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 PRINCIPLES 
 
 OP THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 
PRINCIPLES 
 
 OP THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 BY WILLIAM CUNINGHAME, ESQ. 
 
 OF ENTERKINE, NORTH BRITAIN. 
 
 
 " THE DISCORDANCE of the opinions entertained by the ablest men on the subject of NATIONAL 
 POLITY, proves that the PRINCIPLES of NATIONAL ORDER, are involved in great obscurity. At any 
 time, then, he, who should elicit those PRINCIPLES, from the darkness which surrounds them, and 
 exhibit them with truth, and perspicuity to the Public, would deserve to be ranked among the benefactors 
 of mankind : but, at a time like the present, when Europe and the World lie panting and exhausted in 
 a war marked by characters of peculiar horror, and induced by differences of opinion, respecting these 
 very PRINCIPLES, the benefits of such an inquiry, if attended even with partial success, would be 
 incalculable." Monthly Review, May 1800. Vol. 113, p. 34. 
 
 Am 3e tov ayaDov xpmv ouh sk twv <7rapcttei7ro{ji,emv dbxi/ja&jv toui ypu$ma$y «M' eh rtiv Uyc^mr 
 
 POLYB. 
 
 LONDON : 
 PRINTED FOR JAMES RIDGWAY, 170, PICCADILLY, 
 
 OPPOSITE BOND-STREET. 
 
 1811. 
 
 W, Flint, Printer, Old Bailey, London, 
 
 
 bak 
 
 *ntm, if-1- 111 'till llll. llfcT I 
 

 8C0HMH3B 
 
 
 
7*C" 
 
 
 
 
 DEDICATION 
 
 TO THE 
 RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 
 THE 
 
 LORD GRENVILLE, 
 
 fyc. Syc. fyc. 
 
 MY DEAR LORD, 
 
 Permit me to dedicate this Work to 
 you, as a tribute of friendship — I certain- 
 ly do not trespass upon the bounds of 
 sincerity, when I say, that I offer it to the 
 person in the Three Kingdoms, whom I 
 hold the best qualified to judge of it. Nor 
 
IV DEDICATION. 
 
 is the interest of this circumstance dimi- 
 nished by the remembrance of our connec- 
 tion at the University, when I had an op- 
 portunity of beholding those Virtues and 
 Talents, which have since, been so power- 
 fully developed — I am, my dear Lord, 
 with sentiments of the highest regard, and 
 esteem, 
 
 Your Lordship's 
 Most faithful 
 and most devoted humble Servant, 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 IN the year 1789, a Revolution took place, which 
 among all the extraordinary consequences it occasioned, 
 was in none more remarkable, than in the discussions it 
 gave rise to, on the subject of POLITICS — It did 
 happen, that the very first PRINCIPLES of GOVERN- 
 MENT, were brought into agitation — But it also 
 happened along with this, that they were treated in such 
 a manner, as shewed the infancy of men's knowledge on 
 these subjects — We talk not of the irritation that was 
 produced by the heat of Party — We talk not of the 
 extravagances into which each was betrayed by the in- 
 temperance of the other— These consequences will vanish, 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 and have vanished with the cause that produced them— 
 We speak of the sober conclusions of men who were 
 disposed to reason coolly, and the difficulty they found 
 in arriving at truth on the subject. 
 
 It then evidently appeared, that POLITICS had never 
 been studied as a SCIENCE — For how did the World 
 stand ? As far as any thing went in antient times, in 
 HOLY WRIT, Government was not connected with 
 Politics at all, it was the immediate Appointment of 
 GOD — In the Pagan World, in the rude ages, it was in- 
 terwoven with their Mythology — It rewarded Patriotic 
 services, for which their Authors w r ere deified afterwards, 
 or recompensed Military valour — In more advanced periods, 
 something like Constitutions were formed, but they 
 had rather the rude elements of Government in them, 
 than Government itself, and so they shewed by their 
 Revolutions, and Convulsions. 
 
 And if their Constitutions shewed those shades of dis- 
 tinction, so did the Opinions of their Writers — It was 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 rather taking up ideas by fits, and starts, than any com- 
 plete, and comprehensive System — Even Aristotle, with 
 that wonderful mind he possessed, amidst the multitude 
 of subjects he embraced, seems rather to have given hints 
 at POLITICS than a System of POLITICS— One time, it 
 is restraining a NOBILITY — Another time, a KING. 
 Another time a PEOPLE, but no where does it seem 
 THAT COMPLETE STRUCTURE, which is formed 
 to give man happiness in Government — And the universal 
 testimony of their Authors, at least the most remarkable 
 among them, pronounces it a Desideratum. 
 
 Then came the Middle Ages — These were the Reign of 
 Arms— The ideas of GOVERNMENT were enclosed in 
 steel — A King was a General — A Nation an Army — This 
 was the Feodal System — A Crown was literally fought 
 for as a Military Prize, and States became the Meed of 
 the most Fortunate Valour. 
 
 Upon this Stock, various Constitutions were grafted — 
 All, inclining differently as the Nation either turned to 
 
 b 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 arms, or, resigned to the gentler occupations of Com- 
 merce — It was this that softened down the Feodal 
 System. As the arts of Peace flowed in, those of War 
 declined, and then it was, that there was something 
 else seen in Europe, than Soldiers. 
 
 But still amongst all these changes, the real ideas of 
 GOVERNMENT, never appeared—The NATION, 
 far from being considered as the basis of it, was never 
 thought of at all — Public happiness was never seen — The 
 general Weal never entered into calculation — Men might 
 court their firesides, more than the camp, they might 
 live at home, more than in the field — But still they were 
 not Citizens. They were the Servants of an Absolute 
 Prince, and they obeyed him as a Master, if they did not 
 follow as Soldiers. 
 
 It was strange to see the curious shades that these 
 ideas took, according to the Countries they prevailed in. 
 — In England, where Commerce had a little advanced, the 
 ideas of Government developed along with it — Till at last, a 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 Revolution gave them an opportunity of appearing in 
 some degree, towards the end of the 17th Century — The 
 Country divided. — One half of the Kingdom, maintained that 
 Power was a Trust given for a Nation's Happiness, and the 
 other, that it was a Property that could never be recalled. 
 
 But still this was only one point in GOVERNMENT 
 — This only respected the Power in the Rulers, but did 
 not say who those Rulers should be — It spoke of the man- 
 ner of recalling Power, but not of so distributing, as to 
 secure the Public Weal. 
 
 At last the French Revolution took place — That gave 
 men's ideas an opportunity of completely shewing them- 
 selves — Here, the great oppression in France, led to the 
 overturning every thing. And here again, men took 
 different sides — And if one was wrong before, so were 
 they both now — One set maintained, that there was an Uni- 
 versal Innate Right in every Individual in every Country 
 to Power, so that he must be consulted about making a 
 Government, and might overturn those which he had not 
 
 b2 
 
V 
 
 Xll PREFACE. 
 
 made, or joined in making — The other, that the Nation 
 had no right to enquire how Power was exercised. 
 
 And what was curious, when each side was refuting 
 the others' absurdities, they thought they were esta- 
 blishing their own — They regarded each other with the 
 most implacable hostility — Condemned as the worst of 
 madmen, and fools, and this because, as they said, it was 
 on a subject the most important of all other's, to man's 
 human happiness, that they committed these mistakes — 
 With all, shewing in the manner in which they discussed 
 it, that the FIRST PRINCIPLES in POLITICS, 
 " FAIRLY UNDERSTOOD, UNIVERSALLY AC- 
 KNOWLEDGED, and PROPERLY BOUNDED, 
 were yet a DESIDERATUM.'' 
 
 And the proof was this — Are there not in every SCI- 
 ENCE, ESSENTIAL, properly called, PRINCIPLES, 
 which every man allows, which he would be thought almost 
 mad, if he were to controvert, and which in truth, are 
 beyond controversy? Are there not SUCH ? And if there 
 
PREFACE. Xlll 
 
 be, were there THESE in POLITICS ? So far from 
 it, that we found men disputing about THESE VERY 
 PRINCIPLES every day— Nothing fixed— Nothing 
 firm — Nothing settled, or acknowledged — " Then POLI- 
 TICS were not a SCIENCE." 
 
 Now, if this was the case, was it not to be desired, 
 that some attempt should be made at constituting them 
 such ? Not, we will say, to make a Complete, by any means, 
 Universal, or Perfect System, but some hints towards a 
 Structure ? Somewhat that should redeem them from the 
 state of uncertainty under which they laboured, and give 
 them a species of consistency, and firmness ? 
 
 And that was the intention of the Present Work. To 
 take them up from the FIRST, and most PRIMITIVE 
 PRINCIPLES, not of THEM, but of ALL THINGS 
 — To proceed step by step, so that it might be fairly seen, 
 where any Error was introduced — In a word, either to 
 force FALSEHOOD to fall, or TRUTH to be established. 
 
 And so it has been pursued step by step — Let not then 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 any one be surprised, at the apparent homeliness 
 with which the Work sets out — We believe, without 
 vindicating any merit on this ground, but merely en- 
 countering as an objection, that the same murmur lies 
 against all SCIENCE — It must be plain at the beginning 
 — The symmetry of the Building is not to be looked for 
 under ground — The beauty of the Architecture, if any, 
 must appear afterwards. 
 
 ■ 
 So much as to aught apparently obsolete, in the 
 first Chapters — As to the Plan of the Work, it was 
 originally intended, to consist, of CONSTITUTION, 
 and LEGISLATION— To DEVELOPE the FIRST 
 PRINCIPLES, upon which Government is founded, 
 and then the RULES for carrying it on — Whether 
 this plan will ever be executed in its full extent, or 
 more of it, than is now offered to the Public, the 
 Author cannot say — It depends upon Circumstances not 
 under his controul. 
 
 But one thing he will say — The Original Idea, the first 
 Incentive to it, was to DISCOVER TRUTH— If any 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 have been found, the Author will rejoice, that he has in 
 any degree contributed to what is profitable for man, in 
 any way conduced to the advantage of his Species — If 
 on the contrary, it should be a System of FALSE- 
 HOOD, and ERROR (for good, or bad, System it 
 is) let it fall, the Author will be contented. Only, 
 « LET TRUTH BE ESTABLISHED IN ITS ROOM" 
 — Then indeed he will rejoice — As his first Motive was 
 to attain that Object, so will he be better satisfied that 
 another's should be fixed, than that his Falsehood 
 should live, even if it were possible — Under a more san- 
 guine view of the subject, if some part should be sound, 
 but all imperfect, he will still congratulate, if it only be 
 the means of inducing another to finish — Too happy 
 even then, to have accomplished even this good, to have 
 elicited another to the attempt, and whoever he be, 
 may he conclude under happier Auspices ! ! ! 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 Page 7 dele w in second Greek quotation 
 
 28 line 7, from top, for { prescribe ' read { proscribe ' 
 
 40 line 4, for ' here ' read * there * 
 
 56 second paragraph, line 1, for < privileges they are* read ' privileges then are* 
 
 69 Greek note, line 2, for w xvroi read o/ uvroi 
 
 78 line 5, read them instead of hem 
 
 79 for iXacvt read t\x& 
 
 87 line 4, for ORDER read ORDERS 
 
 102 first Greek quotation in notes read emxpxrrxrat for mxpxmveui 
 
 • 120 line 6, reference to note * at < one way *.' 
 
 123 reference to note J, end of first paragraph { equal manner J' 
 
 ■ 127 line 7, second paragraph, for ' deserve 1 read ' desire' 
 
 ■ 129 reference in note * must be to note Ch. XXI. 
 
 ■ 151 in margin, line 4, for Executive read Execution 
 
 152 end of second paragraph, read taking up at Law, Civil rights were the subject of Go. 
 
 vemment 
 
 165 end of second paragraph, read < on LA W or DICTATION' 
 
 Ibid, line 6, from bottom, read * hozo far it is superior' 
 
 167 margin, line 4, read CIRCUMSTANCES used as proofs 
 
 171 line 5, from top, read * must be done directly* 
 
 174 line 5, from bottom, read * correspondingly in Contestations' 
 
 178 line 4, for * the Minor application' read ' the Minor applications' 
 
 Ibid, line 8, from bottom, for ' to among men' read * among men to* 
 
 181 line 8, from bottom, for * preserved' read ' perceived' 
 
 182 in note, for ETM0EPON read ZYM0EPON 
 
 . 186 third paragraph, last line but one, dele l to be judged' 
 
 189 1st line, 2nd paragraph, read ' qualification on its limits — In ally' with capital I 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 OF REAL RIGHTS. 
 
 pace 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 That there is an Original RIGHT ... . 1 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 That there is an Original JUSTICE ..... 7 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 That Original JUSTICE entitles to Life, Property, and Free-agency . . 8 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 That Life, Property, and Free-agency, are paramount to Government '. . 10 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 OF PRETENDED RIGHTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 If Original JUSTICE entitle to aught else, besides Life, Property, and Free-agency it 
 
CONTENTS. 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 FACE 
 
 That Original JUSTICE does not entitle to Equality . . ., 12 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 That Original JUSTICE does not entitle to Power ... .16 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 That Original JUSTICE does not entitle to Independence of Government . 19 
 
 CHAP. V. ' 
 
 That Equality, Power, and Independence of Government are pretended Rights, with 
 
 all Systems founded upon them . . 24 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 OF CIVIL RIGHTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Evils to which Men were exposed in a State of Nature . . 29 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 That Government or Power, was the Remedy for the Evils to which Men were exposed 
 
 in a State of Nature . . . . .30 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 That the End of Government or Power, is to preserve Civil Rights . . 31 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 That Civil Rights are only Real or Natural ones in another Shape . ib. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 That the End of Government or Power is to preserve Civil or Real, or Natural Rights, 
 
 and that the whole is a business of Practical Utility. . . 32 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK IV; 
 
 OF POLITICAL RIGHTS. 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 PAG I 
 
 Of the Difference between Civil and Political RIGHTS . . . 33 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 That the first great Political Right is to Establish Power . . . . 34 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 That all Political Rights,' or Rights to Power, are founded in the Preservation of 
 
 Civil Privileges . . ...... 34 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 That a Nation has a Right to Establish Power ... 40 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 That a Nation has a right to Abolish Power . . 41 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Difference betweena Right to ESTABLISH Power,and aRightto POSSESS Power ib. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 That at the Moment of Establishing Power, or Government, none can be excluded -17 
 
 chap: viii. 
 
 That at the Moment of forming Governments, all Questions must be determined by 
 
 a Majority ...... ..53 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 That it does not follow from men being " Politically Equal," or " Equal in Power," 
 
 before Government, that they should be so after . . . 5b 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 PACE. 
 
 That if Men are possessed of their Civil Privileges, viz. their Lives, Properties, and 
 
 Free-agencies, they are not entitled ultimately to Power. . . 56 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 That all Government is either Legal or Arbitrary ... 58 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 That Legal Government is a Government of Fixed and settled Rule . . ' 59 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 That Arbitrary Government is a Government of Will or Caprice . . 63 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 That Legal Government is the better for Civil Privileges . • ' • 65 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 That Arbitrary Government is the worse for Civil Privileges, and the worst possible 69 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 That Arbitrary Government is to be thrown out of the Question . . 70 
 
 CHAP. XVII. 
 
 That Legal Government depends upon a Balance . . . 71 
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 
 That a Balance depends upon a Division of Power ... ib. 
 
 CHAP. XIX. 
 That a Division of Power depends upon Power and Persons . . .72 
 
 CHAP. XX. 
 That all Power is to be divided by LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE ib. 
 
 CHAP. XXI. 
 
 That there are in every State, three Interests or ORDERS, MONARCHY, ARISTO- 
 CRACY, and DEMOCRACY ... ... 76 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. XXII. . m... 
 
 •That the Spirit of MONARCHY, is Power . , . 78 
 
 CHAP. XXIII. 
 That the Spirit of ARISTOCRACY, is Pride .... ib. 
 
 CHAP. XXIV. 
 
 That the Spirit of DEMOCRACY, is Violence . 79 
 
 CHAP. XXV. 
 
 That the three POWERS united in MONARCHY, goto DESPOTISM . 79 
 
 CHAP. XXVI. 
 
 That the three POWERS united in ARISTOCRACY, go to OLIGARCHY . 80 
 
 CHAP. XXVII. 
 That the three POWERS united in DEMOCRACY, goto OCHLOCRACY ib. 
 
 CHAP. XXVIII. 
 That Power must be given equally to make a Balance . . • ib. 
 
 CHAP. XXIX. 
 
 That the Persons or ORDERS, who are to receive Power must be rendered equal to 
 
 make a Balance ... .81 
 
 CHAP. XXX. 
 That to make the Persons or ORDERS ,who are to reeeive Power, equal, they must 
 
 be divided by ORDERS, and not by Bodies ... 82 
 
 CHAP. XXXI. 
 
 That the THREE POWERS cannot be vested in ONE ORDER, to make a Balance 87 
 
 CHAP. XXXII. 
 That the THREE POWERS cannot be vested in TWO ORDERS to make a Balance 92 
 
 CHAP. XXXIII. 
 
 That in Proportion as the THREE POWERS have been vested in TWO ORDERS, 
 
 they have been defective in Balance. • • 99 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. XXXIV. 
 That the THRE E POWERS must be vested in THREE ORDERS to make a Balance 119 
 
 CHAP. XXXV. 
 
 That the THREE POWERS must be vested in THREE ORDERS, so as to 
 
 make a Balance ..... . 128 
 
 CHAP. XXXVI. 
 
 That to give Power equally, the ORDERS, who are to receive it, must be made 
 
 permanent . . • . 12S 
 
 CHAP. XXXVII. 
 
 That to make the persons or ORDERS who are to receive Power, equal, they must 
 
 be made, so as not to overwhelm each other . , . 129 
 
 CHAP. .XXXVIII. 
 
 That the ORDER of KING must be strengthened , . 130 
 
 CHAP. XXXIX. 
 That the ORDER of NOBILITY must be reduced , . . .131 
 
 CHAP. XL. 
 That the ORDER of PEOPLE must be reduced further . . ib. 
 
 CHAP. XLI. 
 That the ORDER of KING must be strengthened by Inheritance . . 133 
 
 CHAP. XLII. 
 That the ORDER of NOBILITY must be reduced by Primogeniture . 13S 
 
 CHAP. XLIII. 
 That the ORI^ER of PEOPLE must be reduced by Representation 137 
 
 CHAP. XLIV. 
 What POWERS ought to be exercised by each of the ORDERS . . 139 
 
 CHAP. XLV. 
 That to conceive a clear Idea of the POWERS, we must conceive them abstracted 
 
 from the Bodies that exercise them .... 140 
 
 CHAP. XLVI. 
 
 That the LEGISLATIVE is the POWER of making the LAW, or DICTATION 
 
 of the State ...... ib. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. XLVII. 
 
 That the JUDICIAL is the POWER of making the JUDGMENT, or DISCERN- 
 
 MENT of the State .... . .141 
 
 CHAP. XLVni. 
 
 That the EXECUTIVE is the POWER of making the EXECUTION or ACCOM- 
 PLISHMENT of the State. ...... ib. 
 
 CHAP. XLIX. 
 
 That the LEGISLATIVE goes through FOUR DEPARTMENTS of the State, 
 INSTITUTES, MEASURES, REVIEW of POWERS, and ALTERATIONS 
 of the CONSTITUTION ..... 142 
 
 CHAP. L. 
 That the JUDICIAL goes through FOUR DEPARTMENTS of the State, INSTL 
 TUTES, MEASURES, REVIEW of POWERS, and ALTERATIONS of the 
 CONSTITUTION . . .... 147 
 
 CHAP. LI. 
 
 That the EXECUTIVE goes through FOUR DEPARTMENTS of the State, IN- 
 STITUTES, MEASURES, REVIEW of POWERS, and ALTERATIONS 
 of the CONSTITUTION . .... 151 
 
 CHAP. LII. 
 
 What if involved by the LEGISLATIVE . . » . is* 
 
 CHAP. LIII. 
 What is involved by the JUDICIAL . . . . . 1<J4 
 
 CHAP. LIV. 
 
 What is involved by the EXECUTIVE . . 182 
 
 V. 
 
BOOK I. 
 OF HEAL RIGHTS, 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINAL RIGHT. 
 
 J N every science or branch of knowledge there are things which Ge . neral 
 
 r ° ° points 
 
 admit of more or less dispute, and which men consider more or less, of know. 
 before they assent to. But this arises from' something partial in their ted at once," 
 nature, that they depend upon some particular fact, point, pr circum- ^bject^tL 
 -stance. Wherever they stand upon general grounds, wherever they ,east under - 
 are built upon enlarged PRINCIPLES, the assent to them is imme- 
 diate and prompt, at least, if there be the smallest knowledge or ac- 
 quaintance with the subject. 
 
 And if this be the case with any subject it surely is with the pre- Certainly 
 sent, for what idea can we entertain more enlarged, what notion more thec * s< ; w ' th 
 
 a 7 an original 
 
 extended than that of an original and unvarying RIGHT ? Right. 
 
 Whoever then should hear this PRINCIPLE stated, might be Ex emp]ifi c J 
 
 on every qo 
 
 expected to yield his immediate and instant assent to it, seeing, that casion. 
 it is exemplified upon every occasion, that it appears in almost every 
 occurrence. 
 
 B 
 
2 THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINAL RIGHT. 
 
 BatmWfeot ^ S tnese exemplifications, however, may escape many, or rather 
 strike n.eu \] , : \ being perceived they may not strike them with the proper con- 
 prop rron- elusions, it may be expedient to notice some of them. Especially as 
 
 tliey contribute to establish a PRINCIPLE so important, and of 
 
 such serous consequence as this. 
 .. ., To begin, then, with the most obvious manifestations of it, are we 
 
 Mam'esta- . 
 
 ti. ns .,r it in not sensible that in perusing history we condemn many actions in- 
 
 ° r> * voluntarily, without the information of any law, and without the 
 
 sentence of any judge? When we read the story of Lucretia do we 
 
 enquire about the laws against rapes at Rome, or do we boil at once 
 
 with indignation against Tarquin ? When we read of Virginia in 
 
 the same history, do we not experience similar sensations against 
 
 Appius Claudius? When we hear of the fate of Socrates, do we 
 
 enquire about the institutes of Athens, or do we condemn at once 
 
 the injustice of the Athenians ? From whence can this arise, but a 
 
 secret monitor in our own breasts, a private adviser in our own 
 
 bosoms ? 
 
 \v e approve Another thing is, that in the common occurrences of life, we in 
 
 provl-Tf the hke manner approve or disapprove of the actions of men, in cases 
 
 acuo-.i, r wn ere the laws are totally silent. Where we have no public rule to 
 
 mi' , in cases ^ ■ „ , m 
 
 win-re the direct us, no acknowledged institute to guide us. From what again 
 
 laws arc si- . . • . • <• i ., 
 
 i t „t. can this arise, but the private operation ot the same cause, the secret 
 
 effect of the same PRINC I PLE ? 
 Told per. We shall be told, perhaps, that we sot this sentiment from edu- 
 
 haps that we 7 r r ° 
 
 got this sen. cation. But where did education get it itself? From what spring 
 
 timent from . . * , . . . 
 
 education, did it draw it, from what source did it deduce it r 
 
 d!dJduc»- Education was either instituted by man, or ordained by GOD. 
 
 tion petit jf ordained by GOD, GOD must have ordained it from the be- 
 
 •tselt f . . 
 
 Either i.isti. ginning. It instituted by man, man must have instituted it accord- 
 
 tuted by ■ t() J^ s f ee ]j n cr S . 
 
 man, or or- © ° 
 
 daii.eiby And what were these feelings? An original feeling of RIGHT. 
 
 GOD . 
 
 But an original feeling of RIGHT is the same as an original RIGHT 
 
 In either o o <=> 
 
 •ose.RiGHT according to all human ideas. In either case, then, RIGHT must have 
 
 original. 
 
THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINAL RIGHT. <$ 
 
 been original, if ordained by GOD as above stated, it must have been 
 from the beginning ; if instituted by man, it must have been from the 
 beginning: also. 
 
 But it is not only from this.that we can shew the original existence of Absurdity or. 
 
 , supposing, 
 
 RIGHT, butfrom the absurdity of supposing the contrary, and that in the contrary 
 the whole system of RELIGION, the VIRTUES and MORALS.* ^j; e 
 
 To begin with RELIGION, what is that? It is paying the duty to J^gf*" 
 GOD which we owe to him. But if RIG HT be not original, what made rals. 
 that duty? It must have been man. Man made RELIGION ! Can Ul rell 
 there be a more impious or blasphemous absurdity ? GION. 
 
 Again, as to the VIRTUES, what becomes of them ? What is pa- 1„ the vir. 
 triotism, for instance? It is the feeling: and doing; what we owe to our !. 
 
 ° ° . , ratnotism. 
 
 country, for the many benefits conferred upon us. For the land it gives 
 to nourish us, the parents to cherish us, and the friends to support us. 
 It is our first, and alma mater. For the force it affords to defend and 
 protect us. For the opportunities it gives to enjoy all the blessings 
 and comforts of life. Are all these nothing ? Yet for all these, accord- 
 ing to this system, we owe nothing; at least, we must first go and ask 
 some professor of moral duties. 
 
 Again as to filial piety, what becomes of that ? Our parents, to be Filial piety. 
 sure, begat us.f They brought us up from our tender years, watched 
 over our infancy, and bore all the perverse humours of our childhood. J 
 rearing us up to maturity, and manhood. But all this is nothing, we owe 
 nothing for all this till we inquire into the nature and extent of our 
 obligation. 
 
 Again, as to conjugal affection. The tie is tender, the union Conjugal 
 close, the call for mutual support and comfort, pressing, and urgent. allitllon ' 
 
 * RELIGION is what is RIGHT as to GOD, MORALS what Is RlGH T as to men, includ- 
 ing of course the VIRTUES as bring exemplified in different situations of men. 
 + E£fer«y. 
 
 J Av<tho\*imv, froward, sec Memorabilia of Socrates, as to the duty imposed upon us thereby, 
 when his son is complaining of the ill usage of his mother. 
 
THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINAL RIGHT. 
 
 Viendsliip. 
 
 In MO- 
 RALS. 
 
 RIGHT if 
 
 But still this is nothing, we can feel nothing of all this whatever 
 we may have learnt, we can feel no natural obligation upon the sub- 
 ject. 
 
 Then again as to friendship. It matters not how many exertions 
 have been made, what efforts have been strained; the multitude, or the 
 energy of our obligations. All these are to be confounded in one com- 
 mon mass of oblivion ; we are to feel no pungency, no incitement to 
 gratitude, no desire of retribution, we must be an absolute sheet of 
 blank paper, till some duty is imposed upon us. 
 
 So much for the VIRTUES. In the same way as to MORALS, of 
 which the former are the exemplification. Every one must see that the 
 not original idea of RIGHT not being original must put a total end to them. If 
 uniTcrsai. RIGHT be not original, then it need not be universal, for if not original 
 it need not be true, and if not true it need not be universal, and if so 
 there may be two RIGHTS in the world, at the same time. What is to 
 hinder it ? The inhabitants of Europe may have one idea of RIGHT 
 and those of Africa another, since there is no common original stan- 
 dard to refer to. This is plainly contrary to our idea of MORALS, 
 which is to be uniform and one. 
 A11 ■> Another thing is, that if RIGHT be not original, all must be re- 
 
 All must be e> ' ° 
 
 referred to ferred to the dictates of men, since there is nothing else to approve, 
 
 4 fig Illptlfps 
 
 of men.' or condemn any thing. Nothing could be WRONG, till a system 
 of ethics was found to reprobate it. Nothing guilty till a code of 
 laws was framed to condemn it. Before the institution of such laws 
 murther, and house-breaking must have been good, or at least, indif- 
 ferent things. JUSTICE must have been founded upon laws, not 
 laws upon JUSTICE. How far this is consistent with reason, we 
 shall leave others to determine. 
 Opinion of But what plainly shews that RIGHT is original, is, that the opi- 
 men have not • ons f me n have not varied upon RELIGION, the VIRTUES, and 
 
 varied upon * . 
 
 REM- MORALS, as they have done upon other subjects, I hey have va- 
 vfiU'UES 6 , ried, it is true, but they have not varied in»the same manner. U 
 RAUk' different nations have entertained different notions of the Deity, 
 
THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINAL RIGHT. 5 
 
 they have all agreed in thinking that some worship was due. 11" dif- upon other 
 ferent philosophers have cherished different opinions of certain vir- sujec 
 tues, they have all agreed in thinking that some were the same, — if 
 the Stoics and Epicureans differed in their ideas of the manner of pur- 
 suing happiness, still their notions in GREAT MORALS were uniform 
 and one. Neither would have held it honourable to steal, neither to 
 betray one's parents, one's friends, or one's country. So that it was 
 not a difference as to a PRINCIPLE, but the application of a 
 PRINCIPLE: not a difference as to the point of its being RIGHT to 
 please the gods, but as to the manner of pleasing the gods. But it will 
 be said, perhaps, that this was the same thing. — By no means. The 
 manner of doing a thing, must always remain a subordinate consi- 
 deration, while whether to do it or not is the real and essential 
 point. In this, then, in the PRINCIPLE, they always agreed. 
 Now was this the case in matters of science? Certainly not. At 
 one time, one half of mankind believed the world to be a flattened 
 round (if we may use the expression), and the other of an elliptical 
 figure, and it was not till after repeated demonstrations on the sub- 
 ject, that they coincided in the former point. And this very natu- 
 rally, because knowledge is matter of instruction, and men will only 
 learn it as they are instructed. But feeling is a totally different thing, 
 they get that from PROVIDENCE,and they have no occasion for any 
 other adviser.* 
 
 We are aware, that it may be objected here, that whole nations If nations 
 have differed in their ideas of RIG HT, and that therefore it cannot intheir ° 
 
 * In this appears the difference between matters of science, and matters of feelin*. — Matteri 
 of feeling depend upon nature, that is, our formation by PROVIDENCE, which is tver true ; mat- 
 ters of science upon the conclusions of men, which are ever fallacious. It may be added here, that 
 bare coincidence is neither a proof of truth, nor want of it of falsehood. At one time all men 
 believed that the sun went round the earth, and at another, one half of them denied that it wa» 
 a flattened round, but neither of these beliefs established positively, or negatively. Natural or 
 necessary coincidence is a proof of truth, and the want of it of falsehood. 
 
THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINAL RIGHT. 
 
 ideas of be uniform, as we would have it. But we will undertake to say, that 
 proceed.^ wherever these differences have taken place, the variations have pro- 
 fromiucaicir- ceec j ec i from some particular fact, or local circumstance, some pre- 
 
 cumstances. ( .... 
 
 judice, or partial institution, and not from the application of general 
 PRINCIPLES. At Sparta, for instance, if theft was encouraged and 
 promoted in the youth, as an exercise of skill and ingenuity, it was 
 esteemed part of their military education. If in Turkey it was no un- 
 common circumstance to submit with alacrity to be put to death by 
 the Grand Signor,it was because a death at his hands was considered as 
 a passport into Paradise. But is it to be supposed, that in these coun- 
 tries, other things would not have remained on the same footing? 
 That at Sparta, it would not have been held dishonourable to cheat 
 a man of his estate, or that in Turkey, murther would not have been 
 Always condemned, and punished ? These things then, are always doubly re- 
 futed/ re fated ; first by the great majority of the rest of the world, in every 
 given case, and then by the practice of the nation itself in other in- 
 stances. 
 Wc are con- There is still one remaining proof upon the subject. We are con- 
 of the unity, scious of the unity, and consequently the originality, of truth, in mat- 
 j° ,1 f soq ( J' en . u ners of common reasoning, and perception. No man believes, nay 
 n'aiity, of can conceive that a thing can be, and not be, can be round and 
 
 truth in mat- , . . . . „ r , , 
 
 ters of rea- square, long and short, at the same instant. Why then any more, 
 n°oMn mo- that it: can be RIGHT and WRONG, proper and improper, honour- 
 iials ? able and base? We have the same strength of repulsion, the same 
 shock of revolting, the same consciousness of incongruity in the one 
 case as the other. 
 Therefore, It is then clear as dav, that, under GOD, there is an original and 
 an original unvarying RIGHT, complete, perfect, and independent, self-suffi- 
 cient,* antecedent, and paramount, not controuled, but under HIM, 
 conirouling all things. It is of this RIGHT that Aristotle speaks 
 
 * Ai/T*pxw. 
 
THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINAL JUSTICE. «J 
 
 when he says that men learn it from no compact or convention, but 
 have it by a kind of natural itnuition ;* also Cicero.t It existed always, 
 
 Ou yatp Ti *uv a' ap^Oef «AA AEI 7tot« 
 
 Zn t8to Soph. 
 
 It could be ascribed to no origin with the antients,with us proceed- 
 ing from GOD. — 
 
 xat *&rf oiitv t% ora tv Qxvn. Ibid. 
 
 And it is universal, 
 
 AxXa to jt*£> TTxvrw yopipov hot, t'ETPYMEAONTOS 
 
 AEPOZ fiviKiut T£T«Ta», hot. r'AnAETOT ATrH2. Vet. Poet. 
 
 And this original RIGHT is the fountain of every excellence, and Fountain of 
 virtue. It is the main PRINCIPLE from which they proceed, the J^e a.uT 
 chief source, from which they spring and issue. It is then highly er- VIRTUE, 
 roneous to distinguish them, as if they were essentially and materially 
 different. They are all branches of the same stock, all applications 
 of the same PRINCIPLE. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 THAT THERE IS AN ORIGINAL JUSTICE. 
 
 THIS is a consequence of the former. For what is our idea of JUS- JtKHCE 
 
 TICE ? To give every man his own—Suumcuique tribiato. And 'l\ l v Q f "*" 
 
 RIGHT. 
 
 * .Eo-n yap «' ixctvrtvttrai ri •nxirti; <pwni xojxoh AIKAION, x«< AAIKON, x'av ^.r^tfjaa, koivuvjx iTfot et\. 
 >W)X«o-», nvdt ZYN0HKH. TlifiPvr. p. 60. Oxf. Ed. 
 
 + Est tnim haec non scnpta, sed NATA lex ; quam non DEDICJMUS. arrepimus, legimtis ; 
 Terum ex natura i^?a, arripuimus, t ausimus, eipressimus ; ad quam non DOCTI, sed FACTI ; 
 non iustituti, sed imbuti sumus.-Cicer. proMiloae. 
 
8 THAT ORIGINAL JUSTICE ENTITLES 
 
 what is his own? What it is RIGHT and fitting that he should 
 have. JUSTICE is then an application of RIGHT. It is then ori- 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THAT ORIGINAL JUSTICE ENTITLES TO LIFE, PROPERTY, AND FREE 
 
 AGENCY. 
 
 JUSTICE is JUSTICE is the idea of giving every man his own. If this 
 gMng^every ^e our idea of JUSTICE, what can be more a man's own, what can 
 Dianhisown.be more RIGHT and fitting that he should have than the Life, 
 
 Life the 
 
 first thing to that he gets from GOD,* which he is indebted to no man 
 
 en titled maD f° r > an d which he must consequently hold independent of him. 
 
 justice 1 ^ otn * n g can k e more his own, more peculiarly and exclusively at- 
 tached to him. Life then is the first thing to which a man is entitled 
 by original JUSTICE. 
 
 N<xtihPro- The next thing is Property or substance. If a man have a right to 
 hold Life, and to possess the gift which he gets from GOD, so also has 
 he to use and employ it. To use andemploy it in acquiring store, 
 and providing for the purposes of his subsistence. And when this 
 store is acquired, it is his by the same right, as the Life that got it. 
 For why has he this Life ? Because GOD gave it him. And why 
 should he have the use of it? Because GOD intended (with all de- 
 ference be it spoken) that it should be used, and gave it for no other 
 purpose. And labour is nothing else than the use of it in some way, 
 
 * It ought to be ssated here that the very idea of JUSTICE is the gift of GOD, for whatever 
 a man has a right to in any state of society, proceeds from something that GOD gave him. What 
 other idea can we have of the GODHEAD, than that RIGHT proceeds from it. To begin then 
 thus : IT gives a thing, then there is an original right to it. Whatever then IT gives there is an 
 original right to, and whatever there is an original right to IT must have given. For on the 
 one Landj as IT is the fountain of right, so on the other IT is the only fountain. 
 
TO LIFE, PROPERTY, AND FREE-AGENCY. I) 
 
 or other, and if so, it is labour that acquires all Property, labour either 
 of the body or mind, and that from the first idea that was ever con- 
 ceived or acorn that was picked up in the field, to the last effort of 
 intellectual ability, or personal exertion. All Property is labour in 
 one wayor other. Property then, is the second thing, which a man 
 holds of GOD, and he holds it by the same tenure as his Life, that is, 
 original JUSTICE attaching to it, and fixing indissolubly with him. 
 
 The third thing is Free-agency, and this is as firmly secured NextisFree- 
 to him, as either of the two former. If it be fitting and RIGHT 
 that a man should hold and use that Life which he gets from GOD, 
 so is it equally, that he should enjoy it, unless indeed it be supposed, 
 that in giving him Life, GOD meant for him a gloomy and thankless 
 gift, which cannot be conceived, nor imagined a moment. And if the 
 contrary was intended by GOD, surely the enjoyment of that Life 
 depends upon the free disposal, and mastery of his actions, in which 
 also is included that of his thoughts, for the free expressing, mani- 
 festing, and entertaining of a man's thoughts as long as they do not 
 HURT another*,contributes clearly to the enjoyment of his existence: 
 Free-agency, then, is the third thing, which a man holds of GOD, 
 which he holds independent of man, and which is secured to him 
 by the same tenure, as either of the two former.* * 
 
 These then are the three rights of man, Life, Property, and These thre 
 Free-agency, they are necessary, and they are all that are neces- necefsary,* 
 sary for his happiness. They are all that are necessary for and ail that 
 his happiness, because they include either the existence which he gets *y for his 
 from GOD, or the free use, or the relish and enjoyment of it. 
 
 • It is to be observed that this boundary.or rather ruIe.CONFIRMS and SECURES all the rights. 
 If I LiTe,I have no right to murther another; if I hold Property, I have no right to rob from another; 
 if I enjoy the Freedom of my actions, I have no right to restrain another. But then, it would not 
 add to my right to Live, that I murlhered another, nor to my right to hold Property that I robbed 
 from another, nor to my right to enjoy the Freedom of my actions that I restrained another, 
 while such a latitude would effectually take away his rights, aye, and mine too. 
 
 C 
 
10 
 
 LIFE, PROPERTY, &c. PARAMOUNT TO GOVERNMENT, 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 That Life, 
 Property, 
 and Free. 
 agency are 
 paramount 
 to govern- 
 ment. 
 
 THAT LIFE, PROPERTY, AND FREE-AGENCY ARE PARAMOUNT TO GOVERNMENT* 
 
 IT appears from the foregoing, 
 
 I. That these rights of Life, Property, and Free-agency, are (with 
 reverence be it spoken) from GOD. 
 
 II. That being from GOD, they are insuperable. 
 
 III. That they are more particularly, independent of govern- 
 ment. Being of an origin superior to man, they, can never yield to 
 any thing that is of man. 
 
 IV. That they extend to all equally. The same JUSTICE that 
 gives them at all, gives them universally. 
 
 V. And lastly. That they are natural, that is, given by PRO- 
 VIDENCE, and consequently most real. Existing antecedent to all 
 things, and consequently preceding every thing artificial, what else 
 c aiitkeybe? 
 
 » 
 
BOOK II. 
 
 OF PRETENDED RIGHTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 IF ORIGINAL JUSTICE ENTITLE TO AUGHT ELSE BESIDES LIFE, PROPERTY, 
 
 AND FREE-AGENCY. 
 
 LIFE, Property, and Free-agency comprehend all that a man gets 
 immediately from GOD, as they include either what he receives 
 from him directly, or the use of it. All the rest then, he must get 
 through man, that is, through other men. He can then have no 
 original title to it. 
 
 Is there any thing besides Life, Property, and Free-agency, that 
 a man gets immediately from GOD ? Nothing. He can then have 
 no original title to it. What is it that constitutes originality of title, 
 but having so received from GOD ? What is it that gives man an ori- 
 ginal title to Life, Property, and Free-agency, but the having thus 
 received, and that it is therefore fitting and RIGHT that he should 
 have them ? The sole question then, will be, if he have so received 
 aught else from GOD ? He has so received nothing. 
 
 And if he have so received nothing else from GOD, as we said, 
 
 c 2 
 
 If original 
 JUSTICE 
 entitle to 
 aught else 
 besides Life, 
 Property, 
 and Free- 
 agency. 
 
 Man has re- 
 ceived no- 
 thing else 
 immediately 
 from GOD; 
 
 Can thea 
 hare 
 
12 ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO EQUALITY. 
 
 no original he can have no original title to it. At the same time, as there are 
 some things to which he has been supposed more immediately enti- 
 tled than others, it will be proper to notice them. Among these, 
 
 Supposed the chief that have been insisted on, are equality, power, and inde- 
 
 lometimes to / J \ 
 
 have a right pendence of government. Equality, the right of being equal, power, 
 power'an/' of having power, and independence of government, of living out of 
 dencTof o- g overnment * These are the chief that have been urged. We shall 
 Ternment. then discuss them severally. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 THAT ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO EQUALITY.* 
 
 Inequality in INEQUALITY" in the situations of men, arises from three 
 the situations things, from riches, from rank, or from power. From riches, which 
 ing from confer affluence, from rank, which confers honour, or from power, 
 ranker from which confers authority. All the inequalities in the situations of men, 
 power. w -jj j^ f oun( i t ar i se f rom one or other f these things, f 
 
 The simple question then will be, whether original JUSTICE 
 require that these things should be levelled, whether it give every 
 man a title to be precisely and perfectly equal in these respects. 
 ah riches or And first as to riches, we know very well, that they are Property, 
 qu?r P ed rt by C " an( * tnat Property is acquired by labour, or the application of our 
 labour. existence either bodily or mental, from the first idea that was con- 
 ceived, or acorn picked up in the field, as above stated, J to the last 
 
 * Not as measuring things, though it does to it, as measuring rights. We shall see presently. 
 
 5 that could have ever bee 
 ht as well attempt to stop 
 \ See Dook I. Ch. III. 
 
 + These are the only inequalities that could have ever been intended to be levelled, for as to ta- 
 lents, or any thing natural, you might as well attempt to stop the winds, or smooth the ocean. 
 
ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO EQUALITY. 13 
 
 effort of intellectual ability, or personal exertion. All Property is la- 
 bour, and if riches be this application of our existence, if Property be 
 acquired by, or be, labour, what has any one to say to it, what has any Therefore 
 one to do with it ? Would it not be against that JUSTICE, which se- a f^" jus" 
 cures to every one the fruit of his own industry and exertions, the use tice, to 
 of what he gets from GOD, to meddle with it ? it. 
 
 The next is rank.* Now what is rank ? Dignity and honours. And Rank ac- 
 how were these dignities and honours acquired ? Look into the most our exertions 
 remote periods of history, and you will find that they were the rewards also * 
 ofpatriotic exertion, of some eminent service, which a man had ren- 
 dered his country, and for which he reaped in return these honours 
 and dignities. Why then, they both take their rise in the same 
 source, they both originate in the same PRINCIPLE. As wealth 
 was acquired by industry, or labour, so are honours and dignities by 
 a more vigorous and effective discharge of our duty. Both then 
 
 * Rank is an exemplification of natural or real right, which requires a certain state of society to 
 produce it. But this is no proof, that there may not be a natural right to it, as far as here de- 
 scribed, but only, that that right could not be exemplified till a certain situation of things. As 
 Montesquieu says, li The rays of a circle would have been equal, though a circle had neTer been 
 traced." — See B.III.Ch.I. This is worthy of notice. It is thought by many, how could we have ideas 
 of a circle before it was traced ?" But yet it is certain, that a 4< circle is not the line that traces it, 
 anymore than that "JUSTICE is the men that it exists between." Yet it is not possible for us to con- 
 ceive what JUSTICE would have been independent of men, or the rays without the tracing of a circle. 
 But the non-possibility of conception is no proof of the thing not being, it is only of the finitencss of 
 our ideas, while our strong conviction that "JUSTICE is not men," or a "circle, aline,"shews both 
 the one, and the other, or rather truth, to be independent of its exemplifications. All we can say 
 on this subject, is, that there are certain things, whjch we cannot conceive. There are certain num 
 bers so immense, that we cannot conceive them. Is that a proof that they do not exist? It is 
 not. The solid testimony of arithmetic shews that they do exist. Or what do we say to 
 ETERNITY ? Are we convinced that that exists ? Yet can we conceive it. Or does it not exist, be- 
 cause we cannot conceive it ? Then comes the argument " that every thing is unreasonable,that is not 
 according to the things of this world.'* But if reason be the rule, why is reason confined to things 
 of this world more than any other world ? If reason be not the rule, why do we talk at all ? Nor 
 let it be said that we are then to conceive contradictions, a thing " being and not being," " being 
 long and short," at the same time, &c. for what is to prevent it, but the ideas of this world ? No. tb$ 
 ideas of any world, reason, consistence, congruity. 
 
14 ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO EQUALITY. 
 
 being the application of that being, which we received from GOD, 
 
 forrneariy " ^ ota must ent ^ e us to tne same, or nearly the same fruits, both must 
 under the be regulated by the same, or nearly the same PRINCIPLES,* 
 
 same rule. -r» 
 
 Power not T ne ^ ast * s power.*)- But we need not discuss now, whether there 
 considered \^ e an y r ]ght to this, as " an object of equality," as we are just pre- 
 paring to enquire in the next chapter, whether there be any right 
 to it at all. 
 Equality not rpj^ far t j ien f 0T e q Ua ii t y. It is clear, clear as day, that the notion 
 
 only not " * * J 
 
 sanctioned of equality, is not only not sanctioned by JUSTICE, but directly con- 
 .tustice, trary to its most obvious PRINCIPLES. It is so contrary to them, that 
 adverse tcl y we are at a * oss to cor,ce ^ ve upon what ground itcould have eve;- been 
 its most ob- erected. The only thing that seems to give it any colour is, that it 
 
 vious prin- , • « 
 
 cipies. would appear consonant to the principles of equity, that every man 
 
 should be put upon a precise par, and level. But while it seems to 
 promote this equity, it in reality strikes at a far more essential, and that 
 is an " equity of right," or of allowing every man to possess and enjoy 
 what he has secured by his own labour, or the use of that existence which 
 he got from GOD, of permitting him to retain what he has acquired 
 by his own exertions. This is an equity far more consonant to our 
 
 How then f ee ]i ngs when we come to examine it. How then could the other have 
 
 ever sup- ° 
 
 ported ? ever been supported ? Because men, it seems, were born equal, and 
 Nothing, therefore they were ever to remain so in society. Were they, and for 
 
 men appear- J ** J ' 
 
 ingtobe what reason ? Was this an equality produced by REASON, i.e. the 
 
 born equal. 
 
 reason of that situation extending to the after purposes of life ? Could 
 any man have continued it a moment, or have stopped his neighbour 
 
 * Though acquiring rank be an application of our existence, yet it is different from acquiring 
 Property. Property is acquired by the individual himself, (proprium) and for individual 
 purposes, but rank is acquired by the individual to be sure, but for public purposes as far as the 
 public is concerned. Being then, as to the public, a public honour, it must be taken as the public 
 chuses to give it. But still it is equally distant from division, equally far from an object of 
 equality. As far as private, it is appropriate, as far as public 3 it is regulated. 
 
 i This is entirely public, as we shall see presently. 
 
ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO EQUALITY. 15 
 
 from earning and acquiring ? He could not. It would have been inter- 
 fering with^the real rights of man, the rights of Life, Property, and Free- 
 agency, the right of acquiring Property, and providing for the pur- 
 poses of his subsistence. Why then, it was an equality good for no- 
 thing, an equality of poverty, an equality of privation of all the com" 
 forts of life, an equality of every one being left to his own exertions, 
 and to be got rid of, and got rid of as soon as possible, by reason of our 
 talents; an equality totally irrational, as such, totally irrelevant to our 
 present purpose, and to all purposes, and not to be argued from in 
 any shape. As well might it be inferred, that because all birds are un- 
 fledged at first, or have the same callow down, that therefore, they 
 should have no increase, or variety, of plumage afterwards. 
 
 But besides all this, it might be seen, methinks, from the natural Might be 
 constitution of man, that this equality was never intended. If it had ff f n that . 
 
 1 J this equality 
 
 been intended, is it not natural to suppose, that these talents and quali- never 
 fications which are fitted to secure the objects of it, would have been men e *' 
 distributed in equal proportion ? And yet this is so far from being 
 the case, that we see the utmost disparity possible in those qualifica- 
 tions. Why then is not this the clearest demonstrative proof, the most 
 decisive evidence, that this equality was not intended ? But into the 
 inscrutable will of PROVIDENCE we are not to search; our business 
 is to take these lights which HE has beenpleased to give us. And what are 
 these lights ? " The lights of ^ur reason assisted by HIM, which we call 
 PRINCIPLES." Taking then these PRINCIPLES as our guide, 
 we say, that in no one way, is man entitled to equality, on the 
 ground of original JUSTICE. That original JUSTICE, «) Directly. ad- 
 
 c c L ' ..... . Terse fo the 
 
 iar from sanctioning, or authorizing it m any shape, is most posi- most ot>?i- 
 tively, and directly hostile to, most decidedly, and diametrically ciplew 
 against it. justice. 
 
j 5 ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO POWER. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THAT ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO POWER. 
 
 idea o? thC POWER is the idea of having command or authority over other 
 authority men,* of directing and regulating their actions, so as to render them 
 
 over other . .... 
 
 subservient to our inclinations. 
 
 men. 
 
 How then And if this be our idea of power, it may well be asked, what ori- 
 justice ginal claim any man can have to it ? How original JUSTICE fur- 
 eutitie to . ^jghgg an y right, how it affords any title or pretension to it ? 
 Enquire if And here we may observe, that a short way of knowing, whether 
 GOD.™ y original JUSTICE entitle us to a thing, is, to enquire, whether it be 
 conferred upon us by GOD, and therefore, originally unjust, that it 
 should be taken from us ; for wherever a thing is so conferred upon us 
 by GOD, original JUSTICE entitles to it, and wherever original 
 JUSTICE entitles to it, we may be sure that it is so conferred. For it ap- 
 peared plainly in our third chapter of first book, that these were con- 
 vertible terms. For how can it do otherwise than inevitably follow, if 
 a thing be conferred by God, that original JUSTICE does entitle to it, 
 GOD doing inevitably RIGHT; and if there be such a title, from what 
 source can it spring but from GOD, GOD being the only Being that 
 can give such a title ? So that the cause proves the consequence, and 
 How sofon. the consequence the cause. The tree proves the fruit, and the fruit 
 the tree. Taking then the subject in this way, how is power one of 
 the things conferred upon us by GOD ? Has GOD given a right to 
 any one man to govern the rest of his species ? Has HE given a title to 
 any one to command another, anymore than to another to com- 
 mand him ? Or is power, Life, or is it Property, or is it Free-agency ? 
 Is it either the holding of our existence, or the use of it, or the relish 
 
 * In a human sense. 
 
ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO POWER, 17 
 
 of it? A man may say, indeed, that he believes by having power he should 
 be happier, but would he really be so ? Is i t any proper (proprium) en- 
 joyment of his existence ? Is it any enjoyment properly confined to him- 
 self, separated and detached from others. On the contrary, it depends ^ ot so COfU 
 upon the command of others.and therefore cannot be proper or peculiar ferred > " ot a 
 
 r > . . personality. 
 
 to the person so wanting the command. Power then, is neither the 
 holding, nor the use, nor the relish of our existence, and consequently 
 not one of those personalities, which are originally attached to us. 
 
 But though not one of those personalities which are originally at- But may be 
 tached to us, it may perhaps be connected with them; Though not ^ith them, 
 Life, it may make us hold it more firmly; Tkough not Property, it may 
 make us preserve it more surely ; Though not Freetagency, it may 
 make us relish it more highly. But it has not the least possible ef- 
 fect in this way. As to Life, a man may hold it as firmly, and se- 
 curely, without power over other men, (providing they have no impro- 
 per controul over him) as with it, and preserve his Property as surely 
 and relish his Free-agency as highly, Free-agency being the privilege 
 of directing our own actions, not regulating other men's. So that it Not so con- 
 has not the least possible effect in this way. It is not then in any " ec 
 wise connected with those personalities which are originally attached 
 to our existence. 
 
 But though not one of our personalities, nor connected with our But may be 
 personalities, it may be originally fitting and RIGHT, that men should JS 8 ]^, 
 have it. Now this is impossible; for if it were originally fitting RrGHT that 
 and RIGHT that men should have it, if original RIGHT have it. 
 did entitle to it, then it must necessarily be one of these person- 
 alities, i. e. things so conferred by GOD, or connected with This is im- 
 them, GOD being the only source from which such an original P 08Slble - 
 title can flow. But setting aside this idea of original JUSTICE (GOD 
 forgive us) for a moment, that GOD is the image of it,* which 
 is the only one we can conceive or ever could conceive, as long 
 
 * See first note, Chap. III. Book I, 
 D 
 
IS ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO POWER. 
 
 Nocking as HE is a sole moral Being governing the universe, and taking 
 kiodofab- tne thing in a kind of abstract, how is the idea of power (without 
 stract. a gi ven cause,) originally just and right? How is it more fitting 
 
 and right, that one man should govern another, than that another 
 houl dgovern him ? How can we discover this in any source of fit- 
 ness or rectitude ? Might not all men pretend the same fitness ? 
 and then it would be a perpetual clashing of claims, a mutual an- 
 nihilation of pretensions, which would extinguish the right in the 
 very beginning?* 
 
 It appears, then, that power is neither a personality, nor connected 
 with a personality, nor founded in original JUSTICE. And indeed they 
 are all the same propositions, for it is only because a thing is a person- 
 ality, i.e. conferred by God, or connected with it, that original JUS- 
 TICE does entitle to it. 
 Compared Now let us compare power with those things which are really con- 
 th^fwhich ferred by God, or are personalities, and see what resemblance it bears 
 ^fTred b to tnem * Take it with Life, Property, and Free-agency, has it any simi- 
 god. larity, any reference or relation to them ? None in the world. It is very 
 No simiia. na t ura ] ? that Life, Property and Free-agency should belong to a man, 
 because they relate to him, to him himself, to no others, and are within 
 his own person. But it is very unnatural that power should belong to 
 
 * But, say some men, power (the establishment of) is expedient, and expedience is the preservation 
 of original rights (Life,Property, and Free-agency); therefore power is an original right. But there is a 
 great difference here. There is a great difference between a "right given for preserving original rights," 
 and an u original right in itself." The one is a right founded upon the preservation of the original 
 i rights of all, and which is to be regulated by the preservation of the original rights of all ; the other 
 is a right founded upon itself exclusively. The one is conditional, the other absolute. The one 
 relative, the other positive. Supposing the expedience of establishing power, which has not yet 
 been proved, but which is very likely to be the case, it would not make power one whit more ori- 
 ginal, it would only shew the call for erecting it. And if it did make it original, the certain conse- 
 quence would be, that all would have it. And so they would, say you, because it would be for 
 the general benefit. "Because?" the moment you mention " Because," you give up the question. 
 This is the difference between power and original rights (how far it would be for the general 
 benefit that all should have it, we shall see afterwards) ; there is no " Because" about them, they 
 depend upon themselves, original JUSTICE entitles to them. i 
 
ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE, &c. 1§ 
 
 him, because that Joes not relate to him, but solely and exclusively to 
 others, and is out of his person. 
 
 But let us appeal to our feelings on the subject. Does any man Appealing t© 
 
 our feelincs. 
 
 fee], that he has a right to power, as he has to Life, Property, and Free- Condemned. 
 agency ? Does he feel that he is entitled to power, or would like 
 to governor be governed, as he likes to enjoy Life, Property and 
 Free-agency, or would like to let another enjoy them? He does not. 
 That answers the question. 
 
 Whether then, we consider power as a personality, i. e. a thing con- Whether 
 ferred by GOD, or connected with a personality, or founded in original sider power 
 RIGHT, which are all the same things, or resembling a personality, or a * n *^" &e> 
 appeal to our own feelings, it is equally destitute of any foundation in equally de. 
 
 . . . TTicmTnr stituteofany 
 
 original RIGHT, equally free of any bottoming in original JUSTICE.* claim in on. 
 
 . ginal JUS- 
 TICE. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 THAT ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE TO INDEPENDENCE OF 
 
 GOVERNMENT. 
 
 INDEPENDENCE of government is a new species of right. The Jfkp?"* 
 
 i • • i . . . rr,, -it dence of go- 
 
 others were positive, this is negative, lhe others were rignts to have vemment. 
 something. This is a right to be exempted from something. 
 
 This is a right, if a government, or mass of power (to be explained if a go- 
 afterwards) be erected in a country for preserving the rights of b/erected in 
 all, a right of living out of it. That it is so for preserving the a r c t s "" v t [ l f for 
 rights of all, must be previously proved ; i.e. it must be the fact, before this the r 'g ,,ts 
 right can come into question. Eor if it be a government of tyranny, right of iiv- 
 i.e. against the rights of all, to resist it is only contending for the rights in s outofiu 
 
 * It is very remarkable that from no one having a claim to power, or preferably, that is, all 
 wanting it equally, it should have been concluded, that all had it equally. 
 
 us 
 

 20 ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE 
 
 How original of alk The question then is, what foundation there is for this title, in 
 ™mK. ? original JUSTICE. 
 
 Enquire if And here in trying whether this title be founded in originalj USTI CE, 
 gavelt - we may resort to the same criterion, as with equality, and power, that 
 is, to enquire whether GOD have given it, whether GOD have con- 
 ferred it ? For if God have given such a title, if GOD have con- 
 ferred it, then it is inevitably right, and we may be very sure that 
 it is founded in original JUSTICE, and if GOD have not given such a 
 title then we may be very sure of the contrary. 
 How? Now how has God given such a title? How has he conferred on 
 
 any one the " right of living out of government?" 
 
 But here it may perhaps be objected : " The onus probandi lies on 
 
 " you. It is not for us to shew the right of living out of govern- 
 
 " ment," but for } r ou to prove the " right of submitting us to it." 
 
 That we are just going to do ; and we are to do it, by supposing 
 
 government in the first place, and then seeing the consequences of not 
 
 being submitted to it. 
 
 if gave such If a government, or mass of power be erected in a country, it must 
 
 have giVea* be erected for preventing disorders and crimes. (We must anticipate 
 
 MaSatHUfe so f ar > though we have not described government yet, for as we are 
 
 Property, talking of this right, we cannot discuss it without considering; what 
 
 and Free- , r , 
 
 agency, at it opposes.) Now if government be erected for this purpose, and we 
 cannot conceive it otherwise, unless it be for the purposes of the 
 devil, what is the right of standing out against it ? What are its con- 
 sequences ? 
 
 It is the right of perpetuating crimes, for such would be its conse- 
 quence. If the government be erected for "repressing crimes/' what 
 can the resisting it be, but " standing out for crimes?" " No," says 
 some one, " AVe do not want that ; when we commit crimes, put us to 
 " death, for we then place ourselves in a state of war.*" 
 
 At the best, then, this right sacrifices all comfort, and security for 
 Life, Property, and Free-agency, and at the worst, these things di- 
 
 * See Locke. 
 
 same time. 
 
TO INDEPENDENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 21 
 
 rcctly. What title, then, has GOD given to it in original JUS- 
 TICE? 
 
 To begin with, the worst state, perpetuating crimes. If he have 
 given such a title, he must have given it against Life, Property, and 
 Free-agency, since their direct ruin would be the consequence. For 
 what are crimes and disorders but destroying these? But GOD has 
 given a right to Life, Property, and Free-agency, (see B. I. Ch. III.) 
 Then he must have given a right for, and against these things at the 
 same time. 
 
 But to take the best state, i. e. losing all comfort and security for 
 them. Here they have provided a notable remedy, " If we attack your 
 " Lives, Properties, and Free-agencies we put ourselves into a state of 
 " war, kill us, and then your Lives, Properties and Free-agencies are safe." 
 " That is not clear, we may not be able to kill you." Besides, we have as 
 good aright to enjoy these things in security, as to enjoy them at all. If 
 not GOD has given us a right to enjoy them, and not to enjoy them. 
 He meant us to possess them as much as possible, and yet not to possess 
 them as much as possible at the same time. This is as great an absurdity 
 as the other. 
 
 Independence of government, then, is not a personality, i.e. thing Indepeo- 
 
 r ii /^</"v-rx mi .... i • i dence of go- 
 
 conrerred by GOD. I he next point is, is it connected with a person- remment, 
 reity. Though not Life, does it make us possess it more fully ? nafity p erso " 
 Though not Property, does it make us hold it more surely ? Though is it con- 
 not Free-agency, does it make us relish it more bighty ? Does it make 
 us enjoy these personalities better ? Does it contribute to the full 
 possession, use, or relish of them ? 
 
 This question is best answered by the preceding paragraphs. ^ the pre " 
 The next thing is, is it founded in original RIGHT ? Now wes ra phs. 
 have seen, that where a thing is not a personality, i. e. conferred by J° ""^ d m 
 GOD, nor connected with it, it cannot be so founded, and night ? 
 for this very reason, that it is not a personality, i. e. thing conferred 
 by GOD, nor connected with it, GOD being the only source from 
 whom such a title can flow.* But, setting aside this, and attempting to Even in a 
 conceive original RIGHT independent of the Deity, (GOD forgive us) abstract re? 
 
 * See thi6 Book, last Chapter, p. 17. 
 
22 
 
 ORIGINAL JUSTICE DOES NOT ENTITLE 
 
 Terse of ap- as far as we can,* how can we think it just, or fit, that a man should 
 parent stand out for what can be no good to himself, but on the contrary 
 a real loss, (being want of protection) against the general benefit ? 
 How can we think it right that he should procure mischief to 
 all, the probability or possibility, of crimes, (for that would be the 
 consequence) without purchasing any real good or advantage, but 
 in place of it a loss, to himself? This would be the very opposite of 
 right, the very reverse of equity. 
 
 But if it could be supposed a benefit, or advantage to any man, that 
 benefit or advantage must give way to the majority of benefits or 
 advantages to others. How much more an useless, and empty, nay,, 
 mischievous title, when put into such a competition I 
 Returning to But, returning to the real ground, the strong stand they always 
 would con- take is on Free-agency. ** Not to allow independence of govern- 
 lence of'" " ment, is to invade Free-agency/ 1 It does not invade Free-agency ,. 
 RIGHT. unless Free-agency be the right of " committing crimes, or promoting 
 " their commission." Now this is impossible, for the same rule of 
 RIGHT that gives me ie my Free-agency, and all my real rights, gives 
 " the same rights to others:" so that to suppose this right against these 
 rights, is to suppose " a right against itself, a thing to be round and 
 w square at the same instant." 
 
 But if real Free-agency were concerned, which cannot be sup- 
 posed, for it is impossible that the enjoyment of my real rights 
 can be diminished by that of others, even then, my Free-agency, 
 my good Free-agency, must give way to the majority of the good Free- 
 agencies of others. What then must become of this bad and mis- 
 chievous, this contradictory to, and destroying, good, and therefore 
 mischievous and bad, Free-agency ? This would not be " Fiat justitia^ 
 " ruat ccelum," but " Fiat injustitia, mat injustitia major." 
 
 And all 
 idea of. 
 
 ♦See Chap. III. Book I. and this book all through, upon GOD;, being the exemplification of 
 RIGHT. It is a subject (hat we cannot be too often upon, or attempt humbJy to investigate too, 
 fully. Though we, talking of a kind of abstract, may attempt to form an idea of what we 
 may call RIGHT, independent of the Deity, yet when we conceive, or attempt to conceive GOD$ 
 ■** cannot separate the idea of RIGHT from him,. Here reasoning stops. 
 
TO INDEPENDENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 23 
 
 • 
 
 The next point is, (pursuing the course we traced in our last Does it re-, 
 chapter) does it resemble those real rights of Life, Property, and Free- g*£ Pu- 
 ngency, those essential things conferred by God, those actual and sub- 
 stantial possessions and personalities, which we talk of? In this way it 
 has almost a worse chance than the other. What connection or resem- 
 blance can those things have with their opposite, what communion or 
 intercourse, their holding, their use, or their relish, with what goes to an- 
 nihilate them? 
 
 The next, and last point, is, what do we feel upon the subject ? Do &° we feel 
 we feel, that if a general compact be made for preserving the Lives, 
 Properties, and Free-agencies of all, we have a right to stand,out against 
 it? A right "not to join in promoting what is for the general benefit, 
 " what is made for preserving these things to all ? The best way of an- 
 swering this question, is to ask, whether we feel a right to our own 
 Lives, Properties, and Free-agencies? If we do, we cannot deny 
 those things to others which we feel entitled to ourselves. We 
 must then feel an irresistible duty imposed upon us to join in preserv- 
 ing them to all others in common with ourselves, for the same original 
 rule of RIGHT that gives them to one gives them to another, it can- 
 not be divided. 
 
 But the unfortunate thing is, that men have always begun wrong. Men always 
 
 . ,. ,'. . . \' \ " ' ' '' . begun wrong 
 
 They have begun, by planting this right in the first place, and then in- by planting 
 sistedthatitshould never be taken from them, whatever the consequences, the first* "* 
 " Fiat Justitia,"&c. &c. But this is reversing the mode of procedure. i )lace * 
 It is these very consequences, contemplated in their extent, that de- 
 termine whether it be a right or not. Let me consider the conse- 
 quences, and I'll tell you if it be a right. It is these consequences, 
 as we see, that compel it to be NO right. Nor is it of any significance 
 for them to say, " We do not want any thing against your government, 
 V we only want you to let us alone." "-No matter what you want, you 
 " want something against our Lives,Properties,and Free-agencies, and 
 t< we canno t grant it you." 
 
 Whether, then, we consider independence of government, as a per- Whetw 
 
 then con- 
 
24, THAT EQUALITY, POWEB* AXD INDEPENDENCE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 sider. d as a sodality, i. '€. a thing conferred .by God, or connected with a personality, 
 
 &!-. £ .qnai'y' or founded in original RIGHT, (which are all the same things,) or re- 
 
 dc \ t j''- e ° f sembling a personality, or appeal to our own feelings, it is equally desti- 
 
 originai tuteof any claim in original JUSTICE. 
 
 JUSTICE. J ° 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 THAT EQUALITY, POWER, AND INDEPENDENCE OF GOVERNMENT ARE PRE- 
 TENDED RIGHTS, WITH ALL SYSTEMS FOUNDED UPON THEM. 
 
 Appearsfrom IT appears from the foregoing, 
 
 foregoing,^ ^ r ^^ equality, power, and independence of government, are not 
 
 tv, &c. not original rights. 
 
 ^hts. a 2dly, That not being original they are not real. 
 
 Not real. 3dly, That not being real, they can never be pled against govern- 
 
 abkagTin'st ment, real being the only that can be so pled. 
 
 government. ^ nc j } iere in consists the difference between these pretended and real 
 
 e^ccbe^we'en rights, that the former can never be pled against government. Life,Pro- 
 
 pwjtended ■ ; ^ ert y andFree-agency, beingfounded upon the PRINCIPLES of truth 
 
 being of an are very naturally superior, and can never be superseded in any shape. 
 
 origin supe- „ „ . ~ . . . , , , i . , , 
 
 rior toman. Being of an origin, as we said, superior to man, they can never yield 
 
 " to any thing that is of man/' But is that the case with these rights ? 
 
 But th^e ]S[ 0# They -are empty notions, mere non-entities in an original point of 
 
 mere non- . * ', ' '. ii ii 
 
 entities. view, some of them incapable of being realized at all, and others 
 only so far as men chuse to give them reality by their institutions.* 
 
 * Equality cannot be realized at all. If it were just, as we see it is not, how could it ever he 
 accomplished ? How could the acquisitions of men be levelled, or (heir care, or their abilities, or 
 their industry ? Or if it could subsist for one generation, how could it be ever transmitted to ano- 
 ther ? How could we answer for these qualities, either for acquiring or preserving, in posterity ? 
 
ARE PRETENDED RIGHTS. 
 
 25 
 
 If we wish to see the difference between these, and real rights il- Look into 
 lustrated,we have only to look into histo y If we traverse its whole scope 51^°^' for 
 we shall find, that the revolutions, and rebellions of the people (pro- between 
 4 perly speaking of the world) have arisen from the invasion of natura 
 privileges. It was they that excited commotion, they that always occa- 
 sioned rebellions. We do not talk of the plots ofrevenge,or the designs 
 of ambition, but the " clear discontents of the mass, breaking out into 
 * open rebellion." These, we will venture to say,al ways proceeded from 
 the above cause, always from the invasion of natural privileges. 
 
 What was it that drove theTarquins from Rome ? The rape of Lu- what drove 
 cretia. What was it that abolished the power of the Decemviri ? The J he T * r( i uin » 
 
 r from Rome ? 
 
 outrage of Appius Claudius. What was it that expelled the thirty &<*. 
 
 from Athens ? The cruelties of that thirty exercised over its citizens.* 
 
 And so will it ever be found, so will it ever be seen,that it is the invasion 
 
 of natural rights, the attack upon personal properties and inherencies 
 
 (if we may use the word) that excites commotion. And how should it 
 
 be otherwise ? An invasion on any other subject, will never reach them, invasion 
 
 It will never reach them in such a way as warmly to interest, and on , * ay ot J| er 
 
 J J J subject will 
 
 thoroughly to rouse their feelings. They may be occasionally never touch 
 worked up, but they will never take the same cordial concern, 
 the same genial interest. You may talk to them of power. Talk 
 to them of their right to it in a country, where some portion has 
 been assigned them by the government, declaim as much as you will, 
 
 Again as to Independence of government, how cot«ld that be substantiated ? Are we to expect 
 that men would be suffered to live in the heart of a country, unsubm itted to the laws of it ? That 
 other men would bear with being attacked, or being subject to be, in their Lives, their Properties, 
 and their Free-agencies, merely to suit their will and pleasure? Even, if maintainable in Justice, 
 this claim would be difficult enougli to be supported in practice, what then are we to say of an 
 empty notion ? As to Power, that is a thing of entirely a different nature. It is established for 
 the convenience of man, and therefore man will either give it existence, or not, as he finds con- 
 venient. 
 
 * These are only a few, from a number of instances. It can never be otherwise. The examples 
 of William Tell, with many others in more modern times, are all to the same effect. And how can 
 
 it but be so, for the reasons here given i 
 
 E 
 
2C 
 
 THAT EQUALITY, POWER, AND INDEPENDENCE OF GOV ERNMENT 
 
 Thus both 
 reason 
 and experi- 
 ence in fa- 
 Tour. 
 
 Supposed by 
 some, that 
 these claims 
 enlarge 
 man's rights. 
 Enlarge, to 
 diminish. 
 
 describe it as invaded, paint that invasion in the most glowing colours* 
 you will never animate them properly. They will be actuated by your 
 passions, not their own. You will be obliged to lead them, and when 
 you cease leading them they will stop ; when the winds fall, the waves 
 will subside. In the other case, they will go on of themselves. The one 
 is a furnace, which requires to be heated by artificial bellows, the other 
 h a volcano, which bursts by natural fires. Everyman feels that 
 he has a right to Life, Property and Free-agency, but no man that 
 he has a right to power, till he is told it by sophists, and false-reasoning 
 politicians. 
 
 Thus then is the voice of reason and the testimony of experience, 
 equally in our favour. And the latter is the sure guide, for reasoning, 
 comparatively speaking, is a treacherous leader. Not that rea- 
 soning may not be true,' but it is so difficult to make it so. In 
 taking an extensive view of a subject, something may escape us, and 
 if that something should escape us, it may derange our finest spe- 
 culations. The best way, then, is to take in the aid of experience 
 and where we can have that, our theories must be complete.* 
 
 It has been supposed, often,f that these rights of equal^, pow- 
 er, and independence of government, add to the dignity of man, 
 and it has therefore been the custom to extol them. It has been 
 imagined, that they multiply the number of his rights, and enlarge 
 the circle of his privileges. If they do so multiply them, they multi- 
 ply in a most sinister manner. Under pretence of enlarging, thej 
 in fact diminish them. They destroy a system of certainty 
 and truth, and introduce in it's room a fabric of ambiguity 
 and falsehood. Life, Property, and Free-agency never did 
 any harm in the world. It was not those original rights, those sure 
 land-marks of GOD's JUSTICE (GOD forgive us if we go 
 too far,) those natural PERSONALITIES which have GOD's seal sec 
 
 * In experientia est omnjs inductio vera. Bacon. 
 
 t See French Revolution. — Written in the year 1706, 
 
ARE PRETENDED RIGHTS. 37 
 
 upon them as it were, that have done the mischief. It was those false 
 lights,those ignis fatuus'of philosophy, as we may call them, which by en- 
 gaging in a^ treacherous pursuit have led us into the bogs of destruction . 
 and deception. 
 
 If we wish to contemplate this delusion for a moment, let us just cast See the 
 our eyes upon these pretended rights, and see their effects upon the dif- these right* 
 ferent PRINCIPLES of JUSTICE. Take equality for instance. JUS- ^TncI 
 TICE gives every man his own, equality would take it from him. Equa- ples of 
 lity would take it from him, because it would take from him the fruits 
 of his industry. Power again, what would that do ? Give every man 
 a right to that, and you have jus divinum* at once, with this difference, 
 that it is in the multitude instead of a sovereign, for as to any mischief 
 produced to mankind, it can be demonstrated, that there is at least as 
 much occasioned by giving an unlimited right of this kind to the mass, 
 when we reckon the various processes it undergoes (barring 
 the temporariness of its nature,) as by placing it in an individual. 
 Unless, indeed, we allude to the governments of Africa, if they 
 can be so called, which as we observe in another part of this 
 work, are not so much the elevation of the sovereign, as the de- 
 pression of the human race. Lastly, take independence of govern- 
 ment, establish that and you will turn mankind back into a savage 
 state, and deprive him at once of all the benefits of civilization. 
 
 Can it be pretended after this, that these rights are really for 0ffers {he 
 
 i'i-i/^ .., -'ii i most direct 
 
 the advantage of mankind ? Can it be maintained, that they con- violence to 
 tribute in any degree, to his well-being, his prosperity, or his them " 
 
 * It may be necessary to inform posterity, that jus divinum was a supposed right of sovereigns, as- 
 serted two centuries ago, to make their subjects miserable, at least to do every thing they chose 
 in defiance of laws, because it was said, they were GOD's vice-gerents. It was a veil of holiness 
 thrown over their authority, which protected the exercise of itfrom examination. It is the superstition 
 of the thing we allude to ; and we make this reference, because though it was the subject of much 
 contest at the time it may be now forgot. But it is hardly necessary to be thus particular. Though 
 that specific exemplification may be no more, the idea will probably remain. 
 
 E 2 
 
28 THAT EQUALITY, &c. ARE PRETENDED RIGHTS. 
 
 happiness ? Does it not plainly appear, on the contrary, does it 
 not prominently force itself on the understanding, does not 
 JUSTICE cry out, as it were, with most miraculous organ that they 
 are infamous quibbles raised upon the names of things, unreal mock- 
 eries and delusions, in direct contradiction to their essence, their 
 purity and their existence ? If equality be equal, it equalizes only to 
 prescribe* If power elevate (the mass) it elevates only to depress 
 them*, by introducing in succession all the various species of govern- 
 mentf with their respective deformities and perversions. If inde- 
 pendence of government add to the dignity of man, by enabling him 
 to pursue his own will in contradistinction to the public happiness, it 
 is the dignity of a wild beast, the pride of a savage. 
 Must there- Such then being these rights, that they cannot be made out on any 
 ibsoufte 311 or ig ma l ground of equity, any fair principle of JUSTICE. That so far 
 period,and from being so made out, they are directly contradicted, and opposed 
 ' by them. That instead of assisting the rights of man, they mu- 
 tilate and destroy them. That under the appearance of enlarging 
 his privileges, they take away his true ones, introducing in their 
 room, such as can never be defined, or made forth-coming. In 
 fine, that they are mischievous phantoms. Can more be needed 
 to shew, that there is an absolute period and end of them ? That 
 these rights of equality, power, and independence of government, 
 under whatever name affirmed, whatever denomination asserted, 
 ^^ are hurtful, and pernicious delusions, equally false, equally con- 
 '* tradictory, and equally baneful with all systems that can be erect- 
 M ed upon them." 
 
 * See whether the antient democracies did not produce tyrants. 
 + Eih } See Potytrius. 
 
BOOK III. 
 OF CIVIL RIGHTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 OF THE EVILS TO WHICH MEN WERE EXPOSED IN A STATE OF NATURE, 
 
 IN what state men were originally or how long they remained in i n what 
 it cannot be very important to know. How long they were hunters, st * e ? m . en 
 and fishers, how long shepherds, or how soon they became tillers of 
 the ground, however it may gratify our curiosity to learn, cannot 
 much increase the stock of our real knowledge, if by real knowledge 
 be meant what bears upon the practical pursuits of men, and con- 
 tributes to their advantage and happiness. 
 
 Whatever then men may have been in their first state, or however Detached 
 long they may have remained in it, sufficient for us is it to know that c^uon- 
 in that state they must have been some time or other. That is, in nexion * 
 a state, when they were " detached from political connexion, and 
 when none had any authority or rule over another. In a word, when 
 they were in a state of nature.*" In such a state, it is easy to see the 
 
 * It has been the custom, sometimes, to object to this state, and to treat it asch/mericaJ,or having 
 never existed* Something may be said here. In the first place, there must have been this state, or 
 something like it, unless we suppose that men were civilized all at once, and that government 
 dropped upon them, ready instituted from the clouds. But in the next place, if there were not, 
 
30 GOVERNMENT THE REMEDY FOR EVILS, &c. 
 
 strong mischiefs to which they must have been exposed. That the strong 
 * P eaiT S &c. e must have oppressed the weak, the unjust injured, and the violent 
 robbed and murthered. That all must have been a scene of disorder 
 Would seek an( ^ °f disorder most difficult to be borne. In such a state, it was natu- 
 a remedy. ra i f or them to look round, and to seek a remedy for their calamities* 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 er. 
 
 THAT GOVERNMENT, OR POWER, WAS THE REMEDY FOR THE EVILS, TO WHICH 
 MEN WERE EXPOSED IN A STATE OF NATURE. 
 
 Would op- AS violence was the cause of the evils which men suffered in a state 
 Wo/cT* of nature, they must have naturally sought a remedy for them, in the 
 restraint of that violence. They must have naturally thought of re- 
 straining force by force, and joining their strength against the com- 
 Chusea lead- mon invader. But as this strength would be often ineffectual, where 
 all would be ready to rule, and none to be commanded, they would 
 chuse a leader who should guide their force, and conduct it properly 
 against the common enemy. But as it would be troublesome always 
 
 what then ? Truth is not things, as we have endeavoured to shew, see Book II. Ch. II. but 
 " the rational relation and possible exemplification of things when the fact happens." The 
 PRINCIPLES of truth must have existed (ready for application) whether this state existed or 
 not. As Montesquieu says, K The rays of the circle would have been equal though the circle had 
 never been traced." This is a grand passage. M Les etres particuliers intelligens peuvent avoir des 
 LOIX qu'ils ont faits ; mais ils EN ont aussi qu'ils n'ont pas faites. Avant qu'il y EUT des 
 etres intelligens, ils etoient POSSIBLES ; ils avoicnt done des RAPPORTS POSSIBLES, et, par 
 consequent des LOIX POSSIBLES. Avant qu'il y eflt des LOIX FAITES, il y avoit des RAP 
 PORTS DE JUSTICE POSSIBLES. Dire qu'il n'y a rien de JUSTE ni d' INJUSTE que ee 
 qu ordoiment ou defendent les LOIX POSITIVES e'estdire quavantqu'on £ut trace le CERCLE, 
 tousles rayons N'ETOIENTPAS EGAUX !!l See Monte sq. Esprit des Loix, Tom. I. 
 ch, 1. p, 3. Ed. Genev. 
 
END OF GOVERNMENT TO PRESERVE CIVIL RIGHTS. 31 
 
 to punish crimes, and better far to prevent their commission, 
 thej would as naturally again think of rules which should forbid cer- 
 tain actions, and annex penalties to their perpetration. Further, as 
 these rules might be misapplied, and the innocent confounded with the 
 guilty, they would appoint those who should judge on them. Here Make rules 
 then would be rules, (or laws) made, rules judged, on, andTules exe- and Appoint 
 
 iudcres. 
 
 cuted. This would be government. ThisgoTem- 
 
 ment. , 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THAT THE END OF GOVERNMENT OR POWER IS TO PRESERVE CIVIL RIGHTS. 
 
 WE have seen that government is the remedy for the evils to which v . . 
 
 J Jind or go- 
 
 men are exposed in a state of nature. And what are these evils ? vcmment to 
 
 Having their Lives, Properties, and Free-agencies attacked. But these rights. 
 are Civil Rights, for when Civil Rights are spoken of, we find, that no 
 other are understood in society. When a government is praised for 
 preserving Civil Rights, it is meant that it protects men's Lives, Pro- 
 perties, and Free-agencies. The end of government then is to pre- 
 serve Civil Rights. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 THAT CIVIL RIGHTS ARE ONLY REALTOR NATURAL ONES IN ANOTHER IHAFE. 
 
 THIS is a consequence of the foregoing. 
 
 Consequence 
 of the fore- 
 going. 
 
$2 END OF GOVERNMENT TO PRESERVE CIVIL RIGHTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 THAT THE END OF GOVERNMENT OR POWER IS TO PRESERVE CIVIL OR REAL 
 OR NATURAL RIGHTS, AND THAT THE WHOLE IS A BUSINESS OP PRACTICAL 
 UTILITY. 
 
 Great con- THE great conclusion from all this is, that the true end of go- 
 al" this that 1 vernment is to preserve Civil or real or natural rights, and that the whole 
 thc end m ent * s aDusmess °f practical utility. For as Civil or real or natural Rights, 
 to preserve or public happiness, or that utility, has been proved positively to be the 
 or natural end of it upon one hand, so has it been shewn negatively, on the 
 th 8 a 1 t t the and otner ti ]at tnere ls no abstract right, or claim to power, to plead over 
 
 whole is a this* 
 business of 
 practical 
 utility. 
 
BOOK IV. 
 
 OF POLITICAL RIGHTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. 
 
 ClVIL rights relate to natural privileges*, Political to power-)-. — Ci»u rights 
 Civil rights concern the titles of Life, Property, and Free-agency; Po- naturaipmi- 
 litical, the share that a man has in the government of the country. c lfto power! 
 And that the above is a true distinction, we may see from this, that 
 when we praise a government for preserving Civil rights, we mean, that 
 it protects Life, Property, and Free-agency ; when we commend it 
 for preserving Political, we mean,t hat it gives a man all the share in 
 the government of the country, that is conducive to public happiness. 
 
 And from this results a further distinction, that Civil rights are of a civil rights 
 private, Political, of a public nature. It is plain that the rights of pj^?"™^' 
 Life, Property, and Free-agency, being for the benefit of the indi- a i ,ublic na * 
 vidual himself, must relate to him, and to him only. But Political, 
 
 * From ci?i9, a citizen, these, viz. Life, Property, and Free-agencj, being the objects for which 
 a man becomes a citizen. 
 
 t From imhirrit, a member of a state, which is the power for preserving the above. 
 
 F 
 
34 THAT POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE FOUNDED 
 
 being rights to power, and power being instituted for the benefit 
 of the community, must relate to the public entirely.* 
 
 Civil rights then relate to Life, Property, and Free-agency, Political, 
 to power, and authority. Civil rights are of a private, Political, of a 
 pubiicnature. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 THAT THE FIRST GREAT POLITICAL RIGHT IS TO ESTABLISH POWER. 
 
 First great AND if Political rights be rights to power, then the first great Po~ 
 Poiiiu-ai ]itical right must be to establish power. Surely that right to a thing 
 
 right to esfa- to , * J & ° 
 
 biibh power, must be primary, which is the right to create and originate it. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THAT ALL POLITICAL RIGHTS, OR RIGHTS TO POWER, ARE FOUNDED IN 
 THE PRESERVATION OF CIVIL PRIVILEGES. f 
 
 All Political THAT all Political rights are founded in the preservation of Civil 
 «nn the Dd " privileges is a PRINCIPLE of the utmost consequence. If the truth 
 
 preservation 
 
 of Civil * It may be said here, that both are equally public, and private* Are not political, equally, 
 
 ' private, as giving the citizen his Life, Property, and Free-agency ? Are not Civil equally public, 
 as being these things preserved to all, and lor the benefit of all ? But the difference lies here. The 
 one is private, the other public in its origin. Life, Property and Free-agency are private where 
 possessed first, that ib, by the individual, and for the benefit of the individual. Political are 
 public, where possessed first, that is, not by the individual, but from the public, not for the in- 
 dividual, but for the community -eutirely. 
 
 + " We are therefore to look upon all the vast apparatus of our government, as having ulti- 
 mately no other object or purpose, but the distribution of JUSTICE, or, in other words, the 
 support of the twelve judges." See Hume's Essays, Vol. I. p. 35. oct. ed. 
 
IN THE PRESERVATION OF CIVIL. 
 
 35 
 
 of this had been rightly understood, much of the error and unhappiness 
 that have taken place in the world would have been saved, as men would 
 have avoided these pretended rights, which by holding forth a vi- 
 sionary power, have defeated what is really salutary to mankind. * 
 They would have placed government upon its true basis, and have 
 shewn, that a as utility is its end, so out of this utility must spring all 
 right, and title to it." 
 
 And that all right and title to government,or power, or Political right, Must plainly 
 does spring out of utility, or Civil rights,must plainly appear to whoever consWerit"^ 
 contemplates the subject. For, in the first place, if we go up to the es- ori s in - 
 senceofthe right,the source of the title,upon which government, or the 
 mass of power which we call government, is founded, we shall find it to 
 be Civil rights. Upon what ground could any man, or set of men, or 
 multitude of men, have controuled man's natural, that is, savage free- 
 agency, (for as to any proper, he has, or ought to have it, more 
 in government, than out of it,) upon what ground could he or they 
 have done so, but the necessary preservation of Civil rights, since 
 no man naturally, or by original JUSTICE, has any right to govern an- 
 other.f Upon what ground could he have done it, but the right 
 that men had, that they, that is, these Civil rights, established 
 by GOD, should be preserved ? Upon the right that they had, 
 that a power should be raised in a country, to restrain crimes, 
 in opposition to the pretensions of any one to wanton independence 
 of action ?J If then they went upon this right, to build govern- 
 ment or power, and could go upon no other, government or power 
 must stop, where this right or occasion for its exercise ends, and of 
 course all right and title to it. 
 
 Thus, then, in the first place, there can be no title, no pure title to Same thing 
 
 i c ,i ~ . . , , appears from 
 
 government, or power, drawn from the source of its right and essence, extent of 
 
 causes. 
 * See French Revolution. 
 + See Book II. Ch. III. 
 X S«e Book II. Ch. IV. 
 F 2 
 
THAT POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE FOUNDED 
 
 independent of Civil privileges. But the same thing will appear in a 
 different way from the extent of causes. Can any cause extend be- 
 yond itself in the effects which it produces ? This is against every 
 idea of causation, and would make a thing no cause at all. Now 
 Civil privileges are the cause of government or power. They produced 
 government or power. How then can they produce more of it, than 
 is caused by them, that is, than is for their preservation ? Yet this 
 would be the case, if there were any right to government, or power, 
 independent of them. There can then be no such right. 
 
 Now this proof is complete. If CIVIL PRIVILEGES be the whole 
 END and PURPOSE of government, the WHOLE OBJECT in 
 view from it, as we hope they have been fully proved to be,* THEN 
 they are the whole MOTIVE for making it, the WHOLE CAUSE 
 for erecting it ; and, since they cannot extend beyond themselves, 
 can produce NO MORE of it, than is for THEIR PRESERVA- 
 TION. 
 if Political But if a right to government or power, do not arise from Civil 
 
 right DK no i ^ 
 
 arising from privileges, it must necessarily from a right to power, as power in itself. 
 
 leges, must There is no other. The system which we call government, taking 
 
 a°rTg C ht a to° in the whole of its fabric, both the governing part and the protected, is 
 
 power. but composed of Civil and Political, of Civil, which regards the citi- 
 
 zen,and Political, which concerns power and authority. This is the to* 
 
 tarn of it. This exhausts itf. If this right then to government, or power, 
 
 taken as its Political or governing part do not arise from Civil privileges, 
 
 None such, it must from a right to power, and authority. Now we have shewn 
 
 clearly, we hope, that there is no right to power, as power, 
 
 * See Book III. Ch?IlI. IV. and V. 
 
 + If religious rights, or the right of worshipping the DEITY, as we chuse, and of hold- 
 ing what opinions respecting HIM we think fit, (as long as we do not disturb society) be 
 mentioned, as they surely ought, we answer, that they are comprehended under Civil rights, or 
 rights of the citizen, coming in as freedom of thought under Free-agency. 
 
IN THE PRESERVATION OF CIVIL. 37 
 
 properly and peculiarly in itself. We have demonstrated that 
 plainly.* We have shewn that there is no title in any man, to go- 
 vern another, on any ground of original JUSTICE. That " power, 
 therefore, can never be an original right, that political titles never 
 can be." In short, that there is no right whatever to power, pro- 
 perly so called, and, consequently, that the right of government, or 
 power, must either come out of Civil privileges or nothing. 
 
 And for this very reason of there being no such thing as a right Political 
 
 1 1 ■ 1 • • 1 ,. 1^ 1 1 i rights to be 
 
 to power, properly and strictly in itself, there cannot be properly and caiiedPoUtu 
 strictly speaking any Political rights in government. They should be C0 -^ IVI ■ 
 called Politico-Civil, since it is to the preservation of Civil privileges, 
 and TO THESE ALONE, that they owe their existence. 
 
 This being the case then, it obviously appears, that all those la fine then, 
 rights commonly and correctly enough, called Political, must arise civil prfti- 
 out of Civil. That it is in this source, in this fountain alone, leges * 
 that they can, or do, take their origin ; that as the right of 
 government or power, is " the right which mankind hold to have 
 their Lives, Properties, and Free-agencies preserved," there can be 
 no right to government or power independent of them. 
 
 But if it were other\vise,if the right of govern ment or power were not But if did 
 constituted,and built^s we see it is, "UPON THE BASIS OF CIVIL not> ought * 
 PRIVILEGES," still these are so precious, and valuable to mankind, 
 that the right of government OUGHT to come out of them, that is, 
 though there were no original title to them from reason and JUSTICE, 
 or (if it were not irreverent to state it, or impossible to believe it) 
 from the SUPREME BEING, as the fountain of reason and JUS-' 
 TICEf, still these things are so much for the good of mankind, so 
 profitable, so advantageous and expedient in themselves, that the af- 
 ter and subsequent title to government or power, ought to be made " 
 
 * See Book II. Ch. III. 
 
 + See Book II. Ch. III. p. 17, 
 
,-53 THAT POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE FOUNDED 
 
 to stand upon, attach to, and come out of, them. Take Life, Proper- 
 ty, and Free-agency. Take them in all their relations, as afterwards 
 developed in government. The security that a man has for his Life, 
 the comfort and happiness derived from it, the eertainty of acquiring 
 Property, the safety of holding, the prospect of succeeding to, of con- 
 veying to whom he will, of receiving from those who acquired it, and 
 this through all the multiplied situations that can take place in a 
 civilized, a commercial, and a happy and populous country, and the 
 more, the more so. Add to this, the comfort of doing what he 
 pleases, of not being interrupted in the performance of any lawful, 
 any naturally, and originally, legitimate action ; of disposing of 
 his being as he lists, without being accountable to any one. 
 When we count these things, when we calculate these advan- 
 tages, multiplied, and modified, and diffused, and developed, and ex- 
 tended as above, we must acknowledge that without going up to the 
 essence of the right, without ascending to the first laws of reason 
 and JUSTICE, we should constitute the right of government upon 
 these privileges, and upon these privileges only. 
 •Whole bies. For it must be confessed that Life, Property, and Free-agency, are 
 in D ?his fmaD not on ty tne paramount blessings, which man can enjoy in this world, 
 world. k u t- j n fact all of them. For they either are themselves, those bles- 
 
 sings director include the after use, relish,or enjoyment of them. Whe- 
 ther a man devote himself to the pursuits of science, the occupations of 
 business, orthe amusements of pleasure, lawful pleasure, still these things 
 are comprehended in the circuit of the privileges we talk of. Nay, 
 even the gratifications of vanity and ambition proceed from them, 
 that is, cannot be attained without them. In a word, whatever re- 
 lates to the use or enjoyment of our existence in any shape, whether 
 good, bad, or indifferent, whatever concerns our being, whether 
 well or ill, is included and implied in them. 
 Right of go- Thus then it appears,that,take itwhich way we will, whether werefer to the 
 
IN THE PRESERVATION OF CIVIL. 
 
 m 
 
 PRINCIPLES of JUSTICE, or to what is advantageous and profitable vomment to 
 formankind,power,orgovernment,and the right of poweror government * e ' 2 >Mtl " 
 IS, and OUGHT TO BE, constituted upon these privileges. But this tfeem. 
 has not ahvaysbeen the way in which men have begun. They have some- 
 times set outwith planting Political rights,(or rights to power)in the first 
 place, and then insisted on never deviating from them. They have given 
 every man a personal right to a share of power in the first instance, and 
 then required that it should not be taken from him.* Perhaps they M>n be<nm 
 thought, that this right as afterwards evinced in government, was for the vvron s- 
 ben< fit of Civil privileges, for we defy any one to deny, that they are the 
 grinci pal. Perhaps they thought so. How far it would be for such benefit, 
 will be seen afterwards. But still they were equally wrong. They should 
 have begun by shewing that it actually was so advantageous and pro- 
 fitable for these privileges, and not asserted it in the first place. 
 
 But however those persons may have founded their argument, or Ha wem- 
 whatever methods they may have taken to support it, still the case p h Riy}! VIL 
 is the same, with respect to these or CIVIL PRIVILEGES, They are, ^EGES, 
 in every way we take them, the CRITERION and STANDARD of kion and 
 POWER, or GOVERNMENT. << Power or government HAS arisen Tuifo^ 
 from them, power or government OUGHT to have arisen from them, Srg^f RN " 
 and power or government NEVER CAN do any thing but arise from 
 them." In these then are we to look for every foundation of power or go- 
 vernment, for every thing relating to it. In them is placed every right, 
 title and possible pretension to it. In short, to conclude almost in the In their 
 words webesjun, in the due preservation of CIVIL PRIVILEGES 8 ?™ lion , an 
 
 ° l right ami 
 
 is to be found all right to power ; in the proper protection, of CIVIL title to u, 
 RIG HIS, all title to government. 
 
 * As they-haie d.onc by a right to independence of government. See Book II, Ch. tV, 
 
40 THAT A NATION HAS A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH POWER. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 THAT A NATION HAS A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH POWER. 
 
 Power or go- Y£ j s obvious from what was stated in our third Book, that the 
 
 vernment * 
 
 luctssary for establishment of power or government is necessary for preserving Civil 
 
 preserving , , . ., „ T in* • 
 
 tivii pri?i- or real or natural privileges*. Let us only reflect upon the crimes, 
 li,gvs ' (as here stated,) which would lay waste society, if there were no 
 
 Musi then power to controul them. This power then must either drop ready 
 man to g esta- instituted from the clouds, or there must be a right in man to esta- 
 blish it. blish it, founded on the preservation of these privileges, as we saw 
 in our last chapter, unless we suppose that GOD has given him a 
 title to these things, Life, Property, and Free-agency, but denied 
 him the means of preserving them, that HE meant that he should pos- 
 sess them, and should not possess them, should hold them, and 
 should not hold them, at the same time, the very idea of which 
 is absurdly blasphemous. We must then conclude that man has this 
 right. 
 How to be And how is he to exercise this right ? Can all mankind do it toge- 
 exercise . ^^ divided, as t | ie ^ arCj ^ seaSj moun tains, rivers, &c. &c. ? Or if they 
 
 could be collected, which they cannot, could they ever agree in their 
 notions, so as to form any thing like one uniform system of govern- 
 ment ? They could not. The very idea is ridiculous. We must then 
 take them as we find them, distributed by Providence, that is by 
 countries or nationsf. 
 By countries Taking them then by Countries or Nations, a Country or Nation 
 and nations, must infallibly have a right to establish power, it having now been 
 
 * See Chap. 1. If. 
 
 + " And hath (GOD) made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the 
 " earth, and hath DETERMINED the times before appointed, and the BOUNDS of their habi- 
 '< tation." Acts of the Apostles, ch. xrii. ver. 20. 
 
 Ka< 3o9r)dvT? i%vjix ith wqiazv $YAHN, x»i AAON, *ai rAflZSAN, xxi E0NO2, AttoxxX. xiii. 7. 
 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH, &c. 41 
 
 clearly proved that mankind have the right, and that there is no 
 way of exercising it but by Countries and Nations. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 THAT A NATION HAS A RIGHT TO ABOLISH POWER. 
 
 AND this right, we think, is pretty obvious, upon the same grounds This right 
 
 T , ., . , ■ i> i n i obvious on 
 
 as the former. It a nation have a right to establish power, for the the same 
 preservation of Civil rights, it has undoubtedly to abolish it for the fh^ former, 
 same purpose, that is, when this power " goes contrary to, or destroys 
 the end for which it was established/' All disputes then, upon the 
 point, whether a Nation have a right to alter their government when 
 prejudicial to Civil rights, are absurd. — First, because they have this 
 right upon the government itself, which is, or ought to bo, consti- 
 tuted upon these rights, and then, upon the PRINCIPLES of JUS- 
 TICE, if a government had never existed. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OP THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH POWER, AND A RIGHT TO 
 
 POSSESS POWER. 
 
 THAT a nation should have a right to establish power, may Right to 
 seem in some measure at variance with our former PRINCI- poJcr^not 
 PLES, as we contended so strenuously in our second book, that at variance 
 
 , * ' with the 
 
 there neither was, nor could be, any right to power.* But this ap- denial of the 
 
 right to pos- 
 * See Book II. Ch.III. 8essit * 
 
 - G 
 
4? DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH, 
 
 parent discordance will soon vanish, when we consider the subje ct 
 more closely, and especially, when we examine the difference be- 
 tween a right to establish power, and a right to possess it. 
 Constituted It will be found that the grounds, upon which the former of these 
 upon i . Rights, is constituted, by no means interfere with the PRINCIPLES, 
 which exclude the latter, nay, that they confirm them. For what 
 were these PRINCIPLES ? That power not being an original pri- 
 vilege, but only a means,f there could be no right to possess it (ab- 
 solutely). And what do we say now ? That being a means, there must 
 be a right to establish it, and that upon the very ground, that it is a 
 means, and that there can be no right to possess it.* 
 Righttopos. But the difference between these two rights, will be much better 
 
 suss power, ■ ' ' _ ' Ai-iz-1 
 
 primary to seen, by a more close comparison of them — And, in the first place, a 
 secondary.' r 'g nt to possess power, would be primary,a right to establish it, is only se- 
 condary— A right to possess it, would be primary, because it would be a 
 right to possess it on account of itself— Would it not be on account of it- 
 self ? On account of what other thing, would it be? If it be a right to 
 possess it (absolutely) it must be a right to possess it under all circum- 
 stances,since there is no right to possess a thing absolutely, which is not 
 to possess it under all circumstances. If it be only aright to possess 
 it under certain circumstances, it is " sometimes a right to possess 
 it, and sometimes not a right to possess it." If we would know 
 the difference between these things, we have only to look to Life, 
 Property, and Free-agency, which are full possessions. . Have not 
 men a right to possess them, under all circumstances ? Is there any 
 
 + See Book II. Ch. Ill, 
 
 * The same reasons that secure it as a means, exclude it as an ewe?-— Why have men a right 
 to establish ? Because it is a means, a means for Life, Property, and Free-agency, which 
 they have an irrefragable right to.— And why have not men a right to possess it ? -Becaus.Mtis 
 only a means for preserving this very Life, Property, and Free-agency, and to be regulated by 
 them. — If tyrants could plead their right to possess it, there would be no establishing, or re- 
 establishing f«r the sake of Civil privileges. 
 
AND A RIGHT TO POSSESS POWER. 43 
 
 ■time when they have not a right to possess them ? As to forfeiting 
 them by crimes, that is another thing — That is no invalidation of the 
 right, that is only securing it to other men. — It is no addition to my 
 rightof Life, that I take away another's. f A right to possess power, 
 then, would be a right to possess it, under all circumstances, 
 and being a right to possess it, under all circumstances, it would 
 be on account of itself, and being on acount of itself, it would 
 be primary. 
 
 Now is this the case with a right to establish power ? Is that pri- 
 mary ? Isthat on account of itself, or " on account of Life, Pro- 
 perty, and Free-agency, which it is meant to preserve ?" Ask 
 any philosopher, or politician, ask any one — Ask them, if it was not 
 erected to preserve men from the attaint of crimes, and to enable 
 them to live comfortably and happily in society. They will all agree 
 in this — A right to establish power, then, is not on account of itself, 
 it is not primary. 
 
 Here then, is one great,and essential difference between these rights, Right to 
 that a right to possess power, would be primary, a right to establish it possess pow " 
 
 . ^y, ®^*> constant, 
 
 is secondary, — Another difference is, that a right to establish it, is to establish 
 occasional,a right to possess it, (absolutely always, let it be remembered) sicmai?* 
 would be constant. If there were, as there is, only a right to establish 
 power,shoulda man come after a government was erected,and claim his 
 share in instituting, he might, as he may be, told, " You are come too 
 " late, the government, or frame of power, which is to protect CIVIL 
 " PRIVILEGES, THE FOUNDATION OF ALL,* and which 
 " does protect them, is established, you must not disturb the public 
 " tranquillity, &c. &c." But suppose a right to possess power, and he 
 might answer, as he certainly cannot answer, " I don't care for that, 
 " your Civil privileges, are nothing to me, give me my share of power, 
 
 + See Book I. Ch. HI. p. 0. 
 * See this Book, Third Chapter. 
 G3 
 
44 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH, 
 
 " I don't like your government, you cannot deprive me of my birth* 
 *' right/' 
 
 Such would the language be, and so would the right be inde- 
 pendent—It would be independent, as much as Life, Property, and 
 Free-agency, and " constantly, like them, reclaimable, as the gift of 
 PROVIDENCE/' Is there any time, when men could be told, 
 " This is not a time for your Lives, Properties and Free-agencies, yoa 
 are to be murthered, robbed, and oppressed ?** 
 Right to A third difference between these rights is, that a right to possess 
 
 ?r S or7 toaT" P ower would be original, a right, to establish it, is subsequent— A 
 to esta- right to possess power, would be original, because, being on account of 
 subsequent, itself, which it would then be, as has been proved, it would be from the 
 beginning. Are not the privileges of Life, Property, and Free-agency, 
 which are on account of themselves, from the beginning ? It is no- 
 thing to say, that they are on account of man's happiness, they are 
 man's happiness, or if not, the same would apply to man's happiness, it 
 would be on account of itself, and then from the beginning. Must not 
 everything, rationally speaking, that is on account ofitself,thatisitsown 
 means, and end, its cause and consequence, be from the beginning?* — 
 What other thing ought to precede it in reasons since it is for the sake 
 of nothing else ? Now a right to possess power, would be on account 
 of itself ; it would be for the sake of nothing else — It would then be 
 from the beginning, it would be original. 
 
 Now is this the case with a right to establish power ? Is that ori- 
 ginal ? No — " Life, Property, and Free-agency existed first, and then 
 this right to protect them/' 
 Right to A fourth difference between these rights, is, that a right to possess 
 
 possess pow- 
 
 * If a thing belts own means, and end, it must be, from the beginning — What is to precede, 
 there is no means to it ? If it be from the beginning, again, it must be its own means and end ; for 
 if any other thing was a means to it, it would not be from the beginning. 
 
AND A RIGHT TO POSSESS POWER. 45 
 
 power, would be absolute, a right to establish it, is conditional. — Aer, absolute, 
 right to establish it, is conditional, because being for the preservation u, con- * 
 of Civil privileges, it must be regulated by these privileges, and can ditlonaL 
 never recalit, nor establish anew, till they are violated. — But would 
 this be the case with a right to possess power ? Would that be condi- 
 tional ? No, it would be most absolute, it would exist like the 
 privileges of Life, Property, and Free-agency, which, as we said, 
 can never be precluded. 
 
 A fifth, and last difference between these rights, is, that a right to Right to 
 possess power, would be individual, aright to establish, it, is collective. 5°"°" 
 — A right to possess it, would be individual, because it would be held individual, to 
 by individuals, and for individual purposes solely, like Life, Property, collective/ 
 and Free-agency. — A right to establish it is collective, because it 
 is held by the public, and for public purposes entirely. 
 
 Here, then, are five cardinal, and essential differences between these Five cardi- 
 rights, that the" one is primary, the other secondary, the one original, ™Lnm dif. 
 the other subsequent, the one constant, the other occasional, the one ferences be - 
 absolute, the other conditional, the one individual, the other collective, rights. 
 Need more be shewn to prove all the radical causes of difference 
 among men, all the possible sources of distinction, and discrimi- 
 nation ? 
 
 And it is from these causes, radical, and essential as they are, that Cause of an 
 have arisen all the great disputes among politicians — If one set of p£tL among 
 men maintained at one time, that let a nation be ever so miserable, P oilt,cians ' 
 they had no right to change their government, from what could this pro- 
 ceed, but denying a right to establish power as a MEANS, since they 
 overlooked the ENDS, for which it was established ? And if another set 
 of men upheld at another time, that let a nation be ever so happy, they 
 had a right to depose their rulers, what could this arise from, but assert- 
 ing a right to possess power as an EN D, (since they took it not as a means 
 connected with Ciyil PRIVILEGES),but an independent, and absolute 
 
46 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH, &c. 
 
 possession in itself? If men meant only by asserting a sovereign right 
 in the nation, that power was made for their happiness, that is," for the 
 protection of Civil privileges," and that when it was abused it ought to 
 be recalled, then it was veryintelligible and only amounted to a denial 
 of the doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance, or in other 
 words, blind, and unlimited submission to government — But if they 
 meant, on the other hand, that let a nation be ever so happy, ever so 
 much in possession of their Civil privileges, they might with any 
 reason, or no reason, on any pretence, and any pretext, at all times, and 
 in all circumstances, overturn a government, merely because power 
 was their property, then it was a right to possess power, and as 
 wicked., and damnable a doctrine, (humanly speaking) as ever was pro- 
 pagated — This was taking the nation as composed of individuals, with 
 every one of them as complete a right to power, as to Life, Pro- 
 perty, and' Free-agency, the very notion we have been reprobating. — 
 But those again w r ere as wrong on the other hand, who maintained, 
 thatw hen once a government was erected, it was by that very circum- 
 stance rendered permanent, as if it could consecrate itself. That the 
 very point of its being government, made it intangible, however 
 fatal to Civil privileges, that there was no enquiring into it, a doc- 
 trine which would justify the government of Turkey — Is there any 
 government, that it would not defend ? If then men thought in this 
 way, (unless indeed the}' gave into divine right, jus divinum* and 
 did not think at all) from what could it arise, but missing the ends of 
 government, and overlooking the distinction between establishing 
 if had ob- and possessing power ? If they had observed that, they would have 
 
 served these l •• ' ', • A , ■, • * 
 
 distinctions, been able to have placeu government upon its proper basis, witn- 
 piacedgol 6 out running into the excesses of extravagance — They would have 
 vcrnme " t on secured all the purposes of freedom, without exposing themselves to 
 
 its true basis. * L jo 
 
 * Upon this and passive obedience, and non-resistance above, see note, p. 27. 
 
AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POWER NONE EXCLUDED. 
 
 47 
 
 the consequences of anarchy — In short, they would have done every Upon dis- 
 thing, that was necessary for the happiness of mankind, without tween°arigit 
 incurring any of the evils of licentiousnessf — Since such then, is the *° establish 
 
 ° . . - ant * to possess 
 
 importance of this distinction, let us rigidly adhere to it — Let us power, to be 
 
 i « i /* . t it* .1 built every 
 
 never lose sight or it — Let us constantly keep our eyes upon the rational no- 
 broad distinction between a right to ESTABLISH power, and a Hgbt^jJ^S* 
 to POSSESS power, since it is upon this difference, that is to be eTCr y proper 
 
 , ., 1 • ! ^ 1 1 idf>a 0f fret > 
 
 built, every sober idea of regular government, every rational notion estabiish- 
 offree establishment. Inent ' 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 THAT AT THE MOMENT OF ESTABLISHING POWER, OR GOVERNMENT, NONE 
 
 CAN BE EXCLUDED. 
 
 THAT CIVIL PRIVILEGES are the FOUNTAIN ofPOLITI-Cirii pri. 
 CAL, is a maxim, which cannot be disputed.* From this axiom, there leturf poii- 
 is no departing,there is no deviating in any shape— We must then ever tica1, 
 look upon Civil rights as the criterion of political, the grand rule, 
 and test by which we are to try them. 
 
 And if this rule shall be, as we trust, it will undoubtedly be found Only ques- 
 to be, of service to us upon many occasions, so will it especially upon exclusion"" 
 the present— For the only question we shall have to ask here, is, how "^T y fo * 
 far this right, if it be a right, of non-exclusion at the moment of form- 
 ing governments, be necessary for preserving Civil rights ? 
 
 And here we have to observe, that there are only two kinds of Only two 
 governments, existing, or that can exist, in the world, and these are an ^nment/ul 
 
 the world, 
 . an open, and 
 
 + See again French Revolution. 
 * See Chapter III. of this Book. 
 
 a close. 
 
48 
 
 AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POWER NONE EXCLUDED. 
 
 an open, 
 persons 
 influenced 
 by a general 
 spirit, 
 to have 
 a close, per- 
 sons in 
 fluenced 
 by a parti- 
 cular. 
 
 a 
 
 a 
 
 open, and a close one. — " An open, which has in view the interests of 
 all, and protects the interests of all, that is, the Civil privileges of 
 all, equally"— And " a close,which has in view the interests of some, and 
 protects the interests of some, that is, more than the Civil privileges 
 of some, particularly." 
 Way to have And the way to have an open government, is, to" have the persons who 
 constitute it, influenced by a general spirit, that they may make it 
 for the general benefit, and the way to have a close one, is to have 
 the persons who constitute it, influenced by a particular spirit, that 
 they may constitute it accordingly." 
 
 For it will always be found, that " exactly as you ante constitute the 
 " persons who are to frame your government, so will your government 
 " be formed"— A complete proof of this appeared in the antient 
 states, where all those, which were constituted by Heroes or Demigods, 
 is they were called, were tyrannical,f and all those which were made 
 by free countries,or colonies, sent from free countries, were free, that is, 
 open, or something like it. J And this very naturally — For the con- 
 stant consequence of some citizens being considered more than others 
 at the moment of forming governments, is, that favourable distinc- 
 tions will be heaped upon them, and burthens laid upon the rest. 
 
 The only question then, is, which of the two governments, an open or 
 a close, be the better for Civil privileges, and here we think,there cannot 
 be much difficulty — That undoubtedly of a general nature — That, 
 which is made for protecting the interests of all, that is, the Civil 
 privileges of all, equally, must unquestionably be better for the Civil 
 privileges of all, than that which is made for protecting the interests of 
 some, that is, more than the Civil privileges of some, particularly. 
 
 How to £Ct -wr 
 
 it? The sole point, then, is, how to get at this government? How to 
 
 Question, 
 open or 
 close bet- 
 ter for 
 Civil rights ? 
 
 Open. 
 
 + See Athens as founded by Theseus, Thebes as founded by Cadmus, &c.&c. &c. 
 J None were either completely open, or completely close, as we shall see after, but we talk 
 of their tendency. 
 
AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POWER NONE EXCLUDED. 49 
 
 attain this system, which is better forthe Civil rights of all ? The By not ex. 
 answer is, " by ante-constituting the persons generally who are to ^"formingf 
 frame it, and not excluding any one from his voice, or suffrage. 
 
 For this is the only way in which you can constitute a Government Only way. 
 of that sort, which is necessary for preserving your Civil privileges. 
 The moment you exclude any one, you give it a close cast, you make 
 it a particular interest, and the more you exclude, the closer. 
 
 Not that it is necessary, nor do we at all mean, " that you are to Notneces- 
 " poll every man at forming a Government, or that the Government is sary t0 po * 
 " illegitimate or spurious, if not so formed." We mean no such thing — 
 We mean only, that you cannot exclude any one of positive authority, 
 at such a time — That if any man offer his vote, you are bound to 
 acceptit — That the PRINCIPLE of exclusion, if once admitted" as 
 " fixing down the right of forming with particular persons," would 
 go any length, even that of attaching the closest government — 
 What is to hinder it ? If once you exclude, may you not go on from 
 exclusion, to exclusion, till you bring it to a Despotism ? What rule 
 would exclude one, that would not exclude twenty, or a thousand, or 
 a million, or any number, if so needed ? If twenty tell the multi- Exclusion go 
 tude, that they are wiser, or worthier, or any thing else than they, tism. 
 may not one tell twenty the same thing, and then it comes to a Des- 
 potism ? 
 
 But it may be said, perhaps, that if you were not to exclude any at Said would 
 
 rt ii k ii end in a broad 
 
 the moment of forming Governments, the thing would end, in abroad Democracy, 
 Democracy, and that would be as bad for Civil rights, as the closest e/dude! 
 Government— And here might be enumerated all the anarchies, op- £ vilsofa 
 
 L Democracy 
 
 pressions, and tumults which take place in Republics, and which so fre- temporary, 
 quently extinguish for the moment all freedom—But it ought to be 
 remembered, that it is but for the moment. These evils are only tem- 
 porary, for let Republics be as bad as they will, as tumultuous under a 
 
 xnob, or as tyrannical under a demagogue, (till lost by corruption, and 
 
 H 
 
50 
 
 AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POWER NONE EXCLUDED. 
 
 that is not more a consequence of Republics, than Monarchies) there 
 is always an energy in them, which enables them to recover them- 
 selves — There is a general sense that government is made for all, and 
 if the nation are not free, they feel at least, that they ought to be so. 
 Is there nothing in this ? Is there any comparison between this state, 
 and that of men's minds, where they think their oppression matter of 
 course, and that it calls for no exertion to emancipate themselves ? 
 Almost all depends upon this, for which reason, it was very well said 
 at one time, that Rome was incapable of freedom. 
 Not so heavy Neither are the evils of a Democracy, setting; aside the temporariness 
 
 as those of a i • • T i 
 
 Despotism, of their nature, so heavy, and oppressive in themselves, as those of a 
 Despotism — We shall take them even with universal suffrage, and that 
 in these Governments, this is as bad a thing as possible, will be readily 
 granted us — Well then, taking them with that, what will be the con- 
 sequence ? Why, at the worst, (we suppose it for the sake of the full 
 argument) confusions without end, seditions, expulsions, a succes- 
 sion of demagogues, some of them tyrannical ones too, for such we 
 have certainly seen Republics in their worst tendencies. f But is this 
 as bad as the situation of things in Africa, where all believe them- 
 selves instruments, absolute tools, and play -things in one man's hand, 
 for his mere sport and pleasure. ? Is the state of Democracy equal to 
 this, either in misery or degradation, for this last too is something? No- 
 body can say it, nobody can think it— Nobody can compare two 
 states, in the one of which at least, men are treated as human crea- 
 tures, and not as brutes, and savages.* 
 
 But it will be said, perhaps, that it would not be a Despotism, 
 if you introduced the rule of exclusion, at forming — What 
 would it be then ? An Aristocracy, or an Oligarchy ? Not to men- 
 tion that it is not clear how far these Governments are preferable 
 
 + See France under Roberspierre. 
 
 * See histories of Africa, and page 27, where these very Governments are pointed out as the 
 worst of all, not being so much the eleration of the soiereigo, as the depression of the humaa race. 
 
 Said would 
 not be a 
 Despotism. 
 
AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POWER NONE EXCLUDED. 51 
 
 to Democracies, for if they are quieter on the one hand, they are 
 more constantly oppressive on the other, as witness the State of 
 Venice,* how are you sure that the few would stop at that? How do 
 vou know that they would not go on to a Despotism ? Might we not Might not 
 
 . we as well 
 
 as well say, that the multitude with no exclusion at all, would stop say would 
 at a good general government, and then you would have both order, ^cncy ?* 
 and liberty ? 
 
 The only fair way of reasoning then, is to take PRINCIPLES in their Oaiyfair 
 extremes, and taking them in their extremes, we say that Democracy, princi ° 
 the broadest you can suppose, is preferable to Despotism— For if once f^^ 
 you exclude a single person at the moment of forming Governments (at treme » 
 the moment of forming, be it remembered we speak) there is no stopping 
 afterwards, you must go the full length of the PRINCIPLE— That men 
 will not do a thing, is no way of reasoning, when we are talking of 
 PRINCIPLES— It is not what they will do, but what they can do, that 
 forms the whole of the consideration — There, "what may be, must be," if 
 we mean to speak with any certainty — But we can take it either way Can take it 
 
 If you say that they are to stop, we say that a good general Govern- both ***"• 
 
 ment is better than an Aristocracy, or Oligarchy — If you chuse them to 
 go on, we say, that a Democracy, the widest you can suppose, is pre- 
 ferable to a Despotism. 
 
 But there is indeed little chance, taking the world as it is, that at the j^e chanM 
 moment of forming Governments,the multitude(even with no exclusion) Jf^f e mul " 
 will proceed to any very dangerous extremity — Though it is a conse- to the widest 
 quence of a general spirit prevailing at such a time, that there will be l 
 a general Government, yet it is by no means so, that that spirit being 
 broadly extended, will produce the widest possible institution. There 
 the reasoning stops. At such a moment, men are apt to be led by 
 the wise, and prudent, and if you examine history you will find, that 
 
 • Written in the year 1798, then the oldest in the world. 
 
 Ha 
 
Not so clear 
 that some 
 
 52 AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POWER NONE EXCLUDED. 
 
 it is not, when a Lycurgus, or Solon are constituting, (as far 
 as they did constitute*) that the multitude are troublesome, but 
 when a Cleon, or Alcibiades are agitating — It is afterwards in the 
 confusion and conflict of parties — And this very naturally, for the 
 multitude never consider themselves as interested in any thing but 
 Civil rights, till led on by others, f* and if aught, are too easy about 
 power, as legitimately bearing upon the purposes of Government — Now 
 take the other side of the question. If once you begin to contract, 
 one win not ft is not quite so clear, that some one, or other will not chuse to be a 
 
 chuse to be 
 
 a tyrant. tyrant. 
 
 With surmis- But with this we have nothing to do — It is not with probabilities, 
 
 wnot in s to an( j surm ises, that we converse, but with " strict conclusions drawn 
 
 u from accurate PRINCIPLES" — Taking then these as our ground , 
 
 we say, that CIVIL PRIVILEGES are the criterion of every thing — 
 
 That they are the STANDARD of everything— That they must deter- 
 
 Exclusion mine every thing — Beginning then from these, we find, that no exclu- 
 
 stroy Civil sion at such a moment is compatible with Civil privileges, for any 
 
 r,ghts ' exclusion would totally destroy them. 
 
 How then "We think then, that there can be no doubt upon the subject 
 now — We think, that there can be no question, or difficulty further. 
 You acknowledge Civil privileges, as all must do, to be the great rule, 
 the grand test, the determining standard and criterion of every thing — 
 Acknowledging them then as such, how can you talk of exclusion, 
 Would intro- at the moment of forming Governments — Exclusion at such a mo- 
 government, nient, would destroy Civil rights, for exclusion would introduce a 
 close Government. 
 
 * See Lycurgus, Solon, and others* 
 + See Book II. Last Chapter* 
 
ON FORMING GOVERNMENTS, QUESTIONS, &c. 55 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 THAT AT THE MOMENT OP FORMING GOVERNMENTS, ALL QUESTIONS MUST 
 
 BE DETERMINED BY A MAJORITY. 
 
 THIS is a consequence of the last chapter — For we agreed to ex- Consequence 
 elude none — What their does it signify, whether we exclude them °f th f last 
 
 P J chapter. 
 
 nominally, or really, whether by giving no voice at all, or a superiority, 
 or superexcellence of voices, tothe same person ? All then must be equal 
 (at the moment of forming be it remembered we speak) and if all be 
 equal, what superiority can we have but a majority, what predo- 
 minance, but that of numbers, where all are of equal value ? 
 
 And that all must be of equal value, at such a moment, would ap- Would ap- 
 pear from other circumstances, even if it did not from the last chapter, Pf* rtr . om 
 
 * . . " othercircum. 
 
 that is, from it's being necessary for preserving Civil rights — For at stances. 
 
 the moment of forming Governments, what can make one man's voice 
 
 of greater value than another's ? Is he richer, or better born, or has 
 
 he any authority ?* There is no Government as yet to attach these No artificial 
 
 things, or any merit to them, therefore in that way, and in an artifi- then." "'*" 
 
 cial point of view, they cannot enter into consideration. 
 
 Nor if we revert to the PRINCIPLES of nature, that is, our for- No natural, 
 mation by PROVIDENCE, are we one whit better — If a man be 
 stronger, or cleverer, or handsomer, than another, what consideration 
 ought he to have on account of these things? PROVIDENCE has not 
 said whether he should avail himself of them at all, or how far he 
 should be allowed, if he were so authorized. PIE has only said that 
 Civil rights must be preserved (see Book I.) and it has appeared that 
 
 * See the inequalities of men, proceeding from riches, from rank, or from power. Book II. 
 Chap. II. 
 
54 ON FORMING GOVERNMENTS, QUESTIONS, &c. 
 
 the only way of preserving them at such a moment, is avoiding any 
 preference — Thus then it appears that there can be no natural su- 
 periority at such a time, nor if there were, that we should know 
 how to appreciate it. 
 No other Neither then upon a natural, nor an artificial, ground, can there 
 
 way of de- , . . 
 
 terminiog be any pretence to superiority, at the moment of forming governments — 
 
 joVit/ * ma " ^ty consequence, all must be determined by a majority, for when all 
 
 are equal, there is no other way of establishing any predominance, or 
 
 prevalence. 
 
 Notneces- Not that we mean to say, as we observed before (see last chapter 
 
 pou. ° * parallelly) that it is necessary to come to a poll for this majority, or 
 
 that a government is bad, if not so formed — We mean no such thing — 
 
 We mean not to talk of a question, nor the probability of a question 
 
 only of what would take place, if it were to happen — That if then any 
 
 prevalence, or preference of persons were to be established, it would 
 
 be fatal to Civil privileges. 
 
 Majority But to this it may be objected, that a majority may be wrong— 
 
 best way. ^^ . g a m i nor ity never so ? The former have equal abilities, and a 
 
 better chance to be right from being the greater number— It is not an 
 
 infallible way but it is the best — It should then be taken.* 
 
 All this however is nothing to the purpose, it is only probable reason- 
 with PiUN-i nff _The real ground is, that we converse with PRINCIPLES— 
 ly way. " Conversing then with PRINCIPLES, in the only way we can 
 converse with them, that is, preserving Civil privileges, we say, that 
 there is no other way of preserving them, at the moment of forming 
 Governments (of forming Governments be it remembered we speak) 
 than " excluding no person frorri bis vote," if it should come to a vote, 
 and " determining ail questions by a majority/' 
 
 * Wboever rejects PRINCIPLE because it cannot always be followed, declares, that be- 
 cause be cannot be as right as he would, he will be as wrong as he can. 
 
POLITICALLY EQUAL BEFORE GOVERNMENT, NOT SO AFTER. 5$ 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 THAT IT DOES NOT FOLLOW PROM MEN BEING " POLITICALLY EQUAL," OR 
 " EQUAL IN POWER/* BEFORE GOVERNMENT, THAT THEY SHOULD DE SO, 
 
 AFTER. 
 
 THAT this is a sound proposition, appears from the following Depends up, 
 consideration — Why are men " politically equal/' or " equal in J > e I1 g S l " lpmu 
 power," before Government ? " Because any political inequality, 
 or difference of power then, would lead to a Civil one, or a dif- 
 ference in Civil privileges, afterwards" — But would that be the case 
 in any subsequent stage of the business ? Wouldany political in- 
 equality, or difference of power, then, produce a Civil one? That is 
 a point to be enquired into — It is not then a consequence in itself — 
 It depends upon circumstances. * 
 
 * There cannot be a stronger proof that Political rights, or rights to power, are not li on account 
 '* of themselves," for if they were M on account of themselves," it would be a consequence of 
 men being"politically equal,"or "equal in power" before Go?ernment,that they should be so after it, 
 and always — It is a consequence of men, being Civilly equal, i. e. equal in Civil privileges which 
 are " on account of themselves," before Government, that they should be so after it, and always. 
 Ii there any time when men can be mnrthered, robbed and oppressed ? 
 
56 MEN HAVING CIVIL PRIVILEGES NOT ENTITLED TO POWER. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 THAT IF MEN ARE POSSESSED OP THEIR CIVIL PRIVILEGES, VIZ. THEIR 
 LIVES* PROPERTIES, AND FREE-AGENCIES, THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED ULTI- 
 MATELY TO POWER. 
 
 Consequence THIS is a consequence of the foregoing — If Government originate 
 IfSt-biyin CIVIL PRIVILEGES, if CIVIL PRIVILEGES be the whole 
 refuted. END> and CAUSE of itj if « all title t0 Government, or power, 
 
 must come out of them/' as, we hope, has been fully proved,* then 
 there can be no POLITICAL right, or right to power, independantof 
 them — That is perfectly clear — But even if there could be such a right, 
 contrary to what has been proved, if it could come from any other 
 source than Civil privileges, then it must come from a right to power, 
 as power in itself, Political and Civil being the whole in the worldf — 
 But it has been proved, that there is no such title. J The question then 
 is determined — The idea thus doubly refuted. 
 Civil privi- Civil privileges they are every thing — They are as it were the 
 alpha * aw > anc * the prophets, the ALPHA, and OMEGA of Government, 
 and ome- After them, nothing is to be demanded. 
 
 vemment. At the same time,however,that nothing is to be demanded after them, 
 
 tiwiprivu 1 " they go a great way in conferring political privileges, or rights to 
 leges * power themselves. For it is certain that a considerable degree of 
 
 power, of what is called political right, (and what really is so, on ac- 
 count of Civil privileges) is necessary to preserve them. 
 Because can- ]? or ft j s verv dear, that, in no country, Civil privileges can be pre- 
 
 not be pre- 
 
 * See Chapter III. of this Book. 
 + See Chapter I. of this Book. 
 J See Book II. Chap. III. 
 
NOT ENTITLED TO POWER. 57 
 
 served long, unless there be a certain degree of power, which then served with, 
 becomes political right, to preserve them.* Such is the corruption out# 
 of human nature, that power is necessary to counteract power. But 
 we shall suppose the contrary for a moment — We shall suppose a very 
 small minority, or even a single individual sitting in the heart of a 
 country, and possessing the whole power of it, yet preserving, neces- If majority 
 sarily, and inevitably by the Constitution of it its Civil privileges, the serve, no* 
 question will then arise, how far the majority, the great majority, have ^jjj 1 ^^ 
 a right to claim power ? We answer, that they have no such title, 
 (the case never occurred, but we suppose it for the sake of argument) 
 and we answer, upon the ground, that it would be supposing 
 a right to power. But it may seem hard perhaps, that the great 
 majority of the country should be deprived of power, while the small 
 minority have it — But where is the hardship of this, if their Civil privileges 
 be preserved ? It is only for Civil privileges, that there is power at all, 
 and it is from our sense of the value of these privileges, and of the'neces- 
 sity of power to preserve them, that we ever think it any hardship, and 
 we cannot get rid of the idea — What makes it clear that it is no hard- 
 ship, is, that this supposed country has got the ends of Government al- 
 ready, those ends, * for which it was, and without which it would 
 " never have been" — Another thing is if they have a right, they 
 may prosecute it, and so in struggling for power, get a worse Govern- 
 ment, or lose the end for the means, which is impossible— But- what ^'s ht to 
 
 1 t claim, na- 
 
 ends the question at once, is, that if there be such a right, it must turai, or 
 
 IT 1 1 fl PI A 1 
 
 be either natural or artificial. If natural, i. e. original, it has been 
 
 * a Not in any individual, particularly, or separately, or as a property, or as power," (like 
 Civil privileges) but " generally and aggregately, in the community, as a means of preserving Civil 
 " privileges." See on this Chap, III. of this Book, on the Origin of Political right. 
 
 I 
 
5S 
 
 None. 
 
 ALL GOVERNMENT EITHER LEGAL OR ARBITRARY. 
 
 proved that there is no such right to power.* If artificial, the ends 
 of Government are secured already .f 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 THAT ALL GOVERNMENT IS BITHER LEGAL OR ARBITRARY. J 
 
 .„ ~ WE are now come to the formation of Government, and now that 
 
 AH Govern- 
 ment either we are come to it, we say, that all is either Legal, or Arbitrary — 
 
 Arbitrary. Legal, which proceeds by fixed and settled rule (lex, as the nameim- 
 
 * See Book II. Ch. III. 
 
 + By men not being entitled to power, if they possess Civil rights, wc do not mean, that by 
 the possession of Civil rights, they are disqualified from possessing power, or have not a fair pretea. 
 sion to it along with others. We only mean, that they suffer " no injury, no injustice, stricto 
 jure* and ultimately, in being deprived of it." — In legal language, there is no right without a 
 remedy — If a single individual were positively, and directly, absolutely, and unqualifiedly de. 
 prived of a Civil right, told he mast be murtheredy for the public good, he would be entitled, 
 stricto jure , and ultimately, to overturn a Government, if he could, and take any chance to 
 help himself, and this upon the PRINCIPLE of » Fiat JUSTITIA ruat coelum"— But would 
 this be the case with power? No, — If many, many were deprived of that, they must be content 
 to put up without it, except as necessary for Civil privileges-— This then ends the question— 
 This, if possible, shews it more clearly. 
 
 + It may be a question here, whether there be not some Governments of a mixed kind, or 
 rather, whether all have not been so mixed, inasmuch, as we have never yet seen any of a per- 
 fectly Legal, or perhaps perfectly Arbitrary, nature — That is, we have never yet seen, any, where 
 no will, absolutely no will, entered on the one hand, or no law, absolutely no law on the other — 
 But if we go to this, we may go to endless distinctions — The next question may be how far 
 mixed, and so on in infinitum. — The only way then to take them, is, like all these subjects, per- 
 fect in their kind, so to define them, and then to characterize other things as more or less ap- 
 proaching them—This is the only way— Then we know what we are about— Then we have 
 clear ideas. , 
 
GOVERNMENT IS OF FIXED AND SETTLED RULE. 
 
 plies) and Arbitrary, by the dictates of its own will, and pleasure, 
 (arbitriiwi)— And there can be but these two kinds of Government 
 in the world, for power must either proceed with rule, or without it. 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 THAT LEGAL GOVERNMENT IS A GOVERNMENT OF FIXED AND SETTLED 
 
 RULE. 
 
 BUT the foregoing is not enough — It is not enough to state that Foregoiug 
 all Governments are either Legal or Arbitrary — We ought also toen- n ° e "° US 
 quire a little into what constitutes them such, seeing, that they are 
 the principal hinge upon which the comforts of a man's life depend, 
 as far at least as he can have any external guard or assurance for 
 them. 
 
 And seeing that Government is this principal hinge, this pivot, upon Legal and 
 which man's human happiness turns, we have to observe in the first gaui e ™ T 
 place, that the distinction between a Legal, and Arbitrary Govern- °. pen » ami 
 ment, corresponds exactly to that which we made in our seventh chap- 
 ter of this book, between an open, and a close one. \ An open, 
 which has in view the interests of all, and protects the interests of 
 
 all, that is, the Civil privileges of all, equally ; and a close, which has 
 
 in view the interests of some, and protects the interests of some, that 
 
 is, more than the Civil privileges of some, particularly. 
 
 For if a Government be Arbitrary, or of will, that is, of the will of any Because men 
 
 one man, or set of men, or description of men, it will consult the in- ! c * n to , theur 
 
 r interests. 
 
 terests of that one man, or set of men, or description — That is human 
 
 12 
 
60 GOV ERNMENT IS OF FIXED AND SETTLED RULE. 
 
 nature — We need not go about to prove this — We might as well at- 
 tempt to prove, that a bowl has a bias, or any other the propensity of 
 nature — The fact is so — And seeing that it is so, the bowl will always 
 follow it's bias, and so will self, or what is connected with self, or 
 the like of one's self, personal, particular, or appropriate, invariably lean 
 to its interests. 
 
 That being the case then, a Government of will, or an Arbitrary one, 
 regulated by one man, or set of men, or description of men, will 
 always be a Government of closeness — Of closeness strictly, and pro- 
 perly so called, that is, devoted to the interests of some sort of men 
 particularly, and a Legal, being conducted by general will, the 
 contrary. 
 What con. Seeino- then, that this is one, and the same distinction, one, and the 
 
 titutcs them. " 
 
 same description of Governments, a Legal, and Arbitrary, an open, and 
 a close, let us pursue it — Let us take up Legal, and Arbitrary, 
 open, and close Governments, and examine them strictly — Let us see 
 into their natures, their constitution, and their essence, and endeavour 
 to find out what really makes up, and composes them. 
 Vain distinc- But nere we ought to observe, first, that if Legal, and Arbitrary turn 
 tion# out what we imagine them to be, there never ought to have been this 
 
 distinction— All ought equally to have contributed to the preservation 
 of Civil privileges, all ought equally to have been exempted from plea- 
 sure, and discretion — This however has not been the case. — We must 
 therefore take it, as the fact has happened. 
 Legal per- Taking it then as the fact has happened, we say, that Legal 
 *°ho make Government is a Government of settled rule, and Arbitrary, of 
 laws'aitefed varying WB> and inclination— But how is this rule to be settled, and 
 mature!/, what makes the varying of this will, and inclination ? Law may be 
 settled two ways, either as to the persons who make it, or as to the 
 manner of making, and altering it — How these persons are to be con- 
 stituted and fixed in Government, so that they cannot be changed 
 
GOVERNMENT IS OF FIXED AND SETTLED RULE. 61 
 
 at all (if well fixed at first) and how the laws which they make, must 
 be altered, so as to be altered as deliberately, and maturely as pos- 
 sible, when they call for alteration, is another thing, but this in the 
 mean time — And the less liable the former are to be changed at all> 
 and the latter without due, and mature deliberation, the more of a 
 Legal Government it will be. 
 
 But it will appear perhaps, that if the fixture of customs and laws Persian and 
 make a legal Government, the Persian Monarchy was such, because ntrcMes. °" 
 it had fixed laws, so much so that those of the Medes, and Persians 
 were proverbial— That these however were considered [as Arbitrary 
 Governments — But there is no contradiction in this — The laws and 
 customs which were so unchangeable might relate to matters of re- 
 ligion, or even giving power to the Prince himself. 
 
 For it is the fixture of laws, and customs, that distinguishes Legal, Fixture of 
 or lawful Government, from that which is absolute, and Arbitrary — It g anty of" 
 is the fixture, the firm establishment of these laws, that excluding Govern - 
 
 & ments. 
 
 the will, the occasional, sudden will, of any one man, or set of men, 
 or description of men, which has no law, but its own motive, no rule, 
 but its own wantonness, and desiring, that constitutes the Legality of 
 Governments. 
 
 For if you ask any one, what a Legal Government is, the idea that Excludes 
 presents itself immediately to his mind is something that's fixed, and prlce * 
 settled, not wilful — Tied down by law, not abandoned to caprice — Fix- 
 ed, settled, and established by rule, establishment or custom, so as 
 to exclude caprice, or inclination. 
 
 But this you will say, supposes always, that these laws are found- Legality 
 ed on JUSTICE— -Not at all— JUSTICE does not constitute the Le- tToWith 
 gality of laws — It i9 only because laws are generally consentane- JUST,CE - 
 ous to JUSTICE, and that men act very unjustly without them, 
 that we couple the ideas, there is no natural connexion between 
 them. 
 
 C»" 
 
 
62 
 
 GOVERNMENT IS OF FIXED AND SETTLED RULE. 
 
 Depends 
 upon fix- 
 ture. 
 
 Even if a 
 law for 
 arbitrary 
 power, legal 
 
 Fixed rule, 
 whether 
 good or bad 
 
 Arbitrary 
 unfixed. 
 
 Legal not 
 change by 
 caprice or 
 inclination. 
 
 Negative of 
 sic volo, sic 
 
 For the laws of a country may be as bad as they will, that will not 
 shew that the Government is illegal, (without law) only, that the 
 laws are bad — Let them be good, or bad, pernicious, or salutary, will 
 is equally excluded.* 
 
 Then, says some one if there were a law, for a Monarchy, an Aris- 
 tocracy, or a Democracy, with power in .their hands, to do what they 
 pleased, would you call this a Legal Government ? Certainly as far 
 as that goes — It would be a play upon words, because law is a rule 
 of conduct, and this would be none, but taking the word against itself 
 it would be a Legal Government. 
 
 Law then is a fixed rule of conduct, whether good, or bad, bene- 
 ficent, or pernicious. By consequence, a Government of law, is a 
 Government of fixed rule, without any relation to it's nature, and 
 tendency. 
 
 A Legal Government then is a Government of law, or settled rule of 
 conduct, an Arbitral^, a Government of caprice and inclination — A 
 Legal Government is a fixed thing — An Arbitrary, an unfixed — A Legaj 
 Government is an immutable thing (properly immutable) — An Arbi- 
 trary, a mutable. 
 
 What then says some one, if laws ever change, you say, it is not a 
 Legal Government— No, we don't say that — We only say, it must 
 not change by caprice or inclination — It must either not change at 
 all, or change in such a way, that caprice, or inclination shall have no 
 hand in it. 
 
 We have then got one step further— A Legal Government is either a 
 Government of fixed rule, or so far fixed, that it must not change by 
 caprice or inclination— It is the negative of Arbitrary will, or inclina- 
 
 * A Legal Government, or rather an attempt at Legal Government, may be bad, bar- 
 ring the certainty of it , and an Arbitrary, good, under a good Administrator. 
 
ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT, OR OF WILL AND CAPRICE. (53 
 
 tion, " Sic volo sicjubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas." Mere will must have 
 nothing to do with it. 
 
 And we may add here, that if we want an illustration of Legal, and Wea of Le- 
 Arbitrary Government, we shall find it in the history of an tien t trary infer- " 
 nations —Those of Assyria, Persia, Babylonia, most of Asia, Africa, Jf s d to f " m 
 with the earlier periods of Greece, give a picture of the latter, those 
 of Carthage, Sparta, Athens, Rome, and most of the Grecian Repub- 
 lics, of (attempts at the) the former.* 
 
 This then is the idea of a Legal Government, a Government of law, 
 and of Arbitrary, a Government of will and inclination. 
 
 ■ 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 THAT ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT IS A GOVERNMENT OF WILL OR CAPRICE. 
 
 AND if Legal Government be a Government of rule (as the name Arbitrary of 
 we said, implies) so is Arbitrary, a Government of \v ill—Of mere wil .' or ca ' 
 will and caprice, not subject to the direction of any precept — As 
 Legal is the exclusion of will, so is Arbitrary, the exclusion of law. 
 
 And here it may be observed, that it has been usual, to take the Extends all 
 distinction between Arbitrary, and Legal Governments, as resting up- throu § h Go - 
 on the relation between the Governing, and the Governed — As if it 
 touched upon the connection between Prince and Subject, and no- 
 thing elsef — But it does no such thing — There is another surely, and 
 much truer way of taking it, and that is, all through Government, 
 
 * We cannot too often notice, that there never have been, we believe, any perfectly Legal, or 
 perfectly Arbitrary, Governments in the world — But the best way, we also think, is to define them 
 perfect, and then leave them to explain themselves. 
 
 + Prince is taken in the sense of Sovereign, or the person, or persons possessing the Supreme 
 power, whether King, Nobility, or People. 
 
64 ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT ONE OF WILL AND CAPRICE. 
 
 considering it, as not only implying the relation between the Govern- 
 ing, and the Governed, or Prince, and Subject, but also between the 
 Governed among themselves, and that through all their situations 
 and connections. 
 Prince may For this relation between the Governed among themselves, as ap- 
 betweenSub- pty* n g to Arbitrary Governments, does most certainly as much exist in 
 jects. these, and constitute as clear a ground of distinction, as between the 
 
 Governing and the Governed — For what is Arbitrary ? Acting as 
 the person pleases— If then, the Prince or Sovereign, no matter 
 whether King, Nobility, or People, act as they please, cannot 
 they suspend any laws there may be, between Subject, and Subject, as 
 much as between themselves and the Governed ? 
 Inferred from But indeed from the very meaning of the word Arbitrary, we 
 might infer as much, without going to the power of the Prince — For 
 what does Arbitrary, as we said, mean? Will — If there be will then, 
 if the Government be properly Arbitrary, taking it in the extreme, 
 will must extend all through, it must reach from one end of the Go- 
 vernment to the other.* 
 Nothin fix- But there is no occasion for this. We may barely content ourselves 
 with observing, that in an Arbitrary Government, if it be Arbitrary 
 at all, the Prince or Sovereign, be he who he will, King, Nobility, 
 or People, must have the power of suspending the laws, and then in- 
 stantly all is Arbitrary — Nothing can be Legal that is not fixed, and 
 where there's a suspending power, suspending, of Civil, Criminal, and 
 Constitutional, or rather all Civil, relating to the citizen, as we said, 
 there's nothing fixed. f 
 
 * Could there be a plainer proof of this, than inantient Persia, where the Satraps, or Govern- 
 ors of Provinces, notwithstanding they had the most Supreme, and Absolute power within their 
 own Territories, were no more than slaves of the Supreme Lord or Master over all ? And were 
 so called, as witness Xenophon, who when talking of Cjtus, the Younger, who waged war 
 against his brother Artaxerxes, terms him A0YA02. — See Xenophon Kv f a Ava&er. 
 
 t All these remarks must be taken generally — There may not, as we said, have ever been 
 
LEGAL GOVERNMENT BETTER FOR CIVIL PRIVILEGES. &5 
 
 Here then an Arbitrary power goes from one end of the Government 
 to the other, and is not more to be considered between Prince and 
 Subject, than between the Subjects among themselves — It is no- 
 wise confined — It extends all through — Extending then all through, . 
 what is it? 
 
 It is an absolute power in the Prince, be he King, Nobility, or An absolute 
 People, of doing what he pleases — Of not being confined by any law, £££«.* 
 of not consulting any rule, but his own inclination. 
 
 As Le^al Government then is a Government of fixed institute, so is Legal Go- 
 Arbitrary, of will, and inclination — As Legal Government is a Govern- Government 
 ment of rule, so is Arbitrary, a privation, and exclusion of it. trary, 0> ex- l " 
 
 elusion of it. 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 THAT LEGAL GOVERNMENT IS THE BETTER FOR CIVIL PRIVILEGES. 
 
 AND this I think, cannot well be doubted by any one, who looks Cannot be 
 to the difference between Legal,and Arbitrary Government — For what anywhoeL 
 is Legal ? Is it not a Government of rule ? Of rule then it must be amiae * 
 for preserving Civil Privileges — For (barring that such are the end of 
 Government, and it will appear that Arbitrary is none at all) can we 
 expect that men would ever make rules against their Lives, Proper- 
 ties and Free-agencies ? That is not to be looked for — They would 
 certainly make rules to preserve them — They would make rules to 
 render themselves as happy as possible, and it appears that all hap- 
 
 Gorernments of a perfectly Legal, or perfectly Arbitrary description, that is, where absolute!/ 
 no will entered, or absolutely no law, nothing fixed (except perhaps in Africa) — But these re- 
 marks, as we say, are to be taken generally, the Governments defined perfect, and then others 
 distinguished more or less, as approaching them. 
 
 I 
 
66 LEGAL GOVERNMENT BETTER FOR CIVIL PRIVILEGES. 
 
 piness is contained in these privileges — We must then think them very 
 bungling indeed, and such as we see them in nothing else, if attempt- 
 ing to preserve these privileges, what they made for the purpose 
 came no nearer it, than that which was nowise so intended, or de- 
 signed, nay calculated for a contrary purpose, viz. Arbitrary Govern- 
 ment. 
 If did not But if it did not appear from the intention of man, that Legal Go- 
 appear from vernme nt must be the better for Civil privileges, it would from what 
 
 intention ot r © > 
 
 man, would lie has actually accomplished — For what has been his constant en- 
 
 from what he .. . .. . . . .. , . „ , 
 
 has accom- deavour in establishing, or abolishing Governments, but to preserve 
 hshed. these privileges (these sacred privileges in Government, as we may 
 
 call them, humanly speaking) of Life, Property, and Free-agency ? 
 They are the only ones, as we have observed, that he has uniformly, 
 and univeisally felt, constantly struggled and rebelled for, having in 
 this way almost the divine impression upon them* — And if men have 
 endeavoured to preserve them, they have succeeded in some degree — 
 They have always made something when in any way left to them- 
 selves, that was better for Civil rights, though falling far short of 
 the real thing, so incalculably better that it is foolish almost to state it, 
 than Arbitrary Government. 
 Examine Examine the attempts at Legal Government, though, far 
 
 ^ em 1 p ^ o at as we observe, from being strictly so, and see whether they w r ere 
 irernment. not all of this description — Though certainly not genuine, or pre- 
 serving Civil privileges in a full degree, as will be explained here- 
 after, whether they did not better do so, than those of a Monar- 
 _ . D chical, or Despotic nature — Whether the Democracies of Greece, 
 
 Grecian, Ro- * l 
 
 man, Cartha. the Republic of Rome, even the Republic of Carthage, which was 
 
 g101 ' Aristocratic, did not better preserve Civil rights than their own, 
 
 that is, the Grecian Monarchies. They were it is true, more, or less^ 
 
 * See Book II- Chap. V. 
 
LEGAL GOVERNMENT BETTER FOR CIVIL PRIVILEGES. 67 
 
 inclined to different spirits, as will also be explained, but they all pre- 
 served Civil rights in some measure. If different ORDERS had their will, 
 they had it in the shape of law, which is something — Perfectly 
 different from the Sic volo, sicjubeo, of Arbitrary Governments, they 
 were obliged to maintain some respect for public opinion, some de- 
 cency and decorum in it — Would any one ever thing of comparing Persian and 
 the Governments of Greece, let them be Democracies, or Aristo- m^™^ 
 cracies, or what they would, with the Babylonian, or Persian Monar- 
 chies ? 
 
 But indeed that Legal Governments are the better for Civil privileges, Might ap- 
 might appear from the nature of the subject itself, without needing Jatur/o? 
 further illustration, when we consider the corruption of mankind — If subject, 
 we were all Angels, then indeed, there would be no occasion/br go- 
 vernment — There would be no need for any fetter, and restriction — 
 But as long as we are imperfect beings, as long as we are infirm, and 
 incomplete, as long as we are not as the Greeks call it, otvrxptiq, the 
 very name of a rule is a recommendation, the very idea of a re- 
 striction is a merit. 
 
 And the more so, when we consider the tendency of power to cor- Poisonous 
 rupt, and what a poisonous tendency, and influence it has on the ,nfluence of 
 mind — Prosperity itself is apt to pervert, and breed an insensibility 
 and want of compassion to the woes of others — The instance of Hazael 
 in scripture,* is by no means singular. But besides this, the very 
 idea of power, breeds a notion of right, for when a man is able, of 
 lias been, to do a thing for a certain time, he believes he has a 
 
 *See 2 Kings, Chap. viii. ver. 12 and 13 — i{ And Hazael said, why weepeth my Lord ? And 
 i* he answered, " Because 1 know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel— Their 
 '* strong holds wilt thou set on fire, and their young men wilt thou slay with the sword, and wilt 
 " dash their children, and rip up their women with child"— And Hazael said, il But what is thy 
 11 servant a dog, that he should do this great thing ?" And Elisha answered/ 4 The Lord hath shew- 
 " ed me that thou shalt be king oyer Syria." 
 
 K2 
 
(58 LEGAL GOVERNMENT BETTER FOR CIVIL PRIVILEGES. 
 
 right to do it. When we consider the joint effect of these upon 
 the mind, we cannot wonder if their influence should be astonish- 
 ing. 
 Nothing else And nothing else than this, can account for the amazing excess we 
 than this have seen man commit, when he has got into power, as if he had abso- 
 
 account for 7 ° l 
 
 the excesses lutely changed his nature — For the enormities he has perpetrated when 
 he has been so placed, and all (except a few) more or less, according to 
 their different dispositions, and circumstances— In Monarchy, it was 
 more intense, fin Aristocracy, more diffused, J in a Populace, or Peo- 
 ple, more malignant and violent § — But all somehow — This is 
 Polybius* cxvaxuxAwo-i? ?roXiT»«i/— Monarchy by its excesses, says he, turns 
 into Despotism, Despotism into Aristocracy from the resistance of the 
 Nobles, Aristocracy into Oligarchy from the same corruption, 
 Oligarchy into Democracy from the impatience of the People, Demo- 
 cracy into Ochlocracy, from a similar abuse, and Ochlocracy 
 back into Monarchy, and Despotism again, from the intole- 
 rance of the nation for these disorders, and their desire of a 
 master, no matter who, to con troul them * — All gave into excesses 
 when they got into power, and all in their own fashion, perpetrated 
 in another way, the very things that had brought their predeces- 
 sors to ruin. 
 Appears From all then that can be seen, from the intention of Govern- 
 
 tcntion of ment, from the way of executing that intention, from the corruption 
 
 + See Roman Ernpcrors. 
 
 % See Venice. 
 
 § See France, under Robespierre. 
 
 •The last part of this picture was exactly exhibited in Frauce, for it was precisely becawse the 
 nation were so tired of Revolutions, that they relapsed into the hands of Buonaparte— And it re- 
 mains yet to see how far the remaining part of the paiuting, may be filled up — Certainly they 
 have been completed in other nations — Meantime, see the whole of the passage alluded lOf in Po- 
 lybius, from p. 11. Vol. II. Ed. Lips, to p. 13. "Aurij woXtrvw uvxKvxXutriSj avrri $wius Wilv>»[m&) kxQ x 
 %i lAtraGa?&.ti } kxi ptQiarxTxi) x«< Ttxkii EI2 ATT A KxrxnXy rx xxrx r«f nOAITEIAS. 
 
ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT WORST FOR CIVIL PRIVILEGES. 69 
 
 of human nature, from the tendency of power to pervert further, Govern, 
 and above all, from the examples, which reinforce, and strengthen ^Letai 
 this theory, it most prominently, and most evidently, appears, that the j^^J*- 
 restriction of Legal Government, its rule, and essence, is better, how for Civil 
 
 Drivi lC£TCS 
 
 incalculably better for Civil privileges, than Arbitrary ! ! ! tha n Arbi- 
 
 trary. 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 THAT ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT IS THE WORSE FOR CIVIL PRIVILEGES, AND 
 
 THE WORST POSSIBLE. 
 
 THIS is a consequence of the former — If a Government of law, Conse- 
 of fixed rule, be the better for Civil privileges, then of course, a Go- foregoing 
 vernment of will, of wanton, and pure will, must be the worse, and 
 the worst possible — And it is evident that it must be so, when we con* 
 sider all the injuries, to which men must be exposed in these Govern- 
 ments — It may perhaps happen to be sure, that Civil privileges 
 are tolerably preserved, but this is the very mischief, that 
 all is uncertain — All lies at the whim of the Prince, be he King, 
 Kobility or People, Civil, Criminal, and Constitutional, or rather all 
 Civil, (regarding the Citizen), as we have so often said, and may be sus- 
 pended at his pleasure — Can it be called protection, when he, or 
 they, or their favourites (and this applies equally to King, Nobility, 
 and People) * hoping to be screened by their masters, may interrupt, 
 or embarrass, or overturn at discretion ?f It would be better almost, 
 that all were abolished at once, or even that the worst things prac- 
 
 * To H©02 to at/To, kxi xpfyu hairorutx ruv Qthriowv, kxi rx r'H'MlMATA, vtnftp tnu rx EniTArMATA* 
 Kxi AHMArnrOS, xxi KOAA3, »u cvroi xzi uvx^oyoi' y.xt f*x/\t<rrx ty.xre^oi itu^ \xzrsgois i<Ty(vn<Tii ) #f 
 {jui K0AAKE2 itxgx TYPANNOIS, 01 h AHMArftrOJ irxgx rots AHMOlS rots rowan, Arist, 
 
 + Law liable to be overturned may be compared to a frozen rirer half thawed, which is nejthe? 
 jiolid enough to walk upon, nor liquid enough to swim through. 
 
70 ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT OUT OF THE QUESTION. 
 
 ticable, were made into law, and institute. Then indeed, men would 
 know what they had to depend upon, and what they had to expect, 
 which is some consolation, 
 
 " Una salus victis, nullam sperare salutem." 
 
 One pro- And this shews what these Governments are, when even their worst 
 
 for'ciVlL im scme ^ s as ^ were,are benefits,when made into a certainty — Nowhere 
 
 PR i vi- i s but one protection,and that is,substantial,solid institute, which cannot, 
 
 fixed'in- and will not be, overturned — Which either cannot be changed at all, or 
 
 ' cannot, be changed, without good, or apparently good, reasons — Which 
 
 must be gradual, and deliberate, and sensible — Which either must be 
 
 settled so, that it cannot change, or changing, must resemble the 
 
 changes of nature, which are ever effected, without altering its causes — 
 
 .This is right law, this is the proper guard for CIVIL PRIVILEGES— 
 
 This is the difference betweeen Legal, and ArbitraryGovernments,which, 
 
 if we were to discuss them eternally, would ever return to the same 
 
 LEGAL, thing, that Legal are fixed and settled, Arbitrary unfixed, and incon- 
 
 ciViL 0r stant — This then being the difference between these Governments, 
 
 t fJ^es" d ^egal are tne better, how incalculably better for Civil privileges, and 
 
 ARBi- Arbitrary the worse,and the worst possible. 
 TRARY, J ■ 
 
 -worst uos- __ ___ __ __> 
 
 siLle. , 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 THAT ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT IS TO BE THROWN OUT OF THE QUESTION. 
 
 WHEN the antient Megarenses came to consult the Oracle, in 
 what rank of nations, they stood, the answer was 
 
 * The ideas of LEGAL and ARBITRARY Government correspond to those of TNEZIOZ 
 and N0©02 among the Greeks, LEGITIMATE and SPURIOUS. 
 
A BALANCE DEPENDS UPON THE DIVISION OF POWER. 71 
 
 CHAP. XVII. 
 
 THAT LEGAL GOVERNMENT DEPENDS UPON A BALANCE. 
 
 IF Arbitrary Government be a Government of will, Legal Go- *^ al Go. 
 
 J , , vernnuntde- 
 
 vernment must be an exclusion of it — And how is this to be accom- perfds upoa- 
 plislied ? By making such an opposition of wills, as shall prevent any a aance "~ 
 one will from leading, or predominating. 
 
 It is thus we obtain that joint will, that complicated and com- 
 pounded one, which is not the will of any one man, or set of men, 
 or description of men, but of several jointly. 
 
 Thus it is, that we correct the imperfections of our nature, and 
 obtain an artificial virtue — Thus it is, that we avoid that swing, which 
 is the mischief of Arbitrary Governments,and makes absolute power,no 
 human portion* — Thus it is that we get a moderation, and measure, a Only 
 middle and medium, by the clash of extremes, by the dash of wills, xion for" 
 which is the only BASIS of true law, the only FOUNDATION ^ U vern 
 for SOUND GOVERNMENT. meints. " 
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 
 
 THAT A BALANCE DEPENDS UPON A DIVISION OF POWER. 
 
 HOW can the wills be balanced, unless there be power to for- Balance de- 
 tify them ? aDfvisio P n°of 
 
 power. 
 * It was for this reason once very well said, that on the same ground, that the DEITY should 
 have, as HE has, Supreme power, no human being should be invested with the like authority. 
 
72 POWER EITHER LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, OR EXECUTIVE. 
 
 CHAP. XIX. 
 
 THAT A DIVISION OP POWER, DEPENDS UPON POWER, AND PERSONS. 
 
 Division of ^ Division of Power depends upon two things, viz. Power, and 
 
 power de- jt i o 
 
 pends upon Persons — It depends upon Power, as more maybe given to one Per- 
 Persons. son than another — It depends upon Persons, as one Person may be 
 natural \y stronger than another— First then, as to Power. 
 
 CHAP. XX. 
 
 THAT ALL POWER IS TO BE DIVIDED BY LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, 
 
 and EXECUTIVE.* 
 
 All political ALL political power is, properly speaking, Legislative, as it relates 
 legis either to the making of Jaws, or the executing them, which widely 
 LATIVE. speaking, includes their application — For whatever is done in any 
 
 country, is, or ought to be done according to law, and then it is 
 
 only following out 9 and realizing the law. 
 Intention of And what plainly shews that all political power is properly speak- 
 a*ppUed°aud in g> Legislative, is, that when a law is framed, it is the intention of 
 executed, that law, that it should be applied, and executed, that is judged upon, 
 
 • It must be seen, that by Power, is meant LEGAL power,as A'bifrary is now thrown out of the 
 question, and taking the thing in that way, there is nothing but LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and 
 EXECUTIVE — Every thing that is done" in Government, must be done by one or other of these 
 THKEE — It must be perceived, that issuing an edict like the Roman Emperors, or suspending a law, 
 or superseding the execution of a law, is all Arbitrary, it cannot therefore come into consideration — • 
 All then must return to the LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE^as far, as that goes, 
 the above being spurious. 
 
POWER EITHER LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, OR EXECUTIVE. 73 
 
 and enforced— That follows of course — Indeed, it is no more than 
 realizing the law — Till it is so judged on, and enforced, it is no law, 
 it is only an airy institute, (that is, if there be occasion for executing 
 it) without body, or substance — It had as well not be, and in some 
 cases, much better — For if the law be ill applied, that is, not properly 
 judged on, so that the innocent are confounded with the guilty, it had 
 better not be — And if, after the guilty are convicted, they are allowed 
 to escape, it had as well at least, not be — So also of Civil cases corres- 
 pondingly — So that it is evident, that the Judicial and Executive powers 
 are parts of theLegislative,andthattoo,in their first essence,and origin. 
 At the same time, as these powers have been usually considered legisla. 
 
 • TTVF ITT 
 
 as distinct, and have certainly a distinct weight in the Constitution of])j C i^ Lam i 
 a State, they shall be treated, as they necessarily must be, separately — tive U ~ 
 And treating them in this way, we say, that they comprehend the comprehend 
 whole force of Government — That they together make up that mass of every ing * 
 power, which we call Government, and contain in them, whatever can 
 be either desired, or could exist, or does exist in it. 
 
 For if we refer to the motives, which first induced men to Govern- Refer to mo. 
 ment, what could they be ? What, but to preserve their Lives, Pro- foment. " 
 perties, and Free-agencies, those natural PRIVILEGES Avhich have 
 been denominated, Civil, and without which, as we have seen, there 
 is no happiness in society* — And if this was their motive, and 
 their sole motive, what more effectual way could they take, indeed 
 what way could they take at all, but forbidding men to invade, 
 enquiring if they did invade, and punishing them for invading them ? 
 They could do nothing else than this— It was the sole protection they 
 could afford them. 
 
 Aye, but says some one, what do you say of Civil matters ? 
 What do you say of the protection, that is afforded men, by 
 adjusting the rights, and questions of property between one 
 
 * See Book III. Chap. I. II. III. 
 L 
 
74 POWER EITHER LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, OR EXECUTIVE. 
 
 another ? We say, that it is a more enlarged protection — The same 
 protection extended in another shape, arising from a more ad- 
 vanced state of society, but still within the LEGISLATIVE, JU- 
 DICIAL, and EXECUTIVE. 
 
 But still say they, this is not all — There is still something else want- 
 ing to protect Civil privileges — There is something wanting to render 
 this system of law, of which you talk, and which does protect them, 
 permanent — To take care, that it does not fall to decay, that it is not 
 destroyed either by foreigner internal enemies — In a word, to support it. 
 
 You mean the State — That we should have a force to defend, and 
 protect it — Fleets to cover it, troops to inarch out against its enemies, 
 treaties made, alliances confirmed, and strengthened, internal affairs 
 administered — Granted— All this is very necessary, and all this is within 
 the LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE-As it was 
 well said by Hume, " armies, forces, and fleets, treaties, alliances, and 
 ambassadors, are all to support the TWELVE JUDGES, it is only 
 doing the same thing in a different way.* 
 
 It appears then, that whatever is done, either for preserving Civil 
 privileges, or preserving the system, that is to preserve them, is to be 
 found in the circle of the LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXE- 
 CUTIVE. 
 ex^^nts ^ Ut settm g as ^ e tne motives to Government, that is, the ends men 
 powers. h ac i i n view, it might appear methinks from the speculative extent 
 of its powers that there could be no other, than these. — For what can we 
 conceive, beyond the LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXECU- 
 
 * We are, therefore, to look upon all the vast apparatus of our Government, as having ulti- 
 mately, no OTHER OBJECT or PURPOSE, but the DISTRIBUTION of JUSTICE, or in 
 other wonls,the SUPPORT of the TWELVE JUDGES— Kings,and Parliaments, ileets,aud armies, 
 officers of the court, and revenue, ambassadors, ministers, and privy counsellors, are all subor- 
 dinate in their END to this PART of administration — Even the Clergy, as their duty leads them 
 to inculcate morality, may justly be thought, so far as regards this world, to have no other useful 
 object of their institution. See Essays, Vol.1, p. 35. Oct. Ed» 
 
POWER EITHER LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, OR EXECUTIVE. jj 
 
 TIVE? What is our idea of governing ? Is it not directing men's 
 actions by fixed rules, let them be made by whom they will (for we 
 talk not of Arbitrary sway, of which there is no reason and account, 
 and which cannot therefore enter into any reasoning, and account,)* 
 and if this be our idea of governing, how can we direct them other- 
 wise, than by telling them what they are to do, enquiring if they do, 
 and punishing them for not doing it, and correspondingly in the Civil ? 
 There is no other way than this, nothing else in the whole circle of 
 regulation. 
 
 But setting aside the motives to Government, or the speculative ex- Actual prac. 
 tent of its powers, what do we see in actual practice ? What do we ce * 
 see, but either framing laws, or applying, or executing them ? What, 
 but either regulating the internal concerns of a State, or providing 
 for its defence against foreign enemies ? What, but either restrain- 
 ing the crimes, that perpetually arise, or confirming its strength, 
 by treaties and alliances ? What, but either public, or private* 
 foreign, or domestic, general, or particular? Either raising an 
 army, or punishing a crime, imposing a tax, or sending an ambassa- 
 dor? We see nothing else than this, nothing except in the deserts 
 of Asia, Africa, or America. 
 
 Taking the thing then, in every way, whether we refer to the mo- 
 tives that prompted men to Government, or to the speculative extent 
 and compass of its powers— Whether to the ends they had in view, 
 or to any mode or manner of accomplishing them — Whether to its 
 origin, and PRINCIPLE, or to its actual exemplification in fact, it 
 all comes to the same thing, it ever returns to the LEGISLATIVE, 
 JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE— So much for the powers—Now for 
 the persons that they are to be divided among. 
 
 * See Ch. X VI. " OvS' » Xoy*,, »3' *y *ji^»." 
 L2 
 
76 IN" EVERY STATE THREE ORDERS. 
 
 CHAR XXI. 
 
 THAT THERE ARE IN EVERY STATE, THREE INTERESTS OR ORDERS, MO- 
 NARCHY, ARISTOCRACY and DEMOCRACY.^ 
 
 Three In- THIS is one of the most important points, that can come under 
 
 terests in ... . 
 
 every State, consideration in the whole subject of Government — To everyone, who 
 chy, " examines ever so little the theory of States, it must be obvious, 
 
 cract*" a ^ at * n everv countr y» tnat can be called a State, there are three In- 
 itio-' terests constantly contending, or ready to contend, when they have the 
 CRACY ' opportunity, and these are MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and 
 DEMOCRACY. 
 
 It is nothing to say here, that every State, is not a Monarchy, an 
 Aristocracy, or Democracy — That every State is not either govern- 
 ed by One, which is a Monarchy,* or the Nobles, which is an Aris- 
 tocracy,f or the Many, which is a Democracy.^ That every State is not, 
 even a mixture of these elements — But there are these Interests in 
 every State — There is a One, who would be greatest of all, a Few, 
 who would be greater than the rest, and a Many, who would 
 wish to have things their own way^[ — It may appear, that this 
 
 \ It may be observed here, that it may appear perhaps, that as Monarchy, &c. imply a degree of 
 power, admixed, it is improper to apply these terms, when we are talking of the naked ORDERS — 
 To this we have only to answer, that there is more colour in these words, and that if any object 
 to them, they have only to read KING, NOBILITY and PEOPLE, instead, and then every 
 purpose is answered. 
 
 * BA2IAEY2, or MONAPX02. 
 t O* APIXTQI. 
 t Oi nOAAOI, or AHM02. 
 
 1 The whole of the above extends even to a village. See Gray's elegy in a church yard, on dif- 
 ferent spirits there 
 
 " Some village-Hampden, that with dauntless breast, 
 
 The little Tyrant of his fields withstood ; 
 Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest, 
 
 Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood." 
 
IN EVERY STATE THREE ORDERS. 77 
 
 view of the subject is theoretic, but we appeal to al!, whether there 
 be not these three Interests constantly ready to operate in a State — 
 And if there be these Interests, if there be this ambition, this pride, and 
 these desires, then,it signifies little by what names they are distinguished, 
 whether MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and DEMOCRACY, or 
 any other. 
 
 If there were not indeed these Spirits in a State — If we did not see Lying like 
 them ready to come forth, and contend, when they had an opportu- ^onwaufd. 
 nity — If we did not perceive them lying like seeds half concealed, 
 yet inherent in human nature, and ever ready to break forth, then in- 
 deed, the system might be deemed visionary — But to say, that be- 
 cause they are not always exemplified, that therefore they do not al- 
 ways exist, is to say, that if the circle had never been traced, its rays 
 would not have been equal — " Truth is not the exemplification of things 
 '* in fact, but their rational relation, and possible exemplification, when 
 " the fact happens.*" 
 
 There are then these three Interests, constantly contending, or ready A,wa ys three 
 to contend in a State, MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and DE- ntefCS(S ' 
 MOCRACY — There are these three Interests, constantly affecting, or 
 ready to influence them — Either actually exemplified in bodily shape, 
 or ready to come forth whenever they have an opportunity — And 
 when they do come forth in such shape, they are called MONARCHY, 
 ARISTOCRACY, and DEMOCRACY-But whether they come 
 forth, or not, they are equally Spirits or Interests — And when they do 
 come forth, and are exemplified, they are termed the ORDERS of a 
 
 * Besides Gray's Elegy already quoted, see passage in Montesquieu, p.29. note for,POSSIBLE MO- 
 N ARCH Y, POSSIBLE ARISTOCRACY and POSSIBLE DEMOCRACY— It may be added here, 
 that these Spirits are as distinct as possibIe,from their POLITICAL POWER— Every one of them 
 here named, has, or may have, his consideration, and following, independent of such power — The 
 King, or who wants to be, King, has,or may have,his station, and consequence; the Nobility, or who 
 want to be great, have, or may have, their rank and adhereuts, and the Many who would have things 
 their own way, have the strength of their numbers— This may be tailed their natural situation, 
 the other arising from political power, their artificial. See Chap. XXXVII. afterwards on this. 
 
78 
 
 SPIRIT OF ARISTOCRACY, PRIDE. 
 
 Like Orders State — And as it happens in Architecture, that a building may consist 
 turc. " either of all the Orders together, or of One, or more separately, soitis 
 of the fabrics of Government — They may either consist of MONAR- 
 CHY, ARISTOCRACY, or DEMOCRACY SINGLY, or of two 
 of hem, or of all together*. 
 
 Such is the nature of these ORDERS, and such their reality, and 
 existence. 
 
 Spirit of 
 MONAR. 
 CHY, 
 Power. 
 
 CHAP. XXII. 
 
 THAT THE SPIRIT OF MONARCHY, IS POWER.f 
 
 THAT is, its tendency, and bias, and it is obvious that it must be 
 so, from the situation of the holder— When all is concentred in ONE, 
 there will desires concentre also— That person will naturally draw 
 every thing to himself. 
 
 Spirit of 
 ARISTO- 
 CRACY, 
 Pride. 
 
 CHAP. XXIII. 
 
 THAT THE SPIRIT OF ARISTOCRACY, IS PRIDE.J 
 
 ARISTOCRACY" is the rule of the best, so called, from their 
 being the most forward, in birth, fortune, and education— Elevated 
 above the rest, in these points, and holding power on that very ground, 
 they will despise them more and more daily. 
 
 * There is a building at Rome, into which, all the five Orders of Architecture, are incorpo- 
 rated, 
 
 ■r MONAPXIA. 
 
 \ API2T0KPATIA. 
 
THREE POWERS UNITED GO TO A DESPOTISM. 79 
 
 CHAP. XXIV. 
 
 THAT THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY IS VIOLENCE.* 
 
 THE many are unenlightened from ignorance, that is, want of edu- Spirit of DE. 
 
 J ° ° . MOCRA. 
 
 cation — Abandoned then to the rule of their leaders, and inflamed by CY.Vio- 
 their own passions, what can they be, but violent? ence * 
 
 CHAP. XXV. 
 
 THAT THE THREE POWERS UNITED IN MONARCHY, GO TO DESPOTlSM.f 
 
 DESPOTISM in its bad sense, is the possession, and abuse of Three powers 
 
 . • 1 , , inMONAR- 
 
 power — When power is constantly encreasing, and by a natural conse- chy to 
 quence, abusing, what else can it come to ? tism. " 
 
 * AHMOKPATIA. 
 
 + 0-n tt*» tiSos woXiTtixs AnAOYN, xxi KATA MIAN 2TNE2THKOS AYNAMIN, tvicrtpaXts yiynrxt, Six 
 to rxyixs us rw otxeixy, xxi (pveei irxfivo^um, txrpsntaQxi xxxixv xxQjcntp yxp aifopu, /xe> ios, %vXois c)e Opines xxi 
 Tipnoonsi (TV(A.$vtit;twt \v[xxi, Vtuv, xxvirxaxs rxs c^wOtv^ix^vycocri GXxQxs, vn 1 xvrui (pQapovrxi rcui crvyyiwptwv, 
 Toy xvtov Tpovov, xxi TC1~H nOAITEIUNj avyyinrxt xxrxfyvvn txxa-rri, xxi ntxpvniTxi rts xxxisc BA2IAEIA (At* t 
 * M0NAPXIK02 teyotwos rpo%oSj , ■ ,. ^ .> . ,.— , ■ , 
 

 80 TO MAKE A BALANCE POWER DIVIDED EQUALLY. 
 
 CHAP. XXVI. 
 
 THAT THE THREE POWERS UNITED ?N ARISTOCRACY GO TO OLI-^ 
 
 GARCHY.;j: 
 Three OLIGARCHY in a similar sense, is the rule, and oppression of 
 
 powers m L l 
 
 aristo- the rich, or great — Despising the- poor more and more, and elevated 
 go to OLI- above them already, by the most evident claims at least to respect, 
 GARCHY. ^y must trample upon them at last. 
 
 
 CHAP. XXVII. 
 
 THAT THE THREE POWERS UNITED IN DEMOCRACY, GO TO OCHLOCRACY. § 
 
 OCHLOCRACY is like Despotism and Oligarchy, in their bad 
 
 Three 
 powers in 
 
 demo- senses, the rule and oppression of the rabble — Ignorant from want of 
 to OCHLO- illumination, and eager to be led, the many will submit themselves to 
 the worst leaders, who will expel the best for their own purposes- 
 Then comes OCHLOCRACY.!} 
 
 4 
 
 CHAP. XXVIII. 
 
 THAT POWER MUST BE DIVIDED EQUALLY TO MAKE A BALANCE. 
 
 ^dldequaiiy "W^ nave now snewn wnat Legal Government is— That it depends 
 
 to make a upon a Balance — That a Balance depends upon a Division of Power, 
 
 and a Division of Power again, upon Power, and Persons — We have 
 
 4* 
 
 + API2TOKPATIA, Si o r»c OAIIAPXIAI, . » 
 
 § AHMOKPATIA, i, o ©HPinAHX,xa<XEIPOKPATlKO:E. Pol. Vol. III. p. 15 and 16, and again, 
 A<o xa.i TENH f«» ES tiytxi pnriM nOAITEIHN — TP1A /«y, a travTts fyvAABcv, WW m mrponfurau — TPIA h 
 tarm avpQvn, *iy«$ £ MONAPXIAN, oAirAPXIAN, OXAOKPATIAN. Ibid. It is to be observed, tha t 
 ■what is here called DESPOTISM, Polybius calls M0NAPXIK02 t/jwoj-, and what is here called 
 MONARCHY, he calls BA2IAEIA or Kingship. 
 
 |{ neirtp rvpcmu ru AHMft xW^W 01 — Arist. de Rep. lib. ii. c. 12. v.xi AEMArHrOTS iKxw <J>ATAOY2, 
 mrimlinvoiMim rm EniElKfiN, ibidem, speaking of Athens. See States of Greece. 
 
 
 # 
 
Jfr 
 
 PERSONS RECEIVING POWER MUST BE EQUAL, &c. 
 
 81 
 
 farther given a general description of power, and persons*— It now 
 remains to say, how power should be divided,and the persons it should 
 be divided among. 
 
 And - first we may observe, that power must be divided equally — In Not equal in 
 
 ,..,.. , , i v • i 1 measure, but 
 
 vain do we divide it iora balance, unless we so divide, as to make some p , ira ii t .| m 
 kind of parallel footing, and equality— And here again, it must be also ^un- 
 observed, that this is not a precise, and mathematical one, such as 
 depends upon strict accuracy, and dimension, but a general and 
 substantial— It is not the " <*p»fyxw to i«V equal in number, but the 
 " Myu to kxt a£r/i/"+ parallel in dignity — It is this, that will preserve 
 the correlative parts of Government^oth in their Legislative and Con- 
 stitutional relations — That will enable them, at once to proceed equal- 
 ly in their functions of making laws, and also which is the foundation of 
 it, to maintain their place in the Constitution, or form of Government. 
 
 # 
 
 % 
 
 
 CHAP. XXIX. 
 
 THAT THE PERSONS WHO ARE TO RECEIVE POWER MUST BE RENDERED EQUAL 
 
 TO MAKE A BALANCE. 
 
 AND if power must be given equally to make a balance, so must Persons who 
 the persons who are to receive it, be rendered equal — For as power) ren- 
 we saw in our nineteenth Chapter that a division of power, depended ? ( f ^akeli 
 upon power, and persons, so in endeavouring to obtain this balance, balance. ..^ 
 we must look to both — If power then must be given equally, so must 
 the persons who are to receive it, be rendered equal— But this equality Nor a 
 again, it must be observed, must (like that of power in the last chap- Epical, 
 ter) not be a precise, and mathematical, but a general, and sub- but s« t,erii, > 
 
 and substan- • jl 
 
 stantial. 
 
 * See for above in order, Chap. XX, XXI, et sequentia. 
 t Plut. Symph, 
 
 . " . M - 
 
 HL 
 I 
 
 
 *#♦ 
 
 
 #* 
 
 W 
 
 & 
 
 
 *s* 
 
 
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 ■i 1fc *t 
 
& 
 
 
 ■■ 
 
 
 '*■- 
 
 
 <Br 
 
 
 83 TO MAKE PERSONS WHO RECEIVE POWER EQUAL, 
 
 CHAP. XXX. 
 
 THAT TO MAKE THE PERSONS WHO ARE TO RECEIVE POWER, EQUAL, THEY 
 MUST BE DIVIDED BY ORDERS, AND NOT BY BODIES. 
 
 Make per- AND if the persons who are to receive power, must be rendered 
 ceive power" equal to make a balance,then must they be divided by ORDERS, and 
 equal, must no j. by bodies — For if they be not, then will they not be different, but 
 
 be divided by J J J 
 
 orders, the same persons, so that there can be no question of equality — For 
 bodies! y there are, as we said, in every State, three Orders, or INTERESTS 
 of men, MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and DEMOCRACY— 
 A ONE, who would be greatest of all, a FEW who would be greater 
 than the rest, and a MANY, who would have things their own way* — 
 There are these INTERESTS, cither open, or concealed — Either 
 openly evinced in the shape of MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, 
 and DEMOCRACY, or ready to come forth, whenever they have the 
 opportunity — Men or bodies of men, who would wish to have the 
 rule, who would desire to have the Supreme power in the State — But 
 along with this ambition and this desire of power, common to all, they 
 'iffj^ JJtl^t have another inclination, which may be denominated an esprit du 
 
 * See Chap. XXI. of this Book. If it be doubted whether these Spirits really do exist in hu- 
 
 tV fk Jk 0fr man nature, what could make Julius Caesar say, that " He would rather be the FIRST man in a 
 
 Village than the second in Rome," but this very spirit of a ONE, who would be GREATEST of all 
 
 -• ^il^'. since he had no other connexion with a village ? And if we see in the humblest bamlet, not to talk 
 
 of towns, persons who would set themselves forward, and ascribe to themselves every thing 
 
 genteel, what is this but the FEW who would be GREATER THAN THE REST? A 
 
 :* 
 
 Lady described herself in a stage coach as visited by all the QUALITY OF BRENTFORD— And 
 if there bea multitude, who resist all this, and maintain that things should be upon a GENERA L FOOT- 
 ING, is not this again, the MANY, who WOULD HAVE THINGS THEIR OWN WAY? It 
 is nothing to say (returning to the Great) that in some countries, Russia for instance, these Spirit* 
 do not manifest themselves— -Do they for that less exist? As well might you conclude that a 
 man does not walk, because his legs are chained, or that a river is not water, because it is frozen. 
 
 t'm 
 
 
 
 
 
 * w -* ^n w **, ** Jf m 
 
 &*%** •*&& **i * £ ***** 
 
• 
 
 - v 
 
 MUST BE DIVIDED BY ORDER?. 
 
 m 
 
 83 
 
 corps, or spirit of their ORDER — This spirit attaches themtotliat OR- Members of 
 DER, and makes them invariably cling to their fellows— It. makes them c | in „ t0 
 always look upon them as their friends, and those of another ORDER, their feiiowt 
 comparatively speaking as strangers, or enemies — And this spirit 
 arises from education, and habit, and situation, and connexion, and 
 a number of external circumstances — The fortunes they feel them- 
 selves in, the education they have had from these fortunes, the ideas 
 that they have imbibed from these educations, and the circumstances 
 they daily meet with, to reinforce these ideas, give them such a strong 
 bias, that you can never in any way eradicate it — It is founded 
 on a feeling in human nature, and before you can ever take it away, 
 you must alter human nature itself*— Now as to this feeling so found- 
 ed in human nature, it operates in all these orders, according as it 
 has an opportunity — In MONARCHY, it has no opening at all, Monarchy, 
 because that is not social, but sole — It is ONE entire in itself, it can an '' d . ls " 
 
 cover it, 
 
 therefore, speaking as to itself, have no relation, or connexion — It can- 
 not be divided into parts, it is not separable into portions, so that these 
 parts, can discover any sympathy, or mutual connexion contradistin- 
 guished from others, 
 
 As to ARISTOCRACY, that speaks out more plainly — That aristo-. ■ 
 declares itself sufficiently intelligibly — The rich and distinguished, ksnior0 
 the NOBLES of every country, the oi apistoi as they were called by P ,ainl y- 
 the Greeks, draw to one another— They always cling to their own OR- 
 DER, seem to regard others as a separate cast, and to contemplate 
 them with a kind of insulated alienation. 
 
 Nor is this confined to ARISTOCRACY — It is the same So demo. 
 thing with DEMOCRACY, only evinced in a different man- ctlACY - 
 ner— However they may feel flattered with the attentions of 
 
 # 
 
 
 ■I 
 
 *v 
 
 
 * It is to be observed bere, that when men get into power, or associate with those who 
 have it, they often drop the spirit of their old ORDER, and take up a new — But this does not 
 shew that men do not draw to their ORDER, but that they change their ORDER. 
 
 J*: M2 - 
 
 « 
 
 -<££* 
 *?!■ 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 m 
 
 % 
 
 1 *>.# 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 & w 
 
« 
 
 S4 * TO MAKE PERSONS WHO RECEIVE POWER EQUAL, 
 
 
 the Great, give them an opportunity, and you will always find 
 them a separate Interest — In a city, a town, or a district, where 
 they have an object to contend for, and can contend with the 
 rich, you will always see them come forward with the most 
 active hostility — Then you will see, whether they are an ORDER, or not, 
 an ORDER with distinct predilections, and interests. They will then 
 shew you that they consider themselves as such, and that in all con- 
 tentions where they can contend, they are incapable of assimilating 
 with the others. 
 No coose- Nor is it of any consequence, where these spirits appear, whether 
 
 spiritsl^pear! "1 a town, or a village, an empire, or a district — They are equally feel- 
 ings grafted in human nature, whatever their exemplifications* — 
 Does anyone suppose that there cannot be a MONARCH in a vil- 
 lage, or an ARISTOCRACY, or a DEMOCRACY ?f 
 Can't be These feelings then, being in human nature, how can we ever hope 
 
 eradicated. { eradicate them ? How can we ever hope to undo what Provi- 
 dence has done, to make man lay -aside his feelings, and to become, 
 as it were, a new creature ? 
 
 And yet we evidently indulge this hope, if we expect, a balance, 
 by separating men from their ORDERS — By cutting and carving these 
 ORDERS into parts, and then hoping that they will oppose each other. 
 monar- L^ us just suppose ARISTOCRACY, or DEMOCRACY 
 i; ii Y can't (MONARCHY is out of the question, as we said, being in- 
 capable of division) split into parts, and that each of these parts, or 
 bodies, had an equal degree of power, assigned them — We shall 
 ARISTO- take ARISTOCRACY for instance — We shall suppose that di- 
 cracy ? vided into bodies, and that each of these bodies, was intended 
 
 Would make, 
 
 judge, aod to oppose the other — The question is, would they do it ? AVould 
 forTwuoT-they exercise the LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE 
 
 DER. 
 
 * See the grand passage of Montesquieu quoted in our 13th and 29th pages. 
 + See again Grey's Elegy in a church-yard. 
 
 -£ 
 
 i 
 
 *&; 
 
 • ~Jn 
 
 
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 -Jm 
 
 
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 :* 
 
 ■ SB?" 
 
 r. *m+*'* 
 
 
 
 
 Jfc ' 
 
 mw ^^j* 
 
 W% . ■ 
 
 ft « 
 
 l <&*4 
 

 MUST BE DIVIDED BY ORDERS. 35 
 
 powers against their own ORDER ? Can any one suppose it ? Would 
 
 not they make laws in favour of their own Order to-day, expecting a 
 
 the same favour to-morrow ? Would not they determine causes for their 
 
 fellows at one time, expecting a return at another? Would not they 
 
 execute, carry on, and administer the daily government of the country, 
 
 in the same way, expecting allthis, and tenfold more in retribution ? 
 
 Would not the\', and the other Order in the same manner ? Every one DEMO- 
 
 feels it, every one thinks it — Every one must be convinced, that there is CRACi % 
 
 ^ _ . same. 
 
 in human nature, a common sensation of sympathy, and interest — It is 
 upon this principle as ajrule of mercy, that the juries in England, are 
 always chosen out of a man's fellows, it being understood, that in that 
 way, he has a better chance for his life. 
 
 ut still the delusion may return, that some separation, some division For every 
 may be effected— But it is but a delusion— What division can be art , i ? cial re 
 
 ' pulsion, a 
 
 accomplished, when for every repulsion you create, PROVIDENCE thousand na- 
 has implanted a thousand attractions? tions. 
 
 The plainest proof of this appeared in antient Rome, where the Go- Proof ia 
 vernment, as we all know, consisted of Consuls, Senate, and People. — . - £ 
 
 W r ell then, there were three bodies, certainly separate, and so separate xhreebodies. 
 that Pofybius mistakes them (with all deference to so great an Author) 
 for ORDERS, boasting moreover of the balance arising from them* — ^ 
 
 Was there then this balance, or did it arise ? It so little arose, & ■£ 
 
 that we hear of nothing in the whole Roman history, but disputes 
 between the Plebeians,and Patricians,conducting too often to convul- 
 sions — Though there were three bodies, there were but TWO disputes, «l 
 or sides of a dispute, that is PLEBEIANS, and PATRICIANS— 
 Herethen is the strongest proof,the disputes corresponding to the num- 
 ber of the ORDERS— That there were but TWO ORDERS,is plain/or But two 
 Cicero pronounces, that a Government of THREE, " would be the 0RDJiRS ' 
 best," that is, talks of it as a desideratum, which he could never have r > | 
 
 * v Ot< upi<rr»> voXiriia. j ix nANTflN TflN EIAflN cvnarSeec, mi on j t$» 'Vupaim iVri TOIATTH, Pol, 
 Vol. III. p. 3. Ed. Lips. 1764., 
 
 * 
 
 
 •jv '•«• * 
 
 Hi 
 
 *W>^ «*f' ^% 
 
 
 
 
 m 
 
 ■ 
 
 Ik 
 
 m 
 
 : % 
 
'fHTHl ; ~J-1 
 
 
 strongest 
 kiud. 
 
 m> # -» ^ ^t # '■ *£ 
 
 86 TO MAKE PERSONS WHO RECEIVE POWER, &c 3tlM 
 
 done,if it had existed already-}- —Besides the thing was evident from the 
 very nature of these bodies — The Consuls were the same as, the Senate, \ 
 
 fr for they had neither standing (being only annual) nor authority (be- 
 
 ing under the Senate to a great degree) nor distinet Interest sufficient, 
 which is more than all the rest put together (being Aristocratic,) ■■'■ 
 
 Proof of to constitute them a different ORDERS— And it is to be ob- 
 served, that the very nature of this proof is of the strongest kind, for 
 it at once shews that bodies are nothing, and that those given as an 
 example, were as distinct as possible, from their being mistaken for 
 ORDERS. * 
 
 It is then clear as day, that no balance, or opposition, can be ef- 
 
 No balance - i j- t» i 
 
 expected fected, by placing power, in different bodies — Regulate, and model 
 t at way. ftipm, as you will, you always leave that spirit, which will predomi- 
 nate and influence them— If then, you split, and divide them in in- 
 finitum, what do you do ? The tyvx*> (or soul) still remains— It is"totura 
 fr in toto,et totum in qualibet parte"— You can never extinguish it — You - 
 
 # might as well limit the effect of those figures in Arithmetic, which 
 
 ever give the same results— You might as well controul the erup- 
 tions of Mount Vesuvius, which always, throws out Hexagons — You 
 might as well turn the bowl from its bias, or the Magnet from- the 
 jkf Pole, nay alter the principles of Causation itself, as change, these incli- 
 
 nations from their leanings, alter these biases from their propensities, 
 fc Ileal o>posi- ^ ie rca ^ opposition then, is opposing the ORDERS to each othei — ■ 
 
 ^ ^ 9t t tion b tiveeu They have a real antipathy, and hostility — They will never join,you may 
 
 ▼ tlio Oil- 
 
 • DERS - 
 
 I ^ ^0 ^ + a £ sse optime constitutam rempublicam, quae ex tribus generibus illis,REGALI, OPTIMO et 
 W'A '4^ m POPULAR! sit modice confusa." Fragm. do rep. lib. ii. ... m i .^^ i ^ 
 
 T^f * .+ yRwf % An ORDER is a class or raDk of men, with different interests from other ranks, and classes. 
 * ^ '. ' If we want more proof that a Government of three such, did not exist at Rome, we have also 
 
 Tacitus' authority on the subject, who not only thought it did not exist, but that if it could exist, 
 it could not long continue— " Cunctas nationes, et urbes, POPULUS, aut PRIMORES, aut 
 I 4J^& 0^ 5INGULI, regunt: delecta ex his, et constituta reipublicse forma; laudari, facilius quea 
 
 eveuire, vel, ci cvenit, haud diuturna esse potest." An. 1. iv. 
 
 • *•< JF^**±M':<~*-^»u 07. 
 
 
 «*<* 
 
 
 ■m 
 
 . ^ 
 
 * » 
 
 E *■ % ** * m. 
 
 Mr '* • .?*, "♦ *, •>■* -^ 
 
^9p 
 
 THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN ONE ORDER. P^ ^ gg 
 
 fejS. 
 
 4ft. ■ • ** 
 be assured, except for the purposes of opposition, that is counteracting 
 
 some predominating force, or Order— Any other is totally accidental, or >2^*w^* 4j 
 
 rather out of the question,and therefore you are not to reckon on it— This 
 
 opposition then, of the ORDER, is the rcal,the natural,the secure, the 
 
 only to be depended upon — Any other is perfectly Utopian — Perfectly 
 
 Utopian,because founded upon false hopes,upon the idea that man will 
 
 change his notions, and from a social, become an insulated, an inde- ♦r^fc ..<* 
 
 pendent, and chimerical animal 
 
 CHAP. XXXI. 
 
 f* dT 
 
 * 
 
 * 
 
 THAT THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE TESTED IN ONE ORDER TO MAKE A 
 
 BALANCE. 
 
 W- 
 
 THAT the three powers cannot be vested in ONE ORDER, Three 
 would follow from the nature of the thing itself, if it did not no7be\csted % * 
 
 from the argument of the preceding chapters — Power must be order to 
 balanced — To be balanced, it must be divided — But how can it betake a 
 divided, if it be all vested, all its constituent parts LEGISLATIVE, 
 JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE in the same Order ? * 
 
 But to be proved is hardly enough— We ought also to See ex- 
 see the exemplifications of these powers in ONE ORDER, that we ™j£ fica " 
 may be able to judge of their effects in practice. 
 
 And first we say, as to MONARCHY, where do we find an ex- in MO- 
 ample of that ? We find it in the tyrants of Greece, we find it in the L A C ' ^ 
 Monarchs of Persia, we find it in the Despots of Africa, we find it 
 
 in the history, and this last chiefly to be remarked, of the Roman - *» ^ 
 
 Emperors — There we see the abuse of power, marching exactly hand 
 in hand with the possession of it, till its wantonness rose to a puerile 
 extravagance — And this is the characteristic of DESPOTISM, 
 
 * * * 
 
 
 m % 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 **** 
 
 *;# 
 
 :"■■■ "" ^l*. 
 
 # 
 
 . 
 
 • '** . * 
 
 ... * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 / 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
 * 
 
 THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN ONE ORDER. 
 
 ARISTO. 
 CUACY. 
 
 DEMO- 
 CRACY. 
 
 * 
 
 i 
 
 that passion, and power, being concentred in one focus, produce the 
 hottest tyranny. fl 
 
 The next is ARISTOCRACY—This, as we said before, degene- 
 rates into OLIGARCH Y— Here we have a tyranny of another nature, 
 it is pride grown into insolence, outrage, and oppression — It is not, 
 cannot be, so hot a tyranny as the other, but it is nevertheless fulL 
 of much severity, and grinding — If we wish to see an example of 
 this, we have only to recur to the Aristocracies of Greece, which, as 
 soon as they became OLIGARCHIES, were suspended.* 
 
 The last is OCHLOCRACY, for in DEMOCRACIES, as we 
 know, the three powers come to this termination — And this is a 
 tyranny of a new kind, shewing different characteristics from either 
 of the two former — It is either a Demagogue got possession of power, 
 and committing crimes for his own safety, or it is a Few lording it over 
 the rest, or it is a Mob, in the agitation of its frenzy, pulling down, 
 and destroying every thing-)- — In all these different shapes, it takes 
 on the resemblance of the rest, but in all it preserves its own character- 
 istic, of envy, and malevolence against the rich, and better born, and 
 original iHiberaUty arising from want of education J — There is, if we 
 may so say an additional irixponw, or bitterness in its excesses, from 
 the remembrance that the former were greater. § 
 Thus then, it appears that whatever Order receives entire power, 
 entire pow- ^ rd ^ q vc ] cy 1S sure ^ a b use it — That these excesses moreover take 
 
 er, sure 10 
 
 abuse it. the colour of their Order— In MONARCHY, it is caprice and wan- 
 
 t See for puerility, the story of Caligula triumphing over the sea, anil gathering Pebbles by beat 
 of drum, for cruelty, Caracalla driving a chariot along the Mole near Naples, and overturning peo- 
 ple into the waves. 
 * KatTrrravtro. 
 
 + An eminent example of this appeared in the cities of Greece — There we see the effects of 
 the three powers in the Multitude, taking the different course of DESPOTISM, OLIGARCHY, 
 or OCHLOCRACY, according to their different situations. Sec for this Pisistratus, Draco, and 
 the other exemplifications. ■*%!* 
 
 X AnXtvQiforr,!, 
 
 § See if this was not exemplified in France, in the years 1792, 3, 4, et sequcntia. 
 
 ORDER 
 
 m 
 
.4fk 
 
 THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN ONE ORDER. 89 
 
 tonness*— In ARISTOCRACY, insolence and out ragef — In DE- 
 MOCRACY, malevolence, and envy.J 
 
 And hence the absurdity of those, who think they have got liberty, Some 
 by placing power in a particular ORDER — One set of men, the friends people. 
 of DEMOCRACY, would give the whole to the People, as if liberty 
 consisted in a King, and Nobles not having any — Another set, the friends ^Q e >{° Fq 
 of ARISTOCRACY, would give it to the Nobility, in order, as they say, 
 to bridle the multitude, without ever recollecting that the Nobles re- 
 quire to be bridled themsel ves — A third set.the friends of MONARCHY, Some to 
 
 . ... . . KING. 
 
 would confer it on a King, as if order, which is their way of it, and 
 which is liberty too, properly taken, consisted in domination. 
 
 But liberty consists in none of these things — It consists not in the Liber *y 
 
 . ° none of these 
 
 rule of a King, or of a Nobility, or of a Rabble, but in the proper things. 
 
 restraint, and opposition of them — It is the bridle, and curb of passion, 
 
 and prejudice, not their gratification, or indulgence. § 
 
 And there cannot be a greater mistake in Government, than to Great mh ~ 
 
 • • i- -m • i'M -nt take to sup- 
 
 think that liberty does consist in these things — tor what is liberty? Is pose it. 
 
 it not the proper enjoyment of Life, Property, and Free- agency, those 
 Civil rights, those original privileges, which, as we said in our first 
 Book, could never be taken from man ? || And if it be the proper en- 
 joyment of these things, what does it signify whether they be taken from 
 him, by a Monarch, a Nobility, or a People ? It is all the same 
 thing— It is all equally privation, it is only done in a different man- 
 ner. 
 
 And that absolute MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and DE- J?°*?ar. 
 
 * YGgtt, or affront. 
 
 + nxseve|/«, or overbearing. 
 
 % Tlixporris, or bitterness. 
 
 § All these things are best expressed by negatives — It is the idea of the laws being equal to all— - 
 Not, as one of the antients expressed it to a Legislator, that his laws would be like cobwebs, the 
 small flies caught, but the large break through. 
 
 11 See Book I, Chap. III. and IV. 
 
 N 
 
90 THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN ONE ORDER. 
 
 aristo- MOCRACY, do all take away these things, is equally clear as we have 
 demo.' been just proving — For what is the simple idea of them ? — That there 
 absolute' * s Supreme power in each, equally unlimited, equally absolute, equally 
 takeaway arbitrary, — And if there be this Supreme power in each, equally unlimit- 
 leges. ed, equally absolute, equally arbitrary, what is to hinder them from do- 
 
 ing what they please, there is no law to controul them, that is, the 
 ORDER ? Now let us keep a clear idea of this, the ORDER— There is 
 no law to controul the ORDER (because there is Supreme power) 
 therefore tyranny, in it — It can do what it pleases, whether it be MO- 
 NARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, or DEMOCRACY. 
 Government But it may appear perhaps to some, that, because this Supreme 
 dividua^no- P ower * s not m an individual, the idea of tyranny is dissipated, and 
 thiug. removed — But what is the idea of tyranny, or a tyrannous Govern- 
 
 ment, in its simple and best sense ? Is it not absolute, or uncontrouled 
 Government, the uncontrouled Government of ONE PERSON ? That 
 PERSO N acting upon other persons,according to his own will, without a 
 balance from the will of any other ! — Now take either MONARCHY, 
 ARISTOCRACY,or DEMOCRACY,have not they all been proved to 
 be ONE PERSON in the idea of sympathetic,and congenial ORDERS 
 within themselves, never detaching themselves from the members of 
 their own body ?* And if they never do detach themselves from the 
 members of their own body, are not they all to be considered as ONE 
 PERSON, all in the sense of Government, as a single personage, or 
 individual, contradistinguished and separated from the rest. 
 All tyranny. Another sense there is,of the word tyranny,and that is, not only abso- 
 lute power, but an ill use of that power — Neither in this sense, will abso- 
 lute MONARCHY, absolute ARISTOCRACY, or absolute DEMO- 
 CRACY,be further removed from the word tyranny — Power,always goes 
 to abuse, from the corruption of human nature — Absolute uncontrouled 
 
 • See Chap. XXX. 
 
THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN ONE ORDER. 91 
 
 power then, must be constantly tyranny in its best sense,and every thing 
 but that, in its worst, from its liability to excess, and extravagance — 
 Liberty it cannot be, because that is security for Civil privileges, 
 and positive ill usage it very often will be, from the natural tendency of 
 man to transgress, and wander. 
 
 Let us take the exemplifications of absolute power in MONAR- Exempiis, 
 CHY, ARISTOCRACY, or DEMOCRACY, arenot they strictly Cat, ° nS ' 
 to be considered, as ONE person ? If it be MONARCHY, will not 
 he lean to himself, if ARISTOCRACY, will not the rich to the 
 rich, if DEMOCRACY, will not the poor to the poor ? Is not 
 that partiality, is not that human nature ? — Will not they always 
 more, or less favour their own set, can they do otherwise than feel a 
 sympathy with, and act for it, and if they do, can they be other than 
 ONE PERSON ? 
 
 But this is not all that they will do — They will sometimes come win not 
 forth in active hostility against the rest, that is, the other Orders, |L? Tour 
 and not only get the most power they can for themselves, but extend 8et > but at- 
 that power to injuring, or abolishing them.* 
 
 Whether then we take tyranny in the sense of uncontrouled power, 
 or uncontrouled power exercised to abuse, absolute, unbalanced Go- 
 vernment, in any ORDER, is equally within the sense of it — The true 
 meaningof tyranny ,is,"absolute uncontrouled Government/' whether that 
 Government be, of MONARCHY,ARISTOCRACY, or DEMOCRA- 
 CY — There is no other rational sense of it,no other meaning, that is in- 
 telligible — Tyranny is either the possession, or abuse of power, and in a 
 Legal sense, that is, the sense of Legal Government, the possible, is the 
 actual,abuseofit — It does not signify then, whether a King, a Nobility, 
 or a People, violate man's privileges — Whether his safety be at the plea- 
 sure of a MO NARCHY, an ARISTOCRACY, or a DEMOCRACY— 
 
 * See History of England when the Long Parliament, or DEMOCRACY abolished the Hou*« 
 
 of Lords. 
 
 N2 
 
 OB. 
 
 own 
 
92 
 
 THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN TWO ORDERS. 
 
 Three pow. In whose hands he is — To whose mercy he is abandoned — All isequal- 
 
 ers can- n • n 1 i 
 
 not be vested Jy tyranny, all is equally uncontrouled power, all is equally, that 
 order to wn i cn should not be, for the reasons given in this chapter, we may 
 make a therefore conclude in the words with which we begun, " That to 
 
 balance. » 
 
 make a balance, the three powers cannot be vested in ONE ORDER/ 
 
 CHAP. XXXII. 
 
 THAT THE THREE POWE11S CANNOT BE VESTED IN TWO ORDERS TO 
 
 MAKE A BALANCE. 
 
 Two 
 ways of 
 
 vesting the 
 powers in 
 TWO Or- 
 ders, in in. 
 tegro, and 
 partim. 
 
 In integro- 
 
 Whole conv 
 binations in 
 integro, 
 eighteen. 
 
 THERE are only two ways of vesting the powers in TWO OR- 
 DERS^ and that is, inintegro and partim — In integro, where each OR- 
 DER shall have an entire power, or powers separately, and partim, 
 where they shall have parts of them jointly. 
 
 The latter of these modes would afford such endless complications, 
 that it is impossible almost to consider it at all — What we may say 
 of it in the meantime, applies equally to both, and that is, that neither 
 of them would afford that balance, which is the basis of true Go- 
 vernment. 
 
 But it is proper to enter a little further into the subject — It is pro- 
 per to examine the distributions in integro, for they really can be 
 examined — This will let us into the nature of the powers, and enable 
 us to observe their influence upon one another. 
 
 And here it is to be remarked that the whole combinations of the* 
 powers upon TWO of the ORDERS in integro, are eighteen. Figures 
 will do that for us—In the first place, of the ORDERS themselves, there 
 are three,KING,and NOBILITY,KING,and PEOPLE, and NOBI- 
 
THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN TWO ORDERS. 
 
 93 
 
 LITY, and PEOPLE*— Upon each of these, there are three combi- 
 nations of the powers forwards, that is, giving two powers to the first 
 named, and one to the last, and as many backwards, reversing this 
 order, which makes six combinations of the powers, upon each com- 
 bination of the ORDERS, of which, there are three, in all eighteen. 
 — Of these eighteen, there are only eight, that are at all practicable, Ten impos- 
 the People being totally unfit for the Executive, or Judicial func- SibIe " 
 tions, of which kind, that is, which throws these powers into their 
 hands, there are ten — Indeed Nobility itself is not very well adapted 
 for the Executive, on account of the promptitude it needs, requiring 
 a single person, but even admitting it were, in that way, there would 
 be only eight, in the other, fourf — Taking then these eight as the only 
 practicable, the others are to be thrown out of the question — If any- 
 one wishes to see this, they have an opportunity in the following table. 
 
 IMPRACTICABLE. PRACTICABLE. Tabic. 
 
 KING AND NOBILITY. 
 
 2 to King King Legisl. Jud. Nob. Exec. 
 King Legisl. Exec. Nob. Jud. 
 King Jud. Exec. Nob. Legisl. 
 
 2 to Nobility Nob. Legisl. Jud. King Exec. 
 ♦ Nob. Legisl. Exec. King Jud. 
 
 Nob. Jud. Exec. King Legisl. 
 
 KING AND PEOPLE. 
 
 2 to King King Legisl. Jud. People Exec. 
 King Legils. Exec. People Jud. 
 
 * The terms are now necesssarily changed from MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and DEMO- 
 CRACY, to KING, NOBILITY, and PEOPLE, because it is no longer a question of consider- 
 ing the spirit of the ORDERS, but giving power to the ORDERS. 
 
 + Counting the Practicable — There are six in all, which give the execution to the NOBILITY, 
 but two of these are off already, by the people having Impracticable powers. 
 
94 THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN TWO ORDERS. 
 
 IMPRACTICABLE. PRACTICABLE. 
 
 KING AND PEOPLE. 
 
 King. Jud. Exec. People Legisl. 
 
 2 to People People Legisl. Jud. King Exec. 
 People Legisl. Exec. King Jud. 
 People Jud. Exec. King Legisl. 
 
 NOBILITY AND PEOPLE. 
 
 2 to Nobility Nob. Legisl. Jud. People Exec. 
 Nob. Legisl. Exec. People Jud. 
 
 Nob. Jud. Exec. People Legisl. 
 
 2 to People People Legisl. Jud. Nob. Exec. 
 People Legisl. Exec. Nob. Jud. 
 People Jud. Exec, Nob. Legisl. 
 
 Jlow far From this it appears that there are ten of these combinations purely 
 
 remain & speculative,because in ten,there are functions given to the People,which 
 expedient-- j t j s no t only unfit for, but absolutely incapable of, exercising — Such are 
 pabie of ex. the Executive andjudicial, one of which, requires a promptitude, and 
 functions. *" the other, a disceptation and decernment of merits, of which the Many 
 are totally incapable — Taking then the eight that remain, the question 
 is, how far they are either good, or expedient — To begin with the first, 
 King, Legislative, Judicial, Nobility, Executive — Here independent of 
 the balance, we shall find that the ORDERS here named, are not pro- 
 perly qualified to exercise their functions — TheKing has the Legislative, 
 andjudicial — One person, not to talk of the Judicial, cannot be sup- 
 posed qualified for Legislation, which has generally been consider- 
 ed as the function of a greater number, from the necessity of a variety 
 of views, and being sure of reaching all parts of the subject — Again, 
 how can Nobility be properly Executive, which, from the promptitude 
 it needs, ought to be the province of a single person — The next is 
 King, Legislative, Executive, Nobility, Judicial — Still the King has 
 a power that does not belong to him, though it is so far better, that 
 Nobility is Judicial instead of Executive, and the King, vice versa — 
 
THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN TWO ORDERS. 
 
 But still there are other reasons, which make Nobility not the best 
 Judicial, from considerations of impartiality, and justice — The next is, 
 King, Judicial, Executive, Nobility, Legislative— Here the Nobility 
 may be composed of such men, as shall make good laws, and it may 
 be a state wisely enough governed, setting the balance out of the 
 question — The King may discharge tolerably well, the Judicial and 
 Executive functions, having no strong interest to bias him, but then 
 the laws must not be complicated, besides that the former of these requires 
 more time, and attention, than Kings are apt to bestow — The next is 
 Nobility Legislative, Judicial, King Executive — Here then are the same 
 reasons in favour of the Legislative, and against it as before, and near- 
 ly the same against the Judicial, leaving the Executive in the middle — 
 This may be a wise, but will be a corrupt, that is, a partial, and se- 
 vere, Government — The fifth is Nobility Legislative, Executive, Kin<* 
 Judicial — This will be less oppressive, but still in a great degree, 
 arising from the partiality of the Nobles to their own ORDER, besides 
 the inconvenience of slowness from the promptitude required in the 
 Executive— The Judicial as remarked on before, that is, a King unfit, 
 or at least, not very fit to exercise it — The sixth is Nobility Judicial, 
 Executive, King Legislative — This will be tyranny in the one, and 
 partiality, and slowness in the other — The seventh is, King Judicial, 
 Executive, People Legislative — This will be the most precipitate 
 of laws, the multitude being incapable of thought, or deliberation, 
 judged on however and executed tolerably — However it might 
 be managed within, and it would be managed very ill, it would 
 be absolutely incapable of standing against foreign enemies, if, 
 as would be the case, the Many had the dictation, or at least the sane • 
 tioning of public measures* — The eighth is Nobility, Judicial, Execu- 
 
 * See the reasons given by Polybins, why (he Romans succeeded against the Carthaginians, 
 tiz. that the Senate managed all at Rome, the Multitude (at that time) at Carthage. See the pas- 
 sage, Ch. xxxiii. See also many other instances, the reverses of the Athenians in Sicily, owing to 
 the Multitude, &c. &c. &c. 
 
 95 
 
96 THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN TWO ORDERS. 
 
 tive, People Legislative — This would be the same thing over again 
 with a litre more partiality, and slowness— Thus it appears, that all 
 these powers independent of having no balance, being so distribut- 
 ed, would be absolutely ill administered, from the incapacity of the 
 ORDERS to exercise them*. 
 Balance ]3 ut t jj e balance, is the most important consideration— It is there, 
 
 gre.it con- 
 sideration— as we observed, that the true foundation of Governmentlies, the right 
 
 basis of all Legislation— And it is in this, that the above distributions ap- 
 pear more deficient if possible,than in the incapacity occasioned to ex- 
 ercise the powersf — King, for instance, Legislative, Judicial, Nobility 
 Executive — In this there is no balance at all, making laws, and judg- 
 ing on, being incomparably greater than executing them, so that 
 the Government would be totally tyrannical — Again, take King, 
 Legislative, Executive, Nobility, Judicial, there would be still sucn a 
 swing in favour of the King, from the powers of making laws, and 
 executing them, that the Judicial would not be able to balance it, 
 even with the most flagrant decisions (always however within the 
 Constitution^) not to mention, that this power might be fettered 
 further still, with Legislative restrictions — King Judicial, Executive, 
 Nobility Legislative, is the next — Here almost the whole power is 
 thrown on the side of Nobility, by allowing them to legislate, which 
 
 they would do, for their own ORDER. § We may be assured that 
 
 • 
 
 * It must be seen that there can be only eight Practicable, the six of King and Nobility, 
 where the People don't enter, and the two Legislatives in the People, joined with King, or 
 Nobility, the only time, that the former, that is, the People, have not either the Judicial, or Exe- 
 cutive, of which, as has been said, they are incapable. 
 
 + As in case of the Multitude having the Legislative, where their very precipitancy occasions 
 ti swing, and destroys the balance. 
 
 % That is, not pretending to contradict a law, but pervert it. 
 
 § It is to be observed here once for all, that when we talk of these Constitutions, and the 
 balance arising from them, we suppose them executed — If not, they are no Constitutions at all, 
 it is impossible to say what they are— It will depend entirely upon the Orders exercising the 
 powers, how the balance will turn out — It maybe said,for instance, that the Judicial, and Executive 
 are strong against the Legislative, because they may refuse to judge and execute, or may judge, and 
 eiecute contrary to, the laws — To this we answer, that they are then not the Judicial, and Executive) 
 
THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN TWO ORDERS. 97 
 
 the laws would take that direction, and Judging and Executing are 
 but a poor balance, where Legislation as it always must be, and it 
 has already been proved to be, is the soul and essence of the State, for 
 the rest is only following out, and realizing^ — The next is Nobility 
 Legislative, Judicial, King, Executive— This would be oppressive in 
 the highest degree — It would be giving the whole power to the No- 
 bility, for the King would be little more than the minister to execute its 
 commands — Nobility again Legislative,Executive,King, Judicial, makes 
 the King only a Judge* — Nobility Judicial, Executive,KingLegislative, 
 throws the whole power almost to the King, as may be conceived 
 from what has been said before — The remaining two are, King Judi- 
 cial, Executive, with the People Legislative, and Nobility the same, ' 
 either of which, besides making a precipitate Government, throws 
 the power into the hands of the Many, so that all thoughts of a 
 balance may be laid aside. 
 
 Thus it appears, that whether we consider the ability of the Or- Divisions be- 
 ders to exercise the powers, or the balance occasioned by the dis- orders in 
 tribution of them, the divisions between two Orders in integro, are inte s ro i bad '; 
 equally bad — Ten are absolutely impossible, and eight are such, as 
 no man would wish to see — Such, as are so defective in balance, 
 that they cannot in any way produce that counterpoise, so indispen- 
 sibly necessary in good Government — We must then betake our- Partim, 
 selves to the modifications of the powers between TWO ORDERS, equMy ' 
 partim- — And here we say that they are as ill calculated, and as ill 
 fitted to the full, to obtain this counterpoise, as the other. 
 
 not being " In the Constitution" — The only way then of taking the thing, is to suppose, the 
 Constitution executed, and then we know what we are about, and say as above — We shall extend 
 this observation further. 
 
 t See Chap. XX. 
 
 * The Kings of Persia, administered justice in their own persons. 
 
 O 
 
93 
 
 Innumera- 
 ble. 
 
 Common 
 PRINCI- 
 PLE. 
 
 Hostility of 
 ORDERS. 
 Ad inter' 
 necionem. 
 
 Destroys 
 balance. 
 
 THE THREE POWERS CANNOT BE VESTED IN TWO ORDERS. 
 
 For in the first place, as we said, it is clear that these modifica- 
 t\ons,(partim) may be multiplied in infinitum, and in such a manner, as 
 to defy enumeration — But though it may be impossible to enumerate 
 them, yet it may be very practicable, to find a common PRIN- 
 CIPLE, which applies to both, and which will effectually determine 
 the question for us. 
 
 That common PRINCIPLE is the known, and perfect hostility 
 of the ORDERS to each other — Whatever two they be, which com- 
 pose a State, whether King, and Nobility, King, and People, or No- 
 bility, and People, they will invariably be inimical, and hostile — If 
 it be King, and Nobility, it will be, the King trying to put down the 
 Nobles, and the Nobles the King — The one canvassing with all his 
 power, weight, and influence, the other with patronage, and protec- 
 tiont — If it be King, and People, it will be ambition, and grasping of 
 power, against turbulence, and popular violence^ — If it be Nobility, 
 and People, it will be the same thing in another shape, it will be the 
 Nobles endeavouring to oppress on one hand, and the Many oppos- 
 ing them on the other, and the more so, that their leaders will in- 
 flame them further, by representing the former as tyrants.^ 
 
 Hence it appears obvious, that wherever there are TWO ORDERS 
 in a State, these Orders will be hostile, and rival spirits, never satis- 
 fied till they accomplish each other's destruction— The testimony of his- 
 tory proves it— They will be for ever on the watch, and they will 
 be so intent to extirpate their enemy, that they will never hesitate 
 to do it, at the expence of ruining the State, as they will infallibly 
 find the opportunity. 
 
 Whether this situation be a good one for the balance of a 
 State,, cannot admit of much question— It will have the certain 
 
 + See Scotch History, as quoted here afterwards. 
 
 £ See the examples of Messene, and Argos, as represented by Plutarch, also of Charles U of 
 England. 
 § See the Tribunes at Rome. 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 99 
 
 effect of keeping it in agitation, by the constant broils, and conten- 
 tions it breeds, besides exposing it to perpetual revolutions. 
 
 But whether again, all possible modifications of the powers between 
 two ORDERS partim, must of necessity leave this hostility, or whether 
 the Governments we have seen are to be admitted as a proof of it, 
 may yet be doubted— The modifications, as has been said, it is im- 
 possible to number — But we may examine those that have been, lo pro- 
 and if we either find that they were all of TWO producing hostility, or^a* 3 ° 
 that in proportion, as they were of TWO, they did produce it, it will 
 be sufficient to establish our premises. 
 
 CHAP. XXXIII. 
 
 THAT IN PROPORTION AS THE THREE POWERS HAVE BEEN VESTED IN TWO 
 ORDERS, THEY HAVE BEEN DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE, 
 
 IN reviewing the early Governments of the world, we find little to 8 " 1 * 00 - 
 
 • « •' " ta« ia • it*ii. vernmenti. 
 
 excite our curiosity, or interest — In Asia s the Assyrian and Babylonian ASIA, 
 empires, afford rather the pictures of tyranny, and Despotism, than 
 any thing else, and the Persian Monarchy, is an instance to the same 
 purpose — There the Sovereign was approached with almost divine 
 honours, and never treated but with the most extravagant demon- 
 strations of respect — In Africa, it was with few, and is now per- AFRICA* 
 haps, with no exceptions, not so much the elevation of the Monarch 
 as the depression of the human race — There the people are not treat- 
 ed as such, but as mere tools, and play things, made for one man's sport s 
 
 02 
 
100 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 AMERICA, and pleasure* — In antient times, America was not known, but as far 
 as it is known, in the southern parts, we see nothing in the histories of 
 Montezuma, or Atabaliba, to rescue them from the general charac- 
 ter of Despotism — In the northern, the dependencies of the tribes are 
 so loose, and so particularly appropriate to the purposes of war, as 
 hardly to deserve the name of social union. 
 
 EUROPE. Europe still remains, and to Europe, attempts at Legal Government 
 were confined in a great degree. But before we begin with this, we shall 
 take notice ofwhat have been esteemed more regular Governments in 
 
 &sytt- Africa.— iEgypt was the first of these — OveriEgypt a Monarchy extend- 
 ed — It was governed by a King, but subject to the customs of the coun- 
 try, in matters of Religion — If ever there was a country that respect- 
 edits religious institutes, it wasiEgypt, so that the Sovereign was per- 
 fectly regulated by them— In other respects, the Government was ar- 
 bitrary,f indeed society had not then sufficiently advanced to admit 
 of any competition of Orders. 
 
 Cartilage. The next Government was Carthage — Carthage consisted of the 
 
 SufFetes,J the Senate, and the People — The Suffetes were a kind of 
 Kings, Consuls, or Dictators, with annual power§ — They were two 
 in number, convoked the Senate, or ZvyxAn-ro?, || presided in it, told 
 the voices, and commanded the armies — The Senate^f was composed of 
 persons the most distinguished for age, experience, birth, riches, and 
 merit — They deliberated on affairs of State, declared peace, and war, 
 
 * King of Dahomey furnished his palace with human heads. 
 
 + The erection of the Pyramids was a pretty good proof of this. 
 
 £ Derived from the word Sophctim, which in the Hebrew and Phenician ?anguages, signifies 
 , Judges. . 
 
 § Ut Romae, Consules, sic Carthagine, quotannis, annui bini reges creabantur, Corn. Nep. in 
 * "vita, Hannibalis. 
 
 |] Senatum itaque Suffetes, quod velut Consulare impcrium apud eos erat, vocarerunt. Lir. 
 xxi. n. 7, called XyyxXyjTos by Pclybiu?, as was also the hundred and four, now going to be men- 
 tioned, or TtfHcrix, 
 
 \ Probably six or seven hundred. 
 
\ 
 
 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 101 
 
 heard complaints from Provinces', admitted Ambassadors to audience, 
 received letters from Generals, in short determined every thing, e-xj-: 
 cept where they were not unanimous, in which case, there was,an, Ap- 
 peal to the People — From the Senate again, were chosen a Hundred • 
 and Four, the rfp*9-**,t or Council of Old men, intended as a balance 
 to the Suffetes, and Senate,:}: like the Ephori at Sparta, as also a 
 Judicial, for trying their Generals at their return from war§ — Lastly, 
 from these Hundred and four, there were Five chosen, who had more 
 authority than the rest, a Court, of Review, who elected in on va- 
 cancies to the Hundred and four, and to themselves — It may be 
 added that, when the Suffetes went out of office, they became Prae- 
 tors, or Great Judges, || with the power of proposing and enacting 
 new laws, and calling to account the receivers of the public re- 
 venues, which power Hannibal exercised in an extraordinary manner.^" 
 
 This was the Constitution of Carthage, and it may be known from An Aristo - 
 
 , , cracy. 
 
 if, that it was an Aristocracy — The Suffetes, and Senate were the 
 Nobles, so were the Hundred and four, and if more were neces- 
 sary, to these were added the Five, who chose in on vacancies, to, the 
 Hundred and four, and to themselves, without mentioning the Prae- 
 tors or Great Judges, who were the Suffetes expired in Office — 
 
 1 Ann. Carfb. 457, the same as the Hundred of Justin, sec the following quotation— Dein. 
 cum familia tanta Imperatorurn (Imilco, Ha<ino, Glisco, Hannibal, Ischar, Sapho) gravis libera. 
 Civitati csset, omniaque ipsi agercut simul,,ct judicareat, CENTUM ex numero Seoatorum, Judices 
 deliguntur, qui revcrsis a bello ducibus, rationem rerum gestarura exigcrcnt, ut hoc mctu in illo, 
 imperiacogitarcnt, ut domi, judicia, legesque rcspicerent — Justin, lib. xix. 8. 
 
 + Carthaginienset — Oratores ad pacem petendammittunt triginta seniorum principes — id erat 
 sanctus apud illos concilium, maxjmaque ad ipsum senatuia regendum vis, Lir. lib. xxvi. n. 51. 
 lib. xxx. n. 16. 
 
 § Ut hoc mctu, as above, ita in bello, imperia cogitarent, ut domi judicia, legesque respiccrent, 
 Justin, lib. xix. 
 
 |j Cum Suffetes ad jus dicendum concedissent. hiv.h xxxiv. n. 62. 
 
 5 See Liv. lib. xxxiii. n. 46, and 47, where the whole story is told. 
 
10* THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 Tims it appears, that tbey were all Nobility, and even Aristotle cen- 
 sures the Government, on account of birth being made a requisite for 
 Office^-The People were totally excluded, for they had only a right 
 to suffrage when the Senate were not unanimous, which the latter took 
 care (at least, while the Constitution flourished) should never be the 
 case — Hannibal carried" a point upon the express ground, that it 
 would be imprudent to allow it to come to the People,* and Po- 
 lybius ascribes the ruin of the Republic to their mixing in aftairst — 
 Aristotle too praises it during the time that they did not so mix, 
 which shews that to exclude them was a point in the Constitu- 
 tion — Carthage then was chiefly a Government of ONE ORDER — It 
 lasted 700 years. 
 Sparta. The next Government (coming to Europe) is Sparta — Here the 
 
 People had one degree more of power, for they possessed a regular 
 voice, though no share in the discussions, or deliberations — They were 
 obliged to receive, or reject the decrees absolutely J — The Constitution 
 was composed of Kings, Senate, and People§ — The Kings were two, 
 of the race of Hercules, and held the first rank in the State — Their 
 authority was extremely limited in time of peace — Ln war, they had 
 the command of the fleets and armies, but even then, they had Com- 
 
 * It ■was at the end of the second Punic war, when one of the Senators opposed the terms of 
 peace offered by the Romans. 
 
 T Aio oat riiv nXiia-Triv 5tW/<uv ev rots $t*£ts}.tcis icxpx //.ev Kxpyjwoviots o Ar^o* ww (/.irnXri^ci vxpx oc Puyxtois 
 ecx[jLi)v taytv ■» J-vyxXyrot — o0e» vtxp m: yiv ruv voXkwv Qn\ivoy.tvvv t trxf on oe ruv api&ruv, xxnayjut rx ruv 
 Puyxiuv §txQtt\tx irtpi rxs xoiv xs itpx\ns — v xxi mrxirxvrts rots cXois, ru QakiviaQxt xxXust rtXos mtxpxnaxt 
 rwrco\ty.u ruv KxpyviSoviuv. Vol. iii. p. 72. 
 
 X T* £i nAHQOYS xSpma^tvroi, timiv /xtv t$tvi yvec^v ruv x>J.uv vQtm, rrjv <T vno ruv rEPONT£2N> xxi tui 
 BAXiAEflN, mportQiurav twixpuxi xvpioiyv oAHMOZ. Piut. in Lycurg. Ed. Tons. Vol. i. p. 93. 
 § 4>e<C« axucxvrts TlvQuvoQtv, oi rxoe vixxv 
 
 Mxvraxs te ©fa, xxi teXeev r'mtx 
 Apytttyi.iv BaXrjy, 0eot///.»jtwBA2;IAeA2 
 
 Oic yt\ti 'Ltrxprxs iytpourvx voKis 
 TJptcGvras te 1 EpONTAS, tirurx Si AHMOTA2 nvlfcts 
 EvQtixis (WTftcis xvrxyuZo^ivHS. Ibid. 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 103 
 
 missioners, or Inspectors over them, who were chosen from persons ob- 
 noxious to them, to diminish their power still further — The Senate, 
 or TspaTia, had the deliberative power — We are told that they 
 were added afterwards by Lycurgus as a balance betwixt the Kings 
 and People, one while siding with the former, another with the 
 latter, as each preponderated* — The People had the determining 
 power, always however with the restriction above mentioned, of not 
 discussing, or amending— This was a great fetter, for if you will not 
 allow men to discuss, they have very little of the power, and none of 
 the inclination, to consider things at all — And they accordingly seemed 
 sensible of it, for they endeavoured to get rid of this restriction, 
 under the reign of Theopompus, who however prevented them, by 
 making a decree as often as they attempted it to dissolve them.f 
 The Ephori were added afterwards to controul the power of Kings, 
 and Senate, being chosen from the People J — This was the Constitu- 
 tion of Sparta. 
 
 And from this it may be seen that Sparta too was an Aristocracy§ — An Aristo- 
 cracy. 
 
 * AtufU(JLtn yxp i) voKiTttx xxi xw/Xivhitx vjv [jlsv us TusBxviXtis sm Tvpxwidx, m $e us to TlKriQos, tni Af)ft.Om 
 xpxrixt) oiov z(vrj.x rriv tuv TipovTuv xpyyv tv (/.tau diptm. xxi i eoppoTrnaxc-x, Tnv xa<fx7\iarxrr,i tx%iv scry;, xxi 
 xxTXCTTxcrtv — Au Tuv om.tux.xi tixocri T l f°vTuv Tots (/.tv Bxtnkiv&i Ttpo<TTtQt(j.ivuVy o&ov xvT&yyxi trpos AyfAoxpxTixvy 
 mvOts ot virip ra //.>) ytvtaQxi Tvpxmox y tcv A»j/*ov xvxppuvvvTuv. Plut. in Lycurg. vol. I. p. 91. From which 
 circumstance it avoided the confusions that had taken place at Mcssene and. Argos as we are told 
 by the same author. O xxi (axXicttx t*j» Avxupyu ao^ixv xxi "rrpovotxv vrroiYiai tyxvtpxv as txs Mhtgwiuv kxi 
 Apysiuv, avyytvuv xxi ysiTOvuv An^uv, xxi BxaiKtxi irrxaets xxi xxxoTiokneixs xtyopucrtv' Oi tuv lauv (with 
 the Spart.ms) xii xpyys Ttrvy^xoTts , iv £s tu xKypu xxi wAsov tyj.nxuvuv £e|aym, ux iiri TroAty ypovoi 
 ivoxi(Aotrj<T»)i, x\\ v~>pu TujV BxaiXiuv, tix cvvii9ix Ja tuv OyXuv^ tx xxGiptutx avvTxpx^xvTis , i^u^zv oti Qtioi rjv 
 
 US X~kWUS IVTW/yiKX TOIS "ZltxpTIXTXISjO TV)V TtoXlTtlXV xpiA0<TX(A.tV<7S, XXI xtpxCTXS TTxp CCVTOIS. Ibid. D. 9 4. 
 
 t At $t erxoXixv o AAMOZ i%oito, tus nPE£3YrENEA2 xxi APxATETAZ xmo-TxTvpxs u^iv. Plut. Ibid. 
 p. 93. 
 
 $ Ovru to <no\iTtvfj.x Td Avxupyu pufay-ra, opus xy.pxTov rrjy OXiyxpy^ixv, xxi Kryypxv 01 utT atTOy opuvTv; 
 
 nrxpyuaxv xxi 6iy/.«^sv>jy, us <py<riv o IIXxtuv, oiov ^>xXiov ((xQxXXuctiv xvTy, tvv Tut H$cpuv ivvaiji.iv. Pint. vol. i 
 
 p. 93- as before. 
 
 § TpiTov itxpx Axxwxipoviois oi BA2IAEI2 uioiov lyjiat Tm xpyyv t ot St irpoaxyoptvo^.tvoi rEPO.\TE2 hxCiv- 
 
 it XV) KXI fU0' UV } IfXVTX XJtipify TXI TX KCtTCt T)JV TfoXlTUX*. Poljb, Vol. ill. 
 
1Q4 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 The authority of the Kings was but limited, besides, whatever they 
 had was included in the Senate, for if they had been opposing one an- 
 other, the Ephori would never have been added to controul them — They 
 were moreover both considered as one, for when the Senate is named, 
 it is said to consist of thirty, whereas it was only of twenty-eight, when 
 the Kings were not counted—The People were totally excluded — 
 Though the Ephori were chosen from among them,. this only diminish- 
 ed the power of the Kings, and Senate, without increasing theirs, for 
 they were kept under by wanting the power of discussion — They 
 might have rejected the decrees, to be sure, but this was but a 
 barren power, and not apt to be exercised, when we consider the 
 superior advantages of modelling, contriving, embarrassing, and re- 
 turning eternally the same upon them, aided by better abilities 
 with more enlightened education — Poly bins therefore), with all defer- 
 ence to so great an author, may be surely said to be wrong when he 
 calls Sparta a Government of THREE ORDERS, which he plainly 
 does, when he boasts of the men of his day having experienced the ad- 
 vantages of such, and gives this very Government as an example of it.* 
 And indeed it was an Aristocracy in the very beginning, at least 
 as far as Lycurgus had to do with it— We are told that when he 
 returned home, being elevated with the Oracles delivered in his 
 favour, he brought the Nobles into his views, and established his 
 Republic by coercion-}— This then, is a pretty good hint, both to 
 those who expect that Governments should be pure in their begin- 
 nings, and that every Republic that bears the name of equality, should 
 he i\ee, that is properly so— Sparta was the very picture of equality, 
 
 • Atj? >6 » 7 « f , »s apiarw p.w yyvrto* nroXiruxv r»jv sx nANTHN TflN nPOEiPHMHNHN (ElAnN) 
 o-vno-Tuecui, mm yxp m pipus, 8 teyu [*ovov, aXK i^u, iftipav ti^vpx^tv, Avxt'pya avarviMtros vpum 
 
 JMTU TbTOV TO* Tp°tl01 y TO AuKitxi^OVIUI Wo/UTEl'/X.*. Pol. Vol. \\\. p. 4. Villdob, C(J. 
 
 f E«*tf6w Se t«twj vgooyyt ms API2TOY2— Pint. Vol. i- p. SI. 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. . 1Q5 
 
 and yet it was an Aristocracy* — But freedom in antient times, very 
 often meant only being Ay-wopo*, or independent, that is, not governed 
 by other nations, no matter how much tyranny within — Sparta lasted 
 700 years.t 
 
 The next Government is Athens^ and that indeed was of a very Athens, 
 different nature — It consisted of the Archons, the Senates, and the Peo- 
 ple — The Archons, ten in number, came in place of their Kings, and 
 corresponded to those of Sparta, but with far inferior authority to 
 both — They were originally instituted for life, afterwards for ten years, 
 and in Solon's time, for one only — Two or three of them, were judges, 
 and the rest had municipal functions, such as the care of the police, 
 the charge of seeing the laws executed, supplying the city with provi- 
 sions, and others of the like nature — They were chosen by lot, and 
 from the People. — The Senate were all chosen in the same way (an- 
 nually) — It was their business to prepare, and digest matters before 
 they were brought before the People, being instituted for this pur- 
 pose by Solon, that nothing crude or immature, might come to such 
 a precipitate multitude — This was called a TrpoSuXsu^a, or preparatory 
 resolution, and if it was approved, it passed into a law, if not, it 
 had only force for a yearj — In the Assemblies of the People, " all the 
 " great affairs of the Republic were discussed — It was there, that 
 u new laws were proposed, and old amended ; the religion, and 
 " worship of the Gods examined — Magistrates, generals, and officers „ 
 " created, their behaviour, and conduct enquired into, peace, or 
 " war concluded ; deputies and ambassadors appointed ; treaties, and 
 
 * It is said that Lycurgus returning from a journey, and observing the perfect equality of 
 the reaped corn, as he passed through Laconia, remarked to those that were with him, smiling, 
 Does not Laconia look like the possession of several brothers, who hare just been dividing their 
 inheritance among them ? 
 
 + It may be remarked, that the very passing of the decree of Theopompus, to dissolve the Peo- 
 ple as often as they attempted discussion, see p. 103, is a proof how little power they had. 
 
 X It was upon this that Anacharsis observed to Solon, " I wonder you should empower the wise 
 men only to deliberate, and debate upon affairs, and leave the determination, and decision of them 
 wholly to fools." * 
 
 P 
 
106 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 "alliances ratified ; freedom of the city granted, rewards and 
 " honours decreed for those who had distinguished themselves in war, 
 H and rendered great services to the Republic, and punishments or- 
 " dained for those who had behaved themselves ill, or had violated 
 u the laws of the State, and were banished by ostracism — In fine, 
 "justice was administered, and judgment passed there upon the 
 " most important affairs,* on all, except what related to the Areopagus, 
 "who had a high jurisdiction in criminal cases, and the supreme 
 " superintendence of Religion, Morals, and Manners. t They interfere 
 " edtoo occasionally in affairs of Government/'J 
 Democracy. This was the Constitution of Athens, and from this it may be 
 seen, that it was a strong Democracy^ — Take away the Areopagus, 
 and the People had the whole Legislative, Judicial, and Exe- 
 cutive, in their hands They took measures, made Jaws, and 
 tried causes — It may be said indeed, that if the Senate could not 
 determine without them, they could not originate without the 
 Senate, but this related chiefly to minor laws, and even in these, 
 the rule was not rigidly adhered to — There were for instance, 
 many laws or amendments of laws, proposed of lvhich the Senate 
 heard nothing, as for instance, the famous alteration of Demosthenes 
 to alienate the theatrical Monies given to the People for public en- 
 tertainment, and apply them to the war against Philip — In taking 
 
 • SeeRollin's Antient History, English translation, Vol. iii. p. 523. Oct. Ed. 
 
 + They condemned a child to death for making it its pastime to put out the eyes of quails. 
 
 * Quamvis Themistoclesjure laudetur, et sit ejusnomen, quam Solonis,illustrius, citeturque Sala- 
 mis clarissimae testis Victoria?, quae antcponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areo- 
 pagitas: non minus prasclarum hoc, quam illud, judicandum est. lllud enim semel profuit, hoc 
 semper proderit Civitati : hoc consilio leges Athenicnsium, hoc majorum instituta servantur — Et 
 Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit, in quo ipse Areopagum juverit : at ille adjuvit Themistoclem 
 — Est enim bcllum gestum consilio Senatus ejus, qui a Solone erat constitus. Oific. I. i. n. 75. 
 
 $ It is remarkable, that ^characterizing the different nations, who went to the siege of Troy, the 
 Athenians are the only one, whom Homer calls AHMO£, or PEOPLE, no doubt alluding to 
 their popular Government. See Aristotle, also de Rep. lib. ii. c. 12. EmffTosTu^^fMtywywtvtivyctyt^ 
 «v$«y us rni m AHMOKPATUN, 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. iq7 
 
 measures, they were supreme, witness the decrees concerning 
 the Mytylenians, whom they condemned, and saved almost 
 in the same day;* and as to law suits, if any. one wishes to know he 
 length,they went in deciding them, both in power and inclination, they 
 may learn it from Aristophanes, who describes a man as making his 
 way through the tiles of a house, to get to the public assembly, 
 and give his vote, he having been confined by his friends on account 
 if his inordinate passion for trying causesf — These things shew what 
 the Assemblies of the Athenians were. 
 
 But the discussion was the great thing — When we consider how 
 much even the smallest power is reinforced by a numerous Assem- 
 bly, we may conceive what the whole LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, 
 and EXECUTIVE must have been, in the hands of near twenty 
 thousand people, rouzed by the agitation of their Orators— The swell 
 was immense — It was so great, that it became a particular art, to 
 know how to animate them 
 
 Ha-rponrriv eE^ovr* evnytuxx mv Eaa#&*, 
 
 as was said of Pericles byAristophanes — And they did rouze and did ani- 
 mate them in such a manner,that nothing could oppose it — It was in vain 
 therefore that Solon flattered himself that having fixed the State as it v 
 were, upon two Anchors, the upper and under Councils,it would be less 
 liable to disturbance, and fluctuation.^ The People would have torn 
 up fifty such Anchors — It is curious too to observe, that as the Ephori 
 were added afterwards to controul the Aristocracy of Sparta " e/*«s 
 
 Kxparov £T» rnv OAiyapp^av, x«ricrp£upav, 01 pir' #vtoi/ (Avnapyov) cpwi/res GTrK$ywvxv t ««* 
 
 * See Thucydid. lib. iii. 
 
 t See Aristophanes, Spwsr. 
 
 J %v (jTnaa.iJ.zwi h r»?y sv Apvwxxyu BOTAHNsx rut xcer 1 tttxvrov Ap yotrut w hx to Apt-xi (having been 
 ArchonJ x.xt xvros (xsTe«£sy«r/ Vop a t rot AHMON ot^strx xxt Opxa-vto/xstot r-n rut yjjtut apso"£/, Ssvrepxt npotrxx- 
 rivti[At BOTAHN ociro tyvKms iKxarys, nrruput ovaut, txxrot ottSpxs'^ 1711X1 lawyer as tip oQa\ivtit irx%£ raAHMOY, 
 xxi (/.ribet e«y wnpoQttXtvrot its exxXXijcvay usQipiaSxi, T»y S* avu BOYAHN nriawitot irxtruti text QvXxy.x rut 
 yojj,ut ikxQio-iv' oio(/.ivos im Svri BOYAA12 wenrtg xywpxis opi^Htrxv virion it <r«X« rrit ToX<y ittffQai t kxi y.xXKot xrfe* 
 \tMtrx rot AHMON it»fi\ut, Plut. in fit. Sol. vol. i. p. 191; 
 
 P2 
 
105 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 fyvaiAtvw" see our 103d page, so were the Senate interposed at 
 Athens to bridle the licentiousness of the Democracy " rn ^'og«v 
 
 "(SoAwi/) rov AHMON oifavrcx, xxi Qf>x<rvvo(i.wQv t« t«j» ypim a<pt<nt" yet the 
 
 two Governments followed the bent of their own genius— Nor 
 was Solon very sanguine in his expectations of any total change, 
 that he should work in the dispositions of the Athenians — Being 
 asked afterwards, if the laws which he had made for the Athenians 
 were the best, he replied, " The best they were capable of receiv- 
 ing."» 
 
 Such were the Governments of Carthage, Sparta, and Athens, and 
 being such, one remark applies to them all, viz. That they were chiefly 
 of ONE ORDER— They were not certainly of THREE^-The 
 power, standing, and authority of the Suffetes, Kings, and Archons, 
 puts a total end to that — They were more of TWO, because power was 
 more divided between TWO — But they were most of all of ONE OR- 
 DER, as ONE had the principal direction of affairs, and are there- 
 fore, to be classed with Governments of that description — Sparta was 
 a strong Aristocracy, even an Oligarchy, we have the authority of 
 Plutarch for that, " O/xws it* axparov mv ox\y»^ot.v t &c." as we have it in 
 the quotation above cited— And Carthage was an Oligarchy, strong 
 enough too, when Hannibal himself one of the Nobles, found it ne- 
 cessary to reform the Hundred and four or r^8<rt«,-f by making them 
 
 * fly av, t<f»i, irfQctSil-xno *f/<rra*. Plut. in vit. Sol. Vol. i. p. 189, Quart. Ed. though at the same 
 time he did say, 
 
 AHMfl / /my y u p t&uxx Tccroy xpxros oa-ov tttxpxti^ 
 
 Tigris st' a^tXwy »t frropt^x(A.tv3t . 
 Oi o iixpnovvxiMy-i xxi ptfni/.xtTikyo'xv ArHTOI, 
 
 Kmi rots t^pxcrxfAv* ^oty xvxis i X t ' u 
 Ec-TJjy S' xfAtp&xXvi xpxrtpov ctxkos x^ortpaivix 
 
 N<x«y S' ax nxa OTAETEPOT2; xSikus . 
 
 + They are called 104, and 100 indiscriminately by Authors, 
 
 4 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 109 
 
 annual, instead of perpetual, which he did at the end of the second 
 Punic war. Athens was a Democracy, even an Ochlocracy sometimes* 
 — We see then, that in all these Governments, there wa* a Nobility, 
 aMultitude, and Ambitious individuals— In some, the Nobility got 
 the better, in others, the Multitude, and in all, there were Ambitious 
 citizens, who every now and then disturbed the public tranquillity, not 
 to mention the earlier Tyrants of Greece, who owed their power to these 
 usurpations t— Our system then of there. being Three INTERESTS 
 or ORDERS in every State, either apparent or concealed, of a ONE 
 who would be GREATEST of all, a FEW who would be GREAT- 
 ER than the rest, and a MANY, who would have things their own 
 way, receives confirmation on every side, but of this only in passing. J 
 These Governments then were all of ONE, or chiefly of ONE ORDER 
 — Others there were in Greece, which imitated their example in beino- 
 also actually of ONE, with aBiform, and sometimes Triform appear- 
 ance^ Such were Corinth and Thebes, the former of an Aristocratic, the 
 latter of a Democratic nature || —But these were the principal— We 
 now come to Governments of another kind, such as were not only of 
 
 * See Arist. and Polyb., Aristotle quoted in Ch. XXXIV. and Polybiusas follows " A/o kxi m ft 
 /xi» ravr-nt re (tw» Afl»xa/«») x.at thj Qr&auwt, *»i?«v cei irXtiu >.iyt/», ev xts o OXA02 X C 'P'&' Tx ^AA 
 xcerac Tn* ioixv ofymv' o y.et o^vTnn x*» ittuff a S/a^tpwyj o ot C«* xzt 9vu.v cvyLitsirxtoivapnQS. Pol. vol. iii 
 p. 63. Oct. Ed. 
 
 + See Pisistratus, &c. 
 
 % See Chap. XXI. 
 
 § It is to be observed before we leave these Governments, that in all 5 the persons who were created 
 to restrain power acquired for themselves — The Ttftatx (at Carthage) were obliged to be reformed 
 by Hannibal,, the Ephori at Sparta imprisoned Pausanias, one of their Kings, without raising 
 the People, and the Senate sided with the Areopagus at Athens, though chosen from the People- 
 But this does not shew that men leave their ORDERS, but only the strength of power ia 
 creating new ORDERS. See on this, note, Ch. XXX. p. 83. 
 
 ]j Atlt (KofitQiot) lAv^vtxfxivoi <*nv tv ry AHMOK.PATJA, kxi irfos AYNA2TAE xiroGteittiyjtixQoTtf, contra: 
 to Athenians says Pint in vit, Timol. p. 108, For Thebans, see last quotation. 
 
 
 
110 
 
 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 Govern- 
 ments of 
 TWO OR. 
 DEUS. 
 Rome — 
 Consuls. 
 
 Senate. 
 
 People. 
 
 Consuls re- 
 spected Se- 
 nate and 
 People. 
 
 TWO or THREE forms in outward and external appearance, but 
 actually of TWO in reality. 
 
 The first of these was Rome. Rome as we all know consisted -of 
 Consuls, Senate, and People— The Consuls " convoked the Senate, and 
 n People, and while in Rome, had all the Magistracies subject to 
 " them, except the Tribunes — They introduced ambassadors into the 
 " Senate, proposed decrees to them, and to the People, and laid before 
 " the former, the most pressing affairs — They received from the Quaes- 
 " tors what money they wanted, and had supreme authority in the 
 " Camp — They levied troops, and had power of life, and death over 
 " the soldiers — They executed also the decrees of the Senate/' 
 
 The Senate again were " masters of the Treasury, except in as 
 " far as regarded the demands of the Consuls — They appointed Com- 
 tl missioners from their number, to try great offences, such as trea- 
 " sons, conspiracies, poisonings, and assassinations — They made trea- 
 " ties with cities, called them to account for their conduct, succour- 
 " ed, guarded, and garrisoned them — Had laws proposed in their sit- 
 " tings — Sent embassies to nations, exhorting to alliance, or im- 
 " posing commands on them — Received ambassadors, and answered 
 " them — Declared peace, and war." 
 
 The People " were the distributors of reward and punishment, 
 " especially in the great offices of the state — .Judged in matters of 
 " life, and death— -Conferred Magistracies — Sanctioned laws— De- 
 *' termined peace, and war — Confirmed treaties, and alliances." 
 
 Therefore says Polybius,the Government consisted of THREE R- 
 DERS* — Therefore we must beg leave to say, with all deference to so 
 great an author, it did no such thing, at least substantially, and really — 
 The Consuls, says he,respec ted the Senate,on acountofthe supplies for 
 
 * Sec p. 225. Ot< apum nohwx v tx, nANTflN TfiN EIAflN awwTW*, ruci oryinruv Pw^awv tert 
 
 VUiiVTK. 
 
 ■ 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE, Ji 
 
 their army, which the latter could either give or refuse, so as to promote, 
 or disappoint their enterprizes — They stood in awe of them too, on ac- 
 count oftheir triumphs, which the Senate could either withhold, or grant. 
 The same Consuls regarded the People, because they alone could 
 confirm the treaties which they made, and because they were 
 obliged to account to them on laying down their power— The Senate re- 
 Senate again respected the People, because they could not bring ^ c c0 " 
 any of the trials for great offences to a conclusion without their 
 assistance — Because all laws tending to diminish the authority, esti- 
 mation, or dignity of the Senate, were in their power — Lastly, be- 
 cause the Tribunes, who were obliged to follow the inclinations of 
 the People, could by their opposition, if it was even but of one of 
 them, stop any of the Senate's laws — The People again were ob« People re- 
 liged to respect the Senate, on account of the numerous contracts J,ateand °" 
 for public works, in which they were all engaged, either as prin- Consuls > 
 cipals, partners, securities, or money-lenders, on which Judges were 
 appointed by, and from the Senate, who in unfortunate cases, might 
 either enforce performance, or spare — They were also obliged to fear 
 the Consuls, under whose absolute authority they were forced to be, 
 while in Camp.* 
 
 But surely, this system may be said to fall to the ground, when 
 we come to examine it a little further — For what was the power 
 of the Consuls ? They introduced ambassadors to the Senate— Con- 
 voked it, we'll say — Proposed decrees to them and to the People — 
 Laid the most urgent affairs before the former — All this was but an 
 empty power— It was neither LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, nor 
 
 * It is remarkable that among all these respects, it is not mentioned that the Senate respected 
 the Consuls — The Consuls feared the Senate and the People— The People, the Senate, ancHhc 
 Consuls, but the Senate feared only the People — What was the reason that they did not fea.v 
 the Consuls ? They swallowed up the Consuls as we shall soon see» 
 
U2 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 EXECUTIVE, or hardly so (for they did execute the decrees of the 
 Senate)— The chief real power they had, was demanding money from the 
 Quaestors, (and even this if they had done it to an immoderate degree, 
 they would have been obliged to account for) with the command of the 
 Magistracies while at Rome (all except the Tribunes too) which 
 were chiefly matters of police— The real LEGISLATIVE, JUDI- 
 CIAL, and EXECUTIVE were in the Senate and People, for as 
 to the command of the armies, that or any tjiing relating to it, was 
 
 only acting as Generalissimos, and discharging their functions to the 
 State-And that the real LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXE- 
 CUTIVE were in the Senate, and People, we may easily see by 
 
 the following state, in which we shall take the THREE POWERS, 
 as mentioned by Polybius himself, and carry them down just as 
 he has stated them. 
 
 k 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE* 
 
 113 
 
 NOBILITY. 
 
 SENATE 
 
 LEGIS- 
 
 Laws proposed, alliances, and treaties 
 contracted, embassies sent, and answered, 
 succours decreed, censures on nations im- 
 posed, peace, and war declared by. 
 
 JUDI- 
 Treasons, conspiracies, poisonings, as- 
 sassinations, delinquency in great offices, 
 taken cognizance of by. 
 
 EXE- 
 CONSULS. 
 
 Laws executed, levies made, succours 
 carried out, war conducted by. 
 
 PEOPLE. 
 
 PEOPLE. 
 
 
 LATIVE. 
 
 Laws sanctioned, alliances and treaties 
 ratified, peace and war determined, re- 
 wards aud punishments decreed by. 
 
 CIAL. 
 
 Finally pronounced on, and sentence of 
 life and death passed by. 
 
 CUTIVE. 
 Consulship, and other commands and 
 offices conferred by.* 
 
 From this we may see that the THREE POWERS were substantially 
 divided between Senate, and Peoplef,and consequently betweenNobility 
 and People,J as clearly as the division can make them, laid down by 
 
 * Q';i facit per alium, facit per se, therefore though the magistrates elected to these offices did 
 apparently the Executive duty, yet those who chose them had the power. 
 
 + The Consuls had nothing — Count the reciprocal holds, that the whole three bodies had upon 
 one another — The People had five, the Senate three, and the Consuls only one — The People 
 held Approbation of treaties, and Judgment over the heads of the Consuls, Conclusion of trials, 
 laws for diminishing the Senate's authority, and all laws, o-ver the Senate — The Senate held the 
 Granting of supplies, and Triumphs over the Consuls, and Judgments in Contracts over the 
 People — The Consuls held only Power over the People while in Camp, which was neither 
 LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL nor EXECUTIVE, as it were, it was only the power of a 
 Generalissimo in an army. 
 
 J We are well aware, that one of the Consuls was a Plebeian, but he was carried away by the 
 spirit of power, wjiich he had not distinct, but reflected from the Senate — Een if he had not been 
 so carried away, he could not have been detached from the Senate — They were both therefore to be 
 considered as ONE ORDER — Or granting that they had split, would not the one have joined the 
 Plebeians, and the other the Patricians, so that still it is the TWO ORDERS, and a proof thar, 
 split them as you will, the spirit stiH remains, u Invents semper disjecti membra Poetat." 
 
114 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 Poly bins* — Now look to the consequences— Were not these ORDERS 
 engaged in constant contention ? Do we hear of any thing else in the 
 
 is is . " 
 
 whole Roman history, than the battles between the Patricians and 
 Plebeians? They were constantly employed in opposing one another, 
 with the most implacable, and virulent hostility, and never agreed but 
 in one thing, which was oppressing all mankind. 
 
 Now does this prove our premises, or not ? Does this shew, that TWO 
 ORDERS must always look upon one another with animosity ,and keep 
 a State in hot water, and contention ? Will any one say, that this was 
 not hostility, or maintain, that the Roman State consisted of more 
 than TWO ORDERS? If ORDER mean any thing, it means a 
 separate interest — A separate set of connexions — How then, could 
 the Consuls be reckoned such, when they were so intimately linked 
 with the Senate, when they had no distinct authority, nor standing, 
 nor what is more than all the rest put together, divided interest 
 from the Senatef — What was the power of demanding money from the 
 Quaestors (liable too to controul) of superintending the police, with 
 that of presiding in, and convoking the assemblies of the People, 
 and Senate, and introducing ambassadors into the latter ? A mere 
 nothing, a mere cypher, compared with the LEGISLATIVE JU- 
 DICIAL, and EXECUTIVE powers. 
 
 Polybius therefore, with all deference, may surely be said to be wrong, 
 
 * If we want moro proof on the subject, we may refer to their standards, S. P. Q. R., SE- 
 NATUS, POPULUS QUIR1TES ROMANUS— What did that say ? 
 
 + It is to be observed once for all, that the idea of ORDER, is a compound one, consisting 
 of authority^ standing and connexion^ making a different Interest, see p. 86. — Men in power how- 
 ever draw to men in power — That was the very thing with the Consuls — But this does not shew 
 that men leave their X)RDER, but only that power creates new ORDERS — To shew it in one 
 point of view — If some of the People were taken into power along with Nobility, they would in a 
 certain time become of the interest of the Nobility, as was shewn by the Ba>.r> (Senate) at Athens, 
 and Ephori at Sparta, who, though chosen from the People, left the People, but this, as remarked 
 on before, not leaving their ORDERS, but changing their ORDERS. If any one doubt still that 
 the Consuls were Patricians why did Coriolanus say, that " beiug a PATRICIAN, he ought only 
 to be judged by the Consuls ? 
 
 A 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 115 
 
 when he calls the Government of Rome,of THREE ORDERS,andsays, 
 that no one looking at it,could tell, whether it was most Monarchical, Aris- 
 tocratical, or Democratical* — They could tell at least, that it was not 
 of the whole THREE ORDERS, not of the whole THREE sub- 
 stantially, and really, but Two Orders and TWO ORDERS, only.f 
 
 Such was the State of Rome, and such the exemplification of 
 the contests between Nobility and People — Other examples there 
 may be, but this we will venture to say, was the most prominent, 
 and principal — Others there may be, which present these conflicts 
 according as the circumstances of the times, or the still more varying 
 shades of Government, have given them an opportunity of appearing — 
 But this is that, which exhibits them in the most constant and steady 
 manner, during a period of almost seven hundred years, without in- 
 terruption, or variation. 
 
 The next exemplification is King and Nobility — This, if new in KING and 
 the appearances it presents, is equally novel in the cause that pro- ty. 
 duced them — That cause was the Feodal system — The Roman Em- 
 pire, that empire of which we have been just speaking, had extended 
 over the civilized part of the world, and swallowed up all other 
 Governments — It was now crumbling to pieces, but still in these 
 pieces, might be discerned the master features of Despotism — A new or- 
 der of things, was now destined to arise, an order, which should 
 sweep away these Governments from the globe, and place in their 
 
 *»> i 
 
 * Clan i&Sivx nor' a» vmi» dwxvQxt G&xt&js, (**& ruv tywftuv, ir»rc} APISTOKPATlKON t« voXtrtvpx 
 
 cifarav. n AHMOKPATlKON, u MONAPXIKON, Pol. vol. i. 
 
 + We need not quote Cicero again here, see p. 86, nor Tacitus again here, sea ibid, nor re- 
 fer to their standards for Government, but just conclude the whole, with observing, that the Two 
 PARTIES were called OPT1 MATES and POPULARES. Further, let uot the incautious reader 
 think, that any little errors such as these, are a d traction from the memory of this great author — 
 No — It was a greater merit, greater far, greater, how incalculably, in the state the world then was, 
 •to do what he did, than it can now b<«, to detect any little mistakes in him — And any objections 
 raised against him on this ground, are best answered in bis own words, which imply that you are to 
 judge an Author, not by what he has Jailed in, but what he has done, an observation in which, 
 there is not more candour than Justice ! Ow «t r«y ir»^K,Ktm*iAUM. 
 
116 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 room those of another nature and species— Immense swarms of Bar- 
 barians, issuing from the North, unable either to content, or subsist 
 themselves in the barren regions they inhabited, poured upon Eu- 
 rope, and overwhelmed it — Overturning every Government, where 
 they came, they substituted in its room, such as bore the mascul ne 
 features of its authors — These authors were i)ee, that is, independent 
 of their leader, or chief tain — They followed him, as voluntary com- 
 panions, not served as mercenary soldiers—They divided with hi n 
 the countries they conquered, and held them from him by- 
 no other tenure, than military service — That is, they were obliged to 
 follow him to the field, and appear in arms at his signal, to defend 
 their common territories — Possessions acquired m this way, were like- 
 ly to be independent — To interfere with them on the part of the So- 
 vereign, would have been meddling beyond his right, because that 
 right w r as only military service — They became therefore separate 
 Jurisdictions — The Proprietor had a right to coin money in them, 
 to administer Justice, civil, and criminal, and to carry on war against 
 his private enemies in his own name — These Proprietors then were 
 so many Sovereigns— The Lord paramount, or King, had the general 
 Sovereignty of the whole, but they the particular, with the LEGIS- 
 LATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE Powers.* 
 
 It could not be expected, that a system so formed, would remain 
 Jong tranquil, and pacific— For the purposes of war,(and here it resem- 
 bled the Roman) it was perfect,but for all others variable, and hostile — 
 It was natural, that the Prince should be jealous of the Nobles, and 
 the Nobles jealous of him — That he should consider them as danger- 
 ous Rivals, and they him, as a troublesome Lord — It was natural too, 
 that these jealousies should break out, and in many cases, bring them 
 to open violence — Accord ingty, we find in these periods, the King, 
 and the Nobles engaged in constant contentions. The power of the 
 
 1 
 
 * Germany afforded an exact picture of this till 1805.1806. 
 
THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE I\ r BALANCE. 
 
 K7 
 
 latter so great, that in many rases, the Sovereign was unable to sub- 
 due it — Witness the contest between James II. of Scotland, and the 
 Earl of Douglas, when the latter for a considerable time, defied his 
 efforts — This was the state of Europe at the period we talk of — 
 " the Monarchical and Aristocrat ical parts of the Constitution (to 
 use the words of Kobertson) having NO INTERMEDIATE POWER 
 6 ' to balance them, were perpetually at variance, and jostling with each 
 " other."* 
 
 Such then being the state of Europe, and such the consequences 
 produced by it we are at no lo>.s v to judge of the combination be- 
 tween Kuilt, andN Ojbilitv - It aft* rds complete exemplification — On 
 the one side, attack and aggression, on the other, repulsion, and re- 
 sistance — No order, n> balance, no solidity, safety, or interior re- 
 gulation — All vehement, and implacable hostility, equally virulent, 
 equally inflexible, equally unappeasable with any of the others, only 
 exemplified m a different mam. or. 
 
 The third and last combination is King, and People. Of this, we have KING and 
 fewer instances, than of' either of the form-r, but still sufficient to es- Pt:0i>Lfc: ' 
 tabhsh our premises — In antient times, different nations have found 
 themselves in this situation, in proportion as the vicissitudes of their 
 Governments, inclined them to it — Of any so constituted originally, and 
 directly, we have few examples — AVe are told by Plutarch that Mcs- 
 sene, and Argos, were founded in this way, and we learn the con* 
 sequences resulting from it*— Through the haughty arrogance of their 
 King , and the turbulent contumacy of the People, they were thrown 
 into constant convulsions. We learn aho, that Sparta was so con- 
 
 * See Robertson's History of Ch. V. vol. i. p. 17. 
 
 * O xxi i^xXirrrtx r-nt AvKbpyts «-o£/av. xott Trooyoicx* CTroincri tpxv&pav, tis rots tAtcmmtn xxi Apytiuv, avyyivxv xx, 
 »E<Toy&vAHMf2N, x«/BA£IAEf2N, arotaas, xoti xxxovoXtrtiaSf ocfyopu.<rn* Oi rut tauv (with tue Spaitans) «rr, 
 Kpyys TinvwTOj e» 5s to xXypu , xui wXeov »%"► txeivav oo|*vts.<-, ux tvti TtoXv* xpovov t vcitxifMnicroif, ocXX vCpn Ta< v 
 BA^IAEHN, nxtvTTBtQ'x <$i r uv OXAON, rot- xxQtTTurx avyrxpoi^JoiTv 9 «£e;|<*» ort Qu»-y u» us stki&ois ivrvyvip/ * 
 tsis iTfaprixrotis* o rv& 'tfo'Kirtmi ccpiAVaetptrnf axt xtpourxs itxp 'turns* Flut. i i Lye. Vol. i, p. 94. 
 
118 THREE POWERS IN TWO ORDERS DEFECTIVE IN BALANCE. 
 
 stituted originally, and corresponded in it's confusions, by Lycur- 
 gus having added the Old men (n Kxraurrwf rw Te^truv) to balance be- 
 tueen Kings and People*. In our own times, we have the examples 
 of Charles I. of England, and Louis XVI. of France, the one left 
 with the long Parliament, after the Lords were abolished, and the 
 other with the National Assembly, or Convention, each of which 
 brought a King to the scaffoldf — These are the principal instances — 
 But in all we recognize two things, first the evils of the combina- 
 nation while it lasts, and secondly, that it cannot last long, unless 
 there be some extraordinary power to reinforce the ORDER of 
 KING (but this in passing) from the immense swing of the PEO- 
 PLE. 
 In ail, a Such are the combinations of TWO ORDERS, and such the 
 
 vant of Ba- conse( , uences resulting from it — In all we may observe a want of Ba- 
 lance in pro- 1 o J 
 
 portion a 3 oi lance, in all, a defect of Order, solidity, and peace, of Nice and 
 LiEUS. constant adjustment — If it be KING, and NOBILITY, they fight, if 
 it be KING, and PEOPLE, they convulse, if it be NOBILITY, and 
 PEOPLE, they are engaged in constant contention — And we may 
 observe too, in proportion, as the combinations have been of TWO, 
 these Consequences arising — If entirely of TWO, entirely, if partly,part- 
 ]y, but in all, a want of balance, more or less, according as they were 
 composed of TWO — Thus then, without enumerating either the Go- 
 vernments of TWO ORDERS that have existed, or the possible 
 modifications that can exist ot them we may assert, (for now the iact 
 
 * Atupv^im yap 10 irol.rttuc xxi onroxKivvax vvy [xt* us ras BA2IAEI2, mi Tvpxvvi^oc, »fv ^t u$ to nAH©02, 
 tTi' Ar.//.oxp*Tiav, otov tpv^x, "njv twv Ttpovro.v xpyjiv tv [j-uju 0£/xf»j, xxi laoppoirna-xax^ tw a(T^x>.tarxTmv toc^id 
 *°"X. E y - M "*T«ffT«ff;» — An rxv oxru xx' £ix.o<ril ipotruv, rots //.eh BASIAEYEl rrpt><jT&tp.viu%i ojov xpnCwxt tt^ojAjj- 
 fcoxpacnav, avOis^s ivig ra foj ysvsaBxi Tttfaw^*, tov AHMON tx.ix%guivvTtuv. Pl.it. ib;d. [). 91 
 
 + This shews the energy of the cause, when ir produced exactly the same eff'-ct in TWO 
 different countries, notwithstanding the disparity of times, circumstances, and national character. 
 It further reinforces completely the remark made in our thirty-second Chapter, see p. 98, that 
 wherever there are TWO ORDERS in a State, these ORDERS will be hostile and rival spirits 
 never satisfied till they accomplish each other's destruction. 
 
THREE POWERS VESTED IN THREE ORDERS FOR A BALANCE. HQ 
 
 bears us out) that Governments have been always defective in Ba- 
 lance, in proportion as the powers have been vested in TWO OR- 
 DERS. 
 
 CHAP. XXXIV. 
 
 THAT THE THREE POWERS MUST BE VESTED IN THREE ORDERS TO 
 
 MARE A BALANCE. 
 
 "WE have now seen, that the three powers cannot be vested in Three pow- 
 
 "tur 11 trs mus t be 
 
 ONE ORDER, to make a balance — We have also seen, that they vested in 
 cannot be vested in TWO ORDERS lor that purpose-The only^^ 
 result seems to be, (for there are no more) that they must be vested ^ ; mike a 
 
 ' Balance. 
 
 in Three Orders. 
 
 But this is not satisfactory — It is not satisfactory to a reasoning 
 mind, to be cut off with short results, and negative demonstrations 
 — It demands something more — It requires positive evidence of the 
 existence of the thing, and absolute, and as far as possible, complete 
 proof on the subject. 
 
 That proof, we hope, we have — We flatter ourselves that we have com- Hope proof, 
 plete evidence arising from the thing itself, from its intrinsic nature, 
 and essence, that the three powers ought to be, and indeed cannot 
 otherwise than be, vested in THREE ORDERS, to obtain a balance. 
 
 Eor what is a Balance, as understood in Government? " A nice, What aBa- 
 " and proper adjustment of forces, fixed in such a way, as to main- ance 
 " tain a constant, and unvarying, generally unvarying, equilibre" — 
 That is a Balance — For as to merely equivalent forces, forces of ire- 
 nerally equal strength,of which, one is getting the better one day, and an- 
 other, another, that is as far removed from the idea of any Balance as 
 
130 THREE POSTERS VESTED IN THREE ORDERS FOR A. BALANCE. 
 
 can be, the most absolute and decided, Monarchy, Aristo.cracy, or 
 Democracy. 
 How to get And if this be our idea of a Balance, how are we to get it? It is 
 pot clearly, by placing the powers in ONE ORDER, in either KIN G, 
 NOBILITY, or PEOPLE, because that would be carrying every 
 v F thing one way. It would be no Balance, let them be divided into 
 order. as many bodies as they woukH* — They would be still the same In- 
 terest — There must then be a force to oppose them — Another OR- 
 DER— Would that do ? No— For that ORDER in checking the 
 first, may become itself too powerful — Or be got the better of by 
 Nor TWO * ts adversary — Or become its rival and keep the State in hot water, 
 oiLDERS. and contention, all three of which are equally distant from the nice- 
 ly adjusted Balance we talk of — What then are we to do? We must 
 check this check itself, we must mitigate its excess, or strengthen 
 its deficiency, and stop the hostility, which breeds contention in a 
 State. 
 BntTHKEE And how is this to be clone? How can it be done, but by adding 
 Tjmi D h ' another ORDER ? We have now got sofar, that a check must be 
 check. created, a prop added, and the acrimony of hostility, qualified and 
 amended between TWO ORDERS — Why then, all these purposes 
 are answered by a THIRD— A THIRD will check an excess, 
 a THIRD will strengthen adeticiency, a third will mitigate the hos- 
 tility, which breeds a contention in a State, and which is the evil 
 we complain of— For let us suppose that a State consists of TWO 
 ORDERS,and that ON E is exceeding— Will not a THIRD check it ? 
 —Is it to be supposed that TWO ORDERS will fight for the purposes 
 of ambition, as we have proved they have done, and that they will 
 not, for self preservation ? It is impossible — And if they do not do 
 
 * Sec Chap. XXXI. of this book, 
 f Sec Chap. XXX. 
 
THREE POWERS VESTED IN THREE ORDERS FOR A BALANCE. 121 
 
 this, they must see that they will be inevitably swallowed up, if they 
 allow the exceeding ORDER, to get to any great pitch or as- 
 cendancy oyer them — They are therefore pledged to resist it in the be- 
 ginning, to oppose it with all their forces—This then, as to the first 
 point of checking an exceeding ORDER. 
 
 Nor are the consequences of A THIRD ORDER, less useful win assist a. 
 with respect to the second point, or strengthening a deficiency ,for from 
 uhe same motive, that it checked an exceeding ORDER,, it will assist a 
 weaker, indeed, they are correlative parts of the same thing. 
 
 The last is mitigating the hostility which breeds contention in a Mitigate tire 
 State, and in this way* a THIRD ORDER is as eminently serviceable, Jhichbree* 
 as in either of the other points of view — For what was the motive contc , ntion 
 
 1 in a Mute. 
 
 to that hostility ? A constant, unsubduable ambition to get the Su- 
 preme power, which would be the infallible consequence of ONE 
 ORDER being annihilated, where there were only TWO in a State — 
 — But would this be the case, were there THREE, or rather would 
 not the fixed apposition of the other TWO, as often as the attempt 
 was made, render such an enterprize nugatory ,and hopeless ? This then, 
 would take away the motive to the ambition, the fixed hostility 
 between two Orders,, that hostility ad internecioncnt, which so 
 often torments a State in the shape of rivalship, leaving only a proper 
 jealousy m its room. 
 
 So far Speculation, and now for the aid of Experience — Does any Experience 
 one suppose that Governments can go on, so as not to need a check ? 
 If they do, let them refer to the testimony of history* — That is solid 
 fact, in that, there can be no delusion, or deception — Have we not 
 seen MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and DEMOCRACY, con- 
 
 * 
 
 Is not this the very thing, that occasions the xta-KvyXm^ic mXirtiuv of Polybius (revolution of 
 Governments) so often quoted, MONARCHY into DESPOTISM, DESPOTISM into ARIS- 
 TOCRACY, ARISTOCRACY into OLIGARCHY, OLIGARCHY into DEMOCRACY, 
 DEMOCRACY into OCHLOCRACY, anl OCHLOCRACY back into MONARCHY and 
 DESPOTISM agair. 
 
 11 
 
\%l THREE POWERS VESTED IN THREE ORDERS FOR A BALANCE, 
 
 slant ly going into their corresponding excesses of DESPOTISM, 
 OLIGARCHY, and OCHLOCRACY ? Have we not seen them do- 
 ing so, as often as they have been unchecked, and unqualified? Have 
 we not seen them taking their corresponding turns of power, pride, 
 and violence, as often, as the interests, or passions of the prevailing 
 men led them ?* MONARCHY under an active Prince, ARISTO- 
 CRACY under designing Nobles, and DEMOCRACY under factious 
 Demagogues? Well then, they require a check, and what must that 
 check be? It cannot be a SECOND ORDER, for we have seen 
 a SECOND ORDER, and yet the consequence, that is, a proper 
 check, or Balance has not resulted — It cannot be a FIRST, for that 
 is the very evil complained of— Why then it must be a THIRD, if 
 there be such a thing as a Balance at all, for there are no more 
 than TIIKEE ORDERS, in nature, no more than THREE, in 
 reality, or existence. 
 Experience But perhaps this may appear speculative too — Besides it is ne- 
 SobilT- -g^tive, as has been observed—We shall then take experience at once. 
 We shall ask the question, if there had been THREE ORDERS 
 &X Rome, for there never have been THREE ORDERS yet in antient 
 limes (THREE ORDERS there always have been, either open, or 
 -concealed, but w;e mean THREE OPEN, DISTINCT ORDERS 
 armed with the powers of Government) we ask if there had been Three 
 £uch at Rome, whether it would not have mitigated the contentions of 
 the State, whether it would not have softened the dissensions of the 
 City ? If Kings had come in the place of Consuls(forthelatter,as we have 
 shewn, were no ORDERf) whether they would not have interposed 
 .their authority, checked the greater force, assisted the weaker, and sooth- 
 
 * See Chap. XXV. XXVI. and XXVH. into DESPOTISM, OLIGARCHY, and OCHLO- 
 CRACY — It is to tie observed further, that if Poh bins calls BAIIAEIA, or KINGSHIP, the legiti- 
 mate, and MOxwrxiA MONARCHY, tlieabuse. still we venture to take MONARCHY, the legiti- 
 mate, avd Dcs'|><itishi, (lie ;ibi;se, on accouni of common usage. 
 
 i SceCi'ao. XXX. am! XXXIII. 
 
 'IV and 
 
 PLOii.E 
 
THREE POWERS VESTED IN THUEE ORDERS FOR A BALANCE. 5 
 
 ed the divisions of the State ? But we need not go to questions, and 
 suppositions, we saw Kiugs at Rome, and we saw what they did — L 
 did mitigate the dissensions of the City, they did meliorate the coi 
 tion of the State — Though with too little power, or too much to make an 
 ORDER, they shewed what the}' would have done,if they had been so— 
 They had,.part of the Legislative,Judiciai and Executive powers, so had 
 the Senate, so had the People — They were the guardians of the cus- 
 toms, and laws, proposed and voted in the latter, judged causes, execu- 
 ted Jaws, commanded the armies — The Senate voted on laws, on peace, 
 and war, judged causes,bore offices — r I ne People voted on laws,on peace, 
 and war, and chose to officesf — So that they had the powers of Go- 
 vernment divided between them, though not in an equal manner. 
 
 As to Carthage, Sparta, and Athens as we said, they were chiefly close CartIia s r * 
 Governments in the proper sense, that is, confined to ONE ORDER Athens, &c. 
 being more ARISTOCRACIES, or DEMOCRACIES than any thing 
 else — If one wished to be speculative,they might say, that some of them, 
 Carthage and Sparta for instance, were somewhat of THREE, more of 
 TWO, but most of all, of ONE ORDER. That accordingly there was 
 a little Balance, more Confusion, and most Closeness — And there might ? 
 be arguments found to support this system — But the truth is, that 
 these States were so much of One, or at least Two Orders, || as to ex- 
 clude much reasoning upon the subject. 
 
 Such would be the effect of a THIRD ORDER upon NOBILITY somuu 
 and PEOPLE — We now come to another combination, King and n - 
 Nobility — As the Feodal system is described, see p.116". the King was a 
 Great Sovereign, theNobles so many lesser ones— They had the whole 
 
 •f See for this Rolliu's Roman Hist. Vol. i. p. 21. Eng. Transl. Oct. Ed.— Chusing to offices, 
 was Executive. Qui facit per aliumjacit per se. 
 
 % See Montesquieu Esprit des Loix, Vol. i. p. 239, Oct. Edit. 
 
 j| They admitted the People sometimes, as for instance, Carthage, at last, to which Poly hi- a 
 ascribes the ruin of the Republic. 
 
 R2 
 
124 THREE POWERS VESTED IN THREE ORDERS FOR A BALANCE. 
 
 Legislative, Judicial, and Executive vested in them, in their own 
 territories— The King had the paramountcy — But the effect was the 
 same, though exemplified in a different manner— The consequences of 
 a biform Government, evidently appeared — To recur to the passage 
 of Robertson already quoted, aud which also points out the remedy, 
 the MONARCHICAL, and ARISTOCRATICAL parts of the Con- 
 stitution, having no INTERMEDIATE POWER to balance them, 
 were perpetually at variance, and jostling with each other. 
 KING and ^ ie * ast combination is King, and People — The effect of a THIRD 
 PEOPLE. ORDER upon these, is best shewn by the dreadful gap that exists 
 between, and the atrocity of the convulsions that follow them — 
 We need not refer again here to the examples of Messene, and Argos,r>or 
 to the tragic fates of Louis XVI. of France, and Charles I. of England, 
 simply remarking that these most clearly point out, that the single 
 hope we have to be delivered from such convulsions, is to be found 
 in THREE ORDERS and THREE ORDERS only. 
 T timon ^ ie third an d last proof upon the subject, is the testimony of Au- 
 
 of Authors thors, and Legislators — Have not Cicero, Tacitus, Poly bi us, Plutarch 
 lators. and Aristotle praised THREE ORDERS,* and did notLycurgus and 
 
 * CICERO. 
 
 Sta(uo ease optimc constitutam. Rempublicam, quae ex tribus generibus illis, REGAL1, OP- 
 TIMO, et POPULARI, sit modice confusa. Fragm.de repub!. lib. ii. 
 
 TACITUS. 
 
 Nam cundas nationcs, et urbes, POPULUS, aut PRIMQRES, aut SINGULI rogunt— De- 
 lecta ex his, et constituta rcipuMica; forma, laudari facilius quam cvenire, vel si eveuit, haud 
 diuturnacsse potest. Ann. lib. iv. 33. 
 
 POLYB1US. 
 
 "ZvpSaiW $t), TilS STXt/flTSj TWV Cx\0(AtVUV Q*ioW**?UXWS VUIV VTrfolXVlW TTtf) TCiiV TWSTiWV, tfia ytV* ?i>£<P 
 
 *oXmu», w TOfttv Ma\*<rt BAIIAEJAN, to *"API2TOKPATL\N, to & rpirov, AEMOKPATIAN 
 
 ****** * 
 
THREE POWERS VESTED IN THREE ORDERS FOR A BALANCE, 125 
 
 others endeavour to constitute of them ?* That they made the at- 
 tempt is clear from their works being mistaken for the accomplish- 
 
 AUxov &?, us*ffrrv$ph fe m fa «*Hdto<» i* XIANTON THN ITPOEIPHMENXIN IAI11MA- 
 TXIN awKj-xmuv. E sext. hist. exc. Tom. ii. p. 4. Oct. Ed. 
 
 Again, 
 "Otj ifirn *o\irei* w I* ItANTON TflN EIAHN (IAIflMATXlN) amtfrura. Ibid. p. & 
 
 PLUTARCH. 
 
 Aiupxfuv* yap n noHTua,KM aitoxhivxcraviM peva( TsjBASIAEIlS^jTwfavwfc, vw & «f to IIAHOOS 
 £«■< AwoKpaTiav, oiov spun* tw T«r rEPONTUN Apxw, ev jtaaa flf/tt£v»i, km I20PPOIIH2AEA, 
 tyiv atrQcLhvrra'TW ta\wta.y£ **" xaraorraaiv — hu tuvOktu km Eikocti TEPONTXiN, roig ftev BA2I- 
 AETEI TTfOar^eftevuv, (xrov aroCwai irpoi b\\(*oxpxTiav, aodi; 0*£ vntp tb (j.t\ ymo^M rvpamtia rov AHMON 
 avappn,vuvjm. Vol. 1. Ed. Tons. p. 91. 
 
 ARISTOTLE. 
 
 nOAITEYE20AI tie $okho-i km Kapjpfioviot xaXw;, km noXka irepiTru; vrpbs rs; a\\g(' noOucrrx 3 s 
 tvia irapamuaios toij Aatwaiv. de Rep. lib. ii. ch. xi. And this is identified with the attempt 
 at THREE ORDERS, by Polybius describing Lacedaemon and Rome of THREE OR- 
 DERS, and then making Carthage the same with them. Km yap BAEIAEI2 wov maf 
 auras, kxi to TEFONTICN ttxfrm Apio-roKparmw E?H<rtav } XM to IIAH0OS >iv wptov rut Kahnonan 
 miry KaQoXx 3e, t«v tuv oXuv af/xovw u%t Trapanhwixv rn¥o/iaiav km AaH^MfiQvwv* 
 
 * It is to be observed here, that we take the Constitutions all through, as originally framed 
 by the Legislators, to prove the attempts at the Balance, by three Bodies — The additions, as Ttpvrtx. 
 at Carthage, Ephori at Sparta,and B<A* at Athens, were annexed afterwards, to cure the deficiencies of 
 their not being ORDERS, and only shew how often they split them in vain— See for this Ch. 
 XXX. Thus then, following on, 
 
 MINOS 
 
 or the plan of Government 
 
 he intended, 
 
 Constituted Crete of 
 
 Three Bodies 
 
 Cosmi Senate People 
 
 Constituted Carthage of 
 Three Bodies 
 
 Suffetcs Senate Peoplj 
 
j<it> THREE POWERS VESTED IX THREE ORDERS FOR A BALANCE, 
 
 merit of them*— That they did not succeed, is also plea,r, from their 
 not having been able to obtain a Balance — Bui- while the conse- 
 quences that flowed from these attempts, shew their inefficiency, and 
 the fallacy of the praises bestowed upon them, they equally demon- 
 strate, the expediency of the thing desired — They (the Antients) might 
 have seen the necessity of THREE ORDERS, or.of a Threefold Ba- 
 lance, and not have had skill to accomplish it. 
 ™igiuTa™ ^ n( l tms was exactly what they did— They knew that a Threefold 
 known ad. Opposition was necessary, but they did not know how to effect it — 
 
 Tantagcs of a rt J ' J 
 
 Balance, but 
 
 LYCURGUS 
 
 Constituted Sparta of 
 Three Bodies 
 Kings Senate People 
 
 SOLOxN 
 
 Constituted Athens of 
 Three Bodies 
 Archons Senates People 
 
 not how to 
 get it 
 
 Constituted Thebes of 
 Three Bodies. 
 
 Constituted C rinth of 
 Three Bodies. 
 
 The plan 
 found amoi g the memoirs of 
 SERVUS TULLIUS 
 Constituted Rome of 
 Thiee Bodies 
 Consuls Senate People. 
 
 Upon all these Constitutions see the various passages quoted in Ch. XXXIII. 
 *A^ovyap us aptarmiuvvwrmvonreiav, t*» ex II ANTON TON riPOEIPHMENX2N IAI^MA- 
 TX1N o-wtaToo-av, ram yap t» pepus, « W? povcv, aW' £f7«, ntipav abitpapiv, Avxapya cmtwkvtos KfUT* 
 kxxv. rvTQv tck rpomv f to Aawfopiovivv TTo^txtvpw Pol v b.Vol, hi. }>. 4. Vindob. Edit. 
 
THREE POWERS VESTED ES THREE ORDERS FOR A BALANCE. 
 
 And it is just in tins way, that we adduce their testimony — They 
 were convinced that an Opposition of Three, would infer the conse- 
 quences we mention — That it would check, strengthen, and mitigate — 
 That Three could never be in diametrical opposition to each other -^ 
 All this they knew, and we know that they did, from the objects 
 proposed, and the praises bestowed on them* — That they failed in 
 their attempts, that they did not know what an ORDER was, or 
 thought that something else would produce a Balance,whether the mis- 
 carriage, happened, from the backward state of society, or from what 
 other cause, it imports as little to know — Their failure in the at- 
 tempt is of no consequence, while the having made it, and made 
 so often, shews the importance of the object. 
 
 Here then is a triple proof, of Speculation, of Experience, and Au- Triple proof, 
 thority — Whether we go to the sources of reason, or contemplate the 
 consequences of fact, or consider the testimony, of Legislators, and 
 Authors, they are all equally in our favour — Can we desire more ou 
 the subject ? Can we wish for more ample satisfaction, and evidence ? 
 THREE ORDERS are then the good—Three Orders are what we thrke 
 ought to wish, deserve, and desiderate — Which keeps a Government ^ RDLL J S 
 
 & l the g06d. 
 
 in check, in perpetual succour, and mitigation — Which insures the 
 strong of being opposed, the weak of being supported, the State of 
 being consolidated, and consistent — Which without giving way to 
 any excess, or any extravagance in checking that excess, keeps all in 
 harmony, and peace, in cordiality, consistence and comfort — That 
 gives freedom without licentiousness, and union without closeness — ^. 
 In short, that without incurring any bad consequence of Govern- Uuir«;ga!t 
 ment, gives every good one, uniting all in harmony, freedom, $md ^ p * o?Gt>- 
 peace, security, liberty, and happiness ! iWnmfcUf. 
 
 * See passage of Plutarch Awfu^n, See. p. 103, and Aurvi iy*.vu kx* stM.o<rt t &c. \b><$. 
 
128 FOR EQUAL POWER THE ORDERS MUST BE PERMANENT. 
 
 CHAP. XXXV. 
 
 THAT THE THREE POWERS MUST BE VESTED IN THREE ORDERS SO AS TO- 
 
 MAKE A BALANCE. 
 
 Three pow. NOR when the Three powers are vested in THREE ORDERS,, is 
 
 vested in the whole business done — They must be so vested, as to make a 
 
 orders Balance — And here come in our old principles,, that a Balance depends 
 
 so as to upon a Division of Power, and a Division of Power upon Power, 
 
 make a Ba- l x 
 
 lance. and Persons* — That the Powers should be given equally; that is cor- 
 
 respondingly, and the Persons who are to receive them, made cor- 
 relative, and parallel f — But how to obtain this correspondence, or 
 equality of Power, and this parallelcy, (if we may be allowed the 
 expression) of Persons, or ORDERS, is the question— First then, of the 
 equality of Power. 
 
 CHAP. XXXVI. 
 
 THAT TO GIVE POWER EQUALLY,- THE ORDERS WHO ARE TO RECEIVE IT,. 
 
 MUST BE MADE PERMANENT. 
 
 To give THE first step in giving the powers equally, is to make the 
 
 iy, OR- ORDERS who are to receive them, permanent — For if they have 
 receive it, not a fixed situation, an established, and permanent existence in the 
 ma j| c P er - Constitution of a State, all equality of power is at an end— They have 
 in fact no power at all, for they are liable to be extinguished at 
 
 • See Ch. XVII. XVI II. and XIX. for all (his. 
 i See Ch. XX VIII. and XXIX. for this.. 
 
POWERS TO BE EQUAL, MUST NOT OVERWHELM EACH OTHER. 129 
 
 every moment — The first step then, in giving equality of powers, 
 is to give the ORDERS who are to receive them, a permanent 
 existence in the constitution. 
 
 CHAP. XXXVII. 
 
 THAT TO MARE THE ORDERS WHO ARE TO RECEIVE POWER, EQUAL, THEY 
 MUST BE MADE, SO AS NOT TO OVERWHELM EACH OTHER. 
 
 BUT after all that can be done in distributing the powers, to To make 
 
 ORDFRS 
 
 render the ORDERS equal, they may be so constituted naturally, as W h rece i V e 
 to have a superiority, one over the other, in that way — Whatever P°** r ^J'^ 1 ' 
 pains therefore we may take to secure them an equality by the divi- not to over- 
 
 . , • i /-1 • whelm each 
 
 sion or powers, either as to carrying on the Government, or maintain- other, 
 ing a permanent existence in it, there may be something in them, that 
 will defy our efforts — For there are in every ORDER, two constitu- j n CT 
 tions, a natural, and artificial. — The natural, is that, which they 0RD ER 
 
 J two const?- 
 
 have independent of Government, or the powers given by Govern- tutions, a 
 ment, the artificial, that, which they have dependent on these things* — artificial* 11 
 And it is evident, that the former of these,must be by far the stronger — 
 What comparison can there be, between a natural, and artificial 
 force ? What parallel between the natural, strength, or weakness of a 
 KING, NOBILITY, or PEOPLE, and any thing we can do, to over- 
 come them ? Between the weakness of a sole ORDER, the weight 
 of the RICH, the multitude of the POOR, and any thing we can 
 do to extinguish it ? We must then begin, by modelling the ORDERS 
 in the first place — We must regulate them so, as to render fit forre- 
 
 * See 00 this Chap. XXX. 
 S 
 
130 THE ORDER OF KING MUST BE STRENGTHENED. 
 
 Natural ceiving powers, malleable, if we may so express it, for the purposes 
 deiied and of society — Nor is there any contradiction in this — There is a great 
 regulate . difference between regulating, and overcoming — A wide distinction 
 between conducting, and extinguishing — He who would regulate, 
 only leads, and modifies, the course of a river — He who would extin- 
 guish, stops it altogether. 
 
 ed. 
 
 CHAP. XXXVIII. 
 
 THAT THE ORDER OF KING MUST BE STRENGTHENED. 
 
 ORDER of WE now come to the natural constitution of the ORDERS, and 
 strengthen- to consider them abstracted from the powers assigned to them. 
 And this we are to do, in order to appreciate their force, and to 
 see how far that force must be increased, or diminished. — Taking 
 them then, in this way, we find the ORDER of KING, to be 
 weak, and feeble in itself— For what is KING, considered as an 
 ORDER ? A sole,and single person — A sole and single person,whatever 
 powers he may have assigned him, against collective, and aggregate 
 forces — That is,0RDERS composed of collective and aggregate forces, 
 whatever their numbers be, prepared to overpower, and overwhelm 
 him — To overpower and overwhelm him, naturally and constitution- 
 ally, for naturally, and constitutionally, surely, whatever artificial pow- 
 ers may be imparted, NOBILITY, and PEOPLE, are incalculably, 
 infinitely, nay innominally, if we may so express it, superior to him. 
 The ORDER of KING then, naturally speaking, must be infinite- 
 ly reinforced, and strengthened* 
 
THE ORDER OF PEOPLE MUST BE REDUCED FURTHER, 131 
 
 CHAP. XXXIX. 
 
 THAT THE ORDER OF NOBILITY MUST be reduced. 
 
 AND if the ORDER of KING must be reinforced, and strength- order 
 ened, so must that of NOBILITY, be reduced— For what is NOBI- ? f ,?5 BI " 
 
 Ll 1 i re- 
 
 LIT Y, considered as an ORDER ? A body of men, great in rank, great duced. 
 in wealth, and great in the weight, and influence, following that rank, 
 and wealth — And if it be this body of men, great in rank, wealth, and 
 influence, how considerable must be its advantages over the other 
 ORDERS ? Over the KING,by it's numbers, and over the PEOPLE, 
 by it's weight, and influence — Why then, it must be reduced, and im- 
 paired proportionally, if we do not wish it to be an overweening a 
 needlessly overweening, nay,pernicious body, in the State. — Do we not 
 see to what a pitch it attains in those Countries, where it is not so im- 
 paired, and diminished ? It becomes an imperium in imperio, a na- 
 tion within a nation, a gens in gente — Did we not see this in France ?* 
 — Have we not seen it in other countries ? Intermarrying, connecting, 
 and accumulating within itself, till it overpowers, or is overpowered 
 by, the nation ? It must then be diminished. 
 
 CHAP. XL. 
 
 THAT THE ORDER OF PEOPLE, MUST BE REDUCED FURTHER. 
 
 AND if the ORDER of NOBILITY must be reduced, and di- order of 
 minished in its strength, so must that of the PEOPLE, be still fur- PJ J 0P *f 
 
 v reduced fur- 
 
 ther. 
 
 * Which produced the revolution in 1789, which whatever it was in the beginning, brought 
 eventually such dreadful mischiefs on mankind. 
 
 S3 
 
152 THE ORDER OF PEOPLE MUST BE REDUCED FURTHER. 
 
 ther— For what is the PEOPLE ? An irresistible multitude,(still talking 
 of as an ORDER) impracticable in it's passions, impracticable in its 
 violence, impracticable in its numbers— Certainly inferior to KING, 
 and NOBILITY, in the common course, and routine of affairs, but 
 as certainly, and infinitely superior to them, in agitations, and com- 
 motions*— It is then, that it becomes truly formidable, then, that it 
 becomes impracticable, and irresistible — And it is ever on the eve of 
 being pushed on to these commotions, by the influence, and agita- 
 tions of its Demagogues-)- — Witness these revolutions, and <rr*«i?, 
 these ever recurring con vulsions, which distinguished the States of 
 Greece, as well as others, of a strictly popular nature^ — To prevent then 
 these revolutions, to prevent these ever returning convulsions, it 
 is necessary to impair, and diminish it's force (it's blind force)— To im- 
 pair, and diminish it in a great degree, in a great, considerable, and 
 manifold one— This is necessary, or we do nothing — If we do not re- 
 duce it in this way, if we do not diminish it in a manifold degree, we 
 can never have it practicable, never have it convenient, and suitable, 
 never properly malleable, as we expressed it before, for the pur- 
 poses of Government — As it was necessary then, to strengthen the 
 Order of KING, so is it, to reduce and mitigate, those of NOBILI- 
 TY, and PEOPLE. 
 
 * See again France, and all Revolutions. 
 
 t It is on this account that Aristotle observes that DEMOCRACY, or the absolute Govern- 
 ment of the PEOPLE, has many points of resemblance with DESPOTISM, or the absolute Go- 
 vernment of the KING. See the passage, Chap. XV. — To *>0w to wto, &c. 
 
 J See Herodotus, and Thucjdides — ixviwrw rr> crrxcru . 
 
THE ORDER OF KING MUST BE STRENGTHENED BY INHERITANCE. 13S 
 
 CHAP. XLI. 
 
 THAT THE ORDER OF KING, MUST BE STRENGTHENED BY INHERITANCE. 
 
 AND if the ORDER of KING must be strengthened,and reinforc- ORDER of 
 ed, the question is, how to reinforce it — And here, in order to obtain a strengthened 
 just notion of this, the way will be to enquire, whence proceeds it's b ? lnheri - 
 feebleness — It is from it's singleness, from it's solitude, its w«, or des- 
 titution, as the Greeks would call it, which exposes it to the other 
 ORDERS, and renders it liable to be overpowered by them — The 
 way then to strengthen it, will be, to correct this tp*m» this solitude, 
 as much as possible, and give it all the aggregateness and body in a 
 State, practicable — And how again is this to be done ? First, by fix- 
 ing it in a particular family, or race, that it may be the generation, 
 or Offspring, that is considered, not the individual, and that in that 
 way, it may support some kind of footing, withthe other OR- 
 DERS— The next thing is, to render it Inheritable, in that 
 race, that when the KING, or person, who actually bears the 
 Supreme power, gives way to nature, there may be no interruption, 
 or gap, so as to allow of any other (person stepping) in, but 
 the sovereign authority proceed in undeviating, and unceasing suc- 
 cession— The third thing is, to fortify it with powers of such a nature, 
 as by their activity, and solidity, shall make amends for the singleness 
 of the ORDER, andcompensate as far as possible its natural disad- 
 vantages in that way — But of this,of course,aftenvards — All these thino-s 
 have their effect, and are necessary to strengthen, and reinforce the 
 ORDER, — And if any doubt it, they have only to look to those 
 Countries, where Crowns have been put upon another footing Where 
 
134 THE ORDER OF KING MUST BE STRENGTHENED BY INHERITANCE. 
 
 they have not been confined to particular families, and where 
 there have been constant disputes between these, concerning 
 the succession, to the great weakening of the royal dignity* — 
 Or where they have been elective, and have produced constant 
 contentions and intrigues mutilating greatly thereby, the royal 
 authority, besides exposing the kingdom to foreign invasion, as 
 has been lately the case in Polandt — Or where the powers given 
 to it, have not been sufficient to protect and cover it's natural 
 weakness, and where it has finished, by first pulling down itself, 
 and then along with it, the Government of the Country, as has 
 been the case in that very Poland, and Rego-republican France, 
 for want of adequate authority .J So that all these things are 
 requisite for strengthening the ORDER of KING to a proper pitch, 
 and rendering it, what it ought to be, the safeguard, and protection 
 of the nation — It is the fixing it in a particular family, that dignifies 
 it, it is the filiating it, if we may so call it, in that family, that secures 
 it, and it is the conferring certain powers upon it, that gives it a so- 
 lidity, a fixed consistence, and settled authority in the Constitution — 
 So that it acquires at last, a patriarchal and majestic appearance 
 in the eyes of the nation, which though undoubtedly mischievous, 
 and absurd, when carried to an improper pitch§, is an excellent 
 principle to strengthen and confirm a good Government — As to the 
 idea of a double Crown, or vested in Two, that is rather to be no- 
 
 * Though in England, the succession was certainly not extended to several families, yet the wars of 
 York, and Lancaster, shew the consequences of several families, and where there were two dif- 
 ferent families as at Sparta, the Ileraclitlae (and may have been at other places,) there were con- 
 stant misunderstandings between them. 
 
 + In the year 1778, see first division of Poland. 
 
 J See Louis XVI. of France left with (he Convention, and a solitary Veto upon their laws. 
 
 § Sec the idea of the old jus divinum, or divine Right. 
 

 ORDER OF NOBILITY MUST BE REDUCED BY PRIMOGENITURE. 135 
 
 ticed as a contradiction of the thing than as originating in any sound, 
 or rational principle* — We have seen it at Rome,f we have seen it at 
 Sparta;}., and may have in other countries, but instead of strengthening, 
 where it took place, it has always had the effect of distracting, and 
 weakening the Government— The ORDER of KING then, must 
 be considered as confined to ONE, and being confined to ONE, this 
 appears the only way to reinforce and strengthen it. 
 
 CHAP. XLII. 
 
 THAT THE ORDER OF NOBILITY MUST be reduced Br PRIMOGENITURE. 
 
 AND if the ORDER of KING must be strengthened by Inheri- ORDER of 
 tance, so must that of NO BIL1TY, be reduced by Primogeniture — TY reduced 
 For what is NOBILITY taken as an ORDER ? Is it not a race of £J£T 
 men, strong in rank, strong in wealth, and strong in the weight, and 
 influence following that rank, and wealth, according to their spirit,which 
 is pride (still speaking of as an ORDER) looking down on, 
 and despising other men ? And if they do this, must not they 
 constantly intermarry with one another, connect themselves with 
 one another, and if not impaired, as we said above, continually ac- 
 cumulate within themselves, till they become at last, as here stated, 
 an imperium in imperio, a nation within a nation, a gens in 
 gente? This was best seen in France, where they did so accu- 
 mulate within themselves, till they divided, and distracted them 
 
 * Certainly a contradiction of the idea BA2IAET2, or MONAPXOS, a Sole as to the person, or 
 GoTernor. 
 
 4. See Romulus, and Tatius. 
 % Two races of the Hcraclid*. 
 
136 ORDER OF NOBILITY MUST BE REDUCED BY PRIMOGENITURE. 
 
 from the nation, to such a degree, that they pulled down 
 themselves, and their Sovereign along with them*— And the spirit that 
 leads them to this, has been seen in all Countries,where they appear in 
 any measuret — In all, they draw to one another, in all associate ex- 
 clusively (except where impaired, as said above) like a Cast, regard- 
 ing others (always talking of as an ORDER) with hostility, and alie- 
 nation—Considering the Sovereign in some Countries, as an obstacle 
 to their power, in others, as the support of it, but in all (till circum- 
 scribed) the PEOPLE as an odious, and detested rival, ihe more 
 hated, because the more despised — Was it not this that occasioned 
 the confusions at Rome, this, the distraction of the Grecian Cities ?t 
 What then is the cure for it ? What so natural, as to make them part 
 of the PEOPLE themselves ? This of course, will take away the di- 
 vision and seclusion, this, the insulation, and separation which is 
 the foundation of all the mischief— And how is this to be done? 
 By Primogeniture, that is, fixing the succession to NOBILI- 
 TY with the eldest son, and making the rest of the family, Popular, 
 or of the PEOPLE— This will at once prevent the NOBILITY, from 
 becoming too numerous, temper that part of the family, who are 
 NOBILITY, harmonize the rest, and eventually the whole, by in- 
 corporating, and associating with the PEOPLE — This will blunt the 
 prejudices of the ORDER, and assimilate and incorporate them 
 with the' fc body of the nation — They will then no longer look upon the 
 MONARCH as an obstacle to their views (having not ambition, that 
 is, power enough, the foundation of that ambition, to consider him as 
 
 * This was precisely what occasioned the French Revolution — The disregard of the PEOPLE 
 grew so strong, and the oppression so great, that the latter thought the NOBILITY Tyrants, 
 whom to extirpate, was liberty, and they accordingly seized on power to their own destruction. 
 
 + In Turkey, they hardly appear at all, the Graud Signor's authority so totally smooths down 
 and levels every thing. 
 * J Irakis. 
 
ORDER OF PEOPLE MUST BE REDUCED BY REPRESENTATION. 137 
 
 a rival,* but rather look up to, for protection, and support — 
 They will no longer consider the PEOPLE, as their enemies, having 
 not distinction enough, or alienation from, to regard as different, but 
 rather, part of their families being incorporated with them, and 
 therefore effectually the whole, the same— Tins then is the way to 
 elevate and refine the PEOPLE, and mitigate, and subdue, the 
 NOBILITY — As Inheritance, was the mode to reinforce the OR- 
 DER of KING, so is Primogeniture, to mitigate and reduce that of 
 NOBILITY. 
 
 CHAP. XLIII. 
 
 THAT THE ORDER OF PEOPLE MUST BE REDUCED BY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 BUT the PEOPLE are the ORDER which requires reduction most order, of 
 of all— It is that, which is most impracticable from its numbers, most p ^ op f J ? 
 
 v ' reduced by 
 
 formidable from its fury, and most dreadhd from its violence — From Represents* 
 thatinsurrective, if we may use the expression, disposition, which dis- 
 tinguishes it, and from its overpowering, and overwhelming nafure,when 
 once rou^ed,and excited — And it is ever upon the eve of being so roused, 
 and excited,from the turbulence and ambition of its Demagogues — Infi- 
 nitely inferior,as we observed,toeitherKING,orNOBILiT Yin common 
 moments, from its never being seen, or heard of, it is as certainly and in- 
 finitely superior to them, in agitations* and commotions— It is then 
 indeed, that it is truly formidable, then, that it becomes impracticable, 
 and irresistible — Then it is in vain to oppose it, and it is this evil, and 
 this evil alone, that renders it so intolerable in Government — blow 
 
 * Sue the History of Scotland. 
 T 
 
158 ORDER OF PEOPLE MUST BE REDUCED BY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 then, is it to be avoided ? How are we to get rid of it ? — By seeking 
 to its root,by searching to its foundation — And what is this foundation ? 
 The numbers of the PEOPLE — It is these numbers, that worked 
 upon, goaded, and agitated by the Demagogues, rise to irresistible 
 fury — Witness the antient <rra<mj of Greece, these trrx<rus or commo- 
 tions that we have quoted so often, the expulsions from Rome, the 
 ejections from the, Grecian Cities * — The agitation of the Tribunes 
 in the former, the effect of the Orators in the latter — And if such be 
 the effect of these winds, these agitations upon such an ocean, these 
 numbers, take them away — Take away the excess, that causes, re- 
 move the superfluity that occasions— And how again is this to 
 be done? By taking one in the place often, ten instead of a hundred 
 (no matter what the proportion) a hundred for a thousand, in a word 
 By Representation — This it is, that will remove the evil— This it is, 
 that by diminishing the numbers of the PEOPLE, will enable it to 
 act— This it is, that by selecting proper actors, will let it know, why 
 it is submitted— This it is above all, that by confining it within 
 a right circle, will put off the possibility of revolutions, by 
 removing the swell that causes them, these ever recurring revo- 
 lutions, which disgraced the States of Greece — That will effec- 
 tually remove the agitations, or at least, the convulsions of party 
 — Thai in fine, will enable States to conduct themselves in good 
 order, and unite all the advantages of a free, and open, with those of 
 a regular and tranquil Government. 
 
 It was this, that was reserved for the invention of modern times, this, 
 that forms so capital a feature, in the list of modern improvements — 
 This, that organizes a mass, that brings shape out of Chaos, and form 
 out of confusion and nothing — This, that teaches the blind to see, the 
 furious to be meek, the obstinate, to be patient, and submissive — This, 
 
 * Ekvivtuv mcrraoruj see Herod, and Thucyd. as before. 
 
WHAT POWERS TO BE EXERCISED TO MAKE A BALANCE. 139 
 
 that arranges, and methodizes every thing, regulating, and teaching it, 
 to play its part in Government — [t was this, that the Antients want- 
 ed, and the extent of their misfortunes, shewed the scope of the 
 desideratum — The PEOPLE always came in upon them, like an irre- 
 sistible mass — They were obliged to oppose to them, the power of 
 a King, or a Senate, which excluded or annihilated them entirety. 
 It was on this principle, that Lycurgus would not let them discuss at 
 Sparta, and that at Carthage, they had no vote, when the Senate were • 
 unanimous— The Legislators treated them like wild beasts, whom 
 they were obliged to chain down, or be devoured by — Tiiey had 
 no alternative but confusion, or slavery — But that option, which 
 the Antients never had, and never could have, is afforded us by Re- 
 presentation — It is that, which exempts us from the necessity of a 
 severe choice, and allows us to take liberty, without subjecting, to an- 
 archy and confusion — That unites peace with freedom, and order with This that 
 discretion— In short, that suffers us to take every advantage of a go;>d don without 
 Government, without submitting us to any of the evils of a close CORfusion ' 
 one— This then, Representation, is the best way, to regulate, and orga- 
 nize the PEOPLE — As Inheritance was the mode to reinforce the 
 ORDER of KING, so are Primogeniture, and Representation, to 
 mitigate, and subdue those of jNOBILITY, and PEOPLE. 
 
 CHAP. XL1V. 
 
 WHAT POWERS OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED BV EACH OF THE ORDERS. 
 
 What 
 P() V\ FRQ 
 
 AS we have now got the ORDERS, reduced and fortified as we exer*£s«a 
 wish, the question wiil be, what POWLKS ought to be exercised 1? rt'oiu 
 
 T 2 DEilS. 
 
1 :0 LEGISLATIVE, THE POWER OF MAKING THE LAW. 
 
 by, that is are best suited to them, to obtain the balance desired— 
 But it is impossible to determine this, till we know the nature of the 
 POWERS— We shall therefore enquire into them. 
 
 CHAP. XLV. 
 
 THAT TO CONCEIVE A CLEAR IDEA OF THE POWERS WE MUST CONCEIVE 
 THEM ABSTRACTED FROM THE BODIES THAT EXERCISE THEM. 
 
 To conceive FOR if we do not, we shall be liable to misunderstand ourselves 
 powers^ at ever y moment — We shall bethinking, that we are taking away so 
 &c - much from this, or that power (that is the body conceived for it,) 
 
 when the question is, what ought to be given to that body — There is 
 then, but one way of conceiving the thing distinctly, and that is, that 
 the LEGISLATIVE is the POWER of making the LAW, or DICTA- 
 TION of the State,theJUDICIAL,the POWER of making the JUDG- 
 MENT, or DISCERNMENT of it,and the EXECUTIVE, the POW- 
 ER of making the EXECUTION, or ACCOMPLISHMENT of it. 
 
 CHAP. XLVI. 
 
 THAT THE LEGISLATIVE IS THE POWER OF MAKING THE LAW OR 
 DICTATION OF THE STATE. 
 
 • leotsla. LEGISLATIVE or legislativum, signifies as we know, making law, 
 power fr° 111 ^ ie Latin words, lex and fero— Of course, LEGISLATIVE, 
 
 of making , 
 
THE EXECUTIVE, ACCOMPLISHING THE ENDS OF THE STATE. Ul 
 
 or the LEGISLATIVE POWER in the State, or that part of political law of 
 power, which is called LEGISLATIVE, is the POWER of raak- State * 
 ingthe LAW, or DICTATION of the State. 
 
 CHAP. XLVII. 
 
 THAT THE JUDICIAL IS THE POWER OF MAKING THE JUDGMENT, 
 
 or DISCERNMENT of the state.. 
 
 THIS also is clear. Judicialis comes from judicium, which sig- judicial 
 nifies judgment — Judicialis then, is of, or pertaining to, judgment — makT!? 11 ° f 
 Judicial then is the same thing, and taken as a POWER in the JU PJ?; 
 State, must mean the power of making the JUDGMENT of the state. 
 State. 
 
 CHAP. XLVIII. 
 
 that the EXECUTIVE is the POWER of making the EXECUTION, 
 or ACCOMPLISHMENT of the state. 
 
 FOR a similar reason — Executive is that which executes, or makes execu. 
 execution— The power of executing then, or the EXECUTIVE PO W- £ ^ Ea 
 ERinthe State, is the. power of making the EXECUTION, or of making 
 ACCOMPLISHMENT of the State. Ron of 
 
 State. 
 
 V 
 
14 2 LEGISLATIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 CHAP. XLIX. 
 
 that the LEGISLATIVE goes through FOUR DEPARTMENTS or 
 the state, INSTITUTES MEASURES, REVIEW of POWERS 
 and ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION. 
 
 LEGISLA- THE meaning of Law, is a rule by which any thing is go- 
 throu^h g , °&c verned— Thus it is, as Montesquieu observes, that we say the laws 
 of nature, the laws of motion, the laws of the planets, meaning the 
 Law gene. Jaws » b y which these things are regulated. 
 
 rally. When we say the LAW of the State then, we must mean the 
 
 p , T j, LAW, or dictation, by which the State, or the Community, or All 
 are regulated — It must therefore be opposed to will, mere will, vary- 
 ing will, and inclination, for as far as that will enters, there can be no 
 Exclusion of regulating over him, who exercises the will, but he legulates others. 
 •*«■ —In this sense we took it (see Ch. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. and XVIL, 
 
 and it is a sense no less congenial to the real meaning of the word, 
 than to the interests of sound Government and liberty. 
 Course of In that last named (Chapter XVIL) we endeavoured to shew, that 
 
 pioo. Legal Government," or an exclusion of will, depended upon a mixture 
 
 " of wills, (see ditto) that is, an opposition or Balance of them*" — Alter 
 that this Balance depended upon a Division of Power, and that again 
 upon Power, and Persons being equal — That this equality was not 
 to be found in' ONE ORDER, nor TWO ORDERS, but THREE 
 ORDERS, and then only with care, and attention — By making the 
 Orders permanent, and so as not to overwhelm each other — And having 
 then endeavoured to arrange them, so as not to overwhelm, we are 
 now, at the other branch of equality, viz. what powers are best suited 
 to each of the ORDERS, and we are actually at that of Law- 
 making— Such is the course we have pursued, such is the progress 
 
 * Resembling the two sides of an equation, which extinguish one another. 
 
LEGISLATIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 143 
 
 tve have made, and such is the sense, we have given the word Law, 
 or Dictation, the substance of Legal Government. 
 
 This then being the sense of Law, or Dictation, the question is, how IIow touch, 
 it touches — What objects it affects, what points it regards, what 
 articles it occupies, and how it affects them. 
 
 Andfirstit may be said that theseobjects are Civil rights. Civil rights* Civil rights. 
 as we saw in our third chapter of this Book, made the object, and whole 
 object, of Government — They were the end, and only end, they were 
 the sole authority, and pretext for it (See ditto Chap.)— If this be the 
 case,Government cannot be supposed to stop short of, or to go beyond 
 them — In the first case, they would be no cause, no adequate 
 cause, they would not exhaust themselves, in the other,* they would 
 go beyond their consequence— See Ch. III. of this Book — Govern- 
 ment then must be determined by them, it cannot stop short of, 
 nor go beyond them. 
 
 Now Government is Law, and Law Government, in the scope, or 
 subject, they refer to — For what does Government refer to ? It 
 refers as above to Civil rights — And how does it refer to them ? It 
 refers to them through Law, forall is Legal now, Arbitrary being thrown 
 out of the question (See Ch.XVI.JAnd if it does refer to them through 
 Law, Law must have the same scope that it has — It must go as far, and 
 can't go beyond it — It must go as far, because Government can only 
 refer to Civil rights, or any thing, through Law — It can't go beyond 
 it, because Law is Government, and must carry Government along 
 with it. 
 
 Government then referring to Civil rights, must make Law refer Jut ! g ,T CBt 
 
 ° and hxtcu- 
 
 to them too — And here we are well aware, that Judgment, and Exe- tion 
 
 cution, as described (in Ch. XX., see ditto) are separated from same subject 
 
 Law— But then, that is taken as POWERS— They are always on as LAW * 
 
 the Law, and therefore must embrace the same subject. 
 
 nvrrnment. 
 
 touches Ciril 
 
 Law,or Dictation then,touching Civil rights as much as Government, ^ ow u Ia * 
 
144 LEGISLATIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 B«giits ? or rather being itself Government, the question is, how it. touches them ? 
 test. How it affects them ? To what extent ? The answer is, to their own ex- 
 
 tent — They must find their own limit — To say,that it did not affect them 
 to that extent as they are the scope of Government, would be to say, 
 that it affected them, and did not affect them at the same time. 
 In thii.r sifn- j\ U( \ first we must say that these rights appear in the most simple 
 INSTi. shape, — They appear as the gift of GOD, to the individual direct, 
 as Life, Property, and Free- agency, primitive, and which must not 
 in any way be taken from him — See Book I. Ch. III. In this way, 
 it is the business of Law, or Dictation, or Government, to take care 
 that they are not taken from him, that they are not assailed in 
 any respect, and that they are preserved in all respects — To 
 pronounce them sacred, to punish the least infringement of them, 
 to regulate in all cases, where it is called for — If Life be attacked, 
 to punish such attack — If Property be invaded, to vindicate such 
 invasion— If Tree-agency be injured, to give retribution for the injury, 
 and finally, to ascertain the rights to Property, so that it may be 
 known in things contested, who is the rightful owner — This is what 
 the Law does in INSTITUTES, and this is the first mode in which 
 it touches Civil rigiits. 
 In their ag- But are there no other shapes in which they appear? Is there no 
 
 grrgale by 
 
 MEA- other way in which Civil rights manifest and discover themselves? 
 There are certainly — There is a State,or Civil community, which is no 
 otherthan an aggregate of the protection of these rights, a mass of power 
 to preserve them— These rights embodied in a system — And is this State, 
 this Civil Community, this mass of power, or this system, to be de- 
 stroyed at once, or at the will of any one ? Is it to perish, or be 
 put down at discretion ? Is it to be brought to nought at the wink, 
 or nod of any other nation, or in any wav whatsoever ? It certainly is not — 
 There ought therefore to be MEASURES taken to defend it— To 
 
LEGISLATIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. H5 
 
 protect it against foreign enemies, or if need be, against internal — 
 Against the attempts of other States to annihilate it, or against do- 
 mestic foes within its own feosom— All these are the objects of politi- 
 cal, or national power, exercised in its endeavour to preserve itself, or 
 rather Civil rights (See passage of Hume quoted '20th Chapter) which 
 require a certain degree of bodily energy to execute them, and are 
 therefore called MEASURES— It is the duty then, of LAW, DIC- 
 TATION, or GOVERNMENT totake,or dictate theseMEASURES, 
 either against foreign enemies or internal disturbers — As in the former 
 case, to preserve Civil rights to the Individual direct, so now to pre- 
 serve the system, that is to preserve them. 
 
 But is there not yet another thing ? If the State be a Mass 6f lntheirag r 
 
 _ _ ° gregate again 
 
 power to protect Civil rights, must not there be wheels to carry on by RE- 
 this power, must not there be PRINCIPLES, to set it in motion, or to powers. 
 speak more properly, must not these very PRINCIPLES make up, 
 and compose it? They must certainly, and these PRINCIPLES are 
 the very LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE, which 
 we mentioned in our 20th Chapter — (See ditto.) And if this LEGIS- 
 LATIVE, JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE make up this 
 power, may it not so happen, that they may forget their des- 
 tination ? That they may neglect the functions assigned them, 
 and be deficient in the duties imposed on them ? — In that 
 case, there should be a revising force in the State to recal them to 
 these duties — To see that they discharge what they were designed to 
 discharge,and that they exhaust and satisfy their intention in Govern- 
 ment—That force is this very LEGISLATIVE,, which by the na- 
 ture of human things, must now be employed in REVIEWING itself, 
 along with the JUDICIAL, and EXECUTIVE-As it was the 
 business thc« of the LEGISLATIVE, to preserve Civil rights in. 
 
 the first instance, to preserve the System that did preserve them 
 
 u 
 
LEGISLATIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 STiTU 
 TION. 
 
 in the second, so is it now to revise the POWERS that compose 
 this System, and recal them, if need be, to their duty. 
 in their ag- £ u t there is still another thing — If Civil rights appear in their simple 
 
 gregate again ° . * x 
 
 by alter- shape as held to Individuals, in their aggregate in the System of power 
 the con.° raised to preserve them, in their aggregate again, in the POWERS 
 that conduct, or compose that System, so do they also in their ag- 
 gregate still again, in the Machine or fabric itself, that founds the whole 
 of the Structure — In the frame of Government erected for their pre- 
 servation — In the Constitution, or form of Polity of the State — 
 May it not so happen that this frame, or form of Polity, may have 
 fallen into decay through time, or been ill formed at the beginning ? 
 Must it always remain perfect, or is it the nature of human things 
 so to do ? It is not — It is then equally of Civil rights, and the pre- 
 servation of Civil rights, that it should be occasionally amended and 
 renovated— It is then again the business of LAW or DICTA- 
 TION or the LEGISLATIVE, or GOVERNMENT, as the 
 Guardian of Civil rights, to make decrees for such amendment, and 
 renovation, and take upon itself the correction of the System. 
 These shapes These then are the different shapes iix which Civil rights appear, 
 gisla. " anc * these are the whole of them — What can we conceive beyond the Ac- 
 ? IV ? ,t ., tua l things themselves,the System raised for them, the Powers that con- 
 
 touches Civil ° J ' - " 
 
 rights. duct or compose that System, and the Constant correction of the whole 
 Structure ? Nothing— These things then limit Civil rights — They must 
 then limit LAW as their Guardian. 
 
JUDICIAL GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS, Uj 
 
 CHAP. L. 
 
 that the JUDICIAL goes through FOUR DEPARTMENTS of the 
 state, INSTITUTES, MEASURES, REVIEW or POWERS,and AL- 
 TERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION. 
 
 JUDGMENT (which is the object of the JUDICIAL) means in judicial 
 general, that power of the mind, that compares two propositions, and &°" roug ' 
 tells their relation to one another—From that it is taken to the re- Jud s m f| nt 
 
 generally. 
 
 suit of exercising the power, or conclusion formed by comparing two 
 propositions — In this last sense we now use it, to correspond with 
 that of Law.*, 
 And if it be the conclusion formed by comparing two propositions, Politically. 
 
 . f l 7 s ' ' . . , O/two pro- 
 
 the question is, what these two propositions are — And here it is evident positions— 
 that one of these, must be the Law, or Dictation of the State — For if aw olle ' 
 JUDGMENT be on the Law, what can it be but of the Law ? Law 
 therefore must be the first proposition which JUDGMENT or the 
 JUDICIAL Power has to compare. 
 
 And if the Law, or Dictation of the State, be the first proposition Subject of 
 which JUDGMENT, or the JUDICIAL POWER has to com- La,v other ' 
 pare, the question is what is the other ? It must be the sub- 
 ject of that Law. f Por JUDGMENT is of the Law, or com- 
 
 • See last chapter on the LEGISLATIVE POWER. 
 
 + The to vno+. 
 
148 JUDICIAL GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 pares the Law, what then can it compare it with, but its sub- 
 ject, since Law consists but of two parts, the rule, and its subject, 
 or rather one philosophically speaking, for that subject is only exem- 
 plifying and realizing it. See Book II. Ch. II. and Book III. Ch. I. 
 — And if Law consist but of these two parts, what has JUDGMENT, or 
 the JUDICIAL to compare it with, but its subject ? 
 Civil rights And if it be the business of JUDGMENT or the JUDICIAL, thus 
 
 subject of ..... 
 
 Law. to compare Law with its subject, the next question arises, what that 
 
 subject is ? Civil rights — Civil rights were the subject of Law, Civil 
 Rights were the subject of Government — They must then be the subject 
 of JUDGMENT which is on the law. JUDGMENT must refer 
 through law to them, it must tell the reference of Law to them 
 — And how must it tell it? It must tell it as Law — For the 
 same reason occurs again, as before — We must then recur to the 
 different shapes in which Civil rights appeared, and through which 
 they became the subjects of LAW, or the LEGISLATIVE. 
 Touciies as These shapes were their simple, as held to Individuals, their aggre* 
 LA.W. gate, in the System of power raised to preserve them, their aggregate 
 again in the Powers that conducted, or composed that System, and in 
 their aggregate still again, in the Machine, or fabric that founded the 
 whole of the Structure — These were the Shapes, in which Law 
 or the LEGISLATIVE touched Civil rights, they must then be 
 the shapes in which JUDGMENT touches them, 
 in their sim- And how again did LAW go through these shapes ? How did it touch 
 by insti- tuem m tnese sna P es - ? It; touched them in their first, or simple 
 TUTES. " s hape by INSTITUTES— It was, as we saw, in our last chap- 
 ter, the business of LAW, to guard Life, Property, and Free-agency, 
 in the first instance, and affix penalties to the invasion of them — If 
 Life were attacked, to punish such attack, if Property were infringed, to 
 pursue such infringement, if Free-agency were assailed, in like man- 
 
JUDICIAL GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 149 
 
 ner to meet the injury, and also, to tell the titles to Property, in 
 cases, where it was disputed — If such was the business of LAW, 
 we cannot much hesitate, to assign that of JUDGMENT, which 
 is on the Law — If JUDGMENT be, to compare two propositions, and 
 one of them, be the Law, or abstract rule of the State, and the other, 
 the subject of it, that subject most undoubtedly must be, in Life, to 
 see who assailed- it, ordaining the punishment of Law, so in Pro- 
 perty, so in Free-agency, so also in Contestations concerning Pro- 
 perty, correspondingly, telling how its titles apply — In all, ordaining 
 penalties according to Law, in all, appointing possession in the 
 same manner— This isthe business of JUDGMENT in INSTITUTES. 
 
 This is the simple shape of Civil rights—The next, is their in their 
 more complicated, or aggregate— That is the shape, as we said , J^me a= 
 in which they appear as a Community, or Nation, with power to SURES - 
 protect them — And it is to prevent this system, from falling to the 
 ground, to save this fabric from coming to ruin, that it is necessary to 
 take Measures to preserve it — To order the expedition of fleets, the 
 march of armies, the taking of internal, or interior MEASURES, 
 for its within prosperity and regulation — But how comes in JUDG- 
 MENT, or the JUDICIAL here ? How comes in, the com- 
 parison of two propositions, where there can be only one, a simple, and 
 MANDATORY Order ? It cannot in the first instance, since such 
 adoption by the Law, is a single ordinance, a mere sole prescription of 
 the step to betaken — It must be afterwards on the not taking that step.to 
 compare the conduct of the POWER, that should have taken it with 
 the Order given, and make it render an account of itself— But this 
 of course, must be done on a new Law, always proceeding on the old, 
 else ex post facto — This then, of MEASURES, is the second mode, 
 in which JUDGMENT touches Civil rights, and brings us to the 
 very Review in question, 
 
150 JUDICIAL GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 in their ag. The next shape as we saw, in which Civil rights appeared, was 
 Igafn by in the POWERS, that conducted, or composed, the System, raised foe 
 of pow- V P reservm g them— It might happen, as we said, that they neglected their 
 ERS. duty— LAW, or LEGISLATIVE then, Orders a REVIEW of there- 
 
 upon this, they must be judged— With this Law, JUDGMENT, or the 
 high JUDICIAL of the State, must compare their conduct, as having 
 failed either in judging or executing the laws, whatever the functions, 
 and ordain issue accordingly, only, as was observed, the new law 
 must have the substance of the old in it. 
 In their ag^ The next, and last shape, in which Civil rights appear, is in 
 b y eg AL- San the Machine, or fabric, that founds the whole of the Structure, that is, 
 ons trine * n tne Constitution, or form of Polity of the State . — It may happen, as we 
 
 consti. sa i(] that it may have fallen into decay, or have been ill formed at 
 XUTION. . . . 
 
 the beginning, that it may require to be supplied, improved,or renovat- 
 ed— In that case, it is the business of LAW, or the LEGISLA- 
 TIVE, to ordain such supplement, improvement, or amendment — 
 And then, if the POWER so ordered to supply it, that is, the EXE- 
 CUTIVE, fail in performing, to order such REVIEW upon it, as it 
 pleases, and upon this, JUDGMENT, or the JUDICIAL, to give 
 issue accordingly. 
 Th*se shapes This is the manner, in which JUDGMENT, or the JUDICIAL of 
 judicial the State, goes through the various shapes of Civil rights, in their 
 Ciiu"} hts.^^P^ as ne ^ to Individuals, in their aggregate, in the System of 
 power raised to preserve them, in their aggregate again, in the Pow- 
 ers that conduct, or compose that System, and in their aggregate still 
 again, in the Machine, or fabric, that founds the whole of the Structure. 
 In all, comparing two propositions, in all, the abstract rule of the 
 State, with its subject, in all, telling its reference to that subject — And 
 if JUDGMENT, or the JUDICIAL, go through these shapes, so 
 did LAW, or the LEGISLATIVE before it— And if Civil rights 
 
EXECUTIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 151 
 
 limited the extent of LAW, so must they, of JUDGMENT also— And 
 if it was the appearance of Civil rights in these shapes, that determin- * 
 
 ed that limit in LAW, so must it in JUDGMENT in like manner— 
 And this is their appearance, in their simple shape, as held to Indivi- 
 duals, in their aggregate, in the System of power raised to preserve 
 them, in their aggregate again, in the Powers that conduct or com- 
 pose that System, and in their aggregate still again, in the Machine, 
 or fabric itself, that founds the whole of the Structure — These then 
 are the extent, or limits of the JUDGMENT or JUDICIAL of 
 the State. 
 
 m l m i 
 
 CHAP. LI. 
 
 that the EXECUTIVE goes through FOUR DEPARTMENTS 
 of the state, INSTITUTES, MEASURES, REVIEWof POWERS, 
 and ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION. 
 
 EXECUTION in general, means the execution, accomplishment, EXECU 
 •r perfection, that is perfecting of any thing, by which it is brought TIVB goes 
 ; o its final conclusion, and termination— And in this, its general sense, Wutl'e*'* 
 it answers very well to the meaning we gave LAW and JUDG- s cueral, J r - 
 MENT— See last chapters- Let the EXECUTION of the State, then, 
 be understood to be, the final end, accomplishment, and perfecting o ,• • „ 
 
 /? «r T t\- . A ' n • t "^^""S Politically 
 
 ot the Law, or Dictation of it, the last conclusion, by which, all end, concludes 
 -nd termination is put to it. ' eTer / thiD §- 
 
 And if this be the sense of the EXECUTION of the State, theques- 
 
15$ EXECUTIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 tion is what it touches ? And here again the doubt returns to what it is ? 
 What is theEXECUTION of the State, substantially, and really ? The 
 Execution of the Law, or Dictation of it — That is its sense-^-And if this- 
 beits sense, that it is the EXECUTION of the LAW or DICTATION of 
 it,then it must undoubtedly touch whatever LAW or DICTATION does. 
 Touches And if the EXECUTION of the State touch whatever LAW, or 
 
 Civil rights. DICTATION does, the next question is, what that is? What does 
 LAW, or DICTATION touch ? Civil rights— That has been suffi- 
 ciently agitated, that has been sufficiently discussed in the last, 
 and preceding chapters — Civil rights were the subject of Law, Civil 
 subject of Government. 
 hi Uv. EXECUTION then touching Civil rights, because LAW does, 
 
 the question is, how it touches them? The same answer will be 
 afforded here, as before, viz. as LAW. 
 
 AND how is this ? W T hat were the shapes in which LAW or DICTA- 
 TION touched Civil rights ? In their simple shape, as held to Indivi- 
 duals, in their aggregate, in the System of power raised to preserve them, 
 in their aggregate again, in the Powers that conducted, or composed, 
 that System, and in their aggregate still again, in the Machine,, or 
 fabric, that founded the whole of the Structure — These were the shapes, 
 in which LA W,or DICTATION touched Civil rights— These then must 
 be also the shapes, in which EXECUTION, or the EXECUTIVE 
 touches them, 
 in their And how does it go through these shapes ? How does it touch 
 
 bTiNSTi P - e ' Civil rights in these shapes? As. LAW-LAW touched Civil 
 TV T & S— rights in their simple shape as held to Individuals by INSTI- 
 TUTES— So must EX ECUTION also— It was,we saw,the business of 
 LAW, to provide ordinances for the preservation of Life, Property, 
 and Free-agency, attaching penalties to their invasion — If Life- 
 were assailed, appointing a punishment for that, so of Property, so 
 
EXECUTIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. %fy 
 
 of Free-agency, adjusting too the titles to Property, in cases where it 
 should be disputed— In all establishing their preservation, in all, or- 
 daining their protection, or regulation. 
 
 And if the business of LAW, or Dictation was, to appoint penal- 
 lies for the invasion of Civil rights, and to adjust their Titles, and of 
 JUDGMENT, to enquire into such invasion, and Titles, so is it of 
 EXECUTION to execute them, or to execute as for them-**To execute 
 the punishment ordained by LAW, to execute the possession also so 
 ordained, when the Title is found to it — It cannot well be the execution 
 of Law in any other way, for if LAW, appoint a punishment, or ordain 
 possession in certain cases, what can the execution of the Law be, but 
 to give it effect ? The Law can have but a body, and a spirit, if we 
 may so use the expression, and if that spirit, or meaning, be the Rule, 
 or Dictation, or first Order itself, and JUDGMENT the finding out 
 or discovering how it applies, what is there left for EXECUTION", 
 but giving it body, and substance, so as to make it actually take place 
 in reality ? 
 
 This then is the mode, in which EXECUTION, or the EX ECU- in their a*. 
 TIVE Power touches Civil rights in their simple shape, as held to Indi- mea. 
 vidualsby INSTITUTES, now as to their more complicated, or aggre- sUilES - 
 gate— That shape,as wesaid,was the State, the shape in whichCivil rights 
 were embodied into a Community, or Nation, with power to protect 
 them — In what manner then does EXECUTION act here ? — Go to 
 Law — What was the operation of LAW itself in this instance ? It was to 
 rder MEASURES for the defence of that State (See Ch. XLIX. on 
 LAW,p. 144) To provide forits within prosperity, or regulation — To take 
 care, that it did not perish, or fall to decay, and weakness — The bu- 
 siness of EXECUTION,- or the EXECUTIVE Power then 
 must be, to give effect to these MEASURES, to take care that 
 they do not fall to the ground, for want of co-operation and assistance 
 — In a word, to execute them. But how, as we said came in 
 
 x 
 
154 EXECUTIVE GOES THROUGH FOUR DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 JUDGMENT here? See last Chapter— -Afterwards on a new 
 Law, if the Measures were not executed, to judge those; who 
 should have done so, and have neglected for their conduct — 
 So then, do we also say of the EXECUTION here, it comes in again, 
 upon that new Law, to execute the decisions of JUDGMENT, 
 but of this afterwards, 
 in thoiiarr- r f| ie nex t shape is the POWERS — That was the next in which 
 byiiRViEW LAW touched Civil rights (see Ch. XLIX. p. 145) How then 
 E ft P ° W " does EXECUTION come in here? If the POWERS, whose bu- 
 siness is to judge and execute, that is, the JUDICIAL, and EXE- 
 CUTIVE, should have neglected their dirties, then there is afresh 
 Law to revise their conduct, always containing the old, else ex post 
 facto, and if Judgment pass against them on this, then EXECUTION 
 comes in to perform it. That is the business of EXECUTION 
 in this instance, 
 in tw.r a g - The next, and last shape, is the CONSTITUTION, or Eorm of 
 f re w te iMMi n Government— -Here, as we saw, it is the nature of human things to 
 
 l>y Alii Kit- ° 
 
 ations of 511^ m to decay, and the business of the LAW of the State, to 
 the con. . . /' _ . „ . . _ . 
 
 STITU. repair it, as far as relative thereto— I o amend any imperfections 
 
 li0N ' that may have originally existed in the fabric, or supply such de- 
 fects, as may have crept in, from the lapse of time — In this case, it 
 is the office of the EXECUTION, to accomplish such ALTER- 
 ATIONS, in the first instance, and then, if it have neglected them, 
 to perform the Judgment of the State, for such failure, and de- 
 ficiency upon itself. 
 These extent These are the provinces of the EXECUTION, or EXECUTIVE 
 YiQjsf Power of the State, these are the modes, and forms, in which it touches 
 Civilrightsin their simple shape as held to Individuals,in their aggregate 
 in the System of power raised to preserve them, in their aggregate 
 again in the Powers that conduct, or compose that System, and in their 
 aggregate still again, in the Machine, or fabric, that founds the whole 
 
 i 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE. 155 
 
 of the Structure — For these were the shapes, in which LAW touched 
 them, see Chap. XLIX., by INSTITUTES, by MEASURES, 
 by REVIEW of POWERS, and ALTERATIONS of the 
 CONSTITUTION— These were ajso the shapes in which JUDG- 
 MENT touched them, seeing how these INSTITUTES ap- 
 plied, how these MEASURES had been executed, how these 
 POWERS had discharged their functions, how these ALTERA- 
 TIONS of the fabric, ordered, had been performed, ordaining the 
 issue of Law upon them — These then, must be also the modes, ia 
 which EXECUTION touches them, executing that issue throughout, 
 or rather, the Order of the State, or Law of, in all cases — These then 
 are the modes, or shapes, in which EXECUTION touches Civil 
 rights, these are the whole of its functions — This then, is the extent 
 of EXECUTION— This is what is to be understood by it. 
 
 CHAP. LIE 
 
 WHAT IS INVOLVED BY THE LEGISLATIVE. 
 
 WE come now to what is involved by the Law, or Dictation of the What inToL 
 State, and it deserves our principal attention, if that Law or Dictation vtd > &c - 
 should be, as we expect it will turn out to be, the anima, and 4>»x n of 
 
 overnment— We did hint at this in our 20th Chap, see ditto., and it 
 is now that we shall attempt to develope the PRINCIPLE. 
 
 We there said, that all political power, or all the power of a State, A ^P^* 1 
 was properly speaking, LEGISLATIVE, because it, related gisla. ' 
 either to the making of Laws, or the executing them, which 
 widely speaking included their application— And we assigned, as a 
 
 X 2 
 
 v._. 
 
156 
 
 WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE. 
 
 JUDICIAL 
 and EXE- 
 CUTIVE* 
 powers turn- 
 ed by 
 
 LEGISLA- 
 TIVE. 
 
 A rule, 
 IDEA. 
 
 Enquiring if 
 it have been 
 adhered to, 
 or adhering 
 to, FACT. 
 
 Motions 
 applied. 
 
 reason fur this, that it was the intention of every Law that it 
 should be applied, and executed, indeed that such application 
 and Execution, were in truth, no more than following out, and 
 realizing it — And we adhere to the same notions — In great effect, 
 though not in the specific nature of the, POWERS, Law, or Dicta- 
 tion, is the idea of Montesquieu's circle (See Book II. Ch. II. and 
 Bock III.. Ch. I..) which existed before the circle was drawn. 
 
 And we adhere, we say, to the same notion of all power being LE- 
 GISLATIVE, because, though JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, 
 are undoubtedly distinct powers, and have a distinct weight in the 
 Constitution of a State, and whether they had, or not have a distinct 
 idea or essence in themselves, yet are these essences so inferior, so 
 Jed, and committed, so guided, prescribed to, and turned about, by 
 the Law or Dictation (always however acting within its own sphere), 
 that it answers the same purpose almost, as if they were involved 
 in it — And to be convinced of this, it will be necessary here to go a 
 little into the theory of the POM ERS, and see how they bear Id* 
 their action, and tendency upon one another. 
 
 And first as to Law, or Dictation— What is the idea of Dictation ? 
 A rule — And what is the idea of a rule? Something to walk by — 
 Then this must be IDEA (Especially in the present case, a great 
 PRINCIPLE, it must be greater than some other thing) else it 
 is light, and not light, guidance, and not guidance, at the same time — 
 And if the question be, whether this rule have been adhered to, 
 it is a question of PACT — And if something be done adhering to 
 it, it is another question of FACT. 
 
 Now apply these notions to LAW, JUDGMENT, and EXE- 
 CUTION-LAW, or DICTATION, is the rule, or guidance, al- 
 ways to be adhered to in every respect— JUDGMENT, is the seeing 
 if it have been adhered to— And EXECUTION is the doing some- 
 thing adhering to it. 
 
 .fll 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE, j* 7 
 
 It is evident then, that LAW, or DICTATION must have what* r,AW, 
 ever relates to IDEA, or PRINCIPLE, and JUDGMENT, or EXE- JgJ}^ 
 CUTION, whatever, to FACT, or CIRCUMSTANCES— The idea, Judg. 
 
 MENT 
 
 the guidance, the enlightening, must always.be PRINCIPLE, itandEXK. 
 cannot otherwise than be, PRINCIPLE— The point whether that £^!°^' 
 LAW, or Dictation have been adhered to, or adhering to it, must stances. 
 always be FACT, it cannot otherwise than be FACT,: or CIRC U DI- 
 STANCES. 
 
 Try it through the DEPARTMENTS— What is LAW, or DIC- ?| ied . A 
 
 J to 3 J n rough ths 
 
 TATION in INSTITUTES ? It is providing for Life, Property, and pKl*Rf. 
 
 t-, i' , '"T»i'^i > * • x MEN PS, ia 
 
 Iree-agency, by instituting Penalties for their invasion, also, forlNSTi. 
 the succession to Property, by instituti g Titles to it— See whether Llfe &c " 
 LAW, or DICTATION have not PRINCIPLE here ? If Life be taken, g»™il 
 and LAW or DICTATION take no cognizance of the more, or less 
 malignant mode,, more, or less prejudicial to society, in which it is taken 
 then all Murthcr,and Homicide would be the same, and the rule would 
 be no rule at all — If it does, then come degrees of guilt, and IDEA, 
 or PRINCIPLE along with them— If intentionally, with what in- 
 tention, deliberate, or sudden and provoked, or self-defensive, pro£ur> 
 sound mind — All these are of PRINCIPLE, and belong to Dic- 
 tation, because you cannot dictate, or guide properly, unless you 
 dictate through — You cannot make a Dictation against Homicide,, 
 against a Crime, or in proportion to Crimes, unless you tell, what is 
 a Crime, and what kinds of Crimes, nor apportion Punishments pro- 
 perly, unless you exhaust the subject in the same manner, that is, by 
 the Crime, and degrees of Crime—And if you do this, you have all that 
 relates to PRINCIPLE— The FACTS, whether the Crime so specified 
 exist, or how exactly it should be punished, are no parts of the 
 PRINCIPLE, therefore you can have the PRINCIPLE with- 
 out them— The CIRCUMSTANCES do not interfere with, 
 it— As little does the PRINCIPLE interfere with the CIRCUM- 
 STANCES; for the DICTATION has nothing to do with the 
 
158 WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE, 
 
 cognizance of the FACTS, which constitute the enquiry of JUDG- 
 MENT, nor the actual mode, or manner of performing, which makes 
 the accomplishment of EXECUTION — It is evident then, that in 
 providing against the invasion of Life, DICTATION has the 
 PRINCIPLE, and JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, the CIR- 
 CUMSTANCES— So in invasions of Property, and Free-agency, the 
 snme notions apply mutatis mutandis, with circumstances of atrocity, 
 maltreating, irritation, insolence, and aggravation— So also corre- 
 sspondingly,,in Contestations concerning Property— The PRINCIPLE 
 is here, the Title to it^-What should be the Title, else no Justice — 
 
 InContes- What has that to do, with the proofs, or the execution of the Title? 
 
 tationscon- ^tfat a son should succeed to his father, preferably, others according to 
 
 ccrning rro- r ^ & 
 
 pe««y, more remote Propinquity, or Destination, or Acquisition, what has this 
 
 to do with the proofs of that Propinquity, Destination, or Acquisition, 
 or the actual putting in possession of the estate, when the Title is 
 found to it? Nothing at all— Here then LAW, or DICTATION 
 has the PRINCIPLE, and JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, 
 CIRCUMSTANCES, equally as in the other cases— So much for 
 INSTITUTES. 
 
 Then again as to MEASURES-What does LAW, or DICTA- 
 
 In MEA- to 
 
 SURES. TION, what ought it to do here? Dictate the MEASURE— 
 Give the Order— Then, dictate anew Law or Dictation, to be judged, 
 and executed, that is, to have trial, and punishment, if the MEASURE 
 be not executed— Here the Law, or Dictation for the MEASURE, is 
 the IDEA for the MANDATORY execution in the first instance, and 
 then the new Law with the old in it, for the JUDGMENT, and 
 EXECUTION in the second — What have these original ideas to do, 
 .with the MANDATORY execution in the first case, or the proofs of 
 non-execution, or actual enforcing of the punishment in the after 
 one ? They are all three, that is, the MANDATORY execution, and 
 the proofs, and the after punishment, FACTS, and CIRCUM- 
 STANCES, and to be done or proved by FACTS or CIRC UM- 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE. lo o, 
 
 STANCES — Law or Dictation, the original notion, lias nothing to do 
 with them-LAW or DICTATION then, has here also the PRIN- 
 CIPLE, and JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION , the CIRCUM- 
 STANCES. 
 
 So it, is in a REVIEW of POWERS -This is a general eegQtnfftc*. r " &**- 
 that the Law, or Dictation takes of the neglect, or abuse, win. h powers. 
 JUDGMENT, or EXECUTION may have made generally, a id 
 substantially in exercising their functions— It must make a new Law 
 for this, a Law, Rule, or Dictation, proceeding on the substance of 
 the old, else as above mentioned, ex post facto — But it is a Law, 
 Rule, or Dictation, an Idea to be compared with the conduct of these 
 POWERS, and then punishment to take place accordingly, if they 
 be found guilty upon it — Now what have this punishment, and this 
 comparison to do, with the Rule, that is " WHAT the Rule lays 
 " down/' all that is, or ought to be, consideration of Justice— If less* 
 the DICTATION does not dictate what it ought to dictate, being 
 the right, or wrong of conduct, to the parties, who are subject to it, 
 if more, it goes beyond its province, because it is only to dictate 
 that right, or wrong — Following then this, what has Dictation to do 
 with the proofs of theconduct of these POWERS, of its squaring, 
 or not squaring, with the Rules laid down, or the actual manner of 
 executing the punishment, if they should be found guilty? . Here 
 then again, the PRINCIPLE belongs to DICTATION, and 
 the CIRCUMSTANCES to JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION. 
 
 Last come ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION— The r„ alter. 
 same notions apply here — There is the Order for executing thet heC0 ^.° 
 ALTERATION— That is the Rule-the ALTERATION must square f? 1 ™- " 
 with it— It must be executed—If not, JUDGMENT and EXECU- 
 TION must take place on a new Law,or Rule (of the substance of the 
 old) for trying for not executing, and heie also, the DICTATION all 
 through, is the IDEA, or PRINCIPLE— First, for the execution o£ 
 
a0v; WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE, 
 
 the ALTERATION, in the first instance, and then, for trying For 
 the non-execution of it, in the second, and the punishment follow- 
 ing upon it — What have these original IDEAS to do with the manner 
 of performing the ALTERATION in the first case, or the proof 
 of non- performance, or the mode of executing the punishment ? 
 Through tie Here then, through the whole FOUR DEPARTMENTS, it is 
 four DE- evident that LAW, or DICTATION, has, and ought to have, 
 J**jk the PRINCIPLE, and the JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION 
 law his the CIRCUMSTANCES— And if LAW, or DICTATION have 
 PLE? CU the PRINCIPLE, and JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, the 
 MBNTabd CIRCUMSTANCES, then must it much commit the JUDG- 
 bxkcu" MENT and EXECLTION-The PRINCIPLE, or rule which it 
 CIKCUM. gives, must much commit the JUDGMENT which is to judge by 
 A ' it — The punishment, possession, or measure which it names, must 
 infinitely lead the EXECUTION, which is to perform it— In truth 
 if PRINCIPLE be totally taken up, as it ought to be, by DIC- 
 TATION, it leaves only considerations of mere FACT, or CIR- 
 CUMSTANCES to JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, which 
 is the narrowest ground (comp'aratively) possible — But has LAW, or 
 DICTATION any more than this? Has it any of the POWERS 
 of JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION ? No-Not a grain, not an 
 atom of them— It was observed, that JUDGMENT, and EXE- 
 CUTION had each an essence of themselves — A complete abstract, 
 or IDEA self-sufficient, and independent*— A Circle, to use the 
 language of Montesquieu (see Book II. Ch. II. and Book III. Ch. 
 I. notes) which was to be exemplified by the line that traced it, 
 and that line was their actual exercise in practice— The Circle was 
 the POWER — Here was the notion— Now does not every one see 
 
 • ATTAPKH2. 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE. l6l 
 
 that this essence, that is, of the POWERS, is complete in itself? That 
 they are the POWERS of JUDGING, and EXECUTING, of com- 
 paring the RULE, IDEA, PRINCIPLE, NOTION of the DIC- 
 TATION, or « WHAT IS ENJOINED," with the subject of it, 
 which is the POWDER of JUDGING, and of executing the thing 
 enjoined, which is the POWER of EXECUTING ? Though they 
 are lesser POWERS, much less, how infinitely, than that of framing 
 yet they are POWERS — They are a separate thing, a separate 
 POWER, and a separate essence W hatha ve the things, the abso- 
 lute points, the objects of JUDGING, or EXECUTING, an IDEA 
 to do with the IDEA itself, or framing the IDEA? They the 
 JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION are much led by that IDEA, 
 very much influenced, very much turned by it, almost as much, and 
 yet a difference too, as if they were involved in it, so that LAW, or 
 DICTATION, may be said to have the field, or what without LAW 
 or DICTATION, would be the held of them, but it has no more, 
 it has not their ESSENCE, never can have their ESSENCE, 
 never more than the first ESSENCE, nor has any thing to do with 
 their ESSENCE— They are totally separate things — You might as wel^ 
 mix the IDEA of one with that of two, or any other incongruous 
 notion — At the same time, they are much committed by the first 
 ESSENCE, which leaves them so little room for their's, yet 
 however without trespassing on its own limits — For if always what 
 is PRINCIPLE, go into LAW, or DICTATION, and always what 
 is CIRCUMSTANCE, into JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, 
 little will be left to JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION. 
 
 And this applies more strongly to EXECUTION — That is, per- Commits 
 forming, as we know, or accomplishing, the Law, or Dictation xjon U * 
 ofthe State— If the other POWER (JUDGMENT) compared 
 the Law, or Dictation of it, with its subject, and told it's 
 reference to that subject, so does this (EXECUTION) execute 
 
 that reference, and in most cases, the Law directly— Executes 
 
 Y 
 
162 
 
 WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE. 
 
 in short, the Law, or Dictation in one way, or other — And 
 if JUDGMENT was committed by the IDEA, which it had to 
 compare with its subject, so is this more committed still, by its being 
 (generally) a type of DICTATION, which is indeed the difference 
 between JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, that EXECUTION 
 (generally) is a part of DICTATION, JUDGMENT is not—We can 
 conceive a Law, or Dictation against a Crime,without JUDGMENT 
 absolutely coming upon it, (except in a REVIEW of POWERS 
 where JUDGMENT is the essence of the LAW, or DICTATION), 
 it is no part of the IDEA, however it may have been attracted after- 
 wards by the necessity of human affairs — It does not therefore contradict 
 identity — But this is not the case with EXECUTION — It is as much 
 a part of the DICTATION against a Crime, that it should be punish- 
 ed, as that it is forbid, and so through the DEPARTMENTS,(in Mea- 
 sures and ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION EXECUTION 
 is the whole of the DICTATION) we cannot conceive it without it, it 
 is to conceive DICTATION, and not to conceive it at the same time — 
 So far is EXECUTION more implicated in DICTATION, than 
 JUDGMENT, in its general sense, not in its particular, it is there the 
 POWER — It has the option of varying in degrees, the mode of its Ex- 
 ecution, and this is the very particular Execution, contradistinguish- 
 ed from the general above, which constitutes the POWER — With- 
 out it, it would be none— EXECUTION then, is a separate POWER, 
 though both it, and JUDGMENT are infinitely inferior to LAW, 
 or DICTATION. 
 
 But the great Superiority which LAW, or DICTATION has, 
 
 arises from the appropriate function it possesses, of drawing back 
 
 "ciprocaiion. JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION to their duty, whenever they 
 
 the pow. have in the least deviated from it, and so bringing them into its 
 
 another ° ne measures > without in the least trespassing upon the integrity of the 
 
 other POWERS — This function is that of repeating, reciprocating,and 
 
 reverberating itself (if we may use the expression) through the DEPART- 
 
 Great Supe 
 riori'y of 
 Law by Re 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY LEGISLATIVE. ^ 
 
 MENTS, from one POWER to another— If for instance, JUDG- 
 MENT do not judge in INSTITUTES, then comes a Law, or Dic- 
 tation, to overhaul it", and execution upon that Law, by EXECU- 
 TION— If EXECUTION does not execute in MEASURES, then 
 comes a Law, or Dictation similarly to overhaul it, and Judgment 
 upon that by the JUDGMENT— If JUDGMENT, and EXECU- 
 TION both fail generally, then a law for reviewing them both in 
 REVIEW of POWERS^ and JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION 
 upon that— So in ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION, a 
 Law to overhaul non-execution, and Judgment upon that — So that 
 wherever either JUDGMENT, or EXECUTION fail, the other is 
 always ready to come upon it, prompted by the LAW or DICTA- 
 TION, and wherever one comes, the other must also, for JUDG- 
 MENT must always precede EXECUTION, and EXECUTION 
 follow JUDGMENT. 
 
 It must be supposed what an amazing force, these two POWERS 7A 
 
 of JUDGMENT and EXECUTION must give to the LAW, or 
 DICTATION, so multiplied and implicated into one another — Al- 
 ways at the nod of the LAW, or DICTATION, which has at any and 
 at all times, the power of recalling them to their duty, when they 
 have the least strayed from it, and so as we said, inducing into its 
 measures — It may be imagined how immense this is, in the variou s 
 DEPARTMENTS, whether the LAW, or DICTATION frame IN- 
 STITUTES, order MEASURES, REVIEW POWERS, or ALTER 
 the CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Nay more, it may Multiply these PQWERS into their multipli- Multiplies 
 cation, and that multiplication into itself, in infinitum, changing the jjj;™ {JJ tl [ 
 very changes themselves, and multiplying multiplication into multi- tipiicaUon, 
 
 and so in in. 
 
 plication. fioitum. 
 
 With this power, it must be seen, what LAW', or DICTATION Aristotle's 
 
 1 praise »f 
 
 ] s — It has so much the command of all, it is so infinitely, and multi- Reasoning 
 
 Y 2 applies to it. 
 
 \ 
 
!(34 WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 plicitly their Master, that what Aristotle says of the Superiority of 
 die Art of Reasoning applies to it — " That whereas other Arts and 
 " Sciences are of their own particular subjects, this is of ALL, it in- 
 cludes ALL OTHERS, it is kata nANTaN."* 
 
 Such is the immense force given to LAW, or DICTATION by re- 
 ciprocation, and it is this added to its particular faculties in the first in- 
 stance, that amazingly confirms? and strengthens it — For if it retain 
 the field of, or what would be the field of JUDGMENT and EXE- 
 CUTION, and have a correspondingly great influence, in consequence, 
 it must be a great accession to this, that it can prevent the POW- 
 ERS from straying from their duty. 
 
 This then, is the idea of LAW, or DICTATION, this its power in 
 consequence^ and this the confirmation of it by reciprocation, all which 
 constitute it that greatsweeping POWER, that MASS of INVOLU- 
 TION, which distinguishes it—So that it may be in truth called, 
 anima the ANIMA, andrrxH of the State, the SOUL, and ESSENCEof 
 and rrxH of GOVERNMENT— This is the involution of LAW, or DICTATION. 
 ment RN " Now for those of JUDGMENT and EXECUTION. 
 
 This LAW. 
 
 CHAP. LIII. 
 
 WHAT IS INYOLVED BY THE JUDICIAL. 
 
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WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. X65 
 
 JUDGMENT, or DISCERNMENT of it— And if it was of impor- 
 tance before to know what was involved by theLAW, or DICTATION 
 because it turned the State (See Chap. LII.) so is it now what is in- 
 volved by the JUDGMENT, or DISCERNMENT of it, because it 
 has much influence in the State. 
 
 For it is easy to see from the general account that was given of influence 
 LAW, JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, in Chapters XLIX , L., ment?; 
 and LI., that the influence of JUDGMENT must be, in proportion i ,r ^ )tir,ioa 
 
 to Ihkit of 
 
 to that of LAW, or DICTATION— -Not in any kind of equality or law. 
 admeasurement, to be sure, but always in consideration to its 
 own part, or share, or administration in the State, on LAW, on DIC- 
 TATION. 
 
 For it was seen there, that LAW or DICTATION was the Law law Rule, 
 or Rule of the State, excluding will, sa as to produce the governing M L £vr coin . 
 of itself— And that JUDGMENT was the comparing this Rule or P arin b'» *c. 
 Law of the State, excluding will, where it was to be compared, that 
 is, in JUDICIAL matters, with the subject submitted to it, and 
 telling its reference to that subject.* 
 
 And we see now further, that this LAW, or DICTATION has law, 
 the IDEA, or PRINCIPLE of the matter, submitted to it, and ™ N ' CI - 
 that JUDGMENT, and EXECUTION, have the FACTS, or CIR-JUdg. 
 
 ME NT 
 
 CUMSTANCES of it,each in its own way— (See last chapter) We know and exec. 
 therefore what to think of the influence of JUDGMENT, as to how^J^ES. 
 far it is inferior to that of LAW, and how far this shews su- 
 perior, or involving, where it is superior, or involving, to that of EXE- 
 CUTION, viz. in the JUDICIAL, or executing its own sentences, 
 but of this afterwards. 
 
 And first in investigating the possession which JUDGMENT hasJUDG- 
 of FACTS, or CIRCUMSTANCES, the question is, how it is con- ^JJtt' 
 
 LAW, or 
 PR1NCI. 
 * TO YnON. PJjE to 
 
166 
 
 WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 CIRCUM- 
 STANCES. 
 
 In all it's 
 colours, and 
 tendencies. 
 
 This great 
 through 
 Govern- 
 ment. 
 INSTI- 
 TUTES 
 Life- 
 
 el/ 
 
 nected with, or relates to them — In what shape it has to do with 
 how it refers to, or attaches to them — And here it may be said, that it 
 takes cognizance of them — It enquires (where it acts at all) into 
 the PRINCIPLE which the LAW, (or DICTATION) lays down, 
 and sees how it applies, to these FACTS — It tells its reference to them 
 — It is, where it acts at all, the middle step, between the PRIN- 
 CIPLE, and it's SUBJECT, between the RULE, and the FACT 
 which it applies to. 
 
 And how does it become this ? How does it effect this situation, 
 which makes it the middle step? It compares this RULE, LIGHT, 
 or PRINCIPLE, this GUIDANCE, in all its shades, or tenden- 
 cies, with the SUBJECT submitted to it, or FiiCT, in all its shades, 
 colours, and tendencies, and tells its reference to it. 
 
 It may be seen how far this goes taken through the whole com- 
 pass of Government— Try it through the DEPARTMENTS— See 
 what it (JUDGMENT) does in the first, viz. that of INSTITUTES— 
 We saw (see Chapter on LAW, what involved by) that in the IN- 
 STITUTE for Life, it was a natural, necessary, and inevitable con- 
 sideration, how that Life was invaded, whether with intention, be- 
 cause intention made the guilt, and consequently mischief of the 
 thing, which taken through society, is in proportion to the design, 
 embraced in a large sense — Again whether that intention was 
 deliberate, or sudden, and provoked, or self-defensive, or of unsound 
 mind (ifitcanbe called intention) — If sudden, and provoked, it could 
 not be so malicious — If self-defensive, it would be to abandon all 
 right, that a man must give up his own Life, if of unsound mind, it 
 would be to extinguish all Criminality, to make that Criminal, as far as 
 Criminality arises from intention, since there could be no (proper) 
 intention— It is the business then of JUDGMENT, to enquire into 
 all these cases, and to see from the FACTS, and CIRCUMSTAN- 
 CES, " whether the situation exist, that the LAW has in meaning, 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. tfft 
 
 " that it precisely states, and mentions" — And it is to be observed, that aucir- 
 in going through these FACTS, or CIRCUMSTANCES, wherever ^vxnces 
 any come in, or are admitted as proofs in the course of these things, and as proofs 
 they instantly become, or indeed were before, PRINCIPLES them-paiNCI. 
 selves, that is, minor PRINCIPLES, down to the very last— For what- PLES * 
 ever proves any thing, let it be ever so trivial, or seemingly barren,or in- 
 significant, or disjointed a CIRCUMSTANCE, must be an IDEA.that 
 is come under an IDEA, applying to the human species, in general, 
 (generally speaking) else no proof,* and in that case JUDGMENT 
 will have a great latitude, in chusing among the CIRCUMSTANCES 
 to take such as will infer the proof— For the proof, as we said above, 
 depending upon such CIRCUMSTANCES, (again generally speak- 
 ing) attaching to a number of persons, which CIRCUMSTANCES 
 JUDGMENT 1 has the privilege of connecting with these persons, 
 or not, as it pleases, though it cannot alter the truth, it must thereby 
 have a great latitude — And if any one doubt of the force of the 
 proof depending upon CIRCUMSTxlNCES attaching to a number of 
 persons, let them only regard the following — We shall suppose, that 
 in an accusation for Murther, or intention deliberate in Life, a man 
 had avowed malice, then it stands thus : 
 
 A man who avows malice intends: 
 This man avow'd malice; 
 Therefore he intended. 
 
 * There may be a person whose modes of acting, and speaking, are so different from those of other 
 men, that the reasoning from his this or that action will not apply to other men, so that there 
 might be proof without it, but this is an extraordinary case, as that of Herod and Mariamne, 
 there it might s-tand : 
 
 Wherever this man loves he kills : 
 
 This man loved; 
 
 Therefore he killed. 
 
 9 
 
1^8 WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 Or that he had declared he hated : 
 A man who hates, intends : 
 This man hated ; 
 Therefore he intended. 
 
 Who does not see that the proof of the intention deliberate, de- 
 pends upon the minor of the syllogism attaching, or becoming a 
 PRINCIPLE, so as to make all persons who hate deliberately in- 
 tend, or all who avow malice deliberately intend ? Where 
 would be the hold without it? And so of the other cases of sudden, 
 and provoked intention, self-defence, and unsound mind correspond- 
 ingly — It is then a great province,to*go through all theseFACTS and va- 
 riety of FACTS, and tell HOW FAR, or if at all, the LAW, or RULE 
 of the State applies to them— What an extent of CIRCUMSTAN- 
 CES, and qualification of CIRCUMSTANCES it embraces, what 
 a latitude of IDEAS, and application of IDEAS, to these CIR- 
 CUMSTANCES— It is an immense field of probabilities, presump- 
 tions, certainties, so as to make one general certainty, human cer- 
 tainty collected from the whole — It is an amazing and expanded ex- 
 tent, an immense space, though not without a boundary. 
 Property* The next case is Property,and it may be observed, that nearly the same 
 
 ideas apply here, as in the invasion of Life. There is the same sweep of 
 chusing amid a variety of FACTS, and colours of FACTS, and ap- 
 plications of LAW, and colours of application — To chuse among a 
 variety of simple facts, to establish the actual doingofthe thing, 
 more or less serious, more or less seriously dressed, and to apply 
 more, or less solid parts of the Law, more, or less intensely applying 
 to them, so that the latitude of JUDGMENT is here almost as 
 extensive, as in the former cases of Life, and Property. 
 Free-agency. The next is Free-agency — The attacks upon this, are subjects of a 
 different investigation— What shall be esteemed an attack upon Free- 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. Jfcg 
 
 agency ? Free-agency is the enjoyment of the freedom of our ac- 
 tions — The first attack upon this then, must be, what should put us 
 under any durance, any kind of confinement, or constraint — This in- 
 vasion is less frequent, than any other in society, as nothing can be 
 gained, generally speaking, by putting any one under constraint — It 
 does happen however that persons may be put under constraint, or de- 
 prived of their personal freedom in different shapes,and wherever it hap- 
 pens in any shape, the LAW makes, or ought to make heavy penalties 
 for it — And it is in selecting the circumstances of such constraint,dressing 
 them up differently, applying different parts of Law, and more, or 
 ]ess,intensely, that appears the latitude of JUDGMENT— -It is further 
 to be observed, that there is the same malus animus to be in- 
 vestigated here, as in the othercases of Life, and Property, the more, or 
 less determined intention of constraint, with facts, and colours of facts* 
 and applications of Law, and colours of application — The scope there- 
 fore of JUDGMENT here, is nearly as wide as in the other cases. 
 
 The last case of INSTITUTES, is Contestations concerning Pro- „ 
 pertv, or what may be called Civil suits, or actions. And there tations 
 is id these,at least a similar latitude, for JUDGMENT — Property! 8 
 There is indeed almost the same scope for it, as in the first case of CiV1L « 
 INSTITUTES, or Life— Here Law tells the Title, or what makes the 
 Title to the Property, as in the other case, the Crime, or what makes 
 the Crime — To make this Title, come Propinquity, Destination, or 
 Acquisition, as in the other cases, design to constitute the Crime — ■ 
 The one is the essence of the right, as the other is of the guilt — . 
 And as in proof of intention, either deliberate, or sudden, and pro- 
 voked, or self-defensive, or of unsound mind, come suitable corre- 
 sponding circumstances to prove it, in the case of Life, so here come 
 
 Legitimacy, Authenticity, (of deed) and marks of acquirement, to 
 
 z 
 
170 
 
 WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 fix Propinquity, Destination, or Acquisition in this case of Property 
 ■ — Marching abreast all the way down — And in supporting Propin- 
 quity, Destination, or Acquisition, these suitable corresponding cir- 
 cumstances come all in as proofs depending upon a certain quality 
 attaching to a certain description of persons — As for instance in Pro- 
 pinquity 
 
 Whoever is born in his wedlock, has by Propinquity : 
 This man was born in his wedlock ; 
 Therefore he has by Propinquity. 
 Or in Destination : 
 
 Whoever has by a deed written with his own hand, has by Desti- 
 nation : 
 
 This man has by a deed written with his own hand ; 
 Therefore he has by Destination. 
 And so of the remaining case Acquisition : 
 Whoever gets a thing by exclusive labour, has by Acquisition : 
 This man got by exclusive labour ; 
 Therefore he has by Acquisition. 
 Proofs both Thus then do the proofs answer all through — And it is evident that 
 in crimi. JUDGMENT has a great latitude down through the PRINCIPLES, 
 civil!* that is, CIRCUMSTANCES making minor PRINCIPLES all the 
 way,successively applying them to persons, and connecting with, in in- 
 finitum, till they are exhausted, so that it has constantly a force, 
 corresponding to that of LAW, expanding as the interpretation 
 of PRINCIPLES expands, and contracting as it is contracted — It is 
 needless to observe, that the power of JUDGMENT, must be thus 
 as extensive here, or in this case of INSTITUTES, viz. Contes- 
 tations concerning Property, as in the others. 
 The next DEPARTMENT is MEASURES— This is a MAN- 
 SURES. DATORY, not a JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT-It is not as in the 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 171 
 
 former DEPARTMENT of INSTITUTES, a passive Law, or ordi- 
 nance, as we may call it,a rule for certain predicaments, but which must 
 wait for those predicaments, to be called forth into operation,it is an ac- 
 tive command to execute, or do something for the benefit, or behoof, or 
 prosperity of the State, which must be directly — Then, if that be not 
 executed,or done, comes a new Law(of the substance of the old, else ex 
 post facto, or trying byaLaw not made at the time)prescribingthe points, 
 by which the EXECUTION of the State,is to be judged for not execut- 
 ing — And here it may be subject of enquiry, how far those syllogisms 
 enter,which include the application of CIRCUMSTANCES, and there- 
 by make minor PRINCIPLES, as in the former DEPARTMENT of 
 INSTITUTES— For instance, in judging on an Order, that is, on 
 not executing an Order to attack a place, or shut up an enemy's har- 
 bour, the Syllogism might stand : 
 
 Every man who does not do his utmost to execute the Order of the 
 State, is liable to penalties : 
 
 This man did not do his utmost to execute the Order of the State ; 
 
 Therefore he is liable to penalties . ; 
 
 Or in an Onier to conclude a peace as Commissioner, or Genera- 
 lissimo : 
 
 Every man who does not do his utmost to execute the Order of 
 the State, is liable to penalties : i *j mwu, - 
 
 This man being ordered to conclude a peace, and carrying on war. 
 did not do his utmost to execute the Order of the State ; 
 
 Therefore he is liable to penalties. 
 
 Or in internal affairs in an Order to suppress a riot : 
 
 Every man who does not do his utmost to execute the Order of the 
 State, is liable to penalties : 
 
 This man being ordered to suppress a riot, and not endeavour- 
 ing to do it, did not do his utmost to execute the order of the State ; 
 
172 WHAT IxVVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 Therefore he is liable to penalties. 
 
 And then come the penalties upon the new Law for judging for 
 not executing this Order, which is not ex post facto, it being under- 
 stood, or right reasonable to be understood, that these penalties, or 
 such like, ought always to be inflicted — Only the order for original 
 execution must be incorporated into the new Law, which prevents it 
 from being ex post facto, or judging by a Law, not made at the time, 
 which must never be, indeed the safest would be to transcribe 
 the old Law for MANDATORY execution into the new for judging, 
 and then see whether it was such as the first Order demanded — 
 This is what the JUDGMENT is to do— But in doing this, what a 
 variety of CIRCUMSTANCES, and QUALIFICATIONS of 
 CIRCUMSTANCES, and APPLICATIONS of Law, and CO- 
 LOURS of APPLICATION are to be made, in introducing the 
 minor PRINCIPLES ! It being to be observed further, that the 
 EXECUTION is not a single person, nor has the command 
 of single persons, so as to be like an Individual, but a collective 
 body, or may employ collective bodies, so that it may be thrown into 
 very different situations from Individuals, in all of which, it must 
 be considered independently — When we reflect on this, we see what 
 a latitude JUDGMENT has in this DEPARTMENT. 
 ^review The next DEPARTMENT is the REVIEW of POWERS, which is 
 Eiis° W " more extensive still— It is here that J UDGMENT developes its whole 
 force, it is here that it displays, and expands its whole magnitude — 
 This DEPARTMENT is entirely JUDICIAL— It is expressly to 
 REVIEW the POWERS, that is its object, and essence— It is that 
 force of the LAW of the State, which recalls the POWERS to their 
 duty, when they have deviated from it — It is by consequence, the 
 chief Law in the State, and by the same consequence, the chiefest 
 force of JUDGMENT, to judge that Law— And it is to be observed 
 

 WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. X73 
 
 further, that this REVIEW of POWERS, is not a REVIEW of a 
 single Judgment, or a single Execution, or of a whole mass of Judg- 
 ment, or a whole mass of Execution, of either properly and ex- ' 
 clusively, but of both jointly, and indifferently — And in REVIEW- 
 ING JUDGMENT, it. is for conniption or contumacy, and in 
 REVIEWING EXECUTION, for remissness, relaxation, treachery, 
 or dereliction. And in REVIEWING JUDGMENT, it is to be 
 observed, that every thing relating to JUDICIAL, or JUDGING 
 how a thing is, is to be considered, and in REVIEWING EXE- 
 CUTION, every thing that relates to MANDATORY, or ACCOM- 
 PLISHING what is ordered— And in this way, simple JUDGMENT, 
 having only one DEPARTMENT, viz. INSTITUTES, in which it 
 judges, or tries causes, and EXECUTION, three, INSTITUTES 
 (executing JUDICIAL decisions) MEASURES, and ALTER- 
 ATIONSof the CONSTITUTION, so the REVIEW has only one 
 DEPARTMENT to try JUDGMENT in, in trying EXECU- 
 TION, it has three — Further, it is equally a Criminal trial (loosely 
 speaking, for all is Civil in a large sense) whether a POWER be judg- 
 ed, or an Individual, the only difference, and that a great one, is, in 
 extent of circumstances, though not in the essence, of the POWER, 
 that it is a collective body, instead of an Individual. 
 
 Knowing: then these general lines of distinction, we know what to 
 do— We know what opinion to form, of the function of the REVIEW, 
 in trying either JUDGMENT or EXECUTION— It has to consider *«»*£* 
 the CIRCUMSTANCES, which JUDGMENT judged on, the more,MkN£ 
 or less, whether they were properly selected, andenhanced,also the AP- 
 PLICATION of the PRINCIPLES of the LAW, which JUDG- 
 MENT made, whether it was that which the subject demanded, and 
 ■whether it was properly heightened, or not — And here, whether we 
 apply a Principle to a Subject, or judge of the application of a Prin- 
 
174 
 
 WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 CHI MI. 
 WAL. 
 
 CIVIL. 
 
 ciple to a Subject, it is the same thing, because in both cases we 
 measure the Principle by the Subject— As for instance : 
 
 Whoever deliberately intends, murthers : 
 
 This man deliberately intended ; 
 
 Therefore he murthered. 
 
 But the process is longer, because we admit a third term — It is not 
 our own opinion, that we compare with the Subject, but the opinion 
 of another person, which must answer ours, and which indeed comes 
 to the same thing in the end, but the process, as we say, is longer — 
 This then is the business of REVIEW, in judging JUDGMENT,to 
 take in all the CIRCUMSTANCES, on which it judged, and APPLY 
 the old law to them, to see if it answers our ideas — And here what a 
 range is there, for besides that there are all the FACTS, and Variations 
 of FACTS, and APPLICATIONS ofLaw,and colours of APPLICA- 
 TION, that there were before, repeated over again, as in a mirror, there 
 is the situation in which the POWER judged, to be considered — And 
 the REVIEW is further bound above all, not to adhibit a novel choice 
 of Facts, nor novel views of Facts, nor novel Applications of Law, 
 nor novel Views of Application (new constructions, or new colours, 
 either of the Law, or Fact) but such as may have arisen, or be sup- 
 posed to have arisen, in the mind of any one — In INSTITUTES, in 
 attacks on Life, to see if the intention deliberate, or sudden, and 
 provoked or self-defensive, or of unsound mind (if it can be called in- 
 tention) be properly proved, if Facts be properly chosen, and colour- 
 ed, (their lawful degrees given them) and parts of law properly taken, 
 and applied — So in attacks on Property, so in attacks on Free-agency, 
 CRIMINAL, so correspondingly is Contestations concerning Property, 
 CIVIL,if Propinquity, Destination, or Acquisition be properly judged 
 on, as supporting Titles,being themselves supported by Legitimacy, Au. 
 thenticity,and Marks of Acquirement— This upon INSTITUTES,for 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 175 
 
 INSTITUTES only come into simple JUDGMENT, or in the 
 first instance, the other DEPARTMENTS being either double, as 
 this REVIEW, or appropriated to EXECUTION, like MEA- 
 SURES and ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION— So far for 
 REVIEWof JUDGMENT— No was to that of EXECUTION— And Judging 
 
 F X. EC U- 
 
 here it may be said, that it is of a very different, or rather what may tion 
 be called a corresponding, or analogous nature, in its own kind — And tory. A " 
 if JUDGMENT be tried for contumacy, or corruption, so is EXE- 
 CUTION, for contumacy, remissness, treachery or dereliction — And 
 if JUDGMENT simple be tried in INSTITUTES, so is EXE- 
 CUTION, simple, in INSTITUTES, MEASURES, and ALTE- 
 RATIONS of the CONSTITUTION-In INSTITUTES, as exe- 
 cuting JUDICIAL decisions,in MEASURES,executing the Orders of 
 the State, or Law of (as indeed in all) in ALTERATIONS of the 
 CONSTITUTION, the same— In all therefore, MANDATORI- 
 LY, or doing what it is ordered to accomplish, JUDICIALLY, or 
 of JUDGMENT,being to examine, or see,or judge how a thing stands 
 —And being this MANDATORY EXECUTION, it takes a colour 
 from it,and so does its REVIEW— In JUDICIAL decisions (executing 
 in INSTITUTES,) it is so peremptory,that it admits not of almost any 
 qualification, or variation — But in MEASURES, it is a very different 
 thing — There, are to be considered all the crisis', conjunctures,emergen- 
 cies, situations, facilities, obstacles,difficulties, dangers, necessities, into 
 which it may be thrown, and which necessarily call for a certain exertion 
 of prudence, and moral agency, all in their own way, and all to be 
 qualified in a certain degree, by CIRCUMSTANCES— Add to this 
 that it is a collective force, and operating through the medium of collec- 
 tive forces, all which make additional shades, in the degree of energy 
 to be expected from intermediate agency — The same in a great de- 
 gree of ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION as to facilities, 
 
176 ' WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 obstacles, difficulties, situations, and forces, how far accomplishable, 
 indeed much more so, but this is almost in the clouds — All we can 
 say, of this part of REVIEW, is, that these are the PRINCIPLES, 
 or hints at PRINCIPLES, for discerning it— And of all parts of 
 REVIEW,that the same PACTS, and selection of FACTS, both JU- 
 DICIAL, and MANDATORY, and APPLICATIONS of law, and 
 colours of APPLICATION, return over again, always on the old law, 
 repeated in the new, as in a mirror ,with the same syllogisms for their ope- 
 ration — And it may be further added, that these same PRINCIPLES 
 will apply to a REVIEW of REVIEW, if the REVIEWING POW- 
 ERS themselves should fail, as noticed before, and so on, in infinitum. 
 alter. The next is ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION. JUDG- 
 thJcoN S -° f MENT, as we said, has no force in the first instance, in this DE- 
 STiru. * PARTMENT— It belongs entirely to the EXECUTION of the State 
 — But it has afterwards, in the second, or REVIEW — It there comes 
 in, as in MEASURES, it is to judge by similar facilities, difficul- 
 ties, obstacles, emergencies, crisis', conjunctures, and situations, as 
 enumerated above (indeed more) therefore unnecessary to mention 
 here. 
 This the This is the extent of JUDGMENT in REVIEW of POW- 
 
 judg/ ERS, this the sweep of its force in INSTITUTES, MEASURES, 
 ment, &c. this RE viEW, and ALTERATIONS of the Constitution— It may be 
 seen what a latitude it embraces, in going through these DEPART. 
 MENTS, in all the different FACTS, and colours of FACTS, both 
 JUDICIAL and MANDATORY, that occur, with all the various 
 APPLICATIONS, and colours of APPLICATION of Law that may 
 be attached, and this more, or less, according to the capacity of the 
 DEPARTMENT!!! 
 JUDG - And if JUDGMENT go through theseDEPARTMENTS,as above, 
 
 MENT in- 8 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. ^7 
 
 it must be obvious, that it involves the EXECUTION of the State, 
 through all of them,inits own branch,the JUDICIAL. — But some of the 
 DEPARTMENTS, it will be said, are JUDICIAL, and some of 
 them MANDATORY, how then can it have any thing to do in the 
 MANDATORY, where it has avowedly no intervention. This is very 
 true, and neither has it in the first instance — But there are two in- 
 stances of the DEPARTMENTS, one the simple, where it has its 
 own nature, and another, where the JUDICIAL comes in upon it, pr 
 rather creates a new DEPARTMENT, trying it in its own branch, as 
 an INSTITUTE, for such must all REVIEWS be, whether of IN- 
 STITUTES, MEASURES, REVIEW of POWERS, or ALTER- 
 ATIONS of the CONSTITUTION. They are all of the nature of 
 CRIMINAL INSTITUTES,therefore all JUDICIAL,for if it be for a 
 wrong Judgment in INSTITUTES, there is an implied prohibition to 
 wrong judge, with the punishment following afterwards, and so corre- 
 spondingly through the other DEPARTMENTS-JUDGMENT then 
 involves JUDICIAL EXECUTION through the whole DEPART- 
 MENTS — The application of the punishment, where it is a CRIMI- General not 
 
 ^-r.-r- • it- 1 • 1 •• ^(ttttt particular. 
 
 NAL question, the application 01 the possession, where it is a CIVIL. 
 But it must be observed again, that it is only the general EXECU- 
 TION— The particular or detail, is the POWER. 
 
 This then is the sweep of JUDGMENT, or the JUDICIAL— if judg. 
 But if JUDGMENT have its Latitudes, it has its Limits too— It is SJ e ^ ave 
 bounded by LAW, or the LEGISLATIVE, inasmuch as that LAW, h « s «** ii 
 
 mits too. 
 
 or LEGISLATIVE has the PRINCIPLE, and JUDGMENT, 
 only the application of the PRINCIPLE to Facts, or CIRCUM- 
 STANCES — But here it may be said, that this very thing implies a 
 great power, and greater even that of LAW in this respect, inas- 
 much as that almost all the disputes among men, are concerning 
 the application of PRINCIPLES, every one agreeing that it is FIT 
 to do RIGHT,and NOT FIT to do WRONG,but the question always 
 returning, what is RIGHT or WRONG? And so it would imply a great 
 
 A a 
 
178 
 
 WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 LAW ap- 
 plies FIRST 
 PRINCI- 
 PLES in IN- 
 STITUTES 
 —CRIMI- 
 NAL. 
 
 CIVIL. 
 
 In MEA- 
 SURES. 
 
 power,and greater even than that of LA Win this point,ifLAWmerely did 
 this— If LAW only fixed the GREAT PRINCIPLES,and left JUDG- 
 MENT to apply them — But LAW does not do this— It descends into 
 theMinor application — It takes them into its own hands, to acertain de~ 
 gree,so far tying up JUDGMENT — As for instance in the caseofMur- 
 ther,it does not legislate aga ins tWrong generally, and then leave JUDG- 
 MENT to determine what that Wrong is — No, it goes into the subject, 
 and says, that Murther is Wrong — Nay, it interferes a second time, and 
 says that Murther is Deliberate intention — And so in the other cases of 
 Culpable Homicide, Self-Defence, Unsound mind, &c, always telling 
 the GREAT PRINCIPLE, and applying it, sometimes two or three 
 changes down— And if LAW, or LEGISLATIVE do this, then 
 there must be a very small latitude, comparatively speaking, left to 
 JUDGMENT, merely that of determining whether the PRINCI- 
 PLE, so narrowed apply to the CIRCUMSTANCES, whether there- 
 be this Deliberate intention in Murther, this Sudden and provoked in 
 Culpable homicide, &c. &c. &c. — Always seeing whether the Princi- 
 ple so narrowed apply, and whether the Crime defined by LAW, 
 exist in the CRIMINAL. 
 
 And so parallelly in the CIVIL, going through all the cases of 
 Property — Seeing if the Title defined by Law exist, how far it is 
 to be gathered out of the CIRCUMSTANCES. Whether this man 
 be the next of Kin, whether he have got the estate Destined to 
 him, whether he have Acquired himself, Propinquity, Destination, 
 and Acquisition, being the whole Titles to among men, Property 
 —And this Title is to be collected from the CIRCUMSTANCES, 
 as in the other case, or CRIMINAL, the intention— The one 
 as we said, being the essence of the Right, as the other is, of the 
 Crime. 
 
 MEASURES are the next thing, and the same observations ap- 
 ply parallely here, LAW has the IDEA, or PRINCIPLE_It names 
 the Order for the MEASURE in the first instance, and then the 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. ^ 
 
 Rule for trying for it, in the second — It does not leave the interpre- 
 tation of RIGHT, or WRONG to the most rigid or lax, of what shall 
 be or not be a pardonable disobedience of the Laws, but the Law itself 
 is the Regulator — That goes down into the distinctions, that descends 
 into all the necessary specifications. 
 
 So in REVIEW of POWERS parallelly, in trying either JUDG- rnRE . 
 MENT, or EXECUTION-LAW or LEGISLATIVE lays downj^w^ 
 the rules for trying JUDGMENT, LAW or LEGISLATIVE lays 
 down the rules for trying EXECUTION— These are the JUDI- 
 CIAL, or MANDATORY, Laws— The JUDICIAL either CRIMI- 
 NAL, or CIVIL in REVIEWING JUDGMENT, the MANDA- 
 TORY, either expressed or implied, in trying EXECUTION— But 
 in no case does it leave to the discretion of the REVIEW, to de- 
 termine what shall be proper, or improper conduct in the POWERS — 
 The consideration of that, it takes into its own hands, and its de- 
 cisions are to be known by the Laws above mentioned. 
 
 So in ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION— As this is in alter. 
 only a Measure of another kind, the same ideas apply here as in the con-° 
 MEASURES-The same latitude for JUDGMENT by the CIR- *g™- 
 CUMSTANCES, the same limits by restricting the PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Such are the restrictions upon JUDGMENT from the LEGIS- The re- 
 LATIVE, and such the manner in which it ties it up, always ap- ^"judg?" 
 plying PRINCIPLES, always vindicating to itself, in the higher de- MENT - 
 grees, and so leaving nothing to JUDGMENT, but CIRCUM- 
 STANCES, which are in truth, its proper Province, 
 
 But we ought to be cautious in limiting JUDGMENT, on the Qualification 
 
 upon Limi- 
 
 Application, lest we should limit it too far — It is very true, that LAW, tation. 
 narrowing and applying these PRINCIPLES, is very different from 
 leaving them in their full latitude to JUDGMENT, but it is equally 
 true, that even in these Applications, so narrowed, there is a variety, as 
 different from any idea of implicitness, or implication— A discretion as 
 
 Aa2 
 
180 WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL. 
 
 distant from peremptory dictation — What do we say in all these, of 
 the different FACTS, that may occur, and the different constructions 
 that may be put upon them? Of the various manner of chusing, and 
 when chosen, of extending Law towards them ? Of receiving 
 in all tfreir shades, and of embracing through Law, with all the 
 versatilityof Application ? Of representing in CRIMINAL, the Crime 
 with greater force, in Civil, the Claims with more solidity ? In 
 both cases, selecting such FACTS, as it pleases, and turning into 
 what tendency, with all the powers of argument ? In the MAN- 
 DATORY, picking out what it likes, for trying EXECUTION, in 
 the JUDICIAL, what it chuses, for arraigning JUDGMENT ? 
 And this, through the whole DEPARTMENTS, JUDICIAL 
 in INSTITUTES, MANDATORY in MEASURES, both in 
 REVIEW of POWERS, and the last PRINCIPLES of GOVERN- 
 MENT, in ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION. 
 Great range. But the great range of JUDGMENT possibly, and politically to 
 be supposed, is in the REVIEW of REVIEW of the POWERS, 
 in infinitum — It was, as we saw, the principal force of LAW, (see last 
 Chapter) to reciprocate, and reverberate these POWERS upon one 
 another — It must then be the principal corresponding force of 
 JUDGMENT, to judge that Law — To judge in all its tendencies, 
 corresponding in these multiplications. 
 Whatever ^ ut one thing is clear, that whatever Crimes are agitated in the 
 crimi- State, whatever Controversies concerning Property, whatever Abuses, 
 CIVIL, or or Neglects of Duty, whatever high Flagrancies, or Misdemeanors, 
 
 POT TTT «•• 
 
 CAL)Sub ] ect whatever Malversations, Delinquencies, Misbehaviours, Disorders, 
 of * or Derangements, of any kind, whether PUBLIC, or PRIVATE, 
 
 CIVIL or POLITICAL, COMMON, or INDIVIDUAL, must all 
 come under the Cognizance of JUDGMENT,therefore with the scope 
 of mind,or intellect to be exercised, its Latitude must be most extensive 
 —What FACTS, and CIRCUMSTANCES, in INSTITUTES! 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY JUDICIAL, 181 
 
 What CASUALTIES, and CRISIS' in MEASURES ! What 
 SITUATIONS, and COLOURS of SITUATION in REVIEW of 
 POWERS! What PRINCIPLES of GOVERNMENT, and HIGH 
 INTERESTS, in ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITUTION ! 
 
 From this view of the subject, steering equally through every pro-' 
 vince, it may be seen what a force JUDGMENT possesses — No 
 Bounds but what LAW r sets, no Limits, but what the superior 
 range of LEGISLATION puts to it ! 
 
 And it may be seen from this,that it commands the Collective Guilt of Commands 
 
 . . . Cruilt, and 
 
 the State, that it holds in its hands also, the Appropriation of its Stock, Property of 
 and Substance — No Crime can arise,that it does not judge, no Property a e * 
 can spring up, that it does not distribute. 
 This then is the sweep of its force, in INSTITUTES, MEASURES, This judg- 
 
 METVT 
 
 REVIEW of POWERS, and ALTERATIONS of the CONSTI- 
 TUTION — either Present, as it may be termed, or Reflective — Either 
 tendering its decision direct, where the nature of things requires, or 
 ultimate, as the POWERS call, above presented. 
 
 It must be preserved from this, what the POWER is, its La- 
 titude, its Essence, and] its Boundaries — It is the Guardian of the 
 State, under another, and most Superior, the LEGISLATIVE, 
 brooding over and protecting, the Laws of it — In the peaceable 
 and passive scenes of GOVERNMENT, constantly, and neces- 
 sarily operating, in the warlike, and alert, always capable of being 
 called into vigour, and effect, if Present, considerable, if Future more 
 so, and the more, the more so ! 
 
182 
 
 WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 
 
 CHAP. LIV. 
 
 WHAT IS INVOLVED BY THE EXECUTIVE. 
 
 POLITI- 
 CAL 
 FORCE of 
 
 State. 
 
 Makes 
 LAW take 
 place. 
 
 Manifest. 
 
 Yet not 
 marking 
 CIVIL 
 BIGHTS 
 
 always, 
 
 AND here it is to be observed, that CIVIL rights appear in a new 
 shape—It is no longer in the PRINCIPLES of LEGISLATION— 
 It is no longer in the APPLICATIONS of JUDGMENT-It is in 
 the MASS of PUBLIC FORCE collected to actfor,and preserve them. 
 
 And if CIVIL rights appear here in a new shape, so do they 
 also, in the operations, that that shape exhibits — EXECUTION is 
 not like LAW, in any particular— It is not like JUDGMENT— It 
 does not, like the former, Contrive in profound speculation, what is 
 most expedient for the State* — It does not, like the latter, Apply these 
 Speculations — But it Gives, what has been already Designed, or Applied, 
 its body, and effect, it makes it take place in reality, and action. 
 
 Neither does it proceed in the same manner — If the things that it 
 does, are different, so is its mode of doing them — It does not like the 
 LEGISLATIVE, advance with a silent, but all powerful step, seen 
 only by its effects, known only by its consequences — Neither does it 
 wind through the State, like the JUDICIAL, certainly with potent, 
 yet insensible, and imperceptible, sinuations — But it appears open, 
 manifest, and bold— Decided, manful, and manly — Avowed and de- 
 clared to all, and where it is not avowed, and declared to all, it is not 
 EXECUTION. 
 
 But most curious it is, that being the MASS of FORCE erected for 
 the Preservation of CIVIL rights, it is in many cases, a less obvious,and 
 
 * TO EYMSEPON Tfl nOAEI. 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 183 
 
 prominent, manifestation of them — All are aware, that a Citizen is pro- 
 tected, when a Law is made against Murther, or a Criminal tried for it 
 — All also see that similar protection is afforded,when aProvision is enact- 
 ed for regulating Property, or a Sentence pronounced in a CIVIL 
 suit. But who contemplates when an Army marches, that it is for 
 the protection of CIVIL rights ? And yet as was well observed by 
 Hume, noticed before, Armies, Forces, and Fleets, Treaties, Al- 
 liances, and Ambassadors, Legislatures, and all the vast APPARA- 
 TUS of GOVERNMENT, are only to support the TWELVE 
 JUDGES ! 
 
 And this is in truth,the great ENDof all— Itis only to protect LIFE, Ail for CL 
 PROPERTY, and FREE-AGENCY, that GOVERNMENT was VIL rights * 
 ever instituted—It is for THOSE OBJECTS, which but for the 
 CRIMES of his FELLOWS, Man might have enjoyed in a Pas- 
 toral state— The Splendour of a Crown ends only in the Attainments 
 of Peace, the Din of Arms, in the Tranquillity of the Cottage. 
 
 Such then being the case, that all is for the Protection of CIVIL How EXE - 
 
 CTTTrVF 
 
 RIGHTS — That these,as we saw, are the a and n of Government, (see protects 
 Chap.X.) let us enquire how the EXECUTIVE does preserve them ? thera ? 
 What mite it contributes to the common stock of Protection, what 
 share it takes, in the General System for preserving them ? 
 
 And here the mode will be, as with the other POWERS, to go g through 
 through the DEPARTMENTS— To follow in its Latitudes,its Limits, J^£{?; 
 its Qualifications on those Limits, and its Range through them — As to MENTS - 
 LAW, that had no Limits— It itself determined the Limits of GO- 
 VERNMENT— It was GOVERNMENT— But JUDGMENT we 
 can investigate better— That had its limits, &c. &c. — Let us then fol- 
 low it. 
 
 Taking up then EXECUTION, in INSTITUTES, the first DE- in insti- 
 PARTMENT, what do we find ? How does it appear there ? We 
 find it executing JUDICIAL decisions— Executing the Sentences of 
 
184 WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 
 
 JUDGMENT, either CRIMINAL or CIVIL— Here then the Exe- 
 cution being so well defined, it has little Latitude— But it has one 
 —It may execute the Sentences in both Kinds with greater, or less 
 rigour. 
 
 SURE^" Eut [t is in MEASURES > that ^ displays its great force— These 
 are its peculiar reign, these are its proper Province— MEASURES 
 are to it, exactly what INSTITUTES, and REVIEW were to 
 JUDGMENT— As they were JUDICIAL, these are MANDA- 
 TORY— And as JUDGMENT could never come into the latter, 
 till EXECUTION had preceded, so EXECUTION can never 
 enter the former, till after JUDGMENT, 
 
 And MEASURES being a PRINCIPAL DEPARTMENT to 
 EXECUTION, the question is, how it takes them, how it acts in 
 them ? And here, it will be natural to examine, what is necessary 
 to maintain a State ? To preserve it ? To preserve this System, which 
 is itself to preserve CIVIL rights — The first thing will be, to guard it 
 
 External. againstForeign Enemies — And here it is to be observed, that all Nations, 
 when constituted within their own Limits, are in the nature of IN- 
 DIVIDUALS in private Society — They must not be attacked — And 
 it is, along with other things, to enable them to resist such attacks, 
 that is erected, a PUBLIC FORCE— Now EXECUTION is to 
 manage it, and how?— When LAW, or LEGISLATIVE decrees what 
 the defence is to be, for all proceeds from it, (see Ch. XLIX.) EXE- 
 CUTION is to execute it— When LAW decrees a Naval, or Military 
 Enterprize, or Naval, or Military MEASURES, according to the si- 
 tuation of the Country, EXECUTION, or the EXECUTIVE, is to 
 direct them — And here, what a Mass of Action there is in Armies, 
 ■ Forces, Fleets, and Latitude of course in managing them ! It will of- 
 ten happen that the very Salvation of the State is in the hands 
 of the EXECUTIVE— Do we remember Themistocles at the battle 
 of Salamis which saved Greece ? Camillus at Rome,when he rescued it 
 
 > nife— 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 
 
 185 
 
 from the Gauls, with many other instances ? Is this then no latitude ? 
 Is this no discretion ? Not to talk of those minor circumstances, and 
 emergencies, which though inferior,may be the ruin of whole Fleets, and 
 Armies ? Countries, friendly, or hostile, as Xenophon experienced on 
 his return from the expedition of Cyrus,* barren desarts to pass, moun- 
 tains to overcome, landing of troops, tides, winds, seasons , with a 
 long &c. of casualties — Do these involve no prudence ? Do these 
 require no discretion ? Do these imply no latitude ? These then, are 
 
 the External of MEASURES, for EXECUTION But are there 
 
 not also Internal ? We know if a State be attacked by Foreign enemies, Internal, 
 it may also by Domestic — And is it not the prime object of the 
 EXECUTIVE, its very essence, to put down these? What is it 
 good for but to support its Parent? Here then again, it must march 
 its troops, and protect CIVIL rights in their own shape — Here again, 
 the salvation of the Empire, is every moment in its hands — The 
 fate of the Widow, the Infant, or the Orphan, against some san- 
 guinary and remorseless Tyrant, who perhaps would glut his ven- 
 geance in the bowels of his own country ! And is this no small 
 commission ? Is this no office of moment? It is a latitude most 
 immense, involving in its circle, the tears, lamentations, and wishes 
 of the distressed ! — The fears, fortunes, and hopes of the Country ! 
 
 But this is only Treason — This is only internal Rebellion — Are there 
 not internalSeditions also? Immediately classing under theformer,which 
 though not so imminently mischievous, are nevertheless productive of 
 much tumult to the country-It is the business oftheEXECUTIONthen, 
 to suppress these — And as in the other case, the most frantic madness, 
 right often stood upon the limits of the most consummate prudence, 
 from varying conjunctures, so here, the most delicate forbearance, 
 may deviate often into the greatest eventual cruelty — And what rules 
 
 * See ANABASIS. 
 Bb 
 
186 WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 
 
 will regulate this ? Would you have instructions ? As well might 
 you file the most capriciously winding cavern with a rod of iron, as 
 well might you regulate a vessel across the Atlantic, with specific 
 Navigations — These Navigations, these Instructions must be the dis- 
 cretion of your Admirals, and Commanders ! 
 
 But who can seize the features of a POWER, which is Action 
 itself, which is variation in Mobility, and motion ? — Not to men- 
 tion inferior things— Not to name Taxes, Police, and a thousand 
 subordinate considerations with the same Mobility in miniature, 
 these very variations in minor exemplification ! 
 REVlEWof The next DEPARTMENT is REVIEW— It is here, as we saw, that 
 powers, the POWERS are tried for swerving from their duty, and it is here, 
 that EXECUTION must execute the behests of JUDGMENT— 
 This is a very different object — A widely varying task from punish- 
 ing Individuals—It is here the whole force of a POWER, that is to 
 be subdued, for EXECUTION, never has to act but upon a 
 POWER, it is always a POWER to be judged that has transgress- 
 ed, always a POWER, that is to be punished. 
 
 And it is this feature of REVIEW, that distinguishes it, and in 
 truth, makes a larger species of INSTITUTES— The same process 
 is undergone, the same variations occur, with this difference only, that 
 it is a POWER judged,instead of an Individual— Accusation, evidence, 
 defence, sentence— And EXECUTION, to execute that sentence ! 
 Now what a high and Imperial Office! Do we not recollect what 
 forces each POWER has to protect it ? We must do this before 
 we can appretiate the EXECUTION— Take then the JUDICIAL, 
 that is the first to be tried— What does that do? It may be 
 JUDICIAL, either Foreign, or Domestic — In the former, it may 
 be a whole Continent that must be subjugated, a Governor with 
 all its forces to support him — In the latter, a beloved Judge, with 
 all the strength of Provincial attachment to defend him — What are 
 you to do here ? How are you to bring them to justice ? — By the 
 
 ■ 
 
-{ 
 
 WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 137 
 
 EXECUTIVE — Exactly like an Individual, who is become amen- 
 able to the Laws — But it requires much more coercion, much more, 
 how infinitely more, effort, and exertion ! — Then again, as to the EXE- 
 CUTION, how do you manage that ? That also may be External, 
 or Internal — External, as before observed, it may bavethe whole 
 force of an Empire to protect it — Witness the calling the Satraps of 
 Persia to account, which was always a Rebellion — So also the 
 Bashaws of Turkey, in modern times, for such are the features of 
 bringing External EXECUTIVES to justice ? Then again as to In- 
 ternal — What do we say of that ? Who shall try the Internal EXE- 
 CUTION of a State ? It may be done if a petty Officer have trans- 
 gressed, but how to effect it when it is the EXECUTIVE of a whole 
 country? — A singular instance occurred of this in England, in the 
 year 1688, when James II. abdicated the throne. He was the 
 POWER judged, the Convention Parliament, the POWER that 
 judged, and William III. the POWER that executed. 
 
 Such are the features of EXECUTION in REVIEW of POW- alter. 
 ERS, we now come to ALTERATIONS of the CONSTITU-^con.^ 
 TION— And here, if the last Principles of Government came in-x^oN^" 
 to question for JUDGMENT, so do the last resources of it, into 
 contest for EXECUTION — How are you to execute these? Petty 
 details of Government may be easily changed, but how are you to re- 
 verse whole CONSTITUTIONS? For it may happen that the 
 LEGISLATURE of a Country may have decreed this, and if it should 
 so, who shall dare to gainsay it ? The LEGISLATIVE of every country 
 is its Omnipotence, or represents it — But it may be, that there may be 
 refractory mem bers of the Empire— If then, the EXECUTION have 
 to subdue these, it has to put down another Rebellion— And what a 
 latitude is here? For besides that, the same Crisis', emergencies, 
 situations, &c. occur over again, as in MEASURES, for ALTERA- 
 TIONS are only MEASURES of a superior kind, there are these 
 
 Bb2 
 
188 WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 
 
 Crisis' multiplied with tenfold, nay, a hundred fold more precarious- 
 ness, and importance— When we consider these things resisting 
 Nations, confounded rights, contradicted patriotism, its latitude 
 almost loses itself in the clouds, its magnitude disappears in an infi- 
 nity of discretion 1 
 matures But if EXECUTION, like JUDGMENT, have its latitudes, it 
 has its limits ha§ itslimits too-LAW, or LEGISLATIVE, that great force lies 
 behind it, always ready to come forth, and draw back to its duty — 
 Constantly regulating and directing, but above all, by RESPON- 
 SIBILITY, controuling — It is this feature, that characterizes LEGI- 
 TIMATE GOVERNMENT, and distinguishes from what is Arbi- 
 trary, and Despotic — There is nothing that a Tyrant hates so much, as 
 the very name of being ACCOUNTABLE,* be he KING, NOBI- 
 LITY,or PEOPLE— That then the Public force of the State must be, 
 else it is a ConstitutionalAnomala— And it is thisRESPONSIBILITY, 
 that lies upon EXECUTION,and renders what would otherwise be in- 
 comprehensible, a malleable, and sociable POWER in the State — Al- 
 ways lying with its relation to the LEGISLATIVE, whether near,or at 
 a distance, it is governed,as we may call it, by the Polarity of LEGITI- 
 MATE GOVERNMENT. TheMagnet we see,whatever its vacillations, 
 whatever its apparent aberrations from its point, is always regulated by 
 its internal propensities, — So the EXECUTIVE, Whatever the 
 grandeur of its force, whatever the extent of its discretion, that discre- 
 tion is ever subject to the eternal, humanly talking, rules of LEGIS- 
 LATIVE REGULATION- What we said of LAW in anotherplace, 
 applies here, in a different exemplification — As the fixture of it, was 
 let loose by the discretions of REASON,t so is the looseness of 
 this fixed, by the Restrictions of LEGISLATIVE PRESCRIP- 
 iniNSTl. TION— If it be INSTITUTES, LAW dictates the Punishment, 
 
 TUTES. 
 
 
 * YnEYGYNOS. See Demost. TJifn 1n<p. 
 t See Chap. XII. 
 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 189 
 
 names the Possession— If it be MEASURES, it tells it to what cli — MEA. 
 
 CTJ DM 
 
 mates it is to go, what forces it is to vanquish — If it be REVIEW of L_ re. 
 POWERS, it declares what Retribution it demands, what Penalty pQ^.j£ s 
 it is to inflict— If it be ALTERATIONS of the CO NSTITU- - alter 
 
 m T ^x i • • i • i ^ • • • ATIONS of 
 
 TION, what seas it is to sail in, what Oceans it is to navigate. theCON- 
 
 But still in all these, there is a Qualification in its Limits, in all^iON." 
 
 the Wheels of Government, there are Springs and Counterchecks, and Quaiifica- 
 
 iii-ii • tions on JLlU 
 
 occasional relaxations to enable them to yield to circumstances, and mitation. 
 
 play their part in Government — Human vicissitudes could never be 
 
 encountered, if they did not meet a corresponding pliability to fall in 
 
 with them — The obligation would break — And these Qualifications 
 
 are formed by all the Crisis, Emergencies, Situations of a Novel 
 
 nature, which imperiously demand an appropriate discretion — These 
 
 form the Qualifications on LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTION— These 
 
 make the play in the Machine of Government. 
 
 But the great Range, that the EXECUTIVE takes, is in those Fo- Great 
 reign climes, those distant scenes of action, where it imitates with oc- ange# 
 casion, the different POWERS, and might easily be mistaken for every 
 one of them— Where it is neither LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, nor 
 EXECUTIVE, and yet all of them — Not one in any degree,andyet pos- 
 sibly, and at once, the whole of them— And if it be not so, the Country 
 is ruined — If a Generalissimo be at the head of an Army, must not he 
 makeTreaties, Alliances, Forces? Must not he commit the Parent Nation 
 at every moment ? Whoever saw a Roman Proconsul judging in 
 his Province, that might not have mistaken for the whole JUDI- 
 CIAL of the Empire? Entire Continents at his award, integral 
 Worlds at his disposal ? Or if they had beheld their Commissioners 
 elevating, and putting down Sovereigns, might not they have well 
 esteemed the EXECUTIVE of the same Country ? 
 
 Indeed in this way the EXECUTIVE is so great a POWER that P om P arabIe 
 
 ... . , . _ _ ° ' * n some mea- 
 
 it might even almost compare with the LEGISLATIVE itself— Al- sure witl » 
 
WHAT INVOLVED BY EXECUTIVE. 
 190 
 
 wavs massed, always throwninto the most prominent light.it is the State, 
 ft«SS 3K55 vigour, and nerve, the absolute rebound, and jet of the 
 
 Wt HLE. E ma e t ! then shall we say of this ™^>*™™\?l\lvlZ 
 g*la. the charac ter of it? Itisthe ACTION, the POWER, the VIVIDA 
 33&SL ^st^TsL.-Alw^ ready to eome forth at the Nod of the 
 £tt& LEGISLATIVE, it represents the State, it is the ^£*«£ 
 \Fent of GOVERNMENT Till it so acts, GOVERNMEN1 is 
 
 never felt-It is an airy INSTITUTE-To cone ude alLtt ,s GO-. 
 
 VERNMENT-It is visible GOVERNMENT-As LAW, or LE- 
 
 rn„,nr, a «r>TTT TTTDGMENT the EYE, so this is 
 GISLATIVE was the SOUL, J U domain ^ «i , ' 
 
 the BODY-Without the Promethean fire of the LEG1S1.A11V &, a 
 lifeless mass, without the JUDICIAL a Polyphemus in act.on, brf 
 animated by the one, and inspired by the other, all that we can 
 wishin the scope of CONSTITUTIONS, all that we can des.re, or 
 desiderate in GOVERNMENT ! ! ! 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 W. Jlint, Printer, Old Bailey, London. 
 
 
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