Ex Libris 
 C. K. OGDEN ; 
 
 (C
 
 PRODROMUS, 
 
 AN INQUIRY 
 
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF REASONING; 
 
 AN ANALYSIS OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 BV 
 
 SIR GRAVES CHAMNEY HAUGHTON, 
 
 K.H., M.A., F.R.S., &c. &c. 
 
 MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, &C. &C. 
 
 * 
 
 " A I, I, MEN ARE AS THE VULGAR, IN WHAT THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND." BURKS 
 
 LONDON : 
 W M . H. ALLEN & CO., LEADENHALL STREET. 
 
 MDCCC XXXIX.
 
 LONDON : PRINTED BY RICHARD WATTS, 
 Crown Court, Temple Bar.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 DEDICATION. 
 PREFACE. 
 
 REFLECTION. 
 GENERAL NOTE. 
 
 INTRODUCTION p. 3 
 
 OF THINGS 
 
 OF STATES 11 
 
 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS . 50 
 
 Of Entity and Quiddity 56 
 
 Of Habit, Habitude, Custom, and Use .... 57 
 
 Of Knowledge and Wisdom 58 
 
 Of Principle 60 
 
 Of Fortune, Chance, and Providence 65 
 
 Of Matter, Substance, and Body 65 
 
 Of Nature 66 
 
 Of Necessity 72 
 
 Of Infinity 73 
 
 Of Individuality 76 
 
 Of Relation (Abstract) 77 
 
 Of Relation (Personal) 79 
 
 Of Correlation (Abstract and Personal) .... 81 
 
 Of Quality 83 
 
 Of Property 90 
 
 - Of Peculiarity 91 
 
 Of Quality, Property, and Peculiarity 92 
 
 Of Cause and Effect 94 
 
 Of Reason and Consequence 127 
 
 Of Motive and Act, and Motive and Result ... 134 
 
 Of Origin and End 135 
 
 3
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 OF STATES 
 
 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTI- } continued : 
 CULAR TERMS 
 
 Of Agency and Act P. 135 
 
 Of Source and Product 136 
 
 Of Causation and Causality 137 
 
 Of Matter, Space, Time, Movement, and Force . . 142 
 
 Of a Body, and a Space 143 
 
 Of a Time 146 
 
 Of a Movement 150 
 
 Of a Force 151 
 
 Of Power 154 
 
 Of Motion 161 
 
 Of Form 162 
 
 Of Number 165 
 
 Of Quantity 171 
 
 Of Weight 172 
 
 Of Magnitude 172 
 
 Of Proportion 174 
 
 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING 175 
 
 Of the Laws of Nature 176 
 
 Of Attraction 177 
 
 Of Attractive and Repulsive Forces 179 
 
 Of Affinity 183 
 
 Of the Vis Inertise, &;c 184 
 
 Of the Vis Vitse, S$c 187 
 
 OF THE MIND 190 
 
 Of Sensation, Consciousness, and Intelligence . .191 
 
 Of the Faculties 194 
 
 Of Reason 197 
 
 Of Insanity 197 
 
 Of Ideas 198 
 
 Of Abstract Ideas 205 
 
 Of the Association of Ideas 205
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 OP STATES-continued: 
 
 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES ... p. 208 
 
 Plato's 210 
 
 Aristotle's 211 
 
 Gotama's 215 
 
 Jina's . 216 
 
 Zoroaster's 217 
 
 Locke's - 219 
 
 Kant's 221 
 
 F. W. Schelling's 233 
 
 CONCLUSION , 235 
 
 APPENDIX : 
 
 NOTE (A) 239 
 
 NOTE (B) 240 
 
 NoTE(C) 251 
 
 NOTE(D) 253 
 
 NOTE (E) 256 
 
 NOTE (F) 258 
 
 NOTE (G) 263
 
 TO 
 THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 THE EARL OF MUNSTER, F.R.S. 
 
 CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, 
 
 $c. $c. 4-0. 
 
 MY DEAR LORD, 
 
 THE warm interest which your Lordship has 
 shown in promoting the advancement of literature, 
 by your first establishing, and subsequently foster- 
 ing with the greatest care, a Society for translating 
 and publishing inedited Oriental MSS., which has 
 made your name known throughout this country and 
 the rest of the civilized world, leads me, in addition 
 to the many obliging attentions I have received 
 from yourself during an intercourse of several 
 years, to place under the protection of your Lord- 
 ship's name the following Observations on the 
 nature of language the noblest instrument at the
 
 DEDICATION. 
 
 disposal of man ; and to which he is as much in- 
 debted for his privilege as a reasoning being, as 
 he is to Providence for having made him a rational 
 creature. I am induced to hope, that the public at 
 large may be roused to feel the high importance of 
 the subject, as well as the value of correct notions 
 with regard to it in physical science ; and that 
 every man of reflection may become aware of the 
 true nature of that upon which, as the adjunct of 
 reason, is founded the moral excellence of the human 
 race. 
 
 I remain, 
 
 My Dear Lord, 
 
 With every sentiment of respect and regard, 
 Your Lordship's 
 
 Very devoted humble servant, 
 
 GRAVES C. HAUGHTON.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 THIS little work must not be mistaken for an idle 
 disquisition about words. So far from this being 
 the case, its object is, to consider the very founda- 
 tion of human reasoning, and, consequently, of 
 human knowledge. The current of metaphysics 
 runs remarkably slack at present in this country ; 
 and perhaps the occasion is only the more favour- 
 able for sounding the depth of the abyss, and dis- 
 covering the amount of its utility to mankind. 
 Whether a period of the world so peculiarly de- 
 voted to pleasure and the practical business of life 
 is one fitted for fixing the attention of the minds 
 of men upon their own misconceptions, will be best 
 learnt from experiment : but should it turn out, 
 that they are so absorbed in their devotion to party 
 politics, railways, steam-engines, sonatas, and secta- 
 rian controversy, as to preclude all other subjects, 
 these pages must, of course, share the fate of every
 
 11 PREFACE. 
 
 thing produced out of season. In that case, they 
 must wait for another revolution of the cycle, before 
 they may be read. It is much more natural that 
 mankind should prefer what brings them present 
 applause, without much labour of thought, than 
 devote themselves to studies that are in some 
 measure against the ordinary tendencies of their 
 minds : though some, like the good man in Moliere, 
 who was so surprised when informed that he had 
 been all his life talking prose, will, perhaps, be 
 astonished to learn, that, though they absolutely 
 detest the name of Metaphysics, they never draw 
 an inference, however obvious, that is not the result 
 of a metaphysical process, equalling in difficulty 
 the generality of the remarks that I have prepared 
 for their consideration. 
 
 I have endeavoured, notwithstanding, to make 
 what I had to say as simple and clear as was in my 
 power ; and I have, in consequence, sacrificed ele- 
 gance to precision and perspicuity. 
 
 The English are, in an eminent degree, gre- 
 garious thinkers ; and whatever is catered for their 
 understandings is generally taken up, or neglected, 
 by all. Should curiosity, however, lead any one to 
 open this volume who has never turned his atten- 
 tion to metaphysical pursuits, let him not throw it 
 down in despair ; as it is particularly intended for
 
 PREFACE. Ill 
 
 the relief of those whose tender consciences may 
 occasionally accuse them of being ignorant of so 
 important a branch of knowledge. Now, the 
 perusal of this little work will save him a world of 
 thought, and also of regret, for his ignorance. This 
 will surely be a strong inducement to the lover of 
 truth to persevere in reading it through. But if 
 he be of a bold and inquisitive turn of mind, he 
 will find in it a guide, by the assistance of which 
 he may explore all the dark and mysterious laby- 
 rinths of metaphysics. Let him, however, beware 
 how he separates himself from it, while led on by 
 the fascination of the moment ; for such are the 
 charms of some of those exquisite specimens of 
 misapplied genius, that he may utterly lose himself, 
 and stray far from all human relief. Should such 
 a result take place, his case is desperate ; and 
 having no means of extricating himself, he will be 
 reduced to the situation of Milton's fallen angels, 
 who are represented as reasoning on these very 
 subjects 
 
 " And found no end, in wand'ring mazes lost." 
 
 Under every disappointment in this country, I 
 feel I have still an unfailing resource in the truth- 
 inquiring spirit of Germany ; and I do not despair 
 of a patient hearing from its philosophers, ever
 
 IV PREFACE. 
 
 though I do not bow the neck to their metaphysical 
 Baals and Molochs ; and may appear before them 
 with the disadvantage of having been rejected by 
 the sanctimonious worshippers of the golden calf, 
 at home. The motto of Germany is FIAT JUSTITIA, 
 RUAT CCELUM ; and I therefore feel confident, that 
 if I have discovered any thing useful, it will be 
 accepted in a friendly spirit, and gain an immediate 
 hearing : for its literary courts are always open ; 
 its judges on their seats ; and it matters not whe- 
 ther the appellant be one of the sons of the father- 
 land, or a barbarian ; as he will, in either case, be 
 judged impartially, and obtain the same justice as 
 a native of the soil, even though he may have 
 come, like another Anacharsis, from the Scythian 
 wastes of France or England. 
 
 Should any one be of opinion that the truths I 
 have brought to light have been previously dis- 
 covered, he should point out where the various 
 topics have been discussed with system, or investi- 
 gated with the exactness and fulness they deserve. 
 He should remember, that, in this instance, as in 
 many others of human knowledge, the remark of 
 Solomon must, from the greater age and activity of 
 the world, gain fresh strength every day. If it 
 were true in his time, that " there is nothing new 
 under the sun," it must be much more so after the
 
 PREFACE. V 
 
 lapse of two thousand five hundred years ; and 
 during a period that has been stored, by the inven- 
 tion of printing, with the memorials of other men's 
 thoughts, to an extent that would have formed at 
 least one exception to the remark of that wise 
 monarch. 
 
 The mention of Solomon's name recalls to my 
 mind a story relating to him, that is current among 
 Mahomedan nations, and which, I think, will help 
 to illustrate the design of the following observa- 
 tions. Pious Moslems are of opinion, that much 
 of the glory of the Hebrew sovereign's reign re- 
 sulted from the great ability and skill of his prime- 
 minister, Asaph ; whose knowledge of the occult 
 sciences was so profound, that it enabled him to 
 control the gins (genii), a race remarkable for their 
 stupidity and malevolence. The fear these beings 
 had of Asaph was such, that during his lifetime 
 they refrained from every act of annoyance to man- 
 kind. Solomon, however, was resolved that his 
 subjects should continue to benefit by the terror 
 which his vizier had inspired ; and, on Asaph's 
 death, he had him embalmed, and then placed in the 
 treasury ; where he was dressed, and set up, resting 
 on his staff. The gins, who were ignorant of his 
 death, stole from time to time to the treasury, and 
 peeped in slyly at the window, to see what their
 
 VI PREFACE. 
 
 tyrant was about ; when observing him always in a 
 vigilant attitude, they invariably fled, lest he should 
 punish them for their impertinent audacity. In 
 this state of ignorance they remained for a long 
 time : but, at last, it happened that some white 
 ants, so well known in the East for their destructive 
 ravages, found their way into the treasury; and 
 attacking Asaph's staff, he fell upon the ground : 
 upon which the gins, finding out the trick that had 
 been practised upon them, began to vex and 
 harass the human race, as they had been in the 
 habit of doing before. Now, reader, what is the 
 whole host of metaphysicians that have formerly 
 existed, but so many Asaphs, merely preserved for 
 the purpose of imposing upon mankind ? and what 
 are all their abstract words, but the staves upon 
 which they rested their arguments while living, 
 and which still continue to prop up their systems 
 now they are dead ? and, finally, what are these 
 few pages, but so many white ants, that will, I trust, 
 destroy their props, and let those arch deceivers fall 
 to the earth, never to be set up again, as bugbears 
 to our race ? 
 
 To the judicious sentiment of Locke, which is 
 contained in the Reflection placed at the head of 
 the following remarks, I wish to draw the reader's 
 particular attention ; because it is not merely most
 
 PREFACE. Vll 
 
 just, but, occurring as it does at the close of his 
 great work, it seems to have loomed upon his mind 
 as the consummation of all his speculations, and 
 even to be a condemnation of the work itself, or at 
 least to intimate that he had arrived at a convic- 
 tion that language itself was the parent of much of 
 the error it was employed to expose. The opinion, 
 therefore, of so masterly a mind is worthy of the 
 highest consideration, and I have accordingly given 
 it its present conspicuous place : for though it ap- 
 pears exactly shaped to suit the following observa- 
 tions, it did not present itself to me till after they 
 were written ; and the same remark applies equally 
 to the quotation with which this work concludes. 
 
 Having been long engaged on a work which is 
 intended to demonstrate the necessary connexion, 
 relation, and dependence of Physics, Metaphysics, 
 and Morals, I found the whole of these topics a 
 perfect chaos, from the deceptive character of lan- 
 guage ; and I felt, accordingly, that there was no 
 chance of giving a profitable direction to my labour, 
 without bestowing a thorough consideration upon 
 that indispensable instrument of thought. The 
 following remarks were accordingly written by way 
 of preliminary observations. As it may be some 
 time before that work is ready, I have thought it 
 as well to send forth this little messenger, to ascer-
 
 Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 tain what degree of chance exists for its meeting 
 with a favourable reception. It is my hope that I 
 shall be able to lead the reader 
 
 " Through Nature, up to Nature's God;" 
 
 and bring home to him, with irresistible convic- 
 tion, the inconsistencies and absurdities of mate- 
 rialism. With this view, I have laboured to clear 
 away the rubbish that has been heaped up so high 
 from antiquity to the present time, as scarcely to 
 allow us more than a glimpse of truth. Berkeley 
 has well said, that " we first raise a dust, and then 
 complain we cannot see : " but he neglected to analyse 
 the nature of this dust, or mankind would have 
 been in possession of the means of laying it, when- 
 ever it clouded their vision. 
 
 Should any unforeseen circumstance prevent the 
 accomplishment of my entire plan, I feel I shall not 
 have lived in vain, if the completion of this portion 
 of it shall help to liberate The Human Understand- 
 ing from some of its strongest bonds of self-delusion 
 and absurdity.
 
 PRODROMUS.
 
 REFLECTION. 
 
 " THE consideration, then, of Ideas and Words, as the great instru- 
 ments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation, 
 who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole Extent 
 of it. And, perhaps, if they w r ere distinctly weighed, and duly con- 
 sidered, they would afford us another sort of Logic and Critic, than 
 what we have been hitherto acquainted with." 
 
 LOCKK'S Essay concerning Human Understanding, 
 Book IV. Ch. xx. $ 4. 
 
 GKNEHAL NOTE. 
 
 THE following disquisitions are strictly confined to the objective 
 view of nature.
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 1. WERE we to hear of an astronomer who should 
 place full reliance on his observation of the stars, 
 though he had never verified his instruments, nor 
 depended for their verification on a competent 
 assistant, we should not merely be extremely sur- 
 prised, but reject with contempt the results of his 
 labours. Nay, sensible men would even require that 
 a scientific observer should be well acquainted with 
 the principle upon which such instruments were 
 constructed, and assure himself that no possible 
 cause of error lay in so essential a point. But, if we 
 are thus particular in the means of obtaining accu- 
 racy in the results of physical inquiries, it is strange 
 that we are so indifferent and negligent in the 
 examination and verification of the only instrument 
 we can employ in philosophical inquiry ; that is, in 
 ascertaining the value and scope of the words we 
 reason with. The cause is simply, I believe, that, 
 as we have employed language by rote from infancy 
 upwards, and have always depended upon it in the 
 common routine business of life, we are led on, 
 gradually, to use it in higher matters ; till at last we 
 place such reliance upon it, that we should almost 
 
 B2
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 be considered insane to doubt its general accuracy. 
 It is my object, however, to show, that partly from 
 disdain for such investigations, and partly from their 
 supposed difficulty, we have proceeded in a round 
 of error, till at last we have, by our neglect, arrived 
 at conclusions so irreconcileable with common sense, 
 that the mass of mankind regard with something of 
 scorn the aerial castles of metaphysics. And, if the 
 labours of the mathematician meet with better suc- 
 cess, we must rather attribute it to the certainty 
 that attends his calculations, when the data are right, 
 than to any means he possesses of avoiding error in 
 his reasoning : it will be found however, as might 
 be expected, that the moment he theorizes, he falls 
 into the same inconsistencies as the metaphysician. 
 The analytic chemist, too, will be seen to be in greater 
 difficulties than the mathematician, whenever he 
 attempts to reason on the invaluable facts his experi- 
 ments and acumen bring to light ; inasmuch as he 
 has to account for the most mysterious results, in 
 words, which are, to him, only so many counters, of 
 which he has not previously fixed either the relative 
 or absolute value. We have acted with regard to 
 language as the alchymists did with respect to mi- 
 neral productions we have made use of it in a gross 
 way ; and if we have been able to make any dis- 
 coveries in philosophy by its help, it is more owing 
 to chance than system. But I believe, that if we 
 imitate the chemists of our own times, we shall arrive
 
 INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 at results altogether new and unexpected : it is 
 only by analysis that we can hope to discover truth ; 
 and it is solely by that process that chemistry has 
 taken its station as an exact science, next in order 
 to astronomy. 
 
 2. I trust I shall be able to render intelligible, 
 to every person of ordinary education and capacity, 
 what I feel to be of such great importance. The 
 truth has been often seen by glimpses ; but I am 
 not aware that any one has undertaken to give a 
 definite and comprehensive view of the subject; 
 and far less has any one attempted to solve the 
 enigma, easy as I believe it to be. It is therefore 
 my intention to make language give evidence against 
 itself, and render up its secret to compel it to 
 confess the manifold impositions it practises on the 
 human understanding, and to acknowledge, that, 
 notwithstanding all its disguises, and its supposed 
 riches, every word may be shown to mean nothing 
 more than THING, or STATE ; and that even the last 
 of these two terms is a mere sound a symbol 
 boldly invented by the intellect 1 , for the purpose of 
 reasoning. I shall enter upon the consideration of 
 these two classes of words, after a few preliminary 
 remarks. 
 
 (!) The term intellect is uniformly employed, throughout 
 pages, for the thinking agent, or self. See the remarks on the 
 Intellect, 158.
 
 (5 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 3. All words are but of two kinds ; to which 
 the terms Concrete* and Abstract have been given. 
 The first class comprehends the names of all objects 
 that come under the cognisance of one or more of 
 the five senses ; that is, all which we can taste, touch, 
 smell, hear, or see. Whatever, therefore, is not to be 
 distinguished by any of our senses, nor derived by 
 indubitable inference such as, God, Soul, and 
 Power 3 is called Abstract. This subdivision points 
 out with accuracy the mode in which this investiga- 
 tion should be pursued : and I shall, accordingly, 
 commence with the consideration of Concrete Terms, 
 or those words which designate real things ; that is, 
 things perceived by the senses, and those we de- 
 rive by indubitable inference 4 . It might at first ap- 
 pear, that the expression ' Concrete' and 'Abstract,' 
 having a scholastic air, might be altogether replaced 
 with advantage by ' Conceptions' and 'Perceptions;' the 
 latter having the great advantage of being referrible, 
 by our intelligence, to the verbs to conceive and to 
 perceive: but, though these are undoubtedly better 
 
 ( 2 ) I limit the word ' Concrete' here to nouns that imply the names 
 of real things; and I except, for my present purpose, all adjectives: 
 yet I helieve the whole of this class of words, not derived from 
 verbs, to have been originally the names of things ; just as we now 
 employ rose, pink, copper, &c. for the names of colours. 
 
 ( 3 ) For the peculiar sense in which the word 'Power 'is here 
 employed, see 123130. 
 
 ( 4 ) The reader will find in 165, the reason why I have not in 
 this place alluded to Ideis.
 
 INTRODUCTION. t 
 
 for all familiar purposes, the former are not without 
 their use, as being more comprehensive. For in- 
 stance, under Concrete we can include both what 
 we perceive, and what we infer, as being both ma- 
 terial and immaterial ; such as, Bodies, as well as 
 God, Soul, or Power; but this cannot be said of 
 Perception. Yet, if we make this exception, we 
 shall find Perception and Conception the more use- 
 ful and significant terms ; and I shall therefore gene- 
 rally use them, from preference, throughout this 
 work. As the point of view, in which these two sets 
 of terms are employed, is quite different, we shall 
 find, that if we attempt to include such immaterial 
 things as God, Soul, or Power under Perceptions or 
 Conceptions, it must be under the last, as they are 
 only discovered by inference ; for all Inferences, 
 Phrases, Opinions, Conjectures, Notions, Proposi- 
 tions, Statements, Arguments, &c. ( 30.) are strictly 
 Conceptions. It is, therefore, worthy of remark, 
 that the term i Conception' has here the advantage 
 over that of Abstract Terms ; and, thus, more than 
 balances that possessed by Concrete terms over Per- 
 ception. Both sets of terms will, therefore, be found 
 occasionally preferable the one to the other. Con- 
 ception admirably represents both Abstract Terms, 
 as well as the Inferences, Phrases, Opinions, &c. 
 which have been just enumerated ; in short, every 
 thing we have already heard or conceived of our- 
 selves by the means of language, and which are trea-
 
 8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 sured up by memory ; a proof how much of the 
 highest intelligence depends upon this faculty, which 
 is the very basis of thought, and without the posses- 
 sion of which,' in a high degree, no man can shine as 
 a just and profound reasoner. An examination, 
 indeed, of the most original productions of the 
 human mind will show how much they are depen- 
 dent upon preconceptions 5 : and if this is the case 
 with them, the discourses of ordinary minds will 
 appear to be little more than parrot-like repetitions, 
 slightly modified for the occasion. 
 
 (s) See the Note to 85.
 
 OF THINGS. 
 
 4. I have already said, that Concrete Terms 
 relate solely to what is made known to us by our 
 senses, or by indubitable inference. But, besides 
 these, there are many sensations which we are 
 almost invariably in the habit of mistaking for the 
 things which produce them. Thus the sensation 
 of heat is commonly mistaken for the something 
 which excites it ; and this is fully felt and acknow- 
 ledged by chemists, and other writers on natural 
 philosophy, who have consequently been obliged to 
 introduce the word caloric, to prevent the confusion 
 of thought that must follow from the use of the 
 word heat in two opposite senses : but no one ap- 
 pears to suspect that the same kind of mistake is 
 made with regard to light, though such is the fact. 
 All the beautiful illumination, seeming to be caused 
 throughout nature by the sun, is but a sensation ; 
 and if there were no eyes in the world, every thing 
 would be dark ; yet that which produced the sensa- 
 tion of light in us would still remain. When we 
 say we see a light, or a flame, or a colour, we make 
 the same mistake as the person who thinks heat and 
 caloric to be one and the same thing. So does he, 
 who supposes that what makes the air vibrate is the
 
 10 OF THINGS. 
 
 sound he hears ; and, he who thinks that the odour 
 he smells is identical with that which passed from 
 the flower he holds in his hand, or that the taste he 
 relishes so much is in the morsel he is pressing 
 against his palate, falls into a similar error. These 
 subjects are merely alluded to here, that the reader 
 may not commit the mistake of classifying under 
 Concrete Terms, what are really Abstract : for 
 Sights, Tastes, Smells, Sounds, and Feelings, are all 
 Abstract Terms ; and the things that produce these 
 effects on our senses, whether they be material 
 or immaterial, are alone represented by Concrete 
 Terms. This is as much as I believe it is necessary 
 to say on the subject of what is Concrete ; and I 
 shall therefore proceed to the next division of the 
 inquiry, namely, to Abstract Terms, which are all 
 included under the word State.
 
 OF STATES. 
 
 5. Every Abstract word implies either a State 
 or an Action. Thus, goodness is the State of a man 
 who is good, that is, a good-man' s-state ; and vibration 
 and movement are Actions of bodies which vibrate 
 and move. If any one wished to generalize further, 
 he might say that all Abstract Words imply a State ; 
 for we can speak of a state of action, and so talk of 
 THE STATE of vibration, or THE STATE of movement of 
 a body, still the distinction will be found to be use- 
 ful in practice', as will be seen when I show what 
 Abstract Words are in reality : but I must first recal 
 the reader's attention to the way he has been in the 
 habit of employing them. He will remember, that 
 he talks of goodness, virtue, and other Abstract States, 
 as something as palpable as the class of Concrete 
 words already alluded to ; and he accordingly says, 
 when occasion requires, IN goodness, FROM goodness, 
 BY goodness, &c., just as he would employ IN, FROM, 
 BY, &c. in speaking of a house, or any other tangible 
 object : though I shall shortly prove to him, that this 
 indispensable and necessary use of language, in the 
 common business of life, is the root of the most 
 glaring fallacies, when we have occasion to reason on 
 the fundamental principles of things in general.
 
 12 OF STATES. 
 
 6. Having thus far introduced the reader to 
 this branch of the inquiry, I wish to inform him, 
 that it is my intention to show, that though we can 
 TALK of goodness, virtue, blackness, whiteness, &c., we 
 cannot THINK of them. If any one will take such a 
 word as goodness, and decompose it, he will find it 
 to contain good and ness. If he will do the same 
 for other compound words implying a State, he 
 will always find that he has an adjective, and an 
 unmeaning termination 6 . In a similar manner, any 
 word implying an Action, such as movement, may be 
 reduced to the verb move, and to ment, a syllable of 
 no sense. Hence it is clear that any word implying 
 a State is derived from an adjective, or a verb neu- 
 ter ; and every one signifying an Action, from a verb 
 active. Nearly every word in English ending in 
 tion is derived from a Latin verb, and the termina- 
 tion tio 1 , which is void of sense. We thus see that 
 
 ( 6 ) The apparent significancy of such terminations as ness, ship, 
 fiood, head, &c., will, if they are referred back to their original forms, 
 be found to be quite delusive : for instance, ship does not mean a ves- 
 sel, nor head the upper part of the body ; and so of the rest. See this 
 subject further pursued in NOTE (A). 
 
 ( 7 ) Some will perhaps prefer restricting the termination to io, in- 
 stead of tio ; as the abstract nouns formed with this affix always incline 
 in their formation to that of the past participle, and not to the present 
 tense. For example, secretio, actio, &c., are more connected with se- 
 cretus, actus, &c., than with secerno, ago, &c. The reader can choose 
 which form he likes best : my object, on the present occasion, is not 
 with etymology, but simply the elucidation of a general principle of 
 language, for which 1 endeavour to find the readiest means.
 
 OF STATES. 13 
 
 these States and Actions have no existence, except 
 as words ; and, consequently, that there are no such 
 things as abstract ideas, but only abstract words. 
 Did Abstract Ideas exist in the mind before such 
 terms were brought into use, we must equally admit 
 that it had in it the Ideas of saltness, sandiness, 
 spong'mess, ropincss, and similar words, before we 
 knew of salt, sand, sponge, rope, or any other thing 
 we may in time discover, or fabricate. Should this 
 assertion, that we only employ Abstract Words, and 
 have no Abstract Ideas, create a doubt, let any one 
 try to form to himself the Idea of saltness, sandiness, 
 sponginess, or ropiness, without any reference to salt, 
 sand, sponge, or rope : and, if he still fancy that he 
 can, let him try to conceive the Idea or image of 
 these qualities, without calling to mind the sounds 
 that express them, or the things from which they 
 have been abstracted. He will, I believe, discover 
 this to be impossible : and, to prove that there is 
 no fallacy at the bottom of the assertion, let him, 
 by way of contrast, try to call to mind a house, a 
 horse, a dog, or any other object that has been made 
 known to him by one or more of his senses ; and let 
 him do this without any reference to the names 
 they bear in his own or in any other language ; and 
 he will, I think, find that he can do it without any 
 difficulty. His dreams, too, may be called in to 
 the proof of this fact. In them, he sees and feels 
 such things as he may have seen and felt in his
 
 14 OF STATES. 
 
 waking moments ; but his Abstract Ideas have dis- 
 appeared, though no one will deny but that it is 
 quite possible to dream of salt, sand, a sponge, a 
 rope, &c. It is no doubt very startling, to have this 
 fact brought home to us, perhaps for the first time ; 
 nor can such a rooted prejudice that is, an opinion 
 founded before judgment has been exerted be at 
 once eradicated from our minds : but it is only ne- 
 nessary for any one to consider it with the attention 
 it merits, and he will not fail, however liable he 
 must be, from habit, to continual relapses, to feel 
 its full force. 
 
 7. Let the reader, therefore, never forget, that 
 all Abstract Terms must come under the same law 
 as saltness, sandiness, sponginess, ropiness, &c. ; and 
 that if these must be admitted to have arisen after 
 the knowledge of salt, sand, sponge, rope, &c., so 
 must all others be equally dependent upon the 
 knowledge of some previous concrete thing to 
 which ness, ship, hood, &c. have merely been added. 
 Those, therefore, who hold out for Abstract Terms, 
 that is, who are realists, must be prepared to de- 
 fend saltness, sandiness, &c., or to surrender up 
 every Abstract Word employed in language ; for 
 they must, one and all, stand or fall together ; and 
 this fact must never be lost sight of, throughout the 
 following remarks.
 
 OF STATES. 15 
 
 8. As to such simple words as cannot be de- 
 compounded, they will be found to be either adjec- 
 tives used nominally, as a good, a white, &c. ; or they 
 are verbs, such as a run, a knock, a jump. When 
 such words are brought into use by convention, 
 they are understood with the greatest facility in 
 their new character ; for if the language possess an 
 article, the placing of it before any term is a signal 
 to the understanding of the new office the word is 
 meant to fill : and if it have not this defining par- 
 ticle, the prefixing a possessive pronoun, or a noun 
 in the genitive case, will at once cause the mind to 
 class the word with other nouns, as in such ex- 
 amples as HIS run, HIS knock, HIS jump, &c., or a 
 MAN'S run, a MAN'S knock, &c. By this process any 
 verb may be converted into a noun, as we see in 
 such expressions as msfiat, HIS fac-simile, &c. ; and 
 the intention of the speaker is comprehended, even* 
 by a child, at the very first employment of such 
 Terms. A fact that throws some light on the faci- 
 lity with which we comprehend forms of speech 
 we may not have heard before ; analogy being, in 
 all such cases, the leading-string of the understand- 
 ing. But it may be objected, that there is in En- 
 glish, and, perhaps, in most other languages, many 
 words which cannot be either decompounded, or 
 traced to their originals. This is undoubtedly 
 true ; but they will be found to be words of the 
 first necessity in language, and for which the com-
 
 16 OF STATES. 
 
 pound form can be generally substituted, as in the 
 case of heat and hotness in our own language, and 
 of vita and vitalitas in Latin. But, though we are 
 now unable to trace such words to their remote 
 etymons, their existence can in no way impugn the 
 force of the observations already made ; for the 
 demonstrative clearness of the real nature of such 
 as we can trace, leaves no doubt respecting those 
 of the same class which are obscure. 
 
 9. It must be evident, that in all the foregoing 
 examples, and also in all others that can be pro- 
 duced, we might, with equal certainty of being 
 understood, particularly after a little use, have sub- 
 stituted the word State, and thus have got rid of the 
 whole multitude of Abstract Words ; and, instead of 
 speaking of goodness, virtue, vibration, movement, &c., 
 have talked of the good-state, the virtuous-state, the 
 vibrating-state, the moving-state*, &c. Had this been 
 so, we could not have been deceived, as we now 
 are ; for whenever we made use of the latter expres- 
 sions, we should never have been led into the error 
 of supposing such words as goodness, virtue, vibra- 
 tion, movement, &c. as having a real existence ; which 
 
 ( 8 ) The reader will observe, that it would be as unnecessary, as 
 incorrect, to subjoin the word Action to an active verb, and to speak 
 of the vibrating action. Here, the generic term State is the right word ; 
 but, if we substitute vibratory for vibrating, that is, the adjective for 
 the participle, we may then speak of the Vibratory Action ; because 
 no adjective contains in itself any reference to Action.
 
 OF STATES. 17 
 
 is, the case, at present, with all reasoners ; and even 
 with myself, as often as I speak without calling my 
 mind, by an effort, to the consciousness of this fact. 
 One decided advantage which must have resulted 
 from this last and more philosophical employment 
 of the forms of speech, would have been, that where 
 we spoke of the good-state, the virtuous-state, the 
 vibrating-state, the moving-state, &c., we must in every 
 instance have referred these States to some individual, 
 or to a body in which they were conceived to exist. 
 But, as it is, we make real and independent entities 
 of these Abstract Words ; and they are as much a 
 stumbling-block to the right use of reason, (when 
 their real nature is not remembered,) as were the 
 quiddities of the schoolmen. But here arises the 
 obvious and important question, namely, if all 
 Abstract Words can be traced up to be the State of 
 some thing, how did mankind arrive at the word 
 State, or such other terminations, significant or 
 otherwise, that are its equivalent : for State, in our 
 language, is the generic term for actions, acts, results, 
 relations, qualities, properties, offices, &c.? To this, 
 the answer is, that the reason has already been partly 
 given, in what has been said of the manner in which 
 any word can be instantly made to pass for a noun 
 by prefixing an article (definite or indefinite) to it; 
 or by employing a possessive pronoun, or its equi- 
 valent, a noun in the genitive case. This, however, 
 only shows how we are enabled, by analogy, to refer
 
 18 OF STATES. 
 
 all other Abstractions to a class already established ; 
 but does not explain by what process the mind came 
 originally to use an Abstract Term. This part of the 
 question, therefore, deserves to be treated more fully. 
 
 10. If we attentively consider language, we 
 shall find, that without the aid of Abstract Terms 
 we could never carry on a connected chain of rea- 
 soning. Children, who in general, up to the age of 
 eight or ten, are extremely sparing in the use of 
 such words, are not capable of reasoning at any 
 great length ; and their longest discourses are con- 
 fined to narrations. Among all races of men that 
 we know of at present, Abstract Words are in use ; 
 but," of course, much more sparingly in proportion 
 as their minds are less cultivated. Hence we see that 
 it is a universal principle of our nature to have 
 recourse to their aid : indeed, we should be but as 
 little children, in thought, without them. I have 
 already shown, that it is by analogy that we class 
 any new Abstract Term with those we had previously 
 acquired : it was by the very same process that we 
 classed the first Abstract Nouns with those that are 
 Concrete. This was one of the noblest steps in 
 language ; for which it effected what the invention 
 of Algebra did for the science of numbers. But 
 while it gave man an almost unlimited power in 
 reasoning on common subjects, it led him into the 
 grossest errors, as soon as he began to reflect on the
 
 OF STATES. 19 
 
 nature of the things he supposed to be represented 
 by those very Abstractions. 
 
 11. The term State we have received from the 
 Latin language ; in which it, and a very large class 
 of similar words, have the same termination in the 
 nominative case as the past participle. Thus, in the 
 Saxon portion of our language, past participles are 
 used as Abstract Nouns ; as, for instance, the word 
 stroke, derived from to strike ; so in French, destinee 
 is a past participle, employed for the modern notion 
 of fate. It is therefore evident, from the universality 
 of such substitutions, that we are driven to their use 
 by the very frame of our intellect. But when we have 
 traced B very Abstraction to a State, and, being unable 
 to go higher, demand of ourselves what we under- 
 stand by the term, we shall be brought to see how 
 mysterious the nature of language really is; and with 
 what a delicate tact we must pursue the inquiry, if 
 we hope to arrive at a just conclusion. In Latin, 
 the word STATUS must, from its derivation, have ori- 
 ginally implied a standing or station ; and in Greek, 
 STASIS 9 is not merely synonymous with the English 
 and Latin, but the three languages all derive the 
 word from roots of common origin, meaning to 
 stand. In the cognate and copious Sanscrit, the 
 word STHITIS might, by its derivation, be expected to 
 express the same meaning ; but it is rather used in 
 
 c 2
 
 20 OF STATES. 
 
 that language with the sense of stay, staying, &c. ; 
 and for the signification of State in its Abstract sense, 
 the word BHAVAS, implying existence, nature, derived 
 from the root BHU, meaning being, or to be, is pre- 
 ferred. In the Arabic language, State is expressed 
 by the term HAL ; which originally meant a turn, 
 being derived from HAWALA, it revolved. 
 
 12. If we consider the foregoing words with 
 attention, we must be convinced that, of them all, 
 BHAVAS is jnot merely the best, but the only one 
 which is the philosophical representative of what 
 nature intended : for if we ask ourselves what is the 
 real sense of State in such phrases as the state of 
 things, the state of action, &c., we must feel that 
 we mean the existence (being-ness) of things or 
 action. Here, again, we are compelled to ask our- 
 selves what is intended by Existence ; and then we 
 find we have got to the utmost bounds of human 
 thought, and that Existence implies THE STATE OF 
 THAT WHICH is ; an answer completely in a circle, 
 that demonstrates that we can go no further. It is 
 obvious, that that which is, is nothing more than 
 what is made known to us by sense ; namely, 
 Existence ; that is to say, visible nature. Now, it is 
 impossible that man in his primitive condition 
 could have felt the force of these conclusions, and 
 that, too, before he had the very instrument with 
 which he could have arrived at them ; namely,
 
 OF STATES. 21 
 
 language. This inevitable inference must convince 
 us, that we must look to some other reason, that 
 will account for the universality with which such 
 terminations, as are the representatives of State, 
 namely, ship, hood, ness, &c., have been brought 
 into use. Previously, however, to entering on this 
 point, it must be remembered, that the word State, 
 which they all represent, is itself a mere fiction : for 
 though we can think of something standing, or that 
 has stood, yet the use of either of these two expres- 
 sions, or of State, as a reality, is merely a bold and 
 daring assumption of the intellect. This is the 
 grand point to which I wish to draw the reader's 
 particular consideration ; nor can I hope that any 
 thing I have said, or have to say, will be compre- 
 hended in its true light, till he has mastered this 
 point : for though I may possibly be able to supply 
 him with food for his thoughts, the profitable nou- 
 rishment of his mind must depend upon his own 
 efforts and the degree of attention which he bestows 
 on what he reads. To borrow an expression 
 employed by tyros, in Euclid, the present is " the 
 asses' bridge " of Metaphysics ; and every exertion 
 should be made to pass over it cleverly, however 
 uninviting it may appear at first sight. Let him 
 reflect, therefore, that the understanding, being defi- 
 cient in what would enable it to reason fluently, and 
 feeling itself arrested in its course by the want of 
 something that should correspond to the real things
 
 22 OF STATES. 
 
 in nature, made known to it through the senses, is 
 led, by the very frame of the intellect, to make this 
 jump ; the necessity of which is abundantly proved 
 by the fact, that the same effort has been made by 
 mankind in every condition in which they have been 
 found, that they might be able to say, IN a fright, IN 
 a hurry, &c., as they would, IN a field, IN a house, &c. 
 This otherwise inexplicable fact points out to us, in 
 conjunction with what I have already said, that the 
 terminations ship, hood, ness, &c., as well as their 
 corresponding representatives in other languages, 
 never did mean State or existence ; and that if they 
 ever had any meaning at all, it was entirely super- 
 seded by the new use to which they were applied. 
 That this is highly probable, is evidenced by the 
 circumstance, that those words which are derived 
 from verbs, such as sleep, anger, love, &c. all contain, 
 covertly, to our understandings, the force of State ; 
 for we can in each case substitute for them the 
 sleeping-state, the angry-state, the loving-state 10 , &c., 
 without the least danger of being misunderstood ; 
 and that, too, though the form of expression is not 
 usual. If, therefore, as I have said, these termina- 
 tions never did mean that for which they now alone 
 stand, it is the nature of our intellect that leads us, 
 by a sort of instinct, to their use ; just as the nature 
 
 ( 10 ) In the Chinese language, position determines the office any word 
 is to fill. An Abstract Word, therefore, is merely known by the place 
 it holds in the sentence.
 
 OF STATES. 23 
 
 of the equally helpless infant guides it unconsciously 
 to seek for nutriment from the mother's breast. 
 
 13. Having done all I can to explain the nature 
 of the word State, which is the very basis of all 
 Abstract Language, I now proceed to make a 
 few remarks on the consequences that result from 
 language being both simple and Abstract; and, 
 which fact having been quite overlooked, or neg- 
 lected, has given rise to the grossest errors, even 
 among the most profound thinkers the world has 
 ever produced. 
 
 14. All language, then, has two forms of expres- 
 sion ; the one simple, the other Abstract. Children 
 always employ the first ; and those who reason much, 
 almost invariably the last if it be possible to do so. 
 Thus, a child would say, Alexander is good ; but the 
 Abstract reasoner, in all probability, would praise 
 the goodness of Alexander. There is scarcely a short 
 proposition that cannot be expressed in Concrete as 
 well as in Abstract Language ; but it would be 
 impossible to put together a sentence of a few lines 
 without some direct or covert use of Abstractions. 
 Even the words when, where, how, &c. are only ellipti- 
 cal forms of phrases in which an abstraction exists : 
 WHERE means, in what place ; WHEN, in what time ; 
 HOW, may mean what degree, manner, reason, cause, or 
 means ; and the same remark may be applied to all
 
 24 OF STATES. 
 
 other adverbs. Language has made considerable ad- 
 vances to perfection before such words as when, where, 
 &c., are made the representatives of phrases. The 
 reader will now remember, that there are two modes 
 in which he may express himself; namely, the simple 
 one of children, and the more abstruse one of dialec- 
 ticians. Both are more or less used on all occasions, 
 however, by every one ; and if every author's style 
 were analysed according to this division, it would 
 afford a singular appearance of incongruity. But 
 the most remarkable circumstance is, that the com- 
 bination of the two produces a singular confusion 
 and jumble in our reasonings, and is the fruitful 
 source of error; as will be evident by referring to the 
 passages quoted from Algazel and Hume, in 80, 
 85, 86, 88. Even the sagacity of Newton committed 
 the same mistake : for, when he accounted for the 
 reflection of light by supposing that its particles 
 were reflected (bent back) from their direct line 
 by attractive and repulsive forces, (which he con- 
 ceived to reside in all material bodies, and a little 
 beyond their surfaces,) he fell into the common error 
 of mixing that which is concrete, (light) and Abstrac- 
 tions (forces) together. Had any one asked this 
 most cautious of philosophers what he meant by 
 these attractive and repulsive forces, Newton would 
 at once have felt that he had turned mere States of 
 Being into realities, and had thereby begged the 
 whole question : that the same is done by all other
 
 OF STATES. 25 
 
 mathematicians will not, therefore, excite surprise. 
 See 120, 123, 147. 
 
 15. The main object of this inquiry is, to show 
 that we ought to learn to put their just value on 
 Abstractions, but never to forget that they are but 
 Terms-, and, that to fully comprehend what they 
 really are, we must become like little children, in 
 the use of language, and restore every Abstract 
 Expression, we are desirous to analyse and under- 
 stand, into that form in which a child would employ 
 it. Thus, when we speak of cohesion, vibration, &c., 
 we must refer them to the things in which they alone 
 have an existence, namely, to bodies (solid, fluid, or 
 aeriform) ; and then we shall discover, that all we can 
 say, is, that bodies cohere, vibrate, &c. : but as for 
 those creations of our fancy, called cohesion, vibration, 
 &c., they have no existence, except as sounds ; and 
 have been solely brought into use that we might not 
 be arrested in our course of reasoning, but be able 
 to say, BY, THROUGH, WITH, IN cohesion, vibration, &c. ; 
 just as we say, BY, THROUGH, WITH, IN a house, field, &c. 
 It is by these most useful non-entities that we are 
 enabled to make our discourse, as it were, of one 
 piece : but, unhappily, we have so far deceived our- 
 selves in so doing, as to make that which refers to 
 something real, and that, which though it puts on the 
 mask of reality, means nothing, but by an unconscious 
 and remote reference to the word from which it
 
 26 OF STATES. 
 
 is derived, of precisely the same value. These Abs- 
 tractions serve the same purpose in thought that 
 ciphers do in calculation : they are but signs of a 
 conventional value, and bearing a given relation to 
 one another, which the intellect feels by a peculiar 
 tact with which it is endowed, and which consti- 
 tutes the thinking principle. To assign the means 
 by which it is enabled to do so, is as impossible, as 
 to comprehend the nature of the memory by which 
 such signs are preserved for its employment. 
 
 16. In drawing the reader's attention so strongly 
 to the question of Abstract Terms, I do so from the 
 conviction, that nothing but a constant vigilance of 
 mind can prevent us from being misled by what we 
 have been accustomed to consider, from the dawn of 
 reason, as something reed ; and which is only incon- 
 venient, as in the present case, when we would raise 
 the veil of nature, and penetrate into her inmost 
 sanctuary. For such is the force of habit, that the 
 delusion of language, in which we have been nursed 
 from our infancy, and which, in fact, from its univer- 
 sality, being found in every class of men, literary 
 and illiterate, and every state of society, civilized 
 and savage, we may consider as one by which we 
 were intended to be deluded ; and from which we 
 can only release ourselves by an occasional effort of 
 reflection, such as I am anxious to effect, on the pre- 
 sent occasion, in the mind of the reader. He ought,
 
 OF STATES. 27 
 
 therefore, not to think this inquiry either useless or 
 irksome ; as I shall have often to remind him of the 
 necessity of bearing in mind the neglected truth it 
 enforces; and he will be fully conscious of its value, 
 as he proceeds. 
 
 17. When we ask ourselves what we mean by 
 Abstract Terms, it is clear, that if we have not pre- 
 viously reflected on the subject, it will require a little 
 effort to discover that they must imply States of 
 bodies ; but not any thing which we can handle, or 
 discover by the means of our senses. Again, if we 
 ask ourselves what are the States of bodies, we must 
 immediately perceive that they are forms of speech. 
 These Forms of speech, therefore, which we call 
 States, Relations, Qualities, &c., could never have had 
 any existence, but for the aid of language, either 
 oral or written. Thus, if we saw a White horse, we 
 could never separate, or abstract from it, the idea of 
 colour. All this we can do by the help of language, 
 and we can talk (but not think) of Whiteness with- 
 out reference to any object whatever. It is evident, 
 therefore, that there is no such conception in the 
 mind as that of Whiteness, or any other colour or 
 quality separate from the image of some object in 
 which it is found ; and that such words are merely 
 symbols which we employ to reason with, and that 
 they are consequently simply conventional terms. 
 When, therefore, metaphysicians speak of Abstract
 
 28 OF STATES. 
 
 Ideas, it is evident that they make use of a Term 
 that has no meaning, because such words denote 
 nothing that has any real existence. If, then, we 
 wish to have a definite notion in the place of what 
 is called an Abstract Idea, we must find the Con- 
 crete Image from which it is drawn or abstracted. 
 For instance, to understand what is meant by White- 
 ness, I think of a swan, snow, or some other object 
 which is commonly White, and I have then a clear 
 conception of that colour : but even then I cannot 
 separate it from the thing with which it is conjoined ; 
 and I consequently discover, that every Idea I have, 
 is one which, to exist, must have a Concrete, that is, 
 a Real existence in nature ; and that when I talk of 
 a General or Abstract Idea, I do so in compliance 
 with common usage; for a General or Abstract 
 Idea is the same as no Idea at all. To feel the im- 
 mense importance of this conclusion, let us remem- 
 ber, that when we speak of extension, length, breadth, 
 &c., which are commonly called Abstract Ideas, to 
 understand what they really designate, we must call 
 up the Image of something that is extended, broad, 
 and deep as a lake, for instance. Now, these words 
 have, by the foregoing reasoning, no existence what- 
 ever, not even mentally ; being mere symbols, pre- 
 served by the memory for the purpose of reasoning. 
 
 18. Some may suppose, that, after the fierce dis- 
 cussions that raged among the schoolmen under
 
 OF STATES. 29 
 
 the names of nominalists and realists which began 
 at the commencement of the twelfth century, and 
 only terminated with the new subjects of difference 
 that were engendered by the Reformation it must 
 be unnecessary to allude to a subject that has ceded 
 to the general feeling that the realists were in error ; 
 and that, as a consequence, all, or nearly all, are of 
 the side of the nominalists, and therefore believe 
 that these Abstract Words have no reality in them- 
 selves. Could I believe that all those who laugh 
 at the most glaring of the absurdities of the realists 
 were truly nominalists, and, as such, reasoned con- 
 sistently according to this opinion, these remarks 
 had doubtlessly been spared, as unnecessary. But 
 I believe the matter of fact to be quite otherwise, 
 and that every man is, by nature, by practice, and by 
 habit, a realist : and for the truth of this assertion, 
 I appeal to the effect the foregoing remarks have 
 produced in the reader, be he a professed metaphy- 
 sician, or merely a lover of metaphysical disquisition. 
 It is, therefore, with the view of correcting, if possi- 
 ble, this natural bias of the mind, that I have taken 
 the pains of making the matter as simple and clear 
 as I can. The nominalists, including their leader 
 Roscellinus, and their later advocate, our country- 
 man William of Ockham, have left the subject still 
 in dispute. The general arguments for and against 
 the belief of General Ideas were insufficient to con- 
 vince either side, a result, I think, that could
 
 30 OF STATES. 
 
 hardly have followed, had the nominalists attempted 
 the analysis of the terms by which such Ideas are 
 supposed to be represented. This effort would have 
 been the experimentum crucis, that would not merely 
 have silenced their opponents, but their doing so 
 would have conferred a lasting benefit on philoso- 
 phical investigation. They should have done with 
 General Ideas as Saint Thomas Aquinas did with 
 the dread-inspiring automaton of Albert the Great, 
 and with one blow have proved their artificial origin 
 by laying open their internal structure : this would 
 have destroyed their magic influence for ever. 
 Roscellinus, though the first among the moderns to 
 broach the notion, seems to have come nearer the 
 exact truth than Ockham ; as " he maintained, with 
 respect to the General Ideas of genera and species, 
 that they were mere sounds (flatus vocis), by means of 
 which we denoted the common qualities which we 
 observe among the various individual objects." But 
 Ockham considered, that " though they had not a 
 subjective, they had an objective existence in the 
 soul 11 ." But to have made the matter quite clear, 
 Ockham and his followers should have shown what 
 this mysterious process of Abstraction is; namely, 
 the manner in which such Ideas are formed. Had 
 he attempted this, he would have been obliged to 
 have substituted the word term for Idea, and thus 
 
 (") Manuel de I'Histoire de la Philosophic, traduit de I'Allemand de 
 Tennemann, par V. COUSIN, Tom. I. 249, 270.
 
 OF STATES, 31 
 
 have put an end to the controversy. He would 
 only have had to show, that such words as rope, 
 stone, &c., might be altered into ropy, stony, &c., 
 and, by a further process of sublimation, converted 
 into ropiness, stoniness, &c., by the mere addition of 
 the unmeaning syllable ness; and thus have brought 
 down, what they called, Philosophy, from her stilts, 
 to the level of the human understanding ; showing 
 her to be little more than a shadow, tricked out in 
 the gorgeous apparel of high-sounding but empty 
 words. 
 
 19. The Realists would certainly have been 
 thrown into great difficulties, if science had anti- 
 cipated its course, and appeared in their days with 
 the Generalizations, Divisions, and Sub-Divisions of 
 modern times. If they could not settle the ques- 
 tion, whether a Genus had a real existence or not, 
 what would they have said to the higher Generali- 
 zation of Genera into Orders, and of these again into 
 the remoter one of Classes ? But in all such dis- 
 putes, the human intellect appears to be spell-bound 
 for a certain period ; and being unable to pass over 
 the narrow circle it had marked out for its own 
 activity, is driven round and round, without the 
 possibility of making a single movement in advance, 
 till it is all at once set at liberty from its folly by 
 some new absurdity, which, in its turn, becomes the 
 subject of those bitter contentions that seem neces-
 
 32 OF STATES. 
 
 sary in human affairs to create that degree of in- 
 terest which shall prevent a stagnation of mind. 
 That classification is a purely artificial process 
 would seem to be sufficiently obvious. We be- 
 gin with the Individual or Variety, as John, Fohi, 
 and Obi, among men; for every Individual is 
 strictly a Variety: we ought, then, to class these 
 into Species, as the bearded, the beardless, and the 
 woolly-headed race. We then see that they likewise 
 have a certain general resemblance ; and we collect 
 them together, under the term Genus, which we call 
 homo or man. Afterwards, we find we can go 
 beyond this ; for certain Genera have a remote rela- 
 tionship : so we connect them under the word Order, 
 and call them Primates: and, finally, we carry our 
 Generalization to a climax, by placing all these Orders 
 under a Class, to which we give the name of Mamma- 
 lia. The distribution of Species into Sub-Species, as 
 is done in some cases, is a proof that such classifica- 
 tion is not quite correct. It seems to have been 
 formed inversely to the true order ; that is, by begin- 
 ning with the class, and descending to individuals or 
 particulars. That which is now called a Sub-Species 
 should have been species, as the first generalization 
 of Individuals or Varieties ; and what are called 
 Species should have been termed Genera, &c. It 
 has been well remarked by an eloquent writer 12 , that 
 
 ( 12 ) Cours de THistoire de la Philosophic, par V. COUSIN, Tome I. 
 Lecture 20.
 
 OF STATES. 33 
 
 it is not language, however complete, that will ren- 
 der science perfect ; but science, when it is com- 
 pletely constituted, that will perfect language. But, 
 with regard to the particular question of Abstrac- 
 tion, the reader must see that mankind are habi- 
 tually in error, and that nothing but a careful 
 effort can release us from its delusive influence. 
 Were we to hear of any one who in summing up 
 the figures that represent so many things apples, 
 for instance of which he was anxious to know the 
 amount, should so far delude himself as to suppose 
 the figures were really apples, we should be cer- 
 tainly warranted in pronouncing him insane. What 
 shall we say of ourselves, however,' when we consi- 
 der mere sounds to be real things ? In the case 
 I have just put, the madman has really something 
 before him which he merely mistakes ; but in our 
 own case, we cannot even assign the things that 
 we think are represented by our sounds. If we 
 judge the man to be mad who should mistake the 
 figures for the fruit they represent, we must surely 
 admit that we, at the least, are most unreflecting, in 
 supposing that the words which we employ merely 
 as signs in reasoning, are the representatives of 
 things called Ideas, that never existed. 
 
 20. I think I cannot produce a more appro- 
 priate specimen of the effects of realism on the 
 most acute minds, than will be found in the following
 
 34 OF STATES. 
 
 extract from a Hindu metaphysician, when dis- 
 cussing the opinions of other writers about nature : 
 " According to some, ' time is cause ; time is the 
 five elements ; tune destroys the world ; time 
 watches when all things sleep ; time is not to be 
 surpassed.' There are but three categories, the 
 discrete principle, the indiscrete principle, and 
 soul ; and by one of them time must be compre- 
 hended. Time, then, is a discrete principle ; for 
 nature, from its universal creative power, is the 
 cause of time ; spontaneity merges into it (nature) ; 
 and time, therefore, is not cause ; matter is spon- 
 taneity. Nature alone, therefore, is cause ; and 
 there is no cause of nature". 13 This subtle reasoner 
 never once suspected that time and spontaneity are 
 mere Abstractions, and that in the use made of the 
 former it is actually personified. The instance is 
 very valuable, as it shows how deeply rooted and 
 universal this fallacy is in the human mind ; and 
 how much mankind have been deceived by lan- 
 guage ; as well as what a small chance exists of 
 escaping from its delusions. Examples equally 
 glaring might be produced from the most eminent 
 metaphysicians of Europe. Such paralogisms as 
 
 ( l3 ) Sankhya Karika, p. 173 ; a work of great interest, as well as 
 antiquity, and admirably elucidated and edited by my friend, Professor 
 Horace Hayman Wilson. This work having been published by the 
 Oriental Translation Committee of Great Britain and Ireland, is now 
 accessible to every one who takes an interest in the history and pro- 
 gress of the human mind.
 
 OF STATES. 35 
 
 these, however, have been dignified, from the most 
 ancient times, as profound philosophy ; and though 
 the novice in metaphysics is confounded when he 
 looks into metaphysical works, and feels reasonable 
 doubts respecting such reasoning, he naturally at- 
 tributes his imperfect comprehension of what seems 
 so consistent, to his ignorance or inaptitude for dis- 
 quisitions of so abstruse and recondite a nature. 
 The truth of this assertion will be rendered evident 
 by the remarks made upon Hume ( 85, 86, 88). 
 
 21. The effect of Realism on our minds, in 
 leading us to convert these airy nothings into enti- 
 ties, cannot be more plainly exhibited than in the 
 universal use of them as faculties of the mind. 
 Thus we speak of our Will, our Judgment, our 
 Fancy, our Imagination, our Understanding, &c., as 
 realities that form part of our intellect ; though we 
 can, in truth, only say that we, that is, our intellec- 
 tual nature, wills, judges, fancies, imagines, under- 
 stands, &c. But this subject is of too much im- 
 portance to be more than alluded to here ; and it 
 will, accordingly, be more appropriately considered 
 hereafter. (See 15& 163.) 
 
 22. Among the most striking instances of the 
 influence of Realism, the reader need only be re- 
 minded of the deification these Abstractions have 
 met with in antiquity. Statues, temples, and altars, 
 
 D2
 
 36 OF STATES. 
 
 were raised to Youth, to Beauty, to Truth, to Vir- 
 tue, to Cheerfulness, to Sleep, to Madness, to Fury, 
 &c., without the slightest suspicion being enter- 
 tained that their votaries were merely honouring 
 so many conceptions of their own brains, and 
 thereby offering a tribute to their love of the 
 beautiful and the good ; or that by such acts they 
 endeavoured to avert from themselves the calami- 
 ties implied by some of the most appalling of these 
 words. In India, even at this period of the world, 
 we find that the Hindus, whose religion and lan- 
 guage bear so remarkable a resemblance to those 
 of Ancient Greece and Rome, consider every epi- 
 demic as a malignant deity, that must be propi- 
 tiated by religious rites ; and small-pox, measles, 
 cholera, &c., are served as gods who can be made 
 to bend from their wrathful purpose by proper 
 offerings. How many there are in these days that 
 would start at the reproach of heathenism, who 
 would be the first to reprove those who should 
 bend to a stock or a stone ; and yet who are mo- 
 mentarily in the habit of making a few articulate 
 sounds the gods of their idolatry, by referring all 
 the mysterious operations in nature to a few words 
 of their own creation ! These are not, to be sure, 
 gods that they have made with their own hands ; 
 but they are idols they have formed with their 
 tongues, and which they substitute, on all occasions, 
 for the Author of Nature, by referring every result
 
 OF STATES. 37 
 
 exhibited in the working of this universal frame to 
 Attraction, Affinity, Cohesion, &c. Like children 
 at a puppet-show, who never ask how the puppets 
 are moved, they would seem, by their silence, never 
 to raise their minds to an inquiry as to the agents 
 that are equally necessary, in both cases, to put all 
 in motion, even though they be hidden from sight. 
 They appear content with what satisfies them for 
 the moment; and would, in all probability, take 
 it extremely amiss, or perhaps as irrelevant, that 
 any one should inquire what is meant by these 
 terms. Words similar to these have satisfied their 
 predecessors as well as these do themselves ; and 
 they have likewise received the sanction of great 
 names ; though these have given way, in succession, 
 to those of some more fortunate rivals, which are 
 in their turn to make place for others. Such are, 
 and ever must be, the consequence of not examin- 
 ing for ourselves the words, or instruments of 
 thought, with which we measure all things ; and 
 of blindly following those who have themselves 
 received their first notions in science without any 
 effort of reflection, and who think it enough that 
 the master has said so. 
 
 23. Perhaps few subjects will show better the 
 strong hold that Abstractions have upon our nature, 
 and the influence they exercise over our minds in the 
 conduct of life, than our attachment to such things
 
 38 OF STATES. 
 
 as the Church, the State, the Constitution, a Prin- 
 ciple, &c. When we ask ourselves what we mean 
 by these terms as objects of affection, we shall at 
 once be brought to see how much we are swayed 
 by mere words. Not one of them designate any 
 thing that has a real existence, except as a sound : 
 still, we are ready to sacrifice our lives for them at 
 a moment's notice. Indeed, a consideration of this 
 question will lead to the belief that language itself 
 is a main part of what we call by the name of 
 mind. (See 156163.) Without language, not 
 one of these conceptions would have had an exis- 
 tence ; nor could one drop of the torrents of blood, 
 that have flowed from such causes, have been shed. 
 I fear that the truth in these cases is, that man is 
 but too fond of any motive that may afford a plau- 
 sible pretext for letting loose, in what may be con- 
 sidered a legitimate way, the bad passions that 
 belong to his nature. The demon of War, and its 
 civil representative, Persecution, are ever dear to 
 his heart ; nor can he, on any occasion, while these 
 favourite modes of gratification present themselves, 
 deny himself the pleasure that attends their indul- 
 gence, except they are silenced by their arch leader, 
 Avarice, and her base, but legitimate offspring, 
 Lucre. Nothing but the hope of gain can tempt 
 him to cultivate the arts of peace, and turn his 
 sword into a sickle. Unfortunately, however, when 
 the love of gold has become the ruling passion of
 
 OF STATES. 39 
 
 any community, from that moment every generous 
 and noble sentiment is extinguished, and neither 
 wisdom nor virtue possess any power in their own 
 right. 
 
 24. The atrocious conduct of Calvin, in causing 
 Servetus to be burned alive though he was himself 
 a Protestant reformer, who vindicated liberty of 
 conscience is a modern, and a melancholy instance 
 of the truth of the foregoing remarks ; and leads to 
 more than a suspicion, that the toleration so ear- 
 nestly inculcated by Arminius was little more than 
 a pleading for exemption for himself and followers 
 from fire and fagot. The same germs are uni- 
 versal in human nature, and require but favourable 
 circumstances for their growth. Though the dis- 
 positions of men may be different, yet religious zeal 
 and fanaticism have a strong tendency to bring all 
 to an equality, when their feelings are once roused 
 into activity ; but particularly in what they are 
 taught is a good and holy cause. The history of all 
 ages will confirm this fact. Heretics were first 
 burned in England, by Henry IV., to please the 
 bishops who had assisted him in dethroning 
 Richard II. 14 Science has been accused of pro- 
 moting irreligion ; but after these, and similar 
 examples, it may be safely asserted, that the mild 
 
 ( 14 ) Walpoliana, Vol. I. p. 78.
 
 40 OF STATES. 
 
 spirit of the Gospel, which inculcates Peace on 
 earthy and good-will toward men, has been essentially 
 served and benefitted by pursuits which have 
 smoothed down the asperities of our nature, and 
 enabled the mass of mankind to re-act on such of 
 their religious instructors as had forgotten that 
 Christianity is a religion which enjoins every man 
 to love his neighbour as himself. 
 
 25. If the abuse of Abstract Terms has a bane- 
 ful effect upon philosophical investigation, we must 
 never lose sight of their extreme value in the ordi- 
 nary use of reason. Here, indeed, it is impossible 
 to be too grateful for their existence ; as they exalt 
 man even above his own exalted nature, giving him 
 a sort of unlimited command over the past, and, in 
 some respect, over the future also. If, through 
 them, he has been successively swayed, and led to 
 entertain doctrines, opinions, and theories which 
 have been noxious to his well-being, it is by their 
 aid, and that of letters, that he discovers whatever 
 may, under the guidance of reason, be conducive to 
 his present and future happiness. It was with a ge- 
 neral feeling of this truth, which few will, I be- 
 lieve, be inclined to question, that I uttered the 
 following sentiment some years back : " Those 
 Abstract Relations, in proportion to the extent and 
 accuracy with which they are comprehended by 
 any individual, raise him, in the scale of reason,
 
 OF STATES. 41 
 
 almost as much above the rest of mankind, as man 
 is elevated above the brute." 15 But if the tendency 
 to Realism is one of the injurious consequences of 
 using Abstract Terms, it cannot but be admitted, 
 that the personifying such words is one of the finest 
 resources of fiction. Here, at least, we are not mis- 
 led, but enter willingly and consciously into the 
 pleasing delusion. Not only are Abstractions some 
 of the choicest ornaments of Poetry, but, when per- 
 sonified, give it an animation and a movement that 
 leads the understanding a willing captive to the in- 
 ventions of Fancy. Its fascinating effects must have 
 been felt by every lover of the Muse ; and before 
 I bring a few examples by way of illustration, I 
 must remind the reader of the celebrated opening 
 of Rasselas, where a writer of remarkable gravity 
 and severity has employed it in prose with the 
 happiest effect. In poetry, it constitutes the riches 
 of every language that by its genius admits of its 
 existence. Though Shakspeare has been sparing 
 in this figure, he may be quoted for some charming 
 instances ; as when he says 
 
 " She never told her love, 
 
 But let Concealment, like a worm i' the bud, 
 Feed on her damask cheek : she pined in thought ; 
 And with a green and yellow melancholy, 
 She sat, like Patience on a monument, 
 Smiling at Grief." 
 
 ( l5 ) A Short Inquiry into the Nature of Language, prefixed to the 
 Author's Bengali, Sanscrit, and English Dictionary, p. vii.
 
 42 OF STATES. 
 
 And again : 
 
 " Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund Day 
 Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain-tops." 
 
 And in the following instance : 
 
 " Grim visag'd War hath smooth'd his wrinkled front." 
 
 26. The personification of Sin and Death in 
 Milton's Paradise Lost is too well known to re- 
 quire to be more than alluded to ; but the 'follow- 
 ing passage, from the same poem, may be adduced 
 as an example of the aid which genius derives from 
 this figure of speech : 
 
 " When strait behold the throne 
 
 Of Chaos, and his dark pavilion spread 
 
 Wide on the wasteful deep ! With him enthron'd, 
 
 Sat sable-vested Night, eldest of things, 
 
 The consort of his reign ; and by them stood 
 
 Orcus and Ades, and the dreaded name 
 
 Of Demogorgon, Rumour next, and Chance, 
 
 And Tumult, and Confusion, all embroil'd, 
 
 And Discord, with a thousand various mouths." 
 
 27. But of all our best Poets, none, with the 
 exception of Spenser and Collins, considering how 
 little he has written, has oftener employed per- 
 sonification than Gray. The following lines are 
 from him :
 
 OF STATES. 43 
 
 These shall the fury passions tear, 
 
 The vultures of the mind, 
 Disdainful Anger, pallid Fear, 
 
 And Shame that skulks behind ; 
 Or pining Love shall waste their youth, 
 Or Jealousy with rankling tooth, 
 
 That inly gnaws the secret heart ; 
 And Envy wan, and faded Care, 
 Grim-visag'd, comfortless Despair, 
 
 And Sorrow's piercing dart. 
 
 Ambition this shall tempt to rise, 
 
 Then whirl the wretch from high, 
 To bitter Scorn a sacrifice, 
 
 And grinning Infamy. 
 The stings of Falsehood those shall try, 
 And hard Unkindness' alter'd eye, 
 
 That mocks the tear it forc'd to flow ; 
 And keen Remorse, with blood defil'd, 
 And moody Madness laughing wild 
 
 Amid severest woe." 
 
 28. Collins's Ode on the Passions is too well 
 known to require more, after the instance just 
 given, than to be recalled to the reader's remem- 
 brance, as affording one of the most complete and 
 perfect instances in our own, and perhaps in any 
 language, of the happy and vivifying effects of per- 
 sonification. Its use in allegory has often been had 
 recourse to ; and the well-known Choice of Her- 
 cules, from the Greek of the celebrated sophist
 
 44 OF STATES. 
 
 Protagoras, may be quoted as one of the most feli- 
 citous efforts of genius in prose composition, di- 
 rected to a great moral end. The poem of Cupid 
 and Psyche, by Mrs. Tighe, is a most delightful 
 production, abounding in such soft and tender 
 graces as could only spring from the gentle and 
 delicate mind of a female. Bunyan's Pilgrim's 
 Progress, as an allegory in prose, exhibits what 
 may be effected by the enthusiasm of untutored 
 genius, when it concentrates its efforts in solitude, 
 and works in the rich mine of the imagination. 
 The writer, trusting solely to his native strength of 
 intellect, and to but one book, which he had made 
 the sole object of his waking thoughts, during the 
 most energetic period of a life that had been roused 
 into activity by all the opposing elements of per- 
 secution and injustice, has produced a work of such 
 unrivalled merit in its class, for originality and in- 
 vention, as must make it a popular favourite, as 
 long as the English language is understood, or its 
 literature valued. 
 
 29. It now remains only to say, that all we have 
 at any time to talk or think of may be summed up 
 by the terms PERCEPTIONS and CONCEPTIONS. To 
 the first belong all objects we PERCEIVE, when we 
 see, hear, smell, taste, or touch. To the last, all the 
 Combinations, Relations, and other States of the 
 objects or things we perceive, and of which we are
 
 OF STATES. 45 
 
 enabled to think, or CONCEIVE, by the mysterious 
 operations of the intellect, aided by the almost 
 equally mysterious mechanism of language, which 
 it had previously prepared by and for the process 
 to which we give the name of thought. To this 
 last class must likewise be referred those essences 
 which we derive by strict inference, when we ob- 
 serve the design, harmony, and operations of 
 nature, such as God, Soul, and Power. The two 
 most general words in language must therefore be 
 THING and STATE ; the first comprising every thing 
 that is Concrete, and the second every Term that 
 is Abstract, or, in short, that can be included under 
 the word State. 
 
 30. The foregoing views demonstrate, that all 
 reasoning is effected solely by means of words, 
 either single, or linked together in those chains 
 which we call Conceptions ; but that no single word, 
 STATE even, not excepted, can be a conception, in any 
 other sense than as a sound preserved by the me- 
 mory. It must, however, not be forgotten, that 
 many single words are really compounds : thus the 
 word altitude (ALTITUDO) is such, being compounded 
 of ALTI, high, and TUDO, state, that is, A^T^STATE ; 16 
 
 ( 16 ) This rule will equally apply to other words, derived from the 
 Latin, ending in tude, such as gratitude, magnitude, &c., as well as to 
 all other Abstractions : for whatever may be their termination, it must 
 
 imply
 
 46 OF STATES. 
 
 so likewise the Terms cause and effect are repre- 
 sentative signs of the Conceptions, that Cause is 
 that general STATE which necessarily includes in itself 
 the notion of an EFFECT ; and, reciprocally, that an 
 Effect is that general STATE which necessarily includes 
 in itself the notion of a CAUSE. If any one is willing 
 to extend this view, and think that every Abstract 
 Term may be considered as the abridged represen- 
 tative of a compound notion, I will not differ with 
 him. He may say, for instance, that goodness, or 
 virtue, implies the STATE of him who is good, or vir- 
 tuous ; and vibration, or movement, the STATE of 
 action of that which vibrates, or moves. Indeed, the 
 consideration of the languages of America, which 
 are in that state which they must have assumed at 
 
 imply State, The words benevolence, reverence, prudence, observation, 
 reflection will be sufficient to serve as examples. The word transub- 
 stantiation implies the STATK-of-substance-transcending (-appearance), 
 that is, substance the state of which is really different from what it seems 
 to be to the senses. I beg the reader to bear in mind, that my object 
 is not, as I have before intimated, with etymology. For instance, 
 when I say that the tude (TUDO) of the foregoing words implies State, 
 I merely mean that this word^tate) is the best our language affords for 
 the purpose ; for I have already pointed out, in 11, that the Sanscrit 
 word BHAVAS, meaning existence, or being, in general, is its true repre- 
 sentative. If effects, therefore, bear evidence of their causes, it 
 marks that the Hindu mind had a just philosophical turn, even 
 in its infancy a fact demonstrated by the whole structure of the 
 Sanscrit language : and certainly it is no small glory to this ancient 
 race, that them is, perhaps, the only language in which the Prin- 
 ciple of Abstraction is exactly expressed by the word that ought to 
 be employed.
 
 OF STATES. 47 
 
 their birth, as is proved by the uniformity of plan 
 that reigns throughout them all, however they may 
 differ from one another in the sounds they employ, 
 would add very much to the belief, that even Con- 
 crete Terms are but the elliptical forms of longer 
 sentences that were employed to represent the most 
 common objects of life. All, therefore, that I mean 
 to contend for is, that while the Concrete Words, 
 house, dog, horse, &c., may be changed or broken up 
 into letters, there still will be Houses, Dogs, Horses, 
 &c. remaining in nature ; but that if we decompose 
 the Abstract Terms goodness, greatness, whiteness, 
 &c., there will then remain nothing that they re- 
 presented ; for with them must likewise disappear, 
 by the same process, the main word ; that is to say, 
 the word State, in the examples just given : and it 
 consequently follows, that if there were no lan- 
 guage, there could be no Conceptions. In short, 
 Abstractions may not inaptly be compared to those 
 crazy potentates found in mad-houses, who assume 
 all the airs and attributes of royalty, without any 
 subjects for their support, and who hold their rule 
 by an ideal title. So these Abstract Terms, when 
 sifted, have neither subject nor object which they 
 represent ; and are, indeed, what Roscellinus termed 
 them, mere sounds. Abstract Terms, therefore, are 
 accurately represented by the term Conceptions; 
 which include, as has been already stated ( 3), all
 
 48 OF STATES. 
 
 the Phrases, Inferences, Opinions, Conjectures, No- 
 tions, Propositions, Assertions, Statements, Argu- 
 ments, &c., we have already heard or conceived of 
 ourselves by the means of language. Not the least 
 remarkable circumstance that attends the considera- 
 tion of language, is the fact, that the limited capa- 
 city of children, at a very tender age, is sufficient 
 for its attainment, and even for its tolerably correct 
 employment ; and, that idiots are able to acquire it 
 with sufficient facility, so as to be no way embar- 
 rassed to explain themselves though some lan- 
 guages, the Basque for instance, are extremely com- 
 plicated in their structure: while parrots, though 
 highly intelligent, are unable to do more than re- 
 peat by rote the sounds they imitate ; thus forming 
 a striking distinction between Man in his lowest, 
 and the Brute in his highest state. 
 
 31. It is worthy of remark, that it is, r as I said 
 before, by turning language against itself that we 
 make it give evidence on its own nature, and thereby 
 unfold much of the mystery that veils its great 
 parent, the human intellect. From an indistinct 
 feeling of this truth it was, that I said, formerly, 
 that " we must thoroughly comprehend the nature 
 of this first offspring of the human mind, before 
 we can hope to arrive at any legitimate conclusion 
 as to the laws that regulate the phenomena of mind
 
 OF STATES. 49 
 
 itself 17 ." The inference to be deduced from the 
 preceding inquiry is as follows : 
 
 32. Whatever really exists, must occupy SPACE ; 
 and whatever does not do so, is only a STATE, that is, 
 a symbol invented for the purpose of reasoning 18 . 
 
 ( 17 ) A Short Inquiry into the Nature of Language, prefixed to the 
 Author's Dictionary of the Bengali, Sanscrit, and English Languages. 
 
 ( 18 ) Or, hi popular language, Whatever is not Body or Spirit is only
 
 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR 
 TERMS. 
 
 33. I now proceed to examine in detail those 
 primary Terms which metaphysicians have been 
 in the habit of taking as self-evident truths ; and 
 which form, consequently, the data and axioms of 
 metaphysics : but I must first make a few remarks 
 on the distinction between Abstract, General, and 
 Particular Terms. So little attention has been 
 bestowed on the classification of the words with 
 which we reason on the most important points, 
 that no distinction is commonly made between 
 Terms, whether they are Abstract, General, or 
 Particular. Yet this want of clearly-defined no- 
 tions on the subject must lead to much confusion 
 in reasoning. 
 
 34. It matters not whether a word imply a 
 Perception or a Conception ; that is, whether it be 
 Concrete or Abstract : it may in either case be ren- 
 dered General or Particular. General Terms are 
 consequently both Concrete and Abstract. Good- 
 ness, gracefulness, perfection, &c., are Abstract 
 Terms, employed in a General sense; and they 
 may be equally used in a Particular sense, at plea- 
 sure : thus we may speak of The goodness of the
 
 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 51 
 
 Deity The gracefulness of a swan The perfection of 
 nature, &c. ; and when we do so, these words have 
 then a General sense : but when we say, He has a 
 goodness of heart peculiarly his own The swan has a 
 gracefulness that belongs to no other aquatic bird 
 Nature has a perfection that art can never attain, we 
 must see that these words, which are simply States 
 of Being, can be rendered both General and Par- 
 ticular. In a similar manner, the name of every 
 Particular material thing may be rendered General, 
 by either prefixing the definite article to it, or by 
 employing it in the plural. We may speak indif- 
 ferently of the horse, the dog, the oak, the diamond, 
 &c. ; or we may generalize, by speaking of horses, 
 dogs, oaks, diamonds, &c. Indeed, it appears to me, 
 that as often as we speak of any thing in an inde- 
 terminate or indefinite manner, we still do no more 
 than generalize ; and so the expressions, a Jiorse, a 
 dog, an oak, a diamond, &c., have scarcely any dif- 
 ference from those with the definite article, except 
 that the figure is less noble and impressive. The 
 only exceptions in our language to the foregoing 
 process of generalization is found in the words God 
 and man. Neither of these can be rendered general 
 by prefixing the. The first is always rendered 
 definite and particular by so doing; as when we 
 say, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. We can 
 also prefix the definite article to the name of God ; 
 as when we say, the Almighty, the Omniscient, or the 
 
 E2
 
 52 OF STATES. 
 
 Omnipotent God, &c. ; which likewise, it will be 
 admitted, have a Particular, and not a General sense, 
 when so employed. There remains one mode of 
 generalization to be yet explained ; which is more 
 perfect, perhaps, than that afforded by preceding 
 examples ; as, when we substitute shipping for ships, 
 literature for letters, cavalry for horsemen, &c. ; thus 
 leaving no doubt on the mind in what sense we are 
 to understand such terms. The reader, however, 
 must not confound this common and natural use 
 of language with the artificial Abstractions and 
 Generalization of naturalists, such as have been 
 alluded to in 18. 
 
 35. The object of the foregoing remarks is to 
 convince the reader that every Abstract Term may 
 be used either in a General or a Particular sense, 
 and that every Concrete Word may be equally em- 
 ployed in the same way. But he must carefully 
 remember, that though we speak of horses, dogs, 
 &c., they have no more reality, when employed 
 in a General sense, than is the case with Abstract 
 Conceptions. This caution is the more neces- 
 sary; as the individual objects being real, we are 
 apt, unconsciously, to refer the General Term to 
 the Particular object from which it is taken, and so 
 to mislead ourselves. The distinction here pointed 
 out, that even a word that signifies something ma- 
 terial becomes a mere non-entity when employed
 
 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 53 
 
 in a General sense, is of the highest importance, as 
 a help to the understanding in the comprehension 
 of the nature of Abstract Terms. The reader can- 
 not but feel that there can be no such thing as a 
 General tree, or any other object ; and that the 
 word tree is therefore a mere sound, and nothing 
 more, when used in such a General sense ; because 
 it then refers neither to a Particular oak^ash^fir^ or 
 other tree. Now, if this be so with what has real 
 representatives, how much less (if the comparison 
 be admissible) must it be the case with what are 
 merely Abstract, and which have no representatives 
 in nature ? 
 
 36. Having thus shown, in treating of Abstract 
 and General Terms, that all the words implying 
 States of Being may be either considered under a 
 General or a Particular point of view, it remains 
 to say, that when they are employed in the first of 
 these divisions, they are then used, absolutely, with- 
 out any reference to a contrast or comparison ; but 
 when we speak of a Particular State, it may be con- 
 templated with reference to the same kind of State 
 existing in a higher, lower, or equal degree in some 
 other subject. Thus we can suppose that the ambi- 
 tion of Alexander was greater than that of Parmenio, 
 by the celebrated reply he made to the latter, 
 when Darius proposed a division of the contested 
 empire of Persia. But when the Poet says,
 
 54 OF STATES. 
 
 " Ambition first sprung from your blest abodes, 
 The glorious fault of angels and of gods ;" 
 
 it is evident that he has employed the word Ambi- 
 tion in an absolute and general way, free from all 
 degrees of comparison ; as is clear from the omission 
 of the article, definite or indefinite. The same may 
 be said for the word " Fame," in the following pas- 
 sage ; which differs from the sentiment contained 
 in that just quoted : 
 
 " Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, 
 (That last infirmity of noble mind,) 
 To scorn delight, and live laborious days." 
 
 Here the religious persuasions of Milton have led 
 him to undervalue one of the most ennobling motives 
 to action that can exist in the human breast. What 
 is either Ambition or the desire of Fame, but the 
 love of notice, exciting us to deserve the admiration 
 and approbation of our fellow-beings ? And is such 
 a .universal passion, evidently implanted in our 
 bosoms by the hand of God himself, to be called an 
 infirmity ? This can only be said of its abuse : and 
 the same can be said, if we allow any other feeling 
 to obtain an undue ascendancy. 
 
 37. The next step is, to give the reader an 
 opportunity of judging of those Abstract Terms 
 that constitute the fundamental notions of meta- 
 physical reasoning : and he should give his whole
 
 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 55 
 
 attention to this most important subject ; as he will, 
 I am certain, be quite convinced, if he still should 
 require any further proofs, of the deceptive influence 
 exerted by language, in leading the understanding 
 astray : but he must never forget the result of what 
 he has just read ; namely, that 
 
 38. Every Abstract Term may be either General or 
 Particular ; and every General Term may be either 
 Abstract or Concrete : but that a word which is Abstract 
 or General is nothing but a SOUND, dependent for it 
 existence merely upon language.
 
 ( 56 ) 
 
 Of Entity and Quiddity. 
 
 39. There is a fortune among words, similar to 
 what we see amongst men : some are destined to be 
 long retained in favour ; whilst others are discarded, 
 never to be recalled again. This is strikingly exem- 
 plified in the words Entity and Quiddity. The first 
 of these continues to be considered of unexcep- 
 tionable value ; but the last, having been discounte- 
 nanced by Locke, has sunk into insignificance, and 
 even contempt. Entity, implying being-STATE, or 
 being-ness, stands for any thing that is real ; and is 
 certainly a harmless word, as long as it is not made 
 to pass for something real by its own nature. Quid- 
 dity, derived from the QUIDDITAS of the Schoolmen, is 
 deduced from QUID, what ? and therefore implies 
 what-sTATE, or what-ness : though they used it for 
 Essence ; it being held, by the Realists among them, 
 that every abstract relation had a real Essence, 
 through which it had its being : but Locke's rea- 
 sonings having shown the absurdity of the notion, 
 which indeed had been long questioned, the word 
 sank into complete disuse, except occasionally to 
 whet the wit of modern metaphysicians. Locke, 
 however, seems to have been in a great measure a 
 Realist himself; and his whole work on Human 
 Understanding is built upon the belief in Abstrac- 
 tions. These two words are humourously alluded 
 to by Butler :
 
 OF ENTITY AND QUIDDITY. 57 
 
 " He could define all acts, 
 And knew their natures and abstracts ; 
 Where entity and quiddity, 
 The ghosts of defunct bodies, fly." 
 
 40. The Arabs would appear to have represented 
 this word by MAHIYAT ; which is of very singular for- 
 mation, being contrary to the general structure of 
 their language : it implies what-is-it-ness. In the 
 Sanscrit language, the word TATTWAM, meaning that- 
 STATE, or that-ness, seems its exact representative. 
 These analogies are curious, as showing the limited 
 resources of the human mind, and the similarity of its 
 mode of proceeding under any difficulties it has to 
 surmount. Quiddity and Entity, though they have 
 now parted company, seem to have represented the 
 Essence and Form which we occasionally hear con- 
 trasted with one another. 
 
 Of Habit, Habitude, Custom, and Use. 
 
 41. These words are very commonly employed 
 indifferently, the one for the other : if however we 
 discriminate, we shall at once see that they are 
 distinct in the notion the mind entertains of them, 
 and ought consequently not to be confounded toge- 
 ther. When any act has been repeated a few times, 
 we perform it again, unconsciously, from Habit. 
 Habit therefore always produces an act of some kind 
 or other. If we repeat such acts frequently, we
 
 58 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 become, from Habit, habituated or accustomed to 
 them ; and Habitude and Custom consequently are the 
 result of Habit. When, however, we are exposed to 
 some inconvenience for a continuance, we become 
 less and less sensitive to its annoyance ; and we are 
 at last so used to it, that we become almost indifferent 
 to its existence, and even unconscious of it; and 
 we are then said to be reconciled to it from Use. 
 
 Of Knowledge and Wisdom. 
 
 42. The words Knowledge and Wisdom are very 
 often employed indiscriminately for one another. 
 They ought, however, to be carefully distinguished. 
 Knowledge simply implies every thing we have 
 learnt, either by instruction, observation, or experi- 
 ence. Hence a man may be very knowing and very 
 learned, and still never be able to pass for a wise 
 man. To make a wise man, it is necessary that he 
 should have reflected upon what he has learnt ; for 
 it is only through having considered any fact, in its 
 various points of view, and in its relation to others 
 to which it has an affinity, that a man can be said to 
 know it to any useful end. It is solely by the same 
 process that he arrives at those general conceptions 
 that store his mind for every emergency : and he 
 who can only trust to what he remembers of other 
 men's thoughts, to supply him with the means of 
 meeting any exigency, will rarely find himself
 
 OF KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM. 59 
 
 prepared to effect a happy result. There is no man 
 that is not wise in some things ; for every one has 
 more or less reflected on what most nearly concerns 
 himself: but there are infinite degrees of Wisdom. 
 Generally speaking, however, it is only to the highest 
 efforts of reflection that we give the name of Wis- 
 dom. Indeed, it seems, from the force of Realism, to 
 be taken in an absolute sense, free from all compari- 
 son. Where it exists in a high degree, it is felt to be 
 something almost divine ; as in the instance when, by 
 the help of personification, we speak of The voice of 
 Wisdom; or as something Real, when we recall to 
 mind the celebrated sentiment of antiquity, Wisdom 
 is the sole imperishable possession 19 . In the well- 
 known and melancholy sentence, where it is said, 
 "For in much wisdom is much grief, and he that 
 increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow" we must 
 
 ( 19 ) So^i'a fidvt) TWV KT^/UOTWV a6avdr(ov. 
 
 C 20 ) ECCLES. ch. i. ver. 18. In the Hebrew original, the first word is 
 the correct translation of hukmah ; but the second would be more 
 correctly rendered science, which is the true meaning of daiith. This 
 passage is remarkable, as being in direct opposition to the opinion of 
 Cicero, " Una igitur essemus beati cognitione rerum et scientise " 
 (Frag. Hortens. de Trinitate) ; as well as to the sentiment of Virgil, 
 
 " Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas." 
 
 As to the sentiment itself, it may probably have arisen from the 
 difficulties attendant upon study and composition in those days: 
 of which some notion may be formed, if it be true, as is said, that 
 Zoroaster committed his doctrines not to paper but to cow-hides, 
 on which he inscribed them with a knife. But in these days, when 
 the art of printing has made study so easy, it is a different matter ; 
 and it can be almost said, tluit he who runs may read.
 
 60 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 not suppose that Wisdom and Knowledge are placed 
 purposely in contrast, but that they are merely put 
 in a sort of opposition for the sake of the diction, a 
 figure that is common in the Hebrew language, and 
 to which the appellation of parallelism is applied. 
 Knowledge must, by its very nature, consist in an 
 acquaintance with particulars ; Wisdom, with gene- 
 ralities. The first, therefore, is to be obtained, as I 
 have before said, by instruction, observation, or 
 experience ; but the last, only by reflection. The 
 Ancients were wise with, comparatively, little know- 
 ledge ; and the Moderns are extremely knowing, 
 with very little wisdom. Those who devote them- 
 selves to study and observation, have but little time 
 and opportunity for reflection; and the converse 
 may be said, with equal truth, of those who are 
 given to reflection. The state of mind required for 
 each is different ; and, perhaps, the kind of mind, 
 likewise. After what I have said on the nature of 
 abstract words, it is hardly necessary to repeat, that 
 there is neither Wisdom nor Knowledge ; and that 
 we can only say, that such a man is wise ; or, that he 
 knows something more or less perfectly than some 
 one else. 
 
 Of Principle. 
 
 43. Principle is a word in the mouth of every 
 one ; and yet it is not, perhaps, always understood
 
 OF PRINCIPLE. 61 
 
 as exactly as its importance merits. In morals, it 
 means those first notions which are the regulating 
 points of all good conduct. Thus, not to steal, to 
 lie, &c., are all Principles, which it is the duty of 
 every good man to obey. When, therefore, any one's 
 conduct is thus regulated, we speak of him as being 
 " a man of principle " ; and when he sets the pri- 
 mary notions of morals at defiance, we equally say, 
 " he is unprincipled." Principle, therefore, im- 
 plies a mind that has arrived at certain primary 
 conceptions, either by the means of instruction, or 
 by a spontaneous effort of reason, or by both. We 
 must feel, consequently, that it is the pure offspring 
 of reason ; and that its birth and value are only 
 appreciated in proportion as its parent obtains 
 dominion in the affairs of mankind ; and as its own 
 offspring, good conduct, is duly respected. Even 
 in subjects that do not relate to morals, we find 
 the word Principle commonly employed ; because 
 whatever is the object of reason, must contain, in 
 itself, some Principle, or leading notion. Thus every 
 law and every argument must be referrible to a 
 Principle, which is their guiding reason ; or they 
 will be nothing but nonsense. Principle, therefore, 
 though a mere word, is one of singular importance, 
 as it is the polar star of the moral and intellectual 
 man. Indeed, among the various Abstractions that 
 have been deified, it is singular that Principle has 
 been overlooked. Perhaps the reason is, that it is
 
 62 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 only found in languages that have arrived at a high 
 perfection ; and that its value is, consequently, only 
 felt in those advanced stages of civilization in which 
 men are too wise to be so grossly duped by a mere 
 word. Yet it is to it that the Legislator must look, 
 as the buoy to which all actions must be moored ; 
 and without which, mankind will ever be at the 
 mercy of the storms and hurricanes of their pas- 
 sions. 
 
 44. Principle is alone the true bond of society, 
 that binds every man firmly to his neighbour, and 
 enables him to reckon upon his word with the same 
 certainty as upon another self. When, therefore, 
 communities possess this link in perfection, which is 
 stronger than any that could be formed of adamant, 
 they will arrive at a degree of internal strength and 
 prosperity at present unknown : but, unfortunately, in 
 the hollowness and unsoundness that inevitably lurk 
 in the rapid growth of civilization, cupidity and lust 
 but too often assume its appearance, and then spread 
 more ruin and misery than could flow from open 
 hostility to this uncompromising safeguard of so- 
 ciety. The importance, therefore, of Principle can- 
 not be too early inculcated on the minds of child- 
 ren ; and even one conquest of self, in the infantine 
 period of life, will be of inestimable advantage to the 
 future man, by giving the child a confidence in his 
 own strength of mind, that will grow with his
 
 OF PRINCIPLE. 63 
 
 growth, and which nothing can afterwards shake or 
 weaken. Unhappily, however, the truth is quite 
 overlooked by the generality of mothers, in their 
 blind admiration of their offspring ; expecting, in 
 their utter ignorance of human nature, that good 
 conduct must be the natural attendant upon what 
 they are pleased to think so perfect ; and forgetting 
 the profound injunction of Solomon, when he says, 
 " Train up a child in the way he should go ; and when 
 he is old, he will not depart from it" If the mother, 
 therefore, neglect to instil good Principles, the 
 schoolmaster's efforts will be next to useless ; be- 
 cause bad habits are with difficulty eradicated, and 
 the future man will be but the enlargement of 
 the child in mind and body. And be it remem- 
 bered, that a very slight incision made in the tender 
 sapling becomes a yawning and unsightly defor- 
 mity in the full-grown tree, and must continue as 
 long as it exists. The stubborn oak, too, may, by 
 early training, be made to retain any form into 
 which it is bent. Moreover, all education should be 
 directed to meet the peculiar propensities of the 
 individual ; the knowledge of which requires some 
 degree of discernment. The self-willed and selfish 
 libertine may be seen in the pampered pet of home ; 
 and the remorseless villain is generally shadowed 
 out in the cruel and apathetic brat. Nearly every 
 instance of moral excellence may be traced to the 
 mother's fostering care ; for she, and not the father,
 
 64 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 is necessarily the child's companion, guide, and 
 example. 
 
 45. The word Principle is often employed, 
 though perhaps without any necessity, for an element 
 in physics. Thus we speak, at one moment, of Che- 
 mical Principles, and, perhaps, at the next, of the 
 Principles of Chemistry, using the word Principle 
 in two opposite senses : yet it appears to me to be 
 a pity to employ this, or any other term, for more 
 than one purpose ; as it cannot but lead to con- 
 fusion of thought, and, consequently, to the produc- 
 tion of error. Like all other words that do not 
 admit of an obvious analysis, it fails to impress its 
 own meaning on the mind of the hearer. Were 
 we without it in our language, we might supply its 
 place equally well by such words as leading notion, 
 prime notion, &c. In morals, a Principle and a 
 Rule appear to be alike ; but in reasoning, the 
 Principle is as the soul, and the Rule as the body 
 which it guides and enlightens. When, therefore, 
 we are doubtful of the intention of any Rule or 
 Argument, a reference to the Principle upon which 
 it has been constructed becomes the sole means 
 by which we ascertain how either is to be under- 
 stood.
 
 ( 65 ) 
 
 Of Fortune, Chance, and Providence. 
 46. In all periods of the world, and among all 
 nations, certain general words have been in current 
 use, to account for the events and vicissitudes of life. 
 In antiquity, Fortune played a great part ; and is still 
 appealed to, though it has ceased to be worshipped 
 as a deity. Chance, in the present times, has the 
 same office; though when employed by one who 
 believes in an Intelligent Ruler of nature, it amounts 
 to a contradiction of his own convictions. Of such 
 words, the most unexceptionable is Providence ; for 
 though an abstract term, as it appeals to the fore- 
 sight of the Deity, it is only expressive by the 
 reference it contains; which is indeed so strong, 
 that the word is generally understood as represent- 
 ing the Deity himself. Nor does it, as in the 
 former terms, necessarily preclude the just infe- 
 rence of reason, that every event must have had an 
 immediate cause. The observations I have made 
 on Fortune and Chance might be extended to Fate 
 and Destiny; but I feel it is unnecessary to say 
 any thing further on this subject. 
 
 Of Matter, Substance, and Body. 
 
 47. These three words are often employed for 
 one another, without much attention to the peculiar 
 force of each, particularly when they are opposed
 
 66 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 to spirit ; but contrasted with one another, they have 
 distinct senses. Matter is that general term which 
 we employ when we speak of the substratum of 
 things, without any allusion to their peculiar na- 
 tures : it is generally opposed to mind. Substance 
 implies Matter existing in some peculiar state or 
 condition : thus, wood, stone, &c., are Substances : 
 it may be opposed to essence. Body, however, refers 
 distinctly to form, and is made up of Substance. 
 Thus, a tree, a pebble, &c., are Bodies. Its oppo- 
 site is spirit ; though, should soul be used, it then 
 relates exclusively to human kind. It therefore 
 follows, that 
 
 48. Matter is the substratum of Substances, and 
 Substance of Bodies. 
 
 Of Nature. 
 
 49. Perhaps no word is used so frequently, and 
 so indiscriminately, as Nature ; nor is there one that 
 leaves so many vague notions on the mind. Were 
 we only to attend to such meanings of words as 
 result from investigating their etymology, nothing 
 would be easier than such a process ; but words 
 acquire distinct senses, from their primitives, by 
 convention. The term ' Nature' we have received 
 from the Latin, through the French. In its original 
 language, it belongs to a class of words which
 
 OF NATURE. 67 
 
 imply the act of what the root signifies, as well as 
 the result of its action, and which terminate in 
 TURA and URA ; such as, STRUCTURA, PRESSURA, C^SURA, 
 &c. NATURA, therefore, as derived from NASCOR, / 
 am born, would seem to mean that which is born, or 
 produced. In Greek, Nature is represented by the 
 word Oy<ns, which is formed from the verb <p6&>, / 
 bring forth ; or (pvopai, I am born, and the termina- 
 tion <rig, that always expresses the State of whatever 
 the root implies ; and in this case, therefore, means, 
 state of bringing forth, or of being born ; but popularly, 
 Nature, Birth, Growth, &c. In the Sanscrit lan- 
 guage, Nature is represented by the word PRAKRITIS, 
 derived from PRA, the same as the Greek and Latin 
 PRO, and KRI, to make, which seems to be the very 
 original of the Latin CREO, / make ; while TIS is the 
 same as the Greek ffiq just spoken of. Now, as this 
 termination always implies the result of the action 
 or state of whatever the root may signify, we must 
 see that PRAKRITIS conveys the notion of fore-make, 
 or that which was first formed, that is to say, Nature. 
 In these words we must feel that nearly the very 
 same sense is implied by all, namely, formation, 
 production, &c., however different the roots or lan- 
 guages may be from one another, in which they 
 exist. Such words as NATURA, (fivtrig, and PRAKRITIS, 
 were all brought into use long before man began to 
 reason on the mysteries of life ; and, consequently, 
 required to be turned from their original meanings, 
 
 F2
 
 68 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 for the new purposes to which they were applied. 
 This was as inevitable as unfortunate. Mankind 
 will do any thing with their old materials, particu- 
 larly in the hurry of conversation or the heat of 
 argument, rather than make something new that 
 would suit the occasion exactly; and, once em- 
 ployed, a word is sure to be used again, when the 
 same necessity recurs ; and it is finally fixed in its 
 new character by habit and convention. This is 
 always an unfortunate result in language ; for the 
 multiplicity of meanings of any word is certain of 
 introducing obscurity and vagueness in its employ- 
 ment : and of this fact, the variety of senses, and 
 the consequent confusion of thought, that results 
 from the use of the word Nature, is itself a sufficient 
 proof. 
 
 50. If we examine the various senses of the 
 Abstract word, Nature, we shall find that they amount 
 to about four, in its original and common use ; but to 
 these we must add one more, when it is employed, 
 as it frequently is, in a comprehensive sense. The 
 first and obvious signification of Nature is that which 
 implies appearance ; as when we say, How lovely is 
 Nature ! on looking at any pleasing object, such as a 
 landscape, a flower, &c. The second sense is that of 
 contrivance, or disposition of parts ; as when we are 
 impressed with the conviction of contrivance in the 
 adaptation of animals and their organs to the pur-
 
 OF NATURE. 69 
 
 poses of their being. Thus we say, It is the Nature 
 of a fox to be cunning ; of a cat, to scratch when 
 angry ; and of a dog, to be affectionate. So we say, 
 Wings are fitted by their Nature for flying, and Legs 
 for walking. The third sense in which Nature is 
 employed, is that of materiality ; as when we ask the 
 question, Of what Nature is it? meaning, Of what 
 substance is it formed ? that is, Is it of wood, stone, 
 
 ?o o 
 ,&c.? 
 
 51. The employment of Nature as an Agent, 
 which is its fourth sense, could only be tolerated in 
 those languages that admit of personification by the 
 genius of their construction. By this figure, Nature 
 is represented as an Agent busy in the production 
 and support of this universal frame of being. In this 
 sense it is considered by some as an imaginary being. 
 But still a question fairly arises, as to what extent 
 mankind are justified in attributing Agency in the 
 phenomena beheld around them. That there is 
 agency in action, no one can doubt ; and though 
 they have borrowed a word that, by its origin, does 
 not imply agency, but its results, their doing so 
 cannot overturn the inference derived from their 
 observation. Thus, though the words for soul, in 
 Sanscrit, Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic, originally sig- 
 nified air or breath, their having been thus turned 
 aside from their original sense does not destroy the 
 existence of the thing they may represent more or
 
 70 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 less aptly. A ship has not the less a real existence 
 because it is called a man-of-war ; and so of any other 
 thing. It could not be expected, in the infancy of 
 society, that a name for so subtile an Agent should 
 have been specifically invented for the occasion ; and 
 in those languages which admit of personification, 
 its want was not felt, as the multitude use personified 
 words in a real sense, and never doubt of their 
 actual existence: hence, Nature stood, and conti- 
 nues to stand, in their minds, for a kind of beneficent 
 Being, that is not merely the operative Agent in the 
 universe, but lends her assistance as often as the cor- 
 poreal necessities of animated beings require her aid. 
 Thus we say continually, Nature came to his assist- 
 ance ; Nature made a great cure : and we say with 
 equal indifference, either Nature or Instinct teaches 
 the bird to make its nest, &c. ; Nature sometimes fails 
 in her works ; and similar expressions 21 . 
 
 52. A fifth meaning may be assigned to Nature ; 
 as when we sum up all we can conceive under the 
 expression God and Nature. In this last case, the 
 word has the collective sense of all the others, and 
 
 (2 1 ) These observations being written while absent from books of 
 reference, I hare not been able to consult the large edition of 
 Dr. Johnson's Dictionary, where I remember he sums up, from Boyle's 
 Essay, the various senses of the word Nature. They may, however, be 
 acceptable to the reader, as the result of independent thought. They 
 will, however, be given in the Appendix, NOTE (C), with some re- 
 marks of my own.
 
 OF NATURE. 71 
 
 implies Appearance, Contrivance, Agency, and Ma- 
 teriality. These are, I believe, all the principal 
 senses of the word, though undoubtedly others 
 exist ; but the only one which really concerns the 
 reader is that of Agent. 
 
 53. It may be interesting, to compare these 
 views with those which Cicero puts into the mouth 
 of Balbus, the Sto'ic, in his work On the Nature of 
 the Gods 22 . ' ' 
 
 " Some think that Nature is a certain irrational 
 power, exciting in bodies the necessary motions : 
 others, that it is an intelligent power, acting by 
 order and method, designing some end in every 
 cause, and always aiming at that end, whose works 
 express such skill, as no art, no hand, can imitate : 
 for they say, such is the virtue of its seed, that, 
 however small it is, it falls into a place proper for 
 its reception, and meets with matter conducive to its 
 nourishment and increase; it forms and produces 
 every thing in its respective kind, either vegetables, 
 which receive their nourishment from their roots, 
 or animals, endowed with motion, sense, appetite, 
 and abilities to beget their likeness. Some apply 
 the word Nature to every thing ; as Epicurus, who 
 acknowledges no cause, but atoms, a void, and their 
 accidents. But when we (the Stoics) say that na- 
 ture forms and governs the world, we do not apply 
 
 ( M ) Translated by THOMAS FBANCKUN, D.D., Book II. p. 111.
 
 72 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 it to a clod of earth, or a piece of stone, whose parts 
 have not the necessary cohesion 23 ; but to a tree, an 
 animal, in which there is not the appearance of 
 chance, but of order, and a resemblance of art." 
 
 54. The first signification of Nature in this pas- 
 sage is just the equivalent of what is commonly 
 called Power ; as will appear in the following views. 
 In its next sense, in which it is personified, it 
 approaches very near to that which we call Provi- 
 dence ; and, in the last, it is employed very much 
 in the general and arbitrary way we hear it used in 
 familiar conversation. 
 
 Of Necessity. 
 
 55. Few words have had a greater influence over 
 the minds of men than that of Necessity; so much 
 so, that it might be almost considered to be supe- 
 rior to the Deity himself. By the help of Realism, 
 it has been converted into a reality of the first im- 
 portance. Indeed, it is not always clear whether 
 the Deity is not oftener controlled by Necessity, 
 than obeyed. Put into plain English, this mighty 
 word means nothing more than unyielding or un- 
 ceasing STATE, that is, Unyieldingness, or Unceasing- 
 
 C 23 ) There is evidently some error in the original ; which commen- 
 tators have endeavoured, in vain, to clear up. The context requires a 
 word implying design or reason ; structure, for instance ; as a clod, or 
 a piece of stone, exhibit cohesion as much as vegetables or animals.
 
 OF NECESSITY. 
 
 ness-, being derived, through the French, from the 
 Latin NECESSITAS, a word which in ancient mytho- 
 logy was personified as the mother of the Fates. 
 
 Of Infinity. 
 
 56. It has been shown in 5 12, that Abstrac- 
 tions must be referrible to some Concrete Term that 
 has at least suggested the notion that led to their 
 formation. When, however, we ask ourselves what 
 is the Concrete Thing that has suggested the notion 
 of Infinity, that is, of endless- STATE, or endlessness, 
 we can only reply, if we dare venture so far, that it 
 is derived from what is infinite. Should it be again 
 demanded of the person who might make such an 
 answer, what the thing is which is infinite, he would 
 be brought into great difficulty ; for he could not 
 point out, or produce, any thing which is infinite. 
 He might possibly say, that the universe is infinite ; 
 but as he had never seen the whole of the universe, 
 he would fairly beg the question, and fall into an 
 absurdity at the same time : for if it could be called 
 a whole, it would be definite, and not indefinite, 
 which every thing infinite must be, by the same 
 reason that the moment a thing can be said to be 
 definite, it is finite, either in number or quantity. 
 The notion of Infinity, therefore, is a mere effect of 
 those conceptions that depend upon our putting 
 sounds together, and is, consequently, a non-entity ;
 
 74 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 for even in imagining a space to be succeeded by a 
 space, and that by another, and so on, we can never 
 arrive at the notion of Infinity ; and wherever we 
 leave off, though we have added one system of stars 
 to another, mentally, we have, at the best, only 
 reached, even in imagination, to what is finite. But 
 we can take the question up under another point of 
 view, that will leave us no room to doubt the fore- 
 going conclusions. Every thing of which the human 
 intellect is cognisant, can be considered as repre- 
 sentable by a definite number. Thus we must sup- 
 pose the number of the planets and satellites of our 
 system to be of a certain definite amount, be they 
 thirty, forty, or whatsoever number any one might 
 fix upon. But if we were to assert, that though they 
 did not exceed fifty, yet that they were indefinite, 
 because their number was unknown to us, we should 
 certainly be deemed insane ; for every one will 
 allow, that they must be equal to a certain number, 
 if they exist at all. Now, what are we to think of 
 the number of all the other heavenly bodies is it 
 definite, or indefinite ? He who shall answer that 
 they are definite in number, will then have tacitly 
 admitted that they are not infinite; and he who 
 shall be of opinion that they are indefinite, will 
 have acknowledged that they have no existence. 
 Here, then, is a dilemma, from which we cannot 
 escape ; and we shall arrive at a similar contradic- 
 tion between reason and sense, as often as we push
 
 OF INFINITY. 75 
 
 any question in nature to an extreme. In every 
 point of view, therefore, Infinity is a mere sound. 
 We here see a case that points out most clearly to 
 us that the intellect is the helpless captive of a chain 
 of words it has forged for its own use, and which 
 never can be permanently burst asunder ; since, at 
 the very moment that reason and reflection break a 
 few of the links, they re-unite of themselves, by the 
 mere effect of habit. With these very chains, how- 
 ever, man presumes to think he can measure and 
 survey all things ; and, in the war of words, dares 
 to strike down every adversary, who, from want of 
 equal dexterity or opportunity, has not been able to 
 forge shackles for himself of equal weight and size. 
 So proud, too, is he of these bonds, made by his own 
 ingenuity, that he looks down with sovereign con- 
 tempt upon those who are not equally encumbered ; 
 and, as the reward of the fallacies with which he 
 has, in his own conceit, fortified his understanding, 
 he becomes the theme of admiration and idolatry 
 with those who are, in fact, less benighted than him- 
 self ; and who are really his superiors, inasmuch as 
 they are conscious of the darkness in which all 
 things are involved ; for to have no opinion, is better 
 than to have one that is false. Hobbes has remarked, 
 " As men abound in copiousness of language, so they 
 become more wise or more mad than ordinary 24 ." 
 From these observations it follows, that 
 
 ( 24 ) Leviathan, Part I. chap. 4. p. 15.
 
 76 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 57. Infinity is an abstraction, abstracted from 
 nothing ; and therefore a pure assumption, suggested 
 to us by SENSE, and unsupported by REASON. 
 
 Of Individuality. 
 
 58. No question, not even Infinity itself, has so 
 much puzzled mankind as that of Individuality. The 
 greater effort we make to gain a clear conception 
 of its nature, the more we feel bewildered ; nor can 
 any exertion of the mind enable us to grasp the 
 phantom that we propose for our comprehension. 
 It is in vain that we attempt to renew our efforts, 
 and to exert all the attention of which we are mas- 
 ters ; it absolutely escapes from us, as we seem to 
 approach it ; and, yet, maliciously, to dance before 
 us, like some visionary spectre, which the day-dream 
 of the maniac has conjured up for the purpose of 
 tormenting its victim. Nor is it very difficult to 
 assign the cause, where we are seeking for a sub- 
 stance, when there exists only a shadow ; in short, 
 for something, where there is nothing but a sound. 
 As an Abstraction, Individuality can have no exis- 
 tence ; and when we resolve it into its elements, it 
 simply implies individual-si ATE ; which State, as I 
 have shown ( 5 12), being nothing more than a 
 figment of the intellect, we have, of course, been in 
 pursuit of what is as unreal, as the Will o' the Wisp, 
 which misleads the benighted wanderer. To keep
 
 OF INDIVIDUALITY. 77 
 
 our understandings, therefore, in a sane state, let us 
 always remember, that though we can think of indi- 
 viduals, we can only talk of individuality. 
 
 Of Relation (Abstract}. 
 
 59. My great object in the present work being 
 not merely to make the mass of mankind think for 
 themselves, but to think justly, the reader must bear 
 with me if I occasionally split a subject "to very 
 rags," in attempting to lay it open to the view of all. 
 There are many words that we are in the habit of 
 using, and which we employ with the nicest accuracy 
 in reasoning, by that delicate intellectual tact with 
 which we are endowed through our organization, yet 
 of which, if we were called upon at a moment's notice, 
 we could not give the slightest account. The words 
 Quality and Relation are two of these : and indeed 
 I may say, I never met with any one, but who, even 
 after exhibiting great talent in using them, while 
 discussing some metaphysical point, seemed quite as 
 if he was deprived of his understanding upon being 
 suddenly asked what he conceived to be the nature 
 of Quality or Relation. For the obscurity of the 
 first word there seems to be some excuse : but this 
 cannot be said to be the case with regard to Rela- 
 tion ; for it clearly expresses the state of the things 
 that we conceive to be related, that is, their related- 
 STATE, or relatedness. For instance, I see a horse
 
 78 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 and a man utterly unconnected with one another. 
 I can at once, by an effort of my mind, cause them 
 to be related, or, abstractly speaking, bring them 
 into relation with one another. I can think of them 
 both as animals: there is an immediate relation 
 between them in my mind, by attributing Animality 
 to both, without any alteration in their previous con- 
 dition. Or, I can fancy the Man to have bought 
 the Horse : there is then the relation of Possessor 
 and Possessed in my mind. Now the reader will, 
 from these familiar instances, clearly see, that the 
 word Relation is only a mental conception ; and that 
 even if the Man and the Horse, just supposed, were 
 really placed in the imagined states, though the 
 Relations would then be actual, they would only be 
 the result of a mental operation which depended 
 on language for its existence. For let us suppose 
 the Man and the Horse to be viewed in reality in 
 the imagined cases by a man born deaf and dumb, 
 and who had never been taught to read or write ; as 
 he could never classify them in his mind as Animals, 
 he could have no means of attributing a common 
 nature to them, because he would only see the Man 
 and the Horse, and he could likewise never think of 
 the relation of Possession ; for a Relation not being 
 like an image, he could not, from want of lan- 
 guage, conceive any thing of the kind : and further, 
 in the last case, though he might be sufficiently 
 aware, by long experience of the value of money,
 
 OF RELATION (ABSTRACT). 79 
 
 that the Man had bought the Horse, the notion of 
 Ownership would be unknown to him, for the reason 
 already assigned ; namely, that from his ignorance 
 of language he had not the slightest conception of 
 such an Abstract Relation ; and the utmost he could 
 possibly conceive, would be, that the Man was the 
 owner of the Horse. The reader will see, from these 
 familiar illustrations, that Relations are but Abstract 
 States, formed by the means of language : and he 
 must remember, from what has been already said 
 ( 5 12), that Abstractions, that is, Abstract Rela- 
 tions, are mere figments, invented by the intellect 
 for the purpose of reasoning, just as algebraic signs 
 are mere symbols by which Relations of number 
 or quantity are compared. All he has to do with 
 this, or any other Abstract Term, that may perplex 
 him for the moment, is to reduce it to its original, 
 which he will always find to be either a verb or an 
 adjective. Relation itself, therefore, is to be referred 
 to the verb to be related ; and the reader will re- 
 member, that every Relation necessarily supposes a 
 mind capable of conceiving two or more things or 
 acts, as being related to one another, either tempo- 
 rarily or permanently. 
 
 Of Relation (Personal}. 
 
 60. Language not merely enables us to form 
 Abstract Relations, but to bring the whole social
 
 80 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 world into a union that could never have existed 
 without it ; for by it man has been enabled to invent 
 terms that bind the whole fabric of society together. 
 Thus we have Sovereign and Subject, Master and 
 Servant., Husband and Wife, Father and Child, Land- 
 lord and Tenant, and a multitude of other terms that 
 have been invented to express the Relation we stand 
 in reciprocally to one another. By the existence of 
 these, we are reminded of our duties, even without 
 the aid of morals. Though these words are general 
 terms applicable to persons, they are as purely con- 
 ceptional as those that are abstract ; for it would be 
 as utterly impossible to prove their existence or 
 reality, as it would be that of whiteness, goodness, 
 greatness, &c., though they are of quite a different 
 class of words. They are not the names of persons, 
 but their supposed States or conditions. Were we 
 to see an individual who was unknown to us, we 
 might be informed that he was a Sovereign, a Mas- 
 ter, a Husband, a Father, and a Landlord 25 ; but we 
 could not be certain of the fact, though he might 
 combine all these Relations in the mind of the per- 
 sons from whom we had received our information : 
 but if we were told that he was a man, we should 
 smile, because our senses, in all probability, would 
 
 ( M ) In addition to the foregoing Relations, he might be a brother, an 
 uncle, a grandfather, a nephew, &c. ; yet no one would be foolish enough 
 to suppose that he had so many individual natures, as he stood in rela- 
 tions to others in the minds of those who spoke about him.
 
 OF RELATION (PERSONAL). 81 
 
 previously have rendered the information unneces- 
 sary. This points out to us, that words implying 
 Relations are of a class differing from that which 
 includes the names of Things. Were we desirous of 
 applying the sense of the foregoing words to persons, 
 in terms that do not express Personal Relationship, 
 we must make use of those that stand for Agents. 
 Thus for Sovereign, we can employ Ruler ; for Fa- 
 ther, Begetter ; and for Landlord, Land-Letter ; and 
 so on for others. 
 
 Of Correlation (Abstract and Personal). 
 
 61. Though many words express Relation, there 
 are only a few, strictly speaking, that possess Corre- 
 lations ; but the others have each an opposite, with 
 which they stand in contrast. Thus Goodness im- 
 plies Badness, Elevation, Depression, &c. The word 
 Cause equally suggests its Correlation, Effect; and 
 the mention of this last, likewise, immediately calls 
 up the notion of Cause. Hence we see that they 
 are necessarily connected. The same is the case 
 with all personal Relations. They have every one 
 a specific Correlation. Husband has Wife; Father, 
 Child; &c. Some, indeed, must, from their being 
 connected with sex, have double Correlations; as 
 Father has both Son and Daughter-, Uncle, both 
 Nephew and Niece ; &c. The mention of any Relation 
 must call up one of its corresponding Correlations : 
 G
 
 82 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 the same is equally true of the Correlations, which 
 must do the same. Should we, however, consider 
 Effect, Son, Wife, &c. as Relations, then Cause, Father, 
 Husband, &c. are their reciprocal Correlations ; but 
 it is more usual to call (if I may employ the expres- 
 sion) the major the Relation, and the minor the 
 Correlation. I think, as I have included Abstract 
 and Personal Correlations under one head, it will be 
 as well to enumerate here such Relations, Abstract 
 and Personal, with their Correlations, as seem of 
 most importance. 
 
 ABSTRACT. 
 Relations. Correlations. 
 
 Cause. Effect. 
 
 Reason. Consequence. 
 
 Motive Act or Result. 
 
 Origin. End. 
 
 Agency. Act. 
 
 Source. Product. 
 
 62. These are all the Abstract Relations that at 
 this moment present themselves to my mind ; but 
 the following are some that are Personal. 
 
 PERSONAL. 
 Relations. Correlations. 
 
 Parent. Offspring. 
 
 Sovereign. Subject. 
 
 Master. Servant. 
 
 Landlord. Tenant.
 
 OF CORRELATION (ABSTRACT AND PERSONAL). 83 
 
 63. These Personal Relations and Correlations 
 might be carried to a great extent ; but the instances 
 here given will be sufficient, as examples : yet the 
 Terms, though accurate, are not sufficiently precise, 
 because they might be applied to such words as 
 Goodness and Badness, which are the mere contraries 
 of one another. The two classes, therefore, would 
 be much more exactly defined by the terms major 
 and minor Relations ; for the reason that Cause is 
 always superior to Effect, Source to Product, &c. So 
 Offspring, Wife, Servant, Tenant, &c. are subordinate, 
 but not opposite to their Correlations, Parent, Hus- 
 band, Master, Landlord, &c. Metaphysicians having 
 had a vague feeling that Abstract Relations pro- 
 duced their Correlations, and forgetting or ignorant 
 that they were but Abstractions, they were led to 
 mix up the question of physical power with that of 
 cause and effect, and, consequently, arrived at con- 
 clusions altogether absurd and irreconcileable with 
 common sense. See $ 94. 
 
 Of Quality. 
 
 64. I have now to give an account of the most 
 important word employed in metaphysics. Quality 
 is the very rock of metaphysical systems : when exa- 
 mined, however, it will be found to vanish into " thin 
 air," and to leave us nothing as a residuum. We 
 have derived this word from the Latin, through the 
 G 2
 
 84 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 French ; and it was brought into use in the former 
 language by Cicero, in explaining the metaphysical 
 notions of the Greeks. The Greek word for it being 
 woiorqg, he naturally made an equivalent ; which gave 
 him QUALITAS, derived from QUALIS, implying, like 
 voio?, what ? or, what manner ? Thus far every thing 
 is very good ; for even the two words, from which 
 the Greek and Latin were formed, have a closer 
 relationship than is commonly supposed. But when 
 we come to inquire what the exact sense of these 
 two Abstract Terms is, we find we can represent 
 them in English by the words what-manner- STATE, 
 or what-manner-ness 26 , both of which, though a little 
 bald and strange, only require time and use to 
 make them pass current for the same end as the 
 orthodox word Quality. The Arabs, in translating 
 Greek works, were in the same difficulty that 
 Cicero had been ; and strained the genius of their 
 language a little to form the word KAIFIYAT % from 
 the adverb KAIFA, how ? Hence their compound im- 
 plies how-ness, instead of what-manner-ness ; but the 
 difference is so very slight, as to be of no practical 
 consequence. The word so formed is still in current 
 
 (*) The reader must feel that the argument deals with the nature 
 of these Abstract Terms, and not with this or that shade of meaning. 
 Perhaps xo?o and QUALIS, if referred to their probable Sanscrit origi- 
 nals, might be rendered what-like, instead of what-manner : in this case 
 the sense will be what-like-ness. 
 
 (") Menmski, in his Lexicon, explains the word KAIFIYAT by 
 " Qualitas. modus, (quasi, quomodeitas)."
 
 OF QUALITY. 85 
 
 use in the Turkish, Persian, and Hindustani lan- 
 guages ; and very probably in those of some other 
 Mahomedan nations. Now, most likely, the reader 
 has not only never doubted of the reality of Quali- 
 ties, but possibly never took the trouble of inquiring 
 into the exact meaning of the word. In all proba- 
 bility, he will be a little surprised at the influence 
 mere sounds have exercised over his understanding, 
 when he feels their exact import; and he will, 
 perhaps, be likewise convinced of the delusiveness 
 of the division, made by metaphysicians, of Qualities 
 into primary and secondary. We can have no 
 notion of Qualities, except through the words that 
 represent them. Though we may talk of redness or 
 whiteness as separate and real existencies, yet, if we 
 would understand what they mean, we must think 
 of some objects that are Red or White ; for when we 
 recall them to mind, we remember the images, 
 that is, the particular pictures, or figured repre- 
 sentations, they raised, which were either Red or 
 White : but it is evident we have no Conception of 
 Red or White that is not coupled with some material 
 thing, or arising from its action on our optic nerve. 
 Still, objects are neither Red nor White ; it is only 
 something reflected from them (photogen 28 ), which 
 
 ( M ) The word light implying merely a sensation, some new term ia 
 necessary, to distinguish the cause from the effect, just in the same way 
 as with respect to caloric and heat. See 4.
 
 86 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 stimulates the retina, and makes it feel in the way 
 we call Red, White, &c. 
 
 65. When we speak therefore of Qualities, we 
 must always bear in mind, that we do so by a mere 
 form of speech indispensable to reasoning ; but, that 
 they have no more foundation in truth, than the 
 phrases sunrise and sunset; which we still use, and 
 must continue to do, though we are now convinced 
 that the sun neither rises nor sets, and that such 
 appearances are made by the rotation of the earth 
 on its axis. In the same way, though Sensible Qua- 
 lities are mere words, we must never forget, when 
 we employ them, that we merely mean to say, that, 
 through the stimulation of the brain and nerves, the 
 percipient feels hot, cold, &c., and his retina. Red, 
 White, &c. : for Sensible Qualities must necessarily 
 be in the subject or percipient ; yet they, as well as 
 those that are Intellectual, are commonly held to be 
 in the object, or thing contemplated. It would be 
 just as rational to say that the pain or pleasure we 
 feel from cold or heat exists only in the object pro- 
 ducing it, as to assert that the cold or heat we feel, 
 on placing our hand on something cold or hot, 
 exists only in the thing that has absorbed caloric 
 from us, or communicated it to us ; for heat and 
 cold are mere sensations, and so it will be allowed 
 are pleasure and pain. When, therefore, I put my 
 hand on a jug filled with boiling water, and reason
 
 OF QUALITY. 87 
 
 on the subject, I am conscious that the jug is not 
 Hot, but that my hand, feels hot by the transfer of 
 caloric from the jug to it ; and it is the same with 
 all other Sensible Qualities, which exist, therefore, 
 only in the organs of sense of the individual who 
 perceives them. 
 
 66. Whenever our sight makes known any 
 colour to us, it must be bounded, that is, have what 
 is called a Form, if the object is small enough to be 
 seen at once ; but if not, it extends to the whole 
 range of vision ; which is necessarily round, because 
 it is so limited by the orifice of the eye, through 
 which the rays of colour are admitted. We never, 
 therefore, can see any colour without the certainty 
 that it belongs to some object, that is, that there is 
 some real thing before us which we see with our 
 eyes: for even when we look at the expanse of 
 heaven, its azure hue (the blue sensation made on 
 our retina) only arises from the absorption in the 
 atmosphere of all the other rays, except the one 
 which is reflected to the eye. Here, therefore, the 
 real thing before us is the air ; which we have as 
 much right to say we see, in this instance, as when 
 we think we see a house or any other object that 
 stands before us, and at which we look; for in 
 every case we see nothing at all, but only feel the 
 particular kind of stimulation caused by one or more 
 rays of light transmitted to us. All, therefore, we
 
 88 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 can really and truly say, is, that our retina feels 
 white, red, &c. ; and that these colours have certain 
 shapes, upon which we found the belief that certain 
 objects are then before us, which we likewise learn 
 from sound, touch, taste, or smell. But the whole 
 of these sensations can do no more than confirm one 
 another ; and then we have, altogether, five witnesses, 
 instead of one : still, we can offer no proof that the 
 whole five may not JDC all deceptive. The reader, 
 however, must now see that these five kinds of evi- 
 dence being only our own feelings, we have no 
 other proof for the reality of nature than the fact 
 that we can feel in five different ways. Yet this 
 simple truth is, from the trickery of language, 
 represented, or rather misrepresented, by certain 
 Abstract Terms we call Sensible Qualities or what- 
 manner-nesses ! 
 
 67. With regard to Intellectual Qualities, they 
 exist only in the intellect of the person who draws 
 the inference ; and they are necessarily in Relation 
 to his own opinions, whether borrowed or self- 
 acquired ; and they will consequently vary with his 
 knowledge and his fortunes, as well as with the 
 exigency of his situation at any particular moment. 
 Thus a peasant lad would think every thing, in the 
 house of the farmer for whom he worked, great, 
 fine, excellent, &c. ; but should he have an opportu- 
 nity of seeing the superior riches and conveniences
 
 OF QUALITY. 89 
 
 found in the mansion of his master's landlord, his 
 notions would be very much modified. He, in all 
 probability, would think every thing he had previ- 
 ously seen, paltry and contemptible, in comparison 
 with what his new experience had made known to 
 him ; and even his last notions would be quite 
 eclipsed, were chance to introduce him to the sight 
 of the splendour and magnificence of a palace. But 
 to the eye of a philosopher, the utmost magnificence 
 might raise nothing but a smile of pity for the glit- 
 tering gewgaws, with which the highest earthly 
 rank attempts to dazzle the minds of the common 
 herd of mankind. In the same way, what one in- 
 dividual, or one state of society, may think worthy of 
 the highest approbation, may be looked upon, by 
 another, as utterly base, and injurious to the best in- 
 terests of our race. Thus suicide was once re- 
 garded as heroic, and worthy of a great man, when 
 deserted by fortune ; yet 
 
 " To act a lover's or a Roman's part " 
 
 would scarcely meet with any applause in these 
 days. There are, however, certain Intellectual Qua- 
 lities, which, as unvarying truths, must always be 
 good or bad ; because the universal reason of man- 
 kind must ever approve or disapprove of them, in 
 reference to the immutable fitness of things, and the 
 inexorable claims arising out of human society. 
 The eternal distinction between Right and Wrong
 
 90 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 can never vary ; Truth, too, must be always one and 
 unchangeable ; and Justice must ever be what it is 
 now, and what it has been ; nor can Honour ever 
 shrink an atom from the scrupulous and voluntary 
 fulfilment of its engagements, whether tacitly or 
 openly made ; that is to say, through the duties 
 incumbent on us by our peculiar position in society, 
 or by our formal pledges to mankind. These obser- 
 vations lead to the inference, that, 
 
 68. Qualities are either Sensible, or Intellectual. 
 
 Of Property. 
 
 69. The analogy between the terms i Quality' 
 and 'Property' is so strong, that a few words will be 
 quite sufficient to explain the meaning of the latter. 
 The word ' Property' has also been borrowed from 
 the French ; and is a corruption of the Latin PRO- 
 PRIETAS, derived from PROPRIUS, own, proper, &c. The 
 Property, therefore, of any substance implies the 
 OMM-STATE, or own-ness, of that substance ; neither of 
 which, the reader will admit, is so pleasing in sound, 
 though they are both equally cogent in sense, with 
 the word ' Property.' To these remarks I might add, 
 that the Arabs appear to have turned the Greek 
 idiorijg, which had led to the Latin PROPRIETAS, into 
 KHASSIYAT ; so that all three have exactly the same 
 sense. This word, like KAIFIYAT, is still in common
 
 OF PROPERTY. 91 
 
 use. Like the word Quality, a Property may be 
 either Sensible or Intellectual. Thus Length is the 
 Sensible Property of a string, as it can be discovered 
 by both sight and feeling ; but the Properties of the 
 circle being only discoverable by the intellect, are 
 purely Intellectual. From these remarks it is evi- 
 dent, that 
 
 70. Properties, from their nature, may be either 
 Sensible, or Intellectual, 
 
 Of Peculiarity. 
 
 71. The term Peculiarity is so familiar, and so 
 obvious in its meaning, that, except for the sake of 
 completing the whole view regarding Qualities and 
 Properties, it might very well have been omitted. 
 The Peculiarity of any thing is that which distin- 
 guishes it from others of the same class. As I shall 
 immediately have to contrast Qualities, Properties, 
 and Peculiarities with one another, the exact import 
 of the last term will be sufficiently apparent, when 
 brought into juxta-position with the two former: 
 from which it will be seen, that Peculiarities, like 
 Qualities and Properties, may be both Sensible and 
 Intellectual. A Peculiarity, in short, is nothing more 
 than a Quality that is of rare occurrence. Thus 
 whiteness in a crow is a Peculiarity made known to 
 us by sight, and is, therefore, Sensible ; but timidity
 
 92 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 in a lion would, if observed, be an Intellectual Pecu- 
 liarity ; because such a Quality could only be ascer- 
 tained by an effort of the intellect. Peculiarity is 
 likewise used to express any unusual Form as well 
 as STATE. The hump of the Indian cow is regarded 
 as a Peculiarity in Europe ; and the want of it 
 would be considered a Peculiarity in India. 
 
 72. Peculiarity) therefore, implies Unusualness, 
 both of Quality and Form, in reference to the ex- 
 perience of the observer. 
 
 Of Quality, Property, and Peculiarity. 
 
 73. Having explained the nature of a Quality 
 and a Property, I mean now to define the exact 
 manner in which they should be employed. By a 
 Quality we always mean something adventitious; 
 and which, though removed, in no way destroys the 
 object in which it is commonly held to exist. Thus 
 a flower may lose its fragrance, yet it will still 
 remain a flower ; but by a Property we invariably 
 intend that which is essential to the very existence 
 of the thing; roundness, for example, in a ball. 
 Thus, to exemplify these terms, we may assert, that 
 the colour of a wheel is its Quality ; roundness, its 
 Property ; and to be of metal, when it is usually of 
 wood, its Peculiarity. Here we see the extreme 
 propriety of the word ' Property ; ' which, meaning
 
 OF QUALITY, PROPERTY, AND PECULIARITY. 93 
 
 own-ness, implies that it belongs to the thing itself, 
 and that without the possession of which it would 
 cease to be what it is : hence, likewise, its applica- 
 bility to express our own possessions 29 . All those 
 attributes of bodies which metaphysicians call Pri- 
 mary Qualities are really nothing more than their 
 Properties : these are, Figure, Length, Breadth, Ex- 
 tension, Impenetrability, &c. : for let us take away any 
 one of these essentials, and the thing ceases to be. 
 This fact is a proof that they reasoned not merely 
 erroneously, but actually without any precise know- 
 ledge of the terms they employed. Nay, so incon- 
 siderate were they, that they even included Motion 
 and Rest, both implying States ; and also Number, 
 which is a Relation among the Primary Qualities : 
 and perhaps the following extract from Berkeley's 
 Essay on Human Knowledge will not be out of place, 
 as demonstrating the inconsistencies of metaphysical 
 writers : " Some there are," he says, " who make a 
 distinction betwixt primary and secondary Qualities : 
 by the former, they mean extension, figure, motion, 
 rest, solidity, or impenetrability and number : by the 
 latter, they denote all other sensible Qualities, as co- 
 lours, sounds, tastes, and so forth." The reader must 
 see, that in this division of Qualities into Primary 
 and Secondary, besides its absurdity, it altogether 
 omits those that are intellectual. When we reason 
 
 (*") That is, our OWH-STATK or -estate.
 
 94 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 respecting the Qualities of any object, we fancy we 
 have very definite notions about it ; but were we to 
 talk of its what-manner-nessesj though the term is 
 much more significant, we should be at once aware 
 that nothing could be more vague than our expres- 
 sions ; and that, consequently, our conceptions on the 
 point must be most incomplete. With regard to 
 Secondary Qualities, the notion is equally incorrect 
 as that of the Primary division. For both I have 
 substituted Sensible and Intellectual. It is worthy of 
 remark in this place, as giving some insight into the 
 nature of the human intellect, that people who have 
 received a very slight education often apply the 
 words Quality, Property, Peculiarity, &c. with the 
 nicest accuracy, by a sort of contrivance in the frame 
 of the intellect, that saves all effort on the part of 
 the speaker; and yet the profoundest thinkers 
 are in danger of falling into great inconsistencies, 
 the moment they attempt to define and classify 
 these or other Abstract Words. See the remarks 
 in 112. 
 
 Of Came and Effect. 
 
 74. In the whole range of metaphysics, there is 
 not any subject that has been so much perplexed by 
 philosophical inquirers, nor one in which language 
 plays a more delusive part, than in that of Cause and 
 Effect ; and yet I think I shall be able to demon-
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 95 
 
 strate, that there is not any inherent difficulty in the 
 question, if it be properly considered. 
 
 75. It might have been presumed, that the very 
 assertion that these words are related or connected 
 (which is made by every one who speaks of the 
 relation or connexion of Cause and Effect) might 
 have saved so much misconception. But this would 
 be to suppose that people felt 30 the force of the 
 words they employ. Both these terms are merely 
 Abstractions of that class, which is called Relations 
 and Correlations ; and they, consequently, distinctly 
 claim connexion with one another. Hence the Terms 
 Cause and Effect are necessarily connected; for it 
 is impossible to think of the word Cause, without 
 its suggesting the notion of Effect ; nor of Effect, 
 without its calling up the conception of Cause. Those, 
 therefore, who deny a necessary connexion between 
 Cause and Effect should abstain from employing 
 these Terms ; for it is as preposterous and incon- 
 sistent, as it would be to speak of sunrise and sunset, 
 and yet to deny the existence of the sun. Cause 
 and Effect, then, being nothing but a Relation with 
 its Correlation, and such words being mere States, 
 it is only necessary to reflect for a moment, and we 
 
 (3) If this be the case with our own expressions, there exists but 
 little chance of being rightly comprehended by others. I have myself 
 been the object of misrepresentation, because a Reviewer could not 
 discriminate between a " a reasoning being" and a rational being!
 
 96 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 shall be certain that all we intend to express by them 
 is, that we conceive that the first State (Cause) pro- 
 duces a second or correlative State (Effect). Again, 
 if we ask ourselves the exact meaning of these two 
 States, we must feel, that that which implies Cause, 
 means the State which alters (not some other thing, 
 but another STATE) ; and that which signifies Effect, 
 the State which is altered : or, if we use compound 
 Terms, they may both, respectively, be expressed by 
 the Altering-sTATE and the Altered-STATE', for the 
 whole process of the mind in Reasoning is, like that 
 of Calculation, purely abstract. And here I think it 
 right to remind the reader, that whenever we wish to 
 avoid the use of the term ' Cause' or ' Effect,' we ought 
 to remember that we have the alternative of employ- 
 ing simple, in place of abstract language. Thus, if we 
 do not desire to use the abstract word ' Cause,' in such 
 a sentence as, ' Thomas was the Cause of Williams 
 death,' we can have recourse to the direct form, and 
 say, ' Thomas killed William: In the first of these two 
 examples, the matter is just put as abstractly as if it 
 were stated, algebraically, a = b ; 3I and, consequently, 
 
 ( ffl ) All Reasoning is solely carried on by means of Abstractions : and 
 when such Abstractions are limited to number and quantity, they can 
 then be represented by ciphers and symbols that are employed for that 
 particular branch of reasoning called Calculation : the only difference 
 between them being, that in common arithmetic we are obliged to sup- 
 ply (mentally) the connecting words required, such as, and, make, to, 
 from, by, into, &c. For instance, 2 (and) 2 (make) 4; but in Algebra, 
 the nature of the process required that the state of the Relations should 
 
 be
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 97 
 
 has nothing to do with either physical Agency or 
 Power; but in the second, we may suppose the 
 transmission of such power from the Agent to the 
 Object, and producing his death. 
 
 76. Having thus shown the Abstract character 
 of Cause and Effect, I now proceed to demonstrate, 
 that these words are also General in their nature, and, 
 as such, are invariably the representatives of any 
 Particular Conception. Thus we commonly say, if a 
 wall fall upon a man and kill him, that The wall was 
 the Cause of his death ; but the wall merely stood in 
 the Relation of Cause, and the Abstract Agency that 
 is conceived to produce his death was the Falling (of 
 the wall). But such sentences being always elliptical, 
 they would, if fully expressed, enounce that The wall 
 STOOD IN THE RELATION ofCause to that Effect. It is no 
 matter what sentence we may analyse, in which Cause 
 is mentioned ; for we shall find that the particular 
 word which is the real Cause is a Noun of Action 
 
 be fully expressed ; and they are accordingly represented by signs + , 
 , x, -r, =, &c., which have superseded the more cumbrous use of 
 words of the early stage of the science. Every one is aware, that a 
 Calculation may be conducted hi such a way, that the process shall not 
 include the slightest error ; and yet, that if the data were either insuf- 
 ficient or erroneous, the Calculation must be useless. It is the^same 
 with Reasoning ; for if the facts are either incomplete or faulty, the con- 
 clusion any one may arrive at will be equally so. Hence it is clear, 
 that we may reason with perfect correctness, and yet be quite wrong in 
 the result. 
 
 II
 
 98 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 ending in ing, such as that of Falling, just given ; or 
 in turn, in that of Ignition, which I shall mention 
 directly. For instance, a hailstone breaks a window : 
 it is not the hailstone, but its Breaking, that is the 
 Cause of the Fracture. So if I say, Heat is the Cause of 
 Fluidity ,it is, Heat stands in the Relation of Producing 
 to the abstract result Fluidity. Cause and Effect, 
 therefore, are the mere General Forms which the in- 
 tellect employs in place of the particular expression 
 which the case requires, as is discovered the moment 
 the sentence is analysed. In the instances of Falling, 
 Breaking, and Producing, as the Particular Notions 
 represented by the term Cause, we must see that 
 they all denote the altering- STATE, or action of the 
 wall, the hailstone, and the heat ; and the results that 
 arose from them respectively, namely, Death, Frac- 
 ture, and Fluidity, were the altered- STATES of the man, 
 the window, and the solid, as the objects affected by 
 them. This points out why we cannot with propriety 
 say, I cause it; for if we could use this expression, we 
 could equally well employ, / breaking it, I producing 
 it. It is different, however, with the word fracture : 
 for as we can say, I fractured it, so we can also say, 
 I effected it. When Cause is employed as a personal 
 agent as when we say, He was the Cause of it we 
 actually make as great a mistake as if we said, He was 
 the Breaking of it : and in those languages that em- 
 ploy a word equivalent to Causer, the error is as 
 great as if they added er to the word Breaking, or
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 99 
 
 any other noun implying Action, and said Breakinger, 
 Producinger, 32 &c., instead of employing Breaker, Pro- 
 ducer, &c. See 110. It is obvious, therefore, from 
 the whole tenour of these observations, that Cause 
 and Effect are the most General Notions we can trace 
 of any Abstract Agency ; and that whether we say The 
 Breaking produced the Fracture, or The hailstone broke 
 the window, we do in neither case, that is to say, 
 either by the abstract or the simple form of expres- 
 sion, allude or refer openly, or covertly, to Cause 
 and Effect. To do so, then, we must invariably and 
 explicitly say, or understand, such and such an Abs- 
 traction is the Cause, or is the Effect ; but when we 
 consider it UNDER THIS ASPECT, we then call into ope- 
 ration one of the most General Forms of expression 
 the human intellect has at its disposal. Where, there- 
 fore, there is no knowledge of language, there can 
 be no Cause and Effect. No one will suppose that 
 a horse thinks of either, when he feels the rider's leg 
 move to give him the spur ; yet it is sufficient to 
 make him mend his pace. 
 
 77. The process by which any one might form to 
 himself the notion of this Relation may be explained 
 
 ( 32 ) The word Widower affords an excellent example of the mistakes 
 we fall into, when we are not aware of the exact import of the original 
 term which we take as a basis. Widow, like the Latin VIDUA, is derived 
 from the Sanscrit VIDHAVA, that is, vi without DHAVAS, a husband; so 
 that ' Widower ' implies a man without a husband, if we refer it to its 
 Sanscrit originals ; but a he-widow, according to its English derivation. 
 H2
 
 100 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 as follows. Suppose a child to apply a piece of 
 paper to a lighted candle, he would see it take fire 
 and disappear ; and if asked about it, would simply 
 reply, that the candle had burnt the paper: but he 
 would not have the most remote conception of Cause 
 and Effect ; and that for the best of reasons, namely, 
 that he had no knowledge of this or any other Rela- 
 tion. We will suppose him arrived at maturity, and 
 to make a repetition of the same act. Having by 
 this time become master of the phrase ' Cause and 
 Effect* and other Abstractions, he could now say, 
 that the candle was the Cause, and what took place, 
 the Effect ; and so he would think he knew all about 
 it : but if we suppose him to be able to reflect, we 
 may imagine him to have some knowledge of the 
 real value of words, and, consequently, to feel that 
 the term ' Effect' was but an Abstraction, and, that 
 though he had thought the candle to be the Cause, 
 this could not possibly be the case, as a Concrete 
 Thing (the candle) could not produce the Abstract 
 State ' Effect.' After a little consideration, he would 
 see, that if the Correlation ( Effect' was an Abstrac- 
 tion, its Relation must be equally so. He might then 
 ask himself what was the particular Effect that oc- 
 curred in the instance of the candle, and he would 
 feel that it was 'Combustion.' The moment he 
 was aware of this, he would seek for the particular 
 Abstraction that the mind required to stand in Re- 
 lation to it, and he would discover that it was
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 101 
 
 ' Ignition 33 .' He would now feel that the Ignition 
 (by the candle) produced the Combustion (of the 
 paper) ; and, that when the matter was expressed 
 solely by General Language, The candle only STOOD 
 IN THE RELATION of Cause (the ignition) to the Effect 
 (combustion), and that both Cause and Effect were 
 simply Abstractions of the highest generality, and not 
 Things. If acquainted with the elements of algebra, 
 he would be aware that he could not say candle = b; 
 but, that if he used the abstract sign b, he must com- 
 pare it with another sign equally abstract, and he 
 would consequently say a = b. This shows to what 
 an extent metaphysicians have deceived themselves, 
 in supposing that Things and Physical Power had any 
 thing to do with the Abstract and General Conception 
 ' Cause and Effect.' And as to the sequences they 
 talk about, these, though they do exist in a limited 
 degree in nature and art 34 , have nothing to do with 
 the intellectual sequences which are alone connected 
 with this Relation. For instance, A Good Disposition 
 and Cultivation stand in the Relation of Causes to Good 
 Principles: these, too, stand in the same Relation to 
 Virtuous Actions ; and these, again, to Happiness. Not- 
 
 ( 33 ) Here it is evident that ignition is the altering-sTATE, and com- 
 bustion the altered-STATE. The previous state of the paper was cohesion, 
 in which combustion has induced a change of State or condition ; that is 
 to say, such is the Abstract Expression of the fact : but the simple truth 
 that is evident to the senses is, as a child would express himself, 
 that Tlie candle burnt the paper. 
 
 ( 34 ) See 11 of Note (B) of the Appendix.
 
 102 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 withstanding, however, the continual reference made 
 by Hume and others to the notion of sequence, there 
 are very few sequences in nature which stand in the 
 Relation of Cause and Effect. Thus, one season 
 does not produce another; Winter does not give 
 rise to Spring ;- nor does the greenness of the leaf 
 in Spring occasion the brown tint observed in it in 
 Autumn ; the flow does not force on the ebb of the 
 tide, nor the ebb the flow ; neither does day draw 
 on the night, nor night the day. The Antecedents, 
 in all these cases, are not the Causes, but the Con- 
 ditions of their Consequents ; the only Relation they 
 stand in to one another being that of Contrast. 
 
 78. The word Cause is so often confounded with 
 Reason and Motive, that I feel that the next step 
 should be to clear up the ambiguity. Let us sup- 
 pose we saw an infant lying dead, which we ex- 
 pected to find alive and well, we should naturally 
 ask What was the Cause of its death? and if we were 
 answered Neglect, the Cause would then be as- 
 signed: but if we asked again, By whose neglect? 
 and were told, By its mothers, our knowledge of the 
 Cause would be enlarged, by being put in possession 
 of the Reason : and if we pushed our inquiries 
 
 ( 3i ) Here we see an instance that an Abstract Word can stand in the 
 Relation of Cause ; a thing never suspected to such an extent has 
 this question been misunderstood. Cause always represents abstract, 
 and never physical agency.
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 103 
 
 further, and demanded ON what account ? and were 
 answered, From her antipathy to it; we should then 
 have the Motive, as we already had the Cause and 
 the Reason of its death. Here we see, clearly, why 
 these notions are so closely connected together in 
 the mind : and, as it will be necessary, hereafter, to 
 investigate each of them in its proper place, I shall 
 content myself with having pointed out the reason of 
 their being so often substituted for one another. 
 Having premised these general remarks, I proceed 
 to consider the most celebrated opinions that have 
 been held with regard to this Relation, from anti- 
 quity to the present time : begging the reader to 
 bear in mind, that Cause and Effect do not exist in 
 the works and processes of nature and art, but only 
 in the Conception of the mind that reasons upon 
 them 3e . 
 
 79. Pyrrho was the first great doubter, among 
 the Greeks, who seems to have been deluded by the 
 trickery of language. The opinion of himself and 
 followers, as handed down by Diogenes Laertius, 
 
 ( 36 ) When I speak of Conceptions existing in the mtnrf, in any part 
 of these remarks, and the reader remembers that I say Conceptions are 
 mere words preserved by the memory, he must not suppose that 
 I contradict myself. In 15G 165, I have shown what the phrase 
 * The Mind' really means. Conceptions exist, then, hi the forms of 
 speech that constitute what we call ' The Mind,' but not in the Intel- 
 lect. See 158, and the last sentence of 17.
 
 104 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 and interpreted by Sir James Mackintosh 37 , is as fol- 
 lows : " Causation they take away thus. A Cause 
 is so only in relation to an Effect. What is relative 
 is only conceived, but does not exist; therefore 
 cause is a mere conception." Now, every word of 
 this is as true as that two and two make four 3 *; 
 but the inference he was said to draw from it was 
 altogether a delusion, from his ignorance of the na- 
 ture of language. That Cause is only a Relation, 
 every just reasoner will allow ; and that Effect is 
 the name of its Correlative Relation, will be equally 
 granted : but when this is done, and we admit that 
 Relations are only creatures of the mind, we have in 
 no respect done away with the things or persons 
 that we have conceived to be related ; and when it 
 was said that Pyrrho would not get out of the way 
 of a carriage, because he had convinced himself that 
 Cause and Effect were mere Conceptions, he was as 
 absurd as a man who should say to himself, ( Father 
 and Son are mere Relations : now, as all Relationship 
 is a mental Conception) there are no such creatures as 
 
 ( 37 ) Note (Q) in SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH'S Dissertation on the Pro- 
 gress of Ethical Philosophy. 
 
 ( M ) I had printed an Essay on Cause and Effect, to prove its Concep- 
 tional Character, before I was aware that I had been anticipated by 
 Pyrrho. I have reprinted it in NOTE (B) of the Appendix. That 
 part which related to Power, and which did not strictly belong to the 
 question of Cause and Effect, will be found under 126130 of the 
 text; and some remarks on "Ex Xihilo, Nihilfit" in NOTE (D) of 
 the Appendix.
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 105 
 
 men, and I will not, therefore, get out of the way of 
 that mad Son of mine, who threatens to run me through 
 with his sword' The absurdity of this last instance 
 is too strong to require any other comment, than 
 that it would have been strictly in accordance with 
 the notions and conduct attributed to Pyrrho, if we 
 do not relieve him from the imputation of being so 
 very inconsistent, by supposing that his extreme 
 scepticism had raised him up enemies, who have 
 wilfully misrepresented his opinions : he must 
 have been too well aware, that the Conceptional 
 Character of any form of speech, in which a fact may 
 be described, cannot re-act on the fact itself, and 
 disprove its existence. 
 
 80. The delusive influence of language over 
 the mind is equally shown in Algazel, the Ara- 
 bian : for of him it is said, that " he denied a neces- 
 sary connexion between Cause and Effect; for of 
 two things, the affirmation of the existence of the 
 one does not necessarily contain the affirmation of 
 the other ; and the same may be said of denial ." 
 When Algazel denied a necessary connexion be- 
 tween Cause and Effect, he quite overlooked the 
 fact, that these two words were not merely Relations, 
 but that they were, moreover, of that kind in which, 
 as I have before said, Effect is the Correlation of 
 
 (- 19 ) See Note (Q) in SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH'S Dissertation on the 
 Projress of Ethical Philosophy.
 
 106 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 Cause ; and that, by this very circumstance, they 
 imply one another, and consequently must be neces- 
 sarily connected. Cause must, therefore, as uni- 
 formly suggest the notion of Effect, as Father does 
 that of Child, and Husband that of Wife. But when 
 we have convinced ourselves of this fact, it still 
 cannot be applied to prove, as Algazel remarked, 
 that, of " two separate things, the affirmation of the 
 existence of the one necessarily contains the affir- 
 mation of the other." Algazel, therefore, was both 
 right and wrong. He was wrong in his inference, 
 which is the leading member of his sentence; and 
 he was quite right in the last clause, which is that 
 from which he drew it, though his assertion was a 
 mere truism. His mistake arose from his not being 
 aware, that, in the first case, he was dealing with 
 Abstract Relations ; and in the other with Realities, as 
 is proved by his employing the words " two sepa- 
 rate things": he, consequently, made the mistake 
 that is inevitable from confounding together these 
 opposite classes of words. Algazel's error is that 
 of all metaphysicians. They forget that the Per- 
 ception is a Thing; but that the RELATION in which 
 it stands is a mere Conception. Now, the Cause 
 being a Relation, it leads to interminable confusion 
 in reasoning, to suppose it and the thing related to be 
 one and the same. He likewise fell into another 
 error, that is uniformly made by those who reason 
 on the nature of Cause and Effect ; and not merely
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 107 
 
 forgot that these words are simply Abstract Rela- 
 tions, but that an Effect, no more than a Cause, can 
 ever be a " Thing" but a Change produced by that 
 which the mind conceives to stand in the Relation 
 of Cause ; which CHANGE is properly called an EFFECT, 
 and not a " Thing :" nay, so far from this being 
 the case, any one has only to attend to the course of 
 common conversation, or to the works he may read, 
 and he will find, that we as often refer to a single 
 abstract word a whole sentence, or even a long 
 detail of facts, as standing in the Relation of 
 Cause, as we do to " Things" and for the same 
 reason; we equally assert that another word, or 
 set of circumstances, was the Effect. Thus we 
 say, Virtue is the Cause of Happiness; in which 
 that which stands in the Relation of Cause is 
 a single word, and that an Abstract one too, while 
 it amounts to a whole sentence, in the following 
 remark : The Cause of the fickleness and injustice 
 of the multitude (Effects) does not merely arise from 
 their ignorance and envy, but from their acting 
 at all times under the impulse of the moment, in- 
 stead of their being guided by the dictates of reason 
 and reflection: and from the same Causes there can be 
 (Effects) no stability in democratic communities, if they 
 are not driven into a state of union, by pressure from 
 ivithout a position that quickly awakens them to a 
 .sense of gratitude, and obliges tfiem to look again for 
 assistance from those who had proved themselves the
 
 108 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 tried friends and benefactors of the commonwealth. 
 So, also, Gibbon might have summed up the con- 
 tents of his great History, by saying, Such were 
 the Causes that led to (Effects) the decline and fall 
 
 (*) The unworthy treatment experienced by Aristides and Scipio 
 Africanus, two of the greatest patriots, as well as the best men of anti- 
 quity, will sufficiently support this opinion. Those who admire Repub- 
 lics will point to the United States of America; but they should 
 remember, that its back- woods are the safety-valve, where the more 
 daring and restless spirits of the nation can find a proper scene for 
 their activity; and that but for this relief then* system must have 
 exploded long ago. The United States afford the extraordinary 
 spectacle of a People without a Government ; for an Executive that is 
 under the necessity of fulfilling the bidding of the populace at every 
 effervescence of feeling, is no Government, hi the proper sense of the 
 word ; as this term can only apply to that which is able to control 
 not foreign nations but its own people. If there is one name more 
 than another that the Americans must revere, it is that of Washington 
 and one for whom, perhaps, they can never hope to produce a 
 parallel : but let them remember, that his integrity, straightforward 
 conduct, and disinterestedness, were not the result of their system, but 
 of that which gave birth to the moral dignity of a Chatham, and the 
 host of other illustrious men, for which Great Britain will be renowned 
 as long as history endures. It is English Institutions that have 
 reason to be proud of Washington, and not the North-American 
 Republic, which was the offspring, and not the parent of the Deliverer 
 of his Country. Every good that America can boast of, she has 
 derived from the Parent State : and she would commit the parricidal 
 act of destroy ing her if she could, because she cannot forget the injus- 
 tice of one obstinate Ruler, who was never countenanced in his coercive 
 measures by our wisest statesmen, nor by the nation at large ! Does 
 she suppose, for a moment, that either self-respect or glory would 
 result from the success of such an effort ? No : foreign nations would 
 only exult, and exclaim, " Thank God, one portion of the Anglo-Saxon 
 race is extinguished as an empire ! May the remainder soon perish, by its 
 own turbulent and unruly hand.'"
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 109 
 
 of the Roman Empire: yet, in all these instances, 
 that which stands in the Relation of Cause is not a 
 " Thing"; nor does it convey the notion of physical 
 agency. 
 
 81. The opinion of Saint Thomas Aquinas being 
 identical with that of Hume indeed so much 
 so, that the latter is supposed to have derived it 
 from him it is only necessary to mention his 
 name here, in the chronological order in which 
 this celebrated man lived : and I pass on to Locke, 
 who is the next great authority, and who seems to 
 have been quite ignorant of the important truth 
 discovered, and misapplied, by Pyrrho; namely, 
 that the Relation of Cause and Effect was merely 
 a mental Conception. The definition Locke gives 
 of Cause and Effect is as follows 41 : A cause is 
 that which makes any other thing, either simple idea, 
 substance, or mode, begin to be : and an effect is that 
 which had its beginning from something else. Here 
 Locke, in assigning his notion of Cause, explains 
 his conception of an Effect at the same time : and 
 he then tells us again, in less express terms, what he 
 considers is an Effect. So far from thinking Cause 
 a Relation, he says it is "that which makes any 
 other thing, either simple idea, substance, or mode, 
 begin to be." He has here been misled by the 
 
 (") Bk. II. Ch. xxvi. 2.
 
 110 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 meaning of the verb To cause (see 93, 110), and con- 
 verts a Cause into an Agent or Maker ; and an Effect, 
 so far from being the mere change (altered- STATE) 
 resulting from the action of that which stood in the 
 Relation of Cause, he considers as a "simple idea, 
 substance, or mode," which the Agent has made to 
 "begin to be." The definition is at once verbose 
 and erroneous ; for if a production or creature can be 
 said to be an Effect that is, a change there is an 
 end to all distinctions of language. 
 
 82. The foregoing remarks on Locke's notion 
 of Cause and Effect will be sufficient to show that 
 he had not a true conception of the nature of the 
 Relation ; and that, in fact, like all other philosophers 
 who went before him (Pyrrho excepted), he con- 
 ceived that things could be both Causes and Effects. 
 I now, therefore, proceed to consider the remarks 
 of Hume, who has done more than all other writers 
 to perplex this question : and as his authority has 
 had great influence, it will be necessary to consider 
 his opinions with the closest attention. He sets out 
 by saying 42 , "that all reasonings concerning matter 
 of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause 
 and Effect. By the means of that relation alone we 
 can go beyond the evidence of our memory and 
 senses." He then, a little afterwards, says, " Causes 
 
 ( 4 ') Essays, Vol. II. Section II.
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. Ill 
 
 and Effects are discoverable, not by reason, but by 
 experience" But to show that, when he made use of 
 the terms Cause and Effect, he had not any idea of 
 their true nature, it is only necessary to attend to 
 the following quotations : " All the operations of 
 bodies, without exception, are known only by expe- 
 rience." Again : " When we reason a priori, and 
 consider merely any object or cause, as it appears 
 to the mind, independent of all observation, it never 
 could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object, 
 such as its effect ; much less show us the inseparable 
 and inviolable connexion between them." Finally, 
 his two formal definitions of Cause and Effect may 
 be brought in evidence : 
 
 " Similar objects," he says, " are always conjoined 
 with similar. Of this we have experience. Suit- 
 ably to this experience, therefore, we may define a 
 cause to be an object, followed by another; and where 
 all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by 
 objects similar to the second: or, in other words, 
 where, if the first object had not been, the second had 
 never existed. The appearance of a cause always 
 conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the 
 idea of the effect. Of this, also, we have experience. 
 We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, 
 form another definition of cause; and call it, 
 an object followed by another, and whose appearance 
 always conveys the thought to that other. But though 
 both these definitions be drawn from circumstances
 
 112 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 foreign to the cause 43 , we cannot remedy this in- 
 convenience, or attain any more perfect definition, 
 which may point out that circumstance in the cause 
 which gives it a connexion with its effect 44 ." 
 
 Now, if the reader give but the most cursory 
 attention to these extracts, he will feel that Hume 
 had totally mistaken the nature of the Relation, and 
 that he was considering the observed operations AND 
 
 PHENOMENA OF NATURE in which, of COUrSC, he 
 
 sought in vain for a necessary connexion, and not 
 the purely intellectual distinctions, which we set up 
 as often as we reason upon those operations, when 
 we consider them in the abstract. That we know 
 nothing except from experience, few would have 
 been inclined to doubt, after the perusal of Locke's 
 work. To give, therefore, Hume the benefit of 
 being merely consistent in his arguments, we must 
 always understand that his OBJECTS, or CAUSES, are 
 
 ( 43 ) Hume, by this remark, apparently alludes to the notion of 
 Power as the true Cause ; but neither he nor Locke had even ima- 
 gined that there could be a distinction between Abstract and Physical 
 Power : both metaphysicians were Realists, and therefore every thing 
 they spoke of was, in their imaginations, equally real. See Note to 
 123. 
 
 ( 44 ) Essays, Vol. II. Section VII. Part II. Not to distract the 
 reader's attention, I have not made any observations on the verbal 
 inaccuracies in the above extracts ; but in 85 88, he will have 
 specimens of the internal constitution of Hume's arguments, that will 
 show him how unsafe a guide so loose and vague a reasoner really is ; 
 and how much he dealt in mere phrases, and words of which he had 
 not previously fixed the meaning.
 
 OP CAUSE AND EFFECT. 113 
 
 not Abstract Relations, but the real Things* we dis- 
 cover by our senses. He, consequently, argues to 
 show, that we know nothing of the nature of the 
 necessary connexion between Objects, that is, why 
 one change follows another ; and that therefore we 
 have no authority, but Custom or Habit* 5 , for attri- 
 buting a necessary connexion to Cause and Effect ; 
 two mere Abstract Relations, that I have shown to 
 be inseparably connected by their related existence 
 in the mind. When he said, therefore, that it was 
 " by means of the relation of cause and effect we are 
 enabled to go beyond the evidence of our memory and 
 senses" he was really drawing strongly upon the 
 want of reflection to which mankind are prone on 
 such subjects ; for who thinks of either Cause or 
 Effect, when he calls to mind a kindness or an 
 injury, or the scenes and friends of his childhood ; 
 and yet no one doubts the excellence of his memory 
 and senses with regard to the past. It is evident, 
 therefore, that when Hume attempted to prove that 
 the universal notion of the necessary connexion 
 between Cause and Effect is only derived from Ex- 
 perience, he fell into a palpable fallacy. He over- 
 looked the fact, and, as I have shown, the very im- 
 portant distinction too, that the necessary connexion 
 between Cause and Effect, as mere Abstract Relations, 
 
 (4 s ) Hume invariably considered Things in operation as Causes. 
 C* 6 ) It is clear that Hume did not feel the distinction between these 
 two words. See 41. 
 
 I
 
 114 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 exists in the mind, and not between the phenomena 
 of nature ; and it therefore follows, that the question 
 of Cause and Effect has nothing to do with that of 
 Experience ; a consequence that could not fail to 
 have been perceived by Hume, had he known what 
 was the true nature of the Relation ; but, from what 
 I have already said, and what remains to be shown, 
 it is clear that neither he nor his predecessors, with 
 the exception of Pyrrho, had any but the most 
 crude conception of its character. His Essay will 
 always remain as a 'proof how much a fine compo- 
 sition will serve, as an impenetrable veil, to conceal 
 the greatest fallacies and inconsistencies ; but so far 
 from throwing any light on the Relation of Cause 
 and Effect, he might just as well have danced an 
 elegant minuet in its place : indeed, he has, by his 
 authority, thrown such a gloom over the question, 
 that those who have since reasoned upon it have 
 not been able to see their way, in the least, through 
 its perplexities. 
 
 83. So, after all the parade made by Hume in 
 this Essay on a necessary connexion, and which he 
 evidently flung amongst metaphysicians with the 
 same glee that Zeno did his sophism relating to 
 Motion, it turns out that this modern Achilles, 
 like its celebrated prototype, is nothing more than 
 an oversight. It would indeed be strange, if the hu- 
 man understanding were so "ignorant and weak" as
 
 OP CAUSE AND EFFECT. 115 
 
 he supposes it, and that it had such a universal 
 conviction without any just foundation; in short, 
 that it believed in what there was no warrant for 
 believing, and that equally among the most savage 
 as well as the most civilised races, in ancient as well 
 as in modern times. 
 
 84. It will not, perhaps, surprise any one, after 
 these remarks, that Hume should make another mis- 
 take in the same Essay ; though he had unwittingly 
 fallen upon the true distinction by the mere forms of 
 routine phrases, when uninfluenced by system : for 
 in the following passages he has employed the word 
 Event; and yet, inconsistently enough, immediately 
 after uses Object as a synonymous term. The mistake 
 is greater than that made by Algazel ; for he con- 
 founded Things with Abstract Relations : but Hume, 
 in this case, has committed the error of making an 
 Event the same as an Object. His words are 
 
 85. "Solidity, extension, motion 47 ; these quali- 
 ties are all complete in themselves, and never point 
 out any other event which may result from them. 
 The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, 
 
 ( 47 ) Hume borrowed the words solidity, extension, and motion from 
 Locke; as may be seen by referring to 184 of this work. This is 
 the way new systems are built up : old materials are taken without 
 any examination of their soundness, and few men quarry for them- 
 selves. 
 
 i 2
 
 116 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 and one object follows another in an uninterrupted 
 succession ; but the power or force which actuates 
 the whole machine is entirely concealed from us, 
 and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qua- 
 lities of body 48 ." 
 
 86. We should certainly think that any one who 
 might write a passage like the following had a 
 greater knowledge of phrases than of the things he 
 was describing : 
 
 " Guns, balls, gunpowder ; these qualities are all 
 complete in themselves, and never point out any 
 other event which may be produced by them. The 
 scenes of an arsenal are continually shifting, and one 
 object follows another in uninterrupted succession ; 
 but the care or attention which regulates the whole 
 magazine is entirely concealed from us, and never 
 discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of the 
 materials of war." 
 
 87. Perhaps the above farrago will rather startle 
 the reader, though he may have read the passage 
 which has given rise to it without his attention being 
 roused. Yet, what causes this difference of judg- 
 ment? Simply this; that from his infancy he has 
 been familiarised with the objects just enumerated, 
 and he is at once aware of the incongruities heaped 
 
 (*) Essays, Vol. II. Section VII. Part I.
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 117 
 
 together: but, in the other case, he does not, perhaps, 
 feel the exact value of each word ; because they are 
 mere Abstractions, the import of which can only be 
 learned by a thorough knowledge of language and 
 deep reflection. For, in those matters that are above 
 our comprehension, we are too apt to be contented 
 with periods that are elegantly turned, and in which 
 an easy flow of language prevents us from suspecting 
 inconsistency. We must therefore be convinced, 
 that, in such cases, our imagination is, at the best, 
 but agreeably soothed and tickled by an harmonious 
 concord of sounds, arranged in such correct gram- 
 matical dependence, as must always lull our atten- 
 tion, and, consequently, prevent us from detecting 
 the imposition that has been practised upon our 
 judgment. But, to show that the above representa- 
 tion is not overstrained, I proceed to the analysis of 
 Hume's own words. . 
 
 88. Now, passing over the fact, that Solidity 
 and Extension are properties, and not qualities, and 
 that Motion is a State, and neither a property nor a 
 quality , and that not one of these words, moreover, 
 can, even by the utmost torturing of language, be 
 called an Event, we must still admit that there 
 exists a singular degree of confusion in this passage : 
 for how could it be expected, by any one who knew 
 the exact import of words, that " the power or force
 
 118 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 which actuates the whole machine" should discover 
 " itself in any of the sensible qualities of body " ? 
 The operation of "power or force" sufficient to 
 move a machine can only be discovered by the Mo- 
 tion of some of its parts ; and such Motion is not a 
 " sensible quality," but, as I have just said, a State ; 
 and how could it be produced by either of the Abs- 
 tractions, "force or power"? But it must be further 
 seen, that Hume employed the word Object in the 
 same sense as Event ; and, if the reader has any mis- 
 givings on the subject, he will find this fact placed 
 beyond all doubt, by attending to a second quotation 
 I shall make. It is very likely that he has, like myself, 
 often read both these passages without ever feeling 
 the nonsense they contain. This will prove to him, 
 how easy it is for us to trip lightly over what is 
 written with smoothness and elegance; and how 
 necessary it is to weigh every expression where truth 
 is at stake. The same confusion subsisting in his 
 mind as in the former passage, he says 
 
 "But when one particular species of event has 
 always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, 
 we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one 
 upon the appearance of the other, and of employing 
 that reasoning which can alone assure us of any 
 matter of fact or existence. We then call the one 
 object, Cause ; the other, Effect. We suppose that 
 there is some connexion between them ; some power
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 119 
 
 in the one by which it infallibly produces the other, 
 and operates with the greatest certainty and strong- 
 est necessity 49 ." 
 
 89. These are interesting instances how an acute 
 and powerful mind may be betrayed into false rea- 
 soning, by not possessing an accurate and almost 
 instinctive feeling of the force of words. Even the 
 first sentence in the above passage is incorrect in 
 reasoning and expression, because he makes the 
 word Event 50 stand for both Cause and Effect: and 
 so also in the next, for the mere sake of avoiding 
 tautology, he employs Object for Event. It is diffi- 
 cult, however, to imagine how he could have fallen 
 into the error of supposing an Effect to be an Object, 
 even if he knew not, or had forgotten, that both it 
 and Cause are merely Abstract Relations ? Indeed, 
 the whole passage is a tissue of absurdities. 
 
 ( 49 ) Essays, Vol. II. Section VII. Part II. 
 
 ( 50 ) Hume may have taken the word ' event ' in the sense of occur- 
 rence, instead of the consequence or result of an action, which is what 
 the subject demanded. Either 'Effect' or 'Change' would have been 
 a much less ambiguous term for his purpose, than ' Event.' It has, 
 however, become a favourite expression with succeeding metaphy- 
 sicians : mankind seem led to copy one another, by the same unerring 
 instinct that makes a flock of sheep follow the bell-wether. 
 
 These views were written while I had not an opportunity of con- 
 sulting Hume's work on Human Nature : but his Essays, and the pas- 
 sage already quoted, will show that he used the word ' Object' syste- 
 matically ; and it follows, that ' Event ' was only introduced by way 
 of changing the phrase. The confusion of thought that led to his 
 making an indiscriminate use of these two words, in a similar sense, 
 is remarkable.
 
 120 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 90. It is seldom that any error is detected, 
 which is of itself not obvious, till it has produced its 
 full consequences: and then the extreme case, at 
 which the understanding has arrived, being evi- 
 dently absurd, even to the multitude, those who 
 assume the airs and name of philosophers are reluc- 
 tantly forced to reconsider the steps that have led 
 them to such extravagant conclusions ; when a fresh 
 inquiry often helps them to discover the first step 
 that led them into their error. The misconception 
 of Hume gave rise to no less a consequence than the 
 extraordinary work of Kant, called " The Critick of 
 Pure Reason":, but though this renowned produc- 
 tion of misapplied genius, on its first appearance, 
 startled every person of sound sense, yet the fallacy 
 upon which it is founded was so far from having 
 been detected, that the work has even won the ap- 
 plause of many who were the first to feel doubts 
 respecting its truth. Hume had, by his false reason- 
 ings, so perplexed the question of Cause and Effect, 
 that the minds of men were ready for the reception 
 of almost any solution of the difficulty he had started 
 regarding a necessary connexion; and though he 
 had said that the true solution was, that it arose 
 from Custom or Habit, yet Kant at once saw that this 
 could not possibly be the case ; but then he did not, 
 at the same time, perceive that Hume had attri- 
 buted this connexion to the phenomena of nature, 
 and not to its real constituents mere Abstractions,
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 121 
 
 that we employ as Antecedents and Consequents in 
 reasoning. Kant, therefore, began to hunt about for 
 some better solution of the problem of error than 
 Custom, and he thought he found it in Necessity. 
 Reflecting upon this supposed discovery, he consi- 
 dered, that if the human understanding had this one 
 Conception not drawn from that grand storehouse of 
 our knowledge Experience, which Locke had laid 
 open to mankind, we might have more; and from 
 this notion he deduced his twelve celebrated Cate- 
 gories or intuitions, on which he built his transcen- 
 dental system. As these are too important to be 
 omitted in this work, the reader will find them more 
 appropriately considered in 185 192. However, 
 it will be as well to see what hints can be found of 
 Kant's own notion of Cause and Effect. First, then, 
 it will be thought not a little remarkable, that a 
 mind so logical as his should have uttered a phrase 
 so near the truth, as that "Every change has its 
 cause 51 " without feeling that the word ' change,' 
 being an Abstraction, its true Antecedent must ne- 
 cessarily be an Abstract Word of the same nature. 
 Had he but seen this inevitable conclusion, he would 
 have been at once led to feel that the two Concep- 
 tions or words stood in the state of Relation and 
 Correlation to one another, and that therefore, as 
 such, they (but not the phenomena of nature) were 
 
 ( Sl ) Pp. 4, 6 of The Critick of Pure Reason.
 
 122 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 necessarily linked together in the mind. But having 
 persuaded himself, that though Hume's solution was 
 faulty, yet that the view he had taken of the Rela- 
 tion was right, he brought himself to believe that 
 the notion of the connexion between the operations 
 and phenomena of nature, instead of being derived 
 from Experience, exists through the constructive 
 form which pure Reason (see 191) confers, through 
 its absolute nature, upon the materials presented 
 to it by the Understanding ( 190). Upon this 
 unsound foundation it was that Kant built up 
 his fallacious system, an inverted pyramid, which 
 rests, like the Mercury of John of Bologna, only 
 on a breath 62 (necessity). To the dark and intricate 
 convolutions of Kant's systematic and logical brain 
 must be attributed the order, symmetry and ob- 
 scurity that have at once delighted, astonished, and 
 confounded his readers. But when he placed such 
 reliance on Hume, and made so capital a mistake, 
 
 ( SJ ) Shakspeare, who seems to have observed every thing that came 
 within his reach, appears to have had in his eye the beautiful and 
 graceful statue of Mercury rising from the breath of Zephyr, in these 
 lines: 
 
 " A station like the herald Mercury, 
 New-lighted on a heaven-kissing hill." 
 
 The puffed-out cheeks of Zephyr, when the figure is viewed in front, 
 from below, bear a strong resemblance to a hill : and a friend, in my 
 presence, though possessed of excellent sight and judgment, made this 
 mistake, at the first glance he took of a small plaster cast of this fine 
 specimen of modern art.
 
 OP CAUSE AND EFFECT. 123 
 
 he was not aware that the Conception of Necessity, 
 like all other notions, being a mere Abstraction, has 
 no other existence than as a word ; and that had 
 Locke even been in error with regard to the doc- 
 trine of Experience, it gave him (Kant) no grounds 
 to establish a system, built entirely on mere Abstract 
 Relations, that are only so many symbols for reason- 
 ing ; the very ability displayed in his work being 
 the more pernicious, by its tendency to fetter the 
 understandings of mankind, already too much en- 
 slaved and oppressed by the misconceptions of pre- 
 ceding writers. 
 
 91. Any one who has attended to the tenour of 
 the preceding remarks, as well as to the arguments 
 of modern writers, will be at no loss to discover that 
 the sources of error on this question by metaphysi- 
 cians are threefold : 
 
 92. First. They consider a Thing or object as 
 being a Cause ; and they do the same likewise with 
 regard to an Effect. The consequence of this mis- 
 conception is, that though they talk of the Relation 
 of Cause and Effect, when the context leads them to 
 the right term, they utterly overlook their own in- 
 consistency, and forget that an Abstract Relation 
 cannot imply either a Thing or object. 
 
 93. Secondly. Deluded by language, they suppose
 
 124 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 that a Relation can be converted into a verb, and 
 that the verb to cause has therefore the same 
 sense as the Relation of Cause. Now, to cause 
 meaning " to effect as an agent," they are evidently 
 talking of an Agent, when they suppose they are 
 speaking of the Relation of Cause and Effect ; and 
 then, carrying out this error a step farther, they 
 imagine the term Causation, implying " the act or 
 power of causing," that is, of effecting like an Agent, 
 means the relation of Cause and Effect also ; though 
 we have seen that any abstraction, sentence, or 
 chain of reasoning can stand in the Relation of 
 Cause. 
 
 94. Thirdly. Having got so far into the error of 
 substituting Agent for Abstract Agency, we find Hume, 
 very naturally, going one step farther still than his 
 predecessors, and inquiring into the notion of 
 Power, which must lie at the bottom of every ques- 
 tion relating to the phenomena of nature. The 
 magnificent and mysterious operations observable 
 in the universe could not fail, therefore, to be the 
 first subject upon which he would fix his attention : 
 and seeing that one change follows another in an 
 uninterrupted sequence, yet one in which human 
 reason cannot discover any necessary connexion, he 
 triumphantly turned round, and asked, How it is 
 that mankind so firmly believe in the necessary 
 connexion of Cause and Effect ? Pleased with the
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 125 
 
 grand discovery he thought he had made of a con- 
 tradiction between fact and belief, it may be easily 
 imagined that he said to himself, ( Look now at the 
 " ignorance and weakness" of the human under- 
 standing ! see how it believes in what it can offer no 
 reason for doing, and that, too, in what is of the 
 first consequence to all belief ! ' 
 
 95. The remedy for all this confusion is, not to 
 talk of the Relation of Cause and Effect till we 
 have a clear conception of its nature ; and never, 
 in any instance, to employ the word Causation for 
 Abstract Agency, nor Cause for Agent : by which 
 means we shall then cease to talk like the School- 
 men of such things as 
 
 1. First Cause 53 , 
 
 2. Efficient Cause, 
 
 3. Material Cause, 
 
 4. Final Cause: 
 
 and we shall consequently bear in mind, that we 
 are no longer speaking of Relations, but Agents; as 
 the word Cause, in the two first of the above instances, 
 has no other sense. The advantage that would 
 
 ( M ) The expression " Causa causarum " is incorrect ; as the word 
 Causa is here used in the sense of Agent ; while Source or Origin is 
 what is alone admissible, if we attend to Common Sense and Logic, two 
 things that can never exist separately. The Arabic phrase ' MUSAB- 
 BIBU 'L ASBAB,' " Causer of causes" though more correct in form, is 
 faulty in conception. See 76, 110.
 
 126 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 attend such a reform would be, that we should then 
 be aware of the superior clearness of our reason- 
 ings, if we called these expressions, respectively, by 
 the name of 
 
 1. Creator, or Origin, 
 
 2. Operative Agent, 
 
 3. Matter, or Substance, 
 
 4. End, or Purpose ; 
 
 because, in every process of thought, it is of the first 
 consequence to have terms that are perfectly clear 
 and unambiguous. We have still too many relics of 
 the jargon of the Schools; and the sooner we dismiss 
 them, the better. 
 
 96. The foregoing remarks contain all, I think, 
 it is necessary to offer on the Relation of Cause and 
 Effect, when it is unconnected with Reason and 
 Consequence, and the other Relations with which it is 
 so often, and unavoidably, mixed up : and I there- 
 fore proceed to the consideration of these last ; which 
 will, moreover, be of use in helping to dispel any 
 delusion the reader may still labour under, on this 
 much misunderstood subject : and I therefore con- 
 clude this branch of the inquiry with three defini- 
 tions of Cause and Effect, out of which the reader 
 can select that which best suits the form of his 
 mind. 
 
 97. Whatever produces a Change, STANDS (in our
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 127 
 
 minds) in the RELATION of Cause; and whatever 
 Change results from it, in that of Effect. 
 
 Or, in other words : 
 
 Cause is that general RELATION which we contem- 
 plate as effecting whatever we see take place. 
 
 Effect is that general CORRELATION which we con- 
 ceive to result from that which STANDS IN RELATION 
 to it. 
 
 Or, again : 
 
 Cause is the altering-STAVE. 
 Effect is the altered-STAVE. 
 
 Of Reason and Consequence. 
 98. The question of Reason and Consequence 
 being, as I have already said, so much connected 
 with that of Cause and Effect, the consideration of 
 it naturally follows as the next in the order of sub- 
 jects. It is singular, that its obvious connexion with 
 Cause and Effect has been altogether overlooked in 
 every investigation regarding the latter question; 
 and still more so, when even a child appeals to the 
 fact as often as it assigns a Reason for its actions. 
 Yet, in every instance in which the word Because 
 (by cause 54 ) is employed, we have an example of 
 
 ( M ) The common use of 'Because' is itself a proof how natural is 
 the tendency of the mind to confound Cause and Reason together ; for 
 instead of ' Because ' we ought to employ ' By Reason' So we use, in- 
 differently for one another, the expressions, ' Through this Cause, 'For 
 
 this
 
 123 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 the conjunction of these two Relations. Whenever, 
 therefore, we employ this word, there is a Reason 
 given in which we shall also see an example of 
 Cause and Effect; and it is further of the greatest 
 value, in placing beyond all contradiction and dis- 
 pute the Abstract Nature of the word Cause. By its 
 means, therefore, and that of the word Effect (which 
 explains itself to every mind), we may satisfy our- 
 selves that Cause never means a "Thing"; as has 
 been supposed by all metaphysicians, if we except 
 Pyrrho, though he knew not how to avail himself of 
 the truth he had discovered. We shall likewise be 
 able to ascertain, with perfect clearness, why Rea- 
 son can be always substituted for it, at pleasure, as 
 well as the word Motive, whenever it relates to a 
 rational being ; and we shall consequently see that 
 the human understanding, so far from displaying 
 " ignorance and weakness," as Hume supposed, is 
 really always in the right, when left to its own 
 discretion ; and that its deficiencies are almost inva- 
 riably the result of an attempt to force what we do 
 not fully comprehend into some system that we 
 have taken up immaturely. A case that may be 
 illustrated by that of gravitation ; which, when left 
 to its own influence, brings down to the earth every 
 
 this Reason,' ' On this Account,' and ' Therefore,' as if they had all one 
 and the same sense. The word Reason itself is not altogether that 
 which ought to be employed; as it is the Account, or explanation, 
 which Reason renders to itself of the operations observed in nature 
 and art, that we really intend by its use.
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 129 
 
 body, in the straightest line possible ; while every 
 attempt that human art could devise to facilitate 
 that end would only have the effect of deranging 
 this spontaneous effort of nature. 
 
 99. If we examine with attention the operations 
 of the human intellect, we shall find that they are, 
 like those of every thing which we include under the 
 general term ' nature,' perfectly uniform and con- 
 sistent. If we wanted, for instance, to convince 
 a savage from Terra del Fuego that a thing cannot 
 both be, and not be, at the same moment, we must 
 set about it in a similar manner that we should to 
 prove it to an infant Locke or Hume. An exami- 
 nation of the languages of the most savage races 
 will prove that they are fundamentally constructed 
 on the same principles as our own : and let it not be 
 imagined that this is a trifling fact; for only those 
 who have reflected on language are aware of its 
 complicated and exquisite mechanism. Uniformity 
 in languages could not exist, if the mode of proceed- 
 ing of the intellect was not fixed and invariable. 
 There is, therefore, but one form of intellect com- 
 mon to mankind ; but individuals and races will be 
 found to possess it in different degrees. That this 
 fact, as well as the extraordinary address of the 
 intellect in the employment of language can admit 
 of no dispute, will be evident, by attending to what 
 I am about to say. 
 
 K
 
 130 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 100. In every instance that can be produced, in 
 which we use the word < Because/ we, by its means, 
 give a reason for the Action or State that is the sub- 
 ject of what we are talking about. Sometimes it may 
 be convenient to express the Reason that moved us to 
 act ; and we then term such a Reason the Motive. 
 Hence it is evident, that the notion of a Reason is 
 always involved in the sentence that assigns either 
 the Cause or Motive ; while the Effect or Act is 
 equally involved in another sentence. A child will 
 assign a Reason for its actions, and say, " / sat down 
 BECAUSE / was tired" and similar phrases ; and yet 
 the profoundest philosophers have been completely 
 mystified by their own ingenuity, the moment they 
 have attempted to investigate the question. The 
 real fact is, that the intellect is guided in some way 
 that always enables it to effect its purpose, when 
 left to its natural efforts ; and is, almost always, 
 thwarted, the instant it is interrogated, or called upon 
 to give up a secret of which it knows no more than 
 the bird does of the unerring instinct which instructs 
 it to build its nest. Now, if we analyse the sentence 
 given above, it will be at once admitted that we 
 have a pure case of Cause and Effect, combined 
 with a Reason and a Consequence. 
 
 Reason, and Cause : I was tired. 
 
 Consequence, and Effect : I sat down. 
 
 101. In this instance there is no mention of a
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 131 
 
 " thing/ or " object " ; and that which constitutes the 
 Reason and Cause is the phrase, / was tired; while 
 the sentence / sat down, is its Consequence and 
 Effect ; which likewise, it will be allowed, are not 
 things or objects. We now see why Cause and 
 Effect must necessarily be related ; for every thing 
 we assign as a Reason must necessarily be connected 
 with that which it is intended to explain. One 
 sentence, therefore, is the Reason and Cause, and 
 the other the Consequence and Effect. But it will 
 be as well to give a few more examples, to put this 
 point beyond all doubt ; and these I shall arrange 
 under the well-known heads of Action, Being, and 
 Suffering. 
 
 ACTION. 
 The deer tremble, because the lion roars. 
 
 Reason, and Cause : The lion roars. 
 Consequence, and Effect: The deer tremble. 
 
 The window is broken, because the boy flung a 
 stone at it. 
 
 Reason, and Cause : The boy flung a stone 
 
 at the window. 
 Consequence, and Effect: The window is broken. 
 
 BEING. 
 
 The lion devoured the man, because he was hungry. 
 
 Reason, and Cause : The lion was hungry. 
 Consequence, and Effect: The lion devoured the 
 
 man. 
 K 2
 
 132 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 The boy whips his top, because he is fond of play. 
 Reason, and Cause : The boy is fond of play. 
 Consequence, and Effect : The boy whips his top. 
 
 SUFFERING. 
 
 The iron grows hot, because it is hammered. 
 
 Reason, and Cause: The iron is hammered. 
 
 Consequence, and Effect: The iron grows hot. 
 The ball rebounds, because it is struck. 
 
 Reason, and Cause : The ball is struck. 
 
 Consequence, and Effect: The ball rebounds. 
 
 In all the foregoing instances, it is the whole sen- 
 tence that stands for Reason and Cause, or Conse- 
 quence and Effect, as the case may be. 
 
 102. Having conducted the reader so far, I pro- 
 ceed to show him what are the Correlations of 
 Reason, Cause, and Motive. Reason gives rise to a 
 Consequence ; Cause is a specific kind of Reason, and 
 has its Effect ; but Motive is a particular kind or 
 variety of Cause, which produces an Act. So every 
 Motive is a Cause, and both it and Cause are Rea- 
 sons. To determine, therefore, in a definite and 
 precise manner, whether any given case is that of 
 Reason, Cause, or Motive, we have only to remem- 
 ber whether the leading sentence implies Action, 
 Being, or Suffering. If it do not, it is a Reason 
 unconnected with any notion of Cause; and its Con- 
 sequence will likewise bear evidence of the fact, by
 
 OP CAUSE AND EFFECT. 133 
 
 not implying a Change, which is the real meaning of 
 every Effect ; and such instances can only occur in 
 scientific demonstration. On the other hand, a 
 Reason that is conjoined with a Cause always con- 
 tains an instance of Action, Being, or Suffering, as 
 may be seen in the examples already given; and 
 Motive and Act are the same as Cause and Effect, 
 but can only be applied to a rational being. This 
 particular kind of Cause will be clearly compre- 
 hended by an example : 
 
 Motive : William was desirous of revenge. 
 Act : William killed Thomas. 
 
 103. The foregoing instances will be sufficient 
 to explain the nature of the difference between 
 Reasons, Causes, and Motives ; but it must not be 
 forgotten, that many Reasons, Causes or Motives 
 may combine to give rise to but one Consequence, 
 Effect, or Act. To prove this, and to show that 
 Cause never means a " Thing," or " Object," though 
 every one of these may stand in that Relation, I 
 may suppose an historian to give an account of the 
 French Revolution. He might state, in great detail, 
 all the grievances, real and imaginary, which the 
 nation had endured ; and then he might sum up the 
 whole in the following words : These were the 
 Causes that led to (Effect) the temporary subversion of 
 monarchy in France. And this example will, I think,
 
 134 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 remove any remaining doubts (if they exist) from 
 the mind of the reader as to the nature of these 
 Relations ; and he will likewise be aware, that 
 though the Term Reason and Consequence has been 
 heretofore overlooked, it is as much entitled to " a 
 local habitation and a name" as the hackneyed and 
 misunderstood Phrase f Cause and Effect,' which has 
 solely obtained such exclusive currency through the 
 misconceptions of metaphysicians, and is as subor- 
 dinate to Reason and Consequence as a branch is to 
 the trunk from which it springs. When we ask, 
 What is the Cause of that Effect? we only demand, 
 What is the PARTICULAR Reason of that Effect? 
 a fact that may help to convince those that are still 
 doubtful of the Abstract Character of Cause and 
 Effect : for I suppose no one will contest the Abs- 
 tract Sense of the word Reason. The four follow- 
 ing Relations are all equally subordinate to Reason 
 and Consequence. 
 
 Of Motive and Act, and Motive and Result. 
 
 104. So much has been said of Motive and Act in 
 explaining the two preceding Relations, that it will 
 require but a few words on the present occasion to 
 complete what I have to say. This particular kind 
 of Cause, implied by Motive, may have two Conse- 
 quences, according to the mode of proceeding of the 
 Agent. If a mother destroy her child by neglecting
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 135 
 
 to nourish it, the Motive has its Correlation Re- 
 sult; but if she were to produce the same effect 
 by violence, the Correlation of the Motive would 
 then be Act; that is, the omission of her duty as a 
 parent gives birth to Result, and the commission of 
 violence to Act. Hence, in speaking of this Rela- 
 tion, we must say Motive and Act, or Motive and 
 Result, according as we are aware of the Reason 
 that has moved the Agent to one or the other. 
 
 Of Origin and End. 
 
 105. The notion of a First Cause contains in 
 itself the assertion of a beginning : hence the Deity 
 is often spoken of under such a term, when the word 
 Origin would be more appropriate ; and we ought, 
 for the same reason, to employ its Correlation, 'End,' 
 in preference to Final Cause. Every case of Agency 
 and Act, as well as of Source and Product, may be 
 considered, in relation to Cause and Effect, as 
 Origin and End. The idiom of our language may 
 sometimes require us to employ the word Begin- 
 ning, in preference to Origin. 
 
 Of Agency and Act. 
 
 106. When we speak of any operation in nature 
 or art, without reference to a particular Agent, we 
 employ the word Agency ; and we can then con- 
 sider it in Relation to the Act that results, which is
 
 136 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 its Correlation. This Relation is often substituted 
 for that of Cause and Effect ; but quite erroneously ; 
 for the latter only expresses Abstract Agency, while 
 the former, though used in a general sense, always 
 indicates Agency that is Physical. 
 
 Of Source and Product. 
 
 107. So intimately are the six relations I am 
 now explaining connected together in our minds, 
 that we are continually substituting them for one 
 another. Thus the Deity, as the great Source of 
 the universe, is continually represented as its Cause, 
 and we speak of the universe as the Effect ; but as 
 an Effect only means a Change, we should be more 
 correct in saying that it was a Product, which pro- 
 ceeded from him as its Source : for every production 
 must be contained in its Source; and it was this fact 
 that misled the Hindu metaphysicians into the error 
 of confounding Source and Product with Cause and 
 Effect 55 . The word Source has been borrowed 
 from the French language, and loses it real sense of 
 Fountain or Spring in the figurative use to which it 
 is applied in this Relation ; and the same may be 
 said of Product. 
 
 108. I have now given the six Relations com- 
 plete; and those that may still contend that the 
 
 (*) See 5 and 10 of Note (B) of the Appendix.
 
 OF CAUSE ARD EFFECT. 137 
 
 words Cause and Effect mean Objects, Things, or 
 Persons, must be prepared to maintain the same 
 opinion with regard to Reason, Motive, Origin, 
 Agency, and Source, as well as Consequence, Re- 
 sult, End, and Act, if they wish to pass for consistent, 
 though erroneous reasoners. 
 
 Of Causation and Causality. 
 
 109. The word Causation, by its etymology, im- 
 plies the ACT of causing, or making to do ; and Cau- 
 sality, the STATE of being Causal. The first is more 
 particularly employed by English, and the latter by 
 French, metaphysicians ; though by both, in cases 
 exactly similar. But the import they have in the 
 minds of those employing them (if they have any) 
 I have found it very difficult, nay, impossible, to 
 comprehend. They are only alluded to here to show 
 the very vague and indistinct manner in which 
 words of the first importance in reasoning are used ; 
 and the little hope, therefore, there must exist of 
 their being comprehended, to any useful purpose, 
 by those who read the works in which they are 
 found. Had those who discussed the question of 
 Cause and Effect known its true nature, they never 
 would have employed either the word Causation or 
 Causality. Their use of the word Causation shows 
 that it was meant to imply Physical Agency, which 
 has nothing whatever to do with the Relation of
 
 138 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 Cause and Effect ; and they were led into this mis- 
 take, as I before said, by the verb to cause, which 
 means, "to effect as an agent." 
 
 110. Before quitting this subject, therefore, it 
 will be as well to inquire into the origin of this 
 mistake. Neither in the Greek, Sanscrit, Bengali, 
 nor Hindustani, any more than in the Arabic or 
 Persian languages, does there exist a verb with 
 the exact sense we imply by ' to cause.' Our English 
 verb is undoubtedly derived from the French causer; 
 and this last, in all probability, has been formed 
 from CAUSO, which Dr. Johnson assigns as the origi- 
 nal stem of causation; and says, it is low Latin. If 
 this be the case, it was not, then, till that language 
 had been barbarized, and its genuine spirit forgotten, 
 that this most illogical term was introduced, and, 
 most likely, by some of the Schoolmen. It has, of 
 course, taken too deep root to be now discarded 
 from the philosophical terms of European reasoners: 
 but whoever employs any one of its derivatives, 
 such as Causation, Causator, Causative, or Causdble, 
 should ever be alive to the misconceptions into 
 which its use may lead him. The words Causal, 
 and Causality, derived from low Latin, must be 
 equally guarded against, whenever they relate to 
 physical, instead of abstract Agency. The tendency 
 of the mind to connect this Relation with Personal 
 Agency is shown in the use of atrsot in the sense of
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 139 
 
 Causer, which is likewise countenanced by the San- 
 scrit HETUKAS, and the Arabic MUSABBIB. The con- 
 fusion of mind which has led to these mistakes 
 seems, therefore, to be common to all mankind ; but 
 no Arab would say, like ourselves, i WHO was the 
 CAUSE of it ? ' but, ' WHO was the CAUSER of it ? ' 
 
 111. For the length to which the remarks on 
 this important subject have extended, I feel I can- 
 not excuse myself better than by quoting the words 
 of Hume : 
 
 " And what stronger instance can be produced 
 of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the 
 understanding, than the present? For surely, if 
 there be any relation among objects 56 (?), which it 
 imports to us to know perfectly, it is that of Cause 
 and Effect. On this are founded all our reasonings 
 concerning matter of fact or existence. By means 
 of it alone we attain any assurance concerning 
 objects (?) which are removed from the present 
 testimony of our memory and senses (?). The only 
 immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us how 
 to control and regulate future events by their 
 causes. Our thoughts and inquiries are, therefore, 
 every moment employed about this relation : yet 
 
 ( 5C ) Here Hume is again incorrect in supposing an Object can stand 
 in the Relation of Effect, though it may in that of Cause ; for it is but 
 the Change produced in an object by something else which the mind 
 conceives to stand in the relation of Cause, that constitutes the Effect.
 
 140 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 so imperfect are the ideas which we form concern- 
 ing it, that it is impossible to give any just defini- 
 tion of a Cause, except what is drawn from some- 
 thing extraneous and foreign to it 67 ." 
 
 112. It may assuredly be said, with the greatest 
 truth, that metaphysical writers, so far from clear- 
 ing up the difficulties of the subject, have only per- 
 plexed it ; and even contributed to the notion, that 
 the human understanding is under the influence 
 of some mysterious principles or agency that set 
 reason at defiance. The attempt of Brown 58 to 
 
 ( 57 ) Essays, Vol. II. pp. 79, 80. The last sentence proves that 
 Hume had not given the subject the attention it deserved ; and he was 
 avowedly ignorant that a Cause is an Abstract Relation, otherwise he 
 would not have uttered the last phrase of the above sentence. No 
 modern writer was a greater Realist than Hume, nor had any one a 
 more crude or popular notion of the true value of words. His meta- 
 physical works teem with proofs of this assertion. Take the following 
 example, from Section XV. Part III. Vol. I. of his work On Human 
 Nature : " No objects are contrary to each other but existence and non- 
 existence" In this example we have two Abstractions ; both of which 
 are termed ' objects,' and the last of them implying privation : so that 
 insistence is itself an object ; that is, the not being anything consti- 
 tutes a supposition to be something ! This is the wisdom that was set 
 up in opposition to the absurdities of the Schoolmen : yet possibly it 
 will continue to delight mankind much better than any thing I can 
 say ; for, as Hume himself has well remarked, " 'tis not reason which 
 carries the prize, but eloquence ; and no man needs ever despair of gain- 
 ing proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to 
 represent it in any favourable colours." 
 
 ( 58 ) I have not deemed it necessary to make any remarks on Brown's 
 Work on Cause and Effect, though he has treated the question so 
 
 elaborately ;
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 141 
 
 clear up this point is a remarkable proof to what 
 an extent human ingenuity may be exerted, and 
 how much may be said, to no purpose. In the 
 instances I have produced, it must be seen that the 
 understanding, though always right in practice, is 
 invariably wrong in theory, the moment it attempts 
 to account for its own mode of proceeding ; a fact 
 that agrees with what Goldsmith said, with so much 
 felicity and humour, of Burke's brother : 
 
 " Here lies honest William, whose heart was a mint, 
 While the owner ne'er knew half the good that was in't : 
 The pupil of impulse, it forc'd him along, 
 His conduct still right, with his argument wrong : 
 Still aiming at honour, yet fearing to roam ; 
 The coachman was tipsy, the chariot drove home. 
 Would you ask for his merits ? Alas ! he had none ; 
 What was good was spontaneous; his faults were HIS OWN." 
 
 113. Such is the nature of prejudice and early 
 bias, that I fear the reader may still be induced to 
 
 elaborately ; because it is entirely founded on the misapprehension 
 upon which I have said so much in the preceding observations; 
 namely, the mistake that this Relation exists between the phenomena 
 of nature. It is surprising that so many acute and able men should 
 have fallen into this common and vulgar error ; one from which they 
 would certainly have escaped, had they known any thing of the true 
 nature of language. Brown's disquisitions are peculiarly marked by 
 those characteristics for which the metaphysicians of his nation have 
 ever been distinguished division and subdivision. It is evident that 
 such a process can in no way % remedy a fallacy, nor convert error into 
 truth. See SIR JAMES MACINTOSH'S Dissertation on Ethical Philo- 
 sophy, p. 207-
 
 142 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 relapse into his old convictions, as often as he wishes 
 to represent the notion of Cause and Effect to his 
 own mind. If this should be the case, I have no other 
 resource left for him, than to recommend him to 
 read over again the preceding remarks, and to reflect 
 upon them : for though it has been happily said 
 
 " A man, convinced against his will, 
 Is of the same opinion still," 
 
 yet I do hope that the obvious and irrefragable 
 proofs I have adduced with regard to this contested 
 Relation, will place it in its true light FOR EVER. 
 
 Of Matter , Space, Time, Movement, and Force. 
 
 114. The reader has been made aware that all 
 Abstractions relate to what is General or Particular. 
 (See 3336). The words Space, Time, Move- 
 ment, and Force, are all Abstractions employed in a 
 General Sense ; and the word Matter is likewise a 
 
 ( s9 ) The etymology of the word Matter deserves mention ; more 
 particularly as it proves how consistent language is, in its greatest 
 changes. We derive the word Matter from the French matiere, a cor- 
 ruption of the Latin materia; and this, and the Greek /uerpov, both 
 descend from the Sanscrit MATRAM. We have two corruptions of the 
 original Sanscrit term in the Saxon portion of our language ; namely, 
 mother ', the feculent matter that forms in vinegar and beer ; and mud, 
 the slimy matter deposited by water. The root of MATRAM is MA, 
 measure, and the Sanscrit termination TRAM is the same as the Greek 
 rpov. The word MATRA, in the feminine, seems to have implied the 
 first measure (of Space) ; and is, therefore, with the Hindus, equi- 
 valent
 
 OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 143 
 
 Generalization, though it relates to what is Concrete. 
 He has seen, that whatever is general has no existence, 
 except by the means of words. To investigate, 
 therefore, the nature of the foregoing Terms, we 
 must look to their use as Particular Words, and see 
 if they have any better claim to reality. First, then, 
 taking the Generalization to which we give the 
 name of Matter, as it is not employed in a parti- 
 cular sense, we must substitute a Body in its place ; 
 and as it is inseparable from Space, we must also 
 take a Space into consideration along with it. 
 
 Of a Body, and a Space. 
 
 115. A Body is either a single atom, or it is an 
 aggregation of many atoms. I will not here enter 
 upon the question of infinite divisibility ; but take 
 it for granted that there is a point at which all 
 things begin to be; and which the Greeks, with 
 great felicity of expression, called an atom, or that 
 which is indivisible. When, therefore, we think of a 
 
 valent to the atom of the Greeks. In the Institutes, attributed to 
 Menu, all nature is said to be made up of MATRAS, which are declared 
 to be minute or subtile. Those who think that the Latin materia is 
 derived from MATER, a mother, and therefore means mother substance, 
 are quite in error ; for the Latin MATER and the Greek /u^-n/p are both 
 derived from the Sanscrit MATRI, a mother, which is radically distinct 
 from MATRAM. Here we see that the corruptions of MATRAM and 
 MATRI are parallel in sound; and that both words have undergone 
 similar changes in their descent. The same analogy holds through 
 nearly all the Teutonic languages.
 
 144 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 Body composed of one or more atoms, we are, from 
 the very condition of such a Conception, obliged to 
 admit that it occupies a Space as large as itself. 
 If we have supposed a Body composed of a single 
 atom, we may imagine another of the same kind ; 
 and having done that, we may again imagine these 
 two little Bodies to approach one another. The 
 instant we have had this conception, we have called 
 into existence, in our own minds, the notion of a 
 Space, and of a Movement of one or of both the 
 atoms a Time in which it was accomplished and 
 a Force by which they were impelled together. 
 Now, this process, which we have merely fancied, 
 we see take place at every moment, either in Bodies 
 that are quite inanimate, or in such as are endowed 
 with locomotion. Indeed, while I have been writ- 
 ing these few lines, I have seen my pen Move in a 
 certain Space ; I am sensible it has occupied a cer- 
 tain Time ; and that it has been impelled by my 
 hand with a certain Force. Now, my pen is a real 
 thing (a body), that leaves no doubt of its existence 
 on my mind : it is therefore termed Concrete, and 
 is capable of being appreciated by oR my senses. 
 But when I come to inquire into the nature of its 
 inseparable adjuncts, I am no longer certain of their 
 separate and real existence. I feel, that to talk of a 
 Space, I should never have had the least notion of 
 it without the existence of my own body, or of some 
 material thing which moved : Movement, therefore,
 
 OF A BODY AND A SPACE. 145 
 
 is essential to the notion of Space. The definition 
 of a Body is, that it is that which prevents what is 
 similar to itself from occupying the Space it fills ; 
 and the definition of a Space is, that it is that 
 which can be filled by a Body of its own dimen- 
 sions : they are both, therefore, united in the same 
 conviction of the mind. But though we could have 
 had no notion of a Space without the existence of 
 Bodies, we must be aware that we can see many 
 Bodies in a given Space ; and that it is therefore not 
 full, that is, not impervious. We can see these Bodies 
 move to, and from, and cross one another ; and they 
 thus prove that the Space was not filled by unyield- 
 ing Matter. The whole field or circuit of vision is, 
 as it were, but one large image, in which we may 
 occasionally see many smaller images (bodies) 
 moving in various directions. These, and their 
 movements, raise in us the conviction of a certain 
 Space, such as we derive from sight; but that 
 which we obtain from touch, we possess from the 
 consciousness that we can, and do, move our hands 
 and fingers freely at our will. That a Space may be 
 enlarged, we learn by moving our eyes, head, or 
 bodies : and from the conviction that we can do so 
 in any direction, we acquire the belief that the 
 Space might, if we could but move ourselves at 
 pleasure, be extended without limitation.
 
 46 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 Of a Time. 
 
 116. The reader is aware that Time, being a 
 Generalization, has no existence, except as a sound. 
 To understand its true nature, therefore, we must 
 examine it as a Particular Term. When we see 
 two Bodies move with unequal velocity in the same 
 direction, we are convinced that one reaches its 
 destination quicker than the other. But though we 
 saw this, if we had no language, we could have no 
 notion of Time: but with the aid of language we 
 have that General Notion ; yet still it does not tell 
 us how much quicker one Body can move than 
 another. When, however, language has a word for a 
 second, a minute, an hour, a day, a week, a month, 
 a year, a century, &c., we are able to assign exactly 
 the degree in which one reached a certain point 
 before the other : for, as all these periods of time can 
 be called one, so they may be called two, or any other 
 number. Now, one may be halved ; and that half 
 may be subdivided, in thought, ad infinitum; BUT 
 ONLY IN THOUGHT. When mankind began to observe 
 and to reason, they found themselves obliged to 
 have some certain standard for quicker and slower; 
 and they fixed on those two great Bodies, that move 
 in the heavens, called the sun and the moon. The 
 apparent revolution of the first they called a day ; 
 and the complete revolution of the other, a month. 
 By dividing the first, they had hours ; and they had
 
 OP A TIME. 147 
 
 weeks by doing the same for the second. The divi- 
 sion of the hours gave them minutes ; and the sub- 
 division, seconds. Now, when they had to express 
 the difference in the velocity between any two 
 moving bodies, they could say it occupied so many 
 hours, so many minutes, or so many seconds ; for 
 every one of these expressions was borrowed from 
 the divisions of a great circle 60 . Each of them, 
 therefore, constituted a certain time; and when 
 they said an act took up such or such a short Time, 
 they only asserted that the difference was equal to a 
 certain portion of the sun's revolution, that is to say, 
 of a day. Now, from all this it is clear, that, as a 
 Particular Term, a Time must always mean a cer- 
 tain portion of the sun or moon's revolution, or the 
 Movement of some other body ; as the hands of a 
 clock, for instance. Space and Time, therefore, 
 though always classed together, ought to be kept 
 quite distinct. We may speak of Matter and Space 
 just as we would of sword and scabbard, because 
 they are concomitant notions : but it will be evident, 
 
 ( 60 ) This assertion is not the less true because the Egyptians 
 divided the circle into 360, to agree with their earliest notion of the 
 length of the year, that is, of the number of days in which they con- 
 ceived the sun to m ake his annual circuit. So the Chinese divide the 
 circle into 365; which is inconvenient, though it be nearer the true 
 length of the year. The notions of Time and Space being conjoint and 
 coetaneous, they naturally act and re- act upon one another in the mind : 
 and if the orbit, which the sun was supposed to move in, suggested the 
 number of the degrees of the circle, the division of those, on the other 
 hand, gave the hours, and their subdivision the minutes and seconds. 
 L 2
 
 148 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 that any specified Time is only the name for the 
 Movement of a Body in a certain space. Yet such 
 is the influence of language over our minds, that we 
 even talk of " a space of time," as if the latter were 
 something real, of which we could separate a portion 
 from the general mass. Kant has been so far misled 
 by language, as to consider Time and Space as Forms 
 of the mind ; and he terms the first an internal, and 
 the second, an external Sense. This is the very 
 basis of his metaphysical system. (See 188, 189.) 
 Mathematicians are equally deceived by the nature 
 of language ; and when they say that " The velocity is 
 always proportional to the time of descent" they, uncon- 
 sciously, only assert that one regulated Movement 
 bears a certain proportion to another regulated 
 Movement, or that the descent of a body in space 
 bears an exact proportion, in accordance with the law 
 of gravitation, to the Movement of the sun, of a clock, 
 or merely of a pendulum. I do not, however, mean to 
 say, or imply, that Time and Movement should not 
 be distinguished by separate terms. My only object 
 is, to show that they are fundamentally identical. 
 When we ask, What is the time ? we just do the same 
 as if we put the question, How much has the sun 
 moved ? Practically, the term Time is indispensable 
 in preventing ambiguity; and the evidence derived 
 from all languages will show that Nature ( 121) in- 
 tended we should be under the delusion of believing 
 them to be distinct notions or existences.
 
 OF A TIME. 149 
 
 1 17. When we reflect, that we can always say 
 that any event has had a before and after, we shall 
 be singularly struck by the foregoing conclusions. 
 Yet let us remember, that these very words are 
 borrowed from the notion of a Space in which we 
 see objects so placed. If, then, there exist no such 
 thing as Time General or Particular, how is the 
 above succession of acts to be conceived ? Here the 
 reader, in suggesting this contradiction between 
 Sense and Reason, has laid bare one of the most 
 mysterious parts of nature, one which immedi- 
 ately recalls our attention once more to that of 
 Matter and Space. Were we to push these two 
 questions to the same extreme that I have done 
 with regard to Time, I should violate the condition 
 upon which the whole of these observations has 
 been ventured ; namely, the objective reality of nature. 
 Such an attempt would only convince us how delu- 
 sive is the nature of every thing that arises from our 
 sensations ; and we should find the steadfast earth 
 recede from under us, the starry host vanish from 
 sight, " the heavens depart as a scroll that is rolled 
 together;" and all our firmest convictions would be 
 shaken to their basis ; nor would aught remain to the 
 reeling understanding, but the bewildering belief 
 that nothing is certain; and that there is neither 
 before nor after in Time or Space ; neither Move- 
 ment nor Force in matter or spirit ; nor fulness nor 
 void in nature; and that all is but a vision, of
 
 150 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 which no account can be given by either SENSE or 
 REASON. It is evident, from the foregoing reasoning, 
 that 
 
 118. A TIME is only another name for a Specified 
 Movement of some Body, that has been agreed upon AS 
 A STANDARD ; and that Time, as a general Term, is a 
 mere SOUND. 
 
 Of a Movement. 
 
 119. The next question for consideration relates 
 to Movement 62 , which must likewise be considered 
 in its Particular point of view. A Particular Move- 
 ment has no more existence than that which we call 
 General; for ' Movement' is merely an Abstract 
 Word. To understand, therefore, what it means, 
 we must refer to the verb to move, from which it is 
 derived. Matter, we see, can move ; but when we 
 abstract and form the notion of Movement from it, 
 we have a word that merely deludes us. But the 
 verb to move, being sometimes neuter, its pre- 
 sent participle, as such, is capable of serving as 
 an adjective, and we can talk and think of a Moving 
 Body of any kind. Movement, therefore that is, the 
 Moving- STATE stands in the same relation to Body, 
 
 ( 6! ) I have uniformly employed the word Movement, instead of 
 Motion; because it has the advantage of being referred to the verb to 
 move. See 131, on Motion.
 
 OF A MOVEMENT. 151 
 
 as redness, or any quality, does : for as there is no 
 such thing as redness, though we can talk and think 
 of a red coat, a red cow, &c., so there is no such thing 
 as Movement, though we can likewise talk and think 
 of a Moving Body ; such as, a Falling Star, a Flowing 
 Stream, &c. The well-known sophism, or rather 
 fallacy of Zeno, which is known by the name of 
 Achilles, and by which he attempted to prove that 
 there was no such thing as Movement, is a proof how 
 the mind of the most acute man maybe deceived, even 
 independently of the misconceptions that arise out 
 of language. That fallacious proposition remained 
 undetected till very modern times; yet it appears 
 to me, that it required no mathematical process to 
 show its absurdity; for even the evidence of his 
 sight might have convinced Zeno that one body can 
 pass another ; and that to pass is only the name for a 
 particular kind of Movement; and this must be 
 relatively true, whether the world has a real, or an 
 ideal existence. 
 
 Of a Force. 
 
 120. The word Force, from its general employ- 
 ment in mathematical reasoning, requires particular 
 attention. Like Space, Time, and Movement, with 
 which it is inseparably linked, it is only a General 
 and Abstract Term ; and, as such, is a mere sound. 
 The word has been derived from the French
 
 152 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 language, in which it was formed from the Latin 
 FORS (strong) ; and it therefore, by its origin, means 
 strength ; but, from the multitude of terms we have 
 in our heterogeneous language, it is generally reser- 
 ved for employment in the abstract sciences. As a 
 Particular term, a Force has no more reality than 
 the General one ; and when we speak of The Force of 
 the torrent, or, that The rock rolled down with a Force 
 that nothing could withstand, we have not conferred 
 any more reality on it than it possessed in its general 
 character. When employed in mathematics, it has a 
 purely Abstract Sense ; and then expresses nothing but 
 an ideal quantity, that becomes the subject of calcula- 
 tion. A quantity, to be real, must refer to something 
 in nature ; but it too frequently happens that ques- 
 tions purely physical are mixed up with those that 
 are abstract, by such as have neglected to look into the 
 nature of language ; and this has been already shown 
 ( 14) in the case of Newton himself. With mathe- 
 maticians, quantity always means something real: it 
 is on this account that Force, Momentum, and Ve- 
 locity, are always understood by them to be realities. 
 If a mathematician took it into his head to investi- 
 gate the amount of the several integral and fractional 
 quantities of nothing, he might represent each by 
 figures or symbols, and arrive at a right conclusion 
 upon the data he had assumed; yet, by such a pro- 
 cess, he would only have amused himself for the 
 time, and his Nothing would really have stood for
 
 OF A FORCE. 153 
 
 something. As a figurative expression, the word 
 Force is of very common use ; and it then implies a 
 Reality, as when we hear that a General sent a Force 
 to the relief of a town. These observations will be 
 sufficient to enable the reader to form a correct no- 
 tion of this much misunderstood term 63 . 
 
 121. From the tenour of the foregoing remarks, 
 it is evident that we have only two Realities, instead 
 of five ; that is to say, we have Matter and Space. 
 But, as soon as w r e turn language into Abstractions, 
 the whole five ' make their appearance, by the addi- 
 tion of Time, Movement, and Force. This is worthy 
 of consideration ; because we see that language itself 
 helps to complete the plan of Nature, and proves 
 itself to have been an instrument intended for the 
 full representation and comprehension of the phe- 
 nomena we witness around us. Indeed, stript of 
 language, the intellect is a mere waste, luxuriating 
 in barrenness, though capable of the richest pro- 
 ducts. 
 
 ( 63 ) Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, asserted that there was as much 
 proof for the reality of Grace as of Force. Had this most worthy man 
 known the nature of the Abstractions against which he raised his 
 voice so loudly, he would have spared himself the remark; as he 
 would then have known, that all we can truly say, is, that Bodies 
 may he made to force, or that, by supplication, God may be rendered 
 yracious. Faith, too, when released from its Abstract Nature, im- 
 plies that its possessor is faithful, that is, truly believes what he 
 has been taught Minute Philosopher, Dialogue VII. IX. X.
 
 154 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 122. From what has been just said, it is evi- 
 dent that there is an intimate and inseparable union 
 between these five fundamental Generalizations. 
 Thus the Movement of Matter gives the notion of 
 Space ; and its Movement in Space, that of Time. 
 Movement is immediately connected with the notion 
 of Force, as implying that from which it has received 
 its impulsion. These Generalizations are all pri- 
 mary, and constitute the basis of any supposition 
 connected with nature. 
 
 Of Power. 
 
 123. Power is a word in universal use ; and per- 
 haps there is not one which is oftener employed in 
 more various senses 64 ; but they are all abstract, ex- 
 cept that for which I have exclusively reserved it in 
 this work, namely, that of a real Agent ; as when we 
 speak of the Power (caloric) passing from the fire 
 into the boiler of a steam-engine. In this sense, it 
 
 ( 64 ) Locke and Hume were both Realists, and employed the word 
 Power without any suspicion of the ambiguous meanings it conveys. 
 With both of them it implied Force, Energy, Efficacy, &c. But as 
 these words are mere Abstractions, they must be referred, if we wish to 
 know what they really import, to something that forces, is energetic, 
 efficacious, &c. ; and such a something would be found to be a Concrete 
 or Physical Agent. Locke distinguishes Power into active and passive. 
 Passive Power resolves itself, therefore, into something that is non- 
 energetic, inefficacious, &c. ; that is, something that is powerful, enough, 
 to be powerless ! Such are the absurdities the ablest of mankind may 
 fall into, from ignorance of the nature of language.
 
 OF POWER. 155 
 
 unequivocally implies something real, and is no 
 longer used as an Abstraction. In a plural sense, as 
 in the " mechanical powers," it is employed figura- 
 tively, and the reader therefore must not be misled 
 to think that it has in this case a Concrete sense. 
 The mechanical powers, which are commonly con- 
 sidered as six, are, the lever (and balance), the 
 pulley, the wheel-and axle, the wedge, the inclined 
 plane, and the screw, which are contrived for the 
 convenient and economical application of the real 
 essence, Power ; as by their means there is the least 
 possible waste of this greatest desideratum in labour. 
 
 124. Mankind, from the obscurity of the subject, 
 and trusting merely to their senses, have considered 
 every Body in Movement as a Force : but if we 
 examine the matter a little closer, we must be con- 
 vinced that the Body in Movement is, as it were, 
 but the mask of that which forces. Every Body 
 that moves must have been impelled by something. 
 Now every one, by his own feelings, is aware, that 
 according to the degree of Strength he possesses at 
 the moment, and which is always varying, he is able 
 to impel a Body with more or less velocity. It is 
 clear, in this case, that, as his weight has not dimi- 
 nished, the Movement cannot simply depend upon 
 his will and his body. We say, by the mere use of 
 popular language, when we feel ourselves weakened 
 after an effort, that we are exhausted. Now here
 
 156 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 we have really said what is perfectly true, without 
 any figure of speech ; and we are deprived of that 
 which enabled us, a few seconds before, to impel 
 bodies in various directions. We have therefore, by 
 our efforts, lost something, that, from long experi- 
 ence, we know cannot return without rest. That 
 something, therefore, which we can employ, when 
 we possess it, is a Reality, though quite invisible 
 and imponderable. 
 
 To this mysterious thing, men have agreed to 
 give the name of Power ; a word originally Abstract, 
 but which, in this case, has, by its use, lost its Abs- 
 tract sense, and has been converted, as often as it 
 is used for this purpose, into a Concrete Term. 
 When mathematicians, therefore, calculate any 
 Force, though their ciphers and symbols merely 
 represent what is Abstract namely, number and 
 quantity, they do really calculate the quantity of 
 Power that is in and has been communicated by 
 another body (living or otherwise) to the one which 
 they imagine, for the time in movement. 
 
 125. The main object of the present investiga- 
 tion is, to prepare the way for the consideration of 
 the real nature of the agency which actuates the 
 universe. Power, by itself, would be utterly unequal 
 to the accomplishment of any effect in nature or art, 
 if it were not directed by some intelligence. The 
 truth of such a view will, I think, be rendered
 
 OF POWER. 157 
 
 evident by the following remarks, which I printed 
 on a former occasion. 
 
 126. " It may not, however, be without its use 
 to carry this inquiry a few steps further, and to con- 
 sider the unanswerable objection that attends upon 
 materialism, with regard to the doctrine of Power. 
 The atheist considers that Power is inherent in mat- 
 ter, and inseparable from it ; and that it is through 
 its own energy that this universe, with all its won- 
 derful variety, has arisen. Perhaps the best answer 
 to the groundlessness of this assumption will be, to 
 consider the nature of the Power with which the 
 materialist endows matter ; and this may be done in 
 a few words. Power must be either something real 
 or something ideal; that is, it must be either Con- 
 crete or Abstract. In the case of a cannon-ball, the 
 Power passes from the gunpowder, by its explosion, 
 into the ball. It is therefore clear, that it is capa- 
 ble of augmentation and diminution ; and that it 
 consequently can be transferred from one body to 
 another. Power, therefore, it must be seen, is not 
 an inherent and inseparable property of matter. 
 But it may be replied, that by Power is meant 
 nothing that is transferable, but merely an inherent 
 Energy which is in matter, and which, by certain 
 mechanical arrangements, enables one thing to give 
 impulse to another. This last explanation implies 
 that it is nothing real that is meant by Power, but
 
 158 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 something ideal; and to this last supposition, there- 
 fore, the remainder of the argument must be directed. 
 Power and Energy, if they do not mean some- 
 thing real, mean nothing at all, as they are mere 
 abstract Terms employed by the mind for the con- 
 venience of reasoning : and the materialist, in using 
 them without a material sense 65 , has really, in this 
 instance, changed himself into an idealist; and is so 
 inconclusive a reasoner, as to admit of operations 
 that stand in the Relation of Effects, and yet to 
 deny the existence of the indispensable thing which 
 can alone produce what are to stand in the Relation 
 of Causes. But as there may be some materialists 
 that do not hold the doctrine that Power is inherent 
 in matter, though they deny the existence of an 
 All-wise Mind, rendering it the instrument of his 
 WILL in producing the phenomena we witness around 
 us, the following remarks are intended as an answer 
 to such a supposition. 
 
 127. " Power being admitted to exist as a real 
 something, it may be asked what it is that directs or 
 guides it into the production of all the exquisite 
 forms we see in nature ? Every individual has a 
 certain degree of Power at his command : still, ex- 
 perience shows us that there must be a most feli- 
 citous combination of circumstances, such as fine 
 
 ( 65 ) By the word material, it is meant that they imply something 
 real, however subtile, and not an Abstraction.
 
 OF POWER. 159 
 
 organization, years of instruction, and application to 
 a particular branch of study, before he (who is him- 
 self assumed to be a mere production of chance !) is 
 fitted to give even an ordinary and lifeless imita- 
 tion of those graceful and beautiful objects, which, 
 according to the supposition of the atheist, has 
 arisen fortuitously, that is, without a directing mind. 
 
 128. " The power possessed by every individual 
 is exhausted after a certain degree of effort; and 
 sleep and repose are both necessary for its renewal. 
 We find that a watch will not go till it is wound 
 up, that is, till a certain degree of Power is commu- 
 nicated to it : by what process, therefore, is it, that 
 the individual is, as it were, wound up, or renovated 
 for new efforts ? Repose and sleep, which are mere 
 STATES of quiescence, could not do it : there must, 
 consequently, have been some Agent at work, which 
 has, so to say, recharged him with Power for the 
 labours of the coming day. That Agent the theist 
 calls God : the atheist terms it repose, a mere Abs- 
 tract Term, and therefore devoid of reality: he 
 has consequently assigned an effect that is without 
 a cause, merely from his ignorance of the nature of 
 language. 
 
 129. " If it be argued, that the Power which had 
 been exhausted by effort returns to the individual 
 by the simple process of sleep, it will be only
 
 160 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 necessary to bear in mind, that what has life must 
 possess more Power than that which is inanimate : 
 consequently, if there was a transfer of Power by the 
 ordinary laws of nature, it would pass from that 
 which is alive into that which is not ; that is, if it 
 tended to an equalization, it would quit, and not enter 
 the body. But so far is this from being the case, 
 that we find that the body receives an increase of 
 Power during sleep. There remains, therefore, but 
 one inference to be drawn from this fact ; namely, 
 that the Power of the sleeping body has been re- 
 plenished by some agency. Vital function could not 
 be assigned as the reason, since function itself, as 
 an Action, must require an Actor or Agent for its 
 production ; and it could, therefore, be only the 
 medium by which the end was effected. 
 
 130. " But it may be said, that if the food was 
 flesh, the Power was transferred from it to the indi- 
 vidual who ate it ; and though this must be true to 
 a certain extent, as experience proves, still, at the 
 best, it could be but the vehicle of the Power, and 
 cannot do away with the necessity of some agency 
 by which the transfer was effected, and does not ac- 
 count for the means by which it entered the animal 
 from whom the flesh was taken. It may, perhaps, 
 be replied, that he got it from the herbage on 
 which he fed ; but if so, whence did the herbage 
 acquire it ? Now all this shows, that in each step
 
 OF POWER. 161 
 
 of the progression we must suppose a conscious and 
 efficient, though invisible Agency, as the prime 
 source of all these natural operations. These inex- 
 plicable difficulties of atheism have evidently beset 
 the human mind from the earliest periods of its in- 
 vestigations ; as will be seen by the following extracts 
 from the Book of Job 66 , one of the most sublime 
 compositions that have come down to us from an- 
 cient times ; where, speaking of the agency of the 
 Deity, it is said : 
 
 ' Behold, I go forward, but he is not there ; and back- 
 ward, but I cannot perceive him : 
 
 4 On the left hand, WHERE HE DOTH WORK, but I cannot 
 behold him: he hideth himself on the right hand, that I 
 cannot see him* " 
 
 Of Motim. 
 
 131. The word Motion has very often the sense 
 of Power, in the way in which it is frequently used : 
 for people speak of a body as having Motion in it, 
 implying that it possesses at the moment something 
 that has the means of moving it. From the many 
 senses in which the word is used, and to prevent all 
 ambiguity, I have invariably substituted Movement 
 for it, to imply that I attach no other than an Abs- 
 tract Meaning to the notion I intend to convey ; and 
 
 ( w ) Chap, xxxiii. verr. 8, 9. 
 M
 
 162 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 because it has the advantage of being referrible to 
 the verb ( to move,' in our own language. 
 
 Of Form. 
 
 132. If we consider Matter as a primary Gene- 
 ralization (concrete), we shall find that there are 
 other Generalizations (abstract), which, being de- 
 pendent upon it, we must consider as secondary. 
 The first of these is Form, which, without Matter, 
 could have had no existence. As a General Abs- 
 tract Term, it has, of course, no reality ; and it re- 
 mains to be discovered whether it has better claims 
 when considered as a Particular Abstraction. 
 
 133. When a man without a knowledge of lan- 
 guage, as one dumb for instance, examines any 
 object with his fingers, he remarks, if it be of 
 suitable dimensions, that it terminates on every 
 side : if he uses his eyes for the same purpose, he 
 observes the same thing, if he can get a proper view 
 of it. When he has done this, it is perhaps supposed 
 that he has got a notion of its Form. This, however, 
 is not the case ; for, even after all this effort, he is 
 only aware that it is similar, or not, to some other 
 object with which he is already acquainted. He 
 may even have a sense of the beautiful, and be cap- 
 tivated by its appearance, and yet not be able to 
 imagine why. We will suppose language to be
 
 OF FORM. 163 
 
 imparted to him : he is now able to say (but not to 
 think), that the Form which pleased him was very 
 beautiful. All he really can think, is, that the ob- 
 ject that is, the image it has made in his mind is 
 very beautiful ; for the Form of any thing is merely 
 in the word. Why the object pleased him so much, 
 is one of those ultimate facts of which no account 
 can be given: and all that can be said is, that it 
 was so designed, that the presence of certain objects 
 in nature (and only those in nature) are calculated 
 to give inexpressible pleasure ; and the greater, as 
 they are more perfect, and observed with more 
 attention ; apparently, as if the sense of beauty were 
 improved, or better awakened, by its employment. 
 If the Form were any thing real, it would be capa- 
 ble of separation and duration apart from the object 
 in which it is conceived to exist. The truth is, that 
 the intellect receives, in the case I have supposed, a 
 certain amount of information of the external object ; 
 if by touch, in succession ; but if by sight, at once 
 and completely. The sensations, in the first case, 
 have to be put together by the intellect, before it 
 can construct the whole notion of the object, sup- 
 posing it to be too large to be grasped : but in the 
 last supposition, there is an image raised at once in 
 the mind, which is considered the same as the 
 object felt by the fingers ; because we have a con- 
 viction of the concurring and co-operating efforts of 
 the senses, as instruments of the individual thinking 
 M 2
 
 164 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 self. But in no way is the Form either made or 
 conceived by the intellect, but is totally dependent 
 upon language for its existence. The mention of 
 Form suggests, in this place, the utility of drawing 
 the reader's attention to the feeling he has of objects 
 in his dreams. He has in them an appearance 
 of objects, moving apparently in space ; and yet he 
 must be aware that they occupy no space. They 
 are simply sensations, and of the most mysterious 
 kind. These will convince him, that the magni- 
 tude of the objects which he beholds when awake, 
 does not depend upon the size of the objects them- 
 selves, but on a cause within himself; and all that the 
 external objects can determine, is the relative size of 
 one to the other, depending on the degree of distance 
 at which they are placed from him. When we 
 reflect on the wonderful combinations and the in- 
 vention displayed in our dreams, we must be con- 
 vinced that they are among the most mysterious 
 phenomena of existence. The word Form has a 
 near resemblance to Symmetry. Its delusive nature 
 so far beguiled Kant, that, as I before said ( 114 
 116), he considered Time and Space as Forms of the 
 mind. These views show, that 
 
 134. Form is nothing but an Intellectual Pro- 
 perty. See 69.
 
 ( 165 ) 
 
 Of Number. 
 
 135. We become acquainted with certain words 
 at so early an age, that we use them without ever 
 inquiring how we came by them, or indeed ever 
 imagining that they could have cost the least effort 
 in their invention. Number is one of the most re- 
 markable of these. The bulk of mankind seem to 
 think that the notion of Number is quite obvious. A 
 little reflection will, however, convince us that this 
 is not the fact. It is, indeed, so far from being 
 obvious, that it is one of the grand criteria of the 
 difference between man and the brute. No animal 
 is sensible of number. If the fondest parent in the 
 lower species is, unknown to her, deprived of all 
 but one of her young, however numerous, she does 
 not observe her loss while that one is left to her ; 
 but deprive her of that solitary remnant of her 
 progeny, and she is for a time inconsolable. It is 
 therefore evident, that she has no notion of Number, 
 however self-evident the matter may seem to be to 
 us. . But, to comprehend this a little better, let us 
 suppose one of the human species, even with the 
 knowledge of language, to have ten or eleven eggs 
 before him exactly similar, he would not, without 
 reckoning them, be aware of the loss of a single egg. 
 Even here, then, is an approximation, though a 
 distant one, to the ignorance of irrational creatures. 
 The miser, with all his love of gold, must count his
 
 166 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 ten pieces, to be sure he has not lost one. It be- 
 comes, therefore, a question, as curious as it is 
 interesting, to inquire how mankind arrived at the 
 knowledge of Numbers, that is, at the means of com- 
 putation. Among many savage tribes, it is common to 
 find that they cannot reckon beyond five units ; and 
 the remainder of mankind, in general, limit them- 
 selves to ten, and then combine these together for 
 the higher Numbers : but, if I remember right, the 
 Basques go as high as twenty, and then increase by 
 combination. Now it is obvious, that, in these three 
 modes, those who have respectively used them 
 have been guided to the employment of each system 
 by the fingers of one hand, or of both hands ; and 
 in the case of the Biscayans, they have added to these 
 the number of their toes. If, then, we say that each 
 finger and each toe had a separate name which is 
 of the highest probability in the infancy of society, 
 as we see that the languages of savages are re- 
 dundant in names for individual objects, but nearly 
 destitute of such as express general notions we 
 may suppose, for instance, that the thumb of the 
 right hand was called one ; the index finger, two ; 
 and so of the others. All, then, that had to be done, 
 was to mention the name of the particular finger 
 that was called one, two, or three, for any number 
 up to ten ; and then, for fifteen, for instance, to say 
 five-ten, which in time was contracted into fifteen. 
 The rest were formed after the same analogy. It
 
 OF NUMBER. 167 
 
 may be thought, that here, at least, we have no 
 Abstract Words ; and that therefore Numbers are 
 exempt from the charge of implying nothing of 
 themselves. This, at first sight, appears plausible ; 
 but if we remember, that, though we have employed 
 the names of what were real, namely, the fingers, 
 the words we have thus borrowed have lost their 
 original import; and for their class we must not 
 refer to their former, but their present use, which 
 is, to express a certain Relation. That the no- 
 tion of Number is altogether a distinction of the 
 mind, must be evident from what I have already 
 said with respect to the difference between the 
 human race and brutes ; and being merely a Gene- 
 ral Term, we must inquire into the origin of its par- 
 ticular notion, which is the unit. When the mind 
 contrasts a single object with a multitude, it arrives 
 at the conception of one. When it does the same 
 with two, three, or more objects, it feels that the 
 distinction amounts to two, three, or more ones. 
 Every number, therefore, however high, only implies 
 so many units. Hence it is evident that the notion 
 of Number is merely relative; and that it arises, 
 like that of other Relations, from an effort of the 
 intellect, which could only be accomplished by the 
 aid of language. Deprive any being of the no- 
 tion of language, and you would equally deprive 
 him of all notion of Numbers, and other Rela- 
 tions. He would still see objects before him as
 
 168 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AN 7 D PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 clearly as formerly ; but he would have no more 
 conception of Number, than an untaught man has of 
 the properties of the circle when he looks at the 
 ring on his finger. Devoid of the knowledge of 
 numbers, and their parent language, man would 
 merely be the most cunning of animals : possessed, 
 however, of these advantages, he stands like a god at 
 the head of creation, wielding all the powers of 
 nature for his pleasure and use, and converting the 
 surface of the earth into a garden, stored with every 
 convenience and contrivance that can conduce to his 
 comfort and happiness. With it, likewise, he is able 
 to weigh the globe he inhabits, and the other 
 planets, in an intellectual balance ; and to predict 
 their revolutions, and the return of the seasons, 
 without quitting his closet. 
 
 136. A fancy exists among German metaphy- 
 sicians, respecting an Absolute Unity, which has been 
 broached in modern times by F. W. Schelling. As 
 I feel I cannot say any thing more to the purpose 
 than I did on a former occasion, I hope to be ex- 
 cused for quoting my own opinions ; an indulgence 
 which I must claim, for a similar reason, in other 
 places, in these pages. 
 
 137. " It is worth while, however, to examine 
 this new discovery of Schilling's a little closer. 
 The idea of me is purely relative, for it arises
 
 OF NUMBER. 169 
 
 from the perception of the division of matter ; and 
 so we say, one, two, three parts, &c. Our ideas 
 on this point are, therefore, perfectly clear and 
 defined. When, however, we transfer the notion 
 from the forms of matter the only thing of 
 which the senses afford us any information to that 
 which is indefinite, namely, infinity, and which 
 we only know by inference, it is certain we have 
 fallen into a fallacy. We cannot in the least release 
 ourselves from this embarrassment by tacking to 
 it another word ; such as, ( absolute, for instance ; as 
 the original materiality and Numerical Relation still 
 remain. Even if we could, by an effort of ima- 
 gination, contemplate one single thing to the exclu- 
 sion of every thing else, that thing would still be 
 definite : and as this idea supposes the existence 
 of no other individual thing but the one contem- 
 plated, the Relation of Number could never have 
 presented itself to the mind ; and we should only 
 have called that one thing by such a General Term 
 as thing, spot, figure, &c. But even admitting that 
 we did call it one, and wished by language to show 
 that it was released from all comparison, it would 
 still, as the one thing contemplated, and therefore 
 comprehended by the mind, be definite, that is, finite, 
 and not infinite. This must prove, that the term abso- 
 lute unity, as applied to the Divine Essence, is totally 
 inapplicable. If mankind, therefore, from the effect 
 of daily use, should receive this new term as one
 
 170 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 perfectly applicable to the divine nature, let no one 
 smile if some future Schelling, some scion of tran- 
 scendentalism, should go one step further, and talk 
 of an absolute half, an absolute quarter, &c. The 
 term absolute unity is, it appears to me, altogether a 
 fallacy, as an attempt to improve upon the word 
 unity, which we must, from the constitution of our 
 minds, as individual beings, attribute to the divine 
 nature, as often as we contemplate it in its agency, 
 as the creator and ruler of all things ; but neither 
 Unity nor Absolute Unity can we, with philosophic 
 accuracy, attribute to the Divine Essence, or God- 
 head, which can be represented by no sign or sym- 
 bol of human invention. It must be admitted of our 
 worthy friends the Germans, with reference to meta- 
 physics, that " they do (to parody the words of Shak- 
 speare) speak an infinite deal of nothing, more 
 than all other men in Europe 68 ." 
 
 (fi 8 ) It becomes a question of the highest interest, to ascertain 
 whether the Relation of Number has entered into the plan upon which 
 the universe has been contrived. I hold back, for the present, some 
 remarks that I have prepared on the subject. Number, in common 
 with all the other Relations, depends for its existence on the frame of 
 our intellect. If, therefore, we can establish the fact of a uniformity 
 in the mode of action of Divine and human intelligence, a great 
 advance is made in the knowledge of what seems almost beyond our 
 finite comprehension ; and a harmony is established between man and 
 the rest of creation, that proves him to be part of a magnificent and 
 extended plan. All Relations, we have seen, are but figments of the 
 Intellect which enable us to reason ; and it would follow, therefore, 
 as a matter of inference, that human reason is in accordance with 
 Divine Intelligence, differing, not in kind, but in its degree.
 
 (,171 ) 
 
 Of Quantity. 
 
 138. The notion of number naturally leads to 
 that of Quantity, of which it is the higher Generali- 
 zation, because it includes measure as well as num- 
 ber. The word Quantity, being derived from the 
 Latin QUANTUS, meaning how much? and how many? 
 signifies, how-much-ness, and how-many-ness. The 
 English language has this degree of definiteness 
 over several others, that it can distinguish between 
 how much, and how many, as applied to both measure 
 and number. The French language, for instance, 
 has but the one word, combien, for both purposes. 
 This affords an example of the great disadvantage 
 attending the employment of comprehensive forms 
 of expression. Every specific question should be 
 discussed with specific terms; otherwise, a reason 
 that would apply only to one particular view may 
 incautiously be extended to that with which it has 
 no relation. Thus, as I have said before, in 107, 
 the Hindus, by comprehending both Cause and 
 Effect, as well as Source and Product, under the 
 same term, have been led into even greater mistakes 
 than the metaphysicians of Europe, upon the points 
 connected with these topics 67 . 
 
 ( 67 ) See Note (B), 6, 10.
 
 172 OF ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 Of Weight. 
 
 139. When we take up a Body in our hands, 
 we feel that it would fall to the ground, if left to 
 self. But we can find others a feather, or a soap- 
 bubble, for instance that, on the contrary, will float 
 of themselves in the air. When we have observed 
 this, we express the fact, by saying, that the first was 
 heavy, and the two last light. But as, according to the 
 genius of language, we have a class of words which 
 we call abstract, that we employ when we reason, 
 we convert this word Heavy into Heaviness, to agree 
 with the others. When we are desirous of knowing 
 how heavy any Body is, we weigh it against another ; 
 and then pronounce that it is of the same, greater, 
 or less Weight than that Body. Still, there is no 
 such thing as absolute weight ; and all we have learnt, 
 by weighing it, is, that it is of a certain relative 
 weight to another body. When we do not speak 
 of Weight in the abstract, we call it a Weight ; and 
 then it always refers to that of some particular 
 object. Weight is only gravitation viewed and con- 
 sidered in a special light. The remarks which 
 follow, on Magnitude, apply with equal force to 
 Weight. 
 
 Of Magnitude 
 
 Of Magnitude. 
 140. When we contemplate a Body, we observe 
 that it has, among other properties, that of being
 
 OF MAGNITUDE. 173 
 
 larger or smaller than others with which we con- 
 trast it. To the notion that arises in our minds 
 after such a comparison, we give the name of Mag- 
 nitude (yreat-sTATE). But such a Relation, it is clear, 
 cannot exist in the object itself, but in the mind 
 contemplating it. Every object is only large or 
 small relatively to some other ; and whatever is rela- 
 tive implies a mind that is capable of inferring the 
 Relation. When we say, therefore, that any object 
 has a certain size, we can do no more than point out 
 or produce another thing of the same size. Conse- 
 quently, there is no such thing as Absolute Magni- 
 tude. When, therefore, we ask what is the parti- 
 cular Magnitude or size of any object, we only de- 
 mand the name of the Body to which it is equal ; be 
 it our thumb (an inch), our foot, &c. Should it ex- 
 ceed or fall short of these respectively, we have 
 only to multiply or divide them, as the case may 
 require. It is obvious, that the question of Magni- 
 tude is identical with that of Matter and Space ; 
 and perhaps it may help to convince the reader how 
 inscrutible these questions are, and which have, in 
 truth, puzzled philosophers ever since the first 
 dawn of inquiry. Such investigations, however, 
 have their use ; as they prove that everything in 
 nature is RELATIVE, and nothing ABSOLUTE. This 
 inexplicable result, joined to what I have said with 
 regard to Infinity and Time, will make the reflect- 
 ing mind fall back with wonder and astonishment
 
 174 OP ABSTRACT GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS. 
 
 at the incomprehensible nature of the phenomena 
 which we behold around us * : so true is the pro- 
 found and beautiful sentiment of Pascal ; that 
 Reason confounds the dogmatist, and Nature the 
 sceptic. 
 
 Of Proportion. 
 
 141. If we look at any object with attention, we 
 shall observe, if it have parts, that these parts can 
 be compared with one another; and each of these, 
 besides being capable of being contrasted with the 
 others, can likewise be compared with the entire 
 object itself. When we have so done, we can say it 
 has such and such Proportions. If it does not con- 
 tain separate parts or members, we are then confined 
 to the examination of its diameter in different direc- 
 tions ; and from this effort we draw our inference, 
 as to its Proportions. In all these processes of the 
 intellect, we have clearly only arrived at an infe- 
 rence ; and we thus feel, that the notion of Pro- 
 portion, like that of Form and other properties, is 
 truly a creation of the mind, resulting from the em- 
 ployment of language. 
 
 ( w ) The incomprehensible nature of these topics to Human Reason 
 is further pointed out in the Appendix, Note (D).
 
 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING. 
 
 142. The utmost we can learn from the pure 
 sciences is, the fact of the perfect agreement of their 
 results with the actual phenomena of nature. They 
 can, however, teach us nothing as to the origin or 
 the rationale of things : still, the demonstrations of 
 Science cannot but raise our minds to the conviction 
 of a wondrous Intelligence, that must be the regu- 
 lating principle of all that we behold around us. 
 That every thing obeys laws established by perfect 
 wisdom, without any deviation, is surely as edifying 
 a conclusion as it is possible for humanity to arrive 
 at ; and cannot but make us feel the dignity of our 
 own nature, at the very moment we are humbled 
 by the contrast that we must unconsciously draw 
 between ourselves and the Omnipotent Being to 
 whom we are indebted for existence. To be fitted 
 for the contemplation of the spectacle of the universe 
 is surely to have a high privilege, and an important 
 station in nature.
 
 176 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING. 
 
 Of the Laws of Nature. 
 
 143. It was not long, even in the infancy of society, 
 before mankind observed that certain results always 
 occurred under similar circumstances. Thus, the fall 
 of a stone, or any other heavy body, to the ground, 
 was soon taken as a matter of course : such, also, 
 was the case with the ascent of flame and smoke. It 
 is unnecessary to repeat here other familiar instances 
 in which we always expect a recurrence of what we 
 have observed before. When such facts began to 
 be reasoned upon, they impressed the mind with the 
 conviction that they had their undeviating uniformity 
 from some presiding influence; and, as the word 
 Nature had become personified as the great Agent 
 of the universe, every result of the kind was said to 
 take place by a Law she had established: hence 
 arose the expression so commonly used, " the Laws 
 of Nature" We must see from this, that it is purely 
 figurative. But, though very convenient for general 
 purposes, it cannot be denied that it has a great 
 tendency to mislead those who employ it, and to 
 make them think that every thing jumps here, and 
 jumps there, in consequence of a " sic volo" or in- 
 junction, given to them, at creation, by Nature. The 
 agents that keep the universe in harmonious action 
 being invisible, such phrases help to take away all 
 uncertainty ; and mankind repose upon them with a 
 security, that will last as long as their ignorance of
 
 OF ATTRACTION. 177 
 
 the real nature of things exists : for the mind of man 
 has as great a horror of uncertainty, as, philoso- 
 phers tell us, Nature has of a vacuum. 
 
 Of Attraction. 
 
 144. The word Attraction, by its derivation, means 
 the act of drawing to ; but its employment as an 
 Agent can only tend to mislead, and is not useful, 
 even theoretically. It is one of those remarkable 
 instances of the effect that language has, in mislead- 
 ing the minds of even the acutest and most cautious 
 of men. But scientific and natural philosophers will 
 find that they are beguiled by language as much as 
 the rest of mankind ; and that they are then as much 
 under the dominion of fancy, as those who are not 
 supposed to be, like themselves, lovers of calculation 
 and matters of fact. 
 
 145. No movement, it will be admitted, can be 
 evident to us, without it is perceived by some one 
 of our Senses. Matter is consequently necessary to 
 the existence of those forms which we can per- 
 ceive ; for whatever form is of sufficient magnitude 
 and solidity to be cognisable by our touch, and is 
 still not tangible, we naturally and truly pronounce 
 to be a mere vision, and to have no outward exis- 
 tence. But while we are thus sensible that matter 
 is indispensably requisite to movement, we must be
 
 178 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING. 
 
 equally certain that that which is void of life and 
 thought can in no way move itself. If we say it is 
 done by Attraction, we then assert that bodies mu- 
 tually attract one another, and so join together spon- 
 taneously. This may be a very easy, though not a 
 very profound way of accounting for the junction 
 and approximation of bodies. If a juggler says " va 
 presto" and seems to make anything disappear by 
 word of command, he may deceive children and 
 ignorant people ; but those who are better informed 
 only admire the dexterity he had displayed in the 
 feat. That a philosopher should talk of Attraction as 
 a reality, and attribute all the phenomena in nature 
 to it, is drawing as strongly on the credulity of 
 mankind in general, as the juggler does upon the 
 simplicity of his company. It is in vain that the 
 philosopher says in his own defence, that he means, 
 by such an expression, only to assert a general fact, 
 namely, the tendency of one body to another. If he 
 mean no more, he should remember, that he who 
 would be the very first to cavil at any term that 
 was contrary to the technical phraseology he is in the 
 habit of employing, should be the last to make use 
 of an expression that contains in itself an assumption 
 that he cannot defend. But he will not make the 
 admission, till he is hard pressed ; and then he will 
 instantly relapse into his real and habitual concep- 
 tion, and talk of attractive and repulsive forces as in- 
 dubitable facts ; thus showing that he has no other
 
 OF ATTRACTION. 179 
 
 opinion on the subject than the one he has been 
 forced for the moment to abandon ; nor could it 
 be otherwise, if thought and words have any confor- 
 mity: and be it likewise remembered, that these 
 same Forces are the mere chimeras of his own ima- 
 gination. See 120 122. 
 
 146. It is easy to understand how one body 
 may attract another ; for a boatman, with his hook, 
 may be seen to attract, or draw to himself, another 
 boat : but how one atom, or one body, can of itself at- 
 tract another, seems utterly incomprehensible to me. 
 I feel it is only battering down a wall of pasteboard, 
 to make these remarks; for not only do natural 
 philosophers feel that Attraction is one of those 
 points which they must surrender up the moment it 
 is vigorously attacked, and which they only pre- 
 serve for want of a better definition ; but the reader 
 is aware that this famous Agent is nothing more 
 than an Abstraction, which has been converted into 
 a reality by the mere course of language ; and there- 
 fore has no existence, except as a sound : it conse- 
 quently stands in the unhappy situation of the non 
 causa pro causa of logicians. 
 
 Of Attractive and Repulsive Forces. 
 
 147. Natural philosophers, having satisfied 
 themselves of the existence of Attraction, have 
 N 2
 
 180 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING. 
 
 founded upon this belief the doctrine of Attractive 
 and Repulsive Forces, as real powers. We have seen, 
 that the notion of Force is purely Abstract, and 
 likewise General ; and that therefore it has no 
 existence, except by the medium of language. We 
 have further seen, that if we are to understand any 
 thing by the term, we must refer it to something that 
 forces ; and, in every case, it can only be effected 
 through the medium of a real essence, which I call 
 by the name of POWER ( 123 130), that may be 
 made to exhibit its energy by the means of any 
 body that it can move. But mathematicians having 
 taken the word Force as a reality, have constructed 
 their arguments upon the strength of the supposi- 
 tion ; and it must be admitted, that they labour under 
 many chances of being deluded, when they theorize 
 without a due knowledge of the nature of language. 
 All that is statical and dynamical, in nature, being 
 strictly in accordance with science, it is not sur- 
 prising that they find but little difficulty in antici- 
 pating most of the obvious consequences resulting 
 from this important truth; but then it is attended 
 by one great disadvantage, namely, that, as in the 
 case I have supposed about nothing ( 120), they may 
 assume any theory, and prove it to themselves and 
 others with the usual parade of the most rigorous 
 demonstration. Thus, according to the undulatory 
 theory of light of Huygens, they have only to as- 
 sume the propulsion of waves, agreeably to certain
 
 OF ATTRACTIVE AND REPULSIVE FORCES. 181 
 
 laws, and they may, without difficulty, satisfy them- 
 selves that it is right : but if they laid aside their 
 symbols, and asked themselves how waves could 
 cross each other in the same instant of time, above, 
 below, on every side, and at all angles, without 
 disturbing, confusing, or obliterating their own ef- 
 fects, they might be brought to feel that something 
 more than nicety of observation and dexterity in 
 wielding the calculus are necessary in such investi- 
 gations : and the very same objection lies against 
 the radial theory of Newton. Some other hypothe- 
 sis, therefore, must be sought for, to account for the 
 propagation of light : and, even were either rays or 
 waves free from the difficulties I have pointed out, 
 it would be still necessary to show what it is that 
 propels either the one or the other with such asto- 
 nishing velocity. A theory is not worth any thing, 
 that merely amuses us with words, or assumes 
 something that requires as much explanation as 
 that which it was meant to expound. The doctrine 
 of Forces can only be admitted in questions of pure 
 mathematics, where the whole of the topics under calcu- 
 lation are all equally abstract ; but when it is pre- 
 tended that the cohesion of bodies, for instance, can 
 be explained by the means of Attractive and Repul- 
 sive Forces, it is clear that nothing but error and 
 misconception can be the consequence : for it is 
 only to assume that the Attractive Force (an Abs- 
 traction) is equal to a certain amount, and that the
 
 182 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING. 
 
 Repulsive Force (an Abstraction) is something less, 
 which therefore allows the Attractive Force to be 
 the stronger of the two ; and so all things in nature 
 are very ingeniously, firmly, and compactly held 
 together by this Attractive Abstraction, when, of 
 course, the whole finishes with Q. E. D., and every 
 one is satisfied. In making these remarks, I have 
 not the most remote intention of undervaluing the 
 labours of mathematicians ; which, in all that regards 
 pure science, have been of inestimable value to 
 mankind, and really constitute, what may, without 
 exaggeration, be called the glory of the Human Intel- 
 lect 70 . My only object is, to point out, that a know- 
 ledge of the nature of words is an important, nay, an 
 indispensable branch of their calling; and without 
 which they will, as often as they begin to theorize, 
 fall into the most absurd mistakes. They should, 
 therefore, be on their guard, whenever they are 
 considering a question of physical science; and re- 
 member, that their symbols either represent what is 
 
 ( 70 ) It is worthy of remark, that the germs of, nearly, every funda- 
 mental notion in science is be found among the Hindus, apparently 
 unborrowed ; but there seems to exist no trace of that branch of ma- 
 thematics called ' conic sections.' These immortal investigations of 
 the properties of the sections of the cone, to which modern Astronomy 
 is so much indebted for its most brilliant discoveries, is therefore 
 entirely due to Greek genius ; and show what it could effect hi abstract 
 science, when a rational subject was presented for its employment. 
 See 169. 

 
 OF AFFINITY. 183 
 
 real, or something that is purely abstract 71 , and, 
 therefore unreal. 
 
 Of Affinity. 
 
 148. The word Affinity is here introduced 
 rather with a view of drawing the reader's attention 
 to the fact that it is not overlooked, than for the pur- 
 pose of any particular elucidation. By its etymology, 
 it means nearness ; but this sense is merely figura- 
 tive as to its scientific use, where it marks the 
 fitness of one substance to combine with another by 
 known laws. Though employed much in the same 
 way as the word Attraction, it does not assume so 
 much as that contested term ; because, being used in 
 a neuter sense, it lays no claim to being an Agent 
 in nature, but is felt to be, as it ought to be consi- 
 dered, rather as a result. When, however, Kirwan 
 and some succeeding writers on chemistry sub- 
 divide Affinity into various kinds, every one must feel 
 that they have merely multiplied terms to an unne- 
 cessary extent, and that they have only obscured 
 a subject sufficiently mysterious. We are told 
 that there are the following kinds of affinity : 
 
 ( 71 ) In Note (E) of the Appendix, it will be seen that Mr. Davies 
 Gilbert has cleared up the difficulties that involved in mystery the 
 nature of Negative and Imaginary Quantities; but he does not seem 
 to have been aware of the paralogisms attendant upon the ordinary 
 use of Abstractions in mathematical and other reasoning.
 
 184 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING. 
 
 Affinity, Compound. 
 
 Divellent. 
 
 Double. 
 
 Intermediate. 
 
 Quiescent. 
 
 Reciprocal. 
 
 Simple. 
 
 Vital. 
 
 149. The reader will be quite convinced, by 
 the above specimen, that it is unnecessary to pursue 
 the subject any farther. 
 
 Of the Vis Inertiae, $c. 
 
 150. Newton considered that there is a " passive 
 principle, by which bodies persist in their motion 
 or rest in proportion to the force impressing it, and 
 resist as much as they are resisted;" to which he 
 gave the name Vis Inertia, or the power of resistance. 
 Had this question not related to mechanics, but to 
 the abstract expression of the laws of the phenomena 
 of nature, we might have understood that he meant 
 by this " passive principle" nothing more, than that 
 all bodies continue to move as long as they are im- 
 pelled, and that action and re-action are equal and 
 opposite. If we do not take the expression in this 
 last sense, we must suppose that he used the terms 
 " Motion," " Rest," and " Force," with a Concrete 
 Meaning; and then we shall be reduced to the
 
 OF THE VIS INERTIA, &C. 185 
 
 further dilemma of inferring that his " Passive Prin- 
 ciple " is a real Agent in nature. Now, supposing, 
 for a moment, that this was what he meant, it is 
 not very easy to comprehend how an Agent, " by 
 which bodies resist as much as they are resisted," 
 could be passive. The fact is, that the difficulty 
 that arises in our minds on this occasion is that 
 which must ever result from the use of Abstract 
 Language with regard to fundamental notions. By 
 not remembering that Motion, Rest, Force, and simi- 
 lar words, are purely Abstract Terms, we cannot 
 but argue in a circle ; and end in amusing ourselves, 
 at the best, with phrases that, when examined, are 
 found to be nothing to the purpose, or to beg the whole 
 question. Science is, undoubtedly, an abstract pro- 
 cess ; and for the mathematical solution of the laws of 
 motion, various things must be assumed, by which 
 mathematicians arrive at a true expression of the 
 desired answer ; but in so doing, they ought never 
 to forget the nature of the words or the symbols 
 they have employed in the process of reasoning 
 and calculation ; and both operations will be found 
 to have a nearer resemblance to one another than is 
 generally supposed. Let us, in opposition to In- 
 ertite (inertness), suppose that all movement is pro- 
 pagated solely by means of the real essence, POWER : 
 we shall then have something that stands in the 
 relation of cause to the effect, and be certain that 
 bodies cannot move without it ; that they are there-
 
 136 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING. 
 
 fore perfectly passive and indifferent; merely chang- 
 ing place when impelled by it, and continuing in 
 movement, resistance, or place, only as long as they 
 are under its influence. We shall also see that bodies 
 must be always inert of their own nature : and we 
 consequently get rid of this extra Agent, that is both 
 Active and Passive at the same moment, and which 
 has been introduced into the mechanism of nature 
 under the delusive influence of language 72 . 
 
 151. By a notion similar to that which led 
 Newton to the employment of the term Vis Inertia, 
 mathematicians speak of the following kinds of 
 Force : 
 
 Vis Activa- 
 . . . Passiva. 
 . . . Absoluta. 
 . . . Accelatrix. 
 . . . Impressa. 
 . . . Insita. 
 , . . Centripeta. 
 . Matrix. 
 
 ( n ) Since writing these remarks, I find that Sir John Herschel has 
 explained away the agency of the Vis Inertice, and, consequently, its 
 reality. (See his able Discourse on Natural Philosophy, 234.) The 
 object of my remarks being to show the delusive influence of lan- 
 guage over the minds of the soundest reasoners, it still remains a 
 question hi what sense Newton himself understood the term. I 
 have already shown, in 14, that language led him into error with 
 regard to Attractive and Repulsive Forces.
 
 OF THE VIS INERTLE, &C. 187 
 
 152. To the foregoing must be added the Vis 
 Viva and the Vis Mortua of Leibnitz. Such terms 
 may be useful, and can lead to no misconception 
 as long as the true nature of language is not for- 
 gotten ; but it is hardly possible that they can be 
 employed by mathematicians, through the ten- 
 dency to Realism that always exists in the mind 
 of every man, without being mistaken for real 
 entities. 
 
 Of the Vis Vitse,#c. 
 
 153. The practisers of the healing art must 
 have been among the earliest votaries, if not the 
 pioneers, of science. The pugnacious tendencies of 
 mankind were continually calling into use whatever 
 skill they had acquired ; and, if we may judge from 
 the accurate specimen afforded us of the prac- 
 tice of semi-savage life in the Pacific Ocean 73 , 
 human ingenuity arrives at considerable perfection 
 in conditions of society that would scarcely promise 
 such advancement. The followers of the medical 
 art must have been strongly impressed with the 
 secret agency of nature in effecting those surprising 
 cures and restoration of parts, which came from 
 time to time under their observation. From the 
 days of Hippocrates to the present, physicians have 
 
 (/ 3 ) See Mariner's very interesting account of the Friendly Isles.
 
 188 OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING. 
 
 employed various terms that express their convic- 
 tion of some secret force operating in animal bodies. 
 Of ttyese, the following are the most common : 
 
 Vis Vita. 
 
 . . . Mortua. 
 
 . . . Medicatrix Naturce. 
 
 . . . Conservatrix. 
 
 . . . Plastica. 
 
 . . . Nervosa. 
 
 . . . Insita. 
 
 154. Other names have been assigned, such 
 as Archcea by Van Helmont, and Impetum Faciens 
 by Boerhaave. Perhaps to all these terms we must 
 attribute an Abstract, rather than a Concrete Sense ; 
 and they are no other than so many attempts to 
 hide ignorance of causes under fictitious names, 
 which might serve as props to support the under- 
 standing from betraying its weakness, to itself and 
 to others. 
 
 155. Having said so much against the abuses 
 attendant upon the employment of Abstract Lan- 
 guage, without we preserve a perpetual conscious- 
 ness of its real nature, I think the present is a 
 favourable opportunity for pointing out its indispen- 
 sable utility as the sole means of classification and 
 reasoning. All diseases being merely States of the 
 body, it follows, that without the help of Abstrac-
 
 OF THE VIS VIT.E, &C. 189 
 
 tions they could never have been the object of 
 reflection : for as they have no other existence than 
 as sounds, they would be without a designation ; and 
 consequently, never being the subject of thought, 
 we should be only able to say that one person was 
 sick or affected just like such another person, or that 
 he was feverish, gouty, coughed, &c. Now, however, 
 we can say, that he has a Fever (tertian, quartan, 
 or any other) ; that he has the Gout, a Cough, &c. 
 The obvious inference to be derived from this ob- 
 servation is, that though diseases are classed under 
 separate heads, they must really be as different from 
 one another, even when called by the same name 
 as the bodies are in which they occur.
 
 ( 190 ) 
 
 OF THE MIND. 
 
 156. The investigation of what is called " The 
 Mind" will be sufficient, of itself, to show that the 
 consideration of the nature of words is no con- 
 temptible pursuit, but one really deserving of the 
 closest application of our faculties. THE MIND 
 is one of those comprehensive and Abstract Gene- 
 ralities which we are momentarily in the habit of 
 employing, till at last we believe them to be per- 
 fectly real things, of which it would be folly to 
 doubt. A little reflection will however convince us, 
 that, at least in the manner in which we make use 
 of these expressions, we are under a great miscon- 
 ception. To feel the full force of this remark, we 
 must consider what are the constituent parts of 
 The Mind, and what likewise is their nature. If 
 we accurately analyse them, we must see that they 
 consist, Reason being excepted, merely in what are 
 called the ' Faculties] which consequently are mere 
 Abstractions; and to them, therefore, I now proceed 
 to draw the reader's attention, after a few remarks 
 upon Sensation, Consciousness, and Intelligence.
 
 Of Sensation, Consciousness, and Intelligence. 
 
 157. No right consideration of the Mind can be 
 undertaken without a due comprehension of these 
 three terms. 
 
 158. A zoophyte, and most animals just born, 
 cannot be said to possess Consciousness ; and it is 
 not for some days after the birth of an infant that 
 it shows symptoms of this state ; and a very much 
 longer period elapses before it exhibits signs of 
 Intelligence. So, when any one is asleep, we dis- 
 cover that even Sensation is almost dormant, and 
 that, when suddenly roused, he is simply conscious ; 
 but it is not until he is broad awake that he can 
 give an intelligible answer, though he is perfectly 
 Conscious of the presence of the person who may be 
 interrogating him. All these facts point out, that 
 Sensation, Consciousness, and Intelligence are to- 
 tally distinct States; and that the abode of each 
 must be sought for in separate organs. Physiology 
 has decisively shown, that it is to the nerves we 
 must look as the seat of Sensation; and that the 
 information they obtain is referred at once to the 
 brain y which is the common centre from which they 
 radiate, mediately, or immediately. It is the brain, 
 therefore, or a part of its contents, that is con- 
 scious of what the nerves have experienced : and if 
 the impressions are not of a transitory nature, the
 
 192 OF THE MIND. 
 
 Consciousness of such sensations is then termed 
 Memory. Our feelings, therefore, are recorded in 
 the brain, as in a memorandum-book ; but we might 
 as well expect that such a volume could make use 
 of its contents, as that the brain should be able to 
 employ its own materials, that is, that what is Con- 
 scious should supply the place of that which is 
 Intelligent. If Sensation depend on the nervous 
 system, and Consciousness on some portion of the 
 brain, we must equally believe that the Intelligence, 
 which, with the aid of Reason, is to compare, clas- 
 sify, and decide upon the -facts at its disposal, must 
 have its own peculiar organ. What portion of the 
 contents of the scull is thus pre-eminently distin- 
 guished over the whole system, it is not my inten- 
 tion to discuss at present; but it is evident that 
 it must be as superior to the portion of the brain 
 that is Conscious, as this is to the nerves, and as 
 these, again, are to the muscles and coarser parts 
 of the body. It is this unknown organ, so highly 
 endowed, and constituting the thinking, reflecting 
 Agent, resulting from the combination of soul with 
 matter, duly organized, that I call, in these pages, 
 by the name of INTELLECT. But as the brain is the 
 general term for the contents of the scull, what I 
 have just said must be so far modified as not to 
 mislead any one ; and that portion of its contents 
 which is conscious ought, for the sake of clearness 
 of conception, to be called by some word which
 
 SENSATION, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND INTELLIGENCE. 193 
 
 would clearly express its office ; and for this reason 
 I assign it the name of SENSORIUM. 
 
 159. It must not, however, be supposed, for a 
 moment, that though the Intellect, Sensorium, and 
 Nerves are separate and distinct organs, that they 
 are independent of one another. They are to be 
 considered as forming a triad, in which every one is 
 essential to the operation of the other; nor can 
 Intelligence, on any occasion, dispense with feeling, 
 when it pronounces judgment on the facts pre- 
 sented to it by Consciousness, except on an abstract 
 subject. For instance, when we say that the whole 
 is equal to all its parts, Feeling is in abeyance, 
 though the notion of whole and parts was originally 
 obtained through its means. The Intellect, without 
 the aid of the materials afforded by the Sensorium, 
 and derived from the Nerves, would be as useless 
 as a mill that is without grain and a hopper. It is 
 the union, therefore, of Intellect, Sensorium, and 
 Nerves that constitute the mysterious Agent called 
 Self, and which is consequently intelligent, conscious, 
 and feeling, and, when under the guidance of Reason, 
 is also rational. This triple being resembles, exter- 
 nally, a bulbous root with its dependent fibres ; the 
 other parts of the body being subsidiary adjuncts, 
 intended for effecting nutrition and action, under 
 the will of the Intellect, the calls of the Appetites, 
 and likewise, but too often, under the unbridled
 
 194 OF THE MIND. 
 
 dictates of the Passions. Are the Feelings, then, 
 too acute, the Appetites too craving, and the Pas- 
 sions too violent, the Intellect will be troubled in its 
 operations; and " the still small voice of Reason" 
 being unheard, the individual is, for the time, under 
 what is termed mental derangement, even though he 
 is not what is actually called mad. But though our 
 Feelings do occasionally betray us into excesses that 
 are injurious, in their consequences, to ourselves and 
 others, we must never forget, that no decision can 
 take place, with the exception just alluded to, that is 
 not effected under their influence a fact of the ut- 
 most consequence, in the regulation of our conduct. 
 
 Of the Faculties. 
 
 160. Of all the Faculties of the Mind, there 
 being none so important as the Understanding, I 
 commence with it. The first great delusion we are 
 under, is in supposing that the word Understanding 
 represents any thing whatsoever. We, that is, our 
 thinking selves, may understand what we hear or 
 see ; but when we employ the Abstract word Under- 
 standing for some part of ourselves, we do so 
 clearly by a fallacy. When we understand anything, 
 we necessarily feel, are conscious, and intelligent: and 
 were I to analyse the term Understanding according 
 to the usual mode in these cases, I would conse- 
 quently say, that it is compounded of Feeling,
 
 OF THE FACULTIES. 195 
 
 Consciousness, and Intelligence. For if I analyse 
 one Abstraction, I shall most likely do it by the help 
 of others ; ' but, in reality, there is neither Under- 
 standing, Feeling, Consciousness, nor Intelligence ; 
 and, instead of these, we must remember that it 
 is the union of soul with matter, which, being 
 organized into human frames, understands, feels, is 
 conscious, and intelligent. This, I think, is suffi- 
 ciently obvious ; and I now proceed to say the same 
 of some other of the most remarkable of our Fa- 
 culties. 
 
 161. We talk of the Faculties we call Memory, 
 Imagination, Judgment, Will, Attention, Reflection, 
 &c. ; but it is obvious we must do the same with 
 these Abstractions as with the Understanding, and 
 remember, that all we can truly say is, that we, our 
 individual selves, can remember, imagine, judge, will, 
 attend, reflect, $c. and nothing more. Consequently, 
 the supposition of Faculties, upon which we so often 
 draw, is a mere conventional form of speech ; and, 
 however expedient or inevitable this course is, we 
 ought never to forget its real nature when we in- 
 vestigate such matters, otherwise we shall only 
 delude ourselves, and mislead others. We call 
 these Abstractions, ' Faculties,' and ' Powers,' but it 
 is only by a sort of figure of speech ; and yet men go 
 on gravely discussing the nature of these Faculties 
 as realities of which there can be no doubt. We 
 o 2
 
 196 OF THE MIND. 
 
 likewise forget that the words Faculty and Power 
 are both Abstract Terms. 
 
 162. The Faculties, if we except Reason, con- 
 stituting the whole of what is called The Mind, we 
 must see that the very thing, of which we were as 
 sure as of our own bodies, resolves itself into the 
 mere OPERATIONS of what we may appropriately 
 call the Intellectual Agent, which, in the sense that 
 results from the preceding views, means nothing 
 more than the Thinking Individual, cognisant of 
 exterior nature through the organs of sense. It is 
 in short, as I have before said, the Mysterious Being 
 that results from the equally mysterious combina- 
 tion of soul with matter. Language, though the 
 essential and indispensable instrument of thought, 
 ought never to be mistaken for that which thinks, 
 that is to say, for the Intellect; yet language is as 
 indispensable to it as wheels are to a carriage ; and 
 were a Shakspeare to be utterly deprived of the 
 memory of words, he would not merely be unable to 
 think, but be simply a cunning animal. From which 
 we must feel, that speech was as much designed 
 as an aid to the Intellect, as the hands and legs 
 are to the body, or as the trunk is to the elephant ; 
 and indeed is actually so identified with the Intel- 
 lect, as to be mistaken for what we call ' The Mind.
 
 Of Reason. 
 
 163. Of all the divisions into which we separate 
 ' The Mind/ Reason is the only one which is not a 
 misconception arising from the delusive nature of 
 language. It is not a Faculty, but a real Agent, 
 aiding and assisting the Intellect of man in all its 
 varied operations. Upon what grounds I make 
 this assertion, must be deferred for the present ; as 
 it would not merely involve me in a disquisition of 
 a length disproportioned to the other questions 
 which I have selected for discussion, but because it 
 will appear more appropriately hereafter, in con- 
 nexion with that to which it has never been 
 suspected to be related : and all I have to say will, 
 consequently, then be better understood than it 
 could be in this place. In so doing, I do not ask the 
 reader for any admission, but merely that he will 
 suspend his judgment till I can produce all the evi- 
 dence necessary to leave no doubt of the truth on his 
 mind ; and he will then see why Instinct never errs ; 
 while Reason, of which we are so proud, is ever in 
 danger of going astray. 
 
 Of Insanity. 
 
 164. The preceding views demonstrate that 
 what we call The Mind is merely a collective 
 Term for the operations of the Intellect. When we
 
 198 OF THE MIND. 
 
 speak therefore of Insanity of Mind, we can only do 
 so by a figure of speech ; and we must consequently 
 look for the cause of mental alienation (in the absence 
 of our knowledge of the abode of the Intellect) to 
 the state of the brain and nervous system. The 
 question of moral insanity, that is, of disease of that 
 separate part of us which is commonly called c The 
 Mind/ has long been agitated among medical rea- 
 soners ; but had just notions of language been en- 
 tertained, the subject could never have been mooted. 
 If, therefore, no other advantage could be derived 
 from the preceding remarks, than the placing this 
 important point in its true light, the effort would 
 certainly have been worth the trouble. Insanity, 
 it is evident, must always be a physical disease; 
 for it would be an absurdity to suppose that the Soul 
 could be subject to derangement, disease, or death. 
 
 Of Ideas. 
 
 165. Perhaps it will be impossible to find, in 
 the whole range of our language, any word that has 
 been brought into such general use as Idea; and 
 which, if we examine it closely, is so little entitled 
 to the distinction. So much, indeed, has this word 
 obtained a general currency, that it requires some 
 hardihood to call its legitimacy in question. What 
 we term an Idea 7 *, being derived from a Greek 
 
 (") Ma.
 
 OF IDEAS. 199 
 
 word implying I see 75 , signifies properly a sight; but 
 is restricted, by convention, to mean a Form or 
 Image, not perceived by the senses, but supposed to 
 be conceived by the mind. It is generally assumed 
 that Ideas are, as it were, the pabulum of our 
 thoughts; but if we closely examine this point, 
 we shall find it to be an error, and that, though 
 the belief in Ideas has prevailed over that of Species 
 ever since the time of Des Cartes, we have only sub- 
 stituted one illegitimate notion for another. When 
 we reason, we do but employ Words; and if we 
 seem to call up the Images or Perceptions of the 
 things they represent, it is merely by that insepa- 
 rable conjunction that exists between the objects 
 of our thoughts, and to which the term Association 
 of Ideas is applied ( 168). The same result, how- 
 ever, will take place if we hear any word pro- 
 nounced in a particular way, to which our attention 
 had been once strongly drawn ; for, on hearing it 
 again, we shall, in all probability, call up the image 
 of the person, and even the place where we first 
 heard it. Such things must have been observed by 
 every one. How often does it happen, that we can- 
 not bring to mind, not the Idea, but the exact Word 
 we feel is required by the nature of what we have 
 said, and of what we are about to say ? Our dis- 
 course, in these respects, being like a piece of
 
 200 OF THE MIND. 
 
 mosaic, or a dissected map, we know we want 
 something, and we are quite aware what form it 
 should have, to fill up the gap in what we are con- 
 structing ; yet there can be no Idea, image, or form 
 previously in our minds, if what we require should 
 be an Abstract Term : but, does it refer to some- 
 thing we have seen, touched, &c., then we call up the 
 image, in our endeavour to find the word we want. 
 If any one will closely attend to the operations of 
 his own mind, he will find this to be the fact. When 
 we argue about something that we have never seen 
 ourselves, or had pourtrayed to us by a pictorial 
 or other representation, we can talk about it just as 
 clearly and as cogently as if we spoke from personal 
 knowledge ; yet, in so doing, we do not call up or 
 form any image on the subject 76 . If, for instance, I 
 talk of Mango Capac, the divine founder of the 
 Peruvian monarchy, I have not merely no image of 
 him in my mind, but, as I never remember to have 
 seen any representation of him produced by the 
 imagination of another, I do so without any other 
 aid than that of Words. Again, if I tell the reader 
 that the Chinese employ, to a great extent, a hard 
 substance, of a granular formation, in their cookery, 
 and that it is of so much consequence to this singu- 
 lar people, that it is to be seen piled up, in large 
 stacks, on the banks of their canals and rivers, ready 
 
 ( 76 ) See Note (F).
 
 OF IDEAS. 201 
 
 for transportation throughout the country, and that 
 the want of it would cause an immediate commotion 
 in man, woman, and child, from one end of the 
 empire to the other, I am sure he is able to com- 
 prehend all I have said, though his imagination 
 has not, perhaps, in this description, called up the 
 Idea of the thing I mean 77 . As a further proof that 
 it is only with words we reason, let the reader 
 remember, that eight out of the nine parts of speech, 
 which we employ in reasoning, cannot, by any pos- 
 sible means, be referred to Ideas. If children and 
 people of vivid imaginations do, at times, couple 
 the images of things with the tenour of the dis- 
 courses (not the single words) that they hear, this is 
 no proof that each word represents an Idea. Very 
 often it arises merely, as I before said, from the 
 Association of Ideas, but generally from a more than 
 usual interest in what they are listening to ; and it 
 is natural, on such an occasion, that they should 
 substitute some person, place, or other object, which 
 had previously come under their cognisance, for 
 what they hear described ; but this cannot be the 
 case in discourses that relate to moral and abstract 
 subjects ; for what Picture or Image can we call up, 
 to identify with such words as Principle and Con- 
 duct ; or Profundity, Research, Glory, &c. ? To reason, 
 
 (") Those whose imagination may not have helped them to the 
 solution of what is here intended, will find it in Note (G) of the 
 Appendix.
 
 202 OF THE MIND. 
 
 therefore, is to employ language according to 
 the frame of our intellect, just as to walk is to 
 employ our legs according to the action for which 
 they were formed. There can, consequently, be no 
 reasoning without language, as there can be no 
 walking without legs, nor flying without wings. The 
 applying, therefore, the term Idea to any single 
 word is a mere mental delusion, founded upon 
 custom, and derived from the misconception of 
 metaphysicians. 
 
 166. Having thus shown that we cannot call a 
 word that stands for a Perception, that is for some- 
 thing Concrete, an Idea, it may be questioned how 
 far it is merely useful, as the representative of the 
 remaining class of words called Conceptions. By 
 the very nature of the word Idea it implies some- 
 thing that is single : it cannot, therefore, represent 
 those Inferences, Phrases, Opinions, &c. already al- 
 luded to ( 3 and 30) which are really or virtually 
 compounded of many single words ; yet we conti- 
 nually employ it for such purposes. So we also say, 
 ( Such is my Ideal & c -> though we mean, on such 
 occasions, ( my opinion, my notion, my sentiments] &c. 
 We must see, therefore, that Idea is one of those 
 words that are introduced into language, from time 
 to time, without the least necessity for so doing ; 
 and, that by its rejection we should be really bene- 
 fitted : for whatever tends to make language vague,
 
 OF IDEAS. 203 
 
 not merely unfits it for its legitimate use, but is 
 really injurious to every process of reasoning. As a 
 word that seemed so happily to stand as a general 
 representative for Concrete and Abstract terms, its 
 use might have been tolerated in philosophical in- 
 vestigations ; but as we have seen that it is inadmis- 
 sible as the representative of Perceptions, it may be 
 justly doubted whether it would not be better if it 
 were altogether discarded from philosophical lan- 
 guage, as merely tending to multiply, without any 
 adequate advantage, the terms which are used in 
 reasoning. In these pages it has been only em- 
 ployed for the purpose of refutation or of quotation, 
 as not merely useless, but tending to create false 
 inferences ; for besides being a redundancy, it has 
 not, like Perception and Conception, the advantage 
 of being connected with a verb in our language. 
 Few reasoners can be more clear than Locke, as far 
 as regards the making his sentiments understood ; 
 and yet, by calling the words we employ to repre- 
 sent what we have conceived by our minds, as well 
 as what we have perceived with our senses, by the 
 term Ideas, he has diminished much of the perspi- 
 cuity that he might have introduced into his work. 
 All true knowledge consists in individualization and 
 exact representation ; and many false and incorrect 
 notions pass without detection by the use of General, 
 and therefore vague, Words. We ought to avoid 
 the needless multiplication of Terms ; to which our
 
 204 OF THE MIND. 
 
 language is but too prone, owing to the various 
 sources from which it is derived : multiplication of 
 terms being apt to generate the notion of multipli- 
 city of things, a baneful tendency in philosophy. 
 The word Conception, however, has not only a 
 beauty and force from being connected with the 
 verb to ' Conceive,' but is, moreover, of particular 
 value, as being applicable to all the Conceptions of 
 our minds, as well as to our combinations of words 
 into phrases. Thus we can apply it to the inven- 
 tions of the poet, the artist, the musical composer, 
 and to those of the mechanic, properties that render 
 it a term of peculiar aptitude and felicity for every 
 thing connected with what can be conceived by the 
 intellect. But if we contrast the word Idea with 
 Perception and Conception, we must at once disco- 
 ver that it is not the true representative of either 
 the one or the other : for, if it be employed for the 
 first, we must see that Image is a more correct term ; 
 and if for the last, that is to say, for Conception, we 
 must be equally convinced, that a word, that in its 
 own language meant an Image or Form, cannot, 
 without a certainty of error, be applied to mere 
 sounds, that have no more existence than so much 
 breath ; and that its employment in a double cha- 
 racter can only produce confusion of thought, and, 
 consequently, fallacy of judgment : for I must once 
 more remind the reader, that an Idea must either 
 be the equivalent of a Perception, or a Conception ;
 
 OF IDEAS. 205 
 
 and that these two words are merely Abstractions, 
 that could have no sense, if we did not refer them, 
 respectively, to the only assertion any of us can 
 truly make ; namely, I PERCEIVE Things, and I CON- 
 CEIVE States. 
 
 Of Abstract Ideas. 
 
 167. I have said so much on the real nature of 
 Abstract Ideas in 6, that I feel it is only necessary 
 to allude to them here, to show that they have not 
 been forgotten in the systematic view which I have 
 proposed to myself in the present remarks. If 
 Ideas really represent nothing, and are merely 
 names for the sounds or symbols we call Concep- 
 tions, it is obvious that the abstracting of these 
 Abstractions is a mere delusion of language. For 
 Abstract Ideas, therefore, we ought invariably to 
 substitute the expressions, Abstract Terms, Abstract 
 Words, or Abstractions. 
 
 Of the Association of Ideas. 
 
 168. From the preceding observations, it is 
 evident that we cannot, with any propriety, speak 
 of the Association of Ideas; but we may, with 
 greater justice, do so of our Associated Recollections. 
 No one event or object being capable of being 
 observed alone, but always in conjunction with
 
 206 OF THE MIND. 
 
 others, it naturally follows, that we cannot think of 
 any one of them without its being accompanied by 
 those which were associated with it from the con- 
 nexion of time and place, or of reflection. For 
 instance, I rise from my chair, and look out of the 
 window, on a beautiful meadow bespangled with 
 countless wild flowers : the sky is serenely beautiful 
 not a cloud is to be seen : the air conveys along, 
 with a delightful coolness, the most agreeable 
 fragrance from the rich vegetation over which it 
 has passed. Beneath the umbrageous foliage of a 
 horse-chesnut, I behold some cows, that have sought 
 shelter, in a shallow pool at its roots, from the 
 ardent heat of the sun : they are engaged in chew- 
 ing the cud, and whisking their tails to keep off the 
 tormenting attacks of innumerable winged-insects 
 that are hovering around them. I see the milk- 
 maid approaching, with a pail in one hand, and a 
 stool and tether in the other. During all this 
 scene, my ears are delighted with the songs of 
 various birds, that express the fulness of their joy of 
 existence in a thousand varied notes : my palate is 
 gratified at this moment by the flavour of the fruit 
 I am eating : my fingers, too, touch the soft and 
 dimpled cheek of a child beautiful as a cherub ; and 
 these objects occupy all my senses at once, and give 
 rise to the most pleasing reflections. My bosom, 
 too, is in harmony, by its own sensations, with the 
 picture I have sketched so imperfectly; and all my
 
 OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. 207 
 
 thoughts and emotions carry me at once to the 
 contemplation of the wondrous Being by whom the 
 whole has been created, and continues to be upheld, 
 and that by an agency at once mysterious and 
 omnipotent. Now, as nothing, in nature, can be seen, 
 felt, or thought of, singly, it matters not which of 
 these objects, reflections, or feelings may be called 
 up at any time hereafter : it will, as far as memory 
 serves, be accompanied or associated with the 
 others with which it is conjoined. This simple fact, 
 however, would, if it passed through the alembic of 
 a metaphysician's brains, be mystified under the 
 wonder-working Term, e Association of Ideas'; by 
 the means of which it has been attempted to 
 account for Instinct itself; with which it has no 
 more to do, than with Respiration, Function, or any 
 other operation of the animal economy. So great 
 an influence have mere phrases, that they are 
 endowed by mankind with agency to perform every 
 office in nature : nay, we find metaphysicians even 
 going farther in error than the rest of mankind ! 
 Under every point of view, therefore, the expres- 
 sion ' Associated Recollections ' is not merely more 
 exact, but more intelligible, than that of the l Asso- 
 ciation of Ideas.' When we speak of Associations 
 that are present, and not past, we may call them 
 Associated Impressions.
 
 ( 208 ) 
 
 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 169. From the earliest dawn of thought, up to 
 the present moment, mankind have been the dupes 
 of language. Impelled by an irresistible curiosity, 
 they have endeavoured to compel Nature to give up 
 her secret ; and though the wisdom of Egypt had 
 pronounced, with oracular truth, that her " veil had 
 not been drawn aside by any man," and thereby 
 implied that it never could be done ; and though a 
 poet of Persia, endowed with more than usual in- 
 spiration, had declared that men might desist from 
 the attempt, for that her enigma never had been, 
 and never could be solved ; yet still it is, and ever 
 will be, the object of human investigation and per- 
 severance. If we look to those ancient authorities 
 with which we are most familiar, that is to say, to 
 the Greeks, we shall find that this most ingenious 
 people, profiting by the hints they had received 
 from the Phoenicians, Egyptians, and other Eastern 
 nations, who were most renowned in their day for 
 wisdom and civilization, pursued with an ardour 
 worthy of a more fortunate result, and a persever- 
 ance that nothing but the insuperable difficulty of 
 the subject could have baffled, the investigation of 
 the great mystery of LIFE. They were not aware
 
 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 209 
 
 that, independently of the perplexity and incompre- 
 hensibleness of the question, they were deceived, at 
 every step, by the very nature of the instrument 
 with which they hoped to obtain a right solution 
 of the mysterious problem. This instrument was 
 language. It will be only necessary to look cur- 
 sorily at their fundamental distinctions, to be con- 
 vinced how greatly they were deceived. But if 
 such men as Plato and Aristotle were thus misled, 
 how could it be otherwise with inferior minds ? If 
 we contrast the systems of these eminent men with 
 those of other schools, cotemporary and modern, 
 we shall find that the views of all are based upon 
 the same radical errors.
 
 210 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 Platos. 
 
 170. Plato, the pupil of Socrates, who was him- 
 self the soundest and most modest thinker that Greece, 
 or perhaps any country, has ever produced, flourished 
 at a time when these studies had been brought to a 
 considerable perfection of system, and when the 
 intelligence of the Greeks was at its height. His 
 celebrated dialogues, though abounding in sur- 
 prising beauties and infinite subtleties, are so 
 blended with mysticism and the mysteries of the 
 religion of his country, that it requires all the 
 veneration and admiration that the moderns have 
 for the remains of Greek genius, not to smile, and to 
 feel surprise that one of the ablest men, one indeed 
 of the greatest geniuses of his own or any other 
 age, could have been so deluded by mere fancies. 
 Let us take for example his five Forms, which he 
 considered the basis of existence. They might be 
 explained thus : 
 
 Substance. 
 
 Similitude. 
 
 Diversity. 
 
 Permanence. 
 
 Movement. 
 
 171. Though commentators give a different 
 interpretation to these five Forms of Plato, I believe 
 that the meanings I have assigned them are very
 
 PLATO'S. ARISTOTLE'S. 211 
 
 nearly those he himself intended they should have ; 
 because a reference to the Categories of Aristotle 
 (which were doubtlessly framed in opposition to 
 them) will, evidently, form the best commentary on 
 those of his master. But, that the reader may be 
 able to judge for himself, I subjoin the original 
 terms, and the translation 79 of the words of the 
 commentators, such as they have been handed 
 down from antiquity. Whichever representation 
 the reader may prefer, he cannot but be convinced 
 that they are only reveries, by which their inventor 
 allowed himself to be deluded, through a few sounds. 
 Plato undoubtedly considered that these words re- 
 presented real entities, or things in nature, by the 
 name he assigned them; and similar beliefs we 
 have seen exist to this day, without the excuse that 
 might be alleged for him. 
 
 Aristotle's. 
 
 172. The foregoing view of Plato's Forms will, 
 as I have just said, be strengthened by the ten Cate- 
 gories of Aristotle, his pupil and opponent. They 
 are commonly translated as follows : 
 
 ( 78 ) " ova-ia, the principle, essence, ravrov, the same, regarding the 
 relation it bears to itself and other things. eVepov, the other, when one 
 varies from another. orao-K, while it keeps its station, or preserves a 
 unity. Kvvt]a-i<;, motion, or that by which it exerts a power to act." 
 DR. FRANCKMN'S Translation DE NATURA DEORUM. 
 
 p 2
 
 2J2 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 Substance. Time. 
 
 Quantity. Situation. 
 
 Quality. Possession. 
 
 Relation. Action. 
 
 Place. Suffering 80 . 
 
 173. When we remember that the systems of 
 these two eminent men are completely in contrast ; 
 and that though the first took the ideal, and the 
 second the real view of nature; we must see that 
 both were deceived by language 81 ; for their terms, 
 
 ( ) ovcrta, iroa-ov, xoiov, irpotrrt, irov, -wore, Keta-Oai, e^eiv, iroteiv, irao^etv. 
 
 ( 81 ) " Aristotle held, against Plato, that previous to, and indepen- 
 dent on matter, there were no universal ideas or essences ; and that 
 the ideas or exemplars, which the latter supposed to have existed in 
 the divine mind, and to have been the models of all created things, 
 had been eternally impressed upon matter, and were coeval with, and 
 inherent in, their objects. Zeno and his followers, departing both 
 from the Platonic and Aristotelian systems, maintained that these pre- 
 tended universals had neither form nor essence, and were no more 
 than mere terms and nominal representations of their particular ob- 
 jects. The doctrine of Aristotle prevailed until the eleventh century ; 
 when Roscellinus embraced the Stoical system, and founded the sect 
 of the Nominalists, whose sentiments were propagated by the famous 
 Abelard. These two sects (Realists and Nominalists) differed considera- 
 bly among themselves, and explained, or rather obscured, their respec- 
 tive tenets in a variety of ways." Note to DR. MACLAINE'S Translation 
 of MOSHEIM'S Ecclesiastical History. It was not Zeno, but his master 
 Stilpo, the Megarean, who first maintained the position that Universals 
 and Species had no other existence than as words. It is to him, and to 
 Roscellinus in modern times (see 18), that we must assign the doc- 
 trines held by the Nominalists. Neither the one nor other, however, 
 appear to have doubted the Reality of qualities. Upon this point all 
 philosophers seem merely to have differed, as to whether they existed 
 in the Object, or in the Mind. See my remarks in 64 68.
 
 ARISTOTLE'S. 213 
 
 though all used in different senses by both, were 
 mere Abstractions, and therefore possess no claim 
 to be considered as a correct analysis of nature. 
 Plato's Forms were undoubtedly understood and 
 conceived by him to be something as actual as his 
 own existence ; and though it might be argued that 
 Aristotle intended his only as a Classification, yet 
 let any candid person examine his metaphysical 
 system, and he will be convinced that Aristotle took 
 all these words as expressing real entities, just as 
 has been done subsequently by his followers, the 
 Realists among the Schoolmen : Aristotle believing 
 them to exist eternally in Matter, as Species ; Plato, 
 in the Divine Mind, as Universals. 
 
 174. It will not be uninteresting, to compare 
 the foregoing divisions of the Academic and Peri- 
 patetic schools with those of India. There is such 
 a general affinity between them, that they could not 
 have had an independent production, but must 
 have stood, more or less, in the relation of parent 
 and offspring, whether the originality be conceded 
 to Greece or to India. It may, however, be re- 
 marked, that the Hindu systems are all complete 
 and peculiar in themselves ; and every part is in 
 harmony with the whole of any one system, which 
 likewise contains principles totally unnoticed by the 
 Greeks. For the originality of the Hindu systems, 
 it may be further remarked, that they have all a
 
 214 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 special application, being intended either to support 
 or controvert the texts of the Fedas, or Hindu Scrip- 
 tures ; which are so ancient, that the peculiar dialect 
 of the language in which they were written (the 
 Sanscrit) was obsolete prior to the expedition of Alex- 
 ander, about 330 years before the Christian era. To 
 these observations it may be added, that had their 
 logic been borrowed from Aristotle, who was the pre- 
 ceptor of that conqueror, it might be naturally 
 expected to be as perfect as the copies made by the 
 Arabians and the moderns ; but instead of this being 
 the case, it bears all the appearance of a system, 
 which, though in its infancy, was a wonderful step 
 in advance upon human knowledge, but deficient in 
 the refinements and subdivisions of the Stagirite: 
 it bears, in short, pretty nearly the same relation to 
 the system of Aristotle, that their Algebra (confess- 
 edly of Hindu invention) does to the state of that 
 science in the present day 82 . 
 
 ( 82 ) The reader, who may take an interest in the subject, can refer 
 to Mr. Colebrooke's exposition of Hindu Logic, in The Transactions 
 of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. I. pp. 92 118 ; or to his Miscellaneous 
 Essays, Vol. I. p. 261. In The Asiatic Journal for February 1839, 
 Colonel Vans Kennedy has given an exposition of Hindu logic; in which 
 he differs, apparently with reason, from Mr. Colebrooke, and I think the 
 following; passage deserving of quotation : " But it seems, at the same 
 time, evident, that the argument of Gautama and the syllogism of 
 Aristotle are too essentially different, in both form and substance, to 
 admit of its being supposed that the one was derived from the other. 
 For the validity of the syllogism depends upon this axiom, that if two 
 
 terms
 
 ( 215 ) 
 
 Gotama's. 
 
 175. Gotama is the reputed founder of logic in 
 India. The division of " The Predicaments/' or 
 " Objects of Proof," are six, according to Kanada ; 
 viz. 
 
 Substance. Community. 
 
 Quality. Particularity. 
 
 Action. Relation 83 (intimate). 
 
 To this arrangement other authors add a seventh, 
 Privation, or Negation. Besides these Categories, 
 others are alleged, by different authorities. 
 
 terms agree with one and the same third, they agree with each other; but 
 the nature and properties of the term which should be employed as 
 the middle terms have not been explained by Aristotle. Gautama, 
 on the contrary, founds the conclusiveness of his argument, on such a 
 property being assigned, as a reason for affirming the proposition as 
 will prove the predicate ; and, on the applicability of the reason being 
 shown, by adducing, in its support, the instance of some object which 
 possesses the property specified in the reason and predicate. In this 
 case, therefore, it is not sufficient to lay it down as a rule, that if A 
 can be attributed to every B, and B to every C, then A is attributable 
 to every C, and to frame syllogisms with the letters of the alphabet : 
 for the argument of Gautama cannot be formed, unless a distinct notion 
 of the properties of the subjects by which the question is to be proved 
 has been first conceived. When, however, this argument is duly con- 
 sidered, it will, perhaps, be admitted, that it exhibits a more natural 
 mode of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits of 
 the syllogism, and that its conclusion is as convincing as that of the 
 syllogism." p. 146. 
 
 ( M ) Or, Aggregation.
 
 216 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 176. Mind, in common with all substance (for 
 they hold it to be such) is the substratum of eight 
 qualities; viz. 
 
 Number. Disjunction. 
 
 Quantity. Priority. 
 
 Individuality. Subsequence. 
 
 Conjunction. Faculty. 
 
 177. This last arrangement, which is made by 
 Kanada, is nothing more nor less than another set of 
 Predicaments or Categories, though termed Qualities 
 by him. But as the Predicaments, in common with 
 all Qualities, are considered as real essences by the 
 Hindus, as well as by ourselves, their distinction of 
 the classes into Categories and Qualities makes no 
 difference in their natures. 
 
 Jina's. 
 
 178. The Jainas (followers of Jina), who are an 
 ancient and a celebrated sect in India, have so many 
 opinions in common with the Bauddhas (followers 
 of Buddha), as to have been often confounded with 
 them, hold that there are five Kdrana, or Causes, 
 which unite in the production of all events. These 
 are as follow : 
 
 1. Time. 
 
 2. Nature. 
 
 3. Fate or Necessity. 
 
 4. Works, or the principle of Retributive Justice. 
 
 5. Mental Effort, or Perseverance.
 
 JAINA'S. 217 
 
 179. The Jainas, besides the above, comprehend 
 nature under the six following Categories ; viz. 
 
 1. Motion. 4. Time. 
 
 2. Rest. 5. Life. 
 
 3. Vacuum. 6. Matter. 
 
 With the exception of Matter, which is a Generali- 
 zation of Body, and is therefore a Concrete Term, 
 the whole of the above are Abstractions ; though the 
 first group is considered as Causes, and the last as 
 Principles or Categories : but, in both cases, they 
 were perfect Realities in the conception of their 
 framers and followers" 4 . 
 
 180. The systems of Gotama and Jina will be 
 sufficient to serve as an illustration of the identity of 
 the fallacy into which the Hindu philosophers have 
 fallen, in common with those of other countries. 
 
 Zoroaster's. 
 
 181. The next system, to contrast with those 
 that have been just given, is that of the divisions of 
 the soul, which the Parsees, or descendants of the 
 ancient Persians, attribute to Zoroaster. If not 
 
 ( 84 ) I have preferred the above exposition given by Colonel Miles, 
 as more popular, to that of Mr. Colebrooke, printed in Vol. IX. p. 287 
 of the Asiatic Researches of Calcutta, and reprinted in his Essays, 
 Vol. II. p. 191. See Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, p. 336.
 
 218 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 handed down from antiquity, it was in all pro- 
 bability framed in India, or borrowed from that 
 fertile hot-bed of metaphysical systems. 
 
 182. " The soul of man, instead of a simple 
 essence, a spark of that eternal light which animates 
 all things, consists, according to Zoroaster, of five 
 separate parts, each having peculiar offices : 
 
 1. The Feroher, or principle of sensation. 
 
 2. The Boe, or principle of intelligence. 
 
 3. The Rouan, the principle of practical judgment, ima- 
 gination, volition. 
 
 4. The Akho, or principle of conscience. 
 
 5. The Jan, or principle of animal life. 
 
 When the four of these, which cannot subsist in the 
 body without the last, abandon their earthly abode, 
 the Jan mingles with the winds, and the Akho 
 returns to heaven with the celestial Rouhs (or spi- 
 rits) ; because, its office being continually to do 
 good, and shun evil, it can have no part in the 
 guilt of the soul, whatever that may be. The Boe, 
 the Rouan, and the Feroher, united together, are 
 the only principles which are accountable for the 
 deeds of the man, and which are accordingly to be 
 examined at the day of judgment. If good pre- 
 dominate, they go to heaven ; if evil, they are 
 despatched to hell. The body is regarded as a mere 
 instrument in the power of the Rouan, and therefore
 
 ZOROASTER'S. 219 
 
 not responsible for its acts. After death, the Akho 
 has a separate existence, as the Feroher had previous 
 to its birth 85 ." 
 
 183. It is not possible to pronounce on the 
 terms contained in the division of the soul as attri- 
 buted to Zoroaster, without a thorough knowledge 
 of the language in which the works, considered as 
 the production of that sage, are written. In all 
 probability, even if we admit of the authenticity of 
 these five terms, we shall not be far mistaken if we 
 suppose that the most of them are but abstrac- 
 tions used in a real or personified sense. That 
 this is the case with the last of the five, that is, with 
 Jan, is certain; as it still means life or vitality, 
 in the modern language of Persia. But whether 
 ancient or modern, this dissection of the soul is of 
 the highest interest, as an additional instance of the 
 delusions of the human mind; and though not 
 strictly in place here, among the Categories, it is 
 well worthy of attention. 
 
 Locke's. 
 
 184. It is to our own country that we must 
 look for the next set of Categories of nature : and 
 
 ( 8i ) Not having the Zendavesta of Anquetil du Perron at hand, I 
 have borrowed the above extract from my friend Mr. JAMES BAILLIE 
 FR A ZKR'S judicious account of Persia, forming one of the Volumes of 
 The Edinburgh Cabinet Library.
 
 220 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 Locke has distinctly furnished us with a system, in 
 which he has shortly and explicitly unfolded his 
 views. As he was a Realist, in every sense of the 
 word, we cannot hope to find that he does more 
 than substitute his own set of General Terms for 
 those of others. On reading them down, the reader 
 will see that they tell us nothing new ; and, that 
 they are arranged upon the notion, that Abstract 
 Words are real entities. They do not even display 
 any remarkable ingenuity or depth of thought, and 
 may even be contested as to the general views they 
 inculcate. He says : 
 
 " And thus I have, in a short draught, given 
 a view of our original Ideas, from whence all the 
 rest are derived, and of which they are made up ; 
 which if I would consider, as a Philosopher, and 
 examine on what Causes they depend, and of what 
 they are made, I believe they all might be reduced 
 to these very few primary and original ones ; viz. 
 
 Extension; 
 
 Solidity; 
 
 Mobility, or the power of being moved, 
 which by our senses we receive from body ; 
 
 Perceptivity, or the power of perception 
 or thinking; 
 
 Motivity, or the power of moving, which, 
 by reflection, we receive from our minds.
 
 LOCKE'S. KANT'S. 221 
 
 I crave leave to make use of these two new words, 
 to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of 
 those which are equivocal. To which if we add 
 
 Existence, 
 
 Duration, 
 
 Number, 
 
 which belong both to the one and the other, we 
 have, perhaps, all the Original Ideas, on which the 
 rest depend. For by these, I imagine, might be 
 explained the nature of colours, sounds, tastes, 
 smells, and all other Ideas we have, if we had but 
 faculties acute enough to perceive the severally- 
 modified extensions, and motions of those minute 
 bodies which produce those several sensations in 
 us." 86 
 
 Kanfs. 
 
 185. As the last but one, though not the least 
 renowned, and certainly the most perplexing of 
 those who have added to these systems, T proceed 
 to consider the view of The Human Mind, and of 
 Nature, given by Immanuel Kant. This extra- 
 ordinary man was so misled by his own subtlety 
 and ingenuity, that he conceived the notion of 
 relieving metaphysics from the charge of uncertainty, 
 so justly urged against them. He was aware, that 
 that, in which no fixed principles were universally 
 acknowledged, could rest upon no solid foundation. 
 
 C* 6 ) Conduct of Human Understanding, Book II. Chap. xxi. 73.
 
 222 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 Among all preceding writers on the subject, he 
 thought that Hume had, at all events, made one 
 capital discovery, in his Essay on a Necessary Con- 
 nexion ( 82, 83.) ; and, that if there existed one 
 notion (necessity) not drawn from experience, which 
 Locke had convinced most thinking people was the 
 only source of knowledge, there might be more. 
 Following up this notion, he thought he had dis- 
 covered eleven others; and upon these, which I 
 shall enumerate presently, he built his dark and 
 incomprehensible system. But this was not all ; for 
 it struck him, that as one of the main difficulties 
 that beset astronomers was removed by adopting 
 the system of Copernicus in place of that of 
 Ptolomy, or, in other words, in preferring the belief 
 that our planet revolved about the sun, and not 
 that the sun and other heavenly bodies revolved 
 about us, he conceived, that by making Time and 
 Space to exist in and not out of the mind, he took 
 away the great stumbling-block in metaphysics : 
 thus making all nature a subjective, and not an 
 objective existence. Yet, strange to say, he at the 
 very same time made the following statement: 
 " Our exposition, consequently, teaches the Reality 
 (that is, the objective validity) of space, in reference 
 to all that externally (?), as object, can be presented 
 to us ; but, at the same time, the Ideality of space, in 
 reference to things, if they are considered in them- 
 selves by means of reason that is, without regard
 
 KANT'S. 223 
 
 to the nature of our sensibility 87 ." Here he evi- 
 dently contradicts himself; and he well knew 
 why ; for if all nature exist only in the mind, what 
 becomes of all other beings ? He therefore slipped 
 in this non sequitur, though it was contrary to the 
 fundamental position he had laid down, that it 
 might serve as a loop-hole, at which to escape, if 
 hard pressed upon the point. 
 
 t * ...* e ' ' ' ' \J ' t ' 
 
 186. By these bold assumptions, joined to his 
 twelve celebrated Categories, he obtained what he 
 considered would enable him to construct a system 
 that might rest, like mathematics, on data that would 
 be universally admitted, and consequently be no 
 longer dependent on proofs got from groping in the 
 dark 88 , that is, from uncertain experience, or, as he 
 calls it, empirical knowledge. By the means of such 
 foundations and assumptions he has built up, with 
 a style, and terms of extreme obscurity, a system so 
 intricate and complicated, that it has puzzled his 
 warmest admirers and followers to make out what 
 he would be at, from time to time. To this system 
 he gave the name of transcendental, because it 
 transcended all proofs drawn from experience ; and 
 made metaphysics an Abstract Science, or one in 
 which every problem could be solved by principles 
 existing in the mind itself. It was also his opinion, 
 
 ( 87 ) English Translation, page 33. 
 
 ( M ) See some able remarks on the Philosophy of Kant, in Tail's 
 Magazine for June 1836.
 
 224 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 that " Only by means of this CRITIC can the roots 
 themselves be cut off from Materialism, Fatalism, 
 Atheism, freethinking Unbelief, Fanaticism, and Su- 
 perstition, which may be universally hurtful ; finally, 
 also, from Idealism and Scepticism, which are more 
 dangerous to the schools, but hardly can pass over 
 to the public." The attempt was worthy of his 
 genius ; but though he constructed his break- water 
 with the utmost skill, yet it is evident that it could 
 not, built as it was upon so weak a foundation, 
 withstand the mighty, though scarcely audible bil- 
 lows that rolled continually against it from the 
 great ocean of COMMON SENSE ; and which, in fifty 
 years, have made so many ravages in its best com- 
 pacted parts, that it lies a stupendous wreck, over 
 which the tide of opinion rises and falls without 
 causing further devastation ; leaving it as a memo- 
 rial for future generations, who will exclaim, on 
 beholding it ' There were giants in the earth, in 
 those days!' 
 
 187. It is now only necessary to analyse his 
 system, which is likewise founded upon another 
 assumption ; namely, that the human mind is com- 
 pounded of three estates, or separate divisions, that 
 is to say, of SENSE, UNDERSTANDING and REASON. 
 But I shall begin with the consideration of Sense ; 
 and merely draw the reader's attention to the fol- 
 lowing synoptical view of Kant's system 89 . 
 
 ( 89 ) Taken from MR. WIRGMAN'S Principles of KANT'S Philosophy.
 
 KANT S. 
 
 225 
 
 THE MIND. 
 
 SENSE. 
 2 Receptivities. 
 
 Time. 
 
 UNDERSTANDING. 
 12 Categories. 
 
 QUANTITY. QUALITY. RELATION. 
 
 Unity. Reality. Substance and Accident. 
 
 Multitudes. Negation. Cause and Effect. 
 Totality. Limitation. Action and Re-action. 
 
 REASON. 
 6 Ideas. 
 
 MODALITY. 
 
 Possibility. 
 Existence. 
 
 Absolute 
 Totality. 
 
 Absolute 
 Limitation. 
 
 Absolute 
 
 Substance. 
 
 Absolute 
 
 Cause. 
 
 Absolute 
 
 Concurrence. 
 
 Absolute 
 Necessity. 
 
 RESULTS. 
 
 INTUITION, 
 
 present in 
 
 TIME and SPACE. 
 
 CONCEPTION, 
 
 absent in 
 
 TIME and SPACE. 
 
 IDEA, 
 
 out of 
 TIME and SPACE.
 
 226 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 SENSE. 
 
 188. With regard to Sense, it is evidently an 
 Abstraction, that can therefore have no real and 
 separate existence. We can feel; and when we abs- 
 tract, we can talk of Feeling, or its synonymous Abs- 
 traction, Sense. So much for the basis. Let us 
 now consider its dependent notions. This non- 
 entity, Sense, has two other non-entities, which he 
 calls Receptivities (Holding-nesses). These two re- 
 ceptive non-entities have been vulgarly called Space 
 and Time. I have already shown, that, though 
 classed together ( 115, 116), they ought to be kept 
 separate ; because the first has a real, and the second 
 only a relative existence ; that is, it is a notion or 
 word we have derived from the apparent revolution 
 of the sun round the earth. Both Space and Time 
 he holds to be Mental Receptivities, that constitute 
 the SENSITIVE FACULTY. 
 
 Space is, he says, a receptivity for matter in ex- 
 tension. 
 
 Time is also a receptivity for matter in succession. 
 
 189. Now, according to Kant, both Space and 
 Time only exist in the mind, and constitute two
 
 KANT'S. 227 
 
 Senses ; the first of which he calls external, and the 
 second internal. But he does not explain how a 
 second being, or percipient, can exist, if he thus 
 takes away the outness of Space ; for it is self- 
 evident, that all nature, according to this system, 
 can only exist in the mind of the one person who 
 conceives, and all other percipients must be only 
 modes of the one individual who has such a faculty : 
 and Kant thus reduces every thing to an egoism, of 
 which his own mind was the centre and boundary. 
 He is here, at the least, inconsistent, even if we 
 could admit of the basis of his system. This is per- 
 haps enough for Sense. The next division is the 
 Understanding.
 
 228 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 UNDERSTANDING. 
 
 190. The Understanding he takes for another 
 Reality ; and conceives that it has four grand divi- 
 sions, to which he gives the names of 
 
 Quantity, 
 Quality, 
 Relation, 
 Modality, 
 
 respectively. Under each of these heads he places 
 three sub-divisions ; making thus, in the whole 
 twelve, according to Mr. Wirgman ; but fifteen 
 according to the new complete translation of the 
 Critick of Pure Reason; because to those under 
 Modality we have the opposite set resulting from 
 Negation ; that is to say, 
 
 Impossibility, 
 
 Non-existence, 
 
 Contingence. 
 
 These twelve (or fifteen) terms are, according to 
 Kant, real divisions of the Understanding, which he 
 took, like Sense, to mean a real substratum of 
 perception. They were, in his view of his philo- 
 sophy, a sort of original types or standards, to
 
 KANT'S 229 
 
 which every thing perceived was referrible, and 
 which confer their form upon every object in na- 
 ture. They are, indeed, to be considered as normal 
 principles, that give a reality and shape to every 
 thing. To what degree they can be entitled to this 
 pre-eminent and peculiar office, the reader will best 
 judge from what has already been said : and if he 
 still believes that the mere figments of the intellect, 
 which it employs, like ciphers, to reckon with, have 
 a separate and independent existence, why then he 
 can take Kant at his word; for, of course, he can 
 never hope to comprehend him in detail. He must 
 not however forget the remarks that I have already 
 made on the Understanding ( 160) ; namely, that all 
 we can say, in any case, is, We understand; and that, 
 consequently, there is no such Faculty as the Un- 
 derstanding.
 
 230 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 REASON. 
 
 191. Reason, according to Kant, unites the 
 twelve Categories that exist in the Understanding, 
 and which are themselves out of Time and Space, 
 into six ideas, which are absolute ; namely, 
 
 Totality, Necessity, 
 
 Limitation, Cause, 
 
 Substance, Concurrence. 
 
 He considers Reason as a spontai 
 
 Faculty, free from Time and Space, in the same 
 
 way as the Understanding was out of space. 
 
 192. Such is a brief, but I believe accurate 90 , 
 sketch of the basis of Kant's celebrated system. If 
 we cease to believe in the reality of Abstractions, 
 we can no more think that it is a true representa- 
 tion of nature, than we can that Aladdin's palace 
 had a real existence ; and it is as futile to inquire 
 into its principles and consequences, as it would be 
 to speculate on the style of architecture and the 
 
 C") I have endeavoured not to misrepresent this almost unrepre- 
 sentable system ; but if I have not succeeded, I hope I shall be ex- 
 cused for a failure, where so many have had the same fate before me.
 
 KANT'S. 231 
 
 proportions of that celebrated edifice of Oriental 
 romance. Throughout his work, Kant displays 
 consummate ingenuity, in constructing his dark and 
 useless labyrinth : and he has cemented the whole 
 together into a cyclopean mass, by the help of a 
 profound knowledge of logical forms, that will long 
 preserve it as an object of wonder and admiration, 
 leaving far behind it all other systems, for subtlety, 
 intricacy, and darkness, and, I may add, for utter 
 uselessness. As a metaphysical feat, it will, in all 
 probability, never be surpassed ; but it is merely to 
 be considered " a cunningly-devised " system, in 
 which Logic is abetting Realism in an attempt to 
 waylay the Human Understanding. Of this system 
 I said, on a former occasion, as follows: " The 
 system of Kant makes phenomena, or the things 
 seen, to arise from noumenon, or what is known; 
 which two words, when released from the juggle of 
 grammatical forms, imply, that we know by seeing, 
 what we knew by knowing, or, in plain English, we 
 know what we knew. Afterwards, by converting this 
 noumenon, a passive participle implying ' what is 
 known,' into something that is the type of our ideas, he 
 has, by the help of Realism, which he has carried to 
 an unprecedented extent, and by the use of uncouth 
 and obscure terms, framed a system so dark and 
 complicated, that it has served to hoodwink most of 
 his own countrymen ; although it has been rejected, 
 with one voice, by the unsophisticated sense of the
 
 232 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 rest of mankind ;" an opinion which I still see no 
 reason to alter. The admirers of this eminent 
 metaphysician may perhaps think that his system 
 ought to have been given more in detail ; but my 
 object, throughout the whole of these pages, is with 
 fundamental notions; and if these are false, of what 
 value are the consequences, however consistent, 
 derived from them? Indeed, nothing but the 
 great celebrity of Kant's system, and the fact that 
 his Categories are its very foundation, have led me 
 to deviate from the plan I have almost invariably 
 followed, of merely analysing the materials of meta- 
 physicians. Nor, indeed, is it necessary : for Kant 
 has himself said, " Upon the solution of this problem 
 (synthetic judgments), or upon a satisfactory proof 
 that the possibility, which it longs to know explained, 
 cannot at all, in fact, take place, DEPENDS, NOW, WHE- 
 THER METAPHYSICK FALLS OR STANDS 91 ." NOW, as I 
 
 have shown, 90, that the very basis of this syn- 
 thetic judgment is altogether a fallacy, it follows 
 that the superstructure raised upon it is a mere 
 castle built in the air, and that it has, consequently, 
 been treated at greater length than it really me- 
 rits 92 . 
 
 ( 91 ) Critick of Pure Reason, p. 17. 
 
 ( 92 ) Kant's system reminds me of the reply made by a Quaker to a 
 Materialist, to whom he had listened for some time with great patience : 
 " Friend ! thee art DARK, but not DEEP."
 
 ( 233 ) 
 
 F. W. Schetting's. 
 
 193. The last system of Categories that I have 
 to show the reader is that of Frederick William 
 Schelling. This view is translated from the History 
 of Philosophy, by Tennemann, as rendered by M. 
 Victor Cousin 93 . 
 
 I. The Absolute, the whole in its primary form (God), 
 
 manifests himself in 
 
 II. Nature (the Absolute, according to its secondary 
 
 forms). 
 It then produces itself in two Relative orders ; viz. 
 
 THE REAL. THE IDEAL. 
 
 Under the following powers : 
 
 Weight Matter, 
 Light Movement, 
 Organization Life, 
 
 Truth Science, 
 Goodness Religion, 
 Beauty Art. 
 
 Above, as reflected forms of the Universe, place 
 themselves : 
 
 Man (the Microcosm). The State. 
 
 The System of the World (the external Universe). History. 
 
 194. Of this system, of which I am informed 
 the able author is still living, I need not say any 
 thing particular, except that it displays the order 
 and method for which the Germans are distin- 
 guished. 
 
 ( M ) Tome II. p. 306.
 
 234 OF VARIOUS METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES. 
 
 195. The whole of these Categories, from Plato 
 to Schelling, the reader must be convinced, are only 
 so many Abstractions ; of which it will be unneces- 
 sary for me to say any thing more, after all the 
 remarks I have previously made on such words. 
 It is clear, therefore, that as long as we believe in 
 the Objective Reality of Nature, we must consider 
 them merely as, wx et prceterea nihil.
 
 ( 235 ) 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 196. From the preceding observations, it is 
 evident that Metaphysical Systems are mere crea- 
 tures of the fancy, and that they are as much in 
 contrast with one another as could be expected 
 with reference to the nature of their origin. The 
 low estimate in which they have been held by the 
 common sense of the bulk of mankind has not been 
 without justice, though it has only arisen from a 
 sort of blind instinct. Men may be dazzled by 
 what they hear, particularly when it is accompanied 
 by the charms of a pleasing style and graceful 
 imagery; but if the foundation be not laid in 
 nature, it makes no more impression on the mind 
 than a passing cloud in summer ; for nothing can 
 produce lasting conviction, or create a desire for 
 closer acquaintance, but what is the very image of 
 truth. Boileau has said, most justly, 
 
 " II n'y a rien de beau que le vrai." 
 
 197. When we hear words that reflect nature 
 accurately and beautifully, we are conscious that 
 our minds are nourished with such wholesome
 
 236 CONCLUSION. 
 
 aliment as its healthy condition universally demands. 
 It is only to the conviction of the inherent truth 
 of the Abstract Sciences, that is, of their consistency 
 with nature, that they are cultivated with such plea- 
 sure and assiduity 94 : but take away that conviction, 
 and they would be as little followed or prized as 
 metaphysical speculations; which are truly what 
 the poet has described them, 
 
 " Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy." 
 
 198. On the one grand point, however, to which 
 I have directed the reader's attention that is to say, 
 the true nature of Abstract Words I must now make 
 a few concluding remarks. Reasoning, it must be 
 seen, is entirely dependent for its existence upon 
 Abstractions, and differs but in its greater variety 
 and extent from Calculation. The last process, 
 
 ( M ) Mathematical science busies itself with deducing, by calcula- 
 tion, the laws that depend upon the relations of number and quantity, 
 in those things of which we are cognisant through our SENSES. But meta- 
 physics only consider the relations existing between Abstractions that 
 have no existence, except as sounds, and which represent nothing IN or 
 OUT of nature. As a science, therefore, it is as chimerical as either 
 alchymy or astrology, though requiring the exercise of powers of 
 mind of the highest order. Indeed, arithmetic and mathematics are 
 only kinds of metaphysics applied to rational and useful purposes, by 
 the means of symbols instead of sounds. Metaphysics, therefore, may 
 be followed as a sort of intellectual gladiatorship, or gymnastic disci- 
 pline, tending to give strength and suppleness to the mind, and fit it 
 for the real combats of life, which, in comparison, will be mere 
 pastime.
 
 CONCLUSION. 237 
 
 every one feels, is merely effected by symbols ; and 
 the former, I believe, I have clearly demonstrated, 
 is accomplished by means precisely similar. The 
 intellect is as dependent upon such words for its 
 efforts as the arm is upon the fingers, by which it 
 grasps whatever it has the strength to hold up ; and 
 we are as much driven to the use of language by 
 instinct, as we are to that of our teeth and jaws for 
 biting and mastication. Above all other points, 
 however, the reader should ponder on the wonder- 
 fully curious nature of Abstract Words ; on the prin- 
 ciple of which we cannot too deeply fix our atten- 
 tion, from its high importance and universality. 
 We must see, that we are impelled by nature to the 
 employment of one or more words that are equiva- 
 lent, by usage, to the Term STATE : and when we 
 search for the original of this most mysterious sym- 
 bol which is, in fact, whether expressed or under- 
 stood, the foundation of all Abstract language we 
 find that the human intellect can give no account of 
 that by which it is rendered the god of this nether 
 world ! 
 
 199. In fine, I cannot do better than conclude 
 with the following quotation from Locke; which 
 may be considered as the complement of the Re- 
 flection which I have placed at the beginning of 
 these remarks, and in the justness of which all 
 will agree:
 
 238 CONCLUSION. 
 
 " Were the capacities of our understandings well con- 
 sidered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, 
 and the horizon found, which sets the bounds between 
 the enlightened and dark parts of things- between 
 what is, and what is not comprehensible by us, men 
 would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed 
 ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and 
 discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the 
 other 95 ." 
 
 (' :5 ) LOCKK On the Conduct of Human Understanding, Book I. 
 Chap. I. .
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 NOTE (A). 6. 
 
 1. NOTHING can be more delusive than the apparent 
 significancy of the terminations ness, ship, hood, head, &c. 
 If we look for the original of ness, we find it in the Saxon 
 tjirre. At first sight, we might suppose that the termi- 
 nation in goodness, and such words, was identical with that 
 in Sheerness, and similar names of places ; but the latter 
 is derived from the Saxon nere, a nose, implying a pro- 
 jection of the land, similar to the effect of that feature on 
 the face. In all probability, if we had not been able to 
 refer to the original distinction between nirre and were, 
 etymologists would have insisted that the termination in 
 goodness, &c., had been derived, like the names of head- 
 lands and promontories, from nose. Ship, hood, head, &c., 
 though apparently familiar terms are equally obscure ; 
 ship being derived from the Saxon rcip and rcyp ; and 
 the same word is written schap in Dutch. So the termi- 
 nations hood and head can be deduced from the Saxon 
 b<vb, the German heit, and the Dutch heid ; and all these 
 terminations are equally insignificant, in whatever lan- 
 guage they are found. In the Sanscrit language, Abstract 
 Words are made by such terminations as TWAM, TA, YA, 
 and TIS. The first of these has been corrupted into the 
 Saxon bcm;, and the English dom, in freedom, &c. TA has 
 given rise, apparently, to the Greek TW, and Latin TAS, as 
 in \evKorr]s, whiteness, and VITALITAS, life or livingness. The
 
 240 APPENDIX. 
 
 TIS is evidently corrupted into the Greek <r/f , in such words 
 as OTcc(r/f, state, and TTO/J/O-IJ-, formation, &c. Not one of 
 these terminations can be traced up to any word having a 
 meaning. If they ever were significant, it could only be 
 in the earliest antiquity. In the Arabic language, we find 
 the termination IYAT forming Abstracts; as, KABILIYAT, 
 ability, which is derived from KABIL, able; and yet we are 
 certain, by the genius of the language, that this termi- 
 nation never was significant, but is purely artificial. 
 
 2. In conclusion, I have only to repeat, that this in- 
 stance from the Arabic is very valuable ; as tending to 
 show, that possibly the terminations I have just explained 
 may never have had a separate existence, as significant 
 words, in the languages where they are found. If the 
 mind, as I have already said in 11, is led to make this 
 jump, it might at the same time call up an unmeaning 
 sound on an emergency. Were I, for want of the light 
 expression, in the hurry of conversation, to praise Alex- 
 ander's greatsen of soul, I might, perhaps, be nearly as 
 well comprehended as if I spoke of his greatness of soul. 
 If such words ever had a meaning, it may have been very 
 different from what the sense now requires ; for we have 
 seen, in 12, that the Sanscrit and Arabic languages totally 
 differed from the Greek and Latin, in the words they have 
 adopted to express the notion of State. 
 
 NOTE (B). 79. 
 
 "Some Observations on the Hindu and European Notions of 
 Cause and Effect. 
 
 1. "A careful consideration of what the Hindus have 
 said on Cause and Effect makes it evident that they have 
 fallen into the same error as the Greeks and modern 
 writers on that subject; and that they have blended the 
 Relation of Cause and Effect with the question of Source
 
 APPENDIX. 241 
 
 and Product, as well as with that of Doer and Deed, Agent 
 and Act ; and that they have also used the word Cause in 
 the sense of Efficient, Maker, Motive, Reason, Origin, &c., as 
 is done by our own metaphysicians. The Latin CAUSA, the 
 Greek atria 1 and the Sanscrit HETU, are all simple terms, 
 the verbal derivation of which is not now obvious; so that, 
 no means remain of defining their actual import by ana- 
 lysis, nor by any ulterior reference : but it will be seen, 
 in the course of the following remarks, that this cannot 
 be assigned as the reason of the great obscurity and con- 
 fusion in which the true meaning of these words is in- 
 volved. 
 
 2. " Though mankind, by that discrimination with which 
 they are commonly endowed, not only, generally speaking, 
 use language correctly, but immediately feel the impro- 
 priety of any thing that is contrary to its true analogies, 
 yet there are very few indeed who could, even after some 
 labour of thought, give any thing like a rational solution 
 of the nature of the words they have been employing. 
 Most people, if they were asked what they meant by the 
 word Cause, would fly to an illustration, and point to a 
 Thing of some kind as being a Cause. But this would be 
 an error; for the word Cause implies the Relation in 
 which the thing stands, and not the Thing itself. Cause, 
 therefore, is merely a General Term which the mind 
 employs to mark one of the two Relations in which any 
 thing may, under certain circumstances, be contemplated. 
 A word that implies a Relation, must often, by its nature, 
 have another that is invariably understood, and which is 
 its Correlative attendant: thus the term Father implies 
 
 (') The Greek air (a is, in all probability, derived from the Sanscrit HETU. 
 The want of etymological significancy in these words is a proof of their 
 antiquity, and shows that they were of the first necessity; as is also clear 
 from their import. The Sanscrit KARANA, implying the making to do, is 
 evidently of much later use.
 
 242 APPENDIX. 
 
 that there is a Child; Husband, that there is a Wife, &c.; 
 and, by the same analogy, Cause implies that there must 
 be something else, which we call an Effect : but the sense 
 of the word Thing is complete and absolute in itself, 
 without the aid of any other word. Even Locke, when he 
 defines Cause as a substance exerting its power into act 2 , 
 has fallen into this mistake; for Cause can never be a 
 substance ; but a substance may stand in the Relation of 
 a Cause which is to produce an Effect. 
 
 3. " These general distinctions have been premised, for 
 the purpose of leading the mind of the reader to the true 
 consideration of this not unimportant question; as the 
 fallacies of many of the ablest writers have derived their 
 importance solely from the obscurity and confusion in 
 which the import of the term Cause has been involved. 
 We have just seen that a substance cannot be a Cause, 
 but that it may stand in the Relation of Cause : therefore, 
 till there was a mind to perceive the Relation between 
 events, there could be no Cause, as it is merely a mental 
 distinction. 
 
 4. " Having thus cleared away all other imports from the 
 word Cause, except that which really belongs to it, namely, 
 a Relation of something that is perceived to be prior to 
 another Relation that is called an Effect, we must see, that 
 when it is employed for Source, Origin, Reason, Motive, 
 Efficient, Agent, or Maker, we are really talking about 
 
 ( 2 ) I have not been able to verify this quotation, which is taken from 
 Johnson's Dictionary, where it is employed to elucidate the word Cause : 
 but this is of very little consequence, as it is only necessary to refer to 
 Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, Bk. II. Ch.XXVI. 2, to see 
 that it is supported by his argument on Cause and Effect; for he says 
 there, A Cause is that which makes any other thing, either simple idea, sub- 
 stance or mode, begin to be , and an Effect is that which had its beginning 
 from some other thinff. This definition, which applies vefy well to Agent 
 and Result, does not contain any allusion to the Conception of Relation, 
 which alone constitutes that of Cause and Effect.
 
 APPENDIX. 243 
 
 things with which it has no logical affinity. When we 
 say, therefore, that God is the first Cause of all things, we 
 mean, though we express ourselves incorrectly, that he is 
 the Source or Maker of all things. When, again, we talk 
 of secondary Causes, we must intend the subsidiary agents, 
 or means, by which an Effect is produced. By the same 
 analogy, we cannot with propriety speak of efficient and 
 material Causes; for the first means an Agent capable of 
 effecting anything ; and the second, a Source from which 
 something proceeds, and which can have nothing to do with 
 the real meaning of Cause ; that is, the conception of relation 
 between the Doer and the Deed, or the Agent and the Act. 
 
 5. "The importance of the foregoing distinctions and 
 elucidations will be immediately felt, when the application 
 is made to the arguments of KAPILA, and the other Sankhya 
 philosophers. For when they assert 3 that Effects exist in 
 their Causes, and that "what exists not, can by no ope- 
 ration of the Cause be brought into existence," and eluci- 
 date their meaning by saying that the oil previously 
 existed in the seed from which it was expressed, we must 
 immediately see that by the word Cause they intend a 
 Source from which a Production proceeds ; which is a mere 
 truism ; for, undoubtedly, without a Source there could be 
 no Production: but when they apply it to the Divine 
 Source of all things, they beg the question; for they might 
 as well argue, that, as every numerical series is composed 
 of units, a unit must come from something else, which, 
 every one will allow, would be nonsense. Now, to con- 
 tinue this illustration, it may be said, that just as the unit 
 is the admitted starting point of numbers, so must the 
 Deity be the Source of all things ; and all Productions, 
 natural and artificial, proceed from his Essence, as all 
 multiples do from the unit. 
 
 6. " The whole of this confusion, in the use of the term 
 
 ( 3 ) Trans. Roy. As. Society, Vol. I. p. 38.
 
 244 APPENDIX. 
 
 Cause, has arisen from the very nature of the human mind; 
 which, deriving all its ideas of language from sensible 
 objects, assimilates every thing to substance, and considers 
 all Abstractions as realities. It is on this account, that 
 employing, as we do, such words as Cause, from infancy 
 upwards, as something real, we never arrive at any idea 
 of their real import, but by close reflection. Now, expe- 
 rience proves that this is an operation beyond any syste- 
 matic effort of the generality of mankind: and if the 
 mind does even occasionally light upon the truth, it is 
 only as is exemplified in the electric flash, which gives a 
 momentary gleam, to leave us at once in the obscurity in 
 which it found us. Owing to this inveterate and almost 
 inevitable mental error, and to the consequent confusion 
 of ideas, we have been led to the invention of a verb 
 meaning to cause ; and we make use of such expressions as 
 " He caused him to fall" But as the verb to cause, in such 
 senses, means to make to do, or to be, and therefore implies 
 that he made him fall, it must express physical Agency, and 
 not abstract Relation; for when the phrase is properly 
 expressed, it means, " He, standing in the Relation of Cause, 
 made him fall." This misuse of language is not of the least 
 consequence in the common business of life, as it misleads 
 no one; but it is of the highest importance when we 
 reason about fundamental notions ; as it then becomes the 
 source of the worst errors of philosophy, deceiving those 
 who are considered the infallible authorities of the rest of 
 mankind ; and thereby riveting the human mind in the 
 fetters of their own mistakes. Such being the nature of 
 language, we cannot hope, nor is it possible, to alter its 
 course: but it is incumbent on philosophers to bear its 
 imperfections in mind, when they attempt to philosophize 
 upon the nature of things, and to endeavour to prevent it 
 from misleading themselves, as well as those for whom 
 they write.
 
 APPENDIX. 245 
 
 7. "It may, however, be objected by those who have not 
 attended closely to the tenour of these observations, that 
 Cause and Effect have always been regarded by philosophic 
 writers as standing in a State of Relation to one another ; 
 and that, as a proof, they always speak of " the Relation of 
 Cause and Effect." This is perfectly true ; but while they 
 have so spoken, they have always argued as if Cause were 
 something real, instead of a mental Conception. Indeed, 
 they have converted it, by their mode of argumentation, 
 into an entity, or rather a substantiality, possessing physical 
 agency, and capable of producing effects ; and this is proved, 
 not merely by the quotation from Locke, but likewise by 
 the use of the verb to cause, implying to make to do ; and 
 the noun of action, causation, signifying the act of making 
 to do, which such writers employ, on the same occasions, 
 with equal incorrectness. By a strange inconsistency, 
 arising from the deceptive character of language, they 
 convert the Relation of Cause into an Agent ; and, at the 
 same time, fancy they employ the verb to cause, and the 
 noun causation, in a manner that only intends Relation! 
 So inveterate are these errors in our way of thinking, 
 owing to the nature of our minds as well as of language, 
 and of habit as the consequence of its employment, that it 
 will require no ordinary effort in the reasoner who may 
 attempt to liberate himself from their thraldom; and an 
 attentive perusal of the arguments that have been adduced 
 on the nature of Cause and Effect, by any one who shall 
 keep the foregoing distinction in view, will make him feel 
 that those stately disquisitions that have been raised on the 
 fallacy here exposed are often but mere verbiage, vox et 
 prceterea nihil, or, at the best, but as the baseless fabric of a 
 vision. The same kind of fallacy could with ease be shown, 
 on nearly similar grounds, to be the case with all the 
 arguments generally used about Nature and Necessity. 4 
 
 ( 4 ) Tliis I have since done, and the Reader will find them 33-39 of 
 the text.
 
 246 APPENDIX. 
 
 8. " The only chance of preventing the errors that have 
 been pointed out from being committed by those who are not 
 accustomed to analyse their own thoughts, is to remember, 
 that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, in which the 
 word Cause is employed, it is involved in this fundamental 
 error. They should therefore always consider, when they 
 adopt the term, whether they use it in any of the many 
 senses that have been already pointed out ; and if so, they 
 should employ the specific word in its place; that is, if 
 they intend to speak of an Agent, a Maker, &c., they should 
 employ those words, and no other. With respect, too, to 
 the verb to cause, and to the noun carnation, these should 
 never be employed in any case where the Relation of 
 Cause and Effect is intended; as they invariably imply 
 physical and not abstract Agency, and they consequently 
 establish the very point of dispute in such cases ; namely, 
 the existence of a causer, agent, or doer; which being once 
 admitted, the whole subject of debate falls to the ground. 
 As a proof of the importance of the foregoing distinctions 
 and observations, a few remarks are here added, that will 
 at once illustrate and confirm their truth: and for the 
 purpose of pointing out the constancy of the fallacy about 
 Cause, whenever it is adopted by popular usage for an 
 Agent instead of the Conception of Relation, the word 
 Causer is made to follow it, in brackets. Were the subject 
 clearly and universally comprehended, it would save much 
 chance of confusion if the word Cause were always re- 
 stricted to the sense of the Relation, and Causer to that 
 of the Agent or Efficient of a result. 
 
 When the Hindu metaphysicians, after the enunciation 
 of the rule, give the examples by which the exact import 
 of the term may be inferred, we must see clearly that 
 they sometimes employ the word Cause as the Efficient, 
 Effector, Producer, Agent, or Maker, and sometimes as the 
 Source of production; and often as the Reason, or the
 
 APPENDIX. 247 
 
 Motive, as well as the Origin of anything, just as is done 
 by the metaphysicians of Europe. 
 
 10. " When they say, therefore, that there is no distinction 
 between Cause and Effect, and that Effects exist in their 
 Causes, it is clear, from the example they give, namely, 
 that The seed of sesamum is the Cause of the oil, and that 
 therefore the oil existed in its Cause, which was the seed, 
 they have palpably confounded Agent and Source, and that 
 the seed can neither be considered as standing in the 
 Relation of Cause, nor as an Agent or Causer. It is quite 
 evident, that the oil, as a Product, must have existed in its 
 Source, which was the seed. So likewise, when they say 
 the Deity is the efficient Cause of the universe, they mean that 
 he was the Agent in producing it: and when they say 
 he was also its material Cause, they imply that he was the 
 Source from which it proceeded. Now, when we assert 
 that God made the world, we mean to say, that he stands 
 in the Relation of its Cause, that he is its Source and its 
 Maker, which senses are all included in the one word, 
 CREATOR: and, by the same reason, the world is contem- 
 plated as an Effect of his power, as the Product of his 
 essence, and the Work of his agency. The Sankhya philo- 
 sophers, therefore, in asserting that that which did not 
 previously exist could not by any effort of the Cause 
 (causer) be brought into existence, have, by separating the 
 Cause (causer) in this case from the Source, made a petitio 
 principii, and proved their own point by the form of the 
 enunciation : for it will be evident, that when we consider 
 the Cause (causer) we call First, we must not argue as we 
 would about the Cause (causer) we contemplate as secon- 
 dary; as we cannot here separate Cause (causer) and Source, 
 though we may do so afterwards, for we then know, by 
 observation, that they are distinct. Thus, to borrow a 
 Hindu illustration, the potter is the Cause (i. e. Causer or 
 Maker) of the pot, but he is not the Source of the earth
 
 248 APPENDIX. 
 
 from which it is formed. Sometimes, however, what we 
 call a secondary Cause (causer) must include the two dis- 
 tinctions ; as when we say, The spider spins his web, of 
 which he is at once the Cause (causer) and the Source, and 
 consequently the web is a Work and a Product ; and the 
 spider stands in the Relation of Source to the web, which is 
 reciprocally in that of Product to him. But those who 
 have been familiarised to the jargon of the Schools, which 
 has been current from Aristotle to the present time, will 
 here, perhaps, fly from the real scope of this argument, 
 which is to prove that Cause and Effect simply imply a 
 Conception of Relation, and will say that the oil existed 
 potentially in the sesamum, just as the fruit existed poten- 
 tially in the tree, and the tree in its seed, and the seed in 
 the preceding tree and seed, &c. But the fallacy of this 
 argument, which has nothing to do with the present 
 question, will be evident, by showing that, by a similar 
 process of reasoning, we might say that all the bullets cast 
 in a mould existed potentially in the mould, as the lead 
 poured in is only the equivalent of the nutriment taken in 
 by the tree and seed. The potentiality which produced 
 the bullets existed in the individual who made the mould 
 and cast the bullets ; and the potentiality of the individual 
 exists only in God, who made and sustains him : and the 
 same must be said of the tree and seed, which have their 
 existence from the Deity only, who is therefore the Source 
 of all power and of all existence. 
 
 11. "The remarks which are now about to be offered to 
 the reader's consideration, and to which his attention is 
 requested, contain the real essence of this question ; and 
 they have been kept back for the purpose of preparing his 
 mind for what would have been otherwise unintelligible or 
 inconclusive. Passing over the error that has been pointed 
 out, of Cause being considered as a Substance instead of a 
 Relation, it is uniformly thought, that in a series of things
 
 APPENDIX. 249 
 
 acting upon one another, the prior is the Cause, and the 
 subsequent the Effect. Thus, in a series of balls put in 
 motion by the billiard- player, the first ball is said to be 
 the Cause, and the next the Effect to it, and the Cause to 
 the one it strikes ; and so on, till the whole are put in 
 movement. That this, however, is not a logical conclusion, 
 will be evident, if we remember that the first ball, which 
 we call the Cause, has, by its movement, only urged on the 
 the second, and that therefore the Effect it produced was 
 the movement of the second. Now, if there were fifty 
 balls, each separately moved by the one that preceded it, 
 it might be said that there were fifty movements ; though, 
 in point of fact, we can only say that the fifty balls were 
 moved. Having got thus far, let us consider that it was 
 the movement of the first ball that made the second to 
 change its place, and so communicated an impulse to the 
 whole series. The moment we see this clearly, we must 
 be convinced that it was not the first ball, but its move- 
 ment, that moved the second ; and that the movement of 
 the second made the next change place, till the whole were 
 urged forward in succession. In all this operation, we 
 can not fail to perceive that we have had fifty Effects, and 
 not one Cause ; for, otherwise, movement must be both 
 Cause and Effect : and if we suppose it so, then we arrive 
 at this conclusion, that movement stands in the Relation 
 of Cause to movement ; which is as much to say, that 
 movement can produce itself, or, in plain language, that 
 change of place can produce change of place! To get at the 
 Cause (causer), therefore, we must go back to the billiard- 
 player, who put the whole in movement. Now it is evident, 
 that all the Effects witnessed on this or any other occasion 
 are simply changes, that evidence the passage of something 
 that flits from the first to the last; and which, being propa- 
 gated by the will of the Agent or Doer, forces the ball on, 
 till it is arrested in its progress by impinging on the next,
 
 250 APPENDIX. 
 
 which it moves in its turn. The something that operates 
 in such changes, mankind have agreed to call POWER; 
 which, as long as we believe In the reality of the external world, 
 is a real essence, capable, under direction, of effecting all the 
 changes that arise from the will of individual beings, or 
 the will of God. But as matter is seen to be passive, or at 
 least may be considered so, from the uniformity of the law 
 of gravitation, Power is the sole means by which it is set 
 in movement, when it is once at rest : but as Power is 
 unequal to produce an Effect, except under direction, it 
 cannot, strictly speaking, be held to be a Cause (causer), 
 but must be merely considered as the medium by which 
 the real Cause (causer), that is, the Deity, carries on all 
 the operations observed in nature. As all things in nature 
 are but results dependent upon the Divine Will, we must, 
 if we desire to be conclusive in our reasoning, admit that 
 there is no real Cause (causer) but God, who, in his cha- 
 racter of Creator, forms and sustains all things, being both 
 the Origin and the Agent in the production of the universe : 
 it is HE, therefore, as the Source of being, that stands in 
 the Relation of Causa Causarum to all things : FOR IN HIM 
 
 WE LIVE, AND MOVE, AND HAVE OUR BEING. 
 
 12. "To sum up the inferences to be drawn from the 
 preceding argument, it may be stated, that the definition 
 of Cause and Effect is simply as follows. Whatever produces 
 a change, STANDS in the RELATION of Cause; and whatever 
 results from it, in that of Effect:' 
 
 Extracted from the Asiatic Journal for March 1836. 
 
 [Paragraph (11) was written for the purpose of exposing 
 the fallacies resulting from the use of Abstract Words. 
 The juggle of thought arises from making the Abstract 
 Term " Movement " mean a reality, as is commonly done. 
 One Movement does not produce another : it is the POWER, 
 passing from the Agent into the balls in succession, that 
 makes them move one after another.]
 
 APPENDIX. 251 
 
 NOTE (C). 51. 
 
 As I think the reader would like to see what Dr. John- 
 son has said, in his Dictionary of the English language, on 
 the various senses of the word nature, I subjoin his epitome 
 of Boyle's notions, which he seems to have considered as 
 worthy of attention. To each I have attached some re- 
 marks. He says : 
 
 " Of this word, which occurs so frequently, with signifi- 
 cations so various, and so difficultly defined, Boyle has 
 given an explication, which deserves to be epitomised : 
 
 (1) "Nature sometimes means the Author of Nature, 
 or natura naturans; as nature hath made man partly cor- 
 poreal and partly immaterial. For nature, in this sense, 
 may be used the word Creator" 
 
 [Nature is here evidently employed in a personified 
 sense, and agrees with the fourth meaning I have as- 
 signed it. See 51, Perhaps the word Deity, or God, 
 might better represent it than Creator :] 
 
 (2) " Nature sometimes means that on whose account a 
 thing is what it is, and is called ; as when we define the 
 nature of an angle. For nature, in this sense, may be used 
 essence or quality" 
 
 [The word essence is not altogether inadmissible in this 
 case ; but Quality is perfectly erroneous. However, we 
 must feel that it is the property of an angle that is intended 
 here by the word nature. See 69 and 73.] 
 
 (3) " Nature sometimes means what belongs to a living 
 creature at its nativity, or accrues to it by its birth ; as 
 when we say, a man is noble by nature, or a child is 
 naturally forward. This may be expressed by saying, 
 the man was born so ; or, the thing was generated such" 
 
 [This particular sense of nature is that which I have 
 included under contrivance, in the second meaning I have 
 attached to the word. See 50.]
 
 252 APPENDIX. 
 
 (4) " Nature sometimes means an internal principle of 
 local motion ; as we say, the stone falls, or the flame rises 
 by nature ; for this we may say, that the motion up or down 
 is spontaneous, or produced by its proper cause" 
 
 [Nature, in this sense, implies tendency a meaning 
 that has not been assigned to it in my sketch.] 
 
 (5) " Nature sometimes means the established course of 
 things corporeal ; as, nature makes the night succeed the 
 day. This may be termed established order, or settled 
 course" 
 
 [This is the same as that I have just commented upon 
 above, under number one, and clearly means nature per- 
 sonified as an Agent. The explanation is an oversight ; 
 and does not refer to Nature, but to that which she is 
 supposed to accomplish.] 
 
 (6) "Nature means, sometimes, the aggregate of the 
 powers belonging to a body, especially a living one; as 
 when physicians say, that nature is strong ; or nature, left 
 to herself, will do the cure. For this may be used, con- 
 stitution, temperament, or structure of the body" 
 
 [This use of nature is also one in which it is personified ; 
 and is therefore the same as numbers one and five of 
 Boyle, being what physicians call the vis medicatrix natures, 
 or curative power of Nature; and also the vis vitce, or power 
 of life.] 
 
 (7) " Nature is put likewise for the system of the cor- 
 poreal works of God ; as there is no phrenix or chimera in 
 nature. For nature, thus applied, we may use the world, 
 or the universe" 
 
 [This is what I have classed as the fifth sense of nature, 
 as when we sum up every thing under the comprehensive 
 terms God and Nature. See 52.] 
 
 (8) " Nature is sometimes, indeed commonly, taken for 
 a kind of semi-deity. In this sense it is best not to use it 
 at all."
 
 APPENDIX. 253 
 
 [Here we have nature, for the fourth time, employed in 
 a personified sense, as we have before had it in numbers 
 one, five, and six. See 51.] 
 
 Having thus compared the various senses assigned by 
 Boyle to the word nature, it will be seen that he has given 
 it four times out of the eight as existing in distinct uses, 
 when it really had but one, namely, that of a personified 
 word employed as an Agent. He has not an example of 
 the use of this word, in the two senses of appearance and 
 materiality. It is unnecessary to say any thing more on 
 the subject, as the reader has now sufficient materials upon 
 which to form his own judgment 
 
 NOTE (D). 140. 
 
 1. The consideration of Infinity, Matter, Space, Magni- 
 tude, &c., are sufficient to make us see that human reason 
 can form no adequate notion of the real substratum of 
 existence. The following remarks, which I formerly put 
 forth, are so much connected with these questions, that 
 they may perhaps be considered deserving of perusal. 
 
 Of the Maxim, " Ex Nihilo, NihilfiC 
 
 2. " The preceding remarks appear to the writer to be 
 indispensable to the taking a rational view of the cele- 
 brated maxim "Ex nihilo, nihil fit " of the ancient Greek 
 philosophers : for though some of the Hindu metaphy- 
 sicians hold the doctrine that nothing comes from nothing, 
 which cannot be disputed, and seems at first sight to be 
 nearly the same opinion as that of the Greeks, yet it 
 does, in fact, essentially differ from it ; as the first merely 
 implies, that without a source there can be no product, 
 but it has no reference to an agent or causer; while the 
 other means something more, by intimating that no agent
 
 254 APPENDIX. 
 
 could produce a work without having a source from which 
 to elicit his production. The opinion of the Greeks, 
 though essentially true in itself as regards any secondary 
 cause (causer) or agent, is utterly inapplicable to the 
 Deity, as it assumes the fact that his work, that is, the 
 universe, is distinct from his essence ; and to prove the 
 fallacy of such a supposition, it is only necessary to con- 
 sider what would be the inevitable consequences of the 
 eternal and absolute existence of matter, with a Deity 
 separate and attempting to operate upon it; and this 
 may be done without taking into consideration the still 
 greater difficulty, how either could, in that case, have had 
 any claim to infinity. 
 
 3. " The absurdity of the maxim of the Greeks, which 
 Hume justly characterizes as impious 5 , consists in sup- 
 posing a being existing without a cause (causer), and 
 therefore of himself, and yet unable to produce matter by 
 his fiat. A Deity so inefficient as the maxim supposes 
 him, must either have been pure spirit, or pure matter, or 
 a compound of both. If we regard him as pure spirit, 
 but unable to modify matter by his fiat, we must imme- 
 diately admit that he could not have acted upon chaotic 
 matter so as to give birth to the universe. So likewise if 
 we suppose such a Deity to be pure matter, he must have 
 remained like a statue, inert, powerless, and lifeless ; and 
 therefore incapable of creation. There remains, then, but 
 the third supposition ; namely, that he was a compound of 
 both spirit and matter. But such a notion as the last 
 implies a self-evident contradiction ; for as he existed of 
 himself, without any extraneous cause, how could matter 
 and spirit become blended in his person? If the Deity, 
 being spirit, had no power to modify matter by his fiat, 
 how could he operate upon it, so as to give it that form 
 
 (") Essays, Vol. II. Note (Q).
 
 APPENDIX. 255 
 
 that was necessary to constitute the corporeity that united 
 both natures in his own person; namely, spirit and matter? 
 But granting, for a moment, that such a union could have 
 arisen by some sort of process or result incapable of being 
 conceived by the human mind, he must still have been 
 under the necessity of fashioning for himself instruments 
 with which to work, like a mere mechanic ; and even then 
 it is impossible to conceive how he could regulate the 
 birth, maturity, and decay of universal nature. He could 
 not himself have escaped the influence of gravitation; 
 which we must, on the hypothesis of his origin, suppose to 
 be an inherent and indestructible property of matter. It 
 is likewise evident, that a being so constituted could have 
 no ubiquity; for, as he would be composed of matter, 
 whatever place he occupied would exclude any planetary 
 system, and he and his work could never have occupied 
 the same part of space. He must have been either large 
 or small. If large, all the heavenly orbs must, by the 
 power of gravitation, have clustered round him, just as 
 barnacles attach themselves round a wreck at sea; and 
 merely added to his mass. If small, he could have had 
 scarcely any influence upon any object larger than him- 
 self; and he must have fallen in by the same force upon 
 what he never could have formed. In short, the diffi- 
 culties and absurdities attendant upon the supposition of 
 the independent and absolute existence of matter are too 
 many to admit of its being entertained by any reflecting 
 mind that has given the subject a moment of due con^ 
 sideration. 
 
 4. " The sum of the argument amounts to this, that 
 whether we divide or multiply matter ad injinitum, we 
 arrive at a contradiction to common sense ; and we have 
 but one conclusion left us, from the incomprehensible 
 nature of the subject, namely, that every thing we see, 
 and feel, and think about, are but results presented to us
 
 256 APPENDIX. 
 
 by Divine Omnipotence and Wisdom, for reasons which it 
 would be folly in us to attempt to scan." 
 
 [Extracted from the Asiatic Journal for March 1836. 
 
 NOTE (E). 177. 
 " On the Nature of Negative and Imaginary Quantities. 
 
 By Davits Gilbert, Esq. President of the Royal Society. 
 
 11 The object of this paper, the author observes, is one that 
 has given rise to much controversy, and has been involved 
 in much unnecessary mystery. Paradoxes and apparent 
 solecisms, when involved with facts and indubitable truths, 
 will always be found, upon accurate examination, to be 
 near the surface ; and to owe their existence either to am- 
 biguities of expression, or to the unperceived adoption of 
 some extraneous additions or limitations into the compound 
 terms employed for definition, and which are subsequently 
 taken as constituent parts of their essence. 
 
 " The first misapprehension pointed out, is that of consi- 
 dering any quantity whatever as negative per se; and with- 
 out reference to another opposed to it, which has previously 
 been established as positive. In order to avoid previously- 
 formed associations of ideas, the author prefers employing, 
 in his reasonings on this subject, the symbols (a) and (6) 
 to express this quality of opposition, rather than the usual 
 ones of plus and minus. By the aid of this notation, he is 
 enabled to present, in its full generalization, the law of the 
 signs in multiplication, a process which, it is well known, 
 is founded solely upon the principle of ratios ; and to show, 
 that like signs invariably give the sign belonging to the 
 assumed unity, or universal antecedent of the ratios ; and 
 unlike signs, the contrary. 
 
 " Since either the one or the other of the arithmetical 
 scales derived from the two unities is in itself equally 
 affirmative, but negative with relation to the other, it
 
 APPENDIX. 257 
 
 follows, that by using the scale of (6), all even roots in 
 the scale (a) will become imaginary, and thus the ap- 
 parent discrimination of the two scales is removed; so 
 that the properties belonging to the two scales are inter- 
 changeable, and all formula become universally applicable 
 to both, by changing the signs according to the side in 
 which the universal antecedent is taken. Imaginary quan- 
 tities, then, are merely creations of arbitrary definitions, 
 endowed with properties at the pleasure of him who de- 
 fines them ; and the whole dispute respecting their essence 
 turns upon the very point that has been contested from 
 the earliest times, between the hostile sects of realists and 
 nominalists. 
 
 " It is now, however, universally agreed, that all abs- 
 tractions and generalizations are mere creatures of the 
 reasoning faculty, existing nowhere but in the mind con- 
 templating them. Such, in algebra, are the supposed even 
 roots of a real quantity, taken in the scale opposite to that 
 which has given the universal antecedent : the sign indi- 
 cating the extraction impossible to be performed, veils the 
 real quantity, and renders it of no actual value until the 
 sign is taken away, by an involution, the reverse of the 
 supposed operation which the sign represents; although 
 the quantity itself is, in the mean time, by its arbitrary 
 essence, made applicable to all the purposes for which real 
 quantities are used, in every kind of formula. 
 
 " Several illustrations of these views of the nature of 
 imaginary quantities occurring in logarithmic formula, 
 and series expressing circular arcs, are given by the 
 author. By considering all quantity as affirmative per se, 
 and admitting plus and minus merely as correlative terms, 
 we thus succeed in banishing mystery and paradox from 
 the science most powerful in eliciting truth, and where 
 they ought least to find a place." 
 
 [Abstract of the Proceedings of the Royal Society, 
 for the 18th November 1830.
 
 258 APPENDIX. 
 
 NOTE (F). 165. 
 
 To the remarks I have made on ideas, I am happy to 
 add some by Burke, that I have since discovered; and 
 which, as far as they go, confirm all I have said on the 
 subject. It is to be regretted that a writer so eminently 
 qualified for the task did not consider the question in all 
 its bearings ; as the sanction of his name could not have 
 failed to draw the attention to it that it so well deserves. 
 His words are : 
 
 " EXAMPLES THAT WORDS MAY AFFECT, WITHOUT RAISING IMAGES. 
 
 " I find it very hard to persuade several that their 
 passions are affected by words from whence they have no 
 ideas ; and yet harder to convince them, that in the ordi- 
 nary course of conversation we are sufficiently understood, 
 without raising any images of the things concerning which 
 we speak. It seems to be an odd subject of dispute with 
 any man, whether he has ideas in his mind or not. Of 
 this, at first view, every man, in his own forum, ought to 
 judge without appeal. But, strange as it may appear, we 
 are often at a loss to understand what ideas we have of 
 things, or whether we have any ideas at all upon some 
 subjects. It even requires a good deal of attention to be 
 thoroughly satisfied on this head. Since I wrote these 
 papers, I found two very striking instances of the possi- 
 bility there is, that a man may hear words without having 
 any idea of the things which they represent, and yet after- 
 wards be capable of returning them to others, combined 
 in a new way, and with great propriety, energy, and in- 
 struction. The first instance is that of Mr. Blacklock, a 
 poet, blind from his birth. Few men blessed with the 
 most perfect sight can describe visual objects with more 
 spirit and justness than this blind man; which cannot
 
 APPENDIX. 259 
 
 possibly Be attributed to his having a clearer conception of 
 the things he describes than is common to other persons. 
 Mr. Spence, in an elegant preface which he has written to 
 the works of this poet, reasons very ingeniously, and, I 
 imagine, for the most part, very rightly, upon the cause 
 of this very extraordinary phenomenon; but I cannot 
 altogether agree with him, that some improprieties in 
 language and thought, which occur in these poems, have 
 arisen from the blind poefs imperfect conception of visual 
 objects ; since such improprieties, and much greater, may 
 be found in writers even of a higher class than Mr. Black- 
 lock, and who, notwithstanding, possessed the faculty of 
 seeing in its full perfection. Here is a poet doubtless as 
 much affected by his own descriptions as any that reads 
 them can be ; and yet he is affected with this strong en- 
 thusiasm, by things of which he neither has, nor can 
 possibly have, any idea, further than that of a bare sound : 
 and why may not those who read his works be affected in 
 the same manner that he was, with as little of any real 
 ideas of the things described ? The second instance is of 
 Mr. Saunderson, professor of mathematics in the University 
 of Cambridge. This learned man had acquired great 
 knowledge in natural philosophy, in astronomy, and what- 
 ever sciences depend upon mathematical skill. What was 
 the most extraordinary, and the most to my purpose, he 
 gave excellent lectures upon light and colours; and this 
 man taught others the theory of those ideas which they 
 had, and which he himself undoubtedly had not. But it 
 is probable that the words red, blue, green, answered to 
 him as well as the ideas of the colour themselves ; for the 
 ideas of greater or lesser degrees of refrangibility being 
 applied to these words, and the blind man being instructed 
 in what other respects they were found to agree or to dis- 
 agree, it was as easy for him to reason upon the words, as 
 if he had been fully master of the ideas. Indeed, it must 
 s 2
 
 260 APPENDIX. 
 
 be owned he could make no new discoveries in the way 
 of experiment. He did nothing but what we do every 
 day in common discourse. When I wrote this last sen- 
 tence, and used the words every day and common discourse, 
 I had no images in my mind of any succession of time ; 
 nor of men in conference with each other ; nor do I ima- 
 gine that the reader will have any such ideas on reading 
 it. Neither, when I spoke of red, or blue, and green, as 
 well as refrangibility, had I these several colours, or the 
 rays of light passing into a different medium, and there 
 diverted from their course, painted before me in the way 
 of images. I know very well that the mind possesses a 
 faculty of raising such images at pleasure 6 ; but then an 
 act of the will is necessary to this ; and in ordinary con- 
 versation or reading, it is very rarely that any image at 
 all is excited in my mind. If I say, " I shall go to Italy 
 next summer," I am well understood. Yet I believe 
 nobody has by this painted in his imagination the exact 
 figure of the speaker passing by land or by water, or both, 
 sometimes on horseback, sometimes in a carriage, with all 
 the particulars of the journey. Still less has he any idea 
 of Italy, the country to which I proposed to go; or of the 
 greenness of the fields, the ripening of the fruits, and the 
 warmth of the air, with the change to this from a different 
 season, which are the ideas for which the word summer is 
 substituted ; but least of all has he any image from the 
 word next; for this word stands for the idea of many 
 summers, with the exclusion of all but one: and surely 
 the man who says next summer has no images of such a 
 succession, and such an exclusion. In short, it is not only 
 of those ideas which are commonly called abstract, and of 
 which no image at all can be formed, but even of par- 
 
 ( 6 ) Red, blue, green and other colours are not images. See my remarks 
 on this subject in 6468, but particularly in 66. G. C. H.
 
 APPENDIX. 261 
 
 ticular real beings, that we converse without having 
 any idea of them excited in the imagination ; as will cer- 
 tainly appear on a diligent examination of our own minds. 
 Indeed, so little does poetry depend for its effect upon the 
 power of raising sensible images, that I am convinced it 
 would lose a very considerable part of its energy if this were 
 the necessary result of all description : because that union 
 of affecting words, which is the most powerful of all 
 poetical instruments, would frequently lose its force along 
 with its propriety and consistency, if the sensible images 
 were always excited. There is not, perhaps, in the whole 
 ^Eneid, a more grand and laboured passage than the de- 
 scription of Vulcan's cavern in Etna, and the works that 
 are carried on there. Virgil dwells particularly on the 
 formation of the thunder, which he describes unfinished 
 under the hammers of the Cyclops. But what are the 
 principles of this extraordinary composition : 
 
 Tres imbris torti radios, tres nubis aquosce 
 Addiderant ; rutili tres ignis et alitis austri ; 
 Fulgores nunc terrificos sonitumque, metumque 
 Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus iras. 
 
 This seems to me admirably sublime : yet, if we attend 
 coolly to the kind of sensible images which a combination 
 of ideas of this sort must form, the chimeras of madmen 
 cannot appear more wild and absurd than such a picture. 
 " Three rays of twisted showers, three of watery clouds, 
 three of fire, and three of the winged south-wind; then 
 mixed they in the work terrific, lightnings, and sound, and 
 fear, and anger, with pursuing flames." This strange 
 composition is formed into a gross body ; it is hammered 
 by the Cyclops, it is in part polished, and partly continues 
 rough. The truth is, if poetry gives us a noble assemblage 
 of words, corresponding to many noble ideas, which are 
 connected by circumstances of time or place, or related to 
 each other as cause and effect, or associated in any natural
 
 262 APPENDIX. 
 
 way, they may be moulded together in any form, and 
 perfectly answer their end. The picturesque connection 
 is not demanded ; because no real picture is formed : nor 
 is the effect of the description at all the less upon this 
 account. What is said of Helen, by Priam and the old 
 men of his council, is generally thought to give us the 
 highest possible idea of that fatal beauty : 
 Ov ve/meo-is, T/owa? /cat evKvrj/juSas 'A%aioi>s 
 uc^i <yvvaiKi iro\vv yjpovov u\<yea 
 adavaroi(Ti 6er^ elg daira 
 
 They cry'd, No wonder such celestial charms 
 For nine long years have set the world in arms ; 
 What winning graces ! what majestic mien ! 
 She moves a goddess^ and she looks a queen. 
 
 POPE. 
 
 Here is not one word said of the particulars of her beauty ; 
 nothing which can in the least help us to any precise idea 
 of her person ; but yet we are much more touched by this 
 manner of mentioning her, than by those long and la- 
 boured descriptions of Helen, whether handed down by 
 tradition, or formed by fancy, which are to be met with 
 in some authors. I am sure that it affects me much more 
 than the minute description which Spenser has given of 
 Belphehe : though I own that there are parts in that de- 
 scription, as there are in all the descriptions of that 
 excellent writer, extremely fine and poetical. The terrible 
 picture which Lucretius has drawn of Religion, in order 
 to display the magnanimity of his philosophical hero in 
 opposing her, is thought to be designed with great bold- 
 ness and spirit : 
 
 Humana ante oculosfceda cum vitajaceret, 
 
 In terris, oppressa gram sub religione, 
 
 Quee caput e cosli regionibus ostendebat 
 
 Horribili) desuper visu mortalibus instans ; 
 
 Primus Graius homo mortales tollere contra 
 
 Est oculos ausus __
 
 APPENDIX. 263 
 
 What idea do you,derive from so excellent a picture ? 
 None at all, most certainly : neither has the poet said a 
 single word which might in the least serve to mark a 
 single limb or feature of the phantom, which he intended 
 to represent in all the horrors imagination can conceive. 
 In reality, poetry and rhetoric do not succeed in exact 
 description, so well as painting does : their business is, to 
 affect rather by sympathy than imitation ; to display 
 rather the effect of things on the mind of the speaker, or 
 of others, than to present a clear idea of the things them- 
 selves. This is their most extensive province, and that in 
 which they succeed the best." 
 
 {Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful, Part V. sect 6. 
 
 NOTE (G). 195. 
 Salt. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY RICHARD WATTS, 
 Crown Court, Temple Bar.