OF CALIFORNIA S ANGELES THE GIFT OF MAY TREAT MORRISON IN MEMORY OF ALEXANDER F MORRISON ( i ^^/^^ fc^-'z!^:^ AMERICAN MARINE^ THE SHIPPING QUESTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS BY WILLIAM W. BATES 11 LATK UNITED STATES COMMlS>IOSKK UK NAVIGATION; FuKMERLY MNNAGBR OF THE INLAND LLOVDS RBGISTBK J AUTHOR OP " KULBS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF VESSELS"' BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 1803 Copyright, 1892, Bt WILLIAM W. BATES. All rights reserved. The Riverside Press, Camhi-idge, Mass., U. S. A. Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Company. 745' TO 9 J WILLIAM H. WEDH, OF NEW YORK. 01 g AN EMINENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AMERICAN NAVAL ART IN * THE ERA OF ITS GLORV, THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED BV THE AUTHOR. 4tj»i>v>aU PREFACE. Every workman should know his own trade well. Hav- ing been for fifty years a student of ships and navigation, I have felt that it was needful to know the causes that have con- tril)uted, first, to the u})huilding, second, to the decline, and third, to the ruin of our shipping interest in the foreign trade. In pursuit of this information time and patience have been well sj)ent, since there was no other way out of darkness into light. The necessity for a work on American Marine has long been felt by its friends. While there have been a few pam])hlets and an essay or two published, books of the kind re- (juisite have not been produced. This may have been because shipbuilding, navigation, and foreign trade form so broad a field that few acquire the practical knowledge, or can command the time needful for their composition. Moreover, a \viiter on the subject of the present work can find so little in libraries, and must look for so many facts outside of books, that his task is one mainly of investigation and original thought. It is only by a rare course of business experience and a for- tunate succession of circumstances that the author has found an opportunity to be the first in the field which this volume is an attempt to explore and explain. In early life he was the projector and co-editor of the only magazine in the United States ever devoted to the interests of shipbuilding, engineer- ing, navigation, and commerce, — 1854-58. The insight then enjoyed has ever been remembered. Though many trade ex- periences have intervened since that time, the impressions vi PREFACE. received in regard to the shipping business have been not only deepened, but increased in number. Light is for distribution. No longer young, it may be full time that some of the facts which the author has learned be given to those who shall follow him ; while it is certain, any light that his efforts can cast upon the "Shipping Question" cannot be thrown too soon for the country's good. Making no pretensions to literary skill, but sensible that men of letters are also men of ideas, he trusts that his facts and figures have sufficient eloquence to make their way. In this age, facts make their own best arguments ; nevertheless, it has seemed useful to impress their teaching, since all readers have not time to spare for study. In all that has been undertaken, the object has been the arrival at truth. The author has not searched for support to theories of any kind. If he has argued for "protection" to shipping, it is because he sees that it is necessary for the rein- statement of that great interest. He believes that this action would be for the public good. A prosperous marine in the foreign tr^^de would be advantageous for each and all of our people. Every loyal citizen must want an American marine. How to obtain it seems clear enough. The concluding chap- ters discuss the legislation required. That this volume shall arouse our nation, and inspire a vig- orous public sentiment, which shall demand the enactments essential to the full enjoyment of our maritime rights, of solid prosperity and real independence, is the earnest desire of the author. William W. Bates. New York, October 1, 1892. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN A MARINE. Sovereignty of the Sea. — Necessity for Ships. — The Means of Peace and Progress. — Sea- Power in History. — Colbert's Great Work in France. — The Fall of Frencli Sea- Power. — Warning of the War for the Union 1 CHAPTER II. THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF SHIPPING OF OUR O^^Tf. Advantages of Sliipping. — A Sample of Economic Misteaching. — The National Use of Merchant Shipping. — The Business of Foreign Shipping. — Early Experience in balancing Trade. — Navigation and Commerce for Different Periods, Table. — Cost of our Present Dependence on Foreign Shipping. — Foreign Ship and Tariff Taxes compared, Table. — The Silver Problem 9 CHAPTER III. THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN MARITIME PURSUITS. The American View a Century ago. — Jefferson's Appreciation of Navigation. — The Utility of our Early Marine. — Culmination of Carriage, Table. — The Inadequacy of our Present Marine. — De- pression of Carriage, Table. — Depression of Carriage, Corrected Table. — The Present and the Future Need of Tonnage .... 26 CHAPTER IV. THE NAVAL ARTS AND NATIONAL PROGRESS. The Progress of Navigation — British Ascendency. — Proportion of the World's Tonnage under the Flags of Five Nations, Table. — Eu- ropean Solicitude and American Indifference. — Influence of Ship- building on Ancient History. — Influence of Shipbuilding on viii CONTENTS. Modern History. — Improving Influence of the Naval Arts. — The Question of the Flag at Sea. — The True Lights in our Course. — Folly and Danger of British Monopoly 42 CHAPTER V. AMERICAN AND BRITISH NAVIGATION LAWS. Duality of our Present Shipping Policy. — Maritime Reciprocity. — The Original British System. — The Modern British System .... 56 CHAPTER VI. THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH MARITIME POWER. The Naval Policy of England. — The Navigation Policy of England. — Efforts to improve British Shipbuilding. — The British Tonnage Measurement Reform. — Improvement of British Shipping Laws. — The Society of Lloyd's Register. — Lloyd's Inspection Policy. — The British Underwriting Policy. — Table of Discriminative In- surance. — The Bane of British Underwriting Rule. — The Two Freight Markets. — American Ship Discount Chartering. — Origin and Progress of Lloyds. — The Postal Subsidy Policy. — The Abolition of Privateering. — The Naval Subvention Policy ... 62 CHAPTER VII. THE EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ship-protection by the Tariff, 1789. — Ship -protection by Tonnage Duties, 1789. — Ship-protection by Tariff, 1794. — Nautical Pro- gress under Protection, Table. — Continued Ship-protection. — Pro- gress from 179G to 1800, Table. — Further Protection to Shipping. — Contending with Difficulties, 1801 to 1805, Table. — Progress from 1806 to 1810, Table. — The Embargo and Non-intercourse Acts. — War with England. — Retrogression from 1811 to 1815, Table. — The Hartford Convention. — First Act abandoning Ship- protection, 1815. — " Reciprocal Liberty of Commerce," Treaty. — First Effect of Unprotection — our Tonnage falling off, 1815 to 1820, Table. — The Second Act of Reciprocity. — Lesser Laws. — Tonnage gaining again. — The Summit in Sight, Table. — Another Stripping of Protection, 1824. — Final Act of Reciprocity, 1828. — Extract from Speech of Senator Woodbury. — Text of the Act of 1828. — The Arguments for the Act. — An Olive Branch. — John Quincy Adams's View. — Remarks on Mr. Adams's View. — Eng- land the Great Beneficiary. — The Climax Period, 1826 to 1830, Table. — Richard Rush on Trade and Transportation. — Comparison of Administrations 93 CONTENTS. ix CHAPTER VIII. DECLENSIOX UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY, 1830 TO 1860. Opening British West India Trade, Act of 1830. — Inequality of Free Freighting with I^nghxnd. — A New British Protection: "Lloyds." — On the Down Grade, 1831 to 1835, Table. — The Gains of Eng- land. — Nearly holding our Own, 183G to 1840, Table. — Anotlier New British Protection : •' Subsidy." — Decidedly declining, 1841 to 1845, Table. — Tonnage rising, Carriage falling, 184G to 1850, Table. — Evils of tlie Bonded Warehouse System. — Losses and Gains for a Single Year, Table. — Value of Imports for Three-year Periods, Table. — Value of Exports for Tliree-year Periods, Table. — Complete Reciprocity with England. — Mr. Meredith's Circular. — The English Victory, Table. — British Lloyd's Action. — Ton- nage sold Foreign, Table. — The Tide of tiie Fifties, Toiuiage still rising, Carriage falling, 1851 to 1855, Table. — Subsidy Protection. — Adventitious Aids. — Active Britisii Intervention. — Substitution of Iron for Wood. — Decline of the Fifties. — British Steamers win, 185G to 1800, Table. — E.xperience of tlie Steamer " United States." — Remarks on the Period of 1856 to 1800 125 CII.U'TER IX. EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE, 18G1 TO 1891. Losses before and during the War, Table. — Period of the War, 1801 to 1805, Table. — The Impulse of Peace. — An Effort of Congress. — Tlie Struggle to rise. 18(i0 to 1870, Table The Lloyds degrade our Ships. — Export Employment beaten, 1871 to 1875, Table. — Continued Shipping Decline. — Retrogression from 1876 to 1880, Table. — Pacific Coast Trade. — Slacking of the Tide, 1881 to 1885, Table. — Nearing Low-water Mark. — The Ebb-tide still running, 1886 to 1890, Table. — Statement of Sail and Steam together. Table. — Registered Steam Vessels, Table. — Decay of American Carriage in California Trade, Table. — Review of Losses from Un- fortunate Legislation. — Losses experienced, Table 150 CHAPTER X. THE QVESTIOX OF TARIFF LEGISLATION. Examination of Tariff Influence. — Losses and Gains. — Vessels sold abroad, 1854 to 1861, Table. —The Tariff and Volume of Trade. — Commerce per Capita, under Low and High Tariff, Table. — Com- merce under Early Policy, Table . 164 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XI. THE FREE IMPORTATION OF SHIPS. Foreign Cooperation. — The Sources of Free-ship Machination. — Objec- tions to American Shipbuilding. — The " Free-ship " Notion an Im- portation. — Value of our Present Shipbuilding Industry. — What shall we Exchange for Tonnage. — Foreign Possession of our Domestic Trade 174 CHAPTER XII. THE UNITY OF INTEREST IN SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPOWNING. Builders as Owners. — Owning follows Building. — British Experi- ence, Table. — Protection to Building is Protection to Owning . . 182 CHAPTER XIII. TRUE ECONOMY IN SHIPOWNING. The Test of Economic Building. — Comparative Cost and Durability, Table. — Prices of Ships in Liverpool, 1869 187 CHAPTER XIV. DURABILITY OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN BUILT SHIPPING. Lloyd's Register for Authority. — Endurance of Sail Vessels above 100 Tons, Table. — Longevity of Sail Vessels above 100 Tons, Table. — Longevity of Steamers above 100 Tons. — The Ratio of Life to Endurance. — Comparative Survival of British and American built Wood and Iron Vessels. — Average Ages of Existing Fleets, Table. — Extreme Survival, Vessels above 100 Tons, Table. — Ages of Fleets above 10 Years, Table. — Ages of Fleets above 15 Years, Table. — Average Ages of Fleets at Different Stages of Survival, Table. — Proportion of Vessels above 15 Years of Age, surviv- ing to Different Ages, Table. — Proportion of Tonnage above 15 Years of Age, surviving to Different Ages, Table. — Comparison of Survival : Age, Number, and Tonnage combined. — Final Com- parison of Survival : Number and Tonnage only combined. — Final Test of Superiority. — British Iron and American Wood Sail further compared. — Proportion of Numbers and Tonnage and Dif- ference, Table. — Average Excess of American Survival and Profit- time, Tables. — American Superiority, Table. — The Conclusion of the Matter 194 CONTENTS. xi CHAPTER XV. FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE POWER AND ITS IRON RULE. State Insurance Protection. — British Insurance Protection. — The Wheat Tariff Association. — Copy of Agreement. — The Object of this Foreign Trust. — Decline of American Underwriting. — British Mercantile Discrimination. — " Insurance on Wheat," Banker's Magazine. — Boycott of the Liverpool Corn Exchange. — Mr. Fow- ler's Letter 219 CHAPTER XVI. SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. Comparative Seaworthiness and Safety of Foreign and American Ships. — Comparative Ship Performance. — Part First of Table VI., Averages. — The Fallacy of Free-carrying. — Lord Bacon's Prin- ciple. — The Motion of Trade : Percentage of Number, Table. — Percentage of Tonnage, Table. — Carriage, Speed, and Efficiency : Part Second of Table VI. — The Consequence of Deep Loading. — Wood Ships can carry most. — American Superiority in Speed. — American Superiority in Efficiency. — Iron Ships least Efficient. — Unfounded British Sentiment. — American Superiority in Speed and Efficiency, Table. — American Ships superior to European Craft. — Extremes of Efficiency — Averages of One Month in Each of Four Years, Table. — Extremes of Efficiency in Four Years, Table. — Observations on Models. — Safety and Seaworthiness. — Part Third of Table VI. : Lost, in Peril, etc. — Proportionate Safety of British Flag. — The Greater Economy of American Ships. — Part Fourth of Table VI. : Property Losses. — Comparative Peril per Ton : Part Fifth of Table VI. — American Superiority for In- surance. — Peril Rate of Different Fleets, Table. — Comparison of British and American Fleets, — Proportionate Economy of British Flag. — Peril Rate of Wood and Iron compared. Table. — L^njust Underwriting Rates. — The Comparative Turnout of Cargoes. — Corrected Table of Turnout of Cargoes. — What has been shown . 232 CHAPTER XVIL PACIFIC COAST COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. Economic Features of 1889. — The Export of Grain. — The Business of One Month. —The Export of Flour. — Total Extra Cost of Foreign Freights. — Performance of Grain Fleets, 1889. — Pro- ducers pay a Bounty to Foreign Tonnage. — The True Principle of Freighting Economy. — The Export Trade and Transportation of xii CONTENTS. Oregon and Washington. — Tables of Grain Export. — Puget Sound Lumber Export, Table. — Oregon and Washington Grain, Flour, and Lumber Export, Table. — Vessels owned in Oregon and Wash- ington, Table 265 CHAPTER XVIII. THE MARINE INSURANCE BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES. Reports from Collectors of Customs. — " Free Trade " the Cause of Insurance Decay. — Insurance Report from New York. — State- ment of President Jones of the Atlantic Insurance Company of New York : Premium Rates on Hulls ; Rates for Steamers ; Rates on Sail Vessels ; Rates on Cargoes ; Premiums on Cargoes, Table ; The Nationality of Underwriting Capital in New York ; Compa- nies discontinuing Business, Table ; Statement of the Marine In- surance Companies of New York. — Insurance Report from San Francisco. — Letter of Secretary Fowler of the California Insur- ance Company of San Francisco ; Rates on Hulls and Cargoes, Tables ; List of Marine Insurance Companies on Pacific Coast ; California Companies retired from Business. — Differential Rates and their Differences, Table. — Differential Rates on Cotton Cargoes. — Insurance Dependency and its Evils 277 CHAPTER XIX. THE MARINE INSURANCE BUSINESS AS CONDUCTED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. The Report from Newcastle-on-Tyne, England. — The Report from Cardiff, Wales. — The Report from Havre, France : Part Third, Hulls, Wooden ; Freights ; Iron Sails Sliips (French or Foreign) ; Additional Premiums for Special Voyages ; Navigation in Winter in the North Seas ; Hulls of Steamers, Wood or Iron ; Foreign Steamers ; Insurance by the Voyage, Additional Premiums. — Re- view of Foreign Insurance Systems. — Comparative Safety at Sea. — Proportionate Losses of Different Nations, Steamers above 50 Tons, Table. — Ditto, Sailers above 50 Tons, Table 296 CHAPTER XX. IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. Faults of Admeasurement. — Favoritism to Steamers and Foreign Ship- ping. — Comparative Tonnages of Steam Fleets, Table. — Admeas- urement Allowances. — Foreign Net-Tonnage Rules. — A Test Office for Tonnage Surveys. — Evils of our Tonnage-tax Laws. — CONTENTS. xili Discrimination against our own Shipping. — Origin of the Free- port Provisos. — Refunding of Tonnage Taxes. — Pretenses for Tonnage-tax Refunds. — Repeal of the Law. — Tonnage-tax Col- lections, 1890. — The Principle of Just Taxation. — The Tonnage of Subsidy. — British Tonnage under Subsidy or Subvention. — Sub- sidized Grerman Tonnage 311 CHAPTER XXL THE LOAD-UNE QUESTION. Action of the Maritime Conference. — International Correspondence, — Comparison of Freeboards, Steam Vessels. — Comparison of Freeboards, Sail Vessels. — Discriminations. — Table III. for Spar- deck Steamers. — Table IV. for Awning-deck Steamers. — Sharp- ness of Hulls considered. Illustration. — Imposition on Wooden Vessels. — Proof from Experience. — Valid Reasons for a Free- board Law 328 CHAPTER XXIL THE COST AND ECONOMY OF SHIPPING. Advantage governs Trade. — The Principles of Transportation. — The Slow Teaching of Experience. — The Brazilian Trade. — The Un- popular Steam Tramp. — The Lake, versus Ocean, Cargo Steam- ers. — Deadweight Ability, Lake Steamer. — Deadweight Ability, British Steamer. — Strength. — Stresses and Factors of Safety, Table. — Workmanship and Durability. — Cost, etc. — Whalebacks compared with Tramps. — Cost of Steamer and Consorts to- gether. — Cost of running Whalebacks. — Lake Traffic Manage- ment. — Comparative Cost of manning British Cargo and Amer- ican Passenger Steamers. — A Fair Illustration, Table. — Wages and Living of Foreign and American Crews. — Reduction in Crews of British Sail Ships. — Reduction in Crews of British Steamers. — Shortening of Freight Steamer Crews. — Tables of Seamen's Wages. — Monthly Wages out of New York, Steamers. — Wages of Sea- men at Atlantic Ports. — Wages out of Cleveland and Chicago . . 338 CHAPTER XXIII. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. The Office of the Secretary of the Treasury. — The Reports of the Secretaries : Hamilton, Woleott, Gallatin, Dallas, Crawford, Rush, Ingham, McLane, Taney, Woodbury, Ewing, Forward, Spencer, Bibb, Walker, Meredith, Corwin, Guthrie, Cobb, Chase, MeCulloch, Boutwell, Richardson, Bristow, Morrill, Sherman, Folger, MeCul- loch, Manning, Fairchild, Windom, Foster. — Conclusion of the Matter 360 xiv CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXIV. THE BUREAU OF NAVIGATION, OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. The Act establishing the Bureau, — Commissioners and their Qualifi- cations. — Opposition to the Bureau. — A Marine Board .... 398 CHAPTER XXV. THE TONNAGE BILL AND ESTIMATES FOR BOUNTIES. The Desperate Struggle of our Marine. — The Tonnage Bill. — An Explanation of the Tonnage Bill. — The Cost of the Tonnage Bill. — Amount of Bounty under the Substitute Bill, for Sail Vessels and Steamers. — The Total of Bounties. — The Payments of Following Years. — Ratio of Bounty to Whole Cost of Transportation. — Further and Final Estimate, Table 404 CHAPTER XXVI. TRANSPORTATION UNDER PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE. Last Words of W^illiam W^indom. — Domestic Commerce. — Foreign Commerce. — Will Government Aid pay ? 420 CHAPTER XXVn. METHODS OF PROTECTING SHIPPING. First Principle. — Protection by Discriminating Duties. — Protection by Export Bounties. — The Carriage of Free and Reciprocity Goods. — How Subsidies, Subventions, and Bounties act. — Protection by Shipbuilding Premiums. — Mr. Blaine's Partially Protective Plan. — Regulation of Triangular Trade. — Free Pilotage. — A Protec- tive System needed 428 APPENDIX. The Load-line Problem. — Of Freeboard Rules. — A Bill for Free- board or Load Marks. — Comparison of Freeboards, Tables. — The Mail Subsidy Bill. — The Shipping League Bill. — Growth, Thrift, and Decline of Shipping, Table. — Foreign Trade and Transporta- tion. — Subsidies and Payments for Ocean Mail Service, Table . . 439 AMERICAN MARINE. CHAPTER I. THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN A MARINE. It may be laid down as fundamontal, that every interest wliit-h largely employs and rewards labor, develops resonrces and auguments wealth, aids soeial progress and increases knowledge, is of national eoneern. 15ut especially is this true of those trades and pursuits whose growth strengthens the state, guards its independence, and makes its safety sure. In line with this maxim, our foremost statesnuMi, from Washing- ton down, have endeavored to square their work. In our early history Mr. Jefferson declared that Agriculture, Manufactures, Commerce, and Navigation constituted the four pillars of our prosperity. Mr. A^ ebster expressed a similar thought in 1824. He said that it was a fundamental axiom that the great inter- ests of the country were united and inseparable ; that agricul- ture, commerce, and manufactures must flourish together or languish together, and that all legislation was dangerous which proposed to benefit one of them without looking to the conse- quences that might fall upon the others. It is, therefore, for fitting and peculiar reasons that ship- building, navigation, and commerce have always called for national care and promotion from politic maritime states. As a maritime people, not only have we a common right in the sea, and consequently a national interest in all its pursuits, but the protection of our trade abroad, resistance to aggression and retaliation for wrongs, and our defense against naval attacks, must be effected by ships and seamen. As a maritime people, our home is not only on our own soil, and our indus- tries those of the land, but our abode is likewise on the ocean, and our pursuits include the work of the sea. On the sea, as 2^ 'AMERICAN MARINE. X'rf/tbi:h)Ad; our' peojple live and toil; therefore, on both ele- ments must our national power be sho\vn. As an independent nation, we must build up and maintain, as well in peace as in war, a marine and navy of our own, or possess no real great- ness as a state, no influential rank among the powers of the world, and no valid voice in its affairs. Sovereignty of the Sea. The ocean is a vast domain. Of the earth's surface, seventy -three per cent, is water and twenty- seven per cent, is land. While military power has been most displayed ashore, history tells of many struggles for possession of the sea. Although the oceans and navigable seas belong in common to all the nations of the earth, only the maritime states and people can enjoy their advantages and profit from their pursuits. These benefits may thus be proved: though the mar- itime nations fly their flags over forty per cent, only of the hab- itable land, yet, through their shipbuilding and navigation, they virtually rule all the land and sea, and the world entire. When we consider that in territory, population, production, coast lines, harbors, and foreign trade we rank now either first or second in the world, the idea presents itself that in future we may rightfully stand preeminent among the maritime powers, — if only we do but claim our rights and cultivate our natural interest in the domain of the sea. Necessity for Ships. Nations are like men; they concede no rights that are not asserted. To assert our rights at sea, we must sail it with our ships. With no marine, we shall have no ris^hts and receive no benefits from the wide domain which is given into our hands. Such a situation would be that of a people planted in the heart of a continent, disunited and distant from the sea. To choose a lot like theirs evidences no states- manship guiding our course; discloses neither enterprise nor skill, independence nor courage. It is not becoming to Ameri- can character and the high civilization of our people. It sacrifices our self-respect, while it forfeits our title to rank among navigating nations, who alone control the world. To give up the ship and relinquish the sea is to yield so much of right, of possession, and advantage, that our delinquency would surely bring disrepute and invite attack from inferior powers. In the present state of maritime advancement, so much of the is THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN A MARINE. 3 power of nations is exerted and shown on the sea, it is not less a matter of military necessity than of commercial policy, that on the same arena our own nation should renew and enlarge its power. The national interest in shipping of our own has not been lessened, but increased, by the alternative of late pre- sented by foreign powers, that we must yield to them our ship- ping and commercial trades, or hold these great and essential interests by the direct expenditure of money, or, if need be, by force of arms. Indeed, the granting or giving of each new foreign subsidy, bounty, or other protection, such as has been resorted to in the past fifty years, to cut our merchants and their shipping out of business, adds one more to the many necessitous circumstances making national aid imperative, if we would have ships and seamen of our own. Deplorable as the truth may be, it is nevertheless the fact that our i-ights on the land or the sea, to our independence and national life, have only been secured by expenditure or by force, by money or by blood. The Means of Peace and Progress. The United States has long been the victim of skillful aggression on tlie j)art of cer- tain European powers, eager to engross our trade. It is true that we retain our domestic navigation, but, under present conditions of railway development, the home-trade is only a small part of our transportation by sea. The destruction of our coastwise navigation wovdd only be an inconvenience, while the ruin of our foreign-trade shipping business has greatly im- paired our financial strength, weakened our defensive power, and daily threatens our national peace. At whatever cost, we must have the means of regaining the relative position that has been long lost, and of rescuing all that is still imperiled. We must have the means of meeting our foes at sea, in readiness to fall upon or defend, with speed to overtake and power to conquer, while all other powers make martial preparations. We must have the means of winning and holding our proper rank among the nations, of insuring our progress and perfect- ing our institutions, with our rights undisputed and our peace secured. What are those means? They are simply (1) the ships and seamen, the merchants and mechanics, the materials, labor, skill, and capital of our eoimtry employed in doing our just proportion of foreign commerce; and (2) the ships, sea- 4 AMERICAN MARINE. men, and marines employed in the naval service, sufficient in number and force to keep the sea in national defense at all times. These resources, as precious as they are simple, should be developed and made available without delay. They must not be wasted or destroyed. If wisely cherished, the marine will always furnish indispensable requisites, and ample reserves of naval power. It is essential to that object; and what is indisputable, so long as the European nations pour out money like water, not only in "subsidies," "subventions," "bounties," and other aids, hut through great naval establishments for military i^rotection to their marines., our own government must do likewise, or the nation will suffer for its weakness. When the Norsemen of Europe had developed their naval skill, they became the undisputed masters of the sea, and for centuries afterward preyed upon the unprotected countries that built no ships and had no maritime power. They ceased to conquer and to colonize better lands than their own when other nations built shipping and took the sea in effective defense. The national interest in cultivating nautical and naval power was well shown at the beginning of our government, in the protective legislation which built up our early marine. It was estimated in 1789 that 600,000 tons of shipping, two thirds of it foreign, chiefly under the British flag, was engaged in our commerce at home and abroad. In six years' time foreign tonnage fell off to one tenth in the foreign trade, and wholly disappeared from the domestic traffic. It was not long ere it was found that naval protection must be extended to the new marine. Thus our navy originated, and our naval power was developed. While it has been observed that nations without shipping sometimes have no navy, history has proved in every instance that naval power is a natural necessity to a maritime nation. The seacoast of a country is one of its frontiers, and the safer the passage to and from the sea, the greater will be the facility for commerce. Good harbors, busied in trade and transportation, are sources of wealth, and should be also of strength, even in time of war. But in proportion to their accessibility and importance, if not properly defended in time of war, they become the means of weakness and defeat. Sea-Poioer in History. History affords many examples of the growth and decay, the restoration and studied improvement THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN A MARINE. 5 of shipping power. The iinportauee of maritiiue nations has depended so greatly upon it, that the ablest statesmanship has always looked to strengtliening the naval arm. The enactment of the British navigation laws in Cromwell's time is often re- ferred to, but a more conspicuous case is that of the French government in the reign of Louis XIV. At that period Eng- land on the sea and Austria on the land seriously menaced the development of France. But Provitlence had raised up to her two gi-eat riders, Henry IV. and Kiehelieu, whose politics had traced the lines of strength and nuistery. Four elements were deemed necessary to the national greatness. These were, (1) internal union witli religious tolerance; (2) alliance with the Dutch and German States; (3) extension of boundary east- ward; and (4) the creation and development of a great sed 2)mrcr^ adding to tlie wealth of the kingdom and making head against its enemies. In the means to be employed, maritime development — ocean carrying and conunerce — was only sec- ond in importance. At tliis time England had decreed the fall of the Dutch Kepul»lic, a power based wholly on navigation and commerce, and was succeed. and a few 60s. [Now observe], ' spot' vessels did not do as well, and the balance [of trade], while largely against shippers [and opei'ators in England], is reduced by spot rates." American Ship Discount Chartering . That Is to sa}^ Brit- ish wheat s}3eculators paid too much for the tonnage of their flag and lost money on the year's business; but this loss was considerably lessened in the aggregate by chartering such American ships as happened at hand at discount rates. The following extracts from Portland market reports will show how our ships were "worked" for contributions in reduction of adverse balances : — "January 12. — The wooden ship Indiana, 1,488 tons, was closed yesterday to Sibson, Church & Co. for wheat to Cork, U. K. or A. for 32s. ^d. ; if to direct port in U. K., Is. 3c?. less. This is said to be the lowest rate ever paid for like freight from this port. The Indiana has lain here since April [nine months]. Some of the wooden in port declare they would not accept a like rate, but there is no saying what a firm offer would result in. The British iron bark Berwickshire ar- rived to-day under prior charter. " January 16. — Market entirely without interest. Attem2)ts to work a wooden ship appear unsuccessful at last rate paid. " January 17. — Charters for the week have been the Beeniah, 954 tons, iron, at 41s. 3(/., and Indiana, 1,488 tons, wood, at 32s. 6fZ., both for U. K. for orders [and both for same shippers]. "January 18. — The wooden ship Sea King, 1,492 tons, was closed to-day to C Caesar & Co., for wheat to Cork, U. K. H. or A., at 32s. Qd. Negotiations have been pending some days. "January 19. — There is an entire absence of anj' disposition to take up wood at over 32s. 6(7., and this figure is deemed too low by waiting ships. " January 29. — The iron bark Henry James, 908 tons, arrived to- day, consigned to Sibson, Church & Co., and chartered for grain prior to arrival. The spot market develops nothing new. "January 31. — For wood, 32s. 6(7. is considered possible, while iron for the moment is in less request. " February 2. — All the fleet chartered ahead at the high rates have put in an appearance. There is little prospect of any spot business." It will be noted that the Beemah, chartered after the Indi- ana, was given a rate 27 per cent, higher, although several wooden (American) ships were offering at rates much lower. 80 AMERICAN MARINE. The Indiana carries 2,282 tons, — nearly half more, — yet her freight-money only exceeded by about one tenth what the Bee- mah received. Lloyds discrimination in cargo insurance was 11 per cent. ; being in 1884, 2| per cent, in iron, and 2| per cent in wooden ships. With the price of wheat at 41s. 6c?. per quarter in Liverpool, the handicap amounted to about 5 pence per ton of cargo. Allowing this excision, the Indiana carrying 2,282 tons, contributed or paid an assessment of 8s. 4(1. per ton, or a gross sum of ?ff4,950 (which about equaled 6 per cent, of her value), towards counterbalancing the losses of her charterers from undue patronage of British tonnage. In the second example, it was deemed best to put off loading the Berwickshire, chartered "prior" at 60s., and charter and load the Sea King at 32s. Qd. If the object was to even accounts, it was a good one, for the Sea King's charter would save about $5,000, and recover considerable of an adverse bal- ance. The Sea King loaded and sailed with a "prior charter" bark, the Banca, as did the Indiana with the Beemah, so we had this inglorious spectacle: Two first-class American ships chartered at the very lowest rate, and two old rusty British barks, inferior in all respects, one engaged at 27, and the other at 45 per cent, higher rates, sailing for Europe on the same day, as per report in the "Oregonian " as follows: — " Clearances. Tuesday, February 5. — Ship Sea King, for Ant- werp with 45,096 centals wheat, valued at $73,100 ; shipped by Cae- sar & Co. British bark Banca, for Queenstown, with 34,527 centals wheat, valued at $62,148 ; shipped by Meyer, Wilson & Co. Ship Indiana, for Queenstown, with 45,653 centals wheat, valued at $77,609 ; shipped by Sibson, Church & Co. British bark Beemah, for Queens- town, with 16,409 pounds of flour, valued at $82,045 ; shipped by Sib- son, Church & Co." The reader may now feel interested to learn some particulars of the "eminent English Association," the Lloyds of London, whose capital and craft can so well protect the British flag, — and so utterly humble our own. Origin and Progress of Lloyds. A Lloyd's Register of British shipping had existed from 1760, when the "Under- writers' Book" was first established. The "Red Book," in opposition, was started by merchants and shipowners in 1799, and both continued until 1834, when a provisional committee, EVOLUTION OF BRITISH MARITIME POWER. 81 consisting of shipowners, merchants, and underwriters of Lon- don, was "appointed to draw up the rules and regulations to establish a new society for the purpose of obtaining a faithful and accurate classification of the mercantile marine of the United Kingdom, and of foreign vessels trading thereto." This committee, with the assistance of the Committee of the Shipowners' Society, drew up the first rules and regulations, expressing their opinion: — "That when these rules have been applied to the classifica- tion of ships, the result will be, that instead of the uncertain standard of the port of building and the uncontrolled decision of surveyors, which has hitherto determined the quality and character of ships, a book of reference will be compiled, which may be referred to with confidence, as not only containing the report of qualified surveyors, but exhibiting that report cor- rected and substantiated by the committee of this society." This arrangement for a supervising committee, with a mem- ber of Parliament as its chairman, was apparently designed to connect the society with the government; and while the work of the surveyors might be inspection, the direction of the com- mittee would secure protection. Having laid down the rules, in conformity therewith the committee elected eight merchants, and the committee for the management of Lloyd's elected eight underwriters, and the General Committee of the Shipowners' Society elected eight shipowners; these, with the chairman at Lloyds, constituted the first General Committee of the "Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping." In 1863 twelve additional members, chosen by shipowners and underwriters, were added. Since the union with the Liverpool branch, in 1885, the affairs of the society have been superintended by a committee of merchants, shipowners, and underwriters ; twenty-four elected in London, and thirty-one at the principal outports, together with the chairmen of the Corporation of Lloyds and of the General Shipowners' Society for the time being. Six of the members elected in London and four in Liverpool retire annually, but are generally reelected. Twenty-seven of the outport mem- bers hold office four years. The committee appoints a sub- committee of classification so regulated that each member of the General Committee, in rotation, takes his turn of duty 82 AMERICAN MARINE. therein tlirougliout the year. While the shipowning strength and underwriting power is nominally equal in the management, the former interest has generally preponderated; hence the protective policy enforced. The surveyors consist of two classes, one the "exclusive officers of the society," the other, those serving it on occasion, and for the most part stationed in foreign countries. The first General Committee reclassified the vessels of the United Kingdom in 1834. The new rides were adopted in the construction of new vessels, and in the repair and restora- tion of old ones. A distinguished member of the first school of Naval Architecture, Mr. A. F. B. Creuze, was appointed Surveyor-in-chief, to visit all outports, and advise with the owners and builders and instruct the surveyors. Since 1834 a large volume has been published to subscribers yearly, giving the character, class, and grade of such British and other vessels as pay for inspection. Of late years this volume contains the names of all vessels in the world, with many particulars, but gives the class of those only that have paid for insertions. This volume is known as "Lloyd's Reg- ister." While it contained only the names of vessels inspected by Lloyd's surveyors, English writers proudly dubbed it "the Blue-book of the aristocracy of ships." The only rival it had for forty years was the "Bureau Veritas " or "French Lloyds " Register, established in 1828, and this work is its only equal to-day. The value of ships for purchase or sale, as well as for the hive of transport, depends materially on the rank they bear in Lloj^d's Register. British underwriters do, probably, three fourths of the marine insurance of the world, and possibly a greater share for the United States. To a great extent, their business is done or refused on the character which each ship holds at Lloyd's. In an English underwriter's view no reg- ister is so reliable as Lloyd's. Ships standing on other books may be good risks, but if they take them, premiums should be higher. From this it may be judged what benefit was done to British, and what injury to "foreign" ships, from 1870 to 1876 inclusive, while the latter were virtually cast out of Lloyd's Register, to give advantage to British iron tonnage. The American shipping, so badly treated then, sought classifi- cation with the "French Lloyds," where the portion engaged EVOLUTION OF BRITISH MARITIME POWER. 83 in foreign trade has chosen to remain. A single wooden, and a few iron vessels are all under our flag that are now on class at Lloyd's. While we have a register of our own, the "Record of American and Foreign Shipping," it lacks the age, prestige, and standing of Lloyd's or tlie Veritas, in England France, and other foreign countries. The seven or eight marine registers now existing have all been called for by the course of Lloyd's. Lloyd's rules for building have had many changes, some for the better and others for the worse. They were never gen- erally followed in the United States, because they were never ahead of the art here. To have followed them blindly would have prevented progress. Many a good idea, in shipbuilding, found its way into Lloyd's rules from the best practice in America. Of late years, Lloyd's have entertained the idea of equivalence in workmanship, and provided, that "all ships which shall show in their structure and in their materials greater strength, security, and durability " shall receive a clas- sification proportioned to their intrinsicality. Prior to 1854 there were no rules for the building and clas- sification of iron ships, although in 1838 the committee of Lloyd's had classed the first iron vessel ever pronounced "fit for the safe conveyance of dry and perishable cargoes." This was a small bark of 271 tons. She was classed as "built of iron," with no letter; and thus were classed all iron vessels until 1814. In that year the committee improved the classifi- cation by rating such iron vessels as were worthy of registra- tion, "six years A 1." Even this advance helped iron craft amazingly. They grew in favor, and fortunate conditions pre- vailed. By 1854 it was found that the iron workers of Great Britain were building many vessels, at nearly as cheap rates as wooden ones could be afforded in that country, while American wooden ships could not get a full and fair class at Lloyd's; that steam propulsion was fast taking the place of sail, while machinery in England was cheaper than elsewhere; and that a wise economy demanded, and national safety required, British ships to be home-built, while iron was the only material for these essentials. In view of all the circumstances, of which there were many of importance to Great Britain, the govern- ment and Lloyd's readily agreed with the iron interests of the 84 AMERICAN MARINE. kingdom, that a higher classification, based on proper rules, would produce a new and national marine, and prove the best protective measure, all-around, that could be adopted. Lloyd's accepted the task; the iron shipbuilders soon had a guide; and a great boom followed. A craze for iron ships prevailed in England, and soon had the effect to check consid- erably both shipbuilding and shipowning in the United States. This was not on account of the merits of iron tonnage, but because of the extraordinary and patriotic exertions of Eng- lishmen everywhere to help their country's cause. AVe did nothing to help ours. The rules for iron shipbuilding, framed in 1854, were well characterized by John Scott Russell as "celebrated." They were prescribed for ships of six, nine, and twelve years' rating Al, and raised iron to an equality with wood, with like periodical surveys. These rules were amended in 1857, by widening the frame spaces, but increasing the plating thick- ness. In 1861 the rides and tables were limited to ordinary dimensions, length of hulls not exceeding seven breadths, or ten depths of hold. To get speed and capacity, iron vessels were being built dangerously long. Provisions were made for more material in vessels of extraordinary proportions. In 1863 further improvements in the rules were made. These were arrived at by heeding the suggestions of practical ship- builders. Rating in years was abolished, as it was found impracticable to determine beforehand, as in the case of wood, how long iron vessels might endure with credit to their insjjec- tion. Many of the first class had proved no more lasting than some of the third class. Monograms were invented to distin- guish the different grades, Aa, Ab, Ac, all having the letter A to indicate first class. In 1870 a further change was made, which stands good at the present time. Iron vessels are now graded by numbers, 100 A, 95 A, 90 A, 85 A, 80 A, and 75 A, according to the tables of scantling from which they are built. The strictness found necessary in surveying iron vessels for Lloyd's Register soon begat opposition on the part of certain builders and owners, and in 1862 the Liverpool Under- writers' Association established a "Red Book," in which great latitude was given to the surveyors. The "committee" of this register professed to class ships "on their merits," though EVOLUTION OP BRITISH MARITIME POWER. 85 they had rules for a guide. Their system was, briefly, to class in red^ for periods varying from ten to twenty years A 1, all vessels built under their inspection. All vessels not so built were classed in black, for periods acording to their "merits," from ten to twenty years ; but while the blacks were subject to special survey once in two years, the reds were privileged to run three, and even four years. The object of these discrimi- nations was to compel all iron shipping to be built under in- spection, — for revenue only, it appeared, for the more inspec- tion the more money, and the stronger the competition to get business from Lloyds, the farther into the ground the trade of iron shipbuilding was run. By the time this book had absorbed the greater part of the iron tonnage of the kingdom, its character had fallen to a low state. Twenty -year ships in numbers were sent to sea, and never heard from afterward. Lloyds attenuated to compete with the Red Book, reduced their requirements for strength, and the opposition followed suit, until the consequences of this deteriorating rivalry attracted the attention of the world. The evils thus induced gave wooden shipping a breathing spell. At length measures were taken to prevent competitive iron-ship inspection, and in 1885 the Red Book was incorporated with Lloyd's. Although the situation is much improved by the changes made since in the rules, there is yet a great stride to the turning out, gener- ally, of a perfect iron ship in Great Britain. Cheapness, and not perfection, still rules the trade there. The Postal Subsidy Policy. The rise and progress of the British postal policy is second in interest to no other chapter in her commercial history. The first contract for subsidized postal service was made by the Postmaster-General in 1833. It provided for semi-weekly trips of 140-ton steamers, from Liverpool to the Isle of Man, at $4,250 per annum. That memorable contract with the Mona Isle Steam Company, on the same terms, continuing to the present time, is a good example of the constancy of British purpose in fostering navi- gation. In 1834 the second subsidiary contract was made. It appropriated -185,000 per annum to the General Steam Navi- gation Company, for semi -weekly service from London to Rot- terdam and Hamburg, renewed in 1849 and continued tiU 1853. 86 AMERICAN MARINE. In 1837 the third steam line, but really the first open ocean service, was established. The route was between Falmouth and ports in Spain and Gibraltar, for which the subsidy paid was $145,000 annually. That contract was transferred in 1843 to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Com- pany, Southampton substituted for Falmouth, the trips changed to three a month, and the support reduced to $102,- 500, and so it has remained. The steam service to Spain soon encouraged hopes that the new navigation could succeed on the wide Atlantic. The British government and people had long submitted to Ameri- can supremacy in postal service, by sailing packet-ships, and if steamers under the British flag could be substituted for sail under the American, almost any subsidy would be gladly paid. As an experiment, the auxiliary steam-powered American bark Savannah had crossed the ocean to Liverpool in 1819, using steam fourteen days of the twenty -two on the voyage. This side-wheel vessel was small, a mere model of 350 tons with engines of 90 horse-power. British steamers were put on between Holyhead and Dublin the same year. We were there- fore ahead; and if our government had been as protective as the British, then or later, the Savannah would have been fol- lowed by larger steamers, ocean steam navigation developed on American lines of trade, and our naval power asserted, as it should have been, before a British steamer saw an Atlantic wave. Our opportunity came, but we turned it away. In 1838 the Sirius arrived in New York, having been dis- patched by the Cork Steamship Company. Her success led the Great Western Steamship Company to propose, to the British government, to carry the mails from Liverpool or Bristol to Halifax and Boston, twice a month, for $225,000 per annum, the service to begin in eighteen to twenty-four • months. But such was the anxiety of the British government to be first on the course with a line of steamers, that it would not allow more time than one year in which to build and fit the vessels out, whereupon Edward Cunard, of Halifax, stepped in and closed a contract on the 4th of July, 1839, for a semi- monthly service, receiving therefor the heavy subsidy of $425,000 per annum. Thus, on our anniversary day, Great Britain began her financial warfare for the acquisition of our EVOLUTION OF BRITISH MARITIME POWER. 87 trade and transportation, and perhaps the eventual resump- tion of her okl relations of master and servant in business life. The Cunard line soon began a service to New York, and its subsidy was raised to 8550,000. American competition began in 1850, and the subsidy was raised then to 8735,000. Larger vessels were employed in 1852, and again the subsidy was in- creased to the amount of $850,000, with orders from the Brit- ish government to run without freight, ""if necessary to beat the American line " having less support. Actuated by this high spirit of control. Great Britain spent millions yearly, for a quarter of a century, to unite her ports with the markets of the world. Her expenditure for com- merce would build all the steamers which she has now em- ployed in the postal service. She now commands the trade, and does most of the transportation of the world, perhaps more on account of her subsidy policy than any other agency with one exception, and that is the non-protective course of the United States, which she had a goodly share in instigating. Britain is great, because active in making opportunities and conditions for business success. The Abolition of Privateering. This was another propo- sition in the interest of our rival. It is known as a " Declara- tion concerning Maritime Law," which was adopted by Eng- land, France, and other powers in 1856, after the Crimean war, inspired, it seems, by the British government, with the view of persuading the United States to go into the next naval war with our hands tied behind our back. Had this stratagem succeeded, it would have swept away an important defense, and added a vital one to the British lines. A few wise strokes from the pen of William L. Marcy balked the scheme. Would that he had directed the correspondence of our government from 1815 to 1830, while "Maritime Reci- procity " was entangling the wits of our statesmen. The Secre- tary of State replied : — "It certainly ought not excite the least surprise that strong naval powers should be willing to forego the practice, compar- atively useless to them, of employing privateers upon condition that weaker powers agree to part with their most effective means of defending their maritime rights. It is, in the opinion of this government, to be seriously apprehended, that if the use 88 AMERICAN MARINE. of privateers be abandoned, the dominion over the seas will be surrendered to those powers which adopt the policy and have the means of keeping up large navies. The one which has a decided naval superiority would be, potentially, the mistress of the ocean, and by the abolition of privateering that domina- tion would be more firmly secured. Such a power engaged in a war with a nation inferior in naval strength would have nothing to do for the security and protection of its commerce but to look after the ships of the regular navy of its enemy. These might be held in check by one half, or less, of its naval force, and the other might sweep the commerce of its enemy from the ocean. Nor would the injurious effects of a vast naval superiority to weaker states be much diminished if that superiority was shared among three or four great powers. It is unquestionably the interest of such weaker states to discoun- tenance and resist a measure which fosters the growth of regu- lar naval establishments. . . . "Those who may have, at any time, a control on the ocean, will be strongly tempted to regulate its use in a manner to subserve their own interests and ambitious projects. The ocean is the common jjroperty of all nations, and instead of yielding to a measure which will be likely to secure to a few — possibly to one — an ascendency over it, each should pertina- ciously retain all the means it possesses to defend the common heritage. A predominant power upon the ocean is more menacing to the well-being of others than such a power on land, and all are alike interested in resisting a measure calcu- lated to facilitate the permanent establishment of such a dom- ination, whether it be wielded by one power or shared by a few others." The advantage sought and gained by England in the aboli- tion of privateering has an illustration in an incident which has lately happened in the German Reichstag. Germany is one of the powers that have agreed to the Declaration against privateers. She must, therefore, maintain a larger naval establishment on this account. ' The naval committee, having under consideration the annual bill, had struck out a provision for five regular cruisers, but Chancellor von Caprivi demanded that the clause be reinserted. He insisted that the ships were necessary, in order to make attacks upon an enemy's commerce EVOLUTION OF BRITISH MARITIME POWER. 89 in the event of war. Germany, he declared, had no intention of conducting a war with privateers. It would be impossible to do without cruisers. The Naval Subvention Policy. The latest protection to the British marine is the subvention of merchant steamers for prospective naval service. This policy, initiated in 1885, is intended to create and maintain lines of transportation of the largest and swiftest steamers, in the interest of British trade and power. Subvention tonnage held at the disposition of the Admiralty for purchase or hire is of two classes: (1) special vessels, fitted to be armed and equipped as cruisers in time of war, and (2) additional vessels of the same owners, or of the lines receiving postal subsidy, to be used as transports, armed or otherwise. The first class is paid fifteen shillings per gross ton annually while carrying the mails, but twenty shillings per ton if sailing without them, payable half yearly. The second class receives no reward unless it renders services, or is taken in purchase under the contracts for retention, which are of a liberal char- acter. The vessels of either class cannot be sold at any time without permission of the Admiralty ; and if any are sold to a British shipowner, the privileges of the agreement go with the ship. The Admiralty, in a letter to the Treasurj^ February 2, 1887, has set forth the subvention policy as follows : — " My lords would desire to state that the experience derived from the events of 1885 has led them to believe that true economy and real efficiency would be best promoted by securing the use to the Admiralty in times of peace of the fastest and most serviceable mercantile vessels. It will be remembered that in 1885 a sum approximating to £600,000 was expended in retaining the services of several fast merchant steam- ers so as to prevent their being available for the service of any power inimical to the interests of the United Kingdom. Had arrangements existed similar to those now contemplated, their lordships believe that a very considerable portion of this expenditure would have been averted, and a degree of confidence felt by the nation on which it is very diffi- cult to place a money value." In the experience referred to, sixteen first-class steamers were taken from their peaceful use, and armed and equipped as cruisers. Other steamers, to the number of 121, were hired 90 AMERICAN MARINE. and used as transports. The expenditure on the mercantile marine for military preparation on this large scale was $9,494,- 018. The war so much expected proved only a scare. The hire of merchant steamers, used in the small Egyptian cam- paign of the year before, was $1,390,357. Such history proves the usefulness and illustrates well the solid advantages reaped by the British nation from its steam marine, which has cost it so much money. The letter goes on : — " Their lordships consider that subventions, or annual payments for preemption in the use or purchase of these steamers, should only be made with those vessels already existing which have an excei:)tionally high sea-going speed, or for vessels which may be built possessing great speed and adaptable in their construction as armed cruisers." In the British view, all superior shipping has a warlike util- ity, and should, therefore, be encouraged in building. It was an observation of Daniel Webster, in 1824, that "it seemed to be announced as the sentiment of the government of England, and undoubtedly it was the real sentiment, that the first of all manufactures is the manufacture of ships." The letter contin- ues: — " As to the standard of speed, the Admiralty consider that no vessel of less than 17 to 18 knots at sea would fully meet the object they have in view. They would add further, that existing vessels, even with this speed, but which have not been built specially to Admiralty de- signs, would not be so valuable to the country as vessels which meet these requirements. The trades which can, from a mercantile aspect, support vessels of the type and character that their lordships desire to see included in the ' reserve fleet of the navy ' are very limited. Such steamers are only likely to find a jirofitable mercantile employment in the passenger and mail service, and particularly in the service to America. Vessels constructed to meet the views of the Admiralty would be at a disadvantage in respect to their cargo-carrying powers, and therefore it would be a distinct advantage to the country if every reasonable encouragement were given to shipowners to build and main- tain this description of steamer in the trades that may be expected to support them. The retention of a fleet of ' royal naval reserved cruis- ers ' would be obviously of great national advantage. In a pecuniary sense they would serve to limit the necessity felt by their lordships for the construction of fast war vessels to protect the commerce of the country. Not only would the nation be a pecuniary gainer in respect to the first cost of such vessels, but their annual maintenance, which EVOLUTION OF BRITISH MARITIME POWER. 91 amounts to a large sum, would be saved were such vessels maintained, while not requii-ed for Admiralty purposes, in mercantile trading." It is here distinctly set forth that the "reserve fleet" — the commerce destroyers of the British navy — is the military harvest of the postal subsidy policy. It is also made apparent what a priceless service was done for British power, when our Congress, in 1858, put an end to an American policy of rival- ing and surpassing England in the building and running of great and swift mail and passenger steamers on the transatlan- tic course. It is clear, also, that our own passive commerce has become a source of danger, and given to foreign nations who actively carry it on the instruments and weapons that may yet decide our destiny as a conquered people and van- quished power. Not England alone has availed herself of the Atlantic passenger trade to create a naval reserve. Germany and France have alike profited by it. The Hamburg- Ameri- can Packet Company, subsidized under the German flag, established in 1847, — the year when our first steamers ran to Europe, — now has a fleet of forty -five large steamships (four of them mammoth twin-screw express steamers, of 10,000 to 12,000 tons, and 13,000 to 16,000 horse-power), measuring gross 138,000 tons, all running in American trade. The French ship-protection system has put into our trade some of the largest and swiftest steamers on the sea, while certain of our own people have been denying its influence and quickening power. The letter concludes : — " Their lordships have not formed a definite view as to the number of vessels that should be retained in the manner indicated, but, as such steamers are not likely to be constructed in any considerable numbers, it is thought that probably ten would be the maximum number at all likely to be placed at the disposition of the Admiralty within the next five years, at a maximum annual charge of £50,000." Here the idea is plainly expressed that all British steamers hereafter built of size and speed suitable for the "reserve fleet " are to be retained — subventioned — - by the government. At this writing the number is ten, measuring 82,402 tons gross, costing annually at the minimum rate, -1299,119 ("so long as holding the American mail contract "), or, at the maxi- mum rate, $398,825 ("if the mail contract be withdrawn"). 92 AMERICAN MARINE. Six or more of these vessels are commanded by officers of the royal naval reserve, and half the crews consist of men belong- ing to the same body of volunteers. The steamers of the "reserve fleet," largely commanded by officers of the corps, under contract as "additional vessels" for transport service, number forty, and measure 160,000 tons gross. Thus, in the total, there are fifty steamers aggregating 242,000 tons — the cream of the British steam fleet — organized and ready at very short notice to cooperate in military opera- tions with the monstrous navy maintained by Great Britain, as the ultimate and crowning protection of her ocean commerce. CHAPTER VII. THE EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 1789 to 1830. The shipping question is not new to the present time, but existed at the adoption of the Constitution. After the institution of the government an active commerce in our own vessels became immediately a leading object of legis- lation. The reason for this course was well stated in a memo- rial from Baltimore to the first Congress, as follows : — "Among the advantages looked for from the national gov- ernment is the increase of the shipping and maritime strength of the United States of America, by laws similar in their nature and operation to the British navigation acts, or laws differing only from these where a difference in the circum- stances of the two countries may render any deviation neces- sary. Your petitioners, on whichever side they may turn their eyes, see reason to believe that the United States may soon be- come as powerful in shipping as any nation in the world. . . . Permit us to add, that for want of national protection and encouragement, our shipping, that great source of strength and riches, has fallen into decay and involved thousands in the utmost distress." Ship- Protection hy the Tariffs 1789. In the brief time of sixty-one days from the date of this petition our patriotic Con- gress responded with the first measure for ship-protection. This was the original tariff act, which provided for lower rates of duties on all goods imported in vessels of our own. The first paragraph of this discrimination related to the importation of teas direct from China or India, in preference to indirect shipments from Europe, and decidedly encouraged an East Indian trade in American vessels. This protection soon induced a commerce such as our merchants, with their small capital and inferior vessels, never could have won, without it, from the merchants of London and the flaof of Britain. The 94 AMERICAN MARINE. following table illustrates the origination and support of our early East Indian commerce and carrying-trade : — DUTIES ox DIFFEBENT KIXDS OF TEA (PER POUTSTD). Manner of Importation. From China or India in American ships From Europe in American vessels . In any other way than as above . . Bohea. Sou- chong. Hyson. Cents. 6 8 15 Cents. 10 13 22 Cents. 10 26 45 Other Green. Cents. 12 16 27 The duties on East India goods other than teas, if brought by foreign vessels, were 12.5 per cent, ad valorem, a rate nearly double that by American vessels. As a general protection to vessels of our own flag, in other trades than the Chinese and East Indian, a rebate of ten per cent, was made on all import duties. At the time of this legislation it was the rule in foreign commerce for merchants to own the shipping which carried their goods. In all such cases protection to ships constituted protection to merchants. But our merchants, whether owners or not of vessels, were pro- tected directly by a credit system for the payment of duties above fifty dollars in amoimt, as follows : On articles of West India produce, four months ; on Madeira wines, twelve months ; on teas, two years ; on all other goods, six months. Thus it was that the very first act of Congress gave protec- tion to merchants as well as to shipowners and manufacturers. This was a means of protecting the nation at large and secur- ing its independence of Great Britain. It induced many enterprising and wealthy foreign merchants to cast in their lot with our own, and so we grew in strength and influence in the trade of the world. Ship- Protection hy Tonnage Duties, 1789. By the second act of Congress, approved only sixteen days after the first was passed, a further protection was given to our marine by dis- criminating tonnage dues, payable on each entry at a custom- house, as follows : — EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 95 TONNAGE DUTIES, 1789. On all vessels American-built, owned by citizens, or for- eign-built, owned by citizens the 29th of May, 1789, and while owned by citizens, per ton . . .6 cents. On all vessels hereafter built in the United States, partly or wholly owned by foreigners, per ton . . 30 cents. On all other ships or vessels, at the rate of, per ton . 50 cents. In addition to this protection, all vessels American built and owned, employed in fishing or coasting, were to pay duties once only in each year ; and every vessel employed in coastwise transportation of American products, except she was both American built and owned, was to pay on every arrival fifty cents. Thus, the coasting-trade was specially protected, at the first, and has had the good fortune to keep this advantage over the marine in the foreign trade down to the present time. While the first act of Congress was strongly protective of shipbuilding, the second decidedly increased its shield, and went so far as to practically exclude foreign tonnage from our domestic trade. The Americanism of this legislation has never been exceeded in our history. It was sound in economy and wise in patriotism. At that time, both our domestic and for- eign trades were principally carried on by foreigners, chiefly the British. The first two acts of Congress induced many of the aliens in our commerce and navigation to become citizens, and the policy adopted resulted in our shipowning and ship- building trades acquiring a large share of capital, enterprise, and skill from foreign countries. It will be instructive to fol- low the chain of our shipping legislation from the first Con- gress to the last, and to examine the workings of the different acts which have been passed. Ship- Protection hy Tariff, T7dJf. In 1794 a change was made in the general mode of discrimination against foreign shipping. Instead of making a rebate of 10 per cent, of duties on goods brought by our own vessels, it was enacted that ten per cent, should be added to the duties on goods imported by foreign vessels. This was in effect an increase of the tariff, which had received its first augmentation of 2,5 per cent, in rates, in the second session of the First Congress, 1790, This augmentation was continued, and the final section provided : — 96 AMERICAN MARINE. "That an addition of 10 per cent, shall be made to the sev- eral rates of duties, above specified and imposed, in respect to all goods, wares, and merchandise, which, after the said last day of June instant, shall be imported in ships or vessels not of the United States." Thus a third act of Congress, five years after the first and second, confirmed that policy of protection for our navigation which had already Americanized it, given our commerce stabil- ity, increased the proportion of our carriage in the foreign trade to seven eighths of the whole volume of business, also quadrupled the number of our shipwrights and seamen, and secured their steady employment; while at the same time there was developed and demonstrated the naval power so essential to our continued independence as a nation. Our sea- power alone, first tested by the Algerine pirates in 1792-93, was destined to spread our country's name and fame, as well as its trade, throughout the world. The progress made in commerce and navigation during the first six years of our national life was simply astonishing. There is nothing like it in history, as wdll appear from the following table : — NAUTICAL PROGRESS UNDER PROTECTION. Year. 1789 . . . 1790 . . . 1791 . . . 1792 . . . 1793 . . . 1794. . . 1795 . . . Average Tonnage in tlie Foreign Trade. Tons. 123,893 346,254 363,110 411,438 367,734 438,863 529,471 370,109 Ship- ping per Capita. Cubic ft. 3.64 9.75 9.81 10..55 8.96 10.32 12.03 10.72 Com- merce per Capita. Dollars. 12.17 13.03 13.39 13.95 15.91 26.76 15.87 Proportion of Amer- ican Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. Per cent. 17.5 41.0 58.0 67.0 82.0 91.0 92.0 64.07 Per cent. 30.0 40.0 52.0 61.0 77.0 86.0 88.0 62.0 In this table the essential elements are given of a full analy- sis of the growth and thrift, advance or decline, of the marine in foreign trade. Any considerable change of condition will be found indicated in one or another of the columns. Besides the acts of protection, the chief events affecting our commer- cial and nautical advancement during the period under consid- EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 97 eration were these : The continued war between England and France; a British order in Council, November 6, 1793, forbid- ding commerce with French colonies ; an embargo of sixty days following this order, 1794; the Algerine piracy of our vessels; and the raising of the tariff duties. The falling off of tonnage in 1793 was clearly in consequence of the trouble with Algiers, yet that did not hinder the stead}^ increase of traffic in Ameri- can vessels, because this was secured by our protective duties. In the six years there was a constant rise in our proportion of carriage, from 17.5 to 92 per cent, of imports; and from 30 to 88 per cent, of exports. Tonnage fell off 10.6 per cent., and shipping per capita 14.3 per cent., in 1793; but recovered next year, when the piratical war ceased. Commerce per cap- ita gained from year to year, and in exact proportion to our prosperity and without reference to tariff rates. The average annual gain of tonnage was 67,596,^ equal to 54 per cent, upon the amount in 1789. The gain of shipping per capita was 230 per cent., and of commerce per capita, 376 per cent. Continued Ship-Protection. In all the changes of the tariff made from 1795 to 1828 there was one provision unaltered, and apparently fixed, in our policy. This was the clause pro- viding that the standard rates of duty were for goods "imported into the United States in ships or vessels of the United States." In the following table is shown the growth of our marine and the state of commercial business for the second period of five years : — PROGRESS FROM 1796 TO 1800. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1796. . . . 1797 .... 1798. . . . 1799. . . . 1800. . . . Tons. 576,733 597,777 603,376 657,142 667,107 Cubic ft. 12.53 12.45 12.06 12.63 12.33 Dollars. 32.28 27.54 26.01 30.33 30.04 29.24 Per cent. 94 92 91 90 91 Per cent. 90 88 87 87 87 Average . . 620,426 12.40 91.6 87.8 ^ Our average loss of tonnage in the foreign trade for 12 years past has been 82 per cent, of this amount. 98 AMERICAN MARINE. From this table it appears that in ths preceding period of six short years we had reached the limits of our facility and capacity for foreign trade and transportation. That this suc- cess was due to the "protection" which was provided in our tariff and navigation laws cannot be successfully disputed. We were six years without this protection, 1783 to 1789, con- stantly losing our hold of the foreign, and even of the domestic trade; but loiththis protection for six years, 1789 to 1795,^ the advantage resulted in foreign nations, but particularly Eng- land, letting go their grasp of American commerce, while our own people were encouraged and enabled to seize and secure their rights, to the profit and safety of the young Rej)ublic. During the five years tabulated above, the French and Brit- ish war continued, and France began to capture such of our vessels as traded to England. This misconduct led to a short war with France, which did most damage to our trade in 1798. BiTt for this adversity, and the failure of all the banks of Eng- land in 1797, the showing of the period would have been much better under all the headings. It was in this period that na'Val protection to a merchant marine was found an indispensable branch of our polity ; accordingly, the United States navy dates from this short struggle with France. Further Protection to Shippinr/. It became necessary in 1804 to use naval protection against the Barbary powers. To defray the expenses of our fleets, the tariff duties were increased 2.5 per cent., and again it was provided that: — "An addition of 10 per cent, shall be made to the said addi- tional duty in respect to all goods imported in ships or vessels not of the United States." At the same session of Congress it was proposed to cede the rights and trade the benefits of our prosperous marine, to give up its protection by discriminative duties and turn it out to free trade, if, in consideration therefor, certain nations in Europe would reduce the duties on tobacco. The proposi- tion failed. (Perhaps President Jefferson frowned upon it.) Instead of removing the protection to our marine, Congress added to it a "light-money" tax of fifty cents a ton, payable to all alien vessels, excepting only French and Spanish when trading to the port of New Orleans. EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 99 CONTEXDI -fG WITH DIFFICULTIKS, 1801 TO 1805. Year. "^onnage in ;he Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1801 .... 1802 .... 1803 .... 1804 .... 1805 .... Tons. 630,558 557,760 585,910 600.514 744,224 Cubic ft. 11.26 9.74 9.84 10.82 11.81 Dollars. 36.06 26.04 20.33 26.67 24.31 Per cent. 91 88 86 91 93 Per cent. 87 85 83 86 89 Average . . 635,793 10.69 28.68 89.8 86 Various difficulties in our foreign relations checked advance- ment and started decline in the period from 1800 to 1805. The trouble with the Barbary States resulted in war, 1801-03. The warfare between France and England grew more and more rancorous, and the British began to board our vessels and impress our seamen. Under the stress of the times, it was wonderful that our shipping held its own so well as it did. And a worse time was coming, for England had made up her mind to force a naval war upon the United States, in the hope of terminating our nautical and commercial career, if she could not reconquer our allegiance. Nevertheless, we gained in ton- nage and in our share of carriage, though our commerce per capita fell off largely. In this declension England herself must have suffered. PROGRESS FROM 1806 TO 1810. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1806 .... 1807 .... 1808 .... 1809 .... 1810 .... Tons. 798,-507 810,163 765,252 906,855 981,019 Cubic ft. 12.28 12..54 11.09 12.77 13.43 Dollars. 35.53 36.84 11.51 15.71 20.84 Per cent. 93 94 93 93 93 Per cent. 89 90 88 84 90 Average . 852,359 12.42 24.08 92.5 88.5 100 AMERICAN MARINE. During this period the searching of our sh'ps for seamen, by British cruisers, became increasingly annoying, and at length outrageous. England was not so much in >vant of men as determined in breaking up American voyages, and contracting our constantly widening commerce and navigadon. If these interests had had no protection from our tariff and tonnage laws, she would have had a grand success. Her blockade declaration of May, 1806; Napoleon's Berlin decree of Octo- ber following; her order in Council of November, 1807; and Napoleon's Milan decree of December following, made it dan- gerous to trade with either the English or French by sea. As, however, our ships had protection in their own ports, and foreign vessels could gain no advantage there, our people endeavored to keep the sea, and continued to trade with both of the belligerents, notwithstanding they kept up an active interference, each to prevent trading with the other. For five years this rival warfare went on, under what seemed like unsympathetic, if not unfriendly administration of our gov- ernment, before effective measures were taken for the naval protection of our shipping. President Jefferson had reversed the naval policy of his predecessor, Adams, and wished to get along without a navy and to protect the marine, if possible, without using force at sea. Tlie Emhargo and N on- Intercourse Acts. It will be seen that commerce fell off 66 per cent, in 1808, and there was con- siderable decline in tonnage and carriage, due, no doubt, to the embargo act, passed December 22, 1807, forbidding our ves- sels to go to sea. Congress seemed to think this was all that could be done, without a navy, for the protection of our com- merce. And withovit a naval policy, the government drifted along, submitting year after year to the insolence of France and the tyranny of Great Britain. The embargo, and the non-intercourse act which followed it. May, 1809, did no good whatever, but harm only to our marine, as more damage resulted from vessels rotting at moorings and decaying on the stocks than if they had been captured in numbers by our enemies. It was virtual submission, and not defense of our rights, thus to resign the sea. Some New England vessels disregarded the embargo, and ran clandestinely in the West Indian and other trades. EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED- STA'TES. lOl All connected with navigation grew restive under the course of the government, and claimed full and equal protection with other citizens. Finally, the House of Representatives voted that : — "The United States ought not to delay beyond a period of six months to repeal the embargo laws, and resume, maintain, and defend the navigation of the high seas against any nation or nations having in force edicts, orders, or decrees violating the lawful commerce of the United States." The 4th of March, 1809, was fixed as the time for a change of policy from submission to defense. This action of Congress had the effect to renew the courage of our shipping interest; and we find trade soon recovered, and tonnage increased. The year 1810 is marked as the first cidmination of our ton- nage in the foreign trade. War icith England. Meanwhile, on one pretext or another, the aggressions of England continued. The change in our policy was spitefully resented. It was determined our flag must, if possible, be driven from the ocean. In 1811 this purpose became so plain that much of our tonnage was laid up voluntarily by ovNiiers, to avoid capture and confiscation. At length a movement for a declaration of war, with a view to the conquest of Canada, found ambitious leaders in John C. Cal- houn and Henry Claj^. B}' some means a discovery was made that "the honor of the country" was involved in resenting the insults and spoliation of Great Britain, Accordingly, in defense of the national honor, rather than the protection of shipping and commerce, the call to arms was sounded by the ruling party. Sectional differences immedi- ately appeared. The "commercial States," so called, wished to see a navy and privateers employed against the enemy, but the "agricultural States" contended for the invasion of Can- ada. Finally, we attacked the foe by land and sea, but beat him best on his "oceanic domain." That we were able to do so was a striking proof of the wisdom of our protective ship- ping policy. W2 AMERICAN MARINE. RETROGRESSION FROM 1811 TO 1815. Yeak. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1811 .... 1812 .... 1813 .... 1814 .... 1815 .... Tons. 763,607 758,636 672,700 674,633 854,295 Cubic ft. 10.18 9.78 8.40 8.17 10.05 Dollars. 15.29 14.91 6.23 2.41 19.47 Per cent. 90 85 71 58 77 Per cent. 86 80 65 51 71 Average . . 744,774 9.31 11.66 76.2 70.6 During the war our shipping and commerce per capita fell to the lowest point occupied since the Revolution. In the last year (1814) the British blockade was so complete that very little merchandise was imported or exported, but our own ves- sels managed to do more than half the carrying. When the war closed, our people were quick to resume their traffic, but the amount of tonnage in 1810 was not reached again until thirty-six years afterward ; nor was the figure to which we re- covered in 1815 regained until thirtj^-one years afterward ; for in 1815 Congress began the stripping off of ship -protection. The new policy had an unfriendly source. There were several sequences of the war of 1812, which con- tributed to the decline of our tonnage in foreign trade. For one thing, peace became general, and all the nations resumed as much of their trade and transportation as they could well recover. But allowing for this change in the situation, it is clear that it cannot account for the different decadences that invariably followed each act and treaty, giving away the advan- tages and stripping oft' the protection of our marine. From 1815 to 1828 — thirteen years — our government was busied changing the policy of the fathers, from encouragement and protection to discouragement and free-carrying. The new pol- icy was sugared over with a glittering coat of verbal sweetness. It was free trade, loftily styled " the reciprocal liberty of com- merce." Since the inception of this plan should be credited to EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 103 the British ministry of that day, it is not easy to see why the "national honor " should have permitted its adoption by our government, after waging a bloody war for "free trade and sailors' rights." England had brought on and fought the war to break down our comniercial power, and if we had truly fought to preserve it, our victories deserved a better sequence than they had. As it was, England got her object in a train for accomplishment, not by whipping our ships and seamen at sea, but by bold and skiUful diplomatic fencing with some of our pliant and easily managed statesmen. In this success she was aided greatly by sectional and party differences. The Hartford Convention. Unfortunately, the naval vic- tories which we won in the war, and which shoidd have satis- fied all our citizens, as they clearly showed the defensive advan- tage of shipping of our own and proved the need of a navy for freedom and independence, only confirmed the foolish and unpatriotic prejudices against what were then termed "the commercial States." An assembly known in history as the "Hartford Convention" passed two resolutions, as follows : — "Congress shall not have power to lay an embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States, in the ports or harbors thereof, for more than sixty days; and shall not have power, without the concurrence of two thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation, or the dependencies thereof." This action at Hartford, as it severely arraigned the admin- istration and the party in power for years past, was very offen- sive to the government and all its friends. The doctrines declared were not only foolish, but subversive of the national unity. The occasion was most untimely, and the shipping interest has suffered ever since for the treason then committed in its name. The work of this convention, and the resentment which followed it, were windfalls right into the hands of the Tory government of Great Britain. The First Act Abandoning Ship-Protection, 18 IS. The Hartford Convention met in January, 1815. On the 3d of March following. Congress passed a law stripping the outer garment of protection from the marine, in preparation for a treaty with Britain, which should begin the removal of aU bar- 104 AMERICAN MARINE. riers which that nation could complain of in her future compe- tition with the shipping of the States ; thus would be avoided British aggressions, congressional embargoes, wars, and future accusing conventions. The act of 1815 provided: — "That so much of the several acts imposing duties on the tonnage of ships and vessels, and on goods, wares, merchan- dise imported into the United States, as imposes a discrimi- nating duty on tonnage between foreign vessels and vessels of the United States, and between goods imported into the United States in foreign vessels and vessels of the United States, be, and the same are hereby repealed ; such repeal to take effect in favor of foreign nations whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that the discriminating or countervail- ing duties of such foreign nation, so far as they operate to the disadvantage of the United States, have been abolished." The assumption in this act, that the discriminating dvities of foreign nations "operated to the disadvantage of the United States," was unsound and absurd. This phrase diplomatically disguised the purj)ose, which was to throw open to foreign nations, but particularly the British, a large share of our foreign trade. If this was not the purpose, why did England, in the discussions of the forthcoming treaty of peace, urge this provision? The a^t was passed to prepare our statutes for the terms of that treaty, as we shall soon per- ceive ; but it did not suit the administration to admit that fact, hence the effort of its friends to mislead the country. In the debates upon the passage of this measure, as in similar acts afterward, it was dwelt upon that foreign nations collected more taxes from American vessels than we did from foreign vessels, the ratio being as nine to one, because our own vessels did nine tenths of the carrying in our foreign trade. This tax was claimed to be a burden laid altogether upon our export business. It had grown up in consequence of our discriminat- ing dues and duties; because without these we should have had no tonnage for foreign nations to tax. It followed that the removal of our duties, in exchange for the foreign, would bring relief. But what would become of our shipping without protection f That question was not seriously considered, thouo'h it was sought to make the "commercial States" believe EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 105 that a mutual removal of duties would result favorably. "Free trade " was highly extolled. For shipping in the foreign trade, there could be nothing like it. "Liberality" would take the place of protection. Under the benign principle of "generosity," it would not be long until American shipping would displace the European, and the whole commerce of the world be ours. Such arguments were simply imposture, and the act itself, prompted as it was by a foreign government, was a shameful abuse of legislative power. It has been represented by some of our historians, that this act of 1815 was really meant for the benefit of our marine, and that the reference to "countervailing duties" operating "to the disadvantage" of the "United States" meant to the disadvantage of the shipping interest. This view is manifestly incorrect. The experience of twenty-six years had proved that our discriminative duties were highly protective, and, there- fore, to our shipping highly advantageous, operating as they did to secure the employment of our own, in preference to for- eign vessels, in foreign ports, for cargoes homeward. On this security of CTnploxjment abroad rented the whole force of argu- ment for discriminative protection. Every one of the illustra- tive tables of carriage in the foreign trade will show that imports exceeded exports, in American bottoms. Protection upon imports prevented coming home in ballast, insured freight both ways, and conduced to minimum rates. Certain it was, that the so-called "countervailing duties "of foreign nations cut no figure at all in preventing the employment of our ship- ping abroad, where cargoes were to be brought home. Our discriminative system brought our vessels into demand, in for- eign ports, while it was the same with foreigners in our ports. The simple truth of the matter is, that our ship-protection was a great success, and this was reason enough for England to desire a change. The only advantage gained by the act was a treaty of peace with England. That is to say, our ship-protection was cast away as the price of pacification of Great Britain. We fought bravely in resistance to the "right of search," but made peace ingloriously by yielding the right of protection, with the right of search unmentioned. This shows, only too plainly, who were the victors in diplomacy after the war. 106 AMERICAN MARINE. '"'' Reciprocal Liberty of Commerce^'''' 1815. The convention to resrulate the commerce between tlie territories of the United States and his Britannic Majesty, dated July 3, 1815, four months after the act above criticised, provided as follows : — First : Reciprocal liberty of commerce between the territo- ries of the United States and the British territories in Europe, but not in America. Second : No higher or other duties on productions of each country than on those of other foreign countries. Third : Equality of duties on American and British vessels in Great Britain and the United States. Fourth: No discriminativ^e duties on importations, whether by American or British vessels, in either Great Britain or the United States. Fifth: Equality of duties, bounties, and drawbacks, and whether in British or American vessels. Sixth: Intercourse with the West Indies not to be affected by this convention. Seventh: Vessels of the United States permitted to trade direct to and from the principal British dominions in the East Indies in articles not prohibited in time of war, and not to pay more duties or charges than vessels of the most favored nation, either on vessel or cargo. The provisions of this treaty, obligatory for four years only, by acts and proclamations since have become the rule of com- mercial intercourse between the United States and Great Brit- ain, though when it was made that nation did not do as we did, grant full "reciprocal liberty of commerce." She kept us out of her West India ports for fifteen years, and out of her North American possessions for thirty-five years afterward. And this was the beginning of our present system of improtection, in the foreign trade. EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 107 THE FIRST EFFECT OF UNPROTECTION", OUR TONNAGE FALLING OFF, 1816 TO 1820. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in. Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1816 .... 1817 .... 1818 .... 1819 .... 1820 .... Tons. 800,760 804,851 .589.9.54 581,230 583,657 Cubic ft. 9.12 8.94 6.39 6.08 5.95 Dollars. 26.10 20.76 23.31 16.55 14.70 Per cent. 73 79 85 87 90 Per cent. 68 74 80 82 89 Average . . 672,090 7.29 20.28 82.8 78.6 The first effect of free-carrying with England, under the treaty of July 3, in accordance with the act of March 3, was a falling off in our share of transportation for the year 1816, in which importations were very large, British goods in British ships rushing in like the waves of the sea. The losses for one year were of tonnage, exceeding 6 per cent. ; of imports car- ried, 4 per cent. ; of exports carried, 3 per cent. ; of shipping per capita, nearly 1 per cent. This single year's experience proved the value of the protection arising from discriminating duties. The extra rush of goods had been patriotically shi]5ped by their owners in British vessels. The regular importations of American merchants came by American vessels, many of them being owned by our merchants. In the previous year, 1815, we had made great gains. In the following year, 1817, we gained slightly in tonnage, and recovered 6 per cent, of lost carriage, though there was a large falling off in commerce, and a small decline in shipping per capita. In point of fact, we have never had since 1817 as great an extent of shipping per capita as in that year. The decline of commerce was due to a tariff check in importations, and the increase in carriage to the consequent withdrawal of British ships, together with the strenuous efforts of our .shipowners to regain the share of carrying enjoyed before the war. The Black Ball line of sail packet-ships, between New York and Liverpool, started in 1816, got fairly to running in 1817, 108 AMERICAN MARINE. and that year, as we have seen, there was a small gain in ton- nage and carriage. For thirty j^ears following, our merchants engaged in forming different packet lines, and this helped very much in counteracting the bad influence of what was called "reciprocity" legislation. In September, 1816, our government made a treaty with Sweden, substantially on the same basis as the one in 1815 with Great Britain. As our Swedish trade was insignificant, but little loss resulted from this treaty for several years after- ward. But this treaty has been valuable to Sweden, — indeed, a veritable protection, such as that nation could not have given its vessels except by bounties, for engaging in our trade. For the past fifteen years, the shipping of the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway has entered our ports at an average rate of 1,529 arrivals of 821,221 tons, against an average of Amer- ican vessels from Sweden and Norway of two only in number aggregating 970 tons. For each ton of ours engaged in carry- ing for this kingdom, there have been 854 tons of its vessels carrying for us. The value of the commerce with Sweden and Norway is less than three tenths of one per cent, of our total foreign commerce. Thus, the results of the legislation of 1815 and following years, on the line of free-carrying for the world's shipping, have been good for foreign nations, but bad for our own. A second act of "liberality " soon followed the first, which was found not immediately ruinous, nor so tempting to foreign nations as it might be made. The shipowners of Europe hesitated a while to put their shipping into American direct trade, which in time of peace had averaged 90 per cent, in the hands of American merchants and carriers. Most foreign fleets were not quite ready to accept the invitation to contend, even on improved footing, with the men and ships of our commercial States ; to bring our imports here and to carry our exports away ; to cut our merchants out and tie our carriers up, and to change the national ensign for foreign colors in all our ports. However, the way had been found to bring all this about in the fullness of time. The Second Act of Reciprocity., 1817. In 1817 the free- freighting policy was revised and strengthened, the object EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 109 being, not as might be supposed, to fortify the shipping inter- est, but to double the inducements ah-eady offered to the mari- time nations to throng our ports with tonnage in search of emj)loyment, which naturally belonged to, and had formerly been enjoyed by, our own people, to the great advantage of the States. It is true that the coasting navigation, as it should be, and as, in fact, it had been, was wholly reserved for our own vessels (by section 4), but the first section of the act relat- ing to foreign trade not only invited, but constrained the car- rying competition of foreign nations. Its terms seemed to con- fess the failure of the act of 1815, which was addressed to the producing nations, and which, so far, had been accepted only by Great Britain, Sweden, and Algiers. The act of 1817 was addressed to the non - producinr/ but carrying nations, and opened our transportation to all, without regard to reciprocal benefits; in fact, this idea is not contained in it. Its central thought is the abolition of ship-protection by all the nations, but particularly the forcing of all into the carrying-trade of the United States. By the new law the door was opened wide to flags whose direct and legitimate trade was never of any special value, and never worth reciprocation; with no other object, that can be seen, than the liberal purpose of giving to them, equally with the greater nations, the opportunity of becoming the prosperous carriers of aU the ocean commerce of the United States, and of letting our own carriers go idle, if they could not command employment. The inferior nations were the very first to enter into so-called " reciprocity " treaties ; and gradually most of them have made a grand success of the act of 1817. The pretension of certain writers, that the good ^f^the^4°i6i^ican marine was the object of this act, is simply absurd. Its authors had no love for that interest ; and for such interests as they had affection, they maintained protection. The following is the text of the act discussed : — "Section 1. That after the 30th day of September next, no goods, wares, or merchandise shall be imported into the United States from any foreign port or place, except in vessels of the United States, or in such foreign vessels as truly and wholly belong to citizens or subjects of that country of which the goods are the growth, production, or manufacture, or from which such goods, wares, or merchandise can be, or most usually are, first shipped for transportation : 110 AMERICAN MARINE. "Provided, nevertheless, That this regulation shall not ex- tend to vessels of any foreign nation which has not adopted, and which shall not adopt, a similar regulation." ^ Had this section been without a proviso, it would have been strongly protective, as, in fact, it was for a few years, and until foreign nations acted on it; then the proviso took all the good- ness out of it. It was interpreted as adverse by the shipping interests, and accordingly our tonnage in the foreign trade fell ofe— From 1817 to 1818 26 per cent. From 1815 to 1818 we lost .... 31 per cent. It was twenty-seven years of time until we had more tonnage in the foreign trade than in 1817 ; and we have never had equal tonnage per capita since. Jjcsser Laws. In 181 7 there were several minor enactments increasing tonnage dues on foreign vessels from ports at which our ships were not permitted to trade. This was protection in so mild a form that it did neither good nor harm for American shipping. Prohibition for prohibition would have better met the case ; yet we are told the government did brave things in thus increasing duties, which, after all, on cargoes inward, our own people paid, while many of our vessels laid up idle. In 1818 discriminating duties against produce from the Nether- lands, Prussia, Hamburg, and Bremen were repealed. Also our ports were closed against British vessels from a certain colony of that nation, with which our vessels were not per- mitted to traffic. Here was prohibition for prohibition, — an experiment prob- ably. In 1819 a treaty concluded with Spain allowed Spanish vessels to enter ports of Florida on payment of same dues as our own vessels, for twelve years. In 1820 a prohibitive duty of eighteen dollars a ton was levied on all French ships. These ^ " Section 4. That no goods, wares, or merchandise shall be imported, under penalty of forfeiture thereof, from one port of the United States to another port thereof, in a vessel belonging wholly or in part to a subject of any foreign power ; but this clause shall not be construed to prohibit the sailing of any foreign vessel from one to another part of the United States, provided no goods, wares, or merchandise, other than those imported in such vessel from such foreign port, and which shall not be unladen, shall be carried from one port or place to another in the United States." EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. Ill different acts all showed the wish of Congress to substitute free trade for protection, as a regulation of the international carrv- ing-trade, whether it was or was not advantageous to our own jieople engaged in that trade. By 1820 our shipping per capita had declined to a point lower than it had occupied for thirty years, while commerce per capita had fallen to a point below any hitherto held in any year of peace for twenty-six years. But our merchants largely owned their own shipping, were enterjirising, and our vessels with their crews, on the average, had neither equals nor supe- riors on the sea, — the result of years of protection. In conse- quence of our commerce being in the hands of our own mer- chants, the proportion of carriage given to our own vessels steadily advanced all through the period of 1816-20. Tonnage Gaining Again. For twenty years after the en- actment of 1817, the average amount of tonnage in the foreign trade was only 656,759 tons. Contrast this with the four years of John Adams's administration, which, under full pro- tection when we were young and growing, had averaged nearly as much, 639,545 tons. As it took time to get treaties made, for foreign nations to build vessels fit to compete with ours, and foreign merchants to get hold of our trade, our people held their own, or gained in carriage with reduced tonnage and, after a few years even made gains in it. THE SUMMrr IN SIGHT, 1821 TO 1825. Tkar. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1821 .... 1822 .... 1823 .... 1824 .... 1825 .... Tons. 593,825 582,701 600,003 630,807 665,409 Cubic ft. 5.88 5.03 5.63 5.79 5.88 Dollars. 12.63 14.05 14.03 14.23 17.33 Per cent. 92.7 92.4 92.1 93.4 95.2 Per cent. 84.9 84.1 87.4 88.7 89.2 Average . . 615,749 5.76 14.45 93.16 86.86 Some of the principal events contributing to the improve- ment of business during this period were: In 1819, the resump- 112 AMERICAN MARINE. tion o£ the Bank of England ; in 1820, the resumption of specie payments in the United States; in 1821-22, the inauguration of a second line of American saiX^^ackets between New York and Liverpool ; in 1822-23, the initiation and running of an American line of sail-packets to London and Havre; in 1823, the opening for two years of the ports of Canada and British West Indies; in 1824, the tariff increasedi_our_ banks expand- ing, and commercial treaties with France, Russia, and the Re- public of Colombia ; and, finall3% the improvements everywhere adopted in the modeling and building of American vessels. Aside from the attitude of our own government on the ques- tion of continued protection to ocean shipping, and the legisla- tion of Congress in 1824, which we will examine presently, there were no adverse circumstances of a serious nature. During this period the amount of tonnage in the domestic or coasting trade became equal to that in the foreign trade, and the two fleets differed but little from 1820 to 1835. In the next five years was reached and passed the smnmit of our pro- portionate carrying. Another Stripping of Protection, 1824- Another strip- ping of protection took place in this term, by act of January 7, 1824.1 This act was not general, but related only to the Netherlands, Prussia, the cities of Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen, Oldenburg, Norway, Sardinia, and Russia, — nations and municipalities which preferred not to reciprocate under the act of 1817, but to obtain the same privileges as Great Britain and Sweden had, under the act of 1815. To do this, however, the act of 1817 had to be modified. This was done for the countries named by the special act of 1824, which pro- vided as follows : — First: For the reciprocal suspension of discriminative or protective duties on tonnage. Second: For the reciprocal suspension of discriminative or protective duties as respects the produce or manufactures of said nations, if imported in vessels truly and wholly belonging to them. Third : These suspensions to continue so long as the ships 1 At the instance mainly of Prussia, the British Parliament in the same year passed reciprocity acts to be applied to the trade with the Continental nations. EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 113 and cargoes of the United States shall be exempt from like discriminative duties in ports of said nations. Fourth: The President to make proL'lamation, on evidence, of any of these nations abolishing their duties. Some of the nations concerned in this act did not qualify for its benefits for several years after its passage, and therefore its evil influence on our trade was not immediately felt. The disposition of our government to rid itself of responsibility for the protection of our marine, so plainly manifested in this legislation, was not calculated to help the efforts of our mer- chants and shijjowners, but they kept on doing their best to succeed. Some even imagined that free trade might help more than it hindered, and all were successful in holding adversity in check a few years longer. The ocean carrying-trade is a cash employment. Foreign commerce induces the circulation of money. Our commerce and navigation, being nearly all our own, furnished life-blood to the country; but we had statesmen then, as now, who could not see it. The "planting States," with little or no shipping of their own in the foreign trade, and, consequently, having only a passive commerce by the vessels of other States or for- eign countries, complained of "hard times." It was imagined that the "commercial States," w^hich had nothing to complain of, had too good a thing in a protected marine, and that the "agricultural States" could be made more prosperous by a blow at shipping. England, too, was firmly of the opinion that too much protection still clung to the American ship, and she, too, was sighing for more prosperity. The American tariff of 1824, and the American merchant, with his superior ship, stood right in the way of her commercial and nautical success. In 1827, when American merchants and owners of vessels were making no lament, these memorable words were uttered by the London "Times: " — " It Is not our habit to sound the tocsin on light occasions, but we conceive It to be Impossible to view the existing state of things In this country without more than apprehension. Twelve years of peace, and what Is the situation of Great Britain? The shipping Interest, the cradle of our navy, Is half ruined, our commercial monopoly exists no longer. We have closed the West India Islands against America from 114 AMERICAN MARINE. feelings of commercial rivalry. Its active seamen have already engrossed an important branch of our trade to the East Indies. Her starred flag is now conspicuous on every sea, and will soon defy our thunder." Final Act of Reciprocity ., 1828. We had already done much for England since the war, in the way of giving the mother country a chance. She had greatly the advantage in the treaty of July 3, 1815. For twelve years after that time we had been losing in tonnage per capita, and in 1827 had 18 per cent, less tonnage than in 1815, much of our loss being gained by England. It is true that with our loss in tonnage we had gained in the proportion of carrying, and England had failed in this respect, esjjecially as a carrier of our imports, and this for the reason that our own merchants and splendid packet-ships yet controlled this trade. It looked to the Brit- ish, in 1827, more than ever like a tough job to run our mer- chants and mariners out of business in a time of peace, with anything like equal footing for competition. Hence the tears of the "Times." But our statesmen had pity for England, and a bill for her relief passed Congress, and was approved May 24, 1828. This opened to her ships the indirect trade, if she chose to qualify for its possession, and could gain its monopoly. ^ She already 1 Extract from the speech of Senator Woodbury on the passage of the reciprocity law of 1828 : " Under the Laws of 1815 and 1824, before men- tioned, and certain commercial conventions, since completed with foreign nations, the following changes as to duties on foreign vessels have occurred since March 3, 1815. British vessels, by the convention of December 22, 1815, pay only the same duty as American ones, unless coming from places where American vessels are prohibited ; but when coming from these places they pay $2 per ton, by our act of March 3, 1817. I say nothing now as to the laws about colonial intercourse with the British West Indies. French vessels, by the convention of June 24, 1822, and by our act of March 3, 1823, pay only SI per ton on the ship, and $3.75 per ton on the cargo, di- minishing one fourth annually, after September, 1824. Swedish vessels, by the convention of 1816, are placed on the terms of the act of March, 1815, so that the discriminating duties now exist, as to England and France, only to the extent above named ; but as to Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Rus- sia, Prussia, Sardinia, the Hanse-towns, the Dukedom of Oldenburg, and Guatemala, they do not exist at all as to their vessels and cargoes, when bringing cargoes of their own produce or growth, nor in the most of them when cargoes not of their produce, if usually first shipped at their ports. But with the exceptions hereafter to be named, discriminations still exist as EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 115 enjoyed all she could acquire of the direct trade, and the new act would allow her to carry to and from the United States, and from and to all the world. In short, this act was the very thing wanted by Great Britain for the preceding thirty-nine years, but there was this difficulty about the matter, she wished to give no consideration for it. Hoping for her own terms, she waited twenty-one years longer before she legislated for its acceptance. Text of the Act of 1828. "That upon satisfactory evidence being given to the President of the United States by the gov- ernment of any foreign nation that no discriminating duties of tonnage or impost are imposed or levied in the ports of said nation upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States, or upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the United States, or from any for- eign country, the President is hereby authorized to issue his proclamation declaring that the foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and imposts within the United States are, and shall be, suspended and discontinued so far as respects the vessels of the said foreign nation, and the produce, manufactures, and merchandise imported into the United States in the same from the said foreign nation, or from any other foreign country; the said suspension to take effect from the time of such notification being given to the President of the United States, and to con- tinue so long as the reciprocal exemption of vessels belonging to citizens of the United States and their cargoes, as aforesaid, shall be continued, and no longer." T7ie Arguments for the Act. These were of all sorts, none were sound, some were specious, others plausible. The meas- ure was recommended by the President in 1825, and the prin- cipal discussion was in the Senate in 1828. The origin and to all other nations ; and as to those places before enumerated, with two or three exceptions, discriminations still exist on all vessels with cargoes not of their growth or produce, ' nor usually first shipped ' at their ports. " The present act proposes to do away with the whole of these remaining discriminations. It removes, whenever a reciprocal rule may prevail, all extra duties on tonnage in all cases, whether the last be the produce and maiuifacture of the nation owning the vessel, or usually first shipping there, though not her product and manufacture, or whether it be produce and manufacture however frequently reshipped, or coming from nations however remote." 116 AMERICAN MARINE. object of the act were wholly political. The shipping interest did not call for it. On the contrary, the chambers of com- merce, beginning with New York, in 1803, so far as known, always opposed the removal of our discriminative and protec- tive duties. The merchants and shipowners of Portsmouth, N. H., the State of the senator who engineered the act, had passed resolutions approving our " navigation acts " as having been "highly favorable," "deprecating their repeal," and ask- ing for maintenance of the "present protection," in Febru- ary, 1822. But Senator Woodbury argued for the principles involved in the bill, that, — "These principles embraced the great paramount one of all liberal governments, that trade shall he free ; that all shackles on commerce should be stricken off; and in accordance with the lights and spirit of the present age, that everything in navigation, as in all other kinds of business, should be left to the fair competition of industry, enterprise, and skill. That in a country which jnstly boasts of the freedom and superiority of its institutions nothing is to be feared from a rivalship on this subject, free as air and extensive as the' widest range of civilization." The main principle of the bill being "free trade," the other elements harmonized, and error ruled the reasoning. Here is an example from Senator Woodbury : — " We are known to possess a skill and economy in building vessels, a cheapness in fitting them out, an activity in sailing them, which, without discrimination (protection), would give us an advantage in coijing with any commercial power in exist- ence. Such are the accurate calculations of our merchants, the youth and agility of our seamen, and the intelligence of our shipmasters, that American vessels can, on an average, make three trips to Europe while a foreign vessel is making two. It must be manifest to all that circumstances like these, rather than any discriminating duty, must always give and maintain to us a superiority and protection which leave nothing to be feared from the fullest competition." Our grini and inglorious ship-experience since this foolish and deceptive utterance painfully contradicts its truth and conclusiveness. Portsmouth, N. H. that in 1828 had 40,000 tons of sail in the foreign trade, has now only 5,000 tons regis- EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 117 tered, and other ports of the country have had a like experi- ence. But here is the final appeal, to pass the bill : — A71 " 0//re Branch.'" "By this bill we now hold out the olive branch to all. If our terms are accepted, we may obtain most of the transportation now enjoyed by foreigners in the eight or ten hundredtlis of our .foreign tonnage ; as they are now enabled to compete with us to that extent, chiefly, by the discrimination they enjoy at home. But, whether accepted or not by nations other than those who already have adopted the basis of this bill, we shall, at all events, by its passage act in conformity to the boasted principles of our free government." This last consideration should have been ridiculous to the identical body of legislators who shortly afterward passed the highest protective tariff ever enacted. And that idea of offer- ing an "olive branch" to Great Britain was servile and abject in a painful degree. At tliat time American produce for Brit- ish AVest Indian markets had to find its way by land to Mon- treal or Quebec, and be taken on by British vessels; or, if shipped by an American vessel, it must be landed at a Swedish West Indian port, and be reshipped thence by British vessels to its destination. But the senator's position was wholly undermined by his own statement of the virtue in protection, to wit, that the "discrimination" enjoyed by foreign nations "at home" enabled them to compete with us to the extent of the 8 or 10 per cent, of the carriage which they had in our trade. Why could he not as well see, or did he think his brother senators and the American people could not see, the opposite of his proposition, to wit, that the discrimination en- joyed by American vessels "at home" enabled thein to hold 90 or 92 per cent, of carriage in the foreign trade? But his state- ment was an exaggeration anyway, for Great Britain, France, and eight or ten other countries had abolished discriminative duties upon certain kinds of traffic, and done this by treaty with us, as he had explained In the beginning of his speech. We were already enjoying the supposed advantages of free-car- rying, as to a large part of our traffic; and from 1815, when this policy began, down to 1827, when the senator might have had the latest Information of its operation, we had lost 41.58 per cent, of per capita shipping, and 17.88 per cent, of ton- nage In our foreign trade. To these facts Senator Woodbury seemed oblivious. 118 AMERICAN MARINE. At this point a better view of the free-trade reasoning-, on which was founded the stripping of protection from our marine, may be obtained from the message of President John Quincy Adams, 1825. His remarks were as follows : — John Quincy Adamses Vieiv. "Tlie policy of the United States in their commercial intercourse with all nations has always been of the most liberal character. In the mutual exchange of their respective productions, they have abstained altogether from prohibitions ; they have interdicted themselves the power of laying taxes upon exports, and whenever they have favored their own shipping, by special prefei'ences, or exclusive privileges in their own ports, it has been only with a view to countervail similar favors and exclusions granted by the nations with whom we have been engaged in traffic, to their own people or shipping, and to the disadvantage of ours. (1) "Immediately after the close of the last war, a proposal was fairly made by the act of Congress of the 8d of March, 1815, to all the maritime nations, to lay aside the system of retaliat- ing restrictions, and to place the shipping of both parties to the common trade on a footing of equality, in respect of duties of tonnage and impost. (2) This offer was partially and suc- cessively accepted by Great Britain, Sweden, Netherlands, the Hanseatic cities, Prussia, Sardinia, the Duke of Oldenburg, and Russia. It was also adopted, under certain modifications, in our late commercial convention with France. And, by the act of Congress of the 8th of January, 1824, it has received a new confirmation with all the nations who had acceded to it, and has been offered again to all those who are, or may here- after be, willing to abide in reciprocity by it. But all these regulations, whether established by treaty, or by municipal enactments, are still subject to one important restriction. "The reinoval of discriminating duties of tonnage and of impost is limited to articles of the growth, produce, or man- ufacture of the country to which th3 vessel belongs, or to such articles as are most usually first shipped from her ports. It will deserve the serious consideration of Congress, whether even this remnant of restriction may not be safely abandoned, and whether the general tender of equal competition, made in EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 119 the act of 8tli January, 1824, may not be extended to include all articles of merchandise, not prohibited, of what country soever they may be the product or manufacture. (3) Proposi- tions to this effect have been made to us by more than one European government, and it is probable that, if once estab- lished by legislation or compact with any distinguished mari- time State, it would recommend itself, by the experience of its advantages, to the general accession of all." (4) Memarks on Mr. Adams'' s View. (1) As said in another place, this theory of our legislation for ship-protection was incorrect. According to it, if there had been no protection of shipping by any of the nations, when our government began, then there would have been no need of protection for our marine at that time. This perfect free-trade doctrine is most inconsistent in John Quincy Adams, for he signed the "high tariff" bill of 1828, that so offended South Carolina that she thought seriously of secession. The object of Congress in the protective policy was to make a condition that woidd induce or facilitate the employment of our ships in foreign ports, not to give tit for tat in taxes. Let us ask, Were the high duties laid in 1828 on bolt iron, copper, canvas, hemp rope, and other articles of importation then indispensable in building, rigging, and outfitting vessels, put on to "countervail" the duties of foreign nations, or to protect their production in the United States ? Protection was stripped from shipowners, while it was given generously to miners, manufactvirers, planters, and farmers. If free trade was good enough for ships, why was it too bad for other inter- ests? The cost of ships was largely increased by the tariff of 1828, and this without the slightest compensation to the ship- ping interest. Besides this injustice, the framers of that tariff, and the President who signed it, had the inconsistency to tell posterity that free trade was better than protection for the American ship; but that protection was indispensable for sugar-planting, rice-cropping, wool-growing, hemp-raising, metal-mining, iron-making, and manufacturing generally. It was stultifying for the protectionists of 1828 to have framed sophistical arguments for making fish of the interests related to the sea, and meat of the industries belonging to the land. Yet this is what they did, and their work stands. 120 AMERICAN MARINE. (2) This "footing of equality" phrase was illusive and deceitful. It said one thing, but seemed to, and did mean, another. In mathematics, if equals be taken from equals, equals will remain. But the science of ship -protection by tariff duties was not one of numbers ; hence, what seemed to be "countervailing duties" were not such in the sense supposed by Mr. Adams. They were not enacted with that view, but were intended to, and did, induce the freighting of American ships abroad. AVhen duties are truly and only "countervail- ing," in a mathematical sense, as far as protection is con- cerned they may as well be mutually removed. But this was not the case at all with our discriminating duties. While these duties continued, they induced, not only our own, but foreign merchants, to freight oiw ships in the import trade. The free -trade object was to remove that inducement, and not merely to deduct equals from equals, to secure "equality." In this consisted the error and the deception that were practiced. Thus, the injury that was done, not only to the marine, but to. the country, stands not upon statesmanship, but folly. The acts of 1815, 1817, 1824, and 1828 being passed, and recipro- cal laws enacted by foreign countries, the advantages of Amer- ican ships abroad were greatly curtailed, jt wais detrimental, and sometimes disastrous to them, that foreign merchants, and even our own, needed no longer to offer them emplopnent; and that they should be compelled to sail home in ballast, while ships of foreign flags got their freight to carry, and with it. the control of their former trade. Ppreign tonnage taxes were ^aved, but our carriage was lost ! (3) In the expression, "the general tender of equal compe- tition," Mr. Adams misled his readers. Tor equal comj)etition to have resulted from a stripping of protection, the former competition must have been unequal with protection, which was absurd, the theory of protection being to equalize the advantages of nations, some requiring more and others less to even up the conditions of competition in different trades. At least that was the theory of the tariff of 1828; and, as said before, it was signed by Mr. Adams. (4) In the acknowledgment that foreign nations were prompting this free-ship legislation, Mr. Adams gives away the secret of the whole matter, and lets out the truth. Great EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 121 Britain had her share in the suggestions made from time to time, and so had other European powers. There was no move- ment at home, excej^t from free-trade jjoliticians, mainly resi- dents in the cotton States. The merchants, the shipowners, the shipbuiklers, the master-mariners, and other classes of American citizens, to whom the country was indebted for the name and fame of our ships, were not consulted. No name of any citizen, entitled to speak for the American ship, was ever put to a petition for the stripping of protection from our marine ; but its divestment was the bad work of politicians, some of them with bees in their bonnets, and none giving evi- dence of rightly understanding or properly appreciating the different interests to be affected, perhaps ruined, by the adverse acts which were passed. Encjland the Great Beneficiary. While the free-freighting act of 1828 has been of advantage to foreign nations ever since its passage, from 1849 it has been turned to most account by Great Britain, especially in the "indirect" trades. And while the change of policy, from protection to non-protection, of the maritime nations has doubtless injured or hindered a few nations in their pursuits of the sea, it has ruined the trade of none but the United States ; first, because we have lojigest and most faithfully adhered to it; second, because the social con- ditions of our people are higher than those of other nations; third, the most of them have some time since returned to some kind of protection, — subsidies, bounties, or other discrimina- tions. One purpose it has well fulfilled. It has brought all nations into the ocean -carrying of our crippled country. An- other object, as promised, it has not effected. It has com- pletely failed to gain us a single business advantage against the shipping of any nation. It was said the act of 1828 was intended as an "olive branch." If the change from protection to free trade, in shipping, was not wholly an "olive branch" to the British government, then all signs fail to indicate what it was. Ostensibly, we made a feast for all mankind, but plainly put the plums in the pudding for the mother country. The temptation to favoritism in 1828 was the opening of the British West India trade. It was hoped the waving of an "olive branch" would secure that result, and no doubt it made a step towards it. 122 AMERICAN MARINE. THE CLIMAX PERIOD, 1826 TO 1830. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1826 .... 1827 .... 1828 .... 1829 .... 1830 .... Tons. 696,221 701,515 757,998 592,859 ' 537,563 Cubic ft. 6.00 5.87 6.18 4.70 4.15 Dollars. 14.01 13..54 13.12 11.65 11.14 Per cent. 95.0 94.3 91.4 93.0 93.6 Per cent. 89.6 87.5 84.5 86.0 86.3 Average . . 657,231 5.38 12.69 93.46 86.78 This period marks the last of the flood, and the first of the ebb tide in our carriage of foreign trade. Commerce. Carried in 1825. Carried in 1826. Imports 95.2 89.2 95.0 89.6 This proportion of value carried in American vessels never has been equaled since, and perhaps was never before exceeded. It was accomplished before foreign bottoms were admitted to our indirect trade. In his report to Congress, December 22, 1825, Richard Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, remarked as follows : — Richard Rush on Trade and Transportation. "The pub- lic revenue is derived in an amount so preponderating from foreign commerce that the state of the latter is always to be chiefly looked to in every prospective view of the income. As the internal business of the country has worn a character of activity and increase during the present year (1825), so has also its foreign trade, by that close connection which subsists be- tween them. The exports for the year ending on the 30th of September last have exceeded $92,000,000. The imports have exceeded $91,000,000. Of the exports, upwards of $66,000,000 were of domestic, and the remainder of foreign productions. EARLY SHIPPING POLICY OF UNITED STATES. 123 "Of the imports, upwards of $86,000,000 were in American vessels. Of the exports, upwards of ?§81,000,000. Consider- ing that the vessels of those foreign nations with which the United States have the most extensive commercial intercourse are now placed upon a footing of equality, as to duties and charges of whatever kind in our ports, with the vessels of the United States, this heavy excess of American tonnage is a sig- nal proof of the flourishing state of our navigation. It may serve to show that the efficient protection extended to it by the laws of Congress succeeded in establishing it in a manner to meet and overcome all competition. Before the era of those laws, it is known how this great interest languished ; how little able it proved, before the auxiliary hand of government was stretched out, to support itself against the established superior- ity and overwhelming competition which it had to face in the world." After 1826 foreign, and especially British, vessels began to get headway in their competition for American freight, at home and here. In 1829, the year following the final stripping of protection, our tonnage in the foreign trade fell off about 22 per cent., and a further decline, in 1830, increased our losses to nearly 30 per cent. Shipping per capita fell off in 1829 nearly 24 per cent, and this loss was increased to more than 32 per cent., in 1830. It was 1840 before we could replace this tonnage; and 1850 before we could recover ground in shipping per capita, and then could hold it only twelve years. The commerce per capita lost in this period was in great part due to the adverse shipping legislation, because the latter injured the prosperity of our merchants, largely concerned as they were in the ownership of vessels. In the effort to hold their trade they must have laid up or sold much tonnage. ^ Shipbuilding for foreign trade ceased entii-ely. Times became hard. Foreign competition reduced freights in 1829, but that did not pay our country for the idleness of labor dependent upon the building and sailing of vessels. The outlook at the close of this period did not support the prediction of Senator Woodbury, that American carriage and tonnage would in- crease. ^ From 1826 to 1831 inclusive our vessels " sold abroad " aggregated 81,617 tons. 124 AMERICAN MARINE. Here it may be of interest to compare the condition of our foreign commerce and navigation under the Presidency of John Adams, the father, with that of John Quincy Adams, the son, twenty-eight years afterward. The elder Adams believed in protection for shipping, the younger statesman put his trust in free trade. COMPABISON OF ADMINISTRATIONS. Proportion of Administrative Periods. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. Tons. Cubic ft. Dollars. Per cent. Per cent. Averages, term of John Adams 620,426 12.40 29.24 91.60 87.80 Averages, term of John Q. Ad- ams . . . 657,231 5.58 12.69 93.46 86.78 From this comparison we see that commerce, and shipping per capita, in the term of the younger Adams was only 43.4 per cent, of the standard in the term of the elder Adams, and that the ratio of decline was almost exactly the same. The amount of tonnage and proportion of carriage in the two peri- ods were also nearly the same. In the earlier period com- merce and navigation flourished. In the later time, it is evi- dent they had met misfortune, and experienced a loss of friends. CHAPTER VIII. DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 1830 to 1860. We arc now at the point in history, as car- riers of our own commerce, where our rise ended, and our fall began. From this point onward, dependence on foreign ship- ping grows constantly, with now and then a check, down to the period of the war. While we had a spurt of shipbuilding and gains of tonnage in the fifties, our prospect of recovering our place, then partially lost as "our own merchants and car- riers," had only a seeming reality, which the war converted into romance. Opening British West India Trade, Act of 18r30. For many years our shipping merchants had worried about the exclusion of our vessels from the British West India ports. It was expected that tlie act of 1828 would be the means of open- ing a direct trade, but England was not yet ready to accept our "olive branch." Its terms were thought to be too sweep- ing. It became necessary to pass a special act, which was done May 29, 1830. This act provided : — "That whenever the President of the United States shall receive satisfactory evidence that the government of Great Britain will open the ports in its colonial possessions in the West Indies, on the continent of South America, the Bahama Islands, the Caicos, and the Bermuda or Somer Islands, to the vessels of the United States, for an indefinite or for a limited term ; that the vessels of the United States and their cargoes on entering the colonial ports aforesaid shall not be subject to other or higher duties of tonnage or impost, or charges of any other description, than would be imposed on British vessels or their cargoes arriving in said colonial possessions from the United States ; that the vessels of the United States may im- port into the said colonial possessions from the United States any article or articles which could be imported in a British 128 AMERICAN MARINE. vessel into the said possessions from the United States; and that the vessels of the United States may export from the Brit- ish colonies aforementioned, to any country whatever other than the dominions or possessions of Great Britain, any article or articles that can be exported therefrom in a British vessel to any country other than the British dominions or possessions, as aforesaid, leaving the commercial intercourse of the United States with all other parts of the British dominions or posses- sions on a footing not less favorable to the United States than it now is, and that then, and in such case, the President of the United States shall be, and is hereby, authorized at any time before the next session of Congress to issue his proclamation, declaring that he has received such evidence ; and, thereupon, from the date of such proclamation, the ports of the United States shall be opened indefinitely or for a term fixed, as the case may be, to British vessels coming from the said British colonial possessions, and their cargoes, subject to no other or higher duty of tonnage or impost, or charge of any description whatever, than would be levied on the vessels of the United States, or their cargoes, arriving from the said British posses- sions, and it shall be lawful for the said British vessels to import into the United States and to export therefrom any article or articles which may be imported or exported in ves- sels of the United States." (Then follows repeal of our acts of April 18, 1818, May 15, 1820, and March 1, 1823.) "Section 2. That whenever the ports of the United States have been opened under the authority given in the first section of this act, British vessels and their cargoes shall be admitted to an entry in the ports of the United States, from the islands, provinces, or colonies of Great Britain, on or near the North American continent, and north or east of the United States." On the 5th of October following, President Jackson issued his proclamation opening the ports of the United States in pursuance of this act. For want of skill on our part, it was open to the British Parliament to burden the new trade with heavy duties on goods imported, which of course was done forthwith, much to our detriment. Inequality of Free Freighting with England. The con- ditions of equitable reciprocity of freighting, or free-carrying, DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 127 between the United States and Great Britain have never existed. In 1828-30 our merchants commanded scanty capital; inter- est was double the rate in Europe ; our government had from the first to give credit on the payment of duties; we had no capitalists with surplus wealth; about all the real advantage we had was 10 per cent, in customs tariff, enterprising mer- chants, resolute seamen, and the superior shipping induced by protected shipbuilding. f"' Great Britain was then, as now, the best naturally protected [ ma ritime nation known on earth. She had long made claim to "sovereignty of the seas." She then had the largest navy and most merchants fleets. She had the oldest and the strongest shipping houses, and the richest bankers, merchants, and cor- porations in the world. London long had been the centre of international exchange. The marine insurance written at Lloyds exceeded what was done in all other marts of trade. The great merchants, shipowners, and underwriters of England had long known each other, and were used to active coopera- tion. Their habit of commercial duty towards one another had acquired the force of centuries. Such were some of the inequalities of the situation when West India free-freighting competition began in 1830.y A New British Protection : '"''Lloyds.''^ Finding themselves under a new rule of trade, British shipowners, merchants, and underwriters soon devised a plan for discrimination, or pro- tection, against foreign tonnage and alien commerce. The sliield of club and society rules soon took the place of parlia- mentary law. The reorganization of the London Lloyd's Register Association, in 1834, created the agency and supplied the means of a most efficient protective system, namely, the opportunity and the power of underrating the qualities of foreign ships, and overcharging for insurance on their cargoes. Thus, it was sought to induce the merchants of other nations than the British to prefer for employment the British ship. The measure of importance which attaches to the British Lloyd's Register Association, as an institution and a force for advancing the interests of British shipping, has been discussed in Chapter VI. The United States to this day is without an organization of any kind executing a similar function. Our 128 AMERICAN MARINE. merchants and shipowners have never combmed against their brethren of foreign nations, nor have our underwriters ever developed the power requisite to help materially in the defense of their country's shipping. ''Free trade " in underwriting has been the order of the day. The different States have admitted foreign insurance companies, on "• liberal " terms, in such numbers that foreign, and not American interests now dominate cargo underwriting in our principal shipping ports. In fact, American underwriting in our foreign trade seems doomed soon to pass away. ON THE DOWN GRADE, 1831 TO 1835. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1831 .... 1832 .... 1833 .... 1834. . . . 1835 .... Tons. 538,136 614,121 648,869 749,378 788,173 Cubic ft. 4.04- 4.48 4.63 5.18 5.32 Dollars. 1.3.80 13.74 14.11 15.97 18.35 Per cent. 91.0 89.4 90.7 89.0 90.2 Per cent. 80.6 75.8 75.5 74.4 77.3 Average . . 667,735 4.73 15.19 90.6 76.7 In this period we have indubitable evidence of the inability of our shipping interest to hold its own for any length of time with unequalized foreign competition. Other conditions were not unfavorable. We added a line of packet-ships to Havre in 1832. Spain and Portugal, and France and Algiers were at war. Discriminating duties on teas from ports east of the Cape of Good Hope helped our import carrying until 1834. Although the tariff was high, commerce per capita increased during the period, and there was a slight gain in tonnage per capita; but our proportion of carriage declined, in imports 5, and in exports 12 percent., in the ten years from 1825 to 1835. The import carrying was most firmly rooted, being in the hands of Anlerican merchants owning their own vessels. The export business suffered first and most, as the opening of indirect trading and triangular voyages sent greater numbers of foreign ships here to purchase and load cargoes for Europe. DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 129 However, few nations besides England cut severely into our trade, which was now assuredly slipping away. The Gains of England. Great Britain entered upon full reciprocity as to our foreign trade, first, direct, as to European traffic in 1815, and as to colonial trade in 1830 ; second, indi- rect, in 1849. In the year of Jackson's proclamation (1830) she had 78,947 tons of shipping entering our ports. For ten years previously her average number had been 76,518 tons. In the next year after reciprocity in the colonial trade, British entrances rose to 143,806 tons ; and for the first ten years thereafter the average number was 212,661 tons, or 63 per cent, of all the foreign arrivals. In this decade (1830-40), while our own tonnage gained but 40 per cent, in all the ports of the world, British tonnage increased nearly 400 per cent, in American ports alone. It has been a common mistake to suppose that any advan- tages were gained by the acts of 1828 to 1830. It was seven years after 1828 before we had more tonnage than in that year, and two years after 1830 before we had more tonnage than then. Nor is it correct to think that our tonnage rose steadily after the peace of 1815. History shows that a generation passed away, and the country made an unexampled growth in population, before our tonnage recovered the figures of 1815. JSTEARLY HOLDING OUR OWN, 1836 TO 1840. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. ia36 .... 1837 .... 18.38 .... ]a39 .... 1840. . . . Tons. 753,094 683,205 702,962 702,400 762,838 Cubic ft. 4.95 4.38 4.39 4.25 4.48 Dollars. 20.94 16..56 13.84 17.13 14.05 Per cent. 90.3 86.5 90.6 88.7 86.6 Per cent. 75.4 77.6 82.8 78.3 79.9 Average . . 720,889 4.49 16..50 88.54 78.8 In this period we suffered a loss in import freighting, but gained somewhat in export carriage, our packet-ship lines hav- ing increased their numbers in 1836. In the following year 130 AMERICAN MARINE. occurred a severe panic, with bank suspensions, and our car- riage fell off. Foreign merchants and their ships kept on at work, while ours had to slacken sail. In 1838 the banks par- tially resumed, only to fail again in 1839. In 1840 the New England and New York banks resumed specie payments, while those in States having no active commerce in shipping of their own took years afterward for recovery. Another New British Protection: '"'' Subsidy.'" In 1838 the first British steamers to cross the Atlantic appeared in our ports. Next year the Cunard line of steamers was announced to run regularly between Liverpool and New York. It was "subsidized" at |425,000 annually, by the British govern- ment. This sum proving insufficient, the pay was increased to 1550,000 in 1840. Still failing to realize profits, Cunard had his subsidy raised to 1735,000. He enlarged his steamers in 1852, and again his pay was raised, this time to ^^850,000, to give him enough protection to beat off Collins's American line, the British Premier advising Cunard, so it was said at the time, to run without freight if necessary, to kill off Collins. In 1858 Congress came to the aid of Cunard and his govern- ment, took off the subsidy protection under which Collins had started and run his ships, and then the victory was easy, and full freights might be carried. That action of Congress stood in the same relation to Cunard and his British line, as the march of Bliieher to the support of Wellington at Waterloo. Mail service, though the ostensible, was not the chief object of Great Britain. The paramount purpose was control of our trade and transportation. While that object may have been legitimate, as nations go, England had not the moral right, under the maxims of liberality and the principles of free trade then ruling her traffic with the United States, to resort to a protective policy for any such purpose. It was supposed by all our statesmen that England and the United States, with other nations, adopting "reciprocal liberty of commerce," had laid aside national effort and governmental interference with the men who went upon the sea in ships. It was at least im- agined that all nations, having exchanged "olive bi'anches," were forever bound to the sjyirit, as well as the letter, of fair play and free footing ; and, at any rate, that the men of Eng- land would not be the first to retake the club of protection, and resume their old play of whacking the heads of their rivals. DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 131 The only protection applied to shipping had been discrimi- nating tonnage dues and tariff duties, together with prohibi- tions. Bounties had been applied to fishermen only. When the dues, duties, and prohibitions were removed, it .was not thought possible that new inventions in propulsion would ever revolutionize trade and transportation; or that any of the nations would contrive inventions in protection, for the avoid- ance of reciprocity acts or treaties and the reinstatement of an old policy under a new form, which should build up quickly an entirely new marine run hy steam. Yet this was done by England, and permitted by the United States. If our old protection had remained, we would have been the first nation to establish lines of ocean steamers. Or if we had resorted to it again, when the British Parliament voted Cunard hi.s first subsidy, we would have quickly become the active rival of England in steamship navigation, and at least achieved the rank of second steam - power on the sea. Great Britain got the weather - gage, and has distanced us, because she went back to protective principles for the perfec- tion of the steamship. We have only ourselves to blame for the situation in which we now find our marine, with few sailing ships and fewer steamers. Negligently we permitted England to safeguard with her treasury the running of steamers in our transatlantic trade, when their first work was to beat our sail- ing-packets out of business, cut our nation out of naval power, and reduce our maritime rank. DECIDEDLY DECLINI^TG, 1841 TO 1845. Tear. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1841 .... 1842 .... 1843 .... 1844 .... 1845 .... Tons. 788,308 82.5,746 856,930 900,471 904,476 Cubic ft. 4.48 4.53 4.36 4.66 4.54 Dollars. 14.13 11.23 11. .50 11.38 11.65 Per cent. 88.4 88.5 77.1 86.7 87.3 Per cent. 77.8 76.3 77.0 70.5 75.8 Average . . 854,804 4.59 11.97 85.6 75.48 132 AMERICAN MARINE. In this period we see tlie first effect of British steamer com- petition for our import carriage, which fell off decidedly, not . alone owing to quicker passages, but to lower insurance rates by British underwriters on goods by steam than by sail. Ex- port carriage fell off most, showing that foreign sailing vessels were losing nothing by the running of foreign steamers. Although we gained in amount of tonnage, the per capita test showed no increase in jjroportion to population for fifteen years past. Commerce itself was at the lowest average ever known in time of peace since the union of the States. The tariff of 1828 had been brought down by degrees to a low rate at the beginning of the period, but scarcely any increase of commerce had resulted. During the period there was a loss of commerce, not because of raising the tariff in 1842 (coming into force September 1, and affecting the year 1843, which had only nine months), but because the country had become poor by the commercial disasters of 1837 ; by the falling off in per capita shipping; and by competition with Great Britain in manufacturing under too low a tariff for protection to wage- workers. In 1841, also, there was a susj)ension of the banks for about a year, with the United States Treasury well-nigh bankrupt. By the tariff act of 1832, credit on import duties was much reduced, and the act of 1833 provided for its abolition in 1842 ; and by the tariff act of that year all duties were made payable in cash. These changes in the payment of duties stripped just so much protection from our merchants, and seri- ously checked their trade. But these changes favored foreign merchants, whose capital was ample, with rates of interest low, and they began in this period to send goods more freely for sale by agents, and to buy regularly return cargoes for their ships. But there were a few favoring circumstances. From 1840 to 1843, the first British war with China took place. This increased insurance rates on British ships in Asiatic traffic, 1 and led to the building of American clippers for the Chinese and Indian trades. The tariff of 1842, so far as it caused the employment of our idle labor, and thus increased prosperity, was helpful to the shipping interest and to shipbuilding. DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY, 133 TONNAGE RISING, CARRIAGE FALLING, 1846 TO 1850. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1846. . . . 1847 .... 1848 .... .1849. . . . 1850 .... Tons. 943,307 1,047,454 1,168,707 1,258,756 1,439,694 Cubic ft. 4.60 4.96 5.38 5.62 6.23 Dollars. 11.48 14.46 14.24 13.10 14.28 Per cent. 87.1 77.2 82.9 81.4 77.8 Per cent. 76.2 65.3 71.1 68.9 65.5 Average . . 1,171,583 5.35 13.51 81.2 69.4 In this period we make quite an exhibit of gains in tonnage, but the average per capita is scarcely equal to that in 1826-30, which was less than half in periods of full protection. Com- merce shows enlargement, but carriage the inevitable contrac- tion. Foreign sail vessels under free freighting, and British steamers under subsidy protection, were getting the weather guage of us from period to period. In twenty years, the five years' average of import carriage had fallen from 93.46 to 81.2 per cent., and export carriage from 86.78 to 69.4, — a decline in the first case of 12.26 per cent., and in the second of 17.38 per cent, of the total transportation, in spite of the many cir- cumstances which, in the course of that time, aided and par- tially protected our commercial efforts. And this happened in the days of wood and sail. In 1846 we put on a packet-ship line to Bremen, war with Mexico began, and the Irish famine occurred. In 1847 and 1848 American steamers began transatlantic voyages, subsi- dized English fashion. Meantime, the Mexican war ended, with the acquisition of California, soon followed by the discov- ery of gold, and large emigration by ship around the Horn; in 1848-50 strife and wars in Europe took place; in 1849-50 Collins's line of steamships came out, beating the Cunard out of sight, and the clipper sailing-ship era fairly opened. All these events and circumstances, tending to increased vessel employment, played the part of protection to our marine. On the other hand, in 1846 the tariff was reduced, and a 134 AMERICAN MARINE. bonded warehouse act passed. Both these measures were dam- aging. This is seen in the great loss of carriage in American ships from 1846 to 1847. Foreign vessels more than doubled their work in the latter year. Our percentage of carrying fell off 10 per cent, in imports, and 11 per cent, in exports of the total transportation in this single year. Nearly all the increase of commerce due to lowering the tariff found its transport in foreigTi ships. And so it will be found in other instances of tariff lessening. In 1848 we recovered about haH of the loss in the previous year, but our share of carriage in 1846, which was 87.1 for imports and 76.2 for exports, has not been attained since that time. Those two acts of Congress did more harm to our shipping than ten years of foreign competition. JEvils of the Bonded Warehouse System. This system, borrowed from England, is part of the free - trade revenue scheme of Robert J. Walker, proposed and adopted in 1846. In its operation, the government becomes, in effect, a party in interest with all the manufacturers, merchants, and shipowners of every country but our own. Foreigners, our rivals dwelling abroad, with no interests that are not adverse to our own, are admitted to full equality for protection with our own citizens, whom they are free to grind into powder by unfair competition. That this system is a protection and convenience to foreign manufacturers, merchants, and shipping is manifest from its provisions. It virtually gives credit for duties. Duties are a part of the expense of placing foreign goods in our markets. Such credit is, therefore, an assistance to merchants and job- bers and reexporters in foreign goods ; and these, with the ves- sels employed, under the working of the system itself, have come to be mainly subjects of foreign countries. One of Walker's arguments for the measure was, that "it would greatly in- crease our revenue (under the low tariff which he advocated, and which passed) by augmenting our imjjorts." But as "re- exportation " was his chief argument, he forgot to show how the increase of revenue could take place, if his sophistry, by accident, proved sound, and the augmented imports were re- exported. The augmentation of imports and the increase of reexpor- tation of foreign goods have proved evil principles in our legis- lation. They have not facilitated the commerce and navigation DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 135 of our own citizens, but of foreigners. In the debate upon the passage of the bill, it was pointed out that the system was British, and would be protective of British interests in our foreign trade ; that one great object of any British commer- cial system is to accumulate power to depress the trade and shipping of other countries ; that, necessarily, the British warehouse system here would be maintained at thfe expense of American importers, who paid high interest on capital, state, and municipal taxes, and whose enterprise gave life and pros- perity to our merchant marine ; that the proposed plan would change the whole business of importing, taking it out of the hands of American merchants, and putting it into the hands of foreign capitalists and specidators ; that it would really trans- fer the control of American commerce from the United States to Europe; that all the great manufacturing establishments abroad would set up agencies in our cities, coastwise and in- land, and they would ultimately absorb all the commerce of the country, both of importing and exporting; that already haK the importations at New Yoi'k were on foreign account, and proportionately alien in the other chief cities; that the effect of such change in our commerce had already induced great losses in our carrying-trade, for which the so-called reciprocity legislation and treaties were mainly to blame so far. That the tonnage of Great Britain engaged in commerce with foreign countries was even then increasing in a greater ratio than the tonnage of other nations in the same trade; that where the British merchant trades, thither sails his ship, and there her underwriter follows. In short, that the whole scheme was anti-American, subjecting, and ruinous in its prospect. Nevertheless, the bill passed; and it is to be noted, that it was put upon its passage nearly a month before the "low- tariff "' bill of the same year, the better to insure the passage of both ; because the vote on the tariff bill would be close, and if it should be tried first and fail, then the warehouse bill would also fail to pass. Of the two measures, the foreign importing interest preferred the warehouse law, as that would suit any kind of a tariff, high or low. Both acts took effect early in the year ending June 30, 1847. On that date, taken together, the two acts had been in force ten and a half months. Losses and Gains for a Single Year. The following fig- 136 AMERICAN MARINE, ures will show the losses and gains, respectively, of American and foreign carriage, in our foreign trade, for a single year, comparing 1846 with 1847 : — VALUE OF IMPORTS. Carriage. 1846. 1847. By American vessels By foreign vessels Percentage American Percentage foreign $106,008,173 15,683,624 87.1 12.9 $113,141,357 33,404,281 77.2 22.8 Thus, imports by foreign vessels increased about 113 per cent., while the increase by American vessels was less than 7 per cent., the usual annual rate for some years previous. The advantage to foreigners, and disservice to Americans, of the two acts in question, will be seen from the following comparison of three-year periods, before and after their pas- sage, to be nearly as great as in the single year from 1846 to 1847: — VALUE OF IMPORTS FOR THREE-TEAR PERIODS. Cabriagk. Period of 1844-46. Period of 1847^9. By American vessels By foreign vessels Percentage American Percentage foreign $302,621,327 44,760,069 87.1 12.9 $362,170,741 87,231,264 80.5 19.5 Thus, imports in foreign vessels increased 95 per cent., but in American vessels only 19.5 per cent., in three years after the passage of these prejudicial and pernicious acts. So much for our import commerce. The following table shows how it was with our export com- merce and carriage, comparing 1846 with 1847 : — DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 137 VALUE OF EXPORTS. Carriage. 1846. 1847. By American vessels $86,5.50,175 26,938,341 76.2 23.8 $103,480,610 54,832,212 Percentage American Percentage foreign 65.3 34.7 Here is seen the work of the alien merchant and the foreign ship, increasing 135 per cent, in ten and a half months. In American vessels the increase was only 19.5 per cent, in the same time. The "reexport" trade cut no figure in these extensions of our commerce in 1847, but they were chiefly due to the famine in Ireland and an extraordinary demand for food supplies in Great Britain. Taking periods of three years, as before, we have the follow- ing table showing foreign gains in carriage, after the passage of the warehouse and tariff acts of 1846 : — VALUE OF EXPORTS FOR THREE-YEAR PERIODS. Carriage. Period of 1844-46. Period of 1847-49. By American vessels By foreign vessels $251,943,146 87,392,022 74.16 25.84 $313,671,664 144,429,109 Percentage American Percentage foreign 68.42 31.57 Again we see how disproportionately foreigners increased their carriage of values in the export, as in the import trade, gaining 65.26 per cent, in three years, while American vessels gained only 24.5 per cent. The foreign gain was greater in the import than the export trade by 45 per cent., proving beyond a doubt that the warehouse act was evil, and only evil for American shipping. Never since 1846 has American car- riage, either for imports or exports, been so high as in that year. This is another proof of the ruin bound up in the legis- lation of 1846. And here is just the place to remind our statesmen that, in the time comprised of short periods before 138 AMERICAN MARINE. and after this legislation, American merchants possessed fleets of better ships than belonged to the merchants of any foreign nation. The British had an advantage in the ownership of steamers, but there were then no iron sailing ships and no freighting propellers at all in our foreign trade. Nor was there then, as now, any prejudicial discrimination against American— j vessels on the part of foreign underwriters, v^ur merchants, ^ labored under no other disabilities than bad congressional acts."^ Senator Dix, who engineered the warehouse bill through the Senate in 1846, solemnly assured tl\e country that he "antici- pated no increase of foreign tonnage in American trade; " that there was "no danger of our commerce going into the hands of foreigners; " and that "there need be no cause for uneasiness.'* In liberal sentiment, how wise he was ! Of business principles, how much he had to learn ! Complete Reciprocity with England. In 1849 Great Brit- ain made up her mind to take advantage of our general reci- procity act of 1828 to increase her trade and transportation out of our foreign traffic. Hitherto, the traffic of the two nations had been between American and British ports only; henceforth, England wished it to be between our own and the ports of the world, and the opposite way; while our govern- ment was willing, not because there was advantage in such reciprocity, for that had been disproved in the loss of 17 per cent, of our foreign carriage in the time of twenty years, but because ours is a "liberal government," that would fain find employment for the shipping of the world, even if it had to lay up all our own fleet in idleness to rot. Immediately after the passage of the British act of 1849, accepting our "olive branch " act of 1828, the Secretary of the Treasury, unmindful of the provisions of the act and heedless of its twenty-one years' effect upon our shipping prosperity, issued circular in- structions to collectors and other officers of the customs as follows : — Mr. Meredith's Circular. "First. In conseqiience of the alterations of the British navigation laws, British vessels, from British or other foreign ports, will (under our existing laws), after the 1st of January next, be allowed to enter our ports with cargoes of the growth, manufacture, or production of any part of the world. DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 139 "Second. Such vessels and their cargoes will be admitted from and after the date before mentioned on the same terms as to duties, imposts, and charges as vessels of the United States and their cargoes (October 15, 1849)." It may be useless now to point it out, that this act of the Secretary of the Treasury was without authority. The act of 1828 authorized the President, not the Secretary of the Treas- ury, to i.>5sue his proclamation declaring that the foreign dis- criminating duties of tonnage and impost are suspended and discontinued, etc. The Secretary did not wait for the Presi- dent to act, but went ahead on his own responsibility. In fact, the Icijal proclamation has twt been made doicn to the present time. It is a strange incident in our administrative history. The act of 1828 shoidd be repealed, and the circular of Mr. Meredith recalled at the earliest possible moment. The effect of the law so officiously invoked was soon felt, and may be shown as follows : — THE ENGLISH VICTORY, 1849 TO 1853. Imports in Vessels. Carriage, per cent. American. Exports in Vessels. Carriage, per cent. American. American. Foreign. American. Foreign. 1&49 1850 1851 1852 1853 $120,382,157 139,657,04:3 163,650,543 155,258,468 191,688,225 $27,475,287 38,481,275 52,574,389 53,038,;388 76,290,322 81.4 77.8 75.6 74.5 71.5 $100,533,123 99,615,041 152,4;56,689 139,476,937 155,028,802 $45,222,697 52,283,679 65,931, .322 70,181,429 75,947,355 68.9 65.5 69.8 66.5 67.1 In four years we lost of import carriage 10 per cent., and of export carriage 2 per cent. That so much more of import than of export carriage was lost came about by British vessels competing with our own in the ports of foreign countries, which they could not do before the Meredith circular was issued. In the period above, our shipping increased its business 59 per cent., but foreign vessels (mostly British) added to their traffic 177 per cent., exactly three times the gain of our own. Brit- ish tonnage arrivals alone increased 70 per cent. In seven years' time, from 1846, our government gave away to foreign- ers 9.1 per cent, of export carriage, and 15.6 per cent, of im- 140 AMERICAN MARINE. port carriage, to prove what, — its liberality, or its folly ; its hardness towards citizens, or softness towards aliens? British Lloyd's Action. In 1850 the British act of 1849, permitting the registry of foreign-built vessels, came into force. It has been generally supposed that the English began immediately the purchase of our superior ships, but they did not, owing to a simple misinterpretation by Lloyd's inspectors of a rule for fastening. They condemned locust wood for tree- nails in high-class ships, compelling any British owner who wished to avail himseK of the "free-ship" act, by buying American-built vessels, to wholly re-treenail a ship with Eng- lish oak, or submit to a low insurance class at Lloyds. This arbitrary and unfair inspection lasted until 1854, as may be seen from our statistics of "tonnage sold foreign," partly given in the table following. We sold nearly as much tonnage in the four years before the British act of 1849 as during the four years after it. But we sold more from 1826 to 1829 than in the period from 1850 to 1853 inclusive. Manifestly the Lloyd's Society practically vetoed the act of Parliament. TONNAGE SOLD FOREIGN. Before " Free-ship " Act- After " Free-ship " Act. Period of 1826 to 1829. Year. Tons. Year. Tons. Year. Tons. 1846 . . . 1847 . . . 1848 . . . 1849 . . . 10,932 16,969 12,456 12,621 1850 . . . 1851 . . . 1852 . . . 1853 . . . 13,468 15,247 17,921 10,035 1826 . . . 1827 . . . 1828 . . . 1829 . . . 13,994 19,043 14,678 14,093 In four years 52,978 56,671 61,808 Yearly average 132,44 14,167 15,452 This restraint of trade is cited to illustrate the working of the British Lloyd's inspection system as a protective medium. Its object was twofold: first, to benefit British shipping by classification in a register of special reference for a large majority of underwriters ; second, to rate as inferior to British such foreign vessels as traded to British ports, grading the DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 141 latter as if built of bad or short-lived materials, with poor workmanship and defective fastenings; of course, to be avoided by shippers and underwriters everywhere, even in the United States. At the time this effective policy was set to work, the American ship in the foreign trade deserved and bore, among fair-minded men, the name of the best of any on the sea. British shipping, by honest English writers, was said to be the slowest and most unsafe of all the nations.^ It was the work of Lloyd's to change this poor repute, to set up rules and claim character which should give British tonnage preference for employment; conjointly, to cast down a reputation by which alone American ships could possibly compete for the carriage of British cargoes, or hope to keep the sea in our own trade. THE TIDE OF THE FIFTIES. TONNAGE STILL RISING, FALLING, 1851 TO 1855. CARKIAGB Yeak. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Cairiage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1851 .... 1852 .... 1853. . . . 1854. . . . 1855 .... Tons. 1,544,663 1,705,650 1,916,471 2,151,918 2,348,358 Cubic ft. 6.47 6.93 7.50 8.18 8.63 Dollars. 18.22 17.18 19.60 22.16 19.72 Per cent. 75.6 74.5 71.5 71.4 77.3 Per cent. 69.8 60.5 67.1 69.3 73.8 Average . . 1,932,212 7.54 19.37 74.06 69.3 We are now to consider the most interesting period in our shipping history. The commerce of the world, feeling the excitement of mining for gold in California and Australia, was rapidly increasing, and many events and circumstances favored the employment of American vessels rather than those of for- eign nations. If the time was ever, since our shipping was stripped of protection, that it could be expected to prosper under free trade, then the period before us is the time. The advocates of "reciprocal liberty of commerce " promised that it 1 A. F. B. Creuze, in his treatise on Naval Architecture, 1841. He was then the surveyor-general of Lloyd's, and had been from the beginning. He mentioned it as a " startling fact that one ship and a half is the average daily loss registered on the books of Lloyd's." 142 AMERICAN MARINE. would lead to the extinction of foreign carriage in our com- merce. In this prosperous period was the golden opportunity for the realization of their delusion. But what was the fact? The percentage of American carriage fell to a lower average point than it had ever touched before, even in the war period of 1811-15. Not only so, but in 1853 and 1854 our import carriage declined to the lowest mark occupied since the war of 1812, or the early days of 1792. In 1855 the decline was arrested, and the following year it was almost at a stand. "*' All through the period we were gaining moderately in ton- nage and in per capita measvirement, but increasing dispropor- tionately in commerce. Foreign merchants and alien shipping made most profit from the growing trade ; which, however, fell short of the per capita of the periods before the war of 1812. The increase of tonnage, fast as it was, averaging 7.5 per cent, annually, was too slow to keep up with our galloping com- merce. Of course, foreigners took their opportunity, seized our trade, held it, and now think it theirs. Had we never thrown our fences down, then had we owned the ships, had the merchants, and gained the capital to have held our heritage ourselves. But our shipping was to reap as our statesmen had sown, — a vanishing crop. Suhsidij Protection. In accounting for the growth of our marine from 1850 to 1855, we should bear in mind we had then several lines of subsidized steamers performing the ocean postal service. But for this slim protection, foreign nations would have cut much faster into our carriage, particularly in import trade. The subsidy protection to American steamers, first authorized in 1845, but retracted in 1858, was beneficial while it lasted, — for about ten years, — though the sail-ship interest complained to Congress, and wanted it abolished at home and abroad. Adventitious Aids. As employment is the object of pro- tection, whatever secures work with fair pay affords preserva- tion and safety. Adventitious aids may be quite as helpful as governmental acts, but in the shipping business the former are transitory and soon disappear. The following are some of the chance succors and supports of the period discussed : — Under the stimulus of increasing trade, due to gold produc- tion, the several sailing transatlantic packet lines were in- creased in number. DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 143 Sailing "clipper-ships" were built for nearly every trade, the improved speed, increased size, and superior sea qualities insuring them preference for freighting and insurance, espe- cially in the Californian, Australian, and East Indian com- merce. From 1853 to 1856 the Crimean war was waged between Russia and England, France, and Turkey, increasing insur- ance rates on the shipping of the belligerents, and requiring American, as well as their own, tonnage in the transport ser- vice, this being before the time of freighting steamers. All through the period an unparalleled emigration took place from Europe to the United States, and from the eastern States and other parts of the world to California and Australia, mak- ing the passenger trade, in its extent by sailing ships, an his- torical wonder. The unfavorable events were few, chiefly the following : — Active British Intervention. In 1852 the British govern- ment increased the subsidy of the Cunard line (New York to Liverpool) from $725,000 to if 850, 000 annually, enabling the Cunard Company to build and run larger postal steamers, and to start freighting steamships. In 1854 the British Lloyd's Register Association raised the insurance rating of iron-built vessels to double its previous figure, namely, from six to twelve years A 1, if built by the rules then laid down. These rules provided for building A 1 iron ships of three grades; the first, to rate for ttt'elve, the second, for nine., and the third, for six years; and have been lauded as "celebrated" by British writers. The object of this appreciation of the iron ship was to make her the standard bottom, and especially the British ship, of all future time. Wooden ships, for the want of native timber, could not longer be produced in sufficiency for the marine, or safety to the maritime defense. England, with all her wealth, could not afford to buy her ships abroad, as her free-ship law of 1849 provided she might do; least of all, would she dare become dependent on her rivals for timber or for ships. Hence, as we have seen, the Lloyds vetoed the act of 1849; and, having a will, made a way to mine materials and build at home a truly British vessel. England was then, as now, the "iron coun- try." The United States, par excellence, was the country for 144 AMERICAN MARINE. wooden ships, of which we built the best in the world. It would never do for England, the ruler of one fourth the land and almost all the sea, to give up building vessels. Shipbuild- ing is a military art. The nation that would rank and rule the world 7nust build her own ships. Iron shipbuilding, for ocean navigation, began in 1838. The first sea-going iron bark, if existing in 1854, was aged but sixteen years then. Only a few vessels were twelve years old when the Lloj^d's Association, without full experience, raised the rating to that term. Tlie /Substitution of Iron for Wood. For British vessel- building, the substitution of iron for wood was a state neces- sity, rather than a mechanical preference. The relative merits of wood and iron scarcely cut any figure in the adoption of the policy to make metal the British ship material. No enactment was required, for the Lloyd's rules are boasted of in England as having "all the force of a law of Parliament." But the gov- ernment provided for an iron navy, and saw to it that no more mail subsidy contracts were given to wooden steamers ; which, imder the free-ship act of 1849, might be built in the United States. The safety and the good of the nation demanding the change from wooden to iron ships, tlie Lloyds quickly settled the question of "substitution." Their fiat went forth. It would benefit Britain, and hurt the United States, most of any nation, to change its ship material. The Lloyds could and would, therefore, compel a change, or the payment of discrim- inating premium rates for insurance on both ships and cargoes. Soon this policy, first applied to aid the British steamers in running off our sailing packets, was put in action against our wooden vessels, to force them out of use and secure their work for British iron ships and steamers. Thus came about the vaunted but miscalled "substitution of iron for wood." By the discrimination of the Lloyds, the building and running of wooden ships, in other words, the rivalry of the United States, was put in a way to be disposed of. On the other hand, the building and rimning of iron ships, otherwise the ascendency of England, could and would become assured. In all this strategy and craft, there was for our rival the best protection a nation's shipping ever had. Having by their protective policy made sure that the pur- DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 145 chasing of foreign-built wooden ships would be temporary, the Lloyds admitted locust treenails, condemned in 1850, to an equality with "English oak," and British owners, in 1854, began buying American ships. Meanwhile, the wood builders of England changed trade, and, with the iron builders, went into the production of an iron marine. Decline of the Fifties. Both the subsidy policy of the Brit- ish government and the discriminative insurance practice of the Lloyds were means and deeds in contravention and viola- tion of the principles of " reciprocal liberty of commerce," then, and now, erroneously supposed to govern the commercial inter- course of England and the United States. It is a just com- plaint, that their protective measures were and are unfair. They have robbed freedom of equality. Had our nation been the offending party, it would not have taken half a century for the world to learn that fact. Our government should have insisted on fair play, and the restoration of equated footing for our marine at least forty-five years ago. And it is a fact, that thirty -three years ago the shipowners of New York and Bos- ton remonstrated before Congress in vain against the contin- ued sufferance of the British subsidy system. BRITISH STEAMERS WIN, 1856 TO 1860. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1856 .... 1857 .... 1858 .... 1859 .... 1860 .... Tons. 2,302,190 2,268,196 2,301,148 2,321,674 2,379,396 Cubic ft. 8.19 7.83 7.72 7.58 7.58 Dollars. 22.83 24.33 20.27 22.73 24.27 Per cent. 78.1 71.8 72.0 63.7 63.0 Per cent. 70.9 69.2 75.0 69.9 69.7 Average . . 2,314,520 7.78 22.88 69.7 70.9 In this period remarkable events occurred. One was strange ■ indeed, — the discontinuance by Congress of our subsidy pro- tection to postal steamers, coupled with the taking of no meas- ures at all for the desistance of Great Britain from her subsidiz- ing course. By this act of desertion. Congress turned its back 146 AMERICAN MARINE. on steam navigation under the American flag in the foreign trade. A bill was passed June 14, 1858, giving "the sea and inland postage," in lieu of the subsidies authorized in 1845, 1847, 1852, 1854, and 1855. This measure was first proposed in 1853. Its promoters finally succeeded; and in less than three years' time were living under a brand-new constitution, fighting valiantly for a new flag. This fact alone lights up the character of their legislation. Aiming ostensibly at "econ- omy," they abandoned our steam navigation interest, which should now rival that of England, to the odds of the British treasury, and gave up to the British flag not only the carriage of our mails, passengers, and fine goods, but our opportunity at sea. It had been proved, both before and after Collins' s line started, that it woidd be impossible, without protection of some kind, to run American steamers in competition with foreign, supported by protection as the British lines were. Even on routes where opposition had not developed, it was impossible to find adequate support for lines destitute of government aid. Commodore Vanderbilt, the best steamship manager of the time, had tested transatlantic steam navigation without protec- tion, and found it ruinous. After the passage of the act, he tested it for "sea and inland postage" pay, and satisfied him- self that there was no money in the business. When he with- drew his vessels and quit the sea, his comment was, that "3 per cent, capital can always beat 6 per cent." A comment of this kind will apply to labor as well as capital. But history has an earlier illustration of the working of sub- sidy protection to sustain a line and help beat off its competi- tors, which may well be given here. Experience of the Steamer United States. The first Ameri- can steamer attempting to rival the British on the route from New York to Liverpool was the United States, built in 1846-47, and owned chiefly by William H. Webb, then the foremost shipbuilder of New York. She made but one round trip, and then seemed to disappear.^ The British were greatly pleased with Cunard's success in getting rid of a Yankee rival. Brit- 1 On her return to New York, the steamer United States was sold for a good price to the Prussian government, just then in want of a steam frig- ate, into which she was converted by her builder. DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 147 ish writers, even of the present day, have expressed their pleasure that the "United States did not pay," and had to haul off beaten. This was what happened : — While the United States was unloading, and before she was ready to receive return freight, the Cunard Company put down their rates 50 per cent., — from <£8 to j£4 per ton, — and noti- fied the public that their steamers of the "Royal Mail Line" would accept freight at this reduced rate so long as the United States laid in port. Their subsidy from the British treasury enabled them to do this, of course, to the loss of the United States, — the nation as well as the ship. It was for this pur- pose the Cunard subsidy was sought and given. The fact was, the Britisli government hud determined on introducing trans- atlantic steam navigation, and they put forward Edward Cu- nard to run and maintain it with our country. The British government was really the i)rincipal, and Cunard the agent, in driving the steamer United States off the Liverpool route. But had there been then, as before 1815, the old system of jn-otection by discriminating tonnage dues and tariff duties, the United States could have commanded living: freights in Liverpool, and with other. American steamers could have gone on the route, and stayed. As it was, none but subsidized steamers could go on, and stay long. Mail subsidy is a kind of protection. Cunard succeeded because he was protected, as Collins did also for the same reason, when he tried the route after Webb failed for want of protection. When Collins put on his line in 1850, as highly subsidized as Cunard's, the latter line seemed not so much in haste, as in the case of the United States, to reduce the rates of freight, but these soon declined 50 per cent. Thus, the subsidizing of Collins 's line saved to American consumers one half of the freight on steamer im- ports paid formerly to enrich a foreign line. Besides this sav- ing, there were the receipts from foreign mails. Really, the naval power, derived from our protected steam-marine, — what we had of it, — cost the country nothing. But its offense was not its cost; that was its existence. liemarhs on the Period of 1836 to 1860. Returning to the period of 1856-60, there were other acts of Congress than that of 1858 that were hurtful to our shipping interest. In 1857 laws were passed for tariff reduction, and for extension of 148 AMERICAN MARINE. bonded warehouse time for the payment of duties, — two acts directly in the interest of foreign manufacturers, their agents, and their ships. So was the panic which followed their pas- sage in a few months' time. In 1856, such was the success of our steam and clipper ship lines, there was a gain of nearly one per cent, in import carrying; but in 1857 there was a loss of 6.3 per cent., from the action of the laws above referred to, — the same as from similar acts in 1846, as already noted. In 1858 we held our own in import carrying, and gained 5 per cent, in export; but in 1859 there was a loss of 8.3 per cent., followed, in 1860, by a loss of seven tenths of one per cent., making in two years a total of 9, and in four years an aggre- gate of 15.1, per cent, of import carriage that has never been recovered. And this was while sailing ships did the greater part of the import trade, there being only a few cargo steamers and no "tramps" in existence; and, moreover, in a time of very low or scant tariff for revenue only. The foreign competition was much severer in this than in the former period. The Crimean war was over. Many British steamers and clippers, released from transport service, entered our trade. Foreign merchants increased in number yearly, taking the places vacated by Americans, whose houses were broken up by the crisis and panic of 1857, and last, but not least, the discriminative insurance rates against wooden ship- ping- The chief thing remarkable about the export carriage is the large increase of 5 per cent, in 1858. The cause for this was doubtless the fact that the British had a war with China from 1856 to 1861 ; and in 1858 a rebellion occurred in India, call- ing off clipper ships in the transport business around the Cape of Good Hope. In 1859, also, the Franco-Austrian war took place, increasing our commerce and employing our ships to some extent. These events and circumstances gave an adventitious protec- tion to our shijjping in the export trade, the opposite of the exposure in the import traffic, and we lost but little of export carriage during the period. Many British sailing vessels were drawn off from competition with our own during the greater part of the time. Our own merchants, who had been fast los- ing the import trade, largely from the operation of the ware- DECLENSION UNDER RECIPROCITY POLICY. 149 house act of 1846, still controlled the export traffic, preferring ships and underwriters of our own. During the period we made a good average in commerce, having a glut of imports in 1857, and a sharp decline in 1858, which was only recovered in 1860. But neither in 1857, nor in 1860, did we reach the extent of commerce per capita en- joyed from 1795 to 1807 inclusive. We gained slightly in tonnage, in the absolute; but in shipping per capita, fell off 12.16 per cent. The culmination of a period of 38 years was 8.63 cubic feet per capita, in 1855; but then we were decidedly on the down grade in our share of carriage. Comparing the period of 1856-60 with that of 1826-30 we find in 30 years an average loss in import carriage of 23.76 per cent., in export carriage of 15.88 per cent., and no prospect of recovery, while the conditions brought about by free-trade legislation continued adverse, and changed betimes from bad to worse. CHAPTER IX. EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE. 1861 to 1891. We now come upon the period of ruin. During the war for the Union, for the want of adequate naval protection, our shipowners sold abroad 800,000 tons of our best shipping, worth in the aggregate $40,000,000. In ad- dition, we had sunk, burnt, and destroyed, by British-built Confederate cruisers, about 80,000 tons, mostly with cargoes, valued together at $10,000,000. Thus, 40 per cent, of the tonnage engaged in our foreign trade, and a capital of $50,000,000, were driven out of our shipping business or destroyed, for want of a proper navy. None of these vessels returned to our flag, as the owners of many of them desired, because Congress, controlled by inland members whose prop- erty could not be reached by cruisers, refused to permit this help to our stricken marine. The war began in 1861 and closed in 1865. In these four years we lost an average of 38 per cent, of the total carriage. In the climax period (1826 to 1830), the proportion of Ameri- can to foreign, in the foreign trade, averaged for imports, 93.46 per cent., for exports, 86.78 per cent. Comparing by this standard up to the war, and also to its close, we lost of total carriage as follows : — LOSSES BEFORE THE WAR. Import carriage ...... 33.46 per cent. Export carriage 14.68 per cent. LOSSES DURING THE WAR. Import carriage ...... 30.1 per cent. Export carriage 46.0 per cent. The British rejoiced at the losses of their "kin beyond the sea," but it vexed their government to feel obliged, because the EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE. 151 Confederacy did not succeed, to pay for their amusement and its own bad faith (f)15,500,000. This trifling sum included no compensation at all for the injury sustained by our mercan- tile interest that was broken up and dispersed, nor to the national welfare that was undermined and assaulted, to the gain and advancement of the British nation. It did not make up the losses of ships and cargoes. The first ship destroyed — the Yorkshire, belonging to William H. Webb, of New York, misreported as the "Yorktown" — has not been paid for. She was sunk in the night, and all hands lost. The American insurance companies, some of them severely injured by efforts to protect our shipowners and merchants, have not been paid a cent, though equitably entitled to their claims. The "Alabama Claims Award" was only a nominal damage assessment. It was a great bargain for the mother country, and was submitted to because we had no (naval) power to enforce full satisfaction. PERIOD OF THE WAR, 1861 TO 1865. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1861 .... 1862 .... 1863 .... 1864 .... 1865 .... Tons. 2,494,894 2,173,537 1,926,886 1,486,749 1,518,350 Cubic ft. 7.76 6.62 5.75 4.35 4.36 Dollars. 18.19 13.28 17.46 19.61 17.36 Per cent. 60.0 44.8 43.3 24.6 29.9 Per cent. 72.1 54.5 40.0 30.0 26.1 Average . . 1,920,483 5.76 17.18 40.52 4AM During the war the export trade passed rapidly into foreign hands and foreign steamers. Under the conditions existing then, many merchants sold their vessels, and quit the shipping business. With our southern ports blockaded, commerce necessarily fell off, but the loss of tonnage was much greater in proportion. The vacuity from this loss was mainly supplied by British iron screw steamers. A great impulse was given to the building of these "cargo" vessels by the discriminative rating and insurance of the Lloyds, as heretofore noted. But 152 AMERICAN MARINE. in 1862 the "Underwriters' Association" (of Liverpool), now a branch of Lloyd's, increased the rating of iron ships to twenty years Al. By this trick of classification, nearly all the tonnage in the "Eed Book," as the iron ship register was called, would insure at the lowest rates, for hull and cargo, while the vessels floated, for few would last as long as twenty years. In view of such an exaggerated rating, a wooden ship, at ten years A 1, stood nowhere in comparison. The Impulse of Peace. With the ending of the war, our merchants and shipowners remaining in trade set about redeeming their fortunes. Some of them desired to bring back under our flag the vessels which, for want of naval protection, they had sold abroad. An act of Congress prevented this return of tonnage. Others wished to build ships to replace their lost property. A law of CongTcss had added an internal revenue tax to the cost of the vessel. These were mistakes of Congress that hindered the work of restoration and reconstruc- tion. It was unwise, thus to discourage our shipping interest. It had received no protection for years, in peace or war, while it had helped more than any other trade to preserve the Union. This great fact should have been considered. A true view of the relationship of shipping to military strength, and therefore of the duty of the government towards the marine, may be found in the following extract from a speech by Senator King, of New York, March 15, 1822 : — "Navigation and maritime industry, for a peculiar reason, call for national protection; for the art of navigation is an expedient of war as well as of commerce, and in this respect differs from every other branch of industry. Though it was doubted, doubt no longer exists, that a navy is the best defense of the United States. And this maxim is not more true than that a naval power never has existed, and never can exist, without a commercial marine; hence, the jjolicy of encouraging and protecting the ships and seamen of the United States." An Effort of Congress. The impulse of peace did but little for the shipping interest, and it did that little without thanks to Congress, for Congress undertook to do something, but did nothing. EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE. 153 THE STRUGGLE TO RLSE, 1866 TO 1870. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1866 .... 1867 .... 1868 .... 1869 .... 1870 .... Tons. 1,-387,756 • 1,515,648 1,494,389 1,496,220 1,448,846 Cubic ft. 3.01 4.18 4.(.)6 3.97 3.76 Dollars. 28.47 24.28 23.02 23.25 25.76 Per cent. 25.1 28.0 33.0 31.3 33.1 Per cent. 37.7 39.1 36.6 34.9 37.7 Average . . 1,468,571 3.97 24.95 30.1 37.2 Late in the period a congressional committee was appointed to hear representatives of the shipping interest, to study the shipping question, and bring in a bill for its solution. This committee, headed by Mr. Lynch, of Maine, went through the seaboard cities investigating, what was then called by some, "the decadence of commerce." As the evils experienced were misunderstood, the inqiiiry of the committee was misdirected. The mistake was, we had an increasing commerce, but, as Mr. Jefferson once distinguislied the sort that we had, it was pas- sive, and not active, — carried in foreign and not American bottoms; in point of fact, our rivals and enemies seemed to have nearly full possession of our trade and transportation over the ocean. Unfortunately the Lynch committee never caught sight of the true cause of our shipping decline. They thought it residted wholly from the war. They took no note of the decline before the war. This was, for import carriage, 83 per cent., and for export carriage 45 per cent., of what was lost during the war. The committee seemed not to know that the "reciprocal liberty of commerce," with other liberal measures of Congress, had given our marine dose after dose of gall and wormwood and deadly bane, before the war broke out. It gave but little attention to the character of our commerce and carrying-trade, and too nmch to the state of shipbuilding and the cost of ships. Now it was not a problem of shipbuilding, or of cheaper ships, that faced our country in what is called 154 AMERICAN MARINE. the "shipping question." If ships or steamers were given to American owners, they could not run them in fleets gainfully, against subsidized, bounty-paid, insurance-protected, cheaper- manned vessels of the European nations, except on equated footing or protection in getting employment. It was a great misfortune that the Lynch committee mistook its work, and so mistaught the country. To the present time, many among us believe that cheaper building, or trashy ships bought abroad, would solve our shipping and sailing problems. Cheapness cuts no figure in true shipping economy. It is emj^loyment that is wanted, and not a small investment. Cheapness is largely an index or expression of quality. Nobody prefers for employment a cheaj) ship. The chances for char- ter, as for insurance, are better for costly shijjs than for cheap ones. Here is the reason why protection, national, associa- tional, or adventitious, is better than cheapness, and at the present time indispensable for an active commerce. Without protection, our shipowners, generally, cannot get or hold pro- fitable emplcymont. With foreign merchants doing our trade, competition with foreign shipi^ing arouses national prejudice, and fails to make engagements. Of this fact, the history of our marine for sixty years past is one continued illustration. Here is a case plainly in point, showing the adverse power of the British Lloyds over the employment of American ships : in 1885, the year in which the %yar closed, our percentage of export carriage was down to 26.1; in 1866 it bounded up to 37.7 per cent., and for the jjeriod of 1866-70 held an average of 37.2 per cent. The year 1865 had an import carriage of 29.9. This fell to 25.1 in 1866, but in following years recovered, and the period of 1866-70 averaged 30.1 per cent. Apparently, we were recovering lost ground, and through the wisdom of the Lynch committee and the aid of Congress, possibly, we were destined soon to see our marine restored, and for future time, protected. The Lloyds Degrade our Ships. There had been a great increase of commerce — about 31 per cent. — over the pre- ceding period. The greater part of the gain was in exports, and English shipowners thought too many cargoes were carried by our wooden sailing ships. From 1854 to 1870 these had EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE. 155 been admitted to classification, with a disparaged rating, in British Lloyd's Register. They were subject to discrimina- tive insurance rates, both on hulls and cargoes, and obliged to carry freights at the lowest rates, or when too low to pay, to lie up idle. In 1870 the Lloyds refused to class and register "foreign ships," except for a single year at a time. This new discrimination, intended to stop the British purchasing and chartering of wooden ships, was aimed especially at American shipping business, then as now, asking Congress for the rec- ognition of its rights. For the six years following 1870 our vessels were shut out practically from the British Lloyd's Register, depreciated, disparaged, degraded, and decried, for English, or even American business. In 1864 our average propoi'tion of carriage in the freighting trade had fallen to 27.5 per cent. In 1870 it had risen to 35.6 per cent., a gain of more than 8 per cent, in seven years. The object of Lloyd's action, dictated by British owners, was to interrupt this little thrift, to hinder future growth, to stamp out our hope of bet- ter times, and force our people to "give up the ship and quit the sea." British merchants were not to freiglit our ships except at the lowest rates. British underwriters were not to insure their cargoes except at the highest rates. It was a part of the scheme, by the help of active agents in the United States, to prevent the revival of our shipbuilding through the passage of a "free-ship" bill, then, and ever since pending, or threatened in the House or Senate. In short, its object was to drive our wooden ships — the best sailing vessels ever built — out of the transatlantic grain and cotton trades, and ulti- mately to work extinction of our flag in the British ports. The talile below shows how well the Lloyds attacked. In three years our export carriage fell off 12 per cent., and in five years 14 per cent., in consequence largely of their well directed assault. Import carriage was likewise affected, fall- ing off 4 per cent, in five years. Meanwhile commerce per capita increased from an average of 124.95 to one of |!30.16, a gain of more than 20 per cent, in the period. Tonnage in foreign trade fell off. Other adverse circumstances were these : the opening of the Suez Canal, in 1870, enabled British tramp steamers to grasp our China trade, hitherto conducted by sailing ships via Cape 156 AMERICAN MARINE. Horn; bank expansion In 1871-72, and panic following con- traction in 1873, ill which year Congress discontinued the ocean mail subsidy given at the close o£ the war to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and other foreign-going lines. EXPORT EMPLOYMENT BEATEN, 1871 TO 1875. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1871 .... 1872 .... 1873 .... 1874 .... 1875 .... Tons. 1,363,652 1,359,040 1,378,533 1,389,815 1,515,598 Cubic ft. 3.45 3.37 3.-33 3.27 3.48 Dollars. 28.70 30.80 32.42 30.88 28.00 Per cent. 31.0 26.8 27.0 30.2 29.2 Per cent. 32.6 29.8 25.7 24.6 23.7 Average . . 1,401,.327 3.38 30.16 28.8 27.3 Favorable events were few indeed. The principal were the building of a line of iron steamers to rim from Philadelphia to Liverpool, which, for want of protection, never grew or pros- pered, and finally had to cease running as an American line. The building of coastwise lines of iron steamers, of which we now have the best in the world, offers a signal contrast to this defeat. The coasting steam lines all live and thrive, because they are protected from foreign competition, and only compete with one another and with railway lines. Continued Shipping Decline. The continued decline of our ocean freighting cannot be better illustrated than by a compar- ison with the carriage of our conquering rival. In 1855 the British shipping in our trade, sailing from the United King- dom, constituted 18 per cent, of the whole tonnage so engaged. American shipping constituted 79 per cent. ; the balance belonged to other nations. In the statement following, the British gains and American losses clearly appear : — Tonnage in American Trade. 1855. 1865. 1875. 1885. British percentage American percentage 18 79 65 26 70 9 84 10 EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE. 157 The boast of the London "Times," that "the ground lost by the shipping of the United States has been occupied mainly by shipping of our own," is all too true. The following table shows the slow but sure RETROGRESSION FROM 1876 TO 1880. Yeab. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1876. . . . 1877 .... 1878. . . . 1879 .... 1880 .... Tons. 1,5.53,705 1,570,600 1,589,348 1,451,-505 1,314,402 Cubic ft. 3.46 3.41 3.36 3.00 2.62 Dollars. 25.51 25.95 25.-59 24.60 32.21 Per cent. 30.8 31.5 32.2 31.6 22.0 Per cent. 25.4 23.7 22.6 17.6 13.7 Average . . 1,495,912 3.17 26.77 29.62 20.6 The only redeeming feature of this period is a gain of import carriage of .75 of one per cent., owing, no doubt, to the action of the free sugar treaty with the Sandwich Islands. Against this gain we suffered an average loss of 6.68 per cent, of export carriage, largely in consequence of British insurance discriminations against wooden (American) ships. In 1879-80 the resumption of specie payments took place, but seems to have done no good for our marine, like the several little "relief" acts passed from time to time in the last twenty years. In the single year of 1880 we lost : — Of export carriage ...... 3.9 per cent. Of import carriage ...... 9.6 per cent. In four years we lost: — Of import carriage Of export carriage . 8.8 per cent. 11.7 per cent. And in five years, shipping per capita fell off nearly 25 per cent. Our British rivals, controlling the shipment and under- writing of grain, provisions, and cotton in the transatlantic trade, had drawn the lines closely by 1880. Scarcely a cargo could be obtained by an American vessel for a British port, 158 AMERICAN MARINE. while a single British ship awaited charter. Competition did not compete, simply because British ships had the preference, from the British merchants and underwriters who ruled the traffic. Pacific Coast Trade. The principal stay to the utter col- lapse of our carriage in the foreign trade has been the develop- ment of our Pacific coast commerce. The grain and lumber trades have done splendidly; and the business between the Atlantic and the Pacific, around Cape Horn, has continued sustaining for our large vessels. In the period following, com- merce per capita shows the principal falling off. We actually recovered some of our lost import trade, and nearly held our own in export. Tonnage also held on remarkably, but was idle much of the time. SLACKING OF THE TIDE, 1881 TO 1885. Year. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1881 .... 1882 .... 1883 .... 1884 .... 1885 .... Tons. 1,297,035 1,2.59,492 1,269,681 1,276,972 1,262,814 Cubic ft. 2.51 2.38 2.33 2.28 2.20 Dollars. 32.52 29.59 29.51 27.06 24.48 Per cent. 19.9 19.2 20.7 22.4 21.3 Per cent. 13.3 12.8 13.4 14.4 13.7 Average . . 1,273,198 2.34 28.63 20.7 13.52 In 1881 a great crop of grain was produced in California, and the markets of Europe stood in need of it all at good prices. Our sailing ships were well employed, and for a few years did fairly for their owners. In 1881-82 many of our wooden ships at San Francisco received higher rates than Brit- ish iron vessels sent out from England. Prom an investigation of sailing-ship performance, in the California and European trade, covering a four -year period,^ it appears that the average difference in rates of freight in favor of British iron, and against American wood, ships was : — 1 See Chapter XVI. EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE. 159 Year. Per cent. 1881-82 4.75 1882-83 13.0 1883-84 17.1 1884-85 14.9 In proportion as the California grain trade has enlarged, the merchant shipowners of Great Britain have managed to engross the carriage of it. The rates of freighting and price of cargo insurance are such as British merchants and underwriters agree to make. In both of these transactions a severe discrimination has been applied for the purpose of handicapping our vessels. The year of 1883-84 opened in July with an average freight discrimination of 28.84 per cent. In August it was 19.66; in September, 12.06; in October, 19.80; in November, 37.70; and in December, 45.5 per cent, in favor of British iron ton- nage. For more than two months following, not a single American ship effected an engagement. In the next and fol- lowing years the same course was taken to freeze out our ship- ping. Nearing Low - Water 3Iarh. Lest it be supposed there are other reasons than the protection of British shipping for the institution and maintenance of the Lloyds' policy, let us look to the jDractice of American underwriters. As a rule, the insurance companies of the United States, from the first, have not set up distinctions in favor of risks on iron vessels, nor any discrimination to bias the choice of wood or metal for ships. As to rates on hulls, our most experienced insurance manager declares : — "First-class wooden ships, steamships as well as sailing ves- sels, are insured with us at as low rates of premium by the year as iron ships and steamships." In our foreign commerce alone does the British rule of dis- crimination prevail. This is one thing in the Atlantic and another in the Pacific trade. At the present, and for some years past, sail-vessels of iron and wood, if "approved," have had cargoes covered on the Atlantic at about equal rates. If any difference, it is small, and applies to the older vessels of wood. But there is a discrimination of 50 per cent, in favor of steam vessels. On the other hand, in the California grain trade, the iron steamer is given no discriminative favor, but rates on cargoes by steamers to Europe are the same as for iron 160 AMERICAN MARINE. sailers. The meaning of this is that the British policy is shaped to drive our wooden sailing ships out of short voyages with iron steamers, and out of long voyages with iron sailers. THE EBB TIDE STILL RUNNING, 1886 TO 1890. Yeab. Tonnage in the Foreign Trade. Shipping per Capita. Commerce per Capita. Proportion of American Carriage in Foreign Trade. Imports. Exports. 1886. . . . 1887. . . . 1888 .... 1889 .... 1890 .... Tons. 1,088,041 989,412 919,302 999,619 928,062 Cubic ft. 1.81 1.63 1.48 1..57 1.45 Dollars. 23.80 24.89 24.60 22.37 25.73 Per cent. 20.0 18.6 18.5 17.08 16.60 Per cent. 13.6 12.2 11.7 11.62 9.03 Average . . 984,887 1.58 24.28 18.15 11.63 We have now neared the end. Except a slight gain of ton- nage in 1889, there is no sign of life in the table above, but a preponderance of proof that recovery is unlikely under the con- ditions prevailing. The gain in tonnage is more seeming than real. It chanced that in 1889 more than the usual number of vessels were temporarily employed in the foreign trade. The following table will explain the fact, that our figures for ton- nage in foreign trade do not stand for the amount constantly employed. What that is cannot be given with accuracy. The following statements show the permanent, temporary, and equivalent to permanent tonnage in the foreign trade, for the years named, whaling vessels excluded : — STATEMENT OF SAIL AND STEAM TOGETHER. Year. Total per- manent and temporary. Constantly employed, or permanent. Briefly employed, or temporary. Equiva- lent to perma- nent. 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 Tons. 1,276,971 1,262,814 1,088,040 989,411 919,301 999,619 928,062 Tons. 9.34,262 909,520 793,065 724,169 659,600 685,877 669,751 Tons. 342,709 353,294 294,945 265,242 259,701 313,742 276,944 Tons. 991,402 963,381 842,252 768,376 702,883 738,167 715,908 EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE. 161 The loss of tonnage permanently employed has been 27.32 per cent, in six years. The loss of tonnage equivalent to per- manently employed has been 27.78 per cent. The average loss has been 27.52 per cent., or at a rate of 142 tons daily, 1,000 tons weekly, and 52,033 tons annually. In 1889 the small gain of 3.4 per cent, came mostly from tonnage in coasting trade temporarily employed in the foreign trade. The time this ton- nage is employed in the foreign trade is closely estimated as an average of two months in each year. A part of the gain in 1889, mostly lost in 1890, was from an increase in steam tonnage, in which there has been a varia- ble gain for the past twelve years ; but not sufficient to com- pensate the losses for a previous term of twelve years, as will be seen from the following table : — REGISTERED STEAM VESSELS. Year. Tons. Year. Tons. 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 221,939 213,252 192,.544 180,914 177,666 193,423 195,245 191,689 198,227 190,133 170,838 156,323 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 146,604 152,769 154,570 171,905 184,188 186,406 176,633 173,571 183,398 194,471 197,630 239,994 The registered steam tonnage reckoned as permanently in the foreign trade, ^ and the sail tonnage computed as equivalent to permanently employed, are as follows : — Class. 1884. 1885. 1886. 1887. 1888. 1889. 1890. 1891. Steam . . . Sail .... 184,187 807,194 186,405 781,998 176,633 665,619 173,570 594,806 183,397 519,486 194,471 543,696 197,630 522,802 239,994 486,751 From this comparison it appears that the loss of sailing ton- ^ Probably 10 per cent, of registered steam tounage is in domestic trade. 162 AMERICAN MARINE. nage employed in the foreign trade has been 35.23 per cent, in the past six years. As might be expected, this waste of 6 per cent, annually has fallen mostly on the long-voyage trades to distant ports. These are the trades requiring the best vessels. To maintain fleets of them, it is necessary to build new tonnage of the first class every year. This has not been done, for want of protection to their employment. In a few years more, unless we apply a remedy for the decay so plainly apparent, we shall have only a very few sailing ships fit for a voyage around the world. One or two only are in building now. Decay of American Carriage in California Trade. The proportion of American to foreign ships engaged in the wheat trade of San Francisco each year for the past nineteen years is shown in the f ollowin cS s 1^ < fx^ H 169 202 371 81 210 291 116 2.55 371 88 161 249 55 227 282 33 165 198 60 229 289 55 229 284 52 213 265 39 234 273 45.55 27.83 31.26 35.34 19.54 16.66 20.76 19.36 19.62 14.24 In the six months ending January 1, 1889, but nine Ameri- can vessels sailed in this trade, and they carried their cargoes at an average rate of 22 per cent, less freight money than was paid to 108 British ships that sailed in the same time. Such is the killing result of competition under the handicapping which protects British shipping. That we submit to it, tamely lie down under it, and do nothing to restore fair footing and secure fair play, is not flattering to our national pride. It is positively disgraceful. Review of Losses from Unfortunate Legislation. It is in order now to epitomize and bring into one view the losses fol- lowing' the legislation which is known to have been hurtful to EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND FREE TRADE SINCE. 163 our shipping in the foreign trade. The table below supplies this information. It should properly begin with the act of March 3, 1815; but, for the sake of comparison, the acts of Congress during our difficulties with Great Britain for eight years prior are included. LOSSES EXPERIEXCED. Date of Act and Time of its Effect. Embargo act, Dec. 22, 1807. one year .... Non-intercourse act, May 30, 1809, one year . Declaration of war, 1812, two years .... '* Reciprocal Commerce " with Eng-Iand, March o, 1815 (first act), two years Second ''Reciprocity" act, 1817, four ye irs . Final '' Reciprocity " act, 1828, two years . . West India opening act, 1830, two years . . . Computing from 182(i, 10 years (1830) . . . do. 20 years (1840) Tariff and warehouse acts, 1*40, one year . . Treasury Circular, 184t>, enforcing act of 1828 with England, one year do. three years Anti-subsidy act, 18.58, two years Losses by stripping off protection from 1820 to 1801, 35 years do. from 1815 to 1801, 40 years . . . Losses by the Avar, four years Losses by non-protection since the war, 1805-90 Losses by non-protection since 1815, 75 years . do. since 1820, 64 years Propor- Propor- tion of tion of Loss in Loss in Shipping Carriage per of Capita. Imports. Per cent. Per cent. 11. .50 1.00 10.46 31.70 11.04 37.02 32.84 — 4.48 17.50 4.94 23.33 8.31 — 11.30 4.42 — 12.16 0.18 12.50 36.84 22.78 43.81 50.16 66.74 44.48 85.57 — 82.52 Propor- tion of Loss in Carriage of Exports. Per cent. 2.00 4.00 30.25 12.16 15.84 14.95 14.30 4.93 2.01 7.06 19.73 63.80 65.40 89.92 This statement of facts should arrest the attention of every patriot and statesman in our land. It sets forth, in unmistak- able terms, what it has cost our nation for "reciprocal liberty of commerce," for "liberal shipping laws," and for "free com- petition with the world" in nautical pursuits. It puts the finger of science upon the follies of Congress, in connection with ships, and makes no mistake in pointing out the causes of our shipping decline. CHAPTEE X. THE QUESTION OF TARIFF LEGISLATION. The marine in our domestic trade lias prospered from the beginning of the government. It has always been protected ; at the first, by high discriminating tonnage dues, and afterward by prohibition of foreign vessels. To what else than un-protec- tion can be ascribed the decay of our shipping in the foreign trade, begun and continued from the stripping off of protec- tion? Because this un -protection of ours has greatly conduced to the prosperity of foreign nations proves nothing at all in favor of its principle, but everything against its practice as a policy of the United States. It may be good for other nations, but is bad for us, says the evidence before us ; but the believers in free trade attribute all our shijoping difficulties, first, to the tariff, and second, to the protection still afforded shipbuilding. If the "protective tariff" has reduced our shipping per capita, or cut down our projsortion of carriage, either of imports or exports, it should be easy to point out the time, and give the figures in each case of its enactment or augmentation. We will, therefore, go over the tariff ground, beginning with the act of 1816. Examination of Tariff Influence. From 1816 to 1817 there w^as a loss of shipping per capita of 1.97 per cent., but a decline had been set up by the first maritime reciprocity act in 1815, so that this loss was not due to the tariff. On the other hand, there was a gain of carriage from 1816 to 1817, for imports of 8.22 per cent., and for exports of 8.89 per cent. In fact, proportionate carriage gained right along until 1826. In 1824 another and higher tariff act was passed, but this did not cheek prosperity in navigation. From 1824 to 1825 shipping per capita gained 1.53 per cent., and carriage of imports 1.89, and of exports .56 per THE QUESTION OF TARIFF LEGISLATION. 165 cent. Also, there were gains in sliipi:)ing' and in carriage in 1826. Thus the tariff of 1821 is disposed of. The next is the "high tariff of 1828," in which year, also, the final "recii)ro- city " act was passed. From 1828 to 1829 there was a loss in per capita shipping, but a gain in carriage, just as there was from 1815 to 1816, and from 1817 to 1818, on the passage of the first and second reciprocity acts. In other words, the first bad effects of these three "liberal" acts were the cutting down of tonnage, and tonnage per capita, in each case. Their ill effects upon car- riage followed at a later period. If "tariff " had any effect at all, it should be seen in the figures of carriage. From 1828 to 1829 there was a gain of 1.72 per cent, in import, and of 1.74 in export, carriage; and there was a slight gain in the pro- portionate carriage of the following year. Thus, if anything is proved, it is that the tariff acts mentioned helped, rather than hindered, the employment of our marine. And the employment of vessels is the main thing for shipowning. It is a fact, however, that the tariff of 1828 bore hardly upon the interest of shipping, as it increased for a while the cost of vessels. The statistics of shipbuilding disclose a sensible check to that industry for about two years' time, but that was chiefly, if not wholly, owing to the discouragement contained in the "reciprocity" act, and not to that in the tariff act of 1828. This is evinced by lai-ge sales of ships to foreigners in 1829 and 1830. But for this tariff, we might never have dis- covered the superiority of American over British iron for ship fastenings. The British material imported and used prior to 1828 was weak, hard, and brittle, every bolt requiring to be heated at both ends, headed and pointed in the blacksmith- shop before driving, or the heads would fly off and points refuse to clinch. It cost more, then, for a blacksmith to pre- pare bolts of English iron for driving than to buy in a few years afterward the superior American iron, that would drive and clinch much better without going into the blacksmith's fire at all. We had a similar experience with canvas. The foreign imported article was made of flax. The fabric was stiff and heavy, requiring many seamen to handle sails made from it. The tariff on imported canvas enabled American inventors to fabricate a better material for sails out of cotton than had been 166 AMERICAN MARINE. known to the world from flax; lighter, closer in texture, more lasting, and capable of handling by fewer men. So it was that the tariff conduced to excellence in shipbuilding and facility in navigation, — very good things in a practical point of view, after shipping protection had been removed. We come now to the tariff passed in 1832, reducing the rates of 1828, and taking effect by degrees in 1833, 1835, 1837, 1839, and 1841, in successive reductions of 10 per cent. According to the "liberal" theory, there should be great advantage, and much gain to American tonnage and carriage, resulting from this legislation. Here is what we find : — From 1833 to 1834 there was a gain in tonnage per capita of 10.61 per cent., and by 1835 a gain in the two years of 12.97 per cent. This looks well, but from 1835 to 1839 there was lost 20.11 per cent, of tonnage per capita; and from 1833 to 1843, when the Whig tariff displaced the Compromise, there was a loss of .58 per cent. So nothing was gained to tonnage per capita from the several ten per cent, tariff reductions of that period. Then as to carriage, which is most important : — From 1833 to 1834 there was a loss of import carriage of 1.87 per cent. From 1835 to 1836 there was a gain in import carriage of .11 per cent. ; but from 1835 to 1837 there was a loss in the two years of 4.10 per cent., and from 1833 to 1843, when the tariff of that year superseded the one in force the former year, there was a loss of import carriage of 14.99 per cent. So much for import business. From 1833 to 1834 there was a loss of export carriage of 1.45 per cent. From 1835 to 1836 there was a loss of 2.33 per cent. From 1837 to 1838 there was a gain of 6.27 per cent. From 1839 to 1840 a gain of 2 per cent. ; but from 1841 to 1842 there was a loss of 1.92 per cent. And from 1833 to 1843, during the enforcement of the tariff passed in the former year, there was a gain of 1.94 per cent. So we may sum up as follows : — LOSSES. Of per capita tonnage, 10 years . . . 0.58 per cent. Of import carriage, 10 years . . . 14.99 per cent. GAIN. Of export carriage, 10 years .... 1.94 per cent. THE QUESTION OF TARIFF LEGISLATION. 167 If these facts show anything for or against tariff reductions, it is that they are beneficial for foreign shipping, but not worth making for American. We come now to the tariff of 1842. At the time of its pas- sage the country was poor ; so poor, in fact, that our commerce per capita was only 811. 23. It had been fll.M in 1830, and •114.11 in 1833, so there was a loss of commerce per capita of 21.04 per cent, in ten years' time, from the very measure that, theoretically, was to increase our trade. It disappointed its patriotic advocates, since it hurt manufactures, run down com- merce, lessened the use of American, and increased the employ- ment of foreign shipping. The tariff of 1842 raised the rates on imports only moderately, but gi-eatly reduced the free list. Its rates were below those of duties by the tariff of 1824. Taking effect in 1843, it lasted four years, in which period the gains and losses were as follows : — GAINS. Of commerce per capita ..... 2.19 per cent. Of shipping per capita .... 1.52 per cent. LOSSES. Of import carriage ...... 1.58 per cent. Of export carriage ..... 0.13 per cent. This shows improvement upon the effects of lowering the tariff in the previous period. In fact, it shows a check to our shipping decline, whatever it was that gave it. And mark this fact, not since the repeal of the tariff legislation of 1842 has our proportion of carriage in the foreign trade been so high as it was at the time of that repeal. The figures then stood 87.1 per cent, for imports, and 76.2 per cent, for exports. In 1843 the decline of the decade ending then had been down to 77.1 for imports; and in 1844 our carriage had risen to 86.7, and stood at 70.5 for imports and exports, respectively; so that there was much improvement in the last two of the four years that the "Whig tariff" prevailed. In 1846 the Walker " tariff -for-revenue " bill was enacted. It reduced duties considerably; consequently It Increased importations and enlarged the work of ships. But, just what might be expected, foreign shipping, and not our own, reaped 168 AMERICAN MARINE. the harvest sown by Congress. In the first year we had a loss of import carriage amounting to 11.36 per cent., and of export cari-iage of 14.30 per cent, (from the proportion of carriage in 1846). In four years' time we fairly recovered these losses, but in the succeeding seven years even greater than these were suffered. By 1857, when another reduction of tariff took place, we had come down in proportion of carriage from 87.1 to 71.8 per cent, for imports; and from 76.2 to 69.2 per cent, for exports; showing losses, respectively, of 17.56 and 9.18 per cent. From 1857 to 1858 there was a gain of .27 per cent, in imports, and 7.73 in export carriage, the panic of that year forcing out cargoes in American vessels ; but this export gain was nearly all lost next year, and import carriage dropped 11.52 per cent. The export carriage of 1858 was never again equaled. In four years of the tariff of 1857 our loss of car- riage for imports was 16.43 per cent., but for exports there was a gain of 4.02 per cent., caused mainly by our mei-chants in the southern trade forcing out cargoes, principally of cotton, in preparation for the war which followed. So this gain of export carriage was not due to "tariff," but was an incident of the war, just as the like gain in 1857 was an incident of the panic of that year. It has been remarked that shipping per capita increased largely during the period of the tariff of 1846, and free-trade advocates have claimed that this fact proved their theory. As this seems to be the only fact, out of many, that bears in their favor, we will examine it. In 1846 we had a per capita ship- ping of 4.6 cubic feet (100 cubic feet making a ton). This figure had been 6 in 1826, had fallen to 4.04 in 1831, had risen to 5.32 in 1835, had fallen to 4.25 in 1839, had risen to 4.53 in 1842, had sunk to 4.36 in 1843, and had risen again to 4.6 (the average for fifteen years past) in 1846. Then shipping per capita rose steadily and evenly for nine years, until 1855 ; then it sunk as gradually for four years, steadied in the fifth, and recovered a little in the sixth, when the war broke out, after which, of course, it rapidly fell, evidently not owing to the "Morrill tariff," but to the incidents and casual- ties of the war itself. Let us now comj)are the ratios of this rise and fall. During THE QUESTION OF TARIFF LEGISLATION. 169 the nine years' rise there was an average annual gain of 5.18 per cent. During the four years' fall there was an average annual loss of 3.04 per cent., and during the six years' fall an average annual loss of 1.68 per cent. During the period from 1846 to 1861 there was only an average annual shipping per capita gain of 2.71 per cent., and in this time, as shown above, there were of losses of import carriage an annual average of 2.07 per cent., and of export carriage of .36 per cent., which more than offset the gain in tonnage. This will plainly appear, if we consider a moment what is implied by a loss of car- riage, and, especially, such great losses as have been pointed out in this discussion. What does carriage represent? Em- j)loyment. What does tonnage represent? Not necessarily employment, for it may be idleness. A loss of carriage means emploj'ment of foreign vessels, and idleness of our own. A gain of carriage denotes prosperity to the marine making it, whether our own, or foreign. A loss of tonnage, or of shipping per capita, means a loss of tools to do business with. A gain of tonnage represents a gain in tools, an increase of shipbuild- ing. When we have the tools in abundance, and fail to get work, then there is something wrong, — something that the rate of tariff cannot right. That was the case exactly in our experience from 1854 to 1858. There was a fever then for building "clippers." We increased our tools until the docks of our large seaports were full of idle vessels built for sale. We sold abroad as follows : — Tons. In 1854 (sales brisk) 60,033 In 1855 (prices fair) 65,887 In 1856 (prices falling) 42,168 In 1857 (prices low) 52,649 In 1858 (sales difficult) 26,305 In 1859 (prices lower) 30,850 In 1860 (no market) 17,418 In 1861 (" cheap ships " at forced sales) . . . 26,849 Total 321,959 All this tonnage is counted in our statistics of each respec- tive year, the same as if unsold. In 1853 we sold foreign only 10,035 tons, and that year our per capita figure was 7.5 cubic 170 AMERICAN MARINE. feet. Deducting the tonnage sold abroad in subsequent years, to the time of the war, our average shipping per capita scarcely rose above the mark of 1854, — 8.18 cubic feet. So the im- provement in transportation supposed to lie in the increase of tonnage from 1853 to 1860 is subject to a heavy discount. There was really no prosperity in it ; and could not be, while our proportionate carriage was passing into the hands of our rivals, never to be recovered by any rate of duty that is not discriminating, and consequently protective. We have now traced the ups and downs of tariff legislation from 1816 to 1861, — forty -five years, twenty of these being- more or less "protective," and twenty -five more or less for "revenue only." In the time mentioned there have been seven different principal acts passed ; f oui* of them aiming at a pro- tective policy, and three shooting the opposite way. We began to lose carriage in the foreign trade while a protective tariff was in operation, but we kept on losing, all the same, after a revenue tariff took its place, and our worst losses have happened under the lowest tariffs. Nevertheless, I cannot see that the tariff of itself, aside from the consequence of reduc- tions, has had any special effect upon our shipping. There have been other agencies so much more effective for evil that it seems idle to speculate upon the influence of the tariff, whether high or low. A full examination of the subject will leave no ground for doubt, that the capital and controlling cause of our decline in tonnage, and decay in carriage in the foreign trade, is the unequal and unfair conditions for inter- national competition, which were invited, and have been per- mitted, and are even now acquiesced in, by our government. These conditions began existence in 1815, took root and branched out in 1817, blossomed in 1824, and bore fruit in 1828 and 1830. It is to the shipping legislation of those years, with the foreign acts and treaties which followed, that we should look mainly for the sources of our losses in ocean carriage, and for' the reasons why gains made now and then in tonnage, owing to adventitious aids, have been temporary and unavailing under every rate of tariff. Manifestly, if we could not make gains in carriage, and hold on to them, during the extraordinary experience of the country, from 1846 to 1861, under the low tariff of that period; when famine in Ireland THE QUESTION OF TARIFF LEGISLATION. 171 and short crops in Europe stimulated traffic ; when the govern- ment was spending millions in a war with Mexico ; when Cali- fornia, and soon afterward Australia, became gold fields, and emigration immense; when steamship and clipper-ship building and running were wonderfully stimulated by the government mail subsidy polic}'-, and the latter by the needs of a new com- merce ; when Congress cut off subsidies and reduced that source of taxation ( ?) ; and when still other influences were at work in our favor, and against our rivals, then the charge that all our ills marine are due to a protective tariff lacks discernment, is devoid of reason, without inspiration, and quite absurd. The Tariff and Volume of Trade. But it is contended that the tariff since the war has been so high that it has restricted commerce, and thus cut down our transportation. As to this, statistics show that since the war, under the "high tariff" complained of, our volume of foreign commerce exceeds the bulk before the war, under the so-called revenue tariffs. Attention is invited to the following comparison : — COMMERCE PEK CAPITA UNDER LOW A>rD HIGH TARIFF. Low Tariff Periods. Average Eate. High Tariff Periods. Average Rate. 1846-50 1851-55 1856-60 $13.51 19.37 22.88 1866-70 1871-75 1876-80 1881-85 1886-90 $24.95 30.16 26.77 28.63 24.28 1846-60 $18.58 1866-90 $26.96 From this it appears that we have had fully 30 per cent, more commerce per capita with foreign nations since, than before the war. And the difficulty with our marine seems to be that the more commerce we have the less carriage it can obtain. In other words, it does not seem to be our commerce, but to belong to foreign flags. It is what the sage of Mon- ticello characterized as a passive, in contradistinction to an active commerce, which latter must needs be carried in Ameri- can bottoms. From a passive policy, active results never flow. And it does not appear that the "war tariff " has prevented gains in carriage on occasion. From 1866 to 1868 there was 172 AMERICAN MARINE. a gain in import carriage of 31.47 per cent. Part o£ tliis was lost in 1869, but was more than recovered in 1870. The im- port carriage of the period, 1871—75, fell off from the mark of four years preceding only 8 per cent. ; and in the period of 1876-80 following there was a gain of 2.7 per cent. In 1866, the year after the war closed, our share of import carriage was 25.1 per cent. It w^as thirteen years afterward before it sunk below this figure. That was holding on better than we did for import carriage for the same time, under the low tariff of 1846-57. We held our export carriage firmly for five years after the war, then rapidly lost it as explained elsewhere, b}-- Lloyds' hostile change of inspection rules and underwriting discriminations against wooden ships, made and applied for the end that was accomplished, our government being indifferent about it. Eight here it may be instructive to take a glance at the vol- ume of commerce in the early time, before the war of 1812 and following events reduced it to inferior dimensions, and while shipping was the best protected industry of the country. COMMERCE UNDER EARLY POLICY. Average rate Periods. per capita. 1790-1795 S15.87 1796-1800 29.24 1801-1805 28.68 1806-1810 24.08 Average for 21 years (of above time) .... $24.47 Average for 15 years (of above time) . . . 26.33 Average from 1866 to 1890 26.96 From this table, it appears that the two greater volumes of foreign commerce in our history have not resulted from free trade, but protection ; the first from protection of shipping in the early time ; and the second from protection of landed indus- tries in the later period. Finally, it may be observed, that no argument worthy of notice can be made for giving more free trade to our marine than it has had for sixty j^ears past. Its ruin has resulted from what it has had in that time. Logically, it is inconsistent for an anti-protectionist to propose any remedy at all for indus- THE QUESTION OF TARIFF LEGISLATION. 173 trial evils, for the essence of his belief is, to do nothing for anything. Protection in the tariff is a remedy for something. That is enough to call down his censure. To charge tariff protection with killing off our foreign -trade marine may be intended to accomplish two objects: first, to make the tariff unpopular; second, to hide the fact that free trade, and not protection, has the ruin of our shipping trade to answer for. But fairness never guides an ardent theorizer. From the tariff stumbling-block he may turn to "free ships." We will, there- fore, see what can be said on this subject in another chapter. CHAPTER XI. THE FREE IMPORTATION OF SHIPS. It is economic dogmatism that the cheap expels the dear, though why it should, and if exceptions exist, is never taught. Nor does economy, scientific as its votaries think it is, ever teach what makes cheapness or constitutes dearness. To do so might turn the purpose of the school, which seems to be the favoring of British factory power, with its yoke on the necks of the working poor. It is an Englishman's faith, that in his countr}^, and his alone, cheapness has its home. This idea, in great volume, is exported to the United States ; and while some of it is warehoused in our colleges, the greater part goes into present consumption through the press. It is this idea of cheapness that leads some people at first thought to favor the remedy of "free ships," when it is seri- ously jDroposed as a cure for our ills marine. That it is only a foreign trade-cry never receives consideration. Nothing was heard of it before the British became the builders of iron ship- ping and desired our market for their novel craft. Nor was the cry put in general circulation here until the late war was over, and measures for the restoration of our shipping power came to be discussed a few years afterward. This discussion was not long under way before there was a foreign interference with our marine, apparently to give an object lesson in aid of free-ship argumentation. Foreign Cooperation. In 1870, as elsewhere stated, the British Lloyds degraded wooden ships "foreign -built," refused longer to class them the same as if British-built, but gave them instead special grades only, for a year at a time, after submit- ting to expensive "special surveys " in a dry dock. The grades allowed were distinguished as 1 F, 2 F, and 3 F, meaning first, second, and third class foreign ; and therefore not to be patron- ized by British merchants or shippers, or covered by British THE FREE IMPORTATION OF SHIPS. 175 underwriters any more than trade necessitated. This change of rules practically cast our superior sailing ships out of the British Lloyd's Register, and deprived many of them of pay- ing employment as competitors of British ships, since the war had thrown our commerce largely into the hands of British merchants and their allied commission houses. This act con- tinuing for six years checked our shipping recovery and effected the substitution of British iron for American wooden sailing ships In the grain, provision, and cotton trades across the Atlantic. It also convinced certain of our shipping people that the days of the proscribed craft were numbered, not for any fault in the one case, or merit in the other, but in conse- quence of the dominance of the British shipping interest and the will of Lloyds to protect It. There were others, however, Avho saw only that Iron ships were in demand for cargoes, and wooden vessels were neglected. These began to think that Iron shipping must be built or bought, and, in short, that the logic of the situation ran for free ships. The attack of Lloyds, if noticed, was not resented by our government; our free-trade advocates appreciated the chance to lie down under It, and called loudly for relief In the shape of foreign ship depen- dence. AVhether such a cry for rescue from an Imposition comported fairly with the character of the American people may well be doubted. At any rate, the mistaken effort to help our na\agation has not yet led to the abrogation of our naviga- tion laws. T/ie Sources of Free- Ship Machination. It Is therefore In response to movements of alien forces that foreign metal ships are now advocated as a remedy for our marine marasmiis. We are to buy these vessels, first, because they are cheaper than we can build; second, because the Lloyds have waged war on wooden shipping in the Interest of iron; and third, because the ship which they favor is British-built. And It is also provided, substantially, by a bill reported for passage In the Fifty -second Congress, that, whether we can build cheaper or dearer than the British, either In wood or metal, we shall swell our marine with shipping built by them. Our ship market, now closed to foreign nations, is to be ojjened widely to all, which means mainly to Great Britain and Canada. This the British well comprehend, while our own people 176 AMERICAN MARINE. should not be ignorant of it. To continue protection to Amer- ican shipbuilding will preserve it, at least so long as the coast- ing-trade is protected, but the policy of the pure free trader looks not to preserving the one, or continuing the other, for a single day. He will tell you gravely, "England has liberated trade and transportation, in accordance with the spirit of our enlightened age." "If England builds the cheapest iron ship, then we should use none other." So, if England can get all our trade and transportation into her forceful and grasping hand, then she is the power, by survival of the fittest, to whom these great industries belong. Objections to American Shipbuilding. Keally, foreign objection lies to any American shipbuilding at all, while free- trade disapproval falls upon the protection which would build it up and watch over it. The antagonism of the one and the opposition of the other tend to the same result, and conse- quently serve the same cause, — the breaking of the bones in the right arm of American power at sea. The existence of American shipbuilding, as a protected industry, is a continual challenge of England's strength, not alone in launching ships upon the sea, but in owning and running them, since building is a strong, even an indispensable auxiliary of owning. The logic of protected sliipbuilding is protected shipowning. Eng- land wants no American interest protected, and least of all shipowning. The effort to give back protection to owners is answered by the tug to take it away from builders. If we must have ships to play with, then England wants to build them. To protect shipowning and building, and to have the skill and practice the powder of building and running our own ships, mean, by contrast, the loss of British prestige, since the consequence of our maritime independence will be to furnish and equip yards and shops, and supply the country with ship- wrights, engineers, and seamen, with a navy, too, for defense. Each ship launched will reduce British dominance, and enlarge American influence everywhere. An American -built marine, sufficient in tonnage for the commercial needs of the United States, means another Rei^ublican naval power. Such an evolution is not in British interest, and, just as truly, cannot be a product of fi-ee-trade policy, because the former is to rule the sea, and the latter is not adapted to promote THE FREE IMPORTATION OF SHIPS. Ill rivalry or to challenge that rule. So far as known, Hule America is not a free -trade maxim. ITie '"'' Free- Ship'' ^ Notion an Importation. The free-ship remedy, so called, is a foreign panacea. Two Americans, from across the sea, have claimed the honor of being the first to bring it over. One came from London and the other from Glasgow. Both wrote for the press, and one, if not both, had in view, not the healing of our ship disease, as might be sup- posed, but the sale of British iron shipping in the American market, — as soon as Congress could be induced to "reform" the navigation laws. Their object cannot be mistaken, as the time of their arrival out was two or three years before the war, when our marine, as a whole, was not seriously complaining. But the money in their enterprise has not yet been made, and this has disappointed many on both sides of the sea. On this side, American sliipbuilders, ahnost the only men who have stuck to shijjowning in the foreign trade, have been maligned and their ships run dowai. Our navigation laws, but for which we woidd never have had shipbuilding of any repute, have been assailed and their history falsified. The press, without the technical or historical knowledge necessary to adjudge the case, has been surfeited with flimsy arguments and mistaken judg- ments. Party spirit has been invoked, and political machinery applied to down the American cause, but so far in vain. Our shipyards still exist, and will not launch their last while the coasting, lake, and river navigation remains protected. It will take a sweeping bill to knock away the last suj)port. The bill in Congress undertakes this work, notwithstanding there is nothing the matter with our shipping in domestic trade. This shows the hoUowness of calling it a remedy for any ailment in the foreign trade. It is simply /)*ee-^rafZe policy, kill or cure. Our domestic marine, fully protected, has consequently flourished; while our foreign-trade shipping, stripped of pro- tection, has necessarily perished. To say the least, the pro- posed stripping of protection from shipbuilding for the domes- tic trade indicates indifference to its survival. From these facts it is plain enough that those who have excited the free- ship "reform" care just nothing at all about the "rehabilita- tion " of the American marine. They are unfriendly to it. They know very well that we cannot buy ships "cheap " and 178 AMERICAN MARINE. build them dear at the same time. If we are to buy, we are not to build. A free-ship act would therefore prove, what it is apparently intended to be, a deadly blow to shipbuilding in the United States. It is certain that such a blow to ship- building here is just the one that would be acceptable in Eng- land. Is it the least uncertain that our misguided politicians mean to give this blow? Value of our Present Shvphuild'ing Industry. It may be inquired. What will it cost to lose this trade? In other words, Is its value so much that it is worth retaining by protection? During the fiscal year of 1891 the vessels built and docu- mented were as follows : — SHIPBUILDING IN 1891. Class. Sailing vessels , Steam vessels . Barges . . , Canal boats . . Total . Number. Tonnage. 733 488 106 57 144,290 185,037 32,916 7,059 1,384 369,302 Value. $7,935,950 20,354,070 1,316,640 176,475 $29,783,135 Thus it appears the value of shipyard production is nearly $30,000,000 annually. Under a free-ship act, about three fourths of this output could be imported, and that the costliest part of it. Our present production might be cut down soon to less than $5,000,000, annually; and, erelong, to less and less, as foreigners worked into our trade. What shall we Exchange for Tonnage? Suppose it settled, that we shall import annually twenty-five millions in value of tonnage, shall we pay for it with goods, or gold? Per cent. th gold, it will take of product 76 th silver, it will take of product .... 35 th tobacco, it will take of product .... 58 th buckwheat and rye, both crops when good . . — th value of mining products exported . . . 112 th value of forest products exported ... 87 th value of tobacco products exported ... 99 th value of lard products exported .... 74 Ifw If w Ifw Ifw Ifw Ifw Ifw Ifw THE FREE IMPORTATION OF SHIPS. 179 If with value of bacon products exported .... 69 If with value of beef (canned and fresh) exported . . 101 If with value of leather products exported . . . 200 If with value of iron and steel manufactures exported . 86 If with value of cotton manufactures exported . . . 200 If with value of wheat exported ..... 49 If with value of flour exported ...... 45 It would seem from the way gold went abroad In 1891, there being $86,362,654 exported, and but $18,232,567 imported, that it is a foolish proposal, from a financial point of view, to quit building our own vessels and go to importing them, no matter in what commodity pay may be made. We are not now building half the tonnage that we should use ourselves upon the sea. Already, the best part of shipbuilding for our trade is in the hands of rivals, and we are paying annually a heavy tribute for our privation. We lost this building by staking it upon the application and fair working of a one-sided "free- trade" principle, and now the proposition is to repeat that disastrous experience as to all our output of tonnage. The consequence of such a measure may be easily shown. Foreign Possession of our Domestic Trade. The surrender of our coasting and lake trades is the inevitable result of a suc- cessful free-ship bill. With a foreign building will come a foreign owning of the vessels in our domestic as well as foreign trade. The way is easy and natural. It is the shipbuilding interest, quite as much as the shipowning, that puts tonnage afloat and pushes it into employment. Shipowning goes with shipbuilding. British shipowning is under every flag where it wants to follow sales of British tonnage. It flourishes in France under the protection of the bounty system, from the circumstance that foreign-built ships were admitted to its ben- efits, contrary to prudence. It is even now in our own country under various guises. There are corporations with American officers, whose entire stock, nearly, belongs to British corpora- tions, our law allowing the president and secretary of an American corporation, If citizens, to register vessels. This corporate ownership and registry may be extended to sail as well as steam vessels, and to fleets as well as single craft. Many single vessels are owned in Great Britain by corpora- tions. Other means of fraud on our registry laws exist. Our 180 AMERICAN MARINE. registry laws are too lax. It Is morally certain, there are ves- sels now in our domestic trade that are owned more or less by aliens, sailing under papers taken out by relatives or business partners of native or naturalized citizenship. Now, the restric- tion of registry to American-6i^i7^ vessels prevents a wholesale entrance of foreigners as owners. But, once admit foreign- built vessels to general registry, and alien ownership will come with whole fleets of craft, sail and steam. By means of bills of sale and mortgages, foreigners could safely trust, even strangers among our citizens, to cover their property for a small interest in it. Under such circumstances, and the pas- sage of a free-ship bill, prices for Canadian and British ton- nage would appreciate. Our o^vn peoj^le, having now all the tonnage they need, would have no call to buy abroad, and the consequence of the situation would be the overcrowding of our ports with tonnage, some of it idle much of the time. Freights would fall. Our coasting and lake business might be demoral- ized in a single year, and our own people could not fail to be the losers in the end, and that shortly. Before long, our citi- zens would have to give up the domestic, as they have been obliged to quit the foreign trade. An alien interest would succeed a native. A foreign, disloyal, inferior service would take the place of what is now national, advantageous, and profitable. Here it may be asked. What general good would be accom- plished for the country, by the changes which woidd surely follow the free importation of vessels? Has any good grown out of the "maritime-reciprocity" acts and treaties which have given our foreign trade into the hands of rivals and enemies? Are the statesmen of the Republic giving attention to the con- sequences of breaking up American power on the sea ? What can they substitute for that power in the day of need ? One inventive American shipbuilder, one enterprising American shipowner carrying on his business, is of greater use to the country, gives it more strength, adds more to its independence and its fame, than thousands of some other citizens. What is a free-ship proposition to the people of the United States? It is abandonment of the sea, and nothing else. There is folly in ever}^ feature of it. To quit building ships ourselves and buy from the British flag is to go under that flag I THE FREE IMPORTATION OF SHIPS. 181 on OUT ocean domain. It Is to repudiate our own banner every time a ship is launched for use in our trade. Having to go to Canada or Great Britain to see the launch of an American ship — What delusion is in the thought ! Jefferson Davis, and his compeers of secession memory, never put their hands on the American ship in the domestic trade. They cut oft' subsidies in the foreign trade; they could have passed a free-ship bill; they coidd have opened the coasting trade; but they were too American. A decent self-respect, pride in the land of their birth, in the time of bitterest politics, kept the hands of Southern statesmen off the shipyards of the North. Strange it is, that it should be left to the present time of sectional peace for pygmies to strike the blow that giants scorned to deliver. CHAPTER XII. THE UNITY OF INTEREST IN SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPOWNING. The friends of "free-ships" have sought to divide the ship- ping interest into two antagonistic parts, shipowning and ship- building, and to prejudice the country against the men who carry on the latter business. It is alleged that shipbuilding is a "protected industry," therefore a "monopoly," and responsi- ble, through high prices, for the ruin of shipowning. But as the same sophists assert that shipbuilding has been "protected to death," this doctrinal proposition cannot be true. It has been shown, Chapter V., that shipowning in the domestic trade has flourished, but in the foreign trade has perished; and, needless to say, the shipbuilders have been the same for both trades. Only one kind of owning and building has suffered, and that is found in the unprotected foreign trade. It has been shown in Chapter VII., that shipping in the foreign trade flourished along with that in domestic trade, while both kinds of tonnage had protection. In Chapters VIII. and IX. it is fully established that decline and decay of our foreign-trade marine set in, continued, and effected their work under one- sided reciprocity and inequitable free trade. Shipowners, as a body, never gave countenance to sophistical arguments of any kind for stripping protection from shipbuild- ing, because they knew what was needed was employment for tonnage, not cheap ships, but good ones, and plenty of work for them to do. American shipowners, ever since the war, have found the tonnage which they used to be altogether too cheap for profit. They have sold it freely at bargain prices, and quit buying at any price, except for the protected domestic trade. Only a few of them have ever thought they could see even a personal advantage in purchasing vessels abroad, while none have pretended that the national interest would be served by giving up the substance of shipbuilding for the shadow of ship- INTEREST IN SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPOWNING. 183 owiiiug, under present conditions of competition. Tliey all know that to strip protection from shipbuilding would bring to that trade the same scourge that has afflicted their own. In other words, that increased competition in shipbuilding, sup- posing our own to survive, could not, and would not, com- pensate for un-protected competition in shipowning. Builders as Owners. But for holding on to our shipbuild- ing, there are even stronger reasons than these, in the unity of interest naturally existing between this trade and shipown- ing. Oiu- builders have generally been owners, and many of our largest owners are even now their own builders. On in- vestigation it appears that American shipbuilders in 1890-91 represented the ownership of 1G8,186 tons of sail shipping. There were 182 vessels, average size of 924 tons, with none above twenty-eight years of age, and the gTeater nimiber under ten years. Of the whole number, 155 of 151,926 tons, average size of 924 tons, hold class in the "Record," or the "Veritas," and are fit for voyages around the Capes. AVith regard to ownership in steam vessels, it is not easy to determine the in- terest held by builders, but it is believed to be considerable. As the Lloyd's Register Book, from which the foregoing facts are derived, credits the United States with 1,306,488 tons of sea-going sailing vessels, it woidd appear that the proportion of this tonnage held by its builders is about one eighth. Owning Follows Building. Here is a simple fact that proves the harmony of owning and building. The sinews of shipowning are centred to-day in the city of Bath, in the State of Maine, where shipbuilding has found its deepest rooting and the surest footing in the United States. Once the blows of the shipwright sounded full and forceful in the South. In 1789 Charleston and Baltimore led the trade in petitioning Congress for navigation laws. Norfolk had early distinction, especially for pilot-boat building. Virginians then took pride both in building and owning. Washington himself built a vessel at Alexandria. Baltimore first built "clippers" of world-wide renown; and once led New York in ownership of sea-going craft. Savannah sent forth the first steam vessel to cross the Atlantic. Indeed, in the early history of this country there was quite a time during which the commerce of Charleston, South Carolina, equaled that of all the New England ports 184 AMERICAN MARINE. together. Then sliipbuilding floiirisliecl in tlie sunny city. An evil day came, however. A better knowledge of the Gulf Stream, and consequently of safer sailing to and from North- ern harbors in the winter season, turned the course of commerce from South to North. This increased New England shipbuild- ing, raised wages, and drew off Southern builders and their mechanics to the free States. Note this : While shipbuilding tarried in the South, much of the best shipping of the Union hailed from our Southern ports. Vessels and shipyards departed in company. The passion for owning died with the ardor for building. Where shipbuilding did not stay, owning has not remained. W^here shipowning did not bide, building has not continued, but both moved to better ground. This is ever the way with these trades, as may be demonstrated from the history of shipbuilding and owning in Great Britain. The time was when these trades centred in London. Of late, however, the metropolis has lost her ship- yards, and her ownership has ceased to keep pace with her commerce, showing that shipbuilders are better than merchants to maintain a marine. The following table will prove this proposition : — VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AND THE NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF VESSELS BELONGING TO DIFFERENT PORTS OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE TEAR 1889. Name of Port. Commerce. Vessels belonging to Imports. Exports. each Port. London Liverpool Glasgow Tyne Ports Hartlepool Sunderland Greenock Hull £ 144,711,517 111,152,007 12,683,064 38,617 1.997,299 714,421 3,879,804 26,2&5,229 £ 48,251,282 102,513,722 14,880,389 1,003,799 734,199 271,798 16,768,144 No. 2,577 2,313 1,549 825 290 309 326 835 Tons. 1,327,726 1,881,862 1,224,002 399,206 279,854 242,471 231,900 220,923 When shipbuilding left London it made its way to Liverpool, and later to Glasgow, where it now overshadows all other ports, having built up a great city with shipownership nearly equal INTEREST IN SHIPBUILDING AND SHIP OWNING. 185 to London, but only 14 per cent, as much commerce. The Tyne Ports, Hartlepool, and Sunderland, like Glasgow, are great shipbuilding points, with but little commerce, but great ownership of vessels. If Greenock be included, the foiu* places would doubtless this year equal London in owning tonnage, notwithstanding its greatness in trade, and their lack of it. Shipowning accompanies shipbuilding for a very simple rea- son. Builders are always becoming owners. One vessel is no sooner launched than another must be begun, or its builder will see his workmen scatter and his business cease. Either with his own or other capital, a builder must keep his yard agoing. But for builders, owners would be much less in num- ber in every country. Vessels are often built and owned as railroads are, by shares, sometimes whole communities taking stock until a market is found, perhaps years afterward. Thus it is that the tonnage of a shipbuilding town, city, or country is always as large as business will permit, while the communi- ties or nations who do not build, but buy their vessels, are cer- tain to fall behind. The idea that shipbuilding survives by the favor of capital- ists, or even of shipowners as a class, is a mistake. The first man necessary to the creation of a marine is not a shipowner, but a builder. Any one with money can become an owner; but it takes a mechanic to plan and build, and increase the business of owning. Where capitalists may originate one scheme in shipowning, practical builders launch ten. Ship- masters stand before capitalists, and next after builders, in the promotion of shipowning. It is generally the case that capital- ists proper are drawn into shipowning by builders or masters, especially in dull times. From 1845 to 1870 Mr. William H. Webb was the foremost shipbuilder of New York, and, indeed, of the country. He launched in aU about 150 vessels, many of the largest size, on one occasion three at once, and owned shares in nearly fifty sail at one time. He was then the lead- ing shipowner of New York, but he might never have owned a timber-head in a ship had he not come up as a builder and constructed his own vessels. One of these is on class to-day, at the age of forty-six years. The principal builders in all our ports have had a similar experience. The only shipowners who have increased their sail tonnage in the foreign trade, for the 186 AMERICAN MARINE. last dozen years, are a few shipbuilders in Maine. Hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping, in shares, once belonged to American shipbuilders, and engaged in the trade of the world. It follows, then, from the closeness of connection, that protec- tion to shipbuilding has been, practically, protection to ship- owning, and especially so for the country at large. It results, also, that the incitement of discord and strife between these great interests is calculated to injure them both, and to make for the advantage of foreign nations. CHAPTER XIII. TRUE ECONOMY IN SHIPOWNING. It is perfection, and not cheapness, that characterizes the economic ship. American shipowners are, mostly, practical men. They know weU that where cheapness rules in mechan- ism, parsimony, and not economy, is indicated. They have been trained to appreciating ships for their qualities, and not lowness in price. They have sought improvements in strength, safety, durability, and speed, and cared less for bargains than for excellence. Under the call of their intelligence, our ship- builders have led the world for a hundred years in the models, the rigs, and the machinery for propelling and working ships. While they have studied improvements, especially in respect to wooden ships, price has never put a balk in their path. Our shipowners, as a class, well understand the fitness and advan- tage of having ships built and repaired at home, where they know the service is better than abroad. Here they can get their money's worth, and credit if they need it; while the employment given confers a benefit on their fellow-citizens, adds to the wealth and increases the power of the republic, and, last but not least, gratifies their own good sense of national duty. The eternal fitness of things has seemed to indicate the inde- pendence of the United States in the building of shipping. We are thousands of miles distant from the great shipyards of Europe, with no interest in navigation and commerce that is not antagonized there. It is, therefore, peculiarly proper to depend on ourselves for ships and for a system of building, adapted to our wants, that shall be our own. We must have ships and commerce of our own. Maritime nations without shipbuilders are nations without ships and without trade of their own. Shipbuilding nations are shipowning nations. Half the ships on the sea to-day belong to that aspiring people 188 AMERICAN MARINE. who want to build and own the shipping of the world, and bid fair to do so. To lose our shipbuilding is to lose our shipown- ing, and this, again, is to let our commerce slip out of our own into foreign hands, as our unsuccessful owners have learned from sad experience. What they want is emplojTnent again in our own trade, for ships built to order at home ; and not for- eign ships built "cheap" for foreigners, with no protection to their use when obtained. As for "iron" ships, there is nothing in the name. It has been British policy for forty j^ears to overrate their merit, because the British ship must be iron-built ; and to underrate the worth of wooden vessels, because our rival tonnage, sail especially, may be advantageously built of wood. To the British nation, the relative merits of wood and iron for all kinds of shipping is not of moment. Of necessity, it must stick to iron and steel. The case is dirferent with the United States. We produce abundantly both wood and iron, and are able to choose from home materials the very best for every ser- vice. Thus it is, we are free to practice true economy, which is this : — In the ratio that materials are costly, perfect the workman- ship and increase the durability. In proportion as wages are high, invent and apply labor-saving machinery. Building thus, our vessels of wood or iron, in the future as in the past, will have no superiors on the sea. Enemies they will always have, however, because certain classes of our own people take no pride in anything that is made at home. To them the cry of "cheap ships" contains a weighty argvmaent for foreign ships, and consequent foreign dependence. As for the merits of cheap ships, parsimony, and not econ- omy, has made the British iron ship a bargain. At the first, vessels iron -built were much more costly than of wood; and iron builders in England, after 1850, had to compete with wooden all over the world. Then, such iron builders as neces- sarily bought materials had to compete with those who pro- duced their own. These conditions induced a pressure on Lloyd's Committee to cut down requirements for strength to the lowest limit sup]iosed to be safe. Satisfaction reigned but a short time. In 18G2 the interest in iron-making, now firmly welded to the interest in iron-building, took steps for the TRUE ECONOMY IX SHIPOWNING. 189 establishment of an opposition register at Liverpool, to be called the "Underwriters'," and to be confined to the inspec- tion and classification of iron shipping. The sentiment of England sustained this unwise course, in order to cheapen the British ship. While the London Lloyd's Register was rating first-class iron ships A 1 for twelve years, the Liverpool Ked Book, after reducing scantlings and weights, rated them A 1 for twenty years. This movement greatly encouraged the building of iron tonnage, though it broke the backs of unwary underwriters by the score. In the history of iron shipbuilding cheapness was not always the makeshift for merit. In the infancy of the art, when it cost a half or third more to build iron than wooden ships in England, the advocates of the new industry, having an eye to safety and true economy, gave out that "vessels built of iron would last twice as long as those of wood." In this proposi- tion was a recognition of the true economy of shipowning. There was no experience to prove the difference claimed for durability, but its truth was gi'uerally accepted as a matter of faith, the more readily, perhaps, that it justified a preference for a new material, which was then England's own. Since that time, more than fifty years ago, experience has demon- strated that durable iron or steel vessels are still costly, even in England. In other words, that cheaiiness is merely dis- counted durability. The average British-built iron or steel ship, as she sails to-day, has not the durability of the British or American built wooden vessel which she has dis])laced. This fact answers much that has been advanced in her favor. The Test of Economic Building. It may be inferred from what has been advanced that cheapness in price is no test at all of economic building, but that durabilit}^ cuts, at least, an equal figure. This being the case, the conclusion of mere economists, that iron vessels have become "the principal vehi- cles of commerce on account of their cheapness," if true, con- tains much error as a doctrine to be taught. The real problem is not hard of comprehension. The only difficidty is in our ignorance of the time for which vessels of all kinds endure. Much as has been said by the advocates of iron, and the detractors of wooden slvips, not one has had the spirit of inves- tigation or the fairness to find and declare the truth about 190 AMERICAN MARINE. endurance. With this knowledge gained, fair comparisons may be made, as it will only be needful, then, to reduce the cost per ton to the cost per ton per year. For example, if a vessel of a certain build, costing forty dollars per ton, will last for use twenty years, then, manifestly, her cost per ton per year is two dollars. Another kind of vessel costing sixty dol- lars per ton would have to endure for thirty years, to have an ecpial yearly cost per ton. Thus we get a first view of the problem to be solved. We will now go a step farther. It is known that all vessels sooner or later repay their cost with interest, if any profit is to be derived from their use while they last, and that their durance or sea-life, on the average, is brief at the best. Some twenty years or more ago, it was given out that the Treasury Department had computed that the average lifetime of Ameri- can vessels of all kinds, ocean, lake, river, and canal, jumbled together, was only fourteen years. This unscientific result had no value whatever. It was incorrect and misleading, especially for lake and ocean vessels. For the wooden ship- ping of the Great Lakes, the author has never found a lower average term of life, in the fleets lost annually, than eighteen years. Statistics of the Bureau Veritas, relating to annual losses of inspected and classed sea-going American vessels, gives 2.75 per cent, as the proportion lost last year (1891). This is less than for any nation but the Swedish, and imports a sea-life of thirty-six years for the class of vessel described. But sea-life is one thing, and duration is another and quite different thing. The former is determined, in a large degree, by the accidents arising from the perils of the sea, — from causes over which man has no control, save in the qualities of seaworthiness, which his skill may incorporate in building, — while the latter is dependent upon the kind and quality of materials and workmanship, together with careful use. A wise economy builds vessels in view of their durability, and not of their probable term of life ; though it would be foolish to undertake the building of everlasting vessels. On the other hand, it is manifest that vessels built in view of brevity or short duration should be cheaply built, like the flat-boats of the Mississippi. It may be conceded, also, that shipping in very profitable use, like the early steamboats of the Western TRUE ECONOMY IN SHIPOWNING. 191 rivers, need not be built so durable as others in poorly paying trades; say, the boats of the present time. But it should be observed that the best-built vessels have practical advantages over the poorer and cheaper-built, in all trades at all times. In comparing different builds of vessels, to ascertain their economic differences, what we need to know is, the i^rofit-time remaining after the first cost has been repaid with interest. For example, four, six, eight, or even ten years of a ship's survival-time may have to be deducted, to find the profit-time, which is to be compared. Assuming that the vessel described above as costing forty dollars per ton, and lasting twenty years, discharges her indebtedness to owners in four years, then she has before her sixteen years of profit-time, and her cost distri- buted over this term would be 82.50 per ton per year. The other vessel described as costing sixty dollars per ton, lasting thirty years, and returning her cost in the proportionate time of six years, would have twenty-four years of profit-time, and her cost per ton per year would be the same sum of two dollars per year of lifetime, or 82.50 per year of profit-time; and simi- larly for other periods of time for repayment of cost and profit, as will appear from the following table : — COMPARATIVE COST AND DURABILITY. Original Cost per Ton. Forty dollars Fifty dollars Sixty dollars Term of Years. Cost pei Ton per \ ear. For Life For Re- For Of Life- Of Profit- payment. Profit. time. time. 4 16 $2.00 $2.50 6 14 2.00 2.85 20 \ 8 12 2.00 3..33 10 10 2.00 4.00 12 8 2.00 5.00 ' 20 2.00 2.50 7.5 17.5 2.00 2.85 25 \ 10 15 2.00 3.33 12.5 12.5 2.00 4.00 15 10 2.00 5.00 6 24 2.00 2.50 9 21 2.00 2.85 30 \ 12 18 2.00 3.33 15 15 2.00 4.00 18 12 2.00 5.00 From this we learn, cost and terms of years being propor- 192 AMERICAN MARINE. tionate, that cost per ton per year of lifetime is the same, but cost per ton per year of profit-time differs greatly. As profit- time contains the real value of vessels, an owner's interest lies in having it as great as possible. In this view, the fact of most importance to him is a speedy repayment of cost. In other words, there is urgency in the employment of vessels, but not in their cost, where that is proportionate to durability. No difference in economy appears in favor of cheap, or against durable vessels. But the running of superior ships alongside of inferior ones, where fair play obtains, always develops a difference, and reveals advantages. This fact accounts for the British claiming superiority for their iron ships, precisely as they once did for wooden ones of their own building. ^ What is true is this: Strong, durable vessels need less annual and periodical repairs, insure equitably at lower rates, command justly higher freights, get generally quicker dispatch in ports, make better voyages and more money in a given time. There- fore, the foregoing table needs modification in favor of the really higher classes of vessels; that is to say, they are worth more for use than they cost, in proportion to the price of cheaply built. In the ship market, however, the modification is made the other way, and for the reason that the cost of building does not increase in proportion to durability and merit, as supposed in the table. Hence, intelligent ship- owners, and those who are also building for their own use, always build the best, i. e., the diirahle and not the "cheap" ship. It may be seen from what has been said, that they have a double inducement to do so. Also, it should be stated in this connection that workmen, accustomed to doing a perfect job, cannot so slight their work as to build "cheap" ships cheaply^ but such vessels must have their materials knocked together by a rough class of lumpers. To illustrate further, the following table is submitted : — 1 It also accounts for the Lloyds' depreciation of wooden (American) vessels, and the different discriminations of British underwriters in favor of vessels flying the " Union Jack." TRUE ECONOMY IN SHIPOWNING. 193 PRICES OF WOODEN SHIPS IN" LIVERPOOL, 1869, A 1, WITH EAST IXDIA OUTFIT AND YELLOW METALED. Class of Vessel. Al. Fourteen years .... Thirteen years .... Twelve years Eleven years Ten years Nine years Eight years . . . . . Seven years Approximate Average Price Class Time. per Ton. Years. £ s. d. 36 15 7 33 14 6 30 13 5 27 12 5 25 11 6 22 10 7 20 9 15 18 9 It is plain from tliis table that, instead of vessels doubling in price by reason of being doubled in durability, about 60 per cent. Is added, and in that proportion. So, from this source, there is 40 per cent, of inducement to purchasing durable ves- sels, to which may be added as much more attraction on account of the running advantages mentioned. And, besides these, the durable ship will have, at least, a half more time than the tran- sient, in the grades below Al. Thus, to owners of every kind, cheap ships are not the economic or the best ships, but these are the perfect, the durable, and the costlier ships wher- ever built. And thus it is, the cheap-ship notion that has had so much attraction for the inexperienced and uneducated on the subject has fallen flat on the shipowning mind of the United States. Bright and experienced owners, able to buy or build good ships, never invest in poor ones, but always sell such as have become inferior, and have consequently lost their practi- cal value. Persons in want of cheap vessels have no need to get them built, for as time elapses all that have been built become cheap and worthless. We propose next to investigate the durability of vessels. CHAPTER XIV. DURABILITY OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN BUILT SHIPPING. To reach a knowledge of the durability of the different kinds of vessels, three ways may be taken. First, the endurance, or average age at which ships are quite worn out may be ascer- tained. It may be objected to this, that comparatively few of the whole number of a given fleet will ever be "condemned," "dismantled," or "broken up." The greater number will be lost at sea, or wrecked on reef or shore, before becoming unfit for use, many of them in their prime, and others when almost new. Then the ages of craft fairly worn out have never been carefully recorded, at least in the United States. Second, we may arrive at the average lifetime or longevity of different fleets; but as this would include "wrecked," "lost," or "abandoned " and "missing," as well as condemned, dismantled, and broken-up vessels, the results found might, and doubtless would, be unsatisfactory. And then the annual losses are only a small fraction of the shipping preserved. The third and best way to solve the problem seems to be to determine the survival or continuance of vessels beyond certain ages. By this course we would deal with whole fleets instead of fractions, thus getting the use of more reliable quantities and numbers. We shall, however, try all the ways mentioned. Our object in this investigation is to compare the merits of British and American shij)building, and to discover, if we can, whether they are British or American shipowners who are supplied with the more economical tonnage. In other words, whether they are British or American shipbuilders who need to make improvements on their average practice. The friends of "free" ships should admit that we ought not to go abroad for ships, except to get more economic bottoms than are built at home. Our inquiry will extend to and include all vessels but those of the Lakes, built under the respective flags, no matter where they may happen to be owned now. DURABILITY OF SHIPPING. 195 LloijiVs Register for Authority. We shall use Lloyd's Register as authority for facts and figures; for one reason, because, besides our own, we are to deal with British-built shipping; and for another, because this work is generally accepted as a standard one throughout the world. The edition used will be the book for 1890-91. We are not entirely sure that Lloyd's is as accurate as the Veritas Repertoire General, a work that has been longer in the field as a reference book of the shipping of the world; but the advocates of the cheaply built British ship would no doubt prefer to learu from Lloyd's. Beginning with the first way of getting knowledge on the subject, the following table shows the endurance, or average age at which British and American vessels, respectively, were irorn out, during the two or three years preceding publication of the book for 1890-91. ENDURANCE OF SAIL VESSELS ABOVE 100 TONS. Kinds of Vessel. Wood Average age of all (07) (4:j) Iron Manner of Ex- tinction. Condemned. Broken up. Dismantled. Condemned, liroken up. Dismantled. Average Age. British. Years. 23.00 32.92 32.36 30.19 No American. Years. 36.20 38.93 34.75 36.28 None worn out. ENDUKANCE OF STEAM VESSELS ABOVE 100 TONS. Years. Years. Wood! Average age of all (8) . Iron Average age of all (19) Condemned. Broken up. Dismantled. Condemned. Broken up. Dismantled. No cases given. 25.50 22.50 28.71 25.15 27.00 29.00 2G.50 28.12 None worn out. It would seem from this table, first, that American worn-out sailers of wood exceed the British in age, and, consequently, have greater durability, on the average, by 20 per cent. ; sec- ^ Composite vessels not included. 196 AMERICAN MARINE. ond, what may excite the wonder of the inexpert, that Ameri- can wood steamers outlast British iron, and exceed them in durability by 12 per cent. We have only three iron sailing vessels, and of course none are worn out. The British have a fleet of 1,954 in number, and it looks singular that no record is made of any being " con- demned," "broken up," or "dismantled" within a year or two j)ast. That some such cases exist is beyond a doubt, it being a common thing for owners to send unseaworthy iron vessels, sail as well as steam, to the "breaker's yard." The omission of worn-out sail in the Register may arise from imperfect com- pilation, though it is more likely to be intentional, a part of the policy prevailing to shield iron vessels from a loss of repu- tation, taking care, however, to let no wooden craft escape the record. But notwithstanding the neglect of Lloyd's, indica- tions exist to show that the "condemned, broken-up, and dis- mantled " iron sail, if its average age was obtained, would show inferiority, not only to American, but British wood as well. One of the best of these indications is found in the table for iron steam, which is 30 per cent, inferior to American (wood) sail. Respecting British wood steam, the whole fleet numbers only 198, and the Lloyd's may be correct in giving no worn- out cases in it. If it be objected that American shipping appears to outlast British, but does not, because the latter keep their vessels running imtil they are lost at sea, the next thing in order is to investigate the longevity of craft, whose end comes on the ocean in place of in port. While the following table supplies this desideratum, it gives only a slight support to the position noted, in the case of wood, while iron is left a long way be- hind. DURABILITY OF SHIPPING. LONGEVITY OF SAIL VESSELS ABOVE 100 TONS. 197 Average Age. Kinds of Vessel. Manner of Ex- tinction. British. American. Years. Years. ■ Dismantled. 32.36 34.75 Condemned. 23.00 36.20 Broken up. 32.92 38.93 Missing. 19.56 18.27 Wood Abandoned. 21.46 21.17 Foundered. 18.33 27.00 Sunk. 19.80 22.00 Lost. 25.39 23.12 Wrecked. 18,51 19.01 Average life of aU (213) (215) . 2.3.T2 2.3.62 Dismantled. No None Condemned. cases vs'orn Broken up. given. out, Missing. 13.00 and Iron .......... Abandoned. Foundered. 15.00 none have Sunk. 4.00 been Lost. 23.71 lost. Wrecked. 1<;.82 — Average life of all (39) . . . 15.74 This table is interesting. First, we have an illustration of the even occurrence of fatalities and the consequent reliability of wooden sailing- vessels as they liJtrve been built in the recent past. The British fleet, out of which 213 gave up existence, numbered 3,453; and the American fleet numbered 3,458, with a loss of 215. Second, the great difference in favor of American durability by the preceding table is not paralleled in this one of longevity, where the British is four tenths of one per cent, above par. That this trifling superiority obtains is due, no doubt, to the fact that the perils of navigation are somewhat greater for American than British vessels. Excluding from the comparison worn-out vessels, which end their days in port, the British wooden sailer exceeds the Amer- ican in sea-Ufe 1.5 per cent., but British iron sailers fall behind American fifteen times as much. PROPER SEA-LIFE OF SAILERS. Years. British wood 20.76 American wood ........ 20.45 British iron 15.74 198 AMERICAN MARINE. As between the wooden fleets honors, if not easy, are very near it, but the British iron is beaten by the British wood, 31.89 per cent., and by the American wood, 29.93 percent. Consequently, it begins to look as though the vaunted iron sailer is far too cheaply built. LONGEVITY OF STEAMERS ABOVE 100 TONS. Kinds of Vessel. Woodi Average life of all (2) (13) Iron Average life of all (98) (3) Manner of Ex- tinction. Dismantled. Condemned. Broken up. Missing. Abandoned. Foundered. Sunk. Lost. Wrecked. Dismantled. Condemned. Broken up. Missing. Abandoned. Foundered. Sunk. Lost. Wrecked. Average Age. British. Years. 20.00 28.71 25.50 22.50 17.00 14.20 11. .50 20.8;^ 11.33 12.48 15.79 American. Years. 2(3.50 27.00 29.00 17.00 21.75 25.30 8.50 16.00 The showing in this report of British wood and American iron steamers lost may be neglected, as there are only two of the former and but three of the latter, and for induction all too few. The low average lifetime of British iron steam, 15.79 years, is almost identical with that for British iron sail, which was 15.74. The greater longevity of American wood than British iron steam, shown to be 60 per cent., is not due altogfether to the fact that none of the former, but several of the latter were "missing," "abandoned," "foundered," or "sunk." The British steamers becoming extinct in this way numbered 32, or one third of the whole, with average age of 15.56 years. ^ Composite vessels not included. DURABILITY OF SHIPPING. 199 Excluding worn-out vessels, sea-life for sail and steam, so far as appears, may be stated as follows : — PKOPER SEA-LIFE OF SAILERS AND STEAMERS. Years. British wood sail ........ 20.76 American wood sail . . . . ... . 20.45 British iron sail ........ 15.74 American iron sail (none lost) ..... — British wood steam (2 only) ... ... — American wood steam ...... 25.30 British iron steam ........ 13.43 American iron steam (3 only) ..... — And we found the worn-out fleets had longevity as fol- lows : — LONGEVITY OF WORN-OUT FLEETS. Years. British wood sail ........ 30.19 American wood sail ....... 36.28 British iron sail (no cases given) ..... — American iron sail (none worn out) .... — British wood steam (no cases given) .... — American wood steam ...... 28.12 British iron steam ........ 25.15 American iron steam (none worn out) ... — Plainly, these figures show nothing for Americans to be ashamed of, nor give awj evidence of the alleged superiority of British shipbuilding and navigation. But there will be fuller statistics given as conclusive proof of American superiority, and these we shall next present; meanwhile, the coming com- parison has cast its shadow before. The Ratio of Life to Enduranee. Some interesting facts may be noticed here. Taking the British and American wood sail together, the term of sea-life is found to be about 62 per cent, of that of the time of endurance ; but British iron steam has a proportion of only 53.4 per cent. For British iron sail, as we have seen, full data is not at hand, but the proportion is probably not above 55 per cent. These findings cannot be far from the mark, both absolutely and relatively. While they prove that the wooden sailing ship of the United States is entitled to the greater confidence, which is bestowed by sea- men, they also show how large is the margin for improvement in the seaworthiness and safe navigation of all kinds of ves- 200 AMERICAN MARINE. sels, but particularly those of British metal cheaply built. The London Lloyds had much better be employed in raising the low character of British iron shipping than in contriving to starve out and run off the sea the safer tonnage of the United States. Such of our own people as have aided and abetted their course owe it to conscience and to duty to hold in honor hereafter the tall mastheads flying their country's flag. Comijarative Survival of British and American huilt Wood and Iron Vessels. The national fleets with which we are now to deal comprise much the greater portion of the shipping of the world. They are the largest that have been built by any two nations, and should afford averages of sufficient number and quantity to indicate truly the comparative merits of their construction. They include all vessels, British and Ameri- can built, of the different kinds and classes, except composite, above 100 tons (net for sail and gross for steam vessels), found in Lloyd's Eegister for 1890-91. It will be seen from the tables numbered I., II., III., IV., and v., which accompany this text, that each distinctive fleet of steam and sail, wood and iron, is principally composed of vessels known as "classed" and "unclassed;" but in most eases there is also a small fleet of "class expired." These divisions or subdivisions are treated separately, and then com- bined as one. Then the steam and sail, wood and iron vessels having been handled separately for the two flags, all the fleets of each are combined as one. Thus wise is shown, in specialty and generality, the comparative merits of the shipbuilding carried on by Great Britain and the United States. The com- parisons made may relate to any two kinds or classes of vessel, of either or both nations. It will be observed that the columns of the tables first give the age, number, and tons ; and tables II., IV., and V. give the percentage of number and tons, for the whole of any fleet or division ; and then at stages of ten years and upward, fifteen years and upward, and so on, in five-year steps to thirty -five years and upward of age. Also, that the numbers, tonnages, and the average of the same are given for each of the divisions composing a fleet, as well as for the fleet entire. Referring especially to Table I., it will be seen that the different fleets, in the order of average age, take precedence as follows : — 202 AMERICAN MARINE, AVERAGE AGES OF EXISTING FLEETS. Years. American iron sail ....... 6.66 American iron steam ....... 10.79 British iron steam ........ 11.67 British iron sail ....... 14.20 American wood steam ....... 16.40 American wood sail ....... 19.26 British wood steam ....... 20.24 British wood sail 22.69 From this statement it is easily seen that the wooden fleets are much older than the iron, and the oldest of the iron is Brit- ish-built. While the comparison here is valuable, as reflecting shipbuilding history, there would be something more in it if all other things were equal. The comimrative durability of fleets may be indicated by their average ages ; for the shorter or longer the duration of vessels, the greater or lesser number of newly built would be included in the calculation. But other things are not quite equal in any two of the above fleets. The British have nearly ceased building wood, steam and sail ; and though we have built considerable iron steam, we have scarcely begun to build iron sail, hence comes much of the difference in the ages of these particular fleets. The only approximately fair comparison is between British iron and American wood sail, as these fleets are in course of maintenance by constant new building, the only difference being that British iron is increasing faster than American wood sail. But as shown in the table, 14.20 years against 19. 2G, the American sail vessel (wood) does not have to be replaced so quickly as the British (iron) by 35 per cent. It may interest underwriters to note, as between the classed and unclassed divisions, that, excepting in a single instance, — British iron sail, — the unclassed have the greater average ages, and, without exception, the greater survival at ages above ten years. This has the look of there being much less virtue in vessel inspection and classification than is commonly supposed. The greatest lack of Lloyd's or other classification is in Brit- ish iron steamers, in which division the unclassed is about 37 per cent, of the whole number, and seem to be much the best constructed and navigated. (Table II.) Some of the large 3 o o o o d S o s a a a r.' £. £. g. P. P, a> i^s i:! ~. ^ 2 oooo ooo 22 OOOO Ooo PS Od C^ D« a< Cu CL ^ 00 £0 S llllfcslllg 11 o o o o CbCJ ^ :^^: — ? H S '^ f^ ^ ^ ? ecu O) CD s; S » C"p S3 » i- c £,a CD hitO ►- ►-►- W I— ►- "Ik en 00 tt. oo'ct O CI O OO -J ^ — =-■' = 5 ; CD o^^ ^ c:; ►^ CO -) iT *. — w _* jr. jw iT -J ^ X p W -I VI i* -1 IC CO •*- -1 c r. 1 i o o -^ 3 2gig tC tC tC h3 to tC to ci _e c; p 4- c- p H- -1 ^ o ^ b bo o ^ *• o o CO -J -4 C-. to Average Age. -1 m CT p to CO ^^ to fU O CO S OT io CO -x ^J .^ X CI -^ 1— o o to ■♦• o 8S cox «£"-0 Oii;XCT C5C3 o*.co tnCOC". CJ .-loto »*k coco COXi*^ CtCitO — c-p p^pop wpp oscoc;! ' '"' "r; W CO CO C5 ►-• to ^ C-. ►- CO *- O *. to I-" 00 CO 00 O'-'io CO CO c; C5 to i6 ■JiOOi-' CO *. (X X en C-. -1 to ~ " Cs (^ CO --1 *.^ gSgg > o ^ »$..-^ ?o *^s- to to to to lO p CO p 00 CO >-> C5 b — CO -1 00 o to hS to (O to to to to to to to to to to i-> to -^lOXCO Ci"JCO tObliUi^ tOt3.t- ^ 1-J b O M i*i- I— o is ^ to bl *- p ox — IE to C3 J-^ to to to to to to en CT CO p p en to to op CO X C5 Average Age. >-• S 5 P CO to CO to O '— w -o -4 -1 -1 CJT >— -< X p ►f.. -3 bt 4k *--a to o 538 to to -• CI -- C5 -1 bgx b ►-^ coo p to CO OtO CO 00 $• 00 *.^1 CI -J CS X CI CO — pp» o CO b ct o CI -J CO rfk --1 CO to CI 4k »-* 1 CO CO *. CT ; to to "^ X CO O -1 CI o o to O CO CO c: g!o £823S w to CO to O X ►--! CI b b ^ i^iSg -^ 4k 00 1^ CO O CI l^-4CO tOi^^'Cl COC5-J: to to to to to to to -1 to 7-1 4k 00 CO 00 Average 4k to 00 to t o p 5-5 ! CO ►- b io t o -J 5>->c — <-'0^0 b CO 30 4^ CO b lu C CO 4^ to O >^ O CO p p_ 4k b b c >- 5 — c 4k 4k to 4k 4k • X o to to -J Olio p CO p X 4- Ct to •"• — b oooo cici bb CO CI to 4- to 4k l.]li b b b^ O 4- -1 -1 4- 5: b to 4k X CO CI X O I— to 4k CO CO CO CSci 4k gg! CO U CO CI b b Oi o to CO CO CO to lO CO Ci CI o to to o ?o Average Age. **)« to k- r: — k-* a CI o X ) CO ■-• . ci to ; Cl ik to — -4 o to to •-' coco p ^ CO >-• CI to ^ bo CO b 4k bo C5Ci CO O tO-1 CO to 4^ •-* to CO ■-* O Cl 4- O -J O X X O O --J k- X ^ CO-Ck pip, CO bo b ?o lo WWWW CO CO CO CO CO CO CO cm -^ n O ^ 00 CT *- w1 03 bi O tC —' o Ibl — »- 30 kJ O C5 OXOO CO CO CO CO CO coco CO O CT O CT to o Average Age. C5 X O to k-k-COtO OOO OOXIO l-k 4k CI p b to b *- k." O 'xtox ox-j ook-*-j k.i CO CO O C2 CT k." to X I O -J s s 4k CO 4k t^ 4k ^ t^ CO CO CO CO CO CO k) o r-. -) CO X to kk o to o Average Age. » X I O 4k O -k CO to p p 4k ^ "— b k-» bo b CO -^ kk -3 00 k- to O 00 4k CO k- 1.^ ..^ O-JO XOOICO k- ct> " - CO k--^ 1 ri c;i k^ OOX-J C5IC0CICO 4.tO O O CI kk C-. k- -4 Ci o .fc to p c"; 03 CICJIC CI 4k CI CI c;i k- k- c Oldest Vessel in Years. 204 AMERICAN MARINE. corporations, owning many steamers, depend altogether upon their own inspectors, in building and repairing. In British iron sailers the unclassed division is very small, — only 1.19 per cent. , — but its superiority in survival is manifest. These facts indicate, plainly, that the average British shipowner has had too much influence in Lloyd's inspection and classification. The average ages of the fleets with class "expired" rather exceeds the sea-lifetime, but falls short of the longevity of worn-out fleets, for same kinds of vessel, as appears below : — CLASS EXPIRED. British-built iron steamers British-built wood steamers (none) American-built iron steamers . American-built wood steamers (none) . British-built wood sail . . . , British-built iron sail .... American-built wood sail (none) Ameiican-buUt iron sail (none) . Years. 17.34 19.07 20.77 26.00 These divisions or sub -fleets may be thought too small for just inductions, because they may not represent fairly the aver- age vessel of the fleets to which they belong. As might be expected, the oldest vessels of the different fleets are unclassed, it being generally the case that vessels are run, some of them, several years after they cease to bear inspection for class. The following table shows the ages of the oldest on class, and of fleet, for the eight different fleets analyzed : — EXTREME SURVIVAL, VESSELS ABOVE 100 TONS. Kinds of Vessel. Oldest on Class. Oldest of Fleet. American iron sail (3 in all) American iron steam Years. 7 24 35 37 38 39 71 75 Years. 7 45 British wood steam 65 British iron steam 51 American wood steam 51 44 British wood sail 115 American wood sail 89 I f 5 ® ?> » 5'S »2. «■<» =r So ^' Bag, g rS 8§ I &?« 5E.§ 5-5 o 5 g £ g a m ri-a - a » I wj _. ^ 3 ■" * ST S-^* p » S" C''' ST 2 2 "■ E S-o O • i-« '"'■«■ O Q, « » n ^ '^ O Si B H" '^ o S^ a »^ « B * 2 g » a S"s.-2 • » J* o"2.a* S ^» lal c 2.1 O P t3 p > w> ti>ti> 6S>H> 5 ^■- 3 2-5 2-3 S.3 2.g ?. cc C.rti 2, S' 2, o' r* o" r" r5* £■ n" =• ^" -^9 5' J If Co- if if &3-C;cr gf cr c rcrs r' c r' c •s = (5 ct- S S 5? g =;• ^ § CD s i §" « 1 w 2. C.5: o-o 2 ^ if si, i o> 3 H ?v a. 3- 1^ w*» tocoi-' -1 fJr' ■^."U.'o (KCO — Number. to S«£w > 1 , to p 4- p p p — p o_ 1 1 1 c; to to c> to *. •— --1 ? !> < 5" ts rs o ^ a- -i 2 ,_, H 3 2. -) CO — -* ^-"C-T H- Number. 3 o (OCT p to CO cnto -J o M i-» Jlrf^CO en -1 KJS" gp 1 1 l^^5, to to — — CO*, pp 1 1 1 1 o o ►— S *.^ GO CII-. o 2 ¥n to 4.0' -- H 3 1 ■ s O"*" ts oc'b'b OCl Si^Jt?! oo CO CO fe S'i^ to to to o 'com ■rf-"---! 1 — — "^ — Number. 3 2. 2 O tn c; -> to CO to GO — OCT -1C5C0 -J wT to *. 1 S 'S, \i \i !> 1 1 I -1-C5 tc ce — 2 > .;--i GO ? 9 w — |i 1 g V 1 < a "w to tiCOO to tr !20 m 2- o So*, c en »-' Sri2?, C-. o >^ ^J-" I-* MA t— p "OD^ "o'coot t — "co Number, 3 w ooo lOO-J es — ocjt O-JO — — 00 ce* CO CO to 1 1 1 oc -1 -] ;-! ^1 l; *- — > < ii*.h^ 4--J tOOO 2 P to p oc ^ 1 § 1 • «3 "^ ii ■--1 CO -3 4-CT01 H- *. oc;i to CO ^ to h^ 05 "to -^ "to 20 1^ 1 -1 Number. 3 CT -1 cic» CO Cl o — CO en re* (0 CO CO IC CO to CO w > f 1 , f^y^'P] 9''~Pr' 1 1 1 a2h ' — bo bo bi > < a CT to -0 ca ? p P s w oc l-> •c> o*» H p to 52 cnoi to*. 00 5gS£ ? to OT -J to-i 03 W COOi-" CJCIOO f^ l~. or v^ -acr> 1 CO Number. 3 o CO w to C5 to to — — 2- KjS" -:i 00 -3 oto .t. CD — CI t 1 ^sgSS, §?S3S^ > > 1 1 1 CO b lu ^ *>. OCT if CO— -J ocno CO ? i CD •f' to H o o-^ 1 « =5 "to to to*. 00 to oocjicn B 3> g o o -s 001 *.-] CO CO to 2occ? o M 2 w 3=3-1 — — Number. •*! 52 to >i.-3 1 tf^ CO C2 >l^ KiS" p £. >b>«>'CO lb CO CO CO >• 1 , , CltO 00 , p p 00 > 1 1 1 ss§s' b *.^'o *i =5 — i Po o cien ^ ' -< p _H-JD t « CD to "to"— to CO 00 — -J ifeCJI c ? ^ -J C-. -J toes -J ..3 CO CO c:: CO tOOOIJ c — -joo * 206 AMERICAN MARINE. American Iron appears at some disadvantage here, but the reason Is good why it does not compare favorably for extreme survival. The industry is young, having sprung up mainly since the war, consequently the vessels built in the mean time cannot be distinguished for age. It is different with the British; they sent the first iron sailer to sea in 1838, and iron steamers were in use before that time, in river and channel navigation. As for the apparent superiority of British wood sail over American in extreme age, it would disappear if the limit of tonnage was either 50 or 250 tons, instead of 100. As it is, American ship- wrights must be credited with building the vessel now the old- est on class (not at Lloyds) in the world. Comparing the figures under the ten-year heading in all the tables of fleets, it will appear that all the steamers are propor- tionably younger than the sailers. This does not indicate that the survival of steam is less than of sail, but only that there has been the more activity In steam construction In ten years past. We may likewise observe that the difference in ages of the various divisions of fleets is considerably less than between the fleets entire. In the order of survival, the fleets above ten years of age stand as follows : — AGES OF FLEETS ABOVE TEX YEARS. Years. American-built iron steam ...... 19.08 British-built iron sail ...... 19.51 British-built iron steam ...... 19.77 British-built wood steam ...... 23.16 American-built wood sail ...... 24.10 American-built wood steam ..... 24.54 British-built wood sail ....... 25.16 As for the size of vessels. It plainly appears from the tables, that British iron, both of steam and sail, and American wood of sail propulsion, have Increased considerably in average capacity in the past ten years. The smallest vessels of sail and steam are British wood, and the largest British iron. We will pass now to Table IV., which begins with vessels "above 15 years" of age. While the average longevity of poorly built vessels extends only to 20 years, of fairly built to 25 years, and of the best built to 35 years, without prejudice DURABILITY OF SHIPPIN-G. 207 to the latter classes, we may fix upon the age of 15 years as the limit when age, for all vessels to be compared for survival, may be supposed to begin. Table IV. is therefore composed of fleets, every vessel of which is 15 years old and upward. The average survival of the various fleets, in the order of age, is as follows : — AGES OF FLEETS ABOVE FIFTEEN YEARS. British-built iron steam American-built iron steam Britlsh-built iron sail British-built wood steam American-built wood sail American-built wood steam British-built wood sail Years. 22.19 22.61 23.68 25.22 26.17 26.84 27.74 In this table it is easily seen that wood has a greater sur- vival than iron. This is not altogether due to material, but in part to wood being the longest in use, particularly in the United States, and also, in great degree, to iron vessels, par- ticularly British, having been Iniilt too cheaply (not too eco- nomically), not of the best material, nor sufficient of it, nor with good work to attain age. This fact will appear even more conspicuous in tlie figures of the table below, from which it is clear that iron has not overtaken, and it is plain cannot overtake, the wood in the various steps of five-year survivals. It also appears that the last test of 35 years and upward re- cords a victory for wood and American workmanship in iron. We copy from Table V. , in order of superiority : — (A) AVERAGE AGES OF FLEETS AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF SURVIVAL. Above Above Above Above Abo re Com- Kinds of Vessel. 1.5 20 25 30 35 mon Av- Years. Years. Years. Years. Years. erage. Years. Years. Years. Years. Years. Years. British iron sail .... 23.68 25.41 29.11 33.81 38.35 29.76 American iron steam 22.61 27.13 31.56 34.53 39.00 30.94 British iron steam 22.19 27.42 30.89 35.00 38.71 31.03 American wood steam 26.84 27.97 29.82 37.45 39.46 32.30 British -wood steam . 25.22 28.74 3.3.15 36.79 40.64 32.85 American wood sail . 26.17 30.74 35.61 39.01 42.53 34.91 British wood sail . . 27.74 30.57 34.56 39.33 45.67 35.17 208 AMERICAN MARINE. At tlie right of this table is a cohimn headed "Common Average," in which will be fonnd a concentrated expression of the various ages given in the preceding columns. From this it appears that wood is superior to iron, and that American wood sail is superior to British iron sail, by 17.30 per cent. At first sight British wood sail is superior to American, but in Tables B and C to follow, we shall see that under the head- ing "above 35 years," that American wood sail leads all the other fleets by considerable. As for the iron fleets, American steam almost equals British, and excels British sail nearly 4 per cent., which is wonderful in view of the fact, hitherto men- tioned, that Great Britain has been building in iron so much longer than the United States, at so much less expense for materials and labor, and therefore with so much more to be expected from her. We will now examine a table showing the proportionate number of vessels of the fifteen-year and upward fleets, surviv- ing to different ages, copying from Table V. in the order of superiority : — (B) PROPOBTION" OF VESSELS ABOVE 15 YEARS OF AGE SUR- VIVING TO DIFFERENT AGES. Kinds of Vessel. American iron steam British iron steam British iron sail . British wood steam American wood sail British wood sail . American wood steam Above Above Above Above 20 25 30 35 Years. Years. Years. Years. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. 51.75 20.31 13.16 3.51 52.37 28.40 12.73 4.39 78.83 34.30 6.43 2.35 66.41 38.68 21.16 10.21 66.02 40.69 28.45 17.67 77.82 50.42 29.55 15.07 88.80 64.00 16.00 10.40 Amplitude of Survival Divided by 30. Proportion- ate Nos. 23.09 23.42 28.44 29.88 32.05 35.85 37.08 Observing that British iron sail, above the average age of 20 years, meets extinction /as^er than any other class, and that American wood sail excels all other classes in continuation above 20 years, we will examine another table, showing the proportionate tonnage of the fifteen -year fleets surviving to different ages, when comment will be made on both tables to- »„» = = » I o' 2 p » S ss p ^^ o o o o 0C> ^ i-'Op to « M Number. CO .-1 yi ^ c;i o CT to tc to to to CO cc cc Co ^1 ^1 p ^1 ^1 w bob >*- c; CO -~i CO o Average Age. -4 00 00 -J COO oo -4C5CD-4 CO ^ _o to CO bo b b I *. X O C5 -1 CI 1 S5 CO Cn C5 CS CO CO X )t» to C-. o to to -4 if» — I cr. 00 -4 c< o < c: Ci a oc o CO p p o oc p p U> b b cc — CO f ci o o C-. CO ?o -J .b-4 p -4—1 p p< p J' to to >-*-i!obo ^^.-co b»*-bobo -40-4h^ -4CnO — 4-4i-*Ci . o en to CO en c^ . 00 CO -4 o 00 to en en V =5 o t en *- *. ^ ■ . en CO "- c -1 lo co -i -^ . ^ O -4 O ^ CO ^OO »- h-0-40 CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO to CO CO CO en 2! b b b b b O O C5 C5 ^ to ; to -4 o\o o Average en en o to to o p >f»pio to b CO b b b to o o O CO CO>|:>-4 CO CO -4 00 4^—1 cn to cn CO to rf^CO h- to "-■ c CO CO*" o c: CO to-4cn— Oit-en oto-.**" h-oto occoo cenco o S^ c k^ CO en CO *.. .;^ CO -4toc:o cotoco C-. ocrito cc CO CO en c. ► CO coco coco p «t- >& p CO b i^ b b 00 cocoeoco CO CO CO «D Cj O 35 O O 00 ; CO coe I fc en c >o-4to ot-'oo oio'-'o en' en : P I— 00 ►- o 05 o 00 o o CO CO Ibl CO CO CO coco CO ; en o en to o Average Age. CO 00 O O C3 rf*. bo o o i* ic c; 00 CT to ^ W ^ tC CO I— 1-1 i-» h- I-. h- ci oo 00 to VI >^ a ^o C5 I-" P O -4 CO to COl-i tOCOtO tOi-" ^ p p p p cn —' r" ." ^^ !^ ^bbb ben CO bo^coto en^H-o CO en -4 cioc—io 00 cn CO CO cn o >t^ CO coco to 00 I O -4 ifeco*.ji ^ *. *. cocoeoco CO coco CO It- cn b Average Age. p to I p |-* CO ^ I ^--b CO 00 to en 1-1 1-. — >_ (O p a^ -4 4^ -J -- p b to i. CO b^ CO -4 » O CO -4 "- O -4»»i— O CO-4-4 C0*.CnC3 210 AMERICAN MARINE. gether. These two tables, B and C, are doubtless more instruc- tive than Table A, since tliey embrace two elements of compu- tation, viz., number and tonnage or quantity. (C) PROPORTION OF TONNAGE ABOVE 15 TEARS OF AGE SUR- VIVING TO DIFFERENT AGES. Kinds o£ Vessel. American iron steam British iron steam . British wood steam . British iron sail . American wood sail . British wood sail . American wood steam Above Above Above Above 20 25 30 35 Years. Years. Years. Years. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. 39.44 17.06 7.14 2.12 44.07 20.96 7.86 2.13 55.09 30.24 16.88 7.00 73.39 31.77 6..55 2.18 72.77 43.83 29.03 16.33 70.17 49.17 27.75 11.97 91.31 59.69 14.13 8.86 Amplitude of ISurvival Divided by 30. Proportion- ate Nos. 17.92 19.54 25.26 26.97 33.95 34.77 36.11 From these tables it appears that, in the amplitudes of num- ber and of tonnage for survival, American wood steam holds first place, though it occupies the fourth in Table A. In like manner, British wood sail holds second rank, though it has the first in Table A. Also, American wood sail holds third place, though it has the second in Table A ; and British iron sail, in the seventh rank in Table A, gets promotion to the fifth in Table B, and to the fourth in Table C, and other changes may be noted. It is therefore necessary to combine the results in a fourth table, D, in which proportional numbers shall repre- sent age, number, and tonnage. This may be done by finding the common average of the proportional number in the three tables. A, B, C, by applying Simpson's rule of alternate mul- tipliers, as for the areas of surfaces of curvilinear outline, in use by naval architects, and then reducing by a divisor to a number of a size convenient for comparison. > W>- Wtt-td>- W>W!> 1 B a. 3 2.3 2.3 3.3 2-3 a 2 » -i »>iw-i a"iaDi 5' B'o" r n' ^ o' ^ o' -^ o' 1 5" "c S. r-crc ?»c«-c 1 !5 3-0 OCo &.0 OS- » »* s ~ o s a O 3 S ■5 ■**. " -^ 3 p< • S: o. si CD O w -5. (T 5 : 1 S 1 s o "a 2- :3 K S, ^ c? •^ §• -;:? *ba s s =1 «s . « 1 1 1 O (O to -J C5 CO 1 gggg Average 3 1 1 1 -J — C5 1 tobo >-»b Age. (D U M *.^oo to ^o p-> ?? it> iTtO bC to 1^ o 2 5£W £5! ^1::"^ 1 y c; CO " t* Oot— -J inio*. Number. 1 3. •^'i to ^ sss. |-'"C0 1-' H en s.a 00 O C5 ^ 1-4 ^ ta- o 2 O.J. ^r^P 1 B ^E Co ^8^ o'b'bcn ji *. b to ? -> = o ji CO en-i a-5 1 1 1 wcjto = p .-" 1 C li to to X -1 ;-l -1 Average •^ 1 1 1 ai-i *. 1 -lb*- — Age. 5- -J*.— *.-> toco o oq "" -1 O-l C-. 00 en or b 00 ic ^ I g p JO^ -) p 00 1 ^© O. CO » C5 00 b bo 1 l*i OD CO^ 9 i-t» ►t) o a ^ to to w ►- 0-4 en (D < ^ •3 SI > B 03 to -j-j-i H 1 to o Kl to p 1 m gi3 ca to CO 1 h--l CO 1 §2 1 o -^•-J o a s> ifc r> ? I c en 1 1 1 5^'^S, gggss Average •^ 1 1 1 g2hl 5;S3S Age. 5* 1- 1. t lO g3 gS^, CO n to to 00 4._» p '^o Cb *-c-. w C5 b ji. CO p ". ►t3 o OI ©►- too o OOO Oh- a < n a ? ^ i ^ l» o .t. *- *-co cocnio tJ H 1 ^ to ?? ow- 1 3 p p;-I 2 O a woo-) 1 tob bb w HH ? p 00 in p -4 W ^ *» toes 05 H 1 1 1 CO coco p O CO 1 ^??s^ Average 3 1 1 1 CO b CO 1 -1 *^ b bi Age. CO to " CO to cno CO E o m „ to ^^_ J" ^ c^ p 00 p 1 j-iptc w S'o •t) o 03 CO en '^ *^ 1 ? "■ (D •-* en -J to 1 pp 4^ CO ? = itJ w bb CO 1 to j. coin O !-.» < ^-jJn ►-0 o — HJ a ^ ^ S o CT CI H p _>-p .- ~ !^ 1 ^ 00 to to o O ^ to "to"— toco -^ 1 b bo ■>-'U 3 I-. ? p -4 C5-1 -) CO 00 o o^co to CO CO ? 212 AMERICAN MARINE. (D) COMPARISOX OF SURVIVAL : AGE, NUMBER, AXD TONNAGE COMBINED. Kinds of Vessel. American iron steam British iron steam . BritLsh iron sail . . British wood steam American wood sail American wood steam British wood saU . Proportion- Proportion- Proportion- al Numbers al Numbers al Numbers of Table A. of Table B. of Table C. 30.94 23.09 17.92 31.03 23.42 19.54 29.76 28.44 26.97 32.85 29.88 25.66 34.91 32.05 33.95 32..30 37.08 36.11 35.17 35.85 34.77 Average of Numbers. 23.98 24.66 28.39 29.46 33.63 35.16 35.26 Here again it is seen that wood-built vessels outlast, and therefore should outrank iron-built. British iron steam out- lasts American 2.83 per cent., which is a trifling difference, considering British builders had twenty years the start of American. But for this start, and the fact that much of our iron steam is built for domestic trade; and another fact, that our builders have copied from the British rules of building, in- stead of striking out for themselves, as our wood builders did, and improving on foreign construction, the figures would have shown a better result. This is foreshadowed in wood steam building, a branch of the trade that has been carried on at equal length in both countries. American wood steam vessels outlast the British 19.34 per cent., and there is no reason why our iron steamers, if not quite so cheaply built, with our supe- rior materials and skill, should not do the same thing. We believe in tima they will, as we are sure they would do now, if our computations were confined, on both sides, to an equal pro- portion of steamers in the ocean trade. As for the superiority of British wood sail over American, it is only 4.84 per cent., and due partly to building with, and importations of, timber from semi-tropical countries, but more perhaps to a preponderance of small vessels whose traffic is confined to the temperate waters and climate of Europe; whereas many of our smaller craft, built of northern mixed hard and soft wood, spend much of their time in the tropical waters and climate of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indies, and therefore cannot be expected to outlast vessels of southern DURABILITY OF SHIPPING. 213 timber used mostly in northern waters. But American sailers, even the poorest, lack nothing when compared with British iron sailers, and this is the comj^arison in point to be made, since our free-ship friends think there is nothing- in a wooden ship to be compared with an iron one. The British iron ship is wholly of British materials and skill, as the American wooden ship is of American materials and skill; and both kinds of vessel have been long enough in building to have developed their qualities in perfection. Not many years ago a senator of Kentucky, the State that first put the question of "free ships" into a political platform, a State wherein an American ocean ship was never built nor owned, in a memorable speech characterized British sailing ships as "fine iron sailing ships," and stigmatized the ships of his own country as "miserable old wooden sailing craft." Little did he think that the vessels which he despised and aspersed could be vindicated to the damage of the "fine " ships that he flattered, and which belonged to our rivals, the ruthless rulers of the sea. The senator's unpatriotic course well illus- trates the line of Pope, that, "A little knowledge is a dan- gerous thing," By the tables, now for the first time made up and published, the superiority of our wooden, over British iron, ships is amply proved. That shipping of iron may be better than of wood is not to be doubted, but to be so it must be built that way, and this is yet to be done in any country for sailing vessels. Readers will observe in Table D, that the superiority of American wood, to British iron, sail is expressed in the numeri- cal relations of 33.63 to 28.39, —a difference of 18.46 per cent. Also, that our wood sail ships compare with British iron steam, as 33.63 to 24.66, —a difference of 36.37 per cent. And, what is more remarkable, our wooden steamers compare with British iron, as 35.16 to 24.66, — a superiority of 42.57 per cent. If it be thought that number and tonnage only (leaving out age) should be combined in the final comparison, such table will now be given : — 214 AMERICAN MARINE. (E) FINAL COMPARISON OF SURVIVAL: NUMBER AND TONNAGE ONLY COMBINED. Kinds of VesseL Proportional Numbers of Table B. Proportional Numbers of Table C. Average of Numbers. American iron steam British iron steam British iron sail British wood steam American wood saU British wood sail American wood steam 23.09 23.42 28.44 29.88 32.05 35.85 37.08 17.92 19.54 26.97 25.66 33.95 34.77 36.11 20.51 21.48 27.71 27.77 33.00 35.31 36.59 It will readily be seen that this table does not improve the comparison for British iron sail and steam with American wood sail. On the contrary, a still greater weight is loaded on the American end of the beam. The shortcoming of British iron sail that was 18.46 per cent, has become 19.09; and the same for steam, which was 36.37, has become 53.63 per cent. The facts relating to iron and wooden ships bring to mind the observation of a great Englishman, William Shakespeare, "Poet," that, "Reputation is often got without merit, and lost without deserving." Final Test of Si/periority. In Table V. a comparison is instituted between all the British and all the American fleets, under the respective flags, to the end that we may ascertain the relative merits of the shipbuilding practice of the two nations. All the sail and steam, whether of wood or iron, are included in a single grand fleet on each side, and the average survival of these two fleets is shown at ages above 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 years. To begin with, the British fleet largely out-num- bers the American, but soon falls off in ratio : — Per cent. At the age of fifteen years, of the number of British, the American are ....... 40.54 At the age of twenty years, of the number of British, the American are ....... 40.37 At the age of twenty-five years, of the number of British, the American increased to .... . 43.15 At the age of thirty years, of the number of British, the American Increased to ..... . 55.97 And at the age of thirty-five years, of the number of British, the American increased to ... 76.37 DURABILITY OF SHIPPING. 215 As the British-built fleet is composed of nearly equal num- bers of iron and wooden vessels, and the American fleet is 95. IG per cent, wooden, the difi^erence in favor of our ship- work and material is very marked. But this difference is even greater than thus appears, when the amoiuit of tonnage surviv- ing, instead of the number of vessels, is compared. The most lasting British vessels are the small wooden ones, whose ton- nage cuts a secondary figure in the great total. The average size of vessel of the respective fleets is, for the British, 653 tons, and for the American, 451 tons, or 70 per cent, of the British size. The proportion of number being less than 40 per cent, of British for American, it will be seen that the fairest comparison must be that for the svrvival of tonnage., espe- cially as we are contrasting the shipbuilding performance of the two nations. The British fleet greatly exceeds in tonnage, to begin with, but finally equalizes nearly : — Per cent. At the age of fifteen years, of the tonnage of British, the American fleet is ...... . 28.04 At the age of twenty years, of the tonnage of British, the American fleet is ...... . 36.11 At the age of twenty -five years, of the tonnage of Brit- ish, the American fleet is ..... 42.58 At the age of thirty yeare, of the tonnage of British, the American fleet is ...... . 60.69 And at the age of thirty-five years, of the tonnage of British, the American fleet is . . . . . 99.27 Here is a puncture in the balloon of "free" ships, that should collapse it high in mid-air, surroimded by ice-cold com- fort for the detractors of American shipbuilding, a business of which they, one and all, are perfectly innocent of any know- ledge that will bear the light of a new moon. Bntish Iron and American Wood Sail Further Compared. While it is obvious many other comparisons may be made from the tables, we will close with one more. This will be the pro- portion of present British iron and American wood sail fleets existing at different periods in the past, with the differences between the same, which may be set out as follows : — 216 AMERICAN MARINE. PROPORTION OF NUMBERS AND TONNAGE, AND DIFFERENCE. At Periods of British. American. Difference. Number. Tonnage. Number. Tonnage. Number. Tonnage. Above 10 years. " 15 " " 20 " " 25 " " 30 " " 35 " Per cent. 63.36 37.00 29.17 12.69 3.22 .87 Per cent. 52.86 29.54 21.68 9.38 2.26 .64 Per cent. 72.99 61.19 40.39 24.89 17.40 10.81 Per cent. 69.79 47.85 34.78 20.97 13.89 8.10 Per cent. 9.63 24,19 11.22 12.20 14.18 9.94 Per cent. 16.93 18.31 13.11 11.59 11.53 7.46 Average of differences for periods 13.56 13.15 A problem in point is this : What is the economical value of the great difference in survival shown above? The cost per ton being known, or if the two fleets cost the same sum, as it is probable in this case, first find the difference in survival, sec- ond the difference in the profit-time, then obtain the value in terms of the cost of the fleets, and from the latter deduce the ratio of value, as in examples following. Manifestly, if the two fleets cost the same sum, an equal number of j^ears must be deducted for repayment, and the shortage of survival must come off the period for profit-time. From Table I. it may be calculated that portions of the two fleets survive as follows : — Survival of American. British. Difference. Three fourths of the fleets Half of the fleets Years. 23.85 28.52 35.60 41..30 Years. 17.90 21.60 27.45 29.12 Years. 5.95 6.92 Quarter of the fleets Eighth of the fleets 8.15 n.i8 6.50 From this showing it is clear, if ten years' time be taken for repayment of cost and interest, that the profit-time remaining for the respective fleets will be as follows : — DURABILITY OF SHIPPING. 217 Profit-time o£ Three fourths of the fleets Half of the fleets Quarter of the fleets Eighth of the fleets Average excess of American profit-time American. Years. 13.85 18.52 25.60 31.30 British. Years. 7.90 11.60 17.45 19.12 Difference. Years. 5.95 6.92 8.15 11.18 6.50 It is obvious from this statement that if we deduct from the four divisions of the two fleets any number equal to, or less than, the time in the British column, the difference in any case, that the average, 6.5 years, will be the same, precisely, as shown above. It follows that G.5 years expresses the econom- ical average value of the American superiority. Also, that if three fourths of the fleets can return their cost in 5.95 years, and the remaining fourth in 8.15 years, as should be easily done, then the American profit - time would be 17.90 and 27.45 years, and the British profit-time would be 11.95 and 19.30, respectively. The value in terms of cost of fleets would be as follows : — AMERICAN SUPERIORITY. Portions of Fleets. American Cost contained in Profit-time. British Cost contained in Profit-time. Number of British to Equal one American Ship. Three fourths . . . One fourth Times. 3.00 3.36 Times. 2.00 2.36 Number. 1.50 1.42 Average British to oe e American ship . 1.48 Tlie Conclusion of the Matter. Here may be closed our examination of the ship-survival question. It must now be clear, that the American wooden sailing ship, worth 48 per cent, more than a British iron one, is a half cheaper at the same price. In oth^r words, where the average British iron sailing ship is worth two dollars, the average American wood sailer is worth three dollars per ton ; consequently, the height 218 AMERICAN MARINE. of folly would be to throw away our knowledge and experience in shipbuilding, quit building our own vessels, and employ the shipyards of Great Britain to produce iron ships for our use. It must also be clear that the British Lloyds and English underwriters generally, prompted thereto by British shipowners and builders, have no just foundation for discriminating against our wooden ships in marine insurance, thereby to rmi them off the sea. It follows, as a matter of course, that it is the bounden duty of our government to interfere, and protect our shipping rights and interests, as it has not fully done for three quarters of a century past, or pretended to do since 1828. It is especially disgraceful to suffer any foreign nation to invade our ports by their underwriters, and enforce under our very eyes a baseless and fraudulent discriminating policy, for the purpose of acquii-ing the control of our foreign trade, and corrupting our politics through that control. And those of our people who have believed in suffering this thing to be done, who have aided in the ruin of our foreign shipping business by voice and vote, by refusing to grant it just and equal protec- tion with other American interests, we commend to a better study of the question, feeling assured that, when their judg- ment is enlightened, their patriotism will be aroused. CHAPTER XV. FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE POWER AND ITS IRON RULE. Of the active forces which influence, control, or forbid the employment of shipping, none have greater effect than marine insurance power. Beginning with a gentle influence upon new and first-class vessels, with moderate premium rates for hulls and cargoes, it gains control with the lapse of time and advance of age, rates increasing meanwhile; until shortly it forbids the making of distant voyages and the carrying of particular cargoes, rates growing onerous meantime; and, finally, it deserts the worn-out ship in port and leaves its hulk to idle and decay. This is the ordinary course of this speculative power when acting on shipping of its own flag. It is a neces- sary factor in trade and transportation, is of the utmost utility, and performs a public service. But it has its likes and dis- likes, its fancies and caprices, as well as many virtues. While the skillful and experienced underwriter aims to apply a system of estimation founded on experience, when he fixes the values of the hazards in which he deals, there are many in the business who prefer to conjure with luck. Fire and life insurance aspire to scientific bases, but marine underwriting is of too complex a nature to be readily reduced to a system or body of knowledge, and the interests concerned in the business are too discordant to accept and practice perfect rules if made. It results that, outside of successful mutual companies and well-managed clubs, risks are not classified at all, and premium rates are arbitrary, often unfair, and never justly proportioned to perils. A second-class ship, or one of moderate age, with strength unimpaired, is quite as safe, 'per se, as a first-class or a new one, but a higher premium is charged, on the principle, probably, that it can be collected So, poor vessels are taken with good ones, for a single owner, where the former would be rejected if offered separately by different owners. Underwrit- 220 AMERICAN MARINE. ers confer great benefits on commerce, and tliey know it ; and they generally patronize their own flag, favor large customers, and make rival flags and small dealers contribute to the objects of their beneficence. Using such influence and wielding such power, manifestly a nation's underwriters should be its own. State- Insurance Protection. It has recently come to light that soon after the date of the first British navigation act, the government of Portugal instituted an obligatory insurance system, as an instrumentality of commerce under the patronage of the state. At that time John II., surnamed the Great, founder of the dynasty of Aviz, was the reigning monarch. This ruler laid the foundation of Portugal's greatness in ship- ping. His government covered the period from 1385 to 1433. On his order, vessels were constructed for the special purpose of contending with the stormy seas of the Cape of Good Hope, the largest of them at first not exceeding 300 tons. From the improvements in shipbuilding thus originated, Portugal became the most advanced state in Europe, in a knowledge of this important art. It was long supposed that the Portu- guese alone could build such ships as were required for voyages to India, which they pioneered. The obligatory insurance mentioned is said to have been applied to Portuguese vessels of less than fifty tons burden, as measured at that time, but by our present rules at least one hundred tons. This insurance indemnified only for total losses, and exacted a premium of two per cent, of the profits of the vessels with the addition of an advance fee as a quota upon, the value of each cargo carried. The length of time this policy continued seems to be unknown. In its working, it was prac- tically a bounty of the government, intended to aid shipowmers and secure the building of a new vessel in place of one lost ; and, it cannot be doubted, contributed much to the spread of Lusitanian commerce over the maritime world. This kind of insurance is now unknown. It may have been suggested by the British navigation law enacted in 1381. That was intended to, and did, protect British shipping, by compelling British mer- chants to make shipments by British vessels, as explained else- where. This Portuguese insurance ])olicy may have prompted British underwriters to protect British shipping, by inspection and underwriting policies, as at the present time. I FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE POWER. 221 British Insurance Protection. The next thing to state- insurance protection is the patriotic system of ship inspection and insurance carried on by modern European nations, but particidarly the British. Since 1834, when Lloyd's Register was instituted, there has prevailed a general practice of appre- ciating British, and depreciating "foreign," tonnage, both in classification and underwriting. The foundation for these pro- tective policies was laid in the rules for inspection and classifi- cation of wooden ships. These did not aim to grade the "per- ils of the sea," but to characterize the "intrinsic qualities" of vessels, which, of course, were governed largely by the cost of building and repairing. In other words, classification in Lloyd's Register depended more on cost than skill and secu- rity. To this feature was added the condition of being British- built, and especially of British materials. Nothing "foreign" was equal to British, was the teaching of the great authority on shipping. Under this system, there was, of course, a high cultivation of the national sentiment, that no country in the world coidd build vessels the equals of those turned out in the United Kingdom. While there was no truth in this sentiment, much protection could be evolved from it. When iron ship- building sprung up, it was sought to inspect and class its out- put on the "intrinsic quality" principle, and to set a rating of years, to express durability. This plan, erelong, had to be abandoned, as it was found from experience that iron ship- ping, as built by their own rules, was too uncertain in its sea- life for the predication of duration. Rating in years was dis- continued, and a gradation of numbers substituted. So that now metal vessels are characterized as 100 A, 95 A, 90 A, 85 A, 80 A, or 75 A, according as they may have been built by corresponding tables of scantling sizes and weights of materi- als. Wooden vessels continue to be classed on the old princi- ple, hence the facility is greater for discrimination against wooden than iron vessels. The construction of wooden vessels admits the choice of a great variety of material. The policy at Lloyds has been to keep down the rating of the different kinds of timber produced in the United States, and to set up the rating of British forest products. To this day our matchless white oak of New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina is graded the same in 222 AMERICAN MARINE. years as the growth of Canada, which is two thirds the time of British oak, also inferior in strength and durability. To this day, also, Lloyd's have never appointed surveyors to in- spect wooden vessels in course of construction in this rival country of ours, though they were sent to all other countries, and this discrimination was practiced before iron shipbuilding became an industry in England. From the first a standing rvde to give no vessel a full class, if not built under survey, has been in force ; and so has another rule, to grant the char- acter A to no vessel, unless her date and place of building is made known. These distinctions and regidations declare their objects, — the protection of the British marine. The course of Lloyds in forcing our wooden sailing ships out of their Register in 1870, with a view to discriminating our export cargoes into British iron ships, has been described elsewhere. That attack ujion a rival marine ^ was a mild exhi- bition of underwriting rule compared to the latest aggression, which may be characterized, not only as selfish and severe, but offensive and insulting. The " Wheat Tariff Association.'" One would not suppose that a "Wheat Tariif " was an underwriters' association, yet it is. Sixteen companies of London and Liverpool, having agencies on the Pacific coast (and for the most part in all our larger ports), closed an agreement the first of June, 1891, to write no risks on grain, flour, or other merchandise by vessels from San Francisco, Columbia or Willamette rivers, or Puget Sound, to ports in Europe, except on terms and conditions as set forth in a compact, which has been published in a Brit- ish journal.'"^ COPT OF AGREEMENT, We the undersigned insurance companies agree that we will not write any risks on grain &/or flour &/or salmon &/or other merchan- dise by vessels from San Francisco, Columbia &/or "Willamette rivers or Puget Sound to port or ports in Europe, except on terms and con- ditions set forth in the tariff agreement of 3d November last (1890) and annexed hereto (Schedule A), subject, however, to such alterations as may be determined from time to time by the Tariff Committee. 1 See Lloyd's Rules and Regulations for 1870, pages 43 and 44, article, " Foreign-Built Ships." 2 Fairplay. FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE POWER. 223 The said committee shall have power to deal with all questions here- under. Tliis agreement applies to branches &,'or agencies, as well as to the head offices. It is further agreed that we will not make, allow, or promise any deductions or payments in the shape of rebates, commissions, broker- ages, discounts, return commissions, percentages of profits, or otherwise in excess of the deductions allowed by the tariff from time to time. It is also agi-eed that, — I. No Company whose signature is affixed hereto shall mthdraw therefrom without giving six months' notice in writing, but in the event of a reduction of rate, any Company may give notice of its refusal to participate in the distribution during such six months' notice. II. No Company shall have more than one agent or representative at any of the above seaports. III. The new rates and conditions shall apply to all vessels arriving at the loading port after sundown, 31st May, 1891, local time, and to all insurances effected after that time. IV. All insurances accepted prior to the sailing of the vessel from the port of loading shall be shared as set forth in the schedule, B, an- nexed. SCHEDULE A. Schedule of rates on wheat &/or flour &/or general merchandise from California, Columbia &/or "Willamette rivers and Puget Sound. FKOM CALIFORMIA. On wheat by first-class iron or steel vessels (as defined below) : — To United Kingdom, Havre, or Antwerp, direct, or with leave to call at a port in channel for orders. If per cent. On wheat by first-class wooden vessels (as defined below) : — To United Kingdom, Havre, or Antwerp, direct, or calling at a port in channel for orders, 2 per cent. Cargoes of flour containing not more than 25 per cent oE wheat in the cargo may be written to a reduction of \ per cent, from the above rates, but such reduction is not to apply to the wheat on board. Mixed cargoes consisting of canned goods and general merchandise, containing not more than 25 per cent of wheat in the cargo, may be written at a reduction of \ per cent, from the above rates, but such reduction is not to apply to the wheat on board. FROM COLUMBIA &/0R WILLAMETTE RIVERS AND PUGET SOUND. By first-class iron or steel vessels, as defined below, carrying wheat or general cargo, canned goods, etc. 224 AMERICAN MARINE. To United Kingdom, Havre, or Antwerp, direct, or calling at a port in channel for orders, 2 per cent. By first-class wooden vessels (as defined below) carrying wheat &/or general cargo, canned goods, etc. To United Kingdom, Havre, or Antwerp or Dunkirk or St. Nazaire direct, or calling at a port in Channel for orders 2| per cent- Cargoes of flour containing not more than 25 per cent, of cargo in wheat may be written at a reduction of \ per cent, from the above rates, but such reduction not to apply to wheat on board. GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLYING TO ALL PORTS. No. 1. The above rates apply only to policies free of particular average, and the wheat and flour rates to cargo shipped in bags. No. 2. No rebate or reduction of any kind to be made from the foregoing rates beyond a rebate of five per cent, and ten per. cent. No. 3. Continental options to Bordeaux and Hamburg, inclusive, except Havre and Antwerp, Dunkirk and St. Nazaire, excluding Rouen, may be granted at an additional premium of not less than \ per cent. No. 4. The minimum rates for particular average of three per cent, on the entire cargo only, shall be not less than | per cent, net by first- class iron and steel ships ; and not less than | per cent, net by first- class wooden vessels from California, \ per cent additional from other ports. No. 5. For the purposes of this agreement, first-class vessels shall be defined as follows : — Iron vessels shall not be more than twenty-five years old at the commencement of the risk. Hard-wood vessels shall be considered as first-class up to two years prior to the expiration of their original classification, provided they are not more than two years on their metal at the commencement of the risk. Soft-wood vessels shall be considered as first-class vessels up to five years prior to the expiration of their original classification, provided that they are not more than two years on their metal at the com- mencement of the risk. All other wooden vessels shall pay an additional premium of not less than \ per cent. SCHEDULE B. Insurance at home or abroad accepted by any of the Companies signing this agreement shall be shared as under. £6,000 on cargo shall be reserved by the Company insuring the FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE POWER. 225 cargo ; six tenths of the remainder shall be equally distributed amongst the companies in Group I., and four tenths amongst the com- panies in Group II. GROUP I. British &, Foreign. Commercial Union. London Assurance. London «& Provincial. The Marine. Thames & Mersey. GROUP II. Alliance. Ocean. Indemnity. Reliance. International. Sea. Maritime. Standard. National. Union. The Object of this Foreign Trust. It has been denied that Lloyds, or other British underwriters, ever consjjired to injure American shipping by discriminative insurance rates or other- wise, but here we have the proof in print, over their own names, of a formidable pool or "trust" organized to control, not only the insurance, but the shipments of our products to European markets in vessels to suit the interest of Great Britain ; the old dislike to American shipping, and its rivalry, taking a more h'jstile form than ever before. Besides this, insurance rates were raised 16.66 per cent. The agents of this combination in the United States have sought to keep its agreement private. No wonder ! A principle entirely neio has been applied, for no other reason, that can be seen, than to drive our superior ships out of — our own trade. This rule is the test hy age. Lloyd's Register, the Veritas, Record, and aU classification books what- ever, are set quite aside. From the light cast upon the endur- ance, sea-life, and survival of vessels in the preceding chapter, we are qualified to affirm that American wood sail shipping is worthy of greater confidence than British iron or steel, as fol- lows : — Superior wear by 23.10 per cent. Longer sea-life by 29.92 per cent. Greater survival by 25.88 per cent. This latest adverse discrimination is therefore most unjust. While iron ships are to be accepted as first-class up to the age of 25 years, wooden vessels are to be rejected if above half 226 AMERICAN MARINE. that age, at the best, and many of them at a quarter of the time. At the average of 25.41 years of age, but 21.68 per cent, of British metal sail tonnage survives, while at the age of 24.10 years 69.79 per cent, of American wood sail tonnage exists.^ The protection given by such a discrimination should surely be sufficient for metal tonnage, but the trust adds greatly to this preponderance. Cargoes shipped in what are allowed by it to be first-class wood vessels must pay, from California, 14.28 per cent., and from Oregon and Washington, 12.25 per cent, additional to the rates for metal, "free of particidar average." For particular average of 3 per cent, (and above), as nearly all cargoes are shipped, there is an extra charge of .375 of one per cent, for metal, which is made .75 of one per cent, (dou- ble) for wood. So that the full discrimination against wood ships is, for cargoes from California, 29.41 per cent., and from Oregon and Washington, 26.31 per cent., in "first-class" ves- sels. For cargoes in "all other wooden vessels" the higher discrimination is, from California, 41.17 per cent., and from Oregon and Washington, 36.84 per cent. And it is neetUess to say, that a considerable number of the few of our ships which still remain in the West Coast European trade will be unable to get cargoes under such insurance conditions.^ These conditions are well calculated for the British fleet to get rid of American competition for freights, the better to control the trade of the Pacific States. Decline of American Underwriting. Perhaps some econo- mists will say, let shippers get American insurance; let them charter the cheapest carriers, especially if they be our o\\n ; let our products go to market under our own flag, and let foreign underwriters go without patronage, if they deal unfairly by our shipping. Good friends, we have been going in for cheap 1 Table I., Chapter XIV. * In support of this opinion, the facts following may be stated : Since December 25, 1891, up to this date, 135 days, not a single American ship, loaded with grain or flour, has sailed from San Francisco to Europe, while in the same time 75 foreign ships (6-1 British), with full cargoes, have gone on their way with flying colors. But one American bark has sailed from Portland or Tacoma, in the grain trade, since November 18, 1891, 240 days, while 84 foreign ships (74 British) have cleared in the same time. So the British ban is doing its work. (July 14, 1892.) FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE POWER. 227 insurance, as it is proposed we shall do for cheap ships, regard- less of where it comes from or belongs, or what would be the consequences of building up foreign underwriting interests to the neglect and decay of our own. We hav^e opened the sheep- fold to the wolf. Where are now the American underwriters you would talk about? What power remains to them to handle the enormous volume of our foreign commerce? Do you not know that they are about as impotent and as wanting as our decayed marine is, for this great work ? A short time ago an American shipbuilding concern, shipping machinery from Wil- mington, Del., to Puget Sound, Wash., for the purpose of establishing there an iron shipbuilding yard and machine shop, owning the steamer as well as the cargo themselves, the whole valued at about •*^300,000, had hard work to find American underwriters enough to take the risk. Why did they seek for American underwriters, you may ask? Because all the for- eign companies refused. They did so, doubtless, because the enterprise was wholly American, and probably this risk would be all the one ever offered to them by this shipbuilding com- pany. Had the expedition been a British one going from Glasgow to Victoria, B. C, every underwriter in the United Kingdom would have giadl}' named a rate, or accepted an offer for name and amount, and every one of them will say that sen- timent has no influence in their transactions, but that, with them, "business is business." But facts talk. Why did for- eign underwriters decline this risk, which was good, and Amer- ican insurance comj^anies accept it? This incident well illus- trates the interest, and icant of interest^ of American and foreign underwriters, respectively, in enterprises wholly of value to our own country, and of disservice to foreign nations. Our old underwriting strength has not all gone yet, but it will go under, ultimately, with our shipping power. What has wasted the one has destroyed the other ; what will save the one will rescue the other. That remedy is the revival of American public spirit and the restoration of our merchant marine, which will be sure to follow that revival, if it ever comes. British Mercantile Discrimination. This seems a good place to show that business is more than "business " with other classes than shipowners and underwriters of Great Britain. The mer- 228 AMERICAN MARINE. chants In their chambers of commerce have their rnles and res- ulations, their tariffs and prohibitions, for the protection of British interests. For a long time it has been privately told that the grain buyers of Liverpool will not pay so much for wheat brought to market in American as in British vessels, hence the greater part of American carriage to Europe has gone to Continental ports. Matters like this seldom get into print, — not even into the market reports, much less free-trade treatises on political economy. It seems we are now so nearly conquered commercially, and so nearly dead in national senti- ment, that matters of mercantile discrimination can be allowed the light. In other words, it appears recently that the British merchants have dressed their front behind the underwriters, as well as the shipowners of the kingdom. Complete consent has been given by them for a British monopoly of underwriting on cargoes from the Pacific coast. They support the "Wheat Tariff Association," which we have introduced in preceding pages, as appears from the following article from the "Bank- er's Magazine : " — EISURAXCE ox WHEAT, California Banker's Magazine, San Francisco, Vlth Mar., 1891. The Editor of the Banker's Magazine, London : Dear Sir, — At p. 351 of your excellent February issue you have an article on "American offices," in which you say, "We have not space to devote to our American cousins ; " although you manage to suggest that we Americans have '' the assurance to make tempting estimates by which somebody must lose if any are to win ; " you charge us " with counting upon the other fellow's losing, and our reli- ance upon forfeiture." Now really that is bad treatment, as you will probably admit when you have read this. Take a walk with us round San Francisco ; see, here are English offices on the right and left. Here are the Thames and Mersey, the Liverpool and London and Globe, Norwich, Union, Roj'al, Northern, Imperial, Queen, London and Lancashire, Liverpool-Underwriters, Lion, Phoenix, Sun, Universal, Scottish Union, North British, Guar- dian, Maritime, Marine, last of all London Assurance. We Americans give you every patronage, and open our cities to your business. What is the return ? A simple boycott ! The cargoes of wheat that the farmers of California ship to London are forced by you into your London offices. No merchant dare pass his bill of lading and drafts with an American policy, or the cargo would be unsalable. FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE POWER. 229 It is a sine qua non that all cargoes must be insured in your offices. Surely, that is a piece of London Assurance. The California msurance offices joined together, and put up $150,- 000 as a gold margin deposit, if you would condescend to allow us to insure our own wheat ! No ! The offer is refused with scorn. Now suppose (for the sake of argument) that we boycotted you, and ordered all these foreign companies out of San Francisco? Our own good companies, the California Insurance, Commercial, Fire- man's Fund, Union, Sun, and others would make the profit upon our own farmer's wheat that you London men take from us. That boy- cott is a foul, burglarious weapon, that has been imported into America by the laborers, because you English over the Pond had not sense enough to crush it there. While these lines are rolling from my gray goosequill, see ! there goes a high wagon along Montgomery Street, painted flaming red, with letters a foot long, " Boycott the firm of ." You fellows (that is your own word) boy- cott the farmers and merchants of San Francisco. Now please part with a little of your London Assurance, and tell us : What excuse you have for so mean a trick ? Your answer will be waited with im- patience by all the distinguished audience of the California Banker's Magazine, Paris, Berlin, Ottawa, Montreal, New York, Boston, Chi- cago, 1,100 banks in the Pacific States, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane. This is the challenge. Please publish this letter in your valuable col- umns. Answer it in a fair strain, considering the advantages that we grant your English companies, and we may arrive at an adjustment of this London Assurance. Ed. C. B. M. Boycott of the Liverpool Corn Exchange. In addition to the evidence above, relating to the London merchants, we shall submit a letter from the secretary of the California Insurance Company, one of the strongest and most reliable corporations of the Pacific coast, in regard to the protective policy of the Liverpool Corn Exchange. This letter corroborates the state- ments of the editor of the "Banker's Magazine," and leaves no doubt of the "taboo " or "boj^cott " now enforced, with more or less rigor, against American insurance, as well as American carriage, of grain to be sold in the British market. The European nations discriminating against American pigs and products did so under the pretense of health ; the British mer- chants and their agents discriminating against our vessels give for an excuse that they are built of wood ; but the new catch- 230 AMERICAN MARINE. penny policy of prohibiting American insurance is yet without j^retense or excuse, except commercial greed. This new sys- tem of "free trade" without " reciprocity " marks the intro- duction of social " protection " run mad. It discounts subsi- dies, subventions, bounties, and all forms of legislative action for the object which it has in view. MR. fowler's letter. The California Insurance Company. San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 25, 1891. Hon. Wm. W. Bates, U. S. Commissioner of Navigation, Treasury Dep't, Wash., D. C. Dear Sir, — I beg to acknowledge due receipt of your esteemed favor of the 22d ult., likewise your valuable Report to the Secretary of the Treasury for last year. I endeavored to procure for you a copy of the agreement entered into by English companies establishing new rates and rules governing insurance on our exports from California, Oregon, and Washington, but found that no company had one to spare. You will, no doubt, be surprised to learn that American insurance companies are tabooed by the Liverpool Corn Exchange from under- writing on our grain exports to Europe, whether by American or foreign vessels. With the view of protecting their own insurance companies, the rule of the Exchange is that these cargoes must be in- sured in standard English companies. Some years back, three of our local companies deposited with English banks at Liverpool the sum of $150,000, which we arranged to keep good at all times, for the better protection of their policy-holders in Europe, but our friends who fa- vored American capital were forced to go over to the enemy, as, to sell their shipments, their Liverpool representatives were compelled to take out insurance thereon in EngHsh companies, as our policies were posi- tively refused as not being the required protection. Under such a strong protection (of English companies) our companies had to yield to the inevitable and lose the cream of our business without the power of retaliation. When iron or steel vessels first commenced trading to our port, the English companies reduced rates for insurance on their cargoes, and of course other companies had to follow. There is a marked preference of English companies for English- owned vessels, so much so that some will not write at all on American vessels.* ^ A similar rule obtains as to the Calcutta trade. FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE POWER. 231 American companies commenced to lose control of their business when foreign capital began to operate in the United States. Compe- tition naturally followed (their advent), and, to retain their own, Ameri- can companies had to meet the cut rates and low quotations, which foreign companies offer to get business on their books (and freights for their ships). Through adverse legislation of all our States against American insurance corporations ; the arbitrary attitude of some of their insur- ance coramissionei's in the matter of our investments, although the assets of foreign companies are accepted without question, doubt, or examination ; and of the favorable conditions under which foreign capital can operate in America, it will be but a short time before our companies will have to cease to be marine underwriters. I beg to remain, dear sir. Yours very truly, Wm. H. C. Fowler, Secretary. The disclosures in this chapter need no comment further than this : They are mortifying to a degree. If such treatment can be taken by the American people without resentment, and without an effort to protect themselves against it, they will deserve the scorn which such a course invites. There is often much talk about a "Monroe Doctrine," to be enforced in some corner of South or Central America, regardless of such foreign imposition on our own citizens as has been, and is being now, practiced with impunity in our own ports. Who will not defend his own, fights not for another's cause. CHAPTER XVI. SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. Coniparatwe Seaworthiness and Safety of Foreign and American Ships. It having been shown that the British han- dicap our shipping in the Pacific coast and European trade, first, by a preferential mode of buikling; second, by differen- tial insurance rates ; third, by interdicting our underwriting, it will be in order next to show the seaworthiness and safety of American over British shipping in this coveted trade. From 1882 to 1886 the author made accurate observations on the spot, and closely studied the performance at sea of the fleets of different flags engaged. The information derived from this investigation will be highly useful in this discussion. The California grain trade to Europe came into prominence in 1867. By 1870, when Lloyds virtually cast our ships out of their Register, both the Atlantic and Pacific grain com- merce had large proportions for that time. It was the growth of this business, after the close of the war, that induced the spurt of shipbuilding from 1865 to 1870. In this period an average of 90 shij)s and barks were built each year. In the three years following, partly in consequence of the action of Lloyds, an average of only 28 were built. In 1872-73 an average of 85 shillings per gi*oss ton was paid for freight from San Francisco to Europe. This induced another stir in the shipyards until 1879. By that time our wooden ships had been forced out of the Atlantic grain trade, and freights had got into foreign control in the Pacific commerce. But while the California trade gave anything like a fair field for our shipowning enterpi-ise, new vessels of enlarged tonnage entered it every year. The importance of this fact to the farmers of California consisted in its effect on the rates of freight, which, on the average, with the building of larger vessels, steadily declined. Of the 358 vessels that sailed in 1880-81, but 14 SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. 233 were over 2,000 tons; of these, 12 were American, and they were nearly new. The two foreigners were converted iron steamers. The same season 101 vessels under 1,000 tons, and a tenth of them below 500 tons, sailed in the fleet. In that great harvest year freights averaged 73 shillings per gross ton. But ever from the building of ships for this trade, our owners have increased their size, met the competition of foreign ship- ping, caused it to be new-built of greater tonnage, and steadily induced a lowering of freights, — to the advantage of our pro- ducers. The British, feeling our opposition, have desired to down our competition in building and carrying, and this they have been permitted to do. The voyage from San Francisco to the ports of Europe, about 14,000 miles, is one of the longest known to commerce. The grain trade is one that calls for the strongest and safest ships, and is well calculated to test the powers of sailing ves- sels. In the four years of the period investigated, the ships of eight different nations engaged in the trade mentioned. The American and British fleets were large, the German consider- able, and the Norwegian, French, and Italian goodly in num- ber. Of course the lion's share of the carrying fell to the Brit- ish, because their merchants control so largely the European e-rain markets. British merchants dealt in most of the car- goes, and, naturally, in circumvention of competition, British ships obtained the greater part of the transportation. British cargfoes, or those to be sold to British merchants, received their cover from British underwriters ; then, pretty much of course, but now nearly all are constrained to do, since merchants and underwriters stand in together for protection, as we have seen. These classes, with the shipowners, are so closely related that this defensive policy has come down, with more or less vigor, from Cromwell's time. It is therefore no wonder that Amer- ican interests are made to stand back, and await the pleasure and convenience of the London and Liverpool exchanges. Comparative Ship Performance. The grain year in Cali- fornia, beginning July 1, and ending June 30, corresponds to the harvest seasons and the fiscal year of the government. The facts and computations, which supply the groundwork of the statistics following, have been studied and verified with attention and care, both on the spot and from public reports of 234 AMERICAN MARINE. dejjartures and arrivals out, charters and freights, disasters, accidents and losses published in the "Commercial News and Shipping List " of San Francisco, a journal of twenty years' standing, specially devoted to commerce and navigation, and regarded as complete and reliable in its work. The averages in the tables have been made for each one of forty-eight consecu- tive months, then combined in four one-year statements, and finally united in a four-year table. This work afforded an analytical and complete view of the performance of the differ- ent divisions and fleets, under the various flags, by months, separate years, and for a period of four years. Of course, the most reliable deductions will be those from comparisons of the larger fleets, — the British and American, precisely those of most importance in this inquiry. For convenience, in discus- sion, the large table, VL, will be divided into five parts. PART FIRST OF TABLE VI. DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL, NUMBER OF EACH KIND, AVERAGE TONNAGE, CARGO, VALUE, AND RATE OF FREIGHT OF EACH FLEET SAILING FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO EUROPE, 1881 TO 1884-85 inclusive, averages. Description of Number Register Cargo in Value in Rate of Vessel. of t^hips. Tonnage. Centals. DoUars. Freight. £ s. d. American wood 418 1634..3 52,400 82,113 2 7 5| American iron ^ 5 1201.0 40,799 62,367 22 18 3f 2 11 9| British wood . . 198 1271.7 42.394 68,201 British iron . 7B1 1356.5 44,618 • 75,595 2 11 5i'b German wood . 39 1196.4 37,697 63,675 2 9 0| German iron . . 41 1006.7 31,999 56,500 2 8 8v Norwegian wood . 20 928.7 29,346 46,900 2 14 94 Norwegian iron 2 1111.0 37,711 72,473 2 10 French wood ^ . . 16 628.1 20,680 36,718 22 18 9| French iron . 7 80(5.3 27,.541 44,987 2 10 8i Italian wood ^ . 12 880.9 28,527 41,203 23 6 2 Dutch wood . . 1 1951.0 53.938 72,816 13 7 6 Russian wood . 1 1383.0 41,823 69,000 33 British steamers . 11 1761.2 61,330 106,850 22 19 8| French steamer 1 2663.0 73,036 106,046 1 10 Two of the American iron sailings in above table were of 1 No American iron or French wood in 1882-83, or Italian wood in 1883-84. 2 Most sailed in year of highest freights. 3 Most sailed in year of lowest freights. • SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. 235 British-built vessels that had been wrecked and subsequently repaired in our ports to such extent as to be entitled to regis- try. Neither of them sailed in 1882-83. One of the sailings was of a new American -built ship in 1884. Only the larger fleets can be fairly compared with one another on all the points of performance. This is especially true in regard to the rates of freight, which were highest in 1881-82, and lowest in 1884-85. Six of the eleven British steamers sailed in the year of highest freights, which accounts for the aj)parent advantage of steam over sail in charter rates. Iron steamers in this trade, although making the voyage in about two thirds of sailing time, commanded only a few pence per gross ton higher rates than sailing ships, and were given no advantage whatever in the matter of insurance. Kussian, Norwegian, and British wood and French iron also took a disproportionate number of cargoes in the years of highest freights, and so appear to have been unduly favored in their rates. And this is also the case as between American wood and British iron ships, and therefore the average difference in rates, 8.33 per cent, in favor of the latter, does not appear so great as it really was, and as it stands in the one-year tables, where it amounts to 4.75 per cent, in 1881-82; to 13 per cent, in 1882-83; to 17.1 per cent, in 1883-84; and to 14.9 per cent, in 1884-85. The very small average difference in 1881 was due to a circum- stance unusual to the trade. In that year wheat was much more abundant in San Francisco than iron tonnage in Liver- pool, and the American ships lying in the "spot" market actually received the highest freights. In July, August, October, and November, American wood received from 3 to 5 per cent, more than British iron, which was in large degree chartered "to arrive." But this fortune was much too good to last. The British merchants soon got the trade in hand again, and next year very much reduced both comparative rates and engagements. The year of 1883-84 opened with an average discrimination, in July, of 23.84 per cent., followed in August with a differ- ence of 19.66 per cent.; in September, 12.06 per cent.; in October, 19.8 per cent. ; in November, 37.7 per cent. ; and in December of 45.5 per cent, in favor of British iron tonnage. For more than two months following not a single American 236 AMERICAN MARINE. ship effected an engagement. In 1884-85 a similar course of competition was pursued. The British iron rates for the month of September averaged 21.26 per cent. ; for October, 20.9 per cent.; November, 16.16 percent.; December, 30.12 per cent. ; and January, 19.42 per cent. gTcater than were paid to American ships. The British discrimination is not always confined to iron. There were many months of the four years when wooden ships under the British flag received from 5 to 15 per cent, more than like tonnage under the stars and stripes ; but from the disparity of nimibers in the two fleets, and the falling off in British wood, it resulted that the yearly tables, in three years out of the four, exhibited the American wood ships as receiv- ing the higher freights, by from 2 to 4.5 per cent. In 1882-83, however, the tables were turned in favor of British wood to the extent of 8 per cent. The Italian wood, for the most part chartered in Europe in the year 1884-85, actually received nearly 3 per cent, higher average rates than British iron. The vessels of Italy and Norway did not carry a pound of their California cargoes to their own ports, and few of the French and German sailed to other than British ports. In the large fleets, as a prevailing rule, the highest rates are always paid to British iron, which years ago was made by British merchants and the Lloyds the standard of the trade. Under this discrimination, without justification, except as a policy protective of British interests, American ships are obliged, as a rule, to accept engagements and take the lowest freights, as opportunity offers. There was another evil. On an average, while the propor- tion of British to American tonnage under charter and loading was as 2 to 1, the proportion of American to British tonnage, idle and awaiting charter, was often much greater than 4 to 1. In the six months ending October, 1885, the chartering of Brit- ish in proportion to tonnage in waiting reached a ratio of 5 to 1. While, in seasons of active markets, a very large propor- tion of British vessels are chartered, months perhaps, before arrival, and few have to wait a month for a cargo, the most of the American ships spent much more time in port than at sea. Many of the best in the business laid a year awaiting an engagement, and several spent three years of time, ready and SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. 237 willing to accept rates much below the standard of British iron charters. The Fallacy of Free- Carrying. Such experience as this proves the unprofitableness and foolishness of dependence on free-carrying and open competition, instead of a wisely con- trived protection, for the employment of our vessels. It also proves that competition with the British is unequal and unfair, as we should expect it to be with any nation determined to monopolize the commerce of the world for itself. It is an art- ful publication that, " The ocean is free to all the world, — on the domain of Neptune you cannot apply protection;" but it need deceive only the simple-minded. It is not on the open sea, but in every port of the world, that Great Britain applies protection to her ships. In a liberal degree, her shipping pro- tection inheres in the hearts of her merchants in foreign trade, who prefer British to other vessels. In an overruling measure, it is derived from the policy of her rich underwriters at Lloyds', who always bet their guineas at home and abroad on the national flag, "that has braved a thousand years the battle and the breeze," and against any rival flag. It dwells largely in the loyal devotion of the British people to the welfare and prosperity of their own countrymen. Lord Bacoii's PAnciiAc. The great Lord Bacon, on a memorable occasion, before American ships had existence, laid down in very plain English the principle and rule of British protection. "Let us," he exclaimed, "advance the commodi- ties of our own kingdom, and employ our own countrymen before strangers." On Bacon's principle Great Britain has reared her naval and commercial greatness, and by this principle it will last for- ever. And it is now enduring at American cost. For if our own good ships can, and do, carry cheaper and safer than the British, whether of iron or wood, their non -employment is our country's loss. Yet this loss in building and sacrifice in car- rying, strange to say, our government seems to care nothing about. Upon the merits of American shijjs the country is sadly misinformed. The enemy hath sown tares in our edito- rial sanctums — while we slept. Numbers of our own people are at work denouncing our shipbuilders, decrying our ships, and condemning our shipowners, — doing their best to work up 238 AMERICAN MARINE. a false sentiment, hurtful to the United States government and damaging to every interest of the American people, but help- ful to Great Britain in gaining a monopoly of our foreign trade. Where is our natural pride of country ? Where is our boasted love of liberty? Where is our sense of fair play, of independence, and economy? Let it be noted that the American wooden ships carried larger and more valuable cargoes than their British iron rivals ; and if paid at equal rates would have received for their four years' work $940,759 more freight money than they did. On the other hand, if the British iron fleet had accepted the aver- age rate paid the American fleet, the sum saved to California would have amounted to a o i < 1 1 1 1 m 1 s 2 4 2 1 i (3 fcJO 5 4 8 3 1 1 aj a .2 1 4 8 2 2 Q 6 1 3 27 1 1" £ 12 4 28 2 1 1 1 s "S "o 9 4 16 1 1 a> ns a 1 5 6 8 2 1 1 1 ■3 6 .A < Ameriean wood . American iron British wood . . British iron . . German wood German iron . . Norwegian wood Norwegian iron . French wood . . French iron Italian wood . . Dutch wood . . Russian wood British steamers . French steamer . 2 7 Of the larger fleets, it appears that the American wood had the fewest accidents, the most infrequent perils, and the smallest number of lost ships. The American total losses — "wrecked," "missing," and "abandoned" — were less than a half (.4784) of 1 per cent, of the number composing the fleet. British iron total losses exceeded three quarters (.7884) of 1 ^ Parts First and Second given in previous pages. SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. 253 per cent, of the iiiunber of the fleet, and amounted to a propor- tion (.648) nearly 65 per cent, greater than for American wood. But the British wood proved inferior to the iron. The total losses of British wood were (.0202) fully 2 per cent, of the fleet, and amounted to (. 294) nearly 30 per cent, more than the iron. This bad record of British shipping is primarily due to weakness of structure and overloading. Necessarily, our better ships, by discriminative premiums, are made to contribute largely of tribute money to reimburse the Llojds and the insurance companies, who cover almost any risk under the British flag. If we take the total losses under this flag, inclu- ding the steamers, we have eleven out of 970 vessels. Under the American flag there were two total losses out of 423 ves- sels. The difference in seaworthiness and safety may be thus exhibited : — Total losses of American flag . . . .1 out of 212. Total losses of British flag .... 1 out of 88. Proportionate safety of British flag . . .41.5 per cent. Nor should it escape attention that half the total losses of British iron were "missing" ships, with all hands lost. With regard to ships in imminent peril, the superior seaworthiness of American ships is even more manifest. Including those in "distress," "sprung a leak," "jettisoned," and "decks swept," in one list, the proportion of American wood is (2.871) 2| per cent. ; of British iron, (5.256) b\ per cent. ; and of British wood, (9.6) 9^^^ per cent. Under the American flag there were 14 ships out of 423 in ]ieril ; but under the British flag there were 59 ships out of 970 in danger. The difference in liability may thus be manifested : — In danger under American flag .... 1 out of 30.2. In danger under British flag ... . .1 out of 16.44. Proportionate safety of British flag . . . 54.4 per cent. What have the depreciators and detractors and non-pro- tectors of American ships to say to facts like these, now for the first time marshaled in the cause of truth and justice? When the accidents, perils, and losses are considered, the con- clusion is irresistible that, on the average, as generally loaded and sailed, first-class American sail-ships of wood excel the 254 AMERICAN MARINE. British, wood or iron, iu every quality o£ good performance at sea, and just as truly in every element of economy in port. This being the settled judgment of American owners and masters, well founded on experience and observation, it is no wonder they see no advantage in changing home for foreign builders. Of this, their decision, let our statesmen take due notice and govern themselves accordingly. Let them seriously consider the fact, that the disadvantages of our shipping inheres in its nationality and the national neglect, and not in its materials or workmanship. Remove the drawback of the Jfag, by instituting benefits for the encouragement of business under it, and protect the rights of our ships, and the whole world will help us restore our vanishing power of gathering the wealth of the sea. The Greater Economy of American Ships. Having shown in previous pages of this chapter that the American sailing ships in the California trade with Europe have no superiors iu size of hull and weight of cargo, in cheapness and speed of carriage, in eflficiency and safety of performance, it remains to compare their merits as economical instruments of trade, and establish their just claims to exemption from damaging insur- ance discriminations. What may be gained from the perfect building and naviga- tion of ships is absolute immunity from the needless waste of property at sea. In the Providence that overrules the deep and directs the whirlwind and the storm, man may not always in his skill and patience successfully prevail. But while the fancied dangers of the deep are few, the positive perils of the ship are many. Ignorance, willfulness, and the greed of gold are the fell destroyers of ships. What acts are more malevolent than the scanting of materi- als and the slighting of work? What can be more merciless than fraudulent construction and reckless navigation? And what is more cruel than the overloading of ships to the extent of foundering and drowning their crews? Yet the evil-doer casts his bane ashore and afloat. What the world wants to know about ships is this: Who are the most inventive and skillful builders? Who are the most liberal and the wisest owners ? Who are the bravest and most proficient mariners ? And last but not least, which power is it that shall eventually SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. 255 rule the nations with a ship of iron? A very good answer to these questions at the present time may be found in the com- parative waste of propei'ty at sea. The following table will exhibit this waste through losses to ship, cargo, and freight of the different fleets engaged for four years : — A FOUR-YEAR TABLE OF COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF FLEETS, CARRYING GRAIN AND FLOUR FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO PORTS IN EUROPE, FROM JULY 1, 1881, TO JULY 1, 1885, GIVEN IN PARTS. Part Fourth.^ Property Losses. Description of Vessel. Number of bhips. Vessel. Cargo. Freight. Total. American wood .... 418 $157,250 $237,560 $47,800 $442,116 American iron 5 300 800 285 1,385 British wood . . 198 249.267 312,445 89,748 651,460 British iron 761 414,350 513,890 129,792 1,058,0.32 German wood . . 39 11,500 9,418 11,240 32,158 German iron . 41 1,250 — — 1,2.50 Norwegian wood 20 1,000 — — 1,000 Norwegian iron . 2 — — — — French wood . . 16 41,280 65,624 21,988 128,892 French iron ( — — — — Italian wood . . 12 20,000 35,000 12,000 67,000 Dutch wood . . 1 — — — — Russian wood . . 1 2,000 — — 2,000 British steamers . 11 245,000 95,726 34,586 375,312 French steamer . 1 1,000 — — 1,000 Total 1,533 $1,144,197 $1,270,469 $346,939 $2,761,605 There is nothing like a test of dollars and cents to cut down commercial conceit, and correct our impressions of intrinsic value. Underwriters frequently publish statements of "losses paid," together with "net premiums," and "margin of re- ceipts," intended to show whether insurance rates are remuner- ative or not; but as insurers do not cover fully all the prop- erty at risk at sea, and on hulls write only against loss or damage above a fixed percentage of value, their statements come far short of full testimony for a just judgment of the merits of different types of ships, or dissimilar systems of ship- building. We must go beyond underwriters' accounts for the ^ Parts First, Second, and Third given iu preceding pages. 256 AMERICAN MARINE. full data of shipi^ing economy. To decide rightly the question of superiority in type and construction, the performance at sea, and all the expense of wear and tear of voyages, must be included and considered. The losses by wear and tear, and through the minor accidents, never find a place in underwriters' statements. A ship is a machine. What it costs to build a vessel is of much less consequence to the owner than what it will cost to run and keep her in good condition. A ship may cost, relatively, high or low, but her value for work and her durability are the true tests for economical character. These tests never form the study of the political economist. All ships, good, bad, and indifferent, are alike to him. He judges by first cost, and is necessarily in error. The survival and efficiency of ships, their performances and economy in use, — sciences yet undeveloped by naval philosophy, — to the wisest economist are quite unknown. In the foregoing statement the value of ships lost, or amount of damages to hull or cargo, wliere not accurately reported, is expertly and fairly estimated from the tonnage of vessel, amount or extent of loss, and character of repairs. Partial losses, so far as published, are taken from underwriters' state- ments. The value of cargoes and freights are known with cer- tainty, and occup}'^ columns in Part First of the Table of Per- formance. Wood and iron vessels have been appraised as of equal value, — fifty dollars per ton. Iron ships cost the most, but the table would seem to show, by the number and amount of losses, that for intrinsicality they are worth the least. If we divide the amount of losses under the headings of "hull," "cargo," "freight," and "total," we shaU have the peril rate per register ton on the average ship of the different fleets in dollars, cents, and mills, as set forth in the following table, in which also is listed the number of lives lost by shipwreck (the British proportion of which is 88 per cent.) : — SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE 257 COMPARATIVE PERIL PER TOX. Part Fifth.^ Peril Bate per Ton. 05 Description of Vessel. M Q l^ o 6 Hul . Cargo. Freight. Total. ^ !zi $ c. m. $ c. m. $ c. m. $ c. m. American wood . 418 23 34 n 7 64 7i — American iron 5 5 13 3 4 1i 23 — British wood . 198 99 1 24 35 7+ 2 58 7+ 18 British iron 761 40 H 49 7+ 12 6 1 2 5 68 German wood . 39 24 6 20 l| 24. 1 68 9 — German iron . 41 3 — 3 — Norwegian wood 20 6 4 — — 5 4 — French wood . 10 4 10 H 6 53 2 19 12 82 5 15 Italian wood . 12 1 89 H 3 31 1 13 5 6 33 8 — Knssian wood . 1 1 44 5 — — 1 44 5 — British steamers 11 12 64 6 4 94 1 1 78 5 19 37 3 25 French steamer . 1 29 1 — — 29 1 — Here it is seen that for the cost of wear and tear, and losses of all kinds, the American wood leads the large fleets by a long distance, notwithstanding it also makes the speediest passages, and its wear and tear may well be considerable. Taking the peril on "cargo" as a standard of comparison, British iron hiills have 21.74 per cent, greater proportionate peril than American wooden ships. By the same standard it is worth 25.37 per cent, more, proportionately, to insure freight in British iron than American wood vessels. Applying the same test to British wood ships, we find them exhibiting a like pro- portionate inferiority of 20.62 per cent, in hull, and 43.1 per cent, in freight risk. Thus we see the American ship is, rela- tively, far siiperior to either the wood or iron under the British flag. The absolute superiority may be represented by the ratios of peril on hulls and cargoes in the following manner : — American superiority. On hulls. Per cent. American wood is to British iron as 23 cts. to 40.12 cts. 74.43 American wood is to British wood as 23 cts. to 99 cts. . 317.39 On cargoes. American wood is to British iron as 34.75 cts. to 49.75 cts. 43.16 American wood is to British wood as 34.75 cts. to 124 cts. 256.11 1 Parts First, Second, Third, and Fourth, given in previous pages. 258 AMERICAN MARINE. Of the smaller fleets experiencing perils and meeting with accidents, the Norwegian and German fleets had the best suc- cess. The fleets having few or no mishaps are probably too small to depend upon for an average rate of eventful risk. The British iron steamers, the French and Italian wood, make a bad showing indeed. The following is a list of fleets, with average speed and total peril rate in the order of superiority for four years : — Description of Vessel. German iron . . Norwegian wood American iron American wood . German wood British iron . British wood . . Italian wood . . French wood . . British steamers Number Number of Voyage Ships. Days. 41 136.7317 20 127.25 5 124 418 125.5471 39 135.5263 701 130.6911 198 131.7644 12 141.9166 16 139.5206 11 83.7 Total Peril Rate per Ton. 3 5 4 23 64 7i 68 9 2 5 58 7i 33 8 82 5 37 3 From this showing, the German and Norwegian navigators and their ships seem to have had unexceptional good fortune. There is no doubt these nations deserve great credit for pru- dent management and good seamanship. They will keep the sea, or at least would deserve to, long after the French and Italians shall have been driven off. By the same indications, the British nation should ultimately strike colors to the United States. The only difficulty in the way is the dispute on the question of "free ships," and that old ship-scuttling heresy that these States are not a nation, but a provincial band of sovereignties, without a single national interest belonging to the whole lot; and, consequently, shipbuilding, navigation, and commerce are only "j^rivate interests," not worth a public thought, let alone protection. Comparison of British and Arnerican Fleets. In this con- nection, however, it may be of interest to review the expectation of the merchant fleets under the American and British flags, if they both be put upon equal footing. We name this condi- I SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. 259 tlon, because the British flag has had the advantage for forty years, and for all this time Congress has neglected and refused to promise our own flag fair play. Forming the American and British ships into opposing fleets, this is how they stand in a comparison of the flags : — Description of Flag. American (sail) British (sail) . British (steam) Number of Ships. Number Voyage Days. 423 125.5287 959 129.8825 11 83.7 Total Peril Rate per Ton. $ c. m. 64 3i 1 33 n 19 37 3 Proportionate economy of British flag, 48.32 per cent. This result indicates a superiority in shipbuilding and navi- gation so deepl}' marked as to entitle our country to confidence in our mechanics and mariners in all time to come. But the truth of the matter may be shown in another way. If Ameri- can wooden ships were no better than British, French, and Italian, there would seem to be good enough reason for "sub- stituting iron for wood " in Europe, as we hear so much, from the thoughtless and uninformed, should be done in the United States. But if wooden ships are inferior to iron in every country but our own, there must be a reason for it. And if our wooden ships can beat the fleets of the preeminently "iron country," there must be a substantial reason for that significant fact. The cardinal causes are simple enough, namely, superiority of model, goodness of materials, excellence of construction, and admirable navigation. These capital qual- ifications are just as marked in our iron steamers as our wooden ships. And these are facts that our statesmen should consider before they resolve to substitute the shipyards of Europe for those of our own country, whereby we shall ex- change greatness for mediocrity, and superiority for shortcom- ing. Doubtless some of our countrymen will be surprised to learn that such was the redeeming excellence of the American wood fleet that, putting all the wooden ships in one fleet, and all the iron vessels, including steamers, into another fleet, the 260 AMERICAN MARINE. total peril per ton was an eighth of one per cent, less for all the wood than for all the iron. Here is the comparison : — Description of Vessel. Wooden Iron . Total Aggregate Tonnage. 1,024,116 1,109,52.3 2,133,639 Aggregate Peril Rate Losses. per Ton. 1,324,626 1,436,979 2,761,605 Average of the aggregate, wood and iron Average of British iron alone .... Average of American wood alone, only 1 29 ^ 1 29 5A 1 29 4A 1 33 U 64 3i As we have shown elsewhere, only 32 per cent, of the aggre- gate of the tonnage for four years was American wood. The British, French, and Italian portions of the aggregate wood was decidedly inferior, while the American, German, and French portions of the iron were as decidedly superior. The result both demonstrates and illustrates, lucidly, the wrong and evil inflicted by the British Llojds, and all underwriters following their lead, in driving our wooden ships out of busi- ness, by a policy of charging, indiscriminately, higher insur- ance rates on wood than iron tonnage. The British under- writers first initiated this distinctive policy, to encourage iron shipbuilding in the United Kingdom. Having firmly estab- lished the new trade by their timely protection, they continue and repeat their master-stroke as a force well calculated to destroy the wood shipping of foreign nations. Unjunt Underwriting Rates. In the California grain trade the Lloyds made a difference in rates on cargoes, ranging from 25 to 40 per cent, greater for wood than for iron, sail or steam. In other words, when iron rates were 2 per cent., the premium for wood ranged from 2.5 to 2.75 per cent., or more. American wood ships per register ton got no better show than British wood ships, whose average peril rate was 124 cents ; or Italian wood ships, whose average peril rate was 331 cents ; or French wood ships, whose average peril rate was 653 I SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. 261 cents, per ton. On the average British iron sailing ship the cargo peril rate was 49.75 cents per ton, which, as we have seen, is 143.16 per cent, of that for the average American wooden ship. That is to say, if cargoes in British iron ships were worth bnt 2 per cent., then cargoes in American wooden ships should have been written for 1.4 per cent. But the Lloyds of London, for the protection of British interest, set up a double rate, and every insurance company at home and abroad enforces the unjust and exterminating discrimination. Is it any wonder there are no ships and few steamers building for foreign trade to-day in the United States? The Comparative Turnout of Cargoen. Lest it be thought possible that discriminative rates of insurance on cargoes may have some justification from relative condition on arrival, the following table is quoted from the report of the Commissioner of Navigation, 1886 : — TABLE OF RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF 100 GRAIN VESSELS LEAVING THE PACIFIC COAST FOR LIVERPOOL IN THE YEAR 1883-84. Condition of Cai^o. American. 40 Wood Ships, with Cargoes of 1,500 to 3,000 tons. British. (50 Iron Ships, with Cargoes of 1,500 to 3,000 tons. Number. Per cent. 52i 20 12i 10 5 Number. Per cent. In perfect order Slightly damaged Damaged 100 to 500 bags . . Damaged 500 to 1,000 bags . Damaged over 1,000 bags . . Damaged by heating .... TotaUylost 21 8 5 4 2 31 7 6 5 8 2 1 51.7 11.7 10.0 8.4 13.2 3.3 1.7 While it is admitted these statistics, collected by the State Department, are too crude to be perfectly satisfactory in regard to accuracy, it is indisputable that the showing is greatly in favor of our position, that there is no warrant whatever for the killing British policy that is studiously applied to American ships. In the first place, as appears in my annual Table of Performance for the year 1883-84, the average size and car- riage of American and British ships in above table would be as follows : — 262 AMERICAN MARINE. Register of American wood ship Register of British iron ship . Carriage of American ship . Carriage of British ship . Cargo of average American ship Cargo of average British ship . 1,632.12 tons. 1,411.64 tons. 3,260.74 lbs. per ton. 3,269.54 lbs. per ton. 53,219 centals. 46,154 centals. Whence it results that each American ship in the foregoing table carries 15.3 per cent greater number of centals, or bags, than her British competitor, and is by that proportion the superior in good delivery of cargo, if there was no other differ- ence in the performance of the fleets. Manifestly, it is not fair to compare by numbers of vessels, but in preference by quantities of cargoes. The table approximately corrected stands as follows : — CORRECTED TABLE OF RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF 40 AMERICAN WOOD AND 60 BRITISH IRON SHIPS. GRAIN LADEN FROM THE PA- CIFIC COAST FOR LIVERPOOL, IN 1883-84. Condition of Cargo. American. 40 Wood Ships, witli Average Cargoes of 53,219 Centals. British. GO Iron Ships, with Av- erage Cargoes of 46,154 Centals. Centals. Per cent. Centals. Per cent. Wliole quantity carried . . . In g'ood condition Damaced Total loss 2.128.760 2,121.710 7,050 43.46 99.668 .332 2,769,240 2,707,486 15,600 46,154 56.54 97.98 .34 1.66 Thus it results that the comparison may assume the follow- ing shape : — American superiority. Per cent. On delivery in good condition ..... 1.713 On delivery, damaged ...... 0.039 On delivery, lost ........ 1.666 Total loss ....... 3.418 What has been Shown. It has now been shown by such an array of proof as was never before brought to the exposition of the subject, that American ships have no superiors in the SAILING-SHIP PERFORMANCE. 263 California trade to Europe, nor, indeed, is it likely they have in any other ocean trade. When compared in fleets with the best ships of all nations, they are found to excel in size, capacity, value of cargo, cheapness of freight, safe delivery, good condition, speed in sailing, efficiency in navigation, escape from disasters, preservation from loss both of life and property, and in reducing to a minimum the perils of the sea. What could we have more, what would we have better, by giving up our own superior building and becoming dependent upon Great Britain for her inferior iron ships? Manifestly we would not get from her the equals of our present fleets, nor vessels of less first cost, nor greater durability. Would we thereby secure what is now wanting, — protection for the employment of our ships? Could we any the better obtain liv- ing freights, in our own ports even? Not a bit of protection or advantage would we find. Whether of iron or wood, built at liome or abroad, American ships would still have to wait till foreign vessels were first engaged at higher rates, or accept ''private terms," just as our present ships do, so long as for- eign merchants and underwriters are permitted to control the carrying-trade of the United States, solely to the advantage of rival nations. There is not a single benefit to be gained, but several sure to be lost, by substituting imported for domestic ships in American commerce. The problem of the American ship is one of protection, or abandonment, of the sea. It is most disgraceful to our govern- ment that the only thing wanting to our ships is something which itself should supply. Let but the Stars and Stripes be hauled down, and the Union Jack of Britain take its place, and better freights with more frequent engagements will fol- low, right out of our own ports. For the want of protection in some of the various ways practicable, our ships do not receive fair play, nor compete on equal footing. With the stigma of "free-ship" bills pending in Congress, how can we expect foreign merchants to load our ships at standard rates ? Every free- ship vote in Congress is an impeachment of the good character of our ships. Naturally, every British subject indorses every such impeachment. Nevertheless, we have now a better average sailing ship than is built in Britain, of either wood or iron. We have in abundance, and use in every 264 AMERICAN MARINE. instance, better iron and steel in all our metal steamers. And the additional cost of superior materials is the most economical expenditure in building a ship, as the added durability and increased safety abundantly compensate and prove. If Con- gress will act wisely the people will be patriotic. Our ship- builders and our ships will not be cast away, but rather their work will be encouraged, shipowners will be protected, and our commerce done by a marine of our own. CHAPTER XVII. PACIFIC COAST COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. The Export of Grain, 1889. Having proved, in the pre- ceding chapter, by the performances of fleets in the California trade, that American ships are superior to European craft, — that in safety, size, and speed, in efficiency and cheapness of carriage, they excel the world, — we will next consider the gain or loss of foreign freighting to the Pacific States. In the calendar year of 1889 there sailed from San Francisco 234 ships, aggregating 387,091 tons, grain laden for ports abroad. This fleet carried 12,011,674 centals (536,235 tons gross), valued at 116,430,076. Of this export, 11,171,848 centals (498,822 tons gross), valued at 815,264,145, went to Europe, and the balance to other foreign parts. The fleet to Europe numbered 213 sail, aggregating 358,205 tons: 167 ships, of 278,885 tons, were British; 30, of 58,601 tons, were American; 11, of 14,551 tons, were German; 3, of 3,277 tons, were Italian; 2, of 2,891 tons, were Swedish and Norwegian, The foreign shipping carried 416,697.05 tons, and the American, 82,046.16 tons gross of cargo. The average rate of freight paid American ships was £1 10s. 6|fZ. (17.423); the British rate was £1 15s. ^d. ; the German rate, XI 14s. Q'^d. ; the Norwegian, <£1 18s. 3J.; the Italian, XI 16s. 8(7. ; and the rate of the foreign fleet, as a whole, XI 15s. 4r7. (18.58). The average proportionate excess of rate over American, paid foreign shipping, was 15.65 per cent. The freight-money paid foreign ships was $3,577,344.17. At the rate paid American ships, it would have been 83,093,- 142.20, or $484,201.97 less. As the measurement of the foreign fleet aggregated 358,205 tons, it is apparent that the excess of freightage apportioned to each ton of vessel was $1.35. It is also clear, that this 266 AMERICAN MARINE. excess alone would have equaled the bounty proposed in the "Tonnage Bill " ^ (which called for -fl.40 to the ton) to be paid to 345,858 tons of shipping. This amount of tonnage equals 89.34 per cent, of the entire grain fleet of 1889. It represents more capacity than we have had for years fit for the California trade with Europe, and as much tonnage as we had in 1889 eligible for bounty under the bill. "The figures above given show the average discrimination for the year. Attention will now be called to the figures for a single month of 1889, in which we find the greater extreme. The Business of One Month. In December, 1889, there sailed from San Francisco 24 British ships, aggregating 40,221 tons; 4 American, measuring 8,722 tons; and 1 German ship of 1,178 tons, with grain to Europe. The average British rate of freight was XI 15s. 3^f7. (equal to ''!i8.57) per ton; the average American rate was <£1 7.s. l^d. (equal to $6.59) per ton; and the German rate was £1 12s. Qd. (equal to -17.77). The British rate in excess of American was 30.04 per cent. ; and the German rate (on a wooden ship) was 19.8 per cent. As a British ship carries 1.4 tons gross of grain for each ton of register measurement, the excess of rate amounted to $'2.72 for each ton of the British fleet. This is equivalent to a bounty rate of 38.85 cents- per ton of vessel, for 1,000 miles sailed (the "Tonnage Bill " called for 20 cents), which mani- festly was overpaid, or abstracted from the pockets of the Cal- ifornia farmers, to enrich the monopolizing marine of England. At 20 cents a ton per 1,000 miles, with a limit of 7,000 miles of voyage, the bounty proposed to be paid American ships by the "Tonnage Bill" amounts to one doUar per ton gross of cargo. As the British fleet of December, 1889, was paid in excess of the American f^2.72, and the German ship il.l8, per ton of cargo, the rate of bounty is not extravagant; on the contrary, it seems too small to cover the average dis- crimination as^ainst our flas", and thus to save our Pacific coast farmers from the sacrifices now made on the altar of foreign greed. The Export of Flour. Having shown that foreign ship- ping asked and received an excess of $484,202 for freightage 1 Fifty-first Congress (1890). See Chap. XV. I PACIFIC COAST COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. 267 on grain, it will be in order to see what additional excess was paid for the carriage of flour. Foreign tonnage almost monop- olized the flour trade in 1889. An American ship took two cargoes to China for Chinese merchants, and another American vessel carried part of a cargo to Liverpool. The balance of the transport was by foreign bottoms, principally British. In the course of the year there sailed 30 flour-laden ships, aggregating 37,974 tons, with 485,245 centals valued at ^1,951,184. Of this fleet 21, of 27,430 tons, were British; 3, of 5,160 tons, were American; 4, of 3,109 tons, were German; 1, of 1,233 tons, was Norwegian; and 1, of 1,030 tons, was Ha- waiian in flag. Of the flour carried, 429,654 centals, valued at 11,707,833, went to Europe, and the balance to China and Australia. Of the cargoes to Europe, the British flag carried 78 per cent., or 335,879 centals, valued at -$1,330,733, at an average rate per ton gross of XI 14^!. ^\d. ; the German flag carried 15.88 per cent., or 68,250 centals, valued at -1274,100, at a rate of XI 15s. 9f7. ; our own flag carried 1.39 per cent., or 6,000 centals, valued at -f 24, 000, at a rate of XI 6^. 9(/. ; the Norwegian flag carried 4.54 per cent., or 19,525 centals, valued at |>79,000, at a rate of X2. Thus, all but 1.39 per cent, of this convey- ance was done by foreign craft, at an average rate of XI 15s. Id. ($8.52), against an American rate of XI 6s. M. ($6.31), an excess of 31.12 per cent. The freight-mone}^ paid foreign ships was $161,139.78. The freightage for the same carriage at the rate paid the American ship would have been only $119,341.78. As the tonnage of the foreign shipping employed aggregated 29,135 tons, and the excess of freightage was $41,798, it is seen that each ton received a largess of $1.43|. The bounty proposed in the "Tonnage Bill" to American ships was $1.40, or three cents less than the flour producers of California, in 1889, overpaid in the shape of tribute to the rulers of the sea, our own good ships going idle, or taking up inferior work. If the bounty proposed in the "Tonnage Bill" was paid by the government, it would encourage our shipowners to increase their tonnage, and enable them, with superior ships, to cut down the extortionate foreign rates, perhaps to the full amount of bounty received. 268 AMERICAN MARINE. Total Extra Cost of Foreign Freights. Adding to the excess of freightage on wheat the largess on flour, we have a total of $526,000. The value of the grain and flour carried to market by for- eign vessels was !$16, 947, 978. The freightage was $3, 728, 384. The ratio of carriage. Per cent. The ratio of freightage to value of products was . . 21.99 By American ships this would have been . . . 18.88 To value of wheat alone the ratio was .... 23.37 By American vessels it would have been . . . 20.19 To value of flour alone it was . ... . . 9.57 By American vessels it would have been . . . 7.08 It follows, if American ships, instead of foreign, had car- ried these pi-oducts to market, our credit abroad would have been 18.88 per cent, more than it was, to wit, $20,147,756, instead of $16,947,978, since export freights are always paid where cargo is landed. From these facts we learn that trans- portation by our own hands is the sister of production, but by foreign hands, an oppressor; and that the use of our own shipping is as beneficial to the country as the cultivation of our farms. The features of the foreign trade and transportation of Cali- fornia, thus exhibited, are no new thing under the sun of that attractive region. The discriminative policy of the clever British, to them protective, but to us unjust, has not only killed our shipping competition in Pacific ports, but skinned the farmers of that fruitful coast from north to south. It was clearly shown in Chapter XVI., that the average annual excess of freight-money for the four-year period, 1881-2 to 1884-5, was ^$363,796. By 1889, as we have seen above, the extortion had risen to $526,000, — at the rate of 10 per cent, a year, — w^hile American shipping in the trade had fallen off proportionately. Performance of Grain Fleets, 1889. The American fleet of this (calendar) year excelled all former fleets, particularly in speed. The average ship of the different fleets made the voy- age from San Francisco to port of destination, on the basis of time to Cork, as follows : — PACIFIC COAST COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. 269 Days. The American fleet in . . . . . . . 112.86 The British fleet in 131.32 The German fleet in . . . . . ... 131.45 The Swedish fleet in 132.50 The Italian fleet in 157.33 The average foreign ship in .... . 131.76 American superiority in speed ..... 18.90 American superiority in percentage .... 16.84 Our suiaerioiity in speed, in the four-year period (Chapter XVI.), was only about 5 per cent. The British performance did not improve; the German did a little. Our gain was owing to the fact that only large and good performers could keep the trade. But look at the injustice of charging from 15 to 30 jjcr cent, higher insurance on such ships as could beat the British 16.35 per cent, of voyage-time! Then, consider whether this oppression should always last? If our shijiping interest should submit to outrage and ruin, for want of national protection, what shall be done about the wrong inflicted upon the producers of the country? Producers Pay a Bounty to Foreign Tonnage. The ques- tion is practical. Who bestows the bounty that is extorted by foreign shipowners, when they take higher freights than American owners would be glad to get? In the author's judg- ment, our farmers pay it, our manufacturers pay it, our trav- eling community and all our people pay it. Our shipping carries now but 9.25 per cent, of export commerce. Why is this? Why are not more American, and fewer foreign, ships laden in our ports? This is certainly an interesting question to the prodvicers of every State. The answer is easy. It is because we have been a simple people, too thoughtless to shield our ships. It is because foreign merchants, shipowners, under- writers, and their governments are too cunning for our states- manship. It is because foreigners have not been kept at bay, but by free trade permitted, without check or hindrance, nay, with approbation, to impose upon our ships and their defense- less owners. The cheapest, safest, and best entitled carriers — our own good vessels — have been driven from the sea ; because, for eighty years past. Congress has not moved protec- tion for them, but given away or suspended what they had, in 270 AMERICAN MARINE. pursuance of the paralogism that "ours is a free government." If freedom should abound at sea, why not spread anarchy around on shore? If protection is wrong in principle, and government is protection, then anarchy is perfection, for that is no rule at all, but freedom wholly. Becaus3 of freedom, — anarchy in the carrying-trade, — our producers of every kind, dependent on foreign markets, are suffering now, and long have been, from the evil consequences of thrusting our ship- ping out upon the mercy and the cunning of rival nations, their shipping societies and underwriters' associations, their cunning merchants and crafty governments. Our people have noted that our ships have lost their business, but how it happened is not so clear to them; and they scarcely dream that the blight on navigation has touched the factory or reached the farm, or ever will. Our merchants and our shipowners in foreign trade, and to a great extent our underwriters, shipbuilders, mariners, engi- neers, and seamen, have been driven from their business and employments, and they will look in vain who think to find any compensation to their country for this wrong and disgrace, — wrong to the citizen and disgrace to the government. The simj)le-minded economist may theorize that freights are the lower for foreign competition. But our statistics of the Pacific coast grain trade prove that foreign shij)S are the costliest carriers. Artificial and invidious distinctions have been set up, to trick our producers out of bounties and largesses to destroy our own and support foreign marines. The question is pertinent, Will our farmers, who have brought our interior railroads to book, always submit to the bestowal of bounties upon foreign tonnage? What American interest can contend on economical grounds against foreign monopoly of our trade and transportation? Not one can do it. It would involve a waste of capital. Besides, American competition has become nil. The True Princii)le of Freighting Economg. The true principle of cheapening freights is improved shipbuilding. This means improvement of rivers and harbors, increased facil- ities of navigation, larger, stronger, safer, more efficient, and longer-lived vessels. It is a different principle, entirely, from that of calling upon the greed and poverty of the Old World PACIFIC COAST COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. 271 to fight for freights for fleets of inferior craft. In the one case we have science and skill working with labor-saving- machinery ; in the other case, there is dullness and rule of thumb, tricks of trade, subterfuges, and extortion. We might as well expect to obtain cheap cloth by reducing the wages of hand-loom weavers, as to get economical ocean carriage froni the majority of foreign ships now monopolizing our transportation. If our statesmen wish information on this subject, let them study the history of lake shipbuilding, navigation, and com- merce.^ At first only six feet of water could be drawn by ves- sels; accordingly the first built were small, and freights cost enormously. Improving the channels and harbors permitted the navigation of larger vessels; new fleets were built and freights cheapened. From a burden of 100 tons on 6 feet draft of water, lake vessels have been enlarged to a capacity of 8,000 tons, on 16 feet of water; and freight on corn from Chicago to Buffalo has fallen from an average of 15.75 cents in 1859 to 10.5 in 1861, thence to 7.5 in 1871, thence to 3.2 in 1881, and finally to 1.88 cents a bushel in 1890. The follow- ing statement is from a pamphlet on the "Twenty Foot Chan- nel," by W. A. Livingston, Detroit: — " The saving eflPected by the lake marine in a single season pays over five times the total cost of all government improvements to date. " The ton-mileage of the lake marine for 1890 was 18,849,681,384 ton-miles. The average rate of freight by rail was 9.41 mills per ton- mile ; by lake It was only 1.2 mills. Assuming the lake transporta- tion to have cost 9 mills, at that rate the carriage of the lake cargoes would have cost $169,647,132, whereas the freightage was only $22,619,617, or a saving of $147,027,514 (in one year). " From official figures given in the annual reports of the Saint ^ Following is the protective statute, under which our lake traffic was pro- hioited to foreigners and reserved for the enjoyment of our own people : — " Section 4. (Act of 1817.) That no goods, wares, or merchandise shall be imported under penalty of forfeiture thereof, from one port of the United States to another port thereof, in a vessel belonging wholly or in part to a subject of any foreign power ; but this clause shall not be con- strued to prohibit the sailing of any foreign vessel from one to another part of the United States, provided no goods, wares, or merchandise, other than those imported in such vessels from such foreign port, and which shall not be unladen, shall be carried from one port or place to another in the United States." 272 AMERICAN MARINE. Mary's Falls Canal, it is shown that the saving by water transportation over rail of the traffic through this canal was $46,138,512 in 1889, and $55,234,548 in 1890, or a total saving of $101,373,160 in two years." Now, had there been no protection to the lake shipping interest, and foreign fleets been free to enter that navigation, it is as certain as anything that might have been expected, that our splendid lake marine would never have been built, but we should have been, now, thirty years behind, not only in lake navigation, but the development of the great Northwest. And yet the great public importance of the lake vessel, her harbors, her channels, and her lighthouses, has never fairly received the recognition of the country. Strange as it may seem, it has been assumed, even by presidents, senates, and houses of rep- resentatives, that the questions relating to all these matters have closely concerned the vessel interest only. There can be no doubt, if protection had been continued to our shipping in the foreign trade, that our producers in every part of the country, especially of cotton and grain, would long ere this have had the benefit of American invention and skill for the reduction of freights, through such improvements in shipbuilding as the world has not yet seen, and never may behold. No country in the world holds equality with the United States in requirements for ships of great size and speed, with special qualities for the cheap dispatch of business ; and no nation has the mechanical or nautical ability to provide better for its naval wants. All that is lacking is the opportu- nity, which a good government would wisely make. If we had control of our foreign trade, as we have of our lake traffic, our vessel designs would be made with American interests in view. Such dimensions, model, propelling power, and means of handling cargoes would be chosen, and such organization of business effected, as would look to the perfect- ing, of every quality and instrumentality of transportation. The conduct of our vessel business on the Lakes is the wonder of the world to-day ; while, to-day, we are shut out from show- ing the world in our seaports how our commerce should be carried on for the advantage of our own people. On the con- trary, every Tom, Dick, and Harry of foreign lands are laying us under tribute for doing our business in their own poky way. PACIFIC COAST COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. 273 Plainly, it is a tribute of a most offensive sort, since it is paid for acting ill our part. The Export Trade and Transportation of Oregon and Washington. If there is one part of the country more than another that needs the resource of its own transportation, it is a coast community, but particularly one at a great distance from markets, like California, Oregon, or Washington. Con- siderable space having been given to California, we will now investio:ate the traffic of the other two distant States. The following tables, A and B, exhibit the export trade of Oregon and of Washington in wheat and flour, with the sums paid for freight and the ratio of freight to cargo, for the year ended March 31, 1891. TABLE A : OREGOIsr GRAIN EXPORT, Flag. Number of Vessels. Regis- ter Tonnage. Cargoes in Centals. Value in Dollars. Freight in Dollars. Ratio of Freight to Cargo. American . . . British .... German .... 7 51 2 10,509 72,239 2,962 332,466 2,476,803 866,674 436,057 3,488,681 1.32,443 143,635 1,120,628 39,183 Per cent. 32.94 32.12 29.43 Total .... 60 85,710 3,675,943 4,057,181 1,303,446 32.126 TABLE B: WASHINGTON GRAIN EXPORT. Flag. Number of Vessels. Regis- ter Tonnage. Cargoes in Centals. Value in Dollars. Freight in Dollars. Ratio of Freight to Cargo. American . . . British .... 3 32 5,137 50,825 171,210 1,726,280 219,349 2,419,435 74,349 744,031 Per cent. 34.19 30.75 Total 35 55,962 1,897,490 2,638,784 819,028 31.03 Attention is called to the sixth column, showing the cost of shipment to market. In the seventh column it appears that transportation is nearly one third of trade, a fact proving the 274 AMERICAN MARINE. importance of shipbuilding and shipowning to the people of the Pacific coast. The following table, C, exhibits the export foreign of lum- ber from the mills of Oregon and Washington, but, mainly, of the latter State, for the year ended March 31, 1891. TABLE C : PUGET SOUND LUMBER EXPORT. Flag. Number of Vessels. Regis- ter Tonnage. Cargo in Fleet. Value in Dollars. Freight in Dollars. Ratio of Freight to Cargo. American . . . British .... Chilian .... Norwegian . . . German .... Hawaiian . . . 115 36 28 12 7 1 85,324 39,510 26,929 11,238 8,611 779 80,846,772 31,715,435 20,855,019 8,375,369 6,356.321 730,569 881,042 340,396 234,973 85,373 64,418 6,155 1,612,357 1,076,896 489,673 277,977 140,058 105,-369 11,097 Per cent. 122.23 130.48 115.47 1.39.04 138.86 144.53 Total .... 199 172,391 148,879,485 2,101,070 130.31 Attention is again invited to the cost of shipment to foreign markets of the cheap but superior lumber product of the Northwestern forests. By the table, vessels engaged in foreign trade are seen to earn thirty per cent, more than the mills, but only fifty -four per cent, of the export (foreign) is carried by American vessels. The foregoing tables may be combined as follows : — TABLE D : OREGON AND WASHINGTON GRAIN, FLOUR, AND LUMBER EXPORT (foreign). Number Tonnage Value Amount Ratio of Freight earned per Reg- ister Ton. Flag. of of of of Freight Vessels. Fleets. Cargo. Freight. to Cargo. Tons. Dollars. Dollars. Per cent. Dollars. American . . . 125 100,970 1,-536,448 1,295,-528 84.32 12.83 British .... 119 162,574 6,248,512 2,3.54,332 37.68 14.48 Chilian .... 28 26,929 234,973 277,977 115.47 10.32 Norwegian . . . 12 11,238 85,373 140,058 1.39.04 12.46 German .... 9 11,573 196,861 144,-552 73.42 12.49 Hawaiian . . . 1 779 6,155 11,097 144.53 14.27 Total .... 294 314,063 8,308,322 4,223,544 50.83 13.44 PACIFIC COAST COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. 275 It thus appears that the cost of ocean carriage to foreign markets of $8,308,322 of products was 50.83 per cent, of their value, for the year taken. Foreign ships carried much the most of the valuable articles, and earned nearly 69 per cent, of the amount paid for freights. The peculiar protection under which British ships are sailed secured for them, as may be noted, the cream of this, as every other carrying-trade. The freight earned by each ton of vessel averaged fl3.44. The time spent in this work, supposing the voyage back to be made in ballast, would not average to exceed ten months. The average ton would therefore "gross" $17.12 in one year, a sum probably equal to one third the cost of the newer vessels, and one half the value of the other ships. In this connection it may be of interest to notice the build- ing and ownership of Oregon and Washington. On the aver- age for a period of seven years past, there have been built in Oregon G sail and 16 steam vessels, aggregating 745 and 2,101 tons, respectively. In Washington there have been built 9 sail and 11 steam vessels, aggregating 2,433 and 1,131 tons, respectively. So that some building is carried on for domestic trade. The number and tonnage of vessels owned in these States, respectively, wiU appear from the table following : — TABLE E : VESSELS OWNED. In Oregon. In Washington. Fiscal Year. SaU. Steam. SaU. Steam. No. 42 Tonnage. No. Tonnage. No. Tonnage. No. 78 Tonnage. 1884 10,616 121 40,182 86 40,948 9,002 1885 55 16,565 129 42,626 87 40,352 79 9,424 1886 59 14,289 132 42,517 91 31,909 86 10,211 1887 51 13,564 137 38,698 79 39,068 86 10,392 1888 49 12,600 136 40,717 93 53,049 98 11,675 1889 48 11,695 148 39,543 94 50,991 120 18,548 1890 42 10,470 154 38,896 88 49,207 136 21,486 The State of Oregon shows no growth in the ownership of vessels, but Washington exhibits a moderate increase, both in sail and steam. It must be acknowledged with regret, how- 276 AMERICAN MARINE. ever, tliat foreign vessels are gaining all the time in the freight- ing business of both States. The staple exports of wheat, flour, and lumber are increasing constantly, and so is the trade of foreign tonnage. It seems that we settle, govern, and develop our country for the benefit of the shipping of all coun- tries but our own. With due protection from our government, — such a protection as we authorize it to give to manufactures and agriculture, and even to minor industries, — all the ship- ping employed by the Pacific States would, in a short time, be built, owned, insured, and manned by citizens of their own, chiefly. The costly carriage to markets would then be added to their export credit abroad, to increase their trade, if they wished; or be brought home in money to enlarge the currency volume and ease the dealings of the banks. The cheapest, safest, swiftest, and best carriers of grain from the Pacific coast have been American wooden sail ships. The finest tim- ber in the world for building such vessels is of staple growth in Oregon and Washington. There, too, may be mined the iron ore and coals for steamship building and running, to make these two States great in maritime power. The day cannot be distant when a wise policy will bring about this grand result, greatly to their gain, but of greater consequence than wealth to the national weal. CHAPTEK XVIII. THE MARINE INSURANCE BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES. Reports from Collectors of Customs. In Chapter XV. ref- erence was made to the unsuecess of American competition with foreign companies in the insurance business; it will be well to look further into this subject, since underwriting is just as much an instrumentality of commerce as a marine itself; and just as necessary to navigation as the employment of ships. Desirous of collecting authentic information on the marine insurance business, not only in our own, but from other coun- tries, the author, as United States Commissioner of Naviga- tion, with the assent of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, in 1891, asked for reports from collectors of customs; and, through the State Department, for accounts from our consuls abroad, for presentation to the public in his annual report. It having been the pleasure of the present Secretary of the Treas- ury, exercising or abusing authority, as the case may be, to suppress the printing of this information, the author will here supply such parts of it as happen to be at his command, pre- facing the same with a few remarks. The reports agree upon one point, that foreign insurance companies, for many years past, have been squeezing Ameri- can companies out of business, and the pressure continues its ruinous work. British companies constitute the bidk of the invading army, but other nations, even to the Chinese, occupy places in its ranks. On the Lakes, within the last few years, not only British corporations, but the members of Lloyds' Exchange in London, are found issuing many policies, espe- cially on cargoes and the hulls of steel steamers. The constant breaking in and destruction of our insurance lines is one of the worst signs of the times for the restoration of our shipping strength. Foreign insurance companies, in our domestic trade especially, are like so many birds of prey, 278 AMERICAN MARINE. here to-day and away to-morrow, never to be depended on in the time of need, uncertain always in the performance of their contracts, and watchful of opportunities to make advantages for their own nation. Capital abroad, wishing to operate in the United States, like labor, should become naturalized, join its fortunes with ours, and so strengthen instead of sap the country. Foreign underwriters do, and always will, prefer to cover the commerce, and serve the interests, of their fatherland. Partiality goes with their allegiance. As clever rivals make unfit agents, so foreign underwriters cannot equally serve two nations. No wise nation will commit its commerce to the insurance powers of rival countries, because to trust foreigners, in place of our own people, is to be betrayed at last. We may as well have our shipyards closed, as our insurance offices shut up, since we should expect the same result to follow, namel}^ helpless foreign dependence in a vital branch of business. It is needful to know only the history of their hatefvil grasping of our trade and transportation to understand fully, if we become dependent on the British Lloyds or other English underwriters for marine insurance, on that day our competition with British shipping is at an end. Now, American hulls, at least, may have home insurance at fair rates, in our foreign trade; and our owners should be wise enough to place it here instead of abroad. If we had to trust to England, or go without insur- ance, by unjustly discriminating rates, she would soon lay up our vessels, as she now outrageously handicaps them for rival business. On the Lakes we have been unable for several years past to cover both hulls and cargoes, in the immense traffic of that region, without the help of the foreign insurance companies whose agencies are numerous there. This failure of our under- writing strength was caused, in the first place, by the ruinous competition of foreign companies waged piratically in our coast cities, in which our original lake underwriters were located. Undercut and weakened in the ocean business, of coiu^se they abandoned the Lakes, and their rivals took their places, to the country's loss. '"'' Free Trade'''' the Cmise of Instirance Decay. Our insur- ance decay is one thing, surely, that cannot be attributed by MARINE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 279 foreign rivals to a "protective tariff." Manifestly it springs from nothing else than "free trade." Underwriting is one intei"est that never had protection, except as it drew it from the existence of a marine and a commerce which was once American in all its branches, prospered by protection. Under- writing has always been as free as air, and has to-day all the liberty it ever had, and yet, this boon of liberty cannot save it ; on the contrary, it is ruining it, because liberty is a greater good to our rivals than to ourselves. The farmer's grass grows no better because his fence is down. Our unregulated foreign transportation it is that is blasting our marine insurance busi- ness. It is not that our companies do not meet the rates of foreign companies that they fail to succeed and survive, but the failure is in getting the business that is to be done. This failure is for the identical reason that our shipping cannot get employment, and that is, simply, because foreign merchants and their shipping agents control the movements of our com- merce to foreign countries, and therefore their patronage is given to sustain and increase the prosperity of their own people. Flag, fealty, and favor act together in the getting, and taking away, of our underwriting. A maritime nation's marine insurance business is an out- growth, a development, a consequence of its shipping and com- mercial power. It is an important part of that power. Great Britain does seven eighths of the sea insurance of the world, in consequence of the fact that she carries five eighths and buys and sells half the cargoes upon tlie ocean. The United States has fallen behind in underwriting, not for the want of capital, but because American insurance business has been undermined through the decay of our marine, and the consequent extinction of American mercantile houses and genuine American com- merce with foreign nations. It cannot be expected, as a prac- tical thing, to have underwriters without merchants, merchants without ships, and ships without shipowners and builders, as these branches all belong to the same tree. When you admit a foreign merchant, you let in his ship, his underwriter, and his shipowner; and there is a great growl by all his friends, new as well as old, because the door is shut to his shipbuilder; for his desire is to employ all his own people, in preference to ours, even after he has grasped, and controls, our trade. 280 AMERICAN MARINE. INSURANCE REPORT FROM NEW YORK. CusTOM-HousE, New York, Collector's Office, August 13, 1891. Hon. Wm. W. Bates, Commissioner of Navigation, Washington, D. C. ^ix^ — Referring to your letters of June 30 and July 22, 1891, re- lating to marine insurance at this port, I transmit herewith a state- ment prepared by Mr. J. D. Jones, President of the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York, upon whose kindness this office was obliged to rely in order to obtain the information required. Mr. Jones requested that copies of your report be sent to him if the information furnished by him be deemed important enough to be incorporated therein. Respectfully youi's, J. S. Fassett, Collector. STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT JONES OP THE ATLANTIC INSUR- ANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK. Premium Rates on Hulls. The premiums charged by the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company are reduced by the divi- dends which may be made ; the company being a mutual one, insuring the interest of its dealers and returning to them the profits of its business in the form of dividends. These divi- dends are made on the terminated j)remiums each year, after deducting losses and expenses, thus reducing the insurance to actual cost, and have averaged 40 per cent, for the past ten years. To ascertain the cost of insurance with this company, deduction for such dividend should be made from the rates of premium herein named : — RATES FOB STEAMERS. Between Atlantic U. S. ports and ports on the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico Gross, 9 per cent, per annum. In past years cost reduced by dividends as above to about . . . • ^i per cent. Between Atlantic ports of the United States and Great Britain • . 6 per cent, per annum. Cost reduced as above to . . .31^ per cent. Coastwise between Northern Atlantic ports of the United States . . 10 per cent, per annum. Cost reduced as above to . . . 6 per cent. Wooden steamships have almost entirely given place to those MARINE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 281 constructed of iron and steel. There are a few built of the former material, but they are not engaged in foreign trade, being mostly confined to short coastwise passages. Insurance on those would necessarily be higher on account of age, etc., say at least 2 per cent, higher. Hates on Sail Vessels. The difference observed by Ameri- can underwriters between sailing vessels built of wood and iron or steel, as a rule, is not so marked as might possibly be sup- posed. Few sailing vessels have been built in the United States of the latter materials. There are at present three sailing ships built of iron and steel sailing under the nationality of the United States, — one of which was built in Scotland, and condemned and sold in San Francisco; the two others were built in Pennsylvania in 1883. British underwriters have usually discriminated in favor of iron and steel vessels, and have, as a rule, given a decided prefer- ence to vessels built and owned in Great Britain, whether built of wood or iron; but their discriminations have been quite marked with respect to the latter for the obvious reason that underwriting interests there are largely controlled by shipown- ers of that class of vessels. Rates per annum of the company named on wooden ships having the highest rating and entitled to the fullest confidence ...... 10 per cent. Cost reduced by dividends of profits as named . 6 per cent. Of Rates on Cargoes. There are so many different ele- ments entering as factors to be considered in determining the value of risks on cargo, that it would be exceedingly difficult to give in a brief summary correct rates of premium to and from different ports of the world. Such rates can be given approximately only. As before intimated, there are few, if any, wooden steam- ships engaged in foreign trade, hence the rates named will be predicated upon risks by approved iron or steel steamships; and respecting these it may be said that quite recently there have been built in Great Britain steamshijjs of a peculiar style of construction technically known as "web-framed," i. e., with- out beams in the holds and below the decks, the structural strength of these ships depending on the belt frames and longi- 282 AMERICAN MARINE. tudinal girders whicli are continued from one end of the vessel to the other, thus giving a much larger carrying capacity because of the large space allowed for cargo, that is usually obstructed by the beams. Steamships of this character have been engaged in carrying heavy and bulky cargoes from Europe, East Indies, South America, and West Indies. The value of risks of this kind is far greater than on general cargo laden on steamships of apj)roved construction, such as the resfular mail steamers in the transatlantic business. Rates of Premiums on Cargoes.^ These are approximate rates charged by the company named (the Atlantic Mutual). If the dividend of profits made, as before indicated, be taken as a basis of deduction, the net rates would be about 40 per cent. less. Approved To and from West Indies : — Cuba ...... Jamaica and Haiti Windward Islands and Porto Rico . Venezuela and Caribbean ports in South America ..... Brazil ...... Argentine Confederation, Uruguay, etc West Coast South and Central America, via Panama and Colon . Via Cape Horn or Sti'aits of Magellan . East Indies : — British India ..... China via Pacific ports and railroad Japan via Pacific ports and railroad Philippine Islands .... Java and Sumatra .... China and Japan via Cape Good Hope ^ To obtain insurance on hull or cargo at the rates herein named it is required that the construction of the vessel, in materials, strength, and model, be equal to the requirements by the rules laid down in the Record of the American Shipmasters' Association, and classification in good standing with the company. Approved Sailing Ves- Steamers (iron). sels (wood or Per cent. iron). Per cent. i tof 1 to 2 1 to 1 11 to 2\ f tol n to If 1 f to 1 li to 2 a ton IJ to2 I to \\ 11 to 21 . 1 tol^ 11 to 21 2jto4 . 1 tolj 2 to 31 ftoli 11 to 2 |tol 1\ to If 11 to 3i 2jto5 . \\ to 3 2i to4 11 to 2 2i to5 MARINE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 283 Europe : — Great Britain ..... i tol 1 to 3 Netherlands ..... itol 11 to 3 Belgium ...... i tol li to 3 Germany not on Baltic itol li to 3 Germany on the Baltic, Denmark, Nor- way and Sweden, Russia on the Baltic and Black Sea ..... 1 to 23 2h to 5^ France not on Mediterranean i tol 1 to 3 France on Mediterranean and Spain h to n U to 3i Italy, Greece, etc. .... 3 to 2 2' to 3" Coastwise United States : — New England States .... itof h to 1^ Southern Atlantic ports ito^ 1 tolj Southern Gulf ports .... ito| li to If British Provinces : — New Brunswick or Nova Scotia not on Gulf St. Lawrence .... |tol 1 to 3 On Gulf St. Lawrence 1 toli 2 to 4 Many wooden vessels, notably a large number of those built in the British Provinces of North America, do not compare favorably with those built of iron or steel, nor are they entitled to the fullest confidence on account of the inferiority of the wood, the style of construction, and the imperfect fastenings. (The term "approved steamers," or "approved sailing ves- sels," means either iron or wood. There is no discrimination against wood, or in favor of iron, but only in favor of steam.) The Nationality of Uiidenvriting Capital in JVeto York. The question of the Commissioner of Navigation regarding American and foreign companies, it is assumed refers to the underwriting capital in New York, and will be fully answered by the accompanying tabulated statement giving the names of the companies, the amount of capital or assets, and the net amount of premiums on risks underwritten in New York by each in 1890. It must be observed that the amount of assets noted in con- nection with the foreign companies represents available funds invested in the United States, and does not include capital of the corporations in use at home. It will be thus seen that of the 22 organizations doing marine underwriting in New York, 8 are American (3 organized in 284 AMERICAN MARINE. the State of New York, and 5 in other States), 10 British, 1 Swiss, 2 German, and 1 Canadian. The total amount of assets of American organiza- tions is $28,311,828.93 The net written premium in 1890. . . . 7,767,946.16 Total amount of assets of foreign organizations is . 6,474,924.31 Net written premium in 1890 .... 3,487,204.55 It is interesting to notice that while the amount of net writ- ten premiums of the American organizations equals only about one fourth the aggregate amount of their assets, the net writ- ten premiums of the foreign organizations exceed one half of the total amount of their assets available in the United States. This may be accounted for in various ways, but the principal reason is undoubtedly the facility that the foreign organizations have for underwriting on large amounts based upon their home capital, while the smaller American organizations having assets equaling if not exceeding the amount invested in the United States by the foreign companies are limited in the risks assumed to the basis of their assets. The foreign underwriters, with all the machinery of organi- zation at home, are thus active competitors in New York with these companies ; and, although not in reality possessing equal financial strength in this country, they have yet successfully crowded them into such narrow compass as to greatly curtail their business, and during the past fifteen years no less than seven American organizations have been forced into liquida- tion. It may be necessary to note that, by legal enactment in many of the States of the United States, the minimum amount of capital required for companies insuring marine risks is pro- vided, and in the State of New York the amount is fixed at 8200,000. Foreign companies, as a condition of doing business in the State, are required to deposit with the Insurance Department an amount equal to the minimum sum of capital provided in the case of local companies.^ ^ This provision of law is very short-sighted and unfair towards Ameri- can companies, and gives a great advantage to foreign corporations. — Author. MARINE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 285 The answer to the question whether American underwriters are gaining or losing ground in the business of New York is somewhat anticipated by the foregoing remai'ks, but it may be added that, as the foreign commerce of New York is largely conducted in British bottoms, whose interests are closely inter- woven with the underwriting business, it naturally follows that whatever influence is possessed by the British owner will be used in behalf of the company in which he is interested; and this is found to be one of the important factors in the rapid growth made by these foreign agencies in New York.^ The accompanying list gives the American companies, seven in number, which have gone into liquidation during the past thirteen years by reason of the unequal competition thus expe- rienced : — COMPANIES, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF UNDERWRITERS OF NEW YORK, WHO HAVE DISCONTINUED BUSINESS DURING THE PAST TWENTY YEARS. Discontinued. Assets at Time of Discontinuance. Union Mutual Ins. Co. Mercantile Mutual Ins. Co. Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. Great Western Ins. Co. Orient Mutual Ins. Co. Sun Mutual Ins. Co. Commercial Mutual Ins. Co. STATEMENT OF THE MARINE INSURANCE COMPANIES IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK. American Companies. Atlantic Mutual New York Mutual United States Lloyds China Mutual Boston Marine . Delaware Mut. Safety . Ins. Co. of North America Providence- Washington ^ In 1890 there were arrivals in New York from foreign ports : 2,868 steamers, of which 1,572 were British and 283 were American ; 295 ships, of which 125 were British and 80 were American. 1878. $1,236,789.36 Net premiums. 1879. 1880. 828,786.92 744,141.77 1886. 910,156.33 1886. 976,946.33 1886. 520,541.67 1890. 652,351.44 $185,757.39 for 1890. $5,120,442.32 Assets. Net Premiums. Recapitulation. $12,108,772 $3,486,211 607,283 225,826 814,407 601,564 . 501,868 401,989 2,666,461 1,020,436 . 1,504,-386 250.262 8,784,102 1,413,747 . 1,324,548 367,908 $28,311,829 $7,767,946 286 AMERICAN MARINE. Foreign Companies. British. British and Foreign Marine Ins Thames and Mersey The London Assurance Corporation Indemnity Mutual . Reliance Marine . Union Marine Ins. Co. Marine Ins. Co. Sea Ins. Co. (Ltd.) . Standard Marine . Universal Marine Swiss. Switzerland Marine German. Mannheim Genl. Ins. Co. of Dresden Canadian. Western Assurance Co. 3. Co. $1,182,724 $858,407 . 587,714 198,000 ration 529,351 286,048 . 248,879 120,033 260,565 53,368 . 451,784 311,275 540,743 290,926 . 321,597 295,994 228,785 110,965 . 250,728 127,159 $4,602,869 $2,652,175 175,739 -238,-389 175,739 238,389 365,985 175,009 218,219 61,960 584,203 236,969 1,112,113 359,671 1,112,113 359,671 $6,474,924 $3,487,205 INSURANCE REPORT FROM SAN FRANCISCO. CusTOM-HousE, San Francisco, Cal., Collector's Office, July 16, 1891. The Commissioner of Navigation, Washington, D. C. Sir, — I respectfully acknowledge receipt of your letter of 30th inst. requesting this office to report in full the premium rates of marine in- surance companies prevailing at this port for the year past, to and from different parts of the world, separately on hulls of various kinds of vessels and on cargoes of same. In reply, I am pleased to he able to place in your h^nds the full and complete report of the Secretary of the California Insurance Com- pany, Mr. Wm. H. C. Fowler, which it is thought will give you the desired information, and which he kindly prepared at my request. I am, respectfully, T. G. Phelps, Collector. LETTER OF SECRETARY FOWLER OF THE CALIFORNIA INSUR- ANCE COMPANY OF SAN FRANCISCO. San Francisco, Cal., July 15, 1891. Collector of Customs, San Francisco, Cal. Dear Sir, — I have your letter from the Treasury Depart- ment dated June 30th in reference to marine insurance, and respectfully beg to give you the following desired information. MARINE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 287 It is difficult to give the current rates of our market for insurance on hulls and cargoes, as they are based upon the con- struction and age of the vessel, the nature of the cargo carried, and the season. I give the following rates on first-class vessels only, viz. : — On Hulls and Cargoes. To and from Atlantic ports of the United States and the Pacific coast ports of the United States with cargoes of general merchandise : — Per cent. On hulls of steamers (iron) . . . . . -2^ On their cargoes . . . . . . . . 1^ On iron hulls, sailing vessels . . . . . -2^ On their cargoes ...... . 1\ On wooden hulls, sailing vessels . . . . . .3 On their cargoes . . . . . . . . 1^ To and from ports of the United Kingdom and the Conti- nent, between Havre and Hamburg and the Pacific coast ports of the United States, barring coal or iron cargoes : — Per cent. On hulls of iron sailing vessels . . . . . ' '^\ On their cargoes . . . . . . . . 1| On hulls of wooden sailing vessels . . . . .3 On their cargoes ........ 2 To and from ports of the west coast of South America and Pacific coast ports of the United States : — Per cent. On iron hull steamers . If On their cargoes ........ 1\ On iron hulls, sailing vessels 2\ On their cargoes . . . . . . . . 1^ On wooden hulls, sailing vessels . . . . . • 2f On their cargoes ........ If To and from Australia and New Zealand and Pacific ports of the United States : — Per cent. On cargo per iron steamer to a direct port . . . . ^ On hulls, wooden sailing vessels . . . . . 2^ On their cargoes (lumber) . . . . . . • Ig On their cargoes (coal) ....... If To and from the Sandwich Islands and Pacific coast ports of the United States : — AMERICAN MARINE. Per cent. On cargo per iron steamer to a direct port . . . . ^ On cargo per wooden steamer ..... |^ On cargo per sailing vessel ...... ^ Our local owned vessels are insured for twelve months at the following rates : — Per cent. Iron steamers trading foreign ...... 6 Iron steamers trading coastwise ..... 6J Wooden steamers trading coastwise . . . ^ . .8 Wooden steamers trading foreign ..... 7 Wooden sailing vessels trading foreign . . , • 7J Wooden sailing vessels trading coastwise . . from 8 to 16 The following named marine insurance companies are trans- acting business on our coast : — Name. California . Commercial . Fireman's Fund Sun Union Alliance Marine Baloise Boston Marine British and Foreign Marme Canton . China Traders . Commercial Union Federal Marine . Fonciere Frankfort Marine Helvetia General Indemnity Mutual Marine Insurance Company of N. A. International Marine . London .... London and Provincial Marine Magdeburg General Mannheim Man On Marine Maritime Head Office. San Francisco. San Francisco. San Francisco. San Francisco. San Francisco. London. Basle. Boston. Liverpool. Hong Kong. Hong Kong. London. Zurich. Paris. Frankfort. St. Gall. London. Philadelphia. Liverpool. London. London. Magdeburg. Mannheim. Hong Kong. London. LiverpooL MARINE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 289 National Marine New Zealand North China Ocean Marine On Tai . Providence-Washington . Reliance Marine Sea .... Standard Marine St. Paul Fu-e and Marine Straits Switzerland Marine Thames and Mersey . Transatlantic Marine Union Fu-e and Marine Union Insurance Society- Union Marine . Universo Marine . Yangftsze . London. Auckland. Shanghai. London. Honw Konsf. Providence. Liverpool. Liverpool. Liverpool. St. Paul. Singapore. Zurich. Liverpool. Berlin. Cbristchurch. Hong Kong. Liverpool. Milan. Shanghai. During 1890 their marine operations were as follows : — Five local companies : Amount written ...... Premiums on same ...... $19,703,243 395,543 Four companies of other States: Amount written ..... Premiums on same ..... Thirty -six companies of foreign countries ; Amount written ..... Premiums on same ..... Total amount insured by aU companies Premiums thereon ..... $4,135,308 77,268 $110,410,533 1,053,642 134,429,084 ^ 1,526,453 In 1877 our five (5) locals wrote 820,760,390, and received in premiums $511,468, an average of §102,298 for each com- pany. The foreign companies, numbering twenty-two (22) wrote $60,908,997, with premiums on same amounting to $1,057,697, making an average for each company of $48,076. Last year the local companies received an average premium ^ Ratio of American to foreign business, 14.65 per cent. 290 AMERICAN MARINE. income of $79,108; tlie companies of other States, 819,317 each, and foreign comj)anies 829,267 each. These figures prove conclusively that the bulk of our marine insurance business is in the hands of foreign capital, and that gradually, but surely, American capital invested in insurance is being driven to the wall through undue competition of for- eign corporations. Local capital and its earnings are invested in buildings, mortgages, stocks, bonds, and manufactures of this State, and help to support the same through taxation on its investment ; whilst foreign capital enters the State without any deposit or security to protect its policy holders, sends its earn- ings to the head-office, and does not contribute one dollar towards the expenses of our state and national government. Under such circumstances foreign capital reiDresented here is transacting business in our State upon more favorable and advantageous terms and conditions than our local capital; hence it is not to be wondered at that the following twelve California companies have failed or wound up their affairs and retired from business : — COMPANIES RETIRED. Pacific Insurance Company . People's Insurance Company San Francisco Insurance Company Occidental Insurance Company . Commercial Insurance Company Western Insurance Company Merchants' Mutual Insurance Company Anglo-Nevada Assurance Corporation Alta Insurance Company California Farmers' Insurance Company Alameda County Insurance Company Builders' Insurance Company . Paid-up Capital. $1,000,000 . 300,000 200,000 . 400,000 200,000 . 200,000 500,000 . 2,000,000 200,000 . 200,000 200,000 . 200,000 $5,600,000 The annual premium income (fire and marine) of these com- panies amounted to about ten millions (-^10,000,000) per annum, and, as the majorit}^ of these companies were reinsured in foreign companies, this amount was naturally withdrawn from our taxable property and added to the immense volume MARINE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 291 of business transacted by the representation of foreign capital, which does business in the United States y'ree of taxation, I am, dear sir, Yours very truly, William H. C. Fowler, Secretary. Differential Rates and their Differences. The foregoing re- ports are from first-class authorities, one in the chief city of the Atlantic, and the other in that of the Pacific coast. A slight difference appears in the standpoints occupied. Mr. Jones sets forth the rates of his company, and Mr. Fowler gives those of the market for which he writes. American companies transact much the most business in New York, and the foreign companies in San Francisco. In both cases much the greater part of American work is for hulls and cargoes of American vessels, mostly in the coasting trade, as the greater part of foreign business is for cargoes of foreign vessels in the foreign trade. Conformable to the circumstances of underwriting in New York and San Francisco, we find a considerable difference in the differential rates prevailing in the two ports. These con- cern steam and sail, iron and wood, hulls and cargoes. As between the three subjects of differentiation, and the two ports mentioned, a comparison may be set forth as follows : — Differential Rates for Hulls. New York. San Francisco. Wood or Iron. Wood. Iron. Wood steam in excess of iron steam . . . Wood sail in excess of iron sail Wood sail in excess of iron steam .... Sail in excess of steam Differential Rates for Cargoes. Wood steam in excess of iron steam . Wood sail in excess of iron sail Wood sail in excess of iron steam .... Sail in excess of steam Differential Rates for Hulls and Cargoes. Hull over cargo for sail Hull over cargo for steam Per cent. 25 to 100 15 to 40 100 to 200 40 to 200 Per cent. 16 to 23 20 to 22 25 to 200 30 to 34 25 to - 15 to 20 50 to 350 40 to 200 50 to 100 Per cent. 11 to 28 20 to - 45 to 100 40 to - 292 AMERICAN MARINE. The rates for hulls at New York being given by the year, it is not practicable to compare them with those for cargoes. However, there is less difference than at San Francisco. The collector of Baltimore, reporting through Coale, Cunning- ham & Co., Lloyds' agents there, stated that "rates on hulls would be but slightly higher than on cargoes." The collector at Portland, Maine, reporting with authority from the Port- land Lloyds, stated that "rates on hulls and cargoes are nearly, if not quite the same," of course, for first-class vessels. While it is the general practice of underwriters to ask more for hull than cargo risks, it will be seen that the British com- panies, controlling the rates at San Francisco, have saddled American hulls at that port with an unjust share of tax upon existence. British hulls are, of course, insured in England, and not in the United States, therefore American vessels, mostly, are affected by the hard discrimination. Where purely American conditions control the rates, as at Portland, Maine, we see that underwriting charges, as between shipown- ers and merchants, are fair and just, and consequently " nearly, if not quite the same." The cause for the difference between rates for hulls and cargoes is generally ascribed to the greater competition for the insurance of the latter, more particularly by the foreign companies in the United States. Whatever the reason may be, the differential practice injures our vessel interest. Differential Rates on Cotton Cargoes. The collector at Norfolk was supplied by the Thames and Mersey (British) Marine Insurance Company with a printed list of their " Cotton Tariff " applicable to Norfolk and other Southern ports. From this list it appeared that the rates for sail are double those for steam, a discrimination intended, manifestly, to give a monop- oly of cotton carrying to British steamers, since it has, at least, contributed to that effect. Another discrimination is, that "regular lines " are favored, without reference to class or char- acter of hulls in Lloj'd's, or other Registers. As for sailing vessels, they get cargoes sometimes, but must be "approved" to get a cargo covered at all. This provision secures the refer- ence of all applications to cover cargoes by sail to the home office, where British interest is not likely to be overlooked, and American is never studied. MARINE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 293 Of late it lias become the practice in cotton insurance, not only to favor regular steamers, but to include the railway and dock risks, where cargoes are "billed through" from interior points of shipment to ports of destination in Europe. In all such cases, and they are common, an American vessel, sail or steam, would be barred from competition for the transporta- tion. Accordingly our shipowners consider themselves shut out from the cotton business, and it is genei'ally left, nowadays, to the monopoly of British shipowners and underwriters. Since the formation of the British insurance pool or trust, for the monopoly of the Pacific coast trade in grain, flour, etc., an account of which has been given in Chapter XV., a suspi- cion has been awakened, that there may exist a similar pool or trust for the control of the Atlantic cotton commerce, car- riage, and insurance. Several of the same great corporations are largely engaged in both Atlantic and Pacific trade under- writing. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that insurance charges on cotton are much greater in proportion to freightage than on any other merchandise intrusted to the ocean. There is everything English, but nothing cheap, about cotton insur- ance, and the freighting pays proportionately. Insurance Dependency and its Evils. From the facts here- with presented, it must be clear enough that the United States are now, and long have been, drifting into a dependency upon foreign underwriting. Syndicates or rings of foreign compa- nies already control, directly or indirectly, the covering of our exports to many parts of the world ; and, also, as a matter of course, of our imports from most shipping points, especially when their transportation is by foreign vessels. Some of our commerce with the countries of our own continent is covered by underwriters of our own, but little, indeed, of any other foreign trade. Our insurance lines once extended around the globe. They have been driven in everywhere. We are losing ground in ever}^ part of the field, and time alone may bring the closing of the last office. It will bear repeating that the loss of our underwriting power is of national concern. Marine insurance is a necessity of commerce and navigation. It is a force for the government, as well as the protection of trade, and the British so use it. It is needful in peace, but in war essential, if traffic is not to 294 AMERICAN MARINE. cease. The underwriting of an enemy is not to be thought of ; that of a rival is never to be depended on. In case of war, the former will go forth in a day to fight for his own flag ; while the latter will raise the rates so the ships of his own nation may capture the work of ours. Foreign capital employed in underwriting, like that used in banking:, cannot be counted in the sum of our national strength. It can be locked up by its owners, withdrawn, or taken away, at the very time it would do our country most good to continue in use. In this regard it differs greatly from foreign capital put into railways, or like imjirovements of any kind. What- ever happens, these remain, reinforce, and strengthen. These things seem never to have received the national atten- tion. The political economists, even, have never dreamed of anything so practical as the functions and forces of marine insurance. Our statesmen have studied dues, duties, and pro- hibitions; bounties, subsidies, and subventions; but the powers of marine inspection and insurance, and the protection that may be given, or attacks made, by imderwriters, is probably a sealed book to them. We have treaties for "reciprocity" in trade and tonnage, but seem not to have learned yet the need of fair international dealing in marine insurance. As for this need we may refer to Chapter XV., and the boycott of the Liverpool Corn Exchange. The fact is, unless our Constitu- tion confers on Congress the power to regulate marine insur- ance in the several States, our form of government facilitates the destructive work of our rivals through their underwriting policy. In several respects our government lacks strength. As now administered, our ships, our merchants, and our under- writers without protection, and each State at liberty to pre- scribe the terms, or make none at all, for the admission of foreign insurance companies, the total failure of American connection with our foreisTi commerce and navigfation seems set down in the Book of Fate. Some of our States, with little or no underwriting capital of their own, and not apparently caring ever to have any, really give better terms to foreign than to American companies. Foreign companies are nowhere excluded, nor anywhere taxed equally with American. They are essentially predatory, and disloyal, but, strangely enough, seem to fare better for these facts. The suggestion is in order, MAPdNE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES. 295 that Congress should make an effort to abate the evils and prevent the abuses of foreign insurance dominancy, or acknow- ledge its incompetency without delay. The Regulation of Underwriting. It will not be disputed that underwriting is a branch of commerce. It is bought and sold, imported and exported as a species of property. The regrulation of this international business is therefore undoubt- edly within the scope of Congressional power. In paragraph 3 of section 8 of the Constitution we find this grant: "The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations," Mr. Benton, in his great work, says of this provi- sion: "The power granted . . . has never yet been exercised by Congress," although it "was the potential moving cause of forming the present Constitution." Does he not, however, overlook the regulation which was applied to the coasting trade, first practically, and afterward actually, prohibiting it to foreign vessels? It seems to be just as clear that clause 3 of section 8 was invoked in tliis protection of domestic busi- ness, as that clause 1 of section 8, granting "power to lay and collect taxes," was applied to the protection of our foreign trade and transportation. If Congress can prohibit foreign underwTiting in the United States, and of this there exists no doubt, if clause 3 of section 8 of the Constitution means anything, then it follows that laws may be enacted for its regulation. Taking the words of the Constitution, to "regulate commerce," says Justice Field, is "to prescribe rules by which it shall be governed; that is, the conditions upon which it shall be conducted, to determine how far it shall be free and untrammeled, how far it shall be bur- dened by duties and imposts, and how far it shall be prohib- ited." Such being the case, it has long been the duty of Con- gress to put a stop to foreign discriminative underwriting, chartering and loading vessels in our ports. Our railroad transportation has been regidated, so let the ocean lines and bottoms be, whether o^;\nied at home or abroad. Our ocean trade and transportation has been ruined, by having freedom on the foreign side with inequality on our own; therefore let us secure fair play by constitutional means. CHAPTER XIX. THE MARINE INSURANCE BUSINESS AS CONDUCTED IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. The manner of conducting the business of marine insurance abroad, the discriminations practiced there, the protection given their own shipjiing by the insurers of different countries, what classes constitute the body of underwriters, who are strong or weak in underwriting power, especially what considerations control the making of premium rates, — these, and other mat- ters closely related, seem to call for notice here. As mentioned elsewhere, our consuls in foreign ports were requested in 1891, at the instance of the author, to investigate and report on these points. Some valuable contributions to public knowledge were thus brought out, sent from the State to the Treasury Department, and necessarily came to the desk of the Commissioner of Navigation for insertion in his report for 1891. In the exercise or abuse of a little brief authority, the Secretary suppressed the publication of these documents. Unfortunately, copies of these consvilar reports were not taken by the author, and he is therefore unable to make this chapter as interesting as it would have been but for this transaction. The Report from Iseiccastle-on- Tyne, England. An excel- lent report, accompanied by valuable documents, was received from Newcastle-on-Tyne. It appears from it that there is considerable discrimination in the rates of premiums on cargoes by steam and sail to the United States. These are greater by sail than to the Danube and Sea of Azof by one third ; or to the Baltic and Cronstadt by one half; or to ports in Brazil by 22 per cent. By steamer to the Danube or Sea of Azof, to the British East Indies, via Suez, and to the United States the rate is the same, and to Brazil 20 per cent. less. It is plain that steamers are favored and sail vessels discouraged in the trade to the United States ; that trade to the British Indies and MARINE INSURANCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 297 Brazil is favored, and merchandise sent to the States unfairly taxed. The consul's idea, gently given between the lines, that prejudice and interest have much influence on rates of insur- ance in England, is proved plainly enough by his quotations. The Report from Card'if\ Walea. Consul Jones, of Car- diif, in his report, seemed anxious to have it believed that the British people did not please sentiment in business, but he did not bear this bias in mind when he gave a list of British flag- preferences, with American ships ranking third, "for reasons which are fairly on the surface," as he generously admitted. Nor is his denial borne out by his subsequent statement that " Insurance may be eif ected at a lower rate in Continental com- panies than in those of the United Kingdom," while the reason given for the English patronage of home companies at higher rates might just as well be referred to sentiment as to conceit. With the greatest conceit of any people on the earth, the Brit- ish combine, not only an instinctive, but an enlightened selfish- ness, which teaches them, as a duty, to support and rely upon their o^vn, whether it be insurance, ships, or government. They worship their own superiority, and feel offended if one rejects their faith. They preach the inferiority of everything "for- eign," and give loud praise that what is theirs is perfect. They will pay more for their own than foreign productions of better quality. British-built, or British-owned, or British- insured makes a ship all right on the "Exchange." Witness the market reports; note the list of ships chartered and left unemployed; mark the higher freights paid to British than foreign ships in British trade ; and take not only Consul Jones's word, but that of other consuls, and reports of British papers, that marine insurance is cheaper in Continental than British ports, but loyal Englishmen prefer to deal at home. They do well, save in denying so plain a fact. We should imitate their sentiment in respect to our own ships, underwriters, and owners. The consul was mistaken, too, about the liberality of the British in letting foreign ships load as deeply as they please in British ports. That time has gone by. The "Load-line Rules " of the Board of Trade were enacted for, and are being applied to, ships of all flags. Fines have been imposed in several cases, one American. The lapsed liberality, when it 298 AMERICAN MARINE. existed, did not compare with the freedom still permitted to the British underwriters in the United States, of dictating the load-draft of American ships in our own ports, at consider- ably less depth than British ships of iron or wood have liberty to draw. The latest report from Consul Jones, of Cardiff, is that he has renounced his American, and returned to his British, alle- giance, and is a candidate for Parliament. So his fealty and his politics now agree. The Report from Havre., France. The French are sys- tematic, if not scientific, in their underwriting regulations. Consul Williams sent several valuable documents, fully explain- ing their methods of business and matters in connection there- with, but only a few points can find place here. The French now follow the British in discriminating, as to hull, but not cargo, insurance against wooden, and therefore American vessels. They also discriminate in hull insurance, to the extent of 5 per cent, of the premium rate, against either iron or wooden ships which are not classed in the Bureau Veritas Register. This book is called the "French Lloyd's," and originated in 1828, at Brussels, Belgium. It has pro- fessed to be "International," and really has upon its official staff inspectors of different countries, some of whom, at least, own stock of the company. Such was deemed the importance to France of having a French book of vessel inspection and classification, that many years ago the government made over- tures to the directors with this object in view. It was under- stood then that no action resulted, but since that time five or six different shipping registers, belonging to different coun- tries, have been instituted, of course with a view to protecting the different marines, and the underwriters doing their busi- ness, from the sentiment known to exist under the different flags. The British Lloyds' course, in making distinctions for the benefit of British vessels, has brought about this multi- plicity of classification books, each with a national duty to per- form. As nearly all our foreign-going ships are classed in the French Lloyd's, their 5 per cent, discrimination is not dam- aging, but it seems unjustified, especially as we have a regis- ter of our own, in which, of course, our ships should be classed; and inspection and classification cost money. Our ships went MARINE INSURANCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 299 voluntarily Into the Veritas, when they were squeezed out of the British Lloyd's in 1870-76. Had they not received from the Veritas just treatment at that time, a much harder experi- ence would have been their lot since then in the foreign trade. The consul intimated that the idea entertained by wide- awake shipping-people in the United States, that English ships and cargoes receive favor from Lloyds, surprised the shij)own- ers of Havre. Their surprise must have been without a shrug, for the wooden shipping of France has suffered severely with our own, from the adverse policy of Lloyds, for many years past. The consul would have better appreciated the surprise, however, if he had known that the French Insurance Tariff, a translated portion of which follows, establishes differential rates for "French," and for "foreign" steamers; the former having the lower rate by about 10 per cent., on account of flag, unless classed in the French Lloyd's, and then by about 5 per cent. While the underwriters of France seem to follow those of England in a protective policy, now as heretofore, they are more careful in covering novel risks, than twenty years ago, when the offices of Paris competed with those of London for the insurance of iron steamers through the Suez Canal, sunk millions of francs, and ruined several companies. Then the Parisians declared "they would rather insure wooden ships around the Cape of Good Hope, than the best iron steamship " through the dangerous shortcut. The French have now an iron marine of their own ; its exist- ence induced by their bounty policy ; but, profiting by experi- ence, they have devised what may be an improved method of dealing with iron vessels, though it is applied to wood as well, without apparent cause. They have regard to the class of hulls, but look sharply to age, increasing the premium rate accord- ing thereto, and limiting all risks to a term of one year. They have also a way of proportioning insurance, both for sailers and steamers, by the voyage, to the value of the merchandise carried, discriminating against hulls and in favor of cargoes from 50 per cent, upward. By both these methods iron vessels are favored. The tendency of this policy is to cause the build- ing of a new iron steam marine, perhaps a laudable object, did it not, at the same time, discourage the building of dura- 300 AMERICAN MARINE. ble and, necessarily, safe vessels. It results that this policy mistakes true shijjping economy. Age cuts too great a figure in the French system, as materials and inspection do in the British. (translation.) part third. hulls (havre policy). Preliminary Observations. — 1. The premiums hereafter fixed upon hulls supposes the insurance to be upon the conditions of the Havre policy, and to follow its application. 2. The insurance upon hulls on the conditions of the French policy can be made according to the pre- miums fixed in the tariff of Bordeaux, Paris, Nantes, and Marseilles. 3. Direct insurance according to the rates and conditions of the Havre policy are forbidden as to ships other than those belonging to the ports comprised between Dunkirk and Cherbourg, inclusively ; others should be made exclusively upon the conditions of the French policy. HULLS OF SAIL VESSELS BY THE VOYAGE. The premiums upon hulls of wooden ships by the voyage will be equal to those upon the merchandise augmented by .50 per cent, upon ships under ten years of age, and by 100 per cent, upon vessels over ten years. The augmentation wiU be 50 per cent., whatever the age, upon iron ships. FREIGHTS. The premiums of insurance on freights shall be those of merchan- dise for the same destination augmented by 50 per cent. The insurance on hulls by the voyage or upon freight of a French ship, belonging to a place having a tariff of premiums published in these categories of risks, shall be made only according to the rate of premium of that place. HULLS BY TERM. Wooden ships of first class for the voyage to which they are des- tined : — MARINE INSURANCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 301 ONE YEAR. Coastwise, Atlantic, and Seas of the South to the Equator. 1st and 2d Year. .3d and 4th Year. 5th and 6th Year. Tth and 8th Year. 9th Year. 10th Year. 11th Year. 12th Year. Per cent. 6i Per cent. 7 Per cent. Per cent. 8 Per cent. 8i Per cent. 9 Per cent. 9i Per cent. 10 71 Indian Ocean and Pacific North of the Equator. 7i 1 8 I 8i I 9 I 9i I 10 China Sea. 8 I 8i I 9 I 9i I 10 I lOi I lOi 11 (For a term of six months, the proportionate rate is augmented from 5 to 10 per cent. For vessels above the age of twelve years no rates are fixed, but such cases are " for consideration.") The premium fixed above for all ships over eight years old will be augmented by one half of one per cent., if the sheathing is over two years old. IRON SAIL SHIPS (FRENCH OR FOREIGN). Iron sail ships classed § I. Division in the French Veritas, 100 A in the Lloyd's Register, and twenty years in the Liverpool Register : ^ — Per cent. . 61 l" . 7i 1st, 2d, and 3d years, per annum 4th, 5th, and 6th years, per annum . . . , Tth, 8th, and 9th years, per annum 10th, 11th, and 12th years, per annum ... 8 Above twelve years the additional premium will be considered (as for wooden vessels). No insurance upon the hull can be underwritten for more than a year, except according to prolongation by usage, for return to Europe. In case of refund for cessation of risks anticipated, the premium shall be 50 per cent, (at the minimum) of the premium stipulated in the policy. One half of one per cent, reduction upon the above premiums, if the owner reserves \ of the real value of the ship, and if the policy forbids insurance of freight. The same increased premium of 5 per cent, shall be due upon wooden or iron ships for absence of classification in the Bureau Veritas. 1 Now a " Branch " of British Llo3^ds. 302 . AMERICAN MARINE. ADDITIONAL PEEillUM UPOX WOOD OR IRON^ VESSELS FOB SPECIAL VOYAGES. The premiums upon hulls of sailing vessels shall be augmented as follows : — Per cent. " Racles de la Reunion," Antilles, in winter from January 1st to April loth (by 15 days) . . ^ For each voyage to other points upon the west side of Africa or south of the river Gambia, Gaboon ex- cepted (the coast of Guinea comprised to Cape Frio) 2 For each voyage to Gaboon .... ^ For each voyage to Cape Haytien • . . . ^ For each voyage to other points in Hayti . . 1 For each voyage to Moule ..... ^ For each voyage to Santo Domingo ... 2 For each voyage from the Dominican Republic to Gulf of Honduras ...... 3 For each voyage, transport of Chinese emigrants . 4 For each voyage in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific north of the equator (when the augmentations are not comprised in the principal premium) . . 1 For each voyage to Vera Cruz and Carmen-Rio Grande ........ ^ For each voyage to Pensacola, Darien, Pascagoula, etc 2 For each voyage to Tobasco .... 3 For each voyage to Tampico ..... 1 For each voyage to Mexican ports upon the Gulf, not mentioned ........ 2 For two voyages to Mexican ports (one half more than the first increase) ...... 3 For each voyage to Lamoo or to Maroim . . 3 For each voyage returning from ports east of the Gulf of Bengal 2 For a year's navigation coastwise to ports, bays, and islands of East Coast of Africa from East London and neighboring ports (reduced to 2 per cent, a voyage from Europe to Coast) .... 4 For one or more voyages to Algerian ports other than Algiers, Oran, Bougiah and Bon^, or to the coast of Maroc from October 15 to April 15 . . .1 MARINE INSURANCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 303 For each voyage to Coast of Spain and Carmania from October 1 to March 31 .... 1 For each voyage to Karradoche .... 3 For each voyage to New Caledonia . ... . 1^ NAVIGATION IN WINTER IN THE NORTH SEAS. The voyage to these seas will cause no augmentation in insurance by the term, if the return is effected according to a guarantee of the same policy. In other cases, all ships which shall be entered in the Baltic after the 30th September must pay an agumentation fixed at 1 per cent. The augmentation is calculated from the date of the de- parture to the return, as follows : — For departure frovi the White Sea after July ^Ist : \ per cent, for each eight days of August, and ^ per cent, for each eight days of September and the following months, run or commenced from July 31st to date of departure. For departure from the Baltic after August 31s^ ; :|: per cent, for each eight days of September, \ per cent, for each eight days of Oc- tober, and 1 per cent, for each eight days of November, run or com- menced from 31st of August to the date of departure, the calculation stopping November 30. The premium paid November 30th must be applied to all departures in December and January ; reduction of 1 per cent, per eight days under the premiums of November 30th for departure from February 1st to March 15th, and \ per cent, per eight days from the 15th to the 30th of March. For departure from Norway, the Cattegat, and Denmark after August ^Ist : ^ per cent, for each fifteen days of September, and ^ per cent, for each fifteen days of the following months, run or com- menced from August 31st to date of departure, the calculation stopping November 30. For departure from Canada, Nova Scotia, or Neiv Brunswick after August 31st : \ per cent, for each eight days of September and October, ^ per cent, for each of the first two eight days of November, and 1 per cent, for each eight days following, the calculations stopping November 30th. HULLS OF STEAM VESSELS ("WOOD OR IROn) BY THE TEEM. FRENCH STEAMERS. Conditions of the French policy on steamers : — Coastwise : Principal premium 8^^ per cent, per annum, with ad- ditional premium for special voyages. Reduction of 1 per cent, if the steamer is classed f I. Division, French Veritas, say 7^ per annum. 304 AMERICAN MARINE. Reduction of \ per cent, if the steamer is classed * II. Division of French Veritas, say 8 per cent, per annum. Atlantic and long voyages : Principal premium 8|^ per cent, per annum. Reduction of 1 per cent, if the steamer is classed I. f 1.1, or A 1.2 for the naviga- tion to which it is destined, say 7^ per cent, per annum. The class of 100 A 1 of Lloyd's Register will be compared to class I. § 1.1 of the French Veritas for the first year of registration. FOREIGN STEAMSHIPS. Conditions of national policies under paragraph one of general con- ditions below : — Principal premium 9 per cent, per annum. Reduction of ^ per cent, if the steamer is classed 100 A 1 in Lloyd's Register, 20 years in the Liverpool Register, or 1st class in register of its nationality, say ii\ per cent, per annum. Reduction of 1 per cent, on the principal premium, if it is classed I. | 1.1 French Veritas, for the voyage to which it is destined, say 8 per cent, per annum. Reduction of ^ per cent, on French or foreign steamers, if the amount reserved uncovered by the insured is \ at least of the total value of the steamer. Reduction \ per cent, on foreign steamers in- sured according to the conditions of the French policy. Ohservations. — 1. The additional premium for special voyages will apply to all steamers, French or foreign. There is no reduction of rates for the clause " free average " on steamboats. INSUBANCE BY THE VOYAGE. Premiums on hulls of steamers by the voyage cannot be less than that of the merchandise for the same voyage, augmented by 50 per cent. Note. — The policies of Havre, Nantes, and Marseilles can be tem- porarily applied to ships in docks of those ports ; but, in this case, the general conditions indicated below shall be rigorously obligatory. The first paragraph of these conditions shall be equally obligatory for all foreign vessels insured according to the conditions of the national policy. General Conditions on Steamers : 1. Reduction of premiums for times of idleness cannot be accorded for a period of less than 30 days. (This condition is applicable in every case.) No reduction for difference between old and new is made during the first two j'ears. The reduction for the difference between the old and new is 10 per cent, during the third year, 15 per cent, during the fourth year, and 20 per cent, after the fourth year. MARINE INSURANCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 305 ADDITIONAL PREMIUMS FOR SPECIAL VOYAGES. Baltic : 3 per cent., reduced to 2 per cent., if the steamer does not navigate the Baltic after October 30, and to 1 per cent, if it does not navigate after October 15th. Black Sea : 1 per cent., reduced to \ per cent., if the steamer makes but one voyage from October 1st to March 1st. Red Sea : 1 per cent., reduced to \ per cent, if the steamer makes but one voyage (going and returning). Canada: 1\ percent, by voyage in the St. Lawrence after October 4, additional premium of 2 per cent, by voyage, for transportation of Chinese Coolies. East Coast of Africa : Additional premium 4 per cent, for a year of coasting to the ports, bays, or islands of the East Coast of Africa (reduced to 2 per cent, for a single voyage from Europe to said coast). West Coast of Africa : Additional premium of 2 per cent, for voyages to ports comprised between the territory south of the river Gambia and the Gaboon, inclusive (reduced to 1 per cent, for a single voy- age). JRevieio of Foreign Insurance Systems. The foregoing extract from the sea insurance system of the French shows the study which their underwriters have given, first, to the protec- tion of their business; and, second, to the shielding of the national interest in the marine. They have doubtless suc- ceeded in proportioning premiums to risks ; and it is likely they will also succeed in the policy of laying up, or selling foreign, their old sailing vessels of wood and iron, and in forcing com- merce into ne-w French iron steamers. Up to 1880, for many years, France had not been a wood or iron shipbuilding coun- try, supplying her own market with tonnage, but had offered a free-ship market to the world ; and. consequently, the marine, especially the sailing part of it, had come to consist mainly of second-hand vessels bought "cheap" from all flags. Great Britain, being a shipbuilding country, not only sold off her old craft to France, but had cut out French transportation with new tonnage. Had the French always protected their ship- building, their tonnage would have been younger, and would not now have needed the efforts of underwriters to reinforce the bounty of the government, to induce the use of newer, more efficient, and safer tonnage, either of iron or wood. 306 AMERICAN MARINE. Their past free-ship policy, by stuffing their marine with the cheap, half-worn, and cast-off craft of other countries, was responsible, primarily, for their backward condition when the bounty system was instituted, to "rehabilitate" the marine twelve years ago. This experience should not be lost on the United States. In reviewing the insurance systems of foreign nations, it is to be noticed, first, that every maritime power of consequence has its own means and expedients for protecting its navigation by insurance. The feebler nations, that have not the capital or skill to distribute their shipping losses in an economical manner, suffer from the rivalry of the richer and more enlight- ened. American underwriters, as a general thing, have deemed themselves debarred from insuring freely on the hulls of vessels sailing under foreign flags ; first, because of the pro- tective character of our navigation laws; and, second, of the sufficiency of the home field. Second, marine insurance is made a means of controlling navigation, through inspection and classification of hulls, as well as by the fixing of premium rates. Insurance power is plenary. Give the underwriting of commerce, with the bank- ing that is closely connected with it, into the hands of capital- ists of a grasping foreign nation, free trade governing all their transactions, and idtimately the shipping of that nation will be found doing the ocean transportation of the world. Only the maintenance by all maritime powers, of all the instrumentali- ties of commerce and navigation for themselves, will prevent monopoly and preserve the liberty of ocean traffic. This maxim seems to be generally understood in Europe, hence the general view that each nation there should keep the sea, even if some of them have to buy instead of building their vessels. Every first-class power, however, has some way of encourag- ing, if not protecting the building of its own commercial fleets. In the United States, where many generous, unsuspicious souls worship even monarchy in Europe, it is frequently denied that underwriting discriminations exist against American ves- sels, on the ground that it is "impossible." Let them read the testimony of these pages. The denial, and not the proof, is absurd. The discrimination alleged may be seen, first, in the preference, among merchants, bankers, and underwriters for MARINE INSURANCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 307 their own flag on the sea. This is general with Europeans, if not Americans. Second, note the distinctive inspection and classification rules, and these followed up by differential insur- ance rates. The course taken is perfectly natural. The rule of existence being self-love, every people rightfully cherish their well-being, national as well as personal. It is not to the interest of one nation to build up the shipping of another. Can an Englishman be expected to load a Frenchman's ship, or a Frenchman a German's, while one of his own flag may be found? Why should any foreigner load an American ship, insure her cargo, or do anything for her that the people of her owTi country neglect to do ? There is really no reason for it, save the cheap sophistry of "free trade," and the dear deceit of "maritime reciprocity," resting on national abnegation. The rule being that every nation should provide its own ship, its own cargo, and its own insurance, a foreigner applying for the one or the other is asked a bonus or advance, for rea- sons well known in trade ; one being that it is worth more ; and another, that more can be obtained for serving foreigners than one's own countrymen. Where it is otherwise, there is a want of inducement to deal, unless a surplus of capital or labor is in the market. Certain flags in the Mediterranean are openly discriminated against, by the underwriters of several western nations. The excuse for this may be "moral hazard," a term in ship insurance, used to cover many grounds for overcharg- ing, or refusing business. Then, necessarily, certain trades are favored and others over-taxed to secure average profits. The favoring of steamers is at the expense of sailing vessels; the partiality shown to iron tonnage makes insurance on wooden ships dear; and the covering of cargoes at much lower rates than hulls is a patronage to merchants that is paid for by the owners of vessels. In Great Britain there appears more system in these discriminations, than in the adjustment of premium rates. Our own country is not found far behind any other in the cheapness of marine insurance, either for hulls or cargoes. Mutual companies here, as elsewhere, afford the lowest rates. Nothing has yet been done towards the forming of associations of owners to insure their own vessels. In Europe, shipowners' clubs are more common than mutual companies. For cheap- 308 AMERICAX MARINE. ness and reliability, Denmark seems to have an excellent sys- tem of the mutual sort. The northern Continental nations contribute the least of any to capitalistic imderwriting, a form to the greatest extent prevalent in England and the south of Europe; while here we are being eaten up with it, of course, mostly by foreign companies, whose agencies swarm in our principal ports, chiefly engaged, as yet, in cargo business. On the Lakes, however, hulls are now quite generally taken, as well as cargoes, by foreign offices. British ships seem to be the fullest protected of any by insurance. Some strong shipping companies and rich firms insure their own steamers, but all who make a practi(^e of insuring their craft cover them and their f reiglits for full value, and over that, if they can. This complete insurance is a great protection. It cannot be effected in several of the countries of Europe, nor in the United States. It is this facility for full insurance, partly, that causes the building in Great Britain of so many cheap iron ships, "tramp steamers," and such tonnage; also, it may be added, it helps no little to keep insurance rates above those current in some Continental countries; and, last but not least, it contributes to the fact, of record, that British shi]>ping is not so safely navigated as American. The first requisite for cheap insurance is seaworthy and durable vessels, safely loaded., only fairly insured, but intelli- gently navigated. The mutual insurance ])lan, under the con- duct of experienced managers, seems preferable to clubs of owners, some of whom will be sure to have inferior vessels, and what is called "unlucky voyages," with heavy losses resulting. Clubs conducted upon the free-for-all principle never fail to come to grief. In the United States, the Atlantic Mutual, of New York, is a good example of an underwriting office well conducted and successful. Their annual dividend of 40 per cent, shows conclusively that the capitalistic or corporate sys- tem must be bleeding to death such owners in this country as patronize it. It is greatly to be deplored that our foreign commerce in every root and branch has become the spoil of foreign nations. Had there been continued a due protection of all the interests concerned in our trade abroad, we would now possess institu- tions of our own ample to cover all our commerce and naviga- MARINE INSURANCE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 309 tion and handle all its exchanges, without a dollar of foreign capital to play the autocrat in any of our ports, and betray our carriage to rival Hags. Comparative Safety at Sea. In justice to American inter- ests, the su])eriority of our shipping is not so generally known and conceded as it shoidd be. Untrue accounts, from unrelia- ble sources, find circulation in our journals and magazines. The tables following, compiled and calculated from information in the Repertoire General, a work issued annually by the Bureau Veritas (French Lloyd's), are instructive on this sub- ject. The facts given refer to sea-f/otng vessels inspected and classed in any of the following marine insurance registers: Registre Veritas, Registro Italiano, Lloyd's Register, Norske Veritas, German ischcr Lloyd, Veritas Austro-Ungarico, Ne- derland Vereeni":in^ Van Assuradeuren, and Record of Ameri- can Shipi)ing. Dealing only with the classified tonnage, the figures represent to good advantage the comparative merits of ships and seamen of the different nations engaged, for the most part, in the carriage of valuable merchandise to and from all parts of the world. The statistics are for the past three years, 1889, 1890, 1891, both for sail and steam, and give the aver- age for the period. SHIPPING OF DIFFERENT NATIONS, AND COMPABISON OF PROPOR- TIONATE LOSSES AT SEA, 1889-91. Steamers Above Fifty Gross Tons. Proportion of Fleet that was Lost. Flags in the Order of Safety. Percentage of Number. Percentage of Tonnage. Average of Number and Tons. 1. Swedish 2. Italian .8 1 1.78 1.78 1.82 1.84 1.91 1..3 2.04 l.C.O 1.82 2.71 2..53 .8.5 1.4.5 .97 1.28 1.47 1..57 1.58 2.49 1.75 2.5G 3.0.3 2.23 2.64 .82 1.23 3. Austrian 4. German 5. Spanish 0. French 7. American 8. Russian 9. Norweg'ian 10. Danish 11. Bels^an 12. British 1.37 1..53 1.64 1.7 1.74 1.89 1.9 2.12 2.42 2.47 13. Dutch 2.58 310 AMERICAN MARINE. Sailers Above Fifty Gross Tons. Flags in the Order of Safety. 1. Spanish 2. Greek , . 3. Russian 4. American . 5. Swedish . 6. Italian . . 7. British. . 8. French . . 9. Norwegian 10. Danish . . 11. Austrian . 12. Dutch . . 13. German Proportion of Fleet that was Lost, Percentage of Percentage of Number. Tonnage. 1.22 .8 1.47 3.46 3.39 3.53 3.8 4.61 5.04 4.72 4.74 5.02 6.67 .39 1.05 2.11 3.45 3.73 4.15 3.89 5.22 5.18 5.61 6.28 6.15 5.13 Average of Number and Tons. .81 .93 1.79 3.45 3.56 3.84 3.85 4.91 5.11 5.16 5.51 5.58 5.90 It will be seen that Great Britain does not lead the world in safety at sea, but ranks as the twelfth flag in steam, and the seventh in sail ; while the United States stands as the seventh in steam and the fourth in sail, of the thirteen foremost na- tions. The Swedish, Norwegian, Russian, and Danish steamers are small, averaging from 400 to 800 tons ; while the French and Sjjanish sailers are less than 200 tons, and Greek, Swedish, and Riissian are but little above, and run on short voyages chiefly. As for the British and American sail, the former are mostly iron, and the latter all wood, with no advantage in the open seas navigated. In regard to steamers, while all the British are iron, many of the American are likewise metal- built. In the case of sail, there is a superiority of 11.6 per cent. ; and in the case of steam, of 42 per cent. Averaging the ratios of steam and sail, the five principal flags rank in safety as follows : — The American, 2.59 per cent.; the Norwegian, 3.10; the British 3.16; the French, 3.30; the German, 3.71 per cent. The American superiority over the Norwegian is 19.5 per cent.; over the British, 21; over the French, 27.36; over the German, it is 43.15 per cent. CHAPTER XX. IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. The tonnage-tax system, with its radical imperfections, as chief among" the minor burdens of our foreign trade marine, deserves our notice here. To this subject attention was invited by the author in his report of the Bureau of Navigation for 1890. Bills for the correction of the evils then- showTi to exist were prepared and submitted to Congress for enactment. JFcnilts of Admeasiirement. Briefly, the provision that "net" tonnage, instead of gross, shall be taken for the basis of assessment for dues or taxes works evil in three waj^s : first, to vitiate the survey itself; second, to do injustice between steam and sail vessels, and between steamers of large and small net tonnage ; and third, it operates to the advantage of foreign shipping, since net-tonnage rules are not international, but each country pleases its own people in the allowances that are made and deducted from gross tonnage to obtain net. There is really no practical way in any country of accurately finding net tonnage. The term itself is inexact and indefinite, since it is based, not on a projjortionate allowance of space, as might be done ; but, in steamers, particularly, the finding of net ton- nage depends upon an arbitrary discount for boiler and engine- room, coal bunkers and shaft-alley ; and in all vessels for the berthing of crews. The rules for gross tonnage, honestly applied, secure tolerably accurate results; and they are inter- national. In Great Britain the Board of Trade, having the power, has changed the rules of allowance from time to time. It has resulted that there are British steamers, below 200 tons mostly, with little or no net tonnage at all. In very few coun- tries are precisely the same allowances made. Internationality of ship admeasurement is an important prin- ciple to secure in a tonnage law. It saves the time and cost of mensuration of foreign vessels in our ports, while it saves to 312 AMERICAN MARINE. American owners the charges for admeasurement in foreign ports. It is, however, all one-sided to accept foreign net ton- nage as the equivalent of American, because our net tonnage is larger than foreign, as wiU be shown. Favoritism to Steamers and Foreign Skipping. By the present law our sailing ships are taxed upon their gross ton- nage, minus 5 per cent, (for crew space), while our steam vessels are taxed upon their gross tonnage, minus from 30 to 45 (but not exceeding 50) per cent. There is no valid reason for this discrimination ; on the contrary, since the tonnage tax is levied to support our marine hospitals, and steamers carry two or three times as many men per hundred (net) tons as sail- ing vessels do, justice requires the greater contribution to be made by steamers. Moreover, the cost of vessels, their value at any time, and their earning powers at all times, are not in proportion to their net, but gross tonnage, so here is another reason, just and weighty, for a change of basis of assessment. At the best, tonnage taxes on a home marine are most inequita- ble. A ton (gross) of sail may cost $50, and a ton of steam $150; and yet, by our law, the one will be taxed the same as the other. That is to say, if the dues are 30 cents per ton, annually, then the sail will pay 28.5 cents, and the steam will pay only 21 cents, on the average ; but, at the most, might pay 15 cents only upon the gross ton. This injustice has been brought about by following a bad British practice. The cost or value of a steamer is measurably proportional to her propelling power; which, again, is proportionate to the allowance or discount from gross, for net tonnage. The larger the allowance necessary, the more has been the cost, and the greater is the value. Owners of steamers in England, to avoid taxation, have claimed from the first an allowance of capacity, on the ground that the more machinery and power they have the less cargo they can carry. While that is true, it is also true that speed is a quality as valuable as capacity, or it would not be provided to take its place. Efficiency requires both speed and capacity, not only in steamers but in sailing vessels, and efficiency makes the money. It is, therefore, specious, if not evasive reasoning, that has advocated the basing of taxa- tion upon a net tonnage, however obtained, and it should have no weio'ht at all with Cono-ress. IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. 313 It is bad enough to do unjustly between our own fleets, but it is even worse to be guilty of favoritism towards foreign flags. While we collect tonnage taxes from our sailing ships in the foreign trade on the basis of 95 per cent, of their gross ton- nage, on many foreign steamers we collect this tax on a basis as low as 32 per cent. That our statesmen thus burden our own struggling craft, and relieve foreign tonnage of taxes, has not the look of brightness about it. The following statement of foreign and American steam lines engaged in our ocean trade, with their number, average, size, ratio of net to gross tonnage, on the average and for the mini- mum, will prove the charges we make against the present sys- tem : — COMPARATIVE TONXAGES OF STEAM FLEETS. Like. French. G^n^ral Transatlantique British. Barrow Cunard Guion Henderson Brothers . Inman Ismay & Co British fleet Merchant cruisers . . Italian. Nav. General Italian Sec. German. North German Lloyds . Austrian. Lloyd Austriaco . . . American. Sea-going fleet .... Average Average Ratio of Number. Tonnage Net to Gross. Gross Tonnage. Per cent. 54 2,639 48.31 9 4,.509 60.44 21 4,019 58.06 .5 4.292 57.09 29 2,810 64.65 6 6,879 ,57.91 13 5,243 58.19 83 4,065 59.90 10 8,240 49.07 69 2,018 62.96 61 2,683 63.83 55 2,012 64.22 104 2,549 69.27 Minimum Ratio of Net to Gross Tonnage. Per cent. 31.83 42..39 45.44 51.27 54..54 52.20 43.82 42.39 45.44 53.92 49.70 5S.97 55.25 Comparing the average ratios, it appears that our tonnage- tax assessments favor the different foreign flags as follows : — 314 AMERICAN MARINE. Per cent. The Austrian, in general ..... 7.29 The German, in general ..... 7.85 The Italian, in general ...... 9.10 The British, in general . . . . . 13.52 The British " merchant cruisers " . . . . 29.16 The French, in general . . . . . 30.25 Admeasurement Allowances. When our present tonnage system was adopted, the gross was the "register" tonnage. There was no allowance to vitiate the measurement or the assessment. In 1880 complaint was made at a shipping con- vention held in Boston, that British steamers in our ports paid taxes upon net, whereas American steamers paid upon gross tonnage, and a resolution was passed to have our law modified to meet the situation. At the next session of Congress this was done. It was mistaken legislation. It was unfair to sail- ing vessels; and, as may be seen from the foregoing table, the change did not effect justice as between our own and British steamers, but the steamship interest was pacified. The difficulty arose in this way : Wishing to avoid frequent remeasurements of tonnage of foreign vessels in our ports, and save our own vessels from remeasurements in foreign ports, the State Department had agreed with foreign countries to accept their "register" tonnage, which was net, if they would accept ours, which was gross. It was not a masterpiece of diplomacy on our part, though no more unadvised than our usual foreign deals in behalf of shipj)ing. It was this unstatesmanlike agree- ment that should have been overruled and set aside by Con- gress, and the law made explicit, that gross tonnage should be the only basis for taxation. If the taxes were too high, they should have been reduced, not dodged by allowances; and this is the remedy now, unless we abolish tonnage as a basis and introduce an equitable principle in its place. In the recent Pan - American Conference this question of basis for tonnage taxes was considered at length; and it was settled that, as between American nations, tonnage taxes should be levied on the gross admeasurement. Our nation is, there- fore, already a party to an intended reformation of net tonnage abuses, and it would be quite in order to pass the bill referred to in the beginning of this chapter. That measure provides IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. 315 for taxing all foreign vessels upon gross tonnage, and our own upon net, if we choose. In relation to so doing, there is no- thing in our reciprocity laws or treaties to prevent it. The stipulation in those laws is for charging no higher rate of ton- nage duty. In point of fact, for many years — 1865 to 1882 — foreign nations, with our consent, assessed tonnage dues to our shipping on the basis of gross tonnage. This was simply because we called it "register" tonnage; and, in the author's judgment, it is competent for foreign nations to do so again, without valid objection from us, even if we did not so call it, so long as the rate of duty charged upon the net tonnage of their own vessels was not discriminative, but the same as charged to ours, on the gross. And the rule should work both ways. Foreign Net- Tonnage Rides. A committee of the Second Northern Maritime Conference, in Europe, in a very full re- port, 1888, gives three different rules, which were then in vogue by different groups of nations, for estimating net ton- nage. The " British rule " is legalized in Great Britain, France,^ Finland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. The "German rule" is followed in Germany, Sweden, Nor- way, Russia, and Belgium. The "Danube rule "is adopted in the United States, and used in Denmark, Holland, Spain, Greece, Egj^pt, for the pas- sage of the Suez Canal and the River Danube. The net tonnage for steamers above 1,000 tons gross, esti- mated under the British rule, is stated by the committee to be, on the average, about 10 per cent, less than the same tonnage by the Danube rule (used by us); and about 16 per cent, less than after the German rule. It is stated on the same author- ity that net tonnage after the British rule is not recognized in countries having adopted either the Danube or the German rule. This statement is not accurate with respect to the United States. Here we are not nice about rules, but accept as true the net tonnage of all nations. What is stated by the authority mentioned is doutbless true of European countries. And this authority states further, "generally, it has been determined that only the gross tonnage for steamers shall be ^ Judging from the foregoing Table, this cannot be true now of France. 316 AMERICAN MARINE. recognized, and that the engine-room deduction in every special case shall be determined according to the rules in force in the respective countries." But there are other than engine-room allowances that disturb the estimation of net tonnage. For instance, while Denmark has the Danube rule (the same as ours for steamers), that coun- try allows from 5 to 18 per cent, for crew or forecastle space in sailing vessels, while we deduct no more, but in some cases less, than 5 per cent. In the "British Nautical Magazine" for 1887, in an article on "Saving Life at Sea," a striking example of the absurdity of using the British rule for net tonnage is given thus : — "The steamer Bournemouth, which went ashore in a passage from Torquay to Bournemouth, and was certified to carry at sea 372 passengers, was 232 tons gross, but, registered under 7 tons net, was free from inspection simply because her builders and owners possessed contrivance and ingenuity enough to avail themselves to the fullest extent of the vagaries in the laws governing 'register tonnage,' and brought that, in her case, down to below seven." Here the blame is laid altogether upon the builders and owners, whereas it doubtless belongs mostly to the surveyors of tonnage. At the present writing the "International Conference," sit- ting at Geneva, for the reform and codification of the law of nations, has had this tonnage question under discussion, and appointed a commission to submit definite proposals for its set- tlement. A Test Office for Tonnage Surveys. In the second section of the bill, to which reference has been made, it is provided that all surveys for tonnage shall be verified and corrected by a supervising authority, before computations are made. Er- rors of all sorts now prevail. The draft of the present tonnage law was prepared by the author, then a naval architect and editor in New York. The British had passed their model act in 1854. Profiting by experience under this act, the original bill provided for a "test office" at Washington, the same as existed in London, but the Committee on Commerce, inspired by economy, the country being at war, dropped this important provision, their IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. 317 idea being "to |3ass the bill without the test section, and let its enactment follow in time to come, when the cost of accuracy would be no object." The Bureau of Navigation, now in the Treasury Department, offers a convenient office for this test work, two or three quali- fied clerks that can make ship drawings and calculations being all the force necessary. The Bureau of Navigation is charged by law with the supervision of tonnage admeasure- ment, but has no means of exercising it. The situation is anomalous and discreditable, and calls for correction. Evils of our Tonnage- Tax Laics. Our jiresent tonnage-tax laws are the worst we have ever had ; not only faulty, as most laws are, but prejudicial to our shipping and hurtful to our own people. They do not even satisfy some of the foreign nations most benefited by their enactment. Many complaints and protests, on the part of foreign shipowners and their gov- ernments, occupy the Treasury Department files, and engage the correspondence of the Department of State. The attention of Congress was invited to this important mat- ter, and corrective legislation suggested by President Cleve- land, in a special message, January 14, 1889.^ The law in question came in force Jvme 26, 1884. It provided that, in lieu of the uniform tax of 30 cents a ton per annum, imposed at the beginning of the late war, a duty of 3 cents a ton, not to exceed in the yearly aggregate 15 cents a ton, should be assessed on all vessels entered from any foreign port in North America, Central America, the West Indies, the Bahamas, the Bermudas, the Hawaiian Islands, or Newfoundland ; and that a duty of 6 cents a ton, not to exceed in the yearly total 30 cents a ton, should be imposed on vessels from all other foreign ports. Upon the enforcement of this law, claims were immediately made by foreign nations that this neighborhood discrimination was in disregard of the favored-nation clause of their commer- cial treaties with the United States. The attorney -general, in 1885, declared it as his opinion, that the distinction set up in the act was "purely geographical in character, inuring to the advantage of any vessel, of any power, that may choose to fetch 1 Differential Rates of Tonnage Dues, House of Representatives, 50th Congress, 2d session, Ex. Doc. No. 74. 318 AMERICAN MARINE. and carry between this country and any port" situated as described by the act; and, consequently, there was no warrant to the claims made. This opinion, though not satisfactory to the powers complaining, seems to have been convincing to our own government. The claims and protests, however, continue to be made and filed away for future controversy and refund- ing, if the propitious time comes, as it may, when we shall be least prepared to deny the demand. But there are greater evils. The act of 1884 contained a proviso which has made more mischief than the geographical discrimination. In 188G it was amended in grammar, but not in policy, and now reads as fol- lows : — " Prodded, That the President of the United States shall suspend the collection of so much of the duty herein imposed on vessels entered from any foreign port, as may be in excess of the tonnage and light- house dues, or other equivalent tax or taxes imposed in said port on American vessels by the government of the foreign country in which such port is situated, and shall, upon the passage of this act, and from time to time thereafter, as often as It may become necessary by reason of changes in the laws of the foreign countries above mentioned, indi- cate by proclamation the port to which such suspension shall apply, and the rate or rates of tonnage duty, if any, to be collected under such suspension : ^^ Provided further, That such proclamation shall exclude from the benefits of the suspension herein authorized the vessels of any foreign country in whose ports the fees or dues of any kind or nature imposed on vessels of the United States, or the Import or export duties on their cargoes, are in excess of the fees, dues, or duties Imposed on the ves- sels of the country in which such port is situated, or on the cargoes of such vessels." It would not be easy to find in all our shipping statutes a more complicated or difficult piece of law for administration. It imposes on the government the duty of watching the legisla- tion of foreign countries in respect to tonnage taxes, and of changing our collections to correspond with their charges, not with our need of revenue, a course which seems absurd and unbecoming. The remedy suggested in President Cleveland's Message was, either the abolition or the equalization of the tonnage IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. 319 duties on a basis of a uniform charge of 3 to 15 cents. Con- gress adjourned without action; and, the trouble with the law continuing, the author's predecessor as Commissioner of Navi- gation, and the Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. William Win- dom, in their reports for 1889, recommended an amendment of the law, by repealing the provisos inviting reciprocity in ton- nage taxes with foreign nations, on the ground mainly that our statute had borne no fruit whatever in that direction. In the second session of the rift3^-first Congress (1890) Hon. Nelson Dingley, Jr., reported a bill of repeal, and it passed the House too late for action by the Senate. The law is therefore wrong, and known to be, but still it stands. Discrimination against our own Shipi)ing. There are two nations in Europe that for years past have laid no tax on tonnage in any of their ports. These are the Netherlands and Germany, where the "free ports" of history are situated; and theirs are the only governments that have accepted the provisos and had proclamations issued in their favor. All other na- tions, as remarked above, have declined our offers of recipro- city, and refused to change their tonnage-tax laws. The net reward of our liberality is the loss of tonnage taxes from all foreign vessels coming from Dutch and German ports, since no nation now collects discriminating duties. In return for this concession, our shipping gets — nothing. Foreign ship- ping gains everything. Before the passage of the acts of 1884-86 our vessels paid no taxes in Dutch and German ports, nor did the vessels of any other country, but the vessels of our own, and every other flag paid taxes on entering our ports. Since the passage of the law, our vessels returning from Dutch and German ports pay taxes as before, but all vessels of for- eign flags are exempt. Thus a law of Congress has within a few years past set up a blundering discrimination against our own shipping, so far as it may engage in Dutch and German trade. Not only is this true, but the law, as it stands, holds out the offer of such discrimination against our own vessels, so far as each of the different nations of the world shall accept its terms ; and if all foreign nations should consent to them, we would then have the shipping of the world, all but our own, if any remained by that time, entering our ports from most places abroad free of tonnage taxes. That would be a liberal 320 AMERICAN MARINE. spectacle, indeed! By just such dreamy and unguarded acts has our shipping been swej^t away year by year, to make room for foreign tonnage. We are now intending by postal subsidies to enable some of our steam shipping to run in the foreign trade. Suppose we put on lines to Dutch and German ports, in competition with those now under these or other foreign fiasfs. The lines of such flags would be charged no tonnage tax at either side the ocean, but American lines would have to pay at our side. Our treaties compel us to tax foreign vessels no higher rates than our own. That is free trade enough, and reciprocity in plenty, but to have such relations with foreign powers as to tax no ton- nage but our own is like running liberalism into paganism. Origin of the Free-Port Provisos. Some of our people may wonder how it is that such legislation as described makes its way through Congress. Good folks, these provisos were in foreign interest. They would relieve the Dutch and German steam lines from tonnage taxes. These, and other foreign lines, with large interests at stake in our transportation, when they want advantages from our government, attend strictly to business in a practical way. Foreign ministers resident at Washington study the welfare of their respective nations. The mail steamer lines of all nations, running to the United States, are subsidized, and many belong to the naval service. Thus it is, each foreign government has an interest in the wel- fare of its steamers in our trade. The ministers attend to the diplomatic work, while for business purposes agents, attor- neys, and lobb34sts are employed. These, too, reside in Washington, attend to details, and put in their time where work is most advantageous, whether in social gatherings, the corridors and committee-rooms of Congress, the departments and bureaus of the government, or elsewhere. Thus it is that foreign business has special attention, grows and flourishes, while American interest, especially in shipping, scarce ever feels the sun upon its back. It has no minister at the seat of government, no attorneys preparing its papers or watching its case, not even an agent to visit the departments, smile on the messengers, make his best bow to the dignitaries within, and remind them of the cheapness of a ticket to Euroj^e. Refunding of Tonnage Taxes. If it was doubtful, in the IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. 321 least, that foreign statesmanship mingled with American, in framing the free-port provisos of the tonnage-tax laws, it is quite certain that the administration of the law by the Bureau of Navigation brought down upon the commissioner the strong- est censure and condemnation. The law, however, from its enactment, was justly construed, and only vessels coming direct fi'om German ports were relieved from the payment of tax. The difficulty was, certain steamers arrived from Southampton, though they started from Bremen. Thi'ir coming was like that of the Chinese from Canada, in which cases our courts held that Canada, and not China, was the country they came from. Coming from a British, which was not a free port, dues were rightly assessed and properly paid. But the foreign view of the question ultimately pre- vailed. It most always does. Under the pressure of legal and political opinions, the Commissioner of Navigation was obliged to direct the cessation of tax collection. This was done under the approval of Secretary Windom. The order was framed by the solicitor of the Treasury. While it was intended to apply to the Southampton steamers onl}', it was impossible not to make it exempt vessels from other ports of England, or of France, which might have stopped likewise on the way from Germany or the Netharland. It resulted, that to please the German government, the tonnage-tax-law provisos have let in free the vessels of all nations but our own, starting from free ports, whether they come direct or indirect. That is to say, the final construction of this law has widened greatly the scope of its discrimination against our own flag. But the matter did not rest there. Demands were made for refunding the taxes, which amounted to many thousands of dollars appropi'iated continuously for the maintenance of hos- pitals for sick and disabled American seamen. It was the understanding of the Commissioner of Navigation that Mr. Windom never intended these disputed tonnage-tax collections should be refunded by the Treasury, but that the claims should go to Congress in connection with the question of repeal or change of the law. On his death, however, the acting secre- tary insisted on the Commissioner of Navigation ordering re- funds made to the North German Lloyds Line, and refused to submit the matter to Congress; and the report of the Com- 322 AMERICAN MARINE. missioner of Navigation, touching the defects and abuse of the law, has never been published. While such facts can make their own comments, it may be well to note that all the chances taken by the Treasury Department made interest for foreign shipping, and thus practically packed burdens on our own. Pretenses for Tonnage-Tax Refunds. Many of the grounds, alleged in appeals of the owners and agents of foreign vessels for refunds of tonnage taxes, are absolutely frivolous, and others are untenable. The pretense usually is, that treaty stipulations with their nation make the collection illegal. In some of these cases there is no treaty at all covering the instance presented. Where no treaty right of exemption ex- ists, it is often sought to show that Congress or the President is to blame, either for action or inaction. Appeals in many cases seem to be filed in the hope that something may possibly happen to give color to a right of exemption under a future act of Congress, or decision of the Commissioner of Navigation, or opinion of a court. The law provides that the President, in certain cases mentioned, shall issue a proclamation relieving foreign vessels from tonnage taxes. That the President has not, in pursuance of duty, issued such proclamation, has been made a ground of protest and claim for exemption of the tax ; and this has been impudently done by the masters of British vessels. Hejoeal of the Late. The remedy for these evils and abuses would seem to be the simple one of having no taxes at all on tonnage. While this would relieve our shipowners, it would be of more advantage to their foreign rivals, and there are eight of the latter to one of the former. In 1890 American vessels paid 44.68 per cent, of the geographical, or three-cent tax; and only 7.73 per cent, of the general, or six-cent tax; while they paid 13.3 per cent, of the total collected, which was 1565,475. The flags paying above a thousand dollars of ton- nage dues in 1890 are as follows : — IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. 323 TONNAGE TAX COLLECTIONS, 1890. Flags. British American Norwegian German . Italian I'reneh .Spanish . Belgian . Dutch . . Swedish . Austrian . Danish Russian . Portuguese Hawaiian . Amount Paid. $340,134 75,208 32,908 30,962 16,949 13,109 12,231 11,686 7,449 3,728 2,884 2,636 2,343 1,671 1,483 Per cent, of Total. 60.15 13.30 5.82 5.47 2.99 2.32 2.16 2.07 1.32 .66 .51 .47 .41 .29 .26 Thus it appears that British tonnage, having displaced our own in a great degree, would be benefited most by freedom from dues. On the other hand, the tonnage of our own to be most relieved would be sailing vessels in distant trades, in which British tonnage would gain most on steam. The amount of taxes paid by American and British vessels, respectively, are derived from sail and steam in proportion as follows : — Nationality. Sail. Steam. American. Per cent. 38.48 35.50 Per cent. 9.87 From tonnage in near-by trades 16.15 73.98 18.85 4.36 26.02 British. 71.59 From connage in near-by trades 5.20 23.21 76.79 The taxes paid by Norwegians are mostly on sail, while those by Germans are on steam, in distant trades. Under our laws and treaties, as these stand, tonnage dues are simply "revenue" taxes. There is no protection in them; 324 AMERICAN MARINE. and, therefore, so far as our vessel interest is concerned, they might better be abolished. They only exist as to the foreign trade ; but so long as foreign vessels do seven eighths or more of our carriage in that trade, it seems too generous, on our part, to give them all this business, through a free -trade pol- icy, and besides this to relieve them wholly from the slight taxation needful to light our coasts and ports, buoy our chan- nels, and maintain hospitals for seamen, necessaries largely used by foreign shipping. There should be, surely, some way of taxing to rival tonnage in our ports, as there is for making our own pay in foreign ports, at least its share of these expenditures ; and there should also be a way of relieving our own vessels of this tax, if Con- gress chooses so to do. Under the Constitution these ways exist, but under our maritime reciprocity legislation and trea- ties, the power of the Constitution is neutralized and repressed — in the interest of our rivals as it has happened. Now, what we would do for one American ton of shipping, in foreign trade, that we must do also for 7iine foreign tons. We could remove the tonnage taxes of the war-time from our shipping in the protected domestic trade, and this has been done; but we could do nothing for our suffering shij^ping in foreign trade, either to reduce or remove the tax, without helping foreign vessels equally with our own. The tax has been reduced, but the question remains, Why should our unprotected shipping be taxed and our protected go free, that we may make foreign vessels pay just dues for lights and the support of hospitals? We have appropriated millions of dollars for improving har- bors and deepening channels for foreign commerce, and re- signed these benefits to foreign shipping. Can we not go enough farther to give up, annually, half a million of tonnage taxes, that our own vessels may save ^75,000? Why should we tax an interest that we refuse to protect, while we protect an interest that we refuse to tax ? The Principle of Just Taxation. Nearly all nations levy tonnage taxes. While they do so, the basis of assessment should be gross tonnage, as we have seen. But, as taxes on tonnage are inequitable, why should they longer be laid on this basis? Why not base taxation on values, rather than tonnage? When tonnage taxes were first laid, crudeness and imperfection IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. 325 characterized all shipping relations. Vessels were small, and but little difference existed between a ton of one vessel and another, either in cost, efficiency, or carriage. All were pro- pelled by sail. Now, there is a very great difference between new vessels; many are driven by steam, and others by sail; some are small, and others very large, with varying degrees of power; some carry merchandise, and others passengers; and transportation is so perfected and regulated that the most val- uable vessels in business, as a general rule, are those that have cost the most per ton. It is upon the valuation, therefore, that taxes for revenue should be assessed. The propriety of this principle may be plainly seen in the cases of new and old vessels, that may have cost identically the same and were built to do the same work. A tax upon tonnage would be most unfair to old vessels; but a tax upon valuation could scarcely be unjust to any class. A tax upon tonnage acts like a specific duty upon imported goods. It favors one quality at the expense of another. The only reason for it could be the impossibility of fair appraisals, but this is not good. Experts can be found to appraise every kind of property and all sorts of structures and machines., The "Inland Lloyd's Register of Lake Shipping " gives the valuation, as well as the class and grade, of all vessels inspected. The government could apply a proper system for accomplishing the same thing, and thereby do justice to every kind of tonnage — but our own, that can have only injustice from any system of taxation, while it runs in competition with the subsidized tonnage of foreign countries. The Tonnage of Siibsidy. The sea-going steam vessels of the world, over 100 tons, recorded in Lloyd's Register, 1890, measures 12,985,372 tons gross. Of this shipping under British, German, French, Spanish, and Italian flags, there are 10,689,805 tons. Thus, the flags of these five principal powers of Europe, aU of them subsidiz- ers of steam, some paying bounties also to sail, cover 82.32 per cent, of the steam shipping of the world. The flag of subsidy — par excellence — the British flag alone, covers 63.42 per cent, of it, principally engaged in foreign trade. Comparing things small with great, the flag of the United States in for- eign trade covers but the insignificant proportion of one and a haK per cent, of the sea-going steam. 326 AMERICAN MARINE. We have paid nothing to speak of to create and support a steam marine, and, in the nature of things, have received as we have paid — nothing for nothing, Bntisk Tonnage under Subsidy or Subvention. Sometimes it is denied, but not by good authorities, that British steamers are subsidized. In the beginning, as shown elsewhere, every ton of steam sent to sea received Treasury support. Now, liowever, not one ton in five receives it. Excluding wooden steamers, which cut no figure in British foreign trade, the amount of metal steam foots up 5,775,132 tons. Not all of this is used in the foreign trade, but much of it takes part in that of other countries, our own included. The tonnage of steam lines under postal subsidy and admiralty subvention amounts to 1,030,196 tons, metal - built, classed at Lloyds. Manifestly, the support given by a subsidy or subvention is to the line and not alone to the ships engaged in earning it. All the subsidized lines have freighting steamers to catch the overflow business, and they are indirectly benefited by the pay- ments made to others. The steamers of the lines owning sub- sidized ships number 396. These vessels are the cream of the British steam fleet. From them are selected "The Royal Brit- ish Naval Reserve Cruisers," and '"'"The Royal British Naval Reserve, under contract for transport service," commanded by naval officers, and manned in large part by reserve seamen. The former class of ships has an aggregate tonnage of 82,402 tons, the latter class of 160,000 tons, and in the total 242,402 tons. Tak.ng the tonnage of the steamers, earning subsidy or sub- ventic 1 the proportion of the whole fleet is 13.75 per cent. Taking the tonnage of the lines receiving such support, the proportion of the fleet patronized by the government is 17.82 per cent. The steam fleet thus aided, amounting to 1,015,196 tons, greatly exceeds in tonnage that of any other than the British nation on the sea. It is equal to five times the tonnage of all the sea-going steam marine of the United States. Germany ranks next to Great Britain in sea-going steam tonnage. The amount of iron and steel is 927,804 tons. IMPERFECTION OF OUR TONNAGE-TAX SYSTEM. 327 SUBSIDIZED GEEMAN TONNAGE. Name of Line. Number. Tonnage. Norddeutscher Lloyd ............ 64 40 26 169,129 117,976 57,497 Hambiirg-Amerlk. Packetfahrt Actien Gesellscliaft Hamburg-Sudaraerikanische Dampfschiffahrt Gesell- Total 130 344,602 The proportion of steam tonnage assisted by government is therefore 37.14 per cent, owned by three corporations. Here is a fine example of imperialistic ship-protection. As for France and Italy, all their steam tonnage is under subsidy or bounty, while that of several other countries is pro- tected largely in a similar manner- It is against these fleets that we tax our ships in foreign trade. It is for these fleets and their flags that we stripped our owners of protection, and either refuse or neglect to restore it. Our proportion of the sea-going steam tonnage of the world is 07ie and a half per cent. Do we deserve, at the hands of our citizens, to have a single ship ? CHAPTER XXI. THE LOAD-LINE QUESTION. For years past the British government has sought to regu- late the loading of vessels, and to that end freeboard ^ rules or tables have been applied to British ships. At first the object was to save the lives of seamen, by the prevention of overload- ing, and the law affected British ships only. Later it was found that foreign vessels, competing with British, sometimes loaded deeper, and consequently could carry cheaper. Then was it seen that equity required that all competitors should load by, at least, equivalent rules, and these, if framed and applied by British authority, could be made protective of British interest. Accordingly, a new act, passed in 1890, is now in operation as to shipping of all flags arriving at, or departing from, a port of the United Kingdom. Our own government has not yet considered the load-line question, except in reports of the Commissioner of Navigation, and the preparation of a freeboard bill by the author, which was introduced in the House, February, 1891, and in the Sen- ate in December following. Our rival's course has made it necessary for Congress to take this tjuestion up and settle it, by the passage of this measure, if our vessels are to receive fair play in British ports, or be protected finally in carrying a full cargo anywhere. By the terms of the British act, if our ships are inspected and marked by officials for their load drafts of water, according to proper rules enacted by Congress, they will be accepted by the British authorities as capable of carry- ing the loads designated; but if not inspected and so marked, ^ The line to which a vessel is loaded is called the load-line. Freeboard is a name given to the emerged, out-of-water or "dry side," between the load-line and the sea-washed deck above it. The freeboard represents the reserve buoyancy of the vessel, and is always a considerable percentage of the entire " displacement," or vessel-body. THE LOAD-LINE QUESTION. 329 it follows that they may, and no doubt will be, imposed on by shippers, underwriters, and governments of foreign countries by restrictions as to loading. Heretofore, in loading our ships in the foreign trade, no restrictions have been imposed by foreign governments, but only by underwriters. Hereafter, since Great Britain has led the way, we may expect other nations, as well as she, to enact loading rules; and through sharp officials make our shipowners pay dearly for governmental neglect. The extent to which this new discrimination may be carried can only be fairly judged from past experience of foreign bias regarding Ameri- can ships. Action of the Maritime Conference. The International Maritime Conference of 1889 was expected to adopt and rec- ommend uniform rules for freeboard, but the committee having that subject in charge deferred action further than to report against taking it up then. Their report amounted to this : that the British Lloyds had a superior set of rules for ship- building anti marine inspection, which turned out vessels of greater strength and better quality than other nations built or generally owned, hence uniform rules for loading, unless based on rules as good as Lloyd's for building and inspection, would do injustice to British shipping. It is clear, at a glance, that British sentiment must haffe ruled the committee. Their plea could not relate to buoyancy, but only to strength ; and it has yet to be shown that Lloyd's rules insure the building of stronger ships than the rules of the Veritas, the Record, and other registers. The fact was, the British dominated the con- ference. Owning most of the world's shipping, on mature reflection, they were not anxious to recognize equality between British and foreign vessels. They preferred having loading rules of their own, which they could make protective to home- built tonnage. If discrimination resulted in their application to foreign vessels, that could only be the fault of such back- ward nations as did not themselves protect their shipping by loading rules and regulations of their own. International Correspondence. Soon after the passage of the new act, the British government brought it to the notice of our own, and invited correspondence as to its adoption in the United States. A reply, prepared by the Commissioner 330 AMERICAN MARINE. of Navigation, advised that a bill for American rules would be submitted to Congress for consideration and passage. This course was necessary in the interest of our marine, because the British tables of freeboard (rules were not enacted) are not based on science, or experience, but, seemingly, on theories of the superior seaworthiness of iron over wooden vessels, of steamers over sailers, of sharp ships over full ones, and of nar- row vessels over wide ones. The English interest in metal shipbuilding and steam navigation must have had undue influ- ence in shaping the tables. If certain kinds and sizes of ves- sels are pinched of cargo, others are permitted to load too deeply. Besides, the British tables do not provide for loading lumber vessels, which again are craft peculiar to American trade. Then, the British law puts the whole matter of loading rules or tables into the hands of the government Board of Trade, and this body may, and doubtless will, make changes from time to time. Our government has no body correspond- ing to the Board of Trade. Congress cannot enact a lot of tables, and he would be a poor American who would take his current law, or amendments thereof, from a department of the British government. We must, therefore, frame, enact, and apply our own rules and tables, improving upon the British where we may. Comparison of Freeboards.^ It may be stated here that the rules of the bill proposed for congressional action have been submitted for examination to the New York Board of Underwriters, and received their unqualified approval. They may, therefore, be referred to as American, in the discussion of points of difference with the British, now to be noted. Table I. — Steam Vessels. The American rules provide a little more freeboard up to a size of vessel of 26 feet depth of hull, at which point the British tables give a little more for winter. At the depth of 30 feet, both summer and winter freeboards are a little greater by the British tables, and at 34 feet a considerable difference appears. Table II. — Sailing Vessels. The American freeboards are * In the Appendix will be found a copy of the freeboard bill, prepared by the author, as introduced in the Senate. Also tabular comparisons of British and American freeboards as adopted and proposed, with an expla- nation of the load-line problem, and the principles of freeboard rules. THE LOAD-LINE QUESTION. 331 the same as for steamers of equal depth. As steamers are longer than sailers, in proportion to depth, and there must be additional freeboard for overlength, it results that sailers carry more freeboard than steamers, by both sets of tables. The British provide for sailers a little more "dry side" up to a depth of hull of 26 feet, where a change appears, and the American rules require more freeboard for iron vessels. Discriminations. For wood and composite ^ sailing vessels, the British tables stop at a size having 27 feet depth of hull, and do not provide for summer freeboards, which are less than winter. Iron sailing vessels have freeboards assigned up to, and including, the size of 31 feet depth. They are given less freeboard than composite ships, and they, in turn, less than wooden vessels. But a stranger discrimination is made. While iron steamers are given less freeboard than iron sailers, below a size of 28 feet depth, at that limit a change is made, and the steamer, with a "coefficient of fineness" of .76, is required to have half an inch more dry side than a sailer of the same sharpness; and, for a depth of 31 feet, 3 inches more freeboard. At a depth of 20 feet, with a coefficient of .74, the difference of freeboard is 3.5 inches greater for the sailing ship. Such changes and differences as these between sailers and steamers are neither reasonable nor consistent, and cannot accord with science. They seem to be mere arbitrary distinc- tions to favor steam at the expense of sail, for such sizes of ships (not the largest) as must naturally do the greater part of ocean commerce, just as the distinction of less freeboard for ii'on than for wooden vessels is intended, probably, to induce a shipowniug preference for iron ships, and, therefore, of Brit- ish-built tonnage. A just distinction in favor of steamers is made in the standard for proportionate dimensions, where they are allowed twelve, but sailers only ten, depths for length, beyond which the freeboard is increased for overlength. By the American rules a sail ship of 20 feet depth would have 2.1 inches more freeboard than a steamer, but by the British tables 3.5 inches moi^e if iron -built, 4 inches if composite, and 4.5 inches if wooden. By the American rules a sailer of 26 feet depth ^ Composite vessels are framed of iron or steel, but planked with wood, calked, and coppered. 332 AMERICAN MARINE. would have 2.4 inches more freeboard than a steamer, but by the British tables she would have 1 inch, if iron-built, 2 inches if composite, and 3 inches, if wooden. By the American rules a sailer of 31 feet depth would have 2.62 inches more freeboard than a steamer, but by the British tables she would have 3 inches less instead of more, if iron-built ; but about the same if wooden. Table III. — J^or Spar-Deck Steamers. For the depth of 23 feet the British tables give a little more freeboard than the American rules, both for winter and summer. At 27, and up to 35 feet depth, the American rules require a little more free- board for winter, and considerable more for summer. At 37 feet depth the British tables give a little more for winter, but less in proportion for summer. Thus, it is seen, the British tables favor the deeper loading of medium-size vessels. The American rules are based on hydrostatics, therefore they cannot favor any depth or class of vessel, but must be fair to great and small. Table IV. — For Awning -Dech Steamers. It will be seen that the British tables give less freeboard for the smaller, and more proportionably for the larger vessels, than the American rules. Comparing the freeboards of awning with those of double-deck steamers, it appears that the British tables restrict unduly the loading of the larger awning-deckers. We may test this by supposing the awning-deck removed and the rules for single or double deck to be applied. In that case the free- boards for extreme sizes of vessels, expressed in inches and tenths, would compare, for the winter season, as follows : — Depth 14 ft. Depth 34 ft. (British Tables.) Freeboards, awning-deck on . 12.0 to 13.5 82.0 to 88.5 Freeboards, awning-deck off . 25.5 to 28.0 109.0 to 118.0 (American Rules.) Freeboards, awning-deck on . 13.5 to 15.4 75.5 to 79.0 Freeboards, awning-deck off . 27.5 to 28.9 101.8 to 103.1 Thus we see, in awning-deck steamers, the American rules require slightly more freeboard for the smaller vessels, but considerably less than the British for the larger. Assuming the American rules give sufficient freeboard to the smaller vessels, we observe that building up the sides and THE LOAD-LINE QUESTION. 333 covering with an awning-deek lessens the freeboard 13.5 inches, or 46.7 per cent., and for the larger vessels it reduces the free- board 24.1 inches, or 23.3 per cent. By the British tables these reductions are, respectively, 14.5 or 51 per cent., and 2^.5 or 25 per cent. ; and the differences between the reduc- tions only average 3 per cent. On the score of buoyancy, no good reason appears why so much more freeboard should be required, proportionately, for the larger vessels. If it be said it is on accoimt of weakness in the larger ships that the differ- ence is made, the plea is bad, as it reflects upon Lloyd's build- ingf rules for awning-deck steamers. The American rules, based on the principle of proportioning freeboards to the pressure and motion of the sea, if correct for 14 feet depth of hull, cannot be wrong for a depth of 34 feet. However, the manifest distrust of the British tables may be fitting for such awning-deck steamers as are built for British service. If that is the case, Lloyds should look to the im- provement of their rules. One has only to inspect the curves of freeboard, in the accompanying cuts, showing the increase from small to large vessels, to perceive the regularity and symmetry of the grada- tion accomplished by the American rules ; and to note, at the same time, the misproportioned and ill-formed curves produced by the British tables, particularly, in the cases of spar and awning deck steamers. A gTadation that violates the laws of progression cannot lay claim to science, but belongs to the rule of thumb. It is simply impossible for the British tables to deal justly with all sizes and classes of ships. To steamers they are partial. To wooden ships unfair. Shai'pness of Hulls Considered. Iv the British tables sharpness of hull receives much consideration, and this without reference to the proportionate dimensions. Long and short, wide and narrow, deep and shallow ships, with equal coeffi- cients, are treated alike and as analogous bodies, which, geo- metrically, they are not. An inspection of the accompanying figures, I., II., III., Comparisons of Coefficients, will show at a glance that vessels of equal coefficients may have very unequal sharpness of form ; that vessels of equal fineness of ends may have great disparity in coefficients of body; and that vessels of the same length may have different coefficients and degrees of sharpness. 334 AMERICAN MARINE. In Figure I. we see that the body A, B, C, D has the same coefficient as the body E, B, F, D inscribed in the parallel- ogram 1, 2, 3, 4, but the one is blunt and the other is sharp. In Figure II. the four different bodies inscribed have the same angle of sharpness and the same length of bow, but the short- est body has a coefficient of 50 per cent., the next longer body of 75 per cent., the next of 83.33 per cent., and the longest body of 87.5 per cent. In Figure III. there is the same length of body with differ- ent angles or sharpness, but a difference of 27.5 per cent, in the coefficients of fineness of ends. What is also strange, the British tables give the least free- board, and, consequently, the greatest draft of water to the sharpest body, which could not fail to be the one that would descend the deepest, and be the wettest in a storm at sea. There is no experience to warrant the loading of sharp vessels deeper than full ones. Nor is there any proving that sharp vessels are stronger built than full ones of the same dimen- sions.. Nor is there any sound basis for this discrimination. It is wrong in all respects, and should have no recognition in the United States. It has long been a common error with naval architects to compare the fineness of vessel models, or promiscuous dimensions, by coefficients of body, whereas only vessels of similar, or strictly proportionate, dimensions, can be so compared with accuracy and fitness. Imposition on Wooden Vessels. The discrimination against loading wooden vessels so deeply as iron or composite (iron frames and wooden planking) is another characteristic of the British tables that has no basis in practical knowledge. To reason that metal, as a material for ships, has buoyancy in excess of wood is absurd. Any difference existing between these materials is in favor of wood. The favoritism shown cannot stand on the ground of greater strength, for, whatever may be said of iron, as against wooden vessels, the mask falls when composite is also set against wood, since it is well known that composite construction is rarely the equal of either wood or iron. Good mechanical reasons explain this fact. But affirmation is not made that wooden vessels are not strong enough to carry loads as great as buoyancy in due reserve will determine. That would reflect upon the Lloyd's THE LOAD-LINE QUESTION. 335 Register Society, whose business it has been to make and enforce rules for obtaining strength, as well as buoyancy, in sufficient reserve for safety at sea. It may be stated as a maxim in shipbuilding, that a vessel must be strong enough to carry a full load, and any one not so built is a failure as a transport, whatever her material may be. There can be no such thing as a first-class vessel that cannot carry a full load, — one limited only by the requirements of safety in flotation. A mechanic knows of no excuse for building vessels of deficient strength of any materials proper to be used. Nor is it a prac- tice to build such vessels in the United States. Besides being dishonest constructions, thsy would not pay to use. In short, the object of discriminating against wooden ships in their load- ing cannot be concealed from American shipbuilders. It is, without doubt, to handicap their skill and discourage their trade. In a preceding chapter we have shown the comparative service and survival of British iron and American wooden ships, and that the latter do the more work in their greater period of existence. This could not be the case if they were weaker. Proof from Experience. If confirmation of this view of the distinction set up in England is needed, we have only to refer to the tables of ship performance in the California trade with Europe, given in preceding chapters. There it is shown that the British rules for loading iron ships gave them about six inches less freeboard and more draft of water than American wood ships were allowed. In consequence of this advantage, the British iron fleet carried 72.82 pounds more to the ton of vessel capacity, or .227 per cent, more cargo than did Ameri- can wood. But note the increased peril per ton which resulted. This was 37.75 per cent, above the peril rate of the American wooden fleet. In other words, in consequence, mainly, of their deeper loading, if it was worth 2 per cent, (the rate then cur- rent) to insure cargoes by British iron ships, then cargoes by American wooden ships, equitably written, would have been only 1.6 per cent, (but the current rates were 2.5 to 2.75, with freights much lower in consequence). This testimony is exper- imental, and not theoretical or political, and should settle the question of parity of freeboards for wood and iron ships, at least as they have been, and will be, built in the United States. 336 AMERICAN MARINE. Valid Reasons for a Freeboard Laiv. We have remarked upon the need of enacting rules for loading, to protect our vessels from foreign interference, but there are other reasons that may be offered. It will be in order, first, however, to inform the reader that the British Board of Trade have exam- ined the freeboard bill proposed and expressed their satisfac- tion with it. If enacted, the British authorities will respect it. So much has been gained already. The increased safety of life and property at sea, that will doubtless attend the enactment of the law, are objects worthy of attainment. We have no idea that American shipping is inferior to any in the world on the score of safety, but progress in this direction will be beneficial to our shipping interest, and honorable to the national character. Great Britain for many years has been endeavoring to improve her merchant fleets in seaworthiness, the appointment of several royal commissions testifying to its necessity and importance. The fact that marine insurance is higher in England than on the Continent is of itself an indication that she should lead in Europe in reducing the dangers of navigation. If she succeeds in this, other nations cannot, without disadvantage, decline to follow her example. And the British law is working successfully. A return has been made of all ships ordered by the Board of Trade or its officers to be provisionally detained as unsafe, in pursuance of the act of 1876, from July 1, 1890, to June 30, 1891, giving the names of the owners of ships that have been dismantled, broken up, or converted into hulks. It appears that the whole number of vessels detained during the year was 44; of these 21 were found unsafe on account of alleged defects in hull, equipment, or machinery; the remaining 23 were cases of overloading or improper loading. These were either lightened or reloaded, and then released. Those with defects of age or condition were either broken up, converted into hulks or lighters, or are still detained. Since the passage of the act of 1876, of which the law of 1890 is an amendment, the total number of vessels reported as defective has been 722, or 48 annually. The number held for illegal loading has been 685, or 39 annually. When we estimate the number of British vessels loading in the ports of foreign countries, where British law is not in force. THE LOAD-LINE QUESTION 337 and consider how many unsafe vessels, but for the law, would annually proceed to sea vinder the British flag, it will be seen what need there was for saving legislation. It cannot be doubted that its effect is, and will be, to raise the reputation of the British marine. This effect will be felt by American shipping. Its place for seaworthiness is in the van. We cannot afford to lose this place. The application of load-line law will increase the pres- ent repute of our marine for safety, and, consequently, its chances for employment. It will tend to reduce marine insur- ance. It will improve the ijersonnel of our seamen. It will help to equalize conditions of competition for freights, by giv- ing owners of character fair play with those, if any there be, who abuse the strength of their vessels and imperil or sacrifice the lives of their crews. Finally, the course of Great Britain, possessing as she does more than half the tonnage of the world, is bound ultimately to prevail, and the safe loading of vessels to be regulated in the future by every nation that keeps the sea. We have nothing to gain, but much to lose, by neglect- ing this opportunity, as we have others, to advance our ship- ping interest. CHAPTEK XXII. THE COST AND ECONOMY OF SHIPPING. Advantage Governs Trade. As in trade two elements reg- ulate all transactions, so in mechanism two principles settle the utility of all machines. These are money and time on the one hand, and power and speed on the other. It is not the cheap- ness, but the fitness and advantage of vessels that demand the shipowner's thovight. A ship is a tool of trade. As the best quality of a tool is adaptation, and the most valuable, effi- ciency, and the most important, profitableness, the cost cuts but a catchpenny figure. It wall pay to throw away a poor tool and get a better one. Shipping history is full of caution to all who read it, and learn the fact that a new type of vessel has been demanded in every decade of our commercial life. Thirty -five years ago, when American shipowners seemed to insist on keeping both trade and travel in sailing vessels, it was our fortune to share in publishing the following observations : ^ — The Principles of Transportation. "Hitherto it has not been regarded as inexpedient to perform two kinds of service with the same ship. But a higher degree of trade development is in progress, and a greater subdivision of employment becomes necessary, both on land and sea. It is of less conse- quence to detain merchandise than persons, in the railway train or the ship. The business man will wait a while for goods, but the traveling public wish to start immediately and arrive speedily. This disposition has induced improvement in transportation ; first, the harnessing of the iron horse, next of express trains for light freight and passengers. Although this change was opposed, we have now four classes of carriers on the railroads, viz. : The freight, accommodation, express, and ^ The Nautical Magazine and Naval Journal, Griffiths & Bates, Editors and Publishers, New York, August, 1857. II THE COST AND ECONOMY OF SHIPPING. 339 lightning trains. Those who wanted but a single train have disappeared. "The principles of transport by ships at sea are the same as for cars ashore. While a month's voyage may not lower the value of staple cargoes, it does take from the traveler both money and time, happiness and opportunity. Even the emi- grants are not so ignorant as to take passage in a sailing ship, when they can cross the Atlantic in a screw steamer in much less time. That passage costs less by sail, than steam, goes for naught with them. Our packet-ships return home with empty steerages and cabins, their weighty and expensive top- sides a mere bill of expense. Can the merchant shipowner longer doubt the propriety of building a different type of ves- sel, and of supplying two types in place of one, to meet the wants of European trade? . . . " When ocean steamers first became passenger carriers, their type and design had unskilled hands. Their plan was little better than placing engine, boilers, and a pair of paddle-wheels upon a packet-ship. Being adapted to no special service, un- adapted to speed, and loaded with machinery and fuel, they could not be profitable, and were sustained by subsidy. Next came larger steamers, no better in dimensions, and but little improved in form. The depth was built up, whereas greater length and breadth should have given the size required. Then, unless the deep steamer carried large freights at high rates, she made no profit. On the other hand, if deeply laden, long voyages and loss of travel resulted. Such facts should have satisfied any manager that, in steam transit, freight and passen- gers must be separated. Yet our people learned but little from British experience. Steamers for transatlantic trade were built with three whole decks fitted with staterooms for first- class passengers, while below these a hold for freight ex- isted. . . . "A division of service and special adaptation is what is needed now for sailing ships and steamers. The former should be designed wholly for freighting, and suited to the special trades. The latter, where intended for freighting, should carry emigrants or second-class passengers only; and the highest type for speed should take no freight, but only first-class pas- sengers, mails, express packages, and precious property. 340 AMERICAN MARINE. Steam vessels as at present constructed are only superior to sailing vessels in the regularity of their trips. Sometimes sail- ers have proved the faster. But our clipper ships, like our packets, have been built with topsides too large for bottom. This operates against them in two ways : first, it gives too great a draft of water, and second, to obtain speed, undue and unprofitable sharpness must be given. Steam machinery must be vastly improved before sailing ships, if well designed, can be displaced by steamers in distant trades. . . . "Fast steamers have not only come to be a matter of conven- ience, but of necessity. For passengers and mails, speed is the prime consideration, but the same principle which has operated to increase the size of sailing ships and steamers is not so applicable to this class of vessel. It is not the great bulk of passengers and mails which is to make the mail steamer profitable, but it is the rapidity of transit, frequency and regu- larity of passages, that will do it. A steamer that can accom- modate but 100 stateroom passengers with the mail, and runs 450 miles per day, will make more money for her owners in a year; than the 5, 000 -ton steamer can make, with double the investment of capital; and no intelligent shipbuilder or engi- neer will doubt the feasibility of attaining an amount of speed equal to this performance, and that on a steamer of 2,000 tons. Four of such steamers would carry more passengers than any one of the transatlantic lines now carry through the year, and could secure the mails at even increased rates." ^ The Slow Teaching of Experience. Since the time of mak- ing these observations, it might be supposed that experience has settled the question of steamer service, yet we find it as necessary now, as then, to insist on a further subdivision of employment, and declare for special tools for particular uses. We see Congress passing a bill for establishing mail-steamer lines, consisting arbitrarily of four classes, with fixed minimiun sizes as follows : — " The first class shall be iron or steel screw steamships, capable of maintaining a speed of 20 knots an hour at sea in ordinary weather, and of a gross registered tonnage of not less than 8,000 tons. No 1 The writer of this article was Mr. John W. Griffiths, marine and naval architect, shipbuilder, author, and designer of the *' Six-Day Steamer," 1853. THE COST AND ECONOMY OF SHIPPING. 341 vessel except of said first class shall be accepted for said mail service under the provisions of this act between the United States and Great Britain. " The second class shall be iron or steel steamships, capable of maintaining a speed of 16 knots an hour at sea in ordinary weather, and of a gross registered tonnage of not less than 5,000 tons. " The third class shall be iron or steel steamshijjs, capable of main- taining a speed of 14 knots an hour at sea in ordinai'y weather, and of a gross registered tonnage of not less than 2,500 tons. " The fourth class shall be iron or steel or wooden steamships capa- ble of maintaining a speed of 12 knots an hour at sea in ordinary weather, and of a gross registered tonnage of not less than 1,500 tons." As might have been expected, the rigid terms of size and speed, quite as much as the inadequate compensation offered, has partially defeated the purpose of the act. It would have been wiser to have given freedom to build steamers of improved adaptation, increased efficiency, and lower cost, and thus to have aided the building of a new type of vessel, instead of per- petuating an old one of primitive design. Eight thousand ton steamers, or none at all under our flag, to carry mails to Eng- land was unstatesmanlike ; but to carry freight in the same ship at 20 miles an hour was rash and uncalculating. And freight would have to be carried when passengers could not be had ; light or loaded, the high speed woidd have to be made, as the compensation was only paid for the outward voyage. The subsidy offered by the Senate bill for 8,000-ton and 20-mile steamers was $6 per mile. The House, aiming to be economical, let us suppose, cut this down to S^l per mile, but forgot to reduce the tonnage or speed in projiortion. It goes without saying that such unskillful legislation is not in the public interest. A similar failure was provided for in the second class of 5,000-ton, 16-knot steamers. A line of this kind was intended for mail carriers to Brazil and Argentina, though why they should be of the size named no expert could exj^lain. The mails would be light, few passengers would travel, and the bulk of business would be freight. The subsidy offered was cut down from 'f3 to $2 per mile, but the tonnage was un- touched. If the promoter of this bill in the House had con- 342 AMERICAN MARINE. trived "bow not to do it," he could not have been expected to make a greater success. No lines of postal steamers, of the first and second classes are running under bis act.^ It has taken a special bill to induce a first-class se^v^ce to be started. The Brazilian Trade. We may now take notice of the Brazilian trade. In 1883 a mail line, consisting at first of two steamers, was put on from New York to Rio de Janeiro, touch- ing at ports on the way. The scheme was to carry the mails, passengers, and freight. Concerning its success. Senator Frye, in a speech on the "Postal Bill," July 3, 1890, made the following remarks : — "Take the American line from New York to Brazil, three or four stearaei*s sailing, I think, once a month, from 2,500 to 3,000 tons each. That steamship line is kept on the ocean to-day by the Brazilian mail pay, and in no other possible way. Let Brazil Avithdraw that pay and that line stops, the same as John Roach's did. That line lost $277,000 the first four years it ran. It never has paid a dividend from the day it was put on down to now. The United States pays it nothing for carrying its mails — not a cent ; and refused to pay it enough to reim- burse the actual cost of handling the mails. If we do nothing, how long wUl that line stay on ? " Confiding in the prospect that the "Tonnage Bill" would be enacted, and protection be given again to our foreign freight- ing, the company put on lately two new steamers, unfortunately of the old type, each above 4,000 tons gross register. But "the cause was more confident than the event was prosperous." The "Tonnage Bill "failed to pass the House; the substitute mail-subsidy measure (which we have referred to) took its place, and, as intimated, has proved unadapted and inapplica- ble to this line, under the first advertisement. In a heedful effort to sustain its enterprise, the company has resorted to "time charters" of foreign steamers, and the laying up of their smaller ships. In other words, it is announced that this unprotected line is dropping its American tools and taking up foreign. But that is not the way a mechanic sees it. To his view, the company is seeking now the adaptation and efficiency * And a line having the speed of the third class failed to get a contract (under the first advertisement) because the vessels lacked a few tons in size. No absurdity like this controls a Spanish subsidized line running in opposi- tion. THE COST AND ECONOMY OF SHIPPING. 343 which it should and might have had from American shipyards in the beoinninff. If it be said that these tools would have cost more for being American built than foreign, — it may be answered that cheapness depends only conditionally and appar- ently on cost, but intrinsically and really on efficiency and du- rability.^ Strange as it may seem, the Brazil mail line was projected by a shipbuilder, who built what he supposed were good tools for the trade, which was then in the hands of sailing vessels. The mistake seems to have been quite recently discovered. In tes- timony recently given before the Senate Committee on Com- merce, the president of the company is reported to have stated : — " One of the things from which we sufPer is due to our own fault. We made a mistake in putting on two new, large, expensive, and hand- some passenger and mail steamships. That is our own fault. They cost us $900,000, or S450,000 each, wliereas I can get the same ton- nage-room in a ship of equal (cargo) carrying capacity for $125,000 ; in fact we have such an offer to build at this time. We already had more high-priced passenger ships in the service than it paid to run, in view of the character of the trade ; for the only real business with Brazil is in cargoes, not passengers ; and a fleet of boats to carry both cargo and passengers is, in my judgment, an unprofitable one." In other words, the lesson of thirty-five years ago was prac- tical, but this line had never learned it until now, at great expense, the president acknowledging that for fifteen voyages their losses on passenger-cargo steamers aggregated 8185,000; and for eight months prior to April 1, 1891, when foreign steamers were first chartered, they amounted to |!l42,000. His summing up of the situation is this : — " Since we have not the tonnage of our own, and cannot build it at present American prices, in order to compete with the English bot- toms, chere is nothing left, as a matter of salvation, except to charter English ships." As we shall see j)resently, the principal saving in this scheme is in the operating expenses, — smaller vessels carrying the same weight of cargo, running at a lower speed, using less fuel, fewer officers and men at lower wages, and the captain 1 See Chapters XIII. and XIV. 344 AMERICAN MARINE. provisionliig tlie sliip at 34 cents a head. As for tlie steamers, if the company would buikl them, and they should cost a trifle more, the excess should be returned by greater durability. The Unpopular Steam Tramp. When steamers came upon the ocean it was a common thing for sailing vessels to visit ports seeking, i. e., looking for employment. At first, steam- ers were so costly to run, they had to be formed in lines, have a regular route, a large passenger traffic, and a subsidy from government for carrying the mails. It is only since the near perfection of the screw-propeller engine that vessels under steam, fitted for cargo-carrying alone, dared to venture forth on irregular voyages, trusting to luck for engagements. Nec- essarily, the utmost economy and the deftest skill were requi- site in their design, build, outfit, and management, as their competition would be against the regular subsidized lines, on the one hand, and the cheaper-run sail ship on the other. Moderate success attended the enterprise, which was, for the most part, started, and since then followed up by British builders, who have become accustomed to carrying a stock account of such vessels. They are vulgarly known as "tramps." Many have been recklessly built and worked off on the mar- ket to keep shipyards a-going in dull times. Parsimony and dishonesty have sometimes taken the place of economy and skill. The very poorest ship material goes into tramps. The very lowest of job wages are paid for their construction. They are sold for almost any price that can be obtained, since, in many cases to more or less extent, they represent an output of odds and ends of material and labor that could not be con- verted into money in any other way. In other words, steam tramps, as a general thing, are not custom but slopmade. They are built by all classes of builders, the good, the bad, and the indifferent. They receive Lloyd's highest class in many instances, but are often classed in some Continental reg- ister. These are the cheap ships of the United Kingdom. President Ivins states in his testimony : "I understand there are six hundred and forty tramp steamers now lying vip in England." A score or more may now be on the stocks, as dull times promote their building.^ ^ Tramp steamer building has been overdone. The increase of the Brit- ish marine for 1891 was in sailing vessels, which formed 25 per cent, of the total construction, against 9 per cent, in 1887. THE COST AND ECONOMY OF SHIPPING. 345 These are the ships that it is lamented that American ship- builders are not able to build in competition with British. It is clear enough to a mechanic, however, that our country loses nothing by this inability. What it loses is lost by the man- agement that puts a passenger steamer to perform the work of a tramp. The tramp type of steamer is correct in design. It has come to stay, and it is going to do a large share of the world's transportation. Sail only can do that work cheaper in distant trades. But there is a type of steamer that is ahead of the tramp. It is American, too. That is the tow-barge type with consorts. Of this type there is a new model, both for steamer and consorts, which is also American. This is the McDougall "whaleback," so called. All three of these types of cargo- carriers exist in numbers on the Great Lakes, where they have been perfected. Managers of American ocean lines of trans- portation have no need to look abroad for examples in types of vessel for economical transport. The best of these can be found in their own country, and on fresh water at that. We may declare with pride, that the shipbuilding, the navigation, and the management of transportation on the Lakes may chal- lenge the world for equality. The Lahe^ Versus Ocean., Cargo Steamers. Some extracts from an interesting paper on American shipbuilding and lake transportation, by a competent authority,^ brought up to iron shipbuilding and engineering in England, may be quoted here. The object of the writer was to institute a fair comparison between the design, construction, efficiency, and cost of lake and foreign freight-steamers. ^'"Dimensions and Dead Weight Ahility. Lalce Steamer. As a type of the ordinary lake cargo-steamer, I will describe the Brown S. S. Company's Castalia. The dimensions are: Length, B. P. — as per British Board of Trade rules — 300 feet; breadth moulded, 40 feet; depth moulded, 24.5 feet; sheer forward, 3 feet; sheer aft, 2 feet; dead rise of floor, 5 inches; tumble-home at upper-deck, 2.5 inches; camber of beams, 9 inches; height of bulwarks, 2.75 feet; displacement ^ Joseph R. Oldham, C. E., of Cleveland, Ohio, naval architect, surveyor to the Record of American and Foreign Shipping, agent of the British Lloyds. 34G AMERICAN MARINE. at 16 feet (mean draft), 4,750 net tons (fresh water, 32 cubic feet to tlie ton), gross register tonnage, 2,513; net, 1,841 tons. The deck is flush, with low topgallant forecastle, pilot-house and texas, and the usual deck houses for accommodation of the owner, his friends, captain, and crew. She has two large din- ing and mess rooms, five spare staterooms, and three bath- rooms, exclusive of those for the crew. There are three pole masts, and she carries 3,000 tons of cargo on 16 feet mean draft, with a freeboard of fully 8.5 feet. Average speed loaded, thirteen (statute) miles per hour. . . . '"'' British Steamer. The British cargo steamer with which I shall compare the Castalia is quite a representative vessel, nearly new. The length and breadth are identical, 300 by 40, but she has 3 feet greater depth (27.5 feet) with finer lines. Her sheer is exactly double, and the coefficient of displace- ment .70, against the Castalia's .81. The total dead weight (carr3dng) ability of this vessel is 3,817 tons, on a mean draft of 23 feet 11.5 inches, which would leave 5 feet .5 inch free- board from the top of wood deck, in accordance with Lloyd's rules. "Now, if the Castalia were loaded down to a proportionate freeboard (21.5 feet draft) she would carry 4,366 tons, against 3,817, or 12.58 per cent, more than the British steamer, and then she woidd draw 2.46 feet less water. As to fullness of model, the lake steamers are largely in excess of the tramps, for the coefficient of .81 is rather below the average. The average coefficient of tramp steamers is about .74. " Strength. There are steamers doing good work on these lakes over 300 feet in length, 40 in breadth, and 25 deep, with- out metal decks, and with light stringer plates only double riv- eted, having four or five large gangways, which cut 5.5 feet in depth out of the top-side plating, and which reduce the sheer plates about twelve inches in depth, and all this without any- thing like adequate compensation, and yet they go on year after year carrying dry and perishable cargoes of 3,000 tons dead weight, without giving any cause for complaint from underwrit- ers or merchants. But the class of vessels we are now discuss- ing forms a bold contrast to these, for the latter "Globe-built" boats have either one or two steel decks, the sheer and stringer plates double strapped and triple riveted, and all weakened THE COST AND ECONOMY OF SHIPPING. 347 plates thoroughly compensated. . . . Decks have been swept in steamers having nine feet of freeboard, and yet tlie bilges, topsides, and stringers never have shown indications of strain- ing. In stranding, rocks pierce the bottoms of our lake steam- ers, but such damage is limited always to the plates and parts where contact occurred. This is more than we could say in favor of the ordinary tramp steamer. "Here I may quote some figures illustrative of the strength of these American steamers, the calculations having been recently made by the writer and published in the 'Iron Trade Keview. ' They show that the Castalia and the Tuscarora are about the strongest vessels of equal length on these lakes, or, perhaps, elsewhere. The greatest tensile stress to which the Tuscarora is liable when afloat is seven tons per square inch at the gunwale, which gives her a factor of safety of 4.25. The Castalia, being a little longer, with larger hatchways, is subject to nearly 7.5 tons tensile strain. APPROXIMATE MAXIMUM STRESSES AT GUNWALE AND FACTORS OF SAFETY. ^ t^ 0) ^ _j^ bi3 s en a «« u c3 h ^^ o o o O O O o O f^ $2.5 $17 O ^ U $25 O July, 1889 $18 $22.00 $25 $25 $25 August, 1889 . 18 25 17 22.00 25 25 25 25 September, 1889 18 2.5 18 23.50 25 25 25 25 October, 1889 . 18 25 18 22.50 25 25 25 25 November, 1889 18 23 18 22.50 25 25 25 25 December, 1889 . 18 20 18 22.50 25 25 25 25 January, 1890 18 18 18 22.50 25 24 25 25 February, 1890 . 18 18 20 22.50 25 24 25 25 March, 1890 . . 18 20 20 22.50 25 25 25 25 April, 1890 . . 18 25 20 22.50 25 25 25 25 May, 1890 . . . 18 25 20 23.50 25 25 25 25 June, 1890 . . 18 25 20 25.00 25 25 25 25 The following' table may be taken to represent the wages on first-class vessels on the Lakes generally. WAGES OUT OF CLEVELAND, 1889. Class of Service. On steamers : — Masters . . . First engineers . Second engineers First mates . Second mates . Cooks .... Helpers . . . Firemen . . . Wheelmen . . Lookout . . . Deck-hands . . On consorts and sail : First mates . . Second mates . Cooks Seamen ... Boys .... Adopted May 12. for Season. Per month. $150 to $190 95 to 115 65 to 75 65 to 80 45 to 60 45 to 55 10 to 15 30 30 25 15 50 to 35 to 30 to 65 45 35 30 15 Adopted Sep- tember 5, for Season. Per month. $95 to $115.00 65 to 75.00 65 to 45 to 45 to 50 to 35 to 80.00 60.00 55.00 17.00 37..50 37..50 37..50 17.00 65.00 45.00 37..50 37.50 17.00 Per day. Per day $1.50 September . . $2.25 1.50 October 2.50 2.00 November . 2.50 2.00 THE COST AND ECONOMY OF SHIPPING. 359 WAGES OF SEAMEX OUT OF CHICAGO, SAIL VESSELS, 1890. May June July- August American officers have 83 per cent, higher wages than Brit- ish. This applies to the ocean and the Lakes. AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES OF FARM LABOR. Sections. Wages. Eastern States . $26.46 Middle States 23.83 Western States . . . . « . . .22.61 Southern States ....... 14.86 It will be noted that the highest wages paid are in the pro- tected lake and coasting trades, and that the wages in the un- protected foreign trade are the lowest given. In the Southern ports, however, where we have but little shipping in foreign trade, the wages are about the same for all trades, and higher than in the Northern cities visited most by foreign ships. The best American seamen are doubtless those who sail in the best paid domestic trade. The aliens, as a class, number most, pro- portionately, in the foreign trade. / While the facts thus far given clearly establish the unequal footing and disadvantage on which American vessels are obliged to run in competition with foreign shipping, there is further testimony to be presented in other chapters. The evidence is overwhelming that American ships and seamen must receive governmental care and encouragement, if they are to exist in numbers sufficient for mercantile economy and mari- time defense. CHAPTER XXIII. A DEPARTMENT OF COOIERCE. Having considered the principal obstacles and difficulties which have arisen and surrounded our navigation in foreign trade, it may be next in order to indicate the measures neces- sary for their removal. Some of these seem to suggest them- selves. It has not been shown, however, that our government itself has a icant that should first be supplied. As a prepara- tion and support for all measures proposed or adopted, it is needful that a department of government be established, to take in special charge the general ship^iing and commercial interests of the country. The magnitude of these interests far transcends that of some others now presided over by separate cabinet officers. We have a secretary of war, although we have no wars, and but a nucleus of an army ; and a secretar}'^ of the navy, notwithstanding we have only a few fighting ships, and, without a marine of our o\vn, really have no naval power; and we might as well have a secretary of commerce, as of war and the navy, even shoidd we remain dependent on foreign shipping to carry on our trade with the world. For a long time past has our government been wanting in eyes and ears and understanding of the needs of navigation and commerce. Interests not rej)resented in the cabinet are not kept before the country, and soon lose importance. In our administrations the sea has never had representation pro- portionate with the land. Since the war, especially, it has been all for the land, and nothing for the sea, in cabinet and Congress. This want of voice for the interests of the sea has caused inattention to their failure and decay. Governmental supervision of commerce and navigation should be as effective in the United States as where it now exists in all foreign countries that cherish naval and commer- cial power. A department of commerce would represent in its A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 361 work not only the national but the Individual interest. It would do for the mercantile, the mechanical, the nautical, and cognate interests connected with the sea, what the Department of Agriculture does for the business of tilling the soil, in origi- nating and promoting advantageous measures in the farming interest, and in removing obstacles to its success. Not only the administration of the laws of Congress concerning com- merce and navigation, but the duty of watching and studying their operations, investigating the working of foreign laws and customs, and acquainting Congress with all the facts needed for improvement or defense, in our policy or laws, would devolve upon the department of commerce. Many a matter of importance to our shijiping or foreign trade has been overlooked or adversely settled in cabinet coun- cils, for the want of an officer present, whose business it should be, at all times, to consider the effect of measures with refer- ence to the great interests under his charge. A secretary of commerce would be chosen in view of his fitness and attility to advise upon questions of trade and transportation, as a secre- tary of state is chosen for his knowledge of diplomacy and international law ; as a secretary of the treasury for his ability in finance ; an attorney -general for his legal attainments, and so forth. These, and other thoughts of a similar character have given rise in the past twelve years to the passage of many resolutions by Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce, and Conven- tions of Shipping in our principal cities, favoring a department of commerce in the administration of the government. It is felt by thoughtful citizens, everywhere, that our government is weak and wanting in its policy and attitude toward the sea. That it is not wise, but shortsighted and impolitic. That it is not thoughtful, but neglectful, of gaining maritime wealth and power. That it is not friendly to, but at variance with, naval and commercial development. In short, that it is behind the times with conservatism, in its want of sympathy with ships and shipping enterprises, and its lack of live Americanism sea- ward. T/ie Office of Secretary of the Treasitry. If it be said that the Secretary of the Treasury administers the law relative to commerce and navigation, and, therefore, is charged with the 362 AMERICAN MARINE. care of these great interests, it will not be difficult to show that the average Secretary of the Treasury has not taken care of them, but left them to shift for themselves. The study of taxation and the collection of revenue is the principal office of the Secretary of the Treasury. The reports of these officers are bound up in a vokime entitled "Finance." When a Treas- ury officer thinks of a ship it is in connection with revenue fees ov fines ^ and not at all for the purpose of studying and pro- moting the national interest in navigation. While a few sec- retaries of the treasury have advised Congress in the view of this interest, the greater number have said nothing for it, and some have recommended injurious legislation, as we may learn from the record, which will now be examined. The Reports of the Secretaries. Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, in his reports to Congress, seems not to have mentioned any measures that would be advantageous to our commerce and navigation. Congress, under the lead of Mr. Madison, in the first bills passed, had well protected these important interests, and they were pros- perous under his administration. Oliver Wolcott, 1795-1800, had no occasion to propose measures in the interest of navigation. Albert Gallatin, secretary from 1801 to 1813, called the attention of Congress to the need of legislation but once, and then it seems there was a lack of law to prevent our vessels in the coasting trade from violating the non -intercourse act with England and France. He advised : — " That either the system of restriction, partially abandoned, must be reinstated in all its parts, and with all the provisions necessary for strict and complete execution, or that all the restrictions, so far at least as they affect the commerce and navigation of the citizens of the United States, ought to be removed." Except in the last clause, presented as an alternative, there was nothing in this statement favoring American commerce and navigation. Mr. Gallatin was willing that these interests should be extinguished by persistence in an evil policy. A. J. Dallas, 1813-15, made no reference to the interests of commerce and navigation. William H. Crawford, 1816-24, found nothing to com- municate on these great topics. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 363 Richard Rush, 1825-28, referring to the operation of the tariff of 1824, advised Congress that our foreign commerce for 1825 had not declined in consequence of higher duties. Con- cerning the preponderance of carriage in American bottoms, which was then at its zenith and destined soon to fall, he ob- served : — " Considering that the vessels of those foreign nations with which the United States have the most extensive commercial intercourse are now placed upon a footing of equality, as to duties, and charges of wliatever kind, in our ports, with the vessels of the United States, this heavy excess of American tonnage ^ is a signal proof of the flour- ishing state of our navigation. It may serve to show that the efficient protection extended to it by the laws of Congress, succeeded in estab- lishing it in a manner to meet and overcome all competition. Before the era of those laws, it is known how this great interest languished ; how little able it proved, before the auxiliary hand of government was stretched out, to support itself against the established superiority, and overwhelming competition, which it had to face in the world." Since the time of Secretary Rush sliipping experience has proved that what must be built up by protection must be main- tained by it. "Equality as to duties In our ports," granted to foreign vessels, has undermined our preponderance of car- riage, and built up that of our rivals, to a ruinous extent for us. Samuel D. Ingham, 1829-30, was much concerned about the privileges of coasting vessels, and desired restrictions to prevent illicit trading. He also wanted the credit system, then in vogue for duties, improved, i. n the register- ing, enrolling, and licensing of vessels, as these relating to the entry, warehousing, and transportation of merchandise. ... If we would promote foreign commerce, and secure for our vessels their full share of the freighting of our own products, and those of other nations, we should be careful to remove every impediment, and extend every fa- cility which affects this intercourse." Mr. Corwin's theory was sound, but he had no practical knowledge of the shij^ping- question, so could not see any obsta- cles not appearing on the books. James Guthrie, 1854-56. It was the fortune of this Secre- tary to administer the law at the time when our tonnage in the foreign trade was at its highest pitch, though we were losing proportionate carriage all the time. It seems he did not know this fact, and in consequence his views were shuffled together. Concerning the protection of our marine, he remarked : — " When our navigation laws were first enacted, in 1789, the tonnage of the United States was secured against the protecting na\agation laws of other nations ^ by countervailing or protecting provisions. Such provisions were from time to time extended, so as to countervail the prohibitory enactments of commercial nations with which we had intercourse. These commercial restrictions have gradually yielded "^ to the more liberal principle of free trade in the transportation of freight and passengers, until in that business we have free trade with almost all the nations of the earth, only marred by the charge of light-money to our vessels where we charge none." Here we meet a statement startling, if not astounding, to our intelligence. He says : — v " This removal of restrictions in our commercial intercourse with other nations in the carrying business has not been prejudicial to our foreign commercial marine." In thirty years of "free trade," we had lost 16.9 per cent, of carriage in the import, and 18.7 per cent, in the export trade. Three of his predecessors had noted more or less of sufPering and pinching in the shipping business. After recommending * Just as it should be now. 2 But other means have been taken to secure the same end. — Author. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 371 the removal of the burden of foreign light-money, the Secre- tary continued : — *' The coasting trade of the United States has, from the beginning, been strictly reserved for vessels built within, and owned by citizens of, the United States, to the exclusion of foreign-built vessels. The American tonnage in foreign trade, and in the coasting, has been American-built, and has had the absolute protection, in the carrying- trade on our coast, and in our own waters. The protection given to our foreign commercial, and to our coasting marine, has secured a large and efficient body of skilled officers and sailors, at all times ready for the defense of our cities and coast, for repelling aggression on our commerce, and for manning our ships of war. In the protec- tion given to our shipping interests, for the purpose of having at all times the power to repel foreign aggression and protect our coast and trade, there appears to have been but little division of sentiment from the earliest times to the present, whilst the yearly increase of our ton- nage ^ proves the wisdom of our laws in this particular." HoweU Cobb, 1857-60, was a great advocate of commerce, but had not a word to say about navigation ; and about com- merce he was concerned only so far as to frame arguments for free trade. lie left the cabinet to secede with his State. Salmon P. Chase, 18G1-64, gave no thought to anything so foreign as the ocean and its navigation. Hugh McCuUoch, 1865-68, could scent salt - water with pleasure and think a little about ships. He observed : — '' No single interest in the United States, fostered though it may be by legislation, can long prosper at the expense of another great interest. Nor can another great interest, nor can any imporant in- terests, be crushed by unwise or unequal laws, without other interests being thereby prejudiced. For illustration : The people of the United States are naturally a commercial and maritime people — fond of ad- venture, bold, enterprising, persistent. Now, the disagreeable fact muFt be admitted that, with unequaled facilities for obtaining the ma- terials, and with acknowledged skill in shipbuilding — with thousands of miles of seacoast, indented with the finest harbors in the world — with surplus products that require in their exportation a large and in- creasing tonnage — we can neither profitably build ships nor successfully compete with English ships in the transportation of our own produc- tions. Twenty years ago it was anticipated that ere this the United * There has been no increase since the time of his remark. 372 AMERICAN MARINE. States would be the first maritime power in the world. ^ Contrary to our anticipations, our foreign commerce has declined nearly 50 per cent, within the last six years." This was the period of the war, and a godsend to England, of course. Our government gave no protection, as it had no naval strength to give it from. Then the currency situation, as our Secretary could have seen, injured foreign trade, while taxes prevented shipbuilding and ate up the substance of our commercial people. As soon as the war was over, why did not the Secretary advocate full protection for our commerce and navigation? Instead of so doing, he gave an account of the futility of compelling Spain to abandon her shipping protec- tion, — a contemptible policy on our part. He said : — " Our commercial relations with Spain and her colonies, under the acts of July 13, 1832, and June 30, 1834, particularly, so far as they relate to trade with Cuba and Porto Rico, have been many years the source of much perplexity, and have given rise to frequent discussions. The acts above cited were designed as retaliatory measures to induce by a sort of coercion a relaxation of the extreme protective system adopted by Spain in relation to her colonial trade. 2s ot only have they entirely failed to produce the desired effect, but their operation has proved, on the contrary, positively injurious to our interest in eveiy respect. Their effect in connection with Spanish exactions has been to drive the greater part of Cuban and Porto Rican trade from our markets to others, where the same policy does not prevail. The countervailing system thus brings no benefit to our shipping interests, and largely curtails our commerce, which, considering the proximity of these islands, should include the greater part of their foreign traf- fic. It is therefore worthy of grave consideration whether sound, enlightened policy does not dictate the repeal, at least, of the act of 1834." The Secretary's sensible suggestion was duly acted upon. George S. Boutwell, 1869-72, a statesman from a maritime State, was the first of a long line to manifest any breadth of intelligence on the shipping subject. He observed : — "One of the most efficient means of strengthening the country in Its financial relations with other countries is the develo2)ment of our com- mercial marine. The returns show that a very large amount of the ^ We should be satisfied, now, that it never can become such, under our present system of uon-protection. — Author. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 373 foreign trade is in English hands. We are not only thus dependent upon a rival country for the performance of the business which should be in the hands of our peo2)le, but our ability to maintain specie pay- ments is materially diminished. If the entire foreign trade of the country, both of exports and imports, were carried on in American ships, the earnings would not be less than $75,000,000 a year. At present the freights of the foreign trade in American ships do not exceed $28,000,000. Were the trade exclusively in American hands a large part of this difference of $47,000,000 would be due to citizens of the United States, and payable in other countries. This amount would be thus added to our ability to i)ay for goods imported from those countries. " I, therefore, deem it essential to our prosperity that the shipping interest of the country be fostered, not only as a nursery for seamen, but also as an essential agency in enabling the government to institute and maintain specie ])ayments. It is an interest, also, which, in its de- velopment, is as important to the States and people remote from the seacoast, as it is to the maritime sections. Every addition to our facilities for the export of the products of the interior is as advan- tageous to the producers as to the merchants and sliipbuilders of the coast." Then was the time for action, but our stock of statesmanship was too short for the occasion. Then we should have repealed every free-trade and free-shipping statute in our law books, and gone back to the protective system of the fathers. Mr. Boutwell, however, did not believe in such a course, but advo- cated bounties of different sorts, the country then groaning under taxation. The case seems to have been one in which the operation was put off, because the surgeon failed in pluck. William A. Richardson, 1873, sought to have the tonnage tax abolished, but failed. Said he : — " A tonnage tax is now levied on all American sailing vessels engaged in the foreign trade, and on all vessels of other nationalities. It is not imposed upon American vessels engaged in the coasting trade. Steamships of foreign flags in some cases are subject to the tonnage tax ; in others they are exempt by old treaty stipulations only recently carried into effect. But all American steam vessels arriving from foreign countries are subject to the tax. In considera- tion of the fact that this was entirel)"^ abolished on all vessels for more than thirty years, and only resorted to as a war measure in 1862, and that those engaged in the coasting trade were again relieved from 374 AMERICAN MARINE. this burden by recent enactments, I recommend that this tax be wholly abolished." A statement accompanied this report to the effect that ma- terials of all kinds imported free of duty, for the building and repairing of vessels under the act of 1872, had amounted in .value, the first year, to $95,211. It has n^ver been so great at any time since, experience proving that it is more trouble, under the regulations, to secure the drawback on most items, than the saving is worth. Benjamin H. Bristow, 1874-75, said nothing on navigation worth noting. Lot M. Morrill, 1876, shed no light on the pursuits of the sea. John Sherman, 1877-80, has the distinction of being the only protectionist Secretary of recent times to favor free-ship (or free-trade) legislation for the solution of the shipping prob- lem. In his report for 1877 he said: — " The preponderance of foreign tonnage over domestic, in carrying on the foreign commerce of the country, is certainly not in accordance with the national desire. Such an increase in our shipping as will re- store this commerce to American citizens should, as far as possible, without burdening other industries, be encouraged by legislation. The increase of the means and appliances for transportation, whether by shipping or land carriage, is a tax upon the industries that produce the commodities to be conveyed. Subsidies drawn from the revenue in support of the transit industries are charges upon the productive in- dustries, and can be discreetly granted only in the sure prospect of a lai"ge expansion in the market demand for the commodities to be transported by shipping or railroads, or where the vital necessities of the country require free and speedy communications." The thought here expressed seems to be that American ship- building would burden the country, though why foreign ship- building would not be equally burdensome it is hard to see. If transportation is a tax, to whom should we pay it, — to our own people or to foreigners? A farmer's team and wagon is not a tax, but a means of production. So are means and ap- pliances of transportation. A product for sale must be put into the market before it is fully pi'oduced. The engine in the steamship and the engine in the mill are equally machines for producing wealth. There is, of course, a transportation that A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 375 is not a branch of production, but it is not that of sending products to market, and not in question here. If our market for cotton is in Liverpool, the carriage thither is a part of its production there. The work of the ship in taking the cotton to its market is a tax on the product in exactly the same way as the hire of a team to haul it from the field to the railway station, and of the charges of the railway company for running it to the wharf where the ship received it. The country grow- ing the cotton should furnish the team, the railway carriage, and the ship transportation. It is a poor planter that has to hire his team ; usually a dependent country that does not own its railways; and a nation without wealth, enterprise, or public spirit that wholly employs foreign ships. The Secretary con- tinued : — '' The high price in oui- depreciated paper money of the chief ma- terials for shi])buil(ling has rentlered us unable, since the war, to com- pete with other nations in this great industry. The demand for iron in building railroads, and the diversion of capital and labor from other industries to that has, however, at present largely ceased. The appre- ciation of our currency to nearly the gold standard, the rapid falling off in the demand for railroads, will tend to direct capital and labor to shipbuilding.^ Every encouragement nia>% at least, be given to the increase of commerce in vessels of American ownership, that can be prudently afforded, by modifying existing law in those respects in which it is a burden upon such commerce." Here we have it at last, — "free ships " ! American owner- ship in vessels bought abroad, by a few trunk-line railroad cor- porations, and similar bodies of capitalists, seems to have been Mr. Sherman's reliance for rehabilitating our commerce and navigation. American shipbuilding was to be turned down and snowed under for the benefit of watered stock. This idea, so essentially selfish, and so unpatriotic, too, has had a great attraction for economists. The singidar thing about it is the plain disregard for the national interest and the rights of the people. It is for the union, independence, and defense of the nation that we must be a shipbuilding people and build our vessels of every sort. It seems hard for ^ A practical mind could not entertain this fallacy. The capital and labor that builds railroads has no genius for shipbuilding, and never dis- played any. — Author. 376 AMERICAN MARINE. some of our best citizens to comprehend this truth. It is the right of every citizen, equally with corporations, to follow any lawful pursuit, and to receive therein governmental protection. Shipbuilding is not a burden upon shipowning. The cause of failure in shipowning is the want of protection, not the higher price of vessels. The true burden upon shipowning is the re- fusal of the government to protect it. The remedy for the decay of our navigation and lack of tonnage is not, logically, the ruin of our shipbuilding, but the performance of govern- ment duty. All the industries of the interior, even to the ves- sel interest on lakes, rivers, and canals, are protected. Now, why cannot the industries of the maritime States be protected? Why cannot shipowning be protected on the ocean, as on the lakes, rivers, and canals ? For a protectionist to propose giving up an industry because we "can't compete" — well, that is inconsistency and absurdity. Secretary Sherman did not content himself with a single piece of free-trade advice to Congress. Here is another, of date December 1, 1879: — " It is neither to the advantage nor the honor of the country that so immense a proportion of its foreign carrying-trade has passed to other nations (now but 23 per cent, in our vessels). " The great decline in our tonnage, as is well known, was due to tlie war ; and soon after its close it was proposed to facilitate the restora- tion to our merchant marine of vessels that had been transferred to foreign flags. But the effort at restoration failed, and a special pro- hibition against the return of such vessels was embodied in the stat- utes.^ It may well be questioned whether the severity of the existing statute might not properly be relaxed after the lapse of so long a time, during which the privilege of registry has been denied to this class of vessels, and since the grounds for denial have, in a measure, lost their original force. ^ .* " It has always been the policy of the law to restrict the privileges of American registry to vessels built in this countiy. The object was to further the shipbuilding and naval interests of the country ; and ^ This was done by the voice of interior senators, whose own property was well protected from the enemy. — Author. 2 This was not a practical snguestion. The vessels sold and transferred to foreign flags were then from 20 to 40 years old, with few in existence, and probablj'^ not a dollar then owned in a single one of them by a citizen of the United States. — Author. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 377 this policy was so successful as to advance the United States to the second rank among nations, as respects tonnage and the number of its ships. Wliile wood was the article mainly used in the construction of ships, we had the advantage over foreign nations in the cost of ma- terial. Our shipbuilders could not only supply vessels for domestic commerce, but could successfully compete in the carrying-trade of the world. The use of iron in shipbuilding, in place of wood, is, however, steatlily increasing, and in the cost of iron, and in the price of labor, other commercial nations have the advantage. It is a grave question of public policy whether the period has not arrived when the limited right of purchase, as under the English statutes, should be extended to vessels as well as to other commodities, and when admission to American registry upon the payment of duties should be allowed them upon importation. Tlie recovery of our old position in the carrying- trade will more than counterbalance any disadvantage likely to ensue upon the right of purchase, while a moderate duty on ships imported will enable our shipbuilders to compete successfully in the construction of iron vessels of the largest class. • The proper ])olicy to be pursued is difficult to determine, but the great importance of considering the subject is respectfully submitted to the attention of Congress." In this effusion the Secretary shifts his ground, but does not improve his position. The main, if not the only, argument used for sacrificing American shipbuilding, and becoming dependent on foreign, has been cost. Logically, the foreign ship must be a "free" ship. Duties added to cost abroad defeats a measure whose theory of operation is cheapness. If the duty is to protect the American shipbuilder fully, so that he can compete successfully, what advantage will accrue to shipowners from going abroad for vessels? The mistake is in proposing legislation for shipowners as a class, instead of looking to the good and welfare of the coun- try. The mistake is in temporizing. Granted, for the sake of the argument and that only, that American vessels cost more to build ; do they not also cost more to ru7i f And is not the cost of running vessels, in the course of their lifetime, from two to te7i times the cost of their building? Import your ves- sels, break up shipbuilding, and then what? What next, Mr. Secretary, will you do for shipowners? The next measure, if one could be contrived on the same line, would be, — well, could it be any other than to abandon shipowning? As for the "unlimited right of purchase" of vessels, as 378 AMERICAN MARINE. against the national interest, it does not, and never did exist. It is an imaginary right, no better, if realized on a general scale against sound public policy, than the old, the once recog- nized right of piracy. Vessels are different from other com- modities. As we have elsewhere shown, shipbuilding is a mil- itary art. The man who would destroy his country's power in this art has no claim to his liberty to do so. Nay, the man who refuses to build it up, — is he patriotic? It is for the national interest and safety, and not for shijiowners, money- makers, or rivals, to say that our nation shall be stripped of its shipbuilding power, and that shipowning shall not receive such protection as other American industries enjoy, without which it cannot succeed, as a pursuit of the people, no matter where vessels may be obtained. But the officer whose duty is supposed to include the charge of shipbuilding, as well as navigation and commerce, had to have a third throw at the American shipyard, shipbuilders then being the only force in the field endeavoring to "recover our old position." In his last report, December, 1880, noting the continued decline of American carriage, Secretary Sher- man said : — " The foreign carrying-trade in American bottoms is more than 50 per cent, less than it has heen, or than it might be, and if it is desir- able to save to the country the annual freightage on merchandise of the value of $1,200,000,000, the only course to reach that result would seem to be to increase our registered shipping. But while the ordinary demand for increased tonnage causes no annual increase in the build- ing of vessels, the only method available, as a measure of public policy, of effecting such an increase, is either to allow American citir zens the privilege of purchasing vessels of foreign build, to give a bounty on home-built vessels, or to await the increase of American- built vessels and their tardy substitution in the foreign trade for those of other nationalities. Doubtless the number of vessels of home-build will be adequate In time to take up the freightage lost to American bottoms in consequence of the war of the rebellion. At present, how- ever, the demand for vessels to carry on our Immense import and ex- port trade does not seem to so stimulate the shipbuilding Industry as to prevent an annual decrease in the number of ships built. The present facilities for freighting in foreign vessels appears to be a greater discouragement to that industry than would be the privilege of purchasing such vessels." A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 379 What appears a greater discouragement to the average ship- ping man is the want of information that has ruled official opinion on the shipping subject. Before the war, from 1826 to 1861, we had lost of import carriage 35 per cent., and of export carriage 17.5 per cent., of the total business. The average annual loss of carriage for the period, imports and ex- ports taken together, had been three quarters of one per cent. At that rate, by 1880, had there not been a war of rebellion, we were bound to have lost an average of 40.5 per cent, of to- tal business, making us entitled to 52 per cent, only ; whereas in 1880 we had an average of 17.18 per cent., showing a loss by the war of 34.15. The unprotection of shipowning had been about 78 per cent, as destructive as the war, yet it was altogether ignored by Secretary Sherman. It was doubtless to avoid giving a bounty on home-built vessels that this statesman, like others, proposed the purchase of foreign ships. Now, fidl information on the obstacles to American ownership of vessels disposes quicldy of this quack remedy. It would be about as effective as reducing the price of board to cure consumption. If iron-making, wool-growing, sugar-production, or cotton-manufacturing, having no protec- tion from the tariff, had beeil for many years declining and dying out, there would be no mistake in the diagnosis, nor error in the remedy of Secretary Sherman. The disease would be designated as free trade, and the prescription given, full protection. Charles J. Folger, 1881-83, in two reports called attention to the fact that our proportion of carriage in the foreign trade was only 16 per cent. In his third report, while he seemed at a loss for a remedy, and had but a dim notion of the disease, he made one suggestion, which has led to the writing of this book. He remarked: — " Tt will be seen from the statistical returns herein presented that for many years past, of the exports and imports of merchandise, no greater part than an average of 16 per cent, has been borne in American vessels. This is in a measure due to the facility and se- curity offered for investments of capital in domestic and inland com- merce, and particularly in land transportation by railroads.^ The ^ This is mistaking the effects of non-protecting our shipowning for the cause of its ruin. It was the capital saved from the wreck of the business that went West to help build up the country. 380 AMERICAN MARINE. decline in the domestic tonnage of the Mississippi River and its tribu- taries may largely be set to this account.^ " It is not an agreeable reflection that the freightage on 84 per cent, of our imports and exports should be paid to alien shipowners. Can this be helped by the removal of burdens laid by law ? Of those now directly imposed by statutes on our vessels sailing foreign, there remain, besides clearance, entry, and admeasurement fees, only the tax of 30 cents per ton, payable once a year on entry from a foreign port. Vessels in the domestic trade have for many years been exempted from tonnage tax. The income from this tax for the last fiscal year was $1,320,591. Of this amount $1,057,962 were paid by foreign ves- sels. Even though so large a portion is thus paid, it is well deserving of consideration whether it is not advisable to return to the policy adopted in 1831, and entirely abolish the tax. It presses more heavily than any other upon our foreign-going shipping." The Secretary's proposal was to give up to foreigners 80 per cent, of tlie tonnage tax to save our vessels paying 20 per cent. A better proposition was made by a shipping convention held at Boston, October, 1880, to wit : — (8) " Resolved that this body recommend to the Senate and House of Representatives the passage of an act to set apart all custom-house dues, including tonnage-tax collected from the vessels of all nations, including our own, in all ports of the United States, as a special fund which shall be appropriated exclusively to pay the bounty to American shipowners, as recommended in a previous resolution." The bounty proposed was to be paid upon tonnage employed. The Secretary continued : — " The burdens imposed by the States in the way of pilotage are considerable. Of this subject Congress has never taken control. The charges on shipping on account of pilotage vary with every port. The extent of the embarrassments arising to commerce from this cause can be fully understood and remedied only when Congress shall take entire control of the subject ; as, it is believed, it has the j)ower to do. " Against the abolition of entrance, clearance, and admeasurement fees, there exists the objection that a portion of the wages of customs officers are at present paid from them, and their abolition would entail ^ There is no analogy in these cases. The foreign traffic continued to be done by vessels, American giving way to foreign. The domestic traffic done by vessels gave way to railroads, but continued to be done by Ameri- cans. There has been no loss to the couutry. — Author. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 381 the payment of fixed salaries in the place of payment by perquisites. If my recommendation in another part of this report for a discon- tinuance of these fees and for payment by pre-fixed salaries be adoi)ted, this objection will cease. " The removal of these burdens will tend in some degree to an increase in our foi-eign-going shipping." The conelusion of the Secretary's remarks on this topic will be reserved for consideration in the following chapter. Hugh McCulloch, 1884, also served as Secretary of the Treasury, 1865-68. He seems to have improved the interval in studying the shipping question, and arrived at the truth in many things. He observed : — " In direct connection with the condition of our foreign trade is the condition of our merchant service. The causes of the decline of our shipping are so well understood that any remarks on this point are quite unnecessary." The Secretary's view was that the war, conjointly with the advantage of England in the substitution of iron for wooden vessels, and of steam for sail, caused our shipping decline. He is credited with this declaration : — " The deadliest blow to the shipping of the United States was in the substitution of iron for wood in the construction of ships." If on our guard, this blow could not have hurt. But we had given up defense. Mr. McCulloch's sentence would show a better understanding of the subject if it read: The deadliest blow to the shi})ping of the United States was in the substitu- tion of a certainty for an uncertainty, — of changing from pro- tection, by discriminative duties on imports and tonnage, to free-freighting under one-sided reciprocity acts and treaties with crafty rivals; of putting it into the power of associations of merchants, shipowners, and underwriters of England to set up and enforce upon our vessels unjust discriminations in the inspection and classification of hulls, and the loading and insurance of cargoes, against which only government protection can avail; in short, of abdicating national control of our com- merce and navigation, practically giving it up to any nation whose subsidies, subventions, bounties, or insurance managers shall take it captive. The Secretary continued: — 382 AMERICAN MARINE. " The humiliating fact staves us in the face, that while the United States not many years ago led all nations in shipbuilding, and was second only to Great Britain in ocean tonnage, it has ceased to be recognized as a maritime power ; that nearly all of our agricultural productions and manufactm-ed goods which find a market in Europe or South America, and the articles received in exchange for them, are carried in foreign ships ; that the many thousands of Americans who annually visit Europe on business or for pleasure go and come in European steamers ; that large foreign steamship lines are, in fact, supported by the people of the United States. All this is not only humiliating to our national pride, but it stands in the way of the im- provement of our foreign trade. In his [my] report to Congress, December 3, 1866, the Secretary lised the following language : — " ' It is a well-established fact, that the people who build ships navigate them, and that a nation which ceases to build ships ceases, of consequence, to be a commercial and maritime nation. Unless, therefore, the causes which prevent the building of ships in the United States shall cease, the foreign carrying-trade even of its own productions must be yielded to other nations. To this humiliation and loss the people of the United States ought not to be subjected. If other branches of industry are to prosper, if agri- culture is to be profitable, and manufactures are to be extended, the com- merce of the country must be restored, sustained, and increased. The United States will not be a first-class power among the nations, nor will her other industrial interests continue long to prosper as they ought, if her com- merce shall be permitted to languish,' " If this language was true then, it is certainly true now. Eighteen years have passed since it was uttered. There has been in the mean time an enormous increase of our population and national wealth, but no improvement whatever in our shipping interest. Not only does this important interest remain well-nigh lifeless, but the difficulties in the way of restoring its vitality have been greatly increased by the immense capital since then invested by foreign steamship companies, which control and practically monopolize the carrying-trade between this and other countries, and these difficulties will become everv year more and more formidable until remedial measures are adopted by Congress. " When the nature of the obstructions in the way of a revival of our shipping is fully investigated, the cost of building ships will not, I think, be found to be a serious one. I am convinced, that if the duties upon the foreign materials used in the construction and outfit of iron ships were removed, they could be built and fitted for sea as cheaply in the United States as in Scotland. Manual labor, it is true, is much cheaper in Scotland, but it is less efficient. Besides, most of A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 383 the work in iron-ship huilding is done by machinery, in the invention and use of which Americans excel. Scores of things are done in Glasgow shipyards by hand, which, in the United States, would be done by machinery." It is wonderful how our statesmen have been led astray by cost comparisons, that amount to a drop in the bucket of ship- ping economy. A fox-hunter knows that every hole in the hills will not yield a fox, but the reader of fox stories thinks differently. Given a bole, there is a burrow, and, of course, a fox. So it is, given a difference in the cost of vessels, and the dear cannot compete with the "cheap." But England did compete with us, with iron vessels, too, when they cost from 50 to 100 per cent, more than ours. And the ships built in cities like New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, costing from 15 to 30 per cent, more than those built in country towns in Maine, competed with these easily enough. In actual busi- ness, new vessels, worth a quarter or a half more tlian old ones, compete with one another. So the fox is not in that old hole of cost. But we will hear the Secretary out : — " Fifty years ago the United States excelled all nations in ship- building. Not only were we able to supply the home demand, but large numbers of ships were built for foi-eigners in the shipyards which lined the coast from Delaware Bay to Eastport. Our superi- ority in shipbuilding then was owing to the facts that our forests abounded in timber of the best qualities, and that our carpenters were skillful in the use of it (1). Since then iron has been substituted for wood in the construction of steamships (2). But are not our iron and coal-fields as productive and accessible as those of any other country ? Are our machinists less skilled in the use of machinery than were our ship-carpenters in the use of the axe and saw ? As far as materials for building ships and skill in the art are regarded, Great Britain has no advantage over us ; on the contrary, is not the advantage on our side ? A])prehended difficulties are magnified until they are encountered. Wh^n steel rails were in demand beyond the home supply at $^75 per ton, and many were imported, subject to a duty of S28 per ton, who would have dared to express the opinion that in four years they could be made in this country at less than $30 per ton ? — With a profit to the makers? " (3) (1) Our superiority then was owing to the system of protec- tion, which built up our wooden marine, and developed the skill of our mechanics. We have yet the woods and the work- men, but lack the protection in shipowning. 384 AMERICAN MARINE. (2) Substituted by whom, and wherefore? By the British, because their timber gave out. Dependence on importations of timber or ships was impolitic ; and, without materials from her own soil, sooner or later, England would cease to be a shipbuilding people. Why should we follow England in a change of ship-material? Her reasons did not exist with us. Why did she not change her material without her Lloyds dis- turbing us? Because, as she was ready, and we were not, it woidd benefit herself, and damage us, to handicap our shipping. Holding the cards, she could play them to .beat the world ; therefore she did it. (3) This result was accomplished by protection, and so claimed to have been by protectionists. When Congress will do for shipowning, for long years the dupe of politics and vic- tim to free trade, what it finds no difficulty in doing for iron- making, then we will have a merchant-marine, as we now have steel rails. Then, the question of shipbuilding will be left to the shipbuilders to answer. The Secretary continues : — " The obstacles in the way of a restoration of our foreign shipping will not, I conceive, be found in the cost of ships, which are to be built in the United States, but in the absence of demand for them. If our navigation laws were so modified that American registers could be granted to foreign-built ships for foreign trade there would be little, if any, Improvement in our shipping interest. Such modification some years ago might have done something to prevent decline ; it would now be insufficient to restore. The great, profitable carrying-trade between the United States and Europe has been permitted to pass into the hands of the shipowners of foreign nations. So complete is their control of it, so large is the capital invested in it, and so sharp and persistent would be the contest if we should attempt, without govern- ment aid, to share it, that our capitalists would not compete for it. There is, in my opinion, no prospect whatever that the United States will ever share to a considerable extent in the foreign cari'ying-trade without government aid. " It is for Congress to determine whether this aid shall be granted, or whether our foreign shipping interest shall remain in its present death-like condition. The let-alone policy has been tried for many years, during which our ships have been swept from the ocean, and we pay every year many millions of dollars to foreign shipowners for freights and fares. Ought this condition of thing^s to be continued .'' A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 385 " Entertaining these views, I do not liesitate to express the opin- ion — " First. — That without government aid to United States steamship lines the foreign carrying-trade will remain in the hands of foreigners. " Second. — That we ought to have an interest in the business which we create, and as the restoration of our shipping interest is important, if not essential, to the extension of our foreign trade, sub- sidies in the form of liberal payments for the transportation of the mails, or in some other form, should be offered as an inducement to investments of capital in steamships. " The amount of necessary aid would be insignificant in comparison with what has been granted to manufacturers by protective duties, and nothing would be paid until the services were rendered. If the sub- ject were investigated, it would be found that all the European steam- ship lines that led the way in the great traffic by steam power have received government aid. It is admitted that all protective duties and subsidies are inconsistent with tlie teachings of political economy, but, true as these teachings may be in the abstract, they are disregarded by all nations when they stand in the way of national welfare. No rules are equally applicable to all nations, nor to the same nation in the different stages of its growth. Political economy is not one of the exact sciences. It is rather adaptive than exact, and all nations so regard it. " Protective duties were undoubtedly needed to induce investment in cotton, iron, and woolen mills, and what not, in the various lines of our manufacturing industry. Whether or not protection has been ex- tended too long or too far, and to what extent it now stands in the way of other great interests, are questions that can only be settled by full investigation. Government aid is now needed to induce invest- ment in shipping. To what extent and for what period this aid should be granted must be settled in the same way." Daniel Manning, 1885-86, in his first report, said not a word about navigation ; in his second, he quoted the plank of his platform, which recited that "under Democratic rule and policy our marine was fast overtaking that of Great Britain," etc., and in which it is charged that the tariff is the raw-head and bloody -hones of our shipping ruin. Our shipping has been under " Democratic policy " all the time since the inaugu- ration of Andrew Jackson, to say the least; and four years of "Democratic rule," under Mr. Cleveland, left it worse than he found it. Charles S. Fairchild, 1887-88, said nothing of navigation in his first report ; in the second, he remarked : — 386 AMERICAN MARINE. " It is useless to expect any material increase in the building of iron and steel steam vessels in this country for the foreign trade under present conditions. Were all the restrictions of the tariff removed, the business would still be hampered by the higher cost of the complete vessel, as compared with the expense of a similar ship built upon the Clyde or at Belfast." Thus, Congress was to understand, free ship-materials were not worth having, so long as the labor in building a ship costs more here than abroad. Interpreted, this means "free ships," and no shipbuilding in the United States ; and agrees with the prudence of the thoughtful mother, who charged her boys not to go near the water till they had learned to swim. Remarking further, that the burdens upon the coasting trade imposed by federal legislation have been nearly removed, the Secretary recommended the abolition of compulsory pilot- age. As this would be federal legislation for the overthrow of "Democratic rule and policy," it is strange that it was sug- gested. William Windom, 1889-90, gave more and wiser thought to the shipping question than any other secretary. The selec- tion of a commissioner of navigation being left to him, the writer can attest the care which he exercised to choose a candi- date having a practical knowledge of shipbuilding and naviga- tion, who had studied and discovered the true causes of our shipping decline, knew the difficulties to be encountered, and coidd indicate the obstacles to be surmounted in the work of "rehabilitation," which he rightly judged could be assisted greatly by his department. In 1889 Secretary Windom made a very full report on shipping matters. He recommended first, the discontinuance of bonds as a basis for the issuing of marine documents. Second, an amendment of the tonnage-tax law so as to do away with its reciprocity feature, which is of advan- tage to foreign vessels only. Third, additional legislation in regard to signals for ships at sea, on pilotage, and like sub- jects. On the shipping question he said: — " It is but a few years since we stood first among the nations in shipbuilding, and were excelled only by Great Bi-itain in the amount of ocean tonnage. Now, so far as foreign trade is concerned, our ship- yards are comparatively silent, and our flag has almost disappeared from the high seas. Once 75 per cent, of our tonnage was carried in A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 387 our ships ; ^ now 87 per cent, is carried in foreign bottoms. Once our ocean commerce enriched our own countrymen ; now our immense ton- nage of exports and imports gives employment, mainly, to alien labor ; and alien capital levies upon our people an annual tribute estimated at $150,000,000 for freights and fares. Nor is this tribute the only, or even the worst, feature of the case, for our farmers and mechanics are practically excluded from the markets of the world, except as they may be reached by circuitous routes prescribed for their own advan- tage and convenience by our great competitors in these markets. An overwhelming public sentiment demands that this humiliation and loss shall cease. If our industrial interests are to prosper, if our commerce is to be sustained, extended, and increased, we must cease to be depen- dent upon any other nation or people for access to foreign markets. " Doubtless there are serious obstacles in the way, and they are greater now than they were a few years ago, on account of the im- mense capital invested by foreign steamship companies, with which we shall have to compete. These obstacles will constantly increase, for every year adds largely to the capital thus invested. Whatever is to be done must be done promptly. We have tried the do-nothing policy long enough. Its results are before us, and they are unsatisfac- tory. Shall we accept as inevitable our present humiliating and un- profitable position, or shall we use means at command to regain our lost power and prestige on the ocean ? Shall we give that protection and encouragement to our shipping interests that other nations give to theirs, and which we freely give to all our other great interests ? Or shall we, by continued neglect, suffer them to be utterly destroyed ? " The lessons taught by the founders of the government on this sub- ject may be read, just now, with great profit. The second act passed by the First Congress, July 4, 1789, was for the protection of American shipping, by the imposition of a discriminating duty of more than 100 per cent, on Asiatic trade, notably on teas brought in foreign vessels. The third act passed by that Congress, July 20, 1789, imposed dis- criminating tonnage duties on foreign vessels entering our ports as follows : — American vessels, per ton ..... 6 cents. American-built vessels belonging to foreigners . 30 cents. All other vessels ....... 50 cents. The same Congress on the 1st of September, 1789, prohibited any but American vessels from wearing the American flag. " The men who had achieved the independence of the republic left no doubt of their purpose to protect its interests, on the water, as well as on the land. So great was the development of our shipbuilding ^ 92.3 per cent., in 1826, was high-water mark. — Author. 388 AMERICAN MARINE. and shipping interests, under the fostering influence of these acts, that we sold ships amounting to hundx-eds of tliousands of tons to foreigners, and our merchant marine soon became the pride of every citizen, and the envy of the world. " Voicing the national sentiment in 1825, Daniel Webster said : * We have a commerce which leaves no sea unexplored, navies which take no law from superior force.' How like bitter irony these words would sound in 1889. The brilliancy of our achievements on the ocean begat over-confidence, and listening to the voice of free trade, Congress on the 24th of May, 1828, passed an act withdrawing all protection from our shipping interest, and opening our ports to the ships of all nations upon the same terms as to our own. Notwithstanding this, our merchant marine continued to be prosperous so long as wooden vessels were the only vehicles of commerce,^ and other nations re- frained from paying heavy subsidies to their ships. But where iron steamers took the place of wooden sail vessels, and European govern- ments began to pour their contributions into the treasuries of their steamship companies, the decadence of American shipping began and has continued ever since. No other result was possible under the cir- cumstances. When we opened our ports to the vessels of the world, upon the broadest princi})les of equality and free trade, other nations seized the advantages thus offered, and at once began the system of liberal subsidies, while this nation left her citizens to compete unaided against foreign shipowners, backed by the power and financial aid of tlieir governments. The total amount which has thus been contributed to aid in sweeping our commerce from the ocean is not accurately known, but the following conservative statement will give some idea of what our people have had to contend with, in their heroic but vain efforts to maintain a respectable merchant marine. " From 1830 to 1885, Great Britain paid out of her treasury to steamship companies for mail contracts and subsidies over $250,000,000, and since 1885 she has paid annually an average of $3,750,000. " The Italian government pays an annual subsidy of $1,570,000. " France pays a graduated bounty for consti'uction of vessels, from $2 to $12 per ton, and also a bounty per mile run. The sums asked for in the French budgets of 1888 and 1889, under these heads, amounted to above $1,650,000 ; the annual outlay from 1881 to 1886 is stated at above $3,500,000.^ ^ This common error is fallen into from crediting the elusive statements of British writers. Wooden vessels would have remained prosperous but for the war waged on them by the British Lloyds, in the interest of British built and owned shipping. — Author. ^ This was for the marine in general. France pays, in addition, subsidies for postal service. — Author. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 389 *' Germany contributes largely to the support of her steamships. Nearly a $1,000,000 a year goes to a single line, which has supplanted an unsubsidized American line, formerly running between New York and Bremen. " Spain pays a bounty of $6 on the tonnage built in that country, in accordance with the established regulations, and pi'ovides for a re- bate of duties on articles imported for the construction of vessels. Her annual compensation for ocean mails is said to be over $1,000,000. " The United States alone, of the great commercial nations, while encouraging railroads by liberal land grants and subsidies, and protect- ing her coastwise and internal commerce, and all her home industries, has utterly neglected and abandoned her great foreign maritime inter- ests, even declining to pay fair rates for services rendered by Ameri- can steamers, although Congress had ai)iJropriated money for the pur- pose.^ "American merchants, shipbuilders, and shipowners ask no special advantages. Give them an equal chance, and they will liold their own against all competitors. But they cannot be expected to main- tain the unequal contest against foreign capital, backed by foreign treasuries. Some of our broad-minded and patriotic citizens are still struggling to maintain a few lines by which direct communication is kept open, notably with South America, the West Indies, China, and Japan. The line to Brazil has to contend with the ships of England, Germany, Spain, and Italy, all of which are heavily subsidized for the j)urpose of extending the connnerce of their respective countries. The lines to the West Indies come in direct competition with Spanish ships running between Havana, New York, Boston, and Quebec, and receiving governmental bounties amounting to $20,307 per round trip. " American vessels running between San Francisco and Asiatic ports, and receiving mail compensation of only $14,446 a year, have to compete with the subsidized ships of England and other countries, and es])eciall3' with the new line recently established for the express purpose of preying upon our commerce, both on land and sea. This latest and boldest attack upon our transportation interest is backed by subsidies of $300,000 per annum on the line between Port Moody, B. C, and China and Jajjan, and $500,000 per annum on the Atlan- tic line between Liverpool and St. John, N. B. The railroad, which forms the connecting link between these two steamer lines, and thus gives a through route from Liverpool to China, has been aided to the extent of $165,548,000, as stated in the annual report of the Canadian Pacific Railway Co. " During the last fiscal year we paid to foreign steamers for car- rjdng our mails $396,584, and to our own steamers only $109,828. 1 This was done by Postmaster-General Vilas, 1886. — Author. I 390 AMERICAN MARINE. " Can there be any doubt how these unequal contests will end, if our government maintains its position of supine indifference ? " The evil and its cause are both apparent. What is the remedy ? It cannot be found in a reenactment of the legislation of 1789, be- cause treaties stand in the way, and it would not now be expedient, even if we had no treaties on the subject.^ " Granting American registers to foreign-built ships for foreign trade would have but little effect, and besides, it would not be in har- mony with the principle of protection to American industries. '" The difficulty is not so much in the cost of buUding ships as in running them in competition with cheap foreign labor, supjilemented by immense foreign bounties. So far as materials for shipbuilding are concerned, no nation has any natural advantages over us. Our iron, coal, and lumber are as cheap, abundant, and accessible as in any other country. Our mechanics are unsurpassed in skill, and the match- less genius of our inventors is the admiration of the world. If it costs somewhat more to build a ship in this country than in Europe, because American labor is better paid, fed, housed, and clothed, it is a cause for rejoicing rather than regi'et. If shipowning will not command the capital of our people as other industries do, it is because that business, being wholly unprotected, has gone into foreign hands, wliile the benefi- cent policy of protection has been thrown around our other industries. The same policy wisely applied to the shipping interest would produce like results as in our manufacturing industries. This statement is illustrated and confirmed by our internal and coastwise trade, which is thoroughly protected, and hence is in a most prosperous and satisfac- tory condition. While the number of vessels engaged in this trade has rapidly increased, the cost of transportation has decreased until our lake, river, and coastwise commerce is conducted as cheaply as like commerce in any part of the world. " The causes of prosperity in our domestic shipping interests, and the causes which have brought our foreign merchant marine to its present deplorable and humiliating condition, clearly indicate the rem- edy necessary for the restoration of the latter. Firmly convinced that American steamship builders and owners cannot, unaided, compete with the governments of Europe ; that without proper aid and en- couragement from the United States we shall not only fail to regain our lost foreign carrying-trade, but even to retain much longer the small remnant that remains ; and that the restoration of our marine is essential to the extension of our foreign trade, I do not hesitate to recommend that liberal and judicious aid and encouragement be given for the construction of steam merchant vessels suitable for use as ^ The author thinks this is an open question. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 391 cruisers and transports in time of war, that fair and liberal rates be paid to American steamers for transportation of mails to foreign coun- tries, and that special aid, either in the form of mail pay or for mileage run, be made for the establishment of direct connection by American steamer lines with Mexico, Central and South America, and with China and Japan." As an argument in support of the true remedy for the evils so ably indicated, this report of Mr. AVindom is clear and cogent to a degree. Strangely enough, however, the recom- mendations made were partial and incomplete. But little more than the establishment of postal steamer lines was contem- plated. The special aid for regular steam freighting service to South American and Asiatic countries was the onl}^ addi- tional proposal. The aid to be given for the construction of steamers suitable for cruisers could apply only to the mail lines. Taken as a whole, it was a proposition to abandon the greater part of the field of ocean transportation, and to recover no por- tion th:it we have lost, except a few mail routes. Sail was abandoned altogether. The protection proposed was of a dis- criminative sort, limited by geography and confined to class. The argument was for full protection, the advice was for par- tial. Why relinquish any part of the field? Why abandon sail? Why should Congress assume to influence and direct the style of vessel that American shipowners shall use? The carriage of our foreign commerce last year was 30 per cent, in sail, and 70 per cent, in steam. Sail affords the cheaper trans- portation, and in many trades will be easier sustained than steam. Our rivals use both methods of propulsion, and are we to use but one ? The only explanation of the Secretary's course is that he w^as not at liberty in his report to make his recommendations entirely logical. His concluding words were these : — " Persistent efforts have been made, from time to time, to break down the safeguards thrown around our domestic commerce, and ex- pose it to the system of free trade, which has wrought such sweeping destruction in our foreign shipping interests. In the light of experience it is difficult to understand how any one, who is not more interested in foreign prosperity than in our own, can desire to see this protection withdrawn." In his report for 1890, after presenting a table of propor- 392 AMERICAN MARINE. tionate carriage in the foreign trade, Secretary Windom thus briefly disposed of the shipping subject: — " It is impossible to present a stronger argument than is contained in the above figures for vigorous and efficient measures in behalf of our rapidly vanishing foreign merchant marine. They show that the relative decline in our foreign carrying-trade has been constant and alarming.^ This decline has averaged 1| per cent, per annum since 1857, until in 1890 the percentage of imports and exports carried in American vessels was less than in any year since the formation of the government. These figures appeal alike to our national pride and our national interests. The folly and the danger of depending upon our competitors for the means of access to foreign markets need not be stated. The humiliation of witnessing the . disappearance of our flag from the high seas without one effort to restore it to its former proud position cannot be expressed. Surely no subject is of greater impor- tance than the enlargement of our foreign markets, and nothing will contribute more to that end than the command of ample facilities for reaching them. Aid to our merchant marine is not aid to a class, ^ but to the farmer, the manufacturer, and the merchant, as well as the ship- owner. No interest is more thoroughly interwoven with all others, or more worthy of the fostering care and protection of the nation. None has been so vigorously and effectively assailed by foreign governments, nor so persistently ignored and neglected by our own. The reasons for our present humiliating position are well known. The remedy is plain, and easily within our power. In the Secretary's report for 1889 are stated somewhat in detail the causes of present conditions, and the practical remedy for them. These recommendations are now re- newed and respectfully urged upon the prompt and favorable consider- ation of Congi-ess." ^ Charles Foster, 1891-92, has manifested no sympathy with the cause of the American ship. In his report for 1891 he said : " The appropriation by the last Congress of a sum to compensate American-built steamships for carrying the mails will greatly encourage the building of ships in the United States of the class to which the benefits of the act are limited, namely, those of a speed in many cases of more than twenty statute miles an hour, for thousands of miles, with- 1 Since 1830. ^ If partial, and not general, it is to a class. If to steam, and not to sail, it is to a class. — Author. 8 For a speech made in support of the Tonnage Bill, shortly after making this repoi't, see Chapter XXVI. A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 393 out coaling ; and will tend to the recovery of our share of the ocean carrying-trade of the world, in competition with the steamsliips of Great Britain, France, and Germany." If an enemy had written this to excite ridicule, we could scarcely take ol't'ense, since the passage of the bill referred to has encouraged little more, so far, than a laugh at our expense, by the subsidized foreign-steamship corporations and their friends. The compensation proposed in the Senate Mail-Sub- sidy Bill was reduced one third in the House, that the measure might be almost worthless, and then substituted by the opposi- tion for the tonnage bill, which would have been effective. In an oration, July 4, 1892, Senator Frye declared: "The reduced payments so discouraged cai)ital that no contracts could be made for thase two classes of vessels. Eight contracts were entered into by the Postmaster-General under the law, which, if executed, will require fifteen ships." To talk about this lit- tle fleet "recovering our share of the ocean carrying-trade" is the veriest nonsense. The Secretary adds : — " Those nations, together with Spain and Italy, have subsidized their lines of steam vessels in one form or another, and they carry most of our exports, which are usually products of a bulky nature, and consti- tute a very large and profitable portion of the commerce of tlie world." One would scarcely think the Secretary would content him- self with such half truths as that five nations have subsidized their steam fleets. He continues : — *' Our annual customs receipts scarcely exceed the money paid an- nually to the owners of foreign vessels for the ocean transportation of our own people and mei-chandise, most of which large sum of about $200,000,000 would be jiaid to our own vessel-owners, under the fos- tering influence of friendly legislation.^ "Through treaties and regulations made since 1827 (?), mostly pi'ior to the late war, the early discriminations of the government in favor of American shipping in the foreign trade have been removed, and the vessels of other nations are now admitted in the United States, in some cases, on more favorable terms than our own,^ and in nearly all instances on conditions as favorable. The foreign competition, thus stimulated, together with tlie injurious effects of the war upon our ocean carrying-trade, have almost destroyed our foreign shipping inter- * One might suppose he would recommend it. ' Notably, all foreign vessels from Dutch and German ports. — Author. 394 AMERICAN MARINE. ests. This, fortunately, is not the case in respect to our coasting trade, which is now the largest of any civilized {sic) country, and gives us a fleet of vast benefit to the nation in time of peace, and capable of in- calculable service in time of war." The Secretary finds no fault with the "treaties and regula- tions" by whicli the protection, styled by him "discrimina- tions of the government," was removed, and ruin to our marine introduced and effected. Nor does it excite his love of fair play, that the shipping of all nations, coming from Dutch and German ports, enter ours free of tonnage taxes, but our vessels pay them. That is a discrimination that may stand, as it hurts nobody but ourselves. Its abolition is not recommended. In fact, his cold account of our shipping loss and humiliation is unrelieved by any effort, intellcL-tual or moral, to repair the loss or restore our prestige. His mind seems at ease about our foreign shij)ping interests, since "fortunately, our coasting trade is the largest of any civilized country," and "capable of incalculable service in time of war." But, reflecting that the enemy might ai)pear in Congress, and tliere destroy the coast- ing trade, as once before he presented himself and applied an extinguisher to the marine in foreign trade, the Secretary added: — " There should be no interference Avith the legal barriers that now preserve the coasting trade to citizens of the United States, whether upon the lakes, the rivers, or the ocean." Even in this declaration there is nothing to show that the Secretary is not of ex-Secretary Sherman's faith, that what is wanted is American ownership, and cheap vessels built abroad. The Secretary is doubtless sincere in his solicitude for the domestic, but particularly the lake trade, as he offers several reasons therefor : — "The late census shows that in addition to the large tonnage of doc- umented vessels mentioned in the statistics above stated of vessels in this trade, there is a very considerable number of inferior undocu- mented craft employed upon the rivers and elscAvhere, consisting of unrigged barges, flat-boats, etc. Upon the Ohio River and its tribu- taries, above Cincinnati alone, this additional tonnage is found to amount to 2,470,547 tons." Considering the presence of so much "tonnage "in the upper A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 395 Ohio, not set down in shipping statistics, the loss of our ocean fleets saems, and perhaps is, unimportant. We never had in the foreign trade more than 2,490,894 tons, and still have 928,002 tons left. As we have in the upper Ohio liiver, ac- cording to the census and the Secretary's report, 901,713 tons more "tonnage" than has been lost by competition at sea, — • ""tonnage " that we did not know we had, — our lot is far from miserable. The Secretary adds : — " The value of the coasting and river fleet to domestic commerce, and its relative importance, is shown by the rejjorts of the Census Office, which state that on the great lakes alone (without considering wharves, elevators, shipyaids, or other j)lants connected with ship- ])ing^), the aggregate valuation of the vessels in 1890 was $58,128,- 500, and that their total ton mileage for the season of 1889 was 15,- 518,.SG0,000, equivalent to 22.6 per cent, of the total ton mileage of railways in the United States." It is, therefore, to be hoped Congress will not open the domestic trade to foreigners, for then we might lose, through unprotection, the "undocumented craft" of the upper Ohio liiver. Verily, the ]:)rotection of shii)ping with Secretary Fos- ter seems altogether a local question. Wishing Congress to have authentic information regarding our losses of carriage in the foreign trade, the Secretary repub- lishes a table going back no farther than 1857. Comparing with 1820, our loss in 1857 was 21.8 per cent, of the whole business. The only object apparent in thus setting out a half truth is to obscure the true cause of the decline, and to take up the false ground that it was induced by the toar, and the "war tariff " since. The Secretary's remark is : — " The causes of the decline need not be discussed here. Since the war they have been such as might have been obviated by action similar to that recently taken by Congress, and by encouragement on the pai-t of that body, such as has been given to its navigation interests in no stinted measure by the government of Great Britain." Evidently he refers to the subsidizing of postal lines. He does not indorse bounty payments to be applied generally, because that would be following the example of France, and ^ Had these been measured for tonnage, doubtless they would have been iucluded. — Author. 396 AMERICAN MARINE. acknowledging that the true cause of our shipping decline is want of protection. By putting the decline upon false ground, evidently it is sought to evade the logical remedy of protection. The "action recently taken by Congress " is but a stej) towards the work of ''rehabilitation" promised in 1888. The Secretary makes the following erroneous statement : — " In 1861 our foreign-going tonnage, exchisive of that on the lakes, was 2,642,628, the highest point reached in the history of the nation, and in 1865, four years later, it had fallen to 1,602,583." The figures here given are for the "registered," and not the "tonnage in foreign trade." The mistake was made by taking the figures from the wrong table in the Report of the Bureau of Navigation, namely, from table No. 10 instead of No. IT. The correct figures are, for 1861, 2,496,894 tons; for 1865, 1,518,350; loss in the period, 978,544 tons. In relation to foreign-built yachts now irregularly docu- mented as of "American ownership," the Secretary said: — " The United States courts are considering various questions relat- ing to the rights and duties of American owners of foreign-huilt yachts navigated in our watei's. Some additional legislation in regard to ves- sels of this class may become necessary." Contrary to the simplest principles of shipping and tariff law, it was sought by the Treasury Department to compel the owner of the yacht Conqueror to pay a tariff duty under the McKinley act, and failure resulted. The suit looked like a scheme to provide, by decision of court, for the general impor- tation of foreign-built vessels; for, it is clear, if such tonnage is a mere dutiable commodity, that the free-ship question is merely one of catalogue, — "dutiable" or "free list." It is well that the government was defeated. Prohibitive protec- tion to shipbuilding should stand. Conclusion of the flatter. We have now completed a pan- oramic view of the Treasury Department in its relations to the shipping industry for a century past. There have been thirty- two secretaries who made one or more reports to Congress. In less than twenty of these is anything said about navigation as an interest. Only eight of the thirty-two secretaries had any- thing useful to propose. Only three of them advocated fos- ♦ A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 397 terlng legislation, and but one perceived, with any clegTee of clearness, the true causes of our shipping decline. This officer was Secretary Windom. On the other hand, since 1815, when the stripping of pro- tection was begun, we have had seven secretaries, who never noticed the need of legislation for shipping; four others who proposed disabling and ruinous measures, and one who took it upon himself to act adversely. It is evident from the record, made by the reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury, that the majority have not consid- ered it their business to champion the interests either of com- merce or navigation. When they come to make up their annual reports, then, for the first time, with few exceptions, they begin to think what they shall say on these topics. For- mer reports are examined, and Congress sometimes gets such a rehash as some handy clerk can prepare. This treatment of these great subjects goes on from year to year, with only now and then a variation. The result of this inattention and neglect we have before us. Our laws relating to vessels are complicated, inconsistent, and vexatious to a degree. The spirit of the statutes is conservative, repressive, and mercenary. Our policy of politeness and lil^erality towards foreigners con- trast strongly w^ith the severity and injustice dealt out to our own citizens. Too many of our laws are framed in foreign interest, too many of them are thus administered. A department of commerce, with a cabinet minister in charge, selected for business ability, with authority to investi- gate all matters relating to trade and transportation, collect information, and block out measures for the consideration of Congress, could do more good in a decade, for the prosperity and power of the United States, than will ever be done in a century, with the Treasury Department as now organized. This department is a mere tax-gathering and distributing ma- chine. A department of commerce, rightly managed, would be a business power for promoting the public weal. CHAPTER XXIV. THE BUREAU OF NAVIGATION OF THE TREASURY DEPART- MENT. The Bureau of Navigation is now the medium of the Treas- ury Department in administering the greater part of the law relative to shipping. It is in charge of an officer entitled Commissioner of Navigation, and was established in 1884, A description of the relations of the department to the shipping interest would be incomplete without an account of this office. It was undoubtedly the outcome of a moderate agitation for a department of commerce, which should perform the same good offices for the trades of the sea as the department of agricul- ture now works out for the interests of the soil. Its recom- mendation to Congress was the kindly work of Secretary Charles J. Folger, of New York. In his report for 1883 he prefaced the presentation of the subject with the following words : — " There appear but two methods by which our foreign shipping can be directly increased, namely, by subsidies, and by allowing the free purchase of foreign ships. Whether either or both of these means shall be adopted will depend on the judgment of Congress whether it is better to resort to them, than to suffer yearly the loss of 84 per cent, of the freightage on our exports and imports of merchandise." Then, distrusting his own knowledge of the questions in- volved in an examination and choice of these propositions, he continued: — " It would facilitate the solution of questions of the character above presented if there were established in the Treasury Department a Bureau of Navigation, whose function it should be to supervise that interest, make a study of its needs, observe its decline or increase, and recommend from time to time such measures as would keep it in a state of progress parallel with the general advance of the country. BUREAU OF NAVIGATION. 399 " If such a bureau were to do nothing more than to look to the in- terests of seamen, and keep a record of the commercial marine, and guard against the physical obstructions to navigation within our own waters, its existence would be justified. Some of the duties which would naturally attach to such a bureau are now incongruously distributed among divisions of tlie Treasury Department, whose prime purpose and main work are of other nature. The establishment of that bureau might be effected with the addition of but two salaried officers to the present number in the civil service." A bill for the establishment of the Bureau of Navigation, prepared by an official of the department, was duly introduced in Congress and promptly passed. The act is as follows : — THE ACT ESTABLISHING THE BUREAU. Be it enacted, etc., That there shall be in the Department of the Treasury of the United States a Bureau of Navigation under the im- mediate charge of a Commissioner of Navigation. Sec. 2. That the Commissioner of Navigation, under tbe direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall have general superintendence of the commercial marine and merchant seamen of the United States, so far as vessels and seamen are not, under existing laws, subject to the supervision of any other officer of tbe government.^ He shall be specially charged with the decision of all questions relating to the issue of registers, enrollments, and licenses of vessels, and to the filing and preservation of those documents ; and whenever in title forty-eight or fifty of the Revised Statutes any of the above-named documents are required to be surrendered or returned to the Register of the Treas- ury, such requirement is hereby repealed, and such documents shall be sui-rendered and returned to the Commissioner of Navigation. Said Commissioner shall have charge of all similar documents now in the keeping of the Register of the Treasury, and shall perform all the duties hitherto devolved upon said Register relating to navigation. Sec. 3. That the Commissioner of Navigation shall be charged with the supervision of the laws relating to the admeasurement of vessels, and the assigning of signal letters thereto, and of designating their official number ; and on all questions of interpretation growing out of tbe execution of the laws relating to these subjects, and relating to the collection of tonnage tax, and to the refund of such tax when collected erroneously or illegally, his decision shall be final. ^ This provision reserved the steamboat inspection service to the super- vision of the Inspector-General. That was a mistake. Every district has a supervisor. 400 AMERICAN MARINE. Sec. 4. That the Commissioner of Navigation shall annually prepare and publish a list of vessels of the United States belonging to the com- mercial marine, specifying the official number, signal letters, names, rig, tonnage, home port, and place and date of building of every vessel, distinguishing in such list sailing vessels from such as may be propelled by steam or other motive power. He shall also report annually to the Secretary of the Treasury the increase of vessels of the United States, by building or otherwise, specifying their number, rig, and motive power. He sliall also investigate the operations of the law relative to navigation, and annually report to the Secretary of the Treasury such particulars as may, in his judgment, admit of improvement or may require amendment. Sec. 5. That the Commissioner of Navigation shall, under the direc- tion of the Secretaiy of the Treasury, be empowered to change the names of vessels of the United States, under such restiictions as may have been or shall be prescribed by act of Congress. The Commis- sioner of Navigation shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive a salary of four thousand dollars per annum.* And the Secretary of the Treasury shall have power to transfer from existing bureaus or divisions of the Treasury one clei-k, to be designated as deputy Commissioner of Navi- gation, to act with the full i)owers of said Commissioner during his temporary absence from his official duty for any cause, and such addi- tional clerks as he may consider necessary to the successful operation of the Bureau of Navigation, without impairing the efficiency of the bureaus or divisions whence such clerks may be transferred- Sec. 7. That this act shall be in force and take effect on and after July first, eighteen hundred and eighty-four. Approved July 5, 1884. Commissioners and fJicir Qnalijications. A commissioner of navigation was immediately appointed, and the bureau be- gan its work. In the eight years of its existence there have been four commissioners. Quoting the language of Secretary Folger, it is a question if all of them have been qualified to "supervise the interest of navigation, make a study of its needs, observe its decline or increase, and recommend, from time to time, such measures as would keep it in a state of pro- gress parallel with the general advance of the country; " at all events, two of them have lacked knowledge or experience on the subject of ships and shipping economy. ^ This was cut down in the first and subsequent appropriation bills to 83,600. BUREAU OF NAVIGATION. 401 The first commissiouer, selected by Secretary Folger, was Captain Jarvis Patten, of Bath, Maine, well known, not only as a navigator of sail and steam vessels, but as identified with the ownership and building of vessels; not only a student of shipping questions, but a writer and author of ability ; a master of several languages, well versed in the science, laws, and lit- erature of shipping. After serving twenty-nine months. Presi- dent Cleveland, at the instance of Secretary Manning, called for his resignation, and appointed in his place, Charles B. Morton, a journalist. The autlior of this book was the third commissioner, and the fourth served as disbursing clerk in the Fifty-first Congress. These facts are introduced to show that the average Secre- tary of the Treasury cares nothing at all about the improve- ment of the shipping situation. He will not even tolerate in his department the talent and experience which he does not himself possess, "to study the needs of navigation," and which Congress has provided "to investigate the operations of the law relative to navigation, and annually report such particulars as may, in his judgment, admit of improvement or may require amendment." The present Secretary has gone so far as to sup- press the report of the commissioner for 1891. Some of the best matter in that report, especially objected to, may be found in Chapters VII., VIII., and IX. Other chapters contain more or less of the suppressed information. These incidents, as affecting individuals, are nothing in themselves. The public interest arises, however, when the public good is trampled down. The Bureau of Navigation represents the ])ublic interest in the ship})ing question. It was not established for the distribution of political spoil. Its prostitution to such a purpose is a public offense. That it has been so treated proves that it cannot perform the work intended by its establishment. This fact, too, is of public importance. Opposition to the Bureau. From the time the bureau was established there has been opposition to its w^ork, both inside and outside of the department. For the most part, it is prompted by the foreign steamship agencies, and the advocates of "free ships." It is needless to add, that this opposition is active and unscrupulous, and loses no opportunity to excite prejudice against any commissioner who is devoted to his duty. 402 AMERICAN MARINE. Besides this, there are secretaries so constituted that they are unwilling to receive any opinions from the head of a bureau, no matter what the law may provide in that respect. The upshot of the matter is, that a bureau of a department is not the natural or logical instrumentality that should be employed to improve our interests in commerce and navigation. Any- thing short of a department will necessarily fail in attaining that object. A Marine Board. The American members of the Inter- national Maritime Conference of 1890 recommended the forma- tion of a marine board, to be composed of certain Treasury officers, performing duties connected with shipping, together with a number of unofficial experts, and a senator and repre- sentative in Congress. A bill for the creation of this board is pending. The Commissioner of Navigation is to be one of its members, and the others are to be taken from the heads of cer- tain Treasury Department bureaus or divisions, the body to be presided over by an assistant scretary. In theory, this bill looks as though it might jjrove useful, if enacted. In practice, however, it is highly probable that it will cheat its supporters, and simply because the Secretary of the Treasury may overturn all its work, or the best of its work, at any time. The board may learn all about a matter and set- tle upon the proper thing to be done, but it will be in the power of one man, who may know nothing about the subject, through influence of diiferent kinds, to oppose their judgment and nullify their action. On the other hand, the Secretary of the Treasury may in- fluence such appointments that the board, through its mem- bers, would not possess the qualifications requisite for wise and expedient action. The disposition to get rid of expert officers and to fill their places with place-hunters is often very strong, and is not peculiar to any particular party. The fact is this : no bureau or board can be relied on by the people for any duty that the head of a department controls, unless that head is appointed to the supreme charge of that duty, and is held re- sponsible for it. The matter all comes to one point, namely, a department of commerce, under a qualified secretary, to take the supervision of that interest and of navigation. The Secre- tary of the Treasury and the Postmaster-General should have BUREAU OF NAVIGATION. 403 nothing to do with vessels. The vessel interests would be even better taken care of by the Navy Department than by the Treas- ury. Secretaries of the Treasury and Postmaster-Generals have been as scourges to our marine. It would be a novel sensation to our shipping interest to find itself under a department whose duty it was to be friendly towards it ; and to manifest towards it the same disposition that the Department of Agriculture shows for the great and im^jortant interests engaged in tilling the soil. I CHAPTEK XXV. THE TONNAGE BILL AND ESTIMATES FOR BOUNTIES. Since statesmanship first sought the furtherance of national interest in any special direction, bounties, rewards, or honors have been among the means employed. In English history we find the first application of such expedients in navigation, when it was decreed by King Athelstan, a. d. 925, that "if a merchant so thrived that he passed thrice over the wide seas of his owne craft, he was thenceforth a Thein's right worthie." In French history, two centuries and a third ago, "boun- ties" first performed a great part in building up a merchant marine. This was in the reign of Louis XIV., under his Minister Colbert, whose protective system included premiums on home-built shij)s, tonnage duties on foreign shipping, and the giving of French vessels the monojDoly of trade to and from the colonies. In 1881 the French applied the bounty princi- ple again, not only to the building, but the sailing of vessels, both of sail and steam. In a few years the Italians followed the example of the French. These marine-bounty laws remain in force, and represent fixed protective policies. In our own country the giving of bounties, premiums, and medals to stimulate improvements and reward public benefac- tors has been so common that the principle is popular and well understood. Its application to the building up of an American marine was one of the steps considered by Thomas Jefferson, but tonnage dues and discriminating tariff duties were then deemed preferable. Bounties, however, as the only practical means to encourage the fisheries and the consequent rearing of seamen, were paid down to a recent date. Following the pre- cedents of France and Germany, in paying bounties on sugar products, the tariff bill of 1890 applied this policy in the United States. For the first year, payments for all kinds. TONNAGE BILL AND ESTIMATES FOR BOUNTIES. 405 including maj)le, have amounted to $7,330,046.^ In 1890, also, the Senate passed a bill for the payment of navigation bounties, which, being modified, barely failed to pass the House. "Subsidy," although a form of bounty, is not quite the same. Bounty is a reward for a public benefaction. Subsidy is paid to an ally, or to a citizen or corporation for a public service, and is in the nature of remuneration, but it may be so liberal as to be only another name for bounty. Such was the subsidy first paid by the British treasury to support steam lines on the ocean. On the other hand, a subsidy may be so mean and wanting as to afford, practically, no support at all. Such is the subsidy authorized by the substitute for the Farquhar tonnage bill. It only amounts to payment for carrying the mails, and gives no reward for building up a naval power for national defense. "Subvention" is another term denoting a government aid or bounty, more especially paid to encourage enlargement and strengthening of the sea-power of a nation. As it is in Eng- land, steamers under subsidy carry the mails, but those under subvention may, or may not, take them, their pay being re- duced one fourth, while they do. There, subvention steamers belong to the royal naval reserve, and are under admiralty control. But bounty, subsidy, and subvention are near relations. In no sense are they gratuities ; these are given without an equiv- alent or recompense, without claim or merit, as alms to relieve a beggar. A marine is a part of the territory of a maritime state ; a part of the means, machinery, and resources by which a maritime people extend their commerce, gather riches, in- crease their strength, and establish their independence. With- out a marine, a maritime state is a paralytic among the nations. It is therefore for the public good that individuals throng into the nautical pursuits, build up a strong, swift, and safe marine, and make the ocean a field of enterprise and a mine of wealth, — not for themselves alone, but for all their countrymen, a7id (heir state. If this public good cannot be attained by volun- tary effort, then it becomes a public duty to encourage its ac- complishment by state policy or assistance. 1 Of which .97,065,284 was paid on cane sugar, $240,098 on beet sngar, $22,197 on sorghum sugar, and S2,466 on maple sugar. 406 AMERICAN MARINE. It is a narrow-minded conception of the function of govern- ment tliat public improvements must be confined to the land, and no money expended for the national advantage at sea. Roads, bridges, canals, river and harbor improvements, every facility for transportation hj land, has received the aid of the treasmy. The men of navigation and commerce, all the trades- men connected with the sea, have contributed their share since the foundation of the government. But the question is not, what in return has been laid out for their benefit, but, for American advancement and mastery in the foreign trade. The state includes the individual. It cannot promote its own good without benefiting individuals. Nor can it neglect or ruin the interests of private citizens without bringing evil to itseK. Our flag is being driven fi-om the sea. What have we ex- pended to maintain it there ? That is the question ; and the answer is, nothing. Practically, nothing. Navigation and commerce have been treated as new milch cows — kept for "revenue only," while all the maritime nations but our own have acted in a wiser way. The Desperate Struggle of oitr JIarine. In closing the debate on the "tonnage bill," February 27, 1891, Hon. John M. Farquhar said: — "I hold in my hand, Mr. Speaker, a list of seventeen nations and of four de])endeneies that expend annually a total of -'1535,000,000 on their shi])ping to drive the American flag from the seas. So it is not a battle of individuals against individ- uals, nor of corporations against corporations, but of nations against nations. The treasuries of all the great powers are generously used in the fierce struggle for supremacy or exist- ence on the ocean. The nation which commands its own com- merce must also own its own ships and successfully employ them. "The question here presented, Mr. Speaker, is a struggle on the part of this country against every power on the face of the earth. That is why the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, desirous to have the best knowledge in their possession to place in the hands of the American Congress, have given this matter careful, thoughtful, and unremitting consideration, with a view of presenting a bill complete and supreme in all of its features, and which would have the effect TONNAGE BILL AND ESTIMATES FOR BOUNTIES. 407 to bring back honor and profit to our nation. The difficulty that has stood in the way of perfect success possibly has been this : I question whether the American peoj)le know to-day the deep disgrace and loss that attach to their land and its marine, by the bad condition we are now in. "But, Mr. Speaker, I hail the bill now before us, as it comes to this Congress in its present &ha])e, as the courier that shall boar anew throughout both hemispheres the announce- ment that Americans are now bound to stand by their flag and the honor of their nation." THE "TONNAGE BILL." An act to place the American merchant marine, engaged in the for- eign trade, upon an equahty with that of other nations, to provide for ocean mail service between the United States and foreign ports, and to strengthen the naval establislmient.^ That on and after the passage of this act there shall be paid, out of any moneys in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise approjjriated, to any vessel, whether sail or steam, registered pursuant to the laws of the United States, and which shall be engaged in the foreign trade, l)lying between the ports of the United States, and for- eign ports, as follows : If a steam vessel of not exceeding eleven knots speed when loaded, or if a sailing vessel, the sum of 10 cents per gross register ton for the first 500 miles or fraction thereof sailed outward, and the same sum for the first 500 miles or fraction thereof sailed inward, on any voyage or voyages ; 10 cents i)er gross register ton for the second 500 miles or fraction tliereof sailed outward, and the same sum for the second 500 miles or fraction thereof sailed inward, and 20 cents per gross register ton for each 1,000 miles thereafter, and pro rata for any distance sailed less than 1,000 miles after the first 1,000 miles sailed. The payments at the rate of 20 cents per ton for each 1,000 miles sailed, as herein provided, shall continue for the term of ten years at that rate, and thereafter for another term of nine years at a reduction of 2 cents per ton each year upon each 1,000 miles sailed, and pro rata for any less distance. But in case any steam ves- sel makes or can attain a higher speed at sea than 11 knots per hour when loaded, with winds and current slack, then, and in such case, the payments per ton for each 1,000 miles sailed as aforesaid shall be made ^ Being the House substitute for House bill No. 4663 and Senate bill No. 3738. Defeated in the House, February 27, 1891, on ordering the third reading, by a vote of 147 to 144. A copy of the American Shipping League-bill will be found iu the Appendix. 408 AMERICAN MARINE. according to the fixed rating for speed ; that is to say, for a speed of over 11 to 12 knots, 21 cents per ton ; for a speed of over 12 to 13 knots, 22 cents per ton ; for a speed of over 13 to 14 knots, 23 cents per ton ; for a speed of over 14 to 15 knots, 24 cents per ton ; for a speed of over 15 to 16 knots, 25 cents per ton ; for a speed of over. 16 to 17 knots, 26 cents per ton ; for a speed of over 17 to 18 knots, 27 cents per ton ; for a speed of over 18 to 19 knots, 28 cents per ton ; for a speed of over 19 to 20 knots, 29 cents per ton, and for a speed of over 20 knots, 30 cents per ton ; the speed of every steam vessel claiming a rate above 11 knots per hour to be ascertained from a trial of four hours' run with the freeboard of an unarmed cruiser, by the Secretary of the Navy, and by him to be certified to the Treasury and Post Office Departments, where records of speed shall be kept. The payments at the different rates for speed shall continue for the term of ten years at the full rate, and thereafter for another term of nine years at a reduction of one tenth the full rate per ton each year upon each 1,000 miles navigated, and pro rata for any distance less : Pro- vided, That payment in all the foregoing cases shall not be made for more than 7,000 miles sailed on either an outward or an inward voy- age, and that the foreign port to which the voyage is made shall be distant more than 70 miles seaward from the ocean or gulf boundary of the United States ; and such payments to any vessel as aforesaid shall be made to the owner or owners thereof upon proof of the dis- tance actually sailed, the distance to be ascertained and the payment to be made under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe and promulgate ; distances between ports to be deter- mined by measurements, which shall be furnished by the United States Hydrographic Office to the Bureau of Navigation of the Treasury Department. Sec. 2. That no vessel shall be entitled to the benefits of this act unless its entire cargo shall be loaded at a port or ports of the United States and discharged or transferred at one or more foreign ports, or shall be loaded at one or more foreign ports and discharged or trans- ferred at a port or ports in the United States ; nor shall a vessel of less than 16 knots speed, not carrying the United States mails, be en- titled to receive payment under this act unless it shall have freight on board at the time of sailing to the amount in tons, weight, or meas- urement, of at least 25 per cent, of the net cargo capacity, 2,240 pounds, or 40 cubic feet, to make a ton of cargo. Sec- 3. That no vessel shall be entitled to the benefits of this act unless all the officers thereof shall be citizens of the United States, in conformity with the existing laws ; nor unless upon each departure from the United States the following proportion of the crew shall be citizens TONNAGE BILL AND ESTIMATES FOR BOUNTIES. 409 of the United States, or shall have declared their intentions to become citizens, to wit : During the first two years this act shall be in force, one sixth thereof ; during the next three succeeding years, one third thereof ; and during the remaining term of this act, at least one half thereof ; nor unless there be carried on vessels of less than 1,000 tons gross register one native-born apprentice, and on vessels of 1,000 tons and upward one such apprentice for each 1,000 tons or three fourths fraction thereof. Sec. 4. That, to owners of vessels already built, payments under this act shall be made for such time only as each shall stand inspection and hold character, if wood built, not lower than the second grade (A 1\) in a scale of six grades in the Record of American and -Foreign Shipping, or the corresponding classification in any other incorporated American register of shipping approved by the Commissioner of Navi- gation of the Treasury Department. If iron or steel built, payments shall be made for such time only as each vessel shall stand inspection, and hold character not lower than the second class (A 1, thirteen years) in the Record of American and Foreign Shipping, or the correspond- ing classification in any other incorporated American register of ship- ping approved by the Commissioner of Navigation of the Treasury Department. Sec. 5. That vessels keel-laid and built after the passage of this act, in order to be entitled to payments after losing or lapsing from class in the first grade if wood built, or from the first class or division if iron or steel built, must have been so well constructed as to have been classed originally in the highest grade of the first class, or first division, to wit : If wood built A 1, twelve years ; and if iron or steel built, A 1 sixteen years, in the Record of American and Foreign Shipping, or the corresponding classification in any other incorporated American register of shipping approved by the Commissioner of Navigation of the Treasury Department. Vessels so built and classed for the high- est character shall receive payments as in section 4 provided for ves- sels already built. Vessels unclassed in the register named in this act, or in an American register whose rules for building and inspection are fully equal in requirements, and all vessels whose class has expired or been suspended or withdrawn, shall be disentitled to payments while this disqualification exists. Sec. 6. That all steam vessels hereafter built for the foreign tr'ade and intended for a speed of twelve knots or more, in order to be en- titled to the benefit of this act shall be structurally adapted to conver- sion into auxiliary cruisers or transports for the naval service, and in accordance with requirements specified by the Secretary of the Navy, to whom the plans of such vessels must be submitted for approval ; but 410 AMERICAN MARINE. if any such vessel shall be built without the approval of his plans, or shall be found on insjjection Avhen completed not to fulfill said require- ments, then such vessels shall be classed for payments with those not exceeding eleven-knot speed : Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy may accept as auxiliary cruisers or transports steam vessels built before the passage of this act which shall meet the require- ments of the Navy Department for the naval service. Steam vessels hereafter built shall receive payments based on speed, and be entitled to carry the mails of the United States only when they hold the certifi- cate of the Secretary of the Navy, and all steam vessels found to ful- fill the requirements of the Navy Department shall be enrolled as aux- iliary vessels, and may be taken by the United States and used as transports or cruisers upon payment to the owners of the fair actual value at the time of the taking, and if there shall be a disagreement as to the fair actual value between the United States and the owners, then the same shall be determined by two imjiartial appraisers, one to be appointed by each of said parties, they at the same time selecting a third, who shall act in said appraisement in case the two shall fail to agree ; and no enrolled auxiliary vessel shall be sold foreign without the consent of the Secretary of the Navy. (Amended : Provided, That no sailing vessel of less than 1,000 tons gross tonnage shall be entitled to receive the benefits of this act).^ Sec. 7. That all steam vessels receiving the benefits of this act and capable of maintaining a speed of twelve knots an hour at sea in ordi- nary weather shall carry the mails of the United States when required by the Postmaster-General to the port or ports for which they may be destined, and under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Post- master-General, and for all mails so carried the Post Ofiice Depart- ment shall turn into the Treasury the sea and inland postage thereon. Upon each of said vessels the United States shall be entitled to have transported free of charge such mail messengers as in the judgment of the Postmaster-General may be necessary, whose duty it shall be to receive, sort, take in charge, and deliver the mails to and from the United States, and who shall be provided with suitable room for the accommodation of messengers and the mails. Sec. 8. That the Secretary of the Treasury shall fix the times and manner of payments, prescribe the vouchers, with forms of account and verifications, upon which payments shall be made, and shall adopt whatever regulations may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act. On the defeat of this bill, the "Cannon substitute" pending * This Amendment in committee of the whole was a partial repudiation of the principle of the bill. TONNAGE BILL AND ESTIMATES FOR BOUNTIES. 411 was passed. A copy of it will be found in the Appendix. They are both good bills — according to the point of view. The tonnage bill is a good American measure, the Cannon sub- sidy bill was a good anti- American manoeuvre. The one offered bread, the other has given a stone. France, Germany, and Great Britain are said to have grumbled when the McKinley bill was passed, and foreign steamship companies to have smiled when Cannon's underhand and well-nigh worthless work went through. An Erplanation of the Tonnage Bill. On April 2, 1890, the House Committee on Marine and Fisheries, through its chairman, Hon. John M. Farquhar, of New York, reported a bill (H. R. No. 4GG3), with a book of hearings. i This biU proposed a navigation bounty of 30 cents per ton per mile. It was introduced in the Senate as S. No. 3738. Early in July it came before the Senate for enactment, together with another bill (S. No. 3739) for ocean mail service. Both biUs passed. The House bounty bill, thus returned, went to the Committee on Marine and Fisheries, and the Senate subsidy bill to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads. The latter was reported to the House as passed by the Senate. The former was laid aside, and a "substitute bill" which should embody the good features of both the House and the Senate bills was prepared. It was this House committee substitute bill which was defeated, and the Senate subsidy bill, cut down in its pay- ments one third, that became law. The subsidy bill ajsplied only to mail-steamship lines. It was a special, and not a general measure. Few, if any peti- tions supported it.^ It offered only a partial protection, even for a steam marine. That it coidd fulfill the pledge of the Republican platform, to "rehabilitate" the American marine, was perfectly absurd. If it was a measure that would fully protect our steam marine, its enactment could not redeem that pledge. The Senate held this view of the matter, and there- fore passed the bounty bill along with the subsidy measure, intending by both bills to protect the entire marine, sail as well as steam. And yet there were in the House great sticklers for protection, who could vote for every item in the McKinley 1 51st Cong. 1st Session, H. of R. Report No. 1210. * The Bounty or Tonnage bill was strongly supported by petitions. 412 AMERICAN MARINE. bill, even to tlie maple-sugar bounty clause, but could not re- frain from speeches and votes to defeat a measure of protection to the nation itself, in supporting an American marine in the ' foreign trade. Not only so, but they could carry the House . for an unprotective measure, one that is neither Democratic 11 nor Republican, but anti-American in every feature, so far as it is eifective in its action. The tonnage or bounty bill, which the enemies of American I shipping defeated, was a general measure framed on the lines of popidar protection. It applied to sail as well as steam, to freighting as well as passenger or postal vessels. Being gen- eral and impartial, it was democratic. It gave all a chance. The rich and the poor, individuals, firms, or corporations, sea- ports small or great, north or south, east or west, all fared alike for encouragement, and no monopolies, rings, or trusts were favored. The operation of a subsidy measure is to build up a few corporations, instead of aiding all citizens who choose to enter and continue in any branch of the carrying-trade. Shipping protection, to be just and efficient, must be full and equal. To suit the American people it must be democratic, giving to every owner and all our ports impartial patronage, as impartial justice. The German steam-marine affords an ex- ample too imperial to be followed in the United States. In Germany the amount of seagoing metal steam tonnage is 927,804 tons, of which 37.14 per cent, is in three lines sub- sidized by the government.^ One of these lines has over 18 per cent, of the total tonnage. Shipping protection, of such a character as to be thus monopolized by a few, will not prob- ably long endure. Our subsidy laws have all been short-lived. The first act, in 1845, was repealed in 1858. The shipping protection given by the republic of France, being general, as it should be, is the best foreign example, if we need one. The bounty paid, as protection^ is free to all seagoing craft, sail as well as steam. In the progress of the tonnage bill the partial protectionists wished to strike out de- fense of sail vessels, though these constituted two thirds of the tonnage eligible for bounty. They succeeded in refusing pro- tection to sailers of less than 1,000 tons. This pleased the anti-protection side of the House, as it put the protectionist ^ Subsidy in Germany dates from 1856. TONNAGE BILL AND ESTIMATES FOR BOUNTIES. 413 party in a false position, namely, that of enacting free trade for small seaports, sailing vessels, and poor young men; but protection for great seaports, steam corporations, and old firms able to own large ships. If one would search the field, a more indefensible position could not be found. The tonnage bill had two faults induced by a desire of the Committee on Marine to be as saving as possible of bounty money. The first was starting the scale of bounties at 20 cents a ton, instead of 25 cents at least ; and the second was limiting the payment of bounty on a single voyage to 7,000, instead of 10,000 miles. Otherwise, it was perfect. TJie Cost of the Tonnage BUI. The Commissioner of NaviQ:ation made a careful estimate for the cost of the ori":inal bill (H. K. No. 4GG3 or S. 3738) which was submitted with the report (1210), and given also in Senator Frye's speech. The estimate that follows was prepared to accompany the "sub- stitute bill," which was defeated, and shows an average abate- ment under the provisions of the original bill of 22.37 per cent., caused mainly by changing the rate of bounty from 30 to 20-30 cents. AMOUXT OF BOUNTY UNDER THE SUBSTITUTE BILL. Treasury Department, Bureau of Navigation, WAsuiNiTON, D. C, December 10, 1890. Sir : Your request for an estimate of the abatement of bounties that would result from certain changes proposed in your (substitute) biU, as it was reported to the House has had due consideration. SAIL VESSELS. If sailing vessels shall receive but 20 cents a ton, in place of 30 cents as formerly calculated, the abatement would be one third, or 8380,784. Against this amount there is an increase from extending the former limit of 500 tons downward. This increase admits 181 vessels of an aggregate measurement of 63,350 tons. At 20 cents a ton, this increase would sum up to $164,710, leaving a net abatement of $216,074 for sail vessels. STEAMERS. If steamers below 11-knot speed receive but 20 cents a ton, instead of 30 cents, then, as it is unknown how many of them there are, and how much tonnage they would aggregate, I will assume this class con- 1 414 AMERICAN MARINE. stitutes 20 per cent, of the whole steam fleet in foreign trade. The abatement woukl be one third on this proportion, or on 6| per cent, of the whole amount formerly estimated, which would be $110,488. The extension of limit from 500 tons downward only includes four vessels of 1,842 tons aggregate ; these would increase the payment by $12,894, leaving an abatement so far of $97,594. Then, taking the steamers above 11-knot speed, it may be assumed that their rate would be fairly averaged at 13 knots. Indeed, this may be too high, but at this rate, paying 21 cents for 12 knots, 22 cents for 13 knots, and so on up to 30 cents per knot, the average of present fleet at 13 knots and 22 cents therefor would abate the por- tion of the former estimate, which would remain subject to this reduc- tion, 26.66 per cent. ; in other words, this part of the abatement would amount to $392,050. Adding the net abatement above ol: $97,594, we find a total of $489,644 for steam vessels. THE TOTAL ABATEMENT. Adding together the abatements for sail and steam, we find a total of $608,124. THE TOTAL OF BOUNTIES. As the former estimate was $2,728,004, for both sail and steam, the first year, deducting the above abatement we have a total payment of $2,109,880. This shows an average abatement of 22.37 per cent. THE PAYMENTS OF FOLLOWING TEAKS. From the foregoing calculations I think a general conclusion may be made, that the modifications proposed would abate the payments that I had estimated for the tonnage bill (as reported by your com- mittee and passed by the Senate) during the lifetime of the measure over 20 per cent., and perhaps 25 per cent. ; because it is doubtful if so great an abatement will leave encouragement enough to induce the measure of enlargement of the marine that was expected under a bounty of 30 cents a ton per 1,000 miles sailed. KATIO OF BOUNTY TO WHOLE COST OF TRANSPORTATION. As for the ratio of bounty to whole cost of transportation, my former estimate will have to be revised in the light of the modifications pro- posed. The whole cost of ship transportation includes the interest, insurance, and depreciation of the ship, besides the running expenses while loading, sailing, and discharging. Taking an average of voyages to Europe and to ports around the capes, I found the average ratio of bounty under the reported bill to TONNAGE BILL FOR ESTIMATES AND BOUNTIES. 415 whole cost of transportation was 12.38 per cent., for sallincj ships. Under the modifications proposed this ratio will shrink to 8.25 per cent. In the case of steamers running to ports in the West Indies and Mexico, I found the average ratio of bounty to whole cost of transpor- tation was 10.93 per cent. Under the changes proposed, there being twice as much sail as steam, this ratio would fall to about 8.16 per cent. For the entire marine under bounty and during the term of the bill when steam will be gaining on sail, an average ratio of 8 per cent, may be estimated as a fair approximation. In this connection it may be instructive to examine, in a practical way, how far the proposed bounty of 20 cents a ton (in place of 30) would go towards equalizing the footing of our sailing ships with those of foreign flags. There are now (or were on the 3d instant) in the harbor of San Francisco " under charter " and loading grain for Eu- rope, 27 ships of large tonnage. Of these 24 were foreign (20 being British, 3 German, and 1 Norwegian). Only three are American, so that foreign flags prevail in the ratio of 9 to 1. The average foreign ship has been thirty-five days in ])ort, the average American ship forty- eight days, or 37 ])er cent, longer time in waiting. The average rate of freight to the foreign ship is £2 0.>;. 5(Z., but the average rate to the American ship is only £1 16s. 2x1., a difference in favor of the foreign ship of 11.51 per cent. The German and Norwegian vessels have full as much advantage as the British. The American ships average a size of 1,878 tons and will carry 2,689.22 tons gross of grain. As their rate of freight is $8.82 per ton, the average earning of each for the carriage of a cargo will be $23,719. Foreign ships of same size getting 11.51 per cent, more freight money for the same load would receive S2,730 in excess of our ships. But there is one of our ships chartered by a British firm getting only £1 12s. 6f?. in contrast with British ships chartered by the same firm getting £2, a difference in favor of the British flag amounting to 24.6 per cent. The discrimination against our ships has often been much greater. (See my report, 1890, pages 99 to 104.) In view of this discrimination, existing to-day as for many years past, let us see how much bounty, as an offset, would be paid under the 20-cent provision of the bill now proposed on ships of 1,878 tons. The bounty would amount to $2,629, as against a discrimination of $2,730, so there would be a shortage of $101 on freight discrimination alone, and nothing for the longer time of waiting for charters and greater expense of running American vessels. This is exactly the situ- ation with the fleet loading grain at San PVancisco to-day : — Nine ships foreign to one American chartered and loading, and 416 AMERICAN MARINE. freights to American ships so discriminating as to drive them out of tlie trade, which is in the possession of foreign merchants, foreign underwriters, and foreign shipping. It must be evident, that our country is gaining nothing by having foi'eigners to transact our com- merce and transport our products ; but, rather, every interest of the country is being laid under contribution for the aliment of foreign nations. The condition of our foreign trade has not improved in years past, and never will improve until American ships shall be sustained by American spirit and American law. Very respectfully yours, Wm. W. Bates, Commissioner. Hon. John M. Farquhar, Chairman of Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Further and Final Estimate. After the opening of the debate upon the bill, the opposition set up that the cost of the measure would run up into the hundreds of millions, and again the Commissioner of Navigation was requested to state the pos- sible extent of the cost under conditions named : — Treasury Department, Bureau of Navigation, Washington, D. C, January 1, 1891. Sir, — Answering your request for an estimate of the " possible ex- tent " of the " rehabilitation " of our marine in foreign trade, in ten years to come, under the stimulus of the bill now on its passage, " in case a policy of Pan-American reciprocity of trade and transportation shall be inaugurated and carried out, and the Nicaragua Canal shall be finished in five years' time," I have the honor to submit the follow- ing tabular statement showing figures for each year of the ten for sail and steam : First. The eligible tonnage of first class — A 1 and A li ; Second. The ineligible tonnage of second and third class ; Third. The eligible tonnage losses, by casualties of all kinds and by falling from first to lower classes ; Fourth. The total losses of eligible tonnage ; Fifth. The total losses of ineligible tonnage ; Sixth. The eligible tonnage gains by building and by repairing. Seventh. The total eligible gains by building and repairing. Eighth. The annual amounts of bounty payments ; and Ninth. The footings of the different columns. TONNAGE BILL FOR ESTIMATES AND BOUNTIES. 417 ID Pj eg- (D 3 B o -5^ cooooooooooooooooooo oooooooo > 03 W > ►- to > o o )^ ^ ) to -^ > 00 o >o~o ; o o ) o o CO UM WCOU CO W *»cn 4-OT oo o'o'o'o Sail. — ,— ,.. *.C0C0tOI-»"-' l-' to to -^ --0 00 o tc -1 Ct i^ ^i^i-'J^i^ w --o o'o'o'o o oooooooo — — oooooo . tf^ 4^ 03 CO CO CO ' O O O 00 -J 35 5j-ajD^tOjt-j*-jt. 5 "bo to "o) to "^"o^ > o -xi W O ^ CO > to M a: 4^ rf^ -* Sail. ■*ooai4--^^*-i05cn** - oj-~i CO cojDj:;i^j;njt^ 3 *. 'o 1r. 00 'co o 'oo 'o cj - 4^ O CO X 10 -1 to ^J CO so^>t-to^">-H^o steam. c. 2 o s 3 o 2 2, oj 3 o a> 'co'o'o'cocnM^lolo'*' oito::5^cno^oi^o oooc;ioooooo to b3 to l-i i-i l-i "co ^ 'x "co ^ ^ "^ ~^ lo "ui ;S8ggs steam. ►-»i-*k-*totototototobO j^_p0_C»^H-'^tO^tO W *.jt^_jt. "cO "*" ^ ^ ~^ '» CO 'o "*h "cD OOOClCt — 'f-^OtOtO O00OOO00*»OOO "'o'j^'CPO'^'CJt'u5'co''oo"tO'V| i(i-~lK^054.4»2035e]l -joooocjitooocoo steam. ? Oi *-i J3 totococococococococo 00 o _o JO jo *- en ^o _p j-J "go w'o'oo CO bi'^'tol.o'co W to to to ri O 00 Vl W X O00OCJiO»*^OOO SaU. COCOtOtOtOt-i-'l->i-"i-i W — * 00 jUl t3 j^ ^ ^ *»■ 4* rf-lo Vs^to^ ci'ci'cn CO cociiJhc5*.co"-5i-'*- -looxcntoootoo steam. 1X3 =; 2 ^ ^ jJ5 55 JJi _C1 CI C.T 4* jf* ^ 'x ^ ':n 05 'o ^ CO ';£> 'cji Ot0 4-4»OCO-'0-XI^ to«o.^too— IXO-J Sxil. OOj-Jj:5C14^ W MbSJ-'J-' en OT "o '^1 CI 'o 'O '^ '.o'Ci 0-4»4»CT-JO — -^75 C5^ocn;;iiotocot0 4» Steam. o«5 a- '^ S. ? S'g, to to to "-■ tc to " 10 to to J3 to O -1 — ~ x 4. -] O ~o "o b 'c; r 'r '= r 'o'o o o o =• = — c o o o OOP o o o o o o o O i-" to CO CO to O O ^ CO j-1 en coj-3 ;n_p_p o j^jo ■o'o'o o'o'o'o'o'o'o oo oooooooo oooooooooo Siil. steam. 4» en C5 O ^ X • CO to to to o : ^. oxocnox4^Soo Sail. cocnOTr5toco— 'Cn — 4- -jooxcntooocoo steam. bototototototocococo 4- -a o CO X X en to ^ o >xocnox4»ooo Sail. i-i h^ to 4k 4- to -O O 35 CO joj»^_co_to C5 en^n ^ o5 "rfk ^ 'o "4k "to - 1 "en ^ 'en "eo coctenotocoH^en^Ok -aooxcntooocoo Steam. ^ a- H g ^ 2?^' o 3 M S.=-3 ^ 5' 8 I 8 XXXXXOOXO'OO o ^ to 4» en -1 o — o to "O t0"c5~O o"C5"c5~o"o"C5 O O O O O C OO O o o < SaU. O to O *. to to ^ CT JCT4k_eo 5"0O 'tO^ 1 to *.to j'o'o'o > o o o >oo© WhOJ-'J-'J- ??'w"Vj'"g'-! enojLnj^^oo 'to'o'o'cn''-' 8 o8oo Steam. CO H O H 2 418 AMERICAN MARINE. The total of all sizes of sailing vessels last year in the foreign trade was 720,431 tons ; of this the portion eligible for payments amounted to 356,000 tons, and the remainder of ineligible vessels to 364,431 tons. The total of steam was 197,630 tons, the eligible being 153,000 tons, and the ineligible for bounty-earning 44,630 tons. From the table it appears that the steam fleet might increase from 153,000 to 913,000 tons of first-class shipping, the greater part of it new, in ten years' time. Including the vessels of second and third classes, the aggregate steam tonnage would amount to 1,127,912, a gain of 572 per cent, in the period. With such a rate of gain in steam it could not be expected that the sail fleet would hold its own. Beginning the period with 356,000 and closing with 310,000 tons, the decline is nearly 13 per cent., but the old ships would be nearly replaced with new. Including second and third class tonnage, the sail fleet might increase slightly. There might be built 209,000 tons of sail and 1,009,000 tons of steam, or a total of 1,218,000 tons of shipping for the foreign trade in the course of the period. There might also be 75,915 tons of sail and 50,675 tons of steam, or a total of 126,590 tons repaired for mainte- nance of class in the same time. The total of building and repairing might amount to 1,344,590 tons in the period. So great an increase of building and repairing, especially of iron or steel steam tonnage, some of it of great power and speed, could not be accomplished by the yards and shops now engaged in the business, but many new ones would have to be started, and thousands of mechanics set at work to turn out the tonnage thus estimated for. At the open- ing of the Nicaragua Canal we should be prepared with steamers for a large increase of trade east and west through that channel. I have estimated for the building and repairing in 1896 of 142,000 tons. That is 104,000 tons more metal steam tonnage than was turned out for ocean service in the past year, when a good business was done. For the average year of the period I have estimated for the building of 106,000 tons of metal steamers, or nearly three times the launch of last year, which was mostly for coastwise trade. The steam tonnage of wood and metal built last year for all seagoing trades was only 61,000 tons, when our machine shops were busy. In the palmy days of the fifties the utmost amount of Atlantic-coast steam tonnage turned out was 95,000 tons in 1853. From these facts it may be judged that it would be impossible to turn out more steam tonnage than I have estimated in the table, even if we doubled the number of our yards and shops and trebled the num- ber of our mechanics in three years' time. It will be fortunate if we can do so much for our country's good. If we shall succeed in build- TONNAGE BILL AND ESTIMATES FOR BOUNTIES. 419 ing up our fleet of steam, and in rebuilding our sail marine to the ton- nage estimated, our absolute, though not our relative, standing on the sea before the war would be practically restored. If we had these fleets now we would cai-ry 35 per cent, of our foreign commerce, which has more than doubled in thirty years past. In making up this estimate I have drawn largely upon the possibili- ties of reciprocal trade with the Pan-American nations. In short, I have assumed that transportation as well as trade will be considered in forming the new relations which it is to be hoped will sooner or later be inaugurated. With many of our American neighbors we can better afford to give trade for ti-ansportation, than transportation for trade, as we have long been doing to Europeans, to the loss of our flag at sea. Respectfully yours, Wm. W. Bates, Commissioner. Hon. John M. Fakquhab, Chairman Committee on Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives. CHAPTER XXVI. TRANSPORTATION UNDER PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE. This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Hon. William Windom, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, whose last patriotic speech was made voluntarily, at the cost of his life, in support of protection to shipping. The occasion was the annual banquet of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, January 29, 1891. The Tonnage Bill was then pending in Congress. The honorable Secretary responded to the toast, "Our country's prosperity dependent upon its instruments of commerce." His remarks were con- lined to the two chief instrumentalities, transportation and money. In a few moments after their delivery, he fell from his chair, dead. On the subject of transportation, the good and wise Secre- tary said: — LAST WORDS OF WILLIAM WINDOM. Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Board of Trade and Transportation: Early association with the charter members of your board, and full sympathy with the objects and purposes of its organization, make this an occasion of peculiar interest to me. The country owes you a debt of gratitude for what you have done in the interests of better and cheaper transportation. Fifteen years ago, when your board was organized and entered ujion its work, our facilities for the interchange of commerce were quite inadequate, and freight charges were more than double what they are now. Improvements made by the trans- portation companies themselves have been very satisfactory, but, though much has been accomplished in the cheapening of rates, much more remains to be done. If I might be allowed to suggest, parenthetically, another very desirable improve- ment, it would be that more water be put into our harbors and canals, and less into our railroad stocks. TRANSPOR TA TION. 421 I am to speak briefly of the instruments of commerce in their relation to the wealth and prosperity of our country. The subject is very broad and my time very limited. I shall, therefore, confine my remarks to the two chief instrumental- ities of commerce, transportation and money. By the former commodities change places, and by the latter they change own- ers. Even as to these I must content myseK with the bare statement of a few facts and deductions. A nation's wealth and prosperity are usually in proportion to the extent and suc- cess of its commerce, and commerce itself is dependent upon the adequacy and adaptation of these two essential instruments. The history of all civilized countries attests the fact that the nation best equipped in these respects rapidly becomes the most powerfid, the richest, and the most prosperous. Domestic Commerce. Our own country is no exception to this rule. No nation has ever fostered more liberally or pro- tected more carefully its internal and coastwise trade than we have done, and the residtant magnitude and prosperity of our domestic commerce is, I believe, without a parallel in the his- tory of the world. For the accommodation and development of our home trade, we have built 45 per cent, of all the railroads of the world. We have more miles of railroad than all Eu- rope, Asia, and Africa combined. The floating tonnage of the United States engaged in coastwise commerce and on our lakes and rivers is very far in excess of that of any other nation. One or two comparisons will convey some idea of this stupen- dous commerce. The tonnage which passed through the Detroit River alone during the 234 days of navigation in 1889 exceeded by 2,468,127 tons the entire British and foreign ton- nage which entered and cleared at London and Liverpool that year in the foreign and coastwise trade. The freight which passed through the St. Mary's Falls Canal in 1890 exceeded by 2,257,876 tons the entire tonnage of all nations which passed through the Suez Canal in 1889. The freight carried on railroads of the United States in 1890 exceeded by over 36,000,000 tons the aggregate carried on all the railroads of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia in 1889. Commodities are interchanged among our own people with greater facility and at cheaper rates (distance being considered) than in any other country on earth. 422 AMERICAN MARINE. The increase of national wealth and prosperity, largely due to this system of protection to our home markets and domestic trade, and to the generous development of these instrumental- ities of commerce, has become the marvel of the world. Take a few comparisons, based upon the United States census of 1880, and upon figures furnished by Mr. Mulhall, the English statistician. In manufactures we exceeded Great Britain in 1880 by $1,579,570,191, France by 12,115,000,000, and Ger- many by '1)2,305,000,000. In products of agriculture we excelled Great Britain by $1,425,000,000, France by $625,- 000,000, and Germany by $925,000,000. Our earnings or income for 1880 from commerce, agriculture, mining, manu- factures, the carrying-trade, and banking, exceeded those of Great Britain from the same sources by $1,250,000,000, France by $2,395,000,000, and Germany by $2,775,000,000. Our increase of wealth from 1870 to 1880 as compared with that of other nations was: United States, $13,573,481,493; Great Britain, $3,250,000,000; France, $1,475,000,000; Ger- many, $3,625,000,000. In 1880 our home markets consumed about $10,000,000,000 worth of our own products, an amount equal to the entire accumulated wealth of Spain, three times the increase of wealth in Great Britain for ten years, and seven times the increase of France for the same period. Our home markets that year absorbed five times as much of our manufactured products as Great Britain exported of hers to all the markets of the world. Of course I do not claim that all this marvelous development of wealth is due to railroads and ships, but without them it would certainly have been impossible. But for these instru- mentalities of commerce, the rich farms of the west and south, and even of the Middle States, would have slumbered in pri- meval silence, and the myriads of shops and factories would never have existed. Were the ship and the railroad with- drawn, business would be paralyzed and desolation would reign supreme over more than half of our broad domain. Foreign Commerce. Contrast these grand results of our liberally developed domestic commerce, operating upon our protected industries, with the present shameful condition of our foreign carrying - trade, which has not only been sadly neglected, but sometimes treated with actual hostility by the TRANSP OR TA TION. 423 government. There was a time when we stood first among the nations in shipbuilding, and Great Britain alone excelled us in ocean tonnage. Once, 95 per cent, of our imports and 89 per cent, of our exports were carried in American bottoms, and our merchant marine became the boast of every citizen, and the envy of the world. Now, so far as foreign trade is concerned, our shipyards are comparatively silent, and our flag has almost disappeared from the high seas. The relative decline in our foreign shipping has been constant and alarming, until in 1889 only 12.25 per cent, of our imports and exports was carried in American bot- toms, being the smallest percentage in any year since the for- mation of the government. Time will not permit me to trace the rise and fall of this industry, or to point out in detail the causes which have resulted in our present humiliating and un- piofitable condition. Suffice it to say that the fault was not with the founders of our government. They fully appreciated the value and the necessity of a strong and healthy merchant marine, and left on record no doubt of their purpose to protect the interests of the republic, on the water as well as on the land. The second act passed by the First Congress — July 4, 1789 — provided for the protection of American shipping by the imposition of a discriminating duty in favor of teas brought in American vessels, thereby signalizing the first Fourth of July under the Constitution, by a declaration of commercial independence as a supplement to the declaration of political independence made thirteen years before. The third act of Congress, passed sixteen days later, imposed tonnage duties as follows : — American vessels per ton ...... 6 cents. American-built vessels belonging to foreigners per ton 30 cents. All other vessels, per ton . . . . . .50 cents. On September 1, the same year. Congress prohibited any but American vessels from carrying the American flag. By the tariff act of 1794 an additional discriminating duty of 10 per cent, was levied on all goods imported in vessels not of the United States. And In all changes of the tariff prior to the war of 1812 this discriminating duty of 10 per cent, was re- enacted. So great was the development of our shipbuilding 424 AMERICAN MARINE. and shipping interests under the fostering influence of these acts that we sold ships amounting to hundreds of thousands of tons to foreigners, and soon took front rank among maritime nations. Voicing the national pride, in 1825 Daniel Webster said, "We have a commerce which leaves no sea unexplored; navies which take no law from superior force." How like bitter irony these words would sound in 1891. The brilliancy of our achievements on the ocean begat overconfidence, and listening to the siren voice of free trade, we gradually yielded to the seductive phrase, "reciprocal liberty of commerce," which at that time became very popular, until, in 1828, Congress swept away all protection to our foreign shijjjjing interest, and oj^ened our ports to the ships of all nations on the same terms as to our own. So strong had our position become under the pro- tective policy of the first twenty-five years of national life that our merchant marine continued to be prosperous so long as wooden vessels wei^e the only vehicles of ocean commerce, and other nations refrained from heavy subsidies to their ships. But when wooden vessels began to be supplanted by iron steamers, and European governments poured their contribu- tions into the treasuries of their steamship companies, the de- cadence of American shipping began, and has continued ever since. How could it be otherwise? The American people ask no odds against any in the world. Give them an even chance, and they wuU distance all competitors ; but how can they be expected to compete unaided against foreign shipyards and shipowners, backed by the power and the treasuries of their governments? The amount which has been thus contributed to sweep our commerce from the seas cannot be accurately stated, but it is known to have reached hundreds of millions of dollars. The mischief and its cause are both apparent. What is the remedy? It cannot be found in the reenactment of the legis- lation of 1789, because treaties stand in the way, and it would not now be expedient even if there were no treaties on the sub- ject. In my judgment the remedy is plain and easily applied. If we would regain our lost prestige, reinstate our flag upon the ocean, and open the markets of the world to American producers, we must make the contest with the same weapons TRANSPORTATION. 425 which have proved so successful in the hands of our rivals. No nation can better afford this kind of contest than ourselves. Surely no object is of greater importance than the enlargement of our foreign markets, and nothing will contribute so much to that end as the command of direct and ample facilities for reaching them. The folly and the danger of depending upon our competitors for the means of reaching competitive markets cannot be expressed. Aid to our merchant marine is not aid to a class, but to the whole people, — to the farmer, the mer- chant, and the manufacturer, quite as much as to the ship- builder and the shipowner. Will Government Aid Pay f But it will cost money. Will it pay? Yes, a hundred-fold. The aggregate of our foreign carrying-trade for the last twenty -five years, while not more than one tenth our domestic trade, has, nevertheless, reached the enormous sum of $29,465,124,920. Estimating the cost of transportation at 10 per cent, of the value of the goods, we have an expenditure of about !$3, 000, 000, 000, at least 80 per cent, of which ($2,400,000,000) has been paid to foreign ship- owners. If we add to this $20,000,000 a year paid for passage money, we have a grand total of $2,900,000,000 paid to for- eign labor and capital during the last quarter of a century, a sum larger by nearly two hundred millions than the maximmn of our bonded debt growing out of the late war. Are not the benefits which would accrue from paying these sums to our own people worth saving? During that period we have exported of gold and silver, to pay balances of trade against us, an excess of $607,000,000 more than we have imported. Had we carried a fair share of our own foreign commerce in American ships, owned by American citizens and manned by American seamen, this vast sum, and much more, might have been retained at home to enrich our own people. Suppose that for twenty -five years we had given $5,000,000 a year in aid of our foreign shipping, and reduced by that amount the prepayments of our bonded debt, should we not have been far better off than we are now ? Is it not high time these vast interests received attention? Have we not tried the do-nothing policy long enough? Shall we give that protection and support to our foreign merchant marine that other nations give to theirs, and which ■l\i 426 AMERICAN MARINE. we freely give to all our other great Interests, or shall we accept as inevitable our present shameful position? I regret to say that the uniform record of indifference, if not actual hostility, during the last fifty years, affords little reason for encourage- ment. In fact, the tendency of late has been to surrender to foreigners even our domestic commerce, rather than to assert ourselves upon the ocean. Discriminations of the most aston- ishing character have been made, both by Congress and by treasury regidations, in favor of Canadian railroad lines and steamships against our own. One instance of this kind may serve to illustrate the nature and extent of many other discrim- inations of like character. Asiatic merchandise, destined for New York, if brought in American vessels to San Francisco, must undergo all the forms and delays of entry, under the strict scrutiny of customs offi- cers, and then be placed in cars heavily bonded, for transpor- tation through our own country to New York, while the same merchandise is brought in Canadian or British steamers to Vancouver, is transferred at once, and without any substantial surveillance to Canadian railways, which are not required to give bonds, but are permitted to pass our frontier and proceed to New York or other eastern ports unvexed by any of the dis- agreeable attentions of customs officers. The same discrimi- nation has existed for years in favor of European goods landed at Montreal and transferred to Canadian railroads for western American ports, against goods landed at New York, Boston, and other eastern ports, to be transported wholly through our own country to their western destination. The result of these unfair and unjust discriminations against our own people and our own transportation lines has been not only seriously to jeopardize the revenues, but also to build up foreign transpor- tation interests at the expense of our own. "Reciprocal liberty of commerce" is a high-sounding, seduc- tive phrase, but the kind of liberty our foreign shipping inter- est has enjoyed, for the last fifty years, is the liberty to die under unjust discriminations of the London Lloyd's Register Association, the crushing powers of European treasuries, and the utter neglect and indifference of our own government. Reciprocity itself is a most valuable thing, if kept within the lines of protection, but reciprocity by which we surrender our TRANSPOR TA TION. 427 merchant marine to our rivals, or give away a home market, worth ten times more to us than all the other markets of the world, in the vain attempt to grasp an uncertain market abroad, is a policy freighted with immeasurable disaster. Presidents of the United States have repeatedly expressed the national humiliation and appealed to Congress for action in behalf of our rapidly vanishing merchant marine, but thus far their words have fallen upon deaf ears. Let us hope that the urgent appeals of President Harrison on this subject may bear fruit in some well-devised measure of protection and encourage- ment. CHAPTER XXVII. METHODS OF PROTECTING SHIPPING. First Principles. In regard to our marine, three facts con- front us. First, our proportionate carriage in the foreign trade has been gradually decreasing for sixty-six years, in which time It has fallen from 92.3 to 12.45 per cent., making a loss of 79.85 per cent., upon the total ocean freightage of exports and imports. The loss, during four years of the war, was 37.5 per cent. Second, on this industry there has been so little protection, during this period, that, as a factor, it may be disregarded, and the fact recognized that free trade has been the ruling and ruinous condition. Third, a remedy is called for, and it must be protective of the interest, or it will do no Sfood. To make an intellio:ent choice of a remedial measure or system of expedients, we must know, first of all, ichat it is that protection must accomplish. According as this question is answered will we be right or wrong, and our legislation efficacious or ineffectual. As vessels are built for use, it seems a simple matter to answer rightly, that protection must secure, first, preference for work; second, such advantages as will make service con- stant and remunerative. This is all that is necessary, and nothing more is wanted. It ought to be easy to fill these con- ditions. In the first place, we have the work to be done. All that is requisite is to give employment to our own, instead of foreign vessels. If it be said we have not the work to be done, that the exporting and importing is, seven eighths of it, in the hands of aliens, it is true, nevertheless, that we may influence largely the business done in our own ports, and we should recover our commerce for the hands of our owai people. We have a proof of the correctness of this view of protection in the circumstances of the British marine. That has been protected for fifty -eight years by discriminative ship-inspection METHODS OF PROTECTING SHIPPING. 429 and classification ; and for thirty-eight years by discriminative underwriting on hulls and cargoes. One of these policies looks to inducing the preference for employment of British tonnage, and the other to renewal of engagements and higher freights. Protection hy Discriminating Duties. We have had an illustration of the working of these principles in our own his- tory. Discriminating duties on imports, while imposed, acted in foreign ports to induce the loading of our vessels in prefer- ence to foreign, unless the freights were made much less. During the forty-nine years of this protection and down to 1858, the proportionate carriage of imports exceeded that of exports in American vessels by an average difference of 6.86 per cent. That the protection given directly to our import car- riage helped our export indirectly, is proved by these facts : — Per cent. Average difference between import and export carriage for 41 years of protection, 1790 to 1830, included . . 4.85 Average difference between import and export carriage for 27 years of unprotection, 1831 to 1857, included . . 9.92 Thus, protection by discriminative duties, being correct in principle, could not help proving effective in practice. The British have supplied their place with what is really better for them, as they have but few duties, — their inspection and un- derwriting policies. Protection by Evport Bounties. The opposite of discrimi- nating duties would be bounties paid on the shipment of ex- ports. It would take but a small percentage upon the value of merchandise sent abroad to induce its shipment by Ameri- can vessels. The bounty should be paid to the shippers, whence it would find its way to the producers. It need be no greater than the premium rate of insurance in any case, and for the greater part of our trade might average only one per cent. It should be equivalent to free insurance on cargoes in Ameri- can vessels. Before it can be applied, however, we must repeal a few foolish acts, and abrogate certain disadvantageous treaties. Take, for instance, the act of March 3, 1815, passed for the purpose of stripping off, by treaty of July 8, 1815, our shipping protection against the British, between their Euro- pean territories and the United States. 430 AMERICAN MARINE. By this convention the following points were yielded : — (1) No higher or other duties on productions of each country than on those of other foreign countries. (2) No higher or other tonnage duties or port charges on British than American vessels. (3) The same duties on productions of each country imported by American or British ships. (4) The same duties and bounties on productions of each country exported, whether in American or British vessels. (5) Where drawbacks are allowed upon the reexportation of goods they shall be the same, whether by British or Ameri- can vessels. Article (2) has never been observed by the British. Our vessels have to pay "light dues" in some of their ports, while their vessels pay none in any of ours. This treaty, while in force, inhibits us from paying export bounties on products to Great Britain, unless in British as well as American vessels. It was negotiated by John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and Albert Gallatin, all three of them politicians, pure and simple, without a particle of interest in the American marine. The ratification of this treaty was a virtual surrender of the independence of the United States. Great Britain needs no other document to secure her ascen- dency in North America. By the "favored nation" clause, which it contains, we have compromised our independence with other powers. As now we need again to protect our shipping, this treaty prevents so doing by discriminating duties, and it is equally out of the question by export bounties, while the acts upon which it was founded stand unrepealed. That we cannot, if we choose, pay planters a bounty on cotton, or farmers on wheat, raised and shipped to Europe in American vessels, may strike our people as an abridgment of liberty, if not a surren- der of freedom. The British made the treaty of 1815 for the benefit of British hottoms, and our government also made it for the benefit of British bottoms, so for that purpose it is well made. For American vessels, there is no benefit in it, while, for British vessels, it is to-day a good defense against our com- petition. It prevents our adoption of two direct and advan- tageous methods of setting up a protected rivalry. While it may be possible to find some inferior powers to whose ports we METHODS OF PROTECTING SHIPPING. 431 might pay export bounties in order to help our vessels to em- ployment, the British shackles on our legislators should be broken and cast aside forthwith. The Carriage of Free and Reciprocity Goods. Another remedy, correct in principle, would be the carriage of "free" and "reciprocity" goods in American vessels. On this line, Senator Aldrich, of Rhode Island, in 1886, made a most useful motion, which was to secure agreements with sugar -producing countries for importing free of duty sugar and molasses under the flags of those countries and our own. The following reso- lution was introduced by him : — " Resolved, by the Senate of the United States (the House of Repre- sentatives concurring), that the President is requested to enter upon negotiations with the governments of the several principal sugar-pro- ducing countries of the world, with a view of securing mutual agree- ments by which the United States shall agree to admit at its ports, free of duty, sugar and molasses, the produce of such countries or their colonies, when transported in vessels under the flag of either of the contracting pai'ties, and upon wliich no export tax or other export charges shall have been levied, upon the condition that such govern- ments shall agree to admit into their respective countries or other sugar-producing colonies, free of duties, the agricultural, mineral, and manufactured products of the United States." This was a statesmanlike scheme, because it provided for the freighting of our vessels, equally with the working of our mines, our factories, and farms. Three years later came Mr. Blaine's plan of "tariff reciprocity^" looking up a market for the products of the land, but thinking and doing nothing for the freightage of the sea. There is no apparent reason why vessels had to be neglected in the reciprocity scheme. It may not be too late, yet, to give shipping a share in the benefits of reciprocity, if Senator Aldrich 's resolution be passed. It would certainly be permissible to provide that, besides admit- ting sugar, coffee, and hides free, we will reciprocate in remit- ting tonnage dues for vessels of the treaty powers carrying reciprocity goods. However, as tonnage dues are a small thing and Congress may abolish them, the reciprocity law should be amended so that treaty goods shall derive benefit only when carried in vessels belonging to the reciprocating powers. For many years past, the policy of the government has aimed 432 AMERICAN MARINE. to reduce the "war" revenue by increasing the "free list." This list now embraces 55 per cent, of all our importations. When we consider that, in respect to many articles, freedom from duty might, as well as not, be conditioned on the carriage of American vessels, to the exclusion of foreign ; and that this advantage has not been turned to profit, we must confess to a painful appreciation of the liberality of the Yankee mind, or be convinced that it has lost its skiU and courage in legislative matters. Free trade undoubtedly increases importations, while we are able to pay for goods, but there can be no reason why striking the "fetters " from commerce should not be conditioned on giving our own people trro advantages in place of one. We are not wise in supposing that an increase of import business now gives proportionately increased employment to American tonnage. In our history, it has not done so for sixty years past. In 1846 there was a striking instance of the advantage that a reduction of our tariff gives to foreign vessels. The tariff was much reduced and importations largely increased. Did the enlargement of business benefit American shipping? Scarcely at all, but it more than doubled the work of foreign vessels. We are having a like experience now. The increased import of sugar is nearly all of it for the benefit of foreign fleets, whereas the sugar, coffee, and tea trades should have been made truly and greatly to aid in the restoration of our flag to the sea. IIoiv Subsidies, Subventions, and Bounties Act. Subsi- dies, subventions, and bounties do not secure, directly, the use or employment of vessels. Their action is indirect and through competition. Their receipt enables a vessel to bid lower for freights, and in this way, to secure engagements. But there is nothing certain in a competitive bid. Owners, agents, and brokers of vessels do not, if they can avoid it, bid against each other like a company at an auction, but a market price is agreed on, and then the engagements go by preference. Va- rious considerations may rule the choice at the same figures for freight. It is the power of competition that is conferred by government aid. The preference must still be secured. While that may be done through a lower rate, there is not a certainty of it. Discriminating duties or export bounties would operate immediately on the preference, at market rates, while subsidy, METHODS OF PROTECTING SHIPPING. 433 subvention, or bounty protection must look to cutting the market rates ; and, even then, may not always succeed. It is therefore evident that the action of Treasury aid tends strongly to the reduction of freights, the world over; although the percentage of aid received that can be applied to the reduc- tion may not be large. As a general thing, constant employ- ment and quick dispatch are more important than high rates of freight, on loads that must be awaited. At San Francisco, it is said to cost 25 cents per ton per month to wait for car- goes. It is about the same in other ports. Vessels under subsidies, subventions, and bounties generally avoid idleness, and manage to get freights. The portion of the world's tonnage in active employment, now under protection of some kind, — subsidies, subventions, bounties, or underwriter's favor, — is very large — not less than one half. It may well be comprehended that this circumstance has very much to do with the cheapening of freights. It is also easily understood that the flags and fleets under this pro- tection will keep the sea when all others have ceased to fly and to float. Protection hy Shiphmhlinrj Premiums. Of the more indi- rect and less effective methods of ship protection, shipbuilding premiums may be classed first. In 1870 the so-called "Lynch Connnittee," after a course of hearings, reported a bill to the House containing the following features : — (1) A drawback of duties on materials imported and used in the building, engineering, rigging, or equipping of vessels, not exceeding on wooden sail vessels >?8 per ton ; on iron, $12 ; on composite, $10; on wood steamers, $10; on composite, |12; and on iron, $15. (2) Where American material was used in the construction of iron or composite vessels or steamers, sums equivalent to the duties, if imported, were to be paid. (This treated wooden sail and steam with disfavor.) (3) Sail or steam vessels engaged more than six months in the year to receive, every sail vessel, $1.50 per ton; steamers running to British provinces, $1.50; to European ports, $4; and to other foreign ports, $3. These provisions, framed on a wrong principle, for a wounder were not enacted. In the first place, shipbuilders 434 AMERICAN MARINE. have all the protection that is required, and they have it in the right way, — their job is secured. No aid from the govern- ment is necessary, and none should be asked or given for the construction of steamers or other vessels. The French, Span- ish, and Italians have made this mistake, and we must not follow it. First, because there is no real weight in the argu- ment for cheap vessels; second, because all the difficulty encountered is in running, and not in building; third, because the problem is not the reduction of prices for building, but the getting of employment and remunerative freights while in the owner's hands. Protection is not given to the building, but to the products of factories; nor upon the purchase, but the produce of farms, and it should be the same with vessels. Freights and fares are the productions of ships. It is for these that our rivals contend. Help in this contention, strife, and warfare must therefore be the purpose of a wise protection. The paying of premiums u])on tonnage engaged in the for- eign trade was really the only feature in the Lynch Committee plan that had any practical point. It would have worked fairly well, though the payments were scant and wide apart. But there was equity in the design. Vessels of all sizes and kinds were included in the protection to be given. Congress, how- ever, resorted to the imperial j)lan of subsidizing a few steam lines, and in a few years withdrew even that little of ship pro- tection. In 1876 Senator Boutwell renewed the Lynch plan, but it was not adopted. Mr. Blaine's Partially Protective Plan. In 1879 Hon. James G. Blaine proposed to the Chamber of Commerce of New York the following plan : — "I would abandon all idea of granting subsidy to special lines as they apply to Congress for aid. That policy, however just and meritorious, will always be rendered abortive by jeal- ousy, and by scandal, either actual or imputed. I would pre- fer a general law that should ignore individuals and enforce a policy. For instance, enact that any man or company of men that will build, in an American yard, with American mate- rials, by American mechanics, a steamship of 3,000 tons, and sail her from any port of the United States to any foreign port, he or they shall receive for a monthly line a mail allow- ance of '125 per mile per annum, for the sailing distance be- METHODS OF PROTECTING SHIPPING. 435 tween the two ports; for a semi-monthly line, ^HS per mile; for a weekly line, i75 per mile. Should the steamer exceed 3,000 tons, a small advance on these rates might be allowed; if less than 3,000 tons, a corresponding reduction; keeping 3,000 tons as the average and the standard. Provide that the steamships shall be thoroughly inspected by a competent com- mission under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Postmaster-General, and thus insure the very first class of construction for safety and for speed, both for passengers and cargo." Of course, only the outlines of this plan can be criticised. It looks only to steam navigation, and to the postal service, but the mileage feature in it was correct. What mainly is wrong is the theory of partial protection, and the idea of subor- dinating the business of shipowning to the carriage of mails. The rule should be the other way. In all our subsidy legisla- tion the mistake has been made of requiring the Postmaster- General, where Congress has omitted it, to prescribe the size and s])eed of vessel, the number of trips per year, and other particulars of service that belong to the shipowner to deter- mine. It is perfectly absurd thus to make the Postmaster- General the manager-in-chief of the steam marine of the United States. In all our history, we have never had a Postmaster- General qualified for such a responsibility.^ The mail and its carriage are things too small and inconse- quential to control the designing and building of a nation's marine. It takes the knowledge and experience of years of business, and an understanding of the traffic needed between any two or more ports, to enable the brightest minds to adapt and plan successful vessels for the making of money. Mail subsidy protection might easily be so crude and stiff in its pro- visions as to wholly defeat its purpose. It should therefore play a subordinate part. The leading part is for the owners to fill and well perform. Regulation of Triangular Trade. A simple and effective means of securing freights for American vessels in foreign ports woidd be found in the regulation of the "triangular trade." In other words, the present practice of admitting vessels of all ^ Once, the Post Office Department planned for steamers to deliver mails at a city several miles inland, 3,000 feet above the sea. 436 AMERICAN MARINE. flags, with cargoes from all countries of the world, should be modified by law, so as to admit vessels from other countries than their own in ballast only. This would do away with British, French, and German ships bringing cargoes from China, Brazil, or Mexico. It would prevent our vessels, if applied to them in return, from carrying cargoes from China, Brazil, or Mexico to British, French, or German ports, but we have now no trade of this kind, while the flags mentioned, with others, are taking away all our foreign trade. Our marine is sinking in a maelstrom of reciprocation that does not recipro- cate. Our reciprocal rights have been rendered worthless, in large measure, by the protection now so generally given by foreign nations, who should have been content to confine it to direct traflic. For instance, if Spain subsidizes a line of steam- ers to run between the countries of South and Central America or Mexico and the United States, we should compel her ships to arrive in ballast. When France and Italy pay a bounty on the running of ships, they should arrive in ballast, from all ports not under their respective flags. And so for other nations. In this proposition, in its broadest application, there is no- thing unfair or unjust, and nothing that our own shipping would suffer from. When the "tonnage bill" was framed (as may be seen in Chapter XXV.), its application was confined to "vessels plying between the ports of the United States and foreign ports." It was not proposed to transgress the princi- ple now laid down, that indirect trades are not rightfully the subject of third party protection, or even of enjoyment. It is not a matter of right, but of privilege only, that a British ship may bring a cargo from Brazil to the United States. The right lies with vessels of the Brazilian and American flags. That Norwegian vessels shall monopolize our West India fruit trade is only a privilege that we are foolish to grant, — for the mere delight of pleasing Norway. It is believed we have no treaties that, rightly interpreted, stand in the way of enacting a measure for the regulation of triangular trade. They are all based, at least theoretically, on the principle of reciprocal advantage, each nation to receive an equivalent from the other. It is therefore just and expedient, when this principle no longer rules, because new and changed METHODS OF PROTECTING SHIPPING. 437 conditions have supervened, that such treaties, if any exist, be abrogated by Congress, and such other measures substituted therefor as will properly protect the interests of the United States. Free Pilotage. There is a small benefit that might be con- ferred, so long as tonnage taxes are collected from vessels in foreign trade. The government might pay their pilotage bills, in and out of American ports. Taking the fleet in the foreign trade, as a whole, the receipts from tonnage dues and the ex- penditure for pilotage would, it is believed, pretty nearly bal- ance. A System Keeded. Finally, it is not a single measure of protection, but a well-considered system, that is needed to nour- ish the growth and insure the prosperity of an American marine. While the friends of this interest have faith in the wisdom of Congress, they feel that the speediest tonic and re- storative would be the tonnage bill (Chajiter XXV.). Other measures, in substitution or modification of it, might follow, until a permanent system, without cost to the treasury, shall have been worked out and finally established. It is as true of the shipping interest as of other industries needing defense from foreign competition, — "when there is a will there is a way." It lies with the American people to have an American marine, or to depend on rivals and enemies for shipping which shall do their foreign trade. There are ways enough, and the best method will reveal itself, if we but put our heads to work with resolution, and keep our hearts true to our patriotic purpose, — the American ship for American trade., — in the interest, the safety, and the honor of the people of the United States. APPENDIX. THE LOAD-LINE PROBLEM. It is a fundamental of the building art that the structure should be planned for the load. Not only must a work have strength for the uses intended, but its sendee must be limited to its competency, if we would preserve its strength and extend its life. (1) To every member of a structure a margin or reserve of power must be given, that it may endure the stresses and survive the strains of use. Tlie builder or engineer, knowing the strength of his niaterials and tlie stoutness of their combination, is guided by experience and judgment in fixing the factor of safety. Ships are not exceptions to the general laws of mechanism. They must possess all the qualities of structures necessary on the land, and, in addition, those peculiar to the sea. Their foundation nuist l>e contained within themselves. The fluid in which they float is in constant motion. Their stresses are ever varying, even in the smoothest sea. Built for carrying loads upon this fluctuating sup- port, a ship may be rolled, pitched, and twisted with every wave, sometimes with regularity, at other times with frightful caprice and furious energy. The greater the load, the more needful the strength and the more imminent the danger in mounting the sea and then plunging into its depth; in dashing from side to side, or sweeping the decks with water. If any work of man requires pro- portioning to its load and its exigencies, it is the freighting ship. Her factor of safety nuist indeed be high. Her builder must study her structural needs, and provide in her fabric for all emergencies. (2) But there is another principle than strength on which the safety of vessels depends at sea. A ship is not only a structure, but a float; not only a machine, but a carrier. Under sail or steam at sea she must possess a power that the waves cannot overcome while her strength shall last. This quality is buoyancy, — specific lightness of body. By its power, when nearly buried in the seeth- ing sea, ships rise to the surface again ; but once under the waves without its presence would disappear forever. It is upon this buoy- ant power that carriage depends, but safety at sea requires that cargo shall not consume it all. 440 APPENDIX. In a harbor or smooth water the least possible lightness will float a vessel in a state of rest. She may there be loaded to the very- verge of her sides, only that the water be refused entrance ; or, if decked, she may be laden ''deck to," and still float. If the deck has the usual sheer, she may be loaded until the water flows over it, except at bow and stern, and she will still swim and keep her bottom. But let the wind arise and the sea make, and the neces- sity will soon appear for a limit to the deep-load draft, and the presence of freeboard in the sides, even in a sheltered roadstead. With the creation of motion in the sea and in the vessel a demand for wave buoyancy will spring up, and it must be supplied, or the overloaded craft will be deck-swept, foundered, or sunk. To be navigable, it is not enough that vessels shall be able to float ; but they must have freeboard and consequent wave buoyancy, or be unseaworthy hulks. Navigable vessels must carry their decks above the water proportionably to their immersion below it. Ex- perience has determined this necessity. When the sea grows high and sharp by the violence of the wind, it rises upon the sides and ends of a vessel and mounts the decks if possible. The vessel, having acquired wave-like motions, rises and falls into the sea with more or less momentum, first one end and then the other, or one side and then the other. Even the centre of gravity itself is often obliged to rise and fall, thus increasing the submersion and redu- cing the freeboard while the water is disturbed and waves prevail. The load-line that the owner sees in port is one line, but the load- line that the crew sees at sea in a gale of wind is another, and a deeper line, often in dangerous proximity to the decks of freight- ing vessels. Illustrations of the efEect of overloading are numerous. One that has got into the books runs thus : The o^vner of a coal ship in the trade between Cardiff and Rouen paid the master by the quantity of coals he delivered. At first, this ship was driven to perform three voyages to two of other vessels. Then the master began experimenting in deep loading; each succeeding voyage he immersed the sides three inches deeper than before. Finally the ship sailed, and has never been heard from since. On the other hand, cases of saving vessels from the consequences of overloading by jettison, or throwing a portion of cargo overboard, have been common enough to teach experienced mariners the necessity of freeboard, and the limits to loading deeply. (3) Ever since cargo vessels have been built, shipbuilders have known they must have strength for the greatest load, and freeboard for the heaviest sea. Mariners have known that "weak " and leak- ing, "unsound " and sinking, "overloaded " and foundering, are causes and effects. Underwriters and owners also know that the "dangers of the seas " await all vessels out of condition, or loaded A PPENDIX. 441 beyond their powers of strength and buoyancy, yet thousands of lives and millions of property are annually swallowed up for the want of safe rules and their observance for loading vessels. It should be the business of statesmen to learn these things, and of government to provide the means of safety. THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEBOARD RULES. (1) Waves are excited by the force of the wind in passing over the sea. By pressure and friction on the surface, the motion of the wind is in part communicated to the water. The latter oscil- lates and forms in waves, their amplitude depending on different causes. Matter of any kind put into motion acquires momentum and develops power. The power of waves is manifested in their velo- city and amplitude. The towering height and enormous breadth of ocean waves prove their power is immeasurable. A vessel floating in waves must be subject to their impulse and recoil. She must receive their motion and yield to their move- ments, which she may hinder, but not obstruct, unless at her peril. No materials, nor any combination of them, can withstand sea- labor; the only safety is in evading it. The motion in a wave approaching a ship cannot pass through her, wholly, without effect- ing her destruction. If she shall survive, it must pass under, around, or over her, and will be sure to take the shortest and easi- est course. For the wave motion to pass under the vessel she must be lifted, and that in the same time. If too deep in the water or too narrow at the surface to be lifted in the time of the wave, and the topside is too low to keep off the unbalanced crest, then it will break upon the deck, and make a trial of the vessel's strength and buoyancy. The principal danger from waves inheres in their rate of motion and the interception of their movements by the immersed body of a vessel. The overloaded ship has been likened to a half-tide rock, over which the sea mvist break because the rock cannot rise. When a ship cannot rise in time, it is because her reserve buoyancy is not sufficient to give her ample lightness when the sea mounts up around her. Her want of life is caused by deficient freeboard, and, in proportion to her deadness, the seas will beat upon her sides and deck. Wave-beating destroys mechanism, and an overloaded vessel may fail at any moment to endure the violence imposed upon her. It is thus that overloading completely disqualifies a vessel to face the ocean in a storm. (2) Vessels, then, require freeboard on account of their load- depth in the water. The farther down the bottom goes the higher up the side should rise. This is necessary for two reasons : first, 442 APPENDIX. to obtain the strength to carry the load over an undulating sea; second, to provide the buoyancy to prevent that sea from breaking upon the deck, perhaps forcing the hatches or breaking the beams, and loading the vessel with tons of water; but in any event taxing her strength, using up her buoyancy, and sapping her life. If she shall spring aleak, as she may do, at such a moment of danger, where will her safety be found, with deck flooded or swept, men at the pumps or washed overboard, and water gaining in the hold? Verily, vessels do need freeboard, and this should be provided in loading by proper rules. As a general proposition, derivable from experience in navigation, it may be laid down that the freeboard first assumes a sensible pro- portion to depth of immersion at about 6 feet draft, provided the length is moderate. Decked craft of less than 6 feet draft of water, unless of faulty dimensions and form, oppose so little hin- drance to the free motion of unbroken waves that their degree of freeboard is as much a question of convenience as safety. Under (5 feet draft the different sizes of craft may load to nearly the same freeboard line. Above 6 feet draft, vessels begin to have depth and weight capable of exciting labor of more or less severity at sea, first, as the model may be adapted to intercept the waves or per- mit them to pass freely ; second, in proportion as the draft of water increases; and third, as the burden assumes the character of a load. (3) But vessels in wave-water are found to require freeboard for lightness on account of their length as well as depth. All experi- ence proves this to be the case. Surf-boats have to be built shal- low, wide, and short, so as to engage but one sea at a time. Long ships loaded as deeply as short ones cannot rise so quickly at the ends, and must, therefore, be wetter and more dangerous. As they will not rise so quickly, they will not mount so high, and will con- sequently offer a longer resistance to the motion of the sea. The need of greater buoyancy stored in the topsides and beneath the upper-decks of long vessels accords with the requirement of more strength than is necessary in short ones. There is, therefore, a twofold reason for giving the long ship more side out of water than a short one. The necessity for increased freeboard, on account of overlength, first becomes apparent in well-formed vessels at the limit of ten depths for the length. This proportion bears a likeness to that established by the force of wave - propagation to the height and length of waves of the second order. There are no exact observa- tions by which it can be established that the standard seaworthy proportion of length to depth should be greater than eight depths for the length ; but experience in navigation will bear out the limit- ing ratio of ten to one with ample proof. APPENDIX. 443 (4) Again, the freeboard requisite on account of depth and length may be modified by the vessel's breadth. The advantage of a broad bottom over a narrow one of same depth is that the former will not be carried by momentum so deeply into the water, and, therefore, will have more time to rise. She will also lift more weight with the same freeboard immersion, ship less water in consequence, and be safer at all times. The wide vessel may therefore have less side out of water, though perhaps no less of buoyancy in reserve, than a sharp bottomed or narrow one. As near as can be judged by experience in navigating vessels of different proportions of breadth to depth, the influence of breadth begins to be favorably felt when it has reached the proportion of two to one.^ In the average vessel, it is at about this point that breadth commences sensibly to increase the stability, and stableness is of itself a quality which largely enables a vessel to keep her deck above the waves. Of late vessels have been built with topsides and deck formed into one curved surface, no bulwarks being erected, the design being not to obstruct the waves, but to allow them to run over the hull. Alexander McDougall, of Duluth, has built many such vessels for the business of the Great Lakes, and some for ocean trade, and general success attends the new model. It is found that by its adoption the mininmm of freeboard or buoyancy reserve may be given to freighting vessels. But these vessels in gales of wind must be handled from decks or towers built above the reach of the sea, which may be done with safety, since the sea, being unobstructed by topsides and bulwarks, rises but little above the hull and soon returns to place. OF FREEBOARD RULES. Rules for load limitation, to be useful, must be of easy and gen- eral application. Regard must be had to the nature of the naviga- tion, the length of voyages, the proportions and propulsion of vessels, and the seasons of the year. The principles of water pressure and wave motion must be applied. Not only after vessels are built, but when they are designed is it necessary to fix the loading limit. Without the knowledge of the load-line height there can be no per- fect design of a cargo ship, nor a scheme of proportions for building her worthy the guidance of a mechanic. Tlie rules in any system of vessel classification should be framed to govern construction with reference to their carrying, in safety, the burdens which they may bear at the designated line of flotation. The principles are simple. First. The load is in proportion to the draft of water, and so must be the strength to carry it. * That is, when the draft without keel included is equal to the half- breadth. 444 APPENDIX. Second. The hindrance of wave oscillation is in proportion to the load and its depth. Third. The load diminishes the vessel's time of oscillation and makes her sluggish in the ratio of the square root of load. The square root is, therefore, a freeboard factor. Fourth. The dangers of waves, depending upon their velocity and height, are increased in the ratios of the squares. The squares of numbers are also factors in the rules to be applied. Fifth. The waves of the sea often prevail in cross directions, so that on every course the vessel is likely to retard the free transmis- sion of motion with more or less constancy. At longer or shorter intervals this retardation will be violently resented. The height to which the obstruction, now at its maximum, will force \he crest of the sea, and tend to precipitate it on board, will depend upon the velocity of projection derived from the load depth, the sluggishness of the vessel, and the velocity of wave oscillation. The latter may be doubled from a fresh breeze to a strong wind ; trebled from a strong wind to a gale, and so on ; and is in proportion to the square root of wave amplitude at all times. (1) As a vessel's side most intercepts the motion of a wave and generally first meets the danger in its effort to overturn or swamp the vessel, the underwater body receiving the impulse and the top- side keeping off the crest, the depth of the side from the deck must form the first element of a freeboard calculation. For average pur- poses this depth may be taken from the gunwale or deck to the middle of the turn of the bilge at midship. (Taken in the reverse way this factor is called a height.) (2) Beyond the limiting proportion of ten depths of hull for the length, taken from the bottom of the deck to the level of garboard strake (outside), any excess must be treated as overlength of vessel, for which freeboard must be allowed in direct ratio and added to the measure for depth. For very long vessels, in certain states of the sea, this allowance would be too small, on account of the in- creased liability to ship seas over the head and stern ; but up to fourteen depths on the Lakes, and twelve depths for length on the Atlantic, the rule will accord with experience. Ocean vessels under ten and over eight depths in length should have allowance for under- length. Such vessels are few in number. (3) When the breadth exceeds the proportion of two depths or heights of side the difference becomes overbreadth, which should be allowed to decrease the freeboard in a ratio corresponding to its square root. (4) For the purpose of calculating freeboards for different sea- sons of the year, it will be convenient to frame the rules to take a certain percentage of an ascertained mmiber for winter, summer, or other conditions of navigation. APPENDIX. 445 (5) As great sheer to the deck unduly deepens the hold forward and aft for cargo, at the same time loading the vessel with herself at the ends, making her sluggish to rise, while decreasing the pro- portionate depth and strength amidshiij, thus doubly unfitting for a maximum load, the advantage of sheer is not considered to extend farther than the premise that the extremities will have sufficient freeboard with the sheer at the stem of seven tenths, and at the stern of three eighths, of the cube root of register length. FREE-BOARD RULES. A BILL TO INCREASE THE SAFETY OF LIFE AND PROPERTY ON SHIPS AT SEA BY ESTABLISHING RULES FOR FREE-BOARD OR LOAD MARKS. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That all vessels above .one hundred tons measuiement duly registered, enrolled, or licensed, engaged in ocean or coasting trade and transportation, shall be inspected, measured, and marked for free board by a sur- veyor of tonnage in the port where documented, anchored, or moored ; the said free board to be set off below the line of the deck, as hereinafter provided, in order that there shall be reserved for each vessel a sufficient margin of strength and a safe seagoing proportion of buoyancy, at the maximum load draft, in salt water. Sec. 2. That the words "free board" shall denote the height of the side of a loaded vessel above the water line at the lowest point of sheer near the middle of her length, measured to the top of the beam at the side ; or, in cases where a water-way is fitted, to the curved line of the top of the beam continued through to the side. In vessels with more than one deck, the one that strengthens the top of the hull, and is able to bear the shipment of seas, and has facil- ities for the speedy discharge of water, shall be considered the true free-board deck, whether it be the uppermost or the one next below. So-called "upper," "spar," or "hurricane" decks filling these con- ditions shall be taken for free-board decks from which to measure and fix the free-board or load marks. So-called "promenade" or "awning decks " are not to be taken for free-board decks, but in their cases the second or "main " deck is to be so regarded and measured from. The free board may be found by either of the methods, fii'st or second, as an oAvner may prefer, but in case of using the second method the vessel must be on the stocks or in dry dock, where the level of the bilge point may be correctly deter- mined. Sec. 3. That in taking dimensions for free-board computations or tables, in all cases the length shall be measured on the load line (approximate) from the fore side of the stem to the aft side of the sternpost in sailing vessels, and to the aft side of the after post in 446 APPENDIX. steamers; the breadth shall he taken from outside planking or plat- ing, as for the register dimension ; the depth used in expressing the proportionate length of all vessels and in computing the free board by the first method shall be the perpendicular depth, taken from the top of the upper-deck beam outside, at the lowest point of sheer near the middle of the length of the vessel to the level of the top of the keel, or the seat of frame, except in awning-deck vessels, in which the depth shall be measured from the top of the main-deck beam to the same points. The depth used in computing the free board by the second method shall be taken from the beam as above, but instead of extending to the keel it shall reach only to the level of a point in the outside of bilge from which a diagonal line may be thence drawn to bisect the right angle formed by a perpendicular to the side with a horizontal line touching the outside of bottom at the garboard strake, thus permitting the dead rise and curve of bilge to vary the free board to some extent. But this method shall not be used in cases where the angle of rise from the keel to the point in the bilge exceeds twelve degrees. In all cases the free board is to be set down from the point from which the depth was taken. Sec. 4. That the rules are framed for flush-deck vessels of stand- ard proportions ; first, of ten times the depth for length in sail vessels and twelve times the depth for length in steam vessels ; second, of twice the draft (without keel) for breadth ; and third, with a sheer at the stem of seven tenths, and at the stern of three eighths of the cube root of length. It has been assumed that with these proportions the strength, stability, and buoyancy will be suffi- cient to insure safety, with the free board fixed by the rules and tables, when the vessel is laden with homogeneous cargo. For ves- sels of less relative breadth than twice the draft (without keel) the free board should be increased to provide a sufficient range of stabil- ity. For vessels whose length, breadth, or sheer is greater or less than the standard above described, the free board shall be increased or diminished proportionably, as hereinafter specified. In cases of vessels built with sides crowned inward to meet and form a deck, dispensing with bulwarks, with intent that the sea may wash freely over the vessel, the free-board volume reserved shall be a portion of the whole displacement am])le for safety and suitable to the draft of water for vessels and barges towed by steamers, respectively, to be ascertained by admeasurement and calculation as hereinafter pre- scribed. Sec. 5. That the free boards for different classes of vessels shall be computed by the following i-ules : APPENDIX. 447 Rule I. I A. For the winter season (October to March, inclusive), for first- class seagoing steam or sail vessels built of metal, wood, or compos- ite materials, not having spar or awning decks, multiply the square root of the depth by the depth in feet, taken from beam to keel, and of the product take fifty per centum for the free board in inches. B. For the winter season, for vessels as described in Clause A, crossing the Atlantic Ocean between ports north of Capes Hatteras and Finisterre, take fifty-three per centum of the product of the depth into its square root for the free board in inches. C. For the summer season (April to September, inclusive), for vessels as described in Clause A, take forty-nine per centum of the product of the dejjth into its square root for the free board in inches. D. For the summer season, for steam vessels, as described in Clause A, on voyages between Atlantic or Gulf ports and ports or places in Mexico, the West Indies, Central and South America to the River Plate, and between all ports and places on the Pacific Ocean from fifty degrees of nortli latitude to forty degrees of south latitude, take foity-seven per centum of the product of the depth into its square root for the free board in inches. Rule II. A. For the winter season (October to March, inclusive), for first-class seagoing steam or sail vessels built of metal, wood, or composite materials, not having spar or awning decks, and as de- scribed in Clause A, but whose owners shall prefer taking the depth to the bilge, as provided and set forth in section three, multiply the square root of the depth by the depth in feet, taken from beam to bilge, and of the product take fifty-six per centum for the free board in inches. B. For the winter season, for vessels as described in Clause A, crossing the Atlantic Ocean between ports north of Capes Hatteras and Finisterre, take fifty-nine per centum of the product of the depth into its square root for the free board in inches. C. For the summer season (April to September, inclusive), for vessels as described in Clause A, take fifty-five per centum of the product of the depth into its square root for the free board in inches. D. For the summer season, for steam vessels as described in Clause A, on voyages between Atlantic or Gulf ports and ports and places in Mexico, the West Indies, Central and South America to the River Plate, and between all ports and places on the Pacific Ocean from fifty degrees of north latitude to forty degrees of south latitude, take fifty-three per centum of the product of the depth into its square root for the free board in inches. 448 APPENDIX. Rule III. A. If there be overlength of vessel the free board found by the foregoing rules shall be corrected by adding thereto, as inches, one third of the square root of the overlength in feet. If there be underlength deduct, instead of adding as above, one third of its square root. B. If there be overbreadth of vessel correct the free board other- wise found by deducting from it, as inches, the square root in feet of the overbreadth. If there be underbreadth add to it, as inches, half of its square in feet. C. If there be less sheer of deck than the standard given in sec- tion four, the free board otherwise found shall be increased by add- ing half the average deficiency in inches. If there be greater sheer, decrease the free board otherwise found by deducting, as inches, the square root of the excess of sheer expressed in feet or decimals of a foot. D. If the vessel be built with inward crowning sides, as described in section four, then the free board shall be marked to reserve a portion of buoyancy, which shall be found from a scale of entire displacement, properly computed from measurements of the vessel or from the verified model or draft, which reservation shall be ten per centum for vessels drawing thirteen feet or less, keel excluded, and one per centum additional for each foot in excess thereof. Rule IV. A. For the winter season (October to March, inclusive), for first- class seagoing steam or sail vessels built of metal, wood, or compos- ite materials, having an "upper," "spar," or "hurricane" deck, as described in section two, multiply the square root of the depth by the depth in feet, taken from the top of beam of said deck to the keel, and of the product take sixty per centum for the free board in inches. B. For the winter season, for vessels as described in Clause A, crossing the Atlantic Ocean between ports north of Capes Hatteras and Finisterre, take sixty-three per centum of the product of the depth into its square root for the free board in inches. C. For the summer season (April to September, inclusive), for ves- sels as described in Clause A, take fifty-nine per centum of the pro- duct of the depth into its square root for the free board in inches. D. For the summer season, for steam vessels as described in Clause A, on voyages between Atlantic or Gulf ports and ports and places in Mexico, the West Indies, Central and South America to the River Plate, and between all ports and places on the Pacific Ocean from fifty degrees of north latitude to forty degrees of south APPENDIX. 449 latitude, take fifty-seven per centum o£ the pi'oduct of the depth into its square root foi* the free board in inches. Rule V. A. For the winter season (October to March, inclusive), for first- class seagoing steam or sail vessels built of metal, wood, or com- posite materials, having an "upper," "spar," or "hurricane" deck, as described in section two (and in Rule IV., A), but whose owners shall prefer taking the depth to the bilge, as provided and set forth in section three (and in Rule II., A), multiply the square root of the depth by the depth in feet, taken from beam to bilge, and of the product take sixty-seven per centum for the free board in inches. B. For the winter season, for vessels as described in Clause A, crossing the Atlantic Ocean between ports north of Capes Hatteras and Finisterre, take seventy per centum of the product of the depth into its square root for the free board in inches. C. For the summer season (April to September, inclusive), for ves- sels as described in Clause A, take sixty-six per centum of the pro- duct of the depth into its square root for tlie free board in inches. D. For the summer season, for steam vessels as described in Clause A, on voyages between Atlantic or Gulf ports and ports and l)laces in Mexico, the West Indies, Centi-al and South America to the River Plate, and between all ])orts and places on the Pacific Ocean from fifty degrees of north latitude to forty degrees south latitude, take sixty-four per centum of the product of the dejjth into its square root for the free board in inches. E. If there be overlength or underlength of vessel, then the free board found by Rules IV. or V. must be corrected as prescribed in Rule III., A. If there be overbreadth or underbreadth of vessel, then the free board otherwise found must be corrected as prescribed in Rule III., B. If there be less sheer of deck than the standard given in section four, then the free board otherwise found must be corrected as prescribed in Rule III., C. If the height of ("upper," "spar," or "hurricane ") deck at the side exceeds seven feet between the tops of beams, then the depth of side and the free board must be measured from a point seven feet above the main-deck beam. For a less height of deck, no correction shall be made. Rule VI. A. For the winter season (October to March, inclusive), for first- class seagoing steam or sail vessels built of metal, wood, or com- posite materials, having an awning deck, divide the square of the depth by one hundred, and of the quotient take fifty-four per cen- tum for the free board in feet and decimals of a foot. 450 APPENDIX. B. For the winter season, for vessels as described in Clause A, crossing the Atlantic Ocean between ports north of Capes Hatteras and Finisterre, take sixty per centum of the quotient (of the division of the square of the depth by one hundred) for the free board in feet and decimals of a foot. C. For the summer season (April to September, inclusive), for vessels as described in Clause A, take fifty-one per centum of the quotient (of the division of the square of the depth by one hundred) for the free board in feet and decimals of a foot. D. For the sunmier season, for steam vessels as described in Clause A, on voyages between Atlantic or Gulf ports and ports and places in Mexico, the West Indies, Central and South America to the River Plate, and between all ports and places on the Pacific Ocean from fifty degrees of north latitude to forty degrees of south latitude, take forty-eight per centum of the quotient (of the divi- sion of the square of the depth by one hundred) for the free board in feet and decimals of a foot. Rule VII. A. For the winter season (October to March, inclusive), for first- class seagoing steam or sail vessels built of metal, wood, or compos- ite materials, having an awning deck, as described in section two (and in Rule VI., A), but whose owners shall prefer taking the depth to the bilge, as ])rovided and set forth in section tliree (and in Rules II., A, and V., A), divide the square of the depth by one hundred, and of the quotient take sixty-one per centmn for the free board in feet and decimals of a foot. B. For the winter season, for vessels as described in Clause A, crossing the Atlantic Ocean between ports north of Capes Hatteras and Finisterre, take sixty-seven per centum of the quotient (of the division of the square of the dej^th by one hundred) for the free board in feet and decimals of a foot. C. For the summer season (April to September, inclusive), for vessels as described in Clause A, take fifty-eight per centum of the quotient (of the division of the square of the depth by one hundred) for tlie free board in feet and decimals of a foot. D. For the summer season, for steam vessels as described in Clause A, on voyages between Atlantic or Gulf ports and ports and })laces in Mexico, the West Indies, Central and South America to the River Plate, and between all ports and places on the Pacific Ocean from fifty degrees of north latitude to forty degrees of south latitude, take fifty-five per centum of the quotient (of the division of the square of the depth by one hundred), for the free board in feet and decimals of a foot. E. If there be overlength or underlength of vessel, then the free APPENDIX. 451 board found by Rules VI. or VII. must be corrected, as provided in Rule III., A. If there be overbreadth or underbreadth of vessel, then the free board must be corrected as provided in Rule III., B. If there be less sheer of main deck than the standard given in sec- tion four, then the free board otherwise found must be corrected as provided in Rule III., C. Rule VIII. A deduction in free board shall be made in cases where the hulls have been framed and built at least four feet above the "main " or "upper" deck (Init not above a "spar" deck), in the form of "poops," or "lialf poops," "forecastles," or "bridge houses," with bulkheads made to resist the admission of water from the sea, the erections being entered from the top, according to the following rules : — (1) In case the combined length of the erections exceeds two tenths of the length of the vessel, for each tenth additional deduct ten per centum of the difference between the free board due to the vessel unT — 297,S]4,U()4 581,: '.30,403 879,165,307 33.9 1S(!8 , 2'.i7.'.t81,573 550,546,074 848,527,(347 35.1 18<)9 — 2S9,9."j6,772 586,492,012 876,448,784 33.1 1870 — 352.969.401 638,927,488 991,896,889 35.6 1871 $22,9S5,510 3.V;.664.172 755,822,57(5 1.1()9.48(;.74S 31.9 1872 27,(i50,770 345.3;;i.ioi 830.:;4t5.362 1.18.1.i;77.4(53 29.2 1873 27.S(;9,978 346.36(5,592 9(56.722,(i51 1,3 1:5,02; 1.243 26.4 1874 23.022,540 350,451,994 93'.t,2(i6.lO(5 1.28'.',('i58.lO(.) 27.2 1875 20,388.235 314,257,792 884,788,517 1,199,046,309 26.1 187(5 18,473,154 311,076,171 813,354,987 1,124,4:31,158 27.7 1877 17,4(54,810 316,(5(50,281 859,920,536 1,176,580,817 26.9 1878 20,477,3(54 313.()50,9(X5 87(5,991,129 l.l!Mt.042.o:;5 26.3 1870 19.423,685 272,015,(592 911,269,232 l,l:;3.2S4. 3 3 O ml o 0^ 0) -.- U. h R "^j 11 < •A dfo dfo lies. &5 nees rift, e. 03 uties increased 2J p uties increased 2^ p fights. 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"Sj 0) ^-c 1— 1 -k^ e - > So c £ ?j i^.2 g 1 e £ a SO V a,=? a f^.2:^ 11 .2 1 ..a-S's S-s ^~ «.§;•='.£ „-S.2 o o a 1 a:?^ 23 ^■s 5 ^^^^ o g -^ O O -O s- a ■" **" ^ f^S" aj »> >rl -5^ S § 1 ^ £ g ^ 5 a - <>; 2 aj _ a §^^ II ■« ^ "S a 5 S» 1 o a C.<: %« S a"S a ?^ o ? ■a S-~ ^ i^ X ••^ « 5 C- p. 1 > o ^fe^-*^ fc C a § 2 B a S .s tn ^ o ■§ a O Ol CO O 1-1 cc; •sl^ o a; o co-tn; t-; :D 5q_ t-; CO q i 1-! O 00 x t-^ o lO t-^ « 2 1-^ 3^ 5^ (M 0^ ^ 1-1 1-1 r-H rH rH ^ <1 HH c 0 !M Cq 0-* rt l-l~IO M q -* c^j 1-; o (M Ci ^ ci c: t-^ •^' -* iri >o CD t-^ c: GO o (>4 (M (N (M 3<( 3^1 Oq (N C<« (M Oq 1^ Q -S tf fcB ^ s .2 ^ iS ^H 05 O '-J CO i-H t-(M ^ t- Tto m— « 00 CO — ' 31 -, -a bo oi a V eC ;: o a I 1 . o H I ca APPENDIX. 467 SUBSIDIES AND PAYMENTS FOR OCEAN MAIL SERVICE BY GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. Great Britain. United States. Subsidy. Subsidy and Mail Payments. Percentage Paid. Year. To To To Total To Amer- To For- British American Foreign Amount ican Steam- eign Steam- Steamers. Steamers. Steamers. Paid. ers. ers. lais $3,250,000 $100,500 $100,-500 100 _ 184) 3,180,000 235,086 235,086 100 — 1850 5,313,98.") 619.924 — 619,924 100 — 1851 5,330,000 1,465,818 — 1,465,818 100 — 1852 5,510,6;i5 1,655,241 — 1,6.5.5,241 100 — 1853 5,805,400 1,880,273 — 1,880,273 100 — 1854 5,950,559 1,903,286 — 1,903,286 100 — 1855 5,741,633 1,936,715 — 1,936,715 100 — 1856 5,713,-560 1,886,766 — 1,886,766 100 — 1857 5,133,485 4,679,415 1,589,153 1,177,303 $33,758 1,589,153 1,211,061 100 — 1858 97.2 2.8 1859 4,740,190 1,079,220 125.3.-)0 1,204,570 89.5 10.5 1860 4,349,760 707,24;') 14T,0S5 854,330 82.7 17.3 1861 4,703,285 570,953 235,932 806,885 70.7 29.3 1862 4,10.">,3.>3 80,086 293,932 374,618 21.6 78.4 1863 4,188,275 79,397 336,677 416,074 19.1 80.9 1864 4,503,050 64,356 376,085 440,441 14.6 85.4 1865 3,981,995 66,572 408,856 475,428 14 86 1866 4,227,018 245,605 468,324 713,929 34.4 65.6 1867 4,079,966 411,065 456,138 867.203 47.4 52.6 1868 4,047,586 625,239 390,907 1,016,146 61.5 38.5 1869 5,481,690 757,964 343,726 1,101,690 68.8 31.2 1870 6,107,761 791,389 315,944 1,115,.3:33 70.9 29.1 1871 6,070,741 699,661 275,364 975,025 71.7 28.3 1872 5,693,500 805,788 221,103 1,026,891 78.4 21.6 1873 5,665,296 815,400 228,757 1,044,157 78.1 21.9 1874 5,697,346 750,296 238,098 988,394 75.9 24.1 1875 4,860,000 740,361 23(),283 976,644 75.8 24.2 1876 4,420,261 580,063 173,.547 753,610 70.9 23.1 1877 3,976,580 286,835 162,001 448,890 63.8 36.2 1878 3,914,990 40,152 159,828 199,980 20.1 79.9 1879 3,768,230 41,251 158,775 200,020 20.6 79.4 1880 3,873,130 38,780 161,029 199,809 19.4 80.6 1881 3,601,350 42,552 197,515 240,007 17.5 82.5 1882 3,538,835 40,645 239,856 280,501 14.4 85.6 1883 3,608,800 48,077 268,281 310,.358 15.2 84.8 1884 3,608,355 53,170 279,051 332,221 16 84 1885 3,642,065 49,048 282,855 331,903 14.8 85.2 1886 3,662,505 43,319 286,072 329,391 13.1 80.9 1887 3,625,915 76,727 335,946 412,673 18.5 81.5 1888 3,490,864 86,890 376,528 463.418 18.7 81.3 1889 3,184,425 109,828 405,573 515,401 21.3 78.7 1890 1 120,170 420,507 540,077 22.2 77.8 1891 1 147,561 443,204 590,705 24.9 75.1 Totals. 190,027,789 25,546,330 9,482,947 35,037,277 Av. 43.2 56.8 ^ Returns incomplete ; amount increased, apparently. 468 APPENDIX. Several facts appear from this Table. First, that Great Britain increased to almost double her subsidies on the establishment of American subsidized lines. Upon the formation of a party in Con- gress, in opposition to subsidies to American steamers, the British ceased to enlarge their appropriations, and even ventured to decrease them. Second, that after the repeal, in 1858, of our subsidy act of 1845, which vpas given effect in 1847, 1848, and 1850, Great Britain lightened up considerably on her subsidy payments to British lines, being able to do this without damage to them, since much of the support withdrawn by Congress from our own lines, to their ruin, was turned to the British after the legislation of 1858. By the breaking out of the war we were paying 30 per cent of tlie cost of foreign mail service to foreign shipping. Until 1858, we had paid nothing to foreign vessels for such a service. Third, that after the war, when Congress had again undertaken to support an American Ocean Mail Service, Great Britain for the second time enlarged her subsidies until a party in Congress was formed to oppose a subsidy policy, when she ventured a second time to reduce her appropriations, and on the second repeal of our acts for supporting steam lines, she greatly reduced them (from 1874 to 1878). As after 1858, so after 1878, a large part of the support withdrawn from our own lines, causing their ruin, was straightway turned over to the aid of the British. From 1868 to 1887, inclu- sive, — ten years, — we paid only 27.8 per cent, of cost of mail service to foreign steamers; but for the later period of 1878 to 1891, — fom"teen years, — the contributions of the treasury have been an average of 80.9 per cent. This ratio was exceeded only, during the four years of the war, when foreign lines were paid a proportion of 82.7 per cent. Taking the period of 1858-1891, — thirty-four years, — in which we have permitted our treasury to support foreign steam lines to more or less extent, the proportion of mail money so paid has been an average of 56.8 per cent. In the forty-four years of the table, we see Great Britain expend- ing eight dollars where we have paid out one upon the maintenance of a steam marine in the foreign trade. And where we have ex- pended $2.70 on our own steam lines, we have contributed one dol- lar to aid foreign. For fourteen years past the United States has contributed to increase the sum paid British steamers as postal sub- sidy an amount, on the average, equal to about 7 per cent. Is it any wonder we are weak and well-nigh helpless on the sea? Or that Great Britain, having paid her money, has got the worth of it in naval and commercial power ? INDEX. Ability of lake steamers, 345-349. Abolition of privateering, 87, 88. Accidents, perils and losses to Brit, and Am. vessels, 253. Act for a Bureau of Navigation, 399, 400. Act protecting coasting, river, and lake trades, 271. Action, Maritime Conference, 320. Acts abandoning ship-protection, 103, 104, 108-112, 114, 145, 14(5, 1.56, 176. Adams, John and John Quincy, adminis- trations compared, 124, 430. Admeasurement of allowances, 314-316. Admeasurement of tonnage, 07-69, 311, 314-317, 366. Admiral Monk, British, 1665, 8. Advantage governs trade, 33S, 345. Advantages from tariff of 182>*, 165, 166. Advantages of foreign shipping at Washington, 320. Advantages of shipping to maritime nations, 10, 17, 18, 24, 39, 52, 147, 187, 268, 269. Advantage of superior ships, 192, 193, 217, 305, 306, 308. Adventitious aids, 142, 148, 154. Age, a guide for insurance, 225, 281, 300. Ages of jfleets at different stages of sur- vival, 207. Ages of fleets above ten years old, 206. Ages of fleets above fifteen years old, 207. Agreement of " Wheat Tariff Associa- tion," 222-225. Alabama claims award, 151. Aldrich, of Rhode Island, U. S. Senator, 431. Amendment to "tonnage bill" carried, 410. American carrying, foreign, 34, 37, 38, 147, 151, 157, 161, 268. American freeboard rules compared with British, 330-337. American insurance prohibited, 229, 230. American iron vessels, 195, 212. American marine, early, 15, 17, 19, 32, 152, 387, 404. American share of steam-tonnage of the world, sea-going, 325, 327. American ship discount chartering, 79, 80, 139. American Shipping League bill, 459, 460. American shipping policy, dual, 56, 93, 110,385,387. American ships reduce freights, 226, 233, 26.5-268. American ships superior to European, 247, 248, 269. _ American superiority in safety, 252, 253. American superiority in shipbuilding, 214-217, 243, 244, 2.57. American superiority in speed and effi- ciency, 247, 248, 269. American Steel Barge Co., 227, 349. American view a century ago, 28, 387. Ames, Fisher, M. C, extract, 29. Amount paid annually to foreign ships, 406. Amount of underwriting. New York and San Francisco, 285, 286, 289, 290. Annual amounts of bounty payments, 417. Appendix, 439-468. " Approved " tonnage, 282, 283. Arguments for '* maritime reciprocity," 11.5-117. Arguments for the Constitution, 28-30. Arrivals in New York, 1890, 285. Asiatic seamen, .356. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 28(J-286. 308. Author of our tonnage rules, 316. Average ages of existing fleets, 202, 206, 207. Average loss of tonnage, 6 years, 161, 162. Bacon, Lord, British statesman, 237. Balance of trade, 11, 13, 15, 18-21, 24, 178, 179, 268, 276, 364, 365, 372, 373, 425. Bane of British underwriting rule, 76- 78, 132, 148, 155, 159, 160, 172, 222, 22.5-227, 269, 381. Bank panics and suspensions, 130, 132. Banker's Magazine, 228, 229. Benefits from aiding our marine, 425. 470 INDEX. Bibb, George M., Sec'y of Treasury, 366, 367. Blaine, Jas. G., of Me., statesman, 431, 434, 435. Board, Marine Underwriters, N. Y., 330. Board, Trade and Transportation, N. Y., 420. Bonded warehouse act, 134, 148, 149. Bounties, 131, 154, 245, 266, 269, 306, 327, 373, 379, 380, 404, 405, 411-413. Bounty, amount under tonnage bill, 413-419. Bounty or largess to foreign ships, 267- 269. Bounty, subsidy and subvention, 404, 405. Boutwell, Geo. S., Sec'y of Treasury, 372, 373, 4:34. Boycott, Liverpool Corn Exchange, 229, 230. Brazilian trade, 342, 343, 352, 353, 389. Bristow, Benj. H., Sec'y of Treasury, 374. British Admiralty letters, 89-91. British ascendencv, 43, 45, 64, 66, 87, 130, 133, 14;5. 144, 157, 162, 17.5. British blockade of our ports, 102. British Board of Trade, 59, 70, 311, 330, 336. British bottoms, 250, 251, 285, 430. British building and owning, 184, 185.' British cargo and lake steamers, 346. British gains and our losses, 156, 157, 238, 265, 2(56, 268, 369, 425. British insurance protection, 221, 275. British iron and American wood sail compared, 215, 216. Britisli load-line law, 328, 330, 337. Briti.sh Lloyd's inspectors condemn lo- cust treenails in American ships, 140. Britif^i marine, 15, 24, 43, 55, 71, 144, 14>!. British monopoly, danger of, .54, .55, 114, 1.57, 102, 237," 238, 293, 381, 382, 392, 425. British naval reserve, 89-92, 326. British objection to American shipbuild- ing, 46, 176. British owners control Lloyds, 281, 285, 292. 293. British search of our ships, 100. British ship-protection, Lloyds, 127, 144, 151, 175, 221-226, 275, 237, 281, 285, 292, 293, 381, 426, 428, 429. British ship-protection, subsidy, 130, 143, 145, .388, 3-^9. British ship-protection, subvention, 89. British shipping policy, 10, 43, 4(5, 50, 57-60, 62, 143, 152, 159, 160, 388, 389. British steamers win, 145. British tax upon our people, 24, 268, 292. British tonnage under subsidy, 325, 326. British war with China, 132, 148. Builders as owners, 183-186. Burdens, petty, on shipping, 363, 370, 371, 374, 380, 381, 386. Bureau of Navigation, 37, 71, 277, 311, 317, 321, 396, 398-403, 408, 413, 452. Bureau of Statistics, 246. Business of foreign shipping, 14, 20, 39, 425. Business of one month, freighting, 266. California grain traffic, 158, 162, 226, 232-270. California Ins. Co., 286. Cannon, J. G., M. C. of 111.. 410, 411. " Caiuion substitute " bill, 410, 411. Cargoes in California trade, 234, 265, 266. Carriage implies employment, 169, 263. Carriage in centals per ton, 241, 249, 250. Carriage of " free " goods, 431, 432. Carriage, speed, efficiency, different flags, 241. Cause of insurance decay, 273, 279. Causes of decline in carriage and ton- nage, 170, 263, 269, 381, 388, 393, 424. Character in the build of ships, 54, 188. Chase, Salmon P., Sac'y of Treasury, 371. Class legislation, 377, 391, 392, 412. Climax period of carriage, 122, 150. Clipper ships, American, 68, 132, 133, 143. 183. Clipper ships, British, 250. Coasting trade, protection of, 95, 156, 271, 3.59, 371, 394. Cobb, Howell, Sec'y of Treasury, 371. Colbert's great work, 5, 6, 404. CoUins's line of steamers, 130, 133, 146, 147. Commerce, 1, 26, 27, 29, 93, 132, 1-35, 141, 151, 1.53, 171, 172, 187, 364, 372, 416, 419, 421, 422. Commerce, department of, 360-403. Commerce, per capita, 34, 37, 38, 147, 149, 151, 1.55, 157, 161. Commerce per capita under low and high tariffs. 171. Commerce under early policy, 172, 363, 424. Commercial News and Shipping List, 234. Commissioner of Navigation, 280, 296, 319, 321, 328, 330, 386, 3!)8-i02, 452. Comparative cost and durability of ves- sels, 191. Comparative peril per ton of different flags, 257-2.59. Comparative safety at sea, 309, 310. INDEX. 471 Comparative seaworthiness of foreign and American ships, 232-264, 309, 310. Comparative ship performance, 233-264, 2f!!». Comparative survival of British and American vessels, 200, 217, 225. Comparative tonnages of steam fleets, for net and g'ross, 313, 314. Comparative turnout of cargoes, 261, 262. Compaiison, Adams's administrations, 124. Comparison, Am. lake with Brit, ocean steamers, 345-350. Comparison, Brit, and Am. fleets, safety, 25S, 251t, 261, 262. Comparison, coefficients, cuts, 334, .33.5. Comparison, freeboards, 330-337, 453- 456. Comparison, iron and wood fleets, 259, 260. Comparison, tariff and foreign freight- ing taxes, 22, 393. Competition defeated, 77-80, 226, 268, 269. Complete reciprocity with England, 138. Composite vessels, 331, 334. Conclusion, department of commerce, 396, 397. Conclusion, ship survival, 217- Consequence of deep loading, 242, 335, 33(). Consul Jones, Cardiff, 297, 298. Consul Williams, Havre, 298, 299. Corwin, Thomas, Sec'y of Treasury, 369, 370. Cost, dependence on foreign ships, 19, 20, 25, 39, 157, 266-2()8, 393, 425. Cost and economy, shipping, 338-359, 377, 383. Cost, foreign freightage over American, 266-268, 415. Cost, running Am. and foreign steamers, 352, 353. Cost, running Brit, cargo and Am. pas- senger steamers. 351, 352. Cost, running whalebacks, 350, 351. Cost of ships. 153. 174, 176, 188-191, 193. 217, 312, 343, 348-3-50, .377. Cost of the tonnage bill, 413, 419. Cost, steamer and consorts, 350. Cotton insurance, 292. 293. Crawford, Wm. H., Sec'y Treasury, 362. Credits for duties, 94, 1:32. Crimean war. 143. 148. Cromwell's shipping policv. 46, 66, 233. Cruisers and transports, bill, 407, 410. Culmination early, carriage, 34. Culmination early, tonnage, 101, 149. Cunard line of steamers, 86, 87, 130, 131, 133, 146, 147. Davis, Jeffei-son, 181. Dallas, A. J., Sec'y of Treasury, 362. Decay of California trade, 162, 269, 415. Declension under reciprocity policy (1830-1860), 12.5-149, 424. Decline of American underwriting, 226, 227, 277-290, 292. Decline of shipping fcegnn, 123, 145. Decline of shipping continued, 156, 159- 162, 269, 374-376, 378, 382, 383, 386, 392, 423, 428, 464, 466. Decline of shipbuilding. See Decline of Shipping. Decrees of Napoleon, 100. Dedications to Lloyds, Brit, authors, 72, 73. Defeat of the tonnage bill, 410, 411. Democratic, the tonnage bill, 412. Department of commerce, 360-397, 402, 403. Dependence on foreign shipping, 19, 20, 39, 157, 269, 276, 343, 360. 381, 382, 392,422,461,466. Dependence on foreign underwriting, 277-279, 293, 294, 466. Depew, Chauncey M,, transportation, 40. Depreciation of vessels, 35, 180, 417, 418, Depression of carriage, 37, 38, 161, 269, 392, 415, Desperate struggle of our marine, Far- quhar, 406. Development of the Northwest, 271, 272. Differential rates, cotton cargoes, 292. Differential rates, differences, 291. Differential rates, hull insurance. New York and San Francisco, 291. Differential rates, hulls and cargoes, 292. Differential rates, sail and steam, 282, ^83, 287, 288, 292. Dimensions of vessels, 251, 345, 346, 349. Dingley, Nelson, Jr., M. C. 319. Discrimination against our own railroad lines by law, 426. Discrimination against our own shipping by law, 319, 320, 394. Discrimination by Brit, merchants, 126, 127, 155, 228-230, 294, 415, 416. Discrimination by Brit, underwriters, 59, 60, 75-77, 223, 224, 260, 261, 269, 281, 381. Discriminations, approved steam and regular lines, 283. 292. Discriminations, Brit, freeboard rules, 331-337. Discriminations, French insurance, 300- 304. Dix, John A., Senator, bill, 138. Domestic commerce, 421, 422. Drawback, amount, ship material, 364, 374. 472 INDEX. Drawback of the flag, 254, 259, 263, 319, 32U. Durability, American and British built vessels, 194-217. Durability of vessels, 189, 190, 192-194, 197, 221, Dutch shipping power, 5, 48, 49, 64, 65. Duties of Commissioner of Navigation, 39L), 400. Duties, discriminating, repealed, 110, 363-365, 367, 370. Duties on teas (n89), 94, 387. Duties on tonnage (entry), 94, 95, 365, 366, 373, 377, 396. Duties and rebate on imports, 94-96, 128, 363-366, 368, 374, 387. Duty, government, to shipping, 404^407. East India Co., British, 64. Economic knowledge, 9, 174, 187, 216, 217, 237, 238, 270, 271, 306, 338, 385, 425. Economic misteaching, 11, 54, 174, 256, 374. Economy of American ships, 254-256, 263. Economy of shipping, 338-359. Effects of nnproteetion, 107, 110, 111, 139, 156, 161, 162, 269. Effects of the war and free trade since, 150-163. Efficiency, American superiority, 244, 245, 247. Efficiency in ship transport, 241, 242, 244, 245, 247. Efforts of Congress, abortive, 1.52. 410. Efforts to improve Brit, shipbuilding, 65, 71, 336. Embargo acts, 97, 100, 101, 103. Employment, what is wanted, 1.54, 188, 263. Endurance of sail and steam, 195, 217. England, the great beneficiary of reci- procity, 121, 129, 133, 138, 139, 156. English victory, 139, 151. Equalized footing for our marine, 407- 410. Estimated building and repairing, 418. Estimated tonnage gains, table, 417. Estimates, cost of tonnage bill, 413-419. Estimates, losses at sea, 256, 257. European solicitude, American indiffer- ence, 25, 45, 162. Evils, bonded warehouse act, 134-137, 148. Evils, tonnage-tax laws, 317-319. Evolution, Brit. mar. power, 62-92. Ewing, Thomas. ISec'y of Treasury, .365. Examination of tariff influence, 164-173. Experience, steamer United States, 146. Explanation, tonnage bill, 411, 413. Export bounties, 429, 430. Export employment beaten, 156, 269. i'.xports, flour, ban Francisco, 266, 267. E .port, grain, San Francisco, 265, 266. Export, trade and transportation, Ore- gon and Washington, 273, 274. Exports and imports, carriage, 19-23, 34, 35, 39, 151. Extent, "rehabilitation," 10 years, 41&- 419. Extortion, foreign shipowners, 266, 263. Extra cost, foreign freights, 265-268, 41.5. Extremes of efficiency, 248, 249. Extreme survival, vessels, 204, 207, 214. Fairchild, Charles J., Sec'y of Treas- ury, 385, 386. Fallacy of free carrying, 237, 263, 415. Farquhar, John M., M. C, mover of the tonnage bill, 405-407, 411, 416, 419, 459. Fassett, J. S., Collector, N. Y., 280. Fast steamei"s, 340, 341. Faults of admeasurements, 311, 314, 315. Favored nation clause, 317, 430. Favoritism to steamers and foreign ship- ping, 312-314. Fees and fines, 362, 370, 381, 396. Final test, superiority in survival, 214, 21.5. First cost no criterion, 1.54, 189, 191-193, 216, 217. 256, 338, 348. First principles, ship-protection, 428. Flag discrimination, 3J6, 307, 319, 320. Flags in California trade, 233-236, 258, 41.5. Flags in order of safety, 309, 310. Flatboats and steamboats, 190, 394. Fleets in order of speed and peril rate, 258, 259. Folger, Charles J.. Sec'y of Treasury, 379, 380, 398. Forward, Walter, Sec'y of Treasury, 365. Foster, Charles, Sec'y of Treasury, 392- 396. Fowler, Wm. H. C, Sec'y Cal. Ins. Co., 230, 231. Fowler, Wm. H. C, insurance state- ment, 286, 291. Foreign commerce. 422, 42.3. Foreign cooperation, free ships, 174. Foreign marine insurance power and its rule, 219-231, 261, 284, 285, 291, 292. Foreign net tonnage rvdes, 315, 316. Foreign possession of our domestic trade. 179, 180, 391. Foreign-ship headquarters, 320. Foreign ship, and tariff, taxes compared, 21, 23, 393. Foreign steamship lines, 320, 326, 327, 353, 373, 382, 385, 386, 393. i INDEX. 473 Foreign subsidy or bounty, 3, 85, 89, 145, 147, 306, 381, 388, 404-400, 412, 424. Foreign trade and transportation, table, 461. Freeboard bill, authorship, 328, 445- 453. Freeboard bill explained, 330, 439—456. Freeboard rules, 328, 443-452. Free freighting, 121, 126, 127, 133, 237, 268, 275, 367, 309, 370, 381, 388. Free importation of ships, 174-181, 377, 378. Free pilotage, Am. ships, 437. Free ports, Europe, 319, 320. Free-ship bills in Congress, 175, 177, 181, 263. Free ships, 46, 52-54, 58-60, 155, 174, 180, 263, 305, 306, 354, 375-378, 386, 390, 394. Free trade, 105, 116-119, 172, 173, 176, 269,270, 320,370, 371. Free trade, cause of msurance decay, 278, 279. Free underwriting, 128, 231, 261, 279, 285, 2'A), 291, 293, 306. Freight-earning ability, test of cheap- ness, 343, 348, 350. Freight markets, the two, 78-80, 235, 432. Freight rates, Cal. trade, 232-236, 250, 265-268, 270, 415. Freight rates, discriminative, 78-80, 159, 250, 265-267,415. Freightage, American share, 19, 20, 23, 268, 274, 373, 376, 379. Freightage on export and import, 11-16, 18-21, 23, 24, 38, 39. 268, 373. Freightage paid foreigners, 19, 20, 22, 23, 268, 274, 275, 373, 393. French deduction, " new for old," 304. French insurance tariff, 299, 300-305. French interest in iron shipping, 299, 301, 305. French ins. policy, steamers, 303, 304. French ship market, 305, 306. French shipping policy, 5, 6, 91, 245, 298. 299, 305, 3^8, 404, 412. French underwriters' protective discrim- inations, 298, 299, 304. Frye, Wm. P., Senator, mover of the tonnage and postal bills, 342, 352- 3.54, 393,413. Full and equal ship-protection, 412. Gains in British carriage, 240, 265, 266. Gallatin, Albert, Sec'y of Treasury, 3()2, 430. German shipping policy, 91, 319, 320, 389, 412. German steamers freed of American taxes, 320, 321, 393, 394. German steam tonnage subsidized, 91, 327, 412. Globe-built lake steamers, 346. Governmental duty, ship-protection, 218, 237, 238, 294, 295, 327, 411, 412. Grain insurance, 228-230, 257, 261, 269. Gratuities or blood-money, 368, 405. Great Britain's greatness due to protec- tion, 10, 43, 46,57, 59, 62, 85, ^\), 127, 130, 143, 154, 237, 325, 326. Greater economy of Am. ships, 254, 256, 261-263. Griffiths, John W., naval architect and author, 340. Growth, thrift, and decline of shipping in foreign trade, table, 462-466. Guthrie, Jas., Sec'y of Treasury, 370,371. Hamilton. Alexander, Sec'y of Treasury, 362. Harbor improvements, 271, 324, 406. Hard times. Am. ships, 364-368, 370, 382, 406. Hartford convention, 103. Havre insurance policy, 300. Highest efficient performance, 250, 251. How subsidies, subventions, and boun- ties act, 432, 433. Humboldt's view, sea pursuits, 33. Humiliation, national pride, 382, 387, 392, 394, 407, 426. Hyde, Henry B., Am. ship, champion performer, 250, 251. Idleness, Am. vessels, 109, 138, 155, 236, 263, 415. Illustration, running steamers, 352, 353. Imperfection, tonnage-tax system, 311- 327. Imposition on wood ships, 334, 335. Improvement, Am. ships, 232, 233, 268- 270. Improvement, Brit, shipping laws, 70, 71. Improvement, shipping league bill, 460. Improvement, under tariff of 1842, 167. Impulse of peace, 152. Inadequacy of our marine, 36, 276, .327. Inequality of free freighting with Eng- land, 126, 127, 139, 152, 154, 1.55, 159, 162, 174, 175, 237, 269, 293, 294. Inferiority, Brit., iron ships, 197-199, 202,206-208, 210, 212,214-217,244, 245, 253, 255, 2.57. Influence of tariff legislation, 164-173, 367, 368, 385, 386. Ingham, Sam'l D., Sec'y of Treasury, 363. Injustice of Brit, discrim. ins., 216-218, 257, 269. Inland Lloyd's Register, 325. Internal revenue tax, shipbuilding, 152. 474 INDEX. Insurance, American underwriters, 159, 226, 227, 230, 231, 277-279, 285, 290. Insurance companies. Am. and for.. New York, 285, 28(3. Insurance companies. Am. and for., San Francisco, 288-290. Insurance dependency, evils, 293, 294. Insurance discrimination against United States, i:'J6, 301, 304. Insurance reports, foreign, 296-308. Insurance reports, New York, 280. Insurance reports, k?an Francisco, 286. Insurance, wheat, discriminative, 228- 230, 257, 261, 269. International conference, Geneva, 316. International correspondence, load-line, 32!:t, 330. International maritime conference, Washington, 329. Intervention, British, 143, 154, 174, 222, 225. Irish famine, 137. Iron ships least efficient, 245, 249. Iron ships, sail and steam, 58, 60, 69- 71, 74, 83, 143, 144, 148, 151, 156, 159, 175, 188, 189, 192, 201-218, 238-245, 257, 281. Italian shipping policy, 388, 393, 404. Jefferson's appreciation of navigation, 1, .30-32, 41,1 8. Jefferson's naval policy, 100, 101. Jefferson's report, fisheries, 30, 41, 153, 404. Jettison of cargo, 241, 242. John II.. King of Portugal, 220. Jones, J. D., statement, ins., 280-286, 291. Judgment, Am. shipowners, 254. Kentucky, free-ship politics, 213. King, Senator of New York, 152. Knowledge, little, is dangerous, 213. Lake shipping, 190, 271, 345, 347-350, 421. Lake traffic management, 351. Lake vs. ocean steamers, 345-.349. Last words of William Windom, 420- 427. Law, protective of lake traffic and coasting trade, 271, 272. Light-money tax, 98, 318, 323, 324, 365, 366. Lindsay, W. S., London, shipping, 70. Livingston, W. A., " twenty-foot chan- nel," 271. Liverpool Corn E.xchange, 229, 230, 294. Lives lost, shipwreck, 254, 257, Lloyds dsgrade onr ships, 154, 174, 222. Lloyds, discriminating policies, 60, 73- 78, 127, 144, 154, 157, 159, 162, 174, 218, 236, 260, 329. Lloyd's inspection policy, 73, 74, 127, 139, 143, 154, 155, 172, 174, 218, 221, 222, 329. Lloyd's Register, British, 72, 73, 80-S5, 127, 139, 143, 1.55, 172, 174, 183, 188, 189, 195, 200, 202, 221, 251, 304, 323. Lloyd's requirements, 3.50. Load-line question, 328-337, 439-456. Loading rules, Brit, and Am., 242, 243, 249, 297. London "Tunes," lament, 113, 157; boast, 157. Longevitv of vessels, 194, 197-199, 214, 215. Losses, Am., hv discriminative freights, 238, 26.5-268^ 415. Losses before and during the war, 150, 163, 379; Losses from decline of marine, 425, 462- 466. Losses of carriage, see " tables of ton- nage." etc., 'i6, 365, 462-466. Losses of a single year, 135, 367, 368. Losses of shipping per capita, see ' ' tables of tonnage, ' ' 96, 365, 462- 466. Losses, running steamers, 342, 343. Losses, ships and cargoes, 4 years, 2.52. Losses under tariff, 1832-33, 166, 365. Losses under tariff, 1846, 168, 368. Louis XIV., of France, 5, 6, 404. Lynch committee on shipping decline, "153, 154, 433, 434. Madison, James, industrial protection, 17. 32, 94. Madison, James, ship-protection, 32, 93, 94. Marcy, Wm. L., Sec'y of State, priva- teering, 87, 88. Marine Board, Treasury Department, 402. Marine Ins. business. United States, 277-295. Marine Ins. business, foreign, 296-309, Marine Insurance power, 219, 277-279, 293, 294, 306. Marine papers, 37, 366, 386. Maritime pursuits, 26, 187, 371, 373. Maritime reciprocity, 56, 77, 102, 104, 106, 109, 110, 112, 127, 138, 141, 157, 179, 180, 364, 372. Maritime States, 37, 52, 276, 371, 372, 376. Mail subsidy bill. 456-459. Managers, transport lines, 345. Manning, Daniel, Sec'y of Treasury, 385. Materials for vessels, 119, 140, 143, 144, 188, 221, 222, 246, 276, 304,344, 374, 383, 384, 386, 390. INDEX, 415 McCulloch, Hugh, Sec'y of Treasury, 371, :361-385. McDougall, Alexander, whalebacks, 34t), 3.)U, 443. McLane, Louis, Sec'y of Treasury, 363. Means of peace and progress, 3, 9, 41, 96,372,3.3. Mercantile discrimination, Brit., 227- 229, 297, 307. Mercantile interest. Am., 28, 152, 228, 229, 233, 270, 279, 372, 373. Mercantile interest, Brit., 59, 60, 228, 229, 233, 23.), 297, 307. Merchant fleets as navies, 44, 64, 89-91, 326. Merchant shipping act, Brit., 70. Merchants, stripped of protection, 132, 151, 270, 363. Mereclith, Wm. M., Sec'y of Treasury, 368, 369. Meredith's circular, 138, 139, 369. Merits of Brit, and Am. shipbuilding, 200, 213-217. Methods of protecting shipping, 428-437. Mistakes of Congress, 152, 163, 259, 263, 2(i9, 314, 319, 388,391, 410, 411, 424, 435. Models of ships, Brit., inferiority, 66, 68, 268. Models of ships, observations on, 250, 251, 349. Modern Brit, shipping system, 59,70, 157. Monroe doctrine, dependent on sea power, i:31. Morrill, Lot M., Sec'y of Treasury, 363. Morton, Charles B., Comr. of Nav., 401. Motion of trade, carrying, 23S, 239. Murray, Mungo, Brit., N. A., 67. National economy, shipping of our own, 9-24, 30-32, 268, 373, 378. National interest in a marine, 1-8, 10, 28, 44, 258, 270, 378, 405, 406. National interest in maritime pursuits, 26-41, 258, 272, 405. National use of merchant shipping, 7, 12, 19, 32, 41, 48, 52, 89, 90. Nationality, Ins. capital, N. Y., 283-285. Nautical Magazine, 338. Nautical progress under protection, 96, 98, 99. Naval arts and national progress, 42-54, 378. Naval policy of England, 62, 89. Naval power, 4, 31, 41, 43, 44, 47, 62, 65, 88, 91, 96, 98, 131, 176, 180, 276, 378, 382, 405, 407. Naval protection, 4, 31, 91,96, 98, 150, 372, 410. Naval reserve, Brit., 89-92, 405. Naval weakness, 5, 8, 45, 47-50, 53, 63, 88, 100, 150, 327, 372. Navigation, Brit,, acts of, 10, 46, 60, 63, 64, 369. Navigation and commerce, different periods, 18, 43, 48. Navigation laws, Am. and Brit., 56-61, 177, 369, 3 iO, 4-S6. Navigation policy of England, 62. Navigation policy of United States, 41, 423. Navigation, progress of, 42, 43, 51. Navigation and social improvement, 51. Navy Department, 403, 408, 410. Necessitv for ships, 2, 39, 41, 44, 162, 187, 276. New and old materials, French ins., 304. New British protections, Lloyds, 127 ; subsidy, 130; subvention, 89. Non-intercourse act, 100, 101. Northern Maritime Conference, 2d, 315. Norsemen of Europe, 4. Number, ships in Cal. trade, 4 years, 234. Object of Brit, wheat, ins. " trust," 225. Objections to Am. shipbuilding, 46, 176. Obligatory ins., Portuguese, 220. Observations on models, 250, 251. Ocean mail service, act, 456-459. Office, Sec'y of Treasury, 361, 362. Of freeboard rules, 443-445. Ohio "tonnage,"' 394,395. Oldham, J. R., N. A. and E., 345. " Olive branch " legislation, 171, 121, 130. On the down grade, 128, 131, 133, 136, 137, 141, 151, 15.5, 102, 269. Opening of Brit. W. I. trade, 125, 126. Opening of Nicaragua Canal, 418. Opening of Suez Canal, 1.55. Opinion, Att'y Gen'l tonnage-tax law, 8(3, 317, 318. Opposition to Bureau of Navigation, 401, 402. Orders in Council, Brit., 97, 100. Oregon, trade and transport, 273, 274. Oregonian, Portland paper, 78-80. Organization of transportation, 338-340. Origin, free-port proviso, tonnage tax law, 320. Origin and progress, London Lloyds, 80- 8.3, 143. Original Brit. ship, system, protective, 57, 58. Our early shipping policy, 93-124. Our footing, running steamers, 352, Our rights at sea, 1, 2, 53, 96, 98, 218, 269, 405, 406, 436. Overioading, 242, 245, 249, 253, 254, 335, 440. Owning foUows building, 183-185, 188. 47G INDEX. Pacific coast com. and nav., 158, 162, 232-27(5. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 1-56. Packet-ships, sail, 107, 112, 128, 129, 133, 144. Pan-American commerce, 416, 419. Pan-American conference, 314, 31.5. Patriotic views, 28, 29, 152, 373, 382, 387, 388, 425, 426. Patten, Capt. Jarvis, 1st Com'r of Nav., 401. Peace with England, 104, 105, 117, 121. Performance of grain fleets, 268. Performance. lUU grain sliips, Brit, and Am., 261, 262. Performance, sail fleets, 4 years, 232- 264, 269. Peril rate per ton, ships, 2.56-260. Perils and dangers, Jirit. flag, 253, 255, 257-259. Period of ruin, 1861 to 1891, 150, 151. Period of the war, 151, 152. Petitions, against subsidies, 145. Petitions, for navigation laws, 93. Petitions, for tonnage bill, 411. Petitions, none for " maritime reci- procity," 121. Pett, Peter, Brit. N. A., 65. Phelps, T. G., collector, letter, 286. Pilotage, 380, 386, 437. Place-hunters and spoil, 401, 402. Policies, Ins., "French," "Havre." "Nantes," "Marseilles," 300, 303, 304. Portuguese shipbuilding, navigation, 220. Postal-service bill, emasculated and enacted. 340, 341, 393. 456-459. Postal steamers, 385, 390-392, 407-410, 435. Postal-subsidy policy, Brit., 85-87, 130, 405. Premium rates, cargoes, 281-283, 287, 288. Premium rates, hulls, 280,281, 287, 288. Premium rates, hulls and cargoes, France, 300-305. President John Q. Adams's message, 118, 119. President Adams's message reviewed, 119-121. President Cleveland's message, tonnage dues, 317. 318. President Grant's testimony favoring a marine (1870), 7. President Harrison, rehabilitation, 427. President Ivins, Brazil mail line, 343, 344, 351. President Jackson's proclamation, 126, 129. President Jefferson's naval policv, 100, 101. President Washington's farewell, 52, 53. Pretenses, tonnage-tax refunds. 322, 324. Prices, wooden ships (186;^), 74. Principle of classification, Lloyd's, pro- tective, 221, 251, 334, 335. Principle, freeboard rules, 441-443. Principle, freighting economy, 270, 338, 351. Principle, Lord Bacon's, protective, 237. Principles, just taxation, vessels, 324, 325. Principles, ship-protection, 105, 120, 131, 155, 404, 405, 411, 412, 428. Principles, transportation, 338-340. Prior chartering, 79, 80. Problem of the Am. ship, 218, 263, 264, 294. Problem of transportation, 14, 18, 19, 40, 41. Producers pay bounty to foreign ton- nage. 269, 270. Profit-time of vessels, 191, 216, 217. Property losses at sea, table, 255. Proportionate economy of British flag, 2.>9. Proportion of tonnage surviving to dif- ferent ages, 210, 215. Proportion of vessels surviving to dif- ferent ages, 208, 214. Protection by bounties, 131, 154, 245, 206, 269, 306, 327, 373, 379, 380, 404, 405, 411-413. Protection by discriminating duties, 429. Protection by export bounties, 429, 4^30. Protection bv Mr. Blaine's plan, 434, 4:^5. Protection bv shipbuilding premiums, 433, 4;!4. Protection by subsidy, 142, 147, 154, 325-327, 374, 385, 386, 391, 405, 406, 434, 456-459. Protection to merchants and shipowners, 94, 132, 263, 266, 272, 384, 385, 390, 423. Public interest in administration of law, 401. Paget Sound lumber export, table, 274. Puget Sound shipyard, 227. Puncture in balloon of free ships, 215. Qualifications, Commissioners of Navi- gation, 400, 401. Question of cheapness. " free ships," 215. Question of a Bureau of Navigation, 398, 399. Question of a department of commerce, 360, 397. Question of a load-line, 328-3.37. Question of tariff influence examined, 164-173, 367, 368, 385. Question of our flag at sea, 51, 52, 146, 180, 2.58, 269, 406, 423, 425. INDEX. 4:11 Raleigh, Sir Walter, on naval improve- ment, 65. Rank among the nations, 3, 52, 53, 382. Rates of ins.. Am., 2S0-288. Rates of ins., French, o()0-o05. Rates of ins., Wheat Tariff trust, 223, 224, 220. Rating of ship-timher, Lloyd's, 221, 222. Rating of vessels classed, 221, 225. Ratio, Am. to foreign arrivals, N. Y.. 285. Ratio, Am. to foreign ins. San Fran., 289. Ratio, bounty to cost of transport, 414. Ratio, freightage to value of cargo, 11, 13, 14, 10, 1!). 20, 23, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 2()8, 273-275. Ratio, life to durability of vessels, 199. Ratio, sail to steam, foreign trade, 40, 391. Reciprocal liberty of commerce, 56, 102, 141, 153, 163, 3-8, 393, 424, 420. Record of American and Foreign Ship- ping, N3, 183, 282, 309, 329, 409, 452. Reduction in crews, Erit., 355, 356. Reexport trade, 134, 137. Refunding, tonnage taxes, 320-322. Registered steam tonnage, 161. Registers, marine, of world, 309. Regulation of trade, 29, 30, 272, 276, 295. Regulation of triangular trade, 435, 436. Regidation of underwriting. 294, 295. Rehabilitation of the Am. marine, 177, 227, 2(54, 270, 295, 354, 373, 375, 382, 385, 390, 390,411, 416. Relief for England, — final act of reci- procity, 114, 304, 309. Remark.s on period of 1856-60, 147. Repeal of di.scrim. duties, 110, 3()3, 370. Repeal of, injurious laws, 114, 120, 134, 135, 139, 103, 319, 322, 373, 390, 424, 429. Repeal of tonnage-tax law, 322-324. Report, consular, Havre, insurance, 298- 305. Report, consular, Newcastle-on-Tyne, in- surance, 296. Reports, collectors of customs, insur- ance, 277, 280, 286. Reports, Secretaries of the Treasury, 362-396. Reports, Secretaries, summed up, 396, 397. Retrogression, 1811-1815, 102; 1861- 1865, 151 ; 1876-1880, 1.57, 160, 162, 365, 367, 369, 370, 380, 392. Review, foreign insurance systems, 305- 310. Review, losses from unfortunate legisla- tion, 162, 163, 170, 365, 307, 309, 370. Richardson, William A., Secretary of Treasury, 373, 374. Rivalry of the Registers, 82, 85, 189, 309. Roman shipping power, 47. Rule America, 177. Rules for freeboard, Am. , 330-337. Rules for ii-on shipbuilding, Brit., 83, 84, 144, 152. Rush, Richard, Secretary of Treasury, 122, 123, 363. Safety and seaworthiness of fleets, 252, 253, 255, 257-259, 308, 309, 310. Sail and steam tonnage. Am., 160, 161, 391. Sailing-ship performance, 232-264, 269. School, naval architecture, Brit., 67. Sea-life of vessels, 190, 197, 199, 225. Sea-power in history, 4, 43-45, 378. Sealing rights invaded, 7. Secretarv of Commerce proposed, 360, 301, 402. Secretary of the Treasury, 277, 296, 361, 362, 400, 401, 409, 410. Sentiment, Brit, shipping, 60, 246, 247, 297, 329. Sharpness of hulls, loading, 333, 334. Sherman, John, Sec'y of Treasury, 374- 379. Shipbuilding, a civilizing art, 42, 50. Shipbuilding, a test of manliness, 50, 378. Shipbuilding essential to independence, 1, 3, 26-28, 42, 47, 48, 50, 52-54, 58, 59, 02, 65,66, 83,90,95, 101, 144, 152, 170, 187, 300, 373, 378, 382. Shipbuilding, influence on history, 32, ^ 3 !, 42. 47, 48, 305, 306, 378. Shipbuilding protected, 95, 164, 176, 177, 182, 186, 376, 387. Shipbuilding since the war, 232, 372, 374, 375, 378. Shipbuilding, value of (1891), 178. Ship market, 174, 185, 192, 193, 305, 306. Shipowner's profits, 30, 191,, 216, 217. Shipowning goes with building, 179, 182-184, 305, 378. Shipping business, 35, 52, 373, 382. Shipping, different nations, safety, 309, 310. Shipping economv, 187-193, 271, 338- 359. Shipping independence, 187, 264, 269, 272, 375, 378, 382, 387. Shipping in foreign trade, 34, 37, 38, 149. See Tables of Tonnage. Shipping per capita, 34, 37, 38, 149, 155. See Tables of Tonnage. Ship-protection, 32, 43, 75, 76, 87, 91, 93, 94, 96-98, 127, 130, 131, 133, 144, 152, 162, 305, 306, 308, 320, 327, 363, 364, 371, 372, 376, 378, 379, 383, 384, 392, 395, 411-413. 478 INDEX. Ship-protection by tariff, 93, Go, 97, 128, 147, 887. 42:]. Ship-protection by tonnage dues, 93, 94, 9(5-98, 1U5, 147, ;]«7, :^.iO. 428. Ship-protection, principle of early policy, 1U.">, 119, 120. Ships, weapons of war, 44, 89, 378. Shipwright's Company, Brit., 65. Shipwrights imported, Eng., 7, 46. Silver problem, the, 23, 1 ?8, 179. Size of ships. Cal. trade, 233-234, 202. Slow teaching of experience, designing, 340,343. Sources, free-ship machination, 175, 176. Southern building and owning, 183, 184. Sovereignty of the sea, 2, 43, 63, 127, 176. Spanish maritime power, 5, 48-50. Spanish shipping policy, 353, 354, 372, 389, 393. Speed, Am. supsriority, 243, 244, 247, 21)9. Speed, lake steamers, .346. 349. Speed, voyage days, San. Fran, to Liver- pool, 241, 269. Spencer, John C, Sec'y of Treasury, 365. State Department, 87, 296, 314, 317. State insurance protection, 220. Statistics, production, .Mtdhall, 422. Steam navigation, t^5-87, 161, 325-327, 388. Strength, lake steamers, 346, 347. Stripping off ship-protection, 102, 103, 108-110, 112, 114, 14.5, 146, 1.56, 176. Struggle to recover (lS8(>-70), 15.3. Subsidy protection. 142, 147, 154,325- 327, 374, 385, '^m, 391, 405, 406, 434, 45(5-459. Subsidized foreign tounage, 325-327, 406, 412. Substitution, iron for wood, 144, 152, 188, 189, 259, 305, 377, 381, 384. _ Subvention policy, Brit., 89, 326, 405. Suez Canal opening, 155. Superior survival, Brit, wood sail, 212. Superiority, Am., iron fastening and canvas, 165. Superiority, Am. ships, 195, 197-190, 202, 2(J8, 210, 212-215. 217, 225, 238, 246,2.53-2.55, 257, 261, 262, 309, 310. Suppression, bureau report, 277, 296, 401. Survival of vessels, 194, 200, 204, 208, 210-217. 22.5. Survival, final comparison, 214. System of protection needed, 437. Table, losses from acts of Congress, 163. Table, extent bounty payments, 417. Table, subsidies, mail payments. Great Britain and United States, 467, 4(58. Table VI., Performance of ships, part 1st, 2;i4 ; 2d, 241 ; 3d, 252 ; 4th,255 ; 5th, 257. Tables I., II., III., and IV., comparison, freeboards, 3.>0. 331. Tables I.. II , III., IV., and V., fleets, survival Am. and Brit, vessels, 200- 211. Tables, tonnage, commerce, and carriage, 9(5, 97, 99, 1(J2, 111,122, 128, 129, 131, 133, 139, 140, 145, 151, 153, 156-158, 160. Tables, wages of seamen, 357-359. Taboo, Brit., of Am. ins.. 228-230, 293. Taney, Roger B., Sec'y of Treasury, 3t>4. Tariff acts, influence of, 164-173, 367, 3(58, 385, 38(5. Tariff and shipping reciprocity, 431, 4-32. T.iriff and volume of trade, 171. Tariff bill of 1828, 119, 165, 364, 369. Tariff for revenue, Walker's, 134, 367, .■]6S. Tariff reciprocity, 431. Taxation of vessels, 312-325, 373? 380. Taxes paid foreigners (Griffin), 24. Taxes, tariff and freightage, 22. Test of economic building, 189, 192, 194, 214, 215, 217, 2.56, 2.57, 348. Test office, tonnage surveys, 316, 317. Text of tonnage bill, 4l>7-4l0. The free-ship notion imported, 177. Theorv. ship-protection, duties, 119, 120. Tide of the fifties, 141, 147. Tonnage, seamen, under five flags, 4.5. Tonnage bill, 266, 2(57, 342, 393, 407, 413-419, 420, 43(5. 4.37, 459. Tonnage bill and estimates. 404-419. Tonnage classification, Brit., 77, 144, 189. Tonnage destroyed by cruisers, 150. Tonn.age, eligible and not, 417. Tonnage gains. 111, 113, 141. 142. Tonnage in statistics may represent idle- ness, 169, 370. Tonnage lost annually, different flags, 309, 310. Tonnage mensuration, Am., 69, 316, 317. Tonnage mensuration, Brit.. 67-69. Tonnage needed, now and future, 39, 40, 1(52. Tonnage of subsidy, 32.5-.327. Tonnage, proportion, at different ages, 210, 21.5. Tonnage rules, foreign net, 315, 316. Tonnage sold off, 123, 140, 150, 152, 1()9. Tonnage-tax collections, 323, 380. INDEX. 479 Tonnapfe-tax law, text, 318, 386. Toniiaj'e-tax system, 311-327, 373, 380. Total of bounties, 414. Trade profits. 3."), 3S. Translation, French ins. tariff, 300-305. Tramp steamei's, 1")."), 308, 343-346, 349, 3.")L'. - Transportation, an export, 11, 19, 273- '2T.'.. 30."). Tran.sportation, production, 374, 375. Transport^ition. lake, 271, 272, 34.5, .351. Transportation under protection and free trade, \\'indoui, 420-427. Treiusurv I ).-partment, 362-396, 398, 401, 4(>7, 40S, 410. Treaty of commerce, England. 104-106, 42'.t, 4.;o. Treaty of commerce, Spain, 1 10. Treaty of commerce, Sweden, 108. Triangular tiade, 12^, 139, 307, 435, 43(;. True economy in shipowning, 187-193, 255, L'57, 33S-345, WO. True lights in our course, 53. True principle, freighting economy, 270, 271. Turnout of cargoes, comparative, 201, 202. I'nderwriters, Brit., protected, 218-2.31. Underwriters' Register, 80, 84, 85, 152. Underwriting, Am., decline, 226, 231, 285, 2'. to. I'nderwriting policy, Brit., 74-78, 132, I4S. 151. Underwriting policy, French, 299, 300. Underwriting science, 219, 30(>— 308. Unfounded Brit, sentiment, 24(», 297. Unjust ins. discrimination, 223-226, 230, 2:'.(i, 2t>(), L'()'.», 291, 3S1. Unjust ins. rates, 200, 209, 291. Unity of interest in shipbuilding and shipowning, 182- ISO. Unsafe vessels, overloading, 336, 337- Valid reasons for freeboard law, 330, ;!37. V;ihiation, a basis for taxation, 324, 325. Value of commerce, 35, 38, 39, 130, 137, Value, cargoes, Cal., 235, 250. Value of carriage, .3.5, 38, 39. Value of insurance, 35, 38, 39. Value, shipbuilding industry, 178. Value, superior survival, 210, 217. Value, vessels lost, 256. Vanderbilt, " Commodore," 146. Veritas, 82, 83, 183, 298, 301, 304, 329. Veritas' inspection policy, 298, 299. Veritas' statistics, 190, 195, 309. Vessels, classed, 59, 82, 200, 202, 204, 309. Vessels, class expired, 204. Vessels owned, Oregon, Washington, 275. Vessels, proportion, surviving, 208, 214. Wages, farm labor, 359. Wages, seamen's, 350, 356-359. Wages, seamen, different ports, 357-359. Wages and living, Am. and foieign crews, 3.54, 355, 359. Walker, Robt. J., Sec'y of Treasury, 1.34. Want of naval protection, 100, 152. War with Algiei-s, 9() 97. War w ith Barbary States, 99. War with England, 101. War \\\th France, 98. War ^vith Mexico, 133. War for the Union, 7. War tariff and trade, 172. Washington, George, President, 52, 53. Washington, trade and transport, 273- 275. Washington, headquarters, foreign steamers, 320. Webb, Wra. H., shipbuilder, 146, 147, 151, 185. Webster, Daniel, statesman, 1, 28, 40, 9(t, 388, 424. Wlialeback type of vessel, 345, 349, 350. Wliat has been shown, insurance, 262, 203. Wliat shall be exchanged for tonnage, 178, 179. Wheat Tariff Association, 222-226. Will government aid pay, 425. Windom, William, Sec'y of Treasury, 319, 321, 380-392, 397, 420-427. William IV., King of England, 67. Wolcott. Oliver, Sec'y of Treasury, 362. Wood ships can carry most, 243. Wood ships most efficient, 249, 276. Wood vessels outlast iron, 212-217, 225. Woodbury, Levi, Senator, 114, 115, 12.3. Woodbury, Levi, Sec'y of Treasury, 364. Wooden ships, 59. 00, 09, 74, 133, 143, 148, 152, 155, 157, 159, 174, 175, 188, 189, 193, 200-218, 225, 226, 238, 249, 276, 283, 310. Workmanship, lake steamers, 347, 348. World's tonnage under protection of some kind, 433. Yacht Conqueror, 396. Yachts, foreign-buUt, 396. UNiVliKSlTY or CAlIFUKihaa AT LOS AxNGELES UfiRAKY . v^xvi -"I j..rv jL,i,uxvrvxv. X Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. L 007 744 468 5 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 001 008 966 2 V .\<^ -^i 1:MMMMMMK: An .:f M A M % U i .