SUVOROF
MILITARY HISTORY
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SUVOROF
BYW.LYONBLEASE
WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR
C. E. CALLWELL, K.C.B.
NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
PUBLISHERS
FOREWOED
An account of the circumstances in which this book
was written will best explain its many deficiencies. I
began to write it in 1917, when I was on the Staff of a
Hospital in Petrograd. Owing to the pressure of my
ordinary duties, which were at intervals considerable,
I was unable to spend any time in the Imperial Library,
where a large collection of papers relating to Suvorof,
the Suvorovskii Sbornik, had been deposited. Still
less was I able to consult the Military Records at
Moscow. I was confined to the study of matter already
published, and in Petrograd to such volumes as I could
find in the booksellers' shops. Fortunately these were
numerous. In November, I was sent down to the
Field Hospital on the Roumanian Front, taking with
me my manuscript and two or three books. The rest
of my library, at some volumes of which I had hardly
glanced, I left in a big box. This has by now, I suppose,
fallen with my spare kit into the hands of pillagers. At
any rate, it was left behind when the Base Hospital
went home, and I cannot get hold of it. From
Roumania I was recalled to Odessa, where, for the first
time, I got into a Public Library. To the City Librarian,
Professor Popruzhenko, and his assistant, Mr. Deribas,
vii
viu SUVOROF
I am much indebted. I am even more obliged to Mr.
Edmund Harris, in whose house I lived. His own
library was very useful, and his natural hospitality
seemed to be only aggravated by the triple alliance
against him of pneumonia, extortionate demands from
his workmen, and a civil war in which his house played
an involuntary but conspicuous part. I regret that his
recent death in exile prevents me from giving him a
copy of the book. I never knew a man who bore with
more fortitude and sweetness of temper the blows of a
remorseless fortune.
As there has been published in Russian an enormous
quantity of literature about Suvorof, I think I have
been able to gather enough raw material to make a
substantially true picture of him. For military events
I have been compelled to rely on such books as Pyetrof 's
Histories of the Turkish Wars and Milyutin's superb
History of the War of 1799, with its abundant citations
from original documents. There are as many anecdotes
about Suvorof as about our Doctor Johnson, and many
of these have been published in one or other of the
numerous periodicals interested in Russian antiquities
and history. I have, with one or two exceptions,
repeated none that are not related by honest eye-
witnesses. On the whole, I think that this book will
be found to contain as much essential truth as many
which are more ostentatiously based upon manuscript
authorities, and indeed seem to bear not a little of the
original dust upon their pages.
My principal omissions are English, French, German,
FOREWORD ix
Polish, and Italian books. I had not time to learn the
Polish language as well as the Russian. Of French and
German books I could find only a few in Russia, and
of English and Italian, none at all. It is hardly less
difficult to lay hands on some of them in England. I
have abandoned all hope of getting the books that I
left in Petrograd. The Bibliography I have made as
complete as I can, though I have not been able to
recollect the exact titles of all my Petrograd books.
I am very greatly indebted to my wife, who at
various times has reduced the whole of my rough
manuscript to legibility, and in the end spent many
hours in Japan in pounding a clumsy typewriter and
making the thing fit for the printer.
W. L. B.
INTRODUCTION
In the following pages the life story is told of a very-
remarkable man, of a principal performer in some of
the most memorable events in modern history, of the
foremost of Russians with the solitary exception of
Peter the Great. They present us with the picture of
a singular personality, of an ardent patriot, of an excep-
tionally brilliant and successful soldier. Strange as
were Suvorof's ways and interesting as was his indi-
viduality in his private capacity, it is rather in his
character of leader of troops and commander in the
field that his career must ever be instructive to posterity
and attractive to the student of history.
Fought for the most part in regions far removed
from centres of culture and of military thought, his
campaigns have perhaps scarcely been studied as
assiduously in the past as they ought to have been,
seeing how varied and how far-reaching are the lessons
that are to be deduced from them. They shed a beacon
light upon the art of countering the mercurial methods
of the partisan, which often prove so great a bugbear
to leaders of a trained and disciplined soldiery. Of
effective achievement mainly and primarily attributable
to the fostering of mobility and elasticity in the field,
they afford numerous, diversified and striking examples.
Those dramatic events of 1800 in Switzerland — the
desperate affray by the Devil's Bridge, the sudden
tidings of Korsakof's discomfiture, the escape from the
trap, the weary retreat over the heights to Chur,
admirably indicate what strategical uncertainties and
xi
xii SUVOROF
perplexing tactical problems a general may find himself
beset with when he undertakes operations at the head
of a formidable force in a mountain country. Nor does
the history of war furnish us with many more convincing
examples of the dangers and difficulties which assail
armies in the field when the plans of their leaders are
interfered with by chatterers in distant capitals, than
is to be found in the conduct of the Aulic Council and its
consequences, after the famous Russian chieftain had
been entrusted with the task of driving back the French
legions out of the territories which they had overrun.
Amongst prominent figures in history, few have been
more traduced than has the victor of the Ruimnik and
the Trebbia. In consequence of his enthusiasm for
monarchial autocracy, Suvorof was anathema to French
writers of the Revolutionary era, and they painted his
actions in the darkest colours. His name has in this
country been too much associated with Lord Byron's
mordant and oft -quoted line, "hero, buffoon, half
demon and half dirt." Granted that the great soldier
was something of a buffoon, the reference to dirt amounted
to a cruel libel and the epithet "demon" was wholly
inappropriate. Bon Juan pictures him in connection
with the taking of Izmail, and, as his conduct on that
occasion unquestionably was open to some criticism, it
may not be out of place to say a word upon this subject.
The fortress had been formally summoned and the
Grand Vizier had, very properly, met the summons
with an uncompromising refusal. Military authorities
in the seventeenth century, and before that era, had
been in substantial agreement that a stronghold which
would not yield after having been called upon to do so
was liable if taken by assault to be sacked and to have
its garrison put to the sword. Cromwell always pleaded
that no quarter need be given in such a case, and he
acted on that principle at Basing House and at Drogheda,
although at Gowran House and Old Castletown he
contented himself with the massacre of the defending
INTRODUCTION xiii
officers, sparing the rank and file. As a matter of fact,
fastnesses did in practice in those days in nineteen cases
out of twenty haul down their flag rather than stand an
assault, in deference to what was to all intents and
purposes a law of war. With the development of
modern ideas and humaner methods, such drastic pro-
cedure fell to a great extent into desuetude. But the
principle had not been forgotten. Writing to Canning
some thirty years after the fall of Izmail, Wellington
declared that he would have considered himself justified
in putting the garrisons of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz
to the sword, and that had he done so at the former it
would have saved him 5000 men before the latter place
of arms. Twenty years after Izmail, Suchet deliber-
ately slaughtered large part of the garrison of Tarragona,
and he bitterly upbraided his opponent, the wounded
Contreras, for persisting in the defence of an untenable
town. It has always to be remembered that the van-
quished in a combat can only pray for quarter as an
act of grace ; they cannot claim it as a right, although
it nowadays is almost always granted.
But in the case of storming a fortress this question
of quarter to its defenders, as also that of the conduct
of the victors towards its citizens, was influenced by
the theory that the assailants were entitled to pillage
the place. That theory no doubt dated back to the
medieval days when warfare was prosecuted with the
utmost savagery; but the theory had been carried on
into much later days by the mercenaries of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, for whom prospects
and possibilities of plunder provided one of the main
inducements to serve. Traditions are amongst soldiers
carried on from one generation to another, and there
can be no doubt that at the time of Izmail and Sering-
apatam and San Sebastian and Tarragona the rank and
file of European armies, even perhaps some of the
officers, were imbued with the notion that the sacking
of a fortified city which had been taken by storm was a
xiv SUVOROF
procedure that was sanctioned by precedent and was
warranted by the circumstances of the case.
It will be urged that there was a very substantial
difference between what occurred within the Peninsular
strongholds taken by British troops, and what occurred
within the enceinte of the Turkish fortress on the Lower
Danube. The excesses committed in the one case were
entirely imauthorised, whereas at Izmail massacre and
rapine enjoyed up to a point the full approval of Suvorof
and his lieutenants. At Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz
there moreover were no reprisals on the part of the
victorious troops against the vanquished garrisons,
whereas thousands of Osmanli warriors were slaughtered
at Izmail without mercy.
But in connection with this latter topic we should
not forget that the conditions in the cases of the Spanish
places of arms differed widely from those that obtained
within the Ottoman ramparts. Resistance collapsed
as soon as the assailants had won their way within the
enceintes of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, whereas there
was desperate fighting in the streets of Izmail ; and
at San Sebastian, where defence continued after the
stormers had forced the breaches, the conquerors took
a heavy toll of their antagonists. In so far as the
outrages to which the citizens were subjected are con-
cerned, the Russians could at least excuse themselves
on the ground that Izmail was for the most part peopled
by Turks ; the inhabitants of the Spanish fortresses on
the other hand were friends of the assailants, not
enemies, but that availed them little. Finally, it has
to be borne in mind that warfare as between Muscovite
and Osmanli had for years past been carried on in ruth-
less fashion, that animosity between these hereditary
foes was stimulated on both sides by religious fervour,
and that there is not the slightest reason to suppose
that Ottoman troops who had fought their way into
a Russian city would have displayed forbearance.
Nobody to-day would suggest that the bloodshed and
INTRODUCTION xv
pillage which continued at Izmail after the defence had
been beaten down were not to be deprecated, nor that
Suvorof's attitude in connection with the matter was
not open to censure. But the case against him was
not in reality so bad as some have pretended.
Advance in the art of fortification and in military
science completely transformed the conditions of fortress
warfare during the century that followed Izmail and
Praga, and it is interesting to note that, on the occasion
of the one signal instance of a storming that has occurred
in these later years, the victorious assailants were
Russians and the defenders were Turks. That was at
Kars in 1877. But Kars was then secured by detached
forts, and it was the detached forts that were taken by
storm. There was no question of street fighting. It
is not solely due to the relatively indulgent methods of
conducting war which — before the Germans re-intro-
duced in Belgium and France the practices of a ruder
age — were supposed to prevail in these later days, that
the horrors of Magdeburg and Drogheda and Izmail
are hardly likely to repeat themselves in the course of
struggles between civilised races. Long-range artillery,
and the influence which this has exerted over the laying
out of defence works, also affect this question.
The uncouth antics and wayward outbursts which
make Suvorof cut so strange a figure in our eyes, were
perhaps to some extent a pose ; but they manifested
themselves too frequently and at too inappropriate
moments to leave much doubt that this remarkable
leader of men was not in all respects quite right in the
head. Still, history indicates that the type of warrior
of ardent temperament who is ever bent on violent
offensives when in the field, is apt to prove himself
eccentric in other matters. Bliicher was a case in
point. In our own annals we have had Nelson, Wolfe,
and the " Salamander " Cutts. His eccentricities have
perhaps been one cause why Suvorof's outstanding
merits as a commander have hardly been sufficiently
xvi SUVOROF
recognised outside the ranks of his own countrymen.
And yet those eccentricities were one of his most precious
assets as a chieftain lording it over the impressionable
Russian peasantry who composed the rank and file of
the armies that he led from victory to victory. His
singular personality was a cardinal factor in his handling
of his men. His demeanour, his grotesque posturings,
his exclamatory communications, may seem to us the
tricks of a mountebank, to the soldiers of Catherine and
Paul they endeared a general in whom officers and men
came to place implicit trust.
Next to Frederick the Great, Napoleon and Wellington,
unquestionably the greatest soldier of the last half of
the eighteenth century and of the wars that followed
the French Revolution, Suvorof was in some respects
more successful than either of the two former. He
never practically had a really untoward reverse on the
battlefield to deplore. There was no Kolin and no
Kunersdorf in his case to dim the glories of Fokchany
and of the passage of the St. Gothard. He met with no
discomfiture in combat so distressing as befell Napoleon
at Aspern and at Leipzig. Almost as uniformly vic-
torious in action as the Iron Duke, Suvorof never
experienced so mortifying a failure when compassing
the downfall of a stronghold as Wellington encountered
before Burgs in Old Castile. He proved himself in the
course of his many years of active service in various
theatres of war to be an exponent of well-nigh every
type of effective military operation, adapting his methods
to the circumstances of each particular case with un-
failing originality and with consistent good fortune.
He mastered the art of vanquishing elusive guerilla
bands, whether the bands were composed of Poles
fighting under educated leaders or were made up of
nomad Tartars, children of the limitless steppes. Otto-
man valour and tenacity behind entrenchments had
become traditional from the date on which the tide of
Turkish penetration westwards began at last to ebb ; but
INTRODUCTION xvii
Suvorof never quailed when confronted with the Sultan's
legions no matter how strongly they might be posted,
and he overcame them under such conditions by tactics
peculiarly his. Face to face with practised French
commanders such as were Macdonald and Joubert, he
more than held his own in combat. A plainsman
himself and at the head of plainsmen, he nevertheless
contrived to prosecute one of the most remarkable
mountain campaigns in the history of war ; for a parallel
to his forcing his way over the high Alps from Airolo to
Altdorf in defiance of stalwart opposition, we have almost
to go back to the days of Hannibal. He received his
baptism of fire as a young staff officer in the Seven
Years' War, winning his spurs as member of the most
lethargic army in Europe ; thanks to his precepts and
his heartening example, that army less than a generation
later rivalled in dash and mobility the fiery levies who
fought under the eyes of Dumouriez and Hoche. We
may occasionally feel tempted, when conning over the
record of what he accomplished, to criticise the pro-
cedure adopted in some particular case, to look askance
at a policy which verged at times seemingly upon the
reckless. And yet we have to admit that, whether he
set to work in the right way or in the wrong way, he
almost invariably conquered in the end. In war nothing
succeeds like success. The result, it is, that counts,
and not the means by which the result has been
arrived at.
Nor were Suvorof 's services to his country at an end
when the old man passed away, ignored by his Sovereign
and neglected by the court. His teachings and his
theory of making war were not forgotten. The tale of
his achievements was to animate coming generations of
Russian warriors in many a strenuous campaign, and
on many a hard-fought field. Had there been no
Suvorof tradition, would some of his successors in charge
of Muscovite armies, one wonders, have won the signal
triumphs that they did ? Would Diebitch have made
xviii SUVOROF
his swoop almost to the Golden Horn in 1829, and
would Paskievitch have been simultaneously carrying
all before him by lightning strokes dealt the Osmanli in
the inhospitable, roadless tracts of Kars and Erzerum ?
Would Tchernaief in 1865, master of only 2000 infantry
and a dozen guns, have stormed the great walled city of
Tashkend defended by 30,000 fighting men ? Would
Gourko have passed the Balkans in mid- winter in 1877,
and have come down like an avalanche upon Thrace
before the bewildered enemy could gather his scattered
legions together to arrest the rush ? The glory of All
the Russias is under eclipse, their greatness has for
the moment passed away. If ever there is to be a
revival, if ever those teeming Slav multitudes are to
recover the place in the world which they occupied
before the upheaval of 1917, the memory of such men
as Suvorof will assuredly have played its part in restoring
an emotional race to sanity and in resuscitating the
patriotism of a nation that has fallen from its high estate.
C. E. C.
CONTENTS
PAGB
Foreword . . vii
Introduction by Major-General Sir C. E. Call well, K.C.B. . xi
CHAPTER I
PREPARATION
Ancestry — Early Life — Education — Enlistment and, Promotions
— The Seven Years' War — Suvorofs Appreciation of its
Lessons— Regimental Command— A Letter— Training his Men 1
CHAPTER n
THE FIRST POLISH WAR
The state of Poland— Entry of Suvorof on the Scene in 1770—
Guerilla Warfare — Battle of Landskron, 1771 — Battle of
Stalovitch — Correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief —
Siege of Cracow, 1772 — Partition — Correspondence ... 14
CHAPTER m
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR
Turkish Warfare — Victories of Rumyantsof — Suvorof captures
Turtukai, 1773 — Correspondence — Captures Turtukai again
—Affair at Hirsof, 1773— Battle of Kozludzhi, 1774— Failure of
the Plan of Campaign — Peace of Kutchuk-Kainardzhi — Suvorof
marries unhappily — His freakish Character .... 36
XX SUVOROF
CHAPTER IV
FRONTIEE WORK
PAOK
Rebellion of Pugatchyof, 1772— Intervention of Suvorof, 1774—
Across the Volga— Capture of Pugatchyof— Suvorofs Little
Ways— Potyorakin— Correspondence — The Tartars— Revolt in
the Crimea, 1777— Squabbles with Prozorovski— Suvorof in
Charge — Migration of the Christians — Astrakhan and the Road
to India— Grievances — The Tartars again— Feasts and Fights
— Correspondence — Command of Petersburg Division, 1785—
The Imperial Progress, 1787— Suvorof one of the Sights . 62
CHAPTER V
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR
Alliance of Russia and Austria against Turkey — Outbreak of War,
1787— Suvorof at Kinburn— Battle at Kinburn, 1787— Suvorof
Wounded— Attack from the Sea, 1788— Siege of Otchakof-
Letter to his Daughter— Difference with Potyomkin— Suvorof
in Moldavia, 1789- Battle of Fokshani— Battle of the Ruimnik
— Rewards — Correspondence — Fruitless Campaign of 1790 —
The Amiable Coburg — The Storm of Izmail — Alienation of
Potyomkin — Peace with Turkey .85
CHAPTER VI
KICKING HIS HEELS
Suvorof at Petersburg — Sent to Finland — Correspondence —
Jealousy — On Military Hospitals — Craving for Work— Daily
Life — His Daughter — Books and Newspapers — Ossian — Enjoys
a Wedding — Transferred to Kherson — Troubles with Con-
tractors and the Treasury — Hospitals again — Letter to a
Godson — A French War threatened 125
CHAPTER VII
THE SECOND POLISH WAR
Poland after the Partition — Rising of 1794 — Rumyantsof sends
Suvorof into the Country — Battles of Kruptchitsa and Brest —
Halt at Brest — Battle of Kobuilk — Storm of Praga and Capitu-
lation of Warsaw — Suvorof as Pacificator — Anecdotes True
CONTENTS xxi
PAGE
and False — Recall to Petersburg, 1795 — An Adventure by the
Way — Upsetting the Court — Sent to Tultchin — The Science of
Victory — How it worked in Practice — The Foundation of
Modern Russian Training — Death of Catherine the Great . 151
CHAPTER VIII
DOWNFALL AND EXILE
Paul I. and Prussianism — Suvorof fails to please— Dismissed —
Exiled — Troubles with his Wife and his Property — His Son
— Daily Life— Recalled — Recalcitrant — Plans for a French
War — Meditates a Monastery — Recalled again, 1799 — War at
last 200
CHAPTER IX
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE
The French Revolutionary Armies — Suvorof s Method compared
— Paul and Suvorof — Suvorof leaves for Vienna — People and
Ministers— Arrival at Verona — Instructing the Austrians — The
March to the Adda — Crossing the Adda — Entrance into Milan
— Wresthng with the High War Council at Vienna — Entrance
into Turin — More Difficulties — Suvorof wants to go Home —
Operations in Switzerland — The French cross the Apennines
—The March to the Tidone— Battle of the Trebbia— Return to
Alessandria 217
CHAPTER X
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE
Correspondence and Complaints — The French cross the Apennines
again — Battle of Novi — International Fame — A Dinner Party
— Anecdotes — Plan of a Swiss Campaign — Its Vices and
Dangers 269
CHAPTER XI
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN
Alternative Routes — March on the St. Gothard — The Pass taken
by Storm — Rosenberg's Flank March — The Devil's Bridge — No
xxii SUVOROF
PAai
Thoroughfare over the Mountains — Korsakofs Defeat at
Zurich— In the Trap— Decision to fight out of it — Battles in
the Muottothal and Klonthal — Through to Glaris — Over the
Mountains again — Safe but not Sound — Correspondence —
Recall to Russia . . 305
CHAPTER XII
RETURN AND DEATH
Letting himself go — Meeting with Korsakof — Catching the Wind
— Christmas Games — Taking it out of Thugut's Son-in-Law —
Correspondence with Nelson — Breaking down — Desperate
Remedies— Another Blow from Paul— Arrival at Petersburg-
Death 340
BIBLIOGRAPHY 361
INDEX 365
LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS
PAOB
1. Map illustrating Operations in Poland . . .17
2. Battle of Landskron
23
3. Battle of Stalovitch
25
4. Map illustrating Operations in Moldavia
41
5. Capture of Turtukai
42
6. Affair of Hirsof
51
7. Battle of Kozludzhi
55
8. Battle of Fokshani .
97
9. Battle of Ruimnik .
101
10. Storm of Izmail
113
11. Battle of Kruptchitsa
157
12. Battle of Brest ....
160
13. Battle of Kobuilk .
. 167
14. Storm of Praga
175
15. Crossing of the Adda
229
16. Map illustrating Operations in Italy
249
17. Battles of the Trebbia
255
18. Battle of Novi
283
19. Map illustrating Operations in Switzerlan
d
307
20. Battles in the Muottothal and Klonthal
319
21. General Map of Russia
. 358
xxm
CHAPTER I
PREPARATION
Ancestry — ^Early life — ^Education — Enlistment and promotions — ^The
Seven Years' War — Suvorof s appreciation of its lessons — ^Regi-
mental command — A letter — ^Training his men.
Of the ancestry and early life of Alexander VftSjsilyevitcJi!
Suvorof very little is known. His family^ was of Swedish
origin. Probably its founder was a man called Yud;*
Suvor, one of the descendants of a Swedish immigrant
who settled near Moscow in the sixteenth century. A
certain Ivan Grigoryevitch Suvorof was a clerk attached
to the Pryeobrazhenski regiment in the time of Peter
the Great. By his second marriage this Ivan had a son
Vassili, who became the father of the great Alexander.
Vassili was a man of good capacity, proof against bribery
and influence, a good linguist, and rather more than
ordinarily careful in money matters. Born in 1705,
he entered the administrative side of the military
service, and in 1753 was made General and a member
of the Military College. Catherine had a very high
opinion of him on account of his " incorruptible
honesty." ^ In 1720, while still a boy, he married
Avdotya or Evdokia Theodosyevna Manukof, the
daughter of a secretary who in 1737 was tried for the
misappropriation of funds in his charge.^ There were
1 See Catherine's letter to Dr. Zimmerman, 15th January 1790,
Russkaya Starina (1887), 8. The Military College had authority over
all matters except the actual conduct of war — commissariat, equip-
ment, and the like.
' For some notes about him see Russkaya Starina (1900), civ. 258,
1 B
2 SUVOROF
three children of this marriage — Anna, Maria, and
Alexander. Alexander was bom at Moscow on the
24th November 1780.
Nothing in his ancestry seems to have foreshadowed
the coming greatness of Alexander Vassilyevitch. If
there were any remarkable members of it, they were
mute and inglorious. His father was a respectable
administrator; his mother died fifteen years after his
birth, and no note of her appearance, character, or
influence upon his education has been preserved. But
from one source or another the boy had got some
unusual aptitude. His health was bad. He was short,
thin, and ugly. Nothing in his body suggested power.
Nevertheless, his eyes must have had some of the keen-
ness and fire which they preserved until the end, and the
spirit v/hich looked out from them can never have been
feeble. His father intended to find him a post of some
civil kind, and he learned, not very well, French,
German, and a little Italian. These languages, and
the ordinary equipment of a civilised man, reading
and writing and the like, were the sum of his regular
studies. But his private reading took him into military
history and biography. There he read with passion.
Some chance encounter among his father's books must
have set him on the track down which he was to travel
almost until the day of his death. For study of this
kind his energy seemed inexhaustible, and, without any
of the common childish liking for the pomp of war,
he devoted himself, while yet a boy, earnestly to military
service. Ordinary companions and ordinary games he
had none. When he was not shut in his garret poring
over books, he was galloping on horseback in the sun
and wind or rain, to harden his body and accustom it
to the fatigues of war.
This overmastering desire for a military career re-
ceived no encouragement from Vassili Suvorof . But the
puzzled and anxious father was wise enough not to resort
to threats and punishments, and if he did not help the
PREPARATION 8
boy, he at least let him alone. There was, at last, a crisis.
When Alexander was eleven years old, Hannibal, the
negro general of Peter the Great, paid a visit to Moscow.^
The father had the good sense to ask his old colleague's
opinion, and Hannibal advised him to let the boy follow
his own bent. Vassili gave way. Any youth who
wished to become an officer must first pass through the
lower ranks, and this wise regulation of Peter the Great
was usually evaded by the enrolment of mere babies as
privates in the Guards. By the time the child had
become a man, he had nominally completed his service
as a private and a non-commissioned officer, and could
proceed at once along the primrose path of promotion
by favour. Alexander Suvorof came late into the
service, and he began at the bottom. In 1742 he was
enrolled in the Semyonovski Guards, and in 1745 he
began actually to serve.
The interval he had spent in study, no less ardent
and more systematic than before. Plutarch, Cornelius
Nepog, and Julius Caesar were his classical authors,
Montecucculi and Turenne among the moderns, and he
got such acquaintance as was possible with the campaigns
of Alexander and Hannibal, of Cond6, Prince Eugen of
Savoy, and Mar6chal de Saxe. Hiibner and RoUin
gave him some general history and geography. Wolf
and Leibnitz some philosophy. For artillery and forti-
fication he had Vauban, and his father was able here at
least to give him help. When, at the age of fifteen, he
put on his private's uniform, he knew more of the history
and art of war than most of the carpet officers to whom
he had to present arms.
This life of reading and meditation continued after
he joined his regiment. He did not throw himself into
practice as fiercely as into theory, and his work was
apparently not well done. No doubt, he had already
determined to be a great general, but he was careless
about making himself a perfect private. His natural
1 This Hannibal was an ancestor of the poet Pushkin.
4 SUVOROF '
independence of temper and hatred of forms seem to
have led him to avoid some of his duties. He did not
live in barracks, but with an uncle, who had a commis-
sion in the Pryeobrazhenski Guards ; he preferred light
duties to heavy ; and on one occasion he played the
malingerer. Most of his biographers have represented
him as an ardent soldier. But the latest research has
shown that he did not work with the unquenchable
happiness of a young man whose trade is also his hobby.^
One incident of this period he recalled in later life. He
was doing sentry duty at Mon Plaisir in the time of the
Empress Elizabeth. She passed by him and offered
him a silver rouble. He refused it, saying that the
regulations forbade a sentry to take money. " Young
man,'* said the Empress, " you know your duty," and
offered him her hand to kiss. Then, throwing the rouble
at his feet, " I'll put the rouble there on the ground ;
when you're relieved, pick it up." He took the coin in
due course, and kept it till the day of his death. ^
Few other details of his service have come down to
us. His companions were not intimate with him, or
they were not of the sort who compose memoirs and
diaries, and no letters or memoranda of his own have
been preserved. What he looked like, thought, and did
during these years of formation cannot be known. The
bare facts of his successive promotions are almost all
that is on record. In 1747 he was made Corporal, in
1751 Sergeant. From May to October 1752 he was
engaged in carrying despatches to Dresden and Vienna.
On the 15th April 1754 he became at last a commissioned
officer, and received a Lieutenancy in the Ingermanland
regiment of infantry. By some freak of fortune, his
earliest duties were purely administrative, and it is
doubtful whether this born leader of men ever com-
1 Maslovski ; in the Russian Biographical Dictionary, x. 9. This
part of the article is based on "Suvorof Soldat" (documents of the
Archives of the Semyonovski Regiment), Petrograd, 1900,
2 Fucjljs, Misc., 63.
PREPARATION 5
manded a company. He was two years with his first
regiment, but seems to have spent a considerable part
of the time on leave, engaged in family affairs. In
January 1756 he became Senior Commissary of Stores,
in the following October Lieutenant General Auditor,
attached to the Military College, and in December
Senior Major. What the disciple of Caesar and Prince
Eugen thought of all this store-keeping and clerking,
flour and porridge and pickled cabbage, reports and
instructions and accounts, we can only guess. It seems
that his father must have been using his interest in the
administrative departments to get Alexander on in the
service. From the latter' s frequent and unrestrained
expressions of feeling in later life, it is obvious that he
would rather have been drilling a single company or
squadron than be involved in this domestic business.
Nevertheless, his chance came in the great war which
broke out in 1756.^
The Seven Years' War gave Suvorof his first view of
active service. He persuaded his father to use his in-
fluence, and as early as 1757 he was sent to the front, but
in the capacity of Ober-Proviantmeister.^ His duties
were still administrative, the purchase and forward-
ing of stores from Memel to the troops actually in the
field. But in 1759 he was appointed, with the rank
of Lieutenant-Colonel, to the staff of Prince Volkonski,
and afterwards to that of Count Fermor, who, in the
previous year, had dragged an unwieldy mass of Russian
soldiers through the indecisive battle of Zorndorf.
Fermor was superseded by Count Saltikof , but remained
with the army, and Suvorof was therefore present at
the complete but profitless victory of Kunersdorf. He
was a mere spectator, but this unparalleled example of
1 Apparently he read in this year two papers before the newly
founded Society of Lovers of Russian Literature at Petrograd. They
were dialogues, the first between Cortez and Montezuma, the second
between Alexander and Herostratos. Neither has any literary merit.
Pyetrushevski (2nd edition), 9.
» Russkaya Siarina (1887), Ivi. 212.
6 SUVOROF
refusal to follow up a victory must have made a profound
impression. Had Suvorof been in the place of Saltikof,
nothing could have saved Frederick from destruction,
and the whole history of modem Germany would have
been different.
In the subsequent operations of the war he took a
more active part. In 1760 he was in Tottleben*s raid
on Berlin. In the next year, in command of part of
General Berg*s light horse, he distinguished himself in
the affair of Reichenbach and in raids upon Frederick's
entrenched camp at Schweidnitz. During the siege of
Colberg by Rumyantsof he was constantly engaged
with the troops of Platen, who attempted to throw
supplies into the place. Once he was wounded, two
horses were killed under him, and he was twice within
an ace of being taken prisoner. He seems to have
behaved on every occasion like a gallant cavalry officer,
and Berg recommended him as " quick in reconnaissance,
bold in fight, and cool in danger." ^ The campaign of
1761 was the last in which the Russian Army took part.
The death of the Empress Elizabeth in December was
followed by the conclusion of peace by Peter III.
The Seven Years' War thus gave Suvorof consider-
able experience of all sorts of military activity. But
more important than the mere practice in the handling
of troops was the understanding which he obtained in
this war of the way in which all war should be conducted.
All Europe had much to learn from a struggle in which
a single state with a highly disciplined army had made
head against a combination of much greater apparent
strength. But the lessons of the war were for the most
part not well learned, not even in Prussia itself. The
extraordinary successes of Frederick cast a spell over
the military minds of the Continent, and his strategy,
1 Pyetnishevski, 15. Suvorof s work during the Seven Years' War
is described in detail in Campagnes du Feldmarechal Souxcarrow, i. 2,
et seq. The Campagnes are a pirated reprint of a translation of Von
Anting' s biography, of which the greater part was read and corrected
by Suvoiof himself.
PREPARATION 7
his tactics, his drill, and even his uniforms were imitated
with slavish fidelity for a whole generation after his
death. The results were generally disastrous. In fact,
the chances of a repetition of any particular combina-
tion of military events are very slight. " War," said
Thucydides, twenty-one hundred years before Frederick,
" is the last of all things to go according to programme."
Strategy is nothing more than putting a force into the
position from which it can strike with most effect, and
Frederick's plans were successful, not in virtue of their
formal perfection, but because he could rely upon himself
and his subordinates to execute marches according to
programme, without delay or deviation. As with his
strategy, so with his tactics. His turning movements
and flank attacks succeeded because his men could
carry them out against the enemy who opposed them.
There was no special worth in such tactics as against the
French armies of the Revolution, which attacked in
column at great speed and broke the centre before the
wing had closed upon them. The value of Frederick's
drill, as of all drill, lay in this, that it accustomed his
men to the instantaneous obedience of orders, and made
it certain that on the field of battle the word of command
would be followed by the execution of the required
manoeuvre in the shortest possible time. In short, the
successes of Frederick, as of all great commanders, were
due to the moral qualities with which he, his generals,
and his troops carried out his designs, and not to any
mystic properties of the designs themselves. His
imitators failed because they and their armies fell short
of him and his armies in practical rather than theoretical
capacity. They missed the real secret : the boldness
of his strokes and the swiftness of his recoveries.
Suvorof was not the man to fall into such an error,
and the incompetence of the Allies, and especially of the
Russians, made a profound impression upon him.^ The
1 A Russian infantry regiment required an hour to deploy into
battle formation I Vassilyef, Suvorof, 16.
8 SUVOROF
soldier will study the failures of his predecessors more
safely than their successes. He can learn to avoid their
mistakes, but nothing but his own genius will enable
him to imitate their triumphs. Suvorof s natural bias
against formalism was encouraged by the very events
which drove most of his contemporaries into excess of
it. They thought that Frederick succeeded through the
perfection of his forms. He saw that Frederick's
opponents failed through want of mobility, decision,
and readiness to take risks. The imitators aggravated
want of energy by loading themselves with forms, while
he came to the bold and sound conclusion that forms
were worse than useless, except as the channels of energy.
With him, energy was first and last. " Remember,*'
he said, " that victory depends on the legs ; the hands
are only the instruments of victory." The essential
contrast between the military sincerity of Frederick
and the sluggishness and indecision of his opponents
thus produced in Suvorof an effect diametrically opposed
to that produced in almost all his contemporaries, and
made him the most original commander in Europe
between Frederick and Napoleon.
On the 26th August 1762, Suvorof was promoted to
the rank of Colonel. His first command was the
Astrakhan regiment of infantry. Tsar Peter was re-
moved soon after the conclusion of peace, and Suvorof
actually received his promotion from the hands of
Catherine. During her absence at Moscow for the
coronation, his regiment was in garrison at Petersburg,
and after her return, on the 6th April 1763, he was
transferred to the Suzdal regiment, which took the place
of the Astrakhan regiment. The change from the vigor-
ous life of a cavalry leader on active service to the sober
management of a garrison unit must have been infinitely
depressing. But material for piecing together a con-
tinuous narrative of this part of his life is wanting.
One private letter alone has been preserved, the first of
a long series of complaints. It was written in bad
PREPARATION 9
French on the 7th February 1764 to Louise Ivanovna
Kulyevna.^ His epistolary style was always disorderly,
sometimes incoherent, and in this letter, as usual, he
spilled his thoughts on to his paper without any elegance.
Come here (Petersburg) ; you will be three or four
times a week at a masked ball, two or three times at
the theatre ; I profit by it as much as my health allows
me, for unfortunately, though I'm never in bed and am
not keeping my room, but the goodness of the waters
of the Neva has so weakened my stomach that it revolts
against me continually, and the air here has bred worms
in my belly, endlessly, which torment me to death ;
the pains in my head and chest do not diminish,
Thin and pale as a homeless ass.
My skeleton chatters its ghastly jaw ;
Like a ghost through the realm of air I pass.
Like a ship that sinks in the ocean's maw.
I am almost face to face with death. He drags me step
by step from the world. But I hate him, I never want
to die so ignominiously, and I should wish never to suffer
it otherwise than on the field of Mars.
This gloomy letter represented, no doubt, only a mood.
But throughout his life, Suvorof was inclined to be
unhappy everywhere except on active service, and his
passion for hard work in the field and personal distinc-
tion was never fully satisfied. Nevertheless, the mere
management and training of men gave him some pleasure,
and these bursts of complaint must have alternated
with periods of real happiness. On the 1st July 1765
his Suzdal regiment was sent to Ladoga, where he made
his first experiments in his special methods. He was
far enough from the capital, and the loose organisation
of the Russian military system allowed him in great
measure to follow his own bent, without much inter-
ference from inspectors and sticklers for uniformity.
Some of his activities were remote from ordinary
^ It is in the Sbornik ; printed in Letters and Papers^ p. 23.
10 SUVOROF
conceptions of the duties of a regimental commander.
Service in the Russian Army was practically for life,
and a regiment could therefore be organised like a great
family. The commanding officer could, if he pleased,
acquire an enduring influence over his men. This Suvorof
set himself to do. He built, besides a cavalry stable, a
church and two schools, one for officers' children, and
the other for those of private soldiers, and he laid out a
garden in which his men worked. But his principal
task was the training of his men as soldiers. His orders
to his troops and his official letters to his superior officer.
General Weimarn, show that he was already putting
into practice the theories which he afterwards elaborated
for whole armies. He knew that victory fell not to the
commander who worked out the most ingenious paper
plans, but to him who could call upon his troops, at a
moment's notice, to do a two days' march in one day,
and fight a battle at the end of it. First and foremost
he put the moral equipment of his men. Courage,
self-confidence, and the endurance of fatigue were the
cardinal virtues. The soldier must be ready and able
to go anywhere and face anything, and the very idea
of retreat must not be allowed to enter his head.
" Help, danger," and other figments of the imagina-
tion are all right for old women, who are afraid to get
off the stove because they may break their legs, and for
lazy, luxurious people, and blockheads — for miserable
self-protection, which in the end, whether good or bad,
in fact, always passes for bravery with the story-tellers.^
Pusillanimous cavalry tactics he specially condemned.
Shock tactics were seldom practised even at this date.
The Russian regular cavalryman was still a man who
used carbine and pistols rather than a swordsman.
The Cossack was little better than a forager.
For cavalry to use firearms is extremely undesirable ;
sword and lance are incomparably better ; there has
1 Pyetrushevski, i. 66.
PREPARATION 11
sometimes been an unexpected opportunity for firing
during a pursuit ; but even in this case cold steel is
better, because one may find one's self without a shot in
one's carbine and cannot afford to waste time in re-load-
ing. ... In pursuit the cavalry must simply charge boldly
with an unbroken front ; except the flankers, who may
fire pistols ; but only with careful aim.^
This desire to accustom his men to fighting at close
quarters led him into unusual paths. He enlisted both
housewifery and religion in the service of the good cause.
He not only built a church, but personally attended to
the prayers, and the washing, patching, and darning, of
his men.
The German or French peasant knows his Church,
his faith, and his prayers ; the Russian hardly knows
his village priest — in my regiment we taught these
peasants a few prayers. So they got to perceive that
in everything God was with us, and strove towards
honour. The officers know that I myself am not
ashamed to work at this. . . . Suvorof was Major, and
Adjutant, and everything down to Corporal ; I myself
looked into everything and could teach everybody.
Every man passed through my hands, and he was
told that nothing more remained for him to know, if
only he did not forget what he had learned. Thus he
was given confidence in himself, the foundation of
bravery.2
This was not mere pettifoggery. The Russian army
was recruited from among the serfs, and consisted in
great part of those whom their masters could most easily
spare. Idleness, drunkenness, and dishonesty were thus
common qualities, almost qualifications. The Slav
lethargy and indifference to appearances, which made
even the modem Russian Army the least smart in
Europe, allowed personal slovenliness full play in the
days of Catherine, and such discipline as existed depended
largely on brutal and ferocious punishments. Suvorof
tried to improve the character of his men by encouraging
1 Pyetrushevski, 72, 73. » Ibid., 67.
12 SUVOROF
godliness and cleanliness together. His regiment was a
sort of reformatory school as well as an instrument of
war. In the soil thus fertilised, he planted the specific
military virtues of obedience, endurance, and speed.
He was most original in keeping his men as much as
possible on a war footing. Marches by day and night,
wading and swimming across rivers, and sham fights
were of constant occurrence, and were undertaken with-
out warning or preparation.* On one occasion he
suddenly ordered his troops to take a monastery by
storm, and sent them tumbling over the wall among the
monks, who must have taken them for a pack of devils.
All these experiments in command were sketches of his
later system. He practised his men in hard realities,
setting his mind to making them healthy, bold, and
hardy, without regard to the niceties of forms. The
specifically Prussian virtues, mechanical exactness and
complete moral subjection of the subordinate to the
conamander, were not there. For those he had to sub-
stitute other things more suited to the Slav character ;
personal indifference to hardship, and an almost parental
relation between officer and soldier. It is not difficult
to see in this Ladoga period of Suvorof 's life an elabora-
tion of the lessons of the Prussian War.
No doubt, he was already master of the art of getting
on to intimate terms with his men. He was not yet
famous, and there was no Boswell to set him down as
he lived among his men at Ladoga. But he must have
already been something of the jesting, porridge-eating,
back-slapping brother-in-arms that he remained through-
out the time of his greatest fame. He was never
happier than when he had pulled off his jacket and
shirt, and sprawled half-naked in the sun, exchanging
jokes on terms of friendship with all. He spared no
man while work was to be done, but he encouraged
liberty, equaUty, and fraternity when it was finished.
If he saw that they darned their socks and washed
1 Pyetrushevski, 68.
PREPARATION 18
their shirts, it was not as a schoolmarm, but as one of
themselves. Hard work seemed lighter when he shared
it, and rough living lost its discomfort when the Colonel
himself endured it with the rest. His men grew to
like doing their utmost, because they grew to like giving
him pleasure. By encouragement and example he
wound his unit up to a high pitch, and in 1769 he got
the opportunity of playing upon the instrument which
he had made.
CHAPTER n
THE FIRST POLISH WAB
The State of Poland — ^Entry of Suvorof on the scene in 1770 — Guerilla
warfare — ^Battle of Landskron, 1771 — Battle of Stalovitch — Corre-
spondence with the Commander-in-Chief— Siege of Cracow, 1772
— ^Partition — Correspondence.
It is a matter for regret that much of Suvorof's mili-
tary reputation depends on his successes in Polish
Wars. He was thus the instrument of one of the great
political crimes of modem history. In the second half
of the eighteenth century the situation of Poland was
one with which students of modern Imperialism are
familiar. The internal condition of the country had
long been one of weakness and uncertainty, and powerful
neighbours waited for the time when an excuse for inter-
vention should offer itself. Russia, Prussia, and Austria,
restrained not by compunction for the perishing nation-
ality of Poland, but by their mutual jealousy and distrust,
waited and manoeuvred for the moment when they could
decently step in to restore that Order, in whose name as
many crimes have been committed as in that of Liberty.
Each maintained its group of partisans in the country,
and through this channel administered, from time to
time, further doses of the poison from which the destined
victim was suffering. The elective monarchy, and the
liherum vetOy or right of a single member of the Diet to
prohibit the execution of any of its decrees, made the
Polish nobility a very convenient instrument of foreign
intrigue. By playing the jealousy of the nobility against
14
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 15
the King and the jealousy of one group of nobles against
another, the neighbouring Powers were able to infect
the whole state with a creeping palsy. The peasants
were mere serfs. The industry and commerce of the
country were in the hands of Jews, and there was no
Polish middle class. Political power was concentrated
in a small space, and pressure upon a very limited area
moved the whole fabric.
Towards the end of the third quarter of the century
the ill condition became acute, and the methods of the
expectant heirs more direct. The collapse of the power
of the Crown, the factiousness of the nobility, and the
complete impotence of the mass of the people made
possible the three successive partitions by which the
Kingdom of Poland was extinguished. The first appro-
priation of territory was made by Austria in 1770,
though a formal partition did not take place until two
years later. But the earliest steps were taken by Russia.
In 1764 Catherine II. secured the election of Stanislav
Poniatowski, a discarded favourite of her own, as King
of Poland. His election was accompanied and secured
by the despatch of Russian troops and the expenditure
of a considerable sum of Russian money. This election
did not, nor was it intended to, put an end to the political
disorganisation of the country. The new King was
chosen by the Russian Empress, not because of his
capacity for making head against the truculent nobility,
but because of his incapacity, of his inevitable need of
further assistance from the Power which had set him on
the throne. It is not the habit of such an Imperialism
as that of Catherine of Russia to spoil its own chances
by nominating a strong man where a puppet will suffice.
In such a case a lively sense of impotence in the nominee
is the first condition of his appointment. The advantages
which he can acquire from the appearance of Royalty
are to be used for the advantage of his patron. The
real governor remains for the time being out of the
picture, but near enough to be called in when the
16 SUVOROF
difficulties of the domestic situation make it decent to
interfere once more. Stanislav was a good-natured man,
of modest character and mediocre capacity. Under
these conditions his election did not alter the state of
Poland. His partisans, of whom the Princes Czartoryski
were the most powerful, aimed at the increase of the
authority of the Crown as the only means of checking
the growing insolence of the nobility. The alternative,
an appeal from the Crown to the common people, did
not present itself as an alternative, and the absence of
any educated non-noble class would have made such an
appeal, in fact, fruitless. The Radziwils, on the other
side, headed the defenders of the old system, and while
one side talked severely of order, the other declaimed
in terms of liberty. Complaints against the Czartoryski
were lodged in Petersburg, but Catherine and her advisers
were still not prepared for strong measures. The sick
man must get a little worse before they would divide
his estate.
The religious disease of Poland combined with the
political to reduce the strength of the country against
permeation from abroad. At the Diet of Vilna in 1563
it had been decreed that all the nobility of whatever
faith, provided they were Christians, should have the
same political rights. This Toleration Act had been
made the basis of more than one subsequent Royal
election, and more than one King, in return for Protestant
support, had pledged himself to maintain the rights of
the Dissidents, most of whom were members of the Greek
Church. But the wars of Russia with Sweden gave the
Roman Catholics opportunities of which they were not
slow to avail themselves, and the members of the Greek
and other Dissenting churches began to suffer disabilities
and even persecution. Stanislav was inclined to favour
them, and Russia and Prussia, to whom religious liberty
was as good political coin as anything else, supported
him. In 1768 a Diet was requested to confirm the rights
of the Dissidents. The opposition was strong, and Prince
THE FIRST POLISH WAR
17
Ryepnin, the Russian representative at Warsaw, went
so far as to arrest four Roman Catholics and transport
them to Russia. Patriotism wanted no further excuse.
On the 1st March 1768 eight of the bolder spirits issued
a declaration from Bar, establishing a Polish Confederacy
c
IS SUVOROF
independent of the foreign Governments and their
nominees.* The numbers of the confederates grew
rapidly. Count Krasinski, and Pulawski, the inspirer
of the movement, were chosen as Marshals of the Con-
federacy, and the revolt assumed a serious appearance.
The affair had now reached the point at which the
rival Powers could begin to collect the spoils. It was
found necessary to reinforce the Russian troops for the
purpose of suppressing the revolt and restoring the
power of the Crown. A small army was collected at
Smolyensk, under Lieutenant-General Nummers, and
Suvorof and his Suzdalskii regiment were included in it.
Suvorof was created a Brigadier on the 22nd September
1768, but it was not until February 1770 that he actually
handed his regiment over to its new Colonel, Stackelburg.
His orders to join Nummers gave him an opportunity
of testing the results of his regimental training, and he
had every reason to be satisfied. From Ladoga to
Smolyensk was more than 570 miles of the worst marching
country in Europe. He covered the distance in 30
days ; not a single sick man was left behind at Ladoga,
six fell ill on the journey, and one died.^ At Smolyensk
he was given the command of a Brigade, comprising
four battalions and two squadrons of cavalry.
The events of the next two or three years need not be
described in detail. Poland was at that time covered
with woods and swamps. The villages and most of
the towns were collections of miserable hovels. The
roads were mere tracks, passable in summer, but for
most of the year filled with mud and water, and the only
inns were wayside huts occupied by Jews. The warfare
was of the guerilla sort, giving opportunity for individual
skill and bravery, but for little on the grand scale.
Small bands of partisans moved over the wretched
1 A Confederacy, according to the Constitution of Poland, was a
sort of legalisation of the divine right of rebellion ; a formal means of
protest against Acts of the Crown.
Pyetrushevski, i. 29.
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 19
country, and Prussiian and Austrian territory afforded
them a temporary refuge, in case the local pressure of
the Russian troops became too strong. Von Weimarn,
the Russian Commander-in-Chief, was a man of more
erudition than vigour. Scattered encounters between
numerically insignificant bodies of troops took place
continually, but the methodical sweeping of the country-
side, the only certain way of dealing with such enemies
as the Confederates, was not possible to such a man as
Von Weimarn, especially when he had so few men at his
disposal. The Due de Choiseul, then in power in France,
openly supported the Confederates. He had also inspired
the Sultan to declare war against Russia, and the double
strain was too much for the Russian military machine.
Nevertheless, for Suvorof, this was an excellent field
for his first practical experiments, and he executed some
very fine marches and raids. On one occasion, he carried
his infantry in carts from Minsk to Warsaw, a distance
of 375 miles, in 12 days.^ On another, he marched
45 miles out from Brest, all night and half the
next day on the road, and defeated a detachment of the
enemy 2000 strong. In this affair he tried to repeat
the English performance at Minden, and charged cavalry
with the bayonet ; the Poles galloping away without
resistance.^ In the autumn of 1769 he fixed his base of
operations at Lyublin, and from that centre struck out,
now in one direction, now in another, as he received
news of the approach of the enemy parties. On one of
these expeditions he fell into the Vistula. A burly
grenadier pulled him out by the hair, but he was badly
bruised by striking against a pontoon, and was not
thoroughly recovered until three months later.^ On the
whole, he had little to do, and his energetic nature chafed
in inactivity. On the 1st January 1770 he was pro-
1 Campagnes, i. 28.
« Pyetrof. On this occasion, owing to the smallness of his force,
Suvorof gave orders that quarter should not be given. Nevertheless,
he brought back about 40 prisoners.
^ CampagneSt i. 37.
20 SUVOROF
moted to the rank of Major-General, but he cared more
for work than for anything else, and throughout this
year his correspondence is full of complaints. Vigorous
operations against the Polish Confederates were impos-
sible, largely because the Turkish threat from the south
was so much more formidable. The troops actually in
Poland were badly led and wanting in discipline, and
Suvorof had constantly to draw attention to the slovenli-
ness, corruption, and plundering habits of those in
command of the co-operating detachments. Of one
Lieutenant-Colonel Dryevitz he writes sneeringly :
What do I care if he has not studied his Russian
grammar for three whole years ? At least I am learning
German from him. . . . He*s a foreigner, under no ties to
Russia, his interest is in prolonging the war, not in cutting
it short. His boasts about his victories are sheer empti-
ness ; they were won by his Russian soldiers. What
are these mighty dispositions against the rebels ? Only
speed, energy, and the discovery of their whereabouts.
His intelligent and strong troops he keeps in a bunch,
incapable of dealing a blow, rather than use them intelli-
gently, with the desire of ending this unrest. The use
of him as a commander is the shame of those of us who
are his seniors in rank, even if without capacity or worth
or service equal to his, the shame of Russia, which has
long been free from the age of such barbarities as his.
While he is carelessly, luxuriously, magnificently making
holiday at Cracow, I with a handful of men am compelled
to struggle like a Cossack bandit with every cut-throat
who comes along.^
Suvorof 's complaints on this as on other occasions
were partly provoked by the foreign origin of their object,
and throughout his life he was almost continually
jealous and resentful at having to work under or on equal
terms with men of inferior capacity to his own. But
he was also thoroughly dissatisfied with the necessarily
few opportunities of the Polish affair. In the whole of
1 Pyelnishevski, i. 89. Dryevitz was accused of having cut off the
hands of some of his Polish prisoners. Ibid. i. 90.
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 21
1770 he only twice encountered the enemy in considerable
force, and the Russian triumphs over the Turks at
Larga, Kagul, and Tchesma held out the promise of
much greater things in the other theatre of war.
In 1771 the Polish War assumed larger proportions.
The indefatigable Choiseul, not contented with his
diplomatic success in Turkey, determined to make the
threat from the direction of Poland more serious. In
1769 he had sent the Comte de Tollis with a considerable
sum of money to stimulate the Confederates, but de
Tollis took his money back to Paris, thinking the enter-
prise hopeless. In his place Choiseul sent Dumouriez,
who was greatly disappointed with the numbers and
character of the Confederates, but determined to make
an attempt to convert their undisciplined rabble into
an army. He got officers from France, arms from Silesia
and Hungary, transport from Bavaria, and with Austrian
and Prussian deserters as a nucleus, worked his miscel-
laneous collection of men on foot into something
approaching military shape. About 60,000 men were
ready for the campaign of 1771, and in the spring
Dumouriez began a vigorous offensive from the Austrian
frontier, proposing to cut off the scattered Russian posts,
and even threaten the rear of Rumyantsof's army
operating against the Turks in Moldavia. His first
efforts prospered. Several Russian detachments were
simultaneously beaten in the plain of Cracow and driven
across the Vistula with heavy losses. But the Con-
federates defeated themselves. With these first victories
order disappeared, and the bulk of the army gave itself
up to rejoicing and plunder. This was the moment for
Suvorof. He had already dispersed several parties of
insurgents, and attempted to take the fortress of Land-
skron by storm. Here, for the time being, he failed,
and, in the course of several unsuccessful attacks, almost
all his superior officers were wounded, Suvorof himself
being grazed by a bullet. But after the occupation of
Cracow by Dumouriez he gained his first substantial
22 SUVOROF
victory. Much against his will he was forced to co-
operate with Dryevitz, but the result showed that
Dryevitz was not so bad as Suvorof had previously made
out. On the 10th of May the joint forces encountered
Dumouriez himself with a considerable army at
Landskron.
The Poles lay along a ridge. The fortress itself
covered the left flank, and the right and centre were
protected by two woods. On the right the ridge was
inaccessible, and along the front, in addition to the
trees, the slopes were covered with brushwood, which
formed a stiff, natural entanglement. The attack of
the Russians was expected, the position was carefully
chosen, and the fortress with its 30 guns was in itself
a most formidable obstacle. But the overthrow of
Dumouriez was instantaneous and complete. Suvorof
took in the situation at a glance, and, without waiting
for his infantry, laimched the Cossacks of Tchuguyef
and a squadron of carabineers straight at the enemy's
centre. Dumouriez, to whom such a cavalry attack
upon unbroken infantry appeared, not unnaturally,
absurd, ordered his men to hold their fire until the
Russians reached the crest of the ridge itself. This was
sound, orthodox, military doctrine, and a steady
infantry, by a couple of volleys at point blank range,
even without artillery, would have emptied almost
every saddle in front of them. But Suvorof knew
Dumouriez*s troops better than the French commander
himself. As the Cossacks swept yelling up the slope,
the Poles turned and ran. Dumouriez and a few other
officers in vain tried to stop them, and Miutchiski
actually led some of the infantry forward against the
Russian foot. But the battle was decided in the first
few minutes. The Polish left wing retired in good
order into Landskron. But about 500 Poles were
killed, two field-guns remained in Suvorof's hands, and
the fortress itself was left alone merely because the
victors had only 8 guns to bring against the 30 which
THE FIRST POLISH WAR
23
defended it. Dumouriez himself shook the dust of
Poland from his feet, and went straight back to France.^
Suvorof completed his brief campaign by defeating
another detachment of Poles under Pulavski at Zamostye.
He then returned to Lyublin. In 17 days he had
marched about 475 miles, and fought 8 battles or
skirmishes.
The defeat at Landskron left the Poles for a time
portress of^**^
landskronYi^ ^
Battle of LANDSKRON.
SCALE- INGUSH M/l£S
O '/z / Z
without a leader, and without even the nucleus of
what could be called an army. But Count Oginski of
Lithuania, who had hitherto held away from the in-
surgents, at length threw in his lot with them, and on
the 30th August fell suddenly upon a Russian detach-
ment under Colonel Albuitch and killed or captured
the greater part of it at Rudka. Around him there
1 Pyetrof, iii. 223. Dumouriez gives his own account of the Polish
business in La Vie et les Memoires du G&neral Dumouriez. Suvorof
himself declared that Dryevitz behaved with " skill, manUness, and
courage." Pyetrushevski, i. 104.
24 SUVOROF
soon gathered a force of several thousand men, and the
work of Landskron seemed all undone.
As early as the 28rd July Weimam had warned
Suvorof to watch the suspicious movements of Oginski.
On the 21st September he sent him elaborate instruc-
tions how to act in co-operation with Dryevitz. Whether
Suvorof received these instructions or not, is doubtful.
At any rate, he learned of the defeat of Albuitch, and
wrote on the 1st September to inform Weimarn that he
was at once starting for Lyublin. On the 2nd he was
at Kotsk, on the 5th at Vyala, and on the 6th at Brest.
From there he marched to Byereza, and then to Nesvizh,
where he at last got certain information of the where-
abouts of Oginski. Bidding Colonel Diring and
Lieutenant-Colonel Klxvabulof, who were near at hand
with small bodies of troops, to join him as soon as
possible, he marched swiftly towards Stalovitch. He
had with him 822 men, and Oginski's strength was about
5000. But the Poles had no news of Suvorof, and
imagined that there were no Russians in their neigh-
bourhood but a few small detachments like that of
Diring. They were taken completely by surprise.
The village of Stalovitch lay in an open plain in
front of a large marsh, across which ran a single cause-
way, 200 yards long. Suvorof, avoiding a frontal
attack, marched during the night of the 9th round to
the rear of the town. It was very dark, and for the
last part of the march, the only guide was the light
in the bell-tower of a neighbouring monastery. Aiming
at the causeway, the Russians dashed across it as the
startled enemy opened fire. The village was soon
taken, and the Poles, leaving many prisoners and some
of their cannon to the Russians, hid themselves in
the houses, or fled out of the place. Only Oginski's
Guard, his so-called " Janissaries," offered a steady
resistance, and Oginski himself barely escaped capture.
Some of Albuitch's men heard the shouts and the firing,
leaped from the windows of the houses in which they
^
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 25
lay, and joined their comrades. The surprise so far
had succeeded.
This, however, was only the first stage. A large
part of the Polish force lay outside the town, and
Oginski was able to collect them in some order in a
trenched camp upon a neighbouring hill. Here he was
attacked at daybreak by Suvorof . After a brief artillery
preparation, the Russians broke in with horse and foot,
and the Poles were soon put to flight. Many surrendered.
A detachment of 1000 horse under General Byelak
came up when the battle was finished, and was sent
Battle of STALOYITCR
flying after the rest. Oginski got away into Prussia
with a handful of horsemen, and the second army of
the Polish Republic, like the first, ceased to exist.^
Neither the desperate energy of the Poles nor the
readiness of the French to make use of them was ended
by this shattering defeat. In September 1771 the
Baron de Viomenil arrived in Poland to reconstruct
the army of the Republic. On the Russian side Von
Weimarn was replaced by Alexander Ilyitch Bibikof,
who had served in the Seven Years' War without being
stereotyped in the form of a Prussian drill sergeant.
The last official transactions between Weimarn and
1 Campagnes, i. 49. Pyetrof, iii. 250.
26 SUVOROF
Suvorof were of the bitterest kind. The retiring
Commander-in-Chief rebuked the victor of Stalovitch
for his presumption in marching against the enemy
without express orders, and reported him to the Military-
College for giving inadequate information about his
proceedings, the losses of both sides, the distribution
of the booty, and so forth. Nothing came of this, and
Suvorof, who had previously received the 1st Grade of
the Order of St. Anne and the 3rd Class of the St.
George, was presented in December 1771 with the
Order of St. Alexander Nevski, which even Bibikof
had not obtained.^ With his new Commander-in-Chief
Suvorof succeeded in keeping on better terms. A letter
written to Bibikof in awkward French shows that the
two were intimate.
An animal, I say, of our species, accustomed to
troubles in spite of inevitable inconvenience, thinks
himself dull when he is without any, and too long
occasional rests lull him to sleep. How sweet to me
are those wearinesses of the past ! I looked for nothing
but the good of my country, embodied in my duty as
a servant of my august Empress, without doing special
wrong to the people among whom I found myself, and
even misfortunes, by whomsoever caused, gave me
nothing but encouragement. Reputation is the lot of
every honest man ; but I have built this reputation
on my country's glory, and its triumphs were only for
her profit. Never did self-love, the most often aroused
by wandering instinct, become master of my actions,
and I forgot myself wherever there was room for
patriotism. A wild education so far as social inter-
course is concerned, but some innocent habits in my
nature and a customary generosity made my labours
easy ; my feelings were free and I did not sink beneath
them. God ! could I soon but find myself in similar
case ! At present I languish in an idle life, fit for those
mean spirits, which live only for themselves, which seek
the crown of happiness in this lassitude, and from
1 This correspondence between Von Weimarn and Suvorof and the
reports to the Military College are in the Moscow Archives of the General
Staff, quoted in Pyetrushevski, i. 120.
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 27
pleasure to pleasure hurry into bitterness. Misanthropy
already casts a shade upon my brow, and I think I foresee
in the result a greater suffering ; an active soul should
always be fed with the practice of its trade, and frequent
exercise is as healthy for it as the ordinary exercises of
the body.^
This letter was written on the 5th December 1771.
Between the defeat of Oginski and the resumption of
hostilities in the spring, Suvorof s energies were occupied
in drilling his troops, and endeavouring to maintain
discipline under exceptionally difficult circumstances.
Polish hospitality was too much for some of his officers
and Polish wealth for some of his men, and he was
constantly making complaints about coffee parties in
Polish country houses and indiscriminate plunder and
robbery. He was also very keen in preventing harsh
treatment of Polish prisoners and deserters : " Feed
them well," he said, " even if you give them more than
their due portion." " A generous reception of repentant
rebels serves our interest better than the shedding of
their blood." The Russians were in Poland to main-
tain " peace in Israel," not as foreign conquerors. As
for spies, " the rebels have spies only to tell them where
we are busying ourselves ; they are so many, that when
we hunt them out I examine them and let them go
home." 2 But this sort of police war was not to his taste,
and the affair at Cracow in 1772 finally disgusted him.
The campaign of 1772 was carried on differently
from those of previous years. Bibikof decided to divide
his troops into three armies ; one to act in the field,
and the other two to reduce, one after another, such
strong places as remained in Polish hands. As there
were no men to spare, the fortresses were to be taken
by siege and not by storm. This would in any case
have meant an indefinite prolongation of the war, and
1 Bibikof, Memoirs of General Bibikof, 164.
^ Moscow Archives of the General Staff ; quoted in Pyetrushevski, i.
121.
28 SUVOROF
unhappily the first place to be captured was the Russian
stronghold of Cracow. The commandant was Colonel
Stackelburg, Suvorof's successor as head of the Suzdal
regiment, a brave man, but destitute of all other soldierly
qualities. As Suvorof declared, he never drilled his
troops. " Who could be found more worthy, more
equitable, more wise than Stackelburg ; only in frost,
in rain, in wind, and in the heat he has the belly-ache."
In addition to being lazy, Stackelburg was fond of the
society of priests and women, and Suvorof was particu-
larly displeased with his facility in foreign languages.^
Under his command the garrison of Cracow fell into a
state of lethargy and invited surprise.
On the night of the 21st January the French officers
in charge of the Polish levies at Tuintse made a daring
attempt against Cracow. Lieutenant-Colonel Choisy
was in command, and the enterprise was as successful
as it was daring. Stackelburg was invited to a recep-
tion at the house of a Polish lady, who had previously
complained that the cries of a particular sentry kept
her awake at night. The obliging Stackelburg removed
the sentry from his post, the exit of the main rubbish
shoot of the citadel, and went off to the reception with
a light heart. A small party crept in single file up the
evil-smelling passage, took the garrison by surprise, and
threw open the gates to the main body of the assailants.*
Suvorof was furious at this disaster, which was due
to sheer negligence on the part of the garrison. He
marched from Lithuania upon Cracow. From there he
sent a letter to Bibikof, denouncing Stackelburg in un-
sparing language.
Now I must inform your Excellency of the cause of
the incredible happenings in the fortress. Count Stackel-
burg ! First, he is one of the darlings of Ivan Ivan-
ovitch Weimam, corresponding with him in foreign
1 Moscow Archives of the General Staff, 20C, Bk. 89.
' Moscow Archives of the General Staff and Orders of the Military
College, 1773. Pyetrof, iv. 4 ; quoted in Pyetrushevski, 128 et seq. ;
Journal de la Si^ge de Cracovie.
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 29
languages, and therefore from the day of his taking over
the regiment he never drew sword ; secondly, here in
a district where he has many acquaintances, priests and
old women have utterly turned his head. Instead of
being active in usefulness, he is merely a good-natured
man, and has slept on the reputation of being that.i
He joined forces with General Branitski, and with
rather more than 3000 men took such steps as were
possible to recapture the citadel. Having no siege
artillery, he mounted his field-guns on neighbouring
houses, and battered the walls in preparation for an
assault. This was a very desperate enterprise. The
place was sufficiently strong to withstand the bombard-
ment, and he could not afford to lose any of his few
hundred men in attempts against unbreached walls.
Twice he tried, by firing off cannons behind his lines and
moving his men about in confusion, to entice the enemy
from their stronghold into traps, but both attempts failed.
Two mines were driven through the rocky soil. But
Suvorof s was ever the bolder way, and, after one or
two sallies had been driven back, he decided to storm
the castle on the night of the 18th February, before
the galleries were completed. While all his men were
concentrated against the citadel, the protection of the
rear was entrusted to parties of Jews, called out from
the Ghetto and hastily armed.
Covered by artillery and musketry fire, the troops
advanced against the main gate. The petard attached
to the gate failed to shatter it, and a disorderly battle
took place around and through the archway, both sides
firing at short range, and the assailants climbing at
some points into the embrasures from which the cannon
were playing upon them. At last, after losing about
100 killed and 45 wounded, Suvorof drew off his men.
For the time being there was nothing more to be done.
But soon after this failure a messenger from the garrison
was captured, and it appeared from the letters taken
1 Bibikof.
80 SUVOROF
upon him that the besieged were in want of food and
medical stores. There was now no question of aban-
doning the blockade. But Suvorof recognised the
futility of such proceedings, if it was desired to bring
the war to a speedy end, and he wrote to Bibikof in
plain terms.
So be it I Our unsuccessful storm appeared the
extreme of boldness ; but it showed at the time that
the impossibility of it was aggravated by our incapacity
for such operations. Without Vauban and Cohorn it
would have been better for us to study a little in the
Petersburg neighbourhood. Our timing was bad. But
if we are to go in for single sieges, then there will never
be a real end. While we take one fortress, they can
fortify themselves in another ; and while we are squan-
dering our strength they will certainly get additions to
theirs. We shan't take three fortresses in a year.^
Nevertheless, there was nothing to be done but to go
on with the blockade. Heavy guns were brought up in
April, and substantial damage was at last done to the
defences. The defenders were already shaken by their
privations. So early as the 29th February Choisy wrote
to Viom^nil, " Dry bread, barley porridge and courage
are the only food we have for officers and men." ^ The
arrival of the siege-guns made further resistance im-
possible, and Choisy opened negotiations. On the 12th
April it was agreed that the place should be surrendered
on the 15th, the garrison to retain their private property,
and the French not to be prisoners of war, entitled to
be exchanged. On the 15th they marched out. Suvorof
gave back the sword which Choisy offered to him, and
embraced the defeated but not disgraced commander.
About 700 prisoners were taken on this surrender.^
1 Bibikof, 179.
' Viom6nil, Lettres sur les Affaires de Pologne.
• Campagnes, i. 60 ; Pyetrof, iv. 9 ; Journal. Some writers, e.g.
Bibikof, say that Suvorof compelled the enemy to come out by way of
the rubbish shoot through which they went in. This is untrue. In
that case he would hardly have returned Choisy's sword, and he would
certainly not have kissed him.
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 31
The recapture of Cracow was almost the last military
event of the Polish war. A great part of the country
was now in the possession of foreign troops. Austria,
having long exhausted the possibilities of matrimony,
had resorted in this case to more direct methods of
aggrandisement. As early as the end of 1770 Austrian
forces had occupied the Duchy of Tsips, in Galicia, at
a time when the Austrian Government was actually
giving shelter in other directions to armed parties of
the Confederates. In 1772 she went still further, and
by May about 40,000 of her soldiers were in movement
towards Cracow. Not wishing to be anticipated, Prussia
had disposed troops along and across the western frontier
of Poland, and there were now some 20,000 of them
actually on Polish soil. The three armies, united only
in their intention of getting some part of the country
for themselves, were an inconvenience to each other,
and tact and good management were constantly required
to prevent actual collisions between them. Suvorof
seems at this time to have made a journey to Berlin,
where he saw Frederick and complained to him of the
conduct of the Prussian postmasters.^ But this quasi-
political work was even more detestable to him than
inactivity, and he wrote at last to Bibikof, begging to
be removed.
Give in to me, my dear sir. Such a home of philos-
ophers as man never saw. Here I have been about
four years, and often I think of running away . . . your
fault ... I have been rude, and they intrigue against
me . . . They quarrel with me . . . I'm a good-natured
man ; I don't know how to say " no." Here I'm afraid
of my neighbours the Jesuits, and all these D'Altoni.
Forgive me . . . Please send some one else. Why the
devil should I go on talking with them ? ^
With D'Alton, the Austrian Civilian Commissioner,
^ This fact is stated in one of the Russian periodicals on German
authority. I cannot give the exact reference.
2 Bibikof.
82 SUVOROF
he came into open conflict, and his embarrassments
were ended by his own removal and a request from the
Russian Government to the Austrian that D' Alton
might be sent somewhere else. But the affairs of Poland
had now got beyond his scope. Arms gave place to
the toga, and the diplomatists completed the work which
the soldiers had begun. The half-hearted attempts of
the three conspiring Powers were replaced by open and
barefaced villainy. The pretence of restoring order was
abandoned, and it became simply a question of dis-
tributing plunder. As the actual hour for the crime
approached, the motives of the three participators had
become defined. Frederick, no doubt, knew his own
intentions at an earlier stage than either of his associates.
His Silesian experience pointed the way to further
enterprises of the same sort, and such an accomplished
appropriator of the territory of others saw further along
the road to the Partition of Poland than those to whom
this would be a first attempt in the kind. The actions
of Russia and Austria had been hesitating, but the
first years of the Turkish War gave each of them im-
portant, though different, reasons for inclining to the
views of Prussia. Panin, Catherine's Foreign Minister,
had been against partition, not because he sympathised
with the Poles, but because he felt that Russia had
already the preponderating influence in Poland, and
that a united Poland under the thumb of Russia was
better than a divided Poland of which two-thirds would
be irrevocably lodged in the hands of competing Powers.
But Russia had now incurred considerable losses in men
and money during the Turkish War, and required some
compensation. The Crimea would not be sufficient, and
Moldavia and Wallachia, where her most striking vic-
tories had been won, could not be annexed without
incurring the jealousy of Austria. Austria, on the other
hand, had previously feared the strength of Turkey.
But now that that strength had been proved to be a
mere bubble, it was immaterial to Austria whether
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 33
Turkey continued to hold Moldavia and Wallachia or
not, so long as they did not swell the formidable re-
sources of Russia. An alternative must therefore be
found for Russia in some other quarter, and nothing
could have been more convenient for this purpose than
the territory offered by the disorders and weaknesses of
Poland.
The three Powers therefore came at last to an agree-
ment, and jealousies and antagonisms, which might very
well have involved them in an expensive and destructive
war, were resolved by the beautiful expedient of an alliance
for the plunder of another State. Each appropriated
part of Poland, and the residue, with a new constitution,
guaranteed by Russia, was left for a time in peace with
the good-natured king Stanislav on the throne. The
blessed word " compensation " was thus introduced into
the vocabulary of Imperialist diplomacy, and the Parti-
tion of Poland illustrated with the completeness of
perfect art the first principle of the modern science of
Empire, that our own property is best protected by
sharing in the forcible distribution of that of others.
Two contending ambitions are by this means satisfied
at the minimum of expense, and two great States,
instead of wasting each other in an internecine struggle,
combine in perfect harmony to enrich each other at
the expense of a third, too weak to defend itself. In
more recent times, the doctrine has been practised more
frequently at the expense, and often even for the benefit
of the inhabitants of uncivilised or barbarous countries.
But the first pattern, the Partition of Poland, was done
upon the living body of a European people of old
civilisation and the greatest natural genius. Italians,
Belgians, and Norwegians had afterwards good cause to
regret its apparent success, and the world has since been
at war to prove that it was in fact a failure.
Suvorof had left the Polish stage before the last
scene of the tragedy was played out. He had had one
more violent conflict with a colleague, this time with a
D
84 SUVOROF
certain Colonel Renn. In August 1772 he wrote a
characteristic letter to Bibikof .
With Renn our affairs go from bad to worse. He's
a notorious, turbulent, debauched man, evil-minded,
and to speak frankly, an appropriator of the goods of
others. Here he has done nothing but be churlish, and
except what I have said already, he has shown himself
fit for nothing. His bulging pocket holds everything.
His insults are beyond my patience ; he sets an alto-
gether vicious example for others.
But Renn made some amends, for at the end of the
month Suvorof wrote again :
I have forgiven everything, if only Renn will hence-
forth refrain from his cunning lies.^
This was the last of his petty worries, and in October
he was transferred to Finland.
Once away from the Polish tangle, he began to look
back upon it with regret. A letter written to Bibikof
on the 21st October, when he had arrived at Vilna,
shows how little impression the discomforts had actually
made upon him, and shows, too, that his own behaviour
had given him good cause for satisfaction. He describes
the letter as written " k I'Anglaise." ^
I follow my destiny, which comes from my own
country and draws me from a land where I have wanted
to do nothing but good, and at least I have always
tried to do it. My heart was never embarrassed by it,
and my duty never raised an obstacle. Sincere in my
acts, I took precautions only against moral evil, and
physical evil died out of itself. My unrepentant virtue
is well content with the satisfaction which they show
towards my conduct ; here they know me from the
point of view of the good side of my reputation, since
I only stayed here a short time, or at least because I
feel I have not served this country well enough. Simple
1 Moscow Archives of the General Staffs quoted in Pyetrushevski, i. 188.
• Apparently because of its frankness. Its incoherence is Suvorof s
own.
THE FIRST POLISH WAR 35
acknowledgement awakes in me a love for this country,
where they wish me nothing but good ; I leave it with
regret.
But if I contemplate the D's, the R's, the Alts, the
iniquitous ministers of my guiltlessness, I begin to
breathe freely ; here I finish my career as a man of
honour, I get rid of them, my feeble complaints aggra-
vate my annoyance, greatest where I wished most to
exceed my duty. I did not hate them, I could never
despise them ; and what change could I expect in their
tortuousness, knowing their qualities as I did ?
It is true, I did not enter too much into relations
with women, but when I did regale myself with them
respect was never absent. Time was too short for the
practice of that sort of art, and I was afraid of them ;
it is they who govern the country here as elsewhere ;
I did not feel strong enough to defend myself again^
their charms.^
So ended the second stage of Suvorof's military
career. The third followed almost at once. In April
he was sent from Finland to the Russian headquarters
at Jassy, where he was given a command in the Army
of Wallachia under General Saltikof, son of the in-
glorious victor of Kunersdorf.
1 Bibikof, 208. " D " is Dryevitz and " R," Renn.
CHAPTER III
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR
Turkish warfare — ^Victories of Rumyantsof — Suvorof captures Tur-
tukai, 1773 — Correspondence — Captures Turtukai again — Affair
at Hirsof, 1773 — ^Battle of Kozludzhi, 1774^Failure of the plan
of campaign — ^Peace of Kutchuk-Kainardzhi — Suvorof marries
unhappily — EQs freakish character.
The war against the Turks, which began in 1769, was
the first stage in the expulsion of that race from the
Europe which they had so long desolated and profaned.
At the beginning of it, the frontier between Russia and
Turkey stretched from Kief on the Dnyepr to the Sea of
Azof. Between the two countries swept the vast and
uninhabited steppe. The line of the Dnyestr had been
fortified by the Turks at Khotin, Bendyeri, and Akker-
man, with advanced fortresses at Otchakof and Kinburn,
but the real defence of the country was the fertile but
untilled desert which lay in front of it. Russia could
only hope to attack it through Poland on the one side,
and from the Black Sea on the other. A successful
advance in either direction would turn the formidable
natural obstacles, which could otherwise be overcome
only by a superlatively well -organised system of com-
missariat and transport. Such a system had hitherto
been far beyond the powers of the Russian State, and
the campaigns of Minnich, earlier in the century, had
broken down owing to the fearful losses inflicted by
cold, hunger, and disease. Poland being already open
to the passage of Russian troops, these had penetrated
36
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 87
deeply into Moldavia and Wallachia by the time that
Suvorof joined them. This new theatre of war afforded
him an admirable opportunity for the display of his
genius.
The methods adopted generally by the Russians in
this war showed a great advance on those of previous
campaigns against the Turks. During the eighteenth
century, however aggressive the policy and strategy of
Russia in its dealings with the Asiatic peril, the tactics
of its armies in the field had always been defensive.
The soldiers were arranged in such a way as to testify
to the terrible reputation of the Turkish hosts in attack.
The main formation was the square of infantry, pro-
tected at the angles and along the flanks by artillery.
Round the square were set the " chevaux de frise '* ;
each section of which was carried into action by six
men, and was attached by hooks and chains to those
on each side of it. Within the square was the infantry
reserve, ready to strengthen the sides at whatever point
they gave way before the whirlwind rush of the Turkish
cavalry. The light baggage train was also collected
inside the square, while the heavy waggons were formed
into a special lager at a safe distance from the battle-
ground. The cavalry was regarded as so hopelessly
inferior to the Turkish, that it was kept well in the
rear, and only released when the enemy was thoroughly
broken by the fire of the artillery and infantry. The
whole scheme of this order of battle was thus defensive.
The tactical initiative was surrendered to the Turks.
Their artillery and infantry were despised, but all their
enemies dreaded the ferocious, even if completely un-
disciplined attacks of their light horse. These were
permitted to sweep down upon the squares in the hope
that after one or more attempts their losses from
artillery and musketry fire would reduce them to utter
chaos. Even then it would be impossible for the square
to move in pursuit. Only the cavalry could be expected
to follow, and that with the utmost caution. Under
88 SUVOROF
these circumstances a decisive victory over the Turks
was obtained with great difficulty.^ If driven back by
the infantry, they dispersed and fled with such rapidity
that an energetic pursuit could seldom be undertaken.
A shattering blow against them could as a rule only be
delivered when they could be shut in a fortress and
besieged. A whole army might be destroyed by storm
or capture. But a victory in the field, however much
it redounded to the glory of those who took part in it,
was seldom of decisive military importance. Against
such an adversary, terrible in attack and feeble in
defence, devoid of discipline, of calculation, and of
endurance, as unresisting and headlong after a defeat
in the field as he was reckless, cruel, and covetous
before the battle was joined, the certain road to victory
was that of resolute aggression. The subsequent mili-
tary career of Suvorof and his whole theory of war
were largely determined by his experience against the
Turks, and his virtues and vices as a general both
sprang from the same root. His methods were learned
before he served in Turkey, but they were developed
and confirmed in this fighting along the Danube. There
he became convinced that the secret of success was to
march swiftly and to attack boldly, and as he never
failed when matched against a slow and irresolute
enemy, so he was at last overthrown when he encoun-
tered one who marched as swiftly and as boldly as
himself, and had at the same time the advantage of
numbers and position.
Without doubt, there were good soldiers in the Turkish
Wars before Suvorof, and he was not the only one who
understood how they should be fought. It did not
require his appearance to improve upon the old methods
of dealing with this barbarous enemy. The need for
1 It is curious to find a Byzantine writer advising the Emperor
(circa 500 a.d.) to use exactly the same device for defending Constan-
tinople against Scythia. See Oman, Ttie Art of War: The Middle
Ages, 23.
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 39
increased mobility, both in attack and in pursuit, was
obvious, and Rumyantsof, the Russian Commander-
in-Chief, had from the first set himself to abolish much
of what was obsolete. The Turks had actually become
much less formidable than in previous wars, and their
generals were less energetic and their troops less stubborn
than in the days when they were the terror of European
civilisation. Their system remained the same, but the
life had gone out of it, and the Turkish armies, though
occasionally energetically and successfully led, were
generally of poor quality. Rumyantsof had thus been
able to win victories which resembled those of Clive in
India. In 1770 at Larga, with 30,000 men, he had
beaten more than 80,000 Tartars ; and he followed up
this exploit by defeating at Kagul, with only 17,000
men, an army of 180,000 Turks. Rumyantsof retained
the square as the ordinary formation of the infantry,
finding it, as the English found it a hundred years later
in the Sudan, the best means of breaking a charge of
fanatics, mounted or on foot. But he reduced its size,
and though the " chevaux de frise " were actually used
on some occasions in the next Turkish War, their use
was almost entirely abandoned by Rumyantsof. In-
stead of massing all his troops into a single huge square,
he divided them into several squares, with cavalry in
the intervals. This plan had all the value of the old
in defence, while it enabled the whole force to move
with greater freedom against the enemy, and avoid the
serious breaches in the formation which might arise
from inequalities in the ground. At the same time one
square could lend support to another as a solid mass,
and at Kagul the broken troops of one unit were in
fact saved in this way by throwing themselves into
another which simultaneously moved towards them.
Rumyantsof had also increased the efficiency of his
troops by improving their arms. To make the fire of
the infantry more effective, he added to each battalion
50 Jagers, whose shorter and more manageable muskets
40 SUVOROF
made them better marksmen than the ordinary grena-
diers. The cavalry he found particularly incompetent,
and as cavalry they were in fact useless against the
Turks. They were armed in such a way as to make
them mere infantry on horseback, incapable of charging
the enemy. The cuirassiers, in addition to their breast-
and back-plates, carried a sword and two pistols; the
carabineers carried a sword, carbine, and bayonet, and
two pistols ; and the hussars a sabre, carbine, and two
pistols. Rumyantsof turned the two last into cold steel
cavalry, and made it impossible for them to waste time
in firing by depriving them of their carbines and
bayonets. They were thus compelled to rely upon
their individual courage and the vigour of their attacks,
instead of halting to fire off their carbines and being
overwhelmed by the superior horsemanship of the Turks.
With the artillery Rumyantsof did not interfere. It
was immensely superior to the Turkish ; and posted at
the angles and on the flanks of the squares of infantry
gave confidence to the Russians and inspired a whole-
some terror in the ranks of their enemies.^ Enough
has been said of the reforms of Rumyantsof to show
that he required in some respects little instruction from
Suvorof. His tactical changes were exactly those that
would have been made by Suvorof himself, and the
latter only improved upon them to the extent of
employing a number of small squares of equal size in
1 Each regiment took into action two or more light guns, which
could, if necessary, be carried on the shoulders of the men. The
Russians had, in addition, field artillery, 6- or 9-pounders. See Pyetrof,
ii. 4. On earlier methods against the Turks and the reforms of
Rumyantsof, see Pyetrof, ii. 426 ; Bogdanovitch, 97 ; Pyetrushevsld,
i. 183 ; Valentini, 19. Baron de Tott, in his Mimoires sur les Turcs
ei les Tartares (Amsterdam, 1785), says that artillery (sc. field artillery)
was unknown to the Turks until this war. He was a French ofiicer,
and was at the time engaged in organising the defences of Constan-
tinople. His third volume contains an invaluable description of the
Turks and his experiments in casting cannon and accustoming the
barbarians to their use. He says (i. 128) that the gunners thought
more of making a great noise than of hitting their object.
Shumla
■"■ 'hill II' ili\llll,',l'';!!i<i'% •jVarna
42
SUVOROF
two lines instead of one large square supported by other
smaller squares. Nevertheless Suvorof, though he had
little opportunity of making innovations, found in this
Turkish War more than one occasion for displaying his
characteristic energy.
His first exploit was his capture of Turtukai. This
little town, situated on the southern bank of the Danube
to the south-east of Bucharest, was one of the strong
posts by which the Turks hoped to hold the line of the
river at the beginning of 1773. Rumyantsof had driven
the enemy out of Moldavia and Wallachia and had
TURTUKAI.
Entnnchmenh
(2)
occupied part of the Dobrudzha itself. But the badness
of Russian roads is only less than that of Turkish.
Transport was accordingly very slow, and supplies for a
big campaign across the Danube were not to be obtained
in the conquered territories. Rumyantsof, therefore, felt
unable to carry out Catherine's vigorous scheme for
pushing on to the Balkans, and confined himself to a
series of isolated attempts against the Turkish system
of defence. The enterprise against Turtukai was
arranged by Saltikof, who threatened the fortress of
Rushtshuk, 45 miles further up the river, with his main
body, while he detailed Suvorof with the Astrakhan
regiment of infantry, three squadrons of regular cavalry,
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 43
and a regiment of Cossacks, with seven guns, to capture
Turtukai at all costs.
Opposite Turtukai, which lay on the slopes of the
southern bank, under the protection of two entrenched
camps and a battery of guns, the river Ardyesh flows
into the Danube through the marshy flats of the northern
bank. At the beginning of May Suvorof collected a
fleet of 17 boats in the Ardyesh at Negoesht, some miles
above its confluence with the Danube. Each boat held
about 40 men, not counting the rowers, and as these
last were also soldiers, it was possible to transport some
700 men at one passage. On the 8th he sent this
miniature fleet down the river, ordering it to wait under
shelter of the reeds at the mouth, near the village of
Oltenitsa. Thither he marched with the remainder of
his forces. In the meantime the enemy, believing
that the Russian strength was concentrated in the
feigned attack upon Rushtshuk, prepared to fall upon
Suvorof at Negoesht. A force of 600 horse and 300
foot left Turtukai on the 8th, crossed the Danube, and
at dawn on the 9th encountered some of Suvorof's
Cossacks near the river. The Cossacks retired to
Oltenitsa, where they were reinforced by both infantry
and cavalry. The Turks were vigorously attacked, and
fled in disorder to their boats. Not a few were drowned,
85 corpses were counted on the field of battle, and an
indefinite number lay hidden in the reeds and long
grass with which the place was covered. The Turkish
commander, Bim Pasha, and eight others were taken
prisoner, and it was ascertained from them that the
garrison of Turtukai was about 4000 strong.
A less vigorous soldier might have been content
with this success. But Suvorof, though his repeated
demands for more infantry had been ignored by Saltikof ,
determined to carry out his original plan. At dusk on
the 9th his flotilla, under command of Major Ryebok,
pushed out from the mouth of the Ardyesh, and
four guns, posted on the angle between the left bank of
44 SUVOROF
that river and the Danube, opened a steady fire on the
Turkish battery below Turtukai. To cause further
perturbation to the enemy Suvorof caused his train of
ox-waggons to be driven along the road towards the
Danube, so that the huge cloud of dust might be taken
to cover the approach of a formidable army. His
cavalry were told to get across as best they could by
swimming. The attack was completely successful. The
Russians landed at two points, and only a few men were
lost out of those who swam. Suvorof himself led a
colunm against the camp below the town and was
wounded in the right leg by a shell. Lieutenant-Colonel
Maurinof with a second column took the Turkish battery
with the bayonet. When the battery fell into the hands
of Maurinof the capture of the camp became an easy
task, and Major Ryebok was ordered to occupy the
town itself. Ryebok carried out his orders, drove the
Turks out of the camp and battery above the town, and
entering the streets joined hands with the other Russian
forces in the middle of it. The enemy offered little
resistance, and none who awaited the Russians escaped
alive. The bulk of them fled in all directions, leaving
the victors in undisputed possession of the south bank
of the Danube. The trophies were 6 standards, 16
guns and 50 ships and boats. The whole town was
destroyed, and the Bulgar population, to the number
of 663, carried over to the north bank. The Russian
losses in the fighting on both banks were 88 killed and
wounded, and Suvorof himself estimated those of the
enemy at about 1500, or almost three times the numbers
of all the Russian troops actually engaged.^
Immediately after the capture of Turtukai, Suvorof
sent a characteristic report of the success to Saltikof.
On a scrap of paper three inches square, he wrote:
" Your Excellency 1 We have won. Glory to God,
^ Pyetrof, iii. 29 et seq. ; Pyetnishevski, i. 148 et seq. Before the
destruction of the town, Suvorof allowed four men from each section
to pillage for themselves and their comrades ; Campagnes, i. 83.
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 45
glory to you." To Rumyantsof he sent a second note,
consisting of a doggerel distich :
Glory to God, glory to you,
Turtukai's taken, and I'm there too.^
These very unusual despatches were followed by some
still more extraordinary letters to Saltikof. The day
after the battle Suvorof wrote to his superior, who was
also his personal friend, in the tone of a schoolboy,
and dragged in some schoolboy Latin :
Yesterday we did in truth veni, vedi, vici ; and I
was top boy. I have served your Excellency before,
I'm a clumsy fellow. Only, daddy, do give me the
second class quickly.^
Two days later came a more sober, but still not too
dignified letter :
Don't omit, your Excellency, my dear comrades, and
for God's sake don't forget me. I think I have really
deserved the Second Class of St. George ; however
warmly disposed I may be to myself, still I do think
so myself. My chest and my bruised side give me
much pain, and my head seems all swollen up ; forgive
me ; let me go to Bucharest for a day or two to cure
myself at the baths.
The next day he wrote again to congratulate Saltikof
on his promotion to the rank of General-in-Chief, and
added :
I trust that your kindness to me will not change
henceforth. Be as much beloved by your soldiers as
your father was.*
Suvorof was a great man. But he had the weakness
of many other great men, a craving for acknowledgement
1 The message to Saltikof is printed in Pyetrof, p. 33 ; that to
Rumyantsof in CampagneSy i. 84.
2 He referred to the 2nd Class Cross of St. George.
3 These letters are quoted by Pyetrushevski, p. 154. They are
in the Archives of Military Education at Petrograd.
46 SUVOROF
and applause, and his requests were sometimes couched
in almost grovelling language.
Unfortunately, his success at Turtukai was not fol-
lowed by any general activity on the part of Saltikof.
Only some vigorous attacks by Major-General Weissman
enlivened the general dulness of the Russian front, and
when Weissman was unfortunately killed in the hour
of victory at Kutchuk-Kainardzhi on the 28rd June,
Suvorof was the only leader of real competence left
under Rumyantsof's command. This failure to make
a general aggressive movement as usual spoilt Suvorof's
temper, and his private correspondence with Saltikof
must have given even that dull man many hours of
uneasiness. The sight of the Turkish troops occupying
the ruins of Turtukai and reconstructing their lagers
and batteries was aggravated by an attack of recurrent
fever, which, in Suvorof's case, rose and fell every 48
hours. Some allowance must be made for the effect
of this upon his spirits, but his letters were neverthe-
less remarkably impatient and inconsistent with each
other, and must have been infinitely exasperating to
Saltikof. On the 29th May he wrote begging to be
allowed to attack Turtukai. On the 4th June he asked
in two separate letters for leave to go to Bucharest to
get cured. On the 5th he received orders from Rum-
yantsof to attack Turtukai, and promptly wrote to
inform Saltikof of his intention to remain at his post.
On the 7th he again asked for leave, but that very night,
having received some reinforcements, directed Prince
Myeshtsherski to make a dash across the river against
the enemy. The prince found the Turks on the alert,
and abandoned his attempt, whereupon on the 8th
Suvorof, not asking again for leave, actually went to
Bucharest. From there he wrote to Saltikof. The
letter of the 8th hinted at the faults of others. In that
of the 9th he wrote more clearly :
Be so good as to judge whether I can resume the
command of such miserable cowards, and if it would
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 47
not be better for me to pick up work when and where
I can than to inflict the shame of this pettifogging
barrack-square soldiery upon me ; to see under me people
breaking their oaths and violating all their military-
duty ? G. B. is the cause of everything ; all lost heart.
Can such a man be a colonel in the Russian army ?
Wouldn't a paper general, even a senator, be better ?
What a shame it is ! All lost heart. For God's sake,
your Excellency, burn this letter. Again I remind you
that I don't want him for an enemy, and I would
abandon everything rather than have him. My penal
servitude in Poland, due to my frankness, everybody
knows. There is still a way out ; be good enough, as
soon as possible, to send our young men a Major-General.
All here are younger than I ; he can be my shadow ; I
will give him the arrangements ; order him only to attack
boldly. Then recall G. B. on some pretext or other, and
then for the time being send a couple of bold and manly
infantry staff officers. . . . God help me, when I think
of this meanness of spirit, my bones turn to water.
On the 10th he wrote asking for another battalion :
Prince Myeshtsherski is an honest man, but not
accustomed to command ; nor is Bat, and he is a coward
to boot.
On the 11th came another letter, and on the 14th
he returned to Negoesht and wrote that he was again
in good health and would make the attempt against
Turtukai.i
The infantry battalion arrived, and Suvorof also dis-
mounted some of his carabineers, and began training
them as infantry. The second assault on Turtukai took
place on the night of the 16th June, and was as success-
ful as the first. On this occasion Suvorof commanded
4100 men, and about 3200 were used in the actual
attack. The Turks were again estimated at about 4000.
1 College of Military Instruction, No. 509 ; quoted in Pyetrushevski,
at p. 157. The " G. B." and *' Bat " of these letters are Colonel
Baturin, who commanded the column which Suvorof led in person on
the first occasion.
48 SUVOROF
The crossing was made in three lines of boats. Ryebok
led the first, with two companies of the Astrakhan
regiment and 60 picked marksmen. Baturin, accom-
panied by Suvorof in person, was in command of the
second, and Myeshtsherski of the third. About three
hours before nightfall the landing was accomplished,
and the enemy were at once driven out of their lager
up into a rectangular entrenchment on the crest of the
hill. There Ryebok attacked them with his usual
gallantry, plunged into the ditch, scrambled over the
parapet, and drove a force of four times his own strength
headlong out of the place. Nevertheless, a counter-
attack was made with great stubbornness, and for three
hours the combat raged in and around the entrench-
ment. Baturin again failed to give adequate support,
but his detachment at length took up a position on
Ryebok's left on the higher ground round the enemy's
right flank. The steady fire of the artillery at last
wore down the enemy, and a bayonet charge cleared
the entrenchment. The Turks took refuge in their other
lager, on the bank of the river above the ruins of the
town. Suvorof summoned the remainder of his troops
from the other bank and prepared for an attack upon
their new position. But the enemy disputed the land-
ing and at the same time surrounded and attacked the
entrenchment from all sides. This final rally gave little
trouble. The fresh troops landed on the right bank,
brushed aside the Turks who stood in their way, and
marched against the rear of the main body, as Suvorof
left the entrenchment and attacked it in front. The
enemy broke and fled once more into the lager, but
without waiting for Suvorof's attack, evacuated it and
hurried off towards Rushtshuk, pursued by the Russian
cavalry. They left a Pasha and 800 other dead on the
field, and the Russians carried off 9 guns and 35 boats.
The losses of the victors, even after such a stubborn
contest, were only 6 killed and 96 wounded.^
1 CampagneSf i. ; Pyetrof, iii. 90.
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 49
No more came of the second occupation of Turtukai
than of the first, and the death of Weissman, on the
23rd June, seemed to paralyse the Russian armies.
Suvorof went on training his troops and fitting out
his river squadrons, and, as usual, complaining of his
subordinates :
The Anzheron squad of recruits, under Major Tyeglef,
has 50 sick out of 150 — perhaps he has gone to Bucharest
after the girls.
Of two staff officers he wrote :
One is clumsy, a meddler ; the other hardly out of
his cradle.
Baturin had gone to Bucharest without leave, and so
on. What is peculiar about these complaints, which
were so constant with Suvorof, and so violent, is that
they are all contained in private letters, and are very
seldom expressed in any official report. Either Suvorof
felt himself too fresh in the command of troops to
make enemies among his subordinate officers, or he was
reluctant to spoil the career of any person in his power.
As he never showed fear of his equals, the first explana-
tion is hardly likely to be correct. He certainly dis-
liked spoiling the fortunes of inferiors, and probably
shrank from using his authority for the professional
destruction of men like Baturin, even while he could
not keep his feelings out of his private correspondence.
When honours and rewards were distributed in 1773,
Suvorof got the 2nd Class of the Order of St. George,
while both Baturin and Ryebok received the 4th Class, the
former for his dubious services in the first action, and
the latter for his unquestionable gallantry in the second.
So far as Suvorof himself was concerned, Rumyantsof
was not slow to give honour where honour was due. On
the 7th July he was transferred from Saltikof's army to
that of Potyomkin, operating lower down the Danube.
But his journey from Negoesht was interrupted by an
accident which might have killed him. Unsteadied by
E
50 SUVOROF
fever and his wound, he slipped and fell down the stairs
of the monastery at Negoesht, and he lay in bed at
Bucharest for two weeks. When he was able to take
up his new command, he was sent by Rumyantsof to
Hirsof, a fortress on the Turkish side of the Danube,
about half-way between Matchin and Silistria. The
nearest Turkish army lay at Karasu, some miles to the
south-east, and Suvorof at once proposed to make an
attack upon it in conjunction with Lieutenant-General
Ungem, who commanded the Russian troops imme-
diately to the north of Hirsof. Unfortunately Rum-
yantsof, whose boldness in the field was spoilt by the
timidity of his strategy, disapproved of the plan, and
it was abandoned. Suvorof had to content himself, or
rather discontent himself with improving the defences
of the post and waiting for the inevitable advance of
the enemy. He also summoned to his assistance Major-
General Miloradovitch with his brigade.
On the night of the 3rd September the Russian
scouts found some 3000 Turkish cavalry encamped
about 13 miles away on the road to Karasu. At 7
o'clock in the next morning 6000 cavalry, followed at
a short distance by about 4000 infantry, encountered
the Russian outposts and drove them back upon Hirsof.
By mid-day the enemy were within cannon-shot.
Suvorof drew up his forces parallel with the Danube
to the north of the fortress. This stood upon an
eminence running from the river bank at right angles
to the direction of its current. At the end of this ridge
furthest from the water was a strong redoubt. About
a mile to the north stood another low hill a mile distant
from the Danube. On this was placed a second and
smaller redoubt. These two hills were included in the
Russian system of defence. Further still to the north
was a third hill, outside the Russian lines, with its
northern slopes falling into the river Borui, which here
runs at a right angle into the Danube. Suvorof's own
men were nearest the fortress itself, and were separated
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR
51
from those of Miloradovitch by the small stream of the
Borui. At the confluence of the two rivers was a trench-
work protected by pits and " chevaux de frise," and here
Suvorof took up his own station. The general scheme
was such that the enemy, to attack the troops in the
field, must expose their left flank to the fire of the
fortress and the two redoubts. If they succeeded in
getting into line in front of Suvorof, the first redoubt
would still gall their left, while Suvorof s line would
have the second redoubt and the trenches in front of
it. The troops of Miloradovitch, who was ill, were
commanded by Colonel Prince Motchebelof, and covered
Fortress
Ad vance oF Tu rA^
Affair of HIRSOF .
SCALE — ENGLISH MILES.
'/i / 1^2
Motchebe/oF
by the Borui, could come into action when and at what-
ever point their intervention would be most effective.
The Russian skirmishers withdrew in feigned dis-
order. The Turks were allowed to pass the two redoubts
without a shot being fired, and, showing signs of French
training, formed in three lines opposite Suvorof. But
when they surrounded the trench -work they were
greeted with a brisk fire of musketry and fell away in
disorder. Motchebelof then led one regiment across the
Borui and attacked their right, and two other squares
simultaneously moved out between the small redoubt
and the trenclx-work, and supported by all the available
guns, attacked their centre and left. For a time the
52 SUVOROF
troops climbing up from the Bond were held back, but
reinforcements came up, and the Turks were driven
over the top of the hill which lay opposite the trench-
work. The reinforcements worked round the rear of the
enemy, and the field artillery, dragged up and posted
on the hill itself, completed the overthrow of their right
wing. A desperate attempt by some of the Turkish
horse to take Motchebelof himself in the rear was frus-
trated by the fire of the troops remaining on the
right bank of the Borui, and the enemy fled with their
usual precipitancy, the centre and left making no attempt
to hold up the tottering right wing. The Russian
hussars chased them for twenty miles, and the Cossacks
only gave up the pursuit long after nightfall. Over
1000 Turks were killed, and 6 guns and a mortar were
taken. The Russian losses were 10 killed and 167
wounded.^
The campaign of 1774 gave Suvorof his last victory
in this Turkish War. Rumyantsof at last determined
to undertake a general offensive, cross the Danube, and
penetrate as far as possible into Turkish territory. The
line of the river was already broken in more than one
place. The fortresses of Izmail and Brailof on the left
bank had been in the hands of the Russians since
1771, and the northern Dobrudzha had in consequence
been occupied by them as far south as Hirsof. If a
further advance was to be made, Silistria, at any rate,
must be captured, and Rumyantsof also aimed at
taking Rushtshuk. These strong places secured,
the way would be open to Shumla and Varna, beyond
which and over the chain of the Balkans lay the road
to Adrianople and Constantinople. The first stage of
the plan was to be carried out in three movements.
Saltikof, with 10,000 men, was to take Rushtshuk,
and Rumyantsof himself, with 12,000, Silistria ; while
Kamyenski and Suvorof, with 14,000, were to advance
through Bazardzhik upon Shumla, where the Grand
1 Campagnes, i. 95 ; Pyetrof, iii. 92.
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 53
Vizier, Mukhzin Sadi Mehemet, lay with the main
Turkish army.^
The plan as a whole failed miserably, largely owing
to deficient transport and the consequent want of
supplies.^ Neither Rushtshuk nor Silistria fell, and no
general advance took place. The third movement
was a partial success and remained incomplete only
because of the failures elsewhere. Kamyenski, with
8000 men, marched south from Izmail, to meet Suvorof,
crossing the Danube at Hirsof with 6000, at Babadagh.
The enterprise began inauspiciously. Suvorof, resenting
his subordination to a man only slightly his senior in
rank, and very much his inferior in capacity, disregarded
the arrangements for the junction, and after a strong
rebuke from Kamyenski, met him at Bazardzhik instead
of Babadagh. Loyalty to a colleague, who was also a
rival, was not one of his virtues, and in this case he
risked the defeat of an army. From Babadagh, on the
20th June, Suvorof having been on the march since
1 o'clock in the morning, they moved in company
towards Kozludzhi.
The very day when the Russians left Bazardzhik, the
Grand Vizier arrived with 40,000 men at Kozludzhi,
on the march from Shumla to Hirsof. On the 22nd
the light troops of the two armies encountered each
other in the middle of a dense wood, which lay between
the advancing Russians and Kozludzhi. The Russians
had the worst of the combat. Their cavalry were
driven back by a mixed force of cavalry and infantry,
and three battalions, coming up to help them, were
unable to stem the advance of the enemy. In the
midst of the trees, through which there ran nothing
but a single track, the numbers and impetuosity of
the Turks gave them an immense advantage, and it
was only at the very edge of the wood that the Russian
infantry, further reinforced, and able at last to form
square, succeeded in breaking the attack by musketry
1 Pyetrof, iv. 32. 2 jj^-^^ 33^
54 SUVOROF
and artillery fire. Suvorof himself was in command
of the Russian vanguard, and at one moment only the
speed of his horse saved him from the sabre of a furious
Janissary.
Their advance stopped in this way, the Turks hurried
back through the wood, and Suvorof, taking great risks,
plunged into the trees after them. He invited defeat.
To advance with weary troops through a dense forest,
along a single road, and that a very bad one, was the
height of folly. In such a place order and discipline
could be of little service against an enemy whose capacity
for fierce attacks upon broken formations was notorious.
No doubt there would be little to fear from the Turkish
cavalry in the wood itself. But the Russians, struggling
out into the open after an exhausting march, ought to
have been cut down to a man. The commander who
would take such risks must be either a fool or a genius ;
and even a genius could hardly have escaped disaster
if his adversary had not been himself a fool. Suvorof
thought he knew his Turk, and the event showed that
he was right. Nevertheless the victory of Kozludzhi is
one of those which geniuses need not, and ordinary men
must not, try to imitate. Along the winding and
broken track, littered with the dead bodies of men,
horses, and oxen,^ and here and there blocked by a
waggon or intersected by a trench, the Russians struggled
for some hours. The pace was thoroughly Suvorovian.
Suvorof s men had not fed that day, nor had the horses
been watered, and many men and animals died of sheer
exhaustion. The enemy soon found that the Russian,
entangled among the trees and undergrowth, was not,
after all, as terrible as he had appeared on the edge of
the wood, and the fighting was almost constant. Never-
theless, after four miles of this scrambling battle,
Suvorof got his men out into the open. On the ridge
1 The draught animals, which seem to have been in great nmnbers,
had probably fallen from exhaustion. Routed Turks always ride and
drive their animals to death.
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR
55
before them was drawn up the whole Turkish army,
and they were greeted with a heavy fire from the enemy's
artillery, which was on this occasion unusually strong.
Fortunately a heavy shower of rain fell,, spoilt many
of the Turkish cartridges, and at the samci time soaked
the long and cumbrous garments which most of the
Turks wore. The dreaded whirlwind charge was de-
layed, and Suvorof had time to draw up his troops in
two lines of five squares, with the cavalry oxx the flanks.
He had about 5000 men on the spot, and some 2000
Arnauts were still engaged in clearing the wood of
Turks. The rest of the Russian army was out of reach.
Turkish
Camp 1
KOZLUDZHli
KOZLUDZHP.
SCALE' ENGLISH MILES.
ft O 1 Z 3 *
1
and all Suvorof s own field artillery seemed hopelessly
bogged among the trees.
No sooner had he got his men into order of battle
than he led them against the enemy. The Turks
advanced to meet them. Several charges were driven
off, and the Russians moved steadily forward, keeping
up a close fire from muskets and the regimental artillery.
The Turkish lager on the crest of the ridge, four miles
away, was at last reached, and halting his troops on
the edge of the gully which lay in front of it, Suvorof
succeeded in bringing up a few of his field guns and
poured a heavy fire into the camp. The Turks were
soon in hopeless confusion. A few returned the Russian
fire. But for the most part they were cutting the gun
56 SUVOROF
traces and riding away on the horses, carrying off their
private property, shooting their own officers, and
thinking of nothing but escape. Into this crowd of
discomfited ruffians the Russian shot fell without
ceasing, and a stream of fugitives overflowed the further
wall of the ] lager and poured away in the direction of
Shumla. At sunset the whole place was in the hands of
Suvorof, with 29 cannon, 107 flags, and the great bulk
of the tents., waggons, and stores.^
It was the fate of Suvorof s Turkish victories to
be barren of fruit. On this occasion nothing stood
between the victors of Kozludzhi and Shumla but the
miserable remnant of the Grand Vizier's army, not more
than 1000 strong. Nevertheless the advance was not
pressed, and the Russians stayed at Kozludzhi for six
days. This was the decision of a council of war at
which Suvorof was present. The only argument in
favour of delay was the exhaustion of the troops, and
even Suvorof himself, who had been on horseback for
some twenty hours, must have needed rest. But a halt
of six days was sheer waste of time and opportunity,
and Rumyantsof himself wrote to Kamyenski :
Not days nor hours, but even moments are valuable
in such a situation ; want of provisions cannot serve
you as an excuse.^
It is safe to assume that Suvorof was not in favour of
so long a halt, unless, indeed, he was so ill and fatigued
that he felt himself incapable of pushing on. It is
certain that the bad feeling between him and Kamyenski
never ceased from this date, and that a few days after
the battle he went again to Bucharest " for reasons of
health."
Nevertheless the victory at Kozludzhi, in the military
sense incomplete, was a very powerful political argu-
ment, and the Turks abandoned all hope of bringing
^ CampagneSy i. ; Pyetrof, iv. 49.
' Archives of Military Instruction, quoted in Pyetrushevski, i. 180.
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 57
the war to a successful end. On the 10th July a treaty
of peace was signed at Kutchuk-Kainardzhi. Turkey
acknowledged the independence of the Crimea, a diplo-
matic fiction which meant that she left the Crimea to
Russia, to be appropriated formally whenever Russia
pleased ; and she literally conceded Kinburn, Azof,
Kertch, and Enikale, with the free right of navigation
on the Black Sea. Turkey also agreed to pay an
indemnity of 4,500,000 roubles.
After the conclusion of his Turkish campaign Suvorof
married. It is not clear why he should have taken
this step so late in life. Apparently he had never
before shown any desire for marriage, and he had not
found any difficulties in celibacy. His worst enemies
never accused him of sexual irregularities, and though
he was always fond of feminine society, it was most
probably because it flattered him, and not because it
satisfied any other want. His military career had
absorbed all his energy, and he had poured all his
emotional force into a habit of life as absorbing as that
of a religious devotee, without any of the perilous
inactivity of a mere life of meditation. To such a
nature and in such circumstances celibacy must have
been easy. Nevertheless he decided to change his
state. It may be that his father, who was then 68,
and died in the following year, pressed him to marry
and continue the family name. It may be that at
the age of 43 he was himself occasionally conscious of
loneliness. Whatever his motives for the change, he
made a bad choice. The bride was Varvara, daughter
of Prince Ivan Prozorovski, whom he met at Moscow
in 1773, either when he was on his way to Turkey, or
when he returned on leave after the battle at Hirsof.
She was poor, but of good family, beautiful, lively, and
20 years younger than himself, the last woman to
live happily with such a man. An acquaintance has
described her as " a beauty in the Russian sense ;
ruddy and buxom, with a mind of no high order and
58 SUVOROF
an old-fashioned education." i " Fat and stupid '* is
the description of another.* For a man who cared
nothing for beauty, and was unusually intolerant of
slowness of mind, such a mate was beyond hope unfit.
Very little record of the affairs of the joint household
has come down to us. For some time there was no
formal parting. The two lived together whenever
Suvorof's duties permitted it, and the pleasure-loving
wife must have been terribly dull in some of the little
provincial towns. There were two children: Natalya,
bom on the 12th August 1775, and Arkadii, bom on
the 15th August 1784. But in September 1779 a
formal separation took place. This was patched up
in the following January, but after other quarrels and
reconciliations a final separation was arranged early
in 1784. Varvara Ivanovna went to live in Moscow
on an allowance of 1200 roubles a year, which was
afterwards increased to 3000.
Suvorof's marriage must therefore be added to the
list of the failures of great men in matrimony. Doubt-
less his wife was of less worth than himself, but if he
had been wise, he would not have chosen an inferior.
Not only was she an unfit companion for him, but he
was also an unfit companion for her, and her side of
the story, if it could be known, would probably be as
pathetic as blameworthy. Nothing of the correspond-
ence between the two has been preserved. He accused
her of infidelity, and apparently with reason. Her
case is not on record. No doubt she could plead many
neglects on his part, but precisely how many dull and
lonely hours she spent, while he was engrossed in his
master passion, cannot be told. The subordination
of her claims upon his society to those of his soldier^
repelled her, as her frivolity and want of appreciation
1 " Anecdotes of Vigel " (Zapiski Vigela) in the Russkii Vyestnik
(1864), 298. See also Shubinskii's " W^ife of Suvorof " (Zhena Suvorova)
in the Istoritcheskii Vyestnik (1877), 7.
* Istoritcheskii Vyestnik (1900), Ixxx. 530.
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 59
repelled him. Such men commit a kind of spiritual
adultery with their public work, hardly less painful in
its consequences to their wives than the other adultery
of which they are never guilty. That Suvorof was
not wholly lacking in the domestic virtues is clear from
the many proofs of his affection for his daughter. But
daughters are not such tests of character as wives.
They are never upon terms of equality. They require
fewer concessions, fewer abdications, renunciations,
and abstentions, and fewer positive acts of affection.
Suvorof never worked easily upon terms of equality
with any one, and besides being absorbed in the study
and practice of the art of war, he was always an imperious
and quick-tempered man. This combination of neglect
and egoism would have been fatal to a marriage with
any but an exceptional woman. To the misfortune
of both Varvara Ivanovna and himself, she was not
above the average, even if she was not below it.
Of his children he saw little. The boy lived with
his mother till he was eleven years old. The daughter
was taken away from her at the age of three, and placed
in the Smolnii Institute at Petersburg, an establishment
recently founded for the education of daughters of the
nobility. She was a good-natured and benevolent
little person.^ With both, their father carried on an
intermittent correspondence, which, in the case of
Natalya, consisted of long and very affectionate letters.
But of personal intercourse there was almost nothing,
and scandal declared that Suvorof at first refused to
acknowledge Arkadii as his own son.^ Nevertheless,
he took a serious view of his responsibilities, and his
correspondence shows him as not only an affectionate
but also a wise father.
This want of family life had no doubt something to
do with the fantastic aspect of his character which in
the remainder of his life became so conspicuous. Celibacy
1 Istoritcheski Vyestnik (1900), Ixxx. 529.
' Masson, M^moires secrets sur la Russie, i. 318.
60 SUVOROF
tends to exaggerate abnormalities, in part directly,
through the frustration of the sex impulse, and in part
indirectly, through the mere absence of objects of
affection and consideration. Doubtless, Suvorof would
in any case have developed into a testy old man, very
fond of mischief and requiring very careful manage-
ment by his women folk. But he could hardly have
risen to the heights of wilful and deliberate perversity
of which so many examples have been recorded, had he
not lived for most of his time without a wife. Absence
of family, and especially of feminine influence is certainly
responsible for the excessive development of this part
of his nature.
Some of his biographers have puzzled themselves
with this freakishness, and gravely explain it as a
deliberate pose, assumed to attract the attention of
his superiors, and get promotion more rapidly than a
more ordinary person could expect.^ This is a rational,
but a too rational explanation. Suvorof was not the
first great man to be eccentric, and in his case, as in
others, it is not necessary to go deeper than high animal
spirits and a liking for mischief. He had all the Russian
instinct for clowning, for exuberant gesture and grimace,
which is apparent in so many of the national dances.
This he indulged to the full, both in getting on to good
terms with his men and in expressing his contempt
for the petty social idolatries of his day. A man who
keeps a clear view of things in their true proportions
cannot avoid the temptation to shock the feelings of
those who strain at the gnats of the great realities,
and swallow the camels of social convention and the
etiquette of Courts. Suvorof's escapades were often
of this kind, and persisted and were exaggerated long
after the favour of Princes had ceased to have anything
1 See, e.g.t Schmidt, i. 135 ; Laveme, 106 n. As an historian
Schmidt had other Teutonic qualities besides his accuracy. An
unconquerable seriousness is one of them. Laverne, as a Frenchman ,
should have known better.
THE FIRST TURKISH WAR 61
more to give him. He was no doubt clumsy among
courtiers, and to some extent may have used his eccen-
tricity as a cloak. But he was big enough to transcend
the rules of conventional good manners, and more often
than not it is safe to assume that he said or did some-
thing outrageous for the sheer pleasure of throwing
into confusion some pompous or pedantic egoist, who
had converted social trifles from conveniences into
matters of religion. Though he occasionally used the
language of flunkeyism for his own advancement, he
was never a flunkey at heart, and he delighted in shock-
ing people who were. Those will best understand this
side of Suvorof's character who most appreciate the
mixture of high seriousness and impish malevolence
which makes up the genius of Mr. George Bernard
Shaw. That it was in later life not always displayed
with wisdom or good effect may be partly attributed
to his disappointment in marriage. But it was a
natural and not an assumed eccentricity, and he enjoyed
indulging it for its own sake, and not for what he hoped
to get by it.
CHAPTER IV
FRONTIER WORK
Rebellion of Pugatchyof, 1772 — Intervention of Suvorof, 1774 — ^Across
the Volga — Capture of Pugatchyof — Suvorofs little ways —
Potyomkin — Correspondence — ^The Tartars — Revolt in the Crimea,
1777 — Squabbles with Prozorovski — Suvorof in charge — Migration
of the Christians — Astrakhan and the road to India — Grievances —
The Tartars again — Feasts and fights — Correspondence — Command
of Petersburg Division, 1785 — ^The Imperial Progress, 1787 —
Suvorof one of the sights.
By the end of the Turkish War Suvorof had acquired
a great professional reputation, and even before
Rumyantsof was ready to release him, his services
were required in another quarter. Early in 1772 the
ordinary turbulence of the inhabitants of the lands
beyond the Volga developed into a dangerous rebellion.
This border country between European civilisation and
Asiatic barbarism was a perpetual menace to the stability
of Russia, and its savage anarchy was held back by a
hardly less savage system of police. At this time
the whole social organisation, already strained by the
Polish and Turkish Wars, seemed about to collapse. A
Cossack named Emilian Pugatchyof, representing him-
self to be the late Emperor Peter III., put himself
at the head of the rising, and for months the inhabitants
of eastern Russia, almost as far as the walls of Moscow,
suffered countless barbarities at the hands of parties
of Kirghiz, Kalmucks, Tartars, Cossacks, and Russian
criminals. It was not until the end of 1773 that Suvorofs
old chief, Bibikof, arrived at Kazan and began to
FRONTIER WORK 63
co-ordinate the measures of defence. But in April of
the next year Bibikof died, and Pugatchyof, more
dangerous than ever, succeeded in burning the town
of Kazan itself. The conclusion of peace with Poland
and Turkey left Catherine free to deal with this ferocious
system of slaughter and pillage. In July 1774 Count
Peter Panin took charge of the operations, and Colonel
Mikhelson drove Pugatchyof across the Volga, and
began to beat him from one point of vantage to another.
Suvorof's appointment had been made in March,
but Rumyantsof would not let him go until peace had
been concluded. It was therefore not until the 24th
August that, after a brief visit to his newly wedded
wife at Moscow, he reached Ulokhovo and had an inter-
view with Panin. The same day he started, with 50
men, for Penza and Saratof. He marched with his
usual haste, leaving alone the scattered bands of
marauders and the parties of landowners and their
armed servants whom he met on the road. He aimed
only at Pugatchyof himself. At Saratof he learned
that Mikhelson had inflicted another heavy blow on
the rebel leader. Adding a few more to his little party
of soldiers, he hurried on to Tsaritsin, where he found
that Pugatchyof had left four days before, and had
plunged into the barren wastes on the eastern bank of
the Volga. With two squadrons of cavalry and two of
Cossacks, and 300 infantry mounted on horses taken by
Mikhelson from the bandits, Suvorof went after him.
In these regions there was no food or fuel to be got,
and he drove 50 oxen before him to supply the place of
the ordinary soldier's bread. The sun by day and the
stars by night were the only guides, and news was picked
up from the rare inhabitants and the armed parties
which had started from other points in pursuit of
Pugatchyof. At last, at the village of Malo Uzenye,
Suvorof heard that the bandit had been seized by his
own followers and taken to Yaitsk. Pushing on to
that place with more haste than ever, he found, to
64 SUVOROF
his bitter disappointment, that the captive had been
handed over to Colonel Simyonof, who commanded
the garrison of the post. In the last nine days Suvorof
had covered 400 miles.
At Yaitsk he took charge of Pugatchyof and his
twelve-year-old son. The boy was put in a cart, the
father in a big wooden cage on wheels, and Suvorof
made for Simbirsk with an escort of three companies
of infantry, 200 Cossacks, and two cannon, with great
torches blazing all night around the cage to prevent
a surprise and a rescue. At Simbirsk, on the 12th
October, he handed over his prisoners to Panin.
One or two sketches of Suvorof on this chase after
Pugatchyof were made by an official who was for some
days in his company. He rode, as always, with a single
Cossack. At the end of a day's march the Cossack
lit a bimdle of straw in default of better fuel. Suvorof
dismounted, took off his coat and breeches, and, holding
his shirt over his head, warmed his back at the blaze.
Then he warmed his chest and stomach, and lastly sat
and warmed himself all round. Then he put on his
uniform again, wrapped himself in his cloak, and,
lying down on a bundle of hay, with his saddle for a
pillow, went straight off to sleep.^ In more civilised sur-
roundings he was less accommodating. On one occasion
the cavalcade pulled up at a house with a high flight
of steps leading up to the front door. Suvorof 's adjutant
told the civilian that he had been careful to tell the
housewife not to clean the house and not to put a cloth
on the table " because my general can't bear them."
Suvorof then trotted up, exclaimed, " Merciful God !
Good morning ! " dismounted, and ran up the steps,
followed by the adjutant. They came out as quickly
as they went in, the adjutant first, and Suvorof after
him crying at the top of his voice, " Hey, hey, hey, hey ! "
Down the steps and out through the gates they went.
1 Reminiscences of Senator Paul S. Rumitch, Rtiss, Star. (1870),
u. 823.
FRONTIER WORK 65
In the road some one contrived to pacify the frantic
general, and it was explained that the unfortunate
woman had disregarded her orders and had laid the
cloth.^ This is the first appearance in contemporary
memoirs of Suvorof the eccentric. The same observer
was present at his interview with Panin at Simbirsk,
and noticed the profundity of his numerous bows and
the puzzled amusement of his colleague, Count Pavel
Potyomkin.2
After the conclusion of his Pugatchyof expedition
Suvorof began to correspond with Count Grigori Potyom-
kin, the new favourite of the Empress. The letters
show him in a new aspect, that of a flatterer and a
sycophant. To Potyomkin Suvorof paid unceasing
court. He was a gorgeous creature, a Russian Duke
of Bedford, the Leviathan among the favourites of
Catherine. His great gifts of imagination were matched
by great deficiencies in practical capacity. Many con-
temporaries, Russian and foreign, have described his
powerful body, his high forehead and eager eyes, his
bright complexion and loose mouth, the width and
depth of his knowledge, his amazing memory, the
rapidity and variety of his conversation, his vast schemes
of conquest, his craving for power, his bursts of energy
and his prolonged and immovable lethargy, his con-
descension towards his inferiors and his jealousy and
harshness towards his rivals, his overflowing good
humour and his sudden and capricious fits of rage.
During the critical part of Suvorof s career thi^ man was
the most powerful in Russia. Catherine, even while
she chided him for his laziness and indecision, like a
true woman paid great deference to the judgement of
her big lover. Fortunately for Suvorof, Potyomkin
looked upon him with favour, and however he dis-
approved of his antics, was willing to tolerate them
in one who was such a useful instrument of his own
* Reminiscences of Senator Paul S. Rumitch, Russ. Star. (1870),
324. a Ibid. 351.
66 SUVOROF
ambitions. " He plays the fool occasionally," he said,
" but with all his folly he*s a man of brains and capacity ;
he deserves watching.*' ^ Suvorof, on his part, was
sensible of the value of the great man to himself, and
for some years the two worked in a sort of partnership.
" One hand washes the other," says the Russian pro-
verb. Potyomkin thus used and advanced Suvorof, and
the latter applied himself diligently to tickling the vanity
of Catherine's great parasite. It is not without some
feeling of humiliation that we read the letters into
which Suvorof poured streams of most unworthy adula-
tion.
Thus on the 24th October he wrote from Moscow
after receiving a letter of praise from Catherine. He
referred to Potyomkin's goodness, to which he ascribed
his own happiness :
... a recognition so favourable, so great, that I
cannot summon strength to express my sincere grati-
tude. I can collect myself only to make the most
unrestrained recognition to my protector, my upholder
in my military service, and my benefactor, of his ex-
cessive kindnesses, the value of which will never cease to
abide in my grateful heart. Honour, Dear Sir, by means
of your powerful intercession, a man whose hopes are
reposed in your admirable benevolence. The greatness
of that benevolence will thus be the more remarkable,
and will compel me to sing your praises, while I shall
ever remain, with the profound consideration which I
owe you and with unhypocritical devotion, etc.^
On the 12th June 1777 he wrote in the same strain
asking for a command :
Only to your exalted person can I have recourse !
Continue to protect, dear sir, one who with unfeigned
devotion and most deep respect will remain to the end
of his life your most humble servant.'
1 Laveme, 105 n. The words were spoken to the Austrian General
Jordis.
2 VoTontsof Archives^ xxiv. 286.
» Ibid. 288.
FRONTIER WORK 67
On the 12th March 1779 he wrote :
This new mark of your Excellency's kindness to me
transcends all my strength and the sensibility of the
gratitude which I owe you. Permit me, illustrious
Prince, to devote the remainder of my life to spreading
the praises of your so limitless benevolence, and to be
always with most deep respect, etc.^
On the 21st April 1784 he wrote :
I humbly thank your Serenity for all your great
kindness to myself. ... I confide myself to the exalted
patronage of your Serenity and will eternally be, with
most profound respect, etc.^
This extravagant language, selected at random from
many letters, is not pleasant to read. It is, of course,
possible that Suvorof fell into an error very common
among men of action, and believed Potyomkin to be a
much greater thing than he really was. To the soldier,
accustomed to authority, order, and obedience, politics
will often seem a profound mystery, and the men
professionally engaged in it a little beyond his power to
understand. In fact, politicians are rarely more than
ordinary, and great places in the State are most often
not occupied by great men. But Suvorof, accus-
tomed from childhood to solitude and camps, was in
his view of the Court a very simple and ignorant man.
He may, as a shy and uncomfortable man will, have
exaggerated what he supposed to be the qualities of a
true courtier. But this explanation, consistent with the
letters, is not consistent with all the facts. It is im-
possible to avoid the conclusion that Suvorof, for all
his greatness, had in him some rather mean jealousy,
and that he realised the power of Potyomkin, and
flattered him unmercifully in order to get on in the
world. If he had looked upon Potyomkin as one great
1 Vorontsof Archives, 296.
^ Ibid,{804i. See further the letters set out, post, pp. 77, 81.
m
68 SUVOROF
man should look upon another, he would have had more
respect for his own dignity and for the other man's
understanding than to address him in such a style.
He wrote himself down to the level of Potyomkin.
Neither to Platon Zubof, who succeeded Potyomkin
in the favour of Catherine, nor to Rumyantsof, the
only other soldier of his day whom he did not pass
in the race for promotion, did he ever behave with
such servility. He despised Potyomkin's capacity as a
soldier, at the same time that he understood the fatal
consequences of his jealousy as a favourite, and so long
as he felt his own prospects insecure, he flattered him
in a style which really degraded one man as much as
the other. Potyomkin, on his side, though he laughed
at Suvorof's antics, found him a very useful instrument.
The man was an admirable soldier, who would go any-
where and do anything, and would never be a rival of
his own. A rupture did not take place until Suvorof
was strong enough to stand upon his own feet ; and it
was to Potyomkin's favour that he owed the opportunity
of his greatest triumphs. It is not pleasant to con-
template a society in which a man must play the lick-
spittle for years to get the chance of showing himself a
hero at the last.
The few years immediately following the Pugatchyof
rising were spent by Suvorof in work of a less exciting
character. During the greater part of 1775 he com-
manded about 80,000 men in the disaffected districts,
and had charge of the work of restoring order. In
August he visited Moscow to wind up the affairs of his
father, who had just died, and Catherine appointed him
to the command of the Petersburg division. This was
not to his taste, and he asked for a year's leave. But
events in the south soon required the presence of an
energetic and capable officer, and at the end of November
Potyomkin sent him to the Crimea. The inhabitants
of this district, declared by the treaty of peace inde-
pendent of Turkey, were not yet reconciled to their
FRONTIER WORK 69
new state of dependence on Russia. They were for the
most part Tartars, nomad tribes who covered not only
the country west and south of the Caspian, but also the
whole sweep of fertile but uncultivated land from the
frontier of Poland to the Black Sea.i They were cattle-
breeders, plunderers, and slave-traders, with many of
the virtues of savages : courage, loyalty, and fidelity to
their pledged word ; but intolerant of Western and even
of Slav civilisation. Among the Tartars of the Crimea
were many Greeks and Armenians, in whose hands were
all the trade and industry of the district. Soon after
the conclusion of peace Russia began her peaceful
penetration of Tartar territory. The centre of Tartary,
so far as such a loosely organised society had a centre,
was in the Crimea. To control the Crimea was to be
at least the predominant power among the tribes. The
Khan of the Crimea, Sahib Girei, was deposed by the
tribes early in 1775, and Devlet Girei was chosen in his
place. Rumyantsof produced Shahin, a brother of
Sahib Girei, and getting the support of some of the
neighbouring tribes, began to work by persuasion,
threats, and bribes to procure his acceptance by the
rest.
The Tartars were soon thoroughly aroused, and
Turkey began to insist upon the literal observance of
the treaty. The Turkish troops were not withdrawn
from the Crimea, the Pasha of Trebizond threatened an
expedition, the frontier forts were strengthened, and
Russian couriers were sometimes cut off on the roads
by parties of Tartars. The policy of permeation had
produced the desired, or at least the expected, result,
and 20,000 Russian troops invaded the Crimea in the
beginning of November 1776. Suvorof arrived at the
end of the month, leaving his wife and infant daughter
at Poltava. He took charge of part of the command
of Prince Prozorovski. In March 1777 the usurping
^ There is a very graphic account of the Tartars in de Tott's Memoirs^
vols. i. and ii.
70 SUVOROF
Shahin Girei appeared in the Crimea. Devlet Girei fled,
and the new Khan was proclaimed.
Suvorof was soon tired of policing the Crimea and
preparing defences against the Turks, and he did not
like Prozorovski. His fever gave him an excuse for
getting leave to go to Poltava. While he was there,
Shahin Girei forgot the pit from which he was digged,
and in October the Tartars were in open revolt against
their new Russian masters. Prozorovski was too
lethargic, the discontent spread rapidly, and in a battle
between the Tartars and the Russian troops 450 of
the latter and 2000 of the former were killed and
wounded. Rumyantsof received the report of Prozo-
rovski, found no mention of Suvorof in it, and asked
the reason. Learning with great indignation of his
absence at Poltava, he forbade Prozorovski to give any
leave to officers of the frontier troops, and ordered
Suvorof to return at once to duty. Suvorof did not
disobey, but wrote direct to Potyomkin asking for a
separate command. He was given that of the corps of
Kuban. He reached Kuban in the middle of January
1778, and there occupied himself with the ordinary
duties of a frontier commander, improving the defences,
cutting off raiding parties of nomads, and looking after
the discipline, training, and health of his troops. But
he was also something of a diplomatist in this field, and
his primitive habits, ridiculous or disgusting to a Euro-
pean ambassador, enabled him to make many friends
among the nomads. The Kuban frontier was very
quickly set in order, while the continued incompetence
of Prozorovski kept the Crimea in an uproar. In April
Prozorovski was ordered home on leave, and Rumyantsof
put Suvorof in his place.
The situation had changed for the worse. Not only
were the Tartars thoroughly discontented, but a Turkish
squadron of 8 ships was hovering in the neighbour-
hood. To Prozorovski Suvorof behaved stiffly, even
with insult. He did not visit the man he was to super-
FRONTIER WORK 71
sede. When Prozorovski sent to ask for an interview,
he said he was too ill. To a second request he sent the
answer that he was out at dinner, and would be going
next day to visit the Khan. Prozorovski gave up the
attempt to see him, sent his report by an aide-de-camp,
and retired from the Crimea. Suvorof, having cleared
the ground of his rival, threw himself vehemently into
his new duties. He divided the peninsula into districts,
increased and improved the defences against the Turks,
and issued detailed instructions to his garrisons for their
feeding, training, health, and behaviour towards the
Tartars. With the Turkish squadron he dealt firmly.
Some of its seamen had landed on the coast and killed
a Cossack. Without demanding satisfaction, Suvorof
began to erect batteries at the mouth of the gulf in
which the ships lay. In reply to inquiries what this
meant, he referred politely to the unhappy accident
which had caused the death of one of his men, and went
on with his works. After three days the Turkish com-
mander became nervous, beat his way out of the gulf in
the face of an unfavourable wind, and anchored outside.
Another and a much larger squadron appeared off the
coast in September. Suvorof strengthened his forts,
increased the number of his pickets along the shore,
and refused to allow the Turks to land even for food
and water. Baffled by a persistence which never gave
a decent excuse for violence, the whole fleet returned
to Constantinople and left Suvorof to deal with the
Tartars by themselves.
The most difficult part of his task was the removal
of the Christian population. The reason for this step,
unique in the history of conquest by permeation, was
twofold. The Christian colonists would be useful in
populating the empty districts of the mainland, in case
the Crimea should for any reason be subsequently
abandoned ; and as the Christian tribute formed a
large part of the revenues of the Khan, the loss of it
would reduce him to a more proper condition of sub-
72 SUVOROF
missiveness and dependence on Russia. Suvorof was
therefore called upon to transfer some thousands of
families from their homes to a distance of many miles.
It was a task of enormous difficulty, requiring a vast
number of ox-carts, building materials for the new
settlements, supplies of food for the journey, and
elaborate measures of protection. The exodus began in
the face of protests from the Khan, and in default of
other vehicles, Suvorof used his baggage waggons and
the private carriages of his officers. In the second half
of September all was completed ; 31,000 people had
been transported to the districts between the rivers
Berda and Kalmyus, around the Sea of Azof, and along
the banks of the Don. It was impossible that such a
project should be carried out without great suffering
among the Christians themselves. Russian transport
and Russian organisation of supplies are always bad,
and Suvorof found it very difficult to get money. In
August he was writing frantically to Turtchaninof, the
Secretary of State :
My dear Sir, money, money, money ; count the cost
afterwards, the loss won't be great. . . . We must com-
pensate the Christians. . . . Oh my dear man, it's hard
work ; there's not a bit of money ; I would gladly
pledge all my villages ; nobody to lend. I'm afraid
the enterprise will come to a standstill.^
Six months after the completion of the work he wrote
to Potyomkin :
The Crimean people are suffering in their present
situation from the want of many things ; look with a
merciful eye on those who have sacrificed so much for
the throne ; sweeten the bitterness of their recollections.^
In truth, 81,000 men, women, and children cannot
be moved like cattle in a few weeks without much
hardship ; and the situation of these wretched Greeks
1 Otyechestvenniya Zapiski (1824), 379, 382.
* Voronisof Archives^ xxiv. 294.
FRONTIER WORK 73
and Armenians, settled, at the beginning of a Russian
winter, in an unprepared country, at the mercy of
fraudulent and corrupt contractors, must have been
beyond description. Suvorof s own part had been per-
formed with as much humanity as was consistent with
speed, and the Empress, whose feelings were not much
affected by the tribulations of a parcel of living movables,
praised him for his efficiency. He heard of this from
Turtchaninof, and wrote one of his overflowing letters
in reply :
Almighty God ! How can I answer your letter of
the 1st September ? Mere gratitude of any sort is too
little ; mine is without bounds ! No, the sacrifice of
myself ; the last drop of my poor blood poured out on
the altars of the all-gracious Mother could not repay it.
I forget my wife, in the agony of her illness, my little
girl, myself ! I remember myself in the service of her
Highness alone, wherever it may be, even in the depths
of the ocean. God give me strength ! ^
In January 1779 he went to see his sick wife at
Poltava. But he stayed there only ten days, and after
a circuitous journey was back again in the Crimea in
February. In March Russia and Turkey signed a new
convention. Turkey recognised Shahin Girei, and the
bulk of the Russian troops were withdrawn from the
Crimea, leaving a garrison of only 6000 men. At the
end of July Suvorof was once more free and returned
to Poltava. There he stayed for a few months, it is
not known in what sort of activity, but probably
fretting at the absence of important work and quarrelling
with his wife. In September he went so far as to prepare
a case for a divorce, and Varvara Ivanovna went to
Moscow.^
At the end of the year he was summoned to Peters-
1 Otyechestvenniya Zapiski (1824), 387. He was still suffering from
fever, and his wife had also fallen ill of it. Ibid. 391. See also his
letters to Turtchaninof in Russkaya Starina (1900), cii. 303 et seq.
* Pyetrushevski.
74 SUVOROF
burg. There he found the Empress and Potyomkin full
of a new project. England and France were now at
grips in India, and Potyomkin thought it might be
possible to open an overland route for the trade which
would fall from the hands of England. With the
jewelled star of the Order of St. Alexander Nevski,
Suvorof was sent to Astrakhan. There he was to estab-
lish order among the frontier tribes near the Caspian
Sea. He set off in the good spirits with which he always
entered on a new piece of work, taking his wife with
him from Moscow. He reached Astrakhan on the 4th
February. But the whole scheme was soon shown to
be a mere bubble. Whatever misfortunes England
might experience in America, she remained mistress of
India, and Suvorof found himself once more reduced to
idleness and insignificance. He began as usual to fret.
He was harassed in particular by three things :
Yakobi, the Governor of Astrakhan, his own wife, and
some writers of pasquinades. The Governor was left
in complete independence of Suvorof, and as usual the
latter showed signs of jealousy. They held the same
rank, that of Lieutenant-General, but the Governor,
not unreasonably, received special honours in his own
province. At one dinner Suvorof was punctual, Yakobi
late, and the orchestra began to play as soon as the
Governor came in. Suvorof stalked about impatiently,
and condemned the dinner as cold, over-cooked, warmed-
up. As soon as it was finished, he thrust his hand out
to a doctor, who was among the guests, and begged
him to feel his pulse. " I have not dined so late for
years,** he said. Yakobi, who seems to have behaved
like a gentleman on all occasions, was obviously offended,
but suppressed his feelings and went home. He prob-
ably knew the better side of Suvorof, and their official
correspondence shows no sign of any serious discord.^
Suvorof and his wife appear at Astrakhan in one of
the very few definitely recorded scenes of their joint
1 Russ. Star. (1000), cii. 520, 621.
FRONTIER WORK 75
life. They came to church to make a solemn recon-
ciliation. He wore a plain uniform, and she the dress
of a woman of the people. They took communion
together and embraced each other with tears in the
presence of the priest. But the ceremony had no lasting
effect, and their relations were soon as bad as ever.^
Nothing made him amiable but hard work, and nothing
made her happy except the gaiety of a capital city. At
Astrakhan they bored themselves and each other.
One of his letters to Turtchaninof contains a long
complaint :
Many babies have been raised to the same rank as
myself. . . . Pr[ozorovski], bedecorated for his numer-
ous victories, sends to me the rumour that I should
have been punished if I hadn't performed this duty
thoroughly. . . . K[amyenski] in the full tide of victory
promises to shoot me if I don't win, and for his heroism
gets this and that and I not a kind word, and so for
Hirsof — instead of the first class according to the rules,
although my victories resound everywhere, like Don-
quixotism. I can't, my honoured friend, hide the fact
that when I betook myself to the society of brigands
from the Ural Steppe, after my triumphant pacification,
I expected the St. Anne for myself ; many people got
swords, I should have been content with the Order ! ^
This rehearsal of old grievances was flung gratuitously
into the midst of a long letter about the transfer of the
Christian population of the Crimea and other matters
of serious importance. The same egoism appears in
his constant references to the attacks of pamphleteers
which he experienced in Astrakhan.
These writers of pasquinades were a new phenomenon
in Suvorof 's life. Who they were is not clear, and what
they wrote only appears from his protests. Probably
neither their personalities nor their performances merited
the attention of a man of sense. But Suvorof, great
man as he was to show himself, was abnormally sensitive
1 Russ. Arkh. (1872), 146.
2 Russ. Star. (1900), cii. 305.
76 SUVOROF
of innuendo and insult, and his outcry at Astrakhan was
ridiculously shrill. To Turtchaninof he wrote a large
number of formal letters, and into these he thrust all
sorts of irrelevant references to the pamphleteers. Thus
on the 22nd March he bade the Secretary of State
Lament for poor Varvara Ivanovna ; who is dearer to
me than my life, or else God will condemn you I Seeing
her condition, I cannot staunch my tears. Defend her
honour. Save the honour of the most trustworthy slave
of our Mother, now almost forty years in the service of
his country. Almighty God be your helper.^
Sending Easter greetings to Turtchaninof and his
wife in May, he wrote :
I have the honour to wish you many happy returns
of the feast which is past, and henceforth I wish you
joy and health continuously for countless years to come,
and to live them in joy — many happy returns of the
day ! . . . I only beg the Creator that he send you all
blessings, as many as may be, for your kindness and
your benevolence. And as for the damned traducer,
please, little father, Pyotr Ivanovitch, try for God's
sake to roast him quickly. With this I conclude.^
In more than one of these letters he inserted the
words, " Remember the shameless ! " It is true that
Turtchaninof was on intimate terms with him, and was
" like father and mother " to his little daughter in
Petersburg.^ But the same lamentations occur in letters
to Potyomkin and even Panin. To the former he
wrote, setting out in a hurried, almost unintelligible
style what the libels were :
This — ^that he will go to conquer P[ersia]. I only
boast that I have served nearly forty years without
reproach. I advised Khur about contributions, asked
money from your Excellency, calculated my income ;
at this time they are not necessary for me or my children.
I demanded pretty girls from Kh., a disgraceful story ;
1 Rus8, Star. (1900), cii. 307. ^ lUd. 310. ^ /jj-^. 311,
FRONTIER WORK 77
I know nothing of it except in marriage, and that is
why I make such a defence of my honour. Per. fine
horses. My travelHng expenses most luxurious. There's
no chest for them. All sorts of extravagance, diamonds
from the highest hands in the World, and tissues from
India. I really didn't know I had any. And so forth.
There's a triumvirate of pasquinaders here ; A Siberian,
an Armenian — Minai Stepanof , and a Tartar — Imangulof .
I regard this stupid meanness with contempt, out of
the respect of my unshakable spirit for your Serenity.
I trust that you, most Serene Prince, will view this
beastliness with no less disgust, and, for the sake of
the gratification I have given your Serenity's august
authority, will now and henceforward graciously tear up
all such criminal publications, protect these tried servants
of your great Empress, and console me, who am ap-
proaching old age and death, with your renowned sense
of justice, so that I on my translation from this world,
may present to Almighty God a fitting plea of inter-
cession on your behalf.^
Even Potyomkin can hardly have stomached the
concluding paragraph. The last billow of this storm in
a tea-cup broke over the head of Count Peter Panin.
On the 4th June the frantic victim wrote to him :
My stoical letter of the last post, with the postscript
about the pasquilles against me under the name of
Thet. X. must have reached you, my dear Sir ; so
patiently I await your answer to it, especially because
I have not had a letter from you for more than a month.
Honoured friend, make yourself half a quarter of an
hour to dwell in thought upon my depression ; all those
flattering meteors will vanish, melancholy is the only
nourishment of my soul.^
Only eight days later he was writing to his kinsman
Khvostof, exhorting him to the sternest of virtues :
I remind you that you should follow Aristides in
rectitude, Fabriciana in temperance, Epaminondas in
1 Voronis. ArkhiVy xxiv. 312.
* Ihid. 323.
78 SUVOROF
truthfulness, Cato in brevity, Julius Caesar in speed,
Turenne in constancy, Laudon in morals.^
He played more parts than most of us, and there
were even moments when he achieved brevity. But as
a rule, his nature ran away from his examples, and it
was only in the field that he resembled his classical
heroes for more than a few minutes together. The
contrast between his precepts and his practice was never
more remarkably illustrated than during his stay in
Astrakhan.
Nevertheless, his life was not an unbroken succession
of pangs of this kind. He lived in a gentleman's house,
and could be seen any day, walking about the streets
and gardens, giving nuts and gingerbreads to children,
and behaving for the greater part of his time like a
reasonable and good-natured man. It is on record that
he stood sponsor to a Kalmuk who wished to be baptized,
and took no small pains to give the man some practical
assistance. No other details of his life have been pre-
served. But it would not be difficult to reconstruct it
from what is more definitely known of him in later
years, when his littleness and jealousy and ill-humour
were no less conspicuous. To children and animals he
was uniformly kind, and if he was often angry with his
inferiors, it was only by fits. Even at Astrakhan he
probably passed the greater part of his time in happiness.
On the 11th January 1782 he received orders from
Potyomkin to proceed to Kazan, where he remained until
the end of the following August. By that time the Crimea
was once more in a state of unrest, and he was told to
take over the command of the troops there from Count
de Balmaine. Shahin Girei was threatened with deposi-
tion, this time in favour of another brother, Arslan
Girei. He had fled to the protection of de Balmaine
and liis army, returned at their head, and remained in
the Crimea. Here Suvorof came, only to be at once
1 Martchenko, Suvorof in his Autographs.
FRONTIER WORK 79
transferred to the river Kuban. This was the extreme
boundary of Russian territory on the side of the Caucasus,
and he was entrusted with the duty of maintaining
order and establishing Russian ascendancy among the
Tartars of that region. This was quite to his taste.
At Yeisk, on the eastern shore of the Sea of Azov, he
entertained 3000 of the nomads, and found it easy to
get on to good terms. In April 1783 Catherine issued
a manifesto, taking the Crimea, Taman, and Kaman
under her protection, and on the 9th July Suvorof held
a great assembly of Tartars to swear allegiance to their
new overlord. The Steppe around Yeisk was covered
with the round wicker-walled, felt-roofed tents of some
6000 Tartars. Russian troops were on their guard, but
refrained from any threatening demonstrations. The
leaders among the Tartars were summoned to an open
space, they listened to the reading of Shahin Girei*s
renunciation of his rights, and took the oath to Catherine.
Dispersing among the tents, they took similar oaths
from their personal followers. There followed a colossal
banquet. It lasted three days, and in the course of it
there disappeared 100 oxen, 800 sheep, a large quantity
of other solids, and 1250 gallons of vodka. It is recorded,
and the fact is not at all improbable, that this display
of loyalty was too much for the Tartars, and many of
them paid for their devotion with their lives.- On the
11th July the guests dispersed, full of enthusiasm for a
monarch who treated her subjects in this lavish style,
and a few weeks later Suvorof received from Catherine
the Order of St. Vladimir of the first class.
Nevertheless, this formal allegiance did not prevent
the nomads from raiding the Don territory and giving
shelter to deserters and fugitives from justice. Turkey
was not slow to take advantage of any tendency to
resent Russian control, and Shahin Girei began to repent
of his abdication. To avoid an outbreak on a large
scale, Potyomkin and Suvorof encouraged a half -formed
desire of the Tartars to migrate to the Ural Steppe,
80 SUVOROF
further north, and pressure was applied to those tribes
who would not go of their own will. A chain of posts
was stretched from Yeisk along the Don, and to the
east of this the groups of men and herds were carefully
shepherded towards the Volga. On the 11th August
there was a serious fight 60 miles to the north-east of
Yeisk. The Tartars fell upon a Russian post, Suvorof
with reinforcements came up, and after a vain attempt
at persuasion, attacked them fiercely. There followed
a massacre of the brave but disorganised barbarians.
About 3000 were killed, and the Tartars themselves
killed a large number of their women and flung their
children into the river Eya. Only 60 old men, women,
and children were taken prisoner. The bulk of the
cattle and horses, estimated at 20,000 head, were also
captured, and deprived of these, many of the nomads
who escaped from the field perished miserably of
hunger on the Steppe. The advance of civilisation
seems often to be accompanied by the sacrifice of an
unnecessary number of minor actors in the great comedy.
This untoward incident spoiled the whole project of
transferring the Tartars to the Ural country. A general
revolt began among those who remained near the Kuban,
and an attack was actually made upon Yeisk itself.
Suvorof returning swiftly from the north, the raiders
crossed the river. An attempt to arrest Shahin Girei
failed, and Potyomkin, showing great irritation, ordered
Suvorof to follow him beyond the Kuban. On the
30th September an expedition, consisting of 16 com-
panies of infantry, 16 squadrons of dragoons and as
many of Cossacks, and 16 guns, left Kopuil. Suvorof
ostentatiously proclaimed his intention of going to
Poltava, where troops were to be concentrated for a
threatened war with Austria. In fact, he marched east-
wards along the right bank of the Kuban, generally by
night, and over such difficult ground that in 10 days
he covered no more than 80 miles. On the 10th October
he forded the river at its junction with the Laba, the
•
FRONTIER WORK 81
infantry up to their necks in water and the cavalry
carrying the reserve ammunition and baggage slung
between each pair of horses. Eight miles beyond the
Kuban they fell upon a large body of Tartars, near the
village of Kermentchik. The Russians were exhausted,
but the nomads were completely unprepared ; and in
a running fight over a distance of 6 miles 4000 of them
were killed. On this occasion the trophies were 700
men, women, and children, 6000 cattle, and 15,000 sheep.
The punitive expedition, after an exhausting march,
reached Yeisk at the end of October. ^ It was not until
the autumn of 1784 that the recalcitrant Shahin Girei
made his final submission, induced as much by the
promise of a yearly pension of 200,000 roubles, as by
the threat of further military operations.
Suvorof had left Kuban in April, and went by way
of Moscow to Petersburg. What he did there for the
next few months is not known. His name appears
occasionally in the correspondence of Turtchaninof with
Potyomkin, but not in connection with anything worthy
of note. The only living pictures of him in this period
are painted by himself in his letters. On the 21st
December he wrote to Potyomkin this strange epistle :
Illustrious Prince and dear Sir — With the
approach of the New Year I most humbly greet your
Serene Highness.
The year which is now expiring I have passed in a
village, among a few soldiers, in the expectation of
receiving from your Serene Highness some special com-
mand of my own, as I have usually commanded a
division or a corps ; especially. Dear Sir, there is a
vacancy for me in the Brusova or Ryenin division.
In the direction of the first are some villages of my own.
But it does not matter, illustrious Prince ! where I
receive from your Serene Highness' gracious kindness a
special command — even in Kamtchatka.
1 Campagnes, ii. 165 et seq. Suvorof s work among the Tartars is
the subject of several papers in the Don Military News (Donskiya
Voyenniya Vyedomostyi), to which I was unable to get access.
G
82 SUVOROF
In my spare time, I have bought 92 souls with a bill
of exchange, which I shall discharge in two years. I
have left behind in Kuban savings of more than 100,000
roubles, and in my short stay salary for four months.
There's my avarice.
At Kopuil the commander was not Filisof but Nikolai
Rachmanof — on to the field with a regiment, off it with
a battalion (I did not waste so many men in proportion
in one year of my service) — and he composed pasquilles
against me.
I have served, Dear Sir! more than 40 years, and I
am almost 60 ; my one wish is to end my most honour-
able service sword in hand. My long stay in the lower
ranks got me a roughness of habit, though it left me
with a spotless heart, and deprived me of all acquaint-
ance with polished manners ; living all my life in the
field, I was late in accustoming myself to them. Study
enlightened me in virtue ; I lie like Epaminondas, fly
like Caesar ; I am constant as Turenne and straightfor-
ward as Aristides ; not understanding the devious ways
of flattery and adulation, I am often displeasing to my
superiors. I have broken my word to none of my
enemies, I have been happy, because I have ordained
happiness.
Give peace to the mind of one not guilty before
you — for that I will answer before the Dread Divine
Tribunal — and grant me a separate command. Pluck
me out of idleness, but do not imagine therefore that
I have been in the least dissatisfied with Count Ivan
Petrovitch, only that I cannot live in luxury. In a
strange land — and in idleness, too.
I trust in the gracious kindness of your Serene High-
ness, and will be to my death with the profoundest
respect, etc.^
The request was granted, and in 1785 Suvorof re-
ceived the command of the Petersburg division. But
for that fact as little is known of his life in the north
after the date of the letter as before it. He emerges
into the light only in October, when he was promoted
to the rank of General-in-Chief and was given the
command of the troops at Krementchug. In 1786 he
1 Vorontsof Archives^ xxiv.
FRONTIER WORK 83
wrote the Autobiography which is still preserved in the
Imperial Library in Petrograd. In 1787 he was seen
among the men who surrounded Catherine during her
triumphal progress through her newly acquired terri-
tories. The task of settling and organising these natur-
ally rich but hitherto undeveloped districts had been
entrusted to Potyomkin, and since the treaty of Kutchuk-
Kainardzhi his principal task had been the establish-
ment of colonists, the planning of towns, and the
erection of fortifications in " New Russia." In January
1787 the Empress set out from Petersburg with a train
of 14 carriages and 120 sledges. At each station she
found 560 fresh horses; during the darkness the road
was illuminated by huge bonfires at every hundred
yards ; the inhabitants of the towns and villages along
the route welcomed her with cheers, the ringing of
church bells, and shots from cannon. At Kief, almost
at the limit of her old dominions, she stayed for three
months ; and in the spring she proceeded by water,
with a fleet of 80 barges, through the lands which her
favourite had been arranging for the past twelve years.
She visited Krementchug, Potyomkin' s new town of
Kherson, Sevastopol, Simferopol, and Kafan, and re-
turned by way of Poltava and Moscow to the capital.
At Kanyef she had met the King of Poland and the
Emperor Joseph II., and at Kief she was visited by an
enormous number of foreign magnates of every nation.
Against this gorgeous background of palaces and
courtiers, fireworks, triumphal arches, music, and feast-
ing we are furnished with one or two glimpses of the
ungraceful figure of Suvorof . The French Ambassador,
the Comte de Segur, made notes of him, as of every
other unusual incident. " Is it true,'* he asked him,
" that when you're with the army you never go to
sleep ? " "Oh yes," replied Suvorof ; " I hate idleness.
To prevent myself from going to sleep, I always keep
a very punctual cock in my tent. But sometimes,
when I'm lazy and want to rest in real comfort, I
84 SUVOROF
take off one of my spurs." ^ Another Frenchman
encountered Suvorof in a less frivolous mood. This was
Colonel Lameth. Meeting him in the street, Suvorof
accosted him in his most abrupt style, " What's
your nationality ? " Lameth, not a little surprised,
answered urbanely, "French.'* There followed a series
of demands. " Calling ? " — " Soldier." " Rank ? "
— " Colonel." " Name ? " — " Alexander Lameth."
" Good ! " and Suvorof turned to go. But Lameth got
in front of him and opened fire in his turn. " What's
your nationality ? " " Russian," replied Suvorof.
" Calling ? " — " Soldier." " Rank ? " — " General."
" Name ? "— " Suvorof." " Good ! " Whereupon both
laughed, and they remained on good terms for the rest
of their stay in Kief .^ For the rest, no doubt he devoted
himself to keeping his men fit, sneering at his professional
rivals, paying court to Potyomkin, and sniffing the
rumours of fresh wars, which came blowing from the
Balkans.
1 De S6gur, M&moireSt iii.
« Ibid,
CHAPTER V
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR
Alliance of Russia and Austria against Turkey — Outbreak of war, 1787
— Suvorof at Kinburn — ^Battle at Kinburn, 1787 — Suvorof wounded
— Attack from the sea, 1788 — Siege of Otchakof — Letter to his
daughter — ^Difference with Potyomkin — Suvorof in Moldavia, 1789
Battle of Fokshani — Battle of the Ruimnik — ^Rewards — Correspond-
ence — Fruitless campaign of 1790 — The amiable Coburg — The
storm of Izmail — Alienation of Potyomkin — Peace with Turkey.
The Peace of Kutchuk-Kainardzhi proved to be no more
than an armistice. The recognition of the independence
of the Crimea was from the day of the signature of the
treaty a mere form, and as the Russian hold upon
the lost province was steadily tightened the restlessness
of the Porte increased. Catherine's triumphal progress
was the final outrage, and the whispers of her European
enemies found the Turk a ready listener. The Asiatic
bandits were once more employed for the ulterior pur-
poses of civilised European States. England and Prussia
on this occasion joined with France to incite Turkey
against the growing power of Russia, while Sweden
also adopted a menacing attitude in the north. The
possibility of an Austro-Russian alliance precipitated
the crisis. The growing harmony between Catherine
and Joseph II. threatened Turkey with a partition re-
sembling that of Poland, and in the hope of anticipating
an aggressive alliance, Turkey flung out a formal declara-
tion of war on the 24th August 1787.
This came too late to prevent the union of the two
Christian States, and Austria prepared for an attack
86
86 SUVOROF
across the Danube and the Carpathians, while the
Russian troops were collected for a new invasion of
Moldavia. One army, that of the Ukraine, under
Rumyantsof, was intended to act as a guard over
Poland, and at the same time unite the active army
with the Austrians. The second army, that of Ekater-
inoslav, was commanded by Potyomkin. Its plan was
to march, by way of Otchakof, across the Dnyestr
and the Prut to the Danube. Suvorof's sphere of
operations was the Crimea, where he commanded 20
battalions of infantry and 38 squadrons of cavalry.
His was in fact the post of danger. His fortress of
Kinburn lay on a narrow peninsula immediately opposite
Otchakof, and every year a Turkish squadron sailed
between the two places. On the 18th August, before
the actual declaration of war, the Turkish commander
at Otchakof informed a Russian officer from Kinburn
that a state of war existed, and the next day a
brisk but indecisive little action took place in the
narrow gulf. Even after this general hostilities were
avoided, but Suvorof, finding a Turkish squadron lying
dangerously near Kherson, at the extreme eastern end
of the same gulf, compelled it to withdraw by throwing
up batteries which threatened to cut the Turks off
from the open sea. The gallant behaviour of a Maltese
named Lombardo, commanding one ship of the Russian
flotilla, practically compelled the whole Turkish fleet to
retreat upon Otchakof. Suvorof's own work, during
the few weeks preceding and following the declaration
of war, consisted in visiting the different parts of his
district. The slovenliness and corruption of the Turkish
Government had progressively increased since the last
war, and if the Russians were slow in collecting their
energies for the struggle, the Turks were even worse.^
1 There is a good contemporary account of the state of Turkey in
Volney's Consid^ations sur la guerre actuelle des Turcs. The author,
a resident in Turkey, takes a Gladstonian view of the Turks and the
maintenance of them as necessary to the European balance of power.
See also de Tott's M6moires.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 87
It was not until the end of September that the Turkish
dispositions became dangerous, and he hurried to Kin-
burn, their obvious objective.
For the delay on the Russian side Potyomkin was
lespon^ible. The proper method of defending Kinburn
was an attack on Otchakof. But Potyomkin was im-
mersed in lethargy, and his overflowing confidence re-
ceived a great shock in the crippling of the Sevastopol
flfjet by a storm. So complete was his moral overthrow
tliat he thought of evacuating the Crimea, and even
asked leave to resign his command and go to Petersburg.
" Did the wind blow only on the Russians ? " asked
Catherine, and told him he had no more endurance than
a five-year-old child. But her sarcasm failed to arouse
him in time to rescue Suvorof.^ Fortunately, Suvorof
was the last man in the world to look for salvation
elsewhere than in himself. From the 29th September
to the 1st October the Turks bombarded Kinburn with
great vigour, and about 9 o'clock on the morning of
the last day, they began to land in boats in two
places.
Kinburn lay across a long and narrow peninsula,
about 4 miles from its western point. One landing,
8 miles to the east, was a mere demonstration.
The real attempt was made from the west. Here the
Turks disembarked at the extremity of the peninsula
some 5000 men led by French officers. Suvorof re-
ceived the news with great coolness, and said, " Let
them all jump out ; don't interfere." Accordingly no
attempt was made to prevent the landing, and the
Turks were permitted to advance steadily along the
peninsula, throwing up, as they came, fifteen separate
lines of entrenchments, sand-bags, and chevaux-de-frise,
without a shot being fired against them. The trenches
were not very deep, as water rose in them at a short
distance below the surface. They were therefore
1 Potyomkin's correspondence during this war has been printed in
Russkaya Starina (1875), ii. 40 et seq.
88 SUVOROP
strengthened by parapets of sand-bags.^ /^^ /^^
from the southern edge of the land to wi. *^ ^ ^^^^^
distance of the northern, whence the movable ^^^^V^
de-frise formed a barrier to the water's edgl' ^"^^'^
could be removed at any time for advance or '{^^^^^^'
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when the last linl ^^^
completed at a distance of about 1000 yards from!'
fortress, Suvorof gave the signal for the attack, a sa^^
from all the guns which could be brought to bear up?^
the enemy.
Detailed description of the fight which followed is
impossible. It took the form of a scramble along the
sandy spit and in the shallow water on either side of
it, and more depended on personal strength and courage
than on any tactical dispositions. The Russians
advanced at first in two lines. In the first were two
battalions and five companies of infantry, and in the
second two battalions. Four squadrons of cavalry
and some Cossacks moved along the southern shore
somewhat in the rear of the infantry. In this formation,
Suvorof himself among the first, they attacked the
Turkish entrenchments, and a hand-to-hand contest
ensued, which continued for the rest of the day and
half of the night. The opposing troops were generally
so intermingled that the artillery on both sides was
silent almost throughout the action. The first charge
drove the Turks out of ten trenches, but the battle
surged back again, and at one moment Suvorof himself
barely escaped being killed. Mistaking a Turk holding
a horse by the bridle for a dismounted Cossack, he was
taken completely off his guard. He was on the point
of being cut down, when a musketeer named Novikof
bayoneted one Turk, knocked down another with the
butt, and drove off a third. Seeing the danger of their
commander the retreating Russians turned and swept
the enemy back once more. This advance was harassed
by a flanking fire from the Turkish fleet, but the guns
^ CampagneSy ii. 6, 14.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 89
of the fortress sank one ship, and the daring Lombardo,
putting out against the whole strength of the enemy,
actually chased seventeen ships and sank one of them.
Taking his vessel for a fire-ship, the enemy squadron
kept at a safe distance for the rest of the battle, and the
hand-to-hand fight went on without further interference
from the sea.
During this naval diversion the Russians had once
more given ground. The commander of the first line,
the Ryebok who had distinguished himself at Turtukai
in the last war, had been twice wounded and carried
off the field, and Suvorof himself was hit in the left
side. Falling back, the Russians even abandoned some
of their regimental cannon. Suvorof sent for rein-
forcements. Every man who could be spared from the
fortress and all the guard of the baggage lager in the
rear, were collected. Followed by some cavalry, for
whom Suvorof had sent in the morning to a distance
of 20 miles, they threw themselves into the surging
mass upon the promontory. This third attack was
successful. Suvorof was wounded again by a chance
bullet striking his left arm. But his men were now
not to be denied, and the Turks were literally driven
into the sea. By way of compelling his men to stand
their ground, the Turkish commander had recalled all
the small boats, and to protect himself, had built a
stockade between the ships and the land. Nothing
was left to the fugitives but a choice of deaths. Some
escaped by swimming, and several hundred wounded
were picked up by the fleet the next day. But many
were drowned, and the corpses on the field of battle
were estimated at 1500. Four-fifths of the whole
force had perished. For long after the day of the
battle corpses continued to be thrown up on the beach,
and on the 9th November no fewer than 70 of
these miserable pieces of jetsam were collected and
buried. The Russian losses were heavy. About 250
were killed and 750 wounded, almost one-third of the
90 SUVOROF
force which Suvorof commanded for the greater part
of the battle, and a proportion unusually large in the
record of his Turkish victories.^
The rest of the year passed without any important
military event. Suvorof spent the time in training his
troops, and, to avoid a second descent upon Kinburn,
kept the ice broken all round the promontory.^ As
late as February he was still suffering from his wound,
and his left arm could not hold the bridle. But this
did not prevent him undertaking journeys on horseback
of as much as 350 miles. In the meantime the prospects
of a general success improved. In January Austria
declared war against Turkey, and a decent display of
energy on the part of the Allies should have driven the
enemy across the Danube. But neither the Austrians
nor the Russians were competently led, and on land
practically the whole year was wasted. Nevertheless,
in a series of naval actions, in which the guns of the
fortress of Kinburn played some part, the Prince of
Nassau-Siegen destroyed the Turkish Black Sea Fleet.^
For Suvorof this year was of importance, because during
it began an estrangement between him and Potyomkin,
or rather a dissolution of that strange relationship of
patron and client which had so long existed between
them. On the 20th June the Turks made a sea attack
upon Kinburn, but were driven off with the loss of
17 ships and 1800 prisoners, the Russians losing
less than 100 men. After this the great military enter-
prise of the year was begun ; the siege of Otchakof .
The siege occupied nearly six months, and wasted
20,000 Russian lives. Potyomkin's lethargy and caprice
1 Campagnes, ii. 5 et seq. ; Pyetrof, i.94,et seq. A few weeks after
the battle the cable of Lombardo's ship was broken in a gale. It drifted
into the middle of the Turkish fleet and its commander was made a
prisoner {Campagnes, ii. 25).
* See his instructions in Pyetrof, 1. Appendix 8.
• Nassau-Siegen was a soldier of fortune. He commanded the
floating batteries at the siege of Gibraltar. See Le Prince Charles de
Nassau-Siegen, by the Marquis D'Aragon. In the Black Sea he was
assisted by Paul Jones.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 91
never appeared more fatal to the success of his enter-
prises. He lacked both the courage for a storm and
the patience for a siege. He began siege operations
half-heartedly, hoping that the Turks would surrender
to the mere display of force, and even when his batteries
had at last inflicted heavy damage upon the fortress,
shrank from ordering a direct assault. It was not
until the 17th December, when many of his men and
animals had perished miserably of cold and hunger,
that he carried the place by storm.^
During the earlier operations Suvorof had commanded
the left or northern wing of the besieging army, and a
letter to his daughter gives a sketch of him :
Darling Suvorovie, I kiss you ! You have again
delighted me with your letter of the 30th April ; I
answered one of yours yesterday. If, please God, we
are alive and well and see each other, glad shall I be
to talk to you about heroes old and new ; only teach
me how to follow after them. Eh ! Suvorovie, how are
you, my soul, in your white dress ? Keep well and grow
big. My humble respects to gracious Madame Sophia
Ivanovna. What a caterwauling they're setting up
at night now in Otchakof — ^the dogs howl like wolves,
the cows moo, the cats squall, the goats bleat ! I sleep
on a sand bank ; it's so far into the sea, the gulf — as I
walk I can hear what they're saying ; they're so near
us, lots of them on such huge ships, six big ones, up to
the sky, sails on them a verst across ; we can see them
smoking their tobacco ; they sing doleful songs. On
one ship there are more of them than you have flies
in the whole Smolni — red men, green men, blue men,
grey men. Their guns are as big as the room where
you sleep with the sisters. God bless you ! — Your
father Alexander Suvorof.^
However cheerfully he might write to his twelve-
year-old daughter, he was in fact chafing at his inaction.
* On the day of assault the temperature was 20 degrees below
zero, Fahrenheit.
2 This letter is in the Sbornik. It is printed in Letters and Papers^
p. 80.
92 SUVOROF
His impatience at Potyomkin*s delays and pusillanimity
gradually overcame his ambition and his interest.
Operations began on the 1st July, and on the 27th the
Turks made a sally directly against Suvorof's own
position. Suvorof wanted nothing better, and a savage
battle began among the gardens and cottages on the
outskirts of the town. But his men were hard pressed
and began to give way. Throwing himself on the
ground before them he cried, " Stop, my Paladins I
theyVe not hit you ; they've hit me I you're crushing
me I Stop ! " They halted, and some sprang to pick
him up. Thereupon he leaped to his feet, crying
" You've healed me." ^ But this rally was short.
Suvorof himself was wounded in the neck by a bullet,
and as the enemy were on the spot in superior numbers,
he instructed his successor to withdraw. Unhappily
the retreat became a rout, and the Russian losses
reached the figure of 500 killed, wounded, and prisoners.
Three times Potyomkin, instead of falling upon the
Turks and entering the fortress on their heels, had sent
orders to Suvorof to discontinue the fight, and a fourth
messenger found the surgeons taking the bullet out of
Suvorof's neck. In response to the peremptory order,
the latter, doubtless smarting more from disappointment
than from the wound, insolently replied in doggerel :
"I'll not get this rock off,
I'll look at Otchakof."
A few days later he retired to Kinburn, and the
breach between him and Potyomkin was never quite
healed. His letters to the Grandee were still of the
same flattering kind. But his contempt for the
Favourite Faineant never waned, and the latter never
forgot how his fantastic client had insulted him.
Nevertheless, at the end of the year Potyomkin recom-
mended Suvorof for his services during the whole
1 This incident was related by an eye-witness to Glinka. See
Russkoe Tchtyeniye (1842), ii. 197.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 93
campaign, and the Empress sent him a diamond aigret
bearing her initial. The next year brought him greater
glory and a complete loss, if not of Imperial, at least
of Vice-Imperial favour.
In the interval he narrowly escaped death by accident.
When barely convalescent he was roused in his room
at Kinburn by the explosion of a magazine, and for
several minutes the air was filled with bursting shells.
He leapt from his bed a few seconds before it was broken
to pieces, and splinters wounded him in the face, chest,
and knee. Eighty officers and men were killed and
wounded, and Suvorof's own condition was for a time
very grave. Nevertheless, his constitution and his
temperate living triumphed, and by the beginning of
the next year he was completely recovered. In the
campaign of 1789 he was fortunate enough to be inde-
pendent of the luxurious indolence of the Commander-
in-Chief. In January Potyomkin travelled to Petersburg,
and a triumphal reception eclipsed for a time the rising
splendours of Platon Zubof, the new favourite of the
Empress. In the beginning of March he returned to
his army of Ekaterinoslav, where he lapsed once more
into inactivity. The army of the Ukraine behaved
with more vigour, and General Derfelden in the beginning
of April twice inflicted heavy defeats on the enemy in
the neighbourhood of Buirlad. Here, at the end of
April, Suvorof took over the command. To gratify
the jealousy of Potyomkin the two Russian armies
had just been united under him alone, and Rumyantsof,
deprived of his command of the army of the Ukraine,
spent the whole of 1789 in idleness at Jassy. This
army was now put under the direct command of Prince
Ryepnin, to whom Suvorof was responsible for the
detachment at Buirlad.
The Moldavian theatre of war presented few striking
features. Bounded on the west by the Carpathians
and on the east by the Steppes of Bessarabia, it consists
of long valleys running north and south between low
94 SUVOROF
chains of hills. The three main valleys are those of the
Seret, the Buirlad, and the Prut, and down these run
the main roads. Suvorof*s station at Buirlad lay in
the midst of these three channels of communication,
at a point where gaps in the hills to east and west lead
to Falchi on the Prut and Adzhud on the Seret. It was
thus possible for him to move without difficulty into
either of the other two valleys, or advance along that of
the Buirlad, as occasion required. The extreme left of
the Austrians extended to the Seret, so that contact
could easily be made with them.
The military situation at the beginning of 1789 was
not favourable to the Allies. Potyomkin's procrastina-
tion in the previous years had produced no worse
consequences than the deaths of some thousands of men
and animals from exposure. The Austrians, equally
dilatory and more pedantic, had strung their troops
out in a long line along the frontier of the Banat and
Transylvania, and on the 18th August the Grand Vizier,
Yussuf Pasha, inflicted a crushing defeat upon one
section of it near Staraya Orshova. The advance of
an Austrian force, in co-operation with Rumyantsof,
in northern Moldavia, had compelled the Turks to
withdraw. But the enemy had no reason to look
forward with any apprehension to the opening of the
campaign of 1789. As soon as the subsidence of the
Spring floods made military operations possible, the
Grand Vizier prepared for new triumphs. Unfortunately
for his fame, he chose on this occasion to come within
reach of Suvorof .
The Turkish plan was simplicity itself. The Prince
of Coburg lay at Adzhud, 35 miles north-west of
Fokshani on the Seret, with 18,000 Austrians. Suvorof
was at Buirlad, 40 miles from Coburg, with Derfelden's
Russian Division, 13,000 strong, consisting of 15
battalions of infantry, 18 regiments of cavalry,
and 30 field-guns, besides the regimental artillery.
The remainder of the Russians were in the neighbour-
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 95
hood of Olviopol, unable to move owing to want of
supplies, or just beginning a leisurely march in the
direction of Bendyeri. Osman Pasha, in command of
the Turks at Fokshani, decided to fall upon Coburg
and annihilate him, and then deal with the Russians.
Coburg applied for help to Ryepnin, who ordered Suvorof
to go to his assistance. Leaving about 3000 men to
hold Buirlad, Suvorof set out with the remaining 10,000
at 6 o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th July. He
sent ahead a messenger, with a letter of two words :
" Coming. Suvorof." At 10 o'clock in the evening
of the next day he marched his men up on the Austrian
left. The journey of 40 miles, over some of the worst
roads in the world, had been completed in 28
hours.i The 29th was spent in throwing three pontoon
bridges across the Trotusha. Coburg sat in anxious
council with his officers, but asked in vain for
Suvorof s advice. His first appeal brought an incom-
prehensible answer. His second messenger could only
say that the general was at his prayers. The third
had to inform Coburg that Suvorof was asleep. Suvorof
was determined at all costs to avoid a general conference.
" Otherwise we should have wasted all the time in
discussions, diplomatical, tactical, enigmatical ; they
would have smothered me, and the enemy would have
settled our arguments! by smashing up our tactics." ^
The Prince, whatever his faults, was at least a model
of courteous patience. He waited until 11 o'clock,
when he received this letter from Suvorof :
The troops advance at 2 in the morning in three
columns, centre consisting of Russians. The enemy
to be attacked with all forces, not troubling about
petty attempts to right or left, so as to get by dawn to
the river Putna, which we are to cross, continuing the
1 I was at Buirlad in April 1917. The country between that place
and Jassy was still flooded, the water in some places being more than a
mile across. South of Buirlad, however, the inundation was very much
less, though the mud was still indescribably Balkan.
' Quoted in Fuchs, Campaign of 1799,
96 SUVOROF
attack. They say that the Turks before us are 50,000
and beyond them 50,000 more ; pity that they are not
all together, it would have been better to finish with
them all at once.^
Coburg, as modest as he was urbane, received these
orders with judicious meekness, and the disunion which
would have been provoked by such treatment of almost
everybody else, was in this case avoided.
The actual start was made at 3 in the morning,
and there were only two columns instead of three.
The Austrians formed the right, the Russians the left,
but, to deceive the enemy, some Austrian horse rode
ahead of Derfelden's men. Marinesht was reached on
the 31st, and on the evening of the same day there was
some brisk cavalry fighting between that place and
the river Putna. The rivers Putna and Seret, which
at the level of Marinesht on the right bank of the latter
are five and a half miles apart, converge very rapidly
7 miles lower down, and the Putna cuts almost
at right angles across the road from Marinesht to
Fokshani. For another seven miles the rivers run
almost parallel, a mile apart, separated by a chain of
low hills. Fokshani itself is situated on the little river
Milka, which runs into the Putna at that point. The
first cavalry encounters took place between the two
rivers north of the point of convergence, the Turks
being separated from their main body by the Putna.
After some vigorous charges the Russian horse were
pushed back by superior numbers, but eventually the
enemy were driven over the river in such confusion
that the tent of Osman Pasha himself was actually
captured and burnt to the ground. Darkness and
heavy rain put an end to this day's fighting.
The work of throwing a pontoon bridge over the
Putna was begun at once, in spite of the continuous rain
and the swelling of the river itself. A night attack
^ Laverne, 161 n. The author's authority was a French Engineer
officer, who was told the story by an Austrian officer named Jordis,
I
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR
97
by the Turks drove the advanced troops back across
the river and was repelled with some difficulty by an
Austrian battalion on the left bank. Nevertheless,
the bridge was finished by 11 o'clock and Suvorof
crossed at once. At 4 o'clock in the morning the
Austrians followed, and by 7 o'clock both forces,
beating away the Turkish horse who had attempted
to oppose the crossing, advanced towards Fokshani.
At a distance of 3 miles from the river, it being
then 9 o'clock, they encountered the enemy in force.
uiuiiiliu
Battle of FOKSHANI
SCALE- ENGUSH MILES
■> I 2 3^5
Turkish Troops
shown l^hus •*>
The Turks attacked in front and from both flanks at
once. The Allies were never in danger, and their
continuous artillery and musketry fire dispersed every
charge. Crossing a deep gully, crowned on the far
side by a wood, they moved forward unbroken, the
enemy making no attempt to use these formidable
natural defences. Swerving to the left from the road,
Suvorof led his detachment through a tract of marshy
ground covered with reeds, which concealed his move-
ments from the enemy. Emerging from this, outside
their right flank, he was attacked by their cavalry,
and his Cossacks fell back upon the infantry. But as
H
98 SUVOROF
before, the latter had no difficulty in coping with the
Turks, drove them back in their turn, and opened fire
at point-blank range upon the entrenched line in front
of Fokshani. To their right the Austrians adopted the
same tactics. The Turkish artillery was silenced, and
on all sides the merciless fire poured upon the masses
of undisciplined infantry in the trenches. The Spahis
galloped headlong from the field, and pursued by the
allied cavalry, the footmen ran in all directions. By
4 o'clock in the afternoon the position was taken.
Some of the fugitives took refuge in the monastery of
St. Spiridon, a short distance to the rear. Here they
were attacked by the Austrians and Russians simul-
taneously, the gates were beaten in by artillery, and
every Turk was killed, a few desperate spirits blowing
up the powder magazine in a cellar of the monastery
rather than surrender.
The victory was lightly won. The Russian casualties
were 150, the Austrian, 200. The Turkish dead alone
were reckoned at 1500, and the victors retained 12
guns and 16 standards as trophies. The ease with
which the small civilised army had defeated the host
of barbarians of four times its own strength, shows
with how little effort Europe might have expelled the
Turks, if only it could have resolved to unite against
them. Nevertheless, the completeness of their defeat
at Fokshani was soon to be eclipsed by their stupefying
overthrow on the Ruimnik and the storm of the great
fortress of Izmail.^
For Suvorof the battle at Fokshani brought not only
fame, but the friendship of his Austrian colleague.
Coburg, the pattern of a courtly gentleman, willingly
acknowledged the superiority of his fantastic associate,
and without any sign of jealousy or rivalry praised him
1 Campagnes, ii. 35 et seq. ; Pyetrof, ii. 82 et seq. Shortly before
the battle Suvorof had injured one of his feet, and he limped badly.
The Turks in consequence nicknamed him " Topal Pasha," or " Captain
Stump " (Campagnes, ii. 51).
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 99
and thanked him. The friendship between these two
remained unbroken, and Suvorof s constant affection
for the bland and unassuming aristocrat is one of the
most pleasing expressions of his versatility.
On the 5th August Suvorof returned to Buirlad,
The victory at Fokshani, tactically complete, had no
strategic consequences. Neither he nor Coburg had
sufficient troops for an advance into Turkish territory,
and Potyomkin, with the main Russian army, was still
beyond the Dnyestr. The initiative was still with
the Turks, and the Grand Vizier began at once to
meditate revenge. Making a feint from Izmail into
Bessarabia, he gathered a large army for a second
attack on Suvorof and Coburg in Moldavia. The
diversion in Bessarabia was well countered by Prince
Ryepnin, who pushed right up to the walls of Izmail
itself. But the principal movement was made in such
force that Coburg' s advanced army was at one time
in great difficulties. About 90,000 Turks threatened
him at Fokshani, and, as before, he sent for help to
Suvorof at Buirlad. The latter had received some
reinforcements from Ryepnin, and on the night of the
18th September he left Buirlad with about 7800 men.
Coburg, with about 17,000 Austrians, came into contact
with the enemy on the 19th, and some hard fighting
took place between Fokshani and the river Ruimna.
By 10 o'clock in the morning of the 21st Suvorof s
little army, much fatigued by its march over the muddy
roads, united with the Austrians between the rivers
Milka and Ruimna. Beyond the latter lay the enemy,
and Suvorof climbed a tree to reconnoitre their position.
The ground presented some formidable obstacles to
an advance on the part of the Allies. The banks of
the Ruimna rose steeply, and beyond the rise there
was a fall into a swampy bottom traversed from right
to left by another stream. Beyond this was a steeper
and loftier ascent to the hill crowned by the wood of
Kruingu Meilor. This hill was almost surrounded by
100 SUVOROF
marshland, which swept round into the bed of the
Ruimnik. The only easy approach to it was by a
narrow neck, which led directly to the summit from
the bank of the Ruimna, without falling to the level of
the intervening marsh. But this neck also was in
part covered by the wood of Kayat, and the whole
ground was cut up by a number of the ravines and
gullies which everywhere intersect the soft clayey soil
of this region. The main Turkish force, with 28 guns,
was entrenched on the height of Kruingu Meilor, its
flanks extending over a front of a mile to the steep
banks of the swampy streams to north and south. On
the right it was additionally protected by dense masses
of thorn bushes and high grass, but the left was open.
Here, however, was situated the little village of Boksa,
which was occupied by the Turks as part of their defence
works. In front of the village one battery swept the
approach from Kayat, and another fired across the
front of the line of trenches, so as to take an attacking
force in flank. In case of defeat the wood in his rear,
extending almost to the extremity of his left, threatened
the Grand Vizier with the loss of everything which
could not get away on its own feet. But defeat was
not within his contemplation. With more energy he
might have destroyed Coburg before Suvorof came on
the scene. But where victory was certain, a day was
of no importance. The same fatal confidence inspired
him still, and though he had thrown up earthworks to
defend the bridge across the Ruimnik at Martinesht
directly to his rear, he was so careless that his trenches
in front of Kruingu Meilor itself were not completed
when they were actually attacked at the end of the battle.
He had sent forward a strong detachment to occupy
the village of Turgo-Kukuli, at the point where the
approach to his main position sprang from the bed of
the Ruimna, a mile and three-quarters from Boksa,
and he awaited with equanimity the approach of his
enemy.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 101
Suvorof s mind was soon made up. The Allies were
to cross the Ruimna at Zoresht and Bogatch, 2 miles
below Turgo-Kukuli. The Russians v:oUld^ then move
upon Turgo-Kukuli, drive out the , troops occupying
it, and follow them along the high gjt>u ad ' >;© B(5ksa'
As soon as Boksa was taken the Austrians were to
attack the Turkish right, while the Russians pressed
on against their left. The enemy would thus be driven
into the wood and through it into the Ruimnik. The
Kruingu -^ "^ -u^ -' -
^t^ Kayat <*"Rnu<;A ^ _ -
Battle of RUIMNIK \ ^'^
SCALB- ENGLISH MILLS l
plan involved a march across the front of the enemy's
position from the point of crossing the Ruimna to Turgo-
Kukuli, and in the face of any other adversary than the
Turk, it would have involved a very rash exposure of
the Russian troops. But a Turkish army made risks
justifiable which could never be undertaken in opera-
tions against any other, and the event attested the
wisdom of Suvorof s judgement. At 7 o'clock on
the evening of the 21st the Allies moved towards the
Ruimna and began to throw pontoon bridges across it.
The Turkish advanced post held stolidly to its position,
the bridges were completed, and by dawn all the troops
102 SUVOROF
were drawn up in order of battle on the right bank of
the river. Suvorof had about 7000 men, Saxe-Coburg
18,000. Itn both armies the infantry were drawn up
in" two lin^s of 'squares, with the cavalry in the rear,
the- Ati^trians' f or th^ first time adopting this formation
for their infantry.* The Russian squares were six in
number, three in each line, and the Austrians ten,
six in the first line and four in the second. In both
armies the squares of the second line covered the gaps
between those of the first. The Austrians faced south-
east, the Russians south-west, and it was the weakness
of the plan of battle that as it was developed, and the
Russians moved upon Turgo-Kukuli while the Austrian
line was directly towards the wood of Kruingu Meilor
and Martinesht, the gap between the two forces must
become very much wider. In effect, the Austrians
were to march across the base of an equilateral
triangle, 2 miles long, while the Russians went round
the other two sides. Suvorof accordingly requested
his colleague to detach two squares of infantry and
four sections of Hussars, under Major-General Karaczay,
to occupy this space, and cover his own left flank
during the attack on the Turkish advanced post.
This post, about 15,000 strong, held the ridge from
Turgo-Kukuli itself to the wood of Kayat. Its right
flank was covered by a powerful battery, which swept
the whole of the slope to the Ruimna. The front was
further protected by a deep gully, which was not at
first visible to the Russians, owing to the dense crop
of unreaped maize which covered the intervening ground.
Coming up in some disorder to this gully, the Russians
were attacked from the right by 7000 Turkish horse,
carrying infantry behind them on their saddles. The
right and centre squares of the first line received the
enemy with great steadiness, and beat off two attacks
with musketry and artillery fire. The whole force then
pushed steadily down into the gully, and began the
ascent of the opposite slope.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 103
In the meantime the Austrian main body had come
into contact with the Turks to the north-east. The
Grand Vizier, seeing, as he could not fail to see, the
wide and widening gap between the two allied armies,
flung a great mass of cavalry into it. This force
immediately split up into two. One, of 16,000 men,
fell upon Suvorof's left, at the moment when his first
line of squares had crossed the gully and the second
had not yet descended into it. The other, of 10,000,
was directed upon Coburg's right. Simultaneously
18,000 horse left the Turkish right, plunged through the
swamp, and furiously attacked the Austrian left. Each
of the Allies was thus subjected to an attack on both
flanks at once. The attack on the Austrian left was
entangled in a wood, and soon broke up in face of fire
from artillery and infantry. That on the Austrian
right was more formidable. Coburg remained firm,
ordered the flanking square of his second line to face to
the right, and sent two squadrons of Hussars to make
connection between it and Karaczay's detachment.
The square blew away the attack^ and Karaczay fell
upon the left of the discomfited enemy. Nevertheless,
the latter displayed unusual powers of resistance, and
Karaczay had to halt and re-form no less than seven
times. It was not until the flanking square in the
Austrian first line also attacked the enemy's right,
that the mellay at last came to an end, and the Turks
drew off.
The attack on Suvorof's left was no more successful.
The flanking square in his second line was actually
broken at more than oile spot, but the next square
came to its assistance, and the enemy were driven back.
Suvorof then ordered these two squares to move slowly
after the enemy, supported by the remaining square
of the second line and a detachment of Austrian Hussars,
while he proceeded with his attack upon the position
in front of him. With some difficulty the squares of
the second line performed their task. The Turks who
104i SUVOROF
had been driven off from the Austrian right joined with
those retreating before the Russian left, and a very
savage attack by both together upon the pursuing
Russians was not beaten back until Karaczay had once
again thrown himself into the fray. From this time
the weak spot in the allied line was left untouched
by the enemy, and in fact, Suvorof's detached second-
line squares and the two squares from Coburg's right,
together with Karaczay' s force, almost filled the interval.
The allied line, therefore, remained almost unbroken,
though its right, under Suvorof , was still moving towards
Turgo-Kukuli at right angles to the main line of advance.
This preliminary operation was soon concluded. The
Turks in front of Suvorof, both attacks on his flank
having failed, began to draw off in their customary
disorder towards the wood of Kayat, leaving all their
guns and baggage behind them. Suvorof launched his
cavalry in pursuit, and they were chased through the
village into the wood, while the infantry occupied their
abandoned entrenched camp.
It was now about midday. All the enemy's cavalry
attacks had failed, his advanced force in Turgo-Kukuli
had been beaten and scattered, and the allied troops
were ready for the assault of his main position. Coburg
halted his men on the near side of the swampy stream
that lay between him and the Turkish trenches, while
Suvorof, sending the centre square of his first line into
the wood of Kayat, swept round the trees with his main
body and drew them up on the far side, facing the enemy.
Here he gave them half an hour's rest, and at 1 o'clock
marched against the village of Boksa. The interval
between the Russian and Austrian troops, as has been
already stated, was no longer of great extent. Never-
theless, the same marshy bottom which lay between
the Austrians and the Turks also cut between the two
sections of the allied army, and along this the Grand
Vizier once more despatched a large force of cavalry.
As before, this was dispersed by Karaczay and the squares
^
#
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 105
from Suvorof's second line. In the meantime the
squares of the Russian first line marched straight upon
Boksa. Arrived within musket shot of the Turkish
batteries, which fired for the most part over their heads,
the squares halted and returned the artillery fire. The
Turkish guns were soon silenced, and the village was
cleared with the bayonet. Some of the fugitives ran
direct to Martinesht, but the majority fell back on the
main position behind them.
The flanking batteries having been taken, the
combined attack upon this position was made without
delay. Suvorof brought his second-line squares up on
the left of those of the first line and, seeing the enemy
still at work with pick and shovel, requested Coburg,
who was now crossing the marsh, to take the shallow
trenches opposite him with cavalry. At the same
moment his own horse passed through the intervals
between the squares and charged the Turkish left.
This unusual method of attack succeeded on the Ruimnik
as at Landskron. The scattered Turkish fire did little
execution, the horsemen leapt the half-dug trenches,
and the artillerymen, standing by their guns as if they
had been chained to them, were cut down to a man.
The cavalry then dispersed the Turkish horse and fell
upon the infantry. Crowded between the wood and
the triumphant Allies, the Grand Vizier's 40,000 infantry
were unable to disengage themselves or manoeuvre,
and his superiority in numbers gave him no superiority
in strength. In a quarter of an hour after the first
cavalry attack, the Russian and Austrian foot were
everywhere across the trenches, and plied their bayonets
vigorously upon the struggling mass of Janissaries.
It was impossible for such a small attacking force to
cumber itself with prisoners, and no quarter was given.
By 4 o'clock in the afternoon the surging mob was
being driven pell-mell into the trees of Kruingu Meilor.
The right and left wing squares of the victors passed
round the skirts of the wood, and fired heavily into the
h
106 SUVOROF
flanks of the routed enemy. The Turkish horse fled
headlong through Martinesht and got across the Ruimnik,
for the most part by swimming. The infantry fared
worse. Some chmbed trees and concealed themselves
in the branches. Others hid among the undergrowth
or in holes or gullies. The great mass, ridden down
by the remorseless cavalry of the pursuers, scrambled
off towards Martinesht, or huddled together in irregular
groups and offered a desperate resistance for want
of any means of escape. The Grand Vizier himself
was dying of malaria, and had hitherto been sitting in
a carriage. At this point he dragged himself on to a
horse, and holding up a copy of the Koran, begged his
troops to stand their ground. But neither these appeals
to their religious zeal nor the two guns which he at last
turned upon them were of avail. They continued to
give back, and he was more than once seen to ride
round a group of fugitives, imploring and threatening,
until they thrust forcibly by him and ran for the bridge
at Martinesht.^ The breaking up of the huge mob
could not be finished in a moment, and almost inert
though it was, the utmost efforts of the attackers pushed
it but slowly off the ground. The accidental or inten-
tional explosion of a large quantity of their own
ammunition completed the demoralisation of the Turks,
and their retreat became as nearly a rout as was possible
over ground so cumbered with trees, waggons, and
corpses. The distance from the edge of the wood to
Martinesht was 4 miles, and upon this space it was
estimated that no less than 8000 of the enemy lay dead.
The flood of panic-stricken fugitives poured on to the
bridge, which was already blocked with waggons,
horses, oxen, and camels. Escape by this road being
hopeless, the multitude flung themselves into the river
and hundreds were drowned. The Austrians halted
a mile and a half from the town, but Suvorof marched
his men right up to the river, and upon the masses
^ Campagnes, ii. 85.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 107
on the bridge, on the banks, and in the water itself
his infantry poured an unceasing fire. Darkness and
fatigue at last put an end to the slaughter, and the
remnants of the shattered host were allowed to escape.
The Russians passed the night on the bank of the
river. Some light cavalry were sent southwards to
clear out the Turks from the neighbouring village of
Odaya, and at daybreak Coburg despatched some
hussars and a battalion of infantry to beat up the Turks
in the wood of Kruingu Meilor. These operations
completed one of the most overwhelming victories that
Europeans have ever gained over the Turks : a victory
which proved, no less incontestably than Kagul, that
nothing was required to rid Europe of the Asiatic pest
except organisation and energy in following up successes
in the field. The Turkish dead alone were reckoned
at 15,000, and the small number of 400 prisoners
indicated the desperate nature of the fighting. An
enormous booty, 100 flags, 6 mortars, 7 heavy and
67 field-guns, horses, oxen, camels, and waggons, the
tents and equipment of three entrenched camps, and
the great gold and silver cloth pavilion of the Vizier
himself fell into the hands of the conquerors.^ The
light horse, following the enemy on the 23rd, 12 miles
down the road to the Buzeo, found nothing but dead and
wounded men and animals. The great host of 90,000
men was completely dispersed, and only a miserable
remnant crossed the Danube.^
The behaviour of the Austrian leader after the
victory was as generous as before it had been modest.
He had adopted Suvorof's plan, and had abandoned
the traditional formation of Austrian infantry in favour
of the Russian square, and he was not afraid to give
Suvorof the credit. " The approval of my arrange-
^ According to one authority the principal camp was so filthy that
one could hardly breathe there {Campagnes, ii. 86).
2 Campagnes, ii. 62 et seq. ; Pyetrof, ii. 58 et seq. ; Geschichte des
Oesterreich-Russischen und Tiirkischen Krieges, 1792, 152 et seq.
108 SUVOROF
ments," he wrote, " which you, my unequalled teacher,
have expressed, is very gratifying to me, and has
increased my confidence in myself.'* Suvorof himself
was in the highest of high spirits, and enjoyed to the
full the honours which were showered upon him. The
Emperor made Coburg a Field Marshal and Suvorof
a Count of the Empire. Catherine presented each
commander with a jewelled sword, and Suvorof received
in addition the title of Count of the Ruimnik, and the
Order of St. Andrew of the First Class with a device
studded with diamonds.
The letter which he wrote to Catherine on the 9th
November 1789 is in his most overflowing style :
Most Gracious Sovereign — I am delighted by the
attention paid to my old services toward your Highness
in your Imperial Highness's most gracious order to me
of the 18th October. The unlimited, unexpected, and
undeserved kindnesses of your Majesty, Great Empress.
I am now like a newly enrolled recruit, ready to give
up my life for you. When by divine decree it comes
to me to take leave of life and my Motherland, I shall
have nothing but God and great Catherine ! And bid
farewell, your Highness, to the means of my approach
to the lowest step of your Highness's throne — my great
spirited commander, that great man, Prince Gregory
Alexandrovitch [Potyomkin]. May the lustre of this
most famous age of your monarchy extend to the last
of time I May your might establish blessings in Europe
and the whole world ! In conclusion I venture to fall
at the sacred feet of your Imperial Highness and will
be with the most spotless zeal and ardour, most
Gracious Sovereign, your Imperial Highness's most
obedient and most humble
Count A. Suvorof Ruimnikski.
To his daughter he wrote with equal excitement :
COMTESSE DE DEUX EMPIRES, DaRLING NaTASHA
SuvoROViE — A cela, ah ha, you must never be anything
but honest, virtuous, and benevolent. Tell Sophia
Ivanovna and the sisters that I've a fever in my inside,
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 109
and who can prevent it ? Have you heard yet, little
sister, my soul, of the rescript de ma magnanime m^re on
a half sheet, as if I were Alexander of Macedon, emblems
of the St. Andrew, fifty thousand, aye, and above all,
darling, the first Class of the St. George. There's your
daddy ! It's true I just didn't die of joy. God's
blessing on you ! ^
To Major-General de Ribas he wrote, in French, of
his delight in Coburg's friendship :
I shall never forget this fine honesty, so rare, perhaps
unexampled, of which I am unchangingly sensible,
without the least shade of distrust. Our little army
lived on brotherly terms and showed its worthiness ;
duplicity, equivocation, enigmas were strictly forbidden
in its ranks. 2
When all the troops had retired into winter quarters
he continued to correspond with Coburg. On the
30th December the latter wrote to him from Bucharest :
The applause of the universe is not so sweet to me
as the pleasure of my honourable friend, to whom I owe
the greater part of the reputation that I have made.^
For the time being Suvorof had everything that he
could desire, victory, fame, honours, and distinctions,
and the unstinted admiration of a man who could not
compete with him in the favour of the Empress. After
a quiet winter he looked forward to fresh triumphs and
fresh rewards.
He was in the end not disappointed. But he had
to wait a long time. The campaign of 1790 began under
the threat of political complications, and ended as
inconclusively as that of 1789. After the Ruimnik,
Potyomkin, by bribery and a show of force, had obtained
the surrender of Bendyeri on the Dnyestr, and the
Austrians had entered Belgrad. The frontier line of
defences was thus effectively pierced, and the road was
^ Istoritcheskii Vyestnik (1900), Ixxx. 532.
2 Martchenko, 33. » Schmidt, i.
110 SUVOROF
open for a serious invasion of Turkey. Suvorof drew
up an elaborate plan, he himself to cross at Brailof,
and Coburg at Zhurzha and Rushtshuk. But the
energy of Potyomkin was more than ever paralysed by
Prussian intrigues in Poland, and a large part of his
army was despatched to watch that frontier. Austria,
also, was nervous about Prussia, and, after an unex-
pected and disastrous failure of Coburg before Zhurzha
in April, ceased to take an active part in the war. On
the 19th September Coburg signed an armistice, which
was ultimately merged in a definite treaty of peace.
Suvorof at the time of the armistice was already on
his way to join forces with Coburg, and had to retire
without delay, to avoid being cut off. The Polish
danger and this loss of Austrian help made a thorough
defeat of Turkey impossible, though the successful
conclusion of the Swedish war in August lessened the
strain on the Russian resources. Potyomkin therefore
opened negotiations with the Porte at Jassy. By this
time Suvorof had done little except occupy Galatz on
the Danube, and equip a small fleet of armed boats.
Two letters which he received from Coburg after the
conclusion of the Austrian armistice seem to deserve
quotation. They serve the purpose of a mirror, reflect-
ing his character as well as expressing that of his
correspondent. The first was written immediately
after the suspension of hostilities :
No ! my adored teacher ! My complete devotion
to you will never be diminished, however space and
time may divide us. I hope, dear Prince, that our
separation will not be perpetual, and that I shall yet
be so happy as to have once more the advantage of
your good counsel and example to bear terror and
despair among the infidels.^
The second was written on the 13th October :
I must leave you on Wednesday next to take up
my new command in Hungary. Nothing grieves me so
1 Pyetrof, ii. 131.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 111
much at my departure as the idea of going still further
away from you, my worthy and precious friend !
I have appreciated all your magnanimity. The
bonds of our friendship have been formed by events
of the greatest importance, and on every occasion I have
had to admire you as a hero and to cherish you as a
man of the greatest worth.
Judge yourself, my incomparable master, of the
sorrow that I experience in separating from a man
who has so much claim to my special esteem and attach-
ment. You alone can sweeten the bitterness of my lot
by keeping for me the affection with which you have
honoured me up to the present, and I protest with all
sincerity that the frequent assurance of your friendship
is absolutely necessary to my happiness.
I cannot bring myself to say goodbye in person ;
it would be too painful for me. Judge of my feelings
by your own. I must therefore confine myself to
assuring you of my most lively affection. I beg you
to continue to show the same to me ; until now it has
been the joy of my military career.
In return, my most worthy friend, you may count
on my regard without bounds. You will always be the
dearest friend that heaven has given me, and no one
will ever have as much claim to the high esteem with
which, etc.^
This is not the language of flattery, but of friendship,
and Coburg's letters suggest a quality in Suvorof which
is not often to be discovered in his own.
But even letters of this kind could hardly relieve the
blackness of Suvorof s outlook. A whole year had been
wasted, and it was already almost time to go again
into winter quarters. At last Potyomkin, realising that
negotiations with Turkey are useless unless words are
supported by threats, was roused to the conception of
a campaign on the lower Danube. The Turkish fleet
on the Black Sea was crippled by Vice-Admiral Ushakof ,
and with the aid of a river flotilla under Major-General
de Ribas, the fortresses of Tultchi and Isaktchi were
taken in September. Here the tide stopped, and two
1 Campagnes, ii. 106.
112 SUVOROF
armies, under Lieutenant-Generals Samoilof and Pavel
Potyomkin, remained passive under the walls of Izmail,
until such time as the jealousy of the two Commanders
should subside. A vigorous artillery attack was carried
on from the boats on the river and some batteries erected
on the opposite bank, but it was impossible by this,
without the co-operation of the land forces, to do more
than shake the defences of the formidable fortress.
The besiegers grew dispirited, and the defenders cor-
respondingly elated. The Russian transport was, as
usual, bad, and food supplies ran short. Even officers
had sometimes to dine off tea and a little bread, or go
without any dinner at all, and the fodder for the horses
was very inferior. To a demand for a surrender the
Pasha of Izmail replied that he saw nothing to be afraid
of.^ He was quite right. Without a change in the
methods of attack, the place would hold out as long as
Otchakof, and the besiegers would die in their camps of
cold, hunger, and scurvy long before the garrison began
to suffer any privations. At last, resolving upon a bold
stroke, the elder Potyomkin broke off negotiations with
the enemy, and at the beginning of December sent
Suvorof to take supreme command of all the Russian
troops before Izmail, and capture the place at all costs.
On the 16th he wrote :
My hope is in God and your bravery. According
to my orders to you, your presence on the spot will
unite all parties. There are many generals there of
equal rank, everywhere the cause of a sort of nest of
indecision. Survey and arrange everything. Pray God
and set to work. There are weak spots, if only you go
together.^
Suvorof had offended Potyomkin at Otchakof. But
he remained the indispensable tool of his ambition.
Samoilof and the other Potyomkin had just determined
to abandon the enterprise. On the 13th Suvorof arrived
1 Letters of Count Tchernishef ; Russ. Arkh. (1871), 385 et seq.
2 Rtiss, Star. (1876), 640.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 113
at the place, turning back some detachments which
were already on their way, " in devilish wind and snow," ^
into winter quarters. He at once, after reconnoitring
the ground, resolved upon a storm. In August 1789
Prince Ryepnin had reached Izmail and severely battered
the walls with his field artillery. But he also had shrunk
from ordering a storm, and the second withdrawal of
a Russian army had increased the confidence of the
J JkE STORM OF IZMAIL.
Russian
Batten
I
garrison. It made no difference to that of Suvorof. It
was too late to begin a siege, and a storm was inevit-
able.
The fortress of Izmail was a bastion of the Dobrudzha,
projecting into Bessarabia on some hard ground among
the swamps and lakes of the northern bank of the
lower Danube. It formed an irregular quadrilateral, of
which the southern side, a mile and a quarter long, was
formed by the river bank. The western face ran at
right angles from the river for a distance of about
1 Russ. Arkh. (1871), 398.
I
lU SUVOROF
1600 yards. The eastern face was about 1100 yards
long. Except along the river front, the whole was
surrounded by a strong wall of earth, varying in height
from 20 to 30 feet, and a ditch 40 feet wide and, in some
parts, 28 feet deep. At the river end of the western
wall stood a great two-storied redoubt of stone, and at
intervals along the wall were projecting bastions. The
river- side had no wall, but it was defended by ten
batteries, mounting 85 guns and 15 mortars, and a
large fleet of armed boats of various sizes. The whole
perimeter of the place was about four miles and around
it were disposed 200 guns. On the western side there
were two gates, and on the northern and eastern one
each. The garrison of 35,000 men, amply supplied with
ammunition and foodstuffs, could reasonably expect to
hold it against any but a greatly superior force, equipped
with a complete siege train.
Against this formidable place Suvorof brought some
30,000 men, nearly half of them Cossacks armed with
long lances, and no siege artillery at all. The only
possible method of taking it was a storm, and the
prospects of a successful attempt at storming a fortress,
surrounded by lofty walls and defended by forces superior
in numbers to those of the attack, were very poor.
But this was not the first occasion on which Suvorof
had violated rules in dealing with the Turks, and he
delayed not an hour in beginning his preparations.
Nevertheless, he warned Potyomkin that failure was
possible. On the 14th he wrote that the field artillery
had very little ammunition. " I cannot promise, God
is wroth, and mercy depends on His Providence. The
generals and troops burn with zeal for the service." ^
To the enemy he showed a confident front. At 2
o'clock on the 18th he sent in to the Turkish Com-
mander Potyomkin' s letter, which had arrived before
him, demanding the surrender of the town, and he
added a brief note of his own.
1 Quoted in Orlof, Shturm Izmaila, 42.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 115
To the Seraskir, chiefs, and all people — I have come
here with troops. Twenty-four hours for deliberation
— ^free choice ; my first volley — free choice no more ;
storm is death. This I leave to your consideration.
Then he set his men to work cutting timber for ladders
and fascines, and throwing up two batteries, 400 yards
from the river end of each of the eastern and western
walls. These batteries were armed with 40 12-pounder
guns, the largest available. The Seraskir delayed his
reply till the evening of the 19th, but the officer who
received Suvorof's letter told the Russian who brought
it that the Danube would stand still in its course and
heaven fall to earth before Izmail would be surrendered.^
The formal answer was less defiant. Calling with
Prussian fervour upon the name of God, the Turk
protested that he and his men would die rather than
surrender. Nevertheless, if Suvorof would wait ten
days, he was ready to communicate with the Grand
Vizier on the subject. Suvorof thereupon, by way of
complying with the regulations, called a council of war.
The youngest officer present, the Cossack brigadier
Platof, cried out " Storm ! " and there was no dissent.
The 22nd was fixed for the attempt, and with his usual
bold confidence in his troops, Suvorof directed that
they should be informed of the strength of the place,
the numbers of the garrison, its guns, and all the
difficulties that lay before them.
An eye-witness thus described him as he rode among
his men :
He was not tall, he had a big mouth, his face was not
altogether pleasant ; but his glance was fiery, quick
and unusually penetrating ; his whole forehead was
covered with wrinkles, and no wrinkles could be so
eloquent ; on his head, grey with age and the work^of
war, only a few hairs were left.
Jack boots, badly polished, badly sewn, broad top
flaps above the knee, trousers, underclothing of white
1 Orlof.
116 SUVOROF
dimity, shirt of the same material, with yellow nankeen
or linen facings, lapels and collar ; white waistcoat,
little hat with yellow brim, such was the uniform of the
hero of the Ruimnik at all seasons of the year ; attire
the more strange that sometimes, on account of two
old wounds in the knee and the leg, which greatly
bothered him, he was compelled to wear a boot on one
leg and a slipper on the other. If the cold was extra-
ordinary he put on a cloth shirt of the same material
and colour. As a rule he wore only his order of St.
Andrew, but on important occasions he put them all on.^
"There,'* he declared, "is the fortress. Its walls
are high, its ditches deep, but we must take it. Our
Empress Mother has ordered it and we must obey her."
" With you we'll take it," they replied.* Officers and
men, in spite of the long delay, the bad weather, and the
deficiency of supplies, were worked up to the highest
point of resolution by the presence of Suvorof. Many
volunteers and foreigners were on the spot, and asked
for posts in the storming parties. In the result there
was an unusual proportion of officers engaged in the
attack. Colonels commanded battalions instead of
regiments, some had under them only a few score
sharpshooters, and others marched with the columns
without any command at all. All were eager to share
in the inevitable success of the enterprise.^
At dawn on the 21st the batteries and the armed
boats in the river opened fire, and the 40 heavy guns
on the land and the 567 light guns on the water poured
a hail of shot of all sizes upon the walls and batteries.
The Turks at first replied vigorously, and a Russian
1 Russ. Invalid. (1827).
« Schmidt.
' Russ. Arkh. (1876). The best-known names among those of the
foreign vohmteers are De Ribas, Richelieu, and Langeron of the French,
and the Prince de Ligne of the Austrians. A Russian volunteer thus
refers to the French : " They are all, like true Frenchmen, delightful
but frivolous people, gay dogs, and feather-pated" (Russ. Arkh. (1871),
394). A variation of the English convention : " a gay and polite
people, fond of dancing and light wines."
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 117
brigantine was blown up and lost with her crew of 200
men. But the Russian artillery as usual was superior
to the Turkish, and the latter was eventually silenced.
The Russian fire continued until past midnight on the
morning of the 22nd. At 3 o'clock the guns ceased,
and a rocket gave the signal for the assembly of the
storming columns. At half -past 5, shrouded in mist,
they moved in silence towards the walls.
Six points had been selected for the land attacks,
and three for boat landings. Two columns attacked
the western face, three the northern, and one the eastern,
and only the western and eastern faces had been previ-
ously battered by artillery. Two of the northern
columns, the fourth and the fifth, were faced with tasks
of frightful difficulty. They were composed of dis-
mounted Cossacks armed with long pikes, the most
unsuitable of all weapons for close fighting against
swordsmen like the Turks ; and there was no opening
of any sort in the wall before them except the Bendyeri
gate. The fifth column, also, had to descend into the
miry gully which divided the fortress into two parts,
called the Old Fortress and the New, and climb the
unbreached wall which ran across it. The third column
found its forty-feet ladders too short, and had to tie
two together before any man could reach the top of the
wall. Under these circumstances it is not surprising
that the first successes occurred on the eastern and
western sides.
The enemy had been warned by deserters, and some
of the columns were seen as they approached the ditch.
But one moved quietly through the mist, guided by the
faint glimmer of the stonework of a bastion, passed a
watch-dog chained on the near side of the ditch, and
got on to the wall before the drowsy and confident
defenders opened fire. The first and second columns
were seen as they approached from the west, and were
received with a torrent of musketry and artillery fire.
The marksmen attached to each column scattered along
118 SUVOROF
the edge of the ditch and opened fire upon the Turks
on the wall, while the main bodies pushed boldly forward.
The great redoubt near the river's edge was an insur-
mountable obstacle, and the first column, under Major-
General Lvof, passing right under its walls, rushed at
the palisade which connected it with the first of the
shore batteries. The timber was climbed or beaten
down, and the nearest batteries were taken with the
bayonet. A violent sortie from the redoubt was driven
in, and Lvof, who had been the first man over the palisade,
led part of his colunm round the inside of the redoubt
towards the nearest, or Brosskii Gate. He and his
second in command were wounded, but the troops
pressed on, burst open the gate, and went on to the
second, or Khotin Gate. Here they joined forces with
the second column under Major-General Lassii. These
troops had scrambled over the wall of a lunette to the
north of the first gate, and were now driving the enemy
before them into the town. Through the opened gates
the reserves poured into the fortress, and on the western
side the most difficult part of the Russian task had been
performed.
The sixth column, under Major-General Kutuzof,^
was the next to get a footing within the walls. It
carried the bastion opposite the Russian battery, but
the defenders received reinforcements, and a stubborn
fight on the wall was only decided by the arrival of the
Russian reserves. The victors then pushed on towards
the north. In the meantime the flotilla under Major-
General de Ribas had discharged its landing parties
among the shore batteries, and a junction was soon
effected with Kutuzof . Three sides of the fortress were
now in Russian hands, though the Turks continued to
resist fiercely among the neighbouring buildings.
The columns which attacked from the north, without
artillery preparation, had, as was to be expected, met
* Later famous as the conqueror of Napoleon, and later still, more
famous yet as the autocthonous hero of Tolstoy's War and Peace.
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 119
with less success. The third, attacking the north-
eastern angle, spliced its ladders together under fire,
and not until all its reserves were brought up did it
succeed in getting a firm footing on the wall. There it
divided and advanced to right and left, pushing the
Turks before it. The fourth column attacked to the
east of the Bendyeri Gate, and was actually cut in half
by a furious sally. The pikes of the unfortunate
Cossacks were deadly when their bearers were on
horseback, but even when shortened to five feet, they
were almost useless encumbrances when the bearers
were dismounted, and they proved a feeble defence
against the scimitars of the raging Janissaries. For
some bloody minutes the latter stormed with impunity
among their adversaries. The column was saved by
the timely arrival of some squadrons of horse, and the
diversion provided by the success of the fifth column,
further to the east, enabled the Cossacks at last to mount
the obstacle in front of them and join hands with their
comrades. The fifth column itself had also suffered
greatly. The final rush was led by Trophim Kutkinskii,
a regimental priest, who was himself hit three times,
two of the bullets rebounding from his cross. After a
fierce struggle the fifth column joined with the fourth
and sixth, and the circle about the doomed Turks was
complete. It was now about 8 o'clock.
There followed a ferocious combat, into and through
the streets of the town. The Turks fought like trapped
animals, and the Russians spared none. Every house
and garden became a fortress in miniature, and the
large khans or inns, stone buildings surrounding court-
yards, were especially formidable. One after another
these were battered to pieces by artillery, or taken with
the bayonet, and every one of the defenders was killed.
The cordon drew closer. A few isolated buildings held
out, notably a great khan near the western redoubt,
where Aidos-Mekhmet himself with 2000 men and a
few guns continued to resist. But the process of hunting
120 SUVOROF
out and killing went on steadily, and only fatigue com-
pelled the Russians at last in some cases to give quarter.
The Turkish Commander finally offered to surrender,
and was permitted to evacuate his stronghold. Un-
happily, one of his Janissaries fired a pistol and killed
the Russian officer who was superintending the disarming
of the prisoners, and all of them, including Aidos-
Mekhmet, were killed on the spot.^ In the great
redoubt and a few other strong places, which held out
until the Russians were exhausted with killing, the
garrisons were taken alive. In all, 9000 Turks were
made prisoners. By 11 o'clock all was over. A few
of the defenders may have escaped. A few more may
have succeeded in concealing themselves in the town.
But of the whole garrison of 35,000 men, not less than
25,000 must have been killed. That is to say, the
Russian troops, after storming formidable defences, in
sheer hand-to-hand fighting had killed a number of
Turks equal to that of their own entire force. Such a
feat of arms is almost without a parallel in history.
The sequel was as horrible as the storm itself. The
garrison were the instruments of the most slovenly
tyranny that ever abused a conquered province. But
the inhabitants of the town were not all Turks, and many
of them were better disposed towards the Russians
than towards the defenders. Nevertheless, the town
was sacked, and every form of violence was committed
against these wretched people. An enormous booty
was obtained, and three days of unlimited licence, in
accordance with military custom, compensated the
victorious soldiery for their fatigues.^ The private
^ The facts are in dispute. Some authorities say that a Russian
snatched at the Turkish leader's jewelled dagger, and that the Janissary,
firing at him, killed the officer instead ; others that an Englishman
named Foot, an officer in the Russian flotilla, tried to seize Aidos-
Mekhmet, who himself killed his assailant.
* English readers should perhaps be reminded that Wellington's
troops in the Peninsula enjoyed the same licence. At Badajoz, Ciudad
Rodrigo, and San Sebastian the Spanish inhabitants suffered every
atrocity at the hands of the English, who had come to save them from
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 121
plunder could not be reckoned. But 265 guns, 100,000
pounds of powder, 20,000 shells, 400 flags, and 52 ships
and boats were included in the official lists. The price
was officially estimated at 1815 killed and 2400 wounded.
But this was mere guess-work, and it would be safe to
assert that 400 officers and 9000 men were either killed
or wounded.^ Six days were occupied in carrying away
the dead. The Russians were buried, the Turks were
flung into the river. The losses in officers had been very
heavy during the attacks upon the wall, and it says
much for the gallantry of those who led the stormers
that, out of the original commanders and their substi-
tutes, five were wounded and one killed.^
For ten days after this sensational feat Suvorof
remained in the neighbourhood of Izmail. Then he
went to Jassy, where Potyomkin, full of self-satisfaction
and good-will, prepared a triumphal reception. The
streets were decorated, and an adjutant was posted at
a window, to give warning to Potyomkin of Suvorof s
approach. Accidentally or of set purpose, the conqueror
of Izmail entered Jassy by night, and lodged with an
old acquaintance, the Prefect of the Police. The next
morning, he set out for Potyomkin' s residence in the
Prefect's old-fashioned carriage, with two men on the
footboard. The officer on the watch informed Pot-
yomkin, but Suvorof was too quick, leapt up the staircase,
and encountered the grandee, hurrying forward with
the effusive readiness of a patron, almost at the top
of the staircase. They embraced each other. " With
the French. Nevertheless, one aspect of the sacking of Izmail is
original. Suvorof permitted the officers to keep for themselves any
of the prisoners whom they pleased, of either sex, on a written promise
to feed and lodge them and treat them humanely (Campagnes, ii. 146).
The share of the Prince de Ligne included valuable weapons, Arab
horses, and twelve Turkish musicians. Rtiss. Star. (1892), Ixxiii. 572,
1 Campagnes, ii. 109 et seq. ; Pyetrof, ii. 165 et seq. ; " Memoirs of
Denisof" in Buss. Star. (1874); Prince de Ligne, CEuvres Militaires,
xiii. ; Orlof, Shturm Izmaila. A facsimile of Suvorof s MS. report is
in the Warsaw Sbornik. A vivid personal account of the storm is in
the Russ. Arkh. (1905), i. 138.
122 SUVOROF
what can I reward your services, Count Alexander
Vassilyevitch ? ** exclaimed Potyomkin. Suvorof drew
back, and harshly replied, " With nothing, Prince. I
am not a merchant, and have not come here to trade.
No one can reward me but God and the Empress.'*
Potyomkin was visibly taken aback, and accepted
Suvorof's written report with a few formal words. They
never met again on friendly terms, and Suvorof lost
his most powerful advocate before the Empress, at the
time when he most needed a shield against the darts
of professional jealousy.^
His conduct was highly impolitic, if not unnatural.
Potyomkin' s admiration was probably genuine, and he
had certainly every reason to be grateful to Suvorof.
He himself could only hope for that sort of greatness
which consists in being the acknowledged patron of
those whose own greatness is apparent to the world.
Like Louis XIV., he could shine only by the reflection of
the glory of his ministers. He was accordingly generous
so long as he did not see in his famous subordinate
a potential rival. His goodwill towards Suvorof was
probably less likely to be affected by jealousy, because
from such an abrupt, fantastic, and untactful man he
had no reason to fear rivalry in the Court itself, the
only field in which he was really, in the last resort,
afraid of rivalry. He could therefore afford to give
full play to his willingness to please, and if he was the
self-conscious favourite of the Empress, he was none
the less the man who had given Suvorof the opportunity
of taking Izmail, and might without impropriety claim
the privilege of rewarding him. But Suvorof on his
side was inflated with victory. He had done something
that no man had ever done before, and felt that he
could now at last stand on his own feet. Potyomkin
was immeasurably his inferior as a soldier, and had
first left him in the lurch at Otchakof , and then rebuked
him for insubordination. He now needed him no more,
1 Suin Otyetchestva (1849).
THE SECOND TURKISH WAR 123
and his present arrogance was proportioned to his past
humility.
The consequences of his rebuff to Potyomkin were
immediate. The latter wrote to Catherine to recommend
Suvorof for promotion : " Since out of all the Generals-
in-Chief, he alone has been on active service throughout
the campaign, and, so to speak, has saved our Allies,
because the enemy, seeing our approach, never dared
to attack them, would it not be gracious to distinguish
him by the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel of the Guards
or General Adjutant ? " ^ The Empress agreed, ordered
a special medal to be struck, and made Suvorof Lieu-
tenant-Colonel of the Pryeobrazhenski Guards, of which
she herself was Colonel. This distinction, often bestowed
upon Generals whose services had been terminated by
their increasing years, gave no special gratification to
Suvorof. Potyomkin, once repelled, was not inclined
to give him further assistance, and neither the post of
General Adjutant nor the coveted rank of Field Marshal
was offered to him. There were ten other Lieutenant-
Colonels of the Guards having precedence over him,
and he had the additional grievance of seeing a mere
favourite like Potyomkin himself rewarded with an
obelisk at Tsarskoe Syelo, a Field Marshal's uniform
sewn with brilliants, and 200,000 roubles in money.
He had not even the reward of seeing his Empress
reap the fruits of his victories. Her original plan was
to create out of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia a
Christian State, of which her grandson Constantine
was to be the first Prince. But the Emperor Leopold,
who had succeeded Joseph on the throne of Austria in
1790, if he could not win victories for himself, was at
least determined that his more skilful neighbours should
not profit by theirs. At the Congress of Reichenbach
he joined with the King of Prussia and William Pitt
in demanding that Catherine should surrender all her
1 Russ. Star. (1876), 643. The rank of General Adjutant carried
with it the right of personal access to the Empress at any time.
124 SUVOROF
conquests. The Empress agreed to give up all except
Otchakof and the empty tracts as far as the Dnyestr.
Even for this she was for a time threatened with war,
and Pitt displayed great energy in the name of the
Balance of Power. But the Empress held out, and the
combination against her had to be content with the
surrender of all the populated country which the Russian
armies had won. Thus all Suvorof's work was undone
for the second time. And thus began the long duel
between the democracy and the despotism : Russia,
for selfish and material ends, for ever working out the
Divine purpose, and Great Britain, the champion of
nationality and constitutional government, for ever
thrusting the persecuted subjects of the Porte back
into the hands of their cruel, corrupt, and slovenly
oppressors.
CHAPTER VI
KICKING HIS HEELS
Suvorof at Petersburg — Sent to Finland — Correspondence — Jealousy —
On military hospitals — Craving for work — Daily life — His daughter
— Books and newspapers — Ossian — ^Enjoys a wedding — Trans-
ferred to Kherson — Troubles with contractors and the Treasury —
Hospitals again — ^Letter to a godson — A French war threatened.
After leaving Moldavia, Suvorof spent three months in
Petersburg. During that time he contrived to offend
not a few persons whom he might well have left alone.
He did not conceal his contempt for his equals in rank,
though, in fact, some of them were far from incompetent.
" Is it true," asked one of them, " that you don't think
much of tactics ? " "Of course,'* sneered Suvorof, " I
don't know anything of tactics ; but tactics know me ;
as for yourself, you seem to know nothing of either
tactics or practics." Of Kutuzof he declared that he
was " a clever man whom even Ribas could not de-
ceive " ; and in a comparison of himself with Kam-
yenski and Saltikof, he said that " Kamyenski knows
all about war, but war knows nothing of him ; I don't
know anything about war, but war knows a good deal
about me ; and as for Saltikof, he knows nothing of
war, and war knows nothing of him." ^ Suvorof in
fact was thoroughly unhappy. He was useless as a
courtier, and while he avoided the dangerous paths
of political intrigue, his boredom found expression in
1 Schmidt, ii. 7, 8.
125
126 SUVOROF
unwise gibes and sneers against persons whose accumu-
lated antipathies did him nothing but harm.
He wrote in one letter :
Here the mornings bore me, and the evenings give
me a headache ; the change of climate and life. Here
the language and manners are strange to me ; I can
make mistakes in them ; so my situation isn't uniform
— now tedious, now gratifying. In this short time it*s
too late for me to learn field sports, which I have never
learned up to now. All this is pastime, not active
service ; between stupidity and hell I see no difference.
There can't be any contempt for me, I'm an honest
man. God will pay me. Malicious chatter, even for
the occasional quenching of my thirst — they know that
it's more restrained with me than with the others. My
excursions are short ; if any obstacles, there won't be
even those.^
And in another :
Time is short, the end approaches, worn out, six
years, and the juice will be squeezed out of the lemon ! 2
A change of scene was provided for him by Potyomkin.
The latter had decided to give a magnificent entertain-
ment to the Empress on the 9th May. His health was
already beginning to break down, and Platon Zubof had
already supplanted him in the favour of Catherine. But
he determined that he should set in a blaze of glory,
and this last display of his, to celebrate the triumphant
conclusion of the Turkish War, was to be the most
magnificent of all. One thing alone would mar his own
enjoyment : the presence of the man to whom his fame
was actually due. At all costs, Suvorof must not be on
the spot to be shown with the finger, the victor of the
Ruimnik and the hero of the Storm of Izmail. A few
days before the great holiday, the Empress sent for
1 Vorontsof Archives, xxiv. ; Journal of Khraponski, 26th April-7th
May 1791.
2 Russ. Star, (1875), iii. 242.
KICKING HIS HEELS 127
Suvorof, and told him that he was urgently needed in
Finland. Two days later he wrote to her from Viborg :
Most Gracious Sovereign — I am in Finland and
waiting for your orders.
The answer was a rescript ordering him to survey
the frontier and decide what points should be fortified
to strengthen it against Sweden.^
In his new field of action Suvorof spent eighteen
months. In that time, besides strengthening existing
works, he erected a new bastion at Neuschlott, redoubts
"x)n the Kyumen Parta and at Utti, forts at Ostinoi and
Likola, and at Rotchensalm on the mainland and the
neighbouring islands a complete fortress. In all, his
new works in the last place mounted 900 guns. The
last was a very thorough piece of work, and Catherine
declared that he had presented her with a new port.^
This sort of occupation, though it was within his capa-
city, was not to his taste. He was primarily a leader
of men, and he devoted himself with his usual energy
to the improvement of the condition of the troops
under his command. These, as was the rule with Russian
frontier troops, were in a bad state. There was con-
stant disease with a high rate of mortality, and deser-
tions were frequent.
He began his special system of marches and sham
fights, and apparently made a considerable improve-
ment. But work brought him no repose. Other officers
were nearer the fountain of honour than he, and were
promoted while he retained his old rank. War was
threatening from the direction of France, and he was
not asked to take the command. Even his work with
the troops brought complaints of his severity, and echoes
of these reached him from Petersburg. His protests
were poured into his correspondence with friends and
acquaintances in the capital. He was an inveterate
1 Russ, Star. (1900), civ. 546.
2 CampagneSy ii. 150, 151.
128 SUVOROF
letter-writer, and very many of his letters from Finland
have been preserved. They display, among other things,
his vanity, jealousy, and sensitiveness to criticism at
their worst. The principal recipient of these cries of
resentment was Dmitri Ivanovitch Khvostof, a Lieu-
tenant-Colonel in the army and the husband of Suvorof 's
niece.^ He was a diligent reporter of all the gossip of
Petersburg, and in return received the long succession
of his relative's protests. The earliest of these were
harpings on old strings : want of recognition of the Storm
of Izmail, resentment against Potyomkin, and the favour
shown to his rivals. Later he passed to the pettiness
of his work in Finland, and the suggestions that he was
overtaxing the strength of his troops, showing indiffer-
ence to their health, and the like.^
Thus on the 8th August 1791 he writes to Khvostof :
Report unpleasantly minimizes the victory of
P.N.V.R.3 There was no overthrow. The army beats
the Vizier, and he's generalissimus.
And in the same month he sneers at another com-
petitor :
C.N.I.S. [Count Nikolai Saltikof] somewhat forti-
fied, temporarily and locally, by me and my zeal, now
exchanges that driving force for petits inUrits,
Of Rumyantzof almost alone he writes with respect :
I praise the talents of Count Peter Alexandrovitch
[Rumyantzof]. He picks me out, I acknowledge that.
1 Agrippina, daughter of Suvorof s sister Anna, who had married
Prince Gortchakof of Moscow.
^ These letters are in the Sbornik. Many of them are printed in
Schmidt's second volume, the Vorontsof Archives y Russkaya Starina
(1872) and elsewhere. Some are dashed off in such a style as to be
incomprehensible — even to Russians.
» Prince Ryepnin's victory over the Turks at Matchin. It was the
final blow to the Turks, and immediately afterwards Ryepnin signed
a provisional treaty of peace. Ryepnin was a very good soldier of the
formal school, an aristocrat, and a courtier. All three things made
him obnoxious to Suvorof.
KICKING HIS HEELS 129
But he wouldn't have liked my winter weather, because
he'd have thought it dangerous to our success. ... I
showed that I alone would be strong enough all through,
but look at all that gang and you'll be bound to acknow-
ledge that I was alone and insufficient.
Then on the 21st November he breaks out about
Izmail :
The Izmail disgrace has not dropped out of my mind.
How long a mere general -adjutancy drags about from
Herod to Pilate, from Pilate to Herod ; it's possible to
promise and put it off till the peace, till the next war,
till the next peace ; the object's postponement — if the
barbarians had surrendered by capitulation that's little,
but by storm's life and reputation . . . Izmail and the
consequences of my device ; the general who took
Anapa,^ at every step the same dispositions, and wisely
too. The Matchin muddle was a toad to a bull compared
with the Ruimnik.
Consider how I've to cut off from the part I first
played in active military service, to which I've been
accustomed for almost as many years as you've been in
this world ; cast about, and you'll find this is the truth
and not vanity, though often I seem at first sight to
have been a mere scene-shifter. In 1774, when I was
a Major -General, I set the whole great machine in
motion, from that came Kozludzhi, and from that
Kainardzhi ; so before and after ; even in the Prussian
War as a Lieutenant-Colonel I had the same column as
my General, but with better success. Am I to amputate
the man I am by nature, and make him a mere phan-
tom ? On the Volga I gave orders to 100,000 ; in the
South and the Crimea, to 80,000. What magnificence
have I here with a dozen battalions ! When they gave
a better army to Kakhovski without any trouble at all.
He never was to be compared with me in command.
In the same month of November he passes in review
a whole series of rivals :
Elmpt was taken as a Captain from a foreign
army ; I was a sergeant in the Guards. Prince Yurii
* A fortress in Asia Minor, taken by Gudovitch on the 3rd July 1791.
K
180 SUVOROF
Dolgoruki entered the service at the same time as my-
self, but he had been enrolled as a child in the cradle.
I am senior to all the others in years and service ; they
were still subalterns when I was already a senior Major ;
but they have all pushed past me ; Count Bruce, as
Adjutant of the Guards ; Ivan Petrovitch Saltikof, with
the title of Kammer-Junker and as the messenger
of the victory near Frankfort [Kunersdorf] ; Nikolai
Ivanovitch Saltikof, with the title of Quartermaster-
General and as the bearer of flags taken at Frankfort ;
Ryepnin, as Adjutant of the Guards ; Kamyenski, as
Quartermaster and in the artillery ; Mushin Pushkin ;
Yurii Dolgoruki, they were all subalterns, when I was
already a Staff Officer.
Then again :
The exploit of my part of the army at Kozludzhi
(my comrade ran away) with an enormous force, sworn
to the service of the Sherif of the Sandzhak, was better
than the affair at Matchin, 100 standards taken against
15 there : there they were working with the men of
the Ruimnik and Izmail, but the cavalry was beaten,
because it stood on air. It's not myself that's speaking
— the advantage of the service ; I've long forgotten
myself.
The sophism of seniority on the list : I'm to be
under his yoke ; to be the ape's cat's-paw or the owl in
the cage ; would not utter annihilation be better ?
Peace was made with Turkey early in January
1792, and in the spring he was thinking of retiring :
I shall definitely end in the autumn . . . through
work and sleeplessness I've lost chest, throat, stomach,
and I'm weak besides from discontent.
On the 20th July he wrote :
My three settled intentions are : retirement, travel,
or foreign service. For the two last I should need
10,000 roubles in cash all at once.
But the affairs of Poland were again nearing a crisis,
find immediately after this very definite proposal to
KICKING HIS HEELS 131
retire, he wrote direct to Catherine to ask for a command.
The Empress replied on the 27th July that there was
no need for the services of such a man as Suvorof , and
he fell back again upon his petty worries.^ Three days
later he began again to Khvostof :
My eyes are very painful, I'm in weak health . . .
thoroughly bored with writing about these matters, and
without necessity I shan't. The will of God and the
Mother of her country be done. The mortal remembers
death ; it is not far from me ; this 22nd October I
shall have been fifty years in the service ; wouldn't it
be better to end my unspoilt career then ? Fly from
the world to some village where I should have enough
to keep myself with 1000 roubles a year, and prepare
my soul for the passage ?
About this time he began to turn his attention to
the charges that he was too hard on his men, wore
them out by excessive marching, turned them out of
hospitals when they were sick, and so caused disaffection
and desertion.2 As a matter of fact, he was always
very careful of his men, spared his raw troops the hard
work that he required from his veterans, and he only
kept the sick out of hospitals because he regarded these
places, with much reason, as death-traps. The com-
plaints probably originated with the subordinate officers,
who had been accustomed to make irregular gains out
of sickness and mortality, and were punished by him if
the sickness in their units rose above a certain pro-
portion.^ His defence against these charges he made to
the authorities, not confining himself to protests to
Khvostof. Thus he wrote to Count Nikolai Ivanovitch
Saltikof :
1 See the letter from Turtchaninof, Secretary of State, set out in
Schmidt, ii. 191.
* Masson, in his M^moires Secrets sur la Russie, i. 316, caricatures
Suvorof as rushing through the wards crying out, " I'm a doctor ! "
administering rhubarb and salts, and turning the sick men out into
the open, saying that Suvorof s men were not allowed to be ill.
' See his instructions to his troops at Kinburn, published in Pyetrof,
Second Turkish War, ii. Appendix 8.
182 SUVOROF
The hospitals have long been foully misused I
haven't suffered it to continue. Regimental and com-
pany commanders, instead of caring for the health of
the soldiers, often send them to them from long dis-
tances, and even without investigating their complaints,
and often, through this method of transport, they
arrive half-dead among the pestilential exhalations of
the dying. " Minerals and Ingredients," but no sense !
... I have herbal remedies in the stores. One of the
doctors has in his own hands a hundred or more, but with-
out trained people in charge. When I took up the com-
mand of the troops in Finland at the beginning of this
year the Friederichsham and Kyumen [hospitals] had a
thousand men in them. In the first months the losses
were reduced, and afterwards there were only four
diseases left in them : Consumption, Dropsy, Stone and
Venereal, and epilepsy for observation. On my de-
parture there were in Friederichsham on sick leave from
the Nevski Regiment about 40 men ; a few others in
the regimental hospitals. My strict attention to the
health of the soldiers has made egoism my enemy.
Scurvy ! Nonsense ! . . . There is no scurvy in Fin-
land, though there may be extraordinary outbreaks
even with me, as of other diseases. By means of
cabbage, tobacco, and horse-radish scurvy has been
stopped, and by cleanliness, too. By the word " Trans-
formation '* I understand " evacuation by philanthropic
sanitation." With me it's from sick to weak, from weak
to convalescent, from that to fresh air, and from that
straight to the ranks ; in the end in the ranks them-
selves we get little by little to no need of any sickness
at all.
Suvorof was in fact making experiments in preventive
medicine. Feed your men, clothe your men, keep your
men active, and you will have no diseases except those
which were and are still peculiarly incident to military
conditions of life. After leaving Finland he published
his ideas about hygiene, and if they do not all stand the
test of modern science, they are a proof of a very sound
untrained judgement.^
^ See posty p. 146,
KICKING HIS HEELS 133
He went on to contrast his record with that of Count
Ivan Petrovitch Saltikof, his predecessor in Finland, and
the cousin of his correspondent.
In his time there was one day when he had more
men run across the frontier, or as many, as I had in
10 months, 500 men. My runaways by discharge were
less than 300 ; he had 700 in the Pskof Regiment alone.
I couldn't examine the previous year, the time of Bruce
and Herman, in detail. The latter founded the Kyumen
hospital, where they died at the rate of 50 men a week.
As for forced marches, he wrote to Count Ivan
Saltikof :
At the beginning of the first war, from Ladoga to
Smolyensk, in mud and sleet, one dead and half a dozen
weak ; on the scramble over the Ural Steppe, back-
wards and forwards, not one dead ; with my corps
beyond Kuban and Laba from Kopuil, one dead ; be-
yond the Danube with my Corps in the first war up to
Kozludzhi, not one dead ; and in Izmail I did found a
hospital. ... In conclusion, to show you how the hos-
pitals cured the men in the Tauris [Crimea], the con-
tractors offered me a bribe of 7000 roubles to establish
them again.
The contractors in fact made money out of full hos-
pitals, and nothing out of empty hospitals. So the
regimental officers profited by a high mortality among
the troops. They kept the dead soldiers on their books,
as political agents have been known to keep dead voters
on the register, and drew their pay and allowances for
their own benefit. Infected buildings helped the pur-
veyors and the officers more than the soldiers for whom
they were intended, and Suvorof was determined to
reduce their number.
On all these points the right was unquestionably
with him. But he was not content with being right.
He wanted to be praised for being right, and he con-
tinued to crave for some employment which would take
him out of reach of gossip, and at the same time keep
184 SUVOROF
him hard at work. His torment of spirit went on almost
uninterruptedly, and Khvostof, diligent though he was,
could never satisfy the impatient old man with his reports
of the intrigues, rumours, and facts which he came across
in Petersburg. Tortured though he was by every hint
of neglect or supersession, Suvorof craved always for
more information.
I write to you every day ; or every twenty-four hours,
mixing night and day in my anxiety. By not writing,
when you have many couriers, you leave me in torturing
bewilderment . . . write much more often.
At last he began to write direct to influential men in
Petersburg. On the 30th July he wrote to Platon Zubof ,
the new favourite :
Here I shall soon finish ; let another man finish
the second class fortresses. Your Excellency knows
what I thirst for : it is not a jealous thirst for honour
or searching for rewards, I am bestrewn with them, but
it is my old habit of fifty years which drives me where,
with any sort of troops, I may pour out the rest of my
blood on the altar of the mother of her country. Trust-
ing to your favour, I have the honour, etc.
He even abused his unfortunate nephew for not
taking more pains to press his appeals.
You were at Turtchaninof's house, and you didn't
bring back the damned rogue's letters. If you didn't
find him at home, you should have waited, even if it
was for more than 24 hours. . . .
Name at once everybody from whom you pass on
anything you've heard ; if anyone tells you anything
as a secret, he's so much the more a traitor. . . .
I want to know bad news and not good, because
pleasant things betray themselves, unpleasant things
are indicated for precaution's sake ; better prevention
than consolation ; waiting for something to turn up
puts one's neck in the noose ; don't stand wheedling,
better endure gruffness ; distinguish real goodwill from
the fox's or sheep's skin of the sham ; distinguish always
KICKING HIS HEELS 135
the right stuff from table talk ; beware of pauses, they're
spies ; don't begin a new subject before you've finished
the first, don't answer an oak with a cedar, or a rose with
a lily.
The rumours of impending service grew at last more
definite, but his distress continued :
The rumours here send me, one to Kuban ; another to
the Caucasus, a third to Kherson as far as Otchakof . . . .
Before I had against me the devil P.G.A. [Prince
Gregory Alexandrovitch Potyomkin] but with fits of
benevolence ; ^ now there are 7 devils ; Lucifer
Martinett, Asmodeus the pious, Astarot Ivan Ts ,
with other devils without number. . . .
Without money, without farm and garden, without
carriage and livery, without banqueting, and without
friends and without fame ; I am equal to none — need
I desire to be equal to any ? Without wealth I got
myself a name — ^judge — equal to none.
Then on the 27th September a final appeal to
Bezborodko :
Your Excellency, remember your kindness to me,
which I shall feel to my death, renew them ! Do not
hand me over to my detractors, I don't interfere with
them, I abound in the kindnesses of Our Great Monarch
although already in the second half century of my service
to her. Don't exile me in preparations for remote
contingencies. I'm not a stage-carpenter soldier.
Another man will easily finish here.
You're a Minister ! Work threatens from France ;
the number of troops is an imposing pretence ; I have
fought and conquered, with 500 against 5000, ten times
our strength, and Gauls are not Prussians. ... In my
gloom I remain, etc.
His old friend Coburg was already in command of
the army in Flanders, and he hoped to march against
the same enemy. Failing that, the French were
intriguing in Turkey, and the second best place would
be the South. For the moment he got nothing from
^ Potyomkin died in October 1791.
186 SUVOROF
Bezborodko, but on the 21st November came an Imperial
rescript, ordering him to take up a new command in the
South, and his dissatisfaction was for the time being
dispelled.
It must not be assumed that the miserable man who
appears in this Finland correspondence was the only
Suvorof. He could never be his whole self without a
grievance, but he had capacity for pleasures of other
sorts. From his own letters and the recollections of
other people we get some more attractive details for
the composite picture. This is his own description of
his daily life :
Gorgeous headquarters at Viborg. Every Sunday a
dance, a big dinner, and an evening reception ; on
holidays full dress parade according to the rules of
tactics. I sometimes sleep till midday, but occasionally
I enjoy hunting hares or sea scorpions. At my own time
I receive reports, and for the sake of discipline make
occasional notes on them. I make no plans, and the
later I finish the longer I'm wanted. I've done some
work ; would that others had done some too. What a
contrast ! Instead of looking after the sick I hate them ;
I run, gallop about like an orderly of the day ; I try to
finish everything in one year instead of ten ; instead of
gorgeous dances I long to turn out garrisons ; I crave
to be where there's any prospect of being in my element,
and I pant for the field of battle as if it were the sacred
valley of the nine sisters ; I shun pomp and celebrity,
desire for fame seems only a desire for what I have long
enjoyed ; I put away the insatiable thirst for rewards,
as one already bestrewn with them ; in my enthusiasms
I follow unswervingly the guiding hand of Minerva,
and am unshakably convinced that I shall have completed
nothing, until, in the capacity of a humble servant, I
have drawn my last breath in the constant fulfilment
of the will of the Empress.
The description is not quite accurate. But it will
serve as that of Suvorof as he appeared to himself.
His external behaviour has been sketched in more detail
by one of his associates.
KICKING HIS HEELS 137
He rose early, and if he showed any signs of contumacy,
his servant Prokhor was under strict orders to pull
him out of bed by the legs. Once out of bed, he ran
about the room stark naked, or in the garden clad in
shirt and boots, all the time learning by heart phrases
in Finnish, Turkish, or Tartar, or some other foreign
language of military importance. Then he washed,
sponging himself all over with cold water, and drank
his morning tea, still going on with his studies. After
tea he sang part of the service of the Church, and went
off to morning drill. Drill finished, he returned home
and worked or read the newspapers. The midday meal
was early and simple. As a rule he drank a small glass
of vodka flavoured with spice, and ate a few radishes ;
if he was unwell, he drank schnapps aggravated by
pepper. He seldom dined alone, and never while on
active service ; he was never so happy as when talking
hard over a meal. On these occasions he had special
dishes for himself, fruits and sweets he never ate, and
he seldom drank wine. Only on festivals he treated
himself to champagne. During Lent he had Church
service in his room almost every day, and himself sang
the responses. In Church at Easter he kissed and gave
eggs to his friends and acquaintances, according to
custom, but he never accepted an egg himself. He
slept on a hay mattress, with two down pillows under
his head ; over him he had as a rule only a sheet, but
in cold weather a blue cloak as well. He wore neither
undervest nor gloves ; the only fire he liked in his rooms
was that which warmed the water for his bath. But
he very seldom actually stepped into the bath ; what
he did was to warm himself in the steam and then splash
himself with cold water. By way of contrast with this
simplicity he was fond of pomade and scent, especially
eau de Havane. He kept three menservants and a
feldshyer, but as a rule paid little attention to appear-
ances. He was fond of animals and petted them, but
never kept one himself ; sometimes, if he met a dog.
188 SUVOROF
he barked at it, and in the same way he would mew in
a friendly way at a cat.^
His correspondence with his daughter adds to the
gentler aspect of his character. She was now sixteen
years old, and left the Smolni Institute to live with the
Khvostofs. In March the Empress made her one of the
Ladies-in- Waiting. This was intended as a compliment,
but it made Suvorof anxious about the child's morals :
It will be enough to be only a little at the theatre in
the Hermitage, poor Natasha, don't be carried away
by pleasures ! With your love of wisdom and virtue,
you will cast a timely light on the infectious rottenness
of those vanities, so deadly to morality and well-being.
Read sometimes in the Prayers and the Psalter,
homilies. . . .
Be patiently loyal to the great Monarch. I am her
soldier, I am dying for my country ; the higher I am
raised by her kindness, the sweeter it is for me to sacrifice
myself for her. I am rapidly approaching the tomb,
my conscience is unspotted, I am 60 years old, my
body is crippled with wounds, and God has left me to
live for the good of the State. . . . Shun people who love
being famous for their wit ; for the most part it's a
mark of perverted morals. . . .Be severe with men,
and don't say very much to them. ... If you happen
to be beset with old men, show them that you want to
kiss their hands, but don't give them yours.
The girl, who was neither very beautiful nor very
wise, seems in fact to have been in little danger. But
her father's suspicions of Courts and courtiers grew
no weaker.2 He began to think of marrying her, and
* Ivan Sergyeyef, Vospominyenia [Recollections] in Mayak (1842).
A feldshyer is a man who has had some experience in a hospital. He
may be intelligent, and is still the only doctor available for millions
of the Russian peasantry.
* He once said to Khvostof, " For the Court you want three qualities
— audacity, flexibility, and perfidy." A letter of Prince Gortchakof
to his son Andryci, who had just been made a Kammer- Junker, shows
the same temper. The Prince told Suvorof of the youth's promotion.
" He began to describe how he had taught Lexie [another son of the
KICKING HIS HEELS 139
considered the claims of a Saltikof and a Dolgorukof .
Khvostof wisely persuaded him to drop the project for
the time being. His letters to her continue to express
the warmth of his affection :
My soul, Natasha ! God's blessing with you ! Be
honourable and virtuous, and shun idleness. Would
that my heart could reach you ! Eh ! Here with us
there are great excursions on the water, in the forest,
on the rocky mountains, and lots of good things, fish,
wild birds, flowers, little chickens. As our wizard
Lieutenant-Colonel Beer has come to stay with us, the
weather is now good ; the birds are singing, swallows,
nightingales, and many others. Yesterday we had
dinner on the island ; to-morrow we want to sail to
the German mainland ; there we shall be far away ;
everywhere I shall kiss your eyes. Whenever you go
for a walk and come home and romp in the house, then
remember me, as I remember you. . . .
Eh ! My soul, Natasha ! go about in the boat, there
are pussy cats everywhere there, what splendid live
salmon they catch here, and I'm writing on Friday, and
on Friday you wanted to go to Countess Natalia Volo-
dimirovna's. So it happens that on the same day and
at the very same hour that you're having dinner, it'll
be time for me to have dinner too. I've written a great
deal, my eyes are as if they were in the specs that people
wear on their noses. God's blessing on you. Kiss your
Auntie for me.
Natasha ! Ah, Good Lord, how bored I am without
seeing you for so long. Good Lord ! how glad I shall
be to see you and to find how big you've grown. Pray
God I may set eyes on you. . . .
Prince] how to serve as a Cossack, private soldier, sergeant, and officer,
and praised him for his quick understanding and his enthusiastic
progress in all his duties, so that he's now earning praise as a leader
of men , . . and then, not so much as mentioning you, he indulged
in criticisms of courtiers, their approach, their gait, their bows, their
flattering speech, their meaningless smiles and haughty looks, their
hair-splitting, and so forth. It's clear that he doesn't like it, and that's
why he's never written a word to me about you." I have unfortunately
lost the references for both these quotations.
140 SUVOROF
Yet other letters reveal him in other capacities. His
love of reading had never deserted him, and he read
not only books but newspapers. He followed the course
of events in Europe with thirsty eagerness, and watched
for wars as sailors watch for fair winds. On the 2nd
November 1791 he wrote thus to Baron Saken :
Baron Fabian Vilmovitch ! I have kept up the
papers — ^for German, Hamburg, Vienna, Berlin, Ellanger
[Elangen] ; for French, Bas Rhin, Courier de Londres ;
Warsaw for Polish ; S. Petersburg or Moscow for
Russian ; the little French Journal EncyclopSdique de
Bullion, the German Hamburg Political Journal. As
this year is at its end and I must order new ones
for the next, I humbly ask your Honour to take on
yourself the burden of getting them — and be good
enough to add the Nouvelles Extraordinaires. Whether
of these above-mentioned newspapers you will like or
will decide to keep any of them, that I leave in all humility
to your determination. Be good enough to give the
order, with some payment on account as is customary,
and inform me of the whole price so that I can pay you
the money without delay.
One of the books which affected him at this time was
Macpherson's Ossian. True, he read it in a Russian
translation of a French translation, but even with such
a double dilution of the romantic spirit of the original,
he was delighted. He exchanged letters with Kostrof,
the translator, sent him money, even wanted to give
him a life pension. Kostrof dexterously compared his
patron to Fingal, and Suvorof, in one of his letters to
Khvostof, overflowed into a sort of Ossianic prose, the
obscurities of which in some passages defy his biographers.
I wander in these rock-strewn places ; I sing songs
out of Ossian. Oh ! in what darkness I ! Piercing the
gloom give me rather the light of day. A translation
from the English.^
^ I do not suppose that there is in fact any English original of this
epigram. It obviously refers to Ryepnin's victory at Matchin.
KICKING HIS HEELS 141
Dimming the brilliant lustre of all former overthrows,
The fifteen thousand Matchin scum he battered with his
blows ;
The hero puffs his loud bassoon, and celebrates the stroke
With which a hundred thousand and the Grand Vizier he
broke.
I visited Neushlott, borne thither on the wings of a
light wind emerging from the womb of Kutvyenetaipolye
traversing the wastes of Pumala, I pant from the prolonged
stress. Returning, I am in Kevkenschild ; its coast is
not so arrayed in rocks as at Kutvyenetaipolye. There
only their fringes are to be seen. Look at this crag, a
hundred of its dry oaks burn without ceasing. A flaxen
torch involves it in a thick cloud, they fall and the wind
is full of darkness. But what do I see ! The solid
earth yields to the dense waves of the well-skilled Saim.
Where is my friend Steinhel ? In the arms of his
beloved spouse, or in commerce with souls transmigrated
into these thick mists, he thrusts me into melancholy,
augments the sorrow which comes flying from the South.
Oh Bards! Sing of the joy that dwells there. . . . Shall
I soon be borne by its eagles into those lands of milk
and honey, where I have made such holiday with men-
at-arms ? . . .
As appears from these letters, he did not despise
entertainments. He was in fact a thorough Russian,
and enjoyed eating and drinking, dancing, and picnicking,
as only a Russian can. No doubt he got a special
pleasure out of being the principal personage at the
numerous festivities of his district. Of one of these a
vivid description has been preserved.^
When his headquarters were at Friedrichsham, he
lived at the house of a lady called Grin, the widow of a
staff surgeon. He occupied the best apartments, and
she, with her daughter and niece, lived on the upper
floor. He treated her with his usual affectionate
familiarity, drinking tea with her, and calling her
" Mummy.** Both the girls were to be married on the
^ This account is taken from a contribution by Milyutin to one of
the periodicals of 1860 or 1861. The exact reference is among my
papers in Petrograd.
142 SUVOROF
same day, and the good lady at last summoned up her
courage, and begged her famous guest to give away the
brides. He at once consented, and offered the use of
his own rooms. To her profuse thanks he replied : " Not
a bit of it I Not a bit of it I I love you, Mummy ;
truly, as a soldier I say it, I love you. I'm a soldier, a
straight fellow, not a double-dealer ; where my thought
is, there's my tongue too. And, look here. Mummy,"
shaking his fist, " see that I'm not hungry at your
supper ; I'm a Russian soldier, I love shtshi and kasha." ^
When she feared that he would object to being crowded
out of his own rooms, he burst out : " Merciful God !
Disturb a Russian soldier ! Is he a cry-baby, pray ?
Give me a garret, or even a cupboard, and a bundle of
hay, and I'll sleep and I'll snore till the cock crows."
The rooms were vacated, dusted and made beautiful.
On the evening of the great day the guests arrived.
The daughter's husband was an Italian doctor, who
appeared in sober dress. The young teacher who had
secured the niece, had unhappily clad himself in the
latest Paris fashion, with a high stock and a curled and
powdered wig, smelling of scent at several paces' distance.
Suvorof was in full uniform, with all his Orders. When
his eyes fell upon the teacher he made a grimace. During
the actual ceremony he scowled, looked at the young
dandy, wrinkled his brows, sniffed, cleared his throat,
and spat. Then he began to mutter : "A coxcomb I
Merciful God, a coxcomb ! A head with a campaign
kettle on it I A caperer ! A scent-bottle ! " And he
blew his nose violently.
At the end of the service the husbands were presented
to him. He gave his hand cordially to the doctor, but
when the teacher appeared before him he snatched out
his handkerchief, held his nose, and looked with a scowl
at the offending wig. When the dancing began, the
^ " Shtshi " is a vegetable soup, *' kasha " any grain, millet, rice,
buckwheat, barley, etc., eaten out of a pot. Our porridge and rice
pudding would be called " kasha " by a Russian.
KICKING HIS HEELS 143
General promenaded with the daughter and danced
with the niece. The teacher, blind and deaf to every
sign of displeasure, danced, laughed, and ran about the
room, as unmindful of the coming doom as the little
victims whose play the poet contemplated at Eton. But
all might have been well had he not, in leading a lady
back to her seat, trodden on Suvorof's toe. Then
the suppressed eruption burst forth. Suvorof clasped
his outraged foot, and howled : " Ow, ow, ow ! I
can't walk ! Merciful God ! I'm lame ! I'm crippled ! "
The guests were dismayed, the hostess shook with terror,
the hapless bridegroom stood rooted to the floor. In
vain they offered Suvorof a chair. His complaints
grew louder. " Oh, the frizzled coxcomb ! He's knocked
my leg off ! A head with a top-knot, a beastly big
top-knot ! Oh ! Merciful God ! I'm crippled ! Oh,
the glib-tongued prig, the scent -bottle ! " Then he
turned upon Madame Grin. " Mummy, where's the
brush you cleaned the ceilings with ? " " It's outside.
Count," stammered the poor woman. " Show it me."
The brush was brought in. " Ah ! A famous brush ! "
vociferated Suvorof, glaring at the wig. The wretched
youth backed against the wall, expecting anything and
everything. But Suvorof was content with a long-range
bombardment, and for once refrained from attacking
his enemy at close quarters. " A perfect barber's
block ! Splendidly trimmed, Merciful God ! Sleek
enough to clean a wall with ! There are people who
can talk over a whole town, and raise no end of a dust. . . .
But their heads — Poof ! A mop, by the Lord, a mop ! "
Then he turned to the hostess, and began to talk to her
about Moscow pancakes. The guests gradually resumed
the programme, and the teacher retired to such consola-
tions as his bride could afford him.
Whatever wretchedness of spirit Suvorof may have
poured into his letters from Finland, it is impossible not to
believe that on one night at least he was supremely happy.
The rescript of the 21st November entrusted him with
144 SUVOROF
the command of all the troops in the Government of
Yekaterinoslav, the Crimea, and the districts between
the Bug and the Dnyestr, which had been acquired
by the last war with Turkey. He had also to inspect
the defences of the new frontier, and complete the
fortifications begun by Major de BoUan. The fleet on
the Black Sea was not under his orders, but the troops
on board the river flotilla of De Ribas were. The
reason for his appointment was the renewal of French
intrigues at Constantinople, and he took up his duties
with alacrity, looking for another war. The Polish
rising had been easily suppressed, and the country was
in process of being again partitioned ; the war with
France was apparently not going to take place, and the
only chance of real service was in the South. He was
disappointed. The energy of the Turks was not equal
to their ill-will, and he had no opportunity of again
defeating armies which had already contributed so much
to his reputation. In the result, he had to confine
himself to the same sort of activity as in Finland : the
building of forts, the care and training of troops, and
of course the writing of letters.
He was no fonder than before of administrative work,
least of all of the repairing of fortifications, which in
his view were rather encumbrances than means of
defence. Nevertheless, as he had to look after them, he
flung himself into the distasteful business with his usual
energy. He at once began to make contracts and to
pay for work done by means of bills of exchange.
These methods were too rapid for his superiors.
Turtchaninof wrote to him explaining with great care
that the political situation scarcely required such haste,
that there was not much money in the Treasury, and that
some of the work must be done more slowly, so that
the expenditure might be spread over a longer period.
Suvorof replied bluntly :
You are putting an end to my beginnings, and warn
me against projects of which I have already laid firm
KICKING HIS HEELS 145
foundations. . . . For the political situation please
enquire of the Vice-Chancellor ; I look at things like a
field officer. You would have taken two months instead
of two days, chasing me about as if you were after a
fish with a net, knowing I'm not a man to sleep. The
year would have been wasted if I had delayed here at
all with the contractors, without whom it is impossible
to get on in the present state of the country. You say
we don't need them. You should have told me that in
Petersburg. Anyhow, this year it can't be undone ;
next year you can do what you like. Send me the
money, and one of your cashiers with it.
He did not get what he wanted. An Imperial re-
script approved in general terms of his plans, but
directed him to postpone the execution of a great part
of them, and, as to his contracts, informed him that no
department of State except the Senate could enter into
contracts of more than 10,000 roubles in value, and
those which he had made were in consequence invalid.
This was a great blow, and it is not surprising to find
him declaring in a letter to Khvostof :
It is simple truth that I prefer Finland to this place.
To Turtchaninof he wrote :
Honest people don't do these things ; you play with
your word, I believe it, and you set your sail to every
wind, seeing that they're inconstant.
Then to Khvostof again :
God help me ! I'm in such misery. Even Prince
Grigori Alexandrovitch [Potyomkin] never so degraded
me.
To add to his difficulties, the contractors themselves
began to make claims against him in person, and at the
same time he was called upon to repay to the State
sums which he had already expended out of public
funds. He wrote to Khvostof, instructing him to sell
his villages near Novgorod " for not less than 100,000
roubles. Transfer the people to Suzdal." Later he
L
146 SUVOROF
wrote again. The contractors wanted 28,648 roubles
and the State 67,500, and the reserve price of the
villages was raised accordingly to 150,000, or at the
very lowest 135,000 roubles. The actual result of the
affair is not known. But by some means or other a
compromise was reached, and Suvorof was not required
to pay anything out of his own pocket.^
Here, as in Finland, he fell foul of the hospitals. In
one of his letters to Turtchaninof he reported a con-
versation with one of his staff officers, who wanted to go
back to regimental duties.
" Zuibin, why are you running away to your com-
pany ? There's no ill-will between us, is there ? Be
honest, and tell me." " I get an income of 1000 roubles
a year there.'* " How ? " " From the dead soldiers."
Zuibin wanted to make profits out of the dead men
he would be able to keep on the strength of his company.
Suvorof knew that the prevention of this sort of corrup-
tion was practically impossible, so far as inspection and
punishment were concerned, but he could do something
to lessen the excessive mortality which made it easy.
He therefore carried on his crusade against the hos-
pitals, and at the same time did his best to teach officers
and men the elementary rules of hygiene. In a general
order addressed to his medical officers on the 8th August
he published the rules drawn up by his Staff Surgeon,
Yefim Byelopolski. The rules naturally take no account
of microbic infections, but in their insistence upon
cleanliness, fresh air, and proper food they are very
sound. Some passages deserve quotation.
Constantly inspect the causes of increasing diseases,
and seek them out not in the hospitals among the sick,
but among the healthy, by regiments, battalions, com-
panies, and platoons, and the various separate com-
mands, enquiring into their food, drink, structure of
barracks and earth huts, the date of their erection,
^ I have taken the whole of this account from Pyetrushevski. The
letters are in the Sbornik at Petrograd.
KICKING HIS HEELS 147
their extent and air space, cleanliness, cooking utensils,
all their contents, and their various possibilities of
debilitating the men. . . .
Endeavour to have a supply of simple domestic
remedies in every store. . . .
Those brought in with trivial and inconsiderable
diseases, such as little boils, little scrofulous wounds or
spots, give them a plaster or other remedy and send
them back to their regiments, taking no notice of any
grumbling about it, because a little disease, through
negligence in the hospital, is turned into a serious one,
sometimes actually into a mortal one. For the others,
after examination, prescribe two or three days' rest,
ordering them to come every day to the hospital for
medicine. . . .
The water of the Dnyestr, although not of perfect
purity, is nevertheless not so bad as appears at first
sight ; because it has everywhere a rapid current ; all
harm which comes from it consists in the slimy mud,
which settles heavily in the belly and produces different
diseases. Therefore it is necessary to let it stand in
tubs. . . . Pour the water into these tubs in the even-
ing, and by morning it will be completely settled and
fit for cooking and drinking. But for drinking it should
only be used in case of need and during a march . . .
at other times good kvass must be in all stores and in
hospital. Healthy men may use the Dnyestr fish for
food without hesitation, but only if it is fresh, either
newly caught or salted and well boiled.
Scurvy in this country has shown itself more danger-
ous than elsewhere ... it is cured especially by clean-
liness, observed in everything, ... by fresh acid food
and drink, with exercise ; sometimes by change of camp-
ing ground and daily bathing in a swift flowing river . . .
by some cabbage, horse radish, etc. etc. . . . Bathing
in sea water, wherever possible, cures scurvy and the
itch . . . fumigate the barracks with pitch and chips
of tar barrels. . . . Fever is cured apart from purga-
tives, emetics, calorifics, salts, and finally stimulating
drugs, especially by refraining from food and drink and
by the use of Siberian salt dissolved in water. . . .
The rules are good enough so far as they go. Dirty
habits and improper food are the principal causes of the
148 SUVOROF
diseases of war. The most deadly of Russian military
diseases were scurvy and typhus. The first is due to
improper food. The second is a dirt disease, spreading
from man to man by means of lice. Both were due to
national faults, slovenliness in organising transport,
peculation and bribery, carelessness about personal
cleanliness. The hospitals would not increase scurvy.
But the man who got into a filthy, unwashed, and
overcrowded hospital, however mild his complaint,
was exposed at once to the infection of typhus. A
wounded man would of course be in danger of erysipelas,
and every wound would become septic. As there were
hardly any military doctors except those attached to
Generals and their Staffs, the sick and wounded were
generally left to the care of feldshyers, whose skill varied
greatly, and could seldom be equal to that of a modem
medical student after three months in a general
hospital.
With no field ambulances or field hospitals, so that
compound fractures without amputation meant death,
and even lightly wounded men often staggered into the
distant base hospitals with maggots ^ breeding in their
flesh, the sight of such a building after a battle must
have been beyond modern imagination. Even in time
of peace it was only too often a breeding ground of
disease, and Suvorof, with characteristic directness,
strove by every means in his power to keep his men
out of it. If Byelopolski's directions were carried out,
typhus and other infectious disorders would certainly
be reduced.
One letter of this time shows Suvorof in his sweeter
1 Maggots in wounds were not uncommon in Russian field hospitals
during the present war. In a very fair Russian hospital with which
I was myself acquainted, the orderlies washed a ward of twelve patients.
An orderly brought a basin of water and a rag, wet the rag and wiped
the face of each patient in turn. In another hospital the orderly filled
his mouth with water and blew it over the faces of the patients, after-
wards wiping them. Washing a patient's body was very rare, and
generally only happened if the patient could do it himself.
4I&
KICKING HIS HEELS 149
mood. The Austrian General Karaczay, whose steady
conduct in the field of the Ruimnik had contributed so
much to the success of that day, asked him to be god-
father to his son. Such a request would please Suvorof
beyond measure, and he set down in a letter to his
infant godson what he considered the main rules for his
future military life.
My dear son Alexander — As a military man, study
well a Vauban, a Coghorn [Cohorn], a Curas, a Hubner;
a little theology, physics, and ethics ; read well Eugene,
Turenne, the commentaries of Caesar, Frederick II., the
first volumes of Rollin with the continuation, and Cte.
de Saxe ; languages are for literature ; dance ; fit up
and manage weapons a little. The military virtues are :
bravery in the soldier, courage in the officer, valour in
the general, but guided by the principles of order and
discipline, dominated by vigilance and foresight. Be
frank with your friends, temperate in your requirements
and disinterested in conduct ; bear an ardent zeal for
the service of your Sovereign ; love true fame, dis-
tinguish ambition from pride and vainglory ; learn early
to forgive the faults of others, and never forgive your
own ; drill your soldiers well, and give them a pattern
in yourself. Constant practice of quick apprehension
will by itself make you a great general. Learn to profit
by local circumstances ; be patient in military work,
don't let yourself be daunted by reverses ; distinguish
between objects true, doubtful, and false ; don't let
yourself be taken aback by an explosion from an un-
foreseen quarter. Preserve in your memory the names
of great men ; and follow them in your marches and
operations — but with caution ; never despise your
enemy, whoever he may be ; and know well his weapons,
his way of employing them and fighting ; know his
strength and his weakness. Accustom yourself to tire-
less activity ; rule fortune ; it is the moment which
gives victory, master it by the swiftness of Caesar, who
knew so well how to surprise his enemies, even in broad
daylight, to turn them and attack them where and
when he wished, without ever being compelled to cut
off their supplies of food and fodder ; and study the
art of never being in want of supplies for your own
150 SUVOROF
troops. God raise you to the level of the heroic
Karaczay.i
Naturally enough, he had not long been in Kherson
before he began to ask for employment elsewhere. On
the 5th July he wrote direct to the Empress :
I most obediently request your Imperial Highness
most graciously to permit me, in this present quiet, to
serve as a volunteer in the German Allied Armies, for
the whole campaign, retaining my present maintenance
out of your Royal bounty.
Turning, Most Gracious Sovereign, to the most sacred
throne of Your Imperial Highness, your most obedient
Count Suvorof Ruimnikski.
At the same time he wrote to Khvostof :
I most obediently request the great Monarch to give
me leave to serve in this prolonged campaign with the
German allied Army, with my present maintenance, i.e.
pay and rations, with my sta:M and mess allowance of
500 roubles a month. For this I shall need a passport
and ordinary recommendations. I humbly request your
Excellency for help in fitting me out in Kherson, where
at present all is quiet, and I have already been a long
time out of practice.
Catherine's reply is dated the 13th August :
You ask to be a volunteer in the allied army. To
that I reply that affairs at home increase daily in
importance, and you will soon be able to have as much
military practice as you want, here. Therefore, in not
releasing you to correct your pupil, who, according to
the latest news, is betaking himself across the Rhine,
I now, as ever, consider your utility to your country.
The Empress was not going to throw away her priceless
Suvorof in an attempt to correct the errors of his "pupil,**
Coburg. He could win personal glory in France. But
more tangible profits for Catherine would soon be within
reach at home. So he was kept, champing his bit, in
Klierson, while the Polish disease throbbed to its fatal end.
^ This letter is set out in the Appendix to Pyetmshevski's second
volume.
CHAPTER VII
THE SECOND POLISH WAR
Poland after the Partition — ^Rising of 1794 — ^Rumyantsof sends Suvorof
into the country — Battles of Kruptchitsa and Brest — Halt at
Brest — Battle of Kobuilk — Storm of Praga and capitulation of
Warsaw — Suvorof as pacificator — Anecdotes true and false —
Recall to Petersburg, 1795 — An adventure by the way — Upsetting
the Court — Sent to Tultchin — The Science of Victory — How it
worked in practice — The foundation of modem Russian training —
Death of Catherine the Great.
After the first partition, the affairs of Poland for a time
presented a less deplorable aspect than before. Never-
theless, the permanent Russian garrison had remained a
source of irritation, and discontent, carefully fostered by
Russian intrigues, grew steadily. The new ideas which
were being proclaimed in France gave a fresh direction to
political enthusiasm, and side by side with the national
movement against Russia marched a new democratic
movement, directed towards popular control of govern-
ment. The two movements combined to produce the
proposed new constitution of 1791, which involved,
among other things, the abolition of the elective
monarchy, the liberum veto, and the irresponsibility of
Ministers. The crown was offered, after the death of
Stanislav, to the Elector of Saxony. This project
alarmed both Catherine of Russia, the dominant power
in Poland as it was, and Frederick William of Prussia,
who feared a combination between Saxony and Poland
in the East, while he was already threatened with
unknown dangers from the French Republic in the West.
151
152 SUVOROF
At the invitation of a section of the nobility, which was
in fact superfluous, both Powers objected to the proposed
constitution. Austria, without asserting any claim at
the moment, gave them a moral support which would
afterwards require the payment of its price. Hostilities
broke out in 1792, as soon as Russia was free from the
embarrassment of the Turkish War, and though the
Polish Army was now by no means so contemptible as
the raw levies of the first war, it had the worst of
several engagements. This was the campaign which
agitated Suvorof during his stay in Finland.
In the result, the country was for the second time
partitioned. The immediate excuse was that Frederick
William, after their first disastrous campaign against
the French Republic, felt himself unable to assist the
Austrian Emperor, unless he received some compensa-
tion for his sacrifices. The only possible way of com-
pensating him was to let him take some more of Poland,
and as Catherine naturally required some return for her
acquiescence, it followed that she also must obtain it in
the same form. The Second Partition of Poland, in
1793, therefore transferred a second third of the whole
population into the hands of Russia and Prussia, and
the remaining third was kept in the same state of miser-
able dependence as before. A new rebellion was care-
fully organised, and at the end of March 1794 it broke
out at Cracow. On the 4th April, Thaddeus Kosciusko,
a good soldier, and a disinterested patriot, who had
studied in Paris and fought under Washington at
Saratoga, beat a Russian force under Major-General
Tormasof at Ratslavitsi. On the 6th April the popula-
tion of Warsaw rose in furious revolt, killed about 2000
of the Russian garrison, took 1700 more prisoners, and
after two days of merciless fighting drove the remaining
7000 out of the city.
This rebellion was a more serious matter than that
of 1770. By this time Poland had an army. Many of
the insurgents were no more than peasants armed with
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 153
scythe blades on the ends of long poles. But there was
a strong nucleus of disciplined troops, a very efficient
artillery, and many of the officers had not only had a
scientific professional education, but had served in
foreign armies. This regular force was reinforced by
the adhesion of several strong detachments of Polish
troops in the Russian service, who hurried to join them
even before the rising at Warsaw. A system of con-
scription introduced by Kosciusko provided a consider-
able number of recruits, and by the time that Suvorof
came upon the scene the number of Poles under arms
can hardly have been less than 75,000. Against these
the Russian troops available were 25,000 men under
Ryepnin between Riga and Pinsk, 19,000 under Der-
felden, as Ryepnin' s subordinate, further south, and
Fersen, with the remains of the garrison of Warsaw,
about 12,000 strong, to the south-west of the Polish
capital. A Prussian force of 10,000, of which Frederick
William himself soon took command, co-operated with
Fersen. Suvorof, with 50,000 men, was in Littl6 Russia
and the Crimea, owing immediate obedience to Rum-
yantsof.^
The first operations were indecisive. The Prussian
King and Fersen defeated Kosciusko, but the latter
succeeded in throwing himself into Warsaw, where
they blockaded him. The Prussians were drawn off by
a rising in the newly acquired Prussian Poland, and
Fersen fell back, covering their retreat. Derfelden was
withdrawn by Ryepnin, and by the beginning of August
both sides seemed to be settling down, to collect their
strength for vigorous action in the next year. Into this
scene of sluggishness and pusillanimity Rumyantsof
flung Suvorof.
The latter, with a special force of some 13,000 men,
had been engaged in disarming the Polish troops in his
1 Orlof, Shiurm Pragi, 20, 22. The Austrian force moved into
Polish territory in July. But this was merely to secure in advance a
share of the spoil. The Austrians never came into action.
154 SUVOROF
district. This difficult task was accomplished with
perfect success, and in less than a fortnight 8000
men laid down their arms without a shot being fired
on either side.^ The news from Poland itself filled
Suvorof with impatience. He could finish the business,
he declared, in forty days,* and he begged Rumyantsof
to send him to the theatre of real war. On the 12th
August the last Polish soldier had surrendered. On
the 18th Rumyantsof told Suvorof to march against
the enemy. " Your Excellency was always a terror to
the Poles and the Turks, and on every occasion you
burn with impatience and envy wherever there is so
much as talk of active service." Nevertheless, for the
time being Suvorof was only to make a demonstration.^
Demonstration or no demonstration, this was enough
to set him on the march. He left Nemirof on the 25th
August, marching towards Brest. On the road he was
overtaken by an Imperial rescript from Petersburg,
ordering him to halt at Brest, to build magazines for
Derfelden and Fersen. He replied to Rumyantsof :
The ignorant Petersburgians cannot make rules for
the Russian Nestor [i.e. Rumyantsof] to me his wishes
only are sacred. Time is the most valuable thing.
Julius Caesar conquered by speed. I shall wait patiently
two days for provisions. ... I must hurry towards
Brest, if the rebels are not beaten in the interval, but
not for magazine building . . . there are younger men —
or do without altogether. There I must get reinforce-
ments, go to Praga, and so cut off supplies from Litva
to Warsaw.*
From the first he had no doubt of his objective :
Warsaw, the head and heart of the rising. Towards
* Campagnes, ii. 158 ei seq. The disbanded men received all arrears
of pay due to them and were sent to their homes.
« Pyetnish. ii. 23, 41.
' The instructions of Rumyantsof are set out in Orlof, 105.
* Pyetrush. ii. 51. Praga is the suburb of Warsaw on the right or
eastern bank of the Vistula.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 155
Brest he marched with his usual speed, with 4500 men
and 10 guns, picking up 6500 more men and 6 guns
on the way. From Nemirof to Varkovitch is 180 miles.
This stage was accomplished in nine days, the ordinary
marching rate of Russian troops being 65 miles a week.
One day was spent at Varkovitch in repairing waggons
and baking bread, and then five days of marching
brought him to Kovel, 85 miles further on, and 40 miles
across the frontier of Poland. After a halt of two days
he again pushed forward on the 11th September,
expecting at any moment to encounter the enemy.^
Both leader and men were in high spirits. All were
in thin summer clothing, each man carried a spare pair
of boots and biscuits for eight days, and two hospital
carts for each regiment and one field kitchen and one
waggon for officers' baggage for each company or
squadron formed the whole baggage train. Guides
were generally taken from among the Jews of the
district. Suvorof himself rode on horseback, attended
by his servant Prokhor and a single Cossack, and he
never got into a carriage. He was constantly beside
his men, calling his veterans by their names or the nick-
names, " Eagle," " Fire," and the like, which he applied
to them, reminding them of their old fights against
the Turks, and exchanging the broad jests which the
Russian soldier still loves. If " Father Alexander
Vassilyevitch " rode past a regiment without pausing to
scatter these greetings, the men knew they were guilty
of some fault. At the halts he sat among the men,
sharing their coarse rations, and he slept, as always,
on a straw mattress or the ground. The first stages
had been covered with music and marching songs,
but as they advanced into the enemy's country noise
of every kind was forbidden. The hour of departure
was never fixed ; the men were to start " at cockcrow."
Every morning Suvorof himself flapped his arms and
crowed, and in fifteen minutes the troops were in
1 Orlof, 37.
156 SUVOROF
movement. In this happy style the little army marched
swiftly to meet the enemy .^
It is one of the most curious of Slav complexities
that troops who go to war in this spirit of boyish, almost
childlike gaiety, should prove terrible adversaries in
battle. The first encounter with the Poles took place
at Divin, 60 miles from Kovel, and the insurgents
found Suvorof and his men in anything but a playful
mood. At dawn on the 14th the Cossacks of the
vanguard fell upon some 200 Polish horse and cut
them to pieces. The few prisoners who were taken
said that 400 or 500 men of Syerakovski's army were at
Kobrin, 20 miles ahead. Disregarding the suggestion
that he should send scouts to investigate the truth of
the story, Suvorof pushed on after a halt of a few hours,
and the Cossacks, starting at midnight, attacked the
enemy at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 15th.
The Poles were again taken completely by surprise.
Hardly any succeeded even in getting on horseback, and
this detachment, like the first, was annihilated. About
300 were killed, 65 were captured, and only 50 escaped.
By 6 o'clock all was over, and a large number of
horses and a well-furnished provision store were in the
hands of the victors. Suvorof and the infantry did
not arrive on the scene until 9 o'clock. The whole
affair had been conducted by about 800 Cossacks.^
The battle with the main body began at 9 o'clock
on the morning of the 16th at Kruptchitsa, 10 miles
beyond Kobrin. Syerakovski, with 12,000 infantry, 3500
cavalry, and 2000 scythemen, occupied a strong position.
A stream flowing through a marsh 200 yards wide ran
across his front, and he extended his men along the
* Campagnes, ii. 168 et seq. The " Cockcrow " and other details
of the manner of march are taken from The Anecdotes of an Old Soldier
aboiU Suvorof. The author, Starkof, served under Suvorof in this
campaign and afterwards in Italy, and collected many facts from
Bagration. His book is invaluable as a representation of Suvorof
among his men.
' Campagnes, ii. 170 et seq. ; Orlof, 40.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR
157
sloping ground beyond it, in front of the village and
convent of Kruptchitsa. The road passed over the
swamp opposite his centre, and an advanced post, with
some guns, held a few buildings at the Russian end of
the bridge. Hills covered with thick woods in the rear
offered the Poles some refuge in case of an overthrow,
and their left wing was covered by another wood.
The battle lasted all day. A brisk cannonade soon
drove the enemy out of the Ute de poni. Some horse
from the Polish right then threatened to turn the
Russian left. Suvorof countered their move by sending
some of his own cavalry to meet it, but they failed to
cross the swamp, and both parties remained facing each
other over the barrier. Suvorof then turned his atten-
tion to the enemy's left. After some bombardment of
their position, he ordered an infantry attack, and in
two columns, partly assisted by planks torn from the
neighbouring cottages, the Russians struggled through
the mud outside the Polish left wing, and even succeeded
in carrying four of their little regimental cannon with
them on their shoulders. The field-guns continued to
158 SUVOROF
fire across the marsh to the right of the bridge. Some
Cossacks and three squadrons of hussars scrambled after
the infantry. The whole body then formed and charged
up the opposite slope. The bulk of the cavalry swept
still further to the right and began to force its way
through the wood. The Poles moved to the left and
swung back their left wing to meet this flank attack.
After a stubborn hand-to-hand combat in the centre,
some of them broke their ranks and fled into the
monastery, where they were killed at the feet of the
terrified monks. But the main body of infantry,
formed into three close columns, with the cavalry on the
flanks, fell sullenly back, disputing every foot of the
ground. At this point the main body of the Russian
cavalry came up. The squadrons recalled from the
left wing crossed by the bridge, and fell upon the left
rear of the retreating mass. The others on the right
had encountered great difficulties. At last they
succeeded in leading their horses across floating roads
of hastily felled timber, and they attacked the retreating
columns from their right flank. The Poles were thus
charged from both sides, while the infantry continued
to press them in the rear. Nevertheless, they held
sternly together, and their guns fired until the end.
Bearing to the left along the road to Perki, they with-
drew, as darkness fell, into the woods in their rear, and
the Russians were compelled to abandon the pursuit.
The Poles had lost 3000 men, and the Russians only
700. But if the latter could claim the victory, the
former could reflect that they had saved all their artillery
and shown Suvorof that in this war there would be no
Landskron.
The day had been exhausting for Suvorof as well as
for his men. From the first moment of the battle, he
had been always at the point of difficulty, directing and
encouraging the troops. He had sent back to Kobrin
for the kitchen train, and an hour after the last shot
had been fired the soup was being boiled. He himself
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 159
rode to the top of a mound, slipped from the saddle,
crossed himself, said, " Praise to God in the highest ! "
ate a biscuit, drank a glass of vodka, and lay down to
sleep, wrapped in his cloak, under a tree. After a
rest he leaped up, ate a meal, mounted his horse, and
rode down to the troops. They crowded round him
with cheers and laughter, while he praised those who had
distinguished themselves. Then he collected the whole
body, took off his hat and recited in a loud voice the
prayer, "Almighty God, being enabled by Thy Holy
Providence to come to this hour of night ..." Then
he visited the wounded and gave instructions for their
disposal, ordered the prisoners to be sent to the rear,
and their weapons to be destroyed. At 2 o'clock in
the morning the march was resumed, with the special
order " Cartridges to be kept dry," which the old
Suvorovians knew meant that they would have to
ford a river.i
By 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 18th the
column was within 2 miles of Brest, after covering
28 miles in 39 hours. Syerakovski had received some
reinforcements. Nevertheless, according to the in-
formation of a Jew, he was determined to continue his
retreat, and had already sent his baggage on ahead.
Suvorof decided to attack at once. The further he
plunged into hostile territory the more difficult would
it be to maintain his supplies without dangerously
weakening his small force to provide baggage guards
and foraging parties. If Syerakovski was to be destroyed
he must be destroyed at Brest. The enemy had observed
a party of Cossack scouts, but did not appear to suspect
the presence of the Russian main body. The direct
road to Brest crossed the river Bug by a bridge. Here
Syerakovski had posted a battalion and two guns,
while the bulk of his force lay encamped beyond the
river, secured in this way against surprise. But there
are two kinds of surprise, and if the Poles were not to
1 Campagnes, ii. ; Orlof, 40 ; Starkof, i. 25 et seq.
160 SUVOROF
be beaten by a direct attack at an unexpectedly early
hour, they might still be beaten by a flank attack from
an unexpected direction. Suvorof, knowing the inde-
fatigable character of his troops, set them the task of
making a long and circuitous march and then attacking
the enemy from his right flank.
At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 19th he
advanced in two columns, the right of cavalry and the
left of infantry and artillery. Before them lay two
\
•>Ji'l-f:5PR0flC^ Polish Line of §/Lr,,^^\:' ,^^
^(^aace or Russ/^yf^\ ^si^ Battle i{L3^ \m^ f
Battle of BREST """""^.....aV''''''''^^ Wl "^^^^'""nL
SCALE-£liCUSH MILES
O '/z I
rivers, the Mutchavets and the Bug. The first they
forded unobserved, but the marshes of the further
bank caused some delay, and before the whole force
was extricated it was already daylight. Three miles
separated them from the Bug, and before they reached
it all the church and convent bells of Brest were sounding
the alarm. Nevertheless the pace was too quick for
the Polish army. Dashing forward to the river, the
Russians plunged through it, and formed up on the
opposite bank without opposition, a mile away from the
Polish camp. As usual, the infantry were in the centre,
with the fourteen guns of the field artillery. Twenty-
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 161
five squadrons under General Shevitch were on the
right, thirteen squadrons and the bulk of the Cossacks
under General Islyenyef on the left. The whole force
was in the right rear of the enemy. But the Poles, if
too slow to prevent the passage of the river, had time
to take up a position facing the Russians, and the latter
had to deal with an enemy equal in numbers and deter-
mined to fight.
Suvorof ordered the whole line to advance. Immedi-
ately, following the same plan as at Kobrin, the Poles
fell into three dense columns, thirty abreast and one
hundred deep, with artillery at each end of the inter-
vening spaces and the cavalry on the flanks. Then they
began to retreat steadily towards the woods in their
rear, crossing the Russian line of advance from right
to left. Over the broken ground Islyenyef s cavalry
galloped with all speed. Emerging from a deep ravine,
they were greeted with a heavy fire from four guns,
which inflicted serious loss. But they charged the
infantry of the nearest column in flank and rear.
Two attacks were repelled, and only the third succeeded
in breaking the Polish formation. The mass once
dissolved, the Poles were frightfully mangled, and but
for the support afforded by the other columns very few
of the 3000 men would have escaped.
In the meantime these other columns had succeeded
in keeping ahead of the Russians, and, passing through
the village of Koroshin, took up a position on the
slopes beyond it, with a dense wood covering their right
flank. In this wood Syerakovski stationed eight of
his big guns, supported by two squadrons of horse.
The remnants of the broken column fled into safety
under the fire of the battery, and Islyenyef was com-
pelled to draw off. But as soon as four battalions of
Russian infantry with four guns and the cavalry of
the right wing came within striking distance, the Poles
again formed their three columns and again made for
the woods, the battery covering their retreat. This
M
162 SUVOROF
time Shevitch first came into action. The nearest
column, composing the left of the retiring enemy, was
furiously attacked, and as furiously defended itself.
Quarter was seldom asked and seldom granted, and
the greater part of the men composing the column died
where they stood.
The centre column had better fortune. While the
battery in the wood kept the cavalry of the Russian left
wing at bay, and the cavalry of the Russian right wing
was engaged with the Polish left or rear, the Poles in the
centre continued their withdrawal. When attacked at
last by the cavalry they were already almost under
shelter of the trees, and though they lost six guns, the
bulk of the men for the time being escaped. But the
Polish right, composed of the remains of the column
first attacked, had suffered a complete overthrow.
Islyenyef received reinforcements, attacked the battery
and carried it, and then, turning upon the infantry
of the exposed column, which was already engaged
with the Russian battalions, cut down every man left
in the open. The Polish horse in this part of the
field attempted little opposition, and the greater part
of it galloped to the rear, leaving the infantry to its
fate.
The fight had so far pursued the same course as
that at Kobrin. But it was little past midday, and
there was no friendly darkness to cover the retreat of
the Poles. The bulk of the fugitives from the Polish
right were cut off by the Russian infantry, and the
four guns attached to their column were taken. There
remained the disorganised mass of the centre column
and the debris of the cavalry and the infantry of the
right and left. The flight extended along the Warsaw
road to the village of Dobrin. Beyond the village ran
the Krasna, one of the numerous swampy streams of
which the district was full. This formed a continuous
barrier, sweeping from west to east until it reached
the Bug. The retreating Poles had been driven in a
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 163
north-westerly direction, making for a dyke and a
wooden bridge, which afforded the only means of cross-
ing the swamp. Some of the fugitives got across the
bridge, but the Russian infantry and a detachment of
Islyenyef's horse from the left wing, arriving almost
simultaneously, succeeded in cutting off the retreat
of the great mass. The bridge and dyke were partly
broken down, and the Poles driven back into the
village. The regimental cannon then opened fire on
the houses, and the Russian field artillery began to
play upon them from the other side. Some of the
Polish cavalry attempted to break away across the
marsh. But many were drowned, others were shot
as they struggled in the mud, and only a handful
escaped. The infantry in the village were all killed
or taken, and at 2 o'clock in the afternoon the Polish
army had ceased to exist. The artillery, 20 guns in
all, and 2 standards bearing the legend " Freedom,
Equality, and Independence " were the trophies of the
victory. Syerakovski and a few hundred men fled
to Warsaw, and others escaped the search parties in
the woods and got away in various directions. But
the highest estimate of those who eventually reached
safety is 2000. The prisoners were about 500. All
the rest of the 10,000 or 12,000 men who fought for
Poland on this bloody day were dead. The losses of
the victors are reckoned at not more than 1000 killed
and wounded. 1
This battle was a shattering blow to the insurrection.
A large proportion of its regular army had disappeared,
and a new Russian force, under a leader of terrible
rapidity and striking power, was in the heart of its
territory, at a point where he could be joined by the
hitherto unco-ordinated detachments of Fersen and
1 Campagnes, ii. 179 et seq. ; Orlof, 42. Suvorof reported his losses
as 92 killed and 228 wounded. In this respect he was always very
inaccurate. The Polish infantry were doing something during the
six hours' fight besides being butchered.
164 SUVOROF
Derfelden. But the war was by no means over. Suvorof
had at the utmost 10,000 men, of whom part were now
sent back with prisoners, and others were engaged in
getting in suppUes. The country was full of Polish
partisans, and it was impossible for him to get into
touch with Fersen, who was in fact on the western
side of the Vistula, with the Polish army of Poninski
between him and Suvorof. Derfelden was compara-
tively close at hand at Slonim, and thither Suvorof
sent a message, begging him to advance to Byelostok,
while he also requested Ryepnin to detach troops
from his command to cover the country in the rear
of Brest. Suvorof was in fact in some danger. To
the north of him were the hostile detachments of
Vavrzhetski and Hedroits, and to the west Kosciusko,
with Poninski, Grokhovski, and the remains of Syera-
kovski's shattered army. Without support he might
be attacked at any time, and to advance further was,
even for him, impossible. He was therefore compelled
to wait at Brest, foraging in the fertile country around
it, and doing his best to get the assistance which he
required.
The latter task was not easy. He was not in supreme
command, and Derfelden was under the orders of
Ryepnin, who was not a friend of Suvorof's. Nor was
Count Nicholas Saltikof, President of the Military
College at Petersburg,^ under whose general directions
the whole war was being conducted. Requests for
help were disregarded or fulfilled with limitations, so
that Suvorof at last wrote in despair to Rumyantsof :
Thus, my Lord, for nearly three weeks I have been
unable to move. I can say here what Maharbal said
to Hannibal : " We know how to win battles, but
not how to use our victories." The same time has
been wasted at Brest as at Cannae and we are nearly
at winter quarters.
^ This office was not academic. It corresponded with that of the
English Secretary of State for War.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 165
Nevertheless, he and Rumyantsof together disposed
troops to cover his communications, and while waiting
for news of Derfelden and Fersen, he busied himself
with keeping his own men in good condition, sending
the Cossacks after raiding parties of the enemy, collect-
ing supplies at Brest, and gathering information about
the fortifications of Warsaw.^ At last, on the 15th
October, he learned that on the 10th Fersen, adroitly
passing the barrier of the Vistula, had beaten Kosciusko
himself at Matsyeovitsa, and that the Polish commander
was a prisoner. Suvorof's left flank, in case of a march
upon Warsaw, was now clear, and the loss of the wise,
brave, and single-minded Kosciusko was in itself a
mortal stroke at the heart of the Polish resistance. To
follow up this success by a direct attack upon the
capital was the obvious course for a man of Suvorof's
temper, and his dispositions were quickly made. As
soon as he heard of Fersen's success, he flung etiquette
to the winds, and sent orders to him and to Derfelden
to march to join him. Fersen had just received a
direction from Ryepnin to obey Suvorof if required, but
Derfelden had orders to distribute his men in winter
quarters. The urgent advice of the young Major-
General Valerian Zubof , brother of the reigning favourite,
fortunately induced Derfelden to obey Suvorof ; and
the plan for the concentration of the three Russian
forces did not miscarry. At the same time Suvorof
begged the Austrians and Prussians operating in the
south and west to draw in towards Warsaw, so as the
better to protect the left flank of his line of march. ^
Suvorof intended at first to move upon Byelsk.
There he hoped to fall in with Derfelden, marching
south from Byelostok, and crush the Polish army of
Makranovski. But the Polish commander, hearing of
Fersen's victory about the same time as Suvorof,
retreated with such speed, that even Derfelden was
^ Campagnes, ii. 193 et seq.
2 Orlof, 58.
166 SUVOROF
unable to overtake him. Some encounters with his
rearguard took place, but he was not brought to battle,
and Derfelden's force, marching by way of Byelsk,
Bryansk, and Brok, turned south to join Suvorof to
the east of Warsaw.^ Suvorof himself abandoned the
march upon Byelsk before he heard of Makranovski's
retreat, and on the 18th he set his troops in march
along the valley of the Bug, through Yanof, where he
hoped to cut the Polish communications between
Byelsk and Warsaw. Learning that Makranovski had
already passed him to the north, he pressed on rapidly,
sending an order to Fersen to reach Stanislavof on the
24th October and there wait for him. But his own
pace was too rapid for both Fersen and Derfelden,
and in response to the request of the former he moved
more slowly through Bengrof and Sokolof, and himself
did not arrive at Stanislavof till the morning of the
25th. There he found Fersen with about 11,000 men.
His own force was about 8000. Derfelden, with some
12,000 more, was not yet on the spot.^
Getting information that one Polish force lay before
him at Kobuilk and another 15 miles to the south-
west, at Okunyef, he promptly despatched Fersen with
all his troops except 1500 cavalry to deal with the
latter, and prepared himself to attack the enemy at
Kobuilk. This was a most hazardous thing to do. He
was about 20 miles from Warsaw, in a hilly district
covered with swamp and forest. Somewhere in front
of him the enemy disposed of about 40,000 troops,
whose quality was not to be despised. One of his
lieutenants was an uncertain distance away to the
north, and he deliberately sent half his own army to
the distance of a day's march. This gave the Poles
an admirable opportunity for annihilating one of the
Russian detachments. A Polish Suvorof would have
^ One battalion marched through Byelsk, Granno, Sokolof, and
Bengrof. Ibid. 62.
' CampagneSy ii. 215 et seq.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR
167
availed himself of his central position, fallen upon one
or other of the forces in front of him, and destroyed
it before either of the remaining two could come to
its assistance. But Suvorof knew that he had no
counterpart on the other side, and he took a risk which
was justified by the event. With Kosciusko the Poles
had lost all the higher qualities of soldiers except
courage.
With his own force Suvorof started on the night of
the 26th along the Warsaw road. Isayof, with 800
Cossacks and 10 squadrons of cavalry, pushed on 2
miles ahead of the main body. He had orders to attack
the enemy at sight. Struggling through a great morass
he came upon the Poles, more than 3000 strong, at
daybreak. They lay between two woods a mile apart,
both of which concealed marksmen and cannon, while
the bulk of the infantry was arranged across the open
space, with cavalry on the wings. Immediately behind
their left the high road ran through the village of
168 SUVOROF
Kobuilk, and through the forest in their rear led several
tracks of inferior quality. Isayof fell upon the enemy
from both flanks simultaneously. But the cross fire
from the woods and the steadiness of the Polish infantry
beat off his attack. Suvorof came up as he recoiled in
disorder, saw how greatly he was outnumbered, and
sent back instructions that the rest of the cavalry
should hurry forward with all speed, and each unit
should attack as soon as it reached the ground. Islyenyef
charged on the left with his Cossacks, and Shevitch on
the right with the regular horse, and the enemy, yield-
ing to successive shocks, began at last to give ground.
They adopted their usual close formation, and in two
dense columns fell back along the roads through the
woods. The sharpshooters in the wings were cut to
pieces as they broke from the trees and attempted to
join the main body, and the cannon were all taken.
The column formed by the troops of the right
wing, about 1000 strong, moved at first towards the
right, and then at a distance of a mile from the main
body, parallel to the high road. It was followed by
Islyenyef. The track was narrow, and the wood dense,
and it was not until a large portion of the pursuers had
been ordered to dismount and attack on foot that the
enemy were at last brought to bay. By this time
they had been driven round three sides of a square,
and when the pursuing cavalry finally got ahead of them,
they had almost reached the high road again, near
the village of Viskovisk. A battalion of infantry after
desperate exertions also succeeded in getting to close
quarters with them, and a hand-to-hand fight in a
small clearing ended in the complete dispersion of the
retreating column. Leaving 200 dead and bringing
back 30 prisoners and 2 guns, Islyenyef retired to
join the Russian main forces, now hotly engaged further
to the east with the second column of Poles. The
fugitives among the trees thereupon attempted to
re-form, but Islyenyef returning upon them compelled
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 169
the whole body to surrender. He brought back 380
prisoners in all. The fighting had been as fierce as
any fighting between Poles and Russians. But this
party of unfortunates had had little to eat for several
days, and their captors, with characteristic Slav friendli-
ness, shared their rations with them on the site of the
first encounter.
The second column had made directly to the rear.
It was pursued, like the first, by cavalry, followed by
a battalion of infantry and four squadrons of dismounted
dragoons. The high road was wide enough to allow
the cavalry to attack with freedom. Some Cossacks
and regular cavalry also succeeded in getting ahead
of the column through the woods, and it was attacked
by these simultaneously with the attack of the cavalry
and infantry in the rear. Five squadrons sent by
Islyenyef arrived in time to leap from their horses and
plunge, sabre in hand, into the fray. For an hour a
desperate fight raged all over the road and the open
ground beside it. But the numbers were not unequal,
the Russian horse was incomparably better than the
Polish, and the infantry battalion, like all Suvorof's
infantry, was terribly proficient with the bayonet. In
the end, the second column suffered the fate of the first.
It was driven into the woods in fragments, and the great
majority of the men composing it were killed or wounded.
Some 400 were taken prisoners at this point. Out of
the two columns about 1000 prisoners remained.
The Russian losses in killed and wounded in all these
hand-to-hand encounters were returned at much less
than the Polish. The highest estimate places them at
200, only one-tenth of those of the Poles, even if allow-
ance is made for the escape of a considerable number
of fugitives among the woods. ^ Polish authorities
claim that the Russian estimates of the number of Poles
engaged in the battles of this war, and consequently of
the numbers killed and wounded, are exaggerated.
1 CampagneSy ii. 219 e< seq. ; Orlof, 64.
170 SUVOROF
But there is nothing remarkable in the fact that the
Polish losses were much greater than the Russian.
Once the Polish artillery had ceased to be effective at
Kruptchitsa and Brest, the Russian superiority with
the bayonet would be overwhelming, musketry being
no more accurate on one side than the other. At
Kobuilk the explanation of any disparity in casualties
must be different. In this fight only two battalions
of Russian infantry had succeeded in getting through
the swamp, churned up as it was by the bodies of horse
which had successively plunged through it, and the
victory was largely due to dismounted cavalry. The
moral of the Russians was no doubt better than that of
the Poles, but the temper of both sides was very savage.
The relations between these two races have always
resembled those between English and Irish, and the
fighting in this war was as merciless as in the Irish
rebellion of 1798. The Poles always fought until the
most desperate and uncalculating valour could fight
no more, and under such circumstances it is not sur-
prising that the beaten army suffered heavily. Their
regular infantry and their artillery were incomparably
superior in discipline and steadiness to those whom
Suvorof had encountered in the first war. But the
cavalry was bad, and seems to have relied upon its
firearms rather than upon shock tactics. In the absence
of good cavalry support the passive courage of the
infantry was of little use against the Russian horse.
Once the latter had burst through the screen of artillery
fire, and the formation of the Polish infantry had been
broken, the battle inevitably became a mere massacre.^
There remained the final task, the storm of the
defences of Praga and the occupation of Warsaw. For
this Suvorof prepared with some care. To ride over
1 Suvorof himself wrote to Rumyantsof after the fight at Brest : " The
Poles fought bravely, and our soldiers paid them for their stubbornness,
giving no quarter." This is quoted by Pyetrushevski (second edition)
at p. 316.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 171
a line of earthworks defended by a numerous artillery
was not so easy as to ride over an army in the open
field. On the 25th Fersen returned from a fruitless
march on Okunyef, and Derfelden, coming into touch
with Suvorof on the same day, actually joined him
on the 30th. The total strength of the Russian army
was now about 25,000 men, with 86 field guns. The
Poles had some 40,000 troops still in the field, but those
actually available for the defence of Warsaw were not
more numerous than the attacking force, and were
not of such good quality as those which had suffered
so heavily in the recent battles. Nevertheless they
had prepared powerful defences. The suburb of Praga
was divided from the main city by the unfordable
Vistula, at this point about 450 yards wide, and round
it had been thrown up a line of earthworks, strengthened
in many places by redoubts and batteries, with lines
of pot-holes along its front. Upon this the inhabitants
of the city had worked with feverish energy. Women
of the highest rank had carried stones with their own
hands, and even the unhappy King, at last taking
sides with his people against his patron, had thrown
up a few handfuls of earth.^ The position was for-
midable. To the south of Praga a tributary stream
ran into the Vistula through an impassable marsh.
The narrow angle between this marsh and the river
was blocked with a wall and ditch, and on the opposite
bank of the Vistula batteries were ready to open fire
on the flank of a force advancing along the strip of
dry ground. From the right bank of this stream ran
the main line of earthworks and batteries, slightly
diverging from the direction of the Vistula, until it
reached the hill called Stony Hill. On this hill were
placed two of the strongest batteries, and from it the
line of works ran at right angles to the eastern face
until it reached the river. The distance from the
1 It is related that a woman begged Stanislav to go away, because
whatever he meddled with was sure to fail.
172 SUVOROF
stream to the apex of the angle was about two miles,
and from that to the river about one and a quarter.
In some places there were two lines of trenches, and
everywhere they were reinforced by " wolf holes,"
small pits with sharp stakes standing up at the
bottom of them. The guns, 104 in number, were
placed in batteries behind the wall and ditch, and
within the angle a group of buildings known as the
Menagerie was barricaded and loop-holed for defence.
The houses of the suburb itself, for the most part poor
cottages inhabited by Jews, were nowhere less than
500 yards from the batteries, and there was ample
room for the movement of troops in the open space.
Two bridges connected Praga with the city of Warsaw.
Four villages outside the lines had been burnt to the
ground, so as to afford a clear field of fire.^
Such a position might have been held by a resolute
and well-equipped garrison, even against Suvorof. But
the Poles were not resolute, and their regular troops
were not sufficient to hold the whole line. Within
the city divided counsels weakened their resolution.
The extreme democrats, headed by a priest named
Kollontaj, resembled the French Jacobins, and threatened
their own aristocratic leaders as much as their national
enemy. The oligarchy paid for its monopoly of power
by the loss of much of the support which it would have
found in an enfranchised middle class. When all
should have been thinking of nothing but duties, half
the intelligent population was thinking of little but
rights. Nor were the leaders of certain mind. De-
prived of Kosciusko, almost the only prominent man
in Poland who owed his position to his own merits and
had inherited no feuds with his title, the nobles and
the generals could come to no conclusion. Some urged
an evacuation and a surrender of the town either to
* Some of the authorities say that there was only one bridge across
the Vistula. I have accepted the view of Friedrich Schmidt in Suin
Otyetchestva (1831), 39.
Mi^^
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 173
Suvorof or the King of Prussia, while others clamoured
for a defence at all costs. General Tomas Vavrzhetski,
who had reluctantly assumed Kosciusko's office without
his power, wished to burn Praga to the ground and
defend the line of the river. He was overruled, and the
decision was taken to hold the defences of the suburb.
These, it was supposed, would delay the Russians until
the winter. They would then be compelled to retire
and look for supplies, and the European situation might
change in favour of the Poles. With this not very
bright prospect before them, all the troops who could
be spared were disposed along the line of earthworks,
and among them were scattered some hundreds of
devoted but untrained civilians. The total force was
not more than 26,000 strong, the regular and partially
trained soldiers being about 24,000.^ All these were
stationed close up to the works, and no provision was
made for a general reserve. If the Russians broke
through at any point, they would find no enemy between
them and the bridges across the Vistula.
On the 29th Suvorof and all his principal officers
reconnoitred the position,^ and the troops were set to
work upon the appliances necessary for a storm. On
the same day some compliments were exchanged between
the two sides, which afford a curious contrast with the
ferocity of their mutual hatred. General Bishefski,
who had been wounded and captured at Kobuilk, was
sent into Warsaw for surgical treatment, and a Russian
doctor, who had previously treated Valerian Zubof,
was released by the Poles, so that he might go to Peters-
burg where the Favourite was lying ill. But General
Zayontchek having demanded the return of Kosciusko's
baggage in a tone which Suvorof thought insulting, the
latter sent back his note with a stern warning that if
^ Suvorof himself estimated the Poles at 30,000. I have adopted
the figures of Schmidt, op. cit. 41 .
2 The Poles fired vigorously on the Staff and their escort, and
Islyenyef s horse was killed under him (Campagnes, ii. 231).
174 SUVOROF
he resisted, he and all his men would be put to the
sword.^ On the 2nd November everything was ready,
and the army, with banners displayed and music sound-
ing, moved forward into the positions marked out
for it. The enemy outposts were driven in, and the
Russians occupied a line nearly five miles in length.
Upon this a vigorous enemy would have made a sortie,
and could hardly have failed to inflict heavy damage.
But the Poles, surrendering the initiative to the other
side, remained quietly in their entrenchments, and
Suvorof's preparations went on. Derfelden and
Potyomkin, the nominal commander of Suvorof*s
own detachment, lay opposite the northern face of
the position, and Fersen opposite the eastern. During
the night of the 2nd four batteries were thrown up.
Two, mounting 48 guns, were placed in front of Fersen ;
one, with 16 guns, was to prepare Potyomkin*s attack
on Stony Hill ; and the fourth, with 22 guns, was
opposite the northern defences.
Next morning the batteries opened fire, and a brisk
reply came from the Polish artillery. After another
survey of the ground, Suvorof decided to storm that
night, relying upon surprise and the prowess of his
troops to do what had previously seemed impossible
to Fersen and his Prussian ally. Three of the columns
were composed of Fersen' s troops, all of them burning
to avenge the losses which they had suffered in the
streets of Warsaw, and Potyomkin and Derfelden pro-
vided two columns each. One of Fersen's columns
was to attack between the marsh and the Vistula,
enter Praga, and throw itself across the roads to the
bridges. On the northern front, Derfelden's first
column was to make straight for the bridges in the same
way. The fourth column, part of Potyomkin' s force,
was to attack Stony Hill. For the others were indicated
various parts of the wall and ditch. In advance of
each colunm 128 marksmen were to clear the wall of
* Campagnes, ii. 231 et seq.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR
175
the enemy, behind them came 272 pioneers with fascines
and ladders, then 30 men with picks and spades, and
behind all the infantry. Some of the cavalry had been
dismounted to complete the reserves of Derfelden's
second column and both columns of Potyomkin, in
support of the actual storming parties. But a mounted
reserve also followed each column, and as soon as the
wall was seized it was to be broken down, so as to
allow this reserve to enter with the field artillery,
The Storm of PRAGA
SCAl£' ENGUSM MILES.
The numbers refer to the
Storming Columns
complete the overthrow of the enemy in Praga, and
threaten Warsaw itself from the river bank. The
attack was to begin at 4.30 in the morning, but the
two columns of Fersen's which were to attack the
main entrenchment were ordered to start half an hour
later, in the belief that Potyomkin's attack on Stony
Hill would draw off part of the troops from the eastern
face.i
At 7 o'clock on the night of the 3rd detailed
instructions were read out to all the troops. After
^ See the detailed instructions of Suvorof, set out in CampagneSy ii.
235 ; Orlof, 78 et seq.
176 SUVOROF
describing the positions and duties of the different arms
the instructions proceeded in thoroughly Suvorovian
style :
When we advance, the troops must move quietly,
not speak a word, and not shoot.
Getting up to the wall, they are to rush forward
quickly, and at the word of command shout " Hurra ! **
The ditch reached, without losing a second, throw
your fascine into it, leap on to it, and put the ladder
up against the wall ; the marksmen to shoot the enemy
down one by one — smartly, quickly, get up two by
two ! the ladder short ? Bayonet into the wall — climb
on to it, after him another and a third. Comrade help
comrade ! Up on the wall, thrust the enemy off with
the bayonet, and in a twinkling form up beyond the
wall.
Don't bother about firing ; don't fire without need ;
beat the enemy and push him with the bayonet ; work
quickly, sharply, bravely, Russianly ! Support your
own men, in a body ; don't leave your officers. Keep
the front.
Don't run about into houses ; give quarter to the
enemy who ask for it ; don't strike the unarmed ; don't
fight with women ; don't touch boys and girls.
To those of us who die the Kingdom of Heaven ; to
the living glory, glory, glory ! i
At 5 o'clock the signal rockets went up, and the
columns moved swiftly forward. From the Polish lines
were heard the confused hum of moving and talking
men, and, nearer and more distinct, the cries of the
sentries. But the Poles had not expected an attack
so soon, and it was only by chance that Vavrzhetski
had come over to Praga at 4 o'clock. The sudden
outbreak of firing along the northern defences was his
first warning of the peril in which he stood, and soon
afterwards the leaders of Derfelden's first column were
^ Starkof, 45. Suvorof gave special instructions to Fersen's men,
just before the actual storm. Among these was an order to give
freedom and a written pass to any man who laid down his arms.
Pyetrush. ii. 109.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 177
clambering over the parapet at the point where it
began to run down steeply to the bed of the river.
This column was led by the General Lassii, who had
distinguished himself at Izmail, and he was as success-
ful on this occasion as on the first. An attempt by the
Polish cavalry to disperse his infantry was frustrated
by the timely arrival of two Russian squadrons.
His infantry reserve came up on his left, and the
artillerymen, who had been battering this part of the
defences, chafing at their enforced inactivity, hauled their
guns across the lines and opened fire at point-blank
range on the Polish emplacements. Driving the enemy
before them, the infantry pushed through the streets
of the suburb and seized the head of the nearest bridge.
The second and third columns had a comparatively
easy task. They swarmed over the defences and took
the batteries in the rear. Some Polish horse threatened
an attack, but a grenadier battalion charged them with
the bayonet, and they turned and fled. These two
columns then made for the bridges. The fourth
column, attacking Stony Hill, met with more difficulty.
The fire from the guns and musketry was at this point
very fierce. Nevertheless, throwing away their fascines,
the men swarmed over the wolf holes and the palisade,
and carried the batteries beyond with the bayonet.
The slaughter here was great, and of a battalion of
500 Jews, which fought with the greatest courage, not
a single man survived.
As had been expected, the furious fighting at the angle
of the defences sensibly lightened the task of the two
columns attacking the eastern face. Fersen's men
got quickly over the trenches, and drove the enemy
through the streets of Praga towards the bridges. The
seventh column turned the Polish detached line between
its left wing and the marsh, some of the men plunging
into the water up to their waists, and the defenders
fell back hurriedly. Their retreat was cut off by the
cavalry, and they were driven back into the narrow
N
178 SUVOROF
angle formed by the bank of the river and the marshy
stream. There, in full view of the inhabitants of
Warsaw, they maintained for a short time a desperate
resistance. But at last, when many had been killed
and some drowned in attempting to escape by swimming,
the rest laid down their arms. About 1300 prisoners
were taken at this point, and rather more were killed
or drowned. The victors then dashed on with all speed,
crossed the stream and joined with the first and fifth
columns at the bridges. These were set on fire, and
the retreat of the rest of the defenders was altogether
cut off.
It was now day, and the Poles had been completely
defeated. Vavrzhetski had escaped, forcing his way
across a bridge through a mass of fugitives, but some
thousands of men remained penned in the streets,
unable to advance or retreat, falling at every moment
under the pitiless fire of the Russian artillery or the
bayonets or sabres of the troops who now pressed in
from every side. There took place one of those scenes
which sometimes remind even historians of the essential
beastliness of war. It will never be known whether
soldiers or civilians first fired from the houses. But the
Russians found themselves assailed with every sort of
missile, fired or flung from the windows or the roofs,
and in defiance of Suvorof's express orders, no less
than of the ordinary dictates of humanity, they began
an indiscriminate massacre. Soldiers and civilians,
men, women, and children, perished wretchedly. There
was no escape to Warsaw. Some had crossed the
bridges before the approaches were cut. Others were
less fortunate. They took to boats, but these were
overcrowded, and some sank with all on board. A few
people tried to swim across and were drowned. Suvorof,
seeing that the men had got completely out of hand,
sent an officer into the town to urge the civilian in-
habitants to flee towards the Russian camp, and many
escaped in this way. But a large number died amongst
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 179
the ruins of Praga. The burning bridges set fire to
the houses, and a great part of the suburb was burnt
to ashes. The whole scene of slaughter, with the glare
and roar of the flames and the stifling smoke, the
stamping, shouting combatants, and the yells and
screams of the women and children as the raving
savages fell upon them in places from which there was
no escape, made an impression upon the minds of the
Polish nation that will never be effaced.
It is easy to provide explanations, or even partial
excuses. Many of the victors had not long before
barely escaped with their lives from the pitiless pursuit
of the Warsaw mob. The custom of the time allowed
plunder after a storm, and plunder always leads to
murder. The soldiers, fighting in a narrow street, and
suddenly attacked from behind, behaved like wild
beasts out of fear. The numbers of the victims were
in any case exaggerated. This is true enough, and
there have been similar episodes in the history of most
European armies of the same or even later date.
Nevertheless, the storm of Praga, though a bold feat
of arms, remains a blot on the fame of the Russian
troops and their leader. Suvorof had given express
orders that no violence should be done to women and
children. But his account of the storm contains no
reference to the unnecessary horrors which accompanied
it, and it is not recorded that he addressed any rebuke
to the guilty troops. On the other hand, admitting
the brutality of the troops and the impotence of Suvorof
to check it, the storm of Praga was not as bad as it
has been represented by contemporary or recent enemies
of Russia. The Russian soldier, like other Slavs, will
kill, in the heat of battle, anything that gets in his
way. But there is no race, except the Jewish, with
which he would not rather eat and drink than fight.
The atrocities committed at Praga were local and
temporary, and the slaughter was not continued after
the battle. The Polish army lost about 10,000 killed,
180 SUVOROF
and the prisoners, wounded and unwounded, were about
12,000.1 The proportion of killed is frightfully high.
But this was the last battle of the war. Putting aside
the question where the right lay between Russians and
Poles, Suvorof was right in claiming that one massacre
which ends a rebellion is better than the long-protracted
killing which goes on during guerilla warfare. But
posterity, which acquits him of mere lust for blood,
does not put aside the major question, and the States
which bear the guilt of originating the war must answer
for every act of each of their ministers.
Even before the last of the defenders of Praga had
laid down their arms, the Russian cannon were firing
across the river into Warsaw itself, and one shell killed
the secretary of the Council of the Republic during a
sitting of the Council. The whole city was in a panic,
and a stream of vehicles and foot passengers poured
out from the western gates. The inhabitants demanded
a capitulation, the King supported them, and even
Vavrzhetski, who was still for a prolongation of the
war, consented to abandon the defence of the capital.
A deputation was therefore sent by the City Govern-
ment to Suvorof. In the early hours of the morning,
in a boat followed so far as the darkness would permit
by the anxious gaze of an enormous crowd, the repre-
sentatives of the citizens crossed the river. After some
delay, they were brought to Suvorof, who was sitting on a
log of wood in front of his tent, with his sword across his
knees. They approached with hesitation. Seeing their
doubt, he leaped to his feet, flung away his sword,
cried out in Polish, " Peace, peace ! " and embraced
them. The deputies threw themselves on their knees
before him, but he raised them and led them into his
tent, where he offered them wine and zakuski.2 The
^ Orlof, 66 et seq. ; Starkof, 43 et seq. ; Schmidt, op. cit. ; CampagneSy
ii. 235 et seq. ; " Memoirs of Denisof " in Rtiss. Star. (1874), ii. Suvorof s
account of the storm is set out in Orlof, 113 et seq.
2 Zakuski are the miscellaneous sardines, smoked fish, pickles, and
so forth by which Russians stimulate their appetites before a large
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 181
poor men were utterly overcome by these actions on
the part of such a terrible enemy, and more than one
of them burst into tears. The negotiations were brief.
The terms finally arranged were that all arms and cannon
were to be deposited in a suitable place outside the
city ; the bridges were to be repaired at once and the
Russians admitted ; all Poles were to be dismissed to
their homes, with all their private property untouched,
immediately after laying down their arms ; the King
was to receive royal honours ; the civilian inhabitants
were to receive no injury in persons or goods or other
property ; the Russians were to enter the city the
same day, or the day after, if a bridge was not ready
sooner.
These terms lacked nothing of generosity, and the
deputies returned to the anxious crowd on the other
bank. The boats approached at full speed, and the
cries of " Peace, peace ! " which the excited messengers
began to utter were taken up and answered by the
populace with the wildest enthusiasm. The deputies
were snatched from the boats and carried up the bank
with shouts. But this was only the attitude of the
citizens. The military men were made of fiercer stuff.
Vavrzhetski refused to give up his arms. On the morn-
ing of the 7th, the deputies started again on their
anxious journey. Suvorof refused to abate his terms,
except to say that he would not enter the town until
the 9th, and his own men would help to repair the
bridge. If the Polish army would not give up its arms,
it must evacuate the city without delay. After this
announcement, he ordered Fersen and Derfelden to
cross the Vistula in boats above Warsaw, and prepare
to cut off the retreat of Vavrzhetski. He had to post-
pone his entry still further, and finally agreed that it
should not take place until the 12th November. But
before dawn on the 9th came an earnest request that
meal. They are eaten by the guests standing at a side-table, or even
in an ante-room.
182 SUVOROF
he should lead his men in at the earliest possible moment.
Already the irreconcilables were restive, and even the
King might soon be in danger. The triumphal entry
was actually made on the 10th, after the bulk of the
Polish military stores had been successfully removed.
Suvorof, wearing a plain uniform, and without his
Orders, received the city keys and bread and salt at
the Warsaw end of the bridge. Russian authorities
speak of the cheering crowds in the streets, the shouts
for Catherine and Suvorof, and the tears which sprang
to his eyes as he thanked God that he had not had to
deal with Warsaw as he had dealt with Praga. All
this is true enough, and it was not Suvorof s way to
abuse a victory. But there has always been a noble
soldier to do the work of a bad cause, and posterity
will not allow one example of personal magnanimity to
dull its memory of Praga and the Second Partition.
Suvorof represented the strength, but not the policy
of Russia, and the Poles who remained at home and
cursed, or trudged out of the city in the train of
Vavrzhetski and Dombrovski, understood what had
happened better than those who crowded the streets
to welcome him into Warsaw.
In dealing with popular risings of this kind there is
one cardinal error which may be committed by a Govern-
ment : the excessive application of force. Suvorof,
or rather Suvorof s army, had already been guilty of a
massacre of innocent people, and this could not be for-
gotten. But he refrained from the additional folly of
courts - martial, executions, and oppressive fines, and
observed the golden rule, not to do anything which
it would afterwards be out of his power to undo. Very
much to the disgust of the aristocracy of Petersburg,
he made no forced levy upon the inhabitants of Warsaw,
proclaimed a general amnesty, and gave a free pass
to any soldier who laid down his arms at any moment
before battle was joined.^ At the personal request
1 Voronis. Arch, xii. 142, 384.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 183
of King Stanislav he released one of the officers taken
at Praga, and of his own free will released 500 others,
sending the order after the convoy of prisoners, which
was already well on its way to Kief.^ The news of the
general amnesty was more destructive of the Polish
army than even such bloody defeats as they had already
sustained at the hands of Suvorof. Some units sur-
rendered on being overtaken by Russian troops, others
did not wait for a summons. Pickets disappeared,
scouts never returned from their expeditions, artillery-
men and waggoners cut their traces and galloped off
with their horses. In ten days after the Russian entry
into Warsaw even the detachments of irreconcilables
like Vavrzhetski and Dombrovski had melted away.
By the 1st December thirty thousand free passes,
given on the sole condition that the bearers went quietly
to their homes, had completed the work of Kobrin,
Brest, Kobuilk, and Praga. The Polish insurrection
was at an end, and the Polish State with it.
Rewards were showered upon the conqueror. After
the victory at Brest, Catherine had presented him with
a diamond-embroidered ribbon for his hat, and three
pieces of cannon out of those which he had captured.
After the capture of Praga she sent him a field-marshal's
baton studded with jewels, and valued at 15,000 roubles,
and endowed him with an estate and 7000 serfs, part
of the property of the unhappy King of Poland. She
wrote to him at the same time that she never promoted
any man except in order of seniority, " but you, by
your own exploits, have made yourself Field Marshal." 2
The King of Prussia sent him the Orders of the Red
and the Black Eagles, and the Emperor his portrait
set in jewels. The receipt of the long-coveted rank
of Field-Marshal filled him with delight, and his high
spirits broke out as usual into extravagance. On the
day on which he went to church to return thanks for
1 Campagnes, ii. 280.
2 State Archives, v. 116 ; printed in Russ. Star. (1892), Ixxiv. 37.
184 SUVOROF
his promotion, he set a number of stools in a row, and
in the presence of his officers leapt over them one
after the other, saying " Over Ryepnin — over Saltikof —
over Prozorovski '* — reciting with each leap the name
of some senior general, whom he had passed in the race
for promotion. After this he put on his new uniform
and all his orders, and went solemnly to church.^ The
most interesting, and probably the most gratifying of
all these honours was the tobacco-box presented to
him by the town of Warsaw itself, with the inscription
" Warsaw to her deliverer." This was no doubt the
gift of the owners of property, who felt that only Suvorof
stood between them and Jacobinism. The economic
state of that country may be imagined, where foreign
conquest seems less terrible than domestic revolution.
Two things are necessary for suppressing national
risings : unhesitating energy in the military operations,
and the most ostentatious clemency immediately armed
resistance is at an end. Complete success may not
always be achieved with these, but it will never be
achieved without them. So far as Suvorof was free
to act according to his own judgement, he had done
well. He had spared the conquered, while striking
down the arrogant. He had had the opportunity of
behaving like one of Plutarch's heroes, and he had used
it with delight. But the Empress and her advisers
were less magnanimous. On the 2nd December he
received detailed instructions for levying a contribution
upon Warsaw, the arrest of the leaders of the April
rising, and the confiscation of public archives and pro-
perty, including the famous Zaluski Library. The con-
tribution was not levied, but the plunder and a few
prisoners were sent to Petersburg, where the books
formed the nucleus of the great Imperial Library. It
1 This anecdote is told by many contemporaries, including De
S6gur, who says the scene took place " in church." His promotion
offended not a few of these rivals, and the complaints of one of them
were so loud that he was dismissed from the service. Voronis. Arch.
xii. 144.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 185
was also by Imperial orders that Derfelden harried
the private estates of Prince Czartoryski, a large
quantity of books, pictures, and furniture being wantonly
destroyed. These systematic outrages, and the indis-
criminate plundering, which marked and marks the
presence of every Russian army in a foreign country,
undid much of the good work done by Suvorof 's clemency,
and the conquest of 1794 remained the bitterest of
Polish memories until obliterated by the still greater
savagery of 1868.
Suvorof's fame was now European. The Turkish
wars had concerned only the statesmen of Western
Europe, the overthrow of Poland aroused the interest,
and often the sympathy, of the peoples. The conqueror
was most often represented in an unfavourable light.
Thus a caricature of the English Rowlandson repre-
sents him as a monster, introducing to his Imperial
mistress a train of slaves bearing dishes full of the
heads of massacred Polish women and children. Those
foreign visitors, who knew his private enemies better
than himself, took the worst possible view of his un-
polished manners and his fantastic appearance, as well
as of his military performances. One writes of him,
after his return to Petersburg, as
A little old man, wizened and crooked, who crosses
the rooms of the Palace with a one-footed skip, or runs
and gambols in the streets, followed by a troop of
children, to whom he throws apples to make them fight,
crying himself " I'm Suvorof ! I'm Suvorof ! " If
the foreigner has difficulty in recognising in this old mad
man the conqueror of the Turks and the Poles, it will
not be difficult for him to suspect in these wild and
haggard eyes and this horrible foaming mouth, the cut-
throat of Praga. Suvorof would be merely the most
ridiculous of buffoons, if he had not shown himself
the most barbarous of warriors. He is a monster,
whose monkey body holds the soul of a butcher's dog.
Attila, his countryman and perhaps his ancestor, was
neither so lucky nor so savage. His vulgar and farcical
186 SUVOROF
■>> S J )
behaviour has inspired the soldiers with blind confidence,
which served him instead of military talents, and was
the real cause of his successes. . . . He sheds blood by
instinct, like the tiger. . . . His exploits in Poland
are those of a brigand. He massacred the remains
of an army already defeated by Fersen and deprived
of the gallant Kosciusko, who gave it all its strength.
Suvorof, embracing the inhabitants of Warsaw, and
granting them pardon over the corpses of twenty
thousand citizens of every age and every sex, resembles
a satiated tiger, who plays with his prey over the offal
of liis den. . . . This cruel man has nevertheless some
virtues ... he values money as little as human blood.
. . . Such is the too celebrated Suvorof.^
This is obviously a clever distortion of the truth.
Popular feeling always requires a hero or a villain. It
cannot spend itself sufficiently on causes and institu-
tions. The man who had done most in the field to
throw Poland under the feet of her oppressors was
thus made responsible for all their crimes. Many other
incidents, carefully preserved from these Warsaw days,
give a more accurate picture of him. The comic is
there, though the monstrous is not. His overwhelming
successes, his honours, his unbounded authority, and
his opportunities of displaying magnanimity to the
fallen, gave Suvorof perpetual pleasure, and his high
spirits as usual found vent in all sorts of freaks.^ These
stories are from the notes of one of his own officers.^
Soon after his arrival at Warsaw, the Due de Polignac *
called upon him. Suvorof kept him waiting an hour
in the ante-room, then popped out of his cabinet, bent
1 Masson, MhnoireSy etc., sur la Russie, 310 et seq. The malicious
innuendo "to make them fight" is a very artistic addition to the
doubtless accurate description of Suvorof throwing apples to children
in the streets.
* As one admirer in Petersburg put it : " Suvorof covers himself
with glory in Warsaw. He won't stop playing the fool. But that apart,
he's a marvel." {Voronts. Arch. xii. 144.)
' Reminiscences of Engelhardt.
* Duke Jules de Polignac, Postmaster-General of Louis XVI. He
emigrated in 1789, and received an estate in the Ukraine from Catherine.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 187
double, with his hands on his stomach, and crying out,
" Oh ! this damned colic ! It's kept you waiting an
hour ! " Then they began to talk. All went well
until De Polignac discreetly but unwisely expectorated
into his handkerchief. Suvorof immediately leapt away
with a shriek, " Oh ! Oh ! '* and began to clear his
throat loudly and spit on the floor. His body-servant
Proshka solemnly presented De Polignac with a clean
handkerchief, taking the dirty one away, while another
servant paraded the room burning incense. De Polignac
looked at this performance with perfect composure,
and Suvorof, delighted to find him made of such sturdy
material, began to treat him affectionately, and they
remained fast friends.
At a morning service Suvorof suddenly cried out,
" A stink ! a stink ! " His adjutant. Count Stolipin,
knowing that he must do something at once, walked
round the Church, found a dirty old woman in the porch,
ordered her to be taken out, and returned. "Well?"
asked Suvorof. " Dirty old woman, Your Excellency,"
was the reply. " Pah ! beastly ! " and he was quiet
for the rest of the service. Unfortunately, his general
adjutants Tishtshenko and Tikhanovski told him, after
the service, that the smell really came from the soldiers
and not from the old woman. Stolipin had lied to
keep him quiet. After dinner Stolipin, as usual, brought
the Field Marshal his glass of vodka. Suvorof refused
to drink, and said to his neighbour, " He's fooling me ;
says ' water.' " ^ Stolipin thereupon loudly repeated,
" Vodka, Your Excellency ! " " Ha ! " said Suvorof,
" he's angry " ; and he refused again to drink. " Fooling
me, fooling me." Stolipin, really annoyed, declared
that he was forbidden by his patent of nobility to tell
lies. But the old man only repeated, " Angry, angry,"
and Stolipin retired in high dudgeon. This scene was
repeated, according to the narrator, every day for
several weeks.
^ The Russian word for water is voda.
188 SUVOROF
The officer who has preserved these stories was him-
self the unhappy victim of one of their hero's outbreaks.
He was dining with Suvorof, and was rash enough to
smile at the punctiliousness with which the vodka was
handed round to the guests in order of seniority. Suvorof
leaped up, screaming, " He stinks, he stinks ! '* and
fled into another room. They opened a window, but
all in vain. Suvorof continued, " Stinks, stinks I "
Then at last, " There's a skunk at the table ! " The
adjutant understood. He approached the guest, ex-
plained that he was wearing dirty boots, and must go
out and clean them. The officer took the hint and went
home.
Another subordinate gives a picture of Suvorof at an
inspection of troops during his survey of his district
in August 1795. Two regiments of cavalry and one of
infantry lay at Nemirov, on the Bug. About midday
Suvorof appeared on horseback, accompanied by three
staff officers and a Cossack. He galloped in among
the infantry, resting after their dinner, and called for
a veteran drummer, " Yakof Vassilyevitch Kislyakof ! "
The drummer ran up, and Suvorof ordered him to beat
the alarm. The men fell in, and were promptly marched
off towards the river. Cavalry and infantry plunged
in and crossed, the footmen up to their shoulders in
the water. On the other side they marched ten miles,
Suvorof still at their head, and then carried out a sham
fight. There followed a speech from Suvorof, with
some quotations from his Science of Victory, and a
rebuke to the commander of one of the cavalry regi-
ments for some defects in the housing of his men. Then
he chatted with his old acquaintances in the ranks,
praised the units which had distinguished themselves
in the campaign, bade farewell, and galloped away.i
But there was no period in Suvorof's military career
in which he was so little occupied with military affairs
as during his occupation of Poland. His hold over
1 Starkof.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 189
his troops became in fact rather slack, and there is
considerable evidence of peculation and want of dis-
cipline among his officers.^ He was engaged in the
despatch to Petersburg of the wretched King of Poland,
the political prisoners, and the Imperial and military
plunder. His correspondence with Khvostof shows
him as more cheerful than might have been expected,
speculating about the chances of service in an Austrian
expedition against France, and worrying most about
the blot on his own honour involved in the prolonged
confinement of Kosciusko and his companions. At
the end of October 1795 an Imperial rescript sum-
moned him back to Petersburg. Nothing was left to
do but partition Poland. The hunter had brought
down the quarry, and the scullions could cut it up
without his help.
Avoiding ceremony, and taking great pains to avoid
triumphal receptions by the way, he set out in his plain
carriage. One scene deserves to be recorded here. On
the first or second night after he left Warsaw he found
quarters prepared for him in a little house. The guest
room had the usual big stove in it, and the responsible
officer had forgotten to turn out the old woman who was
accustomed, in Russian fashion, to sleep on the top
of the stove. Suvorof in due course entered, stripped
himself naked, splashed himself with cold water, and
began to prance about the room, reciting at the top
of his voice, and in the original tongue, some verses
from the Koran. At this point the old woman became
aware that something was going on. Seeing the strange
sight, and hearing the strange sound, she concluded
that she was in the presence of the Devil himself, and
ejaculated, with pious terror, " Avaunt ! The Heavenly
powers are with us ! " Suvorof, on his part, was hardly
less frightened by this sudden yell from the stove, and
shouted with equal force. Help came, the old woman
was removed, and the Terror of the Turks and the Poles
^ See, e.g., the Memoirs of Denisof and Engelhardt,
190 SUVOROF
recovered his self-possession and went to sleep.i But
for this incident his journey was unexciting.
On the 15th January 1796 he reached Petersburg,
where the Empress received him with special marks of
distinction. He was lodged in the Taurid Palace, the
large, dull edifice which Catherine had presented to
Potyomkin. In deference to his peculiar tastes, all
the mirrors were draped with cloth, and a straw mattress
was laid on the floor in his bedroom. His usual plain-
ness of manners went with his usual elaboration of
Court etiquette, and the great woman must sometimes
have been embarrassed by his profound obeisances
and fervent professions of loyalty.^ But she showed
him every possible kindness. At his request she made
Khvostof a Gentleman-in- Waiting, and when somebody
suggested that the honour was not deserved, she replied :
" If Suvorof had asked for it, I should have made him
a Lady-in- Waiting." ® At a ball at the Winter Palace
she asked him, " How am I to treat so dear a guest ? *'
" Blessed Empress," was the answer, " a drop of vodka."
" Fi done ! " said Her Majesty, " what will the Ladies-
in- Waiting say when they talk to you ? " " They will
feel, little mother, that they're talking to a soldier."
She gave him the vodka, and he drank her health.
Then he knelt before her, and cried out : " Your
Majesty's condescension makes me your slave. I will
die for my mother Catherine ! " " Live," said she very
properly, " for the glory of your country." *
On another occasion he entered her room and
prostrated himself three times before the ikon; then,
turning round, made the same obeisance to her. She
did her best to prevent him. " Mercy, Alexander
Vassilyevitch," she exclaimed, " what are you doing ? "
And she raised him and seated him beside her.
1 I have not found the authority for this anecdote. Pyetrushevski
assumes its truth, and I have copied it from him.
* Istoritcheskii Vyestnik (1900), Ixxx. 526.
3 Russ. Star. (1900), li. 573.
* Fuchs, Misc. 107.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 191
" Mother," he cried, " after God, you are my only
hope." ^ Catherine could not endure very much of
this sort of thing, and her willingness to find work for
Suvorof at a distance from the Court was perhaps
encouraged by Platon Zubof. This young man, con-
sidering that the favourite of Catherine was not the
inferior of any of her subjects, treated the conqueror of
Praga with familiarity. When he paid a formal visit
to the Taurid Palace, Suvorof determined to put him
in his right place, and received him in his shirt.^ After
a few weeks of Court life, which he made as uncomfort-
able as possible for the Court, he left Petersburg, to
take up his next command, in the Governments of
Vratslav, Voznyesensk, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkof, and
the Crimea. In the middle of March he reached his
headquarters at Tultchin.
Here he remained for some months, fighting with
his usual enemies — excessive sickness, arrears of pay,
desertions, bad feeding, and bad housing of the troops.
His chief object was to get an army into good condi-
tion for the approaching war with France. But the
designation of Platon Zubof as commander of a Persian
expedition aroused all his old jealousy, and the faithful
Khvostof received the usual letters, but rather more
sarcastic and less clamorously complaining than before.
The same correspondence shows that he was making
occasionally gifts of money to poor relations, officers
in needy circumstances, and other less deserving
acquaintances. Egoism and generosity as usual
flourished in him together, and there is in existence
a letter from his nephew. Count Alexyei Gortchakof, to
Khvostof, which shows the young man busily engaged in
flattering his petulant and jealous old uncle, making
himself indispensable to him, and getting two pro-
motions in three years without any particular merits
or services. When he was not thinking of his own
1 Rtiss. Star. (1892), Ixiii. 39.
2 Otyetchestvenniya Zapiski (1841), 1.
192 SUVOROF
wrongs, Suvorof could be lavish in gifts of money and
was ready enough to get jobs for his relations and
friends. His own work was thoroughly done, and it
was at Tultchin that his system of military training
was brought to perfection.
At one moment in this period he came into contact
with Grimm. At the latter's request Suvorof sent him
a silhouette portrait. The portrait was enclosed in a
letter overflowing with those precepts which ran so
easily down the writer's pen.
I ought in everything to tread in the steps of your
Excellency's wisdom, so renowned in Europe. The
immortality of learning brings it nearer than all else
to the divine. Its influence raises us to the loftiest
heights of well-doing. It inspires in us the noble and
sacred resolution to live for the common good. From
it we study not to think of self, to scorn the vicissitudes
of fortune, and to sacrifice ourselves for country and
mankind.
Praise to the Lord of Hosts ! I shall acquit myself
according to your rules.^
In his work with his men he showed himself not
inconsistent with these lofty sentiments. It was in
1796 that he cast into its final form his famous Nduka
Pobyezhdat or Science of Victory, containing those^
principles which were to him the Alpha and the Omega
of the art of war. This little book is of great importance,
not only because it explains Suvorof's own method, but
because it has been the foundation of all Russian
military training since his death. Dragomirof, the
brain of the Russian army during the Japanese War,
was an avowed disciple of Suvorof, and the heroic
struggles in the Carpathians and Armenia during the
recent war were carried on in the spirit of the same
tradition. It is in the Science of Victory, first sketched
in the Polish War, and elaborated during the drills
1 This was copied by Grimm, and is printed in the Correspondence
of Catherine II, with Grimm, 274,
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 193
and sham fights of Tultchin, that we find the rules
for converting mobs of illiterate peasants into soldiers
capable of almost incredible feats of physical strength
and endurance.^
The dominant principle is to teach the soldier to
go and meet danger and not to wait for it. Rules for
retreat find no place in the book ; every instruction,
directly or indirectly, bears upon movement in the
direction of the enemy. It is divided into two parts.
The first, entitled Wachtparad, consists of technical
terms of drill and their explanation. The second,
Verbal Instruction of the Troops^ is a collection of rules,
maxims, aphorisms, and exhortations, directed towards
the moral inspiration rather than the technical training
of the soldier. This second part deserves extensive
quotation. It is a complete exposition of Suvorof's
military creed.
Boots close together, knees pressed ; the soldiers
stand like a needle ; I see the fourth man, not the
fifth.
The military step is a yard, in deploying a yard and
a half ; keep your distance.
The soldier in front on the march dresses by the
elbow, three paces from rank to rank ; on the march,
two ; no bother with drums.
Keep a bullet for three days, sometimes for a whole
campaign, when there's no need to use it. Shoot
rarely, and when you do, aim ; with the bayonet strike
hard ; the bullet misses, the bayonet doesn't miss ;
the bullet's a fool, the bayonet's a fine lad.
Strike once — ^throw the pagan from your bayonet ;
dead on your bayonet, one strikes at your neck with
his sword. Sword at your neck — jump back a pace,
hit again, strike another, strike a third ; a champion
will kill half-a-dozen, and I have seen more. Keep
the bullet in your musket ; three leap at you — ^knock
down the first, shoot the second, do in the third with
the bayonet.
^ The book was first published by Antonovski in 1805, and has been
several times reprinted. It is set out in full in Pyetrush. ii. 455 et seq.
O
194 SUVOROF
Never pull up during an attack.
Fuse in the grape-shot — throw yourself at the grape-
shot ; it flies over your head ; the guns are yours, the
men are yours — halt on the spot, chase, strike, give
quarter to the survivors ; it*s a sin to kill without need,
Wxey're only men like you.
Die for the Royal House, for your Little Mother, for
the most famous House ; the Church will pray God for
you. To him who survives, honour and glory.
Don't hurt civilians, they give us food and drink ; a
soldier is not a footpad. Booty is sacred ; take a
camp, and all is yours ; take a fortress, and all is yours.
In Izmail, besides that, they shared gold and silver in
handfuls ; and so in many places.
Without orders no going after plunder.
There follow brief descriptions of different " battles '* ;
battle on the field, battle in the trenches.
The ditch isn't deep, the wall isn't high ; fling your-
self into the ditch ; leap over the wall, charge with the
bayonet, strike, chase, take prisoner.
Storm.
The enemy runs into the town, turn his guns against
him, fire hard down the streets, keep up a lively bom-
bardment ; go after him at once . . . the enemy
surrenders, spare him ; the walls occupied, after the
plunder.
The three military arts^ First — ^Apprehension,^ how
to arrange things in camp, how to march, how to
attack, pursue, and strike ; for taking up position,
final judgement of the enemy's strength, for estimating
his intentions.
Second — Quickness. . . .
There followed detailed instructions for marches,
with necessary halts every six miles, four hours' rest
midday and six or eight at night.
* The Russian word glazomir means literally " eye-measure."
The French coup (Tosil comes near it, but there is no exact English
translation.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 195
This quickness doesn't weary the men. The enemy
doesn't expect us, reckons us 100 versts away, and if a
long way off to begin with — 200, 300 or more — suddenly
we're on him, like snow on the head ; his head spins.
Attack with what comes up, with what God sends ;
the cavalry to begin, smash, strike, cut off, don't let
slip, hurra !
Brothers do miracles.
Third — Attack. Leg supports leg, arm strengthens
arm ; many men will die in the volley ; the enemy has
the same weapons, but he doesn't know the Russian
bayonet. Extend the line — ^attack at once with cold
steel ; extend the line without stopping. . . . The
Cossacks to get through everywhere. ... In two
lines is strength ; in three, half as much again ; the
first breaks, the second drives into heaps, the third
overthrows.
Then follow some improvisations on his favourite
theme, the terrors of military hospitals.
Fear the hospital — German drugs are deadly at a
distance ; utterly useless and harmful ; the Russian
soldier is not used to them ; we have in our own stores
roots, herbs, grasses. A soldier is precious ; be careful
of your health ; clear out your bowels if you're stopped
up ; hunger's the best remedy. Who doesn't look
after his men — ^for the officer arrest ; for the sergeant
and corporal the horse ; and the horse for every one
who doesn't look after himself. . . . Remember,
men, the field medicine of Staff Surgeon Byelopolski;
in fever eat nothing for twelve days, and drink soldier's
kvass, which is also a remedy ; and in ague neither
eat nor drink — punishment for whoever doesn't look
after himself. ... In the camp, sick and weak ;
invalids in huts, not in villages — ^better air. . . . No
need to regret money spent on drugs, if there's any-
where to buy them. . . . But all that is unimportant,
we'll understand how to look after ourselves ; where
one man in a hundred dies, we shall lose less in a month
out of five hundred. . . .
Champions, the enemy trembles at us, but there is
another enemy . . . the damned can't-tell-er, hinter,
guesser, white -liar, smooth -tongue, gossip, double-
196 SUVOROF
meaner, sleek-talker, thickhead. . . . From the can't-
tell-er come many disasters. For the can*t-tell officer
arrest, and for the staff officer from the chief downwards
confinement to quarters.^
The soldier's duty is to be healthy, brave, hard»
resolute, truthful, honourable. Pray to God — from Him
is victory. Demigods, God leads us. He is our general.
Study is light, idleness darkness ; the proof of the
pudding is in the eating, and if the peasant doesn't
know how to work his plough, the corn doesn't grow.
One trained man is worth three untrained ; three's too
little for us ; give us six, give us ten to one — we shall
beat them all, crowd them up, take them prisoners. In
the last campaign the enemy lost 75,000 men by count,
just not 100,000 ; he fought cleverly and desperately,
but we didn't lose a full thousand. There, brothers, is
the training of a soldier ; gentlemen officers, what a
triumph I
Finally come the words to be spoken at the dismissal
from parade, after the necessary praise or blame of the
behaviour of the troops. They are
Subordination, discipline, cleanliness, health, neat-
ness, bravery, daring, courage, victory, glory, glory,
glory!
This Suvorovian war gospel is a priceless document,
and explains both leader and followers at once. The
simple Russian peasant was not a fit subject for instruc-
tion in complicated movements. But his incomparable
patience and docility made him as clay in the hands of
the potter to a commander who could win his affection
and his trust, and when well led he would go forward
as long as he could move one foot before the other. He
^ His hatred of the " can't-tell-er " (nyemoguznaik) was unquenchable.
He was continually putting questions to officers and men, and cared
little about the absurdity of the answer, so long as it was prompt. " If
he asked you, ' Where's Calcutta ? ' you might answer, ' On the Missis-
sippi,' and so long as it came smartly he would think you a splendid
fellow and embrace you with all his heart " (" Memoirs of Theodor
G. Golovkin," in Istor. Vyestnik (1900), Ixxx. 537). There are countless
stories on this subject, most of them of the " well-found " kind.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 197
was a bad marksman, and at Kinburn Suvorof had
had to denounce shooting without aim, and especially
shooting from the rear rank over the heads of the men
in front. The man who fired away his ammunition
too fast was threatened with the penalty of running
the gauntlet.! But in bayonet fighting the immobility
of the Russian soldier made him most formidable. " In
every case," said Suvorof at Kinburn, " the most
damaging of our weapons is our terrible bayonet, with
which our soldiers are incomparably the best in the
world." 2 It was not the least valuable quality of the
Russian infantryman that he literally did not know
how to retreat. But where an offensive did actually
fail, this incapacity was very serious in circumstances
where above all others individual resource and initia-
tive were required. To teach him that he had nothing
more to learn, that he was capable of dealing with every
problem that could possibly confront him, was all very
well so long as he could still advance. But once his
formation was broken by superior strength, as the
massed artillery of Napoleon afterwards showed, he
became a mere unit in a mob, still capable of patient
suffering, but difficult to extricate and replace in an
orderly array. .
We have been provided with a description of the
Suvorovian system at work during the Polish War.
A number of foreign officers had the opportunity of
watching the Russian troops, and in 1796 Major Vronski
collected the opinions of some Prussian and Austrian
officers, and set them out in a report to the Empress.
Vronski himself was not a partisan of Suvorof s, but his
report is on the whole very favourable to his system.
It declared that he was a very wise, very virtuous,
and very noble man, who nevertheless had the weakness
^ Instructions at Kinburn, in Pyetrof (second War), i. 18. At the
battle of the Alma it was noticed that many of the men in the Russian
columns fired in the air in the same way as at Kinburn.
2 Ibid.
198 SUVOROF
of judging others by his own standards, and was conse-
quently incapable of understanding that they could
deceive him, when in fact they most emphatically did
deceive him. He was richly endowed with military
gifts, but declined to follow the conventional rules of
tactics, and tried to open the road to a revolution in
military science. After praising the quality of the
soldiers, the report points out that they could be beaten
in the moment of victory, partly because of their dis-
position to break their formation, and partly because
of their drunkenness. Their successes hitherto had
been against enemies who could not take advantage of
their weaknesses. They were not trained to retire,
and if attacked while in disorder were quickly defeated ;
even the generals did not know how to withdraw their
men. But the Russian patience made their armies
hard to beat ; and victory could only be won over
them by manoeuvres which prevented them from
getting to close quarters with the bayonet, by feigned
retreats which broke up their formations, and by steady
and sustained fire, which was especially effective against
Cossacks.^
This is a very just estimate, and it applies as forcibly
to the Russian soldier of later times as to Suvorof*s
own men. The principles of the Science of Victory
have been the basis of Russian infantry training for
more than a century. Careless of appearances, and
careful of the essential obedience, patience, and indif-
ference to losses in the field, the Russian infantry have
always been ineffective with the rifle, terrible with the
bayonet, and as clumsily passive in retreat as they
have been vigorous, persistent, and tireless in advance.
Under Suvorof they became the most formidable in
1 Suae Archives, vii. 2898 ; quoted in Pyetnish. ii. x. 292. Sir Robert
Wilson, the British officer attached to the Russian armies which served
against Napoleon, refers to the Russian incapacity for movements
" not in union with Suvorof's practice," and adds, " The most difficult
of human operations to the year 1807 was the conduct of a Russian
retreat." See his Brief Remarks^ etc. on the Russian Army, 2.
THE SECOND POLISH WAR 199
Europe, and though Wellington's Peninsular troops
would have beaten them as they beat the French, by-
superior musketry, there was no other infantry in Europe
which they need have feared to meet. Out of this
training school at Tultchin came the system, moral
rather than tactical, which in 1799 overthrew French
armies, and with wiser statesmanship would have
overthrown the French Republic. There is no reason
to suppose that Napoleon himself, in his Italian period,
would have been able to defeat Suvorof. But on the
17th November 1796 ^Catherine died, and with her
vanished the Field-Marshal's opportunity of meeting
the first soldier of France.
CHAPTER VIII
DOWNFALL AND EXILE
Paul I. and Pnissianism — Suvorof fails to please — Dismissed — ^Exiled —
Troubles with his wife and his property — His son — ^Daily life —
Recalled — Recalcitrant — Plans for a French War — Meditates a
monastery — ^Recalled again, 1799 — War at last.
Whatever faults there may have been in Suvorof s
military method, there can be no doubt that it was
better than that which paralysed the army after the
accession of the Emperor Paul. Even before he became
Emperor, Paul had been passionately devoted to
military exercises, and, unfortunately, the Prussian
blight had fallen upon him more completely than upon
any other person of equal importance in Europe. His
character was extremely complex, and he passed from
one mood to another with bewildering and dangerous
facility. He was often magnanimous, and one of his
first public acts as Emperor was to pardon and release
Kosciusko and the other leaders of the Polish insurrec-
tion. But he was equally capable of severity, and a
personal interview with him was as likely to end in
exile to Siberia as in promotion in the State service.
This instability of temper made his interest in the
affairs of the army extremely unpleasant for officers
and men alike. Before he ascended the throne, he had
made a tour of Europe, and became a fanatical admirer
of Frederick the Great. Upon him he modelled his
life, and especially his military life. At his country
seat at Gatchina he collected and trained a miniature
200
DOWNFALL AND EXILE 201
army of his own. The ideas which he first carried
out on this small scale were expanded after his accession,
so as to include the whole of the Imperial forces. Detail
in all things was his passion, and nowhere had he greater
scope for expressing his ardour for it than in the clothing
and drilling of soldiers. In the army, therefore, the
spirit of Prussianism was carried to the extreme. The
uniforms were modelled on those of Frederick's soldiers,
the Prussian drill was slavishly imitated, and evolutions,
instead of being used as means to success in real warfare,
were made ends in themselves. So far as was possible,
Paul reduced the army to a machine, and himself
supervised the execution of his most insignificant
alterations in the littlenesses of dress and drill. From
the highest commander below the Emperor down to
the most humble private soldier, all military persons
were, so far as possible, reduced to mere parts of a life-
less and unintelligent mechanism.
This was one of those fits of Prussian mechanicalness
which have from time to time at once regulated and
paralysed the wayward individualism of Russia. Like
the other epidemics of efficiency, it had its good as well
as its bad side. The Russian military system had
sunk, during the reign of Catherine and under the
gorgeous negligence of Potyomkin, into the depths of
inefficiency and corruption. Suvorof's efforts to improve
matters in Finland, Kherson, and Tultchin have already
been described, and though he was the most active and
successful, he was not the only reformer. But the
general condition was lamentable. The Guards were
splendid, lazy, and incompetent ; the other regiments
unkempt and ill-disciplined. Patronage and jobbery
in promotions, waste and peculation in the expenditure
of regimental funds, absenteeism among the officers,
the appropriation of large numbers of private soldiers
to service as couriers, orderlies, or personal servants,
savage punishments producing wholesale desertions, and
a general want of thoroughness, method, and uniformity
202 SUVOROF
in drill, had reduced the bulk of the army to com-
plete uselessness. The wars against the Turks and
the Poles necessarily produced a better state of affairs
among the troops who actually took part in them.
But in spite of the constant warfare many officers and
men had no experience of active service, and the Guards
in particular did not make a single campaign between
1742 and 1790. At the death of Catherine the army
as a whole was incapable of meeting that of any other
of the European Powers.
Upon this mass of slovenliness, dishonesty, and
neglect, the reforming zeal of the Emperor fell with
religious fury, and if he flew into extravagances in detail
he undoubtedly produced an improvement in the general
temper of the troops. The officers from Gatchina,
where they had been engaged in training his model
army during the last years of Catherine's reign, followed
Paul to Petersburg, and their uniforms, their drill, and
their theories were enforced upon the Guards and the
other regiments of the old sort with all the energy and
terrifying capriciousness of the new Sovereign. The
new uniforms, the long-skirted coats, the tight trousers,
the lacquered boots, the gaiters and garters and hooks
and eyes, the powdered heads and beribboned pigtails
were anything but an improvement upon the vest,
long coat, loose trousers, and soft boots of the time of
Catherine. The soldier who had to polish up his
boots after a march over a Russian road in autumn,
or sit up all night to keep his freshly powdered hair in
order for the morning's inspection, was none the better
soldier for the experience. Nor were the officers im-
proved by compulsory attendance at lectures, after
which they might be examined by the Emperor in person,
or by seeing him get up early in the morning to dress
the ranks for them before drill began.^ Nevertheless,
^ One day the Petersburg garrison read a general order to the effect
that " the deceased general N. N. is severely admonished for his ignorance
of his duty " (" Reminiscences of A. M. Turgyenyef," Russkaya Starina
(1886), ii. 40).
DOWNFALL AND EXILE 203
the system, pettifogging though it was, got some sort
of method into the army. It would have succeeded
more than it did but for the uncertain temper of the
man who enforced it. Paul was on the throne for
four years and four months, and in that time the number
of officers who were placed on the retired list or expelled
from the service with ignominy included 7 Field-
Marshals, more than 300 Generals, and more than 2000
Staff Officers and other officers of senior rank. There
was no certainty of tenure, and in consequence no
responsibility. Slovenliness, if detected, was sure of
punishment, but there was no real safety in industry
and intelligence. Obviously such methods produced
innumerable evasions and occasional conformities, and
in many cases an appearance of efficiency must have
been worked up to cover actual negligence and incom-
petence. On the other hand, the most honest officer was
never sure of his place, and one error or omission of
the most trifling kind might end in dismissal or even
exile to Siberia. The moral improvement of the army
was by no means proportioned to the formal improve-
ment. Nevertheless the army of Paul was better than
the army of Catherine.^
In the meantime, Suvorof was pursuing his own
course at Tultchin, and enough has already been said
of his methods to show how little he was likely to con-
form to the new requirements. Nevertheless, for a
brief space, the relations between the new Sovereign
and the bizarre Field-Marshal remained friendly, though
the latter, as a client of the detested dilettante Potyom-
kin, must have been suspect from the first. The distance
between Tultchin and Petersburg postponed a rupture
with Suvorof, while Paul busied himself with the short-
^ I have taken this account from Pyetrushevski's chap. xxii. For
details of Paul's character and reforms, see K. Waliszewski, Le Fils
de la Grande Catherine, Paul i*"". There is a story of a cavalry colonel
who had not enough smart boots for his whole regiment. He therefore
issued one boot to each man, ordering him to put it on the leg which
the Emperor would see at the march past !
SM SUVOROF
comings of Generals nearer home. But the shower of
rewards and honours passed by him, and on the 26th
December he committed his first offence against the
new system by sending an adjutant to Petersburg
with private letters. The officer was promptly sent to
serve in another regiment, and Suvorof was informed
that this use of officers as private couriers was degrading
to the service and their rank. Before this rebuke
reached him, he sinned three times in rapid succession.
He altered the distribution of some of the units in his
command, he asked that the Cossack General Isayof
should be left on his staff when he was ordered to send
all his Cossacks back to their own province, and he
granted leave to Lieutenant-Colonel Baturin at a time
when the Emperor was particularly incensed against
the granting of leave to officers. Baturin was promptly
sent back from Petersburg with a severe rebuke for
Suvorof. But before he returned another officer on
leave appeared in the capital, and this unfortunate
holiday-maker was sent to Riga. These offences against
the regulations were publicly denounced in the Imperial
Orders to the army. Another admonition was de-
spatched to Suvorof himself, but by this time the
latter had received the first of the series, and had
written to the Emperor asking leave to retire from
the service. The answer to this was a summons to
Petersburg.
Actual contact between the two quick-tempered
men was bound to produce an explosion. The Emperor's
fury at the informal proceedings of Suvorof was matched
by Suvorof's impatience at the pettifogging regulations
of the Emperor. His correspondence with Khvostof
contains more than one characteristic outburst. In
December 1796 he was complaining that the Russian
national army was being turned into a Prussian mer-
cenary army, and, after the Emperor's refusal to go
on with the war with France, he declared that " the
Carmagnolists will beat the Germans, and then the
DOWNFALL AND EXILE 205
Russians will be bored into being beaten like the
Germans." And on the 3rd January 1797 he wrote :
. . . the soldiers are indescribably unhappy, depressed
and demoralised by boredom. My pace has been reduced
to three quarters, and consequently against the enemy,
instead of 40 versts, it's only 30. I'm a husbandman
at Kobrin, only just better than an inspector, which I
was when I was a Lieutenant-Colonel. . . . I'm dying
from day to day.
Then he sketched out the plot of a drama, with him-
self as the ostracised Aristides, said that it was a good
opportunity for him to retire, and went on to denounce
the new Prussian uniforms and drill.
There's nothing more lousy than the Prussians ;
they call their overcoats " lousers " ; you can't go into
their sentry boxes or guard houses without getting
vermin, and the stink of their heads makes you faint.
We used to be free from vermin — ^the first irritation
of the soldiers was gaiters — septic feet. . . . Kind-
ness conceals strictness ; you must mix kindness with
strictness ; otherwise strictness is tyranny. I'm strict
in maintaining health, the true art of benevolence ;
kind soldierly strictness ; and from that general brother-
liness. And in me capricious strictness would have
been tyranny. Civil virtue doesn't make up for useless
cruelty to the troops." ^
The effect of the summons to Petersburg was to
determine him to resign from the service. The Emperor,
on his part, was incensed, not only by Suvorof's indif-
ference to the new rules of discipline, but also by some
of the gibes and sneers which were rightly or wrongly
attributed to the recalcitrant Field-Marshal. "Pig-
tails don't pierce, buckles don't fire, hair powder doesn't
explode." And " Hair powder isn't gunpowder, buckles
aren't guns, pigtails aren't salvos, and I'm not a German
but a true-born Russian." On reaching Petersburg
^ These passages are contained in a letter written on the 3rd, 4th,
5th, and 6th January 1797, and entitled, " A Gale of Thoughts." It
is in the Petrograd Sbornik.
206 SUVOROF
on the 8r(l February, Suvorof asked leave to retire.
The answer was an Imperial Order : ** Field-Marshal
Count Suvorof having informed his Imperial Highness
that as there is no war he has no work to do, for this
declaration is dismissed the service." On the 6th
February, the date when the Order came into effect,
Suvorof's career seemed at an end. He was in his
sixty-seventh year, and he prepared to withdraw to
his new estate at Kobrin, and there live like a simple
country gentleman.
Arranging affairs at Tultchin, he went to Kobrin,
and began to set the estate in order. He found it in
the occupation of 8187 serfs and their families. He
had arranged with 18 of his old ofHcers, including his
biographer, Anting, and his staff surgeon, Byelopolski,
to join him on the estate, and had promised each of
them a certain number of serfs, in return for the services
which he would require of them. They were, in fact,
to be estate agents for different sections of the property,
with Lieutenant-Colonel Koritskii at their head. But
the whole project was overthrown like a house of cards
by an Imperial Order. On the 8rd May an Assessor
of the Military College, named Nikolyef, appeared at
Kobrin, with instructions to remove Suvorof. Nikolyef
expressed his regret, and said he must obey his orders.
** I should not," said Suvorof; "I'd have said I was
unwell.'* * He made no other protest. At 10 o'clock
on the morning of the 4th he took his seat in his carriage.
But before starting, Koritskii presented him with the
formal documents by which ho divided more than 1500
of his serfs among Koritskii -.uul his !< Hows. Without
saying a word, Suvorof signed the p.ijx rs .md <h(>vo
off. He went without papers, withoui his j( \v( Ih ly,
and without money, except a thousand muhN s \vlii( h
he borrowed from Koritskii. His destination was the
little village of Kontchansk, 80 miles from Borovitchi,
where his father had left him an estate of 1000 male
> Ru»a, Vyeat. (1884), xviii. 144.
DOWNFALL AND EXILE 207
serfs. On the 16th May he arrived at this obscure
place, which he could have no hope of ever leaving
alive. The district was unfertile, swampy, and full
of timber, and the house in which he was to live was in
bad repair. What had impelled the Emperor to exile
him to this place will probably never be known. The
utmost diligence of his Russian biographers has dis-
covered no facts which could have come to the Emperor's
knowledge after Suvorof's departure for Kobrin, and it
is not necessary, to explain this new degradation, that
any such facts should be found. For the acts of a man
like Paul reasons were not always required. Meditating
on Suvorof, he no doubt recalled something which
revived his fury, and he struck a second blow where
one would have sufficed.
These new and dull surroundings were not the only
discomfort in which Suvorof was involved. On the
81st May Nikolyef descended once more upon Kobrin,
arrested all the officers who were settled there, and
transported them to Kief. After some delay they were
allowed to return. The rapacity with which they
secured their shares of the property in the first place
was equalled by the extravagance with which they now
proceeded to dissipate them, and the estate suffered
considerable damage. Valuable timber was wasted,
part of the proceeds of sales of com was embezzled, and
money and provisions were squandered in entertaining
guests. In November 1797 Suvorof at last came to
the conclusion that he must get rid of the officers alto-
gether, and he took steps to buy them out, offering
twenty roubles a serf to those who would leave Kobrin
altogether, and forty to those who would remain on
the estate until his death.^
He had also trouble with his wife. Getting into
debt, and not satisfied with the allowance which he had
agreed to make to her, she applied for a sum of 23,000
* There is a mass of correspondence about these matters in the
Petrograd Sbomik,
208 SUVOROF
roubles. The Emperor ordered an inquiry to be made,
and Suvorof was ordered to pay. The result of this
investigation was to show that he was now a rich man.
From his father he had inherited 2080 " souls,'* and
Imperial grants had given him 7000 more. His income
amounted to 50,000 roubles. Besides his estates in the
country, he had a stone house in Moscow worth 12,000
roubles, and the jewels which Catherine had given to
him were worth 100,000. His debts amounted only
to 17,200 roubles. But he had given away or promised
two dowries, one of 60,000 and the other of 30,000
roubles.^ The military trade has seldom been more
profitable. But it should be noted that the gains were
entirely due to gifts from the Throne, and there was no
suggestion, in the investigator's report, that Suvorof
had obtained anything by either plunder or peculation.
As much could not be said of very many of his pre-
decessors, contemporaries, and successors in the Russian
service.
During this period his son attracted the affection
which he could no longer show towards his wife. Young
Arkadii was now fourteen years old, and his father
grew disturbed about his education. The boy had been
living in his sister's house, with one Sion as his tutor.
The latter was already suspected by Suvorof of extra-
vagance and fast living, and when the Zubofs went
to Moscow at the end of 1797, the Field-Marshal wrote
to the faithful Khvostof to remove him from Sion's
care altogether. The tutor had taken Arkadii to his
own lodging, and was apparently going to bring him
1 Russ, Vyest. (1884), xviii. 144, 158. Pyetrushevski has examined
a large mass of documents relating to his estates, and comes to the
conclusion that he was a good landowner, not inflicting savage punish-
ments on his serfs, purchasing substitutes for those liable to military
service, encouraging marriage and large families, and, as might be
expected, blaming parents for a high infant death-rate. But he had
no scruples about migrating serfs from one estate to another, bringing
girls away to be married, and generally asserting himself as the bene-
volent despot he was.
.^u..
DOWNFALL AND EXILE 209
up as a young man of fashion. Suvorof accordingly
asked Khvostof to take charge of his son.
Arkadii needs spotless morals, not visits and return
visits ; not intercourse with young bloods, where they
suffer shipwreck . . . you have a corner, his acquaint-
ance will be Andy and Basil, and so until he's eighteen,
and then we'll look round. You'll be his Aristotle ;
Natasha was brought up by you, he's her heir.^
A new tutor was found in the person of Ivan
Dyementyevitch Kanitsyef, chosen " not for his learning,
but for his morality." ^ Kanitsyef was to receive 300
roubles a year for his life.^
To the boy himself Suvorof wrote for the most part
brief exhortations of this sort :
Be well-behaved, follow my rules, be obedient to
Dimitri Ivanovitch [Khvostof], use your spare time for
your own enlightenment in well-doing ; the Lord God
be with you.
And again :
To Arkadii honour, morality, courage; aversion
from equivocation, enigmas, phrases; moderation, en-
durance, constancy." *
Suvorof lived to see the promise of his son, but not
his performance. Arkadii was with him during the
greater part of his last campaign, and afterwards served
in the Turkish War under Kutuzof. He was a gallant
lad, as much loved by his men as his father had been.
But unhappily he was a gambler and a spendthrift,
and he had already dissipated much of his inheritance
when he died. His coachman fell into that Ruimnik
by whose waters his father had gained his most brilliant
victory. Plunging in after his servant, the young man
injured his arm, was unable to reach the shore, and
perished. His father would have been proud of his
death if not of his life.
1 Pyetmsh. (2nd ed.), 499. » lUd.
» Ihid. 500. « lUd.
210 SUVOROF
Apart from his financial distresses, which in the
end did not cost him more than he could pay without
hardship, Suvorof's life at Kontchansk was of the
simplest kind. Local tradition has preserved some of
its details, his own letters furnish others, and yet more
are to be found in Nikolyef's reports. According to
Nikolyef his manner of life had not changed very much,
and he was still, as always, on active service. He rose
two hours before dawn, drank some tea, and washed
himself. At dawn he went to church, and took part in
matins and the mass, himself reading part of the service
and singing. At 7 o'clock he lunched. Then he slept.
When he got up he washed again, looked in at the
evening service, and after that washed himself three
times and went to bed. He never ate meat. He spent
the whole day alone, never received visitors, and talked
only with his own servants and a few soldiers who
remained about the place. His ordinary clothes were
of the simplest. On Sundays and holidays he put on
a Jager tunic and helmet ; on the most solemn festivals,
his Field-MarshaFs uniform with all his Orders. As a
rule he went about in shirt and breeches. On one foot
he wore a boot, and on the other a slipper.^
The people of the village noticed other things. In
hot weather he took off his shirt, and walked about the
fields naked to the waist, with the faithful but drunken
Proshka at his heels. The people noticed that the
Field-Marshal's skin was sunburnt, and not at all like
that of an ordinary fine gentleman. On these occasions
he carried a black knotted stick. His conduct in church
was sometimes unusual. He crossed himself with great
fervour and very rapidly, striking himself with three
fingers on the forehead, the breast, and right and left
shoulders. During the service he bowed his head
constantly to the ground, striking it with his forehead,
but without bending his knees. Sometimes he looked
between his legs at the worshippers behind him, and if
1 Russ. Vyest. (1884), 155.
DOWNFALL AND EXILE 211
he saw anybody smiling, he told them after the service
that they should look at the images of the Saviour and
St. Nicholas, and not at their master.^
In his own letters we get references to occasional
visits from friends, dinners with the village priest, and
firing salutes and feasting the villagers on Imperial
birthdays.2 From other sources we learn of strolls
about his garden, superintending the building of out-
houses and potting-sheds, and walks to the top of Oak
Hill, half a mile away from his house, whence he could
look out over the woods and waters of the district.
He was often in the houses of the peasantry, arranging
betrothals, attending weddings, fondling babies, and
playing with the children. For the winter he built
himself a " bird room," a large apartment fitted with
trees and plants and full of little birds, where he sat
and sometimes had his meals. His reading was no
doubt as constant and as miscellaneous as ever, and he
kept in touch with the affairs of Europe through the
newspapers.^
This quiet life was not congenial now any more than
in previous years, and on the 22nd January 1798
Nikolyef had to report that
The Count grows every day more irritable, and hardly
a day passes without his striking one of his people.
Even on Christmas Day itself, after morning service,
in the presence of all his servants, he gave somebody
a cuff. He was angry with me because I accidentally
called him " you " instead of " Your Excellency." *
So early as the 1st October 1797 Suvorof had written
to the Emperor :
Repent ; have pity on a poor old man. Forgive,
if he has done wrong in anything.^
1 Istoritch. Vyest. (1886), xxvi. 408.
2 Materials of Milyutin, quoted in Pyetrush. ii. 406, 407.
8 Russ. Vyest. (1884), xviii. 144.
* Ibid. 158.
6 IMd, 156.
212 SUVOROF
Other letters followed, to the Emperor and the
Empress, and Khvostof was called upon to present
them and do his best to get his uncle recalled.^
At last the Emperor resolved to end the exile of the
great soldier, and on the 25th February sent his nephew,
Prince Andryei Gortchakof, to summon him to Peters-
burg. But the old man was in a testy mood, and for
a long time demurred. He was old and unwell. He
had had seven attacks of paralysis, seventy of gout,
and seven hundred of fever, and he didn't want
to come. Gortchakof, fearing the Emperor more than
his uncle, finally succeeded in persuading him. But
Suvorof would only come with ordinary post-horses
and was not going to hurry. Glad to get him on any
terms, Gortchakof drove back with all speed to Peters-
burg, and found the Emperor impatiently waiting.
Informed that the Count would come, he ordered that
he should be told when he arrived, " whatever the hour.'*
Suvorof drove up at ten o'clock at night, when the
Emperor was already undressed. Gortchakof duly
made his report to the Emperor, who came out of his
bedroom wrapped in a greatcoat. " I shall receive
the Count at 9 in the morning." " Very good. Sire.
And in what uniform ? " "In the ordinary uniform
of the army."
Clad in one of his nephew's uniforms, in the new
Prussian style, without any badges of rank, Suvorof
presented himself the next day at the Winter Palace.
While waiting in the ante-room he amused himself
by jesting with the other officers present, and was
specially pleased with talking Turkish to Count Kutaizof ,
a baptized Turk, whom Paul had raised from among
his valets to the ranks of the nobility. At a quarter
past nine the Emperor arrived, and a private interview
of an hour's length took place. From this the two
emerged, the Emperor worried, and Suvorof obviously
in a difficult mood. Paul then invited him to be present
» Russ. Star. (1892), Ixxiv. 674.
DOWNFALL AND EXILE 213
at the morning's inspection of troops. This was in-
tended as a special compliment. But the old warrior
refused to be conciliated. The new Prussian uniforms
and drill were too much for him. He sneered at the
evolutions, shuffled about, and constantly said to
Gortchakof, " No, I can't stand any more ; I'm going."
Gortchakof urged him to stay ; it would be a breach
of etiquette to go. But at last Suvorof's patience was
quite exhausted. " I can't stand any more ; I've got
a belly-ache." And off he went.
After the inspection Paul demanded of the unfortunate
Gortchakof what all this meant ? The latter plunged
into such excuses as he could invent, but Paul cut him
short, with obvious anger. " I speak to him of the
services which he can still render to his country and to
me ; I bring the conversation to the point where he
may ask himself for work — and instead of that he turns
off to Izmail, and begins a long description of the storm.
I listen to his endless tale, and then again bring him
back to the point — and instead of that, there we are,
trotted away to Praga or Otchakof." Then he turned
to the incident of the inspection. " Please, my good
sir, go to him, ask him himself to explain his conduct,
and bring his answer back to me as soon as possible.
I shall not sit down to dinner till you come."
Gortchakof, between his all-powerful Emperor and
his disrespectful old uncle, was in a most unenviable
position. He found Suvorof immovable. " I was an
inspector when I was a Major-General ; it's too late
now to make me an inspector again. Let them make
me Commander-in-Chief, and give me my old staff, and
give me a free hand, so that I can promote people, and
not go on asking. . . . Then, if you like, I'll come
back to the service. If not, better go back to the
village ; I'm old and feeble ; I want to be a monk. . . ."
" But I can't tell that to the Emperor ! " " Tell him
what you like. I can't change myself." From the
deep sea Gortchakof returned in great perturbation
214 SUVOROF
to the devil. He reported that his uncle had been
overpowered by the presence of his Imperial Highness ;
did not accurately remember what he had said ; very
much regretted his stupidity ; would speak differently
another time ; and would gladly profit by the Imperial
kindness if the Emperor would take him back into
the service. " Very well,'* said the Emperor, " I
authorise you to take charge of your uncle. You will
be responsible for him."
Gortchakof's new post of Suvorof - keeper proved
beyond all others formidable. The Emperor several
times invited the stubborn old man to dinner, and
talked of his future services. Suvorof was as deferential
as ever, and actual violence was sometimes required
to prevent him from prostrating himself before the
Emperor and Grand Dukes.* But he remained obdurate,
took refuge in his illness and feebleness, and never
stopped playing pranks, and gibing at the new uniforms
and equipment. Once he spent a quarter of an hour
gravely and conscientiously trying to get into his
carriage, to show the impossibility of getting about
with a great long sword sticking out behind him. At
an inspection he pretended that he could not manage
his flat hat, and after beating it several times on the
ground, first with one hand and then with the other,
he ended by dropping it at the foot of the frowning
Emperor himself. Then he deliberately ran about
and bustled into the way of a formal march past, and
spoilt the whole performance, showing the while by his
expression his amazement and wonder what all this tom-
foolery meant. Not content with this, he kept muttering
through his nose and crossing himself, and when the
Tsar asked him what he meant by it, he replied that he
was only repeating the prayer, " Thy will be done.*'
1 Istor. Vyest. (1900), Ixxx. 527, " Anecdotes of Theodor G. Golov-
kin." The same observer declares that the Empress once ordered a
dish of fruit to be offered to him. He thanked her profusely, and
ordered the whole dish to be taken to his room I
DOWNFALL AND EXILE 215
After every occasion of this sort, Paul demanded
an explanation from the luckless Gortchakof. The
latter suggested an excuse, went to Suvorof, received
his expressions of impenitence and contumacy, and
went back to the Emperor with yet another plausible
invention. At length, after three weeks, Paul abandoned
his attempts to get Suvorof back into harness, and dis-
missed him.i The old man delivered himself of some
defiant cockcrows and went back to Kontchansk.^
The Emperor had not given up all belief in Suvorof,
or ceased to hope for his advice. In September 1798
he sent Major-General Prevost de Lumian, who had
served with the old man in Finland, to ask his opinion
about the threatened war with the French Republic.
Suvorof dictated the following ;
Austrians and Prussians will act against France
with 100,000 men each, as follows :
1. Nothing but the offensive.
2. Speed on the march, energy in attacks, cold steel.
3. Never any " methodics " — ^good apprehension.
4. Full power to the Commander-in-Chief.
5. Fall upon the enemy and beat him in the field.
6. Lose no time in sieges, unless some fortress base
like Mainz comes in the way. Sometimes blockade
with an observation corps, sometimes take a fortress by
assault or storm. Then you lose less.
7. Never break strength to protect different points.
If the enemy passes these points, so much the better ;
he is all the nearer for being beaten.
8. ... Go forward fighting, without stopping, and
straight to Paris, as the chief olDJective, not stopping at
Landau except only to secure the rear, not for a retreat,
of which it is never necessary to think, but for the
baggage trains ; and never encumber yourselves with
empty manoeuvres, counter-marches or so-called " ruses
de guerre,'^ which please only wretched academicals.
9. ... No delays, false prudence and jealousy,
heads of Medea [sic] in the Cabinet and the Ministry.
1 Russ. Vyest. (1856), vi. « Buss. Star, Ixxiv. 575.
216 SUVOROF
A young Marlborough will come to light — and not a
few Suvorofs and Coburgs.^
For the moment nothing came of the plan, and it
remained as a hint of what Suvorof would do if he were
given the chief command against the French. But
even if war were declared it seemed very unlikely that
he would ever serve again. He was now sixty-eight
years old. His active career had apparently come to an
end, his health was not good, and his solitary life gave
him inactivity without repose. He made up his mind
that he had better end his days in a monastery. In
December 1798 he wrote to the Emperor :
I most humbly request your Imperial Highness to
allow me to retire to the Novogorod Hermitage at
Nilof, where I am resolved to end my brief days in the
service of God. Our Saviour alone is without sin.
Forgive my abruptness, Gracious Sovereign.
And he signed himself " the most humble suppliant and
slave of God."
This appeal received no direct answer. But on the
6th February of the next year came an Imperial rescript
which must have resounded in the exile's ears like a
clap of thunder.
This day I have received, Count Alexander Vassilye-
vitch, news of the pressing desire of the Court of Vienna,
that you should lead its armies in Italy, whither will
also go my corps of Rosenberg and Herman. So there-
fore and in the present state of Europe, I think it my
duty to propose to you to take the matter and command
upon yourself and to come here for your journey to
Vienna.
1 Fuchs, History of the War of 1799, ii. 1, 6. Fuchs was Suvorofs
secretary during his last campaign, but a pretentious and careless
historian. His History includes two volumes of copies of letters,
general orders, and other documents, not always accurate, as a com-
parison with other authorities shows.
CHAPTER IX
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE
The French Revolutionary Armies — Suvorofs method compared — Paul
and Suvorof — Suvorof leaves for Vienna — People and Ministers —
Arrival at Verona — Instructing the Austrians — The march to the
Adda — Crossing the Adda — Entrance into Milan — Wrestling
with the High War Council at Vienna — Entrance into Turin —
More difficulties — Suvorof wants to go home — Operations in
Switzerland — The French cross the Apennines — The march to the
Tidone — Battle of the Trebbia — ^Return to Alessandria.
The French Revolutionary armies, at first not much
better than armed mobs, had by this time worked out
a system of warfare which made them the terror of
Western Europe. Moving habitually by forced marches,
careless about lines of communication, and living upon
the country as they went, they were too quick for the
methodical armies of Austria. In the field they scorned
the flanking movements and carefully prepared defen-
sive positions of the enemy, and their attacks in column
broke through the opposing lines in spite of all that
individual bravery could do to stop them. Their tactics
alone would not have given them victory. The English in
the Peninsula always used a line formation and beat them.
The real secret of success of the French was their temper.
Both leaders and men were full of a spirit which made
them indifferent to hardships while moving towards the
field of battle, and indifferent to dangers when they were
upon it. The rapidity of their marches and the violence
of their blows against the enemy were inspired by the
217
218 SUVOROF
same fanatical spirit, whether that was a passion for
liberty or a mere craving for military glory or for
plunder. This spirit could only be conquered by
another spirit, and in the end the spirit of nationalism
overcame that of revolution. But long before their
final overthrow, Suvorof had already shown Europe
the secret of success, had Europe but known how to use
it. The Austrian Court took care that he should not
arouse national feeling against the French. But he
could use his personal influence over his troops, and
with this he impelled them to prodigies of valour as
astonishing as those of the French themselves. His
marches were as rapid, and his men fought with the
same indifference to loss. To the political fanaticism
of the French armies he opposed the personal fanaticism
of his own, and overthrew a cause by a character. His
system was as unsystematic as that of the French. It
had as little to do with paper combinations, plans of
campaign, and theories. It consisted primarily in the
mutual devotion of leader and men, in their belief that
together they could go anywhere and do anything, and
in the second place, in the physical training which
kept individual officers and men at the highest pitch
of bodily efficiency. It had its limitations, and in the
end, when Suvorof encountered a head younger and
cooler than his own, he found that there were things
which could not be done. But for a time his trust
in moral as the decisive thing in war was justified
by an amazing series of victories. To this strenuous
task he was now recalled by the Emperor.
In May 1798, after his sensational triumphs over
the Austrian forces in Italy, Napoleon had sailed for
Egypt. On his way he seized Malta, then the property
of the Knights of St. John. The Emperor Paul, in
one of his theatrical moods, had allowed himself in the
previous year to be styled Patron and Grand Master
of the Order, which appeared to him a strong bulwark
against democratic principles. Taking the annexation
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 219
of the island as an affront to his own majesty, he
despatched three armies to the assistance of Austria,
who, with Great Britain, Turkey, and Naples, now
formed the Second Coalition against the French. The
first army, under Rosenberg, was 22,000 strong ; the
second, under Herman, 11,000 ; and the third, under
Numsen, 36,000. Originally they were intended to
operate against the French in North Italy, Naples,
and South Germany respectively. But early in 1799
Herman's army was ordered to reinforce Rosenberg's in
North Italy, and Numsen's, in co-operation with the
Austrians and the French imigris under the Prince of
Conde, to act on the Upper Rhine against the French
army of Massena in Switzerland. The Archduke Charles
of Austria was the obvious choice for the high command
on the Rhine. The Austrians threatening the eastern
frontier of Switzerland were under Count Bellegarde.
But the Archduke Joseph was too young for the Italian
command, and to some genius in Vienna or London it
occurred to ask that Suvorof should be sent as his
adviser, and in effect, as the commander-in-chief of
the combined armies in Northern Italy.^
Paul was naturally flattered, and consented. But
while this tribute from abroad forced him to recognise
Suvorof 's merit, he neither understood nor trusted him.
He even wrote to Herman, an officer after his own
heart, instructing him to play the mentor to Suvorof,
who was liable to be carried away by his imagination,
moderate his outbreaks, and see that he did no damage
to the troops. 2 Fortunately for himself and the army,
Herman never went to Italy, and the command of his
force was in the end given to Rehbinder. The post of
tutor was not filled up, and so far as Paul was con-
cerned, Suvorof had the utmost possible freedom. The
* As long before as 1793 the Austrian General Wiimiser said to
Grimm : " Give us your Count Suvorof and 15,000 Russians, and I
promise you that in a fortnight we'll be in Mainz and have bagged all
the arms and stuff in the place " {Voronts, Arkh, xx. 332).
* Ibid. xii. 217.
220 SUVOROF
Tsar even sent his son, the Grand Duke Constantine,
to learn the military trade under him in Italy. The
hero came in due course to Petersburg. On this occa-
sion his pranks were less serious than before. He was
invested by the Emperor with the Maltese Cross. He
fell upon his knees and cried, " Lord, save the
Emperor ! ** " Do you,** answered Paul, " go and save
the Emperors." Then some of those present stepped
forward to raise the old man. He leaped up, and
spun round on one leg. " Voila ! " he exclaimed, " I
stood up by myself ! " ^ He was of course surrounded
by old friends and new flatterers. At one of his recep-
tions Nikolyef had the boldness to appear. Suvorof
greeted him with enthusiasm. " Merciful God ! My
chief benefactor ! Proshka, set him above all the
others ! " Thereupon the servant placed a stool on
the couch, and Suvorof compelled the unfortunate
official to get up, and treated him to a series of pro-
found obeisances. 2
He left for Vienna in the middle of February 1799.
Rosenberg's army was already on its way, but the other
two were still in process of formation. He moved for
once by easy stages, and stayed for some days at Mittau,
where he paid a formal visit to the exiled Louis of
France. Nothing of importance passed at this inter-
view. But the local gentry were given a taste of the
old Suvorof at his own reception. As they gathered
in the saloon, the door of his bedroom was suddenly
opened. The hero appeared in his shirt, announced
briefly, " Suvorof is coming out," and withdrew. A
minute later he emerged, wearing full uniform and all
his decorations, and solemnly received the guests.
Thus he announced that the conqueror of the French
would be no polished and refined penitent, but the
same recalcitrant old porcupine who had erected his
bristles against social and military pedants in the
palaces of Petersburg and on the battlefields of
1 Russ. Star, (1872), 93. 2 /^^-^^ 93^ 94^
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 221
Turkey and Poland.^ His journey beyond Mittau con-
tinued to be laborious and slow. A regiment of
cuirassiers overtook his carriage near Kobrin, stuck
in a snowdrift. They dug it out, the old man hallooing
at them from the window, " Hurra, hurra ! Gallant
Carabineers of the Ruimnik ! " ^ Soon after this he
abandoned the carriage altogether, and continued his
way in a post sledge. On the 25th March he reached
Vienna.
There he was greeted with enthusiasm by the ordinary
people, with affability by the Emperor, with a mixture
of admiration, curiosity, and superciliousness by the
military, and with professional concealment of his real
feelings by Thugut, the all-powerful Minister. On the
whole, with his old friends Coburg and De Ligne to
sponsor him, he made a good impression, though his
behaviour at receptions, skipping like a goat from one
group to another, and overwhelming the great ladies
by the profundity of his bows and the lavishness of his
flatteries, excited no little amusement.^ The general
mass of the inhabitants wished him nothing but good,
and the crowds in the streets welcomed him without
reserve.* But the authorities were by no means disposed
to give him their full confidence. The greatness which
seizes the affection of the populace is the very quality
which arouses the suspicions of a bureaucracy. Where
the people acclaim a leader, officials scent only an
undisciplined servant. The Emperor and his advisers
were ready enough to make use of Suvorof . They made
him a Field-Marshal in the Austrian Army, decided not
to encumber him with the Archduke Joseph, and
1 Russ. Star. (1873), vii. 263.
2 Loewenstern, Memoirs, i. 15.
3 Vassiltchkof, Syemyeistvo Razumovskikh, iii.
* One eye-witness, Ribeaupierre, asserts that as he drove through the
streets, in response to the cheers for " Paul and Suvorof," he shouted,
" Vivat Josef I " On being reminded that the reigning Emperor's
name was Franz, he exclaimed, " Merciful God ! I forgot ! Vivat Franz 1 "
{Russ. Arkh. (1877), i. 471).
222 SUVOROF
appointed the veteran Melas to take command, under
him, of the Austrian Army in Italy. They provided
Suvorof himself with an efficient staff, headed by the
Marquis von Chasteler, and made up the other great
Russian deficiency by undertaking all the commissariat
of his army. This was only to make him a better
instrument. Whatever his qualities as a leader in the
field, they had no intention of giving him a free hand,
even in the elaboration of a plan of campaign. Four
members of the High War Council waited upon him
with a plan of campaign " as far as the river Adda " ;
and a request that he should express his opinion upon
it. He drew a great cross over the sheet, and wrote
at the bottom : " The plan will begin with the passage
of the Adda, and will end as God pleases." This was
an ominous beginning. The Austrian Ministers imposed
restrictions on the liberty of their own Archduke. They
were not going to give freedom of action to an eccentric
foreigner, who had been successful against barbarians
and insurgents, but had had no experience of disciplined
enemies. Modesty should have reminded them that
they had themselves been defeated by the same bar-
barians, and gratitude that they had got great profits
by his victories over the insurgents ; while his very
presence among them was a comment on the fact that
against their disciplined enemies they had shown nothing
better than a resolute incompetence. But the pride of
a Hapsburg Ministry admits of neither criticism of self
nor a generous estimate of others. When Suvorof left
Vienna on the 4th April, he took with him the express
orders of the Emperor himself that the whole object of
his campaign should be to protect the possessions of
Austria, and remove from them all danger of a hostile
invasion. Until the attitude of the Elector of Bavaria
was known, and until all the French strong places in
North Italy were reduced, there could be no thought of
a concerted offensive against the French in Switzerland
or elsewhere. Suvorof was thus tied down to a limited
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 223
scheme. It is certain that these orders produced no
change in his mind. His own intention remained what
it had always been : to meet the enemy wherever they
were to be found, beat them, and follow them, if necessary,
even into their own territory.
Before Suvorof arrived upon the scene, the armies
had been already engaged. In spite of their superiority
in numbers and the heavy losses which they inflicted
upon the enemy, the Austrians under General Kray
had behaved with little energy, and had taken up a
position under the walls of Verona itself.. Nevertheless,
the French were not strong enough to press their advan-
tages, and themselves withdrew beyond the Mincio. On
the 12th April, leaving garrisons in Peschiera and Mantua,
they were in full march towards the Adda. On the
14th Melas, five days after his arrival at Verona, started
in pursuit, and on the same day Suvorof entered the
town and took up his quarters in the Palazzo Emilio.
His reception was even more enthusiastic than at
Vienna. For some miles he was accompanied by a
cheering crowd, and the people took out the horses and
dragged the carriage through the streets with waving
flags and shouts of joy.
It was already evening. He ran quickly through his
apartments, noting with satisfaction that the mirrors
were all covered, and returned to the reception room.
Here were gathered the Grand Duke Constantine,
Austrian and Russian officers, and representatives of
the clergy, the nobility, and the citizens of the town.
Going straight to the Archbishop he received his blessing,
and then listened to the address of welcome from the
town of Verona. He replied that he was sent to expel
the shameless French, to restore order, and to defend
Thrones and the Christian Faith. He begged the
Archbishop to pray God for the Emperors and their
pious soldiery, and reminded the nobility and citizens
of their duty to be zealous for lawful government.
Then he abruptly left the room, and the Italians
224 SUVOROF
dispersed. He returned with his usual rapidity to the
remaining officers, wrinkled up his eyes, and asked
Rosenberg to present the Generals to him. He stood
with his eyes shut. As each unknown name was
pronounced, he bowed, saying, " Merciful God I I've
not heard it. Let us know each other." But whenever
some old acquaintance came forward, he opened his
eyes and talked cheerfully of their old campaigns.
When the presentations were finished, he began to
walk briskly about the room. Then he stopped, and
again wrinkling up his eyes, delivered a series of extracts
from the Science of Victory : " Discipline I Practice !
The military step's a yard ; in deploying one and a half.
The head doesn't wait for the tail ; suddenly, like snow
on the head ! . . . Bullet's a fool, bayonet's a lad ! . . .
We've come to beat the godless, windy, feather-headed
Frenchies : they fight in columns, and we'll beat them
with columns ! " Then after a silence of a few minutes
he turned swiftly upon Rosenberg, and said: "Your
Excellency ! Please let me have two regiments of
infantry and two of Cossacks." This was not explicit
enough for Rosenberg, who answered suavely that it
was as his Excellency liked, and which did he require ?
The Field-Marshal was displeased. He wanted the men
to start at once after the enemy, and here was a " can't
teller " in the person of his chief subordinate. There
followed one or two more Suvorovian questions and one
or two more unready replies. Suvorof turned away,
walked several times up and down the room, and then,
wrinkling his brow, vociferated : " Hinter, guesser, liar,
spellbinder, soft-soaper, glib -tongue, can't teller!"
After this reply, as annihilating as any of those recorded
of Mr. F.'s Aunt, he bowed and left the room, leaving
the unhappy Rosenberg to his feelings.^
The next day he rode among the troops in his usual
familiar style. Coming back to his palace, he again
put the question to Rosenberg. The latter was no more
^ Starkof, on Bagration's authority.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 225
fortunate than before. But on this occasion Bagration
came to his rescue, and said that his own regiment was
ready. " Ah, you understand me, Prince Peter ! "
cried Suvorof, " you understand. Get them ready and
yourself too ! " In less than an hour they reported that
the cavalry and infantry were waiting. " God be with
you, Prince Peter," said Suvorof, " understand ; the
head doesn't wait for the tail ; suddenly, like snow
on the head." Bagration put his men in motion, and
they marched down the road to Valleggio, singing
their marching songs, and welcomed everywhere with
immense enthusiasm.^ On the same day Suvorof left
for the headquarters at Valleggio.
Along the Mincio, the French had the shortest
defensive line in Lombardy, protected on each flank
by a strong fortress, and, in addition, on the north by
Lago di Garda, and on the south by the marches of
Mantua and the river Po. After the sanguinary battles
around Verona, Scherer had now less than 33,000 men,
of whom 7500 were left in Peschiera and Mantua.
Against him were about 55,000 Austrian and Russian
troops. Vukassovitch, with 7000 Austrians, was
descending by Lake Idro in his left rear. On his right
was Klenau with 14,500 Austrians. Parties of horse
were rousing all the Italians beyond the Po, and the
garrison of Ferrara was already shut up in the citadel.
Melas, with 29,000 Austrians, was moving directly
against his left at Valleggio, and behind Melas was the
main Russian Army, with Suvorof at its head. Under
such circumstances the line of the Mincio could only
have been held by a great military genius. Scherer
was a man of ordinary capacity and less than ordinary
resolution. He abandoned his line of defence, left
nearly a quarter of his army to be besieged in the
fortresses, and made away with all speed towards Milan.
After him came Suvorof. On the 16th the latter
inspected the Austrians at Valleggio. " A good step ! "
^ Starkof, on Bagration's authority.
Q
226 SUVOROF
he said, ** victory I " Nevertheless, he thought it wise
to wait a few days, while the Austrian infantry were
initiated into the mysteries of the Suvorovian bayonet
practice. It was not until the 18th that all the Russians
were concentrated at Valleggio, to the number of 11,000.^
On the 19th they started in pursuit, marching in three
columns towards Brescia. A force of 5000 under Count
Hohenzollern followed another line from Mantua to
Cremona, where on the 21st it captured a considerable
quantity of abandoned siege guns and ammunition.*
On the same day the advance guard of the main army
attacked Brescia from all sides, and the commandant
surrendered with 1264 officers and men and 46 guns.
This was a promising beginning. The news so gratified
the Emperor Paul that he sent young Arkadii Suvorof
to the army of Italy " to be an eye-witness of his father's
victories." ' It was not Suvorof 's way to let an unbeaten
enemy run away from him, and he pressed on with all
speed.
This energy was too much for some of the Austrians.
They were not accustomed to spend half the night
in marching, and cover 20 miles in a day. Units
sometimes lost their way among the lanes and gardens,
fell into streams, and reached their quarters for the
night long after they were due. After one night-march
in the rain, Melas took it upon himself to halt his men,
to rest and dry their clothes. Suvorof thereupon sent
him the following letter :
Complaints have come to my notice, that the infantry
have wet their feet. For that the weather is to blame.
The march was made in the service of a mighty Monarch.
Women, coxcombs, and laggards crave for good weather.
The big chatterer who complains on service will be
dismissed from duty as an egoist. In military practice
one must plan quickly and carry out without delay, so
as to give the enemy no time to collect himself. If
any one*s ill, he can stay behind. Italy must be freed
I MU. i. 272. » Ibid. 273. » Fuchs, ii. 397.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 227
from the yoke of the godless and the French : every
honest officer must sacrifice himself for this end. In
no army can argle-barglers be tolerated. Apprehension,
quickness, energy ! — ^for this time enough.^
Coming from the lusty youth of sixty-nine to the
senile old veteran of seventy this rebuke is piquant.
No more complaints were heard, and it was not long
before Suvorof found that he could rely upon the Austrian
rank and file as much as upon the Russian. The dis-
positions after the fall of Brescia were made in expecta-
tion of a speedy encounter with the enemy. Kray
was left, with 20,000 men and the siege artillery, to
garrison Verona and blockade Peschiera and Mantua,
and Klenau was sent across the Po to watch the French
in Ferrara and Modena. The army in the field was still
in three columns. The first, 29,000 strong, contained
the Russian troops and the Austrians of Vukassovitch,
Ott, and Zopf, and marched towards Bergamo. The
second, consisting of the Austrians of Frohlich and
Keim, 13,000 in all, marched upon Treviglio. The third,
a small force of 1500 men under General Seckendorf,
went by way of Crema, to maintain connection with
HohenzoUern, on his way from Cremona to Pizzighetone.
The French were on the 22nd behind the Adda ; some-
what increased in numbers by the drafts from the
Lombard garrisons. Serurier, with 8000 men, was at
Lecco ; Gregnet, with 8000, at Cassano ; Victor, with
8000, at Lodi ; and Laboissi^re, with 4000, at Pizzi-
ghetone. A small rear-guard offered some resistance on
the 23rd at Palazzola on the Oglio, but this was soon
brushed aside. On the 24th Denisof's Cossacks galloped
into the streets of Bergamo, and captured the citadel
and 130 men with 19 guns.^ On the 25th Seckendorf
entered Crema and captured 30 cannon and some stores,
and on the same day the two main armies came face to
face with each other across the Adda, and prepared for
battle.
1 Fuchs, ii. ; Mil. i. 279. « Mil. 282,
228 SUVOROF
The river was in itself a good line of defence. It was
wide enough to be unfordable ; in its northern portion,
where it left the hills, the banks were steep and high, and
from Cassano to its junction with the Po it ran through
a wide and muddy bed, with more than one irrigation
canal to increase the natural difficulties of the ground.
It was crossed by bridges at only four places : Lecco,
Cassano, Lodi, and Pizzighetone. But, however useful
to an army of sufficient size, it was too long for that
of Scherer. From Lake Como to the Po it covers a
distance of 70 miles. S^rurier had to defend 20 miles,
from Lecco to Trezzo ; Gregnet the next 18 miles,
from Trezzo to Villa Pompeiana ; and Victor and
Laboissi^re the last 32 miles to Pizzighetone. Against
these forces stood 35,000 men between Lecco and
Cassano, and 8000 at Pizzighetone. Bagration was
moving north towards Lecco, with Rosenberg and
Vukassovitch behind him. Suvorof himself stood at
San Gervasio, opposite Trezzo, with the Austrian troops
of Ott and Zopf. Melas faced Cassano with Frohlich
and Keim. Under these circumstances the value of
Laboissi^re and a great part of Victor's division existed
only on paper.
Few things in war are so difficult as to defend a long
line of river against an enemy superior in numbers. If
the troops on both sides are approximately equal in
character, only a very grave miscalculation of time can
prevent the assailant from crossing at one point or
another, and making good his hold before sufficient
numbers can be concentrated on the spot to defeat him.
But nothing can be done when the defending army is
strung along the whole line. Its only hope is in con-
centration and mobility. Scherer' s army was as widely
as possible dispersed, and he himself was the last man
to move troops with the speed required of an opponent
of Suvorof.
Suvorof 's original plan was to cross first from San
Gervasio to Trezzo, and he gave orders to that effect to
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 229
Ott, sending the Cossacks and Vukassovitch to support
him.i But on the night of the 25th he learned that the
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enemy were in force at Lecco, and not wishing to leave
Bagration without help against what he took to be
Serurier's whole division, he halted Vukassovitch at
1 Mil. 286, 290 ; Fuchs, ii. 33, 35.
230 SUVOROF
Caprino, 9 miles from Lecco, so that in case of need
he might march to Bagration's assistance. Holding
back from his main operations until definite news should
arrive from the right flank, he told Melas to attack the
next day at Cassano, and made himself ready to follow
Ott at San Gervasio. At 8 o*clock in the morning
of the 26th, Bagration, with three battalions of infantry
and three regiments of Cossacks, came into touch with
the enemy outposts and pursued them up to the walls
of Lecco. Here were four French battalions and a
squadron of cavalry under General Soyez. A battery
of six guns covered the town across the lake, which at
this point is only 300 yards wide. After a hard fight
in the streets of the town the French were pressed out,
but rallied among the gardens and vineyards, and with
their superior numbers even threatened to cut Bagration's
communications with the Russian main body. An
appeal for help brought up Miloradovitch with a battalion
of Grenadiers at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Milorado-
vitch was the senior officer, but saying " this is no place
to think of ranks," he refused to take over the general
command. The fresh battalion stopped the enemy's
flanking movement, and two others coming up under
Shveikovski finally turned the scale. The town was
again occupied, an attempt at crossing in boats from
the other bank was frustrated, and at 8 o'clock in
the evening the French were in full retreat in the hills
beyond.
This affair, which had cost the Russians 385 men
killed and wounded, was not in fact necessary. Vukas-
sovitch had found the enemy in very little strength at
Brivio, opposite Caprino, and on the night of the same
day began his preparations for crossing. If the thrust
had been made at this point, instead of at Lecco, the
French in Lecco would have been cut off, and must have
retreated without a shot being fired. In the meantime
a change had taken place on the French side which might
have materially affected the campaign. Scherer had
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 231
been removed from his command, and replaced by
Moreau. The latter was as clear-headed, bold, and
popular with the troops as the former was weak,
irresolute, and disliked, and the change of leader meant
a great accession of strength to the French armies.
Nevertheless it came too late to save them from disaster.
Moreau wasted no time. He learned of his appointment
at Lodi on the evening of the 26th. Without delay he
mounted his horse and galloped to the General Head-
quarters, whence he scattered his orders for an immediate
concentration. Gregnet was to draw in from the north
upon Vaprio and Cassano, Victor to march up the river
to Cassano, and Laboissi^re to come up from Pizzighetone
to Lodi. S^rurier was at first ordered to move in
towards Gregnet's left, but after the news of the threat
from Vukassovitch this was countermanded, and he was
told to leave one battalion at Trezzo, and go back with
the rest of his troops to Brivio. Orders were at the
same time sent to Milan and other points in the rear
for all available units to make for the Adda. If these
movements had been completed, there would have been
some 16,000 men between Vaprio and Cassano, and,
with luck, even a crossing from San Gervasio to Trezzo
might have been frustrated by a rapid march from
Vaprio, only 3 miles to the south. But Moreau was
too late by at least a day, and when the fighting began
he had only 10,500 men against 24,500. At midnight
on the 26th Suvorof began to throw a pontoon bridge
across the river at San Gervasio. With considerable
difficulty, but without any opposition on the part of
the French, the bridge was completed, and six companies
of Jagers and some hundreds of Cossacks were already
on the other side before the French battalion in Trezzo
opened fire. After them came the first men of Ott's
division, behind them Bagration's three Cossack regi-
ments, coming at great speed from Lecco, and lastly
Zopf's division. In all, 11,500 men crossed at this point,
and the solitary French battalion against them lost its
282 SUVOROF
only chance when it allowed the bridge to be built
without resistance. Denisof 's Cossacks, in spite of their
previous exertions, were soon galloping round the rear
of the town, and the French infantry barely succeeded
in getting away to Vaprio.
Outside Vaprio they were met by Gregnet*s division,
just brought up from Cassano. Moreau himself hurried
to the spot, and was nearly cut off by the Cossacks. But
he had time to take up a position between Vaprio and
Pozzo before the battle was joined, and to send a
message to S^rurier, bidding him halt wherever he was.
This last order seems incredibly foolish, and was in the
result fatal to S6rurier. An attack, or even a threat
by a force of several thousand men against Suvorof's
right rear would have been invaluable at the crisis of
the battle, and once the main body was defeated,
S^rurier, cut off from Milan and pressed against the
mountains by both Suvorof and Vukassovitch, could
hardly expect to escape. The one chance both for
Gregnet and for Serurier himself was for the latter to
march with all possible speed upon the sound of the
guns. As things actually stood, Gregnet, with some
assistance from Victor, had to face a great superiority
in force, and S6rurier was left to fall like a ripe plum
into the hands of the victorious army. Nevertheless,
the matter was not easily decided. Gregnet held up
against Ott, and even took the offensive, threatening to
turn his right from the direction of Pozzo. The arrival
of two battalions from Zopf did not change the aspect
of affairs, and one of the new battalions was cut to
pieces by the French cavalry. But a violent charge by
Denisof 's Cossacks drove back the French infantry into
Pozzo, and the Cossacks, continuing their charge, fell
upon four squadrons of chasseurs a cheval which had
just come up from Milan, and chased them as far as
Gorgonzola, 4 miles to the south-west. The Austrian
infantry then attacked Pozzo and Vaprio simultaneously,
and after some bitter fighting got hold of both. Moreau
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 233
thereupon decided that he could not stand his ground
until Victor came to his help, and began to fall back
southwards towards Inzago and Cassano. There he
hoped to fight a second battle in conjunction with
Victor. But hardly had his movement begun when
he encountered the latter' s troops, themselves in full
flight.
Melas, with the divisions of Frohlich and Keim,
13,000 men in all, had attacked simultaneously with
Suvorof. Cassano was a more formidable objective
than Trezzo. Besides the river, there were two irrigation
canals to be crossed, and between the left bank and one of
these canals the French had thrown up earthworks across
the road. Here 3000 men held out for five hours. But
at 11 o'clock in the morning, under cover of a massed
battery of thirty guns, the Austrians crossed the canal
on a pontoon bridge, and carried the defences with a
rush, taking all the guns and getting a foothold on the
river bridge before the French could destroy it. This
obstacle once passed, all was easy. The Austrians
poured over the bridge, and drove the remainder of
the defenders of Cassano into the face of the retreating
Moreau.
The latter' s only task now was to save his army from
annihilation. The direct road to Milan through Gorgon-
zola was already in the hands of the Cossacks, and the
troops who had been in action were ordered to march
by roads to the south. Leaving 2000 prisoners and 19
guns in the hands of the victorious Allies, the beaten
army hurried away. The last line of the French defences
in Northern Italy had gone.^
There remained the troops about Lecco and the
division of Serurier. During the progress of the main
battle, Vukassovitch had crossed at Brivio, and General
Giglet with great difficulty carried his detachment into
safety at Como. Soyez scrambled round the hills
^ Mil. 292, et seq. Denisof s personal account is in Russ. Star,
1874), ii.
284 SUVOROF
bordering the lake, crossed it in boats, and by a long
march through Lugano eventually reached the banks
of Lake Maggiore. The position of S^rurier was hopeless.
He had remained with 3000 men at Verderio, 5 miles
from the field of battle, and within earshot of the cannon.
He received no news during the whole of the 27th, and
remained for the night in a good defensive position
facing westwards between Verderio and Paderno. At
the latter point his right rested on the river, and at the
former his left was strengthened with earthworks. Here
on the 28th he was found by Vukassovitch. The latter
did not expect to encounter anything but a few scattered
parties of the French between the Adda and Milan.
But some of his scouts, seeing and pursuing a few enemy
horsemen, followed them into Paderno, and reported
their discovery of a French army to Vukassovitch. The
latter at once attacked in front and on both flanks, and
on the arrival of the first of Rosenberg's Russians
Serurier capitulated. Nearly 3000 men were made
prisoners at this point with 8 guns.^
Suvorof's first encounter with the French thus glori-
ously ended. The enemy's defences had been shattered,
and out of the 18,000 men opposed to him, 2500 had been
killed and wounded, and 5000 captured, with 27 guns,
while his own losses were not more than 2000 men.^
The operation, in view of the disparity in strength, had
not been difficult. But the moral effect was enormous.
In the previous year the French had swept everything
before them. Now they had themselves been swept
back with an injury to their prestige greater even
than the great injury to their military power. Milan is
only 12 miles from Cassano, and on the evening of the
28th the Cossacks of Motchanof were clattering through
the streets of the city, cutting down all the French who
had not time to take refuge in the citadel. The main
army had already left the place, accompanied by a crowd
of partisans of the Cisalpine Republic. A garrison of
^ Mil. ii. 296. ' Mil. i. 298.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 235
2400 in the citadel was all that was left of the French
power in Lombardy.
On the 29th, Easter Sunday, Suvorof rode in through
the Porta Orientale, and in the presence of a vast crowd
knelt and kissed the hand of the Archbishop. " I am
sent,'* he said, " to restore the ancient throne of the
Pope, and to bring the people to obedience to their
Sovereign. Help me in the sacred work." He then
proceeded through the thronged streets to the house of
the Duchess Castiglione, where Moreau had lodged before
him. The next day he attended High Mass in the
Cathedral, and entertained all the local magnates at
dinner. To the same feast came Serurier, to whom
Suvorof quoted the distich of Lomonosof :
The lion magnanimous strikes low the evil race,
Which with his greedy jaw the wolf devours apace.
" Translate those verses to the General,'* he said to
Fuchs. " I repeated them to the Polish envoys after
the taking of Warsaw." To Serurier himself he played
the magnanimous lion, sending him to France on his
verbal promise not to serve again in that campaign.
So far his conduct at Milan had been entirely consistent
with his rank and his mission. But the season of the
year gave him an opportunity of puzzling the Italians
more than a little. The Russian Easter customs
include not only the presentation of coloured eggs, but
a greeting, consisting of three kisses, on the lips and the
two cheeks, accompanied by the words, " Christ is risen."
Suvorof was not going to abandon a cherished Slav habit
out of consideration for Latin dignity. Accordingly
he embraced every acquaintance whom he met, not
excepting Serurier. His troops pursued the same course,
and for a brief space the kisses bestowed by military
men in the streets of Milan must have reminded detached
spectators of an operatic chorus. The Italian population,
feeling the kisses, and seeing the signs of the Cross, but
not understanding the Russian words, must have been
236 SUVOROF
hugely mystified. Fuchs heard more than one of his
compatriots saying, " Christ is risen, padrone. Although
you*re an outlander and silly, all the same you're a man."
And the three kisses followed. In particular, the citizens
must have wondered why the strangers kissed men as
well as women. It had not been the French way.^
Suvorof did not waste much time in initiating the
Italians into the mysteries of the Orthodox Church. He
began serious work at once. The necessary steps were
taken for abolishing the Cisalpine Republic, for dis-
arming the National Guard, and for restoring the old
authorities. Chasteler drew up a plan for future opera-
tions, and on the 1st May it was sent to the Austrian
Emperor. This plan involved the crossing of the Po
by Suvorof for the purpose of defeating Macdonald, the
clearing of the Alpine passes by the Austrians, the crushing
of Mass6na by the Archduke Charles, and a simultaneous
invasion of Switzerland by the Austrians from the east
and by Suvorof from the south. This plan was vetoed
by the Emperor, who forbade Suvorof to cross the Po,
and would not allow the Archduke to make anything
more than a demonstration, until the Elector of Bavaria
had shown clearly whether his army of 8000 men was to
help the Austrians or oppose them, or until the second
Russian army reached Austrian territory.^
Thus the open conflict between Suvorof and the
Austrian Court began. The latter was playing for safety,
while he played for victory. In the political as well as
in the military sense France was weak and disorganised.
After the Italian defeats she was dangerously exposed
in Switzerland, and a heavy blow in that quarter must
have resulted in a retreat to the frontier. As far as
Suvorof was concerned, the direction to keep the army
* Fuchs, Miscellany^ 183. Fuchs was once called upon to save a
child from a Cossack, who had seen a likeness to his own boy, away
on the banks of the Don, and was kissing the young Italian with tears
in his eyes. The Cossacks were known as the Russian Capuchins, on
account of their long beards, but they were reputed to eat children.
« Mil. ii. 311, 314, 595, 598 ; Fuchs, ii. 47, 54, 88.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 237
north of the Po was ineffective. By the time that it
reached him, he was already across the river. But the
Archduke Charles near Lake Constance and Count
Bellegarde in the Tyrol remained passive. The whole
strength of Austria was paralysed by fear of the insignifi-
cant army of Bavaria. In all there were about 120,000
efficient troops busily engaged in doing nothing along
the Swiss frontier, while the French recovered from the
shock of the loss of Northern Italy.^
With his immediate associates among the Austrians
Suvorof remained on fairly good terms. Thugut and
the War Council taxed his classical and modern vocabu-
laries to the utmost. But on the whole his officers
behaved well. Of Melas he was especially fond, though
Fuchs records his jingling epigram, " J'ai vu Melas —
Helas ! " He called him " Papa Melas," and treated
him with the patronising affection which he used to
bestow on Coburg. Nevertheless, Melas was desperately
slow, and Suvorof was at last compelled to issue orders
direct to the Austrian army as well as the Russian,
requesting the subordinate commanders to report the
orders to Melas as they received them. Chasteler was
a great favourite of his, and an invaluable Chief of Staff.
But the anomalous arrangement by which the Russians
were dependent on the Austrians for their supplies
caused not a little friction, and Suvorof soon invented
German equivalents for his favourite epithet, " Can't
teller." He would denounce an Austrian as a " Nicht-
bestimmtsager " or " Not-clear-say er," or sometimes as
a " Bestimmtsager," a man who was very positive about
things of which he knew nothing. The word " Unter-
kunft " was new. By it he meant " Molly-coddling,"
and he applied it unsparingly.
It was not until a later date that the Austrian con-
nection began to interfere seriously with his military
designs. The stream of checks and prohibitions had
not yet begun to reach him, and he busied himself after
1 Mil. i. 318, 601 ; ii. 40, 435 ; Fuchs, Misc, 119.
288 SUVOROF
the occupation of Milan with hunting the enemy out
of Northern Italy, without much hindrance from Vienna.
At first he expected an attack from Macdonald, and
on the 18th May moved south towards Piacenza. But
getting no information about Macdonald, and learning
of an Austrian reverse on the St. Gothard, he abandoned
this aggressive movement. Moreau had in the meantime
taken up a strong position behind Alessandria, from
which he could fall on Suvorof's rear if he marched
against Macdonald, or anticipate him by a shorter route,
if he made for Turin. Suvorof determined to cut the
communications between Moreau and Switzerland. But
Moreau' s state was too bad for any daring operations
in co-operation with the army of Switzeriand. Food
was running short, the Italians were in revolt on all sides,
and his army was being steadily weakened by the
detachment of escorts for his waggon trains. He decided
to make for Genoa. After an attempt to break out by
Way of Marengo had been frustrated, he left a garrison
in Alessandria, and made for the Apennines in two
columns. On the 19th, Victor, with one of these, was
already across the mountains.^
As soon as he heard of Moreau*s retreat, Suvorof
determined to march on Turin. The Austrians had
recovered themselves in the Alps, and his right flank
was now safe. Pizzighetone fell on the 9th, Ferrara
and the Citadel of Milan on the 23rd. On the 25th
Vukassovitch occupied the hill of the Superga, which
dominates Turin. The French commandant, Fiorella,
refused to surrender, but the gate of the town was
opened by treachery, and the garrison was soon blockaded
in the Citadel. Fiorella began to bombard the town,
and Suvorof, rashly venturing too near the zone of
danger, was picked up bodily by Denisof and carried
into a place of safety.^ The arsenal at Turin was a
1 Mil. ii. 8 et seq., 409 et seq. ; Fuchs, ii. 50 et seq.
« " Reminiscences of Denisof," Russ. Star. (1874), ii. 638. " Damn
you 1 " cried Suvorof, " what are you doing ? *' and he grasped Denisofs
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 239
great prize, and 382 cannon, 15 mortars, 20,000 muskets,
and a vast quantity of every sort of war material were
captured in it. These afterwards supplied Suvorof's
siege train.^ The inhabitants received the Russians
and Austrians with great enthusiasm. But at this point
differences in policy began to make themselves seriously
felt. Lombardy had been taken from Austria by the
French, and it had been restored to Austria. But
Piedmont had belonged, before the French conquest,
to the independent Kingdom of Sardinia, and its exiled
monarch was now living in Sardinia. Suvorof, acting
as the restorer of the old order, recognised the King's
rights. On his entry into Turin he issued a proclamation
to the inhabitants, and declared that —
Henceforward peace, harmony, and order, both in
the capital and in the whole of Piedmont, will be the
object of my peculiar care. I believe that that end
will best be secured by the restoration of the former
order of things.^
A temporary Council was appointed. Count St.
Andre was made Governor of Turin, and General Baron
de Latour was entrusted with full powers of adminis-
tration, military and political, throughout Piedmont.
Suvorof was in fact occupying Piedmont as a military
measure, with the intention of restoring it to the King.
His proclamations issued to the Piedmontese soldiery
and people had made this clear from the first. On the
6th May he announced his arrival in Piedmont in these
terms :
The armies of their Highnesses the Roman and
Russian Emperors have broken and scattered the French
troops, who boasted themselves invincible. Those
armies are now advancing into Piedmont to restore your
good King.
hair. But he was wise enough not to pull it, and though they both
fell into a hole, neither was hurt.
1 Mil. ii.
« Mil, ii. 110, 483.
240 SUVOROF
Calling upon them to take service on the side of
the Allies, he added :
To no other will you be called upon to swear allegiance
than the King of Sardinia.^
These proclamations were dictated by natural justice,
and they were admirably suited to the dramatic instinct,
the generosity, and the monarchical prejudices of the
Russian Tsar. But if the Tsar was pleased, the Kaiser
was not, and Suvorof's dispositions at Turin, as well as
the language of his proclamations, were received with
lively displeasure at Vienna. The Austrian Court, for
ever thinking more of the ancient glories of the House
of Hapsburg than of the rights and liberties of the
peoples of Europe and the best means of securing them
in the face of the common enemy, viewed with grave
disapproval these attempts to restore an independent
kingdom in Northern Italy. The Emperor ordered
Suvorof to go no further. He could not tolerate the
establishment of any competing authority in Piedmont.
Austria had now been engaged in war for eleven years,
and had suffered considerable losses, which ought to
be made up by levies from territories newly wrested
from the enemy. Any troops raised in Piedmont should
therefore be raised for the Emperor's service, and his
alone, and political changes should await his further
arrangements.^ Suvorof 's acts at Turin were accordingly
rescinded. The duties of Governor were transferred to
the Austrian Count Concini, and Melas was entrusted
with all the arrangements for the maintenance of the
armies. Piedmontese troops were raised for the Austrian
service. From the 28th May all proclamations were
issued in the name of the Austrian Emperor and signed
by Melas, and the King of Sardinia was never mentioned
in any of them.
1 Raccolta, etc. p. 1. Compare his proclamation of the 8th May,
ibid. 11.
* See the Emperor's rescript of the 17th May, set out in Mil. ii. "432.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 241
These interferences from Vienna infuriated Suvorof.
But this was not all. The War Council actually issued
orders direct to the Austrian Generals in Italy, not
seldom overriding Suvorof's own. He overflowed into
complaints, official and unofficial. To Razumovski, the
Russian Ambassador at Vienna, he wrote on the 27th
May, reciting his various grievances :
So that there's no need for me here, and I want to
go home. This Cabinet decree has shattered the order
of all my operations. . . . Every sectional general, not
for one domestic matter but for everything, goes straight
to the War Council, so has the right to intrigue in favour
of its infatuated preconceptions. . . . Through this War
Council sitting at the cross roads he [the Archduke]
has the right to order them about and tie my hands.
... Its lethargy forces lethargy on the Archduke.
That Prince, though zealous for the common good, is
as tied as I am, so far as co-operation with us is concerned,
just as if he himself liked this fatal slowness. Otherwise
it would have been possible in this campaign for me to
answer for Italy, him for Germany and Switzerland.
His High Excellency Baron Thugut will stick his nose
into these arrangements. ... I had picked out here a
number of Piedmontese volunteer soldiers, and we could
have armed them. . . . Would not this have been the
best of arrangements for the French with their rapid
conquests ? Their mighty liberie and igalitS could not
have stood long against Religion and Monarchy ! And
what now ? Count Andrei Kirilovitch : men who would
have entered our service in faith and faithfulness. . . .
It's for all these important matters that I am here
. . . otherwise I should have done better to go home
from Vienna.
However the War Council has bothered me, its " one
or two campaigns " took me one month. . . .^
On another date he wrote in the same style :
I am hampered by flattery, my bitterest enemy.
I am very weary of the diplomatic style, with its
double-faced witchcraft. No leisure for sleep, . . .
1 Fuchs, ii. 193.
242 SUVOROF
The Austrian generals are more like recruits. By
God's help the campaign will end. . . . Either a Thirty
Years' War or Campo Formio, and worse than young
Bonaparte's. Paris would have lain open to us in
the next campaign. The Adda was the Rubicon. We
crossed it in the teeth of the enemy. . . . Hardly one
of them escaped. I leamt only here that they ran
here like sheep, and the generals foremost. In the same
way every other river in the world can be crossed. The
Defensive is the Offensive. ... Oh God, how useful
the Piedmontese army would have been to us ; we
could have discharged it later, if we didn't want it. I
am consoled in my labours by the gracious rescript of
his Imperial Russian Highness. For the Saviour's sake,
don't hinder me ! ^
He had, in fact, done far more than the Austrian
War Council had expected. So far as Italy was con-
cerned, there was nothing left of the French except
the remnants of Moreau's army in the Genoese Riviera
and the army of Naples under General Macdonald
somewhere to the south of the Apennines. Similar
vigour against the French in Switzerland should produce
similar results, and the campaign of the following year
would be fought on French territory. But the timidity
of the War Council was not in the north frustrated by
the energy of a second Suvorof .
After long inactivity, the principal Austrian armies
on the Rhine began to move early in May, and their
immediate success sufficiently condemned their previous
lethargy. The French were first driven out of Grau-
bunden. Three Austrian forces, together 38,000 strong,
pushed the 13,000 French, who defended that region,
towards the west. The Archduke then felt able to
advance upon Zurich round the western end of Lake
Constance. The French army, among whose com-
manders were Ney, Soult, and Oudinot, gave the
leisurely Austrians more than one lesson in the art of
marching and fighting. But the odds were too great,
1 Voronts. Arkh. xxiv. 323.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 243
and they were eventually pressed back everywhere.
On the 4th June the main armies of the Archduke and
Mass6na fought a pitched battle to the east of Zurich.
The Austrians were 42,000 strong, the French only
15,000, and Mass6na, in spite of his strongly fortified
position on the hills, was at last compelled to abandon
the town and cross the Limat. The Archduke then
became once more motionless. With 70,000 men at
his disposal against a French force of half that number
he did nothing except send Jellacic to open up com-
munications with the army of Italy by way of the St.
Gothard. The strategic initiative, assumed with such
good results, was again abandoned to the French.^
At the beginning of June the situation of the army
in Italy was not secure. The enemy had been driven
out of the great plain, but he had the choice of three
ways by which he might return : through Switzerland,
through the Western Alps, and from the south over
the Apennines. All these lines had to be covered by
Suvorof, and while the danger from the south was the
greatest, it was nevertheless necessary to employ part
of the troops in guarding the passes from Switzerland,
Savoy, and the Dauphin^. From the south, also, the
enemy might advance in one of two ways, and the
problem was to dispose the main army in such a way
as to be able to meet an attack from either direction.
By the 8th June the army was thus widely distributed.
Suvorof himself, with 21,700 men, was stationed at
Turin. Bellegarde was at Alessandria with Schveikov-
ski, and at need, by calling in Tchubarof and Seckendorf
from Acqui, could bring up his total forces to 16,700;
Ott, with 7400 men, was at Reggio, with outposts beyond
the Apennines and beyond Modena on the way to
Bologna. Kray, besieging Mantua with nearly 20,000
men, Klenau at Ferrara with 5000, and the 10,000 men
under Haddik engaged in guarding the Alpine Passes,
were too far away and too busily engaged to be of
1 Mil. ii. 120 ei seq. Jellacic is pronounced Yellatchich.
244 SUVOROF
use in case of a French attack. But Frohlich and
Vukassovitch in the valley of the Tanaro, with nearly
8000 men, were within easy reach of both Turin and
Alessandria. About 80,000 men could be rapidly
collected at either of these places, and it was unlikely
that any French force crossing the mountains from the
Genoese Riviera would be of substantially greater
strength.
On the 9th June he came to the conclusion that the
attack would be directed towards Alessandria. This
was due to defective information, partly arising from
the deliberate scattering of false reports by Moreau.^
Apparently Macdonald had joined Moreau by sea,
and both would attack together from the Riviera.
Calling in Ott, Frohlich, and Vukassovitch, and asking
even Kray to send as much cavalry as he could spare,
Suvorof left Turin on the 10th with 10,000 men, ex-
pecting to meet and defeat the united enemy at Aless-
andria. Making ample provision for the security of
Turin, Milan, and the line of the Po, he gave orders for
bridges to be constructed on the Bormida and Tanaro,
so as to give the utmost freedom of manoeuvring to
his army in the field. ^ He was still ignorant where the
blow would actually fall. But when the shock did
come he leapt at once into full activity.
One of his preparatory instructions sounds a charac-
teristic note. He wrote a special letter to Bagration :
Count Peter Ivanovitch. The troops of Count
Bellegarde from the Tyrol will come up to Alessandria,
uninstructed, strangers to the handling of bayonet and
sword. As soon as your Serenity comes to Asti, visit
me, and set off at once to Alessandria, and there reveal
to the Bellegarde troops the secret of beating the enemy
^ Moreau said afterwards that he believed Suvorof to be too credulous.
Orlof, Suvorof na Trebbii, 88, note 2.
" His detailed instructions were most complete and provided for
every contingency. The credit for them should no doubt be given,
in large measure, to Chasteler and the Austrian staff officers. See Mil.
ii. 542 ; Fuohs, ii. 240, 282, 293.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 245
with the cold steel, and carefully adapt them to this
conquering attack ; two or three lessons will be enough
for the instruction of all the detachments, but if there
is time, they can study more by themselves ; but do
you unlearn them how to retreat.^
However carefully he might prepare for a possible
failure, Suvorof never had any doubt of success. Field
works at Pavia and Milan were all very well, but the
business was going to be settled by the bayonet.
His own march upon Alessandria was not wanting
in rapidity. His troops left Turin at 2 o'clock in
the morning of the 10th June, and at 8 o'clock on
the morning of the 11th they arrived at Asti, 33 miles
away, in spite of the bad condition of the roads and the
heavy rain. At 10 in the evening they resumed their
march, in company with Frohlich's Austrian division,
sending all the heavy baggage to Valenza, and making
ready for the instant encounter with the enemy. At
2 in the afternoon of the 12th they reached Aless-
andria.2 There were now in that neighbourhood, under
Suvorof's immediate command, 34,000 men. Vukasso-
vitch was already on his way with 4400 more ; Ott,
with 5300, was on the road from Piacenza to Voghera ;
and Hohenzollern, with 4500, was at Modena. Suvorof
therefore hoped to meet the enemy with nearly 50,000
men.
Unfortunately he was at once faced with the diffi-
culty of feeding this large number of troops so hastily
thrown upon the Austrian commissariat. The Austrians
declared that the task was beyond their powers, and on
the evening of the 13th Rosenberg, with a large body
of Russian troops, started on the return journey to
Asti. On the assumption that the French attack would
be from Genoa, this manoeuvre was harmless enough.
But, in the actual event, it was highly dangerous.
Rosenberg was overtaken at 5 o'clock in the morning
by a letter from Suvorof, the last words in his own hand.
1 Mil. ii. 545. * jj^i^, 227, 547.
246 SUVOROF
Latest news. The French hke bees and from well-
nigh all quarters are swarming to Mantua. We must
hasten upon them. Wherever this overtakes you, after
resting as much as may be necessary, hasten to join us.
We shall start soon. They are in force ; God with us.
Forgive me. It is circumstances that have given
you so much trouble.^
Suvorof had been badly served by his spies. So far
from being carried by sea to Genoa, to join in an attack
on Alessandria from the south, Macdonald, strengthened
by the transfer of Victor's division from Moreau's army
to his own, had crossed the Apennines to the south-east,
and on the evening of the 11th June his right wing was
in occupation of Bologna. In all, he had with him
36,000 men, and after passing the mountain barrier,
was turning west to crush Suvorof against the army
of Moreau, who was simultaneously making towards
Alessandria from the south.^
The two French Commanders had been in communica-
tion §ince the 29th May, and while the difficulty of traver-
sing the mountain paths between Pisa and Genoa had
prevented a full exchange of ideas, the main outlines
of their joint enterprise were clear. It was agreed that
Macdonald should set his troops in motion from Tuscany
on the 9th June, while Moreau started from Genoa on
the 17th. Both armies had badly needed rest and
refitting, Macdonald's after an exhausting march from
Southern Italy, and Moreau's after its equally damaging
if shorter retreat from Lombardy.* Once on the road,
both moved with great rapidity, and Macdonald's cross-
ing of the Apennines was worthy of an opponent of
Suvorof. He was, in fact, too quick for Moreau. All
his troops were in the plain on the 14th June, a week
1 Mil. ii. 230. « Mil. ii. 235.
• Macdonald's march from Southern Italy to Florence occupied
eighteen days. In that time he covered about 270 miles, an average
of 15 miles a day. The country was full of armed insurgents, and
provided little or no food. The army reached Florence half-starved
and in rags.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 247
after leaving Tuscany, and in the seven days they had
marched 150 miles and beaten the Austrians under
Hohenzollern at Modena.
The French plan was daring, and against a meaner
adversary might have ended in a brilliant and decisive
victory. But no operation of war is so difficult or so
dangerous as to carry two different armies over separate
and diverging mountain passes into a plain, where an
enemy of even approximately equal strength is waiting
to receive them. If they unite before one of them is
engaged, they may together crush the enemy. But
everything depends upon the punctual and exact per-
formance of every stage of the joint undertaking, and
the arrival of both forces intact at the prearranged
point of union. The enemy must be fought by both
together, or, at least, one must be able to hold him
until the other comes on to the field. But the matter
is never entirely in the hands of the co-operating leaders.
The utmost diligence on their part cannot ensure suc-
cess, unless the enemy himself permits it. A sluggish
opponent may allow the plan to succeed. But he must
almost invariably have the opportunity, if only he has
accurate information, of moving upon one of the ap-
proaching armies before the other can touch him.
Suvorof himself was to learn to his cost what fatal
consequences may follow upon an unexpected delay,
when the enemy is bold and resolute. On the present
occasion he showed by his own action what such an
enemy can do, even when there has been no substantial
mistake in the calculations of the attacking commanders,
and he himself is taken by surprise. Macdonald reached
Modena on the 12th June, and Moreau was not in the
neighbourhood of Voghera till the 19th, when Macdonald's
fate had already been decided. The interval was suffi-
cient to give Suvorof a complete victory, though he
did not know until early on the 13th that any danger
whatever was threatening him from the direction of
Modena.
248 SUVOROF
Hohenzollern had been attacked at Modena by
Ollivier, who had crossed the mountains from Pistoia,
and he had been flung back with heavy loss towards
Mantua. It was open to Macdonald either to follow
him across the Po to Mantua, raise the siege of that
fortress, and cut the communications of the Allies
through Verona, or else to inflict a sanguinary defeat
upon some other isolated detachment. In either case
Suvorof must act quickly. He had been caught nap-
ping. But to catch Suvorof napping was not to destroy
him. He had fixed upon Alessandria as a good base
for operations against an attack from Genoa. But it
was not a bad base for operations in the direction of
Modena. His decision was taken on the 13th, as soon
as he heard of the disaster to Hohenzollern. He must
settle accounts with Macdonald before Moreau appeared
on the scene. On the 14th he set out with all speed
towards the enemy. Bellegarde was'left at Alessandria,
and Suvorof took with him not more than 25,000 men,
of whom three-fifths were Russian.
Macdonald, on the other hand, marched as rapidly
against Suvorof. Mantua could wait. If Suvorof were
beaten it must be relieved, and until Suvorof was
beaten it could not be relieved. Macdonald, there-
fore, pursuing the original design, threw out Montrichard
in the direction of Mantua to occupy the attention of
Kray, stationed Ollivier at Modena, and on the 13th
began to march with the rest of his troops along the
great road, to fling all his weight upon Ott at Parma.
On the 14th, Victor descended unopposed the valley
of the Taro, and occupied Borgo San Donnino, where
he was joined by Macdonald's advance guard under
Dombrovski. On the 15th, Victor and Dombrovski
reached Fiorenzolla on the Arda. On the same day Ott,
obeying Suvorof's orders, had retreated as far as
Piacenza. He had been told to fight a delaying action
between Parma and that place.^ He therefore took
1 Mil. ii. 240.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 249
up a position along the River Nura, and on the 16th
his outposts were already in action.
Suvorof was by this time in full march to his assist-
ance. He ordered Kray to detach as many troops as
possible to assist him, and also to help Hohenzollern
and Klenau in threatening Macdonald's rear. Belle-
250 SUVOROF
garde was instructed to cover the troops blockading
the citadel of Alessandria, and to protect Suvorof
himself against the threatened attack from Genoa.
The Commander-in-Chief also requested Haddik to
send a brigade to Turin, and begged the Archduke
Charles to replace Haddik' s troops by a detachment
of his own.i To Keim he sent a flying note :
Dear General — I am going to Piacenza to beat
Macdonald. Hurry on your siege works against the
citadel of Turin, or else I shall sing a Te Deum before
you.2
Unfortunately the striking army was still dispersed.
Rosenberg was behind Suvorof and did not reach
Alessandria till the evening of the 14th. There he
found the main body, held up by a delay in throwing
the bridge across the Bormida, and no real start was
possible till 10 o'clock on the night of the 15th. Even
then Tchubarof , coming from Acqui with three of Secken-
dorf 's battalions, was still further in the rear, and arrived
at Alessandria after all the rest of the troops, including
those of Rosenberg, had left the town. During this
enforced delay Suvorof had issued a general order,
emphasising his favourite injunctions :
Defeat the enemy with cold steel, bayonet, swords,
and pikes. . . . Don't slow down during an attack.
When the enemy is broken, shattered, then pursue
him at once, and don't give him time either to collect
or re-form. If he surrenders, spare him ; only order
him to throw down his arms. During the attack call
on the enemy to surrender. . . . Spare nothing, don't
think of your labours ; pursue the enemy night and
day, so long as anything is left to be destroyed.^
These directions were all very well. But the delay
had nearly ruined Ott. On the 16th, Victor, with about
^ With great reluctance Kray sent a regiment of Dragoons. He
had been ordered by the War Council at Vienna not to spare a single
man from the siege of Mantua. Mil. ii. 547, 648 ; Fuchs, ii. 194.
2 Mil. ii. 241. » Fuchs, ii. 304.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 251
7000 men, came into touch with his 6000 at Piacenza,
and Ott, leaving seven companies in the citadel, destroyed
the bridge over the Po, and fell back behind the Tidone,
5 miles to the west. Fortunately for him, the French
were still distributed over a great distance along the
road. When Macdonald's troops had all reached the
plain, Dombrovski and Rusca were 10 miles, Watrin
16 miles, and Ollivier and Montrichard more than
70 miles to the east of Victor.^ When Victor
attacked Ott at 8 o'clock on the morning of the
17th, this straggling army had been brought somewhat
together, and there were sufficient troops at hand to
give the French an overwhelming superiority. Victor
himself attacked Ott's left at Verrato di Sopra, Rusca
attacked his centre across the high-road at Ponte
Tidone, and Salme's brigade was held in reserve. The
ground was difficult, cut up in every direction by
ditches, fenceS; gardens, and vineyards, bu^ the River
Tidone itself, like all the other Lombard rivers at that
season, was almost dry, and its wide sandy bed could
be crossed at any point. The French came on rapidly,
until Ott was reinforced by some of the advanced
troops of Melas at 10 o'clock. His troops were now
about 9000 against 16,000 French, and he succeeded
in making a stand at the village of Sarmato, posting a
battery of 8 guns, covered by a deep ditch, by the
high-road. But by 3 o'clock in the afternoon a
violent attack on his right wing had carried this battery,
the Austrians were falling back to San Giovanni, and
Dombrovski' s Poles at Caramello were threatening to
turn their right and cut off their retreat. At this point
Suvorof himself came upon the scene.
The march from Alessandria had been made with
his usual remorseless energy, and the phenomenal
powers of his troops redeemed the time lost at the
Bormida. They started from the Bormida in two
columns. The left column, under Melas, 9 Austrian
* Rousset, Souvenirs de Macdonald, 90.
252 SUVOROF
battalions and 12 squadrons of cavalry, marched by
Sale and Castelnuovo di Scrivia. The right column,
imder Rosenberg, 20 Russian battalions and 4 regi-
ments of Cossacks, was at first ordered to go through
San Giuliano to Tortona. But its direction was
changed at San Giuliano, and to avoid the delay of
bridging the Scrivia near Tortona, it was sent to Sale.
From that point it marched on the heels of the Austrians.
The whole army thus moved east in a long train down
the road along the right bank of the Po, as the French
moved west to meet them.^ The Austrian advance
guard under Daller succeeded in getting into touch
with Ott about 10 o'clock in the morning of the 17th.
But, as has already been described, he was not in
sufficient strength to resist the increasing pressure of
the French, and as the rest of Melas* column came up
the enemy also were reinforced.
Everything depended upon the ability of the Russian
main body to reach the scene of the combat before the
outnumbered and exhausted Austrians were driven
into absolute rout. The soldiers were called upon to
do their utmost, and their advance was made at such
a speed, that a casual spectator, meeting them on the
road, might have supposed it to be a retreat. The
Cossacks, under Bagration, pushed on ahead, and the
infantry followed as best it could. For miles behind
the marching battalions the road, the ditches, and
the fields were marked with the bodies of men who had
fallen from the ranks, not a few of them already dead
from exhaustion. A long trail of stragglers toiled after
them in the dust, too weak to fulfil their duty, but
too proud to give way entirely to fatigue. Suvorof
rode with his men, galloping up and down the labour-
ing column, breaking out into homely jests and pro-
verbial wisdom, crying : " Forward, forward, forward
— ^the head doesn't wait for the tail," praising those
who kept on, encouraging those who fell behind, and
1 Fuchs, ii. 316.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 253
every now and then dismounting to examine, from
some house or hillock, how many of his troops were
still at his command, before clambering into his saddle
and plunging once more into the dust.^
The Cossacks came first into action, with orders to
" Take the enemy army prisoner,'* crying, " Bas les
armes — -jettez les armes,''' and paying special attention
to the guns and the Generals with their Staffs.^
Approaching San Giovanni, Suvorof took the four
regiments of Cossacks and the Austrian Dragoons, and
galloped forward with Bagration. Mounting a knoll
shortly before four o'clock, he saw the critical situation
of Ott's right wing, and launched two Cossack and two
Dragoon regiments against Dombrovski, sending the
other two Cossack regiments to the left. The attack
was completely successful. Dombrovski's cavalry
were broken, and his infantry thrown into confusion.
Ott thus obtained a short space in which to re-form.
At four o'clock the Russian Grenadiers marched on
to the field. So great had been their effort that
Bagration, begging for a short rest, declared that the
companies which left Alessandria about 100 strong,
now contained, on the average, only 40 men each.
" Only 40 to a company ? " exclaimed Suvorof. " Mac-
donald will only have 20. Forward ! Victory ! Hurra ! "
And he ordered his men directly into the fight, flags
displayed, drums beating, trumpets sounding, and the
choir of every battalion singing a national air. The
soldiers responded nobly, and men who were well-
nigh too exhausted to carry their muskets, advanced
through the crumbling Austrian ranks straight upon the
triumphant French, and drove them back at the point
^ For this march see Starkof, 127; "Reminiscences of Denisof,"
Russ. Star. One of Suvorof's devices, according to Starkof, was to
teach the men a few words of French. When a group showed signs
of collapse, it was the duty of the sergeants to call upon them to repeat
their lesson. Weariness was thus forgotten, while the jaded scholars
struggled over a few more of those heart-breaking versts,
2 Fuchs, ii. 316.
254 SUVOROF
of the bayonet. The attack was general. Ott advanced
on both sides of the road, Gortchakof, with two Cossack
regiments, in support on his left, and Bagration with
the Russian infantry on his right. Little time was
lost in musketry fire. The Field-Marshal galloped
along his front, crying : " Forward, forward I Cut
them down, smash them ! '* and, with banners, drums,
trumpets, and singing, the weary troops moved steadily
to the attack.
They were met as steadily by the French. But
nothing could resist their determined pressure. Sarmato
was passed. Some of Dombrovski's battalions were
completely dispersed, and a French demi-brigade
coming to their assistance was driven back by the
triumphant Cossacks. Dombrovski was pushed across
the Tidone, and the cavalry of Suvorof's right were
able to wheel to the left and attack Victor and Salme
in flank. Forming square, the French infantry stub-
bornly retreated across the river, and only the fall
of darkness stopped the Russian advance. Scattered
groups of Cossacks and Dragoons were still pulling their
horses out of ditches, or leading them by the bridle
through the tangle of fences and vineyards, long after
night had come.
The first day's fighting, begun so threateningly, had
ended in an unequivocal Russian success. Ott had
escaped destruction, and the French had been so severely
handled that during the night they fell back behind
the Trebbia, covered by Salme.^ The performance of
Suvorof's army had been one of the most remarkable
in the history of war. In the full heat of an Italian
June, they marched 53 miles in thirty-six hours,
and going straight into the heart of a doubtful battle,
drove the enemy off the field after five hours of stubborn
fighting. The Austrians had shown themselves in no
way inferior to the Russians. In Suvorof's hands both
nations were capable of equal endurance : evidence at
^ Rousset, 92.
^2*
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 255
once of his capacity and theirs. Few leaders have been
worthy of such desperate exertions on the part of their
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armies, and few armies have given their leaders the
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make them.
256 SUVOROF
The night was spent by both forces in rest, but both
commanders were resolved to renew the combat next
morning. Suvorof's motives are obvious. Moreau was
somewhere behind him, and Macdonald must be com-
pletely defeated before the other French army came
within reach. Macdonald's reasons are not unim-
peachable. Watrin's division had come up on the
evening of the 17th, too late to take part in the fight,
and allowing for a total loss of about 1500 men, there
were now on the French side 22,000 against at least as
many on the Russian. Ollivier and Montrichard were
still a whole day*s journey behind him, and it would
have been only prudent for Macdonald to withdraw still
further in their direction, keeping Suvorof entangled
until Moreau was ready to strike. But Macdonald
was determined to fight, partly because of the losses
inevitably incident to a retreat, and partly because he
felt bound to keep his agreement with Moreau. In
any case, he could easily defend himself in such broken
country, and would not have much difficulty in holding
out till Ollivier and Montrichard appeared on the scene.^
The scene of this second battle was the space tra-
versed by the River Trebbia, between the Apennines and
the Po. This is an open plain about 10 miles across, inter-
sected, like the rest of the neighbourhood, by ditches,
avenues, vineyards, and gardens. Through it runs the
bed of the river, a sandy waste about 1000 yards wide,
traversed by a few shallow streams of water. Over
the river bed troops could manoeuvre with ease, and
the French were accordingly disposed on both banks
without any risk. Salme was posted across the high
road at San Niccolo, with a few squadrons thrown out
as far to the left as Grignano, and Dombrovski held
Casaligio. Rusca and Victor were on the right bank
of the river in the centre, while Watrin lay at Piacenza,
and blockaded the Austrian^ in the citadel.
Suvorof determined to throw his weight upon the
1 Rousset, 93.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 257
enemy's left. Officers had been sent out along the
roads to get in as many as possible of the men who had
fallen out from the march of the previous day, and
Tchubarof was ordered to hurry on with all speed.
Unfortunately, Tchubarof did not arrive in time to be
of any use, and Kray sent no help that day from Mantua,
so that only the combatants of the 17th, reinforced by
the recovered stragglers, were at hand on the 18th.
In all, Suvorof had no more than 22,000 men at his
disposal, and was about equal in strength to Macdonald.
One step he took, which hinted at his recognition of
the possibility of defeat. He ordered a bridge to be
thrown across the Po at Parpanese, 12 miles above
Piacenza. This served two purposes. If Kray sent
help, it could reach Suvorof by way of the new bridge ;
and if the Field-Marshal lost the day's battle, he could
withdraw by it to the north bank of the Po, in full
communication with Turin to the west and Mantua
to the east, and with the river between him and his
combined enemies. The first motive was probably
uppermost in his own mind, the second in that of his
Austrian staff. His own line of retreat being thus
secured, he disposed his attacking troops so as to cut
into that of the enemy, force a way between their left
wing and the Apennines, and drive them into the Po.
The attack was to be made in three columns, and
with his usual confidence he marked out their line of
advance as far as the River Nura, 10 miles beyond the
Trebbia. Rosenberg was in command of the right and
centre columns, and Melas of the left. The first, con-
sisting of the troops of Bagration and Schveikovski,
was to make for Casaligio. The second, consisting of
Forster's division, was directed through Grignano.
The third, Ott's division, was to move along the high
road, pick up the garrison of Piacenza, and then march
to the Nura. Frohlich's division was kept in reserve,
and was to follow Ott as far as the east bank of the
Tidone, and then, bearing to the right, support Forster.
258 SUVOROF
Three Cossack regiments and 12 squadrons of Austrian
Dragoons were attached to the right column, one Cossack
regiment and 6 squadrons to the centre, and one Cossack
regiment and 6 squadrons to the left, while 6 squadrons
of Dragoons remained in reserve with Frohlich. The
field artillery was similarly distributed ; 6 guns, a
howitzer, and a battery of horse artillery with the
right column, 2 guns with Forster, and 2 with Frohlich.
The troops were to deploy at 2 miles from the enemy,
but if the latter were encountered sooner than was
expected, they were to deploy at once " without confu-
sion, but also without pedantry or superfluous accuracy.
. . . The word ' halt ' not to be used. It is neither for
drill nor battle. Attack, strike, cut down, hurra, drums,
music." ^
The right and centre columns, with the support of
Frohlich, would thus throw a weight of 17,500 men
upon Dombrovski and Victor, 10,000 strong, while
Ott could only bring 4500 to bear upon Salme and
Rusca, who between them had 6000. The disparity
in strength was dangerous, especially having regard to
the difficulty of moving across the wide gap of broken
ground between the centre and left. If the enemy
proved as vigorous as Suvorof ought to have expected,
*' hurra, drums, music " could hardly have saved his
left wing from destruction, and himself from being cut
off from the bridge across the Po. This isolation of
his weak left wing was one of those dispositions which
are described by historians as rash or bold, according
to the result of the whole battle. Possibly Suvorof
intended, by thus refusing his left, to lure the enemy
into a rash advance on that side, while he fell with
unexpected and irresistible force upon their other wing.
Whatever his intentions, they were in the actual event
frustrated by Melas, who was afraid of Ott's weakness
and refused to allow Frohlich to bear to the right.
It was already two o'clock when Bagration came
1 Mil. ii. 261.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 259
into touch with Dombrovski, and Suvorof gave the
order for a general attack. This was not expected by
the French, or at least by Salme, who had actually
asked leave to go for a few hours to Piacenza.^ As on
the previous day, the first shock fell upon Dombrovski,
and after a savage hand-to-hand combat, the Poles
were again driven back. One battalion was cut off
and laid down its arms, and the loss of the whole division
amounted to 500 killed, a flag, 2 guns, and 600 prisoners.
Victor, with his own division and part of Rusca's,
came to the rescue of the fragments of Dombrovski's
troops, and for a time was able to pass round the higher
ground to Bagration's right, and even threaten his
rear. But Bagration threw fresh masses of infantry
upon him, and cleared the right wing with the bayonet.
At the same moment Schveikovski came up on
Bagration's left, and drove back the enemy who were
pressing him on that side. By this time, also, Forster
had cleared Grignano of the infantry of Rusca's division,
and the right and centre columns had thus attained all
their first objectives.
But the divisions of Ollivier and Montrichard were
now coming into action. The former marched direct
along the high road. The latter, inclining to his left,
filled up the gap between the high road and the troops
of Victor and Rusca around Casaligio. There he met
Forster, driving Rusca out of Grignano, and a vigorous
battle was joined between approximately equal forces
along the left bank of the river. This was ended by
the retreat of Victor and Dombrovski, who were pressed
back as far as Settima. Montrichard in his turn, his
left flank being thus uncovered, was bound to withdraw
to Gossolengo. This second stage of the battle ended,
like the first, in favour of the Russians.
Meanwhile, Ott had been in action on the left. Salme,
disregarding Macdonald's instructions to fall back to
the river before being attacked,^ found himself exposed
1 Rousset, 93, 94. 2 Rousset, 93, 94.
260 SUVOROF
to both Ott and Frohlich, the latter of whom Melas
had directed to the left instead of the right. They
attacked Salme with great energy about five o'clock.
Salme himself was wounded, and the same fate befell
two of his successors in command, while his troops were
driven across the river in great disorder. The fire of
the French artillery on the right bank saved them from
a complete overthrow. But they lost about 800 killed,
and 700 remained prisoners in the hands of the Austrians.
By the time that Salme*s brigade had succeeded in
re-forming itself, darkness had already fallen. The
second day had ended, more definitely than the first,
in Suvorof's favour. But the crushing victory had not
yet been gained, and the enemy had still a considerable
number of fresh troops at his disposal, and was even
superior in numbers. Only part of Victor's and Ollivier's
divisions had been seriously engaged, and Watrin had
not been in action at all. For this indecisive result
Melas was undoubtedly to blame. With the assistance
of Frohlich' s eight battalions, the success of the right
wing would have been more thorough, and the want
of them on the right was not compensated by the
services which they had been able to render Ott. In
view of the late hour at which Ott came into action,
it is clear that he could not have been seriously in
danger before nightfall. If he had done no more than
hold his ground the enemy might have been pushed
round, pivoting on their right, until they found them-
selves with their backs to the Po and the roads to the
Apennines, or even to Modena, in the hands of Suvorof.
In that case Macdonald could not have escaped with
anything resembling an army. As things stood on
the night of the 18th, after a day's marching and fighting,
the relative positions of the two forces were much the
same as on the night of the 19th.
During the night the battle was unexpectedly re-
newed. Three French battalions crossed the river
and attacked Ott, and an obscure and useless scramble
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 261
began in the river bed and lasted for an hour. It ceased
at eleven o'clock, but not until the fighting had become
general, and Rosenberg and four of his battalions pene-
trated into the French lines in front of Settima, and
remained there until morning.^ On the next day the
battle began again in earnest. Suvorof at last received
reinforcements in the shape of Tchubarof's three
battalions and six squadrons of Dragoons from Kray,
but these were not actually at his disposal until after
the fighting had begun. He made little change in his
general dispositions, but reiterated and emphasised his
order to Melas to send Frohlich to the support of
Forster. Macdonald, on his part, had decided on this
third day to attack. Dombrovski was to advance first
through Rivalta, and then bear in upon the Russian
right flank, while Victor and Rusca marched directly
upon Casaligio. Ollivier's line was across the high road,
and Montrichard's ran from the road to Grignano.
Watrin and Salme were to operate on the right between
the high road and the Po, and the former was if possible
to get between Ott and the river.^ All Macdonald's
troops were thus on this day in the line of battle, and
he had no general reserve, while Suvorof, as before,
relied upon Frohlich to turn the scale if the balance
began to incline against him at any point.
The battle began about ten o'clock with a general
advance of the French,^ though Montrichard did not
bring the bulk of bis men into action until noon. They
crossed the river in columns, headed by clouds of
skirmishers, and with cavalry in the intervals. As
before, Dombrovski's Poles came first into contact
with the Russians, moving round the slopes of the
hills, and threatening to turn their right. Suvorof
promptly launched Bagration against them. The
infantry charged them in front, the Cossacks and
1 Gryazef. " Rousset, 96.
3 Suvorof had intended to attack at 6 a.m. ; Macdonald at 9. The
delay on both sides was no doubt due to fatigue.
262 SUVOROF
Dragoons on both flanks ; and, scrambling up the hills,
the unfortunate Poles barely succeeded in crossing the
river, leaving another flag, a gun, and 400 men in the
hands of Bagration. This third overthrow completed
the ruin of the division, and Dombrovski took no further
part in the action.
This vigorous advance of the Russian right left a
dangerous gap between Bagration and Schveikovski's
infantry. Victor and Rusca seized the opportunity,
and attacked Schveikovski with horse and foot, cut-
ting him off completely from Bagration, and driving
him back into Casaligio. One regiment, Rosenberg's
Grenadiers, was actually surrounded. It was thrown
into square, and firing steadily on all sides, continued
to present a bold front to the clamorous and exultant
French. Nevertheless, the whole mass was driven
staggering backwards, and defeat in this part of the
field seemed assured. Bagration attacked the advancing
enemy in flank. But he was in too small force, and met
with such resistance that he gave up hope of saving
Schveikovski, and began to fall back to save himself
from being completely isolated. All seemed lost.
Rosenberg himself galloped up to Suvorof, who was
lying on a great stone in shirt, breeches, and boots.
" Try and pick up this stone," said the Field-Marshal.
" You cannot ! No more can you make Russians
retreat ! " He told Rosenberg not to withdraw a
single step, and sent an order to Melas to push forward
on the left. At this moment Bagration rode up to
declare that his men were worn out, half were killed or
wounded, the muskets were foul, the enemy were still
coming on in strength. " That's bad, Count Peter,"
said Suvorof. " Horse ! " He leapt into the saddle
and galloped up to Schveikovski's reeling battalions.
Throwing himself into their midst he cried, " Draw
them on ! Draw them on ! Smartly ! Smartly ! "
Then, as the men came together in better order fifty
paces to the rear, " Halt I " Covered by a sudden
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 263
outburst of artillery fire at point-blank range, the
retiring troops turned, and, led by Suvorof himself,
once more advanced. At the same moment Tchubarof's
long-expected battalions hurried up, and the united
forces drove the French back across the Trebbia.^ The
right was now safe.
The struggle in the centre had in the meantime never
been doubtful. Montrichard attacked Forster shortly
after midday, when the Russian right wing was already
in difficulties, but in a very brief space he suffered a
complete defeat. Melas, jealously keeping Frohlich on
the left, had spared ten squadrons of Dragoons under
Lichtenstein for the support of Forster. Lichten-
stein, not waiting for the French to be checked by
artillery or musketry, attacked them on their right
flank, while Forster charged them in front. The sharp-
shooters were driven in, the cavalry on the flank
scattered, and the whole body of infantry chased in
panic under the protection of their artillery on the right
bank of the Trebbia.
This fortunate use of Lichtenstein's Dragoons was
the only display of real activity which Melas made
during the whole battle. If he had followed it by the
despatch of all Frohlich' s infantry to the right or centre,
the French would almost have certainly been driven
from the field. But, as if exhausted by this effort,
Melas relapsed again into pedantry, and at the very
crisis of the action summoned a council of war. While
Suvorof was at last driving the French left before him,
and their centre was huddling in disgraceful panic on
the far side of the river bed, this council solemnly
decided to act on the defensive. What would have
come of this decision, if the French had also remained
passive, it is difficult to say. But the French had not
1 Starkof, 131 ; Gryazef. I assume that the " fresh infantry " who
came up at the critical moment were Tchubarof s. Clausewitz says
somewhere that they were sent by Forster. This seems very unhkely,
as Forster himself was hotly engaged at the same time as Schveikovski.
It was, of course, the proper moment for Frohlich to intervene.
264 SUVOROF
been trained in Vienna, and they quickly put an end
to the inglorious repose of Melas. He found himself
attacked by Salme to the south of the high road, while
Ollivier, with his entire division, turned his left. The
French were soon in the streets of San Niccolo and
captured two guns.
The situation was saved by Lichtenstein. This
gallant officer had four horses killed under him during
the day, and he behaved with as much discretion as
bravery.^ Calling his Dragoons from the pursuit of
Montrichard, he launched them against Ollivier, and
drove him in his turn across the river bed. The
Austrian infantry recovered, pressed on against their
opponents, and compelled Salme to join Ollivier under
the shelter of his artillery. This advance was at last
checked by the guns. But an attempt to renew the
French attack was similarly frustrated, and no sub-
stantial move was made by either side. The situation
here, as on the right and in the centre, was stalemate.
On the Austrian left the French advance had reached
its furthest point. Watrin had penetrated as far as
Calendasco. But just as Schveikovski's retreat had
compelled Bagration to come in, so Watrin was with-
drawn by that of Ollivier and Salme. He was in
danger of being completely cut off, and beat a hasty
retreat. Only the lethargy of the Austrians saved him
from very heavy losses.
It was now six o'clock, and the general exhaustion
of the troops made further fighting impossible, though
the artillery remained for some time active on either
side. At nightfall the two armies lay in their bivouacs
along the banks of the river, their outposts only 30
yards apart. Suvorof, who had spent most of the
day in the saddle, congratulated his generals on their
" third victory," and declared that on the morrow
they would give Macdonald his fourth lesson. The
time for the attack was fixed at five o'clock. But, in
* Report of Melas ; Fuchs, ii. 417.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 265
fact, the outlook was anything but cheerful. Moreau
was already at Voghera, and his patrols reached as
far as Casteggio. Suvorof probably knew of this on
the evening of the 19th, and he had to choose between
three courses. The first was to march against Moreau,
leaving a strong rearguard in front of Macdonald ; the
second, to cross the Po at Parpanese and take up a
defensive position on the left bank ; the third, to make
all safe by a decisive overthrow of Macdonald. He
might have chosen the first, but in fact he chose the
last. Moreau behind him was no worse than Macdonald
behind him. In case of failure there was still the bridge
across the Po, and if he succeeded, Moreau himself
would be between two fires.
The problem was settled by the retreat of Macdonald.
At nine o'clock in the evening of the 19th the French
Commander summoned a council of war. His losses
had been very heavy ; some infantry battalions had
ceased to exist as military units, the cavalry had been
reduced by almost half, and the artillery had very
little ammunition left. There was no news of Moreau,
while detachments of Austrians from Mantua had
already appeared at Modena, Reggio, and Parma, and
on the northern bank of the Po opposite Piacenza.
The spirit of the troops, many of whom were Italian
levies, was bad, and there was no sign of any failure
of resolution on the other side. On the whole, it
seemed wiser to save the remainder of the army by a
retreat, than to risk a complete disaster in another
attempt at victory. At midnight the order was given
to retire, and at six o'clock in the morning of the 21st
the last units of Victor's division marched sullenly
away, leaving the field of battle to the Allies.^ It had
been hard pounding, and the Russians and Austrians
had pounded longest.
Before dawn Suvorof was preparing to ride among
his troops and rouse them to the attack. On receiving
1 Rousset, 97, 98, 99.
266 SUVOROF
the news of the French retreat, he ordered the whole
force to follow in pursuit, Melas along the high road,
and Rosenberg through San Giorgio. The Austrians
displayed their usual indecision. Melas contented him-
self with occupying Piacenza, and Ott, going on in a
leisurely fashion with some squadrons of cavalry,
captured about 200 men of the French rearguard. The
Russian column was more energetic. The advance
guard, composed of Tchubarof's comparatively fresh
men, drove Victor beyond the Nura, and a pitched
battle on a small scale was fought by Rosenberg at
San Giorgio. The 17th demi-brigade was compelled
to lay down its arms, and 3 flags, 4 guns, 1029 prisoners,
and the baggage and papers of Victor himself remained
in the hands of the pursuers. Victor's troops were now
thoroughly demoralised, many took to the hills in small
parties, and the artillery was dragged away by the
horses of one of the other Divisions.^ Other fighting
took place at different points, and on the 25th June an
incautious detachment of Ott's Division was captured
with two guns at Sassuolo. But the affair at San
Giorgio ended the operations against the main army of
Macdonald. On the 16th June a body of 3000 Ligurian
troops under La Poype, forming a connecting link
between the two French armies, had crossed the Apen-
nines to Bobbio, and, venturing too near the main
body of the Allies, was heavily defeated by Vyeletski,
with a single battalion of Austrian infantry, 50 Dragoons,
and 20 Cossacks. Suvorof was never again disturbed
from the direction of Tuscany.
So ended the first attempt of the French to regain
Lombardy. Macdonald's losses amounted to about
17,000, or half his entire force. All his wounded in the
hospitals of Piacenza fell into the hands of Melas, to
the number of 7500, and the total number of prisoners
taken by the Allies was 12,000. A large quantity of
baggage, 7 guns, and 8 flags were the other trophies of
1 Rousset, 100.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, FIRST STAGE 267
the day. Especially tragic was the fate of Dombrovski's
Poles. These exiles, who had left their country rather
than accept passports from Suvorof, fought at all
stages of the action with desperate bravery. Their
losses were frightful, and at the end of the battle, out
of 2000 men, barely 300 remained under arms. The
Russian losses were returned at 680 killed, 2088 wounded ;
the Austrian at 254 killed, 1903 wounded, and 500 miss-
ing. Suvorof, as usual, probably underestimated his
own losses, and the proportion of killed to wounded
in the Austrian figures is strangely low. Nevertheless,
the total losses of the Allies cannot have exceeded
6000 men.i
While the battles had been raging across the bed
of the Trebbia, Moreau had crossed the Apennines and
fallen upon Bellegarde. On the 16th the Austrian out-
posts were driven from the hills, and on the 17th the
French were already in the plain at Novi and Pozzolo
Formigaro. They were too late. Macdonald was
engaged and beaten long before Moreau could reach
him. But the presence of 14,500 men so near to
Alessandria was a formidable menace. Bellegarde had
about as many men under his command. But 2000
were blockading the citadel at Alessandria, 2000 more
were at Tortona, and Vukassovitch and Seckendorf,
with 6500, were far away towards Nice and Acqui.
Alkaini, in accordance with Suvorof 's plan, abandoned
the blockade of Tortona and fell back towards Ales-
sandria, and Bellegarde himself sent to recall
Vukassovitch and Seckendorf. With 4200 men of La
Marcelle's brigade and the troops of Alkaini he deter-
mined to meet Moreau. His proper course was to
fall back behind the Bormida. But he came gallantly,
if wrongly, to the conclusion that he must protect
Suvorof's rear at all costs by an attack. A stubborn
^ My chief authority for this account of the battle of the Trebbia is
Milyutin. For the part played by the Polish contingent, see also
Chodzko, Histoire des legions polonaises, etc. ii. 168 et seq.
268 SUVOROF
fight therefore began on the 20th between San Giuliano
and Cassina Grossa. So well did Bellegarde handle
his men that by sunset the French were in full retreat.
But only a part of Moreau's whole force had been
employed up to this point, and the arrival of fresh
troops turned the defeat into a victory. Bellegarde's
exhausted Austrians were cut in two, and the remains
of La Marcelle's brigade were actually driven towards
the hills, and returned the next day with great difficulty
to Alessandria. The Austrian loss was heavy ; 850
killed and wounded, 1294 prisoners, and 5 guns were
a heavy price to pay for such an object. Moreau was
of course unable to advance further, and as soon as
Suvorof began his return to Alessandria he was com-
pelled to fall back to the mountains.^
By seven o'clock in the evening of the 27th Suvorof
and his army had arrived at San Giuliano. Moreau
was already out of reach in the mountains, and the
army again went into camp near Alessandria. For
some weeks it remained inactive. The sieges of the
citadels at Turin and Alessandria and the fortress of
Mantua were the only operations of importance between
the victory of the Trebbia and the end of July. Work
began at Turin on the 8th June, and the garrison
surrendered on the 20th. Alessandria was taken on
the 22nd July. In the beginning of July the second
Russian corps under Rehbinder arrived in the plain,
and was stationed at Piacenza. Its siege train was
sent on to Mantua, and that place capitulated on the
last day of the month.
1 Mil. ii. 288.
CHAPTER X
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE
Correspondence and complaints — ^The French cross the Apennines
again — Battle of Novi — International fame — A dinner party —
Anecdotes — Plan of a Swiss campaign — Its vices and dangers.
During this period of inactivity at Alessandria, the
correspondence of Suvorof, with Moreau keeping an
unbeaten army on the other side of the Apennines, was
very feverish. Letters from Vienna provoked a torrent
of protests and complaints. On the 21st June the
Austrian Emperor sent him a long rescript, showing
great anxiety about a French invasion of Piedmont,
and referring, with singular want of tact, to the " good-
luck " which had so often helped Suvorof in war. The
rescript continued :
I beg you earnestly, dear Field-Marshal, always to
carry out my former instructions ; that is, abstain
altogether from all distant and uncertain undertakings,
corresponding neither with the present general situa-
tion of affairs, nor with the intentions of myself and my
sincere Ally, the Russian Emperor . . . and especially
not to lose sight of the promise given by you before
your departure from Vienna, that to every important
proposal or proceeding which should occur to you as
suitable to the circumstances of the moment, you would
previously draw my attention.^
Suvorof s answer to this was a detailed description
of Macdonald's defeat on the Trebbia. But there
1 Fuchs, ii. 458.
270 SUVOROF
followed reiterated orders to defend Piedmont and
Lombardy, and an express prohibition of any opera-
tions in the direction of Rome or Naples until the siege
of Mantua was successfully concluded.^ He was actu-
ally meditating a descent on the Genoese Riviera with
60,000 men, and for the protection of his rear again
asked permission to equip Italian troops for the defence
of their own country.* This met with the usual pro-
hibition, and the Emperor went on to express his
grave displeasure at hearing a rumour that the King
of Sardinia proposed to visit his late kingdom of
Piedmont, now so happily recovered from the enemy.
Suvorof was not on any account to let the King come
near the theatre of war.^ This blind selfishness injured
Austria in more ways than one. It limited the number
of troops available for aggressive action, it alienated
public opinion in Piedmont, and it deprived Austria of
the assistance of a patriotic army when Suvorof had
gone, and the French again descended upon Italy. All
these checks and interferences drove Suvorof into a
fury, and, coupled with proposals to keep Rehbinder's
Russian army in Switzerland to help the Archduke
Charles, made him at last ask for his recall. Some of
his letters are almost incoherent.
To Count Theodor Rostoptchin he wrote after the
Trebbia :
The Russian God is great — The French are sighing,
the Imperialists smile — here things go victoriously,
but with difficulty — Our best is impossible ; the Im-
perialists are slow at getting into line, the French
hot ; they're warm, beaten many of them, difficult to
get together — and in England there are many gay folk
and my portrait out on holidays, and Simeon Roman-
ovitch praises me — but my stockings have fallen
1 Mil.; Fuchs.
2 Fuchs, ii. 472, 482.
' Fuchs, ii. 663. The King had even asked leave to serve under
Suvorof.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 271
down. ... It would have been better without tactics
and practics . . . politics, criticism, Thugut, the
Directory, London, Potsdam — God protect us ! and
you and your wife.^
This was written soon after the Trebbia. On the
1st July he wrote to Razumovski :
Such mean deceits, contrived with a thousand
clerkish intrigues against me as a foreigner, compel
me not to endure them for an hour, and I must abandon
the service if an opportunity should suddenly present
itself. You are my only means of doing that. I shall
be content to pass the remainder of my days, even with
little means, as a country gentleman. ... I can
scarcely force myself to write these lines, I'm really so
weak. . . . For God's sake, lead me out of Purgatory.
... I should be ashamed if I didn't clear the rest of
Italy of the French in this campaign. After that the
French theatre wouldn't be difficult ; we should find
a great part of the people there sympathetic.
(1) To clear Italy of the French, give me full freedom
of decision ; (2) don't let the War Council and its vile
projectors interfere with me ; (3) I am ready, from
Switzerland into either Germany or France ; otherwise
there's no work for me here. Home, home, home ;
tell Vienna that's all my plan.^
To the Tsar himself he wrote on the 6th July :
The cowardice of the War Council, jealous of me as a
foreigner, the intrigues of double-faced sectional com-
manders in direct communication with the Council,
which has hitherto controlled all the operations ; my
impotence to carry them out before sending a dispatch
a thousand versts, compel me most humbly to request
Your Imperial Highness to recall me unless things here
change. I wish to lay my bones in my own land, and
pray God for my Sovereign.^
1 Voronts. Arkhiv, xxiv. 88. Simeon Romano vitch is Prince
Vorontsof, the Ambassador in London. Tlie allusion to his stocldngs
is a hint at Suvorof s disappointment at not receiving the Garter.
He was not aware that there was no damned nonsense about merit in it.
a Voronts. Arkh. xxiv. 325. * Fuchs, ii. 472.
272 SUVOROF ::.
On the same day he broke out again to Razumovski :
" Luck ! '* says the Roman Emperor. . . . Manager
Thugut knows plumb-line K[arl]. . . . Enough pre-
tences. " You want soldiers ! What would you have
done with them if you had been beaten ? " The Minister
didn't know that to follow up a victory more soldiers
are wanted. From innocent me they're taking away
my ewe lamb, Rehbinder.
Archduke Charles, exalted person, he doesn't even
give me what he's ordered to. The Cabinet wants to
emphasize that the enthusiasm of Lombardy is a
hallucination of mine, susceptible foreigner — rather, so
as not to disgrace its rules before Europe, and prove
that I ought to be only a sentry at the gates of the
folks at Vienna.
The era of the Tidone and the Trebbia flies to its
end — what will become of me ? . . . They have drowned
Zenith and Nadir. Very wisely — I shall be Cincinnatus.
. . . My last victories have torn from my hands 5000.
The knowalls have wasted more than 10,000 of my men.
The common good counsels you to replace them, not
simply stupidly tear Rehbinder from me. . . . How soon
may he be away from me, and I from here ! In the
uttermost weakness of spirit and body — ^whenever God
wills ... I shall hasten to my plough.
Does the Cabinet know that a complete siege without
the cover of an observation corps can't go on ? It
surely doesn't ; according to its custom of being beaten
in entrenchments. . . . More honest and more amiable
to fight the French than me and the common good.
I advise you, honoured friend, if it happens to your
Excellency to have anything to do with the troops, to
be good enough to communicate the matter to me, their
Commander, for my consideration. Vienna can never
be as learned as I am in military operations. Do not
set up more War Councils : even one will destroy my
faith and faithfulness. Forgive my frankness.^
Again to Razumovski on the 8th July :
Fortune has a bald occiput, and a few dangling locks
on her forehead. She travels like lightning — Jail to
1 Fuchs, ii. 472.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 273
catch her locks — ^never again will she return. Is not
one campaign better than ten ? Or, is it not better
to have the aim of directing one's march eventually
on Paris, than cleverly bar the way to one's own gates ?
On the same day to Count Pavel Tolstoy :
Archduke Charles, in three or four general engage-
ments and victories, has inflicted on the enemy a loss
of five or six thousand. He could have doubled, trebled
it. Bayonets ! Here with me the Germans hit hard ;
there it's altogether otherwise. . . . Why did the
Archduke Charles not march after his victory on Berne,
attack Massena again ? The French are making levies,
collecting a new army to the cry of " Vengeance." ^
To Razumovski again on the 12th July :
I am having a real attack of fever, though on my legs.
... I write unhappily, and would that I could write
it for the last time ! . . . Day and night work — carping,
monstrous correspondence with the pat-talkers, ceaseless
dissatisfaction with the intrigues of the War Council.
. . . Would that I had full power to take advantage
of circumstances, and no one would interfere, especially
who have not served in war. Projectors. To — and
this one — and those — take away their pens, paper,
and factiousness. . . . The wily Thugut, by nature an
honest patriot, but carried away by projectors of military
matters, for want of true leaders, and for excess of mer-
cenaries or parasites. Their service is for titles, ambition
or egoism, hurtful to their country. I will say, they
are brave ; I have tried them, and I shall leave an
army more victorious than that of Eugen. But without
me they won't beat the others. Mollycoddles and
pat-talkers.^
This inflamed condition lasted till the end of the
month. On the 31st, hearing of the capitulation of
Mantua, he wrote in great glee to Melas :
The fall of this fortress strengthens our army, and
makes it impossible to postpone any further our pro-
1 Fuchs, ii. 472. « Ibid. 505.
274 SUVOROF
jected aggressive movement. ... I urge your Ex-
cellency by your attachment to his Most Gracious
Majesty our Sovereign and your devotion to the common
good, to use all your authority and all your strength,
so that the preparations necessary for active measures
in the Riviera may be completely finished in the course
of ten days. Speed is now of the greatest value — delay
is a sin, unforgivable for its harmful consequences.^
At this critical moment he was deprived of the services
of Chasteler, and wrote with much feeling to Razumovski
on the 7th August :
My dear firebrand, but worthy and efficient Chasteler.
. . . Under the walls of Alessandria, out of sheer
wilfulness, he was wounded in a trench ; in his place —
not Zach-Haft, but only Zach : good-natured, quiet,
learned ; but a true projecting mollycoddle — and I'm
in combustion — God grant health to Chasteler.^
But with or without his Chief of the Staff, he was
going on. He had already issued a proclamation to
the Genoese, announcing his arrival " to set them free
from humiliation and the savage yoke of France." ^
To Kray he sent on the 30th, bidding him come from
Mantua with every man who could be brought away,
and allowing him eight days for the march of 115 miles.*
The Tsar had made him Prince of Italy after the fall
of Mantua, but this new title pleased him less than the
prospect of another battle. Practically the whole of
Italy was now in the hands of the Allies. The Genoese
Riviera, the citadel of Tortona, and the forts of Coni,
Gavi, and Serravalle were all that remained in French
hands in the north ; and in central Italy they had lost
everything except Rome, Civita Vecchia, Ancona, and
the citadel of Perugia. On the northern frontier they
had been pushed back as far as Brigue by Victor Rohan
and the Great St. Bernard by Haddik. On the western
1 Mil. ii. 406 ; Fuchs, ii. 638.
2 Mil. ii. 606. ' Fuchs, ii. 613.
* Kray left on the 3rd August and reached Alessfindrifi on the 10th,
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 275
they had withdrawn into Savoy and the Dauphin^.^
In all, Suvorof had 108,000 men at his disposal. In the
neighbourhood of Alessandria he had his main striking
force of about 45,000 ; Keim, with 14,000, watched
the passes from the west, and 11,000 protected him
on the side of Switzerland. When Kray had left 5000
men in Mantua, he was able to bring to Suvorof s assist-
ance 19,000 men, thus bringing the main body up to
about 64,000.2 His plans had been changed several
times in detail, but were finally settled on the 30th
July.^ He had been busy collecting mules for the
transport across the mountains, and he persuaded
Nelson, then in the midst of his shameful co-operation
with the Neapolitan Bourbons, to detach some vessels
to cut the French communications with Genoa.* He
directed General Klenau, simultaneously with his own
invasion from the north, to enter the Riviera with a
mixed force from the side of Tuscany. On the 2nd
August he was in motion. He found the enemy closer
than he expected.
A few days were required to reduce the fort of Serra-
valle, and even before the 7th August, on which it
capitulated, news had come in of the strengthening
of the French outposts in the Apennines, and of their
increasing aggressiveness. On the 10th August a
detachment actually succeeded in reaching Novi, where
Suvorof had fixed his headquarters. The full significance
of this was not at first perceived, and on the 11th the
Field-Marshal issued his orders for an advance upon
Genoa in four columns, in accordance with the agreed
plan. But within twenty-four hours he found that
he had been forestalled. Instead of attacking he was
once more to be attacked.
1 Mil. iii. 7, 269.
2 Mil. iii. 17.
3 Three plans are set out in Fuchs, ii. 515, 585, and 685. Milyutin
found the final plan in the Moscow Archives (Mil. iii. 283).
* He also wrote to St. Vincent and the Russian Admiral Ushakof
(Mil. iii. 273).
of th^ ll^f/iiblK* At h/itff^ hti<\ k\fr(rMi w^-r^ At, t.hfif hrw^^u
Th^ fislfijl^ ifi th^ Vf«ml^^ AttAfn#>/f AlAfrriin^ frfo;
The thptittttU'tiiH fi^Afftftt the /fr/rf^J"-^ ^^^re .. ,.^,,, 1
hnfa i4f hitnkh wip^plie* Urf ihif ^ rr the fU'](\.
iHifiptit tiikl tiAfely filIe/1 the p]m*^ /jf the f!rk?fc aw/I t»/ilf
//f ftftly WA« ifi ftpe<'iAHy fffK\ f!Af»e. The wh/rle fiA^Alry
#a# ^iMiKytfliM, hr ^^ r^ WAi«j no Itrtt^ Utf the
h/xf»e«, mA ttie tf <lvefi» wete in WAfit ^
every /le^efWftry (rf life. M<mf»y, el/rthen, fio//t/«, WAgiOffH^
And even ^Artridgeft were deft^-ient^ And «/)trie dewri*
hfJ^Ade^i And ft'ffitntinU were fe/hi«e/l t/> ftin/i^le hAttAlJ^ri
/rr f'Vf^n A ff'W <'ornpA/iie«.< With thift Army trt rkf^
ttuiiVitiH Jrxtihert WAfl now (;f<>fisin^ the Apennines, And it
tr^/iild be nn/Aif t^i ^ftrttrf ntA to Mitrnt thM the mmny
wh<»rr» t »o mtumnUft w. 'J^rr t^> him, n^
Wily in ' 's, trfit aWj in ev -I (rl e/|iiipmeni«
thts ffeneh AttA<?k was lAf^ely impirmi \ry politieAJ
ffi/rtlve*. The new l)ifer't.<xfy, set tip tm the l»th June,
WA« M\xitmn to ftetMjre itself liy a success In the fWld,
And A new JoAn, A new e<ms<'rijjrt>i//n, And a new yi/'t<rfy
hA<l been projecte<J Urt thAt friirp^me. The |)ir - • - -
<inf//ftijnfltely f<;f itself, fixed uptm ftiivofof as tir
wh<ise flp^fils were to (jrAce its triumph. Twd rnw
Arniies, ** of the Rhine " And ** (A tfie Alps," were to be
eolleited i the Afrny of I^Jwity/erlAnd was to be JnereAse/i
in 70,m>0 tm^n, And thAt of ftAly to 70,000. The ('(;rri-
ummS of the last was entrusted to Jf/ubert, and MoreAii,
enJoyin« the empty tltkf (A CommAndef'lii^Chl^l (A th«
pap' * ' nhine, r* ' ' 1 at hjs /»wn re/jiiest,
AS J oit. Ali 'in/^ all the burden
(4 the fatigues, Anxieties, And disAppf/intmetitft of the
< Mhnuiret du MtHhhut de m, (Jiff, U flld, MOi
iMMt four luunthiit hn ytm m[\\^ifkk\\^\ Uy m y\m«
JtmM'i« iM\ly thirty ymv^ k4 (^^\ y^m '
NM|mt(^viu m ** m ^ihmuuUim' iu vH»um^^ mul i« r
ill iHi^moity fvir wur.'* Uln •itiiiy w»i« tii fm^t not <
tliMi 4A,iHHi utiHMiifi Itn qimlity wmm kmvL iMui hi;^ «id\
WA« M (»l^H>lf of liU (HMUHi^' mtlu>v llmM hU tikill, M
wnn for th«» »wvMul tinif* to W4vt> tlu> \w\m \if wv iiwny
ftHMii tli(^ rt^iiiiltN v»f Miiotlii^rV tiluiuli^i^iuK.
'riit* ttotuiil f^httM'|»rl»o M^iiiikt Suvoiskf wii» uiul«^r»
tiikf*h l»y only Wft»tHH> mum»» tiiul Uu^no MiovtMi tiy
Umijit^rovmly so^mmttnl v\mU, HU i\vr'« rl^iht wlii|t
WMji H^vKt Into Uir^o ooUiiiiiiM t tK0 t^i^iiti'^i iiiuIim' t#lH^ii«
i'^< ' ' ' ^ ' ' Uif» iUvUly»o«*
'<< NN ""•" '" ' - ' • ■' • ' "« Mill H.ll^l tlu>
If^fti ooimiMtui)! or i'otirM tiri|(MAl(v of mm mumi. IVrl^imiii
with thf» loft whin. tttlvmioiHl hi twvi oohiOMiM, JoiihtMl
hhiiMf wtiN with IVi*i||imii. (hi llu« tilth Wiitvlii hml
almiily (MMo<^ into iMMiiMot with thi^ AiiHti'iiiii** in H(>rm«
vnlhs whih^ Jouhort hinmolf wu* wtlll u «I'm '- wywwh
from hi» lUMiivwt mlvt*wiiry,
Th(^ HitiuithMi of th(^ I'Viii^h, hml it l^^^o kiuovh
mrlliir to 8\iv\MH»f| w»i« iu>w oioM |HM'iloi»«» uiul w li^ht
iihilf nifwki^ ii|iot\ Ht\« Cyr iiiliiht tmvi» hmvii mn ftilut mm
IiIh iiiivtH^h upon M»u«(toimhl Mt thi^ IVhhln. Hut wh^u
Wtitrhi (If^rnHMiiliMl ill U\f\^P upon lUmorHl hullu^hn Hi
AnHtuAtA, lunl ilrovt^ hlin Imok through HrrmvMllf»( U
WHN Ktlll not WII^vihI Ihttt tlu^ whoh* I'Vnoli iiriny
WAN on th0 iimMii In oiplti^ yst hiM iihunihint oMVuh^Vi
hf^Uwv Nov I tui Imfoif^ tlu^ 'I'lHilihiw, Huvoinif wni* vt»ry
hiNullh'inilly Hwtii'o of hlM f»npniv'ii inovf^ninntu, li
wnn (Iroithnl thiit \\\{n iittm^k on tttillu^ini wmn nn^n^ly
iin Httf'Mipt to h^hovt^ i\it'toiui, Novrt'tht^h^M, tMti»^
KuihIi' wfiN H(Mit tit nmko »i t'H«onn»ii^Miti(«o in tho VMlloy
of tlui llotnihUi M\\\ h<^ Hi^nt Imok iit oui^^ tlu^ infornm'
tion tluit HnoduM' hnNtth> mthnnn wiim h)m !•>.«(
AiMjul, Nuvoi'of inouiMllHti^ly oiiIUmI in hiw ♦!
tro(t|iM, In W opmi (uumtry hit IioimmI to un^ htii
oviii'wlu^hnlnji Nupprlorlty of for<»tt witli m'lmtpr f^ff^oi
278 SUVOROF
than in the upper valleys, and he therefore refrained
from striking before the French columns emerged from
the mountains.
On the 13th he fixed his headquarters at Pozzolo
Formigaro, 8 miles north of Novi. He ordered
Bagration to take up a position to the south of the
town, sent to his support six Russian battalions from
Derfelden*s force, under the command of Miloradovitch,
and told Kray to come up from Alessandria on the
right wing, and attack the enemy's left as soon as it
came out of the mountain valley. At dawn on the
14th Bagration found the enemy approaching in great
force, and fell back to Pozzolo Formigaro. St. Cyr
took possession of the town of Novi, Laboissi^re occupy-
ing the town and the hills behind it, Watrin moving
further into the plain upon his right, and Dombrovski
remaining about Serravalle.
In the meantime Joubert was coming up from the
west, and if Kray had carried out his original orders, a
general action would no doubt have been begun, and
the French would have had to fight with a dangerous
gap between their left and right wings. But on Kray's
urgent representation that his men were too tired to*
fight, Suvorof consented to his remaining inactive.
Joubert was thus enabled, undisturbed, to effect a
junction with the troops at Novi. The whole of the
15th was allowed to pass without any movement in
strength.^ The French commander, on the other hand,
spent the day and the following night in great perplexity.
His first view of the plain satisfied him that the worst
of the rumours which had come over the Apennines were
true, that Mantua had indeed fallen, and that before
him was collected the flower of the Allied armies, in
numbers almost twice his own. A council of war did
nothing to resolve his doubts, and his final decision to
^ Suvorof rode along the line to examine the French position. In
his shirt and breeches he was recognised, skirmishers fired at him, and
cavalry threatened to capture him (St. Cyr, i. 236 ; Mil. iii. 41, 303).
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 279
fight was that of the grenadier rather than the general.
The movements of the troops reflected the confusion of
their leader. Even at dawn on the 16th the French had
not taken up positions as for a battle, and a large part
of the left wing was still in motion towards the place
assigned to it, when the Austrians were already ascending
the heights.
The French position had one great virtue and one
great defect. Stretching along the hills between the
Scrivia and the Orba, it overlooked the plain, in which
lay the army of Suvorof. Everywhere a steep descent
gave the French an immense advantage. Their artillery
and infantry could fire with more effect, and the Allies,
besides being compelled to attack uphill, would have
hardly any chance at all of using their cavalry. In
addition to this general superiority of position, the
French had the walled town of Novi, not isolated in the
plain in front of their line, like Hougoumont in front of
the British line at Waterloo, but nestling close under
the hill, and jutting out like a great bastion at the
junction of their centre and right. On the other hand,
the position, admirably adapted for defence, was danger-
ously ill supplied with means of retreat. Behind the
whole French line, and roughly parallel with it, ran a
number of streams, flowing through narrow, steep, and
deep ravines into the Lemma, which in its turn flowed
into the Orba. Every movement to the rear must
therefore be determined by the course of these streams.
The only line of retreat of the left wing would be through
the village of Pasturano, across the torrent of the Riasco,
and then in a south-easterly direction, parallel to the
course of the Lemma. Unless the withdrawal were
made in good order and without much pressure from
the enemy, the left wing must inevitably come into
collision with the centre, which must also pass through
Pasturano. The right wing could escape by another
road, though even that passed by Serravalle and ran
for some distance within gunshot of the Austrian garrison.
280 SUVOROF
The general who posted his troops in the face of a superior
enemy, with badly broken ground in his rear and only
one road for the retreat of two-thirds of his whole army,
was taking a frightful risk. In the end it was only the
right wing of Joubert which escaped in military order.
After the whole of the 15th had passed without
any serious move on either side, Suvorof resolved to
attack early on the 16th. His plan was simple, almost
crude. He had about 35,000 men within striking
distance: 25,000 Austrians under Kray, and 10,000
Russians under Bagration and Miloradovitch. The
right wing, under Kray, was to attack the French
left and drive it through Pasturano towards the Scrivia.
So confident was the Field-Marshal of success, that he
gave orders to Melas not to attack the French right on
the position behind Novi, but to advance along the
Scrivia and capture or drive into the mountains the
enemy column which he supposed to be advancing down
that valley. This column, he assumed, would be making
for Tortona, and it would be cut off by the triumphant
advance of Kray to the banks of the Scrivia.^ The plan
was based on incorrect information about the intentions
of the enemy and the disposition of their troops, and it
had in consequence a vital defect. Assuming that only
part of the French was on the hills, and that at least
half their army was advancing down the Scrivia, it
provided only for Kray*s attack on their left, without
any co-operation from the rest of the allied line.
About 30,000 Russians and Austrians, including the
bulk of Derfelden's division and all the troops of
Rosenberg and Melas, remained inactive near Rivalta.
Unless the enemy were extraordinarily incompetent,
such a partial attack could hardly succeed.
As a matter of fact, the French were extraordinarily
incompetent, and the plan came nearer to success than
it deserved. Bellegarde moved before sunrise against
the extreme left of the enemy, and Ott simultaneously
1 Puchs, iii. 13 ; Mil. iii. 310.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 281
attacked them nearer to their centre, while Seckendorf
with three battalions and three squadrons of cavalry
passed round the extreme point of the ridge and pressed
up the gorge of the Riasco on to Pasturano itself.
Incredible as it seems, the French left wing was not yet
in order of battle. Nor was the right. Watrin was at
this moment still marching from the Scrivia, to take
up his position to the east of Novi in contact with
Laboissiere. But here no danger threatened, whereas
on the left an attack was actually being made. One
division, that of Lemoine, faced Bellegarde, and sufficient
troops were in line against Ott. But between Lemoine
and the Riasco there was a wide gap, which Grouchy
was about to occupy with his division. The infantry
reserve of Clausel and Partounaux was still in column
of march behind Pasturano, when the Austrians were^
already closing with the troops on the ridge. The
situation was desperate, and Joubert himself, rushing
forward to steady his line, was killed by an Austrian
skirmisher. The cavalry reserve of Richepanse threw
themselves between Bellegarde and Grouchy, but as
the Austrian infantry advanced with magnificent steadi-
ness up the slope in front and Seckendorf opened fire
upon the French in flank and rear, they were driven back
into Pasturano. Ott was as successful as Bellegarde,
and his right wing, pushing hard against Lemoine,
obtained a foothold on the crest. A vigorous attack
along the whole line might have converted this local
success into a complete victory, but Suvorof, still
believing that Kray was strong enough to beat the whole
French army on the hills behind Novi, made no move.
In the meantime Moreau had resumed command of the
French, and behaved as steadily in this new emergency
as on the Adda. Urging the troops of Grouchy and
Lemoine to stand fast, he summoned help from St. Cyr,
who still remained undisturbed behind Novi. St. Cyr
promptly despatched Colli's brigade to assist Lemoine,
and Clausel at last coming up behind Grouchy, with the
282 SUVOROF
aid of Richepanse the Austrians were driven down into
the plain, retiring in good order and firing steadily as
they went. Seckendorf fell back in conformity with
the rest.
All the advantage of surprise was now lost. It was
clear to Kray himself that he could not carry out
Suvorof*s plan without aid, and even while the struggle
was still in doubt he had sent a message to Bagration
urging him to attack St. Cyr. But Bagration refused
to move, on the ground that he had no orders from
Suvorof. The Field-Marshal was in an even stranger
state than Bagration. Shut in his room at Pozzolo
Formigaro, he refused admission to every one.^ It was
after 7 o'clock, when Kray had already been com-
pletely repulsed, before he emerged, and rode out to
Bagration. He immediately ordered an attack upon
Novi by Bagration, with Miloradovitch in support, and
directed Kray to renew his assault.
It was now too late. The French were in full posses-
sion of the ridge, and the second attack was no more
successful than the first. Bagration was met by a fierce
fire from the town wall, which was manned by Gardane*s
brigade, and, moving steadily round the town to the
right under this galling musketry, he encountered
Quesnel's brigade on the ridge. Quesnel was supported
by a reserve of four battalions and six squadrons under
Guerin, and the position was the strongest part of the
whole of the French line. The behaviour of the Russian
troops was beyond praise. Fired upon in front and in
flank, they moved as if on parade.^ But the utmost
gallantry could not overcome the natural difficulties of
the ground and the determination of the enemy. A
French battery on the hill called the Belvedere, im-
mediately in front of the Russians, was especially
damaging, and their own artillery, firing upwards from
the level ground, threw its shot over the heads of the
1 Mil. iii. 52, 312 ; Starkof, 161.
« St. Cyr, i. 250.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 283
defenders. Gardane even issued from the town and
charged them in flank. This onset was repulsed, but
Bagration was forced to withdraw to his original position
under cover of his cavalry.
While Bagration was re-forming his defeated but
284 SUVOROF
still unbroken troops, Watrin moved up into his assigned
position on the right of the French line. He had been
ordered by St. Cyr to march from Bettole di Novi at as
great a distance as possible from the enemy, so as to
avoid any encounter until he was actually on the ridge
and in touch with Laboissi^re.^ But Watrin, very
carelessly leaving one of his three brigades at Bettole
di Novi, led the other two along the direct road to Novi
itself. This brought him against the flank of Bagration
in front of the town, but at the same time exposed his
own flank to the Russian reserves. Suvorof promptly
despatched against him a large part of the troops of
Miloradovitch, under the command of Forster, and
summoned Derfelden with the rest of his force from
Rivalta. Forster was soon hotly engaged, and as
Bagration again advanced against Laboissi^re, this
time to the east of Novi, St. Cyr was hard pressed.
Lacking the assistance of Watrin, who ought to have
been in line with Laboissi^re, he was forced to draw
from his reserves to strengthen his hold upon the ridge.
But Gardane again sallied from the town and harassed
Bagration, and the defenders were not in any way
shaken. The Russians had no better hope of success
than before, when Derfelden, deploying in perfect style
to the left of Forster, bore down upon Watrin. The
whole Russian left wing then advanced, Watrin was
driven up on to the hill, and Gardane shut himself
once more within the walls of Novi.
Meanwhile Kray's second attempt had failed. Some
of Bellegarde's troops actually reached Pasturano, and
Ott once more got a foothold on the hills. But the
infantry of Clausel and the cavalry of Richepanse fell
upon Bellegarde, Partounaux held up the tottering
ranks of Lemoine, and the Austrians again fell back.
On this occasion the pursuit was pressed into the
plain itself. The Austrian horse seized its oppor-
tunity, swept down upon the French infantry, in-
1 St. Cyr, i. 241.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 285
flicted heavy losses upon them, and took Partounaux
himself prisoner.
By 1 o'clock in the afternoon both sides were
exhausted by their exertions, and neither could claim
the victory. A decision could only be obtained by the
introduction of fresh troops. The French had none,
except the brigade which had been left behind by
Watrin at Bettole di Novi and was now in line with the
rest. But Suvorof had still, in the forces of Rosenberg
and Melas, a whole army of unused men, and he at last
bethought himself of them. He ordered the Austrian
commander to attack the French right, and Rosenberg
to take the place of Melas at Rivalta. His orders met
Melas on the road. The veteran had supposed, when
Derfelden moved towards the battle, that it was already
decided, and that the time had come for him to pursue
the scattered fragments of the enemy. At 4 o'clock
Suvorof ordered a general attack. By this time Melas
was on the field, with the infantry brigades of Mitrovski,
Laudon, and Lusignan, and the cavalry of Lichtenstein.
Simultaneously with a new advance of the right and
centre, Lusignan, with Lichtenstein in support, attacked
Watrin in front. The fourth brigade, that of Nobili,
marched up the right bank of the Scrivia and forced
Dombrovski to retire from Serravalle to Gavi. Mitrovski
and Laudon, moving up the left bank of the river,
wheeled round to the west, and attacked Watrin in
flank and rear.
This fresh attack was too much for the French. A
Cisalpine legion, forming part of Watrin* s division, was
the first to give way. Lusignan forced himself into the
gap and effected a junction with Laudon, and under
their combined pressure the whole division was driven
into flight. St. Cyr in vain threw the 106th demi-
brigade against Lusignan. The Austrians halted,
Lusignan was wounded and taken prisoner, and two
guns were for a time lost. Watrin' s line was for the
moment restored. But he was given no chance to
286 SUVOROF
recover the lost ground. Miloradovitch broke into Novi
from the north, and Derfelden from the east, and
Gardane's brigade, escaping with difficulty, swarmed
up on to the ridge, with the Russians in hot pursuit.
This settled the fate of Watrin, and a third and last
attack from Kray finally drove the French left from its
position.
It was now 6 o'clock. The whole French Army was
in retreat, and the retreat became a rout. Watrin' s
division got away in good order, but Grouchy, Lemoine,
and Colli were driven pell-mell into the narrow streets
of Pasturano and the gorge of the Riasco. The gorge
was filled with guns and waggons, through which the
terrified soldiery had to struggle. To add to the con-
fusion, a battalion of Austrian infantry and some hussars
succeeded in crossing the ravine, and opened fire on the
road. In a few minutes this was still further blocked
with dead animals and immovable vehicles. These,
with the maddened fugitives, the screaming and plunging
horses, and cursing drivers and artillerymen, filling the
bottom of the gorge from side to side, while the bullets
rained on them from above, presented for a time an
impassable barrier to those troops who held together
and tried to effect a disciplined withdrawal. The sharp-
shooters were at length driven off by General Debel,
who got together a mass of drivers, artillerymen, and
infantry, and made a charge upon them. But the road
remained blocked. The crowd of men in Pasturano
had to get away as best it could, scrambling through
the gardens and vineyards, and dispersing over the
slopes of the hills. Grouchy and Perignan, with one
battalion, were captured in the village, and Colli, with
his entire brigade, was surrounded outside it, and forced
to surrender. All the artillery and baggage in the gorge
were left to the victors, and nothing of the whole army
escaped in order except a portion of St. Cyr's right wing.
The list of casualties was no index of the extent of the
French defeat. In killed and wounded they lost 6500,
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 287
while the Allies lost 7000 ; and the French prisoners
were about 4500, against 1000 taken from the Allies.
But the real measure of Suvorofs victory was the com-
plete dispersion of the mass of Moreau's army. One-
third had been killed, wounded, or taken. Another third
was irretrievably scattered. Only a remnant escaped
as a military organisation.
The victory at Novi, shattering as it was, cannot be
regarded as a good example of Suvorofs military genius.
The proper use of overwhelming numbers is to overwhelm,
and by bringing different parts of his army into action
at different times, he to a great extent threw away his
advantages. This was not a case like the Tidone, where
he brought his troops up to the field with great difficulty,
and sent them into action as they reached the ground.
There was never any reason why he should not have
attacked Joubert along the whole line simultaneously.
The reasons urged on his behalf are very inadequate.
The first is that he intended Kray's attack to be a mere
feint, and hoped that the French would descend into
the plain in pursuit of him, in which case they would
be destroyed by the cavalry. This suggestion is incon-
sistent not only with Suvorofs whole character, but
with other and equally stubborn facts. His instructions
to Kray contain no hint of such an object, and actually
bid him attack with all his strength. Kray carried out
his orders to the letter, and, in spite of considerable
losses, repeated his attack, and asked Bagration to help
him. If the attack had been a mere feint, there was no
need to repeat it after the first costly failure, except as
part of a general attack. The second plea for the defence
is that Suvorof did not know that all the enemy were
before him, and kept a large force in hand to deal with
the apprehended advance down the valley of the Scrivia.
This is a reason, but not an excuse. That he was
ignorant of the distribution and objective of the forces
against him is quite true. But he kept back not only
Melas, but also Rosenberg, and whatever threat might
288 SUVOROF
be made against him at Tortona, it could not require
20,000 men to meet it. Nothing would have been easier
than to bring Melas into action at the same time as Kray,
leaving Rosenberg to cover Tortona. In that case, the
main body of the French would have been beaten in
three or four hours, and any force operating against
Tortona would have fallen into his hands, as S6rurier
fell into his hands after the passage of the Adda. Kray's
attack was, in fact, entirely proper as a real, and not as
a sham, attack. Apart from the sluggishness of the
enemy in taking up their positions, which Suvorof had
no right to expect, the condition of the ground clamoured
for such an attack. But neither that nor any other
flank attack ought to have been made, except as part
of a concerted movement. Simultaneous blows at the
centre and right would have detained all St. Cyr's men
on the spot, and the left wing would never have recovered
from its first confusion. Many gallant lives would thus
have been saved. The only reasonable explanation of
Suvorof s use of his army at Novi is that he was nearly
seventy years old, and that even his abundant energy
was for a few hours asleep.
The victory so sluggishly achieved was no more
vigorously developed, and the leisurely pursuit of the
French was ended on the 18th by a successful encounter
with their rear-guard at Monte Rosso. Moreau was
nevertheless in such a plight that pursuit was hardly
necessary to complete his ruin, and a slight effort on
the part of Suvorof would have achieved his object of
driving the French entirely out of Italy. The first
cause of his inaction was his anxiety about supplies.
The preparations begun before Novi were still incomplete,
the army had with it bread for no more than two days,
and nothing would be found on the southern slopes of
the mountains.^ On the 17th the main body was there-
fore halted on the northern side of the range, and only
scouts were sent forward. ^ But this halt was meant to
1 Mil. iii. 77. 332. « Mil. iii. 334 : Fuchs, iii. 21.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 289
be temporary. In the meantime Klenau was going on
with his invasion of the Riviera from Tuscany, with
an army composed of Austrians from Mantua, Italian
levies, and some Cossacks. At Lerici he was helped
by some sailors sent by Captain Martin, of the English
ship Northumberland.^ His whole force amounted to
about 9000 men. He was actually preparing for an
advance from Santa Marta upon Genoa itself, when, on
the 17th August, he received direct orders from the War
Council at Vienna to abandon his plan, return to
Tuscany, and do nothing until he received further
instructions. At the same time the Council ordered
Melas to collect 9000 men in Tuscany, to restore order
and disarm the native irregulars. This army was to
be under the command of Frohlich, who was summoned
to Vienna to receive his orders in person.
Suvorof heard of this fresh outrage on the part of
the Council in a letter from Melas, who wrote on the
16th to inform him that he was actually carrying out
the instructions of the Council without waiting for the
consent of the Field-Marshal.^ Soon afterwards Suvorof
received a rescript from the Emperor Francis, dated
the 9th August, in answer to his own suggestion of an
invasion of France itself. In this the news of Melas
was confirmed. The Emperor wrote :
The time has now come to detach a part of my troops
to restore order in the southern parts of Italy, especially
in Tuscany and the neighbouring possessions of Rome,
to put an end to the turmoil caused there by the popular
rising.
And the Emperor peremptorily forbade the invasion
of French territory.' On the lips of an Austrian
Emperor the restoration of order was synonymous with
the suppression of freedom, and Suvorof bitterly resented
this diversion of military forces from the completion of
1 Fuchs, ii. 595, 603, 614 ; Mil. iii. 104.
» Mil. iii. 79, 337. ^ puchs, ii. 681.
U
290 SUVOROF
the enemy's overthrow to the furthering of the private
ends of the House of Hapsburg. Colonel Zuccato,
who was engaged on his behalf in raising the Tuscan
levies in their own defence, immediately returned to
Lombardy, " to save the honour of the Russian uniform
in the eyes of the Italians." ^
Nevertheless, Suvorof hoped that KJenau might be
allowed to go on and capture Genoa. On the 16th he
begged that the Emperor would not prevent the gather-
ing of at least thus much of the fruits of Novi, though
he agreed that a French campaign was impossible till
the spring.2 His private correspondence continued to
express his indignation. On the 11th he had written
to Count Rostoptchin :
All goes ill with me. The orders sent every minute
from the War Council weaken my health, and I cannot
serve here any longer. They want to regulate operations
a thousand versts away ; they don't know that every
minute on the spot makes them change. They make
me the agent of some Diedrichstein, Turpin, or other.
Here's a new arrangement of the Viennese Cabinet. . . .
You will see from it whether I can be here any longer.
I ask your Excellency to lay it before His Imperial
Highness, as well as the suggestion that after the
Genoese operation I shall ask formally for my recall,
and get away from here.^
This letter was followed by a stream of others.*
But the question whether the Genoese enterprise should
continue was settled by events in another quarter. On
the 17th Suvorof heard that the French on the Swiss
frontier had begun to show signs of aggressiveness.
Victor Rohan had been driven down the Simplon as far
as Domodossola, and Strauch, pressed back from the
St. Gothard to Airolo, had retreated to Bellinzona.^
1 Mil. iii. 338, 342 ; Fuchs, iii. 11.
2 Mil. iii. 341 ; Fuchs, iii. 16.
3 Fuchs, iii. 20.
* Ibid. 158, 163, 164. Suvorof was again suffering from fever,
" though still on my feet." e Mil. iii. 344,
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 291
On the 17th itself the enemy crossed the Great and the
Little St. Bernard, and came to blows with Haddik
in the valley of Aosta.^
The want of men, money, and supplies in all the
theatres of war had not deterred the Directory from
undertaking offensive action in Switzerland ag well as
in Italy. If possible, the troops of Massena were in a
worse condition even than those of Moreau, and the
consequent plundering had reduced the occupied districts
to absolute destitution. Nevertheless, in spite of its
privations, the army remained resolute, and at the urgent
request of the Directory, Massena set it in motion, con-
fident that so long as his men could stand on their legs
they would fight.^ The Directory had constructed an
elaborate plan for the destruction of both the Archduke
Charles and Suvorof. But, in fact, Massena's action
was determined by the approach of Korsakof, with the
Russian Army formerly under the command of Herman. \
He must strike at the Archduke before the Austrian
commander was joined by Korsakof, or he must, given
ordinary energy on their part, himself be expelled from
Switzerland. He therefore determined to attack the
Austrians at the moment when Joubert was descending
the Apennines, to escape dishonour only by perishing
at Novi. Massena had 64,500 troops against 73,000,
and he knew how to concentrate his strength. When
the fighting began, he had at Zurich only 25,000 against
the Archduke's 47,000. All the rest were first thrown
against the Austrians keeping touch between the Arch-
duke and Suvorof. The net result of the operations
of the 13th, 14th, and 15th of August was that the
French captured the Simplon and the St. Gothard.
The Austrians had displayed all the resolution which
could reasonably be required of soldiers, and the French
1 Mil. iii. 357.
2 Hennequin, Zurich, chap. iii. The Swiss contrasted the French
very unfavourably with the Austrians, and Mass6na's Swiss auxiliaries
deserted in large numbers.
292 SUVOROF
such daring and impetuosity as have seldom been seen
in war. The Austrians were beaten in every encounter.
Their total losses were 21 guns and little short of 10,000
men, of whom 6000 were prisoners, while the victors
lost less than 2000 killed and wounded.^ The news of
these disastrous happenings, too late to save the French
at Novi, nevertheless reached Suvorof in time to make
all further thought of crossing the Apennines impossible.
A final blow was given to his hopes by the latest news
from Klenau. On the 22nd the commandant of the
French in Tortona agreed to surrender the citadel on
the 11th September, if no advance were made in the
meantime by the French. A few days later came the
news of the complete defeat of Klenau. The latter had
been overtaken by an order from Melas to send back
six battalions to Tuscany, and his Cossacks to Lombardy,
just when Watrin and Mulisse left Genoa to attack him.
He obeyed the order of Melas, and was, in consequence,
soundly beaten on the 26th at Rapello.^ Suvorof was
now compelled to think of other things than the invasion
of Genoa.
For a few weeks after the victory of Novi he remained
inactive in camp at Asti, enjoying his growing fame.
The Tsar was carried away by his feelings, and ordered
the Guard and all other Russian troops, even in his own
presence, to show the same military honours to Suvorof
as to His Imperial Highness's own person.^ The King
of Sardinia having addressed him as " our dear cousin,'*
the Tsar welcomed Suvorof into his own family, " since
all Kings were related to each other." Outside Russia
the name of Suvorof became known as widely as that of
Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War. His
portrait appeared in the window of every print-shop,
and no one was deterred from selling the fashionable
subject by want of acquaintance with the original.
^ Mil. iii. 105, 350 ; Hennequin, vi.
* Fuchs, iii. 24, 76, 132, 169.
» Russ. Star. (1884), iv. 627.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 293
One enterprising Austrian tradesman coolly appropriated
an English portrait of George Washington, and labelled
it "Suwarrow." In England, where everybody was
wildly excited by Suvorof's triumphs, the artists went
as far astray, and he generally appeared adorned with
huge moustaches, smoking a monstrous pipe, and wear-
ing furs, gold chains, and boots which rivalled those
accredited to the famous Puss. Gillray, with nothing
but his imagination to guide him, drew a ferocious giant
of a negroid type, with the customary moustaches,
described it as etched " from the original drawing taken
from life," and underneath it declared that " This
extraordinary man is now in the prime of life — Six
Feet Ten Inches in height — never tastes either wine
or spirits ; takes but one Meal a day ; and every
Morning plunges into an Ice Bath ; his Wardrobe
consists of a plain Shirt, a White Waistcoat and Breeches;
short Boots and a Russian Cloak ; he wears no covering
on his Head, either by day or night ; when tired he
wraps himself up in a Blanket and sleeps in the open air :
he has fought 29 pitched battles, and been in 75 engage-
ments.'* 1 The Russian Ambassador wrote to tell Suvorof
that in a Birmingham theatre he had heard a song in
his praise sung after " God save the King " and " Rule
Britain." It was greeted with thunderous applause,
and was twice encored. A medal designer named
Bolton was anxious to issue a medal, and wanted a
portrait.2 Ladies began to wear Suvorof hats and
feathers.^ Fame had nothing more to offer.
Suvorof did not abandon his liking for talking across
the dinner-table. Every day he entertained a large
number of guests at the midday meal, which took place
at the time of a modern breakfast. At his own table,
at any rate, the fare was not of a tasty kind. French
^ Several of these " portraits," including the Gillray, are in the
Suvorof Museum at Petrograd.
2 Fuchs, iii. 258.
3 Russ. Star. (1884), iv. 627.
294 SUVOROF
hnigrSs and Austrian officers found boiled meat and
kasha very inadequate, in spite of the enthusiasm with
which he pressed the stuff upon them, and they generally
had another meal immediately afterwards. On these
occasions Suvorof talked constantly. He displayed an
intimate knowledge of military history, and could
describe in detail all the principal fortresses of Europe.
He was particularly fond of talking of his own perform-
ances. " A man," he said, " who has accomplished
great works ought to speak of them often, so as to
inspire ambition and emulation in his hearers." He
must have been very happy, sitting in the midst of a
concourse of guests, Russian, Austrian, Italian, French,
and English, every one of them in full uniform and
wearing his orders, and himself the unchallenged leader
of them all. He talked as a rule until he was tired, and
then he lay down to rest on his straw mattress.^ One
of these great triumphs has been described in detail by
Fuchs, who for once did his duty by posterity, and set
down Suvorof as he was.
After welcoming the guests, who included Lord
William Bentinck, Suvorof ordered some one to read
the Lord's Prayer. At the end he said, " Who doesn't
say ' Amen ' won't get any vodka." Then he drank
to the health of the two Emperors, and bade the guests
be seated. He began at once to talk, and expressed
great delight at having two " High Excellencies " at his
table, in the persons of Rosenberg and Melas. He
proceeded to make Melas repeat after him that Russian
title, in the first syllable of which is the most difficult
vowel sound in the language. Poor Melas was unable
to get over the stumbling-block, and the cheerful Field-
Marshal launched upon a long dissertation in German
on the beauty and richness of his native tongue. Then
he asked Melas if he had a Russian interpreter in his
army. Receiving the answer, " No," he declared that
1 ** Reminiscences of the Marquis Marsillac," Russ. Star. (1879),
ii. 399.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 295
in future he would always write to Melas in Russian, " just
as I wrote to Prince Coburg at the Ruimnik, ' Coming
Suvorof.' 1 All the heads of his staff nodded over those
words like antiquaries over Egyptian hieroglyphics. But
the victory on the Ruimnik interpreted them."
Turning upon Fuchs and Miloradovitch, who had
been entertaining an Italian poet, he demanded why
they were not talking to their " dear guest." They
answered with one voice that they had been doing
nothing else since they sat down. He then told them
to request the poet, whenever he sang, to sing bass.
He had himself sung once with Dyerzhavin. He invited
the poet to come to church and listen to him.
At this point some rather badly cooked beef was
brought to the table, and Suvorof directed his fire at
Lord William. " Take a little more, Lord Bentinck !
Now you, as an old acquaintance, will be able to judge
of the goodness of this roast beef. I love the country,"
he went on, " where Duke Portland and Lord Bentinck
were bom. There also was born Marlborough, the
friend of Prince Eugen. Yes, and there is my friend
the Prince of Coburg. We make the age of Orestes and
Pylades no empty fable." Then he went on to praise
Lord Chatham, comparing him with Cicero, and spoke
in high terms of the existing British Government. All
this while he was pulling up his stockings, by way of
hinting to his English guests that he was in great need
of the Order of the Garter. Then, after a short pause,
he began to wink his eyes, smile, grimace, and rub his
face with his fingers. " This," he declared to the com-
pany, " is the best remedy against faintness." And
without any warning he began to tell his adjutant a
story in German, the crisis of the anecdote being a
French pim. The unfortunate man understood hardly
a word of any language but Russian, and escaped a
disaster only by the continual repetition of his entire
German vocabulary, " Ja, gut. Ja, gut."
1 " Reminiscences of De la Gardie," Russ. Star. (1876), iii. 834.
296 SUVOROF
Then the Field-Marshal turned upon the general
company, and informed them that " a military man
must know the languages of the peoples with whom he
is at war. In Turkey I studied Turkish ; in Poland,
Polish ; in Finland, Finnish," and in proof of this last
statement he declaimed a Finnish poem, extolling its
rhythm. After this he discoursed to Miloradovitch
about the military virtues, and told him to work out,
with the assistance of Fuchs, the distinction between
vaillanc€y valour, courage, and bravoure. His attention
was next directed to the Italian poet, who was sitting,
as Fuchs says, " holding his finger under his eye, according
to the custom of the Italians,'* and demanded, " What
are you thinking about ? *' The bard replied with
enthusiasm, " My imagination has transported me to
the tent of Agamemnon, where I sit in the council of the
Greek chieftains, and see the fall of Troy and the triumph
of Hellas.*' Suvorof upon this delivered an address
of considerable length, which Miloradovitch and Fuchs
were bidden to translate for the benefit of the poet. " I
have known Homer for a long time. It was my friend
Yermil Ivanovitch Kostrof who made me intimately
acquainted with him in our native language. I like
Homer, but I don't like the ten-year siege of Troy.
What slowness I How much misery for Greece ! I
don't want to be Agamenmon ; I should not have
quarrelled with quick-footed Achilles. I like his friend
Patroclus for his quickness ; where he showed himself,
there the enemy was not. And Ossian, my travelling
companion ; he fires me ; I see and hear Fingal in the
mist, sitting on the high rock and saying, ' Oscar,
conquer might in arms ; defend the weak.' Honour
and fame to the singers ! They make us men I They
are the creators of social good. They are the spark
flung into the powder. Even now there rings in my
ears the summons of his poetry ; oh, the great man !
The genius ! The grandissima testa ! "
As Fuchs says, " Somehow or other we were able to
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 297
quench this conflagration." But another began almost
at once. Turning to Melas, he asked, " Was it long ago,
the Trojan War ? " A more learned man would have
fallen into the pit and been denounced as a can't-teller.
But Melas, being a simple soldier, answered positively,
" A thousand years before Christ." " Ah, merciful
God ! How long ago began, not the period, but the age
of our military art ! How it has been mutilated in our
time ! Why did Wiirmser hide himself in Mantua ? "
" Surely," said Melas, " the existing circumstances
compelled him." " Existing circumstances, existing
circumstances ! Can't-tellness, molly-coddling, method-
ism, equivocation ! " vociferated Suvorof. This he
repeated several times. Then he said to Fuchs, " My
Prime Minister and High Chancellor in the war against
the atheists, write this down clearly, ' They love
mediocrity, they don't endure talent, because it can't
bear the curb.' " Then to Melas again, " Isn't it true,
papa Melas, that our war is the first in the world ? It
is being waged by Paul I., and in truth he is the first to
fight without covetousness, to render to each his own
without reward. Where are there such examples in
history ? Hurrah for the Russian Tsar ! "
At this point Melas' s adjutant, Eckhardt, slapped his
forehead, trying to kill a fly. " Ah, merciful God ! "
cried the horrified Suvorof, " you didn't kill the fly ? "
" No," replied Eckhardt, " I drove it away." " Thanks ;
we mustn't kill the poor mites, they're only looking for
food. Have you read Voltaire ? " " No." " Bravo,
bravo ! The frivolous levity of Voltaire, the crack-
brained paradoxes of Rousseau, and the atheism of
Diderot have generated a hellish crop of rebelliousness.
But our bayonets have just sent them flying." Here
the Field-Marshal shed a few tears. Then he went on,
" What a rootless tree ! Let us pray to God — read
Gellert, he's no sophist, no debauchee."
He next treated three of his guests in succession to
a long and detailed conversation about his private
298 SUVOROF
estates. After this he talked of his last ball, and
regretted the absence from it of a certain Maria
Mikhailovna of Borovits, who would have eclipsed all
the ladies of this country. " Now,** he said, " I shall
dance no more till we reach Paris, and there I shall
dance the * Minuet k la Reine,' to the tune of *Vive
Louis, vive Louis, vive Louis ! ' "
After nearly three hours of this miscellaneous talking,
the old man grew tired, and began to hang his head.
His servant Proshka dug him in the back, and whispered
" Time to sleep, master.*' He nodded. Then, after
sitting for a few more minutes in meditation, he declared
that " after the thunder of the guns the Muses had lulled
me to sleep.** He crossed himself, hopped from his
chair, trotted off to another room, and threw himself
down on his straw mattress.
Having sat for three hours over dinner, " all dis-
persed,'* says Fuchs, " to look for something to eat.*'
Melas stayed behind to say to the Secretary, " Good
Lord, how this man busies himself with his own pride.
But what's to be done ? He's the only one who has
anything to be proud of. Sit still, shut your mouth,
and wonder." ^
One or two undated notes of Fuchs may refer to
events of this period. An autograph letter from a
certain Minister came to him, written in a cramped and
undecipherable hand. He and the Secretary struggled
with it for some time, but with little success. Then he
told Fuchs to send it back with a covering note :
We return your impenetrable secret. Suvorof likes,
in diplomacy and politics, clear writing and mathe-
matical accuracy. Mystical Delphic language is alien
to him. It was the ruin of Greece.^
These classical allusions were constantly on his lips
and his pen. But one of them fell on stony ground.
Coming across a military surgeon of very questionable
skill, he bade him " cease to enrich Charon." The
1 Fuchs. Misc, 92. » Fuchs, Misc. 138.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 299
doctor stolidly answered that he had never heard the
name before. This hardy reply was too much for
Suvorof . Running into another room, he shut the door,
and cried out, " Don't cast pearls before swine." ^
Fuchs had an eye for other things beside the ludicrous,
and some of his gleanings are worth preservation as
throwing light on the stronger aspects of the Field-
Marshal's character. " I work in minutes, not hours." ^
"To do good one must make haste." ^ " Love your
soldiers and they will love you — that's the whole secret
of victory." * "Be the slave of your word, not the
master of it." ^ These are not bad maxims, and his
description of Chasteler as " my full, but badly arranged
military library " ^ is better than mere clowning. Fuchs
himself, in the pages where he describes the great dinner,
is careful to point out that performances of this sort
were only Suvorof's play, and that in business he was
energetic and kept close to his work. That work was
now largely concerned with the proposals for a campaign
in Switzerland.
The first suggestion that Suvorof should enter
Switzerland came from England. In May the Dutch
expedition was proposed to the Tsar, and on the 13th
June Lord Grenville sent the sketch of a further plan :
that the Archduke Charles should march through Alsace,
by way of Belfort, into France ; that Suvorof should
take his place and clear Switzerland ; and that the
Austrian Army in Northern Italy should enter Savoy
and the Dauphine. This project had the solitary merit
of concentrating all the Russian forces on one spot and
abolishing the difficulty of the joint operations in Italy.
It was at once approved by the Tsar, and, rather
unexpectedly, by Thugut. But the latter had other
objects in view than a military victory. He was deter-
mined that if the English and Russians were going to
1 Fuchs, Misc. 139. 2 jj^-^, 84, 93.
3 Ibid. 91, 94. * Ibid. 110.
^ Ibid. 110. « Ibid. 111.
800 SUVOROF
the Low Countries, an Austrian army should be on the
spot when the time came to share the spoils. Raising
no objection to the transfer of Suvorof to Switzerland,
he said that the Archduke must be transferred to the
Lower Rhine. This would leave not more than 25,000
men on the frontiers of Alsace, and would make an
advance on Belf ort impossible. The negotiations dragged
on for some weeks, and on the 7th August Thugut went
so far as to order the Archduke to leave Switzerland as
soon as Korsakof arrived on the spot to replace him.
The immediate effect of this order was to paralyse the
Archduke, who could undertake nothing in a theatre
which he was so soon to leave. Suvorof, in the mean-
time, had shown no liking for a plan which wasted time
and threw Italy once more into the incompetent hands
of Austria. But so long as the plan retained its original
form, he was prepared to acquiesce in it. It was not
until the 27th August that he received orders from the
Austrian Emperor to betake himself into Switzerland,
and learnt that the Archduke was to transfer himself
to the Lower Rhine.
The original plan, though it involved the loss of
some time in moving troops from one theatre of war
to another, had some good in it. With Thugut's
alterations it was incurably bad. Even the transfer
of Suvorof to Switzerland would have been a sound
move, if only it had not been made conditional on the
withdrawal of the Archduke. Every military argu-
ment was in favour, not of such a dispersion of forces,
but of a concentration against the French in Switzerland.
Italy was safe, on the Lower Rhine the enemy could
only muster 10,000 or 15,000 men, and there was little
to encourage the Directory in what was going on in
Holland. A direct attack by the Archduke upon
Massena, supported by an invasion of Switzerland
from Italy by Suvorof and vigorous action by the
smaller Austrian forces on the Lindt and in the Grisons,
must have resulted in a complete victory. The Swiss
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 301
bastion would have been abolished, and the French
frontiers opened to invasion. In the absence of some
almost impossible accident, these consequences must
have followed. Even the events of the middle of
August had not affected the vital principles of strategy.
The control of the Simplon and the St. Got hard had
been lost. But it might be resumed, or Suvorof might
enter Switzerland further to the east.
Nevertheless, while all the practical arguments were
on the side of bold and combined aggressive action,
the War Council at Vienna, enveloped in its hyper-
political mist, saw nothing but its own distorted abstrac-
tions. With its usual insistence upon secondary and
private affairs, it subordinated the interest of the
alliance to that of the Austrian Empire. It was jealous
of English and Russian success in the Low Countries,
and it was jealous of English and Russian success in
Italy. If any plunder was to be got in Flanders, it
must be got for the House of Hapsburg, and if the
French were expelled from Italy, the fruits of the work
of Suvorof and Nelson must be gathered by Austrian
armies. Therefore, while reason and loyalty clamoured
for a united effort in Switzerland, the elaborated
intellects of Vienna had worked out their plan for
withdrawing the Archduke into a position where he
could share in the approaching triumph in the Nether-
lands, and for getting Suvorof out of Italy, where he
was for ever threatening to restore authority to native
princes, instead of passing it over to the pro-consuls
of the Austrian Empire. The War Council aimed first
and last at the enlargement of Austrian territory, and
its Allies were never more than its instruments. The
Emperor had even the insolence to refer to " the press-
ing requests of the inhabitants of Belgium, who wish
to see appearing in their neighbourhood part of the
Austrian Army in Germany." ^ No one chafed more
1 Letter of Thugut to Cobenzl of the 6th August ; set out in Mil.
iii. 883, 385.
802 SUVOROF
at this interference of politicians with questions of
strategy than did the Archduke Charles.^ The blame
for the failure of the campaign, the consequent destruc-
tion of the Coalition, and the resurrection of French
power in the next year must rest upon the shoulders
of the statesmen of Vienna. There have always been
fewer perils in the hostility of Austria than in her
friendship.
Bad as the plan had now become, it was made still
worse. It had been agreed that the Austrians should
evacuate their positions in Switzerland only when the
Russians were ready to occupy them.^ But as Suvorof
continued his arrangements for the consolidation of
his position in Italy, the Archduke's patience became
exhausted. On the 15th August, at his first interview
with the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, Korsakof learned
to his dismay that the Archduke was about to march
his troops out of Switzerland to the last man, and that
he himself was to be left, with 28,000 Russians, the
French 6migr6s of the Prince de Conde, 6000 Bavarians,
and an indefinite but certainly weak force of Swiss in
English pay, to defend a line of 150 miles against enemy
forces of twice his strength.^ Suvorof wrote on the
80th August, not yet aware of the Archduke's inten-
tion, to beg him to wait until Coni and Tortona had
fallen, and the French had been driven back into
Savoy. These operations would occupy two months.*
But before this date, on the 26th, the Archduke had
written to inform Suvorof that he was going to carry
out his part of the scheme, and on the 29th his van-
guard had actually been set in motion towards Schaff-
hausen.^ At the earnest appeal of Wickham, the British
envoy at his headquarters, he consented to leave 22,000
1 Letter of Wickham to Suvorof of the 9th Sept. ; Mil. iii. 407 ;
the Archduke's own Geschichte des Feldzugs, 1799, ii. 149 ; Hiiffer,
Quellen, 240.
2 Mil. iii. 380, 382, 384. » Mil. iii. 161, 394 ; Huffer, 240.
« Huffer, 311, 326. » Ihid. 312, 813.
ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, SECOND STAGE 303
men, under Hotze, Jellacic, and Zimbschen, until Suvorof
should actually arrive. But he took with him 38,000
men.^ The Allies were thus deprived of all their existing
superiority of strength at the critical point, in the hope
of succeeding at a later date in a direction from which
they were as yet threatened with no danger.
On the 3rd September Suvorof learned with horror
that the Archduke had begun his march.^ Waiting
only for the surrender of Tortona, he began his prepara-
tions for departure.^ There could be no question now
of further triumphs in Italy. He must go to Switzer-
land to avoid a disaster. His feelings during the
period were expressed in some violent private and
official letters. On the 21st August he broke out to
Count Stephan Vorontsof in his crypto-mythological
style :
Survey the hell over which Momus reigns, and,
stretching his jaw at the century's end more mightily
than ever to the Alps, restores new Rome, whose
foundations were near the abyss. Mighty Pluto,
conquered by his great-grandchild, Astoroth, abandons
his bridge-building across the Styx, and flies to dry
his cloak under the roof of Mollycoddling. Most humbly
I begged long ago for my recall. Now I have had fever
for a week, though still on my legs. This hell has
vomited the hydra. Cassano 20,000, Tidone-Trebbia
30,000, Novi 40,000 ; now there will be 50,000, although
I have 60,000 in prisoners alone.*
On the 3rd September he wrote more coherently to
Razumovski :
Thugut — that pettifogger — ^that owl from his dark
nest, as if bound about by dreams of Skanderbeg, can
he lead armies, direct circumstances that change in
the twinkling of an eye ? A conqueror and a commander
he can never be except without his political rules.
Thugut is bound hand and foot to detail.
1 Mil. iii. 174, 398.
2 Mii^ iii^ 424 ; Fuchs, iii. 179, 183.
3 Fuchs, iii. 254, 257, 282.
* Voronts. Arkh. xxiv. 339.
804 SUVOROF
This colossal Thugut, having lost by his defensive-
ness the Netherlands, Switzerland with the Rhine
fortresses, and Italy, was only stopped by Campo
Formio, where he bent his knee to Bonaparte. By the
help of God alone I began the work of setting things
in order, and then he with his silly system uses the
Archduke to thrust me out of France. My indignation
prevents me from writing more now.
So he relieved his feelings. But, as usual, though
his distrust and hatred of Thugut and the War Council
never vanished till the final rupture of the Coalition,
the prospect of action made him more cheerful. On
the 7th September he wrote to the Tsar :
Graciously forgive me, if in the bitterness of my
heart I dared to ask for my recall from here to my
blessed fatherland. I am now used to bearing with
contempt insults directed against myself ; but when,
by the insolence and audacity of the Cabinet of an
Ally whom you have loaded with benefits, some outrage
is done to the glory and worthiness of my Sovereign
and the victorious arms which he has entrusted to me
— then I am forced to incline towards a life of peace.
Henceforward in all places where it shall please the
All Highest to direct my life, I consecrate it to the
glorious service of Your Imperial Highness. . . . Now
I am about to lead your brave soldiery into Switzer-
land, whither your Supreme Authority has pointed me
the road, and there on a new field of battle I shall
defeat the enemy or die with glory for my fatherland
and my Sovereign.^
On the 11th the French in Tortona surrendered. On
the same day the Russians left Alessandria and Rivalta
for Valenza ; and on the 13th, in a single column,
they crossed the Po, and made for Bellinzona and the
St. Gothard.
I Mil. iii. 437.
CHAPTER XI
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN
Alternative routes — ^March on the St. Gothard — ^The Pass taken by
storm — Rosenberg's flank march — The Devil's Bridge — No
thoroughfare over the Mountains — Korsakof s defeat at Zurich —
In the trap — ^Decision to fight out of it — ^Battles in the Muottothal
and Klonthal — ^Through to Claris — Over the mountains again —
Safe but not sound — Correspondence — ^Recall to Russia.
When, on the 21st September, the Russian Army left
Bellinzona, and began to climb the valley of the Ticino
towards the St. Gothard, the general situation in
Switzerland was not safe. Along the Limmat, from
the Aar to the town of Zurich, stood Korsakof 's Russians,
24,000 strong. Prince Albert of Wiirtemberg, with
2500 Austrians, watched the northern shore of the
Lake, and Hotze, with 8000, guarded the line of the
Lindt, between the Lakes of Zurich and Wallenstadt.
Jellacic was at Sargans with 5000 men, Linken at
Ilanz with 3500, and Auffenberg at Disentis with 3000.
Strauch was beyond Biasco, on the way to the St.
Gothard, with 4500, Victor Rohan with 2500 in front
of Arona, where the Simplon road opens on to Lake
Maggiore, and Haddik, with 7500, blocked the mouth of
the valley of Aosta and the Great St. Bernard. The
French were strongest where the Allies were weakest.
On the southern passes they had now comparatively
few men, and Lecourbe had less than 12,000 men
between Glaris, on the Lindt, and Airolo, on the Italian
side of the St. Gothard. But between the Aar and
305 X
806 SUVOROF
Zurich Mass^na had 88,000 men, and opposite Hotze
Soult had 11,500. The aspect of affairs in northern
Switzerland had been completely reversed. The
Austrians had deliberately marched away, and the French
were now to teach them what to do, if they ever had
such a chance again. All depended on the movements
of Suvorof. If his 18,000 men could reach Zurich in
time, the French superiority, in numbers and in
command, would disappear. But if the French chose,
they could win a victory at Zurich which would make
even the arrival of Suvorof of no importance.
There were in fact two roads open to him. He might
have gone by way of Chiavenna over the Spliigen, or,
having come to Bellinzona, might cross the Bernardino,
descending in either case into the valley of the Upper
Rhine, safe from any hostile interference. Down that
valley he might go through Chur and Sargans ; or,
crossing the Panixer Pass from Ilanz, fall upon the
French at Claris and drive Soult away from the Lindt.
This was the safe way. On the other hand was the
St. Gothard. This, it is true, was held by a small force
of the enemy. But it was a pass which a small force
could easily hold, and the road over it ended abruptly
on the Lake of Luzern at Altdorf. After that there
was nothing but a mountain path. Nevertheless, for
Suvorof this was the direct road, and his determination
to come to close quarters with the enemy at the earliest
possible moment made him choose the St. Gothard route.
To him the plan presented itself as a concentration
against a stationary enemy. He and Strauch on the
south, Auffenberg, Linken, and Jellacic on the east,
and Hotze and Korsakof on the north, would move
simultaneously against the French, who must either
run or be ruined. " The true law of the art of war "
he wrote to Hotze, " is to fall direct upon the enemy." ^
1 Letter of the 13th September ; Mil. iv. 17 ; Fuchs, iii. 289.
Compare his circular letter of the 5th Sept. ; Mil. iv. 252 ; Fuchs,
iii. 220.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 307
Perhaps underestimating the strength of the French, and
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ZURICH
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THE Operations in
SWITZERLAND.
SCALE— ENGLISH MILES
S 10 20 30
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thus
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certainly underestimating their capacity, he decided upon
808 SUVOROF
a strategy which could only succeed if the enemy
remained inactive, and must inevitably involve him in
great perils if they did not.
The fundamental error of the plan being admitted,
his immediate dispositions were nevertheless well made.
He was not going to waste his men on a blind rush up
a narrow gorge. He therefore ordered Strauch and
Derfelden to advance along the Ticino and attack the
actual pass in front, while Rosenberg was directed, with
about 6000 men, to go by Dongio and Santa Maria to
Disentis, and take the defenders in the rear. The two
columns of Russians were to unite at Andermatt and
descend the valley of the Reuss, while Strauch remained
on the St. Gothard to prevent any attack from the
Rhone valley. Auffenberg was to cross from the Rhine
valley to the Maderanerthal and turn the defences of
the Reuss.i
The question of maintaining the supplies of the
Russian Army was not the least difficult of those which
presented themselves. Waggons could not go over the
St. Gothard. Suvorof therefore instructed Melas to
provide him with 1429 mules, to be ready for him
when he reached Taverno. Each man was to carry
food for 3 days and the mules were to carry enough
for 4. The expedition was thus equipped for a week
in advance. By the expiration of that time Suvorof
expected to be at Schwyz, where he could get all he
wanted from northern Switzerland, with the assist-
ance of Hotze and Korsakof. All this was pure specu-
lation. Schwyz was 90 miles away over the Alps,
and 13 miles a day in such country would be very
hard marching, even if there were no enemy in the way.
The assumption that communications would be opened
with northern Switzerland was also very audacious.
It postulated the continued inactivity of Massena, and
whatever Suvorof*s experience of Scherer, he had no
right to calculate on similar irresolution in any other
1 See the plan of attack in Mil. iv. 257.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 309
Frenchman. The success of his strategy depended
entirely on the luck being with him, and he should have
known that in war there is no luck, save in one's self
and one's troops.^
The march from Alessandria was made with great
speed. The heavy baggage and artillery had been left
behind, to be sent round by way of Chiavenna and
the Engadine or Verona and the Tyrol, and 25 mountain
guns had been taken from the arsenals of Piedmont.
In this state the Russians covered more than 100 miles
in 6 days. Arrived at Taverno on the 15th, Suvorof
found to his dismay that the mules were not there.
There was nothing to be done but wait. Even between
Taverno and Bellinzona the road was useless for waggons.
Five priceless days were thus wasted. By the 20th
650 mules had been collected, but the bulk of the baggage,
food, and ammunition was loaded on to the horses of
dismounted Cossacks.^ On the 19th Rosenberg had
started for Bellinzona. On the 21st, refusing to be
diverted by renewed French activity against Rohan
and Haddik, Suvorof set his main body in motion.
Bagration led the vanguard, with 3000 men and 4 guns.
Schveikovski followed, with 4400 men and 6 guns.
Then came Forster, with 3100 men and 5 guns.
Derfelden brought up the rear with 5000 men and 10
guns. A handful of Cossacks and pioneers was attached
to each section, the remainder of the Cossacks serving
on foot as a baggage-guard.^
The weather was bad, and the road an ill-kept track.
In streaming rain the columns moved along the gorge
of the Ticino, at first between the densely wooded slopes
beyond Bellinzona, and then among the barren rocks
which shut in the approach to the actual pass near
Airolo. Derfelden, with Bagration, Schveikovski, and
Forster, reached Biasco on the 21st, when Rosenberg
1 Mil. iv. 262 ; Fuchs, iii. 215.
2 Mil. iv. 22, 264, 265 ; Fuchs, iii. 291, 313, 315, 339, 347.
8 Mil. iv. 26, 270 ; Fuchs, iii. 319.
810 SUVOROF
had already started on his flanking march by Dongio
and Santa Maria. On the 22nd the Russians were at
Giomico, and Strauch, who had been waiting for them
to come up, moved on to Faido. With this column
rode Suvorof on a Cossack horse. He wore his plain
uniform with a thin, unlined, and much-worn cloak,
which he called his " paternal cloak." Gloves, as usual,
he had not. Beside him rode an old Italian named
Antonio Gamma. He had lodged in Gamma's house at
Taverno, and the two men grew quickly to like each
other. "If I had a hundred heads," said Gamma,
" they should all lie at your feet." On the morning of
Suvorof's departure, the Italian mounted his horse
and announced his intention of going with him. To
his weeping and protesting family he answered that he
was the happiest of men ; he would be riding with the
great Suvorof. So the two old men went off together
into the dark mountains, where there was such bloody
young men's work to be done.^
On the 23rd the column reached Dazio. Suvorof
was holding Derfelden back, so as to give Rosenberg
time to get round the mountains to the north-east.
Rosenberg, on his part, was struggling with continuous
rain and cold in worse country than Suvorof, and his
marches were wonderful. On the 21st he covered
16 miles from Bellinzona, and on the 22nd as much
as 20. The night of that day was spent at a height
of 8000 feet, without any fuel to cook food or to warm
the soaked and shivering men. On the 23rd they
descended to Santa Maria, and went on to Disentis,
where they came into touch with Auffenberg's Austrians.
Leaving Auff enberg to climb over into the Maderanerthal,
Rosenberg pushed straight on to Tavetsch. He had
marched from dawn till midnight, and had covered 18
miles. The next day he advanced towards Andermatt,
on the St. Gothard road, and attacked the French on
the heights to the east of the village.
* Fuchs, History of Suvorof, ii. 172 ; Misc. 181,
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 311
The St. Gothard was defended by a French brigade,
4250 strong. About 2000 of these were posted on the
actual pass above Airolo, 700 guarded the road to the
Valais and the Furka, and the remainder faced Rosen-
berg. The natural defences were tremendous. The
track rose steeply from Airolo, crossed a buttress of
the massif, and plunged into a gorge at the junction
of two torrents. Thence it rose again to the top of the
pass and the hospice, 6800 feet above the sea and 3000
feet above Airolo. Without modern artillery and high
explosives it would have been impossible to take such
a position by direct attack. Nevertheless, in order to
detain the enemy in front of him while Rosenberg
completed his turning movement, Suvorof resolved to
make an attempt. On the 24th, when Rosenberg was
loyally fulfiUing his duty at Andermatt, he himself
began a vigorous battle at Airolo. He advanced in
three columns, Bagration and Schveikovski turning
the enemy's left, and three battaUons climbing the rocks
on the opposite bank of the Ticino, while Forster and
the bulk of Strauch's Austrians pushed straight through
Airolo. The flanking columns started from Dazio at
3 o'clock in the morning, and the centre column,
with all the artillery, was held back so as not to come
into action till the enemy had already been shaken from
the flanks. 1
The rain had ceased, but the day was cold and misty,
and a biting wind met the Russians as they moved up
the ravine. Bagration came into contact with the
enemy at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and was soon
fiercely engaged with about 1000 men posted in the
rocks and gullies round the village of Bosco. The
infantry and some dismounted Cossacks succeeded in
getting round the enemy's left by a climb over the
heights above. The left and centre columns had by
this time come into action, and the French fell back
behind the first of the two torrents. Here they were
1 Mil. iv. 275 ; Fuchs, iii. 328, 335.
812 SUVOROF
again attacked in front by Schveikovski and Forster,
and again Bagration, continuing his advance at a higher
level, forced them out of their position. Step by step
the defenders withdrew to the summit of the pass, where
they received help from Loison's brigade at Altdorf.
Here Schveikovski and Forster made a third attack
upon them. But numbers and courage could make no
impression upon such a position, and after two attempts
the Russians were brought to a stand. Already 1200
men had been killed and wounded, and the survivors
were utterly exhausted by their fighting and climbing
in clothes and boots unfit for such rugged work.^ But
there was still Bagration. At 4 o'clock in the after-
noon he suddenly appeared on the French left and
threatened their rear from the Mont St. Gothard.
They beat a hasty retreat towards Hospithal, and the
Russian main body crawled up the bloodstained track
to the hospice.
After a brief rest at the hospice, the army resumed
its march. Half-way towards Hospithal the French
again offered some opposition and were driven back.
At Hospithal they were reinforced by the indefatigable
Lecourbe, with the rest of Loison's brigade. But at
this point Rosenberg at last made his presence felt. He
had encountered the enemy on the southern slope of
the Krispalt early in the morning and drove them hard
to the west. Miloradovitch, with the vanguard, fell
impetuously upon the main body, consisting of two
battalions, and pushed them over the ridge which
separates the Rhine valley from that of Ober Alp.
Around the Lake of Ober Alp a stubborn fight took
place, and the French musketry was continuous and
accurate. But Miloradovitch at last drove back their
right wing, and the rest, fearing to be cut off from
^ It was not until the day of the battle in the Muottothal that the
Russians found out the secret of the French sureness of foot. Tight
Prussian clothes and gaiters and lacquered boots without nails were,
of course, worse than useless. See Starkof, 102.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 813
Andermatt, gave way and retreated. They were hotly
pursued, and reached the village almost at a run. So
close were the Russians that the road was nearly cut
between Andermatt and the Umer Loch, the tunnel
which leads to the Devil's Bridge. But the French
succeeded in occupying the mouth of the tunnel, and,
with the reserve left in the village by Lecourbe, pre-
pared to renew the struggle. The numbers were too
unequal. As soon as he could collect his men, Rosen-
berg advanced to the attack. In the mist of evening
his whole line charged with the bayonet, the French
were outflanked and driven past the village, and they
were not allowed to halt until they reached the other
bank of the Reuss.
It was now 7 o'clock, and Rosenberg was in the
rear of Lecourbe at Hospithal. Unfortunately he was
not aware of this, and camped for the night, without
thinking that 2 miles away he might have crushed
Lecourbe against Suvorof. Lecourbe himself, knowing
the ground, was able to carry his men into safety. Some
crossed the Furka into the Rhone valley, and he himself
with the rest, throwing his guns into the Reuss, climbed
over the Betsberg and descended at Goeschenen. The
exhausted Russians made little attempt at pursuit.
Veletski's Austrian regiment was sent towards the Furka,
and the rest of Suvorof 's men lay where the last shots
of the battle left them. Thus ended the first experience
of a Russian Army in mountain warfare. The lesson
had cost 2000 casualties. But it had done nothing to
shake the confidence of Suvorof in his troops or of the
men in their leader.^
1 In a despatch to Hotze from Hospithal, Suvorof broke out into
German doggerel. The following is an equivalent :
The twentieth we loaded every ass ;
The twenty-first climbed Rosenberg the pass ;
The twenty-second Wildfield went to fight ;
The twenty-fourth Mount Gothard stormed by might ;
And thus have we by bayonet and sword
The poor down-fallen Switzerland restored.
Mil. iv. 283. " Wildfield " is Tierfeld, i.e. Derfelden.
814 SUVOROF
Early in the morning Suvorof left Hospithal, and he
immediately effected a junction with Rosenberg. His
next task was to pass the Urner Loch and the DeviPs
Bridge. From Andermatt he sent General Kamyenski,
with one of Derfelden's regiments, to follow Lecourbe
over the Betsberg. With the main body he marched
through the village and prepared to force the direct
passage. The place was naturally impregnable, and
if the defending force had been large enough to beat
off attacks from the flank as well as in front, even
Suvorof might have been turned back. The Reuss is
not very deep, though, like all similar streams, it is
very rapid, and its bed is sown with boulders. The
road itself at that time ran at a rather lower level than
to-day, and the existing bridge was actually built on
the top of the other. The old bridge, over which
Suvorof had to pass, was about 75 feet above the surface
of the water, which at this point plunges down a series
of falls with mist and a loud uproar. Before crossing
the bridge the road runs along the right bank through
the tunnel called the Urner Loch. This is about
80 yards long, and in those days was no higher
than could be traversed by a pack-horse. Emerging
from this passage, the road traverses a shelf of the
precipice, turns sharply to the left over the bridge,
and then again to the right, following the left bank
down the stream. The old bridge, 30 yards long,
was composed of two arches, the larger springing from
the right side of the gulf to the left, and the smaller
covering the gap between the abutment of the first on
the left side and the principal mass of the cliff. On
both sides of the abyss the rocks rise very steeply,
without any covering of soil or trees, and, except by
the road itself, there is no passage that can be found
without great exertion and great danger. The whole
scene, at the time of year when Suvorof came upon it,
is gloomy and full of menace.
The French troops on the spot belonged to those
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 315
resolute men who had recently taught the Austrians
how to conduct mountain warfare. On the 24th there
were two battalions of Loison's brigade in readiness,
and on the morning of the 25th they were joined by
a battalion of grenadiers under Lecourbe himself, fresh
from their night march over the Betsberg. The bulk
of the defenders were on the right bank, between the
mouth of the tunnel and the bridge, with a single gun.^
Two companies were posted on the heights above to
prevent a turning movement, and a small detachment
was on the Russian side of the tunnel. For some
inexplicable reason the French did not take the obvious
course of destroying the bridge and distributing all
their forces along the left bank. In the event they
began to break down the bridge when it was too late,
and they were driven across it in such confusion that
it was easily repaired, and provided a convenient passage
for the whole Russian Army.
Miloradovitch, followed by the rest of Rosenberg's
troops, led the way, and after them came Derfelden.
They were greeted by a burst of firing from the tunnel,
and no attempt was made at a direct attack. While a
steady fire was kept up on such of the enemy as appeared
on the opposite bank a detachment of 300 volunteers,
under Colonel Trubnikof, scrambled over the rocks to
the right. At the same time Major Tryebogin, with
200 others, descended into the bed of the torrent,
waded across it, sometimes up to the waist in water,
struggled up the opposite bank, and got a footing
among the rocks. Tryebogin's party was followed by
a whole battalion of grenadiers, and the French were
attacked from all sides.
The defenders in front of the bridge, with Tryebogin
and the grenadiers firing from their right, and Trubnikof
1 Hennequin, 344. Hennequin says that Lecourbe had apparently
no cannon with him. The Russian authorities say that he had, and
it is difficult to suppose that eye-witnesses can have imagined a cannon
where none existed.
816 SUVOROF
and his 800 showering bullets and rocks upon their
heads from their left, were soon in hard case, and a
belated attempt was made to destroy the smaller arch
of the bridge. The advanced post must either retire
or stand and be cut off when the bridge collapsed.
Seeing them in confusion, the leading Russian battalion
rushed boldly through the tunnel, took without blench-
ing the scattered fire of the enemy in front and the
more steady volleys of those on the other side of the
stream, and drove some of their opponents into the
gulf or across the bridge. Those who remained were
all killed or taken, and the gun was thrown into the
torrent. The Russians were for a time held up by the
gap in the bridge. But the troops on the left bank were
now well in the rear of the scene of action, and Kamyenski
had effected a junction with them. The situation of
the French was made still more hopeless by the arrival
of Auffenberg at Amsteg by way of the Maderanerthal.
Lecourbe, with his usual energy, struck back at him,
and drove him up the Thal.^ But this was only to
enable the troops at the Devil's Bridge to get away.
The French retreat was made in good order. They fell
steadily back to Altdorf, and Suvorof's army marched
as steadily after them down the pass. On the 26th
there was a brisk fight at Altdorf, and Rosenberg drove
Lecourbe out of the road towards the west.^
Up to this point Suvorof's design had been carried
out, but not with clockwork precision. The situation
was not encouraging. The weary troops had now
traversed 40 miles of mountain country in 3 days,
and had had some hard fighting as well. They
were already faced with the prospect of insufficient
food, in spite of the supplies which had been found
at Andermatt, Amsteg, and Altdorf. They were a day
behind the time-table, and many of the mules laden
with food were still struggling along the St. Gothard,
while others had been lost by accidents on the road.
1 Mil. iv. 66, 57. « Ibid. 58.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 317
Before Suvorof lay the Lake of the Four Cantons,
surrounded by lofty mountains, which plunged directly
into the lake, leaving no space for a road on either
side.^ To the left there was no passage by which he
could reach Korsakof. To the right the defile of the
Schachenthal wound upwards to the Klausen Pass,
beyond which lay the valley of the upper Lindt. In
front the snow-crowned mass of the Rosstock, rising to
9000 feet above the sea, barred his way to Schwyz and
Zurich. Over it wound two tracks, by which the tourist
may still scramble to the Muottothal with great pleasure
in the holiday season. But at the end of September
such paths in the Alps present great difficulties, and
it was Suvorof's fortune to find the snow, the mist, and
the cold wind at their worst.
Two other roads lay open to him, the St. Gothard
and the Maderanerthal. But he was not yet aware of
what was going on in the north, and he had no reason
to think of getting away from the enemy. A man of
such a temper as his was not to be deterred by any
natural difficulty, and upon his troops he knew that
he could rely to the uttermost extremity of human
strength. The men were in want of food and boots,
the pack animals and horses were exhausted, and
Suvorof himself not only shared the common physical
discomforts but bore the additional burden of his
responsibility. He ordered the march to go on, over
the Rosstock to Schwyz, and of the two paths he
chose that which lay furthest from the lake. This was
concealed from the view of Lecourbe, but at the same
time was the longer and the less practicable of the
two. Its highest point was the Kinzig Pass, 6500 feet
above the level of the sea, and 5000 feet above Altdorf.
The Russians had entered Altdorf at midday on the
* It used to be alleged by Russian historians (e.g. Mil. iv. 59) that
the Austrian officers attached to Suvorof had neglected to inform him
that there was no road round the lake from Altdorf to Schwyz. This
allegation is disproved by Hiiffer, Quellen, 356, 363. Suvorof was told
that this part of the route was a mere footpath.
818 SUVOROF
26th. At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 27th
the troops of Bagration wound their way through the
streets of Borglen, on the slopes of the Rosstock.
Military order soon vanished, and the march assumed
the form of a scramble in single file up a path which often
disappeared entirely from view. At one point the men
could hardly find a foothold on a ledge, at another
they struggled through screes, at a third they found
themselves in deep snow. The condition of the animals
was terrible. A Cossack might lead his horse safely
over a dangerous spot, but many a horse or mule,
stumbling across treacherous ground with a load of
stores, part of a gun, ammunition, or priceless biscuits,
lost its footing and was broken among the rocks. Not
seldom a soldier or a muleteer was dragged down by
a struggling beast and perished with it. The mist
clung about the men, soaked them like heavy rain,
and increased every difficulty and danger of the passage.
Tight coats, belts, and breeches prevented free move-
ment. Boots gave way, and every discomfort that can
afflict a soldier on the march — cuts, bruises, and wet
cold — played havoc with toes and feet. Over the highest
point of the ridge, after the last abrupt climb, began
a difficult descent, made worse than usual by the recent
rains, which had in some places washed away every
semblance of a path. The Russian advance-guard
staggered into the Muottothal at 5 o'clock in the
evening. A journey of 12 miles as the crow flies had
occupied as many hours.^
The men of the Army of Italy took no time for rest
while there was an enemy before them. Bagration, with
some mounted and dismounted cavalry, pushed on to
Mutten, and attacked the French in the village. Not
a man escaped of the 144 men who were there ; 57
were killed and 87 taken. Bagration then disposed
such of his men as had reached the spot, in readiness
1 In 1894 a Swiss brigade, in bad weather, made the same passage
in 11 hours. Hennequin, 354, n. 3.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN
319
to receive an attack from the direction of Schwyz. The
last of the main body had not yet left Altdorf. The
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whole path behind Bagration was filled with a long
train of men and animals, and the situation of those
820 SUVOROF
on the upper levels — hungry, cold, and footsore, with
no shelter from the biting wind — was miserable beyond
description. There was no wood to make fires, and
fortunate indeed was the party which could lay hands
on a candle end, shield it with paper, and by its aid
crawl safely into a place where the wind was shut away
by the rocks.^ The last men of the main body drew
up in the Muottothal late in the evening of the 28th,
and the rear-guard and the stragglers of the baggage-
train were not got in till the 30th.* The appearance
of this crowd of dirty, ragged, and ravenous strangers
filled the inhabitants of the valley with horror and
suspicion. They hid everything they could, and ex-
pected the worst. But the discipline of the Russians
was not yet destroyed. So hungry were they that
the first arrivals devoured their potatoes and cabbage
raw. But they paid for everything they took, and at
last their friendliness conquered even the terrors of
the children.*
The difficult and perilous march had not escaped
the notice of the enemy. Lecourbe was as little in-
clined as Suvorof to let a foe escape with impunity.
He begged Mass^na to send troops to Schwyz and at
least 8000 men to Claris, ordered Molitor to watch the
Klonthal and throw some men into the Muottothal,
and directed the officer commanding at Schwyz to hold
the valley against the invading Russians. He was
convinced of success. " Suvorof with his 18,000
Russians is in our hands," he wrote to Mass6na on
the 27th.* He himself had very few men on the spot,
and they were hardly less weary than the Russians
themselves. Nevertheless, with about 900 of them
he engaged the rear-guard in Altdorf, and on the 29th
followed it vigorously up the Schachenthal, capturing
1 Gryazef, 96. * Mil. iv.
3 Russ. Star. (1900), ci. 131. The authority is the son of the Pro-
testant pastor of the valley.
* Hennequin, 351, 352.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 821
150 men, 60 horses, and a considerable quantity of
ammunition and stores.^
In the meantime events had happened which changed
the whole aspect of the campaign. Up to this point,
whatever the trials and sufferings of his own troops,
and whatever the vexations which he had personally
experienced at the hands of his Allies, Suvorof had
been pressing on to a junction with another army,
with the aid of which he intended to destroy the main
force of the French. • At Schwyz, too, he expected to
find ample supplies sent to meet him by Korsakof and
Hotze. But on the 28th September, when his main
body was still struggling down into the Muottothal,
Colonel Suitchof, who had been sent with a squadron
of Cossacks in the direction of Claris, returned with
appalling news. Korsakof had been beaten at Zurich
and had retreated to Schaffhausen ; Hotze had been
beaten on the Lindt, and no news could be got of his
subsequent movements or his present situation; and
Massena himself was in all probability already at
Schwyz. Everything had gone to smoke.
This meant the complete failure of all Suvorof's
plans for the overthrow of the French power in Switzer-
land, and the consequent imminence of his own destruc-
tion. The defeat of Korsakof at Zurich had been as
overwhelming as that of Moreau at Novi, and much
more skilfully done. Mass6na had beaten a stupid
and arrogant commander by admirably conceived and
executed manoeuvres. Leaving the streets of Zurich
littered with his artillery, his baggage, and his wounded,
Korsakof had burst his way through the enemy's line,
and carried away into safety some 5000 exhausted,
though not dispirited troops. Some other units eventu-
ally reached him. But for practical purposes his army
had ceased to exist. ^ The triumph of Massena had been
^ Hennequin, 357.
^ Mil. iv. chap. Ix. ; Hennequin, chap. x. ; Dedon, Relation DHaiUe^
etc. (Paris, 1801), an admirable account of Massena's passage of the
Limmat.
y
822 SUVOROF
consummated by three other victories, no less important
in their cumulative effect. Soult had beaten Hotze
on the Lindt, killing, wounding, or capturing almost
half of his force. Jellacic had attacked Molitor at
Claris, but on learning of Soult's success had retreated
beyond the Rhine, as far as Maienfeld. Molitor had
then turned upon Linken, and chased him with such
vigour to Schwanden that he continued his retreat to
Uanz. By the 29th all the French Armies were free to
deal with Suvorof. Mass6na marched upon Schwyz,
and Molitor to the mouth of the Klonthal, as the Field-
Marshal collected his hungry and exhausted soldiers in
the Muottothal and prepared for the hunters to close
upon him in the trap.
Any other commander in such a situation might have
thought of capitulating. For Suvorof there was only
a choice of ways of extricating himself by force. He
summoned a council of war. Bagration was early
on the spot and found the Field-Marshal in great
distress. In full uniform and wearing all his orders he
paced rapidly up and down the room, and not noticing
the entry of Bagration, broke out into disjointed
utterance : " Parades — drills — ^great respect for one's
self — defend one's self — hats off ! — merciful Lord ! . . .
Aye, and it must be . . . and in time . . . but needs
more to know how to wage war, know the lie of the land,
be able to calculate, not allow one's self to be deceived,
understand how to beat. . . . But to be beaten is easy
. . . throw away so many thousands ! . . . and such
men! . . . in one day . . . Merciful Lord ! " Bagration
withdrew, and left the old man to himself.
When he returned, and the full council, including
the Grand Duke Constantine, assembled, Suvorof wore
a different aspect. He bowed to the officers, shut his
eyes, and remained silent for a few moments. Then
he glared fiercely at the company, and began a vehement
address : " Korsakof is smashed and driven behind the
Rhine. Hotze is beaten, we have no news of him, and
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 823
his corps is scattered. Jellacic has retreated. All our
plan is destroyed." Then he launched upon a passionate
denunciation of the Austrian Government, recited all the
checks, slights, and provocations which he had suffered at
its hands since he entered Italy, and ascribed the defeat
of Korsakof to its withdrawal of the Archduke. He
described the miserable condition of his own troops,
their want of food, clothing, and ammunition, all due
to the delay of 5 days at Taverno. But for that delay
Korsakof would not have been beaten at Zurich. All
was due to the perfidy and treachery of Thugut and the
War Council at Vienna. Now they were on the verge
of ruin. " One hope left to us is in Almighty God ;
another in the bravery and unselfishness of our soldiers.
We are Russians. God is with us. Save the honour
of Russia ! Save the son of our Emperor, the pledge
of his gracious Imperial confidence ! " And, bursting
into tears, he flung himself at the feet of the Grand
Duke.
The young man raised him and embraced him, unable
to speak. When the old man had recovered himself,
Derfelden, the senior officer present, declared the opinion
of all. Derfelden was sixty-four years old, but he spoke
with as much fire as Suvorof himself: "Father Alex-
ander Vassilyevitch ! We see and know what threatens
us. Surely you know us, father, you know fighters,
the devoted ministers of your will, who love you beyond
all reckoning. Trust us 1 We swear to you before
Almighty God, for ourselves and all the rest, whatever
may betide. You will find no cowardice in us — we're
Russians and don't know the loathsome thing — and no
grumbling. Let a hundred thousand enemies stand
before us, and let the mountains in our way be twice —
ten times as high ; we shall conquer both ; we shall
overcome everything and not shame the arms of Russia.
If we die we shall die with glory ! Lead us where you
think fit ; do as you know how ; we are all yours,
father 1 We are Russians ! "
824 SUVOROF
This was followed by a general cry : " We swear it
before Almighty God 1 " Suvorof, who had listened
to his old comrade-in-arms with closed eyes, opened
them, looked proudly upon his followers, and cried:
" I hope I Joy I Merciful God, we are Russians ! I
thank you I Thanks I We shall beat the enemy ; a
victory over them and intrigue together — victory there
shall be I " 1
There was no question of going on to Zurich, nor
can there have been much debate about the direction
of the next march. To push on to Schwyz was to court
disaster. The only possible route was over the Bragel,
5000 feet high, into the KlonthaL At Glaris there
would be a chance of uniting with Linken, and after-
wards with Hotze and Korsakof. Orders were issued
accordingly. Auffenberg was to leave at once, beat
the enemy from the Bragel, and drive them as far as
possible down the Klonthal. Early on the next day,
the 30th, Bagration was to follow him, and both were
to push on to Glaris itself. Schveikovski's division
was to start after Bagration. Rosenberg and Forster
were to hold the Muottothal until all the rest had got
over the Bragel. Rosenberg in particular was to fight
to the last, not to yield a step to the enemy, and, if
possible, to drive him as far as Schwyz, but no further.*
Auffenberg's brigade started immediately, cleared
the pass of the enemy's outposts, and descended into
the Klonthal. Bagration and Schveikovski left early
next morning, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon
were trudging in straggling formation through the
boulders, undergrowth and swampy ground between
the cliffs and the head of the lake, which filled a large
part of the other valley. They found Auffenberg
already hotly engaged. The Austrians, 2000 strong,
* Starkof, 210, 281. According to Starkof, Suvorof said, " Jellacic
and Linken have retreated." In fact, at this time the retirement of
Linken was not known to Suvorof. He only heard of it in the Kldnthal.
* Fuchs, iii. 348.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 325
had been in action since the morning. The French
battalion at the head of the lake had been driven back
along the narrow road between the water and the
mountains as far as the eastern end of the lake. There
Molitor brought up another battalion, and Auffenberg
in his turn was compelled to give ground. In spite
of his superior numbers the Austrian commander made
no attempt at a turning movement, and was unable
by repeated frontal attacks to dislodge the French.^
Molitor himself, clamouring for further reinforcements,
was equally unable to defeat Auffenberg, and the affair
was not settled even after the arrival of Bagration.
Three of the latter's battalions were sent up the
heights to the left, and three advanced straight down
the valley. Auffenberg simultaneously withdrew,
followed by Molitor, who was attacked, as soon as he
passed the head of the lake, in front and on the left
flank. The French were driven back with heavy loss
into the gap, but they rallied there and held their
ground until the evening. Suvorof and Schveikovski
came up after dark. More of the baggage-animals
were lost on the mountains, and the Russians camped
for the night in rain and mist, shivering with cold and
half-fed.
The rest of the army in the Muottothal had in the
meantime fought a battle of a decisive character. At
dawn on the 30th there had been some firing between
the outposts, but during the morning the Russians
remained quietly in their bivouacs. Rosenberg and
Miloradovitch with three regiments occupied the
village of Mutten; Rehbinder with his own regiment,
a battalion of Jagers, and two regiments of dismounted
Cossacks lay in front of the Franciscan monastery,
a mile lower down the stream of the Muotto ; and another
* Milyutin alleges (iv. 132, 317) that Auffenberg actually entered
into negotiations with Molitor. This is denied by Angeli, and the
French have no records of it. Almost certainly it is not true.
Hennequin, 362, n. 2.
826 SUVOROF
battalion of Jagers and a handful of Cossacks under
Major Sabanyeyef a mile still further towards Schwyz.
The three regiments of infantry and two of Cossacks,
which together composed the rear-guard, were at this
time still descending the pass some miles away. There
were about 5500 men at Rosenberg's disposal in the
valley.
On the other hand Mass^na, after a hurried journey
by water to Altdorf, had returned to Schwyz. By noon
he had about 8000 men on the spot, and with these he
marched upon Sabanyeyef at the mouth of the narrow
valley. The first shots were exchanged about 2 o'clock,
and the Russians fell slowly back upon Rehbinder,
who on his part came up to meet them. Rehbinder's
men went gallantly forward with the bayonet, and
made no fewer than six charges upon the French. The
latter, being greatly superior in numbers, eventually
drove back the Russians and captured one of their
guns. But Rehbinder himself led a counter-attack,
and after a murderous combat the gun was carried
off in triumph.^ Shortly afterwards, it being then
about 5 o'clock, the remaining three Russian regi-
ments came up from Mutten. Miloradovitch passed
through the disordered fragments of Rehbinder's regi-
ment and closed upon the enemy, while the two Cossack
regiments clambered round the sides of the valley,
separated into little groups, and attacked them in flank.
The Cossacks were especially effective, not only inflicting
loss upon the French but also greatly embarrassing
them by their unexpected appearances and sudden
withdrawals. The French at last gave way and were
driven headlong down the valley for more than two
miles. Some of the Cossacks outran them, and fell
upon their rear-guard at the narrow entrance of the
valley. But night stopped the pursuit, and the Russian
main body withdrew to the village of Mutten.
On the next day the fighting was renewed. Rosenberg
1 Starkof, 271.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 327
had now his full strength with him and could put
about 7000 men into line. The exact French numbers
are unknown. But their total strength can hardly
have been less than 15,000. Massena sent a column,
the composition of which is unknown, over the heights
to the north. These troops went astray and took no
part in the fighting. It is nevertheless beyond question
that the French troops actually engaged were very
superior in numbers to the Russian.^ The formation
of the ground favoured the defenders. The road from
Schwyz crossing the torrent of the Muota at Ibach
follows the left bank into the gorge, through which the
water hurries down from the Thai itself. At the entrance
to the narrowest part of the defile the track once more
crosses the stream over a stone bridge, and then mounts
the rocks on the right bank. Two miles beyond the
bridge the path emerges into the open valley, which
at its widest part is about a mile across. On the morning
of the 1st October the Russian advanced post, a regi-
ment of infantry and some Cossacks, stood at the point
where the torrent of Klingen Tobel crosses the road, a
mile above the stone bridge. Two regiments of infantry
and four of Cossacks under Rehbinder were stationed
two miles behind them, and the rest of the force lay
at the village of Mutten, further still to the rear.
At 11 o'clock the French came on in three columns
headed by skirmishers. Massena himself with a strong
reserve and 5 guns held the narrow mouth of the valley.
The first attacking column with artillery followed the
road. The other two, pressing into the open ground,
marched along to right and left of the stream. The
Russian outpost retired, as on the previous day, firing
steadily, and attacking any incautiously advanced
parties with the bayonet. They were met at the monas-
tery by Rosenberg, who had drawn up his main body
^ Massena had Mortier's division, a demi-brigade from that of Loison,
Hasan's division, and a reserve of grenadiers at Schwyz. Mil. iv. 319 ;
Hennequin.
828 SUVOROF
in two lines across the valley. The retreating detach-
ments passed to right and left of these lines and re-formed
on their flanks. The whole mass then bore down upon
the French, fired a volley, and charged with the bayonet.
With these serried ranl«; in front and swarms of yelling
Cossacks on right and left the French were unable to
deploy, fell into disorder, and were driven pell-mell
down into the gorge.
There they were met by the reserve, and the Russian
advance was for a time completely stopped. But the
Cossacks got round on the flanks, and the whole body of
the French was pushed through the defile as far as the
Klingen Tobel. Here the fugitives made another stand.
Wasting no time on frontal attacks in a place as difficult
as the Devil's Bridge itself, Rosenberg sent his Cossacks
round the rocks overhanging the French left. They
passed completely round the enemy infantry, and
attacked the gunners. Then Forster's infantry rushed
down the road; the French resistance once more col-
lapsed ; and a desperate struggle for safety began on
the narrow road, blocked with artillery and ammunition-
waggons. Many of the runaways fell into the torrent
from the stone bridge, and the Russians mercilessly
slaughtered the rearmost of those who kept on their
feet. The rout continued as far as Schwyz. The
67th demi-brigade met the pursuers at Schonenbuch,
and Rosenberg withdrew his main body to the Muotto-
thal. But some of the mounted Cossacks chased the
enemy into the streets of Schwyz itself. About 1200
prisoners, including General Lacour, remained in the
hands of the victors, and several cannon with limbers and
ammunition were taken, and either buried or thrown
into the torrent. The losses of both sides in killed and
wounded are uncertain. About 1500 French wounded
were brought back by the Russians, and were left in
the monastery, and it is probably not unfair to estimate
the total casualties of the French at about 4000 men.
Some 600 Russian wounded were left behind, and the
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 329
total Russian losses were about 1000 killed and wounded
and a few prisoners.^
Mass^na was modest in his estimate of the import-
ance of this battle. But in fact, he had suffered a
complete defeat where he had expected a decisive
victory.2 Rosenberg had not only saved Suvorof
from pursuit, but had driven the French headlong
before him, and inflicted such loss upon them that he
was afterwards able to climb over the crest of the
Bragel without any interference. The night after the
battle was spent by the troops in collecting the dead
and wounded, and an eager search for the food carried
by the dead French or thrown away by the panic-
stricken survivors. Great was the rejoicing when
some Cossack found a cheese or a sausage in the woods ;
and even soldiers' biscuits were carefully collected and
devoured on the spot.^
The day of the great victory in the Muottothal had
been spent by the other half of the army in fighting as
fierce though not so successful. On the night of the
30th September Bagration and four grenadier battalions,
a battalion of Jagers, and four companies of Austrian
infantry had scrambled up the rocks to the left of the
road and attained a position directly above the right
flank of the French. Molitor's patrols encountered
them, and before dawn the rattle of musketry was
heard all over the heights. This was the signal for
Schveikovski to advance boldly down the valley. A
scrambling fight among the pine trees and precipices
drove the French light troops along the side of the
mountain, while their main body retreated 4 miles
along the road until it reached the valley of the Lindt.
Here desperate fighting took place. Molitor was
determined at all costs to prevent Suvorof from effect-
ing a junction with the Austrians in the north. He
1 Starkof, 219.
* See his Bulletin Historique, set out in Hennequin, 506.
8 Starkof, 219.
880 SUVOROF
threw a battalion and a half with 4 guns across
the river at Netsthal, and blew up the bridge when
some of the pursuing Russians were actually upon it.
The rest of his troops, two battalions and a half with
3 guns, he drew back to the north of Netsthal.
Here he was at once attacked by the Russians, and as
each battalion in turn emerged from the valley it
threw itself upon the French. The latter after a
determined struggle gave way, and left 300 prisoners,
a flag, and one gun behind them.^ Molitor fell back
to Nafels, while his detachment on the other side of
the river maintained a brisk fire on the flank of the
pursuers. Rallying at Nafels, the French, inferior to
the Russians in nothing but numbers, turned and
drove them back to Netsthal. This attack and counter-
attack were twice repeated. The third charge of the
Russians almost carried the bridge at Nafels, and the
two forces were struggling desperately on the middle
of the bridge when a final effort of the 84th demi-
brigade turned the scale. A fourth onslaught again
reduced the French to extremities, and the road to the
north seemed at last to be definitely in the hands of
the Russians, when the 2nd Swiss demi-brigade, followed
by some of Gagan's division, came up from the rear.
Molitor harangued the Swiss, reminded them of an
earlier Swiss victory on the same ground, and launched
his new reinforcements at the bridge. The Russians
were driven back once more to Netsthal. There a
group of Cossacks and a battalion of infantry had at
last succeeded in crossing the river and driving back
the detachment on the right bank, but the impetuous
advance of the French main body compelled them to
withdraw. Nevertheless, the struggle was not even yet
decided, and once more the Russians succeeded in
pressing on to Nafels. As night fell, Gagan himself
came up behind Molitor with a fresh battalion of
grenadiers, and about 9 o'clock 400 of the 94th
1 Mil. iv. 148 : Venanson's Narrative in Jomini, vol. xii.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 331
demi-brigade reached Nafels. The arrival of these
new troops settled the fate of the day. For the sixth
time the Russians were driven back, this time beyond
Netsthal, and Molitor firmly established himself for
the night in the position which he had taken up in
the morning. The conduct of the Russian troops on
this occasion left nothing for criticism, but that of the
French was beyond praise. The losses on either side
remain as uncertain here as in the Muottothal. But
the flanking fire of Molitor's detachment across the Lindt
more than made up for any inferiority in his numbers,
and there can be little doubt that the Russian casualties
were the heavier.
This heavy fighting between Netsthal and Nafels had
been carried on by Bagration and Auffenberg. Suvorof,
with the bulk of Schveikovski's division, had entered
Claris. There he was joined by Rosenberg. On the
2nd October the latter began his march over the Bragel.
Before setting out, he sent a messenger to Schwyz
demanding rations for 12,000 men, who were to enter
the town on the next day. Deceived by this, or shaken
by their overthrow of the 1st, the French made no
attempt at an attack. Not till the 3rd did their van-
guard enter the valley, and, pushing on towards the
pass, gather in a few score prisoners, a large number
of horses and mules, and the cannon which the Russians
had pitched into the ravines. After a toilsome march
and two nights on the rocks of the Bragel the last of
Rosenberg's rear-guard were gathered into Claris. The
whole army was in a most miserable state. Their
clothes and boots were in rags, they had suffered all the
hardships of continual marching and fighting, cold,
wet, and hunger, and when the French magazines at
Claris and the resources of the inhabitants had been
exhausted, each man received little more than a few
biscuits and a pound of cheese. Officers and soldiers
were in the same state. No one would allow Suvorof
to go on foot. But Rehbinder's boots were without
882 SUVOROF
soles, and if any general was in better case it was not
because he had claimed the privileges of his rank.
Misfortune had reduced all to one common level of
physical wretchedness, as it had raised all to one common
level of reputation.
Suvorof was faced on the 4th October with the same
difficulty of choosing a way of escape as had confronted
him in the Muottothal, six days before. The obvious
route was through Netsthal and Nafels. True, Molitor
barred the way, and had shown by his fighting on the
1st that his own temper and that of his troops were
of the most resolute and fiery description. But Molitor
until the night of the 4th had only 8000 men with him,
and the rest of the available French troops were distri-
buted between the mouth of the Muottothal and the
Lakes of Zurich and Wallenstadt. Suvorof had still
16,000 men, who had already proved themselves to be
inferior to none in the world in spirit. There can be
no doubt that if he had marched straight upon Netsthal,
even Molitor must have yielded the passage. There was
besides Jellacic, who could make a diversion in the rear
of the French.
These were obvious facts, and even if Suvorof did
not know the exact situation and strength of the French
troops in front of him, there can be little doubt that,
in ordinary circumstances, he would have marched
straight ahead. But the circumstances were not
ordinary. Apart from the want of ammunition, which,
more than the want of food, reduced the actual fighting
value of his army, the ill-feeling against the Austrians
had reached a point beyond which it could hardly be
suppressed. There had as yet been no hint of dis-
loyalty or want of co-operation between the different
units of his army. But their own hardships, consequent
upon the destruction of Korsakof's force at Zurich,
which in its turn was attributed to the retirement of
the Archduke from Switzerland, had confirmed in the
minds of the Russian officers and men that contempt
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 333
and distrust of Austria as an ally, which had been
created by previous experience and their knowledge
of the Viennese plan of campaign. Linken, too, had
run away without being beaten ; and Jellacic could
not be trusted to do anything else. The time had
come to abandon the attempt to support those who
had never supported them, and to save the remainder
of the precious Russian Army for the further purposes
of the Tsar. It was therefore decided at a Council of
War, held on the 4th October, to make for Chur by
way of the Panixer Pass and Ilanz ; and a message was
sent on to Linken to have 20,000 rations ready at Chur
for the 6th and Tth.i
On the night of the 4th began the last stage of the
march into safety. The heavily wounded were left
behind and commended to the mercy of the French.
Bagration on this occasion commanded the rear-guard.
He had at his disposal the same units as those which
had formed his vanguard at the beginning of the
campaign. But their total strength, once nearly 3000,
was now only 2000. One-third of his force had been
killed, wounded, or captured.^ As the rest of the army
marched away, he drew his force across the valley in
front of Schwanden. Molitor, who knew of Suvorof's
intention on the 4th, sent one battalion along the Alps
to the right of Bagration, where its fire could command
the road to Engi and the Panixer Pass. But with the
aid of an additional battalion Bagration was able, in
spite of his want of artillery, to hold Molitor in check
with the bayonet alone during the whole of the 5th.
Falling slowly back to Engi he remained there for two
hours, resisting all attempts of the French to dislodge
1 Mil. iv. 153, 327. Suvorof wrote in his own hand, " There is no
hope of the Imperialists." Weyrother had written to Jellacic on
the 3rd, telling him that Suvorof was going to move on to Wallenstadt,
and Jellacic actually took steps to meet him. Huffer, 402.
' Mil. iv. 156. The losses of his six battalions amounted, between
the 14th September and the 6th October, to 499 killed, 524 wounded,
and 141 missing — in all, 1164 men. Bagration's Journal, 54.
834 SUVOROF
him. As night fell he got away with difficulty to Matt,
closely pursued by the enemy, who captured a con-
siderable number of prisoners, horses, and mules.^
The night was spent in the neighbourhood of Elm,
and a part of the troops was under arms until daybreak.
At 2 o'clock in the morning the vanguard moved up
the defile towards the Ringenkopf, and when the light
came the main body was beyond the reach of the
enemy. The weather was worse than before. Heavy
rain in the valley and snow on the heights, a bitterly
cold wind, and dense mist combined to render this the
most terrible of all the marches of Suvorof 's army. The
local guides fled and left the soldiers to take care of
themselves. The hardships of the Rosstock and the
Bragel were forgotten in the extremity of endurance
and exertion required by the Panixer Pass. The
soaked and shivering column wandered as best it could
among the rocks. In many places a false step meant
death, and not a few of those who sat down to rest
perished of cold. More than 300 unhappy beasts of
burden fell with their precious loads and were left
behind. All the remaining cannon were flung over the
precipices. An officer, rashly venturing on horseback,
rolled from top to bottom of one of the fatal slopes
and was dashed to pieces. Suvorof himself was held
in his saddle by two Cossacks, and to all his requests
to be left alone his sturdy protectors answered nothing
but " Sit still 1 " * At one point a few Cossack lances
were burnt to provide him with hot tea, and no other
fuel was to be found for the whole army but similar
weapons and the pack-saddles. But the spirit of the
commander and his followers remained what it had
always been, and if they groaned, it was not in re-
proach. Most spent the night of the 6th along the
mountain track. Only the vanguard under Milorado-
vitch succeeded in reaching the little village of Panix,
» Mil. iv. 156, 157 ; Hennequin, 380, 381 ; Gryazef, 181.
> Gryazef, 183.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 335
on the southern slopes, 4500 feet below the summit of
the pass. Others found shelter in the pinewoods. The
majority were left without food or fuel or any other
protection than that of the rocks. By midday on the
7th most of the troops had come into Panix, and the
march was resumed. In the evening Suvorof reached
Ilanz, and stragglers were still crawling into the town
on the following morning. Some 200 men, too ex-
hausted to move further, were taken prisoner at Panix.
The remainder, now about 15,000 strong, reached Chur
on the 8th. There they lit fires and cooked food,
repaired their boots and cleaned their weapons, laughed,
jested, and sang, and prepared for new encounters with
the enemy .1 In seventeen days one quarter of the
whole original force had been lost, with all the pack-
animals, artillery, and baggage.^ Nevertheless, there
were brought into Chur no less than 1400 French
prisoners.^
Suvorof's defeated soldiers had no reason to doubt
that after a short rest they would be able to face any
enemy that might be brought against them. Their
failure had been due to the stupidity of the Austrian
Cabinet, the rashness of Korsakof, and the obstacles
thrown in their own way by Nature. Of what had been
in their leader and themselves, patience, courage, and
a mutual loyalty not to be broken by any act or event
proceeding from without, they and he remained in full and
abounding possession. Such virtues in such men are
increased rather than diminished by suffering ; and if
Suvorof and his army had been proud, strong, and terrible
when they swung gaily out of Bellinzona, they were
prouder, stronger, and more terrible when they dragged
their bleeding feet over the cobble-stones of Chur.
Nevertheless, the shock to both leader and men had
been too severe. March discipline, never very strong,
had disappeared in those terrible mountains, and at
^ Mil. iv. chap. Ixiii. ; Hennequin, 379, ei seq.
* Mil. iv. 330. 3 Ibid. 148.
836 SUVOROF
Claris, Ilanz, and Chur, the inhabitants had suffered
from the irresponsible and purposeless plundering which
always marks the track of a demoralised Russian Army.^
Suvorof himself, though still emitting flashes of his old
energy, began to waver in his purpose. On the 7th
October, when his rear-guard was still trailing over the
savage ridge of the Ringenkopf, he wrote from Panix
to the Archduke Charles saying, that if the latter would
provide food and ammunition, he was himself prepared
to unite in a fresh attempt against the enemy.^ On the
road from Chur to Feldkirch he repeated this offer.'
But the Archduke could not adopt his plans, and he
could not adopt the Archduke's. Wickham, the English
envoy, met him at Feldkirch with Colloredo, an aide-de-
camp of the Archduke, but was unable to produce an
agreement. His own opinion of Suvorof was of the
most unfavourable kind. It would have been impossible
for any English diplomatist to appreciate a man whose
manners so lacked the calm repose of a perfect gentle-
man. But Suvorof showed himself not only eccentric,
but thoroughly unwilling to co-operate any further
with Austrians. The Archduke, on his side, lost
patience.* On the 18th October Suvorof held a Council
of War. It resolved unanimously that from the Im-
perialists nothing was now to be expected but treachery,
that on no account should a forward movement be
undertaken, and that for the necessary refitting of the
troops a halt should be made on the right bank of the
Rhine.^ This finally settled the question of a renewal
of hostilities by the Alliance.
Suvorof's own temper is apparent from his corre-
spondence. On the 20th he wrote from Linden to
Count Peter Tolstoy :
* Wickham's Correspondence ^ ii. 258.
« Fuchs, iii. 855. ' Ibid. 381, 424.
* See the correspondence in Mil. iv. 351 et seq. ; Fuchs, iii. 381
ei seq. ; Hiiffer, 150 et seq.
^ Report of Suvorof to the Tsar; Fuchs, iii. 440, 443.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 337
The General wants to spellbind me with his Demo-
sthenics. You are within three steps of him — settle
with him, and let me know ; I have my answer ready
for his knowallness. The hero on the defensive has let
them wrest from him in this campaign — all through
protecting the hereditary dominions. . . . How can he
not be ashamed before the conqueror ? And he makes
these proposals to me ! Let him polish up his tarnished
glory. Let him take his strong army and enter Switzer-
land now ; in a month he must free it ; if not, I shall
have refitted in quarters and shall be ready to act with
him, even in a winter campaign.^
And in some notes of the same day, entitled " Military
Physics," he showed the same resentment against the
Archduke :
The Archduke Charles, being not at the Court but
on active service, is a General like Suvorof, except that
the latter is the senior in experience, and it is he who
has overthrown the theories of the century, chiefly by
his conquests in Poland and Italy ; the rules of military
science are his province. All argument and interviews
would be superfluous.
And among the rules appended to this are some
characteristic touches :
No jealousies, no counter-marches, no demonstrations,
which are only child's play. ... It is a question of a
month. One need only be on one's guard against the
bottomless pit of systematic rules. ^
Also on the 20th October he wrote to Razumovski :
This crooked Thugut will fling Europe and himself
into danger. I declare that Potsdam will suffer from
his cunning with the other Cabinets — a worse man than
any of them ; but will it be for long ? In a brief space
they and he and Vienna will be swallowed up by the
new Rome.
^ Fuchs, iii. 447 ; Voronts. Arkh. xxiv. 348.
2 Fuchs. iii. 455.
338 SUVOROF
Out of his bilious eyrie he enticed me from Italy,
where my heart was set on Lyons and Paris. . . . The
Archduke Charles left Switzerland. The price was
Lieutenant-General Korsakof — to the joy of the gallows-
birds — the price was I and a great and high-tempered
Ally — the price was every atom of the common cause !
The various beliefs, opinions, and customs of our
Ally's armies — I long ago put many of them to the proof,
and found them false — only further evidence in this
campaign. All their commanders, mercenaries, spying
for Thugut for their living, were bound indissolubly to
me by duty and friendship, and from that fact sprang
all my incredible victories and conquests. The existing
Army of Italy in its present state, through the pestilential
contrivances of Thugut, will remain dead capital, as I
am here at this moment, and the Archduke Charles
himself, too. For new Campo Formios or Reichenbachs.^
At this point the Tsar himself interfered. Enraged
by Suvorof's stream of complaints, and finally by the
defeat of Korsakof, he wrote on the 22nd October to
the Austrian Emperor, before receiving the report of
Suvorof 's Council of War, to put an end to the Alliance :
Seeing my troops abandoned and thus delivered to
the enemy by the Ally on whom I counted most, his
policy contrary to my views, and the safety of Europe
sacrificed to the plans of your Monarchy for its own
aggrandisement ; having besides every ground for being
dissatisfied with the double and artificial methods of its
Minister, of whose motives, out of regard for Your
Imperial Majesty, I desire to remain ignorant — I declare
to you, with the same loyalty which made me fly to
Your aid and co-operate in the success of Your arms,
that from this moment I abandon Your interests, to
occupy myself solely with my own and those of my other
Allies.2
He therefore ordered Suvorof to return to Russia.
Before receiving the order of recall, the old warrior
addressed a final warning and appeal to the Archduke :
1 Fuchs, iii. 449 ; Voronts. Arkh. xxiv. 348.
* Mil. iv. 388.
THE SWISS CAMPAIGN 339
It is an old soldier, nearly sixty years in harness,
who speaks to you, who has led the troops of Joseph II.
and Francis II. to victory, and confirmed Galicia in the
power of the illustrious house of Austria ; who is not
for the babble of Demosthenes, nor for the Academicians
who do nothing but destroy judgement, nor for Hannibal's
Senate. I am not for jealousies, demonstrations,
counter-marches ; instead of these puerilities — appre-
hension, quickness, energy are my guides.
Let the two armies serve the two Emperors, the
Coalition, and all Europe, like honest heroes ! . . .
Otherwise, there will be more Campo Formidos [sic] ;
already you see the new Rome walking in the steps of
the old ; gaining friends, she will come to honouring
Germany with the title of Ally, as she did Spain, Holland,
and, a little earlier, Italy ; to reduce her later in her
own time to the lowest level of estimation, the rank of
client or subject, and the territory of flourishing nations
into provinces.^
Soon afterwards came his order of recall, and he left
the scene of his disastrous and yet glorious campaign.
1 Letter of the 29th October ; Mil. iv. ; Fuehs, iii. 478.
CHAPTER XII
RETURN AND DEATH
Letting himself go — Meeting with Korsakof — Catching the wind —
Christmas games — ^Taking it out of Thugut's son-in-law — Corre-
spondence with Nelson — Breaking down — Desperate remedies —
Another blow from Paul — ^Arrival at Petersburg — Death.
During his profitless argument about plans of campaign
and on his journey home, Suvorof swam, or rather
skipped into the ken of more than one curious observer.
De Rover6a, an officer of the Swiss levies, called upon
him at Lindau, and has recorded his interview with " a
man of middle height and lean, clad in a white woollen
shirt, carelessly buttoned breeches, and a much-worn
hat, with an old boot on one foot and a slipper on the
other ; his face wrinkled as if pulled about by hard
thinking." Suvorof received him warmly, put his hand
on his shoulder and spoke to him in French, throwing
back his head and screwing up his eyes. At the end of
the conversation he kissed Rover^a on the forehead and
invited him to dinner.^
At the same place Suvorof effected a junction with
the Prince de Cond6 and the beaten army of Korsakof.
His first encounter with the latter caused him great
agitation. When the defeated Commander came to
present his report, the Field-Marshal was pacing up and
down his room among a group of officers and civilians,
and fumbling at his clothes. " Merciful God ! " he
^ G. de Tavel, Mhnoires de F. de Roveria.
340
RETURN AND DEATH 341
exclaimed, " I ought to receive Alexander Mikhailovitch
decently ; he's the pattern of civility himself, he's a
courtier, he's a gentleman of the chamber." Then he
stopped, shut his eyes, and pulled at his cuffs. The
unhappy Korsakof entered, and halted in confusion at
the sight of the company in which he was to be received.
Suvorof looked up, gave him a slight bow, took his re-
port, and shut his eyes again. Then he broke forth,
" Alexander Mikhailovitch ! What have we done ?
The Trebbia, the Tidone, Novi— sisters. But Zurich ? "
And he raised himself on tiptoe, threw back his head,
and made a very bitter grimace. He repeated his words,
and then demanded a spontoon from one of the officers
who stood near. Holding it at the present, he demanded,
" Alexander Mikhailovitch ! How did you do honour
to Mass6na ? This, thus, was it this way ? Then you
did him honour in no Russian style ; merciful God !
not in Russian style." Then he gave back the spontoon ;
backed towards the door of his cabinet ; called Korsakof,
and shut himself up with his miserable subordinate for
a whole hour. Korsakof came out looking like a dead
man.i
But soon afterwards Suvorof treated Korsakof in a
different fashion. On the 24th October he formally
received a number of officers, including Korsakof, an
Austrian General, and the Due de Berry, who represented
Conde. On this occasion he directed his wrath against
the Austrian. He greeted De Berry with great warmth,
and expressed his indignation at the way in which
Conde' s army had been treated. Turning upon the
Austrian, he demanded if they wanted to destroy the
French SmigrSs ? Then he went on, " You have brought
me an order from the Archduke. At Vienna I am at his
feet, but here it is quite different, and I take orders only
from my Sovereign." Then he went about among the
Russians, praised those who had distinguished themselves
^ This is related by Suvorof s Secretary, Trefurt, in Rtiss. Star,
(1876), i. 214.
342 SUVOROF
in Switzerland, and told one, who had not, that he ought
to resign his commission. Poor Korsakof overheard
this, and tried to steal out of the room before the eye
of the terrible Commander-in-Chief fell upon him. But
Suvorof was too quick for him. The occasion for a slap
at Austria was too good to be missed, and instead of
humiliating Korsakof, the veteran declared in a loud
voice, " You saw, gentlemen, that Korsakof has gone
out, though he said nothing to me, or I to him. He is
more unfortunate than guilty ; 50,000 Austrians never
stirred a foot to support him. They're the criminals.
They wanted to ruin him ; they thought they would
ruin me too, but Suvorof was too damned quick for
them. Tell the Archduke," turning to the Austrian,
" that he will answer to God for the blood shed before
Zurich." 1
The French imigri, Marsillac, who had been through
the Italian and Swiss campaigns, left the army at Lindau.
" Tell the Comte d'Artois," said Suvorof, on saying
farewell to him, " that Hannibal and Suvorof crossed
the Alps." 2 Up to this point his prouder self seems
to have been uppermost. But when, at the beginning
of December, he reached Prague, where he received the
order of recall from the Tsar, the impish side of his
nature was in the ascendant, and the anecdotes are of
a more ludicrous sort. It was at Prague that a Swedish
officer saw him in church, prostrating himself twenty
times in an hour, each time for about two minutes. He
invited the Swede to dinner, and in the middle of the
meal put on his guest's hat. When he said farewell,
he gave the officer " a very sincere, but not very pleasant
kiss." 3
In the same town, his orderly officer Kononof heard,
at 2 o'clock in the morning, a strange disturbance in
the Field-Marshal's room. Suvorof woke, and began to
1 Voronts. Arkh. xx.
2 Russ. Star. (1879), ii. 400.
8 " Reminiscences of De La Gardie," Russ. Star. (1876), iii. 883.
RETURN AND DEATH 343
run about the room. Proshka came in. " Ah ! " cried
Suvorof, " damn you, you've let the wind through the
door ; I'm cold ; catch it, catch the wind. I'll help."
Thereupon the two began to run about the room. At
last Proshka opened the door, pretended to throw some-
thing out, and said, " I've got hold of it and put it out."
" Thanks, thanks — now I'm warm ; but just now,
damn you, it was freezing." Then came in the cook,
in cap and apron, and asked, " What's to be cooked for
lunch ? " "Cook me something Armenian, ' ' said Suvorof.
" Aye, aye, sir." " Cook me something Tartar." " Aye,
aye, sir." " Cook me something Jewish." " Aye, aye,
sir." " But not French, and not German." " Aye, aye,
sir." " And then some Russian shtshi." " Can't be
done." " Why ? Ah, you can't - teller ! Impossible ?
Tell me, you damned don't-knower, why it's impossible ! "
" There's no smyetana." " Pull yourself together, pull
yourself together ! No smyetana ? I won't listen to
him — I want my shtshi ! Hit him, Proshka ! " " All
right," said the cook, " I'm going out myself." And
he went out and slammed the door. " Look, Proshka,"
cried Suvorof, " how angry he is. Let's get away ;
I'm horribly afraid." At this point Proshka came out,
and Kononof asked him, " What . . . ? " "Well, you
see," answered Proshka, " the Field-Marshal just now
dozes and wakes up, and all his military contraptions
go to his head, and so he clears them up with these
pranks." " And what's he doing now ? " asked Kononof,
hearing a murmuring from inside the room. " He's
saying his prayers."^
The Swedish General Armfeldt witnessed a great
popular demonstration in a theatre. The house was
crowded, and three times the ordinary prices had been
paid for the tickets. When Suvorof appeared in his
box the place resounded with shouts of " Hurra, vivat
^ " Anecdotes of Kononof," Russkaya Besyeda (1860). Shtshi is
a vegetable soup, and smyetana the sour cream which is always served
with it.
844 SUVOROF
Suvorof ! " A prologue in his honour was recited from
the stage, and was greeted with a fresh outburst of
enthusiasm. He bowed repeatedly, and attempted in
vain to persuade the people to cry " Vivat Franz ! "
Finally he blessed them all. No one laughed, and many
bowed low as to the priest. All this was solemn and
dignified. But after the first act a young lady burst
out of her box to get a close view of the great man. He
asked that she should be presented to him, and held out
his hand. Repenting of her temerity, she hesitated,
whereupon he took her by the nose and kissed her, to
the great dehght of the bystanders. ^
With his usual determination to make poor foreigners
comply with Russian customs, he insisted on playing
all the ordinary Russian games at Christmas — forfeits,
blind man's buff, fortune-telling, and the like. Into all
these he threw himself with the greatest zest, dancing,
singing, skipping about, and laughing, no doubt to the
amused contempt of guests like the English Lord Minto
and the Austrian Count Bellegarde.^
But Suvorof's most outrageous performance was at
the house of Baron Nostitz, a son-in-law of the detested
Thugut. The Baron invited him to a great ball given
in his honour. He drove up to the house in full uniform.
The front of the edifice was hung with flags and wreaths,
and the grand staircase was crowded with the beauty
and fashion of Prague, all agog to welcome the hero.
Suvorof popped out of the carriage, and, seeing the
dazzling group before him, promptly blew his nose with
his fingers. The ladies turned away in horror, while
Proshka gravely presented him with a handkerchief.
Restored to order, he mounted the staircase as solemnly
as possible, bowing to right and left, and entered
the ball-room. The orchestra played the Russian
Anthem, an Austrian General gave a solo on the violon-
cello, and the Baroness Schlyk sang. This lady was
^ I quote this from Pyetrushevski.
2 For Lord Minto's opinion, see his Life and LeUers, iii. 107.
RETURN AND DEATH 845
with child, and after her performance, the distinguished
guest went up to her, and in the presence of the whole
company, blessed her, congratulated her on the approach-
ing birth, and kissed her on the forehead.
Leaving the Baroness to her blushes, Suvorof opened
the ball with his hostess, and then promenaded the
rooms with his host. The orchestra began to play a
valse, and, after watching the dancers revolving in this
very un-Russian fashion, he grasped his adjutant,
Baron Rosen, and proceeded to spin round the room
in an opposite direction to the rest. After several
collisions he stopped panting, and told Rosen that he
must teach him " this famous dance." Nostitz, anxious
at once to please his terrible guest, and save the limbs
and garments of the ladies from any more of his devas-
tating experiments, proposed to show him the pictures.
Some of these represented Suvorof's own victories.
Pausing in front of one of them, the Field-Marshal
broke out, " Moreau retreats ! Does Your Excellency
want to see how he really did retreat ? It was just like
this." He thereupon trotted from the room, with all
his suite after him, skipped down the grand stair-
case, threw himself into his carriage, called out,
" Home ! *' and drove off, leaving Nostitz to discover
for himself what Suvorof thought of Thugut and all
his relations.^
Suvorof's correspondence at this time was not as a
rule important. One or two sparks of the old fire
appear in his letters to Koluitchof, who had taken the
place of Razumovski at Vienna. " To me death is
better than the defensive." " Not with the pen shall
we conquer Paris." ^ But the most interesting parts of
his correspondence are the letter which he received
from Lord Nelson and his reply. The compliments
with which the two great egoists be-lathered each other
were not unjust, though the physical resemblance which
^ " Anecdotes of Kononof," rjM sup.
2 Russ. Star. (1900), cii. 320, 322.
M6 SUVOROF
it gave them so much pleasure to discover is difficult
to detect. Nelson's letter was written on the 22nd
November from Palermo :
My Dear, Dear Prince and Brother, there is not that
man in Europe who loves You equal to myself. All
admire Your Great and Glorious atchievements, as
does Nelson, but he loves You for Your despising of
wealth as it may stand in the way of Your duty, for
being indeed the faithful! servant of Your Sovereign,
in this alone I presume to claim the dear name of
Brother. I know that my atchievements are not to [be]
named with Yours. But the Bounty of my own
Sovereign, that of the Emperor of Russia and his
Sicilian Majesty and the Grand Signor, have loaded
me with honors and wealth, in these joined to You we
show an example to the World that fidelity will be
amply rewarded. This day has made me the Proudest
man in Europe, I am told by a person who has seen
You for many years that in our stature persons and
manners we are more alike than any two people ever
were. We are certainly relations and I entreat that
You will never take from me the Dear Name of Your
Affectionate Brother and sincere Friend
Bronte Nelson.
Suvorof's answer was written in French by his friend
Baron Andrei de Byuler. But he could not keep his own
hand out of it, and the last sentence of the letter and
the postscript, with its sidelong thrust at Lady Hamilton,
were dashed in by himself. The date is the 12th January
1800:
My dear Baron and Brother ! If ever a memory is
precious to me, it is just that of an Admiral of the first
merit like Yourself. Contemplating your portrait, I
have certainly found some resemblance between us
two ; so one might say that fine spirits meet and our
ideas have coincided. It is a distinction the more for
me, and I am delighted at it ; but more at resembling
You on the side of Your character.
There is no reward, my dear Admiral, of which
Your eminent merits do not make you worthy, and in
RETURN AND DEATH 347
which Your brother and friend does not share most
vividly. Jealous to preserve that title, and Your
friendship, which bears the stamp of honesty, I beg You
to be so good as to continue to give me news of You
and to believe in the most perfect reciprocity of my
feelings for You, with which I am always Your affec-
tionate brother and sincere friend. Victory, Glory,
Prosperity for the new Year.
Prince Alexandre Italiiski.
COMTE SUWOROW RyMNIKSKI.
P.S. — I thought you [gone] from Malta to Egypt
to crush there the rest of the supernatural atheists of
our times by means of the Arabs ! Palermo is not
Cithera. The magnanimous Sovereign is for us. For
the rest, illustrious brother, why don't you give the
world some more Aboukirs to think of ? Happy New
Year ! Happy New Century ! P. A. It.^
These profuse compliments make very attractive
reading. The physical resemblance between them was
not very strong. Both were of fragile appearance, and
there is one highly ideahsed portrait of Suvorof, in
which his wrinkled and whimsical old face is polished
down, with photographic art, into a real similarity to
that of Nelson. But the physical likeness was actually
remote. There was a more real resemblance in temper.
They were equal in their passion for perfection in their
own service, in their questionless acceptance of the
commands of their Sovereigns, in their indifference to
the political origins of their wars, in their contempt of
secret and underhand dealings, in their special hatred
of the French, in the ceaseless energy of their move-
ments and the directness of their blows upon the enemy,
in their simple vanity and in their love of reputation.
There was no Lady Hamilton in Suvorof's life, and
Nelson had none of Suvorof's jealousy. But as men
^ The Nelson letter was given to De Byuler by Suvorof. He obtained
Suvorof s reply from Admiral Tchitchagof, who got it from a friend in
London. Both are printed in Russ. Star. (1872), 738 et seq. Inaccurate
Russian versions are in Fuchs, iii.
848 SUVOROF
of war they were justified in recognising each other as
twins.
The extreme liveliness which Suvorof displayed at
Prague did not conceal, from himself or from others,
the fact that he was growing rapidly old and weak.
The Swiss campaign had worn him out. He began to
feel the cold, and he was troubled with a constant cough.
Nevertheless, he refused to admit defeat, and bore up
in the face of Death as if He were only another Mass6na
or Molitor. He wore the same thin clothes, did the
same gynmastics, and splashed himself with the same
cold water. But on his way from Prague he had to stay
a few days at Cracow for medical treatment.
At Vishau in Moravia he invited some of the local
magnates to dinner. After the meal he drank to the
health of the two Emperors, and some children sang a
cantata in his honour, and gave him a present. Tears
of joy ran down his cheeks. He sat the children round
him and gave them each a dainty and a sip out of his
own liqueur glass. An hour and a half he talked with
them, telling them of his own children, often shedding
a few tears. " To-day," he said more than once, " I
have entertained the most pleasant guests I have ever
had. O innocence ! And I, my dear children, will
soon be like you. You delight me so much that I
cannot part with you." And he stayed an hour longer
than usual at the table. Then he told his servants to
put away the children's gifts with a copy of the cantata.
He gave a copy of his own portrait to each of the children,
admonished them a second time, despatched them
along the road of honour and virtue, and kissed and
blessed each one with the sign of the Cross, thanking
them heartily for the honour they had done him.^
When he reached Kobrin, intending to stay there
four days, he was seriously ill, and had in fact to stay
for forty. On the 25th February 1800 he wrote to
Count Theodore Rostoptchin :
1 Rus8. Star, (1887), Ivi. 201.
RETURN AND DEATH 849
Prince P. I. Bagration will tell you about my
suffering body, I am beginning with a cough, of late
increasing . . . nevertheless, I am still so strong natur-
ally that though it is there at one moment, at another,
when there's no wind, there's no cough. For a month
I have eaten very little, but been on my feet. Seeing
the fever threatening fiercely, I ate almost nothing for
six days, and in bed. I feel that I almost did not get
over it . . . but what's the use ? The rash wanders
from place to place ; and I by no means foresee a speedy
end of it. My intention's to increase my nourishment
a little . . . but there's doubt about the fever as i^y
tongue still hints at it. There's hope in quarantine.
I have bored you ; that's my Shrovetide holiday.^
The old body was in decay, and the process was not
prevented by the desperate remedies of its inhabitant.
The Emperor sent a physician called Weikart to look
after Suvorof. But the patient refused skilled assistance.
" What I want," he protested, " is a cottage in the
country, my prayers, kasha, and kvas. Am I not a
soldier?" "You're not," said Weikart. "You're
generalissimus ! " " True," was the answer, " but the
soldier takes me for his pattern." Nevertheless, he
yielded in the end, and showed signs of rallying.
But he remained very ill. One of his few companions,
Baron Rosen, wrote a letter which shows what a difficult
patient he was. For four days he had had nothing to
eat or drink except some soup and English beer :
We never leave him. You know what he was in
good health ; he's twice as bad ill ; but with all that
we are glad to make any sacrifice for our benefactor,
and a man who is the prop and stay of his country.^
This irritable temper in the patient was a sign, if not
of returning health, at least of continuing vitality. He
still corresponded at great length with Khvostof, going
with occasional complaints and reproofs into great
^ Fuchs, iii. 653. The rash was doubtless eczema.
2 nuss. Star. (1900), ci. 329.
350 SUVOROF
detail about the reception destined for him at Peters-
burg, about spending his last days in the country, about
building a stone house with a church close by, about
the pension attached to his Order of Maria Teresa, about
the three Austrian cannon promised him by Catherine,
which he had not yet received, and even about the next
year's campaign and the means of restoring peace to
Europe. One letter, evidently written in a period of
decline, contains this pathetic touch :
I should have liked sometimes to be in public in my
foreign uniform ; it was a glorious thing for the great
Emperor that a subject of his should have served and
won it.*
At last, at the end of March, he resumed his journey,
thinking no doubt of the flags and soldiers and cheering
crowds that he would see in the streets of the capital.
He reckoned without the capricious brutality of the
Emperor. On the 31st March came a public Imperial
order, and a rescript to himself. In defiance of orders,
he had maintained on his staff in Italy and Switzerland
a General of the Day, and he was required to justify
his conduct. Broken in health, and bearing the addi-
tional burden of his ungrateful master's displeasure, he
crawled towards Petersburg. He received a friendly
public welcome at Stryelna, 15 miles outside the capital.
His carriage was surrounded by a large crowd, who
pressed upon him fruit and flowers, and the women
held up their children to receive his blessing. This was
all his triumph. He drove slowly into the empty
flagless streets of Petersburg at 10 o'clock on the night
of the 1st May, and went straight to bed in Khvostof's
house.
On the 4th Khvostof wrote to the Emperor to say
that the old man had arrived " in a very weak condition.' *
Paul, whose harshness has never been explained, had
* Martchenko.
* Russ, Star. (1900), ci. 329.
RETURN AND DEATH 351
the grace to send Bagration to inquire after the health
of his great servant. Bagration's account shows him
apparently on the point of death :
I found Alexander Vassilyevitch lying on his bed ;
he was mightily weak ; he fell into a swoon, and they
rubbed him with spirit, and gave him snuff. Coming
to himself, he looked at me, and in his big kindly eyes
the look of life shone no more. He gazed long at me,
as if getting to know who I was ; then he said, " Ah !
. . . It's you, Peter ! How are you ? " and he was
silent and forgot himself. A minute later, he again
looked at me, and I reported to him all the Emperor's
commands. Alexander Vassilyevitch seemed to revive,
but it was with a great effort that he said, " Make — my —
homage — at the feet — of the Tsar — Peter ! my ear — ill ! "
and he groaned, and fell into a faint .^
But this was no more than the fatigue of his long
journey and his disappointments. He clung to life for a
short time longer, and from the midst of his decay there
came some flashes of the old spirit. Count Kutaizof
waited upon him one day in the name of the Emperor.
The sick man feigned ignorance of the identity of his
visitor, and pressed him with question after question
to explain who he was. Kutaizof was a baptized Turk,
who had begun his Russian life as the Emperor's body-
servant, and had been promoted to the nobility and
entrusted with confidential business. The remorseless
cross-examination drew out the whole story, after which,
" Proshka, Proshka ! " cried Suvorof to his own man.
" Yes, sir ? " " See there ! If only you keep clean and
don't drink you may rise to be a nobleman yourself,
some day ! " ^
When he was actually lapsing into unconsciousness
the jesting was less spiteful. CalHng earnestly for
Khvostof, he whispered in his ear, " Dear friend, oblige
me by not writing any verses on my death." ^ This was
1 Starkof, 271.
» Russ. Star. (1884), iii. 147 ; (1892) Ixxiv. 583.
8 Russ. Arkh. (1873), 706 ; (1871), 109.
852 SUVOROF
his last joke. Memory and speech became confused,
and after several refusals, he consented at last to receive
the supreme unction and bid farewell to his friends and
relations. On the 18th May he became unconscious,
and for three days the anxious listeners heard nothing
but murmuring about plans of campaign, with more
than one earnest repetition of the word " Genoa."
The murmurs at last came to an end, and at two
o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th the poor flame was
quenched.
It is largely owing to his connection with Poland
that Suvorof once enjoyed the reputation of being
nothing but a butcher on a large scale, caring as little
for the lives of his own men as for those of his country's
enemies. In fact he was nothing of the sort. He was
terrible in battle, but he is free from the guilt of indis-
criminate killing. The excesses of Izmail and Warsaw
were due less to his own defects of character than to
those of his army, defects which still are the defects
of all Slav armies alike. His published orders contain
more than one injunction that non-combatants must be
spared, and in things within his own control, notably
in his treatment of the Poles after his conquest, he
showed himself a man of clemency. There was indeed
in him a great store of affection, which was as manifest
in his treatment of conquered enemies, of his own troops,
and of his children, as in his love of sitting among his
pet birds, mewing at strange cats, and barking cheerfully
at dogs.
Suvorof was a Russian, and any judgement of him
which is based on references to Western standards of
conduct is certain to be unfair. He was Russian in
his piety, in his indifference to appearances, in his
contempt of all ranks below the throne, in his lavishness
of affection, in his naked and unashamed egoism and
jealousy, in his carelessness about discipline and method,
in his mastering of his troops through their love rather
RETURN AND DEATH 353
than their respect. It would be as easy to write him
down a buffoon, a toady, or an intriguer, as a butcher,
and those of his contemporaries who did not care to
penetrate beneath the surface of a man saw in him
nothing but one or all of these. But the faults of a
Russian, though no greater, are more conspicuous than
those of other Europeans. He knows no standards of
conduct but his own, and the expression of his self is
his habit, almost his duty. All of Suvorof's vices are
thus proclaimed most loudly by Suvorof. His grovellings
to Potyomkin, his sneers at Ryepnin, his frantic,
querulous, and unremitting appeals to Khvostof, these
are obvious. No man ever loved a woman more
passionately than he loved war, and to secure that he,
and he alone, should command against an enemy, he
stooped to conduct to which ordinary men are driven,
if at all, only by force of animal instinct.
His buffoonery stands on another level from his
jealousy, though a hasty critic would reckon both among
his vices. It was not in fact a vice. It was an expres-
sion not of a moral defect, but of his peculiar virtue as
a leader of Russian troops. In an officer of any other
army it would have been a fault. In a Russian it was
an adjunct of authority, almost a substitute for it. In
no other country in the world is it so easy to appeal to
the affections of the common people as in Russia, and
the man who ventures to treat them as his equals will
have a greater influence over them than the man who
cannot stoop from his superior rank. Modem military
discipline in Russia has been inspired by political
motives, and systematic harshness was the substitute
'for " Revolutionary " brotherhood. Suvorof, in the
days when the peasant had not begun to think of politics,
chose the other method of securing the obedience of
his men. It is not an English method. An Englishman
can as little afford to show himself without dignity as
without clothing. He must keep his romps, like his
dishabilU, for his family. Each in fact believes that to
2A
B54 SUVOROF
expose himself to his fellow-men is to treat them as his
brothers. But whereas the Englishman finds that a
reason for treating strangers with reserve, to the Russian
it is a reason for treating them with familiarity. The
one exposes himself only to the limited circle of his
natural family, the other exposes himself to strangers
so as to increase his family, as it were, by adoption.
Suvorof thus played the fool not merely without
injury to his influence over his men, but to its advantage.
When, after exchanging chaff with a market woman, he
rushed off to the nearest stream crying, amid the shouts
and laughter of his soldiers, " I've burnt myself ! I've
burnt myself ! " he was strengthening, not loosening,
the bonds between him and them.^ To this tie of
affection was of course added that of equal effort and
equal endurance on his part. If they lay out in the
open at night, so did he. If they were soaked in fording
a river, so was he. If they slept little and ate less, so
did he. Showing them thus that he called upon them
for no sacrifice which he was not ready to impose upon
himself, and joining freely in their broad jests and
laughter, he got from them that highest form of obedience,
the deliberate submission of their wills to his, because
their greatest delight was in giving him pleasure.
It is indeed only to a careless observer that Suvorof 's
littleness would appear to outweigh his essential great-
ness. Simple in his vanity and jealousy, in his personal
habits, in his piety, and in his carelessness of his own
rank as well as of that of others, he was simple also in
his ambition. He had no craving for power or wealth.
His sole desire was to raise himself to the level of those
great men of antiquity whose example he so often held
up for the imitation of others. It was not so much that
he loved the applause of ordinary people as that he
craved for the approbation of Epaminondas. It is true
that he bestowed his smiles and his bows with delight,
because he felt that it was the duty of a great man to
1 1st. Vyest. (1900), Ixxx. 526.
RETURN AND DEATH 355
give pleasure to his admirers. But his heart glowed
not so much at the sight of the shouting crowds in the
streets and theatres, as at the reflection that at last he
had made himself worthy of inclusion in the " Lives "
of Plutarch. Many men have been impelled by less
honourable motives, and many men have been driven
by the same desire of fame to crimes of which he was
incapable.
Such a man, if he had many enemies, was not without
friends. Presumptuous incompetence was his natural
foe, and unhappily he alienated many whose friendship
would not have been unworthy of him. The craving
for unquestioned supremacy, which so often mars a
great character, must inevitably repel all self-respecting
men, except those who frankly recognise that their
own merits are inferior, and those who, conscious of
their own equal or even superior worth, are yet mag-
nanimous enough to suppress their feelings in the
public interest. But modesty and generosity of temper
are not the most common of human qualities, and these
masterful folk work most productively in independence.
Suvorof 's associates were divided into avowed rivals and
devoted followers. There was at least one good soldier,
Ryepnin, among the former. But the enthusiasm of
the rank and file was generally not greater than that
of his subordinate officers, and there were many like
Coburg and Melas, whose public spirit and magnanimity
enabled them to bear from an equal in rank what to
less modest men would have seemed patronage or
insolence.
His military methods were as simple as his personal
habits. He had to deal with a people of great natural
ability, but without education. The private soldier
was a strong, docile, and illiterate serf, and the officer,
even if he knew enough of Prussian methods to manoeuvre
troops in the field, knew nothing of staff work. With
this powerful but clumsy instrument Suvorof had to
win all his victories. His own nature rejected elaborate
856 SUVOROF
plans of campaign, but if he had been himself inclined
to them, he could not have relied upon his subordinates
to carry them into execution. Physical strength and
personal courage were the two things which he could
always be sure of finding in his men, and rapid marches
and hand-to-hand fighting were all his scheme of war.
If it be the mark of genius to adapt its raw material
perfectly to its ends, then Suvorof's military genius
was of a high order. At the time when it appeared
most brilliant, during the brief Italian campaign of
1799, there was no other soldier in Europe whom he
need have feared to meet. The contrast presented by
the Austrian performances under Suvorof's direction
with their achievements before his coming and after
his departure is not explained merely by the changes
in the French command. The Austrians gained as
much by the presence of Suvorof as the French lost by
the absence of Napoleon.
In some respects he actually anticipated Napoleon.
He had not Napoleon's gift for organisation, nor did he
learn to use artillery in great masses. But he knew
that the first and last thing in war is to destroy armies,
not to occupy territory; that victory almost always
inclines to the leader who fetters his enemy's will by
taking the offensive ; that plans are less important than
the capacity of an army to adapt itself to an emergency ;
and that rapid marches and determination in shock
fighting are worth more than elaborate drill. In all this
he was Napoleonic, and his dealing with Macdonald and
Moreau was an example of the use of the containing
force and the mass of manoeuvre which the great French
leader himself might have envied.
As a commander he had the defects of his virtues.
His dislike of plans of campaign was rooted in his healthy
contempt for the formalism which was the characteristic
vice of his age. But his reaction from slavery to forms
carried him too far. It was not plans, but only a rigid
adherence to plans, when the original circumstances
RETURN AND DEATH 357
had changed, which he need have avoided. He was
beyond question right in making the accumulation of
energy, aggressive force, sometimes inhibited but never
relaxed, the first principle of his military system. Unless
an army is constantly and unremittingly poised, so
that at the bidding of its directing mind it can strike
with all its weight, there is nothing in any plan to make
it an effective military instrument. An army which is
prepared to remain passive is an army which is beaten.
In this respect Suvorof's genius was of the first rank.
But the most active commander will be none the worse
for having in his mind a general outline of future possi-
bilities, provided he is ready to abandon any preconceived
course, as soon as the facts beyond his control make it
dangerous. The one thing that he can never accurately
foresee is the action of his enemy, and he should be
prepared in advance to deal with it. He must have a
plan, which includes knowledge of his own intention
and a guess at that of his opponent, and must be ready
and able to vary it if his guess proves to be wrong.
Modern German practice ignores the consequence of
enemy movements. It forms its own design, and persists
in it so long as its strength lasts, trusting to its own
overwhelming application of force in general to obliterate
any local and temporary alterations imposed by the
other side. French practice trusts nothing to this
general superiority of mere numbers, but considers the
possible alternatives, taking into account all the likely
moves of the enemy, and contriving its own measures
so as to gather a superior strength for a blow at a vital
point at some stage of the action after the first, so
dealing with any new situation which may be established
by the first conflict of forces. This flexibility has shown
itself of a higher order than the German rigidity. It
relies less upon brute strength, and more upon individual
capacity, upon Suvorof's " apprehension, quickness,
and energy," displayed at a critical moment at a criti-
cal place. In this French sense a " plan of campaign "
858
SUVOROF
would have enabled Suvorof to avoid his Swiss disaster.
In Turkey and Poland he had not to deal with a
formidable adversary, and he could trust, like a modern
German, to the conscious moral superiority of his own
men to redress any local inequality which might appear.
RETURN AND DEATH 359
His first encounters with the French in Italy gave him no
warning. Macdonald and Joubert exposed themselves
to him, and paid the full price of their temerity. But
Massena was of a different calibre, and the omission to
take his probable actions into account led Suvorof into
a course which could have met with success only against
an uncalculating enemy.
The trade of the professional soldier may, like many
others, be censured by a rigid moralist. The man
who undertakes to kill without question at the bidding
of others will inevitably make himself, on occasion,
the instrument of evil. Suvorof, if he fought in Turkey
for the improvement of the world, aided a very dis-
reputable cause in Poland. But great virtues not
seldom flourish in ill ground, and the bold and energetic
performance of any arduous duty affords an example
and an incentive to posterity. Nor is Suvorof or any
other man to be judged only from his victories. A
man is not always at his best when he is most successful.
Often he applies to the imperfect execution of a faulty
project higher powers than he shows in a completed
achievement. Suvorof triumphed beyond the reach
of criticism in his Turkish and Polish enterprises. But
he was never more greatly himself than in his rashly
undertaken and disastrously frustrated expedition into
Switzerland. A man of ordinary merit could have got
himself into the Muottothal, but no man of less than
heroic stature could have beaten his way into safety
at Chur. The whole of the campaign of 1799 is an
astonishing exhibition of fortitude and energy on the
part of so old a man. Whatever his faults, it is impos-
sible to withhold admiration from him. After reaching
almost the summit of his desires, he had been crippled
by disfavour and exile, at an age when most men
have little to contemplate but their own imminent
extinction. But he kept himself firm in body and
spirit, yielding neither to luxury nor to despair, and
in the end, when his disabilities were removed, he
860 SUVOROF
rushed to the crowning of his life's work with the
eagerness and certainty of a youth approaching his
first attempt. Throughout his hfe, glowing through
the tissue of his follies, there shines the pure light of
this passion for perfection in his work. He ends his
autobiography with this exhortation : "I ask my
descendants to follow my example : to begin every task
with the blessing of God, to their last breath to be
faithful to their Sovereign and country, to shun luxury,
idleness, and covetousness, and to seek fame through
truth and well-doing." It is an exhortation which the
cynic will not deny him the right to utter. Whether to
produce such virtues in such men is ever worth the cost,
the infliction of so much suffering and death, and the
diffusion of so much wickedness over so large a part of
the surface of the earth, is another question.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Note on Proper Names. — I have transliterated the Russian names as well as I can.
Having adopted a scheme for them, I was bound to use the same scheme for Turkish
names. But Polish and Austro-Slav names, being originally spelt in our Latin
characters, I have had to leave untouched. It is not symmetrical, but I could not, on
the one hand, re-spell Kosciusko as Kostsiushko, nor, on the other, spell Martchenko
as Marczenko. An English reader will at any rate make no serious mistake if he
pronounces my Russian and Turkish names as they are spelt here, and there are not
many of the others.
Angeli, M. von. Erzherzog Karl von Oesterreich. Vienna, 1896.
Annals of the Fatherland (Otyetchestvenniya Zapiski).
Petrograd.
Anthing. Campagnes du feldmarechal Souwarrow (trans, from
German). London^ 1799.
Aragon, Marquis de. Le Prince Charles de Nassau- Siegen.
Paris, 1893.
Archives of Prince Vorontsof (Arkhiv Knyazya Vorontsova).
Moscow, 1870.
Bagration, Prince P. I. Journal of the Campaign of 1799.
(Suvorof Museum. Petrograd.)
BiBiKOF. Memoir of I. Bibikof.
BoGDANOviTCH. The Campaigns of Rumyantsof, Potyomkin,
and Suvorof in Turkey (Pokhodi R., P. i S. v Turtsii).
Petrograd, 1852.
Buturlin-Valentini. La Guerre avec les Turcs. Berlin, 1829.
Charles of Austria, Archduke. Geschichte des Feldzuges
von 1799. Vienna, 1819.
Chodzko. Histoire des Legions polonaises en Italic. Paris,
1829.
Clausewitz. Hinterlassene Werker. Berlin, 1832.
Danilyevski. The Pugatchyof Rebelhon (Pugatchefskii Bunt).
Petrograd, 1904.
DuMOURiEZ, Gi^NiiRAL. Mcmoircs. Paris, 1848.
Engelhardt, L. N. M^moires (Zapiski Engelgarta). Moscow,
1868.
861
862 SUVOROF
FucHS, E. History of the Campaign of 1799 (Istoria Kampanii
1799 goda). Petrograd, 1825.
Collection of Miscellaneous Works (Sobraniye raznuikh
sotchinyenyi). Petrograd, 1827.
Georoel, Abb]6. Voyage k St-P6tersbourg. Paris, 1818.
Hennequin, Caft. Ziirich ; Mass^na en Suisse. Paris, 1918.
Historical Messenger. (Istoritchyeskii Vyestnik.)
HtJFFER, H. Quellen zur Geschichte der Kriege von 1799 und
1800. Leipzig, 1900.
JoMiNi, Baron A. H. de. Histoire des guerres de la Revolution.
Paris, 1820.
Journal de la si^ge de Cracovie.
Laverne. Histoire du feld-Mar^chal Suvorof.
Lecourbe, G^n^ral. Correspondance. Paris, 1895.
Letters and Papers of Suvorof (Pisma i Buinagi Suvorova).
Petrograd, 1900.
LiGNE, Prince de. Melanges militaires. Vienna, 1865.
LoEWENSTEiN, G^N^RAL, Baron DE. Mcmoircs. Paris, 1903.
Martchenko. Suvorof in his Autographs (S. v svoikh rukopi-
sakh). Petrograd, 1900.
Maslovski, D. F. Article "Suvorof" in Russian Biographical
Dictionary.
Masson. Memoires s^cr^tes sur la Russie. Paris, 1797.
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1893.
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1898.
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Russian Discourses (Russkaya Besyeda),
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INDEX
Adda, crossing of the, 227
Austrian High War Council, 222,
236, 240, 289, 301, 332
Bagration, General Prince, 225,
228, 230, 244, 262, 282,
284, 311, 318, 324, 329, 351
Bellegarde, General Count, 219,
237, 243, 267, 277, 280, 281,
344
Catherine II., 1, 8, 83, 87, 108,
123, 183, 190
Coburg, Prince of, 94, 99, 110
letters of, to Suvorof, 107, 109,
110
Derfelden, General, 93, 153, 164,
166, 171, 181, 185, 284,
309, 323
Devil's Bridge, 314
Dombrovski, General, 182, 183,
248, 251, 253, 254, 259,
261, 277, 285
Fokshani, battle of, 96
France and Poland, 19, 21, 25,
28 ; and Turkey, 89 ; war
with, 135, 150, 199, 204,
215, 218
French Revolutionary Armies, 217
Hirsof, battle of, 50
Izmail, siege and storm of, 112
Joubert, General, 276, 277, 278,
281
Karl, Archduke, of Austria, 219,
236, 242, 291, 302, 336
Kinburn, battle at, 87
Klenau, General, 225, 227, 243,
275, 289, 292
KlonthaL battle in the, 324, 329
Korsakof, General Prince, 302, 340
Kosciusko, 152, 165
Kozludzhi, battle of, 53
Kray, General, 223, 243, 249, 274,
275, 278, 280
Kutchuk-Kainardzhi, Treaty of, 57
Landskron, battle of, 22
Lecourbe, General, 305, 312, 313,
315, 316, 320
Macdonald, General, 238, 242, 244,
246, 247, 248
Mass6na, General, 219, 243, 244,
246, 247, 291, 321, 322, 326
Melas, Field-Marshal, 222, 226,
228, 233, 237, 251, 257,
258, 260, 263, 266, 280,
285, 289, 292, 294, 298
Miloradovitch, General M. I., 50,
230, 280, 284, 312, 315, 326
Molitor, General, 322, 325, 329
Moreau, General, 231, 238, 244,
246, 247, 267, 276, 281
Muottothal, battle in the, 326
Nelson, Admiral, 275, 345
Novi, battle of, 278
Otchakof, siege and storm of, 90
Ott, General, 243, 244, 248, 251,
280, 281
Paul, Tsar, 200, 219, 220, 292,
338, 349, 350
Potyomkin, Count G. A., 65, 86,
87, 92, 93, 109, 111, 112,
121
Praga, 170 ; storm of, 174
Pugatchyof, rebellion of, 62
Rosenberg, General A. G., 219,
224, 245, 250, 257, 262,
266, 308, 309, 316, 324, 327
Ruimnik, battle of the, 99
365
866
SUVOROF
Rumyantsof, Field-Marshal, 89,
40, 52, 56, 60
Scherer, General, 225
S6rurier, General, 227, 281, 282,
234, 235
Stalovitch, battle of, 24
Suvorof, A. V. —
ancestry, 1
appearance, 2, 115, 847
birth, 1
characteristics and habits, 60,
65, 67, 69, 71, 74, 136, 137,
182, 293, 299, 848, 352
death, 352
domestic affairs, 57, 58, 78, 74,
207
education, 2
honours and rewards, 26, 49,
79, 108, 123, 183, 274, 292
military qualities and methods,
9, 40, 192, 197, 203, 215,
218, 287, 306, 355
anecdotes of, 64, 83, 125, 141,
184, 186, 187, 188, 189,
190, 191, 212, 220, 221,
235, 294, 298, 340, 341,
342, 343, 344, 348, 351
battles and sieges of, Landskron,
22 ; Stalovitch, 24 ; Cra-
cow, 29 ; Turtukai, 42, 47 ;
Hirsof, 50 ; Kozludzhi, 53 ;
Kinburn, 87 ; Otchakof,
92 ; Fokshani, 95 ; the
Ruinmik, 99 ; Izmail, 112 ;
Kruptchitsa, 156 ; Brest,
160 ; Kobuilk, 167 ; Praga,
174; the Adda, 227; the
Trebbia, 251 ; Novi, 277 ;
St. Gothard, 311 ; Devil's
Bridge, 314 ; Klonthal, 329
correspondence with —
Bibikof, A. I., 26, 28, 30, 31, 34
Catherine, 108, 127, 150
Khvostof, D. I., 77, 128, 129,
130, 131, 134, 135, 145,
150, 204, 205, 209, 350
Nelson, 346
Suvorof, A. V. (contd.) —
correspondence with (contd.) —
Paul, 211, 216, 304
Potyomkin, G. I., 66, 76, 81
his son, 209
his daughter, 91, 108, 138,
139
his godson, 149
others, 9, 10, 11, 20, 44, 45,
46, 47, 72, 73, 76, 77, 109,
126, 131, 138, 135, 140,
144, 145, 154, 164, 192,
226, 241, 244, 245, 250,
273, 274, 290, 298, 808,
837, 345, 349
stationed at —
Ladoga, 9 ; Poland, 18 ;
Crimea, 69 ; Kuban, 70 ;
Crimea, 70 ; Astrakhan, 74 ;
Petersburg, 81 ; Krement-
chug, 82 ; Kief, 83 ; Kin-
burn, 86 ; Otchakof, 91 ;
Kinburn, 92 ; Moldavia,
93 ; Petersburg, 125 ; Fin-
land, 127 ; Petersburg, 190 ;
Tultchin, 191 ; Kontchansk,
210 ; Verona, 223 ; Milan,
235 ; Turin, 238 ; Aless-
andria, 269 ; Asti, 292
estimate of his character, 352
Suvorof, Varvara I., 57, 73, 74
Suvorof, Arkadii A., 59, 208, 209,
226
Suvorof, Natalia A., 59, 91
Suvorof, Vassilii, 1
Tartars, the, 69, 78
Thugut, Baron von, 221, 299, 300,
304
Trebbia, battle of the, 251
Turks, the military methods of,
36 ; first war with, 39 ;
and the Crimea, 69, 73 ;
second war with, 85
Turtukai, capture of, 42, 47
Victor, General, 227, 228, 233,
238, 246, 248, 251, 266
Viom^nil, Baron de, 25
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