UNIVERSITY 
 
 AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 Majl Ev;ing
 
 AKCIIOLOGY; 
 
 OR, 
 
 THE SCIENCE or GOYEEXMEXT. 
 
 BY 
 
 sT V. BLAKESLEE, 
 
 OAKLAND, CAL. 
 
 I *m J » 
 
 ' t' % c 4 
 
 NEW YORK AND SAN FRANCISCO : 
 
 A. ROMAN AND COMPANY, PUBLISHERS. 
 
 1876.
 
 Copyright, 
 S. V. BLAKESLEE, 
 1876. 
 
 New York : Lnnge, LKtIe & Co., rrInt«rB. 
 10 tu -jll A>t>ir Plu:i!. 
 
 10 to -JU Attor PI:
 
 i^5.' 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 MoDEKN civilization Las been characterized by the 
 great variety and rapid development of the pliysical 
 sciences. The vast material fields of thought have 
 been vigorously canvassed, and their facts carefully 
 studied, for the discovery of principles. These have 
 been clearly explained, exactly defined, and arranged 
 into different systems of science, which again have 
 been wonderfully applied in practice for the improve- 
 • foment of the physical welfare of man. 
 \^ But, in the rich fields of abstract thought, there has 
 . been comparatively very little done in the form of 
 ^ developed science. Especially in the all-important 
 ^science of govern inent, bearing directly on the wel- 
 V fare of nations, and affecting the interests of every 
 '^intelligent being, this failure of a scientific treatment 
 has been most remarkable. Thousands of volumes, 
 scores of thousands, have been written upon the prac- 
 tice and enforcement of law, as if an art; but, in the 
 opinion of the writer, not properly one, on govern- 
 ment, treated from a generic point of view, as a
 
 4 PKEFACE. 
 
 science. Only few authors Lave suggested such a 
 treatment as possible, while a specific name for it is 
 not found in any civilized language. 
 
 As an attempt to remedy this defect, by the devel- 
 opment of a distinct science of government, the fol- 
 lowing treatise has been prepared ; but, as a pioneer 
 eflfort, it has been made with much hesitation on the 
 part of its author, through a conscious sense of its 
 deficiencies in completeness, and of imperfections in 
 matter. Still, as an effort in a right direction, it is 
 offered to the favorable notice of a forbearing; and 
 criticising public, with confidence that other writers, 
 with better facilities, will improve upon it, and per- 
 fect a work on Archology which shall surpass the 
 physical sciences for good, as mind surpasses matter. 
 
 Oakland, Cal., 1876.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Archology ; Government ; Origin of Government ; Aim of Govern- 
 . ment ; Manner of Government ; Law. 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 
 Classes of Government ; Material ; Instinctive ; Rational ; Dis- 
 tinguishing Feature of Eacli ; Reason ; Will. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Classes of Government Contrasted ; Primal Element in which 
 Begins Control ; Higher Government Maj' Degrade ; Lower 
 Government Naver Ascends. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Rational Government ; Necessity to Success of Rational Govern- 
 ment ; Right ; Moral and Practical Right ; Motive. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Means of Government ; Instruction ; Compulsion ; Law, Its 
 Essential Elements ; Advice ; Sanctions of Law. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Sanctions of Law ; their Magnitude ; their Legal E^^dence ; 
 Magnitude of Crime. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Fuller Consideration of Law ; Origin; Aim; Peculiarities of Law; 
 Mu.st be Declared ; Must be Protected ; Vigor of Executive to 
 Enlorce Law.
 
 6 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Right of Government to Enforce Law ; Principle of Benevolence ; 
 of Liberty in this Enforcement. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Governments Above Governments Necessary ; Mutual Duties of 
 Higher and Lower Governments. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 Divisions of Rational Government ; Legal ; Disciplinary ; Six 
 Distinctions. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 Punishment and Chastisement ; How Clearly Distinguished. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 Punishment More Exactly Examined ; Its Design ; Its Magnitude ; 
 Punishment Instructive ; Protective. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 Other Facts of Punishment ; Its Applications ; To Protect Wealth ; 
 Person ; Liberty ; Life. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 Pardon ; When Possible as Right ; Atonement ; A Necessary Pre- 
 requisite to Pardon ; Commutation of Punishment. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 Taxation ; Right of Taxation ; Amount of Taxation. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 Right of Government to Enforce Contracts ; To Carry on War. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 Right of Government to Establish Pablic Schools. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 Conscience, and the Relation between it and the Government.
 
 AROHOLOGY; 
 
 OK, 
 
 THE SCIENCE OF G0\ERN31ENT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Archologij is the Soience of Government. 
 
 Derived from the two Greek words, "archo," govern, 
 and "log-OS," science, its signification accords with the 
 definition given. 
 
 Government is the whole system of control in any 
 particular case. 
 
 " Whole " is used in the definition, because there 
 may be predicated of parts that which is not true of 
 the whole. Government is the wliole. 
 
 System signifies all the things under consideration 
 regarded as arranged in some methodical manner. 
 
 A system of control includes both the controller 
 and the controlled ; also the laws and the means of 
 control, together with all else involved in considering 
 the subject. 
 
 Control signifies either originating ^ or directing^ or 
 restraining^ the action of that which is controlled. 
 
 The clause " in any particular case" limits the word 
 whole to that which is under consideration at the
 
 8 AECHOLOGY ; Olt, 
 
 time. Illustrations of government : That of the sun 
 over the planets; of instinct over animals; of parents 
 over the family ; of an officer over an army ; of a 
 king over his subjects ; and of God over the universe. 
 In each specilication government is the whole system 
 of control in the particular case ; it includes all under 
 consideration at the time. 
 
 ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT ; OE, WHAT IS THE PUILOSOPH- 
 ICAL GROUND OR REASON OF ITS EXISTENCE, AS A 
 FACT ? 
 
 Government Originates as a Necessity to the Secur- 
 ing of Ends. 
 
 This statement is proved by considering the facts 
 that ends can be secured only by action. But, in re- 
 spect to every end, there are always two classes of 
 possible actions : those which would result in securing 
 it, and those which would prevent the securing of 
 it. Hence, to secure an end, there is a necessity of a 
 control to originate, direct, or restrain, the actions pos- 
 sible in the case, according as they would, or would 
 not, result in the securing of the end. Now, the 
 whole system of this control is, according to defi- 
 nition, a government. Therefore, government orig- 
 inates as a necessity to the securing of ends. 
 
 Government Exists as a Means Helpful to its Entities 
 in Securing the Ends of their Existence. 
 
 The word, "entities " is used as the most general in 
 signification to include all of which action or influ-
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. » 
 
 ence, can be predicated, even snch as desires, emotions, 
 etc. It includes all over which control can be ex- 
 erted. 
 
 " Helpful " is used with means, because often govern- 
 ment is more than a means. For, as an actor, it often 
 both offers its help, and compels its acceptance. 
 
 Inasmnch as government is a necessity to the secur- 
 ing of aii^y eud, it follows at once that, to entities, it 
 is a necessitv in securino^ the ends of their existence. 
 In the innumerable variety of actions, all possible to 
 be put forth by entities, affecting the ends of their 
 existence, there are incalculable liabilities for actions 
 to clashwith actions, preventing their securing such 
 ends. Hence, to entities, in securing the ends of their 
 existence, as a helpful means, there is a necessity of a 
 government, to control all possible actions, in such a 
 manner that those, and those only, shall be put forth 
 which are adapted to result in securing the ends of 
 their existence. 
 
 Illustrations of this necessity: The government of 
 the sun is a necessity to the planets, that the ends for 
 which they exist may be secured. Were such govern- 
 ment to cease, they must whirl away into ruin, or 
 dash together in mutual destruction. Among migrat- 
 ing animals, were all government of instinct to cease, in- 
 cessant clashinirs of actions with actions would take 
 place, destroying the ends for which the creatures exist, 
 and even the existence of the creatures themselves. So, 
 also, among rational beings, should all rational govern- 
 ment cease, and each one act only for himself, merely in 
 accordance with his own will, then in the clashing of 
 1*
 
 10 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 desires of objects to be secured, and in the clashing of 
 means selected witli wliich to secure them, and in the 
 clashing of actions put forth for this purpose, there 
 would follow the destruction of all ends for wliicli 
 rational beings exist. Hence, gov^erntnent exists as a 
 necessity to entities, to their securing the ends of their 
 existence, by so controlling all actions put fortli as to 
 insure a harmonious adaptedness in those put forth to 
 result in the securing of such ends. 
 
 Aim or Purpose of Government. 
 
 The examination of the origin of government ren- 
 ders apparent also its purpose, or aim. 
 
 The Aim, or Purjjose, of Government is to Enahle 
 its Entities to Secure the Ends of their Existence. 
 
 It is not the province of government to secure these 
 ends. It is only a helpful means to its entities, in se- 
 curing, themselves, the ends of their own existence. 
 They are the agents in securing these ends, while gov- 
 ernment is only a necessary aid to them in doing this, 
 by controlling actions, which, without it, would be 
 constantly clasliing ; in the use of means where other- 
 wise there would be continual interferences, while se- 
 curing ends in which otherwise there would be 
 incessant conflicts. In all this, government is to secure 
 a harmony necessary to the attainment of the ends 
 for which its entities exist. 
 
 The government of the sun over the planets is not
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 11 
 
 fur tlie benefit ot" the sun, l)Ut tbi- that of the planets, 
 as a necessary aid to tlicm in attaining tlie ends tor 
 whicli they exist. So, also, in the State and nation, 
 the government is not for the benefit of itself, nor for 
 that of the officers of the State. It is wholly for the 
 benefit of the subjects of government, to enable them, 
 each and all, to secure the ends for which they exist. 
 
 From this it follows that the scientific treatment of 
 the subject of government consists in the systematic 
 unfolding of its features and peculiarities, as a help- 
 ful means to entities in securing the ends for which 
 they exist. But th.e idea of the heljtfulness of a 
 means to an end is generally expressed by the word 
 usefulness. Hence, the origin of government is found 
 in its usefulness to the entities comjirehended in it, in 
 , securing the ends of their existence, and, also, its 
 aim or purpose is found to be this, its nsefulness to 
 entities in securing such ends. In other words, the 
 principle in the case is that hoth the oricjin and the 
 aim of Government are found in its usefulness to the 
 entities comprehended under it. It exists as a means 
 of usefulness necessary to them, both in avoiding the 
 evils to which they are exposed, and in securing the 
 ends for which they exist. 
 
 MANNER OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL. 
 
 All Governmental Control is throutjlt Law. 
 
 A single act, involving no law, if such a thing is 
 possible, is not government, and the control involved 
 in such act is not cfoveniment. But f2:overnmcnt is
 
 12 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 tlie whole system of control in the ease, and this must 
 be through law. 
 
 Law is a uniform mode of action^ so long as there 
 is occasion for uniformity. 
 
 The laws of matter are the uniform modes of the 
 actitms of matter, so long as there is occasion for such 
 uniformity. If ever the occasion for the uniformity 
 of a law of matter should cease, — for exami:)le, if ever 
 the occasion for the law of gravitation should cease, — 
 science cannot assert that the law would still continue 
 and be uniform. So, in rational government, as in 
 national affairs, if the occasion for the uniformity of a 
 law ceases, no science or philosophy or moralizing can 
 rationallj^ assert that the law will or ought to continue 
 as a law. It may then, in perfect harmony with science, 
 be changed to that for which there is occasion. Hence . 
 the principle : 
 
 The uniformity of a law, and the law itself in any 
 government m.ay cease v)hen the occasion for it ceases. 
 Or., lohenever in view of all circumstances, usefulness 
 is no longer promoted hy the uniformity of a law, that 
 uniformity in any government may cease, and the law 
 ie changed. 
 
 Thus, law is a uniform mode of action, so long as 
 there is occasion for such uniformity, and the manner 
 of governmental control is through law. In respect 
 to matter, it evidently can exert a control only through 
 the laws of matter : as, for example, the government of 
 the sun over the planets is a system of control exerted 
 only through the laws of gravitation, light, heat, etc. So 
 the government of instinct in animals is only through
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 13 
 
 tlie laws of instinct. So also the ijoverninent of i-ational 
 beinsrs is a control tlirouii-h the laws of such beings. 
 
 In all cases law is generically the same, — a uniform 
 mode of action, so long as there is occasion for uni- 
 formity, and the manner of governmental control is 
 through law.
 
 14 archology; or, 
 
 CHAPTER ir. 
 
 CLASSES OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Governments are divided into classes, according to 
 their nature and manner of exerting control. 
 
 Some governments are without consciousness; others 
 involve consciousness and a will, but are destitute of 
 some peculiarities of these; while, again, other gov- 
 ernments involve them. Hence, as thus divided, 
 
 There are Three great Classes of Governments: the 
 Material, the Instinctive, and the Rational. 
 
 The rational is again divided into disciplinary and 
 legal, but this division will be considered farther on. 
 
 Material government is the government of m.atter 
 over matter. 
 
 In this definition are included, under the word 
 matter, all the adjuncts of matter; such as light, heat, 
 electricity, the organizing principle in plants, etc., 
 whatever these may be. Illustrations of material 
 government appear numberless, as that of the moon 
 over the tides ; the heart over the circulation of the 
 blood ; vegetable life in shaping the growing plant; 
 the wind in controlling the waves; etc. They answer 
 to the definition as the whole system of control in 
 each particular case. They originate as a necessity to 
 the entities involved in them in securing the ends
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 15 
 
 for which tliey exist. Their iiiin is the iii&uring a 
 harmony of action anion<^ these entities necessary to 
 securing the ends for which they exist ; and the man- 
 ner of their control is through law, the laws of matter, 
 uniform modes of action, so long as there is occasion 
 for uniformity. 
 
 The distinguishing feature of material govern- 
 ment is control loithout consciousness on the ^jarl of 
 its actors. 
 
 This statement has reference only to the govern- 
 ment in itself alone considered. For there must have 
 been consciousness as necessary to knowledge on the 
 part of the Creator, to give matter all its wonderful 
 capabilities, adaptations, forces, and laws of action. 
 Yet in matter itself there is discoverable Jiot the least 
 evidence of conscionsness or knowledge. And being 
 destitute of knowledge, it is therefore without self- 
 directing power, acting only as acted upon in accord- 
 ance with its laws of action. 
 
 IXSTINCTIVE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Instinctive government is the system of control 
 exerted under the deteYmining force of instinct. 
 Instinct is an original and conscious impulse to do 
 certain actions without regard to fnal residts heyond 
 the iwnu diuiefuthre. 
 
 This instinct is original, because implanted at the 
 origin of instinctive beings in their very nature. It 
 is proved to have been thus implanted, because it is 
 uniform in all of the same species; unchanged by repe- 
 tition ; unaltered however object's in the distance may
 
 IG ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 change ; and nnmodified except by immediate circum- 
 stances, and even then but slightly. It is without a 
 regard to fiiuil results, because it is not changed in 
 view of such results ; and is often intensely active 
 and minutely exact, where, in the peculiarities of the 
 being and the circumstances, it could not have any 
 knowledge of such results. The butterfly, of only a 
 few days' existence, deposits eggs in a manner exactly 
 adaj^ted to the peculiarities of the seasons for months 
 to come, and also to the needs of the hatching larvae, 
 in conditions of life entirely different from the parent, 
 through various and most wonderful transformations. 
 
 There must have been knowledge on the part of the 
 Creator as to the future, in giving the creature the 
 impulse of instinct to act in such a manner adapted 
 to secure needed results far in the future. Yet there 
 could be no such knowledge on the part of the crea- 
 ture itself. Its knowledo^e is that of immediate cir- 
 cumstances, with, probably, very limited remembrance 
 of the past, but without any conscious reference to 
 ultimate results in the future. 
 
 Illustrations of instinctive government are found 
 
 throughout all the animated world : as in migrating 
 
 wild fowls, passing over continents and oceans at the 
 
 proper time to escape the severity of the seasons ; in 
 
 herds of buffaloes ti-aversinof immense regions of terri- 
 er o 
 
 tory in the needed direction to secure a supply of 
 food ; in a hive of bees, constructing, Avith perfect 
 fitness, and with mathematical exactness, their coml), 
 ada])ted to its purposes in meeting the wants of their 
 existence; in the anthill, where every insect, from the
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 17 
 
 beginning, does with perfection just what is needed 
 to be done; in the bird building its nest; the mole 
 its ])inTo\v; tlie spider its web ; and tliiis on without 
 limit. In all these cases there is an impulse to do that 
 M'hieh is adapted to result in distant objects of good, 
 without a knowledge of these objects beyond the 
 immediate future. Their Creator must have known 
 these objects, but not they. 
 
 The distinguishing feature of instinctive govern- 
 Tnent is conscious impulse to action, with a form of 
 will, hut %oithout conscious reference to ultimate 
 results. 
 
 Consciousness, with an impulse which may be called 
 a form of will, distinguishes instinctive government 
 from material government. They both are active 
 systems of control, necessary to the entities compre- 
 hended in them in securing the ends for which they 
 exist ; and operate through laws, uniform modes of 
 action, so long as there is occasion for uniformit}-. 
 One is unconscious; the other conscious, and with a 
 form of will. But the will is irrational under the 
 control of impulse, and must obey the law of impulse, 
 without reference to final results. 
 
 Will is tJiat in an intelligent heing which dictates 
 action, and controls it directly at its heginning as the 
 primal cause. 
 
 Not all the actions of an intelligent being are thus 
 dictated by will, but that which does dictate is the 
 will. Much of thinking is action without will or dic- 
 tation. Yet the will may assume control and dictate 
 the method and objects of thought, the same as it may
 
 18 aechology; or, 
 
 dictate the order of breathing. So, also, the art of will- 
 ing in a rational being is not dictated. Science, in its 
 limiting ignorance, stops and declares that, as far as 
 evidence goes, the will in a rational being dictates 
 actions, but nothing dictates to it. 
 
 "While every action dictated bj will is directly con- 
 trolled bv the will at its beginnino-, yet, afterwards, 
 every such action flows onward in single or branching 
 trains of results without liijiit. After the beo-inninff 
 of action, many other forces may affect and control 
 it more or less continualh\ But, in its beginning, 
 such action is controlled directly by the will. 
 
 RATIONAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Rational government is the system of control com- 
 mencing in the will, in harmony with reason, and 
 exerted consciously l>y, and over^ rational heings. 
 
 The word "consciously" is used in the definition, 
 because a rational being often exerts a control of the 
 same character with matter, unconsciously. Only that 
 which is conscious pertains to rational government. 
 
 Reason, as used in this definition^ signifies the 
 power ^ or faculty^ which hoth perceives truths in their 
 different relations^ and infers new truths from those 
 already apprehended. 
 
 Truths here signify whatever, as an object of belief, 
 the intellect holds in the belief as truth. And when- 
 ever the belief is so clear and positive as not to admit 
 of the least conscious doubt or hesitation in the mind, 
 it is called knowledge. Hence, belief and knowledge 
 differ only in the degree of the intellectual assent. 
 

 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVEKNMENT. 19 
 
 with which tho mind receives their objects as true. 
 Therefore, in this treatise, hereafter, instead of belief 
 and believe, the words knowledge and know will gen- 
 erally be used as the more convenient. 
 
 Since a clear apprehension of what rational govern- 
 ment is, and an exact definition of it, are of the utmost 
 importance, each portion of the definition here given 
 is separately specified. 
 
 In the first place, the governmental control is exerted 
 by and over rational beings — i. e., those possessing 
 faculties for perceiving truths, and inferring new ones 
 from those already apprehended. Hence, government 
 needs to correspond to the wants of such beings, and 
 be modified according to their necessities. 
 
 It needs to affect them, not like blind force, as that 
 of matter, nor the equally blind impulse of feeling or 
 instinct; but as a rational force, acting through intelli- 
 gence, reaching the subjects of government for good. 
 In all its features, and entire influence, it needs to 
 harmonize witli their natures as rational beings, and, 
 through truth, become to them a means of usefulness 
 in securing the ends for which they exist. 
 
 If rational government should appear to involve, also, 
 creatures of instinct, this is so only in appearance. 
 For, it is in such case, at most, only a mixed govern- 
 ment. Because, while on the part of those who exert 
 the control, there is reason, yet, on the part of the 
 creatures of instinct, the control reaches them only 
 through the laws of instinct, and therefore to them 
 it is instinctive government. 
 
 In the second place, rational government involves,
 
 20 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 on tlie part of those by and over whom the control 
 is exerted, knowledge of truths, as the basis of all 
 governmental action. Hence, government mnst cor- 
 respond with truth, knoM'n and to be known. It 
 needs to commence with truth, and proceed witli 
 truth, in all its actions affecting its subjects in accord- 
 ance with their knowledge, and ever add to tliis 
 knowledge as a means helpful to them in securing the 
 ends for which they exist. Rational government is 
 not an abstract, arbitrary power or reality. Tlie 
 whole system of it harmonizes with reason, and its 
 everv featui-e has its basis in knowledge. 
 
 In the third place, rational government involves, on 
 the part of those by and over whom it is exerted, the 
 fact of reasoning, that of inferring new truths from 
 those already apprehended, and of distinguishing 
 truth from error. Hence, government needs to be a 
 help to them in reasoning, in inferring truths from 
 truths, that they may secure the ends for which they 
 exist. 
 
 And in the fourth place, rational government in- 
 volves, on the part of those by and over whom it is 
 exerted, as its great, all-important element, the will of 
 the rational being, with all the peculiarities of it. In 
 view of this as the primal element of control, the 
 features of rational government must be most care- 
 fully modified, and be exactly conformed to its prin- 
 ciples, as an aid to it in its executive capacities, that 
 all action may tend to result in good. 
 
 The will lias been defined to be " that in an intel- 
 ligent beino; which dictates action and controls it
 
 THE SCIENCE OP GOVERNMENT. 21 
 
 directly at its begiiniiiii^." In instinctive government 
 the form of will is controlled by impulse ; but in ra- 
 tional ffovernraent the will is under no control. For, 
 first, were the will under the control of impulse, it 
 would be an entity of instinctive government, and 
 thus there would exist no rational government at all. 
 Again, were the will under the control of matter, it 
 would be an/entity of material government, and again 
 there would exist no rational government at all. 
 Lastly, therefore, if in rational government the Avill is 
 under control, it must be under that of reason. Now 
 reason, as defined, consists of only two things, as " the 
 faculty or power which perceives truths in their differ- 
 ent relations, and infers new truths from those already 
 apprehended." In the first function of reason as 
 'perceivhKj truth, it acts only so far as to perceive 
 truths in their different relations; and here its action, 
 as merely-perceiving, ceases. It does not dictate and 
 control other actions, to bring them into harmony with 
 its perceptions. It is the function of the will, as de- 
 fined, to do this — to dictate actions in harmony with, 
 or contrary to, the reason. Again, if the second func- 
 tion of reason be considered — that of inferring ti'uths 
 from others — this is only one action : that of inferring ; 
 while after this, after the whole process of inferring 
 truths is finished, there is that of dictating and con- 
 trolling the actions of the intelligent being, either in 
 harmony or not in harmonv with truth <;iven in the 
 inferences of reason. This latter act is that of the 
 will. Kow here both experience and consciousness 
 prove that the will is often in opposition to truth and
 
 22 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 reason, not in harmony ^vitll the decisions of reason, 
 effectnallj rejecting the inferences of reason, and 
 yieldiiii^ itself up in obedience to impulse and self- 
 gratification. Thus it is proved that the will in rational 
 government is not under the control either of matter, 
 or of impulse, or of reason, and hence is under no 
 control. 
 
 Again, in rational government the will is itself 
 alone sovereign. Nothing is practically superior to 
 it. Nothing can, or does, compulsorily control it. 
 Deciding for itself, it may determine action either in 
 harmony with reason, with truth, with right, witli 
 good, with benevolence, or it may determine action in 
 opposition to all these, dictating all for self, for im- 
 pulse, for passion, and for the unreasonable. 
 
 Again, in rational govei'nment the will is a free will. 
 As sovereign, the will is necessarily free, not governed, 
 not controlled by any force or power. It may be per- 
 suaded by reason, it may be influenced by impulse, it 
 may be induced by desire, it may be affected by cir- 
 cumstances, but it is itself to decide to yield or not to 
 yield to the influence. As sovereign, it is the only 
 dictating power, free in its actions, going out through 
 a whole system of control, but controlled itself by 
 nothing. Reason is its chief minister, its constant 
 companion, its faithful adviser, and its truest guide; 
 but itself is alone sovereign and free, the real source 
 of efficiency, the ultimate authority in the case, deter- 
 mining the whole system of control affecting every 
 entity of the government. Nothing exists for the 
 benefit of this will, but it should exist wholly for the
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNifENT. 23 
 
 benefit of tlio entities compreliended in croverninent. 
 To act for itself", called wilfulness, or fur others to act 
 for it, or in its place, is a perversion. It, or tliey, or 
 both, are wrong in such a case. The will, as a free 
 sovereign, is alone to dictate, order, control all others, 
 in view of securing the ends for which they e.xist. 
 
 THE MANNER OF THE WILl's CONTEOL. 
 
 1st. As to actions, the loill controls the actions hy 
 immediate and direct force. Not all actions, thi-ougli 
 rational government, are thus controlled by will, since 
 actions result from actions in endless series and com- 
 binations; but the will begins actions by immediate 
 and direct force upon the active powers. 
 
 2d. As to feelings, the will controls the feelings hy 
 mediate and indirect force. The feelings are moved 
 only by their exciting causes, which are found in the 
 conditions of things. Hence, the will can reach these 
 feelings, to move them, oidy by holding before the 
 emotional powers their exciting causes. In this n)anner, 
 by means of these causes, the will can, and does, 
 control the feelings indirectly. Still it is an effectual 
 control, as truly so as is its direct control over the 
 actions. 
 
 3d. As to the reason and belief, the 2cill also con- 
 trols the reason hy mediate and indirect force. 
 
 The reason as defined signifies " both the faculty to 
 infer and the process of inferring new truths from 
 those already apprehended." But the will can hold 
 before the reasoning faculties such truths as it may 
 select and in such relations as it may determine, so as
 
 24 aechology; or, 
 
 to direct the process of reasoning, and in general 
 make certain the decision as to what sliall or shall not 
 be believed. Thus indirectly the will controls the 
 reason and the belief. He that will believe an error 
 can 2:enerallv do it, and he that will receive a truth 
 can probably always do it. The will is as sovereign 
 indirectl^^ over the feelings, the reason and belief, as 
 it is directly over actions. In both cases some things 
 are impossible. In actions, if the will determines a man 
 to jump to the sun, it is impossible. So, as to the belief, 
 if the will determines that the reason shall infer one 
 and one to be three, itprobabh' is impossible. Or that 
 a truly and clearly good mother shall be hated ; yes, 
 this in particular cases, might be possible. The will is 
 somewhat limited, but indirectly it is as sovereign over 
 the feelings and the reason, i. e., belief, as it is directly 
 over the actions. Thus in rational o-overnment tlu; 
 will is the originating, determinating, compulsory 
 source of all control. It alone is sovereign, free, un- 
 controlled, but may control all else within thatgov'ern- 
 ment — the actions, the feelings, the reason, or belief. 
 It may be influenced, persuaded, urged, affected, but 
 it alone is free to determine to vield or not, and all 
 must obey its dictum. 
 
 The disting^iishing feature of rational govern- 
 ment is conscious hnoiuledge of actions determined 
 upon hy the will in view of final results as given in 
 the reason. 
 
 Illustrations of rational government appear almost 
 limitless, as the lyceum, the family, the school, the 
 city, the State, the kingdom of Heaven, etc. In each
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 25 
 
 there is knowledge of final results, in the securing of 
 ends for which entities exist, with will controlliuir 
 actions put forth for the securing of such ends. In the 
 famil}' there is tlie will of the parent; in the State, 
 the will of the executive ; in the kingdom of Heaven, 
 the will of God; and the manner of governmental 
 control is through law; uniform modes of action — so 
 long as there is occasion for uniformity — insuring a 
 harmony of action necessary' to entities in securing 
 the ends for which they exist. 
 2
 
 26 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE THREE CLASSES OF GOVERNMENT CONTRASTED. 
 
 In tlie distino-uishino^ feature of each class of 
 government is found the single element from which or 
 in which commences the control. 
 
 In Material Government the jprinial element in 
 which the control legins is matter. In Instinctive 
 Government the primal element in which the control 
 hegins is impulse. In Rational Governmeiit theprimdi 
 element in which the control hegins is will. 
 
 In the development of the science of archology it 
 is of the utmost importance, that these three primal 
 elements of control be kept clear and distinct in the 
 mind. The mixins; or confusinij; of thein with one 
 another, or with other elements, is sure to result in the 
 greatest errors. They are in themselves simple, and in 
 their departments, supreme. They are matter, im- 
 pulse, will; unconscious matter; impulse witli con- 
 sciousness and a form of will ; and will with conscious- 
 ness, knowledge, reason, desire, impulse, motive, plan, 
 and all else pertaining to a rational being. 
 
 Matter, impulse, will ; each simple and supreme in 
 its department, controlling and necessitating all within 
 the sphere of its government. 
 
 The higher government can control the lower 
 through its laws / never the lower control the higher.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 27 
 
 The instinct of the animal may govern matter and 
 determine its action in harmony -with impulse; and 
 tliisit must do, if done at all, by availing itself of the 
 laws of matter. But matter cannot govern the animal 
 by availing itself of the laws of instinct. Matter, 
 through the laws of matter, may govern the animal 
 as matter, but never through the law of instinct. 
 So also the will of a rational being ijiay, through the 
 laws of instinct and of matter, force the instinct of 
 the animal and all the elements of matter into sub- 
 servience to the designs of the rational being. But in- 
 stinct Can never rccoo^nize anvthing higher than it- 
 self as reason, and thus brin<>: it into subservience to 
 itself for its own purposes. Impulse in a creature of 
 instinct may force the animal into conflict with a 
 rational being and compel such being contrary to his 
 will. But this is done only as one creature of instinct 
 overcomes another creature of instinct, with no refer- 
 ence to reason. The will through reason may take 
 advantage of instinct and govern it for its own pur- 
 poses, but never can instinct thus ^vail itself of 
 reason. 
 
 Again, the higher govei^mnent may lose its distin- 
 guishing feature, and descend into, or he sitpplanted 
 hy, the lower ; hut never the lower ascend to hecome tJie 
 liigher. 
 
 A creature of instinct may lose all conscious im- 
 pulse, and become governed only as so much matter. 
 This may result from sickness, or an injury to the 
 brain, and the animal is only as so much nuitter. So, 
 also, in rational government, the will, as free and su-
 
 28 archology; or, 
 
 preme, may yield itself a slave, in obedience to impulse, 
 to anger, or passion, or seliisljness, etc., and the gov- 
 ernment descend from its rational character, to be 
 only one of unnatural instinct ; an instinctive govern- 
 ment of most wretched perversion. Yet in the op- 
 posite direction, matter cannot ascend to involve 
 instinct, for it can only act through its own laws, and 
 in those is no will. Neither can instinct ascend to 
 reason, for it can only act in accordance with its own 
 laws. And those laws are only those of impulse, with 
 no reference to ultimate results. Thus instinct can 
 never become reason. 
 
 Again, m case of the descending of the higher gov- 
 ernment to hecome the loiver, disaster to the entities 
 comprehended in the higher is inevitable. 
 
 The government upon which the entities were de- 
 pendent, that they might secure the ends of their ex- 
 istence, has turned from its assistance to them, and 
 become subservient to another government, with an- 
 other class of results. Without their needed govern- 
 ment, the entities in their actions must come into 
 unavoidable conflicts ; hence disaster, destruction, 
 death, are the inevitable results. 
 
 Again, in case of the degradation of the higher gov- 
 ernment to the lower, there is no probahility, if there is 
 any possibility, of a recovery of the degraded g<yvern- 
 ment hack to its original position a?id character by its 
 ovm efforts alone. 
 
 When once the impulse of instinct in the animal is 
 gone, and he has become only so much matter, decom- 
 position begins, dispersion rapidly follows, and the
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 29 
 
 former government of iustinct is forever at an end. It 
 has no power to restore itself as it was. The activity 
 of impulse may be temporarily suspended, and the 
 power of impulse remain for a time paralyzed. In 
 this case, when the suspending cause is removed, the 
 impulse resumes again its control. Yet there is no 
 degrading of the government of impulse in this case, 
 only a suspension of it, and when the suspending cause 
 is removed, it merely goes on in its activity as before. 
 But when the power of impulse no more exists, and 
 the whole system has gone mider the control of matter, 
 as in death, then the individual instinctive government 
 has ceased, without the least possibility of self-recovery." 
 It is very much so also in rational government. When 
 once the fi'ee will, which should have controlled all in 
 harmony with reason, with truth, and the welfare of 
 the entities involved in the government, has ceased its 
 proper restraint of all the activities, and yielded itself 
 a slave to impulse, its sovereignty is practically gone; 
 its freedom is perverted in exercise ; its control of ac- 
 tions, which should have been in accordance with reason 
 and truth for good, is now itself controlled by another 
 power, one which has no reference to reason or truth. 
 The previous government is in ruins ; its sovereign is 
 in voluntary slavery, and science unfolds in the case 
 no probability, if there is any possibility, for the slave 
 to recover the mastery, and reestablish the former 
 government. The free will, voluntarily renouncing 
 its control, and becoming obedient to another power, 
 can scarcely revolt against its new lord, corret*t the 
 ruin begun, and restore to harmony all actions for
 
 30 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 the good of those inchided in the first government. 
 It' restoration comes, it must come at least with aid 
 from some other and hio-her source than that of the 
 government itself alone — a source outside of itself 
 and superior to it — or ruin inevitably must follow. 
 
 Again, only rational governraevit can degrade itself 
 to a lower. 
 
 Material government is as low as it can be. As 
 matter came from the hand of its Creator, so of itself 
 it must remain. 
 
 Also, as to instinct, it has no freedom or self-con- 
 trol. Impulse is simply impulse, just such as the 
 Creator made it, and must ever be in exact harmony 
 with its own laws, unchanged by itself, for it possesses 
 no self-modulating power. 
 
 But in rational government the primal element of 
 action is will, as to which there is nothing compul- 
 sorily controlling it. It may decide for good or evil, 
 for right or wrong ; for impulse or reason ; for self- 
 gratification or for the welfare of all the entities 
 involved in the government. Hence it has the power 
 to degrade itself and degrade its government from 
 its rational character and objects, involving all in ruin. 
 If it will ever choose reason as its adviser and constant 
 guide, ever aiming at truth, right, and welfare, \i may ; 
 if it will not so do, but will do the opposite, it can. 
 
 In the very necessities of rational government the 
 Creator gave to the will this power, freely to control 
 all for good, or for what involves the opposite ; to be 
 true to all excellence, or to degrade itself and the 
 government to a lower character.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVEllNMENT. 31 
 
 Had he not giveti tliis power to the will, no rational 
 government conld have existed. For a free and sov- 
 ereign will is the very element, the essential and 
 ])rimal element, of such government, without which 
 such government would not he. Aside from this free 
 and sovereign will — sovereign, as being itself uncon- 
 trolled by any compulsory power within its own prov- 
 ince of action — there would exist only the two forms 
 of material and instinctive government. Thus there 
 could be none of the higher joys, and dignities, and 
 activities, and limitless progress of the creatures of 
 rational government. The inconceivably higher 
 interests of the universe demanded rational govern- 
 ment. And in this was necessarily involved the free 
 will of the intellifjent creatures of such ijovernment. 
 Hence, there was necessarily involved the power, and 
 even also the opportunity, for the will to degrade 
 itself by deciding actions for that which is not reason- 
 able, not true, not good. 
 
 Thus, in rational government, the will, being free, 
 must 1)6 able to degrade itself and the government. 
 For the existence of such rational government, involv- 
 ing such power of self-degradation, the Creator is 
 responsible; and if, in the fact of allowing the exist- 
 ence of such government, there is, or was, wrong, 
 then the Creator is to blame. JBut if, in view of all 
 things forever, it was best that rational governments 
 should exist at all, then, of necessity, in the nature 
 of such governments, the will controlling them must 
 possess the freedom and power to degrade itself and 
 them. They, through the will, are alone the blame-
 
 32 AKCHOLOGY ; OK, 
 
 worthy party for such degradation and consequent 
 disaster. Morally the Creator must do all he consist- 
 ently can to prevent such degradation and consequent 
 ruin. But there must necessarily be a possibility of 
 its taking place ; and if there be a will to do it, the^. 
 possibility must become a reality, with all the fearful, 
 inevitable results. 
 
 In the truth of the freedom and the sovereignty of 
 the Avill is involved the necessary truth that there is 
 no j)ower which can reach the will to compel it to be 
 right. Hence, if it wills to refuse the guidance of 
 reason, and to yield itself to impulse and seliishness, 
 it can do so, become wrong itself, and degrade its 
 government in character, whelming all in ruin. 
 
 Now the whole object, eftbrt, and benefit of archol- 
 ogy as a science is to aid either in avoiding this degra- 
 dation, or in recovei'ing from it if it be a reality. 
 Therefore, as the science, in its application to Mate- 
 rial and Instinctive governments, is, comparatively, of 
 little importance, and seems easily exhausted, the 
 remaining development of it will be confined to the 
 fuller investigation of the principles and peculiarities 
 of Rational Government.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 33 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 RATIONAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Rational government has been delined to be "the 
 system of control commencing in the will, harmoniz- 
 ing with reason, and exerted consciously by and over 
 rational beings." According to this definition, as 
 previously explained, the Nvill, in true rational gov- 
 ernment, accepts the reason as its adviser and guide, 
 conforms to its decisions, and controls all actions for 
 the benefit of the rational entities involved in such 
 government. But the entities of a rational govern- 
 ment arc properly called subjects. Therefore, in 
 accordance with the principles discovered in the exam- 
 ination of gover.nment as a genus, it follows, in the 
 application of those principles to rational government 
 as a species, that the whole origin and aim of such 
 government are found in the necessities of its sub- 
 jects, as a means indispensable to their securing the 
 ends of their existence. Its aim is in no manner for 
 itself, but Mholly for the Avelfare of its subjects. Its 
 principle of existence, its virtue and force, consist in 
 the fact of its usefulness as far as possible to them, 
 as a means necessary in securing their own gO(.)d. 
 The word good, or welfare, is a co'mjyrehensive term, 
 signifying <dl the ends taken colleeiicely for which 
 2*
 
 34 AECHOLOGY ; OE, 
 
 sensitive l)eings exist, together with the means hy which 
 they are secured. 
 
 In order to secure this good, as a means of useful- 
 ness necessary to subjects, rational gov^ernment exists, 
 exerting, so far as possible, such a control over them 
 that, without conflicting interference, they, in harmony 
 together, may secure their truest, highest welfai-e. 
 Just in proportion as government is changed from 
 this usefulness to its subjects, it becomes changed from 
 a rational government to be perverted into a form of 
 corrupt instinctive government, under the control of 
 impulse. In this case, being destitute of the regw- 
 lating restraints and protective guards of a naturally 
 instinctive government, as established by the Creator, 
 the perverted government, as pre\iously shown, must 
 probably become an ntter ruin. It lias in itself little 
 or no remedial quality, and seems very sure to pro- 
 gress, of itself alone, from bad to worse without 
 known limit. 
 
 For the perfect success of rational government, in 
 insuring the real good of all its subjects, there is a 
 necessity of three things : 
 
 1st, That the intelligence of the governing authority 
 shall correctly apprehend the ends for which the sub- 
 jects exist. 
 
 All rational actions necessarilj'^ presuppose knowl- 
 edge of that for which the action is put forth ; hence 
 the governing authority must know the ends for which 
 subjects exist. Otherwise it could not govern them 
 successfully in securing these ends, or their real 
 good.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 35 
 
 2d. That the reason correctly decide iLjpon the means 
 with wliicJi to secure these ends. 
 
 3d. Tltat the will, in accordance with the decisions 
 of reason, succeed in so controlling all actions, as to 
 secure their harmonious adaptation to result in these 
 ends. 
 
 If tlie iiitclli<^-ence fails of apprehending the real 
 objects of existence, i. 6., the real good and welfare of 
 the subjects of government, disaster must follow. If 
 the reason does not point out correctly the means to 
 be used, and the actions to be put forth, adapted to 
 secure such good, disaster must follow. If the will, 
 as the primal element of control, fails to accord with 
 reason, by yielding itself to impulse, or in any other 
 way fails to control the actions put forth so as to se- 
 cure an adaptation to result in such good, disaster must 
 follow. 
 
 Intelligence, reason, will, must all be correct, and 
 the will must be successful, or disaster must follow. 
 The true objects of good must be known, the true 
 means of securing them must be perceived, and the 
 will must succeed in controlling all actions in a numner 
 adapted to result in their attainment, or disaster must 
 follow, the good of the subjects must be lost, the 
 very objects for which alone government ex'sts not 
 be secured, and evils incalculable be the result. 
 
 Knowledge, plan, and execution, mus^ le right, or 
 disaster follows. 
 
 The word right is one of frequent use in rational 
 government. It is of the greatest importance that its 
 exact signitication be nnderstood. Perhaps no other
 
 36 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 word is so difierently regarded by able men as to its 
 real meaniiifj. 
 
 Tlie word right lias generically otiIj^ one significa- 
 tion, yet specifically it has, in practice or in common 
 use, two. 
 
 Generically^ as an adjectwe, Ticflit signifies adapted 
 to the end designed in the case. 
 
 A garment is made right when exactly adapted to 
 the end designed in the making of it. A plow is 
 made right when exactly adapted to do the thing de- 
 signed in its making. A good man does right when 
 acting in a manner adapted to result in the welfare of 
 all. Adaptedness to a designed end is the generic 
 meaning of the word right, used as a noun. But, 
 specifically, the word has two significations, called 
 Moral right, and external or Practical right. Practi- 
 cal or external right is adaptation in external action 
 or thing to ends designed in the case. But Moral 
 right is adaptation in the motives influencing the will 
 to the great ends of all existence. 
 
 However moral philosophers may attempt to bring 
 out other meanings of the word right, yet, in an ex- 
 ecutive sense, as in rational government, these two are 
 the only significations in which it is used. Govern- 
 ment and law have no reference to any right, except 
 in motive ^and in action, in design and in thing, 
 moral and practical. 
 
 External or practical right has no reference to the 
 actor, but only to the action, or external thing as adapted 
 to an end. But moral right has entire reference to the 
 actor as influenced by a motive adapted to promote
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 37 
 
 the good of all. Motive sigmfies either an object of 
 desire^ or the desire of an object ultimate in the j9<Z'/'- 
 ticular case, iiijlu ending the will. 
 
 This motive is only an influence upon the will, not 
 a necessitating cause to it ; not a compulsoiy force. 
 The will, as the primal element of control, is to de- 
 cide or dictate action in the case ; yet motive is a 
 strong inducing influence. AVhcn this motive is the 
 universal good of all, then it is adapted to the great 
 ends of all existence ; i. e., to the highest welfare of 
 all, and is right. The rational being is right in motive, 
 and is moralhj right. Moi-al has always reference to 
 motive. Moral truth is truth in reference to motives. 
 Moral law is law in reference to motives. Moral riffht 
 is right in reference to motives. Moral oblij^ation is 
 obligation in reference to motives. Moral ffood is 
 good in reference to motives. So the opposite of 
 these, moral wrong, moral error, or moral evil, etc., all 
 have reference to the motives. 
 
 Illustrations of practical right have been given. 
 Yet, in addition, a locomotive is made right when ex- 
 actly adapted to move both with safety and with 
 power along the track. A book is bound right when 
 the best adapted to the end for which a book is bound. 
 A house is built right when the best adapted to the 
 ends for -which a honse is built. And a ruler rules 
 right when so ruling as the best to promote the good 
 of his subjects — the one true object of ruling. 
 
 But moral right refers to the innermost, secret, in- 
 fluencing, design of the rational being; a design which 
 is the ultimate aim of the actor in determining upon
 
 38 AECHOLOGY ; OE, 
 
 the action. The man whose motive is constantly to 
 do tliat which is for the highest good of all, and 
 therefore chooses the perfect law of right in all his 
 dealings and actions, is morally right, even though, in 
 necessary ignorance, he may fail of doing the good 
 designed in particular cases. His motive is right, and 
 hence he himself is morally right. 
 
 If a rational being jjossessed knowledge so as uner- 
 ringly to know the results of all actions possible for 
 him to put forth, then, in his case, moral right and 
 practical right would perfectly harmonize, and always 
 coexist. For perfect moral right, or the motive of 
 universal good, would insure, through his unerring 
 knowledge, the choosing of perfect practical right, or 
 tlie actions adapted to result in the highest good of all. 
 There exists only one such being, the one Creator and 
 God over all, infinite in knowledge, righteousness, and 
 power. With Him perfect moral right and perfect 
 practical right must always coincide and harmonize. 
 
 But in the case of every finite being these two spe- 
 cies of right may coincide, or they may conflict. 
 Hence, in the case of every finite heing an act may he 
 at the same time both morally right and jpractically 
 wrong • or it may he hoth morally wrong and practi- 
 cally right. 
 
 If a rational being, with the evil intention of mur- 
 der, so strikes his victim ns really to open an other- 
 wise fatal absccssand thus saves the man's life, the man, 
 restored to health, would say, " The kn ife was struck just 
 right to save my life;" but the decision of a^ righteous 
 jury in tlie case would be, "Tlie intentional assassin
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 39 
 
 was morally wrong, and is guilty of assault with intent 
 to kill." Again, a eompaiiy of good and cxperienecd 
 surgeons may be morally right in an operation in- 
 volving an unperceivable difficulty, so that a life be 
 lost. Practically there was an error, a wrong; yet 
 they were morally right, free from all blame or guilt. 
 In all things every rational heing ought to he morallg 
 right. He ought in all things to have the motive of 
 promoting, to the utmost of his abihty, the highest 
 welfare, the truest good of all sensitive beings. This 
 is moral right, a right in motives. Still every finite 
 heing is, of himself^ and ever must le, liable to practi- 
 cal wrong. Since practical right is external to the 
 actor, in the condition of things, and in the tendency 
 of actions, he, the finite being, is, through ignorance, 
 constantly liable to failure in this right, and thus to do 
 practical wrong because of the limited character of his 
 powers. 
 
 This failure of the finite heing in practical right 
 may originate iti part, or in all, of three things: in 
 want of knowledge, loant of loill, or xoant of ■povoer. 
 
 He may know the right and will to do it, but fail 
 in power. He nuiy know the i-ight and have power 
 to do it, but fail in will. He may have the power and 
 the will to do it, but fail in knowledge. In case of 
 want of power, or want of knowledge, if this was una- 
 voidable, the rational being, when influenced by a 
 right motive, is morally right, tliongh failing of prac- 
 tical right in the case, and so doing practical wrong. 
 But in the case of the failure of the will, when there 
 is knowledge and power, then there is m6ral wrong in
 
 40' AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 the case ; there is a wrong motive, and the being is in 
 character morally wrong. Then, when the motive is 
 wrong, the will M'ill be wrong, leading to wrong ac- 
 tions in practice, or to practical wrong. Hence, in 
 moral wrong is involved all wrong, loth moral and 
 jyractical. For in this ease the will is refusing the 
 guidance of reason, and is yielding itself to the impulse 
 of selfishness, in conflict with reason, with truth, with 
 good. In this case, the more the will yields itself to 
 impulse, the more the efficiency of reason to influence 
 the will diminishes, and the ability of the will to con- 
 trol the feelings and actions in harmony with rea- 
 son weakens, M'hile the power of impulse to control 
 the will increases, with little or no saving laws of 
 restraint. 
 
 Thus the being becomes more and more perverted 
 from a rational beir)g intoabeingof unnatm-al instinct, 
 under the power of seltishness, envy, jealousy, anger, 
 malice, revenge, and every evil passion, in conflict with 
 all the real welfare of others, and of all future irood. 
 The will is wrong, and is becoming more and more 
 wrong, and the whole nature of the being, of himself 
 alone, is changed into greater and greater wrong. 
 J^ow there is very little probabilitj^, even if there be 
 any possibility, that the moral being, thus perverted 
 in nature and character, will, alone of himself, recover 
 from his moral ruin, and the reason regain its influence 
 over the will as its counsel and guide, and the will 
 again recover its control over the feelings, the intel- 
 lect and the actions, to brine: all once more into har- 
 mony with immutable right.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 41 
 
 All these facts illustrate and make more evident the 
 necessity of rational government as a means indispen- 
 sable to rational beings in securing good. It is neces- 
 sary to the individual himself, in all the activities of 
 his being, through all his existence. It is necessary 
 in the family, and in every association of numbers, to 
 securing the good ever to be attained by such associ- 
 ated numbers ; necessary to societies, to cities, to States, 
 to the universe of rational beings, and ever must be 
 BO. It is necessary to them as a great, helpful means 
 indispensable to them in tlieir very nature as iinite 
 beings, and in the constitution of things, to their 
 avoiding the evils to which they are liable, and to the 
 securing of the good possible to them throughout their 
 course of existence. This still more will appear in 
 the succeeding chapters.
 
 42 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE MEANS OF GOTEKNMENTAL CONTROL. 
 
 While the manner of fyovernmental control is al- 
 wa^ys through law, The means of governmental con- 
 trol in rational government are two. They are instruc- 
 tion, and compulsion, or physical force. Instruction 
 signifies the imparting of knowledge, or the com- 
 municating of information, to another. 
 
 In supplying the wants of subjects so that they may 
 secure good and avoid the opposite, as unfolded in the 
 previous chapters, government becomes an aid to them, 
 first of all, by giving information as to objects of good 
 to be secured, the means to be used, and the actions 
 to be put forth for this purpose, together with what 
 must be avoided. This is the first and great work of 
 government, and consists of the instruction govern- 
 ment must give its subjects. This it may give in any 
 manner and by any means consistent with good, it may 
 judge best. But its one great, and necessary instru- 
 mentality for this purpose, and the one which peculi- 
 arly affects all other means, determining their matter 
 and manner, is law. Through law is given, hy govern- 
 ment, instruction necessary to its suhjectsin securing
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 43 
 
 their own real good^ i. e., the real ends of their exist- 
 ence. 
 
 Law is designed to be the specification of those uni- 
 form courses of action wliich the government is sup- 
 posed, from its superior opportunities, to know to be 
 best for the subjects to put forth ; and lience it in- 
 structs them bv ffivino' them information in the form 
 of hiw. So also as to what they are to avoid it in- 
 structs them by prohibitory Jaws, This is only one 
 element of law. A second is involved in it as essen- 
 tial to its existence. 
 
 For, instruction is not all which is necessar}' to sub- 
 jects. They need also protection against those actions 
 Avhich tend to the destruction of good, and against 
 those who will to put forth such actions. This pro- 
 tection on the part of government is given its subjects 
 in connection with law, and is involved in it as an 
 element, so that without it law would be no law. This 
 element of law is the obligatory. 
 
 Hence The essential elements or qualities of law are 
 two, the instructive and the obligatory. 
 
 While, as instructive, law is designed to present that 
 which is necessary to be known by subjects in secur- 
 ing good ; as obligatory, it is designed to bind them 
 to conform to it. Hence, as a full definition. Law in 
 a rational government is an authoritative, reqiiired, 
 mode, or ride, of action, made obligatory uj)on the sub- 
 jects, and uniform so long as there is occasion for 
 uniformity, as judged of by the law-making 'power. 
 
 This definition is desio-ncd to include everv variety 
 of law in rational government, both the eiToneous,
 
 44 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 the bad, as well as the good. A generic definition 
 aimstdo this, or else it is defective. Thus tlie words 
 anthoritative and obligatory as here used do not in- 
 clude the ideas of an 3^ supposed abstract dut}^, or ob- 
 ligation, or moral binding, or whatever other word 
 writers on morals have attempted to use, expressing 
 something they have generally called inexplicable, or 
 incomprehensible. These words here, in this treat- 
 ise, are designed to express only that wliich the gov- 
 ernment through its law-making department, and its 
 legal executive, originates, in the making of its laws, 
 and in the enforcing them npon its subjects. They 
 signify, that wliicli is trne botii in an erring govern- 
 m.ent as well as in a perfect government. Hence, 
 authoritative does not include the idea often connected 
 with it of a right to command and enforce obedience. 
 This idea is involved in the phrase " made obliga- 
 tory." Therefore in this definition Authoritative 
 signifies simjjly possessing sufficient emdence of truth- 
 fulness in the character of its author. Itequired 
 signifies^ that obedience is commanded. Thongh some- 
 times law appears in the form of permission, yet it is 
 a command, commanding no interference with him to 
 whom the permission is given. 
 
 Made ohligatory by government is necessary to law, 
 to its being law, in distinction from being mere ad- 
 vice. For Ad/oice is information given in a manner 
 expressing the author'' s opinion that it would he hest 
 the information be chosen and put into corresponding 
 practice. Yet this advice possesses in itself no legal 
 or governmental obligation, and he to whom it is
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 45 
 
 given, is at full liberty to conform to it, or not, in 
 practice. 
 
 But law is more than this. In its nature, as an 
 element of it, it is made obligatory upon the sub- 
 ject to conform to it and obey. And, That which 
 makes law to he obligatory^ distingtiishing it from 
 advice, is its sanctions^ i. c^its jpunishments and chas- 
 tisements. 
 
 Rewards for obedience to law are not sanctions, 
 and true law never justifies or uses them. Rewards 
 are oidy right where, either, there is done beneficially; 
 more than law requires, or else as an estimated remedy 
 for evils which are liable to be suffered in the exe- 
 cution of law. The aim and true operation of gov- 
 ernment are, so to control all things as to enable sub- 
 jects to secure real good. And when a subject yields 
 to the helpful, needed, control of government, by 
 obeying law, and thus really secures his own good and 
 the good of others, verily, he does not deserve, and 
 should not receive, a reward for it. Indeed, the re- 
 ward, if any, should be on the other side, and he re- 
 ward the government for its so necessary aid in his 
 securing his own and others' good. 
 
 Thus law, to be law, involves, as sanctions, only 
 punishments and chastisements. 
 
 The Sanctions of laio are some species of suffering, 
 threatened or injlicted iipon the transgressor, on ac- 
 count of his transgression, 7'endering obedience to law 
 sensibly obligatory, upon the subjects of government. 
 
 The sanctions of law are sometimes called the 
 penalties of law. But as penalty signifies the specifi-
 
 46 AKCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 cation of suffering, while both ])iinishn]ent and elias- 
 tisement generally signify the inflicted specifications, 
 these nice distinctions are not deemed necessary, and 
 penalty is never used in this work. 
 
 Kow it is very important to observe that while the 
 sanctions of law give to it its element of being 
 obligatory, i.e., its quality of binding the subject to 
 obey, yet they are not presented by the government 
 as objects of fear, to insure obedience through the im- 
 pulse of terror like an instinctive government. They 
 are presented as evidence, as testimony, as proofs, of 
 truth, which the subject needs, and are addressed only 
 to the reason of the truly rational being. While they 
 are thus evidence, they also act as a protection against 
 the actions of those who wish, or will, to violate the 
 laws of the government, and thus involve all in the 
 danger of suffering the evils consequent on disobe- 
 dience. 
 
 Hence, in their nature the sanctions of law are in- 
 structive and protective. 
 
 They are instructive to all the subjects of govern- 
 ment, and are protective to the obedient. 
 
 For a clear understanding of these two qualities 
 of sanctions of law, it is important to examine them 
 separately, the instructive and the protective, as in 
 the liext chapter. But before proceeding to the fuller 
 examination, it is well to epitomize the facts of this 
 chapter by the following forms: 
 
 Rational government is instructive and compul- 
 sory, through law. Law is instructive and obligatory, 
 throusch sanctions. Sanctions are instructive and
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 47 
 
 protective tliroui;li thcinselves. By their first element 
 they address themselves each to the intelligence and 
 reason of the subject, communicating information. 
 By their second element they attain, in their dili'er- 
 ent ways, the good to which they are specifically 
 adapted.
 
 48 archology; or, 
 
 CHAPTER YI. 
 
 SANCTIONS OF LAW. 
 
 It has been stated that, in their nature, the sanctions 
 of Jaw are instructive and protective. Considered 
 first, as instructive. The sanctions of law are the legal 
 evidence of the importance of law, and hy their mag- 
 nitude express the magnitude of that importance. 
 
 A being, to act rationally, must act in view of 
 truth, presented to his reason, through the evidence 
 of it. Hence, in order that the subject of govern- 
 ment may act rationally in his obedience to law, he 
 must have the evidence of the law, and also of its 
 importance. Yet, being only as one of the vast num- 
 bers of the subjects of government, he, in his limited 
 circumstances, cannot, from natural reasoning, and 
 from personal observation, so comprehend the various 
 results and bearings of actions on his own good and 
 also the good of others, as to select without failure 
 the right course of actions adapted to result in the 
 good of all. But the government, from its greater 
 opportunities, is supposed to be able to make this 
 selection for him, and, tlirough the law-making depart- 
 ment, it does this, expressing, in the form of law, its 
 opinion of what is right, and of how great is its 
 importance. 
 
 Therefore the subject must uniformly depend upon
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 49 
 
 this expressed opinion of govemnieiit as to tlie 
 importance of law and obey it accordiiii::! y. Now the 
 opinion of government as to the law and its impor- 
 tance, is legally expressed by tiie sanctions which the 
 law-making department attaches to the A'iolation of 
 law. 
 
 Therefore these sanctions of law are to each subject 
 of government the legal evidence of law and of its 
 importance. "Without them he could have no such 
 evidence, and the so-called law would be to him only 
 as advice, for him to adopt or reject at his option. 
 But in the sanctions he has the evidence of the law, 
 and of its ijnportance, given him in the expressed 
 opinion of the law-making department of government. 
 
 These sanctions thus become to him of vast impor- 
 tance as a rational being, just equal to the importance 
 of his having evidence at all in the case. With this 
 evidence he may rationally act in his obedience, and, by 
 obedience, secure his own good and that of others : 
 without it, irremediable evils are certain. This sup- 
 poses that the government is right in its opinion as 
 expressed by law and its sanction, and the confidence 
 of the subject that the law is right and for the best 
 good of all, will be in proportion to his confidence in 
 the ability and righteousness of the government. 
 
 Now to the rational subject of government, TJte 
 •magnitude of the sanctions of law expresses the iruuj- 
 nitude of the importance of the law. Or, The sanc- 
 tions of law are the measure of the iviportance of 
 law. 
 
 A law, to be truthful, must have sanctions of a
 
 50 AECHOLOGY ; OK, 
 
 magnitude equal to its own importance, or else tlie^y, 
 the sanctions, as evidence, belie the truth. Laws of 
 great importance, to be truthful, must have great 
 sanctions; laws of medium importance, medium sanc- 
 tions ; laws of little importance, little sanctions. If 
 the sanctions of law are small, when, in reality, the 
 importance of the law is great, they falsify the truth, 
 testifying that the law of great importance is only of 
 little importance. So also if the sanctions of law are 
 great, when the importance of law is small, they fal- 
 sify the truth, testifying that the law of little impor- 
 tance is of great importance. The sanctions of law, 
 and its importance, must correspond, or the evidence 
 in the case is erroneous, leading the subjects of gov- 
 ernment into error, certain to result in disaster, the 
 very thing government exists to prevent. 
 
 In practice this principle admits of modifications in 
 view of other considerations, yet, of itself, the prin- 
 ciple is true. 
 
 When the subject of government, approving of law 
 in view of its importance, as proved hy its sanctions 
 taken only as evidence, not as ohjects of fear, chooses 
 obedience to the law, he is acting rationally, and is 
 morally right. 
 
 But wlien, disregarding the importance of law, he 
 fears its sanctions only as objects of terror, then, 
 though he may, in external action, obey the law to 
 escape suffering, he yet is morally wrong in his very 
 obedience, for his motive is wrong, and he deserves 
 moral condemnation. 
 
 Again, The sanctions of law are also the legal evi-
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 51 
 
 dence of the criminality^ or hadness^ involved, in trans- 
 gressing a law^ and of the degree or magnitude of titat 
 criminality. The crime of violating a law is in pro- 
 portion to the importance of the law, while the impor- 
 tance is in proportion to the welfare, the true good, 
 which the law is designed to protect and insure. 
 
 As the sanctions express this importance of law, so 
 also, in the same manner, they express the criminality 
 of transgressing that law. Thus the crime of trans- 
 gressing a law of little importance is little in degree; 
 one of medium importance, medium in degree ; one 
 of great importance, great in degree. The crime of 
 violating a law and the degree of the crime, are 
 expressed by the sanctions of law. Hence these sanc- 
 tions, to be truthful, as evidence, must correspond to 
 the crime in ma<!;nitude. If srreat crime were 
 expressed, in its evidence, by little sanctions, these 
 would belie the truth, testifvins; o-reat crime to be 
 little. So if little crime were expressed in its evi- 
 dence by great sanctions, these again would belie the 
 truth, testifying the little crime to be great. 
 
 The sanctions of law must be truthful. Crime, and 
 the legal sanctions, expressing that crime, must be in 
 proportion, or the sanctions are wrong. Thus the 
 sanctions give instruction, testifying by their magni- 
 tude, to both the magnitude of tlie importance of law, 
 and also to the ma<i:nitude of the crime of transsrress- 
 ing the law. The great principle in the case is as 
 follows : Little importance, little crime, little legal 
 sanctions ; groat im])ortance, great crime, great legal 
 sanctions; linite importance, tinite crime, tiuito legal
 
 52 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 sanctions; infinite importance, infinite crime, infinite 
 legal sanctions. Such are the proportions in archol- 
 ogy, such the truth, and such the necessities in reason, 
 or else, in the legal evidence, there is error; a false- 
 hood ; a lie. Truth cannot lie; and a true rational 
 government must express, by sanctions, truthfully, 
 the real magnitude of the importance of law and 
 also of the crime involved in transs-ressino^ the law. 
 
 When the snljject of governm,ent, with the Tnotive of 
 avoiding crime, through abhorrence of it as had, 
 tahes the sanctions of law as the evidence of the crime 
 of transgression not as objects of terror, and avoids 
 the crime hy obedience, he is acting rationally, and is 
 morally right. 
 
 But when, through fear of suffering, he avoids the 
 transgression of law to escape the pain, solely as an 
 object of terror, he is wrong in motive, and is thus a 
 moral transgressor even in his obedience. There is 
 also another principle in respect to crime, which is in 
 exact harmony with the previous one. This is, that 
 In any jyarticular government, the crime of trans- 
 gressing law, is in proportion to the authority of that 
 government, and the sanctions of law are the measure 
 of that crime. 
 
 The crime of transgressing law in a government 
 of little authority, as that of a voluntary lyceum, is 
 little in degree, and the sanctions of law are corre- 
 spondingly small, perhaps only a vote of censure, or 
 expulsion from the association. But the crime of vio- 
 lating the law of the family wiiich is a government of 
 higher authority, is greater, and the sanctions of law
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT, 53 
 
 measuring tlie crime, are greater. The same is true in 
 the city, the State, the general government, etc. As tlie 
 antliority of the government rises higher and higher, 
 the crime of ti-ansgressing law is greater and greater 
 in degree, and the sanctions of law are proportionally 
 greater. Now were a fully competent rational being, 
 from a world of superior intelligence, to assume, right- 
 fully, the government of the whole world as a united 
 kingdom, the crime of violating a law of that govern- 
 ment would be yet greater, and the sanctions of law 
 in the case would be greater. Once more, if the 
 authority of the government of the Creator of the 
 universe is infinite, then the crime of violating law in 
 that government is infinite, and the sanctions of law, 
 expressing, or measuring, that crime, must be infinite. 
 The sanctions of law in a truly rational government 
 must be true, giving, as evidence, truthful testimony 
 as to the imj^ortance of law and as to the crime of trans- 
 gressing law. Then the rational subject can take 
 those sanctions as evidence of the importance of 
 law, toirethcr with that of the magnitude of the crime 
 of violating it, and rationally obey the laws of the 
 government; not as the law of a tyrant; not as the 
 law of a feared compulsory power; not as law which 
 he would reject if he could yet cannot ; but as the 
 direction of a most truthful, sympathizing, loving, 
 capal)le and necessary helper, to him and to all con- 
 cerned, through the whole government: a helper, 
 kindly and truthfully, pointing out the mode of ac- 
 tion necessary to their securing their own best good, 
 their real welfare.
 
 64 archology; or, 
 
 III this manner law and tlie sanctions of law be- 
 come incalculably beneficial to the obedient subjects 
 of government, necessary, in the nature of things, to 
 their good, instructing them as to the real and only 
 manner possible in which tiiey can secure the ends for 
 which they exist. Thus the sanctions of law are first 
 instructive ; but secondly they are also protective. 
 
 The sanctions of law are protective, hy protecting 
 the obedient from the evils consequent on the trans- 
 gression of law. 
 
 In the freedom of the will of rational beings, there 
 is immense danger that some subjects will not obey 
 law upon which depends the welfare of all, and thus 
 both themselves and all others become involved in in- 
 calculable evils. But the sanctions of law protect 
 against these evils, and in three different ways. First, 
 by preventing them, through means of their giving 
 evidence of the importance of law and of the badness 
 of transgression ; with some proper influence also as 
 evils like others to be avoided. Secondly, by being 
 a terror to the evilly disposed, preventing their trans- 
 gression of the law ; and, thirdly, by so confining or 
 affecting the transgressor, as to prevent the repetition 
 of transn^ression. Thus the sanctions of law are in- 
 structive and protective; instructive as evidence of 
 the law and of its importance ; of crime and of its de- 
 gree ; protective, as protecting the obedient from the 
 evils of transgression, by their instruction to all ; by 
 their terror to the evilly disposed; and by their con- 
 fining, or so affecting, the transgressor that the act of 
 transgression may not be repeated.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 55 
 
 CHAPTER Yir. 
 
 A FULLER CONSIDERATION OF LAW. 
 
 In rational government, the historical origin of law 
 is found in the law-making department of govern- 
 ment. 
 
 But, The rational origin^or reason for the existence 
 of law, is, that it is a necessary part of government in 
 enahlhig suhjects to secure the ends for which they 
 exist. 
 
 Since ends can be secured only by putting forth the 
 proper actions adapted to result in securing tliem, it is 
 necessary that sul)jects should know those actions which 
 are adapted thus to result. Law is designed to exjyrcss 
 these actions that t/iey may he known to suhjects. But 
 not all actions can thus be ex]3ressed by law, for in the 
 endlessly varying circumstances of existence, there 
 are, and must ever be, endlessly varying and particu- 
 lar actions put forth, which cannot be pointed out in 
 the form of law by government. These must be de- 
 cided u})on by the subject himself in the exercise of 
 his own reason. Still there are uniform principles of 
 action involved in all cases; and often uniform trains 
 of actions, as well as uniform actions themselves to 
 be put forth, or else objects of good must be lost, and 
 great consequent evils sutfered. Law is designed to
 
 56 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 express those prinoiples and trains of actions, as well 
 as the actions themselves, which can he expressed hj 
 rules. A rule of action is the expressed, or appre- 
 hended, mode of action, and lience the term rule is 
 more generally used in rational government. 
 
 In conflict with actions tending to result in good, 
 there are many possible ones tending to prevent the 
 securing of such good. Law, hy prohibiting these ac- 
 tions, is designed to prevent their heing put forth to 
 the injury of the subjects. 
 
 Law, as a uniform rule, is designed to express those 
 actions which can be expressed as uniform, requiring 
 the right and forbidding the wrong. The subject of 
 government is to accept of this law as an immensely 
 important help to him in securing good for himself 
 and for others ; but not as his direct guide with no 
 exercise of reason on his own part. 
 
 For, an intelligent being in acting rationally, has 
 only one direct guide in selecting ivhat is right, and in 
 avoiding what is vn'ong. This one direct guide is his 
 own reason. 
 
 But, in his limited knowledge as a finite being, he, 
 in the vast majority of cases, is under the necessity 
 of accepting the indirect guide of another's reason. 
 Still, in this case, his own reason is his direct guide, 
 for it must determine whether he can repose confi- 
 dence in the reason of the other, so as to accept of it 
 as indirect guide. Law is the authoritative expression 
 in a particidar case, of another'' s reason as to wliat is 
 right, and vjhat is wrong, in action, and that other, in 
 this case is the law-making department of government.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 57 
 
 No two or more beings can come into any relations 
 to one another without the certainty of more or less 
 diversity and conflict of feelin<^s, impulses, choices, 
 beliefs, purposes, actions, and so forth. A harmony of 
 objects of choice, and of the means with which to at- 
 tain them, and of the actions piit forth for this pur- 
 pose, is necessary, or else a failure of the objects 
 desired, and of all real good, is certain to follow, while, 
 also, the consequent evils must be suffered. 
 
 Laws in rational government are the uniform rules 
 of actions designed to insure the liarmony of all these 
 things to result in securing good. 
 
 AV^ithout law, such harmony is impossible ; but with 
 law, originating in a fully competent law-making de- 
 partment, and with a fully efficient executive, such 
 harmony may be secured, and thus the securing of 
 the real good of subjects be rendered certain to the 
 obedient. 
 
 Throughout the whole system of government — 
 and this must extend as far as relationship extends — 
 the welfare of each subject is so involved in, and iden- 
 tilied with, the welfare of each and all the others, that 
 the welfare of one can be secured only in securing 
 also the welfare of all ; and the welfare of all can be 
 secured oidy in securing also the welfare of each. Hence, 
 in order that any one may, of himself, unaided, secure 
 his own real welfare, he must know not only the 
 results of his actions affecting himself, but also the 
 results affecting all others. 
 
 In his ignorance this is impossible. But if it were 
 not so, and he did know all these results, still there 
 3
 
 68 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 ■\vould also be a necessity that he botli will exactly tlie 
 right actions adapted to result in good to himself and all 
 others, and also succeed in putting forth just these 
 actions at all times and no others, or else again the 
 good must be lost and all evils follow. 
 
 But there is yet a still greater difficulty, for all this 
 must be true also of every individual of the whole 
 system, or the good of each and of all must fail to be 
 secured, while evils beyond all conception must follow. 
 
 Here absolute certainty on certainty accumulates, 
 that every finite being of himself alone must fail in 
 this knowledge ; that he probably will fail in this will ; 
 that also he must fail in power, and entirely fail of 
 succeeding. Then, in his failure, are involved the 
 failure of his own good and the good of all the others, 
 together with the sufifering of the untold consequent 
 evils. 
 
 These evils, in case each one were to act only on his 
 own responsibility, would rapidly increase, and in fear- 
 ful ratio, because of increasing wrong actions put 
 forth in the excitement of suffering; in the arousing 
 of intense feelings ; in the enraging of angry pas- 
 sions ; in the clashing of believed interests, objects of 
 desire, and plans, with no possibility of a remedy, if 
 each were to act only as guided alone by his own 
 unaided reason. 
 
 To avoid such evils, laws as a necessity are estab- 
 lished, and enforced by the power of government. 
 They are indispensable in the securing of good. 
 
 Laws are, to subjects, the expressed decisions of the 
 reason of government through the law-making depart-
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 59 
 
 ment unfolding, anthoritatively, and obligatorially, the 
 objects of good consistently to be secured; the means 
 safely to be used in securing them ; and the actions 
 liarmoniously to be put forth adapted to result in the 
 securing of them. Tlius through government, as au 
 efficient aid, by means of law, those who choose obedi- 
 ence may secure real good, even all ends of their 
 existence. This is on the supposition that the govern- 
 ment is certainly right in all its qualifications and 
 requisitions. 
 
 Ill every rational government there is a necessity 
 of the giving of exjylicit and j[)osilive law to suhjects 
 l>y the government. 
 
 This is evident from what has just been said. If 
 subjects are, without law, left to the inferences of 
 their own reason alone, they must inevitably differ in 
 their judgments, wills, choices, feelings, impulses, and 
 actions. The consequence must be unavoidable clash- 
 ings in their selection of objects to be secured, in their 
 choice of means with which to secure them, and in 
 actions put forth for this purpose. In these clashings, 
 necessary to subjects when left to their own reason 
 alone, there arises the necessity that government, 
 through express law, instruct the subjects and enforce 
 obedience to insure the harmony indispensable to the 
 securing of good and avoiding of evils in the case. 
 
 Thus law in rational government must he positive, 
 direct, and expressed, not left to be inferred. The 
 giving of law may be called promulgation, revelation, 
 CDmiuand, edict, or anything else expressive of the 
 idea, and it may be made known by words, or signs,
 
 60 APvCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 or even looks, and this be tliroii<j;-h personal presence 
 of the supreme official, or through authorized heralds, 
 messengers, teachers, or books, or through any other 
 means the government may select ; yet it must be 
 done by the government itself as express law from it 
 to the subjects. 
 
 Not by any means is it necessary that every thing 
 or action should be specified by law. This is impossi- 
 ble. But as to the great uniform principles of actions, 
 and the uniform classes and trains of actions, there 
 must be expressed law. The government must di- 
 rectly instruct and compel obedience through law, 
 which shall directly instruct and be obligatory by 
 means of sanctions, which shall truthfully instruct 
 and protect the obedient subjects through themselves, 
 and thus there be secured a harmonious adaptation of 
 all things to result in the securing of good. 
 
 Moreover, when laws have been directly given. It 
 is necessary that government protect the laws from 
 any alteration or corruption to which they may he 
 liable. 
 
 For the very object of law, in its first great ele- 
 ment, of being instructive, is to give i^i formation to 
 subjects for their good, where otherwise they are 
 ignorant. Hence, if the law becomes altered or cor- 
 rupted, the subjects, in their ignorance, cannot deter- 
 mine the true from the false, the original from the 
 corruption, i. <?., they cannot do this from reasoning 
 upon the nature of things in the case on account of 
 their ignorance. Therefore, government must itself 
 preserve its laws uncorrupted and clearly distinguished
 
 THE SCIENCE OP GOVERNMENT. 61 
 
 from any unautlujiized cIkuio-c, To j)reserve its laws 
 pure is as necessary on the part of government, us it 
 is to give tliem at first. And, if any subject uses as 
 authority a known corrupted law, where the true can- 
 not be clearly and delinitely distinguished from the 
 corrupt, he is insulting the government under which 
 lie is assumiuii: to act, and ott'erinu- an outrage to his 
 fellow subjects. He should be judged criminal by the 
 courts of justice. 
 
 In Rational Governinent there is a necessity 
 that the law orifjinate in a (lejyartraent possessed 
 of the greatest knowledge, and of the greatest benevo- 
 lence. 
 
 The reason of the law-making department of govern- 
 ment, expressed through law, must be the indirect 
 guide of the subject, and this law he, in his reason, 
 is to accept, because of his confidence in the govern- 
 ment. But if the law-making department fails in 
 knowledge, so as not to be able to specify the right 
 Jaws, or if it fails in its benevolence, so as not to 
 choose laws designed for good, the subjects must be 
 involved in disasters. But with the greatest knowl- 
 edge, and the greatest benevolence, i. <'., choice of 
 good, there is a certainty of the best laws possible, 
 insuring the greatest good to the subjects. In this 
 case, the subjects wnll possess the best possible guide 
 for their reason, in the reason of the government ex- 
 pressed to them by law. 
 
 In Rational Government there is a necessity of 
 vigor of will to enforce the laio, and also of power on 
 the part of the executive.
 
 62 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 Tlie enforcement of law depends entirely on the 
 will and the power of the executive. If he fail in 
 will or in ability, the laws fail in the essential element 
 of "being made obligatory by government," as de- 
 fined ; so far it fails to be law, or is only dead law, and 
 so the good designed to be secured through it must be 
 lost and all consequent evils be suffered. In all 
 rational governments there is liability that some will 
 not obey law, and thus involve all in the danger of 
 suffering untold evils. Government is pledged to the 
 obedient to protect them from a repetition of the 
 danger from those evilly disposed. For tins purpose 
 the executive needs vigor of will and ability to exe- 
 cute the law. 
 
 Thus law in rational government is necessary to the 
 good of subjects ; it must be expressed directly and 
 positively by the government ; it must be preserved 
 by the government from unauthorized alteration and 
 from all corruption ; it is educative to all, and is pro- 
 tective to the obedient ; and it needs on the part of the 
 government the greatest knowledge and gi-eatest be- 
 nevolence, with proper vigor of will and power for its 
 enforcement. 
 
 If the law-making department of government and 
 the executive together are possessed of perfect knowl- 
 edge, perfect benevolence, perfect will, and perfect 
 power, then there is a certainty that, to the obedient, 
 tliere will be no failure in securing the highest good 
 possible in the case. There can be only one such gov- 
 ernment, and this that of the infinite Creator. In all 
 finite governments there is, and always must be, lia-
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 63 
 
 hilitj to-fiiilurc, and consequent evils to follow. This 
 failure may be approximately avoided, by each infe- 
 rior government seeking the rational aid of higher 
 governments up to the highest. But this last fact 
 is to be still more fully considered under its proper 
 head.
 
 64 akchology; or, 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 EIGHT OF GOVERNMENT TO ENFOECE OBEDIENCE TO LAW. 
 
 The right of government to enforce obedience to 
 law is involved in the principles of goodness, benevo- 
 lence, and beneficence, as a necessity for good. 
 
 Without government, as previously seen, subjects, 
 through their failure of one, or all, of knowledge, will 
 and power, must become wlielmed in suffering; in 
 wretchedness, ruin, death. With fully qualified gov- 
 ernment they may escape these and secure true and 
 permanent good. Hence goodness, benevolence, love, 
 demand obedience to government and justify the ap- 
 plication of any compulsory force to secure it and de- 
 feat the schemes of the disobedient and evilly dis- 
 posed. 
 
 This involves the right of using any compulsory 
 force lohatever in the support of government and the 
 execution of law, enforcing obedience by the infliction 
 of its sanctions upon its violaters. 
 
 The sanctions of law are species of suffering, 
 threatened or inflicted, upon the disobedient for spe- 
 cific objects of good. But in the infliction of the sanc- 
 tions of law, there is doubtless not so great suffering, 
 as the actions of the disobedient are adapted to pro-
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 65 
 
 diice, without government, both to tliemselves alone, 
 and also to all others. In the iniiiction of these sanc- 
 tions the government relieves and protects the obedi- 
 ent from the tlireateninsr evils, restrictino: sufferini; to 
 tliose who will to produce it by their course of wrong- 
 doing. 
 
 Therefore, the government, by the enforcing of obe- 
 dience, is doing the very greatest kindness possible 
 in the case, removing suffering from the obedient, 
 and diminishing it to the disobedient, so far as is con- 
 sistent. The restricted suffering of the sanctions of 
 law, by the disobedient, are doubtless less than would 
 be the unrestricted sufferings even by themselves 
 alone, to say nothing of those of others, without the 
 intiietions of the sanctions, so that even to the disobe- 
 dient themselves, the government is acting more kindly 
 than it would be, were it not to inflict the sanctions. 
 Moreover, 
 
 In tills is exemplified the common p^'incijyle of he- 
 nevole7ice. That in the alternative of one or tJie 
 other of two ahsolnte evils, it is right to escape the 
 greater hy accepting the less. For, in the enforcement 
 of the sanctions of law, there is an escape from the 
 immensely great suffering of all, by inflicting deserved 
 suffering upon the evilly disposed, who in this case 
 endure, even for themselves, doubtless, only part of 
 what they must suffer if there were no such enforce- 
 ment, and hence no government. 
 
 There is also a principle of Liherty involved in the 
 case. For, in government, each subject possesses the 
 means, by obedience, of securing for himself and ioY
 
 66 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 otliers, the very liigliest possible good. So also, by 
 disobedience, he possesses the means of whelming 
 himself in great evils and suffering. Now there can 
 be no greater personal liberty than to do, and receive, 
 what one wills. Therefore, in accordance with this 
 idea of liberty, no one can reasonably complain of 
 government, if it insures to each subject what he wills. 
 If he wills to secure good to himself and toothers, he 
 has the liberty, by obedience to law, to do so ; while 
 the government is with him to insure this good in a 
 manner the very highest possible in the case. 
 
 But if one wills to produce evils to himself and to 
 others throngli the means of disobedience, he has the 
 personal liberty to do so to himself, only that his lib- 
 erty must not extend to interfere with that of others 
 who choose, by oljedience, to secure good ; and 
 government is with him to insure to him, in part 
 at least, the evil he wills by enforcing upon him the 
 suffering necessar}' in the case for the good of others. 
 
 The common and probably generic meaning of lib- 
 erty is, "the opportunity to do as one wills to do." 
 It does not mean that it is right so to do, but only 
 that he has the opportunity, without restraint. Now 
 if one is not restrained from doing evil, and has the 
 opportunity to do so if lie wills, he certainly has a 
 kind of personal liberty in the case. 
 
 The manner and kind of the resultins' suffering in 
 its effect upon the evil-doer, are changed by govern- 
 ment in order that the liberty of those who choose to 
 do right may not be interfered with. This modifica- 
 tion is a necessity that the liberty of the good may
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 67 
 
 not be destivn-ed, but does not destroy the liberty of 
 the •wrong-doer to receive evil which lie wills. 
 
 Government, by its power, insures, as far as pos- 
 sible, to each free agent and suigect, that, in principle, 
 which he wills to secure ; good to those who will to 
 secure good, and evil to those who will to secure evil, 
 only modified in the forms of the evil in view of the 
 necessities of good to those who choose good. 
 
 If it is said that no one wills evil, the answer is 
 that, if a rational being directly wills a means, clearly 
 knowing the end ; if he wills an action clearly know- 
 ing the result ; legally, he is held as having willed the 
 end and the result itself, so as to be responsible for it. 
 Now the rational subject of government knows that 
 obedience will result in good ; that disobedience will 
 result in evil. He knows that this is so, not merely 
 because such isthelaw, but that this is true in the nature 
 of things before the law said so, and therefore that 
 the law says it. 
 
 Hence, if he wills disobedience, he legally wills 
 clearly the resultant evil. It is in accordance with a 
 ftirm of liberty that he should have, and suffer, the 
 evil he thus wills. Government modifies slightly this 
 evil to him as a necessity so that his liberty, badly 
 used, may not interfere with the liberty of those who 
 use theirs for good. 
 
 This principle, even without others which tend to 
 the same conclusion, would probably lead to the infer- 
 ence that, in a perfect rational government, those sub- 
 jects who will choose evil by willfully practicing that 
 which leads to suffering, must be separated from those
 
 68 aechology; or, 
 
 who choose good, and be placed by themselves 
 where they may receive for themselves the evils they 
 choose without interfering with the others; while 
 those who will choose good by obedience to law, shall 
 he by themselves where they may receive, and com- 
 municate to others, all the good consistent in the case, 
 without interference from those who will that which 
 results in evil.
 
 THE SCIENCE OP GOVEUMNENT. 69 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 GOVERNMENTS ABOVE GOVERNMENTS NECESSARY. 
 
 Various governments sustain to one another rela- 
 tions tlie same as individuals. In these relations tliev, 
 like individuals, need a higher government to secure 
 among them harmony in their desires of objects, in 
 their choice of means for securing them, and in the 
 actions put forth for this purpose. Hence the prin- 
 ciple : 
 
 Whenever two or more governmsnts on an equality 
 come into relations to each other, there is a necessity to 
 their securing the ends for xohichthey exists that there 
 he another government properly called the Higher, to 
 control them as its suhjects. As easil}' can individuals 
 exist and secure all real good ^vithout a controlling 
 power to prevent conflicts and insure harmony in their 
 activities, as can governments thus exist, each acting 
 only as it sees fit to act in securing its own good, with 
 no controlling power. 
 
 Tliere must be such a controlling power, and its 
 whole system of control is, according to definition, the 
 government in the case, higher than the others, iiuis- 
 much as it is over them. 
 
 And the necessity of such higher governments over 
 the related governments, originates in facts the same 
 with those of other governments, viz., that, as they
 
 70 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 are finite, or limited in knowledo^e, in abilit^y, and in 
 will, tliere must inevitably be among them, of them- 
 selves alone, clashings in their desires, and choice of 
 objects, in their use of means to secure them, and in 
 actions put forth for this purpose, resulting in incal- 
 culable evils, unless there be over them a governmental 
 control to correct all this, and insure the harmony 
 necessaFj to their securing good. 
 
 Individuals, in their varied relations, are united in 
 families, and in society organizations ; each a govern- 
 ment in its system of control. Families are united in 
 districts, wards, cities, etc. ; each a government in its 
 system of control. Cities are under States ; States 
 under nations; and nations under a more or less per- 
 fect system of treaties, balances of power, interna- 
 tional laws, etc. ; in all which cases the system of con- 
 trol is the government in the case. 
 
 Thus from tlie individual upwards, governments 
 above governments appear, up to the highest ; all orig- 
 inating, so far as principles are concerned, as a neces- 
 sity to the securing the ends of existence, or real good. 
 
 Moreovei-, in this series of governments there are 
 involved, identically, the same relationships and ne- 
 cessities of each higher government towards the lower, 
 as are found in a single government towards its indi- 
 vidual sul)jects,^. e,, the higher government must be, to 
 the lower under it, instructive and compulsory, through 
 laws, M'hich again must be instructive and obligatory 
 by means of sanctions, while these must be instructive 
 and protective through themselves. 
 
 Also, in this series of governments, there is the
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 71 
 
 same liability to failure and disaster as in the sinj^lo 
 government, over individuals; a failure through want 
 of knowledge, want of will, and want of power. In 
 the tailureis involved a failure of good, and the surt'er- 
 ing of consequent evils. Such results are inevitable 
 in case of the failure of either the three necessities to 
 success, to be avoided only through the successful con- 
 trol of the higher government over the lower. 
 ' Hence in the series of governments above govern- 
 ments, if the series ever ceases, in a government of 
 limited knowledge, will, or abilit}', there is a ratio of 
 probability of failure of good and of suffering of evils, 
 against the probability of success, incalculably great, 
 amounting to a certainty of failure. For, all actions 
 set in course trains of consequences, flowing on in 
 their results forever. Hence, to be certain that such 
 results shall be good, there is a necessity of a knowl- 
 edge of those results in order that the actions adapted 
 to result oidy in good may be selected by the reason, 
 dictated by the will, and put in operation through 
 power, while all other actions tending to evil or tend- 
 ing to prevent the securing of good, shall be avoided. 
 But if the liiii'her ocovernment fails in knowledge 
 of results, or in will to secure them, or in power to 
 do this, a failure in the selection of proper actions, 
 adapted to result in good, is inevitable, and evil must 
 be the result. Hence to success in the securing of 
 good, by rational beings, by means of rational govern- 
 ments, there is a necessity that, in a series of govern- 
 ments over governments, the highest of all should be 
 a government of perfect knowledge, perfect will and
 
 72 archology; or, 
 
 perfect power. Without sncli governinent there is a 
 certaint}' of failure and a suffering of incalculable 
 evils. The highest government must be one of in- 
 finite knowledge, infinite will, with infinite goodness, 
 and of infinite power, or else incalculable evils must 
 be realized ; must be suffered. 
 
 There must be government to harmonize objects of 
 choice, means to secure them, and actions put forth for 
 this purpose ; while for success, there must be on the 
 part of government, knowledge, will and power, com- 
 mensurate with the i-esults. Hence, as all actions set 
 in operation trains of results, flowing onward and out- 
 ward without limit, there must be, for perfect and per- 
 manent success in securing good, a supreme govern- 
 ment of knoM'ledge, will and power, commensurate 
 with these results, even of infinite knowledge, will, 
 and power, or else conflicts, disasters, evils irremedia- 
 ble in themselves must come. 
 
 In this series of governments, each higher govern- 
 ment is to include and control all the lower ones un- 
 der it. 
 
 From the definition, government is a whole. But 
 to control a whole, includes the controlling of all its 
 parts. Hence, for a higher government to control a 
 lower, it must control all its parts, all the subjects of 
 that government, as well as itself. And if these subjects 
 of the government controlled, are governments over 
 other's subjects, then to control them involves the con- 
 trol of those others, their subjects, and thus onward 
 to t?ie lowest in the series, to the individual. The 
 higher government is to have regard to everything
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVEllNMENT. 73 
 
 tlirouorli the scries l)elow it and so control all as to in- 
 sure the good of all. 
 
 In this seines of governments each lower needs to 
 yield ohedience to each and all the higher^ so far as 
 their laws can he knotvn. 
 
 The only possible manner in which good can be 
 secured is in the harmony effected through govern- 
 ment. Now, as this harnion\' can be secured only 
 through tlie control of the highest, extending down 
 through all to the lowest, the lower needs to regard 
 the higher governnjents up to the highest, and yield 
 obedience to their control, that the necessary harmony 
 may be realized and the good of all secured. 
 
 Again, each government^ from the highest to the 
 lowest, is to enforce its own laws, and see that the sub- 
 jects ohey, Ijut no lower government may enforce the 
 laics of the higher. 
 
 Each lower government is a subject or entity of the 
 higher. Its part is obedience, and not the making it- 
 self to be the higher government bv exercising its 
 control. The enforcement of law is a function of 
 government, and when tlie subject without authoriz- 
 ation assumes to enforce law, he is assuming a function 
 not his own, and is falsely making hiujself what he is 
 not. Thus, in conflict with truth, he will be in con- 
 flict with good, and involve himself and others in 
 evils. The government of man has nothino^ to do 
 with the enforcement of the laws of God. The city 
 has nothing to do with the enforcement of the laws of 
 the State. The family has nothing to do with the en- 
 forcement of the laws of the city. 
 4
 
 74 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 Each government is to enforce its own laws, upon 
 its own subjects, but not assume the control of a 
 higher government by enforcing the laws of it. 
 
 The lowei" government is to have a regard to the 
 higher, and ought, in all which it does, to conform to 
 the laws of the higher. The city onght to conform 
 to the laws of the State ; yet it may not assume to 
 enforce those laws. The laws of the family onght to 
 conform to the laws of the city and of the State, but 
 the family may not assume to enforce those laws by 
 inflicting their sanctions on the disobedient. The 
 same is true of the State : it should conform in its 
 actions to the laws of God ; but it has nothing to do 
 in the manner of enforcing Divine laws. This be- 
 longs to the Divine government, and not to man's. 
 
 Tlie lower government may rightly teach the laws 
 of the higher, as the citj' may teach the laws of the 
 State, and require them to be read, yet it may not en- 
 force them, nor even require belief in them as right 
 or good. The belief of a rational being is wholly his 
 own, and no hnman government has the least right to 
 enforce any peculiar form of it ; still a government 
 may teach whatever it judges l)est to teach, even the 
 laws of the higher government, though it must not 
 enforce them. 
 
 However, a lower government, for its own good 
 purposes, in meeting the wants of its own subjects may 
 enact identically the same law with the higher, as its 
 own, but not as that of the higher. Yet, since, in the 
 lower government, the importance of law is smaller, 
 and the guilt of transgression is less, accordingly as
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVEUNMENT. 75 
 
 the antliority of the government is less, the sanctions 
 in the lower government ninst be less than in tlie 
 liii;h(!r. Tims, while the laws of the kingdom ol 
 Heaven are. Thou shalt not steal, not kill, not bear 
 false witness, etc. ; the State also, ma3' make the same 
 laws, and the city the same, and the family the same, 
 each forbidding all theft, murder, and lying. But each 
 lower government must enforce the law as its own, 
 not as of the higher, and with sanctions appropriate 
 to truth in its own system. 
 
 Thus, a human sfovernment may enforce its own 
 laws as to marriao^e, as to hours of rest, or a dav of 
 quietude and relaxation from labor; any day it may 
 judge to be for benefit to its subjects. But this it 
 must do as its own regulation, or law, for good in its 
 own system of control, to its own subjects. 
 
 Human ijovernments have nothino- to do in en- 
 forcing 'A religion. That ]»ertains to a higher govern- 
 ment — the govei'iiment of the Divine Being, and 
 science unfolds the fact that a higher government is 
 alone to enforce its own laws. 
 
 Still, if a higher government authorizes the lower 
 to enforce its laws, as if the State authorizes the city 
 to enforce State laws, and specifies the sanctions, then 
 the lower government is made by the higher a part 
 of the executive of that higher government, and as 
 an authorized agent, it may enforce the higher laws, 
 though oidy so far as expressly authorized.
 
 76 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 DIVISION OF RATIONAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Rational Government is divisihle into Legal and 
 Disciplinary. 
 
 Strictly speaking, legal is applicable to all govern- 
 ments because all governments involve law. Still, as 
 a distinguishing term in this treatise, it will be used 
 only for one division of rational government, in which 
 the great importance of law justifies its specific use. 
 
 Legal Government is a rational government which 
 has for its aim the controlling of the actions of its 
 subjects in such a raanner as to insure harmoniously 
 their securing good, i. e., all the ends of their eceistence. 
 But Disci])linary Government is a rational gov- 
 ertiTTient which has for its aim to establish in its sub- 
 ject a certain character or jpecuUar habits of action 
 as a 2>'>^(iJ>0''r'ation for some future condition of the 
 subject. 
 
 This division of rational government is one of tiie 
 utmost importance both scientifically and practically 
 considered. It needs to be very carefully examined. 
 This can be done the most successfully bv considering^ 
 distinct features of the two classes placed in contrast 
 one with the other. 
 First. In Legal Government the control affects all
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 77 
 
 the snhjects of government considered as co-operators 
 together. 
 
 In Disciplinary Government the control affects only 
 one subject, or else each single one of many, considered 
 separately. 
 
 While tliere inu}' be many indivicluals includud 
 under discijiliiiaiy govei'iiment, yet as the design is to 
 develop a certain character, or establish peculiar habits, 
 the control has reference to each one separately, 
 according to its results in its e£Fect on character, and 
 must be modified accordinglj-. But as legal govern- 
 ment has for its aim the harmonizinij: the actions of 
 all in order to their securins; o;ood, it has reference to 
 all in their co-actions together. 
 
 Second. Legal Government has respect to all results 
 in their effect iipon the welfare or good of its snhjects. 
 
 Disciplinary Government has respect to one result, 
 that of estahlishing a certain character or hahit of 
 action. 
 
 Disciplinary government may control all present 
 actions, yet its aim is only one, that of an effect on 
 character and habits. 
 
 Third. Legal Government is designed to he perpet- 
 ual so long as the subjects exist, or so long as the cir- 
 cumstances ai^e unchanged, which gave occasion for 
 the government to aid the subjects in securing the ends 
 for which they exist. 
 
 Di^tcijflinary Government is designed to be tonpo- 
 rary, lasting only till the establishing of character, or 
 habits of action shall be completed. 
 
 Disciplinary government may be indefinitely pro-
 
 78 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 longed, in itself considered, by passing from each one 
 of its subjects to his successor. Yet in respect to each 
 it ceases with the completion of its work on his 
 character. 
 
 Fourth. Legal Government recognizes the right of 
 each subject, for himself alone, to choose his own 
 objects of good, the means with which he may obtain 
 them, and the actions he will put forth for this pur- 
 pose / while the governmental control is only directed 
 to insuring a harmony in these respects among all the 
 subjects of government. 
 
 Disciplinary Government recognizes no such free- 
 dom of choice or will, but aims at originating, cliang- 
 ing, fixing, or even destroying a specific choice of the 
 s\d>ject, in the process of cstcd)lishing Iiis character or 
 habits of action. 
 
 Disciplinary Government endeavors to dictate to its 
 subject what he shall be, what he shall choose, and 
 what he shall do. But in Legal Government tiie sub- 
 ject is regarded as a rational being with a free will, to 
 be, and to choose, and to act as he M'ill ; only, in tlie 
 nature of things, he must not come into conflict witii 
 others' interests, so as to prevent them from securing 
 good. Laws instruct him how to avoid such conflicts ; 
 and government, by the sanctions of law, compels 
 conformity to what is for the greatest good of all in 
 tlie case. 
 
 Fifth. In Legal Goveroiment, the laws and their admin- 
 istration are regular and permanent, admitting of cliange 
 only by the law-making department in vieio of a change 
 of circumstances affecting tlie securing of good by all.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 79 
 
 In Disciplinary Government the laics and adminis- 
 tration may vary at any time at the will of the 
 executive in this government, according to results 
 in tlie establishing of character and habits of the 
 suhjcct. 
 
 As all laws in Rational Government are instructive 
 as well as obligatory, it is important that they be as 
 uniform and permanent as possible in the case. For, 
 thus only can they be used by subjects as a basis of 
 calculation for the future. All changes are more or 
 less in conflict with such calculations. 
 
 Still, in Disciplinary Government, since the only 
 object is the development of character and habits, there 
 is no occasion for calculation after the development is 
 secured. Hence, here change may take place accord- 
 ing to the judgment of the executive. 
 
 But in Legal Government limitless objects of good 
 to be secured are ever in the future. And laws are 
 designed to be the expressions of the reason of the 
 government as to the manner in which these objects 
 in the future can be secured. These laws become the 
 basis of caicuhition to the subjects in securing these 
 objects, and need therefore to be as permanent and 
 unchanged as possible. On this account change will 
 be rare, and permanence be the character of law in 
 leo^al ofovernmcnt. 
 
 Sixth. Finally, In Legal Government the sanctions 
 of law are only punishments. 
 
 But, in Disciplinary Government the sanctions of 
 law are only chastisements. 
 
 This division of the sanctions of law into punish-
 
 80 AllCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 ments and chastisements is one, in importance, next 
 to that of governments into legal and dieciplirmry. 
 In science it is secondary to the other ; but, in prac- 
 tical application, indeed it is verilj the first in im- 
 portance. It needs therefore an exceedingly careful 
 examination in a separate chapter devoted to the sub- 
 ject. In the meantime a review is here given of this 
 division of government in epitomized form for clear- 
 est remembrance. 
 
 First. Legal Government designs an effect upon 
 many subjects. 
 
 Disciplinary Government designs an effect upon one 
 subject. 
 
 Second. Legal Government designs an effect upon 
 many things. 
 
 Disciplinary Govo'nment designs an effect upon 
 one thing. 
 
 Third. Legal Government designs a control of all 
 actions for the securing of good. 
 
 Disciplinary Government designs a control of all 
 actions for the establishino; of character. 
 
 Fourth. Legal Government recoOTiizes the rio-ht 
 and freedom of choice in the subject, requiring only 
 a harmony of actions with others. 
 
 Disciplinary Government recognizes no such right 
 or freedom, but designs the determination of a choice 
 in accordance with the will of the executive. 
 
 Fifth. Legal Government is, in its nature and in its 
 laws, permanent, or changing rarely in view of a change 
 of circumstances. 
 
 Disciplinary Government is in its nature and its
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 81 
 
 laws temporary, and cLanging according to effect on 
 character. 
 
 Sixth. Finally, in Leiijal Government the sanctions 
 of law are puni.sliments. 
 
 In Discipliiuuy Government the sanctions of law 
 are chastisements. 
 
 ]>nt in the scientific examinations of the distinctions 
 between legal and disciplinary governments, it is very 
 important to have in mind tiie fact that these two 
 governments often blend together in the one same 
 system of control, confusing the intellect and leading 
 to erroneous conclusions. Disciplinary government is 
 rarely found entirely alone. And where perhaps it is 
 thus found, it very soon commences to blend more 
 and more with legal government till fully supplanted 
 by the latter. 
 
 From the birth of a human being it is probably for 
 a time wholly under a disciplinary government, that 
 of the parents. By them that younir rational being 
 must be most carefully disciplined for the development 
 of a riijht character, and the establisliiuij' of riij^ht habits 
 of action in view of its future condition. And in this 
 they must succeed, or else, so far, those parents, in 
 their government, are a failure ; derelict to every 
 government above them, up to the highest, that of 
 God. The disastrous results to themselves, to the 
 chiUl, and to others, none except one of unlimited 
 knowledge can estimate. 
 
 But in a very short time the child, through its con- 
 nection with other members of the family, other 
 children in schoul, other persons in society, and other 
 4.*
 
 82 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 citizens of the State, begins to pass out from under 
 the disciplinary government designed for the develop- 
 ment of chai-acter, more and more, into a legal gov- 
 ernment of control in view of the good of others. 
 Finally, at twenty-one years of age, the transition is 
 supposed to be complete, and now he is recognized 
 solely as a free subject of a legal government, the 
 State, the nation, the empire. No more is any one to 
 dictate to him for his own sake as to his character, 
 habits, choice or actions. Pie is now on an equality 
 with every other subject, and has the same right with 
 others to choose for himself, and act as he will, so far 
 as he alone is concerned. Still legal government, in 
 the interest of others for the good of all, in the ne- 
 cessity of things, may dictate to him so far as is need- 
 ed to insure a harmony among all in the securing of 
 
 good. 
 
 The family and the school are the two great recog- 
 nized disciplinary governments under the legal gov- 
 ernment of the State. Yet in these disciplinary gov- 
 ernments, so far as the administration of law is not 
 solely for the development of the character and the 
 establishing of habits of the child, but is for the good 
 of other children in securing a needed harmony of 
 the actions of all, so far the government is a legal 
 government. 
 
 When the sanctions of law, in the school, are in- 
 flicted upon the child solely for his own good, in the 
 development of his character, the govei-nment of ^the 
 school is disciplinary, and its sanctions of law are 
 chastisements. But when, and so far as, the sanctions 
 3
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 83 
 
 arc inflicted as an example to the others for their in- 
 struction and protection from a repetition of trans- 
 gression, the government of the scliool is legal, and 
 its sanctions of law are punishment. 
 
 The State, in its own laws, always uses punishments 
 alone, but as to families, schools, etc., it says, judicious 
 chastisements may be inflicted : a clear distinction. 
 Here, therefore, tiie distinction in the ideas expressed 
 by the two words, may appropriately be considered.
 
 84 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTEK XI. 
 
 PUNISHMENT AND CHASTISEMENT. 
 
 Punishment is the deprivation of good, or the inflic- 
 tion of siifferimj tipon, the reed, or supposed, transgress- 
 or, hecause of his transgression, for the good of others, 
 as judged of hy the authority ivhich determines the 
 suffering. 
 
 Chastisement, as a sanction of law, is the dep7'ivation 
 of good, or the infliction of suffering upon the real, or 
 possible, transgressor, in consideration of transgression, 
 for the good of himself, as judged of hy tJie authority 
 which determines the suffering. 
 
 In this definition, cliastisement is limited bj the 
 phrase, " as a sanction of law," because, occasioiiallj, 
 this word is used without being a sanction. Its deri- 
 vation is from two different verbs, to chastise, and to 
 chasten. "When derived from chasten, and meaning 
 the same as a chastening, it often has no reference di- 
 rectly to law. In this case it may not be a sanction, 
 and the definition then does not include it, 
 
 AVith an understanding of slight s})ecia]ties, the fol- 
 lowing short definitions are sufficient in place of the 
 longer ones above. Punishment is tlie infliction of 
 suffering upon the transgressor iov tlie good of others ;
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 85 
 
 t'liastisenieiit is the infliction of suffering upon the 
 tnin^irressor for his own ^ood. 
 
 Tlie inquiry nu^y arise, whetlier, in some slight pro- 
 portional degree, punishment ma)- not also include the 
 good of the transgressor. Perhaps it does as one of 
 all the sahjects of government; yet, if this he true, it 
 is proportionally so sliglit that, for convenience, it 
 seems not best to cumber the definition with its speci- 
 iication. 
 
 So, perhaps, in chastisement, the final design in the 
 developing of character may, in a secondary sense, in- 
 clude the good of others, still for a definition, tiiis 
 ])ossible design of a second thing need not be in- 
 cluded in expressing the first. 
 
 In view of the very great importance of clearly 
 perceiving the distinction in the signification of these 
 two words, the differences need to be dwelt npon at 
 so!ne length in contrasts. 
 
 1st. Punishment, in its use, pertains only to a Legal 
 Government. 
 
 Chastisement pertains to a DisdjMnarij Govern- 
 ment. As in science the two species of government are 
 distinct, so are the species of sanctions; one is punish- 
 ment, the other is chastisement. 
 
 This distinction is always practically observed by 
 jurists. For chastisement is never found used in the 
 statutes of States and nations, when referring to any- 
 thing directly in the legal government. But when re- 
 ferring to inferior, and evidently disciplinary govern- 
 ment, the laws of States declai-e that in families, 
 schools, the army, etc., ''judicious chastisements may
 
 86 archoloctY ; or, 
 
 be inllicted." In legal practice these two words are 
 distinguished as science distinguishes them. 
 
 2d. Punishment is for the good of many^ having 
 reference to all the subjects of the government. 
 
 Chastisement is for the good of one, having refer- 
 ence only to the one subject concerned. 
 
 3d. Punishment has reference to all objects of good 
 for which subjects exist. 
 
 Chastisement has reference to ojily one, that of 
 estaljlishing character and habits of the subject con- 
 cerned. 
 
 4tli. Punishment instructs as the legal evidence and 
 exact measure, both of the importance of law, and of 
 the magnitude, or degree, of crime, involved in its 
 transgression. 
 
 Chastisement instructs as evidence, but is only in 
 part a measure of the importance of law and degree 
 of crime. 
 
 Inasmuch as chastisement may vary at any time, 
 according to the judgment of the executive, in view 
 of results" affecting character, it cannot be an exact 
 measure. Punishment, being fixed, can be. 
 
 5th. Punishment depends upon the law-making de- 
 partment of government for all its peculiarities. 
 
 Chastisement depends upon the will of its executive 
 for all its peculiarities. 
 
 6th. Punishment is generally specified in quality, 
 quantity, and duration. 
 
 Chastisements need not be in any of these respects. 
 
 In all fully constituted legal governments, punish- 
 ment must be clearly specified, as much so as law it-
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 87 
 
 self, of whicli it is an olciiient. When not specilied, 
 punishment would involve the element of ex post 
 facto law, if intlicted. 
 
 7th, Punishment in itself has no reference to ref- 
 ormation. 
 
 Chastisement in its nature has direct reference to 
 reformation, being designed to effect a genuine and 
 permanent change of character and habits. 
 
 Punishment, in its language, is, always, so much, no 
 more, no less ; so long, no longer, no shorter ; such in 
 kind, this and no other, all which would Ije erroneous, 
 were reformation the design of pmiishment. If ref- 
 ormation were the design, then the punishment ought 
 to stop when this is secured, since to continue suffer- 
 ing after the very design of it is secured, is downright 
 cruelty. And, again, were reformation the design of 
 punishment, then it should be continued till reforma- 
 tion is secured, since without securing the design, the 
 means is lost, and even worse than lost, because the 
 sufferiuir would stimulate the unreformed criminal to 
 revenge. Thus evidently reformation is not the de- 
 sign of punishment. 
 
 Sometimes, Jaw si)ecifies a range of selection by 
 the judge, as to punishment, according to what may 
 seem to him adapted, the most effectually, to secure 
 the ends of justice. And at times "good behavior" 
 is specified as a fact admitting of executive clemency. 
 ]jut this is only a cirt-umstance or fact for the exec- 
 utive to take into consideration, and is never stated 
 to be the object of the punishment. 
 
 But chastisement is directlv, in its nature, to eon-
 
 88 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 tinne till reformation is secured, then always to cease ; 
 and, in all its administration, it is to change at the will 
 of the executive as he may judge the best adapted to 
 result in reformation or the establishinij of character. 
 
 8th. Punisliment protects, loth hy preventing a 
 transgression before it is committed, and by restrain- 
 ing the criminal after its commission. 
 
 Chastisement protects, by effecting a change of char- 
 acter^ either before or after commission of the crime. 
 
 9th, Punishment is in connection with laws which 
 recognize the rigid of the subject to choose and act for 
 himself^ as he will, so far as he himself is concerned ; 
 but which, for the good of all. hold him to a course of 
 action in harmony with others. 
 
 ChastJisement is in connection Avith laws lohich do 
 not recognize any such right, but are designed to de- 
 termine his choice and will. 
 
 10th. Punishment may at times involve j^;^r^tfZ'^mZ 
 confinement, or even the destruction of the criminal. 
 
 Chastisement, in its very nature and design, never 
 can he thus severe. 
 
 11 til. Punishment is never inflicted except after a 
 real or supposed transgression upon the supposed 
 transgressor. 
 
 Chastisement, in modified forms, is sometimes in- 
 flicted without an actual violation of law, in order to 
 effect such a change of character as may prevent a 
 transgression or other evil, and secure good. 
 
 By these eleven distinctions at least are punish- 
 ment and chastisement found clearly to differ. In 
 two respects they are, as sanctions, similar ; they both
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 89 
 
 are suffering, and both have reference to transgres- 
 sion. But in other and many thini's tliev arc spe- 
 cifically and clearly distinct. Tliey must not be con- 
 fused, one with the other, nor Mith other things. A 
 principal error of the past has been that of regarding 
 punishment the same as chastisement, designed to se- 
 cure the reformation of the transgressor, thus making 
 the two words to be identical in signification. 
 
 Doul)tless one cause of error, in respect to these 
 two important words, was that of a truth which is 
 always connected with punishment, though not a part 
 of it. This truth is that, in connection with suffering 
 punts/unoit, the transgressor ought of himself to re- 
 form. 
 
 The punishment is exactly adapted to result in his 
 reformation, if he would use it ario-ht. It is instruc- 
 tive in its nature, imparting to him knowledge of 
 truth if he will receive it. It is right, while he is 
 wrong. lie ought to perceive it ; to feel it ; to yield 
 to the truth, and reform. This he M'ould do if he 
 would act as a rational being, for reason would lead 
 him thus to do. 
 
 But, in the liberty of the subject, this is his part ; 
 not that of law, or of government. lie ought, of 
 himself, to reform in view of the truth presented in 
 punishment. Yet the law makes no reference to such 
 reformation as its design. As law, it* requires the 
 same suffering with reformation as without it. And 
 the cnminal, though suftering the full punishment 
 of the law, ought to abhor his crimes as bad; and 
 choose, yes, will, obedience to the law as right.
 
 90 AKCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 It is true also that the government itself and the 
 executive of law, onglit, in benevolence, to seek, as far 
 as possible, the reformation of the transgressor. This 
 they are to do in tkeir benevolence, not as the object 
 of punishment, but as a good to another, always to be 
 sought, so far as consistent witli truth and justice. 
 
 Tiiese facts as to the duty of the criminal to reform 
 when suffering punishment, and of the executive and 
 government to secure it if ])Ossible, as an object desir- 
 able in benevolence, are so co-existent with punish- 
 ment, tliat generally they have been regarded as a 
 veritable element in punishment itself. These, as 
 co-existent facts, are to be carefully distinguished from 
 the real elements and desigji of the thing itself. In 
 itself punishment is to be regarded as instructive to 
 all and protective to the obedient ; to be executed 
 directly for their good.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOYEItNMENT. 91 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 PUNISHMENT MORE CAREFULLY DISTINGUISHED AND 
 
 EXPLAINED. 
 
 From the definitiou of punisliment as "Deprivation 
 of good or infliction of suffering njion the transgressor 
 because of his transgression for tlie good of others as 
 judged of Ity the authority which determines the suf- 
 fering," it is evident, T/iat not all siiffermg is pnn- 
 is/iment, hut only that which accords toiththe definition. 
 
 It must be a suffering inflicted, upon a being of a 
 pai'ticula?' character, because of a certain act, for one 
 e Kiict jp'U7'j)ose, dcternn'ned upon by one who has this 
 ohject in vieic. All this involves the fact that tlie suf- 
 fering must be inflicted by an intelligent rational 
 being, on account of believed ti-ansgression for a spe- 
 ciflc object, and to be right, it must be inflicted by 
 one authorized to inflict it. 
 
 Not all suffering resulting from transgi^ession^of law 
 is punishmen t. 
 
 A wife may suffer exceedingly, when first learning 
 that the hushand, whom she thought anobleand good 
 man, is in jail for a real theft. Her sufferings are the 
 result of a transgression, yet are not punishment. So 
 also mav the tranP2;rcssor himself suffer irreatlv
 
 92 archology; or, 
 
 because of his disi^n-ace and of liis confinement, and 
 because of the sulferings his wife and friends endure 
 on his account, and yet there be no punishment in 
 the wliole ; altliough a part of the suifering at least, 
 was inflicted by an executive of government. None 
 of tlie sufferings of the prisonei', before he has been 
 tried, proved guilty, condemned, and the sentence 
 commenced to be inflicted, are punishment. All pre- 
 vious sufferings result from the circumstances, in view 
 of which the judge may however see fit to sentence 
 the criminal to a less severe punishment than other- 
 wise he would have done, but they were not punishment. 
 
 Again, Wo natural 'result^ however 2)ainful, is 
 j)un{shment. 
 
 All natural results are in perfect harmony with natural 
 law. They are always results of a form of obedience to 
 them, obedience being used with no reference to intel- 
 ligence in the case. If from an unavoidable necessity 
 the hand of a man is brought into fire, it comes under 
 the law of disorganization, and is burned, in obedience 
 to that law. There is no punishment in it, any more 
 than when that hand was under the law of growth 
 and it grew. 
 
 The same also is true, if a man designs to put his 
 hand in the fire. For the material law of disorgan- 
 ization requires the consuming of the hand ; and 
 there is no more punishment in the case than when 
 the man puts his hand in cold water and, by the law 
 in the case, the hand is cooled. 
 
 There is a law of mind that when a moral being 
 intentionally injures another he M'ill hate that other.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVEUNMENT. 93 
 
 This hatred is a species of suffering, and terribly 
 degrades the being, yet it is not punishment. 
 
 Punislinient belongs only to legal, rational, govci-n- 
 nient, and must be suffering inflicted by a rational 
 executive in accordance with law for a certain pur- 
 pose, the good of the subjects of that government. 
 
 Once more, Remorse of conscience is ^lot punishment. 
 
 Remorse is a feeling of self-condemnation and de- 
 sert of punishment because of transgression. 
 
 In two things it resembles punishment : it is suffer- 
 im;: and is because of transii^ression. But in other 
 things it utterly fails of the features of punishment. 
 It is not inflicted ; it is not specified by law ; it is not 
 uniform ; it does not cease after a certain amount ; or 
 after a definite length of time ; it is not a measure of 
 the importance of law ; it does not accord with the 
 degree of crime; it varies in different individuals; 
 with different times; with different circumstances; 
 and lias no authority determining its degree. 
 
 Especially, remorse differs from punishment, in that, 
 while, if a transgression is repeated after punishment, 
 the punishment is always justly increased, and so for- 
 ward with every repetition, yet, with remorse, it is di- 
 rectly the opposite. For, generally it diminishes with 
 the repetition of crime, till at length it almost or quite 
 ceases to act. Indeed, so far is remorse from being 
 punishment tliat a major element of it, in this world, 
 is a feeling tliat punishment is deserved but not in- 
 flicted. 
 
 This feelinir of remorse bears a close analoi^v to 
 other feelings and emotions of the rational being.
 
 94 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 Hunger is an original, peculiar feeling of sufTering, 
 difl'eringfrom all others, and becomes a powerful im- 
 pulse to action. Thirst is also another original, pecu- 
 liar feeling, which becomes a powerful impulse to 
 appropriate action. These are but two of many orig- 
 inal feelings of the body, each a powerful impulse. 
 
 The mind has, in like manner, its variety of feel- 
 ings, each an impulse to action. One of these is the 
 sense of moral obligation, an original and peculiar 
 emotion becoming consciously felt on occasion of per- 
 ceived right and wrong. When wrong is committed, 
 another original feeling is awakened, that of remorse. 
 It is a peculiar feeling of suffering in the moral nature 
 of the rational being, one of immense importance, dif- 
 ferent from all others, and becomes a powerful im- 
 pulse to certain actions. 
 
 It is not punishment any more than hunger is pun- 
 ishment. But there is in it, awfulness, tearfulness, 
 miserableness, agony ; a suffering at times which words 
 cannot express, impelling to its own variety of action. 
 
 Yet, this remorse, like any other suffering, may be 
 made a real jmnishment. Any suffering, when judi- 
 cially inflicted, i. e., when the ci'iminal is judicially de- 
 livered over to the suffering, becomes a true punish- 
 ment. To be torn to pieces* by wild beasts is not 
 punishment. But if there is a judicial sentence, com- 
 mitting the criminal to wild beasts to be torn to pieces, 
 then it becomes punishment. So if ever there is a 
 judicial delivering of the criminal over to the horrors 
 of remorse of conscience, then remorse must be pun- 
 ishment of tremendous import.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVEllNMENT. 95 
 
 These sy)eeitic distinctions between piinishuient and 
 tliinirs resembling it, though not themselves it, are 
 here presented to guard the mind against confounding 
 the important element and principleof punishment in 
 government \vith other tilings ditieiing from it in es- 
 sential facts. Confusion here is certain to confuse the 
 whole science in the mind, and lead, in practical re- 
 sults, to irreparable evils. 
 
 In Legal Government all the superiority of law over 
 advice is due entirely to the clement called punish- 
 ment. The real value, force, and obhgation, of hiw, 
 are all given it by punishment. The entire legal in- 
 struction given by government to its subjects, as to the 
 importance of law, and as to the badness or criminality 
 of transgression (upon the knowledge of which de- 
 pends rational obedience), and the entire legal protec- 
 tion of the obedient against the evils of transgression, 
 all are dependent upon punishment. 
 
 Punishment, in view of its importance, should be 
 exactly and clearly apprehended by the scientist, as a 
 great central force, and elemental principle in gov- 
 ernment. Without it legal government ceases to 
 exist ; with it, in perfection, government is perfect. 
 
 Hence, in legal gooernment^ true punishment is aii 
 expression of highest goodness, a necessity in benevo- 
 lence and love, essential to the welfare of subjects. 
 Its true origin, true administration, and true design, 
 are all found in its being useful, as a means of good, 
 necessary to the subjects of government in securing 
 the ends of their existence. 
 
 This usefulness of punishment and the manner of
 
 96 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 it, have been treated of under the head of sanctions 
 of law (cliapter vi.). All there presented having 
 referred to sanctions as a genus, is also true of pun- 
 ishment as a species. But a species always possesses 
 some peculiarities not found in the genus. Hence, 
 in order that these peculiarities may be seen in their 
 true connections, and also in view of the great impor- 
 tance of the whole subject of punishment in distinc- 
 tion from everything else, those principles there pre- 
 sented are here- in connection with new features, 
 repeated with aoridged explanations. 
 
 There is especial reason moreover, for this repeti- 
 tion, in the fact of the very grave errors commoidy 
 entertained in reference to the subject of punishment 
 in its various applications. 
 
 The great principle in the case is, that All the vir- 
 tue, force, and excellence of punishment are fo^tnd 
 in the fact of its usefulness, as a means necessary to 
 suhjects in securing good. 
 
 The next principle is, that, T?ie usefulness of ]jun^ 
 ishment lies entirely in its two qualities of heing in- 
 structive and protective. 
 
 It is instructive in three ways : First, It instructs 
 hj heing the measure of the importance of law. 
 
 As has been said, the subjects of government can 
 act rationally only by conforming to truth as made 
 known thronii:h evidence. But, in their limited 
 knowledge, they cannot, each one, from his own ex- 
 perience and investigation alone, apprehend the re- 
 sults of actions upon all through the system of gov- 
 ernment, and correctly select, each for himself, those
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 97 
 
 actions wliich are adapted to result in good. His 
 own reason will certainly fail him in the case and all 
 be involved in consequent disaster. Legal govern- 
 ment is designed to aid the subject in this condition 
 of difficulty by unfolding authoritatively, through 
 law, the course of action adapted to result in good to 
 
 all. 
 
 But to be law, as distinct from mere ad^'ice, there is 
 a necessity of the element of punishment By the 
 magnitude of this punishment the government ex- 
 presses its estimation of the importance of law. This 
 expression of government, as to the importance of 
 law, is to the subject the legal evidence of this im- 
 portance, and, as evidence, it is essential to his knowl- 
 edge of this importance. Thus punishment is instruc- 
 tive, giving evidence, by its magnitude, of the magni- 
 tude of the importance of law. 
 
 In view of this importance must the subject obey 
 if he is to act rationally. This he is to do, not through 
 fear of the punishment, but through approval of law, 
 and out of regard to its importance, as proved to him 
 by punishment taken as evidence on the authority of 
 government. 
 
 Corresponding to authority there is need of a cor- 
 relative word on the part of subjects. Authority; 
 o-ivine: in itself, i.(\, in the character of the author, the 
 evidence for truth, demands reception of the truth. 
 The subject does, or ought to, receive it on the au- 
 thority of government. This reception needs in 
 science a term expressive of it. Faith is a word in 
 common use expressing this exact idea.
 
 98 aechology; or, 
 
 Faith signifies the reception of truth simply 07i the 
 evidence of authority. 
 
 Government is the authority for laws ; subjects, 
 from faith in government, are to receive those laws on 
 its authority to obey them. Faith, indeed, is not con- 
 fined to government. It expresses one of the most 
 common and most rational acts of an intelligent being. 
 "With little exception all historical belief is simply 
 faith in the authority of historians. J^early all scien- 
 tific belief among the masses of the people is merely 
 faith in the authority of scientific men. The im- 
 mensely larger proportion of all i-ational belief is only 
 faith in the authority of the various sources of evi- 
 dence. Government justly demands from subjects 
 this faith in its authority as to law. It expresses the 
 importance of law by the magnitude of punishment, 
 and demands that the subject obey law in view of this 
 importance. Thus is punishment first instructive. 
 
 Second. Punishment is instructive hy heing the meas- 
 ure of the degree of crime involved in transgressing law. 
 
 It is in view of the badness or the criminality in- 
 volved in transgressing a law that the subject is to 
 avoid such transgression. But tlie punishment is the 
 measure of that criminality, and is the legal evidence 
 of it to the subject. 
 
 Third. Punishm^ent is instructive as evincing the 
 vigor of will and the poiver of the executive to enforce 
 thelaio and protect the obedient subjects from the evils 
 consequent on transgression. 
 
 All protection against the evils of transgression, 
 resulting from those who chose to violate law, depends
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 99 
 
 upon tlie will and the power of the executive. Just 
 in proportion to the confidence of the subjects in the 
 will and power of the executive to protect them, can 
 tliey rationall)-- trust this department of government 
 to do it, while they peacefully and rationally oljey the 
 laws of the government. This vigor of will and 
 ability, on the part of the executive, are evinced to 
 the subjects by the punishments he enforces on occa- 
 sion of transgression. Thus punishment is instruc- 
 tive by being the evidence of the will and power of 
 the executive, upon which depends for subjects all 
 their rational confidence of protection from evil. 
 
 The three facts united in the instructive quality of 
 punishment are necessary to subjects if they are to act 
 rationally, as rational beings, under a rational govern- 
 ment. These three facts given in punishment are 
 formulated in the followins' manner : 
 
 A law of little importance, hence of little crime in 
 its violation, evoking little vigor of will and power on 
 the part of the executive, must have little punish- 
 ment specified ibr its transgression. A law of great 
 importance, hence of great crime in its violation, and 
 evoking great vigor of will and power on the part of 
 the executive, must have great punishment sjiecified for 
 its transgression ; and a law of the greatest importance, 
 hence of greatest crime in its violation, and evoking 
 the greatest vigor of will and power on the part of 
 the executive, must have the greatest punishment 
 specified for its transgression. 
 
 Or, little importance, little crime, little vigor of 
 will and power, little punishment ; great importance,
 
 100 archology; or, 
 
 great crime, great vigor of will and power, great pun- 
 ishment ; finite importance, finite crime, finite vigor 
 of will and power, finite punishment; infinite im- 
 portance, infinite crime, infinite vigor of will and 
 power, infinite punishment. 
 
 Such are the proportions, such the correlations 
 of truth, and such the necessities for subjects in their 
 instruction by government. Punishment, to be true, 
 must instruct truthfully. Its testimony, as evidence, 
 must neither overstate nor imderstate the truth. By 
 its magnitude it must be the true measure of the im- 
 portance of law, and of the correct degree of crime, 
 and be the true expression of the vigor of will, and of 
 the power of the executive of law to enforce its claims, 
 sustain the government, and protect the obedient. 
 In view of this evidence, the subjects of government 
 can rationally act, and peacefully yield cheerful obedi- 
 ence to law and government. 
 
 Again, The jprotective quality of punishment is 
 evinced also in three ways. 
 
 First. Punishment protects against the evils of 
 transgression hy preventing them through instruction. 
 
 Inasmuch as it instructs all as to the importance of 
 law and the badness of transgression, it enables sub- 
 jects to choose the good, carefully to do right, and 
 avoid wrong. Thus by its influence in preventing 
 evils by its instruction, it so far protects obedient sub- 
 jects against them. 
 
 Second. Punishment protects against the evils of 
 transgression hy being a terror to those inclined to 
 transgress the law^ inducing them, practically to obey.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 101 
 
 There is no moral virtue in this obedience ; still, to 
 the truly obedient, tliis influence is of gre:it ini])or- 
 tance in preventiiifi: the evilly disposed from violatin<; 
 law, and involving others in suffering. Thus, as an 
 object of terror to the evilly disposed, punishment is, 
 for the obedient, a great ])rotection against evils. 
 
 Perhaps also the suffering of punishment, as an evil 
 to be avoided, may have a rational influence upon the 
 good themselves. They may perhaps perceive it as an 
 evil like any other fact of pain, and Mith a right 
 motive avoid it by obedience. Thus punishment, as a 
 suffering in itself, may have some proper influ- 
 ence, as an object of fear, even upon the good as well 
 as the bad, to protect from evil, by insuring obedi- 
 ence. 
 
 Third. Punishment is protective hy being such, a 
 confining and affecting of the evil-doer, that repeti- 
 tion of the transgression may not take place. 
 
 Since, in its very nature, government is to protect 
 its subjects from actions tending to prevent the secur- 
 ing of the ends of existence, i. e., their real good, it 
 follows that if it cannot protect them either by 
 instruction or by fear, then it must give such protec- 
 tion through com]nilsion or physical force. But 
 because the will is free in rational beings, government 
 cannot force or coni])el the wills of those inclined to 
 violate law. Therefore, it must, by physical force, 
 restrain and conflne those thus evilly inclined, that 
 they may not again, by transgression, involve the 
 obedient in evil. This "inflicting of confinement 
 upon the transgressor, because of his transgression,
 
 102 archology; or, 
 
 for the good of others," is, according to the definition, 
 punislinient. 
 
 In formulating the principles of this chapter, it ap- 
 pears that punishment is both instructive in three 
 ways, and also protective in three ways. 
 
 It is instructive, 1st, as evidence of the importance 
 of law, 2d, as evidence of the degree of crime, and 3d, 
 as evidence of the vigor of will and power of the exec- 
 utive to enforce law. It protects, 1st, by its instruc- 
 tion, to all, 2d, by its terror to the evilly disposed, 
 and 3d, by its coniinement and eifect upon the trans- 
 gressor to prevent repetition of crime.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 103 
 
 CHxiPTER XIII. 
 
 OTHER FACTS AS TO rUNISlIMP:NT TOGETHER "WITH 
 APPLICATIONS OF IT. 
 
 From the fact that punishment is protective it is evi- 
 dent, that, It must involve greater deprivation of 
 good to the transgressor than the good he designed for 
 himself in his transgression. 
 
 For, if by breaking the hiw whicli protects tlie rights 
 of property, he secures as a thief, five thousand doHars, 
 and yet is punislied onl}' by the deprivation of four 
 thousand, he lias made one thousand dollars clear b}' 
 his transgression. Protection would not be given the 
 obedient in the case, and the thief will repeat the act. 
 
 So also if suffering is inflicted, such as imprison- 
 ment or scourging at the whipping-post, and yet the 
 suffering be to him, as he regards it, only equal to 
 four thousand dullars, he will consider himself as 
 clearly gaining one thousand dollars, and be ready to 
 renew the theft as an advantageous transaction. 
 
 Again, The chances that the criniinal may escape the 
 executive must he considered still more to increase the 
 ■punisliment. 
 
 For, if when stealing five thousand dollars, the 
 criminal is to be punished by a deprivation of six
 
 104 AKCHOLOGY ; OE, 
 
 thousand, and yet lie can escape detection once out 
 of three times, then, in the three transgressions, he 
 will secure iifteen thousand dollars, but be punished 
 only in the loss of twelve thousand. Thus, in this 
 case, protection would not be given the obedient. 
 
 Again, The hardening of the criminaV s feelings by 
 transgression must be considered yet still more to in- 
 crease the punishment. 
 
 For, the repeated transgression of law, and often a 
 single act, will so deaden the sensibilities of the 
 criminal, that a suffering, as punishment, which to an 
 honest man would be very severe, would, by him, be 
 little felt. Thus protection in this case also would 
 not be given. 
 
 Moreover, from a consideration in the quality of pun- 
 ishment, it is further evident that, Ptmishment must 
 he to the transgressor very mttch greater than the good 
 he secureSy or designs for himself. 
 
 For punishment is the measure of the importance 
 of law, and of the degree of crime involved in its 
 violation. But the importance is much greater than 
 the good it protects for the one single possessor, since 
 it protects also the same good of all like possessors. 
 Therefoi-e the punishment which expresses the impor- 
 tance of this law, protecting all these various posses- 
 sors, must be much greater than the sum taken by 
 the one thief from the one possessor. 
 
 Again, since punishment is the measure of crime, 
 while criminality increases not only with the impor- 
 tance of a law in government, but also with the au- 
 thority of the government itself, it is still further
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 105 
 
 evident tliat the ])uiii.slinicnt, measuring this increased 
 criminality, must often very far surpass the indivi(hial 
 good secured or designed by the criminal in his vio- 
 latinii; law. 
 
 From all these considerations it follows tliat the 
 punishment for violating law ought in truth often to 
 be manv fold u'reater than the <^ood the criminal 
 secured or designed for himself in the violation of 
 law. Justice, goodness, love, demand it to be much 
 greater, and its execution is one of the highest legal 
 expressions, which the executive can make, of his love 
 and benevolence. 
 
 APPLICATIONS OF PUNISHMENT. 
 
 The principles of punishment in their application to 
 the protection of property, appear comparatively sim- 
 ple. In this case a numerical estimate of good and 
 evil in the case can be a[)proximately made, and a 
 punishment that shall instruct and protect be some- 
 where near correctly determined upon. 
 
 But ill their apjdication to the protection of liberty, 
 the determination of just punishment becomes more 
 difficult. For the deprivation of liberty is generally 
 felt to be a greater evil than the loss of money, and 
 the law-making department of government must 
 indire of this loss, with other considerations, in deter- 
 mining punishment in the case. 
 
 Still more difficult and complicated is the matter 
 when these principles are applied to the protection of 
 limbs, health, and cliaracter. In determining the 
 criminalitv involved in the willful destroying of a 
 
 o 

 
 106 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 liinb, or any member of the body, it is necessary to 
 consider the loss of time, of health, of wealth, of 
 comfort, of liberty, of aid to a dependent family, of 
 help to general society, of assistance to government, 
 and of all things involved in the loss of the liml), or 
 member, in order that a true and just punishment may 
 be determined upon. The punishment must both cor- 
 rectly instruct and effectually protect or it is wrong. 
 
 Should the punishment for Avillfully destroying an 
 eye, or disabling an arm be fixed at one thousand 
 dollars, tjien possibly the anger, spite, malice or re- 
 venge, of a rich man might induce him to risk the 
 loss of the thousand dollars for the gratification of de- 
 stroying the eye, or other useful member of a poor 
 man with whom he had difficulty. In this case the 
 law by its punishment would fail to give protection to 
 the poor man; for the rich, evilly disposed man could 
 easily trample upon the poor, by means of his wealth. 
 The government is in duty bound to protect all obe- 
 dient subjects, the poor as well as the rich, yet in this 
 case it seems it would not. 
 
 Probably no better punishment was ever specified, 
 for such a condition of tJmigs, than that, after an im- 
 partial court trial, the -rich man should have his own 
 eye, tooth, or limb, destroyed by the proper executive 
 of law. This would effectually protect the poor man 
 from outrage by an evilly disposed man of wealth. 
 Tiiis must not be done by a private man on his own 
 authority, for this would be only revenge. But it 
 must be by the proper officers of government, as an 
 instructive and j^rotective punishment, to be inflicted
 
 THE SCIENCE OP GOVERNMENT. 107 
 
 upon the criminal by the properly constituted execu- 
 tive of government. Just punishment must both 
 trutlit'uliy instruct, and effectually protect. All else 
 is false to truth and goodness. 
 
 Finally, in the application of these principles to the 
 protection of life, there is an inference of the great- 
 est importance. The estimate of life is that of a good 
 to a man greater than any other object of desire on 
 earth. No sum of money, no amount of wealth, and 
 no years of servitude, can express to a man the real 
 value of his own life. He regards it to himself as a 
 good too great to be expressed in numbers. 
 
 jSow the law, which protects life, protects for him 
 this great and inestimable good. But the importance 
 of a law is equal to the good it protects, and the crime 
 of violating a law is, in degree, equal to the impor- 
 tance of it. And the magnitude of this importance, 
 and the degree of the crime, are expressed by the 
 magnitude of the punishment attached to the trans- 
 gression of the law. Hence, if the punishment for 
 murder be any sum of money, such as ten thousand 
 dollars, the legal testimony by punishment, as the evi- 
 dence in the case, is that the real value of life is no 
 greater than ten thousand dollars, and that the crime 
 of destroying life is correctly measured by this sum. 
 
 But this legal testimony would appear to be a ju- 
 dicial falsehood, for life to a man is of more impor- 
 tance than any sum of money. All the subjects of 
 government do estimate life as of more value than 
 money ; but by a punishment of money to protect it, 
 the government declares, by law, that this estimate is
 
 108 archology; oe, 
 
 an error; that life is really of value only equal to a cer- 
 tain sum of money, and that the crime of •willfully de- 
 stroying it is correctly expressed in degree by such sum. 
 
 Exactly the same reasoning with the previous holds 
 true in respect to imprisonmeut for life being punish- 
 ment for murder. For in this case the legal testi- 
 mony is, that the loss of liberty during life, is equal to 
 the loss of life itself, and that the crime of willfully 
 destroying life is truthfully expressed in degree by loss 
 of liberty through life. Such testimony is false. Life 
 is more valuable than liberty; and the importance of 
 the law which protects life, and the crime'of willfully 
 destroying it, are greater than can be expressed by 
 imprisonment, or by loss of liberty. Therefore they 
 must be expressed by a punishment greater than tlie 
 loss of any sum of money, or than the loss of liberty 
 by imprisonment for life. Otherwise the legal testi- 
 mony in the case would be a falsehood and a lie, while 
 truth and safety would become sacrificed to the im- 
 pulse of sympatiiy for a criminal, that liad no sympa- 
 thy for his victim. 
 
 Life for life is alone the punishment which the 
 science of Archology can justify as the true punish- 
 ment for murder. This only expresses as evidence the 
 real importance of the law which protects life, and the 
 degree of crime involved in the transgression of that 
 law, giving, at the same time, the only sure protection 
 against the repetition of the ti'ansgression. 
 
 The principles here discussed in Ihe application of 
 punishment to the protection of ditlcrent varieties of 
 good, may be formulated in the following manner :
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 109 
 
 llielosfi of inone]} protects money ^ or full equivalents 
 are admissible. 
 
 The loss of I'lhertij prottcts Uhertij^ or full equiva- 
 lents are admissible. 
 
 The loss of liiiib p>rotects limh^ or full ecjuivalents 
 are admissible. 
 
 The loss of life protects life, but here there are no 
 sufficient equivalents, rationally expressing the impor- 
 tance of the law protecting life, and the degi-ee of 
 crime involved in its transgression. Capital punish- 
 ment alone for murder ijives the true instruction and 
 the effectual protection requisite in the case.
 
 110 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTER XIY. 
 
 THE PAKDON OF CKIME. 
 
 Pardon is the setting aside of the jpunishment 
 widch law demands, and the treating of the criminal 
 as if he were innocent. 
 
 Punisliineiit and pardon appear as direct opposites. 
 While punishment is tlie infliction of suffering, pardon 
 is the non-infliction of that same siifferino;. While 
 punishment is what the law demands because of a 
 crime, pardon sets this demand aside and treats the 
 criminal as if innocent. 
 
 The acts expressed by the two words are in them- 
 selves directly opposite, the one to the other. As in 
 worldly phenomena, tlie attraction of gravitation draws 
 all tilings toward the center of the earth, yet smoke 
 ascends directly from that center, so punishment and 
 pardon appear directly opposed. Science explains, in 
 each case, this apparent opposition, and proves them, 
 in their appropriate actions, perfectly harmonious, 
 originating in the same principle, resulting from the 
 same cause in different circumstances, and, mutually, 
 of incalculable importance, practically considered. 
 
 Punishment is from the law-making department of 
 government, ft direct demand, involv^ed, as an element,
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. Ill 
 
 in the nature of law itself; while pardon is from the 
 executive of that same law, a direct rejection, in letter, 
 of this demand of law. Yet are they, each in their 
 appropriate circumstances, perfectly rii^ht, and har- 
 moniously tending to the same end of good in govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The explanation lies in the one great underlying 
 principle and aim of government, the one same prin- 
 ciple and aim of law, the one same principle and ob- 
 ject of the whole administration of government and 
 law. This one principle and aim is that of usefulness 
 to the subjects of government in securing the ends for 
 which they exist, their true good and welfare. 
 
 In view of usefulness to subjects, government 
 and law exist. But law beinii; a uniform rule of ac- 
 tion, so long as there is occasion for uniformity, can- 
 not specify the varying particulars, which in tempor- 
 arily varying circumstances, would be best in securing 
 the general good. Law is the uniform great means ; 
 but the varying particulars njust depend upon the 
 execution of law. Pardon is one of these particulars, 
 the great and important particular, admissible when, 
 in view of all tiie circumstances, it M'ill result in the 
 same good to subjects of government equally with 
 punishment. 
 
 That is, Whenever pardon, in view of all circum- 
 stances, will result in, and secure for the subjects of 
 government, all the same ohjects of good, equaUij with 
 punishinent, then pardon is possible and right as a 
 means of good in place of the punishment. 
 
 The law-making department promulgates the law
 
 112 archology; or, 
 
 as a means of usefulness to subjects ; the executive 
 enforces the law as a means of usefulness to them. 
 Hence when, as a means of usefulness, pardon will se- 
 cure the same results of good equally with punish- 
 ment, the executive may substitute one for the other. 
 Then M-hichever as a means is used, the other becomes 
 useless and impossible. 
 
 The only difficulty involving danger in the case, is 
 the liability of the executive to err in his iudffment as 
 to whetlier pardon will result in good equally well 
 with punishment. But science has nothing to do 
 with possil)le eri'ors in practice. It is to present the 
 principles of truth in their true relations, while, in the 
 particular application of the science as an art, errors 
 must be guarded against. So in this case, the prin- 
 ciple of pardon and the possibility of pardon are as 
 presented. Hence the principle of pardon is possi- 
 ble and right, whenever with it can be secured all 
 the objects of good possible to be secured by punish- 
 ment. 
 
 That is, Whenever, with pardon, are given to suh- 
 jects, all the instruction and all the protection possible 
 to he given hy punishment, with no resultant evils, 
 then is pardon possible and right. 
 
 In this case the executive finds himself in posses- 
 sion of two means of good, that of punishment and 
 that of pardon. He now has a choice of means, and 
 if he perceives that the second is, in every respect, 
 equally effectual with the first, he has a right to 
 select it and dispense with the first ; moreover benevo- 
 lence demands of him, in this case, to make use of the
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 113 
 
 second, and lie would be ii cruel executive if he did 
 not do it. 
 
 If now the judicial usefnlness of pardon be divided, 
 tlic same as that of punishment, into the Instructive 
 and the Protective, it will follow. 
 
 First, as to the Instructive, that With pardon there 
 must be given, in some manner, evidence of the three 
 threat facts which ])unishment gives, viz. : That the 
 law is just as i?iipo/'tant as it in reality is ; that the 
 degree of crime, involved in the transgression of the 
 law, is just as great as it in reality is j and that the 
 executive of law is of a vigor of will and of ability to 
 enforce the laivjust equal to what he in reality is, the 
 same as in the case of punishment. 
 
 Secondly, as to Protection, With jyardon, there 
 must also be given to the subjects of government ^ro- 
 tection from the evils of transgression, by instruction 
 to all ; by terror to the evilly disposed; and by an 
 effect upon the transgressor to insure the non-repeti- 
 tion of the transgression. 
 
 This instruction and this protection may be given 
 in different ways, and by different actors in the appli- 
 cation of pardon to particular cases, but in some man- 
 ner it must be given. It may be done by the execu- 
 tive ; or by the criminal ; or by others, such as friends ; 
 or by the circumstances of the case; by one ; by all ; 
 or partly by one and ]>artly by the others. But in some 
 manner; by some means; in some way; there must 
 be given, in the case, the same full instruction and 
 full protectloTi which punishment would give. When 
 this is done then pardon is admissible, as perfectly
 
 114 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 right, good, benevolent. The highest good of all is 
 secured ; the real protection of all is certain ; justice 
 is satisfied ; the punishment dispensed with ; and par- 
 don correctly granted. 
 
 In the above statement, as to the granting of par- 
 don, in order that misapprehension may be avoided, 
 the full force of the word circumstances, needs partic- 
 ular notice. A few ilhistrations will make this the 
 most clear. A pupil has violated a rule of the school ; 
 broken a pane of glass and run liome. The teacher 
 says, " I must punish that boy to-morrow." But that 
 evening the mother of that bov dies. This fact 
 requires that the teacher refer tenderly to the painful 
 bereavement, and pardon the criminal. The circum- 
 stances make the pardon more useful than the punish- 
 ment. A murderer is clearly convicted and con- 
 demned. Before the day of execution the criminal 
 is almost gone with the consumption ; utterly unable to 
 rise, and is certain to die in less than ten days. Public 
 feeling would revolt at his being brouglit thus upon his 
 bed to execution. A pai-don might do more good if 
 couched in proper terms than the punishment. The 
 executive might rightfully pardon, justified in so doing 
 because of the circumstances. Once more, an aged 
 man, in a financial crisis, forges a note ; is convicted, 
 and condemned to the penitentiary for years. Just 
 at this time, his worthy son returns, the leader of a 
 victoi'ious army, having saved his country in the hour 
 of her greatest peril. lie petitions, as a favor to him 
 personally, for the pardon of that aged father ; prom- 
 ising to provide for him well the remainder of his
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 115 
 
 life, aiul reimburse all losses to injured parties. To 
 refuse the petition would proi)ably be an outrage to a 
 g-rateful people. In the circumstances a pardon would 
 do more good than punishment and would be right. 
 
 Circumstances iramensel)' vary ; yet these, as illus- 
 trations, suffice to bring out the principle that when, 
 by tliem, pardon results in good equally with, or bet- 
 ter than, punishment, it is then right. 
 
 There is, however, a difference to be considered in 
 the two cases of punishment and pardon. For, while 
 punishment, in its miture, as a suffering, docs directly 
 instruct and protect ; yet, as pardon is a setting aside 
 of suffering, it, in its own nature, cannot instruct or 
 protect. Therefore the instruction and protection 
 must be given by something in connection with the 
 pardon, as the ground, or cause, on account of which 
 the pardon is granted. This ground or cause, on 
 account of which the pardon is granted, needs a term 
 by which it may be expressed ; it needs a clear and 
 distinct name. 
 
 Inasn)uch as this ground or cause of pardon is the 
 occasion of government and the violator of its laws 
 becoming fully reconciled, so as to be at-one again, it 
 is appropriate that that which is the means of their 
 being at-one should be called an at-one-ment or atone- 
 ment. 
 
 Hence an atonement is that which is done as the 
 ground or cause on account of which a pardon is ren- 
 dered possible and right. 
 
 The wording of this definition is designed to ex- 
 clude those cases where the cause of the pardon is
 
 116 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 some defect in law, or evidence, which the law de- 
 partment, bj statute, could not guard against; or 
 where new evidence has come to light after the judg- 
 ment of court has been rendered. Strictly speaking, 
 in these cases there is only the form, but no real, par- 
 don; because the punishment really .is not deserved, 
 and would be wronir. To remedv the wrono^ of the 
 technical punishment, a ])ardon in form is granted, 
 still this is not strictly a pardon. In science pardon 
 is setting aside the punishment which the transgressor 
 deservesl^y the execution of law. This can justly be 
 done only where in connection with the pardon are 
 given all the same instruction and protection, equally 
 with punishment. That which, as the ground and 
 source of pardon, gives this instruction and protection 
 is called an atonement. 
 
 Hence an atonement, as the ground of pardon, must 
 ^ive all the instruction and 'protection ivMch are given by 
 punishment. Then is pardon just and right. The 
 language of law is punish, the spirit and aim of law 
 admit of pardon ; and benevolence demands it from 
 the executive. 
 
 Still, notwithstanding whatever may be the atone- 
 ment made, either by the transgressor or by others, there 
 is one prerequisite to pardon, on the part of the crim- 
 inal, which, in all cases where he is to go out as an ac- 
 tive, free subject of the government again, is absolutely 
 necessary as given in science. 
 
 As a prerequisite to pardon there must he a real 
 change in the will and motive character of the transgres- 
 sor, so that there shall he, on his part^ a sincere approval
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 117 
 
 of the law, and a genuine^ fixed purpose to ohci/ the gov- 
 ei'mnent. 
 
 This necessity is very evident from all unfolded in 
 previous chapters. For, witiiout such a change in the 
 character and action of the criminal as involves a gen- 
 uine abhorrence of his crimes, and a fixed will to obey 
 the law, there could be no protection for the obedient 
 subjects against a repetition of transgression, and this, 
 too, in aggravated forms, with all the consequent evils. 
 The government must give protection ; but in case of 
 pardon, without a genuine purpose, founded rationally 
 in the very motive character of the criminal, there 
 would not be protection. Government would be 
 granting the criminal the privilege of repeating his 
 transjrression with imi)unitv. Tiiere must be a 
 chano-e of character in the criminal from the choice 
 influencing him to transgress, to a choice to obey, be- 
 fore pardon can justly be granted. 
 
 The only apparent exception to this principle is, 
 that in an imperfect, weak government there may 
 rest upon the executive a necessity to remedy errors 
 in law, or administration, or in some other defect, by 
 granting a pardon without the above principles being 
 realized in the case. Jhit this, like other necessities in 
 practice, belongs rather to art than to science, to dis- 
 cuss and determine. In science the principle is posi- 
 tive; there must be a change in character from dis- 
 obedience to genuine obedience before pardon can be 
 granted. 
 
 This change of character is not the reason for par- 
 don. It is not the ground or rational cause on account
 
 118 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 of which pardon is granted. It does not require a 
 pardon. It, of itself alone, never justifies a pardon ; 
 and the criminal cannot properly, on account of it, 
 demand a pardon. 
 
 But pardon can be justly granted because there can 
 be given with it all the same instruction and the same 
 protection which can be given with punishment. 
 Then is it possible and right. Even in this case the 
 criminal cannot demand it as his right. By trans- 
 gression he has forfeited his rights to the benefits of 
 law, and is at the disposal of the executive, who, in 
 his judgment, has the legal right to use either pardon 
 or punishment. Yet in the principles of benevolence 
 he is in duty bound to grant the pardon. But the 
 criminal cannot justly demand it. He may ask for it, 
 but not demand, then trust to the clemency of the 
 executive. 
 
 COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE. 
 
 The same principles which hold good with respect 
 to pardon, also hold with respect to commutation of 
 sentence or punishment, except that a change of char- 
 acter in the criminal is not an essential prerequisite. 
 Whenever the chief executive of law jierceives that in 
 all the circumstances of the case a certain legally spe- 
 cified punishment is defective in its instructive or 
 protective efficiency, while another milder y)unish- 
 ment is superior in this respect, then he may substi- 
 tute this second variet}^ of punishment, which, like 
 pardon, utterly excludes the first specified punishment. 
 
 The process of reasoning justifying, this conclusion,
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 119 
 
 rests, like that of pardon, entirely on the great prin- 
 ciple, that all of government and law and administra- 
 tion has its origin and end in usefulness, as a means 
 to the securing of good. Hence, when there is a cer- 
 tainty that some means of punishment, other than that 
 specified by law, will, the more effectually, secure the 
 objects desired, tlie executive may rightfully make 
 use of this other means, and dispense with the first. 
 The danger is that the executive may err in judgment. 
 But science must give the principle, while in practice 
 the danijer must be o-uarded as^ainst. 
 
 Tiius, while strict law makes no refereiice to either 
 pardon or commutation, yet both, in their appropriate 
 circumstances, are right, just, and benevolent in the 
 place of specified punishment, whenever the executive 
 clearly perceives that the full objects of the punish- 
 ment can with them be as well or better secured than 
 with the specified punishment. 
 
 Commutation, like pardon, at times, is designed to 
 remed}' defects in the administration of human govern- 
 ment. The law, in the circumstances, may be too 
 severe; the jury may be biased by prejudices; the 
 judge may err in his renderings ; new and clearly 
 modifying evidence may appear after the sentence, so 
 that iniustice would be done bv the exact infliction of 
 the punishment. Commutation, or sometimes pardon, 
 is a remedy in the case.
 
 120 AKCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 CIIAPTEE XY. 
 
 TAXATION. 
 
 Taxation is a requisition from government upon its 
 subjects for a certain amount or proportion of their 
 wealth to meet the expenses of government. 
 
 The clause, to meet the expenses of government, in 
 the definition distiiiguislies true taxation from tlie im- 
 posing of lines, tlie assessing of damages, the seques- 
 tration of property, taiiffs, duties, imposts, h'censes, 
 etc., all of which involve more than to " meet the ex- 
 penses of government." Fines involve the principle 
 of punishment. Damages involve the same in a 
 lower degree, and so also of sequestration. Tariffs 
 are requisitions of specified portions of foreign produc- 
 tions imported into a country, one design of which is 
 generally to encourage home productions. So of 
 duties, imposts, licenses, etc., each of which involves, 
 in its signification, something more than for the pur- 
 poses of government. Taxation is properly apjjHcable 
 to the property of foreigners within the limits of gov- 
 ernment, when no distinction is made Ijetween such 
 property and that of subjects; also at times, for the 
 want of a better and distinctive term, " taxation of 
 foreigners" is used, but tlic idea in reality is that
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 121 
 
 of a license to the foreigner to reside and posses? 
 })n>])erty in the territory of the government, while 
 in dillerent ways this license, though like taxes 
 largely supporting government, yet includes addi- 
 tional things, such as discouraging the residence of 
 foreigners in large numbers within the territory, or as 
 an inlluence to induce them to become naturalized, or 
 some other object, besides solely that of meeting the 
 expenses of government. Taxation proper is alone 
 for the purposes of government, and is imposed upon 
 the subjects. 
 
 RIGHT OF TA5:ATI0N. 
 
 The right of taxation originates in the nature of 
 tilings as a necessity to government in its usefulness 
 for good to its subjects. 
 
 Since rational government originates as a necessity 
 to subjects in securing good, the means needed by gov- 
 ernment for its success are included in this necessity. 
 Kevenue is one of these means necessary to human 
 government for its success. Without this, in some 
 form, rational government, at least on earth, must 
 soon cease to exist, and all the evils of its loss be suf- 
 fered. Hence, it is necessary, and taxation is the reg- 
 ular method of obtainini!: it. 
 
 Now, it is a principle of riglit, that when one 
 rational being is in need of another's help, and at the 
 same time, possesses the means of helping the other in 
 return, he ought to render such help, and the two be 
 mutually helpful to each other. This principle is a 
 basis of all business transactions among intelligent
 
 122 AllCHOLOGY ; OE, 
 
 beings. If one demands an advantage from another 
 without a willingness to return a full equivalent 
 advantage, he is acting on the principle of the robber, 
 and is in conflict with justice. The government in 
 the case has a right to deal with him as a wrong-doer, 
 and reqnire him to do right, by the proper return of 
 advantage to him from whom he receives advantage. 
 
 And when such are the circumstances that the 
 mutual advantages, or helps, are of very great impor- 
 tance to both parties, and one actually does receive 
 from the other the advantage he needs, and yet refuses 
 to return the advantage he can render to the other, it 
 is right that the government in the case compel him 
 to do it. For, by so doing, the government is insuring 
 a harmony in actions necessary to secure good, while 
 without it government would be permitting a clashing 
 of actions tending to disaster, and would be itself 
 doing wrong. 
 
 All this is still more evident when the mutual ad- 
 vantages are in reality necessary to both and one does 
 receive the advantage for himself. Then truly the 
 government in the case ought, in all right and duty, 
 to compel a return of advantage necessary to the (^ther. 
 
 Now this is the condition of things between govern- 
 ment and its subjects. There are mutual advantages, 
 necessary to each, which they can render one to the 
 other. The subject needs the help of government as 
 a necessity to his securing the ends of his existence, 
 or his own real good together with the good of others. 
 Without it he cannot, for a length of time, secure, or 
 preserve, either property, liberty, or even life. In the
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 123 
 
 necessities of his eireimistances and nature, he needs 
 the great advantages of government. Moreover lie 
 does receive these advantages from government, and 
 only thus does he avoid evils incalculably great, and 
 secure real good. Hence he ought to return to gov- 
 ernment such advantage in his power as government 
 needs. 
 
 But the government needs the means of efficiency 
 in its efforts for the good of its subjects. Kevenue in- 
 sures all such means to the government. AV^ithout it, 
 in this world, rational government cannot long exist. 
 Therefore if the subject has wealth, the very advan- 
 tage as a means necessary to government, the subject 
 ought to return to government such a proportion of 
 it as, on the average with other subjects, will meet the 
 real needs of government. 
 
 Here are the two mutual advantages, necessary to 
 each of the two parties, the subject and the govern- 
 ment. The subject does of necessity receive to him- 
 self the advantages of government. Whether he ad- 
 mits it or not, he does receive such necessary advan- 
 tases. He ouijht to return the advantage needed to 
 that government in a proper proportion of his wealth. 
 
 If he refuses to return such proportion as, on aver- 
 age with other subjects, is needed, the government in 
 the case has the right, and ought, to compel him to do 
 his share ; and also to add so much to the amount as a 
 ])nnishment to him as would prove to be instructive 
 and protective in the case. 
 
 The whole of the wealth rightfully ac(piircd by the 
 subject, he has acquired through the help of govern-
 
 12-i ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 inent, necessary to liiiii in the nature of tilings ; and 
 only by that help does he retain that M^ealth. Surely 
 he ought to return to government the proportion 
 necessary to it, as the means of its existence and effi- 
 ciency for the good of the subjects. If he will not 
 do this, government has the right to compel him to 
 do it, and this is taxation, together with the right to 
 enforce it. 
 
 THE AMOUNT OF TAXATION. 
 
 Taxation is never to exceed the necessities of goV' 
 ernment as a means of its usefulness to its suhjects. 
 
 Since government exists solely for the good of its 
 subjects, it is evident the government ought to de- 
 mand of its subjects only so much tax as is necessary 
 to its greatest efficiency in promoting the welfare of 
 the subjects. Hence no tax should be for the aggran- 
 dizement of government any further than such aggran- 
 dizement will contribute to the hii^hest welfare of sub- 
 jeets. So also no tax should be for the honor, display, 
 or gratification of officers of government any further 
 than the real welfare of the subjects will be promoted 
 by such means. 
 
 If officers of government manipulate the taxes or 
 other affairs of government for their own personal in- 
 terest, overlooking the simple object of their official 
 existence, viz., the real welfare of the subjects of gov- 
 ernment, they are both morally and practically recre- 
 ant to truth ; they are at variance with the undei'lj'ing 
 principle of government; they are in motive wrong, 
 and deserve severe condemnation. Their punishment
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 125 
 
 ought to be inucli more severe tlian that of tlie com- 
 inon thief, even, as tliey are greater criminals. 
 
 Archology forljitls the sentiment, " to the victors 
 belong the spoils." There are no spoils, but all are 
 means of usefulness to subjects of the government in 
 ]>r()moting good. Every rational being of govern- 
 ment, whether officer or common citizen, should be 
 supremely influenced by the motive of usefulness in 
 the promotion of the welfare of all, 
 
 "The divine I'ight of kings," or, in science, "the 
 divine right of officers," in their own personal inclina- 
 tions, is a falsehood. The whole i-ight of officers lies 
 in their being of use ; being of benefit to all affected 
 by their administration of the affairs of their offices. 
 
 In commercial transactions it is a common custom 
 for each party to regard mainl}-, or only, his own ad- 
 vantages, leaving the other to see to his own interest. 
 But in government this practice is at variance with 
 the first principle of right. For the very idea of true 
 government is to supply to suljjects a help for their 
 good, where, without it, they are without help. It is 
 so to control all things pertaining to subjects as to 
 insure to them such a harmony of actions as shall 
 result in their highest good, where, without it, they 
 would be whelmed in irremediable disaster through 
 the clashings of apparent interests and operations. 
 This is the whole oriii-in and rational aim of govern- 
 ment. Hence, when in the administration of govern- 
 ment the officers turn from this very origin and pur- 
 pose of government to manipulate affairs mainly or 
 only for their own gratifications, they, in motive and
 
 126 ARCHOLOGY ; OE, 
 
 practice, are tiirniiig from tlie very first and highest 
 principles of right in government, to put into exercise 
 the very principle of all evil, tending to utter ruin, 
 viz., the gratification of selfish impulse in conflict with 
 the highest good of all. Thus the officers of govern- 
 ment, in taxing the subjects, are to require only such 
 a sura as will, the most effectually, contribute to the 
 efficiency of government in promoting the good of 
 subjects. 
 
 This principle of promoting alone the good of sub- 
 jects holds as to all expenses of government, i. e., as 
 to its public buildings, its parks and fountains, its 
 roads and general improvements, its military and 
 civic'displays before the people, and in its treatment 
 of foreign officials. In all things its expenses are to 
 be limited to the promotion of the true welfare of its 
 subjects.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 127 
 
 CHAPTER XYI. 
 
 KianT OF GOVERNMENT TO ENFORCE CONTRACTS. 
 
 Tlie right of government to regulate and enforce con- 
 tracts is involved in its very aim of existence^ and ap- 
 pears evident from the j^nnciples already unfolded. 
 
 Tlie making, fulfilling, and repudiating of contracts 
 are all varieties of actions, the very things in which it 
 is the design of government to prevent clashing inter- 
 ferences, and iasure a harmony essential to the secur- 
 ing of good. On the basis of contracts, the honest 
 l)arties coiicerned set in operation whole trains of en- 
 terprises designed for good, all of which are depend- 
 ent for success upon the fulfillment of the contract. 
 If the contract fails of being fulfilled, the good de- 
 signed must be lost, while the evils, which must be 
 suffered in the case, are beyond all calculation. These 
 evils affect not only the direct contracting parties, but 
 they extend outward and forward with no certain 
 limits to great numbers of others. 
 
 Hence, in the very purpt)se for which government 
 exists, that of preventing evil and insuring good to its 
 subjects, there is involved the right and duty to regu- 
 late and enforce the fulfillment of contracts among 
 su])jects. Without such governmental enforcement 
 there is a constant liability that some party will fail to
 
 128 archology; or, 
 
 fiarry out the stipulations of a contract, and thus in- 
 volve all interested in evils. Government is to enforce 
 the fullilhnent, and thus prevent evil while insuring 
 good. 
 
 The failure of the fulfillment of single contracts in- 
 volves many more evils than those directly following 
 from such failure. For they serve as examples of 
 what may take place as to all.contracts, destroying con- 
 fidence in the uniform fulfillment of all. But rational 
 calculation as to the future depends entirely upon an 
 intellectual confidence in the uniformity of things. 
 Therefore, without somethino' to insure the uniform 
 fulfillment of contracts, they could not answer as a 
 basis of calculation, and all contracts would cease to 
 be of value, or of use. Universal distrust would pre- 
 vail, and all rational action, based on a calculation for 
 the future in human enterprise, would fail. Upon 
 government depends the insuring of contracts to 
 avoid such evils and to secure to its sulrjeets all the 
 good possible in the case. 
 
 Hence appears evident the right of our government 
 to enfoi-ce uniformly the fulfilhnent of contracts, in 
 order that they may serve as a basis for rational calcu- 
 lation as to the future, and all possible good designed 
 be secured, while the opposite possible evils may be 
 avoided. 
 
 One illustration of the importance of the fulfillment 
 of contracts may be sufiicient. Mr. A. contracts with 
 Mr. B. to pay him ten thousand dollars in seven 
 months. On the basis of the expected fulfillment of 
 this contract, Mi-. B. contracts to pay Mr. C. the same
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 129 
 
 sum in the sanio time, and so on tlirou(,'li all the 
 letters of the alphabet. This sum in all amounts to 
 two hundred and sixty thousand dollars. In these 
 contracts are involved all varieties of business, such as 
 building houses, gradiuij^ streets, cultivating farms, 
 constructing bridges, putting up machinery, etc. 
 Besides the influence of these direct enterprises, the 
 stimulus given to other undertakings indirectly con- 
 nected with the principal series of contracts, is almost 
 unlimited, surpassing perhaps the direct, tenfold in 
 value. 
 
 Kow if A. fulfills his contract with B. and pays 
 him the stipulated sum, B. can pay C, and thus on- 
 ward with all, and the vast enterprises, both direct 
 and indirect, be pressed to successful completion ac- 
 cording to previous rational plans. 
 
 But, if A. fails in his contract, all the others may 
 be compelled to fail ; two hundred and sixty thou- 
 sand dollars of debts remain unpaid, the character of 
 twenty-six men of business honesty is greatly im- 
 paired ; the whole community is involved in the 
 trouble ; while all enterprise is more or less checked ; 
 houses remain half finished, bridges half built, roads 
 half graded, lands half cultivated, mills half put up, 
 and thus onward almost without limit, all tending to 
 ruin. This all may be viewed as the direct result of 
 the non-fulfillment of the first contract of A. with B. 
 But in various ways the evils stop not with the im- 
 mediate community. It extends outward to far distant 
 localities, because of the world-wide complications of 
 business, and cumulates beyond all estinuite by man.
 
 130 aechology; or, 
 
 All these evils could, and would, have been avoided, 
 had A. fulfilled his contract with 13. Surely govern- 
 ment has a right and a duty, involved in the very ob- 
 ject of its existence, to control the matter and enforce 
 the fulfillment of contracts to insure the desired good, 
 and avoid the possible evils. 
 
 This right of government extends to every variety 
 and species of contracts among subjects, as those with 
 respect to money, wealth, labor, education, moral or 
 benevolent enterprise, ecclesiastical or religious co-op- 
 eration, marriage, or any other possible contract 
 between subject and subject. Moreover, not only has 
 government a right to enforce contracts, but also it 
 has a right to control them themselves, specifying by 
 law some as permitted and others as forbidden, accord- 
 ing as the government perceives that, as species of 
 actions, their results will be good or bad. 
 
 The general principles of government, as previously 
 unfolded, settle the whole subject, because the making, 
 fulfilling, and repudiating, or violating of contracts, 
 are only varieties of actions, as to which the very 
 object of government is to insure the harmonious 
 adaptation of all put forth to result in the securing 
 of good, by the subjects. 
 
 EIGHT OF GOVERNMENT TO CARRY ON WAR. 
 
 War is a condition of regular conflict of physical 
 forces heticeen tv)o or more governments. 
 
 All the principles, unfolded in archology, expressive 
 of the right and duty of government to control the 
 actions of its subjects, by restraining whatever tends
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 131 
 
 to evil, and insuring all ^vllicll tends to good within the 
 government, ])rove also the right and duty of govern- 
 ment to restrain and prevent whatever from witiiont 
 endangers the good of its subjects. The verj' design 
 for which it exists, is to prevent evil and insure good, 
 and this it must do b}' all the means it possesses. 
 When, therefore, great evils from without threaten the 
 real welfare of subjects, the duty of government is 
 as plain as when the dangers arise Mithin. It must 
 use its compulsory power, its physical force, to prevent 
 the evil and insure good to the utmost of its power. 
 In its physical force lies all its comj)ulsory ability to 
 enforce the claims of law upon its subjects. So in 
 physical force lies all its coinpulsory ability to repress 
 evil from without. 
 
 This physical force, as within among subjects, so 
 without toward enemies, is alwavs to be used as the 
 second means of government after the first, that of 
 instruction has been tried. Therefore, if the danger 
 is not so great as to demand immediate force, the gov- 
 ernment should first use, toward the endangering par- 
 ties, argument, entreaty, remonstrance, declaration, 
 command. Then if instruction fails, the second means, 
 compulsion, must be used and this is alone physical 
 force. 
 
 Hence, when one government finds that another 
 government is threatening, with i)hysical or other 
 force, to destroy the good of its subjects and whelm 
 them in evils, it is its right and duty, guided by reason, 
 to use its utmost physical force if necessary to prevent 
 the efforts of tlie aggressive government, and protect
 
 132 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 its subject, the same with the right and duty it has to 
 exist at alh 
 
 Still, if there is a supei'ior government over those 
 liable to a conflict whose duty it is to control the con- 
 flicting parties as its subjects, to insure a harmony 
 among them for the good of all, then an appeal to 
 this superior government must be made for its control 
 in the case. Cities are not to war with cities, nor 
 States with States, while there is a higher government 
 over them to insure them from the clashings of inter- 
 ests and activities. 
 
 There is but one real exception to this statement, 
 and that is in a case of sudden emergency, wdien ap- 
 peal cannot be made to the higher government. In 
 this case good judgment is to decide whether immedi- 
 ate war is to be inaugurated for self-defense, or 
 whether the evil shall be temporarily endured in 
 expectation of a redress of grievances in the future by 
 the higher government. 
 
 But if thei'e be no superior government that can or 
 will control the conflicting parties and insure good, 
 then in the very ends for whicli government exists is 
 involved its right and duty, after all other means fail, 
 to use physical force and i-epress the aggressions of 
 the endangering government to protect its subjects 
 from evils. This is war ; defensive war. 
 
 Defensive War is the use of physical force by govern- 
 ment in regular conjllct luith another, and aggressive, 
 government, for the good of its own subjects, to protect 
 them from the evils of which they are in danger by the 
 aggression.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 133 
 
 This is ri^lit, when all other means fail, and the pro- 
 tection of the welfare of the suhjects can be secnred 
 in no other manner. 
 
 Thus: 
 
 The right of candying on war, in the manner of 
 defense, is involved as a necessity to government in 
 securing the ends for which it exists, hy insuring to 
 its subjects the opportnnity of securing their highest 
 good and real welfare. 
 
 Tliis principle of right, however, does not in all 
 circnmstances justify a resort to even defensive war. 
 For M'hen all other means in the manner of instruc- 
 tion have failed, and only physical force remains to 
 be used for protection, if yet it is evident that this is 
 not sufficient with which to resist the superior force 
 of the aggressive government, and no other good can 
 be secured by an (effort at defense, then it is the duty 
 of the weaker government to submit to the more 
 powerful. Since the only object of government is to 
 secure good to its subjects, it must not carry on a war 
 which will evidently result in no good to its subjects, 
 but it must submit to another government when that 
 submission will result in such good, the greatest possi- 
 ble in the case. 
 
 OFFENSIVE AVAK. 
 
 Offensive War is a condition of regular conflict of 
 jyhysical force of one government with another, not m 
 the manner of defense against aggression hj such other 
 governTncnt. 
 
 This form of loar is only in \ery rare cases right.
 
 134 aechology; oe, 
 
 Each government exists for the good of its own 
 subjects, and not, except indii-ectly, for the subjects 
 of other governments. Now, in offensive war, the 
 government is generally going out of the field in 
 wliicli is found the end of its existence, and is at- 
 tempting to dictate to an outside government and to 
 its subjects. Hence, generally, offensive war is 
 wrong. 
 
 Still, in some rare and extreme cases, one govern- 
 ment may become so inefficient in action, so perverted 
 in operation, so cruel in character, or so distracted in 
 its condition, and its subjects be so involved in mis- 
 ery, as to be without hope or good if left to them- 
 selves. 
 
 Then, in such rare cases, acting with deliberation 
 and good judgment, another government may inter- 
 fere by an offensive war, to compel and insure good 
 where all was anarchy before. This is in reality 
 obedience to a higher government of general benevo- 
 lence. Yet such cases are rare, and war can here be 
 justified only when approved by good judgment. 
 
 So also, in still more rare cases, it is possible that, in 
 the necessities of subjects, perhaps involved in fam- 
 ine, or in some other cause of severe suffering, as 
 possibl}' by an excessively over-crowded population, the 
 government maybe justified in forcing a passage even 
 by war into the sparsely settled but productive terri- 
 tory of another government. Yet circumstances of 
 this character will be very rare, and the case must 
 be one of great necessity to justify such a question- 
 able measure as offensive war only for personal good.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 135 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH PUBLIC SCHOOLS OP 
 
 INSTRUCTION. 
 
 As previously shown, both tlie origin and purpose 
 of government, are found in its usefuhiess to its sub- 
 jects, as a means to their seeurinir the ends of their 
 existence. It was also shown that, in doing this, it is 
 confined to two means of efficiency, that of instruc- 
 tion and compulsion, and that the instruction is es- 
 pecially given in the form of law, designed to be the 
 specification of actions adapted to result in the secur- 
 ing of good, and of those to be avoided tending to 
 result in evil. 
 
 But, in the very nature of law, since it is only the 
 expression of uniform actions, or modes of actions, it 
 can specify comparatively few of all which the sub- 
 ject must put forth. Vastly the larger portion are so 
 variable in features that they cannot be expressed in 
 the form of law, but must be left to the reason and 
 good judgment of the subject alone Such are the 
 ever-changing activities of general life, in common 
 conversation ; in the business of trade ; in labor ui)on 
 the farm ; in tlie operations of mechanical enterprises, 
 etc., in different methods beyond enumeration. Gov- 
 ernment can specify only the uniform principles to
 
 136 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 which these shiiU conform; but, in no manner, can it 
 specify the acts themselves in their varying particu- 
 lars, occasioned by the ever-changing circumstances, 
 in M^hich each subject is constantly placed. 
 
 Still, these actions, each one of them, sets in course 
 of operation, trains of consequences, flowing onward 
 and outward without limit, to produce good or cause 
 evil to others. As to these actions in their tendencies 
 the subjects of government need information that 
 they may be able to put forth only those adapted to re- 
 sult in good and avoid others. They cannot obtain 
 this from laws of a rational government except in part, 
 because law can specify only those which are uniform 
 in mode. But all of nature consists of principles and 
 tendencies operating as uniform forces, endlessly com- 
 pounding, in different relations and proportions, in 
 which all action is in the line of the diagonal of the 
 parallelogram of the compounding forces. Could the 
 subjects of government, in some manner, be enabled 
 to understand these principles and tendencies of 
 forces of nature in their varying combinations, in the 
 different circumstances, they could generally judge of 
 results with great accuracy, so as to select the good 
 and avoid the evil. 
 
 If there exists any means by which the subject can 
 obtain this information, it is of the greatest impor- 
 tance in securing the ends of his existence that he 
 have the opportunity of availing himself of this means, 
 and so secure the needed information. Such a means 
 would answer, to the subjects of government, in the 
 ever-varying actions of life, the same instructive pur-
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 137 
 
 pose with law, in the uiiitbriii modes of actions. When 
 thrown upon tlieir own reasons, in deciding upon ac- 
 tions, they would be enabled, the most correctly possi- 
 ble, to judge of results, choosing the right, and avoid- 
 ing the wrong. 
 
 Such a means does exist by which the necessary 
 knowledge may be approximately given. It is through 
 instruction given in schools. In these can be given 
 information as to the principles, tendencies, laws, facts, 
 and results, of things in nature, in themselves, and in 
 their endlessly varying combinations. These can give 
 the instruction which statute law cannot give, an in- 
 formation of immense importance to the subjects of 
 government in securing the true good and welfare of 
 all. 
 
 Hence, in respect to government, there appears at 
 once a right and also duty to establish, furnish, and 
 control such schools for the good of all, a right and 
 duty originating in the same source with that of the 
 enactment of laws. They are necessary to the highest 
 good of all. The princiide in the ease is as follows : 
 
 The right and duty of government to establish and 
 onaintain a system of inMic schools for the T)eneft of 
 all is involved in the first element of its existence, that 
 of its heing instructive to its suhjects. 
 
 In other lano-uasre : 
 
 For the same reason that laws are needed to give 
 instruction as to unifoi^m, Tuodes of actions, piihliG 
 schools are needed to give instruction as to all evei'- 
 varying actions through the endlessly diversified cir- 
 cumstances of life.
 
 138 AJICHOLOGY ; OK, 
 
 The word public is used in the statement because 
 in no })rivate schools can the true design of govern- 
 ment be secured. Private instruction, in the very 
 nature of rational beings, will, and must be, modified 
 in its methods of communication to secure the results 
 designed by its private instructors. In private enter- 
 prise, as previously shown, are involved, by necessity, 
 among the individual actors, clashings in the objects 
 of good desired, in the means selected by which to 
 secure them, and in the actions put forth for this 
 purpose. 
 
 Government exists as a necessity to secure a har- 
 mony in these respects in order that good may be 
 secured by subjects. This harmony is sought to be 
 secured, as to uniform modes of actions, by means of 
 law ; but as to varying actions by schools. Both 
 design the same thing in their different departments, 
 viz., to give the instruction needed in order to secure 
 that harmony which is necessary to the securing of 
 good among the subjects of government. 
 
 Government could, in principle, as safely give up 
 the making of laws to private parties, relying upon 
 them for public good, as to give up all schools to 
 private control, either as individuals or class organiza- 
 tions of any sort, relying upon their action for public 
 good. Only through public schools, public as under 
 control of the government for public good, can the 
 true welfare of the public he secured. 
 
 Hence, Government must establish, furnish, and 
 control, hy proper siLperintendence, the system of 
 schools designed for the good of all its subjects.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 139 
 
 Government wonld be recreant to the principles of 
 its existence, false to both its origin and pnrpose, and 
 sure to be whelmed in more or less of evil, if it should 
 yield up its schools, designed for public good, to any 
 class of private managers or instructors. 
 
 Private schools, like other means for securing pri- 
 vate ends, or individual good, oi- class welfare, are to 
 be regulated by their private managers in accordance 
 with their own designs. With such government has 
 nothing to do, except to make sure that they shall not 
 conflict with the interests of others, the same as in 
 the case of all private activities, in order to secure the 
 harmony necessary to universal welfare. 
 
 The general principle in the case is that j^nvate good 
 must he secured by private action, not in confiict with 
 'public good. But 
 
 Public good must be secured by pid)Uc action, under 
 direction of government so superinte7iding as to secure 
 the harmony necessary to such good. 
 
 Schools, in the department of variable actions, are 
 the same as laws in the department of uniform actions, 
 of immense importance in imparting the instruction 
 needed in securing good. Hence, private organized 
 enterprises have their private laws and various regula- 
 tions, with private means of instruction, often regu- 
 larly estal)lished schools ; so the great public organiza- 
 tion, the State, the nation, the government, has its 
 laws and public schools, giving the instruction neces- 
 sary for public good, and it must superintend them 
 itself, or disaster will follow. 
 
 Also with schools are involved all the means of
 
 140 archology; or, 
 
 the greatest efficiency of such scliools, and even other 
 means of general instruction, such as the publishing 
 of books, tlie issuing of pamphlets and papers, the 
 furnishing of illustrative arpparatus, the instituting of 
 experiments, the appointment of teachers and other 
 officers, and the supplying of all other i-equisites to the 
 best instruction. This all pertains appropriately to 
 government in order that it may furnish to its sub- 
 jects the best opportunities to form correct judg- 
 ments, in acting to secure the greatest good possible 
 to all. 
 
 It does not follow from this, that government is to 
 supersede by its schools all private schools, or that 
 it is to give instruction as to everything. Private 
 enterprise has the same freedom as to schools, which it 
 has as to any other means of securing private good, 
 restricted by law only so far as to guard against clash- 
 ing interferences with other interests. And as to the 
 quality and extent of public instruction, the govern- 
 ment is to exercise its own judgment, how far it shall 
 extend its general instruction, the same as in respect 
 to law. 
 
 Then, with the instruction as to varying and general 
 activities government may come in with the great law 
 of all rational, moral beings, and require a uniform 
 motive of highest good to all^ in all cases. In this 
 mannei', to the greatest extent possible, can the gov- 
 ernment secure in all circumstances the greatest good 
 to all who, as rational beings, will choose its help, and 
 obey its commands. 
 
 The facts in the case, are absolute, are necessitous.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 141 
 
 If a subject of government, through either ignorance 
 or careless, or willfubiess, or in any other way, errs in 
 liis actions so as to conflict with practical, or external, 
 right, the good possible in the case must, so far, fail to 
 be secured, and evils, which no one can estimate, may 
 result. To prevent these and make sure, the good, 
 government exists, and its only two means of eth- 
 ciency are instruction and compulsion ; while its 
 methods of instruction are also two. These are the 
 giving of positive laws for uniform modes of action, 
 and the establishing of public schools for the end- 
 lessly varyine: particular actions, in the always chang- 
 ing circumstances of life. 
 
 Therefore, systems of public schools, in all their 
 varieties, in all their different furnishings, and in all 
 their management, come directly under the proper and 
 necessary control of government.
 
 142 ARCHOLOGY ; OE, 
 
 CHAPTER XYIII. 
 
 COjStscience, and the relations between it and the 
 
 government. 
 
 There is a feature of all known rational beings, and 
 one of very great importance in their relations to gov- 
 ernment, wliicli has not yet been treated of, in this 
 work, because there has appeared, so far, no con- 
 venient place in which it could well be distinctly con- 
 sidered. Therefore, a full chapter is here appro- 
 priated to the subject. This feature of the rational 
 beino' is that which is called conscience. 
 
 The conscience, next to the will, is probal)ly the 
 most important, most variable, most obstinate, most 
 positive, and apparently most independent element of 
 inJluence in the rational being. It needs to be care- 
 fully considered, first in regard to what it is in itself, 
 and its diflFerent peculiarities ; then in the relations of 
 government to it, and through it to subjects. 
 
 As to a definition : 
 
 Conscience is that, in the rational heing, ivhich when 
 he truly helieves an action to he right for him, hoth 
 apjrroves of it, and imjyels him to do it, 'while it re- 
 2)els him from the opposite as wrong. 
 
 Conscience is the mandatory force and impulsive 
 power of the reason. It is not the reason itself, but is
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 143 
 
 the impulsive power acconi])anying the reason, in exec- 
 utive capacity. It is an impulse to do the right as 
 decided by tlie reason, and to avoid the wrong, as de- 
 cided in the same manner. 
 
 It is not tlie province of conscience to investigate 
 truths, and from them to infer otlier truths, and thus 
 determine what is right and what is wrong. It does 
 recognize a right, but it never does or can investigate 
 facts and trutlis, to determine particular and external 
 riglit. Tliis is wliolly the province of the reason, 
 which alone weiglis evidence, compares truths, draws 
 conchisions, and decides what is riglit or wrong. 
 
 WMi this function of reason the conscience has 
 nothing directly to do. Its whole ofHce and work is 
 that of an impulse toward what the reason decides to 
 be right, and from what the reason decides to be 
 
 wrong. 
 
 It is of great importance to distinguish clearly 
 between the conscience and the reason. The con- 
 foundino^ of them, one with the other, leads to srave 
 errors in theory, but worse in practice. 
 
 Perhaps one cause of misapprehension in respect to 
 tliem is that of a metaphysical character in reference 
 to the activity of the reasoning faculties. For, it is 
 true that much of the process of reasoning is ean-ied 
 on unconsciously in the mind. Trains of inferences, 
 from truths to other truths, may be followed out in vol- 
 untai-ily through a correct process of reasoning, and 
 the final conclusions be reached, as clearly in belief as 
 though each step in the process had been consciously- 
 watched, and superintended by the will. In this invol-
 
 14-1 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 untary mental action, and one often exceedingly rapid, 
 when the reason has decided an action right, the con- 
 science impels to its performance. 
 
 Then the subject may suppose that the conscience 
 itself decided the riglit, but it did not. It is the reason 
 alone, whicli infers truths from truths, deciding what 
 is right and what is wrong. Immediatel3' after this 
 comes in the conscience, commanding, with the voice 
 of authority, obedience to the riglit, avoidance of the 
 wrong. 
 
 If the reason errs and clearly decides the wrong to 
 be right, the conscience speaks in perfect harmony 
 with the reason, and requires obedience to the believed 
 right. Thus, the conscience of a heathen woman may, 
 as sternly and as positively, impel the loving mother 
 to throw her helpless child into the jaws of a croco- 
 dile, because her reason, through education, decides it 
 right, as the conscience of a Christian mother, to nurse 
 the sick and help the needy. 
 
 The principle is tliat Conscience is imperatively in 
 harmony with the real belief. * 
 
 It is possible that choice, selfishness, will and a pro- 
 cess of voluntary reasoning may conflict with truth, 
 and influence the judgment to a decision in belief 
 favorable to error. Yet the conscience will harmonize 
 with tlie real belief, though weakened and confused, 
 as the real belief gi-adually disappears, and becomes 
 supplanted by the chosen belief. At length if the 
 will, or choice, in the case, succeeds in the perfect sup- 
 pression of the real belief, and the chosen one becomes 
 fully received by the mind, then the conscience will
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 145 
 
 be with the new belief, and impel to what the reason 
 has finally decided to be right. 
 
 Thus it appears, that whenever, through an error 
 in reasoning, an actual wrong is fully believed to be 
 right, the conscience will impel with all its force 
 to this believed right, though practically a great 
 wrong. 
 
 Therefore, Conscience is not a direct and sure guide 
 in reference to rigid action practically or exter'nally 
 considered. It is a very important element of influ- 
 ence, a great assistance in determining uj^on actions, 
 and a valuable secondary guide ; yet one dangerously 
 liable to error. The one only direct guide for the 
 rational being is his reason, for which he needs all pos- 
 sible help. Yet, whenever this errs, conscience will 
 also err, and impel according to the error. 
 
 Yet, at any moment of time, since the conscience 
 is always with the real belief, and hence real reason, 
 im])elling to what is really believed to be right, its 
 voice should be heeded as carefully as that of reason 
 itself. At a given time the conscience should be 
 strictly obeyed, for it is ox\\j enjoining obedience to 
 the real belief. Yet, at the same time, the reason 
 should be freely searching for additional evidence to 
 correct, in the future, any possible error of judgment 
 in the present. 
 
 Besides this, the conscience serves als»o as a most 
 valuable help to the rational being in guarding him 
 against self-deception. For, while he may suppose him- 
 self acting in great sincerity according to his reason, 
 he yet may only be acting in harmony with the result
 
 14:6 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 of a voluntarily determined process of reason, effected, 
 as before shown, by the influence of choice. 
 
 Here, conscience, in opposition to this self-decep- 
 tion, may actively sound an alarm of danger, as it im- 
 pels confusedly, now to the old, real belief, mostly 
 supplanted by the new, then to the new, partly domi- 
 nant over the old ; and again, to, or against, both, in 
 the uncertainty of the truth. Hence again, the prin- 
 ciple, the converse of the preceding. 
 
 No rational being can safely follow merely his con- 
 science, as a direct and sufficient guide. 
 
 Since the conscience is only an impulse in accord- 
 ance with the real belief, the rational being needs ever 
 to be watchful, and suspicious of it, lest, in his ignor- 
 ance or carelessness, or willfullness, he may believe 
 wrong, and thus his conscience be wrong. Then, in 
 action, he will be practically wrong, and the result be 
 evil to himself and to others. 
 
 Once more. He who aims merely at obeying his con- 
 science is always wrong. For, he is ignoring reason 
 which was given him as his own direct guide, to yield 
 himself to an impulse. This is to conflict with origi- 
 nal principles of his nature, as a rational being, and 
 to descend, so far, towards the condition of a creature 
 of instinct. 
 
 Conscience was never given him for the purpose of 
 a direct guide, but as a cautioner ; a monitor; a stim- 
 ulant in doing right ; a goad in the ])ath of duty, in 
 active harmony with reason. Its function is that of 
 spurring the being to eflbrt in that course of action 
 which the reason dictates as right. But a goad is no
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 147 
 
 guide to a rationul being, and he who takes it as such, 
 is mistaking an element of his own being, and the 
 functions of its office. Great evil to him and others 
 must be the result. His reason he is to accept as guide, 
 and ever improve all Hieans for its instruction, wliile 
 conscience is ever with him as an authoritative, friend- 
 ly, adinonisher, urging him to the right, repressing 
 him from the wrong. 
 
 SOME PECULIARITIES OF CONSCIENCE. 
 
 The impulse of conscience is weakened the more it 
 is disregarded. 
 
 This is tlie natural result as to any impulse of the 
 sensitive being on earth. For a short season it may 
 increase, but, beyond a certain limit, it begins to di- 
 minish, and may ultimately cease all its activity. It 
 is the same with the impulse of conscience as with 
 otliers. Witli neglect or repeated violation — and neg- 
 lect is violation — the conscience varies in intensity, 
 vacillates in its course, and diminishes in force, while 
 the habit of willful self-gratification increases, and the 
 svhole rational being becomes more and more pervert- 
 ed to error. 
 
 Acting in accordance with the conscience iiicreases 
 the force of its activity. The habit of obeying the 
 conscience, quickens the sense of its least impulses, 
 and stimulates its action in harmony with the right as 
 perceived in reason, till at length the wliole character 
 of the being, intellectual, moral, and impulsive, be- 
 comes fixed in harmony with truth. The conscience
 
 148 AECHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 becomes keenly alive to every feature and aspect of 
 duty, vigorously impelling to the cheerful practice of 
 right, in the effort to promote the highest good of 
 alL 
 
 Once more: In the experience of the wrong-doer 
 the impulse of cortscience is exceedingly variable. The 
 will, the choice, the voluntary reasonings, and the 
 actions, all come into conflict with the conscience to 
 check and confuse its activity; while the circum- 
 stances determining the degree of its force, such as the 
 recentness of a wrong act ; the vividness with M-hicli 
 an act is remembered; the clearness with which the 
 evil tendencies of an act are apprehended ; the proba- 
 bilities of detection ; the severity of expected punish- 
 ment ; the encouragement or reproach of esteemed 
 friends, the state of physical health, and nervous sen- 
 sibility of the evil-doer; together with many other 
 facts, all endlessly vary, thus occasioning great vari- 
 ations in the sensitive impulses of conscience. 
 
 Finally : The conscience may sometimes he appcu- 
 rently dead for years, and then, again, at length wake 
 up as with the voice of avenging wrath. 
 
 Yiolated, rejected, unheeded, and covered up with 
 voluntary perverted reasonings and willful beliefs, the 
 conscience may become repressed and smothered as if 
 dead for a long period of time. But it is one of the 
 original principles of man's nature, and can never be 
 destroyed. At length, when the subterfuges of vol- 
 untary reasonings and other masks are removed, and 
 reason clearly apprehends the real right and the real 
 wrong, and all the fearful tendencies of evil are seen,
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 149 
 
 then tlie conscience may rouse itself up toward the 
 evil-doer as a personal, mighty, implacable, unmerci- 
 ful, accusing tormentor. 
 
 So terrible may be its voice of condemnation and 
 impulse toward deserved punishment, that to escape 
 its horrors the guilty party may perpetrate upon him- 
 self fearful sufferings, in the vain hope of expiating 
 his crime, or may voluntarily deliver himself up to 
 the proper tribunal of justice in order that he 
 may suffer tlie ])unishmeut deserved tor his wrong- 
 doing. 
 
 Such are the main features of conscience, in itself 
 considered, and in its principal peculiarities. It is an 
 im})ulse of the rational being, in harmony with the 
 real reason, toward believed right, from believed 
 wrong. It is an immensely important aid to the good, 
 but a force of tremendously awful possibilities to the 
 bad. 
 
 It is the authoritative mandate of reason, but liable 
 to all errors and mistakes of reason ; never to be 
 chosen as a direct guide. It needs, through the reason, 
 all the instructive aids, and guarding influences, which 
 reason needs. It shonld be most carefully heeded, 
 and its slightest impulses obeyed at the moment by 
 the rational being, as the most important sensibility 
 in his whole nature. With it in perfection, insured as 
 right by right reason, the rational being is a being the 
 highest, noblest, and most blessed possible in his cir- 
 cumstances. AVith it violated, rejected, perverted, till 
 the habit of selfish, willful, wrong-doing is estab- 
 lished in the character, the rational being becomes a
 
 150 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 monster, with no known limit to his willful scllish- 
 ness, jealousy, envy, revenge, malice, hatred, and 
 mental, remorseful misery. Science stops in the 
 lawfulness of the possibilities which the view prevents, 
 and would vainly seek to find or hide the end. 
 
 KELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO CONSCIENCE. 
 
 From the preceding considerations of the nature, 
 office, and peculiarities of conscience, the inferences, 
 as to the relations of the government to the conscience 
 of its subjects, appear very evident. 
 
 First. Government shovld appreciate the great im- 
 fortanee of conscience^ and do all it consistently can 
 to develop and strengthen it among its subjects, endea- 
 voring to establish their uniform obedience to its 
 demands in seeking to do right. 
 
 The very origin and purpose of government are in 
 its usefulness to its subjects, as a means to their secur- 
 ing the ends of their existence, the highest good of 
 all. For this purpose, they need not only to know, 
 but, also, to choose, and will, that which is adapted to 
 result in such ends, their highest good. The conscience 
 is the one great impulse of their being, even the only 
 one, having direct reference to this end. All other 
 impulses the animals of instinct may probably expe- 
 rience. But this is a distinguishing feature of the 
 liighest intelligence, and is the characteristic of a 
 rational being. If this is destroyed, the rational sub- 
 ject becomes a fearful creature of depraved instincts, 
 the more powerful for evil as he is the more instructed 
 in the use of means for self-gratification.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 151 
 
 It is therefore of the utmost importance tliat gov- 
 ernment have especial regard to this feature of its 
 subjects. For, in its destruction, is the destruction of 
 all good ; in its weakening is danger to all good ; in 
 its perversion is loss of great good ; while only in its 
 obedience is there the securing of the greatest possible 
 good attainable in the case. 
 
 "With an active conscience, carefully obeyed as the 
 authoritative mandate of reason, the subjects, in per- 
 fect harmony witli good government, will be actively 
 seeking to promote, and secure, the highest good of 
 all concerned, the very aim of good government and 
 of its expressed laws. 
 
 Thus most evidently the government should espe- 
 cially regard the conscience of its subjects, and seek to 
 give, through the reason, the fullest instruction to it, 
 in order to develop, strengthen, establish it, in active 
 hai-monv w'ith reason and the rig-ht. 
 
 .Second. Th'e government should, in no case, re- 
 quire the violation of conscience on the part of its 
 suhjects. 
 
 To make such a requisition is to do that which tends 
 to destroy the highest and most important impulse in 
 the nature of a rational being, degrading him to a 
 creature devoid of the principle and motive of right, 
 ready for any act to which selfish inclination may 
 impel him. It is better that government sacrifice the 
 wealth of tens of its subjects, and put scores to large 
 inconvenience, than to violate, or corrupt the con- 
 science of a single one. !N'o greater evil than this 
 can befall a rational being, and no greater wrong can
 
 152 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 government perpetrate upon a subject. The very pur- 
 poses of government forbid this. 
 
 Third. In case of a conflict between government and 
 the conscience of a subject, an equivalent in 'place of the 
 specific obedience "ina.y he Tequired^ but the government 
 must not punish the individual as if guilty of a crime. 
 
 While the subject, in the exercise of his reason, is 
 carefully conforming to the dictates of conscience, he 
 is, so far as his motives are concerned, in perfect har- 
 mony with the great design of good government. In 
 disregard of mere present consideration, he is acting 
 under a sense of the highest moral right and obliga- 
 tion. As such he is worthy of all respect by govern- 
 ment for consistency in acting from the high sense of 
 right. Hence the government should accept of an 
 equivalent for the specific obedience, one which will 
 serve the public good equally well in the circum- 
 stances with the other. 
 
 To relieve him unconditionally from the required 
 service, would be to relieve him from his share of the 
 duty toward the government, and throw the burden 
 on the other subjects. This in itself would probably 
 be wrong, while the tendency would be to engender 
 dissatisfaction with government as exhibiting partiality 
 in its dealings and its laws. Hence an equivalent 
 service should be required. 
 
 Fourth. If still the conscience of the subject forbids 
 him rendering any equivalent, the government, treating 
 the subject with respect for his regard to right, may 
 take by force the equivalent, even increased, because 
 of the increased expense in securing it.
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 153 
 
 There is notliing wliicli can destroy the necessity of 
 government among intelh'gent beings. So tliere is 
 nothing wliich can destroy the necessity of means to 
 the government in carrying ont its administration for 
 the good of its subjects. Again, nothing can destroy 
 the necessity, and liertce obligation, resting upon sub- 
 jects to furnish, eaeli one, his share of service and 
 revenue needed by govei-nment for its administration 
 in securing the good of all. Therefore, government 
 should hold each one to the requirement of rendering 
 his just, proportionate share of aid in securing the 
 good of all. 
 
 Hence, if necessary, the government may secure 
 this aid by force; yet in the circumstances supposed 
 it may not act as toward a criminal and intentional 
 evil-doer. 
 
 Fifth. In case the sul)ject claims, not as a duty but 
 as a right, in his conscience, that which government 
 forbids as a vice, the gouernment is under' no obliga- 
 tion to regard his claim. The subject may not be 
 compelled to do wrong, yet he may be required to 
 yield up believed right in deference to the superior 
 judgment of government. There is no violation of 
 his conscience in the case, but onl}' obedience to ne- 
 cessary authority. Government is not bound by the 
 judgment of the subject, but the subject is bound by 
 the judgment of i:-overnment. 
 
 In the greater opportunities for knowing what is 
 for the best, possessed by government, and in its re- 
 lations involving solemn obligations toward all its 
 subjects, when once it has expressed its judgment in
 
 154 archology; oe, 
 
 the form of law, the subject must readily yield up his 
 believed convenience, or advantage, or right, through 
 due regard to the authority of government. If he 
 will not, but will refuse obedience, then he may be 
 used as a transgressor, a willful criminal, to be pun- 
 ished as the law requires. 
 
 There may be very extreme cases, there have been 
 a few such in the world, where in the degradation of 
 certain classes, a subject of government may verily be- 
 lieve he ought to do that which is such flagrant vice, 
 and absolute wickedness, that even against his de- 
 graded conscience, the government by force must 
 check the vice and break up the wickedness; such 
 probabl}' were the Thugs of India. 
 
 So far, in considering the relations subsisting be- 
 tween government and the consciences of its subjects, 
 only the relations and duties of government have been 
 considered. But the relations between parties are al- 
 ways so correlated that a duty on one party involves a- 
 corresponding duty on the other. Hence, in consider- 
 ing the relations of subjects toward government, as to 
 conscience, it follows : 
 
 First. That they., in a spirit of trustfulness and of 
 cheerful confidence toward government, are to seek its 
 aid in obtaining all posaihle information as to truth 
 for the correction, streiigthening and establishing of 
 conscience in harmony with J'iglit. They should avail 
 themselves of the instruction afforded by government 
 through its laws, and their sanctions, and all other 
 means, acting conscientiously in their obedience, not 
 by force of compulsion or through fear as before a
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 155 
 
 tyrannical power. But they sliould obey in tlie li^^lit 
 of- truth, witli regard, through conscience, to the right 
 and tlie duty and the privilege of being under the 
 government. They are to regard government as a 
 necessary and most kindly friend, an efficient power, 
 aiding them to secure the highest possible good, 
 and avoid all possible evil. In this light, obedience 
 to government is to be cheerfully rendered, both 
 as a conscientious duty, and as a very great privi- 
 lege. 
 
 For a subject to go forward in careless disregard of 
 the instructive aid of government, doing what he calls 
 right merely in the light of his own reason and con- 
 science, is for him to ignore one of the most impor- 
 tant sources of information, that of government, and 
 to pursue a course which, if followed by all, would 
 inevitably involve clashings in the desire of objects of 
 good, in the means selected with which to secure 
 them, and in the actions put forth for this purpose, 
 involving incalculable evils. It is wrong in motive, 
 and wrong practically for the subject to be indiilerent 
 toward government. This deadens his conscience, re- 
 presses his reason, checks his spirit of broad benevo- 
 lence, and perverts his character into that of narrow 
 selfishness. He must make the duty of obedience an 
 appreciated fact in the conscience, awakening its im- 
 pulse toward right. 
 
 The very purpose, the aim of government, is to aid 
 the subject both in apprehending the truth in its ref- 
 erence to tlie good of all, and in choosing the truth 
 because of this good, and in carrvine; it out success-
 
 156 ARCHOLOGY ; OR, 
 
 fiill;^, to this result, even the liighest ^ood possible to 
 himself and to others. This, for him, is ri<rht in its 
 fullest sense; morally and practically right. 
 
 Here conscience has its largest field for exercise ; 
 here is scope for its fullest development. Hence the 
 subject ought cheerfully, with the sense of a privi- 
 leged duty, to seek the aid of government in the im- 
 proving of both his reasoning faculties and his con- 
 science, acting himself in a spirit of trustfulness and 
 cheerful confidence toward government in seeking 
 its aid. 
 
 Second. In case of a requirement of government 
 in violation of his conscience, the subject may not de- 
 nounce the government^ and in the spirit of enmity 
 refuse obedience. 
 
 He has no reason to require, that government, in 
 acting for the good of all, shall gauge its requisitions 
 by his limited knowledge, or personal conscience, as 
 to what is right and good for all. The government 
 is not bound by him, but he is bound by government. 
 He ought to hold in check for a time his own judg- 
 ment and conscience, wdiile he recasts the matter 
 anew, in reason, to see more clearly wherein the error 
 lies. 
 
 Then, if, finally, his conscience still forbids his 
 yielding to the requirement of government, the con- 
 science must be obeyed. No higher authority than 
 that of conscience, carefully enlightened by reason, 
 can any rational being possess. This, under all cir- 
 cumstances, must be obeyed. It is the awakened sen- 
 timent within the mind of the hiifhest government of
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 157 
 
 the universe, tlie government of tl)e Creator, and 
 mnst be obeyed. The conflicting requisitions ot" the 
 inferior government must be rejected in deference to 
 the higlier. Yet tliis should be done in no violent, in- 
 imical spirit; but with a calm and quiet submission to 
 what the government may require as an equivalent, 
 or so-called, punishment. 
 
 The subject may use all proper means to effect a 
 change in the demand of government, yet his duty is 
 that of kindly submission to its dealings with him, 
 out of true regard to the government, both in view of 
 the necessities of its existence, the important relations 
 it sustains to its subjects, and of its superior oppor- 
 tunities for knowing what is for the best interests of 
 all concerned. 
 
 Third. One other case of conscience as to the duty 
 of subjects with respect to government, remains to be 
 considered. In the case of outrages of (jovernment upon 
 the liberties, welfare, and conscience, of its subjects, there 
 may be a combination of facts and circumstances tchich 
 shall justify them in seeking relief by effecting a change 
 throuyh violence. 
 
 This involves the right of forcible revolution. This 
 right is as clear and positive as any other, when the 
 circumstances are realized in certain combinations. 
 These may oe very numerous, but the following will 
 answer for specification : 
 
 The outrages of government upon its subjects must 
 be severe / they must have been so proloncjed as to 
 prove them involved in the policy oi government ; all 
 practical and legal measures, other than violence, must
 
 158 archology; oe, 
 
 generally have been tried and failed ; there must be 
 strong, reasonable evidence, that, if the violent revo- 
 lution succeeds, the evils sought to be remedied will 
 he remedied, and no other counterbalancing equal 
 evils be suffered ; and there must be a decided pre- 
 ponderance of evidence in favor of a successful result 
 to the etfbrt of the revolution. In such a combina- 
 tion of circumstances, all harmonizing to favor the 
 effort, with no strong, opposing considerations, then 
 will judgment, reason and conscience approve the rev- 
 olution. 
 
 Government is a necessity to existences, and rational, 
 legal government is indispensable to free, rational be- 
 ings. The worst government is far better than none, 
 and a violent change, in hopes of securing a better, in- 
 volves, inevitably, severe evils. It should be resorted 
 to only in the last extremity. 
 
 Fourth. Finally, in the case of good government, 
 the conscientious subject ought, in every manner, to 
 encourage, aid, support, reverence, and heartily esteem 
 the government under which he is placed. He ought 
 earnestly to seek its prosperity, to strive for the pro- 
 motion of its purity, and readily contribute to the 
 enforcement of its laws. This he should do, holding 
 it as the highest conscientious duty within his sphere 
 of action. 
 
 And he ought not to stop with the one, or two, or 
 three, inferior governments, under which he may be 
 living. He ought to think, and act, with truest refer- 
 ence to each higher government above him, up to the 
 highest, revealed in the light of evidence ; up to the
 
 THE SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT. 159 
 
 one, great, unifying and universal, government of God 
 over all ; while he advances, ever improving in knowl- 
 edge, ever strengthening in conscience, ever increas- 
 ing in rational joy, and ever securing, more and more 
 fully, all the ends of existence, even the highest pos- 
 sible good and welfare of all sentient beings.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 • PACK 
 
 Actions, Two Varieties of 8 
 
 Advice Defined 44 
 
 Aim of Qovernineut 10 
 
 Application of Punishment 105 
 
 Archology ^ 
 
 Atonement 115 
 
 Authoritative 44 
 
 Capital Punishment 107 
 
 Chastisement 84 
 
 Classes Contrasted 26 
 
 Classes of Government 14 
 
 Commutation of Punishment 118 
 
 Conscience 143 
 
 Contracts 127 
 
 Control Defined 7 
 
 Creator, Responsible 31 
 
 Criminality, Measure of 52 
 
 Day of Rest 75 
 
 Disciplinary Government 76 
 
 Divine Right of Kings 125 
 
 Elements of Law 43 
 
 Elements of Punishment 
 
 Elements, Primal, Control of 26 
 
 Entities Defined 8 
 
 Failure in Contracts 128 
 
 Failure of Finite Beings 39 
 
 Faith Defined 98
 
 162 INDEX. 
 
 FACE 
 
 Feelings Controlled 23 
 
 Force, Physical, to be Used 64 
 
 Good Defined 33 
 
 Government Defined 7 
 
 Government Enforce own Laws 64 
 
 Government a Means 8 
 
 Government, Manner of • • • H 
 
 Government, Means of 8 
 
 Government, Mixed 19 
 
 Government, Origin of 8 
 
 Government over Governments 69 
 
 Government, Right of War 130 
 
 Government to Enforce Contracts 127 
 
 Guide Direct, Indirect 56 
 
 Hielier Government Controls Lower 26 
 
 Higher Government, Degrade 27 
 
 Higher Government over Governments 69 
 
 Ignorance of Finite Beings 57 
 
 Importance of Law 48 
 
 Instinct Defined 15 
 
 Instinctive Government 15 
 
 Instruction 42 
 
 Instruction of Government 42 
 
 Instruction of Law 43 
 
 Instruction of Punishment 96 
 
 Law Defined 12 
 
 Law, Elements of 43 
 
 Law in Rational Government 43 
 
 Law Must be Expressive 59 
 
 Law, Origin of 55 
 
 Law to be Kept Pure 60 
 
 Laws of Governments may be Same 74 
 
 Legal Government 76 
 
 Liability of Government to Err 71 
 
 Liberty in Punishment 65 
 
 Liberty of Action 66 
 
 Liberty of Choice 66 
 
 Manner of Government 11
 
 INDEX. 1G3 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Manner of Will's Control 23 
 
 Marriage Regulated 75 
 
 Material Government 14 
 
 Mean.s of Government 42 
 
 Measure of Crime 50 
 
 Measure of Importance of Law 40 
 
 Measure of Vigor of Will 98 
 
 Moral Defined 37 
 
 Moral Kight 30 
 
 Motive Defined 37 
 
 N^itural Suffering 93 
 
 Obligation Defined 44 
 
 Origin of Government 8 
 
 Pardon Defined 110 
 
 Pardon, when Right 112 
 
 Practical Right 36 
 
 Prerequisite to Pardon 116 
 
 Primal Element in Control 26 
 
 Punishment 84 
 
 Punishment Benevolent 95 
 
 Punishment Instructive 96 
 
 Punishment, Magnitude of 97 
 
 Punishment Protective 100 
 
 Purpose of Government 10 
 
 Rational Government 18 
 
 Reason Defined 18 
 
 Religion not Enforced 75 
 
 Remorse 93 
 
 Reformation by the Sinned 89 
 
 Reformation in Disciplinary Government 87 
 
 Right Defined 36 
 
 Right, Moral 36 
 
 Right of Subjects to Choose 78 
 
 Right, Practical 36 
 
 Sanctions 45 
 
 Sanctions Evidence of Truth 49 
 
 Sanctions, Magnitude of 48 
 
 Sanctions not a Terror 46
 
 164 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sanctions Protective 54 
 
 Schools, Private 131 
 
 Schools, Public 138 
 
 Schools, Eight of Government 137 
 
 Separation of the Evil 66 
 
 System Defined 7 
 
 Taxes, Amount of 124 
 
 Taxes Defined 120 
 
 Taxes may be Enforced 123 
 
 Uniformity, Basis of Real 128 
 
 Uniformity of Law 12 
 
 Usefulness of Government 11 
 
 Usefulness of Law 33 
 
 Usefulness of Pardon Ill 
 
 Usefulness of Punishment 96 
 
 Vigor of Will of Executive 98 
 
 Will, Control of the Feelings 23 
 
 Will, Control of the Reason 23 
 
 Will Defined 17 
 
 Will Free 22 
 
 Will in Instinctive Government 17 
 
 Will in Rational Government 20 
 
 Will, Manner of its Control 23 
 
 Will not Controlled 21 
 
 Will, Sovereign 22 
 
 War, Defensive 132 
 
 War Defined 130 
 
 War, Offensive , 133 
 
 War, when Right 133
 
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