Jin 
 .
 
 y. ' --
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 KEY. HEXKY A. BRASH, D.D. 
 
 II 
 
 NEWARK, N. J. : 
 J. J. O'CONNOR & 00. 59 AND 61 NEW STREET. 
 
 18G6.
 
 ENTERED, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1866, by 
 J. J. O'CONNOR & CO., 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
 District of New-Jersey.
 
 TO THE 
 
 VERY REV. T. J. O'MAHONY, D.D., D.C.L., 
 
 AS A. 
 
 PLEDGE OF FRIENDSHIP 
 
 WHICH TIME OR DISTANCE CAN NOT CHANGE,
 
 f 
 
 R E F A C E 
 
 THIS book has been written with the hope of do- 
 ing some good. The author, in reading the works 
 of American writers, has observed that their errors 
 arise from a lack of first principles, from a defect 
 in their primary education. Those who read the 
 following questions will find that, for the most 
 part, they treat of all that is most difficult and at 
 the same time most essential in human knowledge. 
 When the first principles are correct, errors are 
 rare. Logic, and natural humility, which con- 
 sists in the consciousness of the mind's weakness, 
 render man infallible. 
 
 The book might be longer and better. It will 
 be longer if it meet with an appreciation sufficient 
 to encourage the author. Abler and more ex- 
 perienced pens must make it better. There are 
 many who have the ability to aid our literature ;
 
 yi PREFACE. 
 
 yet indolence or excess of modesty restrains their 
 pen. They forget that, although it is better to 
 write no book than a bad one, it is better to have 
 a book of mediocrity, to supply a want or help a 
 cause, than none at all. We must all work ; we 
 must all strive to fulfill our mission in the plan of 
 creation. Hence, if we can write a book that 
 may do good, natural or supernatural, we should 
 not hesitate even though the purity of our mo- 
 tives should be suspected. 
 
 The author wishes to say but one word in con- 
 clusion, to propitiate the critics. No one will be 
 more delighted than he to find that his critic has 
 written a better book than this. The author 
 wishes to evoke the thoughts of others as well as 
 express his own. In the friction of minds there 
 must be scintillations of light, and intellectual 
 light is truth. 
 
 FORT LEE, August 15, 1S66.
 
 LONTENTS, 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 CHAPTER L The Utility of Philosophy, .... 9 
 
 CnAPTBB II. Philosophical Terms, . , . . . 29 
 
 QUESTION FIKST. 
 What is Science? .... 87 
 
 QUESTION SECOND. 
 What Relation has Philosophy to other Sciences ? . . . . 53 
 
 QUESTION THIRD. 
 What is the Difference between Mental and Oral Terms ? . . .65 
 
 QUESTION FOURTH. 
 What is the Criterion of Certitude ? Degrees of Certitude, . . 70 
 
 QUESTION FIFTH. 
 What is the True Notion of an Idea? 75 
 
 QUESTION SIXTH. 
 Is Idea a Possible Being, or an Existing One ? System of Rosmini, 85 
 
 QUESTION SEVENTH. 
 What Kind of Existence has Idea ? System of Gioberti, ... 99 
 
 QUESTION EIGHTH. 
 Does the Intellect apprehend Contingent Facts ? . 130 
 
 QUESTION NINTH. 
 
 What is Meant by the History and Solution of the Controversy con- 
 cerning the Universals ? 138
 
 Vlll CONTENTS. 
 
 "turn 
 
 QUESTION TBHTH. 
 
 What is the Difference between the Direct and Reflex State of Use 
 
 Soul? . . Io3 
 
 QUESTION ELEVENTH. 
 Does God Exist ?. . . .-.:'' . . . .ICO 
 
 QUESTION TWELFTH. 
 Is God's Existence Identified with the Existence of other Beings T 167 
 
 QUESTION THIRTEENTH. 
 What is Beauty in Art? 193 
 
 QUESTION FOUBTEENTH. 
 Does Beauty Consist in Magnitude or Exaggeration ? Iii Illusion or 
 
 Imitation? 214 
 
 QUESTION FIFTEENTH. 
 
 " Does Beauty Consist in Proportion and Order of Parts or in Unity 
 
 and Variety? 224 
 
 QUESTION SIXTEENTH. 
 Is the Beautiful the " Splendor Verl " as Plato deflnes.it ? . . 235 
 
 QUESTION SEVENTEENTH. 
 Are there but two Real Causes in the World Man and God ? . .251 
 
 QUESTION EIGHTEENTH. 
 Why ia the Spirit of the Age Anti-Christian and Anti-Philosophic ? 861
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 THE UTILITY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 JE live in a most unphilosophical 
 age: principles are despised, 
 and iniquity respected. In re- 
 ligion, in government, in the family circle, 
 all is confusion. Sects swarm, and tear 
 Christianity into bits like ants with a 
 crumb; some of them destroy not only 
 revealed religion, but reject even the law 
 of nature. Political heresies brood among 
 the nations. Robbery is applauded on 
 the ground of expediency; rebellion is 
 justified in the press, and shows itself 
 boldly on the field of battle; plots for
 
 10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the overthrow of established thrones, 
 round which grow the moss of centuries, 
 are hatched in the countless secret socie- 
 ties of Europe and America. The family 
 tie has been broken by the civil laws in 
 admitting divorce; the state in this case 
 showing the corruption of the citizens, for 
 the state is sound so long as its members 
 are incorrupt. Children, in consequence 
 of social vices, have been dragged from 
 their mothers' arms, and allowed to grow 
 up ignorant of true principles ; their minds 
 warped from their natural bent to good- 
 ness by the example of fathers without 
 religion, or mothers without virtue. The 
 age is illogical ; unreasonable in its insti- 
 tutions, for it eschews religion in its edu- 
 cation, allows the extreme of tyranny and 
 licentiousness in its civil governments, and 
 consequently, partially if not completely 
 ignores the immutable principles of the 
 natural law. Such a diseased state of 
 human society cries out for a remedy. Re- 
 ligion is that remedy, and after religion
 
 INTRODUCTION. 11 
 
 sound philosophy. We say sound philoso- 
 phy, for the aberrations of the Germans 
 of modern times have done harm instead 
 of good. The philosophy of Kant, Fichte, 
 and Schelling, imported into France by 
 Victor Cousin and Ernest Renan, and 
 sown broadcast in Italy by the pantheists, 
 has been wafted on the wings of the winds 
 to our own land. . It has taken root, and 
 its fruits are an unprincipled press, fanat- 
 icism, and general unbelief. The Christian 
 philosopher must try to do his part in 
 healing these eye-sores of modern times. 
 It is a duty he owes to his God and to 
 his fellow-beings; he is bound to be an 
 active member of society, influencing its 
 thought ; not a mere passive spectator of 
 the scenes enacted on the world's theatre. 
 Hence, he must study sound philosophy, 
 and hence one of the great advantages of 
 intellectual philosophy, so often sneered 
 at and so much neglected in our schools. 
 It is our intention, in this preliminary 
 chapter, to expose the utility of this sci-
 
 12 INTKODUCTION. 
 
 ence, that the reader may be induced 
 the more zealously to apply himself to 
 the acquiring of a perfect mastery of 
 it. In order, therefore, that we may pro- 
 ceed with greater clearness, we shall di- 
 vide our remarks into three parts. In 
 the first we shall -speak of the utility 
 of this study considered with regard 
 to the subject-matter of which it treats. 
 In the second we shall discourse of its 
 importance, subjectively considered, as a 
 means of mental culture; and in the 
 third we shall glance at it as relating to 
 revealed religion and smoothing the way 
 to theology, being in this respect the 
 footstool of faith and the handmaid of 
 religion. 
 
 Sec. 1. The utility of Philosophy shown 
 from tlie nature of the matter of which it 
 treats. 
 
 What is the object of philosophical re- 
 search? It is God, the world, and man. 
 There is a great part of this science that
 
 INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 treats of the existence, nature, and attri- 
 butes of the Divinity. The whole of 
 Theodicy has no other scope than to prove 
 the existence of God and explain his at- 
 tributes. Now, no one will deny the im- 
 portance of this part of intellectual phi- 
 losophy ; for what is of more importance 
 than the knowledge of (rod? God is the 
 Being of beings, the Creator of all things, 
 and man's final cause. To know such a 
 being is important to man. He was made 
 for no other being but God, he tends to 
 God as to his centre. God is the sun of 
 his planetary system; hence the utility 
 of studying a science that makes of God 
 a special study ; that investigates the na- 
 ture of the Divinity, examines his infinite 
 perfections, his goodness,' omnipotence, 
 and immensity. The advantages to be 
 derived from such a study are manifest; 
 for by knowing our Creator better we 
 love him more, and are more inclined to 
 aim at possessing Him. Now, the posses- 
 sion of the end for which we were formed
 
 14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 is that which is most" important to us ; 
 therefore, the study of intellectual philoso- 
 phy which helps us to arrive at the term 
 of our existence is of the greatest import- 
 ance to us. The second object of whicli 
 our science treats is the universe. The 
 world of possibilities, which is the world 
 of ideas, cosmology describes and en- 
 deavors to explain. This world is the 
 link that binds us and God together; for 
 other beings have their proximate end in 
 man, though their last end, like that of 
 man himself, must be God. To know the 
 means of arriving at our end, to know 
 the reason of the existence of other beings 
 around us, is of great utility and advan- 
 tage to us. We must always in these 
 matters go on the hypothesis that nothing 
 is useful or advantageous to man which 
 does not tend either mediately or immedi- 
 ately to the end for which he was created. 
 For what is meant by the word useful, if 
 not apt for a purpose ? Usefulness, then, 
 supposes a purpose an end in the acquisi-
 
 INTRODUCTION". 15 
 
 tion of which useful things are employed. 
 Hence, to man nothing is useful but what 
 leads to his final end, to which all other 
 ends are subservient, and compared with 
 which they are secondary. Now creatures 
 are made to serve man, to aid him in 
 knowing his Creator. St. Augustine, a 
 great philosopher, says that moral de- 
 formity consists in endeavoring to enjoy 
 what is only meant to be used, " frui 
 utendis et uti fruendis." When we know 
 creatures and their causes we know the 
 greatness of their Creator, as well as their 
 own littleness better. Besides this there 
 is a great benefit derived from the know- 
 ledge of creatures; we know their exact 
 worth ; they can not, therefore, cheat us ; 
 and this, certainly, is a very useful know- 
 ledge. The poet has said, " Felix qui po- 
 test rerum cognoscere causas," and he said 
 truly ; for, besides the incontestable plea- 
 sure derived from such examinations in 
 the satisfaction of our intellectual curi- 
 osity, the utility also is very great, as we
 
 16 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 have shown; great bec'ause of the char- 
 acter of means which the universe bears 
 in our relation to God ; great, also, on ac- 
 count of the subjective improvement of 
 our intellectual capacities. And here we 
 touch on the third great utility of philoso- 
 phy, considered in relation to the objects 
 of which it treats. There is a veiy exten- 
 sive part of our science which treats of 
 the soul and its faculties, and, taken even 
 in its more general sense, which treats of 
 man's body also. Logic and psychology 
 in a special manner deal with human 
 thought, and the different operations of 
 the mind. The old philosophers said that 
 science consisted in the JV^QE Oeov KO.I oeavrov, 
 "the knowledge of God and of our- 
 selves." Now, both these parts of science 
 are embraced by philosophy. Self-know- 
 ledge is very important for all. It is use- 
 ful to know our failings and our strength, 
 so that we may not be tempted to go be- 
 yond it. Now, to know our strength, we 
 study in philosophy the character of our
 
 INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 mental faculties, and their ways of work- 
 ing; tlie mechanism of the mind, and'the 
 play of the passions. Psychology and 
 logic are mental anatomy. We fathom 
 the depth of our intellect, and learn to 
 distrust its shallows and quicksands ; we 
 feel the pulse of the will, to learn wheth- 
 er it be feverish and wayward, or firm 
 and resolute. We drag our imagination 
 to the bar of reason and interrogate it as 
 to its intentions, so that it may not hur- 
 riedly lead us astray before reflection has 
 time to recall it to the right path. Man's 
 mind is a kingdom which philosophy ex- 
 amines, classifying its products, arranging 
 in order its powers, as a geologist places 
 fossils in a cabinet. Knowledge is power ; 
 and hence the knowledge we acquire of 
 ourselves by the philosophical examina- 
 tion of the faculties of the soul gives us a 
 better appreciation of our own ability. 
 In a word, if we reflect for a moment on 
 the character of the objects with which 
 philosophy deals, taking reason as the
 
 18 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 judge, we shall charge strongly for the 
 utility of the science. Nor will the result 
 be otherwise if we examine the question 
 of the utility of philosophy from the 
 subjective point of view. 
 
 Sec. 2. The importance of the study 
 of Intellectual Philosophy as a means of 
 intellectual culture. 
 
 Those who are best able to judge of 
 the utility of our science place it the last 
 in the course of classical education. The 
 reason is obvious, Because it is the crown- 
 ing science of all it caps the climax of 
 elementary education. It is the scientia 
 scientiarum, the basis of all, and it runs 
 through all, for it is the science of reason, 
 and reason is necessaiy everywhere. The 
 boy, after having gone through his clas- 
 sics and the greater part of his mathe- 
 matical studies, is gradually being trans- 
 formed into a man. He now needs a 
 greater aid in controlling his passions than 
 heretofore. Though grace is more than
 
 INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 sufficient, still lie must not disdain to use 
 her handmaid, Nature. Hence, the science 
 of reason as well as of faith is imparted 
 to him, till his mind becomes inoculated 
 with right principles. The play of his 
 fancy is checked, the "way wardness of his 
 will controlled, and the reluctance of his 
 intellect to meditate overcome by con- 
 stant application to the study of matter, 
 which brings out all the reflective pow- 
 ers. His mind is drilled by syllogisms 
 daily ; he argues ; he proposes his thesis, 
 lays down his premises, and draws his 
 conclusions according to rule, as an archi- 
 tect builds a mansion. He had been ac- 
 customed to think as the ostrich flies, by 
 fits and starts ; now his reasoning is close, 
 connected, solid. Heretofore there was 
 an exaggerated growth of the imagina- 
 tion apparent in his style; weeds grew 
 along with flowers; now his judgment 
 assumes the office of pruner. The style 
 becomes chaster and more elegant. He 
 , has passed from being an author of bom-
 
 20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 bastic verses to being the writer of sound 
 prose ; and if lie still preserves the charac- 
 ter of a poet, his productions are more 
 labored and exact. 
 
 There is more common-sense appearing 
 in him as his reason improves under logi- 
 cal discipline an'd metaphysical* drill. 
 He obeys more readily, for the principles 
 he is imbibing influence his will. Excep- 
 tions there may be to this rule, but the 
 exceptions prove the rule here as well as 
 in many other cases. 
 
 In fact, the improvement of his intel- 
 lect, will, and imagination is apparent. 
 His intellect grows robust, it seizes great 
 difficulties by the hair, it dives into 
 abysses, scales precipices, it has the 
 6oa TTOV arw of Archimedes, nothing can 
 shake it, and it can move the world. The 
 intellect becomes more impartial, it ex- 
 amines both sides of questions, acquires a 
 love of justice, stability, and strength, and 
 loves to see them everywhere, in religion 
 as well as in government. The thoughts be-
 
 INTKODUCTION. 21 
 
 come clear for philosophy is an intellec- 
 tual clarifier the conceptions exact, and 
 the expression of the thought more just, 
 according to the rule of Boileau : " Ce qui 
 se congoit bien s'enonce clairement." 
 Clearness of expression is a consequence 
 of clearness of thought. On the will, it 
 (our science) produces similar effects, for 
 volition generally follows the intellect. 
 Mental conviction is the next step to per- 
 suasion. The young man's ardor is not 
 quenched by our science, but tempered. 
 We had seen more of the animal in the 
 boy and child ; philosophy brings out 
 the rational, so that we finally have the 
 definition of the metaphysicians proved : 
 " Homo est animal rationale." The effect 
 of serious study on a wild imagination is 
 evident from experience. Young men, 
 whose passions were mad as Charybdis, 
 whose fancy never dismounted Pegasus, 
 and never let the winged charger relax 
 from a breakneck gallop, have gradually 
 become tamed under the influence of
 
 22 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 philosophy. The boiling of the Charyb- 
 dis of the classics has ended in a quiet 
 simmer ; and the furious Pegasus has 
 taken to a quiet and steady walk. We 
 have seen it, and others more competent 
 to judge bear testimony to this good re- 
 sult obtained from the study of intellect- 
 ual philosophy. It is so useful, too, at 
 a time when young men are going to de- 
 cide the all-important question of voca- 
 tion, to have their minds rendered capable 
 of serious reflection, that the choice may 
 be made with prudence and calmness. In 
 fact, philosophy is useful to the statesman ; 
 for how can he decide on questions of 
 civil policy without knowing the princi- 
 ples of the natural law and law of na- 
 tions ? It is useful to the lawyer for the 
 same reasons, but it has a special useful- 
 ness for him besides. He is a pleader; 
 he must know how to refute his adver- 
 sary's arguments, as well as to prove his 
 own case ; he needs logic. To be able 
 to form a judgment on the character of
 
 INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 the witnesses, lie must have studied the 
 workings of the minds of men. Even if 
 he be a physician, the knowledge of /the 
 connection between the body and soul 
 will help him immensely in the cur- 
 ing of sick imaginations as well as cor- 
 poral infirmities. But if he be a Christ- 
 ian minister, the utility of this science is 
 incontestably suitable to his character and 
 to the nature of the sciences to which he 
 must apply his mind in the holy ministry. 
 This, however, brings us to the third 
 great utility of intellectual philosophy as 
 it appears from its connection with the 
 supernatural order of things. 
 
 Sec. 3. The utility of tlie study of In- 
 tellectual Philosophy as the handmaid of 
 Religion. 
 
 There is a philosophy of religion as 
 well as of history ; there is philosophy in 
 every science. No science seems to be 
 more closely joined to intellectual philo- 
 sophy than theology.
 
 24 INTEODUCTION. 
 
 Theology treats of revealed, philo- 
 sophy of natural religion; but the lat- 
 ter is the footstool of the former, for 
 grace builds on nature. It might be said 
 with truth, that theology is not specifi- 
 cally distinct, but only a degree higher 
 up the scale than philosophy ; it gives us 
 a better knowledge of God than philoso- 
 phy. In the latter science we see him 
 faintly, as the sun in a cloudy sky ; in 
 the former, though not visible as in noon- 
 day brightness, still we behold him more 
 clearly. Reason points him out in the one, 
 faith in the other. In philosophy, We ar- 
 gue from first principles, given by intui- 
 tion or discovered by the mere workings 
 of intellectual power; in theology, we 
 build our science on facts which we have 
 learned by revelation, and by uniting 
 these facts together we have the prin- 
 ciples of a science. 
 
 Theology treats of God, of the soul, 
 and of creatures considered in a super- 
 natural light ; and as philosophy treats of
 
 INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 them in a natural point of view, it follows 
 that the philosophical knowledge we ac- 
 quire of them serves us greatly in rising 
 to the higher sphere. There is, as it were, 
 an echo of the supernatural in the natural 
 order. Revelation's shadow falls into the 
 natural order. In fact the two orders are 
 inseparable and .dovetailed into each 
 other, if we may so speak, in time as well 
 as in eternity. 
 
 It was the observation of this fact that 
 made Gioberti invent the mental faculty 
 which he calls sovrintdligenza, or superin- 
 telligence the natural power of appre- 
 hending in the supernatural order. We 
 say which made him invent the faculty, 
 for its existence is problematic. It was 
 this connection between theology and 
 philosophy that made the scholastics 
 give the latter science the name of " An- 
 cilla Theologise." In modern times this 
 name has been rejected by many philo- 
 sophers, who could not bear to hear their 
 favorite science receive a name that would
 
 26 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 imply inferiority. This feeling, hoover, 
 is one of unreasonable pride, for there is 
 no insult meant to philosophy by giving 
 her her natural position. She is a hand- 
 maid, and though rationalists may endea- 
 vor to put reason above faith, they will 
 never succeed in ,their undertaking, for 
 things must be as God wills them. At 
 the same time, therefore, that we give 
 our science all the honor that is due to 
 her, we must never exaggerate her worth. 
 Men have done so in our days, and 
 their conduct has been the cause of the 
 general fear that has crept into some 
 minds of philosophy and every thing that 
 sounds like it. They look on a philoso- 
 pher as a bugbear, a humbug, or a mad- 
 man. He is supposed to be a human 
 being who deals only with ethereal ob- 
 jects, and can not descend from his ele- 
 vated position to the ordinary mundane 
 sphere. This, in fact, is one of the great 
 objections against the study of philoso- 
 phy ; we shall answer it, therefore, before
 
 INTRODUCTION. 27 
 
 we end this " chapter. Does philosophy 
 make men unreal and exaggerated ? We 
 have shown its utility from' the na- 
 ture of the matter of which it treats, 
 as well as from its great power in cul- 
 tivating the mind. We should not, there- 
 fore, be induced to consider it a dan- 
 gerous study on account of the abuse 
 which some have made of it. There is no 
 contesting the fact that all the danger- 
 ous systems of modern times have had 
 founders who prided themselves on be- 
 ing philosophers. Communism, in France, 
 claims St. Simon and Pierre Le Roux 
 as its authors; the Pantheists, in Ger- 
 many, glory in Hegel, Fichte, and Schil- 
 ling. We need not mention some of 
 our own philosophical scapegoats, whose 
 exaggerations are as great as any of the 
 worst European speculations. The abuse 
 never destroys the thing used. The Bible 
 is abused, yet the Bible is the best of 
 books ; and though food is abused by 
 those who eat to excess, it does not there-
 
 28 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 fore follow that we are to die of hunger. 
 
 o 
 
 So is it with philosophy ; we do not 
 praise bad philosophy, "but sound philo- 
 sophy. We speak of the advantages of 
 sound philosophy, not of the creations of 
 bewildered brains. There are objections 
 against every thing that is good. It is 
 not, therefore, astonishing that there 
 should be objections against philosophy. 
 But, after all, those who know the sci- 
 ence, feel that there is none more useful 
 or more important; none more beloved 
 of reason and more respected by faith. 
 Let us, therefore, proceed to examine some 
 of the most interesting questions which 
 the science proposes to be solved by the 
 human intellect.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS. 
 
 Section 1. Logical Terms. 
 
 IN artist should know the names 
 and uses of his instruments be- 
 fore undertaking to use them. 
 We shall therefore explain some of the 
 terms used in logic, in psychology, and in 
 ontology, before examining some of the 
 most interesting questions of philosophy. 
 The first simple act of the mind is per- 
 ception or apprehension, and the object 
 of this act is an idea. An idea is every 
 object apprehended by the mind, or it is 
 the object of thought. We call the first 
 operation of the mind an act, though 
 Gioberti holds the mind to be passive in 
 the first gleam of thought, which he calls
 
 30 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 intuition. In his system, intuition is the 
 presentation of the object to the mind. 
 
 When the mind has apprehended an 
 idea, it may compare it with another 
 idea, and thus judge. Judgment is there- 
 fore the second act of the mind, and con- 
 sists in the affirmation or negation of an 
 agreement between two ideas. The ele- 
 ments of a judgment are, therefore, two 
 ideas, and a copula or connecting link 
 between them. The oral expression of a 
 judgment is called a proposition. The 
 first term of a proposition is called the 
 subject, which is affirmed or dgnied of a 
 second idea, which is called the predicate. 
 The next operation of the mind consists 
 in comparing different judgments with 
 each other, and this is done by reasoning 
 or argumentation. The simplest mode of 
 argumentation, and the one to which all 
 species of argument may be reduced, is 
 the syllogism. A syllogism or argument 
 is the act of the mind by which we re- 
 duce one proposition from two others.
 
 INTRODUCTION. 31 
 
 The elements of a syllogism are therefore 
 three the two extremes and the middle 
 term. In every syllogism we compare 
 two terms or ideas with a third, either 
 pronouncing that they agree with this 
 third and hence agree with each other, 
 or that they disagree with the third and 
 hence disagree with each other. The two 
 
 o 
 
 terms compared are the two extremes; 
 one of them is called the minor extreme, 
 and it is the subject of the conclusion. 
 The middle term the term of compari- 
 son must never be found in the conclu- 
 sion. Another term explained in logic is 
 that of certitude. 
 
 Certitude is said to exist when a judg- 
 ment has an essential connection with 
 truth. Certitude has three branches 
 evidence, common-sense, and authority. 
 Judgments certain by evidence are those 
 which are certain in the very act of 
 thought. Judgments certain by common- 
 sense are those which derive their cer- 
 tainty from the infallible voice of nature.
 
 32 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Judgments certain by authority are those 
 which are derived from the testimony of 
 a rational being, which we admit as a 
 rule of truth. 
 
 Demonstration, another logical term, 
 consists in showing that a given proposi- 
 tion is certain by some one of these three 
 kinds of certitude. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS. 
 
 Psychology is that part of philosophy 
 which treats of the soul. The soul is 
 conceived by us as the subject of thought, 
 or as that substance whose specific termi- 
 nation is thought. We are conscious of 
 thought by that internal monitor called 
 conscience or internal sense, which tells 
 us of our soul and its modifications. 
 There are three elements in thought. The 
 first is the representation of some object 
 distinct from the soul and constituting 
 the object of thought. This object con- 
 sidered in itself is called being. But 
 considered as illuminating the mind, it
 
 INTRODUCTION". 33 
 
 is called idea. The operation of the mind 
 in apprehending this object is called per- 
 ception. When the soul perceives it acts, 
 and by this exercise of its activity, it, as 
 it were, creates its own thoughts. The 
 principal exercise of the activity of the 
 soul is in judgment; that is to say, the 
 mental affirmation by which the mind 
 pronounces such or such a notion to be 
 included or not included in such or such 
 another notion. The various sensations, 
 namely, of color, sound, etc., etc., which 
 affect the mind when it perceives and 
 acts, constitute the third element of 
 thought. This element produces speech. 
 It is the sensible element of thought. 
 Speech serves as the sensible exponent 
 of the mind's ideas. It is, as it were, the 
 mirror in which ideas are represented. 
 Hence the three elements of thought are 
 perception, activity, and sensibility, if we 
 look at thought from a psychological 
 stand-point ; if we look at it, though, ob- 
 jectively, its elements are object, copula,
 
 34 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and subject. The old division of the 
 faculties was into intellect, will, and 
 memory; but as we know sufficiently 
 well the meaning of those faculties, we 
 will not dwell upon them, but pass im- 
 mediately to some of the ontological 
 terms. 
 
 ONTOLOGICAL TEEMS. 
 
 We often see the term being employed. 
 We mean by being reality ; every reality 
 that is the object of thought is being. 
 There are, however, different classes of 
 being, and there are certain conceptions 
 subordinate to the general notion of 
 being, namely, essence and existence. The 
 essence of a thing is that which makes a 
 being what it is ; or to use a scholastic 
 term, essence is the quiddity of a thing. 
 The elements of an essence are several, 
 which are called its modes or properties. 
 Some are so peculiar to an essence that 
 they distinguish it from every thing else. 
 These are called specific properties, and
 
 INTRODUCTION. 35 
 
 distinguish the different species of being. 
 Other modes are common to several es- 
 sences, and "by these, species are distin- 
 guished into kinds or genera. That 
 kind which has none above it is called 
 being in general. In speaking of any 
 essence, we must distinguish the exten- 
 sion from its comprehension. The com- 
 prehension of an essence is given in its 
 definition, in which we have an enumera- 
 tion of its specific properties. The exten- 
 sion is given by a division, where we have 
 the enumeration either of the different 
 species or of the different individuals in 
 a species. From essence we pass to exist- 
 ence. This term expresses the actuation 
 of the essence. In the idea of essence is 
 included the possibility of the creation of 
 an indefinite number of individuals bear- 
 ing its stamp. This is true of all essences 
 except the essence of God. But in the 
 idea of existence you have the notion of 
 but one individual. In this individual 
 you distinguish two elements, 1st. The
 
 36 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 substance, which is the fundamental sup- 
 port of every thing that happens in the 
 existing being, and hence it may be called 
 being subsisting in itself, or better, .an 
 active force, as Leibnitz defines it. The 
 other element is the mode, and it varies. 
 Modes are the different ways in which 
 different substances exist. Every essence 
 is immutable and necessary ; but not so 
 with eveiy existence. Some are merely 
 contingent. God alone exists immutably. 
 As contingent existences have not the 
 principle of actuation in themselves, they 
 suppose it to rest in some other being, 
 which is their cause and whose effects 
 they are. A cause, therefore, is whatever 
 exists perfectly in itself, and gives the 
 beginning of existence to another. Its 
 production is called the effect.
 
 QUESTION FIF^ST. 
 WHAT IS SCIENCE? 
 
 JUDGMENTS are of two kinds- 
 certain and doubtful. Judg- 
 ments are certain when there 
 is an essential connection between the 
 object apprehended and the subject ap- 
 prehending. Judgments are only proba- 
 ble when this essential connection be- 
 tween the object and the subject does not 
 exist. Scientific knowledge is a series of 
 certain judgments, all derived from one 
 common principle. The links of the se- 
 ries are called common principles. There 
 may be different classes of common prin- 
 ciples, and different series of certain judg- 
 ments, hence there may be different kinds 
 of scientific knowledge. A series of cer-
 
 38 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 tain judgments, joined together by com- 
 mon principles and constituting one class, 
 is called a science. 
 
 Science and art are not synonymous, 
 either in sound or sense. Art is the as- 
 semblage of the rules by which human 
 activity is directed in the attainment of 
 any end ; for instance, the rules necessary 
 to the painter, in order that he may exer- 
 cise his profession, constitute the art of 
 painting. In a subjective sense, however, 
 art is often used synonymously with skill. 
 Still, mere manual skill is not art. Sci- 
 ence has very little direct relation with 
 .manual exercise, while art is seldom or 
 never without this, relation. 
 
 All philosophers agree that science 
 should be divided into different branches. 
 They often agree upon the names even to 
 be given to those classes, but there is 
 very little agreement about the reason of 
 the division of science. The ancient phi- 
 losophers divided science into speculative 
 and practical, and an intermediate science,
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 39 
 
 which they called instrumental. This 
 division is commonly attributed to Aris- 
 totle, though Brucker says that Plato is 
 the author of it. Instrumental science is 
 called logic, which teaches the rules of 
 reasoning. Speculative science goes no 
 farther t^an the knowledge of the object, 
 while practical science endeavors to re- 
 duce speculative knowledge to practice. 
 The speculative sciences are physics, 
 metaphysics, and mathematics. Physics 
 treats of visible existences ; metaphysics 
 of invisible and immutable things, and 
 comprises general ontology and theodicy ; 
 while the mathematics treat of divided 
 and continued quantity. The practical 
 sciences are ethics, politics, and private 
 economy. The philosophers of the mid- 
 dle ages divided the sciences according to 
 the three faculties of the universities, 
 namely, theology, law, and medicine. The 
 other sciences were called arts, and were 
 divided into the liberal and the inechani* 
 cal. The liberal arts were seven in num-
 
 40 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 ber, and subdivided into two classes : the 
 first called the trivium, which included 
 grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics ; the 
 second called the quadrivium, which com 
 prised music, geometry, astronomy, and 
 arithmetic. The mechanical arts were 
 also seven in number, namely, agricul- 
 ture, hunting, the art of war, architecture, 
 navigation, painting, and surgery. In 
 these categories neither logic nor ethics 
 was mentioned, because up to the twelfth 
 century these sciences were not taught 
 tinder their present names. When Aris- 
 totle's philosophy was in fashion, they 
 were numbered among the arts. The 
 faculty of arts in modern universities has 
 been subdivided into two others, namely, 
 that of letters and that of matliematics 
 and physical sciences, so that now imi- 
 versities have five faculties instead of 
 three. Among the modern divisions of 
 science, the first is that of Bacon. Fran- 
 cis Bacon, who lived in the seventeenth 
 century, and published a work entitled
 
 CDEIOUS QUESTIONS. 41 
 
 " De Augmentis Scientiarum," gives the 
 following division of science. He says 
 that it may be classified according to the 
 three faculties of the mind memory, im- 
 agination, and understanding or reason. 
 To memory belongs history, which is sub- 
 divided into civil and ecclesiastical. ., To 
 the imagination must be referred poetry, 
 which may be divided into narrative, dra- 
 matic, and parabolic. Finally, to reason 
 belongs science, properly so-called, which 
 is divided into philosophy and theology. 
 Bacon divides philosophy into divine, na- 
 tural, and human, while he leaves theolo- 
 gy to be subdivided by the theologians. 
 The authors of the great work published 
 in France, in the eighteenth century, un- 
 der the name of " Encyclopaedia," give al- 
 most the same division of science as that 
 of Bacon. They divide it into history, 
 philosophy, and poetry. They subdivide 
 history into sacred, civil, and natural. 
 Philosophy, according to these authors, 
 comprises general metaphysics, natural
 
 42 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 and revealed theology, the science of good 
 and bad spirits, the science of man, which 
 is subdivided into pneumatology and uni- 
 versal logic, and finally into moral sci- 
 ence and the science of nature, which com- 
 prises the metaphysics of bodies; pure 
 and applied mathematics, and special 
 physics. Poetry is divided into sacred 
 and profane, and each of these subdivided 
 into narrative, dramatic, and parabolic. 
 The next division of science is that of M. 
 Ampere, a French writer of the present 
 century. His division is very detailed. 
 According to him, there are two primary 
 kingdoms of science, which are subdivid- 
 ed into two more, and these two again 
 into two others. The two latter are 
 called two general series, and are subdi- 
 vided into two sub-series, and each sub- 
 series contains two sciences of the first 
 order, and each science of the first order 
 two sciences of the second order, and each 
 of the second two of the third order. The 
 sciences of the third order are one hun-
 
 CUKIOTJS QUESTIONS. 43 
 
 dred and twenty-eight in number. The 
 two general kingdoms of science are cos- 
 mological and noological. The cosmolo- 
 gical sciences are either cosmological, pro- 
 perly so called, or psychological. The cos- 
 mological are divided into mathematical 
 and physical, and the psychological into 
 natural and medicinal. The noological 
 sciences are either noological, properly so- 
 called, or social. The noological are di- 
 vided into philosophical and dialegmati- 
 cal. The social are divided into ethnolo- 
 gical and political. 
 
 Of these four divisions of science, three 
 follow reason ; but all the authors of 
 these three divisions differ in their man- 
 ner of explaining them. Plato divides 
 science according to the end which it has 
 in view ; Bacon, according to the faculty 
 which is principally exercised in acquir- 
 ing the science ; while Ampere attends 
 only to the object of which science treats. 
 What are we, then, to think of these re- 
 spective divisions ? We reject the first
 
 44 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 one, because it does not divide the sci- 
 ences so as to distinguish one part from 
 another. There is no practical science 
 which is not in a certain sense specula- 
 tive, and there is no speculative science 
 which may not be made more or less 
 practical. Hence' the division of Aristo- 
 tle must be rejected, for it does not dis- 
 tinguish the parts from each other ; and 
 this is necessaiy according to the rules 
 of logic. Neither can we admit the divi- 
 sion of Bacon : for although science bears 
 
 ' O 
 
 a necessary relation to the faculties of the 
 mind, nevertheless, according to the defi- 
 nition of science which we have given 
 above, memory and imagination can have 
 no part in the division of science, since 
 they can have no share in the acquisition 
 of what we have termed common princi- . 
 pies. Reason alone holds sway over 
 this department. We reject the divi- 
 sion of the authors of the "Encyclo- 
 paedia" for nearly the same reason, since 
 the foundation of their division is sub-
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 45 
 
 stantially the same as that of Bacon. 
 The division of M. Ampere is faulty 
 for the reason that he divides the sci- 
 ences according to the different objects 
 about which they treat, instead of stating 
 the common principles as the basis of his 
 division. The object of a science, and the 
 principle on which a science rests, 'are two 
 different things. Science, then, according 
 to our definition, should be divided ac- 
 cording to the different classes of common 
 principles ; for if we were to divide with 
 M. Ampere according to the object, then 
 it would follow that two different sci- 
 ences could not treat of the same object, 
 (God, for instance,) which is false, since 
 theology and theodicy treat of the same 
 object, God, and yet they are not the 
 same science. 
 
 There are as many sciences, therefore, 
 as there are distinct classes of common 
 principles; but here arises the question, 
 How can one series of common principles 
 be distinguished from another ? The dif-
 
 46 CUBIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 ference of those series, we think, may be 
 determined by the different motives of 
 certitude on which they are founded. 
 There are different kinds of certitude, and 
 when the certitude of one series of prin- 
 ciples differs from that of another series, 
 the sciences will be different. Now, there 
 are three sources of certitude evidence, 
 common-sense, and authority. From evi- 
 dence arises the certitude of philosophy, 
 properly so-called, and upon common- 
 sense rests the certitude of the laws of 
 bodies. Hence, the physical sciences are 
 based upon common- sense. Now, the 
 physical sciences treat either of the phe- 
 nomena of bodies or of individual bodies, 
 and hence we have the physical sciences 
 proper and natural history. Authority 
 may be either natural or supernatural. 
 Natural authority treats of social facts; 
 supernatural, of religious facts. 
 
 Having premised so much on science 
 in general, we shall now proceed to give 
 a definition of the science of philosophy.
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 47 
 
 A definition may be of two kinds; 
 verbal or real. A verbal definition is a 
 definition of tlie word. A real definition 
 is a definition of the thing. The verbal 
 definition of philosophy is love of wisdom. 
 Cicero, in the fifth chapter of the Tusculan 
 Questions, tells us " that those who for- 
 merly spent their time in the study of 
 sciences were called 2o0oi " or wise men, 
 by the Greeks. Pythagoras, however, 
 thought this appellation too high-sound- 
 ing, and hence, with an appearance of 
 modesty, called himself simply a " lover of 
 wisdom" " $tAoao00." Succeeding philo- 
 sophers have adopted this title. As to the 
 real definition of philosophy, it has varied 
 with different periods. In the early ages 
 philosophy meant no particular science, but 
 only " the disposition of a learned mind 
 well versed in the sciences, or at least, of 
 one inflamed with the desire of know- 
 ledge." Objectively considered, philoso- 
 phy meant science in general ; but when, 
 after the first ages of the Church, sacred
 
 48 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 theology began to be treated as the science 
 distinct from mere natural sciences, the 
 name Philosophy was restricted to those 
 sciences which could be learned by the ex> 
 ercise of natural reason, without having re- 
 course to the authority of God's revelation. 
 Hence, philosophy was commonly called 
 in the schools, " Scientia ex ratione, \el 
 cognitio ex primis principiis evidenter de- 
 ducta." Philosophy, understood in this 
 extended sense, included not only meta- 
 physics, or the science of God, but also 
 physical and mathematical sciences : even 
 jurisprudence, economy, and politics, as 
 we can prove by opening any of the phi- 
 losophical works which have come down 
 from the middle ages to our days. For 
 in those works we find philosophy em- 
 bracing four parts, logic, physics, which 
 includes also metaphysics, mathematics, 
 and ethics. The second of these, namely, 
 physics, which was then a very limited 
 science, has been so developed by mod- 
 ern discoveries that it now forms a
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 49 
 
 branch by itself. Hence, intellectual 
 philosophy now comprises logic, which 
 teaches the rules to be followed in the 
 acquisition of truth ; metaphysics, which 
 treats of being in general, as well as of 
 spiritual being, and especially of the 
 human soul ; and ethics, which discusses 
 about the principles of morality. To 
 these three parts may be added a fourth, 
 called cosmology, which gives us some 
 general speculations about the corporeal 
 world. 
 
 As authors differ in giving a verbal 
 definition of philosophy, in circumscrib- 
 ing its limits as well as in giving a 
 real definition of it, we may venture to 
 give one of our own. Philosophy, then, 
 we identify with the first part of the de- 
 finition of science already given. Hence, 
 philosophy is a series of certain judg- 
 ments based on evidence ; but as evident 
 judgments are those which are included 
 in the very act of thought, we may define 
 philosophy to be the " Science of thought."
 
 50 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 Let us run through, the different parts of 
 philosophy, in order to see how this defi- 
 nition will bear upon them. In the act of 
 thought there are three things to be dis- 
 tinguished: the object, which is being; 
 the subject, or mind which receives being ; 
 and the laws which govern the mind in 
 the production of thoughts. Hence, in 
 philosophy there are three parts : the on- 
 tological, the psychological, and the no- 
 mological. The object of thought is es- 
 sentially distinguished from the subject, 
 and it is called idea or being. It may 
 be apprehended in two ways either ab- 
 solutely as being in general, or relatively 
 as limited being. Being which is abso- 
 lute or unlimited must be God, while 
 restricted being must be a creature. 
 Hence, ontology treats of the Creator and 
 the creature. But as these two realities 
 are made known to us by certain general 
 abstract conceptions, we must discourse 
 about those conceptions before speaking 
 of their applications. Hence, in meta-
 
 CUBIOUS QUESTIONS. 51 
 
 physics, or in the ontological part of phi- 
 losophy, we have three treatises, namely, 
 general metaphysics and special metaphy- 
 sics, which is divided into theodicy or the 
 treatise on the Creator, and cosmology, 
 which treats of the world or creature. 
 Psychology has but one treatise on the 
 subject of thought the human soul. 
 The third part of philosophy is nomolog- 
 ical, which treats of the laws of the mind. 
 A law is the rule which the activity of 
 any being must follow in order to attain 
 the end for which it was destined. By 
 thought itself is meant the exercise of 
 the soul's activity. This exercise, like 
 every other evolution of a being, is an at- 
 tempt to attain some end, and this end 
 can not be attained except by following 
 certain laws. Hence, the laws of thought 
 are the rules which the mind must ob- 
 serve in thinking in order to attain its 
 end. But the operations of the mind are 
 of two kinds, cognoscitive and affective, as 
 they have reference either to the mind or
 
 52 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 to the will. The cognoscitive or judging 
 operations of the mind aim at the discov- 
 ery of truth, while the affective deal with 
 the love of God and the hatred of vice. 
 The laws of thought, therefore, may "be 
 divided into two classes, since they may 
 either govern the cognoscitive or affective 
 operations of the mind. Logic treats of 
 the first class, and ethics of the second. 
 There is a little treatise called aesthetics 
 the science of the beautiful which we 
 have left out in this enumeration, but it 
 may be considered as an appendix to 
 theodicy.
 
 QUESTION SECOND. 
 
 WHAT RELATION HAS PHILOSOPHY TO OTHER 
 SCIENCES ? 
 
 | HERE is a great controversy re- 
 garding the order to be fol- 
 lowed in studying philosophy- 
 "We have seen the different parts of this 
 science ; now the practical question arises, 
 Which part should we treat first ? One 
 school, called the school of the dialecti- 
 cians, begins by logic; another, called 
 the school of the psychologists, begins by 
 psychology ; while another, called the 
 ontologists, maintains that we should be- 
 gin philosophy by the study of ontology. 
 Let us weigh the reasons of these three 
 schools. Most of the scholastics were 
 dialecticians, and many moderns belong 
 to the same school. The origin of this
 
 54: CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 first system is found in the great dispute 
 between the Stoics and Peripatetics as to 
 the nature of logic. According to the 
 Stoics logic is a science, and hence, like 
 all other sciences, it aims at giving us a 
 distinct speculative knowledge of some 
 object. Hence, l6gic could have the first 
 place in philosophy only inasmuch as the 
 object of which it treated would be the 
 first among the objects of science ; but as 
 the Stoics denied that the object of logic 
 was the first among the objects of science, 
 they denied that logic should have the 
 first place in philosophy. The Peripatetics 
 replied that logic was not a science, but 
 a universal instrument necessary for the 
 study of all sciences, and hence they gave 
 the name of organon, or instrument, to 
 Aristotle's works on logic. The Peripa- 
 tetics, therefore, contend that no science 
 can be acquired unless we know the 
 foundation of human certitude, the laws 
 of reasoning, and the method which should 
 be followed in investigating and distrib-
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 55 
 
 uting the different parts of science ; and 
 as logic teaches all these things, it is not 
 a science but a universal requisite for the 
 study of all sciences; and hence some- 
 thing which should precede the study of 
 all science. Hence, we should begin the 
 study of philosophy by logic. The psy- 
 chological system is of Scotch origin ; its 
 author being Thomas Reid, the founder 
 of the Scotch school of philosophy. In 
 this century there have been many disci- 
 ples of this system in France, the principal 
 of whom are Royer Collard, Jouffroy, and 
 Damiron of the Paris University. Victor 
 Cousin, also, in many points, admits this 
 system. These authors almost com- 
 pletely neglect the other parts of philoso- 
 phy to devote themselves especially to 
 the study of the thinking subject. They 
 make psychology the foundation of all 
 philosophy, and endeavor to refute the 
 dialecticians as follows. They deny that 
 logic is a necessary and universal instru- 
 ment for the acquisition of science. For
 
 66 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 the object of logic is to give us a scientific 
 knowledge of the rules which govern the 
 "thinking faculty, and hence logic could 
 not be called the universal instrument of 
 science, only inasmuch as a knowledge 
 of these rules would be necessary to every 
 scientific disquisition. But this know- 
 ledge is not necessary. For just as we 
 have naturally the faculty of knowing, so 
 do we know naturally how to use it, as it 
 were by instinct ; and we know how to 
 distinguish between truth and error with- 
 out having a scientific knowledge of the 
 laws and principles of reasoning. Thus 
 we see every day men without education 
 and ignorant of the rules of logic, judging 
 correctly things that fall under their ob- 
 servation. Again, if logic were the uni- 
 versal instrument of science, it would fol- 
 low that as often as we exercise the think- 
 ing faculty we should be conscious of the 
 application of the rules of logic ; we could 
 approve of no reason without having first 
 analyzed it logically; but experience
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 57 
 
 teaches us that this is false. Moreover 
 
 > 
 
 if we assert that logic is the necessary in- 
 strument in the acquisition of science, we 
 fall into a manifest contradiction; for logic 
 is a science, no matter what may be its 
 object, and this science can not be learned 
 without using the faculty of thought. 
 This is as true of logic as of any other 
 science. But, on the other hand, we can 
 not say that the scientific knowledge of 
 logic is necessary to acquire the science 
 of logic. Therefore, logic is not a uni- 
 versal instrument, as the dialecticians 
 would have it. The psychologists, how- 
 ever, do not despise logic. They ac- 
 knowledge its utility in common with 
 that of all sciences ; and they admit that 
 it aids us in the investigation of truth. 
 Truth being the object of the intellect, 
 the knowledge of it is useful and neces- 
 sary ; and as logic helps us in this investi- 
 gation, it is a useful science, and in many 
 respects superior to the other sciences ; be- 
 cause to know the laws of our thought is
 
 58 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 one of the objects most deserving our at- 
 tention. Besides, logic is extremely use- 
 ful, because, say the psychologists, per- 
 haps there is no science in which the 
 mind's reflecting power is so well drilled ; 
 and although, without the knowledge 
 of logic, we may reason and investigate 
 truth, still it is only the experienced lo- 
 gician who can easily refute sophisms 
 and defend truth. After having thus de- 
 stroyed the arguments of the dialecticians, 
 the psychologists proceed to show that 
 the study of their science should precede 
 the study of logic. The object of logic 
 is to determine the laws of thought ; but 
 as the laws of thought can not be appre- 
 hended unless the nature of thought be 
 first understood, it follows that psycholo- 
 gy, which analyzes thought, and explains 
 its nature, should come before logic. In- 
 deed, the dialecticians must admit this in 
 practice if not in theory. For there is 
 hardly one of them who does not analyze 
 the cognoscitive faculties of the mind,' be-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 59 
 
 fore describing the laws of reason. In 
 truth, then, the dispute between the 
 dialecticians and psychologists would 
 seem to be merely verbal. On the same 
 ground the psychologists endeavor to 
 show the priority of psychology to every 
 other part of intellectual philosophy. 
 For, in the first place, the knowledge of 
 one's self should go before all other know- 
 ledge, since we should know what we 
 are before knowing other objects. Again, 
 our faculties are the means of acquiring 
 all science; and hence, we should first 
 study their nature before that of any thing 
 else. Next in order comes the system of 
 the ontologists. Men of marked ability 
 some of the greatest philosophers of the 
 age defend the system which holds the 
 priority of the ontological order in the 
 science of philosophy. These, on the one 
 hand, admit the reasoning of the psy- 
 chologists against the dialecticians, while 
 at the same time they reject the psycho- 
 logical method. They contend that on-
 
 60 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 tology should have the first place in phi- 
 losophy, because this method is mare in 
 conformity with the order of priority 
 which the objects of philosophy hold 
 among themselves in the primitive act of 
 thought and in reflection. For the object 
 of thought is prior to the subject in the 
 order of real existence. The object is 
 conceived as something absolute and ne- 
 cessary, while the subject is relative and 
 contingent, ^ and the absolute and neces- 
 sary precede the contingent in the order 
 of reality. Besides, thought is primarily 
 constituted by the intuition of the object, 
 and it is only by a kind of rebound from 
 the object, in the act of intuition, that the 
 soul becomes conscious of itself. More- 
 over, the reflexive order requires also this 
 ontological priority. We mean by the 
 reflexive order, that which is distin- 
 guished from the intuitive order. In the 
 intuitive order the mind is conceived by 
 a logical, if not by a real instant, as pas- 
 sive; but in the reflexive order, the mind
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 61 
 
 acts, and thus evolves its activity. For, 
 if we go back by the aid of memory into 
 the history of our past life, we shall ob- 
 serve that the first object to which the 
 soul directed its attention, was not itself, 
 or its operations, but exterior things. 
 For we knew how to distinguish external 
 objects from one another, nay, even to 
 reason abstractly about them, before we 
 had apprehended ourselves by a distinct 
 thought. The principal objection against 
 this system is one that holds equally good 
 against the other two. It is said that it 
 is impossible to treat the objective part 
 of philosophy without supposing many 
 things from psychology and logic. This 
 difficulty is unanswerable. Hence, we 
 reject the three systems, not for the pur- 
 pose of making a fourth, but with the 
 intention of giving what we consider to 
 be the true view on the subject. 
 
 Philosophy is the science of thought. 
 Now, as every science must begin by its 
 elements, the science of philosophy must
 
 62 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 begin by treating of the elements of 
 thought. The elements of thought are 
 three. The subject, the object, and the 
 copula, or link between subject and ob- 
 ject. Hence, we should begin philoso- 
 phy by simultaneously treating the logi- 
 cal, psychological,- and the ontological 
 parts. The error of each of these three 
 systems consists in not admitting what is 
 true in the systems of its adversaries. 
 The student of philosophy should then 
 pursue three classes at the same time. 
 But, for convenience sake, it is best to 
 begin by logic. 
 
 Having thus defined the nature of the 
 science of philosophy, let us now see 
 what relation it bears to the other sci- 
 ences. A science, we said, was a series of 
 truths 'reduced to unity by means of com- 
 mon principles. Hence, in every science, 
 these three things are to be considered, 
 namely, 1st. The general notions which 
 constitute its subject-matter. 2d. The 
 foundation on which their certitude is
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 63 
 
 based. 3d. The relation of the particu- 
 lar conclusions to the general principles. 
 Now, it is very easy to show, that all 
 other rational sciences are subject to phi- 
 losophy in these three respects. It is 
 evident, as far as the first part is con- 
 cerned; for the general notions of any 
 science must be apprehended by thought ; 
 and as philosophy is the science of 
 thought, these general notions belong 
 primarily to philosophy, whose object it 
 is to explain them. Again, the same 
 may be said of the foundation on which 
 the certitude of every science is built. 
 For that foundation is either the common- 
 sense of nature, or some authority either 
 sacred or profane ; but we shall hereafter 
 demonstrate that neither common-sense 
 nor authority is the ultimate criterion of 
 certitude ; but that both rest on evidence, 
 which is the foundation of philosophical 
 certitude. Therefore, the certitude of all 
 sciences is based on philosophy. The ar- 
 rangements of the judgments constituting
 
 64 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 any science, consist, especially, in deduc- 
 ing them legitimately from each other. 
 But one judgment is deduced from an- 
 other by means of reasoning, and as it 
 is the province of philosophy to deter- 
 mine the laws of reasoning, it follows 
 that, in this third respect also, all other 
 sciences are subordinate to philosophy. 
 This subordination of other sciences to 
 philosophy is called the philosophy of 
 science, and it consists in reducing the 
 fundamental conceptions of any science 
 to its first principles in assigning the last 
 foundation of its certitude, and in giving 
 the reason of the order of its subject-mat- 
 ter. The name philosophy of science, 
 however, is sometimes understood in a 
 different sense ; as there are some sciences 
 which have a double object, namely, to 
 expose certain facts, or determine their 
 laws and causes. This latter object is 
 sometimes called the philosophy of science. 
 From this subordination of all sciences to 
 philosophy we again see its utility and 
 importance.
 
 QUESTION THIRD. 
 
 WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN- 
 TAL AND ORAL TERMS? 
 
 I HERE are two kinds of terms 
 mental and oral; the mental 
 term means the idea, and the 
 oral term the means by which we render 
 the mental term visible, or the expression 
 of an idea. These terms are the founda- 
 tion of human logic ; but human logic is 
 but the copy of divine, sublime, or tran- 
 scendental logic. The human, mental 
 term, we say, is the idea, and the idea is 
 God, the essence of God, the Aoyoj of 
 Plato, (the word of God,) the 6 Aoyo? of 
 St. John. The word of God is the reposi- 
 tory of ideas. God sees ideas in his word, 
 and his word is God, and hence God sees
 
 66 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 ideas in God, as the 6 Aoyof, or the word, 
 not in God as the Father. Hence, the 
 is the mental term of God, and the 
 incarnate is the oral term of God ; 
 the 6 Aoyof of St. John, the 6 /toyo^ 
 aapx eyevero of God is the incarnation of 
 his mental term. 'So, Quantum licet parva 
 componere magnis, our oral term is the 
 incarnation, as it were, of our mental 
 term. Therefore God's oral term and 
 God's mental term are the same. Our 
 mental term and God's are also 'the 
 same. Yet, for all this, we are not God, 
 for our mental term is outside of us. 
 God's mental term is inside of him ; but 
 our oral term is more like God's oral 
 term; for his oral term, or the incarna- 
 tion, is outside of him just as our oral 
 term is outside of us. Hence, God's logic 
 and man's logic have the same object. 
 God's truth or God's logic is man's truth 
 or man's logic ; that is to say, it is derived 
 from God himself. This is reducing hu- 
 man logic to its primary principles ; it is
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 67 
 
 building logic on its real foundation on 
 God, the supreme reality. Hence, our 
 logic is real logic truth. 
 
 There is "but one truth, one species of 
 truth. Logical, metaphysical, and moral 
 are but one truth ; for truth is the equality 
 between being and the intellect appre- 
 hending beings ; but being is not truth, 
 but being as apprehended by the intel- 
 lect is truth. Without the intellect there 
 is no truth, for truth essentially supposes 
 an intellect. Without being there is no 
 truth, for without being the intellect 
 could apprehend nothing, and nothing 
 could not be truth ; truth could not come 
 from nothing. 
 
 Truth is, then, a relation between being 
 and intellect. Being is that which is ; the 
 intellect is that which apprehends that 
 which is; and the relation, the essential 
 relation, between that which is, or being, 
 and the faculty which apprehends that 
 which is, is truth. Now, as this relation 
 between the intellect and being is never
 
 68 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 changed, neither is truth changed. Hence, 
 the division of truth into logical, metaphy- 
 sical, and moral, may imply different modes 
 of truth, but not different species of it; if 
 it implied different species, the division 
 would have to be rejected by us who 
 found all science on reality on things as 
 they are. 
 
 This distinction between our mental 
 and oral term gives us the real distinction 
 between truth as it is in itself, and truth 
 as expressed in language. Truth in itself 
 is one and indivisible; truth in speech is 
 multiple. It is divided in passing through 
 the mind as the colors of light are separ- 
 ated by a prism. All truths are but scin- 
 tillations of one truth, of the truth eter- 
 nal and immutable. Our mind, being 
 finite, can consider truth by reflection only 
 in analysis. Truth in synthesis is intued 
 by the mind ; but it can not be reflected 
 in the present condition of the intellect 
 without logical divisions and distinctions. 
 The mind, in presence of truth, sees it all
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 69 
 
 in a confused state, but can not clothe it 
 in a sensible shape, so that others may 
 reflect upon it, unless it be robed in gar- 
 ments of many colors.
 
 QUESTION FOURTH. 
 
 WHAT IS THE CRITERION OF CERTITUDE? 
 DEGREES OF CERTITUDE. 
 
 jY the criterion of certitude we 
 mean the last foundation of all 
 certitude. This criterion must 
 be an infallible sign of truth; for if it 
 could admit the possibility of an error, 
 or need the assistance of another means 
 to detect error, it would not be 'the last 
 foundation of truth. In the second place, 
 the criterion of certitude must be self-evi- 
 dent ; for if it were not, we should have 
 to go beyond it to find the last founda- 
 tion of truth. The criterion must also be 
 universal; that is to say, all the other 
 motives of certitude must rest upon it as
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 71 
 
 their basis. For, if all the motives of 
 certainty did not rest on it, we would 
 have certitude outside of its criterion, and 
 consequently it could not be called the 
 last foundation of truth. 
 
 Authors do not agree on the criterion 
 of certitude. We hold that it is evi- 
 dence. We define evidence to be, " The 
 perfect equality between receptive and ac- 
 tive thought ;" between the act of the 
 mind affirming its perceptions, and the 
 intuitions of the mind receiving its ideas. 
 All certainty, whether of common-sense 
 or of authority, is based on this internal 
 fact of the equality between receptive and 
 active thought. 
 
 In the first place, evidence is an infalli- 
 ble sign of truth. It is a motive of certi- 
 tude, as we all know; and there is no 
 other motive presupposed by it. 
 
 Evidence is self-evident ; for it is inter- 
 nal to the mind, and it is impossible by 
 any straining of thought to conceive any 
 thing prior to it in the mind, since it is
 
 72 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 in the very essence of every mental act. 
 Receptive facts are the first element of 
 thought, and evidence consists in the 
 equality between them and the judgments 
 which affirm them. 
 
 Finally, evidence is the universal foun- 
 dation of certainty. Besides evidence, 
 there are only two other motives of certi- 
 tude common-sense and authority and 
 both these motives rest on evidence. 
 Common-sense is the invincible propen- 
 sity of our nature to affirm certain things 
 to be true. But does not evidence tell us 
 of the existence of such a propensity, and 
 of the presence of such judgments in our 
 mind? As for authority, it is evident 
 that it presupposes evidence, since au- 
 thority presupposes even common-sense. 
 How can we know the existence of au- 
 thority, unless we use our senses; and 
 does not the certainty of the senses pre- 
 suppose the certainty of judgments, 
 which is the certainty of evidence ? 
 
 This is the system of Des Cartes, who
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 73 
 
 was tlie first philosopher to investigate 
 the nature of the criterion of certitude. 
 
 A very common error regarding certi- 
 tude is that it admits of degrees. This 
 error is founded in a misconception of the 
 nature of certainty. Some authors, espe- 
 cially theologians, distinguish two kinds 
 of certitude : that of faith, and that of 
 reason. The certitude of faith they con- 
 sider greater than that of reason. Others 
 distinguish in certitude two elements: 
 the exclusion of fear of error, and the 
 firmness of mental adhesion. Considered 
 under the first aspect, they deny that 
 there are degrees incertitude; but they 
 contend that the adhesion of the mind to 
 truth may be greater or less, and conse- 
 quently, in this respect, they admit de- 
 grees in certitude, according to the greater 
 or less number of motives. 
 
 Now, certitude consists in the essential 
 connection of our judgments with truth ; 
 but there can be no degrees in such a con- 
 nection. If this connection of a judgment
 
 74: CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 with truth could admit of degrees, it 
 would be either because there could be a 
 greater or less doubt or fear of error, or 
 because there could be a greater or less 
 adhesion of the mind to truth. But 
 neither of these hypotheses can be main- 
 tained. 
 
 Not the first one; for where there is 
 doubt, or fear of error, there can be no 
 certitude, though there may be a greater 
 or less probability. Nor can the second 
 be held ; for the firmness of mental ad- 
 hesion in itself adds nothing to the con- 
 nection of a judgment with truth, for we 
 know by experience that the mind can ad- 
 here as pertinaciously to error as to truth. 
 
 It is a great error, therefore, to say that 
 we are more or less certain. Certitude is 
 like a simple point, and can not have de- 
 grees in it. In the last analysis all certi- 
 tude is reduced to evidence, which is the 
 basis of all scientific certitude. Scientific 
 certitude should never be confounded 
 with probability.
 
 QUESTION FIFTH. 
 
 WHAT IS THE TRUE NOTION OF AN IDEA? 
 
 [ HE word idea has different mean- 
 ings with different authors. It 
 is sometimes used to signify an 
 opinion or judgment, and again it is ap- 
 plied to the elements of judgment. We 
 mean by idea the object of thought. As 
 we have already remarked, the analysis 
 of thought gives us three elements the 
 subject, the bond, and the object. Let 
 us examine the nature of ideas. We re- 
 mark, before entering on this question, 
 that no thought is possible without an 
 idea ; Jfor when the mind thinks it per- 
 ceives, but this act supposes an object 
 perceived, and hence it supposes an idea, 
 for idea and object of thought are one
 
 76 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 and the same thing. What, then, is an 
 idea ? Is it a reality ? and if so, is it a 
 possible or existing one ? and if it be an 
 existing reality, what kind of existence 
 has it ? 
 
 Thomas Reid, founder of the so-called 
 Scotch school of philosophy, in his work 
 entitled " Essays on the Faculties of the 
 Mind," denies that an idea is a reality, 
 and asserts it to be a conception or image 
 formed by the mind itself. Hence we 
 can be certain of nothing by means of 
 ideas. He denied the axiom of the schools, 
 " Ideas nostras mensuram es-se possibilis 
 et impossibilis? which means that an idea 
 always implied at least a possibility. He 
 gives us examples of many things of 
 which we have ideas, but which are im- 
 possible and absurd, for example, a wing- 
 ed horse. It is objected to this system of 
 Reid that it leads to scepticism, because, 
 as there is no connection between the 
 ideas and the things which they repre- 
 sent, we can not acquire a knowledge of
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 77 
 
 the tilings themselves ; and that the pas- 
 sage from the subject to the object is 
 impossible, and hence that all certitude 
 is destroyed. 
 
 He endeavors to evade this difficulty 
 in the following manner. As he abhors 
 scepticism and does not wish to be classed 
 among sceptics, he invents a faculty which 
 he calls external perception, by means of 
 which corporal realities existing outside 
 ourselves are apprehended. In this fa- 
 culty there are three elements, 1st. The 
 conception of an object formed a priori 
 by the mind. 2d. An affirmation of the 
 object's real existence. 3d. An immediate 
 persuasion of the truth of this affirmation. 
 Whenever we know an object in this 
 manner we are certain of its existence. 
 This is the sum of Reid's system. The 
 difficulty, however, is only evaded, not 
 solved. For after all, even in the case or 
 this external perception, the idea is but a 
 fetus of the mind, having in it no objec- 
 tivity. But how can that which has no
 
 78 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 objectivity in it make us certain of the 
 real existence of an object ? He answers 
 by dividing ideas into two classes. In 
 one of these classes we have the affirma- 
 tion and the immediate persuasion as 
 above explained; in the other there is 
 a simple representation, pure conception 
 without reality. In the first case we have 
 external perception, by which we appre- 
 hend an object not merely possible, but 
 enjoying actual existence. But still the 
 difficulty is unsolved; for every idea 
 must imply a real object. Idea is the 
 object of thought, and if this object be 
 not a being it is nothing. " Si non est 
 Ens est non Ens." But the mind can not 
 think nothing, as an object for thought 
 essentially implies a real object distinct 
 from itself. To think nothing and not to 
 think at all are one and the same thing. 
 No idea, therefore, can be a mere spectre 
 conjured up from the depths ^of the soul. 
 Again, three hypotheses may be made 
 with regard to the connection of ideas
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 79 
 
 with being. Either all ideas are, or all 
 ideas are not, or some are and some are not 
 realities according to certain circumstances 
 given by Reid. But the two last sup- 
 positions are absurd ; for if there be no 
 reality in any idea, there can be no judg- 
 ment either certain or doubtful ; for there 
 will be nothing upon which to judge ; and 
 we can not give reality to some ideas and 
 deny it to others according to certain cir- 
 cumstances, because circumstances do not 
 change the essence of intellectual percep- 
 tion. This essence consists in the intui- 
 tion of an object ; but this intuition either 
 implies the reality of an object, or it does 
 not. If it does, then the connection must 
 always exist ; if it does not, it can never 
 exist. Nor will it do for the Scotch 
 philosophers to assert that the presence 
 of an affirmation with an immediate 
 persuasion will decide the question of 
 the object's reality, for as we have al- 
 ready remarked, how can these circum- 
 stances give reality to an idea which is
 
 80 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 unreal? Besides, the affirmation which 
 distinguishes the real ideas from the 
 phantasms must be a judgment. Reid, 
 therefore, makes the judgment the mea- 
 sure of our ideas ; whereas, in point of 
 fact, it is ideas that are the measures of 
 our judgments. 
 
 Another system on the nature of our 
 ideas is that called the system of the 
 intelligible species or of representative 
 ideas. This system contends that an idea 
 is a being, in the sense that its existence 
 in the mind always proves the existence 
 of some reality either existing or possible 
 outside of the mind. The being of idea, 
 however, is not being in itself, but the 
 medium or image through which being 
 is made intelligible. Ideas in this system 
 are the mirrors in which the faces of 
 beings are reflected ; hence the mind does 
 not immediately apprehend being, but 
 only its image ; and thus it judges from 
 the image to the existence of the reality. 
 All masters in this school, however, do
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 81 
 
 not agree in explaining their system, for 
 there are two hypotheses. According to 
 St. Thomas and the other Christian fol- 
 lowers of this system, ideas are certain 
 forms or representations of things which 
 God imprints on our soul, either succes- 
 sively or in the first instance of its crea- 
 tion. The system thus explained is 
 commonly taught in the schools ; but it 
 was not thus understood by its pagan 
 inventors. Democritus and Epicurus 
 considered ideas as the images or species 
 which physical objects produced in us. 
 According to those authors, bodies emit 
 particles which form images of the bodies. 
 The image of each body thus formed 
 passes through the senses to that part of 
 the brain called anciently "sensorium 
 commune." This image is as yet mate- 
 rial, but the acting intellect now takes it 
 up, etherealizes it, and produces from it a 
 spiritual image of the body from which it 
 emanated. The passive intellect can now 
 contemplate this chemically formed idea
 
 82 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 of the external object. The system thus 
 explained is pure materialism. For in it 
 there is no account made of the existence 
 of spiritual realities, nor is there any 
 means of having their ideas. 
 
 But this school of philosophers, whether 
 Pagan or Christian, does not give us the 
 true explanation of the nature of ideas. 
 Ideas are not images or representations of 
 objects ; for in order that one thing should 
 be the image of another, it is necessary 
 in the first place that we should have an 
 idea of the thing represented, as well as 
 of its representation ; and that we should 
 be able to assert a similarity between the 
 image and the object. If either of these 
 two conditions be wanting, there is no 
 true representation. But the system of 
 representative ideas fulfills neither of 
 them ; for by it we have only a notion 
 of the image. The object represented is 
 not perceived by the mind. 
 
 And as representative ideas have no 
 being in themselves, (for if they had
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 83 
 
 these, our mind would perceive being 
 immediately,) there can be no means of 
 deciding a similarity between the idea 
 and the object. The idea in this system 
 is either being or it is not. If it be being, 
 then the mind immediately apprehends 
 being, and there is no ^necessity for in- 
 venting the intelligible species as the 
 media between realities and the mind. If 
 it be not being, it must be nothing; it 
 can represent nothing. Moreover, we 
 have ideas of the infinite and the neces- 
 sary being ; for we know what is meant 
 when we hear this being spoken of. Now 
 how could an image or intelligible species 
 be the representative idea of this object \ 
 since there would be no similitude between 
 the object and the image, the one being 
 infinite and the other finite. Yet simi- 
 larity between the object and image is 
 necessary to constitute true representa? 
 tion. Therefore this system, besides other 
 defects, has that of not being able to ex-
 
 84 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 plain the origin of the idea of God in our 
 mind. 
 
 The third system with regard to the 
 nature of ideas teaches that they are 
 being in themselves ; hence idea and 
 being mean one and the same thing ; so 
 that being as well as idea may be denned 
 that which terminates our mind as the 
 object of thought. We must naturally 
 admit this system since we have rejected 
 that of Reid and of St. Thomas. It 
 follows as a necessary consequence, from 
 what has thus far been argued ; for if we 
 apprehend being from ideas, as all admit, 
 not even excepting the Scotch school, 
 which admits the apprehension of being 
 by ideas, at least in the case of external 
 perception; and if, again, ideas, as mere 
 images, can not be the instrument by 
 w T hich being is apprehended, it follows 
 that we must apprehend being in itself. 
 Ideas and being are, therefore, identified 
 in signification.
 
 QUESTION SIXTH. 
 
 IS IDEA A POSSIBLE BEING, OR AN EXISTING 
 ONE ? SYSTEM OF ROSMINI. 
 
 IOTHONY ROSMINI SERBA- 
 
 TI was born at Roveredo, in the 
 Tyrol, on the 25th. of March, 
 1797, and died in the beginning of July, 
 1855. He is one of the greatest of the 
 Italian philosophers, and stands on an 
 equal footing with Gioberti and Cardinal 
 Gerdil. He founded the Society of Char- 
 ity, which was sanctioned by the Pope as 
 a religious congregation in 1838. His 
 theological ^,nd philosophical works fill 
 thirty volumes in octavo, the chief of 
 which is Nuovo Saggio suW Origine deW 
 Idee, which he published in four volumes, 
 and in which his philosophical system is
 
 86 CUBIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 contained. It may "he summed up as fol- 
 lows : In order to explain the phenomena 
 of the human mind, we should admit no 
 more nor no less than is sufficient. But 
 this principle has not been followed out 
 by the different schools of philosophy. 
 The mind, in order to judge, necessarily 
 requires certain general notions which are 
 not the products of the mind, for the 
 mind finds them as the materials with 
 which it makes its judgments. 
 
 There is in our mind, therefore, an idea, 
 the basis of all other ideas, and yet not 
 produced by our intellect. Whence comes 
 it, then, if not from the mind ? Here, 
 says Rosmini, we have different systems. 
 Locke, Condillac, and the Sensist school 
 say this primary idea, these primary no- 
 tions, come from sensations. Reid makes 
 them come from a natural and primitive 
 judgment, of which all the elements are 
 subjective. Dugald Stewart derives them 
 from the common name used to designate 
 a collection of similar objects, which the
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 87 
 
 intellect does not, however, perceive as a 
 collection, but individually. These sys- 
 tems do not admit all that is necessary 
 to explain the facts of the human mind. 
 They sin by defect. The other class of 
 philosophers sin by excess at least in 
 the opinion of Rosmini for they admit 
 more than is necessary to explain the 
 presence of ideas in our minds. Plato, 
 Leibnitz, and Kant make all ideas innate. 
 But Rosmini shows that ideas engender 
 each other ; that they can be derived 
 from one ; and hence there is no necessity 
 of having all in the mind from the be- 
 ginning. It is in refuting these different 
 systems, then, that Rosmini explains his 
 own. He maintains that an analysis of 
 our ideas will show them all to be modi- 
 fications of the fundamental idea of being 
 in general. From this idea we can de- 
 duce all others, and without it none are 
 possible. This idea is, therefore, innate. 
 But this being in general is not a real, ab- 
 solute, concrete, and existing being, is not
 
 88 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 God, as Gioberti and the Ontologists hold, 
 but it is possible being in general. It is 
 not a fetus of the mind, however, for it 
 has an objectivity in itself. It is not God, 
 nor yet a creature, but, like an intelligible 
 atmosphere, it is an eternal and necessary 
 light emanating from God, by means of 
 which our intelligence contemplates all 
 ideas. 
 
 Rosmini then endeavors to explain the 
 process by which all other ideas are de- 
 rived from the idea of being in general. 
 According to him, the idea of being con- 
 stitutes the a priori part or form of all 
 cognition. In order to determine this 
 form in individual cases, the matter must 
 be supplied by the senses. We give the 
 translation of Rosmini' s words : " If there 
 be something else in our idea besides the 
 conception of being, this something else 
 is only a mode of being itself, so that it 
 can be truly said of every idea that it is 
 either being conceived, or being more or 
 less determined by its modes. The mat-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 89 
 
 ter of thought, or a posteriori cognition, 
 gives each particular determination of 
 the idea of being in general. When we 
 wish, then, to explain the origin of ideas, 
 we must explain two things : 1st. The 
 manner in which we obtain the concep- 
 tion of beino*. 2d. The manner in which 
 
 O 
 
 we obtain the different determinations to 
 which being is subject. But, as we have 
 demonstrated that the conception of being 
 is innate, there no longer remains any dif- 
 ficulty, for the different determinations of 
 the ideas of being are manifestly derived 
 from the senses." (Essay, vol ii. sec. 5, 
 cap. 1.) 
 
 He exemplified his theory by the man- 
 ner in which we apprehend a ball of 
 ivory. The first idea in the mind is the 
 idea of possible being. We think a being, 
 and this is the intelligible element, the 
 a priori part of the thought. Then, by 
 means of sensation, we observe the 
 weight, color, and shape of the ball, and 
 this is the matter of thought. Thus, we
 
 90 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 have a particular determination of the 
 idea of possible being. Hence, in accord 
 ance with this theory, Rosmini endeav 
 ors to establish a proposition entitled, 
 "The double cause of acquired ideas is 
 the idea of being and sensation." But, as 
 the idea of being in general gives the 
 form to our thought, and is the principle 
 of our cognoscitive faculty, the origin of 
 our ideas may be said to be, without re- 
 striction, the idea of being in general. 
 We must not, however, confound idea 
 and judgment. There are two means by 
 which we may have thought : either by 
 intuition or affirmation. The first deals 
 with possible beings ; the second, which 
 is a judgment, in which there are an idea 
 and persuasion of the existence of an ob- 
 ject, treats of existence outside the mind. 
 But what relation has idea with judg- 
 ment, or how do we pass from one to the 
 other? Rosmini continues to explain: 
 In the first place, the mind has the idea 
 of being ; then, by means of sensations, a
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 91 
 
 judgment is produced, which is equiva- 
 lent to the formula, " That which I feel 
 exists." This judgment has two elements : 
 the idea of its object, and the persuasion 
 of its real existence. 
 
 If the mind separate the second ele- 
 ment from the first by a process which 
 Kosmini calls Universalizzazione, we shall 
 have the simple idea. This universaliza- 
 tion, however, is not the same as abstrac- 
 tion ; for, although, when we universalize 
 we abstract from the existence of a thing, 
 nevertheless we leave it as a type or re- 
 presentation what it always was ; where- 
 as, when we abstract, we take away a 
 part of the object or one of its proper- 
 ties, and thus give rise to new ideal com- 
 binations. For instance, the senses show 
 me a tree. I immediately say it exists, 
 and here there is a judgment as to the ex- 
 istence. But I can conceive this tree ab- 
 stractly, apart from its existence, as merely 
 possible. Here, then, I universalize. I 
 have a concrete and universal idea, which
 
 92 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 may be looked upon as a species or type 
 participable by individuals ad infinitum. 
 But if I consider a tree in general, or cer- 
 tain properties of it, I abstract. Hence, 
 universalization gives us ideas. Abstrac- 
 tion gives them different terms, and 
 changes the manner of representing them. 
 Three things, therefore, are to be noted 
 with regard to universalization. 1st. 
 There is a corporeal sensation, a phan- 
 tasm, or perception by the senses. 2d. A 
 wedding which takes place in the unity 
 of our conscience between this sensation 
 and the idea of being in general this is 
 intellectual perception. In the intellec- 
 tual perception there are a judgment on 
 the existence of an object and an idea of 
 the object obtained by the process of uni- 
 versalization. 3d. The separation of the 
 judgment from the idea by means of ab- 
 straction, so that we may have the idea 
 alone. This idea was universal from the 
 very beginning, but as it was hidden in 
 a,n individual, it needs this separation to
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 93 
 
 be seen in its universality. Hence, as we 
 have already said, all ideas are the idea 
 of a being in general, modified by the 
 senses. Hence, possible being in general 
 is the form of all ideas. It is the instru- 
 ment by which the mind renders an ob- 
 ject intelligible. It is the necessary 
 means of all knowledge, the light of the 
 mind, and the form of every human intel- 
 ligence. 
 
 The great merit of Kosmini in invent- 
 ing this system consists in his having 
 given the death-blow to materialism or 
 sensism ; for although this degrading 
 school of philosophy had been supplanted 
 in France by rationalistic electicism, it 
 still continued to be taught in Italy by 
 Romagnosi. Galuppi, it is true, attacked 
 it, but he was too fond of the system of 
 Locke to be able to give materialism a 
 complete overthrow. Rosmini completely 
 destroyed it ; but he went so far to the 
 other extreme as almost to fell into the 
 contrary errors arising from the transcen-
 
 94 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 dental philosophy of the Germans. Hence 
 he plants his system nearly on the same 
 platform as that of Kant; for after de- 
 molishing the other system of philosophy, 
 he writes thus of 'Kant : " Kant came 
 after these. He gave a more accurate 
 and profound analysis of our cognitions 
 when he asserted that they are the result 
 of two elements one sensible and not 
 innate, the other not sensible, and hence 
 to be looked for in our mind. He pro- 
 perly calls one of these the matter, the 
 other the form of thought. Hence he 
 does not make all ideas innate in them- 
 selves as Plato does ; nor in their vestiges, 
 as Leibnitz ; but he makes only the for- 
 mal part of ideas innate, so that all ideas 
 according to Kant are factitious, but not 
 4n every respect. This was a notable 
 step in the progress of philosophical 
 science. (Essay, vol. ii. sec. 5. " Theoria 
 dell' origine dell' Idee,") 
 
 According to Rosmini, therefore, the 
 system of the philosopher of Konigsberg
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 95 
 
 is substantially good and acceptable, pro- 
 vided we lop off its superfluous excres- 
 cences. He partly admits Kant's system ; 
 for lie says that the formal must be dis- 
 tinguished from the material part in cog- 
 nition, and that the formal part alone is 
 innate. He endeavors to simplify Kant's 
 system by reducing the seventeen mental 
 forms to the idea of being in general, and 
 making them objective. "The mental 
 forms of Kant," he continued, " were 
 seventeen, two being from the senses ex- 
 ternal and internal, twelve from the in- 
 tellect, called by him pure conceptions or 
 categories, and three of our reason, to 
 which he gave the name of ideas. This 
 number of forms is too great, and the 
 formal part of reason is far more simple." 
 He then goes on to show that the idea of 
 possible being in general is the foundation 
 and formal part of all ideas. 
 
 The great mistake of Rosmini lay in 
 his imagining that a system which was 
 the extreme of materialism should be
 
 96 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 necessarily right ; whereas, in fact, Ger- 
 man transcendentalism is quite as erro- 
 neous and dangerous as sensism. You 
 can not build the edifice of truth on an 
 erroneous foundation. Indeed, the refu- 
 tation of Rosmini's system follows from 
 what has been already said. Idea is 
 being, not an image or subjective concep- 
 tion of the mind, and hence it must have 
 concrete and existing reality in itself; for 
 if we suppose it to have existence in 
 another being, then idea would be per- 
 ceptible only in this being. Possible 
 being in general is only potential in 
 itself; hence it must have its existence 
 in another being which is concrete and 
 existing. It is, then, in fact, concrete and 
 existing being which terminates our in- 
 tellect, even when we have the idea of 
 possible being in general ; hence the ob- 
 ject of our mind must be existing and 
 not possible being. Again, possible being 
 in general has no reality in itself; for that 
 which really exists is determined and
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 97 
 
 concrete, not general and possible ; hence 
 'if being in general were the object of 
 our intellect, our mind would not per- 
 ceive reality in itself, which is contrary 
 to what Rosmini would desire. Besides, 
 9 possible being in general merely indicates 
 a power possessed by a real and existing 
 being. This power, when used, causes 
 possible beings to pass from the state of 
 potentiality to that of act; but an idea 
 must be real being, as we have sjiown ; 
 therefore, possible being in general is not 
 the fountain of our ideas. Moreover, 
 Rosmini makes this possible being neither 
 a creature nor yet the Creator, but a 
 mysterious and (as he calls it) a terrible 
 idea. 
 
 Now, as Rosmini gives this idea of 
 possible being in general to some of the 
 attributes of God, we can not see how he 
 can distinguish it from the Creator. This 
 being in general must be nothing at all, 
 or else it must be either a creature or the 
 Creator ; and, as Rosmini will admit it to
 
 98 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 be neither of the two first, it must be re- 
 duced to the last ; for a vague, indefinite, 
 infinite abstraction like Hosmmi's possible 
 being in general is a metaphysical ab- 
 surdity.
 
 QUESTION SEVENTH. 
 
 WHAT KIND OF EXISTENCE HAS IDEA ? 
 SYSTEM OF GIOBERTI. 
 
 IN" order to answer this question 
 correctly, namely, What kind 
 of existence has idea ? we must 
 distinguish three kinds of existences 
 the soul, other finite existences, and ne- 
 cessary being. There are four opinions 
 on this point. The first is that of Fichte, 
 a German philosopher, which places all 
 the objectivity of our ideas in the think- 
 ing principle or in the TO eyw. 
 
 Fichte supposes the mind to have the 
 power of presenting itself to itself, as the 
 object of thought ; so that it is at the 
 same time both subject and object. Hence 
 the mind is every thing, and every thing is
 
 100 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 in the mind, as its different modifications. 
 Hence tlie idea of God as well as the idea 
 of creature, is nothing but the idea of the 
 mind making itself the object of its own 
 intellectual faculties. This system is 
 fully explained by Fichte in the appendix 
 to his theodicy. 
 
 This system is refuted by what geo- 
 metricians call " reductio ad absurdum ;" 
 for if we suppose for an instant that the 
 subject and object of thought are identi- 
 fied, it will follow that what is finite is at 
 the same time infinite. 
 
 Two conditions are necessary to realize 
 Fichte's hypothesis. First, that the think- 
 ing subject should really apprehend itself 
 as the object of thought ; secondly, that 
 the thinking subject thus apprehended as 
 the object of thought should have all the 
 characteristics of the real object of thought. 
 But in the first place, the mind does not 
 apprehend itself as the object of thought ; 
 for if it did, we should be conscious of the 
 fact ; we should feel that we were thought
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 101 
 
 as well as that we think. Each of us 
 would not only say, " I think," but " I am 
 thought." Now, no matter how much 
 we may reflect, we are only conscious 
 that we think, not that we are thought. 
 Our intellect never apprehends the ob- 
 ject of thought as identified with the 
 subject. Again, the thinking subject 
 considered as the object of thought could 
 not have all the characteristics of the 
 ideal object which we apprehend; be- 
 cause we intue an objective reality as 
 distinct and separate from, and indepen- 
 dent of us, having full being in itself. 
 Besides, we have the idea of an infinite 
 object, necessarily existing and possessing 
 a creative power ; but it is evident that 
 the thinking subject has not a single one 
 of these qualities. It is not independent 
 of, nor separate from, us, for it is we, our 
 personality. It is not infinite, it does not 
 necessarily exist, nor can it create ; but if 
 it were the object of thought, it should 
 have these qualities. Moreover, the mind
 
 102 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 as the object of thought can not be differ- 
 ent from the mind as the subject of 
 thought ; but our conscience or intimate 
 sense tells us that our soul as the subject 
 of thought is finite, contingent, and mut- 
 able. Hence it must be finite, contingent, 
 and mutable as object of thought, which 
 it is not, and hence it can not be the ob- 
 ject of thought. 
 
 Fichte's system, which destroys the 
 reality of God's existence and that of the 
 world or better, which identifies God 
 and the world with the human soul by 
 an unintelligible pantheism, is defended 
 by two principal arguments. He says 
 that must be the object of thought, with- 
 out which it is impossible to apprehend 
 any thing, and without which the passage 
 from the subject to the object of thought 
 is impossible. But such is the soul ; for 
 unless the soul be its own object, how 
 will you span the chasm between the 
 subject and object of thought ? 
 
 The answer is easily given. We deny
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 103 
 
 
 
 the soul to be the complete cause of our 
 apprehension. We know the fact that 
 the mind apprehends, but the manner in 
 which it apprehends we know not. The 
 mode of the intellectual act is a mystery 
 which can not be solved. We know that 
 there is no contradiction in asserting that 
 the mind apprehends an object distinct 
 from itself, though we be unable to com- 
 prehend how the intellect apprehends the 
 object. Besides, it is not more easy to 
 comprehend Fichte's system in this re- 
 gard than that which he attacks ; for, let 
 him say what he will, we must always 
 suppose, if not a real at least a logical 
 distinction between the subject and the 
 object. The subject is not the subject in 
 the same way that it is the object of 
 thought, and hence there is not a complete 
 identity between the subject and the ob- 
 ject. Yet he says there must be this 
 identity; for if they be distinct, how 
 can they become united by intellec- 
 tual apprehension ? Either the subject
 
 104 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 
 
 must walk out of itself to apprehend 
 the object, or the object must jump out 
 of itself to be received by the subject. 
 Still the difficulty remains ; for with this 
 logical distinction between the subject 
 and object, there is the same necessity for 
 the jumping process as in the case of a 
 real distinction. But, in fact, the objec- 
 tion of Fichte does not hold good ; for 
 the object and subject touch each other 
 intellectually, and thus the subject appre- 
 hends the object without either of these 
 being obliged to go out of itself. More- 
 over, every philosopher knows that the 
 mode or the Jiow of intellectual apprehen- 
 sion is one of those natural mysteries so 
 frequent in philosophy, inexplicable but 
 not absurd. Hence Fichte's system is 
 to be rejected. 
 
 The second opinion with regard to the 
 kind of existence which idea possesses, is 
 that of Reid, which we have already par- 
 tially explained ; and the third is that of 
 St. Thomas, which has also been given.
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 105 
 
 St. Thomas makes the object of thought 
 distinct from the subject. This object 
 is identified with contingent beings, and 
 God is not immediately intued by the 
 mind. The idea of God is derived from 
 the idea of created existences. Now, al- 
 though we may not say that created ex- 
 istences may not be the object of intellec- 
 tual vision, still, we deny that they make 
 up the sufficient object; for in order 
 that the objectivity of our ideas should 
 exist wholly in contingent facts, one con- 
 dition is necessary. The contingent must 
 include in itself whatever is the object of 
 our thought. But it does not; for be- 
 sides contingent we perceive necessary 
 being, and besides the finite we have an 
 idea of the infinite, and conscience bears 
 testimony to the fact. But contingent 
 facts can not include the idea of the neces- 
 sary and infinite. The infinite idea must 
 be in an infinite object. Finite and con- 
 tingent are ideas that come after the idea 
 of the infinite and necessary. Hence, the
 
 106 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 system of St. Thomas, gives us only one 
 series of objects, namely, objects that are 
 finite. Nor does it explain even tlie 
 manner in which we apprehend these. 
 For we have already refuted his system 
 of image ideas, or intelligible species. 
 
 Let us now examine the system of Gio- 
 berti. This great philosopher was born 
 in Piedmont, in the beginning of the pre- 
 sent century, and died in Paris not many 
 years ago. Shortly after his ordination 
 he was made Chaplain of the Court, and 
 Professor of Philosophy in the University 
 of Turin. On account of his political 
 principles he was exiled in 1833, went 
 to Paris, and afterward to Brussels. He 
 returned to Italy during the troubles of 
 1848, and was made Prime Minister of 
 Charles Albert. He wrote many works, 
 most of them on philosophical subjects. 
 All were put on the Index shortly before 
 his death. Few of them are free from 
 error, and all of them deserved to be con- 
 demned " in odium auctoris," for the bit-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 107 
 
 ter attacks made by him against the 
 Court of Kome, and the learned and 
 zealous " Society of Jesus." It is cer- 
 tain that he died excommunicated, and 
 very probably a Pantheist. Yet Gioberti 
 is, without doubt, the greatest philoso- 
 pher of the nineteenth century. . ; 
 
 This age is revolutionary, but its revo- 
 lutions are caused as much by principles 
 and ideas, as by the force of arms. It en- 
 deavors to lay aside all supernatural reli- 
 gion ; but not being able to do so without 
 something to put in its stead, it exalts 
 and deifies every thing natural. Hence, 
 we see, where revelation has been rejected, 
 a longing after the mystic, the wonderful, 
 the preternatural, the extraordinary, man- 
 ifesting itself in politics, in religion, and 
 in philosophy. Its fruits are socialism, 
 spiritism, rationalism, and pantheism. It 
 has produced men like St. Simon, Pierre 
 Leroux, the Pere Enfantin, Hegel and 
 Schelling, Lamartine, Victor Hugo, and 
 above them all Gioberti.
 
 108 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 We have to remark of Gioberti's 
 character as it appears in his writings, 
 that he was too violent in his denuncia- 
 tions, too exaggerated in his theories, 
 though we do not believe that his system 
 of metaphysics as given in his " Introduc- 
 tion to the Study of Philosophy " has ever 
 been satisfactorily refuted. Hence, while 
 we condemn him as a ruthless assailant 
 of the Jesuits, in the " Gesuita Moderno," 
 and in the Prolegomena to the " Primato 
 d'ltalia," we admire his genius and learn- 
 ing. His errors have been so great and 
 numerous that they cause every thing 
 from him to be suspected; " Tirneo Danaos 
 et dona ferentes." In fact, it must be ad- 
 mitted, that Gioberti has done much 
 harm to religion and to society. His 
 style is powerful and eloquent ; torrent- 
 like, it carries away the reader's -imagina- 
 tion, and hence, it has a special tendency 
 to exalt the minds of the young with 
 vague theories and ethereal systems. 
 
 The system of Gioberti has been well
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 109 
 
 translated into English in Brownson's 
 Quarterly Review. Gioberti makes the 
 immediate intuition of God, while Des 
 Cartes makes the soul the basis of his 
 system. Hence, Gioberti is a strong op- 
 ponent of Des Cartes, and ridicules him 
 at every step in his Introduzione. 
 Among other hard things, Gioberti says 
 this of the French philosopher : " Non 
 credo in tutti gli annalli del genere hu- 
 mano, se posse trovare un essempio di 
 temerita e di leggerezza simile a questo."* 
 
 Gioberti's system may be summed up 
 as follows: 
 
 The philosopher may start either from, 
 the subject or object. If he start from 
 the subject, he may either take realities 
 existing outside of our mind, or the re- 
 presentations in our mind as the ful- 
 crum of his system. Reason determines 
 the realities, and conscience or intimate 
 
 * " I do not believe that in all the annals of mankind, 
 you can find an example of rashness and levity similar 
 to those of this man, (Des Cartes.)"
 
 110 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 < 
 
 sense, determines the images. The ob- 
 ject of reason is the intelligible. Of con- 
 science the proper object is the sensible, 
 contained in the internal modifications of 
 the mind. The one is ontological, the 
 other psychological. "Ontology," says 
 Gioberti, "is as old as the world, and 
 may be found in the different systems of 
 philosophy, both pagan and Christian, up 
 to the days of that philosophical heretic, 
 Rene Des Cartes. It is the basis of Orien- 
 tal philosophy, from which it passed into 
 the school of the Pythagoricians, Eleatics, 
 and of Plato, among the Greeks. Onto- 
 logism was taught in the school of Alex- 
 andria, by the early Christian Fathers, 
 and by the Realists of the middle ages. 
 It is true that the Nominalists and Con- 
 ceptualists were somewhat opposed to it, 
 but it was especially Rene" Des Cartes who 
 broke the golden chain of ontologistic 
 tradition, by putting the internal sensible 
 instead of the objective intelligible. Gio- 
 berti puts the foundation of all philoso-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. Ill 
 
 pliy in the immediate vision of God, 
 which he calls the ideal vision, " Visione 
 Ideale." All philosophy in this system 
 must start from the idea, the province of 
 philosophy being to work upon idea, and 
 evolve it by reflection. But the idea is 
 not a mere image or representation of the 
 object ; it is the object itself, and is called 
 being autonomastically. Creatures in the 
 system of Gioberti are called existences. 
 Being is, therefore, the " primum philoso- 
 pliicum" the principle and cause of all 
 things,* and hence the "primum psyclio- 
 logicum " and the "primum ontologicum " 
 are its effects, have their last reason in it. 
 Now, the intuition or vision of being 
 imparts an apodictic judgment in which 
 all evidence and certainty are based. 
 Gioberti explains this as follows: "The 
 
 * By the "primum psychologicum " is meant the first 
 idea, and by "primum ontologicum" the first thing. 
 But as the first idea and the first thing are the same in 
 the system of Gioberti, hence, being is the "primuin 
 philosophicum," the basis of all reality, and of all the 
 Tcnowable.
 
 112 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 idea of being contains this judgment 
 being is necessarily. In pronouncing 
 this, the mind is not a judge, but merely 
 a witness or hearer of a judgment which 
 does not go out of the mind itself. Being 
 proposes itself to the mind's eye, and 
 says, ' I am necessarily.' In this objective 
 affirmation we have the foundation of all 
 evidence and certitude." (Introduzione, 
 vol. ii. chap. 1.) 
 
 The first step that philosophy makes, 
 is to repeat this judgment by reflection. 
 Gioberti says, " The repetition of the ob- 
 jective and divine judgment, made by 
 means of reflection, is the first link in the 
 chain of philosophy." But in order to 
 make this repetition, we need speech or 
 language, which is the bridge or passage 
 in our mind from the direct to the reflex 
 state.* 
 
 We quote from Gioberti: "Between 
 the primitive divine judgment and the 
 
 * The nature of the direct and reflex state will be ex- 
 plained hereafter.
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 113 
 
 secondary human judgment, that is to 
 say, between intuition and reflection, 
 speech acts as the medium. It is by 
 means of language that intuitive truth 
 becomes accessible to reflection." The 
 necessity of speech arises from the neces- 
 sity of circumscribing the idea of being, 
 and of concentrating the mind to contem- 
 plate it in a limited form. In short, a 
 word is like a niche in which idea puts 
 itself to be apprehended by the mind. 
 The sum of all this is, that the mind 
 intues God as being, and all things in 
 Him. Hence, being is the foundation of 
 reflection, and consequently of all philo- 
 sophy. Gioberti speaks: "L'ente e in 
 effetto' il supremo criterio, e giudicatorio 
 del vero, il supremo assioma di tutto lo 
 scibile, perche' e 1' intelligibilita' e 1'evi- 
 denza stessa delle cose." 
 
 The intuition of God as being, gives us 
 only a knowledge of His attributes and 
 existence. But besides these conceptions, 
 we have others that regard creatures.
 
 IH CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 Whence came these? Gioberti replies 
 by the idea of creation, which is the 
 means of passing from God to finite exist- 
 ence. We intue God as real, not as 
 merely possible being. But, as it is a fact 
 that His being is always cause and crea- 
 tor, so, in the intuition of His being, we 
 also have His creating act and its effect. 
 Beholding God, we see the divine crea- 
 tion, and those things that receive exis- 
 tence by it. Hence, the ideal formula, 
 the foundation of the whole system : 
 Being creates existences, " Ens creat exis- 
 tentias." Gioberti thus speaks of his 
 ideal formula, "La vera formula ideale 
 suprema base di tutto lo scibile, de la 
 quale andavano intracia peno dunque 
 essere ensciata in questi termini, Tente 
 crealee estenze." (Vol. ii., cap. Intro.) In 
 this formula we have the three realities, 
 God, the world, and the creation. The 
 last is the bond between the first and the 
 second. Being is the first and centre 
 with regard to all realities. All other
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 115 
 
 ideas are, as it were, rays emanating from 
 being, as from the centre of a circle. All 
 conceptions, then, derived from this intui- 
 tion are divided into two classes. Abso- 
 lute, that regard only God or possible 
 beings, and contingent, which concern 
 only finite existences. But, although 
 being is only intelligible in itself as the 
 object of thought, there is a part of it 
 unintelligible, namely, essence ; and as 
 all the properties of this being come 
 from its essence, they can not be known 
 by conceptions derived from the idea of 
 being as the object of thought. Whence, 
 therefore, do they come ? How have we 
 these ideas ? 
 
 They are given at the same time with 
 the idea of being which precedes them 
 logically, but not chronologically. Hence, 
 the conceptions of eternity, immensity, 
 unity, infinity, etc., make what Gioberti 
 calls the synthesis of the infinite, and this 
 he calls a true revelation, "vera rivela- 
 zione."
 
 116 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 The same may be said of contingent 
 and relative conceptions, which are syn- 
 chronous in our mind with the idea of 
 contingent existences. They can not be 
 deduced from each other, since their prin- 
 ciple is unappreh ended by us. The root 
 of all these qualities is the essence of the 
 esistenza. But this essence is as unknown 
 to us as the essence of the ens. These 
 conceptions, then, come along with the 
 idea of being into our mind by intuition. 
 They, too, are revealed. Intuition is, 
 therefore, a natural revelation. Hence, 
 all our judgments are synthetical, a priori, 
 except the first, namely, being is. This syn- 
 thesis, however, is not subjective, as Kant 
 maintains, but objective, coming from the 
 revelation of being, whose essence is un- 
 known to us in this life. To sum up, 
 then, all our knowledge commences by 
 contemplating truth in itself; truth, centre 
 of all truths, truth, God. But, as we see 
 God concrete, not abstract, we see Him
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 117 
 
 acting by creation, and hence this ideal 
 formula, ens creat existentias. 
 
 Language enables iis to reflect, to 
 evolve this formula, and thus make philo- 
 sophy, which is the product of reflection. 
 But, as in the intuition of being, as well 
 as in the intuition of existence, the es- 
 sence is always invisible to intellectual 
 perception, it follows that all our judg- 
 ments are synthetical except this one : 
 " Being is necessarily." This is the first 
 in the order of judgments, and the only 
 one that is analytical. 
 
 We shall examine the arguments 
 brought for and against this system. It 
 is argued in favor of it, that psycholo- 
 gism, its opponent, begets scepticism and 
 pantheism. It is, indeed, a fact that mod- 
 ern Pantheism is not the child of ontolo- 
 gism. The German pantheists derive 
 their system from Kant, and Kant was a 
 psychologist. Indeed, if we deny that 
 the mind immediately perceives objective 
 reality, how shall we bridge the chasm
 
 118 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 between the subjective and objective or- 
 ders? How shall we avoid scepticism, 
 which consists precisely in a certain inca- 
 pacity of man's mind to pass from the 
 subject to the object \ We have hinted 
 at this impossibility in our refutation of 
 the system of St. Thomas and of Reid. 
 Again, the logical should be the same as 
 the ontological order. But in the onto- 
 logical order God holds the first place, 
 creation the second, and existence the 
 third. Hence, in the logical order, or or- 
 der of thought, God must be first. Be- 
 sides, unless we admit the immediate 
 vision of God we never can have an idea 
 of God. We should have to derive his 
 intelligibility from that of creatures. That 
 is, we should derive the' infinite from the 
 finite, as the psychologists absurdly do. 
 There is no doubt that we apprehend 
 God ideally, for we know what the word 
 God means. We distinguish the idea of 
 the infinite from every other idea. Now, 
 this idea can be contained in no other,
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 119 
 
 indeed it must precede all other ideas. 
 The idea of God is the idea of a being 
 supreme by essence, self-existing, and ne- 
 cessary ; a being in external operation 
 omnipotent. Now, what idea, except God 
 himself, can represent such a being to 
 our mind ? How could any other reality 
 represent such a being? For either the 
 reality that would represent it would 
 have the same properties as the object re- 
 presented or it would not. If the first be 
 asserted, then it would be God, for it 
 would have infinite attributes ; and if the 
 second be said, then we ask how could it 
 represent to us qualities that it does not 
 possess ? Therefore, God is apprehended 
 ideally in himself, and not in any repre- 
 sentative. Besides, we have shown that 
 the object of thought is neither possible 
 being in general, as Kosmini asserted, nor 
 representative being, as the Aristotelians 
 maintain ; therefore it must be. being it- 
 selfGod. 
 The adversaries of this system do not
 
 120 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 dispute its power to captivate the imagin- 
 ation and the heart. Indeed, no one can 
 deny its elevating influence on the mind, 
 for there is something ennobling in the 
 thought that the human intellect appre- 
 hends God, and nothing out of Him, that 
 He is the centre 'of all truth and science, 
 pervading all human knowledge. How 
 far removed is this system from grovel- 
 ing materialism and narrow-minded scep- 
 ticism ! All, then, admit the charms of 
 ontology. Indeed, these charms have at- 
 tracted some of the ablest and noblest 
 minds of modern times. But, while its 
 adversaries admit its brilliancy, they deny 
 its truth, and it is only right that we 
 should now examine the arguments 
 against it. 
 
 They say, in the first place, that this 
 system is refuted by the testimony of con- 
 science. Conscience should bear testi- 
 mony to all the phenomena of the mind, 
 and hence, if the intuition of God be an 
 internal fact, conscience must make us
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 121 
 
 certain of its existence. But we may in- 
 terrogate conscience forever on this point, 
 yet it will be mute. It knows nothing of 
 this ontolosrical vision, and hence it must 
 
 o / 
 
 be rejected as the offspring of a fervid 
 imagination, rather than the child of a 
 logical head. This difficulty, however, is 
 easily solved. For we deny that the in- 
 tellectual vision of God belongs to the 
 domain of conscience. Conscience tells 
 us of the subjective modifications of the 
 mind in the reflex state. But it neither 
 tells us all our ideas nor all the facts in 
 the mind. Nor can it enter the sanctu- 
 ary of the soul in its direct state. It can 
 not, especially, inform us of the presence 
 of the infinite in our souls. For if it 
 could, it would be infinite itself. The 
 soul would have an infinite modification. 
 It is reason that instructs us in the rfa- 
 ture of the soul's direct state, and proves 
 that we intue God's existence. When 
 man shall have attained his last end after 
 the reflex state of the soul has been fully
 
 122 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 developed, and made equal to the direct 
 state by man's becoming a participant of 
 the Divine nature, then conscience will 
 feel the presence of God in the mind. 
 But here below, nothing short of a mira- 
 cle can make us aware of God's presence 
 in us, either in the natural or supernatu- 
 ral order. Nor does the fact that con- 
 science tells us that the sensation of a 
 creature's presence, or that an oral term, 
 which is always finite, is always necessary 
 to evoke the idea of the infinite, prove 
 that we do not intue the infinite, or that 
 the idea of the infinite is not prior to that 
 of the finite in our mind. At most it 
 shows the simultaneousness of the two 
 ideas in our mind in the order of reflec- 
 tion a fact which we do not deny, since 
 the formula ens creat existential supposes 
 the three ideas of being, creation, and ex- 
 istences to be synchronologically in our 
 mind. This formula gives us the ideal 
 system in the direct state of the mind, as 
 well as the real order which the objects
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 123 
 
 liave to each other, the idea of being 
 coming first. But in the order of reflection, 
 since existences have two modes in which 
 they may be apprehended one as ideas 
 in the creative act, and in this way they 
 are perceived by God's intellect as well as 
 by 'ours ; the other as the causes or sensa- 
 tions, and in this way they are not ap- 
 prehended by the intellect but felt by 
 the senses it follows that there is a great 
 difference between ideal perception in the 
 direct state and in the order of reflection. 
 For while conscience has no part in the 
 one it comes into the second. For con- 
 science tells us about facts and never 
 about ideas, unless in connection with 
 facts. Hence, conscience plays the same 
 role with regard to spiritual perceptions 
 as the senses with regard to the apprehen- 
 sion of sensations. Just as the senses seem 
 to tell us that the sun turns around us 
 while the earth stands still, though it is 
 vice versa; so conscience seems to assert 
 that we only see creatures, while reason
 
 124 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 teaches us that we see God. As con- 
 science is the peculiar faculty which deals 
 with what we feel, it is finite ; for the pre- 
 dominating element in the order of reflec- 
 tion is the sensible, which is always finite. 
 The intelligible, or God, must be inclosed, 
 as it were, in a word, in order to be con- 
 templated. But here there seems to be 
 a contradiction. If the reflective act, be- 
 cause it is finite, can not perceive the intu- 
 ition of God in our souls, how is it that 
 reason, which is also finite in the intui- 
 tive act, apprehends the existence of God ? 
 The cases, however, are not similar. For 
 the object of conscience is especially the 
 finite, the sensible, the existing; while 
 the object of reason is especially the in- 
 finite, the invisible, and the possible. 
 How finite reason can intue an infinite 
 object is a natural mystery included in 
 the mystery of creation. We know it is 
 a fact, without knowing its manner of ex- 
 isting ; and, on the other hand, we know it 
 is a fact that reflection or conscience does
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 125 
 
 not apprehend the infinite. And an in- 
 ference drawn from the first case to the 
 second would not be allowable. Yet, 
 even in the reflective order, conscience 
 seems to have some perception of the in- 
 finite. It knows what that idea is; we dis- 
 tinguish it from other ideas. And have 
 we not often felt, when under the influ- 
 ence of some great passion, when behold- 
 ing some vast prospect or moved by some 
 great idea, as if the infinite touched our 
 minds and warmed our hearts ? Just as 
 saints have often felt the movements of 
 grace or inspiration in the supernatural 
 order. Have we not something in our con- 
 science which tells us of the infinite abid- 
 ing in our minds in a manner somewhat 
 similar to that mysterious sentiment called 
 by Gioberti the " faculty of super-intelli- 
 gence," which in every natural man seems 
 to admonish him of the existence of the 
 supernatural ? It is hardly correct, then, 
 to say that conscience is entirely mute 
 with regard to our ideal perceptions of 
 the infinite.
 
 126 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 But it will be objected against this sys- 
 tem, that in the order of reflection it de- 
 stroys the idea of the infinite. For how 
 can we have this idea except by means of 
 language ? But this infinite wrapped up 
 in a word is not the infinite; for it is 
 limited and circumscribed by its "in- 
 volucrum," and hence, in the order of re- 
 flection, we can not have an idea of the 
 infinite. Hence the ontologists are in 
 the same condition as the partisans of the 
 other systems which we have been re- 
 futing. 
 
 But we answer, that, in the order of 
 reflection, we have not the idea of the in- 
 finite in its perfection or in its integrity. 
 We see it obscurely, as the eye sees the 
 sun partially hidden by the clouds. What 
 we see in the word is but a ray emanat- 
 ing from it. Conscience becomes aware 
 of its presence in the mind by the sensi- 
 ble form or sign, while the intellect is en- 
 lightened by this ray of light from God, 
 and mounts by its aid right to the centre 
 from which it has gone forth. We proved
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 127 
 
 by reason that in the direct state of our 
 soul there must be the idea of the infinite 
 in its integrity ; but in the order of reflec- 
 tion our intellect can not grasp the whole 
 of this idea at the same .time. Every 
 man's intellect is illuminated by the in- 
 finite. But no human intellect in this 
 life is able to bear the full blaze of infi- 
 nite majesty. As the rays of the sun 
 coming into a darkened chamber give 
 light to the objects in it, and are connect- 
 ed with the sun itself and emanate direct- 
 ly from it, so that we may say it is the 
 sun that dispels the darkness; so it is 
 with God's intellectual light beaming on 
 the human intellect and enlightening 
 every man that comes into the world. 
 
 Another great objection against this 
 system is, that it tends to pantheism. In 
 this regard the example of Gioberti is 
 cited, who, toward the end of his career, 
 is said to have become a pantheist, and 
 to have written a letter to Young Italy, 
 in which the following expression occurs :
 
 128 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 " I hold that pantheism is the only true 
 and solid philosophy." The authenticity 
 of this letter, however, has never been 
 sufficiently proved. It is probably a for- 
 gery of the Mazzinian faction. But as a 
 special dissertation will be given by us 
 on pantheism in another part of the trea- 
 tise, and as we shall then see that onto- 
 logism alone satisfactorily refutes that 
 error in its various forms, we need now 
 say no more of this difficulty. 
 
 It is also objected against Gioberti's 
 system, that it is not necessary that there 
 should be an identity of relation between 
 the logical and ontological order. Let 
 us, then, show the truth of this assertion. 
 The ontological order is the order of 
 things as they are ; the logical order is the 
 order of things as they are apprehended 
 by the mind. Now, in the first place, 
 there is no reason why the mind should 
 not apprehend things as they are, and 
 hence there is no reason why the logical 
 and ontological order should not be the
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 129 
 
 same. In the second place, there is a rea- 
 son why they should be the same. For 
 if the logical order be not the same as the 
 ontological, the mind will not apprehend 
 things as they are ; and if it does not ap- 
 prehend them as they are, it will not ap- 
 prehend them truly, and it will not ap- 
 prehend truths which would be contrary 
 to the nature of the mind. There is truth 
 in our mind subjectively considered be- 
 cause there is conformity with the object ; 
 and where this conformity does not exist, 
 there is error. Now, in the ontological 
 order, God is first and creatures second. 
 Hence, in the logical order, the mind must 
 apprehend God first and creatures second. 
 For if it apprehended creature first and 
 God second, it would not apprehend 
 things as they are, it would not apprehend 
 truth. Hence, however much we may 
 condemn Gioberti personally, we can not 
 help admitting his philosophical system.
 
 QUESTION EIGHTH. 
 
 DOES THE INTELLECT APPREHEND CONTIN- 
 GENT FACTS? 
 
 IE have thus far seen that the 
 idea of God is intelligible in 
 
 O 
 
 itself. Let us see if creatures 
 be intelligible in themselves. In other 
 words, does the rnind apprehend the indi- 
 vidual in itself? To this St. Thomas an- 
 swers, " -ZV0." For he denies that mate- 
 rial individuals are intelligible in them- 
 selves. We are glad, then, to be able to 
 join hands with the disciples of the An- 
 gelic Doctor in establishing the opinion, 
 that finite or contingent facts are not the 
 object of thought. Those who defend 
 the intelligibility of finite or contingent 
 facts might do so either by maintaining 
 that nothing but the contingent or finite
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 131 
 
 facts are apprehended by the mind, or 
 that they are perceived together with the 
 infinite and their types or possibilities. 
 But neither of these hypotheses can be 
 maintained. In order that the object of 
 thought should be wholly in the contin- 
 gent, two conditions must be fulfilled. 
 Firstly, that the contingent should be 
 capable of immediately terminating, our 
 thoughts. Secondly, it should include in 
 itself whatever we apprehend by thought. 
 But the contingent fulfills neither of these 
 two conditions. It does not terminate 
 the mind by itself, because it is con- 
 tingent, and being contingent, it must 
 have a cause prior to itself, and therefore 
 the idea of cause goes before it, and is 
 the condition sine qua non of its appre- 
 hension. 
 
 Nor do contingent facts include in 
 themselves every thing we apprehend by 
 thought. For beside the contingent, we 
 have an idea of the necessary, and beside 
 the finite we have an idea of the infinite.
 
 132 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 Now, neither the infinite nor the necessa- 
 ry can be contained in the finite and con- 
 tingent. Hence the finite and contingent 
 can not be said to be the only object ap- 
 prehended by the mind. 
 
 The hypothesis that the objectivity of 
 ideas is partially made up of contingent 
 facts is equally absurd. For that can be 
 in no sense the object of thought which 
 can not at all terminate our intellect. 
 But such are contingent beings, whose 
 existence, indeed, we can feel by means 
 of sensations, but never apprehend as 
 ideas. For they have no essential con- 
 nection with our perceptions. The ob- 
 ject of thought is essential to every per- 
 ception, and if there be any object which 
 we can perceive as unnecessary to intel- 
 lectual perception, it is no longer the ob- 
 ject of thought. But every finite exist- 
 ence may be conceived .as not existing, 
 and we can conceive God as producing 
 all the impressions made on our minds 
 by physical existences, even though they
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 133 
 
 did not exist ; lience their existence has no 
 essential connection with our perception. 
 In fact, if this connection between the 
 finite object of our perception existed, it 
 would either exist always, so that we 
 could think of no creature which would 
 not be at the same time existing ; or 
 this connection would only exist in 
 certain circumstances that is to say, in 
 what we call external perceptions. But 
 this connection between our perception 
 and the finite object exists in neither of 
 these two cases. To show the first, we 
 have only to cite the case of a dreamer or 
 madman, who may have many finite ideas, 
 or rather sensations of the finite, without 
 their having any connection with existing 
 finite realities ; and to show the second, 
 we have only to say that circumstances 
 can not change the essence of any thing, 
 and hence if the connection between the 
 perception and finite existence be some- 
 times wanting, the finite can not be intel- 
 ligible in itself, nor in any sense be the
 
 134: CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 object of thought. Hence, finite or con- 
 tingent facts are not intelligible in them- 
 selves or as individuals, but only in their 
 types or species, which are in God. In 
 themselves, however, they are felt ; we 
 become certain of their existence by means 
 of sensations. All ideas are therefore dif- 
 ferent aspects of the divinity viewed by 
 the intellect, and hence they constitute 
 the intelligible part of thought, the ob- 
 ject of our intellectual perceptions. But 
 ideas, perceptions, sensations, and facts 
 have a real relation to each other; for 
 every idea implies a possible fact, and 
 every fact implies a real idea, for facts 
 are but the individualization or actuation 
 of ideas. And all sensations are the sub- 
 jective modifications of the mind produced 
 by facts, and they give us the sensible 
 elements of thought. By ideas we arrive 
 at the knowledge of the existence of God 
 and of the possibility of creation, and by 
 sensations we are made certain of the fact
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 135 
 
 of our own existence and of the existence 
 of other created things. 
 
 But it may be asked, if contingent facts 
 are not apprehended by the intellect as 
 ideas, how can it be certain of their exist- 
 ence ? Since the intellect is the seat of 
 certitude, every thing that is certain must 
 have a relation to it. To this question 
 we answer, that contingent facts have a 
 relation to the intellect, though they be 
 not apprehended by it in themselves. 
 All the faculties of the mind are connect- 
 ed; for the mind is a simple substance, 
 and hence nothing can affect one of these 
 faculties without affecting at the same 
 time all the others. Yet the modifica- 
 tions and the acts of one faculty have not 
 the same relations to all the other facul- 
 ties, for each faculty has its peculiarities 
 and its idiosyncrasies. Hence the will 
 can not be separated from the intellect, 
 nor the intellect from the will, etc., though 
 the acts of the will are not formally the 
 same as the acts of the intellect, and the
 
 136 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 same may be said of the acts of the im- 
 agination and the memory. Hence sen- 
 sations by which we become certain of 
 the existence of the finite or contingent 
 facts have relation with the intellect ; but 
 the manner in which sense acts upon the 
 reason, as well as 'the manner in which 
 one faculty relates to another, is a psycho- 
 logical mystery impervious to reason. 
 Mysteries of this kind are common in 
 every order. In fact, the last reason of 
 every thing is a mystery. We know, 
 with regard to finite or contingent facts, 
 that our senses apprehend tfcem, and we 
 feel an invincible propensity in our na- 
 ture to believe the testimony of those 
 senses. This propensity is called common- 
 sense, the second in the order of the 
 motives of certitude, evidence being the 
 first. Now, evidence is peculiarly the 
 certitude of pure intellect, and hence, just 
 as common-sense, the principal element of 
 which is sensation or the sensible of 
 thought, is based upon evidence, the
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 137 
 
 principal element of which is idea or the 
 intelligible of thought ; so sensation de- 
 pends upon idea or reason, which is pro- 
 perly the mistress of the mind, whom all 
 the other faculties must obey. Hence we 
 see that the intellect may be certain of 
 the existence of finite or contingent facts, 
 though it does not apprehend them ide- 
 ally.
 
 QUESTION NINTH. 
 
 WHAT IS MEANT BY THE HISTORY AND SOLU- 
 TION OF THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING 
 THE UNIVERSALS? 
 
 (IND, species, difference, property, 
 (proprium,) and accident, are 
 called the universals. It is 
 certain tliat the ideas suggested by those 
 words are distinct from the idea of indi- 
 vidualities. Thus, when I think of man, 
 the object which I represent to myself is 
 not any particular individual, as James 
 or John, but something which is common 
 to all of those individuals, and conse- 
 quently belongs to none of them exclu- 
 sively. The question for us to treat is, 
 are those five universals mere names, or 
 do they indicate realities ? This question
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 139 
 
 gave rise to many quarrels in the middle 
 ages, when intellectual tilts were almost 
 as common and as esteemed as knightly 
 tournaments. 
 
 There were three great schools holding 
 different opinions with regard to the na- 
 ture of universals. These were called 
 the Nominalists, the Conceptualists, and 
 the Realists. Roscelin, a French canon of 
 the eleventh centuiy, denied the objec- 
 tive reality of the universals. According 
 to him, a universal was but a name, a 
 word indicative of no reality, but used 
 to designate a collection of individuals. 
 Hence his system was called Nomi- 
 nalism. He acknowledged no reality 
 but that of individuals. 
 
 The second system was called Concep- 
 tualism, invented in the twelfth century 
 by Abelard. According to him, univer- 
 sal ideas are not mere names or empty 
 sounds, nor yet objective realities. But 
 they are intellectual conceptions mental 
 realities which our intellect forms by
 
 140 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 means of abstraction that is to say, "by 
 noting the difference and comparing the 
 relations between individuals. But this 
 system differs from Nominalism only in 
 name. For when the Nominalists say 
 that the universals are mere sounds, they 
 do not suppose that the mind does not 
 understand their sense. But as the mind 
 can not understand the sense of any thing 
 without having a conception of it, the 
 Nominalists must admit the universals 
 to be conceptions of the mind. In fact 
 the difficulty between the Nominalists 
 and the Realists does not lie in this 
 point, but in the objectivity to be given 
 to the universals, outside of the mind. 
 Therefore Nominalism and Conceptualism 
 agree in substance. 
 
 Realism is directly opposed to Nomin- 
 alism. It maintains that universals have 
 a real objectivity " a parte rei" The 
 principal defenders of this system were 
 St. Anselm in the eleventh century, 
 William Champeaux in the twelfth, and
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 141 
 
 Scotus in the fourteenth. All the Real- 
 ists agree in one point, namely, that the 
 universals have reality, but they disagree 
 in explaining its nature. Some say, with 
 the Nominalists, that there is no reality 
 which is not an individual. Yet they 
 admit a kind of reality for the universals. 
 They say that there are many respects 
 in which each . individual might be con- 
 sidered. For instance, in the essence of 
 each individual we find something which 
 makes it similar to others of its species, 
 and something which makes it unlike all 
 other individuals. The former property 
 they called its species, and the latter its 
 difference. The difference is indivisible, 
 
 *v ' 
 
 but the species is by nature multiple, for 
 it may be found in several individuals, 
 and hence it is called a universal. To 
 illustrate this, let us take a scholastic 
 example: Socratitas, in Socrates, indi- 
 cates the individual Socrates. But liu* 
 manitas designates something which 
 Socrates has in common with all men ,
 
 142 CUBIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 and hence it is the universal or species, 
 while the other is the individual. Other 
 Realists consider universals as realities 
 entirely distinct from individuals, so that, 
 for instance, though no human individual 
 should exist, still Jiumanitas would have 
 its reality. But these Realists disagree 
 .again upon the nature of this reality, as 
 well as with regard to the manner in 
 which individuals are distinguished from 
 the species as well as from each other. 
 
 Some make the reality of the univer- 
 sals a distinct, uncreated, and independ- 
 ent existence r and they interpret Plato's 
 theory of ideas in this sense. Others, in 
 giving them a distinct existence, say they 
 were created by God ; while others again 
 identify the universals with the eternal 
 archetypes of things contained in the 
 essence of God, which is creation's model. 
 There are also several opinions as to 
 what constitutes and distinguishes in- 
 dividuals. According to some, Individ- 
 
 O ' 
 
 uality is but a mere accident, which, being
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 143 
 
 added to the universal, constitutes the in- 
 dividual. 
 
 Others, with Scotus, admit a universal 
 reality found in all individuals, and called 
 JiCGCceitas, which distinguishes one indi- 
 vidual from another, as well as from the 
 species. Having thus explained the dif- 
 ferent systems regarding the nature of 
 universals, we shall now examine doc- 
 trinally the three following questions: 
 Firstly : Are the universals objective 
 realities, or mere conceptions of the 
 mind ? Secondly : Are they distinct 
 from mere individuals and independent 
 of them in their being ? Thirdly : What 
 is their nature ? In answer to the first 
 question we assert that universals are 
 objective realities. In order to prove this 
 assertion, three things are necessary to be 
 made evident, namely, Firstly : That we can 
 have no intellectual conception which has 
 not an object. Secondly: That we can 
 have an intellectual conception of the 
 universals. Thirdly: That this concep-
 
 144 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 tion has its foundation only in objective 
 reality. That there can be no thought 
 in our mind which does not imply an 
 object is a principle included in the 
 very nature of intellectual conception, as 
 we have already shown. Besides, 'there 
 is no necessity of proving what is ad- 
 mitted by our adversaries, who do not 
 deny that conceptions imply an object, 
 but deny that this object is a universal 
 reality. 
 
 As to the question whether we have 
 a conception of the universals or not, 
 Abelard himself, as well as the Nominal- 
 ists, admits that we think of kinds and 
 species, and hence we have ideas of them. 
 Finally, that the reality of the universals 
 is objective and self-existing can Be easily 
 proved ; for in this respect nothing can 
 exist in itself but universals and individ- 
 uals. Now if it be denied that the uni- 
 versals have realities in themselves, their 
 realities must be taken from individuals 
 by means of mental abstraction. In fact,
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 145 
 
 this is what the Nominalists and Concep- 
 tualists assert. But this can not be 
 said ; for then it would follow that we 
 should have an idea of the individual 
 before that of the species to which it 
 belongs. Yet in order to conceive an 
 individual as such, it is necessary that 
 we should conceive it by that note or 
 characteristic which makes it an indi- 
 vidual of such a nature, rather than of 
 such another ; that is to say, with the 
 scholastics, the " Quidditas rei" Thus, 
 before we conceive the individual Peter, 
 it is first necessary that we should have 
 the idea of man the species of which he 
 is a member. For if we have not the 
 idea of man, we could not assert that he 
 was such or such a man. But this quid- 
 dity or essence is the universal or species, 
 which may be participable by an in- 
 definite number of individuals. There- 
 fore we have the idea of the universal 
 before we conceive the idea of the indi- 
 vidual. But even if we admit the priority
 
 146 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 of the conception of the individual to that 
 of the species, still the hypothesis of our 
 adversaries would not hold good. For in 
 order that the mind should obtain one 
 idea from -another by means of mental 
 abstraction, it is necessary that the latter 
 should have a greater extension than the 
 former ; for the greater can not be con- 
 tained in the less. But the universal is 
 greater than the individual, and there- 
 fore the universal can not be derived 
 from the individual by any kind of 
 abstraction. And hence the universals are 
 objective realities. 
 
 Are the universals constituted in. their 
 realities independent of individuals ? 
 We answer affirmatively. If not, we 
 should have to say, with a certain class 
 of Realists, that they are nothing else 
 than those properties which are possessed 
 in common by several individuals. But 
 this assertion can by no means be main- 
 tained. For it makes the individual 
 contain the universal. The uuiversr.l
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 147 
 
 would be an integral part of the indi- 
 vidual, and concur in its formation. But 
 as the individual can contain nothing 
 which is not individual without losing 
 its nature, we can not suppose it to 
 contain the universal without becoming 
 a universal instead of an individual. 
 Besides, when our adversaries say that 
 the universal is part of the individual, 
 they must mean either that the universal 
 is a reality, found the same in all in- 
 dividuals, or in the relation of simili- 
 tude among individuals by means of dif- 
 ferent aspects, which make them similar 
 without being identical. 
 
 But in neither sense can the universals 
 be said to be in the individuals. For in 
 the first case the universal should pertain 
 no more to one individual than to an- 
 other, and hence no individual could 
 claim the universal, and therefore the 
 universal would be independent of indi- 
 viduals for its reality. For instance, let 
 us suppose that humanity is identical in
 
 148 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 two individuals, A and B. Since the 
 individuality is that which constitutes A 
 distinct from B, humanity must be dis- 
 tinguished from the individuality of each. 
 But in this*case individuality can be con- 
 ceived only as an accident which may 
 affect the same essence differently ; and 
 humanity, which is the universal, will be 
 independent in its reality of all indi- 
 viduals. Nor can it be said that uni- 
 versals are contained in the individ- 
 uals in the second manner; for several 
 individuals can not be similar to each 
 other in any respect, witliout being in 
 that respect, individualizations of the 
 same universal distinct from each of them. 
 Thus, I can not say that A and B are 
 similar in any respect to humanity, with- 
 out conceiving a certain archetype, of 
 which each of them is an exact copy, and 
 yet from which each of them is distinct. 
 Arid hence the universals are in no sense 
 either constitutive or accidental parts of 
 individuals.
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 149 
 
 Besides, universals are absolute and 
 necessary, while individuals are relative 
 and contingent. But the absolute and 
 necessary do not depend upon the con- 
 tingent for their reality, sinfce the abso- 
 lute and necessary would have their 
 reality although neither relative nor con- 
 tingent should exist. However, though 
 the universals do not depend upon indi- 
 viduals for their reality, they nevertheless 
 always imply at least possible individuals. 
 For two things may be considered in 
 them, namely, either the degree of 
 being which makes them perceptible to 
 the mind ; or their participability by an 
 indefinite number of individuals. Only 
 in this latter respect are they called uni- 
 versals. Thus, the universal humanity is 
 conceived as participable by an indefinite 
 number of individual men ; hence the 
 conception of the universal always im- 
 plies the conception of the individual. 
 All that we maintain is, that universals 
 would be real if there never were any
 
 150 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 individuals; so that the reality of the 
 universal does not depend on the indi- 
 vidual; though the universal and indi- 
 vidual, being correlative terms, can never 
 be conceived one without the other. 
 
 We assert, in the third place, that uni- 
 versals, considered in themselves, are 
 nothing else than the archetypes of all 
 things, contained from all eternity in the 
 essence of God. In order to prove this, 
 three facts must be established. Firstly, 
 that archetypes of things must be admit- 
 ted in God ; secondly, that those arche- 
 types fulfill the conditions necessary to 
 make them identical with the universals ; 
 thirdly, that nothing else can fulfill those 
 conditions. In the first place, the arche- 
 types of things are in God ; for God must 
 have a knowledge of possible things, and 
 this knowledge must be terminated by 
 reality. Moreover, as this knowledge is 
 essential and necessary, the reality which 
 terminates must have the same qualities, 
 and must exist in God; otherwise a
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 151 
 
 necessary reality could exist outside of 
 God, which is absurd. 
 
 Secondly, those archetypes fulfill the 
 conditions necessary to make them iden- 
 tical with the universals ; for these con- 
 ditions are three, namely, the archetypes 
 must be something real ; must be consti- 
 tuted independently of individuals ; and 
 participable by an indefinite number of 
 individuals. But they are real since they 
 are the object of the divine knowledge, 
 and the term of the divine intellect must 
 be a reality. They are constituted inde- 
 pendently of individuals, for the arche- 
 types of things would exist even if no 
 individuals were ever created. This fact 
 is implied in their conception. Thirdly 
 and lastly, they are conceived as partici- 
 pable by an indefinite number of indi- 
 viduals ; for they are the common exem- 
 plars which God imitates in the produc- 
 tion of individuals, and they are conceived 
 as inexhaustible. 
 
 Thirdly, nothing else but these arche-
 
 152 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 types can fulfill those conditions; for if 
 there be given such reality, it must bo 
 either uncreated and necessary according 
 to Plato's theory, and distinct from God ; 
 or it should be a created reality. But 
 there can be no such thing as an uncreated 
 reality distinct from God ; and if we make 
 this supposed reality a creature, it must 
 be identified with contingent individuals ; 
 which is absurd, as we have already 
 shown. Hence universals are nothing 
 else but the archetypes of things in the 
 essence of God.
 
 
 
 QUESTION TENTH. 
 
 1HE soul is said to be in the re- 
 flex state when it can analyze 
 thoughts and distinguish ob- 
 jects from each other. Our soul is now 
 in that state. But we know that this is 
 not its primitive state. We know that 
 we have come to this state successively, 
 acquiring knowledge bit by bit. The 
 further we go toward our childhood, the 
 less we find in it of our knowledge ; and 
 we finally arrive at a period where our 
 knowledge seems to begin, beyond which 
 we can remember nothing. Besides, we 
 know from experience that our knowledge 
 has been obtained by the influence which
 
 154 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 external objects have exerted on our mind 
 and by education. Hence, we conclude 
 that the actual state of our mind is not 
 primitive; is not that which was from 
 the beginning, for we are certain that our 
 mind existed before the existence of mem- 
 ory. What then was the state of the 
 mind before the reflex state? We call 
 this primitive state of the mind the direct 
 state. As to its nature philosophers dis- 
 agree. Some say the mind before reflec- 
 tion was a blank, something like a clean 
 slab of marble without mark or letter, on 
 which external objects inscribed their 
 names one after the other. In short, the 
 mind was a " tabula rasa." 
 
 But we reject this materialistic opinion. 
 For the mind was never a blank. It is 
 essentially a thinking substance. It has 
 now the power of thought, and this power 
 constitutes its essence. And as the es- 
 sence of being is unchangeable, the mind 
 always possessed the power of thought 
 even in its primitive state. But as the
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 155 
 
 power in this case essentially implies the 
 act, the mind actually thinks, and has 
 ever actually thought. Thought, there- 
 fore, has ever been in the mind, and hence 
 the mind has never been a blank. 
 
 Another school admits that the mind 
 had thought in this primitive state, but 
 denies that this thought had any other 
 element than a sensible one. But this 
 too we must reject; for as the essence of 
 thought never varies, and as this essence 
 implies an intelligible as well as a sensible 
 element, the hypothesis of the merely sen- 
 sible thought must be rejected. 
 
 In what way then was thought in the 
 mind in the direct state? We answer 
 it was there in synthesis. Experience 
 teaches us that we arrive at distinct no- 
 tions by analyzing the elements of some 
 object which at first presented itself to us 
 synthetically, and yet by this analysis we 
 do not acquire new but distinct know- 
 ledge. Thus, a man looking at a vast 
 landscape apprehends the whole view at
 
 156 CtJKIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 once. He seizes it, as it were, in syn- 
 thesis. But it is only by analyzing it 
 that he acquires a distinct perception of 
 its natural phenomena. Yet he acquires 
 no really new knowledge by this analysis. 
 Again, when a professor of mathematics 
 defines a circle to the tyro in geometry, 
 the student apprehends all its properties 
 in the synthesis of the definition. He 
 may afterward analyze these properties 
 and acquire greater distinctness of know- 
 ledge. Yet he has acquired nothing pos- 
 itively new, since all is contained in the 
 definition. 
 
 In this primitive state, therefore, the 
 ideal formula, u Ens creat existentias," is 
 in the mind synthetically, and, as we ad-' 
 vance in years, by analyzing this syn- 
 thesis we obtain reflex knowledge. In 
 this first state the intellect has the simple 
 intuition of God. The will was a pure ad- 
 hesion to good. The mind in this period 
 of its existence is in a state of involution ; 
 it gradually evolves its faculties. It con-
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTION'S. 157 
 
 tinues to evolve them through life, and 
 happiness for the soul consists in the per- 
 fect evolution of all its faculties. So that 
 the happiness of the soul may be philo- 
 sophically defined to be the complete evo- 
 lution of the synthesis of the direct state. 
 This hypothesis is very simple, and might 
 be received. It implies no repugnances ; 
 there is nothing absurd in it ; besides, it 
 explains perfectly the soul's nature at the 
 same time that it preserves its dignity 
 better than other systems. It is, more- 
 over, in accordance with analogy ; for cer- 
 tainly experience teaches us that the soul 
 evolves its faculties and acquires greater 
 knowledge with its years; and it seems 
 to be a law of nature that all created 
 things should thus evolve their latent en- 
 ergies. The germ contains the plant. 
 The oak has its direct state in the acorn, 
 and as things can not change their essence 
 
 o o 
 
 without losing their identity, we can not 
 admit any system which would add in 
 the course of time an essential attribute
 
 158 CUBIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 to a being which it had not from the very 
 first instant of its creation. The essential 
 elements of thought have therefore been 
 ever in the mind ; and hence it does not 
 change its nature but only its manner of 
 existing when it passes from the direct 
 to the reflex state. '
 
 IUESTION -PLEYENTH. 
 ^ / 
 
 DOES GOD EXIST? 
 
 i| HE arguments which are derived 
 from the mere consideration of 
 our ideas, to prove the exist- 
 ence of God, are called metaphysical argu- 
 ments. They are three in number : In- 
 tuitive, Deductive a priori, and Deductive 
 a posteriori / they are the basis of all 
 other arguments which prove God's ex- 
 istence ; and they are the only arguments 
 that can not be disputed. We consider, 
 firstly, the Intuitive. We derive this 
 argument from the mere fact of our ap- 
 prehension of God without ratiocination. 
 From this mere fact of intuition we prove 
 the existence of God. We intue God 
 existing, and therefore we say He exists.
 
 160 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 This argument is the strongest on ac- 
 count of its clearness. We will explain. 
 In the first place, we have an idea of God ; 
 secondly, this idea is the idea of God ex- 
 isting; thirdly, our idea can not give us 
 God existing, if he does not exist. We 
 know that we have an idea of God, be- 
 cause we know what is meant by the word 
 God; we distinguish this from others. 
 Secondly, this idea is the idea of God ex- 
 isting. Existence is being in act; pos- 
 sibility is nothing in itself, but is some- 
 thing in the cause which brings the pos- 
 sibility into the state of act. Hence our 
 ideas are always realities; for, whether 
 they have for their object existing reality 
 or possible reality, the groundwork is 
 always something real. Now, the idea of 
 God is not the idea of a possibility, for 
 the idea of God is the idea of a simple 
 being, of supreme and infinite being. 
 But infinite, supreme, and simple being 
 exists in itself, and is not merely in the 
 order of potentiality ; for, granting for a
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. '161 
 
 moment that sucli being were possible in 
 another being, so that this other being 
 would be its (muse, this cause would exist, 
 and it would be this existing cause that 
 we would see in contemplating simple, in- 
 finite, and supreme being. Hence in any 
 case the idea of God would be the idea 
 of an existing reality. Thirdly, our ideas 
 can not give us God existing if He does 
 not exist ; for perception is intuition in- 
 tuition supposes something intued. Now 
 the object intued must be as it is seen to 
 be. Now as -our intuition in the case of 
 God, gives us God existing, God must 
 really exist, otherwise it would be false 
 that we have an idea of him. Therefore, 
 from the simple fact that we have an idea 
 of God, we lawfully conclude that God 
 exists. 
 
 From this argument we may learn the 
 difference between simple, infinite, and su- 
 preme being, and the ideas of finite being. 
 From the fact that we have the idea of 
 some finite being present to the mind, it
 
 162 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 follows that this being is possible ; but not 
 that it exists in itself, but that it exists in 
 the infinite being which isthe archetype 
 of all contingent being. But simple, su- 
 preme, and infinite being, or rather its 
 idea, can be contained in nothing else 
 than in itself; it has no archetype, and 
 hence it is conceived by itself, and exists 
 by the fact that it is conceived as exist- 
 ing. 
 
 SECOND ARGUMENT. 
 
 We have what is called deduction in 
 the demonstration of every judgment 
 when the two terms are shown by means 
 of a third to express identical or subor- 
 dinate notions. This deduction takes 
 place a priori, when the truth of the pre- 
 mises logically precedes, or at least does 
 not presuppose the truth of the con- 
 clusion. Since, therefore, besides the es- 
 sence of God, nothing can be conceived 
 which does not presuppose the truth that 
 God exists, the argument thus exposed 
 by us now consists in showing, from the
 
 CTJEIOUS QUESTIONS. 163 
 
 essence of God, that Ms existence must 
 "be included in his essence. Now, whether 
 we consider God's essence either as simple, 
 infinite, or supreme being, we must con- 
 clude that he exists. For what is exist- 
 ence ? It is a mode of being. But simple 
 being, that is, which is all being, being by 
 essence, and out of which there is no 
 being, must have all modes of being, 
 therefore, it must have the mode of exist- 
 ence ; for if it had not, it would be only 
 a partial being,* or an "ens seoundum 
 quid" which implies a contradiction in 
 terms. It would be saying that ens sim- 
 pliciter was at the same time only ens 
 secundum quid. Secondly, we conceive 
 God's essence as infinite, therefore he ex- 
 ists by essence, for existence is something 
 real and positive; it is a perfection; it 
 means more than its opposite possibility. 
 Hence a being without existence has noth- 
 ing positive in itself; but that which 
 has nothing positive, is limited in its 
 being, and hence is not infinite. Hence,
 
 164 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 though all being with existence is not in- 
 finite, infinite being must have existence. 
 Thirdly, God is the supreme being. But 
 the essence of the supreme being essen- 
 tially implies its existence ; for supreme 
 being expresses a mode of being which 
 places the being that possesses it above 
 all other beings, no matter what may be 
 their nature ; but a" being not existing 
 by essence is not supreme or above all 
 other beings ; hence supreme being must 
 have existence by its very nature and 
 essence. 
 
 THIRD ARGUMENT. 
 
 This argument proves the existence of 
 God from the idea of the essence of beings 
 distinct from God. The fact that God 
 exists is shown from premises in which it 
 is contained as the reason of their truth. 
 Thus we formulate it : That being exists, 
 without whose existence other beings 
 would neither exist, be possible, or even 
 intelligible. But such a being is God. 
 To prove it, it is only necessary to show
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 165 
 
 that the hypothesis is absurd which 
 would suppose beings conceived by us 
 as possessing existence, possibility, and 
 intelligibility, and, at the same time, not 
 possessing existence, possibility, or inteEi- 
 gibility ; such an hypothesis may be shown 
 to be absurd intuitively and deductively. 
 Intuitively, for by the fact that those 
 beings are apprehended by us, they must 
 have some reality outside of the mind 
 either in themselves or in a cause which 
 has the power of creating them, which is 
 their intelligible archetype, and which ren- 
 ders them apprehensible by the mind; 
 deductively, for, by the fact that those 
 beings are beings, they must be dis- 
 tinguished from nonentity, or nothing; 
 for it would imply a contradiction to say 
 that a being was at the same time being 
 and nonentity. But if those beings had 
 no existence, possibility, or intelligibility, 
 they would be nothing. Yet if God does 
 not exist, the above absurd hypothesis 
 would be true ; for without God's exist-
 
 166 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 ence no other being could exist. God is 
 simple, infinite, and supreme being ; other 
 beings are finite, partial, and subordinate. 
 But if simple, infinite, and supreme being 
 do not exist, how can the others exist, for 
 they are only participants of it ? They 
 would not be possible ; possibility means 
 existence in a cause which has the power 
 of reducing beings to act; but if this 
 cause do not exist, there is no producing 
 cause. Hence finite, subordinate, and 
 limited beings would not be possible ; 
 neither would they be intelligible with- 
 out the existence of God. Intelligibility 
 means the capacity of a being to be ap- 
 prehended by the mind, either in itself or 
 in another being. Now finite, subordinate, 
 and secundum quid beings are not in- 
 telligible in themselves, but in their 
 cause God. Hence, as we have shown 
 elsewhere, without the existence of God, 
 finite, subordinate, . and secundum quid 
 beings would be unintelligible, impossi- 
 ble, and could not exist.
 
 QUESTION TWELFTH. 
 
 IS GOD'S EXISTENCE IDENTIFIED WITH THE 
 EXISTENCE OF OTHER BEINGS? 
 
 1 HE great philosophical heresy of 
 the age is Pantheism. In every 
 nation in which it has grown 
 up 'in modern times it has produced the 
 wildest theories regarding religion, civil 
 government, and morality. Its effects are 
 manifested in the literature as well as in 
 the political revolutions of the age. It 
 has infected not only the minds of philo- 
 sophers, "but even of historians, poets, legis- 
 lators, statesmen, and even novelists. Its 
 theories have been propagated even among 
 the masses, and, actuated by its influence, 
 they have risen up in rebellion against all 
 law, human and divine. We assert facts
 
 168 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 which prove how false it is to assume that 
 merely speculative or metaphysical the- 
 ories exercise no influence over the minds 
 of men. Most of the philosophers of 
 Germany, as Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling 
 many in France, among others Victor 
 Cousin, were, or are, all pantheists. The 
 principal leaders of the revolution in 
 1848, and the ruling spirits of the present 
 movement in Italy ~ belong to the same 
 school. The fruits of pantheism have 
 been socialism, Fourierism, philanthrop- 
 ism, radicalism, and communism. As the 
 system of philosophy which we have thus 
 far been maintaining, has been charged 
 with pantheistic tendencies, we shall now 
 see that perhaps this modern error can be 
 better refuted from an ontologistic stand- 
 point than from any other. Besides the 
 essence of God there are other essences 
 which exist or may exist ; and the ques- 
 tion to be solved between the pantheists 
 and us, is, whether the existence of those 
 essences is identified with that of God or
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 169 
 
 not. The pantheists assert that God 
 alone exists, and that, as he is infinite, 
 nothing positive, no individual existence 
 is distinguished from his. It. is true we 
 have the ideas of the finite multiple and 
 of creation, which would imply terms dis- 
 tinct from the Creator. But these are 
 either illusions of the imagination, or in- 
 ternal evolutions and manifestations of 
 God himself, who, though always remain- 
 ing the -same, one, infinite, and uncreated, 
 limits, multiplies, and creates himself phe- 
 nomenally. This is the marrow of pan- 
 theism. 
 
 There are different schools of panthe- 
 ists; different ways of explaining their 
 system. The three great pantheistical 
 schools are called Emanatism, Formalism, 
 and Idealism. According to the first 
 system God existed as a complete and in- 
 dependent person when he desired to 
 manifest himself in creation. But crea- 
 tion is not a production of being out of 
 nothing, but a communication of the Ore-
 
 170 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 ator's being in a finite manner. By 
 means of this communication new indi- 
 viduals are begotten having distinct per- 
 sonal life in God. Their substance is the 
 substance of God which they possess in a 
 finite manner, while God has it in an in- 
 finite degree. 
 
 Hence, in the unity of the divine sub- 
 stance, there are several terms each of 
 which is constituted by a determinate 
 particle, and the divine substance is con- 
 scious of its existence in as many different 
 ways as there are terms of this character. 
 But this distinction of persons in God 
 will cease; for creatures will return to 
 their pristine unity by complete absorp- 
 tion in the divine personality. Creation 
 will return to its source in this way. 
 Therefore creation is like a stream going 
 out from the sea, but returning again to its 
 source after trarersing rarious regions. 
 It is in this manner that the humanitarian 
 school of pantheists explain the identifi- 
 cation of the world with God.
 
 CURIOUS QUESTION'S. 171 
 
 The second school of pantheists is that 
 of the formalists. This school does not 
 admit even a personal distinction between 
 God and other beings. God is not an in- 
 dividual being endowed either with the 
 faculty of understanding or of loving. He 
 is infinite, and for this reason can not be 
 a distinct individuality ; for every indi- 
 vidual is limited as such, and hence not 
 infinite. God is therefore a force every- 
 where diffused, and determined by no 
 limits. This force constitutes the reality 
 of all individuals conceived by us. But 
 in itself considered, independently of in- 
 dividuals, it is but a mere abstraction 
 without reality. Hence, the various cre- 
 ated beings, inasmuch as they partake of 
 this force, are identical. But they are at 
 the same time distinct from each other as 
 ideal forms or modifications which this 
 force is ever producing by an intrinsic 
 necessity of its nature. There are two 
 kinds of forms in which the divine being 
 manifests itself thought and extension.
 
 172 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 The first makes human minds and other 
 spiritual substances. The second con- 
 stitutes bodies. This is the sum of Spi- 
 noza's system. 
 
 "We see that the formalists do not 
 perfectly identify all things with God, 
 since they admit at least a formal dis- 
 tinction among beings. But the idealists, 
 in order to make all things perfectly 
 identical, deny this formal distinction. 
 They maintain that nothing exists in 
 reality either as forms or as individuals, 
 but that all ideas are mere abstractions, 
 or different modes in which being is suc- 
 cessively apprehended by us. Nothing 
 exists or can exist, though we have the idea 
 of being without any distinct form, unde- 
 termined, neither finite nor infinite, neith- 
 er matter nor spirit, neither one nor many. 
 Hence, this being is nothing in itself. 
 Hence, there is no created being, but 
 being is ever being created, no being is 
 in facto esse, but all is in rofari. Hence 
 all science consists in asserting that
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 173 
 
 nothing is. This system is called Ideal- 
 ism. 
 
 We shall now begin to refute those 
 systems, and we shall commence with 
 idealism, for a reason that will manifest 
 itself as we proceed. We must prove, 
 therefore, firstly, that real ideal distinc- 
 tions must be admitted in being, and, 
 consequently, that the universal identity 
 of idealism is false. Secondly, that these 
 distinct terms are not mere forms of the 
 same personality, but distinct persons or 
 individuals, and hence, that formalism is 
 wrong; and thirdly, that these distinct 
 individuals can not exist in the same sub- 
 stance, but that they imply a plurality 
 of substances and the consequent rejection 
 of emanatism. Thus we refute the three 
 systems inversely. 
 
 FIEST PKOPOSFTIOIS'. 
 
 Heal distinctions must lye admitted in 
 being objectively considered, and hence the 
 system of the idealists is refuted. To
 
 174 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 prove this assertion we have only to ob- 
 serve that if our intellect sees real distinc- 
 tions they must at least exist subjectively, 
 and so must have objective distinctions 
 corresponding to them. Now, it is clear 
 that there are such subjective distinctions. 
 The idealists themselves admit it, and be- 
 sides conscience informs us of the fact. 
 For there are real distinctions where there 
 are several terms so distinct from each 
 other that they can not be confounded 
 without contradiction. Many such terms 
 are found in the subjective order. In the 
 very fact of thought we have the subject 
 and object distinct, which we can not 
 identify without destroying the possi- 
 bility of a relation between them. Again, 
 the subject of thought has consciousness 
 of itself as a finite being, that is to say a 
 being which derives its existence from 
 another. But principle or cause of exist- 
 ence, and its term can not be confounded 
 without contradiction. Another proof 
 may be taken from the fact that the object
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 175 
 
 of thought is varied in term, in such a 
 way that one term by its very nature 
 prevents identity with another. Thus, 
 for instance, the terms finite and infinite, 
 or necessary and contingent. Hence, real 
 distinctions in being must be admitted at 
 least in the subjective order. We fur- 
 thermore assert that these subjective dis- 
 tinctions imply real objective distinctions ; 
 for objective being is that which termi- 
 nates our intellect or what our intellect 
 apprehends in thinking. Hence, things 
 must be objectively as we apprehend 
 them subjectively; otherwise the same 
 thing would be and would not be at the 
 same time. For if the real distinctions 
 which we conceive subjectively had no 
 corresponding objective reality, we should 
 be obliged to admit one of two hypothe- 
 ses either that what we conceive has no 
 reality out of our mind, and that it is con- 
 sequently identified with absolute noth- 
 ingness, or that it is the mere indetermi- 
 nate being which the idealists make it.
 
 176 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 But neither of these hypotheses can be 
 maintained. The first would lead us into 
 nihilism, than which nothing can be con- 
 ceived more absurd or contradictory. 
 And the second is equally absurd, for 
 either our mind apprehends things as 
 they are or it does not. If it apprehends 
 things as they are, they have all the real- 
 ity which we apprehend ; and if it does 
 not, we can affirm nothing of them, not 
 even indeterminate being, for every affirm- 
 ation has its foundation in the truth of 
 our mental apprehension. Besides, in- 
 determinate being is a mere abstraction 
 having no reality. For every thing that 
 exists is determined in some way or other. 
 The idealists, therefore, can not avoid 
 nihilism. They can not get out of it by 
 saying that there is a difference between 
 absolute nothing and " JSns in fieri" for 
 that which is nothing can not be possible 
 or in fieri. But it may be objected that 
 unless we admit the hypothesis of the 
 idealists we fall into a manifest contradic-
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 177 
 
 tion by supposing the object of the intel- 
 lect to be at the same time finite and in- 
 finite, contingent and necessaiy, material 
 and spiritual, relative and absolute. For 
 the object of thought presents itself to 
 our mind under these different aspects. 
 But we answer that those different ideas 
 do not present the same being formally 
 considered. The real object of thought 
 is infinite being, and presents itself to 
 us as possessing infinite attributes. But 
 with this idea of the infinite we perceive 
 the possible existence of other beings dis- 
 tinct in character and attributes from in- 
 finite being, yet dependent on it as their 
 cause and creator. Consequently the dif- 
 ficulty does not hold, and the system of 
 the idealists is refuted. 
 
 SECOOT) PKOPOSmON. 
 
 The real distinctions which must le ad- 
 mitted in objective being imply the possi- 
 bility or existence of beings distinct from 
 God, at least in their personal life, and
 
 178 CUBIC US QUESTIONS. 
 
 consequently, the personal identity of all 
 things in the sense of the formalists must 
 be rejected. Here we assert two things. 
 First, that God has personal life ; and 
 second, that there are other beings which 
 either actually or potentially do not be- 
 long to this personal life. To have 
 personal life three things are necessary, 
 namely, First, that there be a substance 
 in act. Second, that this substance be 
 not subject to another as to its term of 
 imputability. Third, that this same sub- 
 stance be conscious of its own power and 
 say " 7?' But God has these three quali- 
 ties. For, in the first place, he exists, 
 and is, consequently, a substance in act. 
 He does not depend on any other sub- 
 stance as the term of his imputability, 
 otherwise he would not be infinite or su- 
 preme being. And in the third place, he 
 has perfect consciousness of himself; for 
 that which is infinite must have an intel- 
 lect ; must be capable of being understood 
 and of bring loved; and as in infinite
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 179 
 
 being there is all good and all truth, 
 there must be consciousness of the posses- 
 sion of those perfections. Otherwise there 
 would be something wanting in the infi- 
 nite, and this we know can not be, for 
 that which is infinite has no defects. 
 Therefore in God there is personal life. 
 The second thing to prove is, that there 
 are beings actually or potentially existing, 
 yet not belonging to the personal life of 
 God. For we apprehend, both subject- 
 ively and objectively, finite beings as well 
 as the infinite. We are conscious of their 
 existence subjectively, for we are aware 
 that our existence is limited ; and object- 
 ively, we conceive the possibility of limi- 
 tation in being. Now, beings of this 
 kind can not be in the personal life of 
 God ; for if they were, their union with 
 this personal life could be explained only 
 in one of two ways. They would either 
 be constitutive parts of his life, so that 
 his life could not be conceived without 
 them, or God by a free act would unite
 
 180 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 them to his life, and make them partici- 
 pate in his nature. Now, the first mode 
 of existence is impossible. For according 
 to this hypothesis the idea of God would 
 necessarily be connected with the idea of 
 finite beings. Nor could we then con- 
 ceive God as absolutely distinct from 
 other beings. For a being can not be 
 conceived independent of its constitutive 
 parts. But God is complete in his es- 
 sence without relation to finite objects, 
 and his idea logically precedes the idea 
 of finite beings, and consequently these 
 finite beings can not be constitutive parts 
 of God's personal life. Besides, the per- 
 sonal life of God is infinite and can not 
 be made up of finite parts ; for that which 
 is made up of finite parts is limited, and 
 that which is limited is not infinite. As 
 to the second hypothesis, it is possible ; 
 indeed, we know by faith that such a 
 union actually does take place in the 
 mystery of the Incarnation. But such a 
 union is a gift. It is 'not something that
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 181 
 
 happens by the nature of things. It is 
 effected by a free act of the Infinite. 
 
 But it may be said by the formalists 
 that finite beings pertain to the personal 
 life of God as forms or determinations or 
 mere manifestations of this life. 
 
 This, however, is equally objectionable ; 
 for, by the fact that they are conceived 
 as distinct beings, they are distinct indi- 
 viduals, and have distinct personal life 
 of their own. Now, that which has 
 personal life of its own can not be a mere 
 form, determination, or manifestation of 
 the personal life of another ; consequently 
 the proposition as it has been enunciated 
 is true in every particular. 
 
 THIRD PROPOSITION. 
 
 Beings distinct from God in tlieir per- 
 sonal life must be distinct from him in 
 
 / / 
 
 substance, and hence the substantial 
 identity of the emanatists must be re- 
 jected. 
 
 The difference between substance and
 
 182 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 person is that the former is the support 
 of the latter. Personal life is the act 
 of determination of a substance conscious 
 of itself, and whose acts are not impu- 
 table to another. And substance is the 
 very force which is put in act, or rather 
 whose act is constituted by the peculiar 
 determination called personal life. We 
 shall, therefore, prove our assertion if we 
 show that the same active force which 
 is the subject of the infinite act, which 
 constitutes God's personal life, can not 
 be at the same time the subject of the 
 finite acts which constitute the personal 
 life of beincrs distinct from God. For 
 
 o 
 
 the contraiy of this assertion could only 
 happen in one of two ways either by 
 the division of this infinite force, or by 
 its undivided co-possession. In the first 
 case, the substances of the beings dis- 
 tinct from the divine act would be so 
 many parts of the active force which con- 
 stitutes the personal life of God. These 
 parts would be contained at first indis-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 183 
 
 tinctly in the infinite force, so that they 
 would form only one substance ; and the 
 production of finite beings would consist 
 in God's taking away one or more of 
 these parts, by a division of his substance, 
 from his own act, and giving it a new 
 determination, and, consequently, distinct 
 life. Thus, as the emanatists say, crea- 
 tures would come from God like the 
 web from a spider, or the thread from a 
 silkworm. In the other way, that is to 
 say by co-possession, the divine substance 
 remaining undivided, would be at the 
 same time the substance of finite beings. 
 In this case, to have other beings created, 
 nothing is required but the production of 
 new determinations in the active force 
 which makes the personal life of God. 
 By means of these determinations the 
 substance of God, at the same time that 
 it retains its own act, is terminated by 
 other acts, and as it were co-possessed. 
 Hence in creation something would hap- 
 pen similar to what takes place eternally
 
 184 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 in God, where the undivided substance of 
 the deity is co-possessed by three distinct 
 persons. But neither of these two modes 
 of explaining the system of the emana- 
 tists can stand the test of truth. For 
 the first mode supposes two absurdities. 
 Firstly, that the undivided divine act has 
 a divisible substance under it. Secondly, 
 that parts may be taken from this sub- 
 stance to be the subject of new determi- 
 nations. Now wherever there is divisi- 
 bility there is multiplicity; and as the 
 act of God is supposed to be divisible, 
 Ms substance must be multiple also, and 
 there must be multiplicity of acts. Act 
 is the determination of substance, or 
 rather it is substance itself determined. 
 Hence a determination is nothing real out 
 of the force which underlies it. Con- 
 sequently where this force is found mul- 
 tiple, the determinations of it must also 
 be multiple,. It is, therefore, repugnant 
 that one act, or determination in exist- 
 ence, should be supported by many active
 
 CTJKIOUS QUESTIONS. 185 
 
 forces instead of one. Consequently the 
 first hypothesis falls to the ground. Nor 
 can the second be better defended ; for if 
 the divine act, or existence, could lose any 
 part of its substance, it would be pos- 
 sible to separate an active force from its 
 actual state, or determination in exist- 
 ence, and the force itself would be some- 
 thing independently real and concrete. 
 But this consequence is opposed to the 
 true notion of substance; for just as 
 there is no existing determination with- 
 out a substance, so there is no substance 
 without a determination. Besides, in this 
 hypothesis, God could lose some of his 
 being, which is contrary to the notions 
 we have of his infinity and immutability. 
 The other hypothesis is equally erroneous, 
 namely, that the active force of God re- 
 maining undivided could, at the same 
 
 O ' 
 
 time, constitute the active force of other 
 beings by co-possession. For the deter- 
 mination of any active force does not 
 differ from its exercise ; indeed, it is this
 
 186 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 force itself manifesting itself in act. Now 
 if this be true, either the force of God 
 would be completely expended in each of 
 the finite beings which would co-possess 
 it, or it would be completely expended 
 in none of them, but in their collection ; 
 or finally, it would be completely expend- 
 ed in one of these, and incompletely in 
 others. But each of these three hypo- 
 theses is absurd. In the first place, there 
 is no difference between one complete 
 manifestation of a force and another ; is 
 it not, therefore, a contradiction of terms 
 to suppose at the same time several com- 
 plete manifestations of the same force in 
 different beings? Besides, in the first 
 hypothesis, each of these manifestations 
 would be God, which is another absurd- 
 ity. And if the second hypothesis be 
 maintained, each of the manifestations 
 would be finite ; and hence God as infinite 
 being will be supposed without personal 
 life, since a finite manifestation can not 
 express infinite personal life
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 187 
 
 Moreover, this hypothesis would make 
 us admit multiplicity of parts in God. 
 For if there be several existences or beings 
 in act, different in their nature and inde- 
 pendent of each other, they can not be 
 manifestations of the same force, but of 
 different forces. The same distinction 
 that exists among them must exist among 
 their forces. Nor is the third supposi- 
 tion more tenable than the other two, 
 .namely, that it would manifest itself com- 
 pletely in one and incompletely in an- 
 other. For there is a contradiction in 
 supposing that the same active force may 
 be and not be completely manifested in 
 the same act at the same moment. And 
 yet this contradiction is implied in the 
 third supposition. For, according to it, 
 the substance of God would be shown 
 forth in several acts or existences at the 
 same time, being in one of them complete 
 and in the others incomplete. Hence, the 
 divine substance would have a complete 
 act, and yet it would not be complete.
 
 188 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 For it would not be complete in many 
 other acts. Therefore, we conclude that 
 beings which are separated from God in 
 their personal life must be also separated 
 from him in their substance, and conse- 
 quently emanatism is false. 
 
 Several objections are made by pan- 
 theists against us. For instance, they say 
 that, according to Christian faith, there are 
 three distinct persons in God in the same 
 substance; and if this be not ajbsurd, 
 neither is it absurd to suppose the sub- 
 stance of God co-possessed by an infinite 
 number of persons. 
 
 "We answer this difficulty by denying 
 the parity. For the three persons of the 
 Trinity are not three acts or three inde- 
 pendent determinations of the divine sub- 
 stance, but only distinct terms, none of 
 which is complete without the others, as 
 the three are essentially necessary to the 
 nature of God. But this is not the case 
 with the co-possession of the emanatists. 
 For the co-possessing beings would in
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 189 
 
 their system be real and separate acts of 
 the same substance, and this hypothesis 
 we have refuted. 
 
 It is objected, in the second place, that 
 every being produced by another must 
 be a mere mode of its producer, and hence 
 the anti-pantheistic idea of creation is ab- 
 surd. For if the being produced be not 
 a mere mode of its cause, either the cause 
 and effect have the same attributes or 
 they have not. If they have the same 
 attributes, they are identical; and if they 
 have not the same attributes, how can we 
 suppose the cause to give its effect at- 
 tributes which the cause does not possess ? 
 We answer, in the first place, by observ- 
 ing that herein lies the mystery of crea- 
 tion ; which being a fact well attested by 
 reason, can not be given up because of 
 obscurity met with in trying to under- 
 stand it. The sun is still the sun though 
 clouds may obscure its shining. Besides, 
 in fact it is no more difficult for us to ex- 
 plain the production of one substance by
 
 190 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 another than for the pantheists to explain 
 the production of modes by a substance. 
 And now that we have made this remark, 
 we answer the difficulty directly by say- 
 ing that it is neither true nor certain that 
 because the producer and produced have 
 the same attributes they are therefore 
 identical. For to be identical they must 
 have the same existence and essence. 
 And as to the second hypothesis, it is 
 true the cause must have the reality 
 which it gives to the effect ; but the cause 
 may have this reality in a different way, 
 or in a different degree from the effect. 
 
 It is again objected that finite beings, 
 from the very fact that they participate 
 in the nature of infinite being, must be 
 identified with it. For only that being 
 is distinct and separate from infinite being 
 which in no ways participates in it. 
 
 This we deny. Participation is nofc 
 identity ; it is only similitude, which will 
 be greater or less according to the degree 
 of participation.
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 191 
 
 It is finally objected that unless we 
 admit the theory of pantheism we must 
 deny the infinity of God. For if God be 
 infinite he must contain all being, and 
 hence there can be no being out of him. 
 In a word, let us suppose the being of 
 God to -be represented by the letter JT, 
 and the being of creatures by the letter 
 Y. If we suppose Y not to be included 
 in X, as we do ; then X, the infinite, will 
 be less than X+ Y. In other words, X 
 will be, at the same time infinite and not 
 infinite. It will be infinite as it is sup- 
 posed, and it will not be infinite since it 
 will not contain the being Y. 
 
 We answer this difficulty by observing 
 that the expression X+ Y>^is only true 
 when Y adds something to the intrinsic 
 value of X. In the present case Y adds 
 nothing to X intrinsically but only exten- 
 sively. A man, for instance, who has 
 several copies of the same book, has not 
 more science, by this fact, than he who 
 has only one copy. X possesses in an
 
 
 
 192 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 eminent degree all the perfections con- 
 tained in Y; for Yis an exemplar struck 
 off from its type which is in X. Of course 
 there is a natural mystery in the distinc- 
 tion caused by creation between Jf and Y. 
 In this answer the natural mystery is 
 supposed, but in the opinion of the pan- 
 theists there is an absurdity implied; 
 since the being JTcan not be infinite, for 
 it has finite parts, namely, Y.
 
 QUESTION THIRTEENTH. 
 WHAT IS BEAUTY IN ART ? 
 
 HEN we behold certain objects 
 either in nature or in art, as a 
 landscape, a palace, or a statue, 
 we experience in the first place a sensa- 
 tion accompanied with the idea of some 
 excellence in the object. Secondly, we 
 pronounce it to be pretty, handsome, 
 beautiful, or sublime. Finally, we expe- 
 rience a certain pleasure in our soul which 
 incites us to love the object contemplated. 
 And those three phenomena give us the 
 psychological analysis of what is called 
 the aesthetic taste. Let us then endeavor 
 to expose the systems of different au- 
 thors regarding the nature of the beau- 
 tiful; and secondly, let us give its true
 
 194 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 notion. Many indeed are the systems of 
 different authors regarding the nature of 
 the beautiful. Some identify it with 
 utility y some place it in novelty or cus- 
 tom; some in magnitude or exaggera- 
 tion / others in imitation or illusion ; in 
 proportion of parts, or in unity joined to 
 variety. Let us expose, in the first place, 
 the system of utility. 
 
 A thing is said to be useful when it is 
 advantageous to us, that is, when it sat- 
 isfies our natural wants, or procures us 
 pleasure. An object may be useful either 
 in the present or in the future, as we en- 
 joy it actually or only in hope. It may 
 be immediately or mediately useful, ac- 
 cording as it gives us immediate pleasure 
 or is only the means by which we may 
 procure objects 'capable of imparting 
 pleasure. Thus the fruit which we eat 
 is useful in the present ; the fruit as yet 
 unplucked from the tree is an example 
 of the future useful. In both cases, 
 whether we eat it or only have the ex-
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 195 
 
 pectation of consuming it or enjoying it, 
 it is immediately useful, while the money 
 with which we may procure it is only me- 
 diately useful. 
 
 Thus far the whole utilitarian 
 school agree ; but now they begin to di- 
 verge into many systems. The sensual- 
 ists make beauty consist in present and 
 immediate utility; thus identifying the 
 beautiful with the sensible impression 
 which objects incite in us. According to 
 this system things are beautiful when 
 they give us pleasant sensations; ugly, 
 when the impressions produced are not 
 pleasant. Hence beauty and deformity 
 are mere sensible facts with which reason 
 or idea has nothing to do. 
 
 Hence, it is impossible to make any 
 theory on the beautiful, or try to deter- 
 mine, a priori, why external objects af- 
 fect us pleasantly or unpleasantly. There- 
 fore the two latter elements of aesthetic 
 taste mentioned above are rejected; for 
 the 'Sensualists admit no judgment or ses-
 
 196 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 thetic sense as distinguished from the first 
 impression of an object, in their psycho- 
 logical analysis of the beautiful. 
 
 Others of the sensualist school make 
 beauty consist in the future useful, whe- 
 ther mediate or immediate. They ex- 
 plain their theory thus : When an object 
 is presented to our regard, it impresses a 
 beautiful sensation upon us, and either 
 by the force of the impression itself, or 
 by calling in the aid of the memory, we 
 pronounce the object to be either useful 
 or useless and injurious. 
 
 If we judge it useful, we desire to en- 
 joy it, and hence it is beautiful. If it be 
 useless, we experience no aesthetic sense 
 whatever; we are moved towards it nei- 
 ther by feelings of admiration nor dis- 
 like. And if we judge it to be injurious, 
 we shrink from it, we abhor it, and call 
 it ugly or deformed. Thus ripe crops in 
 the fields or trees laden with fruit are 
 beautiful, because they are useful ; whilst 
 a shipwreck, or any thing else betokening
 
 CURIOUS QUESTION'S. 197 
 
 destruction, is ugly because it is or may 
 be injurious to us. Thus far the second 
 school of utilitarians. 
 
 In order to refute both opinions 
 we establish the following proposition : 
 The beautiful or the deformed in nature 
 does not consist in the pleasant or un- 
 pleasant impressions made on us lyy sen- 
 sible objects. To prove this proposition, 
 we remark, in the first place, that the im- 
 pressions produced on us by external ob- 
 jects are entirely subjective and relative, 
 depending on the peculiarity of each in- 
 dividual's mind, and having no existence 
 in the objects themselves. But when we 
 judge a thing to be beautiful, we sup- 
 pose something objective and absolute in 
 beauty ; we are persuaded that beauty is 
 in the object, and that it would exist 
 even though the impressions should cease 
 to exist. Consequently we can not iden- 
 tify beauty with our sensible impressions. 
 Besides, unity is one of the conditions of 
 the beautiful ; thus, that a house may be
 
 198 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 beautiful it must constitute one whole be- 
 ing, though having several distinct parts ; 
 but unity is altogether an intellectual con-, 
 ception which no sensible impression can 
 give us. For unity essentially expresses 
 either a relation of parts to a whole or 
 of parts to each other. Now the notion 
 of such relation sensibility can not give ; 
 for it is the nature of this faculty to give 
 us as many impressions as there are parts 
 in the external object. And again the same 
 species of beauty is found in objects 
 giving entirely different impressions. 
 For instance, the solemn music of a 
 church choir, the pomp of the ceremonies, 
 and the religious architecture of the build- 
 ing excite the same species of aesthetic feel- 
 ings in us, and have a relation to each other ; 
 while the music of the opera, the archi- 
 tecture of a theatre, and the mazes of the 
 ballet, though giving similar impressions, 
 and though beautiful in themselves, 
 would be out of place in the sanctuary, 
 because the beautiful is different in both
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 199 
 
 cases. But this difference is inexplicable 
 in the system which we are refuting. 
 For if beauty consists only in the sen- 
 sible impression produced in us by an 
 object, any t\vo objects would be beauti- 
 ful only in case the impressions produced 
 were alike; but this would not hold 
 good in the examples cited;- for what 
 similarity is there between the sounds of 
 the music and the colors of the objects 
 mentioned ? This opinion may be refut- 
 ed also by considering how the aesthetic 
 faculty acts. For according to the sys- 
 tem which we are discussing, whenever 
 the impression is the same, the sesthetical 
 judgment should be the same. But this 
 does not happen. For in the first place, 
 if we suppose two men, one a connoisseur 
 and the other not, to examine a painting 
 of some excellence, the sensible impres- 
 sion produced will be the same in both 
 cases, yet evidently the gesthetical judg- 
 ment will not be identical, for that of 
 the connoisseur will show a greater ap-
 
 200 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 preciation of beauty than that of his less 
 skilled companion; therefore the sesthet- 
 ical object can not be identified with the 
 sensible impression. 
 
 Secondly, the gesthetical faculty may 
 be educated by the exercise of attention 
 and with the aid'of documents. Hence, 
 the beautiful does not consist in the im- 
 pression produced by the objects ; for if 
 such were the case, the judgment of the 
 beauty of an object could not be changed 
 without changing the sensible impression ; 
 but we know by experience that many an 
 object w r hich for a long time may not 
 have pleased us, finally gives us sesthetical 
 delight, without any change of the im- 
 pression having been produced. Finally, 
 from the fact that men dispute daily 
 about the beautiful or deformed, we may 
 conclude that neither consists in the plea- 
 sant or unpleasant impressions produced 
 in us by external objects. For as these 
 impressions are merely subjective, it would 
 be folly to dispute about the fact wheth-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 201 
 
 er they were pleasant or unpleasant, since 
 it would depend on each individual's pri- 
 vate appreciation, against which no argu- 
 ments would avail. Nor can it "be ob- 
 jected in favor of this opinion that the 
 presence of beautiful objects affects us 
 pleasantly, while the presence of deformed 
 objects affects us unpleasantly, and that 
 this phenomenon is therefore the effect 
 of the sensible impression produced ; for 
 this is confounding the cause with the 
 effect. It is the idea of the beautiful that 
 produces the sesthetical judgment. The 
 impression is the result and not the cause 
 of the beautiful. 
 
 In the second place, we assert that tlie 
 notion of the beautiful consists neither in 
 tlie mediate nor the immediate future utility 
 of objects. This assertion is the opposite 
 of utilitarianism a system which is par- 
 tially the result of the philosophy of the 
 materialists of the last century. In the 
 first place, we observe that there are many 
 objects useful which are not beautiful;
 
 202 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 for instance, the tools of workmen and 
 artisans. Besides, if we identify the 
 beautiful with the useful, it will follow 
 that the more useful the object is, the 
 more beautiful it will be. But experi- 
 ence teaches this .to be false. For instance, 
 antique vases are much less useful for 
 drinking purposes than modern goblets, 
 yet not, on that account, less beautiful. 
 And this same principle holds in archi- 
 tecture, for it is not always the most com- 
 modious or useful house that is the most 
 beautiful. Again, a fruit-tree is more 
 useful to the possessor than to the travel- 
 er who contemplates it, yet it is equally 
 beautiful to both. Again, it would fol- 
 low from the utilitarian system that those 
 would be the best connoisseurs of beauty 
 who would be the best judges of utility. 
 But experience shows that utilitarians 
 have generally no taste for beauty, while 
 the admirers of beauty are usually poor 
 judges of utility. Hence, countries like 
 our own, in which the utilitarian spirit
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 203 
 
 prevails, seldom attain to "great eminence 
 in the cultivation of the fine arts. More- 
 over, according to the system we are re- 
 futing, we should first see if any thing be 
 useful before pronouncing it to be beau- 
 tiful. Now, this does not happen. For 
 when the same object is useful and beau- 
 tiful, we judge it to be beautiful without 
 thinking expressly of its utility. In fact 
 we can hardly consider a thing as useful 
 without making an abstraction of its 
 beauty. For instance, I may look at a 
 tree and consider it beautiful without at- 
 tending to its utility. But when I begin 
 to think that its branches, its wood, may 
 serve to make a fire and warm me, the 
 tree loses its beauty. And, in like man- 
 ner, the symmetry and order of the viands 
 disposed on the table for a banquet may 
 afford us a beautiful spectacle; but if, 
 pressed by hunger, we think how useful 
 they are to satisfy the cravings of our ap- 
 petite, beauty vanishes and utility takes 
 its place.
 
 204: CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 Hence, the useful and the beautiful are 
 distinct, and in some way opposed, at 
 least as objects of thought. We must 
 observe, however, in conclusion, that al- 
 though the useful does not constitute the 
 foundation of our sesthetical judgments, 
 it has often a part in them. For it some- 
 times happens that an object, beautiful in 
 itself, fails to excite any sesthetical feeling 
 in us on account of some injurious pro- 
 perty it may possess or because of some 
 danger connected with it. In this case 
 the gesthetical feeling is kept in the back- 
 ground by the injury that is threatened. 
 Thus, a man whose house is on fire does 
 not think much of the beauty of the con- 
 flagration, nor does he contemplate the 
 spectacle with aesthetical feelings, but 
 rather his mind is occupied with the loss 
 he sustains. But even in this case the 
 spectacle of the burning mass does not 
 cease to be beautiful if not sublime. 
 
 The next system is that which identi- 
 fies beauty with novelty or with habitual
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 205 
 
 familiarity. Here we have two systems 
 rather than one, for continued familiarity 
 is directly opposed to novelty; but we 
 discuss both together, as the observations 
 to be made on both are alike. 
 
 Regarding the system of novelty, we 
 remark that new things naturally please 
 us, and gradually, as we become more 
 familiar with them, the pleasure first ex- 
 perienced decreases, till, after long posses- 
 sion, it ends in disgust. 
 
 Beauty then is in novelty and deformity 
 in long possession, say the partisans of 
 this system. Hence, beauty and deform- 
 ity are not qualities inherent in objects ; 
 they are merely extrinsic and accidental 
 relations. 
 
 The partisans of the other system say 
 that experience teaches that we are pleas- 
 ed with old and familiar things. What 
 at first sight displeased us gradually 
 grows pleasant to the sight, and hence 
 custom or habit is the cause of beauty, 
 and novelty the cause of deformity. For
 
 206 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 instance, the deformity which the Cauca- 
 sian race finds in the dark hue of the Af- 
 rican's skin is something which would 
 entirely disappear by practical miscegena- 
 tion. 
 
 Now, we admit the truth of the facts 
 alleged by the partisans of these systems, 
 but at the same time we deny the infer- 
 ence deduced from them. We assert that 
 neither novelty nor continued familiarity 
 gives the true notion of beauty. We 
 shall, however, attempt to show the vari- 
 ous effects of novelty and familiarity, and 
 reconcile the apparent contradictions al- 
 leged by the partisans of each system. 
 
 If beauty were identified either with 
 novelty or with familiarity, these three as- 
 sertions would be true, namely^rst, every 
 thing beautiful should be new or it should 
 be old ; second, every thing new or eveiy 
 thing old should be beautiful ; and third, 
 in both systems the beautiful should con- 
 sist in the mere accidental and extrinsic 
 relation of objects. But experience shows
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 207 
 
 that these three assertions are false. For, 
 in the first place, many things are beauti- 
 ful which are not new, which have not 
 novelty. For instance, the starry sky, 
 which we have been contemplating from 
 our childhood. And in fact, many things 
 are beautiful to us, because we have been 
 long familiar with them, and on the other 
 hand, many things are beautiful which 
 are not familiar. We see beauty in them 
 at the first glance. In the second place, 
 all new or familiar things are not beauti- 
 ful ; for some new things are indifferent, 
 others appear beautiful, and others ugly, 
 simply because they are new ; while many 
 objects do not appear more beautiful to 
 us after long familiarity with them than 
 they did when we first became acquainted 
 with them. 
 
 Thirdly, we apprehend beauty in the 
 object as something absolute, and not de- 
 pending on our mind. Thus, a landscape 
 in May would be beautiful, though we 
 were not living to behold it. Conse-
 
 208 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 quently beauty does not consist in a 
 mere accidental or extrinsic relation of 
 objects to each other or to us, and hence 
 neither novelty, nor habit, nor custom, nor 
 long-continued familiarity constitutes the 
 beautiful. 
 
 Yet there are certain sesthetical effects 
 produced in the mind by novelty and fa- 
 miliarity. Novelty produces two effects 
 in the mind. Firstly, it puts the mind 
 in a new state of existence. Secondly, it 
 excites the mind more vividly in that 
 state. Hence, there are as many kinds of 
 novelty as there are states of the mind. 
 Thus, there is novelty for the intellect, 
 when it begins to know what has hither- 
 
 O 
 
 to been unknown to it, or when it knows 
 an object in many ways after having 
 known it only in one. And there is no- 
 velty for the sensibility when we have a 
 feeling not experienced before. Hence, 
 there may be novelty in our perception 
 of objects, whether beautiful, ugly, or de- 
 formed. If we ask the reason why the
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 209 
 
 mind is excited so vividly by novelty, the 
 answer is, that the vivacity of our affec- 
 tions depends upon the degree of atten- 
 tion we give the object. If there be inat- 
 tention, there will be neither joy nor sor- 
 row. Hence, when we wish to divert the 
 mind of a friend from grief, we advise 
 him not to think of it ; that is to say, not 
 to give it his attention. A new object, 
 therefore, excites attention,' and hence ex- 
 cites the mind; but, when we become 
 accustomed to the object, our attention 
 gradually flags and our mind grows cool. 
 Hence, familiarity or custom produces an 
 effect directly contrary to that of novelty. 
 Should we ask now the cause of these ef- 
 fects, we shall find it first, in the nature of 
 the object ; and second, in the peculiar dis- 
 position of the subject. The object may be 
 either pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent. 
 If the object be agreeable, then the plea- 
 sure caused by it will be greater by no- 
 velty and weaker by familiarity. In this 
 case undoubtedly novelty is the cause of
 
 210 CT7RIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 beauty. But if the object be disagree- 
 able in itself, tlie unpleasant impression 
 produced by its novelty will gradually 
 melt away with custom or familiarity. 
 And if the object be neither agreeable 
 nor disagreeable, neither novelty nor fa- 
 miliarity will enhance its aesthetic impres- 
 sion. As to the other cause of the effect 
 of novelty or familiarity, namely, the dis- 
 position of the subject, we remark that 
 there are two dispositions, apparently op- 
 posed, which have great influence on the 
 aesthetic taste as to objects new or old. 
 One of these dispositions is the love of 
 perfectibility; the other the love of re- 
 pose. We all desire to be perfect, and 
 hence we desire that which may either 
 increase our knowledge or our happiness, 
 while, at the same time, we love our ease, 
 and are naturally averse to labor. But, 
 as in the present state of existence, there 
 is no perfection possible without toil and 
 trouble, our love of ease and desire of 
 perfectibility can not be satisfied at the 

 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 211 
 
 same time in this life, and, consequently, 
 one must preponderate over the other, 
 according to the different temperaments of 
 individuals. Hence, one class of men love 
 novelty, another dislike or fear it, and 
 are pleased only with what is old. In the 
 one the love of perfectibility predominates, 
 hence they love new things and detest 
 routine. Young people are generally of 
 this character, for their love of knowledge 
 and their activity are great; while old 
 persons, being swayed by the love of re- 
 pose, distrust what is new, for they fear 
 lest it should trouble their long-cherished 
 theories and thus disturb their equanimi- 
 ty. The young man is cupidus novi, the 
 old one, laudator temporis acti. These 
 seem to be the causes of the different ef- 
 fects produced by novelty and familiarity. 
 Let us now endeavor to reconcile the 
 opposite facts alleged by the partisans of 
 both these systems. It is not difficult to 
 conceive how a new object may be more 
 beautiful than an old one, and vice versa.
 
 212 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 In the first place, let us suppose an object 
 beautiful in itself to attract our attention. 
 We are moved by its beauty, for in know- 
 ing it we are perfecting our faculties, and 
 our attention is more excited. Indeed, 
 in the first instance, we may admire it, 
 more than it deserves, because we expect 
 in it hidden beauties which it has not. 
 But in a longer and more careful exami- 
 nation, not discovering those beauties, 
 and the hopes that were raised being dis- 
 appointed, we become displeased, our at- 
 tention and admiration grow less, and the 
 object partially or completely loses its 
 beauty. 
 
 In this case novelty begets beauty and 
 familiarity creates deformity. But let us 
 suppose, on the other hand, that some- 
 thing new makes an unpleasant impres- 
 sion on us, or disturbs our tranquillity of 
 mind, or attacks our deep-rooted preju- 
 dices. Here, though the object should be 
 really beautiful, it will not appear so to 
 us at first, because of the unpleasant sen- 

 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 213 
 
 sation it produces being so great as to 
 prevent our attention from resting on the 
 real beauties of the being. But when, 
 by familiarity, the first unpleasant im- 
 pression becomes weaker, the beauties 
 of the object, at first hidden, gradually 
 manifest themselves to our mind, and 
 that which at first we considered de- 
 formed we begin to think beautiful.
 
 QUESTION FOURTEENTH. 
 
 DOES BEAUTY CONSIST IN MAGNITUDE OR 
 
 EXAGGERATION? IN ILLUSION OR 
 
 IMITATION? 
 
 | HE next system to be discussed 
 is that of magnitude or exag- 
 geration. There is a certain 
 school in art and literature, called the ro- 
 mantic, which contends that nothing is 
 beautiful which is not exaggerated be- 
 yond the ordinary proportions of nature. 
 Hence, even in the moral order, great 
 crimes and monsters are models of the 
 beautiful, notwithstanding the assertion 
 of the classic school to the contrary, 
 which makes virtue only beautiful and 
 vice hideous. The romantic school hold 
 that great vice constitutes the beautiful, 
 because there is something superhuman
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. .215 
 
 in it; and unfortunately, they endeavor 
 to realize tlieir theory in both the arts 
 and literature. We shall not speak of 
 the injurious effect of this system upon 
 good morals, as we are not writing on a 
 question of ethics but of aesthetics. We 
 therefore formulate the following pro- 
 position: Beauty does not consist in 
 mere magnitude. If it were true that 
 beauty consisted in magnitude, then it 
 would follow that the greater an object 
 is, the more beautiful it would be. But 
 experience shows this to be absurd. For 
 in the moral order, to which the roman- 
 tics love to appeal, are not the little vir- 
 tues more beautiful than the great crimes 
 against nature? In the second place, 
 the romantics destroy the distinction be- 
 tween the beautiful and the deformed. 
 That such a distinction exists no one can 
 deny, for the deformed is the negation of 
 the beautiful, and no two things can be 
 more different than the positive and the 
 negative. Now, if whatever is great
 
 216 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 must be beautiful, an object of few 
 charms or of small deformity could be 
 made beautiful by increasing its deforrd- 
 ity to a great degree. And consequently 
 the beautiful would be identified with 
 the greatest deformity, which is a con- 
 tradiction in terms. Again in this system 
 every thing great should be beautiful, 
 whether good or bad. Now this is ab- 
 surd ; for let us suppose a case ; robbery, 
 for instance, whether great or small, can 
 never make a beautiful action. For you 
 can not change the deformity of its es- 
 sence, which consists in the unjust taking 
 away of an object. Indeed, the deform- 
 ity will be increased in proportion to the 
 greatness of the crime. . Nor can any cir- 
 cumstance change its nature ; for instance, 
 greatness of mind or the audacity of the 
 robber. For although these qualities are 
 beautiful in themselves, they can never 
 change the nature of the act, which is at 
 the same time bad and ugly. 
 
 Moreover, it is absurd to suppose that
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 217 
 
 the greatest crimes and the most heroic 
 actions are equally beautiful. Individual 
 consciousness and the common-sense of 
 mankind reject this theory. We can 
 never force ourselves to regard the crimes 
 of Caligula or Nero as equally beautiful 
 with the virtues of Charlemagne, St. 
 Henry, or St. Louis. But even a priori 
 this system is shown to be false, by 
 considering the very nature of exaggera- 
 tion and beauty. Beauty is a quality 
 inherent in the very nature of the object. 
 Magnitude only increases or intensifies 
 the object without changing its essence. 
 Consequently an object beautiful in it- 
 self may have its beauty increased or 
 diminished according to its size. But 
 the size can not change the nature of the 
 object, or make it beautiful if it be de- 
 formed or deformed if it be beautiful. 
 But it may be objected that there are in 
 reality objects deformed in themselves 
 which become beautiful by exaggeration ; 
 namely, the vice of pride, when person-
 
 218 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 ified in Milton's Satan, becomes sublime 
 and beautiful. But we answer that here 
 it is the representation, and not the thing 
 itself which is beautiful. For according 
 to Boileau, 
 
 "II n'est point de serpents ni de monstre odieux, 
 Qui par 1'art imit<5 ne puisse plaire aux yeux." 
 
 Besides, in most of the cases that might 
 be alleged by the romantics, we would 
 find that it was the great power or intelli- 
 gence displayed, rather than the .action 
 itself, which constituted the beautiful in 
 them. 
 
 From the fact that the representation 
 of vice or virtue may be beautiful, some 
 authors have concluded that beauty con- 
 sists entirely in imitation. Hence, for them 
 an object is beautiful, if it be a perfect 
 representation ; if not, it is ugly. Regard- 
 ing this point we may make three in- 
 quiries : Firstly, Whether there be any 
 beauty at all in imitation? Secondly, 
 Whether all beauty be in it ? Thirdly, In 
 what the beauty of imitation consists?
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 219 
 
 There is some beauty in imitation. 
 This experience proves. For many nat- 
 ural objects, indifferent to our taste in 
 themselves, become really beautiful as 
 images. Indeed the real attraction of 
 the Flemish school of painting comes from 
 this. Moreover, even things which are 
 deformed in themselves please us when 
 represented by art, or at least do not ex- 
 cite the same horror as when in their nat- 
 ural state. Even objects which are beau- 
 tiful in themselves acquire an increase of 
 accidental beauty, merely on account of 
 their representation. Consequently it 
 follows that there is some beauty in imi- 
 tation. 
 
 Yet beauty, generally speaking, must be 
 distinguished from imitation. For other- 
 wise all beauty would consist in imita- 
 tion, and then these four consequences 
 would follow : Firstly, only works of art 
 would be beautiful. Secondly, among the 
 works of art only those would be beauti- 
 ful which would be imitations. Thirdly,
 
 220 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 that would be the more beautiful which 
 would be the better imitation. Fourthly, 
 in these same works there would be no 
 other beauty than that which would arise 
 from imitation. 
 
 Now these four consequences are ab- 
 surd. In the first place, besides works of 
 art, other objects are beautiful, namely, 
 the human body, the sky, or a meadow 
 in summer. Secondly, many works of 
 art which are not imitations are beautiful. 
 For instance, a palace, a piece of music, a 
 painting, or a statue, may be imitations 
 of nature, but realizations of the ideal, 
 and yet be beautiful. In fact, in some 
 works of art imitation may be merely ac- 
 cidental in them. Thirdly, of two works 
 of art, that one is often judged to be the 
 more beautiful in which there is the less 
 imitation. Take, for instance, two statues 
 the one representing a real man, and the 
 other an ideal archetype; the latter is 
 often the more beautiful. Again, in the 
 imitative works of art, there are generally
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 221 
 
 two kinds of beauty or of deformity: 
 one consisting in the perfection or the 
 imperfection of the imitation, the other 
 being entirely distinct from it. For in- 
 stance, the picture of a monster will be 
 beautiful inasmuch as it imitates ; and de- 
 formed inasmuch as it relates to an ugly 
 object. If a painter, who wishes to take 
 the portrait of a man, makes an image 
 unlike his archetype, the picture may not 
 be on this account ugly, but very beauti- 
 ful, compared to the subject. Conse- 
 quently there is another kind of beauty 
 besides that of imitation. 
 
 Should we ask now what it is that 
 pleases us in imitation, there are two dif- 
 ferent opinions on this subject. Some say 
 it is the similarity itself, or the illusion 
 the image produces in our mind. While 
 others deny this and say it is the judg- 
 ment which pronounces the imitation to 
 be the work of some intelligent being; 
 that is to say, we do not admire the imi- 
 tation, properly speaking, but the intel-
 
 222 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 lectual labor which it supposes. It is the 
 skill of the artist which pleases us. 
 
 Of these two opinions we reject the 
 former and adopt the latter, for the fol- 
 lowing reasons : Similarity can not "be 
 the sense of the pleasure which we feel in 
 contemplating the copies of natural things ; 
 for if it were so, we should experience the 
 same aesthetic savor in beholding similar 
 objects in nature. "We should feel the 
 same pleasure in seeing, for instance, two 
 trees that are alike, as in viewing the 
 images of the trees. 
 
 Moreover, the latter opinion is based 
 on experience. Suppose an instance. If 
 we see two pictures that look alike, they 
 may not strike us as beautiful so long as 
 we imagine them to be the work of the 
 same artist. But when we are told that 
 one is the copy of the other, our admira- 
 tion is instantly excited. We admire the 
 ability of the copyist. "We admire the 
 effort of one mind to copy the work of 
 another. Hence, the greater the skill dis-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 223 
 
 played in the execution of the work, the 
 more beauty shall we perceive in it, on 
 account of the greater difficulties to be 
 overcome. Thus far then we have ex- 
 plained the nature of the aesthetic element 
 in works of imitation. Let us now exam- 
 ine the next system, namely, that which 
 identifies beauty with proportion and 
 order of parts.
 
 OUESTIQN FIFTEENTH. 
 
 DOES BEAUTY CONSIST IN PROPORTION AND 
 ORDER OF PARTS OR IN UNITY AND 
 VARIETY? 
 
 I HE system which identifies beau- 
 ty with proportion and order 
 of parts is one of the oldest and 
 most respected theories on the subject. 
 One of its ablest defenders in modern 
 times is the Pere Andre" in his " Essai sur 
 le Beau." The partisans of this system 
 understand by order the disposition of 
 parts in a being to each other. Thus, 
 order in the human body consists in the 
 fact that the different members have a 
 determined place as parts of the whole. 
 And this order is the first element of hu- 
 man beauty. Thus the nose is in the
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 225 
 
 centre of the face ; the eyes are either side 
 of it, and the mouth below it, all in order. 
 But beauty is not complete without pro- 
 portion, its second element. 
 
 Proportion consists in the difference of 
 degrees in duration, intensity, or exten- 
 sion. Thus in music or dancing there is 
 the proportion of duration. For the 
 sounds or motions must succeed each 
 other in uniform times. We also find in 
 music an example of the proportion of in- 
 tensity. The notes must? not be discor- 
 dant, and consequently the number of 
 vibrations must be greater or less to effect 
 the purpose. Finally, in bodies we have 
 the proportion of extension, as in the hu- 
 man countenance the length or shortness 
 of the features will have relative effects 
 on a man's good looks. 
 
 But there are various ways of under- 
 standing this system of proportion and 
 order of parts. It can not mean that 
 every order and proportion will make 
 beauty, for then all objects would be
 
 226 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 / 
 
 beautiful, since in all there are a certain 
 order and proportion. It means, there- 
 fore, that among all possible orders and 
 proportions there is one that necessarily 
 makes an object beautiful. But why 
 should this order ancj proportion make 
 the beautiful and not the others ? This 
 is a question to which four different an- 
 swers are given, and which give rise to 
 four different opinions. The first holds 
 that the cause of this beauty in order and 
 proportion is found in the very essence 
 of things. That among all possible orders 
 there is one which by its very nature is 
 absolute order and proportion, and there- 
 fore constitutes the beautiful. The second 
 opinion gives a subjective origin to the 
 beautiful in proportion. It maintains that 
 the beautiful of proportion is produced 
 in us by a habit or by a peculiar disposi- 
 tion of our nature. For instance, the 
 hunchback appears ugly to us because 
 we are accustomed to see all other men 
 straight. The third opinion places the
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 227 
 
 beauty of order and proportion in the 
 apt disposition of the parts of the object 
 to its end. While the fourth opinion 
 maintains that objects, which in them 
 selves are neither beautiful nor deformed 
 are so inasmuch as they are signs of in- 
 visible beauty. We shall speak of this 
 last system later. Let us now discuss the 
 three first opinions. 
 
 We affirm, in the first place, that no 
 order or proportion of parts considered in 
 itself, or essentially, can constitute the 
 beautiful. It is impossible to find in the 
 essence of things one order surpassing 
 another ; for all combinations of order or 
 proportion are equally indifferent if con- 
 sidered independently of any extrinsic re- 
 lation. Besides, according to the hypo- 
 thesis which we refute, we should be de- 
 lighted with the beauty of an object in 
 proportion to the degree of -knowledge we 
 might have of its parts. Hence, to use a 
 familiar example, we should be less pleas- 
 ed when we merely behold a fiije-looking
 
 228 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 man than when we have a knowledge of 
 the proportion of all his parts, as, for in- 
 stance, that the circumference of the neck 
 is equal to the circumference of the calf 
 of his leg. But experience teaches that 
 the geometrical -measurement instead of 
 increasing our aesthetic taste, disgusts us. 
 In the third place, if order essentially 
 makes beauty, this order must be the 
 same for all species of beings, or it must 
 be different for different kinds of beings ; 
 that is, one species of beauty would con- 
 stitute that of a horse, another that of a 
 tree, etc. But neither of these two opin- 
 ions can be held. If the first supposition 
 be true, then we should find the same 
 proportion and order in all beautiful ob- 
 jects, or at least an approximation to a 
 common type. But this contradicts expe- 
 rience, for where is the similarity of pro- 
 portion between a pretty woman, a fine 
 palace, and a beautiful rose ? Nor is the 
 second hypothesis true ; for, if it were, 
 then there could be no degrees in beauty
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 229 
 
 no comparison, because in each being 
 there would be a proportion of parts that 
 would make it perfectly beautiful in its 
 kind. 
 
 Thus, the proportion of parts in the 
 round, plump, and juicy body of a fat 
 partridge would be equally beautiful with 
 the most perfect specimen of the Ionian 
 style of architecture. From what has 
 been thus far seen, it must follow that 
 beauty does not consist in any order or 
 proportion, which by familiarity or a dis- 
 position of our nature would seem beauti- 
 ful in itself, since we have shown the ef- 
 fects" of familiarity in refuting another 
 system. 
 
 Nor is the beautiful constituted by 
 order and proportion considered in the 
 aptness of the parts of a being for attain- 
 ing the end of its creation. For if this 
 system were true, we should have to ac- 
 knowledge the same beauty in all created 
 beings ; for there are none of them whose 
 parts are not aptly disposed by the Crea-
 
 230 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 tor to the end for which they were des- 
 tined. But this consequence we know to 
 be false. Moreover, experience shows the 
 contrary of this system to be true ; for the 
 form and parts of a hog, for instance, 
 might be changed so as to make it more 
 beautiful, yet they would not be so well 
 adapted to the attaining of its end. 
 Again, if beauty consisted in the aptitude 
 of the parts of an object to its end, then the 
 following absurd consequences would fol- 
 low: Firstly, in every judgment regarding 
 the beauty of an object, the consideration 
 of its end should be first in the order of 
 thought. Secondly, we could never pro- 
 nounce an object beautiful without know- 
 ing the design for which it was created. But 
 who does not see the absurdityof these 
 two consequences ; for who has ever said 
 that a mouth was beautiful because it 
 was fitted for eating or speaking ? And 
 again, eveiy day we pronounce objects to 
 be most beautiful without knowing the end 
 for which they were created. Yet although
 
 CUBIOUS QUESTIONS. 231 
 
 we have said so nmcli against the system 
 of order and proportion, it must be ad- 
 mitted that they partake of beauty inas- 
 much as they show forth the intelligence 
 of some agent accommodating beings to 
 an end. 
 
 SYSTEM OF UNITY IN VAEIETY. 
 
 Some very able philosophers hold that 
 beauty consists in variety reduced to uni- 
 ty. St. Augustine says, in his 18th Epis- 
 tle, " Omnisporropulchritudinis forma est 
 unitas" But to this unity moderns have 
 added variety. There may be unity in 
 variety in many ways. Thus the various 
 phenonomena which take place in the 
 same space or time, are said to have unity 
 of time or space. Again, there may be 
 several modes in a substance, as in the 
 soul there are various thoughts and sen- 
 timents. This unity in variety may 
 exist when several beings have the same 
 end, or are adapted to produce the same 
 effect. The partisans of this system do
 
 232 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 not agree in placing this unity in variety 
 in any one of these forms. They gener- 
 ally explain it, however, according to the 
 last example, and, indeed, it is the most 
 beautiful kind of unity. According to 
 this system, therefore, a musical composi- 
 tion is beautiful when the various notes 
 and sounds have the same general idea or 
 impression ; and the beauty of a poem or 
 tragedy consists in the various actions, 
 characters, or parts tending to a common 
 end or catastrophe. Before discussing the 
 claims of this system, let us make two ob- 
 servations. In the first place, we remark 
 that the system of unity explained accord- 
 ing to the third manner, does not differ 
 much from the system of order and pro- 
 portion taken to express the adaptation 
 of parts to the attaining of a common 
 end ; for order can not exist without the 
 accommodation of means to an end. 
 
 Hence, the partisans of the system of 
 order and proportion, as Pere Andre for 
 instance, admit unity as its complement.
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 233 
 
 There is, however, a difference between 
 the two systems ; for in the adaptation of 
 means to an end, two things may be dis- 
 tinguished : First, the intrinsic fitness of 
 each part to an end ; and secondly, the har- 
 mony of all the parts in producing that 
 end. In the first consists the idea of pro- 
 portion ; in the second that of unity. We 
 observe, in the second place, that the sys- 
 tem of unity is the same as the system of 
 symmetry, for symmetry is only an effect 
 of unity. Having premised these few re- 
 marks, let us now discuss the value of 
 this system, inasmuch as it pretends to 
 give the true explanation of the sublime 
 and beautiful. 
 
 We deny that the beautiful is found in 
 unity considered in itself. If the contrary 
 of this proposition were true, it would 
 follow that in all objects which have the 
 same unity, we should find the same de- 
 gree of beauty. But experience shows 
 the contrary to be the case ; for in the 
 various works of nature, we find beauties
 
 23-1 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 the most diverse in degree and kind, yet 
 we find unity equally in all Thus, 
 the beauty in the horse and in the ass 
 is different ; yet there is the same unity 
 in their constitution. The same may be 
 said of works of art, for we can conceive 
 two poems perfectly^ equal in unity, 
 but not so in beaiity. On the other 
 hand, the tragedies of Shakespeare have 
 less unity in their plan, yet are far more 
 beautiful than the more regularly compiled 
 works of less capable dramatic authors. 
 But although unity in itself does not con- 
 stitute beauty, nevertheless it adds to the 
 beauty of an object, inasmuch as unity is 
 a sign of intellectual labor ; and experi- 
 ence teaches that there are no beautiful 
 objects which have not more or less of 
 unity. Unity is therefore a condition, 
 but not the constituent of beauty, and it 
 is in this sense we are to understand the 
 text of St. Augustine.
 
 .QUESTION SIXTEENTH. 
 
 IS THE BEAUTIFUL THE "SPLENDOR VERI" 
 AS PLATO DEFINES IT? 
 
 | HE beautiful may be considered 
 in two ways, firstly in external 
 and visible forms, as in a pal- 
 ace or statue ; secondly, as purely intelli- 
 gible, devoid of all sensible representa- 
 tion, contemplated by the intellect. We 
 mean by the beauty of sensible forms 
 that which is represented by the senses. 
 Now, if we should ask in what this spe- 
 cies of beauty consists, we should receive 
 two answers. The first says that beauty 
 is in the form itself as one of its charac- 
 teristics ; while the second maintains that 
 beauty is not in the form, that the form 
 is a mere sign by which our mind's eye
 
 236 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 is enlightened to contemplate the true 
 beautiful, which is in ' the intelligible. 
 The systems so far explained adopt the 
 first manner of explaining the notion of 
 the beautiful ; but, since we have refuted 
 them, we can not admit their theory ; for 
 we understand by the sensible form the 
 sensation which it excites, or the total 
 representation of the object, which rep- 
 resentation consists in the impression of 
 our sensibility, and the conception of our 
 intellect. But the sensible form con- 
 sidered in itself can not be called the 
 beautiful regarded in any of the two 
 ways of explaining it. It can not be 
 called such in the first manner, for we 
 have proved that beauty differs essential- 
 ly from the impression. To call it so in 
 the second manner is equally impossible ; 
 for the intellectual conceptions which 
 added to the impression can all be reduced 
 to the ideas of order and unity. But we 
 have already shown that neither order 
 nor unity in itself makes the beautiful,
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 237 
 
 although they are both conditions of 
 beauty. External forms are, therefore, 
 the signs of invisible beauty according 
 to the second hypothesis which we ad- 
 mit. They are symbols or types of in- 
 visible beauty. Let us now develop 
 and explain this system, by examining 
 the following questions : Firstly, "What 
 is a symbol ? Secondly, Are all sensible 
 forms symbols ? Thirdly, Is their sym- 
 bolism the foundation of all their aesthe- 
 tic properties ? Fourthly, How may the 
 beauty or deformity of objects be deter- 
 mined by their symbolism ? Let us an- 
 swer the first question on the nature and 
 division of symbols. A symbol is^a sen- 
 sible phenomenon exciting in us the idea 
 of a reality. For instance, the figure 
 with the balance in her hand is a symbol 
 of justice and equity. There are many 
 kinds of symbols, divided according to the 
 principle of their origin, their clearness, or 
 their determination. The principle of 
 symbolism is the association of ideas and
 
 238 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 sensations; and hence there may be as 
 many kinds of symbols as there are 
 modes of associating ideas and sensations. 
 Thus there are natural symbols, arbitrary 
 symbols, and symbols of custom, as there 
 may be a natural, arbitrary, or customary 
 association of ideas. As to their clear- 
 ness, symbols are divided into clear and 
 obscure, according as their meaning is 
 discovered with ease or difficulty. But 
 this clearness is not absolute but relative ; 
 for a symbol which may be obscure to 
 one may be very clear to another. Thus 
 symbols derived from the manners or reli- 
 gion of a people, are very intelligible to 
 them, though quite obscure to others. A 
 more particular application of this prin- 
 ciple may be found in the symbolism of 
 the Catholic Church, well understood 
 within its pale, though not outside of it. 
 As to the degree of determination of 
 symbols, they are either vague or specific. 
 Vague symbols express something in a 
 general way ; for instance, a passion or
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 239 
 
 state of the mind, as joy or sadness, with- 
 out particularizing any thing. Specific 
 symbols express the thing with circum- 
 stances. Some symbols are vague by 
 their very nature, as in music; others' 
 are essentially specific, as in painting; 
 while others again, as words in language, 
 are either vague or specific at will. It is 
 not difficult to prove that all sensible 
 things are symbols of invisible things; 
 for the sensible phenomena of nature may 
 be reduced to sounds, colors, lines, and 
 motions. All sounds have reference to 
 the ear, while the three last in the cate- 
 gory are seen by the eye. But all these 
 express something invisible, for they all 
 have the power of expressing the invis- 
 ible. We might even prove the symbol- 
 ism of sensible things by an a priori ar- 
 gument, for all of them show forth a de- 
 gree of being. They manifest modifica- 
 tions of an active force, but the active 
 force is invisible. Hence sensible forms are 
 symbols of the invisible. But it will now
 
 240 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 be asked, In what does this invisible con- 
 sist? We answer that the invisible, ex- 
 pressed by sensible forms in creation, is of 
 two kinds ; the first consists in some qual- 
 ity, property, or attribute of the Author of 
 being, as when,' for instance, the Scripture 
 says, " The skies tell the glory of God ;" 
 or as when a well-executed picture shows 
 the skill of the artist. It requires reflec- 
 tion, however, on our part to perceive 
 this invisible. The oiJwr part of the in- 
 visible symbolized by sensible forms, con- 
 sists in moral qualities ; as, when, either 
 by nature or from consent, certain sen- 
 sible signs are used to express invisible 
 beings. They express, in the first place, 
 undetermined being, or being in general ; 
 and in the second place, they express 
 such and such a degree of being, which 
 it is sometimes very difficult to appre- 
 hend. 
 
 Yet we always find that the foundation 
 of the aesthetic properties in sensible be- 
 ings is their symbolism. If we examine
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 241 
 
 closely the relation between the force of 
 expression in beings, and their power of 
 exciting aesthetic feelings, we shall find 
 them to be identical. In the first place, 
 objects please us in proportion to their 
 power of expression ; and, as we descend 
 in the scale of creation, we find the beau- 
 ty of beings grow less as we descend in 
 species. Animals are more beautiful than 
 plants, and plants more beautiful than 
 minerals. Moreover, if we consider the 
 same thins: in two different states of a be- 
 
 O 
 
 ing, in that one in which it will have the 
 greater expression it will certainly be more 
 beautiful. Thus as there is a great differ- 
 ence between the power of expression in 
 the face of a living and of a dead man, 
 so there is a difference in their beauty. 
 Again, some objects please us only after a 
 time, when we become familiar with them. 
 Pleasure in beholding them commences 
 only when we begin to understand their 
 meaning. Experience also teaches that 
 those men who appreciate the symbolism
 
 2-i2 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 of beings the best are the most capable 
 of perceiving their beauty. Thus many 
 natural objects, whose beauty poets and 
 artists feel vividly, move not in the least 
 the rustic mind. The rustic looks only at 
 the utility of th6 object, and cares not for 
 its expression, while the poet and the 
 artist admire its expression. Hence, there 
 is truth in saying that it is the poet and 
 the artist that give sense and beauty to 
 inanimate things. Even if we observe 
 the impression which inanimate things 
 produce in us, we shall find that it is not 
 the form or external shape that pleases us 
 in nature or in art, but that which it ex- 
 presses. In a church, for instance, it is 
 the religious expression of the arches and 
 columns ; or the nobility, the majesty, be- 
 nevolence, and generosity, expressed by 
 the statues or paintings representing hu- 
 man forms that excite in us emotions of 
 beauty. In fact, the words we use on be- 
 holding such objects refer less to them 
 than to their expression.
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 243 
 
 But let us now inquire how the de- 
 formity or beauty of objects is determined 
 by their symbolism. Upon this question 
 there are two opinions. The first main- 
 tains that beauty and deformity are joined 
 in beings in proportion to their power of 
 expression; that is to say, an object is 
 beautiful that can give expression, and 
 deformed when there is no expression in 
 it. The partisans of the second system 
 hold that beauty or deformity consists in 
 the thing expressed, and not in the thing 
 expressing. Objects are beautiful or de- 
 formed because they express this or that 
 idea. Of these two opinions we must 
 admit the latter, for the former would 
 lead us into absurdities. It would, in the 
 first place, make us maintain that every 
 object which expresses something is beau- 
 tiful ; and again, that two objects having 
 equal expression have equal beauty. It 
 is not difficult to show the absurdity of 
 these consequences. In the first place, 
 experience teaches that beings which ex-
 
 244 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 press nothing are not therefore deformed, 
 since there are many things in the world 
 indifferent with respect to beauty. But 
 this could not be the case in the opinion 
 we refute ; for according to it beings should 
 have expression' and therefore be beauti- 
 ful, or they should be deprived of expres- 
 sion and therefore ugly, so that there 
 could be no such thing as sesthetical in- 
 difference. Nor can it be objected that 
 there are objects in which a defect of ex- 
 pression implies a defect of beauty; as, 
 for instance, a poem or a statue may have 
 no value as a work of art. It is not on this 
 account deformed in the true sense of the 
 word ; and even if it were deformed, this 
 would prove nothing against us ; for its 
 deformity would not arise from a want 
 of expression, but of the true expression ; 
 it would arise from the defective skill or 
 genius of the maker. Again, it is false 
 that beauty is found in every object that 
 expresses something. The face of a mon- 
 key is veiy expressive, but certainly not
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 245 
 
 beautiful, and so is the face of a drunk- 
 ard or a man excited by anger ; yet 
 none of these has beauty. It is equally 
 false that two objects having equal ex- 
 pression have equal beauty. We can 
 show this by taking two works of art, 
 two statues, for instance, one representing 
 the passion of anger, the other the virtue 
 of purity. Each has great expression, 
 they may both have equal expression ; but 
 certainly their beauty will not be equal. 
 Take, for example, the statue of Silenus 
 and that of Abraham ; the one represent- 
 ing drunkenness, the other the great pa- 
 triarch about to offer up his only son to 
 Grod. They may have equal expression, 
 but certainly not equal beauty. Beauty, 
 therefore, consists in the invisible type 
 expressed by the sensible form. Let us 
 now examine the qualities and character- 
 istics of invisible beauty. What is this 
 invisible beauty ? And what are the con- 
 ditions required that it should affect us 
 aesthetically ? According to Plato, beauty
 
 246 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 is the splendor veri. That which is true 
 is beautiful, and objects will be more or 
 less beautiful in proportion to their de- 
 gree of participation in the reality of God 
 who is truth itself. We must admit this 
 theory of Plato for many reasons. For a 
 supreme rule of beauty must be admitted, 
 and this supreme rule must be God. Jn 
 our judgment upon beings, when we say 
 that some are more beautiful than others, 
 we acknowledge a supreme rule of beauty. 
 For when we compare objects as greater 
 and less, we suppose an absolute rule ; for 
 that which is relative implies the abso- 
 lute, and greater and less are relative 
 terms. There is then an absolute rule of 
 beauty, which is absolute beauty itself. 
 What then are the properties of this ab- 
 solute rule of beauty? We answer, it 
 must be eternal, necessaiy, and infinite. 
 It must be independent of time, place, 
 and circumstances. 
 
 For example, the act of a man under- 
 going martyrdom for conscience sake is
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 247 
 
 beautiful in itself, independently of all 
 circumstances ; it is eternally beautiful ; 
 and as this rule is eternal, it must be ne- 
 cessary and unchangeable. This absolute 
 rule of beauty is also infinite ; for if it 
 were merely finite, a higher type of beauty 
 than it could be conceived, and therefore 
 it would not be the supreme rule of 
 beauty. Besides, as this rule is beauty 
 itself, without limit or restriction, it is in- 
 finite. This invisible beauty, therefore, 
 being absolute, eternal, and infinite, is 
 God. Beauty is, therefore, identified 
 with truth, and the truth of existing 
 beings is conceived in two ways : Firstly, 
 inasmuch as they are imitations of 
 ideas which exist in God ; and secondly, 
 as possessing liberty of will, and acting 
 in conformity with the will of God. The 
 first manner gives us real truth ; the sec- 
 ond, voluntary truth or moral goodness. 
 Henoe there are two kinds of beauty, essen- 
 tial and moral. Now beauty in beings 
 can be considered either absolutely or rel-
 
 248 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 atively ; absolutely, when their activity or 
 the evolution of their existence is com- 
 pared with the infinite activity of God ; 
 relatively, when they are compared with 
 individuals of the same species. Thus, 
 when we say that man is superior to the 
 beast, we compare beings according to 
 infinite activity ; and when we say that 
 one man is more beautiful than another, 
 there is question of relative beauty. 
 
 Now, deformity is the want of beauty 
 which should exist ; but the want of es- 
 sential beauty, or beauty of essence, is not 
 deformity ; for if it were, all finite beings 
 would be in a certain measure deformed, 
 since they are all below the infinite stand- 
 ard of real beauty or God. 
 
 Deformity exists then only where there 
 is a want of moral beauty, and conse- 
 Quently of voluntary truth ; or when rel- 
 ative essential beauty is wanting as, for 
 instance, where one man is deformed, he 
 lacks the beauty which belongs to his 
 species, beauty which should exist but is
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 249 
 
 wanting, and which, therefore, begets de- 
 formity. Hence sensible forms are beau- 
 tiful only when they express moral or es- 
 sential invisible beauty. The figure, 
 then, which represents the human coun- 
 tenance will be beautiful in proportion to 
 the majesty, benevolence, generosity, and 
 other amiable dispositions portrayed ; 
 and deformed in proportion as it expresses 
 a want of virtue. But it may be objected 
 against our theory, that an ugly face often 
 carries a fine mind, and therefore it is 
 not true that sensible forms are beautiful 
 only when they express invisible beauty. 
 To this we answer that the form may 
 often express a different thing from that 
 to which it is joined. The spirit of a 
 demon may dwell in the body of a dog ; 
 hence this objection does not contradict 
 our theory. At any rate, the objection* 
 only gives us an exceptional case in na- 
 ture ; for, as a rule, the face is an index 
 to the mind and character, just as the 
 sound in the musical composition of
 
 250 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 a great artist is ever an echo of the 
 sense. 
 
 All created beauty, then, as well as all 
 created truth and goodness, is derived 
 from God. God is the fulcrum on which 
 both the psychological and ontological 
 scales of philosophy depend. He is the 
 alpha and omega of philosophy as of the- 
 ology ; He is the beginning and the end.
 
 QUESTION SEVENTEENTH. 
 
 ARE THERE BUT TWO REAL CAUSES IN THE 
 WORLD MAN AND GOD? 
 
 [HERE is a system in philosophy 
 that has some affinities with that 
 of Berkeley and Kant, but which 
 is nevertheless substantially distinct from 
 them. It is called the system of occa- 
 sional causes. Its partisans are Male- 
 branche and Leibnitz ; but Leibnitz gives 
 it another name and new modifications. 
 He calls it the system of preestablished 
 harmony. The fundamental tenets of this 
 system are : 1st, that only God can act 
 outside of ourselves ; 2d, that all othe'r 
 beings are incapable of exercising any 
 influence on each other; 3d, that it is 
 God who produces all the modifications 
 in all created substances; so that neither
 
 252 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 man's thoughts, nor his volitions, nor his 
 sensations, nor any other of his acts is 
 caused by any external finite being, but 
 only by the immediate and direct action 
 of God on his soul. He is, as it were, a 
 harp placed in the hands of God, and 
 only God's fingers can touch this harp 
 and awake its latent harmony. These 
 principles, if true, lead to extraordinary 
 consequences ; for it will not be then mere 
 poetry to say that the voice of God is 
 heard in the rustling of the wind or the 
 roaring of the thunder; that his omnipo- 
 tence appears in the upheavings of the 
 ocean; that his majesty is emblemed in 
 the cloud-capped mountains, and his 
 beauty manifested in the flowery prairies ; 
 but all will be philosophic truth. Ac- 
 cording to this system, created things are 
 only causes of their own internal acts ; 
 and especially with regard to their influ- 
 ence on each other, they are mere occa- 
 sions ; hence, it is not the fire that pro- 
 duces the sensation of heat, it is God, and
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 253 
 
 the fire is but an occasion, and so on. In 
 an especial manner can this system be 
 applied to the reciprocal action of sonl 
 and body. The body does not act on the 
 soul, it is God ; since the soul and the 
 body are causes only of their internal 
 acts, and with regard to the external act 
 they are but occasions. Leibnitz supposes 
 that the soul and the body were created 
 in such a manner that the actions of the 
 one would necessarily awake harmonious 
 echoes in the other, as if two clocks were 
 connected by a chain, and then, after hav- 
 ing been wound up, were set in motion by 
 the maker, so that every stroke in the 
 one would cause a harmonious stroke in 
 the other, and all this in virtue of a pre- 
 established harmony between them. This 
 modification which Leibnitz gave the sys- 
 tem of occasional causes can not be ad- 
 mitted, for it destroys free-will; though 
 there is nothing in the system, as it is 
 given by Malebranche, that would abso- 
 lutely prevent its admission. The differ
 
 254 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 ence between this system and that of 
 Berkeley and Kant is easily seen. Berkeley 
 and Kant deny the existence of bodies. 
 Malebranche, on the contrary, admits the 
 existence of bodies, but denies their im- 
 mediate influence. He argues that God 
 creates us in act at every instant of our 
 lives. The modifications produced in our 
 souls are caused by God. Creatures can 
 not cause these ; for if they did, creatures 
 could create. A modification in the soul 
 is a creation of something new, not exist- 
 ing before, and no creature can have the 
 power of producing such an effect. 
 
 From the questions thus far treated we 
 are led to conclude that there are but 
 two beings in the universe that can pro- 
 duce their own acts God and man. 
 Man's acts are those of his will rather 
 than those of his intellect. He should be 
 defined to be, therefore, not so much a 
 rational animal as an animal possessing 
 free-will. 
 
 Intellect does not specifically distin-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 255 
 
 guish man from the rest of creation. 
 All creatures have a certain amount of 
 intellectual life. The elements of matter 
 are spiritual. Properly speaking, there 
 is no such thing in the world as matter 
 understood in the vulgar sense of the 
 word. The elements of matter are sim- 
 ple. Their coexistence it is which makes 
 extension. They all participate in the 
 divinity, and hence have something of 
 the being of God. Now in God all is 
 spiritual. All creatures are therefore 
 spiritual, and participate in different de- 
 grees of intelligence. Intelligence, there- 
 fore, is not the specific attribute of man. 
 Nor is sensibility. He has less of it in 
 many cases than brutes. The mother's 
 love for her child is not essentially differ- 
 ent from that of the brute for its young. 
 In both it is instinct ; sensibility, there- 
 fore, does not specifically distinguish man 
 from the rest of creation ; but will does. 
 It is the will that makes the man. Man 
 has free-will, and in this he is most like
 
 256 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 God. It is this will that constitutes him 
 lord of creation. It is his power of 
 choosing his own acts that makes him 
 above all created earthly beings, makes 
 him a mystery in creation. He is not 
 the mere occasion of his volitions, but 
 their real cause. How he is so is a mys- 
 tery which no human intellect can solve. 
 The mystery of free-will, the mystery of 
 creation, and the mystery of ideal intui- 
 tion are three in one. They are the 
 trinity in unity of philosophy ; the three 
 great mysteries of the natural order, all 
 centring in the grand mystery of creation, 
 or distinction between God and the uni- 
 verse. 
 
 We shall now conclude our work by an 
 investigation into the spirit of the age. Our 
 views, set forth in this investigation, when 
 compared with those preceding it, may 
 show that the study of metaphysics, so 
 far from injuring Christian faith, serves 
 only to make it stronger.
 
 QUESTION EIGHTEENTH. 
 
 WHY IS THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE ANTI-CHRIS- 
 TIAN AND ANTI-PHILOSOPHIC ? 
 
 |VERY man given to reflection 
 must notice something in the 
 spirit of the age not in accord 
 with the spirit of true philosophy. There 
 is a tendency in our century to act con- 
 trary to the spirit of religion; and this 
 tendency manifest's itself in education as 
 well as in action; in the school, in the 
 senate-chamber, in law and politics. This 
 anti-christian, which is the anti-philosophic 
 spirit, is the offspring of what may be 
 called a tendency to paganism. We are 
 reviving paganism in every thing. There 
 is a great difference, however, between 
 ancient and modern paganism; and yet 
 in idea and tendencies they are the same.
 
 258 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 Our modern pagans do not, it is true, 
 adore statues of Jupiter, Venus, and Bac- 
 chus ; but they render worship to the 
 ideas of those false deities. There are no 
 sacrifices of human bodies, but there are 
 of human minds: Two of the old augurs 
 could not meet without smiling at each 
 other's knavery; yet our modern priests of 
 paganism, with the greatest gravity, incul- 
 cate their doctrines and believe in their 
 truth. There is a revival of defunct paganism 
 manifested in false history and philoso- 
 phy, and in attempts to do away with the 
 necessity of revelation and redemption. 
 Men preach the doctrine of human per- 
 fectibility; that nature alone suffices to 
 itself, and that Christianity should not 
 interfere with its action. The intellect is 
 all-powerful. In Germany it has created 
 God in the school of Fichte and Schel- 
 ling. We have doctors who preach the 
 sufficiency of natural religion, like Jules 
 Simon ; and others who make out Christ 
 a myth or an impostor, like Ernest Renan ;
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS, 259 
 
 and others who teach the necessity of 
 civil Christianity, like the so-called libera- 
 tors of Italy. In short, modern paganism 
 is like the ancient in all but idolatry. 
 "We should have, however, even this beau- 
 ty of paganism among us were it not for 
 the fact that men living under the influ- 
 ence of Christianity can never throw away 
 completely all their Christian education. 
 It has often been noticed that the exist- 
 ence and unity of the Church is the indi- 
 rect cause of the non-dissolution of secta- 
 rian Christianity. All sects unite in their 
 opposition to the Church; and if this 
 cause of vitality were removed, they would 
 shortly decompose in virtue of the princi- 
 ple of dissolution which is at the bottom 
 of them all. For this same reason there 
 can be no thorough infidel in a Christian 
 community. Christian Catholic ideas are 
 afloat around him, and he can not drown 
 them. They enter his mind even against 
 his will. He breathes in Christian air, 
 and it helps to give him life. Hence,
 
 260 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 modern paganism is a monstrous medley 
 of Christian ideas with pagan inclinations 
 and intentions. The radical principle of 
 paganism is pride, which preaches the 
 self-sufficiency of human nature, and leads, 
 consequently, to the entire separation of 
 man from his Creator. When this sepa- 
 ration took place, two conclusions natu- 
 rally followed ; man lost self-knowledge ; 
 and no longer understood the end for 
 which the inferior beings of creation were 
 produced. 
 
 Nothing in nature is explicable without 
 the idea of the Creator ; this idea is the 
 keystone of all knowledge. It explains 
 every thing. But when man lost it, every 
 thing became a mystery to him. He 
 thought by separating himself from God 
 he would become free, as Adam thought 
 he would acquire more knowledge by 
 eating the forbidden fruit and become as 
 a god ; but itfstead of freedom he found 
 slavery; instead of true knowledge he 
 lost much of what he had hitherto pos-
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 261 
 
 sessed. He was created above nature, 
 but by separation from God he became 
 nature's serf, the bondsman of creatures, 
 the slave of his senses and passions. Sla- 
 very was introduced into the family and 
 into the state, and man forgot his dig- 
 nity. He introduced vice in the seat of 
 virtue, and made idols of his base pas- 
 sions. This was the. consequence of man's 
 separation 'from God, the fruit of his self- 
 sufficiency. 
 
 St. Thomas in his " Summa Theologica," 
 asks himself the question, Why the Re- 
 deemer did not come into the world soon- 
 er ? Why did he not choose to be born 
 immediately after the fall, instead of 
 waiting till forty centuries after that 
 event ? And the great doctor gives 
 this answer ; he says God wished to 
 let man try his natural strength, to see 
 what he could effect. God wished to 
 let man learn a lesson in humility from 
 the proof of the incapacity of his nature 
 for any thing great or virtuous derived
 
 262 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 from so long an experience. Yet even 
 four thousand years did not suffice to 
 teach that great lesson ; for even in the 
 nineteenth century after the coming 
 of Christ men seem to be still ignorant 
 of the weakness 'of their natural forces. 
 This self-sufficiency is directly opposed to 
 the economy of redemption ; it is the re- 
 fusal of the helper, Christ, and of his 
 Church. In ancient paganism, therefore, 
 we find what human nature does when 
 left to itself; and yet not altogether to 
 itself. For the ancient pagans had many 
 revealed traditions which were carried 
 away by the different peoples at the con- 
 fusion of tongues in the building of 
 Babel. Paganism was the continuation 
 of Adam's sin; it was egotism, natur- 
 alism ; the substitution of human nature 
 in the place of God. St. Jerome tells us 
 that paganism was symbolized in the 
 parable of the prodigal son. Whether 
 this be true of ancient paganism or not, 
 it certainly applies very aptly to modern
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 263 
 
 paganism. Our modern pagans leave 
 the house of their parent, the Church of 
 Christ, and they go into a far off country, 
 and they are obliged to feed on husks. 
 They separate themselves as much as pos- 
 sible from God, by sundering religion 
 from civil government; the temporal 
 from the eternal ; literature and the arts 
 from religious influence. They make us 
 a history without admitting a divine pro- 
 vidence. They make us natural politics, 
 natural morality, natural economy, and 
 they exclude the supernatural from their 
 philosophy. In a word, they separate 
 faith from reason, earth from heaven ; and 
 the consequence is, that they feed on 
 husks. They speak, write, and act like 
 pagans. They praise the material profi- 
 ciency of a country, and call it flourishing, 
 though it be an enemy of truth and of 
 Christianity. In their ideas a man may 
 be a gentleman without religion. The 
 principle of sectarian Christianity is iden- 
 tical with that of paganism, for sectarian-
 
 264 cuAious QUESTIONS. 
 
 isrn is autology or self- worship. Reli- 
 gious self-sufficiency is, therefore, a help- 
 er of pagan naturalism. Hence in many 
 countries the old traditions of Christian 
 faith have been rejected by the govern- 
 ments; hospitals, churches, and universi- 
 ties have been secularized, and religion 
 thrown in the background as if it were 
 merely of secondary importance. The 
 strangest feature in modern paganism is 
 that men of intellect and rank are among 
 its greatest supporters ; yet it does not 
 require much logic to discover its absurd- 
 ity. God had but one end in view in 
 creating this world of ours ; and man, the 
 lord of creation, has but one end also. 
 Yet there are two orders, the natural and 
 supernatural; but not separate though 
 they are distinct. They are distinct in 
 nature, and in the beings that constitute 
 each ; but they have the same ultimate 
 end, though their proximate ends are of- 
 ten different. The ultimate end of all 
 things is God; the ultimate end of man
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 265 
 
 is the possession of God. As far then as 
 man is concerned, both nature and grace 
 tend to the one ultimate end; nature 
 leading to it by being subordinate to 
 grace. These are elementary principles 
 of theology and even of philosophy. 
 For how could it be otherwise ? If you 
 admit the existence of the supernatural 
 order, as a fact, which is as incontrovert- 
 ible as the existence of the natural.order, 
 you must admit the relation of subordina- 
 tion of which we speak. The lower or- 
 der must be subordinate to the higher, 
 because nature must obey grace ; the nat- 
 ural order must be subservient to the su- 
 pernatural. Hence the state is below the 
 church; the temporal is inferior to the 
 eternal ; religion must hold the first place 
 in all things, as it is it that tends most 
 directly to the ultimate end of creation, 
 and it is through religion, that is, through 
 Christ, that all other creatures attain 
 their ultimate end. A system that would 
 put the orders of grace and nature on the
 
 266 CUBIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 same footing is as absurd as one that 
 would make- grace obey nature, or even 
 deny its existence altogether. God would 
 never create two perfectly equal moral 
 forces for the pleasure of witnessing their 
 continual struggle. He has made all 
 things in order, and hence he has made 
 the natural subservient to the super- 
 natural order, just as in Christ, the ex- 
 emplar of creation, there are two natures ; 
 but the human is subservient to the di- 
 vine, and both are made one in their end 
 by the divine Person who rules both. 
 Any system, therefore, is pagan in prin- 
 ciple which separates the state from the 
 church, or makes the temporal equal to 
 spiritual. Autolatria, or sectarianism, is 
 pagan, for the reason that every man is 
 his own God, for he is his own judge of 
 faith. 
 
 This spirit of modern paganism extols 
 ancient paganism, its theories and inspi- 
 rations ; and decries Christianity, its arts 
 and sciences, its doctrine and moral code.
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 267 
 
 Gibbon is one of its incarnations. He 
 has many disciples. They .often assert 
 facts that are true, but derive from them 
 conclusions that are false. It is true 
 that, in a mere material point of view, 
 Greece and Rome produced works of art 
 or exercised influence unknown to any 
 Christian nation. Christianity may nat 
 have produced a poet like Homer, an 
 orator like Demosthenes, or a sculptor 
 like Phidias. But this proves nothing 
 against Christianity, nor should it cause 
 us to desire a revival of ancient paganism. 
 The end of man is not to write poetry or 
 make statues, and hence the civilization 
 and progress of a people are not to be esti- 
 mated according to their excellence in 
 literature or sculpture. Religion is the 
 only true civilizer. ' The index of true 
 progress is the state of morality; the 
 knowledge of God and of moral obliga- 
 tions. True progress does not reject the 
 arts and sciences ; but it keeps them in 
 their proper place, it makes them of
 
 268 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 secondary importance. Progress is ten- 
 dency to an end. Human progress is 
 tendency to the end of man, to God, by 
 means of true religion. If this assertion 
 be true, then we can not admire so much 
 the civilization of the ancient Greeks and 
 Romans. They were ignorant of the true 
 religion ; they had false notions of God 
 and of man's destiny. They admitted 
 that the greatest science was the know- 
 ledge of self, and they had an aphorism to 
 that effect, yvuOe oeavrov. But what was 
 their self-knowledge? They were igno- 
 rant of the destiny of man's soul ; they 
 doubted its immortality; they were un- 
 certain of the existence of a future state ; 
 and their greatest philosophers were un- 
 able to answer those simple questions 
 regarding God and the soul which the 
 Christian child of eleven summers can 
 now solve with the greatest facility. 
 Arnobius speaks of this ignorance when 
 he says : " Potest quispiam explicare mor- 
 talium id quod Socrates ille explicare
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 2G9 
 
 nequit in Phsedone ? homo quid sit ? unde 
 sit ? in quos usus prolatus sit ? cujus sit 
 excogitatus ingenio? quid in mundo 
 faciat ? Cur malorum tanta experiatur 
 examina ?"* And Lactantius tells us that 
 they only told the truth when they ad- 
 mitted their complete ignorance regarding 
 the most necessary knowledge. "Nun- 
 quam illi tarn veridici fuerunt quam cum 
 sententiam de sua ignorantia dederunt ?" 
 Div. Ins. III. 2. Pagan excellence is the 
 excellence of matter and sense. Pagan art 
 could form the statue of a nude Venus, 
 but never create the likeness of a chaste 
 Madonna ; their excellence was devoid of 
 the true ideal ; they were masters in the 
 art of war and in the efforts of imagina- 
 tion, but they fell far below the standard 
 of human dignity, on the score of moral- 
 
 * " Can any of them explain what Socrates was unable 
 to explain in Phaedo ? What is man ? Whence does he 
 come ? For what purpose was he created ? What has 
 he to do in the world ? Why does he suffer so many 
 ills?"
 
 270 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 ity and intellectual truth. Their great- 
 est god was a libertine, as Ovid tells us. 
 " Quam multas matres fecerit ille Deus." 
 Why then laud so much ancient pagan- 
 ism, when its only excellence was mate- 
 rial progress? If material ingenuity is to 
 be the measure of greatness, is not man 
 surpassed by the lower animals ? He can 
 make no edifice so perfect in architecture 
 as the hive of the bee or the cell of the 
 beaver. He can produce no music equal 
 to the warbling of the canary or the 
 nightingale; even an inanimate machine 
 will surpass him in some respects. The 
 light of the sun in the camera of the 
 photographer will produce the likeness 
 of the human countenance in a few sec- 
 onds more exactly than all mankind could 
 ever effect. Yet it is for the sake of 
 material progress that many wish to re- 
 vive ancient paganism. The cause of 
 the success of paganism in the material 
 order is easily accounted for. The pagan 
 mind was imbedded in sense ; it knew no-
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 271 
 
 thing of the life to come, or not enough 
 to make it give special attention to the 
 future state. Its principle was the Epi- 
 curean one of Horace, " Carpe diem," en- 
 joy the present : 
 
 " Pluck the rosebud while you may ! 
 
 Old Time is ever flying ; 
 The bud that blooms for thee to-day, 
 To-morrow may be dying." 
 
 Hence the attention of pagan genius 
 was paid solely to the present life, to mat- 
 ter, to sense, and not to the ideal, spiritual, 
 or supersensible. Hence materialism and 
 paganism are twin sisters. It is no wonder, 
 then, that the pagans succeeded in this 
 world, since all their attention was direct- 
 ed to it. But how deplorable was their 
 moral condition may be seen from the fact 
 that slavery existed everywhere ; and that 
 Aristotle taught that it was bgth ration- 
 al and necessary. These, then, were some 
 of the effects of that separation from God 
 which constitutes the essence of paganism 
 whether ancient or modern.
 
 272 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 The same effects show themselves now 
 in many countries of the world. The re- 
 vival of pagan ideas has had many sup- 
 porters in Europe and America. The 
 theories and theorizers that have been 
 disturbing the good order of society in 
 Europe for many years socialists, phi- 
 lanthropists, pantheists are men imbued 
 with pagan ideas. The ideas of Eu- 
 rope before what is called in France 
 the "Renaissance," were for the most 
 part Christian, but since that period pa- 
 gan ideas have become prevalent. Too 
 much attention began to be given to mere 
 profane literature. The classics were 
 studied at the expense of the catechism, 
 and gradually men's thoughts became im- 
 bued with the pagan spirit ; sound phi- 
 losophy was neglected; men could not 
 reason clearly because they were not well 
 grounded in the first principles of things. 
 Thus modern paganism came into exist- 
 once, and it still flourishes. It was the 
 ruling spirit of the first French revolution,
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 273 
 
 and was impersonated by the " Goddess 
 of Reason." It has filled Germany and 
 France with false philosophy ; we can see 
 its traces in the works of Fichte, Schelling, 
 Cousin, and Jules Simon. It has been 
 working mischief in England for the 
 last two centuries; it has disturbed the 
 peace of Italy filled that beautiful land 
 with demagogues, radicals, and brigands; 
 it has even laid sacrilegious hands on the 
 crown of the great Pontiff of Christianity. 
 Indeed it seems to us as if modern pagan- 
 ism were impersonated in the spirit of 
 opposition to the temporal power of the 
 Pope ; for this opposition is essentially un- 
 christian. It aims at the destruction of 
 civil government, the rights of justice, 
 the law of God and of man. All justice- 
 loving men admit this. The opposers of 
 the temporal power start from the pagan 
 principle of separation of the temporal 
 from the spiritual ; they are either bigots 
 or infidels, or vain and frothy theorizers, 
 or corrupt politicians, or Machiavelian
 
 274: CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 statesmen, or restless demagogues ; and if 
 they be Christians, their faith sits as light- 
 ly on their conscience as a feather on the 
 back of a whirlwind; they are all per- 
 vaded by the pestilential spirit of modern 
 paganism. When a government becomes 
 indifferent in religious matters, wishes to 
 assume supreme control over the asylums 
 of suffering humanity, secularizes churches 
 and schools, caring only for the mere lit- 
 erary or arithmetical education of its sub- 
 jects ; when it makes laws infringing on 
 the rights of conscience or property; 
 when it interferes with the sacraments 
 and the rites of the Church, then it is pa- 
 gan in spirit. It endeavors to prevent 
 men from attaining the end of creation; 
 it ceases to be a free government, or ful- 
 fill the end for which all governments 
 were instituted. Practical applications 
 of these assertions will not fail to present 
 themselves to the mind of the serious 
 reader. It is this spirit of paganism 
 which threatens to overturn all order in
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 275 
 
 society. In ancient pagan nations, where 
 the poor were comparatively ignorant, 
 and hence did not know their rights, it 
 was easy to hold them in bondage ; Ibut 
 now things have changed. Discontent in 
 the lower orders of society can no longer 
 be smothered ; education has become gen- 
 eral, and, unfortunately, that element, 
 without which it is doubtful whether sci- 
 ence be a boon or a curse, has been omit- 
 ted. Religious education has been sep- 
 arated from secular instruction. Without 
 religion the poor are unable to control 
 their passions or bear their hard lot. 
 They see wealth around them, and with- 
 out religion they see no reason why it 
 should not be divided among them. Why 
 should they starve while their neighbors 
 roll in splendor and luxury? If the 
 poor were ignorant, they might not ob- 
 serve the disproportion between their con- 
 dition and that of the aristocracy, nor 
 feel it so keenly. But they are partially 
 educated, they feel their power, and not
 
 276 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 Laving the restraining influence of reli- 
 gion to console them, they use this pow- 
 er. They have done so in Paris ; and if 
 they do not always succeed, it is only the 
 bayonet that prevents them. This is one 
 of the dangers o modern paganism, the 
 subversion of stable governments; the 
 effect of unchristian education. It is pa- 
 ganism in education which begets restless- 
 ness among the masses, so that "Nemo 
 contentus sorte sua vivat." Those, there- 
 fore, who have been so strong in defend- 
 ing the system of pagan education 
 adopted in the state schools of Prussia, 
 England, and our own countiy, can hardly 
 have reflected on the pernicious tendency 
 of those institutions. Even the reading 
 of the Bible, the great book of Christian- 
 ity, will not counterbalance the danger- 
 ous results of p/agan education. Under 
 this system the child learns every thing 
 but the law of God ; he unlearns in the 
 society of the school what he had learned 
 from his parents. He may have certain
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 277 
 
 general ideas of right and wrong, cer- 
 tain vague ideas regarding Christianity 
 and the economy of redemption; but 
 there is nothing solid in his mind, nothing 
 
 O 7 ^j 
 
 fixed. He does not learn to understand 
 correctly any one dogma of the Christian 
 dispensation. His mind is a religious va- 
 cuum, or at least- there is but a religious 
 mist in his intellect. What does he learn 
 under a pagan system of education that 
 will press down his rising passions ? 
 What precept of positive virtue ? What 
 principle of self-restraint? What does 
 he learn in a school removed from direct 
 and positive religious influence to make 
 him obedient, honest, chaste, a good cit- 
 izen and a good Christian? Experience 
 is teaching us every day the dire effects 
 of paganism in education ; it begets pa- 
 ganism in religion. Yes, the age is pa- 
 ganizing Christianity. Christianity is a 
 positive religion, with a fixed code of 
 dogmatic truths and moral principles. 
 The religion of Christ, the supreme truth,
 
 278 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 could not be a vague and unfinished reli 
 gion. He taught virtue by facts ; He re- 
 vealed dogmas that should be received 
 as facts ; his moral principles are facts ; 
 men should receive them. He made the 
 Church their guardian; men should re- 
 ceive truth through the hands of the 
 Church. But the contrary spirit is 
 spreading now. Christianity, if you ex- 
 cept its Catholic form, is paganized. 
 From the pulpit preachers hold forth 
 against dogmas and precepts. Religion 
 is said to be every man's private business ; 
 'there is nothing fixed in it ; truth is rel- 
 ative ; your Christianity is true and mine 
 is true, and' yet we disagree wofully. 
 Religion is made to consist in sympathy 
 or feeling ; it is no longer an affair of rea- 
 son and will, but imagination. It is the 
 poetic sentiment. It is not any longer 
 masculine but feminine. It is not for 
 men, but for spinsters and tender-heart- 
 ed young ladies. Does not experience 
 teach that this is the character of the
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 279 
 
 fashionable pulpit eloquence of our conn, 
 try? 
 
 Another proof of the revival of pagan- 
 ism is found in the change of sentiment 
 manifested toward woman. In ancient 
 paganism she was the mere slave of 
 man's appetites. She is so in Mohammed- 
 anism; and she is becoming so again. 
 Modern paganism in appearance exalts 
 woman ; it makes her even the superior 
 of man ; denies that she should be obe- 
 dient to her husband ; opens to her the 
 liberal professions, and allows her to 
 mount the rostrum or the pulpit. But 
 what does this mean ? Does it acknow- 
 ledge woman to be man's 'spiritual help- 
 mate, or is it not another way to worship 
 sensuality ? Free-loveism, communism, 
 and spiritualism are but the expression 
 of modern paganism. It is not through 
 real esteem or respect that woman is now 
 honored so excessively, but from self- 
 love. Men worship their passions in 
 this woman-worship. Ancient paganism
 
 280 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 identified human passions in their gods. 
 Jupiter was licentious, and the other di- 
 vinities followed his good example. 
 Modern paganism is too enlightened to 
 worship the old idols, but it hides the 
 deformity of its nature under the vail of 
 woman-worship. It lives in "*Woman's 
 Bights Conventions" and among the 
 disciples of spiritualism. Divorce is 
 common. The sanctity of marriage is 
 despised, and the restrictions of law 
 laughed at. The family tie may be sun- 
 dered even according to law law which 
 of its very nature ought to mean limit- 
 ation and restriction. The Christian 
 may, indeed, lead an evil life, but still 
 his principles are right. There is always 
 hope for his amendment, so long as his 
 faith is unhurt. He yields to passions 
 more from weakness than from malice; 
 he will seldom praise vice, although he 
 himself may be vicious. Though the 
 flesh may rule him, the spirit is willing 
 to acknowledge the truth. But modern
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 281 
 
 paganism erects vice into the dignity of 
 a principle. He that gives up his Chris- 
 tian faith endeavors to sanction the grati- 
 fication of his passions by making us be- 
 lieve that virtue which we hold to be 
 vice, and that falsehood which we hold 
 to be truth. There is a great difference 
 between being bad and having bad 
 principles. Few men are as good as 
 their good principles; and few are as 
 bad as the bad principles which they 
 hold. It is principles, good or bad, that 
 influence states and individuals. That 
 state of man is always the worst when, 
 not content with being wicked himself, 
 he endeavors to corrupt others by. dis- 
 seminating immoral principles in society. 
 Hence the first pagans, ignorant as they 
 were, and only thinking of gratifying 
 the passion of the hour, were far less 
 guilty than their enlightened philosophic 
 successors, who in cold blood teach im- 
 morality in their works of philosophy, 
 sugar-coating, as it were, the pill to make
 
 282 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 its bitterness less sensible. Hence, de- 
 praved as were the mobs of the French 
 Revolution the children of modern pa- 
 ganism, who worshiped the goddess of 
 Reason at Notre Dame far more heinous 
 was the offense 'of the crowd of philo- 
 sophers and writers of the last two cen- 
 turies who preached the deification of 
 nature and sense in their works. Modern 
 paganism, like ancient paganism, is sen- 
 sual. Hence it denies virginity to be a 
 perfection, and scoffs at celibacy. It 
 denies marriage to be a sacrament, and 
 hence tends to debase woman. Woman 
 under the pagan institutions was merely 
 MULIER or fcemina / she was far below 
 man. Under Christianity she has been 
 named mistress and lady. The greatest 
 creature that ever existed was a woman. 
 Christianity teaches this, and hence the 
 dignity of woman is great under the 
 Christian law. Now by raising up wo- 
 man virtue has been raised up.. We 
 must learn to respect woman as Chris-
 
 CUEIOUS QUESTIONS. 283 
 
 tians. We can not look upon her as a 
 mere mass of soulless matter, as Moham- 
 medanism teaches ; nor make an idol of 
 her with modern paganism, which makes 
 her an idol to personify sensuality. Nor 
 is the exaggerated respect for woman 
 manifested by unchristian philosophers 
 in our times substantially different from 
 the pagan view of the sex. The parti- 
 sans of " Woman's Rights" do not defend 
 their theories from the fact that they 
 really believe woman to be the superior 
 or even the equal of man ; but rathe? be- 
 cause, their principles being founded on 
 sensuality, they deify woman, who is in 
 their eyes the personification of sensual 
 delight. It is the same spirit as that 
 which put the Goddess of Reason on the 
 altar of Notre Dame during the French 
 Revolution. There is a mixture of Chris- 
 tian respect and pagan brutality in this 
 modern apotheosis of woman. And this 
 modern paganism which debases, while 
 it seems to exalt the dignity of woman,
 
 284- CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 produces the most direful consequences in 
 the family, and in the state as well as in 
 religion. The daughters are trained up 
 in the principles of their parents. Society 
 gives us women without virtue and men 
 who could not esteem it. In religion 
 woman usurps a position that is not hers 
 by any law. She mounts the pulpit, and 
 men of intelligence and standing in so- 
 ciety listen to her, daring to speak 
 where good taste and an apostle tell her 
 to be silent. She enters the political 
 arena, and thousands listen to her. The 
 daughters of the land are set an example 
 of effrontery in the women lecturers of 
 the day. The press, which should be one 
 of the guardians of public morality, ap- 
 plauds the disgusting spectacle of woman 
 throwing away her modesty, the only 
 true dignity of her sex. But the press 
 could not be expected to do otherwise, 
 since it too is infected by modern pagan- 
 ism. What is its tone throughout the 
 world at the present time ? As a rule,
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 285 
 
 the great organs of public opinion are 
 unchristian. They are so in Europe as 
 well as in America. They attack re- 
 ligion ; preach revolutionism ; ignore the 
 laws of eternal justice and truth ; care 
 nothing for the observances of Christian 
 politeness ; despise charity, and fill the 
 country with scandals, falsehoods, and 
 disgusting items and obscenities to such 
 an extent that no man who cares for the 
 morality of his children can in conscience 
 permit them the promiscuous reading of 
 the newspapers daily published. Nor 
 are the weekly magazines better than the 
 daily journals. You find sickly senti- 
 mentality in most of them; enervating 
 tales if not immoral novels. Yet what 
 must the state of society be when we 
 consider the immense multitude that de- 
 vour daily and weekly the contents of 
 such a licentious press ? Is not society 
 thoroughly paganized ? Yet we are told 
 that there is much natural morality still 
 left ; that the great vices are not com-
 
 286 OUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 mitted ; that persons are more gentle- 
 manly now than ever they were. In a 
 word, natural religion and morality are 
 praised, and persons assert them to be suffi- 
 cient for the preservation of order and 
 society. Now, as for this natural mo- 
 rality, few will be found so deficient in 
 judgment as to believe in it. Though 
 we know it was an error of the Jan- 
 senists to deny the existence of natural 
 virtues, and although but one or two sects 
 admit " the total depravity" system, still 
 in practice and as a matter of fact, we 
 feel that little reliance is to be placed 
 in human nature bereft of God's grace. 
 Man's spiritual nature is very weak. Con 
 cupiscence is strong. Let temptations 
 arise, let the occasions present them- 
 selves, and how long will natural morality 
 stand the siege ? And though it may 
 stand a longer assault when it has to con- 
 tend with less violent temptations, it will 
 certainly fall before greater attacks. If 
 we ask ourselves, What is the cause of
 
 CUKIOUS QUESTIONS. 287 
 
 modern paganism ? the answer must be, 
 self-worship. The tendency to paganize 
 every thing grew strongest from the pe- 
 riod when men made themselves each the 
 judge of his religious belief. 
 . The family is the groundwork of civil 
 society; if the family be Christian, the 
 state will be so in like manner ; and if the 
 family be corrupt, the state can not remain 
 long untarnished. That which gives 
 sanctity to the family, and consequently 
 strength to civil society, was the Catholic 
 sacrament of marriage ; and when the re- 
 formers destroyed it, they sowed the seeds 
 of revolution in Europe. Revolution in 
 the family begets revolution in the state. 
 When you allow the separation of man 
 and wife, you allow the right of revolu- 
 tion in the family, and the state must 
 feel the effects of the doctrine. Modern 
 paganism may then be laid at the door 
 of sectarianism, so much alike are all 
 errors, and such is the character of error 
 that it must of necessity engender vice.
 
 288 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 The influence of all speculative doctrines 
 is felt in tlie practical order. Truth 
 begets virtue. The true, the good, and 
 the beautiful are sisters ; and so are error, 
 vice, and deformity. They imply each 
 other. Virtue is truth in practice, and 
 beauty in its splendor. Vice is the 
 legitimate offspring of error. 
 
 Hence the speculative doctrines of 
 modern paganism have produced and 
 they are producing the most direful results 
 in the moral order. As modern paganism 
 is falsehood, in contradistinction to Chris- 
 tianity, which is truth ; so the effects of 
 paganism must be immorality, as the 
 consequence of Christianity must be 
 virtue. Modern paganism, in endeavor- 
 ing to destroy Christianity, and in chang- 
 ing the principles that govern society, 
 has begotten another excess in regard to 
 love of country. It has given birth to 
 false patriotism, and tends to make men 
 believe that their country is of greater 
 importance than either God or religion.
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 289 
 
 There is such a thing as true love of 
 country; but it must be Christian in 
 order to be true. The country is not an 
 idol to be worshiped, but a society to- 
 ward which we have duties and obliga- 
 tions. All obligations centre in one, 
 namely, in that which we have to God, 
 as our Creator and supreme Lord. "We 
 have no obligations to our fellow- 
 men only inasmuch as we are bound 
 to them by the law of God. Men are 
 not the property of the state, for there 
 are individual rights as well as state 
 rights. True patriotism is the Christian 
 love of our neighbor. It is founded on 
 the love of family ; for the family is the 
 groundwork of civil society. Hence, 
 where there is no true love of family, as 
 in modern pagan legislation, which admits 
 divorce, there can be no true patriotism. 
 The patriot begins by loving his parish 
 and ends by loving his country. He loves 
 his country because he loves his family, 
 his birthplace, and his province. He is
 
 290 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 like the Vendean, " Breton en France, et 
 Francais a 1'etranger." Politicians, in 
 the modern sense of the word, are not 
 true patriots; they are selfish dema- 
 gogues actuated by party spirit, not by 
 Christian charity. In Sparta, the child- 
 ren were the property of the state, and 
 the -modern system of education tends to 
 a similar result. The true theory of 
 politics, that is to say, the Christian the- 
 ory, puts every thing in its right place, 
 in regard to the divine order of things. 
 The pagan idea of patriotism does not 
 give us true independence, for it sacrifices 
 the family and individual rights. Chris- 
 tianity defines and limits the rights of 
 the temporal without putting them above 
 the spiritual; it proclaims the liberty of 
 the subject, denounces tyranny, and re- 
 sists usurpation. For the pagan, the 
 state is all-powerful ; for the Christian, its 
 power is subject to reason and a higher 
 law. The true Christian only can say, 
 "Tu solus Dominus, tu solus altissimus,"
 
 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 291 
 
 thus teaching a lesson of humility to 
 rulers. How far from crouching or ser- 
 vility were our good, stout, yet pious 
 forefathers ! Modern politics, therefore, 
 which make the country an idol, before 
 which every right must be sacrificed, are 
 also pagan. Paganism, in fine, pervades 
 all society, its teachings and its actions. 
 In a word, the spirit of the nineteenth 
 century is thoroughly pagan. 
 
 How can this spirit be counteracted? 
 One great natural means of stemming the 
 torrent of pagan ideas is to oblige men 
 to exact and serious study. A sound, 
 precise course of mental philosophy, in 
 collegiate education, in which right prin- 
 ciples regarding law and morality would 
 be inculcated, could do much toward this 
 object. Logic, metaphysics, ethics, and 
 aesthetics should be carefully taught and 
 deeply studied. But this means is not 
 sufficient. It can do something ; it can do 
 much ; but not every thing. However 
 much we may esteem that great science
 
 292 CURIOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 of reason, which we call philosophy ; and 
 however much we may appreciate its 
 utility, we are conscious of its defects. 
 Philosophy alone, reason alone, can not 
 put pagan ideas out of society. We must 
 have recourse to 'a supernatural means. 
 Experience teaches in the present, as in 
 the past, that paganism never yields to 
 any force but that of Christian faith. 
 You may stagger paganism with a syllo- 
 gism, but you can not kill it without the 
 sign of the Cross.
 
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