 enough indeed but of little skill in the military art, "as they had 
 never fired a gun." 
 
 ''Baltasar Vela to Antonio Gonzales in Madrid, July 24, 1764, B. & R., 
 XLIX, p. 288. That Spain continued to rely on the terror of her name ap- 
 pears from the history of the Spanish-American War. After that war the 
 usual controversy arose as to who was responsible for the lack of prepara- 
 tion for the defense of Manila.
 
 166 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The archbishop has been severely criticized for his anxiety 
 to surrender the city. It should be remembered that he was an 
 ecclesiastic, not a soldier. If we may rely upon the narrative 
 and journal kept by him at the time, it appears that he took 
 advantage of all available means of defense. One faction, more 
 anxious to protect property than honor, criticized the arch- 
 bishop-governor for not surrendering the city earlier, thus saving 
 it from sack and pillage. Simon de Anda Salazar, an energetic 
 magistrate of the audiencia, placed himself at the head of the 
 faction which was determined to resist to the end, and with a 
 single servant escaped to the provinces, where he raised the 
 standard of revolt against the archbishop's authority and policy. 
 
 While preparing for an attack on the city, the British had the 
 good fortune to intercept and capture one of the galleons which 
 was arriving from Mexico, thereby securing several millions 
 of specie which "were being imported for the support of the gov- 
 ernment and the use of Manila merchants. 
 
 Although there were no adequate means for defending the 
 city, the garrison made a brave defense. After some very severe 
 fighting,® the city capitulated, and on October 6, the British flag 
 was raised over Fort Santiago.^" 
 
 The terms granted required the payment of an indemnity of 
 four million pesos, of which one-half was to be paid at once and 
 the balance in bills drawn on Madrid. It was soon found that 
 so much money could not be raised in Manila. Much property 
 had been destroyed and many valuables had been removed to 
 the provinces. The heavy contributions levied on the people, 
 together with the silver plate, church ornaments, and even the 
 archbishop's ring and breast cross, produced but one-half of 
 the required amount. An arrangement was then made by which 
 
 ^ For fhe details of the attack, etc, see Draper's Journal, B. & R., XLIX, pp. 
 81-101. For the Spanish account of the capture, see Rojo's Journal, ihid., 
 pp. 105-132; Rojo's Narrative, ibid., pp. 177-261. "The Indians, though armed 
 with bows and lances, flung themselves with desperate valor on our lines, and 
 died by scores, biting the bayonets hke wild beasts. But their valor was ill 
 supported." Lord, The Lost Possessions of England, p. 175. 
 
 1° The demand was for the cession to his Britannic Majesty of Manila and 
 of the island of Luzon and the recognition of the British sovereignty unti^ 
 the peace between France and England should decide the fate of the islands.
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 167 
 
 the British were to receive on account the cargo of another galleon 
 which was daily expected to arrive, providing that it had not 
 been captured by their forces before the date of capitulation. 
 But this galleon was not destined to fall into the hands of the 
 British, as its treasure had already been landed on the northern 
 coast and carried inland and delivered to Anda, 
 
 The archbishop had great difficulty in compelling the friars 
 to deliver their money and treasure, and in the end the British 
 became exasperated and overran the country north and south of 
 Manila. In the meantime the redoubtable Anda, who claimed to 
 be governor and captain-general, by legal right, as the archbishop 
 and the other magistrates were prisoners of war and in the eye of 
 the Spanish law civilly dead, supported by the Jesuits,^' had 
 raised a considerable force in the provinces. 
 
 The natives were willing to accept Anda as the representative 
 of Spanish authority, but an assembly convened at Manila at the 
 instance of the British commander proclaimed him a seditious 
 person who deserved the death penalty. In the fight which fol- 
 lowed, the natives were severely punished, but the British were 
 forced to reduce their outposts and practically to withdraw 
 within the limits of the city of Manila. The British commander 
 who insisted that the archbishop should be recognized as the 
 real representative of Spanish authority, now offered a reward 
 for the head of Anda, and proclaimed his troops as "canaille and 
 robbers." Anda responded promptly in kind and for a time 
 belligerent operations were confined to abusive proclamations. 
 
 In the meantime Anda's actions had been approved by the 
 king. The friars now came to his assistance and the position 
 of the British was far from pleasant Fortunately in January 
 a frigate arrived with the news of an European armistice and 
 in August the terms of the preliminaries of peace were received. 
 General Draper, acting under secret instructions from the king, 
 had already handed the country over to a Mr. Dawson Drake, 
 of the Honorable East India Company's service, and returned 
 to England, where, like most of the men who have won territory 
 
 ^^ This was one of the grounds for the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1768.
 
 168 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 for England, he spent his declining years defending his ac- 
 tions. 
 
 The fighting flow ceased. . The much-troubled archbishop 
 broke down under the strain and died. Soon thereafter Anda 
 received direct news of peace by way of China. The ministry 
 of Lord Bute had carelessly tossed an empire away without 
 compensation. The treaty merely provided in effect that Manila, 
 if captured, should be restored. A new governor-general ad 
 interim now arrived, but considerately feigned illness and per- 
 mitted Anda to receive the city from the departing British. 
 
 On his return to Spain, Anda was received with favor by the 
 king, and later was appointed governor and captain-general 
 of the Philippines. His administration was far from peaceful, 
 as he seems to have been tactless and disposed to revenge him- 
 self on his enemies. After six years of strife and friction, he 
 retired to Cavlte^ where he died, as one contemporary says, 
 "much to the relief of his adversaries." He was a vigorous 
 magistrate, who, after being deserted by the Spanish element, 
 with the aid of native soldiers succeeded in confining the Eng- 
 lish to the vicinity of Manlla.^^ Posterity has recognized his 
 services for the Philippines and a monument to his memory 
 stands in front of Fort Santiago at the end of the Malecon Drive 
 in the city of Manila.'^ 
 
 Spain refused to pay the bills which had been drawn for the 
 deferred part of the ransom money on the grounds that the au- 
 thorities at Manila had no right to draw such bills, that they were 
 induced to do so by force, and that the British, in violation of 
 the terms of the capitulation, had given over the city to sack and 
 plunder. The first two reasons were manifestly absurd, as ran- 
 som Is never paid or agreed to be paid except under duress. 
 Doctor von Ruvllle, the German author of a life of the Earl of 
 
 12 Le Roy (The American in the Philippines, I, p. 19) says that Anda 
 thus "probably saved the Archipelago for Spain at the making of the Treaty 
 of Paris." In fact he had no influence on the treaty. 
 
 13 For the friar account of Anda and his work, see Zufiiga, Estadismo de 
 Islas Filipinos (Madrid, 1893). For Anda's own statement, see B. & R., 
 XLIX, pp. 263, 269, An English translation, with notes by Dr. Pardo de 
 ITavera, was published at Manila in 1899.
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 169 
 
 Chatham,** intimates that Spain was justified in refusing to pay 
 the bills but advances no reason for his opinion. It was a clear 
 case of dishonoring a draft drawn by a duly authorized agent. 
 General Draper, abandoned by a pusillanimous ministry, pub- 
 lished an indignant defense of his conduct, in which he showed 
 quite conclusively that no plundering was authorized after the 
 capitulation, although, as in other such cases, there were un- 
 doubtedly many outrages and much destruction of property. The 
 weight of the evidence sustains Draper's claim that he took all 
 possible means to protect the city and that the excesses which 
 occurred were only such as in that age were inevitable when a 
 city was taken by storm by a body of miscellaneous troops such 
 as he commanded.*' 
 
 After the departure of the British matters soon fell into the 
 old routine. The ravages of war were repaired as rapidly as the 
 means available would permit, and Moro raids and Chinese up- 
 risings became again the matters of most vital interest. 
 
 According to a contemporary," Torre, the new governor, was 
 "the most detestable robber ever seen in the East or West Indies, 
 a man without shame or trace of Christianity. All this might 
 be tolerated if he took any care of the Indians; but he has wholly 
 abandoned the fields of Christendom, saying that a cornucopia 
 of the islands is given to him, and that the King, our sovereign, 
 will abandon them or give them to the French. Thereupon he 
 has given himself over to a libertine life, so far as his morals 
 are concerned. He looks after nothing else than selling the 
 offices dear and robbing the king and vassals." 
 
 After deploring the conditions, the indignant ecclesiastic ex- 
 claims, "May Cjod bring us a Governor, may God bring us a few 
 judges, who shall recognize and appreciate the defense of the 
 Catholic religion and of the poor Indians." 
 
 "Albert von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (London, 1907), 
 III, p. 67. 
 
 15 For Draper's defense, see B. & R., XLIX, p. 309. 
 
 ** Bernardo Pazuengos, the Philippine provincial, to Joaquin Mesquida, 
 procurenr-general, Madrid, June 7, 1765, B. & R., XLIX, p. Z37. Due allow- 
 ance must be made for the animus of the writers of such letters.
 
 170 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 During the time of the British occupation, the Chinese were 
 charged with plotting against the Spaniards. It would not be 
 surprising if they looked with satisfaction upon the prospect 
 of the British taking over the islands. The Spaniards always 
 feared but could not do without the Chinese. When they in- 
 creased in number beyond a certain point, they were either ex- 
 pelled from the islands or massacred, and a new start was made. 
 When they were able, the Chinese retaliated in kind. 
 
 The visit of a number of Chinese mandarins to Manila in 
 ,1603 on what was considered a silly errand, greatly frightened 
 the Spaniards, who imagined it to be the forerunner of an im- 
 pending invasion. The active measures taken to prepare the 
 colony for defense produced a feeling of restlessness and fear 
 iamong the Chinese. The Spaniards circulated rumors that the 
 Chinese intended to rise and prepare the way for the coming 
 of their friends from China. The Chinese were as badly fright- 
 iened as the Spaniards, and fearing that they would be massacred 
 took measures for their defense. Two badly frightened parties 
 easily get to fighting. The Chinese struck the first blow, but in 
 the end they were annihilated. The number killed reached 
 twenty-five thousand.^'' 
 
 "Some say," says Argensola,^* "that the number of Sangleys 
 killed was greater, but in order that the illegality in admitting 
 so many into the country contrary to royal prohibition might 
 not be seen, the officials concealed or diminished the number of 
 those that perished." Morga says, "The Captains were occupied 
 in this finishing the enemies for twenty days, and with it the 
 war was ended. Very few merchants were left in Manila." In 
 1639 there was another massacre in which twenty-two thousand 
 >vere killed, and in 1662 this was repeated.^® 
 
 i^Morga's Sucesos, in B. & R., XV, p. 273. For documents relating to 
 the mandarins and the insurrection, see B. & R., XII, p. 142. _ 
 
 As a punishment for their actions the governor arbitrarily increased the 
 amount the Sangleys must pay for licenses to do business and used the pro- 
 ceeds to strengthen the fortifications. The fiscal published a pamphlet pro- 
 testing against the action as illegal. B. & R., XXXV, p. 185. 
 
 18 Argensola's Conquista. B. & R., XVI, p. 295. 
 
 ^^ Events in Philippines, B. & R., XXIX, p. 141.
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 171 
 
 After the British departed, the Spaniards and natives com- 
 bined against the Chinese and slaughtered them without mercy. 
 None were left alive in the provinces and only those in Manila 
 who had become Christians or who were in the process of being 
 converted. 
 
 The Moros have been an important factor in Philippine history. 
 During the entire Spanish regime their presence in the southern 
 islands was a constant menace to the colony. The injudicious 
 activity of the early governors laid the foundation for an im- 
 placable warfare, which continued without cessation until the era 
 of steam vessels made it possible to pursue and destroy the 
 raiders. Spain never conquered the I^Ioros. Her settlements in 
 Mindanao and Jolo were merely military outposts. 
 
 It is difficult to overestimate the depressing effect of the More 
 raids on the Spaniards and natives in the northern and central 
 island. The cost of the numerous military expeditions was a 
 serious drain on the never too well supplied treasury.^" For more 
 than two and one-half centuries their war vintas ravaged the 
 coasts, appearing at times even in Manila Bay. For protection the 
 people constructed many forts and picturesque war towers along 
 the coast. Their towns were built well inland and many people 
 abandoned their homes near the coasts and settled in the inland 
 valleys, where they were comparatively safe from the marauders. 
 Churches near the coast, even in northern Luzon, were often 
 constructed like fortifications. 
 
 Many of the expeditions against the Moros were led by the 
 governors in person, and titles and military honors were cheaply 
 won for inconclusive victories. Numerous treaties were made 
 with the various sultans, but the Moro country was never really 
 conquered until the Americans arrived and adopted othei; 
 methods. 
 
 The wealth which was accumulated by the monastic orders id 
 various ways made them important factors in tlie commercial 
 life of the islands. They were the largest planters and eni 
 
 ^''For detailed account of numerous Moro raids compiled from varioui 
 sources, sec B. & R„ XLI, pp. 277-324.
 
 172 [THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 gaged in raising rice and all sorts of agricultural products. 
 They loaned money and, indirectly at least, engaged in banking. 
 The way in which the affairs of business and religion w^ere inter- 
 woven in that curious community is well illustrated by the his- 
 tory of the Ohras Pias, the Pious Works. About the year 1759 
 an enterprising governor-general who had managed, out of a 
 small salary during a five-year term of office, to save a quarter 
 of a million pesos, left that amount for pious purposes. This 
 fund was thereafter from time to time added to by further dona- 
 tions from those who felt the need of some form of expiation, 
 and also by some worthy, charitably inclined people. Prior to 
 1819 the fund was administered by a board representing the 
 religious orders. Thereafter it was to some extent under the 
 control of the secular government. In 1850 the government 
 required the entire fund to be transferred to an institution which 
 was then chartered, called the Banco-Espafiol-Filipina, by which 
 it was subsequently loaned for purposes which had been desig- 
 nated by the donors. The bank was thereafter a sort of part- 
 nership between the government and the Church. Until the Ohras 
 Pias became simply the capital of a commercial bank two-thirds 
 of the fund had been loaned "to stimulate trade" and the other 
 one-third reserved to cover losses. During the days of the 
 galleon trade the most of this fund was invested in that com- 
 merce, although it was common for Spaniards who had been 
 appointed alcaldes or governors of provinces to borrow from 
 it sufficient money to enable them to engage in business in con- 
 nection with their official duties. When the Americans took 
 possession it was found very difficult to determine the legal status 
 of the fund, as it was claimed by the State and by the Church. 
 
 The liberal movement which made so much progress in Spain 
 (luring the Napoleonic times exerted considerable influence on 
 the colonies. The ambitious scheme which was entertained by 
 some of the leaders of consolidating all the Spanish possessions 
 into a single unified empire with a legislative body sitting in the 
 Peninsula, with representatives from all the colonies, resulted in 
 a decree under which the Philippines were given representation
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 173 
 
 in the Cortes of 1810. The scheme was wholly impracticable 
 because of the great distance from the Philippines to Spain. All 
 the objections which Burke urged against representation by the 
 American colonies in the British parliament applied with more 
 than double force to this plan. 
 
 In the first session of the new Cortes, the Philippines were 
 represented by "acting deputies" selected by the minister from 
 residents of Manila, who happened then to be in Spain. The 
 municipality of Manila chose a merchant named Ventura de los 
 Reyes, who seems to have taken quite an active part in the work 
 of the Cortes. 
 
 In the sessions of 1820 to 1823 the colony managed to send 
 four of the seventeen deputies to which it was entitled, and upon 
 being censured for not sending the full number pleaded poverty. 
 During that session Delegate Camba served with distinction on 
 the Committee on Etiquette. Delegates were also sent to the 
 Cortes in 1837, but before they arrived a new constitution had 
 been adopted under which the colonies were to be governed by 
 special laws. The withdrawal of the privilege of representation 
 created much dissatisfaction and some serious disturbances in 
 the islands. The reform party continued to demand the priv- 
 ilege down to the end of the Spanish rule. 
 
 The political and social organization was not favorable to the 
 economic and industrial development of the country. Neither 
 Spaniards nor natives were by nature endowed with the qualities 
 essential for trade and commerce on a large scale. They were 
 not trading people, like the Dutch and English. The ecclesiastical 
 atmosphere which enveloped the country was unfavorable to 
 material and political growth. The priests were content if they 
 were able to preach and pray to a docile and submissive people. 
 What energy and ambition the European people carried out with 
 them soon evaporated under the influence of the tropical sun. 
 The officials, not overburdened with work, lived a languid in- 
 active life.*^ 
 
 *^ "With very few exceptions all the government offices in Manila were 
 closed to the public during one-half the ordinary working day, the afternoon, 
 and many of the Civil Service officials made their appearance at their de^s
 
 174 .THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Trade and commerce were subject to so many restrictions that 
 expansion was impossible. The export trade was in the hands 
 of foreigners. The Spanish and native merchants, with a few 
 exceptions, were httle more than tiende keepers. There were 
 few opportunities for growth and probably few persons with the 
 inclination more than to exist. 
 
 Occasionally a new governor-general created a diversion by 
 trying to rouse the colony out of its lethargy, but the ineffective- 
 ness of all efforts soon became apparent and the community re- 
 lapsed into its normal state. It was always, probably, as it is 
 to-day, a great place for schemes and reform organizations, so- 
 cieties to effect this and associations to accomplish that. 
 
 In the early part of the nineteenth century some very cred- 
 itable public works were designed and even constructed. Gov- 
 ernor-General Aguilar built highways and paved and lighted 
 the streets of Manila. The same enlightened governor gave 
 much attention to the development of the domestic industries to 
 which the country and the people are so well adapted. 
 
 Pascuel Enrile, who became governor-general in 1830, seems 
 to have been a zealous, energetic and intelligent executive who 
 was ambitious to improve the condition of agriculture. In com- 
 pany with an engineer he traveled about the island making new 
 maps, surveying the bays and rivers and designing roads and 
 bridges, many of which he caused to be constructed. 
 
 Enrile induced the officials, merchants and planters to organize 
 the famous Economic Society of Friends of the Country, which 
 continued to exist until 1890. But these scientific engineering 
 studies and bursts of energy produced no lasting effects, because 
 neither the people nor their leaders had the tenacity of purpose 
 nor the persistence in well-doing that was necessary for success. 
 
 There are two contemporaneous narratives which give a fair 
 and accurate description of conditions in the country just before 
 the opening of the last period of Spanish control. Like the 
 
 about ten o'clock in the morning, returning shortly after midday when they 
 had smoked their habitual number of cigarettes." Foreman, Philippine 
 Islands, p. 219.
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 175 
 
 narrative of Morga, which described conditions at the end of the 
 constructive period, they are critical and rather pessimistic in 
 tone. 
 
 The first is an extremely interesting report by Sinibaldo de 
 Mas, on political conditions in the Philippines in 1842.-^ It was 
 intended for official use only and but a few copies were printed, 
 and they were distributed with care. 
 
 According to Mas, if Spain intended to continue her control 
 she must take prompt measures to reduce the white populution, 
 subordinate the natives, and reform the administration. The 
 whites encourage independence. The island-born Spaniards re- 
 gard the country as theirs and have no affection for Spain. They 
 are lazy and ignorant and concerned only with getting govern- 
 ment positions, of which there are but four hundred for more 
 than one thousand applicants. They object to the appointment 
 of real Spaniards. Spain must either decide to keep the islands 
 permanently, neglect them absolutely, or emancipate them. As 
 the second alternative is not to be considered, he considers only 
 the other two. 
 
 Only single men should be sent to the islands, and they should 
 be returned to Spain after twenty years* service, with the option 
 of returning in ten years. They would probably marry native 
 women and take their families back to Spain with them, thus 
 reducing the white population. No women should be sent from 
 the Peninsula. All boys should be sent to Spain at the age of 
 sixteen years and educated there at the expense of the Phihppine 
 treasury. Separation from Spain would probably mean the dis- 
 appearance of the whites by absorption. The whites and natives 
 will not work together. The salvation of the natives is agricul- 
 ture, but they are too lazy for such work. A system of indus- 
 trial servants would enable them with the help of the Chinese 
 
 22 This review 13 in the third volume of Mas' Report, B. & R., LIT. 
 p. 29 et seq. "This document, while containing many things which are general 
 in nature, and which even appear childish and visionary, is in many other 
 things clear sighted, and shows deep and keen observation." B. & R., LII, 
 Preface, p. 14. It is probable that Mas purposely so framed the statement of 
 measures necessary to preserve the Filipinos in order to strengthen his argu- 
 ment in favor of preparing the country for independence.
 
 176 ^ THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 and captive Moros to work their fields. A certain number of 
 Chinese could be safely admitted to work on the plantations. 
 
 Greater respect for the whites must be secured. To that end 
 the education of the natives should be restricted, and the colleges 
 at Manila closed. Natives should not be taught Spanish nor 
 should soldiers be allowed to rise above the rank of corporal. 
 The native priests should be reduced in number and be allowed 
 to act only as assistants to the regulars. The laws of the Indies 
 he considered were too favorable to the natives who were becom- 
 ing impudent and arrogant and would soon drive the Spaniards 
 out of the country. They should be required to wear a distinctive 
 dress, salute all Spaniards, and be forbidden to use the title of 
 Don. They should not be allowed to learn how to cast artillery 
 or make firearms or powder. In fact, the powder factory should 
 be suspended. 
 
 Only men of good character should be appointed to office in 
 the islands, and then they should be paid liberal salaries and be 
 required to spend their money liberally. As religion is the main- 
 stay of the islands, the regular cures must be given as much power 
 as possible and officials must work in harmony with them. They 
 should have the power of intervening in the meetings of the 
 principalias. 
 
 The friars should abstain from trade, live morally, and not 
 meddle in temporal affairs. They should all be Spaniards, and 
 in order to enable them to maintain the respect of the natives, 
 the government should collect marriage and burial fees, in the 
 form of a specific tax, and thus relieve them from this disagree- 
 able duty. The whites also should pay more attention to their 
 religious duties, thus setting a good example. 
 
 It would be well, he thought, to farm out the work of collecting 
 the taxes to natives, as it is odious work which engenders much 
 hatred and ill will. Hatred between the Chinese and the Fili- 
 pinos should be cultivated. The former were the richer and abler 
 and if the country was left to itself, would soon control every- 
 thing. There should be a respectable Spanish force in the coun- 
 try to prevent the native troops from mutinying.
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 177 
 
 It was also necessary that steam vessels should be furnished in 
 order to enable the authorities to repel the Moros and suppress 
 uprisings among the natives. Newspapers under proper censor- 
 ship should be allowed, and the priests should translate suitable 
 articles into the native dialects. Foreigners living in the islands 
 should be carefully watched. The administration of the govern- 
 ment was honeycombed with laxity and graft and should be 
 completely reformed. It should be centralized and vested in a 
 regency of three men, the president being a Spanish grande, 
 which should exercise the powers of the governor-general and 
 the audiencia, with a council of state. The judiciary should be 
 made independent of the other government departments. All 
 power in the provinces should be in a chief who should be sent 
 from Spain. The treasury methods should also be completely 
 changed so as to prevent graft. 
 
 But if Spain decided to give the Philippines their independence 
 a system diametrically the opposite should be adopted. It should 
 be so devised as to avoid bloodshed and provide for good rela- 
 tions in the future. Mas then outlines a procedure which is 
 startlingly similar to that which later was adopted by the United 
 States. If future emancipation Is the ultimate end, public in- 
 struction, he thought, should be encouraged, and newspapers 
 established in Manila. The barriers which separate the races 
 should be broken down. The Spanish, Chinese and Filipinos 
 should be admitted on terms of equality to the military corps. 
 The present service tax should be abolished or an equal and gen- 
 eral tax imposed on all. To encourage cross-marriages, dowries 
 should be paid. Some Filipinos and mestizo alcaldes-may ores 
 should be appointed. It should be ordered that when a Filipino 
 chief goes into the house of a Spaniard he should be received as 
 an equal. In a word, by these and other means, the idea that 
 they and the Castilians are two people of distinct races should be 
 erased from the minds of the natives, and the families should 
 become so related by marriage that when free of the Castilian 
 dominion, should Filipinos try to expel or enslave the Spanish,
 
 178 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 they would find them so interlaced with their own people that 
 the plan would be practically impossible. 
 
 After some years "when this population was sufficiently 
 trimmed off" an assembly of deputies should be formed from 
 the people, in order that they may hold sessions in Manila, for 
 two or three months every year, when they may discuss public 
 affairs, especially those relating to taxes and budgets. After 
 a period of political education the Spanish government could be 
 withdrawn, fixing first the kind of government to be established, 
 probably some constitutional form analogous to those of Europe 
 with a royal Spanish prince at its head. 
 
 Mas favored this plan of emancipation. Spain, he argued, 
 had received no benefit from her colonies. The true interest of 
 a state is in a dense, well educated population — that general edu- 
 cation which makes each one perfect in his trade ; that education 
 which makes a cabinet maker, a weaver, or a blacksmith. 
 
 Colonies may be useful to the mother country because they in- 
 crease her income, supply a place for the emigration of surplus 
 population, and a market for the products of the home manu- 
 factures.^^ As to the first, the Philippines are and for a long time 
 will remain a poor country, and Spain has neither surplus popu- 
 lation nor manufactures. The trade with the islands amounts 
 to practically nothing, and what there is would be retained if the 
 country were emancipated. Spaniards could return to Spain. 
 
 Mas was not concerned as to the future of religion in the 
 islands, and as to the argument that the country would fall into 
 the hands of the British, Dutch or Chinese, he asked why should 
 Spain set up as a knight errant, a kind of Don Quixote self- 
 charged with the protection of all kinds of people? As to the 
 claim that as Spain had spent over three hundred million pesos 
 in the islands, she should be reimbursed — she had spent as much 
 on the Holy Land and did not expect to be reimbursed ! I f the 
 Filipinos had to pay heavier taxes under their own government, 
 
 23 Lewis* book on The Government of Dependencies, in which this classi- 
 fication was made, had been published in 1841 and Mas was evidently 
 acquainted with it.
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 179 
 
 tliat was their concern. "If," says he, in language which sounds 
 strangely familiar, "we are conserving the islands for love of 
 the islanders, we are losing our time and merit, for gratitude 
 is sometimes met with in persons, but never can he hoped for 
 in peoples. Why claim liberty for ourselves, and yet wish to 
 impose our law on remote peoples? Why deny to others the 
 benefits we claim for ourselves?" 
 
 However, as conditions were in Spain, he believed that the 
 colony would be neglected. None of the measures he had sug- 
 gested would be adopted, and the Indians would in time emanci- 
 pate themselves. It would be easier and more glorious to show 
 generosity, so that the world could say, "The Spaniards, crossing 
 new and remote seas, extended the domain of geography by 
 discovering the Philippines. They found anarchy and despotism 
 there and established order and justice; they destroyed slavery 
 and established political equality; ruled the natives with just 
 laws; Christianized and civilized them; defended them from 
 the Chinese, from Moro pirates and European aggressors. They 
 spent much gold on them and then gave them their liberty" 
 
 How different the course of Philippine history had this advice 
 been heeded ! 
 
 About the same time, Don Manuel de la Matta, the intendent 
 of the army and treasury, made a confidential report^* to the 
 governor-general on the conditions which existed after the 
 trouble with Apolinario and the mutiny of 1843. According to 
 this report the situation was very delicate, in fact, about as bad 
 as it could be. Radical reforms were necessary. A condition 
 approaching anarchy existed and the army was demoralized. He 
 advised that the laws should be revised to suit the character of 
 the natives ; the government centralized ; and various educational 
 institutions should be abolished, because they were "perpetual 
 nurseries of corruption, laziness, and subversive ideas as contrary 
 to the quiet and welfare of the villages as to Peninsular interests." 
 From these institutions came "the swarms of ignorant and 
 vicious secular priests, and the pettifogging lawyers, who stir 
 
 2* Printed in B. & R., LII, p. 91 et scq.
 
 180 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 up so much trouble among the natives, and cause the jprovincial 
 chiefs so great inconvenience. Akhough not much attention is 
 paid to this class they are the most vicious and worthless in the 
 islands/'" 
 
 In the place of these colleges, agricultural, commercial and 
 trade schools should be established. 
 
 The residencia should be abolished, as it had done much harm 
 and no good. Agriculture must be developed by whites, mestizos 
 and Chinese who will be loyal to the government. There should 
 be extensive military and police reforms. Schools should be 
 established where the Spanish officers could learn the native 
 dialects. Peninsular- and Filipino-born Spaniards should be con- 
 ciliated so they would work together. Merit only should deter- 
 mine advancement in the public service. 
 
 25 Lawyers seem always to have been unpopular with persons officially re- 
 sponsible for the government of colonics. Sir John Bowring after visiting 
 Manila wrote: "As far as my experience goes lawyers are tlie curse of 
 colonies. I remember one of the most intelligent of the Chinese merchants, 
 who had settled at Singapore, after having been long estabUshed at Hong 
 Kong, telling me that all the disadvantages of Singapore were more than 
 compensated by the absence of the profession, and all the recommendations 
 of Hong Kong more than counterbalanced by the presence of gentlemen 
 occupied in fomenting and recompensed for fomenting litigation and quar- 
 rels. Many of them make large fortunes, not unfrequently at the expense of 
 substantial justice. A sound observer says that in the Philippines truth is 
 swamped by the superfluity of law documents. The doors opened for the 
 protection of innocence are made for chicanery, and discussions are carried 
 on without any regard for the decorum which prevails in European courts." 
 Bowring's A Visit to the Philippine Islands (1859), p. 187. 
 
 It is interesting to note tlie efforts which have been made to exclude law- 
 yers from colonies. Heaps {The Spanish Conquest of America, IH, p. 
 17) says that as soon as any colony was in the least degree established in the 
 new world, the colonists almost in their first communication with the sov- 
 ereign were sure to entreat him "to prohibit lawyers from coming out." He 
 cites numerous illustrations from the history of the Spanish-American col- 
 onies and adds : "It would_ almost seem as if each colonist had undergone 
 some dreadful experience with the law and felt ... it was too much for 
 a man who had to fight against new diseases, noxious animals, a trying 
 climate, and surrounding barbarians, to be also molested by the cruel frivoli- 
 ties, the fatal forms, the needless precautions which soon became snares, the 
 subtlety appHed to verbiage and to dialects which no skill can securely ar- 
 range and no dialectics can disentangle, and all the vast delay which belongs 
 to great lawsuits in highly civilized communities. These things can only be 
 borne when the rest of life is smooth." 
 
 The unfortunate Jews were generally classed with the lawyers and also 
 excluded. Both were excluded from certain of the New England colonies, 
 and to-day no lawyer or Jew is permitted to live in Sarawak, the land of the 
 white Rajah.
 
 CENTURIES OF STAGNATION 181 
 
 These two reports convey a clear idea of conditions in the 
 Philippines about the end of the first half of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury.^* The removal of trade restrictions, the free admission of 
 foreigners, and the gradual introduction of modern liberal ideas 
 rendered reforms inevitable and the blind resistance of the au- 
 thorities led to insurrection and the downfall of Spanish power. 
 
 20 When Lord Elgin, returning from his second mission to China, in 1861, 
 visited Manila, he found conditions very satisfactory. "They (rulers and 
 natives) are not separated from each other by that unpassable barrier of 
 mutual contempt, suspicion, and antipathy which aUenates us (the British) 
 from the unhappy natives in those lands where we settle ourselves among 
 inferior orders of men. . . . One feels a little softened and sublimated 
 when one passes from Hong Kong, where the devil is worshiped in his naked 
 deformity, to this place, where he displays at least some of the feathers which 
 he wore before he fell. . . . The natives seem to have a great deal of our 
 dear old French Canadian hahitans about them, only in a more sublime stage 
 of infantile simplicity." Wrong, The Earl of Elgin, p. 279.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 The Awakening and Revolt 
 
 A New Era — Changing Conditions — Attack on Monastic Orders — Revolts and 
 Insurrections — The Cavite Revolt — Execution of Native Priests — The Move- 
 ment for Reforms — The Propaganda Abroad — ^Jose Rizal — The Idea of Inde- 
 pendence — Insurrection of 1896 — The Katipunan — Execution of Rizal — The 
 Pact of Biak-na-bato — Departure of the Leaders. 
 
 The Opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 brought the Philip- 
 pines into more direct relations with Europe. Thereafter they 
 faced toward Spain instead of Mexico. After the early adven- 
 turers and encomendcros had disappeared, the Spanish in the 
 islands other than the officials and soldiers, were limited to the 
 favored merchants of Manila, who were allowed to participate 
 in the galleon trade, and an occasional planter in the provinces. 
 The small army was composed of Mexicans and Filipinos and 
 the officers were mostly half-castes. The members of the religious 
 orders constituted the largest and most influential element in 
 the community. Comyn says that in 1810, including the mes- 
 tizos, there were not more than four thousand Spaniards of all 
 classes in the Philippines. The loss of the American colonies 
 brought many of the Spanish officials and a few planters from 
 America to the Philippines, but with certain notable exceptions 
 this immigration was of no particular benefit to the community. 
 In 1848 there were seven thousand five hundred forty- four 
 Spaniards and mestizos in Manila and Tondo and two hundred 
 forty-two in the provinces. Of these probably two thousand 
 were officers and soldiers. 
 
 In 1852 a direct line of steamers was established between 
 Barcelona and Manila, and in the same year the first regular 
 
 182
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 183 
 
 bank >vas opened in the islands.* "The old situation/' wrote 
 Jagor, *'is no longer possible of maintenance, with the changed 
 conditions of the present time. The colony can no longer be 
 shut off from the outside. Every facility in communication 
 opens a breach in the ancient system and necessarily leads to 
 reforms of a liberal character. The more that foreign capital 
 and foreign ideas penetrate there, the more they increase pros- 
 perity, intelligence, and self-esteem, making the existing evils 
 more intolerable." 
 
 The general restlessness began to find expression in political 
 activity which in part was a reflection of the revolutionary move- 
 ment in Spain that was to lead to the esablishment of the short- 
 lived republic. A new governor-general who represented Span- 
 ish liberalism was sent out, but the doctrine that tlie victors have 
 a legitimate claim to the spoils and perquisites of office which 
 had always been accepted in Spain, was now applied with great 
 thoroughness in the Philippines. The change of administration 
 brought some hope of better things and some reforms were ef- 
 fected, but the Filipinos were impressed principally by the fact 
 that the new supply of officials would require new taxes for 
 their support. 
 
 The friars had few friends left among the Filipinos, whom 
 they had given up as ungrateful and hopeless, thus completely 
 stultifying their claim to great accomplishments in the islands. 
 Of the old missionary spirit only the dregs of bitter controversies 
 remained. All sympathy and kindliness had disappeared. The 
 Dominican newspaper in Manila continually referred to the Fili- 
 pinos as monkeys. At the public exercises of the University of 
 Santo Tomas, an official, before two thousand students, recited 
 a poem which represented the native people as mere animals who 
 lived like the beasts of the field. "These verses," wrote a promi- 
 nent friar to Minister Monet, in 1897, "brilliantly set forth the 
 savage instincts and the bestial inclinations of those faithful imi- 
 tators of apes. ... As neither Spain nor the friars can 
 change the ethnological character of the race, so inferior to ours, 
 
 1 The Spanish Filipino Bank, known as the Bank of the Philippines.
 
 184 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 it will be idle to apply to them the same laws as to us. . . ► 
 The only liberty the Indians want is the liberty of savages. 
 Leave them to their cockfighting and their indolence, and they 
 will thank you more than if you load them down with old and 
 new rights."^ 
 
 Many of the liberal officials who came out from Spain brought 
 with them the anticlerical feeling which so embittered the home 
 politics. They became temporarily popular with the Filipinos 
 and aided in destroying what remained of Spanish prestige by 
 >veakening the racial unity upon which it largely depended. The 
 people, including the Spaniards born on the islands and the half- 
 castes, had begun to feel conscious of a common race interest. 
 A sentiment of nationality was developing. The friars were 
 considered as foreigners and their expulsion was demanded on 
 the grounds that they were absorbing the wealth of the land, 
 stifling the intellectual freedom of the people, and excluding the 
 Filipino priests from the parishes. The friars in their defense 
 struck savagely and for the time effectively at their enemies. 
 
 During the long years of Spanish rule there had been many 
 insurrections and local uprisings against the authorities, but 
 with few exceptions they had been caused by the oppressive acts 
 of local authorities.' Two revolts in the early part of the nine- 
 teenth century probably resulted from discontent with general 
 political and social conditions. The Liberal Spanish Cortes of 
 1810 declared that "the kingdoms and provinces of America and 
 Asia are and ought to have always been reputed an integral part 
 of the Spanish monarchy, and for that reason their natives and 
 free inhabitants are equal in rights and privileges to those of 
 the Peninsula." This declaration was received by the Filipinos 
 with much satisfaction, particularly as it would, if made effec- 
 tive, relieve them from the burden of forced labor on public 
 works. The return of Ferdinand in 1813 crushed all these 
 hopes, and the people of some of the provinces in their anger 
 
 2Le Roy, I, p. 62, quoting from the letter In La Politica de Espana eft 
 Filipinos, VII, pp. 35-37. 
 
 *For an accoimt of the early insurrections, see B. & R., XXXVIII, p. S7,
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 185 
 
 began destroying churches, public property, iand particularly the 
 private property of their native leading citizens. This revolt 
 was against the social order which was sustained by Spanish 
 rule. 
 
 In 1823, the government attempted to replace the Spanish- 
 American and Philippine-bom officers of the army with Penin- 
 sular-born Spaniards. The officers who were deprived of their 
 positions led a revolt of native troops, and gained possession of 
 everything within the walled city of Manila except Fort Santiago, 
 before they were overcome. 
 
 A much more serious uprising occurred in 1841. A young 
 Filipino priest named Apolinario who had developed some of 
 the qualities of leadership, upon being denied the privilege of 
 establishing a native brotherhood in honor of St. Joseph and 
 the Virgin, launched an independent church with himself as 
 Supreme Pontiff, and raised the standard of revolt against the 
 friars. He succeeded in securing such a following that it was 
 necessary to fight a severe battle before he was defeated and 
 killed. 
 
 The importance of an outbreak of native soldiers in Cavite 
 in 1872 was greatly increased by the way in which the authorities 
 proceeded to suppress it. It occurred during a period of reaction 
 from the sympathetic policy which had been tried by Governor- 
 General de la Torre. Even the Spanish Liberals had gone over 
 to the reactionaries and were favoring a "strong" policy. Gov- 
 ernor-General Izquierdo acted vigorously, but very unwisely. 
 Many natives of good standing in the capital, who in the past 
 had actively but peacefully worked for reforms, were arrested 
 and charged with complicity, and three priests, Burgos, a Span- 
 iard, Zamora, a Chinese mestizo, and Gomez, a Filipino, were 
 executed. 
 
 The action of the government showed the utter incapacity of 
 those in control for the work of either suppressing a revolt or 
 directing the reform movement in the islands. They could 
 conceive of no way to meet the issues other than by fiercely
 
 186 fTHE PHILIPPINES 
 
 destroying their opponents and all who sympathized with them. 
 The evidence against the priests was submitted to a court-mar- 
 tial which sat in secret, and the record was never made public. 
 The idea was to impress the imagination of the people by the 
 swiftness of the punishment. The mystery with which the trial 
 was surrounded merely caused them to believe that their friends, 
 though innocent, had been secretly murdered on the orders of 
 the enemies of the liberal movement. 
 
 This is the universal feeling of the present-day Filipinos. In 
 1877 their side of the story was told in an article in the Revue 
 des Deux Mondes*' by a Frenchman named Plauchut, who resided 
 in Manila at the time of the trial. The official version is given 
 by Montero y Videl, who was also a contemporary resident.^ 
 
 According to the friars the Cavite insurrection had the same 
 origin and was "the result of the same causes as those of France, 
 Italy and Spain, or rather of Europe and America. They are 
 all the fruit of the corruption of the intelligence and the heart. 
 Tell man, you are free to think and to will, because reason recog- 
 nizes no dependence and will follows reason, and you have put 
 into action the principle of disorder and anarchy which so dom- 
 inates society."* 
 
 Soon after the execution of these priests, Rizal, who was him- 
 self soon to join the goodly army of martyrs, dedicated his 
 political novel. El Filihusterismo, to their memory in the follow- 
 ing language : 
 
 "The Church by refusing to degrade you has placed in doubt 
 the crime which had been attributed to you ; the government by 
 surrounding your case with mystery and shadows, has caused 
 the belief that there was some error committed in fatal moments; 
 and all of the Philippines by worshipping your memory and call- 
 
 4May IS, 1877. 
 
 s Plauchut's version is denounced by the friars, but in an article published 
 in the Philippine Census, I, pp. 575-579, it is approved by Dr. Pardo de 
 Tavera. In the unpublished appeal for the intervention of the United States 
 presented to the American Consul-General at Hong Kong in 1897 there is an 
 account of the popular understanding of the Cavite insurrection. See Le Roy, 
 The Americans in the Philippines, I, p. 58, note. 
 
 ^The Reseiia of Father Casimiro Herrero, quoted by Le Roy, I, p. 59, 
 note.
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 187 
 
 ing you martyrs refuse to recognize your culpability. . . . 
 Let these pages serve as a tardy wreath of dried leaves upon 
 your unknown tombs, and let it be understood that every one 
 who, without clear proof, attacks your memory stains his hands 
 in your blood." 
 
 The general reform movement was perfectly legitimate, and 
 would have been legal had it been carried on in Spain itself. It 
 was seeking necessary and reasonable reforms by methods which 
 would have been proper in any free country. The violent re- 
 pressive measures by which it was opposed led to an outbreak 
 of race hatred and war. The natives had at last gained sufficient 
 courage to assert themselves against the friars. In Malolos and 
 in certain .districts of Manila, controversies with the friars over 
 personal tax lists were appealed to the civil authorities. This 
 seems to have been an unprecedented proceeding. The tenants 
 of the Colamba friar estate publicly aired their grievances against 
 their Dominican landlords, and for their boldness a number of 
 them appear later to have been deported by General Weyler. 
 Demonstrations against the friars and the archbishop also took 
 place in Manila 
 
 The queen regent was earnestly petitioned to remove the 
 friars from the islands, but the aggressiveness and all-advised 
 methods of the Filipinos produced a reaction against them in 
 Spain. The church authorities there were strong enough to 
 have the provisions relating to civil marriage and registration, 
 things much desired by the reformers, omitted from the new 
 civil code which was to go into effect in the Philippines in 1889. 
 
 But the policy of the government had created conditions which 
 enabled the reformers to get a hearing before the world. After 
 the Cavlte mutiny of 1872 many prominent Filipinos were sent 
 into exile and deportations under the discretionary power of the 
 governor-general and on the instigation of the friars and half- 
 caste sycophants became thereafter very common. All classes 
 of the people were subjected to this arbitrary method of punish- 
 ment. One workman was deported for being a subscriber to 
 such an inflammatory publication as the Scientific American. The
 
 188 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 more active and intelligent of the deportes found their way to 
 Hong Kong, Singapore, Paris, London and Madrid, where by 
 the late eighties they had organized a very extensive propaganda 
 for the extension of liberal ideas and methods in the Philippines. 
 
 Most of these propagandists were superficial young men with- 
 out adequate capacity or training for such work. There were, 
 however, some effective workers among them. In 1888 Gra- 
 ciano Lopaz Jaena, a Vizayan from Capiz, founded in Madrid 
 a paper called La Solidaridad, which became their organ. Among 
 its contributors were Marcelo del Pilar, Jose Rizal, the Bo- 
 hemian Ferdinand Blumentritt, and certain Spanish Liberals. 
 Pilar was a lawyer, who, after publishing a Tagalog daily in 
 Manila, was sent abroad by wealthy Filipinos to aid in conduct- 
 ing the propaganda. Pie finally became discouraged and joined 
 those who advocated the use of force. 
 
 Jose Rizal, who was destined to become the Filipino national 
 hero, was the son of common people who were tenants on the 
 friar Colamba estate near Manila.^ It is commonly said that 
 Rizal was a pure blood Tagalog, but recent investigations have 
 shown that he, like many other successful Filipinos, had a strong 
 infusion of Chinese blood in his veins. 
 
 Having an active mind Rizal soon exhausted the educational 
 opportunities of Manila and with the aid of friends was en- 
 abled to continue his medical studies in Europe. After a short 
 stay in Paris he went to Germany and studied at Heidelberg, 
 Leipzig and Berlin, where he made many friends among scien- 
 tific men. 
 
 His first political novel. Noli me Tangere, published at Berlin 
 in 1886, when Rizal was twenty-six years old, was "the pas- 
 sionate cry of a Malay who felt himself the equal of any white 
 man, had proved himself in the halls of learning, and was so 
 received by the scholars whom he met in Germany, for a fair 
 chance for his race." His second novel. El Filibusterismo, 
 
 ^Austin Craig: Lineage, Life and Labors of Jose Risal, Manila, 1913. 
 For estimates of his character and work, see articles by Sir Hugh Clifford in 
 Blackwood's Magazine for Nov., 1902, and by Dr. Blumentritt, in the Popular 
 Science Monthly for July, 1902.
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 189 
 
 .which was published at Ghent in 1891, was a powerful appeal 
 to his people to arouse themselves from their lethargy and pre- 
 pare for the future. 
 
 Rizal consistently opposed the use of force, at least until some 
 indefinite time in the future, when the Filipinos should have been 
 educated and developed to a point where there would be some 
 reasonable chance for success. The American government has 
 encouraged the Filipinos to regard him as their great man. 
 As President Roosevelt said: "In the Philippines the Amer- 
 ican government has tried, and is trying, to carry out exactly 
 what the greatest genius and most revered patriot ever known 
 in the Philippines, Jose Rizal, steadfastly advocated." Judged 
 by American and European standard he was a man of abil- 
 ity, character and high ideals. He taught the Filipinos that 
 only by raising themselves through education and self-restraint 
 to a higher level of intelligence could they hope permanently to 
 improve their condition. He certainly contemplated the inde- 
 pendence of the islands at some future time, which in an in- 
 definite way he set half a century away. The Liga Filipina, 
 which he organized in 1891, was designed according to the in- 
 strument of its creation "to raise the arts and sciences,*' and he 
 may have contemplated the possibility of accomplishing this 
 laudable purpose by means which it was not then necessary to 
 state in detail. It is certain that they had not been raised "to 
 any great altitude under Spanish domination." 
 
 The novels of Rizal, the newspaper La SoUdaridad and other 
 publications which gradually found their way into the islands, 
 produced a profound impression on the minds of the more in- 
 telligent and educated Filipinos. The foundation was thus laid 
 for the organization of the people. The Liga Filipina seems 
 to have accomplished very little in its original form. After the 
 exile of Rizal it disappeared and was succeeded by the secret 
 organization known as the Katlpunan. The most effective work 
 was done through organizations which are alleged to have been 
 Masonic Lodges. The membership of what was called the 
 Spanish-Filipino Association of Madrid, was almost identical
 
 190 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 with that of certain Masonic Lodges. Miguel Morayta, the 
 editor of La Solidaridad, was the head of the Grand Lodge of 
 Madrid called the Oriente Espanol. It is certain that the Fili- 
 pinos adopted a system of Masonic secret lodges in order to 
 carry on their work. Under the authority of the Oriente Espanol 
 a "Grand Regional Lodge" was organized in Manila with subor- 
 dinate lodges throughout the islands. It is not material for 
 present purposes whether these lodges were true Masonic bodies 
 or merely political secret societies organized on the model of 
 Masonic Lodges. Whatever their character they were agencies 
 for the dissemination of revolutionary ideas among the Filipinos 
 of the better class.* 
 
 In 1892, with the consent of the authorities, Rizal returned to 
 Manila to find himself the hete noir of the friars whom he had 
 attacked and flouted in his novels, and an object of suspicion to 
 Governor-General Despujol, who, although not a protege of the 
 friars, was much under their influence. While in Manila at- 
 tempting, without concealment, to organize the Liga Filipina, he 
 was suddenly ordered deported to Dapitan, a small village on 
 the northeast coast of Mindanao. There he remained for four 
 years quietly engaged in practising his profession and in various 
 :ways improving the condition of the people of the village. 
 
 For some time before Rizal's return to the Philippines many 
 of the leaders of the propaganda had begun to feel the necessity 
 for an organization which would more effectually reach the 
 masses of the people. Del Pilar, although naturally a conserva- 
 
 ^ It is claimed that these lodges were all spurious, as the Grand Lodge of 
 Spain only had authority to represent the Freemasonry of England and Scot- 
 land in Spain and in the Spanish possessions. The lodges organized in the 
 Philippines under its authority took no part in the political propaganda. See 
 a pamphlet by Viriato Diaz-Perex, entitled Los Frailes de Filipinas (Madrid, 
 1904) and an article in La Epoca, Aug. 15, 1896. For an arraignment of 
 masonry, see Friar Edouardo Navarro's Filipinas; Estudios de algunos 
 asuntos de actualidad (Madrid, 1907) ; St. Clair, The Katipunan, or The Rise 
 and Fall of the Filipino Commune (Manila, 1902). 
 
 "Only slight familiarity with Filipino character and history is needed to 
 comprehend how such a secret organization, with its signs, symbols, mysteries 
 of initiation, etc., would, even were its special aims not at the time constantly 
 in the minds of the Filipino leaders, spread with exceeding facility. It called 
 into play certain characteristics and propensities for secret, one might almost 
 say blackhanded, procedure in which the Filipinos sometimes seem to revel." 
 Le Roy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 81.
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT! 191 
 
 tive and opposed to violence, had broken with Rizal and gone 
 over to the more belligerently inclined faction, which was at- 
 tempting to organize a popular body which would supplement and 
 if necessary supplant the Liga Filipina. 
 
 Immediately after Rizal's exile to Dapitan the Supreme Coun- 
 cil of the Katipunan was organized in Manila with a brother-in- 
 law of Del Pilar at its head. Designed to reach the lower orders, 
 the Katipunan soon passed under the control of one of that class, 
 Andres Bonifacio, a porter in the warehouses of a German ex- 
 porting firm. Bonifacio was a Tagalog who seems to have read 
 considerably in the literature of French and German socialism and 
 political philosophy. 
 
 He planned to organize an armed revolt against the Spanish 
 government. Rizal, who at first sympathized with and probably 
 joined the society, refused peremptorily to countenance its pro- 
 gram, but it had reached the popular heart and was encouraged 
 by certain wealthy Filipinos who had long been contributing 
 money for the propaganda and were beginning to look for re- 
 sults. Rizal's reply to the request for his support was suppressed 
 and the work of organizing subordinate lodges proceeded so 
 rapidly that the society soon had from one hundred thousand 
 to four hundred thousand members, who were pledged by fearful 
 oaths and bound by the ancient pacte de sangre, or blood cov- 
 enant. There is no question but that the Katipunan was or- 
 ganized for the purpose of rebellion and revolt, and Bonifacio and 
 the great mass of its ignorant members intended that the up- 
 rising should be a bloody one. While it can not justly be called a 
 mere murder society, it certainly contemplated a secret blow at 
 the community and the death of every Spaniard within its reach, 
 just as a few years later the leaders of the revolt against the 
 Americans plotted the destruction of the city of Manila and its 
 white residents. The ghastly oaths which the initiates were re- 
 quired to take need not be taken too seriously by those who are 
 familiar with the initiation ceremonies of perfectly innocent 
 and innocuous secret societies in other countries. Nevertheless, 
 the majority of the impressionable and ignorant members un-
 
 192 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 doubtedly took such matters seriously and supported with en- 
 thusiasm a plan which was designed "to shake off their masters, 
 get rid of the whites, and divide up the big estates not only of 
 the friars but of Filipino landlords as well." 
 
 On June 12, 1896, the Supreme Council of the Katipunan 
 issued an order which contained the following instructions .' 
 
 "When once the signal of H. 2. Sep. is given, every brother 
 will fulfill the duty which this Grand Regional Lodge has im- 
 posed upon him, assassinating all the Spaniards, their wives and 
 sons, without considerations of any sort, whether relationship, 
 friendship, gratitude, etc." 
 
 Detailed instructions were given for the accumulation of the 
 bodies of the slain on Bagumbayan field, where they were to be 
 buried at a place where a monument should in the future be 
 erected in honor of the independence of the country.^" The bodies 
 of the friars were directed to be burned. This document is prob- 
 ably authentic, although the original seems not to have been pro- 
 duced. It finds confirmation in many similar documents cap- 
 tured during the subsequent insurrection against the United 
 States. 
 
 During the spring and summer of 1896 rumors of plots and 
 uprisings were rife. Governor-General Blanco sympathized with 
 the legitimate aspirations of the people, but he was already in 
 the bad books of the friars and was unable to do more than 
 steady the situation. For once the danger was real. The Kati- 
 punan leaders had determined to resort to arms, but before they 
 were ready the plot was discovered by one Mariano Gil, the 
 Augustinian curate of the Tondo parish of Manila. A sister of 
 
 * See the documents in full in Sastron, p. 54, and in Nozaleda's Defense 
 Ohligada, Appendix 9; Archive, III, No, 19, Documentos politicos de actu- 
 alidad, and in English as an appendix to St. Clair's book entitled The Katipu- 
 nan, or The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune (Manila, 1902) ; Le Roy 
 (I, p. 99, note) pronounces this work utterly unreliable, even questioning the 
 existence of such a person as "Arthur St. Clair," notwithstanding the accom- 
 panying portrait of the author. It will be understood that the Filipinos deny 
 the authenticity of this document. They generally claim that the Katipunan 
 was an innocent patriotic society and have recently erected a monument to 
 Bonifacio, as the "hero of the common man." 
 
 i<>The Rizal monument erected by the government in 1913 stands very 
 near the place selected in 1896 by the Katipunan.
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 193 
 
 one of the members of the society, a workman in the government 
 printing office, had told the story in the confessional. The gov- 
 ernment struck promptly. On August thirtieth martial law was 
 declared in Manila and the surrounding provinces. Many arrests 
 were made, five hundred in Manila on the first day after the dis- 
 closure. Soon the prisons of Manila were crowded. At one 
 time over four thousand prisoners were crowded into the suffo- 
 cating jails awaiting trial before the military tribunals. When 
 Blanco resigned early in December, nearly one thousand Filipinos 
 had been deported to the Mariana Islands and the Spanish penal 
 colonies near Africa. 
 
 Bonifacio had received timely warning and escaped to Cal- 
 loocan, where, notwithstanding the surprise and condition of 
 unreadiness, he ordered hostilities to commence. Fighting of 
 a desultory character followed in the vicinity of Manila and to 
 some extent throughout Luzon and elsewhere. The movement 
 soon centered in Cavite Province, where it developed under the 
 leadership of an active young Tagalog named Emilio Aguinaldo. 
 But the uprising was far from general. It was confined almost 
 entirely to the Tagalogs and many of their leading men hastened 
 to assure the Spanish authorities of their loyalty. "While it is 
 beyond question," says Le Roy,^^ "that there was a general and a 
 natural race feeling of sympathy for the insurgents, it is also 
 true that there was a very general feeling on the part of the more 
 conservative and capable Filipinos, of practically all the educated 
 men who ought in any national movement to be the leaders, that 
 the revolt was wholly premature." 
 
 At the time of the uprising there were about fifteen thousand 
 regular troops scattered throughout the Archipelago, of whom 
 three hundred Spanish artillerjrmen and two thousand five hun- 
 dred loyal native infantry were in Manila. In addition there 
 were about four thousand of the Civil Guard who constituted 
 a sort of constabulary force. Uncertainty as to the attitude of 
 the native troops for a time paralyzed active military operations. 
 During the period when an effort was being made to assimilate 
 
 iiLe Roy, I, p. 93.
 
 194 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the Philippines with Spain the native regiments had been num- 
 bered as though actually incorporated in the regular Spanish army. 
 For a time these regiments loyally sustained the burden of the 
 fighting, and some of them remained loyal to Spain until the 
 end. The lack of tmanimity of opinion in support of the in- 
 surgents is shown by the ease with which voluntary military 
 organizations of various kinds were raised throughout the 
 islands. General Blanco, still hoping for the success of his 
 policy of attraction and conciliation, issued on October eleventh a 
 circular in which he directed the provincial governors "to take 
 care not to order imprisonments unless they are justified by 
 serious complications." Upon the arrival of some new troops 
 from Spain, General Aquirre led them through the towns of 
 Laguna and Batangas for the purpose of participating in a series 
 of balls and banquets where Spaniards and Filipinos pledged 
 undying affection and loyalty. This evidence of a desire to deal 
 fairly with the people brought upon Blanco's head the wrath of 
 those who were demanding the full penalty of death and confis- 
 cation. On December 9, 1897, he was recalled to Spain, where 
 he spent much of the time during the succeeding years trying to 
 explain why he had not crushed the rebellion by greater severities. 
 
 The reign of his successor. General Camilio Polavieja, was 
 brief. It opened inauspiciously by the ill-advised execution of 
 Rizal, an act which so stirred the people as to render any hope 
 of sincere reconciliation with Spain thereafter impossible. 
 
 Rizal, with the consent of General Blanco, had returned from 
 Dapltan and had been granted permission to join the Spanish 
 army in Cuba as a surgeon. Carrying a letter from Blanco which 
 exonerated him of any part in the insurrection, he sailed for 
 Spain. But it was not intended that he should escape. At Barce- 
 lona he was arrested and returned to Manila, where he was held 
 in prison until after Blanco left the country. A military com- 
 mission, convened on December twenty-sixth, found him guilty of 
 rebellion, sedition and illicit associations, and sentenced him to 
 death. The proceedings as far as form and record are concerned 
 >v^ere in all respects legal under Spanish laws, but the secrecy and
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 195 
 
 lack of deliberation, to say nothing of circumstances which sug- 
 gest the manipulation of the evidence against him, shocks one's 
 sense of fairness and justice. Much of the evidence bears the ear- 
 marks of having been manufactured. The court found in effect 
 that the chief object of the Liga Filipina was to gather money 
 with which to purchase arms to secure the independence of the 
 Philippines; that the Katipunan was a mere offshoot of the Liga 
 Filipina through which the masses were prepared for rebellion; 
 that the purpose of the society was to assassinate all Spaniards 
 and proclaim independence, and that Rizal had been a systematic 
 and persistent rebel from the time when in early childhood he 
 read a poem about the "Fatherland," until the Katipunan in- 
 surrection. 
 
 Evidence which was favorable to Rizal was suppressed or 
 distorted to his discredit. It is certain that at Dapitan Rizal 
 informed Bonifacio's agent that he disapproved of and would 
 have nothing to do with the insurrection. The prosecution used 
 Rizal's statement to his injury, arguing that when he should 
 have protested against the principle of revolt he only opposed 
 its expediency. Having advised against a particular rebellion, 
 he was convicted for having failed to advise against all rebellions. 
 While Rizal was in prison awaiting trial he wrote and proposed 
 to issue a manifesto to his countrymen in which he said, "Upon 
 my return from Spain, I have come to know that my name has 
 been used among some who were in arms, as a battle cry. The 
 news came to me as a painful surprise; but thinking every- 
 thing already over, I kept silent before a circumstance I regarded 
 impossible of setting right. . . . From the first that I had 
 news of what was being planned, I opposed it, I fought against 
 it, and I showed its absolute impossibility. ... I did more. 
 When, later on, in spite of my advice, the outbreak occurred, 
 I spontaneously offered not only my services but my life, and my 
 name as well, to be used in the manner they thought best for the 
 purpose of stifling the rebellion; . . . I have given proof as 
 much as has any of desiring liberties for my country, and I 
 continue to desire them. But I set down as the premise the edu«»
 
 196 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 cation of the people, so that, through instruction and labor, it 
 might come to possess its own personality, and might be worthy 
 of these liberties. In my writings I have recommended study, 
 and the civic virtues, without which there is no redemption, I 
 have also written (and my words have been repeated) that re- 
 forms, to be fruitful, must come from above, and that those com- 
 ing from below were only to be obtained in a manner which 
 would make them irregular and uncertain. Nourished upon 
 these ideas, I can not less than condemn, and I do condemn that 
 absurd and savage outbreak, plotted behind my back, which dis- 
 honors us Filipinos and discredits those who may speak in our 
 behalf. I abominate its criminal proceedings, and I disown any 
 sort of participation in it, deploring with all the sorrow of my 
 heart the ignorant victims of deception. Return then to your 
 houses, and may God pardon those who have acted in bad faith." 
 
 Upon this document Auditor Pefia placed the following en- 
 dorsement: "With Rizal the question is one of opportuneness, 
 not of principles, nor of purposes. His manifesto might be con- 
 densed into these words *In the face of evidence of your defeat, 
 lay down your arms, countrymen; afterwards I will lead you 
 to the promised land.' It is of no benefit in behalf of peace, and 
 it might nourish in future the spirit of rebellion; and on that 
 account its publication is to be advised against. Instead, it might 
 be well to forbid its publication and to send these records to the 
 judge advocate of the case being prosecuted against Rizal, to 
 be added to these proceedings."^^ 
 
 On the morning of December 30, 1896, outside of the old 
 city walls near the pleasure field known as the Luneta, in the 
 presence of a gay and laughing crowd of Spanish officials and 
 friars, Rizal was shot." The night before his execution, he 
 signed the following statement : 
 
 12 See Le Roy, I, p. Ill, note. Craig, Jose Rizal, p. 235. Sastron, pp. 
 179-183. For Rizal's teachings see his novels, Nole me Jangere (An Eagle's 
 Flight, New York, 1900) and El Filibusterismo (The Reign of Greed, Ma- 
 nila, 1912). 
 
 ""Turning away, sick at heart, from the contemplation of this bitter 
 tragedy, it is with a thrill of almost vindictive satisfaction that one remem- 
 bers that less than eighteen months later the Luneta echoed to the sound of a 
 mightier fusillade — the roar of the great guns with which the battle of 
 Manila Bay was fought and won. . . . And if in the moment of his last
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 197 
 
 "I declare myself Catholic, and in this religion in which I was 
 born and reared, I wish to live and die. I retract with all my 
 heart whatsoever there has been in my words, writings, publica- 
 tions, and conduct contrary to my quality as a son of the Catholic 
 Church. I believe and profess what it teaches, and submit to 
 what it commands. I abominate Masonry, as hostile to the 
 church and a society prohibited by the church. The diocesan 
 prelate, as the' superior ecclesiastical authority, may make public 
 this voluntary statement of mine, to repair the scandal my deeds 
 have caused and that God and man may pardon me." 
 
 It has been claimed that this retraction was obtained through 
 undue influence asserted by the Jesuit Fathers who surrounded 
 him during the night which preceded his death and that it did 
 not represent Rizal's true convictions. As Le Roy truly says: 
 "The document is really a revelation of how strong a hold the 
 teachings and influence of childhood, more than ever in a land 
 like the Philippines, have even upon a man with the mentality 
 and the experience in life of Rizal, rather than a reliable indi- 
 cation that Rizal repented the general tendency of his writings as 
 a whole. Unquestionably, too, as he grew older he felt that he 
 had been unduly rabid in his youth, and became stronger in his 
 belief that evolution, not revolution, was the proper pathway 
 for his people."^* 
 
 The fact is that Rizal did not and never had favored a resort 
 to arms. He realized that his people were not prepared to govern 
 themselves. He was convicted for opinions and not for acts, 
 for what he was thought to believe, not for what he had done 
 or urged others to do. His trial was regular and yet it was 
 grossly unfair. The defense by his counsel was formal and per- 
 functory. His death had been determined upon before he was 
 arrested in Barcelona. All that remained to be done was to make 
 
 supreme agony the power to probe the future had been vouchsafed Jose 
 Rizal, would he not have died happy in the knowledge that the land he loved 
 so dearly was very soon to be transferred into such safekeeping?" Sir Hugh 
 CliflFord, in Blackwood's Magazine for November, 1902. 
 
 i*Le Roy, I, p. 113, note. For the letter sent by Rizal to Archbishop 
 Nozalada, in connection with the retraction, see the Defensa Obligada^ 
 Appendix 12.
 
 198 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 a record which would reflect most upon Rizal and least upon 
 Spain. His execution, after a formal retraction which was con- 
 sidered such a triumph for the authorities, made reconciliation 
 with Spain thereafter impossible, and associated Rizal's name 
 with the sentiment of nationality which was just beginning to 
 develop in the hearts of his countrymen. On the spot where 
 Rizal died there has recently been erected a beautiful monument, 
 the work of a famous Spanish sculptor. To every Filipino he 
 is the national hero. 
 
 The savage and indomitable spirit manifested in the execution 
 of Rizal for a time produced its effect upon the community. The 
 people not already in arms were stunned and intimidated. Dur- 
 ing the campaign carried on by General Blanco the insurgents 
 seem to have generally held their own. In February, 1897, 
 General Polavieja took the field personally against the rebels 
 in Cavite Province. Aguinaldo, who was now the recognized 
 military leader, had about five thousand men and probably one- 
 half as many firearms. There was some desperate fighting, but 
 the rebels were gradually Avorn away and scattered over the 
 country. Within four months the Spanish losses were twenty 
 officers and three hundred soldiers killed and eighty officers and 
 one thousand two hundred soldiers wounded. After the fall of 
 Imus the insurrection seemed broken, and Polavieja offered an 
 amnesty of which many took advantage. In April the governor- 
 general returned to Spain, and during ten days General La- 
 chambre acted as governor-general." 
 
 On April twenty-fifth the new governor-general, Primo de 
 Rivera, arrived at Manila and was received with stately cere- 
 monies. Although appointed by a conservative ministry, Primo 
 de Rivera was himself a Liberal who recognized the necessity for 
 reforms in the Philippines. The spirit in which he entered upon 
 his administration appeared in a cable sent to Madrid a few 
 months after his arrival in the islands. "There must," he wrote, 
 *T)e much thought given to the political and economic reforms, 
 
 15 Lachambre was an efficient soldier. For an account of his work, see 
 F. de Monteverde y Sedeno, La Division Lachambre (Madrid, 1896).
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 199 
 
 which should tend to assure the well-being of the native, or to 
 guarantee him against abuses and clerical exactions, but at the 
 same time to separate him from modern currents and principles 
 which, if they are the essential life of European societies, are 
 the virus that is inoculated in colonies for the growth of ideas of 
 separatism and ambition which revolutions originate."" 
 
 As the result of the campaign conducted by Primo de Rivera, 
 Aguinaldo, who now called himself President and Dictator of a 
 Revolutionary Government, w^as driven into the mountains of 
 Bulican, where he proposed to make a final stand at a place called 
 Biak-na-bato.^' The war was practically at an end, but it was 
 within the power of the insurgents to prolong it almost indef- 
 initely by adopting the guerrilla tactics for which the country is 
 so well adapted. The government was also in difficulties. It 
 was in great need of more troops, but as Primo de Rivera had 
 constantly minimized the revolution in his reports he could 
 not consistently ask that more men be sent from the Peninsula. 
 More native soldiers had, therefore, to be raised, and this 
 seems not to have been difficult, as the people were weary of 
 the burdens imposed by the war. In order to obtain funds, 
 bonds to the amount of forty million pesos were issued payable 
 in forty years, "with the special guarantee of the Philippine 
 customs and the general guarantee of the nation." 
 
 But the preparations for what was to have been the final 
 crushing campaign were suddenly suspended. One day early in 
 August there appeared at the Malicafian Palace, His Excellency, 
 Don Pedro Paterno, a distinguished citizen of Manila and Ma- 
 drid, wearer of the Grand Cross of Isabella the Catholic, suave, 
 resourceful, diplomatic, friend of the people, intimate of Gran- 
 dees, ready at a moment's notice to furnish a treaty, a drama, 
 an opera, a form of government or a system of philosophy, and, 
 like Godoy, ambitious to win the title of Prince of Peace." He 
 
 ^* Quoted by Le Roy (I, p. 120) from Primo de Rivera's Memoria, which 
 was published in Madrid in 1898. 
 
 ^7 For an account of the mihtary operations of the insurgents prepared by 
 Major John S. Mallory, see Rept. War Dcpt., 1903. Vol. III. 
 
 18 For an interesting account of Paterno, see Foreman, pp. 409-413.
 
 200 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 brought a proposition to save his native land by paying Aguinaldo 
 and his associates to leave it. On August the ninth, the governor- 
 general wrote to Sefior Canova, then president of the Cabinet, 
 that it was probable that a permanent peace could be secured if 
 the ministry would authorize him to use some of the funds to 
 purchase patriots instead of munitions of war. Thus opened 
 a chapter in the history of the Philippines which is full of sig- 
 nificance, illustrating, as it does, Spanish methods and Filipino 
 characteristics. 
 
 The agreement entered Into between Primo de Rivera and the 
 insurgent leaders at Biak-na-bato has been dignified by the name 
 of a treaty and used by Aguinaldo' s friends and enemies respec- 
 tively as demonstrating his lofty patriotism or his venality. The 
 mystery which for a time surrounded the transaction no longer 
 exists, as the preliminary negotiations In part and the final agree- 
 ment were reduced to writing, and filed in the Filipino govern- 
 ment archives from whence they passed Into the custody of the 
 American War Department. The only question about which 
 there can now be any doubt is whether there was an oral col- 
 lateral agreement with reference to future reforms. 
 
 Before Primo de Rivera's letter reached Madrid, Canova had 
 been murdered and In the resulting confusion the letter remained 
 unanswered. On August ninth, Pedro Patemo delivered to the 
 governor-general the first of a series of very Interesting docu- 
 ments. It recited that he was encouraged to suggest the plan 
 by the fact that on various occasions he had heard His Excel- 
 lency lament that he was forced by the existence of war "to hold 
 in suspense the longed for reforms solely because these very men 
 continued to bear arms," and that he was anxious "to establish 
 and unfold during his command a new series of reforms bound 
 to give satisfaction to the country." The governor-general's 
 response was such as to encourage Patemo to journey to Biak- 
 na-bato, from whence he returned with an elaborate proposal 
 duly signed by Aguinaldo and his associates, and a full power of 
 attorney from Aguinaldo to receive and disburse the money 
 which was to be paid. In this document Aguinaldo demanded
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 201 
 
 the payment of money and the granting of the reforms for 
 which the insurgents had gone to war. The original of the 
 paper is on file in the War Department and it effectually dis- 
 poses of the claim that the promise of reforms by Spain formed 
 a part of the agreement which was signed by the parties. As 
 drafted and carried to Manila by Patemo the instrument pro- 
 vided for: 
 
 1. "Expulsion of the religious orders, or at least regulations 
 forbidding them to live together in cloisters. 
 
 2. "Representation of the Filipinos in the Spanish Cortes. 
 
 3. "The application of true justice in the Philippines, . . . 
 equal for the Indians and the Spaniards. The same laws in 
 Spain and the Philippines. The Indians to have a share of the 
 higher offices of the civil administration. 
 
 4. "Changes in the laws governing property, taxation, and 
 the holding of the church benefices, in favor of the Indians. 
 
 5. "Proclamation of the individual rights of the Indians, as 
 for example, the liberty to combine in associations, and the lib- 
 erty of the press." 
 
 Through the first and second of these provisions and all refer- 
 ences to the Philippine Republic, and Aguinaldo's position as 
 president thereof, Patemo drew a line with his lead pencil.^" It 
 has been suggested that these all-important provisions were 
 stricken by Paterno as the representative of Primo de Rivera, 
 at Biak-na-bato, but manifestly this is wrong. It is much more 
 probable that it was done by Paterno at Manila in his capacity 
 as the representative of Aguinaldo, because Primo de Rivera 
 refused absolutely to consider any such demands. In his Me- 
 moria the latter says, and the records corroborate the assertion, 
 that Spain would consider nothing "which might affect her honor 
 or her sovereignty, or involve compromises for the future, and 
 he informed Paterno that he could only employ his good offices 
 to bring about such reforms as he thought were necessary and 
 
 " Cong. Rec, May 29, 1902, XXXV, Part 6, p. 6093. In the documents 
 as printed in the Record the parts which were crossed out in the original, 
 that is, numbers 1 and 2, are enclosed in brackets. The other five, which deal 
 in generalities, were evidently ignored.
 
 202 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 that they would have to trtist to the magnanimity of the govern^ 
 ment." 
 
 After another consultation with the insurgent leaders Patemo 
 returned and according to Primo de Rivera reported that the 
 demands contained in the previous paper represented merely 
 "an aspiration which the rebels wished the government to take 
 into account; that they understood that the country was not 
 sufficiently prepared for the transformation they desired."^** 
 
 On October seventh, the governor-general cabled the terms of 
 the agreement to Madrid, laying particular stress on the fact that 
 the arrangement would destroy the prestige of the chiefs who 
 had sold out and left the country. If the plan was not approved 
 he was ready to proceed with the final campaign. It would be 
 useless, he wrote, to offer reforms at that time, as the insurgents 
 were "fighting for independence; after conquering them in one 
 way or another, there may be conceded or imposed, the reforms 
 that are suitable." In reply to a request for further details with 
 reference to the terms of payment and the opinions of other offi- 
 cials, the minister was informed that the archbishop, the au- 
 ditor-general, and the civil governor of Manila had been con- 
 sulted and approved the plan. He was thereupon instructed to 
 close the deal. 
 
 Paterno originally estimated that $500,000.00^^ would be suffi- 
 cient to purchase the peace, but when he returned from Biak-na- 
 bato, he carried a demand for $3,000,000.00 and the reforms. 
 Primo de Rivera's offer of $1,700,000.00 for the arms and the 
 absence of the leaders, after striking out the reforms, was ac- 
 cepted. Patemo wrote $800,000 in the paper stating orally that 
 the balance of $900,000 should be paid to him "on the side" to 
 be used to indemnify the people who had suffered by the war. 
 After some delay, due to the solicitude of some of Aguinaldo's 
 subordinates, over the matter of the disposition of the money, 
 the governor-general's nephew, Lieutenant-Colonel Primo de 
 
 '0 Primo de Rivera, Memoria, p. 131. Quoted by Le Roy, I, p. 129. 
 21 Mexican. The value of the dollar fluctuated, but it was worth generally 
 about fifty cents in gold.
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 203 
 
 Rivera, went with Paterno to Biak-na-bato to secure the signature 
 of Aguinaldo, which, with the approval of "the Assembly" and 
 the "Supreme Council" was duly affixed. A careful program 
 for carrying out the terms of the agreement was worked out and 
 signed, but the agreement itself, although reduced to writing, 
 appears not to have been signed by the parties. It provided that : 
 
 "Don Emilia Aguinaldo, in his quality as supreme leader of 
 these in the Island of Luzon, now waging open hostilities against 
 their legitimate government, and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo and 
 Don Mariane Llanera, who also exercise important command in 
 the forces mentioned, are to cease their hostile attitude, surrender 
 the arms that they are using against the Fatherland, and are to 
 surrender to the legitimate authorities, claiming their rights as 
 Spanish Filipino citizens which they desire to preserve. And as 
 a consequence of this surrender, they obligate themselves to 
 cause the surrender of such individuals as actually follow them 
 and those who recognize them as leaders and obey their orders."^* 
 
 It was also provided that the arms were to be surrendered 
 in accordance with an inventory to be taken at a time and place 
 to be decided upon. Individuals who surrendered were to re- 
 ceive passes, and all were to be pardoned for their part in the 
 insurrection. Deserters from the Spanish army were not to be 
 punished, but would be required to serve the balance of their 
 terms of enlistment. Spaniards and Americans and foreigners 
 were to receive a pardon, but be expelled from the Philippines. 
 All who did not surrender within the time stated should be treated 
 as outlaws. Section four provided that : 
 
 "The Excellent Sefior General Chief will provide the neces- 
 sary means for supporting the lives of those who surrender 
 themselves before the date given in the second paragraph in view; 
 of the painful situation to which the war has reduced them, but 
 he will negotiate only with Don Emilia Aguinaldo, through His 
 Excellency Sefior Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno." 
 
 The document closed with a provision that if any of the para- 
 
 " Cong. Rec, XXXV, Part 6, p. 6092.
 
 204 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 graphs were violated the whole should be null and void, and 
 Patemo's statement that those whom he represented 
 
 "confidently expect that on account of the foresight of the gov- 
 ernment of His Majesty, that it will take into consideration and 
 satisfy the desires of the Filipino people in order to assure them 
 the peace and well being which they desire." 
 
 Delay in surrendering the expected number of guns rendered 
 the Spaniards uneasy, and on December fourteenth another docu- 
 ment was signed which provided in detail for the manner of pay- 
 ing the money. On December 27, 1897, Aguinaldo and twenty- 
 seven of his followers sailed on a Spanish ship from Sual near 
 Dagupan, and on December thirty-first arrived at Hong Kong. 
 The Spaniards and Filipinos parted with many assurances of un- 
 dying affection and loyalty. From Biak-na-bato, Aguinaldo is- 
 sued a proclamation addressed to the "Manilos" in which he said : 
 *'I leave, because, behind the back of the personal immunity con- 
 ceded to me by the laws, pledges and nobility of Spain, the ex- 
 alted passion of hatred or some other outburst of oppressive 
 policy may raise its suicidal hand and make victims, causing once 
 more disturbances and interruptions in the life and progress of 
 our land. Long live Spain ! Long live the Philippines !'* 
 
 Before sailing all the leaders signed a telegram addressed to 
 the governor-general, which read : 
 
 "We all trust to Spain to grant reforms without blood or war- 
 fare, following the path of right and justice. . . . To the 
 paternal policy of Your Excellency these who to-day loyally 
 offer themselves to Spain, entrust the true humanization of liber- 
 ties and rights. May God bless and make lasting this peace, for 
 the glorious future of our loved home, the Philippines, and for 
 the prosperity and greatness of the Spanish Fatherland."^^ 
 
 The first payment of $400,000 was made in Hong Kong on 
 January 2, 1898, and was deposited in a bank to the credit of 
 "Aguinaldo & Co." 
 
 23 This document and others from which I have quoted are printed by 
 Le Roy, I, p. 13S, note 3.
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 205 
 
 But the insurgents who were left behind were dissatisfied. 
 Within a few days after the departure of Aguinaldo a meeting 
 was held at Biak-na-bato which was presided over by Isabella 
 Artacho, Aguinaldo's former Secretary of the Interior, which 
 passed resolutions demanding that the next payment of $200,000, 
 instead of being sent to Hong Kong, should be paid to them to 
 be distributed among the people who were in dire need.^* This 
 demand was complied with. Primo de Rivera says that the 
 balance was by him turned over to his successor. General Au- 
 gustin. It was never accounted for. Nor is it known what be- 
 came of the $900,000 which was to be distributed among the 
 deserving of the rank and file. The leaders are still charging 
 one another with the misappropriation of this money. Artacho 
 went to Hong Kong and brought suit in the British courts 
 against Aguinaldo for an accounting and distribution of the 
 fund, but the action was settled out of court to the satisfaction 
 presumably of all parties.^'' 
 
 2* For Aguinaldo's account, see the Resena veridica, in Cong. Rec, XXXV, 
 Appendix, pp. 440-445. Agoncilo's account given to General Greene is printed 
 in Sen. Doc. 62, 55 Cong. 3d Sess., Part 1, p. 430. 
 
 25 "Artacho, who had received 5,000 pesos as his share of the second pay- 
 ment, arrived in Hong Kong and on April 5 demanded 200,000 pesos of the 
 insurgent^ funds, probably under the agreement that he should establish a 
 company in Hong Kong for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely 
 of those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders in Hong Kong 
 had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He then entered suit 
 before the supreme court of Hong Kong, calling upon Aguinaldo for an 
 accounting of the trust funds deposited in his hands for the benefit of Artacho 
 and others, and asked for an injunction restraining Aguinaldo or any mem- 
 ber of the junta from handling or disposing of any part of said funds. He 
 filed as evidence copies of the Biak-na-bato agreement and of the agreement 
 made by the leaders on December 19. This suit was brought not merely in the 
 name of Artacho, but in that of all the exiles who were described as living 
 in exile in Hong Kong in accordance with an agreement made with the 
 Spanish government. Artacho probably had adherents among these men, 
 some at least of whom were utterly weary of waiting in Hong Kong and of 
 living upon what was doled out to them. Some at least saw no chance of 
 any other fate than indefinite exile spent in dependence upon the inner group 
 for even the means of existence. The suit was in equity, and called for an 
 accounting for the trust funds which the complainant recognized were legally 
 in the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only with great difficulty 
 without his presence and without his account books. Meetings were held, 
 and Artacho was denounced as attempting to extort blackmail, but he refused 
 to yield, and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of the Hong 
 Kong junta before a British court, prepared for flight. A summons was 
 issued for his appearance before the supreme court of Hong Kong on April 
 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond its jurisdiction. He drew out the
 
 206 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 A study of the evidence relating to this remarkable transac- 
 tion leads to the conclusions that the Filipinos were forced by 
 circumstances to accept what the Spanish government was will- 
 ing to give them and that the government was never willing to 
 complicate the settlement with any definite promises relating to 
 reforms. The expressions of hope and confidence of the depart- 
 ing insurgents were left unanswered, and subsequently were 
 ignored. The war had gone against the Filipinos. Their cause 
 was lost and the vengence of the government stared them in the 
 face. Probably not one of the leaders at that time would have 
 declined a pardon and free transportation to Hong Kong. Pa- 
 temo's suggestion presented the possibility of better terms, and 
 a demand for the reforms was included in their proposition. 
 Primo de Rivera was willing to pay the money for a peace. 
 With the leaders discredited and out of the country and tlie 
 people unarmed, peace might well be lasting, but he had no in- 
 tention of stipulating for any reforms. He saw no necessity for 
 doing so, and the insurgents were not in a position to enforce 
 any demands. Aguinaldo and his representative did all the 
 proposing, conceding, writing and signing. As has been said, 
 Primo de Rivera signed nothing but the checks. All references 
 to the reforms for which the insurgents had gone to war, except 
 the hope for the future which Paterno expressed, were stricken 
 from the documents. Notwithstanding this, Aguinaldo subse- 
 quently claimed that the granting of the reforms was the prin- 
 cipal consideration for the surrender and departure. But his 
 claim finds no corroboration in the records or in the circum- 
 stances. When an instrument is signed after a clause therein 
 has been stricken out it is ordinarily conclusive evidence that the 
 
 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank, which had become due according to 
 the terms of the deposit, and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn 
 upon by check, engaged passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. 
 del Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed V. Belar- 
 mino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks signed in blank to draw 
 the interest of the sums on deposit to provide for the support of the exiles. 
 He gave as his reason for departure that he was going to remain under cover 
 until Artacho could be bought oif, but he intended to go far afield for this 
 purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and the United States." Taylor, 
 Phil. Insurg, Recs,
 
 THE AWAKENING AND REVOLT 207 
 
 parties do not intend the stricken clause to be a part of the bind- 
 ing agreement. 
 
 It thus appears that the Spanish government did not promise 
 definite reforms or intend that its freedom of action should be 
 restricted by any inference which the insurgent leaders might 
 draw from the terms of their surrender. The clause inserted by 
 Patemo in the agreement and the hopes expressed in the tele- 
 grams of the departing leaders met with no response. With 
 Aguinaldo and his lieutenants discredited and in exile the gov- 
 ernment intended to exercise its own discretion as outlined by 
 Primo de Rivera in his telegram to the Ministry. 
 
 Aguinaldo felt that his followers would benefit by the trans- 
 action. His demand for reforms had been denied and stricken 
 from the written agreement. A pardon and ample means "to 
 support their lives" abroad and the distribution of a large sum 
 of money among his followers, thus relieving their Immediate 
 necessities, were something substantial saved from the wreck of 
 the insurrection. 
 
 The fact that after the arrival at Hong Kong Aguinaldo care- 
 fully conserved the money which had been paid to him as a trust 
 fund shows conclusively that he was not actuated by selfish pe- 
 cuniary motives. Undoubtedly he intended to organize a new 
 revolt when conditions became favorable and the money was in 
 fact used for that purpose.^* 
 
 26 There was a plan to form a commercial company with the fund as work- 
 ing capital and under this cover distribute the money to the stockholders. 
 Evidently Aguinaldo had other ideas.
 
 PART III 
 The Spanish Colonial System 
 
 "Bending every energy for years to stay the tide of change 
 and progress, suppressing freedom of thought with relentless 
 vigor, and quarantining herself and her dependencies against 
 new ideas, conservatism grew to he her settled habit and the 
 organs of government became ossified. Policies of commercial 
 restriction which were justifiable or at least rationally explicable 
 in the sixteenth century, lasted on, proof against innovation or 
 improvement, until the eighteenth century and later. Conse- 
 quently from the middle of the seventeenth century at the period 
 of the rapid rise of the colonial powers of France, Holland and 
 England, the Spanish colonies find themselves under a commer- 
 cial regime which increasingly hampers their prosperity and ef- 
 fectually blocks their advancement." Edward G. Bourne.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 The Governmental Organization 
 
 Literary Theories of Government — Theory and Practise — The Minister of 
 Ultramar and the Consejo de Filipinos — The Chief Executive — The Board of 
 Authorities and the Council of Administration — The Audiencia — The Resi- 
 dencia — The Ecclesiastical System — The Monastic Orders — Powers of the 
 Friars — Conflicting Opinions of Their Work — The Inquisition — The Provin- 
 cial Governments — Provinces and Pi«^&/oi— Organization of Municipalities 
 under Maura Law. 
 
 The real Spanish government in the Philippines, the one 
 that the people knew in their daily lives, was very different 
 from the one we find described in the codes, royal decrees and 
 other formal documents. It is a very good illustration of the 
 difference which so often exists between the literary theory of 
 a government and the reality. As worked out in the laws it 
 was a himiane and liberal system designed solely for the protec- 
 tion and conversion of the native people. In fact, it was illiberal, 
 restrictive and often oppressive. 
 
 In the sixteenth century the Spanish monarchy was a con- 
 geries of more or less independent countries united through a 
 common sovereign, but each regulating its affairs by local laws 
 and customs. Dependencies, such as Mexico, were practically in- 
 dependent monarchies governed by the king through his viceroys. 
 
 The Philippine government was subordinate to the viceroyalty 
 of Mexico, but, like every other department, was responsible 
 directly to the king. As it existed when the end came the royal 
 control was exercised through the Minister of Ultramar, to 
 whom was entrusted the superior administrative supervision of 
 the colonies. He was assisted by the Consejo de Filipinos, which 
 was composed of persons selected because of their special knowl- 
 edge of the country. One member of the Council represented 
 
 211
 
 212 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 war, two marine, one the regular clerical body in the Philippines, 
 one the monastic orders, two the Philippine branch of the treas- 
 ury, two the Home Office, one the Department of Grace and 
 Justice, and two the Department of Administration and Public 
 Works. 
 
 This Council was consulted by the minister at his pleasure 
 on matters relating to the islands. It prepared the statutes and 
 decrees or projects for reforms at the direction of the minister 
 or on its own initiative for his consideration. 
 
 At the head of the government in the islands was placed a 
 governor-general with the additional local military rank of cap- 
 tain-general, who was the representative of the king's power 
 and governed in his name under instructions which were often 
 very detailed and specific. His powers varied at different times. 
 During the late period he was appointed by the king with the 
 approval of the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of 
 the Minister of Ultramar, under whose immediate control he 
 exercised his functions. He was regarded as the representative 
 of each of the home ministries of State, War and Marine in 
 matters pertaining to those departments. The powers and 
 duties of the governor- and captain-general may be summarized 
 as follows: 
 
 As the representative of the central power, it was his duty to 
 publish, execute and enforce the laws, decrees, orders and com- 
 mands of general character issuing from any of the ministries 
 to which he was subject, and to secure the fulfilment of all in- 
 ternational obligations pertaining to the islands; to watch over 
 and inspect all the branches of the public service of the state in 
 the islands, and to give an account to the ministries which he 
 represented of any or all matters affecting them; to exercise, in 
 certain specified cases, the prerogative of pardon; to suspend the 
 resolutions, or the enforcement of orders of the general govern- 
 ment whenever the public interest in the islands required such 
 action, and to suspend the execution of any act or resolution of 
 inferior authorities whenever deemed necessary. 
 
 As chief of the administration it was his duty to maintain the
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 213 
 
 integrity of the administrative regime in accordance with law; 
 to publish orders and commands for the fulfilment of the laws 
 and regulations, and for the administration and government of 
 the islands, giving an account of his action to the Minister of 
 Ultramar; to propose to the home government whatever in his 
 opinion might promote the moral and material interests of the 
 people under the government ; to suspend associations or corpora- 
 tions which were found in delicto; to authorize the imposition 
 of fines by the governors of provinces upon public officers or 
 corporations; and to suspend for cause the public servants of 
 the administration appointed by the home government, giving 
 immediate notice thereof, and filling the vacancies meanwhile 
 in the manner provided by law. 
 
 As head of the military and naval forces in the Archipelago, 
 he had the powers and functions accorded to the captains-general 
 of the various districts of the Peninsula, with the additional 
 power of disposing of troops and assigning superior officers to 
 commands, and the multifarious powers and functions which 
 belong to a general in command of an army corps/ 
 
 There were two councils, one called the Board of Authorities 
 and the other the Council of Administration. The former, which 
 was merely a cabinet, was composed of the governor-general as 
 president; the archbishop of Manila; the lieutenant-general sec- 
 ond in command; the commander of the navy; the chief officer, 
 intendent, of the treasury; the director-general of the civil ad- 
 ministration; the president of the audiencia, and the fiscal or 
 attorney-general of the islands. 
 
 Its functions were purely advisory ; its advice was not binding 
 upon the governor-general; nor did his acceptance of its advice 
 in any way relieve him of personal responsibility. 
 
 The Council of Administration was a consultative body of 
 large representation. It was composed of some twelve members 
 ex officio: the governor-general as president; the archbishop of 
 Manila; the commander of the navy; the lieutenant-general, 
 
 1 Vide Report of Schurman Commission, I, p. 72. The governor-general 
 received a salary of $40,000, Mexican, per annum.
 
 214 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 second in command of the army; the president of the audiencia; 
 the intendent of the treasury department; the director-general 
 of the administration; the superiors of the religious orders; the 
 president of the Chamber of Commerce of Manila; the president 
 of the Society of Friends of the Country and in addition six 
 appointed members, three from the provinces of Luzon and 
 three from the Visayan provinces. The delegated members were 
 designated by their respective local provincial boards, or juntas. 
 To these were added three members appointed by the king. 
 
 This council considered the general budget of receipts and 
 expenses in all the branches of the service; the budget of re- 
 ceipts and expenditures of local funds; reforms or changes in 
 the regulations or instructions which the governor-general de- 
 sired to propose to the home government ; royal patronage, and 
 all other matters which the governor-general might deem it 
 proper to submit for its consideration. 
 
 The supervision of matters relating to the interior, such as 
 education, sanitation, public works, mines, meteorology, agri- 
 culture, industry, commerce and communications, was in a Gen- 
 eral Directorate of Civil Administration, composed of a direc- 
 tor-general and various heads of bureaus. 
 
 Prior to 1865 the finances were under the immediate control 
 of the chief executive, but in that year an attempt was made to 
 separate the financial from the executive functions. The ad- 
 ministrative work of the treasury was in charge of an official 
 known as the intendent-general, but the last word in matters 
 financial as well as executive remained with the governor-general. 
 
 There were numerous subordinate officials, who collected and 
 disbursed public funds and audited the accounts. The duties 
 were collected through a customs house at Manila. A tariff 
 board interpreted the regulations and schedules and made an 
 annual report on general conditions including the merchant ma- 
 rine. An auxiliary commission of appraisers, which included 
 merchants and traders In its membership, prepared and published 
 tabulated statements showing the average prices of imported and 
 exported goods.
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 215 
 
 The manner in which the ecclesiastical was connected with 
 the civil power tended to restrict the authority of the governors- 
 general by creating a jealous coordinating authority eager to 
 maintain its rights and privileges and willing to absorb those of 
 the civil authorities. The audiencia had the legal right to share 
 the executive and legislative power with the governor-general, 
 and at times, when the chief executive was not a strong man it 
 was the master. Le Gentil regarded it as the only safeguard 
 against the arbitrary disposition of the governors. But Zuniga, 
 writing a generation later, pronounced it ineffective. "The 
 royal audiencia," says he, "was established to restrain the dis- 
 position of the governors which it has never prevented; for the 
 gentlemen of the gown are always weak-kneed, and the governor 
 can send them under guard to Spain, pack them off to the prov- 
 inces to take a census of the natives, or imprison them, which 
 has been done several times."^ Until after the murder of Buste- 
 mente, the audiencia was authorized to assume control of the 
 government upon the death of the governor-general. Thereafter 
 until after the British occupation, the archbishop succeeded 
 the governor-general during an ad interim vacancy. But the 
 weakness displayed by Archbishop Rojo led the king to doubt 
 the qualifications of archbishops for the position of governor- 
 general, and the office of lieutenant-governor was created. Sub- 
 sequently it was so arranged that in the absence of the governor 
 and captain-general, the commander of the army, and in his 
 absence, the admiral of the navy should assume the duties of 
 chief executive. During his term of office a governor-general 
 could not be criticized with impunity. He was given free rein 
 as far as the public and individuals were concerned. But there 
 was for him a very serious hereafter. 
 
 The position was never a bed of roses. The vexatious con- 
 troversies with the ecclesiastics, the disposition of the officials 
 to abuse their powers and misappropriate funds, the remoteness 
 from Spain, and the general inconveniences and hardships of 
 the life rendered it attractive only to the few who were filled 
 
 * Estadismo, I, p. 244, quoted, B. & R., I, p. 50, note.
 
 216 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 with high enthusiasm for the extension of the power of the 
 king and the realm of the true faith, and to the many who de- 
 sired to amass fortunes regardless of methods. One of the early 
 officials paints the portrait of the ideal governor, such as he did 
 not find in the islands, in terms which are not yet without in- 
 terest. "The Governor must,*' he wrote,® "understand war, but 
 he must not be over-confident of his abilities. Let him give ear 
 to the advice of those who know the country where things are 
 managed very differently from what they are in Europe. Those 
 who have tried to carry on war in the islands as it is carried on 
 in Flanders and elsewhere in Europe have fallen into irreparable 
 mistakes. The main thing, however, is to aim at the welfare of 
 the people, to treat them kindly, to he friendly towards foreigners, 
 to take pains to have the ships for New Spain sail promptly and 
 in good order, to promote trade with the neighboring people, and 
 to encourage ship-building. In a word, to live with the Indians 
 rather like a father than like a governor. 
 
 The Spaniards devised an institution known as the residencia, 
 under which the governors and other officials were required to 
 remain in the country of their service for a certain length of 
 time after ceasing to hold office, during which time an investiga- 
 tion was made into their conduct during their entire term of 
 
 8 See B. & R., I, p. 53. 
 
 In an interesting volume entitled Many Memories, Col. Rivett-Carnac says 
 that for an ideal governor-general of India, "a very clever man is not what is 
 wanted. Such a one will probably be full of fads and will rub every one 
 the wrong way. ... If you employ a clever man, the effect will be some- 
 what the same, as I have seen it described, of using a sharp pen-knife in cut- 
 ting the leaves of your book. The very sharp blade will run off the line and 
 commence to cut out curves on its own account, irrespective of direction. 
 What is wanted for the purpose is in the nature of a good, solid, sound paper 
 knife .which, working steadily through the folds of the pages, will do its work 
 honestly and neatly." 
 
 The Norman Baron's advice to his son as to the way to govern his Saxons, 
 done into English by Kipling, may well be remembered — 
 
 "Appear with your wife and the children 
 
 At their weddings and funerals and feasts; 
 
 Be polite, but not friendly to bishops ; 
 
 Be good to all poor parish priests; 
 
 Say 'we*, 'us* and 'our' when you're talking, 
 
 Instead of 'you fellows*, and 'I*. 
 
 Don't ride over seeds ; keep your temper, 
 
 And never you tell 'em a lie."
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 217 
 
 office.* Any one from his successor to the poorest native was 
 then at liberty to file charges against him. And a plentiful crop 
 of charges was certain. 
 
 In the Philippines the residencia for the governor-general 
 lasted for six months, and was conducted by his successor in 
 office. Such an institution must have constituted a very effective 
 restraint, but it was capable of infinite abuse. When, as some- 
 times happened, the governor's successor was his personal enemy, 
 the temptation to blacken the preceding administration generally 
 proved irresistible. In some instances, the governors were sub- 
 jected to very severe penalties for misconduct during their terms 
 of office. Governor Corcuera was brought to trial and com- 
 pelled to pay a heavy fine, and after having been imprisoned for 
 five years, was released by royal order and returned to Spain. 
 The investigation into the affairs of Governor Gargas was so 
 extensive that the preparation of the report required four years. 
 A statement of charges, some grave and others frivolous, filled 
 twenty volumes. Acting-Governor Jose Talba was charged with 
 embezzlement of great sums of money. After an elaborate in- 
 vestigation he was sentenced to pay a fine of approximately 
 $1,000,000 and the cost of the trial, to deprivation of public 
 office and banishment from the Philippines and Madrid. Other 
 governors were charged with embezzlement of public funds and 
 various other forms of official malfeasance, and unless these 
 officials were victims of false charges or malicious persecution, 
 as many of them possibly were, the institution of the residencia 
 seems to have justified its existence. Verily, the consciousness 
 that an inquiry into his conduct would be conducted by his suc- 
 cessor, who might be a personal enemy, may well have been a 
 terrible trial, the strain of which, as one writer says, "would 
 sometimes break their hearts." Many a governor quarreling 
 with the Church and facing the ordeal of the residencia^ must 
 have felt with the Knight of La Manche that it were better "to 
 
 * See Morga's Sucesos, B. & R., XVI, p. 166. 
 
 ' It would be interesting to see the residencia applied to the adminstra« 
 tions of certain modern governors-general.
 
 218 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 be Sancho Panza and go to heaven than be governor and go 
 to hell." 
 
 De Pons, after describing the residencia, says, "I request the 
 reader not to infer from my opinion of the tribunals of residencia, 
 my confidence in their efficacy. My homage is immediately and 
 solely addressed to the wisdom of the law. I resign all criticism 
 on its operation to those who know the seductive influence of 
 Plutus over the feeble and pliant Themis."® 
 
 As the propulsive power back of the colonizing movement 
 came from the ecclesiastical authorities, it was but natural that 
 the influence of the Church in the colonies should be great and 
 often controlling. The early Spanish kings recognized the right 
 of the Pope to dispose of territory not already occupied by 
 Christians. As the expenses connected with the discovery of 
 the Indians were borne by the king, the Pope by a Bull of Sep- 
 tember 3, 1501, granted to him the right to collect tithes, on 
 condition that he would endow and maintain the churches to be 
 established in the colonies. These churches and the clergy were 
 thereafter supported by appropriations made by the king, who 
 possessed, in virtue of this arrangement, certain powers or- 
 dinarily exercised by church officials. 
 
 The ecclesiastical system in the Philippines was well organ- 
 ized."^ "Here," says Bourne, "we find the real vital organization 
 of the Philippines governing system." The archbishop of Manila 
 was the head of the organization and under him as suffragans 
 were the bishops of Cebu, Segovia and Caceras. The Domini- 
 can, Augustinian, Franciscan and Jesuit orders were under the 
 direct and independent control of their own provincials. Each 
 maintained a representative in Madrid, through whom it could 
 always reached the ear of the king without the intervention of 
 the civil authorities at Manila. 
 
 The persistent claim of the members of the monastic orders 
 to exemption from the supervision and control of the bishops 
 
 6 Voyage to the Eastern Parts of Terra Firma, etc., II, p. 25 (1806) ; B. & 
 R., I, p. 52, note. 
 
 7 For an account of the ecclesiastical machinery, see the translation from 
 Buzeta y Bravo, Diccionario de las Filipinas (Madrid, 1850), in B. & R., 
 XXVIII, p. 266, et seq.
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 219 
 
 led to many violent controversies in which the civil authorities 
 also were generally involved. The friars, or regulars, always 
 greatly outnumbered the secular clergy, but the statistics convey 
 a very inadequate idea of their relative power and importance.® 
 
 The vows of the friars required them to live in monasteries, 
 but the Pope was induced to absolve them from this particular 
 obligation and permit them to act as curates in the parishes, in 
 the same manner as the secular clergy. This arrangement, which 
 was intended to be but temporary, became permanent and laid 
 the foundation for the practical control of the country by the 
 representatives of the monastic orders. The question whether 
 the friars who were in charge of the parishes were subject to 
 visitation by the bishop was never actually settled. When the 
 pressure became too strong, a threat to withdraw from the 
 islands was always sufficient to win the victory, as the king 
 fully realized the necessity for the services of the friars in the 
 work of governing, civilizing and Christianizing the country. 
 
 When Archbishop Poblete attempted to enforce the Bull of 
 Pope Urban VIII and subject them to the orders of the bishops, 
 all the friars resigned their positions. Archbishop Camancho 
 was foiled in the same way.® Between 1744 and 1753 the Pope 
 issued four bulls in which the friars who acted as curates were 
 placed under the authority of the bishops and Ferdinand VI 
 strictly enjoined the observance of these bulls. But with the 
 usual threat of resignation the friars were able to defy the orders 
 
 8 In 1750 of 569 parishes with 904,116 souls, but 148 with 147,269 persons 
 were under secular priests. The rest were distributed among the various 
 orders as follows : 
 
 Augustinians ; 115 parishes 252.963 
 
 Franciscans 63 parishes 141,193 
 
 Jesuits 93 parishes 209,527 
 
 Dominicans 51 parishes 99,780 
 
 Recolletos 105 parishes 53,384 
 
 In 1898, according to the Church records in Manila, there were 746 regular 
 parishes, 116 mission parishes, 346 Augustinian friars, 107 Franciscans, 233 
 Dominicans, 327 Recolletos, 42 Jesuits, 16 Capuchins, and 6 Benedictans. On 
 January 4, 1904, there were 246 friars in the islands. Practically all soon 
 thereafter left, but many have returned. 
 
 " See Dr. Pardo de Tavera's "The Power of the Monastic Orders," in 
 Census of Philippine Islands (1905), I, p. 340, et seq.
 
 220 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 of both Pope and king. A generation later, when a similar 
 attempt was contemplated, the archbishop in despair wrote to 
 the king that "when the order for obliging the friars to submit 
 to their superiors is put into effect they will threaten to abandon 
 all of the parishes under their charge in these islands, and rather 
 than bring about that result it would be preferable to let the 
 present bad state of affairs continue. These caprices of theirs 
 are of long standing and will not easily be abandoned." 
 
 As late as 1865 the archbishop of Manila and the bishops of 
 Cebu and Neuva Caceras joined in a complaint to the governor 
 in which they denounced the abuses committed by the friar 
 curates which had been tolerated for three centuries. "The 
 friars who acted as curates," said the archbishop, "were almost 
 sure of immunity; they relied on their offices to shield them 
 from punishment, and made it obligatory for their ecclesiastical 
 superiors who desired to avoid scandal to submit to defeat, to 
 stomach the insults heaped upon them and to continue in the 
 ministry persons who were not up to the standards of their holy 
 mission." So great had the power of the four monastic orders 
 become that papal bulls and royal cedulas were of no avail 
 against the veto of their provincial heads. 
 
 Under such conditions it was inevitable that the government 
 should pass under the control of the friars. Both their good 
 and evil work tended to increase their power and influence. In 
 the distant villages the curates exercised a mild but very effective 
 despotism. In some provinces there were no white persons other 
 than the friars to assist the alcalde-mayor to perform his duties 
 as provincial governor. In more than one-half of the twelve 
 hundred villages in the islands "there were no Spaniards, no 
 other national authority, nor any other force to maintain public 
 order save only the friars." 
 
 They thus created for themselves a position independent of 
 the regular ecclesiastical authority as represented by the arch- 
 bishop, as well as the civil power, and that position they con- 
 tinued to strengthen and maintain until the debacle which ex- 
 tinguished Spanish sovereignty in the islands. With wealth and
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 221 
 
 political power came the arrogance which always goes with the 
 combination. They intimidated bishops, led a mob against one 
 governor-general, and threw another into the dungeon of the 
 Inquisition. In the beginning they were poor, but in the course 
 of time the orders acquired wealth by donations, and by purchase 
 and inheritances of lands. By 1601 they were possessed of 
 such territorial possessions as to alarm the king and lead to the 
 appointment of a commissioner to investigate and report on the 
 extent and description of their lands and the nature of the titles 
 by which they were held. The friars, claiming exemption from 
 such formalities, refused to give any information, and were 
 declared to be "occupants in bad faith," of certain lands of which 
 they were in possession. But in the end they triumphed. A 
 new archbishop arrived; to him the friars somewhat inconsist- 
 ently appealed for protection against the commissioner; and 
 under such pressure their titles were finally confirmed. 
 
 After the early days of poverty and enthusiasm had passed 
 each of the orders had its hacienda or plantation in the country, 
 valuable property in the city, and shares in the galleons which 
 passed between Manila and Acapulco. Each friar who acted 
 as a curate received rentals which sometimes amounted to 10,000 
 pesos per year in addition to support and certain concessions and 
 gratuities from the crown. So great did the influence of the 
 friars become that in the latter days of the Spanish regime the 
 curates had absorbed nearly all political as well as ecclesiastical 
 power. 
 
 That the parish priests had become veritable Pooh-Bahs ap- 
 pears from the testimony which the head of the Franciscan 
 order gave before the Schurman Commission in 1900. In addi- 
 tion to the duties connected with his sacred office, the curate was 
 inspector of the primary schools, president of the Boards of 
 Health, Statistics, Charities, and Urban Taxation; inspector of 
 taxation; honorary (formerly actual) president of the Board 
 of Public Works; examiner of pupils who attended the first and 
 second grades in the public schools; censor of native plays, com- 
 edies and dramas; president of the Prison Board; inspector of
 
 222 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 food provided for the prisoners; and member of the Provincial 
 Board and of the Board for Partitioning Crown lands. 
 
 He certified from his parish records to the correctness of 
 the cedulas, and to the certificates of character, which under 
 Spanish law every man had to have in his possession, to the civil 
 status of persons, and to the condition of persons drawn for 
 military service. He was required to be present at municipal 
 elections, act as a member of the municipal council, and to ex- 
 amine and censor the financial budgets before they were sent 
 to the provincial governors. In some instances he also acted 
 as provincial auditor. "Besides the above," we are told, "there 
 were other details which devolved on the priest."^" 
 
 "No pent up Utica contracts your powers. 
 But the whole boundless continent is yours." 
 
 Under such conditions the ordinary native naturally and very 
 properly held the men who possessed such powers responsible 
 for the abuses of the government and the local insurrections and 
 disturbances induced thereby hastened, if they did not actually 
 cause, the downfall of Spanish power. 
 
 In view of the conflicting testimony, it is perhaps impossible 
 at this time properly to apportion the merits and demerits of the 
 friars. Yet they were such an important part of the system of 
 government that neither its form, operations, nor efficiency can 
 be understood without taking the work of the friars into consid- 
 eration. 
 
 They have been bitterly censured and indiscriminately con- 
 demned. The modern Filipinos almost without exception at- 
 tribute to them the evils from which the country suffered. In 
 this there is doubtless much exaggeration; there is another side 
 to the shield. Travelers and residents in no way connected 
 with the orders have painted in roseate colors the early condi- 
 tions which were brought about by the friars. They doubtless 
 
 1° See testimony relating to the Religious Orders, taken during July and 
 August, 1890, Sen. Doc. igo, 36 Cong., 2nd Sess.
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 223 
 
 bear about the same relation to reality that one's view of a 
 Filipino village under the softening light of a tropical moon 
 does to that of a sanitary inspector who makes his rounds in the 
 daytime. Tomas de Comyn enthusiastically invites his readers 
 to "visit the Philippine Islands and with astonishment shall we 
 there behold extended ranges, studded with temples, and spa- 
 cious convents, the Divine worship celebrated with pomp and 
 splendor ; regularity in the streets, and even luxury in the houses 
 and dress; schools of the first rudiments in all the towns and the 
 inhabitants well versed in the art of writing. We shall see there 
 causeways raised, bridges of good architecture built, and, in 
 short, all the measures of good government and police in the 
 greatest part of the country carried into effect; yet the whole 
 is due to the exertions, apostolic labors, and pure patriotism of 
 the ministers of religion. Let us travel over the provinces and 
 we shall see towns of five, ten and twenty thousand Indians, 
 peacefully governed by one weak, old man, who, with his doors 
 open at all hours, sleeps quiet and secure in his dwelling, without 
 any other magic or any other guard than the love and respect 
 with which he has known how to inspire his flock."^^ 
 
 The German naturalist, Jagor, who was free from ecclesi- 
 astical influence, after speaking of the credit due to Spain for 
 improving the conditions of the islands, says : "The monks con- 
 tributed an essential part to this result. Coming from among 
 the common people, used to poverty and self-denial, their duties 
 led them into intimate relations with the natives, and they were 
 naturally fitted to adapt the foreign religion and morals to prac- 
 tical use. So, too, in later times, when they came to possess 
 rich livings, and their pious zeal in general relaxed as their 
 revenues increased, they still contributed most essentially to 
 bring about conditions both good and bad which we have de- 
 scribed, since without families of their own and without refined 
 culture, intimate association with the children of the soil was 
 a necessity to them. Even their haughty opposition to the 
 
 ^^ State of the Philippine Islands, pp. 216, 217; B. &. R., I, p. 59.
 
 224 fTHE PHILIPPINES 
 
 secular authorities was generally for the advantage of the na- 
 tives."" 
 
 Palgrave, writing in 1878, says that, "To clerical government, 
 paradoxical as the statement may sound in modern European 
 ears, the Philippine Islands owe, more than to anything else, 
 their internal prosperity and the Malay population its sufficiency 
 and happiness. This it is that again and again has stood a 
 barrier of mercy and justice between the weaker and stronger 
 race, the vanquished and the victor; this has been the steady 
 protector of the native inhabitants, this their faithful benefactor, 
 their sufficient leader and guide. With a cura for father and 
 the Capitan for his adjutant, a Philippine hamlet feels and 
 knows little of the vexations inseparable from direct and for- 
 eign official administration; and if under such rule 'progress,' 
 as we love to term it, be rare, disaffection and want are rarer 
 stiU."^' 
 
 There were imdoubtedly cruel and tyrannical members of 
 the monastic orders, such as are drawn by Rizal in his novels, 
 who were guilty of wrongs and crimes, but it is certain that as 
 a class they were generally, at least until about the middle of the 
 nineteenth century, the consistent advocates of humane treat- 
 ment for the natives and their defenders against the oppressive 
 measures of the civil and military authorities. They were im- 
 portant and probably the controlling factors in the work of 
 conquest and development of the country. In the early days, at 
 least, it was true that, as said by one of the viceroys, "in each 
 friar in the Philippines, the King had a captain-general and a 
 whole army."** 
 
 To quote again from Tomas de Comyn, who for eighteen 
 years resided in Manila as the agent of the Philippine Commer- 
 cial Company: "Of little avail would have been the valor and 
 constancy with which Legaspi and his worthy comrades overcame 
 
 12 Jagor, The Philippine Islands, p. 366 (London, 1875), B. & R., I, p. 74. 
 
 13 In Cornhill Magazine, 1878, p. 161. 
 
 1* Tomas de Com3m, State of the Philippine Islands (translated by Will- 
 iam Walton, 1821), p. 209.
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 225 
 
 the natives of the islands if the apostolic zeal of the mission- 
 aries had not seconded their exertions, and aided to consolidate 
 the enterprise. The latter were the real conquerors; they who, 
 without any other arms than their virtues, gained over the good 
 will of the islanders, caused the Spanish name to be beloved, 
 and gave the King, as it were, by miracle, two millions more of 
 submissive and Christian subjects." 
 
 Filipinos who are not blinded by prejudice recognize the good 
 while condemning the evil work of the friars. Doctor Pardo de 
 Tavera, writing after the friars had left the islands, says: "His- 
 tory makes the friars responsible for the errors committed by 
 the Spanish government in these Islands, but it would appear 
 that without the aid of the religious orders it would have been 
 impossible for Spain to have fulfilled, even to the extent she 
 has, her promises of civilizing the Filipinos, and of helping 
 them to advance along the lines marked out by the European 
 nations. It is impossible not to recognize the humanitarian im- 
 pulses, truly Christian and equitable, which guided the Kings 
 and the Spanish legislators in what they did for the Philippine 
 Islands. . . . The friars have been made to bear the brunt 
 of many shortcomings, but if the other officials of the Spanish 
 government had complied with their duties even to the extent 
 to which the friars complied with theirs, it is certain that his- 
 tory to-day would shift that burden of responsibility to other 
 shoulders. The friars undoubtedly were responsible for many 
 things, but they also should be credited with the attainment of 
 certain results in the civilization of the Filipino people, the 
 credit for which is now denied them."^"* With this judgment we 
 must agree. 
 
 Until the year 1598 the Bishopric of Manila was suffragan 
 to the Archbishopric of Mexico and was included in the district 
 of the Mexican Inquisition. But the energetic Bishop Salazar, 
 on his own authority, established an Inquisition and proceeded 
 to clear the Philippines of heresy.^' His activities soon attracted 
 
 *" Census of the Philippine Islands, I, p. 340. 
 
 ^' "The Holy office of the Inquisition residing in Mexico of Nueva Espana
 
 ?26 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the attention of the authorities in Mexico, and a commissioner 
 was sent out to vindicate their rights. Salazar refused to recog- 
 nize the commissioner and threatened all who did so with ex- 
 communication. As the commissioner was a member of the 
 Augustinian order the bishop found adherents among the Jesuits 
 and for a time remained in control of the situation. 
 
 Finally the tribunal annulled all the acts of the bishop, and 
 the king wrote that he had exceeded his jurisdiction and in the 
 future should not interfere with the work of the commissioner. 
 Subsequent attempts to organize an independent tribunal in the 
 islands were unsuccessful. The power of the commissioner 
 was carefully limited and defined.^'^ He could do little more 
 than collect Information, receive charges, search ships for pro- 
 hibited books and report to Mexico and execute the orders re- 
 ceived from there. He could interfere with the courts, but not 
 enforce orders. He could make arrests only in special cases, 
 such as bigamy and desertion to the Dutch or Moros, and was 
 required to send all his prisoners to Mexico for trial and pun- 
 ishment. The cases of desertion by soldiers to the Moros or 
 Dutch proved difficult. The matter was submitted to Philip HI, 
 and learned discussions ensued. But the question was purely 
 academic. The Inquisition never had a real case to act on for 
 the very good reason that the military authorities promptly shot 
 all available culprits. There was another class of cases which 
 troubled the tribunals greatly and which throws light on the 
 conditions in the military service. It seems strange that any one 
 should have voluntarily submitted himself to the Inquisition, but 
 many soldiers preferred it to the hardships of the service. De- 
 liberately uttering heretical opinions or blaspheming, they would 
 be arrested and sent to Mexico for trial. The tribunal was then 
 called upon to bear the expenses, and for a time it looked as if 
 
 has its commissaries, servants, and helpers in Manila and in the bishoprics of 
 the Islands, who attend to matters touching the Holy Office. They never fail 
 to have plenty to do there because of the entrance of so many strangers into 
 those districts. However, the Holy tribunal does not have jurisdiction of the 
 causes pertaining to the natives, as the latter are so recently converted." 
 Morga's Sucesos (1609), B. & R.. XVI. p. 154. 
 
 1^ For the instructions to the Commissary, see B. & R., V, p. 256.
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 22/ 
 
 it might be required to furnish free transportation home to the 
 entire army. It preferred to authorize the commissioner to 
 dispose of such cases. 
 
 Lea finds during the sixteenth century only three cases of 
 "real inquisitorial work for the purity of the faith." Diego 
 Hernandez, who was accused of ordering his cook to cut the 
 chickens' throats instead of strangling them, had his property 
 sequestrated and died during the long delay occasioned by the 
 search for evidence in his home province in Spain. There were 
 numerous insignificant cases during the following centuries which 
 the curious will find fully described in Lea's learned book. In 
 1762 the commissioner attempted unsuccessfully to exercise jur- 
 isdiction over the Moros and the English sailors on board an 
 English ship. 
 
 The important fact to note is that the natives were never 
 subject to the inquisitional jurisdiction; it applied only to Span- 
 iards. As Lea says, "While this branch of the Inquisition ac- 
 complished so little for the faith, it was eminently successful in 
 the functions of contributing to the discontent and confusion 
 which so disastrously affected colonial administrations." It be- 
 came involved in the quarrel between Governor Corcuera and 
 the archbishop and finally lost all influence with the public 
 through the persecution of Governor-General Salcedo. This pro- 
 ceeding originated in the malice of Commissioner Paternia and 
 the ambitions of his accomplices in the audiencia. It was re- 
 pudiated by the tribunal in Mexico, and Paternia, like his victim, 
 died a prisoner while on the way to Mexico. But he had accom- 
 plished something. He "had reduced the power of the Holy 
 office until its officials were so despised that if they had to ar- 
 rest the vilest individual no one would help them."" 
 
 For the purposes of government the islands were at first 
 divided into three provinces and from time to time these were 
 subdivided according, as nearly as possible, to the dialects spoken 
 
 ** Lea, The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies, p. 299 et seq. The 
 records of the Inquisition were destroyed in order to prevent them from fall- 
 ing into the hands of the English at the time of the capture of Manila.
 
 228 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 by the inhabitants. Each province was under the control of a 
 functionary known as alcalde-mayor who exercised both ex- 
 ecutive and judicial powers, under the direction of and subject 
 to rules and regulations proclaimed by the governor-general. 
 
 Until about 1884, these alcaldes or provincial governors were 
 allowed to engage in trade on their own account, and as they 
 were charged with the duty of receiving tribute in kind and 
 in fixed amounts, they were enabled to profit by the fluctuation 
 in prices, thus filling their own pockets at the expense of the 
 tribute payers. The king several times directed that the alcaldes 
 should not engage in business, but in 1754 a royal cedula per- 
 mitted them to go into business on condition of paying a "fine 
 for engaging in commerce" — the treasury thus sharing in the 
 profits. The fines to be paid for violating the law ran from 
 forty to three hundred pesos in the different provinces. In 1840 
 to be alcalde in certain localities is said to have been worth 
 fifty thousand pesos per year. 
 
 In 1886 the office of alcalde was abolished, and that of civil 
 governor established. The governors were thereafter charged 
 with the administration of the laws and the management of 
 the provincial finances and the punishment of offenses against 
 religion. At the same time the judicial system was reorganized, 
 and the judicial powers of the alcaldes were transferred to the 
 newly created judges of the Courts of First Instance. The gov- 
 ernors appear, however, to have retained some of the powers of 
 local magistrates. 
 
 Contemporaneous writers paint very somber pictures of the 
 men who were appointed to these provincial offices during the 
 decadent period of Spanish rule. No doubt, here, as elsewhere, 
 there were exceptions to the rule of incompetency and corrup- 
 tion. 
 
 "It is a fact common enough," says the indignant Tomas de 
 Comyn, "to see a hairdresser or a lackey converted into a gov- 
 ernor; a sailor or a deserter transformed into a district magis- 
 trate, collector or military commander of a populous province 
 without other counselor than his own crude understanding, or
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 229 
 
 any other guide than his own passions. Such a metamorphosis 
 would excite laughter in a comedy or farce ; but realized in the 
 theater of human life, it must give rise to sensations of a very 
 different nature. Who is there that does not feel horror-struck 
 and tremble for the innocent when he sees a being of this kind 
 transformed from the yard-arm to the seat of justice, deciding 
 in the first instance on the honor, lives and property of a hun- 
 dred thousand persons, and haughtily exacting the homage and 
 incense of the spiritual ministers of the towns under his juris- 
 diction as well as the parish curates, respectable for their ac- 
 quirements and benevolence and who in their own native places 
 would possibly have rejected as a servant the very man whom 
 in the Philippines they are compelled to court and obey as a 
 sovereign."" 
 
 The provinces were subdivided into districts called pueblos, 
 each under a gohernadorcillo, ordinarily called capitan. This 
 important local official was required to be a citizen, that is, either 
 a native or a Chinese mestizo, twenty-five years old, able to 
 speak and write Spanish and be or have been a caheza for a 
 certain number of years. The pueblos were subdivided into 
 barangays, each, as in the original native system, under a sort 
 of tribal chief called a cabeza de barangay. Each barangay was 
 supposed to contain from one hundred to one hundred and fifty 
 families. Originally the office of cabeza was hereditary, but in 
 time it became elective.^" Morga says that in his time all mar- 
 ried natives had the right to vote for gobernadorcillo, but later 
 this official was elected by thirteen electors from those who, like 
 himself, held the office of cabeza. The chief of a barangay paid 
 no tribute, and after three years of service could resign and 
 thereafter be a member of a local municipal body called la prin- 
 cipalia^^ and be exempt from the payment of tribute. 
 
 ^^ State of the Philippines, p. 194. However, compare this with the same 
 writer's description, supra, of the idyllic conditions in the towns where the 
 curate is the king. 
 
 20 "Formerly the cabesa exercised many functions of the government, but 
 under the Spanish regime the office has gradually degenerated until the 
 person who fills it enjoys little but the ill-will of his district. The function 
 he exercised was that of a representative, or better, an agent for the govern- 
 ment." Report of the Schurman Commission, 1900, I, p. 56. 
 
 21 The leading citizens in the Philippines are still referred to locally as 
 principalias.
 
 230 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The Filipinos seem always to have had a certain instinct for 
 orderly government on a small scale. I have in modern times 
 attended meetings of the populace of small pueblos called to 
 consider questions which affected the community and heard all 
 classes discuss questions, if not with the intelligence, certainly 
 with the interest of a typical New England town meeting. 
 
 Jagor^^ describes an election for gohernadorcillo which as to 
 form and spirit may have occurred as well the present year as 
 about 1860. The election "took place in the town house. At 
 the table sits the governor or his proxy, on his right the pastor 
 and on his left the secretary who is the interpreter. All the 
 cahezas de harangay, the gohernadorcillo and those who have 
 formerly been such have taken their places on the benches. In 
 the first place, six of the cahezas and six of the ex-gobernador- 
 cillos respectively are chosen by lot to serve as electors. The 
 gobernadorcillo in office makes the thirteenth. The rest now 
 leave the room. After the chairman has read the rules and ex- 
 horted the electors to fulfill their duties conscientiously, they 
 go one by one to the table and write three names on a ballot. 
 Whoever receives the largest number of votes is forthwith nom- 
 inated for gohernadorcillo for the ensuing year, if the pastor 
 or the electors make no well founded objection, subject to con- 
 firmation of the Superior Court in Manila, which is a matter of 
 course since the influence of the pastor would prevent an unsuit- 
 able choice. The same process was followed in the election of the 
 other local officials, except that the new gobernadorcillo was 
 called in that he might make any objections to the selection." 
 Probably the pastor was a Spaniard and all the rest were Fili- 
 pinos. 
 
 At the time of the American occupation the municipalities 
 were gradually being organized under the Maura law of 1893. 
 That law was, however, very materially modified before it was 
 put in force in the Philippines. Many of its provisions for 
 local self-government remained a dead letter up to the time 
 
 22 Travels in the Philippines (London, 1875). See Rizal's account of "The 
 Meeting in the Town Hall," in An Eagle's Flight, Chap. XXII. This is the 
 absurd title of the English translation of Nole me Jangere, 
 
 \
 
 THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 231 
 
 of the revolt in 1896 when it was superseded by martial law. 
 It is important principally as showing what the Spanish govern- 
 ment was attempting to do.^' 
 
 The Spanish towns like Manila were organized much like 
 similar places in Spain. The corporation, el cabildo, consisted 
 of two ordinary alcaldes, or justices, eight regidores, or alder- 
 men, a registrar and a constable. The aldermen were elected 
 annually by the householders of the city, but the other offices 
 were proprietary and could be sold, bought or inherited. 
 
 23 B. & R., LII, p. 153, note 91. A description of the government, pre- 
 pared by the Jesuits, is printed^ in the Report of the Schurman Commission 
 (1900), IV, p. 122, The following table will enable the reader to understand 
 the system which was being introduced into Luzon at the time of the Amer- 
 ican occupation : 
 
 TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS 
 
 Luzon and the Visa3ran Islands are divided into Provinces and districts 
 
 Each province or district is divided into Pueblos (towns) 
 
 Each pueblo is divided into Distritos (divisions) 
 
 Each distrito is divided into Barrios (wards) 
 
 Each barrio is divided into Barangays (groups of 
 
 from 50 to 100 fam- 
 ihes) 
 
 GOVERNING BODIES CORRESPONDING TO DIVISIONS 
 
 The governor-general, assisted by the Council of 
 Administration, the Board of Authorities, and the 
 general directorate of civil administration form 
 
 the general government of the Archipelago 
 
 The governor of the province, assisted by the Pro- 
 vincial Council (junta) governs or rather super- 
 vises the affairs of the Province 
 
 The municipal tribunal, assisted by the principalia, 
 
 administers the Pueblo 
 
 The cabeza de barangay represents the government 
 
 as a sort of agent in the Barangay 
 
 The divisions called distritos and barrios are merely 
 for the purpose of administration. 
 
 Governor of a province appointed by the Government in Spain 
 
 Provincial junta: 
 
 Governor of province and five other officials. . . .Members ex officio 
 
 Four other members elected by Municipal captains 
 
 The municipal tribunal (captain and four lieuten- 
 ants) elected by Twelve delegates of the 
 
 principalia (cliief citi- 
 zens) 
 
 Twelve delegates of the principalia chosen by Principalia 
 
 The principalia is composed or — 
 
 All persons who have held certain offices. 
 Persons who pay 50 pesos land tax. 
 The cabezas de barangays are appointed by — 
 
 The governor of the province on recommenda- 
 tion of the twelve delegates or "principals" and 
 municipal tribunal, but practically elected by. . Municipal tribunal 
 See Report Schurman Phil. Com., I, Part 4.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 Legislation, Codes and Courts 
 
 Sources of the Law — ^The Laws of the Indias — Extension of Peninsular Laws 
 to Philippines — The Ancient Spanish Codes — The Fuero Juzgo — Siete Par- 
 tidas — La Nueva Recopilacion — The Prelation of Laws — The Modern Codes 
 — The Judicial Tribunals — The Audiencia — Its Organization and Powers — 
 The Provincial Courts — The Courts of First Instance — Justice Courts — Eccle- 
 siastical, Military, Treasury and Contentious Courts — The Judicial Personnel 
 — Unsatisfactory Procedure — Popular Dissatisfaction with the Courts. 
 
 During Spanish times laws for the Philippines were enacted 
 or proclaimed in various forms by the king directly or through 
 the Council of the Indias, the Casa de Contratacion or India 
 House, the governor-general, the audiencia, and in later years 
 by the Cortes. 
 
 The supreme control under the king over all colonial affairs 
 was vested in a body called the Council of the Indias, of which 
 the leading statesmen of the Spanish court were members. Its 
 jurisdiction covered the entire field of governmental activity. It 
 enacted laws for the colonies, determined finally all controversies 
 concerning colonial affairs and advised the king in all matters 
 connected with the admlnstration. 
 
 Economic affairs were controlled by a subordinate body known 
 as the Casa de Contratacion which also exercised judicial func- 
 tions and made rules which had the force of law.^ 
 
 The Laws of the Indias, the Novisima Recopilacion and the 
 Partidas are at present frequently referred to in the Philippine 
 courts as sources of controlling law and are thus of practical as 
 well as historical importance.^ 
 
 1 Moses' The Spanish Dependencies in South America, I, Chap. XIV 
 (1914), and the same author's earlier book, Spanish Rule in America, Chap. 
 Ill ; Bourne's Spain in America, Chap. XV. 
 
 2 See the Historical Resume of the Administration of Justice in the Philip- 
 
 232
 
 LEGISLATION, CODES AND COURTS 233 
 
 The Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, com- 
 monly referred to as the Laws of the Indias, is a collection of 
 cedulas,^ decretos* resoluciones/ ordenamientos and pregmat- 
 icas/ and reglamentos/ which was published about 1680. It 
 contains the general laws declared or enacted for the govern- 
 ment of the Indias and may be called the primary legal authority. 
 It never constituted a complete code and had to be supplemented 
 by other compilations and laws designed primarily for the Penin- 
 sula and not in force in the colonies unless expressly made so by 
 compliance with certain prescribed formalities. According to 
 the Spanish constitution, *'Las provinces de Ultramar seran 
 governados par leyes especiales." Laws enacted in the Peninsula 
 if intended to go into effect in the Philippines were transmitted 
 to the governor-general with instructions to proclaim and pub- 
 lish them there. Until they had received the governor-general's 
 "cumplase" (let it go into effect) they had no legal effect. 
 
 But it was necessary occasionally to resort to laws which had 
 never been enacted for or extended to the Philippines. The 
 Laws of the Indias provided that cases not covered by any of its 
 provisions should be governed by the Laws of Castile in con- 
 formity with Law 1 of the Laws of Toro, which latter was in- 
 cluded in the Novisima Recopilacion de Castilla. Thus the Fili- 
 pino lawyer whose case was not determined by the Laws of the 
 Indias or any statute subsequently passed for or extended to the 
 islands found himself thrown back on the ancient Spanish Codes. 
 
 Spanish history and jurisprudence are rich in compilations 
 and codes in which are embodied the legislation, decisions, cus- 
 toms and usages of hundreds of years of national life. While 
 
 pine Islands, by Cayetana S. Arellano, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
 Rept. Phil. Com., 1900, p. 225, Exhibit J, Sen. Doc. ii2, 56 Cong., 2d Sess. As 
 to conditions about 1840, see Mas' Report in B. & R., XXXVI, p. 279. 
 
 2 Orders emanating from some superior tribunal, promulgated in the name 
 and by the authority of the sovereign. 
 
 * Similar orders in ecclesiastical matters. 
 ^ * Opinions rendered by some superior authority on questions duly sub- 
 mitted, and thereafter sent to the inferior authorities for their guidance. 
 
 " Orders emanating from the king differing from cedulas only in form and 
 in the manner of their promulgation. 
 
 ^ Informal written instructions by competent authority. See Walton, 
 Civil Law of Spain, p. 523, note.
 
 234 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 they are sometimes a source of weariness to the men who are 
 called upon to adjust the rights of contentious individuals, the 
 student of the history of laws and institutions finds them of 
 absorbing interest. II faut eclairer Vhistoire par lots et les 
 lots par Vhistoire. 
 
 In these ancient codes, as clearly as in the ancient highways, 
 bridges, viaducts, theaters, arches, baths, porticos and palaces, 
 are written the permanent records of Roman, Gothic and Sara- 
 cen rule. What remains of Germanic law is embodied in the 
 famous code known as the Fuero Juzgo or Forma Judicum 
 which was probably compiled at the Council of Toledo^ in the 
 eighth century. It was written in Latin, the language of the 
 Church, and was not translated into the vernacular Spanish until 
 the thirteenth century. In the meantime, although undergoing 
 many vicissitudes, it was always in force in some part of the 
 country, more particularly in sections where resistance to the 
 Moors was strongest. In 1241 so strong had become the pres- 
 sure of the Saracens that its application seems to have been 
 confined to the towns of Andalusia alone. 
 
 After much controversy as to the value of the Fuero Jusgo 
 its authority was finally established, and in the Spanish law 
 of precedence it stands third in order. 
 
 During the reign of Charles III, it was ordered that a cer- 
 tain law from the Fuero Jusgo should be applied in preference 
 to one contained in the Partidas.^ "As said law of Fuero Jusgo 
 is not derogated by any other, you should abide by it in deter- 
 mining on this or similar business without attaching much im- 
 portance to those of the Partidas." "After this decision," says 
 Walton,^** "no dispute can be had about the existence to-day of 
 the Gothic-Spanish legislation. Although its application may 
 
 8 A translation of this work by Mr, S. P. Scott, under the name of the 
 Visigothic Code, has been published by the Comparative Law Bureau of the 
 American Bar Association (Boston, 1910). Mr. Scott calls it "the most re- 
 markable monument of legislation which ever emanated from a semi-barbar- 
 ous people, and the only substantial memorial of greatness or erudition 
 bequeathed by the Goths to posterity." Preface, p. 24. 
 
 ^ Visigothic Code, Preface, p. 11. 
 
 10 Walton, Civil Law of Spain, p. 57.
 
 LEGISLATION, CODES AND COURTS 235 
 
 be limited or rare, part of the Fuero Juzgo is included in the 
 latter collections and while other portions do not entirely har- 
 monize with the social, juridical and political spirit of the 
 epoch, many of its laws can be found in some form in the 
 present Spanish Civil Code." The same writer calls this code 
 the most famous and most important of all bodies of laws 
 formed after the fall of the Roman Empire. 
 
 Provinces, cities and towns were governed by special laws. 
 In one section of the country, one code, statute and custom 
 existed, while the adjoining community was governed by differ- 
 ent laws. By the middle of the thirteenth century the situa- 
 tion had become intolerable, and that wise monarch, Alfonso X, 
 caused the laws to be recompiled imder the name of the Fuero 
 Real. This collection assumed to contain all the laws and cus- 
 toms of the Castilian monarchy in force at the time of its pub- 
 lication. 
 
 Passing over the various other compilations, we come to the 
 famous Partidas published in 1348, which wrought a radical 
 change in Spanish law and jurisprudence. This was probably 
 the most systematic and complete legal work which the world 
 had seen since the publication of the great masterpieces of 
 Roman jurisprudence. It was divided into seven parts, from 
 which came the name by which it is now known.^^ 
 
 In 1567 Philip II sanctioned another compilation, which was 
 known as La Nueva Recopilacion. This included all laws in 
 force which had been enacted since the Fuero Real and Partidas, 
 some from the Fuero Juzgo, and others from the laws of Es- 
 tilo," Montalvo,^^ the Ordenamiento of Alcala," the Laws of 
 Toro,*'' and the autos acordados or pragmaticas, cedulas, or- 
 denes and decretos of the Supreme Court of Spain. 
 
 ** A new English translation of this work is being made under the auspices 
 of the Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association. 
 
 " Principally a code of practise of the time of Ferdinand IV. (1295-1312.) 
 
 *8 A collection of laws made by Alonzo Diaz Montalvo during the time of 
 Ferdinand and Isabella. 
 
 1* A collection published in 1348. 
 
 "A body of laws enacted by the Cortes of Toledo in 1502, to explain, 
 correct and supply omission in existing legislation. They were included in the 
 Nueva and Novisima Recopilacion.
 
 236 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Another compilation known as the Novisima Recopilacion 
 was pubHshed in 1802. The work was hastily done, and it is 
 generally considered inferior to the earlier compilations. The 
 royal decree of July 15, 1805, made the laws which appear in 
 the Novisima Recopilacion superior to all earlier legislation. 
 But the effect was simply to increase the confusion which al- 
 ready existed, as it left in force the order of prelation, of codes 
 contained in Law 1, of Tore, and Law 28 of the Ordenamiento 
 of Alcala. 
 
 Subsequently enacted laws prior to the modem civil codes are 
 found in compilations, some official, and other private, which, 
 however, did not assume the dignity of codes. 
 
 After examining the Laws of the Indias and the special laws 
 in force in the Philippines, the lawyers and jurists were re- 
 quired, if they were still in doubt, to turn to the laws of Spain. 
 In addition to the ancient codes and compilations, there had 
 grown up a vast body of what is known on the continent as 
 jurisprudence, that is, the decisions of courts and the com- 
 mentaries and emanations of the text writers. These became 
 so voluminous that the literature was said to be centum camel- 
 lorum onus — a burden for a hundred camels. 
 
 So confusing were the various compilations that it became 
 necessary to determine their prelation — the order in which they 
 should be applied. In Spain the order of precedence thereafter 
 was : ( 1 ) The laws enacted after the Novisima Recopilacion de 
 Castilla; (2) the Novisima Recopilacion de Castilla of 1805; 
 (3) the Fuero Jusgo; (4) the Fuero Real; and then (5) the 
 Partidas. 
 
 In the Philippines the laws, royal decrees, royal orders, spe- 
 cially directed to be there in force were controlling and after 
 them came: (1) The Autos Ac or dados duly made by the Au- 
 diencia of Manila; (2) the Recopilacion de Leyes de Las Indias. 
 Cases not determined by either of these were governed by the 
 Novisima Recopilacion de Castilla, the Fuero Jusgo, the Fuero 
 Real, or the Partidas, in the order named. 
 
 The Novisima Recopilacion and the Partidas were largely
 
 LEGISLATION, CODES AND COURTS 237 
 
 drawn on because they contained both civil and criminal laws 
 and provisions relating to civil and criminal procedure. Not- 
 withstanding the statutor}"- order of procedure, the Partidas, 
 which were composed in the thirteenth century, were generally 
 given preference as authority over the Novisima Recopilacion. 
 "All who have studied the legislation of Spain," says Chief 
 Justice Arellano, "know that the Partidas were oftener quoted, 
 were better known, and more often applied than the Novisima 
 Recopilacion, although the Recopilacion, being more modem 
 and the one ordered to be complied with, should have enjoyed 
 greater authority." 
 
 It is probable that the lawyers and jurists were more at- 
 tracted by the principles of Roman Law which were embodied 
 in the Partidas than by the pure Spanish law and the elements 
 of German law derived from the earlier codes contained in the 
 Novisima Recopilacion. The Partidas also had other attrac- 
 tions, not always found in legal treaties and compilations. As 
 said by the learned Alonzo Martinez in a speech delivered at 
 the opening of the Supreme Court of Spain:" *'The Siete Parti- 
 das are undoubtedly in principle and form by reason of their 
 contents, the clearness of their composition, and the inimitable 
 graceful language and style, an imperishable monument of wis- 
 dom without rival in Europe during the Middle Ages; and as 
 everything which is superior rules by legitimate right, this code 
 has been in the past and still is, the beacon which illumines 
 and guides the courts, judges, and lawyers through the dark- 
 ness of our contracted and contradictory civil legislation." 
 
 But even with all these compilations, there were cases for 
 the determination of which resort must be had to the laws of 
 Spain, enacted after the publication of the Novisima Recopila- 
 cion and the codes in the order of precedence established for 
 Spain. With all this complicated confusion it is easy to believe, 
 as has been stated, that during the last quarter of the nine- 
 teenth century the tendency of lawyers and judges was to rely 
 on the general principles of jurisprudence rather than attempt 
 
 " Kept. Phil. Com., 1900, Appendix, p. 236.
 
 238 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 to find a definite rule in the labyrinth of ancient and modern 
 laws and codes. 
 
 The modern civil code, which was promulgated in 1889, orig- 
 inated in the Cortes of Cadiz in 1811. Two years later a com- 
 mittee of the most distinguished lawyers and statesmen of 
 Spain was appointed and charged with the duty of codifying 
 the most important branches of Spanish law. The project was 
 officially abandoned during the reactionary period, but in 1821 
 it was revived, and thereafter a part of the civil code was pub- 
 lished. The overthrow of constitutional government in 1823 
 threw the work into the background where it was carried on 
 by private persons, who in 1839 presented a complete project 
 to the Cortes. No action was taken thereon. In 1843 it was 
 again taken up officially. A new committee of twenty-four 
 eminent jurists was appointed, which, after almost ten years 
 of labor, submitted what is commonly known as the Project of 
 1851. 
 
 For several years it was circulated among jurists and states- 
 men, and criticism and suggestions were invited. Both were 
 freely given. So important was the work considered that the 
 Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation convened a 
 special juridical congress for its discussion. Localities jealous 
 of their special laws succeeded in injecting certain exceptions 
 which cast doubt on how far the old compilations were abro- 
 gated by the new code. As finally promulgated in 1889, the 
 new code was not entirely satisfactory, as the exceptions added 
 one more to the list of legal puzzles with which Spanish juris- 
 prudence was already so well supplied. But this particular diffi- 
 culty was not important in the Philippines, where the local and 
 customary laws of particular Spanish communities, of course, 
 never were applicable. 
 
 The Penal Code went into efifect in the Philippines in 1886, and 
 as modified by Order No. 58 and subsequent American legisla- 
 tion is now in force. 
 
 The first governor-general of the Philippines was vested 
 :with full power to administer civil and criminal justice and to
 
 LEGISLATION, CODES AND COURTS 239 
 
 hear and determine all civil and criminal actions which migfit 
 arise in the islands. Until the middle of the last century, to a 
 great extent, the governors were judges and the judges were 
 governors, and both were legislators and administrators. Orig- 
 inal and appellate judicial powers were vested in Legaspi by the 
 royal order of his appointment, and to the first royal audiencia 
 was given **the same authority and preeminence as each of the 
 royal audiencias of the town of Valladolid and the city of 
 Granada."^' The territorial district within which this august 
 body was to exercise its power was described in generous terms 
 as including "the Island of Luzon and other Islands of the 
 Archipelago of China and the mainlands of the same, whether 
 discovered or to be discovered." It had appellate jurisdiction 
 in all civil and criminal cases appealed from the decisions of the 
 governors, alcaldes-mayores and other magistrates. Its original 
 jurisdiction was limited to cases which, on account of their 
 importance, the amount involved, and the dignity of the parties, 
 might be tried in the Superior Court, and criminal cases arising 
 in the place where the court might meet. Appeals from judg- 
 ments in civil cases might within one year be taken to the king 
 if the amount involved was large. 
 
 The audiencia was more than the Supreme Court of the 
 Archipelago, as it was charged with the performance of many 
 duties which were purely administrative. Prior to the year 
 1715 it took over the civil government in the interim between 
 the death or departure of a governor-general and the arrival 
 of his successor, while the duties of captain-general were 
 assumed by the senior magistrate. The president of the audi- 
 encia was required to send annually to the Council of the In- 
 dias carefully itemized and descriptive lists showing the salaries, 
 payments, fees and allowances paid by the royal treasury; a 
 
 *'The first royal audiencia, the Audiencia de Territorial de Manila, was 
 established May 5, 1582. See B. & R., V., p. 274, and VI, p. 35. where the 
 instrument stating its powers and duties is printed. It was abolished August 
 9, 1589, and reestablished May 25, 1596, under the name of the Audencia de 
 Chancilleria Real de Manila. It was reorganized by Toya\ Cedula, in 1776, 
 in 1815, in 1855, and again in 1886, when the Audiencia Territorial 4e Cebu 
 was created.
 
 240 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 list of the corregidores showing who were appointed by the 
 royal warrant and who by the president of the audiencia, the 
 qualifications and merits of each, the amount of fees received, 
 and the nature of the services rendered. A registry had to be 
 kept of all questions which came before the body pertaining to 
 the government and of the votes cast by each member. No fees 
 or other means of profit were permitted to be granted to any of 
 the encomenderos, nor could merchants be allowed to raise their 
 prices on merchandise above the limits established by the king. 
 
 The audiencia was authorized to grant licenses and to make 
 repartimientos of land involved in pending litigation, and to 
 summon citizens of the islands, whether in peace or war, under 
 penalty of infamy for failure to respond. The president and 
 two auditors were required to audit the accounts of the royal 
 treasury annually, to weigh the gold and silver, and send an 
 account thereof to the Council of the Indias. They were also 
 required to audit the accounts of the city of Manila. Each 
 magistrate in turn was required once a year to visit the villages 
 of the district of the audiencia, inspect the inns and apothecary 
 shops, examine the nature of the soil for agricultural purposes, 
 ascertain the number of inhabitants, the condition of the public 
 buildings, the habits of the natives with reference to idolatrous 
 worship; how various officials performed their duties, whether 
 the laws prohibiting slavery were enforced, whether the na- 
 tives were properly instructed in doctrine, and various other 
 things which might affect the welfare of the communities vis- 
 ited. A court with so many non-judicial functions was bound 
 to be involved in all the controversies of local politics. 
 
 Although the audiencia was established as the result of the 
 protest by Bishop Salazar against the abuses of power and the 
 neglect to enforce certain decrees, particularly those relating to 
 the treatment of the natives, it was certain to come into early 
 conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities. The governor-gen- 
 eral was the presidente of the audiencia, which exercised juris- 
 diction over all branches of the government. It could deter- 
 mine the right of the ecclesiastical courts to try a certain case
 
 LEGISLATION, CODES AND COURTS 241 
 
 and the president had certain supervisory powers in connection 
 with ecclesiastical appointments. 
 
 A dispute with Bishop Salazar soon arose over the wording 
 of certain prayers in the mass and as to where the president, 
 magistrates and bishop should sit during the celebration of 
 mass. The governor and the audiencia were soon at war over 
 appointments. The religious orders resented interference with 
 the control which had been exercised previously by the provin- 
 cials. The master of the camp and the captains of the four 
 companies of the garrison complained to the king that because 
 of the constant interference of the audiencia in the administra- 
 tion of the army and the unfair bestowal of encomiendos on 
 the undeserving, the troops had become disobedient and had 
 publicly insulted their officers. The city of Manila petitioned 
 for the withdrawal of the audiencia, which, in its opinion, was 
 expensive and unnecessary. Finally all parties seem to have 
 joined in the memorial which was carried to the Council of the 
 Indias by Father Sanchez. The result was that the audiencia 
 was abolished and was not reestablished until 1596/' 
 
 When the audiencia acted in a governmental, administrative, 
 or advisory capacity, it was known by the na;me of real acuerdo. 
 All the members and the fiscal or attorney-general were then 
 required to be present. Its ordinances, known as autos acor- 
 dados, when approved by the president had the force of laws 
 and as such were cited in the courts.^* These ordinances related 
 to subjects innumerable, including the Chinese, notaries, prisons, 
 hucksters, slavery, breeding of fowls, the collection of tribute, 
 the regulations of markets and market supplies, and vagrancy.'* 
 
 18 See Chap. V, p. 158. 
 
 The letter by which the king reestablished the audiencia is a model of its 
 kind. It criticizes no one, makes no reference to the real cause for the change, 
 and assigns reasons which no one in Manila probably had thought of. 
 
 19 From this real acuerdo emanated the autos acordados, or reports which 
 have been used as precedents in courts of justice and which have been col- 
 lected into four volumes with an appendix, edited by the audiencia of 
 Manila. This was formerly the indispensable book of every judge and lawyer, 
 as it contained all the rules of procedure, and many rulings of an adminis- 
 trative character which affected the administration of justice. 
 
 20 Many of these ordinances of the latter ISOO's are collected and printed 
 in B. & R., X, p. 293 et seq., and XI, p. 21 et seq. They cover a wide range of 
 subjects.
 
 242 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The composition and personnel of the audiencia varied from 
 time to time.^^ When first established, it consisted of a presi- 
 dent, who was the governor-general, three magistrates, an at- 
 torney-general and the necessary subordinate officials.^^ The 
 number of magistrates was increased from time to time. The 
 attorney-general also held the office of "protector of the In- 
 dians." 
 
 About 1815 a regent was appointed to preside in the ab- 
 sence of the governor-general. In 1865 the governor-general 
 ceased to be the president, and the powers of the real acuerdo 
 passed to the Board of Administration, an advisory or consulta- 
 tive body which had been established in 1861 and over which 
 the governor-general presided. Thereafter the audiencia in 
 banc with the regent, whose title was soon changed to presi- 
 dent (chief justice), presiding, constituted the gubernative body. 
 After 1879 the two branches of the audiencia were known as 
 the Sala de lo Civil and Sala de lo Criminal with a president 
 for each chamber. 
 
 As organized in 1855, the judge advocates of the army and 
 navy were members of the court. Under the reforms of 1870 
 they ceased to be magistrates, but ten years later were made 
 ex-officio members of the civil branch, when it was called upon 
 to decide questions of conflicting jurisdiction between the mili- 
 tary, civil and naval courts. In 1886 a territorial audiencia 
 was established at Cebu, but later it was reduced to the rank of 
 criminal audiencia with a president and two associates. A 
 criminal audiencia also existed at Vigan. Substantially as thus 
 organized, the audiencias continued until the end of Spanish 
 sovereignty when some of the magistrates became members of 
 the courts as organized under the American government.^^ 
 
 21 See, for its composition during different periods, Rept. Phil. Com., 1900, 
 Appendix, p. 225. 
 
 22 The members of the audiencia other than the president were called 
 oidores, or auditors, and finally magistrados, or magistrates. The attorney 
 who represented the public, the attorney-general, was called the fiscal. 
 
 23 In a brief summary of the organization of the old Spanish Courts, see 
 an article on "The Administration of Jtistice in the Philippines," by George 
 R. Harvey, formerly solicitor general for the islands. Yale, Law Review. 
 1914.
 
 LEGISLATION, CODES AND COURTS 243 
 
 The Spanish regulations with reference to the conduct and 
 actions of the members of the audiencia were very strict and 
 some of them are yet in force. For instance, no magistrate 
 could sit in any case when challenged or when a relative or 
 member of his family was interested. Nor could he engage 
 directly or indirectly in any mercantile business or own any 
 income-bearing estate in arable land or cattle. He was for- 
 bidden, under pain of loss of office, to avail himself of the 
 services of a native or to receive any fees or reward or share 
 the fees of any lawyer. The members of the audiencia were 
 required to be present each day for a certain fixed number of 
 hours under penalty of a fine of one-half day's pay for each day's 
 absence. The facilities afforded for maintaining actions for 
 damages against judicial officers were unnecessarily good from 
 the point of view of an American or English judge and they 
 have been held to be inconsistent with the basic principles of 
 the American system of government and therefore repealed by 
 implication.^* 
 
 Prior to 1860 the alcaldes-mayores (provincial governors) and 
 the military and civil officials acted as inferior judicial officers. 
 The reforms of this period mark the theoretical separation of 
 the executive and judicial powers in the provinces. It was pro- 
 vided that the alcaldes-mayores should thereafter exercise judicial 
 powers only. One year later the provinces for judicial purposes 
 were divided into districts, judicial districts and municipal dis- 
 tricts. The entire islands constituted a district. The administra- 
 tion of justice in the judicial districts was vested in the newly cre- 
 ated Courts of First Instance. The ordinary functions of a 
 trial judge now devolved on an official who was always a law- 
 yer, although in some instances the provincial governors con- 
 tinued to act as judges with the assistance of the assessors who 
 
 2* In Alzua V. Johnson, 231 U. S. 107 {21 Ph. Kept. 308), Mr. Justice 
 Holmes said : "We regard it as fundamental that the immunity of the defend- 
 ant from this suit is the same as that of judges in the United States. . . . 
 Whatever may have been the Spanish law, this is a principle so deep seated 
 in our system that we should regard it as carried into the Philippines by im- 
 plication as soon as we established courts in those islands."
 
 244 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 were appointed to aid and advise them. The audiencia exer- 
 cised general supervision over the personnel of the lower courts. 
 
 In the early days of Spanish occupation, the local headmen 
 continued to exercise their ancient powers, which were judicial 
 as well as executive. The chiefs of the barangays were judges 
 as well as law-givers and executives. The Spanish local au- 
 thorities also exercised rough and ready judicial powers in the 
 pueblos and municipalities. The office of justice of the peace was 
 created, and the powers of the justices were defined by the autos 
 acordados of 1860. After that date there was a justice of the 
 peace in every judicial district in the city of Manila, and in every 
 municipality which was the headquarters of a judicial district. 
 The justices of the peace were appointed by the governor- 
 general on the recommendation of the audiencia of Manila. 
 These appointments were given to persons who were either 
 lawyers or who had some academic or professional title, "or 
 those whose positions or circumstances warranted it." When 
 such persons could not be found, the petty governor of the 
 municipality acted as justice of the peace. If there was a vacancy 
 in the office of Judge of First Instance, or during the absence 
 or sickness of the judge, the nearest justice of the peace who 
 was a lawyer was required to perform his duties. 
 
 The royal decree of February 3, 1883, regulating the civil 
 procedure of the Courts of Spain, was extended to the Philip- 
 pines and gave the justice courts jurisdiction over civil cases 
 when the property involved did not exceed two hundred pesos 
 in value. The royal decree of January 6, 1891, which was a 
 compilation of the provisions relating to the administration of 
 justice in all colonial possessions, modified to some extent the 
 decrees to which reference has been made. It was at the time 
 regarded as a very liberal concession to the colonies, and it is 
 still in force in the Philippines, except as specifically changed 
 by recent legislation. 
 
 There were also certain special courts which should be briefly 
 mentioned. The Ecclesiastical Court had jurisdiction over mar- 
 riage and divorce, violations in general of the canon law and
 
 LEGISLATION, CODES AND COURTS 245 
 
 originally over every action, civil or criminal, which was 
 brought against an ecclesiastic. In 1835, the civil courts were 
 given jurisdiction over cases involving certain atrocious crimes 
 committed by ecclesiastics. For many years the jurisdiction of 
 the Ecclesiastical Courts was exercised by such of the judges 
 of the Courts of First Instance as were designated as ecclesi- 
 astical judges by the Archbishop of Manila and the suffragan 
 bishops of the other dioceses. 
 
 Military courts had jurisdiction over offenses purely military 
 and of actions affecting soldiers and other persons having spe- 
 cial military privileges. 
 
 The Commercial Court, which operated in Manila only, was 
 composed of a number of merchants of credit and respecta- 
 bility known as consuls, but who were advised by lawyers se- 
 lected for the purpose because of their special knowledge of 
 commercial matters. This court had jurisdiction over all com- 
 mercial controversies which called for prompt and equitable 
 action without much reference to technical procedure. 
 
 There was also a Treasury Court which sat in Manila with 
 jurisdiction over matters which affected the treasury and 
 which involved questions supposed to be within the peculiar 
 knowledge of treasury officials. In 1887 these special treasury 
 and commercial courts were abolished, and their functions, to- 
 gether with a portion of those of the military courts, were 
 transferred to the ordinary courts. The clergy and the mem- 
 bers of the army and navy were thereby deprived of many of 
 their special personal privileges. It was intended that the or- 
 dinary courts should thereafter be competent to dispose of all 
 civil and criminal cases, but the decree subjecting the clergy to 
 the jurisdiction of the civil courts never became effective, as 
 it was suspended by the governor-general until a decision could 
 be received from the home government. No decision was ever 
 rendered.'^' When the civil code went into effect in 1889, the 
 governor-general was authorized to suspend certain titles which 
 
 " Rept. Phil. Com., 1900, Appendix, p. 229.
 
 246 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 practically exempted the clergy from the jurisdiction of the 
 ordinary courts, except in case of atrocious crimes. 
 
 There existed also in Manila what was known as the Con- 
 tentious Court which was an adjunct of the Council of Adminis- 
 tration created by the royal decree of July 4, 1861. This body, 
 which was not really a court, was composed of prominent men 
 who heard complaints against the government and from whose 
 decisions there was an appeal to the Council of State in Spain. 
 
 Such were the judicial tribunals through which justice was 
 administered. As a rule, the judges were all Spaniards. The 
 procedure, both civil and criminal, followed closely the forms 
 observed in Spain. The evidence all tends to show that the 
 courts were in fact inefficient and that their general adminis- 
 tration was very imsatis factory to the litigants. The substantive 
 law was in general wise and humane and well adapted to con- 
 ditions, but its administration could not have been much worse. 
 Much of the personnel of the lower courts was bad. Before 
 the separation of the judicial from the executive functions, the 
 alcaldes-may ores, and inferior judges generally, appear to have 
 been notoriously ignorant and often corrupt. Qualifications for 
 their work was rarely a factor in their selection. Tant valent 
 les juges, tant valent les lois is an old and very true maxim. 
 
 There were among the magistrados of the audiencia many 
 honest and some learned lawyers who would have honored judi- 
 cial positions in any country. There was ample technical learn- 
 ing, but almost a complete absence of the executive ability which 
 is necessary for the administrative work of a court. Without it 
 all the learning of the jurisconsults will not, even under a simple 
 and effective method of procedure, prevent the calendars from 
 becoming clogged with cases with the resulting vexatious and 
 expensive delays which amount to the substantial denial of justice. 
 
 The procedure in civil actions seems never to have been sys- 
 tematized and established, and the criminal procedure was even 
 more uncertain.^® The insidious custom of compensating officials 
 
 28 The Philippines never had a code of criminal procedure. There were 
 merely scattered provisions in the form of royal orders and autos acordados.
 
 LEGISLATION, CODES AND COURTS 247 
 
 by fees encouraged all manner of unconscionable delays. Thus 
 before a civil action could be commenced in an ordinary trial 
 court the would-be litigant was required to execute a power of 
 attorney authorizing a solicitor to appear for him. This power 
 had then to be acknowledged before a notary, after which it had 
 to be examined and pronounced sufficient by the attorney who 
 was to appear in the case. The intervention of three paid agents, 
 solicitor, notary and attorney, was thus necessary before the liti- 
 gant could get his case started. Any formal defect in the certifi- 
 cate of the notary, in the power of attorney, or in the declaration 
 of sufficiency, was ground for the dismissal of the action with 
 heavy costs. Worse yet, from a ruling on either of these matters 
 an appeal could be taken to the audiencia, where the litigant 
 would learn whether he was in court. All the documents had to 
 be on stamped paper, and any irregularity in that respect 
 might lead to a ruling from which an appeal would lie. The 
 competency of the judge to try the case might be challenged and 
 an appeal taken from the ruling on that question. Or the juris- 
 diction of the court might be assailed by inhibitory or declara- 
 tory pleas and the foundation laid for another appeal. 
 
 All this was mere jockeying for a start. Once off, at every 
 stage of the proceedings interlocutory appeals were possible and 
 usual. Actions were often dismissed on the most trivial grounds 
 and the solicitors' and attorneys' fees taxed against the unfor- 
 tunate plaintiff. The fees under such circumstances were like 
 damages, in personal injury litigation often punitive, being al- 
 ways much larger than would have been charged the client. 
 Instances of gross extortion under the forms of law were com- 
 mon. 
 
 The system made for injustice instead of justice. The pro- 
 cedure seemed to have been skilfully devised to promote delay 
 and increase expense. Business men avoided the courts and 
 settled their controversies or submitted to loss rather than allow 
 themselves to be robbed under the forms of law.*'^ The divorce 
 
 2T Report of the Philippine Commission, 1900, p. 82. Foreman, The Philip- 
 pine Islands (1906), pp. 239, 241.
 
 248 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 between law and justice was absolute. The ordinary Filipino 
 is naturally a contentious person. Next to a cockpit a court 
 room with cocky abogados pitted against each other in the 
 game of technicalities is his ideal place of entertainment. He 
 delights in suing his neighbor and organizing a gang of witnesses 
 to engage in the cheerful game of perjury. In the old days there 
 were always plenty of lawyers to aid and abet him in such en- 
 terprises. There was also a sort of legalized banditti, a special 
 class of shysters, known as ahogadocillas, or little lawyers, who 
 were recognized as entitled, to practise before the justice courts. 
 Because of lack of character or qualifications they had not been 
 regularly admitted to practise in the courts of record and were 
 experts at stirring up strife and encouraging litigation. 
 
 The Filipinos realized that the courts as administered were 
 the agencies of extortion and injustice, and their complaints were 
 loud and continuous. The necessity for reforming the procedure 
 of the courts was a matter about which there was no difference 
 of opinion.^^ 
 
 28 As to the unsatisfactory state of the admitiistration of justice, see 
 Sawyer, The Inhabitants of the Philippines, Chap. IV.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 Taxation and Revenue 
 
 The Tax System— Direct Taxes— The Tribute— Abolished in 1884— The 
 Cedula Personal — Special Provisions for Chinese — The Income Tax — In- 
 direct Taxes — Customs Duties — Classification of Goods — Rates Levied — Cer- 
 tain Special Charges — Monopolies, Stamps, Cockpits, Lotteries, etc. — The 
 Tobacco Monopoly — Government Receipts and Disbursements. 
 
 The system of taxation which the Spaniards established in 
 the Philippines was suitable for the people and the conditions 
 under which they lived.^ As usual, it was the administration 
 that was at fault. The government raised the money required 
 for its support by direct and indirect taxes, and by trade and 
 other monopolies. As noted by Professor C. C. Plehn^ the fea- 
 ture of the history of taxation in the Philippines is "the con- 
 tinuity in the development of the tax system, the antiquity of 
 its origins, and the skill and care with which it was ever read- 
 justed to the conditions of the times and of the country. The 
 direct taxes which the United States government found in op- 
 eration at the time of their occupation can all be traced back, 
 with scarcely a break in the line of evolution, to the primitive 
 'tribute' provided for with such simple logic and stately eloquence 
 in that impressive old law for the Indians written by royal au- 
 thority in 1523. The indirect taxes in their turn were all evolved 
 from the simple almojarifazgo, whose quaint Moorish name so 
 forcibly suggests its age ; while the other revenues, all practically 
 in the form of monopolies, either arose from the assertion of 
 the royal rights to the profits of all trade that might be won by 
 
 1 The general opinion is that the burden of taxation was not excessive, 
 Bourne in B. & R., I. Int.. p. 85. 
 
 • Pol. Set. Quar. XVII, p. 147. This account of the system of taxation is 
 based very largely upon Prof. Plehn's two articles in the Political Science 
 Quarterly, XVI. p. 680 and XVII, p. 125. See also Hords* Internal Taxation 
 (J.U.R Studies), 1907. 
 
 249
 
 250 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 loyal Spanish subjects or else rested on the Papal supremacy over 
 all the converts to the Church of Rome." 
 
 The direct taxes began with the tribute which, with no change 
 in principle and but little in form, was regularly collected from 
 the time of Legaspi until the year 1884. A law of the Indies 
 declared that : 
 
 "Since it is a just and reasonable thing, that the Indians who 
 may be pacified and reduced to obedience and vassalage to Us, 
 should render tribute in recognition of Our sovereignty and 
 should give such service as Our subjects and vassals owe, and 
 as moreover, they have established among themselves the custom 
 of paying tribute to their chiefs. We command that they be per- 
 suaded to aid Us with tribute, in such moderate amount of the 
 fruits of the earth, as may from time to time be required by 
 law."« 
 
 The tribute was a personal tax, a kind of universal poll tax 
 such as is common in some form in all countries. It was levied 
 on natives and mestizos, at the rate originally of eight silver 
 reales for each family, but was soon increased to ten reales /m- 
 ertes, equal to about seventy-five cents in gold. It was for a 
 time payable in gold, or in the designated products of the coun- 
 try at a fixed "ofiicial price." The government determined what 
 articles should be tendered in payment, usually the principal 
 products of the particular province or locality, such as rice in 
 the lower provinces of Luzon and tobacco in the Cayagan Valley. 
 
 The family was the unit for the payment, but matters were 
 so arranged that it operated as a poll tax of about one-half a 
 tribute on every person, male or female, over sixteen and under 
 sixty years of age. The alcaldes, gobernadores, and cahezas de 
 harangay who collected the tributes, together with their wives 
 and first-born sons, were exempt from the tax. The cabesas, 
 in recognition of their original rights as native chiefs as well 
 as their services, might, if they had no sons, adopt one. The 
 
 2 Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de Las Indias, Book VI, tit. v, la 
 1, quoted Pol. Sci. Quar. XVI, p. 684.
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 251 
 
 exemption was also granted to soldiers, active and retired, their 
 wives and sons residing with them, the members of the pro- 
 vincial reserves, members of the Civil Guard, revenue inspectors, 
 customs and marine guards; inspectors and storekeepers under 
 the tobacco monopoly; government employees receiving a fixed 
 salary; paupers and cripples receiving public aid; those who had 
 rendered some special service to agriculture or industry; and 
 others simply "for just causes." This was construed to include 
 certain college students, widows of advocates, native women who 
 were widows of Spaniards, day laborers in the royal artillery 
 shops, and many other government employees. The descend- 
 ants of Don Pedro Mojica and Don Carlos Lacondola, who were 
 ruling as petty native kings when the Spaniards captured Manila, 
 were never required to pay the tribute. To this list must be 
 added all those who paid certain amounts for other taxes. A 
 tax list, padron de tasas, approved by the parish priest, was pre- 
 pared annually for each caheceria which showed the name, age 
 and occupation of all heads of families, and the caheza had to ac- 
 count for the tributes which thus appeared to be payable.* Fail- 
 ure in this meant imprisonment and confiscation of goods. In 
 addition to the regular tribute, the natives paid one real for com- 
 mutation of the tithes; one for the community fund, and 
 three for the Church. From 1635 to about 1850 they had 
 to pay also one-half a real for the conquest of Jolo, known as 
 the donativo de Zamhoanga. Certain provinces also occasionally 
 imposed additional direct personal taxes for such purposes as 
 maintaining vintas, or boats, for coast defense. But in addition 
 to these payments, which it will be noted were not in the least 
 oppressive in amount, the people were required to pay heavy 
 local direct taxes in the form of labor on the public works which, 
 however, could be commuted and paid in money. 
 
 The tribute was supposed to be paid by those only who had 
 submitted to Spanish rule and owed the duty of allegiance to 
 the king. The mountain people were, when it was possible, 
 
 * The alcaldes, corregidores and gohernadorcillos were held responsible 
 for the collection of the taxes in the provinces and municipalities.
 
 252 .THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 required to pay something in "recognition of vassalage." Col- 
 lecting tribute from the timid little Negritos must have been a 
 dangerous as well as unprofitable business. 
 
 The liability to pay tribute seems sometimes to have been used 
 for missionary purposes, as exemption for a certain number of 
 years was frequently offered as an inducement to become con- 
 verts or for those in rebellion to lay down their arms. 
 
 In 1884 the ancient tribute was abolished along with the caja 
 cie communidad and the sanctorum, and their place was taken by 
 a graduated poll tax. Thereafter every resident over eighteen, 
 male or female, except Chinese, natives and colonists of Jolo, 
 Palawan and Balabac, was required annually to purchase and carry 
 with him a certificate of identification, which was called a cedula 
 personal. It was a very convenient method of collecting the poll 
 tax and is in use in the Philippines at the present time. As un- 
 der the old tribute system, gohernadorcillos and their wives, 
 cahesas de harangay, and their wives and assistants, received 
 'cedulas gratis in consideration of their services in collecting the 
 tax. Monks, sisters of charity, privates in the army, naval and 
 civil guards, convicts while in prison, and paupers who received 
 public aid also received cedulas without charge. The tax, or 
 amount paid for the cedula, ran from one-half peso to thirty- 
 seven pesos, determined by occupation, status, amount of other 
 taxes paid, and income. 
 
 The tax lists were prepared in much the same way as those 
 iipon which the tributes had been based. The heads of house- 
 holds were required to prepare schedules giving descriptions of 
 all persons over eighteen years of age. Lists of those under their 
 charge or care were prepared by the heads of institutions such 
 as convents or prisons, and the captains of boats. Cahezas and 
 captains of boats were held personally responsible for the pay- 
 ment of the tax by all persons under them. Under this system 
 the tax had to be paid by every person who lived in the country ; 
 [without it nothing could be done. It was a sort of license to 
 exist and do business. During the period just preceding Ameri-
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 253 
 
 can occupation the cedulas brought into the treasury approxi- 
 mately seven million pesos per annum, 
 
 Chinese traders or Sangleys, as they were called, were required 
 to purchase a special cedula. The system of licensing them was 
 introduced very early and the amount charged varied at differ- 
 ent periods. The authorities seem to have been in constant fear 
 that they were not imposing on the Chinese all that the traffic 
 would bear. In 1828, recognizing that the tribute of eight reales 
 per annum which they were paying was very little compared 
 with their gains, the government decided that a new list of 
 the Chinese residents should be prepared. They were to be di- 
 vided into cahecerias like the natives, with Chinese cdbezas in 
 charge, who should give bond for the collection of the tribute. 
 For the purposes of the tax the Chinese were divided into three 
 classes: (1) The greater merchants, such as are now known 
 as importers and exporters, who were to pay ten pesos fuertes 
 per month. (2) The lesser merchants or shopkeepers, who were 
 to pay four pesos fuertes per month, and (3) the artisans, who 
 were to pay two pesos per month. Those in default of payment 
 for three months were required to work the amount out with 
 some planter at a fixed daily wage. 
 
 The plan had to be considerably modified, as it was found that 
 many of the Chinese could not pay the two pesos per month. A 
 fourth class was therefore created, the members of which should 
 pay one peso. The third class thereafter included only over- 
 seers, or superintendents of shops, and the new fourth class 
 all ordinary laborers and operators. The law was a failure. 
 Many preferred to return to China rather than pay the tax; 
 more than a thousand fled to the mountains. Nor would 
 any Chinamen act as cahesas. The amount of the tax was finally 
 so reduced that it could be paid, but the special tax on Chinese 
 commerce and industry was increased. In 1866 two new classes 
 were created. The first included all those who were engaged in 
 raising sugar, indigo or hemp in Luzon and the Viscayas, and the 
 second those engaged in agriculture in sparsely settled districts. 
 These were to pay twelve and five reales per annum. Those who
 
 254 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 would raise tobacco for the government were exempt from the 
 tax for five years. The benefits of the act were afterward ex- 
 tended to Chinese engaged in fisheries, wood-cutting, mining, 
 shipbuilding and other industrial pursuits. But the Chinese 
 could not be taxed out of commerce and into agriculture. 
 
 In 1890 the law was revised so that every Chinaman, without 
 reference to age or sex, was required to procure each year a 
 cedula like that required of the natives. The Chinese were now 
 divided into eight classes and paid from three to thirty pesos for 
 the cedulas. Those under fourteen years of age or who were 
 unable to work, received the cedulas gratis. 
 
 These rates were as usual increased by several surtaxes. These 
 were five per cent of the price as a "consumption tax," and in ad- 
 dition about fifty per cent, for the benefit of the provincial and 
 municipal governments, and eight per cent, distributed as follows : 
 One per cent, for the general treasury, two per cent, for the costs 
 of collection, and five per cent, to meet the expenses of sending 
 vagrant Chinese to China. The total cost of a thirty peso cedida 
 was thus actually forty-eight and ninety one-hundredths pesos, 
 and the others in the same proportion. The Chinese, like the na- 
 tives, were required to produce their identification cedulas upon 
 demand. 
 
 A royal decree of June 14, 1878, provided for a tax on the 
 income received as rent of urban real estate and from commer- 
 cial and industrial business. The former, known as the urbana 
 tax, was originally five per cent, of the net rental value of all 
 houses and buildings of brick, masonry, iron and wood, and 
 those of bamboo and nipa when rented or used for commercial 
 or industrial purposes. The urbana tax covered all income de- 
 rived from real estate other than the income produced by agri- 
 culture. Unoccupied building lots, buildings owned or used by 
 religious communities as residences for the parish priests, for 
 hospitals, houses of benevolence or schools, houses inhabited by 
 the foreign consuls when the governments they represented re-
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 255 
 
 clprocated, and public buildings owned or used by the State 
 were exempt. 
 
 No distinction was made between owners of different classes 
 or nationalities. Natives who paid the tribute were exempt if 
 the urbana tax did not exceed four pesos per year. I f it reached 
 or exceeded that amount, those who paid it were exempt from 
 payment of the tribute. If the urbana tax exceeded twelve pesos 
 the exemption from tribute extended to the legitimate children 
 who were under the father's control, and when it reached twenty- 
 five pesos it also carried exemption from personal service. The 
 tax was Increased by a surtax of five per cent, for the expenses 
 of assessment and collection. 
 
 In order to ascertain the rental values of buildings, the officials 
 were authorized to examine receipts and any other papers relat- 
 ing to the property. The rate of assessment on property which 
 was occupied by the owner was fixed at ten per cent, of the selling 
 value. Tax lists were prepared by a local assessment board, upon 
 which citizens were required to serve without compensation. 
 
 The industrial tax, which was much more important than the 
 urbana tax, resembled the Spanish excise, which was never col- 
 lected in the Philippines. In the beginning it was levied only on 
 the business of the Chinese. The elaborate tariff for all indus- 
 tries and commerce which was in force in 1898 grew out of the 
 original classification of Chinese shops according to their size 
 and the kind of goods made or sold therein. One class included 
 the shops which, in addition to a main room, had interior rooms 
 "where were displayed manufactures of cotton, linen or silk, 
 fancy goods, books, paper and other things used by the rich and 
 well-to-do." The second class Included all those shops having one 
 room only In which were sold silks, porcelain, mirrors and the 
 like. A third Included the shops selling comestibles, carpenter 
 shops, dye shops and the like ; and the fourth, all others, including 
 umbrella shops, junk shops and old clothes stores. 
 
 Chinese running shops of the first class paid one hundred 
 pesos per annum ; the second, sixty pesos ; the third, thirty pesos.
 
 256 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 and the fourth, twelve pesos. The rates were, however, modified 
 at various times. 
 
 The decree of June 14, 1878, which established the urbana tax, 
 extended the industrial tax as levied on the Chinese, to all indus- 
 tries of the same sort by whomsoever conducted, and created two 
 new classes, one of which paid three hundred pesos and the other 
 two hundred pesos per annum. The first of the new classes in- 
 cluded stock companies, corporations engaged in making loans 
 and discounts, large commercial houses, factories, insurance com- 
 panies other than mutual, banks which issued bills payable to the 
 bearer on demand, and commercial capitalists engaged in bank- 
 ing, the exporting and importing trade, and operating warehouses 
 and selling at wholesale at Manila. The second included those 
 transacting the same kind of business elsewhere than in Manila, 
 and also wholesalers, money lenders, dealers in the products of 
 the country, and all those manufacturing and mercantile houses 
 which "by reason of their business ought to pay higher rates 
 than those assigned to the third class." This system was gradu- 
 ally extended until by the reglamento of June 18, 1890, it cov- 
 ered four hundred different industries and occupations. 
 
 Ordinarily no declaration of the extent or amount of income 
 in money was required, as the amount to be paid was determined 
 by the nature of the business, the kind of goods manufactured, 
 the size and arrangement of the shop in which the business was 
 transacted and the importance from a commercial point of view 
 of the town in which it was located. There were, however, some 
 exceptions. 
 
 There were four specific rates for industrial shops or occupa- 
 tions. The first for Manila and its adjacent suburbs, the second 
 for most of the other important ports of entry and a few towns 
 of over thirty thousand inhabitants, a third for provincial towns 
 of over fifteen thousand and not over thirty thousand inhabi- 
 tants, and a fourth for all other towns. These rates stood about 
 in the relation of one hundred, sixty-eight, fifty-one and thirty- 
 six. Certain industries which manufactured goods from raw 
 material produced in the islands, and certain occupations, such
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 257 
 
 as peddling (in which locaHty was not important) paid one rate, 
 without reference to location. 
 
 The numerous occupations and industries which were exempt 
 included the following : ( 1 ) all persons other than Chinese whose 
 incomes were below six hundred pesos per annum, such as seam- 
 stresses, domestic servants, weavers of mats and nipa thatch, 
 itinerant barbers and day laborers; (2) all public officials, includ- 
 ing school-teachers; (3) public and benevolent institutions; (4) 
 industries otherwise taxed or burdened, as mining and forestry ; 
 (5) all branches of agricultural industries; (6) fishing; (7) 
 writers, authors and editors of scientific or literary works, and 
 teachers in the higher branches; and (8), for two years only, any 
 manufacturing industry which had not been previously conducted 
 in the islands. 
 
 Like all Spanish taxes, the industrial tax was increased by sur- 
 taxes, some of which went to the provincial and municipal gov- 
 ernments. The tax was payable quarterly, and delinquents were 
 punished by a fine of twenty-five per cent., plus twenty-five cents 
 per day for the expenses of collection. In commenting on this 
 income tax, which was continued for some time under the Ameri- 
 can government, Professor Plehn says : *Tt is distinctly a tax 
 on profits. The only place where labor and capital can go to 
 escape this taxation is, therefore, into agriculture, all branches of 
 industrial and commercial activity being alike subject to the tax 
 and at practically the same rates; consequently the price of manu- 
 factured or commercial wares can be affected by the tax only to 
 the extent that capital and labor are driven into agriculture and 
 the cost of agricultural products correspondingly reduced. The 
 reasons for thus favoring agriculture, which had all the more 
 weight by reason of the fact that the friars who were large land 
 holders had a decisive voice in the government, are to be found : 
 (1) in the great natural advantages which the islands possess 
 for the production of such crops as hemp, tobacco, copra, cocoa- 
 nut oil, sugar, indigo and chocolate — crops which promise such 
 magnificent returns for the general wealth and welfare of the 
 country when they are developed; and (2) in the inertness of
 
 258 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the natives and their reluctance to labor after their immediate 
 necessities are supplied, which place so severe a handicap on all 
 agricultural endeavors."' 
 
 Professor Plehn also comments on the skilful way in which the 
 Spaniards avoided the difficulties always incidental to personal 
 declarations and estimates of income and the attendant dangers 
 of false statements and misrepresentation. As he justly re- 
 marks, it is probably the only form of income tax which can be 
 enforced with any degree of effectiveness among a people not 
 given to open-heartedness where the interests of the government 
 are concerned. Had it been honestly administered it would have 
 been as just and equitable as any which could have been adopted. 
 
 Customs duties assumed little importance until well into the 
 nineteenth century. In theory the ad valorem duties (almojari- 
 fasgo) on both imports and exports, established for all Spanish 
 colonies by the Laws of the Indias, applied in the Philippines as 
 soon as they were acquired.^ Legaspi established a customs 
 house at Manila in 1573,. Early in the seventeenth century the 
 law was modified to suit conditions in the Philippines, and as 
 modified it continued in force, with few exceptions, until 1789. 
 A duty of (1) fifteen per cent, was collected on all goods (ex- 
 cept wines, which paid twenty per cent.) imported from Spain 
 or New Spain to the Philippines — five per cent, payable on the 
 departure of the vessel from the home port and ten per cent, 
 upon the arrival in the islands; (2) three per cent, on all goods 
 imported into the islands from any other countries, except mer- 
 chandise brought by the Chinese, which paid six per cent.; (3) 
 ten per cent, on all Chinese and other Asiatic wares exported to 
 New Spain; and (4) three per cent, on all other goods exported 
 from the islands. 
 
 The original classification of goods with reference to origin 
 and character was retained as the foundation of the system which 
 remained in force until the end of Spanish rule. Between 1734 
 
 5 Pol. Sci. Quar. XVI, p. 710. 
 ^ Ibid., XVII, p. 125 etseq.
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 259 
 
 and 1828 the values of imported goods were fixed arbitrarily 
 by a board composed of one royal officer, two merchants and 
 the fiscal for the treasury. Tables of "official values" were 
 published from time to time. In 1828, as a part of a move- 
 ment to revive and extend the commerce of the islands, a gen- 
 eral tariff board was created and instructed to devise a tariff 
 which would so operate as to increase the revenues, nourish and 
 protect agriculture and encourage general commerce. The tar- 
 iff which this board prepared went into effect on January 1, 1832. 
 It enumerated over one thousand articles of import and, with a 
 very few exceptions, fixed their value per unit of weight or 
 measure. The lowest rate of duty was placed on Spanish goods 
 imported in Spanish vessels, the second on Spanish goods im- 
 ported in foreign vessels, the third on foreign goods imported in 
 Spanish vessels, and the fourth and highest on foreign goods 
 imported in foreign vessels. 
 
 The goods thus imported paid respectively three, eight, seven 
 and fourteen per cent. Certain special articles paid more or less 
 than these rates. Thus spirits were divided into four classes, 
 ' which paid respectively ten, twenty-five, thirty and sixty per cent., 
 except Spanish rum, which paid three or eight per cent. The 
 four classes of beer and cider paid, respectively, three, ten, 
 twenty and twenty-five per cent. Certain kinds of cotton, linen, 
 silk and woolen fabrics, olives and olive oil, boots, shoes, sweet 
 potatoes, onions, beans, preserved fruits, salt fish and a few other 
 minor articles were classified, and paid, according to their class, 
 three, eight, forty and fifty per cent. 
 
 Agricultural machinery was admitted free, while much-needed 
 diamonds and brilliants were charged but one per cent. Birds' 
 nests and tortoise shells coming from Jolo paid two per cent. 
 Trees and shrubs for horticulture, gold and silver coin, paving 
 stone, horses for breeding purposes and goats were all on the free 
 list. 
 
 The ease with which the rates on any article could be increased 
 by simply increasing the valuation led to discrimination against 
 foreign wares. Thus lawns were valued at twice their market
 
 260 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 value, and cotton goods and textiles of colors similar to those 
 produced in the Philippines paid from fourteen to fifteen per 
 cent., while those of red, green or yellow, not local colors, were 
 admitted free. 
 
 Only fifteen articles of export are enumerated as paying ex- 
 port duty, but everything, in fact, except gold, silver and tobacco, 
 sent to Spanish ports paid such a duty. Articles not enumerated, 
 if exported under the Spanish flag, paid one per cent. ; if under 
 a foreign flag to Spain, two per cent. ; and to foreign ports, three 
 per cent. Silver coin sent under the Spanish flag to a foreign 
 port paid two per cent., and four per cent, if carried under a for- 
 eign flag. The export duty on hemp depended on four sets of 
 conditions. If exported (1) in Spanish ships to Spanish ports 
 it paid one per cent., (2) in Spanish ships to a foreign port, one 
 and one-half per cent., (3) in foreign ships to Spanish ports, or 
 (4) in foreign ships to foreign ports, two per cent. Rice under 
 the same conditions was free in the first and second instances, 
 paid two per cent, in the third and four per cent, in the fourth. 
 After 1831 rice exported In foreign ships paid an additional one 
 per cent, for the benefit of the poor in San Jose. 
 
 Under this policy Spanish ships carried nearly all the imports 
 and foreign ships nearly all the exports. Thus in 1854 the im- 
 ports under the Spanish flag amounted to 5,544,844 pesos, and 
 under foreign flags to 210,482 pesos. The exports under the 
 Spanish flag amounted to 213,656 pesos, and under foreign flags 
 to 5,138,691 pesos. 
 
 Although the rates were occasionally revised and some changes 
 made in classification, the tariff remained substantially in this 
 form until 1891. In 1857 rice and paddy were exempt from the 
 import duty. Before that time no rice of any consequence had 
 been imported. From the time when the importation of rice 
 commenced the quantity of hemp, sugar, tobacco and copra ex- 
 ported commenced to increase steadily. Agricultural machinery, 
 rails, cars and railroad machinery, as well as machinery for cer- 
 tain industries, books and scientific instruments and the like, were 
 placed on the free list.
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 261 
 
 After 1870 the most of the duties were calculated with', ref- 
 erence to quantity and not value. The revised tariff of 1891, 
 which was in force at the time of American occupation, was con- 
 tinued until November 15, 1901. Under its provisions all Span- 
 ish goods imported under the Spanish flag were admitted free; 
 the island market was carefully protected for the benefit of Span- 
 ish goods, the ad valorem duties were entirely abandoned and the 
 free list practically wiped out. 
 
 Between 1890 and 1896, reviving an old custom, a loading and 
 unloading tax of two per cent, ad valorem based on "official 
 values" was levied on vessels frequenting Manila Harbor. In 
 1896 a consumption tax at specific rates was levied on spirituous 
 liquors, beer and cider, salt, vegetables, flour and mineral oils. 
 In 1897 six per cent, additional was levied as a war tax. 
 
 In 1880 the Board of Harbor Improvement was established at 
 Manila, with authority to collect additional duties equal to twenty 
 per cent, of the regular duties. At first this tax was collected by 
 the board and was levied even on Spanish goods which were 
 exempt from the specific duties of the general tariff. As goods 
 from other ports of the Philippines did not pay this tax, the way 
 was open for fraud, and it became necessary to reduce the rate 
 to ten per cent, and collect it at all ports. Collections were there- 
 after made by the regular customs officials. 
 
 Wharf and harbor dues in later years amounted to one and 
 one-half peso per ton of one thousand kilos (2,500 pounds) on 
 all exports and one-half peso per ton on imports intended for 
 transshipment to other parts of the islands. There was also a 
 charge of 0.10 pesos per net ton for lighthouse dues, and the 
 stamps which had to be purchased and used in connection with 
 a ship's papers cost about four pesos. From 1528 until 1874 
 there was a peculiar charge on commerce which was known as 
 the average. It came from the days when merchant ships had 
 to be convoyed and was supposed to reimburse the government 
 for special protection rendered commerce by the navy, judicial 
 and lighthouse service. 
 
 To illustrate the way in which the additional taxes modified
 
 262 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the original specific duties, Professor Plehn takes the case of an 
 importation of one hundred kilos of salt/ The following charges 
 would have to be paid : 
 
 (1) Specific duty 0.650 
 
 (2) Surtax for Manila Harbor, ten percent, of the above 
 
 duty 0.065 
 
 (3) Six per cent, plus two per cent ad valorem (on offi- 
 
 cial value of 0.40 peso) 0.032 
 
 (4) Consumption tax 1 . 000 
 
 Total 1.747 
 
 As was but natural, this method caused much friction, as the 
 shipping people inevitably thought in terms of the specific tax 
 and were greatly irritated by the extras which they regarded as 
 impositions. 
 
 A considerable part of the income of the government was de- 
 rived from various forms of trade monopolies. The sale of 
 stamped paper brought a large revenue. Adhesive stamps were 
 required to be used on insurance policies, drafts and bank checks, 
 and such like instruments. Postage and telegraph stamps were 
 handled in the same general way. The stamped paper was in 
 various forms and was sold at different prices, but the kind 
 that should be used in each business transaction was carefully 
 determined by law. In order to avoid the handling of money by 
 employees it was provided that a person who was required to pay 
 a fine imposed by a court must purchase certain stamped paper, 
 a package of which was cut through, one part, upon which proper 
 memoranda was made, being retained by the official and the other 
 part by the payer as his receipt. Considerable revenue was de- 
 rived from the sale of papal bulls and indulgences, which, like 
 tithes, was one of the revenues that passed to the Crown under 
 the arrangement by which it assumed the obligation to support 
 the churches. 
 
 The exclusive right to sell opium, which was farmed out, in 
 
 Tpo/. Sci. Quar. XVII, p. 134.
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 263 
 
 1849 yielded five hundred thousand pesos per annum.® Cockpits 
 were also sources of government revenue. A royal order of 
 March 21, 1861, provided for the regulation of this popular 
 amusement. The privilege to operate cockpits was sold to the 
 highest bidder and yielded the government from one hundred 
 thousand pesos to two hundred thousand pesos per year. In 1891 
 this source of revenue was relinquished to the local governments. 
 
 Lotteries were encouraged and from 1850 to the American oc- 
 cupation they brought in about eight hundred thousand pesos per 
 year. Three-fourths of the receipts were distributed in prizes, 
 and all unsold tickets were "played" by the treasury. 
 
 From 1850 to 1882 the general government levied a tax of 
 ten per cent, on the fees received by municipal governments for 
 licenses for markets, fisheries, ferries, fords, slaughter-houses, 
 public carts and carriages, weights and measures, and the rents 
 received from public property, — a tax on the taxes. 
 
 Considerable revenue was derived from the sale of forestry 
 products and lesser amounts from the sales of public lands and 
 commutations, or payments by squatters for the right to locate 
 temporarily on public lands. The carefully guarded mining priv- 
 ileges never brought the government a very great amount of 
 revenue. 
 
 For many years the government derived a substantial revenue 
 from the profits of the trade and commerce in which it engaged 
 as a trader or farmed out. The trade in quicksilver, salt, playing 
 cards and, in later times, spirituous liquors, explosives, opium and 
 tobacco, was reserved to the government and the profits were 
 large. 
 
 The tribute which was paid in kind by the people, was ex- 
 changed at the royal stores in Manila for Chinese, Indian or Per- 
 sian goods which were exported to Mexico in the galleons on 
 government account. Prior to the opening of the nineteenth 
 century all business not conducted by the royal stores was in the 
 hands of a close corporation of Manila merchants, the Consulado, 
 
 8 The contractor paid a tax of 40 pesos per chest in addition to the regular 
 customs duties.
 
 264 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 afterward the Compafiia Guipuzcoana de Caracas. The export 
 trade, which was confined to the galleons, paid little revenue at 
 the custom house. Of course all this has changed when the trade 
 with Europe and the Asiatic coast was legalized and the port of 
 Manila opened to foreign traders.® 
 
 The raising, manufacture and sale of tobacco was assumed 
 by the government in 1871 and continued until 1884. It was 
 the most important of all the government monopolies, and in it 
 were manifested all the worst evils of such a system. At first 
 confined to the district of Gapon, in Nueva Ecija, certain dis- 
 tricts in the Cagayan Valley and the island of Martinique, it was 
 in time extended to La Isabela, La Union, Ibra, Hocus Sur and 
 Hocus Norte. In the Visayans the people were at liberty to raise 
 tobacco or sell to whom they pleased, but the government estab- 
 lished collecting centers where the product could be classified and 
 stored. From 1842 the Igorots were allowed to cultivate tobacco, 
 and in 1853 they produced twenty-five thousand bales. For 
 many years this trade in tobacco furnished one of the principal 
 items in the budget, but it ended like all government trade mo- 
 nopolies in the oppression of the people and in financial loss. 
 
 The monopoly involved the restriction of cultivation to cer- 
 tain districts, certainty in the amount to be raised, compulsory 
 labor, the prevention of contraband production and sales, the 
 purchase of the entire crop by the government at a price fixed 
 by the purchaser, inspection of the growing crop and of the prod- 
 uct, its classification, its transportation under government super- 
 vision, the manufacture in government factories, the prohibition 
 of the export of any tobacco product except by the government, 
 and the collection and purchase of as much as possible of the 
 crop raised in districts not under the control of the monopoly." 
 
 The natives were encouraged and assisted to settle in the se- 
 lected districts, and for a while were well treated. To induce 
 them to leave their old habitations, a very serious matter for a 
 
 »In 1834. From 1785 to 1830 the trade other than between Manila and 
 Acapulco was controlled by the Real Compafiia de la Filipinas. 
 " C. C. Plehn, Pol. Set. Quar., XVII, p. 142.
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 265 
 
 Filipino, an old law which limited the responsibility of a native 
 for debts to five pesos was revived. The emigration, while fur- 
 nishing the necessary labor supply for the tobacco provinces, 
 thus served also as a kind of bankruptcy proceedings. But after 
 the people were settled in the country and had become dependent 
 on the tobacco crop the government became remiss in paying for 
 their products. The interests of the producers were neglected. 
 No other crops were allowed to be raised, nor were the natives 
 permitted merely to "scrape up the earth and plant where they 
 liked." The forced labor system, which left such a blot on Dutch 
 administration in Java, was in full force in Luzon, with the 
 inevitable cruelties and abuses. Each family was forced to con- 
 tract to raise four thousand tobacco plants each year, and a 
 breach of the contract meant fine and imprisonment. The caheza 
 de harangay had to see that the families performed the contracts 
 under the same penalty for himself. Every leaf of tobacco 
 raised had to be delivered, and what graded below the required 
 standard was destroyed. Juan was not allowed even the bad 
 leaves for his own consumption. 
 
 In 1880 a Madrid paper, El Liberal, contained a letter from a 
 planter,^^ from which it appears that the tobacco grower was 
 only allowed to smoke tobacco of his own crop inside the aerating 
 sheds, which were usually erected on the field. For smoking a 
 cigar or a cigarette elsewhere he was fined. From these fines 
 in Nueva Ecija alone the government received each year on an 
 average seven thousand pesos. "The native grower," says Fore- 
 man, who lived in the islands at the time, "was subject to domi- 
 ciliary search for concealed tobacco. His trunks, furniture and 
 every nook and corner of the dwelling was ransacked." The peo- 
 ple were absolutely at the mercy of the monopoly, and when the 
 government took the tobacco and did not pay for it they were 
 helpless. 
 
 Often the government paid in treasury certificates, which 
 
 ^^ Quoted in Foreman's Philippine Islands, p. 295 (1906). 
 Day {The Dutch in Java) says that the Filipinos under the monopoly sys- 
 tem were worse off than the slaves in Cuba.
 
 265 iTHE PHILIPPINES 
 
 were immediately bought up by the speculators at a mere frac- 
 tion of their face value. Toward the end the debt to the tobacco 
 growers became so great that the governor-general in despera- 
 tion appropriated the funds of the Deposit Bank, and its deposit 
 notes, which were mostly held by clerks, were consequently dis- 
 honored. 
 
 And yet the natives are said to have generally opposed the 
 abandonment by the government of the control of the tobacco 
 industry, preferring its certainties to the uncertainties of private 
 control. In 1882 the monopoly came to an end and the tobacco 
 lands soon passed into the hands of private corporations and in- 
 dividuals.^^ 
 
 It is not easy to ascertain the exact amount of money which 
 the Spanish government collected through taxation. The receipts 
 of the central government, as shown by the annual budgets, 
 do not show the taxes collected by the provinces and munici- 
 palities for their own uses. Nor do they include all the collec- 
 tions made by the church authorities, which were in reality taxes 
 imposed by the state and formed no small portion of the burden 
 imposed on the people. Taking the year 1894-1895, just before 
 the outbreak of the insurrection, we find that the receipts of the 
 central government were as follows •^^ 
 
 Direct taxes $6,659,450 
 
 Indirect taxes (customs) 4,565.000 
 
 Receipts for monopolies 1,112,850 
 
 Lotteries 873,000 
 
 From state property 195,000 
 
 Estimated petty receipts 174,000 
 
 Total $13,579,300 
 
 ^2 The Companie General de Tobacco de Filipinos organized in 1883 is still 
 an important factor in the business life of the islands. It is the only remain- 
 ing Spanish business concern of importance, and the gentlemen responsible 
 for its policy have worked in perfect harmony with the American govern- 
 ment. 
 
 13 The receipts for 1896-7 were $17,474,000, Mex. The first budget was 
 published in 1839. Foreman {The Philippine Islands, p. 227) gives some of 
 the figures of the 1888 budget. For the budget for 1896-7, see Sen. Doc. 62, 
 55 Cong., 3d Sess., p. 409; Sawyer, The Inhabitants of the Philippines, Appen- 
 dix ; in the Report of the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands on Civil 
 Affairs, 1900 {Kept. War Dept., 1900, I, Pt. 10).
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 267 
 
 The proceeds of direct taxation — that is, the poll and income 
 taxes — tlius produced one-half of the total revenue. Four mill- 
 ion five hundred eighty-six thousand two hundred fifty dollars 
 of it was collected from the cedulas, or personal identification cer- 
 tificates. Next to the cedulas the tax on commerce and industry 
 was most productive, yielding $1,323,000. The poll tax on Chi- 
 nese produced $482,800, and the tax on urban property $1 10,400. 
 Of the balance twelve thousand dollars came from the tributes 
 received from wild tribes, thirty-five thousand dollars from the 
 ten per cent, tax on railway tickets, seventy thousand dollars 
 from a ten per cent, assessment on certain salaries, and forty 
 thousand dollars from a twenty-five per cent, tax on the pre- 
 miums for the collection of urban and industrial taxes, cedulas 
 and the Chinese head tax. 
 
 The customs receipts, which amoimted to $4,565,000, were 
 made up of $3,800,000 from duties on imports, $430,000 duties 
 on exports, $300,000 clearance dues, and the balance from fines 
 and so forth. In the receipts from monopolies are included 
 $602,300 from the opium contract, and $510,550 from stamps 
 and stamped paper. The receipts from state property included 
 rents or products as well as sales. The sale of forest products 
 produced $122,000, the sale of lands $45,000, and of buildings 
 $25,000. Of the $174,000 estimated petty receipts, $100,000 
 was expected to accrue from profits on the coinage, $9,000 from 
 the sales of army and navy stores, $13,000 from resources de- 
 scribed as "indeterminate," and $30,000 was the estimated unex- 
 pended money in the secret service fund. 
 
 The expenditures for the same fiscal year were : 
 
 General obligations $1,360,506 53 
 
 State 65,150 00 
 
 Church and courts 1,687,108 88 
 
 War 4,045.061 84 
 
 Navy 2,450,176 77 
 
 Government (gobernacion) 2,220,120 98 
 
 Public Works and Institutions 628,752 46 
 
 Total $12,456,877, 46
 
 268 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 It appears that of the $1,360,506.53 the sum of $118,103 was 
 spent on the colonial department in Madrid; $70,822.73 on the 
 colony of Fernando Po, on the coast of Africa ; $718,000 on pen- 
 sions, and $367,000 was paid for interest. Nearly all of the 
 $65,150 devoted to the state was used to defray the cost of 
 Spain's diplomatic and consular service in China, Japan and the 
 French and British colonies. Of the sum alloted for the church 
 and courts, $460,315.14 was spent on the courts, $625,860 for 
 salaries of the bishops and parochial clergy, and $419,680 for 
 materials for the ecclesiastical establishment. War, though it 
 was a time of peace, absorbed almost a third of the entire reve- 
 nue of the government. Seven hundred seventy-one thousand 
 forty-three dollars twenty-five cents was paid for the salaries of 
 officials in the administrative bureaus, $1,997,649.27 for the army 
 (13,291 individuals, of whom only 2,210 were Europeans), and 
 $1,332,484.32 for materials for the army. 
 
 Of the allotment for the treasury, $232,996 went to maintain 
 the central offices of the intendency-general and the controller- 
 ship, and $216,244 for provincial administration. Of the navy 
 allotment $1,147,540.20 went for materials and $1,349,504 for 
 salaries and wages. The governor-general and provincial gov- 
 ernors and commanders received for salaries $272,606, the Civil 
 Guard cost $843,735.91, the maintenance of communication, in- 
 cluding posts, $969,921.92, and the general directorate of the 
 civil administration $88,555. Of the money appropriated for 
 public works, $141,175.55 was spent for special institutions of 
 instruction, chiefly in Manila, and $109,690 for public works gen- 
 erally. One hundred forty-two thousand three hundred sixty- 
 five dollars went for the general inspection of mountains, $15,575 
 for mines, $103,570 for agricultural schools and stations, and 
 $37,462 for navigation and lighthouses." 
 
 These figures are interesting as a basis for comparing the 
 Spanish and American administrations. It appears that taxes are 
 
 ^* Report of Schurman Commission (1900), I, p. 79.
 
 TAXATION AND REVENUE 269 
 
 higher at present than they were before 1898, but they are more 
 justly distributed and the people are better able to pay, and the 
 proceeds are spent for the benefit of the country instead of being 
 stolen or wasted.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 Personal Status and Trade Restrictions 
 
 Classification of Residents — Restrictions — Status of Natives — Slavery Forbid- 
 den by Law — The Tribute and Its Collection — The Encomiendas — A Sort of 
 Slavery — Restrictions on Commerce — The Galleons — Japanese and Chinese — 
 Segregation and Regulation of Chinese — Massacres — Effect of the Restrictive 
 System on Character of the Natives. 
 
 The reader who would understand the PhiHppine people and 
 judge of their capacity for self-government must never lose 
 sight of the vital fact that they are the products of the Spanish 
 mission system of colonial government, a system designed to save 
 souls, but not to develop merchants, traders, agriculturists or 
 citizens. At every point where it touched the natives it was re- 
 strictive and repressive, seeking to control his every thought and 
 action. Nothing was further from the thought of the Spaniards, 
 particularly those to whom Spain delegated the actual power, 
 than to train the inhabitants for citizenship in a free constitu- 
 tional government. The laws were paternal In character and 
 were enforced by a superior class of foreigners temporarily resi- 
 dent in the country and to but a limited extent identified by Inter- 
 est or sympathy with the people. The Spaniards who were with- 
 out some official position In either Church or State were of little 
 importance In the community.^ 
 
 The inclination of the Spanish mestizos was to identify them- 
 selves with the Spanish official class In order to share the privi- 
 lege of living on their native blood relations. Frequently they 
 
 1 The number of unofficial Spaniards increased during the last three or 
 four decades. In 1899 a Spaniard, Senor Jose de Loyzaga, the editor of El 
 Commercio, testified that there were about 3,000 Spaniards in the islands. 
 "The Spaniards who hold extensive properties here are no more than three. 
 The rest of them are engaged in keeping shops or something of that sort." 
 Rept. Schurman Com., II, p. 373. 
 
 270
 
 PERSONAL STATUS 271 
 
 were greater tyrants than the Spaniards. The civil, military 
 and ecclesiastical officials, a few Spaniards who were engaged in 
 some business favored by the government, such as farming a 
 monopoly, the Chinese and tlie natives constituted the inhabi- 
 tants. The great proportion of Chinese were native bom, but 
 they were always regarded as a distinct class and subjected to 
 special laws and regulations. 
 
 Until about the middle of the nineteenth century foreigners, 
 other than Chinese, were not permitted to reside in the Philip- 
 pines. After the relaxation of the laws governing foreign com- 
 merce a few English, Swiss, French and American traders estab- 
 lished themselves in Manila; but they were a negligible factor 
 except in so far as they aided in developing commerce. They were, 
 in a sense, transients, although but little more so than the Span- 
 ish civil and military official class who were there to govern the 
 inhabitants for a while and then returned to the Peninsula or to 
 some better official position in Mexico or South America. The 
 sort of people who might accompany a governor-general to the 
 Philippines was determined by law. Discharged soldiers were 
 not allowed to remain in the country. Of course these restric- 
 tions were not always enforced, but the policy was fixed and 
 definite.^ 
 
 Trade was regulated for the benefit of the India House in 
 Seville, and until after the loss of Mexico the foreign commerce 
 of the islands was little more than a form of gambling engaged 
 in by the public officials and their friends, often with money bor- 
 rowed from the Ohras Pias. Commerce, in a broad and gen- 
 erous sense of the term, was forbidden by law. Manufacturing 
 in such a community could never rise much above the level of 
 tinkering. Agriculture never made substantial progress. There 
 were a few haciendas, or plantations, which were owned by the 
 friars or by Spaniards, or caciques, and worked by tenants or by 
 workmen who were generally in a condition of peonage, if not 
 
 2 From December, 18S3, to November, 1854, there were four governor- 
 generals. From 1835 to 1897 there were fifty governor-generals, each serving 
 an average of one 3^ar and three months.
 
 272 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 actual slavery. The small farms were constantly being divided 
 among heirs until they became little more than truck patches. 
 
 In the provinces the people lived in villages gathered about 
 great stone churches and conventos in which the parish priest 
 lived and from which he practically governed the local com- 
 munity. All the political institutions were designed for the at- 
 tainment of religious ends. The legal status of the natives was 
 that of minors who were never expected to reach their majority. 
 They were the wards of the State, by which they had been placed 
 in the custody of the Church to be made into Christians, but 
 never into citizens. 
 
 The system was admirably adapted for its purposes. It as- 
 sumed that the Indians were incapable of development; that they 
 were children and would remain children through successive gen- 
 erations. It contemplated a perpetual condition of tutelage. It 
 succeeded for centuries in isolating the country from the influ- 
 ence of liberal ideas which were revolutionizing and remaking 
 the Western world. It left its mark upon every Filipino who was 
 born and reared under its influence. It paralyzed individual initi- 
 ative, denied the right to participate in public affairs or to acquire 
 modern scientific education. It kept the people shrouded in the 
 mists of economic, religious and political medievalism, and it 
 fought with unparalleled bitterness every attempt to let in the 
 light of modem civilization. Its beneficial work, for which full 
 credit should be awarded, was completed by the end of the first 
 half century of Spanish occupation ; thereafter it was obstructive, 
 repressive and detrimental to the best interests of the people. 
 
 When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines they found 
 three conditions of persons among the natives — ^the chiefs, the 
 timaguas or plebeians, and slaves. Of the latter class there seems 
 to have been a great number. Slavery was an established insti- 
 tution and has never been entirely disestablished in all parts of 
 the Archipelago. According to Morga there were two classes of 
 slaves — seguiguilires, who were in absolute slavery and required 
 to do all kinds of work in and about the master's house, and 
 namamahays, who lived in their own houses and came at the
 
 PERSONAL STATUS 273 
 
 proper times and seasons to assist their lord in planting and har- 
 vesting, constructing his buildings, acting as oarsman for his 
 boats and serving in his house when guests of distinction were 
 present. All classes were subject to sale by the master. The 
 descendants of slaves were of the class of their parents. If either 
 the father or mother was free and the other a slave, a single child 
 was half free and half slave. If there was more than one child 
 the first born followed the condition of the father and the second 
 that of the mother. If there were an odd number of children the 
 last bom was half free and half slave. The children of a free 
 father or mother and a half slave were only one-quarter slave. 
 These partial slaves served their masters during every other 
 moon. The price of a slave depended upon his class and the de- 
 gree of his slavery. 
 
 A free man became a slave if he entered the house of a chief 
 without asking permission, if he crossed the fields planted by a 
 chief, if he even looked at a chief's wife; but it was not a com- 
 mon occurrence for one to enter the state of slavery in this man- 
 ner, as the offenses described were considered so very serious 
 that but rarely was any one guilty of their commission. 
 
 The most numerous slaves were probably those who were in 
 the condition now known as peonage. When a man needed 
 money badly it was customary to offer himself as security for 
 a loan and to serve as a slave to his creditor until the debt was 
 paid. A debt of a few pesos, when properly manipulated, was 
 sufficient to make a man a slave for life. A creditor might 
 transfer both the debt and the security therefor to another per- 
 son. As the wealth and power of each headman depended largely 
 on the number of his slaves he of course tried by all imaginable 
 means to increase their number.* 
 
 8 For detailed descriptions of slavery amonpr the primitive Filipinos, see 
 letter of Martin De Rada (1574), B. & R., XXXIV, p. 292; Chirino's Rela- 
 cion (1604), B. & R., XIII, p. 56; Morga's Sucesos (1609), B. & R., XIV, p. 
 297-310; Blumentritt, De los estados Indigenes Existent en Filipinas en 
 Tiempo de la Conquista Espanola, in the Revista Contemporanca (Madrid, 
 1886). 
 
 A great part of this pamphlet and quotations from other early writers will 
 be found in a report of a committee of the Philippine Assembly entitled. 
 In forme Sobre la Esclavitud y Peonaje en Filipinas (Manila, 1914).
 
 274 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 There are many early Spanish laws and decrees forbidding the 
 holding of natives in slavery.* The Bull of Gregory XIV of 
 April 18, 1591,^ recited that some, despite the edict of the 
 king, continued to keep their slaves, bought or taken in war, 
 "therefore, in order that, as is befitting to reason and equity, the 
 Indians themselves may freely and safely, without fear of bond- 
 age, come and go to their Christian doctrines and to their homes 
 and possessions," it was ordered under pain of excommunica- 
 tion that all slaves be freed. 
 
 Notwithstanding the elaborate legislation, slavery, in more or 
 less disguised forms, continued to exist during the entire Span- 
 ish period, and remnants of it still exist even in the civilized 
 parts of the islands,^ although contrary to law. 
 
 Under the system which was introduced immediately after 
 the conquest of the country, every native family which acknowl- 
 edged the authority of the Spaniards was required to show the 
 sincerity of his loyalty by paying tribute to the government or 
 to some favored person to whom the privilege of receiving the 
 same had been granted. Had the letter of this law been ob- 
 served the tribute would not have imposed any serious burden 
 on the families. It was no greater than any intelligent com- 
 munity of savages should be willing to pay cheerfully for pro- 
 tection against their raiding neighbors, and even the Igorots of 
 
 * Many of these laws are quoted in the pamphlet Informe Sohre la Esclo- 
 vitud y Peonaje en Filipinas, referred to above, pp. 10-19. 
 
 5 See B. & R., VIII, p. 71. 
 
 6 In 1913 Commissioner Worcester published a report in which he asserted 
 that slavery and peonage existed in the Philippines at that time and the same 
 conclusion was reached by W. H. Phipps, the Insular Auditor, who made an 
 investigation about the same time. The Filipino leaders indignantly denied 
 that slavery existed and the Assembly conducted an elaborate investigation 
 into the conditions and reached the conclusion that slavery did not exist. The 
 agitation resulted in the enactment by the legislature of Act No. 2300, which 
 supplied the deficiencies of the Spanish law and by providing penalties for the 
 offense of holding persons in involuntary servitude made the Act of Congress 
 of July 1, 1902, which had been held not self-executing, effective. See Slavery 
 and Peonage in the Philippine Islands, by D. C. Worcester, Manila, 1913; 
 Rept. on Slavery in the Philippines, by W. H. Phipps, Manila, 1913 ; Informe 
 Sohre la Esclavitud y Peonaje en Filipinas, Manila, 1914. 
 
 The controversy, which was personal and political, reduced itself to a mere 
 matter of definition of the word slavery. It was conceded by the investigators 
 that there were many scattered instances of persons who were being deprived 
 of their liberty and required to work for a master against their will.
 
 PERSONAL STATUS 275 
 
 northern Luzon have come to take this view of its legitimate 
 successor, the personal cedula. But the Spaniards always had 
 trouble in collecting the tribute. Entire villages moved away, and 
 many of the people preferred to flee to the mountains rather than 
 pay for being civilized. The amount of the tribute was ordi- 
 narily not sufficient to be oppressive and was never as objection- 
 able as the compulsory service on the public ways and works, 
 which was known as the polos y servicioJ 
 
 The encomenderos profited by the rise of prices, and the king, 
 at the instigation of the friars, ordered that the natives might 
 pay the tribute in kind or in money at their option. Morga says 
 that this was a mistake. They could without too much effort 
 raise the cash, but "now since they naturally dislike work they 
 do not sow, spin, dig gold, rear fowls or raise other food sup- 
 plies, as they did before when they had to pay their tribute in 
 these articles . . . and the country which was formerly well 
 provided and well supplied with all products is now suffering 
 want and deprivation of them." 
 
 Among the institutions developed by the Spaniards in tlie work 
 of governing their colonies, none is more interesting than the 
 system by which the countries were divided among the deserving 
 friends of the king or governor, who, in consideration of the 
 gift, assumed responsibility for the welfare of the natives, the 
 collection of the tribute and the payment of a portion thereof to 
 the government. 
 
 The repartimiento was at first a grant of land in a conquered 
 country, but as the land was of no value without laborers it was 
 soon extended so as to include the natives thereon. The word 
 encomienda seems to describe a later development of the system. 
 According to Helps,® it was a right conceded by royal bounty 
 to well-deserving persons in the Indias, to receive and enjoy for 
 themselves the tribute due from the Indians who should be as- 
 
 '' Morga's Sucesos, B. & R., XVI, p. 164. Originally personal service was 
 due to Spaniards. Rizal in a note to Morga says that in 1890 it had disap- 
 peared from the law but continued to exist in practise. The amount then 
 due the state was fifteen days' labor. 
 
 ^Spanish Conquest in America, III, Chap. 2. See also Moses, Spanish 
 Rule in America, p. 93, and B. & R., II, p. 54.
 
 276 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 signed to them, with the duty of providing for the good of the 
 Indians in spiritual and temporal matters, and of inhabiting 
 and defending the provinces where their encomiendas should be 
 granted to them. It was simply a mild form of slavery. The 
 grantees were supposed to maintain order, attend to the welfare 
 of the people and protect them from oppression by soldiers and 
 other Spaniards. In the event of any calamity or public disaster 
 they were expected to care for the people. The amount of serv- 
 ices they could require was in theory definite; in practise very 
 much otherwise. They were required by the Laws of the Indias 
 to build stone houses on their lands and otherwise develop the 
 country. 
 
 One of the vessels which followed Legaspi carried an order 
 directing him to divide the islands into encomiendas among the 
 conquerors. As rapidly as the country was subjugated it was 
 divided among officers and soldiers. The energetic Salcedo was 
 given the encomienda of Vigan, and upon his death he left his 
 property to the Indians who had been granted to him. A few 
 of the encomiendas were reserved for the king. So rapidly did 
 the work proceed that about twenty years after the system was 
 introduced the entire island of Luzon, so far as it was ever occu- 
 pied, had been granted in encomiendas.^ 
 
 From Morga's report it appears that there were then 266 enco- 
 miendas, of which only thirty-one were the king's, paying in all 
 
 ^Report of the Encomiendas in the Islands in 1591. Archivo del 
 Bibliofilo Filipino, IV, p. 39, quoted in B. & R., I, p. 39. 
 
 In his Secesos (1609), B. & R., XVI, p. 157, Morga says: "All these 
 islands and their natives so far as they were pacified were apportioned into 
 encomiendas from the beginning. To the royal crown were allotted those 
 which were the chief towns and ports, and the dwellers of the cities and 
 towns ; and also other special encomiendas and villages in all the provinces 
 for the expenses and necessities of the royal estate. All the rest were assigned 
 to the conquerors and settlers who have served and labored for the conquest 
 and pacification, and in the war. This matter is in charge of the Governor, 
 who takes into consideration the merits and services of the claimants. In 
 like manner the villages that become vacant are assigned. There are many 
 very excellent encomiendas throughout the Islands, and they oflrer many 
 profits, both by the amount of their tributes and by the nature and value of 
 what is paid as tribute. The encomienda lasts, according to the royal laws 
 and decrees, and by the regular order and manner of succession to them, for 
 two lives; but it may be extended to a third life, by permission. After it 
 becomes vacant it is again assigned and granted anew."
 
 PERSONAL STATUS 277 
 
 166,903 tributes. It is estimated that each tribute represented 
 five persons. This probably represents the population of the 
 islands three hundred years ago, excluding what are known as 
 the non-Christian tribes and the Moros. 
 
 In Spanish-America no one was permitted to hold more than 
 three hundred Indians, but in the Philippines one thousand or 
 more tributantes were often held by a single person. The grant- 
 ees were supposed to live on their estates, but in practise they 
 soon became merely collectors of tribute, non-resident encomen- 
 deros, or landlords who once a year went the rounds and made 
 their collections. If payment was refused the headman was 
 whipped or otherwise punished. Some of the royal decrees pro- 
 vided that only Christian Indians should be given to the encom- 
 enderos, but like other restrictive laws they were not always ob- 
 served. Under the system all peacefully inclined Indians who 
 accepted the government and were Christianized could be made 
 the slaves of the encomenderos. Surely this was not much of 
 a reward to offer an Indian who was hesitating between becom- 
 ing a convert and a remontado. 
 
 The king attempted to regulate the forced labor of the Indians 
 by just laws,^** but the laws were generally ineffectual. After 
 making allowance for the possibility of exaggeration, it is appar- 
 ent from Bishop Salazar's description of conditions that the insti- 
 tution of the encomienda, although an efficient instrument for 
 establishing and maintaining order, was productive of much hard- 
 ship and suffering. 
 
 During the first thirty years of Spanish occupation commerce 
 with the coast of Asia was free and unrestricted. Hardly 
 had Manila been established, when a ship arrived from China 
 loaded with silks, porcelain, gunpowder, mercury, pepper, cloves, 
 cinnamon, sugar, iron, copper, lead, wax, lime, and, as some as- 
 sert, images of saints and crucifixes for sale to the Christians. 
 The trade with China increased rapidly, and for some years 
 Chinese goods were the only articles sent from the Philippines 
 to Mexico and other Spanish- American ports. European coun- 
 
 io"See Law of PhiUp III. May 26, 1609, in B. & R., XVII, p. 79.
 
 278 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 tries were not allowed to engage in commerce with the islands, 
 but as ships from India and Siam could enter the Philippines, 
 it was only necessary for the English, Dutch and French mer- 
 chants to land in Manila and from there import their goods in 
 ships under the apparent command of Asiatic captains. 
 
 But the merchants of Cadiz and Seville, who enjoyed a mon- 
 opoly of the commerce with America, looked with disfavor on 
 the trade in silks and Chinese products that had grown up be- 
 tween Manila and New Spain.^^ At their instance, about 1593, 
 the king issued a royal decree which restricted the trade between 
 the Philippines and Mexico to two hundred and fifty thousand 
 dollars per annum for exports to Mexico, and five hundred thou- 
 sand dollars per annum for imports to the Philippines, to be car- 
 ried in two ships not to exceed three hundred tons' burden each. 
 It was also provided that no ship should bring more than five 
 hundred thousand dollars in money including the situado sent by 
 the king to pay the cost of the administration in the islands. 
 No one could directly or indirectly bring bullion from Mexico 
 to the Philippines, and before an immigrant could bring in even 
 his own money he had to give a bond guaranteeing that he would 
 reside in the Philippines for not less than eight years. For a 
 time these regulations were evaded, but in 1604 the cedula of 
 1593 was republished and thereafter strictly enforced. 
 
 The story of the trade which was carried on between Acapulco 
 and Manila is one of the strangest in the history of commerce. 
 The profits were enormous. It was a lottery in which, barring 
 accidents, every ticket drew a prize, and it was as demoralizing 
 as any other lottery. 
 
 Every Spaniard was entitled to a share in the voyage in pro- 
 portion to his capital and his importance in the community. Ac- 
 cording to the regulations the ship's hold was divided into a 
 certain number of spaces called boletas, and each boleta was ar- 
 ranged to hold a package of merchandise of a certain shape and 
 
 '^'^ Commerce of the Philippines with Nueva Espana (1640-1736). This 
 elaborate document contains the protest of the Manila people against the 
 restrictive policy. B. & R., XLIV, p. 225 et seq., and XLV, pp. 29-88.
 
 PERSONAL STATUS 279 
 
 size. These holetas were about four thousand in number, and 
 were subdivided into parts in order to provide facilities for the 
 "small shipper." The right to participate was evidenced by tick- 
 ets which were distributed by a board composed of the governor, 
 attorney-general, the head of the audiencia, one alcalde, one 
 regidor and eight prominent citizens. The tickets were divided 
 into eighths. In the eighteenth century they were worth from 
 eighty dollars to one hundred dollars in times of peace, and as 
 much as three hundred dollars in war times. We learn that in 
 1766 the tickets sold for two hundred dollars each and that the 
 galleon went loaded beyond the legal limit. All except favored 
 officials had to prove that they were members of the Manila 
 Chamber of Commerce, and that they had contributed their share 
 of the twenty thousand dollars which had to be paid to the cap- 
 tain of the galleon for each trip from Manila to Mexico and 
 return. Space was reserved for certain officials, widows in indi- 
 gent circumstances, and others whom it was desired to favor." 
 
 Bourne has drawn from Le Gentil and Zufiiga the following 
 account of the manner in which this trade was managed.^^ "The 
 small holders who did not care to take a venture in the voyage 
 disposed of their tickets to merchants or speculators, who bor- 
 rowed money, usually of the religious corporations, at twenty- 
 five to thirty per cent, per annum to buy them up, and who some- 
 times bought as many as two or three hundred. The command 
 of the Acapulco galleon was the fattest office within the gift 
 of the governor, who bestowed it upon 'whomsoever he desired 
 to make happy for the commission,* and was equivalent to a 
 gift of from fifty thousand dollars to one hundred thousand 
 dollars. This was made up from commissions, part of the pas- 
 sage-money of passengers, from the sale of his freight tickets, 
 
 12 Tomas de Comyn says "that each shipper had to pay down twenty-five 
 to forty per cent for freight, according to circumstances, which money is 
 distributed among certain canons, aldermen, subalterns of the army and 
 widows of Spaniards to whom a given number of tickets or certified permits 
 to ship are granted, either as a compensation for the smallness of their pay, 
 or in the way of a privilege." Rojo refers to "having completed the dis- 
 tribution or allotments of tiie tickets in the best manner that this labjnrinth 
 of entanglements, complaints, and vileness permits." B. & R., XLIX, p. 196. 
 
 " B. & R., I, Int, p. 64.
 
 280 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 and from the gifts of the merchants. Captain Arguelles told 
 Careri in 1696 that his commissions would amount to twenty- 
 five thousand dollars or thirty thousand dollars, and that in all 
 he would make forty thousand dollars ; that the pilot would clear 
 twenty thousand dollars and the mates nine thousand dollars 
 each. The pay of the sailors was three hundred and fifty dol- 
 lars, of which seventy-five dollars was advanced before the start. 
 The merchants expected to clear one hundred and fifty to two 
 hundred per cent. The passenger fare at the end of the eight- 
 eenth century was one thousand dollars for the voyage to Aca- 
 pulco, which was the hardest, and five hundred dollars for the 
 return. Careri's voyage to Acapulco lasted two hundred and 
 four days. The ordinary time for the voyage to Manila was 
 seventy-five to ninety days." "One such voyage," wrote Careri, 
 "is enough to destroy a man or make him imfit for anything as 
 long as he lives." 
 
 The business of the colony was confined almost entirely to 
 this demoralizing galleon trade with Mexico. "The people of 
 Manila," said Archbishop Rojo, "are only busy for two or three 
 months each year getting ready their bales for the Acapulco ship 
 and during the rest recline at ease. This ease is the pillow and 
 stimulus of other vices, and one of the effects which is experi- 
 enced is the multitude of clerks and the huge amounts of copying 
 paper which are consumed throughout the year."^* 
 
 The trade continued until 1718, when the merchants of Se- 
 ville and Cadiz succeeded, over the protest of the viceroy, in 
 having the importation of Chinese silk into Mexico forbidden. 
 But the merchants of Manila were also active and sent a repre- 
 sentative to Madrid, who, after a long struggle before the Coun- 
 cil of the Indies, succeeded in getting the law modified so that 
 in 1734 the trade was reopened, and the amounts of exports and 
 imports increased to five hundred thousand dollars and one mil- 
 lion dollars, respectively. The last galleon sailed from Manila 
 in 1811 and returned in 1815. Thereafter the trade was in the 
 hands of private persons, but was limited to seven hundred and 
 
 "Rojo's Narrative, B. & R., XLIX, p. 193.
 
 I 
 
 PERSONAL STATUS 281 
 
 fifty thousand dollars a year and confined to designated ports 
 in Mexico and South America. The direct trade with Spain 
 was carried on by a public ship until 1783, when it was granted 
 to the Royal Philippine Company as a monopoly. This com- 
 pany ceased to exist in 1830. 
 
 In the early years there was some communication between 
 Spain and Japan, and this continued until the massacre by the 
 latter of the Christian missionaries. At that time many of the 
 converted Japanese escaped to Manila, where they were allowed 
 to reside. The missionaries did all in their power to encourage 
 Japanese and Chinese to come to the islands because they hoped 
 thereby to increase the number of their converts. The Chinese 
 were trading with the natives at Manila before the arrival of 
 the Spaniards, and after the founding of the Spanish city they 
 settled there in such numbers as to create apprehensions. In 
 1580 Governor Ronquilla inaugurated the policy of segregating 
 the Chinese, Japanese and the Malays from Borneo, and sub- 
 jecting them to special laws and restrictions.*'' He built the 
 Parian under the guns of the fort and the alcaceria or silk mar- 
 ket, where all except such as were married to Filipino women 
 were required to live and transact their business. As the num- 
 ber continued to increase, the Parian was relocated and laid out as 
 a barrio. It soon grew into a Chinese town with its own church, 
 cemetery and priest. But it was always under military g^ard. 
 The Parian became the commercial quarter of Manila where all 
 kinds of Chinese, Japanese and European goods, wares and mer- 
 chandise were sold. 
 
 The Chinese were the artisans and laboring men, the carpen- 
 ters and blacksmiths, as well as the merchants of the city. In 
 the course of time the entire community became dependent upon 
 them. They had the same characteristics then as now. They 
 were willing and anxious to work, and as neither the Spaniards 
 nor the Indians were particularly ambitious in that direction, 
 their opportunities were practically unlimited. It was inevitable 
 
 *' Vide Extracts from the Laws of the Indians, Relative to the Chinese in 
 the Philippines, B. & R., XXII, p. 151.
 
 282 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 that they should become the possessors of most of the wealth 
 of the community. A good idea of the extent of the business 
 is gained from the following contemporary letter quoted by Ar- 
 gensola/* 
 
 "The city is remarkable for the size of the buildings, which 
 have surprised me. I shall mention only one, which is the chief 
 one. It has an Alcayceria that contains all kinds of silks and 
 gold, and mechanical trades ; and for these things there are more 
 than four hundred shops, and generally more than eight thousand 
 men who trade therein. When the trading fleet comes in from 
 China with their merchandise . . . there are always more 
 than thirteen thousand or fourteen thousand men. [They bring 
 wonderful things that are found in Europa." 
 
 The Chinese were a source of constant worry to the author- 
 ities, and the policy pursued was that of restriction and regula- 
 tion. It was never satisfactory. The enforcement or non- 
 enforcement of the strict regulations was used by the officials as 
 a means of graft, and many accumulated wealth through the 
 possession of discretionary powers in this respect. Fear, jeal- 
 ousy, envy, race hatred, and policy tempted the Spaniards to 
 destroy the Chinese, and this they did at pretty regular intervals. 
 They were probably justified in their distrust and fear. The 
 yellow peril had already appeared upon the horizon. The shadow 
 of a probable invasion was always over the land. After the visit 
 of the mandarins, the Spaniards thought it advisable to abandon 
 the Moluccas, in order to devote their entire strength to pre- 
 paring for defense against the Chinese. In 1603 there were only 
 about eight hundred Spaniards in the city of Manila and its en- 
 virons, while there were about twenty thousand Chinese, who 
 were often bold and insolent. The revolt against Rajah Brooke 
 in the near-by country of Sarawak two centuries later shows what 
 they were capable of doing. In the troubles of 1603 the Chinese 
 probably took the initiative; if so, they paid the penalty of an- 
 nihilation. 
 
 ^^Conquesta (1609), B. & R., XVI, p. 296.
 
 I 
 
 PERSONAL STATUS 283 
 
 But after the massacre the Spaniards began to fear that they 
 had overobne the matter, and that the citizens, Spaniards as well 
 as Indians, would be under the dire necessity of going to work. 
 This, we are told, "conspired to sadden the minds of the Span- 
 iards." Morga says that "after the end of the war the need 
 of the City began, for, because of not having Chinese who worked 
 at the trades, and brought in all the provisions, there was no 
 food, nor shoes to wear, not even at excessive prices. The native 
 Indians are very far from exercising those trades, and have even 
 forgotten much of farming and the raising of fowls, cattle and 
 cotton, and the weaving of cloth, which they used to do in the 
 days of their paganism and for a long time after the conquest 
 of the country. In addition to this, people thought that Chinese 
 vessels would not come to the Islands with food and merchandise 
 on accoimt of the late revolution."" 
 
 So the governor sent a letter to China explaining why it had 
 been necessary to kill the Sangleys and expressing the hope that 
 the little incident would not prevent their friends from coming 
 to Manila in the future. The Chinese, as usual, did not take the 
 killing of their compatriots too seriously, and their goods were 
 soon coming to Manila in quantities sufficient to supply the neces- 
 sities of the inhabitants. The good people had learned a lesson, 
 and thereafter a few Chinese were always left to do the work. 
 In 1639, when they had increased to forty thousand, they killed 
 only twenty-two thousand. After the slaughter in 1662 about 
 eight thousand were left, but by 1755 they had again accumu- 
 lated wealth, and at the instigation of the Spanish merchants, 
 who had organized a society to take over all the buildings and 
 grounds occupied by the Chinese communities, the governor- 
 general ordered all the Chinese except such as had become Chris- 
 tians to be expelled from the islands. There were only 515 
 Christians, but with characteristic Celestial shrewdness about one 
 thousand others announced that they were earnestly studying the 
 
 *^ This was written about thirty-five years after Manila was founded. 
 ^ Rizal in a note to his edition of Morga's Sucesos cites this passage to sus- 
 tain the view that the coming of the Spaniards and Chinese destroyed the 
 industry and agriculture of the country.
 
 284 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 doctrines and expected soon to become Christians, and they were 
 permitted to remain. 
 
 The destruction of the Chinese in the provinces after the de- 
 parture of the British again produced a shortage in the labor 
 supply, and the order of expulsion was revoked. In 1804 it was 
 ordered that only those engaged in agriculture should be allowed 
 to live in the country. But a Chinaman will not long remain an 
 agriculturist. He travels rapidly from a garden plot to a tiende 
 and by easy stages to a wholesale house in Calle Rosario. A few 
 years later they were permitted to engage in any branch of indus- 
 try providing a permit was first obtained from the proper gov- 
 ernment official. It is needless to say that in many cases these 
 permits cost a great deal of money. 
 
 During later times the Chinese greatly increased in number. 
 In 1876 there were over thirty thousand, and in 1886 the num- 
 ber had increased to one hundred thousand. Many were smug- 
 gled in from Borneo, a custom which to some extent has sur- 
 vived to the present time. In 1886 the Chinese were forbidden 
 to reside in the provinces or to trade with the Moros. Two years 
 later they were forbidden absolutely to live in Mindanao. Such 
 was their status when the country passed under the sovereignty 
 of the United States, and her exclusionary acts were made op- 
 erative. 
 
 The Spanish system of government rested like a dead weight 
 upon the millions of common people. There was little to encour- 
 age any one to aspire to improve his condition; nothing was 
 required of the native but to be good and obey orders. Slavery, 
 the encomienda, the trade restrictions, forced labor, personal 
 service in many forms, all served to prevent the growth of self- 
 respect and personal independence. The perpetual quarrels of 
 the officials and the ecclesiastics, the oppressive acts of the mili- 
 tary officials and alcades, rendered the government an object of 
 hatred to the people. With examples of official corruption con- 
 stantly before them it is not surprising that they were not im- 
 bued with high ideals of government and were inclined to ac- 
 cept the view that the first duty of every public servant was to
 
 PERSONAL STATUS 285 
 
 provide for his own future out of the public funds. Certainly 
 it was not a school in which to train an impressionable people 
 in the civic virtues or to develop in them the qualities neces- 
 sary for self-government.
 
 PART IV 
 
 American Occupation and Change of 
 Sovereignty 
 
 '7m proportion as the navigation of the west coast of America 
 extends the influence of the American element over the South 
 Sea, the captivating, magic power which the great Republic exer- 
 cises over the Spanish Colonies, will not fail to make itself felt 
 also in the Philippines. The Americans are evidently destined 
 to bring to a full development the germs originated by the Span- 
 iards. As conquerors of modern times, they pursue their road to 
 victory with the assistance of the pioneer's ax and plow, represent- 
 ing an age of peace and commercial prosperity in contrast to that 
 bygone and chivalrous age whose champions were upheld by the 
 cross and protected by the sword." Jagor, Travels in the Philip- 
 pines, (London, 1875), p. 369. 
 
 "To extend rulership over subdued natives is to bad men a 
 felicity, but to good men a necessity." — St. Augustine. 
 
 "No Constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours 
 for extensive empire and self-government." — Thomas Jefferson 
 (1809).
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 The Capture of Manila 
 
 Conditions in 1898 — Means of Defense — Opinions as to Relative Power — 
 Dewey at Hong Kong — And Mirs Bay — Localizing a War — Spanish Prepa- 
 rations at Manila — Destruction of the Spanish Fleet — At Anchor on the 
 Battle-Field — New Problems for the Government — Attitude of Foreign Naval 
 Officers — The Germans — The Filipinos Disloyal to Spain — Arrival of Amer- 
 ican Troops — Camp Dewey — The Military Situation — Delaying the Attack 
 — Plan for Painless Extraction of Spaniards — Night Attacks — Demands for 
 Surrender — Capture of the City — Terms of Capitulation — ^The Insurgents and 
 Their Claims — Conflict Avoided — ^The Materiel Captured. 
 
 The eventful year of 1898 found the Philippines enjoying 
 a condition of comparative quiet. The insurrection had been 
 brought to an end by the arrangement at Biak-na-bato, and 
 the leaders were scattered in foreign countries. But there were 
 rumblings of discontent over the failure of the government to 
 institute reforms which it was claimed were a part of the con- 
 sideration upon which the insurgents had laid down their arms, 
 and numerous small bodies were still disturbing various sections 
 of the country.^ 
 
 Primo de Rivera was governor-general,* with Admiral Mon- 
 tojo in command of the fleet. The serious insurrection of 1896 
 had made it necessary to strengthen the army and navy, and al- 
 though a number of soldiers had been returned to the Peninsula 
 the Spanish military power in the islands was much greater than 
 it had been for many years.* 
 
 ^The most serious disturbances were in southern Pangasinan, Zambales 
 and Cebu. Report of Consul-General Williams. Sen. Doc. 62, 55th Cong., 
 3d Sess., p. 221. 
 
 2 On April 10 he was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Basilio Augustin, 
 "the well-meaning but rather dunderheaded old soldier whom the Liberals 
 had sent out to take his place." 
 
 ' For a memorandum of Spanish troops in the Philippines, see Corres- 
 pondence Relating to the War with Spain, II, p. 654. General Corbin esti- 
 mated the number at 41,014. 
 
 289
 
 290 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Admiral Montojo's fleet in Philippine waters was composed 
 of the Reina Cristina, the Castilla, the Isla de Cuba, the Isla de 
 Luzon, the Don Juan de Austria, the Don Antonio de Ulloa, the 
 Marques del Duero, and numerous gunboats and smaller craft, 
 in all 11,689 tons, with a complement of 1,664 men. <,^-f^ 
 
 Notwithstanding this formidable force the Spaniards were 
 little better prepared to defend the islands against an efficient 
 modern military force than they had been a century and a half 
 earlier, when the British fleet sailed into Manila Bay. The local 
 authorities were familiar with the political situation in Europe 
 and America and had been warned of the probability of war 
 between the United States and Spain, but, like Roja and his asso- 
 ciates on the former occasion, they seem to have felt that their 
 very remoteness was a defense from attack. 
 
 Until a hostile fleet was already on their coasts they made no 
 serious eft'ort to make effective the means of defense which were 
 at hand, and then, amid the usual diversity of counsel, they 
 merely succeeded In establishing their utter incapacity. 
 
 At the opening of the war both the United States and Spain 
 had the beginnings of a modern navy, but neither was in even 
 the second class as naval powers. As events showed, the United 
 States navy was superior in all respects to that of Spain, but 
 the world was not fully informed as to the facts and generally 
 overestimated the Spanish power, naval and military. 
 
 But the American government had very exact Information as 
 to the inefficiency of the Spanish navy, while the Spanish political 
 authorities either wilfully closed their eyes to the situation, or 
 were so blinded by prejudice that they were unable to see. The 
 mere disparity of heavy armament, which was well known, 
 should have been enough to "give food for thought had the Span- 
 ish authorities but thought at all." 
 
 Few Americans realize the tenacity with which the average 
 European believed, and still believes,* that the Americans are a 
 
 4 In 1814 the London Graphic quotes Mr. Gerard Finnes, described as "one 
 of the greatest naval experts of Europe," as saying : 
 
 "There are a hundred indications which show that a collision between
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 291 
 
 mercenary, mongrel people in whom the sentiment of patriotism 
 must necessarily be very weak. The French press particularly 
 was certain that little could be expected of the American navy, 
 manned as it was alleged to be by "foreign mercenaries." 
 
 A leading Spanish paper,'* in commenting on the approaching 
 war, said, "We shall conquer on the sea, and I am now going 
 to give you my reasons : The first is the remarkable discipline 
 that prevails on our warships; the second is, as soon as fire is 
 opened the crews of the American ships will begin to desert, 
 since we all know that among them are people of all nationali- 
 ties — ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared." 
 
 Continental Europe may be excused for holding such danger- 
 ous opinions and the expressions of the Spanish press, like the 
 proclamations of the governor-general and the archbishop of 
 the Philippines may have been intended for popular consumption, 
 but that intelligent Englishmen familiar with naval history should 
 make such statements is less comprehensible. And yet an Eng- 
 lish technical magazine,® after an elaborate analysis of the two 
 fleets, informed its readers that, "The three thousand Swedish 
 sailors who were to form a part of the complement of the United 
 States sailors might be excellent material if fighting in defense of 
 their own hearths and homes, but naval warfare of to-day is no 
 pastime — it is a grim and ghastly reality, swiftly executed, and no 
 hirelings of an alien state are likely to come out of such a ter- 
 rible ordeal. In point of fact, we do not believe that the Yan- 
 kees thoroughly understand the spirit of mischief that they seem 
 determined to evoke." 
 
 Japan and the United States is approaching. The Americans live in a fool's 
 paradise in this matter. 
 
 "The Japanese are full of contempt for American brag and bounce for the 
 lack of national spirit or even of true nationaHty. They have a profound 
 disbelief in the war-worthiness of the American navy and an acute realization 
 of the fact that the strategical situation is overwhelmingly in their favor.** 
 Cong. Rec, June 23, 1915. 
 
 ȣ/ Heraldo of Madrid, March 6, 1898. The chief owner of this paper 
 was captain of the Cristobal Colon. 
 
 * The Engineer, London, February 15, 1898. American names are mislead- 
 ing; a Swedish or French name on the roster does not necessarily mean that 
 the bearer thereof is a foreigner. His ancestor may have signed the Declara- 
 tion of Independence.
 
 292 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The Asiatic squadron, under the command of Commodore 
 George Dewey, had been ordered to concentrate at Hong 
 Kong. On February 25 Mr. Roosevelt, as acting Secretary of 
 the Navy, had cabled Dewey to keep his bunkers full of coal 
 and in the event of a declaration of war to prevent the Spanish 
 fleet from leaving the Asiatic coasts, and then to take the offen- 
 sive in the Philippines."^ 
 
 Events moved rapidly. Diplomatic relations between the two 
 countries were severed on April 20, and on the following day 
 the American minister at Madrid demanded his passports. On 
 April 21 the Baltimore arrived at Hong Kong with ammunition 
 for the fleet. Although war had not yet been formally declared, 
 Admiral Sampson was ordered to blockade Cuba, and Dewey was 
 directed to hold himself in readiness for further orders. On 
 April 24 he was notified by the British authorities that in ac- 
 cordance with the requirements of the law of neutrality he must 
 leave the harbor of Hong Kong within twenty-four hours. 
 
 The European view of the situation is very well illustrated 
 by an incident which occurred as the fleet was preparing to sail. 
 The German admiral, Prince Henry of Prussia, went aboard 
 the Olympia and said, "Good-bye, Commodore; I fear I shall 
 never see you again. You are going on a desperate undertak- 
 ing." 
 
 On the morning of April 25 the last of the American ships 
 sailed out of the harbor with the cheers of the British soldiers 
 and sailors ringing in their ears, but they only went to Mirs Bay, 
 some thirty miles away, where the evening was spent in distrib- 
 uting ammunition and preparing the fleet for action.^ On the fol- 
 lowing day a revenue cutter arrived from Hong Kong with the 
 news that war had been declared and with orders for Dewey to 
 proceed at once to the Philippine Islands and commence opera- 
 tions against the Spanish fleet.® Within a few hours thereafter 
 the squadron, consisting of the Olympia, Baltimore, Boston, Ral- 
 
 7 Dewey, Autobiography, p. 179. Roosevelt, Autobiography, p. 234. 
 
 8 Dewey, Autobiography, p. 194. 
 «»/fc»d.,p. 195.
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 293 
 
 ii 
 eigh. Concord, Petrel and the revenue cutter McCulloch, was at 
 sea speeding southwestward toward the coast of Luzon. 
 
 When two nations are at war the point of attack and the ex- 
 tent to which the attack shall be pushed are determined by the 
 particular circumstances, local conditions and the objects for 
 which the war is waged. On land the combatants are legally con- 
 fined to their own territories unless, as in the Russo-Japanese 
 War, they are struggling for the possession of the territory of 
 some third power. In that instance, through the influence of the 
 Powers, actual hostilities were to a great extent localized. But 
 the open sea is the common battle-ground for all nations. Navies 
 wander over it in times of peace, and when war commences they 
 strike the forces of the enemy which are nearest. The war 
 with Spain, which grew out of the Cuban situation, naturally 
 localized in the West Indies, but when it opened both belligerents 
 had fleets in the Far East, and it was inevitable that they should 
 come into collision. 
 
 The Spanish authorities in Manila were promptly notified by 
 cable of the sailing of the American fleet. As early as April 19 
 Admiral Montojo had been informed by Madrid "that circum- 
 stances demanded the closing of the ports of the Islands with 
 mines," and had replied, "Your Excellency is aware that I have 
 no mines." But mines were somehow improvised and anchored 
 in the channel near Caballo Island, but so deep that they were 
 harmless. A leading English writer on naval affairs^" says : "The 
 water at the entrance of the bay was so deep as to render the 
 placing of mines difficult, but numerous powerful contact mines 
 were anchored in the channel by the Spaniards. They were, 
 however, placed with the greatest carelessness at depths far be- 
 yond the reach of any ship's hull and were simply wasted." 
 
 Admiral Montojo advised that the port of Subig should be 
 fortified and that the fleet should repair there and wait the 
 enemy, "provided they come at all, keeping the fleet in readiness, 
 
 / 
 
 *® Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, p. 124. See also Harper's Magacine, 
 Feb.. 1899, p. 481 ; The Defense of Manila Bay, by Lieut. J. M. Ellicott, Proc. 
 U. S. Naval Institute, June, 1900; Dewey, Autobiography, pp. 201, 202.
 
 294 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 in case Manila should be assaulted, to hasten there at night and 
 attack the Americans, as soon as the governor-general sends 
 notice by telegram that the time is propitious for such a ma- 
 noeuvre," But, alas ! that propitious time never came. The child- 
 ish suggestion throws a flood of light upon the incapacity of the 
 Spaniards to do much more in such a situation than to fight 
 bravely. A hurried attempt, was in fact made to fortify Subig 
 Bay, but the utter futility of it all soon became apparent even to 
 the Spaniards. 
 
 All naval authorities are agreed that of the possible courses 
 open to the Spaniards they selected the one which offered the 
 least chance for success. Had Montojo met the American ships 
 as they were passing Corregidor in the night and made a sharp 
 vigorous attack he might have inflicted great damage and pos- 
 sibly have left Dewey in a serious condition. Had he abandoned 
 the ships and added their guns, equipment and men to the de- 
 fenses of Manila it is questionable whether Dewey could, under 
 such conditions, have done more than institute a blockade. 
 
 The third course was to fight at anchor under the guns of a 
 fort, and this was the one adopted. But even here, having the 
 choice of two locations, the Spaniards selected the one which gave 
 them the least chance of success. ^^ 
 
 As far as armament was concerned, Manila was reasonably 
 well provided with means for defense, but the plan of anchoring 
 the fleet under the guns of the city was rejected because it would 
 provoke the Americans to bombard the city, and, as the precious 
 Plaza and the property of the leading citizens must not be sub- 
 jected to Injury, it was decided to go to Cavite and anchor in 
 the shallow Bay of Cafiacao, where the ships could sink without 
 much risk of drowning the sailors. "The refusal of the gov- 
 ernor," says Admiral Chadwlck,*^ "to allow the squadron to 
 place itself in a situation where the guns of Manila could be used 
 
 ^1 "The Cavite fortifications, though weak, exercised the same attractive 
 force on the Spanish squadron as did the obsolete works of Sedan on Mc- 
 Mahon's Army in 1870." Wilson, Downfall of Spain, p. 131. 
 
 12 Chadwick, The Spanish- American War, I, p. 169. See also Wilson, The 
 Downfall of Spain, p. 132.
 
 ^ THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 295 
 
 in its partial defense was fatal to any prospect of success. Not 
 having left the Bay it was the one course left. Damage to 
 Manila could not from a national point of view be commensurate 
 with the loss of the Archipelago, and this latter was the real 
 risk which the Governor insisted upon taking. He could not 
 recognize that a great question was in his hands to decide as 
 might be best for Spain and not Manila." 
 
 It is probable that the responsibility for this blunder rests with 
 the governor-general instead of Admiral Montojo. Going to 
 Cavite made destruction certain. 
 
 The batteries on the water-front at Manila were bluffed into 
 practical silence by Dewey's threat to fire in their direction. Just 
 what purpose these batteries were expected to serve if they were 
 to remain quiet in order to prevent the enemy from firing at them, 
 and incidentally, of course, into the city behind, it is difficult to 
 understand. On that theory a few good old-fashioned quaker 
 guns placed on the city walls would have served as well and 
 been much cheaper than the powerful Krupps. 
 
 Having successfully passed Corregidor and its much-adver- 
 tised mines, Dewey headed straight for Manila, which lay twenty- 
 two miles due east across the great bay. The speed was so regu- 
 lated as to arrive off the city at the break of day. By three 
 o'clock the low-lying lights were visible. As day broke the fleet 
 was three miles off the mouth of the Pasig River, directly in 
 front of Fort Santiago and the city walls. What in the indis- 
 tinct light had looked like ships of war proved to be peaceful 
 merchantmen. But as the morning mist rose from the water the 
 Spanish fleet became visible, with its back against the wall, nine 
 miles south, under the guns of Cavite and Sangley Point. The 
 shore batteries at Manila had already opened fire, but the Olym- 
 pia, without pausing, turned to the right and, followed by the 
 Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord and Boston, in the order 
 named, moved southward parallel with the shore toward Cavite. 
 The Spanish land battery at Sangley Point began firing almost 
 as soon as the Olympia turned, and their fleet soon joining in, 
 a storm of metal lashed the water far in front of the approaching
 
 296 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 American ships. When six miles away the Olympia fired one 
 shot to test the range. When about three miles from her target 
 she fired an eight-inch shell from one of her turret guns. 
 
 No attempt was made to count the Spanish ships or to identify 
 individual vessels. Close comparison of forces was deemed un- 
 necessary. From general information Dewey was satisfied that 
 the six American cruisers could defeat all the ships Spain had 
 in the Philippines, particularly as they had chosen to lie moored 
 and motionless within easy range of open water deep enough for 
 safe navigation. 
 
 When within two miles the Olympia turned and led a stately 
 procession due west past the Spanish ships, while from every 
 available gun a storm of projectiles rained upon the enemy. As 
 the procession came off Sangley Point it was within easy range 
 of the Spanish batteries, and the contest became one of marks- 
 manship, with the natural advantages in favor of the shore bat- 
 teries. 
 / y. The Spaniards had seven ships in an irregular line, two of 
 ''''^wvhich were moored with springs on their cables. The others 
 /moved about aimlessly, often masking each other's fire, "occa- 
 / sionally dodging back to the shelter of the arsenal and more often 
 / making isolated and ineffectual rushes in advance, rushes which 
 / had no rational significance except as demonstrative of the point 
 [ at hand. They were mere flourishes of desperation, inspired by 
 ! defeat." 
 — ^ Their guns were handled vigorously, although unskilfully, but 
 the aimless hurrying and scurrying about was in painful contrast 
 with the orderly movements of the American ships as they 
 steamed slowly around an ellipse, engaging with all their bat- 
 teries.^^ Their marksmanship was not particularly good, but it 
 was much superior to that of the Spaniards.^*, ^j^ 
 
 15 There has been some uncertainty as to the movement of the American 
 ships. See Chadwick, The Spanish- American War, I, p. 179, and the map in 
 Dewey's Autobiography, p. 198. 
 
 1* Mr. Roosevelt (Autobiography, p. 232) says, "Our navy had no idea 
 how low our standard of marksmanship was. . . . Almost the only man 
 in the navy who fully realized this was our naval attache at Paris, Lieutenant 
 Sims. . . . When I was President, . . . Sims was given the lead in re-
 
 > THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 297 
 
 Montojo soon saw that his position was desperate. In a last 
 effort to accomplish something he sent the Cristina out to grapple 
 with the Olympia, but she was beaten down under the concen- 
 trated fire of the fleet and, turning, crawled like a wounded ani- 
 mal toward the shore, where she grounded. 
 
 Five times the American ships swung back and forth over the 
 course. Although the battle had lasted for two hours, the Span- 
 ish fire seemed as active as in the beginning. It was apparent 
 that the Rcina Cristina and the Castilla had suffered seriously, 
 but otherwise the visible results of the firing were disappointing. 
 
 About this time a disturbing report was brought to the Ameri- 
 can commodore that the ammunition was running low. A great 
 deal of it had been wasted by reckless firing at long range, and 
 the possibility of such a disaster was appalling. It was decided, 
 much to the disgust of the seamen, who, according to the predic- 
 tion of European experts, should have been deserting, to draw 
 off and take account of stock. To conceal the real cause of the 
 movement it was announced that the work was being suspended in 
 order to allow all hands to enjoy a well-earned breakfast. "For 
 God's sake, don't stop now. To hell with breakfast !" shouted a 
 gunner who had a better instinct for what had been accomplished 
 than even the commodore. In fact, the latter appears to have 
 been decidedly uncomfortable — probably more so than at any 
 moment since sailing from Mirs Bay. He did not then believe 
 that the Spanish ships had been sufficiently injured to prevent 
 them from renewing the battle. He had been distinctly disap- 
 pointed by the result of the firing. The projectiles seemed to go 
 too high or too low, as had those of the Spaniards. At that dis- 
 tance in a smooth sea there should have been a large percentage 
 of hits, but apparently the Spanish ships had not been seriously 
 injured. At least they were still firing as vigorously as ever. 
 
 It was known that the enemy had sufficient ammunition to 
 continue the fight almost indefinitely. Dewey was more than 
 
 'organizing and introducing the new system ; and to him more than to any 
 other one man was due the astonishing progress made by our fleet in this 
 respect, a progress which made the fleet, gtm for gun, at least three times as 
 eflFective, in point of fighting efficiency, in 1908 as it was in 1902."
 
 298 THE PHILIPPINES ' 
 
 seven thousand miles from home, and under the most favorable 
 condition it would require a month to secure a new supply of 
 ammunition. Without powder and shell the hunter might be- 
 come the hunted.^^ 
 
 The American ships now gathered in irregular groups four 
 miles or so north of Sangley Point. The Spaniards believed that 
 they had been hauled off for repairs and reported to Madrid that 
 they had sought refuge behind the neutral shipping. An irreg- 
 ular fire was kept up from the shore batteries, and occasionally 
 a shell fell within a few hundred feet of the cruisers. But the 
 novelty of being fired at had worn off, and the work of consulta- 
 tion and counting the shells continued, while the men enjoyed 
 their historic breakfast and cheered one another to the echo. In 
 the meantime the situation was clearing. The effect of the morn- 
 ing's work was becoming apparent. The Spanish line was melt- 
 ing away. The Castilla was in flames. The magazine of the 
 Reina Cristina blew up. Only the Don Juan de Ulloa kept her 
 ensign flying and maintained her station close to the Sangley 
 Point battery. The smaller craft had taken refuge behind the 
 arsenal. 
 
 About eleven o'clock, having ascertained that the reported 
 shortage of ammunition was without foundation, the Americans 
 renewed the battle. But there was very little fight left in the 
 Spaniards. The batteries were soon silenced. By the middle 
 of the afternoon the work was finished, and the squadron was 
 at anchor off the City of Manila. The British consul came 
 aboard the flagship and on behalf of the foreign residents re- 
 quested that the city should not be bombarded. To this Dewey 
 agreed, on condition that he be supplied with coal and granted 
 the use of the cable to Hong Kong. These concessions were 
 refused by the Spanish authorities, and the next day the cable 
 was cut and the end taken aboard an American ship. The forti- 
 fications at Cavite and at the entrance of Manila Bay were now 
 
 *5J. L. Stickney, in Harper's Magasine, Feb., 1899; New York Herald, 
 quoted by Chadwick, I, p, 181. 
 
 Dewey went into the battle with but 60 per cent, of a full supply of ammu- 
 nition.
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 299 
 
 surrendered and were soon rendered incapable of doing further 
 harm.^® 
 
 The victory was complete. The Spanish fleet had been de- 
 stroyed, while the American ships were but slightly damaged — 
 indeed, scarcely more than scratched. Of the Spanish sailors, 
 one hundred sixty-seven were killed and two himdred fourteen 
 wounded. On the American ships there was not even a seri- 
 ously wounded sailor to show for all the Spanish ammunition that 
 had been wasted. 
 
 An English writer has called the battle a military execution, 
 rather than a real contest, but, as Admiral Chadwick says,^'^ this 
 is misleading. The fact is that the American ships "were thor- 
 oughly vulnerable; the action was at short range; and had the 
 scores in marksmanship been reversed the victory, despite their 
 inferiority of force, would have been with the Spaniards. The 
 gist of the matter is thus in that masterful quality in human af- 
 fairs, racial temperament, and in the superior training of the 
 American gunner. Coolness of action and its corollary, accu- 
 racy of aim, were the deciding factors." 
 
 Certain it is that, as the English author admits, the work 
 which lay in the admiral's hands to do was done thoroughly 
 well. 
 
 L Dewey was now in undisputed possession of the Bay of Manila. 
 The instructions of the Navy Department to destroy the Spanish 
 fleet had been obeyed. Spanish naval power in the Orient had 
 been completely destroyed. The City of Manila lay helpless un- 
 der the American guns, j But the American commander had no 
 troops with which to garrison a captured city. The insurgents 
 had become extremely active on land, but could not be permitted 
 
 18 For graphic and authoritative descriptions of the battle, see Admiral 
 Dewey's Autobiography, Chap. 15, and Rear-Admiral Fisk's War Times in 
 Manila. Neither side had any armored ships and both used brown powder. 
 For the relative strength of the squadrons, see Dewey, Autobiography, p. 203, 
 or Anpendix A, p, 294: Ref>ort Chief of Ordnance of the Navy, 1898, pp. 
 1180-1183; Cong. Rec, XXXV, pp. 5374-5375. In the prize money case of 
 Dewey vs. United States, 178 U. S. 510. the court found that there were 2,973 
 men on board the Spanish and 1,836 on the American vessels. In determining 
 the superiority of the Spanish force the land batteries, mines and torpedoes 
 were excluded. See Harper's Pictorial History of the War in the Philip- 
 pines, p. 29. Senate Doc, 175, 57 Cong., Second Sess. 
 
 " Chadwick, The Spanish- American War. I, p. 207.
 
 300 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 to enter the city. Reporting the situation to Washington, Dewey 
 instituted an effective blockade and awaited further orders. The 
 next move must be made in Washington. 
 
 The first news of the battle reached the United States by way 
 of Madrid, and naturally it did not give the whole story. On the 
 second day thereafter the American and English newspapers had 
 secured fairly accurate information, and on May 3 the president 
 telegraphed his congratulations. Dewey*s report did not reach 
 Washington until a week after the battle.^® Soon thereafter he 
 was raised to the rank of admiral. 
 
 It is evident that the authorities at Washington were a trifle 
 confused by the suddenness and completeness of the victory. 
 
 Notwithstanding the statement of Secretary Alger^* that it 
 had, before May 1, been decided to send an army to the Philip- 
 pines, it is reasonably certain that no serious plans for events be- 
 yond the battle had been formed. As said by Admiral Chadwick, 
 "Perhaps none were more surprised to find a great Archipelago 
 at their command than were the gentlemen composing the Admin- 
 istration at Washington. The idea of possession had probably 
 but vaguely entered the minds of any one until it was known that 
 a victorious American Squadron commanded so completely the 
 situation."'^" 
 
 But the administration now acted with great promptness and 
 energy. The question of sending troops to the islands was con- 
 sidered immediately upon the receipt of the public rumors of the 
 
 18 The cable company refused to forward messages sent through from 
 Manila. There was some justification for this as the company held its con- 
 cession from Spain on condition that it should not send any cablegrams for- 
 bidden by the government. A violation would result in the forfeiture of the 
 franchise. The application of the company for permission to accept telegrams 
 from both governments was declined. The British government declined to 
 permit the United States to lay a cable from the Philippines to Hong Kong. 
 On July 11, the Spanish government consented that the cable be neutralized, 
 but it was not reopened until August 22. 
 
 1^ Alger, The Spanish-American War, I, p. 326. 
 
 20 Chadwick, The Spanish-American War, I, p. 208. Probably, however, 
 plans had been considered for securing and holding a coaling and naval sta- 
 tion. See an article by A. Viallate, "Les preliminaires de la guerre hispano- 
 Americaine et I'annexic/i des Philippines Par les Etats-Unis," Revue Histor- 
 ique, LXXXII, p. 282.
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 301 
 
 victory. Four days before Dewey's despatch arrived General 
 Miles wrote to the Secretary of War advising that Brigadier- 
 General Thomas M. Anderson "be sent to occupy the Philippine 
 Islands" in command of certain designated regiments. On May 4 
 President McKinley directed that, "The troops designated by 
 General Miles, if approved by the Secretary of War, should be 
 assembled at San Francisco, California, for such service as may 
 be ordered hereafter." 
 
 Upon receiving Dewey's first despatch the Department notified 
 him that the Charleston would sail at once with ammunition, and 
 that another vessel would follow with troops "unless you tele- 
 graph otherwise. How many will you require ?" 
 
 Five days after receiving this inquiry Dewey notified Wash- 
 ington that he could take Manila at any time, that he was main- 
 taining a strict blockade, and that he believed that the rebels 
 were hemming in Manila by land, although they were inactive 
 and making no demonstrations. The possibilities of the future, 
 other than the hostility of the natives, were now in his mind, as 
 he advised the Department that in his judgment to retain posses- 
 sion and thus control the Philippine Islands would require a well- 
 equipped force of five thousand men. 
 
 On May 29 Dewey was informed that no Spanish troops were 
 on the way to Manila, and that the first expedition of United 
 States troops had already sailed from San Francisco. 
 
 In the meantime, while Washington was devising a policy, 
 events of importance were happening in Manila Bay. The moral 
 effect of the naval victory had been very great. The confidence 
 of Europe In the efficiency of the Spanish navy had been badly 
 shaken, and the talk in the press about putting restraint upon the 
 conduct of the United States came to a sudden end. Chadwick 
 says : "The curiosity of naval commanders in the East was in- 
 tense but natural. There was no question of the friendliness of 
 those of Great Britain and Japan, with whom the American Ad- 
 miral was on most cordial terms. But the attitude of the powers 
 of Continental Europe was doubtful, and when the number of
 
 302 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 German ships rose to five and their movements assumed an activ- 
 ity and character not consonant with friendliness the situation 
 became serious."^^ 
 
 The first German cruiser, the Irene, which arrived on May 6, 
 ignored the blockade and, steaming by the Olympia, dropped 
 anchor at a place of her own selection. The Cormoran arrived 
 at three o'clock in the morning, and as she ignored the hail of 
 a steam launch, the Raleigh fired a shot across her bows. The 
 German captain, says Dewey,^^ "was surprised at our action, 
 but our boarding officer explained the law and also the risk that 
 a man-of-war was running into in coming into the harbor at 
 night. We had no thought of being discourteous and no desire 
 to arouse ill-feeling, and fully appreciated how our point of view 
 had not occurred to the captain of the Cormoran when he ran 
 straight in toward our squadron in the dark." 
 
 On the same day a German transport brought fourteen hun- 
 dred sailors to relieve the crews of the German squadron, but the 
 men were kept on the ship. On May twelfth Vice-Admiral von 
 Diedrich arrived with the Kaiserin Augusta. 
 
 From the first the relations between the American and German 
 commanders were strained. When Dewey at their first meeting 
 commented on the apparent disproportion between the naval 
 force which had been assembled in Manila Bay and German 
 commercial interests in the Philippines, the German admiral 
 remarked stiffly, *T am here by order of the Kaiser, sir." The 
 Germans ignored the fact that Manila was blockaded. Their 
 officers landed in Manila and affiliated with the Spaniards; the 
 vice-admiral called officially on the Spanish captain-general, who 
 returned the call at night ; the Irene went to Subig Bay and inter- 
 fered between the Spaniards and insurgents ; German sailors were 
 landed for drill at Marivales; German boats took soundings at 
 the mouth of the Pasig River, and their sailors for a time occu- 
 pied the lighthouse within the city of Manila. During this time 
 Admiral Dewey was inferior in force to the Germans, but the 
 
 21 The Spanish-American War, II, p. 364. 
 ^^Autobiography, p. 255.
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 303 
 
 arrival of the Monterey restored the equilibrium and an issue 
 was at once made. There had been formal correspondence be- 
 tween Dewey and Von Diedrich with reference to the rights of 
 neutral warships in a blockaded harbor, in which the latter at- 
 tempted to sustain the utterly untenable position that his ships 
 were not subject to any regulation while in Manila Bay. Ad- 
 miral Dewey disclaimed any intention of exercising a right of 
 search, but claimed "the right to communicate with all vessels 
 entering the port now blockaded with the forces at my com- 
 mand."^^ The German admiral agreed to submit the question 
 to a conference of the senior officers of the men-of-war in the 
 harbor, but only Captain Chichester, of the British cruiser, ap- 
 peared, and he agreed with Dewey. Von Diedrich refused to 
 acquiesce, and later, when the Cormoran in entering the bay 
 ignored a signal to communicate, the McCulloch fired a shot 
 across her bows. The next day, when the indignant German 
 commander sent a staff officer to state his grievance, Admiral 
 Dewey bluntly told him to inform his chief that persistence 
 in the course which had been adopted would lead to a con- 
 flict. *T made the most of the occasion," says Dewey, "and 
 by using him as a third person to state candidly and firmly my 
 attitude in a verbal message, which he conveyed so successfully 
 that Vice-Admiral von Diedrich was able to understand my 
 point of view. There was no further interference with the block- 
 ade or breach of the etiquette which had been established by the 
 common consent of the other foreign commanders."^* 
 
 23 The right claimed by Admiral Dewey is recognized by all writers on 
 international law. 
 
 ^* Autobiography, p. 266. The accuracy of Admiral Dewey's account is 
 confirmed by Admiral Fiske {With Dewey at Manila, pp. 111-114). See also 
 Chadwick, The Spanish-American War, II, p. 364 ; Wilson, The Downfall of 
 Spain, p. 167. 
 
 ^ After the publication in 1914 of Admiral Dewey's Autobiography Von 
 Diedrich issued a statement in which he denied some of Dewey's statements 
 and attempted to explain his actions at Manila. New York Times, Feb. 25 and 
 28, 1914. His story appeared in the German naval magazine, Marine Rund- 
 chau, for March, 1915. He claimed that the concentration of the German 
 squadron was merely fortuitous and that the misunderstanding with the 
 American admiral was due to the latter's misconstruction of the situation. 
 While it appears from Admiral von Diedrich's statement that Dewey may 
 have misconstrued some of tlie acts of the Germans, the substantial accuracy
 
 304 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 It is difficult to understand the motives which actuated the 
 Germans. Naval officers do not ordinarily ignore the established 
 customs and courtesies of international intercourse. Admiral 
 von Diedrich seemed to resent the presence of the Americans, 
 and made no attempt to conceal that feeling of contempt for 
 American military operations which then pervaded continental 
 Europe. He was there "by order of the Kaiser, sir," and that 
 simple fact to his mind determined all questions of right or 
 wrong. 
 
 The first troops from the United States, under the command 
 of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. A., arrived at 
 Manila^^ on June 30, a second expedition^^ under Brigadier-Gen- 
 
 of the latter's account of what occurred remains unshaken. Von Diedrich's 
 absurd statement that Dewey never established a legal blockade throws a 
 flood of light on the situation. 
 
 The author of The Life and Letters of John Hay (II, p. 280) repeats the 
 story that the Germans sent their fleet to Manila at the suggestion of an Amer- 
 ican official at Berlin. I am informed by Dr. White, who was then the Amer- 
 ican ambassador, that there is no foundation for the story. 
 
 On May 18, 1898, six days after the arrival of Admiral von Diedrich in 
 Manila Bay, Prince Bismarck, in a conversation with Mr. Wolf von Schear- 
 band, said : 
 
 "This whole war is indefensible on grounds of international equity. It is 
 a war of pretext, undertaken against a waning power for the sole sake of 
 spoils. The United States complained that Cuba, as a Spanish colony, was 
 being maladministered. What of that? Colonies have often been misman- 
 aged and I suppose the Americans, when they shall have colonies, will not be 
 exempt. But that is no fair reason for dispossessing the owners. Other 
 powers have never interfered in such cases before. The Creoles and the 
 West India half-breeds are difficult to manage and it would be impossible 
 to satisfy them under any circumstances. The Americans will find them 
 later on a hard nut to crack. Spoils, spoils, all else is pretense. That, too, 
 has been your procedure in the Philippines. The Americans call this Europe 
 of ours effete. Well, there must be some truth in it or else there would have 
 been a united European front to oppose and hinder this unrighteous war. 
 And the Monroe Doctrine ? . . . That is a species of arrogance peculiarly 
 American and inexcusable. . . . How will you enforce it? . . . With 
 your pigmy navy?" Germany, The Welding of a World Power, by Wolf 
 von Schearband, p. 352 (New York, 1902). 
 
 25 This expedition consisting of the Second Oregon and the First Cali- 
 fornia Volunteers, five companies of the 14th United States Infantry, and a 
 detachment of the CaUfornia Heavy Artillery, in all one hundred seventeen 
 officers, and 2,386 men, sailed from San Francisco on May 25, 1898, on the 
 chartered steamers City of Pekin, City of Sidney and Austraila. It brought 
 four hundred tons of much-needed ammunition for the fleet. On the way 
 out it took possession of the island of Guam. 
 
 28 The second expedition was composed of the First Colorado and the 
 Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers, one Battalion 18th Infantry, one Battalion 23rd
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 305 
 
 eral F. V. Greene, U. S. V., on July 17, and a third under Briga- 
 dier-General Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., with which came 
 Major-General Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., the commander of the 
 Department of the Pacific, on July 25. A camp was established on 
 the beach south of Manila, near the present polo grounds. As the 
 water was shallow and the position within easy range of the 
 Spanish guns in Fort Antonio de Abad, it was necessary to land 
 the troops from the transports by means of cascos and steam 
 launches. The Spanish guns, overawed by the guns of the fleet, 
 remained quiet as the American soldiers waded ashore and went 
 into camp, preparatory to marching against the defenses. 
 
 The camp, which was large enough to care for about five thou- 
 sand men, covered practically all the land in the vicinity that 
 during the rainy season was above the level of the rice swamps. 
 Here the troops remained for twenty-six wet and weary days 
 while the chiefs were arranging the stage for the battle of 
 Manila. 
 
 It was the rainy season, and nothing but the inherent good 
 temper and patience of the intelligent American soldier made 
 the life endurable. Granted the privilege of grumbling and ex- 
 plaining the shortcomings of those in authority to his comrades 
 and the folks at home, he could manage to await the course of 
 events. But he had traveled ten thousand miles for the purpose 
 of fighting the Spaniards and could not quite see why there 
 should now be so much delay. True, there were not more than 
 four thousand troops in camp, and in front of them were thir- 
 teen thousand perfectly-armed and equipped Spanish troops, pro- 
 tected by ancient but massive fortifications of the Vauban type 
 surrounded by almost impassable moats. There was also a line 
 
 Infantry, two Batteries Utah Light Artillery, and twenty-eight men from 
 the Regular Eng^ineers, in all three thousand five hundred men. Of these the 
 China carried thirteen hundred, the Senate about nine hundred, and the 
 Zealand and Colon about seven hundred each. 
 
 The third expedition, under the command of Brig. Gen. Arthur Mac- 
 Arthur consisted of one hundred ninety-seven officers and four thousand six 
 hundred fifty men.
 
 306 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 of Spanish blockhouses and trenches on a semicircle which en- 
 closed the various villages which clustered about the city. 
 
 Just outside of the Spanish lines the insurgents had taken, 
 possession of all the roads and connected them by small trenches, 
 in which they had a fluctuating force of about ten thousand men. 
 
 Between the American camp and the city of Manila, about 
 three miles away, lay the villages of Malate and Ermite, each 
 with its plaza and huge stone church. Malate was nearest the 
 American camp, and at its southern limit, at the water's edge on. 
 the point of a peninsula formed by a small stream that flowed 
 diagonally southward through the city, was a strong stone fort 
 known as San Antonio de Abad, which mounted good modern 
 artillery. Opposite this fort the stream was spanned by a bridge 
 with stone parapets backed by sand-bags. Starting at this bridge, 
 which was but a few feet from the fort, and extending about 
 one thousand yards inland to a blockhouse, was a strong line of 
 trenches about five feet high and eight feet thick, with heavy 
 traverses at intervals of a few yards. From this blockhouse, 
 which commanded one of the roads, the line of defense turned 
 to the north and, as it appeared to the Americans, "disappeared 
 in the bamboo thickets." 
 
 General Anderson had brought instructions from Major-Gen- 
 eral Merritt, who had been assigned to the command of the 
 Eighth Army Corps, not to attack Manila before he arrived un- 
 less he was certain of success. Admiral Dewey did not wish to 
 risk his ships until the monitors Monterey and Monadnock ar- 
 rived and with their heavy guns silenced the shore batteries. 
 Under the circumstances it was thought best to await the arrival 
 of General Merritt. In the meantime General Anderson and Gen- 
 eral Greene carefully studied the ground and prepared plans for 
 an attack. The former favored moving to the right across the 
 lowlands to the high ground back of the city, near the village 
 of San Pedro Macati, on the Pasig River, while Greene was 
 in favor of advancing along the shore of the bay and driving the 
 Spaniards out of the fort and trenches. 
 
 When General Merritt arrived, on July 25, he approved Gen-
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 307 
 
 eral Greene's plan, but manifested a disappointing lack of enthu- 
 siasm for an immediate advance on either line. Admiral Dewey 
 had for some time been carrying on negotiations with the Span- 
 iards through the Belgian ConsuP^ Andre, and had become con- 
 vinced that the city could be induced to surrender without loss 
 if a plan could be devised whereby the Spaniards could be 
 given an opportunity to protect their "military honor," which, in 
 the language of the Orient, means, "saving face." 
 
 Admiral Dewey gives a carefully guarded account of the ar- 
 rangements.^' 
 
 "When the negotiations with the Captain-General tending to 
 a surrender were again broached it was M. Andre who acted as 
 intermediary, transmitting all messages (always verbal ones) 
 from the Captain-General to me and from me to the Captain- 
 General. I was almost alone in believing in the sincerity of these 
 negotiations. General Merritt was skeptical, but ready to defer 
 to my judgment, and so were my Chief of Staff and my flag lieu- 
 tenant. Nevertheless I felt confident of the outcome, in which 
 I considered I was fully justified by later events. . . . Andre 
 continued with General Jaudenes the negotiations begun with 
 Don Basillo. These progressed with varying success and nu- 
 merous side issues, but always with the stipulation on the part 
 of the Spaniards that if they surrendered the insurgents should 
 be kept out of the city. Finally, without making any definite 
 promise, General Jaudenes agreed that, although he would not 
 surrender except in consequence of an attack upon the city, yet, 
 unless the city was bombarded, the Manila batteries would not 
 
 _ 27 "The negotiations by which it was attempted to secure a surrender 
 without resistance was carried on through Mr. Andre, the Belgian consul. 
 His method was to go to the governor-general and get a statement, which he 
 wrote down in a memorandum book. Then he would go to General Merritt 
 and Admiral Dewey and get a statement from them, which he would carry 
 back to the governor-general. This was apart from some formal corre- 
 spondence. After the surrender Andre translated to me the notes in his 
 memorandum book, for they were written in Spanish. The substance of the 
 agreement seemed to be that if the fleet did not throw shells into the walled 
 city on the Spanish part of Manila, the Spanish artillery would not open on 
 the fleet. There was no agreement, as the agreement was read to me, that 
 our land forces would not be fired on. On the contrary there was a state- 
 ment that the honor of Spain required that there should be resistance, or 
 that under the Spanish Army Code their officers surrendering without re- 
 sistance or giving a parole would subject themselves to court-martial. Ac- 
 cordingly we were fired on from the trenches and back through the streets 
 of the city." Anderson, in North Am. Rev., CLXX, p. 213. 
 't^ Autobiography, pp. 273, 274.
 
 308 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 open on our ships. Moreover once the attack was begun he would 
 if willing to surrender, hoist a white flag over a certain point 
 in the walled city from which it could be seen both from Malate 
 and from the bay."^^ 
 
 General Merritt on his arrival was convinced by Admiral 
 Dewey that the plan was practicable. The motives which 
 prompted the adoption of this plan of procedure were beyond 
 praise, but as events unfolded it seems that a number of Ameri- 
 can soldiers lost their lives unnecessarily. It might have been 
 better to have allowed the Spanish officers to stand trial accord- 
 ing to the barbarous military code under which they were serv- 
 ing.^" A few shells sent into the city would have forced a prompt 
 surrender without the loss of a single American soldier. Instead 
 of adopting this course the rank and file of the army were left 
 to believe that they were to engage in a serious struggle against 
 a superior force strongly entrenched. They believed that they 
 were risking death in their country's service, when the fact was 
 that they were about to engage in a sham battle with ball-cart- 
 ridges. 
 
 The brigade commanders were not informed of what was be- 
 ing arranged and proceeded with the work of preparation. The 
 insurgents were between the American camp and the Spanish 
 lines, and before an advance could be made it was necessary that 
 they be removed. The task under the circumstances was difficult. 
 General Merritt had given imperative orders that there must be 
 no rupture with the natives and that only pacific and diplomatic 
 means must be used.^^ Nevertheless, he directed General Greene 
 that he must get the Filipinos out of the way. 
 
 29 Soon after the naval battle of May 1, Governor-General Don Basilio 
 Augustin intimated through the British consul that he was willing to sur- 
 render the city. A request to Madrid for authority to make the surrender 
 resulted in Augustin's being directed to turn over his office to General Firmin 
 Jaudenes. Don Basilio was then permitted by Admiral Dewey and General 
 Merritt to sail from Hong Kong on a German vessel. 
 
 30 There was reason for the solicitude of the Spanish officers. After their 
 return to Spain Admiral Montojo and General Jaudenes were confined under 
 the most humiliating conditions in cells in the prison of San Francisco, 
 Madrid. A military tribunal convicted and sentenced them to forced retire- 
 ment and inability in the future to discharge any public duties. Their offense 
 was inability to accomplish the impossible. 
 
 81 Merritt's orders were : "No rupture with insurgents ; this is imperative ;
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 309 
 
 A polite request to vacate and permit the Americans to man 
 the trenches and install better artillery was referred to Aguinaldo, 
 who expressed a desire to have the request in writing. This 
 suggestion was brushed aside with the statement that such for- 
 mal matters could be arranged later. In the meantime General 
 Greene needed the trenches, and soon got them.^^ 
 
 New and more substantial trenches were now constructed much 
 nearer the enemy's lines. The Spaniards did not observe or 
 
 can ask insurgents' generals for permission to occupy their trenches, but if 
 refused not to use force." War Dept. Kept., 1898, I, Part 2, p. 7Z. 
 
 32 A great deal has been made of this incident. General Greene gives the 
 following account: 
 
 "General Merritt arrived on . . . July 25, and after examining the 
 ground the following day promptly decided two points : First, that the attack 
 would be made along the shore, and second, that it was necessary to get the 
 insurgents off to one side so as to give us the right of way. He was very 
 anxious to avoid any entangling alliances with Aguinaldo, with whom he had 
 no direct communication. He therefore sent his chief of staff on the after- 
 noon of July 28 with a verbal message directing me to persuade the insur- 
 gents, if possible, to evacuate a portion of their trenches, but I was to do this 
 on my own responsibility and without intimating that I had instructions to 
 this effect from him. I had previously met General Noriel, who commanded 
 the brigade of insurgents nearest the beach, and on receiving General Mer- 
 ritt's message, I sent my orderly, who spoke Spanish fluently, to find this gen- 
 eral and give him a most polite message that I desired to see him on matters 
 of common interest. At the same time the orderly was instructed not to come 
 back without him. He returned in about an hour with General Noriel and his 
 young Adjutant-General Arevolas, both wearing handsome uniforms and 
 equipment I explained to him that the antique six-inch columbiads which he 
 had in his trenches were of an obsolete pattern and very ineflfective against the 
 Spanish artillery, and that if he would give up the trenches for about four 
 hundred yards from the beach I would place in them the fine modern pieces 
 of field artillery which we had brought and which would be much more effect- 
 ive against the Spaniards. He received the idea favorably, but said he could 
 do nothing without consulting Aguinaldo, and I requested him to do this by 
 telegraph (Aguinaldo's headquarters being about eleven miles in the rear) and 
 give me an answer during the night He promised to do so. About half-past 
 two in the morning his adjutant-general arrived, having been obliged to ride 
 back through the rain and mud to Bacour to see Aguinaldo, as the answer by 
 telegraph was not satisfactory. He said Aguinaldo had given his consent pro- 
 vided I would make the request in writing. I told him that I had no objec- 
 tion to this, but in order to save time I would post troops in the trenches 
 early in the morning and send the written request as soon thereafter as 
 possible. This arrangement was carried out" Century Magazine, XXXV, 
 p. 916. 
 
 Millet {The Expedition to the Philippines, p. 83) says: "On the afternoon 
 of the 28th, General Greene received a verbal message from General Merritt 
 suggesting that he juggle the insurgents out of part of their lines, always on 
 his own responsibility, and without committing in any way the Commanding 
 General to any recognition of the native leaders on opening up the prospect 
 of an allaince. This General Greene accomplished very cleverly, dealing with 
 the natives exactly in accordance with their own methods."
 
 310 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 chose to ignore what was going on until the night of July 31, 
 when they opened on the Americans with artillery and infantry 
 fire. Notwithstanding orders to the contrary, the fire was re- 
 turned and some casualties resulted. This was repeated on suc- 
 ceeding nights. General Greene was anxious to advance, but 
 General Merritt's orders were to hold the trenches and avoid 
 bringing on an engagement. Owing to the bad weather, it had 
 not yet been possible to disembark all of General MacArthur's 
 brigade, which had arrived on July 25, and Admiral Dewey still 
 advised delay. 
 
 The Monterey arrived on August 4. By this time the Ameri- 
 cans, while on the defensive in the trenches, had suffered a loss 
 of twelve killed and twenty-two wounded. On the following day 
 Greene held a conference with Merritt and Dewey and urged an 
 immediate advance. Dewey advised waiting until the Monterey 
 could be overhauled and the Monadnock had arrived, but finally 
 said:^^ "The decision rests with you. If you bum the blue light 
 on the beach the Raleigh will immediately open fire, the Charles- 
 ton will go to her assistance, and the Boston and Monterey will 
 follow if the engagement continues. All three ships have steam 
 up every night and these orders have been given to their captains, 
 but I hope you will not bum the light unless you are on the point 
 of being driven out." 
 
 Merritt agreed with Dewey, and Greene returned with orders 
 to do no more than hold the trenches. That night three more 
 men were killed and seven wounded, and it was decided to hasten 
 the action of the Spanish commander. Dewey and Merritt sent 
 a joint letter to the governor-general stating that, "If the night 
 attacks continue, at the end of forty-eight hours an attack of the 
 land and naval forces would take place, and that the notice was 
 given in order to enable the noncombatants to be removed to a 
 safe place." The governor-general replied that he was sur- 
 rounded by insurgents and had no place to send his people. But 
 so potent was the fear of the naval guns that not another shot 
 
 S3 Dewey, Autobiography, p. 272.
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 311 
 
 was fired on the trenches during the six days which followed 
 before the surrender of the city. 
 
 The shipping people and the residents of Manila took the 
 forty-eight hours' notice seriously, and on the morning of the 
 ninth all the foreign ships left their anchorage and steamed out 
 into the bay. Foreigners moved their persons and as much of 
 their property as was possible aboard their national warships. 
 Red Cross flags blossomed out at unexpected places. But the fate- 
 ful hour of noon passed and nothing happened. The stage was 
 not yet arranged and additional arguments instead of shells were 
 sent into the city. 
 
 The attention of the authorities was called again to the help- 
 lessness of the city and a peremptory demand for surrender was 
 made. The governor-general declined to surrender and asked 
 permission to communicate with his government in Madrid. 
 This, of course, was refused, and the next two days were devoted 
 to the serious work of preparation for the assault, which was 
 to be made on the morning of August 13. 
 
 The plan of battle contemplated that at 10:10 a. m. the cruisers 
 should take their positions and open fire on Fort San Antonio de 
 Abad, which was well south of the city. Immediately thereafter 
 the field artillery in front of the Spanish trenches would join. 
 After the firing had continued for a reasonable time the Olympia 
 would move up in front of the city and display the international 
 signal, which means, "surrender." If this was answered accord- 
 ing to program by the display of a white flag the troops would 
 then move forward and take possession. It was not contem- 
 plated that the troops should bring on an actual battle. 
 
 The Memorandum for General Officers, issued on the twelfth 
 regarding "the possible action on August 13," specified definitely 
 that this white flag might be expected to appear "on the angle 
 of the walled city," and concluded with the statement that, "It 
 is intended that these results shall be accomplished without loss 
 of life." If for any reason the white flag failed to appear, the 
 troops were to await further orders front General Merritt. No 
 one but the commanding general and admiral knew whether
 
 312 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 there was to be an assault. These careful plans may have been 
 humanitarian and designed to save life, but the general innocuous- 
 ness of the whole proceedings suggests the order given by the 
 Spanish Ministry to Admiral Camera, who was directed to re- 
 turn to Spain and "when the torpedo boat destroyers have re- 
 joined your squadron, start for Cadiz with the Pelayo, etc., 
 keeping close to the shore, so as to he seen from Spanish cities, 
 exhibiting when near them the national flag illuminated by 
 search-lights, which are also to be thrown upon the cities." 
 
 Long before the navy opened fire on the morning of the thir- 
 teenth, the troops were in position and eager to advance. The 
 artillery fire brought no response. The guns on the Luneta 
 sulked, and Antonio de Abad was as silent as a tomb. After the 
 fire had continued for some time, General Greene, who had re- 
 ceived orders changing those of the previous day, sent one regi- 
 ment forward along the water-front and took possession of the 
 deserted fort and trenches. The Spaniards retired to their second 
 line of trenches without offering any substantial resistance, and 
 Greene's brigade pushed forward along the shore and through 
 Malate to the open space in front of the walled city known as 
 the Luneta. 
 
 On the right of the line Mac Arthur's men advanced along the 
 Pasay road, and after capturing the first blockhouse, all but a 
 battalion of the Minnesota regiment (which reached the Luneta) 
 moved through Singalong into the Paco district. Severe fighting 
 occurred in Singalong, and there were heavy losses. The white 
 flag, which had now been raised, was not visible to the men who 
 were entangled in the bamboo thickets and flower gardens, and 
 the firing continued for some time. The Spanish soldiers did 
 not seem to have been notified of the surrender.^* 
 
 All of the city outside of the walls was soon in the hands of 
 the Americans and Filipinos, and the white flag was flying from 
 the walls. Staff officers were sent in to communicate with the 
 Spanish authorities. General Merritt and General Jaudenes 
 
 "*For a good description, see Millet, The Expedition to the Philippines, 
 p. 153, et seq.
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 313 
 
 agreed on preliminary terms of capitulation, and the city was 
 delivered into the care of the American troops. On the follow- 
 ing day formal articles of capitulation were prepared and duly 
 signed. 
 
 A capitulation is a surrender upon conditions, a bargain in the 
 common interest of the contracting parties by which one avoids 
 the certain loss involved in the continuance of a hopeless strug- 
 gle and the forces of the other are released for service elsewhere. 
 After a place has been taken by assault it is too late to ask for 
 conditions ; the surrender must then be unconditional. Capitula- 
 tions are purely military conventions. The commanding officer 
 may include therein stipulations and conditions of a political na- 
 ture, but they are not effective until approved by the political 
 authorities. Subject to this limitation, any terms may be granted 
 which the importance of the place and the forces surrendered 
 and the bravery of the defendants seem to require. 
 
 During the Franco-German War of 1870 the Germans permit- 
 ted the French who had surrendered Bel fort to march out unmo- 
 lested through the German lines, carrying their arms and bag- 
 gage, and join the main body of their army some distance away. 
 The capitulation of Manila more nearly resembles that of Bel- 
 fort than that of Sedan, which is a fair type of the ordinary 
 form. 
 
 The conditions granted to the Spaniards were unusually favor- 
 able. It was provided that the troops, Spanish and native, capitu- 
 lated with all the honors of war; that the officers should retain 
 their side arms, horses and private property, including money, 
 but that all public property, including money, should be delivered 
 to the representatives of the United States. Spanish families 
 might leave the city at any time, but all questions relating to the 
 repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces and their 
 families, and the expenses connected therewith, were to be re- 
 ferred to Washington. 
 
 As a special concession to Spanish susceptibility, it was pro- 
 vided that all persons included in the capitulation should "remain 
 at liberty, the officers remaining in their respective homes," but,
 
 314 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 nevertheless, all should be supplied by the United States, accord- 
 ing to their rank, with rations and necessary aid as though they 
 were prisoners of war until the conclusion of the treaty of peace 
 between the United States and Spain. 
 
 A more unusual concession, however, was that by which the 
 Spaniards, upon the evacuation of the city, by either the Spanish 
 or the Americans, were to receive back all their arms. The 
 instrument closed with the solemn words : 
 
 "This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, 
 its educational establishments and its private property of all de- 
 scription are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and 
 honor of the American army." 
 
 The capitulation of Manila was inconsistent with the theory 
 that the city had been carried by assault, as claimed by the 
 army. 
 
 "So far as the land forces were concerned," says General An- 
 derson, "they took the place by storm, and it has never been 
 made apparent why the Spaniards were allowed the honors of 
 war and why the return of all captured property upon the sign- 
 ing of the treaty of peace was assured to them. The Filipinos 
 assumed that it was because we intended to turn the Spaniards 
 loose on them as soon as we had made satisfactory terms with 
 the Spanish government."^^ 
 
 The terms granted the Spaniards and the fact that the sur- 
 render was under the form of a capitulation, although the city 
 outside the walls was already in the hands of the American 
 troops,'* was due to the fact that the surrender was all carefully 
 
 85 Anderson, "Our Rule in the Philippines," North Am. Rev., CLXX, p. 
 213. 
 
 38 The southern limits of the city of Manila are now near the point where 
 the Spanish line of trenches came down to the old fort. At the time of the 
 battle "Manila" meant the part enclosed within the walls, intramuros, about 
 a mile square. In popular language, Manila to-day means that part within 
 the old walls, and it is common to hear a cab driver directed to go to Manila 
 when he is already in the very center of the business part of modern Manila. 
 Binondo, Paco, Malate, Singalong, Ermite, etc., now sections or wards of 
 Manila, were, while technically a part of the city, in fact, at the time of 
 the battle separate villages or barrios. The American troops never entered 
 llhe walled city, to which the Spaniards retired, until after the capitulation.
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 31$ 
 
 iprearranged. But the army resented the suggestion that the bat- 
 tle was not real, and it certainly was real to all below the rank of 
 commanding general.'^ 
 
 The Filipino troops had done some good fighting against the 
 demoralized Spaniards, but they had no part in the final opera- 
 tions which resulted in the surrender of Manila. During the 
 long weeks while Admiral Dewey was waiting for the arrival 
 of the army they had succeeded in driving the Spaniards out 
 of the country between Cavite and the suburbs of Manila and 
 within the outer lines of the city, but there is no justification for 
 the assumption that this work would have had to be done by the 
 Americans in the way in which it was done by the Filipinos. 
 They had, however, succeeded in putting Manila in a state of 
 siege, although its effectiveness has been exaggerated. "The in- 
 surgents," says General Greene, "had furnished a force which, 
 tmorganized and poorly equipped as it was, nevertheless was suf- 
 
 At the time of the surrender the American troops had merely driven the 
 Spaniards within the walls, where their main defense would have been made. 
 
 87 General Anderson, who was second in command, wrote : "I do not know 
 that I can give the absolute gospel truth as to the so-called capitulation 
 agreement, but I can say that if there was an agreement that Manila was to 
 be surrendered with only a semblance of a fight, it was not communicated to 
 the army. I was directed to draw up and submit what is known as the tech- 
 nical plan of attack. I drew it up on the theory that there was to be a bona 
 fide resistance, and it was adopted by the commanding general. I was directed 
 not to press the land attack until it was seen whether the Spaniards raised 
 the white flag after the navy opened fire. I had twelve field pieces of artillery 
 bearing on the Spanish lines and four in reserve. I waited twenty minutes 
 after the naval guns began firing and then directed the land batteries to open. 
 As the white flag was not then raised the infantry advanced, carried the 
 Spanish works and entered the city and then, and not before, the white flag 
 was raised." No. Am. Rev., CLXX, p. 213. 
 
 In an article published in the Century Magazine, XXXV, p. 942, Mr. John 
 T. McCutcheon, who was on board the Olympia, says that after the firing 
 had continued for some time, "Captain Lamberton turned his glasses on the 
 walled city and said, reflectively: 'They were to raise a white flag on the 
 southeast corner, but I do not see it yet* The Admiral said that it had been 
 there for some time and that by close observation it was discovered at the 
 appointed place and had^ evidently been raised according to program and at 
 the proper moment. This was part of the agreement The Spaniards would 
 not give up the city without a theatrical show of resistance which could be 
 reported to Madrid, but they had arranged to raise a white flag when the 
 Malate fort was taken. In the meantime it was tacitly understood that the 
 guns of the fleet should not be turned on the city and that the guns of Manila 
 should not be turned on the Americans." 
 
 Admiral Dewey has cleared up whatever doubt there may have been. 
 Autobiography, p. 273.
 
 316 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ficlent to capture the waterworks and to prevent any food enter- 
 ing the city, thus leaving the population dependent on rain-water 
 and on the food supply that happened to be in the city." Although 
 badly organized and disciplined, they fought well, and generally 
 with success. It must be remembered, however, that the Span- 
 iards were at that time intimidated by the presence of the Amer- 
 ican fleet in front of the city.^* 
 
 There were various reasons, some political and others human- 
 itarian, why the insurgents should not enter the city. To have 
 permitted them to join in the attack would have given them at 
 least a moral right to be heard as to the terms of surrender and 
 the future control and government of the city. The subsequent 
 demand by Aguinaldo that the governor-general's palace should 
 be delivered to him for his use as an official residence suggests 
 the nature of the demands which would have been made had he 
 been allowed to enter the city as one of the captors. It was also 
 feared that the leaders of the undisciplined Filipinos would not 
 be able to control them and that summary vengeance would be 
 taken on their ancient enemies. 
 
 As some of the insurgents might, notwithstanding the order, 
 succeed in getting into Manila, General Merritt on the evening 
 before the attack sent Aguinaldo a copy, of the proclamation 
 which he intended to issue after the capture, in which the maxi- 
 mum penalty known to military law was announced as the pun- 
 ishment which would be imposed on all who were guilty of vio- 
 lence or pillage. 
 
 About the same time General Anderson was ordered to notify 
 
 88 General Greene, who saw much of the native troops, gives a very good 
 picture of their methods of fighting. "They had," he says, "but Httle organi- 
 zation and were young men and boys of slight stature weighing from 100 to 
 120 pounds each, dressed in a uniform of striped blue cloth and a straw hat, 
 without shoes. They were armed indiscriminately with Mausers and Rem- 
 ingtons and took turns in serving in the trenches for a few days and then 
 returning to their homes in the vicinity for a week of rest, their posts and 
 arms being taken by others. They occupied the houses in the numerous vil- 
 lages in the rear of their barricades and trenches, and here their food, which 
 consisted principally of rice, occasionally with a little meat, was cooked and 
 then carried to the trenches. . . . They were constantly engaged in desul- 
 tory fighting with the Spaniards, and when their ammunition was exhausted 
 they would abandon a barricade in a body and go off to get more." Century 
 Magazine, XXXV, p. 790.
 
 THE CAPTURE OF MANILA 317 
 
 Aguinaldo to forbid his troops to enter the city. This unpleas- 
 ant information reached the insurgent leader late on the evening 
 of August 12, after he had made all his preparations to attack 
 the Spanish lines on the following morning. It was received 
 with anger and indignation. Fearing that the order would not 
 be obeyed, General Anderson sent troops to hold the bridge 
 which the insurgents must cross if they followed the Americans 
 when they advanced. 
 
 However, during the battle they broke through by way of 
 Santa Anna, and by the time the white flag was raised fully 
 four thousand of the Filipinos were in possession of Paco, close 
 to the walls of the old city. 
 
 General Greene tells an interesting story of the summary man- 
 ner in which he disposed temporarily of a considerable force 
 which he found close at hand waiting for the gates to be opened, 
 by simply crowding them to one side.'* But they could not be 
 thus shouldered out of the suburbs. 
 
 General Anderson drew a cordon of troops around the in- 
 surgents to prevent them from looting or spreading. "The sit- 
 uation," says he, "was very critical. Our soldiers believed that 
 the Filipinos had fired on them and the Filipinos were almost 
 beside themselves with rage and disappointment. The friendly 
 relations we had with Generals Recarti and Noriel alone pre- 
 vented a conflict with them then and there." 
 
 Early in the evening orders came from the commanding gen- 
 eral to remove the insurgents from the city. The use of force 
 meant a conflict between ten thousand Americans and fourteen 
 thousand Filipinos, in which thirteen thousand Spaniards who 
 were looking on from the comparatively safe vantage ground of 
 the interior of the walled city would probably join. General 
 Anderson, with good judgment, took the responsibility of send- 
 ing a message to Aguinaldo, who was at Bacour, ten miles away, 
 requesting him to withdraw his troops. In reply there came a 
 commission consisting of Sefiors Buencamino, Legarde, Araneta 
 and Sandico with a proposition that the insurgent troops would 
 
 39 Century Magasine, XXXV, p. 790.
 
 318 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 be withdrawn if the Americans would agree to reinstate them 
 in the same positions when peace was made between Spain and 
 the United States. 
 
 This proposal seems to have impressed General Anderson as 
 reasonable, but General Merritt, to whom it was referred, in- 
 formed the commissioners that he could not give such a promise 
 and that they must rely on the good-will and sense of justice 
 of the American people. The commissioners then returned to 
 Aguinaldo for further instructions, but one of the members left 
 with General Anderson a letter in which Aguinaldo claimed that 
 he had been treated harshly and that he had given up the trenches 
 before Camp Dewey on a promise that there should be cooper- 
 ation in future military movements. It is certain that no such 
 promise was made by General Greene. 
 
 General Merritt directed that Aguinaldo should be informed 
 that if he had been treated with apparent harshness it was from 
 military necessity and that, while we might recognize the justice 
 of their insurrection, it was thought judicious to have but one 
 army in Manila at a time. Aguinaldo, in reply, agreed to the 
 latter proposition but evidently felt that the army should be com- 
 posed of Filipino instead of American troops. 
 
 During the operations which resulted in the capitulation of 
 Manila, the American army had nineteen men killed and one hun- 
 dred and three wounded. At this cost approximately ten thou- 
 sand American soldiers, with the assistance of the navy, captured 
 a city of more than two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, 
 thirteen thousand Spanish prisoners, twenty-two thousand small 
 arms, ten million rounds of ammunition, seventy-five modern 
 guns, several hundred ancient bronze cannon well adapted for 
 decorating parks and plazas, and nine hundred thousand dollars 
 of public money.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 The Peace Protocol and the Treaty of Paris 
 
 Spain Sues for Peace — Negotiations Through French Ambassador — ^The 
 Protocol — Status of Spain in Philippines — Effect of the Capitulation — The 
 Peace Commissioners — Opening of the Conference — Uneasiness about Philip- 
 pines — Spanish Preliminary Demands — Proposals for Treaty — Assumption of 
 Sovereignty over Cuba — The Colonial Debts — Refusal of the United States to 
 Assume Debts — Original Instructions as to Philippines — Growth of Sentiment 
 in United States — Investigations by Commission — Conflicting Opinions — Final 
 Instructions — Claim of Conquest — The Philippine Public Debt — Continental 
 Sentiment Favors Spain— British Attitude— Offer of $20,000,000— Spain Ac- 
 cepts America's Terms — Certain Minor Issues — ^The Treaty — Purchase of 
 Additional Islands — The End of a Colonial Empire. 
 
 By the middle of July, 1898, it had become apparent to the 
 Spanish government that the prolongation of the war could 
 only add to its already heavy accumulation of disasters. Spain 
 had entered upon the war with the confident expectation that she 
 would be able at least to inflict sufficient injury upon the United 
 States to enable her to secure creditable terms of peace. But 
 the accomplishments of her army and navy had been so slight 
 that the proud old monarchy was left in a position perilously near 
 the ridiculous. Judged by the results, neither army nor navy 
 had been able to make even a reasonable showing, and Spain's 
 prestige as a military power had vanished. Further delay might 
 mean the loss of everything and even the humiliation of having 
 the Peninsular coasts visited by an American fleet. 
 
 Having come to a realizing sense of the actual conditions, 
 Spain lost no time in opening negotiations for peace. The Duke 
 of Almodovar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, directed the Span- 
 ish ambassador at Paris to ask for the good offices of the French 
 government in conveying to the United States the desire of Spain 
 
 319
 
 320 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 for an immediate suspension of hostilities preliminary to nego- 
 tiations for a treaty of peace. 
 
 There was some delay in Paris, occasioned by the absence of 
 the president of the Republic and the unwillingness of the min- 
 ister of foreign affairs to assume the responsibility of instruct- 
 ing M. Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, to act 
 on behalf of Spain. This lack of enthusiasm on the part of the 
 French minister irritated Almodovar, who fully appreciated the 
 value of time, and the ambassador at Paris was instructed to 
 say that the request did not admit of delay. In fact, extreme 
 haste was necessary, as the loss of even a few hours might be 
 of the gravest consequence to Spain. The capitulation of Ma- 
 nila might occur at any time, and additional victories would prob- 
 ably result in greater claims being advanced by the United 
 States/ 
 
 Without further delay M. Cambon was directed to represent 
 the interests of Spain, and on July 26 he presented a communi- 
 cation which expressed a desire to learn from the president 
 upon what basis the political status of Cuba could be established 
 and the war thus brought to an end. The request was so worded 
 as to imply that the future of Cuba was the only question at 
 issue between Spain and the United States. During the con- 
 versation which followed Secretary Day, in the presence of Pres- 
 ident McKinley, stated that he understood that Spain desired 
 to know also upon what conditions it would be possible to ter- 
 minate hostilities at all points where they then existed, and M. 
 
 1 Duke of Almodovar to Sthor Leon y Castillo, Sp. Dip. Corr. and Docs. 
 
 (1896-1900), p. 200. 
 
 The documents and correspondence relating to the war and the treaty of 
 peace will be found in Foreign Relations, 1898; Spanish Red Book, Ncgo- 
 cidcions diplomaticas desde el principio de la guerra con los Estados Unidos 
 hasta la firma del protocolo de Washington (i8g8) ; Conferencia de Paris y 
 tratado de pas de jo de dicicmbre de 1898 (1899), and the volume published 
 by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Negociations pour la paix cntres 
 I'Espagne et les Etats-Unis (1898). The formal record of the Conference is 
 in Senate Doc. No. 62, $s Cong, srd Sess, Part I. The instructions of the 
 president and the cable correspondence were printed as Sen. Doc. No. 148, 56 
 Cong. 2nd Sess. The matter is the same as For. Rel. 1898. See an article 
 entitled "Revelations of a Senate Document" in the North Am. Rev. for June, 
 1901. For the question of the debts, see Magoon's Repts. (1902), pp. 180-183. 
 For Mr. Reid's private letters to the president, see Olcott's Life of McKinley, 
 II, Chap. XXVIII.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 321 
 
 Cambon replied that such seemed to be the effect of the Span- 
 ish communication. 
 
 Before a formal reply could be made M. Cambon received a 
 despatch from the Duke of Almodovar stating that Spain would 
 accept any conditions which would result in the pacification of 
 Cuba, whether they involved absolute independence, independ- 
 ence under a protectorate or annexation to the United States. 
 The latter was preferred, as it would guarantee security for the 
 lives and property of Spaniards who were established in Cuba.* 
 
 It was assumed that the United States would demand some- 
 thing by way of indemnity, but on that subject M. Cambon was 
 instructed to "maintain reserve." Spain did not want to be held 
 responsible for the expenses of military expeditions undertaken 
 against territory remote from Cuba, as, according to Almodo- 
 var's theory, the war should have been localized. What he feared 
 was that the United States might hold the islands she had cap- 
 tured on what may be called collateral expeditions as indemnity 
 for the expenses of their capture. M. Cambon was directed par- 
 ticularly to ascertain the disposition of the president toward 
 Porto Rico and the Philippines, and if he was found reasonable 
 from the Spanish point of view, to press for the immediate sus- 
 pension of hostilities. 
 
 Spain thus opened the negotiations for peace with a proposal 
 to abandon Cuba, with the expectation — ^not expressed, however 
 — ^that something would have to be done toward indemnifying 
 the United States for the expenses of the war, but hoping to save 
 Porto Rico. It is hardly probable that she then seriously feared 
 that she would lose all of the Philippine Islands, as the Ameri- 
 cans at that time had done nothing in that part of the world ex- 
 cept destroy the Spanish fleet. 
 
 On July 30 Almodovar was informed that the United States, 
 as a condition of the suspension of hostilities, would require: 
 
 "First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sover- 
 eignty over or title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the 
 island. 
 
 »For. Rel, 1898, p. 819.
 
 322 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 "Second. The president, desirous of exhibiting signal gener- 
 osity, would not at that time make any demand for pecuniary 
 indemnity. Nevertheless, he could not be insensible to the losses 
 and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to 
 the claims of American citizens for injuries to their persons and 
 property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, there- 
 fore, require the cession to the United States of the islands of 
 Porto Rico and the other islands then under the sovereignty of 
 Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in 
 the Ladrones to be selected by the United States. 
 
 "Third. On similar grounds the United States was entitled to 
 occupy and would hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pend- 
 ing the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine 
 the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."^ 
 
 From these terms there was never thereafter any material de- 
 parture. The word possession originally used in the paragraph 
 relating to the Philippines was changed to disposition, on the 
 earnest representation of M. Cambon that it would when trans- 
 lated into Spanish carry a meaning which would make it impos- 
 sible for the negotiations to proceed. 
 
 M. Cambon struggled desperately to secure some material mod- 
 ification of these terms, particularly as regards the demand for 
 Porto Rico, which he characterized as evincing a spirit of con- 
 quest inconsistent with the declaration of disinterestedness with 
 which the United States had commenced the war. The temper 
 manifested is illustrated by his statement that in making this 
 claim for the cession of Porto Rico and one of the Ladrones, 
 the United States evidently considered as a definite conquest all 
 territory "upon which the fortune of arms has permitted an 
 American soldier to set his foot," thus ignoring the fact that 
 the islands had been demanded, not on the theory of conquest, 
 but in lieu of a money indemnity. The provision relating to the 
 Philippines he charged must have been inserted for the purpose 
 of putting an end to the present negotiations, as Madrid would 
 certainly construe it as casting doubt upon her present and fu- 
 ture sovereignty in the Archipelago. Such charges of bad faith 
 and insincerity were not well calculated to secure modifications 
 
 ' For. Rel., 1898, p. 820. These terms were drafted by the president per- 
 sonally, Olcott's Life of McKinley, II, p. 67.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 323 
 
 of the well-considered terms which the president had offered to 
 Spain. 
 
 "You will observe," replied the president, "that my demands 
 set forth in the first two articles do not admit of any discussion. 
 I leave to negotiations the task of resolving the question of the 
 Philippines. If the American forces have remained until now 
 in their positions, it is in obedience to a duty with respect to 
 residents and strangers and the progress of affairs imposed on 
 me. 
 
 M. Cambon had another interview with the president and 
 secretary of state on August 3, when he pressed for an expres- 
 sion of intention as regards the Philippines. What then oc- 
 curred is important, as the Spanish commissioners, during the 
 negotiations at Paris, asserted that the United States had never 
 until then expressed in concrete form the idea understood to be 
 conveyed by the phrase, ^'control, disposition and government of 
 the Philippines." They claimed that the demand for the cession 
 of the entire Archipelago was a surprise. It is evident from 
 what we now know that the surprise was purely technical. 
 
 During the interview on August 3 M. Cambon stated to the 
 president that the provision was so drawn as to imply no restric- 
 tions upon the demands which the United States might make, 
 and thus created grave apprehensions on the part of Spain as to 
 the fate of her future sovereignty. The reports of this confer- 
 ence made by Cambon and Secretary Day differ in some re- 
 spects,* but both make it clear that the president declared his 
 purpose to leave to the negotiators of the treaty the most ample 
 freedom with reference to the Philippines." 
 
 According to M. Cambon's report the president said that he 
 did not want any misunderstanding on this subject and that the 
 "negotiators of the two countries must be the ones to decide 
 what should be the permanent advantages that we shall demand 
 
 * See despatch from the American commissioners from Paris, dated No- 
 vember 19. 1898. 
 
 « For. Rel., 1898, p. 955. See also Sen. Doc. 62, 55 Cong., 3d Sess., Part I, 
 p. 132. This document will be hereafter cited as Sen. Doc. 62.
 
 324 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 in the Archipelago, and finally the control, disposition and gov- 
 ernment of the Philippines." 
 
 Secretary Day, in his memorandum of the conversation, says 
 that the ambassador called attention to the statement in the 
 note of July 30, that the possession of the city, bay and harbor 
 of Manila should be retained during the pendency of the treaty, 
 and asked what was to be done with them afterward. "That," 
 said the president, "must depend upon the terms of the treaty." 
 The ambassador then inquired whether the United States had 
 prejudged the matter of the Philippines and the rights to be ac- 
 quired therein by the United States. The president replied that 
 the case had not been prejudged; that the whole matter would 
 be left to the commissioners for negotiation to be settled by the 
 treaty of peace. 
 
 M. Cambon persisted, and presented a communication" from 
 the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, dated August 7, which 
 came near bringing the negotiations to an abrupt close. The 
 conditions contained in the first and second paragraphs of the 
 proposal were accepted subject to the approval of the Cortes; 
 the third paragraph was described as quite indefinite, but never- 
 theless was accepted with an accompanying interpretation and 
 reservation. The positions taken in this note were maintained 
 by the Spaniards to the end of the chapter. 
 
 "On one hand," wrote the duke, "the ground on which the 
 United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the 
 harbor and the City of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty 
 of peace, can not be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade 
 maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege 
 established on land by a native army supported and provided for 
 by the American admiral, Manila still holds its own and the Span- 
 ish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the 
 whole Archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under 
 the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the government of Spain 
 thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should consti- 
 tute a guaranty. It is stated that the Treaty of Peace shall 
 determine the control, disposition and government of the Philip- 
 
 « For. Rel, 1898, pp. 822-^.
 
 THE TREATY OP PARIS 325 
 
 pines; but as the intentions of the Federal Government by regres- 
 sion remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government must de- 
 clare that while accepting the third condition, they do not a 
 priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the Archipelago, 
 leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms which 
 the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of 
 their natives may render desirable." 
 
 M. Cambon reported that the reading of this note visibly an- 
 noyed the president and the secretary of state, and that after a 
 prolonged silence the president said : 
 
 "I asked of Spain the cession, and consequently the immediate 
 evacuation of the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. Instead of 
 a categorical acceptance, as was expected, the Spanish Grov- 
 ernment addresses me a note in which it invokes the necessity 
 of obtaining the approval of the Cortes. I can not lend myself 
 to entering into these considerations of domestic governments." 
 
 M. Cambon replied that the Spanish minister was merely con- 
 forming to his constitutional obligations, and that the president 
 had formerly stated that his acts also must be ratified by the 
 Senate. In fact, the preliminary document would merely em- 
 body the understanding of the two governments upon which 
 hostilities would be suspended, and only the definite treaty was 
 required to be ratified by either the Cortes or the Senate. 
 
 Cambon finally agreed to secure authority to sign a protocol, 
 "having by all his persistence and diplomacy succeeded in hav- 
 ing only one word, and it unimportant, of the proposed terms 
 changed. He reported to Madrid that it was the best he could 
 do and that nothing more was to be expected "from a conqueror 
 resolved to procure all the profit possible from the advantages it 
 has obtained."' 
 
 The protocol, as signed on August 12, provided that 
 
 "The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and 
 harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace 
 
 "fSp. Dip. Corr. and Docs., p. 219; For. Rel, 1898, p. 956.
 
 326 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 which shall determine the control, disposition and government 
 of the Philippines."® 
 
 Commissioners representing Spain and the United States were 
 to convene at Paris on the first day of October, for the purpose 
 of negotiating a treaty of peace. In the interim M. Cambon 
 would continue to represent Spanish interests at Washington. 
 
 The situation created by this protocol was somewhat unusual, 
 and differences of opinion soon developed over the meaning of 
 the provisions relating to the status of Spain in the Philippines. 
 Arrangements were to be made for the evacuation of Cuba and 
 Porto Rico, and, regardless of theories, Spanish sovereignty in 
 those islands came at once to an end. But the capitulation of 
 Manila a few hours after the signing of the protocol at Wash- 
 ington created a situation which bristled with legal difficulties. 
 The protocol provided that the United States would occupy the 
 city, bay and harbor of Manila, which implied that elsewhere in 
 the Archipelago Spain should not be relieved of the duty of 
 maintaining order and protecting the lives and property of her 
 subjects. The fact that a native insurrection was in progress 
 was not taken into consideration, nor did the protocol contain 
 anything which implied that Spanish sovereignty should be sus- 
 pended elsewhere than over the city, bay and harbor of Manila. 
 
 The reasonable inference was that these places were to be held 
 as security until the future disposition of the islands was deter- 
 mined in the manner provided, but the capitulation of Manila 
 after the signing of the protocol, and without knowledge thereof, 
 changed the situation. The Spanish took the plausible position 
 that all military operations after the protocol was signed were 
 without legal value; that is, created no legal rights. Had this 
 view been adopted it would have left the parties to the protocol 
 where they probably intended to place themselves when it was 
 signed. The city, bay and harbor would have been in the pos- 
 session of the United States, but the Spanish soldiers would not 
 have been technically prisoners of war, and the public property 
 would have remained the property of Spain. 
 
 ^For.Rel, 1898, p. 824.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 327 
 
 Several communications passed between the French ambas- 
 sador and the secretary of state, in which the former called 
 attention to rumors which had come by way of Madrid that the 
 insurrection was spreading throughout the islands and that the in- 
 surgents were sending out armed vessels to attack Spanish ports 
 and shipping ; that ships were being chartered at Hong Kong to 
 transport the Spanish troops from Manila to Spain, and that the 
 United States was increasing its naval strength in the Pacific by 
 sending the Oregon and Iowa to Manila. Assuming that Spain 
 was still under obligation to maintain law and order beyond 
 the limits of the city, harbor and bay of Manila, M. Cambon 
 suggested that either the Spanish troops, who had been reduced 
 to inactivity by the capitulation of Manila, should be placed at 
 the disposal of Spain to be used against the insurgents, or that 
 troops for that purpose should be despatched from Spain. Such 
 a proposal shows how little he understood the actual situation in 
 the islands, and it also shows what Spain expected to do with 
 the forces which would be released upon the evacuation of Cuba. 
 
 In language which assumed that the United States was re- 
 sponsible for and controlled the actions of the Filipino insur- 
 gents, it was requested that the United States cause hostili- 
 ties by all parties to cease while the peace negotiations were 
 pending. Secretary Day assured M. Cambon that the rumors 
 which had caused so much anxiety were mostly without founda- 
 tion, but that the release of the Spanish troops for use against 
 the insurgents could not be considered, nor would the sending of 
 troops from Spain be looked upon with favor. While assum- 
 ing no responsibility for the actions of insurgents beyond the 
 limits of Manila, Spain was assured that the government of the 
 United States would exert its influence in favor of a suspen- 
 sion by them of hostilities while peace negotiations between the 
 United States and Spain were in progress. 
 
 On September 11 M. Cambon transmitted a note from the 
 Duke of Almodovar, in which the views of Spain as to the situa- 
 tion were summarized. * Practically all of its propositions had 
 
 ~For. Rel. 1898, p. 813.
 
 328 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 already been advanced by M. Cambon and their validity denied 
 by Secretary Day. In view of what occurred during the peace 
 negotiations, it is interesting to note the position of the Spanish 
 government as expressed immediately after the signing of the 
 Peace Protocol. 
 
 It was contended that the occupation of the city, bay and har- 
 bor of Manila should be considered to be under the provision of 
 the protocol of August 12, and not of the capitulation of August 
 13, which Spain claimed was null and void, because concluded 
 after the agreement to suspend hostilities had been signed. Spain 
 had acquiesced in the occupation of Manila without renouncing 
 her sovereignty, and, therefore, possession did not authorize the 
 United States to alter the Spanish law then in force. All civil, 
 administrative, judicial and political institutions should remain 
 unchanged until the treaty of peace determined the control, dis- 
 position and government of the islands. The Spanish troops in 
 Manila were free, and Spain by the terms of the protocol had 
 the right to use them during the interim and transport them, 
 with their colors, arms and ammunition, to parts of the Archi- 
 pelago not occupied by the Americans, to suppress rebellion, main- 
 tain order and protect the lives and property of foreigners and 
 subjects in accordance with its duties as sovereign. As the insur- 
 gents had not been recognized as belligerents, their armed ships 
 which engaged in depredations on the high seas were pirates and 
 should be treated as such. Therefore, confidence was expressed 
 that during the period preceding the making of a treaty of peace 
 the United States would not introduce changes into the economic 
 and fiscal administrations of Manila, nor divert for other pur- 
 poses the customs revenues which were pledged for lawfully 
 incurred obligations. 
 
 The propositions thus advanced by Spain were not argued by 
 Mr. Day; they were simply denied. It was conceded that the 
 United States held Manila by virtue of the provisions of the 
 protocol, but that, nevertheless, the capitulation was valid be- 
 cause the suspension of hostilities, provided for, must be con- 
 sidered as taking effect at the date of the receipt of the notice.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 329 
 
 However, it was immaterial whether the occupation was by 
 virtue of the protocol or the capitulation; in either case it was 
 military occupation, and the rights and powers of the occupants 
 were the same. 
 
 The Spanish government replied that the theory of the valid- 
 ity of the capitulation was contrary to international law and the 
 history of wars between civilized countries, and dissented from 
 the assertion that the powers of the occupant were the same 
 whether the possession was under the protocol or the capitula- 
 tion.'" 
 
 But the Peace Commission was now in session in Paris, and 
 John Hay, who had become secretary of state, after correcting 
 certain statements as to facts, declined to continue further the 
 consideration of questions which would come before that body. 
 
 The representatives of the United States and Spain met at 
 Paris on the Quai d'Orsay, October 1, 1898, and entered upon 
 the work of negotiating a treaty of peace. For the United States 
 it was to be a gathering of the fruits of the war; for Spain, the 
 last struggle to save something from the wreck of her ancient 
 colonial possessions. 
 
 The United States sent to the conference the ablest men who 
 had represented her in any such capacity since Gallatin, Adams, 
 Clay, Bayard and Russell, at Ghent, succeeded in wresting from 
 Great Britain a treaty which would have been creditable had 
 they represented a victorious instead of a sadly discomfited 
 nation. 
 
 The American commissioners were William R. Day, former 
 Secretary of State, who had been in charge of foreign affairs 
 during the war and until after the signing of the Peace Protocol 
 under which the commission was acting; Cushman K. Davis, a 
 senator of the United States from Minnesota, the powerful chair- 
 jnan of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, a lawyer of 
 great learning and experience, an orator and scholar learned in 
 international law and diplomatic usage ; William P. Frye, a sen- 
 
 •^'^For. Rel, 1898, pp. 815-817.
 
 330 .THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ator of the United States from Maine and a man of vast experi- 
 ence in public life; George Gray, a senator from Delaware, who 
 had represented the country on various international tribunals; 
 and Whitelaw Reid, a journalist and publicist of international 
 reputation, who had lately retired from the position of minister 
 to France. As secretary and consul. President McKinley named 
 John Bassett Moore, formerly Assistant Secretary of State, Pro- 
 fessor of International Law at Columbia University, a member 
 of the Institute of International Law, and well and widely known 
 as a writer on international law. 
 
 The members of the Spanish Commission were all men of dis- 
 tinction and experience. E. Montero Rios was President of the 
 Senate, ex-Minister of the Crown and President of the Supreme 
 Tribunal of Justice; Buenaventura Abarzuza was a senator and 
 former ambassador; Jose de Garnica y Diaz, a member of the 
 Supreme Court of Justice; W. R. de Villa-Urrutia, Minister of 
 Spain at the Court of Brussels, and a professor in the Royal 
 Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation; Rafael Cerero, a 
 General of Division, and, like the others, entitled to wear the 
 insignia of many illustrious orders. Senor Emilio de Ojeda was 
 secretary of the Spanish Commission.** 
 
 The negotiations extended from October 1 to December 10, 
 and were distinguished by some acerbity and arrogance on the 
 part of the Spaniards and stern adherence to their demands by 
 the Americans. As President McKinley had imposed his de- 
 
 11 The Filipinos sent Seiior Filipe Agoncillo to Paris to present their case 
 to the Conference, but he never made any serious effort to be heard, beheving 
 evidently that he could be more effective at Washington. It has been fre- 
 quently asserted that Agoncillo was denied a hearing, that the door was 
 slammed in his face. See Mr. Schurtz's speech at Chicago, October, 1899. 
 
 There is some uncertainty as to what occurred. Mr. Justice Day's rec- 
 ollection is that a representative of Aguinaldo requested a hearing which was 
 denied on the ground that the commission had no authority to deal with the 
 matter. Personal letter, March 22, 1916. 
 
 Whitelaw Reid (American and English Studies, I, p. 177), says: "Now, 
 whatever might have happened, the door was certainly never slammed in 
 their faces at Paris, for they never came to it. On the contrary, every time 
 Mr. Agoncillo approached any member of the Commission on the subject he 
 was courteously invited to send the Commissioners a written request for a 
 hearing, which would at any rate receive immediate consideration. No such 
 request ever came, and any Filipino who wrote for a hearing in Paris was 
 heard."
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 331 
 
 mands upon M. Cambon in Washington, so the commissioners 
 in Paris, acting under his immediate instructions and orders, did 
 little more than announce what America required of Spain and 
 proceed to make up a record of the conferences. 
 
 Spain knev/ that her possessions in the West were gone for- 
 ever, but her representatives evidently went to Paris expecting 
 that with the burdens would go the troublesome possessions. The 
 colonial debts, it was assumed, would pass with the sovereignty, 
 and thus substantial future good might come out of the hopeless 
 conditions which preceded the war. In this she was to be griev- 
 ously disappointed. 
 
 She also hoped that she would be permitted to retain her colo- 
 nial possessions in the Far East, as they had been but indirectly 
 involved in the war, and, as far as she knew, there was nothing 
 in the past history of the United States to suggest that it would 
 care to assume the burden of governing these far-away colonies 
 inhabited by an alien people who had already formed well-estab- 
 lished insurrectionary habits. Nevertheless, it was possible that 
 the United States would wrest this last vestige of her colonies 
 from her. Suggestions to this effect began to appear in the 
 American press almost immediately after the naval battle of 
 Manila Bay, and the sending over of an army to capture and 
 hold Manila was ominous of an intent to do more than repeat 
 the British exploit of 1762. This uneasiness, as we have already 
 seen, was apparent throughout the preliminary negotiations at 
 Washington. 
 
 Events in Manila had also added to Spanish perturbation. 
 The capitulation of the city, with its army and public property, 
 on the day after the signing of the Peace Protocol was very un- 
 fortunate for Spain. It was the fear of this very thing which 
 agitated the Duke of Almodovar when he hurriedly sought the 
 good offices of France to bring hostilities to a close. But Manila 
 had been captured before notice of the cessation of hostilities 
 could reach the American commander, and when the commis- 
 sion met in Paris American officers were already ruling the city, 
 as the exigencies of military occupation and the peculiar local
 
 332 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 conditions, created by the existence of Agulnaldo and his gov- 
 ernment, seemed to require. To the demand of the governor- 
 general for the status quo. General Merritt had replied that as he 
 had no notice of the signing of the protocol until after the capitu- 
 lation of the city, he held it as a military conqueror and would 
 govern it under military law according to the terms of the capit- 
 ulation. A similar answer had been given to M. Cambon by the 
 secretary of state. 
 
 At the first conference the Spanish took the offensive by stat- 
 ing in rather peremptory terms what they designated as the 
 preliminary demands of Spain. Senor Montero Rios announced 
 that he was charged with the duty of laying before the American 
 commissioners a proposition in limine and of a pressing nature. 
 It related to the situation in the Philippines and to the claim 
 that the rights of the respective states were fixed and determined 
 as of the date of the signing of the Peace Protocol and could not 
 be thereafter altered to the prejudice of the parties during the 
 suspension of hostilities. Therefore, the Spanish representatives 
 felt 
 
 "bound to propose and demand of the said Commissioners that 
 jointly with the undersigned they be pleased to declare that the 
 said status quo must be immediately restored by the contracting 
 party that may have altered the same, or may have consented to, 
 or failed to prevent its alteration to the prejudice of the other. 
 And the Spanish Commissioners, understanding that such status 
 quo was altered and continues being altered with daily increas- 
 ing gravity to the prejudice of Spain by the Tagalog rebels, who 
 formed during the campaign, and still form, an auxiliary force to 
 the regular American troops, demand of the American Commis- 
 sioners that jointly with the undersigned they be pleased to de- 
 clare that the authorities and officers of the American forces in 
 the Philippine Islands must at once proceed fully and absolutely 
 to restore the said status quo in the territories they may occupy, 
 and must abstain from preventing, by any means, direct or indi- 
 rect, the restoration thereof by the Spanish authorities and forces, 
 in the territory now occupied by those of the United States."** 
 
 ^'^Sen. Doc. 62, p. 15; For. Rel, 1898, p. 916. Mr. Reid, in an interesting 
 private letter to President McKinley (Olcott, II, p. 123), says that their tone 
 was "one of rather proud supplication," an appeal to our magnanimity.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 333 
 
 The American commissioners concurred in tHe opinion that 
 the protocol of August 12 embodied the conditions upon which 
 the negotiations for peace were proceeding, but declined to join 
 in the proposals and demands, because they could see therein 
 nothing but an attempt to divert the conference from the objects 
 for which it had met to the consideration of subjects which prop- 
 erly belonged to their governments, and which had, in fact, been 
 already disposed of at Washington." 
 
 Mr. Day reported to Secretary Hay that this communication! 
 was well received by the Spanish commissioners.** If so, it sug- 
 gests that they must have expected very little, for they got nothing. 
 Secretary Hay had declined to consider further the questions 
 raised in the Spanish note of October 4, presented at Wash- 
 ington by M. Cambon, because they were for the consideration 
 of the conference. The Spanish commissioners were, therefore, 
 obliged to content themselves with asserting that it was their 
 duty to make known to the American commissioners that if the 
 status quo existing in the Philippines on August 12 continued to 
 be disturbed to the prejudice of Spain the representatives of Her 
 Catholic Majesty reserved the right to act as they might deem 
 the rights of Spain required, since they could not conceive how 
 the treaty of peace they were charged with arranging with the 
 American commissioners on the immutable basis of the protocol 
 could be continued if these bases were being constantly altered 
 to the prejudice of Spain.*" Having thus entered its protest, the 
 Spanish Commission allowed this question to rest until the future 
 of the Philippines was brought up for consideration. 
 
 The way being thus cleared, thje conference proceeded to the 
 consideration of the provisions of the Peace Protocol. At the 
 third meeting the Spanish commissioners proposed various ar- 
 ticles for a treaty, the first of which raised a question upon which 
 the conference came near going to pieces — that of the colonial 
 debts. Upon this Spain made her first stand, and fought as des- 
 
 " Sen. Doc. 62, p. 21. 
 ^*For.Rel., 1898, p. 917. 
 i» Sen. Doc. 62, p. 25.
 
 334 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 perately as had her soldiers and sailors on more spectacular if 
 not less important fields. Time has shown that her fears of utter 
 bankruptcy were groundless, but they were, nevertheless, at the 
 time very serious and reasonable fears. The Spanish people 
 failed to see that Spain with the debts and without the colonies 
 would be on a firmer financial basis than with the debts and the 
 debt-breeding colonies. Of course, to be relieved of both the 
 colonies and the debts was a consummation devoutly to be wished ; 
 but it was not to be. 
 
 By one of the proposed articles^^ Spain was to relinquish her 
 sovereignty over Cuba to the United States, which accepted it 
 in order to transfer it to the Cuban people. The relinquishment 
 was to include all the prerogatives, powers and rights which be- 
 longed to Spain and all charges and obligations of every kind 
 in existence at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace 
 which Spain in the exercise of her sovereign authority had law- 
 fully contracted in Cuba. 
 
 It will be remembered that the third article of the Peace Proto- 
 col made no reference to these debts, although it is inconceivable 
 that the matter was not in the minds of the negotiators. It is a 
 remarkable fact that while the president's instructions to the 
 peace commissioners referred to a rumor, which proved un- 
 founded, that a claim would be made for compensation for the 
 public property of the Spanish government in Cuba and in the 
 territories ceded to the United States, no reference was made to 
 the substantial bonded indebtedness of Cuba, Porto Rico and the 
 Philippine Islands. The Spaniards assumed that under estab- 
 lished public law the public debt of a ceded province or country 
 would pass as an incident of the cession to the new sovereign. 
 But so far as the record shows, the probability of this claim 
 being made did not even suggest itself to the president or the 
 secretary of state. 
 
 Spain wished to relinquish Cuba to the United States and per- 
 mit her to dispose of it in the future as to her seemed most expe- 
 dient and desirable. It was contended that under the rules of 
 
 ^« See Annex to Protocol, No. 3, Sen. Doc. 62, p. 27.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 335 
 
 international law the public debts which were a charge on Cuba 
 should pass with the sovereignty. The argument was legally 
 sound, and the only way it could be effectively met was by 
 impugning the moral validity of the debts as obligations of the 
 colonies. 
 
 The administration of the Spanish colonies had always been 
 kept distinct from that of the mother country. Each colony col- 
 lected its own revenues, and its deficits were made up not by 
 Spain, but from the treasury of some other more prosperous 
 colony. Thus for many years Cuba and the Philippines received 
 their annual situado, or subsidy, from Mexico. In more modern 
 times each colony had its own budget, and generally its own 
 personal deficit. When the revenues were insufficient the ex- 
 penses of the local government were provided for by consoli- 
 dated mortgages, or floating debts which were charged to the 
 colony for whose benefit they were contracted. Neither Cuba 
 nor Porto Rico had ever been included in the general budget of 
 Spain nor had their revenues or expenses ever appeared there. 
 
 All the Spanish-American colonies when they separated from 
 Spain had recognized this situation and had voluntarily assumed 
 their existing public debts. Spain now desired the recognition 
 in the treaty of the principle that a debt, being exclusively the 
 debt of the colony and affecting its territory only, should go with 
 the colony. The application of the principle could be intrusted 
 to a commission to be provided for in the treaty of peace. 
 
 In one of their memoranda*^ the Spanish commissioners in- 
 dulged in some moralizing upon the duties of a government to- 
 ward its subjects in terms which, in the light of her history, must 
 have suggested to the American public, if not to the American 
 commissioners, the well-known habit of a certain distinguished 
 personage of quoting the Scriptures : "The Sovereign, it is true," 
 it was said, "has prerogatives and rights over the territory and 
 its inhabitants; but these prerogatives and rights attach to him 
 not for his own satisfaction and enjoyment, but for the good 
 government and the welfare of the people, subject to his rule." 
 
 " Sen. Doc. 62, p. 41.
 
 336 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Spain, therefore, could not consent to sacrifice the financial rights 
 of her subjects who were the holders of the colonial debts. Lan- 
 guage such as this was purely conventional and had a false ring, 
 but the following words which closed one of the Spanish com- 
 munications can not be read without sympathy by those who are 
 familiar with Spanish history: 
 
 Issues which related to money only could not "fail to be solved 
 satisfactorily between two parties, one of which is the greatest 
 nation of the new world, immensely rich and prosperous, blessed 
 with inexhaustible resources, whether due to nature or the pro- 
 digious activity of its inhabitants, which, on the one hand, ac- 
 quires by this treaty territories of great importance, and thereby 
 fulfils an aspiration of its policy in America, while the other 
 party is a great and noble nation of the old world, a cordial friend 
 of her late antagonist in days, for her, more prosperous, but now 
 impoverished through the misfortunes heaped upon her during 
 the century which is about to terminate ; whose treasury is over- 
 burdened by obligations, and for whom the present treaty will 
 mean the solemn confirmation of the loss of the last remnant of 
 her American Empire."^* 
 
 But the American Commission had decided that the debts 
 should not be assumed and that the Cubans should start their 
 independent existence with the national homestead free from in- 
 cumbrance. It must be conceded that this was legally a tour de 
 force. According to the settled principles of international law 
 the debts which had been legally incurred and secured as a spe- 
 cific lien on the colonial revenues, particularly when the proceeds 
 had been used for the construction of public works, should have 
 been held to run with the country. 
 
 The arguments advanced by the American commissioners 
 were mostly either extremely technical or were based on such 
 large general principles that they were without any real basis in 
 public law. The distinction which it was sought to make be- 
 tween the relinquishment and the abandonment of sovereignty 
 was not substantial, and the attempt of the Americans to sustain 
 their view by citing Eschriche's Diccionario drew the remark 
 
 " Sen. Doc. 62, p. 93.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 337 
 
 that this was a very respectable work much used in Spain by 
 young lawyers in the early stages of legal practise. Nor was 
 the claim that the question of the debts was excluded from con- 
 sideration by the language of the protocol tenable, as it was 
 fairly one of the details connected with the relinquishment of 
 sovereignty over Cuba and the cession of the other islands. 
 
 Mr. Day notified Washington that the Spanish Commission 
 had expressed a willingness to relinquish sovereignty over Cuba 
 if some responsibility for the debt was acknowledged, and that 
 they had been requested to state whether they would decline to 
 sign any treaty which did not contain such a provision. 
 
 This was the critical stage of the negotiations. On the eve- 
 ning of October 25 the Spanish ambassador called upon Gen- 
 eral Horace Porter, the American ambassador to France, and 
 explained the situation to him. From General Porter he went 
 to Mr. Reid and informed him that Montero Rios could not re- 
 turn to Spain and must break off negotiations rather than aban- 
 don the claim to have at least a part of the Cuban debt assumed 
 by the United States or Cuba. 
 
 The ambassador suggested that possibly if Spain abandoned 
 her demand for the assumption of the Cuban debt, some compen- 
 sating advantage might be granted her in the form of a conces- 
 sion in connection with the Philippines. Mr. Reid could give 
 him little satisfaction. He informed the ambassador that the 
 American people, while not eager to retain the Philippines, were 
 beginning to feel that as they had practically conquered the 
 islands they had a right to retain them. He believed that the 
 preponderance of sentiment in the United States favored that 
 course, although an influential minority did not go to that length. 
 It was possible, Mr. Reid suggested, that out of this condition the 
 Spanish commissioners might be able to find something in terri- 
 tory or debt which would seem to their people at home like a 
 concession/' 
 
 While waiting for the Spanish commissioners to decide 
 
 " Mr. Day to Mr. Adee, Oct 27, For. Rel, 1898, p. 936.
 
 338 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 whether they would stand or fall on the question of the debt, 
 Mr. Day asked the secretary of state whether the president 
 would approve an article to the effect that the United States, 
 while not assuming any independent liability of its own, would 
 use its good offices with any people or government possessing 
 sovereignty in Cuba for the acknowledgment of debts incurred 
 by Spain of a pacific character in the island — the amounts to be 
 determined by a commission. The American Commission, he 
 thought, might feel inclined to make this concession on the 
 strength of the precedents and opinions of publicists that local 
 debts incurred specially for the benefit of territory are trans- 
 ferred with such territory.^" 
 
 But this disposition on the part of the commissioners to yield 
 to argument and authority was promptly suppressed. Secretary 
 Hay replied that he was directed by the president to say that 
 
 "under no circumstances will the United States Government 
 assume any part of what is known as the Cuban debt, . . . nor 
 would the United States engage to use its good offices to induce 
 any government hereafter to be established in Cuba to assume 
 such debt."" 
 
 The Spanish commissioners were then bluntly informed that 
 the United States did not believe that there were any debts out- 
 standing which had been incurred by Spain for existing improve- 
 ments of a permanent character f^ that while the United States 
 would, of course, assume the obligations imposed by the rules 
 of international law, and which would follow from its occupa- 
 tion of Cuba, it declined to accept the burden of Cuban debts 
 either for itself or for Cuba. Spain must, in the language of the 
 protocol, simply relinquish her claim of sovereignty over and title 
 to Cuba and cede to the United States the islands of Porto Rico 
 and Guam in the Ladrones. 
 
 20 Mr. Day to Mr. Hay, October 25, For. Rel, 1898. p. 931. 
 
 21 Secretary Hay to Mr. Day, Oct. 25, 1898, For. Rel. 1898, p. 932. 
 22/7or. Rel, 1898, p. 936. A royal decree of June 28, 1897, announced the 
 
 issuance of bonds to the amount of 40,000,000 pesos due in forty years, se- 
 cured by the Philippine customs on the general guarantee of Spain. The 
 proceeds certainly were not used to construct public works, but the $20,000,- 
 000 paid by the United States probably represented about the amount that 
 had from time to time been invested in such works on the islands.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 339 
 
 The Spanish commissioners, with elaborate explanations and 
 reservations, then accepted the articles proposed by the Ameri- 
 cans, and suggested that the matter of the Philippines should be 
 taken up. It was evident that the faint hope held out by Mr. 
 Reid to the Spanish ambassador had been seized upon by the 
 Spaniards. After the conference Senor Ojedo informed Mr. 
 Day that a surrender on their part without some relief would 
 mean national bankruptcy, and that they hoped they would re- 
 ceive liberal treatment in the matter of the Philippines. "He 
 made further appeal," says Mr. Day, "to which I made no an- 
 swer." 
 
 But it was to no purpose that Spain thus humiliated herself. 
 At the conference on October 31 the American commissioners 
 demanded the cession of the entire Philippine Archipelago, merely 
 stating that the United States would assume any existing indebt- 
 ness which had been incurred for public works and improvements 
 of a pacific character in the Philippines.^' 
 
 The decision to take the islands was not reached without care- 
 ful consideration of conditions and possible consequences, and 
 after much correspondence with Washington. The problem was 
 worked out while the conference was in session. When the 
 Peace Protocol was signed on August 12 public opinion in the 
 United States had not crystallized, and the president, as we have 
 seen, decided to leave the question of the future of the islands 
 to be decided by the commission, which was to meet some months 
 later. He realized that any demand for territory in the Far East 
 must be made to square with the disinterested motives which had 
 been proclaimed to the world at the beginning of the war. The 
 original instructions^* stated that while still solicitous to adhere 
 to our original purpose, we could not be unmindful that, without 
 any desire on our part, the war had brought duties and respon- 
 sibilities "which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great 
 nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the 
 
 " Sen. Doc. 62, p. 107. 
 
 " See Vor. Rel., 1898, p. 904, et seq.
 
 340 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Ruler of Nations has plainly jvritten the high command and 
 pledge of civilization." 
 
 The United States, therefore, could not accept less than the 
 cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon, and 
 it vv^as desirable that we should acquire the right of entry for 
 vessels and merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States 
 into such ports of the Philippines as were not ceded to the United 
 States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and mer- 
 chandise. 
 
 But it is evident that the commissioners understood that these 
 instructions were merely tentative, as they immediately began 
 to collect information with reference to conditions in the islands 
 and the commercial value of the country. 
 
 On October 4 Mr. Day telegraphed to Secretary Hay that the 
 opinion of Admiral Dewey in the possession of the commission 
 seemed to favor the retention of Luzon only, but as it appeared 
 to have been given in answer to a question as to which island 
 should be retained, it was desired that the admiral's opinion as 
 to the value of the other islands should be obtained. Five days 
 later the commission reported that it had taken the testimony 
 of General Merritt, and had received and considered the state- 
 ments of General F. V. Greene, Major Bourne, Major J. F. Bell, 
 Admiral Dewey, Commander R. B. Bradford, General C. A. 
 Whittier, Colonel C. L. Jewett, the Belgian Consul, Andre, and 
 the correspondence which had passed between the American offi- 
 cers and Aguinaldo. 
 
 On October 9 they examined Mr. John Foreman, an English- 
 man who had lived in Manila and had written a popular book on 
 the Philippines. The weight of the evidence taken supported the 
 view that the islands should not be returned to Spain; that the 
 Filipinos were not then capable of self-government, and that it 
 would be good policy for the United States to acquire the entire 
 Archipelago instead of merely the island of Luzon.^' 
 
 2" The opinions were summarized in a despatch to Secretary Hay October 6. 
 For. Rel., 1898, p. 918. The evidence and statements in full are in Sen. Doc. 
 62, p. 362 et seq.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 341 
 
 About the same time a message was received from Admiral 
 Dewey, which doubtless had some effect upon the action of the 
 commissioners. "It is important," said the admiral, "that the 
 disposition of the Philippine Islands should be decided as soon as 
 possible and a strong government established. Spanish author- 
 ity has been completely destroyed in Luzon, and general anarchy 
 prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila. 
 Strongly probable that islands to the south will fall into the 
 same state soon. Distressing reports have been received of 
 inhuman cruelty practised on religious and civil authorities 
 in other parts of these islands. The natives appear unable to 
 govern."^" 
 
 Five days later a telegram from General Otis, forwarded to 
 Paris, announced that the situation in Luzon was somewhat im- 
 proved ; that Aguinaldo was moderately recognized by the natives, 
 but that the insurgent authority was "crude." By this time con- 
 flicting opinions had developed among the commissioners, and 
 on October 25 complete statements of their different views were 
 cabled to Washington,^^ with a request for explicit instructions. 
 Davis, Frye and Reid, who had reached the conclusion that it 
 would be a political and commercial mistake to divide the Archi- 
 pelago, therefore favored taking the entire group and asked for 
 broader instructions. 
 
 Mr. Day believed that they should be mindful of the oft- 
 declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs 
 of conquest with which the war had been undertaken, and should 
 not peremptorily demand the entire Philippine group. He fa- 
 vored experimenting with the colonial problem on a small scale. 
 
 "Only experience," he said, "can determine the success of colo- 
 nial expansion upon which the United States is entering. It 
 may prove expensive in proportion to the scale upon which it is 
 tried with ignorant and semi-barbarous people at the other side 
 of the world. It should, therefore, be kept within bounds." 
 
 ^^For. Rel, 1898, p. 928. 
 *tFor. Rel, 1898, p. 932.
 
 342 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Senator Gray's statement summed up the familiar arguments 
 against the policy of annexation. 
 
 But the president had reached the conclusion that it was neces- 
 sary to demand the entire Archipelago, and Secretary Hay in- 
 formed the commission that : 
 
 "The information which has come to the President since your 
 departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of 
 Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish 
 rule, or to be the subject of future contention, can not be justi- 
 fied on political, commercial or humanitarian grounds. The ces- 
 sion must be of the whole Archipelago or none. The latter is 
 wholly inadmissible and the former must therefore be required. 
 The President reaches this conclusion after most thorough con-, 
 sideration of the whole subject and is deeply sensible of the grave 
 responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will en- 
 tail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the 
 interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we can not 
 escape responsibility."^* 
 
 This was followed by another telegram, in which Secretary 
 Hay considered the grounds upon which the demand should be 
 made. "While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, 
 which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition, control 
 and government the President prefers should be the subject of 
 negotiations as provided in the protocol. . . . The sentiment 
 in the United States is almost universal that the people of the 
 Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Span- 
 ish domination. In this sentiment the President fully concurs." 
 
 The president, wrote Secretary Hay, "can see but one plain 
 path of duty — the acceptance of the Archipelago. Greater diffi- 
 culties and more serious complications, administrative and inter- 
 national, would follow any other course."^' 
 
 28 For. Rel., 1898, p. 935. In a speech delivered after the treaty was signed, 
 Senator Foraker said : "The case of Cuba was simple, involving only our 
 relations with Spain and the Cubans, In the case of the Philippines there 
 were other complications which can not be mentioned here, but of which 
 senators will hear in Executive session, which justified the President's course 
 in most ample manner and vindicated most completely everything he has 
 done." Quoted in The London Times, Jan. 13, 1899. 
 
 29 Mr, Hay to Mr. Day, Oct. 28, 1898, For. Rel, 1898, p. 937. See the 
 president's statement to the Methodist bishops on Nov, 21, 1899, Olcott's Life 
 of McKinley, II, p. 109, also in The Christian Advocate, January 22, 1903.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 343 
 
 The president and Secretary Hay were of the opinion that 
 the entire Archipelago had been acquired by conquest, but the 
 commissioners could not accept that view. "After careful ex- 
 amination of the authorities," wrote Mr. Day, "the majority of 
 the Commission are clearly of the opinion that our demand for 
 the Philippine Islands can not be based on conquest. When the 
 protocol was signed, Manila was not captured; siege was in 
 progress and capture made after the execution of the protocol. 
 Captures made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded 
 and status quo restored as far as practicable. We can require 
 cession of the Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and 
 expenses of the war."^'^ 
 
 The president replied that the destruction of the Spanish fleet 
 on May 1 was the conquest of Manila, the capital of the Philip- 
 pines, and that the claim by right of conquest should not be aban- 
 doned. But the commissioners were convinced that to urge the 
 claim of conquest would probably prevent the making of a treaty, 
 as "subsequent military operations and capitulation, no less than 
 mutual acceptance of the protocol, precludes making demand 
 upon that ground. Our opinion as to the ineffectiveness of capit- 
 ulation after protocol has already been stated." 
 
 Senator Davis added the following statement to the despatch : 
 "I think we can demand cession of the entire Archipelago on 
 other and more valid grounds than a perfected territorial con- 
 quest of the Philippine Islands, such as indemnity or as condi- 
 tions of peace imposed by our general military success, and in 
 view of our future security and general welfare, commercial and 
 otherwise."" 
 
 In the face of this opposition the president gave way, and Sec- 
 retary Hay replied that the only wish of the president was to 
 hold all the grounds upon which the United States could fairly 
 and justly make the claim; that while indemnity should be put 
 forth as the chief ground, conquest should not be ignored. His 
 
 «o Mr. Day to Mr. Adee, Nov. 3, 1898. For. Rel. 1898. p. 940. 
 81 Mr. Day to Mr. Adee, Nov. 4, 1898. (Marked Special for the President) 
 For. RcL, 1898, p. 941.
 
 344 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 great concern was to secure a treaty which would not only satisfy 
 the present generation, but also meet with the approving judg- 
 ment of poster ity.^^ 
 
 Upon the presentation of the American demand for the Phil- 
 ippines the Spaniards attempted to reopen all the questions which 
 had been considered and disposed of in connection with the ces- 
 sion of Cuba. 
 
 It was again asserted'^ that the protocol provided for the tem- 
 porary and provisional occupation only of the city, bay and 
 harbor of Manila until such time as the treaty of peace was con- 
 cluded. Argument to support this view was found in the circular 
 sent by the French government to its ambassadors, in which 
 it was stated that the French ambassador at Washington had 
 signed in the name of Spain a protocol which contained a provi- 
 sion for the provisional occupation of Manila by the American 
 forces. 
 
 They also reoccupied their former position with reference to 
 colonial debts, saying loftily, "Let it be understood, therefore, 
 and the Spanish commissioners hope there will be no necessity 
 to repeat it, that Spain can not and ought not, since respect for 
 the rights of others forbids it, to agree to this treaty or to any- 
 thing implying the impairment or suppression, or even disregard, 
 of the private rights of others against the will of their legitimate 
 and special proprietors." 
 
 After renewing her protest against the exercise of sovereign 
 power by the American military government at Manila, and 
 asserting again the invalidity of all military acts subsequent to 
 the signing of the Peace Protocol, the Spanish commissioners 
 announced that they could not consent to the cession of the Phil- 
 ippine Archipelago, but would he happy to consider the question 
 of the liability of the United States for the hostile acts committed 
 after August 12. 
 
 The Americans met the charge of inconsistency with the state- 
 ment'* that they had based their demands with reference to Cuba 
 
 82 Secy. Hay to Mr. Day, Nov. 5, 1909. For, ReL, 1898, p. 941. 
 ^^Sen. Doc. 62, p. 119. 
 ^Sen. Doc. 62. p. 129.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 345 
 
 and Porto Rico upon the precise terms of the protocol, because 
 it was in those terms that the United States had made its de- 
 mands. As to the Philippines, the United States, except as to the 
 present occupation of Manila, confined itself in the protocol to 
 demanding that the future of the islands should be left in the 
 widest and fullest sense for future consideration. While it had 
 not in the protocol demanded other specific concessions, it had 
 reserved the right to demand them. Of course, the protocol pro- 
 vided for the temporary occupation of Manila. Had it provided 
 for permanent occupation the Philippines, to that extent, would 
 have been withdrawn from future consideration. 
 
 The negotiations . with M. Cambon were then reviewed at 
 length. President McKinley had clearly and definitely stated 
 the situation with reference to the islands. With reference to 
 the claim that the French minister of foreign affairs had under- 
 stood the third article of the protocol as providing for a tempo- 
 rary possession only, they quoted a letter from General Horace 
 Porter, the American ambassador in Paris, to the effect that the 
 French minister for foreign affairs, when his attention was 
 called to the use that the Spanish commissioners were making 
 of his circular, had "disclaimed any intention of giving any views 
 of his own regarding it, having no authority for so doing, and 
 declared that the brief mention contained in his letter could in 
 no wise be construed as an interpretation by him of the terms or 
 meaning of that instrument."^' 
 
 The United States did not ask for a pecuniary indemnity, nor 
 would it take to itself the sovereignty of Cuba. It assumed only 
 the burdens. It did demand Porto Rico, and now Spain was asked 
 to cede a country constantly in rebellion, a country in which 
 if to-day the United States should withdraw its troops Spain 
 would immediately have to resort to force to overcome a rebel- 
 lious and discontented people. 
 
 It was the turn of the American Commission to be "surprised** 
 at the "extraordinary" claims of Spain, who seemed to be at one 
 time claiming under and at another repudiating the Peace Pro- 
 
 »» Gen. Porter to Mr. Day, Nov. S, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 140.
 
 346 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 tocol. "Spain," it was said, "could claim only the status quo 
 provided for by that instrument, and that was the right of the 
 United States to occupy and hold the city, harbor and bay of 
 Manila pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace. The city, 
 harbor and bay of Manila were in the possession of the United 
 States; it had been conceded by Spain, and the results incident 
 thereto can not be defeated by alleging the invalidity of acts of 
 hostility subsequent to the protocol." 
 
 According to the American view the protocol was, in legal 
 effect, a military convention which provided for the capitulation 
 of Manila which should thereafter be governed by the laws of 
 war. Hence the acts complained of and for which Spain de- 
 manded compensation were legal even under the protocol and 
 could rightfully have been done if no hostilities had been con- 
 ducted after it was signed. 
 
 When the protocol "was executed by the United States taking 
 possession, it presented a case of military occupation of that cer- 
 tain defined territory, and vested in that government all the rights 
 which the laws of war give to a military occupation. This capit- 
 ulation was general in its character and terms. It comprehended 
 the defined territory and all that it contained, including the forts, 
 the muniments of war and the barracks. It included everything 
 and every person left in the city by Spain. It included the garri- 
 son for that reason. Under the special circumstances of the case 
 the surrender of the garrison was necessarily contemplated by 
 the protocol. . . . Had it been intended that the garrison 
 should be permitted to depart from the capitulated city, the usual 
 provision would have been made that it should march out with 
 its arms and with the honors of war. Containing no such pro- 
 vision, the exaction that the Spanish troops should surrender to 
 the occupying power was as justifiable and legal under the pro- 
 tocol as was the taking possession by that power of the forts, 
 barracks and muniments of war. ... In all cases where, 
 pending war, a certain defined part of the territory of the bellig- 
 erent is, by the terms of a military convention, agreed to be put 
 in the military possession of the other belligerent, the sovereignty 
 of the occupying party (the United States in the present instance) 
 displaces or suspends the sovereignty of the other belligerent and
 
 I 
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 347 
 
 "becomes for the purposes of the mihtary occupation a substitute 
 for it." 
 
 In an elaborate memorandum, somewhat overcharged with sar- 
 casm, presented at the conference of November 16,'" the Spanish 
 commissioners returned to the question of colonial debts and 
 reviewed again the negotiations preceding the signing of the pro- 
 tocol, but nothing of value was added to the argument against 
 the claim that the occupation of Manila under the protocol was 
 a military occupation. 
 
 The Spaniards now proposed that the meaning of articles 
 three and four of the protocol should be submitted to arbitration, 
 and in view of "the glorious precedents" which had been estab- 
 lished by the United States they expressed great confidence that 
 the proposition would be accepted. It was a very good move. 
 But the answer was that arbitration, while commendable in itself, 
 should precede war and not come after the trial by battle to 
 enable the defeated party to escape the consequences of his 
 folly." 
 
 As to the Filipinos being allies, "It was not a relation which 
 the government of the United States intended to establish, but 
 it must be at least admitted that the insurgent chiefs returned and 
 assumed their activities with the consent of our military and 
 naval commanders, who permitted them to arm with the weapons 
 which we had captured from the Spaniards and assured them of 
 fair treatment and justice. Would we be justified now in sur- 
 rendering these people to the government of Spain, even under 
 a promise of amnesty, which we know they would not accept? 
 . . . The situation which has arisen in the Philippines was 
 neither foreseen nor desired by the United States; but since It 
 exists tliat government will not shirk the responsibility growing 
 out of it, and the American Commissioners now make to the 
 
 ^'^Sen.Doc.62,p. 174. 
 
 *'"The principle thus stated is thought self-evidently sound and^ just 
 Americans were surprised to find how completely it was overlooked in the 
 contemporaneous European discussion — how general was the sympathy with 
 the Spanish request for arbitration, and how naive was the apparently genuine 
 surprise at the instant and unqualified refusal to consider it Even English 
 voices joined in the chorus of encouraging approval that from every quarter 
 of Europe greeted the formal Spanish appeal for an opportunity to try over 
 in another form the questions they had already submitted to the arbitrament 
 of arms." Reid, Problems of Expansion, p. 74.
 
 348 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Spanish Commissioners, in the light of these responsibihties, the 
 final proposition." 
 
 The Spaniards made considerable capital out of the alleged 
 harshness of the American demand and appealed with some suc- 
 cess to the sympathies of the public. 
 
 The peace conferences were being held in a distinctly anti- 
 American environment.^^ M. Gabriel Hanotaux, who was then 
 the French minister for foreign affairs, in his recent book, La 
 France vivante en I'Amerique du Nord, assures us that French 
 diplomacy was eminently correct.^^ Nevertheless, neither France, 
 Germany nor Russia was in sympathy with American aims or 
 methods. The demand for the Philippines was regarded as un- 
 warranted. The holders of Cuban bonds were active in trying 
 to bring influence to bear on the American commissioners. Ger- 
 man, like French diplomacy, was formally correct, but the people 
 and the press were distinctly hostile to America. Doctor An- 
 drew D. White, who was the American minister at Berlin, says 
 that "whatever may have been the attitude of the German press 
 and people, and indeed of continental Europe generally, the Im- 
 perial Government at Berlin was friendly to us rather than to 
 Spain. They knew what Spain was and what we are; they 
 showed this from the first in ways which could not be mis- 
 taken."*" 
 
 America's traditional European friend, Russia, which was then 
 working out the Manchurian policy which resulted so disastrously, 
 
 88 On Nov. 15 the American commissioners found it advisable to issue 
 a statement to meet the charges of violation of the protocol with which the 
 Spaniards had flooded the European press. For. Rel., 1898, p. 948. 
 
 39 "Suddenly, and from no one knows where," says _M. Hanotaux, "the 
 rumor spread that France was hostile to the great American Republic. Cer- 
 tainly we had no need to take part against our neighbors and friends of the 
 Peninsula. But if any diplomacy was ever correct and applied conscien- 
 tiously the rules of neutrality, it was the French diplomacy of the period, as 
 the documents would establish if it were necessary. However, the rumor, 
 once launched, grew till it became menacing throughout all North America. 
 It was an admitted and accepted fact that Americans passing through Paris 
 were hostilely received, molested, maltreated, France was putting herself at 
 the head of a league of hostile nations against the United States! ... It 
 was one of the worst moments of my ministerial career." 
 
 40 Personal letter to the author. Dec. 18, 1913. See Mr. Hay's account of 
 his interview with the German ambassador, Count Hatzfeldt, on July 13, 01- 
 cott's Life of McKinley, II, p. 133.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 349 
 
 very seriously objected to the injection of a new power into the 
 Far Eastern situation. The Gazette of St. Petersburg, as quoted 
 in the London Times, said : 
 
 "By the transfer of the whole of the Philippines to such enter- 
 prising and tenacious people as the Americans, the Pacific Ocean 
 would soon become a North American lake on which the flag of 
 other nations would be merely tolerated. And yet this is what 
 the American delegates now demand in the peace conference at 
 Paris. McKinley, since his visit to Chicago, has joined the 
 American jingoes. Madrid can only, of course, protest on paper. 
 But besides the United States and Spain there are other great 
 powers who have shown themselves capable of acting in concert 
 in Japan and Crete, and those powers will no doubt be able to 
 play a very affecting and harmonious tune to the North Ameri- 
 cans on the shores of the Philippines, at San Francisco and New 
 York, and, if necessary, in Washington. Only the growing in- 
 toxication induced by their victories over the Spaniards could 
 have led them to dream that Europe, which is now so intensely 
 interested in the permanent balance of national forces on the 
 East Asiatic coast, would permit such a post as the Philippines 
 to be placed exclusively in the possession of the United States." 
 
 The British public was friendly to the United States, although 
 the London Times criticized her attitude on the question of the 
 Cuban debts.*^ Nevertheless it saw nothing unreasonable or 
 indeed harsh in the terms which the United States proposed to 
 impose upon Spain. They were no more severe than those im- 
 posed by Germany on France in 1871, or by Russia on Turkey 
 in 1878, even after the latter were revised by the cdncert of 
 Europe. According to the Times, the language of the protocol 
 did not imply the necessary continuance of Spanish sovereignty 
 in the Philippines. On November 9 it editorially expressed "The 
 hope that Spain would speedily bow to necessity and confine her 
 efforts in the negotiations to obtaining the best bargain possible 
 in the allocation of the debts of her lost dependencies. . . . 
 The sacrifice which she is called upon to make is not so great 
 
 *^ Mr. Frye reported the fact to Washington October 30. For. Rel., 1898, 
 p. 939.
 
 350 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 as it appears. The retention of a nominal sovereignty in the 
 Philippines would be a purely imaginary gain, and any share of 
 effectual control would only be a danger to her peace and a drain 
 upon her resources." 
 
 Indeed Great Britain was anxious that the United States should 
 acquire the islands, as she expected thereby to gain a new ally 
 in the Far East.*^ Lord Salisbury, never an enthusiastic admirer 
 of America, speaking at the Guildhall while the Peace Confer- 
 ence was in session, said: "It is the first year in which the 
 mighty force of the Republic has been introduced among the 
 nations whose dominions are expanding and whose instruments 
 are war. I am not implying the slightest blame — far from it; 
 I am not refusing sympathy to the American Republic in the 
 difficulties through which they have passed, but no one can deny 
 that their appearance among the factors of Asiatic diplomacy 
 is a grave and serious event which may not induce to the inter- 
 ests of peace, though I think in any event it is likely to conduce 
 to the interests of Great Britain." 
 
 On November 13 the Times said: "We would rather see the 
 Philippines in the hands of our American friends than in those 
 of any European power." 
 
 Of Count Cassini's subsequent protest against the idea that the 
 Russian government ever harbored the intention of interfering 
 with America's action, the Times observed that "Governments 
 were never so foolish as to avow an intention which it has not 
 been found convenient to act upon." 
 
 In his original instructions to the commissioners President 
 McKinley said that he was not "unmindful of the distressed finan- 
 cial condition of Spain, and whatever consideration the United 
 States make now must come from its sense of generosity and 
 benevolence rather than from any real o^* technical obligation." 
 As the Spaniards refused to discuss the nature of the debts and 
 the purposes for which the money had been expended, nothing 
 
 *2 This expectation has not been reahzed in any marked degree. Great 
 Britain's alliance with Japan has prevented unity of action by the English- 
 speaking powers in China.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 351 
 
 could be done but estimate the amount as nearly as possible from 
 the available data and offer a gross sum of money in lieu of a 
 formal assumption of the debt.*^ The way in which the amount 
 finally paid was determined appears in the correspondence which 
 passed between the commissioners at Washington. As on many 
 other matters the individual commissioners entertained conflict- 
 ing views. On October 29 the secretary of state was informed 
 that it was the intention to offer to assume the existing indebted- 
 ness incurred for necessary works and improvements of a pacific 
 character, and this was approved by the president. 
 
 On the following day Mr. Frye sent a telegram for the presi- 
 dent, in which, after stating that he feared there would be no 
 treaty, he outlined a plan which he believed might be adopted. 
 The articles relating to the Cuban debt had been accepted pro- 
 visionally only by the Spanish Commission. The matter was 
 therefore still unsettled. It seemed to him that the United States 
 might agree to use its good offices with any government here- 
 after established in Cuba to secure the assumption by it of any 
 indebtedness incurred for internal improvements there, and her- 
 self assume any like indebtedness in the territory ceded to the 
 United States, "Might we not go further," he added, "and 
 agree to pay Spain from ten to twenty million dollars if thus a 
 treaty could be secured? If no treaty, then war; a continued 
 disturbance of business, an expenditure of a million dollars a 
 day, and further loss of life. Would not our people prefer to 
 
 <3 For details of the debt, see Sen. Doc. 148, p. 44. For. Rel, 1898, p. 945. 
 
 "The American Commissioners," says Mr. Reid, "recognized the duty of 
 reimbursement for debts legitimately incurred for specified improvements or 
 otherwise for the real benefit of the transferred territory. Not till it began 
 to appear that of the Philippine debt, $40,000,000 (Mexican), or a little under 
 twenty millions of our money, had been transferred direct to aid the war in 
 Cuba, and the rest had probably been spent in the war in Luzon, did your 
 representatives hesitate at the payment; and even then they decided to give 
 a lump sum equal to it which could serve as a recognition of whatever debts 
 Spain might have incurred in the past for expenditures in that Archipelago 
 for the benefit of the people." Reid, Problems of Expansion, p. 40. In an 
 article published in the Anglo-Saxon Review for June, 1899, Mr. Reid says: 
 "She could use it to pay the Philippine bonds if she chose. That was the 
 American view of the sanctity of public debts legitimately incurred in behalf 
 of ceded territory; and that is an explanation of the money payment in the 
 case of the Philippines, as well as the precise amount at which it was finally 
 fixed."
 
 352 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 pay Spain one-half of war expenditures rather than indulge in 
 its costly luxury? Europe sympathizes with Spain in this re- 
 gard. The correspondent of the London Times, in his yesterday's 
 letter, criticised severely our attitude. The precedents of the last 
 century are antagonistic to our position. Of course, we will not 
 pay debts incurred in the suppression of the colonial rebellions."** 
 
 The president again expressed the desire that the commis- 
 sioners should be generous in all matters which did not require 
 a disregard of principle or duty, and a willingness to consider 
 favorably whatever the commission deemed best with reference 
 to debts for pacific public improvements in the Philippines. 
 
 On November 10 the personal views of each commissioner 
 with reference to the assumption of the debt or a money payment 
 to Spain were cabled to Washington.*^ Mr. Day adhered to 
 his previously-expressed opinion that the islands would prob- 
 ably prove a burden instead of a benefit to the United States. 
 Assuming, however, that the entire group was to be taken, and 
 in view of the fact that Spain was bankrupt and losing her colo- 
 nies, the revenues of which were charged with the outstanding 
 debts, he favored paying a lump sum of about fifteen million 
 dollars. 
 
 Senator Frye favored taking the entire group of islands and 
 paying therefor the sum of ten million dollars, which he con- 
 sidered a fair estimate of the debt properly chargeable to the 
 Philippine Islands. If necessary to secure a treaty, however, 
 he favored taking Luzon, Mindora, Palawan and one of the 
 Carolines, and paying from five to ten million dollars, but re- 
 quiring, in addition, certain trade and cable concessions for 
 Americans in the islands retained by Spain, and the immediate 
 
 **>or. ReL, 1898, p. 939. 
 
 In an address delivered at Chicago, Feby. 13, 1899, Mr, Reid said that 
 the American commissioners had "maintained, :n the face of the most 
 vehement opposition, not merely of Spain but of well-nigh all Europe, a 
 principle vital to oppressed people struggling for freedom, a principle vk^ithout 
 which our own freedom could not have been established, and without which 
 any successful revolt against any unjust rule could be made practically im- 
 possible. That principle is that, contrary to the prevailing rule and practice 
 in large transfers of sovereignty, debts do not necessarily follow the territory 
 if incurred by the mother country distinctly in efforts to enslave it." 
 
 45 For. Rel, 1898, p. 945.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 353 
 
 release of all political prisoners held in Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam 
 and the Philippines, as well as freedom of religion in the islands. 
 
 Senator Grey was now willing to accept the cession of the 
 islands in order to avoid what would inevitably result should 
 \var be resumed, the seizure with the strong hand of all Spain's 
 colonial possessions. 
 
 Mr. Reid estimated the costs of the war at approximately three 
 hundred million dollars. He regarded Porto Rico as worth not 
 more than fifty million, and favored taking the entire Archipel- 
 ago as indemnity for the balance, regarding "it as an asset of 
 some sort, whether to develop or dispose of." However, to 
 secure a treaty, he was willing to leave the island of Mindanao 
 and the Sulu group and take in their place the Caroline Islands 
 and the Ladrones, and pay a lump sum of from twelve to fifteen 
 million dollars, which, however, should be returned to the United 
 States out of the future revenues of the islands. 
 
 Senator Davis favored presenting an ultimatum requiring the 
 cession of the entire Archipelago, Porto Rico and Guam, and 
 the relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba, without any money 
 payment or the assumption of debts of any kind. 
 
 It will be noted that none of the commissioners made any 
 reference to the duties which it was assumed that we owed to the 
 Filipinos. The problem had been reduced to one of indemnity 
 and the form the demand should take. 
 
 The definite and final instructions came on the following day.** 
 The commission was instructed to insist upon the cession of the 
 whole of the Philippines, and, if necessary, to pay from ten 
 million to twenty million dollars. Questions of indemnity and 
 trade advantages might be yielded, "they might be waived or 
 compromised, but the question of duty and humanity appeals 
 to the President so strongly that he can find no appropriate 
 answer but the one he has here marked out." 
 
 On November 21 the offer of twenty million dollars was made, 
 and an answer required within one week. 
 
 On November 22 the president of the Spanish Commission 
 
 *«For./?^/., 1898, p. 948.
 
 354 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 submitted seven questions to Mr. Day, which were designed to 
 bring out the meaning which the Americans attached to the pro- 
 posed articles, and on the following day the Spaniards presented 
 three alternative propositions for which consideration was re- 
 quested. The differing views of individual members were again 
 communicated to Washington, but the president directed the 
 commission to be guided by the instructions already given, and 
 on November 26 the Spanish commissioners were so informed. 
 
 On November 29 Mr. Day telegraphed Washington that the 
 Spanish commissioners had given a definite and final acceptance 
 of the American proposals. 
 
 Considerable time was now devoted to subsidiary and collat- 
 eral matters.*'^ The Spanish commissioners attempted unsuc- 
 cessfully to have inserted articles permitting all Spanish subjects 
 residing in the islands to retain Spanish citizenship, binding the 
 United States to recognize the validity of existing contracts for 
 the construction of public works, for the return of the privately- 
 owned bonds and moneys which had been paid into the public 
 treasury as security for the performance of such contracts, for 
 the investigation of the Maine disaster by a commission, and 
 for the assumption by the United States of certain pensions 
 which Spain had always paid to the descendants of Columbus. 
 
 The nationality article proposed by the Spaniards could not 
 be accepted, as it would have allowed the natives of the Philip- 
 pines, including the uncivilized tribes, to create for themselves 
 a nationality other than the one in control of the territory. The 
 article with reference to the recognition of certain contracts was 
 rejected because the nature and obligation of the contracts were 
 unknown. It was conceded that if an investigation showed that 
 the contracts were valid the obligations Imposed by international 
 law upon the successor in sovereignty would fall upon the United 
 States. As to the bonds held as security for the performance of 
 contracts, it was said that nothing was further from the inten- 
 tion of the United States government than to keep from the 
 lawful owner such sums as come under its control, and that they 
 
 *7 Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 258, 261.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 355 
 
 would be restored after the fulfilment of the contracts or obliga- 
 tions for which they were security. The United States had no 
 intention to confiscate private property. 
 
 The Americans declined to enter upon any consideration of 
 the question of the destruction of the battleship Maine, and closed 
 their final communication by expressing their sense of the thor- 
 oughness, learning, ability and uniform courtesy with which the 
 Spanish commissioners had conducted the negotiations. This 
 compliment was about all the devoted Spaniards secured to carry 
 back to Madrid. 
 
 The treaty was not signed until December 10, 1898. By its 
 terms Spain relinquished all claim of sovereignty over and title 
 to Cuba, and ceded to the United States the Philippine Islands, 
 Porto Rico and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the 
 West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Ladrones. The 
 United States agreed during its occupancy of Cuba, but no longer, 
 to assume and discharge all obligations which under international 
 law resulted from such occupation, to pay to Spain the sum of 
 twenty million dollars within three months after the exchange 
 of ratifications of the treaty, to send back to Spain at its own 
 cost and expense soldiers taken as prisoners of war at Manila,*^ 
 and to restore to them their arms. 
 
 It was agreed that all stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, 
 small arms, guns of every caliber with their carriages and acces- 
 sories, powder, ammunition, and live stock, and materials and 
 supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of 
 Spain in the Philippines and Guam should remain the property 
 of Spain. Pieces of ordnance, exclusive of artillery in the forti- 
 fications and coast defenses, should remain in their emplacements 
 for the term of six months from the ratifications of the treaty, 
 the United States reserving the right in the meantime to purchase 
 the same from Spain. 
 
 Spain agreed at once to release all prisoners of war and all 
 
 *8 The United States obligated itself to convey to Spain only such Spanish 
 soldiers as were actually prisoners of war. Troops which were under arms 
 and under control of the Spanish authorities were not included. 22 0pp. 
 Atty.-Gen., 383 (1899).
 
 356 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses in connec- 
 tion with the insurrection in the Philippines during the war with 
 the United States. The United States agreed to obtain the 
 release of all Spanish prisoners held by the insurgents in Cuba 
 and the Philippines. Each government at its own expense was 
 to return all released prisoners of war to their homes. All claims 
 for indemnity, national and individual, against either govern- 
 ment were mutually released, but the United States agreed to 
 adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain. 
 
 It was declared that the relinquishment or cession of the desig- 
 nated islands and the buildings, forts, barracks, structures, pub- 
 lic highways, and other immovable property which belonged to 
 the Crown of Spain, should not be held in any respect to impair 
 the property or rights which by law belonged to the peaceful 
 possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities,*' 
 public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civil bodies,®" 
 or of any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and 
 possess property in the renounced and ceded territory, or of pri- 
 vate individuals of whatsoever nationality.^^ 
 
 The Spaniards residing in the ceded or relinquished territory 
 were to be subject to the same law and entitled to the same rights 
 and privileges before the courts as citizens of the country. Care- 
 ful provision was made for the determination of the proceedings 
 then pending before the judicial tribunals. Judgments rendered 
 before the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty, in the cases 
 in which under the Spanish law there was no right of review, 
 
 *9 Public property belonging to the city of Manila did not pass to the 
 United States. It remained the property of the municipality. Vilas v. Manila 
 (1911),220U. S. 345. 
 
 so The Roman Catholic Church in Porto Rico was held to be a legal per- 
 sonality within this provision. Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church 
 (1908), 210 U. S. 296. The Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines is a 
 legal personality with power to hold property acquired by gift. Santos v. 
 Holy Roman Catholic Church, 212 U. S. 463. 
 
 SI An hereditary franchise granted by the Spanish Crown and appurtenant 
 to the office of mayor of Havana, giving the exclusive right of slaughtering 
 cattle in the city of Havana was held to constitute private property within the 
 protection of this provision of the treaty. O'Reilly de Camera v. Brooke, 135 
 Fed. Rep. 384. But it did not include the office of Solicitor of the Court of 
 First Instance which had been purchased in perpetuity. Alvarez v. Sanchez, 
 216 U. S. 167.
 
 THE TREATY OF PARIS 357 
 
 •were to be final. Civil actions which were pending and not 
 determined at the time of such exchange of ratifications would 
 continue to judgment in the same court, or in the court which 
 might be substituted therefor. 
 
 Criminal actions pending on the date of the exchange of rati- 
 fications before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of 
 the territory which by the treaty ceased to be Spanish should 
 continue under the jurisdiction of that court until final judg- 
 ment, but the execution of the judgment rendered therein should 
 be committed to the authorities of the place where the case 
 arose. 
 
 All copyrights and patents which had been acquired by Span- 
 iards in the ceded territory should be respected."^ Spanish scien- 
 tific, literary and artistic work not subversive of public order in 
 the territories in question were to be admitted free for a period 
 of ten years, and during the same time Spanish merchant ves- 
 sels and merchandise should be admitted into all ports of the Phil- 
 ippines on the same terms and conditions as ships and merchan- 
 dise of the United States. This privilege proved of little value 
 to Spain, as the United States permitted the ships and merchan- 
 dise of all nations to enter on the same terms. 
 
 There was also a rather superfluous provision, to the effect that 
 the inhabitants of the lost territories should be secured in the free 
 exercise of their religion. 
 
 Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula residing in the ter- 
 ritory over which Spain relinquished her sovereignty, might re- 
 main or remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their 
 property rights, with the right to carry on their industry, com- 
 merce and professions, subject to the laws applicable to other 
 foreigners. If they remained in the territory they might pre- 
 serve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making before 
 a court of record within a year from the exchange of ratifica- 
 tions of the treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve 
 
 62 The validity of such rights were to be determined by Spanish law. 22 
 Opp. Atty.-Gen. 617 (1899).
 
 358 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 such allegiance." In default of such declaration, they should 
 be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality 
 of the territory in which they resided. The civil rights and politi- 
 cal status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded by 
 the United States were to be determined by the Congress of the 
 United States." 
 
 It was subsequently discovered that Spain owned certain islands 
 which were not within the boundary lines drawn in the treaty 
 which were thus left derelict and useless to Spain. Under a 
 treaty signed at Washington, November 7, 1900, and ratified 
 January 23, 1901, it was agreed that in consideration of the pay- 
 ment of one hundred thousand dollars all islands belonging to the 
 Philippine Archipelago lying outside of such lines, particularly 
 the islands of Cagayan Sulu and Sibutu and their dependencies, 
 should be included in the cession.^^ 
 
 Such was the Treaty of Paris, which was supposed to mark 
 the close of an era of the world's history. As the result of a 
 war into which the fatuous Madrid government allowed itself 
 to drift, the old Spain ceased to exist. Thereafter what re- 
 mained was a different Spain. As said by an European critic, it 
 was Spain's misfortune and fault "that her extraordinary mis- 
 management of Cuba brought her into conflict with the United 
 States, whose politicians had little regard for the conventions of 
 European diplomacy and no particular reverence for the status 
 quo. For whatever mistakes she may have made at this crisis, 
 Spain has paid the penalty to the full."®^ 
 
 53 By a subsequent protocol signed at Washington on March 29, 1900, tiie 
 time was extended for six months from April 11, 1900. 
 
 5* It was the intention of the f ramers of the treaty to leave Congress a 
 free hand to deal with the islands.^ Dorr v. U. S. (1904), 195 U. S. 138. 
 
 The Filipinos did not become citizens of the United States. Congress, by 
 Act of July 1, 1902, as amended by Act March 23, 1912, authorized the Philip- 
 pine Legislature to provide for the acquisition of citizenship by certain natives 
 who did not come within the terms of the treaty. The act makes all in- 
 habitants of the islands on April 11, 1899, including Spanish subjects who did 
 not elect to retain their Spanish allegiance, citizens of the Philippines. Roga 
 V. Col. of Customs, 22 Ph. Rep. 332. Fed. Stat. Ann. Sup. 1914, p. 310. 
 
 55 Fed. Stat, Ann., VII, p. 818 ; For. Rel, 1900, p. 887. 
 
 56 The London Times, Dec. 12, 1898.
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 The Policy of Expansion and the Anti-Imperialists 
 
 Some Generalities — First Impressions — McKinley's Original Views — Publi- 
 cists and Literary Men — Their Arguments Inefifective — A Question of National 
 Policy — Instincts of the People — Natural Desire for Growth — Decision Rested 
 With McKinley — The Anti-Imperialists — Nature of Their Opposition — Senti- 
 ment in Continental Europe — British Feeling — Kipling's Appeal — Opposition 
 at First Negative — The Policy of "Walk Alone" — Senator Hoar's Suggestion 
 for a Convention of Nations — The World Power Idea, Altruism and Com- 
 mercialism — Not Originally a Party Issue — Mr. Bryan's Responsibility — Rati- 
 fication of the Treaty — Future Policy Left Undetermined. 
 
 It is difficult to ascertain the causes of a war. It is impossible 
 to anticipate its consequences. Some simple or dramatic incident 
 serves as a spark and lights a magazine in which the troubles of 
 an era have accumulated. A battleship, while in a friendly port, 
 is blown up; an ancient colonial empire crumbles and a modem 
 republic is deflected into new courses. An irritated Bey strikes 
 a French ambassador with a fan, Algiers is occupied, and in the 
 course of a few years France finds herself charged with the cares 
 of a colonial empire. A company of traders on the far side of 
 the world bring about conditions which force England, against 
 her will, to assume the burden of governing the millions of India. 
 Certain bondholders so involve her in the entangling meshes of 
 Egyptian affairs that thereafter all the struggles and writhings 
 of her statesmen serve only to draw tighter her bonds. Even 
 the Romans were not intentionally the conquerors of the world.* 
 Verily, as McKinley said, the march of events rules and overrules 
 
 1 "Events have generally evolved themselves so that a contest has arisen 
 out of comparatively insignificant causes, such as a border line or a commer- 
 cial right of way, and the conqueror by his mere victory has been obliged to 
 enlarge the boundaries of his country. Even the Romans were not inten- 
 tionally the conquerors of the world." Delbriick, Contemporary Review, 
 Oct., 1909. 
 
 359
 
 360 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 human actions. The incidental becomes the principle, the tem- 
 porary the permanent, and the world bows its head in acquies- 
 cence before au fait accompli. More than twenty centuries ago 
 Thucydides remarked that war was the last thing in the world to 
 go according to program. We speak of the purposes of a war 
 and propose to confine and limit its results. But when the flood- 
 gates of war are once opened man seems able to do but little more 
 than run for a time along the shore and watch the torrent as it 
 breaks new channels and spreads into the most unexpected places. 
 "I claim not to have controlled events," said Lincoln, "but confess 
 plainly that events have controlled me. Now at the end of three 
 years' struggle the nation's condition is not what either party or 
 any man desired or expected." The world is never the same after 
 as before a war. "A stricken field," says Lord Salisbury, "is 
 one of the stages upon the road of history, and the state of 
 things that existed before that stricken field can not be the same 
 as that which exists afterward."^ It is not surprising that the 
 Spanish-American War created unexpected conditions and new 
 problems for solution. 
 
 The great question whether the United States should take the 
 Philippines from Spain and assume the burden of governing and 
 developing an alien people was seriously and even acrimoniously 
 discussed almost from the day of Dewey's victory. It is probably 
 true that in the beginning a majority of the thoughtful men in the 
 country instinctively shrank from the adoption of a national 
 policy which seemed so remote from anything in the past history 
 of the country. 
 
 Doctor Schurman relates that when he was offered the presi- 
 dency of the first Philippine Commission by President McKinley, 
 he replied, "To be plain, Mr. President, I am opposed to your 
 Philippine policy. I never wanted the Philippines." "Oh," re- 
 plied the president, "that need not trouble you; I did not want 
 the Philippines either, and in the protocol to the treaty I kept 
 myself free not to take them, but in the end there was no alterna- 
 tive." 
 
 2 The Times, Nov. 11, 1898.
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 361 
 
 To the suggestion that, after reserving suitable naval stations, 
 the islands should be left in the possession of Spain, the presi- 
 dent replied that the American people who had gone to war for 
 the emancipation of Cuba would not after Dewey's victory in 
 Manila Bay consent to leave the Filipinos any longer under the 
 dominion of Spain, and that if Spain were driven out and Ameri- 
 can sovereignty not set up, the peace of the world would be 
 endangered.' 
 
 When a few months later the president asked Judge Taft to 
 become the president of the second Philippine Commission, it is 
 said that he was met with substantially the same reply that he 
 had received from Doctor Schurman. 
 
 Many distinguished scholars, educators, statesmen, publicists, 
 literary men, poets and philosophers, were saddened by what 
 seemed to them the proposed abandonment of the primary prin- 
 ciples upon which the nation had been founded. Some of the 
 arguments which these men advanced against the policy of expan- 
 sion seemed unanswerable, and yet they were not effective. The 
 speeches delivered by Senator Hoar in the Senate won the respect 
 and admiration of the entire country, but convinced no one who 
 was not already of the same way of thinking. The powerful 
 addresses of Carl Schurz, Moorfield Storey and others were 
 equally admirable and equally unconclusive. It is possible that 
 they were pitched on too high a key and that the speakers neg- 
 lected the appeal to certain very human traits. The wise man 
 who tells the people of their incapacity generally has a silent 
 audience, while he who flatters is certain of applause. 
 
 The extremists predicted that the new policy would lead to 
 glory ineffable or disaster dire and dreadful. The optimists 
 found in it inspiration and encouragement. But the pessimists 
 questioned the source of the inspiration and drew an inference 
 from the incident recorded in the fourth chapter of the Gospel 
 according to St. Matthew : "The devil taketh him up into an 
 exceeding high mountain, and sheweth him all the kingdoms of 
 
 8 Schurman, Philippine Affairs, p. 2. See Olcott's Life of William Mc- 
 Kinley, I, Chap. IX, p. 175.
 
 362 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the world, and the glory of them; And salth unto him, All these 
 things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me." 
 
 The arguments on both sides were often carried to such ex- 
 tremes as to seem absurd and hysterical. An emotional patriot 
 sobbing over what he thought was the grave of the Declaration 
 of Independence irresistibly reminded the common man of Mark 
 Twain weeping at the grave of Adam. And the harrowing pic- 
 tures painted by the expansionists of the confusion and the 
 awful results generally which would follow the withdrawal of 
 American troops, were also overdrawn. "What do you suppose 
 the Filipinos would do," dramatically asked Mr. Choate, "if 
 we should withdraw the American troops?" "Well," drawled 
 Speaker Reed, "I don't suppose they would pursue us farther 
 than San Francisco." Unemotional people were reasonably cer- 
 tain that the United States would continue to prosper under 
 either policy. 
 
 It was, after all, merely a question of national policy. Neither 
 national life nor liberty was involved. The people were untram- 
 meled by any precedent or principle which forbade them to 
 acquire and hold dependencies, and they took no stock in the 
 assertion that they, the descendants of successful colonists, were 
 incompetent to develop colonies or govern dependencies, or in 
 the theory that the reaction from the attempt would ruin the 
 home coimtry. They knew instinctively the meaning of their 
 political maxims and realized the implied limitation upon the 
 general statements that all men are created free and equal and 
 that government should rest on the consent of the governed. 
 Every reasonably well-informed person knew that the natives of 
 California, Louisiana, Florida, New Mexico and Alaska had not 
 been asked whether they desired to become citizens or subjects 
 of the United States, and that the people of the southern states 
 had, against their will and by force of arms, been compelled to 
 remain within the Union and continue to hear the Declaration 
 of Independence read on each recurring Fourth of July. They 
 realized, also, that in the United States, as elsewhere, there had 
 always been a wide divergence between the precepts of political
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 363 
 
 philosophy and the practise of politicians. Their histories told 
 them that the leading statesmen of the East, from Daniel Web- 
 ster and Josiah Quincy to Senator Hoar and his associates, had 
 opposed the territorial expansion of the United States, and the 
 extension of her boundaries west of the Mississippi, as strenu- 
 ously as they now opposed its extension beyond the Pacific. In 
 fact, the desire for expansion, for bigness, for new lands to 
 develop was a race inheritance. It existed before the Constitu- 
 tion was adopted, and it exists to-day. Democracies are usually 
 aggressive and sometimes intolerant. The American democracy 
 is, and from its birth has been, one of the aggressive nations 
 of the earth. Its territorial expansion has been one of the mar- 
 vels of the age. It has recognized no line of sea, river or moun- 
 tain as a permanent boundary. By the end of the nineteenth 
 century the idea of contiguous and non-contiguous territory had 
 become little more than a mere verbal collocation. Facilities 
 for rapid communication had destroyed all such limitations. All 
 the world was contiguous to a farmer's section of land. 
 
 With expansion has always gone some form of colonization. 
 When in contact, a higher generally absorbs or destroys a lower 
 civilization. The Germans would reduce this dangerous lesson 
 of history to a natural law. Mommsen says :* 
 
 "By virtue of the law, that a people which has grown into a 
 state absorbs its neighbors who are in political nonage, and a 
 civilized people absorbs its neighbors who are in intellectual 
 nonage — by virtue of this law, which is as universally valid and 
 as much a law of nature as the law of gravity, the ancient Italian 
 nation . . . was entitled to reduce to subjection the Greek 
 states of the East which were ripe for destruction, and to dis- 
 possess the people of lower grades of culture in the West . . . 
 by means of its settlers; just so England, with equal right, has 
 in Asia reduced to subjection a civilization of rival standing but 
 
 * History of Rome, V, Chap. 8. 
 
 Of course the impulse to obey a natural law need not be selfish. If it is 
 a natural law it must in the end operate for the good of humanity. Nature 
 is constantly sacrificing the individual for the benefit of the race. According 
 to Professor Frank's interpretation of the history of Roman expansion, it 
 was not unlike that of America — forced upon the state by considerations 
 neither selfish nor commercial. 
 
 Frank, Roman Imperialism (1904).
 
 364 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 politically impotent, and in America and Australia has marked 
 and ennobled, and still continues to mark and ennoble ex- 
 tensive barbarian countries with the impress of its nationality. 
 . . . It is the imperishable glory of the Roman democracy or 
 monarchy — for the two coincide — to have correctly apprehended 
 and vigorously realized this, its highest destination." 
 
 It is a simple observable fact that virile nations are and always 
 have been colonizing nations, and non-expanding and non-col- 
 onizing nations generally fall out of the race. Whether it pleases 
 us or not, these things are regulated by some law which the opti- 
 mist must believe makes for the uplifting of the human race. As 
 said by the writer of an interesting article in The Spectator^ 
 
 "The great races, when the hour of opportunity arrives, ex- 
 pand greatly — that is all we really know; and what, when the 
 momentum is on them, they have to care about is to see that 
 their actions, for which they are only half responsible, benefit 
 the world." 
 
 With such nations as England, France, Germany, Japan and 
 Italy actively working outward, seeking new worlds to conquer 
 and new fields for the exercise of the superabundant activities 
 of their people, it ought not to have been expected that the Amer- 
 ican people would be content with the policy of ingrowing devel- 
 opment. 
 
 No American statesman ever had a keener sense for detecting 
 the currents and drifts of public opinion than President McKin- 
 ley. What the people really desired he seems to have wanted 
 them to have, regardless of his own private views as to what was 
 best for them. 
 
 Under the pressure of public opinion the president had been 
 forced into the war with Spain against his better judgment. 
 Thereafter, however, until the treaty of peace was signed he 
 controlled men and events with a firm hand. Some of the 
 most drastic provisions of the treaty of peace were inserted, 
 under the orders of the president, against the judgment of 
 
 ^Jan. 14, 1899. Of course when the lines of expansion meet it becomes 
 merely a question of strength.
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 365 
 
 at least a part of the commission. His was the wisdom of 
 Polonius : "Beware of entrance into quarrel ; but being in, bear 
 it, that the opposer may beware of thee." George W. Smalley 
 gives Whitelaw Reid the credit for determining McKinley's Phil- 
 ippine policy for him." Mr. Reid, while a member of the 
 Peace Commission, was certainly very influential, and his inti- 
 mate knowledge of diplomatic affairs enabled him, at a critical 
 stage of the negotiations, to plant a fertile suggestion in the mind 
 of the Spanish ambassador at Paris. But Smalley's account of 
 events is quite inaccurate and his assertions are not sustained by 
 the correspondence that passed between Washington and the 
 Peace Commission. President McKinley, on vital matters, such 
 as the Cuban and Philippine debts and the claim of conquest, 
 showed a persistence and determination which are quite inconsist- 
 ent with the popular but erroneous idea of his character.''' 
 
 After availing himself of every means of information he 
 reached the conclusion that a large majority of the people fa- 
 vored retaining the Philippines, and subsequent events proved 
 that he was correct. They were not averse to acquiring addi- 
 tional territory, whether contiguous or non-contiguous, if it 
 seemed the proper thing to do and for the probable political and 
 commercial advantage of the United States. They had not, in- 
 deed, contemplated the invasion of the Far East. The idea of 
 absorbing an archipelago, of which the greater number possibly 
 had never even heard, required consideration. The proposal that 
 they should become responsible for the government of another 
 alien race induced a perceptible hesitancy. After a tour through 
 the Western States the president returned to Washington, con- 
 vinced that he would be supported in demanding the cession of 
 the entire group of islands.* At this stage of the controversy 
 
 " Smalley, Anglo-American Memories, 2nd Series, p. 191. 
 
 7 See Olcott's Life of William McKinley, II, Chap. XXVIII. 
 
 * Senator Hoar wrote : "I dare say that he was influenced as any other 
 man who was not more than human would have been influenced by the ap- 
 parently earnest desire of the American people, as he understood it, as it 
 was conveyed to him on his Western journey. But I believe every step he 
 took he thought necessary at the time. . . . The feeling of the country 
 was deeply excited. President McKinley made his famous Western journey. 
 He was greeted by enthusiastic throngs. The feeling in that part of the
 
 366 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the situation was within his control. The people were wilHng to 
 accept his judgment. The peace commissioners at Paris were 
 divided. Had President McKinley directed the commission not 
 to demand the cession of the Philippines, the American people 
 would have acquiesced, probably with a sigh of relief. He had 
 the power to choose, and his choice was subsequently ratified by 
 the people. 
 
 Mr. Taft in a public address once said that the United States 
 blundered into colonization.® It is a common view, but entirely 
 erroneous. What was done was done deliberately. If it was a 
 blunder, it was a deliberate blunder adopted after the fullest 
 consideration. Those who opposed the policy of expansion or- 
 ganized under the name of Anti-Imperialists and characterized 
 their opponents as Imperialists. As a term of reproach, the word 
 imperialist was not a very disparaging one. The great majority 
 of the nation which successfully governs more than a fifth of the 
 population of the world bear it proudly as a term of honor. 
 Whether intended as a term of honor or reproach depends, of 
 course, upon what it connotes to the person who uses it. It per- 
 tains to empire, something which may be very noble, or very 
 much otherwise. Chief Justice Marshall referred to "the empire 
 of the United States." Thomas Jefferson, from his retirement, 
 wrote to Madison that "no constitution was ever before so well 
 calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government."^® 
 W. H. Stead wrote of the "ministry of empire," and declared 
 its "essence to be not lordship, but service." It is true, as said 
 by a recent English writer,^* that there is a debased and mock 
 imperialism which walks in jackboots and works to the sound 
 of kettledrimis, but there is also another and finer Imperialism 
 
 country in favor of permanent dominion over the Philippine Islands was 
 uttered by excited crowds, whom he addressed from the platform and the 
 railroad cars as he passed through the country. But the sober, conservative 
 feeling which seldom finds utterance in such assembly did not make itself 
 heard." Autobiography, II, p. 311. 
 
 ^ Geographical Magazine, Aug., 1905. 
 
 ^° Reid, One Welchman, p. 43. 
 
 11 Fraser, Lord Curson in India and After, p. 456. For a statement of 
 the faith of a "sound but reasonable Imperialist," see Lord Cromer's paper on 
 the "Government of Subject Races," in The Edinburgh Review, June, 1908; 
 Cromer's Pol. and Lit. Essays, p. 3.
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 367 
 
 which has for its object the creation of great nations upon firm 
 foundations, the uplifting of myriads to a happier and nobler 
 level, the spread of justice and liberty, and the evolution of a 
 higher manhood. And such, regardless of the errors and mis- 
 takes which are incident to all great undertakings, America's 
 "imperial" work in the Orient, if such it be called, has proved 
 to be. 
 
 Empire and democracy are not necessarily antagonistic. The 
 most advanced democracies in the world, such as New Zealand, 
 nestle within the protecting arms of the greatest of empires. 
 
 "The world," says Professor Giddings,*^ "has been accustomed 
 to think of democracy and empire as antagonistic phenomena. 
 It has assumed that democracy could be established only on the 
 ruins of empire, and that the establishment of empire necessarily 
 means the overthrow of liberty by a triumphant reign of abso- 
 lutism. Yet in our day, we are witnessing the simultaneous 
 development of both democracy and empire. The two most 
 powerful nations of the world are becoming, year by year, more 
 democratic in their local life, in their general legislation, and in 
 their social institutions. Nevertheless, for a generation, both 
 have been continually extending their territorial boundaries, ab- 
 sorbing outlying states or colonial possessions, and developing 
 a complicated system of general or imperial administrations. 
 Not only so, but, under that government which has carried this 
 policy to its highest perfection, the coexistence of democracy 
 and empire has become an approximately perfect blend." 
 
 The work of the Anti-Imperialist League during the early part 
 of the controversy was commendable. It supplied the organized 
 opposition essential for the proper discussion and consideration 
 of an important question of national policy. It fought great 
 battles in the Senate, through the press and on the platform. 
 No more patriotic body of citizens were ever banded together 
 in the support of a cause. But after the insurrection in the 
 islands began, the impartial historian will find but little to com- 
 mend in the course pursued by the organization, or at least by 
 
 ^^ Giddings, Democracy and Empire, p. 1 ; and see Frank's Roman Im' 
 perialism. Chap. 6 (Rome as an Imperial Democracy), pp. 88-110.
 
 368 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 some of its most active members. The warfare which was car- 
 ried on after the political battle had been lost much resembled 
 that which prevailed in the Philippines after Aguinaldo had been 
 driven into the mountains — it was of the guerrilla variety, de- 
 signed merely to annoy. 
 
 The acquisition by the United States of territory in the Far 
 East was regarded with much disfavor by the nations of conti- 
 nental Europe. Russia and Germany in particular resented what 
 was assumed to be the entry of a new and aggressive western 
 power into world affairs. Officially the conduct of these govern- 
 ments may have been strictly correct and friendly to us, but the 
 weight of public sentiment was thrown in favor of Spain and 
 against the policy of American expansion. 
 
 The continental press was loud in its protests against the acqui- 
 sition of territory by America in the Orient. To the editors of the 
 anti-republican journals it seemed exceedingly sad that the great 
 republic should fall away from its ideals. Incidentally they sur- 
 mised that events might strengthen a power which would stand in 
 the way of their advances in Manchuria and China. Writing on 
 the assumed decay of Anglo-Saxondom, M. de Pressence noted 
 that "in the United States we see the intoxications of the strong 
 wine of warlike glory carrying a great democracy off its feet and 
 raising the threatened specter of militarism," 
 
 In England the extremists, of whom Wilfred Blunt and Kier 
 Hardie were leading exemplars, the men who have always op- 
 posed their own country's policy in India and Egypt, naturally 
 sympathized with the Anti-Imperialists. The erratic Mr. Labou- 
 chere wrote pungently and interestingly in Truth of what he 
 called the affiliation of English and American jingoes.^^ 
 
 13 Truth, July 7, 1898. Truth, Jan. 5, 1899, sent the following New Year's 
 greeting to Uncle Sam. While not much as poetry, it is worth something as 
 a prophecy: 
 
 "We wish you much joy of the islands 
 
 Which you have so easily won. 
 
 But the troublesome part of the business 
 
 Has only, we fear, just begun. 
 
 You will prove how extremely ungrateful 
 
 Your new fellow subjects can be. 
 
 Compelling you even to shoot them 
 
 Before they consent to be free.
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 369 
 
 But the Times and its constituency and responsible English 
 statesmen generally were friendly to the expansion policy upon 
 which the United States was entering. The work ahead of 
 America appealed to the instinct of those Englishmen who gen- 
 erally assume that the lower races have been provided by Provi- 
 dence as material upon which to exercise their special talents for 
 government/* If they were not themselves to govern the Philip- 
 pines, they preferred that the duty should fall upon Americans. 
 Mr. Smalley tells of a conversation with Lord Kitchener, who, 
 like many Americans, thought that the Filipinos were causing an 
 unreasonable amount of trouble. He attempted to explain the 
 situation by stating that America was inexperienced in colonial 
 work. Lord Kitchener replied, "I should like to govern them for 
 you," and it was evident, adds Mr. Smalley, that while the re- 
 mark was not serious, he would like "to have taken on a job of 
 that kind, had it been possible." Later in Egypt he dealt suc- 
 cessfully with similar problems. 
 
 The controversy inspired one poem which made a strong ap- 
 peal to the conscience and sense of obligation of the American 
 people. A great English poet, idealizing the imperial vocation, 
 stripped it of the tinsel and glitter by which its enemies and some 
 of its friends are accustomed to ornament it, and revealed it as 
 
 You will certainly find yourself bothered 
 At first in your much enlarged sphere, 
 But nations that go on the warpath 
 Can not hope for a Happy New Year." 
 
 i*Thus in an address delivered April 30, 1914, Sir George Reid said: 
 "Let us consider what being a Britisher means. It means belonging to the 
 only race capable of managing the affairs of every other race and creed." 
 United Empire, V (N. S.), p. 481. This assumption by the British of omnip- 
 otence in colonial matters, however well justified by history, is sometimes 
 a little trying to the people who have been less favored by Providence. 
 
 A blockade-running English skipper, who was in Philippine waters during 
 the war, published a book in which he suggested, that, in view of America's 
 experience with negroes and England's natural qualifications for governing 
 Eastern people, the Philippines should be exchanged for Jamaica. Ross, 
 Sixty Years' Life and Adventure in the Far East (1911). A more practical 
 plan was that suggested by Congressman Bede, that America should re- 
 lieve herself from the Philippine troubles and at the same time preserve 
 the protective principle by exchanging the Philippines for Ireland and then 
 raise her own policemen.
 
 370 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 a necessary but thankless task to be performed by the white race 
 under the restraints of conscience/^ 
 
 In winged words which circled the earth in a day and by repeti- 
 tion became hackneyed within a week, Kipling appealed to Amer- 
 ica to 
 
 "Take up the White Man's burden — 
 
 Send forth the best ye breed — 
 
 Go bind your sons to exile 
 
 To serve your captives' need ; 
 
 To wait in heavy harness, 
 
 On fluttering folk and wild — 
 
 Your new-caught sullen peoples 
 
 Half devil and half child. 
 
 "Take up the White Man's burden. 
 And reap his old reward : 
 The blame of those ye better 
 The hate of those ye guard. 
 
 "Take up the White Man's Burden, 
 Have done with childish days — 
 The lightly proffered laurel, 
 The easy, ungrudged praise. 
 Come now, to search your manhood. 
 Through all the thankless years. 
 Cold, edged with dear bought wisdom, 
 The judgment of your peers."^* 
 
 This stirring appeal did much to make real and definite the 
 sense of responsibility which had been vague and inarticulate and 
 to crystallize public sentiment in the United States." 
 
 15 W. H. Stead in Eng. Rev. of Rev., March, 1899. 
 
 16 First published in McClure's Magasine. 
 
 i'^ Of course, Kipling's suggestion of the relative value of white and brown 
 people was offensive to those whose minds were constantly "groping in the 
 ethics of a more expansive humanity." A recent Indian writer says : "The 
 'White Man's Burden' aroused a storm of bitter criticism and howling ap- 
 preciation. Within a few days of its publication journalists on the staff of 
 country periodicals with a reputation for verse, amateur poets, poetasters, 
 and would-be poetasters had written replies, imitations, and parodies in 
 rhythmic foot. Even Labouchere wrote a reply. The poem was a stirring 
 success. . . . Kipling achieved more. Not only did he invent an excuse, 
 he founded an inspiring war note. He filled the young blood with the germ 
 of a complicated disease ... an empire-building fever. Kipling made 
 himself immortal." Mr. A. R. Sarath-Roy in N. A. Rev., Feb., 1914, p. 279.
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 371 
 
 The weakness of the opposition to the policy of expansion lay 
 in the fact that it was nothing but obstruction. America was 
 already in the Philippines, and the problem was whether inglori- 
 ously to scuttle away or remain at least until the Filipinos could 
 put the house in order for their own housekeeping. It was a 
 situation in which inaction by the United States was impossible. 
 
 The Anti-Imperialist leaders soon realized that a policy of 
 negation could not win. Charles Francis Adams wrote to Carl 
 Schurz : " "Whenever we criticize the policy up to this time pur- 
 sued, we are met with an inquiry as to what we have to oppose to 
 it, we are invited to stop finding fault with others, and to propose 
 some feasible alternative policy ourselves. ... It is, in my 
 judgment, useless to attempt to carry on the discussion merely in 
 a negative form. As opponents of an inchoate policy we must, in 
 place of what we object to, propose something positive, or we 
 must abandon the field." The alternative, according to Mr. 
 Adams, was the old policy of "hands off" and "walk alone," 
 which the United States, it was alleged, had pursued "with such 
 signal success" toward Mexico, Hayti and Venezuela, countries 
 whose people were "equally unfit for self-government." 
 
 The results of that policy in those countries when compared 
 with the work of the British in Egypt and the Straits Settlements 
 can hardly be called brilliant. The Anti-Imperialists finally set- 
 tled upon the plan of an independent Philippine Republic either 
 under the protection of the United States, or of the Powers gen- 
 erally through some form of neutralization. 
 
 But this proposed solution of future difficulties did not solve 
 the immediate problems, and its possible ultimate adoption was 
 not in the least inconsistent with the course which was being at 
 the time pursued by the administration. Senator Hoar favored 
 calling a convention of the nations and asking a joint guarantee 
 of autonomy and good government ; a singular suggestion indeed 
 
 Kipling may have much to answer for, but it is rather too much to charge 
 him with responsibility for creating the germ of the disease of empire 
 building. 
 
 "See Adam's pamphlet, Imperialism (1899).
 
 372 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 from a statesman who aided in preventing the ratification of the 
 Congo treaty of 1878. 
 
 The opponents of the administration policy advanced three 
 propositions, either of which if accepted would require the United 
 States to withdraw from the Philippines and leave the natives 
 free to erect such a government as to them seemed most desir- 
 able. Their principal contentions were : 
 
 ( 1 ) That the United States, having reached its natural bound- 
 aries, should be content with its present size and devote its energy 
 to the solution of problems connected with its internal welfare 
 and development. 
 
 (2) If, however, additional territory was to be acquired, it 
 should be such only as in the course of time could be created into 
 new states of the Union. This meant, in the words of Grover 
 Cleveland, that "the government of remote and alien peoples 
 should have no permanent place in the purposes of our national 
 life." It meant the permanent exclusion of the United States 
 from the work of developing the tropics, which Mr. Kidd in his 
 remarkable book^^ predicted would be the most important work 
 of the twentieth century. 
 
 (3) Should neither of the foregoing principles be adopted, 
 the Philippines should nevertheless be abandoned, because (a) 
 the United States was pledged to acquire no territory by the 
 war, (b) the Filipinos had been, by implication, promised their 
 independence and were fully capable of self-government, and (c) 
 to impose American sovereignty upon the islands under such 
 conditions would be to violate the principles which had hitherto 
 guided the national life and deny the ideals which had made the 
 Republic honored throughout the world. It was also asserted 
 that the islands would prove a financial burden, that the Ameri- 
 can system was not adapted to governing colonies, and that Amer- 
 icans, being without experience in such work, would prove un- 
 equal to the task.^° 
 
 ^^The Control of the Tropics (1899). 
 
 20 The arguments will be found in Jordan's Imperial Democracy; Ran- 
 dolph, The Law and Policy of Annexation (1901) ; Hoar, Autobiography, 
 II, Chap. 33; Adam's Imperialism and the Tracks of Our Ancestors
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 373 
 
 The reply was that the country was dealing with conditions 
 and not theories; that the situation had not been voluntarily 
 created; that out of the war had come unexpected duties and 
 obligations which could not honorably be shirked; that having 
 destroyed the power of Spain in the islands, the United States 
 could not, consistent with its duty to foreign residents as well 
 as to natives, abandon them to disorder or anarchy; that the 
 Filipinos had never been promised independence ; that they were 
 without experience in self-government and incapable of estab- 
 lishing a government which would be able to maintain law and 
 order and protect the lives of foreigners; that such a condition 
 would be a temptation to predatory powers and a threat to the 
 peace of the world; that the title to the islands under the treaty 
 with Spain was perfect In morals and in law, and that it was 
 the solemn duty of the United States to assume the government 
 in a spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice for the good of the na- 
 tives and of humanity in general. 
 
 America, it was said, had always been a colonizing nation, the 
 policy of expansion was not new, and while the administration 
 of a distant dependency would present new problems, they would 
 not be unsolvable. It was conceded that the islands must be gov- 
 erned for the benefit of the natives and that possibly they would 
 for many years constitute a burden upon the United States. 
 Until the natives were educated and trained for self-government 
 their future should be left undetermined. It was generally im- 
 plied, however, that when they should be capable of self-gov- 
 ernment they would be given the right to determine whether to 
 remain under the American flag or set up a government of their 
 own." 
 
 (1898) ; Speeches by Carl Schurz at Conference on the Foreign Policy of the 
 United States, Chicago, Aug. 18, 1898 ; Univ. of Chicago. July 4, 1899 ; Phila- 
 delphia, Apr. 7, 1899; Cooper Union, New York, May 24, 1900. Hugo 
 Munsterberg (The Americans, 1902) gives a very good summary of the 
 arguments for and against holding the Philippines. 
 
 The fear that the Philippines would be made a state of the Union was soon 
 dissipated. The history of the short-lived Filipino Federal party showed that 
 the natives as well as the Anti-Imperialists were opposed to it. 
 
 21 Messages and Speeches of President McKinley, Olcott's Life of Mc- 
 Kinley (1916), Reid's Problems of Expansion (1900). Coleridge The United 
 States as a World Power (1908). Speeches of Lodge, Spooner and Foraker in 
 Congressional Records from 1899 to 1902.
 
 374 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Three special facts — pride in a suddenly realized sense of inter- 
 national importance, altruism and commercialism — operated in 
 different degrees and upon different types of mind in inducing 
 the American people to favor the policy of expansion. The 
 people for the first time realized what had long been an estab- 
 lished fact, that the United States was one of the great powers 
 of the world.^* The effect which the acquisition of the Philip- 
 pines would have upon the future international policy of the 
 United States was greatly exaggerated. As a matter of fact, it 
 bound her to no necessary change of national policy. Her ab- 
 stention from participation in European politics from the first 
 had been voluntary, not compulsory. The explanation is found 
 in the simple fact that her interests were elsewhere. But she had 
 always been recognized as a member of the family of nations and 
 had been invited to send representatives to nearly all the inter- 
 national congresses which had met in Europe during the preced- 
 ing century. 
 
 The United States has always been active diplomatically in 
 the Orient, where her policy has been of a peaceful and commer- 
 cial character. While abstaining from interference in Europe, 
 Africa and the Levant, she has from the first asserted equality 
 with European powers in the extreme Orient. The implied limi- 
 tation on her activities which were supposed to result from the 
 Monroe doctrine has never been held to apply in the Far East. 
 American diplomats, from Burlingame to Foster, have exerted 
 great influence in the domestic and foreign affairs of China. 
 Ward, a Yankee from Salem, organized, and until his death, led 
 the "Ever Victorious Army," which for the time saved the 
 Manchu dynasty and later brought fame to Gordon. Commo- 
 dore Perry opened Japan to the world and started the country 
 on its spectacular course. In fact, the policy of the United States 
 in that part of the world, although peaceful, had been rather ag- 
 gressive.^' It was now assumed that the acquisition of important 
 
 22 Dr. A. B. Hart, Harper's Mag., Feby., 1899. 
 
 23 See generally, Foster's American Diplomacy in the Orient (1903);
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION, 375 
 
 territory in the East would induce the United States to enter even 
 more actively into the politics of that part of the world. 
 
 There was no apparent reason why the ownership of these 
 islands should require the United States to accept invitations to 
 conferences dealing with purely European affairs such as she 
 had previously declined. But the world agreed in assuming that 
 America was entering upon a new era of her history, and to a 
 certain extent such was the fact. It was assumed that she was 
 now full grown, and Dewey's battle in Manila Bay was regarded 
 as a sort of national coming-out party. Henceforth Columbia 
 was to be considered in society. While the conservatives shrank 
 from the assumption of the new responsibilities which would 
 result from the policy of expansion, such things had no terrors 
 for the average uncloistered citizen who was, in fact, very willing 
 to get down into the dust of the arena and battle for the world's 
 prizes. 
 
 The importance of the economic factor in the policy of ex- 
 pansion must not be underestimated. Nations no less than in- 
 dividuals are interested in dollars. Statesmen could not be in- 
 different to the commercial possibilities of the situation, and they 
 were disposed to give them due consideration. It was a time 
 when trade expansion was much discussed at home. In an ad- 
 dress as Chairman of the Republican National Convention which 
 renominated President McKinley, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
 said : "We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in 
 the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in trade 
 expansion." There were also many who felt that some of the 
 most revered of our political maxims had outlived their useful- 
 ness and that commercialism had become the directing and con- 
 trolling force in international affairs.^* 
 
 Soon after the Spanish fleet was destroyed measures were 
 taken to ascertain the real and potential wealth of the Philip- 
 Morse, Int. Rel. of the Chinese Empire (1910) ; Conant, The United States 
 in the Orient, p. 156 et seq.; American Foreign Policy. By a Diplomat; 
 Chap. 5. 
 
 2* See article by F. A. Vanderlip in Century Magazine, August, 1898, also 
 in Senate Doc. 62, p. 563.
 
 376 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 pines. An expert was detailed to report upon the financial and 
 industrial conditions and a geologist, charged with the duty of 
 investigating the mineral resources, accompanied the first ex- 
 pedition to Manila.^^ 
 
 Nevertheless, the altruistic factors of the situation were those 
 which controlled. Had investigation shown that the islands were 
 commercially and economically useless, it is improbable that the 
 McKinley administration would have pursued any course other 
 than that which was adopted. The president could not be made 
 to believe that, after having destroyed the power of Spain and 
 overthrown the existing government, the United States could, 
 consistent with its obligations to foreign residents and the na- 
 tives, withdraw the troops and leave the country to "stew in its 
 own juice." It was largely on these grounds that the American 
 people sustained the administration policy. They felt that, like 
 the Cubans, the Filipinos were entitled to receive some benefit 
 from the destruction of Spanish power. Just how it was to 
 come about they were not then able to say, but they were certain 
 that to abandon the natives to their own devices at that stage 
 of the proceedings would be to inflict upon them an irreparable 
 wrong.^^ 
 
 It was not until after the treaty was ratified that the policy 
 of expansion became a party issue. While many members of 
 the Democratic party were affiliated with the so-called Anti- 
 Imperialists, others, and those not the least influential, gave active 
 as well as passive support to the administration measures. When 
 the treaty was before the Senate party lines were loosely drawn. 
 Senator Hoar, one of the old-time leaders of the Republican 
 party, led the opposition to ratification, while Senator Gray, 
 who as a member of the Peace Commission had opposed the 
 
 25 Senate^ Doc. 62, pp. 513-518. 
 
 26 One distinguished publicist, writing before the capture of Manila and 
 when American dealings with the Filipinos had not extended beyond furnish- 
 ing Aguinaldo and a few companions with free transportation from Hong 
 Kong, giving him some arms, and putting him ashore with the advice to "get 
 his army going," wrote, "We do not intend to hand the people of the Philip- 
 pines back to the Spaniards, and our sense of decency and respect for the 
 enlightened opinion of mankind will not permit us to abandon them." Rev. 
 of Rev.. July, 1898.
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 377 
 
 acquisition of the islands, spoke and voted in favor of ratifica- 
 tion. But for the votes of democratic senators the treaty would 
 have been defeated. It rested with Mr. W. J. Bryan, who had 
 been the Democratic candidate for the presidency in the pre- 
 ceding election, to determine the issue. How his influence was 
 exerted is thus told by Senator Hoar : "Mr. Bryan, in the height 
 of the contest, came to Washington for the express purpose of 
 urging upon his followers that it was best to support the treaty, 
 end the war, and let the question of what should be done with 
 our conquest be settled in the coming campaign. He urged upon 
 them, as I was told by several Democrats at the time who did 
 not take his advice, that the Democratic party could not hope 
 to win a victory on the financial questions at stake, as they had 
 been "beaten on them in a time of adversity ; and that they must 
 have this issue for the coming campaign. He was besought by 
 his wiser political associates to go away and leave the Senate 
 to settle the matter. But he remained. After that it became 
 impossible not only to defeat the treaty, but to defeat the policy 
 which had inspired it."^'' 
 
 According to Senator Hoar, the Democratic party, at least 
 in the early days of the controversy, were not earnestly and se- 
 riously opposed to the acquisition of the Philippines. They never 
 wielded their party strength in opposition to it. The leaders sup- 
 ported the administration in enacting the legislation necessary 
 to suppress the insurrection which followed the ratification of 
 the treaty.^® *T do not mean to imply," says Senator Hoar, 
 "that a large number of the Democratic party, both in public life 
 and out of it, were not sincere and zealous in their objection to 
 this wretched business. But next to a very few men who con- 
 trolled the policy of the Republican party in this matter, Mr. 
 
 " Autobiography, II, p. 322. 
 
 28 In the Washington Post of February 6. 1899, Sen. Bacon is quoted as 
 saying : "I will cheerfully vote all the money that may be necessary to carry 
 on the war in the Philippines, but I still maintain that we could have avoided 
 a conflict with those people had the Senate adopted my resolution or a similar 
 resolution announcing our honest intentions with regard to the Philippines."
 
 37« THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Bryan and his followers who voted in the Senate for the treaty, 
 are responsible for the results."^^ 
 
 On February 10, 1899, a few days after the attack by the 
 Filipinos upon the American troops, the treaty was ratified by 
 a vote of fifty-seven to twenty-seven. Three Democratic sen- 
 ators, who had been understood to be in opposition, voted in the 
 affirmative and saved the treaty.^" 
 
 Mr. Bryan and his followers thus consented to the acquisition 
 of the Philippines by the United States. As conditions then 
 were it was the proper thing for them to do. They could very 
 properly support the treaty and yet oppose the permanent re- 
 tention of the islands. But on the questions of the propriety 
 or morality of the acquisition it was incumbent on them there- 
 after to maintain silence. 
 
 On the motion of one of the Democratic senators who had 
 voted for ratification, the Senate, by a majority vote only, then 
 passed a resolution similar to the one which previously had been 
 offered by Senator Bacon, declaring that the ratification of the 
 treaty was not to be deemed a determination that the United 
 States would permanently hold the islands. This was merely 
 
 ^^Autobiography, II, p. 323. 
 
 In a letter to the author dated November 9, 1915, Mr. Bryan says : "Sen- 
 ator Hoar's criticism of my position is unjust. He looks at the matter from 
 the standpoint of a Republican, I from the standpoint of a Democrat. The 
 situation was this : It might have been possible to defeat the ratification of 
 the treaty, but it was impossible to itistrtict the commission and, of course, 
 it was not proper according to the theory of our institutions that a minority 
 should dictate to the majority how the treaty should be made. . . . The 
 Democratic party, however, was to furnish the bulk of the votes to defeat the 
 treaty and our party would have had to bear the responsibility for anything 
 that might have happened as a result of the rejection of the treaty. . . . 
 Then, too, a great pressure was being brought to bear upon the government 
 by parents to get their boys out of the army, the actual fighting being over, 
 and this blame, too, would have been thrown upon the Democratic party, 
 the few Republicans being unable to commit their party or fasten the respon- 
 sibility upon it._ . . . My advice was to ratify the treaty and at the same 
 time promise independence by resolution. ... As the leader of the 
 Democratic party I was interested in having it pursue a course which would 
 give it the largest possibility of doing good with the least risk of being held 
 responsible for things which it could not prevent." In the light of this state- 
 ment, it is difficult to see wherein Senator Hoar's criticism is unjust. 
 
 ^^ Senate Journal, SS Cong., 3d Sess., p. 216; 40 Republicans, 10 Demo- 
 crats, 3 Populists, 2 Silverites and 2 Independents voted for ratification, and 
 22 Democrats, 3 Republicans and 2 Populists voted against it. Sen,. Doc. 182, 
 57 Cong., 1st Sess.
 
 THE POLICY OF EXPANSION 379 
 
 a formal expression of the sentiments of individual senators. 
 The resolution was never presented to the House of Representa- 
 tives, and it had no legal force.^^ 
 
 In Spain the treaty encountered even greater opposition than 
 in the United States. The Cortes refused to ratify it, and on 
 March 19 the queen regent, in the exercise of a constitutional 
 alternative power, ratified it in her own name. The ratifications 
 were exchanged on April 11, 1899, and on that date the Spanish- 
 American War came legally to an end and the sovereignty of 
 the United States over the Philippine Archipelago became an es- 
 tablished fact. Thereafter the question was as to the manner 
 of governing the people and the ultimate disposition of the coun- 
 try. After the lapse of nearly two decades it is clear that 
 the fears of the Anti-Imperialists were groundless. The United 
 States has not become embroiled in the affairs of Europe; 
 neither has it become wedded to militarism, nor have the prin- 
 ciples of the fathers suffered to any appreciable extent. The 
 Pax Americana envelopes the Philippine Archipelago and the 
 natives enjoy a civil and political liberty and a general material 
 prosperity such as they never before experienced. 
 
 ^Cong. Rec, VoL XXXII, pt. 2, Feb. 14, 1899, pp. 1845-7; The Diamond 
 Rings, 183 U. S. Rep. 176. Brown, J. 
 
 The rejection of the treaty would have placed the country in a serious 
 situation. "The President," said Senator Lodge, "can not be sent back across 
 the Atlantic in the person of his Commissioners, hat in hand to say to Spain, 
 with bated breath, T am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of 
 one-third of the Senate to tell you that we have been too victorious, and that 
 you have yielded us too much, and that I am sorry that I took the Philippines 
 from you.' I do not think that any American President would do that, or 
 that any American would wish him to." Olcott's Life of William McKinley, 
 II, p. 138.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 The Diplomacy of the Consulates 
 
 EARLY RELATIONS WITH THE INSURGENTS 
 
 Charges of Bad Faith — Consular Activities — Wildman's Relations with Hong 
 Kong Junta — Forbidden to Discuss Policies — Aguinaldo at Singapore — The 
 Pratt-Dewey Cables — No Reference to Independence — Aguinaldo at Hong 
 Kong — Minutes of Meeting of Junta — Aguinaldo Meets Dewey — Is As- 
 sisted with Arms — Organizes Army and Government — Dewey's Statement — 
 Proclaims Independence — Origin of the Promise Myth — Filipino Claims 
 — Bray and St. Clair — Aguinaldo's Report to the Junta — Summary — Filipino 
 Plans and Policies — American Policy Unknown — No Promise Made and No 
 Bad Faith. 
 
 According to Carl Schurz and other radical Anti-Imperi- 
 alists, America's early relations with the Filipino insurgents 
 make "a story of deceit, false pretense and brutal treachery 
 to friends without parallel in the history of republics."^ The 
 constant repetition of such charges has left a vague impression 
 on the public mind that the government of the United States, 
 President McKinley, President Roosevelt, Admiral Dewey and 
 their subordinates in the Far East were guilty of acts of bad 
 faith in their relations with the Filipino leaders and that there 
 is a sort of moral cloud on our title to the Philippines. 
 
 Aguinaldo and his advisers claimed that the American gov- 
 ernment, through its authorized representatives, promised ex- 
 pressly and by implication, in return for his military cooperation, 
 to assist in establishing an Independent state In the Philippines. 
 Their supporters In the United States have placed the stress on 
 the implications said to result from a de facto alliance with the 
 Filipino organization. The records of the American and Fili- 
 pino governments and armies are now accessible and there is no 
 
 1 Bancroft, Reminiscences of Carl Schurs, III, p. 446. See Chap. XVII, 
 infra. 
 
 380
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 381 
 
 reason for any further misunderstanding as to >vhat actually oc- 
 curred. The facts are no longer in doubt.^ 
 
 The early relations with Aguinaldo had more effect upon sen- 
 timent in the United States than upon the actual military con- 
 ditions in the Philippines. The importance and extent of the 
 assistance rendered the United States by the insurgents have been 
 greatly exaggerated. They were merely such as were incidental to 
 their own operations. Manila lay defenseless under the guns 
 of the fleet. All Dewey needed was men to garrison it. The 
 city would have fallen had there been no insurgents and the 
 Spanish troops would have become prisoners of war whether they 
 were in Manila or in the provinces.® 
 
 2 The captured records of the insurgent government and army were de- 
 posited in the archives of the War Department at Washington. Captain (now 
 Major) John R. M. Taylor was detailed to prepare an official history of the 
 insurrection based upon these records. One volume of narrative and two 
 supplementary volumes of documents were prepared by him and printed, but 
 Mr. Taft, then secretary of war, after reading the proofs, decided that while 
 the government was cultivating friendly relations with the Filipinos, it would 
 be contrary to public policy to publish the record of their cruelties and treach- 
 ery. The type was therefore thrown down. Two copies of the galley-proofs 
 were preserved and deposited, one in the War Department at Washington, 
 and the other in the Department of Commerce and Police at Manila. I have 
 made use of the Manila copy in preparing this chapter, but the references are 
 to the War Department records. Major Taylor's text is cited under his name, 
 followed by the numbers of the proof sheets. The documents are cited as 
 Philippine Insurgent Records, with the file number or the exhibit number in 
 the matter prepared by Captain Taylor. 
 
 A pamphlet edited by Captain Taylor entitled Telegraphic Correspondence 
 of Emilio Aguinaldo, July 15, l8g8, to November 28, iSgg, annotated, was 
 published in 1903. _ 
 
 A few of the insurgent records were printed in Taylor's Report on the 
 Organisation for the Administration of Civil Government Instituted by 
 Emilio Aguinaldo and His followers (Washington, 1903). 
 
 3 For various opinions as to the value of the services rendered to the 
 Americans by the Filipino army, see Century Magazine for May, 1899 (Gen. 
 F. V. Greene) ; Sen. Doc. 62, p. 375 (Gen. Merritt). 
 
 Admiral Dewey in his testimony in 1902 was inclined to belittle the value 
 of such services. In reply to questions he said : 'T would like to say now, 
 that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul Pratt and Consul 
 Williams. ... I did not think they would do anything. I would not have 
 taken them. I did not want them, I did not believe in them. . . . They 
 were assisting us. . . i They were assisting us, but incidentally they were 
 fighting their own enemies. ... It was their own idea coming over there. 
 We could have taken the city on any moment we had the troops to occupy it." 
 Sen. Doc. 25, pp. 37-31. 
 
 In his proclamations to the people Aguinaldo generally claimed to have 
 an alliance with the Americans but in his reply to Paterno's Manifesto in 
 favor of an alliance with Spain instead of the United States, Aguinaldo said : 
 "Remember, Senor Paterno, that we make war without the help of any one;
 
 B92 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Although the Spanish "policy of attraction" was making some 
 headway among the Tagalogs, the Filipinos generally were no 
 more loyal to Spain than they had been before the pact of Biak- 
 na-bato. The reforms which they had been told were to result 
 from the banishment of their leaders had not materialized and 
 in certain parts of the country the fires of revolt had again been 
 lighted. But the leaders were discouraged and hopeless. It was 
 inevitable that a declaration of war against Spain by the great 
 Republic of the West, the traditional friend of the South Amer- 
 ican colonies and the champion of Cuba Libre, would revive the 
 hopes of the insurgents. But Aguinaldo failed to grasp the sit- 
 uation and left Hong Kong at the time when it was most im- 
 portant for the Philippine leaders to be within reach of Manila.* 
 What the Insurgents could have accomplished without Aguinaldo 
 is, of course, mere conjecture. Some inspiration came from the 
 widely advertised claim that there was an "alliance" with the 
 Americans. Without Aguinaldo, Luna the soldier, and Mabini 
 • the politician, might have organized a formidable movement 
 against Spain, but the probabilities are that Aguinaldo was the 
 only Filipino then capable of consolidating the factions. He 
 showed no particular capacity as a general or as a constructive 
 politician. Other men planned his campaigns, fought his battles, 
 wrote his proclamations and organized his government. He was 
 at that time only twenty-nine years old and almost pathetically 
 
 not even the North Americans ; but no ! We have the help of God, who is 
 eternally allied with great and just causes such as that which we defend 
 against Spain, our own beloved independence." Paterno's Manifesto and 
 Aguinaldo's reply are published in full in Foreman's The Philippine Islands, 
 pp. 438-445 (1906). The insurgent newspaper, La Independencia, for No- 
 vember 22, 1899, concedes that "America has aided us indirectly by the 
 blockade of Manila," but does not claim that the Filipinos had in any way 
 assisted the United States. 
 
 * Major Taylor says (Taylor, I, 42, F.Z.) : "In fact, Aguinaldo had no just 
 conception of the conditions and opportunities which were about to open 
 before the Hong Kong junta for, although war between Spain and the United 
 States was imminent and the United States squadron was at Hong Kong 
 threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly concerned in finding how to avoid 
 losing the money which had been received from the Spanish Government as 
 the price of his surrender. The importance of his presence near the Philip- 
 pines in case of war did not occur to him or. if it did occur to him, anything 
 which he could obtain there from the United States seemed for the moment 
 of little consequence compared with escaping from his wrangling companions 
 with enough money to live on in Paris."
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 383 
 
 ignorant of the world beyond the island of Luzon, where he had 
 spent his life. He knew nothing of books and little of men and 
 events beyond the islands. He was, nevertheless, a born leader 
 of men. He was dignified, ambitious and personally honest, and 
 nature had endowed him with those undefinable qualities which 
 induced men of much greater ability and intelligence to accept 
 his leadership. He and the members of the Hong Kong junta 
 were the leaders of the movement for independence. Had they 
 not been brought back to the islands the insurgents might have 
 continued the contest against the Spaniards, but it is very doubt- 
 ful whether there would have been a revolt against the United 
 States, as the leadership would probably have fallen to more 
 conservative men. 
 
 The initial responsibility for injecting Agulnaldo and the Hong 
 Kong junta into American affairs rests with certain United 
 States consular officials in the Far East. When the Spanish- 
 American War began our commercial interests were represented 
 at Manila by Oscar G. Williams, at the British port of Hong 
 Kong by Rounceville Wildman and at Singapore in the Straits 
 Settlements by E. Spencer Pratt. The position of American 
 consul at Manila had been of slight importance. Williams, 
 judged by his official correspondence, was a typical old-fashioned 
 consul who wrote rhetorical despatches in which he did not al- 
 ways discriminate nicely between rumors and ascertained facts.* 
 When the crisis came he performed his duties well and was com- 
 mended by Admiral Dewey and the State Department. He was 
 called to Hong Kong to report on the condition of the Spanish 
 defenses and was thus enabled to return to Manila with the fleet 
 
 ' On August 5, 1898, Consul Williams wrote the State Deiwirtment solicit- 
 ing an appointment in the Philippines as either general commissioner of cus- 
 toms, general commissioner of agriculture, superintendent of public instruc- 
 tion, or lighthouse inspector. 
 
 "For many years," he wrote, "T have made a special study of tariff and 
 economic questions ; have translated the Philippine tariff, and so have a meas- 
 ure of fitness. Then I was reared a farmer and my business interests having 
 always been along such lines, I have kept fully abreast of agricultural matters. 
 I am a graduate of Cornell University and for about twenty years was a 
 teacher, lecturer, and author." Sen. Doc. 62, Part i, 55 Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 
 332.
 
 384 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 and observe the battle from the bridge of the Olympia. His 
 relations with the Filipinos were friendly and sympathetic. He 
 assumed from the first that the islands would be conquered and 
 annexed to the United States and that the Filipinos would gladly 
 accept such a solution of their difficulties. The desirability of 
 securing the military cooperation of the insurgents was to him 
 self-evident.* 
 
 Wildman, at Hong Kong, seems to have been fairly well qual- 
 ified for his duties. He had lived among the Malays of the 
 Straits Settlements and had some knowledge of Malay charac- 
 ter. His sympathies were with the insurgents and he believed 
 that they desired the annexation of the islands to the United 
 States. 
 
 E. Spencer Pratt had been minister to Persia, but when he 
 was selected for the post of consul at Singapore it is im- 
 probable that his qualifications for diplomacy were care- 
 fully investigated. He proved to be an ambitious busy- 
 body who, by meddling with matters which were beyond the 
 scope of his official duties, succeeded in putting his country in 
 a false light before the world. Williams had slight opportunity 
 to muddle things and so did fairly well. Wildman maintained 
 improper relations with the Filipino exiles before the war and 
 improperly assumed to control their actions after war was de- 
 clared. Pratt was incompetent, had no sense of official propriety, 
 misconceived the nature of his duties and was guilty of indis- 
 creet acts and conduct which enabled the insurgents to claim with 
 color of truth that he had entered into a formal agreement with 
 Aguinaldo and that Dewey had approved it. He at least was 
 
 6 Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, May 12, 1898, Sen. Doc. 62, p. 327. On May 12 
 Williams wrote that from the naval battle "must come the acquisition of these 
 islands, many times more extensive, more populous, and more_ valuable than 
 Cuba." On June 16 he wrote, "I expect that on July 4 we will celebrate in 
 Manila under the folds of Old Glory and write in living letters a page of 
 history that this magnificent insular empire has become a part and parcel of 
 the United States of America." On July 2 he expressed the ill-advised hope 
 that 10,000 American workmen and artisans would during the year settle in 
 the islands. On August 5 he wrote : "Presumably when Manila falls and the 
 Philippines become a part of our rational domain," etc. Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 
 330, 332.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 385 
 
 typical of the men who were formerly appointed to positions 
 in the consular service as rewards for political work on the gen- 
 eral theory that if they did the country no good they could at 
 least do it no harm when so far away from it. In this instance 
 extraordinary conditions arose which called for the exercise of 
 intelligent discretion and judgment.'' 
 
 The insurrection in the Philippines had not attracted much 
 attention in the United States. When Commodore George 
 Dewey at Nagasaki on June 2, 1897, assumed command of the 
 Asiatic squadron, he was officially informed that, while the news- 
 papers had occasionally referred to a revolution in the Philip- 
 pines, no information had been received which suggested that 
 American interests were likely to be affected.® But the atten- 
 tion of the State Department had, shortly before that time, been 
 called to the existence of the insurgents through a remarkable 
 letter from the United States consul at Hong-Kong.* The rev- 
 olutionary government of 1896 had sent a young lawyer 
 named Agoncillo to represent it abroad. While the negotia- 
 tions between the Spanish governor-general and Aguinaldo 
 which led to the pact of Biak-na-bato were in progress Agoncillo 
 was in Hong Kong bearing a commission as foreign agent and 
 high commissioner of the Philippine Republic. Consul Wildman 
 was at that time in close communion with the group of Filipinos 
 who were then living in Hong Kong as political exiles. On 
 November 3, 1897, about six months before the declaration of 
 war against Spain, he informed Washington that in view of a 
 possible war between the United States and Spain Agoncillo had, 
 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, offered to enter 
 
 "^ Certain letters written by Mr. Wildman to Aguinaldo during June and 
 July, 1898, do not put the consul-general in a very favorable light They 
 were printed in connection with Buencamino's Address to Congress, August 
 20, 1899. Cong. Rec, 57 Cong., ist Sess., p. 6180. 
 
 * Dewey's Autobiography, p. 175. No American vessel had visited Manila 
 for three years and the last official report relative to the islands was dated 
 1876. Ibid., p. 175. 
 
 " Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, Nov. 3, 1897. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 333.
 
 386 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 into an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States. 
 Pending the execution of a formal treaty, he requested that the 
 United States send to some port of the Philippines twenty thou- 
 sand rifles and two hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, to 
 be paid for when the United States recognized the Independence 
 of his government. As security, the high commissioner offered 
 to pledge two provinces and the custom house at Manila. The 
 price to be paid for the arms was of slight importance; he had 
 no objection to the United States making twenty-five or even 
 thirty per cent, profit. As Agonclllo had written his government, 
 then at its last gasp at Blak-na-bato, that he had hopes of induc- 
 ing the United States to supply the arms and was threatening to 
 proceed to Washington "to conclude the proposed treaty," the 
 consul thought it advisable to inform the Department of State 
 of the nature of the offer. The naivete of this proposition 
 seems not to have struck the consul, as he communicated It with 
 perfect seriousness to the Department. He was curtly directed 
 to inform Agonclllo that the United States did not negotiate 
 such treaties and to forward no more such communications. 
 Notwithstanding this rebuff, Wildman continued to have close 
 relations with the Filipino colony. After war was declared and 
 while Aguinaldo was in Singapore consulting with Consul Pratt, 
 he received a delegation from the insurgent junta who desired 
 to return to Manila with the fleet, and pledged them to obey 
 the orders of Dewey and observe the rules of civilized warfare. 
 After consulting Consul Williams, Wildman, with the consent 
 of Dewey, took two Filipinos to MIrs Bay and put them on board 
 the Olympia. 
 
 Aguinaldo, who reached Hong Kong from Singapore on May 
 2, expressed to Wildman a desire to become a citizen of the 
 United States, but, being informed that this was impossible, 
 asked to be allowed to go to Manila and place himself under 
 the orders of Dewey. ^^ It was finally arranged that he should 
 sail on the revenue cutter McCulloch, and Wildman outlined the 
 proclamation which was subsequently issued from Cavite for- 
 
 10 Taylor, Phil. Insurg. Rec, 44, F. Z.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 387 
 
 bidding pillage and making the abuse of neutrals a criminal of- 
 fense/^ Two months thereafter Wildman wrote to the State 
 Department that, in view of the rumors that the United States 
 on the conclusion of the war intended to return the islands to 
 Spain, he desired to say that after years of experience with the 
 thirty or forty Filipino leaders with whose fortunes he had been 
 closely connected, he knew that they were "fighting for annexa- 
 tion to the United States firstly and for independence secondly, 
 if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the 
 Islands/'" 
 
 The close association of the American consul with the Fili- 
 pino junta naturally caused newspaper comment and on August 
 6 there came a cable from Washington disapproving statements 
 which Wildman was reported by the London Daily Mail to have 
 made to Aguinaldo, and forbidding him to make pledges or dis- 
 cuss questions of policy with the Filipino leaders. In reply he 
 denied that he had made any pledges or discussed the policy of 
 America with Aguinaldo further than to try to hold him to prom- 
 ises made before he left for Cavite. He and Consul Williams 
 had taken the position that the insurgents were a necessary evil 
 in the situation and that if Aguinaldo was placed in command 
 Dewey and Merritt would have some one they could hold respon- 
 sible for excesses. The other alternative was to allow the islands 
 to be overrun by small bands bent on revenge and looting. They 
 had made Aguinaldo no pledges and extracted from him but two 
 promises, to obey unquestioningly the commander of the Amer- 
 ican forces and to conduct his warfare on civilized lines. He 
 felt that he had taken Aguinaldo's measure, had some influence 
 with him, and had used it for the benefit of the United States. 
 
 11 Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore, July 18. 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 336. 
 
 12 Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, July 18, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 336. In this 
 despatch Wildman says that he was in Hong Kong in Sept., i8g7, when 
 Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with the Spanish govern- 
 ment and that after waiting until November 1 for the payment of the prom- 
 ised money by Spain they lost faith in tlie promise and on November 3 
 Agoncillo came to him with the proposition transmitted to the Department in 
 his despatch of November 3, 1897. Supra, p. 386. This is a mistake, as 
 Aguinaldo and his companions did not sail from the Philippines imtil Decem- 
 ber 27, 1897.
 
 388 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 He had no doubt but that Aguinaldo would like to be president 
 of the Philippine Republic and that there might be a small coterie 
 of his native advisers who entertained a like ambition. "But 
 he was perfectly certain that the great majority of his followers 
 and all the wealthy, educated Filipinos had but one desire, to 
 become citizens of the United States of America."^' 
 
 II 
 
 Without occupation and denied access to the money which had 
 been furnished by Spain for their support, it was inevitable that 
 the exiled Filipinos should fall to quarreling among themselves. 
 Aguinaldo was determined to conserve the funds for use in pos- 
 sible future military operations. He seems, however, to have 
 become discouraged and disgusted with his companions, and after 
 being made defendant in the lawsuit brought by Articho to com- 
 pel a distribution of the money, he arranged for the modest sup- 
 port of the rest of the party, drew fifty thousand pesos from 
 the bank and, under assumed names, engaged passage to Europe 
 for himself, his aide, C. H. Del Pilar, and his secretary, J. M. 
 Leyba. The party went first to Saigon in French Indo-China 
 and from there to Singapore, where they arrived on April 22.** 
 
 13 Mr. Wildman to Mr. Moore, August 9, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 338. 
 
 His admiration for the insurgent leaders expressed in the letter of July 8, 
 had now somewhat abated. Aguinaldo had for some weeks been getting what 
 Dewey called the "big head" and had been writing sulky and childish letters. 
 "My correspondence with Aguinaldo has been strictly of a personal nature 
 and I have missed no opportunity to remind him of his ante helium promises. 
 His letters are childish and he is far more interested in the kind of cane he 
 will carry or the breast-plate he will wear than in the figure he will make in 
 history. The demands that he and his junta here have made upon my time 
 are excessive and most tiresome. He is a man of petty moods and I have re- 
 peatedly had letters from Consul Williams requesting me to write to Agui- 
 naldo a friendly letter congratulating him on his success and reminding him 
 of his obligations." Sen. Doc. 62, p. 339. 
 
 ^ Under the Spanish government a cane was the badge of office and the law 
 still prescribes the description of cane which certain officers may carry. 
 
 1* Aguinaldo undoubtedly intended to go to Europe. 
 
 In an article in the Singapore Free Press, May 4, 1898, W. G. St. Clair, 
 evidently upon information furnished by H. W. Bray, made the absurd state- 
 ment that "the principal purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to 
 consult other friends here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray, an old and 
 intimate English friend and for fifteen years a resident of the Philippines, 
 about the state of affairs in the islands, particularly as to the possibility of
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 389 
 
 Consul Pratt first learned of Aguinaldo from an Englishman 
 named Howard W. Bray, who had formerly lived in the Philip- 
 pines but was then in Singapore writing for the Singapore Free 
 Press. Whether he had known Aguinaldo personally does not 
 appear. He certainly knew of his relation to the insurrection 
 and, sensing an opportunity which might be turned to his own 
 advantage, Bray arranged to bring the American consul and the 
 former insurrectionary leader together. Aguinaldo, with a letter 
 of credit for twenty-five thousand dollars gold and a ticket to 
 Europe in his pocket, seems not to have been very anxious to 
 consult with Pratt. However, during the night of April 22-23 
 Pratt, Aguinaldo, Del Pilar, Leyba and a Filipino resident of 
 Singapore named Doctor Marcelino Santos met secretly and 
 talked over the situation. Pratt neither spoke nor understood 
 Spanish and Aguinaldo was ignorant of English. Bray, who 
 acted as interpreter, was active in the interests of the Filipinos, 
 and subsequently received five thousand dollars from Aguinaldo 
 as compensation for his services at Singapore and Hong-Kong.*" 
 It very satisfactorily appears from Bray's own correspondence 
 that he was a man upon whose word no reliance could be placed. 
 Sastron very justly observes that Bray "engineered the whole 
 proceedings."" 
 
 After his first talk with Aguinaldo, Pratt cabled Commodore 
 Dewey that if desired Aguinaldo would go to Hong Kong to 
 arrange with him for the cooperation of the insurgents. Dewey, 
 who was expecting orders to sail for Manila, replied, "Tell 
 Aguinaldo to come as soon as possible." After receiving this 
 cable Pratt had another interview with Aguinaldo, at which 
 
 war between the United States and Spain and ■whether in such an event the 
 United States would eventually recognize the independence of the Philippines 
 provided he lent his cooperation to the Americans in the conquest of the 
 country." Just what special knowledge of the possibility of war between the 
 United States and Spain this stray English newspaper writer in Singapore 
 had does not appear. The article was written a few days after Pratt and 
 Aguinaldo had their interview, and was designed to magnify Mr. Bray. 
 
 ^^ In 1902 Buencamino said {Hearings, etc.. Com. on Ins. Affrs., 1901-1903, 
 p. 283) that the insurgent treasury was called upon to pay $6,000 to satisfy 
 a judgment for libel which Pratt had obtained against Bray at Singapore. 
 
 ^* La Insureccion en Filipinos, pp. 415-419.
 
 390 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Leyba, Del Pilar and Bray were present, the latter again acting 
 as interpreter. Immediately thereafter, on April 26, under as- 
 sumed names, Aguinaldo and Leyba sailed for Hong Kong on 
 the British steamer Malacca.^'^ 
 
 On the following day Pratt reported to the secretary of state 
 that Aguinaldo had at his instance gone to Hong Kong to ar- 
 range for the cooperation of the insurgents with Dewey. On 
 the twenty-eighth he wrote, stating that after learning from Ag- 
 uinaldo the object sought to be obtained by the insurrectionary 
 movement, he had taken it upon himself, while explaining that he 
 "had no authority to speak for the government, to point out 
 the danger of continuing independent action at this stage, and 
 having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with 
 our fleet then at Hong Kong, and obtained the assurance of his 
 willingness to proceed further and confer with Commodore 
 Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire," he sent the cable- 
 gram to the commodore. 
 
 Appraising highly what he had done, Mr. Pratt added : 
 
 "I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the 
 commander of our forces I have prevented possible conflict of 
 action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering 
 the Philippines."" 
 
 Pratt certainly realized that Aguinaldo was thinking of in- 
 dependence, but from this correspondence it is clear that Pratt 
 was not then conscious that he had promised that the United 
 States would assist Aguinaldo in establishing an independent 
 government. There is no reference to independence in either 
 of his letters to the Departm.ent or in the two telegrams, and 
 there were but two, which passed between Pratt and Dewey, nor 
 does Pratt appear even to have discussed the conditions upon 
 which the anticipated cooperation should be carried out. That 
 was left for Dewey and Aguinaldo to arrange. 
 
 17 Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day, April 28, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 341. 
 " Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day, April 28, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 342.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 391 
 
 On April 30 Pratt wrote describing his final interview witK 
 Aguinaldo. After stating that he urged upon Aguinaldo the ne- 
 cessity of preventing the Filipino forces from committing ex- 
 cesses and was told that once in the field he "would be perfectly 
 able to lead them as our commander should direct," Pratt wrote :" 
 
 "The general further stated that he hoped the United States 
 would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long 
 enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their 
 own, in the organization of which he would desire American ad- 
 vice and assistance. These questions I told him I had no author- 
 ity to discuss/* 
 
 On June 2 Pratt wrote again, calling attention to the report 
 that Aguinaldo had been well received in the Philippines and 
 expressing surprise that his "cooperation had not been secured 
 during the months General Aguinaldo remained awaiting events 
 in Hong Kong." It will be noted that these letters were written 
 by Pratt before any question had been raised as to the propriety 
 of his dealings with Aguinaldo and while he was under the 
 pleasant illusion that he had rendered an important service to 
 his country, for which he would be commended and rewarded. 
 It is inconceivable that the letter of April 30 could have been 
 written had the correspondence between Pratt and Dewey, as 
 was subsequently claimed, contained any reference to the inde- 
 pendence of the Philippines. 
 
 Pratt attempted to keep his dealings with Aguinaldo secret, 
 but Bray, who was connected with the Singapore Free Press and 
 was working with St. Clair, its editor, to further the interests 
 of the Filipino leaders, prepared an article describing the inter- 
 im Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day, April 30, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 342. 
 In an article in Collier's Weekly, April 13, 1901, Pratt said, "From the 
 way he expressed himself, however, I realized that he already had in mind 
 an independent government in the Philippines and only feared lest the United 
 States should abandon the islands before such a government could be estab- 
 lished." 
 
 This article, written after the capture of Aguinaldo, shows strong preju- 
 dice in favor of the insurgents. On April 7. 1913, Mr. Pratt wrote to Presi- 
 dent Wilson that "it was on the assumption that we only contemplated a 
 temporary occupation of their country, that the Filipinos entered into coop- 
 eration with us." MSS., War Dept
 
 392 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 view which appeared in that paper on May 4, 1898. Pratt sent 
 a copy of the paper to Washington with the statement that it was 
 substantially correct, notwithstanding **a certain amount of con- 
 jecture has been indulged in as regards my action in the matter 
 and that of the Commodore."^" 
 
 On June 7 a Singapore paper copied an article entitled "The 
 Fate of the Philippines" from the London Spectator, in which the 
 writer expressed the hope that the United States would retain 
 the Philippines and join Great Britain in the work of governing 
 the tropics. The suggestion that the islands could be garrisoned 
 by negro troops with white officers and easily made self-support- 
 ing brought a vigorous reply from Bray, who ridiculed the idea 
 that the Filipinos would ever consent to have negro troops quar- 
 tered in their country and asserted that the only possible solution 
 of the question was an independent government under the pro- 
 tection of the United States. "This," he wrote, "is the policy 
 I recommended General Aguinaldo and his compatriots to ac- 
 cept."^^ Pratt forwarded copies of these articles to the secretary 
 of state with the comment that Bray's opinion was deserving 
 of special consideration. 
 
 These letters and cables created a feeling of uneasiness at 
 Washington and Pratt was directed by cable to "avoid unauthor- 
 ized negotiations with Philippine insurgents," and in reply stated 
 that he had no intention to negotiate with them but had left that 
 to Commodore Dewey. Pratt now anxiously awaited the De- 
 partment's opinion of his course, scarcely believing that, as he 
 wrote the secretary, "in view of the motives which prompted it 
 and the excellent results which have ensued, that it can be alto- 
 gether disapproved."^^ 
 
 20 "Though the facts are, in the main, correctly given, the dates are not 
 quite accurate and a certain amount of conjecture has been indulged in as 
 regards my action in the matter and that of the Commodore." Mr. Pratt to 
 Mr. Day, May 5, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 343. 
 
 21 See Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 348-350, for the two articles. 
 
 22 On July 28, after receiving Secretary Day's despatch of June 16, Pratt 
 wrote : "I beg to repeat that ... I declined even to discuss with General 
 Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard 
 to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed 
 the Government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confidences,
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 393 
 
 June 16, immediately after sending the cablegram, Secretary 
 Day wrote to Pratt stating his understanding of what had been 
 done and noting particularly that the consul had informed 
 Aguinaldo that he had no authority to speak for the United 
 States. While waiting for the promised full report, the secre- 
 tary assumed that the consul had not attempted 
 
 "to commit this government to any alliance with the Philippine 
 insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of 
 General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if 
 in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might 
 not be practicable to gratify. This government has known the 
 Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious subjects 
 of Spain and is not acquainted with their purposes. While their 
 contest with that power has been a matter of public notoriety, 
 they have neither asked nor received from this government any 
 recognition. The United States in entering upon the occupation 
 of the Islands as the result of its military operations in that quar- 
 ter will do so in the exercise of the right which the state of war 
 confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard 
 to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that 
 obedience which will be lawfully due from them. If in the course 
 of your conferences with General Aguinaldo you acted upon the 
 assumption that this government would cooperate with him 
 for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting 
 his cooperation it would consider itself pledged to recognize any 
 political claims which he may put forward, your action was un- 
 authorized and can not be approved."^' 
 
 Unfortunately, before the ominous cable of June 16 had put 
 Pratt on his guard he had been guilty of an act of folly which 
 was destined to close his career as a representative of the State 
 Department. He had been the object of a serenade by a Fili- 
 pino band and had made a speech in French to an audience which 
 understood only Spanish, Tagalog or English. On June 8, 1898, 
 
 never acted upon the assumption that the Government would cooperate with 
 him — General Aguinaldo — for the furtherance of any plan of his own, nor 
 that, in accepting his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to 
 recognize any political claims which he might put forward." Sen. Doc. 62, 
 p. 358. 
 
 23 Mr. Day to Mr. Pratt, June 16, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 354.
 
 394 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 certain Filipino residents in Singapore — described by their 
 spokesman, Doctor Santos, as "thirty or more Filipinos, nine of 
 the higher class, fifteen musicians, and the remainder of the mid- 
 dle class," — assembled before the consular residence and "after a 
 little quiet music" Doctor Santos read an address to the consul 
 which expressed the "eternal gratitude" of the Filipinos for 
 the moral and material protection which Admiral Dewey had 
 extended to General Aguinaldo and their thanks to the consul 
 "for having been the first to cultivate relations with General 
 Aguinaldo and arrange for his cooperation with Admiral Dewey, 
 thus supporting our aspirations." 
 The address stated that : 
 
 "Our countrymen at home and those of us residing here . . . 
 hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its hu- 
 mane policy, will efficaciously second the program arranged be- 
 tween you, sir, and General Aguinaldo, in the port of Singapore 
 and secure to us our independence under the protection of the 
 United States.""* 
 
 Pratt's formal reply contained complimentary words for the 
 Filipinos and the expressions of appreciation proper for such 
 an interesting occasion, but made no reference to Santos' impli- 
 cation that there had been an arrangement between the consul 
 and Aguinaldo by which the United States would support the 
 insurgents in their struggle for independence. After enthusi- 
 astic vivcts for the president of the United States, Admiral 
 Dewey, Consul Pratt, General Aguinaldo and the Filipino peo- 
 
 2* The reports of the serenade and English translation of the speeches 
 from the Singapore Free Press and the Straits Times are printed in Sen Doc. 
 62, pp. 351-353. 
 
 Dr. Santos immediately forwarded copies of the speech and an account of 
 the incident to Aguinaldo. It would seem that the serenade was not unex- 
 pected. "On the invitation of Mr. Bray," says Santos, "we ascended. He 
 (Mr. Pratt) received us in his private office and it was imposing to see that 
 the only decoration was the American flag which covered the desk, and in the 
 center a carved wooden frame holding the portrait of our worthy chief. 
 After the speech there was enthusiastic applause for the consul. He offered 
 us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and lemonade for the musicians 
 and the majority." Phil. Insurg. Recs., 516, 4.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 395 
 
 pie, and the presentation by Pratt to Santos of an American 
 flag^° and more music by the band, the ceremony terminated. 
 
 If Mr. Pratt had possessed the shghtest knowledge of Filipino 
 customs he would have regarded the incident as of trifling im- 
 portance. But his vanity led him to regard it as a great political 
 event. The local papers published glowing accounts of the 
 honor which had been paid the American representative and 
 Pratt forwarded clippings to the secretary of state with the 
 suggestion that they should be given out to the American press. 
 But the state department declined to cause the article from the 
 Straits Times entitled "Mr. Spencer Pratt's Serenade," to be pub- 
 lished in the American press. Secretary Day wrote :^' 
 
 "The address presented to you by the twenty-five or thirty 
 Filipinos who gathered about the consulate discloses an under- 
 standing on their part that the object of Admiral Dewey was 
 to support the cause of General Aguinaldo and that the ultimate 
 object of our action is to secure the independence of the Philip- 
 pines under the protection of the United States. 
 
 "Your address does not repel this implication and it moreover 
 represents that General Aguinaldo was 'sought out by you' 
 whereas it had been the understanding of the Department that 
 you received him only upon the request of a British subject 
 named Bray who formerly lived in the Philippines- Your further 
 reference to Aguinaldo as 'the man for the occasion' and to your 
 'bringing about' the 'arrangement' between 'General Aguinaldo 
 and Admiral Dewey which has resulted so happily' also repre- 
 sents the matter in a light which causes apprehension lest your 
 action may have laid the ground of future misunderstandings 
 and complications. 
 
 "For these reasons the Department has not caused the article 
 
 25 The Filipinos always wrote their confidential letters in Tagalog. Maj. 
 Taylor (Phil. Insurg. Recs., 406, 7) says: "In a letter written in Tagalog to 
 Aguinaldo on June 8 by Santos, he described the American Consul-Gen- 
 eral as having cried out, "Hurrah for General Aguinaldo, hurrah for the 
 Republic of the Philippines,' and then, having apparently taken several drinks, 
 he passed up and down the room waving the American flag before giving it 
 to the assembled Filipinos." 
 
 In Santos' version of Pratt's speech he is made to say that he personally 
 was not entitled to thanks as he had only faithfully followed the instructions 
 from his government 
 
 w Mr. Day to Mr. Pratt, July 20, 1898. Sen. Doc. 6s» p. 356.
 
 396 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 to be given to the press lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanc- 
 tion to views, the expression of which it had not authorized." 
 
 On August 2 the Department informed Mr. Pratt that it noted 
 with pleasure that he was not having and did not propose to 
 have any further dealings with the Philippine insurgents. 
 
 Ill 
 
 But as St. Clair wrote to Bray, "The vital thing, and nothing 
 else counts, is what Dewey said and did when he at last met 
 Aguinaldo. That is the thing, all else is empty wind." 
 
 What Admiral Dewey, General Aguinaldo and General An- 
 derson did is easily ascertained. But what did they sayf 
 
 Dewey asked Aguinaldo to come to Hong Kong, but before 
 he arrived there the fleet sailed for Manila. With the admiral's 
 consent the McCulloch carried Aguinaldo and thirteen of his 
 companions to Cavite where they arrived nearly three weeks 
 after the Spanish fleet had been destroyed. Dewey was able to 
 take Manila at any time, but had no troops with which to gar- 
 rison it. After an interview aboard the Olympia, Dewey told 
 Aguinaldo to go ashore and organize his army and gave him 
 some guns and ammunition with which to equip it. He soon had 
 twenty-five or thirty thousand men and was so successful in 
 fighting the Spaniards that they were driven within the outer 
 defenses of Manila. With success Aguinaldo's sense of im- 
 portance expanded and he proceeded to organize a government 
 as well as an army. On May 24, he announced himself as 
 dictator^' and on July 18 proclaimed a form of dictatorial gov- 
 ernment, which on July 23 was succeeded by the Revolutionary- 
 Government with a paper organization of executive, congress 
 and courts.^* In a proclamation of July 25 he announced that 
 
 _ 27 "I again assume command of all the troops in the struggle for the at- 
 tainment of our lofty aspirations, inaugurating a dictatorial government to be 
 administered by decrees promulgated under my sole responsibility" until a 
 regular government can be established. 
 
 28 For the proclamations of June 18 and June 23, and "message to foreign 
 powers" of June 23, see Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 432-437. Also see Capt Taylor's
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 397 
 
 the Filipinos no longer limited themselves "to asking for assim- 
 ilation with the political constitution of Spain, but ask for com- 
 plete separation and strive for independence, completely assured 
 that the time has come when they; can and ought to govern 
 themselves." 
 
 By June 30, 1898, when General Anderson arrived with 
 troops, the insurgents had become confident and were determined 
 to fight the Americans if necessary to maintain their new govern- 
 ment. From that time the objects of the Americans and Fili- 
 pinos were conflicting and friction was inevitable. 
 
 The controversy centers about what was said by Admiral 
 Dewey and General Aguinaldo at their first interview on the 
 Olympia.^^ 
 
 During the hearing on Philippine affairs^" before a Committee 
 of the Senate, Admiral Dewey gave an interesting account of his 
 relations with the Filipino leaders : 
 
 "I should think," said he, "that about a month before leav- 
 ing Hong Kong, that is, about the first of April, when it became 
 pretty certain that there was to be war with Spain, I heard that 
 there were a number of Filipinos in the city of Hong Kong who 
 were anxious to accompany the squadron to Manila in case we 
 went over. I saw these men two or three times myself. They 
 seemed to be all very young, earnest boys. I did not attach 
 much importance to what they said or to themselves. Finally 
 before we left Hong Kong for Mirs Bay I received a telegram 
 from Consul-General Pratt at Singapore saying that Aguinaldo 
 was there and anxious to see me. I said to him, 'All right, tell 
 him to come on,' but I attached so little importance to Aguinaldo 
 that I did not wait for him. He did not arrive and we sailed for 
 Mirs Bay without any Filipinos." 
 
 Dewey did not take the Hong Kong Filipinos very seriously : 
 
 Report on the Organication for the Administration of Civil Government by 
 Emilio Aguinaldo (1903), pp. 19-31. 
 
 29 Admiral Dewey informs me that some Filipino acted as interpreter and 
 that members of his staff were present All tlie Americans who were present, 
 except the admiral, are dead. 
 
 80 June 26, 1902, Sen. Doc. 331, 57 Cong., ist Sess., Part 3; Sen. Doc. 62. 
 p. 356.
 
 398 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 "They were bothering me," he said. "I was very busy getting 
 my squadron ready for battle, and these Httle men were coming 
 on board my ship at Hong Kong and taking a good deal of my 
 time, and I did not attach the slightest importance to anything 
 they could do, and they did nothing; that is, none of them were 
 with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good 
 deal of talk, but when the time came they did not go. One of 
 them didn't go because he didn't have any tooth brush" 
 
 Such an excuse naturally left a bad impression on the mind 
 of the American commander, who was not familiar with Malay 
 reasons and evasions.^^ 
 
 Dewey's first official reference to Aguinaldo was in a des- 
 patch of May 20, in which he informed the Navy Department 
 that the insurgent leader had been brought down from Hong 
 Kong and was engaged in organizing a force of natives which 
 might render valuable assistance. He was immediately cau- 
 tioned that it was "desirable as far as possible and consistent 
 for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with 
 the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur 
 liability to maintain their cause in the future." Commodore 
 Dewey replied on June 3, assuring the Department that he had 
 acted from the beginning in the spirit of these instructions and 
 had "entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any 
 faction."^'' 
 
 Dewey's account of his first meeting with the Filipino general 
 shows the patronizing attitude which he assumed. Aguinaldo 
 was not received with any special honors.^' 
 
 "Aguinaldo came to see me. I said, *Well now, go ashore 
 there, we have got our forces at the arsenal at Cavlte. Go ashore 
 
 81 See also, Dewey, Autobiography, pp. 245-247. 
 
 32 Dewey added : "This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any 
 time, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States 
 forces to retain possession." Rcpt. Bureau of Navigation, 1898, p. 103. In 
 this despatch Dewey stated that in his opinion the Filipinos were more capable 
 of self-government than the Cubans, but he stated later that he thought 
 neither was capable. Sen. Doc. 331, 57 Cong., ist Sess., p. 2983; Autobiog- 
 raphy, Appendix E. 
 
 33 See Admiral Dewey's testimony, Con. Rec, Vol. XXV, 57th Cong., isi 
 Sess., pp. 2928 et seq.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 399 
 
 and start your army/ He came back in the course of a few- 
 hours and said, 'I want to go to Japan.' I said, 'Don't give it 
 up, Don Emilio/ I wanted his help, you know. He did not 
 sleep ashore that night. He slept on the ship. The next morn- 
 ing he went on shore, still within my lines, and began recruiting 
 men." 
 
 In order to aid hini to "start his army" Aguinaldo was given 
 a few guns and allowed to help himself from the arms which 
 had been captured at Cavite. Apparently that was the extent 
 of the active assistance rendered him.'* 
 
 As to the wishes of the natives, Dewey testified, "They wanted 
 to get rid of the Spaniards; I do not think they looked much be- 
 yond that." He did not know what the future policy of the 
 government would be, and simply used his best judgment. The 
 first that Dewey heard of independence in the Philippines was 
 when Aguinaldo issued his proclamation of June 15. 
 
 *T attached so little importance to this proclamation that I 
 did not even cable its contents to Washington, but forwarded 
 it through the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted inde- 
 pendence. ... I was," he says, "waiting for troops to arrive, 
 and felt sure the Filipinos could not take Manila, and I thought 
 that the closer they invested the city the easier it would be when 
 our troops arrived to march in. The Filipinos were our friends 
 assisting us ; they were doing our work." 
 
 Up to the time the army arrived Aguinaldo did everything that 
 Dewey requested. "He was most obedient ; whatever I told him 
 to do he did. I saw him almost daily." 
 
 Having been instructed to report fully any conferences, rela- 
 tions, or cooperations, military or otherwise, which he had had 
 with Aguinaldo, the admiral on June 27, summarized the situ- 
 
 8* Dewey (Autobiography, p. 247) says: "Aside from permitting him to 
 establish himself ashore, the only aid rendered him was a gift of some Mauser 
 rifles and an old smooth-bore gun that had been abandoned by the Spanish. 
 He mounted the gun on a float, but I declined to grant his request that our 
 launches tow it across the bay. In short, my policy was to avoid any en- 
 tangling alliance with the insurgents, while I appreciated that pending the 
 arrival of our troops they might be of service in clearing the long neck of 
 land that stretches out from Cavite Peninsula to the environs of Manila."
 
 400 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ation to that date in the following language to which what has 
 been quoted will serve as comment. 
 
 "Aguinaldo," cabled Dewey,^^ "insurgent leader, with thirteen 
 of his staff arrived May 19, by permission on Nanshan [McCul- 
 loch]. Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the pro- 
 tection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several 
 conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consist- 
 ently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the 
 forces under my command, and on several occasions I have de- 
 clined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could 
 not act until the arrival of the United States troops. . . . 
 Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has 
 kept me advised of his progress. . . . My relations with 
 him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United 
 States has not been bound in any way to assist the insurgents 
 by any act or promises, and he is not to my knowledge committed 
 to assist us." 
 
 To the Schurman Commission he gave the following writ- 
 ten statement :^^ 
 
 "I never directly nor indirectly promised the Filipinos inde- 
 pendence. I never received Aguinaldo with military honors or 
 recognized or saluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never con- 
 sidered him an ally, although I did make use of him and his na- 
 tives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards." 
 
 After the arrival of General Anderson with the first expedi- 
 tion Admiral Dewey had very little to do with Aguinaldo. His 
 relations with him had been pleasant because there had been no 
 occasion to antagonize him. After the arrival of the army the 
 relations with the insurgents changed for the worse. 
 
 In the meantime while Dewey was waiting for the arrival of 
 the troops, Consul Williams was exercising his diplomatic powers 
 upon Aguinaldo and his associates. On May 12 he was confident 
 that the Filipinos hoped that the United States or Great Britain 
 
 35 Autobiography, Appendix E, p. 312. 
 
 ^^Rept Phil. (Schurman) Com., 1900, I, p. 121. See also his letter to 
 Senator H. C. Lodge, Cong. Rec, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1329.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 401 
 
 ' would acquire the islands. "Officers and cabinet ministers of 
 the Philippine Republic" had visited him and expressed their 
 desire to swear allegiance to America. He reported that when 
 he and the British consul visited Cavite they moved for over 
 a mile through a shouting crowd, anxious to shake the hand of 
 the representatives of the great American Republic. He believed 
 that it would be easy to organize a civil government which would 
 be gratefully accepted by the people.^'' On May twenty- fourth he 
 informed the secretary of state that Filipino officers had visited 
 him during the darkness of the night to inform him and the fleet 
 of their operations. Aguinaldo executed a power of attorney be- 
 fore him under which the money in the Hong Kong bank was 
 made available for the purchase of arms- At Aguinaldo's head- 
 quarters he saw soldiers enlisting and was informed that almost 
 thirty-seven thousand insurgents were ready to join the American 
 forces.^' He was endeavoring to maintain harmonious relations 
 with the insurgents in order to be able to exercise greater influ- 
 ence when "we reorganize the government."^' He declined an in- 
 vitation to attend a council that on June 12 organized a pro- 
 visional government and was commended for his good judgment 
 by the department.*** He reported that the insurgents had organ- 
 ized a form of government but that "Aguinaldo told me to-day 
 that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a 
 colony of the United States of America."*^ Immediately after his 
 arrival General Anderson, according to Williams, asked the lat- 
 ter "to treat with General Aguinaldo as to American interests."** 
 About a month after Anderson arrived Williams wrote that 
 "for ultimate objects" he had made it his study to keep in pleasant 
 relations with the insurgents. 
 
 87 "Few United States troops will be needed for conquest, and fewer still 
 to occupy." Mr, Williams to Mr. Day, May 12. 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 327. 
 
 38 Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, May 24, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 328. 
 
 39 Ibid., June 16, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 329. 
 
 «> Mr. Cridler to Mr. Williams, August 4, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 330. 
 
 "Your course while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents in 
 abstaining from any participation in their so-called provisional government 
 is approved." 
 
 <i Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, June 16, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 329. 
 
 *2 Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, July 2, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62. p. 330.
 
 402 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 "My argument with General Aguinaldo has been,'* he wrote, 
 "that the conditions of government by the United States in the 
 Philippines would be vastly better for him and his people in 
 honor, advancement, and profits than could exist under any plan 
 fixed by himself and Filipinos. I have traversed the entire ground 
 of government with him in council, and he has called his officials 
 from fifteen provinces to meet me for their discussion, all stated 
 as friendly but unofficial on my part. Our relations are cordial 
 while certain antagonisms have arisen between the General and 
 certain other Americans. I hope to bring about harmony and 
 cooperation."" 
 
 Immediately after his arrival. General Anderson with Admiral 
 Dewey called unofficially on the Filipino leader."** Aguinaldo 
 immediately asked the general whether "the United States of 
 the North" had or intended to recognize his government. An- 
 derson had brought the first news to Dewey that there was a 
 sentiment in the United States in favor of conquering and re- 
 taining the islands and he appreciated the political importance 
 of his dealings with the insurgent leader. His orders required 
 him "to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go beyond the 
 zone of naval cooperation, to consult with Dewey and to wait 
 for Merrltt."*^ To Aguinaldo's question he replied that he was 
 acting in a military capacity only; that he had no authority to 
 recognize a government; that "we had come to whip the Span- 
 iards and that if we were successful the indirect result would 
 be to free them from Spanish tyranny." To this he added, 
 "As we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped that we would 
 get along amicably together." 
 
 Aguinaldo was not satisfied. "The fact is," says General 
 Anderson, "that he hoped and expected to take Manila with 
 Admiral Dewey's assistance and he was bitterly disappointed 
 when our soldiers landed at Cavite." 
 
 43 Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, August 4, 1898. Sen. Doc. 62, p. 331. For 
 Aguinaldo's answer, see Seyi. Doc. 62, p. 397. 
 
 ^^Sen.Doc. 33i,^.2n(i. 
 
 *5 For General Anderson's orders, see his letter (Chicago Record-Herald 
 for July 11, 1902) in reply to Admiral Dewey's criticisms. Sen. Doc. 331, 
 pp. 2976-80.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 403 
 
 Aguinaldo on May 23, 1898, had announced himself as abso- 
 lute dictator. On June 12 he issued a decree proclaiming the 
 independence of the Philippines. Invitations to the ceremony 
 >vere sent to Admiral Dewey and his officers but no one at- 
 tended." 
 
 A few hours after the interview with Dewey and Anderson 
 on July 1, two of the latter's staff officers while walking through 
 the streets of Cavite were arrested and taken before Aguinaldo, 
 who informed them that strangers could only visit the town by 
 his permission, which permission, however, he graciously granted 
 to them. After this incident the troops were immediately landed. 
 
 Aguinaldo declined an invitation to witness a parade on the 
 Fourth of July because he had been invited as general and not 
 as president. Immediately thereafter Anderson wrote to him 
 that, while he hoped to maintain amicable relations, he had taken 
 Cavite as a base for operations and requested that Aguinaldo 
 instruct his officers not to interfere with American officers in 
 the performance of their duties and not to assume that Ameri- 
 can officers or men could not visit Cavite without permission 
 from the Filipino leader. 
 
 Soon after receiving this notice Aguinaldo, with his cabinet, 
 military staff and the inevitable band, called on General Ander- 
 son and presented to him the plan of an autonomous form of 
 government which it was said Spain was willing to grant the 
 islands. It had been prepared by certain Filipino leaders and 
 was accompanied by an open letter from Don Pedro Patemo, 
 to the Filipino people advising them that Spain, rather than the 
 United States, was entitled to their trust and confidence. To 
 
 *• "Invitations to the ceremony of the declaration of independence were 
 sent to Admiral Dewey, but neither he nor any of his officers were present. 
 It was, however, important to Aguinaldo that some American should be there 
 whom the assembled people would consider a representative of the United 
 States. 'Colonel' Johnson, ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai, who was in the 
 Philippines exhibiting a cinematograph, kindly consented to appear on this 
 occasion as Aguinaldo's Chief of Artillery and the representative of the North 
 American nation. His name does not appear subsequently among the papers 
 of Aguinaldo. It is possible that his position as Colonel and Chief of Artillery 
 was a merely temporary one which enabled him to appear in a uniform which 
 would befit the character of the representative of a great people upon so 
 solemn an occasion." Taylor, II (71, Ly.), p. 338.
 
 404 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 General Anderson's inquiry whether this scheme was agreeable 
 to the Filipinos, Aguinaldo replied by asking whether the North 
 Americans intended to hold the Philippines as a dependency. 
 The general stated that he was not informed on that subject, 
 but ventured the not wholly accurate statement that in one hun- 
 dred twenty years the United States had established no colonies. 
 Aguinaldo replied that he had studied attentively the constitu- 
 tion of the United States and had found in it no authority for 
 colonies. He therefore had no fear as to the future.*' 
 
 General Anderson arrived in the islands after the insurgents 
 had organized and proclaimed their government and determined 
 to try for absolute independence. Dewey knew, and evidently 
 cared very little about what was going on in Filipino political 
 circles. Anderson on land was brought into closer relations with 
 the insurgents and soon learned of their real designs. Early in 
 July he reported to Washington that the Filipinos expected in- 
 dependence and that an attempt to establish a provisional govern- 
 ment would probably lead to a conflict. 
 
 IV 
 
 The opponents of the policy of annexation very generally 
 accepted as true the claim of Aguinaldo and his followers that 
 the American consuls at Hong Kong and Singapore, and Admiral 
 Dewey and General Anderson at Manila, in return for the mili- 
 
 *7 For General Anderson's account of his relations with the insurgents, see 
 his article in the North American Review (Feb., 1900), and his letter pub- 
 lished in the Chicago Record-Herald for July 11, 1902. The correspondence 
 with Aguinaldo is in Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 399-403; Rept. of Maj. Gen. Com. 
 Army, 1899, Part 2, pp. 335-44; and Sen. Doc. 208, 56th Cong., ist Sess., 
 Part 1, pp. 4-20. The omissions shown by stars in General Anderson's letter 
 of July 9, 1902 (see Sen. Doc. 208) relate to criticisms of the transport serv- 
 ice. This document contains all communications with Aguinaldo to March, 
 1900, and also Aguinaldo's proclamations and other manifestos. 
 
 With reference to the Anderson-Aguinaldo correspondence, General Mer- 
 ritt in his statement to the Peace Commission at Paris said : "It is correspond- 
 ence between General Anderson and Aguinaldo, and relates largely to Agui- 
 naldo's growing views. The whole correspondence was deprecated by Ad- 
 miral Dewey before I got there, and I suppressed the whole thing after I 
 arrived, because it was not the wish of the government to make any promises 
 to the insurgents or act in any way with them." Sen. Doc. 62, p. 366.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 405 
 
 tary cooperation of Aguinaldo promised that the United States 
 would aid him in establishing an independent government in the 
 Philippines. 
 
 As presented by Agonclllo to tlie Peace Commission at Paris 
 in December, 1898, the Filipino claim was that: 
 
 "At the time of Imploring their armed cooperation, both the com- 
 mander of the Petrel and Captain Wood in Hong Kong, before 
 the declaration of war, the American consuls-general, Mr, Pratt 
 in Singapore, Mr. Wildman in Hong Kong, and Mr. Williams 
 in Cavite, acting as international agents of the great American 
 nation, at a moment of great anxiety, offered to recognize the 
 independence of the Philippine Nation as soon as triumph was 
 obtained."" 
 
 In the Reseiia Veridica which was published in September, 
 1899, long after his arrival at Cavite, Aguinaldo says that he 
 was received with the honors of a general, and that after the 
 greetings of courtesy he asked Admiral Dewey : 
 
 "if all the telegrams relative to myself which he had addressed 
 to the consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, were true. He re- 
 plied in the affirmative and added that 'the United States had 
 come to the Philippines to protect the natives and free them 
 from the yoke of Spain.' He said moreover, that 'America 
 was rich In territory and money and needed no colonies,' con- 
 cluding by assuring me 'to have no doubt whatever about the 
 recognition of Philippine Independence of the United States.* 
 Thereupon he asked me if I could induce the people to rise 
 against the Spaniards and carry on a rapid campaign. . . . 
 The Admiral replied that he was delighted at my sincerity and 
 believed that both Filipinos and Americans should treat each 
 other as allies and friends . . . and added that 'so he had 
 been Informed, the United States would recognize the inde- 
 pendence of the Filipino people, guaranteed by the word of 
 honor of the Americans' . . . advising me to form at once 
 
 *8 Phil. Insurg. Recs., 102, I. See also the Proclamation of June 8, 1899. 
 In the letter to President McKinley of October 3, 1898. Agoncillo did not 
 claim that independence had been promised. For Agoncillo's statement given 
 to General Greene on September 15, 1898, see Sen. Doc. 62, p. 429.
 
 406 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 a Filipino national flag, offering in virtue thereof id recognize 
 and protect it before the other nations, which were represented 
 by the various squadrons then in the bay. ... I announced 
 that I would take up my residence at the naval headquarters in 
 the Cavite arsenal. ... In the same month of July the 
 Admiral, accompanied by General Anderson, presented himself 
 . . . and said, 'Documents are not complied with when there 
 is no honor, as has happened with your agreement with the Span- 
 iards, who have failed in what was written and signed. Trust in 
 my word, for I hold myself responsible, that the United States 
 will recognize the independence of the country. But I recommend 
 to you to keep everything that we have talked about and agreed 
 upon with a great deal of secrecy at present.' "*® 
 
 AH this would be important if true, but there is no longer 
 any question but that Admiral Dewey was correct when he called 
 Aguinaldo's story *'a tissue of falsity."^* In the Resena Veridica 
 the original, modest claim of Aguinaldo was elaborated and 
 dressed up by Buencamino and other leaders for the purpose of 
 influencing public opinion in the United States and elsewhere 
 outside of the Philippines.^^ 
 
 49 Taylor, 4 MG. E. ^ ^ 
 
 50 In a letter written by Agtxinaldo to his brother on the day of this inter- 
 view he said {Phil. Jnsurg. Recs., 12, 1) : "I inform you that we arrived here 
 in Cavite at eleven o'clock and disembarked at four o'clock in the afternoon 
 after our conference with the American Admiral. Everything appears to be 
 favorable for attaining our independence. I can not say more on that sub- 
 ject as it would take too long. I have no object in writing this except to ask 
 you and your companions to meet at once and arrange the best way to entrap 
 all the enemy in your town, employing deceit, for instance, etc ... The 
 hour has arrived for the PhiHppines to belong to her sons. • . • Only one 
 step and we shall reach Independence." 
 
 51 The Resena Veridica was dated September 23, 1899, and was probably 
 written by Buencamino in collaboration with the other political leaders. An 
 English translation is in the Cong. Rec, XXXV, Pt. 6, Appendix, pp. 440-445. 
 On September 12, 1899, Buencamino wrote from the Philippines to Dr. 
 Apacible at Hong Kong a letter which shows the way in which the Resena 
 Veridica was prepared and distributed. "This work is entitled Resena 
 Veridica de la Revolucion Filipina, in which Don Emilio relates in detail his 
 acts with Admiral Dewey. It has been distributed to the consuls and you are 
 ordered to reprint it there translated into English and send some copies to the 
 United States, even though only a thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send 
 copies also to Europe, Seiior Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. 
 . . . This is an order of the Government." Phil Jnsurg. Recs., 391, 3. 
 
 On the 30th of the same month he wrote, "We have not distributed them 
 here in^ order that Otis may not counteract the eflfects that we desire to pro- 
 duce with this publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we believe
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 407 
 
 It is easy to trace the growth of this hiytH of a promise of 
 independence from its inception in the brain of "Aguinaldo's 
 Englishman" to its maturity in the Reseiia Veridica and the for- 
 mal statement of Agoncillo at Paris. It was of slow but steady 
 growth. Evidently Bray did not fully grasp the possibilities of 
 an interview between parties ignorant of each other's language 
 imtil several days after Aguinaldo had sailed from Singapore. 
 The meetings with Pratt had been held secretly but it was to 
 Bray's interest that his part in the transaction should be made 
 public and he prepared an account of the interviews for publica- 
 tion in the Singapore Free Press. St. Clair, the editor of that 
 paper, had been induced by Bray to favor the Filipino cause. 
 Immediately after Aguinaldo arrived in Singapore he was taken 
 by Bray to call on the editor and St. , Clair says that he was 
 thereafter fully informed of the progress of affairs. 
 
 The article in the Free Press, prepared very soon after the 
 interviews, made no reference to any promise by Pratt. But 
 Bray and Santos were soon claiming that not only had there 
 been a promise but that it had been reduced to writing and duly 
 signed by Pratt and Aguinaldo and approved by Dewey. It 
 seems that this story was being circulated in Hong Kong after 
 Aguinaldo had sailed for Manila. Mr. Albert G. Robinson, the 
 correspondent of the New York Evening Post, was assured by 
 the Filipino junta that there was a written agreement with fif- 
 teen clauses and that it was to be effective when ratified by 
 Commodore Dewey and President McKinley. According to the 
 story this remarkable document provided, among other things: 
 
 it advisable to make this pamphlet public in those colonies before your arrival 
 in tlie United States."^ Ibid. 
 
 On this letter in cipher is a postcript addressed to Aguinaldo's secretary 
 (Pablo Ocampo) : 
 
 "At last moment, Nota bene— 
 
 "Don't deliver iiny copy of the Reseiia Veridica to the consuls, even though 
 it was so directed in the beginning of the letter. All except one, which is for 
 you, will be sent to Hong Kong, Don Pedro de la Vina being bearer of the 
 same, as also of other documents. The copy intended for you is neither to 
 be divulged nor published, for strict reserve is required until these which are 
 being sent arrive at their destination." Ibid., 461, 4, 
 
 LeRoy says {The Americans in the Philippines, I, p. 180) : "The Reseiia 
 Veridica is so inaccurate and uncandid that it will not do to accept any state- 
 ment resting on its authority."
 
 408 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 "1. Philippine independence to be proclaimed. 
 
 **2. A federal republic to be established by vote of the rebels ; 
 pending the taking of this vote, Aguinaldo to appoint the mem- 
 bers of that government. 
 
 "3. The federal republic to recognize a temporary interven- 
 tion of American and European administrative commissioners 
 to be appointed by Commodore Dewey. 
 
 *'4. The American protectorate to be recognized in the same 
 terms as those fixed in Cuba." 
 
 Robinson was informed that Aguinaldo, Bray, the editor of 
 the Singapore Free Press, and all the other parties present at 
 the interview except Pratt claimed that such a formal written 
 agreement was entered into and he concluded therefore that the 
 question was largely one of personal veracity between Mr. Pratt 
 and these parties.^^ 
 
 Of course, the fact that no such writing was ever produced 
 is conclusive evidence that it never existed. Aguinaldo himself 
 effectually disposed of the claim. In the Resena Veridica he 
 tells why the agreement which he says was made was not reduced 
 to writing. In a letter written about November, 1898, and ad- 
 dressed to "Sefior McKinley, President of the Republic of the 
 United States of North America," Aguinaldo wrote: 
 
 "The commander of the McCulloch telegraphed me also 
 from Hong Kong offering in the name of Commodore Dewey 
 to take me to Cavite in order to raise the Filipinos against Spain. 
 
 ''Without any written treaty, — counting only upon the sacred 
 word of American citizens, I went to Hong Kong, embarked on 
 the McCulloch," etc.'^ 
 
 The editor of the Singapore Free Press was not, as Robinson 
 understood, present at either of the interviews between Pratt 
 and Aguinaldo. Nor had he ever agreed with Bray's claim. In 
 an interesting letter to Bray, St. Clair wrote :®* 
 
 52 Robinson, The Philippines, the War, and the People (1901), p. 41. 
 
 ^3 Phil. Insurg. Recs., 441-2. Evidently this letter was not sent. The state- 
 ment that the commander of the McCulloch telegraphed Aguinaldo is cer- 
 tainly untrue. 
 
 e*P/tt7. Insurg. Recs., 406, 5. Taylor, I, p. 272.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY. OF THE CONSULATES 409 
 
 "I felt it my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold that 
 you and Santos hatve evidence that will controvert his. . . . 
 Curiously you never mentioned to me anything of the agreement 
 as having taken place then, nor in the paper you communicated 
 to me was there any mention of one, nor did Pratt know of any. 
 It is only more recently that the fictioti took shape. . . . / 
 would like to urge you, from a practical point of view, to drop 
 any such foolishness. The vital thing, and nothing else counts, 
 is what Dewey said and did when he at last met Aguinaldo. That 
 that is the thing; all else is empty wind. . . . Sink every- 
 thing into Dewey-Aguinaldo cooperation ; that was on both sides 
 honest. Even if it did not imply actual arrangement, which 
 of course, Dewey, himself, could not make. That here you 
 have the facts, undenied — incontrovertible. . . . Dewey is 
 the *key.* " 
 
 On June 12, 1899, with this letter in his possession. Bray had 
 the audacity to write the following letter to Aguinaldo : 
 
 "There is still a trump card to be played. Did you not say 
 that the basis of any negotiation at Singapore was the inde- 
 pendence of the Philippines under an American protectorate? 
 This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed and to which Dewey and 
 Washington agreed ; as I figured up the price of the telegram, I. 
 know very well what occurred, and I am ready to state it and to 
 swear to it when the proper time comes. There are five of us 
 against one in the event of Consul Pratt receiving instructions 
 to deny it. Furthermore Mr. St. Clair knows what happened 
 and I am certain that he also would testify. St. Clair still has the 
 rough draft as an historical relic, and St. Clair is a true and 
 loyal friend of yours."" 
 
 On the same day Bray telegraphed to Senator George F. Hoar 
 that :" 
 
 "As the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the Ameri- 
 can Government, through the consul at Singapore, I frankly state 
 that the conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to coop- 
 erate with Dewey were independence under a protectorate." 
 
 "5 Phil. Insurg. Rccs., 398, 9. 
 
 "PA»7. Insurg. Recs., 453-4. Taylor, I, 273.
 
 410 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 Self-serving statements made by the insurgent leaders with 
 reference to what had occurred in the past are entitled to very 
 little consideration/'' They wrote down whatever they thought 
 would bolster up their case, create sentiment in their favor 
 abroad, or encourage their followers at home, exactly as Euro- 
 pean belligerents did a decade and more later. But contem- 
 poraneous admissions against interest are pretty certain to be 
 true and have a recognized value in the law of evidence. The 
 Filipinos had acquired the Spanish habit of making elaborate 
 srecords of all their political and military transactions. The 
 acts of the Hong Kong junta were carefully recorded in detail 
 in the records of their meetings.^^ From the minutes of the 
 meeting held on May 4, 1898, two days after Aguinaldo returned 
 from Singapore, it appears that he explained to the junta the 
 situation which had developed and that there was then a general 
 discussion of the advisability of his returning to the Philippines. 
 Aguinaldo then knew what had occurred between himself and 
 Pratt; it was fresh in his mind. If Pratt, with Dewey's ap- 
 proval, had pledged the faith of the United States, it is abso- 
 lutely certain that Aguinaldo would have reported the fact to 
 his associates. 
 
 It was for all of them the one big thing in all the world. And 
 yet Aguinaldo, in his statement to the junta, made no reference 
 to any covenant with Pratt and Dewey. In fact, what he did 
 report was inconsistent with the existence of even an implied 
 understanding. According to his report the conditions under 
 which he was to cooperate with the American forces had not 
 at liiat time been determined. Pratt and Aguinaldo had, as 
 stated in the minutes of the meeting, 
 
 "both agreed that the President (Aguinaldo) should confer with 
 the Admiral commanding the Aimerican squadron in Mirs Bay 
 and if the latter should accept his propositions, advantageous in 
 
 ^' Those who accept as true every assertion made by the insurgents with 
 reference to the acts and statements of Americans must also believe many 
 things discreditable to certain American public men who were not in the 
 Philippines. See infra, p. 508, note. 
 
 «8P/tt7. Insurg. Recs., 53-2..^
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 411 
 
 his judgment to the Philippines, he would go to said country in 
 one of the cruisers." 
 
 Nothing more. 
 
 When Aguinaldo reached Hong Kong, Dewey had sailed for 
 Manila. He then talked with Consul Wildman and reported 
 that he "was not satisfied with such interviews." As everything 
 was in the air, Aguinaldo "begged the committee to discuss the 
 advisability of his going to the Islands" and leaving them at 
 Hong Kong. The opinions of leading members of the junta 
 were entered at length in the minutes to which they affixed 
 their signatures. Sandico, Garchitorena and Apacible, thought 
 that Aguinaldo's presence in the Philippines was necessary in 
 order to prevent dissension among the people, but Aguinaldo 
 insisted that he 
 
 "considered it reckless for him to go to the Philippines without 
 first making a written agreement with the Admiral as it might 
 happen, if he placed himself at his orders, that he might make 
 him subscribe to or sign a document containing proposals highly 
 prejudicial to the interests of the country from which might 
 arise the following two very grave contingencies : 
 
 "1. If he should accept them he would undoubtedly commit 
 an unpatriotic act and his name would justly be eternally cursed 
 by the Filipinos. 
 
 "2. If he should refuse, then the break between the two 
 would be evident." 
 
 To escape this dilemma he proposed that a committee should 
 go to the Philippines, see Admiral Dewey and 
 
 "ascertain in an authentic manner what the intentions of the 
 United States in regard to that country are and if his interven- 
 tion is absolutely necessary, he would not object to go at once 
 to the Philippines." 
 
 Hence Aguinaldo at that time realized that he had no definite 
 arrangements with any representative of the United States and 
 that even if Pratt and Wildman had encouraged him to return
 
 412 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 to Hong Kong he understood that they were without authority 
 to speak for the United States. Neither he nor the junta had 
 any illusions as to the powers of the consuls. They did believe, 
 however, that Dewey might possibly have such authority, and 
 Aguinaldo desired to get in touch with him. 
 
 The objections to sending a committee, instead of Aguinaldo, 
 to Manila, which were then made by Sandico, Garchitorena, 
 Apacible and Gonzaga, and the policy then outlined, were fully 
 set forth in the minutes of the meeting, and signed by all present. 
 They were convinced that Dewey would furnish arms because 
 the fleet alone could do nothing unless it operated in conjunction 
 with the insurgents. They understood the situation and calcu- 
 lated very properly upon taking advantage of Dewey's neces- 
 sities.^^ This document is so important as to justify further 
 quotation. 
 
 "The authority to treat which the President desired to give 
 to the other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personal 
 qualifications, they did not believe would be as efficacious as his 
 personal intervention, which is necessary in grave affairs, such 
 as those the subject of discussion; there would be no better oc- 
 casion than that afforded them to insure the landing of the ex- 
 peditionary forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the 
 expense of the Americans and to assure the situation of the 
 Philippines in regard to our legitimate aspirations against those 
 very people. The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, would 
 be the victims of the demands and exactions of the United States ; 
 but, provided with arms, would be able to oppose themselves to 
 them, struggling for independence, in which consists the true 
 happiness of the Philippines. And they finished by saying that 
 it made no difference if the Spanish governm.ent did demand 
 the return of the four hundred thousand pesos, and if the de- 
 mand were allowed in an action, since the object of the sum would 
 be obtained by the Admiral furnishing the Filipinos the arms 
 which they required for the struggle for their legitimate aspira- 
 tions. . . . 
 
 S9 "As a matter of fact," says Le Roy, "this is only the first of a series of 
 events and documents which show that the Filipinos during 1898 and 1899 
 looked into the future more shrewdly and mapped out their course of action 
 in a less haphazard way than did tiie Americans." The Americans in the 
 Philippines, I, p. 208, note.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 413 
 
 "The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would 
 he able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the 
 United States, if they colonized that country, and would drive 
 them, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle 
 for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking 
 off the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington proposed to 
 carry out tlie fundamental principles of its constitution, there 
 was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the Philip- 
 pines, or even to annex them. It was probable then that it would 
 give them independence and guarantee it ; in such case the pres- 
 ence of the President was necessary, as he would prevent dis- 
 sensions among the sons of the country who sought office, who 
 might cause the intervention of European powers, an interven- 
 tion which there was no reason to doubt would be highly preju- 
 dicial to the interests of the country. . . . What injury 
 could come to the Philippines, even if we admitted that the 
 Admiral would not give arms to the President on account of his 
 refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the country, after he 
 had taken all means to provide for her defense ? None. Such 
 an act of the President could not be censured, but, on the other 
 hand, would be most meritorious because it would be one proof 
 more of his undoubted patriotism."^" 
 
 Aguinaldo sailed for Manila with the definite understanding 
 that the Americans had made no promises. He and his associ- 
 ates hoped that after reaching the islands he might induce the 
 admiral to make some sort of terms with him. They understood 
 perfectly that they were relying on their own influence and 
 their skill in turning the situation to their advantage. 
 
 V 
 
 It thus appears from the statements of Pratt, Wildman and 
 Aguinaldo himself, that Bray's assertion that a written agree- 
 ment was entered into at Singapore was false. Aguinaldo never 
 claimed that there was any such document. The minutes of 
 the meeting of the Hong Kong junta, held immediately after 
 Aguinaldo's return, prove that he did not then claim that there 
 
 ««PA»7. Insurg. Recs., SZ, 2. Taylor, I, p. 231.
 
 414 THE PHILIPPINES' 
 
 had been even an oral agreement between him and Pratt or any 
 understanding other than that he should return to Hong Kong, 
 see Dewey, and if possible arrange for the cooperation of the 
 insurgents. He proceeded to Hong Kong and thence to Cavite 
 for that purpose. Our knowledge of what occurred at his first 
 interview with Dewey rests on the conflicting statements of 
 Dewey and Aguinaldo. The former made his statement within 
 a few days after the meeting in a formal report to the secretary 
 of the navy. Aguinaldo's statement in the Reseiia Veridica 
 was made in September, 1899, a year and three months after 
 the event. As dressed up by his advisers it was inherently 
 improbable and unworthy of belief. Admiral Dewey was an 
 experienced naval officer, fully informed of his powers and 
 duties and aware of the fact that political questions were be- 
 yond his province. He delivered the insurgent leader on shore 
 and supplied him with arms, but it is inconceivable that he as- 
 sumed to make any such promises or representations as are 
 set forth in the Reseiia Veridica. No one who is acquainted 
 with the circumstances and the records now believes that Dewey 
 made Aguinaldo any promises. 
 
 It is equally certain that the insurgent leaders were not misled 
 into assisting the Americans by any inferences which they were 
 justified in drawing from the conduct of either Pratt, Wildman, 
 Dewey, or Anderson. It has been believed by many friends of 
 the Filipinos that Aguinaldo and the members of the Hong Kong 
 junta were tricked by wiser and more experienced men, but we 
 now know that they were playing their own game with open eyes 
 and subtle brains alert to take every advantage of the extraor- 
 dinary conditions which had arisen in the Philippines. Wild- 
 man, Williams and Pratt thought that theirs were the guiding 
 hands. To Dewey the Filipinos were "little brown men," "mere 
 boys," who annoyed him. They were in fact a type of men 
 with which the American officers were unfamiliar and whose 
 general intelligence and skill as politicians they greatly under- 
 estimated. 
 
 Long before the United States decided to annex the Philip-
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 415 
 
 pines the relations with the insurgents were definitely fixed. Final 
 instructions to demand the cession of the entire Archipelago 
 were sent to the commissioners at Paris on November 11, 1898. 
 Before that Aguinaldo had proclaimed his Republic and estab- 
 lished his capital at Malolos. During the period of uncertainty 
 which extended from May 1 to November 11, neither Aguinaldo, 
 Dewey, Anderson, nor the people of the United States had any 
 information on the subject. By a process of reasoning or in- 
 stinct, Pratt reached the conclusion that the Filipinos would 
 be supported in their demand for independence. Williams as- 
 sumed that the islands would be annexed and governed by the 
 United States. Wildman evidently believed that a protectorate 
 would be established. Dewey first favored retaining Luzon. 
 Washington instructed the consuls and officers not to talk poli- 
 tics and in the meantime maintained absolute silence- Aguin- 
 aldo and his associates were naturally very desirous of ascer- 
 taining the policy of the United States. Like most Americans 
 at that time, they inferred from the history of America that it 
 would not care to assume the burden of governing a distant 
 territory. Before leaving Hong Kong for Cavite Aguinaldo 
 and the junta satisfied themselves that the constitution of the 
 United States conferred no power to hold colonies. The conclu- 
 sion, as recorded in the minutes of the junta on May 4, was 
 that if the American government "proposed to carry out the 
 fundamental principles of its constitution, there was no doubt 
 that it would not attempt to colonize the Philippines or even to 
 annex them. It was probable then that it would give them inde- 
 pendence and guarantee it." 
 
 This was a reasonable deduction from the facts known to the 
 Filipinos and they knew about as much as any one did at that 
 time. The United States had gone to war to free the Cubans 
 and the Filipinos with their limited knowledge of history might 
 well ignore the facts which distinguished the Cuban from the 
 Philippine situation. The important thing to note is that the 
 Filipino leaders did not then pretend to have received any in- 
 formation with reference to the American policy. They reached
 
 416 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 their conclusions by reasoning from the conditions known to 
 them. 
 
 The meeting of the junta, the minutes of which have been 
 quoted, was held three days after the destruction of the Spanish 
 fleet. It required no great prescience to infer that Dewey, being 
 without troops, would be willing to encourage the insurgents 
 to attack the common enemy, and might aid them with the arms 
 they "required for the struggle for their legitimate aspirations." 
 The arms, at least, would be so much clear gain. If later the 
 Americans should have other views as to what aspirations were 
 "legitimate" the arms could be turned against them. It seemed 
 a perfectly good policy because under it both parties secured the 
 immediate thing desired and the future was left to take care of 
 itself. The Filipinos had everything to win and nothing to lose 
 by reviving the insurrection under such conditions. 
 
 There was, however, one dread contingency, — the United 
 States might decide to withdraw from the Philippines and leave 
 the Filipinos to fight it out with Spain. That must be avoided 
 at all hazard. "To be again in the hands of Spain," wrote 
 Agoncillo to Mabini a few days after the fall of Manila, "will 
 mean a long and bloody war and it is doubtful whether the end 
 will be favorable to us. A treaty of peace sanctioned by the 
 other powers will assure the dominion of Spain. Spain free 
 from Cuba and her other colonies will employ all her energies to 
 crush us and will send here the one hundred and fifty thousand 
 men she has in Cuba."®^ 
 
 Until the American policy should be defined the Filipino policy 
 must necessarily be tentative. Aguinaldo and his following had 
 already determined to secure absolute independence if possible, 
 but many influential Filipinos had other views and it was neces- 
 sary to act with tact and discretion. Many of the wealthy upper 
 class favored annexation, but they were skilfully maneuvered 
 out of position. Before leaving Hong Kong two proclamations 
 were prepared for circulation in the Philippines, one, a copy of 
 which was sent to Washington by Pratt, bore the heading, "Amer- 
 
 '^^ Phil. Insurg. Recs., 453, 3.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF! THE CONSULATES 417 
 
 ica's Allies," and contained the words, "Divine Providence places 
 us in a position to secure our independence. . . . Where you 
 see the American flag flying, bear in mind that they are our 
 redeemers." The other contained the following: 
 
 "This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for 
 contriving that our country, all the Philippine Archipelago, may 
 be counted as another star in the great republic of the United 
 States. . . . Now is the time to offer ourselves to that nation. 
 . . . With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy."** 
 
 Aguinaldo is understood to have carried these proclamations 
 to the Philippines, but neither was circulated. Manifestly he was 
 not ready to announce a policy. After the insurgent army was 
 organized the native people were informed that the Americans 
 would aid them in securing independence, but Aguinaldo at all 
 times realized that it might be necessary to accept something less. 
 
 On July 28, 1898, Seiior Regidor, a Filipino residing in Lon- 
 don, telegraphed Agoncillo that President McKinley should be 
 requested not to abandon the islands. "Pledge him our uncondi- 
 tional adhesion, especially of well-to-do people. To return to 
 Spain, in whatever form, would mean annihilation, perpetual 
 anarchy. . . . Influence Aguinaldo to accept American flag, 
 flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to remain."*' Agoncillo 
 replied that Aguinaldo's government aspired to independence. 
 Regidor then wrote to J. M. Basa, urging that a protectorate was 
 the only feasible policy.** Upon receiving this communication 
 Basa called together his friends in Hong Kong and they adopted 
 a resolution directing that a congratulatory message be sent to 
 President McKinley. Agoncillo informed Aguinaldo of what 
 had been done by a letter, in which he described Basa and his 
 friends as "boastful patriots." 
 
 "If the American troops leave us alone there," he wrote, "the 
 questions which will arise are these : Have we sufficient arms to 
 
 ®2 Phil. Insurg. Recs., 1204-10. J. M. Basa enclosed the proclamation in a 
 letter of May 16, 1898, to Jose Basa at Manila, recommending that it be given 
 the widest possible circulation. 
 
 «3 Phil. Insurg. Recs., 471, 4. 
 
 '*Phil. Insurg. Recs., 450, 2.
 
 418 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 maintain the war against Spain in order to secure our inde- 
 pendence? ... If you think that we have not sufficient 
 strength to fight against them, should we accept independence 
 under an American protectorate; and if so, what conditions or 
 advantages should be given to the United States? You should 
 carefully consider the preceding questions . . . and your de- 
 cision be notified to our representatives abroad in order that 
 they may know what they must do in their negotiations."^^ 
 
 On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote to Agoncillo definitely 
 announcing the policy he then had in mind : 
 
 "Still do not accept any contracts or give any promises respect- 
 ing protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can 
 obtain independence. This is what we shall endeavor to secure; 
 meanwhile if it should be possible to do so, still give them to 
 understand in a way that you are unable to bind yourself, but that 
 once we are independent we will be able to make arrangements 
 with them."«« 
 
 On August 10, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote to Sandico : 
 
 "The policy of the government is as follows : 
 
 "1. To struggle for the independence of the Philippines as 
 far as our strength and our means will permit. Protection or 
 annexation will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen 
 that the recognition of our independence, either by force of arms 
 or diplomacy, is impossible."" 
 
 And two weeks later he wrote Agoncillo : 
 
 "You must bear in mind that the policy of the government is 
 to obtain absolute independence, and if perchance we should 
 know by the course of events that such can not be the case, we 
 will then think of annexation or protection."^^ 
 
 After the arrival of the troops Admiral Dewey ceased to have 
 
 ^f^Phil Insurg. Recs., 471, 4. On July 21, 1898, Agoncillo wrote to Mabin! 
 that the idea that the purpose of the American government was to grant 
 independence without conditions was too philosophical to be true and that 
 Don Emilio knew what he thought and "I shall think the same; that is to 
 say that we are the ones who must secure the independence of our country 
 by means of unheard-of sacrifices and thus work out its happiness." 
 
 «8PAj7. Insurg. Recs., Book C, 1. 
 
 s'' Phil. Insurg. Recs., S, 7. 
 
 «8PM. Insurg. Recs., C, 1.
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 419 
 
 any relations with Aguinaldo. General Anderson dealt with him 
 as the commander of a military force engaged in fighting the 
 common enemy. That condition necessitated friendly relations 
 to the point where their vital interests conflicted. There never 
 was any real cooperation.®" The Americans merely permitted 
 the insurgents to carry on military operations so long as they did 
 not conflict with their own plans. On July 22 General Anderson 
 informed Aguinaldo that he could not without orders from 
 Washington, recognize his civil authority.'^" The burden of 
 Aguinaldo's complaints was the refusal to recognize him as an 
 ally or to recognize his government, but he never in any of his 
 correspondence with Dewey, Anderson, Merritt or Otis claimed 
 that he had been promised American support in his attempt to 
 establish an independent republic in the Philippines. He com- 
 plained only of the unfairness and injustice of the refusal to per- 
 mit his army to enter the city of Manila, which it had assisted 
 in capturing. He refused to attend the Fourth of July cere- 
 monies because not invited as president. His military operations 
 were carried on for his own purposes. He attempted unsuccess- 
 fully to capture Manila without the assistance of the Americans. 
 He ignored requests for assistance in obtaining transportation 
 and complied only when threatened with force. 
 
 The right to use deceit against an enemy is recognized by the 
 laws of war. The original plan for obtaining arms from the 
 Americans which could be used against them if the "legitimate 
 aspirations" of the Filipinos were not recognized should not be 
 too severely criticized. At least there is nothing in the modem 
 history of European nations to justify them in throwing stones 
 at Aguinaldo and his associates. But conveying information to 
 the Spaniards while professing friendship, and asserting the 
 existence of an alliance with the Americans, can not be justified 
 even by the law of necessity. On at least two occasions such 
 information was conveyed to the Spaniards. On July 30 Gen- 
 
 •• Aguinaldo, writing to Consul Williams on August 1, 1898, said that his 
 people were claiming that the "American forces have shown not an active, 
 only a passive cooperation." Sen. Doc. 62, p. 398. 
 
 ""^Sen. Doc. 62, p. 393.
 
 420 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 eral Del Pilar informed a Spanish officer that the Americans 
 would attack Manila on August 2, and General Ricarte gave 
 warning of the attack of August 13.''* 
 
 The verdict of history must be that the United States was 
 guilty of neither false pretenses, breach of faith nor treachery 
 toward the Filipino insurgent leaders. Aguinaldo was not so 
 simple-minded as to rely on the statements of consuls, and he 
 was not in fact misled by their statements or their actions. In- 
 stead of trusting the Americans, his attitude, at least from the 
 time of the arrival of the army, was unfriendly and suspicious. 
 
 No promises were made by Admiral Dewey or by any respon- 
 sible army officer. The government at Washington disapproved 
 the conduct of Pratt and Wildman, but its disapproval was not 
 made public until after the treaty of peace was signed. As its 
 policy was undetermined, no other reasonable course was possible. 
 It could not be expected to communicate its disapproval of the 
 alleged acts of the consuls to Aguinaldo. However, certain of the 
 letters sent by the State Department to the consuls might very 
 well have been made public, and it would have been better had 
 Admiral Dewey protested against Aguinaldo's assumption of 
 civil authority. It is very certain, however, that the course of 
 events would not have been thereby affected. It would simply 
 have made a better record and deprived Aguinaldo's friends of 
 one of their arguments.'^ 
 
 71 The following letter from a Spanish ofRcer is self-explanatory : 
 
 "SiNGALON, Aug. 10, 1898. 
 "Senor Don Artemio Ricarte : 
 
 "My Dear Sir — I have received, to-day your very kind letter giving warn- 
 ing of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interest in me, 
 which, on my part I reciprocate. I assure you I am yours, most truly and 
 sincerely, 
 
 **Luis Martinez Alcobendas." 
 
 Phil, Ittsurg. Recs., 1187, 5. 
 
 '2 In 1904 a leading Filipino wrote to Mr. Le Roy as follows : 
 
 "In my judgment the Americans who held the first conferences with some 
 of the Filipinos in 1898, in the United States, in Hong Kong, and in Singa- 
 pore, ought to have been persons of high standing, duly authorized by their 
 government, and they ought to have spoken plainly and set forth concretely 
 what was in the thought of the McKinley Government. . . . Those definite 
 and concrete proposals ought to have been expressed without ambiguities or 
 doubts, but with absolute plainness and blunt frankness. ... It appears 
 as though certain Americans, and even military and naval officers, allowed to 
 outline itself in perspective the future absolute independence of the country,
 
 THE DIPLOMACY OF THE CONSULATES 421 
 
 The United States was fighting Spain, and the Philippine 
 Islands were Spanish territory. In the eye of international law 
 the insurgents were rebellious subjects of Spain, but subjects 
 nevertheless. After Spain ceded the territory to the United 
 States the inhabitants owed allegiance to the new sovereign. 
 They chose to exercise their fundamental right to try for inde- 
 pendence, and failed. 
 
 a promise more or less indecisive or at any rate lacking formality ; asked and 
 reasked afterward by the Democrats during the presidential campaign ; all 
 which did much damage and deceived the people of only moderate education 
 and still more the ignorant who to this day believe that independence is the 
 panacea of the ills and backwardness of the country. . . . And it was 
 necessary also that the Democrats should not have supported the desire for 
 independence of many Filipinos. 
 
 To the latter there were said and promised many things which could not be 
 carried out, especially independence, by Americans who were speaking and 
 acting according to their own judgment; and the result was what we have al- 
 ready seen, more than three years of war and at this time in spite of peace we 
 still have trouble-brewers abroad, or partisans of independence who really are 
 devoting themselves to the robbery of the Filipinos." Mr. Le Roy describes 
 the writer of this letter as "one of the foremost Filipinos for experience, 
 legal attainment, and a character, universally recognized as the highest." The 
 Americans in the Philippines, I, p. 380, note. The letter was printed in the 
 issue of the New York Evening Post of May 17, 1904. 
 
 Of course no authorized Americans ever held conferences with the 
 Filipinos in Hong Kong, Singapore, or the United States during 1898. The 
 United States then had no policy with reference to the Filipinos other than 
 that conveyed to Pratt, Wildman and Dewey, to have no political dealings 
 with the insurgent leaders. It would have been well indeed if there had been 
 a little plain and blunt speaking to Aguinaldo and his friends then and later. 
 In fact, most of the difficulties of American administration in the Philippines 
 during the past sixteen years has been due to the fear of injuring the sensi- 
 bilities of the Filipinos by speaking with "absolute plainness and bluntness."
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 The Period of Military Occupation — Suspended Sovereignty 
 
 Military Occupation— Powers of a Military Occupant— Merritt's Instructions 
 — The Proclamation — Organization of Civil Affairs — ^The Peace Protocol- 
 Spanish Claims Thereunder — Relations with Insurgents — No Joint Occupation 
 — Aguinaldo Required to Withdraw His Troops — Consolidation of Civil 
 Offices — The Courts — Trade and Commerce — Prisons — Ownership of Bonds 
 and Money in the Treasury — Spanish Prisoners — Spanish Priests and Nuns 
 as Prisoners — The Chinese — Closing up Spanish Afifairs — Difficulties at Iloilo 
 — The "Benevolent Assimilation" Proclamation — Aguinaldo's Response — Con- 
 ferences with Insurgents — The Schurman Commission — The Attack on 
 Manila. 
 
 While the people of the United States were busy with the 
 questions of national policy involved in the acquisition of ter- 
 ritory in the Far East the army was governing Manila under 
 military law. Until the treaty of peace had been ratified by the 
 proper authorities in Spain and the United States, and the fact 
 duly notified and proclaimed, the sovereignty over the Philip- 
 pines remained vested in Spain, subject to the provision of the 
 Peace Protocol, which granted to the United States possession 
 of the city, bay and harbor of Manila. This possession carried 
 with it the right and the duty to govern the territory so occu- 
 pied. Spain retained the right to govern the rest of the Archi- 
 pelago, and a Spanish governor continued his nominal rule from 
 the city of Iloilo. As the terms of the Peace Protocol implied the 
 possible permanent retention of Manila, the military govern- 
 ment from the first naturally thought to some degree at least 
 in terms of permanency. Hostilities were suspended, and the 
 strong temptation to exercise jurisdiction over the adjacent ter- 
 ritory for the purpose of maintaining order was generally re- 
 sisted. 
 
 The instructions which General Merritt carried with him to 
 
 422 
 
 \
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 423 
 
 the Philippines assumed that the occupation of Manila would be 
 that of a military conqueror, and. his powers and duties were 
 defined and announced upon that theory. The original occupa- 
 tion was under the articles of capitulation, and the provisions 
 of the Peace Protocol, by which the city, bay and harbor of 
 Manila were to be placed under the control of the United States 
 pending the determination of the future of the islands, never 
 really controlled the action of the military authorities. The pos- 
 session, from the time of the capitulation until the formal trans- 
 fer of sovereignty under the treaty of peace, was treated as a 
 military occupation, and it was assumed that the powers of the 
 authorities were derived from military law. 
 
 The instructions to the commanding general, dated the day 
 before the first expedition sailed from San Francisco, stated that 
 the army of occupation was being sent to the Philippines for the 
 twofold purpose of completing the destruction of the power of 
 Spain in that part of the world and giving order and security 
 to the islands while they were in the possession of the United 
 States. He was directed immediately upon his arrival to publish 
 a proclamation announcing that the Americans came not to make 
 war upon the people or upon any party or faction among them, 
 but to protect them in their homes, employments, and personal 
 and religious rights. 
 
 The occupation was to be made as free as possible from sever- 
 ity, although, if necessary for the maintenance of law and order, 
 the commanding general was authorized in his discretion to re- 
 move native officials and establish new judicial tribunals. It was 
 announced as a principle of public law that the first effect of mili- 
 tary occupation of an enemy's territory is the severance of the 
 former political relations and the establishment of a new political 
 power. The powers of a military occupant are absolute and 
 supreme and operate immediately upon the political condition of 
 the inhabitants, but the ordinary municipal laws of the conquered 
 territory, those which affect the private rights of persons and 
 property or provide for the punishment of crime, continue in 
 force until suspended or superseded by the acts of the occupying
 
 424 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 power. In practise these local laws are not usually abrogated, 
 but are administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as 
 they were before the occupation. This enlightened practise was 
 as far as possible to be adhered to on the present occasion. 
 
 The substance of these instructions was embodied in a procla- 
 mation which was issued by General Merritt on the day after the 
 surrender of the city. It was announced that the municipal law 
 would remain operative so far as compatible with the purposes 
 of military government and would be administered through the 
 ordinary tribunals, but by officers appointed by the government 
 of occupation. A provost-marshal-general would be appointed 
 for the city of Manila and the outlying districts, with deputy 
 provost-marshal-generals for designated subdivisions, charged 
 with the duty of making arrests and bringing offenders before 
 the proper courts. The port of Manila and all other ports and 
 places in the Philippines in actual possession of the American 
 land and naval forces would be open while such occupation con- 
 tinued to the commerce of neutral nations in articles not contra- 
 band of war upon the payment of the duties in force at the time 
 of the importation. 
 
 All churches and places devoted to religious worship and to 
 the arts and sciences, all educational institutions, libraries, scien- 
 tific collections and museums would, as far as possible, be pro- 
 tected, and their destruction and effacement, save when required 
 by urgent military necessity, would be severely punished. 
 
 The army thus displaced the Spanish officials and assumed the 
 government of the city and its environs. The management of 
 financial afifairs was assigned to Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, 
 who assumed the duties of the Spanish intendente general de 
 hacienda. Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Whittier was made collector 
 of customs ; Major B. C. Bement, collector of internal revenue ; 
 Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur, provost-marshal-general 
 and civil governor of Manila; Captain Henry Glass, of the navy, 
 captain of the port, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jewell, provost- 
 judge. A military commission was created, to try cases of arson.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 425 
 
 homicide and other such serious offenses and their equivalents 
 in Spanish law. 
 
 Health, police and street cleaning departments were soon in 
 active operation, and conditions, which had been necessarily bad 
 in an oriental city at the end of a siege, rapidly improved. 
 
 Three days after having taken possession of the city under the 
 capitulation. General Merritt learned that the Peace Protocol had 
 been signed at Washington, and received an order directing that 
 all military operations against the enemy should be suspended. 
 The protocol was signed at Washington at 4 :30 on the afternoon 
 of August 12, 1898. It was then 5 :30 in the morning of August 
 13 at Manila, and the American troops were already in position 
 and waiting for the navy to open fire upon the defenses of the 
 city. The president's proclamation announcing the suspension 
 of hostilities was at once communicated to the Spanish authori- 
 ties, who thereupon declined to transfer the public funds, as 
 required by the capitulation, on the ground that the proclamation 
 was dated prior to the surrender. General Merritt replied that 
 the status quo which must be observed was that which existed 
 when he received notice of suspension of hostilities. The funds 
 were then delivered under protest and the question thus raised 
 was disposed of adversely to the Spaniards by the treaty of 
 peace. 
 
 After getting the local government roughly organized and un- 
 der way, General Merritt again took up the very serious question 
 of the relations with the Filipino insurgents. The situation was 
 now somewhat more favorable to the Americans, as they were 
 no longer between the Spanish and the Filipino lines. If neces- 
 sary, force could safely be used to compel obedience. 
 
 On the day after the battle General Merritt had notified Wash- 
 mgton that the insurgents were pressing for a joint occupation 
 of the city, and requested instructions as to how far he should 
 go in enforcing obedience to his orders in this and other matters 
 of the same nature. The reply was direct and positive. The 
 president directed that there must be no joint occupation with
 
 426 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the insurgents. The United States must have the absolute pos- 
 session and control of the city, bay and harbor, as upon it 
 would rest the duty of preserving the peace and protecting per- 
 sons and property within the territory occupied by its military 
 and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must therefore 
 recognize the military occupation and authority of the United 
 States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the presi- 
 dent. The commanding general was instructed to use whatever 
 means in his judgment was necessary to this end. 
 
 The statement in General Merritt's proclamation that the Phil- 
 ippines would for the present be held under military rule greatly 
 increased the agitation of the insurgents. Immediately the tone 
 of their demands was raised. A commission which Aguinaldo 
 had sent to General Anderson to treat with reference to the with- 
 drawal of the insurgents from the city, had proposed but one, 
 and that a seemingly reasonable condition, if the place was turned 
 back to Spain — that when a treaty of peace was signed the United 
 States would reinstate them in the positions they were now re- 
 quired to give up. Immediately after the issuance of Merritt's 
 proclamation these commissioners returned, in a very bad hu- 
 mor, with ten new and very unreasonable demands. They were 
 now informed that no conditions would be considered until after 
 their troops had been withdrawn beyond the lines marked on 
 the maps which were delivered to them. 
 
 Major-General E. S. Otis succeeded General Merritt as mili- 
 tary governor on August 29, 1898, and on the following day 
 General Merritt sailed for Europe to give the Peace Commission 
 the benefit of his knowledge of the situation. Aguinaldo's rather 
 pathetic letter of August 27 thus came to General Otis for con- 
 sideration. Merritt had explained to Otis that the difficulty 
 seemed to be that Aguinaldo did not think it prudent to give 
 positive orders for his people to withdraw for fear he would 
 not be obeyed. The Filipino leader was, in fact, seeking some 
 easy way of dealing with the inevitable. "I appreciate as well 
 as yourself," he had written from Bacour, "the inconvenience of 
 a dual occupation of the city of Manila and its suburbs . . ,
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 427 
 
 but you ought to understand that without the long siege sustained 
 by my forces you might have obtained possession of the ruins of 
 the city, but never of the Spanish forces, who could have retired 
 to the interior towns. I do not complain of the disowning of 
 our help in the capitulation, although justice resents it greatly, 
 and I have to bear the well-founded blame of m.y people. I do 
 not insist on the retention of all the positions conquered by my 
 forces within the city limits at the cost of much blood, of inde- 
 scribable suffering and much money. I promise to retire to this 
 line. , . . Permit me to insist, if you will, upon the restitu- 
 tion of the possessions which we are now giving up, if in the 
 treaty of peace between Spain and the United States they ac- 
 knowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines, I am com- 
 pelled to insist on the said conditions to quiet the complaints of 
 my chiefs and soldiers who have exposed their lives and aban- 
 doned their interests during the siege of Manila." 
 
 After delaying long enough to familiarize himself with the 
 situation, General Otis on September 8 sent to Aguinaldo a long 
 communication, in which he reviewed the questions at issue, gave 
 the insurgent leader some very good advice, and peremptorily 
 directed that his forces evacuate the entire city, including its 
 suburbs and defenses, before September 15, in default of which 
 forcible action would be taken. It would be easy to criticize the 
 tone and language of this letter. It showed not the slightest 
 consideration for the susceptibilities of the Filipinos. It was, in 
 fact, a frank Anglo-Saxon document. Nevertheless it was what 
 was required by the situation. The Filipinos expected ultimately 
 to oppose the Americans with arms and were playing the game 
 of negotiation quite skilfully. A Filipino will never cease urg- 
 ing and arguing his case until he receives an ultimatum, and it 
 must be an ultimatum which he clearly recognizes. When nec- 
 essary, he generally acquiesces with perfect good nature. Gen- 
 eral Aguinaldo realized that he must remove his troops, but sent 
 another commission to beg General Otis to withdraw the letter 
 and substitute a simple request, unaccompanied by a threat to 
 use force. General Otis refused to withdraw his letter, but
 
 428 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 finally consented to write another which Aguinaldo could show 
 to his army. This was done, and on the evening of the appointed 
 day all the insurgent organizations withdrew from the city.^ 
 
 The attempt to govern the city by merely substituting Ameri- 
 can for Spanish officials was not very successful. In the interest 
 of economy and efficiency many of the Spanish offices were 
 abolished and others were consolidated. The result was a grad- 
 ual concentration of power in the office of the military governor. 
 It was found impractical to continue the office of intendente 
 general de hacienda, in which General Whittier had succeeded 
 General Greene when the latter left for the United States. The 
 duties of the office as defined by the Spanish law were broader 
 than the powers which were to be exercised by the American 
 government, as it included matters relating to the entire islands, 
 such as the customs and internal revenue. The Spanish colonial 
 treasury had dealt with questions of general as well as local 
 import. The funds of the insular government and of the city 
 of Manila and the money which had been deposited in the treas- 
 ury by private individuals had been commingled and could not 
 easily be segregated. The laws of the military government were 
 not operative beyond the limits of the territory under its con- 
 trol. The Spanish officials very properly claimed that financial 
 matters which related to the islands generally, in which Manila 
 was not immediately concerned, were still under their control. 
 This dual control made the situation very difficult, and the mili- 
 tary governor soon found it necessary to bring all financial mat- 
 ters within the direct control of his office. 
 
 1 Aguinaldo managed to keep his men ignorant of the real situation. Gen- 
 eral Otis says that the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering 
 the American troops. An eye witness gives the following account of an inci- 
 dent connected with the withdrawal. The Filipinos had requested that they 
 be allowed to march up to the Luneta, the old Spanish execution grounds. 
 
 "Early on this morning that part of the insurgent forces which would make 
 their departure by the Luneta began to move. The columns passed from the 
 Calle Real into the Calle Luis, the rank and file in blue drilling, lead by the 
 famous Pasig band of ninety pieces, and the column headed by Colonel 
 Callies. Down to the Paco Road they went, to the Calle Bagumbayan, where 
 they soon stood beside the wall where so many of their comrades had en- 
 dured Spanish execution. As they passed the Wyoming regiment, cheer upon 
 cheer was given by the Wyoming boys. It was an incident long remembered 
 by the insurgents." Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, p. 111.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 429 
 
 The management of the Bureau of Internal Revenue also pre- 
 sented many perplexing problems. Operating under many de- 
 crees, of different dates, it issued cedulas, executed the stamp 
 laws and the industrial regulations, and collected the money 
 belonging to the city as well as to the central government. It 
 was not easy to determine what particular taxes should be 
 collected by the military government. Thus the railway tax, 
 imposed by the Spanish insular government for services ren- 
 dered in the island of Luzon, was not at first collected by the 
 American government, as the services rendered by the railways 
 were not confined to the city. 
 
 It was also thought to be doubtful whether the cedulas should 
 be issued at all, because they were supposed to confer certain ad- 
 vantages upon the holders, such as the right to travel about the- 
 islands. The cedtdas were, therefore, at first not collected, but 
 the inhabitants demanded them so persistently, as a means o*f 
 identification, that they were issued finally for a merely nominal 
 fee. 
 
 The officers assigned to the work of civil government found 
 themselves beset with all kinds of difficulties. The old Spanish 
 system, which they had been set to operate, was extremely com- 
 plicated. The accumulation of uncodified and often conflicting 
 laws, orders and decrees, was not to be mastered in a day by 
 military officers who had been trained under a different system 
 of legislation and jurisprudence. The Royal Decree of 1894, 
 under which the limits of Manila had been extended to include 
 the adjacent villages of Ermita, Malate, Binondo, Paco and 
 others, recognized and retained many of the usages and cus- 
 toms which for generations had formed a part of the native com- 
 munity life. Certain of the city offices had been made elective. 
 Taxation was to some extent controlled by the municipal council, 
 subject to the approval of the governor-general. It was found 
 impossible to operate this kind of a city government, and munici- 
 pal affairs were entrusted to the provost-marshal-general, who 
 deposited all funds received from any source in the general
 
 430 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 treasury and drew thereon for money to cover the necessary city 
 expenditures. 
 
 Although Spanish sovereignty was supposed to continue, sub- 
 ject to the exigencies of military occupation, most of the Spanish 
 civil officials abandoned their offices without transferring the 
 property and records. The Spanish army officers neglected to 
 make proper returns of their troops or to render lists of public 
 property, as required by the capitulation. The Americans were,, 
 therefore, obliged to discover it and make their own inventories; 
 and it was upon these that the property was finally returned to tlie 
 Spaniards, as required by the Treaty of Paris. 
 
 Many of the judicial officers also vacated their positions and 
 sailed for Spain without making provision for the care of the 
 records of their courts. A proclamation of August 14 suspended 
 the criminal jurisdiction of the audiencia and of the inferior 
 local courts. On August 22 it was ordered that crimes committed 
 by or against persons connected with the army should be deter- 
 mined by military commissions whose sentences were "to con- 
 form to the laws of war of the United States or of either of the 
 states or the customs of war." In a few instances the Spanish 
 judges opened their courts without previous consultation with 
 the military authorities, but the protests of the Filipinos led to 
 the issuance of an order that all proceedings should be suspended. 
 The courts of first instance were then closed. 
 
 The audiencia claimed the right to remain open and determine 
 civil and criminal cases which had been submitted to it on appeal 
 before the surrender of the city, and the Spanish chief justice 
 rather persistently urged this claim upon the military governor. 
 He was informed that the rule that the ordinary civil jurisdic- 
 tion of the courts was not displaced by military occupation was 
 subject to the will of the occupying power, and that the func- 
 tions of the audiencia had already been suspended by General 
 Merritt's proclamation. Whether it was advisable to continue 
 the suspension was a matter which was under consideration. It 
 was suggested that if adequate assurances could be obtained that 
 the resumption of its customary duties would not operate to
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 431 
 
 obstruct the operations of the government, the ban might be 
 removed. 
 
 For a time the civil courts were all closed, and the people were 
 subjected to serious inconvenience. After conferring with the 
 chief justice and leading Filipino lawyers. General Otis con- 
 cluded to authorize the old courts to reopen under certain restric- 
 tions. On October 7, 1898, therefore, an order was issued direct- 
 ing that 
 
 "the civil courts, as composed and constituted by the laws of 
 Spain, which were held and administered prior to August 13, 
 1898, within Philippine territory now subject to United States 
 military occupation and control, are permitted to resume at once 
 the exercise of the civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanish laws 
 within the limits of that territory; subject, however, to such 
 supervision by the military government of the United States here 
 instituted as in its judgment the interests of that government 
 may demand."* 
 
 But the restrictions placed on their functions were not satis- 
 factory to the Spanish judges, and they gradually abandoned 
 their work. During the rest of the period now under considera- 
 tion substantially all judicial functions were exercised by provost- 
 courts and military commissions. 
 
 The blockade had paralyzed trade and commerce, and the food 
 supply of the city was rapidly becoming exhausted. Manila was 
 then, as it is to-day, the commercial as well as the political center 
 of the Archipelago. The trade relations of the islands were very 
 close. In some instances they were dependent upon one another 
 for the necessities of life. Certain sections cultivated rice ; others 
 tobacco, sugar or hemp; others raised live stock, which was ex- 
 changed for foodstuffs and other necessities. These products 
 were the medium of exchange, and comparatively little money 
 was used. The principal trade of Manila, and the transporta- 
 tion business generally, was in the hands of European and Chinese 
 merchants, who were clamoring for the opening of the ports and 
 the removal of the restrictions on interisland commerce. Large 
 
 » Otis Kept. 1899, p. 12.
 
 432 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 sums of money had been advanced by these people on the security 
 of tobacco, hemp and sugar which awaited shipment to Manila. 
 The harbor was filled with Spanish and other European ship- 
 ping. The restrictions on trade elsewhere than at Manila were 
 imposed by the Spanish government, which was at liberty to 
 close the ports to outside commerce and influence if it chose to 
 do so. But while the bulk of the Spanish forces were held as 
 prisoners of war the insurrection had spread to all the islands in- 
 cluding those occupied by the Moros. The Spaniards, under Gen- 
 eral Rios, were concentrated at Iloilo and Zamboanga. To the 
 protests of the merchants General Otis replied : "A government 
 almost in extremis mortiiis, as certainly the Spanish government 
 in the central Philippine Islands must be considered to be at 
 present, has the lawful right to shut temporarily all of its ports, 
 whether declared of entry or otherwise, and whatever the busi- 
 ness interests of outside merchants, be they foreigners or citizens 
 of its domain."' 
 
 An arrangement was made with General Rios under which 
 vessels carrying the Spanish or American flag might, subject to 
 the provisions of the Spanish law, trade between certain inter- 
 island ports. But those flying the Spanish flag dared not enter 
 the ports which were in the possession of the insurgents. The 
 interisland commerce which was free and undutiable could not be 
 thrown open to foreign ships. The result was that many of the 
 ships which had formerly sailed under the Spanish flag made 
 colorable transfers to American residents, complied with the 
 consular regulations and received American registers. 
 
 The Spanish tariff regulations were complicated and very diffi- 
 cult to understand. The orders of the president required them 
 to be maintained in force with as little change as possible. Even 
 slight modifications were resented by the merchants who had 
 made their arrangements and their purchases on the theory of 
 the perpetuity of Spanish dominion. An executive order issued 
 by the president on July 12, 1898, before the capture of Manila, 
 directed that upon the occupation and possession of any ports 
 
 » Otis Rept. 1899, p. 45.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 433 
 
 iand places in the Philippine Islands by the forces of the United 
 States, the tariff of duties and taxes therein prescribed should be 
 levied as a military contribution.* This schedule also proved 
 unsatisfactory, and on September 29 it was ordered that its en- 
 forcement should be postponed until November 10, and that, in 
 the meantime, the existing tariffs and duties should be main- 
 tained, except that all goods and merchandise secured or pur- 
 chased within the dominion of Spain since the declaration of 
 ;war between Spain and the United States should be received 
 upon the same condition as to tariff and duties as the goods and 
 merchandise of neutral nations. 
 
 A careful revision of the tariff law was made by experts, and 
 the new duties were made effective November 10, 1898. The 
 revenues were collected thereafter under this schedule, with no 
 more friction than was inevitable under the circumstances. 
 
 Some difficulties resulted from misunderstandings with the 
 Spanish authorities over permits for trading at certain ports. 
 By this time Aguinaldo's Malolos government was, in the lan- 
 guage of General Otis, "reeling off decrees and constitutional 
 provisions at a rapid rate." The insurgent government was 
 greatly in need of money and obtained it by imposing an export 
 duty of ten per cent, on all products shipped to Manila from 
 ports in their possession. Under such conditions commerce natu- 
 rally languished. 
 
 Much confusion was caused by the lack of proper prison rec- 
 ords. The prisons were filled to overflowing with criminals and 
 persons charged with various crimes. Many persons were found 
 in Bilibid prison against whom no charges appeared of record. 
 Some had evidently been thrown into prison on mere suspicion 
 or for some personal reason, and simply forgotten. The pressure 
 from friends and relatives for the release of prisoners was very 
 great, and for a time any occupant of Bilibid seems to have 
 
 *The Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec 2, ratified, approved and con- 
 firmed the action of the president as set forth in the order of July 12, 1898, 
 and subsequent amendments whereby a tariff of duties and taxes was to_ be 
 levied and collected at all ports and places in the occupation and possession 
 of the armies of the United States.
 
 434 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 been given the benefit of the doubt and released on the slightest 
 provocation. A number of notorious criminals were thus en- 
 abled to escape punishment. Subsequently greater care was 
 exercised and each case was carefully investigated. This exer- 
 cise of power to release prisoners who had been regularly con- 
 victed and sentenced before the capitulation of the city — ^that is, 
 in effect, to retry the cases without the use of the original evi- 
 dence — was, of course, without legal justification and was cited 
 by the Spanish Commission at Paris as an act of sovereignty 
 justified by neither the Peace Protocol nor the articles of capitu- 
 lation. 
 
 Many difficult questions of a purely legal nature affecting the 
 rights of individuals arose during this early period. The Spanish 
 government had been in the habit of receiving from individuals 
 various bonds and special deposits in trust or as security for 
 the performance of personal obligations, and it was claimed that 
 many of these deposits were in the safes and vaults which con- 
 tained the public funds captured by the United States. Private 
 persons promptly filed their applications for the return of money, 
 bonds and securities which they claimed had been deposited 
 in exchange for Spanish bonds which they had never received, 
 or for the purpose of guaranteeing the performance of con- 
 tracts which they had entered into with the government. The 
 treasury books, in fact, showed many such deposits, some of 
 which had been properly designated and placed in the vaults, 
 so that ownership could be determined. The aggregate amount 
 of these claims exceeded the funds in the treasury, and had 
 they been recognized as an obligation of the United States 
 would have left it in debt to the claimants. The latter were 
 notified, however, that the title to all these funds had passed 
 to the United States by capture, free from claims against the 
 Spanish government, and that their contracts, although tempo- 
 rarily suspended, would revive against Spain upon the cessation 
 of American military occupation and the return of the territory 
 to Spain.® 
 
 8 Letter of October 6, 1898, Otis' Kept. 1899, p. 37.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 435 
 
 All pending claims for the refund of taxes, and these were 
 many, were treated as demands against the Spanish government, 
 in which the United States was not interested. The United 
 States claimed all moneys and securities found in the Spanish 
 treasury at the inception of the occupation as the property of 
 the public enemy and did not acknowledge the validity of any 
 liens asserted by the former subjects of Spain. Money in the 
 treasury at the time it was surrendered to the United States was 
 treated as public money which could not be paid out in liquida- 
 tion of Spanish indebtedness of any kind. Only taxes which 
 had accrued since August 13, 1898, were collected by the mil- 
 itary government, and refunds could be made only out of such 
 funds. 
 
 The estates of many individuals charged with treason had 
 been embargoed and taken possession of by the Spanish authori- 
 ties. The owners now sought vigorously, but unsuccessfully, to 
 impose a liability for their property upon the United States gov- 
 ernment. Under the Spanish law the title to an embargoed 
 estate remained in the individual owner, but the use and profit 
 of the estate was vested in the Spanish government as long as 
 the embargo continued in effect. The continuance of the em- 
 bargo depended upon a pardon or the result of a trial. If the 
 owner was convicted of the offense charged, his property was 
 confiscated ; if he was acquitted, it was returned to him. Turning 
 the situation into terms of American law, the estate in such a 
 case was held in trust by the Spanish government for its sole 
 use and benefit with remainder vested in the parties formerly 
 holding the unqualified fee and depending upon a contingency 
 involving due conviction of the crime of disloyalty. The United 
 States during its occupancy under the truce with Spain, which 
 provided only for a temporary cessation of hostilities, was a 
 trustee for Spain and "would be recreant to its trust should it 
 knowingly divert without just cause under the law any properties 
 which would again inure to the dominion of Spain upon a return 
 of Spanish sovereignty." Should the possession of the United 
 States be declared permanent, the question would present a dif-
 
 436 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ferent aspect. In the meantime the temporary occupancy of the 
 United States did not impose upon it any obligation to redress 
 or even to investigate alleged grievances of Spanish subjects 
 against their government. All sequestered estates were, there- 
 fore, taken possession of by the provost-marshal and adminis- 
 tered for the benefit of the United States, and in the final adjust- 
 ment of affairs they were returned to their owners. 
 
 The Spanish military prisoners w^ere a source of much annoy- 
 ance and no little menace to the health and safety of the city. 
 While the future of the islands was uncertain they could not be 
 expatriated without the consent of both Spain and the United 
 States. If Spain retained the islands, the troops would probably 
 be needed there. Many of them were sick and required special 
 care and consideration. The necessary articles and appliances 
 were furnished by the Americans, and the health of the soldiers 
 soon commenced to improve. But, having no employment, their 
 conduct was such as to cause the Spanish officers, as well as the 
 American authorities, considerable uneasiness. The old antip- 
 athy between the Spanish soldiers and the Filipinos, which dur- 
 ing the early days of the occupation had been very intense, was 
 rapidly succeeded by a friendliness which seemed rather unnat- 
 ural. The Spanish soldiers were a trifle too anxious to frat- 
 ernize with the insurgents, and their officers were required to 
 keep the men better organized, as contemplated by the articles of 
 capitulation. But their authority had been greatly diminished. 
 A request by General Rizzo for authority to impose punishments 
 authorized by the Spanish military code upon his troops was 
 refused, as the Americans, being responsible for the care of the 
 prisoners, felt that they must "see that they receive humane treat- 
 ment in accordance with the dictates and spirit of their own 
 military code." General Otis was authorized to permit Spanish 
 officers who were disabled to depart for Spain, and a consider- 
 able number availed themselves of the privilege." 
 
 _^ Congress appropriated $1,500,000 for the expense of returning Spanish 
 prisoners and their families to Spain. H. R. Doc. 264, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 
 p. 1. According to Sastron (p. 563), 29,418 Spaniards were thus returned.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 437 
 
 The disposition of the Spanish native troops held as prisoners 
 presented serious difficulties. The Spanish authorities pro- 
 posed to disband them, but this could not be permitted. About 
 three thousand of these troops had deserted to the insurgents 
 before the surrender of the city. Of those remaining, some came 
 from the southern islands and others from the surrounding coun- 
 try; and all, after having served the Spaniards, werQ afraid to 
 return to their homes. Ultimately the most of them were dis- 
 charged at Manila and found their way into the insurgent ranks, 
 where they became the most efficient of Aguinaldo's troops. 
 
 General Otis was in constant correspondence with the insur- 
 gent leader with reference to various matters. The Vatican and 
 the Catholic world generally were much disturbed by rumors of 
 the manner in which the Filipinos were treating their prisoners, 
 and the United States was appealed to for aid in securing the 
 release of the members of the religious orders and the nuns. The 
 correspondence which resulted is very instructive to the student 
 of Filipino character and illustrates well the lack of grasp which 
 their leaders had on the principles of international law. General 
 Otis, in a very fatherly and condescending communication re- 
 plete with good but vmappreciated advice, expressed the fear that 
 the imprisonment of the Spanish clergy and nuns would create 
 an unfavorable impression in the great world. as to the nature 
 of Filipino culture. General Aguinaldo in reply expressed his 
 appreciation of the American's consideration for the reputation 
 of his government and disclaimed any intention of holding nuns 
 or women and children as prisoners. Such as were with his 
 troops, he said, were free to go as their interests and desires dic- 
 tated. As to the clergy and civil officials, he conceded that inter- 
 national law did not permit of their being made prisoners of 
 war, but in this instance all of these people had borne arms 
 against the Filipinos, and the friars had been the means of 
 sending many patriotic Filipinos into banishment or to languish 
 in prison. The friars, it was said, had cheated the government, 
 the Vatican and foreign public opinion and had made themselves 
 masters of the lives, honor and property of the people and were
 
 438 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the primary cause of the revolution. To free them would be 
 neither just nor politic, as they would proceed at once to the 
 work of inciting a counter-revolution. He, therefore, proposed 
 to hold the civil officials until the deported and imprisoned Fili- 
 pinos obtained their liberty, and the friars until the Vatican rec- 
 ognized the rights of the native Filipino clergy. The public 
 interest and the peace of the Filipino people, according to Agui- 
 naldo, required this, and "international law will have to give way 
 before the just cause of a country of a million of souls, because 
 this cause is one of humanity, civilization and progress. My 
 people demand these measures, and I can not but comply with 
 their will." Many who have occupied higher places in history 
 than the Filipino chief have applied the same doctrine, while not 
 so frankly stating it. 
 
 There was indeed respectable authority for the view that all 
 who follow an army, including civil officials, newspaper corre- 
 spondents and sutlers, may be made prisoners of war, and as 
 General Otis' arguments proved ineffective, the subject was for 
 the time abandoned.'' 
 
 The sudden inrush of Chinese seemed to the new government 
 to require special and immediate attention. Many of these peo- 
 ple had retired to China during the revolution and were merely 
 returning to their homes, while others were newcomers who were 
 attracted by the prospects for trade under the new conditions. 
 The Spanish laws in force at the time seemed inadequate to 
 Americans, who thought of Chinese immigration in terms of 
 Pacific coast sentiment. Thousands of the Chino-Filipinos were 
 the descendants of ancestors who had settled in the Philippines 
 generations, even centuries, before American occupation. They 
 had intermarried with the Filipinos, and Chinese and Filipino 
 and Spanish names were inextricably interwoven. Many of the 
 leading men of the country carried in their physiognomy the 
 unmistakable evidence of Chinese blood. 
 
 The Chinese controlled a great part of the leading business 
 of the islands and during recent times they had been frequently 
 
 ^ For the correspondence, see Gen, Oti^ Report, 1899, pp. 22-29.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 439 
 
 the holders of valuable concessions, particularly such as could 
 only be obtained by liberal donations to Spanish officials. The 
 lower classes were found in most of the occupations of life, ex- 
 cept farming. While the Filipinos were normally indolent and 
 not eager for wealth, the Chinese were always wide awake and 
 very active. Notwithstanding this intermixture of the races 
 and centuries of association, there remained considerable race 
 antagonism. 
 
 The Chinaman, when away from home, has no political ambi- 
 tion and is always willing to take advantage of his neighbor's 
 troubles to put money into his own purse. The common China- 
 men were sympathetic Spaniards, Filipino patriots, or enthusi- 
 astic Americantstas, as the immediate circumstances seemed to 
 require. But they were useful people in the Philippines, and it 
 might have been as well to allow the existing Spanish laws to 
 remain in force, at least until the future of the islands was de- 
 termined. However, within a month after the occupation of 
 Manila the laws relative to the admission of Chinese into the 
 United States were by an order of the military governor made 
 effective in the Philippines.^ An oriental people, of all others 
 the best adapted to aid in stimulating the slumbering resources 
 of the country, were thus excluded by the application of prin- 
 ciples which in the United States had been thought necessary 
 to protect the white race against the competition of the yellow. 
 
 Soon after the treaty of peace was signed the Spanish au- 
 thorities manifested great anxiety to close their affairs in the 
 islands. Until the treaty was ratified it was impossible to 
 make definite arrangements with reference to property matters, 
 but the prisoners were gradually sent home, and on January 31, 
 1899, a board of officers' was named to act with a similar Span- 
 ish board to "clear the accounts of the Spanish government in 
 
 8 Otis Report, 1899, p. 34. 
 
 •Maj. Chas. McClure, Chief Paymaster; Maj. C. U. Guatenbein, Second 
 Oregon Volunteers, and Lieutenant M. A. Hildreth, First North Dakota 
 Volunteers. There were three Spanish boards. Sastron, the author of the 
 Spanish history of the war, was president of the Spanish civil board. The 
 reports of the American board are in Otis' Report, 1899, Appendix R, and 
 MacArthur's Report, 1900, Appendix N.
 
 440 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 the Philippines." This board commenced work immediately and 
 after a great deal of labor secured the data upon which the 
 final adjustment was made. 
 
 In the meantime the Spanish government of the islands was 
 being administered by General Rios, from Iloilo, in the island 
 of Panay. Rios realized that he might not be able to hold Iloilo 
 against an attack of the insurgents and asked to be permitted 
 to turn the city over to the United States authorities and retire 
 to Zamboanga. He was informed that nothing could be done 
 until the commission then sitting at Paris had determined the 
 future of the Archipelago. 
 
 Soon after the treaty of peace was signed General Otis re- 
 ceived a petition from certain merchants of Iloilo, asking for 
 American protection. In response to a request for instructions 
 he was directed from Washington to send the necessary troops 
 to preserve the peace and protect life and property, but to 
 be conciliatory, as it was "most important that there should 
 be no conflict with the insurgents."^^ As the treaty of peace 
 was not yet effective and -the protocol suspending hostilities 
 was in full force, the sending of this expedition was unau- 
 thorized. However, as the Spaniards and the merchants of 
 Iloilo were requesting that American troops should be sent 
 to take possession of the city, there seemed no particular reason 
 why events should not be allowed to take their natural course. 
 But the Spanish force evacuated Iloilo on December 24, and 
 when, on December 28, General Marcus P. Miller, with two thou- 
 sand five hundred American troops, arrived in front of the city, 
 they found a native organization in possession and evidently in 
 sympathy with the Malolos government. General Miller's original 
 instructions, prepared before the evacuation by the Spanish was 
 known, required him to be conciliatory but firm; to make no 
 great display of force and to seek to gain possession by peace- 
 able and leisurely negotiations." If this course proved ineffective. 
 
 10 These instructions were dated December 21, 1898. The instructions to 
 proclaim American sovereignty over the Archipelago bear the same date. 
 " Otis' Report, 1899, pp. 57-59.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 441 
 
 he was to report to Manila and await instructions. He was now 
 informed that under the changed conditions it was necessary to 
 occupy Iloilo at once and that the manner of doing so must be 
 left to his discretion, avoiding a conflict if possible, but accept- 
 ing it if necessary, ^^ 
 
 The government which the natives had set up at Malolos had 
 passed under the control of the radicals, who favored a conflict 
 with the Americans, and Aguinaldo hoped that it would be pre- 
 cipitated at Iloilo, where it would serve to fire the hearts of the 
 Visayans, who thus far had been notably lukewarm in his cause. 
 By the same token it was important from the American point 
 of view to avoid hostilities at Iloilo. The treaty was under dis- 
 cussion in the Senate and the final vote was very uncertain. 
 Admiral Dewey, with his usual good sense and caution, advised 
 the abandonment of the movement, but General Otis, while fa- 
 voring every possible effort at conciliation, declined to recall the 
 troops. 
 
 General Miller reported that he found the city quiet. Had 
 he acted with decision, the people would doubtless have acqui- 
 esced in American occupation, as they had made no provision 
 for defense.*' But they soon gained confidence and took their 
 stand with the Malolos government. On the day of his arrival 
 the general announced that the United States had succeeded, 
 by virtue of conquest supplemented by treaty stipulations, to 
 all the rights of Spain in the islands, and invited a conference 
 with representatives of the people of Iloilo. A committee rep- 
 resenting those in control replied that they must confer with 
 Aguinaldo before acting, as any other course would endanger 
 their lives and property. This privilege being denied them, they 
 asked for time to consider the demand, and on December 30 
 submitted their final answer. It was signed by R. Lopez, as 
 "President of the Federal Government of the Visayas," and an- 
 
 " Gen. Otis to Gen. Miller, Dec. 28, 1898 ; Otis' Report, p. 60. 
 
 18 One of the newspaper men who accompanied Gen. Miller's expedition 
 stated {Harper's History, pp. 74-77) that he went on shore at once and found 
 no troops in the town, and no flag flying. The insurgents evidently expected 
 the troops to land.
 
 442 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 nounced that "in conjunction with the people, the army and com- 
 mittee will insist upon our pretensions not to consent in our 
 present situation to any foreign interference without express or- 
 ders from the Central Government of Luzon, upon which we 
 state once more that we depend, and with which we are one in 
 ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices." 
 
 The merchants who had petitioned for the troops had expe- 
 rienced a change of heart and now besought General Miller to 
 consider their large interests and the results to them of a con- 
 flict between the Americans and the natives. Events in Manila 
 and to the north were rapidly drifting toward a crisis, but Gen- 
 eral Otis was determined that hostilities should not be com- 
 menced by his troops, and General Miller was instructed to pro- 
 ceed slowly and await the progress of events. 
 
 Some time before the treaty of peace was signed Admiral 
 Dewey recommended that in order to quiet the spirit of unrest 
 the president should issue a proclamation in which he should 
 announce the policy of the United States and explain to the Fili- 
 pinos that it was the intention to interfere as little as possible 
 in their internal affairs and to grant increased powers and priv- 
 ileges as fast as they were capable of exercising them — ^thus 
 clearly outlining the policy which has since been pursued. 
 
 Immediately after the signing of the treaty of peace the presi- 
 ident issued such a proclamation, in which the policy of the 
 United States, as far as it had been determined, was announced." 
 General Otis on December 29 sent a translation of the proclama- 
 tion to General Miller, who on January 6, 1899, published it 
 at Iloilo. He reported to General Otis that a copy had been 
 sent to the committee of the natives, but that no answer had 
 been received. In fact, a public meeting had been held to dis- 
 cuss the proclamation and the intention announced of resorting 
 to arms. General Miller reported "that the people laughed at 
 
 **This proclamation was issued a month before the beginning of hostili- 
 ties. Nevertheless Mr. Thayer (Life and Letters of John Hay, II, p. 137) 
 says: "Even when the United States was engaged in wiping out certain 
 tribes of recalcitrant Filipinos, the Major [McKinley] announced that we 
 vrerc bent on 'benevolent assimilation.' "
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 443 
 
 it (the proclamation). The insurgents call us cowards and are 
 fortifying the old fort at the point of the peninsula and are 
 mounting old smooth-bore guns left by the Spaniards. They are 
 entrenching everywhere, bent on having one fight, and are confi- 
 dent of victory."" 
 
 General Miller remained quietly in front of Iloilo until after 
 the beginning of hostilities at Manila on February 4. The de 
 facto native government continued to administer civil affairs 
 and collect the customs taxes, much to the disgust of the Amer- 
 ican officials designated for that purpose, who were required to 
 remain on board the ships. 
 
 General Otis, recognizing that Iloilo was not in the legal pos- 
 session of the Americans and that Spanish authority remained 
 intact until the treaty was ratified and proclaimed, directed that 
 the commerce of the port should not be interfered with, and this 
 action was subsequently approved by the president.** 
 
 Unfortunately, the military government did not adhere con- 
 sistently to this policy. The executive order of July 12, 1898, 
 following the rule of international law and the ordinary practise 
 of the American government, directed that tariff duties should 
 be collected at ports in the occupation and possession of the 
 United States forces. The occupation of the city, bay and har- 
 bor of Manila was provided for by the protocol of August 12, 
 1898. Until the exchange of ratifications of the treaty a tech- 
 nical state of war existed, but under the provisions of the pro- 
 tocol hostile operations could not be conducted by either bellig- 
 erent. Beyond the city, bay and harbor of Manila the entire 
 Archipelago was, in legal contemplation, in the possession of 
 Spain. Cebu, like Iloilo, was in the actual possession oi a. de 
 facto native insurgent government, which was collecting the 
 duties on goods delivered at the port. The government at Ma- 
 nila In this instance disregarded the rule announced for the con- 
 trol of affairs at Iloilo and required a merchant at Manila to 
 
 *» Repts. War Dept. 1899, I, Pt. 5. p. 328. John F. Bass' account of the 
 Iloilo meeting in Harper's Hist., p. 75. 
 
 "General Corbin to General Otis, Jan. 16, 1899; Otis' Report, 1899, pp.
 
 444 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 pay the duty a second time on a cargo of rice which he had 
 shipped from Saigon, Indo-China, to Cebu. The Supreme Court 
 of the United States finally held that this collection was illegal 
 and that the amount collected should be returned to the shipper.^^ 
 The hasty publication of the president's proclamation at Iloilo 
 was unfortunate in view of the fact that General Otis had de- 
 cided that under the circumstances it required editing for local 
 consumption. An unsuccessful effort was made to inform Gen- 
 eral Miller of this intention. The result was that the translation 
 issued by General Otis at Manila differed from that published 
 at Iloilo in that it omitted certain words and phrases which it 
 was feared would tend to excite the natives. General Otis has 
 been severely criticized for his action in respect to this proclama- 
 tion. The remarkable thing is that in a matter of such impor- 
 tance and on which he and Dewey disagreed he should have acted 
 without consultation with Washington. 
 
 "After fully considering the president's proclamation," he 
 says, "and the temper of the Tagalogs, with whom I was daily 
 discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the 
 United States government toward them, I concluded that there 
 were certain words and expressions therein, such as 'sovereignty,' 
 *the right of cession,' and those which directed immediate occu- 
 pation, etc., though most admirably employed and tersely express- 
 ing the actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the 
 Tagalog war party to incite widespread hostility among the na- 
 tives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that cer- 
 tain words, as 'sovereignty,' 'protection,' etc., had peculiar mean- 
 ing, disastrous to their welfare, and signified a future political 
 domination like that from which they had recently been freed. 
 It was my opinion, therefore, that I would be justified in so 
 amending the paper that the beneficent object of the United 
 States government would be brought clearly within the compre- 
 hension of the people, and this conclusion was the more readily 
 reached because of the radical change of the past few days in 
 
 i^Macleod v. United States, 229 U. S. 416 (1913), reversing 45 Ct of 
 CI. 339.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 445 
 
 the constitution of Aguinaldo's government, which could not 
 have been understood at Washington at the time the proclama- 
 tion was prepared." 
 
 Therefore, instead of printing the president's instructions in 
 full. General Otis issued a proclamation of his own, in which he 
 quoted the following language of the president : 
 
 "Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the 
 Administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of 
 the inhabitants of the Philippines by insuring to them in every 
 possible way the full measure of individual rights and liberty, 
 which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them 
 that the mission of the United States is one of beneficent as- 
 similation, which will substitute the mild sway of justice and 
 right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, 
 while upholding the temporary administration of affairs for the 
 greatest good of the governed, there will be sedulously main- 
 tained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to 
 overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good 
 and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands." 
 
 Speaking for himself, General Otis said : 
 
 "From the tenor and substance of the above instructions of 
 the President, I am fully of the opinion that it is the intention 
 of the United States, while directing affairs generally, to appoint 
 the representative men now forming the controlling element of 
 the Filipinos to civil positions of trust and responsibility, and 
 it will be my aim to appoint thereto such Filipinos as may be 
 acceptable to the supreme authorities at Washington. It is also 
 my belief that it is the intention of the United States govern- 
 ment to draw from the Filipino people so much of the military 
 force of the islands as is possible and consistent with a free and 
 well-constituted government of the country, and it is my desire 
 to inaugurate a policy of that character. I am also convinced 
 that it is the intention of the United States government to seek 
 the establishment of a most liberal government for the islands, 
 in which the people themselves shall have as full representation 
 as the maintenance of law and order will permit, and which shall 
 be susceptible of development on lines of increased representa- 
 tion and the bestowal of increased powers into a government as
 
 446 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces 
 of the world."^" 
 
 While the friendl}- and well disposed Filipinos were pleased 
 with the proclamation, the militant element of the community 
 received it with derision. The leading native newspapers de- 
 nounced it as a mere subterfuge, designed to quiet the people 
 until measures could be inaugurated to put into effect all the 
 odious practises which Spain had employed. The radicals, Gen- 
 eral Luna and Senor Mabini, were at that time the dominating 
 influences in the Malolos government. On January 5, 1899, Ag- 
 uinaldo issued a proclamation which was nothing less than a 
 declaration of war against the United States. After reciting his 
 version of events from the time of his departure from Singapore, 
 he said : 
 
 "My government can not remain indifferent in view of such 
 a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by 
 a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, champion of op- 
 pressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to 
 open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible 
 possession of the Visayan Islands. I denounce these acts before 
 the world in order that the conscience of mankind may pro- 
 nounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of 
 nations and the tormentors of human kins." 
 
 A few days later, on June 8, another proclamation, addressed 
 "To my brothers, the Filipinos, and to all the respectable Consuls 
 and other Foreigners," was issued and published in certain Ma- 
 nila papers. In it Aguinaldo said : 
 
 "As in General Otis' proclamation he alluded to some instruc- 
 tions issued by His Excellency the President of the United States, 
 referring to the administration of the matters in the Philippine 
 Islands, I, in the name of God, the root and fountain of all jus- 
 tice, and that of all the right which has been visibly granted to me 
 
 ^^Otis Rept., 1899, pp. 66-69. For the proclamations, see Sen. Doc. 331, 
 pp. 776-8. For General Otis' testimony regarding the incident, see Ibid., pp. 
 764-8. For General Miller's statement, see Cong. Rec. XXXV, Pt. 6, p. 6026.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 447 
 
 to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of our regenera- 
 tion, protest most solemnly against this intrusion of the United 
 States government on the sovereignty of these islands. 
 
 "I equally protest in the name of the Filipino people against 
 the said intrusion because, as they have granted their vote of 
 confidence appointing me President of the nation although I do 
 not consider that I deserve such, therefore I consider it my duty 
 to defend to death its liberty and independence. 
 
 "Finally, I protest against such an unexpected act of sover- 
 eignty of the United States in these islands, in the name of all 
 the proceedings which I have in my possession Vv'ith regard to 
 my relationship with the United States authorities, which un- 
 mistakably prove that the United States did not take me from 
 Hong Kong to fight the Spaniards for their benefit, but for the 
 benefit of our liberty and independence, for which purpose the 
 said authorities verbally promised me their most decided assist- 
 ance and efficacious cooperation ; and so should you, all my dear 
 brothers, understand, in order that we may united act according 
 to the idea of our liberty and independence, which were our most 
 noble desires, and assist with your work to obtain our aim with 
 the strength which our old convictions may afford and must not 
 go back in the way of glory which we have obtained."^' 
 
 This proclamation, printed in Spanish and Tagalog and widely 
 distributed, produced a serious effect upon the people. The sen- 
 timent of antagonism toward the Americans now became prac- 
 tically unanimous. The few intelligent people who honestly be- 
 lieved that the Filipino people would be happier and more 
 prosperous under a government imposed by the United States 
 than under an experimental government conducted by inexpe- 
 rienced leaders and ambitious military officers swollen by their 
 temporary importance were for the time silenced by considera- 
 tions of personal safety. 
 
 A few days after the publication of the "beneficent assimila- 
 tion" "proclamation Aguinaldo, as the result of negotiations com- 
 menced some time before at the instance of conservative Fill- 
 
 ip These proclamations are printed in Otis' Report, 1899, pp. 76-79. It 
 seems that the first proclamation, which contained a virtual declaration of 
 war, was as far as possible withdrawn from circulation. The second, while 
 more rabid in tone, omitted that provision and modified the statement with 
 reference to the alleged promise of independence. See Le Roy, I, p. 404.
 
 448 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 pinos, appointed a commission to visit Manila in the interests of 
 peace.^" How sincere his desire for peace was is shown by a 
 code of instructions to soldiers issued on the day of the appoint- 
 ment of the commissioners in which patriots were told to observe 
 their fellow countrymen in order to see whether they are Amer- 
 ican sympathizers and "whenever they are assured of the loyalty 
 of the converts they shall instruct them to continue in the char- 
 acter of an American sympathizer in order that they may receive' 
 good pay, but without prejudicing the cause of our country. 
 In this way they can serve themselves and at the same time serve 
 the public by communicating to the committee of chiefs and offi- 
 cers of our army whatever news of importance they may have."^^ 
 Numerous lengthy conferences led to the usual negative 
 results. Mabini, who drew the instructions of the Filipinos 
 and controlled their actions, desired the withdrawal of the 
 American forces from before Iloilo and the recognition of 
 independence under some sort of a protectorate. It was all 
 very general and indefinite. The sovereignty of the United 
 States was not a subject for consideration by military officers, 
 and the insurgent commissioners, having nothing definite 
 to offer, were helpless.^^ On January 29 the commissioners 
 held their final meeting and adjourned sine die. 
 
 20 The Filipino commission was composed of Florentino Torres, Eufrasio 
 Flores and Manuel Arguelles. General Otis appointed Brigadier-General R. 
 P. Hughes, Colonel James F. Smith and Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Crowder 
 to confer with them. 
 
 ^^ House Doc. 2, 56 Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 2, 200. These instructions as 
 to the method to be pursued by the Sandatahan (bolo men) within the city 
 make interesting reading. 
 
 22 Sen. Doc. 331, 57th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 2709-2751, where the official 
 minutes of the conference are printed. Aguinaldo gives some account of the 
 negotiations in his Reseiia Veridica. For the position of the conservative 
 party at that time, see Judge Torres' statement. Kept. War Dept., 1901, I, 
 Part 4, p. 120. General Otis wrote: "With the insurgent representatives it 
 was one continued plea for some concession which would satisfy the people. 
 One of them was a man of excellent legal ability, who had occupied an im- 
 portant judicial position at Cebu under the Spanish Government for a number 
 of years. He had recently arrived in Manila, and on the invitation of Agui- 
 naldo had visited Malolos. He was animated with a desire to restore har- 
 monious relations, or at least to effect a temporary peace until the existing 
 excitement could be allayed, when the people might listen to reason. He 
 secured the appointment of Aguinaldo's board and was named thereon as the 
 most important member, but he was so circumscribed by specific instructions 
 that he could not accomplish anything. I charged him with playing a false
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 449 
 
 Two days previously Aguinaldo had notified General Otis 
 that he had proclaimed the Philippine Republic and that it 
 had been enthusiastically received by the people. With 
 what under the circumstances was sublime impudence he 
 expressed the sincere hope that the general would inform 
 the United States government of his desire for the prompt 
 recognition by the United States of the latest member of 
 the family of nations. 
 
 War was now inevitable. The Filipinos knew that General 
 Otis had been ordered not to begin the war. Their troops 
 had become so arrogant that it was with the utmost difficulty 
 that the American soldiers could be prevented from resenting 
 their taunts and insults. Colonel Barry, the adjutant-gen- 
 eral, was sent to Malolos to try and impress Aguinaldo with 
 the dangers of the situation, but he was not accorded the 
 honor of an interview. Mabini was gracious, but assured 
 Barry that the people were greatly excited and could not 
 be controlled beyond a certain point. While protesting 
 friendliness and a desire for peace, Aguinaldo and his ad- 
 visers had long before this determined to bring about a rupture. 
 Within the city of Manila their agents were organizing the 
 disaffected element into clubs and lodges, preparatory to an 
 uprising in connection with the contemplated attack from with- 
 out. By taunts and insults of every description it was sought to 
 induce the American soldiers to become the aggressors.*' It is 
 
 part, basing the charge upon a knowledge of his legal acquirements. He con- 
 fessed that he was fully aware of the untenable position he occupied, and was 
 powerless under the circumstances. He was an adept at legal fiction and 
 could discover pregnants both negative and positive in every international 
 postulate." General Otis' Report, p. 83. 
 
 Seiior Torres was subsequently appointed an associate justice of the 
 Supreme Court and still holds that responsible position. He is universally 
 respected by Americans and Filipinos. 
 
 See also House Doc. No. 2, 56th Cong., znd Sess., Part 2, p. 202. 
 
 23 In his report dated May 14, 1900, General Otis said : "I desire to correct 
 an erroneous impression which appears to prevail . . . that war with the 
 insurgents was initiated by the United States government, or that the attitude 
 or conduct of its troops in Manila was the cause of hostilities, unless possibly 
 it may be held that their failure to resent insult or punish hostile demonstra- 
 tion constantly recurring in their midst encouraged the already openly avowed 
 eremy in the belief that it could easily slaughter them within the city which 
 »t had invested, and thereby incited him to action. War with the insurgents of
 
 450 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 reasonably certain that a day was designated for an uprising, 
 when the city was to be fired and all Americans put to the sword. 
 
 Early in January, 1899, Admiral Dewey suggested to the presi- 
 dent that a commission should be sent from the United States 
 to study the general situation in the Philippines and recom- 
 mend a policy to be pursued. After consultation with General 
 Otis, President McKinley appointed Jacob C. Schurman, 
 President of Cornell University; Charles Denby, for- 
 merly United States Minister to China; Dean C. Worcester; 
 Rear- Admiral George Dewey; and Major-General E. S. 
 Otis, as the members of what became known as the Schur- 
 man Commission. At the time of the appointment of this 
 commission no definite policy for the government of the 
 islands had been adopted or even seriously considered by 
 President McKinley. The United States in dealing with the 
 Filipinos was still free to grant them independence, to estab- 
 lish a protectorate over them, to confer upon them a colonial 
 form of government, or to admit them to the dignity of a 
 territory or even a state in the Union. Nothing had been 
 settled except that Spain should cede to the United States 
 the sovereignty, which for three hundred years she had ex- 
 ercised over the islands.^* 
 
 With conditions as they were in Manila it was inevitable 
 that there would soon be a collision between the troops and 
 the insurgents. The Americans were doing everything pos- 
 sible to prevent hostilities, at least until the arrival of the 
 regular regiments that were on the way. The Filipinos had 
 determined to declare war and attack the Americans. Their 
 
 the Philippines was forced upon us and was unavoidable. No nation but the 
 United States would have permitted an unfriendly force of large numerical 
 strength to throw up intrenchments and erect fortifications in the immediate 
 proximity of its troops, as did the insurgents during several weeks preceding 
 their attack on Manila, without considering it an act of war and adopting 
 measures to arrest it. By all law and approved precedent the United States 
 would have been justified in arresting these insurgent demonstrations by 
 demand, to be followed with the application of force if demand was insuf- 
 ficient ; and had that course been adopted no wrong could have been imputed 
 to the United States." House Doc. 2, 56th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 2, p. 199; 
 Otis' Kept, 1899-1900, p. 3. 
 
 2* Schurman, Filipino Affairs, A Retrospect and Outlook (1902), p. 4.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 451 
 
 troops were constantly pressing upon the American lines 
 and apparently inviting trouble, with the officers encouraging 
 instead of restraining them. 
 
 The spirit in which the leaders were acting appears in 
 correspondence between General Aguinaldo and one of his 
 best officers, Colonel Cailles. On January 10, 1899, the lat- 
 ter, who had taken up a position beyond the line which had 
 been agreed upon, wrote that the Americans had requested 
 him to withdraw his forces fifty paces, but he wrote, "I shall 
 not draw back a step and in place of withdrawing I shall 
 advance a little farther. He . . . brings a letter from 
 his American General in which he speaks as a friend. I said 
 that from the day I knew that Macquinley opposed our inde- 
 pendence I do not want to have dealings with any Americans. 
 War, war is what we want. The American after this speech 
 went off pale." Replying to this Aguinaldo said: "I ap- 
 prove and applaud what you have done with the Americans 
 and zeal and valor always, also my beloved officers and sol- 
 diers here. I believe that they are playing us until the ar- 
 rival of their reinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum 
 and shall be always on the alert."^^ 
 
 Three days later Cailles desired to know the result of the ulti- 
 matum and also what rewards the government contemplated "for 
 the forces that will be able first to enter Manila." The reply, in 
 the handwriting of Aguinaldo, informed the gallant colonel that, 
 "Those who will be the heroes will have as their rewards a large 
 quantity of money, extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses 
 of Biak-na-bato, Marquis of Malate, Ermite, Count of Manila, 
 etc., besides the congratulations of our idolizing country on ac- 
 count of their being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regi- 
 ments with their generals, and if possible the chief of them all 
 who represents our future enemies in Manila."^' 
 
 Aguinaldo had for the moment evidently forgotten that 
 
 25 Telegraphic Correspondence of Aguinaldo, p. 39. Edited by Captain 
 R. Taylor, pamphlet (1903). 
 2* Tel. Cor, of Aguinaldo, p. 40.
 
 452 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 his constitution prohibited the granting of titles of nobility. 
 Probably he never took Mabini's paper government very 
 seriously or even was aw^are of the contents of the elaborate 
 documents that he signed at Mabini's dictation. It is cer- 
 tain that he never permitted such matters seriously to inter- 
 fere with his projects, and had Cailles succeeded in captur- 
 ing "the regiments with their generals" he would probably 
 have secured his title of nobility.^^ 
 
 On February 2 a company of Filipinos deliberately came 
 within the American lines and took possession of a small 
 village, but on the demand of General Mac Arthur they were 
 withdrawn. Notice was served on the commander that such 
 violations of the agreement would not be thereafter endured. 
 About 8:30 on the night of February 4 four Filipinos ap- 
 proached within five yards of an American outpost near the 
 San Juan bridge and ignoring the command to halt were 
 fired upon by the sentry. A Filipino detachment near by 
 returned the fire, and the firing soon became general along 
 the entire line. In the early morning the naval ships began 
 sending shells into the Filipino lines. During the day of the 
 fifth, which was Sunday, there was severe fighting. The 
 Americans advanced steadily, and by evening the Filipinos 
 had been driven from their lines and were badly demoralized. 
 The American loss was fifty killed and one hundred eighty- 
 
 27 In this connection an entry in the interesting diary kept by Simeon 
 Villa, one of Aguinaldo's companions in his flight toward the mountains, 
 throws a flood of light upon the character of Aguinaldo. "On a moonlight 
 night," records the diarist, "the honorable President (and others) were dis- 
 cussing the matter ; and once the independence of the country is declared, we 
 shall take a trip to Europe with an allowance of a million dollars to pay our 
 expenses." On another occasion, "After supper the honorable President in 
 conversation with B. and V. and Lieutenant Carrasco, told them that as soon 
 as the independence of the country was declared, he would give each one of 
 them an amount of land, equal to what he himself will take for the future of 
 his own family; that is, he will give each one of the three men 13,500 acres of 
 land as a recompense for their work. ... In all probability they will be 
 located in the San Jose Valley, Province of Nueva Ecija, and the principal 
 products will be coffee, cacao, sugar, rice, and cattle." 
 
 This diary was published by the government in 1902 under the title of 
 Flight and Wanderings of Etnilio Aguinaldo. See Senate Doc, 331, 57th 
 Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, pp. 1980-2060.
 
 MILITARY OCCUPATION 453 
 
 four wounded. General Otis estimated the enemy's casual- 
 ties at three thousand, but no exact figures were available. 
 
 The fact that the outbreak occurred just before the date 
 set for the vote in the Senate on the ratification of the treaty 
 with Spain was probably a mere coincidence, but to the sus- 
 piciously inclined it suggested design. The Anti-Imperialists 
 and their friends in the Senate, ever ready to think the worst 
 of their countrymen, charged that the conflict had been de- 
 liberately brought on by the Americans in order to influence 
 the vote on the treaty.^^ There is no credible evidence 
 to show that the Filipinos timed the attack with reference 
 to the vote on the treaty. Their representatives abroad cer- 
 tainly had advised an attack before the arrival of the Ameri- 
 can forces, and Agoncillo hurriedly left Washington for Can- 
 ada on the night of Feburary 4, under circumstances which 
 suggested flight. But there is nothing to show that he had 
 any information other than what he could have acquired 
 from a New York newspaper which published an account of 
 the outbreak about midnight of February 4.^^ Having learned of 
 the attack, Agoncillo probably thought it advisable to be in Mon- 
 treal instead of Washington, The circumstances of the firing at 
 San Juan bridge were inconsistent with the theory of a pre- 
 arranged incident advised by Agoncillo to intimidate the Senate 
 by knowledge that the Filipinos intended to go to war. The 
 Filipinos at that particular hour were unprepared for attack or 
 defense. The expected battle came when they were off their 
 guard, most of the higher officers being absent at Malolos or en- 
 joying themselves at various entertainments in the vicinity. How- 
 ever, Aguinaldo had the draft of a declaration of war ready, and 
 
 28 See the speeches of Sen. Rawh'ns, April 23, 1902. Con. Rec, XXXV, 
 Part 5. p. 4573, and Sen. Patterson, Ibid., p. 5915. The attempt to manipulate 
 the records to the discredit of the American authorities was a failure. See 
 the record contained in a speech by Sen. Spooner, Cong. Rec, XXXV, Part 6, 
 pp. 6107-6108. 
 
 29 Manila is 13 hours west of Washington. Otis' message, filed at Manila 
 at 8:32 a. m., February 6, was received at Washington at 10:52 p. m. on 
 February 5. The New York Herald contained the first news before midnight 
 of February 4, which was February 5 in Manila.
 
 454 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 *'at the first tick of the telegraph reporting the trouble in front 
 of Manila, it was reeled off the old press at Malolos."^" 
 
 30 Le Roy, II, p. 19, note. For this document see Otis' Report, 1899, p. 95, 
 Sen. Doc. 208, Part 1, pp. 104-106. A facsimile of the original declaration is 
 in Harper's History, p. 123.
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 The Filipino Rebellion and the Days of the Empire 
 
 Nature of the War — Filipinos Misjudged — Aguinaldo at Zenith of Power — 
 The Malolos Congress His Creature — Character of Leaders — Encouraged and 
 Misled by Americans — Democrats Vote SuppHes for War — Bitter Opposition 
 by Anti-Imperialists — MiHtary Situation at Manila — State Volunteers Remain 
 — New United States Volunteers — Campaign to the North — Capture of Ma- 
 lolos, Calumpit and San Fernando — Minor Movements Near Manila — Law- 
 ton's Campaign Toward San Maguil de Mayuma — Fight at Zapote River — 
 Situation in the Vasayas and to the South — The Occupation of Jolo — Spanish 
 Relations with Moros — The Bates Agreement — The Republic of Negros — 
 Special Military Government — Arrival of Schurman Commission — Negotia- 
 tions with Insurgents — Statement of American Intentions — Efforts at Con- 
 ciliation — The Insurgents Confident of Foreign Intervention — Aguinaldo In- 
 clined to Peace — Influence of Mabini and Agoncillo — The Congress Votes for 
 Peace — Pacification in Sight — Reversal of Policy by Luna — The End of 
 Filipino Government — Negotiations for Peace End in Failure — Military 
 Despotism — Final Campaign in the North — Searching for the Enemy — Escape 
 of Aguinaldo — Death of General Lawton — End of Organized Warfare — Gen- 
 eral MacArthur Succeeds General Otis — Character and Work of General Otis 
 — New Phase of the Insurrection — Guerrilla Warfare — Attitude of Munici- 
 palities — People of Luzon Support Guerrillas — Beginning of Educational 
 Work. 
 
 The attempt by the Filipinos to overthrow the American power 
 in the Philippines is commonly referred to as an insurrection. It 
 was, in fact a rebellion. Its legal statics was correctly stated by 
 Apolinario Mabini, the "brains of Aguinaldo's government" — in 
 an article published in La Independencia after he had retired 
 from Aguinaldo's cabinet. "Our present war with the Ameri- 
 cans," he wrote, "is in fact and in law a revolution, and not an 
 international war, because at no time did we ever succeed in ex- 
 pelling either the Spaniards or the Americans who took the place 
 of the former. It can not be denied that the Treaty of Paris 
 legitimates the grant to the United States of the right of Spain 
 to the Philippines, . . . it is also unquestionable that were 
 
 455
 
 456 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 it not for the cession, Spain could, if she felt sufficiently strong 
 again, lawfully make war upon us to recover her old empire, 
 unless she be obliged to recognize our independence." 
 
 After thus recognizing the title of the United States and the 
 legality of her use of force to suppress the revolt Mabini 
 adds : "We here use as the criterion of legality not absolute 
 but relative justice, established by tacit concurrence of the 
 Great Powers, baptized by the pompous name of Interna- 
 tional Law for their own glory and aggrandizement and to 
 the prejudice and ruin of weak nations." Rebelling thus 
 against the lawful authority of their sovereign, they w^ere 
 like all other rebels, obliged to appeal to principles asserted 
 to be over and beyond the law and to justify their actions 
 by the successful use of force. 
 
 When the Schurman Commission was appointed the w^ar 
 with Spain was over, and it was expected that most of the 
 army would soon be returned to the United States. The 
 commission was instructed to study conditions and recom- 
 mend a suitable government for the people. This w^ork had 
 now to be subordinated to purely military considerations. 
 
 The general situation w^as decidedly unpleasant. The ef- 
 forts of the Americans in Manila to avoid an armed conflict 
 had failed. The war was a sort of by-product of the war 
 with Spain.* And yet it came as a surprise to most Ameri- 
 cans. That these people, insignificant in numbers and re- 
 sources, would seriously attempt to oppose the military 
 power of the United States did not seem within the range 
 
 1 The idea prevailed very generally that the uprising might have been pre- 
 vented if the situation had been handled with greater firmness. Mr. Whitelaw 
 Reid, in an address at Princeton University in the autumn of 1899, on Our 
 Duty in the Philippines, said that the difficulties then existing in the islands 
 were largely of our own making. "We have not the knowledge to say just 
 who, or whether any man or body, is wholly at fault. What we do know is 
 that the course of hesitation and inaction which the nation pursued in face 
 of an openly maturing attack was precisely the policy sure to give us the 
 greatest trouble, and that we are now paying the penalty. If the opposite 
 course had been taken at the outset, — unless all the testimony from foreign 
 observers, and from our own officers is at fault. — there would have been 
 either no outbreak at all, or only one easily controlled and settled to the gen-
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD
 
 45^ THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 .... ;., Spain could, if she. felt snf^rirtinv strong 
 
 make war upon us to recover pire, 
 
 i to recognize our independence. " 
 
 •aizing the title of the United S e 
 
 ^c o£ force to suppress the re^ j 
 
 re use as the criterion of legality not absolute 
 
 e justice, established by tacit concurrence of the 
 
 •'• ' '-^:'' ' ' - ' - ' -~ipous name of Interna- 
 
 aggrandizement and to 
 
 tsations." Rebelling thus 
 
 r sovereign, they were 
 
 • ■ T^'-inciples asserted 
 
 i*y their actions 
 
 the war 
 
 ( of the 
 •«. Th** 
 
 tJOW to ., . - _,.^.iiS. 
 
 The -W unpleasant. The ef- 
 
 fji«t« of tl> V to avoid an armed conflict 
 
 ' ■• ' ort of by-product of the war 
 
 c as a surprise to most Ameri- 
 
 ignificant in numbers and re- 
 
 >MHjrcc attempt to oppose the military 
 
 pHver oi i 1' ? ^^Q^ seem within the range 
 
 "" ' ' '^ing might have been pre- 
 
 lirmness. Mr. Whitelaw 
 
 ...v autumn of ^^'"'<^ '- '"i-- 
 
 s then existing 
 
 not the knowlc 
 
 y at fault. What ^ 
 
 ^ which the nation { .e 
 
 .^3 preusety the policy sure to give us the 
 
 e now paying the penalty. If the oppo.site 
 
 i- oatset, — unless all tlie testimony from foreign 
 
 AT? officers is at fault.— there would have been 
 
 i-v one easily controlled and settled to the gen-
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 457 
 
 of reasonable probability. They had fought well against 
 the Spaniards, but they had shown no special military ca- 
 pacity. The general feeling of the army and navy toward 
 them was that of condescending tolerance. Their qualities 
 and characteristics were misjudged even by those who were 
 presumably best qualified to judge. The American military 
 leaders were without experience with Malays, but in one 
 respect their instincts were more nearly correct than the 
 reasoned theories of the civilians. They knew the value of 
 firmness and decisiveness in dealing with such people. But 
 all equally misjudged the resisting qualities of the Fili- 
 pinos and attached excessive importance to the efficacy of 
 fine phrases and fervid assurances of good intentions. Mr. 
 John Foreman, an Englishman who had lived in the Philip- 
 pines for many years, Informed the Peace Commission at 
 Paris that the Tagalogs were of an easy plastic nature and 
 could easily be induced to accept a new system of govern- 
 ment. The Visayans, he thought, would require more pres- 
 sure. General Merritt advised the Peace Commission that 
 the Filipinos would submit to American government without 
 serious opposition. The reverse of all this proved to be the 
 truth. The Tagalogs were not plastic; they refused to ac- 
 cept American sovereignty, and the Visayans required the 
 least pressure. 
 
 While the Americans were pursuing a policy of patience, 
 conciliation and abnegation, the Filipino leaders were busily 
 engaged in consolidating their power and extending the 
 scope of their influence. The government which they erected 
 on paper was designed for effect and for use in the future 
 rather than the immediate present, when military considerations 
 were all-important. Aguinaldo was at the zenith of his 
 power. Attempts at rebellion against his authority had 
 been ruthlessly suppressed. The Congress of Malolos was ready 
 to make him dictator. Manila, although governed by the Amer- 
 
 eral satisfaction of most of the civilized and semi-civilized inhabitants of the 
 islands." American and English Studies, I, p. 180.
 
 458 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 iscans, was so completely under his influence that on the days 
 named by him for celebrations and fiestas, all doors were closed 
 and business was suspended. His governors ruled in most of the 
 provinces. Even to the south the Visayans, after some hesitation, 
 had very generally accepted his authority. From enthusiastic in- 
 dividuals in Europe there came to Aguinaldo greetings and assur- 
 ances of the "sympathy of all liberal and noble nations." 
 
 It is idle to assert that the mass of the people of Luzon 
 and the central islands were not at that time in sympathy 
 with the attempt to drive the Americans from the country 
 and establish an independent government. How and by 
 what methods they had been brought to that way of think- 
 ing is not at present very important. During such social up- 
 heavals majorities are often less important than minorities. 
 In fact, revolutions are generally the work of able, active 
 and energetic minorities, and in the beginning the revolt 
 against American power in the Philippines was no exception 
 to this general rule. 
 
 The Filipino leaders were probably as patriotic and dis- 
 interested as are most revolutionary leaders, and among 
 them were about the same proportion of demagogues, self- 
 servers and ambitious upstarts as are connected with all 
 popular uprisings. Very little that is complimentary can 
 be said of the political judgment and good sense of the Fili- 
 pino leaders. They were shrewd, skilful politicians who 
 took advantage of the presence of the Americans in the 
 Philippines, but they misjudged the magnitude of the enter- 
 prise in which they engaged. They were inexperienced, and 
 generally ignorant and they overestimated the part they were 
 playing in the history of the world. They believed that 
 European nations were greatly agitated by the contest in the 
 Philippines and that the great Powers would certainly come 
 to their assistance. They thought that the eyes of the world 
 were upon them, and Aguinaldo and his group of impromptu 
 statesmen and generals for their brief day strutted about 
 the remote islands believing that they were actors upon a
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 459 
 
 great world stage. They were also possessed by the idea 
 that the majority of the people of the United States and 
 even of the soldiers of the army privately justified them in 
 their uprising. 
 
 And there was some justification for this illusion. Many 
 American newspapers, without much more sense of propor- 
 tion than that possessed by the Filipinos themselves, were 
 calling Aguinaldo the "savior of his country" and "the Wash- 
 ington of the Orient." Enterprising editors solicited his 
 views on the issues of the day for publication in America 
 and political managers informed him that his influence would 
 be of material value in the coming presidential election in 
 the United States. Having no proper standard by which to 
 measure the value of such expressions, Aguinaldo and his 
 advisers, hot unreasonably, attached undue importance to 
 them and fatuously threw the gauge of battle at the feet of 
 one of the great Powers of the world. 
 
 The sovereignty of the Philippines, having passed to the 
 United States, it was necessary that order should be restored. 
 The nation had no other reasonable choice. It was an un- 
 pleasant task, but it had to be performed. The Democratic 
 leaders, having aided in determining the immediate policy 
 of the country by voting for the ratification of the treaty with 
 Spain, were not in a position to oppose the legislative meas- 
 ures which were necessary in order to suppress the revolt. 
 The attempt to keep the immediate question of supporting 
 the war measures distinct from that of the general policy 
 of the future was only partially successful. As the campaign 
 in the Philippines advanced, the Anti-Imperialists became 
 daily more violent, illustrating by their conduct the extremes 
 to which men are sometimes driven by circumstances which, 
 to their great disgust, they are unable to control.* Some 
 of them worked themselves into that condition of mind where 
 
 2 Senator Hoar supported the administration during the war with Spain 
 and attacked his old friend Norton for advising Harvard students that it 
 was not their duty to enter it. For the correspondence, see Life of Charles 
 Eliot Norton, II, Appendix D, p. 457 (1913).
 
 460 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 facts lose their importance. They were determined to be- 
 lieve only the worst of their countrymen who were fighting 
 in distant lands. They were avid for evil reports. Having 
 by a process of reasoning from general principles reached 
 the conclusion that only evil could result from the policy 
 of the administration, they refused to allow their conclu- 
 sions to be disturbed by mere facts. They were in the con- 
 dition of mind of Lord Palmerston when he said, with refer- 
 ence to the Turks, that he "believed all that was said on 
 the one side and nothing upon the other, and no arguments 
 or facts could shake his convictions." 
 
 Carl Schurz wrote to Charles Francis Adams :^ *T have 
 carefully and laboriously studied what has happened in all 
 its details and bearings, and that study has profoundly con- 
 vinced me that the story of our attempted conquest of the 
 Philippines is a story of deceit, false pretenses, brutal treach- 
 ery to friends, unconstitutional assumption of power, be- 
 trayal of the fundamental principles of our democracy, 
 wanton sacrifice of our soldiers for an unjust cause, cruel 
 slaughter of innocent people and thus of horrible blood guilti- 
 ness without parallel in the history of republics ; and that such a 
 policy is bound to bring upon this republic danger, demor- 
 ahzation, dishonor and disaster."* 
 
 This picture of despair would not be complete without a 
 sample patch from the poets. 
 
 "Tempt not our weakness, our cupidity," 
 
 pleaded William Vaughn Moody in his Ode in Time of Hesita- 
 tion. 
 
 3 Bancroft's Life of Schurz, III, p. 446. See also Schurz's Speeches at the 
 University of Chicago on January 4, at Philadelphia on April 7, and at Cooper 
 Union, September 28, 1900. 
 
 * Charles Eliot Norton wrote to Frederick Harrison that the accession to 
 the presidency of Mr. Roosevelt might result in a change of policy, as he was 
 not, like McKinley, "possessed of a cruel spirit of Christian self-righteous- 
 ness." This war of ours "is even more criminal and in a profound sense 
 more disastrous than the war in South Africa." Life and Letters of Charles 
 Eliot Norton, 11,^ p. 312. 
 
 ^ "It is all a miserable affair, a kind of world's comi-tragedy with' a begin- 
 ning of fine humanitarian pretensions." Ibid., p. 281.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 461 
 
 "For, save we let the island men go free, 
 These baffled and dislaureled ghosts 
 Will curse us from the lamentable coasts 
 Where walk the frustrate dead. 
 . . . Oh ye who lead 
 Take heed ! 
 Blindness we may forgive, but baseness we will smite.'* 
 
 For the soldier fallen in the Philippines the poet was will- 
 ing to 
 
 "Let the great bells toll 
 Till the clashing air is dim. 
 Did we wrong his parted soul 
 We will make it up to him. 
 Toll ! Let him never guess 
 What work we set him to. 
 Laurel, laurel, yes; 
 He did what we bade him do." 
 
 To the soldier his meed of praise, but never a whispered 
 hint but that the 
 
 ". . . fight he fought was good; 
 Never a word that the blood on his sword was his coun- 
 try's own heart's blood."'* 
 
 Nevertheless the country went quietly and seriously about 
 the work of suppressing the revolt and restoring order in 
 the Philippines.* 
 
 It does not fall within the scope of this work to give a 
 detailed account of the military operations which resulted 
 
 5 Poems and Poetic Dramas, pp. 25, 29, Boston, 1912. 
 
 « Under date of November 29, 1898, John Hay wrote to Whitelaw Reid, 
 then a member of the Peace Commission, "There is a wild and frantic attack 
 now going on in the press against the whole Philippine transaction. Andrew 
 Carnegie really seems to be off his head. He writes me frantic letters, sign- 
 ing them 'Your Bitterest Opponent.' He threatens the President, not only 
 with the vengeance of the voters, but with practical punishment at the hands 
 of the mob. He says henceforth the entire labor vote of America will be cast 
 against us, and that he will see that it is done. He says the Administration 
 will fall in irretrievable ruin the moment it shoots down one insurgent Fili- 
 pino. He does not seem to reflect that the Government is in a somewhat 
 robust condition even after shooting down several American citizens in his 
 interest at Homestead. But all this confusion of tongues will go its way. 
 The country will applaud the resolution that has been reached, and you iJuill 
 return in the role of conquering heroes with your 'brows bound wiih oak."* 
 Thayer's Life of John Hay, II, p. 198.
 
 462 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 in the destruction of Aguinaldo's army and the suppression 
 of the insurrection. A brief reference to the general course 
 of events must suffice. 
 
 At the time of the outbreak, General E. S. Otis had at 
 Manila about fourteen thousand men ready for active service. 
 General Aguinaldo had between twenty and thirty thousand 
 fairly well armed men and an indefinite number of irregulars, 
 armed with bolos and other primitive weapons. The terms 
 of enlistment of the state volunteers would expire when the 
 treaty of peace was ratified and they would then become 
 legally entitled to their discharges.'^ The volunteers had not 
 enlisted to fight insurgents, but under the circumstances it 
 was impossible to send them home, and they were simply 
 held until new regiments could be organized and sent to the 
 islands. The soldiers generally submitted gracefully to what 
 they regarded as a patriotic duty.^ 
 
 After the fighting on February 5, 1899, the Americans 
 waited as patiently as possible for reinforcements to arrive. 
 It was necessary to hold the waterworks, upon which the 
 city was dependent, and as its location was far in advance 
 of the line and exposed to flank attacks, measures were taken 
 to drive the Filipinos from the vicinity of Pasig. This was 
 accomplished by a provisional brigade under the command 
 of Brigadier-General Lloyd Wheaton. There was also more 
 or less constant irregular fighting along the entire line.^ On 
 February 22, the insurgents made a determined attempt to 
 burn the city of Manila. In this they came very near being 
 successful, as a number of them succeeded in entering the 
 city and burning a large part of the Tondo district.^" 
 
 7 The treaty was ratified April 11. 1899. 
 
 8 President McKinley in his message to Congress December 5, said : "I 
 recommend that Congress provide a special medal of honor for the volun- 
 teers, regulars, sailors, and marines who voluntarily remained in the service 
 after their terms of enlistment had expired." See also Alger's The Spanish- 
 American War, pp. 374-5. 
 
 8 General Frederick Funston in his interesting Memoirs of Two Wars 
 gives a graphic account of events on the line during this period. 
 
 ^^Rept. War Dept., 1899, I, Part 5, 6-20. Testimony of Gen. Hughes. 
 Senate Doc. 331, pp. 506, 507. Luna's Report, Tel. Corp. Aguinaldo, pp. 46, 47, 
 is absurdly inaccurate.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 463 
 
 Aguinaldo's army under General Luna was concentrating for 
 the protection of his capital at Malolos. Early in March Con- 
 gress authorized the enlistment of thirty new regiments of Na- 
 tional Volunteers, to be organized without reference to states, 
 and officered by the president of the United States. While they 
 were organizing, regiments of regulars were rushed to Manila, 
 and by the latter part of March the Eighth Army Corps, under 
 Major-General E. S. Otis, twenty-four thousand strong, was 
 ready to take the offensive. The second division, under Major- 
 General Arthur Mac Arthur, was north of a line which extended 
 from a point on the bay near Caloocan, eastward from La Loma 
 Church to the Deposito and the waterworks, and thence to the 
 Pasig River at San Pedro Macati. The First Division, under 
 Major-General H. W. Lawton, held the country south of the 
 Pasig River. 
 
 On March 25 Mac Arthur's division moved northward for the 
 capture of Malolos. The brigades of Brigadier-General Irving 
 Hale and Brigadier-General Harrison G. Otis were in advance, 
 with that of General Wheaton in the rear as a support. The 
 line of advance covered about eight miles. The country was 
 low and marshy, intersected by numerous tidal estuaries. From 
 the shore of Manila Bay the land here rises gradually toward the 
 east. Beyond Caloocan the foothills fall away and a wide and 
 fertile valley extends northward through which flow numerous 
 sluggish and troublesome rivers. Beyond the swamps the coun- 
 try was densely populated and highly cultivated. The villages 
 which nestled among the bamboo thickets and banana planta- 
 tions housed an astonishing number of people. The streams 
 were lined with dense clumps of bamboo trees, which made per- 
 fect cover for troops acting on the defensive. Much of the 
 country was devoted to the cultivation of rice, and during the 
 wet season it was impossible for troops to pass over it. A rice 
 field is laid out like a checker-board, the lines being drawn by 
 narrow embankments of earth from two to three feet in height. 
 In the planting and growing season the intervening spaces are 
 covered with water, in which the plowing is done and the rice
 
 464 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 is cultivated. During the dry season the ground bakes hard, 
 and the embankments make very good defensive works. 
 
 The roads which ran through the country were mostly of a 
 primitive character and soon became impossible for the passage 
 of troops. The embankment of the railroad which ran north 
 from Manila to Dagupan was used as a highway by both Ameri- 
 can and Filipino troops. The latter took full advantage of the 
 natural defenses of the country. During most of the march of 
 twenty miles from Manila to Malolos the army moved in line 
 of battle. Although there was constant fighting there were no 
 general engagements of massed troops. Crossing a river was 
 often a serious undertaking, but in no instance were the Fili- 
 pinos able to more than delay the steady advance of the Ameri- 
 can troops. The Filipinos, who were armed with Mausers, were 
 able to do effective execution while out of range of the Spring- 
 field rifles with which the American volunteer regiments had been 
 supplied by a generous and wealthy country. After seven days 
 of hard marching and almost continuous fighting the Americans 
 entered Aguinaldo's capital city.** 
 
 In possession of Malolos, Mac Arthur rested quietly for sev- 
 eral weeks. The Filipino lines had been pushed back a few 
 miles, but otherwise conditions were not materially changed. 
 The enemy was as active as ever. When the Americans ad- 
 vanced, they retreated; when the Americans retired, they ad- 
 vanced. 
 
 From Malolos north the next important place was Calumpit, 
 which Buencamino had marked for "the sepulture of the Ameri- 
 cans." In the possession of trained troops the place would have 
 been very difficult to capture. The Filipinos had taken every 
 advantage of the natural features of the locality and defended 
 it with courage. The town lay in a rectangle formed by the 
 railroad, the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, the Calumpit and 
 Bagbag Rivers, which were supposed to be unfordable. The 
 railroad embankment had been gashed with trenches cut across 
 
 11 Col. Harry C. Egbert, in command of the 22nd Infantry, was killed near 
 Malinta.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 465 
 
 and thus converted into formidable defensive works. The Fili- 
 pinos had twelve thousand well-armed troops and several pieces 
 of good modern artillery. Before reaching Calumpit General 
 Hale's brigade fought a severe battle at Quingua, where Colonel 
 Stotsenberg of the Nebraska regiment was killed. After severe 
 fighting and under a heavy fire the troops finally crossed the 
 Calumpit River. Wheaton's brigade advanced along the rail- 
 road embankment. A span of the bridge had been destroyed by 
 the Filipinos, and a few officers and men gallantly swam the 
 river just as Hale's men, who had found a ford, approached and 
 assisted in driving the Filipinos out of the entrenchments. The 
 Americans were now in possession of Calumpit, but the Filipinos 
 were still in force on the north bank of the broad and deep Rio 
 Grande, where they had constructed elaborate field fortifications. 
 Near the end of the railroad bridge they had three pieces of artil- 
 lery and one rapid-fire gun. Under a heavy fire Privates White 
 and Trembley of the Kansas regiment swam the river and fas- 
 tened a rope to a stake on the Filipino entrenchments, by means 
 of which rafts loaded with troops were pulled across. They 
 were soon in possession of the Filipino works.^^ 
 
 On May 4 the northward movement was continued over a 
 country which was more difficult than any that had previously 
 been encountered. "It is," wrote a correspondent, "a country 
 which only an adventurous huntsman would venture over in 
 search of the wildest fowl that inhabited its dark fens — a land 
 of moors and tarns difficult to cross in most peaceful times — a 
 horrible place for an army with artillery, baggage and accoutre- 
 ments and with an entrenched enemy to dispute the passage 
 through every river and swamp. Into this country of desolate 
 moors and dangerous bogs the American army now plunged." 
 
 The enemy was resourceful and active. At one place the road 
 
 *2Gen, Fvmston's Memories of Two Wars, pp. 281, 282, says: "I had 
 initiated this enterprise and felt tnat I must see it through. I could not but 
 consider the outcome as doubtful and knew mighty well that if I should send 
 a small force across and sacrifice it I would be damned in my home state all 
 the rest of my life and held up to scorn by all the corner-grocery tacticians 
 in the country." So the colonel of the regiment, with eight men, crossed on 
 the first raft
 
 466 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 as it approached a stone bridge was found to be honeycombed 
 with conical pits, in the bottoms of which sharp bamboo stakes 
 were stuck, the whole covered with bamboo nets over which 
 earth had been carefully spread. At one point where the Fili- 
 pinos made a stand, the troops advanced through swamps waist- 
 deep, across mud-bottomed esteros, in which they often sank to 
 their waists, under a galling fire, until they had thus crossed 
 eleven such streams. 
 
 On the night of May 4 General Luna abandoned San Fer- 
 nando Pampanga, after burning much of the town,^' and on the 
 following day it was occupied by the Americans. On May 16 
 General Funston, who had been promoted, relieved General 
 Wheaton in command of the First Brigade. The advance north 
 now ceased for a time, but there was almost constant fighting 
 in the neighborhood of San Fernando. On July 16 the Fili- 
 pinos in force made a determined attack on the place, but, as 
 usual, were driven off with heavy loss. 
 
 While these operations were going on in the north. General 
 Hall, who had remained in command of the troops near Manila, 
 captured the mountain town of Antipolo and drove the Filipinos 
 from the Morong Peninsula. During the early part of April 
 General W. H. Lawton led an expedition up the Pasig River 
 and about the shores of the Laguna de Bay, with no results other 
 than the acquisition of a certain amount of geographical infor- 
 mation.^* 
 
 While General MacArthur was preparing to advance on Ca- 
 lumpit, his flank and line of communication were seriously 
 threatened by the Filipinos operating from the east. General 
 Lawton was now recalled to Manila and placed in charge of 
 an expedition which was to proceed north along the base of the 
 mountains east of Mac Arthur's position, and thus support him 
 by striking the extreme right of the Filipinos and preventing the 
 concentration of their forces. It was anticipated that these move- 
 
 ^3 Luna generally burned the towns before retreating, injuring only his 
 own people. 
 
 14 Lawton's Report, Kept. War Dept, 1899, I, Part 5, pp. 20-74.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 467 
 
 ments would drive the insurgents out of the Tagalog provinces 
 and into the north country, where the people were supposed to 
 be unfriendly to them. Lawton started on April 22, and after 
 a march through very difficult country, during which he had a 
 number of spirited engagements, reached Baluiag, where he was 
 detained for several days while MacArthur was trying to locate 
 the elusive enemy. On May 14 Lawton advanced and captured 
 San Maguil de Mayuma. From there he moved rapidly on to 
 San Isidro, of which he took possession on May 17. Aguinaldo, 
 who, with what was left of his government, had been at 
 San Isidro, now retired to Cabanatuan, a few miles to the north- 
 east. Soon thereafter the most of Lawton's troops were sent to 
 join MacArthur at Calumpit, and he returned to Manila. 
 
 General Otis had not deemed it necessary to hold possession 
 of the country between Manila and Cavite, and on the with- 
 drawal of the American troops it had been promptly reoccu- 
 pied by the Filipinos. By June they had become very demon- 
 strative, and it was thought necessary to throw them back 
 again. They had constructed strong works in front of San Pe- 
 dro Macati and at Parafiaque, on the bay south of Manila. With 
 four thousand men General Lawton, after a severe preliminary 
 fight on the Bacour road, found the Filipinos strongly entrenched 
 at the Zapote River, where during the insurrection of 1896 they 
 had defeated the Spaniards. Here on June 13 Lawton fought 
 one of the severest engagements of the war, driving the Fili- 
 pinos out and thus clearing the way from Manila to Cavite." 
 
 The southern islands were also gradually brought under con- 
 trol. The Visayans, except in the island of Panay, never offered 
 any very serious organized resistance. Aguinaldo's agents were 
 active and secured their formal adherence to the Philippine Re- 
 public, but the insurrection as a military proposition was never 
 so formidable in the south central islands as in Luzon. Iloilo 
 was taken on February 11, after it had been set on fire by the 
 Filipinos." 
 
 " Kept. War. Dept., 1900, T. Part 5, pp. 273-385. 
 
 ^° Claims for damages caused by fire were subsequently made to the United
 
 468 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The mixed Filipino population which occupied the northern 
 shores of the great Moro island of Mindanao cast their lot with 
 the Tagalogs. At Zamboanga the Moro, Tagalog and Visayan 
 factions struggled with one another for control. In the spring of 
 1899 the insurgents at Zamboanga seized several Spanish gun- 
 boats and thus obtained possession of a number of quick-firing 
 guns, rifles and much ammunition. In November the faction 
 which then had the upper hand delivered Zamboanga to one of 
 the American naval officers. 
 
 Early in the year 1900 American troops were sent to Cotta- 
 batu, Basilan and Davao. At Cottabatu the Moros rose against 
 the Filipino agents, established a government of their own and 
 with conscious merit notified the Americans that they had de- 
 stroyed their tormentors and hoped for their reward in the favor 
 and protection of the United States. 
 
 Evidently the Spaniards who were stationed in the southern 
 islands did not expect to be immediately relieved by American 
 troops, as soon after the treaty of peace was ratified they 
 delivered the town of Siassi to the Sultan of Sulu, and were pre- 
 paring to deliver Jolo to the same eager potentate, when, in May, 
 1899, General Otis, much to the disgust of the sultan, sent a 
 regiment of infantry to the Moro country. The sultan, who 
 had recently returned from a journey to Mecca and was resid- 
 ing at Siassi, did not respond with enthusiasm to an invitation 
 to call on the American commander at Jolo. Although friendly 
 relations were finally established, the situation throughout the 
 entire southern archipelago was dangerous and unsatisfactory. 
 Early in July General Bates was directed to establish some kind 
 of a working agreement with the sultan. He found this quasi 
 monarch under the delusion that after the departure of the Span- 
 iards he had become a real sovereign. Spanish sovereignty over 
 the Sulu Archipelago had been conceded in numerous treaties to 
 which European states were parties, and in 1878 the sultan, 
 in consideration of certain money payments, had acknowledged 
 
 States government by foreign residents of Iloilo, but were disallowed. See 
 For. Rel, 1903, pp. 479-483.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 469 
 
 that fact and agreed to become a loyal Spanish subject. As the 
 United States had succeeded to the rights of Spain, her sover- 
 eignty over the country could not be questioned. But Spain had 
 granted certain special privileges to the sultan which left him 
 with some semblance of sovereign rights, and the American gov- 
 ernment thought it advisable to recognize and continue these 
 concessions. Spain had never pursued a definite policy with 
 regard to the sultan, his dominion, or the trade of the Archi- 
 pelago, and great uncertainty existed as to the extent and nature 
 of the obligations which she had assumed. 
 
 General Bates was instructed to arrange to continue the money 
 payments to the sultan according to the terms of his agreements 
 with Spain, to promise not to interfere with the religion or the 
 social or domestic customs of the people, to respect the rights 
 and dignities of the sultan and his advisers, to protect the sul- 
 tan and his people from interference by foreign nations, and to 
 agree that the United States would not interfere in the internal 
 economy and political administration of the country unless in 
 response to requests for assistance and guidance. But the United 
 States must exercise absolute control over the places which it 
 actually occupied. The sultan was, among other things, re- 
 quired to acknowledge the sovereignty of the United States, to 
 fly the American flag, to permit the United States to occupy and 
 control such places on the island as it deemed advisable, to sup- 
 press piracy and crime, and to prevent the purchase of rifles by 
 his people. 
 
 The sultan, who was also sultan of North Borneo and in re- 
 ceipt of a substantial honorarium from the North Borneo Trad- 
 ing Company, had rather lofty ideas of his earning capacities.*' 
 But an agreement was finally signed and transmitted to Wash- 
 ington, where it was approved, with the reservation that the 
 provision that any slave should have the right to purchase his 
 
 i^In 1911 the sultan, after a visit to Singapore, applied to the authorities 
 at Manila for an increase of his annual payment, on the ground of the "gen- 
 eral increase of the cost of living." He was inclined to attribute the increase 
 to the influence of the American trusts.
 
 470 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 freedom, should not be deemed to authorize the existence of 
 slavery in the Sulu Archipelago/® 
 
 A unique situation developed in the great island of Negros, 
 which lies in the central and Visayan part of the Archipelago. 
 Negros was the home of the wealthy sugar planters. About the 
 time that the Peace Protocol was signed at Washington the peo- 
 ,ple of Negros rose against the Spanish government. It seems to 
 have been an independent movement, having no connection with 
 the Tagalog organization, of which Aguinaldo was the head. 
 Some sort of an arrangement was made with the Spaniards, 
 under which they assumed to relinquish their authority to the 
 natives, who in return stipulated to protect the Spanish civil and 
 military officers from harm. The natives then proceeded to es- 
 tablish an independent government, which they called the Repub- 
 lic of Negros. A full complement of officers was elected, and the, 
 new government took charge of affairs. But faction, the bane 
 of every native government, soon wrought its downfall. A com- 
 mittee representing the intelligent people of the island waited 
 upon Captain Glass of the cruiser Charleston and requested that 
 he should land marines and raise the American flag. This he 
 refused to do, because under the terms of the Peace Protocol hos- 
 tilities had been suspended and the island was still Spanish ter- 
 ritory. The troubles of the infantile republic continued to in- 
 crease, and soon after the transfer of sovereignty to the United 
 States a delegation journeyed to Manila and requested the mili- 
 tary governor to take charge of the island in the name of the 
 United States. Colonel James F. Smith was thereupon appointed 
 military governor of Negros, with instructions to assist the 
 people in forming a government for the administration of the 
 
 18 President McKinley in his message of Dec, 5, 1899, said : "The agree- 
 ment by Gen. Bates was made subject to confirmation by the President and 
 to future modifications by the consent of the parties in interest I have con- 
 firmed said agreement, subject to the action of the Congress, and with the 
 reservation which I have directed shall be communicated to the Sul'tan of 
 Jolo, that this agreement is not to be deemed in any way to authorize or give 
 the consent of the United States to the existence of slavery in the Sulu 
 Archipelago." Messages and Papers of the Presidents, X, p, 172. 
 
 This treaty was of no advantage to the United States and was later 
 abrogated.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 471 
 
 internal affairs of the island. They evidently still hoped to re- 
 main separated from the rest of the Archipelago. Soon after 
 Colonel Smith arrived in Negros a convention of elected dele- 
 gates met at Bacolod and after some two months' labor prepared 
 a constitution for the island and requested that it be submitted 
 to the president of the United States for approval. This con- 
 stitution was an elaborate affair, but as the form and phraseology 
 was that of an American constitution it is reasonable to assume 
 that it was largely the work of Americans. 
 
 The government which the Filipinos had organized for them- 
 selves was a failure, and, pending the action of the president on 
 the new constitution,^^ General Otis, on July 22, 1899, directed 
 that a military government should be established in Negros which 
 would give the people as large a measure of control of their local 
 affairs as was practicable. As outlined in the order, there was 
 to be a military governor appointed by the military governor of 
 the Philippines, a civil governor and an advisory council. The 
 military governor should appoint secretaries of the treasury, 
 interior, agriculture, public instruction, an auditor and an attor- 
 ney-general, all with carefully defined powers. The civil gov- 
 ernor should be elected by the people, should preside over the 
 advisory council and perform generally the duties of a civil 
 subordinate of the military governor. The advisory council 
 should consist of eight members elected by the people within 
 defined territorial districts. In order to be qualified to vote at 
 any election a person was required to be a resident of Negros, 
 a male citizen over twenty-one years of age, able to speak, read 
 or write imderstandingly the English, Spanish or Visayan lan- 
 guage, or be the owner of real estate worth five hundred dollars 
 or pay a rental on real property of the value of one thousand 
 dollars. 
 
 The advisory council was given the ordinary powers of a local 
 legislature and was authorized specifically to devise and adopt a 
 uniform system of taxation which would result in distributing 
 the burderls of government as nearly equal as possible among the 
 
 ^* No action was ever taken.
 
 472 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 people. Municipal governments, with the usual powers of such 
 bodies, were to be organized. The judges were to be appointed 
 by the military governor, and their modes of procedure, terms 
 of office and compensation were to be fixed by the advisory coun- 
 cil, with the approval of the military governor. Free public 
 schools, in which the English language should be taught, were 
 required to be established in the populous districts of the island. 
 
 The local government thus instituted under military supervi- 
 sion, proved quite successful and became, to some extent, a model 
 upon which the provincial governments throughout the islands 
 were subsequently organized. President McKinley commented 
 upon it in his message of December 5, 1900, and in the instruc- 
 tions to the Philippine Commission he directed that special atten- 
 tion should be given to the government then existing in the island 
 of Negros, "which has been instituted with the approval of the 
 people of that island."^" 
 
 For a time all went well, but the trouble at Iloilo, near by, made 
 the people uneasy, and during December certain agents of Agui- 
 naldo's government arrived in Negros with what purported to 
 be copies of a letter from Doctor Blumentritt, the Austrian eth- 
 nologist, and "information" that in January absolute indepen- 
 dence would be granted by Congress.^^ Negros, it was said, 
 would then be properly punished for her subserviency to the 
 Americans. The people were for a short time shaken from their 
 
 20 In speaking of the military government of the island of Negros, Presi- 
 dent McKinley said, "A notable beginning has been made in the establishment 
 of a government in Negros which is deserving of special consideration. This 
 was the first island to accept American sovereignty. Its people unreservedly 
 proclaimed allegience to the United States and adopted a constitution looking 
 to the establishment of a popular government. It was impossible to guar- 
 antee to the people of Negros that the constitution so adopted should be the 
 ultirnate form of government. . . . The government actually set up by 
 the inhabitants of Negros evidently proved unsatisfactory to the natives 
 themselves. A new system was put into force by order of the Major General 
 commanding the Department" Messages and Papers of the Presidents, X, 
 p. 170. 
 
 The full text of the proposed constitution for the island of Negros is 
 printed in the Report of the Schurman Commission, I, p. 202. General 
 Smith's report on the Negros Government is found in War Dept. Kept., 1900, 
 I, Part 10, Appendix T T. 
 
 21 Doctor Blumentritt endeared himself to the Filipinos by his long-range 
 labors on their behalf. On his death, in 1914, the Assembly published a 
 volume in honor of his memory.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 473 
 
 moorings, but the uprising which resulted was suppressed with- 
 out great difficulty. 
 
 After the capture of Malolos it was believed that the Fili- 
 pinos must appreciate the fact that future military success on 
 an effective scale was for them impossible, and that the more rea- 
 sonable of the leaders could be induced to listen to the repre- 
 sentations of the American government. The Schurman Com- 
 mission arrived in Manila on March 4, 1899. It had sailed from 
 the United States before the beginning of hostilities, with instruc- 
 tions to study the general situation and by conciliatory measures 
 to assist the military authorities in restoring order preparatory 
 to the introduction of civil government.^^ Arriving at Manila 
 after war had commenced, the commissioners soon found them- 
 selves transformed into a sort of peace commission and en- 
 gaged in negotiations with the emissaries of an active military 
 force. They earnestly endeavored to gain the confidence of the 
 people and convince them of the humane and beneficent purpose 
 of the United States. In this they were to some extent suc- 
 cessful, although subsequent events over which they had no con- 
 trol rendered their work ineffective. According to Doctor Schur- 
 man,^^ "Having satisfied them that American sovereignty was 
 only another name for the liberty of the Filipinos, we set in 
 motion, through their agency, currents of good-will, amity and 
 reconciliation, which overflowed the domains of the Philippine 
 Republic, gradually spread throughout Luzon and the Visayas, 
 and reached even the well-guarded camps of the insurgents in 
 arms." 
 
 They did indeed come very near bringing the insurrection to 
 a close. After consulting with leading Filipinos in Manila and 
 carefully studying the various proclamations and documents in 
 which the natives had expressed their desires and aspirations, a 
 proclamation was prepared, printed in English, Spanish and 
 Tagalog, and circulated very extensively throughout the island. 
 
 22 Instructions of the President, Rept. (Schurman) Phil. Com. (1900), I, 
 p. 184. 
 
 '^^ Philippine Affairs, A Retrospect, etc. (1902), p. 6.
 
 474 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 This was the first formal authorized statement to the public of 
 the general principles upon which America proposed to govern 
 the country.^* It was objected to as dealing in generalities which 
 might, after the Spanish custom, be ignored after the insurgents 
 had laid down their arms. 
 
 But the proclamation had a very decided effect upon Filipino 
 opinion. The leading people in Manila were satisfied with it and 
 at once commenced active work designed to put an end to the 
 war. Probably at their instigation, Colonel Arguellos came from 
 Aguinaldo asking for a suspension of hostilities in order that 
 the scattered Filipino Congress could be collected to consider 
 conditions of peace. This was denied by General Otis. Argu- 
 ellos' report of the conference with the American commissioners 
 was so satisfactory that he, with another officer, was sent back 
 to Manila with a letter signed by Mabini asking for a suspension 
 of hostilities and for an armistice of three weeks. With these 
 parties the commission discussed the situation with such effect 
 that Arguellos expressed himself as satisfied and willing to ac- 
 cept the sovereignty of the United States. In reply to his request 
 for the details of a plan of government which would be adopted, 
 the commission outlined what they would recommend to the 
 president, and later Secretary Hay's reply was submitted to 
 them.*" The conference accomplished nothing. The Filipinos 
 demanded independence in some form, and that, of course, could 
 not be conceded by the commission, or even by the president. 
 They were informed that the matter of the sovereignty of the 
 
 ^^'Rept. (Schurman) Phil. Com., 1900, I, p. 3. For a reply prepared by 
 Mabini, see Harper's History, p. 158, and Sen. Hoar's speech in the Senate on 
 April 17, 1900. 
 
 25 On May 5, 1899, Secretary Hay telegraphed, "You are authorized to pro- 
 pose that under the military power of the President, pending action of Con- 
 gress, government of the Philippines shall consist of a Governor-General 
 appointed by the President ; Cabinet appointed by the Govenor-General ; a 
 general advisory council elected by the people; the qualifications of electors 
 to be carefully considered and determined ; and the Governor-General to 
 have absolute veto; Judiciary strong and independent; principal judges 
 appointed by the President. The Cabinet and judges to be chosen from 
 natives or Americans, or both, having regard to fitness. The President ear- 
 nestly desires the cessation of bloodshed, and that the people of the Philip- 
 pines at an early date shall have the largest measure of self-government con- 
 sistent with peace and good order."
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 475 
 
 United States could not be discussed, and that, "after a careful 
 consideration and study, it was the opinion of the Commission 
 that the Philippine people were not capable of independent self- 
 government, and that independence for which some of them said 
 they were fighting was, in the opinion of the Commission, an 
 ideal at present impossible, not only because of their unfitness 
 for it, but because of their inability to preserve it among the 
 nations even if it were granted."^* 
 
 Colonel Arguellos, upon his return, seems to have expressed 
 his satisfaction with the American attitude a trifle too enthusi- 
 astically, and for his treasonable sentiments and advice was 
 expelled from the army and sentenced to twelve years' impris- 
 onment.^'^ Nevertheless, there were among Aguinaldo's advisers 
 a few sane men who agreed with the discredited emissary. We 
 may fairly assume that such men as Arellano and Torres re- 
 garded the Philippine Republic as a temporary expedient for 
 bridging a period which would be followed by some form of 
 government under American control. As early as June, 1898, 
 Arellano, then acting as secretary for foreign affairs, had out- 
 lined a plan for cooperation with the Americans and had ad- 
 vised a correspondent to "avoid all doing and undoing, and when 
 America has established a stable government it will be time 
 enough to make laws." 
 
 In October of the same year Arellano and Pardo de Tavera 
 had urged that the United States be asked to acknowledge the 
 independence of the islands under a protectorate, and the plan 
 had been approved by Aguinaldo and his cabinet. But a radi- 
 cal leader named Sandico is said to have induced Aguinaldo to 
 abandon this plan by assuring him that the Japanese govern- 
 ment had agreed to aid the Filipinos in their struggle for abso- 
 lute independence. Nothing more clearly shows the incapacity 
 of the Filipino leaders for large affairs than their childish belief 
 that foreign powers would involve themselves in war with the 
 
 *»Rept. Phil. Com., 1900, I, p. 7. For Secretary Hay's letter of May S, 
 see Ibid., p. 9. 
 
 *^ No attempt was made to execute the sentence.
 
 476 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 United States on behalf of a people in whom they had not the 
 remotest financial or political interest.^^ 
 
 Aguinaldo was also encouraged by letters from Agoncillo from 
 Washington assuring him that the majority of the American 
 people favored the independence of the Filipinos. 
 
 Arellano and Pardo de Tavera withdrew from the cabi- 
 net, and the radicals, under the lead of Mabini were left in con- 
 trol. If we are to believe Buencamino, after the capture of Ma- 
 lolos in April, 1899, the majority of the congress began to see the 
 advantages of Arellano's plan for a protectorate. But so long 
 as Mabini controlled the policy of the government there was no 
 possibility of the acceptance of American sovereignty. This 
 remarkable young man, of fragile and paralytic frame, but of 
 a keen, subtle and logical intellect, was a fierce, irreconcilable 
 hater of the American government. With him no compromise 
 was possible.^^ But the proclamation issued by the commission, 
 following the military successes of MacArthur and Lawton, so 
 encouraged the conservatives that they took the aggressive. 
 Early in May whatever was available of the congress was as- 
 sembled at San Isidro, and voted for ending the war and for 
 peace on the basis of the announcement which had been made by 
 
 28 On November 15, 1899, Aguinaldo, or probably Mabini over Aguinaldo's 
 signature, wrote to one of the chiefs that "The quadruple alliance between 
 France, Russia, Germany and Spain is a fact. Before December we will 
 know our fate. Throughout Europe there is sympathy for our cause. Amer- 
 ican Democrats are already in our favor." Rept. War Dept., 1901. 
 
 On May 16, 1899, Sandico (the officer who in February had issued the 
 order to the faithful in Manila to rise, slay and spare no one of the white 
 blood) issued an appeal in which he said, "The latest Eastern question may 
 bring about an international conflict which would oblige America to abandon 
 her policy with regard to the Philippines. The justice of our cause, together 
 with the circumstance that you have aided America to banish and destroy the 
 Spanish Government in these islands, has won the sympathy of the press of 
 Europe and Japan, in fact that of all nations. . . . We should exhaust 
 all the resources of diplomacy, put in play before foreign countries every 
 inducement which we can offer with the aid of the tribune and the press, now 
 giving up coaling stations, and now offering concessions to commerce and 
 concessions to build railroads and to mine." Ihid., p. 361. 
 
 Flores, the Secretary of War, called it "this palpitating international 
 question." 
 
 29 For a study of Mabini's life and character, see an article by Jorge 
 Bocobo, an intelligent young Filipino, educated in the United States, in tile 
 magazine, The Filipino People, for August, 1913.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 477 
 
 the Schurman Commission.'** Mabini now retired, and his place 
 was taken by Pedro Patemo, with Felipe Buencamino for his 
 leading supporter. The first act of the new cabinet was to 
 authorize Buencamino, Maximo Paterno, Torres, Pablo Ocampo, 
 Arsenio Hererra, Jose Albert and two military officers to proceed 
 to Manila and negotiate a peace.'^ 
 
 The American commissioners thus had good reasons to re- 
 joice over the apparent success of their policy. The Philippine 
 Republic itself had been won over. The congress had voted for 
 peace, and Aguinaldo had acquiesced. The irreconcilable Mabini 
 was out and a cabinet in sympathy with the new policy was in 
 power. But the unfortunate land was not to be thus easily paci- 
 fied. General Luna and other military leaders succeeded in re- 
 versing the policy which Aguinaldo's government had adopted. 
 "In its patriotic effort to bring about peace," says Doctor Schur- 
 man, "the Philippine Republic itself suffered collapse. Done 
 to death by its own false friends, I shall never forget that its 
 last expiring voice was for peace and reconciliation on the basis 
 of the proclamation issued by our Commission. But what the 
 congress, cabinet and president of the Philippine Republic so 
 unanimously resolved, Luna, the general commanding their army, 
 as completely frustrated. He arrested the delegates who had 
 been so solemnly authorized by congress, cabinet and president 
 to proceed to Manila, accused them of treason and sentenced 
 some to imprisonment and others to death."^^ 
 
 Luna and the military party thus made it impossible for the 
 commissioners who had been appointed to proceed to Manila, 
 
 80 By this time the congress had become badly demoralized. But sixteen 
 members were present, and fifteen voted for the new peace policy. 
 
 81 Later Buencamino wrote to Gen. MacArthur, "Don Felipe Buencamino 
 and Don Pedro Paterno, without any previous agreement, saw a door 
 through which they could enter into friendly and harmonious relations with 
 the Americans. All the members of the congress adopted the policy with the 
 exception of o few partisans of Mabini, who was at that time president of 
 the cabinet. Hence, it is that at the first meeting of congress in San Isidro 
 Nueva Ecija, the first day of May, 1899, it was resolved to change the war 
 policy for one of peace with the United States." Kept. War Dept., 1901, 
 Part 2, p. 118. 
 
 82 Philippine Affairs, p. 13. See testimony of Dr. Jose Albert before the 
 Phil. Com., May 30, 1899. Kept. Schurman Com. (1890), II, pp. 127-129.
 
 478 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 but shortly thereafter Aguinaldo named other representatives,'* 
 who met the American commissioners on May 22, 1899, and 
 again urged an armistice. Seiior Barretto claimed that the con- 
 gress which had voted to end the war had been so reduced in 
 numbers that it was not really representative of the people, and 
 that some sort of a constituent assembly ought to be called to con- 
 sider a matter of such grave importance to the country. He 
 frankly stated that the leaders feared to take the responsibility 
 of making peace. He expressed himself as satisfied with the 
 plan outlined for a provisional government and with the state- 
 ment contained in the telegram from Secretary Hay of May 4, 
 but said that the Filipinos w^ere not willing to trust the American 
 Congress with the power of devising a permanent form of gov- 
 ernment at some time in the future. As that was necessary, the 
 conference resulted in nothing but an interesting exchange of 
 views. 
 
 The conservative leaders now abandoned Aguinaldo and found 
 their way to Manila, where the best of them thereafter aided the 
 Americans in the work of establishing order throughout the coun- 
 try. The congress was heard of no more. General Luna him- 
 self was killed by Aguinaldo's guards in front of the convent at 
 Cabanatuan,^* and Aguinaldo took the active command of what 
 
 S3 General Gregario del Pilar, Gracio Gonzago and Alberto Barretto. 
 
 3*Mabini's account of the death of Luna (published after Mabini's death) 
 is printed in El Commercio for July 23, 1902, and in part in Le Roy, II, 
 p. 94, note, from which the following extracts are taken : 
 
 "Aguinaldo telegraphed to Luna asking him to come to see him in Caba- 
 natuan to confer with him ; but when Luna arrived in the appointed place, 
 he did not find Aguinaldo in his residence, and was traitorously assassinated 
 by the soldiers on guard there ... I can not believe even now that Luna 
 was working for the overthrow of Seiior Aguinaldo from the elevated posi- 
 tion which he occupied; but it is certain that he aspired to be chief of the 
 Cabinet in place of Sefior Paterno, with whom he was not in agreement 
 because the autonomous program of the latter was an infraction of the 
 fundamental law of the State and as such constituted a punishable offense. 
 . . . When ... he received the telegram from Sefior Aguinaldo sum- 
 moning him to Cabanatuan, Luna may perhaps have thought that the object 
 of the conference would be the new Cabinet : he did not expect that they were 
 planning to assassinate him - •• Senor Aguinaldo, in order to get rid of 
 Luna, rnade use of the same soldiers whom Luna had punished for infractions 
 of discipline; Seiior Aguinaldo, then, slew discipline, destroying his own 
 army, . , . The fall of Luna, coming back with full force upon the head 
 of Aguinaldo, caused in turn his own moral death, a thousand times more 
 bitter than physical death."
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 479 
 
 remained of the army. Henceforth selfish ambition, ignorance 
 and folly controlled events. All semblance of law and justice 
 disappeared. A military despotism took the place of the Phil- 
 ippine Republic, which "never again pretended to live." Doctor 
 Schurman well says, "Such an unholy carnival of militarism, 
 despotism, brigandage, cruelty and wholesale intimidation of 
 peaceful and unoffending inhabitants as the disorganized insur- 
 gent bands have since enacted in different parts of the Philippine 
 Islands is without parallel in Occidental history and finds a par- 
 allel in Asia alone."^" 
 
 All efforts at conciliation having thus failed, it was necessary 
 to plan another campaign in the North. During the rainy season, 
 which ordinarily extends well into the month of September, mili- 
 tary operations in that section had been suspended. The new 
 volunteer regiments began to arrive in October, 1899.^® The 
 principal Filipino forces were scattered over the plains of Tar- 
 lac, Pangasinan, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. Back of them to the 
 north were the mountains, into which they expected to retire in 
 the event of disaster. If American troops could be thrown be- 
 tween the Filipinos and the foothills it would be thereafter 
 merely a matter of beating the bush and combing the nipa swamps. 
 All other military operations were now made subordinate to 
 this. The plan was very simple. General MacArthur was to 
 capture the town of Angelis and then proceed north along the 
 line of railroad. General Lawton was to move up the Rio 
 Grande from Calumpit to San Fernando, prepared to swing to 
 the west if occasion required. Another force was to come by sea 
 and land at San Fabian, on the coast near Dagupan, the end of 
 the railroad. 
 
 These plans were successfully carried out during the latter 
 part of the year 1899. The campaign presents little of interest 
 to the gen'^iral reader, and its military lessons may be learned 
 
 ''^Philippine Affairs (1902), p. 14. No one who has examined the records 
 of the Fihpino government and army and the correspondence and orders of 
 the officers will claim that this language is too strong. 
 
 *^The effective force at the end of November, 1899, was 41,500. Two rep- 
 ments had been sent to the southern islands, 13,000 more arrived in Decem- 
 ber and 5,500 in January, 1900, making 55,000 in all. Otis' Report, 1900, p. 14.
 
 480 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 from the elaborate reports of the officers who were in charge of 
 the operations.^^ It was mostly a search for the enemy. The Fili- 
 pino military organizations w^ere broken up and whenever occa- 
 sion required the units were absorbed by the friendly towns. But, 
 unfortunately, Aguinaldo and a small body of his soldiers suc- 
 ceeded in getting through the lines and escaping into the moun- 
 tains. 
 
 At this time, in their desperation, new plans were devised by 
 the insurgents' leaders for the destruction of Manila from within, 
 but their efforts were frustrated by the vigilance of the American 
 authorities. While the northern country was thus being cleaned 
 up expeditions were sent from Manila to the province of Cavite, 
 and up the Mariquina Valley to the east. On December 19 Gen- 
 eral Lawton was killed near San Mateo and the army suffered 
 the loss of one of its most efficient and distinguished leaders. 
 
 As there were no large bodies of insurgents remaining, the 
 American troops were now distributed in small detachments, and 
 the work of organizing the country for peace was commenced. 
 Some roads were constructed for military purposes and others in 
 order to make it possible for the natives to market their products. 
 Early in the spring of 1900 the military authorities ceased to 
 operate the railroad from Manila to Dagupan and it was returned 
 to its owners. The war, so far as it was a contest between organ- 
 ized forces, was at an end. 
 
 On May 5, 1900, General E. L. Otis was relieved as military 
 governor and was succeeded by General Arthur MacArthur. The 
 duties which General Otis had been called upon to perform were 
 such as had fallen to the lot of no other American army officer. 
 They were complicated and onerous and called for the combined 
 qualities of a soldier and a statesman. The conditions were 
 unique in American history. It had not been customary in pre- 
 vious American experience or in the British service under such 
 circumstances to combine the military and civil functions in one 
 person. In India, Java and other conquered countries the civil- 
 
 s^'Le Roy, II, Ch. XIX, gives a detailed account of these military opera- 
 tions.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 481 
 
 ian administrator always accompanied the military commander. 
 Clive, originally, Hastings and the empire builders were generally 
 civilians. Sir Stamford Raffles, who did such remarkable con- 
 structive work in Java, was a young East India Company civil 
 servant, with whom served Auchmulty and Gillespie as military 
 commanders. In Manila the United States government con- 
 ferred all power upon the military commander, who had thus 
 to deal with war, politics, diplomacy, finance, jurisprudence and 
 military and civil government. His powers, although prac- 
 tically absolute, were never seriously abused. General Otis' 
 plans for crushing the insurrection were executed successfully. 
 The administration of civil affairs was creditable and as effi- 
 cient as that of the early days of the civil government which suc- 
 ceeded it. He made mistakes, of course, and he offended many 
 persons. He had not the personal qualities out of which popular 
 military heroes are made. He never rushed about on a charger, 
 and certainly used his pen more than his sword. He succeeded in 
 getting into unpleasant relations with Admiral Dewey and with 
 certain members of the commission, and the tendency has been 
 "to write him down." He was, in fact, somewhat dry and unre- 
 sponsive and very much over-addicted to detail. He became 
 unpopular with the newspaper correspondents and the editors. 
 Military governors are not generally favorites with local jour- 
 nalists, who object to being ridden with a check-rein. Nor did 
 the policy which General Otis was requijed to pursue toward the 
 Filipinos meet with the approval of the correspondents or the 
 local newspapers, which were edited by ex-soldiers with ideas of 
 their own as to the proper way to govern a dependency. The 
 prevalent local view was that all Americans living under the 
 flag in any territory, no matter where that territory was located, 
 were entitled to all their home-made constitutional rights, regard- 
 less of the condition of the subject people, and that any policy 
 which lowered their legal status to a level with a servile race 
 would result in disaster to America and also mislead and de- 
 ceive the natives. They saw nothing but disaster in the policy
 
 482 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 of "the Philippines for the Filipinos." Otis was charged with 
 being too optimistic and with not understanding the real situa- 
 tion, and thus misleading the authorities at Washington. 
 
 As usual in such cases, the censorship of the news was not 
 pleasing to those immediately affected by it. At one time the 
 correspondents combined and sent a "round robin" from Hong 
 Kong which created something of a sensation in the United 
 States. It is not necessary to assume that in such controversies 
 the men in authority and who are bearing the burden of respon- 
 sibility are always wrong and that the newspaper correspondents 
 are always right. General Otis was subjected to some merited 
 and much unmerited criticism and abuse, but when all the diffi- 
 culties are taken into consideration every fair-minded and un- 
 prejudiced person will now concede that his administration was 
 reasonably successful. Of him General Funston says :^^ "While 
 always civil, he was a very reserved man and an indefatigable 
 worker, who took upon himself the decision of all sorts of minor 
 matters ordinarily left by a general officer to the members of his 
 staff. One would about as soon think of cracking a joke in his 
 presence as of trying to pull his beard. It should not be inferred 
 that he was of the pompous type, for he was anything but that, 
 being a most simple and unaffected man, though without the sav- 
 ing grace of humor." 
 
 It then seemed that to General MacArthur was left merely 
 the work of gathering up the odds and ends of the insurrection 
 and organizing governments in the distracted country, but soon 
 after he succeeded to power the insurrection entered upon what 
 was by far the most annoying and troublesome phase of its exist- 
 ence. At a council held by the Filipino leaders at Bayambong 
 in November, 1899, it was decided to disband what remained of 
 the army and to organize the people in each province for pro- 
 longed guerrilla warfare. A good idea of the plan is obtained 
 from one of the orders issued by Aguinaldo which fell into the 
 hands of the American authorities. Luzon was divided into dis- 
 tricts, each under a politico-military commander, upon whom was 
 
 ^^ Memories of Two Wars, p. 159.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 483 
 
 conferred the "full and extraordinary powers" to impose contri- 
 butions and adopt all such measures as might seem to him "for 
 the good service of the country." The troops in each district 
 "were instructed henceforth to maneuver in flying columns and 
 in guerrilla bands.^" 
 
 Detailed and systematized instructions for conducting guerrilla 
 warfare were prepared by that valiant warrior of the pen, Isa- 
 bello de los Reyes, under the direction of the Filipino Revolu- 
 tionary Committee in Madrid and forwarded to the Philippines/" 
 
 This production is well worth careful reading. It opened with 
 the statement that the object of the guerrilla warfare which was 
 to be inaugurated was to convince the "American Imperialists 
 who sought to reduce the Filipinos to slavery and confiscate their 
 rich archipelago" that their nefarious purpose could never be 
 accomplished. The success of the Sultan of Sulu, "through his 
 fanatical perseverance," in securing a fair degree of indepen- 
 dence*^ was referred .to as an encouraging fact. The guerrillas 
 were instructed not to give battle, as disease would soon destroy 
 the Americans. However, while awaiting this much desired con- 
 summation, the Americans were to be constantly worried and 
 ■when possible destroyed root and branch. 
 
 It must be conceded that the system was effective for the pur- 
 pose for which it was devised. Uniforms were thereafter dis- 
 carded, and soldiers appeared now in the field as fighting men 
 and now within the American lines as amigos — peaceful natives 
 engaged in tilling the soil and eager to assist in the capture of 
 the friends whom they called bandits. 
 
 The work of capturing these guerrillas was even more strenu- 
 ous, dangerous and demoralizing than regular warfare.*^ The 
 service required the highest degree of endurance, fortitude and 
 
 89 Order of May 6, 1900, to Pantaleone Garcia. House Doc. 2, 36th Cong., 
 ^nd Sess., Part 3, p. 59. Rcpt. War Dept., 1900, Part 1, p. 59. ^ 
 
 *o A translation of this extraordinary document is printed in House Doc. 
 2, pp. 72-76. 
 
 <i^ So the Filipino leaders construed the Bates Agreement with the sultan. 
 
 *2 Between November 1, 1899, and September 1, 1900, the American casual- 
 ties were 268 killed, 751 wounded, and 55 captured. The Filipino loss, so far 
 as reported during the same period, was 3,227 killed, 694 wounded and 2,864 
 captured.
 
 484 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 valor. The Filipinos conducted their irregular warfare with 
 skill and a considerable degree of success, and thus succeeded in 
 postponing for a few months the day of complete submission. 
 During that time they made life very unpleasant for the Ameri- 
 cans and subjected their own people to untold miseries. 
 
 The municipalities which had been organized under American 
 military supervision were centers of insurgent activities.*^ It was 
 from them that the serious opposition to pacification came. The 
 acceptance of American authority, which was involved in the 
 holding of municipal office, was never, with the people, more 
 than a mere form. In fact, the municipal politicos seem to have 
 regarded the oath of loyalty to the United States as a perform- 
 ance which had a real value, because it tended to throw the 
 Americans off their guard. Their hearts were always with their 
 friends in the hosca, to whom they rendered every assistance in 
 their power. The offices of municipal president and councilmen 
 were the best possible vantage grounds for their purposes. Most 
 of the towns had complete secret insurgent municipal govern- 
 ments, which operated simultaneously and within the same sphere 
 as the American organized local government, and in many in- 
 stances the offices were held by the same persons. The officials 
 acted thus openly in behalf of the United States and secretly in 
 behalf of the insurgents, apparently with equal solicitude for 
 the interests of both. Their actions present a very curious study 
 in the psychology of the Oriental. In such matters as the peace 
 of the town, the regulation of markets, labor on roads, streets 
 and bridges, and the opening and conducting of schools, these 
 men were very active and accepted with alacrity the guidance 
 and assistance of the Americans. At the same time they were 
 collecting contributions and supplies, recruiting men and sending 
 military information to the Filipino leaders in the field. Nearly 
 every town, regardless of the fact of American occupation, was 
 thus a base for insurgent military activities. When) closely 
 pressed a band of guerrillas simply dissolved and reappeared as 
 
 *8 See Robinson, The Philippines, etc., pp. 292-313.
 
 THE FILIPINO REBELLION 485 
 
 peaceful citizens of a near-by barrio. It is doubtful whether the 
 skill with which the system was operated has ever been equaled. 
 As General MacArthur well said, "The people seemed actuated 
 by the idea than in all doubtful matters of politics or war, men 
 are never nearer right than when going with their own kith and 
 kin regardless of the nature of the action or of its consequences." 
 
 There was at this time almost complete unanimity of action 
 on the part of the native population in the provinces of the islands 
 not inhabited by the Moros and uncivilized tribes. The excep- 
 tions were found among the comparatively few educated and 
 intelligent people whose material interests were involved and 
 whose knowledge of the world enabled them to form a fairly just 
 and reasonable judgment upon such affairs. But the common 
 people had been so stirred by the events of the war and by the 
 appeals of the radical leaders that they refused absolutely to 
 follow the leadership of the conservatives. This unanimity of 
 sentiment had been brought about by various means. Intimida- 
 tion and fear were doubtless potent factors, but they were not 
 alone sufficient to account for the apparently spontaneous actions 
 of several millions of people. "It is not improbable," wrote Gen- 
 eral MacArthur, very truly if somewhat ponderously, "that the 
 adhesive principle comes from ethnological homogeneity which 
 induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consanguine- 
 ous leadership even when such action is opposed to their own in- 
 terests and convictions of expediency." 
 
 It is a remarkable fact that throughout this period of confu- 
 sion and disorganization the Filipinos were anxious to assist the 
 army officers in their laudable efforts to introduce a system of 
 primary education for the common people. But Americans were 
 inclined to attach excessive importance to this ambition for edu- 
 cation. The people were and are eager to acquire knowledge, but 
 principally because they regard it as a means by which they are 
 to obtain the satisfaction of their ambition to control their own 
 affairs. As American interests and Filipino aspirations in this 
 respect ran on the same lines, it was easy to work together. The 
 
 I
 
 486 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 educational work which was commenced by American officers in 
 the municipahties was enthusiastically seconded by even the most 
 disloyal natives. They desired particularly to have the children 
 taught the English language, as they appreciated its practical 
 advantages for the purposes they had in view.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 The End of the Military Re'gime 
 
 BUILDING A GOVERNMENT 
 
 Policy of the Administration — Civil Government in Occupied Territory- 
 Unpopularity of the Policy — Elihu Root, Secretary of War — War Depart- 
 ment in Charge — War Powers of President — Civil Government by Civilian 
 Agents — Constitutional Questions — Theories of National Power — Power to 
 Acquire and Hold Territory — The Political Precedents — Secretary Root's 
 Theory — The Insular Cases — The United States Philippine Commission — The 
 President's Instructions — Principles of Government Adopted — Questions for 
 Consideration — Legislative Power of Commission — Reception in Manila — 
 Local Conditions — Building a Government — Further Efforts at Reconciliation 
 — Presidential Election in the United States — Final Blow at the Insurrection 
 — Deportations — Organization of Federal Party — Early Legislation — Civil 
 Service Law — Reorganization of the Judicial System — Municipal Code — Pro- 
 vincial Government Law — The Beginnings of Baguio — Tour of the Islands 
 — Organization of Provincial Governments — The Spooner Law — Capture of 
 Aguinaldo. 
 
 In his message of December 5, 1899, President McKinley 
 informed Congress that there seemed to be no good reason 
 why steps should not be taken at once to organize local gov- 
 ernments essentially popular in the parts of the territory of the 
 Philippines which were already under the control of the army. 
 
 The Schurman Commission urged the importance of insti- 
 tuting civil governments in the provinces and towns at the 
 earliest possible date, but the work had been delayed by the 
 insurrection. Although the native government and the organized 
 forces by which it had been supported were now dispersed, it was 
 clear that it would take an indefinite time to capture or extermi- 
 nate all the irregular bands which continued to operate in certain 
 localities. Race hatred and personal bitterness were increasing. 
 The feelings and sympathies of the people were overwhelmingly 
 anti- American. But the Filipinos had eaten of the fruit of war, 
 
 487
 
 488 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 and found it very bitter. It was the duty of the statesmen to pro- 
 vide something which would inspire them with hope and confi- 
 dence and direct their attention to the task of rebuilding the 
 country. Military government always has the defects of its 
 qualities and it is necessarily harsh and unpopular. It was 
 believed that the prospect of immediate peace under a lib- 
 eral and popular system of government would tend to weaken 
 the attachment to what was manifestly a lost cause. Procla- 
 mations and promises alone would not do. So many Spanish 
 promises had been broken that the Filipinos had become skeptical. 
 It was important that some at least of the American promises 
 should at the earliest possible time be translated into accomplished 
 facts. 
 
 The political conditions in the United States also seemed 
 to require that such a course should be pursued. The pol- 
 icy of the administration was on trial before the country, 
 and it is absurd to criticize politicians or statesmen for giv- 
 ing consideration to matters which will affect the probability 
 of their continuing in office. Out of office they can do 
 nothing; in office they may be able to carry out their pol- 
 icies. The successful establishment of civil governments in 
 parts even of the Philippines would be conclusive evidence 
 of progress toward the fulfilment of the prediction that the 
 insurrection would soon be ended and that the common 
 people would, if given the opportunity, willingly accept 
 American control. There were thus good reasons, some of 
 them political, others arising out of the condition of affairs 
 in the islands, why the work of organizing local governments 
 should not wait until the military authorities had captured 
 every outlaw and by disciplinary measures taught the Fili- 
 pinos to love the flag. 
 
 The policy adopted was not popular with the army or with 
 the newspaper correspondents who taught the home people 
 what they should think with reference to the Philippines, 
 and it caused much unpleasant friction between the civil and 
 military authorities. The former felt that their work was
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 489 
 
 constantly belittled and impeded, and the latter resented the 
 injection of civilians into a situation which in their judg- 
 ment would for many months be purely military. General 
 MacArthur felt that the appointment of the commission 
 showed a lack of appreciation of his capacity to establish 
 civil governments as well as control the military situation. 
 At that distance from home many of the officers seemed 
 unable to accept the theory, never questioned in the United 
 States, of the legal subordination of the military to the 
 civil power.' 
 
 The hasty institution of civil governments in some in- 
 stances resulted unfortunately, but it is far from clear that 
 the evils of continuing military government would not have 
 been greater than those which were incidental to a too rapid 
 progress in the right direction. 
 
 The Schurman Philippine Commission for some reason 
 had been required to report to the secretary of state. The 
 management of the new- dependencies was now transferred 
 to the War Department. Elihu Root became secretary of 
 war in 1899, and thereafter until 1904 Philippine affairs 
 were under his personal direction and control. Mr. Root 
 was a great lawyer, a profound student of public and consti- 
 tutional law, and a constructive statesman of the first order. 
 The government of the Philippines as it exists to-day is largely 
 his creation, and his efficient work in establishing and main- 
 taining peace in the Archipelago was given due weight when, 
 in 1913, he was granted the Nobel prize. 
 
 The president derived his power to govern the territory 
 from his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief of 
 the army and navy, and this power continued after the rati- 
 fication of the treaty of peace and until such time as Congress 
 assumed jurisdiction and control of the territory.'' But his au- 
 
 1 This question is always a live one in dependencies unless the civil gov- 
 ernor is by law also commander-in-chief, as in such colonies as Ceylon and 
 Hong Kong. For the famous contest between Lord Curzon and Lord Kitch- 
 ener over the organization of the India government, see Fraser, Lord Curson 
 in India and After, Chap. XIL 
 
 a Cross v. Howard, 16 Howard (U. S.) 164.
 
 490 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 thorlty was simply that of a military commander and was much 
 less comprehensive than that of Congress. The immediate ques- 
 tion was how, in the exercise of the war power, to give the 
 Philippines the benefit of civil government while awaiting 
 the action of Congress. 
 
 The military authority of a president includes executive, 
 legislative and judicial power. Not infrequently a single 
 military order includes all these powers, — the exercise of 
 legislative power by prescribing a rule of action, of judicial 
 power by determining a right, and executive power by the 
 enforcement of the rules prescribed or the rights determined. 
 As said by Secretary Root, "It is indeed the combination of 
 all these powers in a single individual which constitutes the 
 chief objection to any unnecessary continuance of military 
 government."^ As the war power could be exercised through 
 civil agents as well as military officers, it was determined that 
 the legislative power should be vested in civil agents who should 
 act in accordance with legislative forms and that the judicial 
 power should be exercised by courts established and regulated 
 by the enactments of the legislative authority. 
 
 The ratification of the treaty with Spain without the usual 
 provision determining the future status of the ceded terri- 
 tory and its inhabitants gave rise to numerous important con- 
 stitutional questions which could not be settled definitely 
 until they could be brought before the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. They were not in fact decided by that august 
 tribunal until March 21, 1901. In the meantime the adminis- 
 tration under the guidance of Secretary Root had to pro- 
 ceed upon its own judgment and trust that its action would meet 
 with the approval of the country and subsequently of the 
 courts.* 
 
 The all important, immediate question was whether, upon 
 the cession of the territory, the Constitution of the United 
 
 ^Rept. Secy, of War, 1901. (Five Years of the War Dept, 1899-1903, 
 p. 199.) 
 
 * See notes, p. 496, infra.
 
 ELIHU ROOT
 
 490 TtIS: 'Pn' ■ '''S 
 
 the. nimander and was much 
 
 l((!j»> ^3. The immediate ques- 
 
 *— ■,.. . v.ic war power, \o give the 
 
 civil government while awaiting 
 
 on of Congress. 
 
 "' ^ ■ !>f a president includes executive, 
 
 w.v. y. owcT. Not infrequently a single 
 
 der inr :! these powers, — the exercise of 
 
 teiri&lative power by prescribing a rule of action, of judicial 
 
 power by determining at' ' d executive power by the 
 
 enforcement of the m^ s i 'or the rights determined. 
 
 As said by Secret oed the combination of 
 
 all ' 'lich constitutes the 
 
 .' — e. of military 
 
 ;ed through 
 
 -vcpsL t^aia'd . rmined that 
 
 -. who should 
 
 power d 
 
 l^ the enactments of the legislative authorii - 
 
 The ratification of the treaty with Spain wiiraut the usual 
 provision determining the future status ox the ceded terri- 
 tory and its inhabitants gave rise to numerous important con- 
 stitutional questions which could not be settled definitely 
 until they could be brought before the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. They were not in fact decided by that august 
 tribunal until March 21, 1901. In the meantime the adminis- 
 tration under the guidance of Secretary Root had to pro- 
 ceed upon its own i. " ■ and trust that its action would meet 
 with the approvn country and subsequently of the 
 courts.* 
 
 The all important, immediate question was whether, upon 
 ' ' '--■-' :' Constitution of the United 
 
 ars of the War Dept.. 1899-1903, 
 ' )6^ infra.
 
 COPYRIGHT, HARRIS & EWINQ
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 491 
 
 States with all its requirements and limitations, became at 
 once effective therein by its own force, regardless of the 
 action of Congress. In the popular language of the day, 
 did the Constitution follow the flag? These questions were 
 agitating the country even before the treaty was signed. 
 The two extreme views were expressed very clearly by 
 Senator Vest of Missouri and Senator Piatt of Connecticut 
 during a debate in the Senate/ On December 6, 1898, in 
 contemplation evidently of the signing of the treaty, the for- 
 mer introduced a resolution to the effect "that under the 
 Constitution of the United States, no power is given to the 
 Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and gov- 
 erned permanently as colonies." 
 
 Senator Piatt's resolution asserted that the United States is a 
 nation with all the powers of a nation.* 
 
 The United States had always held territory which was 
 for a time out of the Union, and the Constitution recognized 
 that such territory might be held as its property- The power 
 to hold implies the power to acquire such territory, and the 
 Supreme Court had held that the power was also implied 
 from the express power to make war and treaties. "The 
 Constitution," said Chief Justice Marshall,'" "confers abso- 
 lutely on the government of the Union the powers of making 
 war and of making treaties; consequently that government 
 possesses the power of acquiring territory by conquest or by 
 treaty." Under the provisions of the Constitution Congress 
 may either sell the territory which it so acquires, hold and 
 govern it by such rules and regulations as it deems wise to 
 make, or carve it up into numerous states and admit them 
 into the Union. It follows that until new states are created 
 out of the national territorial property and admitted into the 
 Union the Constitution of the United States is not in force 
 
 'For the conflicting views of jurists, see Thayer, 12 Harvard Law Rev. 
 464, March, 1899; Baldwin, Ibid., 393; Burgess, 14 Pol. Set. Guar. 1. March, 
 1899; Woolsey, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Set. Supp.. p. 15, April 7, 1899. 
 
 « Cong. Ree., Dec. 19. 1898, pp. 321. et seq. 
 
 ' American and Ocean Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet (U. S.) 511.
 
 492 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 in such territory. The McKinley administration had good 
 Jeffersonian authority for proceeding on the assumption that 
 the Constitution did not apply to the new territory until 
 it had been extended thereto by Congress in the exercise 
 of its powers to "make all needful rules and regulations re- 
 specting the territory or other property belonging to the 
 United States." 
 
 It followed strictly the political precedents in the history 
 of the country. The treaty under which Louisiana was ac- 
 quired from France in 1803 contained a provision with ref- 
 erence to the politicial status of the inhabitants but left Con- 
 gress to determine when the Constitution and laws of the 
 United States should be made applicable in the new terri- 
 tory. The Act of Congress of October 31, 1803, provided 
 that "until the expiration of the present session of Con- 
 gress, unless provision for the temporary government for 
 the said territory be sooner made by Congress, all the mili- 
 tary, civil and judicial powers exercised by the officers of 
 the existing government of the same shall be vested in such 
 person and persons and shall be exercised in such man- 
 ner as the president of the United States shall direct for 
 maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of Louisiana in 
 the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion."* 
 This statute was construed to mean that the local laws should 
 remain in force until changed by Congress. Albert Gallatin, 
 then secretary of the treasury, wrote to the territorial governor, 
 "that the existing duties on imports and exports which by the 
 Spanish law are now levied within the province, will continue 
 until Congress shall have otherwise provided."* 
 
 Early in the next year Congress extended the laws of the 
 United States relating to customs duties to Louisiana and 
 organized a territorial government by an act which specifi- 
 
 8 U. S. Stat at Large (Pet. Ed.), II, 245. 
 
 8 See Magoon, Law of Civil Government under Military Occupation, 
 p. 159.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 493 
 
 cally enumerated the provisions of the bill of rights of which 
 the inhabitants of the territory should have the benefit.*® 
 
 Upon the acquisition of Florida in 1819, a part of Mexico 
 in 1848, the Gadsen's Purchase in 1853, and Alaska in 1867, 
 it was assumed that the Constitution and laws of the United 
 States did not extend to the new territory without express 
 action by Congress. The Act of April 30, 1900, expressly 
 extended the Constitution of the United States over the new 
 territory of Hawaii. In each of these instances the treaty 
 of cession provided that the inhabitants should in due time 
 be admitted to the full rights of citizens of the United States, 
 while the treaty with Spain merely reserved to Congress the 
 right to determine the civil rights and political status of the 
 inhabitants of the ceded territory. In neither case could the 
 inhabitants become citizens without the action of Congress. 
 
 Under these political precedents the administration was 
 justified in assuming that the Constitution was not self-op- 
 erating in the newly acquired territory. Any government 
 instituted by the president under the war power, necessarily 
 would be temporary and it was not essential that the tem- 
 porary government should be so framed as to provide a 
 model for future congressional action. It was, however, 
 desirable that the president's action should conform to the 
 constitutional theory upon which Congress would act. Sec- 
 retary Root proceeded to frame a government for the Phil- 
 ippines on the theory that the United States as a nation 
 possessed and might lawfully exercise all the powers in re- 
 spect to such territory which any other nation could have 
 exercised in respect to territory and people so acquired. The 
 inhabitants of the territory were subject to the complete 
 sovereignty of the United States, and the sovereign was 
 subject only to the legal limitations on its powers which 
 were found in the treaty. The legal rights of the inhabitants 
 also were determined by the treaty and not by a constitu- 
 
 " United Stat, at Large (Pet Ed.), II, p. 283.
 
 494 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 tion which had been established by the people of the United 
 States for themselves and to meet conditions existing on 
 the American continent. They had, however, acquired a 
 moral right to be governed by the United States according 
 to the principles of justice and freedom which underlay the 
 American system of government, and it was the duty of the 
 United States to make the interests of the people the first 
 and controlling consideration in all administration and legis- 
 lation which concerned them.^^ 
 
 ' On the theory that the laws of the United States did not 
 apply to the new territory until extended thereto by Con- 
 gress the administration proceeded to collect duties on goods 
 imported into the United States from Porto Rico and the 
 Philippines, thus treating them as foreign countries within 
 the contemplation of the tarifif law. The Supreme Court 
 subsequently held that this could not be done, because im- 
 mediately upon the ratification of the treaty of peace the 
 islands ceased to be foreign territory. In considering the 
 litigation with reference to the tariff laws it is necessary 
 to distinguish the period before the ratification of the treaty, 
 the period from the ratification of the treaty to the passage 
 of the Foraker Act on April 12, 1900, and the time subse- 
 quent to the enactment of that law. During the first period 
 the duties and customs were legally determined and collected 
 under the executive orders of the president in the exercise 
 of the war power. In the first of the so-called Insular Cases, 
 decided May 27, 1901, the Supreme Court held that the 
 United States had the right to acquire territory by treaty, 
 that the treaty of cession did not extend the Constitution 
 and laws of the United States over such territory, and that 
 territory thus acquired could not be considered as foreign 
 territory. It followed that the duties could not be collected 
 under the Dingley Tariff Law on goods coming from Porto 
 Rico to the United States. ^^ 
 
 ^^ Report Secy, of War, 1899 (Five Years of the War Dept., pp. 31-38). 
 « De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 495 
 
 Porto Rico and the Philippines, therefore, were not for- 
 eign territory. But were they domestic territory in the sense 
 that they came within the commercial union? Congress, 
 assuming that Porto Rico was foreign territory within the 
 meaning of the revenue laws, had by the Foraker Act estab- 
 lished a schedule of duties which should be paid on goods 
 coming therefrom to the United States. In order to sustain 
 this statute the court held that within the meaning of the 
 revenue clauses of the Constitution requiring all duties, im- 
 posts and excises to be uniform throughout the United States, 
 Porto Rico while not foreign territory was not for all pur- 
 poses to be regarded as domestic territory. It was territory 
 appurtenant to and belonging to the United States, and the 
 Foraker Act was therefore constitutional.^' This conclusion 
 was reached by various processes of reasoning and was much 
 criticized by students of constitutional law and political sci- 
 ence, and the general public. It was claimed that as four 
 justices believed that the Constitution was extended by its 
 own force to the new territory and four other justices be- 
 lieved that an Act of Congress was necessary so to extend it 
 and the reasoning of the justice who wrote the prevailing 
 opinion was not concurred in by any of his associates, no 
 constitutional doctrine was declared by a majority of the 
 court.^* But the reasoning by which a court reaches its con- 
 clusion is no part of a judicial decision. Many a correct de- 
 cision is reached by an erroneous course of reasoning. So 
 far as the binding effect of the decision is concerned it is 
 from a legal point of view entirely immaterial that a majority 
 of the members of the court were unable to agree on a single 
 reason for the decision. The conclusion embodied in the 
 judgment was that of the majority, and the decision itself 
 was that of the court. The various conflicting reasons given 
 for the insular decisions are therefore of interest only to 
 students of the development of constitutional law.*" 
 
 "Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901). 
 
 '* Latane. America as a World Power, Chap. VIII. 
 
 "In O'Campo v. Cabiaiiis, 15 Phil. Kept. 625, the court said: "There caa
 
 496 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The questions involved in these cases were not determined 
 by the court until the work of organizing the temporary 
 government in the Philippines was well under way and 
 until after the people at the presidential election of 1900 had 
 placed the seal of their approval upon the policy which was 
 being pursued by the administration. There was, therefore, 
 some truth in the assertion that the constitutional questions 
 connected with the acquisition of the Philippines were set- 
 tled on commercial and political grounds before they came 
 before the court, just as similar great questions of public 
 policy have been and doubtless in the future will be settled/^ 
 Congress was, therefore, left free to provide a government 
 for the Philippines subject only to the restrictions of the Con- 
 stitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all 
 irrespective of time and place/'^ 
 
 In April, 1900, the president appointed the United States 
 Philippine Commission, which was designed to supplement 
 the work of the army and establish a civil government which 
 should exist until Congress assumed charge. The members 
 of the new commission were not so well known to the pub- 
 lic as those of the Schurman Commission had been. The 
 president, Mr. William H. Taft, of Ohio, had been solicitor- 
 general of the United States and was well and favorably 
 known to the legal profession as a United States circuit 
 judge. Neither of the other members had more than a local 
 reputation. They were, however, all men of high standing 
 in the states from which they came. Mr. Luke L. Wright 
 
 be but one decision by a court, and it must be the result of the concurrent 
 judgment of a majority of the justices constituting that court. The legisla- 
 ture can not compel the minds of men. The law has no mandamus to the 
 logical faculties." 
 
 16 The impression made on many people was that expressed by Mr. 
 Dooley : 
 
 "But there is one thing that I'm sure about" 
 
 "What's that?" asked Mr. Hennessey. 
 
 "That is," said Mr. Dooley, "no matter whether th' Constitution follows 
 the flag or not th' Supreme Court follows th' illiction returns." The wit 
 justifies the irreverence. 
 
 "De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1 ; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244; 
 Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197; Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138; 
 Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 497 
 
 had been attorney-general of Tennessee, but had held no 
 other public office. Mr. Henry C. Ide, of Vermont, was a. 
 lawyer and had served creditably as chief justice of Samoa 
 during the period of the joint American, English and Ger- 
 man protectorate. Mr. Dean C. Worcester was assistant pro- 
 fessor of zoology at the University of Michigan and was the 
 only member who had the advantage of any personal knowledge 
 of the islands, having visited them on two previous occasions 
 on scientific expeditions and recently as a member of the Schur- 
 man Commission. Mr. Bernard Moses was professor of history 
 at the University of California and had written several books 
 on Spanish-American history. All these men served their coun- 
 try and the Philippines faithfully and well. !Mr. Taft became 
 civil governor, secretary of war and president of the United 
 States. Mr. Wright became tlie first governor-general of the 
 Philippines, the first American ambassador to Japan, and secre- 
 tary of war during the last days of President Roosevelt's admin- 
 istration. Mr. Ide became governor-general and minister to 
 Spain. Mr. Worcester remained a member of the commission 
 and secretary of the interior until 1913. Mr. Moses, after serv- 
 ing as commissioner and secretary of public instruction, resigned 
 and returned to the University of California. 
 
 The Instructions which were prepared by Secretary Root 
 for the guidance of this commission constitute a very noble 
 state paper. The general principles therein announced were 
 such as would naturally control in any government for which 
 America, with her traditions, was responsible. They were 
 prepared in the full light of modern colonial history and with 
 ample knowledge of the most advanced theory and practise of 
 colonial government. There was at that time little to be 
 learned from the Dutch, French or German systems which 
 could be made applicable in the Philippines. Obviously the 
 German military and bureaucratic methods were inapplicable, 
 being equally unadapted to the American or Filipino char- 
 acter. The French system of assimilation to the metropoli- 
 tan country was equally impossible. The much advertised
 
 498 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 work of the Dutch in Netherlands India did not stand the 
 acid test of modern principles of conduct. Their reputation 
 as governors of tropical countries rested on the fact that for 
 a number of years by brute force and medieval methods they 
 had "made a colony pay." They stood "for no nonsense" 
 about the rights of the natives. 
 
 The policy outlined in the Instructions embodied the prin-' 
 ciple which in recent years had controlled British colonial 
 policy and the language of some of the paragraphs reads 
 like a paraphrase of sections of Queen Victoria's proclama- 
 tion when in 1858 Great Britain assumed the government of 
 India/^ The government actually organized for the Philippines 
 resembled somewhat that of a British Crown colony, with the 
 principle of native representation which had been tried with in- 
 different success in some of the English tropical colonies, such 
 as Jamaica and Mauritius.^^ 
 
 The United States had determined to govern the Philip- 
 pines on lines designed to lead to complete self-government 
 and ultimately to independence, should the people of the 
 territory when that time came so desire. In the mean- 
 time the problem was to take a community, which in some 
 respects resembled India, in some Egypt, and in others Cey- 
 lon and Jamaica, and devise a government therefor which 
 would secure the peace, order and justice of a British Crown 
 colony, give the natives a practical part in the work of the 
 government, as in India, and inculcate political, social and 
 economic doctrines which, as in Egypt, were designed to train 
 the people for the future control of their affairs.^'* 
 
 The exploitation of the natives of tropical colonies for 
 the benefit of foreigners was no longer in theory permitted 
 by any colonizing power. The controlling principle, there- 
 in See supra, pp. 56, 57. 
 
 ^^Parl. Blue Book, p. 9412, July, 1899. Reinsch, Colonial Government, 
 p. 219 ; Bruce, The Broad Stone of Empire, I, Chap. VIII. 
 
 20 The original plan of government devised by Secretary Root did not 
 include a bicameral legislative body such as was provided for by the Act of 
 Congress of July 1, 1902. The Filipinos were represented on the commissioa 
 by natives appointed by the president
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 499 
 
 fore, must be that the new government should have for its 
 primary object the well-being of the native people. It must 
 be a government of service. Therefore the commission was 
 solemnly enjoined to remember that the government which 
 they were establishing was designed not for the satisfaction 
 of the Americans nor for the expression of their theoretical 
 views, but for the happiness and prosperity of the people 
 of the Philippine Islands. The measures adopted must be 
 made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even 
 their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the 
 indispensable requisites of just and efficient government. 
 This particular instruction, which has been faithfully ob- 
 served to the present day, was the cause of considerable 
 hard feeling on the part of members of the rough and ready 
 American element which was obsessed with the idea that the 
 conquerors should have first consideration. 
 
 The work of organization was to begin at the bottom by 
 establishing village or municipal governments in which the 
 natives should be given the opportunity to manage their own 
 local affairs to the fullest extent of which they were capable and 
 subject only to such supervision and control as might be neces- 
 sary to maintain law, order and loyalty. Next in ordei* should 
 come the organization of governments in the larger adminis- 
 trative divisions, corresponding to counties, departments, or 
 provinces, which should, as far as practicable, be composed 
 of municipalities^^ having natural geographical limits and in- 
 habited by people speaking the same language.^^ In distributing 
 power among these local governments, the presumption was to 
 be in favor of the smaller subdivisions. All power which could 
 be exercised properly by these local governments should be con- 
 ferred upon them, and only powers of a more general character 
 should be granted to the provincial governments. The idea was 
 to create a system in which the central government should have 
 
 21 A Philippine municipality is a territorial district in which there may be 
 several villages. 
 
 22 It was upon this principle that the Spaniards had fixed the boundaries 
 of the existing provinces, and few changes were found necessary.
 
 500 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 direct administration over matters of general concern and such 
 control only over the local governments as was necessary to se- 
 cure and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local 
 officers. 
 
 The municipal officers were to be selected by the people, 
 and in the larger divisions loyal and competent natives were 
 to be given the preference in appointment to office. It was 
 recognized that in the first instance it would be necessary 
 to fill many offices with Americans who after a time might 
 be replaced by natives. As soon as practicable a system for 
 ascertaining the merit and fitness of candidates for office 
 should be devised. 
 
 The attention of the commission was directed especially 
 to certain vital questions which required immediate consid- 
 eration. Probably the most important was that of the claim 
 of ownership by the monastic orders of certain large tracts 
 of agricultural lands. These lands had by a decree of the 
 Philippine Congress been arbitrarily confiscated. A thor- 
 ough investigation was directed to be made of the titles of 
 lands claimed by individuals or religious orders and of the 
 justice of the claims and complaints of the people, to enable 
 the commission to recommend some wise and peaceable measure 
 for the settlement of the controversy. As far as substantial 
 rights permitted technicalities were to be disregarded, but it had 
 to be remembered : 
 
 "That the provision of the Treaty of Paris, pledging the 
 United States to the protection of all rights of property in 
 the islands, and as well the principle of our own Govern- 
 ment which prohibits the taking of private property without 
 due process of law shall not be violated; that the welfare of 
 the people of the islands, which should be a paramount con- 
 sideration, shall be attained consistently with this rule of 
 property right; that if it becomes necessary for the public 
 interest of the people of the islands to dispose of claims to 
 property which the Commission finds to be not lawfully 
 acquired and held, disposition shall be made thereof by due 
 legal procedure, in which there shall be full opportunity for
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 501 
 
 fair and impartial hearing and judgment; that if the same 
 public interests require the extinguishment of property rights 
 lawfully acquired and held due compensation shall be made 
 out of the public treasury therefor; that no form of religion 
 and no minister of religion shall be forced upon any com- 
 munity or upon any citizen of the islands ; that upon the other 
 hand no minister of religion shall be interfered with or mo- 
 lested in following his calling, and that the separation be- 
 tween state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute." 
 
 The system of education which had been inaugurated^ by the 
 military authorities was to be promoted and extended, giving at- 
 tention first to free primary education, which would fit the peo- 
 ple for citizenship and the ordinary avocations of a civilized 
 community. Instruction should be given in every part of the 
 islands in the language of the people, but full opportunity should 
 be given to all of the people to acquire the use of the English 
 language. The subject of taxation was to be left for considera- 
 tion by the civil government which was to be established under 
 the auspices of the commission. In dealing with the unciv- 
 ilized tribes the course followed by the United States in dealing 
 with the American Indians was to be adopted. These wild people 
 were to be allowed to retain their tribal organizations, subject 
 to firm and wise regulations designed to prevent barbarous prac- 
 tises and uncivilized customs. 
 
 Until September 1, 1890, the commission was to devote its 
 attention to these investigations. On that date the part of the 
 power of the government which was of a legislative nature should 
 be transferred from the military governor to the commission and 
 be thereafter exercised by it under rules and regulations pre- 
 scribed by the secretary of war until the establishment of a com- 
 plete civil central government, or until Congress should other- 
 wise provide. The legislative power thus conferred included the 
 making of rules and orders having the effect of law for raising 
 revenue by taxation, customs and imposts; the appropriation 
 and expenditure of such funds; the establishment of an educa- 
 tional system and a civil service ; the organization and establish-
 
 502 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 ment of courts, of municipal and departmental governments, and 
 all other matters of a civil nature for which the military gov- 
 ernor was then competent to provide by rules or orders of a leg- 
 islative character. 
 
 The commission was also authorized to appoint such officers 
 as it should provide for in the judicial, educational and civil 
 service systems and in the municipal and provincial governments. 
 This was a grant of a portion of the executive power. Until 
 the complete transfer of control to the civil power the military 
 governor should remain the chief executive head of the govern- 
 ment and exercise the executive power not assigned to the com- 
 mission, subject to the rules and orders enacted by the commis- 
 sion in the exercise of its legislative power. The municipal and 
 departmental governments were to continue to report to the 
 military governor and to be subject to his administrative con- 
 trol under the direction of the secretary of war. This control, 
 however, was to be confined within the narrowest limits consist- 
 ent with honest and efficient government, the maintenance of 
 order and the protection of individuals. The military forces 
 should be subject at all times to the call of the civil officers for 
 the maintenance of order and the enforcement of their authority. 
 Wherever civil governments were instituted such military posts 
 and garrisons as the commander deemed requisite should be con- 
 tinued for the suppression of disorder. 
 
 This government was to be instituted in a country which was 
 practically without what is commonly called native institutions, 
 such as exist in India, China, Java and the Malay country gen- 
 erally. Such as originally existed had long since been displaced 
 or radically modified by the Spaniards. Fortunately the reforms 
 which the Filipinos had been demanding were in harmony with 
 the fundamental ideas of government in the United States. 
 What the Filipinos expressly desired in the way of reforms 
 was what Americans would naturally expect to establish. Hence, 
 the changes made by the new government were really much less 
 radical than they appeared to the world. 
 
 The laws and customs of the natives were to be interfered
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 503 
 
 "With as little as possible. Even their prejudices were to be re- 
 spected. But they were to be made to understand that there 
 are certain great principles of government which lie at the base 
 of the American system and which are essential for the rule of 
 law and maintenance of individual freedom. In all else America 
 said: 
 
 "The law that ye make shall be law after the rule of your 
 lands." 
 
 But there were certain practical rules of government which 
 had been found essential for the protection of these great pri- 
 mary principles of liberty, and when these came in conflict with 
 local customs and laws the latter must be set aside. Upon every 
 branch of the government of the Philippines there was imposed 
 the inviolable injunction: 
 
 "That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
 without due process of law; that private property shall not be 
 taken for public use without just compensation; that in all crim- 
 inal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
 and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
 accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to 
 have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
 and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that ex- 
 cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
 nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted ; that no person shall 
 be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled 
 in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the 
 right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures 
 shall not be violated ; that neither slavery nor involuntary servi- 
 tude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill 
 of attainder or ex-post- facto law shall be passed; that no law 
 shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, 
 or the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition 
 the government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall 
 be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting 
 the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoy- 
 ment of religious profession and worship without discrimina- 
 tion or preference shall forever be allowed."
 
 504 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 With the exception of those relating to trial by jury and the 
 right to carry arms, substantially all the provisions of the Bill of 
 Rights of the Constitution of the United States were thus to be 
 respected in the Philippines. 
 
 The commissioners arrived in Manila on June 4, 1900, and 
 were received with proper ceremonies by the military authori- 
 ties and by representatives of the Filipinos. There was, how- 
 ever, a notable lack of genuine enthusiasm in their reception 
 which might well have chilled the ardor of the newcomers. The 
 Filipinos, while anxious to be relieved from the severities inci- 
 dent to military government, were not willing to commit them- 
 selves irrevocably to the uncertainties represented by the pro- 
 posed civil government. Many interesting things might be 
 written on the undisclosed pages of the book of Fate, and until 
 they could see the page upon which the results of the coming 
 presidential election, then but five months away, were recorded, 
 they deemed it wise to be non-committal. The leading Filipinos 
 were, therefore, formally courteous. The common people were 
 sullen or indifferent. The American army's enthusiasm was con- 
 fined strictly within the terms of the regulations. 
 
 Before entering upon the work of creating a government it 
 was necessary for the commissioners to solve the more prosaic 
 problem of habitations for themselves and their families. This 
 was no easy task in the Manila of 1900. All the "palaces" were 
 in possession of the generals, and an inspection of the available 
 habitations tended to raise doubts as to the advantages of a 
 colonial policy.^^ Even the president of the commission seems 
 to have had some misgivings as to whether the career of a great 
 pro-consul was going to be as attractive as it had seemed from 
 the other side of the Pacific. 
 
 But the commission soon learned to accept small favors with 
 a respectful show of courtesy, as we find them reporting to the 
 secretary of war that they had been courteously received and 
 "after about a month" had been "furnished comfortable offices 
 
 23 Moses, Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife, p. 5. Williams, The 
 Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 54.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 505 
 
 in the Ayuntamiento." The civilian attaches of the commission, 
 who seem to have been rather unsophisticated in the w^ays of the 
 military world, found themselves in a strange atmosphere. One 
 of them solemnly recorded in his diary the interesting fact that 
 "there are more captains, majors and colonels here than we had 
 any idea existed." The city of Manila was, in fact, a huge mili- 
 tary camp swarming with khaki-clad soldiers. "They patrol the 
 streets, guard the public buildings and perform all the functions 
 of government. We go to bed to the sound of taps and wake 
 to hear the bugles sounding reveille. Military authority is su- 
 preme — omnipotent. To be on the street after ten at night is 
 presumptive evidence of treason; any one found abroad after that 
 hour without a pass being hustled to the guard-house. The talk 
 you hear is of 'insurrectos* and of fighting here and fighting there. 
 Manila itself, while perfectly quiet, is disturbed by constant ru- 
 mors of contemplated attacks. It was currently reported and 
 believed that a demonstration against the city was to follow the 
 arrival of the Commission — ^just a little something to show how 
 welcome we were. Thus far, however, nothing has happened. 
 We find the army view of the situation decidedly pessimistic. 
 They think it will take years to crush the insurrection and restore 
 public order. This would mean the indefinite continuance of 
 military rule — a prospect much more alluring to many of our 
 officers than the advent of civil government."^* 
 
 Official calls having been duly received and returned with 
 proper ceremony, and the wearing of frock coats and top hats 
 officially condemned,^' the commission settled down to business 
 
 2* Williams, The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 51. 
 
 25 A good deal of amusement has been got out of the clothes problem 
 in Manila. _ In Spanish days the frock coat and top hat were universally worn 
 by all dignitaries who were not entitled to wear a uniform. The Filipinos to 
 some extent still indulge in that dignified but, for the tropics, uncomfortable 
 habit ^ Under date of July 15, 1900, Mr. Williams wrote, "The other day the 
 commissioners made some formal calls dressed in frock coats and silk hats, 
 and returned to the Ayuntamiento heated throughout and dripping with per- 
 spiration. When they went into session Judge Taft, as chairman, called for 
 a resolution to the effect that thereafter, no matter what the occasion, frock 
 coats and silk hats be neither worn nor required. With some slight protest 
 from Commissioner Ide, whose residence in Samoa has won him the position 
 of censor in matters of official etiquette, the resolution was adopted. If ad- 
 hered to it will prove quite a departure from the pomp and the splendor with
 
 506 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 in those comfortable but delayed quarters in the Ayuntamlento 
 for which they were so grateful. There in the dignified Palacio. 
 fronting the Plaza where stood the bronze statue of Charles IV, 
 with its stately stairway, resounding corridors and lofty though 
 dilapidated apartments, under the pictorial gaze of many gor- 
 geously appareled Spanish dignitaries of the era which had 
 passed as in a night, they commenced the tedious nerve-wreck- 
 ing and health-destroying labor of building a state on American 
 lines upon the ruins of a semi-oriental province. 
 
 The prospects were not very encouraging. The army was un- 
 sympathetic. To the natives the commission represented the 
 undesired rule of a conquering foreign power. Infinite patience, 
 good judgment and skilful diplomacy only would gain their con- 
 fidence. A brief general statement of the purposes of the com- 
 mission was Issued. ^^ The people were assured that the commis- 
 sioners were men of peace, who would confine their work to 
 regions where there was no longer resistance to American arms, 
 and that they could rely on the justice and clemency of the 
 United States. Buencamino published a full stenographic report 
 of an interview with the commission, in which, the plans of the 
 government were quite fully stated.^^ Two days in each week 
 were set aside for open sessions and the people were invited to 
 appear and give the commission the benefit of criticisms and 
 suggestions as to necessary legislation. Many Filipinos availed 
 
 which officialdom arrayed itself in old days." The Odyssey of the Philippine 
 Commission, p. 63. 
 
 Thereafter until the arrival of Governor-General Harrison in 1913, this 
 rule of self-denial was very generally adhered to. According to the news- 
 papers, Governor-General Harrison cabled from Nagisaki that he would 
 arrive in Manila wearing a "cutaway coat and a silk hat," thereby causing 
 great consternation in Manila and the resurrection of top hats of remote 
 vintage. 
 
 American prestige has, in fact, suffered considerably from excessive inat- 
 tention to such matters. Democracy as operated in the western states is not 
 always appreciated in the Orient. One governor-generar delivered his inau- 
 guration address clothed in "the simple dress of an American citizen of the 
 Philippines," that is, like a barber in the United States. Army and naval 
 officers in full uniform and Supreme Court justices in silk robes appeared 
 more dignified than the new chief magistrate in his neglige; but probably 
 they were not so comfortable. 
 
 2« Rept. Phil. Com., 1900, Ex. A. 
 
 2T Published in El Diario de Manila, August 3, 1900.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 507 
 
 themselves of this opportunity. Mabini, then a prisoner in Ma- 
 nila, was wheeled into the audience room and delivered a long 
 speech on the general principles of freedom and liberty and the 
 inherent right of individuals and races to shape their own des- 
 tiny. His reply to an inquiry by the president of the commis- 
 sion was destined to be often quoted as illustrating the imprac- 
 ticable character of even the most intellectual type of Filipinos. 
 
 "But suppose," said Mr. Taft,'^^ "the Americans should with- 
 draw and this freedom of which you speak be granted you, what 
 then? Your country is composed of many scattered islands, 
 some of them inhabited by savages, and all of them by people 
 speaking different dialects and without any cohesion of ideas or 
 experience in government. You occupy an exposed and coveted 
 position in the path of world commerce, and would doubtless 
 be called upon very soon to defend your nationality. You have 
 many foreigners living here, for whose lives and property you 
 would be held accountable, not only from outside interfer- 
 ence, but from the ambitions and jealousies of your own people. 
 To protect your country from these dangers you would need 
 an army of considerable strength and at least the nucleus of a 
 navy. All these things, together with the necessary expenses of 
 government, would cost a great deal of money. Your country 
 and people are poor and your industries paralyzed. Waiving, 
 therefore, all question of your ability to govern yourselves, I 
 would ask how you propose to raise the revenues necessary to 
 preserve and administer such a government ?** 
 
 To this inquiry Mabini simply shrugged his shoulders and re- 
 plied, "The question of revenue is a mere detail" 
 
 Subjects for special investigation and study were assigned to 
 the several members of the commission, Mr. Taft taking the 
 friar and land questions and the civil service. A list of questions 
 covering the moral, economic and educational phases of the re- 
 ligious questions was sent to prominent Filipinos and attracted 
 much attention, as the questions related to what the natives 
 regarded as the most vital of all subjects.** 
 
 28 Williams' Odyssey, p. 70. 
 
 «»£/ Diario Dc Manila, Sept. 3, 1890.
 
 508 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 While the work of investigation, consultation and legislation 
 proceeded in Manila, the guerrillas continued active in the prov- 
 inces. It was absolutely necessary that order should now be 
 restored, and as preliminary to severe measures it was decided 
 to try the effect of extreme clemency. On June 21, 1900, Gen- 
 eral MacArthur, as military governor, issued an order tender- 
 ing complete immunity for the past and liberty of action for the 
 future to all who had been in insurrection against the United 
 States who should within ninety days formally renounce their 
 connection with the insurgents and accept the sovereignty of the 
 United States in the Philippines. Those who accepted the bene- 
 fits of this amnesty would be given transportation to their homes. 
 To provide in some measure for the Filipino soldiers who during 
 a time would be destitute, the government offered to pay thirty 
 pesos to each man who surrendered a rifle in good condition. 
 The results were not commensurate with the liberality of the 
 terms offered. Only five thousand persons, of all grades of the 
 civil and military service, presented themselves and took the 
 oath. Among the number, however, were Don Pedro Paterno, 
 former president of the Philippine Cabinet; General Ambrosia 
 Flores, former secretary of war, and several of the most active 
 of the military officers.*" 
 
 When the amnesty expired, on September 21, the situation 
 had undergone but little change. The disorganized Filipinos 
 struggled on in the forlorn hope that W. J. Bryan would be 
 elected president in November. Even during the preceding year 
 the insurgent leaders encouraged their followers by asserting that 
 the majority of the American people were in favor of acknowl- 
 edging their independence, and that the Democratic party would 
 elect its candidate for presldent.^^ Mr. Bryan devoted a great 
 
 3° Paterno, of Bijik-na-bato fame, immediately became for a time an enthu- 
 siastic Americanista. For an account of his famous fieste to celebrate the 
 amnesty, see Williams, Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 66. Report 
 of General MacArthur, House Doc. 2, pp. 69-77. 
 
 3^ The Filipino leaders claimed that they were being encouraged by promi- 
 ment Americans to continue their resistance. 
 
 On May 1, 1900, Santos, reporting to Aguinaldo on the work of agents 
 in the United States, wrote that Apacible, Sexto Lopez and Del Pan met in 
 Toronto in February and proceeded to the United States, where tliey "sue-
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 509 
 
 part of his letter of acceptance to the question, and succeeded in 
 making the present and future of the Philippines a party ques- 
 
 ceeded in interviewing Bryan, who happened to be in New York. Senor 
 Raff (Sexto Lopez) said that Bryan feared being present at a conference lest 
 he might be called a traitor by members of his own party, and also by those 
 of the opposite or 'imperialist* party, who are quite proud of the victories 
 they have gained against our people over there. Nevertheless, Raff was able 
 to be present and talk at some of the anti-imperialist meetings, our political 
 friends introducing him as a friend from the committee (at Hong Kong) 
 and as an advocate of the cessation of the war over there, in order that our 
 sacred rights may be given consideration by them. And as Bryan could not 
 personally take part in the conference, he sent a most trusted person, his 
 right-hand man, Doctor Gardner. The results of the conference between 
 Senor Raff and Doctor Gardner, the latter acting in the name of Bryan, are 
 as follows: 
 
 "That we may fight on, and Bryan will never cease to defend our sacred 
 rights. That we must never mention Bryan's name in our manifestos and 
 proclamations, lest the opposite party might say he is a traitor. That we are 
 in the right; and hence he promised in the name of Bryan that if this Senor 
 Bryan is victorious in the presidential campaign he will recognize our inde- 
 pendence without delay. Your honored self can easily conclude from all the 
 foregoing that Setior Del Pan, after the receipt of these promises, concurred 
 with him ; and he returned to inform Senor Apacible about the results of the 
 conference. So these two studied over the plan of the policy to be adopted 
 and carried out. I write you what their opinions are, viz. : First, that they 
 •will reside there, pending the outcome of the presidential contest, aiding the 
 propaganda and enlivening it until November, the date set for the desired 
 thing. Owing to what Doctor Gardner said and promised in the name of 
 Bryan, some one ought to stay there in order that Bryan may be approached, 
 if he is elected, so he can sign the recognition of our independence ; and this 
 should be done at once, lest in his excitement over the victory he should for- 
 get his promise. Third, For carrying out the two propositions just men- 
 tioned, they request 2,000 pounds sterHng, that is, $20,000 in silver, to be used 
 for the propaganda, for paying newspapers and for bribing senators — this 
 last clause is somewhat dangerous and impossible. And fourth, that the 
 money must be spent immediately, and that you should be informed not to 
 mention the name of Bryan in the manifestos and proclamations. 
 
 "In order to answer quickly and decisively that proposition, and as I did 
 not have the desired money here, I answered as follows: 'Plan approved; 
 for the sake of economy we have decided that one of the two retire, but 
 before doing so make arrangements, establish communications with leaders 
 of Bryan's party, and he who remains should thus cultivate the relations; 
 he who is to retire will locate himself in Paris near Seiior Katipalad (Agon- 
 cillo), with whom he will secretly discuss political problems that may arise. 
 So he will watch for the opportune moment of Bryan's election, in order to 
 go immediately to Hayti (United States) and formally arrange the contract 
 with Bryan." 
 
 The insurgent leaders were active in distributing encouraging "news" 
 among their adherents. Major Taylor says : 
 
 "There are a number of these publications among the papers captured 
 from the insurgents, and the adoption of this method of propaganda seems to 
 have been nearly coincident with Aguinaldo's orders declaring guerrilla war- 
 fare. It does not seem likely that the matter contained in them was supplied 
 by a Filipino, for if it was he assumed a general acquaintance among the 
 people with American politics and American methods which they were far 
 from possessing. 
 
 "In these publications the Filipinos were assured that the Imperialists were
 
 SIO THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 tion, if not the "paramount issue" in the campaign. The Demo- 
 cratic platform in 1900 announced that : 
 
 "We declare again that all governments instituted among men 
 derive their just powers from the consent of the governed; that 
 any government not based upon the consent of the governed is 
 a tyranny, and that to impose upon any people a government of 
 force is to substitute the methods of imperialism for those of a 
 republic. 
 
 "We assert that no nation can long endure half republic and 
 half empire, and we warn the American people that imperialism 
 abroad will lead quickly and inevitably to despotism at home. 
 
 "We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the pres- 
 ent administration. 
 
 "The Filipinos can not be citizens without endangering our 
 civilization; they can not be subjects without imperiling our 
 form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our 
 civilization or to convert the Republic into an empire, we favor 
 
 kept in. power only by the lavish contributions of the 'trusts,' whatever they 
 may have been; but the people of the United States were growing weary 
 of their domination and were about to return to the true principles of Wash- 
 ington and Jefferson. The illustrious Americans 'Crosvy Sticcney and Vart- 
 ridge' were all laboring for the cause of PhiUppine independence. Long lists 
 of American cities were given in which the illustrious orators, Mr. Crosby 
 and Mr. Schurts had addressed applauding crowds upon the necessity of 
 throttUng the 'trusts' because they opposed recognition of the rights of the 
 Filipinos. In August, 1900, 'News from our agents in America* informed its 
 readers that — ■ 
 
 "'W. J. Bryan has stated in a speech that his first act upon being elected 
 president will be to declare the independence of the Philippines.' 
 
 "On June 16, 1900, Gen. Riego de Dios, acting head of the Hong Kong 
 junta, wrote to Gen. I. Torres (P. I. R., 530), the guerrilla commander in 
 Bulacan Province, and assured him that a little more endurance, a little more 
 constancy, was all that was needed to secure the attainment of their ends. 
 According to their advices the Democratic party would win in the approach- 
 ing elections in the United States, and — 'it is certain that Bryan is the incar- 
 nation of our independence.* 
 
 "The number of men opposed to the policy of the administration was said 
 to be continually increasing. 
 
 "The attitude of those who protect us can not be more manly and reso- 
 lute. 'Continue the struggle until you conquer or die,' Mr. Beecher of the 
 League of Cincinnati writes us. 'I shall always be the champion of the cause 
 of justice and of truth,' says Mr. Winslow, of the Boston League. 'Not even 
 threats of imprisonment will make me cease in my undertaking,* Doctor 
 Denziger assures us._ 'I shall accept every risk and responsibility,' says Doc- 
 tor Leverson. 'If it is necessary, I shall go so far as to provoke a revolution 
 in my own country,' repeats Mr. Udell. 'It is necessary to save the Republic 
 and democracy from the abyss of imperialism* is cried by all, and the sound 
 of this cry is ever rising louder and louder." Taylor, 13, 15 and 16, KK. E. 
 Quoted in Worcester, I, Chap. X.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY Rl^GIME 511 
 
 an immediate declaration of the Nation's purpose to give the 
 Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independ- 
 ence, and, third, protection from outside interference, such as has 
 been given for nearly a century to the Republics of Central and 
 South America." 
 
 The Republican platform approved what the administration 
 had done and promised to the Filipinos the largest measure of 
 self-government consistent with their welfare.^^ 
 
 The reelection of McKinley was a deathblow to the Anti- 
 Imperialist movement in the United States. It was also a bitter 
 disappointment to the insurgent leaders in the Philippines. Very 
 soon after the election the commission announced that there was 
 very little life left in the remains of the insurrection and that "no 
 one breathed more freely and took more enjoyment in the result 
 as announced than the conservative Filipino people."'^ 
 
 The opportune moment was now seized to strike a final blow 
 at what remained of the insurrection. More than a year earlier 
 General MacArthur had urged General Otis to inaugurate a more 
 drastic policy.^* The clemency shown captured soldiers, and 
 particularly the people who rendered assistance to the guerrillas, 
 seems to have been misconstrued. Such extreme leniency had 
 been regarded as evidence of conscious weakness and had induced 
 grave doubts in the minds of the Filipinos as to the wisdom of 
 casting in their lots with a power which at any time might decide 
 to abandon the islands. From his point of view the native might 
 very reasonably conclude that it were better to be a patriot and 
 stand well with the insurgent leaders, who punished disloyalty 
 by death, than to adhere to the foolish Americans, who, at the 
 
 " See the Republican and Democratic text-books for 1900. 
 
 »» Kept. Phil. Com., 1901, p. 34. 
 
 The reports as to conditions sent by the military governor and subse- 
 quently by the commission were often unduly optimistic. The inevitable 
 tendency was to overrate the value of the friendly assurances of the natives 
 with whom they were in personal contact and to underestimate the strength 
 of their natural and racial dislike of the conquering Americans. Every ori- 
 ental is an expert in the art of dissimulation, and even the Spaniard does not, 
 when he presents you with his house, expect you to take him literally and 
 demand a deed thereof. 
 
 ^*Rept. War Dept., 1900, I, Part 8, pp. 59, 60.
 
 512 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 worst, did no more than disarm and admonish the citizen discov- 
 ered trafficking with the guerrillas. The insurgent leaders ad- 
 hered inflexibly to the rule that every native who resided within 
 the limits of the Philippines owed active allegiance to their cause, 
 and the observance of the doctrine was enforced through secret 
 agents even within the limits of American garrisons. Punish- 
 ments, even capital, were administered without resistance by the 
 victims. A strange mixture of apathy, ignorance, timidity and 
 loyalty which incite our pity induced most of the people to acqui- 
 esce in this assumed authority. Even assassination was accepted 
 apparently as a legitimate exercise of power. Many indi- 
 viduals marked for death would not appeal to the Americans for 
 the protection which was at hand, or give the information which 
 would insure their safety. 
 
 On December 20, 1900, there was issued another proclamation 
 designed to inform the people that in the future the strict rules 
 of war would be enforced against all who violated them. The 
 law relating to occupied places was something of a revelation to 
 them. 
 
 "The white population," says General MacArthur, "especially 
 the part thereof residing in Manila, was perhaps quite as much, 
 if not more, surprised at the views propounded and the penalties 
 prescribed than the natives. The Filipino military leaders prob- 
 ably had never before been informed of the existence of such 
 a law and the possible application thereof to their own actions. 
 As an educational document the effect was immediate and far- 
 reaching. From the date of its issuance secret resistance and 
 apathy began to diminish, and kidnaping and assassination were 
 much abated. In a very short time these malign influences were 
 to a great extent superseded by cooperation and active interest 
 in American affairs. Rarely in war has a single document been 
 so instrumental in influencing ultimate results."^^ 
 
 '5 House Doc. 2, syih Cong., ist Sess.. Part 2, pp. 91, 93. For the order di- 
 recting strict enforcement of the law as outlined in the proclamation, see p. 93. 
 "In December Gen. MacArthur issued a proclamation warning all who were 
 aiding and abetting the insurrections by furnishing funds and other assist- 
 ance that they would be severely dealt with. Many persons suspected of com- 
 plicity in offenses of this description were imprisoned, and it ceased to be 
 regarded as an innocent amusement to enjoy life within American garrisons 
 and assist the guerrillas in the woods and mountains." Rept. Phil. Com., 1901.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 513 
 
 To remove any lingering doubts from the minds of those who 
 were skeptical as to the seriousness of the government a number 
 of the most active politicians and military leaders were banished 
 to the island of Guam until such time as conditions in the Philip- 
 pines should justify their retum.^^ All persons captured in the 
 field were thereafter to be retained in custody. 
 
 The policy declared in this proclamation and the removal of 
 the leading agitators encouraged conservative Filipinos to organ- 
 ize for effective peace work. This movement resulted in the 
 creation of the first Filipino political party under American gov- 
 ernment. Manifestly such a party might become an important 
 factor for crystallizing such sentiment as existed favorable to 
 the United States and thus advance the work of pacification. 
 Both the military governor and the members of the commission 
 encouraged the organization of this party.^' 
 
 Soon after the amnesty proclamation of December 20 was 
 issued, Arellano, Torres, Buencamino and others met in Manila 
 and adopted certain principles which for a time appeared satis- 
 factory to the intelligent natives. The organization included the 
 leading men of the islands who were not under arms, many of 
 whom are still serving the government with distinction to them- 
 selves and their countrymen. Their platform called for the rec- 
 ognition of American sovereignty, guarantees for personal prop- 
 erty and religious rights, local self-government, free education, 
 a legislative body with a Senate and House of Representatives, 
 representation in the American Congress, a governor-general 
 
 «« Gen. Order No. 4, Jan. 4, 1901. Under this order Ricarte, Pio Del Pilar, 
 Mabini, Pablo Ocampo, Trias, Manuel E. Roxas and others were sent to 
 Guam. During the month of January, 1901, many others of the irreconcilables 
 were also deported. 
 
 37 "There was an organized political party in 1900 called the Federal party, 
 which advocated permanent annexation of the Philippines to the United 
 States, to become later a state of the Union. That party I think lived about 
 two years. They found more opposition in this country than in the Philip- 
 pines. They did not find any one in the United States from the President, then 
 Governor of the Islands, down, who ever entertained the idea of bringing the 
 Philippines into the Union as a State. In fact. President Taft, testifsang 
 before the Insular Committee at that time, said : *I never encouraged the 
 idea* — the hope of Statehood." Testimony of Manuel Quezon, before Com* 
 on Ins. Affairs, Feb. 24, 1913. Hearing on H. R. 200049 (Jones Bill).
 
 514 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 with the power of veto, governors of provinces to be appointed 
 by the governor-general with the advice and consent of the Sen- 
 ate, a judiciary to be appointed by the governor-general, and, 
 uhimately, the admission of the islands as a state of the Ameri- 
 can Union.^* 
 
 Three months after assuming its legislative duties the com- 
 mission was able to report that forty-seven laws had been enacted. 
 A year later Secretary Root called the attention of Congress to 
 two hundred and sixty-three Philippine statutes, and expressed 
 the hope that the work of the commission would "receive the 
 approval which I believe it merits for its high quality of con- 
 structive ability, its wise adaptation to the ends desirable to be 
 accomplished, and its faithful adherence to the principles con- 
 trolling our government." 
 
 The most important of these statutes were the results of patient 
 study of actual conditions by the military and civil authorities. 
 While having no greater legal force than the orders of a military 
 commander, they were for all practical purposes statutes. They 
 had been publicly introduced into the formal body which the 
 president had designated to exercise the legislative power, sub- 
 ject to his approval, and had been duly printed, discussed and 
 passed according to the ordinary procedure of legislative bodies. 
 
 The Philippines thus 'at that early date had all the practical 
 advantages of having the legislative separated from the execu- 
 tive authority; the laws matured under the influence of public 
 discussion and deliberation; the laws certain, permanent and 
 known ; and the public money expended only pursuant to previous 
 appropriations duly made, so that official accountability could be 
 enforced by a rigid system of audit, testing the accounts of all 
 disbursing officers from the lowest to the highest by reference 
 to a fixed standard of lawful authority .^^ 
 
 The idea was universally prevalent that the personnel of the 
 
 38 Dr. Pardo de Tavero, Filipe Buencamino, and Florentine Torres subse- 
 quently wrote detailed accounts of the organization and purposes of the 
 Federal party. See H. Doc. 2, 56 Cong., 2nd Sess., Pt. 2, p. 114, for these 
 statements and also the platform of the party. The party was short lived, 
 being succeeded by the Progresista party. 
 
 ^^Rept. Secy, of War, 1901.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 515 
 
 Spanish government had been dishonest in the handling of pub- 
 He money. Undoubtedly there were faithful and honest Spanish 
 officials, but the system under which they worked made no pro- 
 vision for proper salaries and the government sent its appointees 
 out with the implied understanding that they might acquire 
 wealth by well understood methods. The official class had come 
 to the conclusion that public money like holy water was free. 
 
 The Filipinos were familiar with that system and assumed 
 that every official would appropriate a certain portion of the 
 money which came into his hands. To them it seemed as natural 
 for an official to steal as for a fruit bat to eat fruit. It would 
 take time and careful training to eradicate this idea. After ten 
 years of American rule a district engineer, when asked if the 
 people of his province at last believed that he honestly expended 
 all public funds, replied that they did but that they could not yet 
 understand why he was so foolish as to do so. Some progress, at 
 least, had been made. 
 
 One of the very last things an oriental grasps is the western 
 idea of the sacredness of public funds and the Filipino was an 
 oriental who had been trained in a very bad school of official 
 morality. To institute a popular government under such condi- 
 tions and secure officers who would honestly collect and ex- 
 pend the taxes was no easy task. It was indispensable that 
 officials should be obtained or developed who would be honest and 
 efficient according to American standards. The greater number 
 of officials would be natives. The elective officers in the munici- 
 palities would be such as the electors chose to select. The in- 
 structions of the president required that when practicable Fili- 
 pinos should be given the preference in appointments to office. 
 But such natives as were then qualified to hold office had 
 been trained in the Spanish service, and it was to be ex- 
 pected that some of these men, when trusted with official control 
 over the affairs of their fellow citizens, would be guilty of 
 financial irregularities. It was hoped that after a time with 
 the better salaries and the example of honest American of- 
 ficers a higher standard of official integrity would be developed.
 
 516 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 There was also grave danger that Americans unaccustomed to 
 power over such people and as yet without the spirit which is 
 developed in an established service such as that of the English 
 in India and Egypt, would occasionally prove unable to with- 
 stand the subtle temptations of the country. Many of them were 
 in the islands with the reasonable and proper hope and expecta- 
 tion of accumulating a comi)etence. Far from home and its as- 
 sociations and without the restraints of a settled community, 
 subject to the temptations offered in a country of loose official 
 morals by persons seeking to escape lawful burdens or obtain 
 fraudulent advantages, it would be surprising indeed if some of 
 them did not prove unworthy. To avoid as far as possible the 
 dangers inseparable from such conditions it was necessary that 
 a system of selection should be devised which would eliminate 
 favoritism and politics, provide adequate salaries, liberal leaves 
 of absence, and cultivate an interest in and an enthusiasm for 
 the service. It was equally essential that the system adopted 
 should be administered with impartiality, because "in no part 
 of the world does rumor of injustice or fraud or underhand 
 methods in the administration of public office receive so much 
 credit as in the Orient."** The commission, therefore, as one 
 of its first legislative acts passed a civil service law which was, 
 in fact, much superior to the one in force in the United States." 
 
 ^oRept. Phil. Com., 1900, p. 36. 
 
 41 Act No. 5 (Sept. 19, 1900). Printed in Rept. Phil. Com., 1900, p. 13 
 et seq. 
 
 This important fact escaped the notice of even the chairman of the Senate 
 Committee on the Philippines. 
 
 The following extract from the testimony taken by the Senate Committee 
 on the Philippines during the winter of 1914-15 is interesting. Former Vice- 
 Governor Gilbert was on the stand. 
 
 Senator Lane. "Yes, was he covered in under the civil service or was it 
 an appointment?" 
 
 The Chairman (Senator Hitchcock). "None of them. / do not think there 
 is any civil service in the Philippine Islands." 
 
 Mr. Gilbert "Oh, yes, sir, we have had a civil service law, which has 
 been observed, I think I may say, very scrupulously, for many years. . . ." 
 
 Senator Crawford. "That has been generally true ever since the Commis- 
 sion first went there. It is a merit system." 
 
 Mr. Gilbert. "It was one of the earliest systems that was established." 
 Hearings on H. R. 18459, p. 604.
 
 C. S. ARELLANO, CHIEF JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
 
 :iaccustamcd to 
 
 ■'oui the spirit which is 
 
 " that of ihe EngUsh 
 
 ^ jve unable to with- 
 
 )•. Many of them were 
 
 nper hope and expecta- 
 
 .i vv-i, . from home and its as- 
 
 ...: ->ut the : . a settled community, 
 
 .ot to the leiTtptations oflFered m a cotmtry of loose official 
 
 ' '"ng to t / f ul burdens or obtain 
 
 - V.V.. . vonld iA , -"g indeed if some of 
 
 1 not prt To ; far as possible the 
 
 daiiger.-^ inseparable was necessary that 
 
 ^ ould eliminate 
 
 . , liberal leaves 
 
 eaMiqiTJTHq sht ^o ffiiioD aMSaqya .SaiTg^i ks»*i5^^4[^i<>tjii^ffi .lor, 
 
 at tiie system adopted 
 ^llou:a '.• V -e 'in no jiart 
 
 of the \% ^, :a or underhand 
 
 methods in the administraticm of/ public office receive so much 
 credit as in the Orieitt."** ^ mission, therefore, as one 
 
 of its first lep-- ^- • • ■-' - ^cu i uvll service law which was, 
 in fact, mnci \ one in force in the United States.*^ 
 
 " Pritited in Fcpt. -'lu!. Com., 1900, p. 13 
 
 tib« tiOtk» of even the chairman of the Senate 
 
 I taken bj' the Sena.te Committee 
 
 ■ Pii. . ; ■ i 5 is interesting. JFormer Vice- 
 
 iior Gilbert w:o. 
 
 ator Lane. *' . :t?«red[ la tinder the civil service or was it 
 
 -,v''»o«Btment?" 
 
 ■p ,-if them. / do not think there 
 
 \ we lu.\- 'vil service lav has 
 
 *y, very : -'v, for many y<. . ." 
 
 - ' ue ever since tti<^ v .tnmis- 
 
 V v.«i^T*i. .T:>,.-.enis that was established."
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 517 
 
 Another important matter which required immediate atten- 
 tion was the reorganization of the judicial system. There was 
 much criticism of the personnel of the courts as organized by the 
 military government/^ The framing and enactment of a new 
 statute was attended with considerable excitement. It is notori- 
 ously difficult to induce any interested body or faction in Manila 
 to act upon any public matter at the proper time. When legisla- 
 tion in which they are vitally interested is pending, they ordi- 
 narily ignore requests to appear until the question has been set- 
 tled and the legislature is ready for the final vote, when they 
 suddenly appear and excitedly ask for a continuance until they 
 can have an opportunity to investigate matters. The lawyers, 
 organized under the title of the College of Advocates, ostenta- 
 tiously refused to attend the public sessions of the commission 
 because some eight months had not been sufficient time for them 
 to begin to study the proposed law. The commission thus was 
 deprived of the benefit of their valuable advice and assistance. 
 
 Under the new act permanent judges were to be appointed by 
 the commission in all the courts. The Supreme Court, consist- 
 ing of a chief justice and six associate justices, was to sit at 
 Manila, Iloilo and Cebu. Courts of first instance were to be 
 held in each of fourteen judicial districts, and certain municipali- 
 ties were to have municipal courts.*^ As organized the members 
 of the Supreme Court were Cayetano S. Arellano, Chief Justice; 
 and Florentino Torres, Victorina Mapa, Joseph F. Cooper, 
 James F. Smith and Charles A. Willard, Associate Justices. 
 Senor Arellano had been chief justice of the former court, and 
 was the Filipino of all others upon whom the various military 
 governors had relied for assistance in establishing peace, law 
 and order. Sefior Torres, who at the time of his appointment 
 was attorney-general, had, like the chief justice, worked faith- 
 fully along the same lines. Sefior Mapa was a Visayan from 
 Iloilo who had not previously taken an active part in public af- 
 
 *2 See Kept. War Dept., 1900, I, Part 10, p. 19, for comments of Lieut. CoL 
 Crowder, the military secretary. 
 
 <»Acts Nos. 136 and 140 (June 12, 1901), defined the judicial districts.
 
 518 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 fairs. Justice Smith at the time of his appointment was Col- 
 lector of customs and had been a brigadier-general of volun- 
 teers and military governor of Negros. 
 
 The Spanish code of criminal procedure had been amended 
 by General Order 58, issued April 23, 1900, so as to abolish the 
 old inquisitorial methods and conform to American procedure.** 
 The work was so well done that it has since been but slightly 
 amended.*^ A code of civil procedure w^hich it was hoped would 
 relieve the people from the oppressive burdens of the old system 
 was enacted/® 
 
 The selection of the judges for the courts of first instance 
 was attended with much agitated discussion. "Believing the 
 judiciary a critical point in our administration," wrote a 
 contemporaneous observer, "the commission proposed making 
 a somewhat clean sweep of the present personnel and nam- 
 ing men of tried standing from the States. This has driven 
 the native press into paroxysms. They say the Filipino judges 
 stood by the American government during the time of trial and 
 that they are now to be ousted without any proof of guilt or in- 
 competency; that if they have done wrong then let charges be 
 brought against them. Our American press while violent enough 
 in its opposition to appointing Filipinos, is pro-military and con- 
 demns the Commission for overlooking the judicial merits of 
 various volunteer army officers whose commissions expire 
 shortly."*' Against the protest of many interested parties, it 
 
 ** For a summary of the changes made, see Kept. War Dept., 1900, I, Part 
 10, p. 17 et seq. 
 
 <5 "The preparation of a reformed code of criminal procedure was largely 
 the work of Judge Young, who was also a member of the board convened to 
 frame the new municipal law (General Order No. 40)." Rept. Lt. Col. E. H. 
 Crowder, Mil. Secy., Sept. 20, 1900. Rept. War Dept., 1900, I, p. 20. 
 
 46 Act No. 190 (August 7, 1901. For a description of the old system, see 
 p. 246, supra; also, Williams, Odyssey, p. 92. 
 
 47 Williams, Odyssey, p, 252. "The American bar of Manila is also up in 
 arms, and is literally pawing the air because the Commission has provided 
 that Spanish shall continue the official language of the Courts until 1906. 
 They want English substituted at once even though it would result in elimi- 
 nating practically every Filipino from the practice. Their attitude has the 
 support of the American papers, and is condemned utterly by the Spanish- 
 Filipino press."
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 519 
 
 was determined that the Spanish language should be the official 
 language of the courts until 1906/* 
 
 The president's instructions required the organization of mu- 
 nicipal governments at as early a date as possible. But the 
 previous enactment of a new municipal code was necessary. In 
 1893 Minister Maura wrote that "the local institutions of the 
 Philippines have arrived at such a state of decadence and mis- 
 understanding that those of their members who have not been 
 corrupted are atrophied and useless." The new Maura Law was 
 in effect in only a few localities. Municipal governments had 
 been provided for by General Order Number 43.*" On further 
 considerations the military governor had on January 29, 1900, 
 appointed the always willing and efficient Chief Justice Arellano 
 and Attorney-General Torres and the three American judges, a 
 board charged with the duty of devising a complete system of 
 municipal government adapted to the new conditions, under 
 which the people might control their own local affairs through 
 officers of their own selection. This board drafted a law'" of 
 which it said: 
 
 "For the first time the Filipino people are to exercise the right 
 of suffrage in the election of municipal officers, a right only 
 slightly restricted by conditions which have been imposed for 
 the purpose of rewarding as well as encouraging the people in 
 their just and natural aspirations to become educated and worthy 
 to enjoy all the benefits of civilization." 
 
 When the commission arrived in the islands, a few towns had 
 applied for organization under this code, but none in fact had 
 been organized.^* At the request of the commission no new 
 applications were received, and matters were held in abeyance 
 until it should assume its legislative functions. In the mean- 
 time the order was printed in Spanish, Tagalog and Visayan 
 
 *8 The date was extended and Spanish is still the official language of the 
 courts. 
 
 " Series of 1899. 
 
 "0 Gen. Order No. 40, Series of 1900, promulgated March 29, 1900. 
 
 *^ See Lt. Col. Crowder's report on municipal governments, Rept. War 
 DepU, 1900, I, Part 10, p. 28 et scq.
 
 520 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 and widely distributed and discussed by the people. Some fifty 
 towns, which had applied early, were organized so that when 
 the commission undertook to draft a new code, it had the benefit 
 of much advice and some experience under the existing law. The 
 new law which was passed in 1901, was based upon Order Num- 
 ber 40.''' 
 
 This beginning the work of introducing popular government 
 at the bottom and working upward was much criticized by those 
 who believed in what had been described as "Oriental govern- 
 ment under the control of a system of sentry boxes," — the method 
 by which the Dutch had governed Netherlands India. Neverthe- 
 less it was strictly logical and in accord with the teachings of 
 history. In primitive communities the unit of government is 
 always a group of people living as a small community and gov- 
 erning themselves on democratic principles."' It was in the local 
 communities that "governments essentially popular" would be 
 most likely to succeed, because the people had already some ex- 
 perience in self-government. 
 
 Another act which provided for the organization of provincial 
 governments, was general in form and required a special act to 
 put it into effect in any particular province. 
 
 Having provided the machinery for local government, the 
 commission's next task was to put it in operation in the pacified 
 provinces. The president's instructions were to organize the 
 mimicipalities first. But matters had moved so rapidly that it 
 was decided to establish provincial governments first and ap- 
 point the provincial governors chairmen of committees to or- 
 ganize municipalities. 
 
 The organization of these governments was made the occasion 
 for a somewhat spectacular tour about the islands. The mem- 
 bers of the commission had been kept closely confined to Manila 
 
 52 Kept. Phil. Com., 1900, p. 53 ; Ihid., 1901, p. 154. 
 
 5* It is a curious fact that despotisms usually embrace democracies. In 
 speaking of the political system of the East, Sir Charles Elliott {Letters front 
 the Far East, p. 4) says : "The political system nearly always consists of a 
 democracy beneath a despotism which allows surprisingly free play to indi- 
 vidual careers, although progressive movements rarely succeed unless aided 
 from without."
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 521 
 
 and from personal observation knew little of the actual condi- 
 tions in distant provinces. It was an opportunity for them to see 
 the country and cultivate friendly, personal relations with the 
 people who never visited the capital city. So the commission 
 with its accessories and impedimenta traveled to the places where 
 provincial governments were to be organized and after full in- 
 vestigation of local conditions proceeded to exercise its execu- 
 tive and legislative functions on the spot. Probably never be- 
 fore since the days when new laws sprang from the mouths of 
 peripatetic monarchs had a fully equipped legislature wandered 
 about the country seeking evils to be remedied. 
 
 It was the first of many such official tours. It is customary 
 in India for the governors to travel throughout the country for 
 purposes of inspection with elaborate trains, living in tents and 
 holding solemn durbars. The Philippine Commission in a very 
 democratic way visited the people, slept in their houses, ate at 
 their tables, and met their leading men and women on a basis of 
 perfect social equality. The Filipinos were greatly flattered by 
 the visits and by the attentions paid them as individuals and ex- 
 erted themselves to justify their reputation for hospitality. These 
 inspection trips are so important a part of the life of a high 
 government official in the Philippines that a somewhat detailed 
 description of the methods of procedure is justified. On all 
 such occasions the real wear and tear results from the social 
 activities. The play is the killing work ; the dancing, dining and 
 eating, the serious danger to health and happiness. The baile is 
 an official dance held in the town hall or school building when 
 available, and is always opened with the stately rigodon led by 
 the ranking visiting official with the wife of the ranking local 
 official. A crowded ballroom in the tropics presents few tempta- 
 tions to a normal middle-aged American of even average avoir- 
 dupois. The members of the commission who made this first 
 grand tour of the islands were large men physically,"* but they 
 
 '*The aggrregrate weight of the five members of the commission and its 
 secretary was 1,362 pounds, an average of 227 pounds each. The Filipinos, 
 who are small people, regarded the commission as an imposing spectacle.
 
 522 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 had a lofty sense of duty which enabled them during two months 
 to participate in from one to five banquets a day, make many 
 speeches, hold trying public sessions, organize and launch local 
 governments, and dance with the ladies until after midnight. 
 
 During February and March, 1901, the commission visited 
 provinces north of Manila and were received with great en- 
 thusiasm by the native people/" The general method of pro- 
 cedure was the same in all the provinces. Upon arriving at the 
 capital the commission would consult with the American army 
 officer stationed there with reference to conditions, candidates 
 for office, and other matters which might enable them to carry 
 on an intelligent discussion with the people. It then met in con- 
 vention with the presidentes, municipal counselors and principal 
 men who had been summoned to the meeting. The important 
 towns of the province were generally well represented. Mr. Taft 
 as president of the commission would state the purposes of the 
 visit and explain the provisions of the provincial government 
 law. The provisions to be inserted in the special act for the 
 province relating to the capital, boundaries, salaries of officials, 
 and other local matters, would be fully discussed and if in the 
 
 55 The party consisted of Commissioners Taft, Worcester, Wright and 
 Moses, with Arthur F. Fergusson, Secretary of the Commission, and a full 
 complement of subordinates. With them went Chief Justice Arellano, Dr. 
 Pardo de Tavera, Senores Flores and Herrera, representing the federal party, 
 and representatives of the American and Spanish-Filipino press. One of the 
 private secretaries thus described the procedure : 
 
 "Our progress along the railroad was a continuous ovation. The first 
 stop was at Bocaue, where a throng of people and two bands — ^both playing 
 at once — heralded our arrival. A number of leading citizens, dressed in 
 customary official black, said they were glad to see us, to which Judge Taft 
 responded, nosotros tambien. General Flores then made a short talk in 
 Tagalog, the purport of which was that if the people behaved themselves 
 things would come their way. The crowd in the meantime gazed at us in 
 petrified silence broken only when the train started, by vivas for La Comision 
 Civil, for America, and various other entities. At Guiguinto we had more 
 music and more speeches, De Tavera getting into the game here with some 
 good advice to the populace. . . , The above proceeding was repeated 
 with variations as to speakers at Malolos and Calumpit ... At San 
 Fernando, where we left the train, the military added their pageantry to that 
 of the natives, the place being decked in holiday attire. Carriages were in 
 waiting and we were conducted in state through a succession of streets 
 spanned by triumphal arches of palm and bamboo. The schools had been 
 dismissed and the children, each with a tiny American flag stuck stiffly up in 
 front, were lined up to greet us." Williams, The Odyssey of the Philippine 
 Commission, p. 146. '
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 523 
 
 judgment of the commission a provincial government should 
 be established, the first officers were appointed and sworn in. 
 
 These formal hearings were supplemented by public receptions, 
 investigations, dances and banquets, which were not the least 
 important of the means by which the commission cultivated the 
 good will of the Filipinos. 
 
 The southern trip extended from March 4 to May 3 and was 
 a repetition with local variations, of the experiences in the north- 
 em provinces. In describing one of the innumerable hailes, Mr. 
 Williams wrote: 
 
 "There was the usual crowd of men in official black bowing 
 and smiling, with a background of dainty femininity bedecked 
 with jewels and fine raiment. It was a scene full of color, with 
 no hint of that grim figure, scarcely out of sight, which had so 
 lately traced its course in blood and flame across the lives of the 
 people. The situation seemed a bit unreal. It was hard to 
 understand why the passionate hatreds of war had left no ap- 
 parent bitterness in their wake." 
 
 This was explained by one of the guests who spoke of life under 
 the Spaniards when the Filipinos were treated as inferiors and 
 permitted no participation in public affairs; of the coming of 
 the Americans and the insurrection waged by ambitious leaders 
 who misrepresented the character and purposes of the Ameri- 
 cans; of the discovery that American soldiers and officers were 
 willing to be the friends of the people ; that a provincial govern- 
 ment had just been organized, and that the "Commission had 
 honored them with a visit and had given personal assurance not 
 only that we held no animosity against them but would help them 
 to realize their legitimate aspirations."" 
 
 "Williams. Odyssey, pp. 171-2. 
 
 "The reception which was accorded the Commission by the educated people 
 and the common people alike was most gratifying. It is easy to discredit the 
 sincerity of such manifestations and it must be admitted that an Oriental 
 people like tliis are much more demonstrative and love to sliow their feelings 
 in fiestas, music, flowers, and arches more than an Occidental people, but the 
 evidences of the sincerest interest in our work and of a real cordial welcome 
 were too many to be doubted. The interest which was taken in the discussion 
 varied, of course, in different provinces. But in all, the attention given to the
 
 524 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 The party visited all the southern provinces including the Moro 
 country where friendly relations were established with the Sul- 
 tan of Sulu who had recently become famous in America as the 
 hero of a comic opera. The provinces of Surigao and Misamis 
 were carved out of sections of Mindanao and given provincial 
 governments.^'' 
 
 The first week in May found the commission back in Manila 
 busily engaged in organizing governments in the remaining prov- 
 inces of Luzon and preparing for the coming installation of the 
 central civil government. 
 
 The commission was seriously embarrassed in its work by limi- 
 tations upon its legislative power. Many subjects which required 
 consideration were deemed beyond the war powers of the presi- 
 dent. There were some strict constructionists who doubted the 
 validity of many things which were being done, even the action 
 of the president in creating the commission. In order to re- 
 move such doubts Congress was urged to confirm what had been 
 done and specifically to authorize the commission to enact laws 
 with reference to public lands, mining, franchises, and other mat- 
 ters deemed necessary for the development of the country. 
 
 On March 2, 1901, Congress took its first halting step toward 
 the performance of its constitutional duty to provide rules and 
 regulations for the new territory.^^ The Spooner Act, however, 
 did little more than approve what the president had done by 
 virtue of the war power and authorize him to continue govern- 
 ing the islands. It provided that "all military, civil and judicial 
 powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands acquired from 
 Spain . . . shall, until otherwise provided by Congress be 
 vested in such person and persons and shall be exercised in such 
 manner as the President of the United States shall direct for 
 
 proceedings was unusual and the gratitude of the people for the establish- 
 ment of civil governments was certain and clear." Report of Governor Taft, 
 Feb. 1, 1902 {Kept. Phil. Com., 1900-3, p. 136). 
 
 5' Williams records that proper notice of the arrival of the commission 
 had not been given to Surigao and there was some trouble in arranging for 
 the public reception owing to the fact that five of the presidentes were in jail 
 charged with furnishing supplies to the insurgents. 
 
 58 The so-called Spooner Amendment to the Army App. Bill. See Rept. 
 Phil. Com., 1900-3, p. 274.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 525 
 
 the establishment of civil government and for maintaining and 
 protecting the inhabitants of such islands in the free enjoyment 
 of their liberty, property and religion." But v^^hat was thus 
 granted in general terms was so limited by provisos as to prac- 
 tically destroy the value of the legislation. 
 
 Congress was very anxious to conserve the public domain in 
 the Philippines and protect it from the exploiters who were as- 
 sumed to be hovering over the islands. After stating that until 
 a permanent government should be established full reports of 
 all legislative proceedings should be made to Congress and re- 
 ports as to general conditions to the president, it provided "that 
 no sale or lease or other disposition of the public lands or the tim- 
 ber thereon, or the mining rights therein, shall be made," thus 
 specifically denying to the commission the powers which it 
 deemed most necessary for the public welfare. Franchises ap- 
 proved by the president were authorized to be granted, but they 
 must contain a reservation of the right to alter, amend, or repeal, 
 and only such should be granted as in the judgment of the presi- 
 dent were clearly necessary for the immediate good of the islands 
 and indispensable for the interest of the people, and which could 
 not without great mischief be postponed until the establishment 
 of permanent civil government. Every franchise granted under 
 this carefully guarded authority should terminate one year after 
 the establishment of such civil government. This legislation did 
 nothing toward bettering conditions."' 
 
 While at Jolo the commission had learned of the capture of the 
 insurgent leader. Aguinaldo had played no particular part in the 
 guerrilla operations which were carried on after he disappeared 
 into the wilderness in December, 1899. He had, however, kept 
 
 ^^ "Word has come of the passage by Congress of the so-called Spooner 
 Bill relating to Philippine affairs and it is a great disappointment. . . . 
 The law effectually ties the hands of the Commission so far as developing 
 the resources of the Islands is concerned, without which development no gen- 
 eral prosperity can be expected. The whole thing illustrates how foolish our 
 representatives can be when dealing with something which does not affect 
 their chance of re-election, and concerning which they have no knowledge, 
 nor the ambition to acquire it. No action whatever was taken to relieve us 
 of our unfortunate currency muddle." Williams, Odyssey, p. 163 (March 31, 
 1901).
 
 526 THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 in irregular communication with some of his adherents. Thus in 
 January, 1900, he received a letter from Hong Kong. In April 
 he was in Abra in consultation with General Tinio, but in May, 
 to avoid capture, he returned to the Cagayan Valley.®" In Au- 
 gust or September, 1900, he reached the little town of Palanan on 
 the isolated northeastern coast of Luzon where on March 24, 
 1901, he was captured by a small party led by General Funston.*^ 
 Aguinaldo was brought to Manila and treated with courtesy and 
 consideration by General MacArthur. He immediately asked for 
 Mabini (who had been sent to Guam) and Chief Justice Arellano 
 who had been his first secretary of foreign affairs. With the 
 chief justice he examined the laws which had been passed by 
 the commission and studied the plans of the United States for 
 the government of the islands, and being convinced that the 
 Americans had only the welfare of the Filipinos at heart, took 
 the oath of allegiance to the United States, which he ever after 
 faithfully observed. With the assistance of Arellano,®^ he pre- 
 pared and issued a proclamation to the Filipino people, in which 
 he said : 
 
 "The time has come, however, when they (the Filipinos) find 
 their advance along this path impeded by an irresistible force, — 
 a force which while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind 
 and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of 
 peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of 
 our fellow countrymen, who are already united around the 
 glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this 
 banner they repose their trust, in the belief that under its pro- 
 tection our people will attain all the promised liberties which 
 they are even now beginning to enjoy. The country has declared 
 unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood f 
 
 60 See Kept. War Dept, 1900, 1, Part 6, pp. 706-720; Part 5, p. 2011. Villas' 
 Diary tells of Aguinaldo's narrow escape. 
 
 61 Gen. Funston (Memories of Two Wars, Chap. VII) gives a graphic 
 account of this remarkable exploit. 
 
 62 At Cebu, on April 18, 1901, Williams wrote: "Chief Justice Arellano, 
 who had returned to Manila from Iliolo, rejoined us here. He came to sub- 
 mit to the Commission the draft of a proposed proclamation prepared by 
 Aguinaldo". To Arellano belongs largely the credit for influencing Aguinaldo 
 to take tlie oath of allegiance, his return to Manila being almost coincident 
 with Aguinaldo's capture." Odyssey, p. 222.
 
 THE END OF THE MILITARY REGIME 527 
 
 enough of tears and desolation. ... By acknowledging and 
 accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the 
 entire Archipelago, as I now do, without any reservation what- 
 soever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved Country. 
 May happiness be thine." 
 
 .With the capture of Aguinaldo, the institution of provincial 
 governments, and the organization of executive departments, the 
 military government of the Philippines came to an end. The 
 legislative power had been vested in the commission since Sep- 
 tember 1, 1900. The president of the commission was now ap- 
 pointed civil governor and on July 4, 1901, a civil government 
 for the islands, under the immediate control of the secretary of 
 war, was formally inaugurated. 
 
 THE END
 
 INDEX
 
 INDEX 
 
 Agoncillo, Felipe, Filipino representative abroad : proposes treaty with United 
 States, 385; letter to Peace Commission, 405; correspondence with 
 Aguinaldo, 418. 
 
 Aguinaldo, Emilio: insurrection of 1896, 193; negotiations with Primo de 
 Rivera, 199 ; signs pact of Biak-na-bato, 201 ; withdraws to Hong Kong, 
 204; care of the money, 205, 207; conversations with Pratt, 389; re- 
 turns to Hong Kong, 390; report to Junta, 410-413; taken to Cavite, 
 414; meeting with Dewey, 405-414; claim of promise of independence, 
 404, 405, 413; proclaims a civil government, 396; his policy, 416-418; 
 negotiates for peace, 475-478; abandoned by conservatives, 478; rela- 
 tions with Luna, 478 note; disappears in mountains, 526; captured by 
 Funston, 526; oath of allegiance and proclamation, 526; his influence 
 
 , and character, 382, 383. 
 
 'Alcalde-Mayor, a provincial governor, 220. 
 
 Alexander VI, the demarcation bulls, 137, 138. 
 
 Ammunition, shortage of at naval battle, 297, 298, 
 
 Amnesty proclamation, issued by MacArthur, 513. 
 
 Anda, Simon de, magistrate: assumes command against British, 166; be- 
 comes governor-general, 168; his character, 168. 
 
 Anderson, Brigadier-General Thomas M. : commands first expedition, 304; 
 estabhshes camp Dewey, 305 ; negotiations with insurgents, 404 ; article 
 in North American Review, 307 note, 315 note, 403, 4M. 
 
 Andre, Belgian consul, negotiations through, 307. 
 
 Animal life, extent of, 74-76. 
 
 Anti-Imperialists: their work, 367; their contentions, 372; join with Demo- 
 crats, 376; Senator Hoar's views, 371 ; arguments of Hoar, Schurz and 
 Storey, 391 ; opposition continued, bitterness of, 459-461 ; encourage in- 
 surgents, 459, 508, 509 ; Schurz' charge of bad faith toward Aguinaldo, 
 380 ; accept Filipino statements as true, 404. 
 
 Aquarium, at Manila, 77. 
 
 Arellano, Cayetano S. : in Aguinaldo's cabinet, favors American control, 475 ; 
 report on Spanish legal system, 232 note; on board to draft municipal 
 code, 519; chief justice, 517. 
 
 Attraction, Spanish policy of, 382. 
 
 Audiencia: 215; its institution, 239, 241; a Supreme Court, 239; other func- 
 tions, 239-241 ; its branches, 242. 
 
 Autos accordados, ordinances of audiencia, as precedents, 241. 
 
 Badojis, Junta of, 145. 
 
 Baguio: a health resort in Benguet Mountains, 66; rainfall at, 67. 
 
 Barangay, ancient political unit, 229, 231. 
 
 Bates Treaty, with Sultan, 469, 470. 
 
 Benguet Road, its location, 67. 
 
 Biak-na-bato, pact of : negotiations between Primo de Rivera and Agui- 
 naldo, 199-205 ; terms of the agreement, 201, 203; the reforms, 201, 206. 
 
 Bismarck, Prince, on American policy, 304 note. 
 
 Blanco : Liberal governor-general, 192 ; grants safe-conduct to Rizal, 194. 
 
 Board of Authorities, 213. 
 
 Bonifacio, Andres, head of Katipunan, 191. 
 
 Bryan, W. J. : urges ratification of treaty, 378 ; alleged relations with insur- 
 gents, 508 note. 
 
 Bukidnons, a promising wild people, 91. 
 
 531
 
 532 INDEX 
 
 Cabatan, A., book on Java cited, 17, 18. 
 
 Cabeza de Barangay, a petty native official, 229. 
 
 Camara, Spanish admiral, starts for Manila, 312. 
 
 Cambon, Jules, French ambassador, represents Spain, 320. 
 
 Caiio, El : completes Magellan's voyage around world, 145 ; his second expe- 
 dition, 145. 
 
 Capitulation of Manila : made in ignorance of peace, 326, 331, 425 ; terms of, 
 313 ; nature of, 313. 
 
 Casa de Contratacion, or India House, 232. ^ 
 
 Chao-Ju-Kuo, Chinese geographer, description of natives, 104. 
 
 Chinese : as colonizers, 5 ; early traders, visit of Mandarins, 170, 281 ;^ the 
 Parian, the silk market, 281 ; as artisans and laborers, 281 ; industrious, 
 become wealthy, 284; fear and jealousy of, 281; restriction as to trade 
 and residence, 284; massacres of, 170, 171, 282, 283; excluded by Gen- 
 eral Otis, American exclusionary law in force, 438, 439; as cooks, 110. 
 
 Christians and non-Christians, classification of people, 80, 86. 
 
 Churches, to be protected, 424. 
 
 Citizenship: under treaty of Paris, 356; under acts of Congress, 358 note. 
 
 Civil government : policy as to establishing, 487 ; in occupied^ territory, 487, 
 488 ; unpopular with army, 488, 489 ; war powers of president, 489, 490 ; 
 constitutional questions, 490, 492; political precedents, 492-494; the 
 Insular cases, 494-496; the new Philippine Commission, 496; the presi- 
 dent's instructions, 497 ; nature of the government, 497 ; its foundation 
 principles, 498-504 ; commission enters on its work, 504 ; condition and 
 prospects, 506; issues statement, 506; public hearings, 506, 507; study 
 of topics, 507, 508; effect of presidential campaign, 508; reelection of 
 McKinley, 511; severe measure adopted, 512, 513; organization of Fed- 
 eral party, 513; enactment of laws, 514, 518; civil service law, 515, 516; 
 reorganization of judicial system, 517; new provincial and municipal 
 codes, 519, 520; commission visits provinces and organizes provincial 
 governments, 520-524; defective powers of commission, 524; the 
 Spooner amendment, 524, 525; Ag^inaldo's capture and oath of alle- 
 giance, 526, 527. 
 
 Civil service law : necessity for, 515 ; enactment of, 516. 
 
 Climate : its character, 78 ; safe with precautions, 79. 
 
 Cockpits, revenue from, 263. 
 
 Codes : ancient Spanish, 233, 234 ; modem Civil Codes, 238 ; the Penal Code, 
 _238;Order No. 58, 238. 
 
 Colonial debts, assumption of, 333-337, 353. 
 
 Colonization : theories of, 1 ; history, 5 ; modern problems, 2 ; modern defini- 
 nition, 3; objects of, 2; involves moral, economic and political con- 
 siderations, 3 ; primitive people's colonies, 5 ; Chinese, 5 ; Phoenicians, 
 5; Greeks, 6, 7; Romans, 7-9; the feudal kingdoms, 9, 10; the Mid- 
 dle Ages, 10; Venetians, 10; Spaniards, 11-13; Spanish methods, 
 11, 12; Portuguese, 12; Dutch, 13-19; English, 19-28; French, 29-31; 
 Italian, 31-33; German, 33-36; Japanese, 36; Belgian, 36 note; a 
 new era, 27; demand for tropical products, 28; territorial expansion, 
 pressure of population, 28 ; new ambitions, 29 ; by United States, 53, 54 ; 
 governing non-contiguous territory, S3; a free hand in Orient, 54; 
 advanced theories, welfare of natives, 55; importance given education, 
 58, 59. 
 
 Colony, definitions and classifications of, 2 ; see Colonization. 
 
 Comyn, Tomas de, description of natives, 106. 
 
 Conferences with insurgents : at Iloila, 441 ; Otis with Aguinaldo's commis- 
 sion, 448; after Malolos, efforts of Schurman Commission, 473-477. 
 
 Conquest of Philippines, 343. 
 
 Consejo de Filipinas, 211.
 
 INDEX 533 
 
 Constitutional questions : istatus of the new territory, 490 ; does constitution 
 follow the flag, 491 ; the Vest and Piatt resolutions, 491 ; the property 
 of the United States, 491 ; the Louisiana and other precedents, 492, 493 ; 
 the Insular cases, 494-496. 
 
 Constructive period: first seventy-five years of Spanish rul^ 153, 154, 159; 
 Morga's description, 159.^ 
 
 Consuls, American, dealings with Aguindaldo, see Chapter XV. 
 
 Continental opinion : favored Spain, 348-350 ; as to relative naval power, 291. 
 
 Conversion of Indians, object of the enterprise, 154, 155. 
 
 Cooper, Joseph F., justice Supreme Court, 517. 
 
 Corrupt systems, difficulties of reformers. Governor Bustamente, 163. 
 
 Cortes, Filipino representation in, 172, 173. 
 
 Council of administration, 213, 214. 
 
 Courts: audiencia, provincial courts, courts of first instance, 243; justice 
 courts, 244; ecclesiastical, miUtary, commercial, treasury and conten- 
 tious, 245-246; inefficient, 247; reconstituted by Americans, 430, 517. 
 
 Cromer, Lord : Roman colonial policy, 9 ; self-government in India, 45 note; 
 in Egypt, 49, 50 ; ultimate control over natives, 55. 
 
 Crown colonies, 2, 52. 
 
 "Culture" system: in Java, 16; profitable to Netherlands, 17; its vicious 
 character, 17, 18 ; in Philippines, 17 note. 
 
 Customs duties, see Taxation, 249. 
 
 Day, Dr. Clive, book on Java cited, 16, 17, 18. 
 
 Deceit and dissimulation, results from environment, 112. 
 
 Deidrich, Vice-Admiral von : friction with Dewey, 301-304 ; publishes state- 
 ment, 303 note. 
 
 Denby, Charles, member Schurman Commission, 450. 
 
 Deportations : after Cavite revolt, 187, 188 ; by Americans to Guam, 513. 
 
 Desmarinas, early governor, 158. 
 
 Dewey, Admiral George : command of Asiatic squadron, 385 ; ordered to be 
 prepared, 292; takes fleet to Mirs Bay, 292; Prince Henry's farewell, 
 292; ships of his fleet, 292; sails for Manila Bay and attacks, 295; 
 ignores mines, 293 ; reports victory, 299 ; cuts cables, 300 ; awaits troops, 
 301 ; relations with foreign navies, 301 ; friction with Germans, 301-304 ; 
 arrival of General Anderson, 304; arranges for surrender of Manila, 
 307; discourages immediate attack, 310; aids in attack, 312; asks Pratt 
 to send Aguinaldo to Hong Kong, 389-397; meets Ag^uinaldo on 
 Olympia, 398; no promises made, 400; calls on Aguinaldo informally, 
 402 ; recommends a commission, 450 ; member first commission, 450. 
 
 Dialects, number of, 101. 
 
 Dickens, Charles, satirizes cultivation of natives, 3. 
 
 Dogs, as food, 97. 
 
 Drake, Sir Francis, 19. 
 
 Draper, General William, captures Manila, 164. 
 
 Earthquakes, 73. 
 
 Ecclesiastical system: its organization, 218; interwoven with civil govern- 
 ment. 215, 220-222. 
 
 Economic Society of Friends, organization of, 174. 
 
 Education : 154 ; American belief in, 58 ; among Moros, 125, 126. 
 
 Egypt: England's constructive work, 48, 49; Cromer's rule, weakened under 
 Gorst, 49 ; Kitchener's firmer control and extension of native participa- 
 tion, 51 ; education in, 59. 
 
 Embargoed estates, 435. 
 
 Encomienda : the system, 275-277 ; grants by Legaspi, 156, 159 ; abuses under, 
 277 ; Morga's report on, 276 note. 
 
 England: early colonization by, 19, 20; settlement colonies in temperate 
 climes, 20; the mercantile theory, 20; loss of American colonies, 20;
 
 534 INDEX 
 
 England — Continued. 
 
 return of colonies after 1815, 21 ; humanitarian spirit, growth of, 21 ; 
 the Colonization Society of 1830, 21 ; three periods of colonial history, 
 21-27; training the colonies for self-government, 22; views of states- 
 men, 22-26; Greater Britain, Seeley's Expansion of England, 25, 26; 
 Disraeli and the Empire, 27; the new policy, 27; in Egypt, 48-51; atti- 
 tude of English toward natives, 52; capture of Manila by English, 166; 
 see India. 
 
 Environment : passive attitude toward, 85 ; dissatisfaction with, test of prog- 
 ress, 85. 
 
 Evil, Oriental view of, 85. 
 
 Expansion, see Policy of Expansion. 
 
 Factories, trading posts, colonial outposts, 10. 
 
 Federal party, its organization and platform, 513. 
 
 Filipinos: as a separate race, 100; of Malay origin, 81, 89; the civilized peb- 
 ple, include Tagalogs, Visayans, Bicols, Ilocanos, Pampangos, Pan- 
 gasines and Ibangs, 100; speak different dialects, 100, 101; racial differ- 
 ences, 100 ; occupy coast and lowlands, 100, 101 ; their social and politi- 
 cal organization, 101, 102 ; descriptions of the people, 104-109 ; conflict- 
 ing views, 103 ; difficult to understand, 109 ; are gregarious, good na- 
 tured and hospitable, 109; family life, status of women, 109, 110; as 
 servants, 110; truth-telling, 111; different standards of conduct, 112; 
 indolence and climate, 112; reserved, proud and dignified, 112, 113. 
 
 Financial troubles : Spanish, mismanagement, 161 ; burden on king, 161, 162 ; 
 charges against, 168, 169. 
 
 Finley, Lieutenant-Colonel John P., governor, on religion of Moros, 126. 
 
 Fish and Fishing, 77, 78. 
 
 Flowers, 77. ^ 
 
 Forced labor : regulation of, 265, 277 ; on public works, 275. 
 
 Foreman, John, 108. 
 
 Foster, George E., colonies a trust, 3 note, 
 
 France: early colonial policy, 19; modern ambition, 29; African colonies, 
 policy hberal, reforms in Algiers, educational work, 30, 31 note. 
 
 Friars : see Monastic Orders, Ecclesiastical System ; claim exemption 
 from control, 218 ; become curates, 219 ; their number, 219 ; absorb civil 
 power, 220-222; their good and bad qualities, conflicting views, 222- 
 225 ; cause of insurrection, 438. 
 
 Fuero Jusgo, an ancient code, 234. 
 
 Germany : becomes an aggressive colonial nation, ZZ ; Bismarck's views, ZZ ; 
 acquisitions in Africa, 33-35; her policy, 35; treatment of natives, 
 35, 36. 
 
 Gironiere, Paul de la, description of natives, 106. 
 
 Governors: Spanish, list of, 160 note; their character, 160, 161, 174; pro- 
 prietary, 155 ; quarrels with ecclesiastics, 155, 162-164, 215 ; occasionally 
 energetic, 174; qualities of a good governor, 216; Enrile organizes the 
 Economic Society of Friends of the Country, 174; difficulties, 215; the 
 residencia, 216-218 ; terms of 271. 
 
 Gobernadorcillo, a petty governor, 229, 252. 
 
 Greeks: nature of their colonies, 6; Aristotle's definition, 6; the city state, 6, 
 7 ; independent communities, 6 ; the ver sacrum, 6. 
 
 Greene, Brigadier-General F. V. : commands second expedition, 305 ; at battle 
 of Manila, 306-319; incident of Filipino trenches, 309; account of battle, 
 309 note, 316 note. 
 
 Head-hunting, custom of, 94, 95. 
 
 Hoar, George, Republican Senator and Anti-Imperialist, 371.
 
 INDEX 535 
 
 Holland: the Lisbon trade, 13; trading companies, 13, 14; Dutch East-India 
 Company, 14; their rule in Java, 15-18; the native governments, 15 ; the 
 "culture" system, 16-18; Httle efforts to train natives, 16; improved 
 conditions, education, 18 note; colonial constitution of 1854, 18. 
 
 Id^ Henry C, member of the commission, secretary of finance and justice, 
 497. 
 
 Ifugaos, a wild tribe, 91. 
 
 Igorots : one of wild tribes, 92; two groups of, Bontoc and Benguet, 92; cus- 
 toms and modes of life, 92-99 ; head-hunting, 94 ; dog eating, 97 ; truth- 
 telling, 96; adopting modern customs, 96; schools, 97. 
 
 Ilocanos, important group of wild men, 100. 
 
 Ilongots, a wild tribe, 92. 
 
 India: the people, 38; government for benefit of the natives, 38, 39; Queen 
 Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 and its promises, 39; natives imbibe 
 liberalism, their education, 39, 40; British concessions, 41; the King- 
 Emperor's Proclamation of 1908, 42; Lord Morle/s reforms, 43-45; 
 Great Britain's Indian problems, 46; basis of her rule, 46, 47; further 
 self-government inevitable, 47, 48 note. 
 
 Indias, Laws of the, extended to Philippines, 150. 
 
 Inquisition : established in Philippines by Salazar, 225 ; a commissioner sent, 
 226; natives not subject to, 227; effect of, 227. 
 
 Instructions: to Philippine Commission, 497-504; to Schurman Commission, 
 450, 473 ; to General Merritt, 422, 423. 
 
 Insular cases, 494-496. 
 
 Insurgent leaders: their character, 456, 457; inexperienced, 458; visited by 
 Americans, 459; shrewd politicians, 382. 
 
 Insurgents: early American relations with, Chapter XV; charges of bad 
 faith, 380 ; effect on public sentiment, 381 ; Spanish war encourages, 
 382 ; Aguinaldo at Hong Kong, 382 ; his character, 383 ; Wildman's re- 
 lations with Hong Kong junta, 387; Aguinaldo starts for Europe, 388; 
 meetings with Pratt at Singapore, 389; returns to Hong Kong, 390; 
 Pratt's reports to Washington, 390; newspaper articles, the Serenade, 
 and Pratt's speech, 391-396; repudiation by secretary of state, 395; 
 Dewey's attitude, 397-400 ; Aguinaldo organizes an army and civil gov- 
 ernment, 396; irritated by arrival of troops, 402; friction with army, 
 403 ; Anderson's correspondence, 404 note; Filipino claims, Agoncillo's 
 statement, 405 ; in the Resena Veridica, 405 ; the promise of independ- 
 ence a myth, 407 ; repudiated by St. Clair, 409 ; the intermediary, Bray, 
 409 ; disproved by Aguinaldo's acts and words, 410-413 ; dissensions 
 among Filipinos, 417; no definite policy, fear of Spain, 417; no real 
 cooperation with Americans, 419 ; not recognized as allies, 421 ; refused 
 permission to enter Manila, 425. 
 
 Insurrection: against Americans, a surprise, 456; carefully organized, 457; 
 support of in Luzon, 458; encouraged by Americans, 459; American 
 troops in Manila, 462 ; volunteers remain, 462 ; national volunteers, 463 ; 
 insurgent army, 462 ; attempt to burn Manila, 462 ; capture of Malolos, 
 464; battle of Calumpit, 464, 465; occupation of San Fernando, 466; 
 Lawton's advance to San Maguil de Mayuma, 467; fight at Zapote 
 River, 467 ; conditions in Mindanao, 468 ; Bates treaty with sultan, 
 468 ; disturbances in Negros, 470 ; campaign in autumn of 1899, 479. 
 
 Insurrections : early, mostly without political significance, 184 ; disappointed 
 hopes, 184; tfiat of 1823, 185; Apolinario, 185; revolt of soldiers at 
 Cavite, incapacity of government 185. 186; execution of priests, 185; 
 popular indignation, 186; troubles with friars over taxes, 187; deporta- 
 tions, 187, 188; insurrection of 1896, 192, 198. 
 
 Italy: acquisition of Assab in 1869, acquisitions along Red Sea, 31; Eritrea 
 and Libia, 22 ; prospects, ZZ.
 
 536 INDEX 
 
 Jagor, Feodor : description of natives, 108 ; predicts American control, 54. 
 
 Japan: colonial ambitions of, 36; early relations with Philippines, 281. 
 
 Jaudenes, General Firmin : Spanish governor-general, 308 ; surrenders Manila, 
 312. ^ ^ 
 
 Judges: generally Spaniards, 246; qualifications of, 246; regulation of con- 
 duct, 243. 
 
 Judicial power: originally in governor-general and alcaldes-mayores, 238, 
 239; the audiencia, 239-243; inferior courts, 243-246. 
 
 Judicial system : see Courts ; during Spanish regime, 243 ; under military 
 government, 430; reorganized by commission, 517, 518. 
 
 Justice, administration of, unsatisfactory, 246-248. 
 
 Kalingas, a wild people, 92. 
 
 Katipunan : a revolutionary society, 191 ; organizes insurrection of 1896, 192 ; 
 
 its character, 191, 192. 
 Keller, Dr., cited, 2, 18, 31, 32, 33. 
 
 Kings, Spanish, unsuccessful efforts to protect natives, 156. 
 Kipling, Rudyard, writes the White Man's Burden in America, 370. 
 
 Ladrone Islands, discovered by Magellan, 143. 
 
 Language: see Dialects; use of Spanish in courts, 518. 
 
 Laws, sources of, 232. 
 
 Laws of the Indias, 232, 233, 236. 
 
 Lawyers, unpopular with colonial authorities, 179, 180. 
 
 Legaspi, Miguel Lopez de : expedition to Philippines, 146, 147 ; first governor, 
 
 147; reaches Cebu, 148; captures Manila, 150; his death and character, 
 
 151. 
 Legislation, codes and courts, see Chapter IX. 
 Leroy-Beaulieu, influence of Moorish wars on Spanish character, 149 and 
 
 note. 
 Lewis, Sir George Cornwall: definition of colony, 2; involves expulsion of 
 
 natives, 3. 
 Limahong, Chinese pirate, invades Philippines, 151-153. 
 Location of towns, fear of Moros, 71. 
 Lotteries, revenue from, 263. 
 
 McKinley, William, President: originally opposed to holding Achipelago, 
 362; studies public sentiment, 364, 365; his control of situations, 330, 
 365, 366; original instructions to Peace Commissioners, 350; negotia- 
 tions with Cambon, 321-329; appoints Peace Commissioners, 329; posi- 
 tion as to colonial debts, 338; as to conquest, 342; directs demand for 
 entire Archipelago, 342; effect of reelection, 511. 
 
 Mabini, Apolinario: the "brains of the insurrection," concedes legality of 
 American title, 455 ; head of Aguinaldo's cabinet, 449, 477 ; favors war, 
 448 ; address to commission, 507 ; banished to Guam, 513 ; defeats Arel- 
 lano's plan for protectorate, 477 note. 
 
 MacArthur, Major-General Arthur: commands third expedition, 305; at 
 battle of Manila, 312. 
 
 Magellan, Ferdinand : discoverer of the Philippines, 137 ; description of, 142 ; 
 loss of royal favor, 141 ; naturalized Spaniard, 142 ; contract with the 
 king, 143; idea that demarcation line extended around the world, 140, 
 142; sails from Seville, 143; reaches Cebu, 144; his death on Mactan 
 Island, 144. 
 
 Malolos Congress, last meeting of, favors peace, 476, 
 
 Manila: captured by Legaspi and organized as a city, 150; captured by Brit- 
 ish, 164-168 ; the dishonored ransom bills, 168 ; captured by Americans, 
 311-318. 
 
 Manila: battle of, surrender arranged for, 308; capitulation, 313-318; Fili- 
 pino troops not allowed to participate, 315.
 
 INDEX 537 
 
 Manila Bay: naval battle of, 290-295; means of defense, 290, 294, 295; rela- 
 tive strength of fleets, 299; plan of battle, 296; a brilliant victory, 299; 
 losses, 299; news reaches Washington, 300. 
 
 Mapa, Victorina, justice Supreme Court, 517. 
 
 Marksmanship, at battle of Manila Bay, 296 and note. 
 
 Mas, Sinibaldo de : descriptions of conditions in 1842, 175-179 ; recommenda- 
 tions, 179. 
 
 Masonic societies, as revolutionary agencies, 189, 190. 
 
 Matta, Don Manuel de la: confidential report on conditions in 1843, 179; 
 recommends radical reforms, ISO. 
 
 Maura law, 230. 
 
 Mayon, Mount, 72. 
 
 Merritt, Major-General Wesley: command at capture of Manila, 305; his 
 instructions, 308 note; cooperation with Dewey, 308; first miUtary gov- 
 ernor, 422, 426 ; goes to Paris. 426. 
 
 Military occupation: see Chapter XVI; to ratification of treaty, of Manila, 
 422, 423 ; authority under, 423 ; personnel of military government, 424, 
 425; General F. V. Greene in charge of finances, 424-429; legal difficul- 
 ties, 429, 434 ; the courts, 430, 431 ; trade and commerce, 431 ; with 
 southern islands, 432; tariff regulations, 432; the prisons, 433, 439; 
 embargoed estates, 435; military prisoners, 436; Aguinaldo's Spanish 
 prisoners, 437 ; regulation of Chinese, 438, 439 ; troops sent to^ Iloilo, 
 440; negotiations for peace, 448; Filipinos favor war, 450, 451; the 
 attack on Manila, 452. 
 
 Milner, Lord, welfare of subject people, 3. 
 
 Minerals, 77. 
 
 Minister of Ultramar, 211. 
 
 Mirandaola, Andres de, description of Filipinos, 102. 
 
 Missionaries : Spanish, accompany Legaspi, 147 ; early activities, 148 ; at 
 Manila, 151 ; gave character to conquest, 154 ; rapid increase in number, 
 154, 158; invade China and Japan, 154, 155. 
 
 Mohammedan: early missionaries in islands, 149; established at Manila be- 
 fore arrival of Legaspi, 149; religion of the Moros, 115. 
 
 Mommsen's law, 363. 
 
 Monastic orders: see Friars; commercial activities of, 171; the obras pias, 
 172 ; control of Banco Espanol Filipina, 172 ; became unpopular during 
 close of last century, 183 ; abuse of natives, 183, 184 ; the claims of, 218 ; 
 number of friars, 219. 
 
 Monopolies, revenue from, 263. 
 
 Montojo, Admiral: commands Spanish fleet, 289; preparations, goes to Subig, 
 293 ; abandons Manila and goes to Cavite, 295 ; surrenders to Dewey, 
 298. 
 
 Morga, Antonio de: early magistrate, description of conditions in 1606, 159; 
 description of natives, 105. 
 
 More raids : factor in Philippine history, costly expeditions against Moros, 
 171 ; continued until age of steam, 171 ; initiated by Sande's expedition, 
 153. 
 
 Moros: Mohammedan tribes of south, so named by Spaniards, 115; never 
 conquered by Spaniards, 171; a special problem, 114; slowly improving, 
 114, 115, 134; missionary work among, 115; the separate tribes. 116, 
 118, 119; the Sultan of Jolo, 116; a warlike people, 118; their weapons, 
 
 118, 119; running amok, 118; the language, 119; habits and customs, 
 
 119, 120, 127; their religion, 125-127; tribal government, 123; slavery, 
 
 124, 125 ; education among. 125 ; occupations. 128-130 ; industries, 
 Moro exchanges, 129, 130; the datu, 115, 130^132; their code of laws, 
 
 125, 131 ; administration of justice, 133. 
 
 Moses, Bernard : member of commission, secretary of public instruction, 496. 
 
 Mountains, height of, 72. 
 
 Municipal code, General Order Number 43, board to draft new, 519, 520.
 
 538 INDEX 
 
 Nationality, growth of sentiment, 3, 4, 5, 48, 49. _ 
 
 Natives : treatment of in colonies, 1, 2 ; native policy, 2, 3, 36 ; in early colonies, 
 36; during Middle Ages, 37; improvement of conditions, 3; change of 
 views, 3; spirit of humanity, 37, 38; obligations toward, 3; Lord Mil- 
 nor's statement, trust relation, 3 note, 38; political training, 4; ignored 
 by Spaniards, 11; conversion of Indians, 37; just Spanish laws, 37; 
 attitude toward of English, French and Germans, 52 ; American policy, 
 55-60, 487, 488 ; embodied in Instructions to Commission, 497, 498. 
 
 Naval power : of Spain and United States, 290 ; European views, 290, 291 ; 
 Montojo's fleet, 290 ; Dewey's fleet, 292, 293. 
 
 Negritos: the original inhabitants, 86; various names, 87; their character- 
 istics, 88 ; a vanishing race, 89. 
 
 Negros, Island of : the native Republic, 471 ; organization of civil government, 
 471 ; the Negros constitution, 472 and note. 
 
 New Era : see Chapter VII ; direct steamers from Spain in 1852, opening of 
 Suez Canal in 1869, 182, 183 ; restlessness of people, 183. 
 
 Novisima Recopilacion, a collection of laws, 232, 236. 
 
 Officials, Spanish, general character of, 161. 
 
 Opium, tax on, 262. 
 
 Otis, Major-General E. S. : becomes military governor, 426; letter to Agui- 
 naldo, 427; charge of military operations until May 5, 1900, nature of 
 duties, 480, 481 ; his character, 481-489 ; succeeded by General Mac- 
 Arthur, 480 ; member first commission, 450. 
 
 Papal bulls, the division of the world, 138-140. 
 
 Parish priests, see Friars, and Ecclesiastical System. 
 
 Partidos, a collection of laws, 236, 237. 
 
 Paterno, Pedro A., negotiates pact of Biak-na-bato, 199. 
 
 Peace Commission: membership of, 329, 330; high character of, 329. 
 
 Peace Protocol, see Treaty of Paris ; provided for possession of Manila, 321. 
 
 Peninsular laws, how extended to Philippines, 233. 
 
 People: native, classification, 86, 87; non-Christians and Filipinos, 80, 86; the 
 aborigines, Negritos, 86, 87; all others are of Malay origin, 81, 89; 
 classification by Blumentritt and Jesuits, 86; Negritos, 86, 89; the 
 Moros, 90; (see Chapter IV, 114-134); the wild tribes, 90-100; the 
 Filipinos, 100, 113. 
 
 Pershing, Brigadier-General John J., governor Moro Province, 114, 125. 
 
 Personal status : classification of residents, 270 ; exclusion of foreigners, 
 271; status of natives, treated as children, 272; the mestizos, 270; 
 slaves, 272. 
 
 Philip II, sends Legaspi expedition to Philippines, 146. 
 
 Philippine Archipelago : its location and extent, 63, 64 ; its physical character- 
 istics, 65; rivers, 65, 66; health resort at Baguio, 66-68; the under- 
 ground river, 68-70; location of cities, 71; mountainous character, 72; 
 volcanoes, 73, 74; earthquakes, 73; sinuous coast line, 73; animal life 
 74-76; the flora, 76; mineral wealth, 77; fish and fishing, 77, 78; tem- 
 perature, 78, 79; chmate, 79. 
 
 Philippine Commission: appointment of members, 496; instructions to, 497- 
 504; arrives in Manila, 504; friction with army, 488, 489; issues state- 
 ment, 506; legislation by, 514; visits provinces, 520-524; organizes local 
 governments, 520; defective powers of, Spooner Amendment, 524, 525. 
 
 Philippine insurgent records, 381 and note. 
 
 Phoenicians : a colonizing people, 5 ; mere traders, 5. 
 
 Pigafetta, Venetian traveler, description of Filipinos, 104. 
 
 Polavieja, General Camilio, governor-general, his treachery toward Rizal, 194. 
 
 Policy: early Spanish, religious character of conquest, 155; proprietary gov- 
 ernor, 155; temptations to exploit natives, 156; protection of natives by 
 missionaries, 156.
 
 INDEX 539 
 
 Policy of expansion: see Oiapter XIV, 359; of United States, 362; develop- 
 ment of, 362; acquisition of Philippines, a question of policy, 360; 
 conflicting views, 360-362; Mommsen's law, 363; opposed by con- 
 tinental nations, 368; English views, 368, 369; Kipling's White Man's 
 Burden, 370 ; McKinley's attitude, 360 ; policy adopted deliberately, 366 ; 
 empire and democracy, 366, 367 ; the opposition negative, 371 ; Senator 
 Hoar's position, 371 ; contentions of Anti-Imperialists, 372 ; of expan- 
 sionists, 373; controlling factors, 374-376; altruism, 376; becomes a 
 party question, 376, 377; W. J. Bryan's attitude, 378 and note; ratifica- 
 tion of treaty, 378 ; by Spain, 379 ; future left undertermined, 378. 
 
 Population, at time of conquest, 277. 
 
 Portugal: importance in trade expansion, 12; founded few permanent colo- 
 nies, 13 ; treatment of Dutch trade, 13. 
 
 Pratt, E. Spencer, consul-general at Singapore, 384. 
 
 Prelation, of laws, 236. 
 
 Primo de Rivera, governor-general, favors reforms from above, 189. 
 
 Principles : at foundation of the American government, 497 ; no exploitation, 
 498 ; the well being of the native people, 499; established for their bene- 
 fit, 499. 
 
 Procedure: civil, 244 ; criminal, 247 «of^; new Code of, 518. 
 
 Proclamation: of General Merritt, 424; a public statement advised by Dewey, 
 442 ; the "beneficent assimilation" proclamation, 423-446 ; Otis' changes, 
 445 ; Aguinaldo's responses, 446 ; by Schurman Commission, 474. 
 
 Propagandists, young Filipinos abroad, 188. 
 
 Provincial Code, enactment of, 520. 
 
 Racial differences : East is East and West is West ; theory of inherent racial 
 differences, 81-85 ; the Chinese, 82 ; essential unity, 83 ; different out- 
 look on life, different point of view, 84, 85. 
 
 Raffles, Sir Stamford, British ruler of Java, 14. 
 
 Ransom bills, given British, dishonor of, by Spain, 168. 
 
 Ratification, Treaty of Paris, 378, 379. 
 
 Reform movement, 187. 
 
 Representative government, in tropical colonies, 5, 489. 
 
 Representation, in Cortes, l72, 173. 
 
 Resena Veridica, a publication over Aguinaldo's name, 405. 
 
 Residencia, its nature and value, 216-218. 
 
 Residents, few European during Spanish times, 182, 271. 
 
 Revenue: in Spanish times, raised by direct and indirect taxes, trade and 
 monopolies, 249, 262 ; stamps, papal bulls and indulgences, 262 ; sale of 
 opium, 262, 263 ; lotteries, profits on trade, 263 ; the tobacco monopoly, 
 264-266; receipts and disbursements, 266-269; mismanaged, 191. 
 
 Rivers : their character, 65 ; torrential rains, {^. 
 
 Rizal, Jose: the Filipino hero, 188; taught the necessity for education, his 
 novels, 188, 189 ; their effect, 189 ; opposed to use of force, 197 ; organ- 
 izes the Liga Filipino, 189; connection with Masonic societies, 190; 
 returns to Manila and is exiled to Dapitan, 190; disapproved plans of 
 Katipunan, 191 ; granted permission to go to Cuba, 194 ; arrested and 
 sent back, 194 ; his trial and execution, 195-198 ; his monument, 198 ; 
 President Roosevelt's estimate of, 189. 
 
 Rojo, Archbishop, surrenders Manila to British, 165, 166. 
 
 Roman colonies: object of, 7; municipia and colonice, 7; military colonies, 7; 
 Roman colonial officers, 7, 8 ; little change in local laws, 8, 9 ; revenues, 
 8; citizenship, 9; provincial governments, 9; policy generally con- 
 demned, 9. 
 
 Roosevelt, Theodore: orders to Dewey, 292; naval marksmanship, 296; esti- 
 mate of Rizal, 189. 
 
 Root, Elihu, Secretary of War, devises system of government for Philippines,
 
 540 INDEX 
 
 St. Lazarus, original name of Archipelago, 143. 
 
 Salazar: first archbishop, 156, 159; "the Las Casas of the Philippines," 156; 
 sends envoy to Spain, 157; induces reorganization of service, 157, 158; 
 visits Spain, 158. 
 
 Salcedo, Juan de, the Cortez of the Philippines, saves Manila from capture, 
 151. 
 
 Schurman Commission : members, 450 ; to study situation,^ 450 ; efforts to 
 secure peace, 473; conference with insurgent commissioners, 474, 475; 
 policy defeated by Luna, 477. 
 
 Schurman, Jacob C, chairman first commission, 450. 
 
 Slavery: among primitive Filipinos, 272; classes of slaves, 272, 273; forbid- 
 den by Spanish law, 274; existed in disguised forms, 274; even after 
 American occupation, controversy about, 274 note; Moro slavery, 124, 
 125; encomiendas, a form of slavery, 275-277; the Bates treaty, 469, 
 470. 
 
 Smith, James F., Brigadier-General Volunteers, governor of Negros, 470. 
 
 Soudan, nature of its government, 52 and note. 
 
 Spain: discovery of Philippines, 143; controversy with Portugal, 140, 142, 
 143, 145, 146; regards Philippines as in the west, 146; relinquishes her 
 claim to Moluccas, 146; regardless thereof, sends Villalabos to Min- 
 danao, 146; qualifications for colonization, 10; military spirit, 11; in- 
 fluence of religion, 11; easy conquests, 11; power of Church, 12; pas- 
 sion for saving souls, 12; system of trade monopoly, 12, 271, 284; im- 
 pression made on natives, 12; just laws for Indians, 37. 
 
 Spanish- American War: declared and Dewey notified, 292; could not be 
 localized, 293. 
 
 Spanish government in Philippines: 211, 214; see Chapters VIII, IX, X, XI; 
 the royal control, 232; the minister of ultramar, Consaje de Filipinos, 
 211 ; the governor-general, his powers, 212, 213 ; the Board of Authori- 
 ties and Council of Administration, 213, 214 ; control over finances, 214 ; 
 the provinces, 227 ; abuses in, 228 ; divided into pueblos and barangays, 
 local officials, 229 ; election methods, 230 ; the Maura law of 1893, 230 ; 
 Spanish cities, 231 ; table showing organization, 231 ; system a dead 
 weight on people, 284. 
 
 Sultan of Sulu, treaty with, 468, 469. 
 
 Taal volcano, 73. 
 
 Taft, William H. : president Philippine Commission, 496; statement of policy, 
 58 ; original views as to annexation, 361 ; work at Manila, 507 ; state- 
 ment to Mabini, 507; organizes tour of islands, 520; becomes civil gov- 
 ernor, July 4, 1901. 
 
 Tagalogs, most numerous of the Filipino groups, 100. 
 
 Tariff regulations : during Spanish regime, 258 ; during military occupation, 
 432, 433 ; applicable to ports occupied, 443. 
 
 Taxation: the Spanish system, 249; direct taxes, the tribute, 250-252; abol- 
 ished in 1884, the cedula personal, 252-254 ; income received as rent, 
 theurbana tax, 254-256; the industrial tax, 256; rates for, 256, 257 
 indirect taxes, customs duties, 258; classification and rates, 258-262 
 licenses and stamps, 262 ; trade monopolies, 262-265. 
 
 Temperature, average from 1885-1912, 78, 79. 
 
 Theories : of colonization, 1-4 ; American theory, 4 ; involves training natives 
 for self-government, 4; aspirations for nationality, 4, 5. 
 
 Theories of government, literary, 211. 
 
 Tingians, a wild tribe, 92. 
 
 Titles of nobility, promised by Aguinaldo, 451. 
 
 Tobacco, the monopoly, 264, 265. 
 
 Tordesillas, Treaty of, 140. 
 
 Torres, Florentino : one of Aguinaldo's peace commissioners, 448; justice 
 Supreme Court, 517.
 
 INDEX 541 
 
 Trade and commerce : at first free, 277 ; the Chinese trade, 277 ; restrictions 
 imposed on Mexican trade, 278 ; the galleon trade, 27&--280 ; its demoral- 
 izing effect, 280 ; trade with Spain a monopoly, 281 ; illiberal and re- 
 strictive policy, 174, 271 ; the Chinese as artisans and traders, 281, 282 ; 
 European and American traders, 271 ; organization of society unfavor- 
 able to, 173; royal stores, 263 ;_ during military occupations, 431. 
 
 Treaty of Paris: preliminary negotiations, 319-329; terms of protocol, 321, 
 325 ; Spanish construction of, 324-332 ; effect of capitulation of Manila, 
 326, 331; Spanish contention, 327; meeting of Peace Commission, its 
 membership, 329, 330; Filipinos ask representation, 330 note; Spaniards 
 demand status quo, 333 ; the colonial debts, 333-337 ; assumption re- 
 fused, 338; demand of cession of Philippines, 339; investigations, 340; 
 personal views of commissioners, 341, 342 ; theory of conquest, 343 ; 
 indemnity, 343; proposal of arbitration refused, 347; European public 
 opinion, 348-350; tender of $20,000,000, in lieu of debts, 353; various 
 views as to amount, 351-353; acceptance of American proposals, 354; 
 treaty signed, 355 ; its provisions, 355-358 ; certain additional islands 
 purchased, 358 ; ratification of, 378, 379. 
 
 Tribes, word applies to wild people only, 100. 
 
 Tribute, a tax, 250, 252. 
 
 Tropical colonies : treatment of natives in, 2, 3 ; native labor, 1 ; economic 
 problems, 1, 2 ; native policy in, 2. 
 
 Truth, oriental conceptions of. 111. 
 
 Underground river, in Palawan, 68. 
 
 United States : theory of colonization, 4 ; importance of its Philippine policy, 
 
 4; principles on which it rests, 56-58; attitude of Europe toward its 
 
 policy, 54, 55 ; its success, 60. 
 Urdaneta, Aiidres de, Augustinian friar, sails with Legaspi, 146, 147. 
 
 Venetians, their colonies, exploitation of people, 10. 
 Villalabos, Lopez de, names Archipelago after Philip II, 146. 
 Visayans, a group of civilized people, 100. 
 Volcanoes, 72. 
 
 White Man's Burden, 370. 
 
 Wildman, Rounceville, consul-general at Hong Kong, 387. 
 
 Wild tribes : 90 ; work among, 93. 96 ; habits and characteristics, 97-100 ; hos- 
 pitals, 96; Bagobos, 90; Manobos, 91; Bukidnons, 91; Ifugaos, 91; 
 Igorots, 92 ; Ilongots, 92 ; Kalingas, 92 ; Tirgians, 92 ; their picturesque- 
 _ ness, 98, 99; at Exposition, 98. 
 
 Williams, Oscar G., consul-general at Manila, 384. 
 
 Williard, Charles A., justice Supreme Court, 517. 
 
 Women, native, social equality, ambition of, 110. 
 
 Worcester, D. C, member Schurman and Taft Commissions, secretary of the 
 interior, 450, 496. 
 
 Wright, Luke W., member of the commission, secretary of commerce and 
 police, 497.
 
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