THE THIRD REAT War RELATION TO HISTORY UC-NRL.,!f ^B 7^a 636 [RIE MAGNUS, M. A. i L< i &BS m am The Third Great War In Relation to Modern History BY LAURIE MAGNUS, M.A. BRISTOL J. W. Arrowsmith Ltd., Quay Street LONDON SiMPKiN, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Co. Limitbd 1914 s> i"*-^ w^*^ " Machiavelli is the earliest conscious and articulate exponent of certain living forces in the present world. Religion, progressive enlightenment, the perpetual vigilance of public opinion, have not reduced his empire, or disputed the justice of his conception of mankind. He obtains a new lease of authority from causes that are still prevailing, and from doctrines that are apparent in politics, philosophy and science. . . . We find him near our common level, and perceive that he is not a vanishing type, but a constant and contemporary influence. Where it is impossible to praise, to defend, or to excuse, the burden of blame may be lightened by adjustment and distribution, and he is more rationally intelligible by lights falling not only from the century in which he wrote, but from our own, which has seen the course of its history diverted twenty-five times by actual or attempted crime." (1891.) Lord Acton. TO MY FRIENDS IN BRISTOL NORTH 297715 PREFACE This little book of modern history is constructed out of the material for a course of lectures which I have been invited to deliver in Bristol in connection with the Workers' Educational Association. It is neither a " history '* of the present war, nor a recapitulation of its immediate causes. It is limited to an attempt to discuss the Allied campaign against the Hohenzollern in the light of our former Allied campaigns against the Bourbon and the Buonaparte. This aim involves a discussion of the Settlements which were made in 1713 and 1815, and of events subsequent to those Settlements. The facts thus ascertained may be useful in guiding opinion on the new Settlement in Europe to be made after the present war. I am much indebted to Mr. C. Sanford Terry, Burnett-Fletcher Professor of History in the University of Aberdeen, for his help in reading the proof- sheets. L. M. The Athen^um, Pall Mall, S.W., November, 1914. CONTENTS Page CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY 9 CHAPTER II THEY CALLED IT PEACE (1648) . . . I7 CHAPTER III THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS (THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV) . 34 CHAPTER IV STALEMATE (THE PEACE OF UTRECHT, I713) . 53 CHAPTER V THE EVIL THAT MEN DO (LOUIS XIV'S IMITATORS) 69 chapter vi sword and pen in prussia (the repression of culture by militarism) . . . 90 chapter vii the giants (the age of the '' benevolent *' despots) 107 Vll CONTENTS CHAPTER VIII THE COMMONS (THE FRENCH REVOLUTION) . I27 CHAPTER IX THE TITAN (NAPOLEON, AND THE TREATY OF PARIS, 1815) 144 CHAPTER X CONCLUDING REMARKS 165 GLOSSARY AND INDEX 177 VUl The Third Great War CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY " In history there is nothing isolated '\ wrote Lord Bryce^ in 1862 ; and Mr. J. A. R. Marriott, using a French phrase for the continuity of historical tradition, declares that, '* In no European State, ancient or modern, have les niceurs folitiques exercised a more profound or more persistent influence than in the kingdom ruled by the HohenzoUern '' ^ Both statements are profoundly true : there is nothing isolated in history, least of all a war of eight nations ; and the history of HohenzoUern rule in Prussia exhibits a tenacity ^ Holy Roman Empire, 3. » The Logic of History, in " The Nineteenth Century and After ", October, 19 14. THE THIRD GREAT WAR of purpose and a political consistency, without parallel in ancient or modern times. ' The first business of a nation in arms is to prosecute her war to victory. But the final object of war is peace ; unless peace is re-established on a surer footing than before, a grievous wrong is committed against patriotism and against posterity. Those who see the face of warfare require no stimulus to imagination. But the rest must supply from their own resources the fire which fortifies resolve. They must learn in the slower school of history why their country fights and what for. They must be seized of the truth of the two propositions above, if they are to be ready, when the time comes, to help to devise terms of peace : not temporary terms of satiety, nor brittle terms of revenge ; but terms of a lasting and just peace, founded securely on the twin bases of national honour and political sagacity. We are engaged in the third ^reat war which a coalition of nations in Europe has waged against a would-be absolutist. The first w^as against Louis XIV, who died in 1715, shortly after the Peace of Utrecht. The second was against Napoleon, whose power was broken in 1815 at Waterloo ; and there is at least a presumption that the war of 1914-15 against Wilhelm II is not '* isolated " in history ; that what we should try to isolate is rather the causation of such occurrences than the circum- stances surrounding the latest of them. These 10 INTRODUCTORY circumstances are in everyone's recollection. England's case has been admirably set out in a dozen leaflets and pamphlets, documented, as historians say, by the correspondence of ambassadors and plenipotentiaries ^ But the ultimate causes of this war lie further back than June 28th, 1914. The dead hand of the murdered Archduke reached out of his new-made grave to dim Habsburgs and Hohenzollems in the past, and joined our twentieth century, with its gracious and humane endeavours, to the martial ideals of his military ancestors. Nemo repente fit turpissimus ; the seeds of Prussian turpitude were sown before Bernhardi and Treitschke, even before their common master, Prince Bismarck, whose sense of the logic of history was always governed by a logic of present facts. No man in this country wanted war. Some thought to avert war by ignoring it ; others sought to prevent war by preparing for it ; but there was no military party, not even a military clique. The chief Liberal War Ministers since Wilhelm II became German Emperor have been Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Lord Haldane, a man of peace and a man of law ; nor does the name of Lord Midleton, who held that office from 1895 to 1902, suggest a military camarilla. War was thrust upon us from without. We were 1 See Great Bntain and the European Crisis, officially published at id., and Why we are at War, by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History, 2S. net. II THE THIRD GREAT WAR interrupted in the tenor of our way. We had been intent on the business of Hfe : on advancing in a hundred ways at once and through every department of State the enhghtened work of social reform. Our eyes were fixed on Ufe, when we were summoned to turn them to death : to death on the battlefield, death in the trenches, death at sea ; to death by shell, death by bayonet, death from cruelty, death from want ; above all, to the death of the young. It is not within our present purpose to dwell on these aspects of war. There are compensations to set against them : the splendour of manhood, the rally of the Empire, the loyalty of Ireland ; good out of evil, sweetness out of foulness. We draw attention to this stoppage in the march of civilisation, to this sudden turning of our eyes from life to death, in order to emphasize our contention that the causes of this war lie deeper than the events of 1914. The contrast is too shattering to be explained by the facts narrated in the Blue-book. Those facts supplied a motive-power to forces which had been formed through centuries. One pretext would have served as well as another. Others, indeed, were suggested in 1911 and before. The pretext of 1914 was merely more complete than those ; it was speedier, more accurate, more adequate ; but it was only a pretext all the same. The true causes lay behind the pretext, as heredity lies behind psychology, and psychology behind action. Why is 12 INTRODUCTORY there militarism in Prussia ? Why is Wilhelm II the scourge of Europe ? These questions, too, must find repHes, if we are to draw the threads of a lasting peace out of the tangled skein of the European situation. Europe made peace in 1713, and made it again in 1815, and will make it again, we trust, in I9r|. Let us see to it that the new peace is a true peace. Let us see to it that we leave no fatal legacy for our descendants in 2015. The peace of 1915 must exclude the possibility of such happenings as led through the acts of aggression of 1866 and 1870 to the Armageddon of to-day. We are fighting for life, not for vengeance ; for the right to continue securely in the course of social regeneration which we started in the shadow of this war. Louvain and Reims are not causes, but effects. Prussia's mihtarism itself and the unchartered ambition of her King may be found by this investigation to be not causes, but effects. We are fighting to counteract the causes. The new peace, whenever it is signed, must deal with the ultimate causes. The avengers of Louvain's library will ensure our liberty of thought ; the avengers of Reims cathedral will ensure our liberty of conscience. It is our business, as trustees for the coming age, so to draft a treaty of peace as to ensure, if foresight may, that the causes of past evils shall disappear. The Peace of Utrecht did not exclude them, for Napoleon succeeded Louis XIV. The Congress of Vienna did not exclude them, for 13 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Bismarck succeeded Napoleon, and waged war a second time against Louis XIV, as a great historian pithily expressed it. And the ceremony of Versailles did not exclude them, for Wilhelm II has succeeded Bismarck. 1713 ; 1815 ; 1914 : it is time to take thought for the future. For the sake of ourselves as well as of our descendants, we must build our peace on sure foundations. Every year is a part of the new century. Next year is as much a part of it as that distant year 2015. For the sake of next year and the year after, for the sake of each of the next hundred years, we must discover and avoid the mistakes which were made at Utrecht and Vienna. We must read history intelligently, and direct our reading to an investigation of the ultimate causes of the present war. In this way only shall we isolate them for removal. The new peace must be the people's peace, not a truce for tired kings and bankrupt ministers. It is the people's blood that has been shed, the people's treasure that has been spilt, the people's homes that have been ruined. It was the people's hopes which war arrested, and the people's rights must govern the new peace. Newspapers cannot help us here. Pictorial histories of the war tell us nothing of its bases in the past. The white-papers are silent about causes prior to the date of their diplomacy ; and it is precisely this concentration upon the immediate case for the war, and this neglect of the ultimate factors, which makes INTRODUCTORY a study of the past imperative, if the future is to profit by its experience. A study of the history of two centuries will help us to select the right and to reject the wrong for the page of history to be com- menced at the new peace. Not in the carelessness of victory, nor in the weariness of strife, but solemnly, deliberately, and out of full knowledge should a free and a generous people inscribe their terms upon that page. For thus only can they be sure that nothing which they admit to it or omit from it will stain it with their children's blood. There is one word more to be added by way of introduction to this inquiry. It has been said in print already, and it is likely to be said more emphatically as the hour of reconstruction draws nearer. " When the new Europe arises out of the ashes of the old, it is not very hazardous to prophesy that diplomacy, with its secret methods, its belief in phrases and abstract principles, and its assumption of a special professional knowledge, will find the range of its powers and the sphere of its authority sensibly curtailed " ^ We may subscribe cheerfully to this prophecy, and we may even concede the prior statement, that " Democracy, though it is supposed to be incompetent to manage foreign relations, could hardly have made a worse mess of it than the highly-trained Chancelleries " * : it could certainly ^ Outis, Armageddon — and After, in " The Fortnightly Review", October, 191 4. ' Ibid, 15 THE THIRD GREAT WAR not have widened the fields of carnage. But if we admit such hghts across the darkness of the battle- field, let us be certain that they burn with a pure flame. '* Abstract principles '\ " professional know- ledge ", and the clear intention of our Foreign Office did not avail to prevent this war ; still less will war be prevented by open prejudice and ignorance. If democracy is to contract the powers and to curtail the authority of its diplomatists, its own powers must be skilful to replace them, and its own authority must command respect. Secrecy need not alarm us overmuch. Every foreman of works is aware that responsibility and control entail confidential action. The point is that, when historians reveal the secrets of a responsible diplomatist — " Whatever record leap to light, He never shall be shamed '\ May it be in the spirit of this resolve that the new diplomacy comes to settle the problems bequeathed to it by the old. Its knowledge need not be pro- fessionalized, nor should its powers be shortened ; but power must wait on knowledge, as the present crisis has waited on past crises. *' In history there is nothing isolated *' ; and it is towards a judgment on related facts that the ensuing chapters are directed. i6 CHAPTER II THEY CALLED IT PEACE In the flood of fact and conjecture as to the origins of the European crisis, the Peace of Westphaha, which was signed on October 24th, 1648, is a visible and veritable landmark. Like most agreements, it represented a compromise of wills, No one got exactly what he wanted ; least of all, the head of Christendom, Pope Innocent X, whose opposition was as impotent, however, as the death of Pius X and the election of Benedict XV were indifferent to the warring States in the summer of 1914% But the Peace of Westphalia emerges out of the troubled waters of the Thirty Years' War. We may consult it, as we should consult the men and women, if we had the opportunity, who contracted it. The fathers ate sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge. The who 's who of that fateful date reveals some striking personalities. There was Queen Christina of Sweden, daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, and the only Swedish sovereign who made Stockholm a kind of northern ^7 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Athens. She was born in 1626 and died in 1689. She was six years old at her accession, and twenty-two at the date of the Peace. Six years later she abdicated — voluntarily, perhaps even a little showily — on her conversion to the Church of Rome. The Queen's statesmanship and learning are attested beyond dispute ; and it is interesting to note that Descartes, the French rationalist philosopher, spent the last year of his life at her court, and was induced to compose a ballet, or operetta, in celebration of the peace, entitled La Naissance de la Paix : truly, a concession to royal charm by the author of the Discourse on Method. There was Cardinal Mazarin (1602-1661) of France, a Sicilian (Giulio Mazarini) by birth, who had been naturalised in 1639. We know the kind of man he was. There is a portrait of him at Chantilly by his contemporary, Philippe de Champaigne, showing his lofty brow and faultless features, and the silken stateliness of the master of craft ; and there is the pen-portrait of him quoted by Lord Morley : ** His ambition raised him above self-love, and he was so scientifically cool that even adversaries never appeared to him in the light of enemies to be hated, but only as obstacles to be moved or turned " ^ \ a diplomatist after Machiavelli's model. His chance came at the death of Richelieu (1642), who had ^ From Mignet, the French historian, in Morley's Oliver Cromwell, 440. 18 THEY CALLED IT PEACE dominated France till then, and whom Mazarin succeeded as chief adviser to King Louis XI I L The King died in the following year, and Mazarin consolidated his position as first minister at the French court, in close confidence, if not in the closest intimacy, with the Queen-Mother, Anne of Austria, Regent during the minority of her son, Louis XIV. The young King, who was ten years of age at the date of the Peace of Westphalia, reigned till 171 5, and was justly known as *' le grand Monarque ". There was Frederick WilHam (1620-1688), Elector of Brandenburg, who was not less justly known as *' der grosse Kurf first " (the Great Elector). He acceded in 1640. Sweden has declined ; the Bourbons are dethroned ; the Stewarts are deposed ; but there is still a Hohenzollern in Brandenburg ^ It was in the reign of Frederick William's son. Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg and King Frederick I of Prussia, who achieved royalty in 1701, that *' the name of Prussia '\ according to Ranke, '* became inseparable from an idea of military ^ In 141 1, Burgrave Frederick VI of Nuremberg became Elector I of Brandenburg, in return for favours received by the Emperor Sigismund. Prior to that date the new Electorate had been a mere Margravate. The first Elector was directly descended from Conrad of Hohenzollern {d. 1291, temp. Barbar- ossa), 25th lineal ancestor of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Kaiser has often referred to the promotion of his family — Margrave, Elector, King, Emperor, — and has lost no opportunity of impressing on his " faithful Mark of Brandenburg *' the moral of its Hohenzollern association, 19 THE THIRD GREAT WAR power and glory ", The Great Elector, the last of his line to die in the inferior rank, established the bases of that idea. According to one authority, he was '' the first sovereign to display the principles of seventeenth-century Machiavellianism, stripped o^ their cloak of Italian refinement, in all the hideous brutality of German coarseness " ^ According to another, *' he first taught the Northern and North- Eastern Powers who impeded the growth of his State, and the Great European Powers to boot, that nothing save the interests of that State itself, as they might from time to time present themselves to its rulers, would in the future decide the course of its political action '' ^ According to a third, *' ' London ' was the last but one, ' Amsterdam ' the last word which he uttered, busy till death with the thought of the great enterprise which was to secure his State, to protect Germany and Europe from the domination of France, and to save the evangel " ». According to a fourth, '' The programme of State-law which Frederick WilHam set before his successors, more than two centuries ago, should still be the model for our rulers. ... In harmony with the juristic writings of Pufendorf, he sought salvation in a ^ Periods of European History: v, 174; The Ascenda?7cy of France, By H. O. Wakeman. * Cambridge Modern History : v, 657 {by Sir A. W. Ward). * Geschichte des Preussischen Staates, 211. By Dr. Ernst Berner. 2nd edn. Bonn, 1896. ao THEY CALLED IT PEACE deliberate and benevolent Absolutism " ^ : a sinister figure among the peace-makers, and an omen of times to come. There was Waldeck, Count and Prince, Frederick William's would-be Mazarin, who, like Bismarck, toiled night and day for the HohenzoUern against the Habsburg, and who served the Protestant cause in the North under the Great Elector, King Charles X of Sweden (Queen Christina's successor), and William III of Orange successively. There was the Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand IIL who was elected in 1637, ^^^ c^i^d twenty years after. He was the son of Ferdinand II, the Emperor of '' Wallenstein", Prince of Friedland, hero of Schiller's three dramas, and he had been King of Hungary since 1625. At this time, and till 1806, when the last Roman Emperor, Francis II, resigned the trappings of an empty dignity, the Emperor was the nominal lay head of the Christian Powers of Central Europe. He owed his title to election, and governed kingdoms or archduchies of his own. The Electors* choice from 1438 fell with two exceptions upon a Habsburg, and the Imperial title stretched right back to Augustus Caesar, in the century before Christ. Marcus Aurelius, in the second century, a.d., has a place of honour in this line. The early Emperors were crowned at Rome, and Frederick I ^ Dev Grosse Kurfiirst, in, 12, By Martin Phiiippson. Bciiii>, 1903. 21 THE THIRD GREAT WAR (Barbarossa), at his coronation in 1152, added the epithet '' Holy " to the old title of the Roman Empire. Gradually, the Empire declined. The ceremony at Rome became more meaningless and infrequent, and the territorial insecurity of the Habsburgs, threatened from the North and East, diminished the con- stitutional authority derived from their Imperial sway. The holder of the Imperial title was the earlier Sick Man of Europe. The day was presently to dawn when a Buonaparte and a Hohenzollern were to assume Imperial rank ; and when the Habsburg line of Roman Emperors was to dissemble its lost Elective dignities under the pretentious style of Hereditary Emperors of Austria: — " Now does he feel his title Hang loose about him, like a giant's robe Upon a dwarfish thief *' ^, That day was still distant in 1648 ; but the circum- stances in which the Emperor Ferdinand was now making peace in Westphalia with the Kings of Sweden and France admitted the course of happenings which raised rival Emperors, so-called, in France and in Sweden's ally, Brandenburg. There was Maximilian, Elector of Bavaria, who, with Count von Tilly (died 1632), commander of his forces, had been responsible for some of the worst outrages committed in the course of the war. These ^ Shakespeare, Macbeth, v, ii. 22 THEY CALLED IT PEACE included the sack of Magdeburg, where, however, the cathedral was spared, and the extrusion of the Calvinists from Heidelberg, where, however, the library was not destroyed, but was deported to Rome ^ There were Charles I of England and Oliver Cromwell, the mightiest Protestant and perhaps the greatest man of his age, just arriving at the Protectorate of 1649. There was the Pope in Rome ; and the Bourbon King Philip IV of Spain, whose daughter, Maria Theresa, was married in 1660 to her cousin, Louis XIV of France, as in the last generation Anne, daughter of Philip III, had been married to Louis XIII ; whence, since neither Philip had a brother, the various treaties of partition and the long war of the Spanish succession (1702- 1713), to which we shall come in due course. Among these high and mighty personages, negotia- tions were opened at the towns of Miinster* and Osnabriick* in 1642. It v/as not till 1645 that the double set of envoys got seriously to work ; and their formalities, entertainments, squabbles, and the shifting fortunes of the unsuspended war considerably protracted the proceedings. Their number, too, was unmanageable. Nominally, terms were to be settled ^ Maximilian's poor scruples of vandalism were too fine for the Bavarian troops in France and Belgium, 19 14. * Betw^een the Emperor and France (Catholic allies). * Between the Emperor and Sweden (Protestant allies). 23 THE THIRD GREAT WAR between France and Sweden on the one part and the Emperor Ferdinand on the other. Actually, every Christian Power was involved as an ally of one or other of the principal negotiants, and all except three — England, Poland and Muscovy — sent repre- sentatives to the Congress. Nor did the presence of mediators from the Papal Court, Venice, and Denmark tend to expedite their labours. The events were as formidable as the personages. If Mazarin, Christina, Ferdinand, Frederick William, and the rest had been as intent upon the future of Europe as they were upon their own present aims their ambassadors would still have been confronted with well-nigh insuperable difficulties. Problems of dynasties, territories, religions, and constitutions were almost inextricably mixed, and the best intentions of the most noble-minded plenipotentiaries could hardly have escaped confusion. The Peace of Westphaha marks a stage in the progress of Europe from the Reformation of Luther in the sixteenth century to the Empire of Napoleon in the nineteenth, and the Thirty Years' War, which it terminated — this at least is to its credit, — partook of the nature of both events. It was always partly and at first wholly a religious war. The object sought and attained was to secure for the followers of Luther and Calvin the same rights within the Empire as were enjoyed by adherents to the Catholic Church. Of the disputes between Lutherans and Calvinists, THEY CALLED IT PEACE of the persecution of Calvinists in France, of their massacre in Piedmont, which drew from Milton one of his finest sonnets {'* Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints "), of the fatal policy of Louis XIV in revoking (1685) the Edict of Nantes and driving his Huguenot subjects to England, Brandenburg, the Netherlands, and other Protestant countries, of all the suffering and cruelty, the bitter and violent polemics, the martyrdom, the misery, and the glory which date from 1521, when Luther met the Diet at Worms, and echoes of which are still heard to-day, this is not the place to speak. We are dealing here with the political issues arising out of these Wars of Religion, which rent the Holy Roman Empire and tossed its wreck on the nineteenth century, despoiled of its holiness, divorced from Rome, and disunited in its constitution. The point is that certain of the warring States had a majority of Protestant in- habitants, certain others a Catholic majority. As early as 1555, in the temporary Peace of Augsburg, this accident was legalized in the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio, or, let each country establish its own church. We are still not concerned with problems of religion as such, and must guard against suggesting any view on the vexed question of Church Establish- ment, But the settlement, even in appearance, contained some obvious vices. It limited the possible alternatives to the churches of Wittenberg 25 THE THIRD GREAT WAR and Rome. For Zwinglians and Calvinists, still less for ''infidels" and Jews, there was no room in the thoughts of the negotiators. These were fixing the frontiers of States, not enlarging the boundaries of toleration. But in fact it was worse than in appearance. The choice of religion was the prince's ; the compulsion of region was the people's. The prince selected his church, and his subjects had either to attend it or to find their way to a more hospitable soil. The present terror of banishment by their territorial lord replaced the distant terror of the ban by the Holy Father in Rome. We cannot do more than mention the *' ecclesiastical reserva- tion ", by which Catholic bishops who abjured their faith forfeited their lands and dignities. Enough has been said to show how the dynastic and territorial issues involved in the Thirty Years' W'^ar arose out of the religious issues challenged by Luther at the Reformation ; how that movement, which began so nobly as the Renaissance of the North, ended in tyrannies more odious than the wrongs which it set out to destroy ; and how the struggle for liberty of faith through the length and breadth of the Empire was turned by the policy of its rulers to the service of their own particularism. This, broadly, was the state of affairs which engaged the diplomacy of the envoys. Mazarin, scheming for France ; the Protestant sovereigns of Sweden and Brandenburg ; Ferdinand, clutching at 26 THEY CALLED IT PEACE the pillars of the crumbling Holy Roman Empire : were they likely to do otherwise than sow the furrow^ed fields of Europe with the dragon's teeth of territorial aspiration ? Considering the personages and the circumstances, the wonder is that they patched a peace at all. A series of arrangements was reached of great detail and complexity. Thus, the regional rehgions, multiplied to include Calvinism, were to be maintained in their status quo as at January 1st, 1624. No charter of toleration was promulgated ; the Austrian Archduke would have resisted it, even if the Pope's opposition had been nullified : but a rough-and-ready map was adopted to fix the distri- bution of creeds ; the rest was left to domestic enterprise. Next, the French frontier was advanced to the Rhine, through Verdun, Toul, and Metz to Austria's Alsace, where Strasburg was retained by the Empire. Pomerania was divided at the mouth of the Oder ; the western half went to Sweden, the eastern half was confirmed to Brandenburg. The western frontier of that Electorate was extended to the Harz mountains, and its thumb was fastened on the duchies of Ravensberg, Mark and Cleves (between the Rhine and the Meuse). Sweden came over to Bremen, at the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. Bavaria spread on her northern boundary, at the expense of the Empire, which had also to make room for Saxony and others, to admit the right of States within the Empire to form their own foreign 27 THE THIRD GREAT WAR alliances S and to give Holland and Switzerland their independence. On all this business and much more the peace- makers at Miinster and Osnabriick consumed their time and their ink ; but when they went their ways home, what was the upshot of it all ? 1. The Protestant triumphs of Luther and Calvin had weakened the chain of religion which had bound the Empire together. 2. The partition of the Empire into States, independent in policy and faith, drew attention to military and naval frontiers and caused a scramble for the Sick Man of Austria's Imperial powers. 3. The contraction in scope and influence of the Catholic Holy Roman Empire, and its reduction to an appanage of the Habsburg dynasty in Austria, led {a) to the idea of a Northern Protestant federation, and (b) to the ambition of the French Bourbons to excel the Austrian Habsburgs. * Lord Morley {op. cit., 439) puts the significance of this concession very luminously : " France, though predominantly Catholic ever since Francis I, had favoured German princes and Protestant powers, from no special care for the reformed faith, but because the Protestant powers were the adversaries of the Emperor, the head of the Catholic party in Europe ". We may add to this political cause the genuine humanism of King Francis and his sister, Queen Margaret of Navarre, which responded to the intellect of reformers. 28 THEY CALLED IT PEACE 4. Was the chief Northern Protestant State to be Sweden with its feet on the mainland, or Brandenburg with its fingers West and East ? 5. The French menace to the House of Habsburg and the Northern menace to its appanage of Empire, and their mutual approaches, shifted the centre of Austrian policy, and directed it to Italy and the Near East. 6. Brandenburg's leaning to the East affected Poland and Muscovy. Thus, 7. Russia was menaced on two fronts ; by Brandenburg on her North- West, and by Austria on her South- West ; And 8. The question of Turkey in Europe was raised by the rivalry of Austria and Russia for the road to Constantinople. Accordingly, 9. The Peace of Westphalia provided material for three main disputes : i. Between France and Austria, ii. Between Brandenburg-Prussia and Russia, iii. Between Austria and Russia. It was highly inflammable material. Twice it burst into flame, and twice it was supposed to be quenched : at Utrecht in 1713, at Vienna in 1815. 29 THE THIRD GREAT WAR It lit other fires in its path ; and a third great war is now in progress, with the same national divisions, on a vaster and a crueller scale. Surely, after 267 years, an asbestos peace must be devised. 10. There was also the further dispute between the moribund Catholic Empire of the Habsburgs and the nascent Protestant Power in the North, which w^as settled by the victory of Prussia in 1866. The proof of that settlement is the alliance between Austria and Prussia-Germany (including Catholic members of the dead Empire, such as Bavaria and Saxony) in the present devastating war. which has united France and Russia against the common foe, and which, from causes to be shown, has drawn England into their alliance. These, then, are the salient features of the paci- fication of Europe at the close of the Thirty Years' War. The horrors of that war are immeasurable. It left the countries now known as Germany not only exhausted, but demoralized; almost decivilized. This, too, needs a brief explanation. The positive aspect which had been assumed by the humanizing virtues of the Renaissance when it crossed the Alps into Germany was already deterrent to wide culture. The concentration on texts and criticism, the theology of Reuchlin^ and Agricola*, the mordant 1 1455-1522. a 1443-1485. 30 THEY CALLED IT PEACE Letters of Obscure Men^, which a briUiant band of humanists at Erfurt wrote to expose the obscurantists of Cologne : these and other signs of Northern scholarship indicate the change of complexion which ensued when the Italian Renaissance changed its clime. The German Renaissance fostered an applied rather than a spontaneous delight in learning, modernism, Hellenism ; thus differing in kind from the French Renaissance under Francis I * and his sister, the broad-minded Queen Margaret * of Navarre, whose patronage was extended to Marot* and even to Rabelais ^ ; and different, too, from the tolerant sympathies of the great Dutch humanist, Erasmus «. It was harder, more purposive, more objective. Even so, it might have reinforced the genius which was released at last in Shakespeare and Milton in England, Moli^re and Pascal in France, Hooft and Vondel. in the Netherlands, Cervantes and Calderon in Spain, if its current had not been turned awry. *' The German Renaissance is the ^ Letters purporting to be written by monks at Cologne but really written by scholars at Erfurt : a famous pasquinade, showing how the wind was blowing in the direction of Church reform. The chief author was Ulrich v. Hutten, 1488-1523. * 1494-1547. Acceded 15 1 5. He founded the Royal Library (now BibliofMque Nationale) in Paris. * 1492-1549. Married, 1527, Henri d'Albret, King of Navarre. Their daughter became the mother of King Henri IV of France. Margaret wrote the Heptameron, * 0, 1496-1544. « 1495-1553- ^ 1466-1536. 31 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Reformation " ^ ; but the fertilizing stream of Renaissance culture, narrow in Germany from the start, was blocked altogether by the wars which ensued on the Lutheran reforms. Almost it seemed " That this most famous stream in bogs and sands Should perish " » ; so disastrous to the States of Germany, in economy, in population, and in aesthetics, were the results of the campaigns which the Peace of Westphalia closed. Truly, they made a desert and called it a peace. German culture recovered from the shock ; recovered magnificently, indeed. We shall come in due course to its flowering-time, with Kant and Goethe at the close of the eighteenth century. Then we may have to refer back to this long period of blight, stricken by the Thirty Years' War. The testimony is universal and cumulative. German writers speak of the War as of a new invasion of the Huns or a foretaste of Napoleon's invasion. Prof. Herford sympathetically says : '' If the extraordinarily gifted, yet relatively barbarous, Germany of the sixteenth century was, in pure literature, of any moment for its neighbours, it was chiefly in so far as it made Hterary capital of its barbarism''*. Grobian, the Ship of Folly, ^ Cambridge Modern History, i, 575 (by Sir Richard Jebb). * Wordsworth. 8 Studies in the Literary Relations of England and Germany in th$ Sixteenth Century, xxviii. By C. H. Herford, Cambridge, 1886. 32 THEY CALLED IT PEACE farce, folkbook and satire, were the Teuton contri- bution to the century, which in other and happier lands was reaping the harvest of the Renaissance. It is not a matter for moral judgment, nor for admiration or the reverse : it is a mere matter of fact, important in the history of modem Europe, which includes the re-building of Germany, that German culture was belated. It was robbed of the nursery of the Renaissance, which more fortunate peoples have enjoyed. It was reared on blood instead of milk, and the effects are palpable to this day. 33 CHAPTER III THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS The First Great War which broke the Peace of WestphaUa is the War of the Spanish Succession. Like the Second and the Third, which is devastating Europe to-day, it was waged by a coaHtion of AUies against a would-be Absolutist. It lasted from 1702-1713. The Allies were England, Holland, the Empire, Prussia and Hesse. Their common enemy was France, and the pacts which closed the War are known as the Peace of Utrecht. As in 1914, so in 1702 it is incorrect to say that war broke out. War had never been shut in. There was almost continuous fighting from 1648 to 1702. The War of the Spanish Succession was an end not a beginning to warfare. Similarly, some years hence, when the history of the Third Great War is written, it will be shown that the period of peace, 1871 to 1914, was full of miscellaneous fighting, especially in South-Eastem Europe, in which, though German arms were not engaged, German policy and German aims were very active. The Third Great War, like the First, was planned through a series of years in the mind of the responsible war-lord. And the 34 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS analogy may be pressed more closely. The situation in Germany after 1871 and in France after 1648, when each had concluded an advantageous peace, had definite points of resemblance, which lie partly in the character of their rulers, and still more in the nature of their rule. In Germany Bismarck was supreme from 1862 to 1891, when he was replaced by Kaiser Wilhelm at the age of thirty-two. In France Mazarin was supreme from 1643 to 1661, when he was replaced by King Louis at the age of twenty-two. In forty years King Louis was con- fronted with a European coalition ; it has taken the Kaiser little more than half that time. Louis XIV was a greater man than Wilhelm II ; more competent, more kingly, more refined ; but neither was as great as he had been made, the one by Mazarin, Richelieu's pupil, the other by Bismarck, a second Richelieu. Each monarch was his own foreign minister. Each fell, it will be written, by his foreign policy. King Louis's secret treaties are notorious. He tried to strike separate blows by neutraHzing possible combinations. He had a secret with Charles II about the Dutch, a secret with the Emperor about the Spanish, secrets with himself about both. More clumsily but not less craftily. Kaiser Wilhelm in 1912 tried to bind England to neutrality in the event of his attack on France. But England in 1912 had outlived the seventeenth century, and the diplomatic tradition of the Stewarts. The clumsy 35 THE THIRD GREAT WAR imitation of a bad model was thrown back at its shameless fabricators. Yet another point of resemblance occurs, though analogies are often fallacious. King Louis's secret treaty with King Charles could not be renewed in 1688, when James II was shaking on his throne. But the War Lord did not despair. There were other means to the same end. '' It was also the view of some of Louis's advisers that a civil war in England would best ensure EngUsh neutrality during the continental war " \ Some of Kaiser Wilhelm's advisers made a like calculation in 1914. Being smaller men, they worked on a smaller scale. In 1688 the civil war which was to neutralize England was nothing less than a dynastic revolution : William III ousted James II. In 1914, though passions ran high, Parliamentary forms were observed. Both calcu- lations miscarried. Two and two made four in sober England, though King Louis and Kaiser Wilhelm reckoned otherwise. Each mistook the English temper. But in 1688 the error was a blunder ; in the twentieth century it was a crime. We may widen the area of comparison. Louis called himself le Roi Soleil, He took the sun as his emblem, and satellites followed in his system. Meanwhile, he was true to the kindred points of vanity and aggression : the vanity of spectacular imperialism, the aggression of territorial militarism. * Cambridge Modern History, v, 52 (by Arthur Hassall). 36 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS Historians write of King Louis : "He openly aimed at acquiring complete military preponderance in Europe '* ; such an aim is a public danger to modem States ; at *' the ecclesiastical independence of France " ; this meant a second Rome in Paris, not a tolerant attitude towards non-Catholics ; '* and the Imperial dignity for himself or his son " ^; this meant a parade of titles which the Habsburgs had worn to a thread. But the thread was strong as a cord to enmesh the present in the past. Louis, like Napoleon after him, claimed Charlemagne * out of the Middle Ages as Emperor of the French. As a fact, Charlemagne was neither French nor German, but Frankish, which was something of both^ Kaiser Wilhelm, too, has a patron-Emperor ; a pattern laid up in the Middle Ages. The Kaiser's Imperial pretensions go back to Frederick Barbarossa (1152 A.D.), " who is still, as the half-mythic type of Teuton character, honoured by picture and statue, in song and in legend, through the breadth of the German lands '' *. English taste called a plague on both houses, as long as their sentimental atavism 1 Ibid., 55. 2 Carolus IMagnus ; Charles I the Great ; Roman Emperor, Soo A.D. * " It is no longer necessary to show how little the modern French, the sons of the Latinised Kelt, have to do with the Teutonic Charles ". Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, 68 (1898). * Ibid., 117. 37 THE THIRD GREAT WAR \\as confined to domestic politics. For England, except during the connection of her Royal house with the Electors of Hanover, has never been interested in the Empire as such. With an insularity, excessive perhaps in view of her continental wars, she has hardly realized the lure of the Imperial title to a French or German monarch. But when a Bourbon, a Buonaparte, or a Hohenzollem, in the eighteenth, nineteenth, or twentieth century, attempts to translate this claim into terms of military preponderance, a coalition allies itself to crush him ; and England is a member of that alliance. This happened in 1702 ; it happened again to Napoleon ; we see it happening to-day. *' France wages two wars at once for two distinct objects " S another historian says of King Louis. The one object was the Holy Roman Empire, to be wrested from the Habsburg of Austria ; the second was the trade of the New World, to be wrested from the Habsburg of Spain. Thus, the War of the Spanish Succession was a war for the shadow of empire and for the substance of sea-power ; for an old title and a new trident. Whether or not Louis XIV, if he had won the sea-power, would have revived the empire, as Napoleon revived it, is unknown. But not otherwise, in 1871, the title was renewed at Versailles ; and in 1914 the grandson of the first German Emperor (new style) makes ^ Sir John Seeley, Expansion of England, 96. 38 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS his bid for the trident ^ Bismarck's Germany, hke Richelieu's France, wages two wars for two distinct objects ; not at once, however, but successively. We must still beware of false analogies ; but the likeness is close enough to warrant a careful exam- ination of the situation in the First Great War (1702-1713) of AUies against Absolutism. Their victory did not avert the Second and the Third Great Wars ; but, if like causes produce like results, we may yet isolate them for removal before a fourth. This, at least, is certain to-day. The sentiment of Europe has moved away from the worn-out symbols of Machiavellism. Its sanction was derived from The Prince {II Principe), by the Florentine 1 Lest we should be thought to be pushing a parallel too far, the following passages are submitted from the Speeches of Kaiser Wilhelm II. On February 26th, 1897, he said at Brandenburg : " The one man who succeeded in uniting our country to some extent was Frederick Barbarossa. After his day, our Fatherland declined, and it seemed that never would the man arise to weld it together again. But Providence created this instrument, and sought out the man whom we reverence as the first great Kaiser of the new German Empire .... If this hero had lived in the Middle Ages, he would have been canonized as a saint. Pilgrims would have come from all countries to offer up prayers at his shrine .... The memory of Kaiser Wilhelm the Great summons us to do our duty. We devote ourselves to him and to his memory, as the Spaniards of old were devoted to their Cid ". In the same year at Cologne the Kaiser said : " Since the Great Kaiser welded the Empire together anew, other tasks are now set before us. We must grasp the trident in our fist ". 39 THE THIRD GREAT WAR statesman, Machiavelli \ whose doctrine was openly directed to a benevolent military despotism in the distracted Italy of his day. It was an ad hoc doctrine of absolutism, with definite limits of time and space. His disciples in the seventeenth century sought, as Treitschke has sought since, to apply his methods to other purposes. They employed a violent restorative under conditions of normal civic sanity. And they found, as Machiavelli failed to find, apt pupils in their princes. Richelieu under Louis XIII ; Mazarin, aggrandizing France during Louis XIV's minority ; Oxenstjerna under Gustavus Adolphus ; Oxenstjerna again, aggrandizing Sweden during Queen Christina's minority ; King Charles XII of Sweden, who fell *' like Lucifer '' at Pultava in 1709 ; Peter the Great of Russia, who overcame him, and won the keys of the Baltic ; the Great Elector of Brandenburg, with his Saxon Machiavelli, von Pufendorf ^ ; the Stewart, the Habsburg, the ^ 1469-15 27. There is an excellent edition of The Prince in Dent's Everyman Library. It should be observed that Machiavelli's aim was to drive the invader out of Florence and to restore the Medici dynasty in a stronger scion than Piero, the incompetent son of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Machiavelli wrote consistently for " the new prince ", the prince who would have to instal himself ; and it is at least legitimate to hope that he would have prescribed a different regimen in the age of Louis XIV ; a fortiori, of Wilhelm II. 2 Author of Jus Natures tt Gentium, 1672. Ranke mentions Seckendorf's FUrstenstaat (1656) as the favourite reading of the Great Elector. From Ranke 's reference it seems also to have been composed on Machiavellian lines. 40 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS Orange ; the anti-Orange, John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland ; above all, the Bourbon Louis, who inherited the France of Richelieu and Mazarin, and played for bigger stakes than either — these trampled the continent of Europe into a chess- board for kings. They defaced the signs of their century. In respect to their Machiavellian policy, they belong to an antiquated convention, devised for other manners and other times. Even Treitschke finds his Wilhelm. It is a melancholy reflection, which conveys a warning for the future, that Machiavelli's theory has so vital a power for evil as to invest even mediocre talent with its sceptre and its orb. ** He obtains a new lease of authority from causes that are still prevailing, and from doctrines that are apparent in politics, philosophy, and science " ^ The Machiavellians overran Europe in the seventeenth century ; but the fall of Louis XIV did not terminate Machiavellism. The Holy Roman Empire, long a-dying, expired in 1806 ; but the ghosts of Charlemagne and Barbarossa still haunted the pillows of kings. Ana the combination of Machiavellism and Empire they call Realpolitik. Yesterday, a Buonaparte ; the day before, a Bourbon ; to-day, a Hohenzollern : we defend to-morrow. Let the dead past bury its dead. " Louis's mistakes, serious though they were, did not prevent his rule from conferring real ^ The late Lord Acton. See the extract prefixed to this book. 41 THE THIRD GREAT WAR benefits on France '' ^ vSo be it. Let France return thanks. She paid her debt to the Bourbons in the Revolution of 1793. They have been. Napoleon has been. To-morrow is the peoples', not the kings'. Antwerp shall have been sacked for the last time. There is nothing in modem life to justify the scenes in Belgium of the autumn of 1914. Imperial MiHtarism is out of date ; a twentieth-century anachronism ; a useless danger, Uke appendicitis, demanding the surgeon's knife. The Western Emperors must follow the Western Empire into the land of shadows from which they came. The Imperial lure has proved a snare. It is our business to assert new principles, derived from the conditions of modern Hfe. The '' causes that are still prevailing " are the legacy of a twice-scotched past ; the *' doctrines " that support it are the superstitions of a false " politics, philosophy, and science." Once more, we must isolate the causes, in order finally to remove them. LEtat, c'est mot, was Louis's maxim of rule, and he professed in his memoirs an invincible distrust of Parliamentary government after the English model ; *' it is the worst evil that can happen to a man in our position ". Je serai d I'avenir mon premier ministre (in future I shall be my own Prime Minister), he declared on the morrow of Mazarin's "^ Louis XIV. By Arthur Hassall, 427; "Heroes of the Nations ", 42 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS death to his Privy Council in the Louvre ; March loth, 1661. Louis was the State. Louis was Prime Minister. Thirdly, Louis was King by Divine right. This was his own firm belief as to the intention and will of God. It was confirmed by the doctrine of Bossuet ^ the greatest preacher and orator of his age, who, in his treatise on The State, derived from Holy Writ, laid down the tenet that : '' No one, whether single or corporate, has the right of resistance to a king. Kings are responsible solely to God, who will demand their accounts. Such accounts will be the more severely scrutinized, since God alone can demand them ''. And the historian adds : *' This terrible responsibility to God is the counterpoise to absolute authority which Bossuet accords to earthly kings ''. We must remember the times, if we are fully to comprehend the man. It was the period of Machiavellian statecraft, and the period of the Catholic Empire. By the theory of the one, the prince-political was committed to a course of State aggrandizement ; by the theory of the other, the prince-religious might acquire a dominion equivalent to but more solid than the Pope's. The times have changed ; but has the man ? The illusion of the dead Empire still clings to the title renewed for Kaiser Wilhelm by his grandfather, 1 1627-1704. The following quotation is from Lanson, Histoire de la Litidrature frangaise, 584. 43 THE THIRD GREAT WAR whom he worships as a saint. A pinchbeck Bossuet in Prussia still discourses of the Divine right of Kings. The monarch who breathes this incense is again his whole State and his own Prime Minister. The differences are, the inferior breed alike of the man and his flatterers, and the insurrection in the conscience of Europe of the principle of the people's rights : the will of that populace assemUee which Louis XIV scorned, and which a later Louis was to dread. The evils of such a regimen are palpable and monstrous. The King's ministers are reduced to mere executants of his instructions. The longer he reigns, the more plausibly he argues that he found them and educated them himself. This was Louis's view of Colbert ^ his great Chancellor of the Exchequer ; this was Kaiser Wilhelm's view of von Billow and Mi quel, when he '' discovered " them in 1897. The King's subjects are reduced to mere milch-cows for his taxes. Commerce and education alike subserve the Imperial ambitions of the Royal army and navy. Independent opinion is discouraged : an unctuous plea of God's will, revealed to his vice-regent on earth, justifies the persecution of Jansenism ^ by Louis ; of Socialism ^ 1619-1683. 2 Cornells Jansen, 1 585-1638, was Catholic bishop of Ypres. His Christianity was founded on St. Augustine, and had affinities with Calvinism. It was adopted by the solitaires of Port Royal in France, who counted Pascal among their disciples ; and the Port Royalist Schools, finally suppressed in 1710, incurred the jealousy of the Jesuits. 44 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS by Kaiser Wilhelm. Why Prussia in the second half of the nineteenth century should have proved as docile to absolutism as France two centuries earlier is a question to which we shall come back. It is part of the fruits of belated culture, to which reference was made in the last chapter. Here we have been concerned to observe the repetition in 1914 of certain features in the chain of causation which led to the Grand AUiance of 1702. It was united by a common danger, and by the opportunities of a common defence ^ Louis XIV had been at work for forty years within the four comers of his policy. Step by step, and not without false steps, with rare patience and consummate craft, he had pursued his composite end. It would occupy more than one chapter to follow these steps in detail, or even clearly to distinguish between the ecclesiastical and territorial-dynastic threads*. Generally, his objects were : I. To complete the belt of fortresses on the East and North-East of France, by annexing the duchies of Burgundy (Franche Comte) and Lorraine, and by taking Belgium (Spanish Nether- 1 Holland and England had been at war in 1664, as Russia and England in 1854. * Mr. Arthur Hassall's Louis XIV in Messrs. Putnam's ** Heroes of the Nations " is an excellent popular account. Mr. Hassall is also the author of Mazarhi in Messrs. Macmillan's " Foreign Statesmen ", and of several chapters in the Cambridge Modern History, vol. v, " The Age of Louis XIV ". 45 THE THIRD GREAT WAR lands) from Spain ; thus extending the French frontiers to the Rhine and the Scheldt ; 2. To make the Mediterranean a French lake, and to nullify the natural barrier of the Pyrenees, by placing a Bourbon on the throne of Spain ; Thus, 3. To extend the French Colonial Empire; And 4. To substitute a Bourbon ascendancy for the Habsburg ascendancy in Europe. Arms and diplomacy were engaged in unresting operation on this programme. One Power after another was cajoled or intimidated into advancing it. A few scenes of the forty years' drama may be selected in illustration. 1659. The Peace of the Pyrenees, supplementary to the Peace of Westphalia, gave Louis access to Spain, and a Spanish consort, Maria Theresa, daughter of Philip IV by his first marriage with Elizabeth, daughter of Henry IV of France. 1662. The purchase of Dunkirk from England gave Louis much the same maritime advantage as Germany derived in 1890 from her acquisition of Heligoland. 1667-1668. The War of Devolution. Louis's Devolution-theory was brutal in its ingenuity. By a local Flemish law, landed property of a man who had married twice passed to any child of his first 46 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS marriage (the daughters after the sons) before passing to the sons of his second marriage. Philip IV of Spain, who was also King of Belgium (Spanish Netherlands) died in 1665. He left two daughters by his first marriage, of whom the elder was Louis's consort, Queen Maria Theresa, and one son by his second, the new King Charles II of Spain. There- upon, Louis claimed the Spanish Netherlands by Flemish law for his wife. He backed his argument by force, and bribed the Empire to neutrality by a secret treaty as to the disposition of the Spanish oversea dominions when Charles II, who was always ailing, should follow Philip IV to the grave. Holland, Sweden and England — Holland first, Sweden reluctantly, and the Stewart King of England half-heartedly — formed a kind of Triple Alliance to resist the Royal highway robber. It was one of Belgium's many martyrdoms at the hands of envious kings. Peace was made at Aix-la-Chapelle, when Louis lost Burgundy, but received the coveted line of North-Eastem fortresses : Lille — Toumai — Charleroi. 1672-1679. Louis next turned his attention to the Dutch, who had objected to his theory of Devolution. The history of the United Provinces in this age would require a volume to itself ^ : here we must be content to observe that a course of tortuous diplomacy placed Louis in the favourable ^ Motley's D^itch Republic is the standard work. 47 THE THIRD GREAT WAR position of attacking the Dutch with Sweden and England on his side. An alliance was again formed against him. The Orange prince who subsequently became King William III of England was joined by the Empire and Brandenburg, and, later, by Denmark, Spain, and other Powers. England presently dropped out, leaving France and Sweden to face Europe. The Treaty of Nimwegen concluded this war, which had ravaged Belgium once more. Louis regained Burgundy and Lorraine, but surrendered Charleroi and other towns secured at the previous '* peace '\ 1679-1684. The next move on the board is known by the name of *' Reunions '\ Louis appointed commissions under this name to seize (under pretext of adjudication) certain territories of the Rhine frontier, which, he alleged, w^ere intended to be included in the *' dependencies '' of the ceded towns. Strasburg was fortified in this wise ; and the Truce of Ratisbon, 1684, confirmed Louis for twenty years in the possession of his seizures. These typical examples illustrate the theory of Absolutism in its best practical order. The State with " military preponderance " and with an acquiescent and a docile population could wait, and creep, and push, and always draw nearer to its goal. We have necessarily omitted the recital of intrigue and honest brokerage (in the Bismarckian sense) by which Louis took advantage of his neighbours. 48 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS Any trouble which preoccupied the Habsburg brought grist to the Bourbon's mill. Turk or Pole : it was indifferent ; the Empire's danger was Louis's opportunity. He held all the strings in his hand, and there were even occasions when it seemed that he was not completely in his own confidence. However imperfectly rehearsed, it is a dreary catalogue of aggression. We are not writing a history of King Louis. The Louis Quatorze style of furniture ; the decorations and gardens at Versailles ; the letters of Madame de Sevigne ; Moliere's comedies and Racine's tragedies ; the military prowess of French generals : all this is nothing to our purpose. From 1661 to 1702, Europe, ostensibly pacified after the Thirty Years' War, was harried from battlefield to battlefield and from treaty to treaty for no other object save the aggrandizement of King Louis. The welfare of nations did not interest him ; the advance of the Turks did not rally his Catholic sentiment to the Empire ; his country had no voice in its own fate ; he was bound to no parliament and no minister. Slowly, steadily, unperturbed, in the sure conviction that might was right, he moved his pieces towards victory. Twice an alliance was formed against him ; and twice he came out stronger from the conflict. 1686--1698. The League and War of Augsburg. After 1684 it was Louis's constant aim to secure in permanency the terms of the Truce of Ratisbon. But his *' secondary age " had begun. The roi Soldi was 49 THE THIRD GREAT WAR moving to his sunset. His great finance-minister, Colbert, died. He married Madame de Maintenon. He revoked the Edict of Nantes. He had the worse in a dispute with the Pope. French Absolutism, like Prussian Militarism at a later day, began to be recognised for what it was. In 1686 the League of Augsburg was formed between Spain, Sweden, the Empire, the German Princes, and the United Provinces, to devise a concerted resistance. Two years later, our Dutch King William succeeded James II, Louis's pliant friend, and the War of the League began. Yet once more Belgium was ravaged. The French fought the English at sea, and beat them at Beachy Head, and were beaten by them at La Hogue. The War was closed in 1698 by the Treaty of Ryswick, which was less favourable to Louis than any before. 1702-1713. The War of the Spanish Succession. The League dispersed, the Treaty was indeterminate, and we can see now a little more clearly what the Spanish Succession meant, alike to Louis and to Europe. If it is not literally true that the *' Spanish Succession question was the pivot which turned the whole foreign policy of Louis XIV *\ yet Mignet's statement accurately represents the importance always attached to it at the back or in the front of the monarch's mind. Belgium was the Spanish Netherlands, with its significance to Dutch and English sea-power. Spain's Colonial possessions tempted 50 THE CHESSBOARD OF KINGS France in much the same way as the French Colonial possessions tempted Germany in 1914 ; and a Bourbon rule in France and Spain would have meant a Bourbon Mediterranean littoral. In the year-long duel between the Bourbon and the Habsburg, fought on every field in Europe, and ominous to every people's rights, one issue was always present, and was still not decided by the terms of the Peace of Ryswick : who was to succeed Charles II of Spain, when his thin thread of life should snap ? We shall come in the next chapter to the immediate causes of the w^ar, and to its termination in the Peace of Utrecht. Marlborough's ^ victorious campaign at Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709), and his recall by Queen Anne, must be sought from other sources, where the repeated anguish of Belgium will surely appeal to present sympathy. Here we have tried to expose some of the ultimate causes, which necessitated the Grand Alliance against the aggression of France. It was an unusual, even a fortuitous combination, which united Holland and England under William III and Marlborough, and brought the Empire into line with Brandenburg. But however unusual the circumstances, we have seen, and tried to show, that the situation, as it developed, had analogies with the situation of to-day. And the conclusion inevitably suggests itself, and may be ^ John Churchill, ist Duke of Marlborough, 1650-1722. 51 THE THIRD GREAT WAR strengthened in the course of our inquiry : since two great wars have not sufficed to remove the power of evil from one man's overweening ambition, the means must be found after the third. For no culture — and we shall return to this, — whether in the style of Louis Quatorze, or of Empire, or of Kultur, is worth the blood shed in Belgium during the last three centuries ; no boons of government bestowable by the most benevolent Absolutism are worth the liberties of free peoples ; no Empire, however holy, is comparable to democracy. If these truths are established at last, the sacrifices of the third Grand Alliance will not have been made in vain. 52 CHAPTER IV STALEMATE Genealogy is never exciting ; but the fruits of this family-tree brought so much woe into the world that attention may be directed to the table on the following page. King Charles II of Spain, although he had married twice, died childless in 1700. His sisters, Maria and Margaret, were married respectively to Louis XIV of France and the Emperor Leopold I ; and these heads of the rival houses of Bourbon and Habsburg were fully aware of the state of their brother-in-law's health, and of the prospects which it offered to their own offspring. The daughter of Margaret and Leopold was the wife of the Elector of Bavaria, and their son. Prince Joseph Ferdinand, being neither all Bourbon nor all Habsburg, was the first favourite for the Spanish crown. Unfortunately, he died in 1699 ^^ ^^^ immature age of five or six ; and his death, like that of Francis Ferdinand on June 28th, 1914, served to hasten the catastrophe which his accession might have locaHzed or averted. The Royal cousins' choice now lay between two 53 THE THIRD GREAT WAR xi S — ^ in H-t "■> X .2 a- a - bo tH S8 II UT3 TO Q «Tj C 53 " ' . 3 sea > "o o w a'- «5 rj 5.W .a 43 (D TJ .2 - P 0. o.^ C S bO 0°- 3r^ .a « 54 STALEMATE younger sons in the direct line of descent : the Bourbon Duke of Anjou and the Habsburg Archduke of Austria. The Duke was Louis's second grandson, the Archduke was Leopold's second son, and both had a common ancestor in King Philip III of Spain. The Duke of Anjou won the stakes, and duly became Philip V at the death of Charles II in 1700. The Archduke of Austria, we may add, had the consola- tion of succeeding his brother as Emperor Charles VI in 1711. So a Bourbon reigned in Paris, and a Bourbon reigned in Madrid, and a stately ceremony such as Louis loved was arranged at Versailles, and a honeyed ambassador remarked *' II n'y a plus de Pyrenees " , and the Royal grandfather and the Royal grandson bowed and smiled. But it wais not w^ell with King Louis. And it was not well with King Philip. After the unexpected death of the little Prince of Bavaria, it had been obvious to Louis that a fresh compromise would have to be reached between his dynastic and territorial ambitions. What he wanted was a Pan- Bourbon Empire, the diplomatic demolition of the Pyrenees, a Franco-Spanish command in the Mediterranean, a French military predominance from the Scheldt and Rhine to the Atlantic, and the reversion of the Spanish Indies and other colonies. He had helped himself to as much as he could while he was waiting for dead men's shoes ; but, without more fighting than he cared for, he was not likely to 55 THE THIRD GREAT WAR get all he wanted. It was a very delicate position, and his diplomacy was correspondingly tortuous : the essential feature of it was, that he signed a Partition Treaty with the English and the Dutch, by which the Archduke Charles was to become King of Spain, and France was to benefit by the scramble. But in the last hour of his unhappy life King Charles II made a will, leaving his kingdom and all that it conveyed to the Duke of Anjou. Historians are commonly much more interested in King Louis than in King Charles ; yet imagination may play for a moment on the motives of the dying, childless King, who, knowing all the plots for the division of his insecure possessions, deliberately bequeathed them to the Bourbon. Did he know Louis better than Louis knew himself ? In a final effort to keep Spain whole, did he wittingly tempt his brother-in-law to make a bid for the biggest stakes of all : dynastic and territorial at once ? While the schemers and prelates came and went, did the King resolve the knotty problem by a simple equation in psychology ? We are not told. What we do know is, that, after a brief hesitation between the treaty and the will, Louis accepted the will ; and Philip, whom Louis's treaty would have excluded from Spain, was not more grateful than the facts required. The treaty was just " a scrap of paper ", of the kind which Absolutists in all ages preserve or tear up as they choose. No doubt we shall learn at last that 56 STALEMATE it is the Absolutism which creates the peril. In this instance, King William of England shrugged his shoulders resentfully ; it would be time enough to think of active measures when the two Bourbon kings should show a lead. We may pause here to point out certain features of resemblance between the situations then and now. The Pan-German scheme of Kaiser Wilhelm in anticipation of the break-up of the Dual Monarchy has more than an accidental likeness to King Louis's Pan-Bourbonism. France had grown and Spain had declined, like Germany and Austria since 1866 ; and the bigger power in each pair was anxious in self- interest to acquire a benevolent control over the smaller. Pan-Bourbonism threatened the Empire, as Pan-Germanism threatens Russia, and each alike was a menace to the maritime States in the Mediterranean and the oceans. Both made a battle- field of Belgium, the Spanish Netherlands of the day ; and both aspired to a leadership (which France at any rate had achieved) in the arts of civilization. The watching nations had not long to wait. The strong wine of Bourbonism mounted. There was the treaty-obligation to be flouted ; and it was prudent to grapple King Philip by military bonds to France. Accordingly, Louis showed his hand. He " reserved '' Philip's right of succession to the throne of France : a reservation which acquired real mean- ing when the Dauphin and his son died in 1711-12, 57 THE THIRD GREAT WAR and the young life of King Louis's great-grandson (Louis XV, 1715) stood alone between Philip and the French throne. Next, in 1701, when the English ex-King James II died in exile, Louis *' recognized " his son as the true King James III of England. This action directly contravened the terms of Anglo - French treaties, and its effect in England was as clumsy and ill-judged as Kaiser Wilhelm's calcula- tion on the Ulster problem in 1914. Instead of fostering seeds of discord, it unified England to a man. Thirdly, in 1701, as in 1914, the gage was thrown down in Belgium (Spanish Netherlands), w^here Louis replaced with French troops the Dutch garrisons in the fortresses. The day had come, and the First Great War of AUies against Absolutism in Europe. The Emperor had lost the throne of Spain, intended for his younger son the Archduke Charles. Holland saw the hand of the Bourbon stretching from the Spanish Nether- lands to the Dutch. Prussia and Hesse were con- cerned to protect the frontiers of the German principalities. England saw France screening Spain in an effort to undo the Armada. — King William died in March, 1702. In the following May, the war broke out which was to decorate the reign of Queen Anne with the laurels of liberty and justice. It did not end as it began. A ten years* war is exhausting. '* For the moment the nation is inspired with enthusiasm for the cause ; and it is 58 STALEMATE not to be doubted that the Government will obtain the national support it requires. The danger is that, bye and bye, a sense of weariness and even of depression may supervene. Increased want of employment, loss of trade, financial difficulties, a hard TOUter, temporary reverses on sea and land — these and many other causes may encourage the ' peace at any price ' fanatics, the faint-hearted and the fickle, to join in the cry of ' stop the war * " ^ These words are profoundly true. Written in 1914, they refer to the Third Great War ; but the historical imagination which inspires them is derived from two centuries ago. For England's enthusiasm waned. A sense of weariness supervened, and a slackening of national support. Marlborough was recalled in 171 1 : his initiative had been checked some time before ; and the '' stop the war '' party at home insisted on a separate peace between England and France. They forgot, or chose to forget, their obligation to their Allies, and they laid no store by the condition, which alone could satisfy the Emperor, that Philip V should be deposed from the Spanish throne. The new Grand Alliance has been wiser. The agreement solemnly ratified between France, Russia and England to make peace jointly, not severally, precludes, we may hope, the privy deaUngs of the Government of Queen Anne in 1711 ; it is one ^ Our Duty and Our Interest in the War. By G. W. Prothero. John Murray, 19 14 ; 2d. 59 THE THIRD GREAT WAR of the lessons of history which has not been taught in vain. There are others still to be learned, if military Absolutism in Europe is to be crushed for ever at its third venture. The Treaty of Utrecht was signed in 1713. Its preliminaries had been arranged between England and France. Holland reluctantly assented to them, and Prussia and Hesse acquiesced. The outraged Empire still held out, the more bitterly, since Charles VI had succeeded (1711) his brother as Emperor, and felt a personal ignominy in confirming Philip V's accession. But Charles was helpless without his Allies, and the Treaties ol Rastadt and Baden completed in 1714 the pacification of Europe after twelve years' uninterrupted warfare. The terms of the peace are to be considered in relation to the objects of the war. King Louis had always been aware that the public safety of Europe would be deemed inconsistent with the full scope of his ambitions. In each treaty of partition since 1668, he had used the Bourbon claim to the Spanish throne as an instrument of bargain for Spanish soil. None of these treaties provided for the Duke of Anjou's succession ; neither before nor after the death of the neutral Bavarian candidate. The Duke of Anjou succeeded under the terms of the late King's will. The Spanish crown was a bonus, as it were, to the Bourbon dividend in Spain, when the estate should rank for distribution. It was more than 60 STALEMATE Louis had expected, through all the long and busy years in which, by arms and diplomacy, he had affirmed his right to the lion's share. We lay strong emphasis on this point, because the Utrecht conven- tions admitted Philip as King of Spain. True, it was expressly provided that no king of Spain or France should at the same time be king of both countries ; but this windy speculation — more practical, as shown, after 171^2 — had been little more than a challenge thrown out by Louis in 1701. Twelve years' war must have cured him of such vanity. The point is that, owing mainly to England's desertion from her Allies, Louis got his own way about the Bourbon succession in Spain. The torn treaty was left unmended. The diplomatists of Europe handed down the *' scrap of paper " theory to the next Absolutist. We are not concerned in this connection with the wisdom or otherwise of recog- nizing Philip as King of Spain. During the course of the war Portugal had joined the Grand Alliance, and at one time the Marquis of Ruvigny ^ in com- mand of the English forces in that country, had occupied Madrid and proclaimed Charles of Austria King of Spain. But Spain rallied to King Philip, and the Empire's short-lived triumph was perhaps a warning to the Allies not to force a foreign monarch on the Spaniards. There was also the further objection that the former Habsburg candidate was 1 1 648- 1 7 20 ; 1st Earl of Galway. 61 THE THIRD GREAT WAR now Roman Emperor, and therefore no longer in the running. Still, diplomacy has resources, and the Utrecht peace-makers might have found other means of chastening King Louis and of asserting the sacredness of treaties, even short of deposing King Philip. We shall see in the next chapter and in later episodes of European history the evil precedent of this example. — With Spain, Philip kept the Indies. Of more positive interest — until international morahty becomes positive — is the effect of the Peace of Utrecht on the balance of power in Europe. Louis, we remember, had aimed not merely at Bourbon crowns but also at Bourbon frontiers. In this in the main he was disappointed. France kept Alsace with Strasburg, thus expanding the rights secured to her by the Peace of Westphalia ; but she was compelled to evacuate certain fortresses which she had seized on the East bank of the Rhine. Dunkirk, ill-gotten, was dismantled. The Dutch were restored to the garrisons from which King Louis had removed them on the eve of the war : Ypres — Toumai — Mons — Namur ; names of tragic import in history. This barrier was re-adjusted at a later date even more to France's disfavour. The adjacent Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) were trans- ferred — it was virtually a retransference — to the Habsburg Empire, which also acquired the Bourbon Italian provinces except Nice and Sicily, which were 62 STALEMATE ceded to the Duke of Savoy. Prussia was given steps Eastward, and certain German Electorates were strengthened or confirmed. We omit to comment in this place on the English acquisition of Newfoundland (subj ect to fishing rights) , Hudson's Bay, Nova Scotia, and St. Christopher's from France ; of Gibraltar and Minorca from Spain (thus shattering Bourbon plans in the Mediterranean), and of certain privileges in the slave-trafiic with Spanish America. The commercial advantages of the Peace rested almost wholly with England, whose general, the Duke of Marlborough, had chiefly contributed to the Allies' success ; and this, with the Dutch claim to their barrier, and with the Empire's claim to compensation for the crown of Spain, carried out the essential conditions of the Treaty of the Hague, concluded in 1701 by the parties to the Grand Alliance. One fact of importance calls for mention. By the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht two new kings were recognised in Europe : King Frederick William^ of Prussia and King Victor Amadeus of Sicily. Later, the same Prussian house became German Emperors ; the same Savoy house became Kings of Italy. If we widen our survey at this point, and look back from the details of the Peace to the general 1 He had acceded, 17 13. His father, Elector Frederick II of Brandenburg, had taken the style of King Frederick of Prussia in 1 701. See p. 19. 63 THE THIRD GREATj^WAR ideas which underlay it, one aspect comes in view of grave importance at the present day. The essential object of the Allies was to reduce the power of the French menace. France had been defeated in battle, and now her dominion was curtailed ; and in order to keep her in subjection, or, rather in equipoise of weight, it was necessary to strengthen other States up to or near the French standard. In other words, the necessity arose of restoring a balance of power. This consideration prevailed to win the assent of the Allies to the ambition of the houses of HohenzoUern and Savoy, who now entered the charmed circle of kings. But the new kingdoms of Prussia and Sicily would not be strong enough in power or prestige to counterweigh the two Bourbon kingdoms, however much diminished, of France and Spain. England could hold them in the New World, as far as it affected the calculations of the map-makers at Utrecht ; what was much more urgent in their eyes were the military scales in Europe. Students of politics must judge for them- selves if the selection of Austria for this purpose has resulted to the advantage of the nations. It is important to observe, however, that the Allies in 1713 had really no visible alternative. The choice of Austria was dictated by the fact that the war had grown out of the rivalry of the Habsburg and the Bourbon ; and students, in forming their opinion, may conceivably take into account the 64 STALEMATE fact that the Bourbon dynasty in the predominant partner of France has since been brought to a close. The following relevant considerations will perhaps be useful in guiding such a judgment. We pointed out in Chapter II that the Habsburg Emperor in Austria was the earlier Sick Man of Europe, and that a war between Austria and France, or between the Habsburg and Bourbon houses, was inevitable after the Peace of Westphalia. We showed that the centre of conflict had shifted from religions to territories, and that the growth of the Protestant Powers, to which France had been Consistently friendly, had diminished the Empire's prestige. We showed, too, that this loss of prestige and the increasing self-dependence of the German States, the former jewels in the Imperial diadem, were creating . a new European problem, now familiar as the Near-Eastern Question : Brandenburg would drive Russia down, and Austria, receding from the West, would seek new conquests from the Turk. Events after 1648 fully bore out this view. In 1683, Vienna was besieged by the Turks. In 1687, the Turks were defeated, and the crown of Hungary was made hereditary in the male Habsburg line. In 1699, the Peace of Carlowitz confirmed the status quo. How astutely King Louis of France utilized these wars of half a century to the advantage of the Bourbon against the Habsburg has been mentioned before, and would take a volume of 65 THE THIRD GREAT WAR diplomacy to expound. The point is, that the Habsburg house formed a Unk between two traditions, the first rooted in the past, the second to fructify in the future ; and the second arose out of the first in the course of the seventeenth century. It was the Phoenix of legend — with a difference. The Habsburg rose from his own ashes ; but he had sunk on the pyre of a Roman Empire, and he rose in the cradle of a Dual Monarchy. Formally, the change, as we saw, was not consummated till 1806. Practically, the Peace of Utrecht, following the Peace of Westphalia, admitted it and made provision for it. The Empire, which had died in the Thirty Years' War, was to be quietly interred by Napoleon. Meanwhile, the Dual Monarchy had been created by the W^ar of the Spanish Succession. This is why we speak of a stalemate as the result of that war. Neither Bourbon nor Habsburg was defeated. The Bourbon reigned in France and Spain, and the chessboard of kings was still spread for new variations of the old game. Europe, willingly or not, had to accommodate itself to the Habsburg transformation, and to accept the Emperor where it found him. The fiction of electing the Emperor was still nominally maintained : it even gave opportunities for intrigue, as in Mazarin's opposition to the election of Leopold I in 1658 ; and it lent pretensions of power to certain minor principalities. But, as Habsburg after Habsburg had been elected 66 STALEMATE with two exceptions since 1438, for all practical purposes the Dual Monarchy was co-terminous with the Empire. The dynastic continuity of the Habsburg created an illusion of identity. If the Dual Monarchy had performed its functions well, it would not be necessary to press this argument. The ready sympathy might go out to the old man crowned with many sorrows. But personal sympathy is one thing, international interests are another ; Europe has left off its mourning for the sorrows of the Bourbons and the Stewarts. Students of history will recognize the fact that the Catholic Holy Roman Empire was undermined by the religious wars of the sixteenth century. The very title of Emperor became profane, and was adopted in later years by other potentates. The territorial wars of the seventeenth century, into which the religious wars had merged, erected a State in Europe, situated in the country of the House traditionally associated with the Empire, ruled by the head of that house, and fattened by the balancers of power on the spoils of that House's ancient enemies. It was not the Empire, though it looked like it. Like the elusive Homer of criticism, it was another man under the same name. The evil lay in his endowment with his old prejudices and prepossessions. The whole Habsburg tradition was opposed to his success : its friendships, its enmities, its self-esteem. The past leadership of the Germanic Empire was 67 THE THIRD GREAT WAR the worst possible school for new Slavonic and Oriental tasks. We urge these considerations for what they are worth, in view of the settlement to come. In the settlement of 1713-14 there appeared, as has been said, no alternative. For the then Emperor Charles VI had distinct claims on the diplomatists at Utrecht. He had been cheated twelve years before of the reversion of the Kingdom of Spain ; and, though he could not have combined it with his present position as Emperor, he was entitled to some compensation. It is possible that a longer-sighted policy would have counselled the deposition of King PhiHp, thus adjusting a family dispute within the confines of the family : it is certain that the interests of Europe have not ultimately been advanced by the course actually adopted ; that the new Austria, as distinct from the old Empire, did not prove a satisfactory pro- prietor of Belgium and parts of Northern Italy ; that she has not served Europe w^ell in the Near East ; that she has never recovered the authority which she lost in her religious wars ; that the traditional grievance of the Habsburg against France is no longer of any interest to Europe ; and that a situation, unforeseen at Utrecht, has arisen from the relations of Austria with the then Electorate of Brandenburg, just promoted to a kingdom, to which we shall come in the next chapter. 68 CHAPTER V THE EVIL THAT MEN DO Louis XIV died in 1715 aged seventy-seven years, during seventy-two of which he had been King of France. In the last four years of his life there had died his only son, two of his grandsons, and his elder great-grandson. His surviving grandson had been King of Spain since 1700, and his second great- grandson accordingly succeeded as Louis XV ^ of France. He reigned till 1774, and was succeeded in turn by his grandson, Louis XVI, who died under the guillotine in 1793. Thus, in a hundred and fifty years, from 1643 to 1793, there were only three kings of France : the first '' surpassed all contemporary despots in his sense of unbounded and irresponsible dominion " ^ ; the third was executed by his subjects. The first was king of the greatest military power in Europe ; the third was king of revolutionaries. Louis XIV cost France dear. His reign and the 1 Louis XV, like his great-grandfather and predecessor, was five years old when he acceded. The Regent till 1723 was Philip, son of the Duke of Orleans, brother to Louis XIV. It is interest- ing to note that the Regent was married to Fran9oise de Bourbon, natural daughter to Louis XIV, and that the crown of France reverted to this branch in the person of Louis Philippe, King of the French, 1830-1848. * Cambridge Modern History, viii, 36 (by Prof. F. C. Montague). 69 THE THIRD GREAT WAR example of his reign teach a lesson — minatory or hortatory, according to the school of the moralist — from their contrast with the period when the memory of his reign was stamped out. Compare the seventy years of French history which closed in 1715 with the seventy years just closing at the end of 1914 ; instead of the dominion of le roi Soleil — Monarchy, Consulate, Empire, Republic ; instead of territorial aggrandize- ment — the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Indeed, reviewing the hundred years since Louis's second successor paid the penalty of his ancestor's greatness, we may say, without affecting a moral bias, that Louis XIV cost France too dear. Louis XVI was beheaded ; his son disappeared during the Terror ; his two brothers had turbulent reigns ; his cousin, Louis Philippe, ended in storm. Nor was the Spanish house of Bourbon, for which Louis XIV plunged Europe into war, much more fortunate in its record of deposition, CarHsm, restoration. And the annals of the Bourbons are the history of France, as dictated by Louis XIV : *' They lie like circle-strewn soaked Autumn-leaves Which stain the forest scarlet, her fair sons ! And of their death her life is : of their blood, From many streams now urging to a flood, No more divided, France shall rise afresh. Of them she learns the lesson of the flesh — That till the chasing out of its last vice The flesh was fashioned but for sacrifice " ^ ^ George Meredith, Odes in Contribution to the Song of Ftench History, 65. 70 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO France rises afresh. She has paid the cost, and more besides ; and it will be our privilege, we trust, to watch the fulfilment of Meredith's prophecy. But the fate of Louis XVI and the misfortunes of his successors were not revealed to the " contemporary despots " whom Louis XIV excited to emulation. Upon these the splendour of his court, the prowess of his generals, the foresight of his policy, and the widening of his frontiers, made an ineffaceable impression of permanence in change and of resistance amid shocks. To them it seemed, and might well seem, that in a little Versailles of their own, with little echoes of BoileauS and little editions of Colbert ^ and Turenne% they could repeat on a scale commensurate with their means the brilliant exploits of their prototype. A generation of " benevolent '' despots sprang from these imitative princelings, and filled the canvas of the eighteenth century with the overwhelming figures of Catherine II of Russia, Frederick the Great of Prussia, the Emperor Joseph II, and Napoleon himself ; till Carlyle wrote in 1840, " The History of the World is but the 1 Nicholas Boileau, 1 636-171 1 ; French critic; ''lawgiver of Parnassus ". 2 Jean Baptiste Colbert, 1619-1683 ; reformer of French finances. 3 D'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne, 1611-1675 ; Louis XIV's greatest general. 71 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Biography of Great Menu's and von Sybel^ Treitschke's forerunner, founded the Prussian school of history in the spirit of this belief. " He was resolved that Austria should gain well-rounded, and if possible extended frontiers on every side, and thus come forth from the centre of Europe as the first of European Powers/' So wrote Sybel of Joseph II, who kept Frederick's portrait in his bedchamber ; and the description would apply, reading France or Germany for Austria, to King Louis in the seventeenth or ^ Lectures on Heroes and Hero-Worship, I. * Heinrich v. Sybel, i8 17-1895 ; German historian ; founded the so-called Prussian school of history in reaction from the judicial objectivity of the Berlin school founded by von Ranke ( 1 795-1 886). Heinrich v. Treitschke, 18 34-1 896, of whom so much has been heard in recent days, was an early adherent to the Prussian school, which has since become exhausted by a reversion to more scientific methods. Carlyle, Froude, and Macaulay had affinities with the Prussian school. It enjoyed the favour of Bismarck, who gave Sybel, Treitschke, and others access to State papers. Treitschke read a moral into German history, and pointed it to the advancement of Prussia ; a view which found many adherents in the epoch 1865-187 5, not only in Germany : among them, Carlyle himself and Lord Bryce, author of the Holy Roman Empire. Treitschke found a military State, and wrote its history as a patriot ; he used it to stimulate recruiting in Prussia : not literally, perhaps, but in a metaphorical sense not far removed from the literal. Late in life, he admitted to dis- illusion ; German unity had not tended to German culture ; and in these views, rather than in the militant views which Bernhardi developed, Treitschke was in agreement with the sage, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, 1 844-1900, who has been strangely mis- represented by some English writers in this crisis. Nietzsche was a strong anti-Prussian, and denied that military discipline could 7a THE EVIL THAT MEN DO Kaiser Wilhelm in the twentieth century. For the type, which was destroyed in France, and which is merely a hollow * sham in Austria to-day (though not therefore innocuous) has persisted in Germany as a cult, which makes false pretensions to culture. We may try to trace this cult, and to inquire what profit was derived from the example of Louis XIV by the three HohenzoUern rulers who reigned in Brandenburg in his lifetime : ever lead to a culture-State. He expressly condemned the " history written on Imperial German lines — and Herr von Treitschke is not ashamed of himself ". He accused his country- men of every crime against culture committed since the sixteenth century, starting with the Reformation, which, in his view, had wrecked the Renaissance, and ending with their failure to appreciate himself ! But professors of the Prussian school of history, in search for a moral sanction for their doctrines, took recourse to the Nietzschean philosophy of the race of " supermen " to be produced by the exercise of the " will to power ", as an amendment of the will to live. This higher species of humankind required for its production the sloughing of the mistaken virtues of pity, sympathy and other foibles, and a conscious sacrifice of weak multitudes in order to make the strong few. Plainly, this theory of evolution fitted the Prussian historians like a glove ; the Treitschkean history became the Nietzschean philosophy teaching by examples, and obtained a strong hold on the German public. The whole subject is less important than has been assumed, since the existence of a body of writings exalting war as an instrument of salvation, blessed by God for the practice of man, struck peaceful Englishmen with surprise in the early weeks of the Third Great War. But it is as well to get the facts right. 73 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Elector Frederick William, the Great Elector ; reigned 1640-1688. Elector Frederick III, King Frederick I ; reigned 1688 (King I70i)-i7i3. King Frederick WiUiam I ; reigned 1713-1740. The three reigns covered exactly a hundred years, and King Frederick II (Frederick the Great) was on the throne from 1740 to the eve of the French Revo- lution, 1786. We last saw the Great Elector at the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, when he was stretching his fingers East and West over the map of Northern Europe. To his central province of Brandenburg, flat, sandy, and unattractive, of which Berhn is the centre, he had added East Pomerania on the right — West Pomerania was Sweden's — with a seaboard on the Baltic, and Magdeburg on the left, with its shoulder on the Harz mountains. On his right frontier was Poland, but across a region of that country, beyond Danzig and the mouth of the Vistula, lay the Elector's duchy of East Prussia, with Konigsberg as its capital, held under the suzerainty of the Polish crown. On his left frontier stretched the Empire, but between the Weser and the Rhine, or between Minden and Cologne, the Elector had been given control over the three little duchies of Ravensberg, Mark and Cleves. Each of these was a separate piece of territory, plumped like three finger-marks on the map; and Cleves, the westernmost of all, had the 74 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO Rhine flowing through it, and was bounded on its left by the United Provinces (Holland). Thus, in order to traverse his dominions, the Elector, starting at Konigsberg, where he w^as fief to the Polish King, would have to step across a big tract of Poland before reaching his Pomeranian acquisition ; he would march from there through Brandenburg, the original home of his race, and would enjoy his extended walk through Magdeburg, till he was pulled up short at the Harz mountains. From there he would stride across the Empire, ruled by his Catholic Emperor, Ferdinand III, into one after another of the three tiny duchies which gave him foothold in the river- valleys. With these jumps, and leaps, and " bunkers '', it would have been an exasperating walk for a more amiable man than Frederick William ; given the HohenzoUern temperament, the example of Louis XIV, and the fact that Brandenburg had been trampled by countless armies during the Thirty Years' War, the Elector was likely to take seriously the favourite pastime of the kings of his age : a scientific rectification of their frontiers. The HohenzoUern has been rectifying them ever since. In every half -century which has elapsed since the Great Elector girded his loins after the so-called Peace of Westphalia, his cherished Electorate has been expanded ; till to-day, in the sixth half-century, in an era of economy and peace, w^e see Belgium added to the booty torn by the same 75 THE THIRD GREAT WAR savage hands of a Frederick or a William of Branden- burg from the Empire, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, France. The Bourbon ceased to oppress, not indeed by the action of the diplomatists, who made peace with him in 1713, but by the action of his own subjects eighty years afterwards ; the Buonaparte, as we shall see, came and went, meteoric in his passage and his power ; the HohenzoUern, greedy and rapacious, indifferent to other interests but his own and therefore insensible to honour, has revived in each generation the characteristics of Louis XIV's contemporary ; has shown himself uniformly dis- satisfied with his constantly extended realm ; and still worships in the twentieth century the same gods of mihtarism and absolutism to which he bowed in the fallen temple of the Bourbon. The Great Elector began on the right, where he was hemmed between the Swedes and the Poles ; and, as Sweden at that epoch was a great naval and military power in the competent hands of Queen Christina, and as John Casimir, King of Poland, com- manded squadrons of horse which could kick up the dust in Brandenburg, he had to play a waiting^game. He employed himself, much as his descendant has been employing recent years of peace, in educating his subjects to wage war on two frontiers at the same time. His chance came when Queen Christina abdicated, and her successor, Charles X, found himself in conflict with John of Poland. The years 1655 to 76 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO 1660, during which this conflict took its course, are particularly interesting in a study of Hohenzollern tactics ; and students may possibly be of opinion that a line of policy which was crooked in the seventeenth century does not become straight in the twentieth, though it may be drawn more heavily and through a wider area. Briefly, what happened is this, and it is well worth attention, Charles X asked the Elector's permission to march through East Pomerania into Poland ; a direct landing in the Gulf of Danzig would have involved a blockade of that port. Frederick William consented. John Casimir and his army were defeated, and the Sw^edes attacked Danzig from the rear. Seeing the Swedes thus engaged, and seeing the Poles recover themselves, the Elector proposed to the King of Poland that they should take joint action with Denmark S always ready for a *' certain liveliness " in the Baltic, in order to defeat Charles X. Charles replied by a blow at Konigsberg, the capital, it will be remembered, of East Prussia, then a duchy under Poland's suzerainty. The result in 1656 was a transference of this suzerainty to Sweden, and the Elector was required to supply his new suzerain with reinforcements. So far, the Elector was worse off, and presently he was meekly taking part in ^ Similarly it has been said of Kaiser Wilhelm that his conception of friendship is — always friendship against, never friendship with. 77 THE THIRD GREAT WAR a Swedish-Prussian subjugation of Poland. But while Charles and Frederick William were quartered somewhere about Warsaw, the Danish movement against Sweden began, and was joined by Muscovite allies. This brought the Elector back, in alarm for the safety of East Prussia, and Charles had to set sail for Denmark. But before quitting his ally, Charles made a bid for his good faith by contracting the Treaty of Labiau, by which he agreed to release East Prussia from his suzerainty. This was in November, 1656. A few months later, Frederick William concluded another Treaty at W^ehlau, contracting himself to John Casimir of Poland for precisely the same price. The Labiau Treaty freed East Prussia on condition of a Swedish alliance ; the Wehlau Treaty freed East Prussia on condition of a Polish alliance ; and Frederick William put his name to both while Sweden and Poland were at war. Truly, the Hohenzollem's bond was never better than his word. Or shall we extenuate the act with the Prussian historian, Martin Philippson ? ** Neither he nor any one else imagined that he was allied with Sweden through all eternity '' ^ But ten months is a brief eternity. The rest of the story is quickly told. Charles X prepared a mighty vengeance, but he died in February, 1660. Peace was then forced on the warring States, chiefly through the instrumentality 1 Der Grosse Kurfurst, i, 254 ; Berlin, 1897. 78 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO of Mazarin; and the Treaty of Oliva, as it was called, formally created East Prussia an independent duchy of the crowTi of Brandenburg. So Greater Prussia began to grow. [; It would be in the highest degree improper to select this episode of past history as typical of German policy to-day, if a new departure had since been made to any purpose : as unfair as if England of George V were to be reproached with the secret treaties of the Stewarts, or the Third French Republic with the statecraft of Louis XIV. But when we see a Hohen- zoUem still directing the diplomacy of his Empire to-day by the same methods and sanctions as were adopted by his ancestor, we ire entitled to ask if it is not to his House rather than to the Bourbon's that the old epigram should be addressed : they learn nothing and they forget nothing. We admit that the Great Elector could quote authority for his action. Where Richelieu gave him a lead, why should he scruple to follow^ ? The point that we suggest for consideration is how far Richelieu's lead is binding on Kaiser Wilhelm to-day, and what steps the Allies shall take, when their war is successfully ended, to prevent a recurrence elsewhere of the evils of the Richelieu tradition. Frederick William now devoted himself to setting his house in order : a process of Branden- burgizing Prussia, analogous to the Prussianizing of Germany in a later regime. There was a little 79 THE THIRD GREAT WAR trouble with the Junkers ^ of East Prussia, who did not readily submit to the substitution of an independent duke for a feudal suzerain. But their new duke took a short way. He had their leader arrested on Pohsh territory in order to be executed on his own, and, as Poland was content with a formal protest, the revolting nobles said no more. In view of the present relation of these East Prussian gentry to the HohenzoUern Throne, it is worth noting how their loyalty had to be enforced as recently as 1672. Even more interesting perhaps are the facts about other sections of the population. It has been calculated that in the year 1770 about a sixth of the inhabitants of Prussia were foreign immigrants or immigrants' offspring. The policy which led to this result was started by the Great Elector, and was continued by his immediate successors. Brandenburg wanted populating, and ready hospitality was offered to Protestant refugees from the United Provinces, Salzburg* and France. Twenty thousand immigrated in 1687 ; 600,000 before 1770. Dutchmen tilled the fields and con- structed the aqueducts of Brandenburg ; Huguenots brought their crafts and introduced their manu- factures. It was a thoroughly * wise policy on Frederick WiUiam's part, and it proves how well ^ Landed nobles. * Goethe's Hermann and Dorothea is founded on the Salzburg migration. 80 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO he had mastered the art of civil and reUgious government. The bureaucratic system of Prussia dates from his administrative reforms. The Great Elector was less successful in his Brandenburg African Trading Company, in his negotiation with Denmark for colonizing the coast of Coromandel, and in his attempts to provide himself with a navy. These ambitions, too, became a tradition in the family. Nor was the Elector much happier in some later stages of his foreign poHcy. Historians speak of his *' usual impetuousness " — a characteristic which was repeated in his descendants — in reference to his changes of ally from France to the Empire, according as it suited his convenience. His friendly attitude to Louis XIV was of great assistance to that monarch at the time of the boundary com- missions in the Rhine-valley district after the Peace of Nimwegen ^ ; but in 1686 he came down on the side of the Habsburg, and joined the secret League of Augsburg formed to resist the French king. Meanwhile, in 1675, he had defeated Sweden at Fehrbellin, where the military balance in the Baltic was transferred from Swedish hands to those of Brandenburg-Prussia and the growing power of Russia. This transference, we may add here, was completed in 1709, when Peter the Great of Russia defeated Charles XII of Sweden at Pultava. The brave Swede went on fighting till he died in ^ See p. 48. 81 THE THIRD GREAT WAR 1718, and by the treaties of 1719-1721 his possessions on the mainland were distributed. Russia got the lion's share ; Hanover, Denmark and others had minor portions ; and Prussia, at that date a kingdom ruled by King Frederick William I, obtained a share of West Pomerania, the islands of Riigen and Usedom, and the ports of Stettin and Danzig. Thus the terms of Oliva were enlarged. The Great Elector did not live to see these gains. He had tried to force the pace after his victory at Fehrbellin in 1675, but it did not suit French policy at the moment, and the consequent treaty (St. Germain, 1679) brought him little money and less land. He died in 1688, and his son Frederick III succeeded as Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of East Prussia. The father had taken Richeheu as his model ; the son, as was natural in his generation, displayed a like talent in imitating King Louis. Of his French court and his sympathy with French taste this is not the place to speak. Prussia was deeply indebted to foreign influence and example in repairing the ravages to culture caused by the Thirty Years' War ; and the carefully - tended exotic now began to bear fruit. In 1694 the University of Halle was founded, and it rapidly became a centre of learning in Prussia. More pertinent to the Hohenzollern policy was Frederick's ambition to be a king, and he made the recognition of his royal title a condition of his support to the 82 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO Emperor Leopold in the Spanish Partition Treaty, necessitated in 1699 by the death of the Prince of Bavaria ^ Leopold was not very willing. It would be a blow to the prestige of the Empire to have a king among the electors ; and it may be that Leopold was prescient, in his capacity as Archduke of Austria, of what the title would mean in added strength when the Hohenzollern should pull against the Habsburg. But 1866 and its harbingers were far off ; the immediate struggle lay between the Habsburg and the Bourbon. The Hohenzollern could not be kept out, and the price of his support was the royal dignity : Frederick assumed the title before the outbreak of war in 1702 ; and it is to be noted that he derived it from Prussia outside the Empire, not from Brandenburg within. The duchy, recently released from the suzerainty of Sweden or Poland, and still divided by PoUsh territory from Brandenburg, became the kingdom of the Elector on his promotion. The new king died in 1713 ; but when the pacts of Utrecht were complete in 1714, his son, Frederick William I, took his place among the crowned heads of Europe, and Prussia was definitely launched on the career marked out for her since 1648. Prussia against Russia on one side, Prussia against the Empire on the other ; Turkey against Russia on one side, Turkey against the Empire on the other : these 1 See p. 53. 83 THE THIRD GREAT WAR became the pressing problems of the balance of power m Europe, after the Habsburg had settled his account with the Bourbon kings in the West. Holland drops out. Sweden drops out. The Peace of Nystad, 1721, replaced Sweden by Russia in the Baltic, and added, as we saw, the coveted strip of Pomerania and the strongholds of Danzig and Stettin to the kingdom of Frederick William I. His next twenty years were devoted, like Bismarck's from 1871 to 1890, to screwing up the tone of his. coxmtrymen to the pitch of their country's new tune. Or if not their national consciousness, at least their mechanical simulation of it. The defences had to march with the frontiers. The likeness in circumstances is really striking, and it is to be remembered that the interval of time was only exactly a hundred and fifty years. In 1721 a new kingdom was established by force of arms on the Baltic, in 1871 a new Empire was established by force of arms on the Rhine ; and the construction of a sense of Royal Prussia preceded on parallel lines the Bismarckian construction of a sense of Imperial Germany. Brandenburg was expanded into Prussia, Prussia into Germany : *' an enlarged Prussia '', as Treitschke calls it ; and the procedure in each instance was the same. There is a strong family likeness in the HohenzoUem. King Frederick William's chief concern was to create an army. Louis XIV had had an army ; 84 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO it had brought him territories and power, and the most efficacious argument was still the argument of force. To the formation of an army the King of Prussia gave his days and nights. On it he lavished all the paternal affection of which his recruiter's heart was capable. He watched it, he nursed it, he flogged it. He liked to catch his soldiers young, drafting the sons of his Junkers into Prussian military schools, of the kind which nearly broke the spirit of young Schiller at Stuttgart about 1775. His army discipline was ferocious. He flung his net so wide as to risk a labour-famine in the fields, and he practised so narrow an economy that his scholars had to go without pay in order that his soldiers might be fed. In the end, by kidnapping, enrolment, and conscription, he got a standing army of about 80,000 men, with a well-filled treasury behind them and a well-drilled government in front. In a will which he wrote in 1722 for the guidance of his son, Frederick William laid the curse of Pharaoh and the doom of Absalom upon him if he should reduce military expenditure. He had the largest army in proportion to his population of any ruler in Europe ; and from his time forth political power in Prussia has been founded on a military basis. They called his grandfather the Great Elector, and his son Frederick the Great ; but if greatness, like genius, consists in taking infinite pains, or in working without rest and without 85 THE THIRD GREAT WAR haste in the preparation of the means towards an end, then King Frederick WiUiam I was the greatest Hohenzollem of the three. His own father had schemed for a king's crown, and had kept up such seemly state that his consort beUeved he would be consoled in the event of her death by organizing the ceremony of her funeral. The successor to the crown thus acquired was concerned to safeguard his possession : Louis XIV had been the roi Soleil ; Prussia should have her place in the sun. When the provisions of the Peace of Utrecht should once more plunge Europe into warfare, Prussia would be enabled to play her part. It was not an unworthy ambition in the age in which he lived. Already Hanover was growing, with her English connection. Already the partition of Poland was becoming as absorbing a question as the partition of Spain had been. Already the House of Savoy was acting the Hohenzollern in Italy, which, unlike Brandenburg, however, had been dreaming of unity since the thirteenth century. Already the old rivalry of Bourbon and Habsburg was complicated by fresh dynastic problems and by fresh claimants for voices in their settlement. The few years of comparative peace had already been broken by wars, which were themselves the omen of greater conflicts in the second half of the eighteenth century. Still, however fully we acknowledge Frederick 86 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO William's genius for preparation, and his right to protect his scattered territories, it is impossible not to see how harsh a rule of life he imposed. He had a skilful and an industrious population, with a large infiltration of foreign elements devoted to trades and agriculture. He had a rare opportunity of stimulating national culture, and of infecting the minor princes of North Germany, among whom his Royal title gave him the lead, with ideals of art and taste. There were great men enough in exile from the rigidly Catholic States to sow a dozen centres of Northern learning with the seeds of pure and gracious thought. But this narrow-souled, coarse-grained monarch, with his brutal cane and ready fist, concentrated all his energy and impelled all the talents of his race into the single channel of military efficiency. With so ample a field for selection, and with so responsible and delicate a task as the direction of a new kingdom into the hegemony of European nations, Frederick William deliberately confined himself to the worst and ugliest way, and is redeemed in the eyes of civilization solely by his Protestant zeal, which opened the gates of Prussian cities to refugees from persecution abroad. But the gates closed heavily on the immigrants. They were not allowed to go farther or to go back ; and half of the Prussian standing army consisted of foreigners impressed for service. They talk of culture to-day as the handmaid of 87 THE THIRD GREAT WAR the German sword. It was the very negation of culture which Frederick WiUiam imposed on his barren land. Leibniz (1646-1716) was the only German thinker whom English, French and Dutch example had inspired with liberal ideas, and his chief disciple. Christian v. Wolff, was dismissed from Halle University by the King in 1723 ^ Winckelmann was bom in 1717, Kant in 1724, Lessing in 1729, Herder in 1744, Goethe in 1749, and to these great thinkers we shall return ; but who knows how many apostles of enhghtenment were crushed beneath the iron heel of the recruiter- king who hated learning ? He subordinated everything to his army : his God, his family, his subjects. In a beaten people yearning for release from the yoke of tyranny or oppression, such urgency might have been noble. In a new people yearning to express themselves in art, literature and science, ready to make all reasonable sacrifice for the privilege of keeping what they had won, the severe, repressive, all-devouring militarism enforced upon them by their despotic sovereign, and the military tradition which he created, were a crime against the present and the future. The King died in 1740, in the same year as the Emperor Charles VI, who was followed in 1746 by his old rival Phihp V of Spain. The stage was being cleared for the giants. Gradually the forces collected ^ His successor, Frederick II, reversed the dismissal in 1740. 88 THE EVIL THAT MEN DO which were destined to break to pieces the cement of the Peace of Utrecht. '* It has been an incalculable misfortune for humanity *\ writes Mr. Fisher, *' that the giants were men who could not afford to be honest, for hence it comes about that we are now confronted with millions of educated men who are still the slaves of a barbaric statecraft " ^ The guilt lies heavily on the King of Prussia who laid the burden of that system on his descendants. How heavily, we have now to see. * The War : Its Causes and Issues. By H. A. L. Fisher, ii. Longmans, 6d. net. 89 CHAPTER VI SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA Frederick the Great, though his father had reviled him, and had soured such milk of human kindness as flowed from a HohenzoUern heart, continued the family purpose of consolidating and extending his dominions, and of asserting his personal leadership in the Empire over that of the Bourbon and the Habsburg. He left in 1786 an army two and a half times as large as that which his father had extracted from the bleeding soil of his country ; the population had increased threefold ; and Silesia and parts of northern Poland had been torn away from Emperor and King, and patched on to the Prussian frontiers. Whereas the Great Elector had had to leap from his duchy in East Prussia across a tract of Polish territory into Pomerania and Brandenburg, the Great Frederick walked through his own realm from beyond Konigsberg in the East along the Baltic littoral to Stettin, with no Pole or Swede to say him nay. He still kept his fingers in the West, and had planted his thumb on East Friesland, up against the United Netherlands on the coast ; and one long leg stretched South-eastwards in Silesia, following the course of 90 SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA the Oder through Breslau down to GaHcia : truly, a formidable rival to the ancient Catholic Powers. We shall learn shortly how he did it. Here we may pause to point out how events reduced the formid- ableness. " Deutschland found Prussia ", wrote Carlyle, midway in his stream of hero-worship ; ''a solid and living State round which the Teutonic people should consolidate itself " ^ Perhaps. But first let us make sure when and how Germany found Prussia. It was not in the hero-king's reign, nor by the sign of his culture, nor under the protection of his army. Germany found Prussia in collapse after Napoleon's invasion. The '' solid and living State'' had been crushed at Auerstadt and Jena, on October 14th, 1806, twenty years after Frederick the Great's death. His work, and his father's work, had all to be done over again ; and if, as we tried to show in the last chapter, the Bourbons cost France too dear between 1643 and 1793 — from Louis XIV's accession to Louis XVI's death by the guillotine, — is this record not equally true, within the same period of time, of the HohenzoUem in Prussia : from the Great Elector's ac- cession in 1640 to Frederick the Great's death in 1786 ? UEtat, c'est moi, he could say, more confidently even than King Louis. ** The tension of a tiger crouching for a spring " ^ is Acton's description of ^ History of Frederick the Great, xx, 13. * Lectures on Modern History, 290. Macmillan, 1906. 91 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Prussia at the opening of Frederick the Great's reign ; and a fitting tribute must be paid to the monarch's personal submission to the claims of service to the State. But there was no health in his State. The props that supported it were not sunk in the concrete of national life. A full third of his army were foreigners ; his culture was foreign through and through : French, specifically Voltairean ; and Frederick's personal rule fell to pieces when his personality disappeared. His success impressed men's imagination. His Seven Years' War, to which we shall come, and from which he emerged with distinction, had fired a sense of unity ; Goethe could write and feel : '' The first true and higher self- consciousness came into German poetry through Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War ". But there was more actuality in Schiller's reflection, in his ode to the German Muse (we translate literally) : * No Augustan Age flowered, No Medici's favour Smiled on German art ; It was not the nurseling of fame, Nor did its flower unfold Under the sunshine of princes. *' From the greatest Teuton son. From the Great Frederick's throne It went unwanted, unhonoured. Gloriously may the Teuton boast. Higher may his heart beat : Himself he made it worthy." 92 SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA The long-postponed literary revival, which flourished in Frederick the Great's age, flourished aloof from Berlin. Leipzig, Ziirich, Gottingen, Heidelberg, Hamburg, Jena, Weimar, — these were the centres of German culture, when Winckelmann brought back from Greece the seeds of the new German Renaissance, which Herder and Lessing tended and Goethe fostered to maturity. The HohenzoUem art was war, and it fell by war in 1806. The German culture of to-day is a thing of artificial extraction, by Prussian routine out of HohenzoUem pedantry. *' It is the greatest danger " , wrote Lord Acton, *' that remains to be encountered by the Anglo-Saxon race " ^ Its aim is to exploit the individual for the service of the group, of which the HohenzoUem is the head. It was the aim consistently inculcated by the Prussian mihtary despots of 1640 to 1786 ; and from its grim and forbidding presence the German muse " went unwanted, unhonoured ". Such was the Prussia which ** Deutschland found '' in the age of Frederick the Great : to which, in its hour of steep affliction, great-hearted Germans came running, with balm and healing in their hands. Poor, broken idol of the HohenzoUem : how generously they deemed it worth repairing ; how ignobly it requited their generosity. Fichte - 1 Ibid,, 289. 2 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 1762-1814; Kantian philosopher. 93 THE THIRD GREAT WAR hastened from Jena to mend its sore and wounded heart, to distil into its anguish of self-abasement his noble Addresses to the German Nation, through which " the name ' German nation ' first regained a meaning and a value '' ^ Schamhorst ^ hurried from Hanover to mend its shattered arm, bringing with him English ideas of miUtary discipline and honour, for which his sons were fighting under Wellington. Stein ^ Humboldt *, and Hardenberg » renovated its stupid, wooden head, and gave it — if only it could have profited by them — new conceptions of self-government and self-control. These were the Germans who " found Prussia '* : who taught her to find herself ; till Amdt « sang her into freedom from under the conqueror's yoke, and Komer' sought a warrior's death to crown his patriotic poetry. But the new Prussia perished in its cradle. This is the melancholy fact in the history of German culture. The creation of Humboldt and Fichte hardly survived its creators, hardly survived the Battle of Leipzig, October i6th to 19th, 1813, in which ^ Biese, Deutsche Litter aturgeschichte, ii, 234. ^ G. S. von Scharnhorst, 1756-18 13 ; organizer of the Prussian army against Napoleon. 3 Baron Heinrich von Stein, 175 7-1 831 ; statesman. * Wilhelm von Humboldt, 1767-183 5 ; minister of education. '^ Prince Karl August von Hardenberg, 1750- 1822 ; statesman. • Ernst Moritz Arndt, 1 769-1 860 ; poet and historian. ' Karl Theodor Komer, 1756-18 13 ; poet; died in battle. 94 SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA Napoleon was defeated and his victory at Jena was avenged. The reaction was speedy and complete. The implacable militarism of the Hohenzollem, backed by the obscurantism of his Junkers and by the poisonous influence of Metternich ^ who had the axe of absolutism to grind, got the Prussia that suited him again. '' For a year or two statesmen as well as poets thought that this patriotic enthusiasm might find permanent expression in a free, independent, and national German State. The quarter of a century which followed the War of Liberation was, however, a period of disillusionment, of hopes belied, promises broken, and reforms deferred. . . . The explanation is not far to seek : nature, it has been said, did not foresee Prussia, and Prussia is the work of man's hands. Monarchy created Prussia to an extent to which it created no other State. . . . Every patriot who wished to serve his country must do so in the civil or military administration '' *. This was Prussia's reply to the great-hearted Germans of the Liberation. This was the sacrifice exacted by the Hohenzollem idol from those who had restored it to its shrine. It were better to be dead on the battlefield of liberty with Scharnhorst and Komer than to be alive in Prussia with I Prince Metternich, 1773-1859 ; Chancellor of the Austrian Empire. * Cambridge Modern History, x, ch. xi (by Professor A. F. Pollard). ^ 95 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Hardenberg and Arndt. For *' the net result of the movement for constitutional progress was a bitter disappointment to that portion of the German people which took an interest in public life " ^ And ** those moral effects of the War of Liberation from which so much had at first been hoped, now seemed to have been lost utterly and for ever " *. Students of the history of Prussian culture should revise in the light of these facts such a statement as Carlyle's, which we quote for the last time : ** Deutschland found Prussia ; a solid and living State, round which the Teutonic people should consolidate itself ". The facts speak for themselves. Arndt was dismissed from his professorship ; Stein was forced into private life ; Hardenberg's old-age retirement was ante-dated by Mettemich's wish ; free speech was treated as high treason ; seven professors at Gottingen were deprived of their chairs : three, including Jakob Grimm, were expatriated. Or take the single case of Heine ^ he was patriot German at heart, fine product of the era of liberation, true brother to Korner and Arndt, own son of Hegel and Goethe. He it was who called Luther's famous hymn " the Marseillaise of the Reformation " ; who called Lessing the prophet of the Third Testament ; and Kant *' the executioner of deism " : everything ^ Ibid. 2 Lord Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, 398. ^ Heinrich Heine, 1 799-1856 ; poet. 96 SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA that was great in German history appealed to his eager imagination, and urged him to fresh con- structive tasks. But there was no room for him in the country which the HohenzoUem forbad to grow. His Liberal ideas and Jewish origin deprived him of his passport to honour, even to respectability in a State in which the civil and military administration was the narrow highway to fame. The culture, which drove out Grimm, sent Heine into voluntary exile, and wrung from his heart the bitter cry (we translate literally again ^) : ** I once possessed a lovely Fatherland. The oaken-tree Grew there so tall, the violets peeped soft. It was a dream. " It kissed me German- wise, and German spake (You '11 not believe How good it sounded), saying ' I love thee ' ! It was a dream.'* Like Niobe, weeping for her children, and they were not ; like Ruth, in tears amid the alien corn ; the German muse was repelled by the Hohenzollern idol, reinstated in its Prussian shrine. If German testimony be sought to these self- evident facts, the following paragraph may be quoted : *' What a singular and astounding spectacle ! Here is a people just recovered from centuries of 1 In der Fremde, 3. 97 THE THIRD GREAT WAR political misery, having just regained the full sense of its power, just risen with one accord to vindicate its honour and independence; and the very moment that the foreign enemy is vanquished, the very moment that the longed-for opportunity for a thorough national reconstruction has come, this same people again falls a victim to its here- ditary lack of common consciousness, it allows the old sectional animosities to revive, it suffers the leaders in the great struggle for freedom and unity to be pushed aside, it is forced back into the old submission to princely omnipotence '' ^ German unity was founded in the end. The German Empire was welded together, despite the disillusionment of the Liberation. But the new nation-builder took no risks. He wanted no Fichte's Addresses, no Stein's constitutional reforms. He had learned his lesson of repression, and he succeeded in teaching it to the HohenzoUern. He has told us how he set to work. '* We should never get nearer to our goal by speeches, leagues, majority-resolutions ; there would have to be a serious conflict, which could only be settled by iron and blood '\ And again : " The Gordian knot of German conditions was not to be loosed by love and dualism, but only ^ Kuno Francke, A History of German Literature as Determined by Social Forces, 495-96 ; Bell, 1901. Dr. Francke, though resident at Harvard University, dedicated his book to his fellow- countrymen, " in unalterable loyalty and attachment to our common Fatherland ". 98 SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA by the military clean-cut ; it came to this, to gain the King of Prussia, with his connivance or without it, and therefore the Prussian army, for the service of the national cause ; no matter whether the leadership of Prussia or the union of Germany was put first : both objects marched together. This was clear to me, and I hinted at it in the Budget Committee (Sept. 30th, 1862), in my oft-quoted remark about iron and blood''. And again: ** German patriotism requires a Prince to concen- trate its attachment. . . Historically, the dynasty in Germany with the strongest-marked characteristics is the Prussian. . . . Other European peoples are not dependent on such a medium for their patriotism and their national feeling " ^ Bismarck's authority is unassailable. The smaller men whom he after- wards inspired may have mistaken or exceeded their instructions. These are the words of the man himself : the specification of the architect of the United Germany. He would have no meddling sentimentalists ; no second string of love in his design. German patriotism must hang round a dynasty ; the HohenzoUern dynasty stood highest, and commanded the biggest army ; therefore the King of Prussia must be played, whether he knew it or not, into the top square on the board ; and the iron strokes of 1864, 1866 and 1870 hammered this policy home. ^ Bismarck, Gedanhen und Erinnerungen, i, 283, 289, 291-2. Stuttgart, 1898. 99 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Prince Bismarck was the second successor to King Frederick William L The first successor was Frederick the Great. His '* military clean-cut '* failed at Jena. But the national sense which had been stimulated by his care for the greatness of Prussia rallied the other States to Prussia in the hour of her collapse. '* The fame of Frederick began to supply the place of a common Government and a common capital '* (Carlyle). German literature, German music, German learning, German freedom, German idealism, German Goethe — these combined to reinstate Prussia on the fields of the War of Liberation. Then the reactionaries had their way. They sealed the windows and the doors. The pass- port to the new Prusso-Germany had to be vis6 by a military official ; the love-duaUsts' dream was rudely shattered. So the road was straightened for Bismarck, the recruiter-king's second successor. He profited by Frederick the Great's mistakes. No Napoleon should overthrow him at a new Jena. He closed every loophole of dualism ; he made '* love " a function of militarism, in the sense of a dynastic attachment to the Prince with the biggest standing army. He captured the forces of culture which had sprung up independent of the Prince, and turned them to the Prince's service. Heine's fate acted as a warning. The new style acquired a mihtary edge. The sword governed the pen. It looked fair. Lord Bryce has told us how, in SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA the eyes of a contemporary, " every citizen, every soldier, felt that this struggle [1870-71] was a struggle for the greatness and freedom of the nation. . . . Never before for centuries, not even in the War of Liberation of 1813-14, had the whole people felt and acted so completely as one. All saw that the time had now come to give this practically realised unity its formal political expression '* ^ But tranquillity sifts emotions, and the moralist corrects the con- temporary observer. " Think not '\ wrote old Sir Thomas Browne, " that morality is ambulatory ; that vices in one age are not vices in another, or that virtues, which are under the everlasting seal of right reason, may be stamped by opinion''. Frederick the Great's military State, owing to its inherent vices, found its Jena in 1806 ; his successor's State will meet the same fate. German unity recovered from the shock, German culture never recovered. The generation which was inspired by the hopes that sprang out of the War of Liberation was extinguished, and was not renewed. There are possibly still those who fear that a second collapse of German unity will destroy national faculties worth preserving. Let history reassure them. They will connive at the destruction of nothing which anyone will miss except for his own good. Culture in Germany has never been nationaUzed ; it was Prussianized by order instead. 1 Holy Roman Empire, Supplementary Chapter, 416. lOI THE THIRD GREAT WAR A national culture meant to Bismarck a dual voice in the nation's affairs, and Prusso-Germany re- pressed such ambitions, as incompatible with the "military clean-cut ''. Bismarck taught a false view of culture : hateful to Lessing, hateful to Goethe, hateful to Arndt. Most hateful of all to the freest of all, the leaders of German Romanticism : the brothers Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Tieck, Novalis, Wacken- roder ; all born between 1767 and 1775. What was the commonest theme of this group of romantic writers, the Wordsworth and Coleridge of Germany ^ ? Beauty, self-expression, the ego, and the rights of the soul in the universe. This thoime, nascent in Wilhelm Meister, Goethe's romance of the apprentice to experience, was repeated in book after book— in Lucinde, Sternbald, William Lovell, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, and the rest, — and was resumed in the quest of the Blue Flower, which symbolized the paradise on earth, where *' world becomes dream, and dream becomes world " (Novalis). To make the visible correspond with the invisible, the outer with the inner, opportunities with rights, man with God : this was, from first to last, in personal experiment and public profession, their creative, constructive ideal. The earth with her bars is about them for ever. 1 In both countries, 1798 was a cardinal year : The Schlegels' AthencBum was pubhshed in Berlin ; Lyrical Ballads in England. 102 SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA Bismarck broke them with iron and blood ; the HohenzoUem idol sat in its temple of Prusso-German militarism, and the muse *' went unwanted, un- honoured ". They had their Coleridge, their Wordsworth, their romantic morning at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But where was their Tennyson, their Meredith, their Swinburne, as the century declined ? We have tried to show in this chapter the divorce between German culture and the German State, and the defeat of the former by the latter. In writing of enemies in war-time, every suspicion of prejudice should be removed ; especially in writing of German culture on the morrow of Louvain and Reims every statement should be abundantly vouched. Accord- ingly, we have quoted freely, and have purposely chosen our authorities from the period before the war : Lord Bryce, Lord Acton, and the Cambridge histories planned according to his design. The best witness of aU is Bismarck, who, in his Reflections and Recollections y laid bare the scaffolding of craft which he used to re-build the fallen State. This record would be irrelevant to the present war, and to its political history in the wars and settlements of the past, if it were not for the German pretence of a destiny and a mission to the nations. We have shown, and shall show more fully as the narrative proceeds, the fallacy of the Imperial 103 THE THIRD GREAT WAR illusion ; how Bourbon, Buonaparte and Hohen- zoUern disputed the inheritance of Charlemagne, and how the Habsburg line of Roman Emperors, who were at the same time Archdukes of Austria and the heads of other States, contrived to keep alive the shadow of Imperial might long after the substance had departed. This illusion, most sedulously fostered during the present reign in Germany, in a period when it has been least appropriate to modern conditions of life and thought, has been cleverly utilized by the State to foster the sense of nationality. The German nation, which still consists of the collection of separate States, among which Bismarck chose Prussia as the possessor of the biggest army, has been brought to believe that its Empire, founded in 1871, represents the Holy Roman Empire, and continues its cultural tradition. Nothing could be further from the truth. The German Empire of 1871 represents Moltke's revision of Schamhorst*s attempt after 1806 to repair the disasters of the Prussian army created between 1640 and 1786. Scharnhorst's fellow- workers admitted other than military factors to the re-making of their State. Bismarck admitted none other. He deliberately excluded from such factors the independent culture of the German States ; and that culture withered where it had grown. A German newspaper wrote in the course of the 104 SWORD AND PEN IN PRUSSIA present war, referring, we believe, to Prof. Delbriick : *' Germany has no use for professors who are frightened at the smell of blood '\ This typifies modern German culture. Frederick the Great was indifferent to his professors. They might gather wool and notions as they chose. Bismarck, playing for higher stakes, mounted from indifference to utility. He ironed and blooded the professoriate. They should sow Prussian culture or none. And the professoriate included poets and song-makers, musicians, painters, and actors : the whole pro- fessional class. Not again were they to be at liberty to be liberal. Prusso-Germany could employ them for better uses. They, too, should bring offerings to the idol ; the Hohenzollern had a capacious maw. We believe this account to be accurate. We beUeve that German culture was arrested, with other liberal ideas, in the reaction after 1815 ; and that, though Prussian militarism succeeded in making an Empire in 1871, as it had made a Kingdom in 1701, it succeeded at the cost of those forces which had generously hastened to its support when the Kingdom fell in 1806. Those forces, unhonoured by the kings, have been basely utilized by the emperors. They have been attracted into the Prussian system. The overgrown army of King Frederick WiUiam I, like Aaron's rod, has swallowed the rest. 105 THE THIRD GREAT WAR pWhat will happen to the arrested culture of Germany if the idol is overthrown again, it is not our business to inquire. German genius, which militarism diverted, flourished independently of militarism, and may so flourish again. This lies on the knees of other gods than those whom Germany has learnt to worship. io6 CHAPTER VII THE GIANTS We return to King Frederick II at the head of his father's army. He made vigorous use of it. The times were favourable to force, and the ruler who intended to be effective in re-settling the balance of power had to speak with the voice of guns. As a fact, the European Wars which disputed the Peace of Utrecht, and which lasted, roughly, a hundred years from 1715 to 1815, were not decided in Europe at all. The old, dreary controversies between rival dynasties and kings, which descended, as we have seen, from the earlier wars of religion, were the tail-end of a bigger conflict, the front of which lay across the seas. This was the struggle between France and England for mastery in Asia and for the trade of the New World. But the movements of the tail and at the front did not always exactly correspond. If it is true that Frederick's aggression was " felt in lands where the name of Prussia was unknown ; and, in order that he might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of 107 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America''^; it is still more true that the " ground of discord was not always equally apparent even to the beUigerents themselves, and still less to the rest of the world '' ^. The two ends of the struggle were not even. The wars in Europe and the Colonies were double aspects of a single rivalry. The decisive battles were won in the New World, and all that occurred in the Old was the resultant of forces out of sight. Still, the Continental wars, however obscure, became means to ends of their own : became original, not secondary, movements ; and the possessor of the biggest army had the opportunity of playing the biggest role. " For that end it was necessary that Prussia should be all sting " ^ It is with the European end that we are here concerned. Prussia used the distant issues to advance her Continental influence. She stung her rivals in Europe into recognising her military value ; stung the Empire in Silesia, stung France on her frontiers, stung Poland to death. In that age she had little or no interest in Greater Europe as such. Her Colonial ambition was to come later, when Germany, too, " should be all sting ''. Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador lately at Berlin, telegraphing to 1 Macaulay, Essays : " Frederic the Great." 2 Seeley, Expansion of England, 31 ; the whole of Bk. I, Lecture ii, should be read. ^ Macaulay, ibid. 108 THE GIANTS Sir Edward Grey on July 29th, 1914, stated that he had questioned the German Chancellor about French colonies in the event of England's neutrality in this war, and he had said that he was unable to give an undertaking that they would not be annexed ^ King Frederick the Great of Prussia, relying on his father's army, took precisely the same course in 1740 as Kaiser Wilhelm, relying on the same weapon, took in 1914. The annexation of the Austrian province of Silesia was a wholly unprovoked outrage, dictated by the desire for aggrandizement and by the conviction of superior strength. It was worse, for Frederick, like his successor, was talking peace while he was preparing war ; he was even offering military assistance to the Archduchess of Austria at the very moment that he was making ready to rob her. The same aim of robbery under arms dictates the Colonial policy of the present possessor of the army bequeathed by Frederick WiUiam I. His first heir, Frederick's Prussia, employed it for aggression in Europe ; his second heir, Bismarck's Germany, employs it for aggression overseas. It is a hurtful and a fatal legacy. It inflicts infinite pain on entirely unoffending countries, and it destroyed Prussia in 1806. A like fate, we trust, will overtake the like aggressor. And it is right to point out that the circumstances ^ See Great Britain and the European Crisis (State-paper), No. 85 ; Id. 109 THE THIRD GREAT WAR are more detestable to-day. Then, the Peace of Utrecht contained direct incitements to war. The Emperor Charles VI was never consoled for his loss of the Spanish throne, nor for its confirmation to Philip V after the War of the Spanish Succession. He was almost equally dissatisfied with the division of spoils in Italy, and with the elevation of the Duke of Savoy to the rank of King of Sicily ^ He hated the necessity of recognising Prussia as a kingdom, and his acquisition of the former Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) was as inconvenient to himself as to others. Fresh wars, therefore, were inevitable, even apart from the weakness of Poland, and the growing powers of Prussia and Russia. Though history condemns Frederick's acts, it cannot blame him for all the fighting that took place. His successor is far more blameworthy. To-day there is no Peace of Utrecht, challenging by its provisions dynastic jealousies hardly allayed and territorial ambitions provocatively gratified. The French (and British) Colonies which Germany covets have not been recently distributed by the arbitrary fiat of diplomatists. They are free and independent com- munities, more conscious even than the peoples of the Old World of their right to be governed as they choose. The principle of annexation by force of arms, the treatment of French or British Africa as ^ Victor Amadeus II ; he exchanged Sicily for Sardinia in 1720. IIO THE GIANTS French or Spanish Italy was treated at Utrecht, is repugnant to the conscience of modern law. Austria's quarrel with France and Spain — the Habsburg quarrel with the Bourbon — in and after 17 14, gave Prussia the occasion which she wanted for encroach- ing on Silesia and Poland. Austria's local quarrel with Serbia in 1914 gave Germany no shadow of a claim to snatch a Colonial Empire from Great Britain or France. There was no double war in progress : in Europe and in Greater Europe at the same time. There were no decaying kingdoms to be partitioned ; no peoples to be bodily transferred, like bales of goods, from one owner to another ; there was no Protestant ascendancy to be estabhshed in the North as a counterpoise to the Catholic Empire ; no Imperial illusion to be sustained ; no Pragmatic Sanction to be defied. These aspects loomed large in 1740, when Frederick the Great became King of Prussia. A " Pragmatic Sanction " was a method reserved to a reigning Sovereign of upsetting the normal course of affairs by personal decree. The Pragmatic Sanction of that date referred to the Austrian succession. Charles VI had no son ; his brother, the late Emperor, had had no son ; and the elective title of Emperor and the hereditary Austrian dominions would both be thrown into the melting- pot when the Habsburg male line failed. Charles VI was unfortunate in this respect. His candidature III THE THIRD GREAT WAR for the crown of Spain — in his modest rank as the Emperor's second son — had led forty years earUer to the Spanish Succession War ; his death as Emperor without an heir led to the War of the Austrian Succession. The object of Charles's Pragmatic Sanction had been to secure the succession for his daughter, Maria Theresa. She could not be elected Emperor, but she could be the Habsburg's heir as Archduchess of Austria, Queen of Hungary, Bohemia, etc. Her father worked for years to win the assent of the Powers to this contemplated arrangement, and, though some required a price for their support, on the whole it was generally guaranteed. Two items of cost are interesting in the light of later events. Frederick Augustus of Saxony demanded Austria's support to his candidature for the throne of Poland, to which he was duly elected in 1733 ; and France obtained the cession of Lorraine, till then a duchy of the Empire. The ousted Duke of Lorraine was transposed to Tuscany, and became the husband of Maria Theresa, and, later, the Emperor Francis L Here it should be noted, however, that Lorraine was never Prussian territory till it was annexed after the war of 1870. — Meanwhile, King Frederick William I was included in the guarantors of the Pragmatic Sanction ; and, when he died, in May, 1740, his son acknowledged the bond. Charles died in the following October, and nothing 112 THE GIANTS but a " scrap of paper '' stood between King Frederick and his desires ; between the Prussian Army, which he had recently inherited, and the patrimony of Maria Theresa, which his father and he had guaranteed. Before the brave young Archduchess was aware, her rich province of Silesia was shorn away. The invasion of Silesia by Prussia in the late autumn of 1740 was indefensible at the time. Frederick is said to have admitted that his object was *' to make a name.'' Louis XV of France thought him *' mad " ; and it was not till later successes had dazzled the eyes of his subjects that his action was condoned either at home or abroad. By Maria Theresa herself the crime was always unforgiven. Looking from the immediate facts to the remoter consequences of the aggression, we are confronted with yet another proof of the continuity of Prussian policy. The newspapers told us the other day that in October, 1914, the Austrian troops were required to take an oath of allegiance to Kaiser Wilhelm. Whether or not it is true that this last humiliation was inflicted upon them, there is no doubt that the Habsburg power has been completely subordinated to the Hohenzollern, and that this object has been achieved step by step, without haste and without rest, since King Frederick's Silesian expedition in October, 1740. Bismarck's war of 1866 and the THE THIRD GREAT WAR defeat of Austria at Sadowa was not an isolated episode in the history of Central Europe ; it was a stage in the development of Prussia, or, rather, in Prussia's self-aggrandizement, as planned by the Hohenzollern family from the Peace of Utrecht to this day. There was a time, as we have shown, when the condition of Europe and Greater Europe supplied pretexts for military acts of violence ; though at no time in European history was the invasion of Silesia other than treacherous and unrighteous. But the Protestant feeling in North Germany, the hollow Imperialism of the Habsburg, the attraction of Austria South-eastwards, the constant menace of France and Spain, the Turkish problem and the growth of Russia : these and other temporary ; factors cannot be left out of account in an estimate • of Frederick the Great's attitude towards the weapon w^hich his father had forged. What is inconceivable, however, or what would be inconceivable if it were not true, is that Europe and Greater Europe should still be at the mercy of the same w^eapon, and of the moral obliquity which it causes. All the other factors have disappeared. Political, religious, dynastic : they are all the phantoms of a shade. The sole permanent factor has been the army of King Frederick William I, and the fatal pride of its possession. '' We do not conquer with the pen, but by the sword '\ said Frederick William himself ; " I wanted to make a name ", said his son. 114 THE GIANTS We do not propose to follow the scenes in the military drama which was enacted on the battle- fields of Central Europe between 1740 and 1748, or more precisely, 1763. The War of the Austrian Succession was closed after eight years' fighting by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, but this Peace was merely an armistice which lasted another eight years. By its terms, Frederick kept Silesia, but he was aware that the struggle would have to be renewed ; France retired from the Austrian Netherlands — the sorely-tried soil of Belgium — though Austria had to consent to the Dutch barrier-towns ; a princi- pality had been carved out of Austrian Italy for Philip, son of Philip V of Spain and of his powerful consort, Elizabeth Famese ; Savoy and Nice went from France to the King of Sardinia ; and there were sundry changes and reconstructions. The total effect of them was this : France was weaker ; Austria was stronger ; Prussia and Russia had become effective States. The Archduchess Maria Theresa had saved the Pragmatic Sanction from its threatened wreck ; and, though she had lost some territories, she had strengthened her hold on the rest, and her husband, Francis I, had been Holy Roman Emperor since 1745, thus ensuring the Habsburg Une. If the Habsburg house was con- fronted with the growing jealousy of theHohenzoUem, it had modified the settlement of 1713 by establishing its superiority over the Bourbon. Maria Theresa 115 THE THIRD GREAT WAR had wsely concluded a close alliance with the Empress Elizabeth of Russia, granddaughter of Peter the Great, and this diplomatic union between two clever and powerful women was obnoxious to Prussia and France ; especially to Frederick the Great, and the hopes which he had cherished at his accession. In that year, 1740, the Russian crown had just been inherited by a little boy, Ivan VI, and the probability of his long minority, possibly with Prussian influence behind the throne, had given Frederick a sense of confidence in his anti-Austrian poHcy. This confidence was grievously shaken when Elizabeth ousted Ivan in 1741. Accordingly, the eight years' truce (1748-56) was devoted by the rulers of Europe to a shuffling of alliances which is known as the diplomatic reversal. Russia and Austria, led respectively by the Empress and Archduchess, combined to contest the might of Prussia, and, primarily, to win back Silesia. France, conscious of her weakness, and recognising that her best hope lay in acquiring powerful friends in Europe while she was fighting England overseas, joined the Austro-Russian coalition. Her price was a slice of Belgium, and she was further attracted to the alliance by the hate — a somewhat personal matter — which King Louis XV and his mistress, the domineer- ing Madame de Pompadour, entertained for Frederick the Great. This threw Frederick back on England, and the Convention of Westminster defined the 116 THE GIANTS relations of England and Prussia, while the Treaty of Versailles united Austria and France. Both were concluded in 1756, and a supplement to the Versailles Treaty was signed at Petrograd in the following year. Thus the Peace of Utrecht was shattered, and, forty-two years after its conclusion, the Seven Years' War (1756-63) was begun. It sounds more confusing than it is. We remember that the Peace of Utrecht contained the seeds of future warfare. Despite the length of the conflict which it terminated, and despite the sacrifices of the AUie5 in their attempt to overthrow Pan- Bourbonism in Europe, the victors did not act together. They established the dangerous principle, which found an apt pupil in Prussia, that might was synonymous with right. Prussia got herself an army, and put the precept into practice. The result was that, when Prussia threatened Austria (and the forceful occupation of Silesia amounted to more than a threat), Austria came to terms with France against the new power in Central Europe, both trusting to the luck of events to score off each other in the end. To this coalition of old foes was added Prussia's eastern rival, Russia. Meanwhile, the French struggle with England for leadership in the New World had not been settled at Utrecht, and any enemy of France on the Continent was to that extent an ally of England. But such alliances, though they had their uses, were bound to be short-lived. 117 THE THIRD GREAT WAR The old feud between Bourbon and Habsburg was too deep to be permanently healed. The old problems of Belgium and Italy could not be solved by shelving them; and, though the pressure of Maria Theresa, backed by her chancellor, von Kaunitz*, prevailed on the unstable self-conceit of King Louis XV of France, it was a flimsy and temporary bond. Similarly, England's future was not destined to be linked with Prussia's. The defence of Hanover was worth gaining, for George II of England was still Elector of that State, but Prussia's territorial ambi- tions were no real concern of England. Briefly, the Seven Years' War, was an incident of the greater war overseas. Its abnormal and expedient alliances were contracted from mixed motives on both sides ; and neither France nor England was long-sighted in failing to settle their differences without doubling them by Continental complications. Still, things were as they were, and they had to take their course. We are not immediately concerned with the military aspects of the Seven Years' War, but its opening scene was so like the opening scene of the present war in Europe as to merit passing considera- tion. Frederick of Prussia, aiming at Austria, decided to strike the first blow, and his quickest way lay through Saxony. The Saxons, to his surprise, ^ Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz, 1711-1794. THE GIANTS put up a stout resistance, and their pluck and valour gave time for Austria to mobilize her army and to organize her commands. The invasion of Saxony started in August, 1756, but the occupation was not complete till the following October, when the Saxon court retired to Warsaw. Now, reading France for Austria, Belgium for Saxony, Havre for Warsaw, and 1914 for 1756, the analogy with recent events is obvious. So obvious, indeed, that the German Government of to-day seems to have tried to round it off. The archives at Dresden had proved that Saxony was in communication with Austria and Russia as early as 1746, with a view to taking joint action against Prussia. It would be immensely convenient to Kaiser Wilhelm to prove the same case against Belgium in relation to England and France. The records of the Seven Years' War are more familiar in Germany than here ; and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the alleged archives at Antwerp, which were said to establish this charge, and to date from 1906, were invented by venal historians on the analogy of the Saxon conquest already repeated in its main features. If this con- jecture is correct, the attempt to fabricate prejudice by false historical suggestion is a gross abuse of the " culture " which makes it possible. King Frederick was a hard fighter. His victory at Rossbach over the French (November, 1757) was said by Napoleon at a later date to have pronounced 119 THE THIRD GREAT WAR the doom of the Bourbon dynasty. At the time it estabHshed Prussia as a formidable mihtary power, and, by driving France across the Rhine, it enabled Frederick to meet the Austrians in the following month and to defeat them soundly at Leuthen. Pitt ^ was naturally delighted : France was losing America in Germany ; and the successes of British arms at Quebec, Quiberon Bay, and Plassey, helped to convince Choiseul ^ of the drawbacks of the Austrian alliance. Still, Frederick's good generalship would not have availed without the chances of good luck. The allied armies could have crushed him more than once if they had only managed to pull together. But with France suspicious of Austria, and with a pro-Prussian party at Petrograd conspiring with the heir to the throne behind the Empress Elizabeth's back, Frederick kept his flag flying ; thus earning his title of *' the Great'' and the admiration of his martial subjects. And the close of the war was as loose- ended as in 1713. England under Lord Bute was again in a "stop the war" mood; Elizabeth of Russia w^as dead, and her successor reversed her policy ; France was counting her losses, with a frank indifference to Austria ; and Frederick of Prussia was left in undisturbed possession of Silesia. From the point of view of international morality, the Treaties of Paris and Hubertusburg (February,i763) reaffirmed 1 William Pitt (the elder), Earl of Chatham, 1708-1778. ' Due do Choiseul, French statesman, 1 719-1785. 120 THE GIANTS the evil principle of the Peace of Utrecht : the wrong which had caused the war was admitted as a right at the settlement. We rue these precedents to-day. They supphed maxims to Napoleon, who crushed Prussia like a rat ; and, in the meanwhile, they furnished the Prussian War-Lord and the greater monarchs of his day wth a mihtary and diplomatic code hardly better than that which the Peace of Westphalia had ratified as long ago as 1648. " Solemn treaties carried no weight ; national boundaries and race limits were held to be of no importance ; the condition of the labouring classes was little considered. Jealousy and suspicion marked the dealings of the States wiht each other ; corruption and venality characterized the official relations of countries ; secret diplomacy was widespread. . . . Self-interest was the only guiding motive " ^. It was a singularly poor return for what Prussian standards would regard as a hundred years' culture by bloodshed. We have reached the last generation before the Second Great War, which re-united Europe against an Absolutist. The chief rulers at this date were : — The Empire. Joseph II, son of Francis I and Maria Theresa : 1765-90 (Maria Theresa died in 1780) ; succeeded by his brother, Leopold II : 1790-92. ^ Periods of European History : vi, the Balance of Power, 284. By Arthur Hassall. 121 THE THIRD GREAT WAR France. Louis XV, died 1774 ; succeeded by Louis XVI, guillotined 1793. Charles III, son of Philip V : 1759-88; Charles IV: 1788-1819. George III : 1760-1820. Catherine II, wife of Peter III, acceded by a palace-revolution : 1762-96. Augustus III of Saxony ; elected 1733, died 1763. (Of this kingdom more anon). Frederick II, the Great : 1740-86 ; succeeded by his nephew, Fred- erick William II : 1786-97. Charles Emmanuel III, died 1773 ; succeeded by Victor Amadeus III: 1773-96. France and Austria, it should be noted, had ratified their military alliance by the marriage, 1770, of Louis XVI as Dauphin to the Archduchess Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa and the Emperor. Thus the Emperors Joseph and Leopold were brothers-in-law to the King of France. Joseph's policy, however, was pro-Russian : the Empress Catherine was the object of his admiration ; and the unhappy fate of Marie Antoinette — VAutrichienne, as her subjects called her — was aggravated by her Habsburg origin/ Spain. England. Russia. Poland. Prussia. Sardinia. 122 THE GIANTS Every date in the foregoing table debouches into the era of Revolution. But every name attached to the dates denotes an apostle of autocracy. Catherine, Frederick, and Joseph, in Russia, Prussia and Austria, were at the height of their power : full of benevolent designs for the compulsory eleva- tion of their peoples, and the consequent enlargement of their revenues ; and equally full of rage if their ideal schemes of State Socialism should fom,ent too much social consciousness. The intellectual impulse, as always, is to be traced to France : in this respect, since the Renaissance, the Athens of modem civilization and a fertile mother of ideas ; Rousseau's^ Social Contract was published in 1762, and it spread like a gospel among the nations. Catherine, Frederick, Joseph, legislated as bene- volently as they dared ; they might even have legislated ten times as beneficently as they did ; Spain and Sardinia followed suit ; but there were secret stirrings of the spring, and . a hidden motion of the sap, which were to confound the giants' wisdom and their might. The quality of wisdom was apparent in various measures of royal reform, not pertinent to our present narrative : '* How small, of all that human hearts endure, That part which laws or Kings can cause or cure." The highest-minded despot-kings — and Joseph II 1 Jean Jacques Rousseau, French philosopher: 171 2-1 778. 123 THE THIRD GREAT WAR earned this epithet — were to learn the truth of Johnson's aphorism, even if they did not learn how to apply it. The quality of might was displayed, hardly dis- guised by disingenuous pleas of wisdom, in the First Partition of Poland, August 5th, 1772. The Kings of Poland were elective, and the intrigues of her powerful neighbour-States to secure the election of a foreign king wrought everlasting mischief to the progress of that limited republic. The latest influence had been Saxon. It will be recalled that the Elector of Saxony had stipulated for the Emperor's support to his candidature for the PoUsh crown, as the price of his adhesion to the Emperor's Pragmatic Sanction. Augustus III was elected accordingly, and died in 1763. It now suited Russia's ambition to wield the chief influence in Poland, and Catherine secured the throne for a native noble, Stanislaus Poniatowski. The obvious result ensued. Poland with a Polish king sought to assert her independence, and she was ill enough advised to enter into relations with Turkey, who declared war against Russia in 1767. The crossing of the Polish by the Eastern Question was too much for the equanimity of Europe : it might have led to a general conflagration ; and, accordingly, the Powers looked on while Russia, Prussia and Austria carved up Poland among themselves. This partition was extended and completed in 1793 and 1795. 124 THE GIANTS To the high-minded despot-kings, to the giants who committed this outrage, it was, we may reasonably beheve, merely a country which they divided : a geographical misplacement which they adjusted ; to their own advantage, no doubt, but likewise to the advantage of the inhabitants. Frederick's road-makers and engineers were set to work in his new West Prussia, spreading the boon of Prussian culture over Poland's sea-front and its hinterland. Why, then, should the Poles complain ? And the spoils of Catherine and Joseph were similarly palUated. But Poland answers for herself. It was a nation, not a country, which they dissected for the rectification of their own frontiers, and it is a nation's heart which is upHfted by the hopes of the Third Great War. Other national rights were asserted, however tentatively, during these troubled years of despotism trenching on democracy. There were revolts against Joseph II in Hungary and in the Austrian Nether- lands (Belgium), and it took all the tact of his successor, the Emperor Leopold II, to reconcile the insurgent Belgians to the last few years of Austrian rule. There was the War of American Independence, of immense influence as republican example, and most important, too, in its effect on England's Continental reputation. There was the endless, almost trackless, course of bargaining, intrigue, 125 THE THIRD GREAT WAR family compacts, dynastic alliances, armed aggres- sion, secret treaties, by which the rulers of Europe — or, more exactly, the rulers in Europe — sought, like Canute, to stem the tide ; and to postpone, even for their own lifetime, the recognition of a force in affairs for which they had failed to make allowance in the balance of power at Utrecht. " Amid the wrecks and dust of this universal decay new powers are fashioning themselves, adapted to the new time and its destinies '* K ^ Carlyle, French Revolution, I, ii. I2§ CHAPTER VIII THE COMMONS The giants of benevolent despotism met a force greater than their own. Frederick of Prussia was dead : his army and all that it supported had fallen into the feebler hands of his nephew, Frederick WilUam II ; but the Empress Catherine of Russia and the Habsburg Emperor Joseph II — the best- meaning despot of them all — survived to witness the revolt of the Commons of France against the Bourbon King, Louis XVI. Nor was Louis its first or only victim. He perished, as we know, by the guillotine in 1793 ; but the death of the Emperor Joseph on February 20th, 1790, was as much a result of the Revolution as the fate of Louis himself. " Your country has killed me/' he cried, when the Commons' disaffection in France spread to his subjects in the Netherlands. Many great and admirable writers have told the story of the French Revolution ^ : the real point in 1 In French, by Mignet, Sorel, Thiers ; in English, by Carlyle, and Cambridge Modern History, Vol. viii. Among works on a smaller scale may be mentioned, Periods of European History : vii, Revolutionary Europe, by H. Morse Stephens (6th edn., Rivingtons, 1907. 5s. net), and The French Revolution, by Hilaire Belloc (Home University Library, is. net). 127 THE THIRD GREAT WAR reading it, perhaps, is to avoid the compartmental fallacy. The ambit of the story is so wide, and it touches such diverse interests of speculation and action, that it is liable to be detached from the rock of history which formed it, and to be treated as an isolated phenomenon. Its dramatic qualities not- withstanding, it is a drama in an epic setting. It rose out of the bed of its own past. It is an incident of the growth of Europe : of the sloughing of its skin of medievalism, and of its continuous adaptation to environment. And it left the process incomplete. If we read the story of the Revolution in relation to its future and its past, we shall see that the Third Great War has resumed the uncompleted process, and is carrying us yet another stage — the final stage, if we are wise — on the long road out of the Middle Ages. The Revolution did not accomplish all it sought. Like the Protestant Reformation in Ger- many, like other rays of the Renaissance, and, indeed, like all human endeavours, the bright hopes which issued from its fount were stained on their passage to reaUty by many colours of experience. There were the repeated partitions of Poland, and there was the problem of Belgium, for example. We recollect from several places the unhappy annals of that country : how Austria took it from Spain, and France coveted it from Austria ; how Austria found it a burden, and tried to exchange it for Bavaria ; how England and Holland were affected ; 128 THE COMMONS how it was overrun by successive invaders ; and how it rebelled from Joseph II. If the peace-makers in 1713 had thought more of national entities than of international frontiers, they might have affirmed a principle and have established a tradition, which, among other results, would have been efficacious in 1815 and 1914 to prevent fresh variations of the Bourbon and Habsburg doctrines. As things were, after many troubled years, a revolution in Belgium ensued immediately on the French ; and the declara- tion of the Belgian Republic (January, 1790), followed by the Austrian re-conquest (December, 1790), led to a renewal of the war between Austria and France (April, 1792). There were many changes and cross-currents, but the bare fact remains : the Second Great War began where the First had left off, in the Bourbon-Habsburg rival claims to Belgium. Between the old peace and the new war, between 1713 and 1792, it will be remembered that there had been a period of alliance. The Treaty of 1756, by which France was committed to help Austria to recover Silesia from Prussia, was confirmed in 1770 by the marriage of the Dauphin of France to Maria Theresa's daughter ; and this couple in 1792 were King Louis XVI and his consort. Queen Marie Antoinette. Meanwhile, Maria Theresa's sons were elected Emperor successively : Joseph II in 1765 ; Leopold II in 1790. 129 THE THIRD GREAT WAR But the Queen's brothers were not the sole em- barrassment when France renewed her war with Austria. The Bourbon in 1792 was in a wholly different position from that of Louis XIV at the opening of hostilities exactly ninety years before. Louis XIV's wars had been expensive ; Louis XV's favourites had been expensive ; Louis XVFs consort was expensive : the taxpayers had stiffened their necks, and the Royal family were prisoners in their own capital. Philosophers, agitators and malcon- tents had combined to revive old rights. On May 5th, 1789, the States-General of representatives of the three estates of the realm (Nobility, Clergy, Commons) met for the first time since 1614. From that day events marched rapidly. The Commons {tiers Stat) found leaders. Within six weeks they nominated themselves the National Assembly. By the solemn oath of the Tennis Court of Versailles (June 2oth), they became the Constituent Assembly : they swore not to disband till France had a new constitution. On July 14th, they captured the Bastille, and added its complement of arms to their trophies from the Hotel des Invalides. On October 6th, the National Guard, under the Marquis de Lafayette S brought the King from Paris to Versailles, where the palace had been entered by force. We omit* the dubitations of 1790, when the 1 1757-1834. 130 THE COMMONS Constituent Assembly turned from action to deliberation. " Not in vague dreaj.is of man forgetting men, Nor in vast morrows losing the to-day " ^, they should have approached their task of re-building the government of France. But Mirabeau ^ their sagest counsellor, died on April 2nd, 1791, and a fortnight later the King's subjects in Paris were revealed as effective gaolers. Next, on June 21st, came the miserable flight, arrested at Varennes, and the more miserable return to Paris (June 25th) : *' Thus lumbers and creeps the ignominious Royal Procession, through many streets, amid a silent- gazing people ; gets itself at length wriggled out of sight ; vanishing in the Tuileries Palace,— towards its doom of slow torture, peine forte et dure *' ^. Opinions hardened after this episode. The new constitution was adopted, and the Constituent Assembly was resolved into a Legislative Assembly, in which Robespierre *, ** the Incorruptible,'' took the lead. The King, too, had defined his attitude ; and the action of his brother-in-law, the Emperor Leopold, who invited the attention of other monarchs to the French menace to monarchy, intensified French sentiment against Austria, and against V Autrichienne, ^ William Watson, To Edward Dowden. * Count Honor6 de Mirabeau, 1749-1791. * Carlyle, op. cit, ; the whole passage, book iv, chapters 4-8, •hould b« consulted. * 1757-1794. 131 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Either way, the King incurred suspicion, fostered by the revolutionaries to deep resentment. If he leaned to war, it was observed that an Austrian victory might suit him better than a French : were not Prussia, Russia and Sweden in league with Austria to save his throne ; w^as there not a free- masonry of kings ? And if he leaned to peace, he w^as suspect of yielding to Marie Antoinette, and of preferring his Habsburg kin to the spread of French liberty in Belgium. In an epoch of political transformation, this was the greatest change of all. The French war against Austria was no longer a dynastic and territorial campaign, as it liad been in the past. To the miUtant vision of the revolutionaries, it had a missionary and a holy cause : it partook of the nature of a crusade. It was not a kings' war, but the Commons', waged upon physical frontiers to extend the boundaries of the intellect. We have the highest contemporary evidence to this sentiment. Wordsworth, in his twenty-third year, was in Paris in 1792, and he has told us with matchless sincerity how he was first attracted and then repulsed by the course of the Revolution : — *' Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive. But to be young was very Heaven ! O times. In which the meagre, stale, forbidding ways Of custom, law, and statute, took at once The attraction of a country in romance /' ! 132 THE COMMONS The ardent poet believed, " That a benignant spirit was abroad Which might not be withstood, that poverty. Abject as this, would in a httle time Be found no more, that we should see the earth Unthw^arted in her wish to recompense The meek, the lowly, patient child of toil ; All institutes for ever blotted out That legalised exclusion ; empty pomp AboUshed, sensual state and cruel power, Whether by edict of the one or few ; And, finally, as sum and crown of all, Should see the people havdng a strong hand In framing their own laws ; whence better days To all mankind *' ; and especially to the Belgians under Austrian rule. Accordingly, *' My heart was all Given to the people, and my love was theirs " ; and when, to his shame and grief, *' Britain opposed the liberties of France,** and Burke's phiUppics thundered against her, " I rejoiced. Exulted, in the triumph of my soul. When Englishmen by thousands were o*erthro^vn ". But disillusion followed exultation : *' The goaded land waxed mad ; the crimes of few Spread««ito madness of the many ; blasts From hell came sanctified like airs from heaven '* ; and the Reign of Terror succeeded the Reign of 133 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Liberty. To the great poet's enduring disappoint- ment : " Frenchmen had changed a war of self-defence For one of conquest " *. We shall note the features of this change, not in " a poet's mind/' but by the milestones of history. The Commons' war of 1792 became an Empire's war in 1804, and we shall see the Republican crusade transformed by Imperial militarism. But at first, at least, there was a " culture," which France deemed it her destiny to spread : a culture, not of tyranny, but of freedom ; not of a king's might, but of the people's rights. We had reached June, 1791. In August, the King of Prussia and the Emperor Leopold circulated a monarchical manifesto, known as the Declaration of Pilnitz, affirming their duty to intervene on behalf of the King of France. It was a kind of trade-union of kings, and the minor princes of the Empire rallied to the defence of their order. War swiftly became inevitable. Its actual outbreak was hastened by two changes in the situation, unfavourable to the cause of the monarchists. On March ist, 1792, occurred the death of the Emperor Leopold, and Gustavus III of Sweden was murdered on March 29th. Leopold was succeeded by his son, Francis II, ^ See The Prelude, xi, io8 ; ix, 519 ; ix, 123 ; xi, 175 ; x, 283 ; -s., "^z^ ', xi, 206. Books ix to xi of this noble poem should be consulted in their entirety. THE COMMONS who became the last of the Roman Emperors and the first Emperor of Austria. At this time, he was twenty-four years old, and was disqualified by his age and experience to cope with the difficult circum- stances into which he was plunged. His sympathy was with his aunt, the Queen of France, and with thf^ monarchical principle, now at stake in her adopted country, which his father and his uncle had upheld. But he missed their sagacity and insight in dealing with his allies. The Emperor Leopold had been able to bring pressure to bear on the Prussian and Russian sovereigns : these would now be leaders where then they had been second. The Seven Years' War was avenging itself on the strange alliances which it had formed. Then, Austria and France had combined to recover Silesia from Prussia. Now, Austria and Prussia were combining, — for what ? Austria, to keep her Netherlands, and to help the Habsburg Queen of France ; Prussia, to get what she could in Poland and elsewhere, while Austria was preoccupied, and, above all, not to stand aside at a time when Austria was posing as the champion of the Germanic princes. — Gustavus of Sweden was succeeded by his infant son, and the new Regent adopted and maintained an attitude of strict neutrality. In April, 1792, France invaded Belgium. The French general was Dumouriez^ His first onset ^ Charles FranQois Dumouriez, 1757 to 1823, when he died in retirement at Henley-on-Thames. THE THIRD GREAT WAR was unsuccessful, and the King suffered for his failure. On the anniversary, almost to a day, of the Royal flight to Varennes, the mob forced its way into the Tuileries, and compelled Louis XVI to don the red cap of liberty (June 20th, 1792). The Germanic monarchs raUied to their union, and issued another manifesto, which added fuel to the revolutionary fire. On August loth, King Louis was " suspended,*' and was removed from the Tuileries to the Temple ; and the rapid Prussian advance caused a sudden fear of prison-breaking which led to wholesale murders through all the prisons of Paris (" September Massacres "), On September 20th, Dumouriez engaged the Prussians, and defeated them at Valmy ; and in the following weeks the forces of the newly-declared French Republic occupied Worms and Mayence, Savoy, Nice, and Brussels. They fought, not to conquer, but to liberate ; and this heady doctrine had fatal results. After Belgium, why not Holland ? Her annexation by France would bring her into the orbit of republican ideals, and would aim a convenient blow at England. Perhaps Pitt ^ would not fight ; the Republic had English sympathizers, and it mistook (as foreigners would, even in 1914) the attitude of a Parliamentary Opposition when national interests were involved. So, on February ist, 1793, France declared war on 1 William Pitt (the younger) ; 1759-1806. 136 THE COMMONS England and Holland ; and, before the end of the next month, the coalition against the Republic was reinforced by the Empire, Prussia, Portugal, the Bourbon Kings of the SiciUes and Spain, and the Princes of several minor States. Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland were neutral. Russia was, nominally, with the AUies ; actually, the Empress Catherine was engaged in her drastic way in curbing Polish republicanism by dividing Poland for the second time. Prussia took Posen and other provinces with the cities of Danzig and Thom ; Russia took 85,000 square miles with nearly 4,000,000 inhabitants ; Austria, unwisely, as events proved, was left without a share in the spoils. Meanwhile, on January 23rd, Louis XVI had been beheaded ; and this sign of republican clemency and zeal had its part in shaping opinion in England and elsewhere adversely to Wordsworth's sentiment. At the same time — and this is important, in the Hght of later events — it shifted the centre of gravity in France. The very number of the Republic's enemies compelled the government of the Republic to concentrate all their powers on war. The military interest became predominant. Success in arms was now the first condition of the success of that pro- gramme of Uberation, which had inspired the Commons of France to advance, day by day, from the States-General of May 5th, 1789, to the King's execution on January 23rd, 1793 ; and it was from 137 THE THIRD GREAT WAR the ranks of the army that the Buonaparte stepped to the Bourbon's throne. The harsher men now came to the front : "To terrorize the opponents of the revolution ; to arouse popular fanaticism by speeches, by present dangers, by insurrections ; to gather all the threads in their own grasp : the government and the safety of the Republic ; to fill it with the keenest enthusiasm in the names of ' Uberty, equality, fraternity ' ; to maintain it in this violent state of crisis in order to utilize its passions and its force — such was the plan of Danton and the V Mountain ' which had taken him as its leader. He it was who stimulated mob-fever with tales of the Republic's growing perils, and who established, under the style of a revolutionary government, the despotism of the majority in place of legal freedom. Robespierre and Marat went even further than he. They wanted to erect in per- manency forms of government which Danton considered merely temporary " ^ We shall not trace in detail the story of rapid decline, when " the goaded land waxed mad '\ The RepubHc suffered in two fields at once : in its external war against foreign foes ; in its internal battle at home ; and the mortality in both fields was disas- trous. The Dauphin, called Louis XVII, disappeared * Mignet, Histoire de la Revolution Frangaise, i, 354 (14th edn., Paris, 1883). Georges Danton, 1 759-1 794. Jean Paul Marat, 1 743-1 793. The " Mountain " party was so-called from the elevation of its benches in the Assembly, 138 THE COMMONS in The Terror; Queen Marie Antoinette was guillotined on October i6th, 1793 ; it is computed that the number of victims rose from three a week in April, 1793, to 196 a week in June, 1794. The Terror was a parricidal monster : Danton's turn had come on March 24th ; Robespierre's came on July 28th. Meanwhile, Dumouriez invaded Holland, and was defeated by Anglo-Austrian troops ; March 2ist, 1793. From terror of The Terror, he deserted to Austria ; and Spain, Austria, England, Prussia invaded France at different parts. But gradually the Republicans rallied. They sacrificed everything to the army : their spreading gospel of liberty was contracted to a defence of the soil of France. No precaution of the Government was so severe, no appetite of the guillotine so insatiate, but that they bore it for the sake of France. The Terror braced their endurance, and fortified their arm. They began to win back what they had lost. Toulon had been surrendered in August, 1793 ; in December, the Republic regained it, and a certain Napoleon Buonaparte distinguished himself in that exploit. Brussels fell to them again ; they invaded Holland in 1794, and fulfilled a dream of purer days by re- habiUtating it^on terms — as the Batavian Republic. In March, 1795, the two Republics entered into alliance. Further successes ensued, and combined with the passing of Robespierre to relax the stringency of The Terror. Its curve had steadily 139 THE THIRD GREAT WAR risen as the fortunes of France declined ; with the rise of her fortunes, the curve gradually sank. It became possible to make peace. Revolutionary France was now in the third year of the French Republic, and the Allies had nothing more to fight for. Louis XVI was dead : no trade-union of Kings could serve his cause any more. Marie Antoinette was dead, and her nephew, the Emperor Francis, was not concerned about Louis's brothers. He had other cares for his concern. The Russo-Prussian partition of Poland in 1793 had led to a Polish insurrection under the patriot, Kosciusko*; and Catherine and Frederick William II were more resolute against Poland than against France. They had more to gain by suppressing its independence, and Prussian troops were promptly withdrawn from the West to the East, so as not to leave Russia all the dividend. This time, the sordid business was com- pleted. The poor peasants of Poland were too weak to try to repeat, under the covetous eyes of jealous neighbours, the experiment of Batavia (Holland) and France ; and their country was erased from the map. Stanislaus Poniatowski was forced to leave the shrunken remnant of his kingdom ; Kosciusko was defeated and taken prisoner ; and the third and final partition was consummated. This was what pre- occupied the Emperor, who had been left in the lurch two years before. Now, Austria got Cracow * Thaddeus Kosciusko, 1746-18 17. 140 THE COMMONS and Polish Galicia ; Prussia, Wai*saw and its adjoin- ing parts ; and Russia filled up the interstices. — The Empress Catherine II died in 1796. The last survivor of the giants, she was faithful to her order till the end. Though she lived through the French Revolution, and even flirted with liberahsm for a while, she never swerved a hair's-breadth to the cause of the Commons from the Kings*. Still, in the year before her death, she was intent on the same arts of '* benevolence " which she had practised at Poland's expense as long ago as 1772 ; and Frederick the Great's Royal nephew and Maria Theresa's Imperial son degraded their experience of a new epoch by consenting to, and sharing in, the spohation. With the Treaties of Basel, 1795, first, in April, between France and Prussia, and, secondly, in August, between France and Spain, a definite period was marked in the history of twenty-three years' warfare : from 1792 to 1815. The Treaties themselves were important, but even more important than their terms were the facts which their conclusion registered. '* France re-entered the comity of nations " ; she had '* re-established her place in Europe " ^ ; and this formula of re-entry and re-establishment acquires a vital significance in relation to the future and the past. The France which had gone to war was a monarchy with its King in gaol ; when the French Republic made peace, foreign courts had put off ^ Morse Stephens, op. cit., 157, and Cambridge Modern History, viii, 441. 14JE THE THIRD GREAT WAR their mourning for King Louis. The revolutionaries who went to war, to Hberate Belgium and Holland, and to spread in Poland and Bohemia the pax Gallica of the Rights of Man, had been filled with a spirit of discovery. They were the last offspring of the Renaissance : like Rabelais, at the edge of the Middle Ages, routing the phantoms of the night with the tonic laughter of glad manhood. Their trained soldiers who came back were seasoned men with positive ideas. They wanted pay and fresh employ- ment, and the customary rewards for military exploits. The first condition of re-entry and re- establishment was a resumption of the common aims of statecraft. Those had sown their wheat with whimsey ; these did not mean to gather tares. So, the French RepubHc made peace, not propa- ganda : a territorial peace of the old kind, with even more than the old temptations to future militarist ambitions. The first thing was to fix a line to separate Prussia from France, and to protect each from the other's aggression. France demanded the Rhine frontiers. Prussia nominally refused : osten- sibly, from the highest motives ; actually, not to give Austria, who was still at war, the chance of scoring a point in the age-long, wasteful competition for leadership among the Empire States. The Empire was dying, nearly dead : the reigning Emperor, Francis II, was to bury it in 1806 ; and still, in 1795, Hohenzollem and Habsburg were disputing the 142 THE COMMONS insignia of Charlemagne's ghost. But the Hohen- zollem, characteristically, wanted the substance as well ; and a secret clause in the Basel Treaty pro- vided that, for a sum of money to be determined, Prussia would surrender such claims as she possessed on the Rhine. This clause was amplified later in a supplementary treaty (August 5th, 1796), even more dishonourable towards the Emperor on the part of King Frederick WiUiam II. — The French treaty with Spain was equally welcome in both countries. The War now entered another phase. The restored *' comity of nations '' restored old causes of warfare. The brief era of Revolution had passed, and the French Republic was the old France under a new name. The old France, but with a difference. The Reign of Terror, stripped of its sanctities, was merely martial law in an extreme form, and the effect of its experience had been to make all France a nation in arms, The martial mobs in the cities were ready to crown with their plaudits the martial heroes from the front. Middle-classes and peasantry alike were drunk with military success ; and with antici- pation of the benefits to accrue from it. What France under Louis XIV had accomplished by the King's behest, the Republic, which had beheaded his successor, would accomplish by common consent. The times were ripe for the man, and the man was now to appear. 143 CHAPTER IX THE TITAN The history of the twenty years from the Treaty of Basel, 1795, to the Battle of Waterloo, 1815, is dominated in Europe by the personahty of Napoleon Buonaparte ^ And not only in Europe. We hear very much to-day about Wdtpolitik : the tidal action of war and diplomacy, affecting the shores of all the world by their least motion in one part, thus leading to the conception of one mind directing all the tides. German scientific professors have given a name to this idea ; the Corsican adventurer gave it Hfe. There are many views of Napoleon. Some of us still remember how our nurse used to frighten us with a legendary bogey of ** Boney '', thus attesting to the reality of the fear and hate which Napoleon had inspired in earlier nurseries, deprived of a father's presence by his wars on land and sea. To others, he is the great legislator and pacificator ; the " super- man " of modern civihzation, who hurled his enormous ^ Born in Corsica, 1769; entered French army; became Republican general ; First Consul, 1799 ; Emperor of the French, 1804 ; died as British prisoner in St. Helena, 1821. 144 THE TITAN strength against the pillars of the temple of the Middle Ages. And between these extreme views lies the record of his biography, showing with what rare genius he soldered the present on to the past. The French Revolution, from which he sprang, which gave him his soldier's chance of rising by courage and leadership to a station of command, would have impressed its lessons on Europe with far slighter effect if the supremely successful general had not gathered all these lessons into one sign, conspicuous throughout the world. Yet he inscribed that sign with the motto of Louis XIV. Though it stretched across the map ot Europe, it bore the blazon rEtat c'est moi. He re- vived Charlemagne in Napoleon, and buried him in Francis II. He renewed the dynastic tradition, planting members of his family as kings and rulers in minor States. There was this grand difference, however, and it is the key to the influence of Napoleon's reforms on the century which has since elapsed. His rule rested on consent. Louis XIV was made by Richelieu ; Kaiser Wilhelm has been made by Bismarck ; Napoleon was self-made. He had behind him no artificial patriotism, compelled by " iron and blood " to rally to an historic name, but '* the opinion of five or six millions of men ", who had asserted their right to free judgment, and who freely acknowledged his lead. He had no name, till he made it known ; no past, till he set Josephine H5 10 THE THIRD GREAT WAR aside to marry Marie Louise, daughter of the Emperor Francis of Austria, and created his son (1811) King of Rome. His power, however unhmited, was based on the broad foundation of that populace assemhUe which Louis XIV and the benevolent despots, formed in his Hkeness, had despised. His rule was the quintessence of militarism ; but, reversing the course of militarism in Germany, where King Frederick WiUiam I made the army, and the army made the Prussian nation, the French nation made the army, and the army made the French Emperor. Thus founded. Napoleon's ideas contained promise of progress, nationalism, and enlightenment, and survived the forms in which he clothed them. A clean breath from the revolutionary era, freed from the excesses of the Terror, touched the fringes of old, decaying things, and swept away many stale abuses. England's notion of sea-power was purified by her Napoleonic wars : not merely by the fear of invasion, nor by the quickened genius for naval command, which the contest of wit with Napoleon induced even in Nelson himself, but by the sense of gravity and responsibility which the American War of Independence and the French Wars of Revolution were bound to evoke in the statecraft of a Colonial Power. Fas est et ah hoste doceri (even an enemy's lessons are worth learning), was the maxim of the oldest Imperialists ; and Napoleon, who had challenged the British Empire, left it some matter 146 THE TITAN for reflection when the ordeal had been passed. In Europe, he rendered impossible the continuance under modem conditions of the medieval Holy Roman Empire. He gave national aspirations to Germany, Italy, Holland ; he thrilled the divided parts of Poland, and his policy of breaking-up and re-combining laid bare the popular foundations of movements previously covered with the rust and mildew of inhibitive tradition. The twenty years, 1795-1815, are the outside limits of the period in which these mighty forces were at work. We cannot follow the story in detail, but a few facts may be stated in outline. They should assist an understanding of the Second Great War and its legacy. 1795-1797. The War with Austria, France had neutrahzed Prussia and Spain, but was still at war with Austria and England. She attacked Austria in Italy, where Francis II was most personally vulner- able. General Buonaparte was in command of the French forces, and quickly proved his mettle. He established as a military principle, which Kaiser Wilhelm has applied in the present war, the requisition of food and money from the towns which he took : the campaign was to be self- supporting ; even profitable. He won a decisive victory over the Austrians in August, 1796, on the very day that the King of Prussia was signing his secret Treaty with France for the demarcation of the H7 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Rhine frontier to Austria's disadvantage. In the same month, a Treaty was concluded between France and Spain, by w^hich Spain was to make war on England and France on Portugal ; the immediate result of this alliance was the English naval victory off Cape St. Vincent (February, 1797), in which Nelson served under Sir John Jervis. In this period, too, the Empress Catherine had died (November, 1796), and was succeeded by her son, the Emperor Paul. Meanwhile Buonaparte's army was continuing its advance ; and in April, 1797, the Franco-Spanish naval defeat was compensated by negotiations for peace between Austria and France, concluded by Buonaparte in the following autumn. The French Rhine frontier was conceded, curtailing the terri- tories of the Empire, and taking Belgium away from Austria. Whole districts of Italy were treated as counters in the game ; and two results of the five years' warfare were manifest : i, France was set free to tackle England ; ii, the Great Powers of Europe recognized that Napoleon Buonaparte was not only a great general of the French Republic, but a formid- able envoy of the French Government. — It should be added that the Government at this time was in the hands of five Directors, who had been appointed under the Constitution of Year 3 of the new Repub- lican calendar. 1797-1799. The War in the East. Buonaparte returned to Paris in December, 1797, crowned with 148 THE TITAN the *' glory and celebrity " which were his object in life. His next business was the war against Eng- land ; and he decided to strike at her through India. This avoided the difificulty of channel-transport ; it gratified a taste which Buonaparte shared with Disraeli for adventure in the gorgeous East, and it may have been acceptable to the Directors to find a distant mission for so powerful a general. In the following May (1798), he set sail for Malta, and thence, after its surrender, for Egypt. Before the end of July, he had occupied Alexandria and Cairo, but his fleet was destroyed by Nelson in the Battle of the Nile on August ist. Buonaparte was stranded in Egypt with his army, while the Mediterranean was held by English ships, and an English garrison replaced the French in Malta. He employed his time effectively. Advancing against the Turkish forces, he successfully invaded Palestine, and besieged Acre in the spring of 1799. Retreating from there to Egypt, he re-established his hold on Cairo, and, leaving his army in occupation, reached Paris in the October of that year. His return, as he had foreseen, was timely. England, Austria, and even Russia, now ruled by the Emperor Paul, whose madness did not redeem his badness, were genuinely alarmed at the aggressions of French arms in Switzerland and Italy ; and, in order to raise the necessary troops, the Directory of the French Repubhc had passed its first Conscription Law in H9 THE THIRD GREAT WAR September, 1798. This fact constituted a surrender to militarism on the part of the Repubhcan Govern- ment ; and the step was taken, it should be noted, without reference to Buonaparte : the principle of conscription was established before he took the helm in France. Fighting began in the spring of 1799, and though Russia, particularly, won some victories, the result by the middle of October was, on the whole, favourable to French arms. Buonaparte*s arrival was the signal for fresh enthusiasm. By a new revolution in the government, the five Directors were replaced by three Consuls (November 9th, 1799), of whom Buonaparte was one ; and the Constitution of Year 8 of the Republican calendar thus placed the greatest French general at the head of the military State. It was adopted by over 3,000,000 votes against a minority of about 1,500 ; a sufficient testimony to the First ConsuFs popularity. 1799-1804. The Consulate. Fresh testimony was forthcoming when, in May, 1802, the First Consul was made life-Consul, by over 3,500,000 to 8,000, with power to nominate his successor ; and in May, again, 1804, the life-Consul was voted the rank of hereditary Emperor of the French by a majority of more than three and a half millions. On December 2nd in that year, the Emperor was crowned in Paris by the Pope, and in the following May he was crowned King of Italy in Milan. The Constitution of 150 THE TITAN Year 12, as it was called, had travelled a long way from the ideals of the authors of the new calendar. Meanwhile, much had happened during the Con- sulate. France in 1799 had four chief enemies : England, Austria, Prussia, Russia. England was irreconcilable. King Frederick William III of Prussia, who had succeeded his father in 1797, was a doubtful quantity in the First Consul's calculations, but was certainly more neutral than hostile. Over the Emperor Paul of Russia, the First Consul quickly established a marked personal ascendancy. Paul's mind had only room for one idea at a time, and it took shape now as hatred for England. He was discussing with Buonaparte a joint invasion of India, when, unregrettably, he was assassinated (March 23rd, 1801) . A month before, the Treaty of Luneville had been concluded between France and Austria, after a double defeat sustained by Francis II : the sands of the Holy Roman Empire were running out. A year later (March 25th, 1802), the Peace of Amiens brought a welcome truce to hostilities between France and England, who had been successful in the Egyptian campaign of 1800-01. The truce lasted little more than a year. The First Consul's ambitions were incompatible with the prosperity of British trade and sea-power, and he hoped, by isolating England, to be able to destroy the foundations of both. Hostilities began afresh in May, 1803, when Spain was friendly to France, THE THIRD GREAT WAR Prussia neutral, Austria weary, and the Emperor Alexander of Russia disposed to whole-hearted admiration of the policy and person of the First Consul. But Napoleon's execution (March 21st, 1804) of the young Due d'Enghien, the only accessible Bourbon prince (Louis and Charles, the late King's brothers, were in prudent hiding abroad), alienated Alexander's good-will. The pretext was a conspiracy against the Consul's life ; but his victim was not an accomplice. The Russian court went into mourning, and Prussia's neutrality stiffened. The First Consul's reply, as we have seen, was to accept the Imperial title on May i8th, thus deal ng the final blow at the crumbled Holy Roman Empire. Francis II abdicated shortly after, and assumed the high-sound- ing title of Hereditary Emperor of Austria (Francis I), of which country he was constitutionally Archduke. 1804-1814. The Empire. *' The popularity of Napoleon," it is said, '' which had waxed steadily under the Consulate, slowly waned under the Empire " ^ It is not possible in a narrative on this scale, nor is it requisite to our purpose, to trace the course or the causes of this decline. Our business is with the Emperor's foreign wars ; not with the barrier which Court etiquette interposed between him and his people, and which was combined with the weight of conscription, the press censorship, and other repressive measures, to disguise the value of ^ Cambridge Modern History, ix, 113 (by Prof. Pariset). 152 THE TITAN the legislation which the new Absolutist imposed on his country. The people who had raised him to his eminence, and who had tasted the sweets of power, began gradually to feel that he was ruling for them, no longer by them : an ominous feeling to arouse barely a dozen years after the Revolution. More- over, the Royalist plots, so luridly illustrated the year before, did not cease when the Emperor's new nobility revived the memory of dead times and dormant titles. Throughout these happenings, the Emperor was waiting for a fine day to invade England from Boulogne. As Nelson clearly perceived, this policy, however resolute, was bound to be carried out in other parts of Europe than the English Channel ; and, in 1805, Napoleon was once more at war with Austria and Russia. On the anniversary of his coronation by Pope Pius VII in Paris, he defeated the army of the two Emperors at Austerlitz (December 2nd) ; but again, as at Cape St. Vincent, this victory was balanced by the defeat of the allied French and Spanish Fleets at Trafalgar (October 2ist). After Austerlitz, Austria made peace, and its terms afford a measure of her prostration. Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia were transferred to French rule in Italy ; Bavaria and Wiirtemberg became King- doms S thus weakening Austrian supremacy, and the ^ Their Kings have not repudiated to-day the titles which they accepted from the French Emperor ; this noble scorn is confined to regimental uniforms and university degrees, 153 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Emperor Napoleon appointed himself Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine (July, 1806). It was Prussia's turn next. She had played an ignoble part throughout the period of the Consulate and Empire, and had derived disproportionate gain from her not disinterested neutrality. On October 14th, 1806, the army created by Frederick William I was crushed under Frederick WiUiam III at Auerstadt and Jena ; and eleven days later Napoleon entered Berlin. — In after years he was disposed to regret that he had not wiped out the HohenzoUern dynasty ; and, though this regret may have been prompted by a recollection of Bliicher at Waterloo, it is legitimate to share it to-day. Russia had still to be dealt with in this lightning campaign, and the Battle of Friedland (June 14th, 1807) was a fine conclusion to Austerlitz and Jena. Russia's resources are so inexhaustible that the effect of her defeat was not as grave as those of Austria and Prussia. It left her free to make honourable terms, and the two Emperors met at Tilsit on June 25th. It was on a raft moored in the river Niemen that Napoleon and Alexander had their interview, while King Frederick William of Prussia " waited in the rain on the river bank to learn his fate." In the end, he owed his Kingdom to Alexander : Napoleon, whom he met the next day, treated him with studied contempt ; and, doubtless, the tradition of that three hours' wetting bit deep into the 154 THE TITAN HohenzoUern memory. The Russian Emperor's romantic temperament had always been attracted to Napoleon, and the French Emperor was not less anxious to please because his vanity was flattered. He hinted at a revival of the two Empires of the West and the East ; and an alliance based on a genuine belief that each would be useful to the other was discussed between the illustrious negotiators, and took shape in the Peace of Tilsit (July 7th, 1807). — A year later, they met again at Erfurt, but a little of the glamour had departed. We must pass over the next four busy years ; of extension rather than of consolidation. In 1812 Napoleon was at his greatest. He ruled wider territories with more might. He had married the Emperor Francis's daughter, and had created his infant son King of Rome. His brothers, step-son, and nominees were placed on various thrones. But his position at the top of a thousand schemes was not as stable as it looked, (i) Russia, in May, 1812, had made peace with Turkey at Bukharest, and the Emperor Alexander was not in the mood of the interview on the raft in the Niemen. Napoleon had gradually moved away from the dual-Empire idea. He had created a Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which, though it was not a new Poland, was sufficiently like it to constitute an infringement on Russian vested rights ; vested, at least, since 1795. (ii) Prussia had learned from Napoleon how to oppose Napoleon. 155 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Always an apt pupil of French example, she had studied absolutism from Richelieu, cosmopolitan scepticism from Voltaire, and was now applying her mind to the French school of ^A;-^os^revolutionary nationalism. The^ application was ministerial and popular ; the Hohenzollem King was impervious to ideas, (iii) Austria, despite the honour paid to the Archduchess Marie Louise, was not reconciled to her shrunken territories, or to her turned Imperial coat, (iv) The Pope had excommunicated (1809) the Emperor whom he had crowned five years before ; and this cause operated with others to strengthen the hopes of the Royalists against the ** parvenu " on the Bourbon throne, (v) Sir Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington, had been showing his quality in the Peninsula ; and British sea-borne trade and sea-power still defied Napoleon's attacks. — Add these five symptoms together ; multiply them by the constant factor of the Emperor's increasing Caesarism, Absolutism, Militarism : any name that signifies vast ambition ; and the events of 1812--15 will be more readily seizable. The Second Great War, like the First, and in many respects like the Third, was not an outbreak, but a concentration. Russia and England combined to resist the Imperial aggressor. Prussia not only stood out, but in February, 1812, King Frederick William III made a treaty with Napoleon, giving free passage to the French troops through his 156 THE TITAN country, and a reinforcement of 30,000 men. Stein S whom Napoleon had required the King of Prussia to dismiss, joined the Emperor of Russia as adviser on the German problem ; and, while it is fair to point out that Prussia's policy was dictated by prudence, its double face is unpleasantly conspicuous. Napoleon's retreat from Moscow in the winter of 1812 is too famous in history to need rehearsal ; and, now that his ally was in sore straits, the King of Prussia yielded to popular sentiment, and, by treaty with Russia in February, 1813, declared war on France, March i6th. Bemadotte, Prince Regent of Sweden, Napoleon's brother-in-law, and formerly a French marshal, joined the Allies' coalition in April ; and Francis of Austria, Napoleon's father-in- law, declared war on France, August 12th. Terms of peace had been offered to the French Emperor, securing him France from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, but had been refused till August 14th, when the acceptance arrived too late. — The combined forces of the Allies took a year to defeat Napoleon, but the task was accomplished at last : on March 31st, 1814, Alexander and Frederick William entered Paris ; on April 6th, Napoleon abdicated ; on the 24th, Louis XVIII entered French territory for the first time since 1791, and Napoleon became Emperor of Elba. The Revolution had swung full-circle, and the Bourbon dynasty was restored. ^ See p. 94. THE THIRD GREAT WAR 1815. The Hundred Days. A year later, March 20th, 1815, the Emperor was in Paris again, and the King was in flight. The last scruple of idealism had vanished, and it was a bid between Buonaparte and Bourbon. At the moment, Napoleon was the higher bidder. On June i8th, his army was crushed at Waterloo by Wellington and Bliicher, who entered Paris on July 3rd. On the 15th, the Emperor surrendered when meditating flight to America, and so passed from the stage of history. One word here about the dates of the Peace ; we shall come to the terms immediately : May 30th, 1814 ; First Treaty of Paris ; between the Allies and Louis XVIII, through his Chief Minister, Talleyrand ^ November ist, 1814 ; opening of Congress of Monarchs at Vienna. March 25th, 1815 ; Vienna Treaty of AUiance between Austria, Russia, Prussia and England against France (again under Napoleon), signed / on June 8th, 1815 ; ten days before the Battle of Waterloo. ^-^ November 20th, 1815 ; Second Treaty of Paris. ^ Charles Maurice Talleyrand de P^rigord, 1 754-1 838 ; assisted Buonaparte in his elevation to Consulate and Empire ; opposed his Russian policy ; became Foreign Minister to Louis XVIII (18 14) and Prime Minister after the Hundred Days. Was, later, French Ambassador in London. 158 THEITITAN ■^Ok November 28th, 1815 ; Holy Alliance between England, Russia, Austria and Prussia. It will be observed that the First Treaty was ratified a month after Napoleon's Elba exile ; that the sittings of the consequent Congress were interrupted by the tidings of his return ; and that the Second Treaty was concluded in the shadow of the Hundred Days, when the ex-Emperor was a prisoner at St. Helena. We shall expect a hardening of counsel between the First and the Second Treaties. But, apart altogether from wars and treaties, what was the gain or loss to Europe of the thought, and hope, and action, between 1713 and 1815 ? What moral advance can be recorded in the relations of State to State ? in the relations of peoples to rulers ? in the condition of peoples ? These questions are difficult to answer. Yet it is essential to find some grounds for a reply, if we are to enter upon a new settlement with fruitful lessons from the old. Twice the statesmen of the nations have assembled after devastating wars, caused by the ambition of an Absolutist, to re-establish peace in their borders ; on their borders, more precisely. Twice, that peace has been shattered by a new pretender to absolute power. We should not be misled by the fact that a hundred years intervened between Louis XIV and Napoleon I ; between Napoleon and Wilhelm II. As we said at the beginning of this inquiry, and as we have sought to 159 THE THIRD GREAT WAR establish in the course of it, every year in a very real sense has been part of the new century. They were fighting in the middle of the eighteenth century they were fighting in the middle of the nineteenth : must they fight in the middle of the twentieth ? Still at the present day, so strong is the force of tradition and so consecrated are the forms of diplo- macy, that we hesitate to intrude considerations which may seem inappropriate or eccentric. Morality, for example, and abstract principle, and justice, and liberty, and plain speaking : such con- ceptions are slow to break through the hallowed portals of a practice which has acquired a special language of its own, and which has inured " from precedent to precedent." Even the brief survey which we have attempted has revealed a recurrence of the same problems and of the same method of treating them, from the Peace of Westphalia down- wards. Frontiers, territories, dynasties ; dynasties, territories, frontiers : these are the perpetual pre- occupation of the kings, ambassadors, and pleni- potentiaries, who have been entrusted from time to time with the splendid and responsible task of settling the politics of nations. Yet we can quote good authority — and high as well as good authority — if we venture to attack this wall of inherited pre- judice and convention. The Emperor Alexander of Russia, who was present in person in Vienna through- i6o THE TITAN out the negotiations of 1814-15, proposed a Holy Alliance, to which his " brothers '* subscribed, and which was to found their relations with one another on " the sublime truths of religion," and to bind them to govern their dominions by the laws of charity, justice, and peace. To his slightly shocked " brothers '' in Vienna — Francis of Austria and the King of Prussia, — this was just Alexander's way. He had the enthusiast's temperament : the mystic's unpractical dreaminess ; and, since he was Tsar of Russia, he was entitled to his dreams. So they put their names to his proclamation, and the Prince Regent ^ wrote a nice letter, and the sardonic Metternich * smiled, and Lord Castlereagh » felt a little dubious ; and they went on with their peace- proceedings in the old way. The Emperor Alex- ander's dream has been translated into a palace at The Hague ; and the descendants of the Monarchs who indulged his whim have outraged the Holy Alliance by the present war. We mentioned good as well as high authority. In a book which has recently been widely read, the author employs a striking epigram to describe the state of Germany to-day : *' Corsica has conquered * George, Prince of Wales ; afterwards George IV. * Prince Clement Wenceslas von Metternich, 1773-18 59 ; Austrian statesman. * Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, afterwards 2nd Marquess of Londonderry, 1 769-1 822 ; British statesman. 161 11 THE THIRD GREAT WAR Galilee '' K They had conquered Corsica in 1815. They had sent the Corsican to a little island, on which he was to pine and die. Yet, if Galilee stands for right — religious and moral right, — and Corsica for might, by whose fault has it come about that might is triumphant to-day ? Someone, surely, is entitled to ask this question of the diplomatists, however strictly they may guard their preserve. The Monarchs' holy intentions, the Corsican conquest of Galilee : such references arouse curiosity ; and, after all, there is no one else to ask. The reply from Vienna to such questionings is by no means encouraging. The moral order of the universe, and the social regeneration of the nations trampled by Napoleon's legions, figured prominently in the programme, and in the many speeches at the many banquets, which Napoleon's hospitable father- in-law provided. The Emperor of Russia interposed to prevent the rapacious King of Prussia from dismembering France in her prostration ^ and this was, perhaps, the only disinterested act which redeemed the course of the Congress. The rest was ^ Germany and England. By J. A. Cramb. New York, Dutton ; p. 133. (This edition first contained the recommenda- tion of the Hon. J. H. Choate, sometime United States Ambassador in London.) * When BlUcher was in Paris, he was with difficulty dissuaded from blowing up the Bridge of Jena, named after the French victory of 1806, and from imposing a levy of 110,000,000 francs on the city. 162 THE TITAN the rapier-play of diplomatists, highly-trained in the old school, among whom Talleyrand was conspicuous for his success in reaping profit for Louis XVIII out of the suspicions which he sowed between the '* peace-makers/* It was not a difficult task ; the difficulty was, rather, what to choose, and, having chosen, where to stop in the game of reviving old antagonisms between Prussia, Russia, and Austria, in Italy, Poland, and on the Rhine. In the end, it was an ineffective Treaty which at last was arranged under the calculating eyes of Metternich ; unillumined by a spark of true feeling for what the last twenty years had meant to the peoples of Western Europe ; unworthy of the hopes of the Revolution, ignorant or even fearful of its culture, and resolute in following the old paths which had twice led to bloody war. It left urgent problems untouched : Turkey and the Near East, for example. It was a Treaty almost childish in its faith in the policy of the footrule and the scales : State-boundaries and the balance of power ; wholly to be condemned for its neglect of the real and vital things, for which diplomatic practice had no language ; but which Talleyrand had seen, and Metternich had heard, and to which Frederick WiUiam owed his kingdom. It was con- ceived and matured in a hothouse atmosphere ; the atmosphere of Westphaha and Utrecht. The plain lessons of history went unmarked, because treaty- making was an artificial product. Thus, Belgium 163 THE THIRD GREAT WAR and Holland were united under the rule of one king ; as if any king's rule could force a union between disparate creeds and contending nationalities. They are not united to-day. Thus, Norway was sundered from Denmark, and joined to Sweden. They, too, are not united to-day. Swedish Finland was given to Russia, and Swedish Pomerania to Prussia. Finland still claims her independence. France lost her provinces on the left bank of the Rhine ; Italy was subjected to foreign princes ; Poland was left in partition ; and the Germanic States were re- formed. — A situation, teeming with seeds of war, was, briefly, the result of the combined wisdom of the monarchs and statesmen who had seen the French Revolution. As in 1791, was their motto ; and, if not, as in 1713. There was little sound thought of any year subsequent to 1815. The sole contribution to the future, except the vague prospects of the Holy Alliance, was Talleyrand's principle of " Legitimacy ", which was another word for vested interests. The unwritten code of Europe was to admit possession as nine-tenths of the law. Step by step, the Third Great War may be traced to the settlement of the Second. If " Corsica has con- quered Galilee '\ a part of the blame must be attributed to the conquerors of the Corsican, who, inevitably, perhaps, at the date and under the conditions of their work, failed to read the signs of the new time. X64 CHAPTER X CONCLUDING REMARKS It would be presumptuous, while war is in progress, to discuss the terms of peace. All that can be attempted is to suggest one or two considerations, arising out of the history of the past, which may illiunine the events of the present day, and be useful for future reference. The ultimate causes of this Third Great War should now be somewhat clearer. Like the Second and the First, though it found us incredulous and unprepared, it can hardly be said to have broken out. Rather, it brought to a definite issue the several wars since 1815. Nominally, the Two " Kaiser *' War of 1914 arose out of Serbia's alleged reluctance to give adequate satisfaction in the affair of the assassination of the Austrian Heir- Apparent. But even this nominal pretext, which might so easily have been adjusted, was founded, as we now see, on the events which had propelled Austria South- eastwards after she had been driven from the Italian peninsula. Her Holy Roman Empire perished in three stages : its rehgious unity was sundered by Martin Luther ; its imperial 165 THE THIRD GREAT WAR trappings were usurped by Napoleon ; its political function was destroyed by Bismarck, at the Battle of Koniggratz (July 3rd, 1866). When the third stage was completed, the HohenzoUem was master of the situation : so much so, that he felt himself able to resuscitate the army of his ex-rival without the remotest fear of its fresh use against his own ; so much so, that he was able to turn his ex-rivars difficulties in the South-east to his own and his ally's advantage by making Turkey a partner to his schemes against her ancient enemy, Russia. Thus, the alliance of the two Kaisers represents the last and worst phase of their long conflict for supremacy in Central Europe. This is one aspect of the present war. Another is derived from the Rhine, and, with the Rhine frontier, from Belgium. Viewed in rapid perspective, the incessant sufferings of Belgium form the blackest indictment against the policy of the Great Powers. First, she was the property of Spain ; then of Austria ; then of France ; then she was forcibly united to Holland (1815) ; then she achieved independence and took Leopold of Coburg as her King (July i6th, 1831) ; then her neutrality was guaranteed (November 15th, 1831, and April 19th, 1839), and rc-affirmed (August 9th, 1870) ; then it was violated by Germany (August, 1914) ; and now, for a brief time, we trust, her capital and chief cities are in German hands. So many changes, and with 166 CONCLUDING REMARKS so much violence, did the Great Powers inflict on an industrious and art-loving country, with a total population no bigger than that of Greater London. Yet it is a living State which they worried hke dogs ; which Austria never could swallow ; which France lickered as a dainty morsel ; and which Germany, when all the misery was done with, has torn to pieces more savagely than ever before. One danger is removed from the present war. We are not likely to repeat in the Third War our fatal error in the First, when England yielded to the clamour of the " peace-at-any-price '' party at home, and withdrew from the conflict before its close. 1 Pacifism, before the war, gave us false security and a fooFs paradise ; pacifism, during the war, would bring dishonour and disaster. We have not only our Allies to remember, not only Belgium to redeem, not only to ensure our continued supremacy at sea, but the Two *' Kaiser '* War is waged against ideas as well as armies. Since Frederick WiUiam I of Prussia beat his peasants into swordsmen, and Frederick William III choked the breath of freedom in his realm *, the dominant partner in their alliance has been governed by one idea, which he has now 1 See page 59. 2 See page 95. The murder of August von Kotzebue, the poet, by a half -crazy student, on March 23rd, 18 19, gave the King and his poHcemen a pretext for a savage policy of reaction, and for a wholesale suppression of Liberal movements in the press, the universities, the athletic clubs, etc. 167 THE THIRD GREAT WAR imposed on his ally, and on the peoples whom they rule. We need not characterize it afresh : the all-pervading, all-subduing Militarism, with the Empire of the Caesars at its back. What we may insist on, however, is the fact that this idea is not novel ; and, further, that, though Prussian in its origin, it is German in its distribution. Bismarck did not invent it, nor Treitschke and Bemhardi bring it to birth. It is deeply founded in the history of the Royal houses of Austria and Prussia, and the traditions of either are the inheri- tance of the subjects of both. We have tried to explain how this happened ; and the facts have become so important that we may briefly recapitulate the story of the Germanic States, now united in a war for Pan-Germanism. First, there was the Holy Catholic Empire, which claimed succession to the Roman Empire and to the tradition of Caesarism. The successive Emperors were elected by the Germanic princes out of the members of their own body, and for nearly four centuries the choice, with the rarest exceptions, invariably fell upon a Habsburg of Austria. Next, Luther's Reformation, and the wars of religion which ensued, established the Protestant Electors of Brandenburg afterwards Kings of Prussia, in a gradually strengthened rivalry to the CathoUc Emperors in Vienna. The HohenzoUem figured more and more as the protector of the Germanic 1 68 CONCLUDING REMARKS princes against the encroachments of France, and the Habsburg was more and more troubled by the Turks and other enemies on his further frontiers. Next, the Hohenzollem and Habsburg aHke were reduced to miUtary nothingness by the sweeping victories of the self-made Emperor Napoleon. He, too, had been crowned by the Pope (1804) ; he, too, styled his son King of Rome (181 1) ; and the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne lived again in the Empire of the French. In the presence of this common conqueror, the Hohenzollem sulked in his tent, and the Habsburg swiftly consoled himself for the loss of his elective Imperial title by proclaiming his Austrian Archduchy an Hereditary Empire (1806). This, with such additions as could be collected — Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example — is the *' ram- shackle Empire *' of to-day. Next, England and Russia combined to resist the Absolutism of Napoleon ; then Prussia, then Austria, joined them ; and, when the new French Empire was destroyed, and Prussian militarism had been restored, the ambitious Hohenzollem seized his chance. He settled his account with the Habsburg (1866) by tuming him out of the Germanic Confederation ; and next, after extending his frontiers, he revived the " German '* Empire in his own family (1871). Not again as a religious union, for which neither the times were propitious, nor his Protestant faith was suit- able, but on a customs-union [Zollverein) — something 169 THE THIRD GREAT WAR positive, practical, and material, — he built up the Imperial idea, which had already caused the fall of Bourbon, Buonaparte, and Habsburg ^ Thus, the upstart Empire of the HohenzoUern has been designed to appeal, as required, to five different classes of customers : i, by the romantic memories of Charle- magne and Barbarossa ; ii, by the loyal traditions of the elective Cathohc Empire ; iii, by the imperia glamour of the conquering and conquered Buonaparte ; iv, by the mihtary doctrine, acquired by Frederick the Great in the school of Louis XIV ; and v, by the self-interest of a modern tariff-girdled State. — ^This is one idea in the present war. Germany calls it, for short, Kultur ; and this composite idea, which has wrought infinite mischief in successive incorporations in the past, must be overthrown with the two Kaisers' armies. To some, it may seem a petty thing to wage war against a name. Though to cross the frontier of the Rhine — from the West under Bourbon or Buona- parte ; from the East under Habsburg or Hohen- zoUern — has been the constant ambition of the Empire, whether in its French or its German incor- porations, it may seem enough to settle the frontiers and to leave the Emperors alone. The student must form his own conclusion ; but he may at least recall 1 And, before them, of the Hohenstaufen dynasty of Emperors, which was wiped out at the Battle of Benevento, 1266, the year after Dante's birth. 17Q CONCLUDING REMARKS the fact that names symbolize ideas, and that men as far removed from pettiness as Napoleon and Bismarck (and Louis XIV might be included) attached great importance to the symbol. Bismarck tells us himself, that *' the assumption of the Kaiser- title by King William of Prussia was a political necessity/' It constituted a profitable source of union and centralization, derived from the memory of times when it meant '' more de jure and less de facto than to-day " S and with this unassailable testimony to the real value — the commercial value — of an Emperor in Western Europe, we venture to suggest that it may be prudent at last to lay Charlemagne's ghost. Another idea is involved. As we review the history of Western Europe from 1648 to 19 14, we are struck, it may be recognized, by the prominence of a moral factor, which can be described as justifica- tion by might. Louis XIV counts his soldiers and louis-d'or, and tears up his own solemn treaty for the partition of Spain. Frederick the Great counts his soldiers and thaler, and tears up his assent to the Pragmatic Sanction for the integrity of Austria (including Silesia). Catherine II dismembers quiver- ing Poland. Bismarck, at the appointed time, fights Denmark, Austria, France. Wilhelm II counts his ships and men, and tears up his treaty guaranteeing the integrity of Belgium. How is this idea to be ^ Gedanken und Erinnerungen, ii, 115. 171 THE THIRD GREAT WAR fought, and a new moral sanction to be substituted ? Do not let us think at all lightly of the difficulty of the peace-makers in this connection. Human nature — Belgium will vouch for it — hardly changes from century to century. Certain acts in the past stand out blackest : the invasion of Silesia in the autumn of 1740 ; of Belgium in the summer of 1914 ; and both were committed by Prussia. But every European State has availed itself, at one time or another, of the sanction of justification by might. Spain, France, Austria, Russia, England : none of these is guiltless ; none can throw stones. Though Germany's attitude may have been the worst, it is acts, not attitudes, that count. Indeed, in this matter of degrees of guilt, though it serves no great purpose to discuss them, are we sure that the State which adopts and does not disguise its adoption of that sanction is more morally blameworthy than the State which acts upon it and repudiates it ? In Brandenburg, Prussia, and the German Empire, from 1740 or earlier to this day, German statesmen and generals, except in the brief interval of idealism during the epoch of Liberation (1807-1813), have never disguised their allegiance to it, alike in theory and in practice. Bismarck, for instance, clearly says that the war with Austria (1866) was '' theoretically impossible. But the validity of all treaties between Great Powers,*' he goes on, " is limited by the test of ' the struggle for 173 CONCLUDING REMARKS existence/ No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its right to live on the altar of treaty- obligations, if it be compelled to choose between the two '\ And again, ** Foreign pohcy is a fluid element. . . . The proviso, ' circumstances being the same,' is tacitly understood to govern all State- treaties which involve specific performance " ^ Thus, the " scrap of paper " point of view, which the German Imperial Chancellor expounded to Sir Edward Goschen on August 4th, 1914, and which genuinely shocked the British nation, and helped to recruit Lord Kitchener's first army, was not a novel view at all. Bismarck expounded it to British statesmen and others as long ago as 1898, and, seeing that it had never been repudiated, there was no good ground to beHeve that it would be abandoned at the eleventh hour. British incredulity did credit to our faith in human perfectibility ; but it has cost us dear. This is, perhaps, beside the point ; except that, in devising a substitute for the theory of justification by might, we are still bound to take account of human nature, as exemplified in the history of two hundred years. And not in German history only. The temptation may arise again : in England, Russia, or France ; and we should guard against the easy optimism, which is the first product of war-w^eariness, and which leads to the belief that no nation wiU ever 1 Ibid., a, 249. 258. 173 THE THIRD GREAT WAR go to war. It may be that the peace-makers will decide, that, for some years at least, the chance of a recurrence of warfare will be best met by constant preparation ; and that a neglect of preparation, though jt may not be dangerous at first, will lead in a later generation to worse loss, financial and economic, than its expense would entail. We cannot say ; but this we should say, that the boon of disarmament and peace will be bought too dearly if it results in a fresh recourse to war, twenty, thirty, even forty years hence. We may ask to be fully informed as to the conditions, foreseen and foreseeable, which govern the decision, but the fate of war is so tremendous that no sanguine self-deception on our part must entail its horrors on our descendants. But we would not end on a pessimistic note. It may well prove, when the Third Great War is over, that the democracies, knocking at kings' doors, are competent to frame a better treaty than those of Westphalia, Utrecht, and Paris. When the diplo- matists have rectified the frontiers, and have fulfilled legitimate aspirations for rehgious and national independence, pubUc opinion in the Allied States is likely to reinforce these measures by a demand for some sign, or contract, or guarantee, of pacific methods in the future. Public opinion is a more formidable engine than it has been in the past, and, though the so-called solidarity of labour has failed to rally German Socialists from the cause of their 174 CONCLUDING REMARKS Fatherland to the call of their comrades in other countries, it may be that the failure of their Father- land will inspire them to seek better government. The memory of the Russian Emperor, Alexander I, will doubtless be recalled at this point : with more open methods of diplomacy and a more direct democratic control, it is not beyond hope that his enlightened scheme of a Holy Alliance of Christian monarchs may develop into an international court of arbitration with the weight of public opinion at its back. How this dream is to be translated into reaUty is another matter ; and, as we have said, it may be a matter of a long time. The worst crime against posterity would be to make shift with a premature solution, and to win a few years' industrial prosperity at the cost of another great war, in which lives and savings would be thrown away. The next worst crime, however, would be to fail to make the attempt, with all the knowledge, all the energy, and all the honesty which so grave an enterprise demands. One word more in conclusion. The sole condition on which this attempt can be made is the complete success of the AlHes in Europe. A partial success of the enemy, even a stalemate of war, would be fatal to the prospect of an abiding peace. The history of Belgium assures us that she would never permanently acquiesce in German occupation or control. It assures us, too, that such a fate would involve a 175 THE THIRD GREAT WAR similar fate for Holland ; and that the subjection of these two countries would inevitably lead to a repeti- tion of wars and counter-wars till they had regained their independence after a new general conflagration. Even a partial success of the enemy would mean a continuance of the problem of the Rhine frontier ; a constant menace of invasion to England ; a re- curring unrest in South-east Europe, and disturb- ances in the Pacific and the Atlantic. As little would peace have resulted from a victory of Napoleon at Waterloo as it will result from anything less than a complete victory of the AUies over the two Kaisers. We are fighting ideas as well as armies. It is the keen perception of this truth, and the belief that even a non-combatant may do a little service by expressing it, that has caused this book to be written. X76 GLOSSARY AND INDEX. A. Acton, Lord, 93 African Trading Company of Brandenburg, 81. Agricola, 30. Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of, 1748 : truce in War of Austrian Succession, 115. Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, acceded 1801 : interview with Napoleon at Tilsit, 154; at Erfurt, 155 ; proposes scheme of Holy Alliance of Monarchs, 161. Amiens, Peace of, year's truce between England and France, 1802-03, 151. Anjou, Duke of ; see Philip V, King of Spain. Anne, Queen of England, 58. Arndt, 94, 96. AuerstSdt, Battle of, 1806, sub- jected Prussia to Napoleon, 91, 154. Augsburg, Peace of, between Catholics and Lutherans in Germany (1555), 25 ; League and War of (1686-98), 49 f. Austerlitz, victory of French over Russia and Austria at, 1805, 153. Austria, and the Eastern Ques- tion, 65 ; defeated by France under Buonaparte, 147, 153. Austrian Succession, War of, 1740-48 : caused by death of Emperor Charles VI without heir male, 112 ff. B. Barbarossa, Holy Roman Em- peror, 1 1 52 A.D., 37. Basel, Treaties of, 1795, between France and Prussia, and France and Spain, 141. 12 177 GLOSSARY AND INDEX Belgium, as Spanish Nether- lands, 47, 58 ; transferred to Austria, 62 ; revolt of, 125, 127 ; becomes Republic, 129 ; invaded by France, 135 ; history reviewed, 166. Bernadotte, Prince Regent of Sweden, 157. Bismarck, Prince, re-founds German unity on iron and blood, 98 f. 99 ^, 105, 166 ; his views on the Imperial title, 171 ; on treaty-obligations, 173. Boileau, 71. Bourbonism, 57. Brandenburg : an Electorate (i.e. a German State ruled by an Elector, so-called because of his vote for the election of the head of the Empire, q.v.), of which the capital was Berlin, and the ruling Prince a HohenzoUern ; territorial ac- quisition of in 1648, 27 ; merged in the kingdom of Prussia, 19. Bryce, Lord ; Holy Roman Empire, 9, 37 ^ 96. loi. Buonaparte, Napoleon, at siege of Toulon, 139 ; from 1795 to 181 5, ch. ix passim. See also Napoleon. Campbell - Bannerman, Sir Henry, 11. Cape St. Vincent, victory of British fleet at, 148. Carlyle, 71, 91, 126, 131. Castlereagh, Viscount, 161. Catherine II, Empress of Russia, accedes 1762, 122 ; intrigues in Poland, 124, 140; death of, 141. Charlemagne, Holy Roman Em- peror, 800 A.D. ; 37. Charles I, King of England, 23. Charles II, King of Spain, 1665- 1 700 : in relation to the War of the Spanish Succession, 53 ff. ; death and will of, 56. Charles VI, Emperor, formerly candidate for Throne of Spain (see Spanish Succession War), and the Treaty of Utrecht, 68 ; Pragmatic Sanction in the matter of the Austrian Suc- cession, III f. Charles X, King of Sweden, 76 fi. Charles XII, King of Sweden, defeated by Russia, 81 ; death of, 1718, 82. Christina, Queen of Sweden ; 1626-89 ; party to the Peace of Westphalia, 18. 178 GLOSSARY AND INDEX Colbert, Finance - minister to Louis XIV, 44, 71. Conscription in France, under the Republican Government of the Directory, 150. Consulate, French, replaces Di- rectory in Year 8 (1799- 1800), 150. Coromandel, 81, 108. Cramb, Mr. J. A., 162. Cromwell, Oliver, 23. Cujus regio, ejus teligio (each man's [prince's] country, his own church) ; principle of religious settlement between Catholics and Lutherans adopted at the Peace of Augsburg (i555)> 25. Culture in Prusso-Germany, 87, 93 ff., 100 f., 105, 119. D. Danton, 138 f. Descartes, Rene, in Sweden, 18. Devolution, War of, 1667-68, waged by Louis XIV against Spain in Belgium, 47. Diplomacy, old and new, 15. Directory, French, instituted in Year 3 (1794-95), 148. Dual Monarchy, how it arose, and how it acquitted itself, 65 fi. Dumouriez, 135, 139. Dunkirk, 46, 62. Dutchmen in Prussia, 80. E. Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, acceded 1741, 116. Emperor (see also Empire), the associations and temptations of the title to rulers in Western Europe, 38, 104. Empire,French, under Napoleon I, 152 f. Empire, Holy Roman ; collection of Germanic States, whose princes elected an Emperor from their body ; traced its origin to Augustus Casar ; included Charlemagne and Barbarossa ; after 1438, the Emperor, with only two excep- tions, was a Habsburg of Austria ; Francis II resigned the title, 1806, and called himself Hereditary Emperor of Austria ; the rise of Protes- tantism destroyed the religious union of the Empire, and Napoleon's conquests com- pleted the destruction of its hegemony. See pp. 21, 22, 64-66, 103-04, 152, 168-70. 179 GLOSSARY AND INDEX Enghien, Due d', execution of, by Napoleon, 1804, 152. Erasmus, Dutch humanist, 3 1 . F. Fehrbellin, Battle of, 1675, between Sweden and Prussia, 81. Ferdinand III, Emperor ; elected 1637 ; died 1657 ; party to the Peace of Westphalia, 2 1 . Fichte, 93. Francis I, King of France, 1515-47, 31- Francis II, Roman Emperor, son of Leopold II, accedes 1792, 134 ; the problem of the Austro - French War, 135; proclaims himself Hereditary Emperor of Austria and abdi- cates from Roman Empire, 152. Francis Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, assassinated June 28th, 1914, 53. Francke, Kuno, 98. Frederick II, King of Prussia* 1740-86 ; surnamed " The Great ", 74 ; accession of, 90 ; his army, 90 ; hollowness of his power, 92 ; his mistakes avoided by Bismarck, 100 ; annexes Austrian province of Silesia, 109 ; indefensible character of the act, inf.; was a guarantor of Pragmatic Sanction of Emperor Charles VI, 112; invasion of Silesia, 113 f . ; keeps it, 115; in Seven Years' War, 118 I invades Saxony, 119; his victories, 120. Frederick III, Elector of Bran- denburg, 1 688-171 3 : becomes King Frederick I of Prussia, 1701, 19; accession, 82; assumes royal title, 83. Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, demands Austria's support to his candidature for the Throne of Poland as the price of his assent to the Prag- matic Sanction of Emperor Charles VI ; is elected accord- ingly, 1733, 112 ; died 1763, 124. Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, 1640-88 ; sur- named " The Great " ; party to the Peace of Westphalia, 19 ; his possessions and policy, 74 f . ; relations with Sweden and Poland, jy ; makes treaties ad idem with both at the same time, 78 ; Branden- burgizes Prussia, 79 f. ; foreign policy of, 81 ; death of, 82. 180 GLOSSARY AND INDEX Frederick William I, King of Prussia, 1713-40; confirmed as King at Treaty of Utrecht, 6^ ; accession of, 83 ; creates Prussian army, 85 ; represses culture, 87 ; death of, 88 ; guarantees Pragmatic Sanc- tion of Emperor Charles VI, 112. French Revolution, ch. viii passim ; events of 1 789, 1 30 ; of 1790-96, 131 ; Words- worth's evidence, 132 ; the war of 1792, 134 f. ; end of, at Treaties of Basel, 141. Friedland, Napoleon's Victory over Russia at, 1807, 154. G. Galway, ist Earl of, 61. George II, King of England, Elector of Hanover, 118. George IV, King of England, 161. German Empire, its origin and aims, 170. Goethe, 88, 93. Goschen, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward, 108. Greater Europe and the Conti- nental Wars of the i8th Century, 107 f. Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward, 109. Grimm, Jakob, 96. Gustavus III, King of Sweden, death of, 1792, 134. H. Haldane, Lord, 11. Halle, University of, founded, 1694, 82. Hardenberg, 94, 96. Heine, 96 f. Herder, 88, 93. Hohenzollern Militarism, its rise and breakdown, 93 ff. Holland, fate linked with Belgium's, 136; becomes Re- public of Batavia, 139. Holy Alliance, 181 5, 161 ; its future prospects, 175. Hubertusburg, Treaty of, 1763, at close of Seven Years' War, 120 f. Huguenots, in Prussia, 80. Humboldt, 94. Hutten, Ulrich von, 31 ^ I. Innocent X, Pope of Rome, 17. Ivan VI, Emperor of Russia, 1740-41, 116. 181 GLOSSARY AND INDEX Jena, Battle of, 1806, subjected Prussia to Napoleon, 91, 154. John Casimir, King of Poland, ^6. Joseph II, Emperor, accedes 1765, 121 ; victim of revolu- tion in Austrian Netherlands (Belgium), 127. Joseph Ferdinand, Electoral Prince of Bavaria, died 1699 : candidate for the Throne of Spain, 53. Junkers, squiredom of East Prussia, coercion of, 80. K. Kant, 88. Kaunitz, Prince von, 118. Korner, 94. Kosciusko, Thaddeus, Polish patriot, 140. Kotzebue, August von, 167*. L. Labiau, Treaty of, 1656, between Frederick the Great of Prussia and Charles X of Sweden, 'j%. Legitimacy, principle of, 164. Leibniz, 88. Leipzig, Battle of, 181 3, Won Prussian Liberation from Napoleon, 94. Leopold, King of the Belgians, 1831, 166. Leopold II, Emperor, accedes 1790, 129 ; espouses cause of his sister. Queen Marie Antoinette of France, 131 ; death of, 1792. 134. Lessmg, 88, 93. Letters of Obscure Men, 31. Leuthen, Battle of, 1757 : Prussian victory over Aus- trians, 120. Lorraine, Duchy of, ceded to France, as the price of her support to the Pragmatic Sanction of Emperor Charles VI, 112. Lorraine, Duke of, married Maria Theresa, daughter and heiress of Charles VI of Austria, and becomes, later. Emperor Francis I, 112. Louis XIV, King of France ; 1 638-171 5 ; party to Peace of Westphalia, 19 ; and Kaiser Wilhelm II, 35 ; his aims and policy, 37 ; his Absolutism, 42 f . ; his political programme, 45 ; the steps he took towards effecting it, 46 S. ; effects, 49 ; his " secondary age," 50 ; proclamation of his grandson, Duke of Anjou, as King Philip V of Spain, 55 ; War of the Spanish Succession, ch. iv ; death of, 69, 18^ GLOSSARY AND INDEX Louis XV, King of France, acceded 171 5 : relation with Frederick II of Prussia, 116. Louis XVI, King of France, acceded 1774 ; marries, as Dauphin, Archduchess Marie Antoinette of Austria, 122 ; his position at the outbreak of the French Revolution, 1789, 1 30 ; flees from Paris and is brought back, 131 ; dons red cap of liberty, 1 36 ; is be- headed, 137. Louis XVII of France (never reigned), 138. Louis XVIII of France, 157. Louis Philippe, King of the French, 1830-48, 69^. Lou vain, 13. Luneville, Treaty of, between France and Austria, 1801, 151. Luther, Martin ; hero of Pro- testant Reformation ; at Diet of Worms (1521), 25. M. Machiavelli, Niccolo, 1469-1527, author of // Principe (The Prince) , favourite text-book of Absolutism, and source-book of Machiavellism, as a recog- nised type of absolutist govern- ment, 39 ff . Macaulay, Lord, 108. Marat, 138. Marcus Aurelius, 21. Margaret, Queen of Navarre, 1527-49, sister to Francis I and mother of Henri IV, King of France, 31. Maria Theresa, Archduchess of Austria, daughter of Emperor Charles VI : Pragmatic Sanc- tion of her father to secure her succession, 112 ; marries Duke of Lorraine, afterwards Em- peror Francis I, 112; forms alliance with Elizabeth of Russia, 116; her daughter marries Louis XVI of France, 122. Marie Antoinette, Archduchess of Austria, daughter of Em- peror Francis I and Maria Theresa, daughter of Emperor Charles VI : marries, 1770, the Dauphin of France, afterwards King Louis XVI, 122 ; is beheaded, 139. Marie Louise, Archduchess of Austria, marries Napoleon, 146. Marlborough, ist Duke of, 51. Marot, French Renaissance poet, 31. Marriott, Mr. J. A. R., 9. 183 GLOSSARY AND INDEX Maximilian, Elector of Bavaria, 22. Mazarin, Cardinal, 1602-61 ; party to Peace of Westphalia on behalf of Louis XIV of France, 18 f. Meredith, George, 70. Metternich, Prince, Austrian Chancellor, 1773-18 59, en- courages reaction in Prussia, 95 ; at Conquest of Vienna, 161. Midleton, Lord, 11. Mignet, 138. Milton, John, 25. Mirabeau, 131. Morley, Lord, 18. N. Napoleon I : 1 769-1 821 ; Em- peror of the French, 1804-15, 144 ; self-made, 145 ; his principles and ideas, 146 ; defeats Austria, 147 ; his Egyptian campaign, 149 ; elected First Consul, 1 50 ; life-Consul, 1 50 ; Emperor, 150 ; executes Due d'Enghien, 152 ; scheme of invasion of England, 153 ; enters Berlin, 154; increasing despotism of, 156 ; commences Second Great War, 156; abdicates, 157; the Hundred Days, 158. Nelson, and Napoleon, 146 ; at Cape St. Vincent, 148 ; wins Battle of the Nile, 149 ; Trafalgar, 153. Neutrality of Belgium, 166. Niemen, river, interview between Napoleon and Alexander on, 1807, 154. Nietzsche, F. W., his views and their misapplication, 72*. Nile, Naval Battle of the, 1798, 149. Nimwegen, Treaty of, between Louis XIV and the Dutch, 1679, 48. Novalis, 102. Nystad, Peace of, 1721 : effect on balance of power in the Baltic, 84. P. Pacifism, 167. Partition Treaty, for the division of Spain's possessions after death of Charles II : re- pudiated by Louis XIV, 56. Paul, Emperor of Russia, ac- ceded 1796, 148 ; Napoleon's influence over, 151; assassina- tion of, 151. Peter the Great, of Russia, defeats Charles XII of Sweden at Pultava, 1709, 81. 184 GLOSSARY AND INDEX Philip V, King of Spain, acceded I yoo ; proclaimed at Versailles by his grandfather, Louis XIV of France, thus causing out- break of Spanish Succession War, 55 ; retains the Throne at Peace of Utrecht, 60. Pitt, William, the elder, 120. Pitt, William, the younger, 136. Poland, Constitution and First Partition of, 1772, 124; Second Partition of, 137 ; Third Partition of, 140. Pomerania, division of territory in 1648, 27. Pompadour, Madame de, 116. Poniatowski, Stanislaus, King of Poland, 1763, 124; deposed, 140. Portugal, joins Grand Alliance in Spanish Succession War, 61. Pragmatic Sanction : personal decree of a Monarch to meet special difficulty ; employed by Emperor Charles VI in the matter of the Austrian Suc- cession, III. Prothero, Mr. G. W., 59. Prussia, becomes a Kingdom by titular change of Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg, 1 70 1, 19 ; recognised under his son, King Fredk. Wm. I, by terms of Treaty of Utrecht, ^7^?)> 63; receives territorial extension, 6-^ ; foreign ele- ments in population, 80 ; acquires army, 85 ; War of Liberation and subsequent reaction, 95 ff. Prussian School of History, 72. Pultava, defeat of Sweden by Russia at, 1709, 81. R. Rabelais, French Renaissance satirist, 31, 142. Ranke, 19. Ratisbon, Truce of : confirmed Louis XIV for 20 years in his seizures of Rhenish terri- tories, 48. Realpolitik, 41. Reims, 13. Renaissance : intellectual move- ment in Europe, directed to a revolt from the narrow limits of medieval knowledge, and of the hampering bonds of medieval authority ; started in Italy in the early 15 th century ; crossed the Alps into Germany, 30 ; merged in the Reformation, 31-2. Reuchlin, 30. Rhmions : Rhenish territorial commissions of Louis XIV, 48. 185 GLOSSARY AND INDEX Robespierre, 131, 139. Ross bach, Battle of, 1757 ; Prussian victory over French, 119. Rousseau, 123. Ryswick, Treaty of, 1698 : con- cluded the War of the League of Augsburg between Louis XIV and Spain, Sweden, Holland and the Empire, 50. Savoy, Royal house of, 63. Saxony, invasion of, by Fredk. the Great of Prussia, in Seven Years' War, 118 ; comparison of the invasion to invasion of Belgium, 1914, 119. Scharnhorst, 94. Schelling, 102. Schiller, 85, 92. Schlegel, 102. Schleiermacher, 102. Sea-power and Empire, 38. Seeley, Sir John, 108. Seven Years' War, 1756-63, 118 fif. Spanish Succession, War of, 1702-13 : the First Great War, between France under Louis XIV and England, Holland, the Empire (Austria), Prussia, etc. ; arose out of death (1700) of King Charles II of Spain without an heir, and the rival claims of the French and Austrian next-of-kin : its out- break, 34 ; its ultimate causes, 38, 50 f. ; its course, 59 ; con- cluded by Treaty of Utrecht, 60 ff. Stein, 94, 157. Sweden, defeat of at Fehrbellin by Fredk. the Great of Prussia, 81 ; replaced by Russia in the Baltic, 84. Sybel. H. von, founder of the Prussian School of German historians, 72. Talleyrand, 158. Terror, Reign of, in Paris, 133 f. ; its rise and fall, 139. Tieck, 102. Tilsit, Peace of, 1807, between France and Russia, 153. Trafalgar, British Naval victory at, 1805, 153. Treaty of Paris, I and II, 158 ff. Treitschke, H. von, Prussian historian, 72 and note. Turenne, 71. 186 GLOSSARY AND INDEX U. Utrecht, Treaty of. 171 3, be- tween the Allies (England, Holland, Prussia, the Empire) and France at the close of the Spanish Succession War (the First Great War), 60 ff. ; short- comings of, 64 ff. Versailles, Convention of, be- tween Austria, France and Russia 1756-57, 117. Victor Amadeus, King of Sicily, 63. Vienna, Congress of, 159 if. W. Wackenroder, 102. Waldeck, Prince, 21. Watson, William, 131, Wehlau, Treaty of, 1657, between Fredk. the Great of Prussia and the King of Poland, 78. Weltpolitik, 144. Westminster, Convention of, be- tween Prussia and England, 1756, 116. Westphalia, Peace of ; October 24th, 1648 ; between the Empire on one part and France and Sweden on the other, 17 ff. ; objects and results, 24 f . ; chief features and up- shot, 28 f. Wilhelm II, German Emperor, 1888 : his views on Sea- power and Empire, 39 ; his Pan - Germanism compared with lh3 Pan-Bourbonism of King Louis XIV of France, 57. William III, King of England, 58. Winckelmann, 88, 93. Wolff, Christian von, 88. Wordsworth, witnesses French Revolution in Paris, 132 f. it7 TWO GOOD SIX SHILLING NOVELS. Crown 8vo, 552 pp. The House at Norwood BY WILLIAM PATRICK KELLY. A vivid description of the most singular and remarkable experience of the century. ... In comparison witli tlie incidents herein described, the most exciting adventures by land or sea, hy flood or field, may be considered as only ** trifles light as air.** (»:C3 H H H [r:::^) Hands of Healing AN IDYLL BY THEODORA FLOWER MILLS. With Four Illustrations by the Author, A picture is drawn of idyllically beauti'^ul woodland scenery, and is sure to appeal to all those who love the out-of-doors. ... A subdued, meditative and restful tone pervades the pages of the whole book. Bristol: J. W. ARROWSMITH LTD. London : Simpkin, Marshall & Co. Ltd. Arrowsmitb's Shilling Reprint Series {Cloth Bound, with Picture Wrapper) contains the following well-known books : ZISKA, The Problem of a Wicked Soul. By Marie Corelli. CALLED BACK. By Hugh Conway. THE TINTED VENUS. By F. Anstey. HETTY WESLEY. By Sir Arthjr Quiller-Coi-ch. PATRICIA AT THE INN. By J. C. Snaith. THE MAN WHO WAS THURSDAY. By G. K. Chesterton. JOHNNY FORTNIGHT. By Eden Phili potts. (•'The Good Red Earth.") TWO IN A TENT-AND JANE. (- A Thames Camp.") gy MaBEL BaRNES-GRUNDY PEARLA. By Miss Betham-Edwards. THREE MEN ON THE BUIVIIVIEL. By Jerome K. JerOxME. A DAUGHTER OF ASTREA. By E. Phillips Oppenheim. THE VACILLATIONS OF HAZEL. By Mabel Barnes-Grundy. Bristol: J. W. ARROWSMITH LTD. London : Simpkin, Marshall & Co. Ltd. Arrowsmith'i ILLUSTRATED. Poctet Series. ^^^ Feap. 8vo. Thin Paper. Leather, 3/6 net. Gilt Top and Back. Cloth, 2/6 net. THE CHARM OF THE WEST COUNTRY. By Thomas Burke. THE DIARY OF A NOBODY. By George and Weedon Grossmith. FROM A CORNISH WINDOW. By Sir A. T. Quiller-Couch. HOME LIFE WITH HERBERT SPENCER. By *' Two." THE PRISONER OF ZENDA. By Anthony Hope. RUPERT OF HENTZAU. By Anthony Hope. SOPHY OF KRAVONIA. By Anthony Hope. THE WESTCOTES. By Sir A. T. Quiller-Couch. ZISKA. By Marie Corelli. Bristol : J. W. ARROWSMITH LTD. London : Simpkin, Marshall & Co. Ltd. ArROWSMITH'S 1/' NET SeRIES. Crown 8vo. Attraetive Paper Covers. The Adventures of Mr. Wellaby Johnson. By Oliver Booth. An Englishwoman in the Canadian West. By Elizabeth Keith Morris. C. B. Fry : The Man and his Methods. By A. Wallis Myers. My Dog and I. By Gerald Sidney. School-Room Humour. By The Rt. Hon. T. J. Macnamara, LL.D., M.P. Our Lady Cinema. By Harry Furniss. Arrowsmith's 6d. Novels. Demy 8vo. Picture Covers. Brown Eyes. By May Crommelin. Dead Man's Court. By Maurice H. Hervey. The Diary of a Nobody. By George and Weedon Grossmith. The Guilty River. By Wilkie Collins. Johnny Fortnight. By Eden Phillpotts. Kitty. By M. Betham-Edwards. The Mark of Cain. By Andrew Lang. The Others. By R. Neish. Pluck and Buttons. By John Strange Winter. A Tiger's Cub. By Eden Phillpotts. The Time Bargain. By F. Anstey. The Tinted Venus. By F. Anstey. Two Aunts and a Nephew. By M. Betham-Edwards. Two Sides of the Face. By Sir A. T. Quiller-Couch. Secrets of the Courts of Europe. By Allen Upward. The Vacillations of Hazel. By Mabel Barnes-Grundy. Bristol : J. W. ARROWSMITH LTD. London : Simpkin, Marshall & Co., Ltd. Pocket Size, 6d. net. iwwi^iiir rafMM: ^m W\ 05^ mM^ Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith Ltd.. Quay Street. London: Simpkin, Marshall. Hamilton, Kent & Co., Lto Useful Phrases for our Soldiers in English and French, with excellent Guide to Pronunciation. THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN j ; T^IS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY . ; Wk-lf WCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE. DEC 26 1939 DEC 30 IMS \ LD 21-100m-7,'39(402s: 297715 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY L