GIFT OF 
 SEELEY W. MUDD 
 
 and 
 
 GEORGE I. COCHRAN MEYER ELSASSER 
 DR. JOHN R. HAYNES WILLIAM L. HONNOLD 
 JAMES R. MARTIN MRS. JOSEPH F. SARTORI 
 
 to the 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 SOUTHERN BRANCH 
 
 JOHN FISKE
 
 t/
 
 PERSONALITY
 
 <ravrov
 
 PERSONALITY 
 
 AND A 
 
 BY 
 
 ALFKED WILLIAMS MOMEEIE 
 
 M.A., D.SC., LL.D. 
 
 LATE FELLOW OK ST JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE ', 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS 
 
 IN KINO'S COLLEGE, LONDON 
 
 FOURTH EDITION, REVISED 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AITD , 
 EDINBUKGH AND LONDON 
 MDCCCLXXXIX 
 
 90937 
 
 All Rights reserved
 
 -331 
 
 PEEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 THE substance of the following pages was originally 
 written as a thesis for my doctor's degree. It was 
 the embodiment of thoughts which were uppermost 
 CD in uiy mind, after some years of almost exclusive 
 C5i devotion to philosophical reading. Notwithstand- 
 ing the favourable reception accorded to the first 
 j^ edition, I delayed the publication of a second, 
 H hoping that I might be able, as a friendly reviewer 
 had suggested, to strengthen my position by en- 
 largement. Various engagements have, however, 
 kept me from securing enough time for this pur- 
 pose; and as I find the book is being constantly 
 called for, I thought it better that it should come 
 out again in the same slight form, rather than
 
 VI PREFACE. 
 
 be any longer delayed. I have revised it with 
 considerable care, and have re-written entirely a 
 good many paragraphs. It was suggested by an 
 appreciative critic that matters would be much 
 simplified for the popular reader, if I divided the 
 essay into sections; and this I have accordingly 
 done. 
 
 One or two of my reviewers found fault with me 
 for not having unriddled all the mysteries of life, 
 at least they said that I should have shown, 
 not only that an ego did exist, but how it came 
 into existence, and in what relation it stood to- 
 wards the Absolute. Now, in a metaphysical 
 system which is offered as a complete explanation 
 of the universe, we perhaps have a right to de- 
 mand that these two great difficulties should be 
 solved. No metaphysician, however, not even 
 Hegel, has yet succeeded in solving them. And 
 as for myself, I never professed I never had the 
 slightest intention in the present essay of pro- 
 ducing a system of metaphysics. I know, of 
 course, that the time which reviewers have at 
 their disposal is limited; but if, in the present 
 instance, they could have managed to read as far
 
 PKEFACE. Vll 
 
 as to the end of the title, they would have seen 
 that my aim was simply to point out how Positiv- 
 ists assumed and could not but assume the 
 existence of a certain metaphysical reality, in 
 which however they supposed themselves to dis- 
 believe. 
 
 I have seen no attempt to refute my main con- 
 tention, which is that the Positivists really assume 
 what they professedly deny ; otherwise I should of 
 course have felt bound either to modify my own 
 arguments, or else to answer those of my opponents. 
 Englishmen generally are said to be endowed with 
 the gift of never knowing when they are beaten. 
 But English Positivists seem to have a yet more 
 remarkable talent that of never knowing when 
 they are attacked. My little essay was published 
 anonymously, and for that reason, as well as for 
 its intrinsic demerits, might have appeared to be 
 unworthy of an answer. But the late Professor 
 Green's ' Introduction to Hume,' and Principal 
 Caird's ' Philosophy of Religion,' have met with 
 the same unsatisfactory fate. The Positivists, ex- 
 cept on the supposition that their theories are mere 
 moonshine, should have something to say. Why do
 
 Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 they not say it ? Unless they soon set about de- 
 fending themselves, we shall begin to think that 
 they agree with us, not only in their metaphysi- 
 cal assumptions, but also in the estimate which 
 they have formed as to the value of their own 
 philosophy. 
 
 A. W. M. 
 
 KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION, 1 
 
 SECT. I. THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO, . . 24 
 
 ii II. THE SELF-KXOWLEDGE OF THE EGO, . 47 
 
 ii III. THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO, ... 63 
 
 ii IV. THE INFINITE EGO, .... 102 
 
 CONCLUSION, ....... 132
 
 PEBSONALITY. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 "WE have taken up the fact of this universe," 
 says Thomas Carlyle, "as it is not. We have 
 quietly closed our eyes to the eternal substance of 
 things, and opened them only to the shows and 
 shams of things. We believe this universe to be 
 intrinsically a great, unintelligible Perhaps. Extrin- 
 sically, clear enough, it is a great, most extensive 
 cattle-fold, with most extensive kitchen-ranges and 
 dining-tables, whereat he is wise who can find a 
 place. All truth of this universe is uncertain; 
 only the profit and loss of it the pudding and 
 praise of it are and remain very visible to the 
 practical man. There is no longer any God for 
 us. God's laws are become a greatest happi- 
 ness principle, a parliamentary expediency. The 
 A
 
 2 PEKSONALITY. 
 
 heavens overarch us only as an astronomical time- 
 keeper, a butt for Herschel's telescopes to shoot 
 science at. Man has lost the s*oul out of him, 
 and now after the due period begins to find the 
 want of it." 
 
 There is much truth in this, except, perhaps, 
 that the last seven words are rather premature. 
 Many of the leaders of thought believe and teach 
 that God and the soul are no more. Professor Bain 
 tells us that " the ego is a pure fiction, coined from 
 nonentity : " and Mr John Morley was so anxious 
 to show the absurdity of believing in, or even hop- 
 ing for, a God, that he used to write the word with 
 a small " g." The universe has been resolved into 
 a set of phenomena, whose sequences exhibit only 
 such meaningless regularity as may be observed 
 in the drawing of balls out of a ballot-box; and 
 the skilful analysts, by way of coup de grdce, have 
 ended by resolving themselves into a set of similar 
 phenomena. There are only appearances without 
 us, and nothing to be seen behind the appearances ; 
 only appearances within us, and nothing by which 
 the appearances can be seen. "The Universe = 
 Phenomena." This is to be the gospel of the 
 future. And when every man believes it, when 
 men come to recognise themselves as merely series 
 of sensations, and the external world as only the
 
 INTKODUCTION. 3 
 
 abstract possibility of sensation in which custom 
 has taught them to believe, above all, when they 
 come to feel that there is absolutely no chance of 
 ever discovering any meaning in anything, then the 
 true golden age will have been reached. In other 
 words, when the search after reason has been given 
 up, the true reign of reason will have begun. 
 
 To those who think thus, metaphysics is of 
 course a remnant of barbarism, only a little re- 
 moved from the fetishism that flourished in the 
 infancy of the race; or, at the best, it is but a 
 puerile amusement which, when one becomes a 
 man that is to say a Positivist ought to be put 
 away. Now it is the purpose of the present essay 
 to offer some suggestions tending to show that this 
 estimate of metaphysics is incorrect, that the Posi- 
 tivists themselves are but metaphysicians in dis- 
 guise, that pure Phenomenalism, without some 
 admixture of metaphysical elements, is an unthink- 
 able absurdity, and that, from the works of the 
 most violently anti-metaphysical writers, it is easy 
 to extract the elements of a metaphysical system. 
 
 It would be well at the outset clearly to distin- 
 guish between three words viz., Psychology, Philo- 
 sophy, and Metaphysics which are frequently used 
 as more or less synonymous. Language is poor 
 enough at the best, and it is to be regretted when
 
 4 PERSONALITY. 
 
 it is made poorer by any avoidable ambiguities. 
 Schwegler's definition of philosophy is this : " It is 
 the thinking of the entire empirical finite in the 
 form of an intelligently articulated system." Now, 
 if we omit the word " intelligently," this definition 
 will apply to the Positive philosophy, which denies 
 the possibility of metaphysics, and restricts itself 
 to the laws of sequence and coexistence that obtain 
 among phenomena. And as the term philosophy is 
 always applied to the systems of Hume, Comte, and 
 others whose systems are pre-eminently anti-meta- 
 physical, it is better to define it so that it will dis- 
 tinctly include phenomenalists. Philosophy, then, 
 should mean the search for those ultimate generali- 
 sations which will embrace the narrower generalisa- 
 tions of the separate sciences. 
 
 Positivism deserved the name of philosophy, 
 because it aimed at constructing a "hierarchy 
 of the sciences," thus transforming them into 
 an organic whole, in which each part would 
 depend on all that preceded, and determine all 
 that succeeded. Lewes returns to the use of the 
 word metaphysics in his 'Problems of life and 
 Mind.' " The object of the sciences is laws," he 
 says ; " the object of metaphysics the laws of 
 laws. Metaphysics is objective logic, or the logic 
 of the cosmos, or the codification of the laws of
 
 INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 cause. If we understand metaphysics in its primi- 
 tive sense as ra pera ra ^vcnicd that which comes 
 after physics it will embrace the ultimate general- 
 isations of research, and become the name for the 
 science of the most general conceptions" Here, how- 
 ever, he stops short. He goes a little further than 
 Hume and Comte; since Comte denied the legiti- 
 macy of the word cause, and Hume maintained 
 that "the highest end of human reason is to reduce 
 many particular effects to a few general causes, 
 such as electricity, gravity, cohesion, &c." But 
 Lewes does not enter into the region of meta- 
 physics properly so called a study which he pro- 
 poses to designate metempirics. 
 
 Again, I think it would be well to draw a 
 sharp distinction between psychology and meta- 
 physics, because the legitimacy of psychology is 
 admitted by anti - metaphysical writers, such as 
 J. S. Mill and Lewes. I do not, therefore, deem 
 it expedient to make psychology, as Mansel does, 
 a branch of metaphysics. 1 If there be an entity 
 call it vital principle, ego or what not that can be 
 distinguished in thought from the passing states 
 
 1 According to Mansel, metaphysics consisted of two parts : (1) 
 psychology, concerned with the facts of consciousness as such ; 
 and (2) ontology, concerned with "the realities" to which those 
 facts bear testimony.
 
 6 PERSONALITY. 
 
 of our mental life, that principle belongs to meta- 
 physics, just as does the principle, if there be 
 one, which underlies external phenomena. Some 
 facts of consciousness, as we shall see, are nou- 
 menal and metaphysical; and psychology should, 
 in my judgment, take cognisance only of pheno- 
 mena. For then again, as in the case of philo- 
 sophy, we should have a word and a science in 
 regard to which there will be little dispute. For 
 example, both Mill and Lewes recognise the possi- 
 bility of a science of psychology and the impor- 
 tance of the introspective method. They differ 
 only in this, that Mill would place it among the 
 hierarchy of sciences, while Lewes would make it 
 a branch of biology. 
 
 Comte, it is true, denies the legitimacy of psycho- 
 logical science, and maintains that introspection 
 can only lead to illusion. This he makes little 
 effort to prove. He relies on the stock arguments 
 of Gall and others, that in order to reflect on a 
 state of mind, we must first pass out of that state 
 into another, and so the state to be reflected on 
 will be over before reflection can begin. He 
 proposes to substitute phrenology and the study 
 of the minds of others. But even if all the 
 phrenological hypotheses were correct, psychological 
 observation would still be necessary ; for, as Mill
 
 INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 justly says, "it is impossible to ascertain the cor- 
 respondence between two things by studying only 
 one of them." And as for the observation of other 
 minds, the signs by which they are manifested 
 must be meaningless to any one who has not 
 studied his own mind and its manifestations. 
 This, indeed, Comte seems to admit in one pas- 
 sage, when he says that " man at first knows 
 only himself, and applies this knowledge as a 
 formula to universal nature." 
 
 At all events, if introspection is an impossibility, 
 knowledge is also an impossibility. Investigating 
 states of consciousness by introspection merely 
 means attending to their presentations or repre- 
 sentations. If we could not do the first, we could 
 know nothing, not even a single sensation; if we 
 could not do the second, we might know our 
 passing states, but this momentary knowledge 
 would be constantly passing into ignorance, and 
 would thus be the most unreal of dissolving views. 
 I hope to show presently that the denial of an 
 ego always leads to contradictions and absurdities ; 
 but the additional denial of introspection involves 
 the theory of knowledge in such manifest and 
 hopeless difficulties, that it is now accepted by 
 very few writers of repute. According to Comte, 
 transitory phenomena of nothing are apprehended
 
 8 PERSONALITY. 
 
 by equally evanescent phenomena of nobody ; but 
 the latter cannot really be a mean to knowledge, 
 for he allows no ego by which they can be cognised, 
 and he expressly maintains that they cannot know 
 themselves, without first ceasing to be, in which 
 case there would be nothing left to be known. 
 Of course, any such theory which involves the 
 denial of knowledge is self-destructive; for if we 
 can know nothing, we cannot know the truth of a 
 theory which maintains that we can know nothing. 
 A science of psychology, without any distinct 
 recognition of metaphysical elements, has been 
 clearly sketched by J. S. Mill. Such a science 
 is not directly concerned with speculations regard- 
 ing the mind's own nature. It understands, by the 
 laws of mind, those of mental phenomena. Sen- 
 sations, having for their immediate antecedents 
 states of the body, would fall under physiology. 1 
 If all mental states were equally dependent with 
 sensations on physical conditions, mental science, 
 as the science of mental phenomena, might be re- 
 garded as merely a branch of physiology. But, as 
 Mill says, there exist uniformities among states of 
 
 1 The reader will bear in mind that I am now speaking only of 
 the classification of feelings not their explanation. The sim- 
 plest feeling, as we shall hereafter see, is not fully accounted for 
 till we have postulated the existence of a subject not apprehensible 
 by sense.
 
 INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 mind which can be ascertained by observation and 
 experiment, and which cannot be deduced from the 
 laws of our nervous organism. Hence, for a long 
 time at any rate, all knowledge of them must be 
 sought in a direct study of the mental successions 
 themselves. Psychology Mill defines as "the 
 science which is concerned with the uniformities of 
 succession the laws, whether ultimate or deriva- 
 tive according to which mental states succeed one 
 another." This definition I could accept, with the 
 proviso that all our mental experience does not, in 
 my judgment, follow in the way of necessary se- 
 quence from preceding states. I believe that we 
 are conscious of ourselves noumenally, and that 
 volition is an originative activity of this noumenal 
 ego. Hence Psychology on my view of it would 
 include, among other things, the laws (not directly 
 deducible from physiological observations) of sen- 
 sation and emotion, of cognition and of reasoning, 
 as well as the vast range of automatic processes 
 which form so large a part of human activity ; but 
 the consideration of the ego itself with its faculty 
 of volition would be a subject for metaphysics. In 
 this relegation of the noumenal ego and its nou- 
 menal volition to metaphysics, Mill would agree, 
 since it was only as (supposed) phenomenal states 
 he admitted them into psychology.
 
 10 PERSONALITY. 
 
 Now if we use " physics " in a wide sense to 
 include the psychical correlatives of neural pro- 
 cesses, and if we include the introspective in- 
 vestigation of mental states among the physical 
 methods, it may be said of "the facts of consci- 
 ousness " belonging to such a science, as Professor 
 Huxley said of all the facts of consciousness with- 
 out exception, that they are practically iiiterpret- 
 able by the method and formulae of physics; or, 
 as I should rather say, generalisable, for physics 
 proper does not profess to interpret anything, 
 except in the sense of bringing a narrower under 
 a wider induction. The question is, Is there any- 
 thing in our consciousness or in the universe that 
 is not phenomenal ? If there is, it belongs to 
 metaphysical science, and is of course not amen- 
 able to physical methods. " If beyond and before 
 this phenomenalism," says Mr Grote, "we at all 
 enter on the consideration of how we, feeling and 
 thinking beings, come to the knowledge of the facts 
 it embodies ; or if beyond and after it, we enter on 
 the consideration of how we are to act or employ 
 our phenomenal knowledge, we pass into quite a 
 different region." In a word, the fact that I am 
 conscious of myself, and that I am "capable," as 
 Huxley admits, "within certain limits, of self- 
 adjustment" cannot be explained, nor even taken
 
 INTRODUCTION. 1 1 
 
 into consideration, by the methods and formulae of 
 physics. 
 
 The term metaphysics was applied by An- 
 dronicus of Ehodes to those of Aristotle's treatises 
 which were to follow the physical books, and which 
 were therefore called TO. /nera TO. <uo-iKa. But there 
 is an allowable etymology which makes the word 
 extremely suggestive. It may mean that which 
 lies beyond the physical that is, beyond every- 
 thing in nature and human nature to which we 
 can apply the ordinary scientific methods of ob- 
 servation, experiment, and generalisation. 1 Meta- 
 physics is concerned with the one and the per- 
 manent, as opposed to the many and the tran- 
 sitory, and so becomes synonymous with Ontology. 
 The former, however, is a better word than the 
 latter, since there is no ground for denying the 
 existence or reality of phenomena, but only their 
 permanent and ultimate reality. Metaphysics then 
 deals with that which lies beyond phenomena, 
 with that which is the source or substratum of 
 the temporarily existent. Metaphysics seeks for 
 a principle of unity in man and in nature, a unity 
 undiscoverable by the senses, or by mere generali- 
 sation from anything which they can reveal. It 
 
 1 Cf. the use of the word in "Macbeth," Act I. scene v., 
 "metaphysical aid" i.e., supernatural aid.
 
 12 PERSONALITY. 
 
 seeks a unal basis for the phenomena of nature 
 and of human nature, and it endeavours to inter- 
 pret and account for the many and the transitory 
 by means of the one and the permanent. It aims 
 at solving, or at any rate throwing light upon, the 
 mystery of the universe, by discovering a meaning 
 and a purpose in the ways of nature and of man. 
 A science is a summation or generalisation of a 
 particular set of facts ; a system of philosophy is a 
 co-ordination of all the sciences ; metaphysics is con- 
 cerned with their ultimate and transcendental basis. 
 But Lewes tells us, and all writers of the Eng- 
 lish school agree with him, that a study of the 
 history of philosophy will prove the impossibility 
 of metaphysics. It will be admitted, too, by many 
 who are not inclined to Positivism, that the his- 
 tory of metaphysics is somewhat discouraging; 
 and this discouragement is frequently felt, even 
 by those who see that important truths have been 
 discovered and unfolded by almost every meta- 
 physical writer of repute. Now I cannot attri- 
 bute this feeling of disappointment merely to the 
 fact that unproved and unprovable theories are 
 included in metaphysical systems ; for even " exact 
 thinkers" do not hesitate to use unverified and 
 unverifiable hypotheses as a means of reaching 
 empirical truth. The dissatisfaction arises, I ap-
 
 INTHODUCTION. 13 
 
 prehend, chiefly because these systems seem for the 
 most part to be based on fancy. They start from 
 propositions that are anything but axiomatic. To 
 the end of the chapter of human life every system 
 of metaphysics which aims at comprehensiveness 
 will probably contain a good deal that cannot 
 be proved ; but we seem justified in demanding, if 
 these systems are to receive our serious consider- 
 ation, that they should at any rate be founded upon 
 fact, and start from propositions that are undeni- 
 able. With this demand however metaphysicians 
 have very seldom and very insufficiently complied. 
 Hence their systems, as a general rule, carry with 
 them little conviction. Their very first statements 
 can be easily rebutted by contradictory assertions 
 which are at least equally tenable, and any truths 
 they may contain appear to have been guessed at 
 rather than proved. 
 
 A few illustrations may suffice. Thales per- 
 ceived that the seeds of things were moist, and at 
 once jumped to the conclusion that water, or rather 
 moisture, was the First Cause. But there was 
 just as much ground for saying that air or heat 
 was the origin of all things, since each of these 
 principles is essential to life ; and, as the reader is 
 aware, they were afterwards fixed upon by Anaxi- 
 mander and Hippanus respectively. The Eleatics,
 
 14 PERSONALITY. 
 
 proceeding on the false assumption that whatever 
 did not exist always and everywhere could not be 
 said to have existed at all, maintained that Ens, 
 or the really existent, must be unum et continuum. 
 Their opponents asserted that the really exist- 
 ent was plura et discontinua, proceeding on the 
 equally false assumption that nothing existed 
 which could not be detected by the senses. Em- 
 pedocles maintained that all things were formed 
 by attraction and repulsion between earth, air, 
 fire, and water, which, because they seemed to be 
 elementary, he termed reWapa TU>V TTO.VTWV PL&- 
 P.O.TO. And again, he assumed as self-evident that 
 like can only be known by like, and that, therefore, 
 our perception of external things is to be accounted 
 for by the fact that the four elements, of which 
 they are composed, enter also into the composition 
 of our own bodies. But the reply seems obvious, 
 that if water in the body is needed to perceive 
 water out of the body, similar means must be 
 necessary for the perception of a loaf of bread. 
 The Atomists traced back the pi<o//.a.Ta to micro- 
 scopic atoms. But their assumption that an in- 
 finite number of material particles, falling through 
 infinite space and time, had produced our world 
 in other words, that life, sensation, perception, 
 and thought had come out of plena and vacua
 
 IKTKODUCTION. 15 
 
 which were dead, senseless, unperceiving, and un- 
 thinking is a purely gratuitous assumption, 
 neither founded on, nor even suggested by, expe- 
 rience. Again, what could well be more fanciful 
 from beginning to end than the fundamental as- 
 sumption of Anaxagoras, that the primeval chaos 
 of opoiopeprj was, so to speak, jerked into a number 
 of distinguishable objects, by a movement which 
 the vovs initiated, in the form of a self-perpetuat- 
 ing vortex? Plato started from the previously 
 received hypotheses, that like can only be known 
 by like, and that sensible things cannot be known 
 at all, being the objects of 8oa and not of eVicm^i?;. 
 Most of the efforts of his transcendent genius are 
 employed to explain the fact of knowledge on the 
 basis of these assumptions, which he certainly did 
 not prove to be legitimate. Aristotle, taking his 
 start from Plato, brought the " ideas " of the latter 
 from the celestial spheres to be the indwelling 
 essence of sensible objects. This " formal " part of 
 every o-woXov he explained by the theory, that the 
 inherent potentiality of the Trpwrq vX-rj, at one end 
 of the scale of existence, is instinctively incited 
 (as by a beloved object) by the Trpwrov e*Sos, or 
 first mover, at the other end, to take to itself 
 forms; all nature being thus but a graduated con- 
 version of matter into form, an eternal passing
 
 16 PERSONALITY. 
 
 of the primeval substance into higher and higher 
 ideal combinations. Surely this, as a foundation 
 for a metaphysical explanation of the universe, in- 
 volves too much imagination and too little reason, 
 too many fancies and too few facts. 
 
 But Spinoza, Mr Lewes tells us, is the crucial 
 instance by which the worthlessness of metaphysics 
 may best be proved. In the ' Ethics ' his theory of 
 the universe is deduced from an arbitrary definition 
 of substance, by the aid of other equally arbitrary 
 definitions and some so-called axioms. " God," he 
 says, " is the absolutely infinite being ; in other 
 words, He is self-comprised, self-contained sub- 
 stance, constituted by an infinity of attributes, each 
 of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence." 
 This definition, though Spinoza calls it an intuitive 
 idea and a simplicissima veritas, is really so far from 
 being simple or intuitive, that, if ever reached at 
 all, it must be the last result of metaphysical re- 
 flection. Hence the fact need not surprise us that 
 the Spinozistic explanation of the universe has so 
 seldom been accepted. It is interesting, ingenious, 
 sublime. It discovers harmony, beauty, cosmos, 
 and law, where most men have seen only discord, 
 deformity, disorder, and lawlessness. It offers a 
 solution of the perennial problem of philosophy, 
 and extracts monism out of a seeming dualism. It
 
 INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 gives us consolation in suffering or remorse, by 
 attempting to prove that all events are the neces- 
 sary outcome of absolute perfection. It promises 
 us an eternal life of calm and unruffled thought. It 
 is, moreover, the work of a man who is now uni- 
 versally acknowledged to have lived a stainless and 
 noble life. Yet we instinctively conclude that we 
 cannot be Spinozists. Long before we discover any 
 flaws in his argument, we feel that they are false. 
 We say with Mr Froude, " It is not so ; we know it ; 
 and that is enough." Now I apprehend the rejec- 
 tion of Spinozism, as a system, is justified not only 
 because, in defining man as a certus et determinatus 
 modus cogitandi, it contradicts what I shall try by- 
 and-by to prove to be a fact of consciousness 
 namely, human freedom ; not only because there is 
 a want of cogency in the reasoning; but chiefly 
 because it is deduced from an arbitrary and un- 
 proved definition. Even if the logic were as unim- 
 peachable as Jacobi and Mr Lewes 1 have main- 
 
 1 Whoever will take the trouble to go carefully through the 
 ' Ethics' will find many circular reasonings, many "definitions," 
 besides the lirst, which are not definitions but assumptions, as well 
 as many alterations of language to suit the exigencies of the argu- 
 ment. E.g., the first axiom seems to answer to its name, as 
 stated at the beginning of the first book " Whatever is, is either 
 in itself or in something else." But afterwards it is quoted thus : 
 "Nothing exists but substances and modes," that is, nothing 
 exists but self-comprised, self-conceived substances, and affections 
 
 B
 
 18 PERSONALITY. 
 
 tained, the system would not necessarily carry con- 
 viction with it, unless the existence of the thing 
 defined were proved ; for the most rigorous deduc- 
 tions from fancy need not lead to facts. True, after 
 having proved that one substance cannot be pro- 
 duced by another, he argues that therefore (Prop. 7) 
 " Substance must be the cause of itself, or, in other 
 words, to exist belongs to the nature of substance." 
 But it is manifest that this tacitly assumes what 
 it professes to prove the question, namely, as to 
 whether substance exists at all. If it be said the 
 existence of substance is implied in its definition, 
 what need is there for this demonstration, any more 
 than in Euclid for propositions proving the possi- 
 bility of superficies and squares ? Nor is his argu- 
 mentum palmarium for the existence of God any 
 more conclusive. " Eeality and perfection are iden- 
 tical : the more attributes anything has, the more 
 real it is, or the more it exists; and hence God, 
 being absolutely infinite, must have an infinity of 
 
 of the attributes of substance a proposition which is by no 
 means axiomatic, and which is only another wa) T of stating his 
 original definition of Substance. As an instance of circular reas- 
 oning, take the following proposition : " The more of perfection 
 anything has, the more it acts and the less it suffers." Demon- 
 stration : ' ' Perfection equals reality, and reality has the character 
 of acting, not suffering." Again, what can be more false to fact, 
 however tme to theory, than such definitions as those of joy, sor- 
 row, humility, &c. ?
 
 JNTKODUCTION. 1 9 
 
 attributes, and so exist absolutely." At the best, 
 this argument only proves that if there, be an abso- 
 lutely real being, he must have an infinity of attri- 
 butes. Curiously enough, while Spinoza maintains 
 that common notions, such as man, freedom, virtue, 
 good and evil, are vague and indefinite, he asserts 
 that his notions of God and substance are indisput- 
 ably clear. Even if they were so, it is not on clear 
 conceptions which may or may not have objective 
 correlates but on necessary facts, that metaphysics 
 should be based. Instead of working his way from 
 what is really certain towards that which we can 
 never hope more than approximately to attain, he 
 supposes the goal to be already reached by an intui- 
 tive and ready-made idea, setting out from which he 
 works his way back towards, though he never actu- 
 ally reaches, the only legitimate starting-point 
 namely, the facts of consciousness. Mr Lewes tells 
 us that "a serious study of the 'Ethics' may be 
 a drastic purge, clearing the mind from all the 
 humours and vapours of ontology." " We can only 
 escape Spinozism," he says, " by denying the possi- 
 bility of metaphysical science." Not so: we can 
 escape it because it is deduced from what ought not 
 to have been assumed. The failure of Spinozism is 
 an argument not against metaphysics, but only 
 against an unsound metaphysical method.
 
 20 PERSONALITY. 
 
 Once more. Though I believe there is more to be 
 learned from Hegel than from any preceding meta- 
 physician, though the application of certain Hegelian 
 principles to philosophical criticism has, I think, 
 been attended with the happiest result, in Pro- 
 fessor Green's reductio ad absurdum of the Lockian 
 philosophy, and Professor Caird's reductio ad Hegel 
 of the Kantian ; yet Hegel's system, as a system, 
 seems to me, like those of previous metaphysicians, 
 to lack solid foundation. Mr Wallace says, in his 
 ' Logic of Hegel,' that " the cogito ergo sum of Des- 
 cartes must be dismissed, because the certainty 
 does not lie at the very root of all things. To 
 begin with the I, would only place us at a point 
 where the severance between thought and being 
 was already a fait accompli. The beginning of 
 philosophy or logic must go far deeper than this 
 division; it must penetrate to a stage where 
 thought and being are at one to the absolute 
 unity of both which precedes their disruption into 
 the several worlds of nature and mind. It must 
 show us the very beginning of thought before it 
 has yet come to the full consciousness of itself, 
 when the truth of what it is still lurks in the 
 background." Now this is what Hegel attempts 
 to do. But what proof have we that we can get 
 back to this point? or that there ever was such
 
 INTRODUCTION. 2 1 
 
 an undifferentiated existence ? Dr Stirling admits 
 that the Hegelian dialectic sometimes leads to 
 grotesqueness, if not absurdity, in the field of 
 Nature. Why may it not lead to falsehood at the 
 opposite end of the system namely, in the theory 
 of Being ? It appears to be founded upon fact 
 the fact, namely, that Motion involves the union 
 of contradictories. 1 But what proof have we that 
 
 1 The difficulties in regard to motion, as stated by Zeno, have 
 been disposed of by Mansel, Mill, De Morgan, and others. But 
 it is, I think, possible to state them in an unanswerable way. 
 De Morgan and Mill seem to imagine that there is no difficulty 
 left if motion be denned as " the passage of a thing from one 
 place to another." The question still remains unanswered, how- 
 ever, as to how the thing can make this passage. As Ferrier 
 puts it, " Change cannot be explained if we regard Being and 
 not-Being as separate conceptions, and not as essential moments 
 of one indivisible conception. Suppose water undergoing the 
 process of freezing, and that it has reached a certain degree of 
 solidity (A) ; if appearance (or Being) and disappearance (or not- 
 Being) were separate conceptions, then A's appearance would last 
 a definite time, and also its disappearance, because our supposi- 
 tion is that the disappearance of A is not the appearance of B. 
 Therefore the water must have lost one degree of solidity without 
 acquiring any other that is, it must be in no degree of solidity 
 whatever." This mode of representing the contradictions in- , 
 volved in motion seems to me unassailable. If so, we have here 
 a strong argument in favour of metaphysics. Since motion of 
 some sort is connected with all forms of evolution and existence, 
 the fact of the apparent contradictions involved in its conception 
 points to the presence, in all phenomena, of a metaphysical ele- 
 ment whose reality must be recognised by the Reason ( Vernunft], 
 though its mode of working cannot be grasped by the Under- 
 standing ( Verstand).
 
 22 PERSONALITY. 
 
 it will reveal God to us " as He was in His eternal 
 essence, before the creation of Nature or a single 
 soul " ? As the system stands it professes to de- 
 duce the universe from the Heine Negativitdt of the 
 Notion, which dialectical reflection starts from pure 
 nothing and pure being. Now either these once 
 existed or they did not. If they did not, they can- 
 not be the origin of all things. If they did, the 
 deduction of the universe from them appears open 
 to Mr Lewes's objection, that it amounts to the im- 
 possible equation + = 1. 
 
 It seems scarcely to be wondered at that scien- 
 tific men, in their love of exactness and precision, 
 shrink from committing themselves to what seem, 
 at first sight, such cloud-born speculations. " There 
 are no writers," says De Morgan, " who give us so 
 much 'must' with so little 'why' as metaphy- 
 sicians." We need not be surprised that men in 
 despair have tried to content themselves with the 
 knowledge of phenomena, have persuaded them- 
 selves that there could be no such thing as a 
 metaphysical existence. But a little more reflec- 
 tion would have driven them from this position. 
 For the denial of metaphysical existence involves 
 the inconceivability tear e^o^v, namely, how a 
 number of states or appearances of knowing, 
 with no connecting link between them, can cluster
 
 INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 themselves together into a series which calls 
 itself "I." 
 
 The comparative failure of metaphysical thinkers 
 in the past has been due simply and entirely, I 
 take it, to their having adopted false starting-points 
 and worked with false methods. Metaphysics, like 
 charity, should begin at home. Though it must be 
 metempirical in the sense of being concerned with 
 what is not " reducible to sensation," it need not, 
 and should not be, metempirical in the wider sense 
 of the term experience, which embraces the whole 
 of consciousness. The true beginning of meta- 
 physics is personality, or the existence of an ego. 
 Here we may find an immovable foundation. If 
 it can be shown that feeling l could not exist with- 
 out an ego, then it is absurd to maintain, as the 
 Positivists do maintain, that the ego cannot exist 
 because it is not a feeling. 
 
 ; The words "feeling" and "sensation" are throughout used 
 as synonyms.
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 
 
 " Cogito ergo sum : it is necessary that I who think 
 should be somewhat." 1 In other words, thought 
 is inconceivable without a thinker: the existence 
 of my thought is inconceivable without the exist- 
 ence of myself to think it. Even if I were the 
 work of a demon who was always imposing on me 
 and deceiving me, I must still exist; for false 
 thoughts, as much as true thoughts, require a 
 thinker to think them. "We may even go further 
 and say "I feel, therefore I am; it is necessary 
 
 1 Descartes went too far when he proceeded to interpret " sum " 
 as meaning " I am a being that has nothing in common with 
 extension." This cannot be deduced from "sum," nor even from 
 " memini." 
 
 I had better perhaps here explain, for the sake of the non- 
 philosophical reader, that the term subject is the technical expres- 
 sion for Descartes' "somewhat." The terms ego, self, soul, are 
 generally used as synonyms for the mind or subject. The 
 word object of course stands for that which is apprehended, 
 whether it be material or mental.
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 25 
 
 that I who feel should be somewhat." Sensation, 
 in truth, is a single abstract word for a concrete 
 double fact. Sensation means something felt by 
 some one. 
 
 It is possible that vegetable life may result 
 merely from a particular combination and col- 
 location of the molecules of a body; it is impos- 
 sible that such combination or collocation can 
 ever account for sensibility, not to say intelli- 
 gence. The triumphs of physiology have tended 
 rather to obscure than to throw light upon the 
 processes of sensation and thought. It has been 
 argued that, because certain conditions of the 
 brain and nerves are the invariable antecedents 
 of certain mental states, in the former we have 
 an explanation of the latter. So entirely has the 
 brain been identified with consciousness, that the 
 late Professor Clifford seemed to think the non- 
 existence of a divine brain sufficient argument for 
 the non-existence of a Deity. Mill and Tyndall, 
 it is true, have perceived clearly enough the differ- 
 ence between sensation and neural process. The 
 latter says, " We have not an organ, nor apparently 
 the rudiments of an organ, by which to apprehend 
 how a motion in the brain becomes a sensation in 
 consciousness." Maurice puts the difficulty thus: 
 "The casuist, having done homage to all the in-
 
 26 PEKSONALITY. 
 
 structions of the physiologist, will say, ' Yes, that 
 is very remarkable indeed ; and do all these emo- 
 tions make me? Did you not say I had them? 
 You might think it worth while to tell me who 
 I am.' " This the physiologist cannot do, nor even 
 the psychologist, in Mill's sense of that term, be- 
 cause " I " am not a phenomenon. 
 
 The fact that every feeling involves some one 
 to feel it, has never been, in so many words, 
 denied. The most zealous opponents of an ego avail 
 themselves of ambiguities by which the existence of 
 an ego can, at pleasure, be tacitly assumed. Mr 
 Lewes, for instance, says that the molecular motion 
 in the nerves, and the experienced sensation in the 
 mind, are only the objective and subjective phases 
 of one and the same thing. He is thus enabled, 
 whenever necessity requires, to treat the neural 
 process as actually identical with the sensation; 
 and any difficulty as to how a sensation could feel 
 itself is provided against, a sentient subject being 
 implied in the word " subjective." As Professor 
 Green says, "We shall not expect to find any 
 philosophical writer who, having distinctly asked 
 himself whether or no experience is a mere succes- 
 sion of feelings, void of a unifying principle, has 
 distinctly answered ' yes.' By help of sundry fam- 
 iliar figures those of the thread, the stream, &c.
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 27 
 
 our psychologists avoid the ultimate analysis by 
 which the question is necessarily raised, and are 
 able, by turns, to avail themselves of a virtually 
 affirmative and a virtually negative answer to it. 
 The phrase 'states of consciousness,' as equivalent 
 to feelings, has come conveniently into fashion as 
 a further shelter for the ambiguity. We cannot 
 employ this phrase for feelings without implying 
 the persistence of a subject throughout them, their 
 relation to which forms their nexus with each other. 
 Thus, by the use of it the physical psychologist can 
 disguise that disintegration of experience, which is 
 logically involved in its reduction to a succession of 
 feelings corresponding to a series of occurrences in 
 the nervous organism. The embarrassment which 
 might be caused by a demand for a physiological 
 account of this persistent subject, he can avoid by 
 saying that to him experience is merely the succes- 
 sion of feelings. The question which might then 
 arise as to the possibility of the successive feelings 
 being also an experience of succession, he can take 
 out of his critic's mouth by the assumption that 
 feelings are states of consciousness states of a 
 subject which recognises them as its successive 
 modes." It is sometimes ludicrous to observe how, 
 after denying a possible ego, writers are obliged to 
 resort to an impossible one. Mr Lewes, in his first
 
 28 PERSONALITY. 
 
 volume of ' Problems,' seems inclined to make the 
 ego consist of a mass of " systemic " sensations 
 those, namely, of nutrition, respiration, generation, 
 and the muscles. These, he says, constitute a stream 
 of sentience, upon which each external stimulus 
 forms a ripple, and consciousness is caused by the 
 consequent breach of equilibrium. But it is mani- 
 fest that this illustration goes for nothing without 
 the presupposition of a sentient observer. A mass 
 of feeling, however large, cannot apprehend a feeling. 
 It is the nature of a feeling to be felt, not to feel ; 
 and no addition to the number or volume of sensa- 
 tions can change their nature, so as to convert them 
 from psychical objects into a psychical subject. 
 The same may be said of Lewes's statement in 
 ' Mind,' that the term soul is the personification of 
 the complex of present and revived feelings, and is 
 the substratum of consciousness (in his general 
 sense of that word), all the particular feelings being 
 its states. Since, then, the necessity for an ego is 
 never denied without being tacitly assumed, it may 
 be taken to be really a self-evident truth, the con- 
 tradictory of which is inconceivable, that, along with 
 every sensation or feeling of any description what- 
 ever, there must exist a sentient principle capable of 
 feeling it. 
 
 This will suggest to the reader the opening pos-
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 29 
 
 tulate of Terrier's ' Institutes/ " Along with what- 
 ever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground 
 or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance 
 of itself." The axiom stated in the last paragraph 
 goes further, in one sense, than this; in another, 
 not so far. It is as true of feeling as of knowledge, 
 that along with the feeling there must exist, as its 
 ground or condition, some one to feel it. The exist- 
 ence of a self, or feeling principle, is an essential 
 basis of all feeling; but its self-cognisance is not. 
 This distinction between the existence and the self- 
 consciousness of an ego, which Terrier failed to 
 make, is important. Terrier's proposition is cer- 
 tainly not self-evident, and perhaps not true. The 
 result of my own reflection on the subject is that I 
 am not always self-conscious. In solving a diffi- 
 cult problem, for example, I seem to be entirely 
 engrossed with the objective, and quite incognisant 
 of myself. But though we may doubt or deny 
 that every mental state involves a knowledge of 
 self, we can neither doubt nor deny that every 
 cognition or feeling involves the existence of some 
 one to cognise or to feel it. This is of course only 
 the old doctrine of the necessary implication of sub- 
 ject and object : a doctrine which has been gener- 
 ally recognised, however, more clearly as regards 
 cognition than sensation.
 
 30 PERSONALITY. 
 
 Baiii, it is true, denies the universal application 
 of this doctrine even in cognition. In his criticism 
 on Terrier, at the end of his ' Emotions and Will/ 
 lie says : " I dissent from the placing of self as a 
 factor or foil in all our cognitions. I grant it to 
 the fullest extent to the great cardinal cognition 
 subject plus object, mind versus matter, internal and 
 external. I maintain, however, that this is only 
 one of the cognitions of the human mind, though 
 a very commanding one. Things might have been 
 known though the subject and object distinction 
 had never emerged at all, it being enough for cog- 
 nition that any sort of contrast should exist. I 
 can know light simply by transition to darkness. 
 Light-darkness is a genuine cognition. We might 
 remain for ever at the point of being distinctly 
 aware of a certain number of qualities, without 
 attaining the subject-object cognition." Bain sub- 
 stitutes for Ferrier's postulate the following: "Along 
 with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as 
 the ground or condition of its knowledge, have 
 some cognisance of a quality in contrast with what 
 is known ; " or, " whenever intelligence is concerned 
 with anything as an object, it must, as the ground 
 or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance 
 of a subject." 
 
 There is great confusion here for which Ferrier
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 31 
 
 is to some extent responsible between the neces- 
 sary existence of a cognitive subject whenever there 
 is a cognised object, and its contingent recognition 
 of itself as a subject. There cannot conceivably be 
 cognition without a knowing subject, though there 
 may be cognition without the subject cognising 
 itself as a knowing subject. There is no other 
 possible notion of cognition than the knowledge 
 of something by some one : and hence a self is a 
 necessary factor or foil in all cognition. It is true 
 that " the cognition of the difference between sub- 
 ject and object is only one of the cognitions of 
 the human mind," and that " we might have been 
 distinctly aware of many qualities without ever 
 attaining to this distinction," but not unless there 
 had existed a human mind to have cognitions, not 
 unless we had existed to attain distinctions. The 
 mind the " I," the " we," which Bain introduces 
 as of no account is the real basis of knowledge, 
 and ought to be taken into account quite as much 
 as the qualities cognised. " I can know the light 
 simply by transition to darkness." Yes, if I exist, 
 and have the power of distinguishing and knowing. 
 "Light-darkness is a genuine cognition." Yes, in 
 a knower, but not per se. " It is enough for cog- 
 nition that any sort of contrast should exist." 
 Surely there must be many contrasts existing in
 
 32 PERSONALITY. 
 
 uninhabited parts of the universe and among the 
 undiscovered forces of nature, which have never yet 
 been brought within the mental range of an ego, 1 
 and of which, therefore, there is as yet no cognition. 
 Professor Bain is of course quite right in main- 
 taining that change of impression is essential to 
 any kind of sentient experience. We are not 
 aware of the motion of the earth, because there is 
 nothing with which to contrast it, and because it 
 is always present; nor, for similar reasons, do we 
 perceive the pressure of the atmosphere on the 
 surface of the body. As Hobbes puts it, " It is 
 almost all one for a man to be always sensible of 
 one and the same thing and not to be sensible at 
 all of anything." Bain has done good service in 
 insisting upon the essential relativity of knowledge ; 
 but he forgets that two comparable qualities will 
 not make knowledge without some one to compare 
 them. " We are affected with surprise in passing 
 from one impression to another." True ; but we 
 must exist in order to " pass " and " be surprised." 
 By means of ambiguous phrases, Bain is able some- 
 times to argue as if this were not the case, as if 
 the brain were itself an ego. Kg., in the following 
 sentence : " In order to produce any effect on the 
 
 1 I.e. , of a, finite ego : and Bain is dealing only with the prob- 
 lem of finite cognition.
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 33 
 
 senses there must be a change, and everything in 
 the nature of change thrills through the brain with 
 a kind of surprise." But, strictly speaking, the 
 molecules of the brain can be neither thrilled nor 
 surprised; at most they can only be the occasion 
 of a thrill or surprise in a sentient subject. 
 
 Let us look at Bain's account of the origin of 
 the cognition of subject and object. " The con- 
 trast of subject and object springs originally from 
 the contrast of movement, or active energy, and 
 passive sensation. Were our impressions all move- 
 ments, we should know nothing of movement as a 
 whole, for want of something to contrast it with ; 
 our knowledge would then be confined to the par- 
 ticulars wherein movements differed." Similarly, 
 if our impressions were all sensations. "Move- 
 ment and sense form the most marked antithesis 
 among all our present feelings. In the presence 
 of the feeling of movement as a foil, we discern 
 something common to all sensations, in spite of 
 their varieties. The antithesis between movement 
 and sensation is an essential preliminary to that 
 between self and the external world. The differ- 
 ence between the actual and ideal is this, that the 
 actual impression changes with all our movements, 
 and we must go through a certain amount of bodily 
 exercise to secure and retain it. When it becomes 
 
 G
 
 34 PERSONALITY'. 
 
 ideal, all that is dispensed with. The transition is a 
 marked one, and impresses the mind with a contrast 
 or mental foil in short, with a cognition (subject 
 and object). It is, however, an extravagance of the 
 fancy to project one of these into the sphere of indepen- 
 dent existence, apart from our whole mental life. 1 The 
 real fact is, that the two greatly differing experi- 
 ences develop between them a cognition." 
 
 Now I have no wish to prove that the ego is 
 " an independent existence, apart from our whole 
 mental life," but only that without it there could be 
 no mental life at all. In the foregoing argument, 
 by which Bain supposes himself to have disproved 
 the existence of the ego, you will observe that 
 he speaks of " our impression," " our feeling," " our 
 mental life : " he says, " we discern something com- 
 mon to all sensations," and that the transition to 
 movements " impresses the mind with a contrast or 
 foil." In these expressions he has tacitly assumed 
 a something which apprehends sensations and 
 movements and the difference between them. On 
 his own showing, therefore, we have but two alter- 
 natives, either to suppose a separate self for each 
 state, or the same self for all. Now, even on the 
 
 1 The italics are mine. In these words Professor Bain gives us 
 his conception of an ego, a conception which is not that either ol 
 metaphysics or of common-sense. See p. 39.
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 35 
 
 ground of Occam's razor," Entia non simt multi- 
 plicanda prseter necessitatem," the latter would be 
 the more philosophical opinion. And when it is 
 remembered that knowledge is impossible without 
 memory, and memory, as we shall find, is incon- 
 ceivable unless we suppose that the same subject 
 has been present to the remembered states, the 
 necessity for accepting the doctrine of a permanent 
 ego becomes more apparent. 
 
 It is often said that the brain, in spite of its non- 
 persistence, is permanent enough for practical pur- 
 poses, since impressions may remain in the changing 
 particles just as scars remain upon the changing 
 skin. The ego however is and must be not 
 only permanent, but one. Even supposing, for 
 the sake of argument, that there could be, in the 
 materialistic sense, a sensation of sound in one 
 part of the brain and a sensation of light in 
 another part, these two sensations, in order to 
 belong to a single experience mine, yours, his 
 must be united in an individual. To say that there 
 exist, or did exist, a sensation of sound and a sensa- 
 tion of light, is not the same thing as saying that I 
 or some other person has had, or is having, both. 
 Even if sensations and thoughts as such could arise 
 in the brain without an ego, they could not possibly 
 without an ego form parts of the same experience.
 
 36 PERSONALITY. 
 
 Moreover, since it would seem that even sensation 
 involves contrast, it follows that the simplest feel- 
 ing is at least dual, and we are therefore compelled 
 to postulate a unity as a sine gud non for its appre- 
 hension. 
 
 It is absolutely impossible to explain or com- 
 prehend the continuity of consciousness, except on 
 the supposition of a subject which continues after 
 the transitory states have gone, and which is one 
 and indivisible while they are multiple and com- 
 plex. To quote an illustration of Mr Picton's 
 "When a schoolmaster canes a row of boys one 
 after another, they have similar feelings, but no 
 continuous feeling. In order to the existence of 
 the latter, the strokes must be given successively 
 to one boy," that is, to one percipient subject. 
 Hence, even if we grant that there may have been 
 handed on to the molecules of which a brain is at 
 present composed, affections similar to those which 
 existed in the molecules that formed it years ago, 
 the similarity can only be apprehended by a single 
 subject that has been cognisant of both. Let us 
 suppose two mental states not connected by any 
 permanent underlying substratum say a state of 
 light followed by a state of darkness in other 
 words, let us suppose some one sentient of light 
 followed by some one sentient of darkness, arid
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 37 
 
 these two some ones different. Now, waiving the 
 objection that, according to Bain's own theory, 
 neither subject could be sentient of the one feeling 
 till it had experienced a transition from the other, 
 it is manifest that neither could be cognisant of the 
 difference between them unless it had experienced 
 both. But, by hypothesis, the first state is supposed 
 to be over when the second state has begun. Hence 
 we must believe that there is a " shock " between 
 two things, one of which has ceased to exist. So 
 the doctrine of relativity, without the supposition 
 of a permanent subject to take cognisance of the 
 relativity, lands us in absurdity. 
 
 Hundreds of sentences might be quoted in which 
 the real mystery of the ego is quietly assumed, and 
 then made to assist in its own assassination. " The 
 sense of difference," Bain tells us, " is the most rudi- 
 mentary property of our intellectual being." But 
 what is our intellectual being ? It must either be 
 the brain, or something different from the brain. It 
 cannot be the latter with Bain, for that would make 
 it a metaphysical entity. Hence we must suppose 
 it is the brain itself. But this supposition will not 
 explain the existence of a single sensation. " Light 
 affects the brain in a certain way, darkness in 
 another, and the transition between the two in 
 a third, which may be called a shock, or surprise, 
 
 90937
 
 38 PERSONALITY. 
 
 or thrill." This is the physiological expression of 
 the doctrine which we looked at psychologically 
 in the previous paragraph. It is characterised by 
 the same confusion and inaccuracy. The cerebral 
 affections must be, not co-existent, but consecu- 
 tive ; for they correspond respectively to light and 
 darkness, which at the same time cannot conceiv- 
 ably exist together. Light must have passed away 
 before darkness can begin ; and between their cer- 
 ebral equivalents there can therefore be no shock 
 or thrill. A shock is only possible between things 
 which coexist. 
 
 Once more let me ask, What does Professor Bain 
 really mean by the following sentence ? " In per- 
 ceiving we are subject and object by turn : object, 
 when attending to the form and magnitude of con- 
 flagration, e.g. ; and subject, when we give way to 
 the emotional effect of the luminous blaze." That 
 it is the same thing which " gives way " and which 
 " attends," may be inferred by his applying " we " to 
 both. Now if there has only been a state of atten- 
 tion to form or magnitude, afterwards succeeded by 
 a state of emotion, and if there has been nothing 
 common to the two states, this mode of expression 
 is surely not justifiable. If the ego be really " a 
 fiction coined from nonentity," it is time that " exact 
 thinkers " should help us to free ourselves from the
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 39 
 
 Bain confounds the existence of a permanent 
 subject, related successively to different objects, 
 with that of an absolute subject, related to no 
 object at all. " As we can think and speak," he 
 says, "of light by itself, without express mention 
 of its foil darkness, so we can think of the object, 
 while the subject is tacitly understood, and the 
 opposite. We never could have come to the notion 
 of externality without its contrast ; but the notion 
 being once formed, we have the power of looking to 
 it alone. An absolute object or subject, however, is 
 an utter irrelevance, absurdity, and impossibility." 
 Now the " subject " which metaphysicians insist 
 upon is not an absolute subject. It may be as 
 relative as you please. It may, it does, exist in an 
 indefinite number of relations, for which very reason 
 we maintain it to be permanent. 
 
 And as for absolute objects, it is Bain himself 
 who is guilty of believing in them, since he fre- 
 quently talks as if mental states were self-support- 
 ing, and did not require any sentient or cognitive 
 subject. It is amusing to observe how the denial 
 of the ego makes it necessary for him to assume the 
 real existence of what all admit to be abstractions. 
 " Knowledge," he says, " involves two notions and 
 a belief in their connection." Bain here seems to 
 see the necessity for some bond of union, and he 
 tells us that the binding circumstance between the
 
 40 PERSONALITY. 
 
 two notions is " one of the comprehensive generali- 
 sations called coexistence or succession." Now two 
 tilings may be bound together in knowledge by the 
 particular fact of their coexistence or succession, 
 if that fact be perceived, but certainly cannot be 
 bound together by the unperceived abstraction of 
 coexistence or succession in general. Who would 
 - have thought it possible that such a use of abstrac- 
 tions should be made by one who was always warn- 
 ing us to beware of mistaking them for realities ? 
 Et tu, Brute ! But perhaps the Professor will say 
 that he meant the " comprehensive generalisation " 
 to be perceived. Well, be it so. It is either per- 
 ceived by the same ego which had the " two notions 
 and a belief in their connection," or by a different 
 ego. In the first case we have a subject permanent 
 and metaphysical. In the second, instead of three 
 things requiring a bond of union, we shall now have 
 four; and what was brought in as an explanation of 
 knowledge has thus only made it more unintelligible 
 than ever. 
 
 It is by an analysis of remembrance that the 
 existence of a metaphysical ego may be most clearly 
 demonstrated. When hard pressed, the Positivist 
 may feel himself obliged to admit that the single 
 word sensation does really stand for something 
 double ; and he may even allow us, if we please,
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 41 
 
 to apply the term " soul " to one of the elements in 
 this complex fact. But now he will insist upon it 
 that this soul is not permanent that it is no more 
 permanent than the feelings and the thoughts with 
 which it correlates. Granting, he will say, that the 
 phenomena involve two elements, both elements 
 pass away together. Allowing that the soul exists, 
 there is no proof that it persists. A very little 
 reflection, however, regarding the faculty of mem- 
 ory, will suffice to show that he is wrong. 
 
 Just as sensation involves the feeling felt and 
 the mind or soul which feels, so a remembrance 
 involves the fact remembered and the mind or soul 
 which remembers. But a third element is also 
 involved in every act of remembrance namely, 
 the soul's consciousness or recognition of its per- 
 manence. Let us take an illustration. I remem- 
 ber that ten years ago many of my opinions 
 were changed by the reading of a certain book. 
 Now this implies (1) the object or fact remem- 
 bered namely, the change of my opinions by 
 the perusal of the book. (2) My soul or mind, 
 which remembers the fact, or which, as we some- 
 times say, has the remembrance. And (3) a con- 
 sciousness of personal identity ; that is to say, a 
 conviction that the mind or soul which is now 
 experiencing the remembrance of the fact, is the
 
 42 PERSONALITY. 
 
 self-same mind or soul which formerly experienced 
 the fact itself that it is, in other words, my mind. 
 The identity of which I am conscious, is certainly 
 not an identity of body, for during the ten years 
 which have elapsed my body has lost its identity. 
 Nor is the identity an identity of phenomena, for 
 the remembrance of the fact is something essenti- 
 ally different from the fact itself. The identity of 
 which I am conscious is an identity of soul. I am 
 sure, I know, that I, who am now remembering 
 a certain change of opinions, once actually experi- 
 enced the change ; and that in the meantime I, one 
 and the self-same subject, a single, indivisible, per- 
 manent being, have been apprehending sensations, 
 and thinking thoughts, and remembering events, 
 and gathering up these varied experiences into the 
 unity of a personal life. Without a permanent or 
 persistent soul, there could be no memory ; for it 
 is just the recognition of this permanence, which is 
 the characteristic feature of every act of remem- 
 brance. This you will see more clearly, perhaps, 
 by contrasting remembrance with imagination. 1 
 may imagine rny opinions being changed in certain 
 ways ten years hence. But here no knowledge of 
 persistence is involved ; because I am not sure that 
 my opinions will be so changed : in other words, 
 I am not sure that I shall ever exist in the par-
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 43 
 
 ticular state I am imagining. But in remembrance 
 I perceive that I, who am now recollecting, did 
 actually exist in a different state, of which the 
 present remembrance is only a representation. In 
 other words, in every act of remembrance I know 
 that I have existed in at least two different 
 states, and that therefore I have persisted between 
 them. 
 
 J. S. Mill has seen very clearly that the fact of 
 memory, or the continuity of consciousness, " brings 
 us face to face with the central principle of our 
 intellectual nature." "The supposition of mental 
 permanence," he tells us, " would admit of the 
 same explanation as the permanence of the ex- 
 ternal world, and mind might be regarded as a 
 mere series of feelings, with a background of pos- 
 sibility of feeling, were it not for memory and ex- 
 pectation. They are in themselves present feelings, 
 but they involve a belief in more than their own 
 existence. They cannot be adequately expressed 
 without saying that I myself had, or shall have 
 them." With James Mill the belief that we have 
 seen an object implies simply an association be- 
 tween the idea of the object and the idea of our- 
 selves seeing it. But, as J. S. Mill shows, this will 
 not account for the phenomenon in question ; for 
 no arbitrary association between the idea of our-
 
 44 PERSONALITY. 
 
 selves and the idea of an object that we have not 
 seen will lead to the belief that we have seen it. 
 Mill acknowledges that to account for belief in 
 external objects and experienced facts, we must 
 " postulate both expectation and memory, as data 
 presupposed and built on, in every attempt to ex- 
 plain the more recondite phenomena of our being." 
 Here he has unconsciously lighted on the ego. So 
 in another place he says, " ' I ' means he who pre- 
 viously had such and such experience." But the 
 fact of the ego is neither explained nor done away 
 with by using the third personal pronoun for the 
 first. The difficulty in regard to the matter is (in 
 one well-known passage) most honestly and clearly 
 stated by him. "If we speak of the mind as a 
 series of feelings which is aware of itself as past 
 and future, we are reduced to the alternative of 
 believing that the mind is something different from 
 any series of feelings, or of accepting the paradox 
 that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series of 
 feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." In 
 other words, the alternative bases of philosophy 
 must be mystery or absurdity. This does not 
 seem, however, to be a cogent reason for founding 
 one's system upon the latter. 
 
 Eemembrance then, and with it almost the 
 whole of our experience, would be impossible
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF THE EGO. 45 
 
 without a continuous subject to remember. Mem- 
 ory is that faculty of the ego by which it recog- 
 nises revived impressions as representations of its 
 own past experience. "And without such a 
 faculty," as Dr Carpenter says, " reproductions of 
 past states would only affect us like the successive 
 phantasies in a play of the imagination." Grant- 
 ing for a moment that feelings could be conscious 
 of themselves, the knowledge of one another is not 
 implied in this. Suppose that each of the numbers 
 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 was conscious of itself as I wrote it 
 down, this could not give any of them a knowledge 
 that it formed part of a series. Suppose a line of 
 billiard-balls, each self-conscious, but with no prin- 
 ciple of connection running through them, and 
 suppose that motion is communicated to the first, 
 transferred to the second, and so on, in what 
 possible way could the last be conscious of its 
 relation to the others ? It might as well be 
 argued that a number of pearls could form a 
 chain without something to bind them together, 
 as that a number of self-conscious states could 
 form a self-conscious series without some principle 
 of continuity running through and connecting 
 them. Without such a principle I see no more 
 reason to suppose that one state could know any- 
 thing of another, than that I, by introspection,
 
 46 PEKSONALITY. 
 
 could remember the actions my father committed 
 before I was born. 
 
 So far we have been dealing merely with the 
 existence of an ego. We may know that it exists, 
 because it is presupposed throughout the whole of 
 our sentient experience. The Positive school admit 
 that knowledge involves remembrance and the ap- 
 prehension of resemblances and differences ; and we 
 have seen that these mental states are perfectly 
 inconceivable except on the supposition of a per- 
 manent ego present to the different phenomena re- 
 membered and contrasted. Further, we have seen 
 that sensations which, according to the Positivists, 
 form the raw material of all knowledge, can only 
 be apprehended by means of " transition." Feelings 
 are not felt unless they are contrasted with other 
 feelings; and this comparison is only possible if 
 the same subject has been equally present to 
 them all. Hence, in order to explain the existence 
 of a single sensation, we must postulate the exist- 
 ence of an ego which persists, while the particular 
 feelings it apprehends change and pass away. 
 
 Jacobi thought, and many seem to agree with 
 him, that that only is proved for which there is 
 found a condition. But I should rather say that 
 that is pre-eminently proved which is found to be 
 the condition of universally admitted existences.
 
 47 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE EGO. 
 
 WE come now to the question, Can we, in addition 
 to knowing that an ego must exist, know it as exist- 
 ing ? We shall be less surprised at the difficulty 
 which a man feels when " in quest of himself " to 
 quote Abraham Tucker's expression if we remem- 
 ber that he has nearly the same difficulty when 
 trying to reflect on any present feeling or thought. 
 Hume seems to think he has annihilated the ego by 
 the assertion, " I can never catch myself without an 
 impression," forgetting that if a man catches him- 
 self with one there must be a self to catch, and that 
 it is almost as difficult to catch the impression as 
 the self ; for the very effort to do so tends to make 
 it disappear. Comte says that as soon as we begin 
 to reflect on a feeling, the feeling itself has vanished. 
 This is a somewhat exaggerated statement, for a 
 second's reflection on the toothache, for example,
 
 48 PERSONALITY. 
 
 does not generally prove a complete cure. But still 
 reflection, even upon the toothache, will diminish 
 the previous intensity of the pain; and thus the 
 original feeling will be changed. It is almost 
 entirely to representations in memory that we are 
 indebted for a knowledge of what our experience 
 has actually been. Hamilton says we can appre- 
 hend six things at once. I do not find the capabili- 
 ties of my own mind nearly so great as this state- 
 ment would make them. But even granting his 
 position, it is still true that the whole of my ex- 
 perience, with the exception of those six things, 
 is past or future. Hence, practically and ulti- 
 mately, knowledge may be said to rest on faith in 
 memory. 
 
 As memory plays such an important part in cog- 
 nition generally, we must be prepared that it should 
 do the same in our cognition of self. Still, if I have 
 never had a moment's knowledge of myself, I can- 
 not possibly remember having had it ; and we are 
 here face to face with the problem how can the 
 knower know himself ? 
 
 Herbert Spencer, in his ' First Principles,' though 
 he asserts that a permanent subject exists, distinctly 
 denies that it can be known. 1 
 
 1 In his ' Psychology ' he adopts the ordinary Positive notion, 
 that the ego is nothing but the transitory state of the moment.
 
 THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE EGO. 49 
 
 First, let us see what he says to show that we 
 are bound to believe in it. " How can conscious- 
 ness be wholly resolved into impressions and ideas 
 that is, into sensations and thoughts when an im- 
 pression necessarily implies something impressed? 
 Or again, how can the sceptic, who has decomposed 
 his consciousness into impressions and ideas, ex- 
 plain the fact that he considers them as his ? Or 
 once more, if he admits (as he must) that he has 
 an impression of his personal existence, what war- 
 rant can he show for rejecting this impression as 
 unreal, while he accepts all his other impressions 
 as real ? Unless he can give satisfactory answers 
 to these questions, which he cannot, he must aban- 
 don his conclusions, and must admit the reality of 
 the individual mind." 
 
 But having thus shown that we must believe in 
 lie soul, he proceeds to argue that we can never 
 know it. " Unavoidable as is this belief [in the 
 existence of the individual soul], established though 
 it is not only by the assent of mankind at large, 
 endorsed by diverse philosophers and by the suicide 
 of the sceptical argument, it is yet a belief admitting 
 of no justification by reason ; nay, it is a belief 
 
 His whole teaching on this subject is singularly confused and 
 contradictory, His curious identification of the finite ego with 
 "the Absolute " I have elsewhere examined. See ' Belief in God,' 
 chap. 3. 
 
 D
 
 50 PERSONALITY. 
 
 which reason, when pressed for a distinct answer, 
 rejects. The fundamental condition of all con- 
 sciousness is the antithesis of subject and object. 
 But what is the corollary of this doctrine, as bear- 
 ing on the consciousness of self ? The mental act 
 in which self is known implies, like every other 
 mental act, a perceiving subject and an object per- 
 ceived. If, then, the object perceived is self, what 
 is the subject that perceives ? Or if it be the true 
 self which thinks, what other self can be thought 
 of ? Clearly the true cognisance of self implies a 
 state in which the knowing and the known are one, 
 in which subject and object are identified ; and this 
 is the annihilation of both. So that the personality 
 of which each is conscious, and of which the exist- 
 ence is to each a fact beyond all others most cer- 
 tain, is yet a thing which cannot be known at all ; 
 knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of 
 thought." 
 
 There is a certain law of thought then, accord- 
 ing to Herbert Spencer, which prevents us from 
 knowing ourselves. Now this law, let rne ask 
 you carefully to notice, he virtually gives us in 
 the passage I have already quoted, under two dif- 
 ferent forms. First, thus : all knowledge involves 
 the relation of subject and object. Second, thus : 
 the object must always be something different from
 
 THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE EGO. 51 
 
 the subject. Now these two modes of statement 
 are not, as he imagines, different ways of express- 
 ing the same law ; they are totally different laws. 
 The one is a law of nature, the other is only a 
 law of his own. To say that knowledge involves 
 the relation of subject and object, is merely 
 to say that the term knowledge, just like the 
 term sensation, is a single word standing for a 
 double fact, and means something known oy some 
 one. There can be no knowledge where there is 
 no one to know ; and contrariwise, no one can 
 know, and at the same time know nothing. This 
 is of course a self-evident truth, involved in the 
 very nature of thought. But to say that the ob- 
 ject must always be something different from the 
 subject in other words, that the subject can never 
 become an object to itself, is to make a totally 
 different assertion, an assertion which, so far 
 from being self-evidently true, is evidently, if not 
 self-evidently, false. It is false because, Spencer 
 himself being witness, it is contradicted by ex- 
 perience. 
 
 Personality, he says, is " a fact of which each one 
 is conscious." Now since consciousness is merely 
 another name for knowledge, and personality is 
 but another name for self, in saying we are con- 
 scious of personality he virtually asserts that we
 
 52 PEKSONALITY. 
 
 know ourselves. Nor is there any vagueness and 
 indistinctness about this knowledge. Personality, 
 he says again, is " the fact beyond all others the 
 most certain." Now the things of which we are 
 most certain are, of course, the things which we 
 may most certainly be said to know. And yet 
 the fact which stands first in the order of certainty, 
 Spencer will not allow to stand even last in the 
 order of knowledge, but declares that in regard to 
 it we are, and must ever remain, completely ignor- 
 ant. It follows then, you see, from Spencer's 
 so-called law of thought, that we are sure of what 
 is somewhat doubtful, but are not sure of that 
 in regard to which there can be no doubt; we 
 may be said to know things of which we are 
 comparatively ignorant, but must be declared 
 ignorant of that which emphatically we know ; 
 all facts are knowable except the most certain 
 fact of all, and that is altogether unknowable: 
 in a word, ignorance is knowledge and knowledge 
 is ignorance. Hence it must be inferred that 
 Spencer's supposed law of thought is merely an 
 imagination of his own; for the real bond fide laws 
 of thought never land us in absurdity. 
 
 Perhaps a parody of Spencer's reasoning may 
 make its fallaciousness more evident. Just as 
 he tries to show the impossibility of self-know-
 
 THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE EGO. 53 
 
 ledge, let us try to show the impossibility of 
 self-love. We might say " The fundamental con- 
 dition of all love is the antithesis of subject and 
 object. If then the object loved be self, what 
 is the subject that loves ? or if it be the true 
 self that loves, what other self can it be that is 
 loved ? Self-love implies the identity of subject 
 and object ; but, by hypothesis, they must always 
 be different : therefore no man can love himself." 
 Now since in point of fact most persons do love 
 themselves, there is manifestly something wrong 
 about this argument. The flaw lies in the hypo- 
 thesis. It is an arbitrary and false assumption 
 that the object must always be different from the 
 subject. The fallacy is a case of petitio principii 
 the assumption containing by implication the point 
 to be proved. It may be objected a man does 
 not love himself exactly in the same way as he 
 loves another. But that is no argument for re- 
 stricting the word love to the latter case. On 
 the contrary, since the chief difference often lies 
 in the certainty and intensity of self-love and 
 the feebleness or doubtfulness of love for others, 
 it might be urged, and indeed has been by Koche- 
 foucauld, that men never really love except when 
 they love themselves. The doctrine of Roche- 
 foucauld may be open to grave question, and I
 
 54 PERSONALITY. 
 
 for one do not believe it to be true. But if his 
 view was really confirmed by experience if 
 men's love for others was found to be universally 
 feeble in comparison with their love for themselves, 
 it would follow, when we used the term in its 
 fullest and strictest sense, we should have to say 
 that men loved themselves alone. Similarly, if 
 personality be, as Spencer says, "a fact above all 
 others the most certain," and if we are going to 
 be very strict in our use of the word knowledge 
 so strict as to apply it only to that which is 
 pre-eminently worthy of the name we must say 
 that men never know anything but themselves. 
 
 The opposite of Terrier's postulate is often 
 assumed to be self-evidently true. Philosophical 
 writers frequently speak as if we might justly say, 
 "that which always knows can never, with its 
 knowledge, have any knowledge of itself; or, in 
 other words, that which must always be the 
 knower can never be the known." I am not 
 aware, however, on what ground this assumption 
 is made. True, we cannot understand how the 
 subject can know itself; but can we understand 
 how it can know the object ? True, we can only 
 dimly understand what the subject is; but can 
 we do more in regard to the object ? " In all 
 probability," says De Morgan in his ' Formal
 
 THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE EGO. 55 
 
 Logic,' " we should need new modes of percep- 
 tion in order to know mind as we know colour 
 or motion." Certainly an intelligence, for whom 
 the reflex knowledge of itself was the same thing 
 as the objective knowledge of its states, could not 
 be constituted as we are ; but what reason is there 
 to think that any such intelligence exists ? Of the 
 two assumptions that a rational being (capable of 
 an indefinitely progressive knowledge of objects) 
 can never know itself, and that such a being must 
 have some knowledge of itself, the latter hypothesis 
 seems to be much more probable than the former, 
 and it is supported by the consensus gentium. Men 
 believe not only that they know, but that they 
 know. The knowledge of self, or the relation of 
 the subject to itself, is after all not more myste- 
 rious than the knowledge of other things, or the 
 relation of subject to object. Nor are we more 
 ignorant of the ultimate nature of ourselves than 
 we are of the ultimate nature of a pebble or a 
 primrose. 1 
 
 " Flower in the crannied wall, 
 
 I pluck you out of the crannies, 
 Hold you there, root and all, in my hand, 
 
 Little flower ; but if I could understand 
 What you are, root and all, and all in all, 
 
 I should know what God and man is." 
 
 1 Soc also my 'Agnosticism,' pp. 38-44.
 
 56 PERSONALITY. 
 
 The word consciousness, which has unhappily 
 been employed with the greatest possible laxity, 
 seems to me well fitted to express our know- 
 ledge of ourselves. Bain enumerates a number 
 of different senses in which the word has been 
 commonly used. 1. For sentient and intelligent 
 life, as distinguished from unsentient existence. 
 2. Dugald Stewart defines consciousness as the 
 immediate knowledge which the mind has of 
 its sensations and thoughts and present opera- 
 tions, as opposed to the knowledge of the ex- 
 ternal world. 3. Bain, Hamilton, Mansel, Spencer, 
 M'Cosh, &c., speak of the mind as conscious, even 
 when engaged with the external world itself. 4. 
 It is often used for strong and irresistible belief. 
 But the word appears specially fitted for enabling 
 us to express the knowledge we have of ourselves 
 along with our states. In sensation we apprehend 
 a feeling, in perception an object, in knowledge a 
 proposition; but in consciousness we apprehend 
 ourselves, along with these states, as their subject. 
 In other words, we know that we know. It would 
 be better, it seems to me, to use the word, not (as 
 is so frequently done) for the knowledge of mental 
 states which we have along with ourselves, but for 
 the knowledge of ourselves which we have along 
 with the states.
 
 THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE EGO. 57 
 
 I have said that I do not think consciousness, 
 or the apprehension of self, is combined with every 
 mental phenomenon. In the case of pleasures and 
 pains especially the more intense ones I seem 
 clearly to apprehend myself as apprehending them ; 
 whereas in perception, still more in abstruse reflec- 
 tion, I am so engaged with the objective as to be, 
 in the one case almost, and in the other altogether, 
 unconscious of myself: though afterwards, if I 
 come to think (by the aid of memory) of what 
 happened, I can discover that there must have been 
 an " I " to perceive and reflect, and that the same 
 I now drawing this inference was then perceiving 
 or reflecting. But when I do apprehend myself as 
 the subject of a present state, I am as certain of my 
 own existence as I am of the existence of the state. 
 Both apprehensions are, I think, absolutely coexist- 
 ent in time. I see no reason why the one should 
 be called knowledge and the other ignorance. 
 Again, I am as sure that certain events have been 
 apprehended by me, and formed part of my per- 
 sonal life, as I am that these events have happened. 
 Hence " the permanent nexus, which is never itself 
 a state of consciousness, but which holds states of 
 consciousness together," l does not seem to me to be 
 legitimately called unknown. But of course a fully 
 1 Mr Spencer's description of the ego.
 
 58 PERSONALITY. 
 
 developed consciousness of self such a conscious- 
 ness as deserves the name of knowledge in the 
 strictest sense of that word can only result from 
 many simple apprehensions of self, from the use of 
 memory, comparison and reflection, from a fairly 
 developed knowledge of others, from a clear percep- 
 tion of personal agency and aims, and especially 
 perhaps, as Ueberweg suggests, from our sense of 
 duty. 
 
 " The baby new to earth and sky, 
 What time his tender palm is pressed 
 Against the circle of the breast, 
 Has never thought that this is I. 
 
 But as he grows, he gathers much, 
 And learns the use of I and Me, 
 And finds I am not what I see, 
 And other than the things I touch. 
 
 So rounds he to a separate mind, 
 From whence clear memory may begin, 
 As through the frame that bounds him in, 
 His isolation grows defined." 
 
 The fact that the complete knowledge of self is 
 a gradual acquisition removes an objection to the 
 existence of the ego, raised by J. S. Mill, viz., that 
 because in the first instant of our existence we have 
 no conception of self, therefore the ego is a gratuit- 
 ous fiction a mere product of generalisation. Now 
 of course we have no conception of anything in the
 
 THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE EGO. 59 
 
 first instant of our existence, nor in the tirst instant 
 of its apprehension ; inasmuch as a conception is 
 only formed after several apprehensions have shown 
 us what are the essential qualities of the object 
 conceived. But a number of non-apprehensions of a 
 thing could never lead to our forming a conception 
 of it. Not even an infinite series of sensations or 
 thoughts, in which no ego was present, could ever 
 give us the conception of an ego that must be 
 present to every sensation and thought. It is 
 impossible to generalise something out of nothing. 
 It is strange that Mill should have fallen into 
 his present fallacy. He was a logician, and he 
 knew well enough (though here he seems to have 
 forgotten) that a conception what in logical lan- 
 guage is called a concept or notion or idea can 
 never coexist with the first apprehension of an 
 object. It involves a comparison of various ex- 
 amples of that object, and an abstraction of the 
 qualities in which they agree. For instance, we 
 conceive of a man, according to the old scholastic 
 definition, as "a rational animal." Mill might as 
 well have argued that man is a pure fiction because, 
 the first time we saw a human being, we formed 
 no such conception of him. : ' Children," says 
 Aristotle, "call all men father." It is not till 
 after many presentations of the object, that we
 
 60 PERSONALITY. 
 
 begin to distinguish the points which they have 
 in common from those in which they differ, and 
 out of the former to construct our idea. 
 
 It is to be observed, moreover, that picturablencss 
 is not necessary to the existence of a concept. Mill 
 has himself strongly insisted upon the difference 
 between imagination and conception. Conception 
 is merely, he tells us, the attention which we pay 
 to the common qualities of objects. The word man 
 may suggest to our minds the image of one or more 
 particular men; but in itself the mental conception, 
 as he says, is nothing more than the two qualities 
 of animality and rationality, united together, ac- 
 cording to the laws of association, by the common 
 term. Hence we may have conceptions not only of 
 what is not, but of what cannot, be pictured in our 
 minds. And, indeed, a little reflection will suffice 
 to show that in the last resort everything of which 
 we form a conception involves an unpicturable 
 element. For a concept consists only of qualities ; 
 and qualities must be the qualities of something: 
 but that of which they are the qualities has never 
 been seen, and therefore can never be imagined. 
 Or, as this mode of statement would be objected to 
 by the Positivists, who think that qualities may be 
 the qualities of nothing, let me put it thus. The
 
 THE SELF-KNOWLEDGE OF THE EGO. 61 
 
 various parts of a concept are bound together in 
 the mind by the associative power of the word 
 which stands for them all collectively. But we find 
 that the qualities, which are united in the mind by 
 means of language, are united in fact in the actual 
 world. They cannot be bound together by nothing. 
 There must be something which makes and keeps 
 the combination of qualities in a pebble different 
 from those in a diamond or a poodle. The com- 
 plete analysis of a material object shows us that it 
 is a something having, or combining, certain quali- 
 ties. The complete analysis of a natural force 
 shows us that it is a something characterised by a 
 certain combination of effects. The complete analy- 
 sis of an ego shows that it is a something possessing 
 a certain combination of faculties. The unpictur- 
 able element is present in all three cases alike. So 
 far as it implies ignorance in the first two, so far 
 and only so far does it imply ignorance in the 
 last. 
 
 Hence on many grounds we maintain that the 
 ego is a real, though not a physical, existence. 
 Without a permanent subject there could never 
 have existed a single remembrance or cognition, 
 nor even a sensation. So far negatively. But 
 further positively : we are sometimes conscious of
 
 62 PERSONALITY. 
 
 ourselves ; apprehending ourselves along with our 
 states in the same indivisible moment of time ; and 
 after reflection upon these past experiences, we are 
 able to form a conception of self not less distinct, 
 at any rate, than are our conceptions of material 
 objects or of natural forces. 1 
 
 1 See also ' Agnosticism,' pp. 43, 44.
 
 63 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 THE FEEEDOM OF THE EGO. 
 
 Now comes the question, Am I, or am I not, a free 
 agent ? Are my volitions made for me, or created 
 by me ? Am I conscious, in willing, merely that a 
 volition has been formed, or do I know that I have 
 formed it ? 
 
 The theory of a necessity in human actions, simi- 
 lar to the necessity obtaining in the external phe- 
 nomena of nature, has been maintained by writers 
 of very different schools, and upon very different 
 grounds. Some, like Jonathan Edwards, deduce 
 it from the universality of the law of cause and 
 effect; others, like Buckle, make it a matter of 
 Baconian observation. We have the clearest and 
 most elaborate explanation of the sensational doc- 
 trine of necessity in Bain's 'Emotions and Will.' 
 The necessitarian theory of this school is based on 
 the hypothesis that a human being consists only
 
 64 PERSONALITY. 
 
 of a series of successive states, which cause one 
 another, or are caused by external influences ; and 
 volition with these thinkers only means the spon- 
 taneous rushing into full activity of the nascent 
 nerve-force of an idea. We have already seen that 
 such a succession of states is impossible and con- 
 tradictory ; but it will be instructive to study the 
 subject from another point of view, as we must now 
 do in examining the theory of volition. 
 
 Bain's account of the development of the will is 
 a singularly ingenious piece of reasoning. But just 
 like his theory of cognition, it is entirely vitiated 
 by his arguing throughout as if sensations were 
 absolute objects not requiring and implying a cor- 
 relative subject. The fundamental elements of 
 will, he says, are (1) a spontaneous tendency to 
 movement, which is the response of the system to 
 nutrition ; and (2) the link between a present feel- 
 ing and certain muscular actions, whereby one 
 comes under the control of the other. " We have 
 only to suppose movements spontaneously begun 
 and accidentally causing pleasure, and then we can 
 understand that a few repetitions of the fortuitous 
 concurrence of pleasure with a certain movement, 
 will lead to the forging of an acquired connection, 
 so that the pleasure, or its idea, shall at once evoke 
 the proper movement." Now when Bain says,
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 65 
 
 " Supposing such movements spontaneously begun 
 and accidentally causing pleasure," &c., I ask, 
 Causing pleasure to whom ? In passing from the 
 movement to the pleasure resulting from it, Bain 
 allows the ego of the metaphysician to slip in un- 
 observed. And we have here an additional source 
 of confusion. Not only are sensations and volitions 
 commonly spoken of by writers like Bain as if they 
 were things existing per sc or absolute objects; 
 but often, as here, the subject of the state is ima- 
 gined to be an object under the microscope of the 
 physiologist. Bain's transition from movement to 
 pleasure seems to imply that he regards the matter 
 thus. There is a visible motion in one part of the 
 brain, and a visible pleasure not a pleasure felt 
 by any one, but a pleasure seen by the physiologist 
 in another part ; then according to the law of 
 brain action, by which two co-existent processes 
 recall one another, there comes to be an inseparable 
 association between them. But there is really no 
 association whatever between the two things: for 
 the motion is seen or imagined by the physiologist, 
 while the pleasure is felt by some one else. 
 
 Let us examine Bain's theory somewhat in detail. 
 According to him, there is " no characteristic form 
 of consciousness for volition." A volition is merely 
 the association between a desire and the actions 
 
 E
 
 66 PERSONALITY. 
 
 necessary for its accomplishment, " A simple but 
 typical example of what takes place in all volition 
 is to be found in the sucking infant. The sight of 
 the breast becomes associated with the feeling of 
 nourishment, and a volitional tie is established be- 
 tween this and the movements necessary for ap- 
 proaching it. The fancied unity of the voluntary 
 power suggested by the appearance assumed by it 
 in after-life, when we seem able to set going any 
 action on the slightest wish, is the culmination of 
 a vast range of detailed associations, whose history 
 has been lost sight of. In vocal acquisitions we 
 can see the truth of this theory the spontaneous 
 commencement, repetition made each time with 
 less difficulty, and lastly the link complete. The 
 ideal exertion, and a stimulus of pleasure or pain, 
 lead to the occurrence of the real exertion. It is 
 the property of our intellectual nature that, for 
 all purposes of action, the remembrance or anticipa- 
 tion of a feeling can operate in the same way as its 
 real presence." Now this may go far towards 
 accounting for our being able to produce effects 
 by means of the will, but it is no explanation at 
 all of the nature of the will itself. 
 
 I can best explain my meaning by a quotation 
 from Dr Carpenter's ' Human Physiology.' "Even 
 in purely volitional movements, those prompted by
 
 THE FKEEDOM OF THE EGO. 67 
 
 a distinct effort of the will do not directly produce 
 results, but play, as it were, on the automatic 
 apparatus, by which the requisite nervo-muscular 
 combination is brought into action. The training 
 which develops the inarticulate cry of the infant 
 into human language consists in fixing the atten- 
 tion on the audible result desired, the selection of 
 that one of the imitative efforts to produce it which 
 is most nearly successful, and the repetition of this 
 till it has become habitual or secondarily auto- 
 matic. The will can thenceforward reproduce any 
 sound once acquired, by calling on the automatic 
 apparatus for the particular combination of move- 
 ments which it has grown into the power of exe- 
 cuting in response to each preconception. What 
 we will is not to throw this or that muscle into 
 contraction, but to produce a certain preconceived 
 result. Otherwise we should need to know what 
 the muscles are, and how to combine them in- 
 tentionally; but even an anatomist is no better 
 able than the completest ignoramus to execute a 
 movement he has never practised. The relation 
 between the automatic activity of the body and the 
 volitional direction may be compared to the loco- 
 motive power of a horse under guidance of a skilful 
 rider. It is not the rider's whip and spur that 
 furnish the power, but the nerves and muscles of
 
 68 PERSONALITY. 
 
 the horse; and when these have been exhausted, 
 no further action can be got out of them even by 
 the sharpest stimulation. But the rate and direc- 
 tion of the movement are determined by the will 
 of the rider. Sometimes, it is true, an unusual 
 excitement calls forth the essential independence 
 of the equine nature, and the horse runs away with 
 his master, just as in spasms and convulsions the 
 voluntary muscles are thrown into violent contrac- 
 tions in spite of voluntary resistance. On the 
 other hand, the horse can find its way home, whilst 
 its master is lost in reverie, just as our own legs 
 can do. And the training of the horse corresponds 
 to the training of our automatic mechanism, the 
 result required being indicated to the learner, every 
 effort that tends to produce it being encouraged 
 and fixed by repetition, and every unsuitable action 
 repressed." Bain has really explained nothing 
 more than this automatic element in human action 
 "A desire for a certain pleasure," says Bain, 
 "and an idea of how to get it, are the two ele- 
 ments that account for and constitute volition ; 
 the first calls forth the necessary energy, the 
 second guides it into the right channels, and the 
 volition is the immediate connection between the 
 two." But the mystery of volition really lies a 
 step further back viz., in the being who desires
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 69 
 
 an end, and has an idea of the means by which 
 the end may be attained. How often must it 
 be repeated that there are no such things as ideas 
 or desires per se ? If it be said that corresponding 
 to the desire there is a molecular motion in one 
 part of my brain, and corresponding to the idea 
 a molecular motion in another part, I do not deny 
 it. But if these motions could actually be seen 
 by the physiologist, they could not possibly account, 
 by themselves, for their supposed effects. He 
 would see one motion producing another; but I, 
 the conscious subject, perceive no such motions, 
 and were it not for the physiologist, I should never 
 have known that there were any motions at all. 
 
 It does not follow, I admit, because sentient 
 creatures exist as the necessary percipients of 
 desires and ideas that therefore they are free. It 
 might be that they were only capable of receiving 
 the effects of the cerebral movements. It might 
 be that they were compelled to determine on 
 attaining every object desired, by making actual 
 the ideal representation of the means. Into this 
 we must inquire. 
 
 The will, Bain says, can suppress emotions 
 "through the operations of its own voluntary 
 muscles." It suppresses first the actual move- 
 ments that accompany emotion, and this tends to
 
 70 PERSONALITY. 
 
 the suppression of the nervous currents that 
 excite them. But he does not tell us whence 
 the desire, or stimulation of pleasure, is to come, 
 which, according to his own theory, is an essential 
 prerequisite to any such attempt at suppression. 
 There can be no association between an emotion, 
 and an idea that tends to suppress it ; and even if 
 there were, it would not account for the fact that 
 the former gradually grows weaker and the latter 
 stronger. Can any explanation be given of this 
 fact except that it is due to the voluntary activity 
 of the ego ? " In attention," says Bain, " the force 
 of the will is set in array against the power of 
 the intellectual associations, and depends on the 
 earnestness of my purpose that is, the strength 
 of motive growing out of some pleasure or pain 
 ^present or apprehended. As soon as the incon- 
 gruity of an idea with what we are seeking for 
 is seen, the tendency is for the idea to vanish 
 forthwith from the mind. The conscious ego 
 consists of one or more states, each of which 
 causes other adhering states to follow, and others 
 of which determine whether these shall remain." 
 The ego, you will observe, according to Bain, is 
 not something underlying and distinct from the 
 mental states, but it " consists of " one or more of 
 them. Hence the states, as such, must be regarded
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 71 
 
 as absolute objects; for they have no subject to 
 apprehend them. Now, can anything be more 
 contradictory than the conception of several of 
 these absolute objects, none of which persist, but 
 one of which dismisses all that are incongruous 
 with itself ? If Professor Bain should say that 
 this representation of his views is a misrepresenta- 
 tion, let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
 he really means by a state some one conscious of 
 itself and its affections. Then if the ego at any 
 moment consists of only one such state, as soon 
 as it is past there must be another ego ; (for, 
 according to his theory, there is nothing which 
 persists between state and state:) hence there 
 would be nothing to connect two successive states ; 
 and so there would be no possibility of memory. 
 On the other hand, if we say the ego consists of 
 several such states, we involve ourselves in the 
 difficulties that arise from supposing several egos 
 at once, which can know nothing of one another 
 since there is no principle of continuity running 
 through them still less of the combination of egos 
 that precede or follow them. 
 
 " Deliberation," says Bain, " is the voluntary act 
 under a concurrence or complication of motive- 
 forces. During the moments of suspended action 
 (suspended because the forces are equal) the cur-
 
 72 PERSONALITY. 
 
 rent of thought brings forward some new motive. 
 I know from experience that it is dangerous to 
 carry into effect the result of the first combat of 
 opposing forces, and the apprehension of evil con- 
 sequences is a stimulant of the will like any other 
 pain. A well-trained intellect, at the end of the 
 proper time, gives way to the side that then ap- 
 pears the strongest. The well-disciplined, deliber- 
 ative will resists the promptings of the strongest 
 side, till nothing new any longer presents itself. 
 An educated activity, motives to the will, and an 
 intelligence to represent these motives, when they 
 are not actual pleasures and pains, and to har- 
 monise our successive operations, are the general 
 foundation of those multifarious movements that 
 constitute the stream of our active life." In what 
 way it is possible to conceive myself as possess- 
 ing an intelligence that harmonises the opera- 
 tions of my life, without conceiving of myself as 
 a permanent ego different from the succession of 
 my states, I am unable to comprehend. Here, as 
 elsewhere, the ego which is theoretically denied is 
 practically assumed. Bain however, (and in this 
 he is more persistent and consistent than most 
 others of the same school), always endeavours to 
 represent man as a passive percipient of the drama 
 of his own life. In deliberating, he is merely the
 
 THE FKEEDOM OF THE EGO. 73 
 
 subject of thoughts, each of which may, or may 
 not, have other thoughts adhering to it. If they 
 have, new motives are brought to bear upon the 
 man, but this is only due to the spontaneously 
 associative processes of his brain. In common 
 however with all who support the doctrine of 
 necessity, he sometimes contradicts himself in 
 representing "the well-trained deliberate will" as 
 " waiting till the proper time, and then giving way 
 to what appears the strongest motive." Man's 
 actions, then, cannot be said to be merely the 
 effects of casual succession of states, exactly in 
 the same u~ay as the products of a machine are 
 the result of a casual succession of forces. A 
 machine does not wait " till the proper time," and 
 then "give way to what appears the strongest 
 motive." This difference between man and nature, 
 between the physical and metaphysical, a difference 
 that seems to me as broad as the universe itself, 
 is mentioned by Professor Bain without his ever 
 perceiving that it is a difference at all. And yet 
 it is a fact which will for ever prove there is some- 
 thing in the world other than the physical and 
 phenomenal, and will for ever prevent the pro- 
 duction of a consistent philosophy when man is 
 considered merely as one of the processes of nature. 
 Very much of our mental life, no doubt, is quite
 
 74 PERSONALITY. 
 
 independent of volition. The power of the brain to 
 retain impressions and suggest ideas is proportional 
 to its quality and conformation, and upon these cir- 
 cumstances will depend, to some extent, the capa- 
 bility of the ego, just as a workman's capability 
 will depend largely upon the tools with which 
 he is supplied. Further, the brain of every new- 
 born infant has lessons, or the material for lessons, 
 latent in it and impressed upon it. It can draw 
 
 " From treasures stored by generations past, 
 In -winding chambers cf receptive sense.' 1 
 
 The law that an impression once made is easily 
 revived applies not only to each single brain, but 
 to brains connected by natural descent. It is in 
 this way, as Herbert Spencer has shown, that many 
 truths which are a posteriori for the race, are a priori 
 for the individual. There is an innate capacity 
 in the brain, as he would perhaps say, for recog- 
 nising these truths, or, as I should prefer putting 
 it, for the reproduction of those molecular changes 
 which are necessary to the recognition of these 
 truths by the ego. Moreover, much of our mental 
 work is undoubtedly carried on by the aid of 
 unconscious cerebration. "It is possible," says 
 Dr Carpenter, "to read or write for hours by 
 automatic action, the will being called into play
 
 THE FEEEDOM OF THE EGO. 75 
 
 only when fatigue or distraction renders it difficult 
 to keep the attention. Even in man, intellectual 
 operations of a high order may go on automatically, 
 one state of consciousness calling forth another 
 without volition ; and ideational and emotional 
 states may express themselves in muscular action 
 without, or against, volition." 
 
 The difference between recollection and reminis- 
 cence affords a striking illustration of the difference 
 between automatic and volitional action. " Often," 
 as Miss Cobbe says, " after trying in vain to recall 
 a name, we deliberately turn away, not intending 
 to abandon the pursuit, but as if possessed of an 
 obedient secretary, whom we could order to hunt 
 up what we wanted," and who, as Dr Carpenter 
 adds, " is more likely to find what we want when 
 we leave him to search for it in his own way, 
 instead of worrying him to look into this, that or 
 the other place for it." It really seems as if our 
 conscious and volitional interference were in such 
 a case misplaced. At any rate, we see clearly 
 that there are two distinct ways of going to work, 
 and two distinct kinds of remembrance viz., the 
 involuntary (or memory), when one idea calls up 
 another, we being merely the passive recipients or 
 percipients of both ; and the voluntary (or remin- 
 iscence), when we actually search for a particular
 
 76 PERSONALITY. 
 
 missing idea. This distinction is as old as Aris- 
 totle, who used the terms i^v^t] and dva/mjo-ts ; but 
 it seems to me in danger of being lost again, at 
 any rate by Professor Bain and his school. The 
 difference is great and important. Memory chiefly 
 depends on the brain, as may be seen from the 
 story that Coleridge relates of a servant-girl who 
 was able to speak correct Hebrew in a state of 
 fever, merely because she had formerly heard her 
 master reciting Hebrew sentences. Becollection, 
 on the other hand, consists essentially in the volun- 
 tary fixing of attention on an idea already pres- 
 ent to the mind. This act of attention serves to 
 intensify the idea itself, and so to intensify its 
 associative powers. 
 
 Attention, deliberation, and suspense themselves 
 imply volitions. The ego is able not merely to 
 resolve on initiating a course of conduct, which 
 reflection has shown to be good or desirable, but 
 it can determine to refrain from the initiation 
 until reflection does show its goodness or desir- 
 ability. It can check "the nascent nerve -force 
 of an idea." Carpenter shows that in certain 
 abnormal conditions of the brain, produced by 
 disease or stimulants, and in the case of individ- 
 uals such as Coleridge, through whose minds ideas 
 flow in continuous streams, but unsolicited and
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 77 
 
 without any fixed order, the power of volitional 
 control is small or nil. In these cases the brain 
 seems to be inefficient as an instrument of will. 
 The difference between automatic and volitional 
 action is sometimes strikingly shown by the dif- 
 ference in their results. Compare, e.g., the works 
 of Hegel with those of Coleridge. 
 
 The distinction between the voluntary and in- 
 voluntary exercise of thought, and between its 
 physiological and psychological aspects, is well 
 stated by E. S. Wyld, in his ' Physics and Philoso- 
 phy of the Senses.' " 1. The brain, in order that it 
 may be a fitting organ of the mind, has a natural 
 tendency to repeat any series of changes which it 
 has once acquired. 2. These cerebral actions are 
 the symbols of thought, but they are no more 
 thought itself than the sentences of a book. 3. 
 We must assume the presence of an intelligent 
 principle to interpret the symbols, or we cannot 
 conceive thought to exist. 4. Though the brain 
 may follow a certain involuntary course of action, 
 and may thus suggest to the mind a train of 
 thought, we know that the mind has the power 
 of controlling the cerebral action. We can inter- 
 rupt one chain of thought and start another, and 
 out of a variety of thoughts we can reject those 
 that are the most pressing."
 
 78 PERSONALITY. 
 
 Now let us ask what we mean, or should mean, 
 by freedom. Bain says "it is surprising that the 
 connection between motives and actions should 
 ever have been questioned, since every human 
 being every day of his life is practically depending 
 on its truth." The connection ought not to have 
 been questioned. What should be denied is that 
 there is an absolutely necessary connection between 
 this motive and that action. So far as men possess 
 the same nature, the influence of motives upon 
 them will be similar. Eeason, as Mr Grote said, is 
 " a deindividualising principle." Therefore, so far 
 as men are rational, they will be similarly influ- 
 enced by similar motives. When men have lost 
 their reason or their will, their actions will of 
 course be irrationally and involuntarily determined 
 by motives, just as if they were mere objects in the 
 external world. Mr Buckle's argument against 
 freedom that a certain number of persons must 
 always be guilty of certain crimes because a cer- 
 tain number always are applies mainly to those 
 who, by a long course of bad habits, have prac- 
 tically lost that will which they once possessed, 
 and have thus become legitimate subjects for the 
 statistician. Mansel stoutly denies the predicta- 
 bility of human actions. I incline to think that,
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 79 
 
 in all but absolutely perfect or absolutely imperfect 
 beings, there would now and again be an element 
 of caprice which could not be foreseen. But even 
 if we allow, with Kant and others, that human 
 actions are not essentially unpredictable, the differ- 
 ence between freedom and necessity does not lie in 
 the fact of predictability or unpredictability. The 
 difference is this. I commit an action by necessity, 
 if I am made to commit it by forces which I have 
 no power either temporarily or permanently to 
 resist. I commit an action freely, if I am endowed 
 with the power of refraining from it till reflection 
 has convinced me of its desirability, and with the 
 power, after such reflection and conviction, of deter- 
 mining to commit it. In the latter case, even if at 
 last I act in accordance with the motives originally 
 presented, the volition, and so the action, is caused 
 not by the motives but by me. 
 
 The doctrine of necessity has received its chief 
 support from the use of the word " motive," which, 
 when understood literally, sweeps away all oppos- 
 ing arguments by assuming the point to be proved 
 viz., that man is moved in the same way as a 
 material object. What Stirling calls " a judicious 
 playing on the word motive " has made the work of 
 the necessitarians uncommonly easy. It is a term,
 
 80 PERSONALITY. 
 
 however, that has no business in the discussion, 
 until, at any rate, it has been qualified by the as- 
 sertion that it is used in a figurative sense. Sup- 
 pose that a man is in a hurry to keep an important 
 engagement, and that a violent wind is blowing 
 dead against him. It seems to me simply absurd 
 to apply the same name of motive to the physical 
 wind which drives him back, and to the psychical 
 remembrance of his engagement, after reflection 
 on which he urges himself forward. There is 
 no such analogy as the word motive suggests be- 
 tween the movements of a machine and the action 
 of an ego. It is said that whatever has motives 
 brought to bear upon it, must move in proportion to 
 the strength and direction of the motives ; which 
 is true enough in the physical sphere, but which 
 is the very question in dispute regarding mind. 
 As Reid puts it, motives cannot determine and 
 plan and resolve, &c. If a number of forces be 
 brought to bear upon a machine, it must at once 
 involuntarily yield to the resultant of their com- 
 bined influences. But when a number of motives 
 are presented to an ego, he need not, in fact he 
 generally does not, yield at once to any of them ; 
 he can pause, he can reflect, he can call up new 
 and more powerful motives. Supposing that there 
 is a motive for me to go out of doors and a motive
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 81 
 
 for me to remain in my easy-chair, if the analogy 
 so often insisted on were correct, the resultant of 
 these forces might move me into the middle of the 
 room or precipitate me from the window. But, 
 fortunately for this human life of ours, there is 
 no psychological parallelogram of forces. Physical 
 and psychical motives have nothing in common. 
 The weight of the latter is imponderable; their 
 force is immaterial ; their effects depend not so 
 much upon their inherent power, as upon the 
 influence which the ego chooses to concede them. 
 In a word, psychical motives are reasons, by re- 
 flection upon which an ego may have recourse to 
 self -adjustment, but not forces by which he is 
 involuntarily adjusted. Nay, if the word motive 
 must be used, I will go so far as to maintain that 
 a man may sometimes act according to the weakest 
 motive. When, for instance, a human being is 
 influenced on the one side by a wild and delirious 
 temptation, and on the other by the "still, small 
 voice " of conscience, it is possible for him to act 
 according to the suggestions of the latter ; but he 
 who says this is the strongest motive must be will- 
 ing to admit that the zephyr may be more power- 
 ful than the whirlwind. "A volition," according 
 to Herbert Spencer, " is a discharge of nervous 
 force along a line which experience has rendered 
 
 F
 
 82 PEESONALITY. 
 
 the line of least resistance." But it is not always 
 so. The most inveterate habits are not quite irre- 
 sistible, for they are sometimes resisted ; and when 
 they are conquered, the nervous force must be dis- 
 charged along the line of greatest resistance. If the 
 figurative sense of the word motive be taken into 
 account, then we can say with Stirling that "a 
 man is free because he obeys motives " i.e., because 
 he has reasons presented to him, in accordance with 
 which he is able, if he please, to act. 
 
 This explanation removes at once several of the 
 stock objections to human freedom. Hamilton says, 
 for example, that if the will is not determined by 
 motives, volitions must be motiveless, and this 
 would give us casualism. Of course an uncaused 
 volition is as absurd a supposition as an uncaused 
 desire. But it does not follow that a volition is 
 motiveless because not caused by a motive. It 
 may be caused by an ego in accordance with a 
 motive. Again, he says in reference to Reid, " it 
 makes no difference whether motives determine 
 a man to act, or determine a man to determine 
 himself." In the word determine there is the 
 same sort of ambiguity which we have noticed in 
 the word motive. It makes all the difference 
 whether .they determine a man so that he cannot 
 but determine himself, or whether they only in-
 
 THE FllEEDOM OF THE EGO. 83 
 
 fiuence him, leaving him free to act in accordance 
 with, or against, them. If it is in his power to 
 wait for new motives, and to direct his attention 
 to this motive or to that, by which process of 
 attention the relative strength of the motives can be 
 altered, then the " determination " of the motives, 
 though it be influential, is certainly not irresistible. 
 Many of the difficulties about freedom and 
 necessity result from the careless use of abstract 
 words. The freedom of the will is a misleading 
 and a tautological expression. Will, if it exist, 
 must be free. A necessitated will is a contradic- 
 tion in terms. For will means the power of choice, 
 and choice cannot be necessitated. We cannot be 
 compelled to choose one thing, while at the same 
 time we are free to choose either of two things. 
 This seems sufficiently evident. But the unfor- 
 tunate phrase, " free-will," has led Hamilton and 
 others into the fallacy mentioned in the last para- 
 graph. It led Mansel into a yet more curious 
 mistake. Though he traced the origin of the idea 
 of power to " myself determining my volitions," he 
 yet denies that our volitions can be the results of 
 causes. He does so on this ground. Our only 
 notions of cause are (1) the exertion of power by 
 an intelligent being, and (2) uniform sequence; 
 " and to say that our volitions were caused in the
 
 84 PERSONALITY. 
 
 first way would be Fatalism, and in the second 
 Determinism." It is true that to say my volition 
 was caused by an intelligent being other than myself 
 would be Fatalism ; but it is equally manifest that 
 if the intelligent being who causes it be myself, we 
 have Freedom. 
 
 Let me try to analyse my consciousness in a 
 complex case of volition. I am affected by a cer- 
 tain desire which prompts me to do, and to do at 
 once, a certain thing. I am conscious that I can 
 say to myself either, " Very well, I will do it ; " or, 
 " Can I afford it ? Would it be right ? Would it be 
 wise ? Would it be kind ? Would it really make 
 me happy ? " If I take the latter course, numerous 
 ideas spring up in my mind, each of which may be 
 called a motive, having some rational weight in 
 assisting me to a decision. At last I perceive that 
 such a course would be best, or at any rate that I 
 should really like it, whereupon I determine to set 
 about it, though I am all the while conscious that 
 I could still refrain, or even act in- the opposite 
 way. " I am convinced," says J. S. Mill, " that I 
 could have chosen the other course had I preferred 
 it, but not that I could have chosen one while I 
 preferred the other." Be it so. But for my part I 
 am also conscious that I was not obliged to choose 
 at that particular instant, that I could have waited
 
 THE FEEEDOM OF THE EGO. 85 
 
 a little longer, and that unless it were something 
 which a rational being could never rationally pre- 
 fer, I could have argued with myself till I did 
 prefer it. Owing to the power of attention, we 
 need never be ultimately affected by impressions 
 exactly in proportion to their original strength. It 
 is a law of our nature that a desire can be increased 
 if it be attentively regarded, and diminished if at- 
 tention be withdrawn from it. And, to a greater 
 or less extent, every human being is capable of such 
 an exercise of attention. 
 
 The supposed consciousness of freedom has been 
 often treated as a mental illusion. Bain is no 
 doubt right in saying, that originally the term 
 freedom was merely a metaphorical compliment, 
 bestowed by the Stoics upon their ideal -wise man, 
 who was called free, just in the same way as he 
 was called king, or beautiful, or rich. But Bain is 
 not right, as I think, in saying that " we are no 
 more conscious of freedom than we are conscious 
 of the double decomposition of salts." All I can 
 say is, I find it in my consciousness, and it does 
 not yield to any analysis not even the able analy- 
 sis of Professor Bain. The reason why he does 
 not find it in his, is, I apprehend, because he does 
 not find consciousness at all, in the sense in which 
 I use that word viz., for the knowledge of self.
 
 86 PERSONALITY. 
 
 If there be no ego, I cannot, of course, be conscious 
 of myself ; and if I am not conscious of myself, I 
 cannot be conscious of myself as free. 
 
 " Liberty," says Hume, " is a certain looseness or 
 indifference which we feel in passing or not passing 
 from the idea of one object to that of a succeeding 
 one. Now we may observe, that though in reflect- 
 ing on human actions we seldom feel such a loose- 
 ness or indifference, but are commonly able to infer 
 them from the motives and dispositions of those 
 who perform them with considerable certainty, yet 
 it frequently happens that in performing the actions 
 themselves we are sensible of something like it. 
 This has been used as a demonstration, and even 
 an intuitive proof, of human liberty." It very well 
 may be. For what is this "looseness or indiffer- 
 ence" but the consciousness that we are able to 
 act in either of two ways, and are not necessitated 
 to either of them ? " We feel," he says, " that our 
 actions are subject to our will on most occasions, 
 and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject 
 to nothing, because when by a denial of it we are 
 provoked to try, we feel that it moves easily every 
 way, and produces an image of itself (a velleity as 
 it is called in the schools) even on that side on 
 which it did not settle. This image, or faint notion, 
 we persuade ourselves could at that time have been
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 87 
 
 completed into the thing itself; because, should 
 that be denied, we find on a second trial that at 
 present it can. We consider not that the fantastical 
 desire of showing liberty is here the motive of our 
 action." As to the will being " subject to nothing," 
 these words really convey no intelligible meaning. 
 We have seen it is the ego, and not the will, which 
 should be spoken of as free or necessitated. At 
 any rate, the "fantastical desire of showing liberty" 
 is not the only thing that makes us believe in our 
 past freedom. Kemorse bears strong testimony to 
 the same fact. It is in vain that Hume, Spinoza 
 and others tell us self-reproach is a mistake. We 
 know better. We feel that we might have done 
 the opposite of what we did. Nor is self-reproach 
 the peculiar idiosyncrasy of fools. On the con- 
 trary, it is to be found in the purest, the wisest, 
 the noblest of the race, and is only altogether 
 absent from those who have become irretrievably 
 degraded. We never think (except in our philo- 
 sophical systems) of attributing men's actions to 
 desire, preference or motive, in such a way that, 
 upon the grounds of this attribution, they them- 
 selves must be exempted from praise or blame. 
 As Butler shows, even if men are not free, we 
 must always, for practical purposes, assume that 
 they are.
 
 88 PERSONALITY. 
 
 Mr Sully, in his ' Sensation and Intuition,' denies 
 that we have any consciousness of freedom in regard 
 to either the present or the past. He maintains 
 that the idea arises merely from a natural pride, 
 which leads us to look upon our future, actions as 
 determinable by ourselves. But if we have, as I 
 have tried to show, a consciousness of freedom in 
 the present, and a remembrance of freedom in the 
 past, if we have, as Hume admits, "a feeling of 
 looseness or indifference in performing actions," 
 our expectation of future freedom is capable of a 
 different explanation. 
 
 Kant also denied our consciousness of freedom, 
 and maintained that the idea was only a trans- 
 cendental deduction from the categorical imperative. 
 There can be no doubt, however, that the whole 
 doctrine of transcendental freedom was really sug- 
 gested to him by his belief in his own freedom. 
 He justly says that if there is a transcendental char- 
 acter only behind some phenomena viz., human 
 we must have learnt the difference from experience, 
 and experience can give us only (so he thought) 
 contingent truths. Hence he tells us, we must 
 conceive of the transcendental character or free- 
 dom as applicable to all phenomena alike. But it 
 is manifest that our conceiving of it as applicable 
 to all phenomena alike, does not save it from the
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 89 
 
 accusation of having been, prior to the conception, 
 suggested by experience. 
 
 It seems to me that all the attempts which have 
 been made to disprove our consciousness of free- 
 dom have failed, as signally as those which have 
 sought to disprove our consciousness of our own 
 permanence. For my own part, at any rate, I am 
 conscious of myself as a being capable not only of 
 feeling, and of receiving the ideas that are presented 
 to me, but capable also of a voluntary exercise of 
 attention, and a voluntary origination of a train of 
 thought or a course of conduct. The free act of an 
 ego is a creative act, and does not therefore involve, 
 as Jonathan Edwards and Hamilton assert, an in- 
 finite number of previous volitions. After I have 
 reflected on what I want, what I ought to want, 
 what I am likely to attain, and what is the best 
 means of attaining it, I am conscious of forming 
 a determination or volition to do certain things. 
 Every such volition originates, or rather I, as often 
 as I am the author of such a volition, originate, a 
 new train of thoughts, or a new set of events, or 
 both. This volition starts the requisite movements 
 in the brain, which may then either go on auto- 
 matically for a considerable time, or may require 
 to be supplemented by fresh volitional causes and 
 cerebral effects. What is the exact nature of the
 
 90 PERSONALITY. 
 
 connection between the will and the brain does 
 not, for our present purpose, very much matter 
 Dr Carpenter says, " The intensity of any ideational 
 state is an expression of the hypersemic condition of 
 some part of the cerebrum, as that of a sensational 
 state is of the sensorium. All volitional action is 
 based on an idea of what is to be done. It seems 
 clear that the same vaso-motor action, which is the 
 condition of attention to that idea, will, if excited 
 to produce a still greater local hypersemia, give 
 effect to it in a spontaneous motorial discharge." 
 But it must be carefully remembered that the 
 volition is neither the intensification of the hyper- 
 eemic condition nor the motorial discharge that is 
 consequent thereon. It precedes both. The voli- 
 tion is not made for an ego by motion in the brain, 
 but is the outcome of its own activity. The ego is 
 the creator of its own volitions. 
 
 It is the consciousness of our ability to create 
 volitions that gives us our idea of power. That 
 we have such an idea is very evident. The ablest 
 treatise written to disprove it assumes it as the 
 basis of proof. Hume tries to demonstrate that we 
 have no notion of power by attempting to show 
 that there is something viz., habit capable of pro- 
 ducing it. But whatever is capable of producing 
 anything has power, according to the ordinary ac-
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 91 
 
 ceptation of the word. His argument, therefore, 
 amounts to this : we have no idea of power because 
 there is something in which we can discover power 
 to produce it ! Unless we had the idea, his reason- 
 ing would be as meaningless as it is illogical. Its 
 plausibility is due entirely to the fact that it 
 assumes the existence of the very thing which is 
 to be proved non-existent. 
 
 It seems to me somewhat unfortunate that the 
 upholders of human freedom have tried to trace the 
 notion of power to the feeling of effort. " Effort," 
 says Bain, very truly, " is the muscular conscious- 
 ness that accompanies voluntary activity, especially 
 in the painful stages. It has been supposed that 
 here we have mechanical power originating in 
 purely mental agency, and that hence volition was 
 the source of all motive power. But it is not the 
 consciousness of effort, but well -digested meals, 
 that enables the labourer to do his work. The 
 concurring consciousness of expended power is no 
 more the cause of that power, than the illumination 
 cast by the engine-furnace is the source of the 
 movements generated. It is strange that the con- 
 sciousness of effort should be deemed the cause of 
 voluntary movements, because when the power is 
 at its greatest the effort is null, and vice versa. 
 The feeling of effort is the symptom of declining
 
 92 PERSONALITY. 
 
 energy, the proof that the true antecedent viz., 
 the organic state of nerves and muscles is on 
 the eve of exhaustion." Mill argues to the same 
 effect that the fact of nisiis or effort being in- 
 volved in the idea of power, proves that idea to be 
 concerned rather with the relation of our volitions 
 to our muscles than of ourselves to our volitions. 
 
 There is a good deal of weight in these objec- 
 tions. It seems to me that the ideas of power 
 and effort are really, as Bain says, contrary to one 
 another. The muscular sense of effort is a sign 
 that, though we have been exerting some power, 
 we are not possessed of all the power that is 
 necessary for our purpose. I have a conscious- 
 ness of power in creating a volition, but a sense 
 of effort in carrying it out. It is in the conflict 
 between my power, as manifested in volition, and 
 the resistance of my organism and its environment, 
 that the sense of effort arises. I think it is better 
 therefore to say that in effort we are conscious, 
 not of power, but of insufficient power. 
 
 This explanation is an answer to Mill's argument 
 just quoted. The real mystery of the will is to be 
 looked for not, as he thought, in the relation 
 between the volition and the muscles but in the 
 relation between the volition and the ego. It is 
 as unreasonable to seek will in the muscles, as to
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 93 
 
 look for skill in an artist's brush and colours. 
 The muscles and the colours are the instruments 
 in either case. Herbert Spencer says that the 
 only force we can know is the force of which we 
 are conscious during our muscular efforts ; and 
 he thinks that there is a necessary illusion by 
 which we are obliged to suppose similar forces 
 behind the external phenomena that resist us. 
 This, he says, is the only conception of causality 
 open to us. Yet this fails ; because if the force in 
 a chair, for example, were like my own, the chair 
 must be conscious of sensations as I am. I have 
 never experienced the " necessary illusion " of sup- 
 posing " effort " in the material world. And besides, 
 as I said just now, it is not in effort but in volition 
 that I am conscious of power. Herbert Spencer 
 would be the first to deny that material objects 
 give any evidence of volition. ISTor do they indi- 
 vidually. It is suggested only by their manner of 
 working together, and by the rational results to 
 which this working gives rise. 1 
 
 If the doctrine of necessity were true, we must 
 regard ourselves as merely the passive recipients of 
 impressions and ideas. When we were in a state 
 of what is called deliberation, we should be con- 
 scious only of waiting to see which of several 
 
 1 See sect. iv.
 
 94 PERSONALITY. 
 
 motives would eventually be the strongest. It is 
 possible to form a conception of a conscious being 
 devoid of will. We can imagine a watch, e.g., that 
 is conscious but not free. Suppose there was with- 
 in it a sentient principle which could hear the tick- 
 ing, and observe the motion of the wheels, and de- 
 sire a regular kind of existence. It might be able 
 to perceive dust accumulating in its interior, and 
 it might remember from its past experience the 
 periodical cleanings which the dust rendered neces- 
 sary. Such a watch might know, and even fore- 
 know, a good deal about its own condition, but it 
 could in no respect alter it. Whether it went faster 
 or slower, got dirty sooner or later, was cleaned 
 often or seldom, &c., might be to it matters of 
 interest and anxiety, but unless it had a faculty 
 different from feeling or knowledge and Bain 
 expressly declares that volition is not different 
 it would for ever be incapable of self-adjustment. 
 Such a piece of mechanism is man, according to 
 modern Positivism. " Just as the blush," we are 
 told, " is no more than a bodily expression, so our 
 will is no more than another kind of expression 
 of a certain condition of the brain. Our bodily 
 actions proceed from physical changes in our brain, 
 just as the motion of a bell results from the touch 
 upon the handle. As for our will, it is but the
 
 THE FKEEDOM OF THE EGO. 95 
 
 signal of what has been going on in our brain 
 just as the sound of the bell tells you it has been 
 moved. To say that the will causes the action is 
 as absurd as to say that the bell's sound causes the 
 bell's motion." If this be true, our whole existence 
 is as much the sport of chance as the motion of 
 the spray driven before the wind. Here we are 
 forcibly reminded of the words of Professor Ferrier : 
 " Philosophers undisturbed have pondered over 
 man's nature, and after all what have they made 
 of it ? What sort of a picture have they presented 
 to our observation ? Not the picture of a man, but 
 the representation of an automaton that is what 
 it cannot help being, a phantom dreaming what 
 it cannot but dream, an engine performing what 
 it must perform, an incarnate reverie, a weather- 
 cock shifting helplessly in the winds of sensibility, 
 a wretched association machine through which 
 ideas pass linked together by laws over which the 
 machine has no control ; anything, in short, but 
 that free and self - sustained centre of underived 
 activity which we call man." 
 
 One reason of this misrepresentation of man's 
 nature may be found in the one - sidedness that 
 almost always follows great success. Science has 
 revealed to us an infinite number of invariable 
 sequences, brought about by the operation of invol-
 
 96 PERSONALITY. 
 
 untary laws; and it has been proved that, though 
 we search over millions of miles of space and mil- 
 lions of years of time, we shall see the same forces 
 producing the same phenomena. Hence many 
 scientists have jumped to the hasty conclusion, that 
 the same laws of invariable sequence must apply 
 to everything in the universe, even to mind itself. 
 "The progress of science," says Professor Huxley, 
 " in all ages, has meant the extension of the prov- 
 ince of what we call matter and causation, and the 
 concomitant gradual banishment from all regions 
 of human thought of what we call spirit and spon- 
 taneity." But the Professor admits " that a human 
 being is, if he be a machine, yet capable within cer- 
 tain limits of self -adjustment ; " and it is admitted 
 by all that he is capable within certain limits of the 
 adjustment of the environment. If therefore the 
 progress of science has consisted in throwing into 
 the shade this fact of adjustment, which is the 
 most important and significant of all facts, so much 
 the worse for science. As Maurice very well says. 
 " Whatever may be the value of the things handled 
 and tasted and seen, I who handle and taste and see 
 them, am at least as interesting to myself as they." 
 The scientific argument against the doctrine of 
 free-will viz., that all events, except perhaps 
 human volitions, are necessarily related to events
 
 THE FKEEDOM OF THE EGO. 97 
 
 immediately preceding them has imposed even on 
 so cautious a writer as Mr Sidgwick, who mentions 
 it as an argument really favouring the necessitarian 
 view. One would have thought that it was mani- 
 festly an argument against that view. Man, since 
 he is " the interpreter of Nature," might a priori 
 be conceived of as something more, something 
 other, than a mere part of her processes, and 
 hence it might be expected beforehand that his 
 actions and Nature's would not be amenable to 
 the same canons. Scientists often lose sight of 
 the fact that in some degree we ourselves are 
 able to alter the course of nature, and by com- 
 bining its invariable laws to bring about the varia- 
 tions in their action which we desire. Forgetting 
 this fact, though it is the one thing which makes 
 life of any value, some philosophers have been 
 gradually tending towards the categorical denial 
 of God and of man (properly so called), and of 
 everything else that cannot be discovered " by 
 the methods and formulae of physics." " I have 
 swept the heavens with my telescope, and have 
 not found a God," said Lalande. "We have ex- 
 amined the brain with our microscopes, and have 
 not found an ego," say the physiologists. Hence 
 God and the ego must be declared non-existent, 
 since they do not come within the focus of these 
 
 a
 
 98 PERSONALITY. 
 
 all-devastating lenses. All-devastating, I say ; for a 
 universe that contains only necessitated and mean- 
 ingless phenomena is "an abomination of desola- 
 tion," worse than that spoken of by the prophet. 
 
 J. S. Mill tells us what a paralysing and de- 
 pressing effect the doctrine of necessity long had 
 upon himself, and how he often wished that it 
 could simply be held quasi the character of others. 
 But he says that he eventually escaped from 
 its injurious influences by guarding against the 
 misleading associations of the word necessity. He 
 distinguished necessity from fatalism. The former, 
 he says, means only that an action will inevitably 
 happen if our desire be sufficiently strong, and if 
 there be nothing external to prevent it ; the latter, 
 that it must happen whether we desire it or not. 
 He admits, however, that though " necessity is re- 
 mote from fatalism, most necessitarians are prob- 
 ably fatalists." " The true doctrine of necessity," 
 he says, " while maintaining that our character is 
 formed by our circumstances, asserts at the same 
 time that our desires can do much to alter our 
 circumstances." The desire, therefore, to alter our 
 character is one of the circumstances by which that 
 character is being moulded. The feeling of being 
 able to modify our character, if we wish it, is the 
 feeling of freedom ; and this ennobling part of the
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 99 
 
 doctrine of free-will is equally implied, Mill thinks, 
 in the doctrine of necessity. "A person is free 
 who feels that his habits and temptations are not 
 his masters but he theirs, who, even in yielding, 
 knows that he could resist, that there is not re- 
 quired for this purpose a greater desire than he is 
 capable of feeling." But the question is, How is 
 that desire to be obtained ? If " feeling " means 
 getting or creating, then here is the difference 
 between a man and a machine. If, though he is 
 capable of feeling it, he is incapable of getting it, 
 then he is not free. Nor on this supposition can it 
 be explained why he feels that he is free. Freedom, 
 properly understood, does not consist in a man's 
 being made to act by internal motives rather than 
 by external ; this would be merely what Kant calls 
 " the freedom of a turnspit." Unless there be an 
 ego, which can voluntarily attend to one idea and 
 draw away its attention from another (irrespective 
 of the inherent strength with which those ideas 
 originally present themselves), and which can even 
 call up a third idea that does not present itself at 
 all, there is no possibility of our obtaining a desire 
 which we have not already got, nor, therefore, of our 
 being anything but that which we are made to be. 
 
 On the whole, it seems to me that, when the 
 errors arising from ambiguities of language have
 
 100 PERSONALITY. 
 
 been removed, when it has been clearly recognised 
 that an ego is the necessary substratum of psychical 
 states, and when consciousness is correctly analysed, 
 the fact of freedom can be established. In other 
 words, the ego is not merely passively acted on by 
 the brain, but is also capable of voluntary self- 
 originated action. 
 
 This then is the beginning of metaphysics: to 
 find that I am conscious of myself as a permanent 
 being in contradistinction from my changing 
 thoughts and feelings, conscious of myself more- 
 over as a being capable, not only of apprehending 
 feelings and thoughts, but of creating volitions and 
 originating thereby series of events. Consciousness 
 reveals to us something more than the phenomenal, 
 it reveals to us substance; something more than 
 invariable sequence, it reveals to us power. This 
 substance and power must be pre-eminently real, 
 since without them feelings and thoughts and self- 
 adjustments could neither be nor be conceived to 
 be. The Positivists tell us that consciousness re- 
 veals nothing of the kind. But their arguments, 
 as we have seen, are based implicitly upon that 
 very metaphysical reality which they are explicitly 
 brought forward to disprove. Their speech "be- 
 wrayeth " them. The theories are the theories of 
 phenomenalists, the words are the words of meta-
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE EGO. 101 
 
 physicians. It is from the surreptitious introduc- 
 tion of metaphysical support that their attempt to 
 annihilate metaphysics derives what little plausi- 
 bility it may possess. Restrict a Positivist to his 
 own vocabulary, and it would be seen at once that 
 he was talking nonsense.
 
 102 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 
 
 UNDERLYING the fleeting phenomena of our mental 
 life, we have discovered, it would seem, a noumenon, 
 a permanent substance, an ego, capable not only 
 of perceiving these phenomena, but of changing 
 them a creative being, having power to originate 
 events. Can any such substance and power be 
 discovered behind those phenomena which col- 
 lectively we call nature ? Is there an Infinite 
 Ego ? This is the last and greatest problem of 
 metaphysics. 
 
 We cannot here discuss the question of our per- 
 ception of an external world ; suffice it to say that 
 it seems altogether inconceivable how, from the 
 mere association of sensations, the notion of exter- 
 nality could ever have been formed. As Bain has 
 well shown, a thing is only known by being con- 
 trasted with its foil. Waiving the objection that
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 103 
 
 by the sensational school sensations are asserted to 
 be associated in nothing, or to be associated in a 
 fluent brain, no particle of which ever long remains 
 the same, and allowing them the benefit of that 
 tacit assumption, which, as we have seen, they are 
 in the habit of making, the assumption, viz., of 
 a sentient principle by which the sensations may 
 be received, it is still inconceivable how the co- 
 existences and successions of sensations within 
 could ever suggest that there was anything with- 
 out. Yet this is the only explanation which the 
 school has to offer. When we seem to be carried 
 out of ourselves to the world beyond, we are merely 
 referred, they tell us, from one of our sensations to 
 others, from a single member of a cluster to the 
 rest, from what we actually feel in one sense to 
 what, in suitable positions, we might feel in the 
 others. "When we attribute whiteness to snow, we 
 say that a particular sensation belongs to a group, 
 the remainder of which colour, softness, sparkle, 
 &c. are expressed by the word snow. Mill adopts 
 Bain's theory that it is the muscular feelings ac- 
 companying locomotion which give us the idea of 
 externality, and lead us to attribute all our sensa- 
 tions to an external cause. But even the muscular 
 sensations are within us : and it is inconceivable 
 how any number of associated internalities could
 
 104 PERSONALITY. 
 
 ever produce the idea of externality. Our know- 
 ledge of the external world really arises, I think, 
 from the consciousness of our volition having been 
 resisted. And inasmuch as we cannot conceive of 
 impotence resisting power, it is natural to regard 
 the external world our own organism included, 
 since this often resists our volition as in some way 
 or other the seat of force. 
 
 But the idea of volition involves something more 
 than power. It is the peculiarity of will always to 
 be exercised for the accomplishment of intelligent, 
 or at any rate, intelligible purposes. Now let us 
 ask When we contemplate nature as a whole, are 
 we, or are we not, led to the supposition of such an 
 underlying "Will ? 
 
 There has been for many years an increasing 
 tendency on the part of scientific men to resolve 
 matter into force. The secondary qualities are 
 universally admitted to arise from differences in 
 molecular vibrations, which produce corresponding 
 differences in the nervous organism. Sir William 
 Thomson has seen reason to believe that resistance 
 also, which is the fundamental primary quality, is 
 nothing but the result of an extremely rapid motion 
 in something infinitely soft and yielding. Clifford, 
 again, says : " We know with great probability that 
 wherever there is an atom there is a small electric
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 105 
 
 current. Very many of the properties of atoms are 
 explained by this ; and we have vague hopes that 
 they all will be. If so, we shall say an atom is a 
 small current." The dynamical theory of matter 
 the theory, viz., that matter ultimately consists of 
 atomic centres of force is favoured by writers of 
 very different schools : for example, Boscovitch, 
 Newton, Faraday, Thomson, Tait, Clifford, Picton, 
 E. S. Wyld, &c. The supposition that matter 
 really consists of a number of centres of energy, 
 capable of interpenetration, seems more intelligible 
 than that which makes it consist of mutually ex- 
 clusive particles. The doctrine of chemical equiv- 
 alents, and the fact that when bodies unite in more 
 than one proportion these combinations rise by 
 exact multiples of the first, appear clearly to point 
 to some form of the atomic theory. That a new 
 compound could ever be produced from a mixture 
 of atoms which were not ultimately interpenetrable, 
 (as, for example, water from oxygen and hydrogen), 
 seems quite inconceivable. On the dynamical 
 theory, the effects of gravity, cohesion, &c., can be 
 understood as resulting from the interaction or 
 interpenetration of unextended forces ; and in 
 adopting this theory, therefore, we avoid the 
 special difficulties supposed to be connected with 
 action at a distance. Further, if the human bodv
 
 106 PERSONALITY. 
 
 consist, not of a mass of forceless atoms, but of a 
 number of centres of force mutually interacting, 
 the connection between soul and body may be 
 ultimately susceptible of explanation. 
 
 There must still however remain an antithesis, 
 if not between mind and matter, yet between the 
 force of volition which I create, and the forces of 
 my organism and its environment, which I can 
 neither create nor alter, but only use. Mr Wallace, 
 in his ' Contributions to Natural Selection/ says : 
 "We have traced one force to an origin in our 
 own will, while we have no knowledge of any other 
 primary cause of force. It does not seem, therefore, 
 an improbable conclusion that all force may be 
 will-force, and that the whole universe is not merely 
 dependent upon, but actually is, the will of higher 
 intelligences or of one supreme intelligence." The 
 difficulty is that will, as we know it, is incapable of 
 producing these external forces. The force which 
 it creates does not "correlate" with the physical 
 forces upon which it works. It does not pass into 
 them, nor can it be extracted out of them. It can 
 neither increase nor diminish them. It can merely 
 modify their effects by changing their relations. 
 However, inasmuch as the will which created the 
 forces of nature (if they were created) is external 
 to our own, it is not to be expected that we should
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 107 
 
 be capable of gauging its resources. We do not 
 seem to have any grounds upon which to discuss 
 the question as to whether this metaphysical Power 
 works upon a matter coeternal with Himself, or 
 whether He has created not only the harmony which 
 we observe in nature, but also the very materials in 
 which that harmony is manifested. The only ques- 
 tion we appear capable of answering is this: Can 
 we see, from the combined effects of these forces, 
 that they are connected in some way with an intel- 
 ligent and volitional ego, who is causing them to 
 produce certain definite results ? The argument from 
 design will hold good, if it can be shown that the 
 forces of Nature are used by a superhuman Will. 
 
 Comte says that " our power of foreseeing phe- 
 nomena, and our power of controlling them, destroy 
 the belief that they are governed by changeable 
 wills." But when they are controlled by us they 
 are governed by changeable wills wills that may 
 be changeable even to caprice. "Comte's incon- 
 sistency," says Martineau, " would be extraordinary, 
 if it were not ordinary in his class the inconsist- 
 ency, viz., of excluding all will from the universe, 
 because there is nothing but necessity, yet insisting 
 on necessity as an attribute of will." Necessity or 
 no necessity, there is one thing very certain: the 
 reign of law does not prevent us from accomplish-
 
 108 PERSONALITY. 
 
 ing purposes of our own. The Positivists often 
 speak as if we were completely the slaves of Nature. 
 Professor Huxley seems to regard the idea of our 
 having any choice, with respect to the details of 
 our own life, as a delusion surviving from primeval 
 barbarism. "The progress of science in all ages," 
 he says, in a passage I have already quoted, " has 
 meant the extension of the province of what we 
 call matter and causation, and the concomitant 
 gradual banishment from all regions of human 
 thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity." 
 And yet even Professor Huxley has said that the 
 human machine is " capable, within certain limits, 
 of self -adjustment." If there had been but one 
 act of " self-adjustment " on the part of but a single 
 member of the human race from its creation until 
 now, that act would for ever distinguish humanity 
 from the whole material world. If therefore the 
 progress of science has been such as the Professor 
 asserts, it has involved the casting into the shade 
 of a highly important fact. And so far from this 
 spontaneity being but rarely exercised, there is 
 scarcely any faculty which we use so frequently. 
 In addition to our power of seZ/-adjustment, we 
 have also the power, within certain limits, of adjust- 
 ing the environment, and these limits are always 
 becoming less and less contracted. Every experi-
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 109 
 
 ment which the Professor makes is an instance of 
 such adjustment: the forces of Nature, if left to 
 themselves, would not teach him what he wishes 
 to learn, and he therefore interferes to make them. 
 Our whole life is spent in using, adapting, combin- 
 ing, controlling and counteracting the forces of the 
 material world. We dissipate cold by lighting a 
 fire; we avoid a sunstroke by retiring into the 
 shade ; we stamp out the cholera by an improved 
 system of sanitation ; and so on, and so on. And 
 all this we achieve, not in spite of, but because of, 
 the inviolability of law. The Positivists generally 
 speak as if we might perhaps do something for 
 ourselves, were the laws of nature changeable ; but, 
 since those laws are unchangeable, we are, they 
 assure us, helpless. A moment's reflection might 
 suffice to show that the exact contrary of this is 
 the truth. The immutability of the laws is their 
 most valuable characteristic. If we could not 
 count on them, we could do nothing with them. 
 For instance, we know the destructive effects of 
 lightning, and we know the conducting power of 
 metals ; we therefore avoid the one by means of the 
 other. We attach lightning-conductors to our more 
 costly edifices, in order that the electricity may 
 pass harmlessly into the ground, instead of linger- 
 ing about the buildings and destroying them. But
 
 110 PERSONALITY. 
 
 if the same metal, which had been once a good con- 
 ductor, might suddenly become a non-conductor, if it 
 might at any time play all sorts of unexpected tricks 
 with the lightning, we should be altogether helpless. 
 It is because we know exactly how the laws of 
 Nature act, that we know exactly what we must 
 do when we wish to counteract them. Their in- 
 violability, as the Duke of Argyll well says, is the 
 very circumstance that makes them "subject to 
 contrivance through endless cycles of design." 
 
 Now since we see the same sort of effects i.e., 
 rational effects produced by the non-human or 
 supernatural combination of physical forces, that 
 are produced by their human or natural combina- 
 tion ; since we find, not only that these forces can 
 be controlled by us, but that, apart from our control, 
 they work together according to an absolutely un- 
 changing method, and that this method results in the 
 evolution of higher and higher forms of existence, 
 the most reasonable conclusion seems to be that 
 they are connected with another Will "in whom 
 there is no change, neither shadow of turning," and 
 " who is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." 
 Of course if it be the law of the universe that 
 atoms of all shapes and sizes have been eternally 
 falling through space in all manner of directions and 
 velocities, and that by their haphazard concurrence
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. Ill 
 
 all things have arisen as they are, then there is 
 no room for volition. But, on the other hand, if it 
 is contrary to experience to believe that such a 
 concurrence of atoms could have produced a cosmos, 
 and certainly our experience, so far as it goes, dis- 
 credits the hypothesis, if, further, there is reason 
 to think that the phenomena of the universe do 
 actually exhibit signs of a controlling will, then 
 it follows that the hypothesis of a fortuitous con- 
 currence of atoms must be rejected. When we 
 remember that every force in Nature, if it worked 
 irregularly instead of regularly, would be capable 
 of throwing the entire universe into confusion, 
 we seem forced to the conviction that the world 
 in which we find oui selves is not the production of 
 a fortuitous concurrence of atoms, but that there 
 is a Being working through all atoms and forces 
 everywhere, who loves beauty, harmony, progress 
 and joy, a Being " who maketh the winds His 
 angels and flaming fires His messengers." Since 
 the voice of Law is " the harmony of the world," 
 there is positive evidence of the fact that " her seat 
 is the bosom of God." 
 
 This view is nowadays generally regarded as 
 effete. Mr Morley, for example, says that "the 
 argument from design, if it has not received its 
 death-blow from Darwinism, is for the nonce at
 
 112 PERSONALITY. 
 
 least in a state of suspended animation." But 
 the truth is, that the theory of Evolution, rightly 
 understood, does not in the least clash with the 
 argument from design. 
 
 The theory of evolution, just like science in 
 general, is concerned with the methods of Nature's 
 working, and not with the question as to whether 
 the origin of those methods be discoverable. Science 
 is not to be blamed for failing to take their origin 
 into consideration; it is only to be condemned when 
 it dogmatically asserts that there is no origin, or 
 that it cannot be discovered. Science is concerned 
 with orderly sequences ; metaphysics with the why 
 and wherefore of this order. The order is the same 
 to an onlooker, whether or not he recognises the 
 necessity of tracing it to an ultimate source. The 
 problem of science or philosophy, as stated by Mill, 
 is this : " What are the fewest assumptions which, 
 being granted, the order of nature as it exists 
 would be the result ? " But the problem of meta- 
 physics is to ascertain on what these assumptions 
 ultimately depend, and whether or not the present 
 system has been brought about by " collocations " 
 that were purely casual and accidental. To this 
 question, it is evident, the theory of evolution can 
 offer no reply. It may be that all things have 
 been produced by the gradual cooling and con-
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 113 
 
 densation of fiery vapour, by the successive "dif- 
 ferentiations and integrations of a primordial 
 homogeneous mass." But this "invariable opera- 
 tion of natural law" manifestly requires to be 
 explained. Nothing can be more ridiculous than 
 the common belief, that the discovery of Nature's 
 methods virtually amounts to the discovery that 
 those methods can have had no cause. 
 
 The researches of modern science have no doubt 
 demonstrated the universality of the reign of Law. 
 Formerly the universe was peopled with thousands 
 of imaginary beings, and supposed to be at the 
 mercy of their caprice and vindictiveness. It was 
 thought that any one of them, if strong enough to 
 prevail over the rest, might destroy the order of 
 nature at a moment's notice ; and religion therefore 
 consisted in appeasing these divinities, so powerful 
 for evil, with barley, wine, or blood. In the dark- 
 ness of an eclipse, in the rolling peal of the thunder, 
 in the eruption of a volcano, in the devastation of a 
 plague, and even in an unusual state of the weather, 
 men imagined the capricious interference of super* 
 natural powers. But observation and reflection 
 have shown the folly of all such notions. The more 
 that nature has been investigated, the more has her 
 uniformity been brought to light. Eesemblances 
 have been discovered where they were least ex- 
 
 H
 
 114 PERSONALITY. 
 
 pected ; as, for example, in the fact that an almost 
 infinite number of animal species have been formed 
 by mere variation from a few primary types. And 
 not only has nature been seen to be uniform in our 
 own world, but the most remote spheres and ages, 
 regarding which we are able to gain any informa- 
 tion, have been found to be subject to the same laws 
 as those which obtain here and now. We know be- 
 yond a doubt that gravity, which causes an apple 
 to fall to the earth, is also concerned in the revolu- 
 tions of the most distant star ; that " the law which 
 moulds a planet rounds a tear "; and that the light of 
 to-day has exactly the same properties as the light 
 of the prehistoric world. So certain are we of the 
 universality of law, that we know apparent excep- 
 tions are not, and cannot be, real exceptions. In 
 fact, a seeming violation of law has not unfrequently 
 led to fresh confirmation of its absolute inviolability. 
 The irregularities of Uranus, e.g., suggested the 
 exact spot where some unknown planet must exist, 
 and where, accordingly, what is now called Neptune 
 was soon afterwards discovered. Even in cases 
 where, owing to the complexity of the problems, 
 our knowledge is less exact, even where we have 
 not been able to ascertain the precise manner in 
 which certain results are produced, we yet feel 
 absolutely sure that these results are brought about
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 115 
 
 by unchanging and unchangeable laws. Epidemics 
 of cholera and plague, which our ancestors attri- 
 buted to the anger of Heaven, we believe to be due 
 to a violation of the laws of health ; we no longer 
 connect them with a sudden interference of Provi- 
 dence, but we set about tracing them to the impur- 
 ity of our springs, or to some other equally simple 
 and natural cause. And similarly, in regard to the 
 weather, though it is the very type of fickleness, 
 and though our knowledge of the laws which govern 
 it is exceedingly imperfect, yet there is not an edu- 
 cated man in the world to-day w r ho does not feel 
 certain that rain and drought, heat and cold, good 
 seasons and bad, depend upon laws as stringent and 
 immutable as those which determine the planetary 
 motions. In a word, to us in this nineteenth cen- 
 tury the universe is essentially and pre-eminently 
 a universe of order and law. 
 
 But all this does not disprove the existence of a 
 metaphysical Will. The only reign of law incom- 
 patible with volition would be the reign of the law 
 of chaos. Law, it may be observed, is a very mis- 
 leading word. It is generally printed with a capital 
 " L," which, like a grenadier's bearskin cap, (as Pro- 
 fessor Huxley remarks in regard to the first letter 
 of the Absolute), makes it look more formidable 
 than it would do by nature. Law only means in-
 
 116 PERSONALITY. 
 
 variable sequence. A law of nature is merely the 
 fact that certain causes produce certain effects, 
 that certain antecedents are followed by certain 
 consequents, that under the same circumstances 
 the same events will always happen. It is some- 
 times said the universe is governed by laws. The 
 universe is not governed by laws. It is governed 
 according to laws ; but no one can suppose that 
 the laws make themselves: no one can imagine, 
 for example, that water determines of its own 
 accord always to freeze at one temperature and 
 boil at another, that snowflakes make up their 
 minds to assume certain definite and regular 
 shapes, or that fire burns of malice aforethought. 
 The sequences of Nature will not explain them- 
 selves. The question still remains, Why are they 
 what they are ? " Nowadays," says Comte, " the 
 heavens declare no other glory than that of Hip- 
 parchus, Kepler, Newton and the rest, who have 
 found out the laws of their sequence." Yes, if 
 the discovery of regular sequences be also the 
 discovery that there can be no cause for their 
 regularity. But to treat this as an axiom is the 
 very acme of illogical flippancy. True, there is 
 no sign of anything approaching to fickleness in 
 Nature. True, the many gods of fetishism have 
 been annihilated by scientific investigation. But
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 117 
 
 the very same harmony which proves that there 
 are not many wills, goes far to show at the same 
 time that there is one. The cosmic results of the 
 combined operation of natural forces testify to some 
 unity of design and purpose. Nothing can be more 
 absurd than Comte's theory, that an irregular and 
 disorderly system of nature would require a super- 
 natural explanation, but that a regular and orderly 
 system requires none. To say this is to maintain 
 that God could only be manifested by the attri- 
 butes of fickleness and impotence. If He were 
 always interfering with things, like an operative 
 in a mill who has constantly to stop his machinery 
 to join a broken thread, if Nature were so paltry a 
 system that her defects required constant interposi- 
 tion, then God would be recognised. But His 
 existence is denied, forsooth, because it is not 
 revealed by failures and mistakes. The regu- 
 larity of Nature is no disproof of supernatural 
 volition, but only of supernatural caprice. 
 
 When the theory of Evolution was less firmly 
 established than it is at present, it used to be 
 urged in favour of it, that it was a good working 
 hypothesis. The same may be said of the theory 
 of design. It has often led to important scientific 
 discoveries. Eobert Boyle tells us : "I remember 
 that when I asked our famous Harvey what were
 
 118 PERSONALITY. 
 
 the things that induced him to think of the cir- 
 culation of the blood, he answered me, that when 
 he took notice of the valves in the veins of many 
 parts of the body, so placed that they gave free 
 passage to the blood toward the heart, but opposed 
 the passage of the venous blood the contrary way, 
 he was invited to think that so provident a cause 
 as nature had not placed so many valves without 
 a design; and no design seemed more probable 
 than that, since the blood could not well, because 
 of the interposing valves, be sent by the veins to 
 the limbs, it should be sent through the arteries, 
 and returned through the veins whose valves did 
 not oppose its course that way." 
 
 It is very remarkable, too, that purpose is always 
 implicitly admitted even when explicitly denied. 
 Haeckel, e.g., in the very book in which he says 
 that "the much-talked-of purpose in Nature has 
 no existence," defines an organic body as " one in 
 which the various parts work together for the pur- 
 pose of producing the phenomena of life." 1 
 i Hartmann according to whom the universe is 
 the outcome of unconsciousness speaks of "the 
 wisdom of the Unconscious ; " of " the mechanical 
 contrivances which It employs;" of "Its direct 
 
 1 For another remarkable illustration of Haeckel's admission ot 
 purpose, see my 'Agnosticism,' pp. 141, 142.
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 119 
 
 activity in bringing about complete adaptation to 
 the peculiar nature of the case " ; of " Its incursions 
 into the human brain, which determine and guide 
 the course of history in all departments of civilisa- 
 tion, in the direction of the goal intended by the 
 Unconscious." And similar illustrations might be 
 multiplied indefinitely. 
 
 Let us grant that the doctrine of evolution, in its 
 most comprehensive form, has been proved true, let 
 us imagine it to be a demonstrated certainty that 
 vegetable, animal, and even human life have been 
 evolved from Oken's "primitive slime," and that 
 there is a development of higher from lower types of 
 existence, through an inherent tendency in the less 
 desirable to pass away, let us grant all this, and 
 the argument from design will remain as strong as 
 ever. Evolution is incompatible, no doubt, with the 
 doctrine of " creation by paroxysm," with the idea 
 that species were made by distinct creative fiats. 
 It is also incompatible with Paley's view that 
 every definite organ, or portion of organ, is spe- 
 cially adapted for a special end. But the latter 
 notion, apart altogether from thewy, has long been 
 exploded by fact. For we find in most animals 
 traces of abortive organs, which are manifestly not 
 adapted to any end at all : as, e.g., the rudiments of 
 fingers in a horse's hoof; the teeth in a whale's
 
 120 PERSONALITY. 
 
 mouth; or the eyes in an unborn mole, which, 
 though perfect in themselves to begin with, dry up 
 before they can be used. Though we no longer 
 profess however to trace design in every minute 
 fraction of every organism, this need not hinder 
 us from seeing it in organisms regarded in their 
 entirety, and in Nature considered as a whole. 
 Professor Huxley imagines, however, that he has 
 ousted us from the second position. He maintains 
 it to be conceivable that a watch might be made 
 altogether without contrivance. In Paley's famous 
 illustration, the adaptation of all parts of the watch 
 to the function or purpose of showing the time, is 
 held to be evidence that they were specially con- 
 structed for that end. " Suppose however," says 
 the Professor, " that any one had been able to show 
 that the watch had not been made directly by any 
 person, but that it was the result of the modifica- 
 tion of another watch, which kept time but poorly ; 
 and that this, again, had proceeded from a structure 
 which could hardly be called a watch at all, seeing 
 it had no figures on the dial, and the hands were 
 rudimentary; and that, going back and back in 
 time, we came at last to a revolving barrel as the 
 earliest traceable rudiment of the whole fabric. 
 And imagine that all these changes had resulted, 
 first, from a tendency in the structure to vary
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 121 
 
 indefinitely; and secondly, from something in 
 the surrounding world which helped all variations 
 in the direction of an accurate time-keeper, and 
 checked all those in other directions, and then it 
 is obvious that the force of Paley's argument would 
 be gone. For it would be demonstrated that an 
 apparatus, thoroughly well adapted to a particular 
 purpose, might be the result of a method of trial 
 and error worked out by unintelligent agents, as 
 well as of the direct application of the means 
 appropriate to that end." 
 
 Very good. But whence come that " tendency " 
 and that " something in the surrounding world " ? 
 When we consider their results, it is contrary to 
 experience to suppose that their combined working 
 is the effect of chance. The "agents" may be 
 " unintelligent " ; but the method of their working 
 implies that they are directed and controlled by 
 intelligence. The further back you trace their 
 operation, the greater becomes the necessity for 
 connecting them with an intelligent mind; since 
 the longer you suppose them to have been at work, 
 the less likely does it become that their rational 
 results can be the effects of irrationality. If two 
 things by their interaction, extending over long 
 periods of time, produce progressive results, the 
 only legitimate hypothesis is that they were in-
 
 122 PERSONALITY. 
 
 tended and adapted for that purpose. When we 
 consider their results, we are forbidden, both by 
 experience and by reason, to suppose that their 
 combined working is the effect of chance. So that, 
 after all, the watch made according to the ingenious 
 theory of the Professor, has not been made without 
 design. He has got rid of one kind of contrivance 
 only by substituting another. 
 
 Professor Huxley's reasoning has been very neatly 
 parodied thus. "Two ignorant men might have a 
 controversy as to the origin of a bronze statue. 
 Says the one, ' He must have been a great sculptor 
 who made that statue ; ' to which the other replies, 
 ' You are quite wrong, my friend ; no sculptor ever 
 touched the statue. I saw it made myself, a form- 
 less molten mass flow out of the furnace, disappear 
 in the sand, and then in a while come out as you 
 see it, a bronze statue. There was, first, "a tend- 
 ency " in the molten metal to " vary indefinitely " ; 
 and there was, secondly, something in the sur- 
 rounding sand that helped all variations in the 
 direction of a beautiful statue, and checked all 
 those in other directions. The result is a statue 
 made not by contrivance but by natural selection.' " 
 The answer to this objection would not be far to 
 seek. The molten metal and the sand, the tend- 
 ency in the structure to vary, and the something
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 123 
 
 outside the structure helping one kind of variation 
 and checking other kinds, were intended and adapted 
 to work together as they do. 
 
 The purpose then which from the days of Anaxa- 
 goras has been more or less observed in nature, is 
 not proved to be no purpose, because it is accom- 
 plished by means that do not constantly require 
 readjustment. Evolution has not disproved design. 
 It has only suggested that the Designer acts in a 
 different way from that which we had formerly 
 supposed. The fact that natural forces work to- 
 gether regularly and methodically, does not prove 
 that they have no master, it suggests rather his 
 absolute control. Natural selection, it is often 
 affirmed, implies the truth of the old doctrine of 
 Lucretius : 
 
 " Nil ideo quoniam natnmst in corpore ut uti 
 Possemus, seel quod natumst id procreat usum." 
 
 But is there any reason why things may not be 
 made for their circumstances, though they are partly 
 made ly them ? " Insects," says Dr Abbott, " have 
 not only fertilised flowers, but, attracted by the 
 brightness, have fertilised the most beautiful. Each 
 speck and spot in each petal of these flowers bears 
 witness to the labours of these creatures, whom for 
 ages we have treated as emblems of beautiful idle-
 
 124 PEKSONALITY. 
 
 ness. Thus has God clothed the grass of the field 
 year by year with increasing glory ; and surely He 
 is none the less the Author of this glory, because He 
 has wrought it by the joyful labours of His obedient 
 creatures." Till it has been proved that the work- 
 ing together of internal and external relations, so 
 as to accomplish a progressive result, is not due 
 to design, we are compelled to suppose that it is. 
 Change may be due to chance, but it is contrary 
 both to experience and to reason to maintain that 
 there can be systematic and progressive evolution 
 apart from intelligence and volition. Natural 
 selection, since it produces an intelligent result, 
 is after all but a form of contrivance. 
 
 Bain's objection to the argument from design is as 
 follows. " Instead of mind being the cause of gravity, 
 gravity and other physical forces are the sine gud non 
 of mind. Our only experience of mental manifesta- 
 tions is in connection with a gravitating framework 
 of exceedingly complicated mechanism. Mind, as 
 known by us, is the very last thing we should set 
 up as an independent power swaying and sustaining 
 the forces of nature. The notion that mind must 
 be the cause of natural changes could not have 
 arisen from a large experience. The agency of men 
 and animals endowed with mind is a fact to be ad- 
 mitted ; but there are other natural agencies, such
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 125 
 
 as gravity, each good in its sphere, without any 
 accompaniment of mental facts." Now it is quite 
 true, as I have already acknowledged, that our voli- 
 tions cannot cause gravity or other physical forces ; 
 and hence we are unable dogmatically to assert that 
 these forces have originated from will. But it is 
 equally true that by our volitions we are able to 
 adjust them, and to make them work together so as 
 to accomplish rational and desirable results; and 
 we have no experience whatever of their com- 
 bining to produce such results except as a conse- 
 quence of intelligent volition. The very fact that 
 my body is a " mechanism " drives me irresistibly 
 to the conclusion that it is the work, directly or 
 indirectly, of a mechanician, as much superior to a 
 human mechanician as that body is superior to any- 
 thing which a man can make. 
 
 The argument from design is a strictly logical 
 argument. I believe that my neighbour is a 
 personal, free, intelligent being like myself, not 
 because he has a body, but because of the con- 
 sistency and purpose manifest in his words and 
 deeds. So I believe that there is an intelligent 
 will behind the forces of nature, because I see 
 them exhibiting marks of adaptation, and working 
 together for definite ends, in a similar way to 
 that in which they work when adjusted by myself
 
 126 PERSONALITY. 
 
 or my fellows. As Mill puts it in his ' Posthumous 
 Essays ' : " The design argument is not drawn from 
 mere resemblances in nature to the works of 
 human intelligence, but from the special character 
 of those resemblances. The circumstances in which 
 it is alleged that the world resembles the works of 
 man are not circumstances taken at random, but 
 are particular instances of a circumstance which 
 experience shows to have a real connection with an 
 intelligent origin, the fact of conspiring to an end. 
 The argument, therefore, is not one of mere analogy. 
 As mere analogy it has its weight, but it is more 
 than analogy, it is an inductive argument." It is 
 true Mill goes on to say, that creative forethought 
 is not absolutely the only link by which the origin 
 of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be 
 connected with the fact of sight that there is 
 another connecting link, the principle, viz., of the 
 survival of the fittest. " This principle," Mill says, 
 "though not inconsistent with creation, would, if 
 proved, greatly attenuate the evidence for it." I do 
 not see that the evidence is attenuated in the very 
 least. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest 
 does not account for the fact that there are fittest 
 to survive. It does not, in other words, explain the 
 existence of organisms, nor the existence of any 
 measure of adaptation between organism and en-
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 127 
 
 vironment. It merely expresses the method accord- 
 ing to which it is supposed that this adaptation has 
 been increased. 
 
 On the other hand, the atheistical argument is 
 most illogical. In human affairs and in human 
 works, except within very narrow limits, we never 
 find order or progress, harmony or adaptation, due 
 to anything but design. To assert therefore that 
 these attributes of nature are the result of chance, 
 is to maintain a hypothesis which is not only un- 
 warranted, but which is absolutely contradicted, by 
 experience. Nor does an attempt to substitute for 
 God an eternal evolution of matter conform to the 
 test which materialists maintain to be the criterion 
 of truth. The ultimate and primordial atoms, if 
 they could be perceived, might no doubt be con- 
 sidered as " reducible to sensations " ; but since 
 they can neither be seen nor touched, they come 
 as far short of the proof demanded as Aristotle's 
 irpuT-ri ZXri or Hegel's " pure being." 
 
 The attempt to explain the regularity in nature 
 on mathematical principles of probability seems to 
 me as absurd as it is ingenious. This regularity, 
 says Laplace, " which some have considered a proof 
 of Providence, is on reflection perceived to be only 
 the development of the respective probabilities of 
 the simple events, which ought to occur more
 
 128 PERSONALITY. 
 
 frequently according as they are more probable." 
 Bernoulli speaks in a similar manner. To this 
 Mr Venn justly objects, that it is one of the relics 
 of realism, an illustration of the tendency to ob- 
 jectify our conceptions, even when they have no 
 right to exist. "A uniformity is observed some- 
 times, as in games of chance ; it is found to be so 
 connected with the constitution of the bodies as to 
 be capable of being inferred beforehand, (though 
 even here the connection is not so necessary as is 
 supposed in cases that lie beyond the range of those 
 vouched for by experience) ; then this constitution 
 is converted into an objective probability, supposed 
 to develop somehow into a sequence which exhibits 
 uniformity ; and finally, this questiona 1 . 1 " ^-"^ive 
 probability is assumed to exist in all a. . m which 
 uniformity is observed." The conception, Mr Venn 
 adds, "is utterly inappropriate where the type 
 changes," as in progressive evolution. Quetelet 
 assumes that the number of males and females 
 being equal, the chance of any one entry in the 
 register being male is one half, and of two males 
 running a quarter, and so on ; hence he says, " Once 
 in a certain number of times we shall find the 
 births of ten males happening successively." He 
 thinks it would be "tedious" to consult the regis- 
 ters, so he resorts to the experiment " more expe-
 
 THE INFINITE EGO. 129 
 
 ditious, and quite as conclusive " of putting forty 
 black and forty white balls into a bag, and noting 
 the successive colours that are drawn out. But if 
 there be any sense or value in such an application 
 of the doctrines of probability, why did not Quetelet 
 go a step further, and, putting in forty speckled 
 balls, deduce therefrom the " objective probability " 
 of hermaphrodites ? 
 
 Accepting the argument from design is not ac- 
 cepting anthropomorphism. Xenophanes said that 
 if the ox could think, it would attribute bovinity to 
 God; and Spinoza made a similar observation about 
 the triangle and the sphere. But there is no force in 
 these remarks, as against my present position, unless 
 bovinity, triangularity, and sphericity are suggested 
 by nature -/ the same manner as purpose or intelli- 
 gence. In attributing an intelligent will to God, 
 we attribute to Him Personality; but we do not 
 attribute to Him the whole of our humanity. We 
 do not assert that His will works by the same 
 means of brains and nerves and muscles : and 
 since we have no idea of the mode in which these 
 instruments are used by our own will, there seems 
 nothing to prevent our supposing that another will 
 can work with other instruments, or in altogether 
 different modes. 
 
 In accepting the argument from design, we do 
 I
 
 130 PERSONALITY. 
 
 'not assert that the divine method is one which a 
 human intelligence would have adopted. There is 
 a sharp contrast, says Lange, between the way in 
 whicli Nature, and that in which man, pursues a 
 purpose. " If a man, in order to shoot a hare, were 
 to discharge thousands of guns on a great moor, in 
 all possible directions; if, in order to get into a 
 locked-up room, he were to buy ten thousand casual 
 keys, and try them all ; if, in order to have a house, 
 he were to build a town, and leave all other houses 
 to wind and weather, assuredly no one would call 
 such proceedings purposeful. But whoever will 
 study the modern scientific laws of the conserva- 
 tion and propagation of species, will find every- 
 where an enormous waste of vital germs." A little 
 reflection, however, will suffice to show that the 
 illustrations which Lange uses are really beside 
 the mark. For we have learnt by experience that 
 there are other and better ways of shooting hares 
 and opening doors and building houses. But, for 
 aught we know, the method which has been adopted 
 in the development of worlds and life and mind 
 may have been the only possible method. 1 Waste, if 
 such it be, was possibly unavoidable. There were, 
 perhaps, inherent difficulties in the problem of 
 creation which could never be completely over- 
 
 1 See my ' Inspiration,' pp. 108, 145-149.
 
 THE INFJN1TE EGO. 131 
 
 come. Plato's notion of the " intractableness of 
 matter " and its " unwillingness to receive the 
 ideas," is, of course, quite compatible with Design. 
 The question, however, as to the existence of pur- 
 pose in Nature should be carefully distinguished 
 and separated, from questions as to the excellence 
 or humanness of the method by which that purpose 
 is effected. 
 
 In accepting the argument from design, we only 
 assert, what the Positivists themselves admit, that 
 we find ourselves living in a cosmos. If we see 
 order and progress in human arrangements, we 
 infer a human will a finite ego: and since we see 
 (the Positivists themselves being judges) order and 
 progress in Nature, it is in reality by a strictly 
 experiential argument that we infer a superhuman 
 will an Infinite Ego. Herbert Spencer says it is 
 not a question whether we should apply Person- 
 ality, or something lower, to the Unknowable ; the 
 alternative is " between Personality and something 
 higher." But we have no higher word. 1 
 
 1 I have further discussed the arguments in favour of the divine 
 existence in my 'BeJifif in God,' and also in 'Agnosticism.'
 
 132 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 THE denial of Personality is the denial of know- 
 ledge. Without a metaphysical ego there could 
 be neither memory nor sensation. The attempt to 
 disprove the existence of such an ego is only 
 rendered apparently successful by that existence 
 being throughout assumed. Its very negation is 
 tantamount to its affirmation; for without this 
 principle of permanence the concepts employed in 
 its denial could not possibly have been formed. In 
 other words, the personality, which should be the 
 beginning of metaphysics, is essential to the con 
 ception and statement of every anti-metaphysical 
 argument. Further, since consciousness has borne 
 such strong testimony to the unity and continuity 
 of the ego, which is the demonstrable sine qua non 
 of every mental state, a presumption arises in 
 favour of the evidence it offers in regard to human 
 freedom. But, even admitting that the supposed 
 sense of freedom is an illusion, our necessitation
 
 CONCLUSION. 133 
 
 is allowed by all to be compatible with a certain 
 ability to control the forces of nature and to make 
 them subservient to our own purposes. And since, 
 apart from our interference, these forces have 
 worked together to form a cosmos, an order of 
 nature, a system of things in which it is desirable 
 to live, we are arguing strictly along the lines of 
 experience when we infer the control of a super- 
 human intelligence. The Personality, which is the 
 end of metaphysics, is frequently assumed in the 
 very books which are supposed to have done away 
 for ever with all traces of its existence; for in 
 these books such words as " design," " adaptation," 
 " purpose," " meaning," " mechanism," are constantly 
 applied to the products and processes of nature. 
 So that, like M. Jourdain who talked prose without 
 knowing it till informed of the fact by his tutor, 
 the Positivists turn out to have been all along un- 
 wittingly metaphysicians. They say there is no 
 ego ; yet they talk of " I," " he," " we," " our mind," 
 "our intelligence," &c., &c., which expressions are 
 merely synonyms for the ego. They say all man's 
 actions are mechanically necessitated ; yet they 
 talk about his " self-adjustment," and the " control " 
 which he exercises over external phenomena. They 
 say there is no evidence of a Mind in nature ; yet 
 they are everlastingly applying to natural objects
 
 134 PERSONALITY. 
 
 words which mean nothing, unless they mean that 
 these objects have been intelligently and purposely 
 produced. If we were to extract from the writings 
 of anti-metaphysical thinkers everything that had 
 a metaphysical signification, what remained would 
 be as meaningless as a Euclid from which all the 
 symbols had been omitted. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 PRINTED BT WILLIAM Bf.ACKWOOD AND SONS.
 
 WORKS BY PROFESSOR MOMERIE. 
 
 I. 
 
 PERSONALITY} 
 
 THE BEGINNING AND END OF METAPHYSICS, 
 
 AND A NECESSARY ASSUMPTION IN ALL POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
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 AGNOSTICISM, 
 
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 Professor Momerie's manner Following the chapters on Agnosticism, 
 
 there are ten other chapters on the book of Bcclesiastes. They form an ad- 
 mirable and scholarly analysis of that strange and melancholy book." The 
 Inquirer. 
 
 "We are thankful for so masterly, so comprehensive, and so complete a 
 vindication of the principles of Christian Theism, with its powerful refuta- 
 tion of the main positions of Agnosticism. The book meets a real and wide- 
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 "Dr Momerie's breadth of intellect and sympathy, his clear thinking and 
 well-chastened style, as well as his deep religiousness, which will, no doubt, 
 after a time assume a more positively evangelical form, eminently adapt 
 him to be a teacher to his generation. He has freed himself, by we know 
 not what process, from many of the prejudices of the older schools ; but he 
 cau search into the very soul of unbelieving sophistry, and the spirit of his 
 exhortation is always ennobling and heavenward." Methodist Times. 
 
 " It is long since we have met with a volume of sermons which will so well 
 repay a careful study." Ecclesiastical Gazette. 
 
 "The work of a majestic intellect." Fifeshire Journal.
 
 VI. 
 
 PREACHING AND HEARINGj 
 
 AND OTHER SERMONS. 
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 VII. 
 
 BELIEF IN GOD, 
 
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 VIII. 
 JUST PUBLISHED. 
 
 INSPIRATION. 
 
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 Professor Momerie in his new volume." Christian World. 
 
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