il'ii!' i'ililllil^ THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES Social Justice A Message to Suffering Humanity By Percy Vivian Jones Cochrane Publishing Company- Tribune Building New York 1910 Copyright, 1910, by PERCY VIVIAN JONES. ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL, LONDON, ENGLAND. PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 1 1 n CONTENTS Publisher's Preface 5 Introduction 7 CHAPTER I Privileges 33 CHAPTER n Instinct 62 CHAPTER III Human Nature ... 72 CHAPTER IV Human Nature (Continued) 82 CHAPTER V Knowledge — Its Relation to Human Nature and Conduct 93 CHAPTER VI Altruism 108 CHAPTER VII Free Will 123 CHAPTER VIII The Law of Justice 130 CHAPTER IX Rights 165 15i:.18o3 CONTENTS (Continued) CHAPTER X Rights (Continued) 180 CHAPTER XI Rights (Continued) 193 CHAPTER XH The Philosophy of Conduct Illustrated by Social Phenomena 231 CHAPTER XIII Philosophy and Civilization 255 CHAPTER XIV Philosophy of Human Progress 267 CHAPTER XV Labor Unions 278 CHAPTER XVI Class Consciousness 292 PUBLISHER'S PREFACE. WiiKN the manuscript of this book came first into my hands, I thought 1 was destined to peruse a mass of (\vy arguments that would leave unsolved tlie momentous problem of social justice. In common with all the wt)rld 1 had recognized that our institutions were wrong somewhere, and that most j^eo- ple's lives were failures — doomed so to be from birth. I had read volumes on social economics and 1 had heard ])oliticians prophesy the good that was coming to the masses ; but the philosophy of all the economists failed to satisfy, just as the promises of the office-seekers failed of realization. Therefore I began reading Jones' "Social Justice" with the feeling that there was nothing in it — that it would fail to sat- isfy, fail to even suggest any remedy for the wrong condi- tions that harassed me, in common with the rest of the toiling millions of the earth. I listlessly followed page after page, and at the end of the first chapter said to myself, "This man Jones at least writes sense. I cannot disagree with anything thus far. He proves every point made." So I read on, and gradually it dawned upon me that a new fundamental principle had been found, that the correct thinking and patient plodding of Percy Vivian Jones had enabled him to fathom the causes of the wrongs which civilization has develoi)ed, and to point out a reasonable remedy. I am naturally skeptic. I view everything new with distrust. I expect nothing good in a new book, and I seldom find it. Yet, Jones' theories of social justice have captured me com- pletely. I endorse the book from cover to cover. I believe it will appeal to all thinkers everywhere, and those who will studiously and critically follow the thread of his argument, 6 PUBLISHER'S PREFACE chapter after chapter, will be amazed, as I was, that from an unknown recluse should come a message of value to all of us, a key to real liberty, an open pathway to happiness, a prac- tical means for establishing social justice. We have been taught that mankind is a mixture of good and bad, and that only by cultivating the good can the world progress. Jones demonstrates that we are necessarily human, being governed under all circumstances by our understanding of our self-interest, regardless, apart from self-interest, of the consequences of our conduct, and that whenever our con- duct is justly censurable, the cause is not any defect of human nature, but solely a misunderstanding of our true self-interest. And hence is reached the inevitable conclusion, that the only means by which right conduct may be induced is to so arrange social matters as to make it to the evident self-interest of all normal persons to act in accordance with the moral law. The social fabric requires to be woven anew, with justice as the warp and self-interest as the woof. As we read, theories develop into facts, and every man who will study "Social Justice," as I have done, will find that it points the way to his personal advancement as well as to the escape of the whole race from the industrial slavery which now enchains the masses. Jones contradicts all writers on social topics. Where all others have failed to convince he convinces. This is the book that has been looked for by the political dreamers of all ages. It will convince open minded Democrats, Republicans, Social- ists, Single Taxers, Populists, Prohibitionists, Anarchists — all, for it is founded on truth, and truth can never die. At the request of the writer the chapter on Privileges, which is properly the eleventh chapter of the book, has been placed first, to give the reader a foreglimpse of Mr. Jones' theories. Charles H. Cochrane. INTRODUCTION. WnKNKVEK \vc (leal with natural laws, and it must be liornc in mind that whatever we do, and whether we will or not. we must deal with them, if we would get good results, we must conform our actions to the requirements of the natural laws involved. The laws of nature are omnioperative, om- nipotent and inexorable. We can neither add to them nor subtract from them. We must strictly observe them or we must suffer the consequences, always harmful to the degree in which we have transgressed the law. There is a right for every wrong. Nothing in nature is wrong, immoral or unjust. All wrongs, which mar, demoral- ize, or destroy the lives of substantially all the people, are due to the transgression by man of nature's laws, or to the per- version of that order of things which the beneficent operation of natural laws has made imperative. All the social evils, all the harassing, demoralizing, destructive social conditions, all the harrowing, discouraging injustices which scourge the peo- ple, as if by a malignant disease perennially epidemic, are caused by actions of men at variance with the requirements of the natural order of things. Therefore, all social or econ- omic injustice and all attending evils may be remedied by simply adjusting our social arrangement . to meet the require- ments of natural laws. That all known systems of social arrangements work mon- strous economic injustice to a large majority of the people, and cause an intolerable inequality in the economic relations between individuals, is recognized by all men who have given the subject serious consideration. Mill expresses his opinion of the then existing social arrangements in England, which do not differ in principle from the system now in vogue in 8 SOCIAL JUSTICE England or in the United States, in the following forceful language : "If, therefore, the choice were to be made between Com- munism with all its chances, and the present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices; if the institution of private property necessarily carried with it as a consequence, that the produce of labour should be appropriated as we now see it, almost in an inverse ratio to the labour — the largest portions to those who have never worked at all, the next largest to those whose work is almost nominal, and so in a descending scale, the remuneration dwindles as the work grows liarder and more disagreeable, until the most fatiguing and exhausting bodily labour cannot count with certainty on being able to earn even the necessaries of life; if this, or Communism, were the alternative, all the difficulties, great or small, of Communism, would be but as dust in the balance." Now, this recognition of the fact that all known systems of social arrangements inflict great injustice on a majority of the people, and are therefore themselves grossly wrong, implies that there must be some conibination of social ar- rangements which would work ju^lice for all individuals, establish and maintain equitable economic relations between individuals, and would therefore be in itself just. For, there is no doubt about it, there is a right for every wrong as surely as there is an up for every down and an in for every out. To deny that the discovery of a system of social arrange- ments which would produce equitable economic relations be- tween individuals is possible, is to assert that either the principles of human nature and the nature of things in general were ill-contrived and unsuited as a means to the desired end — the promotion of the well-being of mankind — or that the discovery by men of their true economic self-interest is an insolvable problem. INTRODUCTION 9 The purpose of this work is to ekicidate the principles or laws whicli deterniine the economic relations of the several members of the society to each other — to point out the cri- terion by which all ^governmental institutions and laws may be rightly judged, and to discover what combination of social arrangements would establish and maintain just economic relations between the divers members of the society. What are the principles or laws which determine the economic relations between the individual members of a com- munity? They are none other than the principles or laws which govern individual economic conduct, the principles which determine whether the economic dealings between the individuals will be just or unjust. These principles or laws are as invariable and persistent in their operation as the law of gravitation or any other natural law. Whether their operation will produce just or unjust economic relations between individuals, depends en- tirely upon the character of the existing governmental insti- tutions and laws — that is to .say, whether the institutions and laws are adapted to the benehcient operation of the natural laws, or otherwise. Economic conduct, like all conduct, is always engendered by the operation of the fundamental principle of human nature which impels every one to pursue self-interest, and the mode of economic conduct is determined by the state of knowledge respecting self-interest, under any given system of social arrangements. For example, under the present system of social arrange- ments in the United States, the great majority of the people are denied their natural right to work for themselves. They must therefore work for others on the best terms they can make; while others have the work to give or withhold, they must have the work in order to live. The result of the bargain made under such circumstances 10 SOCIAL JUSTICE will naturally be that the employer gets the services of the employe for less than those services are worth ; that is to say, the employers will work their employes at a profit. It is an inevitable condition of this so-called free contract, that the worker must yield to his employer a considerable part of the produce of his labor, in order that he be permitted to live. Here we have an example of grossly immoral conduct, of the denial of natural rights, and consequently the subversion of property rights, all committed while acting in strict con- formity with the institutions and laws of the country. Thus we see that the principles and laws which govern economic conduct, operating under faulty institutions and laws, result in immoral, unjust economic conduct. It is the chief purpose of this work to demonstrate that these same principles and laws, operating under governmental institutions and laws of a certain, definitely prescribed char- acter, will produce just economic conduct, and, consequently, just economic relations between individuals. It would be preposterous to infer from the fact that the operation of these principles under certain conditions pro- duces an unjust distribution of wealth, that the operation of these principles under any circumstances must produce unjust results. There is not the slightest evidence that any natural law or principle was so contrived that by its very nature it would bring about undesirable consequences. These principles and laws pertain exclusively to human nature, the acquired characteristics of men, the state of their knowledge of what constitutes their self-interest, and the influence which these things severally and conjointly exert in determining human conduct. In other words, questions of right and wrong, of justice, involve only human beings and the principles which govern human conduct. These principles consist in the single instinctive law of human nature which invariably impels every human being to INTRODUCTION 11 pursue self-interest, and the truth tliat to every one his self- interest is nothing but liis un(lcrstan(Hng as to what will pro- mote his well-being; and the further truth, which compre- hends the other two, that the state of knowledge as to what will best promote one's welfare determines the course of his conduct, which will result in good or evil for him accordingly as his knowledge of what will be good for him to do, be cor- rect or faulty. While the acquirement of knowledge, like the doing of anything and everything else which is conducive to our wel- fare, depends ultimately upon the irresistible impulse to serve self-interest, we may properly say that the immediate cause of all human progress, which means above all things advance- ment toward social justice, is the acquirement of better knowl- edge of what will subserve self-interest. Than all the knowledge of the truths of nature which man- kind have thus far attained, a true knowledge of human nature is inestimably more important. The coming recognition of the simple natural law that every human being, everywhere, at all times and under all circumstances, does that which he conceives to be to his self- interest to do, will cause a greater transformation in the ideas of men, and therefore in all human affairs, than all discoveries that have been made during the last hundred years, the pre-eminent era of invention. I say that the mere recognition of this truth will cause an undreamed-of transformation of civilization, for the reason that its recognition will render the adjustment of social arrangements to its requirements subject to the self-interest of the people, and therefore make such an adjustment un- avoidable. Since to do that which, according to the understanding, will serve self-interest, is the fundamental law of human nature, a knowledge of that law is of the first importance; 12 SOCIAL JUSTICE for, we would not know how to proceed to so order our affairs that they may comport with the law, until we have appre- hended the law itself. Having once grasped the law, the remainder of our work will consist simply in the adjustment of things to its requirements. Now, since every individual must always act in accordance with his understanding as to his self-interest, and cannot pos- sibly act otherwise, whatever his individual environment or the social system under which he lives may be, we are con- fronted point-blank by the momentous proposition that there can never be good conduct, just relations between men, nor a state of real civilization, until matters are so arranged as to make good conduct and self-interest identical. The only thing needful to be done, therefore, in order to bring about social justice, is to fix things so that the pursuit by everyone of his true self-interest will result in just rela- tions between men. The pursuit of their welfare is the only conceivable object of the existence of reasoning human beings. Therefore, we must conclude that whatever ministers to their well-being, is right, and we must further conclude that any social arrange- ments which will best subserve the interests of human beings, are in the nature of things right. Hence, what we mean, when we speak of the natural order of things, is that order under which the free play of human nature, the pursuit of self-interest, will produce the most beneficial results. Our problem, therefore, is to discover the natural order of things respecting social arrangements. Pursuing this object, concerning governmental power and authority, we find that, in the nature of things, all power, and consequently all authority, resides ultimately in the will of the majority, and that therefore, in order to get good results, the will of the majority must govern. The very fact that the majority naturally have the power to do whatsoever they will, INTRODUCTION 13 leaves open to us no other conclusion than that the majority ought to rule absolutely. For no other condition will har- monize with the natural fact that the majority ha^e the power to rule. Justice, therefore, can only bo brought about, and the best interests of mankind in all respects subserved, by the majority of the people assuming and exercising directly all power and authority over all social arrangements. In perfect agreement with the fundamental truth that the majority naturally have the power to rule, nature has so con- trived matters that if the majority of a society act in strict accordance with their true interests, severally, the inexorable consequence will be justice, not only for themselves, but for every member of the society. And because the minority have not been vested by nature with the power to rule, by that very fact she has ordained that nothing but injustice can come from the rule of the minority. Therefore, it is impossible, in any event, for justice to result from minority rule, and representative government is always minority rule. Justice can come from, and only from, majority rule, and then, only when the majority have learned what is their self- interest concerning social arrangements. So we are brought to the conclusion that a just and ben- eficial state of affairs can never be wrought by the agency of representative government ; that the least particle of official authority is an obstruction to justice, and that the attainment of justice finally depends upon the acquirement by a majority of the people of an accurate knowledge as to their self-interest respecting social arrangements — that is, a knowledge of what social arrangements will be perfectly compatible with the nature of things. Hence, it may be laid down as a general proposition that the precise conformation of all social arrangements to the 14 SOCIAL JUSTICE nature of things will yield a true answer to every social question. Self-interest is the mainspring of human progress. It is also the incentive to the acquirement of knowledge. Knowl- edge directs conduct along the right course. False beliefs or a lack of knowledge are the only impediments to progress along the roads which lead to higher attainments in any direction. While the understanding of self-interest molds the conduct, and therefore a better knowledge of self-interest is pre- requisite to any human progress, yet, but for the principle of human nature, which imperatively impels the pursuit of what the understanding presents to the ego as self-interest, human life itself could not be maintained, and much less would any sort of human progress be possible. For, where human beings are possessed of ever so little knowledge of what may subserve their self-interest, it is only because they always must act in accordance with what knowledge they may have as to their self-interest, that it is possible for them to maintain life at all. Knowledge contributes to the fullness of life. The principle self-interest is the mainstay of life itself. A perfect system of social arrangements must be such that the free play, under that system, of the factors which con- trol economic conduct will automatically produce the follow- ing economic conditions: The absolute economic independence of every person who is able to work; the perfect freedom of each individual to pursue his own self-interest, which, of course, excludes the doing of injustice to others; the life-long opportunity of each to exercise his faculties toward the satisfaction of his desires to the best of his ability, the most efficient methods being available to him ; and that, under such freedom of individual action, it will be impossible for any individual to acquire INTRODUCTION 15 economic advantages or benefits at the expense of others, which is etiuivalent to the statement that each will get, econom- ically, what he pro«luces, and nuisl produce what he gets, unless by free gift or be(|ucst. Writers on political economy have observed that the dis- tribution of wealth — which is the subject about which we are most concerned — is dependent on the laws and customs of society, and have held that the rules by which distribution is determined, are what the oijinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the community make them. lUit, unfortunately, they have confined their efforts to the explanation of the operation of those rules as they found them, accepting the opinions and feelings of the rulers merely as facts behiml which they were not called upon to go. On the contrary, they have assumed that the consideration of the jjrinciples which govern the opinions and feelings of those who make the rules by which wealth is distributed is outside the province of political economy. Mill clearly asserts this notion as follows: "The opinions and feelings of mankind, doubtless, are not a matter of chance. They are conseet us see what tiiis declaration of Mill really means. He says that the rules by which wealth is distributed are always what the opinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the community choose to make them, and that the opinions and feelings are the consequences of the operation of natural laws. That is to say, the natural laws which generate the opinions 16 SOCIAL JUSTICE and feelings of men primarily determine what the rules by which wealth shall be distributed shall be. But, says he, political economy (whose only rational object is to discover what rules will cause a just distribution of wealth) has noth- ing to do with the sources of the opinions and feelings which make the rules which determine the manner in which wealth shall be distributed, which i^ equivalent to saying that it is altogether foreign to the object of political economy to inquire into the means by which may be engendered the sort of opinions and feelings which would cause to be made the par- ticular rules which would result in a just distribution of wealth. It amounts even to an assertion that it is not the province of political economy to solve social questions. To this conception of the scope of political economy, and to the failure to inquire into the laws of the generation of human opinions, which are the cause of the rules by which wealth is distributed, that is to say, the fundamental cause of the manner in which wealth is distributed. I propose to show that the utter failure on the part of economists to solve social problems is ascribable. In this connection Mill refers to the opinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the community only. He makes no reference to the vastly important circumstance — the opinions and feelings of the portion of the community who are being ruled, notwithstanding the fact that those who are being ruled, everywhere, with rare exceptions, greatly outnumber the rulers. Mill merely recognized the fact that the opinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the people, whether large or small, make the rules by which wealth is distributed. In a country like the United States, where, according to the general belief, every man enjoys the right to express his will tlirough the ballot, it would be supposed that a majority of the people would actually rule, and that their opinions and INTRODUCTION 17 feelings would ni.ikc such rules, by which wealth were to be distributed, as would redound to their interest. Yet we find the contrary to be the fact. We find that even in this c(»untry the overwhelming majority arc ruled by a paltry few ; that the oi)inions and feelings of the few actually make the rules by which wealth is distributed, and that they make rules which enable them to api)ro[)riatc the produce of the labor of the larger class to the value of several thousand million dollars annually. What then is the matter with the opinions and feelings of the majority who are shamefully cheated throui^h the operation of these rules, since the nature of each of the majority unfailingly prompts him to vote in accordance with what he understands to be his self-interest, as the nature of each of the ruling class promi)ts him to exert his influence respecting governmental affairs in accordance with what he conceives to be his self-interest? Why does it happen that the opinions and feelings of a few make the rules by which wealth is distributed in the interest of the few and against the interest of the many, when the many have the power to make rules so as to sub- serve their own interest? That is the question which must be answered before we can hope to fmd a way by which an equitable distribution of wealth will be realized. And how can that question be an- swered, unless we know the principles, pursuant to the opera- tion of which the opinions and feelings of both the minority and the majority — the rulers and the ruled, the exploiters and the exploited, those who profit by privilege and those who suffer from privilege — are determined ? For, without an understanding of the nature and of the operation of the principles which cause the opinions which determine the rules by which wealth is distributed, we have for our task the solution of a problem, where the very thing 18 SOCIAL JUSTICE which must be known in order to make the solution possible, is left unknown. If there are principles which generate the opinions which determine the rules by which wealth is dis- tributed, and we find that everywhere the distribution of wealth is grossly inequitable, how can we hope to find the means by which the distribution may be rendered equitable, unless we know these principles and understand their opera- tion? For through such knowledge alone will it be possible for us to so shape conditions as to cause the operation of these principles under those conditions to engender opinions and feelings, not on the part of the rulers (the minority) alone, but on the part of a majority of the people, which will determine the rules by which wealth will be justly dis- tributed. The sufferers from wrong social arrangements always com- prise by far the larger proportion of the people, and prece- dent to any improvement in their condition, their opinions and feelings must be so modified as to cause them to make rules which will better subserve their interests, and prece- dent to the establishment of a perfectly just system, a suf- ficient number at least of those who suffer by the present order of things to constitute a majority of the people, must learn what their true self-interest is concerning social ar- rangements, and act accordingly. Since to do that which the understanding apprises the con- sciousness it is to the self-interest to do, is the first law of nature, and since to do that which will perfectly serve self- interest is, in the nature of things, right, it follows that to do anything which is essential to the well-being of the in- dividual is a natural right. Thus, from the general proposition, that in order that jus- tice may obtain, matters must be so arranged that each mem- ber of the society may always act in accordance with his real self-interest, the several natural rights of the individual arc INTkOnUCTION 19 deduced. And then, by devising a set of social arrangements which will remler it possible for each and every member of the society to freely exercise all his natural rights, we find the solution of our problem. Nov/, we are led to the conclusion that all social injustice is caused by the denial in some degree of one or more of natural rights. When we examine into the matter, we find that the denial of natural rights is invariably accomplished by the acts of government which directly or indirectly cause the existence of economic privileges. For the rea.son that all economic injustice arises from the existence of law-maut, it may be asked, if the majority of men, who have the franchise, do not use their power to enforce and jirotect their rights, what reason is there for assimiing that women will make any better use of the ballot toward safeguarding their rights than the men have made of the franchise in 26 SOCIAL JUSTICE taking care of everybody's rights, their own included? The answer is that the franchise as a promoter of justice, a pro- tection of rights, is of no use whatever, except when and to the extent the majority are guided in its exercise by an ac- curate knowledge of their natural rights, which accord with their self-interest. The chief purpose of the advocates of woman suffrage at present seems to be only to put women on the same footing respecting rights as the men nov/ occupy. They assert that women have the same rights as men, but not knowing what the rights of men are, they content themselves with the demand that they be allowed the same rights as men, no matter how many of their rights the majority of the men may be deprived of. The ballot is a weapon with which one who does not know how to use it is certain to inflict on himself great injury. And it is because most women realize that they would not know what to do with the ballot if they had it, that the women, practically as one mass, do not now enthusiastically, aye furiously, demand it. The strength of the desire for the fran- chise depends upon a knowledge of the benefits to be secure-1 by its use — that is, a knowledge of how to use it to good pur- pose. The strength of the demand for the initiative and ref- erendum depends upon the same condition. The reason that from tvv'enty to twenty-five per cent, of the voters fail to ex- ercise their right is obviously because they do not see how they may cast their vote to their own advantage. In the contents of this work the great mass of the people, men and women, will find, I trust, such enlightenment on tlieir self-interest concerning social arrangements as will teach them the inestimable benefits which will certainly result from the w'ise use of the ballot, and inspire them with a burning, im- patient desire to turn the ballot to good account ?t once. In determining the destinies of mankind, truth is mightier INTRODUCTION 27 than all other torccs combined. The Mippoii of all tUe wealth and armaments that can be piled U[) will avail nothing when confronted with the simple truth. A realization that the ])resent order of things works ter- rible injustice has engendered a restless discontent and a spirit of revolt v,hich is world-wide. The people have reached a state of intelligence which will no longer permit thcin to be fooled into satisfaction b)' sham reforms. That radical changes in the governmental alTairs of coimtries in several quarters of the globe will ere long be made is a foregone con- clusion. The only question is, what the nature of those changes is to be. The i)eople may be contented in the non-possession of a right, but only when they are ignorant that it is their right. Whenever the people discover a right which had been denied them and which they had not known belonged to them ; when- ever they learn that they have been deprived of something which it is good for them to have and which they may enjoy without depriving anyone else of what belongs to him, their enlightened self-interest gives them no rest until they have laid secure hold of their newly discovered right. And wdiat is more, their enjoyment of one more right never dulls, but always shari)ens their appetite for the next right they recognize. Discontent, arising from a knowledge that the present order of things is wrong, is ever the precursor of a change in that order. It is doubtful if ever before in the history of the world has there been such general dissatisfac- tion with the social order as that now being loudly proclaimed from the four quarters of the earth. The people have become wise enough to want their rights, and they are going to have them as soon as they find out what they are and a way to get them. The philosophy of social alTairs expounded in the following pages was not constructed around and made to fit a precon- 28 SOCIAL JUSTICE ceived notion or belief. In superficial appearance, nothing in nature is more complex and bewildering than the interplay of the conrluct of masses of men, and nothing seems so ob- scure and inscrutable as the principles which result in that particular series of actions peculiar to each individual, which constitute his life. I confess that the apprehension of the fundamental prin- ciples, the natural laws, the nature of things, from which the philosophy radiates, involved very great difficulties and con- sideration covering a long period of time. But when I had once found the few, simple but profoundly momentous prin- ciples which govern human conduct, the philosophy became an open book — I had merely to reduce to some order the in- evitable deductions from the principles. This new philosophy is so simple and so obviously true that there is every reason to believe that its spread among the masses of the people will be far more rapid and its reception by seekers for the truth more enthusiastic than that accorded to any former theory of social affairs. The two leading parties in this country are disintegrating from their own rottenness and paucity of principles. The masses of the people keep within the lines of one or the other of those parties, not because they indorse the conduct of their own party, but because they loathe the conduct of the other party and do not want it entrusted with power, and there is no other party which proposes to do wdiat they would like to have done and whose program appeals to their sense of justice. Similar conditions prevail in nearly if not quite all European countries. The hour has struck when principles must supersede policies, when justice must take the place of expediency, and true morality must drive pharisaism into everlasting disgrace. There are innumerable evidences that the common people all over the world are anxiously and impatiently waiting for INTRODUCTION 29 a true soliitinn of social (|Ucstions. Tlicrc can be but one solution, riic cause of injustice is everywhere the same, the non-compliance wilh the laws of nature, the denial of natural rii^hts. The only remedy is to make social arrangements conform to the re(|uirements of nature. A program which will establish justice in the United States will also establish justice in Russia, China, England, Chili. Turkey, or any other country, and no other i)rogram could, since natural laws and natural rights deducible therefrom are universal. Having subjected the principles laid down in this book to every test known to me, including the theories of the best writers on moral philosophy, i)sychology, law and sociology, as well as social phenomena, I have as good reasons for know- ing that these principles arc natural laws as Newton had for knowing that he had discovered the law of gravitation, and until someone is able to refute them, existing opinions and beliefs on the subject which are incompatible with them will not be able to survive in their atmosphere. I.et it be clearly understood that I am not pitting my ofyinions against the opin- ions and beliefs of others, but that I am opposing only their wrong oi)inions and beliefs with natural laws and their neces- sary implications. It will come of ill grace for those who stand for the pre- vailing^ opinions, beliefs and interests to disparage tiie teach- ings of this book; for. the damnable injustice which char- acterizes every fibre of the economic fabric is the direct con- sequence of those ojiinions. beliefs and interests. Let those who now profit by, those who only think they profit by. or those who hope they will profit by injustice, not waste their time in denouncing or ridiculing me or my grand- father or my dog. Such attacks will avail them nothing, for they are self-con lemnatory — a confession of turpitude. But let them turn their attention to the principles and the philos- ophy founded on them, to be found in these writings. 30 SOCIAL JUSTICE If any man can show that the principles are not true, or that any of the conckisions adduced are not necessary deduc- tions from the principles, I will promptly and publicly ac- knowledge my error. As an inveterate seeker of the truth, I long since acquired the incorrigible habit of repudiating and casting out from among my belongings any idea the moment I could discover that it was erroneous. If, however, those whose understanding of their self-interest wall cause them to object to putting this philosophy into practice, are unable to prove that it is not true, they will be forced either to ac- knowledge the truth and abandon their position, or to shame- lessly and brutally take their stand for injustice, immorality as against justice and morality. The issue, the question of the right or wrong of social arrangements, can neither be ignored nor disposed of by flippant, ignorant ridicule or by sophistry, however cunning. Now, for the first time, have all social questions been re- duced to simple questions of right and wrong, and an in- fallible criterion provided by which they may be rightly settled. The inevitable consequence must be the precipitation of such a conflict between right and wrong, justice and injustice, morality and immorality, as the world has never v/itnessed. The contest will be inaugurated by the formation of a new political party, founded on fundamental principles of morality, ^nd having for its platform a program comprehending all the essential features of a just social system. Naturally the party of justice will assume an aggressive attitude from the start. As the contest goes on and the ranks of the just swell, as they surely Avill, the conflict will grow fiercer and fiercer. It is to be understood that those who live by the labor of others will not surrender their unjust advantages without first resorting to every means within their power, fair or foul, to retain them. But it must also be understood that in a realignment of the people on principles INTRODULTIOX 31 of justice into two opposing parties, the one standing for economic justice and the other for economic slavery, the self- interest of a great majority of the people will inij^el them to join the ranks of those who contend for justice, just as the self-interest of the small minority, or what they conceive to be their self-interest, will induce them to join hands in oppo- sition to justice. It will be the true self-interest of the many with justice as an ally, against the supposed self-interest of the few, handicapped by the injustice of their cause. That the contest will result in complete victory for justice there can be no doubt. The duration of the struggle will depend altogether on how long it will take the mass of the people to become acquainted with their self-interest. SOCIAL JUSTICE CHAPTER I. PRIVILEGES. It is shown in the chapter on Rights that the coexistence of natural rights and privileges is impossible ; that the enjoy- ment of complete natural rights precludes the existence of any privilege, and that the presence of a privilege involves the absence of a part or the whole of some natural right. Having clearly defined and demonstrated in Chapters VIII, IX and X, what are the natural rights of the individual, from the scientific point of view it should not be necessary to give privileges any special consideration, since when the individual is in possession of all his natural rights, he has all that justly belongs to him or that his well-being requires ; he can lay no valid claim to any artificial right or privilege. Ikit the pop- ular misconception of rights and privileges renders it desirable to enumerate various forms of privileges, and to show how they severally affect the natural rights and consequently the well-being of the people. Now, it is exceedingly important that we get a clear and comprehensive understanding of what constitutes an economic privilege. For until we have such a thorough perception of what a privilege is, and are able to unerringly discern a priv- ilege in whatever guise it may be presented to us. we will be ill fitted to judge whether or Tiot any institution or law creates directly or indirectly some form of privilege. \\'hcn we once clearly understand what are our natural rights, and that when society takes any other action respecting rights tlian to adopt such rules as are necessary to the conservation of 34 SOCIAL JUSTICE natural rights it must necessarily abridge or abrogate some natural right and consequently commit an injustice, we will be equipped with all the knowledge needed to recognize on sight any unjust institution or law and to point out wherein the injustice lies. All we have to know is whether an institution or law enables any person or set of persons to do in the economic field what they could not do by the free exercise of their natural rights, or hinders any person in the doing of anything he has a natural right to do. Yet, since the giving to some of more than their natural rights and the depriving of others of their natural rights is invariably accomplished simultaneously by the same act, the granting of a privilege, it may help some to see the true rela- tion between rights and privileges, to detect any injustice which may lurk in any social arrangement, and to know pre- cisely the nature of the injustice, if the matter is considered from its privilege side. Fortunately, in undertaking to formulate a clean cut defini- tion of the term privilege, as used in the discussion of econ- omics, we do not encounter the difficulties which have thwarted the efforts of all political economists to draw a line which would set ofif and distinguish "capital" from "wealth." For privileges are but the reverse of the same truth of which natural rights are the obverse. Therefore, privileges may be as easily and clearly defined, as may natural rights. In truth, when we have defined natural rights, we have also, by implication, defined privileges. Considered economically and morally, the doing of any act which it is not a natural right to do, is to exercise an economic privilege and to com- mit a moral crime. Rights and privileges are antipodes. If I shall succeed in giving to the people a comprehensive understanding of the distinction between rights and privileges, PRIVILEGES 35 one of the chief objects in writing this book will have been attained. In the discussion of the science of sociology, as in dealing with any scientific subject, a definite terminology is of the first importance. Where there are distinctions to be made, they should be clearly drawn ; but the neglect to make neces- sary distinctions is no more harmful than the attempt to make distinctions where none exist, as, for example, the labored attempt of the political economists to point out a diflference, in economics, between some products of labor which arc called capital, and other products of labor which arc called wealth. When, in fact, in so far as the things called capital, or the things called wealth enter into any question of true economics — just relations between men — there is between "capital" and "wealth" no distinction whatever. Drawing false distinctions, using the simile and false metaphor, reasoning by analogy, and giving things wrong names, are what have dismalized political economy. So far as I have been able to discover, no political economist has, up to the present, even suspected that the mere ownership of the things called capital or wealth is under existing social arrangements, and has been under all social arrangements of which we have any knowdedge, nothing more nor less than a privilege created by government, as all privileges are and al- ways have been created. It is because the institutions and laws enable some to accu- mulate the things called capital at the expense of others, and thereby prevent the others from accumulating things called capital, that the mere ownership of so-called capital becomes in effect a privilege — that is to say, institutions and laws which create privileges, which make it possible only for a small por- tion of the community to accumulate capital, indirectly but effectually create the pri-'ilcgr of the ownership of capital. And since the use of the things called capital is indispensable 36 SOCIAL JUSTICE to the carrying on of any kind of business, institutions and laws of that character make the carrying on of any sort of business a privilege. I refer to this remarkable fact in this connection and in advance of an exhaustive treatment of capital and wealth, for the purpose only of pointing out how little has been known of the true nature and extent of economic privilege, and to give the reader an inkling why so little progress has been made toward the establishment of a system of just social arrange- ments. While the professors and all sorts of reformers have in gen- eral terms denounced all privileges as unjust, they have at the same time upheld and advocated some of the most omnivorous and obnoxious of privileges. We can account for this inconsistency by no other theory than that the professors and reformers have been ignorant of what an economic privilege is, and without a knowdedge of what is an economic privilege, which knowledge is derived from an understanding of natural rights, the discovery of a system of social arrangements wdiich will result in just econ- omic relations between man and man is simply out of the question. For there is nothing the matter with the institutions and laws under which we now live, except that they confer, di- rectly or indirectly, divers forms of economic privilege. But for the reason that the people do not recognize many privileges as privileges, and because they have been unable to see the connection between even those privileges which they do recog- nize as such and their inevitable evil consequences, they vainly rail at the natural and inevitable effects of the privileges, while they regard the privileges themselves, at the worst, as mixtures of good and evil which are essential to social progress. The evil effects of privileges are vehemently denounced. I'R1\ ll.i-XiES 37 while tlic institutions and laws, which engender the privileges, are held to be a blessing. All of the economic evils of which we complain are due to the fact that some members of the community enjoy economic advantages at the exjiense of their fellows, which it would be impossible for them to possess except by the aid of govern- ment. Therefore, the economic problem is, to devise a system of social arrangements under which the free play of human nature will result in no species of privilege. A privilege, in the sense in which that term will be used throughout this treatise, is any economic advantage which some members of the society enjoy at the expense of other members by reason of the institutions and laws of that society. The meaning of the word privilege t^iven here is no coined definition invented for s])ccial plcailing. It is the true and only adequate definition of that term when used in economic discussion. It is deemed necessary to give a comprehensive definition of the term, because so few persons conii)reliend what constitutes a privilege. If they understand its academic meaning, they do not understand its application to social ar- rangements. For example, it is habitual, in the common understanding of the people as well as throughout the literature of law. to draw a distinction in their moral and economic efTect, as well as in their merely abstract definition, between a "privilege" and a "special privilege." A law-given privilege is generally regarded as legitimate and harmless so long as it is not in terms made specifically a special priHlcgc. Although the phrase "general privilege" is seldom used, the general use of the a'ljective "special" to qualify the meaning of the word l^rivilege, implies the existence of the idea that there is such a tiling as a gcucrol privilege'. Privileges which are conceived to be general, even though they be profitable to those who avail themselves of such priv- 38 SOCIAL JUSTICE ileges, are regarded not only as harmless but actually advan- tageous to all members of the community, or, as the idea is generally stated, the community at large. To illustrate, it is sufficient to cite the notions held by a majority of the people concerning the economic effect of the supposed general privileges created by the protective tariff or the institution of the unrestricted traffic in, ownership and engrossment of land or natural resources, the privileges granted in the form of bank, railroad, gas, electric light, water supply, patent right and other similar charters, and by licenses and taxes, such as saloon and peddlers' licenses and taxes on liquor, tobacco and oleomargarine. Some privileges are special in form. Charters are granted to particular persons or corporations. These are generally recognized as special privileges. Generally their object is to put into operation some public utility. But because the public services to be performed by such chartered concerns are in themselves desirable, the injustice involved in the method of obtaining those services is either overlooked or condoned. Privileges pertaining to public utilities are considered a public benefit even by those who recognize them as special privileges, because it is erroneously believed that through such grants by government public utilities are brought into being which could not, at least so well or so cheaply, be established in any other way. Yet, any of the persons who hold this opinion and who understand the rudiments of arithmetic, could, from ascertainable facts, demonstrate that such public utilities, operated as the private property of individuals, in the course of a few years invariably cost the community sev- eral times the cost of their creation, over and above the actual expense of operating them. Most persons fail to apprehend that the economic advan- tages which some persons enjoy at the expense of others, as a result of the protective tariff, are in effect as purely "special PRIVILEGES 39 privileges" as they would be li.id the governinent conferred those privileges on tiiose indivicUials hy name. The fact that the protective tariff law does not specify the persons who shall profit by the economic advantages it bestows, does not alter the ctTect of the law, which is to create economic advantages, by which, in the nature of things, some profit at the expense of others. The granting of economic advantages by law in general terms, without respect to persons, does not deprive them of their sting. That the law permits anyone who can to exercise the power to rob his fellowmcn, which is the essential principle of the protective tariff, does not change its pernicious character, nor its unjust effects, because only a comparatively few persons can grasp the opportunity. If the effect of the protective tariff were to enable each member of the community to rob every other member to exactly the same extent, it might be said that the protective tariff resulted in robbery in form, yet there would be no rob- bery in effect, and the protective tariff could not be con- demned as a creator of privileges. Each individual would be left in the same economic relation to others as he was be- fore the protective tariff law was enacted. But, if that were its effect, there would be no demand for a protective tariff law from any quarter. There would be no advantage to be gained by anyone. Men do not seek or want merely nominal privileges. They want what is called in par- lance of slang, "the real thing." They want the government to give them the power to rob their fellows in a manner in which they would be unable to rob them without the help of the government. And when a certain set of persons clamor for the grant of a certain so-called general privilege, one may be certain that they are the persons who expect to profit by the privilege to the disadvantage of others. All licenses, in effect, create privileges. They always in- 40 SOCIAL JUSTICE crease the price of the commodities handled under the license, to a much greater extent than the amount of the license. Some individuals reap these additional profits which they could not gather but for the license. Taxes levied on any object produced by labor act in a similar manner. They increase the price of the commodity to the amount of the investment in the tax, plus the usual profit of capital on the amount of the tax. All privileges are monopolies, in character and effect, whether they be bestowed on single individuals or on large numbers, or whether they are free for all. A patent right is a privilege, strictly exclusive in form. It confers special legal rights on one or more specified persons. That right, once conferred, becomes, like a natural property right, subject to purchase and sale. A corporation is fre- quently formed to exploit the privilege. This right, created by law, is sometimes capitalized for several hundreds of thou- sands of dollars and the shares are sold to hundreds of per- sons. But that fact does not change the character or effect of the privilege. The patent right is none the less a monopoly if it falls into the possession of a thousand persons, than it would be if it remained in the possession of the original grantee. The laws which give to everyone the privilege of getting and owning all the land he can legally acquire make a mon- opoly of land ownership, notwithstanding the fact that there are several millions of land owners in this country. If the land were distributed among twice as many owners, the land would still be monopolized. There would still be millions who owned no land, who must pay tribute to others for the use of land, without the use of which they could not exist. The essential and distinguishing character of a privilege is the power to take the proceeds of the labor of some persons I'kI\'lLEGES 41 against their will, without compensation, and give it to other I)ers()ns. A privilege is in essence and effect the jx^wer given to private persons by law to tax their fellowmen. Such taxes consist of rent, interest and profits. There can be no lK)j)e of the inauguration of justice until rent, interest and profits, sanctioned by the written law tlKnigh they be, have come to be regarded as no less reprehensible a form of theft than pocket-picking, and far more harmful. If pocket-picking were legalized, and rent, interest and profits were inhibited by law, judged by the eternal principles of right, rent, interest and profits would be none the worse nor pocket-picking none the better. Privilege and monopoly are, in economics, .synonymous terms. The granting of any sort of privilege by law is the making of a monopoly by law. In order to establish a monopoly by law it is not necessary for government to confer a privilege on one or only a few persons by name. A privilege, no matter how general its form, always results in a monopoly, more or less exclusive, but a monopoly nevertheless. A saloon license and heavy taxes on liquors are a privilege in disguise. They result in the monopoly, more or less ex- clusive, of the traffic in liquors. Without the taxes and license fee. other conditions remaining unchanged, there would be many more saloons, but the individual saloon keeper would not make as much money as he does under the high license and taxes. The result of high license and taxes is to con- centrate the Inisincss in the hands of fewer persons, to more completely monopolize it, and to increase the price of liquors. This truth accounts for the fact that so large a number of saloons are now owned 1)y the breweries and are run by persons who arc practically the selling agents of the 1)rewers. Therefore, if any institution or law, any social arrangement whatever, enables some members of the society to take econ- 42 SOCIAL JUSTICE omic advantage of other members, that institution, law or social arrangement creates an economic privilege consisting in the power to appropriate the produce of the labor of others. If, for example, the manufacturer of watches in this country- is enabled by the protective tariff to charge and get a higher price for a watch than he sells the same watch for in Europe, or a higher price than he would be compelled to sell the watch for in this country, if there were no tariff on w-atches, that single fact brands the tariff on watches as the creator of a privilege and condemns it. And the manufacture and sale of watches, though a great many persons may be engaged in that business, is nevertheless a privilege so long as the tariff on w^atches makes it possible to sell them at a higher price than would prevail under abso- lutely free competition. And, like the operation of all priv- ilege-making social arrangements, the tariff on watches cer- tainly does harm to a greater number of people than it ben- efits, in proportion as there are more .watch users than watch makers. It is one of the tenets of the jurisprudence of America that special legislation is a bad thing and not to be tolerated. So all of our laws and institutions are, ostensibly, general laws and institutions which act alike on every member of the community. In fact, all our institutions and laws are framed in general terms, and none of them specifies, nor even suggests, that the intention is to enable any member of the society to enjoy an economic advantage over his fellow citizens. And because the institutions and laws are general in form and purport, it is asserted that the institutions and laws at least create no privileges and result in no discrimination between the several members of the community. From this assertion it is further inferred that any injustice which exists in the economic relations between men may not I'KIXILEGES 43 be ascribed to tbe institutions and laws. Therefore, it is finally concluded that, so far as the institutions and laws are con- cerned, all citizens are put on a parity — they all enjoy equal rights before the law, which is all that in reason may be de- manded from government. Our system of land tenure denies to no man the right to own land if he can, under the law. get a title to it. Never- theless, the operation of our system of land tenure has resulted in the ownership of all of the land by less than half of the people, the ownership of the greater proportion of the land by a comparatively few people, and the ownership of no land by a majority of the people. And it has resulted in the pay- ment by some people to other people of several thousands of millions of dollars per annum, in the form of land rent, for which they received nothing in return. These several circumstances show that the present institu- tion of land tenure confers upon those members of the com- munity who have been iible. under the so-called impartial land laws, to acquire ownershij) of tlie land, a privilege wliich enables them to appropriate a very considerable proportion of the fruits of the labor of all non-landowners, who con- stitute a majority of the peoi)le, without giving them a ])cnny or rendering them the slightest service in return. It is impossible to arrive, by the empirical process of rea- soning, at correct conclusions as to whether social arrange- ments work economic justice or injustice. Of course, all the facts would show precisely to what ex- tent a protective tariff were either helpful or harmful. But if it were possible to gather all the facts, it would not be worth the great trouble ; for all economic questions are moral ques- tions, questions of right and wrong, and not questions of per- centages or averages, or great or small quantities. It is abun- dantly sufficient for us to ascertain whether the protective tarift, or any other social arrangement, is right or wrong, by 44 SOCIAL JUSTICE putting it to the test of recognized principles of morality and justice. If the protective tariff, or any other social arrangement, makes it possible for anyone to acquire an economic advantage, that advantage, in the nature of things, can only be enjoyed by a small minority and must be enjoyed at the expense of a great majority. The protective tariff law is in form a general law; it is no respecter of persons. One man, when he imports a certain commodity, must, according to law, pay the same tariff as any other man. But the actual net result of the operation of this law has been to enable a comparatively few members of the community to compel the remainder to pay them tribute to the extent of several thousand million dollars a year. In other words, the protective tariff has conferred upon a few of the people the privilege of appropriating a considerable proportion of the fruits of the labor of the great majoity of the people, without giving them anything or any service in return. Many simple minded people have a notion that, if a law is general in its form, or if an institution does not specifically discriminate between individuals, privileges are not created by such laws and institutions, but that the rights of all individuals will be and will remain equal under such laws and institutions. For they have been taught that such laws and institutions put every member of the community on an equal footing. And, therefore, if some individuals acquire an economic advantage over others, it never enters their minds to look to those laws and institutions as the only cause of the privileges. And, of course, so long as they labor under the delusion that there is no connection between such laws and the economic advantages referred to, it is impossible for them to find out what is the cause of those economic advantages. I'RIVILICGKS 45 There is no such thing as a natural economic advantage or privilege. All privileges or economic advantages are created by law. If one man be more intelligent, more ingenious, or m(jre dexterous, or if he be physically stronger than another, he may be able to produce more wealth and conse(iucntly enjoy the blessings of more wealth llum another, even under a just system; but. under a just system he will not bo able to accjuire wealth at the expense of another. To make a just system of social arrangements is simply to make it impossible for anyone to profit at the exj^ense of another without committing plain fraud or theft by the terms of the written law; and to make it impossible for anyone to take economic advantage of another without suffering the consequences, is to make a just social system; which is equiv- alent to saying that a social system so contrived that it would render the subsistence of any privilege impossible, would be a just system. It is impossible to draft any law which is general in its application which will result in giving any individual an econ- omic advantage — that is to say, which will make it possible for any individual to get from another, against the other's will, something for nothing, without giving the power to a fcic to appropriate the belongings of the nia)i\\ unless it be a law establishing chattel slavery, and that, under that law, one man should own a single man only. It is impossible to create by law an economic advantage which would benefit equally all members of the community; just as impossible as it is by law to create wealth. The claim that any such laws enrich the community col- lectively is a self-evitlent absurdity. It is equivalent to saying that by law the total production may be enhanced, which means, if it means anything, that wealth may be produced by law. 46 SOCIAL JUSTICE Even the political economists, who hold that land and cap- ital are economic factors of production — that is to say, they are such independent agencies in the production of wealth that they may justly lay claim to a part of the produce, have never maintained that the law is a factor of production. However, it would be no more absurd to assert that the law is a factor of production and increases production, than it is to assert that land and capital contribute such a share toward production as to justly entitle their owners to a share of the produce. It would be quite as impossible to devise a privilege which would benefit equally each of a majority of the community, as it would be to contrive one which would equally benefit every member of the community. For that reason the granting of any particular privilege can never be to the self-interest of a sufficient number of the in- dividual members of the society to constitute a majority. Hence, under a social system where the will of the majority would actually be the law of the land — where every member of the community would exercise the right to vote that each and every social arrangement, every institution and every law shall conform to his own self-interest, and where his vote, like that of every member of the society, would count for one — it is as certain as that human nature is human nature, that not a single privilege would ever be granted, unless a considerable number of persons failed to understand what their self-interest in the matter was. But it may be supposed that the granting of privileges gen- erally may become the self-interest of a majority of the com- munity, for this reason : That while no single privilege may benefit more than a small minority of the people, a few may be benefitted by one privilege, another few by another privilege, and still others by other privileges, until the benefits of one privilege or another PRIVILEGES 47 would be enjoyed by enough individuals to make a majority, an! that, therefore, it might be to the self-interest of a ma- jority to have privileges, and that consequently under a system of majority rule there would be privileges. But the fallacy of this supposition becomes apparent the moment we consider that the gains of the bencliciaries of each privilege are had at the cost of more than an equivalent loss by the remainder of the community, including the bencliciaries of all other privileges, and that the total net gains of all the beneficiaries of all privileges must be drawn from the so- called surplus produce of the minority of the people. For all privilege owners cannot possibly gain anything by merely appropriating the produce of each other's labor. If the total net gains of all the beneficiaries of all privileges, in case they constituted a majority of the people, must neces- sarily be drawn from the produce of the labor of the minority, non-owners of privileges, the gain of each privilege owner, if they all gained alike, would be even less than the profits on the labor of a single man. If some of them gaineelungs to the class that are being exploited and that consequently all privileges are opposed to his self-interest, to adopt as his motto: "Tolerate no social arrangement which enables some to get something ior nothing and compels others to give something for nothing." If every man in this country who is being worked like an ox for the benefit of others; if every man who is being in- sulted, intimidated, arbitrarily bossed, starved, or whose life is being made worthless in a thousand ways which I cannot here describe, could be brought to understand his self-interest respecting social arrangements, there wouUl not be a single privilege of any description left in this country in four years. The Single Taxers want land monopoly destroyed, not be- cause they recognize the truth that land rent is the natural consequence of man-made land monopoly, but because they understand and know that the extortion froin one person by another of tribute for the use of land is sheer robbery. Tiie Socialists want to get rid of rent, interest and profits because they understand and know that all of those things are, according to the moral law, common tiieft. They pro- pose to abolish rent, interest and profits by making land and capital, so-called, common property, while the single taxers would eliminate the injustice involved in the payment of land rent only, by one person to another, by means of government appropriation of the rental value of land. All that I desire to say here on this subject is that in a sub- sequent volume I will demonstrate that rent, interest, and profits are nothing more than the creatures of law-matle privi- leges, and that, therefore, when all privileges have been abol- ished, rent, interest and profits will, as a natural consequence, disappear. It will there be demonstrated that the avowed objects of 60 SOCIAL JUSTICE the single taxers cannot be attained by means of the single tax ; that the proclaimed purposes of the socialists cannot pos- sibly be accomplished by any of the devices nor by any com- bination of the devices claimed to be socialism ; and that the de- clared ends of anarchists would be defeated by anarchism or by communist-anarchism. Concerning the single tax, it will be shown that while the appropriation by government of the precise rental value of every parcel of land, irrespective of improvements (if that were possible) would abolish the privilege of land engross- ment and would put the people in their relation to land on an equal footing, it would at the same time initiate a decline in land values which would not stop until they completely dis- appeared. This monopoly-begotten fund having disappeared, it would be found that in order to support what government they desired, the single taxers would be compelled to raise their revenue in a manner which would be quite clearly a tax on labor, but not more truly so than the would-be appro- priation of the assumed unearned increment of land. Concerning socialism, it will be shown that while private monopoly of the means of production may be abolished by the substitution therefor of state monopoly of all production, and that thereby rent, interest and profits may be abolished, any system of state socialism possible to contrive would be so complicated and cumbersome that it is impossible to draught even an outline of its mechanism. It will further be shown that any variety of socialism will fail to accomplish the lauda- ble and righteous purposes common to socialists of all creeds, for the reason that none of the systems of social arrange- ments proposed by any school of socialism has for its basis fundamental principles of justice, but only dogmatic assertion prompted by considerations of expediency incident to the peculiarities of each of these arbitrary systems. Concerning anarchism, whose ultimate objects, like those PRIVILEGES 61 of socialism and the single tax, arc conimcii'lahlc and just (in truth, there is no important diflfcrcncc between the ob- jects of the three, but what distinguishes them one from the other are only di(Terences of methods) it will be demonstrated that although the inauguration of anarchism would preclude law-made privileges, it would not secure to each and every indivi