U^'i^U^^/ ^t^Cni^ // // ( /y / p. No. 45 ; Forrest's an account of the three days' dis- Selections, vol. i. p. 148. cussion see Hastings' Appeal to the 124 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. it must not be forgotten that he is an Hindostaner, or that a successor might enter the government with very different ideas and disposition. The General agrees with the President that the Vizier's dominions would become compact, and not subject to invasion, but the General supposes it will become too compact, and not sufficiently open to invasion. It is the apprehension of invasion that cements the Vizier's friendship with the English, and makes him that staunch ally we find him 1 .' The reasons which had led Hastings at Benares to ac- quiesce in the wish of the Vizier that the expedition against the Rohillas should be postponed weighed heavily ont he minds of the Council. 'The Board,' Hastings afterwards wrote, ' rested their wish to avoid the expedition solely upon their doubts of the consequences which might personally affect us, at the same time that they were sensible of the advantages it would secure to the Company. . . . My sentiments on the propriety of the expedition had undergone no change, but I will not deny that I felt myself influenced by the same fears which operated on the other Members of the Council, that the propriety of the measure might not be seen in the same light by our constituents, which we knew, from the temper of the times, might not only draw upon us their severe resentment, but aggravate the load of popular odium which has of late fallen on their servants V 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 23 ; For- favourable. He said that consider- rest's Selections, vol. i. p. 81. Sir ing the heavy expenses of the Corn- Robert Barker at no time objected pany, these provinces ought not to to the Rohilla expedition on the have been given up for so small a ground that it was unjust, nor did sum as two years' revenue. See he ever doubt that the Rohillas de- minutes by Sir Robert Barker, Fifth served punishment for their perfidy. Report, App. Nos. 13, 19, and 33 ; Mill's reference to this Minute is mis- and Minute by Hastings, App. No. 12. leading, and it is for this reason that I Sir Robert Barker was much displeased now notice it. When Sir Robert Bar- because he had not been invited to take ker was with Hastings at Benares, he part in the conferences with the Vizier, expressed doubts regarding the expe- Hastings appears, however, to have diency of the expedition on account of treated him otherwise with great con- 1 the interruption which it would prob- sideration. He was anxious that Sir ably receive from the King and the Robert Barker should have com- Marathas, and the unsteadiness of the manded the British troops in the Vizier's disposition.' This is stated final campaign against the Rohillas, in the Diary of Hastings, quoted but this was not possible in con- above. Sir Robert Barker also dis- sequence of his resignation of the approved the cession of Kora and service. He was evidently a far Allahabad to the Vizier, partly be- superior officer to Colonel Champion, cause it set aside the treaty entered who took his place, into in 1765 with the Emperor, but a Appeal to the Court of Directors, also because he thought the terms Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's granted to the Vizier much too Selections, vol. i. p. 41. IX.] ANSWER OF THE VIZIER. 125 On the 10th of January, 1774, an answer was received from the Vizier, declining to undertake the expedition against the Rohillas under the conditions that had been offered. The letter was as follows : — ' I have received your friendly letter, informing me that the English Brigade is at my service, either for the protection of my own dominions, or to assist me in my operations against the Rohillas. It is known that the firmest union subsists between us, and I am certain that you will suffer the English forces to join me for the protection of my own dominions ; but as the distance between us is now so great, that much time will be taken up in writing to you and receiving your answer, for precaution sake I request you will send a positive order to the Com- mander-in-Chief of the forces at Patna to march them to the frontiers of Oudh or Kora (both which countries now belong to me), whenever I shall require them. At present I have no occasion for them, and should I chance to call for them, I will not require their proceeding further than the frontiers of Kora and Karra. I make this request by way of precaution only, and to guard against future events. Whenever I shall write to the Commander-in-Chief for the troops, let them im- mediately be sent, and it is becoming our union that you give orders accordingly, which will give me great satisfaction. My friend, I request this of you that I may be at ease with respect to my own dominions, as well as to prevent future delays, otherwise I have at present no occasion for the troops V On the 17th January, 1774, the Bengal Government sent the following report to the Court of Directors : — 1 It was with pleasure we found the plan we had adopted answer so completely to our intention. The Vizier, on receipt of the President's letter written agreeably to the Resolution of the Board, returned an immediate answer, declining our assistance in his distant expedition on the conditions we required, but at the same time desiring the Brigade might be held in readiness to march whenever he shall find it necessary to call on it for the defence of his own dominions. The affair being happily terminated in the manner we wished, we shall now remain spectators only of the operations of the different powers in those distant parts, preserving, however, a watchful eye over the course of events, that we may be prepared to interpose whenever the interests of the Honourable Company are likely to be affected by them. In this view we shall, in compliance with the Vizier's request, hold one Brigade in readiness to march to his assistance within his own 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 25 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 91. 126 THE ROHILLA WAR. territories, including the provinces of Kora and Allahabad, and we acknowledge we shall not be sorry to find that he calls for them on this footing, as we shall then be eased of so considerable a part of the military expense, and have the discipline of our troops preserved in an actual service at so little distance from our frontiers V 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 25. CHAPTER X. A. D. 1774. THE VIZIER AND HASTINGS RESOLVE TO INVADE ROHILKHAND. The Vizier expels the Marathas from the Doab. — He forms alliances with Zabita Khan and other Rohilla chiefs. — He enters into a secret agreement with the Emperor. — He again resolves to invade Rohilkhand and asks for the assistance of English troops. — Hastings complies with his request. — Colonel Champion appointed to command the troops. — His instructions. — His dis- satisfaction. — Strength of the British and the Vizier's army. — Disturbed condition of Rohilkhand. — Dissensions between the Rohilla chiefs. — Advance of the allied forces. — Envoy sent to Hafiz Rahmat. — State of affairs in Rohil- khand. ALTHOUGH the Vizier had declined the assistance of the English he had by no means abandoned the project of invading Rohilkhand, but he thought it prudent, in the first instance, to obtain possession of Etawa and the neighbouring districts of the Doab, in which small Maratha garrisons still remained. Hastings, although he had refused the co-operation of British troops in carrying out this plan, subsequently agreed to the Vizier's request for the loan of a few pieces of heavy artillery, and these were sent to him in charge of an English officer 1 . In November 1773, the Vizier marched upon Etawa. The Marathas offered no opposition and withdrew their garrisons across the Jumna. There were other measures which Shuja-ud-dowla thought expedient. He went to Farukhabad, and induced the Rohilla chief Muzaffar Jang to enter into engagements which severed his connection with his countrymen in Rohilkhand, and made him virtually dependent on the Vizier. Zabita 1 See Vizier's letter received De- Hastings, September 15, 1776. For- cember 17, 1773, and Minute by rest's Selections, vol. ii. p. 554. 128 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. Khan who, in consequence of the departure of the Marathas, had shown an inclination again to join Hafiz Rahmat, was persuaded by Shuja-ud-dowla to abandon all such ideas, and to promise his help when the time came for carry- ing out the attack upon Rohilkhand. The Vizier also thought it desirable to obtain the Emperor's approval of his projected expedition. With this view he entered into communication with the Minister, Najf Khan, and assisted him in recovering Agra which had fallen into the hands of the Jats. The result was a secret agreement, carefully concealed from the English Government, under which the Vizier promised to give to the Emperor one half of 1 such new territories as he might wrest from the possession of usurpers,' and the Emperor engaged to bestow the other half on the Vizier 1 . These arrangements were settled in December to Shuja- ud-dowla's satisfaction, and within less than a month from the time in which he had stated that he had no present occasion for military assistance he again wrote to Hastings and declared his intention of immediately attacking the Rohillas ; he agreed to all the conditions on which the co- operation of a British force had previously been offered to him, and he asked that a brigade might be at once ordered to join him and take part in the proposed expedition. His letter reached Calcutta on the 3rd February, I774 2 - This rapid change in the plans of the Vizier was at- tributed by Hastings to the success with which his opera- tions in the Doab had been attended, and to his conviction that there was now no danger of interference by the Marathas. It was impossible for the Bengal Government, after what had passed, to refuse consent, and orders were issued for complying with the Vizier's requisition. Colonel Cham- pion had been appointed provisional Commander-in-Chief in succession to Sir Robert Barker, who had resigned the service, and on the 14th February, 1774, instructions were sent to him. He was desired to assume the command 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. a Fifth Report, App. No. 26. X.] INSTRUCTIONS TO CHAMPION. 129 of the troops which were already marching towards the Vizier's territory ; he was informed that the object of the expedition was ' the reduction of the Rohilla country lying between the Ganges and the mountains ; ' papers were sent to show the conditions agreed upon between the Govern- ment and the Vizier ; operations were to be strictly con- fined within the limits of Oudh and of Rohilkhand ; the troops were on no account to be permitted to cross the Ganges ; the military conduct of the expedition was left entirely to the Commander-in-Chief ; stringent orders were given to ensure the punctual payment of the troops ; in the event of the Vizier failing to furnish the stipulated monthly subsidy, he was to be informed that this was con- sidered equivalent to an expression of his wish to receive no longer the co-operation of the English troops, and Colonel Champion was in that case to suspend operations, return to Benares, and await further orders. When the Vizier ceased to require the services of the Brigade it was to return to our own provinces. Further details were to be settled personally by Colonel Champion with Shuja-ud- dowla, but on this point a special warning was given. If it became necessary to meet the Vizier at any place within the territories lately held by the Marathas in the Doab, Colonel Champion was to take with him no military force except a personal guard, so that the interview might not be construed as an act of hostility on the part of the English Government towards the Marathas. Finally, it was said, ' we recommend in the strongest manner that you cultivate a good understanding with the Vizier, and that you pay the strictest attention to the behaviour and discipline of the troops, that no subject of complaint may arise on that head, either from himself or from any people of the coun- tries with whom we are not in a state of hostilities V Colonel Champion's powers were strictly confined to the military conduct of the expedition. He was instructed that 'in all points but such as immediately respect the 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 26 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 92. K 130 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. operations in the field, the Vizier is solely empowered to prescribe.' Hastings preferred to entrust to Middleton, the Resident, the management of all political relations, and he remained with the Vizier throughout the campaign. This was very distasteful to Colonel Champion, who saw that less confidence was placed in his judgment than that which had been given to Sir Robert Barker, his predecessor in the command of the army. He was also much dissatis- fied with his military position, and with his rank, which was that of Colonel only. He wished to receive the rank of Brigadier-GeneraL but the Government held that they were prevented by the orders of the Court of Directors from complying with his request 1 . He assumed the command with feelings far from cordial towards Hastings, towards the Vizier, or towards Middleton. The British force consisted of one Company of Artillery, the 2nd European Regiment, the Select Picket, composed of about 100 cadets waiting for their commissions, and the 2nd Brigade composed of six battalions of Native Infantry under the command of Colonel Galliez. The Vizier's army is said to have numbered ioo,oco men, but nothing certain is known of its strength or composition. During the time that had elapsed since the Marathas had been compelled by the English and the Vizier to abandon their attacks upon Rohilkhand, the condition of affairs in that province had become more disturbed than ever. Further spoliations of the family of Ali Mohammad had occurred, and fresh dissensions and conflicts had arisen among the chiefs. * Notwithstanding,' says Hamilton, ' the very advanced age of Hafiz Rahmat, he still perhaps possessed spirit and abilities sufficient to have enabled him to bear with success the great weight thrown upon his shoulders, had any tolerable degree of harmony subsisted among the then leading members of the community, but that unanimity which alone could render them formidable now no longer prevailed among them ; the authority of Hafiz, as Chief Guardian of the State, was slighted by some and openly renounced by others ; they regarded the 1 Consultations, February 21, 1774, India Office Records; Forrest's Se- lections, vol. i. p. 94. X.] CONDITION OF ROHILKHAND. 131 superiority he assumed with envy ; and the manner of his obtaining that pre-eminence had rendered him particularly obnoxious to 4he sons of Ali Mohammad and their party ; so that he found himself tottering on the pinnacle of an usurped authority, without the support of a single friend in whom he could venture to confide. In addition to a total defect in mutual alliance and general co-operation, many other circumstances concurred to weaken the power of the Afghan independencies in the Northern provinces at this period. Zabita Khan had been drawn off from their interest, as already related ; and the death of Ahmad Khan Bangash left the principality of Farukhabad in the hands of Muzzafar Jang, a weak and ignorant young man, who so far from being able to add force or stability to any union which might have been entered into by them for their general defence, had it not in his power to support himself, and was constrained, the year before, to have recourse to Shuja-ud-dowla to protect his city from the attempts of a petty detachment of Marathas. Add to this that in Rohilkhand the seeds of contention which had been sown in the original formation of the government, had long since sprung up ; a mutual jealousy and avowed animosity which had effectually restrained the different leaders from each other, induced every man, in the present unsettled state of affairs, to aspire at a separate independence utterly inconsistent with their political consequence as a collective body ; and the total relaxation or suspension of the general laws, attendant upon such a state of anarchy, could not fail of producing the most mischievous effects among a people naturally of a fierce and untoward temper, and possessed of a disposition so addicted to violence and rapine, as would at any time have required the sternest exertions of justice to restrain it within bounds. The Hindu farmers, and other original inhabitants of the country, groaned under the worst species of military vassalage, whilst the upstart Mussulman despots who held them in subjection, were, by their perpetual feuds, disabled, as we have seen, from affording them the smallest protection against armies of barbarous marauders, who every year spread their devastations among them, almost without resistance. The haughty and turbulent spirit of the Afghans could not long submit to that strict control which was necessary to procure any tolerable degree of regularity or sub- ordination in a government composed of so many independent members. Consequently, orders were no longer heard or obeyed ; the administration of justice, the collection of revenue, and the inter- course of commerce, were all at a stand ; the roads were infested with bands of armed ruffians, and every enormity had grown to such a height as was not likely to yield to any remedy which in the present state of things could possibly be supplied. Such was the state of the Afghan powers in these countries a few months before the commence- ment of the celebrated Rohilla war V 1 Hamilton, p. 209. K 2 i$l THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. In the beginning of April 1774, the English troops were not far from the Rohilla frontier, and the Vizier, crossing the Ganges by a bridge of boats, returned from the Doab into Oudh with his army, and joined Colonel Champion near Shahabad. He then sent an envoy to Hafiz Rahmat, with a copy of the treaty of 1772, and made a formal de- mand of immediate payment of the sums due to him, on pain of the consequences. ' Hafiz Rahmat,' Hamilton tells us, 'answered the Vakil with hopes of success in his deputation, and in the meantime applied to the several chiefs, desiring them either to enable him forthwith to discharge this demand, or to join him in the field ; they had already resolved on the latter alternative. The Vakil, after some delay, was sent back to his master with an evasive answer, and Hafiz Rahmat proceeded from Pilibhit to Aonla, where he set up his standard and sent notices through the country, requiring the Rohillas to repair thither. Here he was joined by Faizullah Khan and others, and as no remedy now appeared except open resistance, Hafiz attempted to inspire into the several leaders a resolution to act with unanimity and firmness in sup- port of the common cause ; but all his efforts were rendered void by the spirit of jealousy and faction already mentioned, which contributed to destroy them much more effectually than the sword of the enemy. . . . He offered (to two of the principal chiefs) bonds of indemnification, engaging either to hold himself personally responsible, or to give assignments upon his country for such sums as they might advance from their own finances for the public service. Notwithstanding these assurances they did not entertain such an opinion of Hafiz as would induce them to place any dependence upon his promise, and having previously entered into a private league to support each other, ab- solutely refused to advance any money, declaring they would oppose by force whoever should offer to compel them. . . . Several other chiefs threw small sums into the grand treasury, but this mode of supply was not generally adopted, and after all the sum collected was very in- sufficient to defray the necessary charges. In fact, so low were their finances reduced by their dominions for the two preceding years having been the seat of war, that few of the Rohilla chiefs had it in their power to contribute largely. . . . Shuja-ud-dowla, well aware of their present temper, employed a multitude of emissaries among them, who by working upon the hopes of some and the fears of others, increased their mutual jealousy and distrust. Neither the Bakshi nor the Khansamah joined the Rohilla army till some time after its formation, the Vizier having entered into a negotiation with them, and partly by threats, partly by promises, prevailed on them, whatever appearance prudence might render necessary, to remain essentially neuter in the ensuing dispute ; and they were themselves sufficiently X.] CONDITION OF ROHILKHAND. 133 disposed, in the present state of things, rather to forsake than to assist their countrymen, as they knew that if the Afghans should make an effectual resistance and repel the invaders, Hafiz would amply revenge himself upon them for their late opposition to him. Mahbullah Khan and Fattehullah Khan, the sons of Dundi Khan, neglected to appear in the field, or to assist in any measures of general co-operation until several days after the enemy had entered into the country, as they had also privately received a message from Shuja-ud-dowla, who sent them a Koran, a sacred pledge of mutual faith among Mussulmans, with assurances of his protection, provided they should not join Hafiz Rahmat on the present occasion ; and to this they returned a favour- able reply ; but with a fraudulent inconsistency, perfectly in character, they proceeded to Aonla at the head of a considerable force within four days after. Perhaps, indeed, these intrigues of Shuja-ud-dowla, whose character was well known, would have assisted but little in shaking the fidelity of any of the chiefs, had not they been strengthened in their operation by the general dread of Hafiz Rahmat. . . . From the time that the death of his colleagues had thrown the principal power into his own hands, Hafiz Rahmat had so often made an intemperate use of the ostensible authority with which, as " Chief Guardian of the State," he was vested, and which he had been able to support only by superiority of military force and territorial resources, that however respected for his abilities and bravery, and revered for the apparent sanctity of his manners, he was almost universally dreaded and disliked, and as he was aware of this disposition in his countrymen, the intrigues he continually kept on foot to support his influence had considerably widened the breaches before existing among the members of a naturally turbulent and distracted State. ... "To sum up all," says the Rohilla narrator, " a surprising degree of animosity and discord had long since arisen in Rohilkhand, and each person was employed in, nay, was earnestly bent upon, the eradication of his neighbour ; and in order to effect the destruction and overthrow of his own immediate kindred and connections was ready to enter into league with foreigners and strangers ; the event was what might be expected, — what indeed soon appeared in the course of the succeeding occurrences." In such cir- cumstances it is not surprising that even at this awful moment, when a foreign enemy was about to overwhelm them, the chiefs were so dubious of each other that no general system of defence was adopted, nor any orders executed with the promptitude and alacrity necessary in so critical a juncture 1 .' Other contemporary English authorities give no infor- mation regarding the condition of affairs in Rohilkhand, but the Sair-ul-Mutakherin contains a description which agrees substantially with that of Hamilton. I quote it 1 Hamilton, pp. 220-229. 134 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. because it shows the belief of the most intelligent of the native historians of that time, and it is a characteristic specimen of a curious and interesting work. 1 With a view to put an end to his disputes with the Rohillas, or to demonstrate to the world the natural perverseness of their temper, the Vizier sent word to Hafiz Rahmat the principal ruler among them, desiring him to remember how he had come in time to the assistance of his nation against the Marathas, and how he had rescued it effec- tually from the destruction intended them, by paying in their stead a mighty sum of money, which had saved their country from devasta- tion and ruin ; he added that all the return made him for his effectual interposition was only a variety of tergiversations and delay in the repayment of a sum due to him, and which they had not yet thought of providing for ; so that matters standing as they were, the Rohillas must prepare themselves for war, or pay without delay the sum advanced for their sakes. This message did not fail to make great impression on Hafiz Rahmat, who was a man of great sense and much foresight. He sent word to Fatehullah Khan, and to the other children of Dundi Khan, as well as to Faizullah Khan, son to AH Mohammad Rohilla, and even to all the principal men of the Rohilla nation, and informed them that he wished to see them assembled at a certain place, as he had something of importance to impart. When they were assembled, he sent them the following message : " Shuja-ud-dowla, who has disciplined his troops, and mounted his artillery in the Frenghi (European) manner, and who besides is supported by the English power, intends to attack you, and to make a conquest of your country, as well as of mine. My opinion is that we shall never be able to stand before people that pour a shower of fire in the ranks of their enemies. Is it not better then to avert so great an evil by repaying him without delay the money promised and which after all is nothing but his due ? For I inform you that we shall never be able to resist his attack." Whilst the Rohilla princes were assembling, Shuja-ud-dowla had sent secret assurances to the sons of Dundi Khan, that he had no business with either their family or their dominions, which were on the other side of the Ganges, but that it was only on condition that they would remain quiet, without interfering by their assistance to others ; else they might reckon upon their falling in the same fire that would be kindled to consume the others. But this message made as little impression upon them, and those senseless men instead of listening to Hafiz Rahmat's advice, and paying their share of the money he had so long stipulated for them, were on the contrary averse to any accommoda- tion, and preferring their money to any other consideration, they were exciting others to a war; and this was the general opinion of the Rohilla princes, who being in general young, ignorant, and proud of their bodily strength and valour, preferred war to a payment, and X.] CONDITION OF ROHILKHAND. 135 even exhorted the others to reject all thoughts of an accommodation, pretexting their inability to pay, and describing the ruinous state of their country. It was in vain that Hafiz Rahmat was preaching that they would never be able to stand before the fire of the Frenghees ; that it would produce clouds of smoke out of their breasts and that of their families, and that they would be obliged to run away from the field pf battle, and to lose their characters as soldiers. All that produced no conviction ; doubtless it was because the Rohillas having been guilty of an infinity of cruelties and extortions towards the inhabitants of Hindostan, it was high time that they should in their turn experience, to the full all the violences which they had hitherto committed upon others. The time appointed by the Omnipotent Avenger was come, nor was it in their power to retard it by a single moment. Blinded by their own ignorance and prejudices, those senseless men thought only of taking the field and coming to a battle 1 .' 1 Sair-ul-Mutakherin, vol. iii. p. 260. CHAPTER XI. A.D. 1774. THE CONQUEST OF ROHILKHAND AND EXPULSION OF THE ROHILLAS. Correspondence between Colonel Champion and Hafiz Rahmat. — Battle and defeat of the Rohillas. — Death of Hafiz Rahmat. — Honourable conduct of the Vizier. — Character of Hafiz Rahmat. — Faizullah Khan becomes head of the Rohillas. — He retreats to the foot of the hills. — Collapse of the Rohilla power. — Question of payments due to the English. — Negotiations with Faizullah Khan. — His proposals rejected. — Treaty between Faizullah Khan and the Vizier. — Treatment of the Rohillas. — Secret treaty between the Emperor and Vizier. — Hastings refuses to interfere. f^N the 1 2th April, when Colonel Champion had almost ^^ reached the frontier of Oudh with his Brigade, he re- ceived a letter from Hafiz Rahmat *; * Last year,' he wrote, ' when the Marathas advanced to the bank of the Ganges, the Nawab Vizier, General Barker, and you came here. I declined all alliance with the Marathas, and regarding my former connections with the said Nawabs, I concluded firm friendships with them, as is clearly known to you. Tuckoo, a Maratha chief, having crossed the Ganges and penetrated into this country, the Nawab Vizier and General advised that I should advance to oppose him, in which the Nawab's army was to assist me. It, however, joined me not. I opposed the enemy with all possible expedition, and obliged them to recross the river with shame and ignominy. After this the Nawab and General invited me to them. I joined them, and the Nawabs having proposed to cross the Ganges, and intimated so to me, I was ready to accompany them across. Thank Heaven, in the particulars of amity and fidelity I have never been deficient, which you are perfectly sensible of. When I obtained an 1 This correspondence between 2nd January, 1775, after the close of Hafiz Rahmat and Colonel Champion the war when Colonel Champion had has not hitherto been printed. For returned to Calcutta. It is recorded some unexplained reason it was not in the Secret Consultations of that sent to the Government until the date; India Office Records. CORRESPONDENCE WITH HAFIZ RAH MAT. 137 interview with the Nawab Vizier at Shahabad, and concluded a friendly alliance with him, the General observed, " Performance of this treaty will be regarded by us both." In this space, nothing has proceeded from me contrary to those friendly agreements, yet has the Nawab Vizier imbibed enmity. As you have come in lieu of the General, Sir, I am extremely happy, and write to tell you so. I hope to be favoured with your agreeable letters the conferers of pleasure.' On the 13th April Colonel Champion replied that the only advice that he could give was that Hafiz Rahmat should in all respects conform to the wishes of the Vizier. On the 27th April the allied forces entered Rohilkhand, and on the following day a second letter arrived from Hafiz Rahmat. He said that he had always acted in accordance with the Vizier's pleasure, and asked for explicit informa- tion regarding his present wishes. On the 19th April Colonel Champion answered as fol- lows : — 1 The Nawab's pleasure is this, that for having afforded the Rohilla tribe aid and assistance for three years, the sum of two crores of rupees has been expended. You also know what the Nawab's expenses have been, and his pleasure I have now written. If you think proper, write to me distinctly what your ability is, but it is most desirable that you comply with the Nawab's demand. In this matter whatever you think proper to do distinctly inform me of, and I shall impatiently expect your reply. If I receive not your answer to-day I shall advance towards you with the army to-morrow.' An official report was sent to Hastings by Colonel Champion on the same day, in the following terms : — ' Hafiz Rahmat has by letter expressed earnest inclinations to come to an accommodation with the Vizier, which has been the cause of my halting here to-day. The Nabob claims no less than two crores of rupees, and unless he greatly abates his demands it is not likely that an amicable decision can take place.' An answer was at once sent by Hafiz Rahmat to this letter, and it reached Colonel Champion on the 19th April. ' You intimate,' he wrote, ' that the Nawab's pleasure is this, that for aid and succour afforded the Afghan tribe for three years, heavy sums have been expended ; that I should write what my ability is, and act conformably to the Nawab's pleasure. Sir, in the particulars 138 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. of aid and expenses what the Nawab has said that is true. From the decease of the Nawab Safdar Jang, the Nawab's friendship and favour has always been apparent, notwithstanding you were not then in these parts ; and it is universally known too that from the first there has been no neglect on our part in the dues of good wishes and amity ; and Heaven knows that regarding our engagements I have defeated the designs of his enemies to the extent of my power. Accordingly, in the preceding year, when the Marathas wanted to invade Kora and the countries eastward, and advanced to the banks of the Ganges, they sent messengers requesting a passage through my territories, refraining to demand a supply, and entering into other agreements of which you are well acquainted. I, regarding the firm connection which has subsisted for fifty or sixty years between the Nawab and me, avoided all alliance with them, and explicitly wrote so to him and General Barker. The particulars also which have occurred are well known to you. My motive for this was that whenever the Nawab Vizier, the illustrious English, and we acted in concert, our affairs would proceed well. From the beginning to this day I have always wished for the Nawab's friendship and good wishes, and never failed in the particulars of sincerity and attachment to him. Why then is this enmity and hatred from him ? It is not unknown that we Afghans, with the young Nawab Zabita Khan, have a lakh of people on these two the smallest districts of Delhi, and with difficulty subsist ourselves, and in all respects are obedient to the Nawab's pleasure. Now also will we not depart from it at any time, our country, our effects, all we have is of the Nawab. As you enjoined me to write a reply speedily, and your messengers conformably to your orders are impatient, and the tents of the other chiefs are distant, I therefore send a confused reply. The chiefs will meet this afternoon ; to-morrow an explicit answer shall be written and sent. You, Sir, who are compassionate, will surely exert the efforts of friendship.' On the 22nd April another letter, to which the seals of Hafiz Rahmat and three other chiefs were attached, reached Colonel Champion, who, with the Vizier, had continued to advance. It contained assurances, couched in submissive terms, of a desire to comply with the Vizier's wishes. It urged the poverty of the chiefs, and suggested that 1 a trusty accountant be sent on the part of the Vizier, who informing himself of our incomes and our expenses for troops, servants, families, and travellers it would then appear whether after all necessary expenses sufficient remained to fulfil the Nawab's demands. In this particular we will use no deceit, but when subsistence is acquired by agriculture with a thousand difficulties whence is power and ability to come? The soldiers who have removed hence, and are in the Nawab's and XI.] CORRESPONDENCE WITH HAFIZ RAHMAT. 139 other service, are a clear proof of our poverty. Moreover, from our proximity and ancient friendship the state and strength of every chief is not concealed from the Vizier, nor with how severe misfortunes our lives pass away. I am hopeful that this matter, being inquired of the Nawab, justice will be required. By the favour of God, the Nawab is replete in implements of war and in fortune, but from collecting particles the treasuries of grandeur are not increased. Apparatus of war and multitudes of troops are purely for reserve and the well government of the country; it is befitting that he show favour to me and turn to the adjusting his country, and I hope that being forgiven the demand by the Nawab's great clemency, whenever the Marathas approach this part to be freed from their demands. God willing, I will duly perform my services and duty, nor fail in the smallest particular. His fame and generosity will be illustrious far and near, and hope of his favour and benefit will cause all to flock to him. His compassion to Mussulmen will be cause of pleasure to God and his Prophet, and my fault has not been of such degree as to require severe chastisement. In all respects we conform implicitly to the Nawab's pleasure, and whatever I have is his gift. You, Sir, are wise and powerful, and a doer of justice. What I have truly written without any deception, that weigh well in the scales of justice, and laying it before the Nawab represent to him that I throw myself on his mercy for forgiveness and therefore am hopeful of pardon ; and notwithstanding he has much displeasures with me, yet as I am ac- quainted with your noble and forgiving disposition, surely you will regard me as yourself, and show favour and compassion.' On the copy of this letter the following memorandum is recorded : — 'The Colonel and Vizier esteeming Hafiz's letter to be intended merely to gain time, as he expected to be joined with other troops, and having determined to fight the Rohillas in the morning, the following note was returned by his cossids to Hafiz Rahmat : "22nd April, 1874; The Nabob has not given any reply that I can write to you. Consequent to this, should he do so, it shall be written to you in a day or two, and I hope it will be such as will prove satisfactory to you." ' Although full of the common-places of oriental flattery, it is clear that the letters from Hafiz Rahmat would have offered no basis for negotiation even if there had been a desire on the part of the Vizier for an amicable arrange- ment. But no such desire existed. The time for nego- tiation had passed *. 1 It will be observed that Colonel to the Bengal Government, said that Champion, in his letter of April 19 the Vizier claimed no less than two 140 THE ROHILLA WAR, [Ch. According to the Gulistan-i-Rahmat, one more attempt to preserve peace was made by Pahar Sing, the Diwan of Hafiz Rahmat. He strongly advised his master not to risk a battle, and offered to find the means of paying thirty-five lakhs of rupees to the Vizier, if he were allowed to visit Colonel Champion, and ask his mediation in obtaining a reasonable period of grace. ■ But Hafiz said that as he had not the money, and as none of the Sirdars were willing to contribute towards the payment, he would not borrow, and was prepared to die in defence of his country. Pahar Sing again offered to procure the money from some merchants, but Hafiz would not consent, ob- serving that, as he must die some time, he could not fall in a better cause V The rest of the story is soon told. The two armies met on the 23rd of April, 1774 2 , at Miranpur Katra, in the district of Shahjehanpur. The Rohillas were reported by Colonel Champion to be 40,000 strong, but their numbers are stated by Hamilton, with greater probability, to have been 28,000, with 60 guns. We have few details of the battle except those furnished by Colonel Champion, and, as I shall have to show, his animosity against the Vizier was so great that implicit confidence cannot always be placed in his statements. After a gallant resistance the Rohillas were defeated with a loss said to amount to more than 2,000 men, and Hafiz Rahmat was killed. ■ It is im- possible,' Colonel Champion wrote, ' to describe a more crores of rupees. Colonel Champion moment to stop the war, by writing is not likely to have been mistaken, to Hafiz Rahmat and promising that, but his statement does not appear to if the money due to the Vizier were be supported by his letter of the 19th paid, he would effect a peace. ■ But April to Hafiz Rahmat, nor do the death had deprived him of all his letters of Hafiz Rahmat show that friends and supporters ; he had there- a demand for any definite sum had fore withdrawn his heart from the been made by the Vizier. The trans- world, and was desirous of martyr- lation of the correspondence with dom.' It is certain that no such Hafiz Rahmat is obviously very im- communication was made by Colonel perfect. Champion. 1 In the Gul-i-Rahmat, the grand- a Colonel Champion called the son of Hafiz Rahmat says that Colonel battle the ' Battle of St. George,' the Champion endeavoured at the last 23rd April being St. George's Day. XI.] DEFEAT OF THE RO HILL AS. 14 1 obstinate firmness of resolution than the enemy displayed ; numerous were the gallant men who advanced, and often pitched their colours between both armies, in order to en- courage their men to follow them.' According to Hafiz Rahmat's son and grandson, the defeat of the Rohillas was in a great measure due to the treachery of several of their own chiefs who joined Shuja-ud-dowla while the action was going on 1 . The brunt of the battle fell, as has always happened in our Indian wars, on the British troops. Colonel Cham- pion complained bitterly that the Vizier himself, with nearly the whole of his cavalry and a large number of guns, remained inactive on the ground that the English army had left in the morning. After describing the flight of the Rohillas, Colonel Champion's despatch thus continues : — ' And now came on the after-game of the few horse the Nabob sent to the field. No sooner was the enemy irrecoverably broken than they pushed after them, and got much plunder in money, elephants and camels, &c, &c, &c. Their camp equipage, which was all standing, and proves we came on them by surprise, with whatever effects they could not carry off, fell a sacrifice to the ravages of the Nabob's people, whilst the Company's troops, in regular order in their ranks, most justly observed, " We have the honour of the day and these banditti the profit." I wish I could pay the Vizier any compliment on this occasion, or that I were not under the indispensable necessity of expressing my highest indignation at his shameful pusillanimity; indispensable, I say, because it is necessary that the Administra- tion should clearly know how little to be depended on is this their ally.' We need not believe in the ' shameful pusillanimity ' of the Vizier. ' Shuja-ud-daula,' as Sir Henry Lawrence writes, ' whatever were his faults was never before accused of cowardice,' The official returns of killed and wounded seem to make it probable that the Vizier's infantry took a larger share in the action than might be supposed from Colonel Champion's despatch, for while the loss of the Company's English and Native troops was 132, that of the 1 Gulistan-i-Rahmat, p. 116 ; Gul-i-Rahmat, Elliot, vol. viii. p. 312. 142 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. troops of the Vizier, not including his cavalry for which there is no return, was 254. Two English officers were wounded, but none were killed *. The following description of the death of Hafiz Rahmat, is given by his grandson : — 1 He went to the tent of Faizullah Khan, and said, " My end is near at hand. So long as I remain alive, do not turn away from the field ; but when I fall, beware, do not press the battle, but leave the field directly, and flee with my children and dependants to the hills. This is the best course for you to take, and if you act upon my advice, it will be the better for you." After giving these directions, he mounted his horse, and marched against the enemy with ten thousand horse and foot. He had proceeded only a short distance, when the advanced force of the enemy came in sight, and fire was opened from cannons and muskets. Ahmad Khan, son of the Bakhshi, who had made a secret engagement with Shuja-ud-daula, now fell back, and set the example of flight, which many others followed. Hafiz Rahmat had only about fifty supporters left when he drew near to the Telingas and English. He was recognised by his umbrella of which spies had given a description, and a cannon was levelled against him. He advanced in front of all his companions using his utmost efforts. The cannon balls fell all round, and at length one struck him on the breast. He was lifted off his horse, and after taking a sip or two of water, he drank the cup of martyrdom V Whatever degree of blame may be justly due to Shuja- 1 Colonel Champion's despatch Nabob Vizier and his rabble made will be found in Appendix No. 26, their appearance and hastened to Fifth Report, and in Forrest's Selec- plunder the camp of the valiant ene- tions, vol. i. p. 96. See also his mies, whom they had never dared to letter, in which reference is made to look in the face.' The statement the Vizier's conduct, dated March 2, that Shuja-ud-daula ■ fled from the 1775, Forrest's Selections, vol. ii. field ' is a mere flight of imagination ; p. 332. Accounts of the battle are neither Colonel Champion nor any given by Hamilton, and in the Sair- other authority asserted or suggested ul-Mutakherin, vol. iii. p. 261. Ma- anything of the kind. The same may caulay's version of the story is worth be said of the distinguished chiefs quoting as an illustration of his love who fell righting bravely ; with the of rhetorical embellishment : ' The exception of Hafiz Rahmat himself dastardly sovereign of Oude fled from no Rohilla chief of importance was the field. The English were left un- killed. Colonel Champion reported supported, but their fire and their in his despatch that a son of Hafiz charge were irresistible. It was not, Rahmat had been killed, but this was however, till the most distinguished a mistake. chiefs had fallen, fighting bravely at a Gul-i- Rahmat ; Elliot, vol. viii. the head of their troops, that the p. 312. Rohilla ranks gave way. Then the XL] HAFIZ RAH MAT. 143 ud-dowla for his conduct during and after the action, his behaviour on the death of Hafiz Rahmat was honourable. On the day on which the battle was fought, Middleton, the English Resident, who was present at the time, sent news to Hastings of the victory, and informed him that the Vizier had ordered the body of Hafiz Rahmat ' to be interred with every honour due to his rank and distinc- tion V The son of Hafiz Rahmat himself has confirmed this statement. ' A Sawar,' he writes, ' named Sultan Khan, severed the head of Hafiz Rahmat from the body and carried it in triumph to Shuja-ud-daula, who placed it and the body in a palanquin, covered it with shawls, and sent it to Bareilly. The principal inhabitants of the town went out to meet the body, and after the proper forms had been observed, it was interred V Soon after the death of Hafiz Rahmat, a mausoleum, still to be seen at Bareilly, was erected to his memory by his relations. Thus ended the Rohilla dominion. Counting from the time when Ali Mohammad's power was first established to the death of Hafiz Rahmat, who during nearly the whole period was the chief personage in the State, it lasted less than thirty-five years. I quote the description which Hamilton has given of the character of Hafiz Rahmat : — 'Whether we consider him as a soldier or a statesman, he was certainly entitled to some degree of respect. As the director of a factious and disturbed government, he by the superiority of his talents and address kept together its several parts much longer than could have been expected, considering the nature of the people with whom he had to deal, and the unfortunate events under which they laboured. 1 Letter from Middleton, British 335), he enclosed, but without corn- Museum MSS. No. 29,134. Colonel ment, an extract from his Persian Champion did not deny this, which Interpreter's Journal of April 23, he certainly would have done if it 1774, which says; 'After the action had not been true, but he more than the Vizier, who had remained on the once referred to the subject after the bank of the nullah that we marched war was over. In his letter to the from until the success of the day was Government dated Jan. 30, 1775, he known, came to the Colonel's tent, speaks of the Vizier ' exulting over bringing with him the head of Hafiz, the pale head of Hafiz,' and in his which he expressed a good deal of letter dated March 2, 1775 (printed pleasure having in his possession.' in Forrest's Selections, vol. ii. p. 2 Gulistan-i-Rahmat, p. 117. 144 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. His personal bravery and firmness in the hour of danger would have enabled the Rohillas to support themselves with success against all foreign enemies, and to have protected their dominion from the many calamities in which it had been involved for some years past, had he been properly supported by his colleagues, and it was this spirit that determined him, on the failure of every other resource, to prefer an honourable death to an inglorious submission. But, however praise- worthy his conduct in these situations may appear, the circumstances of his rise to power, as well as the use he often made of that power when acquired, must detract greatly from his merit ; and it remains to be regretted that such happy endowments should have been blended with the most mischievous of all vices, and that a grasping and unprincipled ambition should have induced him to betray the trust of his friend, and usurp the inheritance of his wards, in a manner which tarnishes all his great qualities and throws a perpetual slur on his memory V Reference has already been made to the condition of Rohilkhand under the government of the Rohillas, and to some of the personal qualifications of Hafiz Rahmat. It is probable that he deserved a better character than that which Hamilton has given to him. It must be remembered that the work on which Hamilton's history is based, and from which much of it is translated, was written by a ser- vant of Faizullah Khan, and that it avowedly expressed the opinions of his master. It was not to be expected that the son of Ali Mohammad would be disposed to take a favourable view of the character of the man by whom the members of his own family had been treated with scant justice, and had been deprived of the greater part of the possessions left to them by their father. The histories of the life of Hafiz Rahmat, written by his son and grandson 2 , throw little light on his character as a ruler. I have already quoted from the Gulistan-i-Rahmat a passage regarding his abolition of taxes upon trade ; the same work extols his liberality towards the widows and sons of his soldiers who fell in battle, and towards learned and pious men, but the qualities which are chiefly dwelt upon are the strictness of his religious observances, his fasts and prayers and sacrifices. ' It is not surprising,' 1 Hamilton, p. 237, a See Preface. XL] FAIZULLAH KHAN. 145 writes his son, ' that a ruler who studied so little his own ease, whose whole life was spent in performing his duty to his God and to his fellow-creatures, should have been be- loved in life, and regretted in death ; indeed his fall caused a general mourning throughout Kather V Mr. Elliott, writing at Bareilly in 1 814, after '■ a residence of many years in Rohilkhand,' tells us, in the preface to his translation of the Gulistan-i-Rahmat, that 'the memory of Hafiz Rahmat was held in the highest veneration.' Although I cannot doubt that these recollections of the Rohilla Chief and of his times were coloured by the abominable mis- government of the Oudh rulers after Shuja-ud-daula's death, they have nevertheless some value. On the whole I cannot pass upon Hafiz Rahmat so harsh a judgment as that of Mr. Whiteway, who sums up our knowledge of his character in the opinion that, although he was a fairly successful ruler, his leading qualities were avarice and insincerity 2 . On the death of Hafiz Rahmat, Faizullah Khan, the eldest surviving son of Ali Mohammad, a man of capacity and courage, became the acknowledged head of the Rohillas. He fled, with the remains of the army, to Rampur, and thence, taking with him his family and his treasure, he retired northwards, through the Terai and forest in the Bijnor district, to Laldhang, a strongly situated post at the foot of the Garhwal mountains, beyond the boundaries of the Rohilla territories. Here he was joined by large numbers of his countrymen, and he was soon in command of a considerable force. No resistance was attempted in the plains of Rohilkhand. The power of the Rohillas, having been merely that of an army of foreigners holding in subjection a numerous people of another and a hostile faith, necessarily collapsed with military defeat. 1 Nothing,' writes Hamilton, * could exceed the terror and confusion of the Afghans throughout Rohilkhand, on learning the disastrous issue of a battle which at once annihilated their power and decided the fate of their dominion. Neither were their fears confined to the 1 Gulistan-i-Rahmat, p. 117. 2 Calcutta Review, 1875, p. 223. L 146 THE ROB ILL A WAR. [Ch. progress of the victorious army. Wherever the defeat of the Rohillas became known, the Hindu zemindars, each of whom is possessed of a stronghold attaching to the chief village of his district, shut their forts, and refusing their late masters succour or protection, plundered without distinction all whom they found flying towards the hills, so that numbers of the Afghans, who would otherwise have joined their countrymen at Laldhang, returned to their homes, and there quietly awaited the event . . . Many more were encouraged to this by the generous and temperate conduct of the British troops, whose characteristic virtues were not more displayed by their gallantry in the late engagement, than by their humanity after it. In the close of the action, whilst yet flushed with recent victory, they advanced by divisions and marched through the Rohilla camp with all the dis- ciplined coolness and regularity of a review : not a man offering to leave his post, or to seize on any part of the spoil which was scattered over the plain around them ; and on the same evening all the wounded Rohillas who appeared to be in a curable state were taken into the English hospital, and attended with the same care as their own people; and these circumstances undoubtedly contributed not only to the reputa- tion of the conquerors, but to the facility of their subsequent success V Early in May Colonel Champion reported to the Go- vernment that the whole of the Rohilla country was in the Vizier's possession, and the Resident was consequently instructed to demand an acknowledgment that the forty lakhs of rupees which the Vizier had agreed to pay had now become due. It was said, however, that it was not intended to insist on immediate satisfaction of the claim, and that the Government wished the time and conditions of payment to be arranged between the Resident and Vizier. When this demand was made the Vizier not un- reasonably expressed surprise ; he said that although the country was in his possession, the Rohillas had not been finally expelled from it, since Faizullah Khan's army still remained on its borders, and that, under the engagement into which he had entered, payment of the forty lakhs was not due until he declared that he no longer required the services of the English brigade. The Vizier's contention was obviously true ; the demand was not pressed, and no payment was made until the troops had been withdrawn, after the change in the Government when power had passed 1 Hamilton, p. 241. XI.] FAIZULLAH KHAN. 1 47 from the hands of Hastings into those of the majority of the Council \ Faizullah Khan lost no time in endeavouring to open negotiations with the commander of the English forces and the Vizier, and towards the end of May he sent an envoy to Colonel Champion with definite proposals. He offered, if he were placed in possession of the whole of Rohilkhand, to pay to the Company eighty lakhs of rupees in three years, or, if it were preferred, to pay that sum to the Vizier, under a guarantee from the English of the Vizier's good faith, and to place his son in the hands of the English as a hostage until the money was paid. As an alternative arrangement, he offered to pay thirty lakhs of rupees an- nually to the Vizier and to ' give the Company twenty-five lakhs if they will influence the Nabob to put him in posses- sion of the country and guarantee the treaty. 5 He also offered to have 15,000 men ready to join the English and Vizier on all occasions. Colonel Champion thought that it would be wise to accept these proposals, and he seems to have believed that Faizullah Khan could have carried out the engagements into which he was ready to enter, but he reported to Hastings on the 28th May that the Vizier ' had rejected them all with the greatest disdain.' Hastings would not listen for a moment to Faizullah Khan's offers, and he desired that the Vizier should be in every way discouraged from accepting them. His letter, sent to Colonel Champion on the 17th June, 1774, is interesting, because it repeats very clearly the reasons which had led him to take part in the war : — 1 1 have one general objection to the whole of these propositions, which is, that they are diametrically opposite to the principle on which 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 2 7. See also Court of Directors, the Government note by Colonel Champion's Persian gave a somewhat different account, interpreter, dated June 12, 1774, de- thinking it, I suppose, inexpedient to scribing an interview between Colonel tell the Court that they had made Champion and the Vizier. App. No. a demand which was not justified. 23 to Colonel Champion's letter dated See Letter to Colonel Champion, January 30, 1775; Consultations of May 23, 1774, and Letter to the February 14, 1775, India Office Re- Court of Directors, dated October 19, cords. In reporting the matter to the 1774. L 2 148 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. the Rohilla expedition was on our part undertaken, which was not merely on account of the pecuniary acquisition of forty lakhs of rupees to the Company, for although this might have been an accessory argument, it was by no means the chief object of the undertaking. We engaged to assist the Vizier in reducing the Rohilla country under his dominion, that the boundary of his possessions might be completed by the Ganges forming a barrier to cover them from the attack and insults to which they were exposed, by his enemies either possessing or having access to the Rohilla country. This our alliance with him, and the necessity of maintaining this alliance so long as he and his successors shall deserve our protection, rendered advantageous to the Company's interest, because security of his possessions from invasions in that quarter is in fact the security of ours. But if the Rohilla country is delivered to Faizullah Khan, the advantages proposed from this measure will be totally defeated. The same objections from the Vizier will take place against him as against Hafiz Rahmat ; he will be actuated by the same principles of self-defence, and the same im- pressions of fear, to seek the protection of other powers against the Vizier, and of course will create the same jealousies and suspicions in the mind of the Vizier, with the additional and strong incentive to a mutual animosity, of an enormous debt, which probably Faizullah Khan will find no other means to get clear of, but by engaging in hostilities against the Vizier. The Board undertook the Rohilla expedition on a firm conviction that the Vizier would be able to maintain his conquest of it, and that it would make his other do- minions more defensible. For the reasons before assigned, and with respect to myself, I declare that if I had not been morally certain of the justness of this reasoning, I would not have consented to enter upon the enterprise at all V This refusal of Hastings to listen to the proposals of Faizullah Khan was included in the Articles of Charge against Hastings brought forward by Burke in 1786, in the House of Commons, but it was afterwards abandoned. It is remarkable that Burke, who was indignant at the receipt by the English of forty lakhs of rupees from Shuja-ud-daula, should have declared these offers of Faizullah Khan to be ' strictly consonant to the demands of justice.' Mill says nothing about their rejection. It would have been inconvenient to call attention to the reasons given by Hastings for refusing to listen to them, because in his letter to Colonel Champion he had repeated 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. XI.] FAIZULLAH KHAN. 149 his explanation of the real objects with which the war had been undertaken, an explanation which Mill has always studiously suppressed. In fact, as Hastings observed in his answer before the House of Commons to the Twenty- second Charge, it was impossible that Faizullah Khan could have carried out his proposals. ' No consequence,' he said, ■ can be more remote from the premises than that the performance of so extravagant an offer would have followed the acceptance of it. . . . The extravagance of the offer was a clear proof of the insincerity of the man who made it, and so I treated it V While these negotiations were going on, the Vizier en- deavoured, with considerable success, to conciliate the Rohilla chiefs who had not joined Faizullah Khan. Letters were sent to them desiring them to remain quietly at their homes, and assuring them of protection. The Hindu popu- lation had no inclination to encourage resistance on the part of its late masters, and nearly the whole of Rohil- khand was soon in the Vizier's possession, and in a state of tolerable tranquillity. When, however, the rainy season had set in, military operations against Faizullah Khan became extremely difficult, and at the same time it was clear that delay in bringing the war to an end might be dangerous. In July, alarming reports of the probable return of the Marathas were received ; it was believed that the Emperor was intriguing with them, and that he was advising Faizullah Khan, who would have been ready to pay largely for help, to continue his resistance. It was urged strongly by the Vizier that the attack on Faizullah Khan could not safely be postponed, but Colonel Cham- pion was averse to undertaking operations during the rainy season in a most difficult and most unhealthy country. Hastings became anxious that there should be no avoid- able delay, and sent orders to that effect. The English troops with those of the Vizier accordingly marched towards the foot of the hills, and at the end of August they were 1 Articles of Charge, No. 22, pre- May 5, 1786; and Answer by Warren sented to the House of Commons, Hastings. 150 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. not far from the strongly fortified positions of the Rohillas. These were outside the recognised limits of Rohilkhand, to which Colonel Champion had been ordered to confine his operations, and he hesitated to advance beyond them. Authority was, however, sent to him to attack the Rohilla army wherever it might be found, and he was strongly urged by Hastings to pursue the most vigorous measures for terminating the war. Negotiations were again opened, but it was not until the 2nd October, when the advanced posts of the English were within a mile of those of the Rohillas, that a decisive step was taken by Faizullah Khan. On that day he came into Colonel Champion's camp, and appealed to him to effect an honourable arrange- ment with the Vizier. Hastings had insisted on the im- portance of bringing the war to an end as soon as the objects with which it was undertaken had been sufficiently secured, and he wrote to Colonel Champion that he hoped that the Vizier would ' conciliate the affections of the Rohillas to his Government by acceding to lenient terms V On the 7th October, 1774, a treaty was concluded between the Vizier and Faizullah Khan, and it was attested by Colonel Champion. It provided that Faizullah Khan should retain possession of the territory formerly allotted to him in Rohilkhand by his father Ali Mohammad, with the city and district of Rampur. Its nominal revenue was nearly fifteen lakhs of rupees, but this was said to be less than the actual amount. It was stipulated that Faizullah Khan should retain in his service a force of not more than 5,000 men, that he should, if called on to do so, render certain military services to the Vizier, and enter into no correspondence with any powers excepting the Vizier and the English. Faizullah Khan, it was further provided, ' shall send the remainder of the Rohillas to the other side of the river.' He agreed ' that whatever the Nabob Vizier directs, I will execute, and I will at all times and on all 1 Letter from Select Committee to Colonel Champion, September 8, 1774. XI.] TREATY OF PEACE, 151 occasions, both in adversity and prosperity, continue his firm associate V On the day after the treaty was executed, Colonel Champion reported to Hastings that ' as Faizullah Khan is restricted to a small body of men, such of the troops dis- banded by him as the Vizier does not choose to entertain, are to cross the Ganges without delay.' He said in the same letter, that Faizullah Khan had agreed to give up to the Vizier one half of the treasure in his possession, but it was subsequently settled, with the consent of both parties, that in lieu of this, Faizullah Khan should pay fifteen lakhs of rupees. This agreement was carried out, but no reference was made to it in the treaty. The Vizier also wrote to Colonel Champion that he was willing to take into his own service 10,000 or 15,000 of Faizullah Khan's soldiers 2 . Immediately after the signature of the treaty, the Vizier and the English withdrew their forces ; Faizulluh Khan went with his 5,000 men to Rampur, and assumed quiet possession of the country assigned to him ; the rest of the Rohilla troops marched, under the command of some of their chiefs, across the Ganges into the districts of Zabita Khan, their countryman. The number of Rohillas who thus left Rohilkhand is said by Hamilton to have been 17,000 or 18,000. According to Colonel Champion it was about 20,000, including camp followers 3 . Many of the Rohilla soldiers entered the service of Zabita Khan, and many soon returned to Rohilkhand, and obtained employment with Faizullah Khan or in the army of the Vizier. No Rohillas except those under arms with Faizullah Khan were compelled to cross the Ganges : the rest were unmolested, and either re- mained in their former homes or settled in the Rampur State. Whatever may have been the misgovernment or absence of government in Rohilkhand after the fall of the 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 44. India Office Records. 2 Fifth Report, App. Nos. 44 and 3 Evidence before Committee of 45 ; Consultations, February 14, 1775, House of Commons, May 3, 1786. 1$% THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. Rohilla dominion, there is no reason to suppose that either at this or at any subsequent time the Rohillas suffered any special persecution or oppression from the Oudh authorities. Several months before the conclusion of the arrange- ment with Faizullah Khan, there were rumours of the existence of the treaty which the Vizier had entered into with the Emperor, without the knowledge of the English Government, for the partition of Rohilkhand. On the 5th May, 1774, Colonel Champion stated that he had heard reports to this effect, and asked for in- structions in case they should prove true. There was a difference of opinion in the Council as to the answer that should be given, but on the 23rd May orders were sent in accordance with the views of Hastings and the majority : — 'As we have no knowledge of any treaty of partition between the King and the Vizier, we can take no cognizance of the breach of it. Our engagements with the latter are to aid him in the conquest of the Rohilla country, and if he is opposed by Najf Khan, or the King himself should personally interfere, you are to pay no regard to either, but steadily and invariably prosecute the tenor of your original instructions against all opponents of whatever power or character they may be. We cannot entertain so bad an opinion of the Vizier as to suppose him capable of acting in avowed breach of a treaty, but if any plea of that kind should be made for contesting our right to occupy any part of the Rohilla country yet unconquered, it will be proper to put the question to him, whether such treaty does exist or not ? If he should acknowledge such a treaty you must undoubtedly abstain from further hostilities in abetment of his breach of faith ; but we repeat that though in reply to a question proposed by you to us for your instruction, we have thus given you our opinion, yet we do not ap- prehend the possibility of such a case occurring, and if the Vizier should deny having engaged in such a treaty we can neither authorize you to examine the identity of it, nor do we see by what means you could investigate the truth V On the 1 6th May, Colonel Champion sent a further report on the same subject. Najf Khan had arrived at his 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. XI.] THE VIZIER AND EMPEROR. 153 camp with a considerable force, and informed him that before the war began the Vizier * prevailed with him to go to Delhi, in order to influence his Majesty to take the field and countenance the conquest of the Rohillas, on the express condition that half of the country should go to his Majesty. That he, Najf Khan, accordingly induced the King to leave Delhi and display the royal standard ; that his Majesty having, however, been taken ill was obliged to relinquish his intentions of continuing in the field in person, but commissioned Najf Khan to represent him, and act in his name as if he were present ; that accordingly Najf Khan with his army were in full march to join the Vizier when he received the news of the defeat of the Rohillas ; that his business here was to demand the performance of the condition on which the King's troops took the field ; that he had sent for a copy of the agreement, and would not declare his business to the Vizier until it came V Najf Khan left the English camp without producing the treaty, but on the 17th June Colonel Champion received a copy of it with a letter from the Emperor, inviting him to remind the Vizier of his promise, and to ' send to the Presence the proportion stipulated to us.' This was shown by Colonel Champion to the Vizier, who acknowledged the authenticity of the treaty ; he produced the counterpart agreement under the Emperor's seal, but said that the Emperor, not having come in person according to his en- gagement, had forfeited any benefits which he might have claimed. Neither in the treaty or in the counterpart agree- ment was there any condition to the effect that the Emperor was to take the field in person, but the Vizier's statement on this point was in accordance with that made to Colonel Champion by Najf Khan, and as the authority of the Emperor himself was little more than nominal, and actual power was in the hands of Najf Khan, it was in fact with him rather than with the Emperor that the agreement had been made. It may be assumed that both parties were equally insincere, and while there can be little doubt that the Vizier never had any intention of fulfilling his promises, if it should afterwards seem more profitable to break them, Najf Khan and the Emperor gave to him, by 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 106. 154 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. their failure to carry out their part of the engage- ment, an ostensible reason for his own disregard of his obligations. In reply to Colonel Champion's request for instructions in regard to these proceedings, the following orders were sent to him on the 14th July : — ' With respect to the treaties mutually interchanged between the King and the Vizier, as the latter insists on secret conditions which invalidate the King's apparent right ; as the treaties were formed without the knowledge or participation of this Government, which could have no right or plea to interfere but that of being guarantee to them ; and as an interposition would be productive of much incon- venience and embarrassment, without the possibility of deriving either credit or advantage from it, we again recur to the answer which you received from the Board on this very subject in their letter of the 23rd May, declaring we will have no concern in these engagements, the execution of which we leave entirely to the parties themselves. It is our intention to persevere in pursuit of the object which originally engaged us in the present enterprise, and to adhere strictly to our engagements with the Vizier, without suffering our attention to be diverted by foreign incidents or occurrences 1 .' The decision of Hastings to refuse all interference was, under the circumstances, the only one that could be adopted, and if there had been any inclination to further the aims of the Emperor it would have been effectually dispelled by the reports repeatedly sent by Colonel Champion of intrigues hostile to the interests of the English and of the Vizier in which the Emperor was engaged. His proceedings were referred to on the 24th August, 1774, in a letter from the Bengal Government to the Court of Directors : — ' The King has lately taken into his service Sumroo, the notorious assassin of the unfortunate prisoners at Patna ; it is also said that he has invited Ghazi-ud-din and Mir Kasim to his court and that he has written letters to the Abdali and to the Maratha chiefs, soliciting their return to that quarter, and to Faizullah Khan, encouraging him to persevere and flattering him with hopes of success. These indications of his Majesty's indisposition towards us, for which many obvious causes may be assigned, are not likely to affect your interest, at least not materially, since his solicitations will have little weight with the powers to whom they are made, and who know that he has neither wealth, territory, nor personal command, to give them credit 9 .' 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. tween the Emperor and the Vizier 8 This account of the treaty be- is taken from the official correspond- XL] THE VIZIER AND EMPEROR. *55 ence between Colonel Champion and the Government, printed in Appendix No. 27 to the Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, and from India Office Records. An account of the transactions connected with the treaty will also be found in the letter to the Government written by Colonel Cham- pion on the 30th January, 1775 (see Fifth Report, App. No. 45, and For- rest's Selections, vol. i. p. 218); it dwells on everything unfavourable to the Vizier, and is in some essential respects inconsistent with the state- ments made in his own official letters while the campaign was going on. The question of this treaty has no important bearing on the history of the war, and my only reason for referring to it in detail is that Mill, who, as usual, has suppressed all that it would have been inconvenient to quote, has found in it an opportunity for attacking Hastings and his Go- vernment. See his History, book v. chap. vi. CHAPTER XII. DISCONTENT OF THE ENGLISH TROOPS. Refusal of Hastings to allow the troops a share of plunder. — Discontent of Colonel Champion and his officers. — Reports sent to Hastings by Colonel Champion, Middleton, and the Vizier. — Alarm of the Bengal Government. — Special meeting of the Council. — The claim of the troops to share of plunder refused. — Discontent of the troops and anxiety of Hastings. — Proposed grant of donation to the army by the Vizier. — Hastings refuses sanction. — Alarming reports from Middleton. — Colonel Macleane sent by Hastings on a secret mission to the camp. — His reports. — Discontent of the officers of the army towards Colonel Champion. — Address of the officers to Hastings. — Colonel Champion returns to Calcutta and renews complaint regarding refusal of share of plunder. — Amount of plunder obtained by the Vizier. HAVE hitherto made no reference to the atrocities said by Burke, and Mill, and Macaulay to have been per- petrated during the Rohilla war, because it seemed desir- able to treat separately this part of the commonly received story. To enable it to be properly understood there is, however, another subject to which it is necessary to refer. In Colonel Champion's official despatch of the 24th April, reporting the defeat of the Rohillas, nothing was said of any atrocities, but in a passage already quoted, he charged the Vizier with ' shameful pusillanimity,' and re- ferred to the plunder of the enemy's camp. ' The Com- pany's troops/ he wrote, ■ in regular order in their ranks, most justly observed — we have the honour of the day and these banditti the profit.' These remarks of Colonel Champion were not dictated by motives of humanity or regard for discipline. They were the first sign of the fact that he and his officers were ex- tremely dissatisfied because they had obtained no share of the plunder, and their discontent soon assumed alarming DISCONTENT OF THE TROOPS. 157 proportions, when it became known that Hastings had refused to allow them any such share during their future operations. This caused so much anxiety to Hastings, it led to such serious consequences in the relations of Colonel Champion with the Vizier, and, in the belief of Hastings, it was the origin of so much exaggeration and misrepre- sentation in the reports of the Vizier's proceedings, that it is necessary to notice it in some detail. On the 28th April, five days after the defeat of the Rohillas, Colonel Champion informed Hastings that in con- sequence of a representation made to him by the troops through their officers, that an immense treasure was re- ported to exist in the fort of Pilibhit, where Hafiz Rahmat and his family had lived, and which had been surrendered, he had sent three of his own and three of the Vizier's officers to ascertain the truth. 1 They found,' Colonel Champion wrote, ' Hafiz Rahmat's family in the greatest misery ; his eldest son assured them there was no money in the fort, excepting a trifle in the zenana. His story having every appearance of truth, the gentlemen commissioned gave belief to it, and as they very properly held the women's apartments sacred, they did not make any attempt to search there for treasure, and returned with the most earnest entreaties of intercession for the unfortunate family of Hafiz. In this matter you are not to entertain the most distant suspicion that any part of our troops was disposed to wanton enormities. The utmost request was that by ascertaining the treasure it might be put in the power of the Board, in case of any considerable sum being found, to determine how much the services of these forces entitled them to ; so that you may rest satisfied of the good temper of the army, which I assure you gives me the utmost heart-felt pleasure. I should be glad, however, to know the sentiments of the Board, how far they may think their troops entitled to any share or consideration of treasure, &c, should anything considerable be found during the further progress of their conquests, either in the field or garrison V On the 7th May, the Resident Middleton reported to Hastings that this affair had ' been the source of much dis- satisfaction to the Nabob 2 ,' and the Vizier himself after- wards sent to Hastings his own version of the story. He 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. 2 Private letter, British Museum MSS. 29,117. 158 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. said that when he arrived at Pilibhit he received intelli- gence that the English troops were committing outrages in the city, that on remonstrating against this, Colonel Cham- pion came to him and told him that the English officers said there were four crores of rupees to a part of which their troops would be entitled, that he would send three officers to inquire into the case, and that if he did not take this step there would be a mutiny among his men. 1 My friend,' the Vizier wrote, ' there was not so much as four or five thousand rupees in Pilibhit; supposing there had been more, what business had the gentlemen with it ? When we concerted this ex- pedition together no such condition was provided for ; the sum which I stipulated with you I will pay without evasion, but what can be the meaning of these steps taken by the gentlemen ? They astonish me. Conferences between me and the English gentlemen were never before conducted in such a manner that other gentlemen were allowed to answer the questions which I asked, whilst the principal withdrew himself on one side. I have long been acquainted with the principal English gentlemen, such as Lord Clive and others, as well as yourself, but I never saw it customary that the principal chief and commander of the whole should sit still and let every one else talk as each thought fit 1 .' On the 1 6th May, Colonel Champion wrote in stronger terms regarding the claims of his troops to a share in the plunder of the country : — 'Since the defeat of the Rohillas the Nabob has plundered the whole country, insomuch that in Pilibhit, Bareilly, Aonla, and Bisauli, he has found jewels and money, above and under ground, elephants, camels, horses, and other effects, to the value I am confi- dent of above fifty lakhs of rupees, besides what the individuals of his army have possessed themselves- of, and if he can lay hold of Faizullah Khan's treasure and effects, his acquisition in ready money will exceed a crore of rupees. These are circumstances, which I believe were not foreseen, Gentlemen, otherwise I persuade myself you would have made further conditions with the Vizier, both on account of the Company and your army. ... It is a matter of very great concern to me, Gentlemen, that no provision was made for your army in the event which has happened, but I hope, that if you have 1 Letter from Vizier to Hastings, Charges,' Fifth Report, App. No. received 28th November, 1774. The 45. See also another letter from reply of Col. Champion will be found Vizier, Forrest's Selections, vol. i. in his ' Refutation of the Vizier's p. 249. XII.] DISCONTENT OF THE TROOPS. 159 not already, in consequence of my letter to the Governor of the 28th ultimo, you will now be pleased to interest yourselves on their behalf, for it must be extremely discouraging to your troops, if they are not attended to on this occasion. By their gallantry they have reduced this country, and of course gained to the Company half a million of money ; they have moreover been the enrichers of Shuja-ud-daula to an immense amount ; before their faces he has seized these riches, and he has not even thanked them for their services. These matters, Gentlemen, are, in my opinion, of the utmost importance, and deserve your most serious consideration. The good temper and forbearance of your army under such temptation is matter of the greatest ad- miration, and a source of much satisfaction to me, but I must confess that I am afraid if some mark of favour and gratification for their services is j not manifested, it may be dangerous ever to try an ex- periment of this kind again, or to put the temper and patience of any part of your troops so much to the proof. Situated as I am, it falls only to my province to submit these matters to your wisdom and deliberation, and I have only at present to add that, upon my honour, self-interest has not dictated a line of this address, to which I have been prompted by a just sense of the Vizier's conduct, and a warm regard for troops who have rendered themselves very dear to me and whose interest I shall ever seek to promote V When these demands, couched in language that was almost menacing, reached Calcutta, they were declared by Hastings to be ' of the greatest importance and of the most alarming tendency,' and they were rendered more serious by the letters of the Vizier and of Middleton which showed how strongly Colonel Champion's proceed- ings had been resented. On the 22nd May, in a private letter to Middleton, Hastings expressed his ' alarm at the repeated complaints with which the letters of Colonel Champion are filled against the Vizier,' and said that while he implicitly accepted the Commander-in-Chiefs state- ments so far as they dealt with facts, he feared that he might be induced by his prejudices against the Vizier to place upon the facts a wrong construction. On the 2nd June a special meeting of the Council was called, and the papers were laid before it by Hastings with a note in which he stated his hope that the judgment of the Government on Colonel Champion's demands ' would 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 106. 160 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. be decisive, and their orders peremptory.' He had himself already sent two letters to Colonel Champion on the subject. * The very idea of prize money,' he said, * suggests to my remem- brance the former disorders which arose in our army from this source, and had almost proved fatal to it. Of this circumstance you must be sufficiently apprized, and of the necessity for discouraging every ex- pectation of the kind among the troops. It is to be avoided like poison.' . . . ' The only instance wherein our troops in the present service could have any pretensions to it, by the customs of war, would be in the actual assault of a place by storm ; in every other case it is clear that the capture becomes the sole property of the power carrying on the war. In the instance of Pilibhit, which made no sort of defence whatever, but fell with the whole Rohilla country into the hands of the Nabob, in consequence of the victory, we had no more right to search or interfere at all in the riches it contained than we had to ransack every defenceless village or house in the open country for plunder V On the 3rd June, official orders were sent to Colonel Champion. The Government refused to admit the claim of the army to share in any plunder which might be acquired by the Vizier. ' You will take,' they wrote, ' the proper method to convey a positive and firm declaration to the troops, that they are not to expect any share of the riches acquired by the Vizier in their conquest. Indeed, the consequences which you signify to us are to be apprehended from our refusing this gratification are sufficiently alarming ; but at the same time, were there no other reason, the very appearance of so dangerous a spirit in the troops would determine us to oppose it in the begin- ning ; and we rely on your conduct and firmness and that subordi- nation which experience has taught us it has been always your pride to maintain, for enforcing, with the support of your second in command and the other field-officers, these orders, and procuring a complete acquiescence in them from all the officers and soldiers of the army. Indeed we are persuaded that the general disposition is to obedience, however a few unruly spirits or unthinking men may have expressed different sentiments. We conclude in recommending, in the warmest manner, that you exert yourself in bringing the troops to a proper disposition on the subject in question ; that you discourage in future those occasional reports of riches and treasure found by the Vizier, which are generally founded on idle rumour and the cupidity of self- interest of individuals, and which can only tend to mislead the soldier into hopes which can never be realised, and instil notions into him very incompatible with his duty and profession V 1 British Museum MSS. ; Gleig, vol. i. p. 421 and 427. 8 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. XII.] DISCONTENT OF THE TROOPS. 161 The anxiety of Hastings was soon increased, for, on the 2nd June, Middleton sent to him privately a letter report- ing the ■ alarming situation of affairs/ and the ' unhappy misunderstanding which had for a considerable time sub- sisted between the Vizier and the Commander-in-Chief/ and which had commenced in the earlier part of the cam- paign. * During the general confusion/ he wrote, 'which succeeded the defeat of the Rohillas, it unfortunately happened that some of the Nabob's officers or dependents, as they themselves asserted, were plundered by the English sepoys, and on a complaint to His Excel- lency a representation was made to the Commander-in-Chief, who caused a strict inquiry and search to be made through the different corps in the brigade, but without being able to fix on the persons who had committed the outrage or discover the unlawful plunder V The next cause of discontent, Middleton said, was the action taken by Colonel Champion at Pilibhit, ' since which period a want of cordiality and mutual confidence has become daily more observable. Every day produces the warmest remonstrances from the Nabob on subjects which, but for the unhappy misunderstanding which has occurred, could never have claimed a moment's reflection.' A few days later Middleton returned to the same subject, and said that the Vizier complained of the conduct of the English sepoys towards the people of the villages \ On the 3rd July, Colonel Champion reported that he had carried out the orders sent to him on the 3rd June. ' I assembled,' he wrote, ' the second in command, and all the other field officers yesterday morning, and communicated to them the orders of the Administration regarding the claim of this division of the army to a share of the riches acquired by the Vizier in consequence of the battle of St. George. The gentlemen unanimously requested of me to assure Government that they will ever prove obedient soldiers, and of course continue to impress the officers and soldiers under their com- mand with a due sense of good order and subordination, but they also desired it might be respectfully intimated that they hope to be excused if they cannot acquiesce in the opinion which has been delivered regarding the rights and customs of war 2 .' 1 Private letters, British Museum despatch from Colonel Champion is MSS. 29,134. a characteristic example of his style. 2 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. This It begins as follows: ' I have to tes- M 162 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. Colonel Champion did not again urge officially these claims to a share of plunder, but the discontent of the troops continued, and became a cause of increasing anxiety to Hastings. On the 4th August he wrote to Middleton in the following terms : — 1 1 have received very alarming reports of the disposition of the troops in the field. Though they have not come to me from authority, yet the nature of the intelligence, and the manner in which it has been communicated to me, compel me to pay attention to it. A spirit of sedition must be visible to every eye, and therefore I desire you will inform me, if you have reason to believe that such a spirit does pre- vail, as the measures which may be taken after the conclusion of the rains ought to be formed accordingly. I am told that the whole army are disappointed, and loudly complain that they are denied a share in the plunder of the country, that they are discontented with the service and violently disaffected towards the Vizier. Inform me of such par- ticulars as have come to your knowledge, or which you can obtain upon this subject. Write to me fully, plainly, and without reserve. I write this in confidence, and desire that you will not communicate the contents of it to any one. You need not be apprehensive about what you may write to me in reply ; the subject is too delicate on my side, and too dangerous on yours, to be communicated without the last necessity V Shuja-ud-daula's alarm at the dissatisfaction of the English troops was as great as that of Hastings, and in the hope of appeasing it he determined to give to them a large donation of money. On the 7th August, Middleton sent to Hastings the following report : — ' I fear he considers an immediate declaration of his intentions the surest and probably the only expedient left him to regain the attach- tify real concern that any part of my vantages ; therefore I must think for letter appeared to carry so great a myself, must write for myself; this degree of warmth ; and it gives me I can say, however, that if there has still more pain that it should be con- been warmth, it has not been of argu- sidered to convey a reflection, and ment ; excuse me, then, gentlemen, to even to impart an impeachment of ad- the Board, if I, who am myself a ministration. When gentlemen prac- soldier, in endeavouring to express tised in thinking are assembled to my ideas of the merits and eminent deliberate, the order, the unreserve of services of my followers, have not one or more, if such there should been able to divest my language of happen to be among them, will be the glow natural to the perception tempered by the equanimity, the cir- of the mind on such occasions.' cumspection, and political knowledge x Private letter, British Museum and experience of their colleagues. MSS. 29,117. An individual cannot have these ad- XII.] DISCONTENT OF THE TROOPS. 163 ment and good will of our troops, for the vein of dissatisfaction and disgust which in general runs through the brigade is too perceptible to have escaped his notice, and I doubt many have been imprudent enough to declare with too much freedom sentiments which, at least, ought to have been concealed from him. I acquainted the Nabob I should without delay address you on this subject, and hoped he would take no further steps until I could be furnished with your instructions. If, however, as I own I am too much inclined to suspect, this act of generosity proceeds more from the dictates of prudence and Hindostan policy than a real sense of gratitude, I am apprehensive my advice will have little weight. Nevertheless, I consider it my duty to oppose the measure until it has received the sanction of your authority V On the following day, the 8th August 2 , Colonel Cham- pion reported to Hastings that he had received a letter from the Vizier stating his intention of giving a gratuity of seven lakhs of rupees to the troops, and on their behalf he asked permission to accept it. The Vizier afterwards proposed to present three lakhs of rupees to Colonel Champion and 50,000 rupees to the officers, but of this Colonel Cham- pion said nothing until the following December, when he returned to Calcutta, after the new Government had come into power. He then stated that he had refused to take the money 'because, when the note was sent to me, I had in my own mind determined to add it to the general fund ; it was my resolution to convince my followers and companions in the field that I only desired to share with them in the advantages as I had done in the honours of the war, and I can with great truth assure you, gentlemen, that I perceive much more pleasure and self-approbation in throwing these three lakhs into the common fund, and taking my chance of drawing a proportion, than I should have had in receiving ten times the sum in any other manner V 1 Private letter, British Museum p. 175. No explanation of Colonel MSS. 29,135. Champion's long silence regarding the 2 Fifth Report, App. No. 27 ; For- Vizier's present to himself and the rest's Selections, vol. i. p. III. officers appears to have been given; 3 Letter dated 13th December, 1774, but I do not suggest that he had Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 158. any unworthy motives. He was pri- See also Minute by Clavering, Mon- vately accused by Francis of having son, and Francis, nth January, 1775, been induced, by a large bribe from para. 65, Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Faizullah Khan, to protect the Ro- and Colonel Champion's evidence, hillas, and of having taken an im- 28th December, 1774, India Office mense fortune to England; but un- Records ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. supported statements of this kind M 2 1 64 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. Colonel Champion's letter announcing the Vizier's donation to the troops reached Hastings at the end of August and increased his anxiety. On the 27th of August he wrote personally to the Vizier, and begged him to post- pone his gift at least until the war was over. ' Although,' he said, ' I am well persuaded that your Excellency has been impelled by motives of pure generosity and a just sense of merit, it will not have that appearance with the world, but it will be believed that it was the effect of an unbecoming requisition on the part of the army, and given to appease their discontent V On the same day he wrote to Middleton. He said that if the claim of the troops had not been made in so clamorous a manner and urged as a right, he would have been ready, after the conclusion of the war, to suggest to the Vizier the propriety of giving them a donation for their services ; but that after what had oc- curred, and while the campaign was still in progress, he could not sanction the proposal that had been made. 1 To do so,' he said, ' would have the appearance of reproach, and imply that their duty required a mercenary incitement, and that the Vizier's bounty could only be extorted from him by intimidation. I cannot, therefore, give my consent to the proposed donation, whatever the Vizier's motive may be, and I desire that you will in my name dissuade him from it, and even insist on his postponing his intention till it can be executed at such a time and under such circumstances as may admit of its taking place with credit to the army, and appear with a good grace in him. While the troops are in action or while they manifest in any manner their discontent with the service or dissatis- faction to him, it will be indignity in him to offer so unseasonable a gift, and it will afford a precedent of the most dangerous kind for enacting similar largesses hereafter by the like violent means V Before the wishes of Hastings were made known to the Vizier, he had already given to Colonel Champion an obli- made by Francis deserve no credence. had undergone in the course of the In his letter of the 1 3th December, war.' Forrest's Selections, vol. fc Colonel Champion wrote as follows: p. 158. • It is certain that in offering that 1 Letter to the Vizier, British Mu- money the Vizier had in view the seum MSS. 29,135. satisfying the Company's troops for 2 Private letter, British Museum their share of plunder, as well as the MSS. 29,117. gratifying them for the hardships they XII.] DISCONTENT OF THE TROOPS. 165 gation for the payment of the money in six months. The Government refused to discuss the subject further, and in- formed Colonel Champion that they were precluded from doing so by the prohibition of Parliament, contained in the Regulating Act 13 (Geo. III.), under which no servants of the Company, civil or military, were allowed to receive any presents upon any pretence whatever \ About the 23nd September, Hastings received from Middleton a letter containing still more alarming ac- counts. ' I have, 5 he wrote, ' in my former addresses intimated to you in general terms the disposition of this brigade towards the Vizier, so far as it became my duty from His Excellency's repeated instances, but the subject was too delicate for me to enlarge upon unless enjoined by your commands. Believe me, sir, I now enter upon the task with the utmost diffidence, but your orders are peremptory, and my obedience shall be implicit. I find myself under the disagreeable necessity of confirming by my concurrent report the alarming reports which have been conveyed to you regarding the troops in the field. A general dissatisfaction does most certainly prevail, and has been carried great lengths in public discourse. It seems to have com- menced soon after our engagement with the Rohillas, when the troops found themselves deprived of a share of the plunder taken in the enemy's camp, and without any hopes of an equivalent from the Nabob. Murmurs and complaints were heard in different quarters of the camp, but were less violent and unrestrained than they have since broke out ; for while the result of the public representation from the Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the army remained in suspense, the troops were buoyed up with expectation of a favourable decision upon their claim, and their discontent was manifested only in exclamation and severe reflections upon the Nabob; but a more general and alarming spirit of disaffection visibly succeeded the publication of the honourable Board's sentiments upon the appeal made to them. It has been confidently affirmed that the judgment of the Council in this in- stance is erroneous, that no authority whatever can withhold from the troops privileges and prerogatives which the customs and usage of war have established, and which are invariably observed in His Majesty's service, and that the laws of England would decree to the troops a proportion of the advantages, whatever they may be, which the Company may derive from their services in the present expedition. An appeal from the decision of the Board is, I believe, actually resolved upon, and an address to the Supreme Council, intended to be 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. 166 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. subscribed by the superior officers of the brigade, has, I am informed, been handed about for approbation. What has been the reception it has met with, or who is the author, I cannot take upon me to deter- mine, but that such letter has been circulated to the commanding officers of the different corps seems not to admit of a doubt. The plunder of Faizullah Khan's camp has been the topic of public dis- cussion in the lines ever since our march from Bisauli, and the officers as well as men have made no secret of their determination to avail themselves of any temptations which may fall in their way, without submitting their right to the decision of a future decree. In justice, however, to many gentlemen, who, I am convinced, are better dis- posed, it is incumbent upon me to assure you this licentious spirit does not prevail without exception, but I have too much reason to believe the majority of the brigade have imbibed it, and should an action at last decide the contest with Faizullah Khan, I fear the event will prove a full confirmation of what I have asserted. The Nabob seems aware of the consequences to be apprehended. Colonel Cham- pion has indeed intimated them to him, and this possibly may be one cause of that strong inclination which His Excellency has latterly shown to compromise matters with Faizullah Khan. Should an accommodation take place, and the gratuity which the troops have been acquainted they are to receive from the Nabob be regularly paid, I apprehend it will go far towards removing the present discontent, but if any circumstances occur to render the latter doubtful, which, from the situation of His Excellency's affairs and his disposition, seems an event within the bounds of probability, it is the opinion of everyone I have ever conversed with on the subject, as well as my own, that the most serious consequences may be expected to ensue. The above, sir, may I think be depended upon as a faithful and' impartial representation of the disposition of the army, to which I shall only add that the Nabob, fully apprized of the disaffection of the troops towards him, has frequently intimated to me his earnest wishes that this brigade might as soon as possible be relieved, and has urged me in the strongest terms to address you on the subject. If I have paid too little regard to these entreaties, I flatter myself, sir, you will attribute it to a diffidence, arising from the nature of the subject, not irreconcilable with the delicacy of my situation. In obedience to your commands, I shall in future make the occurrences of the army an object of my notice, and shall not fail to communicate to you every particular coming within my knowledge which may in any degree affect the service V When he received this letter, Hastings resolved to send to the camp in Rohilkhand an officer whom he could trust, with instructions to ascertain everything of import- 1 Private letter, dated 3rd September, 1774, British Museum MSS. 29,135. XII.] DISCONTENT OF THE TROOPS. 167 ance, and endeavour to reconcile the dissensions between the English army and the Vizier. Colonel Macleane, the Commissary-General, was chosen for this duty. He was sent under the personal orders of Hastings ; no in- formation regarding his mission was communicated to the Council, and the matter was one that required such delicate handling that every precaution was taken to secure absolute secrecy. It was given out that it was necessary for the Commissary-General to make personal inquiries in regard to the supplies that would be required for the army in case the war should be prolonged. No notice of the real objects of Colonel Macleane's deputation is to be found in any official papers, and the only person whom Hastings took into his confidence appears to have been Middleton, who was privately told by him, on the 27th September, that he would learn from Colonel Macleane ' his private sentiments on some points of very great consequence.' On the same day he wrote to Colonel Macleane, who had already left Calcutta, and enclosed a letter addressed to Colonel Champion explaining the duty with which Colonel Mac- leane had been entrusted. ' From the disposition/ he wrote, 'which you perceive him to bear towards me or towards yourself, I leave it to your discretion to deliver or suppress my letter V Colonel Macleane travelled with the greatest possible speed, but he did not reach the camp in Rohlkhhand until the 12th October. The treaty of peace had been signed a few days before, and the state of affairs was far from satisfactory. When the attack on Faizullah Khan's position was believed to be imminent, Colonel Champion had thought it necessary, in spite of the orders that he had received, to pacify the troops by holding out hopes that 1 Private letters, British Museum majority in the Council, that Colonel MSS. 29,117. It is clear from some Macleane did not think it expedient remarks contained in Colonel Cham- to deliver the letter, for Colonel pion's 'Refutation of the Vizier's Champion was evidently, when he Charges/ sent by him to the Govern- wrote, in complete ignorance of the ment in January 1775, when Hast- objects for which Col. Macleane had ings was contending with the hostile been sent. 1 68 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. they would be allowed compensation for the share of plunder to which they considered themselves entitled. The following account of their behaviour on the 28th September, and of his own proceedings, was given by Colonel Champion himself after the war was over : — 'Well assured of the great advantage the enemy had in the strength of their situation, sensible that nothing but the strictest observance of good order could ensure our success, and having reason to be sus- picious lest the troops, mindful of past neglects, should suffer their discontent to get the better of their moderation, and impel them to disperse in search of plunder, I assembled the field officers at head quarters. Some proposed to stipulate with His Excellency for twenty, some for fifteen, and the most moderate for ten lakhs, in lieu of plunder, and that the troops should be acquainted of it before the attack. I told the gentlemen, that if His Excellency should offer five lakhs, I thought it would be advisable to accept of them, both on account of the imminent danger which would ensue from any disorder of the troops, and the small probability of discovering the riches of a people accustomed to bury their treasure, declaring, however, my wishes that the Vizier might offer a larger sum. The gentlemen, satisfied of my good inclination, said no more on the subject. . . . Mention being made to His Excellency of the plunder, he observed that he had certain intelligence where the riches of the enemy lay buried, that he knew the English could never discover the treasure, and therefore he would not give them one cowrie ; a circumstance which I thought it prudent to conceal carefully from the knowledge of the troops 1 .' On the 1 2th October, Colonel Macleane reported to Hastings that he had arrived just in time to prevent ' a deputation of the captains to Colonel Champion to demand whether any notice has been taken of the army in the treaty with Faizullah Khan, as they were ready to storm the place before the treaty took place.' On the 16th October he wrote again at greater length. He said that although the state of affairs was very unsatisfactory there was no danger of anything like actual mutiny. 1 When,' he wrote, ' matters ran highest, there were not three men of any consideration who would not have shuddered at the very thought of mutiny. Indecent clamour, I am sorry to say, not only prevailed but was encouraged, but the more clamorous the authors of it were, 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 232. XII.] DISCONTENT OF THE TROOPS. 169 the more necessary they found it, in points of service, to behave well and obediently. I flatter myself that I am in the right track to succeed in that part of my commission which relates to the army. I do not mean, however, that matters can possibly be now brought to the very point you could wish, but I have reason to believe they will be so moderated as to give you very little uneasiness. In my letter of the 12th instant I mentioned that a remonstrance of a dis- agreeable nature would, I was apprehensive, be signed by all the captains relative to the late treaty with Faizullah Khan. The ferment ran very high, particularly against the Commander-in-Chief, who has lost all credit and weight with the army, and I was for two days very uneasy lest some unruly spirit should prevail over the more moderate. It was very necessary for me to act vigorously and without delay, but it was also very necessary to conceal that I had any particular induce- ment to do so, and to make it appear that the business of my depart- ment only had drawn me to camp. The first step I took was to see Mr. Middleton, to whom I opened myself confidentially, though he had not yet received any letter relative to me from you. I gave him the first intimation of what was going on, and we took our measures in concert. The thing we desired was to bring the army back to that point from which they ought never to have departed, an appeal to you, and a reliance on your justice in every circumstance of their real or supposed grievances, and our endeavours, I may venture to say, will be crowned with success V On the 36th October, Colonel Macleane sent another report to Hastings. He had taken into his confidence three of the superior officers who were his personal friends and whom he could trust, and with their help he appears to have been able to bring influence to bear upon the troops. He informed Hastings that several modes of proceeding had been advocated in the camp, but that at last it had been agreed that an address should be sent to Hastings himself, ' submitting respectfully to his determination and craving protection and good offices for the army,' and this was to be signed by the field officers only, 'not in the tumultuous way of all the captains as they had intended.' This address was taken by the officers to Colonel Champion, who at first approved it and said that he would gladly send it to Hastings, but he afterwards objected to the form in which it was written and wished it to be altered. This 1 Private letter, British Museum MSS. 29,135. 170 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. proposal of the Commander-in-Chief was met by the officers ' with an absolute refusal,' ' a proof/ Colonel Mac- leane said, ' of the very little weight which he now has with the army, as he had not a friend to acquaint him pre- viously of a thing known to every captain and subaltern almost under his command.' Two private letters from officers of the army illustrate the feeling towards Colonel Champion, which at this time prevailed. ' The man,' one of them wrote to Colonel Macleane, 'has now dis- covered himself, and must be execrated by us ; but I entreat your kind interposition to ward off any sinister scheme he may practice against us, as I am now con- fident he can be guilty of any meanness.' As the officers would not consent to alter the address, they sent it to Middleton with a request that he would forward it. It was sent to Hastings on the 28th October with a letter under the joint signatures of Middleton and Macleane 1 . It did not reach him until after the arrival in Calcutta of Clavering, Monson, and Francis. He then laid it before the Council, with a recommendation that the matter should be referred to the Court of Directors for orders, and that meanwhile the money offered by the Vizier should be placed in deposit. This course was adopted 2 . When Colonel Champion returned to Calcutta on the termination of the war, he renewed his complaint of the refusal to allow the troops a share of the booty acquired by Shuja-ud-daula. 1 This remarkable complaisance to the Vizier was,' he said, ' inex- plicable.' ' As we are now on the subject of plunder, permit me to offer my attachment to the army in apology for begging of you to attend to it a little farther. According to the letter and to the meaning of my instructions, I had authority to proceed to the conquest of the Rohilla country, if the Vizier required it, with the Company's troops only. Supposing then, gentlemen, that the Nabob had found himself sufficiently engaged in the Dodb, and that I had effected the Rohilla conquest, can it be alleged that the Company's troops would have 1 Private letters, British Museum 1774, India Office Records ; and letter MSS. 29,135. to Court of Directors 4th January, a Consultations, 19th December, 1775, Fifth Report, App. No. 45. XII.] DISCONTENT OF THE TROOPS. 171 taken charge of the riches found in the forts and cities merely on account of the Vizier, and that they must afterwards have delivered them over to His Excellency? Impossible ! And it follows, of course, that his being present could only entitle him to a proportion. I submit, therefore, whether the giving up of the rights of the army was not in effect sacrificing the interest of the nation, inasmuch as the riches of the individuals contribute to the support of the state V It is not possible to give any opinion regarding the value of the treasure and property of Hafiz Rahmat and other chiefs which fell into the possession of the Vizier, or re- garding the amount which he obtained from the plunder of the country. Colonel Champion supposed that he had gained altogether as much as a crore and a half of rupees. Middleton thought that the sum might, perhaps, be about half that amount, and in a private letter to Hastings, he wrote as follows : — ' His Excellency has been apprized of the immense plunder which the public have accorded to his conquest, and has repeatedly observed to me in the course of conversation that he is willing to relinquish the whole for an acquittance of the stipulation [of forty lakhs] which he is bound to pay the Honourable Company on the dismission of the brigade. . . . If to the immense charge of supporting this, the Vizier's army, we add the expense 1 'Refutation of the Vizier's Charges/ sider the propriety of applying for Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's a special Act to authorise it. On the Selections, vol. i. p. 219. I believe that 25th March, 1777, the Bengal Go- this account of the discontent in the vernment reported to the Court that army and of the anxiety of Hastings they had received another address is the first that has been published, from the army, and asked for orders, and the wish of Hastings, that the Correspondence between England and reasons for Colonel Macleane's mis- India continued, and at last, on the sion might remain unknown, would 14th March, 1786, the Court autho- have been fulfilled, but for the existence rized the payment of the money 'to in the British Museum of the secret the several claimants or their legal correspondence on the subject. Mr. representatives.' Unclaimed shares, F. C. Danvers has been good enough it was said, might be given to the to trace for me in the India Office Orphan Military Funds, 'if it may Records the subsequent history of the be done with propriety.' It was not Vizier's gift. On the 15th December, until August 1787, nearly thirteen 1775, the Court of Directors wrote years after the conclusion of the war, that the existing Act of Parliament that the claims appear to have been rendered the acceptance of the money finally settled, impossible, but that they would con- I J 2 THE ROHILLA WAR. of his civil establishment and the subsidy to our troops, it will appear evident that the wealth he has accumulated, although it should exceed my estimate, has not been equivalent to his disbursements in the field V 1 Private letter, nth July, 1774, British Museum MSS. 29,135. CHAPTER XIII. THE 'EXTERMINATION' OF THE ROHILLAS. The atrocities said to have been committed in the Rohilla war. — The charges of Burke. — Macaulay's version of the story. — Mill on the extermi- nation of the Rohillas. — Mr. John Morley. — Mill's statements altogether false. — Origin of the charge. — The Persian correspondence between the Vizier and Hastings. — Explanations given by Hastings in refutation of the charge. — British Museum MSS. — Paper by the Persian Interpreter. — The charge abso- lutely unfounded. — The evidence of Colonel Champion, Middleton, and other officers. — No Rohillas killed except in battle. Honourable termination of the war. — Treatment of the Rohilla soldiers. T N order that nothing may be wanting in my description of the indictment brought against Hastings on account of the atrocities said to have been committed in the Rohilla war, I shall make some quotations from the charges of his chief accusers. The first is taken from the speech delivered by Burke on Fox's East India Bill : — * The next sale was that of the whole nation of the Rohillas, which the great salesman, without a pretence of quarrel, and contrary to his own declared sense of duty and rectitude, sold to the same Shuja-ud- daula. He sold the people to utter extirpation for ,£400,000. Faith- fully was the bargain performed on our side. Haflz Rahmat, the most eminent of their chiefs, one of the bravest men of his time, and as famous throughout the East for the elegance of his poetical compositions (by which he supported the name of Hafiz), as for his courage, was invaded with an army of an hundred thousand men and an English brigade. This man at the head of inferior forces was slain valiantly fighting for his country. His head was cut off and delivered for money to a barbarian. His wife and children, persons of that rank, were seen begging a handful of rice through the English camp. The whole nation, with inconsiderable exceptions, was slaughtered or banished. The country was laid waste with fire and sword, and that land, dis- tinguished above most others by the cheerful face of paternal govern- ment and protected labour, the chosen seat of cultivation and plenty, 174 THE R0H1LLA WAR. [Ch. is now almost throughout a dreary desert, covered with rushes and briars and jungles full of wild beasts. The British officer who com- manded in the delivery of the people thus sold felt some compunction at his employment. He represented the enormous excesses to the President of Bengal, for which he received a severe reprimand from the civil governor, and I much doubt whether the breach caused by the conflict between the compassion of the military and the firmness of the civil governor be closed at this hour V My next quotations are made from the First Article of Charge presented by Burke to the House of Commons on the 4th April, 1786:— 'That the said Warren Hastings . . . did, in September 1773, enter into a private engagement with the said Nabob of Oudh ... to furnish him for a stipulated sum of money, to be paid to the East India Company, with a body of troops, for the declared purpose of thoroughly extirpating the nation of the Rohillas. . . . That the said Nabob of Oudh did, in consequence of the said agreement, and with the assistance of British troops, which were ordered to march, and sub- jected to his disposal by the said Warren Hastings and the Council, unjustly enter into and invade the country of the Rohillas, and did there make war in a barbarous and inhuman manner, by an abuse of victory ; by the unnecessary destruction of the country ; by a wanton display of violence and oppression, of inhumanity, and cruelty; and by the sudden expulsion and casting down of a whole race of people, to whom the slightest benevolence was denied. When prayer was made not to dishonour the Begum (a princess of great rank whose husband had been killed in battle) and other women, by dragging them about the country, to be loaded with the scoffs of the Nabob's rabble, and other- wise still worse used, the Nabob refused to listen to the entreaties of a British Commander-in-Chief in their favour, and the said women of high rank were exposed not only to the vilest personal indignities, but even to absolute want ; and these transactions being by Colonel Champion communicated to the said Warren Hastings, instead of commendations for his intelligence, and orders to redress the said evils, and to prevent the like in future, by means which were suggested, and which appear to have been proper and feasible, he received a reprimand from the said Warren Hastings, who declared that we had no authority to control the conduct of the Vizier in the treatment of his subjects : And that Colonel Champion desisted from making further representations on the subject to the said Warren Hastings, being apprehensive of having already run some risk of displeasing, by perhaps a too free communication of sentiments. — That in consequence of the said proceedings, not only the eminent families of the chiefs of 1 Speech, December 1st, 1783. XIII.] 'EXTERMINATION' OF THE ROHILLAS. 175 the Rohilla nation were either cut off or banished, and their wives and offspring reduced to utter ruin, but the country itself, heretofore distinguished above all others for the extent of its cultivation as a garden, not having one spot in it of uncultivated ground, and from being in the most flourishing state that a country could be, was, by the inhuman mode of carrying on the war, and the ill government during the consequent usurpation, reduced to a state of great decay and depopulation, in which it still remains V The contrast is curious between this clumsy invective and Macaulay's version of the story : ' Then the horrors of Indian war were let loose on the fair valleys and cities of Rohilcund. The whole country was in a blaze. More than a hundred thousand people fled from their homes to pestilential jungles, preferring famine, and fever, and the haunts of tigers, to the tyranny of him, to whom an English and a Christian government had, for shameful lucre, sold their substance, and their blood, and the honour of their wives and daughters. Colonel Champion remon- strated with the Nabob Vizier, and sent strong representations to Fort William ; but the Governor had made no conditions as to the mode in which the war was to be carried on. He had troubled him- self about nothing but his forty lacs ; and although he might dis- approve of Sujah-Dowla's wanton barbarity, he did not think himself entitled to interfere except by offering advice. This delicacy excites the admiration of the biographer. " Mr. Hastings," he says, " could not himself dictate to the Nabob, nor permit the commander of the Company's troops to dictate how the war was to be carried on." No, to be sure. Mr. Hastings had only to put down by main force the brave struggles of innocent men fighting for their liberty. Their military resistance crushed, his duties ended ; and he had then only to fold his arms and look on while their villages were burned, their children butchered, and their women violated 2 .' 1 After these quotations from Burke It is conjectured that above 500,000 it is needless to give others from the industrious husbandmen and artists, speeches of less famous men, or from who were also, for the most part, the numerous pamphlets of that time. able warriors, together with their Many of the latter were, as Hastings families, were deliberately driven said in his Defence before the House openly across the Jumna to receive of Commons, • filled with the most an asylum from their late enemies and scandalous and libellous abuse to in- plunderers, the Marathas. The Ro- fluence the prejudices of the public.' hilla provinces are now a barren The following is a specimen of some waste, almost totally deserted by of the accounts of the Rohilla war : their remaining inhabitants.' Tract 'The fatal battle was fought which No. 132, India Office Library, iniquitously decided the melancholy 2 It seems to me probable that Mac- fate of the brave, industrious, popu- aulay, although he placed the name lous, and inoffensive Rohilla nation. of ■ Gleig's Memoirs of the Life of 176 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. I have quoted this passage from Macaulay's essay, be- cause many thousands of Englishmen have long believed that it describes faithfully one of the most abominable crimes recorded in the history of their country. Although I know that it contains hardly a line that is true, I do not propose to criticize it. I yield to no one in respect for Macaulay or in recognition of his services to India, and I feel that while he was misled, it is not Macaulay that we should chiefly blame. I do not doubt that he accepted the statements of Burke and Mill without independent enquiry, that he as- sumed, as a matter of course, that they were true, and that no suspicion crossed his mind that the testimony which he trusted was worthless. Leaving the domain of invective and rhetoric, I come now to the sober facts of history. Mill has professed to give them, and to give also the authorities by which they are supported *, 1 Though Faizullah Khan,' he tells us, ' with his treasures and the remains of the army, had made good his flight toward the mountains, the whole country lay at the mercy of the Vizier, and never probably were the rights of conquest more savagely abused. Not only was the ferocity of Indian depredation let loose upon the wretched inhabitants, but as the intention of the Vizier, according to what he had previously and repeatedly declared to the English government, was to exter- minate the Rohillas, every one who bore the name of Rohilla was either butchered, or found his safety in flight and exile.' A note is appended by Mill to this passage : — ' " The inhumanity and dishonour," says Colonel Champion, in his letter of June 12th, 1774, "with which the late proprietors of this country and their families have been used, is known all over these parts ; a relation of them would swell this letter to an immense size. I could not help compassionating such unparalleled misery ; and my Warren Hastings' at the head of his * It is not worth while to give ex- essay, had never read the book, for tracts from the Minutes and letters if he had done so he would hardly in which Hastings and the Vizier were have written this. Gleig had printed denounced in unmeasured language some of the letters of Hastings, which by Francis and his colleagues after showed how entirely false these charges the new government had been estab- were, but it is difficult to blame any lished in Calcutta. The bitter hatred one who finds it impossible to wade of Francis afterwards found full ex- through that most tedious and confused pression in the speeches and charges and unsatisfactory of biographies. of Burke. XIII.] MILL'S STATEMENTS. 177 requests to the Vizier to show lenity were frequent, but as fruitless as were those advices which I almost hourly gave him regarding the destruction of the villages, with respect to which I am now constrained to declare that although he always promised as fairly as I could wish, yet he did not observe one of his promises, nor cease to overspread the country with flames, till three days after the fate of Hafiz Rahmat was decided." In another letter he says, " Above a lakh of people have deserted their abodes in consequence of the defeat of Hafiz." Fifth Report, App. No. 27. In another, " The whole army were wit- nesses of scenes that cannot be described." That the President was perfectly aware of the designs of the Vizier, before his engagement to assist in them, sufficiently appears from his own letter to that chief, dated the 22nd of April, 1773: — " I have received," says he, "your Ex- cellency's letter, mentioning . . . that, should the Rohillas be guilty of a breach of their agreement [viz. : about the forty lakhs], we will thoroughly exterminate them, and settle your Excellency in the country ; you will in that case pay the Company fifty lakhs of rupees, and exempt them from the King's tribute." Ibid. App. No. 21. In the Nabob's own letter to the President, of the 18th November, 1773, he says, " During an interview at Benares, it was agreed that I should pay, &c. . . . and that I should, with the assistance of the English forces, endeavour to punish and exterminate the Rohillas out of their country'' Ibid. App. No. 22. Mr. Hastings only admits the atrocities in part, and then defends them in a curious manner ; that is to say, not only by the example of Indian barbarity in general, but by the example of British barbarity on the subjects of the Vizier. w I believe it to be a truth," says he, " that he [the Vizier] began by sending de- tachments to plunder. This I pronounce to have been both barbarous and impolitic. But too much justified by the practice of war estab- lished among all nations of the East ; and I am sorry to add by our own ; in an instance (which the Vizier has a right to quote in vindica- tion of the charges against him) of a detachment employed in the war in which we were engaged with him in the year 1764, to burn and ravage his country." He then quotes a letter from Major Champion, who commanded the detachment, which says, " Two separate parties have been sent into the enemy's country, the one of which was as high up as Buxar, and (according to the directions given me) there are destroyed upwards of a thousand villages. Had not the rains, &c, prevented, we should have done very considerable more damage." Minute of the Governor-General dated loth January, 1775, m tne Fifth Report ut supra, App. No. 45 V If this be true, I hope we shall all agree with Mr. John Morley when he asks — * Can any Englishman who loves his country, read of this execrable 1 Mill, Book v. chap. 1. The italics are those of Mill. N 178 THE ROHILLA WAR, [Ch. crime, even at this distance, without feeling his ears tingle with shame ? . . . When these atrocities were represented to Hastings, he replied, with incomparable self-possession, that they were usual in Eastern warfare, and what was more, that the English, when at war with this very Nabob of Oude, ten years before, had burnt and ravaged his country in the same way in which he was burning and ravaging the country of the Rohillas. War cannot be made with rose-water, but it will scarcely be pretended that a governor lending his troops for a sum of money to another ruler, who with their indirect aid overruns a whole district with fire and sword, deserves credit for protecting a suffering people against rapacious sovereigns.' Mr. Morley adds a note expressing astonishment at the assurance with which, in his edition of Mill's History, Wilson, ' with Colonel Champion's own words before him on the page,' has called in question the accuracy of Mill's statements \ Mr. Morley was justified in assuming that Mill had quoted correctly the words of Colonel Champion and of Hastings, but they have in both cases been garbled rather than quoted, nor did Hastings ever make any reply to the representations of Colonel Champion at all resembling that which Mr. Morley supposes. Mill has deliberately sup- pressed and perverted the facts. Two questions have to be investigated. What was the nature of the atrocities actually committed during the war, and what was the conduct of Hastings in regard to them ? It will be seen, from the extract that has been given from Mill's History, that he has asserted, on the authority of Hastings himself, not only that the extermination of the Rohillas was part of the original design of Shuja-ud-daula, but that their extermination was agreed to by Hastings when he consented to give the assistance of British troops. Mill has not said a word to show that any different inter- pretation of the intention of Hastings and the Vizier had ever been or could be suggested, or that Hastings himself had repeatedly repudiated the charge, and had declared it to be absolutely without foundation. The correspondence between Hastings and the Vizier 1 Edmund Burke, p. 303. XIII.] 'EXTERMINATION' OF THE ROHILLAS. 179 was carried on in Persian. The original letters have perished or cannot now be discovered, and the words • ex- terminate ' and ' extirpate,' on which the charge was based, are those of the official Interpreter who translated the Persian letters into English. In the translations of the Vizier's letter of the 24th March, 1773, and of the letter re- ceived from him on the 18th November, 1773, the word used is ' exterminate V The word ' extirpate,' more commonly employed in the Charges of Burke and by others, is found in the translation of a letter from the Vizier to Hastings, received on the 28th November, 1774: — 1 Ambassadors came on the part of Faizullah Khan to Colonel Champion, to confer with him concerning an accommodation which the Colonel proposed to me. As I was determined to extirpate the Rohillas, I would not listen to any proposals of peace. Consider, my friend, that it was my absolute determination to extirpate the Rohillas, and that I requested the assistance of the English troops for that purpose.' This passage was quoted by Colonel Champion, on the 30th January, 1775, in his reply to the charges of the Vizier, to which I shall again refer, and it was repeated by Clavering, Monson, and Francis, in a Minute written on the nth January, 1775 : — * In our opinion,' they said, ' it is needless to look for farther evidence of the nature of the Vizier's designs or of the approbation it received from Mr. Hastings. It cannot now be a question, whether from the first he meant to extirpate the Rohillas or not, or whether Mr. Hastings was originally apprized of that design in its full extent V To these remarks by the hostile Majority in the Council, Hastings made the following reply : — ' I am charged with a concealed design, formed in concert with the Vizier, to " extirpate " the Rohillas, and much use is made of this dis- covery, both by the Majority in the letter before me, and by Colonel Champion in his Vindication. The word, in the original language of the letter, which is here translated "extirpate," means to "expel or remove." In another passage of the letter it is joined with a word which does literally mean to u extirpate or root out " ; and both 1 See pp. 80 and 117. 2 Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 192. N 2 i8o THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. passages mean no more than that it was the intention of the Vizier to expel or remove the Rohillas from the country which they occupied, without suffering the smallest vestige of their power to remain in it. In this sense, I most certainly did agree to assist the Vizier, and so did the late President and Council, nor can I conceive how the war could have been undertaken with any other object. The Majority know as well as myself that the Rohillas are not the people of the country, but a military tribe who conquered it, and quartered themselves upon the people without following any profession but that of arms, or mixing in any relation with the native inhabitants. I have already described the nature of this tribe in the ninth paragraph of my observations on the first letter of the Majority, and the same account of them has been given by Colonel Leslie and Major Hannay, and, if I mistake not, by Colonel Champion himself, in their examination before the Board on the 19th and 28th of December. Major Hannay's words are remark- able ; I beg leave to quote them. " I have learned from many people that it is only within fifty years that the Rohillas are become masters of the country to the north of the Ganges. That they were originally Afghans, come into Hindostan under a Sirdar named Daud Khan, and that they conquered that country from the Hindus, and that since that time they have followed no profession than that of arms, and the ancient Hindus have cultivated the country. The Rohillas are Mussul- men, of the sect of Omar, and the cultivators of the country are Hindus. I suppose the proportion to be about nine Hindus to one Mussulman V ' Hastings wrote again in his Defence before the House of Commons, on the 2nd May, 1876: — 1 The " extirpation " consisted in nothing more than in removing from their offices the Rohillas who had the official management of the country, and from the country the soldiers who had opposed us in the conquest of it. Nor was the process a sanguinary or hard one, as they had only to pass the Ganges to their countrymen on the other side of it. In a word, we conquered the country from the conquerors of it, and substituted another rule in the place of theirs, upon the same principle of right and usage (the right of the war being pre-supposed), as a British Commander in Europe would expel the soldiers of a con- quered town, and garrison it with his own, which by the same mode of speech, and with equal propriety, might be called an " extirpation." • I have found among the British Museum Manuscripts some interesting evidence in confirmation of the statement thus made by Warren Hastings. The most important part of this evidence is a paper by the Persian Interpreter, who 1 Letter to the Court of Directors, Records. 5th Report, A pp. No. 45 ; 2 2nd February, 1775, India Office Forrest's Selections, vol. ii. p. 268. XIII.] 'EXTERMINATION" OF THE ROHILLAS. i8l made the original translations of the Vizier's letters. The following is an extract : — i Another material obstacle has been the great stress laid by those who accused Mr. Hastings before the House of Commons upon certain words and expressions made use of in the written documents (I allude particularly to translated papers) which they produced in support of their charges, when perhaps they bore a very different sense in the original papers. Any one who has been accustomed to translate from one language to another must know how difficult it often is to find words which shall exactly express the meaning of the original. Few, therefore, confine themselves to a literal translation, but endeavour to render it in terms as near their conception of its sense as possible, and I believe it rarely happens that two people would give the interpret- ations precisely in the same words. If this is true of European languages, where the idioms and modes of expression bear so great an affinity, how much more must it be with respect to an European and Asiatic language, than which no two things can be more dissimilar. On this point I can speak to a certainty, having so often experienced it during the time I held the office of Persian Interpreter in Calcutta. One particular instance has been the subject of much declamation and drawn much undeserved censure on Mr. Hastings. It is the expression made use of by the Nabob Shuja-ud-daula in his cor- respondence respecting the Rohilla war, which is rendered by the word to "exterminate" or "extirpate." It is the more incumbent on me to explain this, because I am apt to believe that I was the person who first so translated it. I conceive that the Persian word, which is " istesaul" never conveyed the meaning which has been affixed to it in this country, of massacring the whole body of the Rohillas, but merely that of destroying the power of those conquerors or expelling them as a body from the country ; and so it certainly appears to have been understood, for when they were totally reduced by the joint arms of the Vizier and the English, one of the chiefs of that nation, Faizullah Khan, was suffered to remain in possession of a considerable tract of country and keep on foot a large body of troops, whilst the remainder were removed to the other side of the river to their countrymen under the dominion of one of their chiefs named Zabita Khan. The words of the grant dated 7th October, 1774, from the Vizier to Faizullah Khan are : "He shall send the remainder of the Rohillas on the other side of the river." I certainly never understood the Persian word in the sense which has been affixed to it in the Charge, and with regard to the English word into which I rendered it, I might have been justified by the authority of Dr. Johnson, who explains it in one sense "to remove." At any rate I certainly understood the word in this sense, and so applied it, viz. : the total abolition of the power of the Rohillas, and their expulsion from the borders of the country — extra terminos. Hard indeed would be the situation of a person in high office, whose 1 82 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. fortune, fame, and even possibly life itself, were made to depend on the interpretation given to an expression in a foreign language by an interpreter who perhaps in the hurry of business adopted the first word which presented itself to him as similar to his original. I am sure, if this is the case, every Governor ought to be his own translator, and not to trust everything clear to him in the power of another who may either from ignorance, carelessness, or enmity, easily bring down ruin on his head V I have quoted the letter of Hastings, dated the 22nd February, 1775, in which he says that the correct meaning of one of the two words in the Vizier's letter which had been translated by the English term 'extirpate' was ' expel or remove.' The original manuscript draft of this letter is in the British Museum 2 . It was corrected by Hastings, and parts of it are in his own handwriting. Opposite the words ' expel or remove,' the word ' ikhrdj ' is written in the margin, in Persian characters, with the obvious intention of showing that this was the expression used by the Vizier. This marginal note has every ap- pearance of having been written at the same time with the letter itself. One more piece of evidence bearing on this subject may be noticed. In his ■ History of the Rohilla Afghans,' Hamilton, describing the attack made in 1745 on Ali Mohammad, says that ' the Emperor resolved, if possible, to root out the Afghan freebooters and expel them entirely from Katehr,' and he adds, referring to the Persian manu- 1 British Museum MSS. No. 29,225. remember the cruelties which were This paper has no signature or date, said to have been inflicted on the but its author was, I suppose, William • Princesses ' in the Khord Mahal, or Redfearn, who was Persian Interpreter Little Seraglio, and which, if they in 1773. He says : * Two years have were ever exercised at all, were no elapsed since Mr. Hastings was brought more to be imputed to Mr. Hastings to the Bar in Westminster Hall.' The than to the government of this coun- paper must therefore have been written try.' Many of these so-called ' Prin- in 1789. It gives other illustrations cesses' were, he says, women of the of mistakes caused by errors of trans- lowest classes, picked up by Shuja- lation. Thus a petty and dependant ud-daula on his marches, with whom Raja became a • King,' and the Be- no women of rank would hold com* gums of Oudh were all called ' Prin- munication. cesses.' With regard to the latter, a MSS. No. 29,136, vol. v. the Interpreter says : ' Everyone must XIII.] 'EXTERMINATION' OF THE RO HILL AS. 183 script on which his work is founded, 'The term in the original is istisdl, the casual interpretation of which, upon another occasion, into " extirpate " has given rise to great and unfounded clamour ; the true meaning is here exhibited, both in the translation of it, and in the circumstance to which it applies V The facts that have now been stated appear to me to show that one of the expressions translated by ' extirpate ' or ' exterminate ' was certainly ' istisdl,' and that it is highly probable that the other expression which received the same translation was Hkhrdj.' 'Istisdl,' although often used in Persian, is an Arabic word, and Lane, than whom there is no greater authority on Arabic, gives as its signification — uproot, eradicate, extirpate, pull up from its roots or foundation. He gives examples showing that the word is used in two senses, either to remove from its place or to destroy altogether. Wishing to obtain the further judgment of one who could speak on such a subject with indisputable authority, I submitted the statements of Hastings and the Per- sian Interpreter to Dr. C. Rieu, Keeper of the Oriental Manuscripts in the British Museum, with the following inquiry : — Assuming that in the Persian correspondence between the Vizier and Hastings the word ' istisdl' was applied to the Rohillas in the manner that has been stated, does that word necessarily convey the idea ordinarily implied by the English words ' exterminate ' or \ extirpate/ that is, that the whole body of the Rohillas was to be destroyed and utterly swept away ; or, on the other hand, is the explanation of the word ' istisdl ' given by Hastings and the Interpreter admissible; that the intention was merely (in the words of the former) ' to expel or remove the Rohillas from the country which they occupied, without suffering the smallest vestige of their power to remain in it.' Dr. Rieu informed me, in reply, that it is certain that the word l istisdV by no means necessarily implies any 1 Hamilton, p. 60. 184 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. barbarous intention of ' extermination ■ or ' extirpation.' The word, he said, strictly signifies ' uproot,' and it appeared to him that the sense in which it was used by the Vizier and Hastings can now best be interpreted by the manner in which the * uprooting' of the Rohillas was actually carried out. If it be true that, in the words of Mill, ' every one who bore the name of Rohilla was either butchered, or found his safety in flight,' then we may infer that this was the sort of ' uprooting ' that was contemplated. If, on the other hand, it be true, as stated by Hastings, that the 'uprooting' actually 'consisted in removing from their offices the Rohillas who had the official management of the country, and from the country the soldiers who had opposed us in the field,' and that ' the process was not a sanguinary or hard one, as they had only to pass the Ganges to their countrymen on the other side of it,' then we may infer that the word HstisdV was used in the sense which Hastings and the Interpreter declared that it was intended to bear. With regard to the term 'ikhrdjl it would, Dr. Rieu informs me, be correctly rendered by the words of Hastings, ' expel or remove V So much for the use of the words 'exterminate' and 'extirpate.' The question remains whether the Rohillas 1 Dr. Rieu has been good enough His thunder in mid-volley; for to allow me to quote him as my au- he meant thority, and he has thus enabled me Not to destroy, but root them to say that no question remains re- out of heaven.' garding the proper interpretation of It may be added, that the meaning these Persian expressions. In referring which the Persian Interpreter says to the translation of the Vizier's letter that he attached to the word ' exter- received on the 18th November, 1773, minate,' is even now by no means in which the word ' exterminate ' is obsolete. Thus, the Century Die- used, it may be noticed that the term tionary gives, as its first meaning, ' expulsion of the Rohillas ' is three ' to drive out or away, to banish,' times employed ; and it is clear that and quotes the following illustration : this was intended to have the same ' How far in any particular district meaning as ■ extermination.' The fol- the vanquished were slain, how far lowing passage from Milton gives a they were simply driven out, we never good illustration of the sense in which, can tell. It is enough that they were according to Hastings, the word istis&l exterminated, got rid of in one way was used : or another within what now became ' Yet half his strength he put not the English border.' E. A. Freeman, forth, but checked Amer. Lects. p. 133. XIII.] 'EXTERMINATION' OF THE ROHILLAS. 185 were in fact exterminated or extirpated in the sense in which Mill has used the former term. He has made it appear that his statement is supported by the authority of Colonel Champion. I assert, on the other hand, that no single authority, whether of Colonel Champion or of any other person, can be quoted in its support, and that it is disproved by the evidence of Colonel Champion himself. Colonel Champion was examined before the House of Commons on the 3rd of May, 1786. I take from his evidence the following questions and answers bearing on this particular point : — 1 Were the military part of the nation, excepting those who fell in battle, put to death, or only required to cross the Ganges ? I To the best of my remembrance, they were only required to cross the Ganges. 'You have said a considerable number remained in the Rohilla country under Faizullah Khan. Can you inform the House about what number remained ? I I can only answer to the best of my recollection that there might be, including followers, about 45,000 men. 'Do not you mean of the whole nation settled in the Rohilla country ? 1 Those men that were under arms. ' Can you inform the Committee about what number of the Rohillas were required to pass the Ganges ? ' It is impossible for me to ascertain the number, but I suppose about 20,000, followers included. 1 Do you think there were as many fell in battle and slaughtered as passed the Ganges ? I What fell in battle might be about one-eleventh part of what passed the Ganges ; I know nothing of any being slaughtered. 'Whether any of the Rohillas were permitted to remain in the Rohilla country, except those who remained under the government of Faizullah Khan ? I I do not recollect there were. ' Do you understand then that the whole Rohilla nation amounted only to those who remained under Faizullah Khan, those who fell in battle, and the 20,000 who crossed the Ganges ? ' By no means. ' What then became of the residue ? 1 If it is meant of the inhabitants of the country, many and many thousands remained. I thought the question related only to those in 1 86 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. ' Whether any persons were driven across the Ganges except people in arms and the followers of the camp and their families ? 1 1 do not believe there was a man V On the nth May, 1786, Major Balfour, who served under Colonel Champion during the campaign, was examined before the House of Commons. He said that he supposed that 20,000 Rohillas in arms had crossed the Ganges after the treaty with Faizullah Khan, and that the number of followers, women, and children, who went with them might have amounted to as many more ; that they immediately solicited protection from their countryman Zabita Khan, into whose country they had gone, and that many of them afterwards returned to Rohilkhand and lived there un- molested. He supposed that between two and three thousand Rohillas had been killed in battle, and on being asked the question — ' Do you believe that any Rohillas were put to death except those who fell in battle?' he answered, — ' I never heard of one ; I believe there were none.' Middleton, the English Resident with the Vizier during the campaign, was examined before the House of Commons on the 22nd May, 1786. He said that 'he knew of no in- stance of cruelty, in the course of the war upon the Rohillas, either by Shuja-ud-daula or by his orders ; ' that he under- stood the article in the treaty with Faizullah Khan, requiring the Rohillas to leave the country to apply only to the troops under arms and their chiefs ; that they crossed the Ganges into the territory of their countryman, Zabita Khan ; that many of them, although not publicly per- mitted, returned to Rohilkhand and either went to Faizullah Khan or enlisted in the Vizier's army. He was asked whether ' after the Rohilla chiefs had been deprived of the 1 It is difficult to suppose that are hardly intelligible. This may Colonel Champion's evidence was al- perhaps be to some extent explained ways correctly reported. For instance, by the fact that he was in bad health he was asked ' whether the Rohilla when he was examined, with, in his nation consists of Mahometans or own words, ' his memory much weak- Hindoos?' and he replied, 'I believe ened.' they are Hindoos.' Other answers XIII.] 'EXTERMINATION" OF THE RO HILL AS. 187 sovereignty of the country, could any expedient have been thought of for disposing of the Rohilla soldiers, equally safe for the peace of the country and more favourable to them than that of compelling them to cross the Ganges,' and he answered — ' I cannot suggest any.' In reply to the question, ' Have you ever heard whether the Rohilla soldiers were averse to that article of the treaty which compelled them to cross the Ganges,' he said, ' If they had been averse to it, I conceive they had the power of preventing Faizullah Khan from acceding to it.' Enough has been said regarding the general charge that the Rohillas were exterminated, and that 'every one who bore the name of Rohilla was either butchered, or found his safety in flight and in exile.' The whole story is fictitious. There is not a particle of evidence to show that any Rohillas were killed except those who fell in battle. The war ended with a treaty honourable to both parties, under which a considerable part of Rohilkhand was restored to Rohilla dominion, and the Rohilla state thus founded has remained from that day to this in the possession of the Rohilla descendants of Faizullah Khan. The stipulation of the treaty, that men actually under arms should leave Rohilkhand, was perfectly reasonable. It was necessary for the peace of the country, and it involved little hard- ship, for all that happened to the Rohilla soldiers whom it affected was that after a march of a few miles they crossed the Ganges into the territory of Zabita Khan, their own countryman. The facts cannot be summed up more accurately than in the words of Hastings, that have been already quoted : — ' We conquered the country from the conquerors of it, and substituted another rule in the place of theirs, upon the same principle of right and usage (the right of the war being pre-supposed), as a British Commander in Europe would expel the soldiers of a conquered town, and garrison it with his own, which by the same figure of speech, and with equal propriety, might be called an ' extirpation.' CHAPTER XIV. THE CHARGE THAT ATROCITIES WERE COMMITTED AND DEFENDED BY HASTINGS. Colonel Champion's first report of excesses by the Vizier's troops. — The replies of Hastings and of the Government. — Colonel Champion's first report of maltreatment of the families of Rohilla chiefs. — The reply of the Govern- ment. — Further reports from Colonel Champion and letter from Hastings. — Orders sent to Middleton regarding alleged cruelties of Vizier. — Colonel Cham- pion sends further accounts of maltreatment of Hafiz Rahmat's family. — Orders of the Government. — Failure to obtain from Colonel Champion the informa- tion called for. — Hastings again writes to Middleton on the subject. COME now to the charge that atrocious cruelties were committed, and that they were, at least in part, admitted and defended by Hastings. It is of course possible that this charge might be well founded, although the charge of exterminating the Rohillas might be false. Among all the accusations brought against Hastings, and usually believed on the authority of Burke, and Mill, and Macaulay to be true, no accusation has thrown such odium on his character as that which describes the manner in which he received Colonel Champion's reports of the cruelties committed in the war, and in which he excused and defended them. The first reference to any excesses of the troops of the Vizier is contained in a private letter from Hastings, sent in reply to one written by Colonel Champion when the army entered Rohilkhand, and before the defeat of the Rohillas. Colonel Champion's letter is not forthcoming, but it is clear from the reply of Hastings, from the in- structions of the Government, and from other papers, that the Vizier had given orders for the devastation of the CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 189 country, but that the English Commander protested against them and succeeded, after a short time, in stopping their execution. Hastings, in his letter, wrote as follows : — 1 On this occasion I cannot omit to take notice of the sensible and humane counsel which you gave to the Vizier on the orders issued by him for laying waste the Rohilla country, a measure which would have reflected equal dishonour on our arms and reproach on his authority had it been continued. You wisely judged that to effect the conquest of the country it was almost as necessary to conciliate the minds of the people as to defeat the actual rulers V Colonel Champion's despatch announcing the defeat of the Rohillas reached Calcutta on the 9th May ; it said nothing of any atrocities, but Hastings, in the answer of the Government, written on the same day, took the oppor- tunity of referring to the correspondence which had passed between himself and Colonel Champion, and of repeating officially the commendation which he had already given privately to Colonel Champion. ' We are exceedingly happy,' it was said, l to learn from the com- munications which the President has made to us, that you have in the course of the campaign been so attentive to maintain the strictest order and discipline among the troops, and that you from the be- ginning opposed, and at last obtained a stop to be put to the devasta- tion of the Rohilla country by the army of the Vizier ; a mistaken policy altogether incompatible with the design of the war, and re- pugnant to humanity, and we have a sensible pleasure in testifying our entire approbation of your conduct in this respect V The first reference made by Colonel Champion, after the defeat of the Rohillas, to any maltreatment of the people of the country generally, or of individuals, is found in a letter to the Select Committee, from the camp near Bareilly, dated the 4th May, 1774. The greater part of the letter, 1 This letter is printed by Gleig, not wait for Colonel Champion's con- vol. i. p. 420, and there is a MS. copy firmation of the news before congra- of it in the British Museum. The tulating him on the victory. The date, 1 6th May, is evidently a mistake letter from the Vizier arrived on the for 6th May. The letter begins by 6th May. saying that Hastings had, on the 2 Letter to Colonel Champion, morning on which he wrote, received dated 9th May, I774» MS. Records, from the Vizier the news of the defeat India Office ; Forrest's Selections, of the Rohillas, and that he would vol. i. p. 101. 190 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. which is a long one, dealt with other matters, but it con- tained the following sentences : — 1 It is said that Ahmad Khan has given his country, which lies between Dundi Khan's and Zabita Khan's, to the King, and indeed the treatment of the family of Hafiz will perfectly justify the other chiefs in every step they can take to avoid coming under the power of Shuja-ud-daula. This much I am under the necessity of declaring, that I am greatly afraid the Vizier's behaviour to the family of the Nabob Hafiz Rahmat Khan, and to the inhabitants of his country, will render our connection with him reproachful to us, and tend to lessen that reputation of our justice which had heretofore prevailed in these countries V An official reply to this letter was sent by Hastings on the 23rd May. I may here observe that the average length of time in which letters from the camp in Rohilkhand reached Calcutta, a distance of nearly a thousand miles, was about seventeen days, and in the rainy season it was more. Answers to letters were seldom received in much less than six weeks. So far as postal communication was con- cerned, Rohilkhand was then about as far from Calcutta as it is now from London, and this must be remembered in considering the means actually possessed by Hastings of controlling proceedings at the seat of war. 1 In two paragraphs of your letter before us,' he wrote to Colonel Champion, ' you barely mention the Vizier's treatment of the family of Hafiz Rahmat ; but in the last place where you notice it you draw an inference that " it will render our connection with the Vizier reproach- ful to us, and tend to lessen that reputation of our justice which had heretofore prevailed in these countries." Where so serious a con- clusion was to be deduced, we cannot but lament that being withheld from a knowledge of the premises on which it is grounded, should disqualify us from passing a judgment. It has been an invariable maxim in the policy of the Company's government, in the execution of any enterprises which they have undertaken in behalf of their allies, to interpose their protection in favour of the conquered princes, for the security of their lives and honour ; and it will unquestionably be the care and attention of this Administration to adhere to this maxim, which has greatly contributed to the reputation of the British name, and to perform what may be incumbent on them on the present occasion. We desire, therefore, to be immediately advised of the particulars of the treatment which you allude to, that we may judge of 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 103. XIV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 191 the measures proper to be adopted. In the interim, we recommend to you to urge, in your own behalf, and in the name of the Board, such remonstrances to the Vizier, against any rigorous treatment of the Rohilla chiefs and their families as you may think the occasion to require. From the readiness which the Vizier testified in a former instance, to be influenced by your advice and persuasion, we flatter ourselves we may expect the same good fruits from your interposition now V A few days after these orders had been despatched, Hastings received a private letter from Colonel Champion, dated the 10th May, enclosing an official request that he might be allowed to return to Calcutta. * Not only do I wish/ he wrote, ' to get down as soon as possible to put my little affairs in the best order for my return to Europe, but I must be candid enough to unbosom myself to you freely, and confess that the nature of the service, and the terms on which I have been employed, this campaign have been inexpressibly dis- agreeable. The authority given to the Vizier over your army has totally absorbed that degree of consequence due to my station. My hands have been tied up from giving protection or asylum to the miserable. I have been obliged to give a deaf ear to the lamentable cries of the widow and fatherless, and to shut my eyes against a wanton display of violence and oppression, of inhumanity and cruelty. The Company's interest constrained me in public to stifle the workings of my feelings, but I must give them vent in private. Though we had no active part in his base proceedings, yet it is well known that the success of our arms gave him the power of perpetrating these enormities ; and I much fear, that our being even silent spect- ators of such deeds will redound to the dishonour of our nation, and impress all Hindostan with the most unfavourable opinion of our Government. As matters now are, I know of no remedy that would so effectually re-establish our character for justice and clemency as your taking the family of Hafiz under the wings of your mercy and protection, and influencing the Nabob to make provision for them in some degree suitable to their birth. It would affect your sensibility too much were I to descend to particulars ; let it suffice, that the Nabob Mohabbat Khan, the eldest son, and the rest of the family of Hafiz, who are under close confinement (the Begums and other women included), have been driven to the necessity of making private supplications for a little rice and water. I wish, my friend, to leave scenes which none but the merciless Shuja can bear without heart- bleeding pain. Relieve me, therefore, as soon as possible and oblige, yours, &c. V 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. In his official letter, dated 10th 2 Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; For- May, Colonel Champion wrote as rest's Selections, vol. ii. p. 286. follows: 'There is not a single enemy 192 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. A reply to this letter was immediately sent by Hastings. On the 27th May, he wrote to Colonel Champion in the following terms : — 1 1 am extremely sorry that the line which was drawn to separate your authority from the Vizier's has been productive of such grievous consequences as you mention. It never could have been suspected by the Board that their orders to you would have tied up your hands from protecting the miserable, stopped your ears to the cries of the widows and fatherless, or shut your eyes against the wanton display of op- pression and cruelty. I am totally at a loss to distinguish wherein their orders have laid you under any greater restraint than your pre- decessors. No authority which the Board could have given you could be capable of preventing the effects you mention, since they could give you no control over the actions of the Vizier further than the weight and influence of your counsel and advice. The orders under which you at present act leave to the Vizier the power of directing the services to be performed, but leave you master of the means of per- forming them. This clear distinction of your respective powers was formed to prevent all disputes, by removing every subject of doubt. If, in the exercise of his authority, the Vizier is guilty of oppression and other excesses, he alone, as the agent, is culpable of it. You have a right, and it is your duty, to remonstrate against any part of his conduct, which may either dishonour the service or prove prejudical to the common interest, but I protest I do not know what you could do more, or what the whole Board, personally present and invested in arms throughout all these countries, command of the army : — 'I had very so that the service of the campaign early signified to the Governor how is effectually over. After the rivers exceedingly disagreeable I found my shall have swelled, the army will not situation. The unhandsome manner be able to act in the field till the be- in which, I must be pardoned to say, ginning of December; and as the I thought myself treated, on account of situation of my affairs very pressingly the impropriety that had appeared to urges the necessity of my presence at me in reposing a greater trust in the Calcutta, I am to request you will Vizier than in the Company's Com- favour me with your permission to mander-in-Chief, had determined me return to the Presidency, and to com- to return to the Presidency, as soon as mit the charge of the army to Colonel the rivers should have swelled, either Galliez in my absence.' He was told to have matters put upon a more in reply, on the 3rd June, that he was becoming footing or to have taken my permitted to return to Calcutta ' when- leave for England, which in case of ever he thought the circumstances of failure in this particular I had resolved the campaign, as well as his own con- to do even if no successor should arrive.' venience, would allow. Fifth Report, 5th Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's App. No. 27. In his letter written Selections, vol. 1. p. 225. The dis- after his return to Calcutta, on the satisfaction of Colonel Champion with 30th January, 1775, he gave another the position assigned to him has been and in the opinion of Hastings the already noticed. See p. 130. true reason for his wish to leave the XIV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 193 with their full authority, could do more. They could exercise no coercive power over the Vizier without committing a violence equal to any of these we should complain of. The picture you have given of the Vizier's conduct, though general and allusive only, is shocking to humanity; but surely your advice and strenuous remonstrance against acts of oppression and wanton cruelty ought to prove some restraint, and, if not, would be a justification of your conduct. You have afforded the instance, at the commencement of your present operations, when the Vizier put a stop to the ravages of the country at your intercession. I have addressed the Vizier in the strongest terms on the subject of his general conduct, alluded to in your letters. If you will point out any other more effectual remedy to such proceedings, or any addition which could be given to your authority, not liable to the objection of establishing a divided power or an unjust usurpation of his authority, I will gladly agree to it ; but to take the family of Hafiz Rahmat immediately under our protection would furnish him with a just plea to refuse his compliance with the stipulation made for the present service, as it would be in effect to conquer the country for the Company, and not for him. The Vizier would have cause to suspect, and the world would adopt the same belief, that with the person of the hereditary claimant of the country we meant to reserve a right, at some convenient period,, to take possession from him ; and while such an opinion prevailed, neither could he establish government in it, nor remain steady in his confidence and fidelity towards us. On better recollection, I have declined writing to the Vizier myself on this subject, as intimated in the beginning of this paragraph, lest the solicitude I might express on account of the family of Hafiz Rahmat should increase their misfortunes, but I have instructed Mr. Middleton to make the strongest representation on this subject, which will perhaps have a better effect than anything I could say from myself 1 .' On the same day on which this letter was w T ritten, Hast- ings wrote to Middleton, the Resident with the Vizier. ' Colonel Champion,' he said, ' complains of the conduct of the Vizier in suffering, and even ordering his troops to ravage the country, and in his cruel treatment of the family of Hafiz Rahmat. This is a subject on which I cannot write to the Vizier. It might widen the breach between him and the Commander-in-Chief, and probably influence the Nabob to some private revenge on the unhappy remains of Hafiz Rahmat's family. I desire, therefore, that you will take an im- mediate occasion to remonstrate with him against every act of cruelty or wanton violence. The country is his, and the people his subjects. They claim by that relation his tenderest regard and unremitted protection. The family of Hafiz Rahmat have never injured him, but have a claim to his protection in default of that of which he has 1 Private letter, British Museum MSS. 29,117 ; Gleig, vol. i. p. 425. O 194 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. deprived them. Tell him that the English manners are abhorrent of every species of inhumanity and oppression, and enjoin the gentlest treatment of a vanquished enemy. Require and entreat his observance of this principle towards the family of Hafiz. Tell him my instructions to you ; generally, but urgently, enforce the same maxims ; and that no part of his conduct will operate so powerfully in winning the affections of the English as instances of benevolence and feeling for others. If these arguments do not prevail, you may inform him directly that you have my orders to insist upon a proper treatment of the family of Hafiz Rahmat, since in our alliance with him our national character is involved in every act which subjects his own to reproach ; that I shall publicly exculpate this Government from the imputation of as- senting to such a procedure, and shall reserve it as an objection to any future engagements with him when the present service shall have been accomplished V I shall show further on how the instructions of Hastings were carried out, and shall give Middleton's account of the representations made by him to the Vizier. On the 1 8th May, Colonel Champion, in a letter that has already been quoted, referred in angry terms to the plunder of the country, but these statements must be received with caution, because, as I have shown, they were not made on account of the Vizier's inhumanity, but on the ground that no share of the plunder had been given to the British troops. On the 28th May, when Colonel Champion reported to Hastings the proposals made by Faizullah Khan with the object of terminating the war, he wrote as follows : — 'Above a lakh of people have deserted their abodes in consequence of the defeat of Hafiz; they will ever seek an opportunity of returning; sixty or seventy thousand of them, though few in arms, are with Faizullah Khan, in a place surrounded by a jungle and almost in- accessible V 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27; Gleig, hundred thousand people fled from vol. i. p. 438. their homes to pestilential jungles, 2 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. It preferring famine, and fever, and the is interesting to trace the processes haunts of tigers, to the tyranny of of famous artists. These words of him to whom an English and a Colonel Champion were the basis, Christian Government had, for shame- and there is certainly no other, for ful lucre, sold their substance, and the following high sounding sen- their blood, and the honour of their tence of Macaulay : • More than a wives and daughters.' XIV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 195 It is very probable that this was substantially true, but Mill was altogether wrong when he quoted the statement as a proof of the Vizier's cruelty towards the Rohillas. It obviously referred to the Hindu inhabitants of the country, and not to the Rohillas, and, even with respect to the former, Colonel Champion had no intention of making any charge against the Vizier. He mentioned the fact incidentally as an illustration of the difficulties with which the Vizier had to deal. I have already explained that it was the established custom in Rohilkhand for the people, when danger threatened, to go off with their families and their cattle and their valuables, and take refuge in the comparatively safe country within easy reach in the Tarai and forest below the hills. It was the more certain that they would do so in the earlier parts of this campaign, in April and May, because at that season there are no important crops on the ground, and almost all agricultural operations are suspended. On the T2th June, Colonel Champion sent his reply to the letter of the 23 rd May, in which he had been ordered by Hastings to furnish full particulars of the maltreat- ment to which Hafiz Rahmat's family had been sub- jected. He began by stating that one of his objects had been ' to be invested with full authority to effectually prevent the Vizier from perpetrating any enormity, under the shield of our force, that could in any degree redound to the discredit of our reputation.' ' In compliance,' he went on to say, ' with the Board's desire, I am now to mention a very unpleasing subject. The Vizier's treatment of the family of Hafiz Rahmat, &c, the inhumanity and dishonour with which they, Mahibullah Khan, his brother Fatehullah Khan, late pro- prietors of this city and country, and their families have been used is well known over all these parts ; a relation of them would swell this letter to an immense size, and withal prove very disagreeable reading. I send you translations of two letters and copy of the third, which affecting as they are, will convey but a faint idea of the treatment these unhappy people have met with. I could not help compassionating such unparalleled misery, and my requests to the Vizier to show lenity were frequent, but as fruitless as were those advices which I almost hourly gave him regarding the destruction of the villages, with respect to which O % 196 THE ROHILLA WAR, [Ch. I am now constrained to declare, that though he always promised as fairly as I could wish, yet he did not observe one of them, nor cease to overspread the country with flames till three days after the fate of Hafiz Rahmat was decided ; but, gentlemen, "as in all points except- ing such as immediately respect the operations in the field, he is solely empowered to prescribe," the reputation of the British name is in his hands, and the line which has been laid down for me is very clear. The above families have been despatched to Faizabad, that their maltreatment might not be so generally known to us. I have, however, frequent accounts of them, and it will give me the most sensible pleasure that you stretch forth the hand of benevolence effectually to relieve them from so indescribable a misery ; and that you may the better devise the means of so doing, without subjecting them to greater misfortunes, I am to inform you that every appli- cation of mine in their favour, though professedly taken in good part by the Vizier, yet only served to procure them more rigorous treat- ment V The letters referred to by Colonel Champion were from the sons of Dundi Khan and from the wife of Hafiz Rah- mat ; the latter I give in extenso : — 1 The English gentlemen, renowned through Hindostan for justice, equity, and compassionating the miserable. Hafiz Rahmat Khan for forty years governed this country, and the very beasts of the forest trembled at his bravery. The will of God is resistless. He is slain, and to his children not an atom remains, but they are cast from their habitations, naked, exposed to the winds, the heats, and the burning sand, and perishing from want of even rice and water. How shall I either write or speak my condition ? My sighs dry my ink and scorch my paper. 'Tis evident as the sun, the English are brave and merci- ful, and whosoever they subdue, their children they preserve, who forget their sorrows by the kind treatment they receive ; nor draw they the sword in an unjust cause. Yesterday I was mistress of an hundred thousand people. To-day I am in want even of a cup of water, and where I commanded I am a prisoner. Fortune is fickle ; she raises the humble and lowers the exalted ; but I am innocent, and if any one is guilty it is Hafiz. But why should the children be punished for the errors of their father ? I am taken like a beast in a snare, without resting place by night, or shade by day. From you, sir, I hope justice and compassion, for I am as a bird confined in a cage ; 'tis better to give up life by the dagger than famish thus by hunger and thirst. You, I hope, sir, will reflect on my state, or my misfortunes will be doubled. I have nothing left. Pardon this paper V 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. in Appendix No. 27, Fifth Report. , * These two letters will be found The extract which I have given from XIV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 197 In another private letter to Hastings, dated the 15th June, 1774, Colonel Champion wrote as follows: — ' I am most heartily disposed to believe that the Board did not sus- pect their orders could have such consequences as have fallen out ; they could not have foreseen so sudden and so total an expulsion and downfall of a whole race of people ; they could not have supposed that a man, exalted and supported by British arms, could pay so very little deference to the advices and counsel of a British Commander ; nor was it possible to conceive that a man, who had himself tested the gall of misfortune, should be so totally unmindful of the unbounded and unparalleled grace shown to him, as to delight in denying a single ray of benevolence to others. Such, however, has been the case, and in due intimation of it I have discharged that which was incumbent upon me. I too can say that the Nabob, as the agent of oppression, is alone culpable. But, whilst all Asia knows that the English gave him the rod, and whilst they in vain look up to them as those who ought, if not direct the application, at least to prevent an ill use being made of that rod, will they not reasonably conclude that the scourges which the agent gives are connived at ? Will they not say that every English chief is another Sujah? It is not to me what restraints were laid on my predecessors ; none of them were ever in similar circum- Colonel Champion's letter of the 12th June, 1774, should be compared with the quotations from it which Mill has professed to make. [See p. 176.] Colonel Champion charged the Vizier with ill-treatment of the family of Hafiz Rahmat Khan and of the two sons of Dundi Khan and their families ; he said nothing of cruelty to the Rohillas generally. Mill desired to quote authority for the statement that, in accordance with the declared intention of the Vizier and Hast- ings to exterminate the Rohillas, they had been treated with atro- cious cruelty. Colonel Champion, neither in this letter nor in any other, had made any such general charge ; but there was one way by which Mill's object could be gained. Those parts of Colonel Champion's letter were suppressed which showed that he was referring solely to the treatment of par- ticular individuals. It was thus made to appear that the terms ' inhumanity and dishonour,' and ' unparalleled misery,' had been applied by Colonel Champion to the Rohillas generally, 'the late proprietors of the country/ whereas they were only applied in fact to the treatment of the two sons of Dundi Khan and their families, and to the family of Hafiz Rahmat. Having put Colonel Champion's words into a shape in which they suited his purpose, Mill quotes them in support of the statement that ' every one who bore the name of Rohilla was either butchered, or found his safety in flight or exile.' Colonel Champion on one occasion only charged the Vizier with any sort of cruelty towards the Ro- hillas generally, and even this charge referred only to their soldiers after the defeat of Hafiz Rahmat. In his letter dated 30th January, 1775, written after his return to Calcutta, he said that the Vizier had refused to give assistance in transporting their wounded to the English hos- pitals or in burying their dead. Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 242. See inf. p. 205. I Q 8 THE ROHILLA WAR, [Ch. stances, nor do the grievances which I have represented against from public views (for I could for a time sacrifice, or at least conceal, my own private feelings) appear to me to have at all been without a pre- ventative, nay an easy and effectual one, and that too without coercive means, or being liable to the objection of any usurpation of the Vizier's authority, which I am as far from desiring as yourself. . . . I am glad you did not address the Vizier concerning the family of Hafiz ; your good sense figured circumstances as they really were. I did not mean or say that Hafiz's family should be rendered indepen- dent of Sujah Dowlah. I wrote to Mr. Hastings requesting that he would take them under his protection, by influencing the Nabob " to make provision for them in some degree suitable to their birth." They themselves proposed that any or as many of the sons as the Nabob pleased should remain in his hands, but prayed him not to dishonour the Begum and other women, by dragging them about the country to be loaded with the scoffs of his rabble and otherwise still worse used ; but he was deaf, maugre all my entreaties, which you will find, by my letter of the 1 2th, were also ineffectual with regard to the destruction of the villages ; a circumstance with respect to which I am now sorry I did not undeceive you sooner, but it proceeded from a real dis- inclination to enlarge upon his excesses, which has also prevented me from descending to the particulars of his conduct 1 .' Colonel Champion's letter of the 12th June was laid be- fore the Select Commitee by Hastings on the ist July, with the following memorandum : — 1 The President informs the Committee that on the first mention made by Colonel Champion of the cruelties exercised by the Vizier upon the family of Hafiz Rahmat, he sent instructions to the Resident, of which he begs leave to record the following copy, which he flatters himself the Committee will judge to have been the most likely to prove effectual for the relief of their distress, and the only means which on such occasion he could have taken to have influenced the Vizier to a more generous conduct V Hastings was much dissatisfied with Colonel Champion's answer, and it seemed to him that the cruelties imputed to the Vizier were being used as a means of compelling the 1 Papers on the Rohilla war, India brought on official record by Hastings. Office Library. A part of this letter Fifth Report, App. No. 45. was quoted by Clavering, Monson, a Fifth Report, App. No. 27. The and Francis, in their letter to the letter to Middleton, to which Hast- Court of Directors, dated 30th Novem- ings here refers, has been given on ber, 1774. See inf. p. 227. It was p. 193. originally a private letter, but was XIV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 199 Government to give to Colonel Champion the increased powers which he had long been anxious to obtain, and the refusal of which had from the first been strongly resented by him. Hastings had resolved to listen to no such demands, and the correspondence going on regarding the claims of the army to a share of the plunder of the conquered country made him the less disposed to place confidence in Colonel Champion's impartiality or discretion. A reply was sent on the 1st July to his letter. The Government refused to give him any additional autho- rity. He was told that the Government itself possessed no such power of absolute control over the actions of the Vizier as he appeared to wish to exercise, and that much less could such power be delegated to the Commander of the army ; that if it were otherwise, we should become the masters instead of the allies of the Vizier, and 'the Commander-in-Chief would become the arbiter of peace and war. ... At present we stand thus with the Vizier : we have engaged to support and assist him in a specific service, and stipulated for a certain compensation to the Company; when that service shall be performed, the conquered country, its riches, its inhabitants, and all other acquisitions must be at his disposal, nor have we a right by our agreement to interfere. If indeed it should happen that elevated by successes, and secure under our protection, he should in the exercise of his authority commit such enormities as we should deem unworthy of the character of our ally, we would not fail in that case to remon- strate against them, and take such other steps as should appear best adapted for bringing him to a more just sense of propriety in his con- duct, but we should not esteem ourselves either obliged or entitled to interfere with authority, or to put power into the hands of our Com- mander-in-Chief effectually to prevent any measure in the manage- ment of his own affairs, which he should think fit to pursue. . . . The intemperate and tyrannical conduct of the Vizier after his conquest, as you have represented, cannot fail to prove highly dissatisfactory to us, and although we do not regard ourselves either as answerable for his actions, or obliged absolutely to interfere for restraining them, yet we should have been glad to have been furnished with such materials as would enable us, upon good grounds, to expostulate with him on the injustice and impropriety of such a conduct. It was in this view that we requested you to acquaint us with the instances of his cruelties, but we confess ourselves exceedingly disappointed in receiving, instead of a precise account of facts, only three letters of loose declamation, which however pathetically written, contain not one single instance of 200 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. the Vizier's particular cruelty towards the family of Hafiz, and indeed express only such sentiments as we can easily conceive to exist in the breasts of that unfortunate family, from reflecting on the sad reverse of their fortune alone, without suffering any peculiar hardship in their case, or uncommon act of oppression in the Vizier. For this reason, we repeat our desire to be furnished with a particular account of the treatment which the family of Hafiz has received, and we shall then take such steps for their relief as the circumstances shall require. In the meantime, we hope that the remonstrances which the President informs us he has directed the Resident to make to the Vizier on this subject, will be sufficient to render any more direct interposition need- less. We conclude with taking notice of an expression in your letter which, in our judgment, conveys a reflection equally improper and unjust. It is that in which you say " the reputation of the British name is in the hands of the Vizier." If this were the case, we who put it into his hands would undoubtedly stand responsible to our country and employers for the wanton prostitution of so precious a trust. But we do not agree that we have in any shape left the national honour at his disposal, or that the British name can be affected by any of his actions, independent of us. Our engagements with the Vizier are clearly defined, and such as we can justify on principles of sound policy and attention to the Company's interest. We afford him our assistance ; our honour we commit into no hands but yours, where we trust it is perfectly safe, and that by your conduct in the field, and by maintaining discipline among the troops, the British name will acquire new lustre, and the campaign be the means of spreading more wide our national reputation, unconnected with that of the Vizier V Although Colonel Champion remained in Rohilkhand for several months after he received these orders, he never sent the ' particular account of the treatment which the family of Hafiz had received,' and which the Government had called upon him to furnish. When, on the 3rd of May, 1786, he was examined before the House of Commons, he was asked whether this was true, and he replied : — 1 In answer to that question, I must observe that repeatedly, before the date of that letter and afterwards, I thought the remonstrances I made were sufficient, and therefore did not comply with the orders I received.' He sent no reply at all until the 3rd September, when he referred to the subject in the following terms : — ' It is true, gentlemen, that declamation is usual in representing dis- tress ; and therefore I should not have been surprised that the letters 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 27. XIV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER, 301 which I transmitted to you had but little effect on your perceptions, if I had not at the same time attested the truth of the complaints, which I will venture to say bear more than one or two instances of cruelty ; I might add others, such as these unhappy captives being driven to the necessity of supplicating and receiving alms from myself and gentle- men of my family to purchase sustenance ; their even begging for water to drink, their struggling who should first be served with it, &c. In short, the gross maltreatment of these families amounts to an axiom in the minds of the English army, and even in the Vizier's own troops V When this letter from Colonel Champion arrived, Hast- ings, hopeless apparently of getting from Colonel Champion the distinct statement of facts which he had demanded, again wrote to the Resident. ' I enclose,' he said, ' an extract from a letter of Colonel Champion to the Select Committee, on the subject of which I am earnestly solicitous to have the fullest and most certain information. The enormities he insists upon are of a nature that I think could not have escaped your observation. The Colonel must receive every inform- ation of this kind at second hand, and he may be deceived or circum- stances may be much exaggerated ; but his representation is peremp- tory and positive, and the Vizier must appear in the darkest colours on our records if what the Colonel affirms stands uncontroverted. I wish the truth to appear, neither glossed by favour nor blackened by prejudice ; let me therefore beg of you to furnish me with the fullest information you can obtain of the Vizier's treatment of the family of Hafiz, &c, and to support your accounts with the strongest proofs that can be produced. Hitherto the circumstances of that kind which you have had to mention have been satisfactory V 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 28. This letter has been printed by 2 Letter dated 24th September, Gleig, not quite accurately, vol. i. 1774, British Museum MSS. 29,135. P441. CHAPTER XV. THE CHARGE THAT ATROCITIES WERE COMMITTED AND DEFENDED BY HASTINGS {continued). Falsehood of the charges against Hastings. — Complaints of Colonel Cham- pion against the Vizier after the close of the war. — Other evidence regarding the cruelties said to have been committed. — The reports of Middleton in reply to the orders of Hastings. — Evidence of Colonel Champion and other officers taken before the Council. — Hamilton's History. — Statements by the Vizier. — Accounts by the son of Hafiz Rahmat. — The Sair-ul-Mutakherin. — Mill's calumnies against Hastings. — The truth regarding the conduct of the war. — The war conducted with unusual humanity. T HAVE quoted every report made by Colonel Champion from the beginning to the end of the war, respecting atrocities committed by the Vizier, and I have shown the manner in which every report was treated by Hastings. The falsehood of the charge that these atrocities were defended by him has, I think, been made clear. I shall now show what further evidence respecting the conduct of the war is on record, and I shall first refer to statements made by Colonel Champion himself after the war was over. In November 1774, Shuja-ud-daula sent to Hastings a letter filled with complaints against the English Com- mander-in-Chief and his troops. The new Government had then come into power, and a copy of the Vizier's letter was given to Colonel Champion. On the 30th January, 1775, he sent to the Council a long letter, full of violent invective against the Vizier, refuting the charges brought by him and explaining his own pro- CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 203 ceedings in great detail, but in most confused and rambling style. I shall quote everything in his letter which bears upon the subject of the Vizier's cruelties : — 1 The war was over early in October. There remained no more towns to plunder, no new discovered hoards of treasure to dig up, no unhappy man to rob of his wealth, no miserable woman of her raiment. ... I submit whether the giving up the rights of the army [to a share of plunder] was not in effect sacrificing the interest of our nation, inasmuch as the riches of the individuals contribute to the support of the State. But passing over this remarkable complaisance to the Vizier as inexplicable, we shall march from Pilibhit and accom- pany His Excellency towards Bisauli, dragging in triumph the dis- consolate Begum and children of the brave but unfortunate Hafiz, the widow of his eldest son Inayat Khan, the wife of his eldest sur- viving son, Mohabbat Khan, and some hundreds of miserable captive women on carts. Leaving Bareilly and Aonla behind us, and trusty slaves of His Excellency to see the inhabitants indiscriminately plun- dered for the behoof of their master, we arrived at Bisauli, when the whole army were witnesses of scenes that cannot be described. . . . The propositions [of Faizullah Khan] were not, it 's true, agreeable to the Vizier ; they were not favourable to his ambitious designs, nor to his inhuman plan of extirpation. I informed the Governor of Sujah having received them with disdain, and when I candidly told His Excellency that I should act in the matter agreeably to the orders of Government, he anticipated the answer which I received by saying that " Mr. Hastings will tell you as I do." But though His Excellency gave himself the liberty of divining this, how was it possible that I should believe that we were to consult the Vizier's interest and aggrandizement only ? I could not, as a Company's servant, give place to such an idea. I know that Sujah's acquisitions in plunder have exceeded the expenses of the campaign, even including the forty lakhs which he had promised to pay to the Company. I had with regret observed that the part the English took in the war brought their national character into the highest disrepute. I had remarked, and all the officers of the army had remarked, that His Excellency's haughti- ness increased with the power which we put into his hands. . . . I have already fully confuted the Vizier's calumnies, but I shall never- theless glance over His Excellency's letter once more and take notice of such parts as may have hitherto escaped me. " Consider, my friend," says His Excellency repeatedly to Mr. Hastings, " that it was my absolute determination to extirpate the Rohillas, and that I re- quested the assistance of the English for that purpose." However well it is known that His Excellency is equal to the barbarous design for which he thus publicly and daringly avows he solicited the aid of the English, is it possible we can believe that the respectable gentleman here traduced could have been privy to so horrid a purpose ? Could he 204 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. have so entirely overcome the feelings of humanity ? Could he have been so lost to every sense of honour as to prostitute the English troops and to stain the glory of the British name by subscribing to a precon- certed massacre ? What is not His Excellency capable of advancing ? . . . It may not be improper to observe that on our way from Shahabad to Pilibhit, it was usual to send safeguards to the villages contiguous to head-quarters to preserve them from destruction ; but the moment the sepoys were withdrawn to proceed on their march, the villages were set in flames by way of bonfire for His Excellency. Afterwards, when we were cantoned at Bisauli, many jemadars who resided at the distance of ten, twenty, and thirty miles, very frequently sent to entreat for even one sepoy to protect them ; and though they could not always be supplied, it is sufficient to show the opinion which the natives entertained of our troops. Besides my Aide-de-camps, who had the charge of detaching these sepoys, several other officers in town are perfectly acquainted with these circumstances. . . . His Ex- cellency is very unreasonable in his railing against the unfortunate family of Hafiz ; and there is a palpable impertinence towards me in his manner of expression ; although he could not command the winds, he had in his power to have treated the captives with tenderness ; he could have ordered it so that these illustrious prisoners should not have been distressed for food or raiment ; yet the truth is that they were covered with vermin, were reduced to the severe necessity of making supplications for private charities, and actually received alms from several gentlemen. But the Minutes which my Aide-de-camp took down from reports of trusty harcarrahs stationed for the pur- pose of bringing faithful intelligence regarding the prisoners, will speak more plainly their miserable situation, and at the same time prove how moderate I was when under examination on these subjects, and how reluctant I have hitherto been to enlarge on the excess of the Nabob l . His behaviour to the families of Mohibullah Khan and his 1 These ' Minutes ' have never, I together in tents and suffered extreme believe, been printed, but they are to discomfort ; that the women were be found in the India Office Records stripped of their jewels ; that the food among the Appendices to Colonel supplied was insufficient ; that the Champion's letter. There is nothing guards were insolent, &c. It is evident to show whether they were written from the questions afterwards seat by at the time or compiled afterwards. Hastings to Captain Macpherson, by They are called 'Intelligence relative whom these notes were written, that to His Excellency the Vizier's treat- Hastings doubted their accuracy and ment of the families of the late Na- believed that they had been compiled bobs Hafiz Rahmat and Dundi Khan to support Colonel Champion's state- in their confinement, taken down from ments. He called for information the accounts of trusty hircarras sta- regarding the hircarras from whom tioned with those families, by order the reports were said to have been of the Commander-in-Chief.' These received, why they had been stationed notes describe the gross neglect of the with the prisoners, and to whom they prisoners ; state that they were crowded sent their intelligence, and (he asked) XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 205 brother, Fattehullah Khan, who possessed a country of about twenty lakhs of rupees per annum, was yet more criminal. Before the com- mencement of the war he corresponded with them ; and upon his assurances of protection and friendship, they remained at peace in Bisauli, the capital of their district. . . . [Three letters are then quoted by Colonel Champion, assuring these chiefs and their mother of pro- tection. A note is added : ' Such was the Vizier's regard for the Rohillas, and such his regard for humanity, that he refused to give any assistance either in transporting their wounded to our hospitals, or burying their dead.] Upon the faith of these letters the deluded chiefs remained in their habitations, in full confidence of being treated * are these Minutes to which you have attached your signature exact copies of those taken at the time, or have they been since revised and methodised by you or any other person?' The answers to these questions are not forthcoming. [SeeAppendixD.] When Colonel Champion was examined be- fore the House of Commons, on the 3rd May, 1786, an attempt was again made to obtain some definite inform- ation regarding the authority on which his statements had been made ; but it failed to elicit anything of value. The following is extracted from his evidence : ' Whether you had any other proof of the rigorous treatment of the Rohilla prisoners than their own representations? — The proof I had was chiefly from spies placed in a situation to receive that intelligence. — Whether the spies you mentioned acquainted you with particular in- stances of cruelty, or only gave you general information ? Did they name particular persons on whom the cruelty was committed, and the particular species of cruelty ? — I believe that in the correspondence, the manner in which I received the intelligence is particularly pointed out and the hard- ships that were inflicted. — Then you was not acquainted with any particu- lar instances, except what are stated in the correspondence with the Go- vernor and the Council ? — Everything is at large in the correspondence. — Whether, after you received the di- rections of the Governor and Select Committee to state particular in- stances, you applied either to the same spies, or to any others, or to any other persons, to furnish you with any other particulars than what you had before that time stated? — I before observed, I cannot carry my remembrance to every particular oc- currence. The correspondence will explain the whole. — Who employed the spies? — By my orders. — Whether you employed a confidential Aide-de- camp, or other officer under your command, to ascertain the truth of the cruelties and barbarities that were represented to you by the Rohilla prisoners, and the intelligence given by the spies ? — The duty was allotted to one man for that purpose. — Who was that man ? — Colonel Macpherson. — What was the intelligence he gave you on that subject ? — It is mentioned in the correspondence. — What was the duty of Colonel Macpherson? — He had the charge of all the spies. — Was it anything more than to receive the intelligence brought by those spies and to make his report of it to you ? — I said before I received all the in- telligence from him. — Do you mean the intelligence only from the spies, or any other intelligence? — There is a kind of intelligence that comes by letter. I had no other intelligence than what came by him. — Did you employ Colonel Macpherson for the purpose of obtaining a knowledge of any supposed cruelties exercised against the Rohillas? — I answered that before.' 206 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. as friends by the Nabob, and being left undisturbed in their posses- sions. The moment he arrived at Bisauli, however, they were put into rigorous confinement, denied access to their families, robbed of their property, and themselves and their women treated not only with dishonour and indignity, but even with cruelty. The unhappy chiefs preferred frequent complaints to me in the most moving terms, and sent the Nabob's original letters to prove how much he had deceived them : — " He has deprived us of our country, of our riches, and even of our honour, and not satisfied with that he is going to send us prisoners to Faizabad. We desire no country, no riches, no houses, but at Bisauli are the tombs of our noble ancestors ; near them, under some shade, we beg permission to spend the remainder of our days as faqueers. Relying on the Vizier's promises, we remained in this country, otherwise we should have fled as the other chiefs did, and have preserved our character and honours ; these he has taken away with our effects, and how has he dishonoured us is known to all." It was this deceitful conduct, this inhuman treatment that filled the minds of all the fugitive chiefs with such a distrust and detestation of the Nabob. And although my representations of the distresses of the family of Hafiz were ungraciously received, and I am sorry to say gave me but little encouragement to plead the cause of the unhappy, yet I regret exceedingly that I have so long suppressed my inclina- tions of endeavouring to alleviate the misfortunes of the much injured chiefs to whom these letters were addressed, and who as well as the family of Hafiz I have good reason to believe are even now stinted of the necessaries of life, and when I was on the way down I received the affecting accounts of the death of twenty-five of these ill-fated prisoners since their arrival at Allahabad for want of sustenance. — " Whoever has lost a father and brother in war, has fallen from the dignity of a throne, and, become a prisoner, will undoubtedly suffer much misery." The analogy between the style of this paragraph and a letter which I received some time ago from another quarter on the same subject is worthy of observation. We grant that the fall of a father, and of a brother, and the loss of a throne, were sufficient causes for impressing the souls of the family of Hafiz with sorrow, but what shall we think of that unfeeling man who added cruelty to the burthen of their afflictions ? What shall we say of him who in violation of all faith, in breach of every sacred tie under the artful mask of dissembled friend- ships, not only robbed the family of Dundi Khan of their throne, but even despoiled them of their honour, and not contented with depriving them of their liberty, has embittered the draught of their misfortunes by unexampled severity in their bondage. You find these unhappy people in the utmost dread, lest the Nabob should hear of their com- plaint, let me, therefore, hope and entreat, gentlemen, that whatever it may be your pleasure to do in their favour may be so ordered and con- certed as that they may not be exposed to the implacable resentment of Shujah. . . . What would have been the consequence if the army XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 207 had been repulsed or greatly thinned, which must have been the case even on the most favourable supposition [if the Rohillas had persisted in declining the Vizier's offers]. . . . Such would very naturally be the language of the gentlemen in the direction, had their army been repelled, or had they even been victorious at the expense of a great number of lives unneccessarily thrown away, and I must confess that I think their highest indignation would be most justly excited. Sup- posing, however, our success out of question, and that the Rohillas had all been cut off, what benefit would have derived, what profit to the Company ? The administration had declared the forty lakhs due ' in May, and they were not to reap any further advantage, but ad- mitting for a moment that the gentlemen in Leadenhall Street were of so forgiving a disposition as to overlook the neglect of the Company's interest, would they not be incensed at the wanton sacrifice of above one hundred thousand lives ? The language of the British Senate on such an occasion would be very serious, " We condescended to admit of your keeping a military force for the preservation of your factories and the protection of your trade ; you have abused our indulgencies, have entered into an unprovoked war, have hired out His Majesty's subjects for your private emolument, and to crown all have brought an indelible stain on your country by the massacre of an innocent people." The Company would throw the blame upon their Adminis- tration, and these gentlemen would endeavour to transfer it to the Commander-in-Chief. I thank God that it is out of their power. I have often successfully fought the battles of the Company, and have acquired them riches and to myself renown. I have been the assertor of their neglected rights. I have been mercifully disposed towards a persecuted people, and I have endeavoured to alleviate the affliction of the miserable and unhappy. I have stood forth for the honour of humanity, and for the glory of my King and of my country. ... It is an easy matter to accuse, but allegations unsupported as the Vizier's fall of themselves. Conscious that no man was ever more injuriously aspersed than I have been, and sensible of the disrepute into which His Excellency has irrecoverably plunged himself, it might perhaps be enough for me to have said, I defy the slander, and it is not incum- bent on me to prove a negative. It too frequently happens that the most irreproachable are thus maliciously accused ; and though they cannot be formally condemned, yet I am afraid the generality of mankind are so prone to think ungenerously of their fellows that innocent men often lay under the most unjust imputations. Happy he who in such a situation can put his hand on his breast, and say all is quiet, all is serenity within. Fortunately for me, however, gentle- men, on this occasion, I have been able to stand forth ; I have bearded the calumniator, and have brought such a load of truth upon his back as shall make the burthen irksome V 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. pp. 218-249. 208 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. I have already mentioned that Colonel Champion was examined before the House of Commons on the 3rd May, 1786 1 . Several extracts have been given from his evidence, and further quotations would serve no useful purpose. He stated in general terms that to the best of his recollection the Vizier had carried on the war with unnecessary cruelty, but he gave no new facts, and apologized to the Committee for his inability to do so. ' I beg to observe,' he said, * that near twelve years have elapsed since that period, in the course of which time not one year has passed in which I have not been confined to my bed eight months ; in con- sequence of which I find my memory much weakened, and I have it not in my power to answer to facts. I therefore desire the indulgence of the Committee to refer to the correspondence which passed between the Board, Mr. Hastings, and myself, for such circumstances as I cannot immediately recollect.' Everything written or said by Colonel Champion, from first to last, regarding the cruelties committed by the Vizier has now been noticed. Mill has quoted no other authority. I shall next show what other evidence is forthcoming. The action taken by Hastings on the reports of Colonel Champion was described in the last Chapter, and the letters were quoted which he sent to Middleton on the subject, when he had failed to obtain from Colonel Champion himself the information that he desired. I shall now give everything of importance in the letters received from Middleton in reply. The first was written on the 17th June, 1774: — * Although I cannot by any means acquit the Nabob of the charge which the Commander-in-Chief alleges against the Vizier on the score of his treatment of Hafiz Rahmat's family, and his wanton ravages of the country, I can almost venture to affirm that his conduct in these particulars would appear on a scrutiny to have been less culpable than Colonel Champion has been taught to believe. To you, honourable sir, who are not unacquainted with the pride and haughtiness of the Nabob's demeanour, it will not appear extraordinary that he should have more enemies than most other men. Even his own servants are very frequently the first to asperse his character and to accuse him of actions which, with all his vices and imperfections, I am persuaded he is incapable of committing. The universal prejudice and dissatis- faction which his denying the army a gratuity they had built with 1 See p. 185. XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 209 certainty upon, has raised against him in our camp, has laid open another source of unjust calumny. Hence sir, I am induced to hope that Colonel Champion relying too implicitly upon the assertions of every one who has thought it necessary to add to the popular pre- judice, may have viewed His Excellency's conduct through a partial medium. Although I might mention many circumstances to prove that my observations are not merely ideal, but drawn from real facts, I think it unnecessary to take up your time with more than one. Soon after our arrival at Bisauli, a report was propagated and obtained almost universal credit, that the Vizier had, in breach of the sacred laws of the harem, forcibly entered the zenana of Mohibullah Khan, and wantonly violated the chastity of his daughter ; and to make the crime appear in a still more heinous light, it was confidently stated that the unhappy victim, unwilling to survive the disgrace, had sacri- ficed her life to testify her own innocence and redeem the honour of her family. The story carrying with it a colour of probability, and artfully related with such aggravating circumstances as could not fail to excite, pity in every human breast, a general clamour was soon raised against the Nabob, and as people who were indifferent to the effects of his displeasure did not scruple to reproach him with this infamous action to his own dependants, the report was not long in reaching his ear. The uneasiness he manifested on the occasion, and the anxious desire he showed to acquit himself of so dishonourable a charge by his unremitting endeavours to discover the author would have furnished strong presumptive proof of his innocence, but when it was notorious that His Excellency at that time had never been in Mohibullah Khan's house, that his effects were left untouched, and that the daughter who was reported to have fallen a sacrifice to his pleasures was yet in being, I could be at no loss what degree of credit to bestow on the information, though other proofs, if required, might have been drawn from the peculiar circumstances which at that time marked the Nabob's situation. Had the propagator of so unjust a stigma been any ways dependent on the Nabob's authority he pro- bably would not have escaped with impunity, but His Excellency having traced the calumniator to our camp, and I have been told, to an individual whose name he bound himself in honour not to disclose, he discontinued his inquiries. The severity with which the Nabob latterly treated Dundi Khan's family may be accounted for, and in my humble opinion in some measure justified. He always considered them his prisoners, but until an appearance of treachery and deceit on their part had given him cause of displeasure, he did not betray any resentment. On the contrary, although guards were placed upon their houses to prevent anything being carried away, every liberty of access and egress was allowed them, although denied to the family of Hafiz Rahmat, and I am persuaded they would have retained posses- sion at least of all their personal effects, had they not abused the confidence he had reposed in them and attempted to secrete their P aio THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. property, circumstances which he came to the knowledge of by their having loaded two officers of our army, who accidentally went into the house, with jewels and money to a considerable amount. This pro- cedure effectually closed every answer to an accommodation with Mohibullah Khan, and those who are acquainted with the impetuosity and violence of the Nabob's temper seem less surprised that His Ex- cellency should deprive this family of everything they possessed than that Mohibullah Khan's infidelity should not have cost him his head 1 . The family of Hafiz have not merited such treatment, though I think it probable they may have suffered for the misconduct of others. They certainly have been improperly neglected, and have suffered much distress and inconvenience for want of proper accommodation in camp, but my own knowledge does not furnish me with any in- stances of cruelty or violence wantonly exercised upon them. I have the satisfaction to find that I have in general anticipated your in- structions on these subjects. In favour of Hafiz Rahmat's family I most earnestly solicited the Nabob at the time I acquainted you with the son's having delivered himself up, and he assured me a jaghir which would afford a handsome provision for their maintenance should be allotted them, but as he thought it probable that the suffering Rohillas of former rank and consequence, to whom the natural inhabitants might be attached, to remain in the country, might prove a bar to the establishment of his own authority, and lay the foundation of future troubles, such persons as had any claim to his consideration should be provided for in his own provinces or in his newly-acquired possessions in the Dodb, where he could be a spy and check upon their actions. The family of Hafiz Rahmat and Dundi Khan, together with a numerous train of dependants, were removed a few days ago, under the escort of Nabob Salar Jang, to Faizabad, where they are to remain until His Excellency's arrival. From what I have been able to learn, I have reason to believe that proper injunctions were laid upon Salar Jang respecting the treatment of these unhappy people, and as I shall be with the Vizier when he determines their respective des- tinies, rest assured, honourable sir, I will not be inattentive to your commands B . On the 5th July, Middleton again wrote enclosing a letter which the Vizier had himself addressed to Hastings on the subject of the charges brought against him. It was written, Middleton believed, in consequence of a conver- sation which he had just had with the Vizier respecting the families of Hafiz Rahmat and Dundi Khan. 1 For Hamilton's account of the lah Khan with severity (see infra, reasons which led the Vizier to p. 223). treat Mohibullah Khan and Fatehul- a Fifth Report, App. No. 27. XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 21 1 ' Notwithstanding,' he said, ' the Vizier's repeated assurances to me, I had still reason to believe from the reports which were daily pro- pagated and obtained universal credit, that his treatment of these unhappy people was such as I could not, consistent with the terms of your instructions, pass unnoticed. I accordingly remonstrated against it, and pointed out to His Excellency wherein his conduct, if faithfully represented, appeared to merit censure. I again warmly urged the prudent and conciliatory measures recommended in your instructions to me of the 27th May, and fully explained to him how intimately the reputation of our national character was connected with every act of his present administration. Thus far premised, I intimated to him, in plain terms, that I had received your peremptory orders to insist upon a proper treatment of the family of Hafiz Rahmat, in default of which he would most assuredly incur your displeasure, and forfeit every claim to that support and protection which the English have on all occasions manifested such readiness to yield him. His Excellency seemed less surprised than hurt at the style of this address, and asked with an appearance of concern, " Whence arose the necessity of prescribing to him a conduct which a due regard to his own reputation, in preference to every other tie, would actually suggest." He observed that he had many enemies, and that the influence of prejudice had drawn a reproach upon his character, which as he now considers he did not merit, it behoved him by every means in his power to remove. He positively denied everything I had taxed him with on the score of his treatment of Hafiz Rahmat's family, offering to stake his innocence on whatever test I chose to propose, and further, as he was convinced, not only from my remonstrances but the concurring circumstances that his conduct in general, but par- ticularly with respect to his treatment of his captives, had been represented to you in a partial and unfavourable light, he hoped you would be pleased to indulge him with the particulars of the charges which may have been alleged against him, and at the same time point out his accusers, that he may attempt that justification which your satisfaction and his own reputation render so essentially necessary. In reply to these reflections, I observed that the knowledge of matters so publicly talked of could not possibly be confined to the immediate scene of action, that various channels must have conveyed it to the Presidency, and the union of so many opinions would naturally give it credit, although unsupported by the direct evidence of facts. Colonel Champion has informed me that he has a multitude of letters from the family of Hafiz Rahmat, pointing out, in the most pathetic terms, the distress and misery they are exposed to. These would be the surest criterion to judge the Nabob's conduct by, but while these unhappy people were so immediately in his power, and no effectual checks upon him, it would be dangerous to produce such vouchers V 1 Private letter, British Museum with Middleton's evidence before the MSS. 29,155. This letter was printed House of Commons, 24th May, 1786. P 2 212 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. On the 22nd and 24th May, 1786, Middleton was ex- amined before the House of Commons. Some extracts from his evidence have already been given, and J have quoted his statement that he knew 'of no instance of cruelty, exercised in the course of the war upon the Rohillas, either by Shuja-ud-daula, or by his orders 1 '. He said that after he sent his letter of the 5th July to Hastings ' he had reason to think more favourably of the character of the Vizier,' and that he ' found that many of the reports that had been propagated to his prejudice, from the best information he could obtain, were without foundation.' Shortly after the close of the campaign, the hostile Majority of the new Government began to inquire into the transactions connected with the war. Their Minutes con- tained several references to passages in Colonel Champion's letters in which he had mentioned the cruel conduct of the Vizier, and, in December 1774, Hastings proposed that as Colonel Champion and two officers who had held important commands in the army, Colonel Leslie and Major Hannay, had arrived in Calcutta, they should be called before the Council and be personally examined with the special object of ascertaining the truth. After some objections on the part of Francis this was agreed to, and the three officers were examined by the Council on the 19th and 28th December 2 . Colonel Champion seems to have been little inclined to give any evidence ; his answers were meagre and evasive, couched in such general terms, and so extremely short, that they add little to our knowledge. The following are the only parts of his evidence which bear upon this subject : — (1) 'Was the Vizier guilty of oppression over the inhabitants of the new conquered country ? 1 Seep. 186. Consultations of the Calcutta Govern- 2 The evidence of these officers was ment preserved in the India Office, not printed with the papers contained The answers of the officers, but not in the Appendix to the Fifth Report all the questions, have been printed of the Committee of Secrecy, but is in Forrest's Selections, vol. i. pp. recorded in the MS. copies of the 53-66. XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 213 1 It appeared so to me. (2) ' Did the Vizier send out parties to burn and ravage the country of the Rohillas on the commencement of the war, or was Hafiz Rahmat Khan the aggressor in this instance ? 1 The Vizier. (3) 'Are the Rohillas the native inhabitants and cultivators of the country, or were they only in possession as conquerors, &c. ? ' The Rohillas are in possession of it as conquerors only ; the native inhabitants are not of the same sect or religion. (4) ' Have the native inhabitants deserted the country since the conquest of it, and in what state is it at present ? * The native inhabitants are still remaining, and the country is in a flourishing state.' On the 2nd January, 1775? Colonel Champion wrote to the Government that he wished to correct ' some mistakes and inaccuracies ' in his evidence, and to this answer he added that the country was ' in a flourishing state, consider- ing it so immediately after the war.' (5) ' Was the Vizier guilty of cruelties to the families of the Rohilla chiefs, and in what instances ? ' It appeared to me that he was guilty of cruelties to the families of the Rohilla chiefs, but as to the instances I must refer to my Minute. (6) ■ Did you hear of a report of any attempt made by the Vizier to violate the chastity of the wives and daughters of Rohilla chiefs, &c, and do you believe there were grounds for the report ? * I did hear such a report, but as to the grounds I have none sufficient to prove the accusation, but the report was made to me.' Questions by General Clavering: — 1 When the Vizier began plundering and burning the country, did you make any representation to him upon it ? ' I did. 1 Did you represent to the Vizier your opinion of the ill treatment of the prisoners ? < I did. 'Were not some of the families of the chiefs left destitute of necessaries for their subsistence ? To this question his answer was ' No,' but on the 2nd January, he corrected this, and answered the question in the affirmative, and added, ' It was reported to me that they were in want of everything that could make their situation tolerably comfortable.' 2T4 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. ' In what way were they ill treated ? ' It was reported to me that they were in want. * Did you inform the Governor, Mr. Hastings, of the Vizier's conduct towards the country and the prisoners ? ' I did. * How did the Governor take your representations ? ' To the best of my recollection, he wrote to the Vizier to be more moderate in his behaviour. ' Did the Governor seem to be pleased at your making this repre- sentation to him ? ' I refer to the Governor's letter, written in answer. 'When you expostulated with the Governor on the disgrace and dishonour which this war brought on the British arms, what answer did he make to these expostulations ? 1 1 cannot charge my memory, but beg leave to refer to the corre- spondence.' I will now notice the evidence given by Colonel Leslie. The first questions were the same as those put to Colonel Champion. To the question [i] 1 whether the Vizier had been guilty of oppression to the people of the country, Colonel Leslie made the following answer : — ' I would beg leave to distinguish between the real inhabitants and the acquired ones. By the acquired ones I mean the Rohillas or Afghans who conquered the country and became the masters of it. I believe the Gentoo inhabitants were not oppressed ; the ryots have been as much cherished by him as they ever were under any former government, except at the time of the march of the army through their country, but they returned to their ploughs immediately and seemed to be as happy as ever.' Referring to this answer, General Clavering said : — 1 I observe that you mentioned that the Vizier behaved well to the ancient inhabitants, and I now desire to know how he behaved to the Rohillas.' To this question Colonel Leslie replied : — ' The prisoners who fell into the hands of the Vizier, which I believe to be very few, are now entertained in his service ; there are some of the sons of Hafiz Rahmat, two particularly whom I know and have often seen riding in his suite. He generally took one of these out with him all the time he was at Bisauli ; their appearance was good, and 1 This and the following numbers within brackets refer to the questions given on pp. 212, 213. XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 215 I think the same as the rest of his cavalry, and they appeared con- tented, but no doubt he kept a watchful eye upon them.' The following extracts give all that is important in the rest of Colonel Leslie's evidence regarding the conduct of the Vizier : (2) ' The day before our march from Shahabad the country upon the opposite side of the river Garrah was in flames, and upon my inquiring into the matter I learned it was by order of the Vizier, that he had sent several detachments of his light cavalry for that purpose, but I believe the inhabitants of those villages had withdrawn themselves from them and taken sanctuary in Shahjehanpur. (4) ' The native inhabitants after I left Bisauli, between that and Samtohal, were all at their habitations, and had returned to their culti- vation of the country. When I went down towards the banks of the Ganges it was highly cultivated, but about Pathargarh, which was the place of arms and retreat of the Rohillas, before they retired to Lal- dhang as their last resource, there was no cultivation but sugar. (5) * I protest I have heard a great deal of severity exercised on the families of the chiefs of the Rohillas, but I cannot speak positively to any of them but from hearsay. I am afraid there was too much reason to give the world a liberty to say that they were ill treated. There was one instance in which I thought it was necessary that I should interfere. I had been sent into Pilibhit, where the wife and family of Hafiz Rahmat were, and after a series of conversations with his sons, at which Major Hannay and Mr. Murray were present, I had a message from the Begum to request that I would speak to her. I returned for answer that I was sorry it was out of my power, as my conduct was prescribed to me, but that I would receive any message she would send to me. She sent her son, in return, to acquaint me that the business she wanted to speak to me on was to beg that I would intercede with Colonel Champion to protect her from any insult which might be offered her by the Vizier. In consequence of her request, I went to Colonel Champion and begged that he would give every sanction in his power and address the Vizier upon the occasion, which the Colonel promised to do. This is the only occasion I had to apply to Colonel Champion on the subject ; I hear that many others did exist. I have heard a great deal of it, and had reason to disbelieve a great deal ; as the reports were so improbable, I did not give ear to them. The messages of the Begum mentioned no instance of severity or ill treatment to her ; at that time nothing could have happened, as it was the very day we marched to Pilibhit. (6) 'Those are the vague reports which I wished in general to inform you of, but indeed there were particular ones which were attended with such circumstances that I could scarce give any credit to from the situation of the parties. There was a particular one at %\ 6 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. Bisauli, one of the daughters of the Rohilla chiefs of that place, whom they said he had committed violence upon, and that she in con- sequence poisoned herself; and knowing the situation of the Vizier at that time I thought it almost impracticable, which made me to give very little credit to the stories which I heard at the time of such a nature.' Questions by Francis : — * When you were sent into Pilibhit, did the Begum send the trinkets and ornaments of the women to you desiring your acceptance of them, and what answer did you send her ? ' The Begum did send her trinkets and ornaments- When Major Hannay and Mr. Murray and I were sent to Pilibhit, we went as three commissioners in conjunction with three of the Vizier's to ex- amine the treasury and search for military chests of the beaten army. We searched the treasury and every other part but the zenanas, which we were forbid to enter. The women of the zenana sent their trinkets from a supposition that they were a part of the treasure, which we returned to them, acquainting them that we did not come in search of their trinkets but for the treasure deposited there. ' Did the Vizier afterwards take away more trinkets and ornaments from the women ? ' I believe he did ; I am pretty sure he did take them away the next day. 'Was it the enormity of the reports circulated concerning the Vizier's conduct to the families of the Rohilla chiefs which made you think them improbable ? ' No, it was not ; they were the circumstances of the reports. ' Do you believe the Vizier ever entered the zenanas of any of the Rohilla chiefs ? ' I don't know ; I believe he did. ' Is not the family of a noble Moor dishonoured by a man's forcibly entering the zenana and seeing the women ? 'Yes, I believe it is.' Major Hannay was examined on the same day. I make the following extracts from his evidence : — (i) 'To the best of my knowledge I saw no signs of oppression to the inhabitants of the new conquered country, but from particular inquiries which I had an opportunity of making of the country people they said they had met with no treatment that they could complain of ; that from the treatment they had met with they had no reason to fear greater severity from the Vizier than their former masters. (2) ' I believe both the Vizier and the Rohillas were concerned in burning the villages. I was informed that some days before our XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 217 arrival at Shahabad the Rohillas had burned some villages towards Mamdi, in the Vizier's ancient dominions. (4) ' Several of the native inhabitants of course had followed the Rohillas to Pathargarh and Laldhang, but the proportion of them was very small, and several of them to my knowledge returned, before the war was finished, to their former habitations. At the time that I went upon an expedition from Bisauli to Sambhal, Moradabad, and Rampur, the country appeared to be in good cultivation, the inhabitants were employed in tilling it. It is in general one of the best cultivated countries I have seen in Hindostan, and very well inhabited, and the people appeared to be as busy at that time as if there had been a profound peace, and under no kind of apprehension from the con- querors. At, or some time after the battle of St. George, Eugee Khan was returning from Delhi to rejoin his master the Vizier, and had taken possession of all the country from Anupshahar and Ram- ghat to Rampur, and established fousdars and collectors of the revenues of it before the arrival of our army at Bisauli, and to main- tain these fousdars in the execution of their duty it was only neces- sary to leave 500 Nudjiff Cawns there and five companies of the Burrah Fultan, in all not amounting to 1500 men, who kept the country in perfect quietness until our army arrived, and after the march of our army to Pathargarh. (5) 'I was generally informed, and from my own observation I am led to believe, that he treated them with a great deal of severity ; for instance, he deprived them of all the ornamental part of their dress, and did not provide them with such accommodation as I thought their rank entitled them to expect. The reports in camp were various, but were not conveyed to me from such authority as to warrant my offering them to the Board.' With reference to the last answer Francis asked : — 1 Do you know, or have you heard, they were at any time reduced to distress for want even of a subsistence ? ' To this question Major Hannay replied : — 1 I have heard that their subsistence was scanty, but this is one of the reports I have heard and have not been able to ascertain the truth of to my own satisfaction. (6) ' I have heard, while I was at Bisauli frequently, that he had violated one of the daughters of Mohibullah Khan, but I never gave credit to it ; nay, I believe it impossible from the state of health he was in at that time. I may say further that when I heard this report I was at a good deal of pains to investigate the truth of it, and tracing it back I could carry it no further than it was a report that prevailed among the guard at the door of the zenana, and from the situation of this guard to the zenana it was impossible they could be 2l8 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. acquainted with any circumstances that passed within, as the apart- ments of the women were at such a distance from the gateway where the guard were placed. There was another motive which induced me to disbelieve the report, which was that a few days after this happened the women were carried to camp, where he would have a much better opportunity of doing it without detection had he been disposed or able.' Question by Francis : — ' Do you know or believe that the Vizier entered the zenanas of the wives of any of the Rohilla chiefs ? * It is impossible for me to answer with any degree of precision, from the zenanas being spacious places consisting of many apart- ments, many of which are not occupied by women. I never knew of his going into any of them at Pilibhit ; I can positively say he did not, for he never went into the town of Pilibhit. At Bisauli, I have heard that he frequently went into the zenana there, but to the best of my remembrance it was after the women were removed to camp, and that he was fitting up the zenanas for the reception of his own family during the time he was going to Pathargarh.' Questions by General Clavering : — 1 Do you not know that Colonel Champion made representations to the Vizier of cruelties exercised by his troops in the Rohilla country ? ' I have heard Colonel Champion say that he had remonstrated to the Vizier against the burning of any villages, but I was not present at any such remonstrance. I further heard him say that he had used his offices with the Vizier to persuade him to treat the captive families of the Rohilla chiefs with more humanity and tenderness, and that upon these occasions the Vizier denied having treated them with severity. 'Do you imagine that Colonel Champion would have made such representations to the Vizier if he had not been persuaded that the facts were true ? 'The burning of the villages was evident, and I can say with confidence that Colonel Champion would not have made application to the Vizier for the remedy of evils which he did not believe to exist. 'Whether you do not think that the Commander of the army was in a situation to be better informed of transactions of that nature than yourself? 1 With respect to the burning of the villages and matters of that nature, with all deference to the Commander-in-Chief, I humbly con- ceive that I had as good opportunity of being acquainted as any one ; with respect to the treatment of the captive families, I conceive he XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 219 must have had better opportunities of information than me, as he might have received letters from them on the subject which I did not.' Question by Colonel Monson : — 'What induced the Vizier to enter the zenana at Bisauli after the women had been removed from it ? 1 To look for treasure was his first motive, and to set up the zenana for his own women was his secondary.' Some quotations have already been made from the evidence given by Major Balfour before the House of Commons on the 1 ith May, 1786 1 . The following extracts contain everything else of importance which he then said regarding the treatment of the Rohillas. After he had stated that he had been in the service of the East India Company for more than twenty years, and had served with Colonel Champion in the Rohilla campaign, his ex- amination proceeded as follows : — 1 Do you conceive that the Rohilla war was carried on with extra- ordinary circumstances of cruelty ? • I do not, by any means. 'Were reports spread in the English camp that Shuja-ud-daula had committed several acts of cruelty during that war ? 1 There were reports spread ; but I afterwards understood that there were no good foundations for them. One notorious circum- stance was reported, that he had ravished a woman of rank, and that she had stabbed him and afterwards stabbed herself; that was very generally believed. I had afterwards an opportunity, by residing a long time in the country, to know that it was an absolute untruth. 1 Were many towns or villages destroyed during the campaign ? 'On the army's first entering the country, there were several vil- lages destroyed ; but after our engagement with the Rohilla army, which happened eight days after entering the country, I did not know of any villages being destroyed, nor of any towns at all being destroyed. 'Were the inhabitants of the country, the husbandmen and me- chanics, prevented from following their occupations by the war, or were they disturbed in their possessions ? ' On our first entering the country, the inhabitants fled on all sides ; but after the action with the Rohillas, in which Hafiz Rahmat was killed, and the Rohilla army defeated, I understood that the Vizier 1 See p. 186. 220 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. sent out his own Aumils to protect the inhabitants and encourage them in peaceable occupations. 1 Did you march back through the Rohilla country after the treaty of Laldhang ? 'I did ; I first accompanied Faizullah Khan to his capital. I re- mained with him there for about six weeks, till he was established in his jagheer. * When you marched back to Oudh, at the end of those six weeks, what was the state of the cultivation of Rohilkhand at that time ? 'It was very much the same as at the time when we entered it, which was about eight months before. The conquest of the country might occasion a temporary interruption to the cultivation of lands, but the ryots were returning to their villages and things were going on as formerly. 1 When did you command in Rohilkhand ? 'I got the command there in March 1778, and commanded there until April 1781. 'Was Bareilly your head quarters at'that time? 4 It was. 'What was the state of Hafiz Rahmat's family when you com- manded in Rohilkhand ? ' Such of them as resided there (I cannot be certain how many of them) had houses and gardens allowed them, such as they chose, and they were indulged with renting such lands, small villages, as they wished to have for their own immediate convenience, for supplying their necessaries, at a lower rent than what other lands were usually let for ; and it was my particular instructions from the Resident at the Vizier's court to treat them with every respect and attention, and to see that the same was shown to them by others. 'Were they under confinement during any part of 1780? 'Never in confinement, during any part of the time that I com- manded in Rohilkhand. 'Are the principal towns in Rohilkhand in ruins? 'Not the towns. Many of the residences of the Rohilla chiefs, from being uninhabited, by their expulsion from the country, were going to ruin, but I confine this entirely to their palaces.' The whole of the recorded evidence of the English offi- cers who took part in the war, in regard to the cruelties said to have been committed by the Vizier, has now been given. I will next quote the statements made by the Vizier himself. On the 28th November, 1774, Hastings received from him a letter filled with complaints against Colonel Champion, and accusing the English of having committed violent XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 221 outrages on the people of the country 1 . He referred in the following terms to the charges of cruelty to the family of Hafiz Rahmat : — 'Some time ago you received letters from some gentlemen con- cerning the affairs of the family of Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Inayat Khan. The English gentlemen first began this method ; I therefore have written all the above particulars for your information. The affair of Hafiz Rahmat Khan's family is as follows : The Colonel sent a message to me that the family of Hafiz Rahmat were dying with hunger ; that a storm had one day thrown down the purdas of the tent of Hafiz Rahmat Khan's family, and left the men and women exposed. I went to visit the Colonel, and returned an answer to his message that I sent provisions from my own sircar daily for their support ; and that with respect to the purdas which were thrown down by the violence of the wind, I could not help it, that I had no authority over the winds to still them ; and that if I had not supplied them with provisions what means had they taken to preserve their existence. My friend, the family of Hafiz Rahmat Khan is well supplied with provisions, and three thousand rupees per month is appointed for this purpose. I have no power with God to prevent the violence of the wind. Consider well these particulars. Let prisoners be ever so well treated and supplied with necessaries, still confinement is uncomfortable. Whoever has lost a father and brother in war, has fallen from the dignity of a throne and become a prisoner, will undoubtedly suffer much misery. I have written this long account that you may be informed of every affair. I have related them all more particularly to Colonel Macleane who will inform you of them. Mr. Middleton will also write you on these subjects. I am very much pleased with Mr. Middleton's good conduct: he is a sensible and intelligent man, and a sincere well-wisher of mine ; I therefore consult him on all affairs, and have been spoken to on this subject by the Colonel, who says that Mr. Middleton was ap- pointed to collect the money due to the Company, and that he has no business to interfere in any other matter V The native historians of the time do not add much to our knowledge, but Mustajab Khan, the son of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, has noticed in the Gulistan-i-Rahmat the treatment of some of the Rohilla chiefs and of his father's family 1 See sup. p. 202, and p. 211. by Colonel Macleane,' and it was 2 Clavering, Monson, and Francis, afterwards insinuated that this was in a Minute dated 25th February, done with the knowledge of Hastings. 1775, wrote regarding this letter from He indignantly denied all knowledge the Vizier that they had ' some reason of the circumstances under which the to think it was fabricated and advised letter was written. See Appendix D. 222 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. during and after the war. Respecting excesses or cruelties committed in the course of the campaign he does not say a word. We are told that after the defeat of the Rohillas two of the sons of Hafiz Rahmat, Mohabbat Khan and Zulfikar Khan, went to the Vizier's camp. They were honourably received and admitted to an audience by Shuja-ud-daula, 'who pretended to lament that he had been compelled to take up arms against their father, and assured them with a solemn oath that he would make a handsome provision for them.' A few days later, ac- cording to the same work, Mohabbat Khan was called on by the Vizier to point out the spot where the treasure of Hafiz was buried, to which he replied that his father had no treasure but the affection of his subjects; the Vizier then required the ladies of the family to deliver up their ornaments, and ordered the women to be removed to tents in order that their rooms might be searched for the sup- posed treasure ; soldiers were posted at the tents, osten- sibly to protect them from thieves, but in reality to prevent any persons from escaping; the Vizier afterwards sent a message to Mohabbat Khan to the effect that he had been prevented by illness from receiving his visits, but that he hoped to see him in a few days ; on the arrival of Shuja- ud-daula at Bisauli, soon afterwards, he was reminded of his promises, * but, as he never intended to fulfil those en- gagements, he put an end to remonstrances by confining Fatehullah Khan and Mohibullah Khan, the sons of Dundi Khan, and then confiscated their property ' ; the whole family of Hafiz Rahmat Khan were sent to Allahabad, where most of them remained until the following January, when Shuja-ud-daula died ; his successor, Asuf-ud-daula, ' stopped the allowance of one thousand rupees per month which had been made by his father to Mohabbat Khan, and even the paltry allowance of one hundred rupees per diem for the support of the families confined in the fort of Allahabad was so irregularly paid that they were not unfrequently in distress for food ' ; some months afterwards, in consequence of the interference of the British Govern- XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 22$ ment, the family of Hafiz were released and went to Lucknow. 'After much discussion, the Nawab agreed to grant an annual pension of one lakh of rupees for the support of the families of Hafiz Rahmat Khan and Dundi Khan, in the proportion of 65,000 rupees to the former and 35,000 rupees to the latter ; Fattehullah and Mohi- bullah, the sons of Dundi Khan, joined the Nawab Najf Khan at Delhi, in the hope that he would provide for them; but being dis- appointed, they fixed their residence at Rampur, while the majority of Hafiz Rahmat's sons remained at Lucknow, subsisting on the small allowance procured for them by the British Government V The only remaining evidence on this subject is contained in Hamilton's History. It possesses a special value because, as I have already explained, it may be assumed to re- present the views of Faizullah Khan. Mohibullah Khan and Fattehullah Khan, the sons of Dundi Khan, were, it will be remembered, the only Rohilla chiefs named by Colonel Champion as having been ill-treated by the Vizier. 'Mohibullah Khan and his brother Fattehulla, depending much upon the assurances which they had received from the Vizier previous to the battle of Kattra, although they had forfeited all title to this de- pendence by joining their friends in the engagement, retired to Bisauli, their own city, and there remained. The Begum, widow of Saidullah Khan, who resided at Aonla, on learning the death of Hafiz Rahmat, and the defeat of the Rohilla forces, immediately despatched a mes- senger to Shuja-ud-daula, " requesting to know his pleasure with re- spect to her, whether he meant that she should surrender up her effects, or rely upon his generosity." In reply to this the Vizier immediately ordered two of his confidential servants to wait upon the Begum, " to assure her of his favourable intentions towards her, and to request her not for a moment to admit any doubt or apprehension into her mind, nor by ill-grounded fears to disseminate confusion and terror in the city of Aonla : that her annual allowance which, under the Rohilla chiefs, had never exceeded 50,000 rupees per annum, should be in- creased to something more proportionable to her rank and situation, and that she might hope for everything from his future kindness." Confiding in these declarations, the Begum remained at Aonla, and thereby preserved the tranquillity of the city, where there was no more 1 Gulistan-i-Rahmat ; pp. 1 21-130. 224 THE R0H1LLA WAR. [Ch. appearance of disturbance or disorder than if nothing extraordinary had happened. The family of Hafiz Rahmat, with a torpid apathy which is not easy to be accounted for, took no measures either for flight or defence, but continued quietly in the fort of Pilibhit, appa- rently little moved by the late (to them) dreadful catastrophe. Zulficar Khan, Hafiz's eldest son, who had fled to Bareilly immediately after the battle, when he heard of Mohammed Yar Khan being at Aonla, went and joined him at that place. . . . The family of Hafiz Rahmat, on hearing of the Vizier's approach [to Pilibhit], were rather pleased than alarmed at the intelligence, as their greatest dread arose from the apprehension of some of the Rohillas taking their opportunity to retaliate upon them the former exactions of their deceased chief, against which they hoped under the shelter of the English and the Vizier, to find a permanent protection. "In short," says the [Rohilla] narrator, " misfortune and infatuation was their lot, in that they did not think of taking refuge in the intrenchments at the foot of the hills, which were at so inconsiderable a distance, and where, under the guardian- ship of Faizullah Khan, their honour and their property would have remained secure and untouched, and they would have experienced every kind of attention and regard from that benignity for which he is so justly famed." The event, indeed, soon evinced the folly of their inactivity. The garrison had already abandoned the place ; so that, upon the allied troops appearing before it, it was surrendered without any resistance, and the family of Hafiz Rahmat, together with such treasure, jewels, &c, as remained from the wreck of his fortune, fell into the hands of the Vizier without stipulation or condition ; and the next day all the women and children were put into palanquins and other covered carriages, and sent off under a strong guard to Aonla, whither the Vizier accompanied them. . . . The two brothers, Mohi- bullah Khan and Fattehullah, when they beheld the fate of Hafiz Rahmat's family, began to entertain some doubts of the Vizier's in- tentions with respect to themselves, especially as they were conscious that by their breach of a private agreement previously understood (in joining Hafiz Rahmat in the battle, notwithstanding their acceptance of the overtures from the Vizier) they must in some measure be consi- dered as having forfeited that protection to which they might otherwise have laid claim. They therefore now resolved to divide the hazard, by one of the brothers proceeding to pay his respects to the Nabob, whilst the other should remain at Bisauli (where their families and treasures were deposited), and act as circumstances might direct. Accordingly, Fattehullah Khan proceeded to the Vizier's camp at Bareilly, and there, before he would venture to appear, solicited the mediation of Salar Jang (the Vizier's uncle) in his favour. Some of his friends endeavoured to dissuade the Rohilla from taking this step, and advised him rather to apply to the British commander, " as it was well known that when the English word was pledged it could be relied on, whereas no faith could be placed either in the Vizier himself or any XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 225 of his officers." Fattehullah, however, rejected this salutary counsel, and procuring an introduction to the Vizier the next day, immediately after being dismissed from audience, he was ordered into confinement. In the interim, Mohibullah Khan waited at Bisauli, under much anxiety to hear of his brother's success, and would have availed himself of the intelligence he received concerning his reception, by removing with the most valuable part of his treasure to join his countrymen at Laldhang; but his intention was at once frustrated by the unexpected appearance of Najf Khan, who arrived at Bisauli the same evening, and either guessing the Rohilla's design, or being furnished with previous instruc- tions, placed guards around his house, so that all hope of escape was extinguished ; and thus both the brothers experienced the natural effects of their indecisive and trimming policy. Had they boldly re- jected the Vizier's insidious offers in the first instance, and openly and gallantly shared the fortunes of their countrymen in their last retreat, their honour would still have remained untouched and their persons free ; but by acceeding to the Vizier's offers, and afterwards appearing against him in battle, they entailed upon themselves universal odium, and at the same time incurred his implacable resentment. The day before the arrival of the allied army at Bisauli, Mohammad Yar Khan [the brother of Faizullah Khan] came in, and being presented to the Vizier was very favourably received, nor did he ever afterwards suffer any molestation either in his person or family. Numbers of the other Rohillas, who had not accompanied their countrymen in their flight, on hearing this, came in, and found a similar reception. * Much has been said of the excessive cruelties practised on the family of Hafiz Rahmat ; the above, however, is all that is mentioned by the Rohilla narrator upon this subject, and notwithstanding every possible inquiry, the writer has never been able to discover a single document from which he might ascertain any one particular of this alleged ill-usage, unless the inconvenience necessarily attendant upon confinement and removal are to be treated as such V The following quotations are taken from the Sair-ul- Mutakherin, the author of which, Syad Gholam Husein Khan, states that he was intimately acquainted with the family of Hafiz Rahmat. They chiefly refer, however, to a later period : — 1 Shuja-ud-daula, after his signal victory, being become the master of the country, spread his victorious troops far and near, with orders to put to the sword every Rohilla that should appear in arms or did not submit ; and meanwhile he turned his thoughts towards quieting the country, bringing it under order and control, and annexing it to his own dominions. The rest of the Rohilla nation, struck with terror 1 Hamilton, pp. 244-252. Q 1%6 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. and dismay submitted, and all their chiefs reluctantly sent their obeisance.' After referring to the resistance offered by Faizullah Khan, and to the treaty by which Rampur and a part of Rohilkhand was restored to him, the historian thus con- tinues : — ' Thither he retired with the remains of his demolished nation, and there he applied himself to the improvement of the country, and there he now lives with dignity and splendour. The rest of the Rohilla princes, so far from being so much favoured by fortune, were left unnoticed, and some who were suspected of knowing of concealed hoards and treasures, suffered every hardship in a long confinement. I, the poor man, have seen at Lucknow most of the sons of Hafiz Rahmat and Dundi Khan, and it is from their own mouths I have learned their own history. It was a little after Shuja-ud-daula's death, and at the beginning of the reign of his son Asuf-ud-daula. It was at Lucknow that I became fully acquainted with them all, and also with a number of the principal persons that had a share in that expedition. But the most illustrious and valuable amongst these Rohilla princes was undoubtedly Mohabbat Khan, younger brother to Inayat Khan, which latter had once endeared himself to Shuja-ud-daula, by being his companion of arms in his expedition against Azimabad. This young prince seemed, by his figure as well as by his character, to be worthy of dominion, or at least to deserve a better fortune, but times were too hard and insensible, or at least too blind to pay a due attention to so much merit, and he was suffered to linger upon a small pension, quite inadequate to his rank in life (iooo or 1200 rupees per month), and that too at the very time when Faizullah Khan was complimented with a country that cannot yield less than twenty lakhs of rupees ; he, whose paternal possessions in the life-time of the Rohilla power never did afford above five lakhs a year ; a strange perverseness this ! And a strange infatuation of the times indeed V 1 Sair-ul-Mutakherin, vol. iii.p. 263. dent writes, 'to Mohabbat Khan, I See inf. Chap, xvii, where an extract was surprised to find a complaint from the same work is given with the made by another branch of the family remarks made by Hafiz Rahmat's son that they were starving. When I ap- on the death of Shuja-ud-daula. On plied to Mohabbat Khan for an ex- the 1 oth August, 1776, the Resident at planation of his not having made a Lucknow reported that all the mem- just distribution of the sum, as it was bers of the families of the Rohilla declaredly granted for their general chiefs had been released, and that support, he asked me with astonish- the Vizier had engaged to give them ment how I could expect it, as the a monthly allowance of 8333 rupees. complainants were his avowed ene- They quarrelled among themselves to mies, and he would himself sooner such an extent that it was difficult to starve than assist them.' Fifth Re- make any distribution of the money. port, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selec- ' On issuing some money,' the Resi- tions, vol. ii. p. 553. XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 22? Having now brought together all the evidence that I have been able to find in regard to the manner in which the Rohilla war was conducted, I must return for a moment to Mill's History. Although he had not seen the whole of the papers to which reference has been made in the present narrative, the greater part of the correspondence between Hastings and Colonel Champion and Middleton, and the evidence taken before the House of Commons was in his hands. With those papers before him, he de- liberately omitted all mention of the fact that Hastings,, in language as strong as it was possible to find, had re- peatedly expressed his detestation of the cruelties attri- buted to the Vizier, and had issued the instructions which seemed to him most likely to stop them. Not content with this suppression of the truth, Mill, in the passage that I have quoted 1 , has stated that Hastings defended the atrocities of the Vizier, and in proof of his assertion he has professed to quote the very words of Hastings himself. I do not use language too strong for the occasion when I say that a more baseless calumny was never recorded by one calling himself an historian. The words which Mill has cited are to be found, not in any reply to the representations of Colonel Champion while the war was in progress, but in a Minute written by Hastings on the ioth January, 1775, in answer to a letter, attacking him in unmeasured terms, which had been sent to the Court of Directors by Clavering, Monson, and Francis, who then formed the Majority in the Council. According to a custom very usual with him, Mill has separated from the context the particular words that suited his purpose, and suppressing the rest, he gives his garbled extract as the proof of a false and atrocious charge. In the letter from the Majority of the Council they had referred in the following terms to the cruelties said to have been committed by the Vizier : — * Para. 18. The united armies obtained a complete victory over the Rohilla chiefs on the 23rd April. From that time we must refer you 1 See p. 176. 328 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. to the letters recorded in your Consultations for the further operations of the Vizier, his barbarous and unnecessary devastation of the country, the cruelty with which he treated his unhappy prisoners, and par- ticularly the brutal outrages offered to their wives and daughters, though of the first rank. In the letters of Colonel Champion you will find a detail of these proceedings, which he calls wanton enormities (uncontradicted, though palliated by the Governor's private agent), which we doubt not will fill you with horror. We enclose copies of three of them, in order to excite and fix your attention to the rest. One paragraph in that of the 15th of June is so striking that we cannot forbear inserting it here : — " I am most heartily disposed to believe that the Board did not suspect their orders could have such con- sequences as have fallen out ; they could not have foreseen so sudden and so total an expulsion and downfall of a whole race of people ; they could not have supposed that a war, exalted and supported by British arms, could pay so very little deference to the advices and counsel of a British Commander ; nor was it possible to conceive that a man who had himself tasted the gall of misfortune should be so totally unmindful of the unbounded and unparalleled grace shown to him, as to delight in denying a single ray of benevolence to others ; such, however, has been the case ; and in due intimation of it I have dis- charged that which was incumbent upon me. I too can say that the Nabob, as the agent of oppression, is alone culpable ; but whilst all Asia know that the English give him the rod, and whilst they in vain look up to them as those who ought, if not direct the application at least to prevent an ill use being made of that rod, will they not reasonably conclude that the scourges which the agent gives are con- nived at ? Will they not say that every English chief is another Sujah 1 ?" 'Para. 19. These details, gentlemen, would probably never have reached your knowledge, if we had not called for Mr. Hastings' private correspondence with Colonel Champion and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton. Even now, that correspondence is laid before us in so broken and imperfect a state, and so many letters belonging to it confessedly withheld, that we do not for ourselves hesitate to conclude that facts and circumstances still more atrocious than any that appear are suppressed V The following extract gives the reply of Hastings 3 :— • 'Para. 18. An appeal to the passions is an insult to the under- standing. Such are the allegations of "barbarous and unnecessary devastation of the country," — the "cruelty with which the Vizier 1 This has been already quoted. 3 The numbers of the paragraphs See p. 197. in this extract correspond to those in 2 Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Letter the letter of the Majority of the Coun- to Court of Directors, dated 30th cil quoted above. November, 1774. XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 229 treated his unhappy prisoners," — "the brutal outrages offered to their wives and daughters, though of the highest rank," — " his wanton enormities," and the declamatory quotation from one of Colonel Champion's letters on the same subject. I believe it will appear from the evidence of Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's letters, and from the ex- amination of Colonel Leslie and Major Hannay, strongly corroborated even by the letters and depositions of Colonel Champion, the Vizier's principal accuser, that he has been unjustly traduced in the reports which have prevailed of the enormities committed by him in the course of the war. / believe it to be a truth that he began by sending detach?ne?its to plunder. This I pro?iounce to have been both barbarous and impolitic, but too much justified by the practice of war established among all the nations of the East, and, I am sorry to add, by our own, in an instance which the Vizier has a right to quote in vindication of the charge against hi?n, of a detachment employed in the war, in which we were engaged with him in the year 1 764, to burn and ravage the country 1 . It fell to the lot of Colonel, then Major Champion to execute this commission, and how well he discharged it, and how little his feelings were at that time affected by the same scene of barbarities and " wanton enormities " against which he has lately so pathetically exclaimed, will appear from the following copy of a letter from him on the subject, to the late President, Mr. Vansittart, which I quote, not meaning to reproach him with having done the duty assigned him, but to prove that the principle which dictated to Colonel Champion the severe charges with which he has laboured to load the Vizier in the late campaign, was either personal animosity or the desire of persuading the Board to grant him the power which he repeatedly solicited — to control, and, in effect, to command the Vizier. I pretend not to look into the hearts of others, but I exercise the right allowed to all mankind of judging of intentions by facts, and I appeal to Colonel Champion's correspondence with the Select Committee and the Board for the grounds on which I form my judgment, and on which every man who reads them may judge for himself. The letter above alluded to is as follows : — Extract of a letter from Major Champion to Henry Vansittart, Esq., dated 20th June, 1764. " Two separate parties have been sent into the enemy's country, the one of which went as high up as Buxar, and according to the di- rection given me, there are destroyed upwards of a thousa?id villages. Had not the rain, &r*c., prevented us, which occasioned our return, we should have done very considerable more damage 1 . I am now marching in the borders of the Deva to the boundary of the Sircar country, to endeavour to bring in the zemindars, as not one of them of any considerable note is yet come in, nor has a rupee been collected from this country." 1 The cruelty with which the Vizier treated his unhappy prisoners forms the second charge against him. It is not even asserted (except 1 The words in italics have been quoted by Mill. 230 THE ROHILLA WAR, [Ch. in the instance which I shall proceed to in the third charge) that they suffered by actual violence, but that they were ill subsisted, and I believe this to be true. Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, whose letters contain the strongest character both of candour and truth, says that the Vizier did allow them too moderate a subsistence and that ill served ; his commands, though frequently repeated, being, in this as in every other instance, ill obeyed. The third charge is indeed of the blackest die, "of brutal outrages offered to the wives and daughters of the Rohillas, though of the highest rank." The only authority which the gentlemen of the Majority had for this horrid accusation, at least I recollect no other, was a letter from Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, who mentioned it only as an instance of the falsehoods which had been propagated to injure the Vizier, adding that the unhappy victims of his brutal lust, who could not survive their shame, but had put an end to their own lives, were still living and that the Vizier had never seen them. Colonel Champion's answer to the question proposed to him by the Board on this subject, namely, " Whether he had heard the report and believed there were grounds for it," is a striking instance of the little inclination he had to show favour to the Vizier, but amounts to the strongest conviction of the falsehood of this abomin- able history. He said, " he did hear such a report, but as to the grounds, he had none sufficient to prove the accusation, but the report was made to him." The charge of oppressing his new subjects has also been laid against the Vizier, and totally refuted by the depositions of Colonel Champion, Colonel Leslie, and Major Hannay, who all declare that the country enjoyed, even in the height of the war, a state of perfect tranquillity.' ' Para. 19. This contains a charge against me for suppression. In answer, I say that these details, if declamations are details, have appeared long ago in Colonel Champion's letters to the Select Com- mittee, complaining of the cruelties exercised by the Vizier, and in the repeated calls which they made upon him to produce the instances of them, which he replied to by repeating the same declamations, but producing no instances, at least none which in my judgment can warrant the smallest part of his invectives against him V Hastings then gives Colonel Champion's letter of the 1 2th June, 1774, which has been already quoted 2 . In the passages which have been quoted from the Minute of Hastings, he has stated the facts with truth, justice, and moderation. I have now brought together all the evidence that I have been able to find in regard to the atrocities said to 1 Minute of Appeal, Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. P- 1S0. » See p. 195. XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 231 have been committed in the Rohilla war. It may be summed up in a few sentences. The statement that atrocities were defended or excused by Hastings had its origin in a baseless falsehood. He did all in his power to cause the war to be conducted with humanity, and, considering all the circumstances of the case, his efforts were successful. From the time when the army of the Vizier entered Rohilkhand to the conclusion of the treaty of peace with Faizullah Khan, nearly six months elapsed. In the first week of this period, while hostilities were in progress, and in the three or four days which followed the defeat of the Rohillas, many villages were burned, and whatever pro- perty could be carried off was plundered. This occurred in a small tract of country between the Oudh frontier and Pilibhit. There was no serious loss of life or personal suffering, because the villages had been, for the most part, entirely deserted by their inhabitants, who, according to their established custom on the approach of danger, had fled to the Tarai and forest, taking with them their cattle and such valuables as they could easily remove. The rest of Rohilkhand, a country nearly as large as Belgium, was rapidly occupied without opposition, after the defeat of the Rohillas, and there is no reason to sup- pose that in any part of it, or at any time, any serious excesses were committed by the troops of the Vizier. Long before the submission of Faizullah Khan, the Hindu inhabitants, who constituted nearly the whole population, were, for the most part, following their usual occupations. There is nothing to show that they were anywhere exposed to any extraordinary hardship or ill-treatment beyond that inevitable in a time of war. In regard to the Rohillas, whose numbers were com- paratively very small, the story of their cruel extermina- tion is absolutely false, nor is there a particle of evidence that any atrocities were committed upon them at any time during the war. Excepting the men who fell in battle, 233 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. there is no evidence that any Rohilla was put to death, or was treated with any inhumanity. The only Rohillas who were compelled to leave Ro- hilkhand, other than the principal chiefs, were the soldiers actually under arms with Faizullah Khan. Under one of the conditions of the final treaty of peace, they crossed the Ganges into the friendly territory of Zabita Khan, their countryman. The rest of the Rohillas were unmolested, or went into Rampur, the Rohilla State assigned by treaty to Faizullah Khan, their recognised chief. The Rohilla chiefs were generally treated with considera- tion and lenity. Two of them only, the sons of Dundi Khan, who had broken engagements which they had entered into with the Vizier, were, not unjustly, punished with temporary confinement and confiscation of their pro- perty ; but they suffered no serious ill-treatment and they were soon released. The ladies of the families of Hafiz Rahmat and Dundi Khan, with their dependents, suffered much distress and inconvenience from their removal into camp, and from the absence of proper arrangements for their comfort and for their maintenance, and their jewels and personal ornaments were taken from them. The stories that they were, in any case, subjected to personal outrage or gross insult are abso- lutely false, without any vestige of foundation. There never was an Indian war in which excesses were not committed. To restrain from all violence troops like those of Shuja-ud-daula would have been impossible, even if their commanders had desired it. Hastings was stating a notorious fact when he said that it was unfortunately true not only that these excesses were the general practice in Eastern warfare, but that the Vizier might find examples of conduct on the part of British troops similar to that of which he had been accused. We all know how, even in more modern times, wars in India have been carried on. The horrors of the Mutinies of 1857 are still fresh in our memories. Even in European countries, and in the present century, terrible atrocities have been committed ; XV.] CRUELTIES OF THE VIZIER. 233 the strong will and stern discipline of Wellington could not always prevent in Spain cruelties towards a friendly people almost as abominable as any that have been perpetrated in India. If Hastings had not firmly resisted the lust of plunder which, as I have shown, pervaded the English army in Rohilkhand, I fear that it would not be the crimes of the Vizier alone that we should now be discussing. I do not doubt that this, like every other war, brought with it an amount of misery far worse than that of which any direct evidence is now before us, but at the same time it seems to me clear that Shuja-ud-daula would have been justified in saying that the campaign in Rohilkhand had been carried on with an absence of violence and bloodshed and generally with a degree of humanity altogether unusual in Indian warfare. Nor can I doubt that this result was mainly due to the remonstrances of Hastings. ' History,' writes Mr. Forrest, ' furnishes no more striking example of the growth and vitality of a slander. The Rohilla atrocities owe their birth to the malignity of Champion and Francis ; their growth to the rhetoric of Burke ; and their wide dif- fusion to the brilliancy and pellucid clearness of Macaulay's style 1 .' The only defect I can find in this perfectly just judgment is that in pronouncing it Mr. Forrest has for- gotten the History of James Mill 2 . 1 Forrest's Selections, Introduction, missing evidence relating to the con- p. xxxi. duct of the Rohilla War.' 2 See Appendix D : ' Note on some CHAPTER XVI. THE OBJECTS WITH WHICH THE ROHILLA WAR WAS UNDERTAKEN. The charge that the acquisition of money was the sole object of the war. — The statements in Mill's History. — Burke's First Charge against Hastings. — Macaulay's Essay. — Mill's suppression of the facts. — Accounts given by Hast- ings himself of the causes of the war. — His Defence before the House of Commons.— Despatch to the Court of Directors. — Minute by Hastings. — Ap- peal of Hastings to the Court of Directors. — Minute by Barwell. — The ac- quisition of money one of the reasons which induced Hastings to take part in the war. — His own admission of the fact. — The policy of Hastings wise and justifiable. — Security against Maratha invasion the primary object of the war. — The arrangements with the Vizier contained nothing unreasonable, — The peculiar conditions under which Hastings was placed. HAVE not hitherto noticed in detail one of the most serious charges brought against Hastings in connection with the Rohilla war, and have reserved it for separate consideration. It has often been asserted that the acquisition of money was the sole object for which the war was undertaken. This charge was brought by Burke and Francis and others of that time, it was repeated in Mill's History, and it was at last dressed up by Macaulay with a power of rhetoric which has made it universally known and almost univer- sally believed. 'A meeting,' Mill writes, 'was concerted between the Vizier and the Governor, which took place at Benares at the beginning of Septem- ber. The terms are memorable in which the cause and object of this interview are mentioned by the English chief. In his report to the Council at Calcutta, on the 4th of October, 1773, he says : * The Vizier THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 235 was at first very desirous of the assistance of an English force to put him in possession of the Rohilla country, lying north of his dominions and east of the Ganges. This has long been a favourite object of his wishes ; and you will recollect that the first occasion of my last visit was furnished by a proposal of this kind V The Governor-General was so far from revolting at this proposition, or hesitating to close with it, that he stimulated the Vizier to its execution. Money was the motive to this eager passion for the ruin of the Rohillas. " As this had long," says the English ruler, " been a favourite object of the Vizier, the Board judged with me that it might afford a fair occasion to urge the improvement of our alliance, by obtaining his assent to a more equit- able compensation for the expenses attending the aid which he occa- sionally received from our forces." The situation of the Company, he says, urged it upon them " as a measure necessary to its interest and safety. All our advices," he continues, " both public and private, re- presented the distresses of the Company at home as extreme. The letters from the Court of Directors called upon us most loudly for ample remittances, and a reduction of our military expenses. At the same time, such was the state of affairs in this Government, that for many years past the income of the year was found inadequate to its expense ; to defray which a heavy bond debt, amounting at one time to 125 lakhs of rupees had accumulated." It was accordingly stipulated that 40 lakhs of rupees, upon the accomplishment of the enterprise, should be advanced to the English by the Vizier, and a monthly allowance, equivalent to the computed expense, be provided for the troops engaged in that service. " By this," says the Governor, " a saving of near one-third of our military expenses would be effected during the period of such service ; the stipulation of 40 lakhs would afford an ample supply to our treasury ; the Vizier would be freed from a troublesome neighbourhood, and his dominions be much more defensible." In all this, we may allow, there was enough for con- venience and profit, both to the President and the Vizier V In this passage Mill has closely followed the method adopted by Burke in the following passage, taken from the first of the Charges against Hastings, presented to the House of Commons on the 4th of April, 1786 : — 'That the object avowed by the said Warren Hastings, and the motives urged by him, for employing the British arms in the utter ex- 1 The manner in which Mill ends gagement to pay him forty lakhs of his quotation at this point is charac- rupees for his protection against the teristic. The next sentence in the Marathas, but had actually supplied report of Hastings is as follows : 'He them with money when they appeared had certainly just grounds of resent- in arms against him.' ment against the chiefs of this nation, 2 History of British India, Book who had not only failed in their en- v. chap. 1. 2^6 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. tirpation of the Rohilla nation, are stated by himself in the following terms : — The acquisition of forty lakhs of rupees to the Company, and of so much specie added to the exhausted currency of our provinces ; that it would give wealth to the Nabob of Oudh, of which we should participate ; that the said Warren Hastings should always be ready to profess that he did reckon the probable acquisition of wealth among his reasons for taking up his arms against his neighbours ; that it would ease the Company of a considerable part of their military expense, and preserve their troops from inaction and relaxation of dis- cipline ; that the weak state of the Rohillas promised an easy con- quest of them ; and finally, that such was his idea of the Company's distress at home, added to his knowledge of their wants abroad, that he should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces, which saved so much of their pay and expenses.' I will not quote the passage in which, in his famous essay, Macaulay has translated into his own brilliant Eng- lish the clumsy sentences of Mill. That he never investi- gated the facts for himself is clear. With the exception of a few erroneous statements taken from the speeches or Charges of Burke, everything that he has written on the subject is traceable to Mill, nor can I blame him for be- lieving that Mill's authority might be accepted as conclu- sive. His version of the story of the Rohilla war is not history but rhetoric, and I do not propose to criticise it. The grave and deliberate allegations of Mill stand on a different footing from the rhetoric of Macaulay and the passionate invective of Burke. I have cited all that he has said in proof of his statement of the reasons for which the war was undertaken. Although it is brief, it appears to be conclusive. The sole authority quoted is that of Hastings himself; he is judged and condemned by his own words ; there is nothing to lead the reader to suppose that Hastings ever gave any other explanation of his motives. Out of the voluminous papers written by Hastings on the subject, Mill has referred to only one, the Appeal to the Court of Directors, dated the 3rd December, 1774. It fills thirteen closely printed pages, as large as those of a modern blue-book and from these Mill has selected and pieced together the seventeen lines by which he supports the assertion that according to Hastings' own admission XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. itf the object of the Rohilla war was money. A more com- plete suppression of the facts of history could hardly be found. Whether the alliance of the English with the Vizier in the war against the Rohillas was right or wrong, the fore- going narrative will have shown that it was not the result of any hasty resolution, but was the outcome of a long series of occurrences extending over several years. This cannot be shown more clearly than in the words of Hastings himself. In reply to the Charges of Burke, in his Defence before the House of Commons, in 1786, he entered at great length into the transactions connected with the Rohilla war, and I quote from it the following passages : — ' The dominions of the Nabob Shuja-ud-daula, our ally, lay open and exposed to that of the Rohillas, both consisting of one vast plain, without any natural line of division or obstruction between them ; and both were shut in by the same common boundary, the Ganges, closing them in the northern extremity with impenetrable mountains. The Marathas had successively attempted to possess themselves of this country ; and, but for the assistance of the Nabob's forces united with those of the Company, they would have succeeded. The Rohillas, though thus effectually and seasonably protected by the Nabob Shuja- ud-daula, had openly negotiated with the Marathas, and had shown manifest dispositions to unite with them against their defender. The same scenes might be renewed the next year, and repeatedly, with equal danger to the Nabob Shuja-ud-daula, whether the Marathas obtained complete possession of the country, or the Rohillas joined with them to carry their ravages into his. The Company's interests, which were at all times involved in the security of the Nabob Vizier's dominions, had acquired a strong additional tie by his recent engage- ments with them. The Rohillas had afforded him a just cause for war, and for all the consequences of it, by their repeated breach of engagement, and he had a right to our concurrence and assistance in the prosecution of it. These were the grounds for undertaking the war .... I shall recite the particulars of the origin, design, progress, conclusion, and effects of the Rohilla war. 1 In May 1 77 1, the King quitted Allahabad, and threw himself into the arms of the Marathas. In a few months afterwards he granted them sunnds, or charters, for the provinces of Kora, Karra, and Allahabad, or the lands immediately situated above the conflux of the rivers Ganges and Jumna, which we had before given to him. In January 1772, General Sir Robert Barker met the Nabob Shuja-ud- daula at Faizabad, who proposed various plans to counteract the 238 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. ambitious designs of the Marathas, who were then preparing to invade Rohilkhand. The General, by his own authority, ordered a battalion of sepoys for the defence of the lines at Cawnpore. The Governor, Mr. Cartier, and the Select Committee, on the 12th February, 1772, approved of the General's conduct, and authorised him to enter into negotiations on the part of the Company in support of the Nabob's views. On the 28th January, 1772, the General wrote to the Select Committee that the Nabob wished to protect the Rohillas and to treat with them, " which could not be done," he said, " without the consent of the English," for their letters " were written to him in a style as if he was one and the same with the English, and he doubted that without such a concurrence, they meant to do nothing with him alone." The dangerous consequences portended from these alarming symptoms are strongly described in the following extract from a letter of the General to the Select Committee, dated the 25th of February, 1772: — "I should imagine that if the Marathas succeed in their attempts of crossing the river, and make a rapid progress through the Rohilla country towards the Vizier's territories, as they have already given out that they intend cantoning at Lucknow, you will judge it necessary to advance a brigade nearer to His Excellency's dominions, for in this case the approach of the Marathas will be very quick." On the 28th February the General wrote that the Marathas had made good their passage of the river, and given a total defeat to the Rohillas posted at the fords to oppose them ; that he had therefore ordered the brigade at Dinapore to march immediately towards the Vizier's dominions, excusing his taking such a step without the authority of the Board, by " the exigency of the service." In this part of the Fifth Report of the Secret Committee, from which I draw this recital, I miss the reply which was written to Sir Robert Barker's letter, but I recollect that the Committee disapproved of the march of the brigade and counter- manded it. On the 9th of April the General wrote that " the Marathas had applied to the Nabob Shuja-ud-daula to be the mediator of their differences with the Rohillas, to which he was much inclined," and " was not to be diverted from this scheme," though the General had strenuously opposed it, and pressed him " rather to form an alliance with the Rohillas ; " the Nabob insisting " that he had no choice, for he must either join the Marathas in the total reduction of the Rohillas, or bring on a compromise between those powers ; for the alternative was an attack on his dominions after the reduction of the Rohillas, unless " (for so the sense follows in the construction) " the English forces would join to support him in the undertaking," preferably re- commended by the General ; and that " he had therefore sent Captain Gabriel Harper to Hafiz Rahmat, and would do his endeavours to pro- crastinate this treaty until he received the Committee's instructions." 'On the 13th of April, 1772, 1 succeeded to the office of President of the Council of Fort William, and from that day only I date my share of responsibility for the acts of the Government of Bengal. XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 239 ' On the 30th of the same month, the Select Committee for the first time entered into a consideration of the General's repeated references, and the sentiments recorded by them on that occasion most decidedly mark their— may I be allowed to change the person and say my — strenuous adherence to the cautious and defensive system enjoined by the Company. ' We approved the General's " endeavours to dissuade the Vizier from entering into any negotiations which might lead to an alliance with the Marathas, since we might by this means be precluded from taking such measures as the Company's exact orders might render necessary. But we could not approve of a promise being made to him of the junction of our forces in the prosecution of an offensive war ; the more especially, as the Court of Directors, in their letters by the Lapwing, had promised to furnish us with clear and precise instructions respecting our carrying hostilities against the Marathas at a distance from our own borders, which," we added, " might be soon expected, but which never came. We expressed some uneasiness at Captain Harper's deputation, and desired that he might be recalled as soon as he con- veniently could be, as we did not choose to appear as principals in these negotiations." In the meantime, the measures pursued by Sir Robert Barker had taken their course, and while I disavow any con- cern in them, I may add that they proved fortunate in their event. Captain Harper returned on the 21st of May, after having prevailed on Hafiz Rahmat to agree to a personal meeting with the Vizier ; the consequence of which was, that on the 17th of June a treaty of alliance was concluded and reciprocally interchanged between the Rohilla chiefs and the Nabob Shuja-ud-daula ; and a separate agree- ment on the part of the Rohillas to pay forty lakhs of rupees to the Nabob Vizier for the expulsion of the Marathas, " whether effected by peace or war ; " ten lakhs to be paid on the immediate effect of his march, " enabling the families of the Rohillas to leave the woods and return to their habitations," the rest in three years. 1 Both deeds were executed in the presence of Sir Robert Barker, and his signature affixed to both as a witness to them. But the same act made him the guarantee of both ; and virtually, by his representation, extended the same obligation to the Company ; for it has been shown that he was the instrument of the negotiation, and that the Rohillas themselves had refused to treat with the Nabob alone, that is, without the junction of the English name and faith with his. ' Thus it appears that by a regular and natural gradation of events, the Government of Bengal found itself entangled in the first move- ments of a war which it had sought to avoid, but which was in its prin- ciple and object defensive, and though extending beyond the line of its prescribed operations, had been recently marked out as an excep- tion by the Court of Directors, in their General Letter of the 28th August, 1 77 1, which is that to which the Select Committee alluded in their instructions to Sir Robert Barker of the 30th of April j and that 240 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. whether the measures which led to this crisis of affairs were right or wrong, or whether the events which produced it might or ought to have been directed in another direction, I myself have no concern in either question. The movements of the machine (if I may be allowed the figure) had received their first impulse from other hands, before the charge of it could be affirmed in any sense to have devolved to mine, and were independent of me. In this state, progress, and direction, I received the share allotted to me in its management ; and to these, even in the subsequent conduct of it, my judgment was necessarily compelled to bind itself, whether I approved the part or disapproved it.' That ' gradation of events,' of which Hastings spoke, and of which he has here given a summary, affords stronger evidence of the causes which led to the Rohilla war than any other evidence that could be adduced. But as Mill has professed to explain those causes on the authority and in the words of Hastings himself, I will follow his example, and will show, in further detail, what Hastings has really said upon this subject. Several important papers in which, at various stages of his connection with the affairs of Rohilkhand, Hastings stated the reasons for the action which he thought it neces- sary to take, have already been noticed in this work *. I will now give others. Some of them are so long that they cannot be quoted in extenso, but I shall at least omit nothing which might in any way be supposed to support views different from my own. 1 See in particular the letter to sideration of the expense and risk in- Colonel Champion, dated 17th June, curred in their protection. They ob- 1774. Sup. p. 147. In an interesting tained their safety and refused to pay letter to his friend Anderson, dated the price of it. We made war on 13th September, 1786, after his re- them, on just grounds surely, unless turn to England, Hastings, referring any other process than that of the to his reasons for undertaking the sword can be devised for recovering war, wrote as follows : — 'In the the rights of nations, defeated them originating connection and subse- with the death of their ungrateful and quent war with the Rohillas, he did perfidious leader, and annexed their what all States ought to do. The dominion to that of Oudh, which invasion of their country threatened from that period became defensible ruin to that of our ally, whom he throughout.' Gleig, vol. iii. p. 303. The joined in repelling it, the Rohillas original draft of this letter, in Hastings' giving a solemn pledge in writing for own handwriting, is in the British the payment of twenty lakhs in con- Museum MSS. 29,170, vol. xxxix. XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 241 One of the most valuable of these papers is a despatch sent to the Court of Directors, immediately after the close of the war, written before the change of Government which transferred almost all authority into the hands of Clavering, Monson, and Francis, and before any discussion had begun regarding the propriety of the war or the reasons for which it was undertaken : — 'As we have undoubted though not regular intelligence of the Rohilla war beipg actually ended by a treaty between the Vizier and Faizullah Khan, we think it proper to recapitulate the causes on which this war was founded, and the advantages which have resulted from it. i You were informed by our advices of 1772 and 1773 of the neces- sity which induced us to carry our arms beyond the prescribed line of your instructions into the Rohilla country, for its defence against the Marathas, whose rapid progress and unbounded ambition at that time threatened all Hindostan, and who had actually reduced the greater part of that country, through which the access was open to the Vizier, by the only quarter of his dominions wanting a defensible barrier. Our records at the time when this subject was debated will sufficiently manifest the extreme diffidence and reluctance with which we at last resolved to pass the line of the Vizier's dominions with our forces. The actual orders of the Company confined us within the limits of our own and his possessions ; yet they had promised to furnish us with instructions wherein a greater latitude of action on particular occasions would be allowed and recommended. These very promises certainly implied the possibility of cases happen- ing wherein more extensive measures were thought advisable and necessary. But the unsettled state of the Company's affairs at home has, we suppose, prevented us from receiving the promised directions for our conduct, and left us without a guide at a very critical conjuncture, which seemed to call for extraordinary measures, and an immediate exertion of our strength, to give a timely check to the accumulating progress of the Maratha power. Such were the circumstances and the occasion which first dictated to us the measure of passing the pre- scribed bounds. On this occasion, as declaredly on all others, we acted as if ignorant of the reports and advices from Europe, which informed us that the Company was precluded from resolving on any clear line of action ; that supervisors were appointed to supersede the actual Government of Bengal ; that a new administration was to be formed ; and that the right of the Company and the nation to the territorial possessions was still in debate. We considered ourselves as acting for the national benefit, and assumed an extraordinary but a dangerous degree of responsibility for the sake of promoting the attaining of that object. It was therefore resolved to expel the Marathas from R 242 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. the Rohilla country. The Vizier, whose aid had been solicited by the Rohillas, undertook their defence against the Marathas. An agreement was entered into for this purpose, and a solemn treaty ratified between the Vizier and Hafiz Rahmat Khan, in behalf, and with the express authority of all the other Rohilla chiefs, in the presence of General Sir Robert Barker, the Commander-in-Chief of our forces, by whom it was attested; wherein, this service being effected, the Rohilla chiefs bound themselves to pay to the Vizier the sum of forty lakhs of rupees. The Vizier accordingly took the field, joined by one of our brigades, and fulfilled his engagement by expelling the Marathas from the Rohilla possessions. Notwithstand- ing which, Hafiz Rahmat, and the rest of the Rohillas, peremptorily refused to acquit themselves of their part of the agreement ; and they not only thus infringed the treaty, by withholding the stipulation agreed upon, but treacherously assisted the Marathas against the Vizier with supplies of money, while he was actually engaged, by virtue of the treaty, in expelling them from the Rohilla country. This laid the foundation of the present war against the Rohillas, and was the first motive which induced us to join our aid to the Vizier in chastising them for their perfidy and breach of faith. * The agreement for entering with the Vizier upon this new measure appeared to us a fit occasion for establishing the Company's alliance with him upon the footing of more adequate advantage to them. Hitherto they had held the labouring oar. The heavy burden of an enormous military expense, under which they were ready to sink, they had constantly supported, while the Vizier, by the tenor of the treaty then existing, without contributing to ease the Company of this weight, experienced the principal and only immediate advantages resulting from it ; those acquired by the Company being remote, and consisting merely in the safety of his country, which was a barrier to theirs. Although we still continued without the lights which had been promised by the Court of Directors for the guidance of our conduct, yet in their letter of the 28th of August, 1771, they expressed in stronger terms than ever they had done before their intention, in certain cases, of authorising our departure from the defensive prin- ciples hitherto recommended and enjoined. These considerations determined us to avail ourselves of the present opportunity of aiding the Vizier against the Rohillas, as the means of obtaining the pro- posed advantages to the Company. 'With this view the President was deputed to give the Vizier a meeting at Benares, and to conclude a new form of alliance, in which he was authorised to comprehend the Rohilla enterprise, on such adequate and permanent terms as should indemnify the Company for the expenses at all times incurred in the Vizier's assistance, and to such other more immediate conditions as were suitable to their extraordinary service. A treaty was accordingly concluded, which in the original draft included both these objects, namely, the agreement XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 243 for the fixed monthly subsidy of 210,000 rupees, for the expenses of our troops when employed in his service, and the payment of forty lakhs of rupees for the projected reduction of the Rohillas. But the Rohilla expedition was at that time set aside, from the irresolution of the Vizier, while the subsidy which had been conceded in consi- deration of our consent to this proposal still remained an Article of the new treaty. The Vizier afterwards renewed his proposition to attack the Rohillas, and it was again debated in several successive meetings of the Board, as recorded in our proceedings of the 26th November, 1773, Wlt ^ tne reasons at large which determined us ulti- mately to resolve on a compliance with the Vizier's requisition. A brigade was accordingly ordered into his country for that purpose. Every circumstance that could possibly favour this enterprise, by an uncommon combination of political considerations and fortuitous events, operated in support of the measure. 1st. Justice to the Vizier, for the aggravated breach of treaty by the Rohilla chiefs. 2nd. The honour of the Company, pledged implicitly by General Barker's attes- tation for the accomplishment of this treaty, and which, added to their alliance with the Vizier, engaged us to see redress obtained for the perfidy of the Rohillas. 3rd. The completion of the line of defence of the Vizier's dominions by extending his boundary to the natural barrier formed by the northern chain of hills and the Ganges, and their junction. 4th. The acquisition of forty lakhs of rupees to the Company, and of so much specie added to the exhausted currency of their provinces. 5th. The subsidy of 210,000 rupees per month, for defraying the charges of one-third of our army employed with the Vizier. 6th. The urgent and recent orders of the Company for re- scinding charges, and procuring means to discharge the heavy debt at interest, heightened by the advices of their great distress at home. 7th. The absence of the Marathas from Hindostan, which left an open field for carrying the proposed plan into execution. 8th, and lastly. The intestine divisions and disunions in their State, which by engaging them fully at home, would prevent interruptions from their incursions, and leave a moral certainty of success to the enterprise. 1 These were the inducements which determined us to adopt this new plan of conduct, in opposition to which one powerful objection, and only one, occurred ; namely, the personal hazard we ran in undertaking so uncommon a measure, without positive instructions, at our own risk, with the eyes of the whole nation on the affairs of the Company, and the passions and prejudices of almost every man in England inflamed against the conduct of the Company and the characters of their servants ; notwithstanding which, we yielded to the strong necessity impressed upon us by the inducements above- mentioned, in spite of the suggestions and the checks of self-interests, which set continually before our eyes the dread of forfeiting the favour of our employers, and becoming the objects of popular invec- tive, and made us rejoice at every change in the Vizier's advices, R 2 244 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. which protracted the execution of the measures. At length however his resolution coinciding with our opinions, the enterprise was under- taken, and, if our intelligence be confirmed, it is now finally closed with that success which we had foreseen from the beginning. We shall then again return to the state of peace from which we emerged when we first engaged in the Rohilla expedition, with the actual pos- session, or acknowledged right, which the power of this Government can amply and effectually assert, of near seventy lakhs of rupees, acquired by the monthly subsidy and the stipulation ; and it rests with you to pass the ultimate judgment on our conduct V On the 24th October, 1774, three days after Clavering, Monson, and Francis had taken their seats in Council, Hastings recorded a ' Minute on the revenues and politics of the country,' desiring (he said) to assist the new Members by Maying before them a succinct view of each subject.' In this Minute, he referred in the following terms to the arrangements which had been made with the Vizier : — 'The alliance with the Nabob Shuja-ud-daula, the Vizier of the empire, is the only foreign connection in which this Government can be with propriety said to be engaged. This took place originally by the treaty formed by Lord Clive, at Allahabad, in the year 1765. By a new treaty with the Vizier, dated the 8th September, 1773, in consequence of an interview which I had with him at Benares, the monthly subsidy for the extraordinary expense of our forces employed in his assistance, was fixed at the sum of 210,000 rupees for one brigade, and the provinces of Cora and Allahabad were ceded to him for the sum of fifty lakhs of rupees, of which twenty lakhs were to be immediately due, and were accordingly paid ; fifteen lakhs were to be paid at the expiration of a year, and the remaining fifteen at the expiration of two years. At the same time the Vizier had solicited the aid of our troops, to reduce the Rohilla country lying on the north of his dominions between the Ganges and the mountains of Tibet. The immediate plea for these hostilities was the breach of faith, with which the Rohilla chiefs were charged in the supplies of money afforded by them to the Marathas, against whom they had solicited and obtained the Vizier's assistance under a solemn engage- ment to pay him forty lakhs of rupees on the departure of the Mara- thas, and for the refusing afterwards to fulfil that engagement. ( This enterprise, the design of which furnished the first occasion of my meeting with the Vizier, formed an article in the original draft of our treaty, but it was afterwards omitted at his desire, and I pro- mised that it should take place if it suited the affairs of the Company 1 Letter to the Court of Directors, 17th October, 1774, Fifth Report, App. No. 41. XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 245 at any other time, when he should find himself in a condition to re- sume it. Accordingly, in the month of January 1774, the Vizier made a formal requisition of the assistance of a brigade of the Com- pany's forces for the defence of his dominions, and for the prosecution of his former purpose of invading the country of the Rohillas. For this service he engaged to pay the Company, beside the stipulated monthly subsidy, forty lakhs of rupees when it should be concluded. The Vizier's request was granted : the 2nd Brigade was ordered on the service, and Colonel Champion, the Provisional Commander-in- Chief, appointed to the command. Having been joined by the Vizier and his troops, he entered the Rohilla borders on the 17th of April, and on the 23rd of the same month attacked and defeated the army of the Rohillas commanded by Hafiz Rahmat, their leader, who was killed in the action. This victory was decisive, no other enemy ap- peared in the field ; and the Vizier, having obtained possession of the greatest part of the country, both armies marched on the 7th of May to the city of Bisauli, where quarters were prepared for them, and it was intended they should pass the rains there : but the re- maining leaders of the Rohillas, having assembled forces under the command of Faizoolah Khan at Najabgar, a town on the northern frontier of the country, the Vizier apprehending their acquiring too great strength, and that the Marathas might return to interrupt the operations before they were brought to a conclusion, prevailed on Colonel Champion to put the brigade again in motion about the latter end of July, and to march with him against the enemy, although the rains were then at their height. The troops enjoyed remarkable good health, and proceeded without opposition to Pathargarh ; the enemy flying before them to the skirts of the hills whither the com- bined armies have followed them. They have lain for a considerable time within a short distance of each other, Colonel Champion waiting for orders from the Select Committee to pursue the enemy beyond the line to which he conceived himself limited by his instructions : the necessary orders were sent, and we have been for some time past in daily expectation of hearing that the war was brought to a con- clusion, either by the attack and defeat of the enemy, or by negocia- tion. The last letters from Colonel Champion which you, gentlemen, have read, were dated the 2nd instant, and advise that Faizoolah Khan had delivered himself up, but that the negociation was still continued. 'The advantages proposed from the expedition were: — 1st, an addition of territory, and of course of wealth, to the Vizier, in which the Company will always participate ; 2nd, the completion of the defensive line of his dominions by freeing them from an inconvenient neighbour and by taking into them the whole space included between the Ganges and the northern mountains ; 3rd, the employment of a third part of our force, and a saving at the same time of its expenses ; and lastly, the stipulation of forty lakhs to be paid on the conclusion of the 246 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. undertaking. The retreat of the Marathas to their ancient territories, and the violent dissensions which had arisen in their State, were argu- ments strongly favouring the time which was chosen for beginning the war ; and the justice of it is supported by the undoubted refusal of Hafiz Rahmat to fulfil the conditions of his treaty with the Vizier, of which the original, witnessed by General Sir Robert Barker, is in our possession. . . . ' The bounds which I had prescribed to myself in this paper, and which I have already exceeded, will not admit of my entering into a discussion of the benefits depending on the alliance of the Company with the Vizier. These will appear at large on various parts of our records, to which I shall hereafter distinctly refer. They may be reduced to the following abridgement ; a secure barrier, a constant occupation for a part of our army, a reduction of our military ex- penses, and an accumulating fund of future wealth. He cannot long subsist without our protection, and is incapable of himself becoming an object of our jealousy or apprehension V My next quotation is from the ' Appeal to the Court of Directors/ written by Hastings on the 3rd of December, 1774, in reply to the virulent attacks made upon him by Francis and his colleagues. It is very long, and my ex- tracts from it would have been shorter but for the fact that this is the only paper quoted by Mill as the authority for his charge against Hastings. 'As the Rohilla war has been the declared source of the most violent measures adopted by the Majority of the Council, I shall briefly recapitulate the grounds and objects of that enterprise, and then proceed to answer the various arguments which have been urged in condemnation of it. 'In the beginning of the year 1772, the Marathas invaded the country of the Rohillas, which after a short but ineffectual opposition at Sukkertole was left at large exposed to their ravages. The Vizier, alarmed at their approach to the only part of his dominions which was easily accessible by such an enemy, applied with such earnestness to Sir Robert Barker, who was at that time with him, for the assist- ance of an English force, and the General thought the necessity so urgent, that of his own authority he sent orders to the 1st Brigade, which was stationed at Dinapore, to march instantly into the province of Oudh. The Board disapproving this irregular proceeding refused their confirmation of it, and the brigade having reached the length of Benares remained there till the beginning of June and then re- turned to its former station. The Vizier availing himself of this move- 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 116. XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 247 ment, offered his protection to the Rohillas and entered into a general treaty of alliance with the chiefs of that nation, and a separate one with Hafiz Rahmat Khan their principal, who, in their name and with their authority, engaged to pay him forty lakhs of rupees for that support whenever the Marathas evacuated the country. Trans- lations of both the treaties are recorded at length in the Consultation of the 23rd July, 1772, and the original of the latter is in the actual possession of the Secretary, attested by General Barker, who was present at the ratification of both. On the approach of the rainy season, the Marathas evacuted the country, and the Vizier demanded the stipulated recompense from the Rohillas, but they evaded pay- ment. 'In the latter end of 1772, the Marathas having extorted from the King a grant of the districts of Kora and Karra, which had been ceded to him by the Company for the express purpose of maintaining his dignity, were preparing to take possession, and as this acquisition would have made them masters of the whole tract of country lying between the rivers Ganges and Jumna, and bordering upon the pro- vince of Oudh, the Vizier again applied for assistance to repel such dangerous neighbours. The Proceedings of the late Council, in their Secret Department of the 1st February, 1773, treat this subject veiy largely, and show how much they considered not only the safety of the Vizier but even of the Company's possessions, to be endangered by this formidable encroachment of the Maratha State. It was ulti- mately concluded to comply with the requisition of the Vizier, by sending the 1st Brigade for the protection of his dominions against any attempt which the Marathas might make on them, and also determined to prevent their design on Kora, by taking prior pos- session for the Company, who had certainly the best title to it, when the King could no longer keep it. It was not supposed that the Marathas would quietly submit to the loss of a territory which they had used the most perfidious means to obtain, and every precaution was therefore necessary to guard against their efforts to recover it. The Company's orders of the 28th August, 1771, expressly allowed the necessity of departing on some occasions from the limited plan which they had for a long time enjoined, and in consequence the Rohilla country, north of the Ganges, was included within the line of action prescribed to the General in his instructions; because, if the Marathas, either by the defeat, or which was as likely to happen, by the desertion of the Rohillas to their cause, should gain a footing in that country, nothing could oppose their entering into the province of Oudh, and laying it waste, in spite of any attempt of our forces united with the Vizier's to prevent them. It was not to be supposed that the Marathas, whose ambition for some years past had aspired to universal conquest, and who had extended their arms from the centre of the Balaghaut to the northern extremity of Hindostan, should sit down contented when they had added the Doab, Kora, 248 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. and Allahabad to their dominions ; on the contrary, there was every reason to apprehend, and it was publicly reported in their own camp, that they would next carry their operations into the country of the Vizier, and even into the Company's own possessions. On the grounds which I have described, it was agreed to maintain the province of Kora against the Marathas, and afterwards to extend our arms beyond the prescribed line of the dominions- of our ally into the Rohilla country by a discretional latitude allowed the General as above mentioned, which he accordingly made use of by marching the brigade as far as Ramghat ; and we have the strongest reason to believe that it was attended with every immediate advantage which we had projected from such a measure, as the Marathas lay during the whole campaign of 1773 in the neighbourhood of our army, but without daring either to cross the river or to approach the borders of Kora ; and before the setting in of the rains of that year, their domestic troubles obliged them to return into their own proper dominions. 1 Of the resolution to enter the Rohilla country for its defence against the Marathas, the Court of Directors were first advised by the general letter of the 31st of March, 1773, which arrived in England long before the departure of the transports. 'The effectual protection thus afforded the Rohillas, and the de- parture of the Marathas, having established beyond all contest the right of the Vizier to the forty lakhs which had been stipulated for this important service, and which by the terms of the engagement were really due the preceding year on the retreat of the Marathas from their country, he demanded payment of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, who refused it. The Vizier also accused him of having secretly encouraged the Marathas, and sent them a supply of money, and, if I mistake not, General Sir Robert Barker in some of his letters men- tions the same circumstance. The plea of justice thus coinciding with the principles of sound policy, which dictated to the Vizier the neces- sity of securing himself against the intrigues and perfidy of the Rohillas, who from their situation were most capable of hurting him in his contests with more powerful enemies, and from their natural weakness and the jealousy inseparable from it, would even seek for their safety in fomenting or joining in attempts against him, he formed the design of invading and reducing their country. As his own strength was unequal to such an undertaking, he solicited the aid of this Government for effecting it, and made an offer of fifty lakhs of rupees to be paid on its accomplishment. As this proposal was urged in the warmest terms, both in person to Sir Robert Barker, and in his letter to me, and this had long been a favourite project of the Vizier, the Board judged with me that it might afford a fair occasion to urge the improvement of our alliance by obtaining his assent to a more equitable compensation for the ex- pense attending the aid which he occasionally received from our XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 249 forces ', and to free the Company from the embarrassment to which they might be subjected by retaining the property and possessions of the remote districts of Kora and Allahabad. For this purpose, it was agreed that I should write the following letter to the Vizier, which I beg leave to quote at length, because it fixes the source of those engagements which took place by a progressive train of measures, and terminated in the Rohilla war ; and will mark, at least, that this was not the effect either of a precipitate and unweighed resolution, or a tame acquiescence in the Vizier's schemes of ambition, but the result of long deliberation, originally devised and consistently em- ployed as an instrument of promoting the interests of the Company, of perpetuating the dependence of their ally, and converting it to a channel of utility 2 . . . . ' The allurement thus held out to the Vizier succeeded. He pro- posed, in reply, a meeting with me at Benares, which took place accordingly. I found him still equally bent on the design of reducing the Rohillas, which I encouraged, as J had before done, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success 3 , but objecting with great force the orders of the Company, restricting us from such remote schemes of conquest, to which I therefore could not assent, without such conditions obtained in return for it as might obviate their displeasure, and win their sanction to so hazardous and unauthorised a measure. I told him that the Company had drawn themselves into great distress by the enormous load of their military expenses, one entire brigade being kept up for the sole purpose of maintaining a connection with him, since it was useless and un- necessary to the protection of our own provinces ; that if he wished, therefore, to avail himself of our aid, either in preventing or even in repelling the designs of his enemies, he must first agree to bear a more equal share of the burden of this expense, by paying the whole charge of the forces lent him for this service while they were so employed. To this, after much contention, he assented, and the sum of 210,000 rupees, which the General computed to be the amount of the expense, was fixed as the monthly subsidy to be paid for the brigade, whenever it should pass the borders of the province of Behar on his requisition. Having obtained this point, which I considered in the light of a perpetual military fund, I easily yielded my assent to the Rohilla plan, on the stipulation of forty lakhs for its accomplishment, ten lakhs being deducted from his first offer, on account of the difference which had taken place in the subsidy. 1 This agreement was no sooner made than he suddenly repented, desired to dedine the war with the Rohillas till a more favourable conjuncture, when he should be less embarrassed by other engage- 1 The words in italics have been Vizier has already been quoted. See quoted by Mill. sup. p. 87. 2 The letter from Hastings to the 3 Words in italics quoted by Mill. 250 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. ments, agreeing however to the monthly subsidy whenever his future occasions should oblige him to require the aid of our forces. Thus the Rohilla plan remained rather suspended than wholly abandoned, although it was left optional in our Government to reject or assent to it on a future occasion. Messrs. Lawrell and Vansittart, who were with me at the time, and to whom I made a daily communication in writing of the substance of every conversation which passed between the Vizier and myself, will vouch for the literal truth of this narrative, as corresponding with what I then repeated to them, and I believe it will appear from it, that although I had not engaged the Government by any express obligation to comply with any future application of the Vizier to support his pretensions on the Rohillas, yet as the most essential article of the treaty had originated from this design, and had been yielded to in consideration of my agreement to engage in it, it would have been dishonourable to decline the undertaking, when pro- posed under circumstances as favourable to its success, and to the general interests of the Company, as they were when I first offered to engage in it. ' Soon after my return to Calcutta the Vizier renewed the proposal for invading the Rohillas, and repeated his desire of engaging in it on the conditions before agreed on. A variety of arguments concurred to favour it at this particular time ; none to oppose it. The Marathas were so much occupied by their own dissensions that they could not even defend their possessions in the Doab, much less were they likely to interrupt the operations against the Rohillas. The King had no means of interference but by his General, Najf Khan, for whose at- tachment we had stronger security in his interest, and in his fear of his rival Abdul Ahmad Khan, than his master had in his allegiance. The Rohillas were too weak to resist so powerful an attack, and as their country was open and undefended either by defiles, woods, or fortresses, and in its greatest extent did not exceed 200 miles, its entire subjection did not require any length of time. To these induce- ments, which apply only to the success of the undertaking, other motives equally powerful engaged our attention to it as a measure necessary to the interests a?id safety of the Company. All our advices, both public and private, represented the distress of the Company at ho?ne as extreme. The letters of the Court of Directors called upon us most loudly for ample remittances and a reduction of our military expenses. At the same time, such was the state of affairs in this Government that for many years past the income of the year was found inadequate to its expense, to defray which a heavy bond debt, amounting at one time to 125 lakhs of rupees had accumulated 1 . The Board had bestowed much labour and time in the retrenchment of their expenses, but much remained yet to be done, and the resolutions which they had already formed required time to produce any visible effect. By allowing the Vizier the military aid which he required, a 1 Words in italics quoted by Mill. XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 1$ I saving of near one-third of our military expenses would be effected du?ing the period of such a service, the stipulation of forty lakhs would afford an a?nple supply to our treasury, and to the currency of the country, the Vizier would be freed fro?n a troublesome neighbour- hood, and his dominions would be made more defensible^, while his alliance with the Company subsisted, by being completely shut in between the river Ganges and the mountains, and his dependence on the Company would be increased by that extension of his possessions, as he himself was incapable of defending even his ancient possessions without our support. . . . ' We might have suffered the Marathas under cover of the King's grant to take possession of Kora and Allahabad, to have allied themselves with the Rohillas or established themselves in that territory, and lain with their armies unmolested on the borders of the open country of our ally the Vizier, till they had completed every preparation for invading it. Such a forbearance might perhaps have been vindicated by the plea that the Company had promised at the distance of two years preceding it to furnish us with their in- structions for a different conduct, and that, wanting those instructions, we took for our rule their latest orders on the subject, which enjoined us to confine our views to the bare security of our own possessions and those of our allies. This might have been a sure way to guard our characters against legal* imputation, although in fact it would have been inconsistent with the security required ; but it is not by such cold and prudential cautions that the British name has acquired such a lustre in India, nor that the British Empire in Bengal is likely to be perpetuated, neither is this the conduct which the Company demands of us. Their orders are enforced by a more liberal spirit, and allow in such cases as are not reducible to fixed and invariable positions, a discretional latitude for the zeal of their servants to exert itself for their security. . . . ' The Board has repeatedly declared in their general letters to the Court of Directors, their intention to adhere to the defensive line recommended to them, and confine their military operations within the limits of the Vizier's territories ; and such were their determina- tions when these letters were written, but at those times they had not fully experienced the inconveniences which attended our engage- ments with the Vizier in the prosecution of that system, nor had the remedy occurred which since presented itself in the conditions offered for prosecuting the Rohilla enterprise, and which has been success- fully applied. Our treaty of alliance obliged us to support the Vizier, when his possessions were threatened with invasion, at a heavy in- creased military expense, and the exportations of our currency, with our troops ; for three successive years these inconveniences had re- curred, and it is impossible to say how often they might recur. At last an occasion took place when, by a slight deviation from the defen- 1 Words in italics quoted by Mill. 252 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. sive plan, our alliance with the Vizier might be converted into solid advantages, the employment of our troops made to save near a third part of our military expenses, and the success of their operations to bring a large flow of currency, not only into the Company's territories, but into their treasury. In effect, the very same reasons which before urged us to shirk every military expedition, namely the expense at- tending it and the exportation of our currency, now operated in the contrary direction, and recommended the employment of our army for the purpose of reducing our expenses and adding to our currency. . . . My sentiments were the same invariably from the beginning, as will be seen from my report to the Board of my proceedings at Benares, and my Minute entered in the consultation above referred to. Private letters are not commonly admissible as authorities, but on this occa- sion I cannot produce a stronger both of my own fixed opinion from the first movement of this proposition, and of the apprehension which influenced the Board, and I confess myself also against it, than the following extract of a letter which I wrote to Mr. Sulivan by the first despatch after my return from Benares : " I was glad to be freed from the Rohilla expedition, because I was doubtful of the judgment which would have been passed upon it at home, where I see too much stress laid upon general maxims and too little attention given to cir- cumstances which require an exception to be made from them ; besides this, an opinion still prevails of the Vizier's great power and his treacherous designs against us, and I cannot expect that my word shall be taken as a proof of their non-existence. On the other hand, the absence of the Marathas and the weak state of the Rohillas pro- mised a?i easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea of the Company's distress at home^ added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, that I should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces that saved so much of their pay and expenses V ' When the measure was determined ^upon, and we had come to a general agreement, I was averse to introduce any new subject of debate, and therefore easily acquiesced in the expression of a wish entertained by the Board which might be construed as inconsistent with the resolution we had taken. My sentiments of the propriety of the expedition had undergone no change, but I will not deny that I felt myself influenced by the same fears which operated on the other Members of the Council, that the propriety of the measure might not be seen in the same light by our constituents, which we knew, from the temper of the times, might not only draw upon us their severe resentment, but aggravate the load of popular odium which has of late fallen on their servants, and, if I mistake not, these reasons were assigned in express terms upon our proceedings. The engagements between the Vizier and the Rohillas which have been already quoted, 1 The words printed in italics were of Charge, presented to the House of quoted by Burke in the First Article Commons, 4th April, 1786. XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 2$$ sufficiently evince the justice of the attack upon them ; they agreed to make him an acknowledgment of forty lakhs of rupees upon certain conditions ; he performed these conditions, and they refused to pay any part of the money they had promised. . . . The Marathas did not possess nor had any claim upon any part of the Rohilla country on the north of the Ganges when we undertook to assist the Vizier in the conquest of it. They might with more reason have attacked us for opposing them in their designs on the Kora district, of which they had obtained a grant from the King. But, in fact, a timid conduct would have been more likely to have involved us in a war with them, than either of those measures ; had they been allowed to subdue the Kora district and the country of the Rohillas, the Vizier's territories would have been open to their incursions, their numerous horse might have plundered it in spite of the efforts of our infantry, and their continued ravages might have obliged him to come to an accom- modation with them as was once apprehended, on terms which would have afforded them an easy entrance into our own provinces. In short, we are much better secured against their attacks than we should otherwise have been, and the better we are secured the less will they be disposed to attack us. . . . 'Merely for the defence of our own provinces, two brigades upon the present establishment are sufficient ; a third is necessary to add to our influence among the powers of Hindostan, to support our alliance with the Vizier, and to answer other exigencies, which may happen at a more remote period of time. Upon the late occasion, when the Ro- hilla expedition was undertaken, our apprehension of an invasion from the French had entirely ceased ; the dissensions among the Marathas fully employed them at home, and are mentioned among the secondary inducements in favour of the undertaking. There was no other enemy from whom we could have the least apprehension of danger; such was the occasion to be embraced for effecting our purpose by a temporary employment of a third part of our forces, and under such circumstances even without reckoning upon the acquisition which was the immediate object of the enterprise, to reduce the Company's military expenses by employing that proportion of their troops which was superfluous for the purpose of their own defence, was a great and manifest advantage ; but when the stipulated acquisition of forty lakhs and the political advantages resulting from the measure are super- added, the visionary idea of danger, which did not exist even in imagination at the time the expedition was undertaken, can have no weight as an objection ; especially as from our knowledge of the open and defenceless state of the Rohilla country we were morally certain that the undertaking would soon be brought to an issue. By our ancient treaty with the Vizier we are bound to assist him with our forces within his paternal dominions, and the distance between their borders, and the remotest part to which our troops have marched is only 200 miles. I will only add that so long as no immediate danger 254 THE ROHILLA WAR, [Ch. threatens our own provinces, it is my earnest wish that one of our three brigades might be constantly employed with the Vizier, as well to save so large a proportion of the expense to the Company, as to prevent the ill consequences of total inactivity to the army. The addition of territory acquired to the Vizier instead of raising him to be a dangerous neighbour serves to render him more dependent upon us than before, as he has more occasion for our assistance to enable him to maintain it and to support him against the claims of other powers. If his increase of wealth be an object of jealousy, let it be considered how largely the Company share in it. From September 1773 t0 September 1775, the sum we have to receive from him by our late engagement amounts to 130 lakhs of rupees. ' I have already remarked that the first proposition for the Rohilla war was made by the Vizier in a letter which I received from him in June 1773, tnat lt was employed afterwards in the negotiations at Benares as an instrument for winning his consent to the payment of the full expenses of our troops employed in his service, and that it was not finally resolved on till the 26th November, after the most ample discussion in the Select Committee and in the Council : it was there- fore not precipitately resolved on V . . „ I shall make one more quotation. It is taken from a Minute written in Calcutta, on the 21st November, 1774, by Barwell, the only Member of the new Government who had been a colleague of Hastings when the resolu- tion was taken to assist the Vizier in his conquest of Rohilkhand : — * Mr. Francis is pleased to say that whatever he may think of the Governor-General's opinion, he is astonished that I should declare for acting, if necessary, in defence of the Vizier's late acquisitions, which he thinks is contradictory to sound policy and to the Company's orders. I have already given reasons for my opinion, and I do not flatter myself with being able to add anything of greater force to effect an alteration in his ; however, I will endeavour to remove his surprise at my sentiments, by showing they are grounded on principles similar to his own, and that I think the measure I support perfectly consonant to sound policy and the spirit of the Company's instructions. It often happens with States that their situations are such that by extending their frontier they bring their line of defence to more prescribed, to more defined, narrow, and compact limits ; and it is an uncontroverted maxim in politics that natural boundaries are always the most secure. The territories of the Vizier, before his late acquisition, undoubtedly stood in this predicament. Towards that part of the Rohilla country he had no barrier of any kind ; he was not only exposed to the in- J Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 140. XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 255 cursions of these people, but also to those of the Marathas, who either by force or agreement were sure to obtain from the Rohillas a passage through their country to attack him, and we consequently were subject from the same cause to be annually called out in his defence. This is not mere speculation ; for two successive years, previous to the treaty of Benares, were we in the field to protect him from that quarter, and that upon the old stipulation of 115,000 rupees per month for our whole expenses. The Vizier endeavoured to form an alliance with these people, to obviate, if possible, the danger from their hostile enterprises : they entered into a treaty with him, broke it afterwards, and called in his enemies to protect them. In this situation, who can deny that it was the soundest policy in the Vizier to attempt their reduction ? How far it was similar policy in us to assist him is another question ; but it appears to me, that if the tranquillity and security of the Vizier's dominions be the object of our alliance with him, we cannot more effectually secure that object than by aiding to remove a constant cause of uneasiness and disturbance to him, and procure for him natural barriers to his dominions on the quarter where they were the most exposed. That the country in question affords this barrier is certain. It shelters him absolutely to the north by the Thibet mountains, and to the south and west by the Ganges, a river hazardous at all times for an enemy to cross. That it was on these ideas the Rohilla expedition was undertaken appears manifestly from the records of the Council and Select Committee, where that country is always mentioned standing in the predicament here defined ; and in effect its defence against the Marathas was taken up on these very grounds two years past, without any particular stipulation for the service, or contract for forty lakhs on its success. I trust I have sufficiently explained to the Board, and particularly to Mr. Francis, who is surprised at my declaring for the defence of the Rohilla country, the motives upon which I ground my opinion. I think I have clearly shown it was sound policy in the late Board to undertake the ex- pedition ; that the defence and security of the Vizier's dominions rendered it eligible ; that it had received mature consideration before it came recommended from the Chair; and that if what I have already pointed out are the objects of our alliance with the Vizier, often ap- proved by the Company, the late Administration could not have acted more conformably to their interests and intentions V The preceding narrative, and the numerous quotations that have been made from the papers written by Hastings, show clearly how far the desire of obtaining money to relieve the financial difficulties of the Company must be counted among the reasons which induced him to take 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 135. 256 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. part in the war. To deny that this was a consideration which had great influence on his decision would be as little in accordance with fact as any of the unfounded statements that I have attributed to his accusers. How- ever important the political advantages that he expected from the war may have appeared to him, he would not have embarked in it if he had not at the same time believed that it would be financially advantageous to the Company. This is a fact which he repeatedly avowed and justified. On the 30th of November, 1774, the Majority of the Council wrote to the Court of Directors : — 'We return,' they said, 'to the President's Minute, which soon explains the true motives and object of the war. " The situation of the Rohilla country must make the possession of it always a desirable object to the Vizier." As the truth of this assertion is not to be disputed, we shall only observe upon it, that the most barefaced ambition is seldom so explicit. "He would obtain, by this acquisition, a complete compact State, shut in effectually from foreign invasions ; it would give him wealth of which we should partake ; and security without any dangerous increase of power : and would undoubtedly, by bringing his frontier nearer to the Marathas, for whom singly he is no match, render him more dependent on us." In these lines it appears to us that there is but one intelligible proposition, viz., that by the conquest of the Rohillas the Vizier would obtain wealth of which we should partake. The expectation of sharing in the spoils of a people, who have given us no cause of quarrel whatsoever, is plainly avowed to be a motive for invading them. We believe there may have been instances of wars undertaken on principles as unwise and as unjust as these, but we doubt whether there ever was an example of the Chief of a great State professing to reckon the probable acquisition of wealth among his reasons for taking up arms against his neighbours V To this Hastings made the following reply : — ' This method of separating the parts of a proposition, and refuting them singly, without adverting to their relation with each other, is new and embarrassing. I own that the conveniency of possessing the Ro- hilla country was not a sufficient reason for invading it. I never said it was : but if they had afforded a just provocation for invading their country, and we saw advantages in invading it, though neither cause was alone sufficient to produce that effect, yet both united would 1 Fifth Report, App. No. 45, XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 2tf certainly justify it, and the most rigid speculator would approve so fair a conclusion. I hope I shall stand acquitted in the breasts of all reasonable men for maintaining the opinions quoted against me in the conclusion of this paragraph ; but I adopt it even in the words of my opponents ; and if I am "the Chief of a great State" alluded to by them, I shall be always ready to "profess that I do reckon the probable acquisition of wealth among my reasons for taking up arms against my neighbours." I never in any period of my life, though long engaged in public affairs, gave my consent for taking up arms in an unjust cause, and I never shall, but in cases of very notorious enormity, give my consent to take up arms in an unprofitable one V In his First Charge in the House of Commons, Burke quoted the words 'he had reckoned the probable acqui- sition of wealth among his reasons for taking up arms against his neighbours,' and in his Answer to the Charge, Hastings again repeated them. * I declare,' he said, ' most cheerfully and unreservedly, that I avow the principle ascribed to my declarations ; and have no doubt that whenever I have had occasion to repeat them, my words have accorded invariably, and at all periods of time, .with my general sentiments, which were and are an abhorrence of offensive wars undertaken on the exclusive principles of ambition, profit, or policy. But I will also avow that I would, without scruple, engage in an offensive war for the sake of retaliating an injury actually done, or of meeting the certain intentions of it. ... I presume that the principle which I have thus stated will be approved by the judgments of all rational men, as it is strictly conformable to the practice of all States in all ages. Wretched and contemptible indeed would be the condition of that Government which should preclude itself from contracting alliances or other engagements with foreign States, and invite the attacks of its less principled neighbours, by establishing it as a rule of fixed and in- variable policy never to commit hostilities but in the immediate re- sistance of actual invasion ; and equally irreconcilable with the common sense of mankind would be that policy which should restrict the efforts of a just war to the chastisement of wrong, and reject every advantage acquired by it.' Whatever view be taken of the propriety of engaging in the Rohilla war, enough has, I think, been said to show that the story of Hastings letting out the English troops for hire to slaughter an unoffending people, without cause or 1 Minute of Appeal, ioth January, 1775, Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 184. *Z$% THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. provocation, for the sole and infamous purpose of putting money into the pockets of his masters, is not true. It was invented by the malignity of Francis, it was adopted by Burke with an indignation of which the motives were honourable but which were blind and unreasoning, it was written down as history by Mill when the evidence of its falsehood was in his hands, and it was then thrown by Macaulay into the rhetorical shape in which it has ever since compelled acceptance from the majority of English- men. Before the war was undertaken, while it was in pro- gress, after it had been successfully completed, but when no hostile imputations connected with it had been made, and afterwards when Hastings had to defend himself against the attacks of his enemies, he never varied in the explanation of his policy. That policy was based on the necessity of guarding against the risk of ruin to ourselves and to our ally. The primary object of the war was to obtain security against the danger which at that time overshadowed all other considerations, that of invasion by the Marathas, who were not far from achieving that universal dominion over India which they openly declared to be their aim. To guard against this danger, Hastings, like Clive, his great predecessor, believed that no measure of precaution could be so efficacious as the maintenance of the territories of the Nawab Vizier of Oudh as a barrier between Bengal and the constantly troubled countries of Northern India. He believed that to secure this object it was necessary that the only road by which Oudh was easily accessible to the inroads of the Maratha armies should be closed. The only means by which this could be done was by the union of Rohilkhand with Oudh, and by the expulsion of the band of turbulent and faithless Afghans who, not many years before, had established themselves in the very quarter from which danger threatened. It had been proved by experi- ence that to obtain the desired security by an alliance with the Rohillas was impossible. A treaty had been entered into between the Rohilla chiefs and the Vizier, by which XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 259 the Vizier bound himself to protect Rohilkhand against the Marathas, and the Rohillas, on their part, engaged to pay- to him, in consideration of that protection, the sum of £500,000. Although the treaty was one to which we were not avowedly a party, it had been concluded with the strenuous co-operation and advice of our Commander-in- Chief, it had been attested by his signature, and it had been approved by our Government. We had given to the Vizier the active and effectual assistance of our army in enabling him to carry out his obligations, and had expelled the Marathas from Rohilkhand. The Rohillas, on their side, refused to fulfil their engagements, and paid nothing to the Vizier. All this afforded, in the belief of Hastings, ample justification to the Vizier for undertaking the war, and ample justification to us for giving him the help with- out which he might probably have been unsuccessful. It would be useless to discuss at any length the question whether, judged by the standard of international morality- accepted at the present day, the policy of Hastings was right. Conclusions that are obviously true in regard to the relations of organised states and civilised communities are often altogether inapplicable to semi-barbarians such as the Marathas and Rohillas of the time of Hastings. ' To suppose' (says Mr. J. S. Mill, in his ' Dissertations and Dis- cussions ') 'that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no states- man can fall into, however it may be with those who, from a safe and irresponsible position, criticize statesmen. . . . In the first place, the rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians will not re- ciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives.' If, however, we were to ignore considerations of this kind, and assume that Hastings was morally bound, in his S % 260 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. dealings with the Vizier and the Rohillas, to conform to a standard of conduct as high as that recognised by civilised nations in their dealings with each other, I believe that, even tried by this high test, his action was entirely justifi- able. If a similar case were now to arise, we should have to answer the following question : — Where a state or its ally is in danger of invasion and ruin by another state, and the only practicable mode of preventing such invasion is by forcibly seizing the territory of an intermediate state, which is either too weak or too treacherous to prevent its ter- ritory from being used for hostile purposes by the inva- ders, is the threatened state justified in forcibly seizing that territory? The authority of great jurists and great statesmen might be quoted in support of an affirmative answer, and the justice of that answer might be enforced by historical precedents and analogies. If this be true, it must, a fortiori, be true if the case be judged by a lower standard. But the relations subsist- ing between Hastings, the Vizier, the Marathas, and the Rohillas were too essentially unlike the relations of Euro- pean states to make such a discussion profitable. The question of morality, if it is to be argued, can only be stated thus : — Is a British governor justified in making war upon a confederacy of barbarous chiefs, who, not long before, had imposed their rule on a population foreign to themselves in race and religion ; through whose country the only road lies open for attacks by savage invaders upon a British ally, whose security is essential to the security of British possessions ; who are too weak and too treacherous to be relied on to close this road ; and who have injured that ally by breaking a treaty with him negotiated and attested by a British General, and approved by the British Government ? Upon such a question there can hardly be much difference of opinion. The only rea- sonable answer is that, in such a case, the supreme duty of a governor is to make the dominions under his care secure from foreign attack ; that if Hastings believed that the security of the British provinces depended on that of XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 26 1 Oudh, he was bound to take measures of precaution against a common danger ; and that if he found it impossible to re- concile the protection of Oudh and of British territory with the maintenance of the dominion of the Rohilla chiefs, he was right in the conclusion that their dominion must cease. It may doubtless be contended that Hastings overrated some of the elements of danger, or committed other errors of judgment, but at all events there is no room for moral reprobation. By ignoring the difficulties and complexities of the situation, it is easy to argue broadly that it is wrong to engage in war without provocation, that the Rohillas had not provoked us, and that the attack upon them was therefore unjustifiable. In the opinion of Hastings the conduct of the Rohillas in breaking their treaty with our ally, and in carrying on negotiations with the common enemy, constituted provocation, and that term can hardly be limited to the case of actual aggression. However this may be, maxims of this sort could afford no assistance to a governor dealing with the question whether Oudh and the British provinces should be allowed to remain exposed to invasion, or how invasion might best be averted. Financial advantage was, as Hastings wrote to Colonel Champion in a letter that has already been quoted, ■ an accessary argument V Having satisfied himself that the establishment of the Vizier's government in Rohilkhand was necessary, he had to settle the terms on which our co-operation should be afforded. Without that co-opera- tion there was obviously no certainty of success. I have shown that Hastings was glad to make use of this oppor- tunity to place the financial conditions of his alliance with the Vizier on a footing more favourable to the Company than that which he found existing, and which he with reason looked upon as inequitable and injurious to the interests of his own Government. Assuming with Hastings that the resolution to establish the Vizier's government in Rohilkhand was politically wise, there was nothing un- 1 See suj>. p. 147. 262 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. reasonable in the stipulation that in addition to the actual charges of the English brigade, the Vizier, in ' considera- tion of the Company relinquishing all claim to share in the Rohilla country, although it is to be conquered by their joint forces,' should pay forty lakhs of rupees on the successful completion of the war. The military prepara- tions in 1772, and the campaign of 1773 in Rohilkhand, had caused heavy military expenditure which the payments made by the Vizier were far from covering. That the charges of the expedition should fall upon the party which would reap the greater benefit was a proposition which was doubted by no one, and Francis and his col- leagues made it afterwards a subject of accusation against Hastings that the sum which the Vizier had agreed to pay was after all insufficient to cover the expenditure. When power fell into their hands, they took the earliest oppor- tunity which they could find for upsetting the arrange- ment made by Hastings, and on the death of Shuja-ud- daula, in January 1775, they called on his successor to increase his contributions. 'We experienced in the last campaign/ they wrote to the Resident at Lucknow, ' that the subsidy paid by his father was considerably less than the real expense of the brigade, which served to involve us in difficulty and distress.' Such considerations as these, however, have no real bear- ing on the question of the conduct of Hastings. If the English Government had itself borne the whole expense of its operations, and had received nothing from the Vizier, the motives with which the war was undertaken would have been less open to misrepresentation, but they would not, as Hastings himself said, have thereby be- come more or less just or honourable 1 . If the war was made the opportunity of bringing profit to the stronger 1 ' Here I cannot omit making one we allowed the Company to acquire general reflection, which occurs in any pecuniary advantages from our reading the address of the Majority, political arrangements. The ceding which is that their grand and prin- of Kora and Allahabad is objected cipal objection to the measures of the to as a sale, because fifty lakhs of late Administration seems to be that rupees were stipulated to the Com- XVI.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. %6$ power, it did not differ in this respect from many more serious contests. It is true that we might sometimes have been better pleased if Hastings, in his despatches and minutes, had said less regarding the financial advantages of his agreement with the Vizier, and the same observation may be made in regard to many other transactions in which he and other Indian Governors of those times were concerned. But the circumstances under which he was placed ought not to be forgotten. He had frequently to justify to the Directors at home measures of policy opposed to their orders, or of which their approval was doubtful, and it was natural that he should, when it was possible to do so, lay stress on those conditions which would be most likely to reconcile them to his proceedings. The East India Company of those days was essentially mercantile, and the Directors were ready to pardon much that they thought politically inexpedient if it could be shown to be pecuniarily profitable. In the words of Macaulay, they 'never enjoined or applauded any crime. Far from it. Whoever examines their letters, written at that time, will find there many just and humane sentiments, many excel- lent precepts ; in short, an excellent code of political ethics. But every exhortation is modified or nullified by a demand for money. " Govern leniently, and send more money ; practise strict justice and moderation towards neighbouring powers, and send more money;" this is, in truth, the sum pany on that account. If we had agreement with the Vizier is dis- given up these without any consider- honourable, because the conditions ation in return, this objection could were mercenary and pecuniary, that not have been made. The subsidy is, the Company were to acquire forty for defraying the whole expense of lakhs of rupees from it. Had there our forces employed with the Vizier been no such acquisition to the Corn- is reproachfully styled hiring them. pany, the Majority would have with- If the Vizier had only paid the extra held their dishonourable epithets, expenses it would have been less re- Upon these points I leave the Com- proachful ; but if we had made the pany to decide between the sentiments Company pay the whole expenses, in of the Majority and the motives which the language of the Majority, it must influenced our conduct.' Minute by then have been entirely irreproach- Hastings, dated ioth January, 1775, able, and we should have acted for para. 69. Fifth Report, App. No. the glory of the British nation. Our 45 ; Forrest's Selections, vol. i. p. 188. 264 THE ROHILLA WAR. of almost all the instructions that Hastings ever received from home V This is a somewhat exaggerated statement, but it is substantially true. Judged by its results, the policy of Hastings was emi- nently successful. Many a 'wild Mahratta battle' had still to be fought. Nearly thirty years after the Rohilla war, Maratha armies were still contending with the English for empire in India, and Wellesley and Lake were winning their victories of Assaye and Argaum and Laswari. More than forty years elapsed before the power of the Marathas was finally swept away, but during the whole of this time they never attacked or seriously threatened Rohilkhand. The occupation of that province gave to Oudh and to Bengal that permanent protection against the most dan- gerous of our Indian enemies which it had been the aim of Hastings to secure. 1 Essays : Warren Hastings. CHAPTER XVII. CLAVERING, MONSON, AND FRANCIS, AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL. — THE SUBSEQUENT HIS- TORY OF ROHILKHAND. The Regulating Act of 1773. — New Constitution given to the Government.— The Members of the new Council. — Character of Francis. — Power passes into the hands of the Majority of the Council. — Description by Hastings of his own position. — The Rohilla war becomes the first object of attack against Hastings. — Subsequent proceedings of the Majority. — Their ignorant inter- ference and malignant charges. — Death of Shuja-ud-daula. — The Majority cancel existing treaties and make fresh demands on his successor. — Orders of the Court of Directors on cession of Kora and Allahabad to the Vizier, on the Rohilla war, and on cancelment of the Oudh treaties. — Death of Monson, and recovery of power by Hastings. — Condition of Oudh and Rohilkhand under Asaf-ud-daula. — Prosperity of Rampur under Faizullah Khan. — Wrong- ful demands upon him. — Francis leaves India. — Hastings returns to England. — Burke and Francis. — Charges against Hastings in the House of Commons. — The First Charge relating to the Rohilla war. — Burke's motion rejected. — Pitt's proceedings and Impeachment of Hastings. — The subsequent history of Rohilkhand. — Death of Faizullah Khan. — Revolution in Rampur. — The Ro- hillas attack the British troops, and are defeated. — Rampur restored to the grandson of Faizullah Khan. — Cession of Rohilkhand to the British Govern- ment in 1801. — Subsequent prosperity of the province. — Raid of Amir Khan. — Revolt at Bareilly in 181 6. — Unbroken tranquillity for forty years. — The Mutinies of 1857. — The British power in Rohilkhand swept away. — Atrocities of Rohilla leaders. — Conspicuous loyalty of the Nawab of Rampur. — Restor- ation of British power. — Honours and rewards to Yusaf Ali Khan of Rampur. — Prosperity of his State. TN 1773, a definite Constitution was for the first time given by Parliament to the Government of India. By the Regulating Act of that year (13 Geo. III. c. 63), introduced by the Ministry of Lord North, a Governor- General and a Council of four Members were appointed for the Presidency of Bengal, with vaguely defined powers over Madras and Bombay. The administration was to be 266 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. carried on by the Governor-General and Council in accord- ance with the votes of a majority of those present. The Governor had a casting vote, but otherwise had no greater authority than any Member of the Council. The first Governor-General and the Members were named in the Act. Hastings was appointed Governor-General. Barwell, who had been a Member of the former Council, was the only one of the new Members who had any Indian ex- perience. The other three were General Clavering. Monson, and Francis. The sole qualification of Clavering was the possession of parliamentary influence ; Monson's qualifications were no better ; the character of Francis, by far the most able and vigorous of the three, is known to everyone. In the words of Macaulay, he was * irritable, rude, and petulant, and his hatred was of intense bitter- ness and long duration,' ' a man in the highest degree arro- gant and insolent, a man prone to malevolence, and prone to the error of mistaking his malevolence for public virtue.' ' He was capable/ Sir James Stephen adds, - not only of the faults of undying malignity and ferocious cruelty, but also of falsehood, treachery, and calumny 1 .' The wit of man could not have devised a more impracticable scheme of Government, nor could it have chosen men more scan- dalously unfit to administer the affairs of a great country than these three Councillors. They landed in Calcutta on the 19th October, 1774, and Hastings who, in his own words, 'was averse to parade and never used it/ had in their opinion made no sufficient arrangements for the ceremonies of their reception. Only seventeen guns were fired, no troops were drawn up, and they were received by Hastings at his own house instead of in the official Council Chamber -. Their ' warfare of scur- rility/ as Hastings called it, immediately began. Barwell 1 ' Nuncomar and Impey,' vol. i. know the whole story of the salutes and p. 30. the rest, and how Mr. Hastings even 8 The influence of these supposed omitted to put on a ruffled shirt, will breaches of etiquette on their conduct find it in Mr. Busteed's very interest- towards Hastings has perhaps been ing and amusing book, 'Echoes of exaggerated. Any one who wishes to Old Calcutta.' XVII.] CLAVERING, MONSON, AND FRANCIS. 2,6j alone gave his support to Hastings ; Clavering, Monson, and Francis were always a majority, and in less than a week after their arrival the power of the Government had passed into their hands. The fact that a measure had been initiated or approved by Hastings was in itself suffi- cient to ensure its condemnation. Twelve years afterwards he gave, in a private letter to his friend David Anderson, a description of his position so graphic, so just, and so characteristic of his indomitable spirit, that it deserves quotation : — 1 1 was a man unknown, unprotected, and unconnected at home, and possessed no other influence abroad than that which I had ac- quired by my own knowledge and practice, in the credit which the success of my measures impressed on the people of Hindostan, and in the attachment of my fellow-servants and citizens. Without time allowed for the pretext of provocation, the impatience of my adversaries hurried them to a declaration and to acts of hostility on the third day after their arrival. They persevered in their persecutions, which were gross to personal outrage, till the death of Colonel Monson ; and their oppo- sition, which the death of General Clavering did but suspend for an instant, continued till their final annihilation by the departure of Mr. Francis in December, 1780. In so long an interval what had I where- with to sustain the weight of their oppressions but the superior weight of my own character and the consciousness of superior desert, set against the claim of high names which supported the respect of my adversaries ; King, Lords, Commons, and Directors, and half the people of England against me ; the power of patronage employed in the seduction of my fellow-servants ; and for a while the rule taken out of my hands, to be employed in a warfare against me and in that only. Yet even in that time the confidence of my opponents allowed me to transact the current business, in which they never interrupted me but for occasions of personal attack. I suffered in patience ; I did my duty when I could ; I waited for better and more lasting means ; no act or word of intemperance escaped me ; no meanness of submis- sion ever afforded my assailants the triumph, even of a moment, over me ; and I have been told that they themselves have been heard to confess themselves foiled, even when they had brought their long prepared plans of attack to the Board, and I was unprepared to resist them. When intervals of accidental authority enabled me to act, and I never had more than intervals, I employed them in forming and setting in motion the greatest and most successful measures of my government. When these were impeded by frequent changes of in- fluence, I still continued to keep them in existence, and again gave them energy when my power returned. My antagonists sickened, 268 THE ROHILLA WAR. [Ch. died, and fled. I maintained my ground unchanged ; neither the health of my body nor the vigour of my mind for a moment deserted The latest and most important of the affairs with which Hastings had been concerned before the arrival of the new Councillors was the Rohilla war, and it naturally became the first subject for attack. The intelligence that the war was over, and that a treaty had been signed with Faizullah Khan, did not reach Calcutta until the 31st October 2 . It was known that negociations were in active progress, and that an immediate settlement was expected, but such considerations had no weight with the Majority of the Council. On the 25th October they desired the Gover- nor-General to lay before the Council the whole of his public and private correspondence with Middleton and Colonel Champion. Hastings declared that he was ready to produce the whole of his official correspondence with Middleton, and ' such parts even of his private correspond- ence that he could with propriety show.' With regard to his official correspondence with Colonel Champion, he said that the whole of it should be laid before the Council ; he refused, without the consent of Colonel Champion, to pro- duce letters 1 of a familiar and friendly communication . . . expressly marked with a distinct mode of address as those which he intended as confidential. I am the more observant of this rule because our correspondence has not been altogether cordial on many points, and we have several times expostulated with each other on these topics with the freedom of private friends, and in a style, which though decent in every degree, is yet different perhaps from the formal addresses of official corre- spondence.' The protests of Hastings were unavailing, and he refused to comply with the orders of the Council 3 . He wrote soon afterwards to Lord North, and stated his intention, 1 Letter dated 13th September, Oct. 1774; Fifth Report, App. No. 44. 1786, Gleig, vol. iii. p. 303 ; British 3 Fifth Report, App. No. 45 ; Con- Museum MSS. 29,170, vol. xxxix. sultations, 19th December, 1774, India 8 Bengal Secret Consultations, 31st Office Records. XVII.] PROCEEDINGS OF THE MAJORITY. 269 which was carried out, of submitting to him the whole of his correspondence with Middleton, both public and pri- vate, so that a judgment might be formed by an impartial authority regarding the propriety of his conduct, ' and in vindication of his own character from the suggestions occa- sioned by his refusal to expose these letters to the view of the new Council V On the 26th October, the Majority, in spite of the remonstrances of Hastings and Barwell, ordered that as the Governor- General had refused to produce the whole of his correspondence, Middleton should be imme- diately removed from the post of Resident with the Vizier, that he should be directed to bring the correspondence with him to Calcutta, and that Colonel Champion should be appointed in his place to carry on all communications with the Vizier. On the 31st October orders were sent to Colonel Champion to demand from the Vizier payment of the forty lakhs of rupees promised for the Rohilla expe- dition, and of any other sums that might be due on other accounts ; at least twenty lakhs were to be paid at once, and the rest within a year at latest ; in default of com- pliance by the Vizier with this requisition, within fourteen days, Colonel Champion was ordered to return with the army into the Company's territories ; if the Vizier complied, then the troops were to be withdrawn within the former limits of Oudh. The practical result of these orders was not very serious, because long before they had reached their destination, the conditions of the treaty of peace had been carried out and the troops had left Rohilkhand. I will not attempt to describe the subsequent proceed- ings of Francis and his colleagues. Every act of the previous Government, important or trivial, which could be made the means of damaging the reputation of Hastings or giving him annoyance, was seized upon. Nor did they confine their ignorant interference and their malignant attacks to his public measures. Charges of the vilest nature against his personal character, brought by the vilest of men, who rightly believed that their accusations would 1 British Museum MSS. ; Gleig, vol. i. pp. 475, 507. 40- return of the Emperor to, in 1771, 40,41. INDEX, 3^7 Directors, Court of, their general po- licy, 263. approve treaty of Benares, 271. orders regarding Rohilla War, 272- 274. on death of Shuja-ud-daula, 274. Diwani, grant of the, 38. Doab, power of Afghan chiefs in, 16. Dow, on Shuja-ud-daula, 35. Dundi Khan, appointed a guardian of Ali Mohammad's sons, 15. defeats Kain Jang, 17. repels invasion of Rohilkhand by Kutb-ud-din, 17. appropriates portion of Rohilkhand, 18. his death, 34. Elliott, ' Life of Hafiz ool-moolk,' Preface, xvii. Elliot, Sir H. M., ' History of India, as told by its own historians,' Preface, xvi, xvii. Elphinstone on the Marathas, 2, 3, 19. on the Rohilla government, 30. Emperor. See Shah Alam and Moghal Emperor. Etawa, proposed occupation of, by Vizier, 1 16. Ethe, Dr., 13, note. ' Extermination' of the Rohillas, 173- 187. Faizullah Khan, 11, 15, 18. becomes head of the Rohillas, 145. retires with Rohillas to Laldhang, 145- proposals to Colonel Champion, 147-149. his proposals rejected by Hastings, 147-149. negotiations with, 150. treaty with, 150. wrongful demands upon, 275. revision of his agreement with Vizier in 1783, 276. charge against Hastings for treat- ment of, 276. death of, 280. confiscation of treasure left by, 281. loyalty of his great grandson in 1857, 283, Farukhabad, seized bySafdar Jang, 17. Forrest, Mr. G.W., his Selections from State papers, Preface, ix. on ■ Rohilla atrocities,' 233. on Hafiz Rahmat, 300. on missing evidence, 312, Appen- dix D. Francis, Philip, instigator of Burke's animosity, Preface, xiii. on the Rohillas, 26, 29, note. Member of Council, 266. character of, 266. his enmity against Hastings, 276. returns to England, 276. Francklin, on Shuja-ud-daula, 35. Ganges, the, 7, 8, 44. Ghazi-ud-din, deposes and blinds Ahmad Shah, 19. attacks Najib-ud-daula, 19-20. Gholam Kadir Khan, 43. Gholam Mohammad, deposes his brother in Rampur, 281. attacks the British at Bhitaura, 281. defeat and banishment of, 281. Gleig, his ' Memoirs of life of Warren Hastings,' Preface, xiv. Government of Bengal, constitution of, before 1773, 57, 58. Government of India, New Constitu- tion of, in 1773, 265. Gul-i-Rahmat, Preface, xvii, 29. on death of Hafiz Rahmat, 142. Gulistan-i-Rahmat, Preface, xvii, 28. its account of Aii Mohammad, 11. on administration of Hafiz Rahmat, 30, 3i. on treatment of Rohillas, 221, 223. Hafiz Rahmat Khan, birth and family of, 11, 12. his work on the genealogy of the Afghans, 12, 13, 28. his literary attainments and poems, 27, 28, 285-287, Appendix A. the name Hafiz, 27. the poet Hafiz, 27, 28. Burke on, 28. library of, 286, Appendix A. appointed chief guardian of Ali Mohammad's sons, 15. defeats Kaim Jang, 17. becomes virtual ruler of Rohil- khand, 18. joins Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1759, 20. territory given to, by Ahmad Shah Abdali, 21. his administration, 30-31. appeals for help to the Vizier, 44. his negotiations with the Vizier in 1772, 49. his treaty with the Vizier, 53-55. rebellion of his son, 63. treachery towards his son, 63. negotiations with Marathas, 69, 74- 76, 78. comes to English camp and renews alliance with Vizier, 79. 3 i8 INDEX. Hafiz Rahmat Khan, evades payment of sums due to Vizier, 84. correspondence with Colonel Cham- pion, 136-139. death of, 140, 142. character of, 1 43-1 45. letter from wife of, 196. pensions to family of, 283, note. rebellion of his grandson in 1857, 283, letter to Hastings on campaigns of 1 7 7 2 , 1 7 7 3, 30 0-30 2 , Appendix C. Hamilton, his ' Historical relation of the origin, &c, of the Rohilla Afghans,' Preface, xv. on the Afghans or Rohillas in India,5> his account of Ali Mohammad, II, 12, 14, 15. on number of Rohillas, 29. on condition of Rohilkhand after Panipat, 32. on Maratha invasions, 44. on attitude of Rohillas in 1 7 73, 73, 74. on condition of Rohilkhand in 1 774, on character of Hafiz Rahmat, 143. on ' extermination ' of the Rohillas, 182. on treatment of Rohillas, 223-225. Hannay, Major, on asserted cruelties of Vizier, 216-219. Harper, Captain, sent to Hafiz Rah- mat, 52, 53. Hastings, Marquis of, letter to, from Warren Hastings regarding Oudh, 38, note. Hastings, Warren, Burke's charges against, Preface, x-xiii. British Museum manuscripts, Pre- face, xiii. his reputation, and character, Pre- face, xviii. his imaginary crimes, Preface, v-vii, xix. the key to his policy, 4. his description of the Rohillas, 26-27. follows the policy of Clive regarding Oudh, 38. his letter to the Marquis of Hastings regarding Oudh, 38, note. allows treaty of 1768 to become a dead letter, 40. on Barker's attestation of Rohilla treaty, 55. becomes Governor of Bengal, 57. on constitution of Bengal Govern- ment in 1773, 57. letter to Colebrooke on public af- fairs in 1772, 59-62. Hastings, Warren, letter to Vizier promising defence against Mara- thas(i772),65. sends brigade to assist Vizier in Rohilkhand (1773), 70. his instructions to Sir Robert Barker 0773), 7<>-7 2 - report to Court of Directors on proposed operations in Rohil- khand (1773), 72. letter to Vizier proposing interview, 87-89. meets Vizier at Benares, 89. conference with the Vizier at Be- nares, 89-115. instructions of Council before Be- nares conference, 91, 92. invites Emperor to send envoy to Benares, 94. cedes Kora and Allahabad to Vizier, 94, 95 et seq. refuses payment of tribute to Em- peror, 97-99. Burke's charges against, regarding Kora and Allahabad, 99-101. answer to charge regarding Kora and Allahabad, 102-105. draft treaty for expulsion of Ro- hillas, 108, 109. negotiations with Vizier, regarding expulsion of the Rohillas, 107- 115. diary of proceedings at Benares, 110-114. reasons for postponement of Rohilla expedition, 110-114, 1 21-124. letter to ' Sulivan on Rohilla ex- pedition, 112. returns toCalcutta from Benares, 114. success of his visit to Benares, 115, 116. letter from Vizier regarding occupa- tion of Etawa, 1 16. on Vizier's renewed proposals for Rohilla expedition, 11 7-1 24. agrees to assist Vizier in expulsion of Rohillas, 128. orders regarding conduct of Rohilla expedition, 128-130. rejects proposals of Faizullah Khan, 147-149. refuses claim of army to share of plunder, 156-172. his anxiety on account of demands of the army, 159 et seq. sends Macleane on secret mission, 166. his correspondence with Vizier re- garding ' extermination ' of Ro- hillas, 179-184. INDEX, 3 l 9 Hastings, Warren, his statements re- garding ' extermination ' of Ro- hillas, 179-187. charges against him of defending atrocities, 188-233. orders to Champion and Middleton regarding treatment of Rohillas, 189-201. his reply regarding charges of cruelty, 228-230. the charge that atrocities were de- fended by him a baseless false- hood, 231. his explanations of the causes and objects of the Rohilla war, 147, 237-258. inquiry into his policy in undertak- ing Rohilla war, 257-264. success of his policy, 264. appointed Governor General, 266. power of, passes into hands of majority of Council, 267. letter to David Anderson, 267. refuses to produce private corre- spondence with Middleton and Champion, 268. submits to Lord North his cor- respondence with Middleton, 269. protests against action of majority on death of Vizier, 271. recovers his power in Council, 274. on critical condition of affairs in 1780, 275. his reception on return to England, 276. charge against, for treatment of Faizullah Khan, 276. charges against, presented to House of Commons, 277-280. acquitted on Rohilla Charge, 279. impeachment of, 280. Hayat-i-Afghan, on Yusufzais, 23- Ibbetson, Mr., on character of Pathans, ,23-25- Ilahyar Khan, son of Hafiz Rahmat, 28. India, critical condition of affairs in 1780, 275. Interpreter, Persian, on • extermination ' of Rohillas, 181. Inayat Khan, rebellion of, 63. Katehr, ancient name of Rohilkhand, 10. Kaim Jang, Chief of Farukhabad, 16. invades Rohilkhand, 17. Keene, Mr., quoted, 43. Khan Bahadur, proclaimed Viceroy at Bareilly in 1857, 283, 284. atrocities of, at Bareilly in 1857, 283, 284. hanged at Bareilly in i860, 284. Khulasat-ul-ansab, 12, 13, note, 28. Kora, defeat of Shuja-ud-daula at, 36. Kora and Karra, 37, note. Kora and Allahabad, given by Clive to Emperor, 37. cession of, by Emperor to Marathas, 67. arrangements by Hastings for charge of, 93- terms of cession to Vizier, 94-96. Burke's charge regarding, 99-101. Mill on cession of, 100-102. Macaulay on cession of, 105. propriety of cession to Vizier, 105. Kutah Khail, tribe of, 12, 13, note. Kutb-ud-din, his unsuccessful invasion of Rohilkhand, 16-17. Law, on extravagance of Burke's language, Preface, xi. on Hafiz Rahmat Khan, 27, 28. Lawrence, Sir Henry, on Sadat Khan, 34- on Shuja-ud-daula, 34, 35, 36, 141. Leslie, Colonel, on asserted cruelties of Vizier, 214-216. Lyall, Sir Alfred, his Life of Hastings, Preface, xiv. on Pitt's proceedings towards Hast- ings, 280, note. Macaulay, his Essay on Warren Hastings, Preface, vii, xiv. his description of Rohilkhand, 9. on the Rohillas, 25, 27. on cession of Kora and Allahabad, 105. on ' extermination ' of the Rohillas, 175. on Court of Directors, 263. his character of Francis, 266, 276. Macleane, Colonel, his secret mission to the army, 166-170. Macpherson, Captain, 204, 306. Maine, Sir Henry, quoted, Preface, v, xix. Marathas, growth of the power of the, 1-3. their mode of warfare and policy, 2. their defeat at Panipat, 3. recovery of their power after Pani- pat, 3, 4. their aim at universal dominion over India, 4. 320 INDEX. Marathas, escape of Oudh from in- vasion by, 8. invade Rohilkhand in 1751, 17-18. conditions of their retirement from Rohilkhand in 1752, 18. invade Rohilkhand in 1758 ; ex- pelled by Shuja-ud-daula, 19, 20. their army destroyed at Panipat, 21. their return to Northern India, 33. occupy Delhi in 1 771, 34, 40. policy of Clive and the Court of Directors regarding the, 36-38. their intrigues with the Emperor, 39> 4°- increase of their power ; demand of Chauth from Bengal, 40. invade Rohilkhand in 1772, 42-56. their treatment of the Emperor, 43- their intention to invade Oudh, Behar, and Bengal, 45. defeat the Rohillas, 49, 50. negotiations with Vizier and Ro- hillas, 50-53- leave Rohilkhand 1772, 55, 56. demands on the Vizier (1772), 64. occupy Delhi (1772), 67. cession to, of Kora and Allahabad, declare intention of occupying Kora and Allahabad, 67. invade Rohilkhand (1773), 68. expelled from Rohilkhand by Eng- lish and Vizier (1773), 82, Ap- pendix C. Middleton on the Rohillas, 27. on Shuja-ud-daula, 36. appointed Resident with Vizier, 115. in charge of political relations with Vizier, 130. on claims of army to share of plunder, 161 et seq. on ' extermination' of Rohillas, 186. on asserted cruelties of Vizier, 208- 212. orders to him from Majority of Council, 269. examined by House of Commons, 278. Mill, James, his History of British India, Preface, vi, xiii, xix. his inaccurate version of Barker's communications with Vizier, 47, note. his statements regarding the Rohilla Government, 280-290, Appen- dix B. his misrepresentations regarding the campaigns of 1772 and 1773, 291 et seq., Appendix C. Mill, James, on cession of Kora and Allahabad to Vizier, 100-102, et seq. on secret treaty between Emperor and Vizier, 154, 155, note. on ' extermination ' of the Rohillas, 176-178. his mis-statements regarding Vi- zier's cruelties, 196, 197, note. his baseless calumnies, 227 et seq. Miranpur Katra, defeat of Rohillas at, 140-142. Moghal Empire, decay of the, 1-3. Moghal Emperor, recognizes Ali Mohammad as Governor of Rohilkhand, 13. assists Safdar Jang against Ali Mohammad, 14. meets Clive and Shuja-ud-daula in 1765, 36. position of, in 1765, 37. receives Kora and Allahabad from Clive, 37. grant of the Diwani to the Com- pany, 38. intrigues with Marathas for his return to Delhi, 39, 40. returns to Delhi in 1771, 40, 41. joins Marathas in 1772, 42. the, and Gholam Kadir Khan, 43. treatment of, by the Marathas, 43- cedes Kora and Allahabad to Ma- rathas, 67. correspondence of, with Hastings at Benares, 94-99. Mohammad Ali, son of Faizullah Khan, 280. his murder in Rampur, 281. Mohammedans in Rohilkhand, 10. Mohammad Yusaf Ali Khan, Nawab of Rampur, his loyalty in 1857, 283. honours and rewards bestowed on, 284. Monson, Member of Council, 266. death of, 274. Moradabad, mutiny at, in 1857, 2 ^3- Morley, Mr. John, on ' extermination ' of the Rohillas, 177. Muhabbat Khan, son of Hafiz Rahmat, 29. Mustajab Khan, son of Hafiz Rahmat, 28. Mutiny of Bengal Army in 1857, Ro- hilkhand during, 282-284. Nadir Shah, his invasion of India, 12. Najib-ud-daula, First Minister of the Empire, 16-19. INDEX. $%\ Najib-ud-daula, attacked and defeated byMarathas, 19-20. joins Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1759, 20, 21. his wise administration, 30, 32, 288, 290. his death, 33. NajfKhan, 42, 151, 153. North, Lord, Hastings sends to him his correspondence with Middleton, 269. pressure brought by his Government on Directors, 273. Oudh. See Shuja-ud-daula. saved by English from Marathas, 4. geographical features of, 7, 8. its climate, area, and population, 8. escapes Maratha invasion, 8. Safdar Jang Subahdar of, 1 3-16, 34. Shuja-ud-daula Nawab Vizier in, , I9>34; Sadat Khan in, 34. policy of Clive and Hastings to- wards, 36-38. only open to attack through Ro- hilkhand, 44. Col. Champion marches into, 50. library of Kings of, 286. Panipat, battle of, 3, 21. Shuja-ud-daula at, 35, 36. Pathan, see Rohillas. a name for Afghans or Rohillas in India, 6. Pilibhit, 31. Pitt, his change of front towards Hastings, 280. Proprietors, Court of, Resolution on Rohilla War, 273. Ramganga, River, 9. Rampur, state of, 9. its prosperity under Faizullah Khan, 275- given to son of Mohammad Ali after battle of Bhitaura, 281. loyalty of Nawab in 1857, 283, 284. honours and rewards to Nawab of, in 1857, 284. present prosperity of State of, 284. Regulating Act of 1773, 265. Rieu, Dr. C, on ' extermination ' of Rohillas, 183, 184. Rohilkhand, geographical features of, 7-9- its climate, area, and population, 8. Rohilkhand, Macaulay's description of, 9. the name, 10. settlement of Afghans in, 10. Ali Mohammad recognized as Governor, 13. rule of, by Ali Mohammad, 14, 15. guardians appointed by Ali Mo- hammad, 15, 16. unsuccessfully invaded by Kutb-ud- din, 16. unsuccessful invasion of, by Kaim Jang, 17. invaded byMarathas inJ.751,17,18. portions appropriated by Hafiz Rahmat and Dundi Khan, 18. invaded by the Marathas in 1758, 19, 20. the Rohillas in, 25-32. government of by the Rohillas, 30- 32, Appendix B. its revenues, 31, and note. its prosperity after Panipat, 31, 32. invaded byMarathas in 1772,42- 56. the Marathas leave, 55, 56. condition of, in 1774, 130-135. conquest of by Vizier and English, 136-155. events in, from 1775 to 1785, 274- 276. its condition under Asaf-ud-daula, 275- events in, after 1783, 280-284. cession of, to British in 1801, 281. condition of, under Oudh Govern- ment, 281, 282. prosperity of, under British rule, 282. during mutinies of 1857, 282-284. Rohillas. See Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Faizullah Khan, &c. or Afghans in India, 4-6. meaning of the name, 5, 6. their custom in time of danger, 10. their power founded by Ali Moham- mad, 10. chiefly of Yusufzai origin, 13. seize and plunder Allahabad, 1 7. apply to Shuja-ud-daula for help against the Marathas, 20. join Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1759, 20. their character, 22-26. Burke and Macaulay on the, 25-27. in Rohilkhand, 25-29. Hastings' description of the, 26, 27. their 'rhetoric and poetry,' 27, 28. in Rohilkhand, their number, 29. their government, 30-32, Appen- dix B. 322 INDEX. Rohillas, assist Shuja-ud-daula in 1764, 36. defeated near Shukartar, 42, 43. their flight from Marathas, 1 772, 44. their relations with Shuja-ud-daula, 1772,47,48. their negotiations with Shuja-nd- daula, 1772, 49. defeated by the Marathas, 49, 50. Maratha intrigues with, 50, 51. treaty of alliance with Vizier, 53-55. re-occupy Rohilkhand, 1772, 56. doubtful attitude of (1773), 69, 73- 76. draft treaty between Hastings and Vizier for expulsion of, 108, 109. defeat of, at Miranpur Katra, 140- 142. collapse of their power, 145, 146. treatment of, after treaty with Faizullah Khan, 151, 152. 'extermination' of, 173-187. 'extermination' of, the truth re- garding, 184-187. defeated at Bhitaura in 1794, 281. atrocities committed by, in 1857, 283. Rohilla war, note on missing evidence regarding conduct of, Appen- dix D. composition of British force in, 130. charges of cruelty during, 188- 233- summary of evidence regarding con- duct of, 231-233. charges of Francis, Burke, Mill, and Macaulay, 234-236. objects of, 234-264. its causes and objects explained by Hastings himself, 237-258. the policy of Hastings regarding, 258-264. the question of its morality, 259- 261. its ultimate results, 264. proceedings of majority of Council in regard to, 268. charge relating to, in House of Commons, 277-280. debate in Commons on Charge relating to, 278-280. charge relating to, rejected by House of Commons, 279. Sadat Yar Khan, grandson of Hafiz Rahmat, 29. Sadat Khan, founder of the Oudh dynasty, 34. Safdar Jang, his quarrel with AH Mohammad, 13, 14. becomes Vizier of the Empire, 16. his conflicts with the Rohillas, 16-18. his death, 19. Saidullah Khan, son of Ali Moham- mad, 19. Sair-ul-mutakherin, Preface, xvii. on the Afghans or Rohillas in India, 5. on Rohillas in Rohilkhand, 27. on character of Rohillas, 33, 34, note, 43. on reception of Shuja-ud-daula by Ahmad Shah Abdali, 35. on Rohilla chiefs in 1774, 134, 135. on treatment of Rohillas by Vizier, 225, 226. on Shuja-ud-daula's death, 270. Scott, Major, his language to Burke, and character, Preface, note, xii. challenges Burke to produce charges against Hastings, 277. Secrecy, Committee of, fifth report of, Preface, viii. Select Committee, its functions, 58. Shahabad, treaty between Vizier and Rohillas at, 53-55. Shah Alam, Emperor, 11, 12. See Moghal Emperor, acknowledged by Ahmad Shah as Emperor, 21. invited to send envoy to Benares, 94. Hastings refuses payment of tribute to, 97-99. treaty with Shuja-ud-daula, 152- 155. Shaikh Kabir, death of, 64. Shaikh Shihab-ud-din, 12. Shahjehanpur, mutiny at, in 1857, 283. Shuja-ud-daula, 3. succeeds Safdar Jang as Nawab Vizier, 19. expels Marathas from Rohilkhand in 1759, 20 - joins Ahmad Shah Abdali, 21. his character, 34-36. his reception by Ahmad Shah Abdali, 35. at Panipat, 35, 36. his conflicts with the English, 36. defeated at Buxar, 36. his defeat at Kora, 36. throws himself on generosity of English, 36. alliance between the English and, 38. INDEX. 3*3 Shuja-ud-daula, meets Clive and Emperor's representative at Chapra, 39. fresh treaty with, in 1 768, 40. alarmed by the Marathas 1772, 44, 45- appeals for help to the English I772,45- meets Sir Robert Barker, 45-48. his proposals to Sir R. Barker, 46, 47. his relations with the Rohillas, 47, 48. marches with Barker to Rohilkhand, 48. his negotiations with the Rohillas, 49. Maratha intrigues with, 50, 51. breaks off communications with the Marathas, 51. further negotiations with the Ma- rathas, 52, 53. _ concludes treaty with Rohillas, 53- 55- his alarm at Maratha demands (1772), 64-65. his alarm on cession to Marathas of Kora and Allahabad, 67. enters Rohilkhand with English brigade (1773), 73- letter from, to Hastings suggesting annexation of Rohilkhand, 80. demands payment of sum due by Rohillas, 83. and English troops leave Rohil- khand (1773), 85. in campaigns of 1772, 1773, 302- 304. proposes interview with Hastings, 89. conference with Hastings at Be- nares, 89-115. his insufficient payments for English troops, 90, 91. cession to, of Kora and Allahabad, 94, 95 et seq. negotiations regarding expulsion of Rohillas, 107-115. draft treaty for expulsion of Ro- hillas, 108, 109. postponement of Rohilla expedi- tion, 110-114. letters to Hastings on proposed occupation of Etawa, 116. renews proposals for Rohilla ex- pedition, 117. declines conditions of assistance for Rohilla expedition, 125. occupies Etawa, 127. Shuja-ud-daula, enters into secret agreement with Emperor, 128. repeats request for assistance for expulsion of Rohillas, 128. sends envoy to Hafiz Rahmat, 132. enters Rohilkhand accompanied by British troops, 137. at battle of Miranpur Katra, 141, 143- negotiations with Faizullah Khan, I 5°- . treaty with Faizullah Khan, 1 50. secret treaty with Emperor, 152- 155. on claims of English troops to share of plunder, 158, 168. his alarm at discontent of English army, and donation to the troops and officers, 162-165, I 7 I - value of plunder obtained by, 171. correspondence with Hastings on 1 extermination ' of Rohillas, 179-184. charges of cruelty against, 188-233. his reply to charges of cruelty, 220, 221. death of, 270. Shukartar, 42. Sirdar Khan Bakshi, death of, 62. Sivaji, 2. Stephen, Sir J. F., on Mill's History, Preface, vi. his ' Impey and Nuncomar,' Pre- face, vi. on Consultations of Bengal Govern- ment, Preface, viii. on Burke's charges, Preface, x. on character of Francis, 266. Sulivan, letter from Hastings on Rohilla expedition, 112. Tarai, the, 9, 10. Tarikh-i-Faiz Baksh, Preface, xv. ' Tawarikh-i-Rahmat Khani,' 13, note. Tennant, on condition of Northern India in 1798, 281. Verelst, on Rohillas and Hafiz Rah- mat, 29, 30, note, 31, Appen- dix B. Verelst succeeds Clive in 1767, 40. Vizier. See Shuja-ud-daula. White way, Mr., article in Calcutta Review, Preface, xiv. on number of Rohillas in Rohil- khand, 29. Y 1 3*4 INDEX. Whiteway, Mr., on character of Hafiz Zabita Khan, appeals for help to the Rahmat, 144. Yule, Colonel, on the name ' Rohilla,' 5, 6, note. Yusufzais in Rohilkhand, 13. character of, 23-25. Zabita Khan, succeeds Najib-ud-daula, 33, 34- Vizier, 44. attacked by the Marathas in 1772, 42. attends camp at Shahabad, 53, 55- defection of, from Rohillas, 64. restored to office by Marathas, 66. rebellion of his grandson in 1857, 283. THE END. Clarenbon press, ©rforb. SELECT LIST OF STANDARD WORKS. DICTIONARIES Page i. LAW „ 2. 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