tilSTORYn GERMAN POLICY BEFORE THE WAR GERMAN POLICY BEFORE THE WAR By G. W. PROTHERO LITT.D., HON. LL.D, (EDINBURGH AND HARVARD), F.B.A. HON. FELLOW OF KINg's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, HON. VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY, CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY NEW YORK : E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY. 1916 5\5 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED *ii^iOK/»£ PREFATORY NOTE The following pages are somewhat expanded, especially in the latter part, from notes of a lecture given before the Royal Historical Society in January last year. The main thesis which I endeavoured then to put before my audience, namely that the establishment of German influence in the Balkans and in the Turkish Empire is the fundamental object of German policy, appears to me to have received corroboration from recent events in South-Eastern Europe. These events are not to be regarded, as some have regarded them, as " afterthoughts,'' or as the desperate efforts of a Power thwarted in other directions ; on the contrary they are incidents in the execution of a plan conceived long ago, to which the crushing, or — ^if that proved impossible — ^the maim- ing, of France and Russia was but the necessary preUminary step. I desire to express my gratitude to Mr. Lucien Wolf for valuable assistance given me in regard to the last three chapters. G. W. P. March, 1916. X 38420 CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MILITARISM— Definition — State and Army — Philosophical Basis — Kant and Goethe — Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke — Schopenhauer, Gobineau, Nietzsche — Summary . . x II. CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS, AIMS AND TENDENCIES, OF MODERN GERMANY— Geographical Position — Military History — Economic Expansion — Self-confidence — Materialism — Delusions — Colonies and Colonization — Economic Requirements — Colonial Movement — Treaties and Customs-Unions — Central European Union — Socialism — Trade Methods — The Navy — The Drang nach Osten — Austria-Hun- gary and Turkey — Control of the Near-East — Summary 1 6 III. FOREIGN POLICY OF BISMARCK, 1871-1890— German Anxieties — Germany and her Allies — Peace of Bismarck — Dreikaiserbtmd — Russo-Turkish War — Austro-German Alliance — Triple Alliance — Success of Bismarck . . . . . . . • . . . . • • 44 IV. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1890-1905— William II and the Near-East — Franco-Russian Alliance — Anglo-French Rivalry — South African War — The Far-East — Russian Advances — Russo-Japanese War — Eclipse of Russia — Summary . . . . . . 54 V. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1905-1914— Effect of Japanese Victories — Anglo-French Agree- ment — Franco-German Relations — Morocco — France, Italy and Spain — Germany, France and Morocco — Fall viii COT>iTE^TS— (continued) PAGB of Delcass^ — Gonference of Algeciras — Casablanca Incident — Franco-German Convention — Anglo-Russian Agreement — The Near-East : Crete — Greece and Rumania — Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro — Turkey and Macedonia — Projects of Reform — Austrian Policy — Aehrenthal and Isvolski — Reval Interview — Turkish Revolution — Annexation of Bosnia — Austria-Hungary and Serbia — Set-back for the Entente — Revolution in Greece — ^Morocco again — The Panther at Agadir — Franco-German Compromise — Tripolitan War — The Balkan League — Attempts at Intervention — First Balkan War : Albania — Conference of London — Treaty of London — Macedonia — Second Balkan War — Treaty of Bucarest — Germany, Austria-Hungary and Serbia — German War Party — Germany's Great Aim . . 66 German Policy before the War CHAPTER I THE PHILOSOPHY OF MILITARISM Few members of this audience will be unacquainted with the remark of Aristotle, that political disturb- ances spring from small occasions but from great causes. The remark is essentially true with regard to the struggle in which this country is now engaged. My object to-day is not to discuss the immediate occasions of the War, or the course of the diplomatic negotiations which preceded the outbreak ; nor shall I attempt to apportion the blame for the failure of those negotiations. These questions have been adequately discussed by many capable writers in Great Britain and abroad, and the general conclusion appears to most people no longer doubtful. This ground, therefore, need not be traversed anew. I wish rather to direct your attention to the deeper causes of the conflict : (i) to the ideas and princi- ples, the ambitions and motives, which have pro- duced in Germany a state of mind favourable to war ; (2) to the historical events and the economic and political conditions which have contributed to t DEFINITION OF MILITARISM strengthen the warUke tendency thus aroused ; and (3) finally to the course of international politics, especially during the last ten or eleven years, which, I will not say rendered an armed conflict inevitable, but made it very difficult to avoid. We shall see that a mass of hopes and fears, of resentments and sus- picions, and of incitements to a warlike solution was gradually accumulated, which only required a spark to be kindled into flame. First, then, as to the ideas and principles which have come to dominate the political mind of Ger- many. We are apt to single out, as the most notable characteristic of the modern German Empire, its militarism ; and the word is habitually, if vaguely, used — like charity — to cover a multitude of sins. Now, what do we mean by militarism ? The T , " See "The Anglo-German Agreement," Fortnightly Review, October,! 898. ^^ See The Life 0] Cecil Rhodes, by Sir L. Michel. 6o AFFAIRS IN THE FAR-EASt ing Imperial plans in Mesopotamia and those of Rhodes in South Africa. Be this as it may, the pro- posal for a coahtion against Great Britain, which was certainly made, and is said, on good authority, to have emanated from Russia, but is attributed by others to Germany, came to nothing.^ The attitude of the German Government during the Boer War appears — though details are still obscure — to have been *' correct " ; and the danger passed when our ultimate victory seemed secure. But the perils of *' splendid isolation " impressed themselves forcibly on the British Government, and had much to do with the changes in foreign policy which followed. Another outcome of the struggle was that the im- portance of sea-power, which alone enabled us to bring the war to a successful close, afforded an object-lesson not lost upon the German people. Its teaching was utilized in the famous Navy Law of 1900. Meanwhile, in the Far East, a conflict was pre- paring, which bade fair to employ the energies of Russia for some time to come. The firstfruits of her alliance with France were seen in the combination of those Powers, in concert with Germany, to upset the Treaty of Simonoseki (1895), which had ended the Chino- Japanese War, and to deprive Japan of the most important results of her victory. The out- come of this somewhat nefarious transaction was mainly to the advantage of Russia. Japan was forced to retrocede Port Arthur to China ; but Russia had no intention of leaving that great fortress ^See " Count MuraviefE's Indiscretion" {ForU Rev., Dec, 1899), the author of which lays the blame on Russia. RUSSIAN ADVANCES IN CHINA 6i in Chinese hands. Early in 1896 she made a secret treaty with China, securing an optional lease of Port Arthur or of Kiaochau, together with important concessions in Manchuria, including the right to make a railway to the Liaotung Peninsula. She strengthened this advantage by advancing money to enable China to pay the Japanese indemnity ; and, in the autumn of 1896, the Cassini Convention made her influence paramount in Pekin. In 1897 Germany, taking advantage of the murder of two German missionaries, seized the valuable port of Kiaochau, and extorted from China important rights over the province of Shantung. The acquisition was one on which the Emperor seems to have set a special value ; and enormous sums of money have been spent in the development of the latest German colony. Early in the following year Russia occupied Port Arthur, upon which England, by arrangement with Japan, occupied Wei-Hai-Wei ; and early in 1899 ^ convention between England and Russia recognized British rights in the Yangtse Valley, as a set-off to the recognition of Russian influence in Manchuria. These encroachments on the integrity of China led to a great outburst of national feeling in that country ; and the " Boxer " troubles were the result. The siege of the Legations at Pekin (1900) forced the Powers to intervene, and furnished Russia with a pretext for occupying Manchuria. When the troubles came to an end, she found other reasons for retaining the ground she had gained. About the same time Russian speculators obtained concessions on the Yalu river; and it became increasingly probable 62 THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR that Russia would soon attain at Seoul the same dominant position which she had already won at Pekin. Now, Korea is for Japan very much what Belgium is to Great Britain ; and the Russians at Seoul and Masampho would have been as menacing to Japanese security as a German occupation of Brussels and Antwerp would be to this country. Japan made up her mind to fight rather than incur this danger, and found in England the support she required. Hence the Anglo- Japanese alUance of 1902, and the Russo-Japanese War which began two years later. How far it is true that Germany prompted Russia to the enterprise must remain for the present doubt- ful ; certain it is that, in consideration of a highly advantageous commercial treaty, the German Government gave the Tsar certain pledges which enabled Russia to denude her western front of troops, in order to transport them to the scene of war in Manchuria. German shipowners were allowed to sell ships to Russia, to be converted into cruisers ; and German financiers provided a loan. If the war was not due to German advice — ^which indeed would have been superfluous — ^it was favourable to German interests, and was therefore facihtated by Germany. This is not the place to discuss the Anglo- Japanese alliance or the war that followed. What I am con- cerned to point out is the enormous effect which the issue of that war produced in international and especially European politics. No one acquainted with the history of Europe in the nineteenth century can fail to be struck by the dominant position which Russia occupied during almost all that time. Courted THE ECLIPSE OF RUSSIA 63 by Napoleon I, and dividing the Continent with him, it was she who gave his Empire its first deadly blow. After 1815 she led the forces of reaction ; and her policy in the Near East kept the Western Powers in constant alarm. The Crimean War exposed her real weakness ; nevertheless, a few years later she weighed as heavily as ever in the scale of European politics. It was her goodwill that enabled Napoleon III to vanquish Austria and emancipate Italy. Courted by Bismarck, her benevolent neutrality allowed him to overthrow Austria and France, and to create the German Empire ; and, except for one brief interlude, a good understanding with Russia was the keynote of his foreign policy. Even the comparatively un- successful war of 1878 only temporarily dimmed her prestige. It recovered more than it had lost through the alliance with France ; and it can hardly be doubted that the fear of a collision with Russia kept the projects of William II, especially his designs in the Near East, within bounds for fifteen years. But now all this was to be altered. Russia chal- lenged the young Asiatic Power, and was grievously defeated. Nor was this all. The result of the war, combined with lamentable social and poUtical con- ditions at home, produced internal disorders which, added to the immense losses of men and maUriel in the Far East, rendered a vigorous foreign policy im- possible for a long time to come. In short, Russia was eUminated from international calculations ; it was as if, in the solar system, Saturn had suddenly fallen from heaven. A balancing force had been removed ; the relations of all the other planets were changed. More especially, a constant source of ni 64 SUMMARY OF THE PERIOD anxiety for Germany disappeared — at least for a time. The Kaiser's hands were freed. The most notable features of the period (1890- 1904) which we have now passed in brief review ar( these. For the poUcy of consoHdation at home ani restraint abroad, which marked the later years ol Bismarck's sway, was substituted a more active an( adventurous policy, a policy of expansion, not ye indeed obviously a^^ressiv e, but rather preparato:^ for aggression. JnciJents but httle noticed at the time, such as the Emperor's visits to the East, the launching of the Bagdad railway, the acquisition of Heligoland, are now seen to mark stages in the execution of a consistent and considered plan. Other events, such as the Kriiger telegram and the seizure of Kiaochau, which made more noise, fall into their place in the same scheme. Above all, the creation of a great navy, starting from the Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900, began to attract attention in this country, and roused apprehensions which the events of the subsequent period did nothing to allay. Meanwhile the internal prosperity of Germany advanced by leaps and bounds ; and the confidence of the country grew with the increase of its wealth. New ideas, new hopes and ambitions, began to permeate poli- tical circles, and inflamed the utterances of a host of writers. The Bismarckian system began to be regarded as obsolete. The great scheme of a Central European Customs Union was launched. The idea^ of a vast semi-colonial empire or protectorate, ex- tending from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf, took shape. The Pan-German League, with its all- . embracing notions of nationality, its far-reaching \ SUMMARY OF THE PERIOD 65 schemes of conquest, appealed to the visionary side of the German mind. The Navy League and other similar associations supplied a practical and im- mediate aim, and strengthened the idea of combined national effort for a great end. It was a period of rapid internal development, both of forces and ideas, during which the foundations were laid for expansion and ultimately for aggression abroad. The nature of this growth was little understood or even observed outside Germany. England, France, Italy, and Russia were all occupied beyond the frontiers of Europe ; what was going on in Germany escaped their attention. Nevertheless, especially towards the end of the period, a vague feeling of suspicion and apprehension began to spread. The Bismarckian grouping of the Powers gave way ; or rather the Powers outside the central bloc tended to substitute coalition for their previous isolation. The Triple AUiance still held firm, but France and Russia drew together, and England and France began to search for a way of composing their mutual jealousies. The Triple Entente was already visible on the horizon. Such was the position when the Russo-Japanese War took place. CHAPTER V GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, I905-I914 We now enter upon another period, one full of " alarums and excursions " which have led on, almost inevitably, to the present war. I am far from asserting that Germany, ten years ago, had conceived the deliberate intention of provoking a European conflict. What I maintain is that the course of action initiated by the German Govern- ment in 1905 was one of an increasingly self-assertive, if not actively aggressive, character, calculated to encourage ambitions in the German people and fears in other nations which divided Europe into two armed camps ; and that a policy of demands and threats, of diplomacy backed by a constant *' rattling of the sabre," was bound eventually to lead Germany into an international position in which diplomatic pressure could no longer ensure a triumph, and war became, for a fully armed and self-confident people, the only alternative. Clausewitz regarded war as the *' continuation of policy." That depends on the policy. A policy was now pursued by Germany which was bound, sooner or later, to result in war. Let us note, at the outset, the dates of certain events in the Far East. The war between Russia 66 EFFECT OF JAPANESE VICTORIES 67 and Japan began in February, 1904. After a long series of sanguinary engagements, Port Arthur fell at the end of the year ; and the remains of the first Russian fleet passed into the hands of the victors. In February and March, 1905, was fought the last great land-battle, that of Mukden ; and in May the second Russian fleet was destroyed in the Battle of Tsushima. President Roosevelt intervened, and the Peace of Portsmouth was signed in September. I pass over the more remote effects of the Japan- ese victory, which re-echoed throughout Asia — the annexation of Korea, the revolution in China, the growth of nationalist feeling and the stimulation of " unrest '' in India, the revolution and the grant of a constitution in Persia. In the Near East also the triumph of an Asiatic over a European Power had a perceptible influence, in the growth of the Young Turk movement, which issued in the revolution of 1908, and in the nationaUst agitation in Egypt. Even in the Far West, the fear of Japanese aggres- sion began to occupy the mind and to affect the policy of the United States. In short, the victories of Japan, like the ocean-waves engendered by the earthquake of Krakatoa, were felt all round the world. What we are here concerned with is their immediate effect on the European position. For some time past the Governments of France and Great Britain had felt that the existence of a number of causes of friction between them was detrimental to both countries ; and efforts had been made by well-disposed persons on both sides of the Channel to bring about a better understanding. These efforts, however, had not made much way 68 THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT before the Russo-Japanese War. At an early stage in the hostiUties it became evident that a Russian victory was improbable, and that, at all events, a long and exhausting struggle was in prospect. With Russia fully occupied in the Far East, France practically fell back again into the isolation from which she had escaped in 1891. So long as England was unfriendly, or even indifferent, she was exposed unaided to dangers from across the Rhine such as had threatened her in 1875 and 1887. The situation was too hazardous to be endured. There was only one possible supporter — Great Britain, with whom France had nearly gone to war six years before. But in the interval some causes of trouble had been removed ; and a King was on the English throne who undoubtedly laboured — even if his influence in this respect has been sometimes exaggerated — ^in the cause of peace. Above all, it was felt in England that, if the situation was to be saved, and the peace of Europe preserved, it could only be by common action on the part of the two western Powers. The result was the Anglo-French agreement of April 1904, which set at rest all outstanding questions between the two countries. France recognized the position of England in Egypt ; England, somewhat vaguely, acknowledged French claims in Morocco ; Madagascar was registered as French ; French and English possessions in Nigeria were finally delimited, rival interests in Siam reconciled, and the ancient disputes about the Newfoundland fisheries brought to a close. There was no further obstacle to concerted action in European affairs. The stability and value of the agreement were soon FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS 69 to be tested. In the following year (1905) Germany made the first of several attempts to destroy it. The ground she chose for this effort was the question of Morocco. To understand her action and the events that followed, it will be necessary to go back a few years, and trace briefly the circumstances which brought Moroccan affairs into such prominence. Since the retirement of Bismarck, Franco-German relations had been, if not precisely friendly, on a tolerable footing. Germany had shown dissatisfac- tion at the Franco-Russian alliance ; and Bismarck had, as we have seen, been blamed for not guarding against it. But the Government made no attempt to undo what had been done, for it had no desire to pick a quarrel with either of the contracting parties at the time. The Allies, moreover, were busily engaged outside Europe — France in Africa and Indo- China, Russia in preparing for advances in the Far East ; and for some years the Bismarckian policy of encouraging such occupations was pursued. Dur- ing the first decade of his reign, the German Emperor showed an inclination to remain on good terms with France ; and overtures for an understanding were made, on several occasions, by the German Foreign Office. M. Hanotaux, French Foreign Secretary from 1894 to 1898, was strongly in favour of a Franco- German entente ; but his successor, M. Delcasse, was of a different mind, and declared, on the morrow of Fashoda, that he would never be satisfied until he had reconciled England and France. Neverthe- less, German attempts to win over the French were repeated in 1900 and 1901 ; they failed principally because the acceptance of overtures from Berlin 70 THE CONDITION OF MOROCCO would have implied acquiescence in the Treaty of Frankfort and the final abandonment of Alsace- Lorraine. It was about this time that Morocco began to take a leading place in French colonial policy. So far back as 1880 the condition of that country had been the subject of international discussion ; and at the Conference of Madrid, held in that year, the German delegate — ^it was before the days when Germany had a colonial policy at all — was instructed to support France. For some twenty years after this date, the French Government had been content with a slowly advancing trade, furthered by private effort ; and at the end of the century France held unquestionably the first place in Moroccan commerce. Great Britain came next, and Germany third, but a long way behind. Until the death of the Sultan Mulai Hassan, in 1894, England held a predominant political posi- tion at Fez ; but under his successor her influence declined, and an anarchical condition began to supervene. The idea of a British protectorate was more than once suggested, as was also that of an Italian protectorate ; but neither suggestion led to any practical results. When Lord Lansdowne took office as Foreign Secretary, England — largely owing to the experience of the Boer War — ^was definitely abandoning the " splendid isolation *' on which she had hitherto prided herself ; and in M. Delcasse she found a statesman ready to meet her half-way. Advances towards an understanding with Italy had already been made by the French Government ; and a commercial treaty (1898) paved the way for a more thorough understanding. This was achieved FRANCE, ITALY AND SPAIN 71 in the Franco-Italian convention of 1900, confirmed two years later, under which France gave Italy a free hand in Tripoli, while Italy promised to raise no objection to a French advance in Morocco. This new orientation showed itself on the occasion of the renewal of the Triple AUiance in 1902, when the clauses of the treaty aimed especially at France, and adopted by Crispi at a time when Italy was very sore over Tunis, were left out, and the treaty became, so far at least as Italy was concerned, one of a mere- ly defensive kind. Certain commercial agreements were made about the same time (1901-2) with the Sultan of Morocco, faciUtating the *' peaceful pen- tration " of the country by French trade. With Spain also a settlement was attempted in 1902. The French proposals were then decHned in Madrid ; and it was not till after the Anglo-French agreement had been signed (April, 1904) that a secret convention was made with Spain, delimiting the respective spheres of action of the twa countries in Morocco (October, 1904). I have dwelt at some length on these preliminaries because the change of policy implied by the con- ventions with England and Spain, taken together with the omission to offer Germany a share in the settlement of Morocco — as to which she had on previous occasions been consulted — was a very momentous one. I will not discuss the wisdom of this policy, beyond remarking that it was evidently hazardous. It was in no sense hostile to Germany, either in purport or in intention ; but its exclusive character afforded some excuse for irritation. Intimation of the Anglo-French agreement, so far F 72 GERMANY, FRANCE AND MOROCCO as Egypt was concerned, was at once given by the British Government to that of Germany ; the French Government informed the German Ambassador in Paris of the arrangement about Morocco. The German Government raised no objections. Prince RadoHn told M. Delcasse that he found the French declarations about Morocco natural and reasonable ; and Count von Biilow made a similar statement in the Reichstag. Although the Emperor, in a pubUc speech made shortly afterwards, gave somewhat cryptic utterance to his resentment, his Government took no overt action so long as the issue of the strug- gle in the East remained uncertain. But the Pan- German League was active ; and the Russian defeats, especially the fall of Port Arthur, produced a change in the attitude of Germany. In January, 1905, M. Rouvier, a politician opposed to Delcasse, suc- ceeded M. Combes as Premier ; and intrigues against the Minister of Foreign Affairs at once began. The German Government, being questioned by the French Ambassador, declared that, not having been formally consulted with regard to Morocco, it did not consider itself bound to observe the Anglo-French agreement. On March 31st, shortly after the Battle of Mukden, the German Emperor landed at Tangier and made a speech in which he proclaimed himself the champion of Moroccan integrity. This was followed by the demand for an international conference to consider the question anew ; and Count Henckel von Don- nersmarck was sent to Paris to require the dismissal of Delcasse. Active negotiations followed ; Europe became anxious ; the French Government, unpre- pared for war, was alarmed. Towards the end of THE FALL OF DELCASS^ 73 May the Battle of Tsushima finally destroyed all hope of Russian intervention ; and on June 6th the Council of Ministers in Paris, in spite of Delcasse's opposition, resolved to accept the German demand. Thereupon the Foreign Minister resigned. This first success was not likely to satisfy Ger- many ; on the contrary, it could only encourage her to further activity and greater truculence. More- over, it is to be remembered that the Conservative Government in England was, at the time, in a state of rapid dissolution ; and the Germans may well have fancied that a Liberal Ministry, already pledged to a change of policy in South Africa, would adopt a different attitude nearer home. The Government of Mr. Balfour, however, at an early stage of the proceedings, intimated to BerHn that, '* in the event of an unprovoked attack upon the Republic, popular feeling in England would not suffer the French to be left unsupported " ; and this timely warning doubtless contributed to the maintenance of peace. The principle of a conference once accepted, the bases of discussion had still to be arranged ; and it was not till September — ^ten days after the conclusion of the Peace of Portsmouth — ^that the agreement was signed. Even with the reservations that were made, the enforced recognition that Germany and her allies had a right to share in the settlement of Morocco was a diplomatic triumph of great importance for Berlin. Nor can it be denied that, although German interests in Morocco were small in comparison with those of England and France, Germany had some ground for asserting that so large and valuable a territory, and one so near to Europe, should not be disposed of by 74 THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS three Powers without attention to the wishes of the rest. When we consider the importance of colonial expansion to Germany, and remember that Morocco was one of the few remaining portions of the earth's surface available for European colonization of a residential kind, it is not surprising that the German Government should have asserted its claim for con- sideration. It was the high-handed manner in which that claim was pressed, and the use which was made of the comparative isolation in which France found herself at the time, that gave genuine cause for alarm and irritation. The Conference met at Algeciras in January, 1906, and sat for three months. To describe the discussion in detail would occupy too much space. It must suffice to say that Germany strove hard to isolate France ; and that the conditions which she sought to impose were such that the chances of peace and war seemed for some time to be evenly balanced. But the British Government, maintaining herein the poHcy of its predecessor, held firm to the Entente ; and Germany, receiving satisfaction on minor points, and finding all Europe, with the exception of her " brilliant second,'' Austria, arrayed against the concession of further demands, at length gave way. In the end, while the '' integrity of Morocco '* was formally recognized and the principle of the " open door " maintained — at least for a specified time — predominant political influence in that country was conceded to France. The first attempt to break up the Anglo-French Entente had failed ; and our friends emerged from the conflict with more advan- tage than they could have expected a year before. THE CASABLANCA INCIDENT 75 This was not, however, to be the end of the Moroccan question ; and it will be convenient to carry the story a stage further before passing to other matters. Early in 1908 civil war broke out in Morocco. The reigning Sultan, Abdul Aziz, was forced to fly from the capital and took refuge in French territory. Germany promptly recognized the pretender, Mulai Hafid, and sent a consul to Fez, thus infringing the compact which attributed politi- cal predominance in Morocco to France. Eventually Mulai Hafid was recognized by the other Powers concerned. This difficulty was hardly settled, when the so- called Casablanca incident (September, 1908) — a trivial dispute between French and German officials respecting some deserters of the Foreign Legion in a Moroccan port — raised another storm. The inci- dent, which might have been easily settled by a Power peaceably disposed, was converted by Ger- many into an international question of the first magnitude ; and the attitude she assumed was as menacing and peremptory as it had been three years before. But things in France had improved in the interval ; the French army was in better trim ; and confidence in the Entente (recently strengthened by the adhesion of Russia) was more strongly estab- lished. Clemenceau and Pichon held firm ; and Germany, whose attention was largely occupied by the Balkan crisis, eventually agreed to submit the question to the Hague Tribunal. Even then the matter was not settled. The pubHcation in the Daily Telegraph (October, 1908) of the famous interview with the Emperor caused so much excitement and 76 FRANCO-GERMAN CONVENTION annoyance in Germany that the Government thought it advisable to divert pubUc attention by another attempt to bully France. They suddenly demanded that France should make a public apology for the action of her officials, before the question was sub- mitted to the Tribunal. But France, supported by England and Russia, again refused to humiliate herself ; and the incident, which threatened to end in tragedy, was closed by an almost comic com- promise. Finally, in February, 1909, almost simultaneously with the settlement of the Bosnian question, a con- vention was signed between France and Germany. The object aimed at was to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras. It was agreed that Germany should enjoy perfect equality of commercial rights in Morocco, and that France should have the political control necessary for the maintenance of order, with a view to the enjoyment of those rights. This con- vention, combined with the decision of the Hague Tribunal on the Casablanca incident, given in May, 1909, seemed to promise quiet for some time to come. We must now turn to another storm-centre, the Near East. But before entering on it, we have to take note of an event of first-rate importance in regard to international relations — ^the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. This convention was the natural though not immediate consequence of the Anglo- French agreement of 1904. For many years there had been difficulties between the two Powers with regard to their respective interests or spheres of activity in the East. In 1878 they had been on the THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT 77 verge of war about Turkey. Russia then retaliated by intrigues at Cabul, which led to the Afghan War of 1878-9. In 1886 the Penjdeh incident nearly brought about an armed collision. The Anglo- Japanese aUiance (1902) aimed at giving mutual security against Russian aggression, and, by localiz- ing the war, enabled Japan to defeat her mighty an- tagonist. The growth of Russian influence at Lhassa provoked the Tibetan expedition of 1903-4 ; while in Persia conflicting interests produced a situation constantly tending to become more serious. In short, with Russia, as with France, before 1904, Great Britain had many points of friction, rendering impossible that harmonious co-operation which the aggressive spirit displayed by Germany in the Moroccan crisis had proved to be eminently desirable. Chastened in spirit by her defeats in the Far East and by the domestic disturbances which added to her weakness, Russia was now in a condition to welcome the overtures made by the Conservative Government in England and continued by their successors. The negotiation was long and difficult, but an end was reached in the Anglo-Russian agree- ment of August, 1907, which established a working compromise with regard to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The arrangement was not in all respects satisfactory, especially with regard to Persia ; but it at least enabled the two Powers to work together harmoniously in Europe. The Dual Entente thus became a Triple Entente ; and it was hoped, at least in this country — where pacific ideas prevailed and the Entente was regarded as purely defensive — that it would prove a bulwark of European peace. In 78 THE NEAR-EAST : CRETAN TROUBLES Germany, however, it was resented as Einkreisungs- politiky a policy deliberately adopted by the enemies of Germany with the malign intention of forcing on the country a strait waistcoat, which it was the duty, as well as the interest, of a powerful and self- respecting State at all costs to destroy. We may now briefly consider the previous course of affairs in South-Eastern Europe, in order to under- stand the conditions under which the Balkan Ques- tion again forced its way in 1908 to the forefront of European politics. After 1885, when Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia coalesced into one State, the his- tory of the Near East for the next twenty years cannot be said to have been uneventful. But such disturbances as occurred were localized ; and the European Concert was, generally speaking, effica- cious, not indeed in removing the deep-seated origins of trouble, but in preventing them from causing a European conflagration. The Serbo-Bulgarian War, which followed (1886) the amalgamation of Bulgaria, ended quickly in a Serbian defeat, and was prevented by Austrian intervention from producing any other results. In the same year Greece, desirous of making war on Turkey, was hindered by a naval blockade from carrying out her intention. Revolutionary movements in Crete, aiming at a union with the Greek kingdom, were for many years the chief source of trouble. An insurrection broke out in 1889 ; and religious differences between the Christians and Mohammedans in the island embit- tered the racial conflict thence arising. In 1895 the Sultan succeeded in allaying the quarrel, but it broke out afresh in the following year ; and the desire for GREECE AND RUMANIA 79 annexation found a growing response in Greece. In 1897 Colonel Vassos, accompanied by Greek sup- porters, landed in Crete ; but the Powers, while promising autonomy, ordered him to leave. National feeling in Greece had, however, risen by this time to bursting-point ; and the *' Thirty Days' War " with Turkey followed. The Greeks were badly beaten ; the Powers again intervened ; and the status quo was restored. A temporary settlement of the Cretan question was achieved in the following year (1898). The Turkish officials left the island ; and Prince George of Greece was installed as High Commissioner, under the nominal suzerainty of the Porte. In 1906 the Prince resigned, and his place was taken by M. Ziamis ; but the compromise was maintained, with the support of international troops, till 1909. It should be observed that from these transactions, so far as they were to the disadvantage of Turkey, the German Government, so far as possible, held aloof. A German contingent was, however, sent to join, for a time, the contingents of the other Powers in Crete. Meanwhile Rumania, which had become a king- dom in 1881, pursued the even tenour of her way. Her intimate connection with the Central Powers, established after the Russo-Turkish War, was main- tained under her Hohenzollern ruler. King Charles, and was strengthened by a military convention in 1896. This convention appears to have been re- newed, with more specific objects, in 1900.^ Remote from the chief areas of disturbance, politically within the German group, but from the cultural point of 1 Gu^choff, U Alliance Balkanique, pp. 61, 62. 8o BULGARIA AND SERBIA view dependent rather on Latin civilization, Rumania made great social and economic progress during a period of thirty-five years. Bulgaria, on the other hand, fell gradually into the orbit of Russian influence. Two years after her junction with Eastern Rumelia, the Prince, Alex- ander of Battenberg, was forced to abdicate ; and Ferdinand of Coburg, a grandson of Louis Philippe, was chosen Prince in his stead. His great minister, Stambuloff, resisted Russian influence until his dismissal in 1894. Ferdinand made his peace with the Tsar ; and thenceforward the foreign poHcy of Bulgaria was distinctly Russophil. By a convention between Russia and Bulgaria signed in 1902, as a counterpoise to Austrian influence in Serbia, Russia undertook to uphold the integrity of Bulgaria. Meanwhile Serbia had passed through stormy times. Under the last two kings of the Obrenovitch dynasty, Milan and Alexander — Milan assumed the royal title in 1882 — Serbia was dominated by Austrian influence, which found expression in the Austro-Serbian convention of 1900. But Milan, constantly tampering with the constitution, became so unpopular that in 1889 he abdicated in favour of his son Alexander, who, after his coming of age in 1893, proved as incapable and ill-advised a ruler as his father. His unfortunate marriage, his proscrip- tion of the Radical party, and his obstinate adherence to the Austrian connection, combined to fan the fire of national discontent to a white heat ; and in 1903 he and his Queen were murdered by a group of officers in circumstances of great brutality. Peter Kara- georgevitch succeeded ; and the foreign relations SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 8i of Serbia at once took on a different colour. The new direction was indicated by a secret treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria signed in 1904/ and by a Serbo-Bulgarian convention in 1906, which was regarded as a step towards a customs-union between the two countries. Austria showed her resentment by imposing a prohibitive tariff on the chief article of Serbian export — pigs ; and her relations with Serbia have been unfriendly ever since. Of Serbia's neighbour, Montenegro — separated from her, however, by the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, for thirty years in the occupation of Austria-Hungary — nothing need be said except that, to the extent of her capacity, she followed in the wake of wealthier States, and, largely by the aid of Italian capital, gradually put on some at least of the externals of civilization. It was not till 1910 that her Prince followed the example of other Balkan rulers, and adopted the title of King. As a Slav State, Montenegro looked to Russia for support against aggression on the part of her great neighbour to the north. To sum up, the rivalry between Austria and Russia in the Balkan peninsula was fairly evenly balanced till 1903, Serbia and Rumania going with the former, Montenegro and Bulgaria with the latter. But in that year the balance was upset by Serbia going over to the Russian side — a change in which Austria- Hungary was not likely to acquiesce. During this period, especially after the German Emperor's second visit in 1898, Turkey was falling more and more under German influence. AHenated from Russia, Germany looked to Turkey to balance 1 Guechoff, L* Alliance Balkanique, p. 14. 82 TURKEY: MACEDONIA the loss. While continuing to strengthen her com- mercial connection and her financial control at Constantinople, she was careful not to annoy the Sultan by inconvenient suggestions on behalf of the oppressed communities subject to his control, or still more disagreeable interventions such as those on which the other Powers occasionally ventured. Germany could not altogether abstain from taking a part in the European Concert, but the " flute " on which she performed was seldom heard; and, when it produced any sound at all, it played a tune more pleasing to the Turk than was that given out by the rest of the band. This attitude was especially manifested in regard to the troubles in Macedonia — the real storm-centre of the Balkan Peninsula. In that extraordinary melange of nationalities and rehgions, Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians lived together in inextricable con- fusion ; even Rumania had, in the wandering shepherds known as Kutzo-Wlachs, an excuse for putting a finger in the pie. National animosities were accentuated by the religious differences between the Orthodox, the Hexarchists, and the Patriarchists. Oppression, anarchy, and internecine strife were chronic ; and, as the hour of Ottoman dissolution seemed approaching, each of the interested States sought, by violent but covert action on behalf of its own nationals, to advance its claim to the disputed territory at the expense of its rivals. It was obvious that any serious disturbance in this region affected the interests of the neighbouring Balkan States, and consequently those of the Great Powers which, PROJECTS OF REFORM 83 through the minor States, sought to extend their influence over the whole peninsula. Such a disturbance was threatened by the Greco- Turkish War of 1897. In view of this event, Turkey had for some time cultivated good relations with Bulgaria ; and it was feared that the Bulgarians might join the Turks against Greece with a view to obtaining concessions in Macedonia. Austria and Russia therefore came to an understanding (April, 1897), by which they agreed that the status quo should be maintained, while recognizing each other's respective spheres of influence in the west and east of the Peninsula. For a time the danger was evaded ; but it recurred in 1903, when the state of things in Macedonia was passing from bad to worse. Some sort of intervention appeared inevitable ; and Great Britain put forward a proposal for the internationali- zation of the disturbed districts. At this moment Russia was preparing for the confliict in Manchuria, and had no wish to see other Powers settling Balkan affairs while her energies were occupied elsewhere. The Tsar therefore approached the Emperor of Austria, whose foreign policy was then directed by the pacific Goluchowski ; and a meeting between the two sovereigns took place at Miirzsteg (Septem- ber, 1903), at which a programme of reforms for Macedonia was drawn up. This was pressed upon the Sultan, and theoretically accepted ; but, as the requisite supervision was not provided, the reforms produced little or no result. The policy of co-operation with Russia was naturally unpopular with the forward party in Vienna, and detested by the Magyar element in the 84 BALKAN POLICY OF AUSTRIA Dual Monarchy. The feeling grew that a chance of pushing Austrian interests in the Balkans had been lost in 1903, and that something must be done to balance the disadvantageous change in Serbian policy. The Russian defeats in the Far East appeared to afford an opportunity which it would be absurd to neglect. These views produced a change in the Austrian ministry. The German Emperor made no secret of his dissatisfaction at the inadequacy of the assistance which the Austrian representative had given him at Algeciras — ^his remark about the '' brilliant second " was inter- preted as conveying a reproof under the guise of praise ; and in 1906 Goluchowski retired. His place was taken by a Hungarian, Count Aehrenthal ; and Austrian policy entered upon an active phase. Its chief object was to incorporate the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, placed under Austrian protection in 1878, in the Austro-Hungarian Em- pire. Once fully in possession of these districts, and occupying the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, Austria might push her way to Salonika, and thus gain direct access to the ^gean. This project, as we shall see, had the full support of Germany. It is said that the Austro-Hungarian Minister, soon after he took office, proposed to the Russian Minister, Isvolski, in the spring of 1907, to renew the Miirzsteg agreement of four years earlier, but with a very important difference. Germany and France were now to be brought into the entente, with certain advantages all round. Austria was to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina ; Russia was to gain the opening of the Dardanelles ; France was to help AEHRENTHAL AND ISVOLSKI 85 Germany, financially and otherwise, in the promo- tion of the Bagdad railway, and was to receive, in return, full German recognition in Morocco. The ultimate object — to break up the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian ententes, and to isolate Great Britain — must have been apparent. Incidentally the pro- posal throws light on the relative importance attached by statesmen in Berlin to the question of Morocco and that of the Near East. If Austrian control over the Balkans, with all that this implied for both the German Powers, could be secured, Morocco might be neglected. The proposal had its attractions for Russia, but the negotiations with England were on the point of completion, and Isvolski declined. In the following August (1907) the Anglo-Russian agreement was signed. As a counter-blow to that convention, Aehrenthal now brought forward (February, 1908) a proposal for a railway through the Sanjak, which should link up with that already running by way of Uskub to Mitrovitza. Thereupon Russia, acting in concert with Serbia, proposed another railway which should run direct from the Danube to the Adriatic — a pro- ject which received the support of Italy. Both these railways, as crossing Turkish territory, would have required the consent of the Porte. While these projects were in the air, England and Russia issued a joint proposal for reforms in Macedonia, which, like the British suggestion of 1903, would have tended to establish international control. A con- ference of ambassadors on the subject of Macedonian reforms was held at Constantinople ; but its pro- ceedings were rendered abortive by the opposition 86 REVAL INTERVIEW: TURKISH DISCONTENT of Germany and Austria. Aehrenthal had secretly bought the consent of the Porte to the Novi-Bazar railway by promising to resist reforms — conduct which Sir E. Grey with justice stigmatized as dis- loyal. In June, 1908, King Edward VII had an interview with the Tsar at Reval, which was taken to indicate the probability of joint action in the Balkans, and has been supposed by German writers, on very inadequate evidence, to have involved Asiatic schemes of far wider scope. Whatever may have been the truth about the interview, it is clear that the prospect of Anglo-Russian intervention in the Balkans was very distasteful to the statesmen of Vienna and Berlin, and stimu- lated them to action which nearly precipitated a European war. The Reval interview had just occurred when a revolution in Turkey took Europe by surprise and gave Austria the opportunity she desired. So far back as 1891, discontent with the despotic and cor- rupt government of Abdul Hamid had led to the formation of the so-called '* Committee of Union and Progress " at Geneva. It was subsequently transferred to Paris, whence for some years it carried on a subterranean propaganda in the Turkish Empire, which appeared to have Uttle result. In 1906, how- ever, the Committee felt itself strong enough to move to Salonika ; and its tenets gained ground rapidly in the Turkish army. The imminence of European intervention in Macedonia stimulated its activity ; and suppressive action on the part of the Sultan brought the revolt to a head. In July, 1908, certain regiments stationed at Salonika marched on THE TURKISH REVOLUTION 87 Constantinople, overthrew the Sultan's Government, and installed the Committee in power. The *' Young Turkish '' revolution was welcomed in the greater part of Europe as an event fraught with the promise of better days for Turkey and the subject races of the Ottoman Empire, and as in- augurating an era of reform which would solve the Eastern Question by removing the causes of perennial disturbance. So convinced were the Powers that reforms would now be voluntarily introduced, that they removed their officials from Macedonia and handed back to the Turks the control they had assumed. From the political point of view the revolution was hailed by the Entente Powers as a set-back for Austria and Germany, whose influence at Constantinople was supposed to depend on the domination of Abdul Hamid. All these expecta- tions were doomed to be disappointed. Meanwhile Isvolski had become aware of the Austrian intention to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina at all costs — an intention which, however, was kept so secret that when in August King Edward visited the Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl nothing what- ever was disclosed to him. Isvolski now took up again the project of opening the Dardanelles, which had been dropped for a time when he declined AehrenthaFs proposals a year before. This project he now hoped to carry through by direct arrange- ment with Austria-Hungary. Two months after the revolution in Constantinople (September, 1908) he had an interview with Aehrenthal at Buchlau, in which he is said to have consented to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the condition that G 88 ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA Austria should assist in the opening of the Dardanelles. Armed with this (at least conditional) undertaking, he went on to Paris and London, where, however, his project of a deal with Austria appears to have been coldly received. Before he could readjust himself to the situation, the statesmen in Vienna had taken the step to which he had conditionally assented. Their intention was not concealed from Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who was anxious to extract his own profit from the state of affairs in Turkey. At an interview which he had with the Emperor Francis Joseph at Pesth, in September, 1908, an understanding as to simultaneous action seems to have been reached. Whether Ferdinand subse- quently carried out his share of the bargain, or forced his partner's hand, we do not know. At all events, it was agreed that advantage should be taken of the confusion that still reigned in Constantinople, and of the precarious position of the Young Turk Govern- ment, already threatened by the forces of reaction. Accordingly, on October 5th, Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of his State and was crowned Tsar of Bulgaria ; and two days later Bosnia and Herzegovina were formally annexed by Austria- Hungary. To appease Turkish feeling, the right to occupy the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar was simultaneously given up. The consent of the signatory Powers was not asked for these infractions of the Treaty of Berlin. These events raised a great outcry throughout Europe. The acts themselves might perhaps have been ratified by consent, if done in a less arbitrary and illegitimate fashion, for the formal annexation AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERBIA 89 made little real change in the condition of the two provinces concerned, and the independence of Bul- garia would hardly have provoked remonstrance except from Turkey. But the cynical disregard of treaties, and the insolent contempt for European opinion, w^hich the manner of the action showed, were of evil omen, and naturally caused widespread indignation. Anxious that, at least, these things should not form a precedent, the Entente Powers proposed that a conference should be held to discuss the matter ; but Austria-Hungary and Germany refused. The strongest opposition to their action was aroused in Serbia, where for some time past the feel- ing of common nationality and of brotherhood with the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been grow- ing stronger. The dream of a South (Yougo) Slav union, of which these provinces, along with Montene- gro, would have formed the central part, had stirred the imagination of the Serbian people to its depths. The realization of such a dream involved, it must be recognized, serious dangers for the Austrian Empire ; for a strong Slav State on its southern border would have exercised a powerful attraction on the Slav populations already embraced in the Dual Mon- archy. It is not surprising, therefore, that Austria felt bound to oppose the Serbian ambition; and this hostility was even stronger in the Hungarian portion of the monarchy, where the ruUng Magyar race were convinced that their dominant position would be fatally imperilled by an advance of Slav nationality. Nor was this all, for behind Austria stood Germany, firmly resolved that neither a Greater Serbia nor any 90 DANGER OF WAR other obstacle should bar her from realizing her dream of preponderance in the Near East. It was now for the first time that the teachings of those thinkers and idealists to whom I have referred above (pp. 38-40) bore manifest fruit ; now for the first time we clearly see, at least in outline, the funda- mental cause of the present war. During the autumn of the year 1908 and the follow- ing winter months, negotiations between the Powers were continued ; and the tempers of the disputants, especially of Serbia, became more and more em- bittered. The Serbs claimed that at any rate they should receive some compensation, in the cession of a corner of Herzegovina which would have given them continuity with Montenegro ; but this was just what Austria was determined to avoid. The British Government protested, but without any intention of taking up arms. Between the Eastern Powers, however, the quarrel came to the verge of open hostility. Austria mobilized part of her army on the Danube, whereupon Russia, in support of Serbia, repUed by a partial mobiUzation on her side. War seemed on the point of breaking out, when Germany intervened with what was practically an ultimatum to the Tsar — an intimation that, if Russia attacked Austria, she would find the German legions marching with their alUes. This was, of course, a justifiable warning, in view of the fact that an attack upon Austria would have formed a casus belli under the aUiance of 1879 > ^"^^ ^^ shows the difficulty of determining what is an " aggressive " war. Eng- land and France were disinclined to go the length of supporting Russia in extreme measures. They A SET-BACK FOR THE ENTENTE 91 counselled peace ; and Russia, whose strength had not yet recovered from the wounds inflicted in the Japanese War, was obliged to give way. The fait accompli was sullenly recognized ; but Russia did not forget the humiliation she underwent in pocket- ing the German affront. Serbia had naturally to follow suit. A money payment, together with the retrocession of the Sanjak (already mentioned), sufficed to indemnify Turkey for the abandon- ment of her rights over Bosnia and Herzegovina (February, 1909). Similar means were found, with the aid of Russia, to compensate the Porte, in April of the same year, for the loss of its nominal sovereignty over Bulgaria. The net result was a severe diplomatic defeat for the Entente Powers — a defeat to which they need never have exposed themselves had they regulated their policy in accordance with their forces and their strength of will, and acted together in well-considered harmony. The prestige of Germany was much enhanced in the eyes of Turkey and the Balkan States, and that of the Entente correspondingly lowered ; while Prince von Biilow could congratu- late his country on the decisive failure of the Einkreisungspolitik. This was a little premature, but there can be no doubt that the episode was highly detrimental to the cause of the Entente in that area which Germany and Austria regarded as of para- mount importance. Meanwhile the Young Turks, whose seizure of power had been the immediate occasion of the inci- dents I have narrated, had not had it all their own way in Constantinople. The constitution which 92 REVOLUTION IN GREECE Midhat Pasha had introduced thirty-two years before, and which Abdul Hamid had *' suspended '* in 1877, was revived ; and a pariiament of the Em- pire was summoned in accordance with it. But a reaction began ; the Committee was opposed by the "Liberal Union"; and in April, 1909, a counter- revolution took place, which restored the Sultan to power. His recovery was, however, of very brief duration ; the army, under Mahmud Shefket, again marched on Constantinople; and Abdul Hamid was finally deposed. His brother was set up as a " constitutional " Sultan in his place, but the Committee governed in the Sultan's name. The example of Bulgaria naturally affected another outlying province — the island of Crete. The demand for union with Greece was revived ; but the Powers, unwiUing to inflict another blow on the Young Turk Government, refused. A settlement was difficult, but eventually the Greek flag was hauled down, the foreign troops were withdrawn (July, 1909), and the status quo was restored. The Greek Government was obliged to acquiesce, but the rebuff acted un- favourably on its position at home ; and a sort of revolution took place, in which the army, acting under the direction of the '' Military League," seized control. But a '' saviour of society " was found in the person of M. Venizelos, who had led, with wisdom and moderation, the nationaHst party in Crete. This statesman was called in ; a National Assembly met (September, 1910) ; the Military League was volun- tarily dissolved ; and Venizelos became Prime Minister. Under him the constitution was revised (January, 1911) ; and at a general election (March, FRANCE AND GERMANY IN MOROCCO 93 1912) he was returned to power by an immense majority. We must now return to the other end of the Mediterranean, and take up again the story of Moroccan affairs, which we left at the point reached by the settlement of the Casablanca incident and the Franco-German convention of 1909. Subsequently to that agreement, several well-intentioned efforts were made with a view to the co-operation of French and German capitalists in opening up the country and exploiting its mineral wealth. Such were the proposed " Union des Mines," the attempted com- bination between the French Ngoko-Sangha Com- pany and a German company in Kamerun, the joint Congo-Kamerun railway, and other projects. For one reason or another, all these schemes broke down ; and this failure produced the impression in Germany that the French were unwilling to carry out their portion of the agreement. The Pan-Germans, on their side, were dissatisfied with the concession of political control to France, and endeavoured to use their commercial position in order to bring about a condominium with that country. Against these efforts Sir E. Grey found it necessary to protest in March, 191 1. As a condominium was put out of court by the convention of 1909, the Germans fell back on other objects ; but they were divided be- tween the demand for *' compensation,'' which they hoped to get in French Congo, and an " exchange " which would have given them a footing on the west coast of Morocco. The breakdown of the Congo-Kamerun railway 94 THE ''PANTHER" AT AGADIR proposal unfortunately coincided with a French expedition to Fez, undertaken because of the in- creasing anarchy in Morocco, and the danger to which European residents in Fez appeared to be exposed. The French justified the expedition on the ground that their agreement with Germany gave them the right of political control, and laid on them the duty of maintaining order. The Germans in- sisted that they had never intended to allow France to convert Morocco into a French province ; Morocco, in short, was not to be " Tunisified.'' Encouraged by their success in the Eastern crisis, by the political disturbances which divided England, and by the instability of French governments, they conceived that the time had come for improving the position which they had been obliged to accept in the Pact of Algeciras. Following the precedent of Tangier, they resolved on another theatrical stroke ; and on July 1st, 1911, the Panther cast anchor off Agadir. This incident plainly meant a demand for a port on the Atlantic, with claims over an indefinite hinterland. An acrimonious negotiation followed. The demand for a portion of West Morocco could not be accepted by France, for, apart from the intrinsic value of the district and the unjustifiable nature of the claim, the French position in Morocco would have been exposed to constant danger from German intrigues, and the footing gained would have been made a basis for further demands. Nor could it be accepted by England, for, apart from our pledges to France, a German naval station at Agadir or Mogador would have endangered our communica- tions with the Cape and our trade with South FRANCO-GERMAN COMPROMISE 95 America. England therefore intimated that on this point she could not give way ; and Germany shifted her ground. For some months the situation was critical. The Germans, asserting that the French advance had destroyed the Pact of Algeciras and relieved them of all obligation to observe their pledges, declared that the new situation thus created justified them in demanding a quid pro quo. It should be added that the vaUdity of the Pact had been limited to five years, and that that period had now elapsed. The attitude of the Caillaux ministry was not devoid of suspicious elements ; and the British Government had to make it plain that they must have a voice in the decision. In August war seemed imminent ; but the French Government gave up the principle of " exchange '' and accepted the German demand for '' compensation.'' The fact was that France had, in the course of the last ten years, gained a vast new province, for which she had already " compensated " other nations — England in Egypt, Italy in Tripoli, Spain in Tangier. It was Germany's turn to receive payment ; and payment was made by the surrender of the northern part of French Congo, a district im- portant to Germany both for geographical reasons and from its wealth in rubber. The convention embodying this concession, and, on the German side, the recognition of a French protectorate in Morocco, was signed at Berlin on November 4th, 1911.^ The Agadir *' incident " was at an end. The Pan-Germans and the colonial party were 1 The protectorate was formally accepted by the Sultan of Morocco in March, 19 12. 96 THE TRIPOLITAN WAR dissatisfied at not getting more ; but Germany had won an important accession of territory. She had, moreover, successfully reasserted her claim to com- pensation for colonial advances made by another country, and her right to be consulted with regard to the disposal of a territory in which her commercial interests were comparatively small. The com- promise adopted must be regarded as having been, on the whole, in Germany's favour. The arrogance with which she pushed her claims was not likely to improve her relations with the Entente Powers ; but it is to be observed — and the observation is import- ant in regard to our attempt to elucidate the funda- mental aims of her policy — that, in the negotiations about Morocco, Germany never went so far as to present an ultimatum, as she had done in the Balkan crisis of 1909. We have now to return to Balkan affairs ; and in what follows we approach the last stage of the inter- national quarrel, that which leads directly to the outbreak of the present war. Just at the time when the Moroccan dispute was passing out of its acute stage, towards the end of September, 1911, the world was startled by the news that a fresh crisis had arisen in the East. Italy conceived that the time had come to carry into effect the arrangement with France about Tripoli, made ten years before. She accordingly sent an ultimatum (September 26th) to the Porte, in which she declared that the treatment meted out by the Turkish Government to Italians in Tripoli and the Cyrenaica called aloud for her armed inter- vention. Three days later war was declared ; and ORIGIN OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE 97 the Italian invasion of Tripoli began. The Turkish forces, especially at sea, were no match for the Italians, who landed without difficulty and pro- ceeded to occupy the coast and the maritime dis- tricts. They were unable to penetrate far inland ; nevertheless the whole territory was early in Novem- ber formally annexed to the Kingdom of Italy. In the spring of the following year Rhodes and other islands off the coast of Asia Minor were occupied. But the war continued till a fresh storm in the Balkan Peninsula compelled the Turks to make peace with Italy at Lausanne (October, 1912). It was agreed that the islands should be retroceded to Turkey when the Turkish troops finally left Libya ; but this stipulation had not taken effect when the present war broke out. The storm to which I have referred was the work of the Balkan League, which attacked Turkey in the autumn of 1912. Certain steps had been taken some time before (above, p. 81) which indicated the possibility of joint action between Serbia and Bul- garia ; but circumstances, in Macedonia and else- where, were not favourable to any real union. What really convinced the Balkan States of the necessity of combination was the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the fear of further Austrian progress ; the occasion which actually called the league into existence was the Tripolitan War. Whether the Italo-Turkish War and the Balkan War that followed are to be connected with the visits paid by the Kings of Serbia and Bulgaria to Petrograd in 1910, and the visit paid by the Tsar to the King of Italy at Racconigi in 1911, must 98 BULGARO-SERBIAN ALLIANCE remain for the present unknown ; but it seems highly probable that Italy counted on a rising of the Balkan States as likely to force the Turks to cede Tripoli — a calculation which was justified by the results. It was in March, 1911, that M. Guechoff became President of the Council in Bulgaria. He was at once approached by the Serbian Government, which had made similar overtures to his predecessors, with a view to a defensive and offensive alliance. The Bulgarian Premier was at first desirous of coming to an understanding with Turkey respecting the re- forms to be introduced in Macedonia ; but a short experience convinced him that the attempt was hopeless. The negotiations with Serbia were going on, when the declaration of war by Italy brought them to a head. The Bulgarian minister was at once authorized by his Government to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with Serbia ; but the terms of the agreement raised considerable difficulties. The Serbs insisted on the consent of Russia being obtained — a point to which Bulgaria raised no serious objections ; but the settlement of the frontiers of the two States in Macedonia, in the event of a successful issue of the conflict with Turkey, was hard to arrange. The difficulty would have been removed by the elevation of Macedonia to the posi- tion of an autonomous State, as suggested by Bul- garia ; but the Serbs would not hear of this solution. After much discussion it was agreed to divide Mace- donia into three zones, of which the northern should fall to Serbia, the southern to Bulgaria, while the partition of the intermediate zone was to be sub- mitted, after the war, to the arbitration of the Tsar. GRECO-BULGARIAN ALLIANCE 99 On this basis the treaty of alHance was signed on March 7th, 1912. A month later a mihtary convention was signed, which contemplated not only a war with Turkey but armed intervention on the part of Austria and Ru- mania, as a result of their convention of twelve years before (see p. 79). It is clear that Russia was con- sulted during the negotiations, and that the treaty, with its secret articles, was communicated to that Power on its conclusion. The Tsar gave his approval ; but there does not appear to be any published evidence for the assertion of certain French and German writers that he either initiated or guided the negotiation. It is impossible, however, to resist the conclusion that the alliance had in view the defence of Balkan independence against Austrian aggression almost, if not quite, as much as the over- throw of Turkish power. Meanwhile informal negotiations between Greece and Bulgaria had been going on since May, 1911. They became official in consequence of the outbreak of the war between Italy and Turkey, and the partial mobilization of the Turkish forces in Europe which immediately followed. The initiative in this case came from Greece, and was actively pushed by M. Venizelos, a personal friend of M. Gu^choff. The difficulties in regard to a partition of the expected conquests in southern Macedonia and Thrace were similar to, if less serious than, those between Serbia and Bulgaria ; but time pressed, and they were simply passed over in the treaty of alUance, which was signed on May 29th, 1912. The military con- vention was not completed till the following 100 ATTEMPTS AT INTERVENTION September. It is noteworthy that the Greek Gov- ernment decUned to enter into any discussion with Austria, as that Power had given Greece to under- stand that, in the event of success, it would claim Salonika. Arrangements with Montenegro appear to have been begun at a much later date than those with the other Powers — not till June 1912 ; nor did they, at least so far as Bulgaria was concerned, go beyond a verbal understanding, which was reached in the following August. Meanwhile the Young Turk Government in Con- stantinople was evidently crumbling to its fall. The garrison of Adrianople mutinied ; the Albanians rose in insurrection, and occupied Uskub and other frontier towns ; and on August 14th Count Berch- told, who had become Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the death of Aehrenthal, issued a proposal for reforms in European Turkey, based on the prin- ciple of decentralization and practical autonomy. Meanwhile peace negotiations between Italy and Turkey had begun. The time for action, if Austrian intervention were to be anticipated and the Tripoli- tan War utilized, was evidently come. M. Sazonoff constantly urged moderation, and advised the Allies not to go to war, but they were determined to press their quarrel to extremes. On September 29th the Turkish Government decreed a general mobilization. Next day the Allies sent an ultimatum to Constanti- nople, and followed this up by mobilizing their forces. The Powers endeavoured at the last moment to stay the conflict for which their mutual jealousies, and their consequent failure to secure the necessary reforms, had supplied an only too wMghty justifica- FIRST BALKAN WAR: Ar.BAMA: - ' m tion. On October 8th the Austrian and Russian Governments issued a joint note, strongly disapprov- ing of a rupture, and declaring that they would not allow it to result in any change in the status quo. On the same day the five Great Powers (Italy, being still at war with Turkey, could not take part) combined to urge reform upon the Porte. But this belated attempt at intervention was vain. The Porte having sent no reply to the Allies' demands, war was declared on October 12th. Montenegro had already opened hostilities four days before. The first result of the war, and of the surprising victories won by the Allies, was that the Powers were forced to abandon the position they had taken up with respect to the maintenance of the status quo ante in European Turkey. So early as November 2nd M. Sazonoff, in a circular note, recognized this necessity. Almost at the same time he informed the Allies that Serbia could not be allowed access to the Adriatic. Count Berchtold, on behalf of Austria, made a similar communication at Belgrade. It appears that the resolution in favour of an autono- mous Albania had been adopted by Austria in the lifetime of Aehrenthal, so far back, at least, as the spring of 1911. Herein she had the support not only of Russia but also of Italy, which was equally loth to allow the Serbs a footing at Durazzo or Valona. Germany threw her weight on the same side. In the face of this agreement, England and France, had they desired another solution, could hardly have resisted ; but it seems probable that they did not foresee (as did the Germans) the disastrous consequences of this determination on the future of the Balkan League. jor. CONFERENCE OF LONDON When, therefore, after the declaraticn of an armistice (November 5th) a conference of ambassa- dors of the neutral Powers and of representatives of the beUigerents met in London, in December, it was on this basis that the discussion was carried on. Even with this preliminary understanding, a settle- ment proved very difficult. At the conference there were two distinct sets of negotiations — those between the belligerents and Turkey, and those between the Powers respecting the limits of an autonomous Albania. Russia pressed the claims of Serbia to certain frontier towns ; Greece demanded a large portion of Epirus ; Austria supported the rights of her new creation, Albania. The possession of Scutari, claimed by Montenegro, also proved a dangerous bone of contention. On more than one occasion, a breach between the Powers seemed im- minent ; but eventually a compromise was arranged. Serbia and Greece were obliged to acquiesce, but it eventually required an Austrian ultimatum to drive the Montenegrins out of Scutari. Between Turkey and the Allies, on the other hand, a settlement proved unattainable, largely owing to the fact that the Turks were still holding out in the fortresses of Scutari, Janina, and Adrianople. In Constantinople opinions were sharply divided be- tween the supporters of peace and those who wished to continue the struggle. In January, 1913, a mili- tary revolution took place ; the Young Turks recovered power ; and in February the negotiations were broken off. The war was renewed ; and before long the three strongholds fell into the hands of the Allies. Turkey was now obliged to yield, and the TRIUMPH OF THE ALLIES 103 Conference was renewed. But the haggling about frontiers continued for many weeks ; and it was not till Sir E. Grey intimated to the delegates that, if they did not come to terms at once, they must leave the country, that peace was signed, on May 30th, 1913. The Balkan Alliance was triumphant. A combina- tion of four small States had effected, in six months, what the Great Powers had hitherto failed to do. The Christians of European Turkey were relieved from Mohammedan tyranny ; the Cretan question was solved by the union of the island with Greece ; and the Turks were confined to Constantinople and a few miles of territory on its landward side. To Austria and Germany the blow was severe. They had indeed succeeded in interposing, by means of an independent Albania, a westward barrier to South-Slav ambitions, and in checking the economic growth of Serbia by cutting off her access to the sea. But this gain was little to set off against the over- throw of Germany's friend and potential ally Turkey, and the establishment of the Balkan Confederation athwart the roads to Salonika and Constantinople. So serious was the set-back to German ambitions, that Germany at once set about largely increasing her military forces, and levying a special war-tax to support them. The fall of Turkey, and the conse- quent shifting of the balance of power to the dis- advantage of Germany, were pubUcly urged by the German Chancellor as a justification for these measures. It was obviously to the interest of the German Powers that the Balkan League should disappear ; and, unfortunately, a deadly quarrel 104 QUARREL ABOUT MACEDONIA between its members came only too opportunely to their aid. Differences between Serbia and Bulgaria as to the partition of their Macedonian conquests had begun almost immediately after the outbreak of war. When an independent Albania, stretching from the frontier of Montenegro to that of Greece, was estab- lished by the Powers, Serbia put forward a claim to compensation in Macedonia, on the ground that she thus suffered a loss not contemplated when the alliance with Bulgaria was made. A similar claim was advanced by Greece, on the ground of her dis- appointment in Epirus ; while the possession of Salonika, over which Greeks and Bulgarians had come to blows even before the peace with Turkey, was another cause of dispute. With a view to the enforcement of their claims, these two States, some time before the end of the first war, contracted an alliance against the third. Bulgaria, on the other side, took her stand on the letter of her treaty with Serbia ; while geographical conditions rendered it practically impossible to settle with Greece until the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier should have been deter- mined. The treaty, rigidly interpreted, was doubt- less on Bulgaria's side ; but equity, not to mention poUcy, demanded that some concessions should be made to her allies. In these circumstances, arbitration seemed to be the only alternative to war. Wisdom dictated such a course ; and to arbitration M. Gu^choff inclined. But a malign influence appears to have intervened ; it has been positively asserted that Austria promised Bulgaria her support in case of war, and both previous THE SECOND BALKAN WAR 105 and subsequent events render the statement highly probable. Whatever may have been the cause, the minister failed to convert his sovereign to his views, and therefore, on the day of the signature of peace with Turkey, resigned. His place was taken by the headstrong Dr. Daneff, whose arrogant attitude had created a bad impression at the Conference of Lon- don during the winter before. The Tsar attempted to intervene, and pressed the disputants to accept his arbitration. Greece and Serbia hesitated. The Bulgarian Cabinet, shrinking from the conflict, was willing to submit its case ; and Dr. Daneff prepared to go to Petrograd. But the King and the chauvinist faction in Bulgaria had control over the army ; and on June 29th the Bulgarian troops attacked their former allies. Against Greece and Serbia alone the Bulgarians might possibly have been able to make head, but a third enemy now appeared. Rumania, which had taken no part in the Balkan League and had re- mained inactive during the recent war, subsequently demanded — on regular German principles — ^that, though she had done nothing to secure the victory over Turkey, she should receive compensation for the gains of the AUies. The Powers had assented ; Bulgaria had not refused ; and by a protocol issued in Petrograd on May 13th, a compensation (accepted by Rumania) had been allotted to her in the north- eastern portion of the Bulgarian territory. The out- break of hostilities, however, afforded too good an opportunity of enlarging this " compensation '* ; a Rumanian army therefore crossed the Danube and marched on Sofia. io6 THE TREATY OF BUCAREST The Turks naturally availed themselves of the situation, and set about recovering their lost terri- tory, including Adrianople, which the Bulgarians abandoned to its fate. Thus attacked on three sides, Bulgaria was forced to accept whatever terms her enemies thought proper to impose. The terms were hard. Serbia took the whole of the disputed central zone in Macedonia, while the coastal portion, in- cluding Salonika and Kavalla, was given to Greece. A large strip on the north-east, including SiUstria, was ceded to Rumania ; and the Turks recovered Adrianople with the surrounding territory. Bulgaria was shut oft from the iEgean, except on a few miles of coast, including the very inadequate port of Dedeagatch. These cessions were embodied in the Treaty of Bucarest, signed on August loth, 1913, and in a Turco-Bulgarian treaty, signed on Sep- tember 29th. A more dramatic reversal of fortune, a sterner illustration of the Nemesis which pursues hubristic insolence, has rarely been seen. The second Balkan War modified the results of the first, in two important points, to the advantage of the German Powers. In the first place, Turkey, to a certain extent, recovered her position ; and the moral effect of this revival was probably worth even more than the territory she regained. Secondly — and this was still more important — ^the Balkan League, the only power which could secure Balkan independence against Austria-Hungary on the one side and Turkey on the other, was hopelessly broken up ; while the seeds of deadly animosity and a craving for revenge were sown between its two most important members. On the other hand, Serbia EFFECT ON AUSTRIA AND GERMANY 107 became more than ever the hope and focus of Yougo- Slav nationaUsm, which threatened the very exist- ence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ; and Serbia had received an enormous accession of power. Greece, too, in alliance with Serbia, stood across the south- ward road from Vienna, and was estabhshed in possession of Salonika, long the aim of Austro- Hungarian statesmen, and preferable, as a com- mercial outlet, even to Trieste. If Vienna was thus prejudicially affected, it is hardly necessary to point out that the dreams of the statesmen in BerHn — ^the open road to Byzantium and Bagdad, the great Central European Customs Union which was to include the Balkan States and Turkey, the point-d'appui against England in Egypt and the East — faded into thin air, if the results of the Balkan wars could not be undone. A reversal of these conditions became, therefore, from this moment, the primary object of Austro-German policy. It was only a good opportunity, a satis- factory pretext, that had to be found. On more than one occasion, in the year 1913, a war between Austria and Serbia was very near. We have it on the authority of M. Giolitti that, only three days after the signature of the Treaty of Bucarest, Austria sounded Italy as to a war with Serbia. The proposal was declined, on the ground that the Triple Alliance did not contemplate such an act of aggres- sion ; but there were more potent reasons. Italy, which had joined Austria to keep the Serbians from access to the Adriatic, could not regard with equani- mity the substitution of Austrian for Serbian in- fluence in Albania. Nevertheless, the quarrel nearly io8 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERBIA came to a head. In her anxiety to reach the Adriatic, Serbia had, in the winter of 1912-13, pushed a force across the mountains to Durazzo ; and, though she withdrew in the face of the decision of the Powers, she still retained some portions of Albanian territory. Austria, only too anxious to pick a quarrel, sent an ultimatum to Belgrade (October 20th), demanding complete retirement ; and Serbia gave way. Even after this, Austria appears to have persisted in her efforts to procure a modification of the Treaty of Bucarest in favour of Bulgaria by force of arms ; and it is understood that only the distinct refusal of Germany to support her in this attempt induced her, for the time being, to desist. The best chance for intervention had in fact been lost. A slight movement on Austria's part, at the outset of the second Balkan War, would have turned the scales in favour of Bulgaria, or might have pre- vented Rumania from joining the AUies ; but either Austria was not ready, or, as seems more likely, she failed to foresee the results of the second war, as there is no doubt the German Powers miscalculated the results of the earlier conflict. In any case, once the Treaty of Bucarest was signed, it seemed to Germany that a pretext was needed before it could be overthrown. Moreover, the increase in the Ger- man army had not yet had time to take effect ; and the widening of the Kiel Canal was not complete. But we know from the report of M. Jules Cambon to his Government (November, 1913) that the Ger- man Emperor had by this time ceased to be in favour of peace ; and, after what has gone before, we need not be surprised. All efforts to break up the Entente THE WAR-PARTY IN GERMANY 109 — ^in 1905-6, in 1908-9, and finally in 191 1 — had failed ; Germany was still '* encircled/' as its people professed to think ; and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on whose cohesion the Drang nach Osten depended, was threatened with disruption by the victorious Serbs. Hence the conversion of the Emperor and the triumph of the military party at Berlin. The fact was not likely to escape that shrewd observer, the French Ambassador; and his state- ment is borne out by the fact that, according to Rohrbach and other authors, the Emperor sent an ultimatum to Petrograd that same year. It was at a moment when Russia seemed to be contemplating intervention in Armenia ; and an obvious threat was contained in the intimation from Berlin that any movement in that direction would endanger Euro- pean peace. Russia, feeling that the object was not worth a war in which she might not have had the support of other Powers, desisted ; but the incident is none the less significant. The danger passed, but in 1914 all was ready ; and the occasion of rupture was found in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Serajevo on June 28th, 1914. The attention of this country and, it may be added, of its rulers (as their attitude during the Conference of London showed) has been so concentrated on the growth of the German fleet and (at intervals) on the action of Germany with regard to Morocco, that they have failed to observe what has been, for the last fifteen years or more, the fundamental aim of Ger- man policy. A study of Austro-German behaviour no GERMANY'S GREAT AIM in regard to the Balkans and of the possibilities open to German ambitions, combined with an examination of the German mind as displayed in a long series of political writings, points, in my opinion, to the conclusion that the domination of the Nearer and Middle East was the essential object of their diplomacy and their gigantic military pre- parations. I do not mean that the statesmen of Berlin aimed at nothing else — ^far from it. The eventual absorption of Holland and Belgium, with German-speaking Switzerland and other countries or parts of countries ; the conquest of the French, Dutch, and Belgian colonies ; the diminution of France and Russia, not to speak of the destruction of British sea-power and the overthrow of the British Empire — all these came within their purview as ultimate objects. But what seemed attainable within a calculable time was the mastery of the Ottoman Empire and the lands that lie between it and the frontier of Austria-Hungary ; and at this they have consistently aimed. Acquisitions in Morocco might come in by the way ; the attitude of Germany in the episodes of Algeciras and Agadir shows that they were only secondary. In regard to the Balkans and the Turkish Empire they were repeatedly ready, if need were, to go to war. Once masters in those territories, the German Powers would obtain what they wanted for their economic growth, throw open a vast region to Ger- man enterprise and capital, exclude Russia from the Mediterranean, and menace their chief rival, Great Britain, in the most vulnerable portions of her empire. Russia would undoubtedly resist, and would be GERMANY'S GREAT AIM iii aided by France ; but, for all the talk (for home consumption) of the Russian bugbear, Berlin was not afraid of France and Russia combined ; and England might be — and to a large extent was — ^lulled into security. The pacific attitude of the British Govern- ment during the Conference of London, and its per- sistent efforts to arrive at an understanding with Germany, had doubtless fostered this belief ; and capable German publicists, writing just before the war, congratulated themselves on the agreement with Great Britain respecting the Bagdad railway and German progress in Central Africa, which it is understood was on the point of being signed in the summer of 1914. It may appear presumptuous, especially at this early stage, to offer an explanation of the world- shaking events which we are now witnessing, and to attempt an exposure of Germany's secret plans. But a survey of preceding incidents and the development of German ideas convinces me that the attack on France and Russia was but a preliminary step, masking the real aim. This could not be attained without the overthrow of those Powers, but such a victory would be, after all, only a means to an end. The frontiers on either hand once secured, the forces of Germany — military, economical, and financial — could, without let or hindrance, flood the Nearer and Middle East. From this point of vantage, with enormously increased resources and heightened prestige, the final challenge might safely be issued to Great Britain for the empire of the world. GARDEN CITY PRESS, LIMITED, PRINTERS, LETCHWORTH, ENGLAND THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE. ^^W OiTp-r b 197H ni J. <: . .«iW^ Ml W0V q 1941 f v ) aJZ8- V52DKL Mayotwt I8sc(mc NOV ?p 1962 HEC'P LD JUL20'6^-^AM HO^^ W^ XSL LD. U. C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES CDMt.DDb7M3 UNIVERSITY OF CAUFORNIA UBRARY